

Authoritarianism as the Common Factor
in Male Dominance and Militarism:
A Cross-Cultural Study

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Abstract

This thesis asserts that a very important and understudied area of war research is that of the relationship of war to aspects of male dominance. Both war and male dominance are said to be connected because they both trace back to a general tendency towards authoritarianism. Several other minor hypotheses are proposed regarding the male dominance/militarism relationship, and the historical origins of authoritarianism.

The relationships of authoritarianism to male dominance and militarism were first investigated among the people of industrialised nations, utilising research on the psychometric study of authoritarianism. Evidence is given to support the notion that authoritarian attitudes are strongly related to attitudes and behaviours of militarism and attitudes and behaviours of male dominance.

These relationships were then examined in a wider selection of cultures, using cross-cultural correlative research methodology and a dataset of precoded variables. There is some evidence for the notion that authoritarianism plays a part in both male dominance and war among these societies. There is also some evidence to support the notion that war is related to an increase in the "importance" or participation of males in political spheres. It proved difficult to conclusively test the idea that male absence due to war improves the position of women, although tests revealed that this theory is plausible. Support was also found for the notion that authoritarianism is related to the level of civilisation. No support was found for the notion that male participation in war increases male glorification, or the notion that aggression against the enemy and against women vary inversely according to a Freudian "drive-discharge" model.

Another significant finding which emerged in the course of these tests is that authoritarian traits have a high propensity to spread geographically by a process called "cultural diffusion". This process may be largely responsible for the number of authoritarian societies in the world today.

Chapter One: Authoritarianism, Male Dominance, and Militarism

Introduction and Past Research

This thesis is a study of factors thought to be associated with war. It asserts that as well as being the result of other variables (such as economic, demographic, geographical, or historical variables), war sometimes arises out of a desire to oppress the people of other societies. Alternatively, it arises out of a desire to defend oneself from such oppression. What are the causes of this oppression, and what is its relationship to other oppressions within the same society? Another common oppression in many human societies, and one that may also have other connections to militarism, is that of the oppression of women. Are militarism and male dominance similar syndromes with the same root causes and characteristics? The first aim of this thesis is to further our understanding of the psychological mechanisms behind war by looking at the gender aspects of militarism, in an effort to add to the literature of war anticipation. We can also attempt to gain a similar understanding of the psychological mechanisms behind male dominance. A question that naturally arises in the course of this is: Can we predict how warlike the men of a society will be by how they treat women?

There are no answers to such questions in the correlative war research literature of political scientists and international relations scholars. There have been some studies in which researchers have tested the incidence of war against selected attributes of a nation that are conceivably related to the position of women (Rummel 1968; Haas 1974). However, these researchers have not conceptualised these attributes as being possible indicators of male dominance. Because of this, there is no attempt to use such variables to create an overall measure of the status of women with which to test against the occurrence of war. Cattell (1949) constructs

what he refers to as a measure of "patriarchal solidarity" in the course of other tasks (pp. 461-2), although the scale's relationship to militarism is unclear. This is due perhaps to the poor quality of his data (Cattell Breul & Hartman 1952).

In any case, such "national attribute" studies in general have met with limited success (Zinnes 1980; Pearson & Rochester 1988, p. 263). Because of this, Holsti (1991) advocates discontinuing such research to look instead at the nature of the issues that actually start wars (pp. 6-9). However, Liebow (1981) draws a distinction between such "immediate" causes of war, and "underlying" causes that also play a part (1981, p. 1). While it is improbable that male dominance serves as an "immediate" cause in triggering wars, is male dominance related to some "underlying" factor that also plays a part in predisposing a country towards war and militarism? To answer these questions, we must look beyond correlative war research.

There has been much writing in feminist¹ literature on the possibility and nature of a connection between male dominance and militarism. Writers such as Caldicott (1986; pp. 235-7) have used biological explanations of male behaviour, both domestically and internationally, while other writers attempt to explain both sexism and militarism as resulting from insecurities only understandable on a psychoanalytic level (Reardon 1985; Adcock 1988). Related to this are writers who see that both male dominance and war are both somehow related to male insecurities, especially sexual insecurities (Easlea 1983; Cohn 1987; Zanotti 1988; Kokapeli & Lakey 1988). Another area of research has been the examination of structures that male dominance and war both have in common (Enloe 1983; Hacker 1981; Hacker & Hacker 1987). Finally, there have been feminist critiques of the military mindset and the military indoctrination process with its accompanying misogyny (MacDonald 1987; Warnock 1988; Michalowski 1988; Brock-Utne 1989).

Unfortunately, there is a wide chasm between feminist war writing and traditional war research, in such fundamental areas as political orientation, methodology, and terminology. There have been some attempts to bridge this gap (Reardon 1985; Brock-Utne 1989), but there has been little overall movement in this direction. There is then, no central theory within either feminist war writing or traditional war research as to why these two issues should be connected. This then is a second aim of this thesis; to contribute to the dialogue between war researchers and feminist peace researchers by exploring the gender aspects of militarism.

It is in the literature of authoritarianism that we find both a body of theory and of research that can bridge the gap between feminist war writers and traditional war

¹ The description "feminist" was usually self-applied, but it occasionally required some "labelling" on the part of this writer.

researchers. Fromm (1973), Readon (1985), and French (1985) see that both male dominance and war are two manifestations of an obsession with control over others. If this is true, cultures that are warlike may also tend to be controlling in general, and would therefore seek to impose control over groups within its own population such as women, ethnic minorities, or children. The third aim of this thesis then is to contribute to the understanding of authoritarianism. As Altemeyer (1988) writes, such an increased understanding is useful for those active in social reform who wish to understand those who oppose them. He also writes that counsellors may be interested in the findings of authoritarianism research, so that they can better help those whom he terms the "victims of authoritarianism" (p. xx).

In addition to authoritarianism research, there is some relevant anthropological work on the question of a male dominance/militarism relationship. It is in this research that we find an alternative reason to explain why male dominance and war may be connected. This is the theory that male involvement in war makes males appear more important, or more glorified, a process that then contributes to male dominance. This has been examined in both correlative studies (Divale & Harris 1976; Divale, Chamberis, & Gangloff 1976; Hayden et al. 1986) and descriptive studies (Murdock 1949, p. 205; Dyer 1988, p. 8; Mayer 1987; Harris 1983, 1989).

However, two reasons can also be drawn from relevant literature to suggest why these two forms of oppression should actually have an inverse relationship. Firstly, there is the Freudian notion that people are able to redirect destructive impulses towards alternative targets in order to discharge their aggression (Freud 1939). If a culture is warlike, there may therefore be less male violence against women, and vice versa. This is a purely psychological reason for an inverse relationship between male dominance and militarism, but it may also have an accompanying demographic effect. Whyte (1978) speculates that males may be absent so much due to war, that they are not around to dominate women (p. 31). Harris (1989) also writes of such a phenomena, saying that this occurs as an exception to the aforementioned effect of male glorification. He claims that in some cultures, men are often away fighting wars of conquest or plunder for long periods of time, and female power structures rise up in their absence to restore the status of women (p. 315).

While authoritarianism serves as the central theory for this thesis, these three other hypothesis can also be tested. How then do we define authoritarianism, male dominance, and militarism for the purposes of this thesis?

Definitions and Dynamics of Authoritarianism

As was implied above, a person with a high desire for power or control over others is seen here as being "authoritarian". More specifically, what are the characteristics of a person who has such a desire? An initial starting point to such a discussion comes from the theoretical writings on authoritarianism and fascism of Reich ([1970]), Maslow (1943), and Fromm ([1969]; 1973). There is also the classical theoretical and psychometric study of *The Authoritarian Personality* by Adorno et al. (1950). As will be seen in chapter three, there have been many attacks on the methodology of this study. This is, however, the seminal work on the measurement of authoritarianism, and one that developed and expanded on the ideas of Fromm, Maslow, and Reich. In more recent times, Altemeyer (1981; 1988) also provides some theoretical discussion of authoritarianism while reporting on the results of his psychometric study of this concept. For the purposes of this thesis, there are three central characteristics of authoritarianism:

(1) *Authoritarian Aggression*

Discussions of authoritarianism overlap in the literature with discussions of sadism. While sadism was defined as just being a sexual disorder by Freud as well as by some clinical psychologists today (Bellock Hersen & Kazdin 1982, pp. 702-3), others give it a wider meaning of a general desire to inflict unnecessary violence and pain on someone else. Fromm ([1969]) talks of how sadists wish to have their victims suffer, through either mental or physical pain (p. 165), and the aim of this is to achieve absolute mastery over them (p. 179; 1973, pp. 288-9). This can also be seen in the conceptualisation of the authoritarian personality research of Adorno et al. (1950). They mention that the authoritarian personality tends to be orientated towards "destructiveness and cynicism", with tendencies towards "generalised hostility, [and] vilification of the human" (p. 228, pp. 238-9).

However, this is not the full story. While there may be a desire for unrestricted violence on the individual level, we must also look at how this violence is expressed in the context of society as a whole. Morgan (1987) writes that individual violence within groups is not necessarily just encouraged; rather it is also controlled (pp. 185-6). If everyone in a culture went around continuously attempting to inflict physical violence and pain on each other, the culture would lack stability and would probably fall apart. The Yanomamö of the Amazon, to be discussed in chapter two, is probably the best example of such a culture, being both extremely violent and also very unstable. How then do other authoritarian cultures still hold together, even when a large proportion of the population harbours such urges?

Aggression is generally only acceptable in authoritarian cultures if it is directed towards certain groups. The authoritarian personality writers talk of "authoritarian aggression", or the "tendency to be on the lookout for, and to condemn, reject and punish people who violate conventional values" (Adorno et al 1950, p. 228, pp. 232-4). More recently, Altemeyer (1981) writes that authoritarian aggression is "a general aggressiveness, directed against various persons, which is perceived to be sanctioned by established authorities" (p. 148). In authoritarian cultures, women and the "enemy" in another society are often considered to be such "legitimate" targets of aggression. Another way in which social stability is maintained in such cultures is for real violence to be replaced with "pretend" violence. If it promotes instability to have everybody continuously engaging in violent acts, it is better just to have people continuously allege that they are capable of such acts through boasting and threats. As Adorno et al. (1950) write, the authoritarian personality manifests itself in an "exaggerated assertion of strength and toughness" (p. 228, pp. 237-8).

Taking all of this into consideration, the first feature of an authoritarian culture is that there is a glorification of unnecessary and/or sadistic violence against people who are seen as legitimate targets. This can either be actual violence, or it can be just the threat of violence and a consequent emphasis on the presentation of an image of toughness to the world. The exact relationship of "actual" violence to "pretend" violence is not always clear. It may be that "pretend" violence acts as a direct replacement for "actual" violence, although it may also accompany it. Alternatively, a culture may be so violent and sadistic, that it does not need any "pretend" violence.

(2) *Authoritarian Submission*

Many writers observe that sadistic tendencies ironically go hand in hand with a parallel tendency towards submission or masochism. Fromm ([1969]) talks of masochists as unassertive people who belittle themselves, refuse to master things, and often hurt themselves due to their unconscious diffidence (p. 163-5). He writes of the close psychological association that sadism and masochism have within each individual, stating that the existence of one tendency always means that the other is present (p. 165; 1973, p. 292). This submission or diffidence is only "triggered" by fear and/or respect for certain people, usually those who are held up as "legitimate", by virtue of their higher status in some respect. Adorno et al. (1950) also talked of the tendency towards "authoritarian submission", or a "submissive, uncritical attitude toward idealised moral authorities of the ingroup" (p. 228, pp. 230-2). Altemeyer (1981) talks of authoritarian submission as being "a high degree of submission to the authorities who are perceived to be established and legitimate in the society in which

one lives" (p. 148). Reich ([1970]) wrote of the 1930's German middle class tendency to have an "ambivalent attitude toward authority - rebellion against it coupled with acceptance and submission" (p. 37).

Those at the very top tend to hide their submissive tendencies, although study of private records can sometimes reveal this. Fromm (1973) claims to find evidence of masochism on the part of Adolf Hitler by analysing personal documents of those who associated with him (pp. 411-3). Why should a desire for power over some people be linked by an accompanying desire to submit to others? One explanation is that the two are linked for deep psychological reasons. Maslow (1943) claims that domineering people are willing to face cruelty, because deep down they approve of such behaviour even when they face it themselves (p. 408). On the other hand, Fromm (1973) claims that feelings of power and cruelty originally emerge from the low self-concept of submission (p. 292). Alternatively, perhaps these two tendencies are linked for reasons to do with the social structure, to be discussed in the next point.

(3) Hierarchical and Exploitative Social Structure

Who is to say that the two aforementioned characteristics are not just "acts" that people "perform"? Do they have a real effect on people's lives when played out on the level of a whole society? It is assumed here that a society is authoritarian if a large percentage of its population has such a disposition, or if leadership positions become dominated with such people. Because those in power have ultimate control over child socialisation, it is likely that the second condition will eventually lead to the first, because authoritarian leaders are likely to encourage an authoritarian upbringing in the children of a society. Once this percentage has been achieved, it will become a cultural norm that authoritarian aggression and submission are valid patterns of behaviour.

Maslow (1943) noted that the authoritarian character has a tendency towards hierarchical ranking. He writes that "people are ranked on a vertical scale as if they were on a ladder, and they are divided into those above and those below the subject on this ladder" (pp. 403-4). Reich ([1970]) makes mention of the "hierarchical view of the state" which accompanies this mindset (p. 342), while Fromm (1973) talks of the "bureaucratic character" and the hierarchical system in which they operate (p. 294-5). The authoritarian personality writers also talked of the authoritarian personality as having a "pre-occupation with the dominance-submission, strong-weak, leader-follower dimension" (Adorno et al. 1950, p. 228, pp. 237-8). As well as creating power hierarchies on an individual level, authoritarians also feel the need for similar hierarchy on the level of society as a whole. All individuals in one social group are

said to be better than all of the individuals in another group. Thus all women, or all of the inhabitants of another country, are conceived of as being lower in status, and are thus viewed as "legitimate" targets for aggression.

As well as being hierarchical, the other major characteristic of these structures is that they are exploitative. Fromm ([1969]) talked of the tendency for sadists to exploit a "victim" (p. 165), while Reich ([1970]) saw that the myth of racial inferiority was created by the Nazis for economic reasons (p. 79). Such a tendency towards exploitation can also be seen reflected in the world view that authoritarians often have. Maslow (1943) notes that such people often conceptualise the world as a "jungle... peopled with animals who either eat or are eaten" (p. 403). In addition to their exploitative function, there may be other reasons why hierarchical structures emerge. Such structures can also be seen as another way of reducing sadistic violence, and are therefore another way of maintaining social stability. These structures can serve as a kind of "pecking order" in that once someone has established their place on the "ladder", the need for them to continually demonstrate their potential for violence is reduced (although not completely eliminated). In such cultures there is usually only a relatively small number of people who actually apply violence as their specialised function, such as police or soldiers. These structures then facilitate a self-restraining system that, once again, reduces the amount of disruptive interpersonal violence.

So the third feature of an authoritarian culture is that it has an exploitative hierarchical social structure. In accordance with the dual tendencies towards authoritarianism aggression and submission, positions in these structures are determined on the basis of strength or perceived strength, rather than by another attribute such as wisdom, experience, or popularity. This strength can be physical strength, economic strength, or strength of some other sort that is relevant to the situation.

What is the causative relationship of this type of social structure, to the psychological features of authoritarian aggression and authoritarian submission? Does the authoritarianism in people's minds create this social structure, or was it this social structure that shaped their authoritarianism? Fromm ([1969]) saw that the fascist personality was shaped by socio-economic sources (p. 232). On the other hand, Keen (1986) sees that the existence of a hierarchical social structure results from the sadomasochistic nature of our culture. He writes; "we can see that society is arranged hierarchically to allow [sodomasochistic] exchanges to take place in a ritualised and "normal" way" (p. 126). In fact, this question is just another manifestation of the long running structure/agency debate of sociology. There are three main positions in this debate. Some say that social life is shaped by the

structure of a society, while others claim that individuals shape the structure. This thesis takes the third position, that structure and agency are complimentary and both feed back and influence the other (Jary & Jary 1991, pp. 636-7).

Other Features

There are also other characteristics of authoritarian cultures that have been mentioned in the literature, but cannot be used here because they are too culturally specific. Most of the aforementioned writers were responding to the fascism observed in Nazi Germany. Many of the things that they observed there were specific to Western culture, and may not apply when examined cross-culturally, as this thesis seeks to do. For example, Reich ([1970]) mentioned the tendency of fascism to be sexually repressive (pp. 24-33), something also mentioned by the authoritarian personality writers (Adorno et al. 1950, p. 228, pp. 240-1). However, authoritarians in other cultures may not necessarily have the same dislike of sexuality that authoritarians in our culture do. Likewise, superstition, or "the belief in mystical determinants of the individuals fate" (Adorno et al. 1950, p. 228, pp. 235-6), was part of the authoritarian personality model, but is not included in this thesis. A tendency towards superstition implies that there is a choice between believing in mysticism and believing in science. Some cultures do not practice science as we know it, and there is no possibility of such a choice.

Conventionalism is also a frequently mentioned component of authoritarianism (Adorno et al. 1950, pp. 228-30; Altemeyer 1981, p. 148), but is not included in the analysis of this thesis. This exclusion is not due to the fact that it does not apply to other cultures, but because there is difficulty in finding variables with which to measure it cross-culturally. The same difficulty with finding relevant measures also means that we cannot test cross-culturally the notions that authoritarianism is associated with the fear of a dangerous world (Maslow 1943, p. 402-3; Adorno et al. 1950, p. 228, pp. 239-40; Altemeyer 1988, pp. 145-7) or that part of authoritarianism is the tendency to have black/white stereotypes of different social groups (Maslow 1943, pp. 404-6; Adorno et al. 1950, p. 228, pp. 235-6).

Definitions of Male Dominance and Militarism

There is nothing in these three indicators of authoritarianism that inevitably lead to a culture being male dominated. Furthermore, while there are no definite examples in historical or archeological literature, it is conceivable that an

authoritarian and female dominated culture could exist. Likewise, there is nothing in these three indicators that suggest that such a culture will inevitably be militarist. A country can have the above three features of authoritarianism and yet still not choose to dominate a neighbouring country. However, if a culture is authoritarian, then it is probable that those within the culture will continually be on the "lookout" for groups to dominate, a tendency noted by Adorno et al. (1950, p. 228, pp. 232-4). Once an idea arises in an authoritarian culture that men should dominate women, or that a neighbouring society should be dominated, it manifests itself in male dominance or in militarism. What are the signs of these manifestations?

Male Dominance

As Ember & Ember (1988) write, there are probably as many definitions of female status as there are interested researchers (p. 300). Much of the disagreement stems from differing beliefs about what the central component of male dominance is, which in turn stems from the differing theoretical orientations of each researcher. Marx, Engels, and writers like Hartmann (1981) claim that male dominance has a materialist base, while Firestone (1970), Millett (1971), and Lerner (1986) more specifically claim that it emerged from reproductive differences between men and women. Daly (1978) explores the idea that male dominance is centred on the religion and language of a society. French (1985) claims that male political power over women is the most important factor.

Because this thesis seeks to test the theory of authoritarianism, we need to use a definition of male dominance that measures how authoritarianism would supposedly impact on male/female relations. Thus, if a culture had the first characteristic of authoritarian aggression, then we may expect violence by men against women. At the very least, we would expect there to be an ideology of male toughness and female weakness. In line with the second feature of authoritarian submission, we would expect women to act submissively towards men, because of genuine respect or because of real or imagined fear. Finally, we would expect women to have a lower average place in the social hierarchy of such a culture, and to face exploitation because of this. These three characteristics form the definition of male dominance used for this thesis.

Militarism

An initial definition of militarism, and one that fits in well with the model presented in this thesis, is "a proclivity in some societies for a section of the higher echelons to look for military solutions to political conflicts, and the readiness of the lower ranks to accept such solutions" (Jary & Jary 1991, p. 398). More specifically,

what characteristics emerge when the three aforementioned tendencies of authoritarianism manifest themselves in relations with outside groups? Firstly, in accordance with the tendency towards authoritarian aggression, there is unnecessary violence and pain infliction on members of a perceived enemy. Of course, it could be said that war by its very nature involves unnecessary violence and pain infliction, although to leave it at this would lead to the tautological conclusion that war is always authoritarian. What about war that occurs by mistake, or war that has simple economic motives? To be able to say that a war is a manifestation of authoritarian aggression, we would look for evidence of particularly unnecessary violence, such as torture or sacrifice of prisoners. At the very least, even if there is no actual violence against the enemy, there may still be a glorification of the idea of such violence or a belief that it should be occurring.


The second element of authoritarianism, that of authoritarian submission, seems a little more complicated. It would appear at first glance that submission plays no part in the life of soldiers, their lives only being orientated towards domination. Soldiers *are*, however, expected to submit to their commanding officer, and this is seen in this thesis as the way in which authoritarian submission manifests itself in militarism. Thirdly, in accordance with the authoritarian tendency towards exploitative hierarchy, such cultures will go to war with the aim of permanently subjugating and then exploiting another group. Again, this differentiates such cultures from those that just go to war with the aim of defending themselves, or who just take part in brief raids for the purpose of prestige or plunder. Once again, these three characteristics serve as the definition of militarism to be used in this study.

Summary of the Main Theory

A summary of the main theory of this thesis can be seen in figure 1.1. While this thesis accepts that male glorification due to war, the Freudian theory of discharge of violence, and the effect of male absence may have some bearing on the male dominance/militarism connection, they are not seen here to be major determinants of this relationship. This is because it appears that each effect may only take place within a culture that is already authoritarian. Firstly, it is possible that male involvement in war causes additional male glorification in a culture that is already warlike. However, such a theory presupposes that violence is already accepted and glorified. A culture in which violence is glorified is also likely to be one which is

authoritarian and, according to the above theory, may be one in which there is already male dominance over women.

Figure 1.1: The Relationship of Authoritarianism to Male Dominance and Militarism



Secondly, the Freudian argument assumes that males already have the option of being able to abuse women physically, presupposing once again that the culture already accepts authoritarian aggressive behaviour. Finally, the male absence argument may only apply properly to the case study that Harris (1989) gives, that of certain tribes of North American Indians. In other cultures, the effect may not be as pronounced, and female status could again fall when males get back from war. This is conceivable, because if males in a culture go to war due to impulses that can be traced back to authoritarianism, then they may be inclined to re-impose control over women when they get back.

It is not so easy to dismiss the theory that male participation in war causes increased male importance, although it is hard to separate the testing of this theory from the tests for the authoritarianism theory. Both the male importance and authoritarianism theories would predict that war is related to the increased importance or participation of men in politics. However, one way to separate out these two effects is to look at the relationship that war has with other features of male dominance, namely violence against women and female submission to males. If male importance due to war is the only effect occurring, then there is no reason why war should also be associated with violence against women, or with an expectation of female submissiveness. If we find that war does have an association with these other two tendencies, then this can be interpreted as a sign that authoritarianism is also manifesting itself.

At this point, it is important to heed the words of Falk & Kim (1980, p. 4), Pearson & Rochester (1988, p. 264), and Holsti (1991, p. 6), who reject mono-causal explanations for militarism. This thesis does not attempt to assert that there is a sole cause for either militarism or male dominance. For this reason, figure 1.1 also suggests that other variables are also having an effect on male/female relationships and militarism, and that the effect of authoritarianism must be seen as occurring within the context of these factors.

Hypotheses

Hypothesis One (a), (b), and (c): Authoritarianism Associated with Male Dominance and Militarism

The three sub-hypotheses are:

- (a) There is a correlation between variables that measure male dominance as it has been defined here, and variables that measure militarism as it has been defined here.
- (b) The variables measuring the existence of authoritarianism should correlate with the variables measuring male dominance.
- (c) These authoritarianism variables should also correlate with the militarism variables.

Hypotheses 1(b) and 1(c) are considered to be the most important relationships, while hypothesis 1(a) is considered to be just the natural follow-on from these two. Hypothesis 1(a) is listed first because, as will be seen in chapter four, this has been the

hypothesis discussed most in the existing anthropological literature. On the other hand, chapter three will only discuss the psychometric studies that have been done on hypotheses 1(b) and 1(c). The results of hypothesis 1(a) can also be used to evaluate the Freudian theory of aggressiveness discharge.

Hypothesis Two (a) and (b): The Effect of Male Glorification and/or Increased Male Importance

Our three point definition of male dominance is not exactly the same as the definition required to test the theory that war causes male glorification. While male glorification implies that men have a higher ideological place in the culture, this may have nothing to do with the level of violence against women, the extent of submission by women, and the actual place of women in the social structure. If it is correct that male participation in war leads to male glorification, then variables measuring the extent of war should correlate with variables that measure a general belief in the superiority of males. These male superiority variables may in turn have an association with the measures of male dominance already discussed. In addition, the definition of militarism also depends on the hypothesis that we are testing. If we are just testing the theory that war in general causes male glorification or increased male importance, then all that is necessary is to correlate the relevant male dominance variables with measures of the general frequency of war, regardless of the motivation of the war, or of other factors such as the submission to military leaders or the sadistic treatment of the other side.

The other variation of this theory is that war makes males more important to a community. If this is true, then there should be a direct correlation between male political participation and war. As was mentioned above, however, the male importance argument does not say anything about violence against women or female submission to males. If variables measuring these two tendencies also have a correlation with war, then we could say that the male importance argument is not completely adequate for explaining the relationship between male dominance and war. We would have to conclude that authoritarianism is also having an influence. The hypotheses are then:

- (a) The higher the level of male involvement in war, then the more likely that a belief in male superiority will be present.
- (b) The higher the level of male involvement in war, then the more political participation by men, without an accompanying rise in male violence against women or an accompanying rise in female submission.

Hypothesis Three: The Effect of Male Absence

If this theory is correct, then a variable measuring male absence due to war should have a negative relationship with our three point definition of male dominance. In addition, this variable may also have a negative relationship with the variables measuring male glorification.

Hypothesis Four: The Origins of Authoritarianism,

Finally, it is worth tentatively examining some ideas about how authoritarianism came about. An initial explanation is that a tendency towards authoritarianism is inborn, and hence traces back to human biology. For example, Tiger (1969) writes that much male behaviour results from biology, pointing to things such as hierarchical male structures and war as the alleged manifestations of this. As was mentioned earlier, some feminists point to the role of biology in male behaviour. If authoritarian male behaviour towards women and other societies is completely inborn, then there should be no variation of such factors across cultures. While we can never be certain about how much biology influences the variables that we are measuring, it is asserted that variation on all of these traits between societies shows them to be culturally modifiable to a considerable degree. Examples given in chapters two and seven will provide illustration of such variation. This is not a biological thesis, and will instead will be looking at the features of authoritarianism that are culturally modifiable.

Leaving biological explanations aside, there is one theoretical strand that attempts to explain the development of authoritarianism. Mumford (1961), Fromm (1973), Harris (1977), French (1985), and Dyer (1988) saw that authoritarianism and sadism emerged alongside the development of civilisation which is, by its very nature, based on the idea of regulation and control. This sense of control was then applied to women to create male dominance, and to other peoples to create imperialistic war. To test these ideas, we can see if the authoritarianism variables positively correlate with variables measuring the extent of civilisation.

Testing the Hypotheses

Nature of the Sample

It was mentioned above that there has been no attempt in "national attribute" research to examine the relationship between male dominance and militarism. Even if an attempt were made to conduct such a study, it is possible that no

relationship would be found. It is proposed in this thesis that there is not enough variation in the level of male dominance and militarism among contemporary world nations for these tests to yield meaningful results. Although the position of women is probably slowly improving in most parts of the world, in no nation do women enjoy complete equality with men (Morgan 1984, p. 1).


Likewise, this thesis asserts that most contemporary nations are militarist. This is by virtue of the simple fact that they maintain an army that is constantly prepared to inflict violence at a moment's notice. The traditional way of assessing militarism in national attribute studies has been to count up the number of wars that a nation engages in during a given period, or to calculate what percentage of its time a nation spends fighting. Researchers assess how "warlike" or "peaceful" a nation is by virtue of the relatively minor variations that they have on these figures. There are few nations in the world that are completely non-militarist, in that they do not field an army. This is not necessarily meant to be a criticism of all world nations, as some do have considerable fear of attack. However, it leads to a sample of world nations that is homogenous in terms of measures of militarism.

Is this the reason why national attribute studies in general have met with such limited success? The nations of the modern world all have their differences, but also have many similarities. Are national attribute studies failing to provide conclusive results because their samples do not feature a wide enough range of cultural types? One way to visualise this situation can be seen in figure 1.2. The first scatterplot might be the results if a war researcher tried to correlate male dominance with militarism among modern nations. As can be seen, all of the cultures in the first sample score highly on both variables. This might still mean that a relationship could be found, given that there is still some variation in the two variables. In this case, however, other factors create random fluctuations in both variables, and this leads to a bunched up circular scatterplot with no obvious straight-line relationship visible. Such random fluctuations are inevitable in hypothesis testing in the social sciences. However, because the random fluctuations here are larger than the amount of variability in the sample, no relationship is found. On the other hand, if a wider variation of cultural types were to be included in the analysis, the second part of figure 1.2 shows what may happen. Once again, there is still random fluctuation, but the overall effect of including a wider range of cultures is to show that there is indeed a straight-line relationship between male dominance and war.

It is worth mentioning at this stage that there have been a number of national attribute studies that have looked at the relationship between regime type and propensity to engage in war. In recent times Rummel (1983) found that "libertarian"

nations were less likely to be warlike, while Weede (1984) found no relationship between regime type and war. Once again, it is possible that there is no clear relationship between the authoritarianism of a nation using this measure and level of war involvement, because there is not enough variation in the level of either for this effect to be consistently visible in all studies. According to the definitions used by this thesis, most contemporary nations can be seen as authoritarian to some degree, regardless of their system of government. The examples given in chapter two will expand on this claim.

Figure 1.2: The Effect of Sample Homogeneity



If there is not enough variation in authoritarianism, male dominance, and militarism among contemporary world nations, how can we test our hypotheses? One solution is to test them by way of cross-cultural correlative research using a sample that features societies from a wide range of cultural types. The sample used is a standard ethnological sample drawn up by Murdock & White (1969). It contains the largest variety of cultural types possible, from hunting and gathering communities such as the Hadza, to feudal societies and empires such as the ancient Romans. The cultures also range in description dates from as early as the ancient Babylonians (1750BC), to cases such as an Irish village in 1932, and a Russian peasant community in 1955.

Generalising from Non-industrial to Industrial Cultures

Even though a wide variation of cultural types can be found in the sample, no modern industrialised communities are included. Modern nations are generally

not included in such studies, because they tend to be too much alike. To include a group of industrial cultures would therefore reduce the variability of such a sample due to overrepresentation. This has some connection to "Galton's Problem", or the problem of accounting for cultural diffusion, and will be discussed further in later chapters. If modern nations are not included in our sample, how applicable are the tests of this thesis to the problems of the modern world? Can we make generalisations about modern nation-states on the basis of tests performed on non-industrialised cultures? Some writers have concluded that political scientists should utilise anthropological data if they wish their theories to be comprehensive. It is important for political scientists to test hypotheses on samples of non-industrial cultures, because humans have spent most of their evolutionary history in this state (Friedrich & Horwitz 1968; Ross 1985, p. 548; 1986b, p. 428).

On the other hand, some writers have objected to such generalisations on various grounds, although none appear to have done so in a way that threatens any of the particular aspects of the theory used in this thesis. Melman (1984) lists differences between the wars of hunting and gathering societies and the war of modern nations. He talks of the tendency for hunting and gathering societies not to have separate military specialists, or a distinct class of military technology, and their tendency not to have the separate military economy that modern nations have. He also writes that such cultures tend to fight just to sustain life, while modern nations fight to gain power. Dyer (1988) writes in a similar vein. He points to the small scale, ritualised, and disorganised nature of warfare among "stone age" cultures, as opposed to the large and organised political wars that we fight (pp. 9-11).

Once again, it must be mentioned that the sample used in this thesis includes cultures from a wide range of levels of cultural complexity. It is inadequate to compare the war of hunting and gathering societies to the war of modern nations, and conclude from this that the war of modern nations is some sort of "special case", as Melman and Dyer appear to do. Any differences in the psychology of authoritarianism, male dominance, and militarism between these levels of cultural complexity are assumed here to be differences of degree, not kind. As Quincy Wright wrote in his classic book *A Study of War*, an examination of the "psychological foundations" of "primitive" war can contribute more to the understanding of modern war than can the study of its "law and technique" (1942, p. 54). Also, some writers explicitly assume that the wars of industrial and non-industrial societies are comparable. There have been a few studies, both correlative (Naroll 1966, Eckhardt 1972) and descriptive (Fromm 1973; Buckley 1989), written with the assumption that what they are revealing about non-industrial war or authoritarianism also applies to modern society. This thesis is also written with such an assumption.

In order to try and demonstrate that the results obtained in this study are applicable to modern nation-states, additional tests will be performed. It will be seen if the relationships between authoritarianism, male dominance, and war hold when separate tests are performed for cultures at different levels of civilisation. If the relationships hold for cultures on all levels, then it will be proposed that such relationships may be universal, and are therefore applicable to industrial cultures on another level of cultural complexity.

Thesis Summary

In order to provide some illustration of the processes described here, chapter two will give descriptive accounts of the various features of authoritarianism, male dominance and war, in both Western and non-Western cultures. Chapter three looks at psychometric research into the measurement of authoritarianism in Western societies, and looks at the correlations that these measures have with feelings on male dominance and militarism. Chapter four is a summary of existing cross-cultural research into the four hypotheses mentioned above. Chapter five will describe the methodology of cross-cultural research, and detail exactly how our hypotheses will be tested. New tests performed on the hypotheses using the aforementioned standard sample will be reported in chapter six. Finally, chapter seven will discuss the results of these tests and comment on what progress we have made on the three aims mentioned at the beginning of this chapter.

Chapter Two: Examples and Illustrations of Authoritarianism

In this chapter, examples will be given of authoritarianism and how it manifests itself in male dominance and militarism. No claim is made that these examples were chosen systematically, nor are they necessarily representative of all manifestations of authoritarianism. They are used merely both to illustrate and expand upon the model presented in the last chapter. By looking at examples from different cultures, it will be asserted that the authoritarian mindset has essentially the same characteristics wherever it is found. Examples given in this chapter will also support the assertion of this thesis that Western society has a strong undercurrent of authoritarianism. The chapter is organised around the three point conceptualisation of authoritarianism used in the first chapter. There may be exceptions, but this thesis conceives that all three points generally go together. This is a question that will also be examined statistically in later chapters.

There will be five main sources of examples. The first three of these are the Western sub-cultures of street gangs, males in the military, and inmates of male prisons. The fourth source will be that of anthropological accounts of non-industrial cultures at various levels of development. Finally, use will also be made of the findings of several pieces of research from the field of social psychology. Some of these studies are correlative, as opposed to the other more descriptive material in this chapter, although they only produce findings relevant to one culture. This is opposed to the cross-cultural studies of chapters four, five, and six that attempt to correlate traits across a number of cultures. Because these social psychological studies only deal with one culture at a time, there is no choice but to treat them as descriptive for the purposes of this chapter.

(1) Authoritarian Aggression

General

As was mentioned in the last chapter, Adorno et al. (1950) and Altemeyer (1981, 1988) talk of authoritarian aggression as something directed against the unconventional or "deviant" people in society. This does not have to be violent aggression. As may be remembered, the **Authoritarian Personality** writers talked of a general tendency to "condemn, reject, and punish" (Adorno et al. 1950, p. 255). Altemeyer (1981) talks of this aggression as being the causing of "harm", this being "physical injury, psychological suffering, financial loss, social isolation, or some other negative state which people would usually avoid" (p. 152). These are, however, very wide definitions and this thesis will only concentrate on direct physical violence. Not only is physical violence easier to observe, but concentrating on it alone also reduces the size of our task considerably.

An important point to remember is that this sort of aggression, even in its violent form, is not that exceptional in Western society. Sadistic and authoritarian aggressive violence is not something that can only be inflicted by a crazed minority of unbalanced people. Most people brought up in an authoritarian culture receive an indoctrination that gives them the capacity for such actions. After the My Lai massacre, in which American soldiers were found to have killed unarmed Vietnamese civilians, an opinion poll (n=989) was taken on some of the issues raised by the incident. One question in the poll asked the people what they themselves would have done if a commanding officer had ordered them to shoot "all inhabitants of a Vietnamese village suspected of aiding the enemy, including old men, women, and children". Over half of the American adults in the sample said that they would (51%), while only 33% claimed that they would refuse the order (Kelman & Lawrence 1972, p. 193).

But this aggressiveness is not just found in "pencil and paper" measures. A famous experiment in social psychology also showed how common such tendencies are. The experiment, performed in the psychology department of Yale University, demonstrated that ordinary men would deliver supposedly fatal electric shocks to a confederate "victim" simply because they were ordered to by an experimenter (Milgram 1974). These experiments were designed to investigate how far, and under what conditions, people follow authority. Out of a sample of 40 men who had volunteered to take part in what they thought was an experiment on learning, 25 gave the supposed victim the maximum shock of 450 volts. This was despite repeated pretend protests by the "victim" that the pain was too much for him and that he had a heart condition (p. 35). These men were not abnormal as defined by

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Western culture and they represented a general cross-section of the males in the local community (p. 14-6)¹.

Such tendencies were also seen in another famous social psychology experiment. Researchers set up a mock prison and randomly assigned roles of "prisoner" and "guard" to student participants as part of a study designed to examine the psychological effects of prison life (Zimbardo 1972). Two dozen law-abiding, intelligent, and emotionally stable male college students were selected and paid to spend two weeks in this simulated prison environment, housed in the basement of Stanford University's psychology department. However, the experiment had to be called off after six days, due to the shocking effect that these roles had on the subjects. Zimbardo writes that the experimenters "were horrified because we saw some boys (guards) treat others as if they were despicable animals, taking pleasure in cruelty" (p. 4). He also notes that:

"About a third of the guards became tyrannical in their arbitrary use of power, in enjoying their control over other people. They were corrupted by the power of their roles and became quite inventive in breaking the spirit of the prisoners and making them feel they were worthless" (p. 6).

It should be noted, however, that in two of these three studies, there were people who would not act aggressively. Obviously people vary in their level of susceptibility to authoritarian aggression. At one extreme are the people who absolutely refused to inflict such aggression. Such men and women are visible in the My Lai and Milgram studies, although no such men were seen in the prison experiment. While Zimbardo (1972) is quoted above as saying that only one third of the men became tyrannical, he also notes that none of the other guards would intervene to stop such men (p. 6). Perhaps this experiment was overpowering enough to suppress even the peaceful tendencies of these people, or perhaps there were none in the small (n=24) sample. Next there are those, seen in all three studies, who will inflict violence on someone seen as weaker or inferior if ordered to by someone else, or if they are in a situation where such acts are common. Finally, there are those at the other extreme who genuinely enjoy such inflicting violence on other people. These are the people referred to in Zimbardo's quote about the "third" of the guards, and the presence of such people was also seen in a variation experiment performed by Milgram (1974). In this experiment, his subjects were free to choose the level of electric shock given to the "victim". Only two out of

¹ Milgram also tested a sample of women in one of his trials. He predicted that women would feel more compassion towards the "victim", but that this effect would be counterbalanced by the expectations that women are more submissive to authority than males. Results suggest that he was right, and women did not differ in their shocking from men (1974, p. 62-3).

the 40 subjects administered very high electric shocks under these conditions (p. 72), possibly because they were members of this "sadistic fringe".

As was mentioned in chapter one, even in the most sadistic culture imaginable, it would be overly disruptive to the social structure to have a large number of people continually engaging in these acts of pain infliction and violence. The Yanomamö Indians of the Amazon are a people that come very close to this extreme, being a culture of widespread interpersonal violence and one that is also reported to suffer "chronic warfare" (Chagnon, 1967, p. 44). From childhood, excessive bellicosity and fierceness is encouraged in males. The level of violence in their society is so great, that their settlements rarely achieve a population of 100-150 before fission occurs (p. 45).

It was also mentioned in chapter one that other mechanisms can be used to reduce the amount of violence in authoritarian societies. One of these was said to be the replacing of "real" violence with "pretend" violence. Perhaps most of what appears to be violent and aggressive behaviour by males in some cultures is in reality just bluff, so that they can appear to be as tough "as the next man". These men do not wish to depart from the expected behaviour of the macho stereotype, nor do they wish to depart from the actual behaviour of those among them who are genuinely sadistic. Thrasher (1963) notes that the gang members whom he studied often varied in how tough they acted, dependent on whether he observed them alone or with the other members of their gang (p. 39). He also notes that in some situations, the uncontrolled violence of the gang can be transformed into more "playful" types of conflict, such as sport (pp. 125-7). Dyer (1988) claims that if street gangs actually behaved in the bloodthirsty way in which they talked "you'd need trucks to clean the bodies off the streets every morning" (p. 116).

Often the name that a group takes on is designed to give an exaggerated idea of how tough and domineering they are. Thrasher (1963) noted that the Chicago gangs christened themselves with names "suggesting murder, blood, banditry, and piracy" and that the gangs "get a great 'kick' out of feeling how diabolical they are and, hence, how superior to the world at large" (p. 193). In his famous experiments on social conflict, Sherif (1966) found how easy it was to produce high levels of aggression in groups of boys when they were pitted in competition against other groups. His accounts of these experiments also show this tendency towards the adoption of "tough" sounding names, with groups taking on titles such as the "Red Devils" and the "Bull Dogs" (p. 80). The choosing of violent sounding names can also be seen in the Yanomamö. The clique of men who run each village call themselves the "*waiteri*" or the "fierce ones" (Chagnon 1967, p. 45).

It is worth noting, though, that most men who express this “pretend” authoritarian aggression probably recognise the falseness of their behaviour. Dyer (1988) writes that British football hooligans “make a very careful distinction between aggressive display and actual violence, and most of what seems to be violence is mime” (p. 116). In the famous prison study of Sykes (1958), the prisoners recognised the difference between the “tough”, or the inmate who is really violent, and the “hipster” who just pretends to be a tough. In any case, such a tough image is often convincing to outside observers. Payne (1991) talks of the concern that other people would have for his safety when he was approaching New Zealand gangs to interview for his study. He concludes that “people must think that gang members regularly need to go berserk as part of their daily routine” (p. 14).

How then do these tendencies towards authoritarian aggression, either real or pretend, manifest themselves in war and in violence towards women?

Sadistic Violence Against the Enemy

War by its very nature is a violent activity, but there are instances where violence is used in particularly unnecessary or torturous ways. This can be seen occurring on a large scale in the slaughter of whole populations. Contemporary examples such as the extermination campaigns of Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, and Pol Pot are only the latest in a long string that extends back into history, as long as the authoritarian mindset has existed. Even among military personnel who do not carry out such large scale actions, there are still numerous examples of atrocities carried out on the level of the individual soldier. Harris (1977) writes that the Aztecs were so bloodthirsty that they did not press for a quick victory if it would kill too many enemy troops. Instead they preferred to capture as many live prisoners as possible so that they could be taken back for ritual sacrifice. They continued with this tactic, even when it cost them dearly in their encounters with European soldiers (p. 107).

However, accusations of war crimes have always been prone to fabrication or exaggeration by the other side. *The Winter Soldier Investigation*, carried out by the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (1971), is one work that offers an unprecedented view of such behaviour from a less biased perspective. This book is the story of such atrocities from the soldiers who committed these acts, or who witnessed their comrades commit them. It is the result of a three day seminar in which more than 100 American Vietnam veterans felt compelled to present their stories to others. What results is a long list of war crimes, featuring numerous examples of the killing of Vietnamese civilians for sport, mutilation of enemy corpses, rape, disembowelment, torture, grave robbery, and crucifixion. How typical this

behaviour is from war to war is, however, difficult to assess. As one veteran said, there was an "unwritten code that you can do anything you want to as long as you don't get caught" (p. 39), a claim also repeated by another veteran with regards to his torture of prisoners (p. 120).

Even if real violence against the "enemy" is not occurring, it is often replaced with a preoccupation with the presentation of an image of military toughness. On the level of the individual military unit, brave and exaggerated talk of "pretend" violence serves as both a preparation and a substitute for "real" violence. In Western military indoctrination the language used with the recruits reeks of brutal and inhumane, but pretend, violence. It does though have a serious aim. As Dyer (1988) writes:

"Most of the language used... to describe the joys of killing people is bloodthirsty but meaningless hyperbole, and the recruits realize that even as they enjoy it. Nevertheless, it does help to desensitize them to the suffering of an "enemy", and at the same time they are being indoctrinated in the most explicit fashion... with the notion that their purpose is not just to be brave or to fight well; it is to kill people" (p. 121).

This desire to project an image of toughness also occurs on the wider national level. Often the population as a whole, or just the government, wishes to project an image of national toughness and strength. For example, politicians and members of the public may believe that defense expenditures should be high, so that the nation can appear strong in the eyes of other countries. A belief in the policy of nuclear deterrence is one manifestation of this.

The desire of a nation to appear strong can also be seen in the lyrics of national anthems. Although these are meant to be songs of national celebration and pride, they are often full of militaristic and belligerent assertions of nationhood and aggressive declarations of manhood. For example, according to their national anthem, the Vietnamese believe that "The path to glory passes over the body of our foes" (quoted in Reed & Bristow 1985, p. 475). Great Britain's national anthem, on the other hand, is a little less severe on such people. It merely asks God to "Scatter her enemies/ And make them fall/ Confound their politics/ [and] Frustrate their knavish tricks" (p. 189). The French anthem expresses hopes that France's "dying enemies" will be amazed by France's "victorious" soldier sons (p. 175). Martyrdom is also a common theme in some national anthems. Algerians who sing their anthem hope that the "cry of the fatherland" is "written with the blood of martyrs" (p. 17), while Iraqis hope that "each martyr follows in the footsteps of a former martyr" (p. 233).

Violence Against Women

Women are also the victims of sadistic violence in male dominated and authoritarian cultures. Reports of particularly torturous violence can be seen among the Yanomamö, or among the Jibaro Indians of Eastern Ecuador. Among the Yanomamö, women face sadistic beatings for such things as slow response to orders from the husband, or suspected extra-marital affairs (Chagnon 1967, p. 44). Among the Jibaro, such violence also occurs over matters of fidelity. (Karsten [1967], p. 310). Such reports could just be written off as isolated acts of violence, but for the fact that they occur in a systematic pattern. They tend to occur only in one direction (male to female), and in a way that appears to punish women who deviate from the submissive female stereotype.

Rape is perhaps the crime in which violence and male dominance most clearly come together (Reardon 1985, p. 39), and again it can be used in a systematic way against non-submissive women. Women are punished by gang rape among the Mundurucú Indians of the Amazon for perceived promiscuity, or for spying on the men's sacred trumpets, the symbols of male power (Murphy & Murphy 1974, p. 107). The Murphys interpret this in the light of males wishing to re-impose control over women who have, in effect, rejected the traditional female subordinate stereotype. Brownmiller (1975) gives another example of a culture in which gang rape is used to control promiscuity. This is the Mundugumor of New Guinea, who hand such a woman over to the men of another community (p. 284). She also mentions the Yanomamö who gang rape women captured in warfare. Later the women is taken back to the village to be raped by men who were not actually on the raid (pp. 286-7).

In Western society, a similar tendency can be readily seen in statistics of violence. Once again the violence tends to be systematically directed against women. In the United States, 91% of all acts of family violence are committed by a husband or former husband on a wife (reported in French 1985, p. 516). Such violence is also widespread. A 1980 study of 2000 married couples in the United States found that there had been an assault in 28% of them, and in 16% of cases this violence had occurred in the past year. Another study in Canada found that one married woman in ten is beaten by her spouse (reported in Wolf 1990, pp. 159-60).

Rape is also common in Western Culture. In a 1983 sample of 930 randomly selected San Francisco women, it was found that 44% had experienced rape or attempted rape as it is defined by the F.B.I. (Wolf 1990, p. 159). In an anonymous survey, Koss et al. (1985) found that 4.3% of 1,846 males at an unnamed American State college would admit to obtaining sexual intercourse with a women through use or threat of force. The word "rape" was not used in the survey questions, because this tends to produce a nil response in such studies (Walker & Quinsey

1992). Given the youth of those in the sample, it is likely that these numbers would be higher in an older population. Multiple group rapes are also common in Western gang cultures, as seen in the studies of the Chicago gangs (Thrasher 1963; p. 166-8) and New Zealand gangs (Payne 1991).

Taking things one stage further, sadistic violence in war and sadistic violence against women both come together in systematic rape during wartime. Such behaviour is often both a symbolic and real indication that one side has conquered the other. During the Third Reich, reports of the mass rape of Jewish women first appeared in November 1938 (Brownmiller 1975, p. 49), a pattern that was to be later repeated among concentration camp inmates (pp. 63-4). Other examples are not hard to find. Perhaps the best known case is that of the "Rape of Nanking" in 1937, in which 20,000 Chinese women were raped by invading Japanese forces (pp. 57-62). More recently was the report by the World Council of Churches of the rape of as many as 200,000 Bengali women by Pakistani soldiers during the 1971 Bangladesh conflict (pp. 78-86). In addition to the incidents of rape mentioned in the aforementioned Winter Soldier Investigation, there are many accounts of the Vietnam war that describe the process of becoming a "double veteran", or the practice of raping a woman and then killing her (for example, Prescott 1975, p. 17; Enloe 1983, p. 34).

Even if authoritarian aggressive men are not inflicting "actual" violence on women, then there is still often an ever present belief in male toughness and female weakness. As can be seen above, such an ideology persists in a range of cultures as diverse as conventional Western culture, Western sub-culture in the form of gangs, and in other societies such as the Yanomomö. Thrasher (1963) talks of the fear that boys in the Chicago gangs had of being termed feminine (p. 234). The Yanomomö have a creation myth that has women and cowardly men both being created from the legs of the same elemental being, while brave men were created from blood (Chagnon 1967, p. 44). While women are on the average weaker than men in muscle power, is this sufficient to justify the expectation that men are automatically the "tough" sex? This thesis asserts that it is not. Firstly, this statistic is the *average* female strength verses the *average* male strength. In any population there are women who are stronger than some men, and men who are weaker than some women. Secondly, there appears to be an over-generalisation of what is meant by toughness. How "tough" men or women are depends on what aspect of strength is being discussed. It requires considerable strength and toughness to give birth to a baby. However, in an authoritarian culture, the ability to inflict direct violent aggression is often regarded as the only proof of physical strength or toughness.

(2) Authoritarian Submission

General

This exploration of authoritarian aggression and sadistic acts is, however, only half of the picture. It is also useful to have some understanding of authoritarian submission to explain the full range of atrocities carried out in the world. Often, such an understanding is necessary to comprehend why people submit to authority and do things that appear to be not in their best interest. Alternatively, we need such an understanding so that we can comprehend why people submit to authority and commit aggressive and sadistic acts, even when they do not wish to do so themselves. As may be recalled from chapter one, *The Authoritarian Personality* writers saw that authoritarian people had a "submissive, uncritical attitude toward idealised moral authorities of the ingroup" (Adorno et al. 1950, p. 255).

The experiments of Milgram and Zimbardo do not just show aggression; they also show a great deal of authoritarian submission. Submission to authority is often so strong, that people will do what they are ordered to do, even when they suffer much personal distress when doing so. There are atrocities performed by people, not because they feel personally sadistic, but because they feel obliged to submit to an authority who wants them to be. Many of the subjects in Milgram's (1974) experiment felt extremely uncomfortable in what they were being asked to do, but still went through with shocking the "victim". The inclination to submit to the order to torture someone also occurs in "real life". Gibson (1991) looks at the actions of torturers operating under the military junta in Greece during the early 1970's. She notes that, like some of the Nazi mass murderers, Greek torturers often felt intense stress and discomfort with what they had been ordered to do, but still went through with it. Griffin (1971) writes that individual men may object to rape, but can feel obliged to participate in gang rapes because of peer pressure from aggressive males who may surround them at the time (p. 30). Payne (1991) reports a similar irony among the members of New Zealand gangs (p. 42)

Although discussions of authoritarian submission also tend to overlap in the literature with discussions of masochism, it is perhaps wise in this thesis to avoid consideration of internal mental states, and instead just concentrate on observable submissive behaviour. To say that some people have a deep-seated enjoyment of pain can lead to incidents of "blame the victim": Los Angeles police did not beat up Rodney King in March 1991 because he was masochistic, but because they were acting in an authoritarian aggressive way within a social structure biased against African-American people. It is asserted in this thesis that most authoritarian submission results from fear.

Perhaps the only "pure" examples of masochistic people in our society are those who engage in sadomasochistic practices for sexual pleasure. It is impossible in most other cases, as an outside observer, to say accurately whether the behaviour someone else manifests is the result of a tendency towards masochism or a reaction to fear. This fear of pain is probably the cause of the submissive behaviour that Zimbardo (1972) noted in his pretend prison experiment. He wrote that the pretend prisoners in his experiment tended to become "servile dehumanized robots", and also writes that when some of the prisoners were refused exit from the prison experiment after pleading for release, they reacted in a passive and docile way (p. 4). How then does authoritarian submission manifest itself in militarism and male dominance?

Submission Towards Military Leaders

Frederick the Great is quoted as saying "In general, the common soldier must fear his officers more than the enemy" (quoted in Dyer 1988, p. 64). Perhaps people who voluntarily join the military can be said to have a genuine desire for submission to authority. On the other hand, perhaps they come from homes in which obedience is stressed, and they join the military because it suits the personality that this sort of upbringing helps to create. The men who became torturers under the Greek military junta were reported to come from families in which obedience was emphasised (Gibson 1991, p. 76). Alternatively, the soldiers may enlist not knowing quite how submissively they will be expected to behave. In any case, submission towards a commanding officer is one of the basic tenets of the military in authoritarian cultures. The recruits first introduction to this is the drill instructor:

"You take that man, and you totally strip him, and then you make him like a big ball of clay, and you take and you make him a soldier. Whether he wants to be a soldier or not, you make him a soldier... They taught me in drill sergeant's [school], get the psychological advantage off the top. Remain on top; remain the aggressor. Keep the man in a state of confusion at all times... If in doubt, attack... I was gruff - I was gruff to the point where I was letting you know I am in command. You might as well strike anything in your mind, any feeling, that you are going to do anything but what I tell you" (Drill instructor quoted in Michalowski 1988, p. 327)

MacDonald (1987) mentions the tension that soldiers face between the pattern of dominant behaviour that men are traditionally expected to follow, and the "feminine" submission that is actually required from them upon entering the military. She proposes that insecurity created by this tension serves the military's purpose well, in that they always have a group of males on hand who are instantly

willing to commit violence to prove their insecure masculinity (p. 16). Related to this is the misogyny of military indoctrination. Farris ([1989]) talks of the traumatic effect that the threat of being labelled feminine had on the recruits that he observed in basic training (p. 96). Words denoting women or femininity such as "sissies", "pussies", or "cunts" become insults hurled at new recruits (Keen 1986, p. 130). The fact that military toughness is associated with the rejection of femininity could be seen as evidence for the male glorification hypothesis mentioned in the first chapter. In any case, the indoctrination of submissiveness can be extremely effective in producing recruits capable of any behaviour. A drill instructor with the United States Marines proudly boasts that he can motivate his recruits into doing "anything I want them to do" (quoted in Dyer 1988, p. 110).

Sadistic violence is also used in the military indoctrination process to desensitise soldiers to violence and to encourage their unthinking compliance. The scapegoating of particular recruits who are seen as weak is used in training by drill instructors to increase the solidarity and confidence of the unit as a whole (Michalowski 1988, pp 331-2; Dyer 1988; p. 115). As part of the training to become torturers under the Greek military junta, techniques that wore them down and encouraged their submission were used:

"For initiation into torture, Greek recruits were required to swear allegiance to a totemlike symbol used by the junta. They were terrorised by kicking, flogging, punching, and cursing. Initiation took place in isolated sites in which moral displacement could occur without interference" (Gibson 1991, p. 80).

Submission to military commanders is not something that only occurs in the military of modern nation-states. Chagnon (1967) gives an eyewitness account of a raid conducted by a group of Yanomamö men, and similar patterns of military submission can be observed. There was some initial reluctance among the men to fight, a resistance only expressed when they were halfway to the "enemy" village. The group leader is reported to have dealt with this situation by way of a "stern lecture" to them on the subject of cowardice. However, the leader himself was just responding to his own place in the military hierarchy. Chagnon writes that he was himself reluctant to go on the raid, but felt obliged to because of the pressure from his allies (p. 46).

War in less authoritarian cultures, even if it does occur, is likely to be more anarchic and less centred around obedience to a central authority. Reports of warfare among Blackfoot Indians of the Northwestern Plains of the United States, for example, suggest little submission to a central command. War parties were meant

to obtain permission from their chief before setting out, but this was not always done (Ewers [1967], p. 331). In addition, the older men and chiefs often tired of war and negotiated peace treaties with their neighbours. However, younger men were always eager for the plunder and social status that they could gain from war, and would often violate these treaties (p. 343).

Women's Submission to Men

Payne (1991) wonders why women were attracted to some of the often violently misogynist gang members that he came across in his study (p. 42). Is this because of some masochistic urge that these women have, or is it because they are not aware of what is at stake when they become involved in such relationships? Once again, as mere observers, we must beware of labelling people as "masochistic" to explain their actions. In 1985, the American Psychiatric Association included a new disorder called "Masochistic Personality Disorder" (MPD) in the latest edition of the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (DSM). Opponents claimed that MPD is actually a mislabelling of the expected submissive female stereotype (Pantony & Caplan 1991). Women could try to act submissively, as some of the men in their lives expected them to be, only to find that health professionals were now regarding them as cases needing treatment. This debate took place against the backdrop of wider controversy in psychiatry, about the extent to which such professionals should concern themselves with politics. If a woman is being submissive, this could mean that the individual woman needs help, or alternatively, it could mean that the men in her life need to change the way that they might be treating her. Going one stage further, it could also mean that political changes need to be made on the level of the whole society.

In any case, many women in some societies do act submissively towards men. Lerner (1986) notes that a system of male dominance can only function with the cooperation of women (p. 217). This may be due of fear of the aforementioned use of violence against non-submissive women. Alternatively, men may use other methods of intimidation to produce such fear, such as the use of "pretend" authoritarian aggression. Divale & Harris (1976) write that males in some non-industrialised cultures make a special effort to rear "passive and submissive" women using "bull-roarers, masked male dancers, and male religious specialists" to intimidate them (p. 526). Bear in mind, however, that this submissive behaviour may only be a manifestation of what Rogers (1975) called "mythical male dominance". Despite their submissive actions, women in most cultures probably do not believe themselves to be inferior to men. For example, Murphy & Murphy (1974) note that while there is a stated belief in Mundurucú culture that women are inferior, the women do not believe so themselves (p. 87). Although there are

customs of female submissiveness, Murphy & Murphy write that the women use these customs as a form of defense against men (p. 137).

Customs of female submissiveness can also be observed in many different forms in many other cultures. In our own society, many women have a fear of walking the streets at night. The response from the more traditionally minded people in our society is that women should not therefore be out at night. This could be interpreted as a similar manifestation of a belief in customs of female submission, for the purposes of "defense". Talking is another activity in which women can be interpreted as acting submissively towards men. Despite the traditional stereotype that women talk more than men, research has found the reverse effect. When a man and a woman talk, studies consistently show that the males tend to talk more than the females, and make as many as 98% of the interruptions (Spender, 1980, pp. 41-3).

Another major custom of female submissiveness is male preference in food distribution and serving, where males are fed first, or fed more. Wolf (1990) cites examples of such male eating preference practices from Hellenistic Rome, to medieval France, to the modern day Third World (pp. 189-91). Morgan (1984) notes that a disproportionate number of women die every year from famine in the Third World (p. 2). Wolf also writes that a male preference custom in feeding still exists in the memory of many Western women alive today, and also speculates that present day eating disorders among women is a partly a follow on from this tradition (1990, p. 191).

Looking at it from a different perspective, Lerner (1986) writes that women have behaved submissively because they have been taught to internalise the idea that they are inferior (p. 218). However, detailed research on the people in Western society finds contradictory results on this point. After reviewing many studies, MacCoby & Jacklin (1974) conclude that women have not generally been shown to have lower self-esteem than men (pp. 152-4). On the other hand, an interesting finding on self-esteem was that of Spence, Helmreich, & Stapp (1975). They found that women who scored low on scales measuring traditionally "masculine" personality traits and high on scales measuring "feminine" personality traits tended to have lower self-esteem than women who scored high on the "masculine" traits and low on the "feminine" traits¹. It appears that women who conform to the traditionally expected female stereotype may manifest lower self-esteem as a result. Bearing in mind what has been said above about "blaming the victim", it would be unwise to interpret even these results as necessarily being evidence of a tendency

¹ Interestingly enough, males who scored high on "feminine" items and low on "masculine" items were also likely to have lower self-esteem than males who scored high on "masculine" items and low on "feminine" ones.

towards masochism. A low self-esteem could interfere with a women's decision making process. She might take on a violent male lover because her self-esteem tells her that she does not deserve anything better. Masochism, on the other hand, implies a desire to feel pain.

(3) Hierarchical and Exploitative Social Structures

General

As was mentioned in the last chapter, authoritarian cultures tend to have exploitative hierarchical social structures. Places in these structures are determined by strength, whether that be physical strength, economic strength, or some other kind of relevant strength. In Milgram's experiments, factors relating to perceived leadership strength appeared to have the strongest effects on the level of painful electric shocks given by the subject. In the initial series of tests, it had been found that electric shocks would be delivered by a subject if ordered to by an official looking experimenter. In a variation experiment, Milgram wanted to see what would happen if the experimenter wanted the subject to stop giving shocks, while the non-official looking "victim" claimed he wanted to to be shocked (allegedly to prove his manliness). Regardless of any sadistic tendencies that the subjects may have had, all obeyed the experimenter and refused to continue (1974, p. 90-2). Milgram writes; "The decision to shock the learner does not depend on the wishes of the learner or the benign or hostile impulses of the subject, but rather on the degree to which the subject is bound into the authority system" (p. 92).

Another variation on the basic experiment also demonstrated that the level of perceived authority was the strongest determinant in influencing the level of electric shock given. Milgram shifted the experiment off campus to less official surroundings, to see if it was the official institutional atmosphere of the University that helped increase the amount of obedience. As expected, the effect of this move was to decrease the amount of obedience obtained from the subjects (pp. 66-70).

As well as being a manifestation of the twin tendencies towards authoritarian aggression and authoritarian submission, hierarchical structures were also said in chapter one to serve as an established "pecking order" that reduces the actual amount of violence that is "necessary". Again looking at the results of Milgram's experiments, we can find some evidence for the notion that considerations of hierarchical relationships were indeed reducing the amount of shocks that subjects inflicted. In another series of trials, the official-looking experimenter pretended to

play the part of the "victim" and the confederate, who appeared to be an ordinary citizen, played the part of the authority. Every subject broke off the experiment at the first protest from the experimenter, despite the demands of the ordinary citizen that the experiment continue (p. 103). An interpretation of this experiment is to say that hierarchical structures perpetuate a fear or a taboo against inflicting pain on someone seen as superior, even when one has the opportunity.

McCorkle & Korn ([1972]) write that among the inmates of American prisons "the dominating value of the inmate social system seems to be the possession and exercise of coercive power" (p. 611). Sykes (1958) also mentions the hierarchical pecking order that prisoners organise for themselves, noting that inmates who have established reputations for "coercive exploitation" are the ones who benefit economically from the other prisoners (p. 91). The leaders that emerge among the inmates in such environments tend to be repeat offenders, tend to be convicted of violent crimes, and are more likely to be diagnosed as psychopathic. Aside from these variables, they are normal for the prison population for age, occupation, educational attainment, ethnicity, and I.Q. (Schrag [1972]; p. 604).

The creation of hierarchical leadership structures based on strength can also be seen in Thrasher's gang study (1963, p. 229). He talks of the assignment of status within the gangs on the basis of "fistic ability" and "hardness" (p. 234). Similar leadership structures are also seen in Whyte's (1973) classic sociological study of an Italian slum gang (pp. 12-3). Payne (1991) also talks of such a hierarchy within New Zealand gangs. This ranges from the gang leader down to the "prospects", or prospective gang members, who are the "lowest of the low" (p. 74). In Western society, these structures are not just confined to prison inmates or gangs. Looking at the structure of just about any governmental or commercial organisation reveals a similar well-defined tendency towards hierarchy, with most of the people clustered near the bottom (French 1985, pp. 299-306).

Such hierarchies were also said in chapter one to be exploitative, and this exploitation can occur in a number of ways. They can be economically exploitative, as was seen above in the prison example. Western capitalist institutions can also be viewed as exploitative in this sense, depending on one's political views. In the New Zealand gangs, Payne (1991) reports that the aforementioned "prospects" are used to do such things as undertake dangerous criminal acts, take the rap for crimes that they are innocent of, and to become the servants and heavies of older gang members once they are in prison. Occasionally they are even asked to hand over their lovers (p. 76). Once these males attain the full status as a gang member, they in turn take on the role of the exploiter.

Tendency Towards Imperialism

The Western military, and indeed just about any modern military, has a highly intricate and formalised hierarchical structure. In fact, Hacker & Hacker (1987) go so far as to suggest that the military was the origin of the idea of hierarchy which was later applied to all other social institutions. Opposing this is Dyer (1988), who writes that the stratification of European armies resulted from the stratified social structure from which they emerged (p. 132). In any case, a stratified military is not something that just occurs among industrialised cultures. Recall the military subordination which occurred among the Yanomamö.

We can conceive that there are three main positions in a system of militarism. At the very top are the leaders who submit to no one. On the second level are the officers of a lower rank who must submit to these commanders. All of the soldiers that they command can be seen as forming a "sub-level" below them on this second tier. The third, or lowest level, is made up of both the soldiers and civilians who make up the "enemy". Since they make up the lowest place in hierarchy, there is an idea that any form of violence can be used against them, even if it is not officially sanctioned. Exploitation within the military hierarchy itself is also common. Harris (1989) talks of three non-industrial warlike cultures in which warriors sexually exploit boys until the boys are old enough to become warriors themselves. These are the ancient Greek culture, the Azande of southern Sudan, and the Sambia of Papua New Guinea. (pp. 240-2).

Alternatively, such structures can be exploitative in other ways. The position of the opposing side at the bottom of the military hierarchy puts them in a position that is ripe for exploitation. The plunder of the other side has been the way that this exploitation has traditionally occurred throughout history. Redlich (1956) traces the practice of taking booty and plunder in European warfare from the middle ages to the nineteenth century. He talks of the legal principles that built up around looting during this time period, in an attempt to separate "just" looting from "unjust" looting. He also notes the changes in the style of looting over the years. Accompanying the rising level of professionalism and discipline in the army, plunder became more organised. The distribution of the spoils of plunder also changed. There was a move away from individual soldiers reaping the rewards of their own plunder, to the allocation of plunder on the basis of military rank.

With the advent of modern rules of war, there has been less acceptance of the exploitation and abuse of the defeated. Unofficially, however, such practices undoubtedly still go on. Much atrocity and plunder of Vietnamese civilians was reported by The Winter Soldier Investigation participants. Similar reports of plunder and abuse among the Iraqi occupying troops in Kuwait may have been

exaggerated, but it is clear that at least some of these activities went on. This thesis asserts that this exploitation also has other forms. Members of the defeated culture can be sold into slavery, or economically exploited in other ways. Depending on one's political viewpoint, the colonisation by the European nations of the Third World and the economic exploitation that continues to this day can be cited as one example of this. Jary & Jary (1991) summarise the main features of this argument (pp. 298-9).

Exploitative Hierarchy Over Women

According to one ranking of the sample of non-industrialised cultures used later in this thesis, in only 10% of them do women have equal public political participation, although in 34% women are still said to have "significant" participation. In only 33% are women said to be "generally excluded" from politics (from Ross 1983; frequencies reported in Appendix Three of this thesis). Based on these figures, women tend to fare better in such cultures than they do in the political systems of contemporary nation-states. According to statistics collected by Seager & Olson (1986), in only four nations for which they were able to collect data do women make up more than 20% of cabinet positions (Norway, Sweden, Panama, and Ghana, map. 30). This can be taken as support for the idea, discussed in the first chapter, that modern nation states are too much alike in the distribution of male dominance for the running of "national attribute" tests.

It is assumed in this thesis that the higher political position of males leads to some form of women's exploitation. This can be taken to mean economic exploitation: Murphy & Murphy (1974) report that Mundurucú women consider their men to be exploitative (p. 139), a fact demonstrated by the ability of males to get out of doing hard work. However, in keeping with what has been said above, such exploitation can also be sexual, or exploitation of another type. The Yanomamö practice polygyny (the practice of having more than one wife), as do many other militaristic cultures (Divale & Harris 1976; Harris 1977, p. 60). This (like rape) can be seen as sexually exploitative. Alternatively, polygyny can be seen as a manifestation of the belief that women are property (Ogden & Florence [1987], p. 56, p. 88). On a world-wide level, United Nations statistics state that women make up one third of the paid labour force and are responsible for two thirds of all working hours, yet receive only one tenth of the world's income. In addition, they own less than one percent of the world's property (quoted in Morgan 1984, p. 1).

The next chapter will examine statistically the relationships between authoritarianism, male dominance and militarism in Western society.

Chapter Three: The Correlates of Authoritarianism in Western Culture

In this chapter, we will look at correlative research on individuals in Western culture. Some of the examples in the last chapter suggest that authoritarianism is widespread in Western society, in that we can observe widespread authoritarian aggression directed against both women and against people in other nations. We can also observe incidences of authoritarian submissive behaviour on the part of women and soldiers. We can also see that women's oppression tends to occur within a social structure that is hierarchical and exploitative, and we can also observe Western nations going to war with the purpose of political subjugation. Although such oppressions should not legally exist under domestic or international law, and may even be slowly diminishing in most Western nations, authoritarian practices are still widespread. Let us now look at the measurement of authoritarianism in Western culture, and its relationship to measures of male dominance and militarism.

Brief History of Past Psychometric Research into Authoritarianism

As was mentioned in the first chapter, the behaviour of the Nazi's during the 1930's and 1940's inspired a number of people to study authoritarianism. The **Authoritarian Personality** study of Adorno et al. (1950) was one of the few studies, at least in these early years, that tried to measure and understand ethnocentric and authoritarian attitudes in a psychometric fashion. Beginning at the University of

California at Berkeley in 1944, the researchers eventually produced a set of questions designed to measure their version of what authoritarianism was (the "F scale"). They conceptualised authoritarianism as having nine components, some of which were discussed in the first chapter. The complete nine point list was composed of: conventionalism, authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, anti-intraception (dislike of subjectivity and imagination), superstition and stereotypy, a preoccupation with power and "toughness", destructiveness and cynicism, projectivity (fear of a dangerous world), and an exaggerated concern with sexual "goings-on" (p. 228).

However, there have been a number of attacks on this study. Firstly, Ray (1990) claims that the researchers were mistaken in even thinking that the attitudes that they were measuring were "fascist", but were instead just "old-fashioned" attitudes. As he notes, they based the questions in their survey on attitudes that they heard expressed in California. Because these Californian attitudes sounded like the sort of thing that Hitler would say, they assumed that these attitudes were the same as those held by Nazis (p. 999). Ray proposed that in fact these Californian attitudes were not "fascist" in the sense that the Nazis were, and were instead just "old-fashioned". Furthermore, he then claims that the Nazis were not "old-fashioned", citing their radical views in areas such as medicine, diet, and ecology, and their acceptance and use of radically new military technology. However, Ray's objections seem rather petty and tend to gloss over some of the very old-fashioned ideas that the Nazis did subscribe to. Their attitudes towards the position of women, and their policies on Jews were hardly new or radical. Ray also ignores the fact that while new technology is not in itself "old-fashioned", it is a very old idea to apply new technology to the the goals of militarism. It appears that Ray was trying to deny that the potential for fascism is as widespread as others in the authoritarianism literature tend to claim. It is asserted in this thesis that such "old-fashioned" attitudes can serve as forerunners to the kind of behaviour which characterises outright fascism. This will be discussed further in chapter seven.

This objection aside, however, there are a number of other methodological objections which cast doubt on the validity of the F scale, and Hyman and Sheatsley (1954) were pioneers in this respect. They point to the non-representative nature of the sample (and its various sub-samples) that were used in the tests that led to the construction of the scale. They also note the inappropriate way in which the survey and clinical methods were combined, and the flaws and inaccuracies in the statistical analysis. Their most pointed criticism comes near the end of their chapter. They write that while each of the objections that they raise is not in itself enough to damage seriously the validity of the study, all the flaws occurred in such a way as to lend further support to the theoretical positions of the writers (p. 121).

In more recent times, Altemeyer (1981) summarises and expands on all of the criticisms of the F scale up to that point. He criticises the F scale for the looseness and vague definitions in its underlying theory (p. 16), and the low value (typically .13) of its inter-item correlations (p. 16). He also notes that the items in the F scale are all worded in the same (pro-authoritarian) direction, demonstrating that response set plays a part in artificially boosting the scale's alpha because of this (pp. 16-17, chpt. 2). Furthermore, its clusters do not even correlate as expected by the underlying theory (p. 17). Factor analytic studies show contradictory results, and fail to demonstrate that the items in the scale measure any central construct (pp. 18-25). A final damning criticism is that the scores on the F scale fail to correlate consistently with many things that they would be theoretically expected to, such as rigidity and dislike for ambiguity, conformity, behaviour in groups, socioeconomic class, and aggression towards unconventional people and people seen as low status (pp. 26-80). Titus & Hollander (1957) and Titus (1968) also write that when the F scale does correlate with other indicators of authoritarianism, it tends to be with "pencil and paper" measures rather than with measures of the level of a person's actual authoritarian behaviour¹.

There have then been a number of major attempts over the years to overcome these difficulties. Some have attempted to get over the response set issue by producing "balanced" versions of the F scale, with an equal number of pro- and anti-authoritarian items. Lee & Warr (1969) has been an example of this. But it has not proven easy to turn around many of the statements. How, for example, does one turn around the F scale statement: "Most people don't realise how much our lives are controlled by plots hatched in secret places", and still get a statement that is equally predictive of anti-authoritarianism (Kirscht & Dillehay 1967, pp.15-16)? Other researchers have just tried to produce complete alternatives to the F scale. Eysenck (1954) advanced a "two factor" theory of politics, whereby people have both a rating on a left/right spectrum and a toughminded/tenderminded spectrum. Another notable attempt has been the "Directiveness" scale of Ray (1976). There have also been many others, with Ray (1984) finding about 40 separate measures in a survey of the authoritarianism literature.

Altemeyer (1981) also extends some of his critiques of the F scale to many of the other authoritarianism scales, including those named above. He writes that studies in the authoritarianism literature tend to share a number of common deficiencies: They have tended to be based on casual and loose theoretical

¹ Regardless of the flaws of the F scale, some researchers have continued to use it through the 1980's (For example: Badgett Hunker & Porter 1984; Bankart & Olson 1986; Newman 1989). In none of these three studies is there any comment regarding the past critiques of the scale that they are using.

conceptualizations (112-3). Scales have tended to be developed quickly and published before they have been thoroughly tested (p. 113) and are usually “one-shot, unreplicated studies” (p. 114). The fact that Ray found 40 other scales suggests that there has been a tendency of researchers to construct scales of their own, rather than try and build on the existing ones. Altemeyer also notices that the methodology in authoritarianism studies, even when it has been described sufficiently, has often been demonstrated as deficient, and that bibliographies in such works have often been very selective and self-serving (pp. 113-4). He also later criticises the Directiveness scale of Ray (1976), citing its low measure of inter-item correlation and poor alpha reliability, and the use of non-naive subjects who were used to “validate” it (Altemeyer 1988, pp. 16-18). He also writes that the Directiveness scale seems to be an attempt to measure the authoritarianism only of leaders, rather than the authoritarian tendencies of followers (p. 8).

There has then been much research related to authoritarianism, and much of it would be relevant to this thesis. Unfortunately, the methodological flaws found in the F scale and other literature render this research of uncertain validity. As Altemeyer (1981) concluded, after 35 years of research, hundreds of studies, the participation of thousands of subjects, and a large amount of money, very little had been discovered about authoritarianism (p. 112). The only good thing about this situation is that it gives us a much smaller body of work that has to be reviewed for this thesis. Altemeyer’s own work has been an attempt to overcome the above flaws and make some real progress on the study of authoritarianism. His work, and other studies derived from it, will form the main body of literature reviewed for this chapter.

The Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale (RWA)

In an effort to develop what would finally be a reliable authoritarianism scale, Altemeyer engaged in a long series of experiments using students at the University of Manitoba in Winnipeg, Canada. The results of these tests are reported in Altemeyer (1981, 1988). The initial version of the Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale in 1973 had 24 items, but all versions since 1979 have had 30 items. The scoring has also gone from a seven-point scale to a nine-point scale. The average inter-item correlation of certain items on the scale has fallen over the years that Altemeyer has studied them, so some items have been replaced to keep up the alpha reliability. On the other hand, some items have remained stable and have therefore been retained in the test. One major problem that this causes is that scores

on the complete test cannot be compared over time, although such comparisons can still be done using just the "core" items that have remained in over the years¹. In all versions, the scale has been balanced against response set effects by way of having equal numbers of both pro- and anti-authoritarian statements.

Altemeyer claims that the scale measures three facets of authoritarianism; authoritarian aggression, authoritarian submission, and conventionalism (1981, p. 148). How do these apply to the three-point model of authoritarianism used in this thesis? The two points of authoritarian aggression and authoritarian submission are the same in both Altemeyer's conceptualisation and my conceptualisation. This is hardly surprising, since RWA literature was used in the creation of the theory of chapter one. In any case these two concepts are common in the authoritarianism literature. Conventionalism is omitted in my model due to the reason given in the first chapter. As may be remembered, this was because of the the difficulty in finding variables within cross-cultural research with which to measure this concept. The RWA scale does not set out to measure feelings towards the the third component of the authoritarianism model of this thesis; the existence of an exploitative hierarchical social structure. However, two experiments suggest that it has a strong relationship with the attitudes behind such structures. These studies were conducted on the "leaders" of society, and the relationships could be weaker (or even non-existent) in the general population. What they do show is that authoritarian leaders are highly likely to favour the creation or maintenance of hierarchical and exploitative social structures.

In the first study, the RWA scale was found to have a strong relationship with pro-capitalist economic philosophy. In April 1990, 635 surveys were sent to legislators in Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Michigan, New York, and Virginia. Of these, 153 (or 24%) of the surveys were returned. Included in this survey was the RWA scale, and a 10 item "Economic Philosophy" scale, which contained questions relating to wealth distribution and government intervention in the economy (see Appendix One). As such, a case could be made that this scale measures the extent to which a legislator believes in institutionalised stratification based on money. This scale correlated highly ($r=.61$)² with the RWA score (Altemeyer, personal correspondence, 30/04/92).

¹ Disturbingly, Altemeyer finds when making such comparisons that authoritarianism among Canadian students has been slowly but steadily rising from 1973 through 1985. However, there has been virtually no corresponding rise among their parents (1988, p. 24).

² When reporting the results of his tests, Altemeyer uses the convention of only reporting the significance of relationships if they are insignificant or highly significant. For all results reported in this chapter, assume that are significant at $p<.05$ unless otherwise specified.

The second study was conducted in March 1991 on legislators in Alabama, Maine, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Utah. 728 surveys were sent out, of which 197 were returned (27%). As well as the RWA scale, they were given a nine-item "freedom and equality" scale (see Appendix One). Four of the questions on this scale related to support for laws that would encourage equality on the basis of ethnicity, sexual orientation, class, and gender. The questions can be interpreted as measuring the extent to which the legislator supports a non-stratified social structure. The other five items in the scale related to laws on freedom, with references to stronger police powers, outlawing of the communist party, compulsory religious instruction in schools, censorship during war, and restriction of anti-war protests. Despite the diversity of these nine items, they had a good average inter-item correlation of .36 (after the appropriate question reversals were made). This supports the notion that they tap a common ideological dimension, interpretable here as dislike for an egalitarian society, and the favouring of restrictive measures to prevent such a society evolving. This scale had a correlation of $r=.84$ with RWA score, which Altemeyer refers to as "one of the strongest ever discovered in the behavioural sciences" (personal correspondence, 30/04/92).

The RWA scale, and the literature that accompanies it, appears to be the best work on the measurement of what has been defined as authoritarianism in this thesis, as well as the best measure of authoritarianism in general in the current literature. What is the justification of such a statement as this? How can we judge the worthiness of this scale? There are several criteria in psychometric research with which to evaluate it:

Face Validity

A scale has face validity if "knowledgeable persons [can] be persuaded that [it] is a valid indicator of the concept" (Manheim & Rich 1991, p. 67). On the surface, how much do the questions in the test appear to conform to the three components of authoritarianism listed above? Of course even experts disagree, and such things will always be a matter of opinion. The reader is invited to look through the items of the scale in Appendix One, in order to form their own opinion. One study can also be interpreted as attesting to the face validity of the scale. Students at the University of Western Ontario were asked to fill out the questionnaire as they thought Adolf Hitler would have. On the basis of this test, "Adolf Hitler" was very much a right-wing authoritarian, scoring, on the average, a very high 145.2 out of 168¹ (Altemeyer 1981, p. 210). This suggests that the students recognised the pro-authoritarian statements in the test as the sort of thing that Hitler would have agreed with, and

¹ 168 was the highest score on the 1973 version of the test. The larger number of items, and the adoption of a nine point scale means that later versions of the scale had 270 as the maximum possible score.

also recognised the anti-authoritarian statements as things that he would have disagreed with.

Construct Validity

How much do scores on the RWA scale correlate with variables that authoritarianism should theoretically be related to? There have been many such tests of "construct validity", some of which were done with the original 1973 version of the test. Firstly, RWA scores had an average correlation of .55 with the acceptance of government injustices against their opponents, like for example, the use of illegal wiretaps or the blocking of peaceful protest (1981, pp. 189-192)¹. There was a relationship between RWA score, and the acceptance of law as a basis for morality (as opposed to things such as conscience as the basis of law). This relationship had an Eta-squared of 37.8% which is equal to a correlation of about $r=.60$ (1988, p. 9). High scorers on the RWA scale were also more likely to impose longer prison sentences in pretend sentencing situations ($r=.45$), particularly if the criminal was unconventional in some way. They also tended to have more dislike for the criminal, and reported more satisfaction and pleasure at being able to impose such punishment on them (1988, p.10).

Scores on the RWA scale do not just correlate with pencil and paper measures of authoritarianism. RWA scores were found to correlate ($r=.43$) with electric shocks given in a modified (and more ethical) version of Milgram's experiment (1981, p. 201). A relationship was also found between RWA score and the support for right-wing political parties, although this relationships was not quite as high as might be expected (.20 to .30). However, it was about twice as high among students who reported that they were interested in politics (1988, p. 11)². Most of these tests, with the exception of the shocking experiment, were later repeated on four alternate samples, those being 113 students at the University of North Dakota, 148 students at the University of Alberta, 172 students at the University of Western Ontario, and 56 non-student males in Winnipeg, Canada. Similar results were also obtained in these samples (1981, pp. 208-211). The studies in the second part of this chapter, which show that the RWA scale correlates with male dominance and militarism, can also be interpreted as indications of construct validity.

¹ Among American university students, there was also a correlation of .48 between RWA score, and the time that it had taken for them to be convinced of Nixon's guilt in the Watergate scandal (Altemeyer 1981, p. 226).

² In addition, tests done on politicians show large differences in RWA scores between legislators of left- and right-wing parties (Altemeyer 1988, Chpt. 7)

Alpha Reliability

What is the alpha reliability of this scale, or in other words, how much do the items correlate together to form a consistent measure? In Altemeyer's original studies, the initial version of the scale had an alpha of .88, with an average inter-item correlation of .23 (1981, p. 181). In the four other samples mentioned above the alphas were .84 (average inter-item correlation=.18) at the University of North Dakota, the University of Alberta, and the University of Western Ontario, and .85 (average inter-item correlation=.19) among the sample of non-student Winnipeg males (pp. 209-11). Among later studies with the expanded 30 item version, the scale has always achieved an alpha of at least .86, and an average inter-item correlation of .18 or over (1981, p. 218).

These results have also been confirmed in other studies. Ray (1985) found that the scale had an alpha of .89 when administered to a random sample of 84 people interviewed door to door in Brisbane, Australia (p. 272). J.H. Duckitt found that the scale had an alpha reliability of .93 when administered to a sample of 212 South African students from the University of Natal (reported in Altemeyer 1988, p. 14). Moghaddam & Vuksanovic (1990) found an alpha of .89 when the scale was tested on 155 students at McGill University in Montreal, Canada. Crandall & Biernat (1990) find an alpha of .83 (average inter-item correlation=.25) when tests were done on 63 students of an unspecified liberal arts college in the American Northeast, although they use an unspecified selection of only 15 of the scale's items. One of the lowest alphas found when tested on an English speaking sample was that found by Heaven (1984). The scale was found to have an alpha of .81 among 52 Australian students, although the same researcher also found an alpha of .90 among 130 adults. Finally, Walker & Quinsey (1992) found an alpha of .93 among a combined sample of 198 student and non-student Canadian males.

The scale has also been found to have similar reliability when translated versions of the test are administered to non-English speaking samples. J. Schneider found a very high alpha of .94 when a translated version of the scale was administered to 70 West German students (reported in Altemeyer 1988, p. 14). An initial experiment using a translated version of the RWA scale among 226 students of Moscow State University showed a relatively poor inter-item correlation of .12 (alpha=.81), although Altemeyer speculates that this may have been due to the poor administration procedures and a poor translation (personal correspondence, 10/05/92). An independent replication by McFarland, Ageyev, & Abalakina (1990) obtained a very high average inter-item correlation of .27 (alpha=.92) among a quota sample made up of 200 citizens of Moscow and 200 citizens of Estonia.

But the greatest average alpha reliability scores have been found among politicians. In an initial set of studies using Canadian legislators, Altemeyer (1988) found average inter-item correlations ranging from .40 to .50, and alphas ranging from .88 to .97. In an initial study of American legislators, average inter-item correlations of from .34 to .52 were found, along with alphas ranging from .94 to .97 (chpt. 7). A later series of studies among American legislators also found a similar range of results (personal correspondence, 30/04/92).

Unidimensionality

The RWA scale has always been found to have high unidimensionality. The 1973 version of the scale was subject to a factor analysis. Only one factor was extracted, and this accounted for 23% of the variance on this measure. Almost all of the items had $\geq .40$ loadings on this factor (Altemeyer 1981, p. 188). In later studies, the first factor was generally shown to account for about 25%-30% of the test's variance (p. 218). In an independent replication, Tarr & Lorr (1991) report that in their tests, the first factor accounted for "50% of the common variance" (p. 311). Finally, Walker & Quinsey (1992) report that the results of their factor analysis supported Altemeyer's three point conceptualisation of authoritarianism, but give no further details.

Test/Retest Reliability

To what degree does the RWA scale give consistent values for people, even when administered to the same subjects at different times? The test/retest reliability for the RWA is .95 for one week (Altemeyer 1988, p. 311) and .85 for 28 weeks (Tarr & Lorr 1991, p. 308). Over a much longer period of 12 years there is also such a correlation, although it is substantially lower. In 1986, Altemeyer sent out 160 copies of the RWA scale to people who had completed the same test in 1974. Among the 90 who returned completed questionnaires, there was a correlation of .62 between scores in 1974 and scores in 1986 (Altemeyer 1988, pp. 95-97).

Given then that we can then use the RWA scale as a valid measure of authoritarianism as it has been conceptualised so far in this thesis, what has been its relationship to militarism and male dominance?

Authoritarianism and Militarism

Militarism in General

There has been some success in correlating scores on the RWA scale to factors relating to war and militarism. Firstly, the RWA scale correlates with negative attitudes towards other cultural groups. The RWA scale was found to correlate at $r=.27$ with a fourteen item prejudice scale among Canadian students, and a figure of $r=.43$ was found among a sample of their parents (Altemeyer 1981, pp. 238-9). Using a later expanded 20 item version of this prejudice scale, the figures were now $r=.30$ for students and $r=.45$ for their parents (Altemeyer 1988, p. 108-9). These findings were also confirmed in South Africa, where J.H. Duckitt found that RWA scores correlated $r=.53$ to $r=.69$ with various measures of anti-black prejudice among whites in that country (reported in Altemeyer 1988, p. 15). Finally, in February 1991, Altemeyer sent out 727 surveys to legislators in Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, South Carolina, Vermont, and Washington. Contained in this survey was a copy of the RWA scale, as well as a 12 item ethnocentrism scale. 205 were returned (28%), and within this sample, there was a correlation of $r=.40$ between RWA score and scores on the ethnocentrism scale.

Secondly, in 1989 and 1990, Altemeyer and an acquaintance at Moscow State University tested the relationship between RWA and scales designed to test the nationalistic "mirror image" perceptions that people often have with regards to both their own and another country. Subjects in the United States and the former Soviet Union were given a copy of the RWA scale (in their own language). Also used in the experiment were two versions of what was called the "Mirror Image" scale. One version asked students to rate their level of agreement or disagreement with statements that were biased in the American direction, while the other version had statements biased in the Russian direction. At each site, subjects were randomly given one of the two versions. There was a moderately strong tendency for authoritarians to favour their own country and a tendency to dislike the other. These relationships were .38, .40, and .47 for the American Universities in the study, and .46 for Moscow State University (Altemeyer, personal correspondence, 30/04/92). A note of caution is required here, because this is the aforementioned study in which the RWA scale was found to have a low alpha score among the Moscow students, possibly due to poor administrative procedures. The probable fault in the administration procedure was getting the students to fill in the questionnaires while they were meant to be listening to a lecture. However, Altemeyer writes that while this probably caused measurement error or "noise" in the test, the results obtained may have been higher if testing conditions had been more ideal (personal correspondence, 28/05/92).

But racism and mirror-image perceptions are not exactly militarism, although they may be contributing factors. What is the evidence for a relationship between RWA score and specific measures of militarism as it has been defined in this thesis? In one experiment, groups of Canadian male students who had RWA scale scores in either the lower or higher quartile (i.e. the top or bottom 25%) were asked to play the part of NATO in a role-playing game involving a situation of conflict with the Warsaw Pact. Participants played the game by hearing the moves that the "other side" had made and responded to them by making a choice from a list of actions, each of which had an associated level of "threat points". (In reality, the "other side" was played by the experimenters). It was found that members of the high RWA teams used a much higher level of threat than did low RWA teams (Altemeyer 1988, p. 196-7). This difference had a significance of $p < .001$ (Altemeyer, personal correspondence, 17/04/92).

In similar series of tests, participants were told that the NATO side had developed a perfect "Star Wars" defense shield. Once again, teams of high and low RWA scoring male students served as subjects. It was found that when the low RWA teams thought that they were safe behind a defense shield they were, as expected, very peaceful. However, the high RWA scorers who had a perfect defense shield advanced 50 times more "threat points" than the low RWA teams, and this difference was significant ($t=2.03$, $p < .05$). Post-experimental interviews suggested that the high RWA teams enjoyed "being the bully" now that they realised they could not be hurt. As one member of a high RWA team was quoted as saying: "We had all the power, and we wanted them to kiss our asses" (Altemeyer, personal correspondence, 30/04/92)¹.

These are tests which measure the relationship of RWA score to militarism in general. What is the relationship of high RWA scores to the specific features of militarism as it has been defined in this thesis?

Unnecessary/Sadistic Violence Against the Enemy, and Submission to Military Leaders

The desire of one of the students in the last test to make the opposing side "kiss our asses" can perhaps be taken as an initial indication that high RWA subjects would tend to favour the use of unnecessary or sadistic violence against the "enemy" during wartime. In addition, recall from earlier in the chapter that the 1973 version of the RWA scale had a relationship with the willingness to administer electric

¹ In another experimental condition, teams were told that the Warsaw Pact were on the verge of setting one up their own "Star Wars" shield, while NATO did not have one. Under these conditions, there was a non-significant difference between the threats made by the high and low RWA teams

shocks to another person. While there has been no research on the relationship between the RWA scale and the willingness to commit specifically military atrocities, there certainly appears to be no evidence to suggest that authoritarians would *not* be inclined to commit such acts.

Two further studies also support the notion that authoritarians would be more likely to use unnecessary and sadistic violence in war, and suggest that such people would also be inclined to submit to a commanding officer in such a situation. While these studies are not completely relevant to a wartime situation because they deal with conflict against groups within the same society, we can reasonably expect that there will be some correspondence. Canadian students (n=584) and their parents (n=203) were given the RWA scale and were then presented with two hypothetical situations. In the first situation, they were asked how likely they would be to engage in six anti-communist actions if the government decided to abolish the communist party. The actions that they were asked to rate were as follows:

- (1) *I would tell my friends and neighbours it was a good law*
- (2) *I would tell the police about any Communists I knew.*
- (3) *If asked by the police, I would help hunt down and arrest Communists.*
- (4) *I would participate in attacks on Communist headquarters organized by the proper authorities.*
- (5) *I would support the use of physical force to make Communists reveal the identity of other Communists.*
- (6) *I would support the execution of Communist leaders if the government insisted it was necessary to protect Canada.*

The responses to these six questions were summed to form an overall scale of anti-communist action ($\alpha=.91$ for the students, $.92$ for the parents). In the second situation, they were asked about their level of support for six similar anti-homosexual actions, should the government pass a similar law aimed at homosexuals. Once again the responses to these six questions were summed to form a scale of overall anti-homosexual action ($\alpha=.92$ for both students and parents). Questions three to six on these scales appear to be clear measures of authoritarian aggression against people seen as the "enemy", while questions one to four and six can be interpreted as specifically measuring the level of compliance, and submission to commanding authorities in such situations.

Among the students, RWA scores correlated as expected with the items on anti-communist action scale ($r=.52$), and as expected with the items on the anti-homosexual action scale ($r=.42$). This supports the assertion that authoritarians favour the use of sadistic and/or unnecessary violence against people seen as "enemies", and are more likely to submit to authority in the course of such actions.

The results were very similar in the parent study, with high RWA subjects scoring significantly higher on both the anti-communist action scale ($r=.49$) and on the anti-homosexual action scale ($r=.52$, Altemeyer 1988, p. 114-7). These studies did not deal with behaviour in a war situation, but it appears valid to conclude that the results would be similar if the government decided to take action against an external "enemy".

Tendency Towards Imperialism

There has only been one relevant study that looked at the relationship between RWA score and measures of what can be termed "imperialism". This was conducted among 163 adults in Moscow during May and June of 1991. It was found that that a translated version of the RWA scale was able to predict whether someone supported the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the use of military force to stop this from happening. There were significant negative relationships between approval for the Baltic vote for independence and RWA score ($r=-.47$), as well as between RWA score and approval ratings of Georgian youths who refused to serve in the former Soviet army ($r=.47$). Finally, there was also a significant correlation ($r=.41$) between RWA score and approval of the Soviet army crackdown in the Baltics (McFarland Ageyev & Abalakina 1991¹; McFarland, personal correspondence, 13/06/92).

Authoritarianism and Male Dominance

Male Dominance in General

In a study not using the RWA scale, Rigby (1988) finds a relationship between another authoritarianism scale and his own "sexism" scale among 117 Australian school children. He then subjects his data to a factor analysis, and examines the resulting factor structure. He concluded that while sexism may not be a central component of authoritarianism, it appears to be an "aspect" of it. With regards to the relationship between RWA score and male dominance, an initial test worth mentioning was conducted by Altemeyer in February 1991. In this study, 644 legislators in Connecticut, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Wyoming were sent a survey containing a copy of the RWA scale and an additional question on abortion. Among the 163 (25%) surveys that were returned, high RWA

¹ Soon after presenting this paper, Vladimir Ageyev was to suddenly become much more directly involved in the aspects of political psychology that he was studying. During the August 1991 coup attempt, Ageyev and his wife were part of the "human shield" which formed outside the Russian Parliament in an effort to stop the armed forces from capturing Boris Yeltsin (Altemeyer, personal correspondence, 11/05/92).

scores were significantly associated with disapproval of abortion ($r=.60$, personal correspondence, 30/04/91). However, while abortion is considered very much a women's right issue by some, it has little overlap with the specific definition of male dominance used in this thesis. What has been the relationship of the RWA scale to other measures of male dominance?

Walker & Quinsey (1992) was one study which investigated the relationship between RWA score and a specific measure of sexism, although these tests were only run with male subjects. Among the aforementioned sample of 198 Canadian males, they found a correlation of $.78$ ($p<.001$) between RWA score and scores on Kalin & Tilby's (1978) "Sex-Role Ideology Scale". In addition, this study found a significant relationship ($.36$, $p<.001$, $n=177$) between scores on the RWA scale and scores on the "Hostility Towards Women" scale of Check et al. (1985). However, some caution is advised here. The "Hostility Towards Women" scale was found to have a low alpha in this study ($.78$), and some men reported finding certain of its questions ambiguous and hard to answer.

The most recent test of the relationship between RWA score and a measure of male dominance within a mixed sex-sample was conducted in January 1992. In this test, the RWA scale was administered to 355 University of Manitoba students, along with Spence & Helmreich's "Attitudes Towards Women" scale (1972), a copy of which can be seen in Appendix One. A correlation of $.58$ ($p<.001$) was found between these two scales (Altemeyer, personal correspondence, 30/04/92 & 11/05/92). Spence & Helmreich's scale had a high alpha ($.89$) on this administration, showing that the questions all tended to correlate together as expected. How does this measure correspond with the definition of male dominance as it has been defined in this thesis, and what other tests have been performed that relate to our three point definition of male dominance?

Violence Against Women

There are no questions on the Spence & Helmreich scale that appear to measure male aggression against women. Fortunately, there are four alternative studies that we can turn to. Altemeyer (1988) asked males taking part in one of his 1984 experiments a question designed to test the relationship of sexual frustration to RWA score, although the question can also be interpreted as one that measures the infliction of violence on women. The question was, in effect, a Guttman scale of rape, and males were asked to tick one of four alternate responses. The first alternative was to admit that they had raped a woman. Ticking the second option indicated that the respondent had forced a woman to have sex with him after she said "No", because they believed that she did not mean it. Men who ticked the third

option were those who admitted that they had used alcohol, drugs, or social pressure to manipulate a unwilling woman into having sex. Finally, men ticked the fourth option if they had done none of the above. The responses on this question had no relationship to RWA score, although this is a result that may be due to the small number of men in the sample (n=65). None of the subjects ticked the first two options, and only 12% (8) ticked the manipulation option. 82% (53) said that they had done none of them, while 6% (4) did not answer the question (pp. 163-4). The null-result may also have been due to the lack of subtlety of the question, a possibility supported by the findings of the next study.

A more sophisticated study with a larger sample of men did find a relationship between RWA score, and the likelihood of admitting to rape. This was the Walker & Quinsey (1992) study among the 198 Canadian males. In this study, a relationship of $r=.26$ ($p<.001$) was found between RWA score and the responses to questions developed by Koss & Oros (1982) that assess whether the respondent has committed the legal definition of rape, without actually naming the crime. Walker & Quinsey found that 4.5% (n=9) of the men in their sample had engaged in behaviours that meet the legal definition of rape in some North American jurisdictions, while 4% (n=8) reported behaviours that could be considered attempted rape. In addition, there was a correlation of $r=.18$ ($p<.05$) between RWA score and responses to a question asking subjects if they would be likely to force a woman to have sex in the future, if they could be sure that they would not be detected or punished. Once again, the word "rape" was not used, and 14.1% (n=28) of men in the sample responded affirmatively to this question. Finally, there was a higher correlation of $r=.54$ ($p<.001$) between RWA score and scores on the "Rape Myth Acceptance" scale of Burt (1980). High scorers on this scale are those who have negative views of women who have been raped, believing, for example, that they are untrustworthy or like being raped.

A third study of interest was that done by Altemeyer on legislators in the American states of Georgia, Indiana, Massachusetts, and New Mexico. In March 1991, 694 surveys were sent to these people, of which 181 were eventually returned (26%). As well as including a copy of the RWA scale, the survey also contained two other questions, one related to abuse of wives and another related to gun control. Legislators who scored high on the RWA scale were less likely ($r=-.19$, $p<.001$) to agree with the statement "Wife abuse is one of the most serious problems in our country today" (personal correspondence, 30/04/92).

Finally, another result also suggests that there is a relationship between the RWA score of students and the amount of male violence against women within their own families. During tests in January 1985, Altemeyer (1988) asked students to

detail the acts of physical violence that had occurred in their family during the past year, excluding "minor spankings" for child misbehaviour. 21 of the high quartile RWA students in his sample reported that there had been violence between their mother and father, while similar violence was observed by only five lower quartile RWA students. In 20 of the 26 incidents, the violence had been inflicted on the mother by the father (p. 191). Considering that Altemeyer had earlier shown there to be a relationship (usually about $r=.40$) between the RWA scores of parents and offspring (p. 64), this study can be interpreted as showing that there is more violence against women in high RWA families. But Altemeyer does not attempt to test the significance of these results, and also cautions us that the majority of both low and high RWA students reported no such violence whatsoever. Also, as he notes, high RWA parents who are violent may also produce rebellious low RWA children, further distorting the results of such tests (p. 191).

Women's Submission to Men

In chapter two, it was suggested that the extent to which women have submitted internally to male dominance could be measured by their level of self-esteem. While there has been no research on the relationship between women's self-esteem and the RWA scale, the January 1992 study with the Spence & Helmreich scale can be interpreted to show that high RWA students of both sexes tend to believe in customs which may signify female submission. Items 7 ("obey" clause in marriage), 16 (father's authority over children), and 25 (freedom of girls) can be interpreted as items measuring agreement or disagreement with these customs of submission. Although they only form a small part of the scale, it will be mentioned again that this scale had a high alpha, and that it can also be pointed out that these three questions had good average inter-item correlations with the other items. These correlations were .43, .58, and .39 respectively. For this reason, we can say that the students who scored high on the whole scale would also have tended to score highly on these three questions. Understandably, women showed themselves to be less sexist on this test (mean score=62.3) than males (mean score=86.5), but the relationship between the scale and RWA score is almost identical for both men ($r=.60$) and women ($r=.59$). This suggests that both men and women who score highly on the RWA scale are likely to favour customs of female submission.

Exploitative Hierarchy over Women

A number of the questions on the Spence & Helmreich scale appear to be measures of a belief in a male dominated political and social structure. These are items 2 (women in leadership), 10 (women's rights), and 20 (men's intellectual leadership). A number of items on the scale also appear to measure the the level of

belief in female economic equality. These are items 8 (sex discrimination at work), 12 (women in business and professions), 18 (law of family property), 21 (economic and social freedom), 22 (women's contribution to economic production), 23 (male preference in hiring/promotion), and 24 (women in apprenticeships). The average inter-item correlations of all of these questions tended to be reasonably high. For the political structure questions, they were .35, .63, and .66 respectively, while the economic questions had average inter-item correlations of .47, .45, .41, .32, .59, .53, and .62 respectively. Once again, the high correlation that this scale had with RWA score suggests that authoritarian people tend to believe in an economic and political structure biased in favour of males. Recall that the March 1991 study on legislators also found a negative relationship between RWA score and a scale measuring belief in equality, which included a question on the equal rights amendment (ERA).

These tests reveal strong support for our main hypotheses, but only deal with people living in modern industrialised nation-states. What are the relationships when people from a wider selection of cultural types are studied? This question will be dealt with in the next three chapters.

Chapter Four: Past Cross-Cultural Research

Cross-cultural correlative research is the process of taking codings done on one trait or variable for a sample of cultures and comparing them statistically to another variable or variables coded for the same sample. To compile these codes, ethnologists spent months, or more usually years reporting on remote and possibly now extinct tribes. Later, researchers and research assistants painstakingly read and coded their accounts for whatever specific trait or traits they were interested in. Unless otherwise specified, the studies below use samples composed of societies from a wide variation of cultural types, ranging from tribes of hunters and gatherers, to feudal societies, peasant communities, and empires. They will be grouped together under the common term "non-industrial". There are a number of methodological concerns that researchers like to take into account while doing pieces of cross-cultural research, and some of the studies in this chapter will be critiqued on this basis. However, a full description of these concerns will have to wait until chapter five, when we describe the methodology of this particular study.

Hypothesis One

The major relationships of interest in this study are those of authoritarianism to militarism, and authoritarianism to male dominance. However, authoritarianism as such has not been studied in the anthropological literature. As was mentioned in the first chapter, the bulk of the past research that is relevant to this thesis concerns the male dominance/militarism relationship. It is for this reason that this sub-hypothesis is discussed first.

(a) Male Dominance Associated with Militarism

As may be recalled, male dominance is said to exist when there is real or "pretend" male violence against women, when women display submissive behaviour towards men, and when there is an exploitative hierarchical social structure with men in a higher average position. An initial set of studies suggests a strong connection between war and male dominated social structures, but also suggests that the relationship may be more complex than a simple linear relationship. These studies emerge from a theory proposed by Van Velzen & Van Wetering (1960). They proposed that the existence in a society of "fraternal interest groups", or groups created by related males living together, increase the chances that the society will be warlike.

There are a number of common customs that often cluster together in uncentralised societies to produce fraternal interest groups. Patrilocality, or the custom of moving to the husband's community after marriage, is the first custom that leads to related males living near each other. Patrilineality, or the reckoning of descent through the male line, also contributes to this process. Thirdly, there is the custom of polygyny. As was mentioned in the second chapter, this is the practice of having more than one wife. This contributes to fraternal interest groups by having numbers of half brothers living with each other. Finally, there is the custom of bride-price, or the custom of husbands having to buy a wife from her family. Like patrilocality, this is a custom associated with women moving between communities to marry, while the men stay unified in the same place.

How then does fraternal interest group strength relate to the three point definition of male dominance used in this thesis? It is assumed here that the male solidarity created by fraternal interest groups creates a situation of "divide and rule" with regards to women, thus ensuring male dominance. In addition, patrilocality has also been cited as a contributing factor to domestic violence against women because it isolates a woman from their nearest relatives who might otherwise be there to protect her (Collier 1974, p. 93; Harris 1989, p. 318). As will be seen later in this chapter, Sanday's (1981a) findings imply that women only achieve a high level of power when they form solidarity groups of their own. Confirming the assumption that fraternal interest groups are related to a lower political participation for women, Ross (1986a) finds that a measure of fraternal interest group strength (using codings of Paige & Paige 1981, and codes from his own dataset: Ross 1983), correlates significantly with lower female non-participation in political activity ($r = -.26, p < .05, n = 82$, 1986a, p. 848).

What is the evidence that fraternal interest groups are more warlike? Significant relationships have been found between fraternal interest groups and the

presence of feuding within a community (Otterbein & Otterbein 1965), as well as between fraternal interest groups and internal war, or war that occurs within a culture (Otterbein [1980]). However, because of the concern in this thesis with imperialistic warfare, these studies may not be useful. Imperialistic warfare implies war on a larger scale than the war that would normally occur within a culture. Perhaps there is still an authoritarian desire for subjugative conquest in internal war and feuding, but this is not made clear in these studies. A clearer indication that war is directed towards imperialist goals is perhaps when the war is against external targets. A study that does correlate fraternal interest groups and external war is that of Ross (1985). He shows that cultures which feature fraternal interest groups (using the aforementioned Paige & Paige codes) tend to score highly on scales that measures the extent of conflict, hostility, and the incidence and acceptability of violence directed against both those in the same culture ($r=.26$, $p<.01$, $n=90$, p. 552) and against those in other cultures ($r=.24$, $p<.01$, $n=87$, p. 552).

However, some studies have suggested that external war is also associated with matrilocality (Ember & Ember 1971; Divale Chamberis & Gangloff 1976). Matrilocality is the opposite of patrilocality, and refers to the custom of the husband moving to live with the bride's family or village after marriage. In addition, Divale, Chamberis, & Gangloff's paper also suggests that matrilocal cultures tend to go to war more frequently ($\text{Tau}=.46$, $p<.01$, $n=25$, p. 70) and tend to have shorter periods during which there is peace ($\text{Ø}=.57$, $p<.01$, $n=22$, p. 72). This is perhaps lending support to the hypothesis, discussed in chapter one, that male absence due to war produces women-centred structures in the absence of men. These studies will therefore be touched upon later during a discussion of the third hypothesis.

Fraternal interest group theory aside, four other studies have also looked at the male dominance/militarism relationship. The first one, Hayden et al. (1986), examined several hypotheses about a number of factors thought to be important in determining the status of women in non-industrial societies. They use only a small sample ($n=33$), and the fact that they only use hunting and gathering cultures probably reduces the universality of their findings. They measure the overall status of women in a society using an index that utilises judgements of women's domestic status and women's public political status. They find a significant correlation ($\text{Ø}=.53$, $p<.05$) between the low status of women, as measured by this two point index, and deaths due to war and homicide (as opposed to things like natural disaster and disease)¹. They explain this connection, as was mentioned in chapter one, by claiming that males become more important in times of war. Once again, though,

¹ This correlation was originally reported as having a value of $\text{Ø}=.63$ ($p<.004$, p. 459) although this was later found to be a mistake (Hayden, personal correspondence, 07/11/91).

this study only looks at deaths due to war in general, and not at deaths due to imperialistic war.

Ross (1986a) is a second study that also demonstrates this relationship within a much more representative sample of cultures, and with codes that specifically measure external war. Ross codes a sample of cultures for a number of variables in order to study the dynamics of politics in non-industrial cultures. After a factor analysis, he concludes that there are two separate dimensions of women's political participation: Firstly, there is female public participation in general, and then there is a second independent dimension of the existence of separate associations, organisations, or positions that are reserved for and under the exclusive control of women (p. 846). The scale measuring female public political participation correlates as expected with a scale measuring the extent of conflict, hostility, incidence, and acceptability of violence directed against those in another cultures ($r=-.27$, $p<.01$, $n=82$, p. 848). However, there is no relationship between this external warfare scale and a variable measuring the existence of separate female political organisations¹.

The next three studies also touch on the relationship between male dominance and war, although technical flaws may reduce their validity. A study that offers ambiguous results is that of Whyte (1978). Whyte compiled a dataset composed of 52 gender related variables for a sample of cultures ($n=93$) in order to examine the position of women in non-industrial societies. Among other things, Whyte firstly wanted to see if there is a single dimension of the status of women, or if there are several independent dimensions as Lowie (1920, pp. 186-7) had proposed. He therefore subjected these 52 dependent variables to a cluster analysis, and concluded that nine separate sub-scales of female status existed among them.

One of these scales is a clear measure of the absence or presence of female economic exploitation. This is a scale that Whyte calls the *Property Control* scale, and contains variables measuring female inheritance rights, dwelling ownership, and control of the fruits of male and female labour (p. 98). However, none of his eight other scales is clearly interpretable as measuring the other two components of male aggression against women or women's submissive behaviour towards men, even though many of the 52 gender related variables are clearly relevant to these two

¹ However, these results change when Ross performs multiple regression. The relationship between external war and female public participation and war falls slightly but remains significant. Now though we also find a significant relationship between external war and the absence of separate female political organisations. However, multiple regression is not the correct technique to use with the ordinal-level data that Ross uses, unless the data is converted into two-point "dummy" variables (Norusis 1985, p. 9; Manheim & Rich 1991, p. 274). Highloglinear regression is the correct technique for use with ordinal data, and it is not known how much this choice of the incorrect technique has influenced the results. Ross also uses Pearson's R statistic in the testing of his results. This is also a statistic not intended for use with ordinal data which means that, strictly speaking, Ross should also not have used it (see Andrews et al. 1974, p. 6).

concepts. Whyte had formed his nine scales as a necessary step to reduce the number of tests that he would have to perform. However, this also means that variables that are perhaps relevant to this thesis are always combined with other irrelevant variables for the running of his tests.

Whyte then runs these nine scales against a large number of other variables that he suspects may have an influence on the status of women. One of these is a variable measuring the frequency of intercommunity warfare. Warfare frequency has no significant correlation with the *Property Control* scale, although it does with two other scales. One of these is called the *Joint Participation* scale which has a significant correlation in the direction expected, meaning that warfare tends to be associated with less participation of women in warfare, more work segregation, and less involvement of women in meetings and gatherings (Gamma=-.45, $p < .05$). This could be interpreted as being a scale of female political status although, as will be seen, this scale is problematic. On the other hand, a scale called the *Domestic Authority* scale disconfirms the hypothesis. It suggests that war frequency is associated with female authority over infants and children, and the absence of a belief that husbands should dominate their wives (Gamma=.44, $p < .05$, p. 130).

It is hard to interpret these results within the framework of this thesis. While there are many variables of relevance to the theory used here, the other variables that they were combined with within the scales confuse the results that we can draw from them. On the other hand, does the fact that all of the variables of interest did not congregate together in the same cluster, invalidate the three point model of male dominance mentioned in the first chapter? These tests will have to be rerun in the next chapter using more carefully chosen variables. Before we leave these results, however, it is worth pointing out that Whyte makes a methodological mistake in the running of one of these tests: A warfare variable, Women's Participation in Warfare, is used to make up a scale, (the *Joint Participation* scale), which is then run against another warfare variable. Cultures in which there was no warfare were regarded as missing values for this variable, meaning that it, in effect, becomes a variable which indicates the presence of war. Whyte then runs a warfare variable against a scale which includes another warfare variable and, not surprisingly, finds a correlation. In addition, bear in mind that Whyte uses a measure of war frequency in general, and not a specific measure of imperialistic warfare.

Like Whyte, Sanday (1981a) compiles codings for a dataset of cultures (n=156) as part of a study into the position of women in non-industrial societies. Sanday uses two scales to measure the overall status of women in a culture. The first is a Guttman scale measuring female political and economic power and was based on a scale found in an earlier piece of work by the same writer (Sanday 1974). Each

culture ranges on this scale from 0 to 6 depending on the presence of the following six traits:

- (0) =No indicators of female power present (lowest female power level)
- (1) =*Flexible marriage mores*
- (2) =(1) + *Females producing non-domestic goods*
- (3) =(1), (2), + *Demand for female produce*
- (4) =(1), (2), (3), + *Female economic control*
- (5) =(1), (2), (3), (4), + *Female political participation*
- (6) =(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), + *Female Solidarity Groups* (highest female power level)

She reports a coefficient of reproducibility for this scale of .91 (1981a, p. 251). As can be seen, it appears to be a clear measure of the presence or absence of an exploitative gender-based hierarchy. A second measure is another Guttman scale, this time measuring male aggression. The items of this scale are:

- (0) =No indicators of male aggression present (lowest level of male aggression)
- (1) =*Ideology of male toughness*
- (2) =(1) + *Separate places for men*
- (3) =(1), (2), + *Interpersonal violence moderate or frequent*
- (4) =(1), (2), (3), + *Rape institutionalised or reported as more than occasional*
- (5) =(1), (2), (3), (4), + *Wives taken from hostile groups* (highest male aggression level)

She reports a coefficient of reproducibility for this scale of .90 (p. 254). Items on this scale appear to be measures of the extent of both real and "pretend" violence against women. Sanday then combines these two scales to produce an overall male dominance measure. The cultures in her sample range on this measure from equality of sexes (33%), to some real or "mythical" male dominance (38%), to sexual inequality (29%). As may be remembered from chapter two, the term "mythical male dominance" comes from the work of Rogers (1975).

Using this combined scale, Sanday finds that warfare is more likely to be chronic or endemic in societies where there is high male dominance (Chi squared=10.76, df=2, p=.005, p. 174). Sanday, though, appears to make the same mistake as Whyte in the running of her tests. One of the variables on the male aggression scale, that of wives being taken from hostile groups, also seems to be a measure of warfare. Because this variable was used to make up the male aggression scale, which was then used to make up this combined scale, it is may be technically invalid to run this combined scale against a warfare variable. In doing so, she may have artificially inflated the correlation. However, the fact that the rape and male toughness variables tended to scale together with the war variable on the male aggression scale in the first place, can in itself be considered support for this hypothesis. In a second study that uses the same dataset, Sanday (1981b) reports that

the incidence of rape, considered here to be a measure of violence against women, has some correlation with the incidence of war ($r=.21$, $p=.03$, p. 23). A final thing which should be pointed out about these studies is that, once again, the researcher uses a measure of war frequency in general and not a measure of imperialistic warfare.

A final work that will be mentioned in the discussion of this first hypothesis is that of Textor (1967). This book, as will be seen, has some major limitations which reduce confidence in any results that we obtain from it. In any case, a discussion of this book is also useful as an introduction to some of the complexities of cross-cultural research. Textor's study is a book called *A Cross-Cultural Summary*, and is one of the most comprehensive pieces of cross-cultural correlative work ever, (weighing nine pounds). As the title suggests, it is a summary of many pieces of cross-cultural research. To produce the book, Textor compiled most works up to that time that had coded a variable, or set of variables for a sample of cultures. The results from these separate studies were combined into a standardised coding format. This produced a dataset containing 500 variables stretching across 400 non-industrial societies, (although the samples used in the different studies varied, meaning that not all variables were coded for all of the different cultures). Textor then ran Phi (Φ) correlations between all the variables using a computer program which performed what is called "The Pattern Search and Table Translation Technique". This automatically reported the 20,000 correlations that had a significance level of $p<.10$ (90% level of confidence) and also translated these correlations into plain English sentences. What results is a tool for use in the preliminary testing of hypothesis about non-industrial societies.

However, there are two methodological concerns that Textor's study did not properly address. The first is that the cases in the sample are not "pinpointed", an issue that will be discussed in the first part of chapter five. This need not trouble us here, because this tends to have a randomising effect. If anything, this reduces the overall number of correlations that we should find, including any that arise purely by chance. Thus we should have more confidence in the correlations that do occur. The second difficulty is that a study which contains as many correlations as Textor cannot possibly do proper tests of what is called Galton's Problem, and we will again have to wait until later chapters to deal with this. Textor is appropriate for spotting broad trends and for preliminary testing of hypothesis, although more rigorous and definitive testing will have to wait.

What then can Textor tell us about this first hypothesis? There are three sets of codings in this study which Textor defines as relating to women, all of which come from Simmons (1945). These are the variables:

- (277) The status of women (inferior or subjected),
- (278) The existence of property rights in women,
- (279) The existence of wife-lending.

The lack of a codebook on Simmon's part has lead some to reject his status of women code (277) out of hand (Whyte 1978; p. 9, Levinson & Malone 1980; p. 268). Simmon's code appears to be merely a subjective judgement of the status of women by outside ethnographers. As will be seen in chapter five, such codings are of dubious value.

In any case, it is clear that Textor gives a narrow definition as to what a women-related variable is, and there are number of other variables in the **Summary** that are conceivably indicative of male dominance as it was defined in chapter one. For this reason, additional variables were selected according to this three point definition of male dominance. These are:

- (204) Patrilocality
- (242) Occurrence of polygyny
- (254) Household authority on father's side¹

Patrilocality (204) and polygyny (242) were discussed above as being possibly indicative of male control and solidarity, while the household authority variable (254) appears to be a measure of the presence of male dominance in the domestic sphere.

There are five variables in the study that Textor defines as relating to the the broad concept of warfare and aggression, and that are actually successful in correlating with other variables. They are:

- (417) The prevalence of warfare.
- (419) The emphasis put on military glory
- (420) The level of bellicosity
- (421) The existence of killing, torturing or mutilating of enemy tribespeople
- (422) The existence of cannibalism²

Running Textor's three selected women related variables against the five warfare variables produces virtually no correlations at all (at the $p < .10$ level). The only exception is the cannibalism variable (422), which correlates significantly ($\phi = .39$,

¹ The (204) and (242) codings come from Murdock (1967), while the (254) codings comes from Apple (1956).

² The (417) and (422) codings also come from Simmons (1945). The (419), (420), and (421) codings came from the unpublished work of Philip E. Slater, which Textor obtained for inclusion in the **Summary**.

p=.02, n=24) with the inferior status of women variable (277)¹. When the three additional male dominance variables were correlated with the five warfare variables, there were only two correlations out of a possible 15 relationships, about what would have been expected by chance alone with a significance criteria of p<.1. Confirming some of the studies above, Textor's results shows significant relationships between polygyny (242) and military glory (419) (ϕ =.28, p=.009, n=85), and between polygyny (242) and bellicosity (420) (ϕ =.27, p=.01, n=85).

There is, however, a valid reason why correlations might not appear when they should in fact be there. Textor chose a large sample so that it that would overlap as much as possible with all of the separate samples that made up his dataset. Remembering what was said above about not all variables being coded for all of the samples, it is possible that correlations did not appear because there was not enough cases in common for some of the tests to be performed (Tatje Naroll & Textor 1970, p. 652). Textor does not provide a list of correlations that were not performed, understandable because it would increase the length of his already large book. This then is a major limitation of the **Summary**: A reader will not know if the non-appearance of a correlation is due to the fact that it is non-significant, or due to the fact that that there were not enough cases in common for a correlation to be performed. In summary, Textor can suggest what *is there* with some degree of certainty, but cannot be used to rule out absolutely what *does not* appear to be there. We must be careful, though, not to use this as an excuse for explaining away correlations that should have appeared.

In summing up the work on this first hypothesis; while no one has done tests using exactly the same definitions as this thesis uses, the results of the fraternal interest group studies, as well as work by Hayden et al. (1986), Ross (1986a), and perhaps Sanday (1981a; 1981b) tend to support this first hypothesis. Of these, Ross comes the closest to showing a relationship between our specific definition of male dominance and variables possibly indicative of our definition of militarism. There have at least been no clearly disconfirming findings, with the possible exception of the matrilocality studies, and Whyte's findings on his *Domestic Authority* scale. Refined versions of these tests will be performed in the sixth chapter using the codes of Ross, Sanday, Whyte and others.

In keeping with the need to consider the other hypotheses of this study, it is worth asking at this stage what these results do for the drive-discharge hypothesis of war and male dominance. Murphy (1957) claims that the tendency, observed above,

¹ No page numbers are given for Textor's results, because the computer printout that forms the bulk of his study does not have them. Instead, this printout is separated into "paragraphs", with each variable having its own set of "sentences" reporting the things that it correlated with.

for matrilineal cultures to fight externally, is a manifestation of the drive-discharge theory of aggression. Murphy argues that since matrilineal cultures disperse men, internal war is not practiced because it would pit males against their closest relatives. Thus they fight against external enemies to reduce their tension (p. 1031). This seems to assume, however, that males always have an innate aggressive drive, an assertion disputed by this thesis. In any case, there are problems in this theory with the direction of causality. As was mentioned above, matrilineal structures may only arise after men have left to fight externally. Perhaps offering a partial refutation of the drive-discharge idea with regards to male dominance, was the composition of Sanday's (1981a) scale of male aggression. In this scale, the measure of frequent interpersonal violence scaled together with the capturing of women in war and the existence of rape, suggesting that violence against women does not lower the level of male aggression in general.

(b) Male Dominance Associated with Authoritarianism

The study that came the closest to measuring the relationship between male dominance and authoritarianism was again that of Ross (1986a). In addition to the warfare variables, Ross tested three other variables of relevance to this thesis. The first is a measure of concentration of political power, and includes measures of the level of leader independence, absence or presence of checks on leader's power, the level of political role differentiation, the importance of decision making bodies, and the level of taxation. Some of these variables are probably related to the complexity and size of a society, but others could be interpreted as indicating authoritarianism. The higher a culture scores on this scale, then the less likely women are to take part in political activity ($r = -.36$, $p < .001$, $n = 82$). On the other hand, however, societies that score highly on this scale are more likely to feature separate female political organisations ($r = .26$, $p < .05$, $n = 82$, p. 848).

A similar result is also found when Ross runs these female politics variables against a scale possibly related to the learning of authoritarianism in children. This is scale of "Harsh Socialisation" and was made up of codings of pain infliction on the infant, use of corporal punishment, non-indulgence of children, scolding of the child, the importance of caretakers other than the mother, and the degrees to which fortitude and aggressiveness are stressed as values (codes came from Barry & Paxson 1971; Barry et al. 1976; 1977). The items on this scale, with the confusing exception of the "caretaker" variable, appears to be clear measures of authoritarian aggression and submission inculturation in children. This scale correlates negatively with female political participation, but the result is insignificant. Once again, however, it correlates positively with the variable measuring separate female organisations, meaning that in cultures where children are given an authoritarian upbringing,

women tend to have their own separate political organisations ($r=.21$, $p<.05$, $n=82$, $p=848$).

Confirmation of some of these results was attempted using Textor (1967). The six variables used above to measure male dominance were correlated with five variables that it was felt best measured authoritarianism:

- (102) Existence of class stratification
- (324) High pain infliction on infant
- (352) Pressure on child to develop obedient behaviour
- (376) Severe ordeals in male initiation rites
- (383) Painful female initiation rites¹

The existence of class stratification is considered to be a variable measuring the existence of an exploitative hierarchical social structure. The pressure to develop obedient behaviour is considered here to be an indication of inculturation of authoritarian submission, while the variables measuring pain infliction on infants, and painful male and female initiation rite variables are perhaps measuring the sadistic component of authoritarian aggression.

However, when these five variables were run against the aforementioned male dominance variables, only one authoritarianism variable consistently correlated with a number of the male dominance variables. This was the variable measuring high pain infliction on infants (324) which had marginally significant correlations with patrilocality (240) ($\phi=.22$, $p=.09$, $n=52$) and polygyny (242) ($\phi=.22$, $p=.07$, $n=65$), and a higher correlation with the general female inferiority measure (277) ($\phi=.49$, $p=.03$, $n=14$). While these results do not show an overly convincing level of support for our hypothesis, at least there were no disconfirming correlations.

In summary, Ross (1986a) is the only specifically relevant study, and is one that supports this hypothesis. Such a conclusion is only thwarted by the other potentially non-authoritarianism variables that Ross includes on the childhood and social structure scales. Once again, more refined versions of these tests can be run in chapter six.

(c) Militarism Associated with Authoritarianism

There are five studies relevant to this hypothesis. Firstly, in his classic war study, Wright (1942) presents an $n=652$ dataset coded for testing various hypotheses

¹ The (102) codings came from Murdock (1963), while the (324) and (352) codings came from Barry, Bacon & Child (1967), while (383) came from Brown (1963). The (376) codings were from the unpublished work of Albert S. Anthony.

related to non-industrial war. In one table, he shows that the more stratified a society is (from sex-age stratification, to professional, to caste stratification), then the higher it will score on what is, in effect, a Guttman scale of war types (ranging from defense war, to social war, to economic war, to political war). The validity of this Guttman scale was largely confirmed when Naroll (1966) and Otterbein (1970) found a similar order of war priorities. Wright's findings are relevant to this hypothesis if the degree of stratification can be considered to be indicative of the third component of authoritarianism; the existence of an exploitative hierarchical social structure. Wright's results suggest that the more stratified a culture is, then the more likely it will be to fight subjugating political wars. (p. 558) Although Wright does not attempt to assess the statistical significance of any of his tables of results, tests performed by this researcher show this finding to be statistically significant (chi-squared=87.26, df=6, p<.001).

Secondly, in his 1970 study on warfare, Otterbein also finds that there is a significant relationship between the centralisation of the political system and the likelihood that a culture will fight wars of political subjugation, as opposed to wars just for defense, prestige, or plunder ($\phi=.61$, $p<.001$, $n=46$, p. 69). Otterbein notes in his codebook that centralised cultures are those that have "bureaucratic governance by legal force" (p. 143) and this could be interpreted as indicating the presence of authoritarianism. He also finds that only officials tend to be allowed to initiate war in centralised societies ($\phi=.48$, $p<.01$, $n=42$, p. 30). This is perhaps indicative of the level of submission to military superiors, although a more specific measure of "military subordination" only has an insignificant ($p>.10$) correlation with political centralisation ($\phi=.23$, $n=36$, p. 24).

In a third study, Russell (1972) performed a factor analysis on the 78 variables that Textor (1967) had found to be related to war. He concluded that "psychocultural" variables such as childraising practices, emphasis on achievement, sensitivity to insult, boastfulness, and display of wealth, had the biggest effect on the war propensity of non-industrial cultures. In support of a single underlying cause for both war and authoritarian aggression, he writes "It is evident that warlikeness is only one form that hostility in a culture may take, and that the level of hostility in a culture varies as a whole from culture to culture" (p. 297).

The next study is Prescott (1975) who used Textor's dataset in a more advanced study of the the cause of what he terms "adult physical violence", which is actually the (421) code on killing, torturing and mutilating of the enemy. He notes than in Textor's dataset, the amount of affection lavished on infants (317)¹, and the existence

¹ Codings come from Barry Bacon & Child (1967).

of the repression of teenage sexuality, as measured by (386), both have a high correlation with this variable. The childhood affection measure correlates $\emptyset=.41$ ($p=.003$, $n=49$), while the sexual repression measure correlates at $\emptyset=.22$ ($p=.002$, $n=46$). Prescott further states that these two variables actually have an interactive effect, and that these two variables taken together can predict the result of the (421) variable in 48 of the 49 cultures studied. This study is important in that it shows that high physical affection, either sexual or otherwise, increases the chances that a society will be peaceful. High physical affection is presumably the direct opposite of authoritarian aggressive physical mistreatment.

However, one criticism of this study is that the (421) variable appears to be a measure of both militarism and sadistic authoritarian aggression. It may be that the reason there was such a high relationship between these three variables was because Prescott was correlating a measure of one type of sadism with two variables that are measuring the absence of another sort of sadism. A second weakness of this study can be seen when we return to the source of the (386) codings. For Prescott to call this a variable measuring repression of adolescent sexuality is in fact incorrect. These codings, from Ford & Beach (1951; pp. 188-192), were actually a mixture of measures for both children and adolescents that Textor had grouped together under the term "young"¹.

Finally, Ross (1985, 1986b) offers the most specific tests of this hypothesis. He correlates his aforementioned measure on external conflict and violence with two of the measures that have been defined above as possibly measuring authoritarianism. Harsh child socialisation practices are seen to correlate significantly with the external conflict and violence measure ($r=.30$, $p<.01$, $n=82$). However, the variable that is a possible measure of political authoritarianism, the scale of political power concentration, only has a small and non-significant correlation with the external conflict and hostility variable (1985, p. 552).

Finally, in addition to the interpretations that Russell and Prescott make, we can also turn to Textor in the original to shed further light on this hypothesis. For these tests, the (421) variable of killing, torturing or mutilation of the enemy and the (420) variable of cannibalism could not be included in this analysis, because they are not clearly warfare variables or variables measuring sadistic and authoritarian aggressive tendencies. To include them could artificially inflate the number of correlations found. Excluding these, however, showed that there was no relationship between any of the remaining variables defined above as being indicative of militarism, and any of the variables selected above as measuring

¹ Prescott obviously does not heed a warning that Textor gives about checks of the codings that should be made before his results are used in serious pieces of research (1967, pp. 53-4).

authoritarianism. This may once again be due to the possible problem of missing correlations due to insignificant cases. In summary, however, this hypothesis appears to be well supported by many of the other studies.

Hypothesis Two (a) and (b): The Effect of Male Glorification and/or Increased Male Importance

In an attempt to prove their theory that female infanticide occurs as part of an overall male supremacist complex which glorifies men because strong fighters are needed, Divale & Harris (1976) perform tests on band and village cultures. They separate their sample into different groups, depending on whether warfare was still present, or whether it had been stopped (usually by colonial authorities). For methodological reasons, to be discussed in the next chapter, it would be wise to just concentrate on cultures in their first group. In this were cultures in which warfare was still present at the time of study by anthropologists. Here they found that there was an imbalance of males to females of 128 to 100 among people aged 15 and under, implying a high rate of female infanticide. For people aged 15 and over, this figure was a more normal 101 to 100. This is presumably due to the fact that there would be high male mortality due to war in the over 15 age group¹ (p. 527).

While Divale & Harris found some support for their theory, it only has a rather limited applicability. Ember (1974) had used a random sample containing a wider selection of cultural types. He had found that high male mortality in warfare actually lead to an imbalance of females to males (Mann-Whitney $U=6$, $p<.001$, p. 201). Harris (1984) later notes that their theory is only applicable to band and village cultures that have a low density of population, have fraternal interest groups, have virilocality (a more general term for patrilocality), and that practice short distance raiding (pp. 111-2). One other study that shows no evidence for Divale & Harris's male glorification theory is that of Whyte (1978). One of his nine scales of the status of women was called the *Value Placed on the Lives of Women* scale, and included measures of wife beating, preference for male children, and evidence of female infanticide. This scale was found to have no relationship with the variable in Whyte's study that measured the frequency of intercommunity war.

¹ It is hard to assess the statistical significance of their results, because the tests for significance were only done on the differences between the pacified and unpacified groups. Methodological problems to be mentioned in the next chapter cast doubt on whether pacified cultures should be used in a study such as this. For what it is worth, Divale & Harris used a series of T-tests to show that there was indeed significant differences between the sex ratios in the pacified and unpacified cultures.

The other variation of this study was that male involvement in war increased the political importance of males to the community. Many of the studies mentioned in the discussion of hypothesis one(a) can be seen as support for the notion that high male involvement in war is associated with increased male political importance (Sanday 1981a; Hayden et al. 1986; Ross 1986a). However, recall from chapter one that the male importance hypothesis alone would be considered inadequate if the general frequency of war was also shown to be related to male violence against women and female submission to men. Sanday's (1981a, 1981b) findings suggest that the general frequency of war is indeed related to acts of violence against women, suggesting that theories of authoritarianism are also necessary.

Hypothesis Three: The Effect of Male Absence

There is contradictory evidence for the theory that frequent war will lead to women developing power structures in the absence of males. On one hand, there was the aforementioned studies of Ember & Ember (1971) and Divale, Chamberis, & Gangloff (1976) who show that matrilocal cultures tend to fight frequent external wars and have unstable peace. On the other hand, this theory is somewhat contradicted by the results that Whyte (1978) obtained when he correlated his nine scales of the status of women against a variable indicating the existence of long periods of male absence. Whyte finds no relationship between this variable and any of his nine scales (p. 144). Recall also that Ross (1986a) found that women were more likely to be excluded from formal positions of political power when there is external war.

Hypothesis Four: The Origins of Authoritarianism

The dataset of Ross (1985; 1986a, 1986b) is the only available collection of variables that show a relationship between authoritarianism and variables measuring civilisation. In the course of running his tests, Ross devises a scale of what he called "socioeconomic complexity". Included on this scale are a measure of social stratification and a measure of average community size. These items had clustered together when Ross ran a factor analysis, suggesting that increasing civilisation is indeed associated with increased authoritarianism in the social structure.

To examine this in greater detail, several variables were selected from Textor to examine the authoritarianism and civilisation hypothesis. These were (44) the degree of fixity of residence, (80) the presence or absence of a town or city¹, and (86) the presence or absence of a state². There were some correlations, but not as many as expected. The existence of class stratification variable (102) was found to be associated with all three measures, correlating significantly with fixity of residence ($\phi=.24$, $p=.00$, $n=322$), the existence of a town or city ($\phi=.36$, $p=.00$, $n=219$), and the existence of a state ($\phi=.39$, $p=.00$, $n=297$). In addition, the child obedience measure correlated with the presence of a state ($\phi=.3$, $p=.00$, $n=61$). The painful female rite variable does not correlate at all, although this can be "excused". Another variable (382)³ correlated in such a way as to suggest that female rite ceremonies tend to be absent when cultures become more "civilised".

The Need for Further Testing

In order to obtain clear and relatively unambiguous answers, more specific tests on these relationships are required. Since many of the codings for the above studies are coded for the standard sample used in this thesis, and are obtainable by this researcher, they can be utilised for this purpose. Of further use in such an endeavour are additional studies. These did not actually test for any correlative relationship that is relevant here, but their datasets include relevant variables also coded for the standard sample.

¹ Both sets of codings came from Murdock (1967).

² Codings came from Murdock (1957).

³ Codings came from Brown (1963).

Chapter Five: Methodology of a Cross-Cultural Study

The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. Firstly, there will be a discussion of four methodological concerns in cross-cultural research; sampling, "pinpointing", data quality, and Galton's problem. During the course of this discussion, mention will be made both of how the studies in chapter four tended to deal with each of these concerns, as well as how this particular study will deal with them. In the second part of this chapter, variables with which to measure our hypotheses will be selected from a database of pre-coded data. The procedure by which these variables will be used to test these hypotheses will be discussed. Results from these tests will be reported in the next chapter.

Methodological Concerns in Cross-Cultural Research

Sampling

Perhaps the most important methodological concern in cross-cultural research is that of sampling. It is vital that the sample used is representative of both all cultural types and of all geographical areas. For example, it may be that in South American cultures, militarism and male dominance tend to be correlated with each other, while in cultures world-wide, they are not. If a researcher was then to oversample South American cultures in an attempt to make generalisations about non-industrial cultures world-wide, the correlations would be artificially inflated. Likewise, if Pacific cultures were oversampled and the traits did not tend to be linked there, no relationship would show, even when one existed on a global level. This also has some connection to Galton's problem, to be discussed later.

Selecting cultures at random from a sampling universe in the form of a numbered list, tends to produce representative samples, just as people chosen randomly tend to form a representative sample for an opinion poll. However, some feel that studies with randomly chosen samples are disadvantageous in the long run, because they tend to prevent researchers from building directly on the work of others. A researcher may want to correlate variables from two previous studies, only to find that the two studies do not have enough cultures in common for tests to be performed (Murdock & White 1969, p. 331). As may be remembered from the last chapter, we did not know how many potential correlations Textor (1967) did not find because of lack of sample compatibility.

For this reason, there have been attempts to draw up standard samples of non-industrial cultures that all researchers can code for. The sample to be used here, the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS), emerged from the work of George P. Murdock (1897-1985). Murdock had earlier worked on the *Ethnographic Atlas* (or the EA), completing it in 1967. This was a standardised list of 1100 cultures, coded for a number of variables. Its main use, as Murdock saw it, was to provide a sampling universe for researchers wanting to perform comparative tests (1967, p. 111). From the EA, the SCCS was drawn up by Murdock & White (1969). The world was first divided into 200 geographic sampling "provinces", each of which contained collections of similar cultures. One particular community of one of the cultures in each province was selected. This choice of which was generally dependent on the extent of available ethnographic material. Exceptions were made, however, to include as diverse a range of cultures as possible (pp. 331-2), with the usual non-inclusion of industrialised societies. Some provinces were not sampled because they were not considered to be sufficiently different from neighbouring provinces, producing a final sample of 186 cultures. A list of the cultures in the sample can be seen in Appendix Two. How representative is this sample then of all human cultures?

The SCCS cannot be considered a probability sample in the sense that it was randomly selected. Because Murdock & White made a deliberate attempt to represent all world regions and all cultural types, it can perhaps be considered the result of "quota" sampling techniques, to borrow a term from survey research. However, was there any systematic bias occurring in the minds of Murdock & White when they selected the sample? Otterbein (1976) suggests that there was, claiming that a disproportionate number of the included cultures were studied by ethnographers who were partial to Murdock's theories of social organisation (pp. 114-5). This is a suggestion that he also repeats more recently (1989, p. 4). In response to this, White (1990) observes that Otterbein provides no evidence for such an effect, and details how tests could be performed to look for this alleged bias. White states

that by coding the principle ethnographies of each culture in the sample for things such as approving citations of Murdock's work, or by coding the writer for evidence of association or personal correspondence with Murdock, we can statistically evaluate Otterbein's claim (pp. 9-11). To date, neither Otterbein nor White report performing such tests.

Meanwhile, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it seems reasonable to conclude that the SCCS is close enough to a random sample. In any case, the large amount of pre-coded data already available for it makes up for any small deficiencies in sampling, even if they do exist. As to whether the SCCS sample is representative of all human cultures; this is a much harder, if not impossible, question. No one has a list of all cultures that have ever existed since the emergence of *homo sapien* as a distinct species, so it is difficult to know how representative any sample is. Almost 2000 societies have been described and studied by anthropologists (Ember & Ember 1988, p. 180), although this is undoubtedly only a fraction of those that have ever existed. This question must then necessarily remain unanswered. All we can say is that the SCCS is an attempt at a representative sample of all cultures known to anthropologists. Of the studies in chapter four, Whyte (1978), Sanday (1981a; 1981b) and Ross (1985; 1986a; 1986b) use the SCCS. All of the other samples in the fourth chapter with, exception of Textor (1967), were randomly drawn. Textor's sample, like the later SCCS, was a quota sample selected from the EA by George Murdock on the basis of representativeness. Finally, as was already noted, Hayden et al. (1986) use a more restrictive sample. Their sample was only composed of hunting and gathering cultures, a fact that reduces the applicability of their findings.

Pinpointing

It was pointed out above that varying samples create problems for later researchers who wish to correlate variables contained in the samples of separate studies. A second difficulty that can also arise when two samples are being matched up is that they may include cultures that are differently "pinpointed" in space and time. To use a local example, one researcher may draw up a sample featuring the Ngai Tahu tribe of the Maori, and then code this and other cultures in their sample for a study on comparative male dominance. Another researcher may also look at Maori culture while coding for a study of comparative warfare, except that they might use the Ngati Paoa tribe, people who occupy a region at the other end of the country. Later, a third researcher would see that both have included the Maori culture in their samples. They may then attempt to use both sets of codings in a study that correlates male dominance and war, unaware that in this case, two possibly different sub-cultures have been assumed to be one. Alternatively, even if two researchers do code for the same tribe, one researcher may code them as they

were in 1890, while another researcher may code them as a second ethnographer found them in 1930. Again, this can make them, in effect, possibly different cultures.

To prevent the SCCS from being coded for different sub-tribes or separate time periods by different researchers, Murdock & White specifically “pinpointed” each of their cultures to a particular geographic location as well as to a particular date. For this reason, the list of SCCS cultures also gives the exact group or sub-group specifications, and also provides exact longitude and latitude measurements. It also pinpoints the samples by time, down to a specific year for which codings should be produced for that culture. Their sample listing also includes the writer(s) that Murdock & White considered to be the best authority on the culture. A researcher coding the sample for a particular attribute would be expected to turn to these writers first¹. Since cultures that are well described in the literature had a better chance of being included in the sample, anyone coding the SCCS for a particular attribute would find relevant information for as many of their cases as possible.

In chapter four, concerns over pinpointing do not apply to most of the studies. Either they use the SCCS, or they only use variables taken from a single dataset, coded by professional anthropologists who know of the importance of pinpointing. Textor’s study is an exception here, considering that he used a number of other contributors. At one stage he concedes that it is possible that some of the contributors could have used cases from a different date than the others. However, he also remarks that since researchers would all probably tend to use the same bibliographic sources, this effect would be minimised. He concludes that the problem of incompatible dates is “probably not serious [but] it must be borne in mind” (1967, p. 14n). Finally, early studies such as Wright (1942) were performed before concerns about pinpointing arose in the literature, and their reliability in this area is unknown.

Data Quality

This is not a specific problem, but rather a collection of concerns that cross-cultural researchers have about the quality of data that they include in their studies, and the inaccuracies that occur at various states of the research process. Firstly, there is the problem of inaccuracies springing from the mistakes and misperceptions of the

¹Actually, Otterbein (1990) also criticised the SCCS in terms of pinpointing. He alleges that some of the codes produced for this sample may not have been correctly pinpointed by some researchers (p. 6). He also writes that the coders for the SCCS do not tend to produce bibliographic citations for each of their codes so that others can check their accuracy. To a certain extent, the publication of a summary bibliography of many of the SCCS coding projects (White 1989a) does provide such bibliographic citations, although not to the extent to which Otterbein would probably wish. A read through this bibliography also suggests that all of the major researchers have kept their samples pinpointed.

ethnologist in the field. Naroll (1970a) surveys studies that have attempted to assess these mistakes. He concludes that as many as one sixth of the statements in poorer quality anthropological accounts may be inaccurate (p. 944). As he notes, however, random inaccuracies need not necessarily worry us. Paradoxically, the more random errors that exist in a dataset, then the more confidence that we can have in any significant correlations that do result (p. 927; Divale 1976, p. 170). This also applies to random errors that can occur due to incorrect pinpointing.

However, this only applies to random inaccuracies, and we still need to worry about a second source of errors; those that result from some type of systematic bias in the research process (Naroll 1970a, p. 944). Could codings that depend on judgements about the status of women be one example of a variable that is prone to such bias? Could Western anthropologists or coders ignore women, or rate them as being of low status in a particular culture because they *expect* them to be so? Some anthropologists are sensitive to such suggestions, and dispute that it occurs. Hayden et al. (1986) point out that anthropologists are specifically trained to avoid ethnocentric assumptions (p. 452). Harris (1977), writing from a personal perspective, notes how professionally rewarding most anthropologists actually find being able to write about cultures in which women have a high level of equality (p. 57-8). This is a claim echoed by Whyte (1978, p. 150n). However, evidence of bias has indeed been reported with regards to subjective judgements regarding the status of women. Divale (1976) finds that the subjective appraisal of the status of women in a culture is significantly lower if the anthropologist was male, if the field work was conducted in the 19th Century (as opposed to the 20th), and if the anthropologist could not speak the native language (p. 188).

This would be problematic for us, except that most studies in cross-cultural research use more specific indicators of male dominance, as opposed to such subjective judgements. For example, in this study we measure male dominance by looking at such things as women in leadership positions, and the incidence of violence against women. In doing so, the dangers associated with subjective judgements about the status of women are greatly reduced. Statistical research, in which the sex of the anthropologist or coder is controlled for, suggests little support for the argument that males tend to make biased observations of specific features related to the status of women. (Schlegel 1972, pp. 49-50; Whyte 1978, pp. 148-151). Similar research also suggests that that males ethnologists do not tend to ignore or understudy women (Naroll Naroll & Howard 1961, pp. 950-1; Martin 1978)¹.

¹ The danger of subjective judgement of female status can easily be seen just by glancing through Divale's (1976) appendix. In this, he provides the codings for each of his cultures, as well as the quote from the ethnography on which the coding was based. In the case of the Jibaro culture, for example, the quotes taken at face value suggest that women are treated well and are coded by Divale's research assistants accordingly (pp. 202-3). In a second piece of writing by the same ethnographer, Jibaro women are again said to be well treated. However, in

Finally, because the coding of cross-cultural data is basically a content analysis of ethnographic material, there are the usual concerns about inter-coder reliability. Many of the studies in chapter four do not report the level of such reliability, although Whyte (1978) and Sanday (1981a, 1981b) are two of the exceptions. Inter-coder reliability ratings on Whyte's status of women variables range from 69% on a variable measuring final authority over children, to 97% for variables measuring the presence of multiple spouses and male/female relative ages at marriage (1978, pp. 198-203). Disputed codes were finally decided on by consensus between the two coders (p. 25). Sanday reports an average inter-coder reliability score of 88% for the 21 variables that she samples, with disagreements resolved by a third coder or by Sanday herself (1981a, p. 236). Ross (1983) remarks that early versions of his variable codebook tended to produce codes had inter-coder reliability levels of over 70%. These codebooks were then reformulated, and the codes were produced by three coders and Ross himself in consultation with each other. Ross concedes that this process was "unconventional in terms of textbook notions of reliability testing", but also notes that it appeared to produced codes with a high validity (p. 171). Ember & Ember (1971) also use a similar procedure. Two coders went through the material together so that they could make a joint decision on the rating of a variable (p. 579). Once again, any small errors in coding, as long as they are random in nature, should not affect the discovery of large and significant correlations.

Galton's Problem

Galton's problem is considered by some to be an important difficulty in interpreting the results of cross-cultural studies. It emerged in 1889 when Edward Tylor introduced the cross-cultural method to the world at a meeting of the Royal Anthropological Institute. Sir Francis Galton, one of those in attendance, raised an objection to Tylor's work. Galton claimed that a potential hazard in this new method of research was that of artificially high correlations resulting from cultural diffusion (Naroll 1970b, p. 974). It may be that two traits correlate not because they have a "functional" relationship, but because they just happened to historically diffuse together when new societies split off from old ones. Put another way; how can we be sure of the true size of our sample? When we think that we are sampling 100 cultures, are we actually sampling this many, or a smaller number of original cultures from which those 100 were descended? Usually a scientific study is made more accurate by increasing the size of its sample. Unless Galton's problem is taken

this second piece, Jibaro men are also said to sometimes kill unfaithful wives (Karsten [1967], p. 310), and are also said to kill and kidnap women in raids on their enemies (pp. 322). Such practices would tend to class a culture as male dominated for the purposes of this thesis, due to this incidence of male violence against women.

into account, however, the larger the sample, the more cultural diffusion will influence the results (White & Brudner-White 1988, p. 65).

Not all cross-cultural studies take Galton's problem into account¹. For the purposes of this thesis, it was felt unwise to make a similar omission. Galton's problem has particular relevance to a study on authoritarianism and war, because authoritarian and warlike cultures would tend to take over neighbouring territories, and impose whole new sets of alien customs on the people there. Alternatively, they could kill all the inhabitants of neighbouring lands, and establish new communities there. Fortunately, there are a number of statistical techniques that we can apply to our sample to measure how much of a correlation is due to the existence of a "functional" association, and how much of it is due to diffusional influence.

How then does the SCCS fare with regards to Galton's problem? This sample attempts to assist researchers in overcoming this problem in two ways. Firstly, there was the aforementioned division of the world into distinct cultural provinces and the selection of only one culture from each. This ensures that cultures that were closely related to others were eliminated. Secondly, the sample is numerically ordered so that each society on the list is preceded by, and precedes a society that is next to it geographically. The list of identification numbers for each culture follows a "trail" that meanders around the globe when plotted on a map. Once traits have been coded for, a computer can run down the list using a number of statistical procedures, attempting to assess how much overall effect geographical closeness has for those two particular traits. A more refined method called spatial autocorrelation analysis (see Odland 1988) has been developed for use with the SCCS by a number of researchers (see White Burton & Dow 1981). This method does not utilise the identification numbers, but instead uses measurements of the actual geographical distance between the various cultures in the sample. This is the method used in this study to check for the effect of Galton's problem.

The studies mentioned in chapter four vary in how they deal with Galton's problem. In many of the studies with small samples, the danger is not as pronounced. This is due to the fact that the cultures would be more dispersed around the world and there would therefore be a greater average geographical distance between them. Even so, Hayden et al. (1986) try to reduce the effect of Galton's problem in their 33 culture study by making a deliberate effort to pick dissimilar cases (p. 451). Within the studies with larger samples, there is again variation in the way that researchers attempt to deal with Galton's problem. Whyte

¹ Raoul Naroll (1920-1985) was the anthropologist who most strongly warned of the danger of Galton's problem in cross-cultural research. One of his former colleagues, Keith Otterbein, perceives that concern with Galton's problem has decreased in anthropology since Naroll's death (personal correspondence, 07/02/92).

(1978) attempts to measure the effect of diffusional influences in his sample using methods called the "interval sift method" and the "linked pair method" (described by Naroll 1970b). Whyte does not report the number or nature of the variables that these methods were applied to, but writes that the results of these tests lead him to conclude that he could ignore Galton's problem as a factor influencing his results (1978, p. 123n).

Other works discussed in chapter four, such as Sanday (1981a, 1981b) and Ross (1985, 1986a, 1986b), do not attempt to deal with Galton's problem, although Ross does attempt to measure the effect of regional differences in his sample. We can also expect that there would be much historical interrelationship between the cases in Textor's (1967) large 400 case sample, but his large number of correlations would render such testing impractical. In addition, the Divale & Harris (1976) study can be singled out as being particularly problematic with regards to Galton's problem. As may be recalled, some of the cultures in their sample were those in which warfare had been stopped by colonial authorities. They reported a lower rate of female infanticide among these cultures and regarded this as supporting evidence for their male supremacist theory. However, is it also possible that colonial authorities disapproved of the practice of infanticide and attempted to stamp it out. Therefore, the only connection that female infanticide and war may have in these cultures is that colonial authorities disapproved of both of them. The attempt to discourage these two practices would be a very direct manifestation of the historical diffusion of the opposite two traits. Divale & Harris's other sub-sample was composed of unpacified cultures, so the results for this category are probably still valid.

Methodology of this Study

Data Collection

The SCCS was created at the University of Pittsburgh under the auspices of what had been called the the Cross-Cultural Cumulative Coding Centre (CCCCC). The initial idea behind this centre was that other researchers would code various traits for the sample, and send the codings to the centre for collection. The CCCCC has since disbanded, but much of its function is now performed by the staff of the electronic journal *World Cultures*, based at the University of Wisconsin in Milwaukee. Subscribers to this journal periodically receive in disk form the variables most recently coded for the SCCS, along with various utility programs with which to analyse the data. By the late 1980's, over 1200 variables had been coded for this sample, and this formed the initial dataset of this study. Issues of *World*

Cultures that contained all of these 1200 sets of codings were obtained. A decision was made to analyse the data with the statistical package SPSS/X, rather than with the less versatile packages included on the data disks. This necessitated the conversion of the data on the **World Cultures** disks into a format suitable for use with SPSS/X. To ensure that no errors had occurred in conversion, frequencies were run on these converted codings and compared to previously published frequencies¹.

Testing the Hypotheses

From the data that was collected together, testing for the expected relationships began. Variables which were thought to measure the three main concepts in this study (authoritarianism, male dominance, and militarism) were selected from the dataset. In addition, other variables thought to measure concepts used in the other hypothesis of this study were also selected. Before we detail these procedures, however, it will pay to heed a warning given by Otterbein (1990) on variable selection in cross-cultural studies. This warning comes up during a discussion of a poor method of cross-cultural research, that of the "throw-it-against-the-wall-and-see-if-it-sticks" approach.

In this method, a researcher wanting to prove that a relationship exists between two traits will go through a list of pre-coded variables, such as that provided by **A Cross-Cultural Summary**, or the **World Cultures** journal. From this list, they will select two sets of variables that they think are measuring these two traits. The researcher will then set up a correlation matrix with one set of variables along one axis, and the second set of variables along the other. As Otterbein writes, this correlation matrix is the "wall" and any significant relationships that are discovered between the variables in some of its cells are the "mud" that sticks to it. Of course in any matrix containing significant correlations, there are likely to be a number that have arisen by chance, this number being dependent on the level of statistical significance used. Otterbein sees that a danger in this style of study is that a researcher will then note the significant correlations that do occur, including the ones that possibly arose purely by chance, and use these in a post-hoc fashion to

¹ Ironically, in the course of this procedure, I discovered that a mistake had been made in the original **World Cultures** dataset. Whyte (1978) had mentioned in an appendix to his study on the status of women that he had used a culture from a time period significantly different to the SCCS pinpointed date, due to an absence of useful ethnographic material for that time (pp. 186-7). However, the staff of **World Cultures** had not noticed this, and had allowed Whyte's codes for this culture to remain in the main dataset. I mentioned this to an associate of the journal while corresponding about other matters. He writes that in response to my discovery, the relevant files in the master **World Cultures** dataset have been amended. A similar amendment was also made to my own dataset before my tests were run. Three other minor errors were also found in the codebooks files that accompany **World Cultures**.

construct a model explaining the relationship between the two variables (p. 7)¹. Keeping these criticisms in mind, it was decided to operationalise all of the concepts in this study using as few variables as possible. Thus we will end up with a small correlation matrix or "wall" when it comes time to run our tests. Given the small size of this "wall" and the care that has gone into selecting variables, we would also expect to find that most cells in the matrix would yield significant correlations.

With 1200 variables to choose from, it was an lengthy process to select those with which to test our hypotheses. Initially, sets of variables were selected and formed into lists according to topic. This number was then reduced further by eliminating variables that appeared to be measuring what others were, but which had a higher number of missing cases. Studies that featured high numbers of missing values tended to occur when researchers had coded only half of the SCCS for the variables that they were measuring. By using only the odd- or even-numbered cases in the SCCS, researchers are still able to obtain a representative sample (Murdock & White 1969, p. 352), but can code them with less time and expense that it would take to code the whole thing. "Rejected" variables were still noted so that they could later be used to check cross-study variable reliability. A full codebook of all variables specifically named in the text is in Appendix Three.

Selection of Authoritarianism Variables

After this procedure, three sets of variables were selected as being possibly indicative of the three components of authoritarianism. These variables were then intercorrelated with each other to see which had the best level of correlation with the others, while still measuring separate aspects of the concept. Three variables were finally selected as measuring authoritarianism. They are listed below, along with their number in the **World Cultures** dataset and the reference of the book or article in which they were first used:

- (1) *Authoritarian Aggression:*
(453-456) New variable measuring the average level of four child corporal punishment variables (Barry et al. 1977).
- (2) *Authoritarian Submission:*
(322-325) New variable measuring the average level of four obedience inculcation in children variables (Barry et al. 1976).
- (3) *Hierarchical and Exploitative Social Structure:*
(158) Existence of social stratification/slavery (Murdock & Provost 1971)

¹While this is a valid criticism of a poor method of research, it is perhaps unfair of Otterbein to extend this to Textor (1967) as he does when he describes it. As Textor writes, his results are intended for use in the initial stages of research (p. 1). It was also mentioned in the footnotes to the last chapter that Textor also encourages researchers to perform a number of more rigorous checks before using his results in serious pieces of research (pp. 53-4).

As can be seen, four variables that measured the use of corporal punishment on children were used to make up the authoritarian aggression measure. Codings were made for both sexes at two stages of development, producing four measures in total, and a mean was then taken by this researcher to produce an overall measure. What is the justification for calling this a measure of authoritarian aggression? We cannot give members of each of the SCCS cultures a copy of the RWA scale to fill out, so how can we know if we have correctly measured this concept? There are two theoretical grounds on which this variable can be accepted as a measure of authoritarian aggression. Firstly, the use of corporal punishment can be seen as a direct manifestation of the use of authoritarian aggression against a weaker and less conventional member of society. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, writers on authoritarianism such as Fromm (1973) and Keen (1986) see the violent treatment of children by their parents as one of the causes of adult authoritarian aggression. If children are taught that it is fine to inflict violence on people weaker than oneself to ensure compliance, then this is a pattern likely to repeat itself in later years. In addition, the composition of the RWA scale suggests that authoritarians do indeed bring up their children using such methods. Item 30 in this scale reads: "One reason we have so many troublemakers in our society nowadays is that parents and other authorities have forgotten that good old-fashioned physical punishment is still one of the best ways to make people behave properly"¹.

We can then theoretically justify its inclusion, but can we also say that the coding is a reliable and accurate assessment of what it was supposed to be measuring? We can assess this by correlating it with another variable from **World Cultures** that attempts to measure a similar thing. A variable measuring the overall level of pain infliction on children was selected from the dataset, the original source of these codings being Barry & Paxson (1971). A significant relationship was found between the two variables, (Tau=.30, p=.00, n=131), despite the fact that they are measuring slightly different things.

To measure authoritarian submission, a mean was taken of four similar childhood obedience inculcation variables from Barry et al. (1976), to obtain an

¹ There is, however, a risk of "contamination" in using this (453-6) variable to test the hypothesis that authoritarian aggression is related to violence against women. This is because part of this variable is itself made up of measures of violence against female children. In an effort to ensure that the corporal punishment measure was indeed a "general" measure of authoritarian aggression and not a specific measure of violence against female children, additional tests were run. It was found that there was no significant difference, as measured by a T-test, between corporal punishment inflicted on young female children and corporal punishment inflicted on young male children. In addition, these two measures correlated highly with each other (Tau=.93, p=.00, n=140). Interestingly enough, however, similar tests performed on the corporal punishment codes for children of an older age group showed that boys actually have an almost significantly higher level of corporal punishment inflicted upon them (t-value=1.77, df=139, p=.07). There was, however, still a significant correlation between the older male and older female corporal punishment variables (Tau=.88, p=.00, n=140). Other tests, to be reported in chapter six, also suggest that there was no danger of "contamination" with regards to this combined measure of corporal punishment.

overall obedience inculcation in children variable. We can once again theoretically justify the use of this variable as measuring authoritarian submission in a similar way to how we justified the use of the corporal punishment variables. Firstly, it can be seen as a manifestation of how some of the “weaker” members in society are expected to act submissively. Secondly, the children will grow up with an expectation that those younger and/or weaker should be submissive, and will presumably apply such a principle to people whom they interact with later in life. The composition of the RWA scale also shows that authoritarians do indeed tend to favour submissiveness in children. Item 12 in the RWA scale reads: “Obedience is the most important virtue children should learn”. There was, however, no similar variable in the dataset with which to test this variable against¹.

Variable (158) was chosen to measure the existence of an exploitative and hierarchical social structure. This is a measure of the number of levels of stratification according to class, caste, and slavery, and also had no missing values. This variable had an impressive number of correlations with many measures from Ross (1983), that also appear to indicate the presence of an authoritarian social structure. The more that a culture was stratified according to this variable, then the more differentiated are its leaders by way of wealth, special titles, or lifestyle (Tau=-.53, p=.00, n=90), the more powerful the leaders are perceived by those in the society (Tau=-.41, p=.00, n=90), the fewer the checks there are on the leader’s power (Tau=-.47, p=.00, n=86), the fewer ways in which incompetent or disliked leaders can be removed (Tau=-.48, p=.00, n=77), the greater the extent to which a leader acts independently and makes authoritative decisions (Tau=-.47, p=.00, n=87), the more formal sanctions there are for the enforcement of decisions (Tau=-.49, p=.00, n=90), and the more enforcement specialists there are such as police and tax collectors (Tau=-.43, p=.00, n=89). The only reason that Ross’s codes were not used directly in this thesis to measure authoritarianism was their large number of missing values.

Intercorrelating the three authoritarianism variables suggested that they were all indeed measuring the same underlying authoritarian tendency. All of the three intercorrelations were significant at p=.005 or better, and in the direction expected according to the theory of the first chapter. It was also interesting to see that the structural measure of authoritarianism (158) correlated with the more psychological

¹ Once again, there is the danger of contamination, given that the (322-5) variable contains measures of female submissiveness, and given that it will later be run against a variable measuring submissive customs on the part of women. This time, significant differences were found between both the early girl and boy (t-value=-3.66, df=158, p=.00) obedience inculcation measures, and the late boy and girl inculcation measures (t-value=-4.02, df=158, p=.00) with girls being given a significantly higher level of obedience inculcation. There was still, however, a significant correlation between the obedience codes for both the two early measures (Tau=.86, p=.00, n=159) and the two late measures (Tau=.84, p=.00, n=159). We will have to wait for additional tests, to be performed in the next chapter, to see how much “contamination” this may have had in our tests.

measures of this concept. It appears that there is indeed a strong relationship between the "structure" and "agency" of authoritarianism.

Selection of Militarism Variables

Similar procedures to the ones used to select the authoritarianism variables were used to select variables measuring militarism. The four variables eventually chosen were:

- (1) *Acceptance of Unnecessary/Sadistic Violence Against Enemy:*
 - (907) Value/enjoyment of war (Wheeler 1974).
 - (913) Taking of trophies and honours, including captives for sacrifice as a goal in war (Wheeler 1974).
- (2) *Submission to Military Superiors:*
 - (902) Leadership during battle (Wheeler 1974).
- (3) *Attempts at Exploitative Political Takeover:*
 - (909) Subjugation of territory or people a goal in war (Wheeler 1974).

Again, like the authoritarianism measures, these variables were tested against others with which they would be expected to have a relationship. Before we detail these tests, it is necessary to make mention of another variable that was used whenever a test involving a war variable was performed in this thesis. Fifteen of the cultures in the SCCS had been pacified by external forces by the date of pinpointing, a fact recorded by variable (1118), coded by White (1989b)¹. How should a researcher code pacified cultures in terms of militarism? Should they be coded as warlike due to the fact that they want to fight, or as peaceful because they do not actually engage in any fighting? It was decided that the best way of dealing with this potential difficulty was to simply drop these 15 cultures from our sample whenever a test involving a warfare variable or variables was run.

Variable (913), from Wheeler's 1974 study into war, looks to be the best measure of unnecessary and sadistic violence against the enemy, although it also includes elements of body mutilation. It is, however, worth bearing in mind that such bloodthirsty acts often go together, a fact seen in *The Winter Soldier Investigation* for example, mentioned in chapter two. This variable correlated significantly and as expected ($\text{Tau} = -.43$, $p = .00$, $n = 71$) with a similar variable coded by Paige & Paige (1981). Remembering that sadistic violence can often just be "pretend", another variable (907) was selected that measured not necessarily just the

¹ This study contained codes of a provisional nature. Because of this, they required author permission before use. Such permission was obtained from Douglas White to use this particular variable (personal correspondence, 25/05/92).

actual incidence, but the value or enjoyment of violence against those in other societies. This had a high correspondence ($\text{Tau}=.62$, $p=.00$, $n=45$) with a similar variable from Ross's (1983) dataset.

Another variable from Wheeler's (1974) dataset appeared to be a clear measure of the level of subordination to military superiors. This was her code on leadership during battle (902), and warlike cultures were ranked on one of three levels. On the first level are cultures in which soldiers were ordered about by an official who could use force to back up his orders, while on the second level were cultures in which fighting males obeyed an informal leader out of respect. On the third level are cultures in which fighting is disorganised, and every soldier is fighting for himself. Recall from chapter four that a variable in Otterbein's (1970) study, the initiation of war only by officials, was considered to be an indicator of military subordination. Because Wheeler bases her coding scheme on Otterbein's, she also codes the SCCS for such a variable. Wheeler's leadership during battle code (902) correlates as expected with her own version of this initiation of war code ($\text{Tau}=.50$, $p=.00$, $n=118$).

To measure the extent to which the culture tries to engage in exploitative political takeover of other societies, the (909) variable was used. This, like the sadistic war practice variable (913), was one of a series of variables coded for by Wheeler, in an attempt to assess the motivations that the SCCS cultures had for going to war. Presumably the ultimate aim of subjugation of people and territory is so that some benefit can then come from their long term exploitation. There was, however, no other political subjugation variable in the dataset with which to compare this.

Again, the variables measuring militarism were intercorrelated with each other. Three of the six relationships were significant at $p=.003$ or better, and in the direction expected. It was found that the level of subordination to superior officers did not have much relationship to the variable indicating the taking of trophies, honours, or captives for sacrifice as a goal in war (913) ($\text{Tau}=.04$, $p=.31$, $n=130$), or with the variable measuring the valuing or enjoyment of war (907) ($\text{Tau}=.08$, $p=.18$, $n=110$). There was also what almost amounted to a significant relationship in the opposite direction to that expected between the taking of trophies, honours, and captives for sacrifice as a goal in war and the presence of subjugation as a goal in war (909) ($\text{Tau}=-.11$, $p=.08$, $n=153$). This was unexpected according to theories of authoritarianism.

In other ways, though, these results do make some sense. If a commanding officer (or his equivalent in a culture) wants his troops to attend to the serious

business of taking over another society, then the sadistic torture of captives is an activity that is at best only a peripheral diversion, and at worst tactically disadvantageous. Recall from chapter two how such activities cost the Aztecs dearly in their engagements. Such activities may still go on, but they would probably receive little or no encouragement from the upper ranks of the military hierarchy. Also recall how in chapter two, one Vietnam veteran talked of the “unwritten code that you can do anything you want to as long as you don’t get caught”. These results suggest that when troops are ordered about, there is little enjoyment of war and little torture, and when the subjugation of the other side is of overriding importance, there is little to be gained by inflicting sadistic violence on captives. It appears then that there may be two variations of authoritarian warfare. On one hand, there is war in which the aim is to subjugate the other side, and in which the soldiers cannot waste time on other tasks. On the other hand, there is warfare where the soldiers know that they cannot win, and they replace it with another sort of “victory”; the mistreatment of individual enemy soldiers. Perhaps the Vietnam war was like this for American soldiers.

Selection of the Male Dominance Variables

Once again, similar methods were used to select variables measuring male dominance:

- (1) *Violence Against Women:*
(754) Presence of wife-beating (Broude & Greene 1983).
- (2) *Customs of Female Submission:*
(615) Wife to husband institutionalised deference Guttman scale (Whyte 1978).
- (3) *Social Hierarchy Based on Female Exploitation:*
(661) Female political participation, at least informal influence (Sanday 1981a).
(660) Female economic control over fruits of own labour (Sanday 1981a)

The (754) wife-beating variable was from a study into husband-wife relations (Broude & Greene 1983), and correlates significantly with a similar variable from Whyte’s (1978) dataset ($Tau = -.45$, $p = .00$, $n = 33$). There are many variables in the dataset that measure various manifestations of male dominance behaviour, but only one appears to be a clear measure of how women act submissively in response to this behaviour. The Wife to husband institutionalised deference variable (615) is a Guttman Scale which records the presence of customs that reflect increasing levels of deference by a women to her husband. Recalling the discussion in chapter two, it should be noted that this variable is probably only measuring submissive behaviour that arises out of fear, rather than out of masochism or out of a genuine belief that one is inferior.

Codes from Sanday (1981a) are once again useful for measuring the extent of exploitative hierarchy over women. The first of these is the variable measuring women's formal or informal involvement in politics (661), taken here to be an indicator of women's place in the social structure. This variable is a little imprecise, due to the inclusion of both formal and informal political spheres, but its relatively low number of missing values makes up for this. Confirming its validity, it corresponds well with the codes of Ross (1983) on the political position of women. It correlates as expected with his variable measuring women's public political participation (Tau=-.48, p=.00, n=76), with his variable measuring women's private political participation (Tau=-.33, p=.00, n=60), and with his variable measuring gender differences in eligibility for political or quasi-political posts (Tau=-.33, p=.00, n=77). The other variable, measuring women's control over the fruits of their own labour (660), is used here to measure the presence or absence of women's economic exploitation. It correlates as expected with a variable from Whyte (1978) that attempts to measure a similar thing (Tau=.29, p=.00, n=70).

In the process of checking the reliability of these male dominance variables, we have seen that the codings of one researcher tended to correspond with those of another. This supports the assertion, made earlier in this chapter, that specific features of male dominance can be coded for without fear of the effect of bias. Now that four variables have been chosen as measuring male dominance, we can once again look at how much intercorrelation there is between them. Of the six intercorrelations, three were in the direction expected and significant at p=.015 or better. However, the wife-beating variable (754) has no relationship with the female politics variable (661), with the female economic control variable (660), or the wife to husband deference measure (615). This last result is perhaps understandable, because if women are already submissive, then there is not necessarily any "need" for husbands to beat them further. However, such a low level of correspondence was unexpected according to theories of authoritarianism. This repeats the experience that we had with the militarism variables. Perhaps it is only a Western expectation that a social structure biased in favour of men would always be associated with violence against women.

Selection of the Other Variables

The selection of variables with which to test the other hypotheses is more straightforward. To find a measure of male glorification so that we can test hypothesis two(a), we can turn first to the original study of Divale & Harris (1976). As was mentioned in the last chapter, Divale & Harris had used the level of female infanticide as an indicator of male glorification. However, as Harris notes

elsewhere, the occurrence of infanticide is notoriously difficult to detect, or separate from infant death due to other forms of deliberate neglect (1989, p. 212). Recall that in their study, Divale & Harris infer the rate of female infanticide from the sex ratios of the populations they study. Sex ratio data is included in Whyte's (1978) study, although we are warned in the codebook files that accompany **World Cultures** that this variable is "probably subject to errors in ethnographic reporting".

However, Whyte (1978) also includes a variable (616) which reports the presence of a stated preference for either male or female children. This variable has some correlation with another variable in his dataset which attempts to measure the presence of female infanticide (Tau=.33, p=.00, n=70). Given Harris's warning about detecting infanticide, it would probably be better to use the stated preference variable, rather than the infanticide variable, as a measure of male glorification. Another variable, also from Whyte's dataset, can be used as another more exact indicator of male glorification. This variable indicates the presence or absence of a specific cultural belief that women are inferior to males (626). Although it has little correlation with the infanticide variable (Tau=.14, p=.11, n=70), it has a better relationship with the variable that measures the stated preference for male children (Tau=.23, p=.00, n=92).

Also necessary for testing the hypotheses of two(a) and two(b) is an additional warfare variable. Recall from chapter one that the theory behind these hypotheses is that the position of males in the culture is dependent on the general frequency of warfare, as opposed to warfare of any specific type. Whyte (1978) and Sanday (1981a) code the SCCS for the general level of warfare, although Sanday's variable (679) has the lowest number of missing cases. The two measures have a correlation of Tau=.2185 (p=.04, n=59).

For hypothesis three, we need a variable with which to test the male absence theory. Whyte (1978) includes a variable, mentioned in the last chapter, that measures male absence due to military service, labouring elsewhere, and extended trade expeditions (715). While this variable does not set out to measure male absence specifically due to war, the original theory implied that male absence should increase female status. Presumably this effect should occur regardless of the reason for their absence.

Finally, there is the selection of a variable with which to measure the level of civilisation, for hypothesis four. By using a definition of "civilisation" as the existence of fixed and large settlements, a number of variables were chosen and intercorrelated with each other. Three were selected as having good intercorrelations with each other, while still measuring different things. The three

variables were: (150) fixity of residence, (152) size of settlement, and (156) population density. These codings came from the work of Murdock & Provost (1971).

Now that our variables have been selected, testing can begin in the next chapter.

Chapter Six: Results

Expectations

As may be remembered from the last chapter, we wanted small correlation matrices ("walls") within which to run our tests. We can also reduce the size of the matrixes even further by placing "boxes" around the correlations that we would expect to have the highest values, according to the theory of the first chapter. This theory would predict that authoritarian aggression would have its biggest correlations with measures of violence against women or sadistic violence against the enemy, rather than with any other feature of male dominance or militarism. Likewise, authoritarian submission should have its biggest correlations with the variables measuring wife/husband deference and submission to commanding officers. Finally, the general existence of an exploitative hierarchy should have the strongest correlations with the variables indicating the presence of an exploitative hierarchy over women and the variable that measures the presence of political subjugation as a goal in war. This is not to say that the other correlations that make up each matrix should not correlate significantly. Because the variables chosen to measure the three concepts of authoritarianism, militarism, and male dominance have some degree of intercorrelation, we would also expect that some parts of one concept would also have correlations with some parts of other concepts.

For the purposes of these tests, correlations with a p value of .05 or less will be considered significant, while correlations with a p of .06 to .1 will be referred to as "marginally significant". After the bivariate tests have been run for each hypothesis, the results of the spatial autocorrelation will be reported, in order to show how much effect cultural diffusion has had in influencing the results. This was not done to all correlations, due to the high number of relationships. Generally, the highest relationship in each matrix or in each matrix "box" was tested for autocorrelation.

Before these autocorrelations were run, an ordinary least-squares regression was also performed on the relationship in question. This allowed a more direct comparison of the strength of the relationship before and after autocorrelation was taken into account. When the affect of accounting for spatial autocorrelation is said below to weaken or strengthen a particular relationship, this judgement is based on the relationship between this ordinary least-squares regression, and the spatial autocorrelation scores. Evidence of spatial autocorrelation in a relationship can be seen as a manifestation of the effects of cultural diffusion. However, even though a relationship shows a "diffusional" component, this can still mean that it has an additional "functional" component. The spatial autocorrelation tests are an attempt to see if the relationship still has a significant "functional" component after the "diffusional" part is removed. Accounting for cultural diffusion can also increase the strength of a correlation, as diffusion on one or more of the variables can also "interfere" with a relationship that would normally be stronger¹.

Hypothesis One

In chapter four, we discussed the male dominance/militarism sub-hypothesis first, because it had been discussed most in the literature. Here we are under no such constraints. Firstly, we will look at the relationship between authoritarianism and male dominance, and then at the relationship between authoritarianism and militarism. Finally, we will examine the possibility of a relationship between male dominance and militarism that may result from the impact that authoritarianism has on both of them.

Male Dominance Associated with Authoritarianism

There were mixed results for this hypothesis. As can be seen in table 6.1, there is some correlation between the level of violence against women and a general tendency towards authoritarian aggression². In addition, a general tendency towards

¹ There was some difficulty in tracking down a computer program capable of performing spatial autocorrelation. The versions of SPSS/X and SAS that are available at the University of Canterbury are not capable of performing this procedure. Fortunately, J. Patrick Gray, the editor of *World Cultures* and a lecturer at the University of Wisconsin, kindly agreed to run these tests for me using a computer program that he had written himself. The interpretative comments that he gave beside each result also provided me with a "learning by example" education in the use of spatial autocorrelation.

² To get over the danger of "contamination" mentioned in the last chapter, these tests were rerun with a reformulated version of the corporal punishment variable which only included the two measures of punishment inflicted on male children. There were virtually no differences between correlations using the overall corporal punishment variable and this male corporal punishment variable, suggesting that the (453-6) variable is indeed a measure of the "general" level of corporal punishment. The correlations that this male corporal punishment variable had with the male dominance measures were: Tau=.22 (p=.02, n=63) with the wife-beating

submission is significantly associated with customs of female submission towards their husbands¹. The strength of "boxed" versus "non-boxed" relationships can be tested further using some rough comparisons that look at the relative average of both sets of correlations. While there is no easy way to calculate the significance of the difference in these means, they can still be used tentatively to provide further evidence that the results occur in the specific pattern predicted by the authoritarianism theory, and are not the result of "mudslinging". To compute these, two average correlations were calculated for each variable by running down each row or column². The far right-hand column and the very bottom row give these averages in table 6.1. The first figure is the average strength of the "boxed" relationships, while the second is the average strength of the "unboxed" relationships. The average value of the "boxed" correlations was greater than the average value of the "unboxed" correlations, for both of the "aggression" variables and for both of the "submission" variables in this table.

Before going on to discuss the relationships in the "social structure" box, we can examine the effect of cultural diffusion on the results for the "aggression" and "submission" variables. The relationship between corporal punishment (453-6) and wife-beating (754) was first tested for the effects of spatial autocorrelation. The ordinary least-squares regression on this relationship showed it to be only close to marginally significant (t -value=1.58, p =.11), but removing the effects of spatial autocorrelation actually made the relationship stronger (z -value=1.85, p =.06). The second relationship to be tested was that between obedience inculcation (322-5) and female submission (615). The strength of the relationship was lowered, but the correlation again remained marginally significant (z -value=1.85, p =.06).

However, the non-significant results on female political participation and economic exploitation are unexpected. If anything, these results suggest that women have a slightly greater chance of participating politically the more stratified a culture is. Why do authoritarian social structures have such an unexpected relationship

variable, Tau =.07 (p =.22, n =68) with the wife/husband deference measure, Tau =-.14 (p =.03, n =120) with the female political participation measure, and Tau =.00 (p =.46, n =114) with the female economic control variable.

¹ Similar tests can be run to see if "contamination" of the obedience variable has had any effect on producing the correlations seen above. Despite the finding in the footnotes to the last chapter that female children were expected to be more obedient than male children on this variable, there appears to be little evidence that this had a substantial effect on the correlations in table 6.1. Additional tests were done after producing a reformulated version of the obedience variable that only included the two measures of obedience inculcation in male children. This produced little change in the strength of the relationships, once again suggesting that the (322-5) variable is close enough to a "general" measure of obedience inculcation for our purposes. The correlations that this male obedience variable had with the male dominance measures were: Tau =.28 (p =.00, n =66) with the wife-beating variable, Tau =.16 (p =.03, n =76) with the wife/husband deference measure, Tau =-.06 (p =.20, n =130) with the female political participation measure, and Tau =.01 (p =.44, n =125) with the female economic control variable.

² These averages were calculated using the absolute value of each correlation. However, if the correlation was a disconfirming one, then it was given a negative sign for the purposes of these tests.

with the female political participation variable? Could this unexpected relationship be a result of the imprecise nature of Sanday's political participation variable? As may be remembered from the last chapter, Sanday's code was used despite its imprecise nature, because it had the lowest number of missing cases. Ross (1983) provides variables which allow a more detailed and refined view of women's political participation, because he codes different aspects of this concept with separate variables. As well as coding for three separate aspects of female political participation relative to males (793-5), he also provides a code of the existence of separatist female political organisations (796). Sanday (1981a) also provides a code of separatist female solidarity groups (662), although its inclusion of both formal and informal groups again makes it a more imprecise code. To examine in greater detail what might be going on here, all of these female politics codes were run against the social stratification variable (table 6.2).

Table 6.1: The Relationship Between Authoritarianism and Male Dominance

	Authoritarianism Variables:			
	Authoritarian Aggression Corporal Punishment (453-6)	Authoritarian Submission Obedience Inculcation (322-5)	Exploitative Hierarchy Slavery/Class Stratification (158)	
Male Dominance <i>Wife Beating</i> (754)	.21 p=.02 (n=63)	.28 p=.00 (n=66)	-.02* p=.40 (n=70)	.21 vs .13
<i>Institutionalised Wife/Husband Deference</i> (615)	.07 p=.23 (n=92)	.19 p=.01 (n=76)	.11 p=.09 (n=84)	.19 vs .09
<i>Female Political Participation</i> (661)	-.14 p=.03 (n=120)	-.03 p=.32 (n=133)	.09* p=.10 (n=145)	-.09 vs .09
<i>Female Economic Control</i> (660)	-.01 p=.42 (n=114)	.00 p=.48 (n=127)	.03* p=.33 (n=139)	-.03 vs .00
	.21 vs .07	.19 vs .10	-.06 vs .04	

*Correlation did not come out in the direction expected.
(All correlations are Kendall's Tau.)

These results are very suggestive, and in ways repeat some of the results obtained by Ross (1986a) that were mentioned in the chapter four. Table 6.2 is

organised around a separation of the politics codes into those measuring female power relative to males, and those measuring the extent of separatist female political power. Ross's codes that measure women's political participation relative to males correlate with the social stratification variable in such a way as to suggest that women tend to be excluded from such power in stratified cultures, although only one of the relationships is marginally significant.

On the other hand, there are significant relationships between social stratification and the existence of separatist female political organisations: When there is high social stratification, women tend to have their own political or solidarity groups. The Sande, Njaye, and Humui women's groups among the Mende of West Africa exemplified of the sort of separatist female political groups that Ross was coding for when he developed the (796) variable (personal correspondence, 23/05/92). Sanday (1981a) gives no examples of the sort of solidarity groups that she was coding for when she developed her (662) variable, although she does talk of formal solidarity groups occurring among cultures such as the Igbo, also of West Africa (pp. 115-6). It appears that Sanday's general (661) code which was used in table 6.1 can be taken as a measure of women's overall level of political participation, both relative to males, and in separatist spheres. It is perhaps understandable then that this variable has no clear and consistent relationship with the social structure variable, given the opposing results in these two separate categories of women's political participation. These results are extremely suggestive. It may be that that women respond to the lower status that an authoritarian culture gives them by forming their own solidarity groups.

It was theorised that there is also meant to be a relationship between female economic exploitation and social stratification. Although there are no more refined female economic exploitation codes available, we can recall from chapter five that the female economic control variable (660) was said to have a relationship with the overall (661) code of the female political participation. This has a strength of $\text{Tau}=.54$ ($p=.00$, $n=132$).

The results in table 6.2 were also tested for the effects of cultural diffusion. The highest relationship between stratification and a relative male/female political power variable was that that between the social stratification code (158) and Ross's code on female public political participation (793). Although this relationship was not particularly strong, it was the highest of the three in this category. A least-squares regression run on this relationship confirms its marginal significance ($z\text{-value}=1.76$, $p=.08$). It did, however, become significant ($z\text{-value}=1.97$, $p=.04$) after the effects of spatial autocorrelation were taken into account. Next, tests were done to check for Galton's problem among social stratification and a separatist female politics

variable. The highest of these two correlations is the relationship between (158) and (796). Once again, removing the effect of spatial autocorrelation actually increased the strength of the relationship (from t-value=-3.35, p=.001, to z-value=-3.34, p=.0008).

Table 6.2: The Relationship Between Exploitative Social Structure and Female Political Involvement

	Exploitative Hierarchy <i>Slavery/Class Stratification</i> (158)
Women's Political Participation Relative to Males:	
<i>Female Public Political Participation (793)</i>	.13 p=.07 (n=77)
<i>Female Private Political Participation (794)</i>	.10 p=.16 (n=66)
<i>Gender Differentiations in Positions of Authority (795)</i>	.11 p=.11 (n=84)
Separatist Female Political Organisations:	
<i>Female Solidarity Groups (662)</i>	.14 p=.03 (n=130)
<i>Separate Female Organisations (796)</i>	-.32 p=.00 (n=69)

(All Correlations Kendall's Tau.)

In conclusion, there is mixed support for this first sub-hypothesis. There is some support for a relationship between authoritarian aggression and violence against women, and some support for the notion that authoritarian submission is also associated with women's submission to males. However, theories of authoritarianism appear to be too simplistic to account for the relationship between

women's political subjugation and exploitation, and the existence of an exploitative hierarchical social structure. It may be that theories should also take into account how women organise themselves in response to such structures. Another indication of the mixed level of support for this sub-hypothesis is the fact that outside the "boxes" in table 6.1, only three of the eight correlations are significant or marginally significant.

Militarism Associated with Authoritarianism.

These results were most unambiguous out of the tests run for this first hypothesis (table 6.3). All of the "boxed" relationships were significant and in the direction expected. That is; authoritarian aggression is also associated with unnecessary sadistic violence against the enemy, the early inculcation of submission tends to be associated with the level of military subordination, and cultures with an exploitative hierarchical social structure tend to be politically subjugating of other peoples. In addition, six of the eight "unboxed" correlations are significant and in the direction expected. However, the averages of the "boxed" correlations are still higher than those of the the "unboxed" for all variables, with only one exception. This is the military obedience variable (902), which actually has its highest correlation with the social stratification variable (158). There is so much intercorrelation within the authoritarianism and militarism variables, as well as between them, that some of this is to be expected anyway.

These results also hold after the effect of cultural diffusion was taken into account. The strongest relationship in the "aggression" box is that of the corporal punishment variable (453-6) to the valuing of war variable (907). Testing for spatial autocorrelation does not have much effect on this relationship, and the end result is still significant (z-value=-3.44, p=.00). The relationship between obedience inculcation (322-5) and the military submission variable (902) was the next one tested. Accounting for spatial autocorrelation did decrease the value of the correlation, although it did remain significant (z-value=-2.29, p=.02). Finally, when spatial autocorrelation was accounted for in the relationship between social stratification (158) and the presence of subjugating war (909), the relationship still remained significant (z-value=-6.45, p=.00).

Table 6.3: The Relationship Between Authoritarianism and Militarism

Militarism	Authoritarianism Variables:			
	Authoritarian Aggression Corporal Punishment (453-6)	Authoritarian Submission Obedience Inculcation (322-5)	Exploitative Hierarchy Slavery/Class Stratification (158)	
Trophies, Honours, Captives for Sacrifice (913)	-0.17 p=.01 (n=124)	-0.12 p=.04 (n=136)	0.08 p=.11 (n=153)	.17 vs .10
Value of War/Violence Against Non-group Members (907)	-0.23 p=.00 (n=107)	-0.03 p=.33 (n=119)	-0.23 p=.00 (n=131)	.23 vs .13
Leadership in Battle (902)	-0.15 p=.02 (n=108)	-0.24 p=.00 (n=117)	-0.38 p=.00 (n=130)	.24 vs .26
Subjugation of Territory or People (909)	-0.18 p=.00 (n=124)	-0.22 p=.00 (n=136)	-0.44 p=.00 (n=153)	.44 vs .20
	.20 vs .17	.24 vs .12	.44 vs .23	

(All correlations Kendall's Tau).

Male Dominance Associated with Militarism

Finally, the original male dominance/militarism relationship can be tested for an association. In general, only weak support can be found for the notion that male dominance and militarism have a direct association (table 6.4). However, high relationships were not necessarily expected for this sub-hypothesis. The relationship between male dominance and militarism is not considered, at least in the discussion of this hypothesis, to be a causative relationship. Rather, they just co-vary according to the third factor of authoritarianism. As was seen above, authoritarianism has a bigger relationship with both of them. There are two correlations which measure the relationship between aggression against women and aggression against the "enemy". Neither of these correlations is notably strong, and only one is marginally significant. The relationship between how much women are expected to defer to their husbands and how much soldiers are expected to obey their commanding officers is also weak and not even marginally significant.

In addition, there is little direct relationship between the political subjugation of women and the political subjugation of other peoples. This was probably due to a similar effect that we observed in table 6.2, when we correlated separate aspects of women's political participation with the social stratification variable (158). Because

the fighting of wars of subjugation tends to be associated with such a stratified social structure, then it is to be expected that the ambiguous relationship between female political participation and subjugating war is similar to the relationship between female political participation and social stratification. Confirming this, no relationship was found between subjugating war and the three aforementioned measures of female political participation relative to males. The results of these tests were $-.06$ ($p=.27$, $n=67$) for the (909)/(793) relationship, $.03$ ($p=.37$, $n=55$) for the (909)/(794) relationship, and $.00$ ($p=.49$, $n=68$) for the (909)/(795) relationship. On the other hand, the existence of subjugating war was found to be associated with the presence of separatist female political groups, as measured by the (662) and (796) variables. Again, this was to be expected, given the relationships in table 6.2. The results were $-.19$ ($p=.02$, $n=107$) for the (909)/(662) relationship, and $.20$ ($p=.05$, $n=58$) for the (909)/(796) relationship.

Table 6.4: The Relationship Between Male Dominance and Militarism

	Militarism Variables:				
	<i>Trophies, Honours, Captives for Sacrifice (913)</i>	<i>Value of War/Violence Against Non-group Members (907)</i>	<i>Leadership in Battle (902)</i>	<i>Subjugation of Territory or People (909)</i>	
Male Dominance <i>Wife Beating (754)</i>	$-.19$ $p=.07$ ($n=55$)	$-.10$ $p=.20$ ($n=55$)	$-.15$ $p=.13$ ($n=50$)	$-.05$ $p=.33$ ($n=55$)	.15 vs .10
<i>Institutionalised Wife/Husband Deference (615)</i>	$.16^*$ $p=.06$ ($n=69$)	$.12$ $p=.13$ ($n=60$)	$-.13$ $p=.11$ ($n=61$)	$-.20$ $p=.03$ ($n=69$)	.13 vs .05
<i>Female Political Participation (661)</i>	$.11$ $p=.10$ ($n=122$)	$.08$ $p=.16$ ($n=109$)	$-.09^*$ $p=.15$ ($n=80$)	$.03$ $p=.33$ ($n=122$)	.03 vs .03
<i>Female Economic Control (660)</i>	$.04$ $p=.33$ ($n=114$)	$.00$ $p=.49$ ($n=102$)	$.01$ $p=.42$ ($n=99$)	$.05$ $p=.26$ ($n=114$)	.05 vs .02
	.19 vs .00	.10 vs .07	.13 vs .02	.04 vs .13	

*Correlation did not come out in the direction expected.
(All correlations Kendalls Tau.)

When averages for “boxed” verses “unboxed” relationships were calculated, all of the “aggression” and “submission” variables were found to have their highest

average relationships in the “boxes”. Once again, however, the “social structure” variables did not feature results on these tests that support theories of authoritarianism. There is also one marginally significant disconfirming correlation outside the boxes. This is the relationship between wife/husband deference and sadistic violence against the enemy. Perhaps this relationship was the result of male absence due to war, to be discussed later. Because these relationships are so weak, and because this is not considered to be a “functional” relationship, it is not worth testing these results for spatial autocorrelation.

Discharge of Violence Hypothesis

Finally, before we leave the authoritarianism hypotheses, we can comment on what these results do for the Freudian discharge of violence theory. There is little in the above tests to support the notion that violent aggression against the enemy is associated with less aggression against women, or vice versa. The only relationship open to interpretation in this way was that found in table 6.4. This was the marginally significant relationship found between the absence of women’s submissiveness (615) and the use of sadistic violence against the enemy (913) variable. Even in the case of this relationship, however, we can recall from chapter five that the submissiveness variable had a non-significant correlation with the wife-beating variable. This suggests that the (615) variable is not useful as an indicator of violence against women.

Hypothesis Two

(a) War Frequency Related to War Glorification

These tests were run using the aforementioned general war frequency variable rather than with the political subjugation variable already used. The results were not as expected (table 6.5). There was a non-significant relationship between war and the belief in female inferiority variable (626), and a significant disconfirming relationship between a stated preference for female children and the frequency of war (616). These results suggested that males are likely to be unglorified the more that they fight. At first it was thought that Sanday’s war code must be at fault and, for this reason, the tests were rerun using Whyte’s (1978) code of the general frequency of war (693), Ross’s (1983) code of the frequency of external warfare (774), and the Wheeler (1974) code of the presence or absence of subjugating warfare (909).

Table 6.5: The Relationship Between Male Glorification, and War Frequency/Male Dominance/Male Absence

	Male Glorification Measures	
	<i>Explicit Belief that Women are Generally Inferior to Men (626)</i>	<i>Stated Preference for Female Children (616)</i>
Militarism		
<i>Frequency of Warfare/Fighting (679)</i>	.03* p=.38 (n=60)	.25* p=.02 (n=60)
<i>Frequency of Intercommunity Armed Conflict (693)</i>	.14* p=.09 (n=85)	.19* p=.03 (n=85)
<i>Frequency of External Warfare (774)</i>	.32* p=.09 (n=17)	.01* p=.47 (n=17)
<i>Presence of Subjugating Warfare (909)</i>	.30 p=.00 (n=77)	.27 p=.00 (n=77)
Male Dominance		
<i>Wife Beating (754)</i>	-.24 p=.06 (n=40)	.01 p=.46 (n=40)
<i>Institutionalised Wife/Husband Deference (615)</i>	-.40 p=.00 (n=83)	.00 p=.47 (n=83)
<i>Female Political Participation (661)</i>	.19 p=.04 (n=72)	-.01* p=.43 (n=72)
<i>Female Economic Control (660)</i>	.16 p=.07 (n=71)	-.03* p=.38 (n=71)
Male Absence		
<i>Systemic Male Absence (715)</i>	.12 p=.12 (n=85)	.01 p=.43 (n=85)

*Correlation did not come out in the direction expected.
(All correlations Kendall's Tau).

These tests produced some very interesting results. Not only did the use of Whyte's warfare code confirm that war frequency is associated with a preference for female children, but it also produced a marginally significant disconfirming relationship with respect to the female inferiority measure. Perhaps this is just because in a warlike culture, no one would want to give birth to a future soldier, although this theory still leaves unexplained the relationship between war frequency and the lack of male glorification. Ross's code also produced a marginally significant

correlation which also supported the female inferiority finding, although it had no relationship with the child gender preference code. However, there is a catch, and this is shown by the results for Wheeler's warfare variable. When the culture fights wars of subjugation, there is a statistically significant chance that women will be thought of as inferior and a significantly greater chance that male children will be favoured. In the course of testing this relationship then, we find more support for the effect of authoritarianism: Male participation of war in general, and even in external war, does not glorify them. If anything, the effect is the opposite to that expected. On the other hand, male glorification and a desire for male children correlates positively with the presence of war that has a goal of subjugation.

These results change slightly when spatial autocorrelation procedures were run on the highest correlations. The marginally significant relationship between the female inferiority measure (626) and Whyte's general warfare frequency variable (693) was chosen for the testing of spatial autocorrelation, because it has much fewer missing cases than the bigger relationship between female inferiority and Ross's warfare code (774). The chosen relationship is not strong though, and the least-squares regression shows it to be non-significant (t -value=1.85, p =.23). After controlling for spatial autocorrelation, this relationship remains non-significant (z -value=1.13, p =.25). It appears that while there is a relationship between war frequency and the absence of male glorification, this is of low strength, regardless of the effects of cultural diffusion. On the other hand, the positive relationship between female inferiority and the presence of war that has subjugation as a goal (909) is weakened by spatial autocorrelation, but still remains significant (t -value=2.37, p =.01).

As an aside to the testing of this hypothesis, these two measures of male glorification were run against the other four variables selected as measuring male dominance. This was done in order to see if there was a relationship between the presence of a specific belief that women are inferior, and the definition of male dominance used in this thesis. As can be seen, the female inferiority measure had a confirming and significant, or confirming and marginally significant relationship with all of the four male dominance variables, suggesting that such a relationship does indeed exist. On the other hand, a stated preference for male infants has no significant relationship with any of the other four male dominance variables. If the female inferiority variable had been found to have a positive correlation with war in general, then a convincing case could have been made that this was a process by which war contributes to male dominance.

Finally, at the risk of pre-empting the tests of hypothesis three, it may be worth trying to determine why war in general does not lead to male glorification. Perhaps

it is because males are not there to glorify themselves. To test this notion, the female inferiority belief and child preference variables were run against the variable from Whyte's dataset that measured the existence of systemic male absence (715). While the relationship between male absence and a belief in female inferiority was in the direction expected, it was not very significant. Accounting for the effects of spatial autocorrelation did nothing to change this (z -value=0.72, p =.46).

(b) War Frequency Related to Male Political Importance.

Does the frequency of male involvement in war increase the degree to which men become "important" in a culture. If we consider that the "importance" of someone refers to their place in the leadership structure, then some support for this has already been found during the testing of the militarism/male dominance relationship in hypothesis one. The testing there, however, involved war that had subjugation as its goal. Here we can compare these results to a similar set of correlations performed using the general warfare variable (679), along with all of the female politics codes already mentioned. The results (table 6.6) suggest that war in general tends to be associated with women's exclusion from formal political structures. One of the relationships is significant, while the other two are marginally significant. On the other hand, the general frequency of war has no strong effect on the presence or absence of separatist female political organisations. In addition, the result for the overall female politics variable (661) suggests that female political participation as a whole decreases as war frequency increases.

It appears that the initial theory of male involvement in war causing increased male political importance has some truth, although there is no such effect for the two separatist female politics variables. We can check the results for the effect of cultural diffusion. The highest relationship between general war frequency and a code that measured female political participation relative to males, was that between (679) and (794). There was virtually no change in the significance of this relationship after spatial autocorrelation was taken into account, and the relationship remained significant (z -value=1.93, p =.05).

However, recall from chapter one that the male importance theory says nothing about the relationships between war frequency and level of violence against women, and war frequency and the level of women's submission. The male importance theory would be considered inadequate on its own if these two were found to be correlated with war. Although the relationship between female submission and war frequency was weak and non-significant (Tau=.08, p =.23, n =57), war frequency did have a marginally significant relationship wife-beating (Tau=.19, p =.08, n =52). However, the ordinary least-squares regression showed this

relationship to be even less significant (t -value=1.45, p =.15), and accounting for spatial autocorrelation did little to improve this (z -value=1.51, p =.13). This suggests that the effect of increased participation or importance of males in politics due to war in general is more or less independent of the effects of authoritarianism.

Table 6.6: The Relationship Between Male Political Importance and War Frequency

	Warfare Frequency <i>Presence of Warfare (679)</i>
Female Political Importance Relative to Males: <i>Female Public Political Participation (793)</i>	.17 p =.07 (n=61)
<i>Female Private Political Participation (794)</i>	.26 p =.02 (n=49)
<i>Gender Differentiations in Positions of Authority (795)</i>	.16 p =.08 (n=63)
Separatist Female Political Structures: <i>Female Solidarity Groups (662)</i>	-.05 p =.28 (n=98)
<i>Separate Female Organisations (796)</i>	-.11 p =.19 (n=54)
Overall Female Political Participation Levels: <i>Female Public and Private Involvement in Politics (661)</i>	-.15 p =.05 (n=111)

(All correlations Kendall's Tau).

Hypothesis Three: The Effect of Male Absence

As was mentioned in the last chapter, Whyte (1978) codes his sample for a variable measuring the extent of male absence due to military or economic reasons

(715). However, some caution is needed here. The male absence variable measures absence due to several things, and is therefore not a good measure of male absence specifically due to war. In fact, it has little correlation (Tau=-.05, p=.29, n=76) with the subjugating war variable (909). To a certain extent, this is to be expected. Males could be on trade expeditions, which would exclude them from fighting. When we try and correlate the war variable with the male absence variable, only part of the male absence variable is "responding" to this correlation. It is still, however, a variable that measures male absence. If the theory of male absence due solely to war is correct, then we would also expect to find such an effect using a more general measure of male absence.

Table 6.7: The Effect of Male Absence on Male Dominance

	Level of male Absence <i>Existence of Systemic Male Absence (715)</i>
Male Dominance <i>Wife Beating (754)</i>	-.24 p=.05 (n=40)
<i>Institutionalised Husband/ Wife Deference (615)</i>	-.24 p=.00 (n=82)
<i>Female Political Participation (661)</i>	.23 p=.02 (n=71)
<i>Female Economic Control (660)</i>	.21 p=.03 (n=70)

(All correlations Kendall's Tau).

The male absence variable correlated significantly and as expected with all of the male dominance variables (table 6.7). When males are absent, there is less wife-beating, less female submissiveness, more female political participation in general, and more female economic control over the fruits of their own labour. The strongest relationship, the one between male absence (715) and wife/husband deference (615), was subject to spatial autocorrelation testing. There was little change in the relationship, and it still remained significant (z-value=-2.79, p=.00). While we do not have a variable that measures male absence specifically due to war, running the tests with this general male absence variable shows it to be a plausible theory.

However, this effect may not be all that common. Cross-tabulating the male absence and subjugating war variable (909) demonstrates this. In the 41 cultures in which there is common male absence, in only 11 do they fight wars of political subjugation.

Hypothesis Four: The Origins of Authoritarianism

Now our authoritarianism variables will be run against the measures of civilisation, in order to investigate the possibility that authoritarianism arose with the development of civilisation. As can be seen in table 6.8, there is some support for the notion that levels of civilisation are indeed connected to how authoritarian a culture is. Two of the highest relationships; population density/obedience inculcation and population density/social stratification were subject to spatial autocorrelation testing, but both relationships still remained highly significant (z-value=2.80, p=.004, and z-value=6.80, p<.000 respectively).

Table 6.8: The Relationship of Authoritarianism to Civilisation

	Authoritarianism Variables:		
	Authoritarian Aggression Corporal Punishment (453-6)	Authoritarian Submission Obedience Inculcation (322-5)	Exploitative Hierarchy Slavery/Class Stratification (158)
Civilisation			
<i>Fixity of Residence (150)</i>	.17 p=.00 (n=148)	.13 p=.01 (n=165)	.40 p=.00 (n=186)
<i>Urbanisation (152)</i>	.16 p=.00 (n=148)	.15 p=.00 (n=165)	.38 p=.00 (n=186)
<i>Population Density (156)</i>	.17 p=.00 (n=148)	.18 p=.00 (n=165)	.44 p=.00 (n=186)

(All correlations Kendall's Tau).

However, while these results are much more convincing than those we obtained in chapter four, the limitation of these sort of tests cannot be over-emphasised. To borrow terms from psychological testing, these are "cross-sectional"

tests performed on many different societies on differing levels of development, as opposed to the "longitudinal" study of any one society. That is; instead of looking at how authoritarianism emerged alongside the development of civilisation in a single culture, we use a sample of cultures of various types and assume that they all fall along a continuum which measures the emergence of civilisation. While these results are suggestive and certainly appear to support the theorists mentioned in the first chapter, it would be risky to make too much of them.

Applicability to Modern Nations

Recall from chapter one that we wished to see if these findings were applicable to modern society by seeing if the relationships held after controlling for the level of cultural complexity. These tests were done using the the first civilisation variable, the fixity of residence code (150). The use of this variable allows a division of the sample into two near equal categories of "fixed" and "unfixed" settlement patterns. In the first column of table 6.9 is a list of the strongest relationships from the "boxes" of the tables for the first hypothesis, while the findings for these tests when performed on the whole sample are repeated in the next column. In the next column are these same correlations performed for cultures that are "uncivilised" according to the (150) code, in that they do not have fixed settlements. In the final column are the results when the tests were performed on cultures that do feature fixed settlements.

As can be seen, the effect of breaking the sample into two like this has the overall effect of lowering the significance of correlations found. In addition, the relationship between female political participation (793) and social stratification (158) is destroyed in both of the two sub-samples. This can probably be attributed to the strong relationship that social stratification has with the civilisation variables. However, the overall effect of selecting only the more civilised cultures is to improve the strength of the correlations. This is very suggestive. It appears that the relationships that authoritarianism has with male dominance and militarism may actually be stronger the more settled and established a culture is. For this reason, we can tentatively conclude that our tests may be even more relevant to modern cultures than they are to non-industrial cultures.

Table 6.9: Strength of the Relationships When Controlling for Civilisation

	Whole Sample (n=186)	Unfixed Settlements (n=84)	Fixed Settlements (n=102)
Authoritarianism/ Male Dominance Tests (453-6)/(754)	.21, p=.02	.22, p=.11	.25, p=.03
(325)/(615)	.19, p=.01	.00, p=.48	.39, p=.00
(158)/(793)	.13, p=.07	.09, p=.24	.00, p=.47
Authoritarianism/ Militarism Tests (453-6)/(907)	-.23, p=.00	-.26, p=.01	-.21, p=.02
(325)/(902)	-.24, p=.00	-.19, p=.05	-.25, p=.00
(158)/(909)	-.44, p=.00	-.20, p=.04	-.44, p=.00

Cultural Diffusion of the Individual Elements

One last set of results worth reporting was the figures that relate to the cultural diffusion of the individual variables, as opposed to the results presented above for the cultural diffusion of the relationships. The results show that several of the variables were highly likely to spread to neighbouring cultures, something which turns out to be of great theoretical interest. Most importantly, the results suggest that the worldwide distributions of the three authoritarianism variables were all strongly influenced by cultural diffusion. This effect was strongest for the social stratification variable, (158), which was shown to have a very significant individual effect for spatial autocorrelation ($z\text{-test}=4.54, p<.000$). Results for the corporal punishment variable (453-6) were also significant ($z\text{-test}=1.63, p=.05$), as was the result for the obedience inculcation (322-5) variable ($z\text{-test}=1.84, p=.03$). Therefore, if I live in a culture which has a stratified social structure, in which children are brought up using corporal punishment, and in which obedience is expected from children, then it is highly likely that my geographic neighbours will also eventually end up engaging in such practices.

The results for the male dominance and militarism variables that were tested in a similar way were not as consistent. No effects for spatial autocorrelation were seen among the wife-beating (754) ($z\text{-test}=-0.02$, $p=.41$) or female submissiveness (615) ($z\text{-test}=0.59$, $p=.26$) variables, although the results for the female political participation variables were contradictory. There was no spatial autocorrelation effect for Ross's code of female public political participation (793) ($z\text{-test}=0.88$, $p=.18$), but Ross's code on the existence of separatist female organisation did show an effect for diffusion (796) ($z\text{-test}=1.72$, $p=.04$). This effect was also found in Sanday's code of separatist female organisations (662) ($z\text{-test}=2.75$, $p=.00$). Finally, there were no such effects for Ross's female private political participation variable (794) ($z\text{-test}=0.50$, $p=.30$), or for Whyte's code on the the belief in female inferiority (626) ($z\text{-test}=0.26$, $p=.39$). Similar inconsistent results were also seen among the war variables. The enjoyment of war variable did not show any evidence of spatial autocorrelation ($z\text{-test}=0.04$, $p=.481$), although the variable measuring subjugation as a goal in war (909) was found to have a marginally significant effect ($z\text{-test}=1.26$, $p=.10$). In addition, the tendency for soldiers to obey their superiors (902) had a significant autocorrelation effect ($z\text{-test}=2.28$, $p=.01$). Finally, Sanday's general warfare variable (679) did not have a significant effect for spatial autocorrelation ($z\text{-test}=0.17$, $p=.43$).

The reasons for the inconsistencies in diffusion between the authoritarianism variables, and the other variables will be discussed in chapter seven, along with a summary of the other findings of this thesis.

Chapter Seven: Beyond Authoritarianism

In this chapter, we will discuss three things. Firstly, there will be comments on the results of the last chapter. Given these results, it will be asserted that authoritarianism is a dangerous syndrome. With this in mind, the second part of this chapter will look at examples of non-authoritarian cultures, suggesting that such dangers do not exist in these societies. In the third and final part, we will look at the small amount of research which relates to some of the options that we have for changing our own society.

Comments on the Results

We have only been able to “scratch the surface” of these relationships. Cohen & Naroll (1970) write that ideally the results of a cross-cultural study can be confirmed by seven other methods: (1) A cross-historical survey, (2) A cross-national survey, (3) A concomitant variation survey, (4) An examination of several extreme cases where the association is very high, (5) An examination of several cases where there is no relationship, (6) Case studies of individuals, and (7) Tests in formal games. Until these are done, then the results of the original tests must remain inconclusive and tentative (p. 22). Barry also writes of the importance of using other techniques to accumulate evidence, such as the comparison of different social groups or different individuals within the same society (personal correspondence, 17/01/92). To a certain extent, the examples in chapter two and the psychometric studies of chapter three do go some distance in fulfilling these goals.

What did we find? We found that there is considerable evidence for a relationship between militarism and authoritarianism, both in Western society, and in cultures far removed from it. There is also some evidence that authoritarianism

is related to male dominance among the people of Western society, but the dynamics of this relationship are more complex when analysed using a wider selection of cultures. It appears that women may respond to the lower place that authoritarian males give them by forming their own solidarity groups. Such groups allow them to regain some of their lost power, although often it is not enough to stop male violence, or the necessity of being submissive to men.

Are female solidarity groups the only reason for the relatively weak relationship between authoritarianism and male dominance (as compared to the relationship between authoritarianism and militarism)? Why did we not find a stronger relationship? Another possibility is that these results were due to poor methodology in the study. Perhaps the use of corporal punishment and obedience codings were not accurate measures of authoritarian aggression and authoritarian submission. No "direct" assessment of authoritarianism was possible, in the way that Altemeyer measured the RWA scores of his students in chapter three. The treatment of children is, after all, as much a manifestation of authoritarianism as male dominance or militarism is. However, it is not immediately obvious how using an inappropriate variable in this manner could produce strong findings with regards to militarism and not with regards to male dominance.

Alternatively, perhaps the theory is at fault. Could it be that women are acting as authoritarian as men in some cultures? To a certain extent, such a culture requires the cooperation of women in bringing up authoritarian children. The results in table 6.1 suggest that mothers are still willing to inculcate authoritarian aggression and authoritarian submission in their children, even when they themselves face domestic violence and act submissively towards their husbands. Perhaps women bring children up in such a way because they do not see what the danger is, or because they do not perceive that there is any other way in which to rear children. Alternatively, they may be responding to pressure from males around them to bring up children in this way.

Another possibility is that women fare better than the "enemy" because women are in a better position to adapt to authoritarianism. Women live with the "oppressors" and learn to predict them, and can then develop "coping" strategies to deal with them. This is one way in which we can interpret the findings with regards to separatist female solidarity groups. On the other hand, the "enemy" in a distant society has less of a chance to develop coping strategies to deal with authoritarians. It only encounters soldiers of the other group in sudden and largely unpredictable attacks. While it can mount a force to defend itself, this is likely, according to the law of averages, to fail as many times as it succeeds. Males in an authoritarian culture may then learn that oppressing the "enemy" works, but may never quite

achieve the same "success" with regards to the oppression of women. There is, though, a limit to how much these coping mechanisms can help women. While table 6.2 suggested that solidarity groups can help women regain political and economic power in public life, such groups appear to be relatively powerless to stop the wife-beating and female submissiveness which occurs in the "private" area of domestic life, where women are often on their own.

A final possibility is that the differing effect that authoritarianism has on male dominance and militarism has something to do with the relative level of "expendability" that both groups have. The "enemy" in another culture is always "available" for mistreatment or abuse, in that the extent of this abuse does not endanger the existence of the authoritarian culture. On the other hand, authoritarians in such cultures would have to be slightly more accommodating with women. Although authoritarian males may have a negative view of anything female, the continued existence of their culture is dependent on the continued well-being of at least a certain proportion of the women in the population.

There is also evidence in the results of chapter six to support the notion that male participation in war is associated with increased male political importance or participation of males, and that this effect occurs in addition to the influence of authoritarianism. On the other hand, there is no evidence that male glorification also results from high male involvement in war. Male glorification only results from war if the war is directed towards imperialistic goals, a finding which again provides support for the authoritarianism hypothesis. There is also little evidence that a Freudian drive-discharge effect is occurring between war and violence against women. The incidence of violence against the enemy tends to be associated with slightly more, not less, violence against women. There is also support for the possibility that male absence due to war may have a positive effect on the status of women, although other figures suggest that this is a rare occurrence. There is also only a very weak direct relationship between our three point definition of militarism and our three point definition of male dominance. Finally, there was also some tentative support for the notion that the rise of authoritarianism was associated with the rise of civilisation

Another interesting finding was that three separate sets of results suggest that authoritarianism is the most "central" out of the three main concepts discussed in this thesis. Firstly, we saw in chapter five that the authoritarianism variables all had a strong level of intercorrelation with each other, while there tended to be fewer intercorrelations for the male dominance and militarism variables. Secondly, in chapter six we saw that the relationships of authoritarianism to male dominance and militarism tended to be stronger than the relationship that male dominance and

militarism had with each other. Finally, all of the three individual authoritarianism variables were shown to have significant effects on the tests that measured the cultural diffusion of the individual variables, suggesting that they diffuse to other cultures "en-block". On the other hand, the male dominance and militarism variables varied in the extent to which they diffused in this manner.

These findings suggest that the level of a culture's authoritarianism can change in response to certain circumstances. Up until now, we have treated authoritarianism as a deep-rooted psychological syndrome (with an accompanying social structure effect). However, it is also obvious that other factors play a part in creating the "authoritarian personality", and that the tendency to be authoritarian is culturally modifiable to some degree. There are many factors that probably play a part in shaping authoritarianism. In addition to the effects of cultural diffusion from outside the culture, there are ideological, religious, educational, and child-rearing influences, as well as the effects of institutional and economic context.

How then does a tendency towards authoritarianism spread to other cultures? There are two ways in which this can happen. As was mentioned in chapter five, authoritarian and militarist cultures would probably tend to take over their neighbour's society or territory and establish authoritarian cultures here. French (1985) noted this process, but also came up with a second way in which authoritarianism could spread. She writes that if an obsession with power arises in a neighbouring society, people can often only defend themselves by "mounting an equal and opposite power". By doing so, the people are in danger of becoming obsessed with power themselves (p. 19).

It was asserted in chapter one that there is little variability in authoritarianism, male dominance, and militarism among contemporary nation-states. Could this be due to the effects of cultural diffusion? Considerations of Galton's problem have particular relevance to the "national attribute" studies mentioned in the first chapter. Most of the world's territories have at one stage in their history been colonised by a small group of countries, located mainly in Europe. In using all of the world's contemporary nations as a sample, researchers may not be discovering functional relationships, but a set of commonalities that once existed in a much smaller and probably unrepresentative sample of colonialist societies. Sanday (1981a) is one writer who comments on the generally negative effect that colonisation can have on the status of women in non-industrialised cultures (chpt. 7).

As well as common colonial heritage, comparatively recent advances in transport and communications exacerbate the effect of cultural diffusion in the modern world. Fast and relatively inexpensive air travel, and instant satellite

communications, for example, are binding the nations of the world together. Rather than being thought of as a sample of independent cases, all the nations of the world are fast becoming integrated into a single society, or the "global village" of popular terminology (Moul 1974, p. 149). Despite this danger, considerations of diffusion and Galton's problem have been largely ignored outside anthropology (p. 149). Naroll (1970b) talks of the challenges to sociological and political science methodology that Galton's problem poses, but also writes of the resistance that he personally found among sociologists to the idea of testing for it (pp. 974-5). More recently, Bahry (1991) touches on Galton's problem in a political science textbook, during a discussion of the methodology of national attribute studies, although she gives no specific solutions to this problem (p. 221). What is the evidence that cultural diffusion does occur among modern nation-states?

The little research that has been done suggests that historical diffusion does indeed occur both within and between modern nations. Walker (1969) looks at how 88 pieces of legislation diffused among the states of the U.S.A. On the country by country by country level, Ross & Homer (1976) show that historical diffusion also inflates correlations in national attribute studies by analysing correlations within both a sample of African countries and a world sample. The most significant finding is that of Moul (1974), who demonstrates that colonisation has a diffusional effect. Moul shows how variables such as a nation's electoral system, party system, executive strength, G.N.P., and literacy rates, tend to correlate with a variable which records the country of colonisation (p. 150-2). We therefore have evidence that that cultural diffusion occurs among modern nation states, as well as the aforementioned evidence that authoritarianism can spread by cultural diffusion. These two points taken together can be seen as "circumstantial" evidence for the notion that the large number of authoritarian societies in the world today is the result of diffusional processes. In their 1991 report, Amnesty International list 141 countries known to have engaged in human rights violations, ranging from acts of police brutality, to acts of torture, detention for political dissent, and "disappearances".

If authoritarianism has some variability around the world, what are societies which have avoided authoritarianism like? Just because patterns of authoritarianism have some similarities across cultures, this does not mean that that these patterns are necessarily universal. Living in Western culture in which authoritarianism is present, many are blinded to the possibility that things can ever be different. There are, however, a number of cultures in the anthropological literature that appear to lack the three components of authoritarianism. Let us have a look at some of these cultures. Although anthropologists do not tend to talk much about "authoritarianism", certain cultures in the literature engage in customs that

appear to be indications of non-authoritarianism. Like the examples in chapter two, this is not meant to be a systematic survey, merely an illustrative one.

Examples of Non-Authoritarian Cultures

Aggression in such cultures is not glorified and may be explained in a number of ways. Firstly, it is often treated as an illness or the result of mystical forces. The Buid of the Philippine Highlands, for example, accept that anger can cause flare-ups of hostility, but if it persists, then the individual is seen to be the victim of mystical forces beyond their control (Gibson 1989; p. 62). Alternatively, it may be seen that aggressive people are not passive victims of mystical forces, but are people responsible for their own actions. In this case the society will have an explicit cultural devaluation of aggression in order to remain peaceful. Some tribes have specific myths that warn against aggression or hostility. Turnbull (1978) for example, wrote that the Mbuti of north-eastern Zaire felt that the origin of human death came from an "original sin" that resulted from one of their kind killing his "brother" antelope. All Mbuti thereafter would eventually die until they learn how not to kill (p. 192). At the very least, aggressive people are seen to be "aberrant types", as they are amongst the peaceful Zuñi Pueblo Indians of south-western North America (Fromm 1973, p. 170).

An example of a specific distaste for violence in a Western sub-culture can be seen in the anthropological account given by Buckley (1989) of a community called "Upper Tullagh" that has managed to remain non-violent in the middle of Northern Ireland. The inhabitants, who are a mixture of both Catholic and Protestant, have a kind of siege mentality regarding the idea of violence. They are proud of their community's record of non-violence in the midst of such a strife torn country and they attribute it to the "good neighbourliness" of their area (p. 153). The inhabitants make a deliberate effort to maintain links across the sectarian divide and if a member of the community is killed in the conflict, people of both religions make a point of attending the funeral (pp. 156-8). Buckley notes that this is not a rejection of the whole Northern Ireland question and that members of the community do still identify with their own side in the conflict (p. 156). It is not the problem of Northern Ireland that is ignored; rather the violent way in which some choose to deal with it.

People in peaceful and non-authoritarian cultures often do not expect their members even to present an appearance of toughness to the world. In such

ocieties, it is sometimes even expected that people should be scared of the world instead of being brave. Among the Chewong people, for example, there is a cultural emphasis on being shy and timid ("*lidy*") as well as fearful ("*höutugen*"). Children are praised by their parents for being timid and adults boast about fearfulness on their own part. To excuse oneself for not doing something, it is perfectly acceptable to claim that you were shy (Howell 1989, p. 49). The two sets of spirits that they worship, the "leaf-people" and the "original people", also flee when danger threatens (p. 50). In addition, the Chewong do not normally think of the word "brave" ("*berani*") as something that applies to them (p. 53). The Buid fear both human outsiders and their spirit world, and have many ceremonies aimed at appeasing predatory spirits. Their language has many words for fear, fleeing, and escape and adults easily gain an audience by telling stories about how scared they were by a particular incident (Gibson 1989, pp. 69-72). Other examples of cultures in which timidity is taught to children are the Semai among whom "being afraid" is thought to be "smart" (Denton 1978, p. 128) and the Tahitians, among whom parents are pleased if their children are timid (Levy 1978, p. 229). Boasting about strength and bravery is also discouraged in such cultures. With the Buid, the word for boasting ("*buagun*") is a variation of the word used to describe lying, and such people are in danger of being ignored or ridiculed (Gibson, 1989; p.66) as they are among the !Kung of the Kalahari Desert¹ (Draper 1978, p. 41). The words in Buid language that translate into our words for "bravery" and "courage" have "strong negative moral overtones" (Gibson 1989, p. 67).

Instead of the physical violence that is used to condition obedience in children in many authoritarian cultures, pleasurable body contact is often emphasised. For example, Sorenson (1978) notes the high degree of physical contact in child rearing among the Fore of the New Guinea Highlands (pp. 16-9), and a similar pattern can be seen among the Mbuti (Turnbull 1978). Non-violent discipline is also common in such cultures. In a markedly non-violent Mexican village studied by Paddock (1975), discipline was minimal but firm, and consistent when it did occur. If possible, misbehaviour was ignored (p. 226). Draper (1978) also notes that among the !Kung, misbehaviour was ignored rather than physically punished (p. 37).

In such cultures, there is usually a lack of hierarchical structures in which authoritarian behaviour can occur. In the Buid, the only legitimate hierarchy is between adult and child, and even then socialisation has the aim of bringing the child to a point of autonomy and independence (Gibson 1989, p. 65). Another example are the Piaroa of Venezuela who have no formal structures based on divisions such as age, sex, or descent (Overing 1989, p. 88). Among the Fore, there

¹ The exclamation mark in the name "!Kung" is the phonetic sign for a click made with the tongue, and is made at the same time that the "K" is pronounced.

ere no chiefs, or indeed any recognised authority figures such as priests or medicine men (Sorenson 1978, p. 14). On the other hand, even if hierarchical structures exist, other factors can modify their effect. The non-violent Mexican village described by addock (1975) had many councils and committees. These, however, were all separate and overlapping in their jurisdiction. The overall effect was to decentralise and diffuse power, again producing a non-hierarchical power structure (p. 228).

Robarckek (1989) writes that among the Semai of the Malaysia, not even children can be ordered about, nor does even material dependence on other adults legitimize domination. To force someone to do something against their will puts the victim in danger of a state called "*pehunan*" which is akin to a state of emotional frustration. This condition is said to increase a person's vulnerability to physical and spiritual danger and the dominator is likely to be blamed if the person later experiences some sort of misfortune. (pp. 37-9). There is also often a perception in non-authoritarian cultures that one person can only get ahead at the detriment of others. For example, in the non-violent Northern Ireland community, it was felt that people can only better themselves financially at the expense of their personal relationships with their neighbours (Buckley 1989; p. 153). Among the Zuñi Pueblo Indians, people frown on excessive concentrations of wealth (French, 1985, p. 61). In such societies, it seems that there is a perception of a zero-sum trade-off between individual greed and the smooth running of the community.

Reducing Authoritarianism

Should we be worried about the large number of authoritarian societies in the world today? This thesis asserts that authoritarianism is indeed a matter of concern for two main reasons. Firstly, even in democratic nations with laws allowing freedom and equality, authoritarianism has been shown in chapter two to be related to militarism and male dominance, as well as many other oppressions such as mistreatment of children, homophobia, and racism. There is also evidence that RWA score is related to more unrecognised prejudices. For example, Crandall & Biernat (1990) find that RWA score is related to a dislike of fat people. A second cause for concern is that a high degree of authoritarianism "sets up" a culture for the acceptance of a totalitarian takeover in situations of national crisis, just as Hitler and his associates were able to take over Germany in the 1930's. This is not such a far-fetched possibility for many nations. An internal military takeover is always possible for any country that fields armed forces. Many nations in the world today are only ever one dissatisfied general away from military rule. Who is there to stop

them if the police manifested authoritarian submission and joined with the military? In some totalitarian nations there is little difference between the two forces.

While many Western nations have managed to avoid displays of overt authoritarianism for the past few decades, this does not guarantee that they will never be authoritarian again. The experiments of Milgram and Zimbardo reported in chapter two suggest that authoritarian leaders could still inspire large proportions of the population to commit atrocities. Another disturbing finding is that 26% of the American legislators who Altemeyer surveyed "strongly agreed" or "very strongly agreed" with the RWA scale item: "Once our government leaders condemn the dangerous elements in our society, it will be the duty of every patriotic citizen to help stomp out the rot that is poisoning our country from within" (item 14). As Altemeyer writes, this is exactly the sort of thinking that led to the holocaust (personal correspondence, 30/04/92).

The feminist movement and the peace movement can be seen as attempts to turn our society away from two manifestations of authoritarianism. Both movements have had some success. How though do we change the central core of authoritarianism that both male dominance and militarism have in common? Marxist or socialist philosophies advocate the overthrow of the hierarchical and exploitative social structure. However, there have been very few "pure" examples of such an overthrow, and it is certainly not something that we can test in controlled experiments. What we can do is engage in "thought experiments", and we can also look at the small amount of research that has been done on the changing of authoritarian attitudes.

In chapter six we saw that authoritarianism tends to accompany civilisation. Will cultures that are urbanised inevitably be authoritarian? Can we only abolish authoritarianism by abandoning cities? This tactic did not work for the Khmer Rouge, but could it work for us? This thesis asserts that this is not necessarily so. Retesting some of the variables used in the last two chapters show that a culture can still live in cities and yet still remain non-authoritarian. Of the cultures that ranked on the highest level of the urbanisation (152) variable (more than 1000 people in the settlement), four out of 22 scored only 0,1, or 2 on the nine point scale of corporal punishment (453-6) (the Russians of Viriatino village, the Japanese of Niiike village, the Huron of North America, and the Quiche of Central America). Similarly, one out of 22 cultures that had the highest level of urbanisation scored only 0,1 or 2 on the nine point scale of obedience inculcation (322-5) (the Huron). In addition, two out of 24 cultures managed to retain an egalitarian social structure under these

circumstances using the social stratification code (158) (the Omaha and the Zúñi, also both of North America)¹.

These numbers are not large. However, the fact that they are not zero show that it is possible for a culture to both live in large settlements, and yet still remain relatively non-authoritarian. This also works the other way. Cultures that do not live in cities can still be authoritarian. The Yanomamö, mentioned in chapter two, are a case in point. They are a band and village culture that has been cited as authoritarian because of the way the men treat women and the inhabitants of other communities. In any case, more detailed study of cultures such as the Huron appears to be a fruitful area of research, for what they can teach us about avoiding authoritarianism in an urban context.

So if increasing levels of civilisation does not inevitably lead to authoritarianism, how can we change our own society? As Dyer (1988) writes, civilisation may have a bloodstained past, but it can hopefully still get over its "unfortunate early upbringing" to become a positive thing (p. 11). This thesis makes three suggestions. Firstly, it has been shown that solidarity on the part of an oppressed group tends to improve their position. Witness how in chapter six it was shown that women's solidarity groups increased their resistance to authoritarianism. Although only a relatively small percentage of women has been active in feminist organisations at any one time in Western society, the effect of even this much solidarity has been to produce some impressive gains. The other two suggestions emerge from the work of Altemeyer (1988).

A second possibility is to reduce the effects of authoritarianism by legislating for change. In one experiment, Altemeyer found some evidence which suggested that authoritarians would begrudgingly lower their level of prejudicial behaviour if laws were passed requiring them to do so. He found that high scorers on the RWA scale said that they would still hire a homosexual teacher if an equal opportunity law required them to do so. The results further suggest that the authoritarians did this because, above all else, they respect the law (pp. 276-7). However, such laws should not go too far. Students were asked in a similar question about how they would respond to a law requiring that religious instruction be completely eliminated from schools. There was less support among high RWA students for this more radical law, and a number of them now claimed that they would actively oppose it (pp. 278-80).

¹ Interesting enough, the Huron, Omaha, and Zúñi all lie close to other when plotted on a map of North America, suggesting that their non-authoritarian ways may be partly the result of some kind of cultural diffusion process.

A third possibility is to control authoritarianism by appealing to the desire for conventionality that such people tend to have. In one test of this, Altemeyer presented students with a pretend newspaper article on a fictitious Canadian politician called "Arnold Gregson". The control version of this article showed him to be a respectable and politically moderate man who led a movement which wanted to create a separatist state in Western Canada. Both low and high quartile RWA students had about the same average favourability rating of this version of "Arnold". Three other versions of the "Arnold" article were also given out. The second had the same opening paragraphs of the first, but later depicted him as social disrespectful, due to the fact that he had used unusual and radical campaign tactics in the past. High RWA students rated this version as significantly less favourable than the control version. In the third version, "Arnold" was once again depicted as using respectable tactics, although he was also shown to be very authoritarian (as evidenced by his views on religion, the economy, sex, race, and crime). Understandably, authoritarians liked this version even more than the control version. However, a final version depicted "Arnold" as being both highly authoritarian but also disrespectful (once again due to the use of radical campaign tactics). Despite his authoritarian views, this disrespectful version of "Arnold" had an evaluation among high RWA students that was not significantly different than the rating of the "ordinary" disrespectful "Arnold" (pp. 282-9).

These results suggest that appeals to the conventionalism of authoritarians in the general population could be used to prevent the emergence of fascist dictators. Altemeyer concluded that future "Hitlers" could be stalled in their rise to power if commentators made a point of fully informing the public about the often unconventional pasts that such people have¹. As Altemeyer points out, Hitler himself had such a past, including his leading of an armed rebellion (p. 289).

Other tests showed that authoritarians themselves feel a desire to be "normal". In 1983, Altemeyer had a sample of 532 students fill in a copy of the RWA scale. They were asked to fill in the same scale a week later, but with one important difference. This time, in the margin beside each item on the scale was the average class score for each item in the test a week before. Students were told that when they answer the survey this time, they may want to take this average figure "into account" before responding. Altemeyer found that both low and high RWA students did indeed take these figures into account and regressed towards the mean in their second set of responses. However, the high RWA students showed a bigger

¹ Although it should be pointed out that Altemeyer does not think that this commentary should be unfair or distorted in any way (p. 289). Altemeyer also suggests that journalists could stop creating the impression of a dangerous world (p. 275), as earlier tests had shown such perceptions to be related to authoritarianism (p. 145-7). By dwelling so much on the violence occurring in the world, the news media reaffirms the perceptions of authoritarians that the world is a dangerous place in which safety is only found in strength.

movement, when a new RWA scale was computed from this second administration. The lower quartile RWA students only rose by an average of 5.7 points towards the mean, while the high quartile RWA students lowered their score towards the mean by an average of 12.5 points. The differences for score change among both groups were significant ($p < .001$, pp. 310-1). In another administration of the RWA in 1985, students were asked to rank ten traits in terms of how desirable they found them. One of the traits was "normality", and there was a correlation of .35 ($p < .001$) between the desire for this and RWA score (p. 312).

The results of these tests inspired a last major experiment from Altemeyer in this area. He gave his students some feedback on his research, explaining to them what authoritarianism was, and what its dangers are. He then told students that they were now going to be given individual feedback on how they scored on the RWA scale. A sheet of paper was handed out to each individual which purported to give them their score. In fact, all were given an artificially high score, regardless of their actual test results. He dehoaxed them a few minutes later, but in the meantime got them to fill in a short questionnaire. One of the questions in this survey asked them what they wished they had scored. Almost of the lows wanted to remain lows, while four fifths of the highs wanted to have an average RWA scores, supporting the contention that high RWA's want to be normal (pp. 312-6)¹. Another question asked of students earlier in the experiment wanted to know if they could estimate their own RWA scores. As would be expected, most high RWA students considered that they would be about average, suggesting that authoritarians consider that they are "more normal than they really are" (p. 315). This study suggests that giving authoritarians a self-awareness about the abnormality of their "condition" may be all that is necessary to make them change themselves.

Conclusions

How far have we come in accordance with the three aims of the first chapter? Firstly, we have found that theories of authoritarianism can be useful in explaining the psychology of both militarism and male dominance. Secondly, we have seen that the inclination towards male dominance overlaps in various ways with the inclination towards militarism, something of note for war researchers. Although it may be difficult to test for such relationships among modern industrialised nations,

¹ Why could not Altemeyer just have given the students their true RWA score? This was apparently because the local university Ethical Review Committee had rules against researchers giving subjects their scores on such tests (p. 314).

these results suggest that stereotypical expectations of masculinity are indeed associated with the level of militarism in a culture. Finally, it has been shown that authoritarianism can be seen as something that functions not just in Western society, but in many others. However, we have also seen that the widespread nature of authoritarianism does not necessarily testify to its inevitability. While everyone may have a potential to be authoritarian, the results suggest that authoritarianism as it has been measured in this thesis may start in a small number of cultures, before spreading to neighbouring societies. A tendency towards non-authoritarianism could spread in a similar way, given the right conditions.

Appendix One: The RWA Scale, and Other Psychometric Scales

The "1992" RWA Scale.

This is scored on a nine-point scale ranging from complete agreement to complete disagreement. Scores range from 30 (very non-authoritarian) to 270 (extremely authoritarian).

This survey is part of an investigation of general public opinion concerning a variety of social issues. You will probably find that you agree with some of the statements, and disagree with others, to varying extents. Please indicate your reaction to each of the statements by blackening a bubble in SECTION 1 of the IBM sheet, according to the following scale:

Blacken the bubble labelled

- 4 if you very strongly disagree with the statement.
- 3 if you strongly disagree with the statement.
- 2 if you moderately disagree with the statement
- 1 if you slightly disagree with the statement.

Blacken the bubble labelled

- + 1 if you slightly agree with the statement.
- + 2 if you moderately agree with the statement.
- + 3 if you strongly agree with the statement.
- + 4 if you very strongly agree with the statement.

If you feel exactly and precisely neutral about a statement, blacken the "0" bubble.

You may find that you sometimes have different reactions to different parts of a statement. For example, you might very strongly disagree ("- 4") with one idea in a statement, but slightly agree (" + 1") with another idea in the same item. When this happens, please combine your reactions, and write down how you feel "on balance" (that is, a "- 3" in this example).

- (1) Our country would be great if we honour the ways of our forefathers, do what the authorities tell us to do, and get rid of the "rotten apples" who are ruining everything.
- (2) Our society needs free thinkers who will have the courage to defy traditional ways, even if this upsets many people.*
- (3) It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers who are trying to create doubt in people's minds.
- (4) People should pay less attention to the Bible and the other old traditional forms of religious guidance, and instead develop their own personal standards of what is moral and immoral.*
- (5) What our country really needs, instead of more "civil rights", is a good stiff dose of law and order.
- (6) Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our moral fibre and traditional beliefs.
- (7) There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse.*
- (8) The sooner we get rid of the traditional family structure, where the father is the head of the family and the children are taught to obey authority automatically, the better. *
- (9) There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to ruin it for their own godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action.
- (10) There is nothing immoral or sick in somebody's being a homosexual.*
- (11) It is important to protect fully the rights of radicals and deviants.*
- (12) Obedience is the most important virtue children should learn.
- (13) There is no "one right way" to live your life; everybody has to create their own way.*
- (14) Once our government leaders condemn the dangerous elements in our society, it will be the duty of every patriotic citizen to help stomp out the rot that is poisoning our country from within.
- (15) Government, judges and the police should never be allowed to censor books.*

- (16) Some of the worst people in our country nowadays are those who do not respect our flag, our leaders, and the normal way things are supposed to be done.
- (17) In these troubled times laws have to be enforced without mercy, especially when dealing with the agitators and revolutionaries who are stirring things up.
- (18) Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt every bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly.*
- (19) The situation in our country is getting so serious, the strongest methods would be justified if they eliminated the troublemakers and got us back to our true path.
- (20) Rules about being "well-behaved" and "respectable" should be changed in favour of greater freedom and new ways of living.*
- (21) Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, even if it makes them different from everyone else.*
- (22) Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they ought to get over them and settle down.
- (23) Authorities such as parents and our national leaders generally turn out to be right about things, and the radicals and protesters are almost always wrong.
- (24) A lot of our rules regarding modesty and sexual behaviour are just customs which are not necessarily any better or holier than those which other people follow.*
- (25) There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps.*
- (26) The real keys to the "good life" are obedience, discipline, and sticking to the straight and narrow.
- (27) We should treat protesters and radicals with open arms and open minds, since new ideas are the lifeblood of progressive change.*
- (28) What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil, and take us back to our true path.
- (29) The people who are always yelling for more "law and order" threaten democracy more than the "radicals" in our society do.*
- (30) One reason we have so many troublemakers in our society nowadays is that parents and other authorities have forgotten that good old-fashioned physical punishment is still one of the best ways to make people behave properly.

* Item is worded in the contrait direction; that is, the authoritarian response is to disagree.

April 1990 Economic Philosophy Scale

Administered to legislators, again using the same nine-point scale.

- (1) The biggest problem we have in the United States is that, even though the federal government takes most of our money, it still can't balance its budget.
- (2) The American economy will perform best if the government basically decides what should be made, and how much things will cost.
- (3) Whatever is good for business is good for America.
- (4) The more government gets involved in the economy, the more red tape, waste, and inefficiency will drag us down.
- (5) The wealth of the United States should be spread out more evenly; right now, too much is owned by too few.
- (6) The less government interferes with business and tries to regulate it, the better.
- (7) The government should increase the federal deficit to create jobs, rather than waiting for business and industry to create them.
- (8) There should be higher taxes on corporate earnings in America than there are now.
- (9) If you let capitalism and the "free market" run unchecked and unregulated, the country will be controlled by the greediest and most dishonest people among us.
- (10) People in the United States who earn lots of money should have their taxes lowered, so that they still have a reason to keep on striving.

March 1991 Freedom and Equality Scale

Legislators were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement on the same nine-point scale for the following laws. They were asked to fill this in regardless of considerations of what the U.S. Supreme Court might later do to those laws. The questions on laws encouraging equality were reversed for scoring when it came time to calculate values on the completed scale.

- (1) A bill giving police much wider, much less restrictive wiretap search-and-seizure, and interrogation rules.
- (2) A law requiring "affirmative action" in state hiring that would give priority to qualified minorities (i.e. they would get more than their per capita "share" until they caught up).
- (3) A bill outlawing the Communist party and other radical political organisations.
- (4) A law requiring Christian religious instruction in public schools.
- (5) A law extending "equal rights" legislation to homosexuals by prohibiting discrimination in housing and employment on the basis of sexual orientation.
- (6) A law that would prohibit television broadcasts (such as CNN's from Baghdad) from a foreign country when the United States is at war with that country.
- (7) A law raising the income tax rate for the rich, and lowering it for the poor.
- (8) A law restricting anti-war protests to certain sizes, times, and places - generally away from public view - while American troops are fighting overseas.
- (9) If the Equal Rights Admendment ("ERA") were still up for radification, would you vote for it?

Spence & Helmreich's Attitudes Towards Women Scale (1972)

In Altemeyer's January 1992 test, students were asked to score this scale using the aforementioned nine-point scale.

- (1) Swearing and obscenity are more repulsive in the speech of a woman than of a man.
- (2) Women should take increasing responsibility for leadership in solving the intellectual and social problems of the day.*
- (3) Both husband and wife should be allowed the same grounds for divorce.*
- (4) Telling dirty jokes should be mostly a masculine prerogative.
- (5) Intoxication among women is worse than intoxication among men.
- (6) Under modern economic conditions with women being active outside the house, men should share in household tasks such as washing dishes and doing the laundry.*
- (7) It is insulting to women to have the "obey" clause remain in the marriage service.*
- (8) There should be a strict merit system in job appointment and promotion without regards to sex.*
- (9) A woman should be as free as a man to propose divorce.*
- (10) Women should worry less about their rights and more about becoming good wives and mothers.
- (11) Women earning as much as their dates should bear equally the expense when they go out together.*
- (12) Women should assume their rightful place in business and all the professions along with men.*
- (13) A woman should not expect to go to exactly the same places and to have exactly the same freedom of action as a man.
- (14) Sons in a family should be given more encouragement to go to college than daughters.
- (15) It is ridiculous for a woman to run a locomotive and for a man to darn socks.
- (16) In general, the father should have greater authority than the mother in the bringing up of children.
- (17) Women should not be encouraged to become sexually intimate with anyone before marriage, even their fiances.
- (18) The husband should not be favoured by law over the wife in the disposal of family property or income.*
- (19) Women should be concerned with their duties of childbearing and house tending, rather than with desires for professional and business careers.
- (20) The intellectual leadership of a community should be largely in the hands of men.

- (21) Economic and social freedom is worth far more to women than acceptance of the ideal of femininity which has been set up by men.*
- (22) On the average, women should be regarded as less capable of contributing to economic production than are men.
- (23) There are many jobs in which men should be given preference to women in being hired or promoted.
- (24) Women should be given equal opportunity with men in apprenticeship in the various trades.
- (25) The modern girl is entitled to the same freedom from regulation and control that is given to the modern boy.*

* Item is worded in the contrait direction; that is, the sexist response is to disagree.

Appendix Two: SCCS Culture List

Below is a list of all of the cultures in the SCCS, along with their I.D. numbers, their dates of pinpointing, and an approximation of the part of the culture that became the pinpointed focus. This material is based on documentation accompanying the **World Cultures** electronic journal. For further details on each culture, such as brief notes on exact location, language, economy, social organisation, and historical context, see Murdock & White (1969, pp. 28-42). This article also plots the position of each culture on a map and gives the name of the authority considered best for each society.

No.	Name	Pinpointed Date	Approximate Focus
1.	Nama	1860	Gei/Khauan Hottentot tribe
2.	Kung	1950	Nyae Nyae region
3.	Thonga	1895	Ronga subtribe
4.	Lozi	1900	Ruling Luyana
5.	Mbundu	1890	Bailundo subtribe
6.	Suku	1920	Feshi region
7.	Bemba	1897	Zambia branch
8.	Nyakyusa	1934	Mwaya & Masoko townships
9.	Hadza	1930	Whole tribe
10.	Luguru	1925	Morogoro district
11.	Kikuyu	1920	Fort Hall or Metume district
12.	Ganda	1875	Kyaddondo district of Kampala
13.	Mbuti	1950	Epulu nethunters Ituri Forest
14.	Nkundo	1930	Ilanga subtribe
15.	Banen	1935	Ndiki subtribe
16.	Tiv	1920	Tiv of Benue Province
17.	Ibo	1935	Eastern Isu-Ana group of the Southern Ibo
18.	Fon	1890	Abomey city and environs
19.	Ashanti	1895	Kumasi State
20.	Mende	1945	Bo town and vicinity
21.	Wolof	1950	Upper and lower Salum, Gambia
22.	Bambara	1902	Segou to Bamako, Niger River
23.	Tallensi	1934	Whole tribe
24.	Songhai	1940	Bamba division
25.	Fulani	1951	Wodaabe of Niger
26.	Hausa	1900	Zazzagawa of Zaria
27.	Massa	1910	Around Yagoua in Cameroon
28.	Azande	1905	Yambio chiefdom
29.	Fur	1880	Jebel Marra
30.	Otoro	1930	Nuba Hills
31.	Shilluk	1910	Whole kingdom
32.	Mao	1939	Northern division
33.	Kaffa	1905	Whole kingdom
34.	Masai	1900	Southern Masai of Tanzania
35.	Konso	1935	Buso town
36.	Somali	1900	Dolbahanta subtribe
37.	Amhara	1953	Gondar district
38.	Bogo	1855	Whole tribe
39.	Nubians	1900	Kenuzi Nubians of Dahmit
40.	Teda	1950	Nomads of Tibesti
41.	Tuareg	1900	Ahaggaren tribe
42.	Riffians	1926	Entirety: Moroccan

No.	Name	Pinpointed Date and Approximate Focus	
13	Egyptians	1950	Silwa town and environs
14.	Hebrews	621BC	Kingdom of Judea
15	Babylonians	1750BC	Babylon city and environs
46.	Bedouin	1913	Rwala Bedouin
47.	Turks	1950	Northern Anatolian plateau
48.	Albanians	1910	Mountain Geg of Northern Albania
49.	Romans	110	Rome city and environs
50.	Basques	1934	Vera de Bidasoa village
51.	Irish	1932	County Clare
52.	Lapps	1950	Konkama District
53.	Samoyed	1894	Trundra Yurak
54.	Russians	1955	Viriatino village
55.	Abkhaz	1880	While tribe
56.	Armenians	1843	Vicinity of Erevan city
57.	Kurd	1951	Rouanduz town and environs
58.	Basseri	1958	Nomadic branch
59.	Punjabi	1950	Mohla village
60.	Gond	1938	Hill Maria
61.	Toda	1900	Whole tribe
62.	Santal	1940	Bankura & Berghum districts
63.	Uttar Pradesh	1945	Senapur village and environs
64.	Burusho	1934	Hunza state
65.	Kazak	1885	Great Horde
66.	Khalka	1920	Narobanchin territory
67.	Lolo	1910	Liang Shan & Taliang Shan
68.	Lepcha	1937	Lingthem and vicinity
69.	Garo	1955	Rengsanggri village
70.	Lakher	1930	Whole tribe
71.	Burmese	1965	Nondwin village
72.	Lamet	1940	Whole tribe, Northwestern Laos
73.	Vietnamese	1930	Red River Delta in Tonkin
74.	Rhade	1962	Ko-sier village
75.	Khmer	1292	Angkor city
76.	Siamese	1955	Bang Chan village
77.	Semang	1925	Jehai subtribe
78.	Nicobarese	1870	Car Nicobar of Northern islands
79.	Andamanese	1860	Aka-Bea tribe
80.	Vedda	1860	Danigala Forest group
81.	Tanala	1925	Menabe subtribe
82.	Negri Sembilan	1958	Inas District
83.	Javanese	1954	Pare town and environs
84.	Balinese	1958	Tihingan village
85.	Iban	1950	Ulu Ai group
86.	Badjau	1963	Tawi-Tawi and adjacent islands
87.	Toradja	1910	Bare'e subgroup
88.	Tobeloese	1900	Tobelo district
89.	Alorese	1938	Atimelang village
90.	Tiwi	1929	Bathhurst & Melville islands.
91.	Aranda	1896	Alice Springs and environs
92.	Orokaiva	1925	Aiga subtribe
93.	Kimam	1960	Bamol village
94.	Kapauku	1955	Botukebo village
95.	Kwoma	1937	Hongwam subtribe
96.	Manus	1929	Peri village
97.	New Ireland	1930	Lesu village
98.	Trobrianders	1914	Kiriwina island
99.	Siuai	1939	Southern Bougainville
100.	Tikopia	1930	Whole island of Tikopia
101.	Pentecost	1953	Bunlap village

No.	Name	Pinpointed Date	Approximate Focus
102.	Mbau Fijians	1840	Bau chiefdom, Vanua Levu
103.	Ajie	1845	Neje chiefdom
104.	Maori	1820	Nga Puhi tribe
105.	Marquesans	1800	Te- i ' i chiefdom of Nuku Hiva island
106.	Samoans	1829	Aana in Western Upolu island
107.	Gilbertese	1890	Makin & Butiritari islands
108.	Marshallese	1900	Jaluit Atoll
109.	Trukese	1947	Romonum island
110.	Yapese	1910	Whole island of Yapese
111.	Palauans	1947	Ulimang village
112.	Ifugao	1910	Kiangan group
113.	Atayal	1930	Whole tribe (but excluding Sedeq)
114.	Chinese	1936	Kaihsienkung village in Chekiang
115.	Manchu	1915	Aigun district
116.	Koreans	1947	Kanghwa island
117.	Japanese	1950	Southern Okayama
118.	Ainu	1880	Southeastern Hokkaido
119.	Gilyak	1890	Sakhalin island
120.	Yukaghir	1850	Upper Kolyma River
121.	Chukchee	1900	Reindeer division
122.	Ingalik	1885	Shageluk village
123.	Aleut	1800	Unalaska branch
124.	Copper Eskimo	1915	Coronation Gulf
125.	Montagnais	1910	Lake St. John & Mistassani bands
126.	Micmac	1650	Mainland division
127.	Saulteaux	1930	Berens River band
128.	Slave	1940	Lynx Point band
129.	Kaska	1900	Upper Liard River group
130.	Eyak	1890	Whole tribe
131.	Haida	1875	Masset town
132.	Bellacoola	1880	Lower Bella Coola River
133.	Twana	1860	Whole tribe
134.	Yurok	1850	Tsurai village
135.	Eastern Pomo	1850	Cignon village, Clear Lake
136.	Lake Yokuts	1850	Tulare Lake
137.	Northern Paiute	1870	Wadadika of Harney Valley
138.	Klamath	1860	Whole tribe
139.	Kutenai	1890	Lower or eastern branch
140.	Gros Ventre	1880	Whole tribe
141.	Hidatsa	1836	Whole village
142.	Pawnee	1867	Skidi band or subtribe
143.	Omaha	1860	Whole tribe
144.	Huron	1634	Bear and Cord subtribes
145.	Creek	1800	Upper division in Alabama
146.	Natchez	1718	Whole kingdom
147.	Comanche	1870	Whole tribe
148.	Chiricahua	1870	Central band
149.	Zuñi	1880	Pueblo band
150.	Havasupai	1918	Whole tribe
151.	Papago	1910	Archie division
152.	Huichol	1890	Whole tribe
153.	Aztec	1520	Tenochtitlan city and environs
154.	Popoluca	1940	Soteapan town and environs
155.	Quiche	1930	Chichicastenango town
156.	Miskito	1921	Cape Gracias a Dios vicinity
157.	Bribri	1917	Whole tribe
158.	Cuna	1927	San Blas Archipelago
159.	Goajiro	1947	Whole tribe
160.	Haitians	1935	Mirebalais town

No.	Name	Pinpointed Date	Approximate Focus
161.	Callinago	1650	Dominica island
162.	Warrau	1935	Winikina of Orinoco Delta
163.	Yanomamö	1965	Shamatari Tribe
164.	Carib	1932	Barama River
165.	Saramacca	1928	Upper Suriname River
166.	Mundurucu	1850	Cabrua village
167.	Cubeo	1939	Village on Coduiari River
168.	Cayapa	1908	Rio Cayapas Basin
169.	Jivaro	1920	Whole tribe
170.	Amahuaca	1960	Upper Inuya River
171.	Inca	1530	Cuzco city and environs
172.	Aymara	1940	Chucuito community
173.	Siriono	1942	Vicinity of the Rio Blanco
174.	Nambicuara	1940	Cocozu group
175.	Trumai	1938	Vanivani village
176.	Timbira	1915	Ramcocamecra or Canella
177.	Tupinamba	1550	Rio de Janeiro hinterland
178.	Botocudo	1884	Naknenuk subtribe
179.	Shavante	1958	São Domingo village
180.	Aweikoma	1932	Duque de Caxias Reservation
181.	Cayua	1890	Southern Mato Grosso, Brazil
182.	Lengua	1889	Vicinity of Anglican mission
183.	Abipon	1750	Vicinity of Jesuit mission
184.	Mapuche	1950	Vicinity of Temuco
185.	Tehuelche	1870	Equestrian Tehuelche
186.	Yahgan	1865	Eastern and central groups

Appendix Three: Codebook of all *World Cultures* Variables Used

Each variable is listed below with the number is that given to them in the *World Cultures* dataset. Also listed is the publication in which the variable was first used. The numbers in brackets following each category are the frequencies.

(150) Fixity of residence (Murdock & Provost 1971)

- 1 = Nomadic (28)
- 2 = Semi-nomadic (21)
- 3 = Semi-sedentary (20)
- 4 = Sedentary; impermanent (15)
- 5 = Sedentary (102)

(152) Urbanisation (Murdock & Provost 1971).

- 1 = Fewer than 100 persons in the settlement (56)
- 2 = 100-199 persons (43)
- 3 = 200-399 persons (33)
- 4 = 400-999 persons (30)
- 5 = More than 1000 persons (24)

(156) Density of population (Murdock & Provost 1971).

- 1 = Less than 1 person/square mile (58)
- 2 = 1-5 persons/square mile (25)
- 3 = 5.1-25 persons/square mile (28)
- 4 = 26-100 persons/square mile (35)
- 5 = 100+ persons/square mile (40)

(158) Social stratification (Murdock & Provost 1971).

- 1 = Egalitarian (65)
- 2 = Heredity slavery (52)
- 3 = 2 social classes, no castes/slavery (19)
- 4 = 2 Social classes, and castes/slavery (20)
- 5 = 3 Social classes or castes, with or without slavery (30)

(322-5) Average of four *Obedience inculcation in children* variables (Early Boy, Early Girl, Late Boy, Late Girl). From Barry et al. (1976).

- . = Missing data (21)
- 0 = No inculcation or opposite trait (0)
- 1 = Weak inculcation (0)
- 2 = (12)
- 3 = (11)
- 4 = (30)
- 5 = Moderately strong inculcation (32)
- 6 = (31)
- 7 = (14)
- 8 = (26)
- 9 = Extremely strong inculcation (9)

- (693) *Frequency of intercommunity armed conflict* (Whyte 1978)
 . = missing data (95)
 1 = Past, supralocal, or absent (49)
 2 = Present and endemic warfare (42)
- (715) *Systemic absence of married males due to military service, labour elsewhere, and extended trade expeditions* (Whyte 1978).
 . = missing data (94)
 1 = No systemic absences (38)
 2 = Systemic absences within memory of present adults (6)
 2 = Systemic absences common presently (48)
- (754) *Wife-beating* (Broude & Greene 1983).
 . = missing data (116)
 1 = Absent (14)
 2 = Present (56)
- (774) *External warfare, with other societies* (Ross 1983)
 . = missing data (102)
 1 = Frequent, occurring at least yearly (45)
 2 = Common, at least every five years (13)
 3 = Occasional, at least every generation (6)
 4 = Rare or never (20)
- (793) *Female participation in public political arenas, relative to males* (Ross 1983)
 . = missing data (106)
 1 = High, in some situations equal to or greater than that of men (8)
 2 = Significant, but not as high as male involvement (27)
 3 = Not great, but clearly some role for women in public aspects of political life (19)
 4 = Women generally excluded from public aspects of politics (26)
- (794) *Female participation in private political arenas, relative to males* (Ross 1983)
 . = missing data (120)
 1 = High, in some situations equal to or greater than that of men (35)
 2 = Significant, but not as high as male involvement (15)
 3 = Not great, but clearly some role for women in private aspects of political life (12)
 4 = Women generally excluded from private aspects of politics (4)
- (795) *Gender differences in political or quasi-political positions of authority* (Ross 1983)
 . = missing data (102)
 1 = Men and women eligible for some of the same positions and women commonly do so (8)
 2 = Men and women eligible for some of the same positions and women occasionally do so (18)
 3 = Women rarely, if ever, hold some of the same positions regardless of rules of eligibility (7)
 4 = The same political positions are not open to both men and women (51)
- (796) *Separate Female organisations and positions* (Ross 1983)
 . = missing data (117)
 1 = Some associations or organisations under exclusive control of women (22)
 2 = No associations but some positions of authority for which only women are eligible (15)
 3 = No associations or positions exclusively controlled by women (32)

(902) *Leadership during battle* (Wheeler 1974).

. = missing data (44)

1 = An official who could back up his decision by force (62)

2 = An informal leader whom people obeyed because of respect (67)

3 = Everyone is on his own (13)

(907) *Value of war/violence against non-members of the group* (Wheeler 1974).

. = missing data (40)

1 = Enjoyed and considered to have high value (72)

2 = Considered to be a necessary evil (51)

3 = Consistently avoided, denounced, not engaged in (23)

(909) *Subjugation of territory or people, as a goal in war* (Wheeler 1974).

. = missing data (18)

1 = Present (35)

2 = Absent or not mentioned (133)

(913) *Taking of trophies, honours, and captives for sacrifice, as a goal in war* (Wheeler 1974).

. = missing data (18)

1 = Present (49)

2 = Absent or not mentioned (119)

(1118) *Pacification by date of observation* (White 1989b)

. = No (171)

1 = Yes (15)

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