PRINCIPLES OR PROCESS?

AN EXAMINATION OF KOHLBERG'S COGNITIVE THEORY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND HAAN'S INTERACTIONIST CRITIQUE

A Research Project in fulfilment
of the Requirements for
M.Ed. Course 686 by
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February, 1985.

ABSTRACT

Lawrence Kohlberg has recently, after 25 years work on moral development theory, updated and adjusted his theory. The contemporary presentation is outlined. At the same time, Norma Haan, after a similar period of less sustained, but equally matured consideration, has presented her fully articulated proposals for an interactional morality. Her theory is presented and then discussed in terms of the most common criticisms of Kohlberg's theory: its liberal, Western, male bias; its structural limitations; and its depreciation of moral action. Haan's suggestions in these areas are considered and then her overall contribution is evaluated. The verdict is that her effort makes a major contribution to breaking away from the cognitive-developmental paradigm, but is incomplete since Haan allows that paradigm to dictate the agenda. Haan has furthered our understanding of moral growth but has failed to provide a comprehensive theory.

HOW DO WE BECOME MORAL PERSONS?

The question, How do we become moral persons?, raises several basic philosophical and psychological issues regarding what is meant by being a person, what is meant by morality, and what is meant by 'becoming'. Different answers to each of these questions lead to different explanations of human development, different evaluations of the influence of society over the individual, and a range of methods for effective development and socialisation (Kleinberger, 1982). The many variations in approach may be distinguished between those which focus on the growth of the moral autonomy, ethical reasoning and capacity to make moral decisions of a person (cognitive developmental theory), and those which focus on the acquisition of socially appropriate habits, motives and behaviours (social learning theory). Cognitive development theory is concerned with the nature of moral thinking at a given phase of development, and with whether that nature is a universally shared human attribute. Social learning theory investigates the variability that can be noted in the ways in which people express themselves morally and is concerned with the external influences that people experience as, during learning, they internalise response repertoires (character formation) (Sieber, 1980; Wren, 1982, Zimmerman, 1983, Gibbs and Schnell, 1985). Each theory has its own definition of morality: cognitive developmental theory views morality as synonymous with certain universal and trans-historical principles which transcend the specific moral codes of any particular groups or cultures. Social learning theory views morality as synonymous with the rules, norms, values and traditions of a particular society. Morality is a social control imposed on a person, whereas for the cognitive developmentalists it is a principle revealed to a person (Lifton, 1985).

Through the work of Lawrence Kohlberg (1927-) and associates (collectively referred to as the 'Harvard Group' (Kohlberg, 1979)) the cognitive developmental approach has dominated scientific investigation of morality for more than a quarter of a century. This is a rare achievement in the contemporary social sciences. It has been achieved through a dogmatic defense of the general theory and a subtle adjustment of particular aspects. Unless

these modifications are detected, criticism can easily become misplaced.

In recent years a third approach to morality has tried to integrate the best insights of both social learning and cognitive development on morality. Theorists in this approach have turned to personality theory for assistance, suggesting that ego-processes (Haan, 1973, 1982, 1985), personality traits (Hogan, 1982), or social expectations (Lifton, 1983) influence morality. In so doing, they would seem to be attempting a task Kohlberg himself has identified as requiring execution. In commenting on Erikson's theory, he notes that

> both the focus upon the self and the focus upon choice coincide with the notion of stages of an ego, of an executor or chooser who uses cognitive and other structures. In contrast, the focus of our moral stages is upon the form and content of "objective" moral principles, rather than upon the process of their choice, use, or application to the self. An "integrated" theory of social and moral stages would attempt to combine the two perspectives. (Kohlberg, 2:496)*

This approach views morality as synonymous with the values and principles developed by a person for the purposes of effective interaction with others. Morality develops intrapersonally, shaped by the uniqueness of personality, and interpersonally, shaped by the uniqueness of social interactions. Morality, in this approach, is the personal meaning created by the individual (Lifton, 1985).

Norma Haan (1936-) agrees with Kohlberg that morality has a rational component, and that there are various degrees of adequacy or effectiveness involved. However, her theory, which she terms "interactional", differs from Kohlberg's in being inductive and contextual, originating from a study of everyday moral situations rather than an investigation of the tradition of moral philosophy. As she describes her work,

> It is irreverent toward the theory and work of the pioneer psychologist, Lawrence Kohlberg, who stirred philosophy when he added the idea of development to classical moral theory, but who stopped short, in our view, of apprehending the

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* Many of Kohlberg's writings have been collected in the three volumes of Essays on Moral Development (1981, 1984, ?). Where articles referred to are found in these volumes, in the interests of simplicity and ease of access for the reader, the volume number followed by pagination only has been given. The contents of each volume are listed in the bibliography. Where chapters have been co-authored, the senior author's work alone has been recognised in the interests of simplicity of reference and without judgment as to relative contribution. A complete Kohlberg bibliography may be found in 2:710-716.

> promises and emendations that lie in practical inquiry. (OMG:4)*

Central to Haan's theory is the view that morality is a particular kind of social agreement that equalises people's relations with one another, whereas Kohlberg's view is that morality derives from an individual's understanding of justice.

The dialogue between these two moral development theorists has important implications for moral philosophy, moral psychology and moral education. The degree to which Haan is able to take up and integrate into her theory dimensions and considerations of morality that Kohlberg is accused of ignoring is important in assessing the value of Haan's work, which she has described as having a double focus:

> We did not conduct our studies simply to disprove Kohlberg's position, although we admittedly thought it would not stand up as well as the interactional theory. We had genuine curiosity about the kind of morality people use to solve actual moral problems with their fellows. We also wondered what kind of people rely on morality as Kohlberg conceived of it because it surely exists as a way of thinking. Also we wanted to find out what kind of people rely on interaction styles. (OMG:53).

The success of this venture has to be investigated.

That Haan's theory is a serious challenge to Kohlberg's approach is suggested by the notable absence of any treatment of her position in Kohlberg's recent response to his critics (2:274-317). This absence, which prompted this study, was also noted by Tomlinson (1984). Kohlberg cannot be unaware of Haan's position as they have collaborated in some studies (Haan, Kohlberg and Langer, 1976; Kuhn, Langer, Kohlberg and Haan, 1977) and more recently figures on inter-rater reliability derived from Haan's work were cited in Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs and Lieberman (1983, p.21). Unanswerable or inconvenient criticisms are frequently left unremarked. However it has been the fate of Haan's work to go generally unnoticed, with few references (Lerner and Shea, 1982; Blasi, 1983) and only one article (Shields, 1980). Whether it has greater significance than that is the point of investigation of this paper.

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* On Moral Grounds: The Search for Practical Morality (1985) (hereafter, OMG), is co-authored by Norma Haan, Elaine Aerts and Bruce A.B. Cooper. Since the contributions of the co-authors are limited to particular chapters, authorship will be attributed to Haan alone without making any judgment on the relative contribution of any of her collaborators.

KOHLBERG'S THEORY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT

The Story of Kohlberg's Theory

Kohlberg's involvement in moral research goes back to 1955 when he began work on his dissertation at the University of Chicago (completed in 1958). He wanted to carry forward into adolescence Piaget's (1932/1965) work on children's moral development. But his thesis was sourced from Piaget's work on cognitive development rather than his study of moral judgment.

Piaget's interest was in how a child, who inevitably must acquire its knowledge of rules through the authority and respect relationship between parents and child (heteronomous morality), comes to be able to make independent judgments which reflect a mutual respect between people and regard for intentions as well as consequences (autonomous morality). His view, which he did not test, was that the experience of peer interaction in middle childhood facilitated a shift from unilateral to mutual respect. He made no claim that this shift met formal stage criteria:

> These moralities (heteronomy and autonomy) are due to formative processes which, broadly speaking, follow on one another without, however, constituting definite stages. (Piaget, 1965, p.195)

It was through subsequent replication that a more cognitive-developmental framework has been applied to Piaget's work on morality (Lickona, 1969; Weinreich-Haste, 1982). Rest summarises Piaget's achievement under these four points:

> 1. He defined the problem area and the theoretical construct of moral judgment. Before Piaget, a psychological construct called "moral judgment" did not exist, nor were psychologists involved in identifying the basic logical structures underlying people's judgments or describing how these structures successively develop
> 2. Piaget introduced methods for studying a subject's moral judgment. Most characteristic is the presentation of an episode or story to the person to evoke discussion and an explanation of the subject's view. An important part of his work also involved the observation of children's game behavior.
> 3. Piaget identified a dozen specific features in children's moral thinking for making inferences about their underlying thought structure. The features include "immanent justice," "intentionality," "relativitism of perspective," etc. Also Piaget gave an extensively argued rationale in each case for the younger child's thinking being more primitive than the older child's.
> 4. Piaget provided some empirical data in support of his theory, almost exclusively the numbers of subjects at different ages whose responses were scored at different types...pointing researchers to a key empirical test of cognitive developmental theory - namely to look for age-related differences in types of responses.. (Rest, 1979, pp.5-6)

Some twenty five years after Piaget's original monograph appeared, Kohlberg applied these insights to his study of adolescent boys.

The relationship between the two thinkers has been extensively explored (Weinreich, 1975; Rest, 1980; Carroll and Rest, 1982; Siegal, 1982; Broughton, 1983). Kohlberg himself describes his reliance on Piaget as follows:

> In studying moral development in adolescent, I decided to use Piaget's general assumptions and method. This meant first a focus on moral judgment and a definition of moral judgment in terms of judgments of justice. Like Piaget, I assumed that the child's active moral constructions, as distinct from passively learned assertions of adult moral cliches, would center on the child's sense of justice. Like Piaget, in focusing upon reasoning about justice, I assumed that the developing child was a philosopher, constructing meanings around universal categories or questions such as the question of fairness. So I chose as cases for eliciting reasoning hypothetical dilemmas of ancient vintage discussed by the philosophers. The assumption of the child as philosopher is the assumption that the child's mind has its own structure. (2:xxvii).

From this basis, Kohlberg has constructed his own theory. Puka (1982) best describes the present relationship:

> The connection between the work of Piaget and Kohlberg is a complex one, more tenuous in some places than others, and mediated by the views of Balwin, Dewey and Mead. It is naive to expect a direct and strong carry over of developments in nonmoral Piagetian research to Kohlberg's efforts. Notably, Kohlberg's research in the moral domain is more extensive than Piaget's, the data more impressive (Kohlberg's moral stages show less decalage than Piaget's). Moreover, given the way Kohlbergian stage descriptions were derived from data, his theory might have arisen independently. (Of course, Piaget's stage model influenced Kohlberg's approach to data). (Puka, 1982, p.481)

The way the data influenced the two theories has been critical.

Kohlberg's original research involved presenting his 72 youths aged 10, 13 and 16 with anecdotal conflict situations. Each dilemma (2:640-651) was preframed so that only one of two opposed actions could be judged as right, either serving the moral norm of human life or the moral norm of law (or property). The dilemmas call for a solution by reliance on a moral principle. Subsequently, 58 of the boys have been followed up at 3 year intervals, utilising the same dilemmas with only minor modifications to the story line but in rearranged order (though retaining the original numbering). The most recent findings have been reported in a Monograph for the Society of Research in Child Development (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs and Lieberman, 1983).

A moral principle implies two things: first, it is not a statement

about a kind of action, but a way of choosing when two rules are in conflict. Second, it is an attitude or idea which generates rules, being more general and universal than a rule (2:526).

Kohlberg found that the responses to his hypothetical dilemmas were clearly structured, but differently from Piaget's proposal: (a) at the earliest levels moral judgments were based on an orientation to power and punishment, not on respect for authority and rules; and (b) the preconventional level was followed in adolescence by the conventional level so that autonomous morality was a feature of adolescence rather than childhood (Turiel, 1983). Kohlberg then went on to propose stages beyond those described by Piaget (though in his writing prior to 1969 he preferred not to describe them as stages but rather as developmental ideal types). He differentiated the developmental types as follows:

Level A. Premoral:
- Stage 1 - Punishment and obedience orientation.
- Stage 2 - Naive instrumental hedonism.

Level B. Morality of conventional role conformity:
- Stage 3 - Good-boy morality of maintaining good relations, approval by others.
- Stage 4 - Authority-maintaing morality.

Level C. Morality of self-accepted moral principles:
- Stage 5 - Morality of contract, of individual rights and democratically accepted law.
- Stage 6 - Morality of individual principles of conscience.

(2:xxix).

In developing the divisions he was influenced by J.M. Baldwin (Kohlberg, 1982). In fact the three levels were originally suggested by Dewey and Tufts (1908/1932) who distinguished "three levels of conduct": (i) instincts and fundamental needs, (ii) custom, in which one acts of the group and does not conceive one's own good as distinct from that of the group; and (iii) conscience, whereby one chooses moral values and principles freely and intelligently. Dewey and Tufts did not attempt to relate their scheme to corresponding age trends in individual psychological development as Kohlberg was able to do as the result of Baldwin's work (Kohlberg, 1980).

By 1969, Kohlberg was entering a second phase of his work. By then three pieces of experimental research were available which suggested that his model did in fact describe actual "stage" development. Turiel (1966) had found that adolescents exposed to the next higher stage would assimilate judgments to which they were exposed more often than when exposed to a stage two above or one below their own, suggesting hierarchical integration. Turiel, Edwards and Kohlberg (1978) reported that Taiwanese, Turkish and Yucatan Mexic-

an youth developed their moral reasoning in the same order as North American young men, suggesting cross-situational consistency. Moreover, while these data relied on group averages, Rest (1973) was accumulating data on individual lognitudinal change, suggesting invariant sequence. Kohlberg was ready to provide a more programmatic statement about stages (2:7-160).

Confident about his paradigm, Kohlberg moved from Chicago to Harvard in 1969 to establish what eventually became the Harvard School of Education's Center for Moral Education. He gathered around him those who had done significant work on his paradigm. Their first task was to attend to some apparent anomalies of sequence emerging in the longitudinal data derived from the original sample (Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969). They originally accepted the scoring system as accurate and interpreted the regressive scores as evidence of genuine "retrogression" in college years:

> This pattern of 'retrogression' and stabilization may be seen as reflecting Eriksonian ego development rather than representing the development of moral stage structures themselves. (Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969, p.110).

This suggested that if there was adult development, it would have to be explained in terms of Erikson's functional stages rather than structural stages. The apparent resurgence of stage 2 reasoning in the students was a "structural retrogression," but a "functional advance." This suggestion that people could regress in the service of development was a view held by Gesell, Werner and a number of other developmentalists of the period.

By 1973 Kohlberg decided that neither appeals to Erikson nor to Perry (1968) were sufficient:

> While relativism and "retrogression" were the most striking problems, there were a number of other anomalies in the data which required developing or revising our stage scoring system and better differentiating structure from content in moral thought in moral stage definitions. (2:437).

Fully principled (stage 5 thinking) was posited as an adult development, and a transitional "stage 4½" introduced (Kohlberg 1973b). As Kohlberg now describes it, "The 1973 interpretation amounted to a reassertion of the sequence hypothesis in longitudinal data but was an acknowledgement of failure in the details of both stage definition and measurement" (2: xxxiii). The history of scoring procedure will be followed later.

While earlier writing had stressed the way in which varying environments provide differential "role-taking" conditions and stimulat-

ion for moral development, Kohlberg's 1976 statement, "Moral Stages and Moralization" (2:170-211) suggested that collective norms and institutional structures can also be defined as representing a particular stage of moral atmosphere. This understanding grew out of Kohlberg's 1972 study of a reformatory (Kohlberg, Hickey and Scarf, 1972). It marks a further stage of development for Kohlberg as he increasingly considers moral atmosphere. The previously out-of-favour Durkheim (1:125-127) is rehabilitated (2:264-265). This may be seen as part of the on-going process of establishing autonomy from Piaget, whose 1932 book is clearly directed against Durkheim (Rest, 1980; Carroll and Rest, 1982). Kohlberg justifies his previous dismissal of socio-moral factors on the grounds that modern social science had ignored rational individual moral development, but that once that had been overcome, it was possible to return to an analysis of group factors (2:xxxv).

Kohlberg's present concerns are (a) further clarification and documentation of his conception of stage structure and transformation; (b) elaboration of the psychological and normative-ethical status of stage 6; and (c) development of a model of the relationship between judgment and action,(2:318-319). This suggests that if we are to grasp his present thinking we must examine (a) his present view of the task of the social scientist investigating morality, (b) the present description of moral stages, (c) the contemporary understanding of how moral development occurs, (d) the model of the relationship between judgment and action, and (e) the current scoring method and its genesis.

Kohlberg's Methodology

Kohlberg claims to have overcome the methodological problems of investigating scientifically the development (a psychological task) of morality (a philosophical reality). He claims:

> Philosophers may not agree with our working assumption of the primacy of justice in defining moral reasoning or with the criteria of universalizability and reversibility as the criteria by which one form of justice reasoning may be said to be more adequate and rational than another. But at least our theory of adequacy is clearly stated within the problems of postulations of "is to ought" relations of identity which Habermas and other philosophers have found dubious and ambiguous. (2:317).

Under the impact of Habermas'(1983) criticism that a theory made in the normative or moral philosophic mode is distinct from a theory made in the psychological mode, Kohlberg retracts his earlier claim

that "The scientific theory as to why people factually do move up from stage to stage is broadly the same as a moral theory as to why people should prefer a higher stage to a lower" (1:179) by a complementarity thesis, namely that rational reconstructions can be partially checked in the empirical domain in the sense that they can be shown not to work but cannot be shown to be valid by standards of empirical truth:

> The complementarity thesis to which we still subscribe makes the much weaker claim that an adequate psychological theory of stages and stage movement presupposes a normative theory of justice; first, to define the domain of justice reasoning and, second, to function as one part of an explanation of stage development. For instance, the normative theoretical claim that a higher stage is philosophically a better stage is one necessary part of a psychological explanation of sequential stage movement. However, the psychological theory adds explanatory concepts in its explanation of ontogenesis, such as mechanisms of cognitive conflict, which are not reducible to the concepts of normative philosophic theory. Thus, the empirical verification of the psychological stage theory does not directly confirm the the normative validity of theories of justice as reversibility, theories such of those of Rawls (1971) and Kohlberg (Volume 1). However, falsification of the empirical hypotheses of our psychological theory would, we believe, cast doubt on the validity of our normative theory of justice" (2:223-4).

The "Is" is no longer the "Ought".

Kohlberg describes his approach as "cognitive-structural" on the basis that (a) the observations of others are made phenomenologically, that is, by attempting to take the role of the other, to see things from that person's perspective; (b) the interview and scoring are acts of grasping the reasons that allow the author's statements appear as rational based on shared philosophical categories of meaning that expose logical and inferential relations and transformations; and (c) the subject is described in terms of the meanings he or she finds in the world, which are real, not hypothetical. It is "developmental" insofar as it is a "rational reconstruction" of progress in moral judgment: "Our theory is a rational reconstruct-because it (a) describes the developmental logic inherent in the development of justice reasoning with the aid of (b) the normative criterion of Stage 6 which is held to be the most adequate (i.e., most reversible) stage of justice reasoning"(2:221).

For these reasons Kohlberg's theory requires philosophic as well as psychological analysis. The first issue here is the definition of morality:

> In our view, the word moral presupposes a normative stance, it is not a"value-neutral" word. The word moral has two meanings.

> One meaning distinguishes the context of moral relevance. The Heinz dilemma is a "moral" dilemma since it involves a conflict between two universal norms, and typically, judgments about the dilemma of which of two houses to buy is not a moral dilemma, it is a practical or economic dilemma. In its second meaning, "moral" is distinguished from "amoral" or "immoral". Not all judgments to moral dilemmas are moral judgments. Sometimes children adopt a practical, economic, or pragmatic set to the Heinz dilemma...These judgments we called partly "premoral"or "amoral", reflecting a lack of development of moral judgment. To call a judgment "moral" or "morally developed" in this second sense is in some sense to commend it or to claim it is good or adequate. It requires then, both some philosophic argument about the use of the word moral and some agreement about the adequacy of the judgment in question. (2:512-3)

Thus it is Kohlberg's position that for an act to be moral all that is required is a moral judgment. He sometimes concedes that this does not reflect all that is recognised as being part of the moral domain (2:227). The source for his definition was R.M.Hare (1963) who laid down as essential to the moral quality of a judgment that it be (a) prescriptive, and (b) universalizable. It should be noted that whereas Kant required moral principles to be universalizable in a normative sense, the categorical imperative, Hare holds that universalizability is a logical or metaethical statement about the meaning of the principle. The form of that principle he found in justice:

> My assumption concerning the centrality of justice derived direct- from Piaget's (1932) own study of the development of moral judgment and reasoning...In defining morality as an attitude of respect for persons and respect for rules, Piaget aligns himself Kant. At the heart of the Kantian notion of morality was the notion of respect for persons, that is, the categorical imperative, to treat each person as an end, not as a means. However, Piaget, unlike Kant, thought there were two moralities of justice, not one. Children first developed a heteronomous morality of absolute obedience to rules and adult authority, and then a second morality of autonomous mutual respect between equals and of respect for rules as the result of social contract, agreement, and cooperation among equals. (2:225).

While Kohlberg's original study did not confirm Piaget's "two principles" theory, in his recent work he has introduced a heteronomous substage A and a more autonomous substage B into his model. He claims (2:307) that in focussing on justice he is not denying the possibility of extending the ideas of moral judgment to other and broader understandings of morality. But he justifies his focus on morality as justice as follows:

> First, it derives from our prescriptive conception of moral judgment; in other words, we focus less upon interpretations of situational facts and more upon those interpretations which express universalizable or "ought" orientations. Second, it springs from

> our concern for cultural and ethical universality in moral judgment...It restricts morality to a central minimal core, striving for universal agreement in the face of more relativist concepts of the good. Another reason for focusing upon justice is our concern for a cognitive or "rational" approach to morality. This is true partly in the sense that justice seeks for "objective" or rational reasons and justification for choice rather than being satisfied with subjective, "decisionistic", personal commitments to aims and to other persons. However, once personal commitments have been made they may become objectively defended by justice conceptions like contract and trust. Possibly the most important reason for focusing upon justice is that it is the most structural feature of moral judgment. For Piaget and ourselves, justice is the structure of interpersonal interaction. Justice "operations" of reciprocity and equality in interaction parallel logical relations or relations of equality and reciprocity in the nonmoral cognitive domain. (2:305-6).

To support such an approach, a notion of justice congenial to structuralist presuppositions must be utilized. Kohlberg found this in in the writings of John Rawls:

> We see John Rawls's(1971) model of justice as a rational description of parts of our sixth stage. Our use of Rawls in this manner does not mean that we believe his normative theory of justice is <u>the</u> theory of justice which should or will be accepted by moral philosophers as most morally adequate. Rather, we use John Rawls' theory as a rational model of parts of our sixth stage because we see it as an instance of the notions of reflective equilibrium and reversibility which a Piagetian or "hard" structural theory of stages assumes to characterize the domain of justice in social interactions. (2:272).

In Rawls' theory, ideal role-taking is the method for establishing appropriate principles of liberty and equality. Ideal role-taking is specified as choosing from an "original position", under a veil of ignorance about who in society one is, those principles which will be socially acceptable. Rawls believes that under such circumstances all rational people would agree with the two major principles of justice he has identified: (i) That each person in society has equal entitlement to maximum liberty that is congenial to a similar liberty for others; and (ii) that any inequalities in the social and economic domains should be only those which are of benefit to all.

Kohlberg and Elfenbein (1975) applied Rawls' device of the original position to the question of whether capital punishment is just. They conclude that no rational person would in advance consent to enter a society that practised such retributive punishment if there were any chance that he or she might be a murderer. Without being specific they suggest that all that is necessary is a punishment "just severe enough to offset the gains which might be realized

from commission of the offense"(Kohlberg and Elfenbein, 1975, p.637). Kohlberg justifies his use of Rawls' theory as follows:

> I have attempted to make use of Rawls's theory for two purposes: The first is to clarify not the substance but the formal structure of moral reasoning at a highest stage. Rawls's specification of judgment from an original position seems to me a particularly well-systmatized account of the type of operations involved in the highest forms of principled reasoning in which moral situations are viewed by putting oneself impartially in the place of each and every person in the situation...In addition, Rawls's theory helps to clarify the need, suggested by our studies, for principled postconventional thinking about problems of justice to invoke a principle of fairness other than, or in addition to, the utilitarian principle of maximizing human welfare. In part, our emphasis n Rawls's theory derived from our effort to define a sixth stage of moral judgment and to justify its superiority to stage 5 judgment. (Kohlberg, 1982b, p.523).

More recently, Kohlberg has turned to Habermas'(1979) theory of a universal communication ethic which is broader than the contractarian ethic of Rawls but is still constructivist rather than rigorist and absolutist.

According to Habermas an ideal communication situation is governed by the assumption of freedom and equality of each participant. In such an ideal situation, reversible role-taking is lived out in actual dialogue among the parties involved in a potential conflict situation, with a consequent discursive will formation in each participant to reconstruct his or her needs and preferences in light of the needs and claims of others. Habermas believes that such a situation only occurs fully when a "universal speech ethic" is established, and that this is a stage beyond Kohlberg's sixth stage: "Only at the level of a universal ethics of speech can need interpretations themselves - that is, what each individual thinks he should understand and represent as his "true" interests - also become the object of practical discourse"(Habermas, 1979, p.90). Habermas argues that there is a qualitative difference here in that justification of norms is no longer the monological application of generalizability but becomes the communally followed procedure of redeeming validity claims discursively. However Kohlberg (2:386) believes that his stage 6 already includes dialogue or "discursive will formation" in his concept of moral "musical chairs" (1:219-221). Kohlberg (2:386) claims Habermas supports that view now.

Habermas' theory of communicative action is based on the assumption that there is an ontogenesis of the communicative competence, i.e., the ability to articulate, and, if necessary argumentatively redeem,

claims of truth and rightness through the medium of speech, which is developmental in the sense that it is structured by three levels or stages: (1) incomplete interaction; (2) complete interaction; and (3) communicative action and discourse. For Habermas, a moral judgment is a manifestation of the use of communicative skills to redeem a validity claim of rightness, which, in turn, is an interactive expression of ego-identity formation. Habermas then matches his own stages of interactive competence with Kohlberg's stages utilising his reciprocity ideal (for the schema, cf. Habermas, 1979, pp. 89-90). Kohlberg (2:384) distances himself from this development claiming that Habermas has exposed levels of communicative and role competence analogous to Selman's social perspective-taking levels and not "hard" stages.

The work of Rawls and Habermas provides a terminal stage, with the principle of justice as its organising focus, for his attempt to rationally reconstruct the ontogenesis of morality. Even if Rawls' analysis turns out to be incorrect, it is still necessary to posit a terminal point beyond stage 5. The philosophical justification for this is that all philosophers of science attempt to formulate a conception of the scientific method whose proper use will lead to agreement on various issues among all scientific thinkers. Regardless of the fact that such agreement may be chimerical, such an ideal underlies all scientific rationality. "Similarly, a rational ideal of moral development implies the need for moral agreement about moral problems"(2:272).

In addition to these normative-ethical assumptions, Kohlberg lists his metaethical assumptions tied to his psychological work as follows: (1) an assumption of value relevance implying that moral concepts be treated as normative and positive rather than value neutral; (2) an assumption of phenomenalism (thus distinguishing him from behaviourists or psychoanalytic theorists); (3) an assumption of universalism; (4) prescriptivism, implying that 'ought' statements are not fully reducible to descriptive judgments (following Hare (1963)); (5) rationalism, implying that moral judgments are not reducible to, nor expressive of, emotive motivations (while the relevant sentiments are part of moral development, he distinguishes expression of a feeling about a moral situation from making a moral judgment about it); (6) formalism, implying that formal qualities can be defined regardless of whether or not agreement exists on substantive matters (Hare, 1963; Peters, 1971;

Frankena, 1973 and Rawls, 1971); (7) principledness, implying that moral judgments are not simply evaluations of particular actions (contra Dewey and Tufts (1932), Munsey (1980), Gilligan and Murphy (1979) and Aron (1980)); (8) constructivism, implying that moral principles are neither innate propositions known a priori nor empirical generalisations of facts in the world but are human constructions generated in social interaction; and (9) that justice is primary, since all moral principles have the central function of resolving conflicts of claims and rights, and thus imply a notion of equilibrium, balancing or reversibility of claims (2:277). With these metaethical assumptions, Kohlberg was able to propose his stage theory.

The Stages of Moral Development

Kohlberg (2:236-249) distinginguishes three forms of stage theory: (i) Erikson's (1963) functional stages which trace the maturation of the individual through a series of socio-cultural spheres and roles (cf. 2:495-6); (ii) Piaget's (1970) system of transformational laws that govern reasoning operations and are manifested in a person's actual responses to conflict or problems (Kohlberg terms these "hard" stages); (iii) stages derived from the Piagetian paradigm but concentrating more on personality functions and the affective and reflective characteristics of people from a psychoanalytic perspective rather than forms of thinking (Loevinger, 1976; Fowler, 1981; Broughton, 1982; Kegan, 1982; Gilligan, 1982; and Perry, 1982) These are termed "soft" stages. Gibbs (1979) originally distinguished "standard Piagetian" stages from "existential" stages.

Hard stage models such as Kohlberg's and those of Selman (1980) and Armon (1984) attempt to define stages in terms of discrete operations of reasoning in contrast to reflective or self-reflective metathinking (1:311-372). By defining the stages in terms of reasoning operations, Kohlberg believes that structural models can explain not only the inner logic of stages but also the logic of the sequence of shift from one stage to another and thus are amenable to formulation within a normative model. He does concede, however, that "viewed in this light, the strength of hard stages is limited by the need to subdivide into discrete domains those world views that are, in an ethical and religious sense, unified"(2:239). Hard stages, however, gain by a precision in their articulation of a structural logic that survives the growth of psychological knowledge

about the self, its functions and development. So while Eriksonian functional models focus on the self as a theoretical ego-construct, developing competency as it meets an invariant sequence of challenges which are difficult to determine, Kohlberg need only tap forms of manifest reasoning. There are similarities between the approaches (Kohlberg, 1973 ; 2:491-7), and Snarey, Kohlberg and Noam (1983) have been able to abstract structural characteristics from the Eriksonian model. But where Kohlberg wants to sharply distinguish content and structure, competence and performance, soft stage theorists are accused of confusing them. Soft stage transition is the conscious formation of a theoretical perspective on one's own development, not an unconscious structural process. Moreover, whereas hard stage models follow Piaget (1970) in asserting a normative model that establishes a standard as a developmental end-point, with each stage in the hierarchy representing a transformation towards ever-increasing correspondence with the end-point of the highest stage, soft stage theorists see each stage as a replacement of a former stage and avoid the claim that higher stages are more adequate stages.

In accepting Piaget's structural stage model, Kohlberg has accepted that certain empirical findings are necessary to define the set of moral developmental levels as stages. These characteristics include (i) "invariant sequence" despite "varying cultural conditions" (1:23-28; 2:14, 422); (ii) structured wholeness (or cross-task and cross-situational consistency)that is more stable than the disequilibrium involved in movement between levels (1:275-281; 2:241-2); and (iii) hierarchical integration or displacement of lower stages by higher stages (1:147-168). While the early Kohlberg (1963a), following Piaget, preferred to talk about his data as ideal types rather than strict sequential stages, he now makes claims (2:xxx) that these are stages on the basis of (a) longitudinal and cross-cultural, cross-sex data, and (b) a method of assessment revealing invariant sequence in such data. Not that he has waited these 25 years before talking about his developmental types as stages.

As a result of his twenty-year longitudinal study (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs and Lieberman, 1982), Kohlberg justifies his claim as follows:

> There are three major implications of the Piagetian stage model with regard to longitudinal data.
> 1. The first is that of <u>invariant sequence</u>. The invariant-sequence hypothesis has two parts.
> (i) Under normal experiential conditions, moral reasoning stage

> remains the same or moves up but does not move to lower stages. This assumption was confirmed in the male longitudinal subjects. In only 2 percent of the interviews was there change downward from time 1 to time 2, and this change downward was small(less than one-half stage). This slight change is accounted for by measurement error according to data on the test-retest reliability of our instrument.
> (ii) There will be no stage skipping. No subject should move from stage 1 to stage 3 without going through stage 2 intermediately. No cases of stage skipping were found in the longitudinal data.
> 2. The second implication of the Piagetian stage model is that of hierarchy. This entails that as a higher stage comes into use, lower stages of thought are replaced as ways of resolving moral dilemmas (This does not rule out the possibility that certain stimuli may elicit lower-stage responses).
> 3. The third implication of the Piagetian stage model is that stage structures are structured wholes. That is, individuals are consistent in their stage of moral reasoning regardless of the kind of dilemma presented to them, regardless of the moral issue on which a subject must take a stand. (Kohlberg, 1982b, pp.516-7).

Kohlberg claims that the longitudinal data demonstrated the last two implications given that, on average, two-thirds of any individuals thinking was assignable to a single mode and that a factor analysis of correlation in stage-used on various dilemmas indicated a single "moral development factor" analogous to the general "intellectual functioning factor" found in tests of cognitive ability and reasoning.

Greater sophistication in distinguishing form and content has led to some of the normative content previously used to define higher stages being used to define a new category or substage associated with each of the stages (2:252-7, 534-6).While Dell and Jurkovic (1978) report the existence of the categories in a mimeographed scoring guide as early as 1972, Kohlberg has only recently described them. He suggests that within each stage there are two different orientations which he terms substage A and B. The first is oriented to heteronomous respect for rules and authority, while the second is oriented to fairness and autonomy. Substage B is more prescriptive, reversible, universalistic and autonomous than substage A. Substage B responses reflect the stage 5 "right answers" to Kohlberg's dilemmas, show an intuitive understanding of the core reasons for those choices, and contain fewer excusing complications.

> Thus substage B reasoning reflects two properties: (a) an intuition of the moral content hierarchically explicitly argued for and chosen by our Stage 5 reasoners and (b) the fully universalized and moral prescriptive form of judgments of rightness and obligation ascribed to our theoretical notion of Stage 6. (2:271).

What substage B orientations lack is organisation around a clearly

formulated principle of justice. Kohlberg suggests that the longitudinal data shows that while some people remain at substage A throughout their lives, others move from A to B (but never the reverse). Once substage B is attained, it is usually maintained even when development to the next stage occurs.

A consequence of this theoretical adjustment has been a reduction in the range of stages. The current scoring manual no longer describes a stage 6, which is now retained only as a philosophical claim (2:270), although Kohlberg still describes a possible stage 6 thinker (2:486-490). What is the fate of those previously scored at stage 6:

> Until 1972, our conceptualization and test manual definition of Stage 6 was based on our 1958 cross-sectional and ideal-typical method for stage scoring...This method classified as Stage 6 high school and college responses which are now scored as Stage 5, Stage 4, and occasionally even Stage 3 in the standardized issue scoring manual...The material that was formally scored as Stage 6 is now scored as substage B at one of these lower stages. (2:270).

Kohlberg defends the actuality of stage 6 reasoners by noting that he drew his case material describing the stage initially from individuals like Martin Luther King who had received graduate training in moral theory as well as being a moral leader. The possible stage 6 thinker is similarly well-schooled in moral philosophy.

During the 1970s, Kohlberg began introducing the possibility of a seventh stage (1973 ; 1974 ; 1:311-372). He suggested that stage 6 did not answer the question, "Why be moral?" and, by implication, "Why live?" and noted that Erikson's mature person passes to an eighth stage of wisdom beyond the seventh stage of care which corresponds to his stage 6."Ultimate moral maturity requires mature solution to the question of the meaning of life"(2:497). This is not the emergence of a new function nor the performance of a new task, but a formal reflection, and so a soft stage. He defines the stage thus:

> The characteristic of all these stage 7 solutions is that they involve contemplative experience of nonegoistic or nondualistic variety. The logic of such experience is sometimes expressed in theistic terms but it need not be. Its essential is the sense of being a part of the whole of life and the adoption of a cosmic as opposed to a nuiversal humanistic (Stage 6) perspective. (Kohlberg, 1973 , pp.500-1)

Kohlberg is currently engaged in investigating "The Aging Person as a Philosopher"(2:496).

Development in Kohlberg's Perspective.

Kohlberg follows Webster's Dictionary in defining development as "to make active, to move from the original position to one providing more opportunity for effective use; to cause to grow and differentiate along lines natural to its kind; to go through a process of natural growth, differentiation, or evolution by successive change" (2:279). Stage transition occurs when present stage equilibration is disrupted. This happen when conflict occurs, induced by encountering events which one's present stage cannot adequately encompass or resolve. Kohlberg described it thus:

> The first step in teaching virtue, then, is the Socratic step of creating dissatisfaction in students about their knowledge of the good. This we do experimentally by exposing the students to moral conflict situations for which their principles have no ready solution. Second, we expose them to disagreement and argument about these situations with their peers. Our Platonic view holds that if we inspire cognitive conflict in students and point the way to the next step up the divided line, they will tend to see things previously invisible. (1:47).

Turiel (1966) took the lead in explaining and researching stage transition. He confirmed two hypotheses: (i) that subjects would manifest greater change in moral stage if exposed to reasoning one stage above their dominant stage than if exposed to reasoning two or more stages above; and (ii) that subjects exposed to reasoning one stage above their present stage would exhibit more stage gain than those exposed to reasoning below their present stage. This finding poses a problem: If stages are integrated logical structures, is there not a contradiction in saying that one can understand arguments a stage ahead of one's own? Turiel (1969)understood stages to be mixed. As the elements from the next stage increase, one's capacity to perceive contradictions from the perspective of the next stage increases. The recognition of such conflict then energises the equilibrating process towards structural reorganisation.

Turiel worked with a sample of children. Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg (1969) replicated the findings with young adolescents. Rest (1973) found that half his subject exhibited comprehension of a stage one above their predominant stage use as revealed in pre-test. Once the structural components of a higher stage are genuinely understood, the subject embraces it as preferable. However Rest found that, irrespective of comprehension, subjects tended to prefer the highest stages. He favoured as a possible explanation of this phenomenon, an intuitive recognition of the truly just. Kohlberg's substage B integrates this into his theory.

Stage 5 is now the highest hard stage for which there is evidence. Kohlberg (2:458). In response to Gibbs' criticism that it fails to fulfil hard stage requirements, Kohlberg (2:375) are that it is a culturally universal, natural stage because stage 5 reasoners base their judgments on a universal hierarchy of natural rights rather than on the societally based rights of stage 4 reasoners. Kohlberg says that it is this, not the use of moral theories such as social contract to justify moral judgments, that leads such reasoning to be considered a distinctive stage. Kohlberg now defines stage 5 principled reasoning by the socio-moral or justice perspective it employs. This conception of a prior-to-society justice perspective was absent from earlier scoring systems, which identified principled reasoning with a differentiation of moral values such as life and conscience from legal and customary values and gave priority to such values in resolving the moral dilemmas. This now represents the core meaning of the autonomous, or B substage, of conventional reasoning. This means "that the original Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) conclusions that Stage 5 and 6 principles are available to adolescents as ideologies was incorrect"(2:493).

How does moral development occur in Kohlberg's theory?
For Kohlberg, moral development is the increasingly comprehensive and differentiated understanding of justice which evolves only as logical reason is acquired. Growth is expected to continue until the individual is an adult but even then only for a few (5% according to his 1972 estimate (1:88)).Although logical development is the precondit- of cognitive development, a secondary condition is the recognition by people at lower stages of their moral limitations when they compare their conclusions with those of their peers and teachers who are at a higher stage (Blatt and Kohlberg, 1975). This seems to provide a self-aware, but gentle motivation for moral growth.

The bulk of moral growth occurs in childhood and adolescence and so, according to Kohlberg, does not require the extensive personal experience of moral choice and responsibility found in adult life. It is cognitive and symbolic experience, not social and emotional experience, which are prime contributors to moral development. Not that moral stage development is simply the horizontal decalage of logical thought to social situations. A formal operational adolescent coming to principled reasoning must undergo social and moral experiences which will often have a strong emotional content. Emotion may trigger and accom-

pany rethinking, but it is the cognitive and social riches of the the environment that will determine its outcome. He believes that a great deal of experience of personal moral decision and choice is unnecessary for moral development in childhood or adolelescence. But the finding that principled thinking does not appear until adulthood suggests that perhaps a different kind of experience is needed for attainment of principled thinking. Up through stage 4, each new stage represents a wider and more adequate process of role-taking.

> Principled thinking, however, is not a more adequate perception of what the social system is, rather, it is a postulation of principles to which the society and self ought to be committed. To be principled in moral judgment is not just to cognitively "see" principles. It is to (a) see their ideal adequacy in spite of the fact that they are not a social reality to conform to, (b) see a basis for commitment to these ideals, and (c) at the same time, see a commitment to a real society in which one acts consistently with these ideals. (2:492).

Kohlberg does not say how this can be achieved.

Part of Kohlberg's difficulties can be explained by the history of his theory. His original dissertation was a study of adolescents, and so did not address questions about adulthood. Since adolescence involves physiological, hormonal and hypothalamic changes, he was unable to show that moral change was not simply biological maturation. Discovery of a relativistic transition (Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969) raised the question as to whether there were stages found only in adulthood. Initially responding in the negative, only later (Kohlberg, 1973) was he led to give an affirmative answer once he was able to elevate the criteria for post-conventionality and distinguish real principled thinking from sophisticated conventional thinking. He then defined adulthood cognitively in terms of post-conventional reason (albeit with the corollary that most adults were trapped in an endless moral adolescence!). This did, however, allow him to establish his cognitive-developmental theory as independent of biology (Broughton, 1983). Maturation and experience were now disentangled (Kohlberg and de Vries, 1971).

In the 1973 paper we see Kohlberg beginning to search for the processes of transformation peculiar to adulthood. He proposes that in becoming adults, people shift the basis of their development from cognitive consistency to reflective understanding and appropriation of concrete personal experience:

> The nature of the experiences leading to adulthood development are somewhat different than those involved in childhood and adolescent movement to the conventional stages of moral reasoning.

> Development of moral thought in childhood is an increasingly adequate comprehension of existing social norms and social ideals. Accordingly, it develops through the usual experiences of social symbolic interaction and role taking. In contrast, construction of principles seems to require experiences of personal moral choice and responsibility usually supervening upon a questioning period of "moratorium". (Kohlberg, 1973, p.180).

Development in the post-conventional phase is dependent upon "the experience of sustained responibility for the welfare of others and the experience of irreversible moral choice"(Ibid, p.196).

This dualism of experiential modalities is supported at the theoretical level by a dual explanatory system. Childhood and adolescent development are accounted for by standard cognitive-developmental theory, while adult development is made comprehensible through"functional" theories such as those of Erikson and Fowler (Noam, Kohlberg, and Snarey, 1983; Snarey, Kohlberg and Noam, 1983). Attention was originally directed to the Eriksonian notion of identity formation (Kohlberg and Gilligan, 1971; Kohlberg, 1973; Colby, 1978; 2:430-31), particularly the so-called adolescent 'identity crisis'. Podd (1972) related Kohlberg's stages to Marcia's (1966) ego-identity statuses (a break-down of Erikson's fifth stageof "identity versus role diffusion") in a study of 112 male college students. Podd concluded, guided by his concern to show that his study"supports Erikson's view that moral ideology is a factor in ego identity"(1972, p.505) that there was a one-to-one correspondence between Kohlberg's stages and Marcia's statuses. Kohlberg and Gilligan (1971) chose to read the relationship the other way, making ego identity a factor in moral development (also Habermas, 1975). After adopting a "necessary-but-not sufficient" stance, they went on to claim that the study showed that morally transitional subjects were in a transitional identity status. This was a positive interpretation of the 1969 Kohlberg and Kramer regressional material which had originally suggested that psychodynamic considerations might indeed affect moral development. The "necessary-and-sufficient" position was more boldly expressed by Colby (1978) as a "basic assumption", seeming to suggest that there is a single transition which has moral and identity dimensions.

Current rescoring of the longitudinal data has shown (2:458) that any substantial (i.e., more than 25%) usage of stage 5 thinking occurs later than previously thought (age 24 or older). Lockwood (1978) and Higgins (1980) had found no evidence of students attaining major stage 5 reasoning at high school.

Cases 2, 14, and 23 were the youngest of our sixty longitudinal

> subjects on whom we have data through their twenties to show Stage 5 reasoning. They first showed Stage 5 thinking at age 24. This means that only 5 percent of our subjects used Stage 5 thinking by age 25. Three of our sixty subjects, Cases 17, 37, and 42, or 5 percent, first used Stage 5 thinking at age 28. Two subjects, or 3 percent of our sample, Cases 44 and 67, used Stage 5 reasoning at age 32. Thus, only 13 percent of our subjects reached Stage 5, and all between the age of 24 and 32. We reinterviewed a few subjects at 40, and one, Case 65, had moved to Stage 5. Stage 5, then, is an adulthood stage. (2:458).

All of those who reached stage 5 had some graduate education, but "an additional finding suggests that it is not merely advanced education but actual experience of moral decision making and job responsibility following an advanced or professional education, rather than education itself, which leads to Stage 5 reasoning" (2:459). He goes on to report another study covering the middle adult years which found an increased number of stage 4/5 men in each age cohort (28-36 years = 0; 37-45 years = 10%; 46-55 years = 50%). This study and a study by Pratt, Golding and Hunter (1983) found no significant correlation between education and moral stage for men, but one for women. The universality of this gating process is further eroded by Kohlberg's comment, "The role of both graduate school and subsequent professional responsibility in movement to Stage 5 does not appear to be a cross-culturally universal generalization"(2:479-80). He instances 3 kibbutz subjects without formal education past high school and few job responsibilities who scored stage 5 in their early 20s.

This new data leads Kohlberg to conclude that the Eriksonian distinction between capacity and functional use is no longer needed to chart adult development:

> Erikson's formulation suggests that for all individuals there should be an adulthood movement from an "ideological" to an "ethical" orientation as there is ego progression through the phases of identity crises and commitment. In contrast, our current "single" view of development implies that the experiences of youth and adulthood lead to a "stabilized" or "ethical" use of moral judgment only in the relatively few adults who also move to a principled stage of moral judgment. (2:494).

Neither identity crisis nor identity achievement is now seen as the key to accession to moral post-conventionality.

Resolving Moral Dilemmas in Action.

With greater clarity about the place of his moral stage theory has come an extension to new fields. There is a new interest in how moral dilemmas are resolved in action and proposals for a theory of moral action (2:498-581). A first elaboration of the theory relates

justice stage to the content of deontic choices, and a second elaboration recognises the relevance of judgments of responsibility. A third factor involved is an analysis of moral atmosphere or the collective norms influencing a person's judgment.

Three principles govern the relation of moral judgment to behaviour for Kohlberg: (i) by providing a concrete definition of rights and duties in a situation (1:86), e.g., at a conventional level someone may refrain from cheating in order to maintain the good opinion of an authority figure (stage 3) or because it was believed that the social system would break down if everyone cheated; (ii) as maturity of moral judgment increases, so does predisposition to behave morally: (a) there is an increased sense of personal responsibility to carry out actions regarded as morally correct, and (b) moral affect (i.e., guilt) increases its influence on behaviour (2:64); (iii) moral judgment alone cannot predict moral behaviour because (a) a person can know what is right and not do it, (b) the personality determinants of moral behaviour include moral factors such as guilt and empathy and also non-moral factors such as ability to control impulses and delay gratification, i.e., ego strength; (c) and situational factors. "The higher the individual's moral stage, the more able he is to resist situational forces toward behavior inconsistent with his moral judgment activities"(Kohlberg and Elfenbein, 1975, p.15).

Kohlberg believes that a unified approach to moral judgment and action is necessary:

> In our view moral judgment development both causes moral action and arises out of moral action itself. A new moral judgment may guide new behavior while the performance of new behavior may lead one to construct a new moral judgment. In either case, however, there is a unitary developmental process involved in the development of both judgment and action. (2:505-6).

The methodological consequences of this are as follows:

> Our approach to studying consistency or generality in real behavioral situations is not essentially different from the way we have looked for and found consistency in hypothetical verbal situations. In hypothetical situations this has been done by presenting subjects with dilemmas, complex situations in which two or more norms conflict. We then look at ways of reasoning to resolve these conflicts in order to determine a course of action. It is these ways of reasoning which are general across verbal situations...We find the person's stage at response to one hypothetical dilemma corresponds closely to his or her response to others...It is this generality that we would expect to be revealed in moral actions, not the endorsement of a particular standard or virtue. (2:516-7).

Kohlberg believes that stage structure imparts a "cognitive disposit-

ion which is the critical factor in determining moral action and not any affective elements: "He who knows the good chooses the good" (1:189). This is explained by the postulation of a monotonic increase in the making of judgments of responsibility consistent with the deontic judgments of rightness as one moves from stage to stage, i.e., the higher the stage reasoning, the more likely action will be consistent with the moral choice made on the dilemma. In support of this he cites a number of studies: Candee (1976), Blasi (1982), a 1979 study of Helkama, and that of McNamee (1978) in which 29 of 102 undergraduates (ages 18-25) are supposed to have reached stage 5 reasoning! In summarising he concludes:

> 1. Judgments of responsibility clearly display a monotonic pattern of increased responsibility to verbal dilemmas which is not always shown by deontic judgments.
> 2. This monotonic trend is one of increased prescriptivity (or consistency of responsibility judgments.
> 3. This increased prescriptivity may be interpreted as the discounting of excuses or "quasi-obligations" in making judgments of responsibility at successively higher stages.
> 4. It may also be interpreted as a growing concept of moral freedom or autonomy with higher stages. (2:534).

Each stage generates not only its own formal obligations, but its own justifications for failure to act in terms of those obligations. He terms these excuses "quasi-obligations" since, in other situations, they may be legitimate obligations. But since they can only stem from reasoning that is not principled, they are, by definition, excluded from stage 5.

Kohlberg proposes a model of judgment-action involving four psychological functions: (i) interpretation of the situation; (ii) decision making, (iii) follow-through (or moral judgment) and (iv) non-moral skills (cf. Appendix A). Each function is served by a cognition or set of cognitions. The first function, defining the problem, is served by the cognitive structures of social perspective taking (Selman, 1980), which are necessary but not sufficient for moral stage. Decision making is served by judgments of deontic choice since Kohlberg believes that where all universalizable moral principles lead to a single alternative as being "more moral," that choice will be almost invariably made by those at stage 5 and substage B but less often by people at lower stages and at substage A. A similar situation holds for judgments of responsibility which serve follow-through. Associated with this function are non-moral skills such as intelligence(i.e., ability to figure out a plan to achieve the moral result), attention (i.e., avoidance of distractions), and perseverance (i.e.,

delay of gratification). These functions are not unidirectional: The experience of past moral behaviour and the perceived consequences of contemplated behaviour influence actual interpretation of the situation. Moreover, in acknowledgement of Gilligan and Belenky's (1980) finding that in decisions about abortion, some subjects were more advanced in real-life reasoning than in hypothetical reasoning, whereas the reverse situation applied to others, he concludes, "Thus, the coordination of structures of reflective moral reasoning with structures of practical moral decision making seems to be a process of coordination between action and reflection, rather than a one-way determination of action by reflective action or vice versa"(2:262).

The model is intentionally related to that of Rest (1983).But whereas Rest approaches the matter from outside, considering the contribution of other disciplines, Kohlberg approaches the question from within moral judgment. He claims similar results (2:539).

Elsewhere Kohlberg makes an interesting statement. In commenting on an early and as yet unpublished Krebs and Kohlberg experiment, he says, "It is the issue of contract and trust as seen by subjects at various stages that is, in our view, the central element in explaining these judgment-action relationships"(2:551). This would seem to move from a cognitive basis to an interactional one. Waterman (1981) has identified trust as basic to initiating action. As Staub (1978) points out, "All forms of trust are likely to contribute to a person's willingness to initiate positive behavior toward others and/or respond positively to others' initiatives"(Staub, 1978, p.375). All the studies Kohlberg considers relate to cheating situations, but as Rothman (1980) points out, although consistent non-cheating seems to emerge from principled thinking, in other situations behavioural choice does not reflect stage of reasoning so directly.

Kohlberg believes that his notion that judgments of responsibility are consistent with deontic judgments at the principled level avoids the philosophical issue of what is morally right and which moral actions should be avoided. Instead, the subject's own response defines what is right and the subject's moral stage development determines the consistency between moral judgment and action.

> Our philosophic considerations leave us with the view that a moral action is an action (a) that is "objectively right" in the sense that the use of philosophic principles by Stage 5 reasoners leads to agreement on what constitutes "right" action, and (b)

> that is "subjectively right" if it is both guided by a moral judgment or reason that is "right" in form and consistent with the objectively right choice. This controversial philosophic view leads us to say that, in at least some situations, principled or stage 5 subjects perform actions which are right in both form and content. (2:259-60).

Kohlberg does not want to limit this claim to the principled stages, for lower stage subjects sometimes choose the "right","just" or "principled" content, i.e., make substage B judgments. He concludes,

> In summary, subjects who are principled or B substage are (a) more likely to make judgments of responsibility and to perform actions that are consistent with their deontic judgments of rightness and (b) more likely to perform the "right action, right action being defined by that agreement reached between philosophic principles and postconventional judgments. (2:261).

Kohlberg is increasingly recognising the part played by the socio-moral atmosphere:

> So far we have discussed moral action as if it were something determined solely by internal psychological factors in the subject. This is not the case, for moral action usually takes place in a social or group context, and that context usually has a profound influence on the moral decision making of individuals. Individual moral decisions in real life are almost always made in the context of group norms or group decision-making processes. Moreover, individual moral action is often a function of these norms or processes. (2:263).

The classic case analysed is the My Lai massacre: "The moral choice made by each individual soldier who pulled the trigger was embedded in the larger institutional context of the army and its decision making procedures"(Higgins, Power and Kohlberg, 1984, p.75). Decisions were dependent in large part on a collectively shared definition of the situation and of what should be done about it. "In short, the My Lai massacre was more a function of the group "moral atmosphere" that prevailed in that place at that time than of the stage of moral development of the individuals present"(Idem). Kohlberg, Hickey and Scarf (1972) had attempted in their study of a reformatory to articulate the notion of a stage of moral atmosphere that might be different from that of the individual. An elaboration of this notion was published in Power and Reimer's (1978) study of moral judgments in group meetings, while Higgins, Power and Kohlberg (1984) studied the influence of norms and culture of the high school. Jennings and Kohlberg (1983) report that in a closed environment such as a school, the sense (a) of how much moral discussion and taking into account the views of others there was; (b) the extent to which subjects felt a sense of power and participation in making rules; and

(c) the extent to which existing rules were perceived as fair,were all significant factors influencing moral growth. Kohlberg, however, limits the influence of moral atmosphere to the situational and institutional context of the group, and does not explore wider social influences such as operate once formal schooling ends.

The Moral Dilemma as judge of Moral Development.

Kohlberg (1979) outlined three phases in developmental research. In the first phase, emphasis is on exploration. One works with cross-sectional, longitudinal, and cross-cultural samples to identify the "broad outlines" of sequential, structural development, typically using the clinical method. There comes a time when the "transcontextual validity" of the basic sequence has been sufficiently explored, and a second, primarily methodological phase begins when effective assessment methodology is developed. Standard procedures can now be introduced with reasonable confidence that their use will not preclude the discovery of important new structures. The traditional psychometric criteria of validity and reliability apply to these tests. Beyond this is a third phase in which the theoretical issues not fully answered in the first stage are returned to once again.

As he describes it, Kohlberg initially had no intention that the clinically probed interviews reported in his 1958 dissertation should be considered a test, but rather a rating system for assessing ideal developmental types. He thus rejects Kurtines and Greif's(1974) criticism that at that time administration of tests was not standardised, chances of rater bias were high, independent scoring was inhibited, no evidence of stability over time was available, estimates of standard error of measurement were lacking, internal consistency across dilemmas was absent, discrimination between the higher stages was difficult, moral action was not correlated with stages, and evidence of invariant sequence was missing. Kuhn (1976) defended Kohlberg by pointing out that time was needed to provide much of this information and that the theory should not be rejected until data was available. Broughton (1978) made a similar defence.

However, by the early 1970s some data was becoming available. Some initial doubts were raised by Kramer's apparent discovery of "regression" in moral stage during the college years (Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969), but it was decided that the fault was in the method of assessment, not the theory (this interpretation seems inaccurate, since

the postulation of a transitional stage 4½ was a theoretical adjustment). Kohlberg expresses his aim then as follows:

> I wanted to construct a test that not only would assess the current stage of moral functioning and would validly and reliably assess stage change, but also would reflect my concern with educational goals and my belief that a higher stage is a better stage. In other words, I include in my approach a normative component. (2:400).

His approach differs from that of psychometric factor analysis in that the concept of structure is built into the initial stages of observation, test construction, and scoring, and does not emerge through pure factor-analytic responses classified by content. He does not argue from effect to cause "but rather from expression or "symbols" to what is postulated as a common theme or "structure"... It is in this sense a construct rather than an inference, and is warranted only on the grounds of "intelligible" ordering of the manifest items"(2:408). The test constructor finds the developmental structure by what Kohlberg describes as an "abductive" rather than an "inductive" method, or what is elsewhere described as "bootstrapping" (2:31-32; Colby, 1978), i.e. by working back and forward between theoretical assumptions such as postulated structures on the one hand, and empirical reflections of those structures in the responses subjects give, on the other. Thus the test scorer as well as the test constructor must know the underlying theory and also function as a "clinician" who can infer structures from the content responses.

We have already described how the theory has changed over the years. The scoring system has seen a similar evolution (Colby, 1978; Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs and Lieberman, 1983, Kuhmerker, 1980): (i) The earliest studies used the Sentence and Story Scoring method or the Global Rating Guide (Kohlberg, 1968), both of which were subjective content-analysis approaches that inflated the presence of higher stages; (ii)The Structural Issue Scoring Manual (Kohlberg, 1972) was an advance in which the rater attended to the structure rather than the content, but was eventually judged overly abstract and susceptible to cultural bias; to be replaced (iii) by the Standardized Issue Scoring Manual in 1979 (2:192-4; Gibbs, Widaman and Colby, 1982; Cortese, 1984). This specifies clear and concrete stage criteria and defines the developmental sequence of specific moral concepts, focussing on operative moral judgments rather than on ethical assumptions. In standard issue scoring the scoring unit is called a criterion judgment and "is defined by the intersection of Dilemma x

Issue x Norm x Element"(Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs and Lieberman, 1983, p.11). Whereas the previous assessment system had allowed the number of issues tapped per dilemma to vary with the proclivities of particular subjects and interviewers, Standardized Issue scoring fixed the number of issues to be scored per subject to two per dilemma (and three dilemmas per protocol). To ensure that every protocol will yield a score on both issues of each dilemma multiple probe questions for each issue are provided.

While the number of scoring subunits and their description have changed frequently over the years (Kohlberg originally used 30 "aspects" (1963), then 25 "subunits" in 1967 (2:47-48), then 29 "modes, elements or issues" in 1971 (1:117) or 12 "modes, elements and categories"(Kohlberg and Gilligan, 1971) and 7 "criterion concepts" in 1976 (2:187), the current Scoring probes only six issues: life, property, conscience, punishment, contract and authority.

Also, whereas previously only the percentage of a group of subject's reasoning at all stages was reported, with no cutoff to control for scoring error, or only mean scores reported, the 1978 manual reports group means as well as individual scores. The method of calculating a person's global stage score now requires that 25% of a person's reasoning be at that stage. Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs and Lieberman (1983) report that 90% of a subject's reasoning is now scored either at a person's major stage or at one adjacent stage. This has depressed scores and reduced the variation for individuals over time. Currently the manual is being refined to produce Standard Issue Scoring (Gibbs, Widaman and Colby, 1982) which has held the status of "in press" for a number of years. This seeks to blend standard controls with more allowances for individual spontaneity than provided in the 1978 manual.

Whereas in his 1969 "Stage and Sequence", stages were assessed in terms of favoured content (2:15), the current method differentiates the form of moral judgment from the norms favoured by subjects:

> To briefly explain, an interview transcript is first classified by the content of the choice; second it is classified by the content of the justification of the choice; and third, it is classified by the value content appealed to in the justification. Only after classifying content according to these three content categories is an interview then assessed by stage and structure. At this point, formal justice structures are identified that characterize a stage in terms of its justice perspective and its use of the operations of equality,reciprocity and equity...Thus, current scoring methods yield an explicit differentiation of content and structure. (2:245).

Kohlberg describes the change as one from an intuitive scoring method to a standardized technique, from interpretation as "art" to interpretation as "science", i.e., a research activity employing a reasonably reliable method of observation. He admits that the method still rests on the communicative and empathic stance of the interpreter, not on the positivistic stance of someone trying to classify and predict behaviour as distinct from meaning. The current instrument aims at tapping a subject's competence rather than his or her performance by providing probing questions that attempt to elicit the upper limits of the subject's thinking.

Revisions in the theory have resulted in the range of scores being reduced. The 1978 manual no longer scores for stage 6 (which is retained only as a philosophical claim and not an empirical one (2:270-74). The stage scale now used is a 9-point scale (e.g., 1, 1/2 2, 2/3, 3.....) whereas previously a 6-point scale was used. The new scale is justified on the grounds that it enables transition between the stages to be more easily handled. However it does raise questions regarding the status of a stage. What is a ½ stage? Gibbs, Widaman and Colby (1982) suggest that these revision destroy the Piagetian stage claim completely.

Gibbs, Widaman and Colby (1982) seriously questioned the reliability of the results of the Haan, Smith and Block (1968) study of participants in the 1964 Berkeley Free Speech Movement in the light of current revisions in scoring methods. Nicolayev and Phillips (1979) had earlier pointed out that the previous method was only able to score 54% of 957 individuals interviewed because the remainder could not be assigned a dominant stage. These criticisms led Kohlberg to rescore the original material (2:541-6). The differences in results are noteworthy and illustrate the difficulty in handling many of the findings obtained from earlier research. Where the original scoring found that half the stage 2 subjects, and more than half the stage 5 and 6 subjects participated in the sit-in, as against only one in eight of the conventional subjects, in the revised findings there is a clear monotonic progression in percentages involved in the sit-in (stage 3: 10%; stage 3½: 13%; stage 4: 44%; stage 4½: 73%).

The complexity of Kohlberg's method has led others to devise tests more easily administered (Bloom, 1977; Rest, 1979 and Gibbs, Widaman and Colby, 1982). Rest (1979) decided that Kohlberg's aim was "not

to put together a handy instrument, but to devise a theoretical system to represent the logic of moral thinking, analogous to Chomsky's work on syntactical structures"(p.xviii). So he devised the Defining Issues Test (DIT) which assesses moral evaluation through a multiple choice format. While Rest (1975) is insistent that he is testing something different to what Kohlberg is, many commentators have confused the two. The DIT has consistently shown a poor concurrent validity with the Kohlbergian scoring (Rest, Cooper, Coder, Masantz and Anderson, 1974; Davison, Robbins and Swanson, 1978). Yussen (1977) elicited the highest correlational score (.75) when he asked subjects to give the responses they imaged a moral philosopher would provide rather than their own. Gibbs, Widaman and Colby (1982) have constructed a Sociomoral Reflection Measure (SRM) which is a production task measure and more directly related to Kohlberg's work. It is primarily addressed to children and young adolescents rather than young adults and in line with Gibb's position does not go beyond stage 4.

The changes in Kohlberg's theory make consideration of it difficult. Colby comments on the changes:

> Stage descriptions and moral judgment scoring systems have frequently been superseded by new formulations. The ongoing changes make it inevitable that stage scores will be assigned to interview material in a different way from one study to the nest. This makes comparison of results across studies difficult.
> (Colby, 1978, p.90).

The successive revisions of definitions and methods of scoring, while charted by Kohlberg, have not been handled by him at all rigorously. In The Current Formulation of the Theory (2:212-319) results from earlier studies are happily mixed with new material and rescored material. Landwehr 's (1982) study provides a good example of the problem this creates for commentators. Colby scored a group of lawyers using the current scoring manual and found that 90.3% were at stage 4 and only negligible numbers at stages 3 and 5. The author then contrasts these findings with Haan, Smith and Block's (1968) sample, Kohlberg and Kramer's (1969) sample of more general student populations. His conclusion is that lawyers are more conventional than the general population! Carroll and Rest(1982)found correlation of .39 between Kohlberg's early and current scoring manual results. Given, these difficulties, the commentator is forced to make only general observations, rather than give specific attention to empirical data.

HAAN'S SEARCH FOR A PRACTICAL MORALITY

Origins of Haan's Theory

The path Norma Haan has followed in developing her interactional theory is less easily traced than that of Kohlberg. In essence, it is one particular application of a much larger theoretical engagement with coping and defense mechanisms as explanations of human development. Her earliest writings (Haan, 1963, 1964, 1965) outlined a theory of ego functioning in terms of coping and defense developed in conjunction with Kroeber (1963) in 1959. The aim was to present "the rational, logical, productive, wise, civil, loving, playful, and sensual aspects of people's ego functions" (Haan, 1977, p.36). Identification of the defensive intents of the ten classical mechanisms led first to the identification of the coping processes. Later (Haan, 1969) ego fragmentations were added to the array after the various clinical descriptions of psychotics also were recognised as processes. Haan (1983) acknowledges the contribution of Swanson's (1968) synthesis of social units, ethics, and ego strategies as a critical contribution. The mature expression of her own work in this area came in Coping and Defending: Processes of Self-Environment Organization (1977).

The major message of Coping and Defending is that personality is not a given but a process. It is composed of strategies that deal with the vagaries and contingencies of living. People develop preferred ways of solving problems which become durable aspects of their personalities. Ego processes are actions that people take at particular times and are determined by the interaction between situation and personal preference. Haan thus separates herself from psychoanalytic tradition where the ego is a mechanism in the struggle between id, drive and physiological processes. For her the ego is a tool in the interaction between person and environment. She justifies her redefinition of the term "ego process" on the basis of its link with the past, the psychoanalytic insights on defensive functioning it brings with it, and the ideal it proposes (Haan, 1981).

Interaction with the environment creates stress, and the strategies adopted to handle this are either of a coping or a defending nature or are fragmented. The three modes are distinguished by formal

properties: coping processes (1) involve choice, so are flexible, purposeful behaviours; (2) are future oriented; (3) yet respond to the requirements of the present situation; (4) involve differentiated thinking integrating conscious and pre-conscious elements; (5) "meter" disturbing effects; and (6) allow various forms of affective satisfaction in open, ordered, and tempered ways. Defending processes (1) turn away from choice; (2) are pushed from the past; (3) distort aspects of the present; (4) include elements not relevant to the situation; (5) operate with the assumption that it is possible to magically remove disturbing feelings; and (6) allow gratification by subterfuge (1977, p.36). Fragmentation is ritualistic, violating intersubjective relations by withdrawal. The processes are defined as a utilitarian hierarchy: "the person will cope if he can, defend if he must, and fragment if he is forced, but whichever mode he uses, it is still in the service of his attempt to maintain organization" (Haan, 1977, p.4). Haan (Appendix B) proposes ten coping and ten defense strategies which are intended to include all the problem-solving methods that people use.

Throughout her career, Haan has been on the staff of the Institute of Human Development of the University of California at Berkeley. This has given her access to the longitudinal studies undertaken by that centre (Haan and Day, 1974; Haan, 1976; Haan, 1981; Eichorn, Clausen, Haan, Honzik and Mussen, 1981). Haan has tested ego functioning in relation to I.Q. change (1963); social mobility (1964); Rorshach performance (1965a)and Personality Inventories (1965b).

During 1965-1966 Haan was able to investigate the distinctive personality characteristics, moral reasoning and perceptions of parents of a large sample of students who had been involved in the Berkeley Free Speech Movement crisis (Haan, Smith and Block, 1968; Block, Haan and Smith, 1968, 1969; Smith, Haan and Block, 1970). In general, she found, principled students described themselves as autonomous and appeared to be candid, even self-critical in describing themselves. The conventionally moral described themselves as conventional, ambitious, and not rebellious. The pre-conventional were more variable but both sexes saw themselves as rebellious. Haan (1975) followed this study with another that examined "the losses, gains or equalities" (Haan, 1977, p.106) in the actual situation of campus civil disobedience compared to the levels of reasoning used for the standard Kohlberg dilemmas. She found that two thirds used a different stage for

the actual situation (46% higher, 20% lower) than for the hypothetical dilemmas. From this study, she concluded that on critical occasions, people used stages other than those employed for hypothetical tasks, and that this was related to ego processes. In a study of hippies (Haan, Stroud, and Holstein, 1973) and of Peace Corps volunteers (Haan, 1974) she found a positive monotonic relationship between moral stages and coping processes. A complementary interest in much of this research was the influence of family on moral reasoning patterns (Haan, Smith and Block, 1968; Haan, 1971; Haan, Langer and Kohlberg (1971).

From originally utilising Kohlberg's theory and cooperating in the gathering of data in support of it (Haan, Kohlberg and Langer, 1976; Kuhn, Langer, Kohlberg and Haan, 1977), Haan moved to apply her own theory to moral development. Her move resulted from several sets of empirical results: (i) the presence of gaps between Kohlberg's moral judgment scale and Loevinger's ego developmental scale, which measures Kohlberg had presumed to be parallel (Haan, Stroud and Holstein, 1973); (ii) inconsistencies in levels of moral reasoning obtained under different interviewing situations (Haan, 1975, 1978); (iii)variations resulting from gender and affectivity (Haan, 1975). She thus began a programme involving a critical dimension and two constructive parts. On the negative side, she has objected to Kohlberg's assumption that "thought equals action, and moral action is nothing more than thought in action" (Haan, 1977, p.108). On the positive side she has proposed a distinctive understanding of moral reasoning, concretely represented by her scale of Interpersonal Morality (Haan, 1978)(cf. Appendix C). The manual for assessing for such morality appeared in 1977, with first reports on its application to an adolescent sample in the same year (Haan, 1977; 1978; 1981; 1985) as well as to a middle aged sample. The second part of her concern is to isolate the effect that certain group situations have on moral development (Haan, 1985).

Underlying her actual empirical investigations has been a concern with the methodology employed by social scientists today (Haan, 1982, 1983). The ethics of the relationship between practitioner and subject has extended beyond the social science field into the medical (Haan, 1979).

All these concerns have come together in the volume, On Moral Grounds: The Search for Practical Morality (1985) which is a statement of the theory of interactional morality and a report of some

research from an interactional perspective on the moral reasoning of small groups of children, adolescents, and young adults. The central thesis of the book is that

> In moral conflict, discussants cope when they accurately and mutually recognize all parties' legitimate self-interests and act together to come to a decision. Accuracy seems, on logical grounds, to be the precondition of adequate moral action. Being only human, moral actors are often nor accurate, but from the standpoint of interaction theory, it would be better if they were. Thus we merge the grounds of coping and morality in our work. (OMG:170).

The work seeks to both differentiate Haan's own approach from that of Kohlberg and to evaluate Kohlberg's theory.

The Methodology of the Social Scientist.

Haan identifies six concerns which, as a social scientist, she brings to the study of moral development: (i) that the working definition with which she begins be open to revision, refutation or total abandonment; (ii) that she deal with an everyday morality which is species-wide and (iii) practical, since that is what affects others; and (iv) she consider people's moral ideals, since these are what impel them to be moral, as well as (v) the social and political factors which restrict adequate moral behaviour. Together these concerns (vi) led her to her theory of "interactional morality" (OMG: 2-3, 44-45).

A number of specific difficulties arise in investigating morality. (i) Morality involves values, but scientists purport to be value neutral. In choosing a particular form of morality as the object of their investigations, they attribute value to it. The solution Haan proposes is that scientists endorse a value that is universal, does not violate common-sense, and can be justified. (ii) Preoccupied as they are with the observable, scientists tend to belive that what they see is the whole truth, but since humanity has always cherished ideal forms of morality, moral observables cannot be the whole truth about moral meaning. (iii) Public declarations of morality cannot be accepted as pure and true indications because of people's need to present themselves as "morally desirable". (iv) There is a gap between people's knowledge about and practice of morality, which means that action is the most reliable focus of investigation (OMG: 47-48). She suggests that the following criteria adequately adjudicate the adequacy of moral theories:

1. How closely does the theory describe the morality of everyday life?

> 2. Does the theory contain provisions that satisfactorily resolve ordinary moral problems as well as difficult dramatic moral puzzles that sometimes occur?
> 3. Do the various propositions within a theory seem internally and logically consistent?
> 4. Can the theory predict the course of moral development and moral actions? (OMG:73).

As a psychologist, Haan claims to be in a unique position to take a fresh look at moral development. But to do so requires clarity of definition. This requires investigating common sense notions. Once these are determined, one can turn to a philosopher like Alexander Sesonske of the University of California, Berkeley. Sesonske (1964) claims to represent real life processes. For him a moral problem is

> a problem involving a choice between alternatives of significant action. A present moral problem exists when these are alternatives for present or future actions and the prospective actor feels some tension between them, when, in short, there is a felt doubt about prospective significant action. (Sesonske, 1962, p.7).

Obligations arise from situations as people make commitments: (i) as explicit promises or agreements with others; (ii) as implicit commitments to fulfill the formal promise as best they can, and (iii) as acceptance first and then continuation of their membership in the community (OMG:26). Such obligations are grounded in a sense of community: "Our attachment to some persons and groups often makes the prospect of exclusion from the community, or even of lesser status within the community, a decisive factor in our actions"(Sesonske, 1962, p.10). Morality is most coercive when it seeks to maintain an existent relationship or is threatened by a failure to agree or act accordingly. The connection between judgment and action is found in the character structure of the agent: "Our very awareness of the problem, our desire and effort to resolve it by reflection and inquiry, are all an aspect of our character, of the nature of ourselves"(Ibid, p.9).

For Sesonske, discussion is at the centre of the moral act. One fundamental purpose of discussion is expansion of the moral imagination and sympathy. "Moral lapses often stem as much from unwittingness as unwillingness, are failures not of will but of imagination." (Ibid, p.15). Morality includes the stances we take to allow each to preserve the status we claim or, at worst, retreat with honour. In face-work we make known, expose, our moral views and our character:

> In making these public we give them specificity and make them

> more permanently part of ourselves; for it is harder to abandon a public opinion than one secretly held. Facework helps us give shape both to our character and the character of others. (Idem).

Haan will take up many of these points. Sesonske takes a different view of reciprocity to Kohlberg or Habermas. For him, full reciprocity is implied in the understandings and language of all communities: When we claim our rights we implicitly recognise that all other community members have the same rights. For Habermas, reciprocity involves two people acting or expecting the same thing in comparable situations (with communicative action being compatible only with complete reciprocity. For Kohlberg (2:623) reciprocity is a distribution by exchange and is distinguished from but derived from a concern for equity.

Haan's position is that one's own goods (whatever these might be) and the goods of others (whatever these might be) should both be served as equally as possible. Her choice of equality as ground of morality is based on the premise that social living tends towards equalization:

> The moral ground considered here assumes that although humans are initially inexperienced, (a) they have a rational self-interest in wanting their morally relevant claims to be considered by others, but (b) their social experience immediately and invariably leads to their becoming responsive to others' self-interests; their own self-interests are never simply curbed. In other words, morality is a dialectic that arises in adjustments between the self and others. (Haan, 1982 , p.1101).

Haan acknowledges that given the differing circumstances, needs and contributions of negotiators, literal equality in amount or kind is seldom the outcome of moral exchanges in everyday life. But morality does not require this form of equality. It is sufficient that the intent be the personal and social meanings should be equalised after all participants' claims have been considered:

> People's different needs partly justify the allocations that they are entitled to keep and those that they award in order to achieve or reestablish psychological equality (a moral balance) with others. Some people are more needful than others; therefore they need more to be equal. Furthermore, unequal contributions are taken into account so that equalizing allocations can be achieved. When people do more, equality is established by their receiving more, all other considerations being equal...Furthermore, moral discussants are always oriented to their future relations. Imbalances today can be rectified tomorrow. (Ibid, p.1102).

Thus, "reality" is something we construct socially and its truth is dependent upon practical usefulness. Moral truth is that upon which we can consensually agree. Because this truth needs to be construct-

ed rather than deduced from pre-existing principles, the central structure of interactional morality is moral dialogue: "Dialogue is the form of all moral activity and dialogue is action"(OMG:68).

Through moral dialogue we enter into those mutual agreements and commitments with one another which are the basis of all moral exchange. Participants in moral dialogue seek to attain, maintain and re-establish moral balance. The agreements discussants achieve in an ideal moral dialogue define moral truth. Since no one fully knows the needs, thoughts and feelings of another, we have to enter into dialogue with one another in order to reach common agreement with regard to our mutual responsibilities. Dialogue prevents us from assuming that a personal perspective on the issue is the only way in which the situation can be evaluated morally. Only if all viewpoints are taken into account can we hope to reach agreement about the morally proper action: "All participants must express their needs and positions. None should dominate, and all must be able to veto,as was suggested by both Rawls (1971) and Habermas (1975)"(OMG:40). Moral dialogue will identify and isolate the morally relevant elements of the situation from its non-moral aspects and seek common agreement about interprrsonal rights and responsibilities.

Moral dialogues are aimed at achieving, maintaining, or restoring moral balance (Haan, 1983; OMG:40). This is the logical point of entry for a social scientist:

> Now that psychologists admit that the mind is constructivist, they must logically make action the focus of research about morality. Habermas (1979) observes that people act when they talk. In moral conflict each person's talk is surely a form of action. Viewing the mind as self-constructing leads to the conclusion that people's moral thinking and decisions are their own (instead of being reproductions of others' or society's teachings) and that their enactments are intelligently and rationally responsive to the peculiar characteristics of each situation.
> (Haan, 1983, p.230).

Haan argues that people in dyads or small groups develop expectancies about what they require of others and will do for them, psychologically and materially, and that these expectancies become moral and binding through relationships that continue either by necessity, choice or kinship. These expectancies take on the character of informal obligations or intersubjective accountabilities. When two or more people are in "moral balance" they are in common agreement that each party has done, is doing, or will do for the others what

is mutually agreed upon as desirable for all. When, as frequently occurs, disagreements arise about individuals' rights and responsibilities, then the moral balance is upset and needs to be restored. Moral dialogue must occur to restore the balance, to restore common understandings and agreement so that social exchange can continue and life go on.

Fundamental to interactional theory is the stipulation of an ideal moral interchange. But given the complexity of human situations, while ideally the participants will discover a resolution that meets everyone's needs and interests, practically there may be a compromise in which each discussant gives up some of what he or she wants in order to achieve a workable solution or all parties will accept some loss in order to reach agreement. Finally, there is the possibility that the less of two "evils" may be chosen. A moral balance occurs when all parties agree that the solution is the best that can be found, given the limitations of the situation and the current resources of the parties involved. Integral to any such dialogue, Haan notes, will be stress and conflict.

Like Habermas (1975), Haan argues for a procedural theory of justice, rather than one that features outcomes or duties. Her justification for choosing equality as the moral ground are analytical, not empirical, but Haan believes that they are consistent with psychological fact:

> 1. Evaluated equality involves the same value endorsement that social scientists already make and that citizens expect from science: the procedures of even-handed consideration, acceptance, and evaluation of all the evidence pursued with the supposition and hope that the "best fit" to the data (or the fairest moral solution between people) will be worked out.
> 2. Although helplessness research (Seligman, 1975) has clarified our understanding of humans' needs of agency, I go beyond Seligman to analyze the moral aspects of helplessness and its sequelae. A state of helplessness is a moral outrage, a violation of people's right to agency. But close observation suggests that morally violated people do not necessarily capitulate. If they must, they will covertly fight back in bad moral faith, even if they become passive and pseudo-stupid. People cannot negotiate morally in good faith if they feel helpless; they need hope that their legitimate self-interests will be heard and considered.
> 3. The understanding that people only give honestly to others as they are given to is a focal understanding of modern psychology and psychiatry. If this is so, evaluative equality may in human experience be the moral exchange that is preferred. Reciprocal giving entails an attitude of good faith that allows dialogue to begin. If this condition is not met,people give up instead of give, and dialogue is a sham...
> 4. For the morality of equality to work, people must be motivat-

> ed morally to engage in exchanges that can result in their having less than they initially thought was justified. In other words, theorizing must be stood on its head to see that moral motivation is compelling, not weak as theorists have historically assumed. (Haan, 1982, p.1102).

So for Haan, morality is grounded ontologically in the interdependence of the human community; normatively expressed in justice formulated as equality; and epistemologically defined by the consensual construction of truth. Interactional theory is based on the assumption that morality is a total experience and that meanings must be generated and regenerated continuously by people who rely upon intuition, emotion, and rationality to equalise their relationships. This means their personalities, especially their processes of adaptation, are involved. Further, the form of this moral dialogue will change as an individual becomes socially more sophisticated.

Levels of Morality

From the interactional view, moral skill is gradually acquired, but to research this, numerical expression is required, so Haan proposes five levels, which she describes as "arbitrarily drawn as divisions of a continuous dimension which is more of quality than development"(OMG:61).*

Briefly described, at the first two levels, the person attempts to create "balances" which are tilted in his or her favour. Then, between levels 2 and 3 there is a shift from assimilation to accomodation. At level 3 the individual tries to create balance by overly accomodating the interests of others. A harmony between the interests of self and others is assumed. At level 4 a person transforms his or her conceptualisation of both self's and other's interests into the idea of common interest. Ascribing to the common interest involves the acceptance of impersonal, outside regulation. At the final level, equilibration is reached when all interests are taken into account equally and a search is undertaken for a solution which optimises mutual interest.

Each moral level is characterised by interlocking "structures". The primary structure is the particular form of "moral balance" that each level seeks to achieve; at level 1 there is a momentary vacillation; at level 2 compromises and trade-offs; at level 3 a desire to maintain good faith; at level 4 a recognition that failure is possible on both sides; and at level 5 integration

* A Table is provided in Appendix B.

of self-interests with others' and mutual interests to achieve mutual, personal, and situational specific balances.

There are four related secondary structures: (i) one's self as a moral being and object; (ii) others as moral beings and objects; (iii) taking chances on others' good faith; and (iv) righting wrongs the self commits. A typical overall justification for balance at each level is suggested.

The action in moral interaction.

Moral performance is the central focus of Haan's study. This is not to say that the procedures and processes which precede the final action are not important: "Without moral means, the end can be only accidentally moral. Therefore, means are also moral actions that are part of moral disputes from the very outset"(OMG:144). Initial actions often reflect only people's self-interest, tempered by vague understandings of other participant's views of their own self-interests. Through "feedback loops" the initial self-preoccupation is corrected. While people act initially only to persuade their protagonists, their intents shift during the process of moral dialogue which has its requirements: (i) that all participants be free to speak their minds; (ii) that any participant be able to veto any non-equalising suggestion; and (iii) that no participants should dominate. If these requirements are violated or some participants fail to exercise their procedural rights, chances of obtaining a moral balance are lessened. Some apparent imbalances, however, may be authentic insofar as they rectify past imbalances or will be rectified in the future.

Moral action is always occurring since moral incidents happen incessantly in normal social intercourse at varying degrees of emotional intensity. A resolution is a paltry representation of everyday moral action. Even as people make preliminary attempts to persuade others or themselves, the are already acting.

Thought cannot be artificially separated out. Only in two special circumstances does such a separation occur:

> The first occurs when discussants distort their thoughts (though at some level aware of their contradictions). They will then act different than they would if they did not compartmentalize or rationalize their thoughts. For example, the defensive process of isolation ruptures connections between related ideas and between ideas and associated feelings,

> so the isolating person "cannot see the forest for the trees"...The second separation between thought and action occurs when people deliberately dissemble during the dialogue while secretly intending to freeload. (OMG:145).

These are not the normal conditions for moral dialogue. The fact that moral outrage follows inconsistency between means and ends, Haan claims, is evidence that people expect moral actions to follow from promises. This is so well understood that when people do default they rationalise it by claiming extenuating circumstances. Moreover, while emotion permeates all moral negotiation, a morally equalised outcome is accompanied by mutual satisfaction and relief.

Haan gives as reasons for variation in moral performance: (i) moral capacity (what the cognitivists describe as a person's stage of moral reasoning); (ii) aspects of situations, including the content of the moral issue at stake; (iii) moral costs, not only from threats to self-interest, but also from witnessing or participating in threats to others' self interests; (iv) the nature of the interpersonal situation (participatory or not); and (v) the person's characteristic and situationally chosen way of adapting and problem solving.

Development in Interactional Morality

Development is wholly constructivist in Haan's system since the actor as a growing person creates particular solutions for particular moral problems. Development occurs as people improve their grasp of the subtle meanings in moral interchange and come to tolerate conflict. Participation in moral exchanges begin in infancy. The child does not learn fixed moral categories and then progressively integrate and reintegrate these at different stages:

> Instead, moral development evolves from the considerably more situationally and inter-subjectively responsive skill of coming to know how to engage in exchange, to know when, why, and how much to give in terms of others' claims and needs and one's own, when all involved are deserving and all have a future together, invariably interacting and mutually needful and committed to each other. (Haan, 1983b, p.241).

The motivations for growth are (i) practical social experience that helps people realise that all benefit when interactions are moral, and (ii) the social-psychological need of all people to regard themselves as moral (OMG:65). Concern to preserve the sense of self as a moral being is considered by Haan to be an elemental human urge(Haan, 1982). She claims support for her position from Lerner's (1980) study of those affected by accidental death of relatives or friends. Among these people

he found what he calls the "belief in a just world." According to Lerner people need to believe that the world they inhabit is one in which people get what they deserve. Central to the hypothesis is the concept of deserving, which relates a person to his or her outcomes. A person is said to have deserved an outcome to the extent that he or she has met the socially defined preconditions for obtaining it (Cohen and Greenberg, 1982).

So Haan's position is the even the very young have moral concern but that their enactment of it is inconsistent:

> The course of moral development is marked by gradual improvement in practical reasoning, rational consideration of factual details, and the ability to "read" the emotions aroused during interchanges. Children, and adult caretakers as well, understand that increasing age means increasing responsibility for ascertaining moral truth. Along with this knowledge comes responsibility for acting so as to maintain and enhance social relations. In moral dialogue young people are most vulnerable. They have fewer resources, both material and social, to support their discussing, disagreeing, and agreeing as equals. And often children do not really have the resources for making adequate reparations for unavoidable wronging, which all people do on occasion. (OMG:240).

As children gradually acquire a repertoire of successful ways of equalising their relation, they build their moral history. They learn that some people will negotiate in good faith and about the risk and futility of trying to deal with insincere protagonists. The equalisation of relations between parent and child is seldom literal. The person of greater resources makes allowances for the needs of the person of lesser power who in turn learns that he or she must not press all claims, only those relevant to the issue at hand. In adolescence this relationship is redefined:

> This is the time when the young are expected and expect to give up special privilege in moral negotiation with their parents. It is also a time when parents must give up their moral superiority and benevolence to accept - even require - full reciprocity from offspring as their equals. (OMG:241).

So family plays an important role in moral development:

> It is the first and most enduring group to which people belong. Children's experiences with moral negotiation in their families build expectations about others' good faith and understandings about the ways moral disputes are negotiated, conducted and concluded. Children's dependency on families as well as their social experience should intensify the impact of the familial group. Parents indirectly communicate a system of values to their children as they impose rules and exercise discipline. More important, their ways of dealing with each other and their children establist the specific obligations and rights of each member as a separate moral being. (OMG:307-8).

Parents are more or less conscious moral educators. They usually

try to get children to consider situations more exhaustively and resolve them more sensitively than children would do on their own. They suggest options which are within the understanding and power of children to enact. Moral dialogue within families usually involves several members, but even when only two argue, the others are very much in mind.

What educational intervention facilitates development? Haan proposes moral conflict itself:

> It is a full-bodied confrontation with one's own and other's ideas, emotions, and interests within the context of real situations. Because practical reasoning, not classical logical deductions is involved in real moral dilemmas, development does not depend on learned sophistication. Instead opportunities to participate in social interchange, which more likely occur in open than closed societies, are necessary...In the interactional theory, threat or the actual experience of miscarried or failed relations with others (the self's reactions to the self and the other, the other's reactions to the self, and the other's reactions to him or herself) constantly provide social disequilibrium. (OMG:65-66).

Playing moral games with friends is an appropriate intervention since friends, with considerable stake in their future relationships, are especially disturbed when social disequilibrium occurs. There needs to be limits because persistent, drastic experiences that are never mutually resolved can be harmful. People lose their confidence that in this context their self-interests will be recognised and considered, if not necessarily fulfilled. In this way, Haan explains regression:

> In the interactional system, pervasive regression can occur when people find themselves inescapably immersed in relationships of bad faith and their attempts to re-mediate these relationships consistently fail. Even then, people may not totally abandon their moral concern but instead become carefully selective in their commitments to good faith, as the inmates of concentration camps did when they made moral distinctions between their captors and their fellows (Des Pres, 1975). (OMG:242).

Regressive development can be reversed if proper conditions are reestablished, but trust is not easily reconstructed:

> Socially deviant persons are wary about taking the risk that proferred good faith might be authentic. Not only do they require improved social conditions that consistently deliver good faith, but they also need support so they themselves can invent new solutions. (*Idem*)

Haan thus sees improving personal morality as inseparable from developing social morality. Three features of interactional theory make the linkage necessary: (i) contexts work to support (or thwart) dialogue; (ii) dialogues can only be fully moral if all participants

are able to speak their minds, if none dominates, and each can veto; (iii) moral balances are achieved only when the relevant needs and contributions of all participants are taken into account and considered in relation to immediate social circumstances. So when compromises are reached or equalization occurs over time, extenuating detail and human feeling must be taken into account. Public policy makers need to be continuously sensitive to the conditions that thwart effective moral action and be ready to take positive action to ensure conditions that facilitate moral dialogue. Society's need to control selfishness must be matched by its obligation to facilitate and tolerate citizen's pursuit of their legitimate self-interests:

> In fact, on logical grounds, the theory would fail as a description and explanation of morality if pursuit of self-interest were not allowed. Dialogues would not work and equalized balances could not be achieved. Its very sensibility and workability depend on whether people, by their very nature, are willing and able to pursue their self-interests. (Their social experiences account for their willingness to submit their self-interests to dialogues that will determine the legitimacy or illegitimacy of their claims. (OMG:386-7).

Haan admits that in real life some people are unwilling or unable to pursue their self-interest (like the losers in her interactional games). This makes for short or long-term trouble in the psychomoral life. Some people have guilt about protecting even the most legitimate of their self-interests: "People are anxious about their classification (as saints or sinners) and therefore tentative and guilty about their legitimate interests to the point of being unable to insist that their societies be morally rearranged"(OMG:388). People want to regard themselves as moral but social conditions often make less than ideal decisions necessary for both advantaged and disadvantaged. This does not mean the disadvantaged are morally weak:

> Moral violation is an empirical fact of life and always will be, given the inevitable dialectic between one's own and the other's interests, and the self's and the common interest. But even if the moral linch-pin for public policy is not to be the curtailment of individual selfishness, moral violation must still be understood and recommendations made for its alleviation. Moral violation occurs mainly for two reasons: Either truth-seeking dialogues do not take place or they are aborted in anger. Otherwise, dialogues occur but agreements are falsely compromised by knowing or unknowing deception. (OMG:388).

Haan's Research Project

Haan believes that the empirical nature of the social sciences raises a number of questions. There is the problem of using numbers to represent a person's complex processes of moral asserting, reasoning, interacting, negotiating, compromising, deciding and acting. Then "subjects" are objects of researcher's observations, and so not interacting with them in a free and open exchange:

> Investigators reason that the inequality is morally legitimate because research is a special case of human interaction that is made "right" by the subjects' willingness to enter the situation and researchers' own conviction that their project serves the "higher" purpose of enriching human knowledge...The subjects' contributions are often altruistic because the interaction between researcher and subject cannot be fully equalized. The straightforward moral claims that people ordinarily make on one another are temporarily suspended. (OMG:93)

Assumption of a third person attitude of neutrality means that the investigators place themselves in positions of moral superiority as judges of their subjects' moral worth. Assigning scores implies (i) that the researcher knows what morality is and how it should be manifested in daily life; (ii) that a single "score" can reflect the complexity of a person's moral processes; and (iii) that the morally imbalanced relationship of researcher-subject is acceptable. Such lopsidedness undoubtedly affects the data secured.

Aware of these problems, Haan and her associates sought to devise a set of complex research projects designed to learn about moral action in situations as close to life as possible. She reports in <u>On Moral Grounds</u> on a main group of young adults, a smaller sample of adolescents (this group has previously been reported on (Haan, 1977, 1978, 1981)with the sample size growing from 56 to 58!), and a small study of 4-year olds. In the main study 15 friendship groups of 4 male and 4 female young adults at the University of California, Berkeley (average age: 19 years) were recruited. The youth group consisted of 6 groups of 5 male and 5 female adolescent friends from youth centres and church youth groups. The participants were interviewed individually about several hypothetical moral dilemmas, their self-perception and how they saw their friends. Later they participated as groups in a series of 5 weekly group experiences, playing "moral games" that brought them into conflict with each other (OMG:86-88). As a comparison, 2 or 3 friends of each adolescent group were interviewed, while 5 of the young adult groups simply discussed Kohlberg's dilemmas. At the conclusion of the group sessions, all participants were once again

interviewed individually on hypothetical dilemmas and the young adults described their friends again. A further interview regarding hypothetical dilemmas took place three or four months later.

Haan explains her purposes in constructing the study in this way:

> "By observing the group sessions, we expected to learn how moral action occurs in different situations. We also expected to learn more about moral development. The intervening group sessions were expected to facilitate development and comparison between moral scores from the first interview with those obtained in the later interviews would allow us to assess whether development had occurred. The group experiences, which involved either discussion of hypothetical dilemmas or direct moral conflict in games, were meant to produce "cognitive disequilibrium" as well as"social disequilibrium", the two vehicles of development for the cognitive and interactional theories." OMG: 79.

Her purpose was to adopt an approach which lay been naturalistic and laboratory study by creating through games and discussion as natural as possible a moral situation in a laboratory context where researchers could observe as objectively as possible. Haan chose this method because her (1975) naturalistic study of the 1964 Free Speech sit-in participants lacked information about the students before the sit-in or what factors influenced particular action. However, in the laboratory situation, she feels, problems have often been trivial, participants have sought to appear morally acceptable, or the experiment itself has been unethical (e.g. Milgram, 1974). Haan points out (OMG: 91) that it was in fact not possible to limit the students' interests in the experiences to the project, and that most groups had continued to discuss the issues outside the laboratory situation. This meant that her intention of knowing all relevant factors that might bear on moral action was not accomplished

The choice to work with friendship groups was made for two reasons: (i) to obtain a naturalistic setting, and (ii) to provide ethical protection for the participants. Friends in a group provide support and protection for members under moral stress and cohesive groups can disengage themselves from the game and turn their anger on the researcher. Moreover, Haan contends, the friendship group is the natural social setting in which adolescents and young adults make many moral situations. Similar reasons are given for employing games. First, under stress, participants can easily disengage themselves by using the defense that it is 'just a game', despite most individuals usual serious engagement in games. Secondly, games cause people to react one to another and this is as close to real life as research can practically and ethically come.

Haan draws her understanding of games as social episodes from the studies of Garfinkel (1967) and Harré and Secord (1973). She extends their analyses to suggest that people's moral commitment leads to the expectation that others share the same commitments:

> "Networks of moral expectancy are especially clear among friends. In fact, unalloyed moral commitment only makes sense if one's companions are also morally committed. If they are not, prudent self-protection is needed. Nevertheless, when people - even friends - first face a moral problem, they have conflicting views about the legitimacy of one another's claims. The function of their dialogue is to winnow everyone's self-interests to determine which interests are legitimate to what extent." (OMG: 105).

Moral episodes and games are similar in that both have rules of fair operations and a certain inviolability. Haan notes that the common but not always explicit rules of practical moral dialogues seem to be that all may speak, none may dominate, and all participants may veto if they think a proposed resolution violates their own or any other participants legitimate self-interest. People protect and are committed to these practices, as if they were a sacred ritual. If these rules are violated, as they often are, the culprit is penalized not only by the victim, but also by others. The penalty may only be a gradual distancing or even exclusion from the community. However, unlike games, moral interchanges seldom end in a clear victory for one person over another, but usually end in the restoration of balance and harmony within the group.

Underlying Haan's work is the belief that all moral problems are accompanied by the emotion of moral stress:

> "If a moral problem is not stressful, it is not a problem; its resolution is automatic. Moral problems cause people stress because their view of themselves as moral beings and their group as morally functional and sensible is challenged. To think of oneself as immoral and to recognize that others also view you as immoral unbearably threatens one's membership. To continue voluntary membership in a group that one considers morally insensible is to consider oneself a fool"
> OMG: 106.

This belief led Haan to take up Garfinkel's (1967) proposal that the functioning of a group under pressure will expose the basic rules which govern the exchanges of the group and its members. Haan acknowledges that stress is a subjective evaluation, but despite this, she argues, people well understand the general meaning of stress in their everyday life. "The most general, simple, and direct definition is that a situation is stressful because the people acting within it believe it is bad for them"(OMG: 107). Haan points out that stress does not inevitably lead to personal deterioration, but may lead to improved performance. Stress may make people more humanized - humble,

sensitive, tender - but hardy (Kobasa, 1979).
Two types of stress were built into the project: (i) those groups dominated by a single member were identified (other members of this group would be stressed because of the violation of the rules of fair moral exchange); (ii) the two games, NeoPd and Starpower, were chosen (these were deemed stressful because they put friends into moral conflict). It was later found that the game Ghetto also caused stress (for a description of the games, cf. OMG: 85-88).

Haan concluded from her research that consistency of moral behaviour was not present (except in those groups led by a staff member discussing hypothetical dilemmas). Moral situations of different costs had strikingly different effects on the levels of moral action whereas situations entailing apparently similar costs led to similar average levels of moral action. Stressful games in which subjects generated moral difficulties of their own making resulted in lower moral action levels whereas non-stressful games resulted in higher moral action levels. Although discussion sessions produced similar levels of morality, higher levels occurred the closer the hypothetical dilemmas were to students' real-life situation (e.g., female students in the Academic Weekend dilemma). Almost without exception, dominated groups (stressed by the morally violating processes of their nature) scored lower than led groups.

The research generated enough evidence to suggest that the objective contents of moral dilemmas affect moral action. In Haan's words, "moral structure did not transcend content" (OMG:344). When the contents of dilemmas were familiar, subtle and involved little damage to victims, higher moral levels were observed in discussion groups, but the self-directed groups scored more highly when the issues were unfamiliar, remote, and involved damage to the imagined victims. Thus, the objective dilemmas had the opposite results to gaming and discussing: playing games that involved hypothetical issues emergised moral action, whereas discussing moral dilemmas did not, but when the issues in gaming arose from the students' own actions, moral action suffered, whereas, in discussion, the level of action rose in relation to the actuality of the issues.

The individual's personal ways of handling and solving problems

had the most significant effect on moral action levels, whether these were characteristic or less-preferred strategies applied to immediately pressing problems. These personal adaptation were independent of either context - gaming or discussing - or stress - a dominated or led group. Ego adaptations were strongly associated with the students' moral levels. They had more influence in stressful than non-stressful situations, and less influence while the students were adjusting to the novelty of becoming research subjects. Haan says that this suggests that researchers should collect data on several occasions, as people may react to different cues on first becoming research subjects than later.

Effective moral action was almost always facilitated by coping strategies and thwarted by defensive adaptations. Haan sees this as proving the central thesis of interactional theory that effective means and ends depend not only on the level of moral skill and development but also on personal, interpersonal, and social honesty, i.e., a mutually satisfactory processing of "moral truth". The subjects' contingently evoked ego strategies influenced their moral action to a greater extent than their characteristic strategies by a ratio of three to one in both games and discussions. While certain ego processes influenced action consistently in both exercises, only two were common. Both these were defensive and made negative contributions: (i) isolation, which prevented related ideas from being integrated; and (ii) displacement, which prevented disputants from realising that their own self-interest might not have priority by allowing them to negate their frustration by taking it out on others.

Finally, Haan notes, there were some situations which had special meanings for particular students with certain strengths or weaknesses, e.g., in the game NeoPd levels of moral action deteriorated sharply among those with an interpersonally sensitive and cognitively focussed characteristic coping style. They seemed particularly distressed by the moral violations of their friends in the game, whereas those whose defensive adaptations were self-righteous and emotionally detached produced their highest level of moral action here. Haan suggests that this phenomenon may occur even more frequently in real life.

Haan concludes from her research that the separation of abstract thought from action is an artifact of academic scholarship. This leads her to distance herself from the cognitive approach of Lawrence Kohlberg.

Her similarities and differences with Kohlberg, as expressed in her own words are:

> In being constructivist, both theories depend on the power, complexity, and inventiveness of the human mind; they only disagree about what ingredients of mind are relevant to moral activity. Neither avoids the naturalistic fallacy; both are based on an ultimate ground that singles out one preferred morality instead of others. By choosing grounds, both theories are liberated from the scientific stance of remaining neutral about values, so they are able to deal with moralities that vary in quality. Each in its own way distinguishes between good and poor morality. Both agree that the study of moral development is a task especially for psychologists and that an efficient, but not the only way, to understand any phenomenon is to learn how it comes into being; they disagree, however, about priorities: Is it strategic to focus first on action or on development?...Their different views of development and action essentially spring from Kohlberg's model of the moral agent's singlehanded moral reflection and Haan's view of the moral agent's immersion in real and imagined social interchange and conflict. (OMG:73).

For Haan, the distinctiveness of interactional morality lies in these conclusions:

> 1. Moral decisions are created and jointly achieved in actual or imagined dialogues instead of being drawn by single persons from principles or learned generalizations.
> 2. The reasoning involved is practical, not formally logical.
> 3. General self-interest is always a legitimate part of dialogue, although a particular self-interest may or may not be found legitimate in particular dialogues.
> 4. Moral decisions are not always expected to be perfect, absolute solutions; they are often compromises or choice between the lesser of two evils.
> 5. Young children are not seen as moral primitives; they engage in moral dialogues at a very early age and make self-chosen decisions.
> 6. Moral skill, but not moral concern, develops gradually rather than by stages.
> 7. All aspects of people's functioning, including thought, emotions, and motivations, are brought into play during the dialogue and influence eventual decisions.
> 8. The adequacy of moral actions can vary, depending on the contents or dilemmas and demands and stress of immediate social contexts. (OMG:39).

These are the essential features of interactional morality as Haan proposes them.

LISTENING TO THE CRITICS

Areas of Criticism

Haan has set herself two tasks: (i) To criticise the work of Kohlberg and (ii) to provide an alternative theory. Her success at the latter can be judged by her success at attending to the main criticisms directed at Kohlberg's theory, while noting that her work lacks the quantity of research that supposedly supports both Kohlberg's position and that of his critics.

Kohlberg's theory rests on three key claims that are mutually confirming. Reject one of these and it is difficult to maintain the general theory. Few critics (Dykstra, 1980; Wonderly and Kupfersmid, 1980) have rejected all three claims, with most believing that only one aspect is mistaken. Kohlberg's own classification of his critics distinguishes those who question (a) the usefulness or completeness of his account of moral reasoning; (b) the claim of cultural universality; (c) the ignoring of context and the claim of an ethically universalizable notion of moral adequacy; (d) the ignoring of moral emotion or volition; (e) the failure to analyse actual situations and particular social relations; (f) the absence of caring and responsibility from moral maturity; (g) the reflection of historically specific Western capitalism; and (h) the neglect of dialectical forms of moral reasoning at principled stages. As Levine, Kohlberg and Hewer have summarised it,

> In general, the critics have argued that to employ Kohlberg's theory and scoring instrument is to use a normative system which fails to accurately represent the normative perspective of many persons. In addition to this charge of bias is the charge of incompleteness, i.e. that Kohlberg's theory ignores psychologically critical components of the moral judgment process, such as imagination, affect, and a sense of responsibility in specific relationships. (1985, p.99).

So four major themes have emerged: (i) Problems with Kohlberg's definition of morality; (ii) the reality of developmental 'stages'; (iii) the separation of thinking about morality from doing morality; and (iv) the choice of research methodology. Haan makes a contribution to all these matters.

Foundational Issues

When one considers the wealth of criticisms of Kohlberg's work, few attend to a central concern of his: How can a psychologist investigate morality? Habermas (1983) is one of the few who has addressed

this foundational problem. He accused Kohlberg of confusing theory developed on a philosophical basis with theory developed on a psychological basis:

> Even if one avoids naturalistic fallacies, there remains the uncomfortable question of whether, through the interplay of normative ethics and empirical science, there does not after all creep in an element which must prejudge in an unfortunate way the philosophical discussion between rival approaches in moral theory. To the degree that one regards the evidence for an empirical theory of moral development, say Kohlberg's, as sufficient, one also has to make a choice about competing ethics...But then empirical arguments are employed in some direct way in a debate, concerning which philosophy has held, and rightly so in my view, that it has to be settled with another kind of argument. (Habermas, 1982, p.259).

This led Kohlberg to revise his earlier claim:

> In agreeing with Habermas, we have accepted his distinction between the isomorphism (i.e., identity) and the complementarity theses. This leads us to question the truth of the isomorphism claim we made in "From Is to Ought" (1:101-189), but to retain the complementarity claim...that an adequate psychological theory of stages and stage movement presupposes a normative theory of justice; first to define the domain of justice reasoning.and, second, to function as one part of an explanation of stage development. (2:223).

The clarifications of the hermeneutics of the social sciences offered by Habermas have been considered by Kohlberg (2:217-224). Haan (1982) has likewise profited from the insights of Habermas. But each has taken a different course as a result. Kohlberg has continued to insist that a complementary philosophical support must be provided. It is the nature of his proposals in that area which has led to much criticism. Puka (1982) maintains that such criticism is misplaced. Yet as Habermas has pointed out above, moral claims must be judged in terms of philosophical coherence.

Philosophical criticism is directed at (a) whether Kohlberg's concept of justice is adequate and accurately formulated, and (b) whether there may not be more to morality than justice reasoning.

Kohlberg's claim is that he is a member of an honourable lineage of philosophers who have responded to the question of "What is a virtuous person, and what is a virtuous school and society which educates virtuous people?'

> They are the answers given by Socrates; next by Kant, as interpreted by John Rawls's <u>A Theory of Justice</u>; then by John Dewey, in <u>Democracy and Education</u>; and most recently by Piaget, in <u>The Moral Judgment of the Child</u>. Following Socrates, Kant and Piaget, the answer I and my colleagues offer says that the first virtue of a person, school or society is justice - interpreted in a democratic way as equity or equal respect for all people. (1:lxiii)

The difficulty is that all these philosophers meant different things by justice and none were as reductionist as Kohlberg, who can reduce Aristotle's carefully distinguished distributive, commutative and corrective justice, as well as procedural justice, to equity (2:621-23). Indeed, Philibert (1975) questions Kohlberg's understanding of Aristotle, particularly his substitution of the caricatured 'bag of virtues' for Aristotle's proportional maturation of all moral skills, while Nunner-Winkler (1984) has questioned his interpretation of Kant. Spence (1980) and Dykstra (1980) have similarly attacked Kohlberg's understanding of the history of philosophy.

Of interest is the absence of Plato from the contemporary list of predecessors. In earlier writings, he was reckoned a prime influence (1:1-2, 29-31, 36-40, 46-48, 314-315, 395-396), particularly because "I am going to argue now, like Plato, that virtue is not many, but one, and its name is justice" (1:39). While Kohlberg originally tended to simply identify morality and justice (2:184), he now usually identifies justice as one virtue among other moral virtues: "In reality our current position about justice is perhaps as close to that of Aristotle as it is to that of Plato" (2:226).

Henry (1983) points out that 'justice' is not the simple concept Kohlberg seems to think it is. There are other forms of justice than'equity' or fairness (Major and Deaux, 1982; Allen, 1982; Cohen and Greenberg ,1982; Karniol and Miller, 1981). Leventhal (1980) has identified three major problems with equity theory: (i) It recognises the relevance of only one justice rule, the "contributions rule," whereas people often use other rules such as desert; (ii) procedural justice is ignored, and (iii) perceived justice as a determinant of behaviour is overemphasised. There are many moral situations in which little thought is given to issues of justice. Cohen and Greenberg (1982) point out that equity theory also ignores situations where the allocator is not also a recipient, as well as group allocation, i.e., it is individualistic. Hogan and Emler (1981) argue that equity theory is based on the presupposition that those involved are strangers, which plays a small part in human relations which are embedded in a social network of mutual acquaintance and have a past and future:

> One cannot define justice in the abstract because there are no universal features of justice to be abstracted from the various areas of human conflict. Justice or injustice cannot be defined

> apart from the context of action where it might be relevant. Indeed, we would like to suggest that justice or injustice, far from being a universal justificatory principle à la Plato of Kant, exists principally in the eyes of the beholder, that people vary considerably in their disposition to recognize justice-injustice in specific human affairs (Hogan and Dickstein, 1972), and that they differ considerably with regard to what constitutes justice-injustice in each situation.
> (Hogan and Emler, 1981, p.1142)

This comes close to Haan's position that there is a far simpler, but more general impulse than justice, namely an understanding of the inevitable reciprocity and community of social living arising from practical experience which is affected by both internal and external circumstances (OMG: 216-17).

There are also those who claim that Kohlberg defines the moral domain too broadly (Turiel, 1975, 1978, 1979; 1983; Smetana, 1983; Smetana, Bridgeman and Turiel, 1983). They claim that there are three domains: the moral, societal and psychological, which are "distinct, parallel and irreducible types of social knowledge developing out of qualitatively different interactions with different classes of objects, events and persons" (Smetana, 1983, p.132). Whereas Kohlberg considers all thought as interrelated, the domain distinctive theorists consider each field has a unique origin and end-point and develops out of different types of interaction. The moral domain is defined as a prescriptive system, based upon an underlying conceptualization of justice and concerned with others' welfare, trust, responsibility and fair distribution of resources:

> Moral transgressions are considered to be unfair, unjust, to cause harm, or to be categorically wrong; conventional events are considered to violate rules, standards, or norms, or to be inappropriate, impolite, or deviant acts. (Idem)

Even children at an early age are considered to be aware of, and to employ the distinctions (Smetana, 1981). Whether actual situations are open to such clear-cut distinction is questioned (Krebs, 1983). Nucci (1982) discusses instances of conventional events taking on moral significance, while both Smetana (1983) and Turiel (1983) report instances of some children coordinating domains, while others subordinated them. Turiel (1983) says that the ability to coordinate domains appears to increase with age. Kaminsky (1984) has argued that the distinction is artificial: Prosocial intention may be non-moral but pro-social action never is. Staub (1978, 1984) defines pro-social behaviour as "behavior that benefits other people."

For many critics the subordination of concern for others to justice causes concern (Trainer, 1977; Peters, 1977, 1981; Crittenden, 1972, 1979; Falikowski, 1982; Keller, 1984). The accusation may be somewhat of a simplification, but even Kohlberg admits it has some validity. He notes the arguments of Carter (1980) and Frankena (1973) that two principles, responsible love and justice are both required (2:273). Altruism did appear in the early scoring manual as an issue and is currently an aspect of structure - a standard.

Crittenden (1979) pointed out that where Kohlberg has been concerned with a morality of right, most moral thought is concerned with the good, and notions of good and evil are much broader than those of right and wrong. He notes that at times principles of compassion and/ or friendship take precedence over justice. Puka (1979) defended Kohlberg against Crittenden, pointing out that he confused (i) the logic of right with the logic of good which are necessarily separated in the deontological tradition; (ii) Rawls' original position method for justifying stage 6 justice (a macro-level procedure) with Kohlberg's ideal role-taking (a micro-level procedure); (iii) the logic of Kohlberg's stages and the range of theories which support such a logic; (iv) and the various forms of theory used: (a) ideal, (b) practical, and (c) historical. These confusions did not destroy the basic thrust of Crittenden's criticism, which Puka (1983) supports, namely recognition of altruism as a defining principle. Blum (1980) is one of the few philosophers to challenge the dominant Kantian position to argue that altruistic concerns and emotions constitute the moral good. Sichel (1985) has pointed out that as it presently stands, however, Blum's theory is incomplete and inadequate and ignores the morality of rights.

Gilligan (1977, 1982) argued that the distinctiveness of altruism, care and responsible love were neglected in Kohlberg's work. She went on to distinguish between a universal justice ethic and a morality of particular relations typical of "personal" moral dilemmas and specific social group issues and characterised by care, loyalty and love. Hampshire (1982) makes a similar distinction. However Kohlberg points out that these are not two different moral orientations, but are different positions along a moral continuum: "Personal moral dilemmas and orientations of special obligation represent one end of this dimension, and the standard hypothetical justice dilemma and justice orientations represent the other end"(2:232). This, at least,

does away with the dualism inherent in Gilligan's approach. Gilligan (1983) describes morality as being "fundamentally dialectical"(p.35) in the sense of containing an on-going tension between justice and care. This dichotomy needs to be transcended.

Youniss (1981) shows that where Piaget (1932/1965) saw the childhood relationship of unilateral constraint (on which justice morality is based) being replaced in adolescence by rules of fairness and sympathetic concern (the basis for a morality of reciprocity), Kohlberg has only attended to the first stage. Spence (1980) suggests that whereas Piaget, in the tradition of Rousseau, Mill and Dewey, understood that cooperation with peers was required for autonomous moral judgment, Kohlberg has focussed on the skill required for participation with peers, namely role-taking. This has meant adopting the Kantian principle that each person be treated as an end and never as a means. Moreover, Kohlberg has replaced Piaget's actual experience by Adam Smith's "generalized Other":

> By the imagination we place ourselves in (the other's)situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were, into his body, and become in some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them. (Smith, 1759/1965, p.257).

Kohlberg uses Rawls' application of this method to clarify the structure of moral reasoning at its highest stage. In so doing he lays himself open to all the criticism directed at Rawls' position (Hare, 1973; Fishkin, 1975; Kleinberger, 1976; Bloom, 1979; Galston, 1980; Sandmel, 1982; Henry, 1983; MacIntyre, 1981). Crittenden (1979) raises some of the typical difficulties: The choice of liberty as the fundamental good and its fundamental role in the practice of justice (Galston, 1980; Sandmel, 1982, Shweder, 1982), particularly when there is conflict over relative values, including differently valued basic liberties. Rawls' judgment of liberty as the primary good lies outside the scope of justice itself. Crittenden argues that it is necessary not only to consider the demands of justice but the ideals of the common good and the consequences of acting justly. There are occasions when the just way of acting is not necessarily the moral thing to do (Galston, 1980; MacIntyre, 1981). Galston (1980) also exposes the dubeity of deriving primary goods from individual rationaltiy and then using this as a basis for collective principles.

Allen (1982) has pointed out that Rawls is vague as to the specific-

ation of the "other" which can vary along dimensions of proximity, similarity and instrumentality. In the end, the choice of the particular referent lies with the subject. There is no evidence that people in the actual "original position" will act as Rawls suggests. For Dworkin (1977) Rawls fails to explain why, given that the contract is agreed to under a veil of ignorance, it should be executed once one is fully knowledgeable that one is intelligent, rich and powerful. Shweder (1982) points out that the approach fails to specify the particular ways those discerned as needing to be treated in like fashion are to be treated in concrete situations. Nor has the way in which they became disadvantaged in the first place been considered (MacIntyre, 1981). Nor has any recognition been given to the aims and attachments that made the individuals distinctive in the first place.

Nevertheless "projective role taking" is considered an important process in becoming moral for many philosophers (Karniol and Miller, 1981). Projective role taking is presumed to facilitate a number of tasks that are critical for moral judgment: (i) the ability to judge one's behaviour from a spectator's point of view; (ii) the ability to judge one's own or another's behaviour from the point of view of the recipient of the action; and (iii) the ability to judge what one would do oneself in another's situation. While there is considerable dispute as to what is involved in this role-taking, it is generally believed that through it a person learns that any behaviour he or she would not like to be a recipient of is unjust and morally wrong. Moreover, projective role-taking enables us to abstract guiding principles against which situations in the real world are assessed.

Haan looks favourably on some aspects of Rawls' position, particularly the claim that "equality" is a "thin" assumption, i.e., not a matter of strong metaphysical belief (OMG:28, 45). However, on the basis of her consensual view of morality, she criticises Rawls' adversarial approach which "assumes that one party's self-interest is moral while the other's is not, a consequence that can only strain their future relations" (Haan, 1983, p.238). Whereas Rawls believes he must provide some justification for moral motivation, Haan says that moral motives are sufficient in themselves (Haan, 1983). Previously Haan had expressed reservations about Rawls' artificial expository device:

> Real people, who actually choose to place themselves in something like the original position, would have to coordinate much more

> than its hard-core, logical deductions. It would appear at minimum that they would need (1) a grasp of intersubjective human inter-relatedness - in the deepest sense of understanding their own embedment in that network - and (2) an intrasubjective understanding that their own good is inextricably enmeshed in it. These two stipulations involve much more than role taking.
> (Haan, 1977, pp. 108-9).

People are not always clear about what their own good is, either in the long-term sense of their general welfare, or in the short-term sense of securing their legitimate share.

Some critics of Kohlberg consider he has artificially abbreviated moral thought. Fishkin (1984) argues that Kohlberg's Platonic assumption "that in a sense, knowledge of the good is always within but needs to be draws out like geometric knowledge in Meno's slave" (1:46) does not allow for conscientious and reasonable moral disagreement; his requirement that principles be inviolable and that they resolve every question does not allow for the complexities of foreseeability; and his strict impartiality leads to an overload of individual obligations in large-scale social problems. Shweder does not think abstract ideas of morality can help us understand why some people do some things and others other things and justify them on a moral basis. For him, talk, conversation, and the "language games" of everyday life are central to understanding morality:

> One might even hypothesize that moral understandings are tacit understandings achieved primarily from having lived in a distinctive cultural environment which is packed with implicit messages about what is of importance, what is of value, who counts as a person, what are the territories of the self, and which likenesses or differences among people should be emphasized or overlooked.
> (Shweder, 1982b,p.56).

For Shweder the distinction between self-constructed knowledge and socially constructed knowledge is orthogonal to the distinction between rational principles and non-rational judgments. All logically possible combinations occur.

Falikowski (1982) asks whether every moral judgment entails interpersonal conflict and requires the formulation of generalizable prescriptions. Pekarsky (1983) suggests that the first moral skill is in judging whether morality enters the situation at all; if it does, the problem must be categorized, and then it may or may not be a problem of competing moral claims as proposed by Kohlberg:

> To suggest, as Kohlberg does, that the heart of moral deliberation is the effort to decide between competing moral commitments is thus to miss a great deal of what, properly construed, moral deliberation involves. First, part of the deliberation is an

> attempt not so much to solve a clearly articulated problem as it is to understand what the problem is. Second, the moral problems we face do not all take shape as conflicts against situationally competing moral claims. And third, even if a problem does assume this shape, it does not follow that we should accept it at face-value without first trying to dissolve the apparent conflict. Indeed, the choice-situation as understood by Kohlberg is a very late phase of the process of deliberation, into which we enter - if at all - only if we conceptualize the problem at hand as concerning competing moral claims and find ourselves unable to dissolve this appearance. (Pekarsky, 1983, p.18).

Pekarsky states that the usual impetus is to evade conflict rather than confront it. He then describes a scenario similar to Haan's coping and defending: the claim may be nullified by a number of strategies or the imagination used to discover a conflict free resolution. The widened moral process involves consideration of the relation between moral judgment and action which will be considered later.

Underlying all these criticisms of Kohlberg, as Haan has shrewdly noted, is the foundational issue of how psychology can understand morality, given that morality is a philosophical issue (Henry, 1983). Haan cannot agree with Kohlberg's claim that the naturalistic fallacy can be "got away with" (1:101-189):

> This is our problem: Because our calling is to be unrestrictedly curious about life and morality is fundamental in life,we should investigate morality. We cannot sidestep problems merely because they are difficult. But if we do research on morality, we and the public risk losing the traditional protections of our scientific impartiality because research on morality cannot be conducted without some notion of what morality is and that cannot be formulated without grounding it - explicitly or implicitly - on some moral value...Fully grasping the argument concerning the naturalistic fallacy leads one to the basic question of research on morality: What naturalistic fallacy must we commit? (Haan, 1982, pp.1096-7).

Her position is that morality can only be the agreements that people make with one another. Morality is one form of social knowledge: moral traditions and norms are constructed as agreements among people and have no greater objective reality. The starting point for investigating morality is everyday life:

> We fantasize an impossible shortcut to discovering what if any common moral understanding exists. If all persons could be engaged in a thoughtful, sincere, exhaustive discussion to uncover the moral understandings that they think ideally should direct all moral actions the nature of practical morality could be found out. Social scientists could then move on to discover the conditions that support or thwart this morality. Since a universal discussion is wildly impractical, we can only attempt to discover the approximate nature of this morality by observation, taking one step at a time. (OMG: 379).

This is further complicated by the inarticulateness of people about

the morality they cherish: "Psychologically, practical moral functioning is more an embedded emotional experience than an abstraction that can be objectively inspected" (OMG:379).

On these grounds, she is not impressed by Kohlberg's enterprise, which she sees as empirical observation added to the philosophical systems of Plato and Kant, who had moral grounds of their own:

> Kohlberg does not precisely explicate what he means by "justice" - for example, how it is manifested during the early years, what are its rules for transformation from one stage to another, and what is its relation to action. Justice is a charismatic word, as we know from Lerner's (1980) demonstration that people want to believe that the world is just. (Haan, 1982, p.1098).

Kohlberg's methodological error is that of all empiricists: to think that the facts that he observes are the whole truth. The problem is that morality is much more:

> Humanity has always cherished moralities that were not always enacted. Observed moral actions are often only specific adjustments necessitated by the special conditions of a time or place. Therefore, a fact of observation may be only an adulteration of a possibility because it represents only what people must do, given certain circumstances, rather than what they think they should do. What is can only be adequately understood in terms of people's dieas of what should be, and what should be will not be understood without knowing what is. Not to explicate this relation between enacted and cherished morality is naive empiricism. (Haan, 1982, p.1099).

Cases of miscarried, distorted, or pathologically based morality need to be separated from instance in which morality is well-performed. Given the strains of being observed and everyone's wish to appear morally proper, expedient forms are likely to appear in the laboratory. While empirical facts can never generate a moral ground, they may allow, by inference, a closer approximation to the values that all would approve. The moral ground (in her case (a) that people cannot tolerate helplessness, and (b) give only as they are given to) can lead the investigator to judge whether he or she has observed an instance of cherished morality or an expedient form that miscarried under stress.

Kohlberg also erred in accepting as first principles formulations made by philosophers. The problem here is that morality is understood as a revelation to the wise made for the guidance of the unwise rather than an achievement of people in their social living. The difficulty here is (i) that some moral philosophers themselves consider that their study is at an impasse (OMG:44) and (ii) that philosophy has created hierarchies of moral

competence.

> Historically, this abstractionism worked to establish hierarchies of presumed moral capacity, the moral elite being people who talked in abstractions and the moral populace being people who talked in practicalities. This hierarchy of moral worthiness exists even today. The burden for individual and social improvement in morality is still placed on persons who are regarded as morally weak, however debilitating their social circumstances. (OMG:381).

Not only does this involve the implicit assumptions: (a) children are moral primitives, (b) the common person is morally weak, and (c) the practical problem is to transform the moral weakness of the populace; but it also has practical social consequences, such as the disproportion in penalties for blue and white collar crime.

Haan challenges these assumptions. In her words,

> First,...scientists cannot start with a moral judgment about the pristine nature of humanity. Second, people's intelligence in selecting when and to whom they will make moral commitments often results in their failing to conform to official moralities, and the advantaged conclude that the populace is morally weak...Third, history's apparent evidence of human selfishness can represent the populace's situationally specific adjustments to social conditions that thwart moral commitment. Fourth, people's moral interchange is undoubtedly a delicate process that is readily destroyed by stress...Fifth, children may not be as self-serving as is often supposed. They are highly vulnerable to stress, deflected by the self-fulfilling prophecies of their adult caretakers, and especially likely to default morally in interaction with adults because inequity in power and resources marks an adult-child relationship. (Haan, 1982 , p.1100).

Kohlberg's theory is thus rejected because it fits so happily into the long tradition of Western moral philosophy with its search for certainty and impartiality in logical reasoning and its belief that moral superiority rests with the educated male members of complex Western societies. Haan wants to divorce herself from this tradition. Thus, she writes,

> It may seem to readers that our advocacy is for particular groups - the disadvantaged, the powerless, the stressed, and even the young. But this seeming advocacy was to corrent an old error... We gave reasons and evidence why all people can act badly when they find themselves in personally debilitating circumstances and why people who continuously live in such circumstances may act badly more often. (OMG: 5).

Thus, for Haan, it is moral action which is central focus. As we have seen, for Kohlberg, interest in moral action is a recent and subsidiary concern. Haan also argues that development is the second questions that has to be addressed by researchers, not the first, since we need to know what develops before we can say how it develops.

Are there "stages" of moral development?

Kohlberg's claim to having discovered stages in the development of moral thinking has been widely criticised. A "strong" interpretation such as Kohlberg's (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs and Lieberman, 1983) contends (i) that there is stage consistency across situations and testing conditions; (ii) that development is an invariant movement through the stages without skipping any; and (iii) that the stage model describes development cross-culturally.

Locke (1978) has provided the most comprehensive attack on Kohlberg's position regarding stages, addressing him under six headings: (i) that Kohlberg's methodology and research findings imply a developmental continuum, not the discrete, unified, and differentiated patterns of thought required by structural theory; (ii) that invariance has not been demonstrated; (iii) that cultural universality has not been shown; (iv) that logical necessity is not evident; (v) that there is no sign of increased cognitive adequacy, only a decrease in cognitive conflict; and (vi) that increased moral adequacy is not based on empirical evidence but on a philosophical option. Tomlinson (1984) has pointed out that Kohlberg has not addressed Locke's arguments directly. We will consider the issues of universalizability and gender differences separately.

Hauerwas (1981) points out that one of the anomalies of Kohlberg's position is his fidelity to a Kantian moral system which excludes moral development through stages. In Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone (1793/1934) Kant deems any attempt to provide a naturalistic account of "autonomy" a category mistake, since autonomy must be free from all "natural causes". Hauerwas points out that Kohlberg's attempt to synthesise Aristotelian concerns with Kantian categories has left him without adequate conceptual tools to describe moral development.

Levine (1979) discovered three different stage models being used interchangeably by Kohlberg: (i) the "displacement" model (Turiel, 1977), in which when a new stage is acquired the previous one is totally reorganised and ceases to exist as a structure; (ii) the "layer cake" model (Rest, 1979) which asserts that new stages are added to previous stages which continue to remain available even though the highest is preferrred; and (iii) the "non-displacement, additive-inclusive" model (Levine, 1979) which focuses on interaction and performance rather than competence. The difficulty Levine is

attempting to overcome is how people utilizing the logic of one stage can interact with those at other stages.

Some have argued that the stage differences are not logical. Reid (1984) applied Douglas' (1982) grid/group theory to Kohlberg's stages ('grid describes the extent of regulation imposed on an individual, while 'group' refers to the degree of commitment or allegiance to the group) and explains stage-change by movement to a different grid/group position in society. Henry (1983) also argues from a social perspective, arguing that the differing moral levels do not represent different logical structures but rather different ascribed sources of authority. Hogan (Hogan, Johnson and Emler, 1978; Johnson, Hogan and Zonderman, 1981) suggests that personality factors are involved, with those who like and trust other people, endorsing an ethics of conscience (post-conventional level), whereas those who distrust other people endorse a conventional ethics of social responsibility. Dell and Jurkovic (1978) found no relationship between personality and moral reasoning at the conventional level, but did suggest that personality might be significant at critical transition points. Schmitt (1980) argued that it was possible to use Holstein's (1976) and Kramer's longitudinal material to distinguish stages by moral orientation: Stage 1 and stage 4 conform to socionomic or theonomic ethical positivism; stage 2 and stage 4½ are characteristic of individualistic utilitarianism, either hedonistic or eudaemonist, while stages 3 and 5 relied on deontological ethics. This proposal also questioned the invariance of the stages.

Rest (1979) suggested that just as certain concrete operational skills continue to develop after the first appearances of formal operations, so in moral stage development. He pointed out that there was some evidence (Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg, 1969) that a particular stage of thinking seems to appear first as a preference task, then as a paraphrasing-for-comprehension task, then as a spontaneous production task, with one stage difference between each. He suggests (i) that the notion that a person "has" or has not a stage is wrong, since the manifestation of a certain thought organisation is not an "all-or-nothing" matter; (ii) subjects fluctuate, so the empirical confirmation of a stage is only in terms of probability ("25% of reasoning was at this stage"); and (iii) the notion of step by step development is challenged since it is difficult to consider a subject at a single stage when such striking stage mixtures occur (Rest, 1979; Carrol and Rest, 1982).

Regarding invariance, Gilligan (1981; Gilligan and Murphy, 1979; Murphy and Gilligan, 1980) have argued that there is regression in justice reasoning in early adulthood which is part of a post-adolescent movement to contextual relativism, and is better explain-by Perry's (1968) model of epistemological development:

> Where Kohlberg speaks of the order of reason and the conception of the moral ideal, Perry talks of the disorder of experience, the realization that life itself is unfair...He describes a revolution in thinking that leads to the perception of all knowledge as contextually relative...If he is still to honor reason, he must now transcend it. (Gilligan and Murphy, 1979, p.89).

Perry centers the drama of late adolescence on the theme of responsibility, whose entry into the familiar ground of logical justification results in a contextual mode of thought concerned with problems of commitment and choice. Fishkin (1984) argues that the "subjectivism" of the regressors poses a basic challenge to Kohlberg's scheme "because it is essentially a meta-ethical phenomenon, while Kohlberg's classifications are normative ethical."He argues that once this is recognised "it can be seen as a resolution to perplexities rather than as a source of them." He finds Kohlberg's tinkering with stage descriptions does not deal with the phenomenon, because "the same motivation for consistency and equilibrium which, according to Kohlberg, drives reasoners through his sequence of stages, also drives some of them to subjectivism" (1984, p.7). He identifies seven ethical positions: three objectivist and four variations of subjectivism, and finds no reason for these to be relegated to the "purely metaphorical notion of a stage 7"(1973, p.55). Kohlberg (2:440-441) says that research in this area is proceeding and presents a typology which seeks to parallel Fishkin's order (2:442-3).

While invariance is one of the central assumptions of stage theory, it is empirically non-confirmable. Stage skipping is a metaphysical proposition that can never be disproved (Kuhn, 1976; Cortese, 1984). Negation of the claim would require proof that a particular stage never existed for an individual.

Kohlberg considers cognitive development to be interdependent with moral development. He cites evidence from the Kuhn, Langer, Kohlberg and Haan (1977) study. However Nucci (1982) has argued that such correlations do not provide an adequate means of testing the hypothesis of developmental interdependence. He instances a case of high

correlation (0.88) between the classification skills in children and their shoe size as an example of a similar empirical fallacy. He had previously (1977) pointed out that whereas Black (1974) found that formal operations were necessary for conventional moral reasoning, Tomlinson, Keasey, and Keasey (1974) had found that all their College stage 4 reasoners were still at the concrete operational level. Several studies (Damon, 1977; Keating and Clark, 1980) have failed to find any systematic relationship between cognitive level and level of moral reasoning.

Haan, Weiss, and Johnson (1982) investigated the relation between logic and stages. They found that (i) formal logical operations, either as a holistic capacity or inferentially, were not required for moral development; (ii) the Kohlberg scores cannot be accepted as definitive evidence for gating, since (a) when strict criteria were applied, disconfirming cases outnumbered confirming cases, and (b) even when relaxed criteria were applied, disconfirming cases were found; and (c) sample sizes in some cells became small; (iii) both correlational and structural analyses resulted in gender differences in results. They point out that the original Kuhn, Langer, Kohlberg and Haan (1977) study had not differentiated these so the fact that the cases in the confirming cell were mostly male was not noticed. They conclude:

> Altogether these results suggest to us that formal propositional logic is probably not an important factor in moral reasoning or performance in either of these moral systems (Piagetian or Kohlbergian). According to logical standards, the gating hypothesis was not supported because legitimate disconfirming cases appeared. While probabilistic standards were applied to structural analysis as well as to the correlational analyses, the hypothesis that logical levels are continuously required also fell. The results either disappeared when controls were applied (the correlational analyses) or were uncertain (the structural analyses).
> Haan, Weiss, and Johnson, 1982, p.256

They go on to suggest that the influence may be in the opposite direction: Participation in socio-moral transactions may be a precondition of later willingness to reason logically. Doise, Mugny and Perret-Clermont (1975, 1976) had made a similar suggestion. Haan (OMG: 60-61) points out the differences between logic and moral thinking. Unlike logic, moral conclusions are seldom wholly true or false; sensitive to emotions; and concern the future. "Moral decisions are also sometimes wisely "illogical" in yielding to strongly felt but objectively erroneous claims" (OMG:61).

Some critics have questioned the number of stages. We have seen

that the number and content of stages has varied. Haan (OMG:35) points out that at times Kohlberg defends them as exemplifying Piaget's (1970) definition of logical structures, but varies in what is organised in the overall structure, from it being a number of forms of thinking (1:120-24, 136-7), to at other times, it being a single form of thinking exemplifying a different historical moral philosophical viewpoint (1:300-302). Nucci (1982), who subscribes to Turiel's firm distinction between social and moral reasoning, points out that the 1976 description of stage 4 has more "social convention" aspects than moral.

Gibbs (1977, 1979) accepts Kohlberg's stages 1 through 4, but argues that during stages 3 and 4 a second order of thought develops which is not structural in the Piagetian sense, but is purely developmental in the "phenomenological and functional"sense. Gibbs does not find sufficient evidence for the existence of post-conventional stages of moral reasoning. Kohlberg's higher stages (i) do not constitute operative structures nor (ii) are they spontaneous (they appear to be based on education and the intellectual traditions of a particular culture); (iii) they are not commonly found in other cultures; and (4) they do not empirically correlate with the use of similar structures in the cognitive domain. They are thus, Gibbs concludes, metaethical positions, or "soft" stages. Kohlberg denies this:

> What Gibbs calls "existential thinking" at Stages 3B, 4B and 5 we identify as the development of the ability to generate statements about what morality is, to identify the grounds for it in conceptions of human nature and metaphysics, and to justify its necessity. (2:374)

For this to happen, Kohlberg maintains,formal operational thought is required, different from the normative-ethical reasoning of the previous stages.

Haan's view is that"moral skill, but not moral concern, develops gradually rather than by stages" (OMG:39). She is in agreement with Kegan that "persons are not their stage of development; persons are a creative motion" (1980, p.407). Since research requires numbers, she is prepared to provide her table of levels, provided that it is understood that these are "arbitrarily drawn as divisions of a continuous dimension which is more of quality than development" (OMG: 61).

Do the morals of the Harvard Yard apply in Huai-ning?

Vine (1983) points out that it is inappropriate for the ethical theorist to assume a priori that every rationally adequate rule must be universally applicable to every human being; or even that one code is objectively preferable to another just because more or all of its rules prescribe universally impartial treatment of all. A special case must be made out, both logically and empirically, to support claims of universal applicability. Kohlberg claims to have been successful in this. He states his claim for cross-cultural universality of moral development as follows:

> In contrast to both extreme and sociological relativism, I have first pointed out that there are universal moral principles, that there is less variation between individuals and cultures than has been usually maintained in the sense that (1) almost all individuals in all cultures use the same twenty-nine basic moral categories, concepts, or principles; and (2) all individuals in all cultures go through the same order or sequence of gross stages of development, though varying in rate and terminal point of development. (1:126).

This is a muted version of the 1971 original. Snarey (1985) identifies five empirical assumptions here: (i) that research has been conducted in a sufficiently wide range of cultures; (ii) that all cultures define morality similarly and ask the same basic questions; (iii) that stage development is upwardly invariant in sequence and without significant regression in all situations; (iv) that the full range of moral stages is present in all cultures; and (v) that all instances of genuine moral reasoning will correspond to one of Kohlberg's modes.

Kohlberg (2:51) based his original claim of universality on the results of research with children in five cultural settings (the USA, Taiwan, Turkey, urban Mexico and Yucatan Mexican villagers). Cross-sectional age trends were credited with giving supportive, but not conclusive evidence of invariant sequence. The issue of differential rates or the ultimate extent of development in the five groups was not addressed. These three major weaknesses were quickly pointed out by Kurtines and Greif (1974) and Simpson (1974).

Simpson (1974) attacked Kohlberg's theory for its Western bias and failure to appreciate Eastern moral approaches. She accused Kohlberg of suppressing some material from research done in other countries and claimed that when he spoke of postconventional morality Kohlberg used rhetorical rather than scientific language. She claimed that

Kohlberg has missed the profound impact of sociocultural forces and so failed to appreciate that the post-conventional thinker is no more autonomous than the conventional thinker. Kohlberg's post-conventional thinker does not function independently but has been thoroughly socialised into the intellectual liberal individualists among whom Kohlberg belongs. Emler (1983) makes a similar claim.

Kohlberg (2:326-33) has responded to Simpson. He claims that the fact that not every culture has people who arrive at post-conventional reasoning does not invalidate his theory. In fact, though low in frequency, it has been found in Indian, Chinese, Israeli, Japanese, Zambian and Kenyan cultures. To the charge that the linguistic nature of his method may have disadvantaged members of certain cultures, he cites American evidence of a low to moderate correlation between verbal fluency and moral stage (2:329). Anyway the dilemmas and questions have proven scorable in other cultures. In his most recent volume, Kohlberg reports on studies in Turkey (2:582-92) and Israel (2:594-619). The first is in cooperation with Nisan and the second with Snarey.

Snarey (1985) surveyed 45 studies in 27 distinct cultures. Seven studies were longitudinal and 20 cross-sectional. The only local study referred to is that of Moir (1974). Commenting on the breadth of sample, Snarey says,

> The samples...do not necessarily represent societies that are historically independent(e.g., there is no longer a society that has not been influenced by the West to some degree). One also would prefer larger sample sizes, broader age ranges, and more uniformity in the scoring systems. Nevertheless, this being an imperfect world where cultural diversity is infinite and research time and money are finite, it seems reasonable to conclude that the diversity and number of cultures in which Kohlberg's model and measure have been applied are sufficient to evaluate the claim of cultural universality. (Snarey, 1985, p.207).

He feels that Kohlberg's interview, while not culture free, is culture fair when creatively adapted (as in 36 studies). However there are instances of moral reasoning in other cultures which do not correspond to any of Kohlberg's modes. Nisan (2:590) makes the same point. Snarey points out that testers rarely report difficult-to-score material, and he wonders if they even examine non-scorable responses.

Snarey (1985) reported a post-conventional communal equality and collective happiness principle missing from Kohlberg's 1976 stage descriptions. He suggested that if a socialist kibbutz perspective

were applied to the data, results would be different. Chazan (1980, 1983), however, suggests that the morally mature Jew is locked into the conventional level by reverence for tradition. Snarey (1985) notes the absence of the unity of life principle basic to Hindu and Buddhist morality, while Dien (1982) found that certain collectivist moral principles and modes of conflict resolution central to Confucianism were not being tapped. Snarey (1985) reports that some of Kohlberg's criterion judgments were never used among Taiwanese subjects, who preferred to use traditional Chinese values of filial piety and collective utility ignored by Kohlberg's scoring system. When Western and Confucian values conflicted, some respondents resolved the dilemma by maintaining both values within a hierarchy (a Kohlbergian post-conventional form of response). Snarey highlights the absence of the communitarian principle of equal right to happiness,which is so central to life in tight-knit communities such as Israel, Papua New Guinea and Kenya, from Kohlberg's system. Gorsuch and Barnes made a similar observation after their study of Black Caribs (1973). Bergling (1981) in a survey of a number of European studies not covered by Snarey concluded that there was greater evidence of societal values represented by religious and philosophical norms than Kohlberg has allowed. Allen (1982) has argued that the importance of justice differs strongly across societies and across time:

> It would be expected that, in highly materialistic societies, the concern with equity would be very pervasive, because allocation of material goods is easily calculated by objective means. By contrast, other types of goods (such as purity of heart or kindness) are less easily quantified" (Allen, 1982, p.191).

Nisan (1984)found that in his Jewish adolescent samples, while there was common agreement as to primary moral values, there were explicitly declared different orderings of these values predictably related to subcultural background. Nisan points out that ordering of values is part of Kohlberg's description of stage 5 where he suggests it is dictated by structure. Nisan wonders whether this is so, given the philosophical debate about the issue and about the commensurability of values. In any case, prior to stage 5, a hierarchy of values is established on a culture dependent basis.

Bergling (1981) found that the same set of stages was not found in all cultures. Edwards (1982b) notes that the higher stages have only been found in non-traditional cultures (Bergling cites evidence from Italy to the same effect). Harkness, Edwards and Super (1981)

point out that findings from a number of studies conducted in non-Western settings suggest that Kohlberg's stages 5 and 6 are not seen in the small face-to-face communities usual in peasant or tribal societies, nor is stage 4 their dominant stage. Edwards (1982b)argued that the upper stages were not likely to be found in all cultures since they correspond to the modes of conflict resolution of complex societies. Elders in a small Kipsigis community in Western Kenya were found to score conventionally, whereas other tribe members were pre-conventional. Harkness, Edwards and Super (1981) suggest that this was a social function adaptation rather than an individual developmental difference.

Snarey (1985) considers that the distinction is not between Western and non-Western societies, but between traditional tribal or village folk (stage 4 or 5 absent in all cases) and urban societies (stage 5 present, if rarely, but samples were small). Class distinctions were also relevant. In 10 out of 11 countries sampled for class differences, upper middle class or middle class subjects scored higher than lower or working class subjects. He notes that studies using the current scoring manual have scored no one as fully stage 5 before the age of 30 (interestingly, scores from other cultures at all socio-economic levels have consistently ranked higher than North American levels where no one has yet been scored at fully stage 5 before the age of 30).

Edwards (1982) claims that to judge the moral reasoning of one group as more adequate than that of another, without reference to fundamental societal differences, is invalid. She contests Kohlberg's claim that "there is a sense in which we characterize moral differences between individuals and groups as being more or less adequate morally" (1:126) when the individuals and groups being compared are from different cultures:

> The "universality" of the system must be limited to the stages and their sequence, and not to the universality of a single standard of moral adequacy in which higher is necessarily better. Moral judgment stages should not be viewed as "achievements". Rather, they should be thought of as adaptive structures developed by people to handle important problems of social living. (Edwards, 1982, pp.277-78).

Simpson (1974) had made a similar criticism, categorically denied by Kohlberg (2:331).

A number of longitudinal studies have attempted to assess the universality of stage sequence (White, Bushnell and Regnemer, 1978;

Turiel, Edwards and Kohlberg, 1978; Snarey, Reimer and Kohlberg (2: 594-619); Nisan and Kohlberg (2: 582-592)). White and his colleagues found that Bahamaian children generally progressed upward over time with short-term fluctuations. Turiel and his colleagues obtained similar results from a small number of Turkish town and village youth. Edwards (1982b) remarks that both these studies support the Wernerian position of spiraling rather than Kohlberg's position of linear progress. Kuhn (1976) and Holstein (1976) can both be interpreted as supportive of spiral development, which Moran (1983) and Gilligan (1982) argue is a moral logical explanation for the regression reported in all studies (Snarey, 1985) which the structural theorists would ignore, claiming that it can be covered by test-retest error (which Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs and Lieberman (1983) report as 19 per cent on the 9-point scale).

Kohlberg (2:282-7) distinguishes cultural conventions and morality (Turiel, 1980). While morality may be the product of a particular society, when people speak morally they have a universalistic intent. He questions his critics' motives: "We must ask critics of our universalistic theory, however, whether they are advising us how to develop a better universalistic theory, or denying the possibility of such a universalistic approach on relativistic grounds" (2:284). He accuses supporters of cultural relativism of failing to distinguish between cultural and ethical relativity (1:106), between moral impartiality and value neutrality (which he points out is impossible to adopt), and between tolerance and relativism.

Nisan (1984) suggests that moral norms are adopted, as opposed to Kohlberg's position of being derived. He rejects Turiel's position that children at an early age are able to distinguish moral issues and social norms: "In contrast with acquaintance with the moral norms of a foreign culture, the norms of one's own culture are perceived by the individual as representing the objective right and wrong" (Nisan, 1984, p.212). A norm not only transmits beliefs but also helps to formulate social reality, determining new interpretations of behaviour that have clear implications for moral judgment. Commenting on his analysis of Muslim and Jewish (religious and kibbutz) children's moral thinking, he says,

> The analysis of interviews of subjects reaching different decisions although using similar structures(as measured by Kohlberg's stages) helped us to identify a number of components of moral content. These components, of the evaluative and cognitive types, are inherent in the norms and are transmitted by them, and each

> may affect moral choice. These components are "open" in the sense that they are not derived from the moral structure but "filled in" by cultural expectations. Their content is not arbitrary, however, as is shown by the systematic and consistent differences between the groups. This indicates that cultural norms and expectations are the source of these components of content. (Nisan, 1984, p.216).

The higher the stage of moral judgment, Nisan argues, the better able the individual is to differentiate between moral and social considerations. Similarly, more complex moral stages allow one to be less dependent on the literal norm and its implicit components; a broader perspective enables a decision on the relevance of the norm and its appropriateness. Cultural groups do accomodate themselves to the process of individual development by socializing their members through a series of age-graded periods. Snarey, Kohlberg and Noam (1983) have acknowledged that these age-graded periods are correlated with modal stage changes in development in a way that builds on and probably facilitates development.

Kohlberg believes that society at large also follows an invariant sequence in its development: "Not only are the moral stages culturally universal, but they also correspond to a progression in cultural history"(1:378). Just as in modern society we see youthful relativistic questioning as necessary for constructing a post-conventional adherence to the underlying structure of one's own or any society, so in ancient Greece the relativism of the Sophists was the prelude to Socrates' acceptance of the social contract (2:454). In the context of their discussion of capital punishment Kohlberg and Elfenbein (1975) claim that social evolution has been occurring which is reflected in a trend toward ultimately stabilizing moral progress at a higher stage of development than it has been in the past. The authors believe that this is currently being applied to retributive forms of justice, which will increasingly deemphasize penal codes in favour of higher forms of justice in future. Habermas (1979) has gone to some length to relate periods of Western culture to Kohlberg's stages. Kurtines and Greif (1974) have also supported such a relationship. Most critics have dealt with the claim only indirectly under the guise of their attack on Kohlberg's liberal Western individualist stance.

Rosen has pointed out that within the terms of Haan's act-theory approach, universality is not the issue it is in the Kantian-Rawlsian approach to morality: "It is the act theorist's contention

that this is either the empty claim that actions that are exactly alike should be judged alike, or it is the false claim that all actions that are similar should be judged alike"(Rosen, 1980, p.206). Vine (1983) points out that by not accepting universality one counteracts the dangerous potential excesses entailed by reification of particular rules and also resists the debilitating effects of reasoning that one should be "an agent of justice all over the world all the time"(Haan, 1978, p.303). Haan, in fact, differentiates between what philosophers and psychologists understand by the term "universal morality." The former mean that their moral judgments _ought_ to be universally applied, whereas the latter ask whether this in _in fact_ so:

> Despite this distinction, both philosophers and psychologists respond to a common feeling about morality: People often feel that the morality which they espouse is so compellingly correct that it should be universally accepted and enacted. Thus they hope it is in fact universal. (OMG: 46).

The possibility that a universal morality exists is based on the assumption that the problems of living across time and place are sufficiently common to elicit the same moral forms. But, as yet, these have not been discerned. Particularly not by Kohlberg. She found that,

> All in all, cognitive moral activity was frequently associated with situational defensiveness, so this way of thinking seems not to be a practical, sincere way of acting morally. It seems, instead, to represent a special self-righteous, sophisticated form of solving moral problems that reflects the intellectual rhetoric and received wisdom of Western culture. Kohlberg himself (1982) identifies this kind of reasoning with Western democracies, and people are thought to need a fair amount of education to move to higher stages (Rest, 1969). Furthermore the cognitive thinker needs to protect the privacy of his or her own thought and judgment. But when people resort to privacy during a moral conflict, they are likely to be understood as avoiding commitment and even asserting moral superiority. (OMG:367-8).

The nature of universal morality has not been identified, but the task of the social scientist is to discover if it does. "To state a truism, moralities based on parochial or idiosyncratic choices will not be endorsed by all people, since such choices would give the prime advantage of moral superiority to certain groups of people over others"(OMG: 378). She claims this is why people reject cognitive theory: it gives the advantage of moral superiority to the well-educated, to men, and to citizens of industrial society.

Are Female Morals like Male Morals?

Kohlberg's theory has been attacked as biased towards males. Kurtines and Greif (1974) first raised the possibility that the dilemmas with masculine participants might be judged differently by male and female subjects. Holstein (1976) and Gilligan (1977) felt that Kohlberg's scoring system was based on a standard that was biased against women and scored them, because of their strong interpersonal orientation, at stage 3. As Gilligan commented,

> Herein lies the paradox, for the very traits that have traditionally defined the "goodness" of women, their care for and sensitivity to the needs of others, are those that mark them as deficient in moral development. The infusion of feeling into their judgments keeps them from developing a more independent and abstract ethical conception in which concern for others derives from principles of justice rather than from compassion and care. (Gilligan, 1977, p.484).

To sharpen understanding of female moral development, Gilligan investigated women engaged in considering the possibility of abortion (Gilligan, 1977; Gilligan, 1981; Gilligan, 1982; Gilligan and Belenky, 1980).

Gilligan's study raised several related points: (i) she argued that there are two distinct and independent approaches to moral judgment: rights versus responsibilities (this issue has already been noted); (ii)these orientations are sex linked, with responsibility more typical of women and rights more typical of men; (iii) women's patterns of moral judgment are intimately bound up with their self-concepts: concern about responsibility and selfishness are closely intertwined and salient for women in their thinking about themselves and morality; and (iv) women's moral judgments, anchored as they are in concerns regarding participant well-being and the particular consequences of actions, are inherently more concrete and context-bound than are the abstract, rights-focussed judgments of men. She points out that the women in her research, when given three Kohlberg dilemmas, sought more information and reconstructed the stories so as not to respond in abstract terms. She accused Kohlberg of "presenting a single configuration (the response of adolescent males to hypothetical dilemmas of conflicting rights) as the basis for a universal stage sequence"(Gilligan, 1977, p.515).

Kohlberg (2:340) admits that he did not collect any data on women until he began his longitudinal study of kibbutz dwellers in 1969. He denies having ever directly stated that men have a more develop-

ed sense of justice than do women as Freud and Piaget had done, but that in Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) and in his 1970 "Education for Justice"(1:29-48) he suggested that women might be less developed in their justice stage reasoning for the same reasons that working-class men were less developed than middle class males, namely, that their lack of education and complex work responsibility denied them the opportunity of acquiring societal role-taking opportunities (2:347-8). Elsewhere (2:459) he reports a study which showed a significant correlation between education and moral judgment stages for women suggesting that women find role-taking opportunities in educational institutions, but since no correlation was found for men, this would seem to disprove rather than confirm his theory.

Walker (1984) asks how the sex bias in Kohlberg's approach could have arisen? (cf. 2:345-8, for a summary). One somewhat trite argument has been that because Kohlberg is a man he has taken a male perspective, which is met by the equally trite rejoinder that some of his colleagues, including the senior author of recent editions of the scoring manual, Anne Colby, have been women. A second suggested source of bias is that the stage sequence has been constructed from longitudinal data provided by an exclusively male sample (Gilligan, 1982; Gilligan, 1983; Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs and Lieberman, 1983). In the absence of any longitudinal data to the contrary the model must stand. Moreover some longitudinal data (e.g. Holstein, 1976) and experimental interventions studies (Walker, 1982) have used both male and female subjects. A third potential source of bias has been the aforementioned predominance of male protagonists in the dilemmas. Women may have difficulty in relating to male characters and thus show artificially low levels of reasoning. The data here is equivocal: Freeman and Giebink (1979) and Bussey and Maughan (1982) both found more advanced reasoning with same-sex protagonists in a sample of female subjects in the first case, and male subjects in the second. However Orchowsky and Jenkins (1979) found more advanced reasoning with opposite-sex characters, while Garwood, Levine and Ewing (1980) found no evidence of differing responses when the protagonists's gender was varied.

What evidence is there for Gilligan's position? Sichel (1985) finds difficulty in establishing what Gilligan actually asserts. She identifies three forms of the thesis: (i) the moral theme interpretation: moral discourse is found in one or other voice depend-

on context; (ii) the male and female languages interpretation: men and women speak different moral languages because of differing socialization; and (iii) the tension complementarity interpretation: mature development is "the discovery of...(the)complementarity of the two languages (Gilligan, 1982, p.147). Sichel (1985) says most discussants consider only the second interpretation.

On the rights versus responsibility issue, Sichel (1985) argues that Gilligan's distinction is philosophically unsound: While rights belongs to a principle-deontic ethic, responsibility does not belong to the virtue-aretaic type. Pratt and Royer (1982) point out that Gilligan's research evidence is obtained only from women and so cannot address directly the question of gender differences. Golding and Laidlaw (1979), while finding general support for Gilligan's observations of a concern for responsibility among women, failed to find a parallel concern for rights among men. Pratt and Royer (1982), using the DIT, found that there were individual differences in preference for responsibility vs. rights focussed moral reasoning among women. They attribute these differences to sex-role conceptions of self rather than sex. This supports Kohlberg's observation that we are not dealing with a dichotomy here. Pratt and Royer (1982) found that a feminine ideal self in women was related to a greater preference for responsibility-focussed items, whereas little ideal self-concept association with moral orientation was shown by men. In a parallel study, Pratt, Golding and Hunter (1984), using Kohlberg's standard Moral Judgment Instrument found no sex differences in average stage level of moral judgment, save with a small sample of principled thinkers. However, they found what they described as "stylistic differences", with women being more tentative in their usage of highest stages. Smetana (1984) criticised this study for its use of Kohlberg's scoring system to test the inadequacy of the same system, but went on to note that the overlapping of approaches in the results was even greater than the authors had allowed: "Simply stated, men and women are more alike than different in moral reasoning patterns"(Smetana, 1984, p.344). Eisenberg-Berg (1979) noted that Kohlberg's theory tends to focus on the development of prohibition-oriented concern with rights and freedoms of people, whereas young people in their moral concerns focus on "empathic" reasoning about prosocial conflicts unregulated by fixed principles. She suggests that empathic focus may follow a

distinctive developmental path. Gibbs, Arnold and Burkhardt (1984) found that while no stage differences were found between the sexes in their adolescent subjects using the SRM, at stage 3 a significant difference was found favouring females in the proportion of appeals to empathic role-taking (53% vs 27%). There was no support for a rights vs responsibility dichotomy. Indeed, at stage 4, "a significantly greater proportion of females used the basic or society-based rights and values aspect"(p.1041). On the other hand, the authors claim their findings can be construed as partially supportive of Gilligan's claim insofar as the referent for "responsibility" in her writings entails an empathic role-taking orientation. Pratt and Royer (1984) point out the absence of studies with adults in this field. They support that general consensus (Rest, 1979; Brabeck, 1983; Walker, 1984) that men and women are more alike than different in their moral reasoning.

With regard to Gilligan's third point, that self-concept and moral judgment are particularly interrelated for women, Leahey and Eiter (1980) found that sex-role conceptions of the self tended to be more closely correlated with stage level for adolescent girls than for boys. Females with less traditional (more masculine) ideal-self as assessed on the Bem Sex Role Inventory tended to prefer higher stage reasoning. As with Pratt and Royer (1982) the effects for males were less consistent. Pratt and Royer (1984) found that while the ideal self-concept was particularly closely linked to moral orientation for women, real self-concept was less closely related. While general images of the "good" person and "right" action appear to underlie women's evaluation of themselves and of others in moral situations, these are less relevant for men.

Gilligan's fourth hypothesis is that women tend to treat hypothetical moral dilemmas differently than do men. They are inclined to reconstruct issues in a more concrete and personal fashion, and so are more likely to deal with the issues in terms of the welfare of participants, than men do. Murphy and Gilligan (1980) later suggested that the particularistic approach was typical of adults and resulted from maturation. There are few studies of real-life versus hypothetical moral situations (Damon, 1980; Levine, 1976, 1979). Levine(1976) found that situations involving real-life characters tended to elicit more stage 3 reasoning whereas those involving hypothetical others elicited stage 4 thought. He suggested that this was the result of increased concern with personal consequences

in the familiar context. Levine observed no sex differences. Pratt and Royer (1984) were unable to replicate these results. Nunner-Winkler (1984) found age and socio-economic background were more likely than gender to affect consideration of contextual particularities - the older and higher the greater the consideration. Brabeck (1983) reassessed the supporting research that Gilligan called upon and pointed out that it was far from compelling, particularly when age was considered, given the different maturing patterns of males and females during adolescence.

Smetana (1981, 1982, 1983) questioned Gilligan's research method. Unlike most critics who would wish to see Kohlberg's view of moral reasoning broadened, she follows Turiel in distinguishing justice reasoning and social conventional concepts (Turiel and Smetana, 1984). She accuses Gilligan of confusing domains and over-generalising the moral domain by including non-moral stimuli: "What have often been assumed to be moral stimuli were not necessarily judged to be moral by respondents" (Smetana, 1982, p.23). Following Nucci (1982), she considers that individual thinking about personal moral issues such as control over one's body and physical appearance follows a developmental sequence separate from but closely associated with social development rather than justice reasoning development. She concludes,

> The complexity of the abortion question arises from a fundamental disagreement as to whether or not the fetus is a human life to be considered in the decision and, therefore, whether personal or moral considerations should apply. While human life is usually distinguished from other forms of life in making moral judgments, the ambiguity of abortion is that the appropriate criterion for such a judgment is unclear. For those who consider abortion a moral issue, the genetic or spiritual potential of the fetus is enough to consider it a human life of equal value to other living persons. For those who treat abortion as a personal issue, the physical separation of the child from the mother at birth makes the distinction between a person and a lesser form of life. Once the person is not considered a person, social and moral considerations are not seen to apply. (Smetana, 1982, p.135).

Subjects who coordinated the two domains were likely to consider an abortion early in pregnancy a personal matter, later in pregnancy, a moral matter. For them, the successively personal and then moral issues were coordinated by the judgment as to when the fetus became a person. A fourth group were confused or equivocal, unable to conceptualise personhood sufficiently to categorise it (Smetana, 1983). Smetana claims that these forms of reasoning appear to be generalizable beyond the decision-making context, as the same modes were found among never-pregnant women matched in age and among male and

female youths. The distinction is not only found among individuals but underlies the whole abortion debate. Smetana says that Gilligan has missed this point, with consequent confusion in her results.

But contributing to the abortion debate is not Gilligan's main contribution. As Sichel (1985) and Brabeck(1983) point out it is in highlighting one of the myths that has guided empirical investigation of morality:

> Gilligan's theory enlarges the description of morality offered by Kohlberg. The ethic of care that Gilligan heard reflected in the voices of women and which exists in mythic beliefs about women, expands our notion of morality to include concern for interconnection, harmony, and nonviolence. Research results suggest that this enlarged conception of morality may be less sex specific than Gilligan has claimed. Her major contribution rests in a redefinition of what constitutes an adequate description of the moral ideal. (Brabeck, 1983, p.288-9)

This contribution may be greater than her actual empirical discoveries. Colby and Damon (1983) insist that Gilligan does not provide systematic data to support her thesis. They point out that Kohlberg's system could only be accused of gender bias if women scored lower than men. The theory allows for people to progress at varying rates and to fixate at different end points of development because of role-taking and decision making opportunities. Thus women can score lower than men without directly attacking Kohlberg's position.

Kohlberg himself has challenged Gilligan to find "hard" stages in the care orientation like those he has found in judgment reasoning:

> We do not believe that there exist two distinct or polar orientations or two tracks in the ontogenesis of moral stage structures...It remains for Gilligan and her colleagues to determine whether there are, in fact, "hard" stages in the care orientation. If she wishes to claim that there are stages of caring in the Piagetian sense of the word stage, she will have to demonstrate the progressive movement, invariant sequence, structured wholeness, and the relationship of thought to action for her orientation in a manner similar to the way we have demonstrated such ontogenetic characteristics for the justice orientation. (2:358).

Nunner-Winkler (1984) supports Kohlberg. She holds that differences between the caring and justice approaches are not differences in ethical position but differences in emphasis on two types of moral duty. Following Kant, she distinguishes perfect duties, which are negative and focus on the rights of others, and open to "stage" description, from imperfect duties, which are positive and formulate maxims to guide action. She includes Gilligan's "ethic of care" in the latter. Investigating whether females feel more obliged to ful-

fil imperfect duties and males to fulfil perfect duties, she found no difference. From this, she suggests that Gilligan is really talking about ideals of the self and good life related to ego interests, not to moral judgment. Kohlberg (2:360) claims that this is his position.

Walker (1984) reviewed 108 studies in which gender differences were considered and found that "sex differences in moral reasoning apparently are rare early in the life span and, when they occur, indicate more mature development for females, although even these infrequent differences are relatively small"(Walker, 1984, p.681). Similar results were found for older adolescents and youth, but here males showed more mature development. Gender differences in adult moral reasoning were minimal and found in only a minority of studies. Walker notes that all but two (Arbuthnot, 1983; Bussey and Maugham, 1982) of the studies showing gender differences used early versions of Kohlberg's scoring. Both Colby (1978) and Kohlberg (2:343) claim that recent revisions have eliminated the tendency to underestimate the reasoning of women because scoring is now less content orientated.

Two studies not covered by Walker were those of Lyons (1983) who interviewed a small sample of pairs of males and females at a range of ages and considered the relative predominance of justice or care orientations in responses. She found that "in real-life moral conflict, all of her sample considered both care and justice considerations, but use predominantly one mode which is related to but not defined or confined to an individual by virtue of gender" (Lyons, 1983, p.139). Women from their 30s on increasingly consider rights, although they still use considerations of response more frequently than rights in the resolution of conflict. At this time, "care of self" disappears from their considerations. Men maintain greater consistency in their consideration of rights across the life cycle. It is difficult to see how this supports Gilligan's position (as Nunner-Winkler (1984)claims). Lifton (1985) administered his newly developed moral character template and Kohlberg's current moral development interview to groups of College students and adults. He found that sex as a variable was not found in either context. However gender differences were present. Finally, individual differences in moral development appear to parallel individual differences in personality development:

> For both models of morality, moral development is related to the development and integrations of self (intrapersonal() and

> social (interpersonal) identities. For the cognitive-developmental model, intrapersonal aspects of personality correlate most strongly with morality in men; interpersonal aspects correlate most strongly in women. If as Gilligan (1982, p.18) argues, justice is a more intrapersonal moral principle and caring a more interpersonal moral principle, then these individual differences in personality may offer yet another explanation for any differences in moral orientation between men and women. For the personological model, interpersonal aspects of personality correlate most strongly with morality in both men and women. This finding is consistent with the theoretical assumptions of the personological model which views moral development as an interactive rather than a solitary process.
> (Lifton, 1985, pp.330-31).

Haan sees Lifton as confirming her own position in this debate.

Haan (1971, 77) was among the first to question the sex-bias of Kohlberg's theory. She found (1977) that on further analysis of the Kuhn, Langer, Kohlberg and Haan (1977) data that men were over-represented and women under-represented in the formal operations/principled moral reasoning category (78% to 22%). As Walker (1984) points out this sample has been critical in the debate (Haan, Langer and Kohlberg, 1976; Haan, Weiss and Johnson, 1982). For Haan (OMG:100), sex bias is not a feminist issue but a question of universalizability. She points out that the sexes may differ in other ways and instances the greater variability she found in both the cognitive and interactional scores of young adult males: "In other words, the males' moral activity was more mecurial than that of the females" (OMG:99). By averaging the scores it may appear that there is no gender difference here.

When she analysed the Young Adults Study she found that the distinction between cognitive and interactional morality was marked for males but not for females:

> Male students had higher cognitive scores than women on the first and third interviews; no sex differences were found for the interactional scores. Because no sex differences were found for any of the action scores, this finding suggests men are especially advantaged in cognitive performance during interviews.
> (OMG: 362).

From this she concludes that women may function equally well under both cognitive and interactional systems, while some kinds of men may excel in cognitive morality and others in interactional morality (OMG: 200, 359). Women whose interactional scores were higher than their cognitive scores were found to be more capable situationally, being able to tolerate ambiguity, concentrate and explore ideas. Men with higher interactional than cognitive scores performed similarly, but became defensively regressive and vigilant, even suspic-

ious in interpersonal concerns. Men with higher cognitive than interactional scores characteristically intellectualised, rationalised and denied. "It seems clear that men of cognitive bent were habitually defensive and not able or willing to cope with moral problems" (OMG:200).

Did women react morally in terms of caring and responsibility and men in terms of justice? Haan was not concerned with preference here but with performance. She found that high interactional or cognitive scores were more a function of the students' situations than of their intrinsic qualities:

> Students who had persistently higher cognitive scores were often members of dominated groups. In other words, the dominated atmosphere may have stimulated them to use this kind of reasoning. Students who had persistently higher interactional scores were often members of game groups. In other words, when action was required interactional morality was used. (OMG:204).

Cognitive (justice) reasoning may be more useful in dominated stressful situations, whereas interactional morality (caring and responsibility) may be more useful in first person situations. Comparison of two small subgroups of persistently high interactional or cognitive reasoners showed that more women and more members of game groups persistently produced interactional scores, which she interprets thus:

> Interactional morality seems to describe the ways these students acted when their circumstances were optimal and when they could cope. Interactional morality may therefore be the way people prefer to deal with moral problems...Although interactional morality may be closer to the morality that people cherish, cognitive morality may be the method some people use when they are personally threatened...In action situations, the women seemed to use either form of morality, whereas some men who are characteristically defensive, had higher cognitive scores when they are stressed. (OMG: 213-4).

She feels that this is a better explanation of sex differences than the usual supposition that women are morally immature in cognitive morality.

Haan seems to have introduced new issues to the debate. Why men who are characteristically defensive prefer justice reasoning needs explanation. Haan does show that Kohlberg is examining only a particular form of moral thinking, that area in which men score higher than women (OMG: 362).

Haan (OMG: 354-5) suggests that the characteristic defenses of some people make it difficult for them to recognise moral problems as

moral and cognitivists have ignored this in their theory. Smetana (1982) seems to be making the same point: under stress decisions are made according to the meaning of the situation. Yet Haan's (1982) review of Smetana's work accuses her of violating common experience and being "intellectualized and hypothetical" (Haan, 1982, p.880). Haan accuses Smetana of ignoring the context of decisions. Smetana's point seems to be that the moral dimension of the situation is predetermined by an ideological pre-understanding of "personhood". This is an important influence on the moral decision. It is not the only one. To dismiss it is "unscientific".

It is also interesting that Haan has not attended to her sample of Berkeley student activists for information on sex differences. Walker (1984) reports his own scoring has indicated that women were over-represented at stage 3 and suggests that this may have been due to misscoring of the original data. Two recent studies of the activists a decade later (Nassi and Abramowitz, 1979; Nassi, Abramowitz and Youmans, 1983) found that not only are all the previously scored pre-conventional reasoners now principled thinkers (thus confirming Kohlberg's rescoring) but also that women contribute disproportionately to the number of principled moral reasoners among the former activists. Moral reasoning was the only domain in which sex discriminated between the former student activists and a control group.

Are we reasoned into moral development?

The theoretical explanation of development from the Kohlbergian perspective involves the interaction of (a) cognitive development; (b) social role taking opportunities, and (c) progressive differentiation of equilibration. Kuhn, Langer, Kohlberg and Haan (1977) indicated that they were unsure whether there were actually two or three different parameters which could be meaningfully distinguished and assessed between the emergence of one stage and another. They suggested as the most likely hypothesis that

> it is the interaction of different, but partially overlapping, aspects of the individual's structures with different, but partially overlapping, sectors of external reality which leads to disequilibrium, reorganization, and change in each of the domains. (Kuhn, Langer, Kohlberg and Haan, 1977, p.177)

They then suggest that there are actually two kinds of interaction: (i) the interaction of the individual's structures with the structures which constitute the environment, and (ii) the interaction

among the structures themselves:

> The discrepancy between the level of development of the individual's operational structures in one domain and their level of development in another may in itself be a source of disequilibrium, and hence change. Furthermore, each of these processes of interaction may influence and regulate the other. (Ibid, p.178).

Turiel (1972) most notably elaborated the notion of disequilibration of cognitive structures to explain change in moral judgment. A number of short-term experimental studies have utilised the basic paradigm but the findings are confusing and contradictory to date. Carroll and Rest (1982) point out that a major difficulty is that short term studies try to promote change which naturally takes years to show. Fischer (1983) states that the internal consistency of moral stage usage takes a remarkably long time to develop. Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs and Lieberman (1983) say that a new structure of reasoning surfaces first in various dimensions of an individual's thinking and then generalises itself across the moral domain and that this may take several years. Long-term educational studies of several months duration employing peer discussion to furnish disequilibrating experiences have been undertaken but these are so complex that it is difficult to separate out the various influences which may be operating. Carroll and Rest feel that to date no adequate way of determining if "disequilibration" is happening have been devised.

Kupfersmid and Wonderly (1982) discuss the difficulty in obtaining a precise definition of "disequilibrium". They had previously found that individuals of mixed moral reasoning (those hypothesized as disequilibrated) demonstrated no less confusion and conflict than those at pure stages. They did find a sex difference: males in nontransitional states and females in transitional states showed greater personality integration than their counterparts.

The position taken by Turiel implies that movement to the next higher stage typically involves some questioning and some sense of contradiction within the stage at which the subject is functioning. The outstanding indicator of such a sense of contradiction should be a sense of relativism. Turiel (1977) instances 5 cases as longitudinal verification of this. More recently, Fishkin (1983) has claimed that subjectivism is primarily a posture or response to metaethical problems, not a transitional response to normative ethical problems. Colby (1978) had described subjectivists as

"stage $3\frac{1}{2}$" and Kohlberg (2:480-490) as "stage $5\frac{1}{2}$". Elsewhere Kohlberg (2:440) agrees with Fishkin and concludes,

> We have given up calling relativism and subjectivism "Stage $4\frac{1}{2}$" a transitional stage. We do, however, retain our conviction that some form of subjectivism or relativism is a necessary but not sufficient condition for movement to stage 5. This is because a conception of liberal tolerance and universal individual rights represents a Stage 5 principle that presupposes a questioning of the legitimacy of absoluteness of the culture's rule system (Stage 4). (2:440-441).

The types of metaethical or moral epistemological positions assumed by youth and the conditions for their development are being investigated by Fishkin (1983), Perry (1981), Boyd (1980), Broughton (1982) and others.

Most studies of development have utilised peer-groups and peer role-taking procedures in one particular type of peer group only, that of schoolmates (Maitland and Goldman, 1974; Sullivan, 1975; Blatt and Kohlberg, 1975). It is argued that schools create groups of nonkin-related agemates. Given Kohlberg's devaluation of peer function in moral development compared with Piaget, findings in this area may not serve to consolidate his theory. Recent attention has been focussed on school environment - the democratic school (Kohlberg, 1980,1984) - but practical results have been rare (Carroll and Rest, 1982).

One study of adult developmental change is reported. Marchand-Jedoin and Samson (1982) found that adults enrolled in a sexology course underwent change, but that this was more likely for adults at the conventional level than for those at the pre-conventional level. Those at stage $4\frac{1}{2}$ advanced in their general moral thinking but regressed in the area of sexual moral judgments. They suggest,

> The moral structure of Stage 5 is based upon the concept of social contract. Yet the questions related to human sexuality, particularly those of an erotic nature, were rarely, if ever placed in this perspective. Kohlberg and Ullian (1974) noted this difficulty and limited their concern to social sex roles...
> (Marchand-Jedoin and Samson, 1982, p.255).

To place sexuality within the context of social contract requires that one be an innovative philosopher and the authors point out that this is not "the apanage of everyone" (Ibid, p.266). Thus, subjects tended to regress. Gilligan, Langer, Kohlberg and Belenky (1971) found that pubertal adolescents underwent a similar stage regression. Finally, Marchand-Jedoin and Samson found that where (a) people volunteered out of real-life interest, (b) discussed openly and freely, (c) in a group situation there was overall greater development than in a group conscripted to discuss hypothetical dilemmas.

Haan agrees with Kohlberg that people must be disequilibrated in order to develop. One need not cope if there are no problems to face. But they differ both as regards the kind of conflict that is needed and the results. Kohlberg proposes that discussion of hypothetical moral dilemma is an effective moral curriculum (Blatt and Kohlberg, 1975; Hersh, Paolitto and Reimer, 1979). The teacher takes a central role in these discussions, seeking to induce cognitive conflict and expose students to thinking at stages above their own. The curriculum is an effort to develop a person's capacities apart from the social context. Haan (OMG:243)says that this approach ignores the social expectation that the "official" adult knows the correct response, and creates a divorce between discussion and actual resolution of moral situations. She holds that social as well as cognitive disequilibrium is needed. She tested for both.

Cognitive disequilibrium was created through Kohlbergian discussions and social equilibrium through gaming. She reports that the amount of absolute change was small (where one-half of a stage or level was taken as a criterion for change, gain was achieved by 26% of the sample for interactional and 16% for congitive morality, stability by 57 and 70% respectively, and loss by 17 and 14% (note that this last figure is within Kohlberg's claimed limits of measurement error). The adolescents gained comparably with the young adults. Where change was defined more stringently (as shifts of approximately one-and-a-half stages) students who gained or remained stable, cognitively or interactionally, were found to be similar, but the students who lost in each system were not. Losers under the interactional system were characteristically defensive (doubting, denying, and repressing) but initially well liked. Their moral level droppped in sessions 3 and 4 when they were especially stressed. Losers under the cognitive system were also defensive, but functioned comfortably and increased in solidarity with the group, but at the expense of completing the moral task set before them (OMG:362). Stable students were identified by both their friends and ego strategies as people who took intellectual, ascendant, even self-righteous stances. During conflicts they remained uninvolved. Those who gained exposed themselves to conflict and became stressed in the later sessions. Haan concludes:

> Developmental gain was substantially predicted by the students' characteristic tendencies to cope in interacting with their friendship groups' social stress. This interaction also predicted the students' interaction and cognitive development, except

> within the subsample of led groups whose lesser degrees of disturbance did not benefit members' development. Cognitive disequilibrium did not predict development. (OMG:353).

Developmental gain followed vivid, morally troubling experiences, not controlled discussion of hypothetical dilemmas. It requires group functioning that allows conflict to be directly and honestly addressed.

Stage theory does not allow for situational variability. Haan found that cognitive functioning was more affected by situational factors than was interactional functioning:

> This trend was first noticed when the effects of gaming or discussing and membership in dominated or led groups were analyzed alone. Further evidence of this trend was provided by the different ratios of characteristic to situationally evoked ego strategies that we found for each system. A larger proportion of contingently evoked ego strategies supported higher cognitive action scores while a greater portion of characteristic strategies supported higher interactions scores. Differences in the ego processes that repeatedly supported moral action in each system were also consistent with this conclusion. The strategies typifying interactional morality were coping and they generally made large contributions. The strategies typifying cognitive morality were more often defenses; these were fewer in number and weaker in contribution. Altogether these differences imply that enactment of cognitive morality is less predictable, since any ego strategy that seemed likely to handle the immediate situation was often brought into play. Finally, when the cognitive-interactional difference scores were analyzed, all three defenses that are themselves cognitive in nature - isolation, intellectualizing, and rationalizing - were repeatedly used by students with higher cognitive than interactional scores. (OMG:366-67).

According to Haan's theory, people prefer to cope when they can, so defensiveness in well-functioning people is interpreted as an emergency reaction provoked by stressful circumstances. She also found that whereas members of led groups had higher interactional scores, members of dominated groups, which were more demanding, hostile and competitive, achieved higher cognitive scores and used "the rhetoric of cognitive morality" (OMG:367) to protect themselves.

Heated emotion and the stress of social disequilibrium predicted development in both systems, whereas cognitive development did not. In fact, cognitive development was affected more by gaming than by discussing:

> Thus, despite the two systems' differences, similar conditions for development were found. The potential for development seems to lie then more in openness to vivid moral experience than in specific stage of logical competency and comparison with other people's reasoning of a higher stage. (OMG:369).

Haan found one major difference between those who developed in the

two systems: those who developed in interactional morality were distinct as persons before the experiment began, whereas those with distinctive cognitive outcomes were not. But in the sessions, those with different cognitive outcomes acted markedly differently from one another, whereas students with different interactional outcomes did not. Haan thinks that this suggests that changes in cognitive morality result from temporary shifts in motivation due to participation in the project rather than from any real development and highlights a major difference in the approaches: "The interactional system's affinity with the way people are in themselves and the cognitive system's affinity with the way people contingently act"(OMG:369).

Are children morally deficient?

Modern moral theory tends to be written from the perspective of some last stage, as if everyone were already at that stage or at least had it in sight and should be working to achieve it. Most discussion has centered therefore on how to reach the last stage of morality where development ceases. Childhood has been seen as a non-moral or pre-moral stage.

Damon (1977) adapted Kohlberg's theory to young children. He used stories and situations that were familiar to them and concluded that children were more active and attuned to their setting than Kohlberg suggested. He formulated a sequence of six levels to characterise development from ages 4-10 years, but retained Kohlberg's basic position that children younger than six were egocentric, that is, incapable of fair distribution since they could not take into account the other person's point of view.

Siegal and Boyes (1980) highlight the methodological problems in assessing children's moral development and the ease with which extraneous factors, e.g. memory span, may enter. Siegal (1980) is sceptical that any empirical support for Kohlberg's stage 1 can be provided. Grueneich (1982) identified several methodological problems such as the way stories are presented as well as memory-span. Trabasso and Nicholas (1980) also argue that developmental differences in the comprehension of story material will distort observations. All of these commentators and others (Darley, Klosson and Zana, 1978; Karniol, 1978; Karniol and Ross, 1979 and Coles, 1980, 1981, 1982) accept that even young children can exhibit a wide variety of moral reasoning rules if the experimenter knows

how to tap them. Anderson and Butzin (1983) developed algebraic models to represent the moral integration of various informational sources and suggest that four-year-olds are able to integrate moral information and make complex judgments about equity. Krebs (1982) in a survey of research literature on children's distributive justice concludes

> (1) from age 4 to 5 on, resource allocation is patterned after principles of justice, although even among adults, these principles are often bent in the direction of self-interest; (2) the situations that people are in exert a strong influence on the principles they employ; (3) general intellectual ability and justice reasoning affect the ways in which people reach decisions about resource allocation; (4) structures of reasoning change with development, and (5) there is an association between thought and behavior, but it is complex. (Krebs, 1982, p.280).

Shweder, Turiel and Much (1981), Turiel (1980), Nucci and Turiel (1978), Turiel (1983), Smetana (1981) and Pool, Shweder and Much (1981) in pursuit of support for their theory of domain distinction have all produced evidence that challenges the claim that moral sentiment is not available to young children. They suggest that the idea that children lack moral understanding may be a methodological artifact of Kohlberg's requiring justification for moral understandings. Their studies demonstrate the child's ability to grasp a distinction or understand a principle by investigating the child's mode of excuse patterns when accused of wrong-doing, the child's inclination or disinclination to mind other children's business, and the child's ability to be systematically discriminating in answers to direct probes about criteria, or in the application of adjectives of moral evaluation. Smetana (1983) says that for children the rightness or wrongness of moral acts stems from their perception of the consequences rather than from rules or prohibitions concerning the act. This group of writers have found ample evidence of their restricted notion of morality in the young.

Others have examined moral prosocial behaviour. Radke-Yarrow, Zahn-Waxler and Chapman (1983) found preschoolers in natural settings exhibiting a wide range of moral prosocial activity. They conclude that preschoolers are not egocentric, selfish and agressive, but are"exquisitely perceptive, have attachments to a wide range of others, and respond prosocially across a broad spectrum of interpersonal events in a wide variety of ways with various motives" (Radke-Yarrow, Zahn-Waxler and Chapman, 1983, p.484). Eisenberg-Berg and her students have also examined pre-schoolers'prosocial moral reasoning using interviews and a range of dilemmas adapted

for children. The reasoning used by children to justify helping or sharing has been subjected to correlational analyses, factor analysis, and multivariate and univariate linear trend analyses. These were grouped into "orientations," which were then age-related:

> According to the stages, hedonistic (self-oriented) reasoning is the least developmentally mature type of judgment, followed by needs-oriented (primitive-empathic) reasoning, stereotyped and interpersonal and approval-oriented reasoning, and the overtly empathic reasoning. The most advanced stage of reasoning includes judgments based on internalized values, norms or responsibilities, and guilt or positive affect relating to maintenance of self-respect by living up to these values. (Eisenberg, 1982 p.233).

Whereas use of less mature types of reasoning decreased in frequency with age, Eisenberg found that childhood modes of reasoning were used by even the oldest subject, particularly when justifying decisions not to assist another in need. Eisenberg makes no claim for stage status as she found children's thinking quite varied. She found no evidence of Kohlberg's stage 1 authority and punishment orientation in her pre-schoolers, but rather considerable use of his stage 3, needs-oriented empathic reasoning. Stereotyped moral judgments also emerged much earlier than Kohlberg claims.

Haan and her associates investigated the cognitive-developmental position that children are morally deficient by observing 40 four-year olds playing a modified version of NeoPd (OMG:276-305). There was a theoretical reason for her study:

> Since morality is a human construction, the very young can hardly be born either naturally moral or immoral; instead they must be seen as born ignorant of morality. Nor does our study of four-year-olds suggest that the very young are without moral concern due to cognitive limitation (unless one thinks morality is only or primarily, cognition). (OMG:386).

And also an empirical one:

> 1. Our finding considerable variability in the qualities of the adolescents' and young adults' moral functioning, which immediately suggests that moral quality is not tightly linked with age.
> 2. The lack of evidence that logical development (Haan, et. al., 1982) is a necessary precondition of moral development.
> 3. The positive evidence that social, not cognitive, disequilibrium fosters moral development.
> 4. The growing number of research reports that suggest very young children are more morally sensitive than previously thought (OMG:370).

She suggests that cognitive-developmental methodology relies too heavily on young children's verbal responses, while observational techniques give too little information about the way children act when their self-interests are actually at stake:

> We suggest that children may only appear morally incapable

> because they are especially vulnerable to stress - they are inexperienced; they are subject to a variety of situational pressures; they lack psychological and material resources and knowledge; and in any case adult authority decides most issues. But none of these factors constitutes evidence of moral deficiency. (OMG:280).

Haan found that in the game, equalizing solutions occurred in 75% of the child-pairs, reparations in 60% of the pairs. Defaults occurred in 65% of the sessions and betrayal in 30%. At the end of sessions, 60% of partners were still managing to cooperate with each other (compared with 80% of the young adults). The pre-schoolers acted and reacted in the same ways as did the adolescents and young adults to the game, which to Haan means "they had essentially the same experience"(OMG:371). Where they differed was (a) in their lack of sophisticated moral vocabulary, (b) their ability to plan the future, and (c) their trust and willingness to put up with being violated. Haan considers that this last aspect may have resulted from the presence of adult monitors who usually set matters right for children when they are in moral conflict but in this instance did not intervene. There were individual difference in level of moral concern and ability to protect legitimate self-interests among the children, but whether this was due to character or temperament was not investigated. Haan's conclusion is that

> it seems that the moral impulse is learned, understood and accepted very early in life. Development, more specifically, would seem then to occur in building a storehouse of past successful adaptations, greater real power in negotiation, and certainly sheer factual information about the way the world - its people, groups, and institutions - operate. (OMG:373).

Does the family help moral development?

For Kohlberg the family does not play a significant part in moral development:

> From our point of view, however, (1) family participation is not unique or critically necessary for moral development and (2) the dimensions on which it stimulates moral development are primarily general dimensions by which other primary groups stimulate moral development, that is, the dimensions of creation of role-taking opportunities. (2:75).

Indeed, it is the negative influence of families rather than their positive impact that interests Kohlberg. The few studies that have considered the family (Holstein, 1972; Haan, Langer and Kohlberg, 1976; Hudgins and Prentice, 1973) have primarily focussed on the relationship between the moral level of parent and child. Kohlberg and Turiel (1971) held that while social influences were dependent

on familial issues, moral development was not. Holstein (1972) seemingly confirmed Kohlberg's view when she found morally principled parents to be significantly more encouraging of their children's participation in moral dilemma discussions in the home than conventional parents, and to use justice principles in their arguments rather than conventional parents' use of stability of the social order and adherence to law arguments. Buck, Walsh and Rothman (1981) queried whether Holstein's differentiation between parents discussing dilemmas and those who employed a pervasive pattern of child rearing was not artificial. Using the intuitive scoring system, they found that parents at higher stages use different child-rearing methods in moral socialisation situations than do parents at lower stages, and that this was not reducible to social class:

> Principled parents chose compromise as their primary method in 13 child-rearing situations, and conventional parents chose reasoning. However, while the conventional parents chose reasoning, they used lesser amounts of it with their sons than the principled parents, and included their sons less. However, in discussing the son's aggression toward the parent, the relationship was curvilinear, with most conventional parents using either high or low amounts of reasoning. The principled parents encouraged their children more to discuss matters, included them more in family decisions, and in one area (truthfulness) satisfied their sons' expressed wishes to a greater degree than conventional parents. (Buck, Walsh and Rothman, 1981, p.106).

The principled parents gave compromise precedence over reasoning alone, even though they used reasoning extensively. Conventional parents reasoned, but encouraged and included their sons less, thereby shortening discussion. There was considerable contrast between the consistency of parents in their general preferences of approach and their inconsistency in handling specific child-rearing situations.

Two literature reviews of parental and peer influences on children's morality (Shaffer and Brody, 1981; Brody and Shaffer, 1982) conclude that parents serve as model of moral reasoning but that their impact is moderated as children as exposed to extrafamilial models, e.g., teachers and peers, whose moral judgments are discordant with those of parents. As children grow older they have more opportunity to interact with people with different moral perspectives. Siegal and Boys (1982) believe that as the child grows, he or she begins to appreciate and respond to adult rules and to the intentions underlying them, thus increasing their moral skill. Kohlberg has accurately described adolescent morality but he is mistaken regarding children.

Haan (1971) found that principled student activists had been more involved with parents in moral discussion than nonactivists. When subjects of the Kuhn, Langer, Kohlberg and Haan (1976) study were asked about their family contexts, Haan, Langer and Kohlberg (1976) found (a) that although younger (aged 10-15) boys' moral reasoning was significantly related to their parents', correlations decreased with each succeeding age group (16-20, 21-30 years); (b) daughters at no stage related to parents. It is noteworthy that 24% of the eldest group of subjects reasoned at a level higher than that of their mothers and 19% at a higher level than that of their fathers. Shaffer and Brody (1981) point out that we are dealing here with adolescents, subject to far more variable factors than children. Leahy (1981) investigated the development of adolescent self-concept and moral judgment and parents' child-rearing practices. He found that parental practices that emphasised unilateral respect or that were nonnurturant were related to a lower level of moral judgment:

> The importance of nurturance in child rearing in the development of moral judgment is reflected in a number of findings reported here. For boys, a higher stage of moral judgment or postconventional judgment was related to encouragement (mothers), acceptance and encouragement (fathers), and comfort and encouragement (fathers). Similarly, use of nurturant practices such as acceptance and encouragement (mothers) was related to the use of Stage 5A for girls. (Leahy, 1981, p.592)

One aspect of his findings was that parental practices did not always have similar effects on sons and daughters. Thus, paternal control and supervision was related to higher moral judgments and a more positive self-ideal for girls but not for boys. However, the findings were consistent with the rationale that higher stages of moral judgment are related to the reasoning that the self cares for others because others (viz., one's parents) care for the self.

Haan sees families as having an important role in moral development since they provide an important and persistent social context in which people participate in moral dialogues, achieve balances, and develop a set of expectations about others trust. While there were no differences due to family background in the interview-based moral scores of either system, suggesting that previous family background does not provide intellectually capable young people with any particular way of dealing with hypothetical dilemmas, family experiences did provide young people with ways of acting when confronted with actual moral conflict in group situations (OMG:333).

Do we do what we think?

The cognitive developmental approach has not been interested in the correspondence of what a person will do to what he or she says will be done. Rather it has been with the correspondence of maturity of moral thought to moral action. It is argued that moral reasoning influences moral behaviour by providing the individual with concrete definitions of those rights and duties in the behavioural situation. Rather than focussing on the particular behaviour as viewed by an outside observer, the ways in which the individual defines the behavioural situation and his or her choice in the situation are concentrated upon. Kohlberg (2:42-3) had early written that action is a function of individual differences and situational specificities and that neither of these considerations was part of his theory. He argued later (2:197) that moral behaviour is not a proper external criterion for validating his theory. His conviction is that people act according to their development. Turiel and Rothman (1972) suggested that the level of action and reasoning at higher stages were more often the same because more developed structures of thought enabled problems to be more realistically dealt with. Kohlberg wrote, "To act in a morally high way requires a high stage of moral reasoning. One cannot follow moral principles (Stage 5 and 6) if one does not understand or believe in them"(2:202). The thought and behaviour of those at lower stages only match in the presence of representatives of authority or convention. Locke (1980) pointed out that this limits autonomous morality to a few rare individuals at the principled level, whereas common sense suggests that this is typical of all morality. To deal with this problem, Kohlberg now proposes that individuals first make a moral judgment by reasoning (a deontic choice) and then an accompanying judgment as to whether they are responsible. This latter judgment may result from either stage 5 reasoning or by virtue of a B-substage intuition. Action then follows (2:260-62).

Locke (1983) claims that the notion of moral behaviour is problematic for researchers.

> Researchers in both the social learning and cognitive-developmental traditions typically identify some target behaviour, e.g., cheating or juvenile delinquency, as moral or immoral, and then investigate its conditions. But as well as implicitly assuming that what is thus regarded as moral or immoral by the observer, or the observer's social group, actually is moral or immoral, this approach ignores the question of whether it is also so re-

> garded by the individual concerned...There is, however, a further difficulty if moral action is defined as action performed because it is regarded as moral. This makes it true by definition that moral action results from moral cognition - if the agent does not act because he or she believes it right, then it is not moral conduct in the sense defined - and this tautology may make the connection between moral reasoning and behaviour seem closer than it is. For the question remains how far moral thought, judgment, etc. actually do influence behaviour...It remains possible that what people think about morality is one thing, and how they actually behave quite another (Aronfreed,1976; Blasi, 1980). (Locke, 1983, p.12).

Broughton (1978) argued that the question was misplaced since the stages of moral reasoning are structures of thought not predictors of behaviour. Nevertheless Kohlberg does make a claim for a connection beyond that discussed above by suggesting that programmes of moral education can be derived from his theory.

Results from the studies are confusing. Blasi (1980) concluded that the evidence so far "seems to offer considerable support for the hypothesis that moral reasoning and moral action are statistically related" (Blasi, 1980, p.37). The clearest relations were between stages of moral judgment and a form of naturalistic behaviour: delinquency and non-delinquency. Somewhat weaker relations were found between stages of moral judgment and behavioural measures of honesty and altruism. Little relation was found between stages of moral judgment and behaviours in situations that give rise to social pressures to act in ways discrepant with one's moral choice.

Explanations for these variations have focussed on: (i) the reliability of thescoring system (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs and Lieberman (1983) have defended this charge); (ii) the validity of the stage model (we have already discussed this); (iii) the assumptions made by Kohlberg as to the relevance of his moral dilemmas (we will discuss this in the next section); (iv) a failure to consider the role of content-related convictions (Jurkovic (1980) claims that cognitions that derive from subjectively held values and attitudes may be more influential determinants of moral actions than justice stage cognitions); (v) the absence of consideration of affective factors (Jurkovic (1980) contends that many moral choices may be made without recourse to rational moral reasoning or reasoning which reflects stage judgment abilities); (vi) use of "ambiguous and conflictual situations for behavioral assessments"(Turiel, 1983, p.192) which are not really moral; and (vii) the complexity of the situation (Locke (1983) suggests that there is no simple gap between thought

and action, but a double division between (a) theoretical-hypothetical moral reasoning and active real-life moral reasoning; and (b) between this practical morality and actual practice).

Locke (1983) suggests that in the absence of an articulated theoretical account of what connections between cognition and conduct might be, evidence of actual relationships will remain elusive. Locke (1983) suggests that there are 3 ways in which moral reasoning may affect behaviour: (i) by affecting the content of specific moral judgments which in turn affect behaviour; (ii) by affecting the extent to which individuals will be motivated by their moral judgments, and (iii) by affecting the likelihood that the judgments will be seen as relevant to the situation at hand.

Rest (1984) suggests that there are four components producing moral behaviour: (i) interpreting the situation and identifying a moral problem (involving empathy, role-taking, and figuring out how the participants in a situation are each affected by various actions); (ii) formulating a plan of action that applies the relevant moral standard or ideal (involving concepts of fairness and justice, moral judgment, and application of socio-moral norms); (iii) evaluating the various courses of action for how they serve moral or nonmoral values and actually deciding to try one (involving decision-making processes, value integration models, defensive operations; and (iv) executing and implementing the moral plan of action (involving "ego strength" and self-regulation processes). He wants to deny that moral behaviour is the result of a single, unitary process. The components represent the processes involved in the production of a moral act, not the general traits of people. He thus distinguishes himself from Hogan's (1975) five-component model which construes the process in terms of personality traits (moral knowledge, moral judgment, socialization, empathy and autonomy).

Rest does not present his model as a linear decision-making model. Although the four components suggest a logical sequence, each influences the other components through feed-back and feed-forward loops. Dienstbier, Hillman, Hillman, Lehnoff and Valkenaar (1975) manipulated the interpretation of the emotion aroused in a situation (component 1) and found differences in behaviour related to that manipulation (probably due to influences in decision making, component 2). They also suggest that the particular way a person thinks of moral ideals (component 2) influences the interpretation

of aroused affect (component 1). Getz (1984) suggests that people's emphasis on their commitment to a conservative religious ideology (component 3) may stifle their development of use of higher levels of moral judgment (component 2).

Keller (1984) has proposed another model based on structural consistency. She suggests that the process of moral decision making involves (i) defining the situation with regard to the rules and principles that apply; (ii) moral feelings, or awareness of the consequences when these have been violated; and (iii) moral discourse, which is the process of negotiating conflicting claims, obligations, expectations and interests. The definition of the situation is closely related to the person's structural level of interpersonal and moral understanding. But where she differs from the cognitive-developmental approach is in seeing discrepancy between thought and action as the disequilibrium which provides motivational force for a cognitive reorganization rather than a change of action.

Nisan (1984) proposes a moral system consisting of (i) a general structure regarding right and wrong and (ii) an aggregate of specific required or forbidden behaviours, each of which is marked according to a level of seriousness, conditions under which it should or should not be followed, and so on.

> The moral system is activated when a behavior (planned or already performed) conflicting with the principle or a standard is perceived. The operation of the system requires a judgment and choice regarding the appropriateness of the behavior. The complete process may include the following phases: (1) examination of the behavior in light of the general principle (and of intermediary rules; (2) reference to the aggregate of standards; (3) quest for relevant information, as dictated by the principles and standards; (4) re-examination of the behavior in light of the standards referred to, the information, the intermediary rules, and the overriding principle. Each behavioral alternative considered in the situation will undergo this process and will be compared with others. Nisan, 1984, p.220.

Nisan stresses that this model is conceptual and that in practice elements may be ommitted. He is trying to overcome the dichotomy between the cognitivist's understanding of principles and the social learning theorist's explanation of specific norms (Liebert, 1979, 1984). He has found that norms may have an independent status; their effects are not completely dominated by principles; and that there are circumstances (against Kohlberg) when norms dictate what principles are used, as well as the more usual principle interpret-

ing the norm. He instances cases in which changing the site of a moral dilemma and thereby raising the salience of a norm has resulted in change in the level of reasoning. Then again, an individual may distort the information or beliefs he or she holds about a situation in order to conform (either in choice or in behaviour) with a salient norm. Moreover, even after a principled decision that is opposed to a salient norm, the person may feel uncomfortable about it (irrational guilt), which may affect later behaviour. He feels Kohlberg has not adequately recognised the influence of affect, either than generated by social learning (Burton, 1984) or by emotion.

Burton (1984) also wishes to bridge the gap between moral reasoning and action, but his approach is from the social learning rather than cognitive development direction. He takes the position that most prototypical moral decisions are made unconsciously and that a conscious rationale comes only after the action has occurred, and yet the action exemplifies mature moral behaviour. He suggests that there is a developmental shift from primary reliance on direct, non-complex disciplinary practices to greater reliance on increasingly abstract verbal cues (Burton, 1976). As a person's cognitive competence develops, care-givers rely more and more on cognitive rather than disciplinary training techniques. The reasons that are communicated to children as to what should be done, when, where, how and why, happen in specific situations. The behavioural experience has primacy in the development of cognitive reasoning. The negative affect (fear of discipline) continues to maintain moral behaviour over the many instances of non(cognitive)reinforcement.

Blasi (1980, 1983, 1984) presents a model which highlights other factors in moral action. He follows Erikson (1964) in seeing morality as more characteristic of the agent than of action or thought: Every individual from early in growth has a self-image which is both a source of cognitive organisation and motives for action. Identity is relevant to moral functioning in two ways: (i) being moral may, but need not be, a part of an individual's essential self; and (ii) there are differences in the moral aspects which characterise the moral identity of the individual who does in fact have one, and these may undergo change as he or she develops. Blasi wants to connect moral identity and action through the concept of responsibility and integrity: responsibility stresses the

self as the source of "moral compulsion" while integrity emphasises the consistency, intactness and wholeness of the moral self. He adopts a cognitive approach, assuming that it is impossible to understand the moral quality of an action without resorting to the agent's judgment, and that moral judgments reflect the individual's own general understanding of self, and understanding which can and does develop as one matures cognitively and socially. He hypothesises (i) that the outcome of moral judgments becomes, at least in some case, the content of judgments of responsibility; that is, the agent, having decided the morally good action, also determines whether the action is obligatory or not; (ii) that the criteria for responsibility are related to the structure of the agent's self or to the essential definition thereof; (iii) that the motivational basis for moral action lies in the internal demand for psychological self-consistency; and (iv) that moral action will be more likely to follow moral judgment if the person has the ability to stop defensive strategies from interfering with the subjective discomfort of self-inconsistency. In this way Blasi claims to have overcome one of the risks of establishing morality on personality, namely loss of the essential characteristic of being based on judgment and reason. He sees the dilemmas thus: If moral identity is based on natural impulses, egotistical or social, one loses the cognitive basis of morality; if cognition and reason are stressed, one risks losing the person as the focus of morality. He escapes the dilemma by suggesting that the self's very identity is constructed, at least in part, under the influence of moral reasons.

Haan considers moral action is a two-step process of identifying the pertinent moral, personal and objective elements of particular situations and then finding the actions that 'fit' the situation:

> Moral action according to the interactional perspective is not only an end product, it is also a procedure; furthermore it is also oriented towards the future, since people are always concerned about the short- and long-term consequences of their actions. (OMG:340).

She assumes that some moral actions are more adequate than others and that judgments about the quality of different moral actions can be made with consensus and "truth". Kohlberg (1:40) muddies the value issue when he argues that justice is empirically demonstrated by findings that show which stages of moral reasoning are "more mature" because young people are sensitive to moral concern and mature people often act poorly. She does not think Kohlberg will

admit that actions can be evaluated for their effectiveness. Kohlberg is in error when he wants to separate situations of action from abstract thinking about morality:

> When it comes to morality, people do not seem to think about morality. They seem almost always to do morality. All moral situations have costs that arise from three human interests: people's hope that the world is just (Lerner, 1980) and their wish to regard themselves and to be regarded as moral. These interests motivate people when they confront moral conflict. (OMG:339)

Both the cognitivists and social theorists ignore the meaning that people give to their moral practices. For Haan morality is a system of common meanings, but people function within particular situations with particular meanings: "People in conflict use these common meanings, as do outside, third-party observers who can and do make judgments about the moral adequacy of the dialogues and resolutions they witness"(OMG: 342). Meaning enhanced or meaning eroded leads to emotion. She criticises Kohlberg for his neglect of emotion. Not that moral functioning can be reduced to emotion (Aronfreed, 1968). For Haan emotions serve as important signals of moral situations:

> Emotions are almost always part of dialogue, even when the dilemma is hypothetical. While emotion surely does not describe all there is to moral activity, close attention to practical morality indicates that emotion is one of its persistent features. Communication of emotions, say moral indignation, may occur precognitively (Zajonc, 1984) and signal a moral evaluation that is not verbalized or not yet entirely known even to the self. At first emotions put people out of motion. They are overcome with emotion, we say. However when the feeling is negative, people do not tolerate this state for long. They develop motivations that give some direction to their emotion. In moral conflict, first motivations are often heated attempts to defend the rightness of individual moral claims. (OMG:68-9).

People want to feel moral, so they work to maintain consistency between their actions and their self-perceptions and between their moral agrements and subsequent actions. Emotion (guilt) follows discrepancies between these pairs. There are also situations when people do far better than usual in coping with the moral costs and emotional elements of a situation. Moral courage may result if a person is energised by outrage. Haan suggests that it is by studying people's strategies of coping and defending that this dimension of moral performance is understood: "Altogether stress is part of all moral situations that are at all problematic, and stress can work either to raise or lower the quality of moral action, depending on the context and the person's personal resources"(OMG:70).

Haan is thus critical of Kohlberg's present position that people act only if their moral stage is of a particular kind (substage B) or only when they make a judgment that they are responsible. When ever people are confronted with an action they perceive as moral, they act. It is morally adequate processes which ensure morally adequate conclusions. If processes are inadequate, morally adequate conclusions occur only accidentally:

> Ineffective action was not due to lower stage development or lower levels of skill. Instead it resulted from incomplete or warped consideration of the issues, failure to consider all the participant's needs and contributions, obliviousness to the group's processes, fantastic formulations and resolutions, impractical solutions, and false balances that swept disagreement under the rug. (OMG:350).

She found that when the distributions of the cognitive and interactional scores for the young adults and adolescents were compared, the interactional scores were generally higher and of greater range. Agreement was strongest within the range of lower scores but weakest for higher scores. Forty-eight percent of the young adults' interactional scores were one interval higher, compared to 11% for the cognitive scores. This was to be expected given the differences in theories. According to interactional theory, ordinary people are often morally effective (higher scores), and moral effectiveness varies in complex interaction between person and situation (greater range); whereas for Kohlberg only a few people are morally effective and that effectiveness remains the same across situations. However, some similarity between the two scoring systems was suggested by correlations between pairs of scores of .51 for interviews and .66 for session scores (OMG:100).

Haan found that although moral action in both systems was supported by essentially equal amounts of variation from nonmoral influences, certain qualitative and quantitative differences were clear. Effective moral interaction was a function of (i) a pattern of coping instead of defending; (ii) characteristic ego processing; (iii) membership in led and game groups; (iv) a particular set of coping processes that involved (a) free exploration of ideas, (b) concern for others' positions and feelings, and (c) awareness of, but careful regulation of feelings. Compartmentalizing ideas and feelings, cognitive pretentiousness and taking anger and frustration out on others thwarted effective moral action. Effective moral cognitive action was a function of (i) a lesser degree of coping

adaptation and avoidance of defensive strategies; (ii) contingently evoked ego processes; (iii) membership of dominated groups; and (iv) a weaker and less clearly defined set of repeated ego processes that involved (a) logical analysis, (b) the defensive use of self-righteousness, and (c) not taking anger and frustration out on others. She concludes:

> These differences imply that there are three conditions for effective moral action (from the interactional view). The interpersonal situation needs to be egalitarian. The moral problems need to be real rather than hypothetical. Finally, participants' ego processes need to include a liberated intellectuality, concern for others, and experienced but modulated feeling. Effective action was prevented by misplaced feelings and attempts to mute moral concern by distancing and intellectualized formulations. In contrast, the conditions for effective cognitive moral action involved a dominated interpersonal situation, self-protection, distortion of cognitive process, and presentation of the self as morally right. When cognitive morality is applied in action situations, it seems to be in protection of one's moral being rather than a commitment to solve practical problems mutually. (OMG:361).

When the systems were directly compared, several processes repeatedly resulted in higher interactional moral scores: coping concentration, intellectuality, and positive use of defensive projection (by males) whereas intellectualising, isolation and rationalisationn typified students with higher cognitive than interactional scores.

How does one test morality?

The final major field of criticism of Kohlberg's theory is the validity of his research methods. His position regarding the relationship between thought and action requires that hypothetical dilemmas be the object of his inquiry (it may, of course, be argued that the reverse causality applies). This distinguishes him from Piaget who gave priority to action and, while employing hypothetical situations himself, was aware of their limitations: "(When a child)simply has stories told to him, he will be led to make judgments devoid of pity and lacking in psychological insight...whereas in real life he would undoubtedly sympathize with those who from afar he regards as the greatest sinners"(Piaget 1932/1965, p.185). Straughan (1975) points out that third person situations as presented in Kohlberg's moral dilemmas are more amenable to universalisability (as required by his structural approach) than are first person situations. When Gilligan suggested that he should use practical rather than hypothetical dilemmas, Kohlberg found her ideas,

> while interesting, were not really welcome for two reasons. First, the years from 1970 to 1978 had been spent by us in developing a manual for scoring the standard dilemmas...The key to the isolation and classification of moral judgment structure, we thought, was to hold a single-minded focus on reasoning about prescriptive moral judgment(judgments of should or ought)as distinct from the descriptive reasoning and judgments of would) which appear in real life decision-making interviews,such as Carol Gilligan's. The latter, we thought, was grist for Jane Loevinger's mill in studying stages of ego development but not for studying the specifically moral dimension in reasoning. (Kohlberg, 1982b, p.514).

He might also have added that they had a certain nostalgia value, since, as an undergraduate, his professor of philosophy at the University of Wisconsin, Frank Scarf, had used some of them to find out"if everyone was really a utilitarian at heart and related all judgments to consequences"(Kohlberg and Kuhmerker, 1980, p.88).

Edwards (1981) list three methodological crieria for valid moral judgment research: (i) Moral dilemmas must raise issues and examine values relevant to the subject's background; (ii) research procedures must be designed to elicit the "best" or most representative reasoning of subjects. She suggests that oral interviews are better than written for this. Cortese (1984) questions this. (iii) Dilemmas and probing questions must be presented in the subject's primary language. Together these raise the issue of ecological validity.

Yussen (1977) complained that "there has been little effort made to discover the characteristics of moral dilemmas that people themselves deem important"(Yussen, 1977, p.162). Siegal likewise argues that "Kohlberg's method relies too heavily on responses to moral dilemmas which are outside the subject's personal experiences" (Siegal, 1980, p.294). Weiss (1982) found that

> relatively "lofty" levels of moral reasoning were demonstrated by adolescents in the "normative" fictitious-other perspective in which they usually recommended that the hypothetical protagonist admit to an act that had brought about some harm. However, when confronted with an equivalent situation in which such a confession would be self-defeating and painful to the self, those individuals who were less knowledgeable about the processes of moral thought "justified" their compromised, more frequently prudential decisions with uncharacteristic (i.e., non-modal) and somewhat less adequate reasoning. (Weiss, 1982, p.858).

This artificiality of the dilemma situation is the core of most criticism. Hersh, Paolitto and Reimer point out that dilemmas are oversimplified:

> The problem with such dilemmas is their failure to engage people in the richness and ambiguity that real life situations can offer. A variety of ways to approach and solve the moral problem is lacking. Although the questions that follow the hypothetical dilemma are open-ended, the situation itself is a tight moral package; it contains a narrow focus on the rights of the people involved and their outstanding moral obligation or responsibility to others. (Hersh, Paolitto and Reimer, 1979, p.143)

Pekarsky (1983) makes a similar point. Straughan picks up the lack of immediacy in the dilemmas:

> What seems to be lacking in the hypothetical presentation is precisely that feature which would make the real life situation a moral problem - immediacy. It is the immediacy of the inclination (not to get into trouble with the police) which I experience at first hand that creates the moral conflict; it is my own situational reasons, motives, wants and emotions which clash with the principle of truth-telling, and so face me with a moral decision to make. The actual motivational effect, though, of states of mind like fear, love, grief and awe cannot be properly appreciated beforehand. (Straughan, 1975, p.184)

Alston (1971) agrees, suggesting that the cognitive developmentalist must offer challenging or unfamiliar problems, otherwise the subject may fall back on established remedies; they might offer a solution without really reasoning. But insofar as Kohlberg's dilemmas successfully forestall such strategies they underestimate the significance in everyday practical moral problem solving of reliance on practised solutions, tried and familiar routines, and common cultural remedies.

There is the problem of devising dilemmas which are equally relevant to all ages (Siegal, 1982). Rybash, Roodin and Hoyer (1983) found that subjects in their 60s were concerned with conflict between personal behaviour and legal requirements, whereas those in their 70s centered their moral concerns on relationships with family members, particularly in the areas of care-giving, advice-giving and living arrangements. Dilemmas of interest to the first group were irrelevant for the older group. Yussen (1977) argued that the themes of some of Kohlberg's dilemmas were beyond the comprehension of many subjects. Leming (1978) found that his set of "practical" moral dilemmas containing moral conflict situations likely to be found within the life space of the subject elicited a different stage response than a Kohlbergian set. Adolescents demonstrated lower level reasoning in self-involved dilemmas than in fictitious-other ones.

Then there are difficulties with the clinical interview method of obtaining data. Burton (1984) claims that the requirement that a

subject be able to clearly articulate a concept before being credited with it excludes the most common forms of moral decision making, lying, stealing and cheating, which are usually not experienced as conscious moral conflicts or dilemmas. Dykstra (1980) also holds that a person's basic moral orientation cannot be judged on his or her ability to articulate this coherently and comprehensively. Communication of a moral vision cannot be reduced to simply specifying what are considered the relevant facts to be considered in a clearly definable conflict of claims open to the objective scrutiny of any third-person observer and by providing a justification as to how one chooses sides. Rest (1979) too is concerned by the extent to which the subject's linguistic abilities govern gathering of data,and claims the method particularly disadvantages children.

Another major weakness has been the complexity and difficulty of scoring (Kurtines and Greif, 1974; Siegal, 1980; Trainer, 1977; Rest, 1979; Cortese, 1984). This is partly due to the structural view that the clinical method is the only possible reliable mode of data collection. Though the procedure leads to fruitful data there are problems with its utilization, such as lack of standardisation, lack of replicability, difficulties with transcription, interviewer skills, and time consuming and expensive scorer training (Cortese, 1984). The current standard form scoring manual has been "in press" for more than five years. It is rumoured to be more than 800 pages long (Kuhmerker, 1980).

Rest (1979) points out that while the current scoring system has reduced stage mix and so produced "cleaner" results, it has done so (i) by reducing the number of moral issues raised (the original 9 stories used in 1958 have been reduced to 6 dealing with wealth and opportunity issues); (ii) by ommitting criteria that previously caused discrepant scores; and (iii) by applying the "upper stage inclusion" rule which states that where a subject gives a response which matches a criterion concept at a lower stage, but elsewhere in the interview gives material scorable at a higher level, the lower stage scores is not recorded. Thus, as Nicolayev and Phillips (1979) point out, the scoring procedure is weighted to eliminate varieties of stage use in the interests of producing the "pure" moral types most advantageous to Kohlberg's system.

Cortese (1984), in an assessment of current scoring procedures, points out deficiencies in the scoring system such as (i) assign-

ment of guess scores (where a protocol does not yield a single match for the issue being scored); (ii) transposition of interview material (where a subject's response does not match any criterion judgment in the scoring manual); (iii) selectivity (only 1800 possible types of response are supposed to be scored, whereas to be "standard" all conceivable Dilemmas (9) x Issue (18) x Norm (9) x Element (17) combinations of response would be required, i.e., 23, 786); (iv) lack of control for offering socially acceptable response (where scoring criteria require that interview material be viewed and judged as at least implicitly prescriptive by the subject); (v) presumption of sincerity on the part of the subject unless explicitly denied; and (vi) acceptance of absence of scorable material on as many as two of the three dilemmas (since only two of six possible issue scores are required). Moreover, Cortese feels that Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs and Lieberman (1983) overstate the internal consistency of the instrument in allowing a 10% error boundary on a 25% indication of stage. This disregards too much inconsistent stage usage.

Kurtines and Greif (1974) had pointed out that not all the dilemmas are independent in content; some are continuations of previous stories. Lieberman (1971) suggested that certain dilemmas "pulled out" certain stage responses. A stage 4 response to the Heinz dilemma is rarer than for other dilemmas. Haan (OMG:346) says that this is a result of content: The possibility of death usually resolves ambiguity. McGeorge (1974) investigated the consistency of responses of 12-year old males and college students to Kohlberg's nine dilemmas and reports that the intercorrelation between moral maturity scores on the nine situations for the entire sample ranged from .05 to .56 with a median correlation of .37. The current scoring manual may provide different results, but Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs and Lieberman (1983) have not reported any investigation of this issue. Crockenberg and Nicolayev (1977) found discrepancies in results between Form A and B. The most recent claim is a correlation of .84 between forms and an 85% agreement within half a stage (Colby, 1979; Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs and Lieberman, 1983).

Haan's theory leads her to test moral skill in action situations and explore the moral solutions particularly created for each situation. She describes her methodology as designed (a) to avoid the cognitive theorists' difficulty in accounting for action and (b) the

social-learning theorists' impoverished and fragmented view of moral meaning: "We designed the projects hoping to observe moral interaction in situations that were close to the moral action of everyday life"(OMG:338). This involved analysing action in a general ways by determining how links between moral-action thoughts and superficially nonmoral influences affect action. Haan (1975) had determined that there are systematic differences between giving a story character fictitious moral advice and formulating and acting on that advice oneself, and attributed that to the nonmoral characteristics of subjects.

Haan freely acknowledges that her assessment has not been value neutral:

> First, we observed complex situations, and some researchers would surely raise questions about how accurate we were in locating the critical stimuli and relevant responses...Second, our evaluation of the adequacy of action was based on a series of judgments (not simply the presence or absence of behavioral acts) ...Thus, we reconstructed the students' construction of moral meaning. (OMG: 341-2).

Such an approach is usual for those who Kohlberg sees as "soft" stage theorists. Fowler and associates have independently developed a similar methodology to investigate faith development (Center for Faith Development, 1983). This differs from Kohlberg's approach where (i) the specific issues to be scored are predetermined; (ii) the respondent's statements must be matched to statements in the scoring manual; and (iii) more weight is given to the first response. In Haan's system the scorer (i) must understand the conceptualisations underlying each level; and (ii) recognise the central meaning of the conceptualisations underlying each level; and (iii) base scores on the subject's most vigorously stated position. "The procedures for scoring cognitive morality probably optimize agreement between scorers, whereas the procedures for interactional morality probably result in more penetrating views of respondents' moral positions"(OMG:343).

How the two systems lead to different interpretations of the same material is shown by Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg's (1969) finding that children could only reconstruct arguments from memory when these were one stage above their own. For the cognitivist this is evidence of a developmental impulse whereas for the interactionists it is evidence of a basic human desire to appear morally competent. The example is interesting since the Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg

results are widely cited as confirming sequentiality in moral thought and so its Piagetian hard stage nature. A number of investigators (Arbuthnot, 1975; Maqsud, 1979; Matefy and Acksen, 1976; and Walker, 1982) have found that 2-stages above reasoning was just as effective in inducing development. Walker (1982) confesses that at the time he never thought to test the efficacy of +3 stage argumentation. Kupfersmid and Wonderly (1980) found that that +2 and +3 stage comprehension occurred with uncomfortable regularity in the literature. They point out that Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg (1969) had themselves found 28% of their 5th and 6th grade subjects preferred statements two stages above their dominant functioning and could correctly recapitulate the arguments. Haan (OMG:56) cites an unpublished analysis she made in 1974 of the ranking that 145 middle-aged adults made of six arguments (each representative of a Kohlbergian moral stage) they might use if their off-spring had done wrong. 73 percent ranked the stage 6 argument as top or next highest, and 79% ranked the stage 1 argument lowest or next lowest, yet according to their own moral stage on the then Kohlberg scoring system, only two of these people were at stage 5 and none at stage 6. Haan comments, "Whatever stage these people were in, they apparently 'liked' the reasoning of the higher principled stages" (OMG:56).

Haan (OMG:365; Haan, Weiss and Johnson, 1982) also feels that there is a gap between Kohlberg's theory and its realization in the scoring system:

> To construct a means of measuring morality that depends on classic, formal logic so it can seem morally plausible to subjects and colleagues is undoubtedly a very difficult task. Examination of past Kohlberg scoring systems, as well as the most recent one, does not clearly indicate just how logical deduction penetrates the moral scores. Everyday moral decisions ...are seldom made according to the rules of bivalent, classical logic, that is, being wholly true or wholly false.
> (Haan, Weiss, and Johnson, 1982, p.255)

Her point is that the superstructure theory does not seem to appear in the practical infrastructure of the scoring system.

CONCLUSION

When one explanation dominates a field as Kohlberg's theory of moral development has ruled over the psychological study of morality, it is difficult to chart a new path. One always starts at a disadvantage in that, as Haan's work exemplifies, one lacks the longitudinal data, the cross-cultural testing, and the benefit of considered criticism that is available to the master. Her data is sparse, resting on three research projects done over a ten-year period. Further problems arise when one recognises that what the master is saying has some truth: morality does have a cognitive component and some people do resolve moral dilemmas in a purely cognitive fashion; but is not the whole truth. So Haan attempts to both test her own theory and test Kohlberg's at the same time to determine its applicability. The danger here is that Kohlbergian presuppositions take over the whole project.

In maintaining justice reasoning as the central focus of her study, Haan opens herself to what Lerner (1982) termed "the market place" mentality in which subjects are considered according to an economic model. Indeed, there are times when her model of moral dialogue suggests barter. One wonders how "equality" can be the object of her scientific research if she believes that no one value can account for all facets of morality (2:342). Leary (1983) and MacIntyre (1981) acknowledge an irreducible pluralism of such values and concerns. And even if "equality" is considered, Waterman (1983) points out that it is not a unified moral concept, as Haan's own writings show, when at various times it implies literal equality, equity, universality and impartiality. Equality is one aspect of distributive justice. As Houts and Kramer (1983) point out, Haan's proposed consensual validation rests on the key assumption that all parties involved have equal status and, therefore, equal chance for their self-interests (in the case of morality) and ideas (in the case of science) to be included. Haan readily admits that such equality does not exists in society, so one wonders on what grounds it can be said to exist in the social sciences?

Haan dismisses the contribution philosophy can make to the clarification of psychological understandings of morality on the grounds that philosophers have failed to agree as to the nature of morality. Her frustration is not new. Forsyth (1980) refers to an early moral psychologist, F.C. Sharp, who in 1898 complained that his research

was hindered by lack of agreement as to what was moral and what was not. Although, like Haan, entertaining the notion that people, including moral philosophers, are simply incompetent, he preferred and individual differences explanation: a variety of personal ethical systems creates disagreements concerning the nature of morality. Forsyth (1980), Fishkin (1983), Frankena (1973) and Iris Murdoch (in her novels) have all developed taxonomies of different basic views of the moral. Haan herself claims that personality orientations and ego processes determine the different ways in which people approach morality. Why philosophers should be exempt from these determinations is not clear. MacIntyre (1981) suggests that the cause of the contemporary moral confusion is that we have isolated the meaning of moral concepts from the contexts in which they originated, which is one of the criticisms Haan makes of Kohlberg's theory. There is a certain irony in the fact that Haan cites as her ally Anscombe and then suggests as a remedy the work of Hare (1964, 1965) who Anscombe was actually criticising at the time. Nevertheless the point is well made, for as Murdoch said, "if moral philosophy does not give a satisfactory account of what we unphilosophically know to be goodness, then away with it"(1959, p.42). What is at issue is whether current moral philosophy is so unhelpful. Much recent moral philosophy would seem to provide complementary support for Haan's psychological analyses, and recognition and utilization of this would give her theory greater independent validity.

Haan wants to escape the conflict between moral understandings. As Waterman (1983) points out, this is not possible. Moral action is judged either according to deontological or consequentialist rationales. Kohlberg opts for the first approach. Haan's inclination is toward the second. The claim here is that a certain behaviour has moral value because (a) it has certain specifiable consequences and (b) those consequences are to be valued. The former is an issue of fact and is open to empirical confirmation. A psychological judgment can be made here. But the latter assertion is not empirical:

> The adequacy of any statement that some types of consequences constitute a better criteria of moral value than do other types of outcome can only be judged in philosophical terms. For example which type of outcome should be considered most morally desirable: (a) one that promotes the greatest self-knowledge and self-actualization (eudaimonism), (b) one that promotes the greatest good for the greatest number (utilitarianism), (c) one that promotes the greatest improvement in the lot of the least advantaged participants in an enterprise (Rawlsian fairness) or some other? Psychological research can be of no assistance on this point.
> (Waterman, 1983, p.1255).

Haan, in fact, recognises this and opts for Rawlsian fairness.

Strasnik (1979) wonders why a single all-inclusive theory is demanded of philosophers, when it is not required for the rationality of individual decision making. He takes the position that the two contrasting philosophical approaches are contextually sensitive, being more relevant in some situations than others. His assumption is

> that there exist sets of relevancy norms that are indigenous to specific areas of morality. Depending upon certain key situational features of these areas, different standards of rightness will be generated by these norms. This is not to claim that such sets of norms exist for all possible moral situations, so that moral theory is complete. There may indeed exist areas of morality that are not covered by these norms, areas for which moral theory may be indeterminate. Rather, the claim is that there do exist certain situations to which these special classes or norms, or frameworks as we will call them, apply. (Strasnik, 1979, p.198).

It would seem that Haan has discerned the psychological complement of this position with her discovery that in certain moral situations cognitive morality applies and in other situations interactionist morality.

Haan seems to have failed to recognise that Habermas' ideal speech situation is more congenial to her approach than Rawls'"original position." Habermas, like Haan, starts with practical reason. For Habermas, a moral judgment is a manifestation of the use of communicative skills to redeem a validity claim of rightness, which, in turn, is an interactive expression of ego-identity formation. He is intent on showing that the "increasing mastery of the basic structures of possible communication and the correlative increase in context independence of the active subject correspond to a graduated role competency"(Habermas, 1979, p.90). Similar considerations constitute Haan's forms of moral balance (OMG:61). Like Haan, the key to moral development is an autonomous ego which centres on the ability to realize onself under conditions of communicatively shared intersubjectivity (Haan's coping or defending). By 'ego autonomy' Habermas means

> the independence that the ego acquires through successful problem-solving, in dealing with (a) the reality of external nature and of a society that can be controlled from strategic points of view; (b) the nonobjectified symbolic structure of a partly internalized culture and society; and (c) the internal nature of culturally interpreted needs, of drives that are not amenable to communication, and of the body. (Habermas, 1979, p.74).

Such emancipatory competence is described by Haan (1981a) as "coping"

Habermas holds that human action necessarily involves an intentional relation to other people. People in an inter-personal situation act towards each other and themselves as responsible persons (this presupposition matches Haan's presupposition of an intrinsic desire to be moral). An action is rational to the extent that it is potentially subject to a discourse leading to reasonable consensus. While making implicit validity claims for their actions, people are prepared to justify their claims and, if need be, expect to reach and submit to mutual consensus. Here Haan wants to distance herself from Habermas: "For Habermas the ideal speech situation is a means for discovering truth as consensus (not morality)...I mean that equity-promoting dialogues literally occur and that people "believe" in equity...to the extent that they will support equity <u>against</u> their own desires"(Haan, 1983, p.239). We seem to make the same claims as rational people, one dimension of which is being morally rational. Habermas goes on to point out that the fundamental problem in ethics is guaranteeing mutual consideration and respect in a way that is effective in actual conduct. This is the place of compassion. Compassion, in the sense of sensitivity to the vulnerability of others, is integrated into Habermas' theory insofar as it relates to the vulnerability of the ego identity as such. There is no place in Haan's theory for pro-social behaviour. Rather, altruism is seen as a short-term expedient motivated by the desire to establish long-term equity (Haan, 1981 ,).

Paul Ricoeur is another philosopher who has contributed to the contemporary understanding of communicative relations. He points out that communicative relations remain essential throughout life as the means to revise and verify one's moral stand. He redefines autonomy so that it includes individual freedom within the bounds of mutual dependence (Ricoeur, 1973). The subject does not grow out of interdependence because he or she recognises that his or her freedom is conditional on freedom in the other. The relationship of the individual to the group is not treated in Haan's work. Ricoeur also investigates how common meanings are established. While Haan devotes considerable attention to factors influencing moral meaning (OMG:221-233) the approach is static, and individualistic.

The similarity between the work of MacIntyre (1981) and the interactional approach has been recognised by one of Haan's colleagues

Packer (1985). He suggests four ways in which MacIntyre's description of the fate of contemporary moral language parallels his own findings about the conduct of the Young Adult sample when conflicts developed over "burning" - the breaking of the agreement to cooperate in the NeoPd game. First, both accounts find it necessary to distinguish what is said from the way it is said. Second, both accounts found similar characteristics in moral disagreement: an absence of resolution, an appeal to objective criteria of right and wrong, and adoption of an indignant self-righteousness. There were also common characteristics in the way moral statements were made: moral disagreements express people's competing interests, so there is no way of deciding between claims as there is with those based on need or legitimate entitlement. Finally, in both descriptions a certain amount of covering up in the relationship between practice and content occurs, so that the conflict is talked about as factual rather than evaluative. Packer points out that such distortion is not a deliberate attempt to mislead for participants are genuinely unaware of the way their position and interests structure their understanding of events. Habermas has written extensively on this last point. Haan has not integrated this material into her theory yet. Packer concludes by identifying his differences with MacIntyre. While MacIntyre attributes the covering-up to moral decline and rationalisation, Packer attributes it to emotion. And whereas the latter thinks unmasking can occur when individuals in actual conflicts call each other to account for their actions, the former sees this as the task of the philosopher. The differences are more apparent than real, since Packer is dealing on the micro-level, while MacIntyre is making a cultural judgment.

Haan's insight is that there is more to morality than the cognitivists propose, and that the "more" is interactional morality. Is it not possible that morality involves more than those matters to which the cognitivists and interactionists attend? Crittenden (1972)asked Kohlberg whether morality was always reducible to conflict between competing moral demands, and the same question can be addressed to Haan. Her analysis fails to deal adequately with issues like dignity (beyond the desire of all to consider themselves moral) and accountability. She neglects the function of the moral imagination, to which the writings of Sesonske should have directed her. Ricoeur (1973) has discussed how the imagination enables us to suspend judgment in situations of moral conflict and approach the establishment of con-

sensus from a previously untried approach. Imagination is not at odds with another neglected aspect of morality, character. To talk of moral character implies a consistency, stability to people's conduct but not a rigidity. Haan has rightly diagnosed that people possess inclinations to behave in one way rather than another. The cumulative force of these inclinations expresses their character. Character further addresses an aspect of ethics not expressed by Haan's approach: that one does not have to replay the moral dialogue every time one returns to a piece of significant action. Rather, we learn from experience, and such learning not only becomes part of our ego-adaptive system, but also becomes part of the moral process itself.

Haan seems to have followed Kohlberg in confusing habit and virtue (O'Leary, 1981). Habit is when one acts in the same way irrespect- of context, whereas virtue is the capability to act appropriately in the context. Both Sandmel (1982) and Hauerwas (1981) argued that it is Kohlberg's deontological position which necessitates his reject- ion of virtue. Haan's consequentionalist position together with her interest in the sense of moral worth should make the writings on character and virtue presently being undertaken attractive. Hauerwas (1981) describes character as being formed by personal narrative or history. It is the imagination which shapes our self-understanding and our assumptions about the nature of things and our place in them. MacIntyre says that it is impossible to evaluate any individ- ual moral decision when it is taken out of its narrative context. We act out of a larger wholeness which our personal narrative enables us to consider. That personal narrative is in psychological terms the history of the ego.

Haan has recognised that individual moral activity cannot be abstract- ed from the social environment, but has failed to capitalise on contemporary understandings of group dynamics and interactions (Sherif, 1966; Israel, 1972; Breakwell, 1983). She has not accepted the need to consider the behaviour of individuals acting as group members differently from their behaviour as autonomous individuals, so Moral Judgment Interview scores are compared with Friendship Group scores. Group theory distinguishes (i) autonomous individual behaviour; (ii) the behaviour of an individual as a group member when not acting in unison with the group; (iii) the behaviour of an individual as a group member; and (iv) the behaviour of groups

in relation to other groups. These subtleties have surprisingly not been controlled for, despite a concern for the nature of the groups as a totality. The moral ideology of the group, encapsuled in its rhetoric, sets the bounds of legitimate action; it establishes codes of practice, one of which Haan has examined: moral dialogue. Mikula and Schwinger (1978) identify a "politeness" ritual operating as well, whereby group members allocate more to their partners than themselves. They argue that this is as critical as Haan's perception of moral self-worth appears to be. It must be asked whether these interact in the group situation and what is the effect on moral dialogue. Haan does not discuss these questions. She has not told us how friendship groups came into being or their fate (with the exception of one group which was later discovered to have been in the process of breaking up at the time of the research (OMG:195)).

The use of groups raises a raft of methodological questions. Haan has been aware of some, but ignored others. Greenberg and Cohen (1982) found that the depth of moral dialogue decreases as one moves from stranger through friends to spouse and eventually to self. Haan does not investigate how intimacy and interdependence affect the quality of moral dialogue. Krebs (1982) argues that justice as equity is replaced by altruism as one moves from competitive games with strangers to intra-familial relationships. Generative group effects have been obtained using the DIT (Nichols and Day, 1982; Dickinson and Gabriel, 1982).

Haan (1982a) excludes altruism from morality because it fails to produce moral balance: the receiver becomes obligated while the giver becomes morally superior. Such a view is surprising from someone who holds that one must not let the theory define what morality is and then judge people by it. The "common sense" view is that altruism is a moral value. Haan's position would seem to be the application of an economic model. This is reinforced when she considers social welfare:

> Failure to understand morality is balanced reciprocity is an endemic blindness of the welfare state, which gives gifts instead of right to participate in legitimate and rewarded work. Gifts so disrupt interpersonal relationships that giving in most cultures is protectively ritualized to avoid later complications. (Haan, 1982a, p.1103).

Whether recipients of welfare see their support a gift or a matter of rights depends on ideology. From her perspective, "altruistic gifts set up a dynamic of obligation and degradation for receivers

and enhanced moral superiority for those sufficiently advantaged to give"(OMG:382). This avoids exposing the rich to dialogue with the poor:

> The advantaged have historically been provided with a justification for avoiding dialogue with the poor. Since the powerless have continuously been classified as morally weak, dialogue with them is thought to be neither required nor worthwhile. So the advantaged typically alleviate their guilt by benevolence. (OMG:390)

This strategy has three results: (i) The disadvantaged are forced into the role of recipient rather than participant; (ii) the advantaged hold themselves at a distance, thereby assuaging their malaise with the rightness of their gifts; (iii) they are relieved from the risks and self-exposure of authentic dialogue. Since the elite have their moral answers at hand, then have no need to become participants. She found confirmation of this in the reactions of the adolescents to the Humanus game. Black youths admitted the possibly contaminated survivor on the basis that life is a risk, whereas white adolescents excluded him on the basis of the abstract "responsibility to continue the human race." While her criticism is appropriate if directed at liberal arguments for social welfare, there are other bases on which "gifting" can be considered. Krebs (1982) provides a number of examples in which gratuitous favours enhanced recipient's self-worth and it may signal a readiness to commence participation rather than a maintenance of subordination.

Haan has, however, identified an important dimension of moral theory: its social implications. She highlights the need for a society in which participation and dialogue is available to all members. She quotes with approval the work of the Latin American liberation theologians, Gustavo Guttierez and Luis Segundo (OMG:379-80; 387-8) in laying down the outlines of such a society. While she would reject the "religious" approach to morality, her values come very close to those of the "biblical" understanding of justice as outlined by Maguire (1983) in contrast to the"American" approach of Kohlberg.

Kohlberg has adopted a limited view of morality and judged people on it. He has been more concerned to fit morality to a particular model of Piagetian stages than assess it as it really is. Haan's criticism are valuable in they expose Kohlberg's presuppositions, and expose some of the weakenesses of his paradigm. Because it is the dominant paradigm, Haan's own work is always in danger of slip-

ping uncritically into accepting aspects of the cognitive approach. Morality cannot be limited to playing games just as much as it cannot be limited to solving dilemmas. Both will expose important elements of morality, but still more remains unexamined. The complexity of the methodology in both systems limits their usefulness as tools for more general examination of morality. Haan's work needs to be extended to consider how school children and adults interact and so provide an empirical warrant for her levels of moral skill. Insofar as she has identified further determinants of how people make moral decisions and bring them to fruition, she has made a valuable contribution.

Appendix A

Model of the Relationship of Moral Judgment to Moral Action



Appendix B

Taxonomy and Examples of Ego Processes[a]

Generic Processes	Modes: Coping	Modes: Defending
	Cognitive Processes	
Discrimination: Separates idea from feeling, idea from idea, feeling from idea	**Objectivity:** "I am of two minds about this problem."	**Isolation:** "There is no forest, only trees."
Detachment: Lets mind roam freely and irreverently, speculates, analyzes	**Intellectuality:** "My past economic insecurities have led me to a degree of petty stinginess."	**Intellectualizing:** "My stinginess can be explained by my upbringing."
Means-end symbolization: Analyzes causal texture of experiences and problems	**Logical analysis:** "Let's start at the beginning and figure out what happened."	**Rationalization:** "I was trying at first, but one thing after another happened."
	Reflexive-intraceptive Processes	
Delayed response: Holds up decisions in complex, uncertain situations	**Tolerance of ambiguity:** "There are some matters that can't be resolved when you want them to be."	**Doubt:** "It's the decisions that get me; I don't know what will happen if I choose to do it."
Sensitivity: Apprehends others' reactions and feelings	**Empathy:** "I think I know how you feel" (second person agrees that first speaker does).	**Projection:** "Don't think I don't know what you have in mind" (second person surprised and mildly guilty).
Time reversion: Recaptures and replays past experiences--cognitive, affective, social	**Regression--ego:** "Let's brainstorm this for a while."	**Regression:** "I just can't deal with this; I'll just give up."
	Attention-focusing Processes	
Selective awareness: focuses attention selectively	**Concentration:** "I intend to work on this job now, and I'll worry about that later."	**Denial:** "Every cloud has a silver lining, so there's no reason to be concerned."
	Affective-impulse Regulating Processes	
Diversion: Emotions expressed	**Sublimation:** Person expresses emotions, both positive and negative, toward objects, people, and activities in relevant and understood ways	**Displacement:** Person displaces emotions from the instigating situation to express them in another situation of greater safety

Appendix C

Levels of Interactional Morality

Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4	Level 5
		Forms of Moral Balances		
Assimilation > Accommodation (Self-interest Other-interest)	Assimilation > Accommodation (Self-interest > Other Interest)	Accommodation > Assimilation (Group > Self or Other-interest)	Accomodation > Assimilation (Group > Self or Other-interests)	Assimilation = Accomodation (equilibration of Self, Other, Mutual-interests)
Assimilation of experiences to self's interest. No sustained view of other's interest; no view of mutual interest.	Accommodation to other's interests when forced. Differentiates other's interests from self but no view of mutual interests.	Assimilation of self interests to others' interests as the common interest. Differentiates others' interests from self but mutuality is harmony.	Accommodation of self interests to common interests. Assimilation of common interest to self-interest (self is object among objects).	Assimilation of self, other and mutual interests. Self, other, and mutual interests differentiated and coordinated.
		Primary Structure: The Moral Balance		
Vacillates between compliance with others/ thwarting others. Balance occurs when self is indifferent to situations, unequal exchanges of good and bad; momentary compromises.	Trade to get what self wants; sometimes others must get what they want. Balances of coexistence (equal exchange of good and bad in kind and amount).	Emphasis on exchanges is based on sustaining good faith (and excluding bad). Self-interest thought to be identical with others' interests).	Systematized, structured exchanges based on understanding that all persons can fall from grace. Thus balances are conscious compromises made by all people including the self (common interests protect the self's interest).	Integration of self interests with others and mutual interests to achieve mutual, personally and situationally specific balances. (Balances are preferably based on mutual interests or if necessary, compromises or the lesser of two evils.)
A versus B	Prudential compromises by both A and B.	A compromises to "good" Bs; bad Bs rejected.	A and B = AB common	A = B
		Secondary Structure: Self as a Moral Being and Object		
I have unqualified rights to secure my own good.	I have a right to secure my own good as others do.	I am a moral being and demonstrate that by my goodness. Thus I have a right to good treatment as do other people.	All persons fall from grace. Thus I subscribe to the common regulation to promy own interests as well as others'. (Some private self-interests are not subject to negotiation.)	I have human vulnerability, weaknesses and strengths as a moral agent but I have responsibility to myself, others, and our mutual interest to require that others treat me as a moral object. If I don't, the moral balance will be upset.
		Secondary Structure: Others as Moral Beings and Objects		
Others are objects who compel or thwart self or who can be compelled by self.	Others are subjects who want their own "good" as I want my own "good."	Most others are morally good; those who act badly to me are exceptions or are "strange," incomprehensible or outside my moral obligation.	Others (and myself) can be culpable. Thus, we must all agree to common regulation to protect our interests. Does not see that the common interest is not synonymous with the mutual interest.	Others also have strengths and weaknesses as moral agents that are variously manifest. I must require others to collaborate in achieving and sustaining moral balances. I need sometimes to forgive others for their impositions, given the complexity of situations and the individuality of others and myself.
		Secondary Structure: Taking Chances on Others' Good Faith		
Self waits momentarily for others to demonstrate their good faith.	Takes blind chances on others' good faith; can't understand others' defaults as connected with own defaults.	Most people have or should have good faith; negotiates with those of good faith; shuns persons of bad faith as outside one's purview.	To gamble that others negotiate in good faith is foolhardy; the common practice protects all from bad faith and determines the limits of the chances that must be taken for moral balance to be achieved.	Gambles on good faith; instances of bad faith need to be handled in terms of one's moral consideration for one's self, other's individuality, the circumstances, and the self's own occasional transgressions.

Appendix C (cont.)

Secondary Structure: Righting Wrongs Self Commits (Guilt)				
No idea self can do wrong; others cause self's wrongs.	Self can make a mistake (in the sense of taking more than others will allow).	Self intends no wrong but can make mistakes for which self is not responsible.	Self can commit wrongs, irrespective of intent. Self confesses and must "pay for" wrongs before one can be readmitted to the moral exchange.	Given the complexity of life, self can commit wrongs; reparations re-establish moral balance.
Redress: blame projected.	Redress: avoid further difficulty with other.	Redress: apologies to make it up and restore harmony, or withdrawal from relationship.	Redress: debt must be cancelled by repayment.	Redress: wrong cannot be undone but can be repaired, forgiven, or explained.
Overall Justification for Balance at Each Level				
Others force me/I force them.	Others get what they want so I deserve to get what I want.	I try to be good so I deserve to receive good from others.	I commit myself to the common structured exchange, so I deserve the same considerations and privileges as others receive from common practices.	I am a moral agent among other moral agents; thus I am responsible to others, myself, and to our mutual interests; we are a part of each other's existences.

Reason for Transitions between Levels			
Increased capability of person to fend for self and awareness that others' desires and interpersonal exchange exists; negotiation is possible and necessary.	Growing awareness of the self's isolation from others if others' interests are not taken into account.	Basic assumption of self and other's goodness becomes insupportable in the face of countering evidence that others act with bad faith on occasion.	Admission of self's culpability; recognition of the insufficiency of common practice to resolve moral dilemmas in sufficient depth for self's and others' needs and rights.

(OMG:62-64).

Appendix D.

Summary of Differences among Students of Different Family Backgrounds[a]

	Moral Functioning	Ego Strategies	Group Behavior	Friends' Evaluation
Open family		**Characteristic:** Sublimating Not doubting **Situational:** Not tolerating ambiguity Not suppressing Intellectualizing Rationalizing	Most involved, most able to suspend disbelief Often cognitive heroes during NeoPd	**First evaluation:** Often group dominators seen as dominating in led contexts, but likeable in dominated contexts **Second evaluation:** No change
Cooperative family	Session 4: lowest cognitive scores Session 5: lowest inter-actional scores	**Characteristic:** Not sublimating Not substituting Doubting Self-righteous in dominated contexts **Situational:** Tolerating ambiguity Suppressing Not intellectualizing Not rationalizing	Least involved, least able to suspend disbelief	No group dominators **First evaluation:** Easily changes mind Seen as dominating in led contexts but likeable in dominated contexts **Second evaluation:** Fair, understands others Changes views, handles self in conflict, well liked
Competitive family	Developmentally unaffected in both systems	**Characteristic:** Substituting	Often cognitive heroes during NeoPd	**First evaluation** Does not change mind Seen as dominating in dominated contexts but likeable in led contexts **Second evaluation:** Decrease in fairness, understanding others, changing views, handling self in conflict, and being well liked
Reserved family	Session 4: highest cognitive scores Session 5: highest interactional scores Developmentally gained in both systems	Characteristic: Concentrating, but not doubting in dominated groups	Sometimes cognitive casualties during NeoPd	**First evaluation:** Seen as dominating in dominated contexts but likeable in led contexts **Second evaluation:** Essentially unchanged

[a]Interactions of sex and family types are not included.

(OMG:328-9).

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