The Buddhist Terms of Name set (*nāmakāya*), Phrase set (*padakāya*) and Phoneme set (*vyañjanakāya*)

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Seongho Choi
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Summary in German

Das Ziel dieser Studie sind drei buddhistische Sanskrit-Begriffe, nämlich *nāman*, *pada* und *vyañjana* im Abhidharma-Yogācāra Buddhismus zu untersuchen. Die Sarvāstivādins erklären, dass es drei Gegebenheiten (*dharma*), nämlich *nāmakāya*, *padakāya* und *vyañjanakāya* gibt, welche als reale Entitäten (*dravya*) existieren und zur Kategorie von den „nicht mit dem Geist verbundenen Gegebenheiten" (*cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*) gehören. Die drei Gegebenheiten werden auch als sprachliche Einheiten beschrieben, die eine Brücke bilden zwischen den Klängen (*ghoṣa*) und der Objekt-Bedeutung (*artha*) der Sprache.

Die moderne Wissenschaft hat diese drei Gegebenheiten aus verschiedenen Blickwinkeln untersucht. Die vorherigen Studien beleuchten die Geschichte der Erklärungen der Sarvāstivāda-Schule und die Debatte zwischen der Sarvāstivāda-Schule und den Sautrāntika in Bezug auf die drei Gegebenheiten. Ich versuche die Erweiterung des Wissens über die drei Gegebenheiten, indem die Passagen in den Yogācāra-Texten untersucht werden.

Einige gegenwärtige Wissenschaftler verstehen *nāman*, *pada* und *vyañjana* als ein Word, einen Satz bzw. ein Phonem. Nach diesem Verständnis ist ein *nāman* die Summe der *vyañjana*-s, und ein *pada* ist die Summe der *nāman*-s. Im ersten Teil studiere ich verschiedene Passagen in den Sarvāstivāda- und Yogācāra-Texten, und argumentiere, dass dieses Verständnis nur eine von mannigfaltigen Interpretationen der drei Gegebenheiten ist.

Diese Studie beginnt mit der Lektüre einiger Passagen über den Begriff *vyañjana*. Dieser Begriff könnte einen einzelnen Konsonanten oder eine einzelne Silbe bedeuten, aber in vielen Stellen bedeutet er einen ganzen Ausdruck, welcher aus vielen Silben besteht. Beispielsweise sind Wörter und Sätze in der Kategorie vom *vyañjana* enthalten. In diesem Zusammenhang bezeichnet dieser Begriff den Ausdruck der buddhistischen Lehre im Gegensatz zu der Bedeutung (*artha*) der Lehre. Nachdem der buddhistische Praktiker den Ausdruck der Lehre gelernt hat, sollte er sich bemühen, die Bedeutung der Lehre zu verstehen durch das wiederholte Nachdenken über den Ausdruck. Eine Passage in der *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (BoBh) von der *Yogācārabhūmi* (YoBh) zeigt, dass der Ausdruck der buddhistischen Lehre nicht nur in Sanskrit, sondern auch in verschiedenen Arten von Dialekten (*prakṛtā vāc*) gesprochen wurde. Dabei betont die BoBh auch, dass ein Bodhisattva nicht vom Erlernen der Lehre abgelenkt werden sollte, obwohl die Lehre nicht im Sanskrit, sondern im Dialekt erklärt wird, weil das Ziel des Lernens nicht darin besteht, einen [guten] Ausdruck (*vyañjana*) zu erreichen, sondern die [richtige] Bedeutung (*artha*) zu verstehen.

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Yogācārins betonen mehrfach, warum wichtig es ist, den Ausdruck der Lehre zu lernen. In einer Passage im *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* (Saṃdhi) wird das Erlernen des Ausdrucks auf die Yogācāra-Kultivierung hinsichtlich drei Arten der Einsicht (*prajñā*) bezogen. Nachdem ein Bodhisattva den Ausdruck der Lehre erlernt hat, versteht er die wörtliche Bedeutung der Lehre durch die aus dem Hören entstehende Einsicht (*śrutamayī prajñā*). Weiterhin betrachtet der Bodhisattva die wörtliche Bedeutung, bis er den Zweck der Lehre versteht, durch die aus dem Denken entstehende Einsicht (*cintāmayī prajñā*). Anschließend wendet der Bodhisattva eine meditative Technik an und realisiert diejenige, welche früher nur konzeptionell verstanden wurde, durch die aus Kultivierung entstehende Einsicht (*bhāvanāmayī prajñā*). Eine andere Passage im Saṃdhi beschreibt eine andere Art der Kultivierung. Nach dieser Beschreibung kann das Erlernen des Ausdrucks zum Verständnis der unaussprechlichen Realität der Dinge führen. Nachdem ein buddhistischer Praktiker mit dem Ausdruck der Lehre vertraut geworden ist, denkt er weiterhin über die Beziehung zwischen der Sprache und dem ausgesprochenen Objekt nach. Schließlich versteht er, dass die Realität der Dinge nicht ausgedrückt werden kann.

Nach der Studie des Begriffs *vyañjana* untersuche ich weiterhin das Kompositum *pada-vyañjana*. In einer Passage der *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* (Aṣṭ) befindet sich ein Kompositum *akṣara-pada-vyañjana*, welches die Silbe, das Wort, und die Phrase bedeuten könnte. Dies Beispiel zeigt, dass *pada* und *vyañjana* im Kompositum nicht immer als "Wort" und "Silbe" verstanden werden sollten. In vielen Stellen bedeutet *vyañjana* nicht Silbe, die Bestandteil eines „Wortes" (*pada*) ist, sondern eine Phrase, die sich aus der Verbindung der Wörter ergibt. Mit anderen Worten zeigt *vyañjana* eine größere syntaktische Einheit als *pada* an. Einige Passagen der Yogācāra-Texte erklären auch, dass es eine unbegrenzte Anzahl von Wörtern (*pada*) und Phrasen (*vyañjana*) gibt, durch welche die verschiedenen buddhistischen Lehren ausgedrückt werden. Andere Passagen der Yogācāra-Texte jedoch erklären, dass eine begrenzte Anzahl von Silben wie „a", „ka" usw. *vyañjana* heißen. Sie betrachten auch *vyañjana* als einen Bestandteil eines „Wortes" (*pada*). Die widersprüchlichen Interpretationen der Beziehung zwischen *pada* und *vyañjana* zeigen, dass Yogācārins *pada* und *vyañjana* auf verschiedene Weise verstanden haben. Daher sollte die Bedeutung jedes Begriffs nur anhand des Kontexts bestätigt werden.

Auf der Grundlage der Untersuchung des Begriffs *vyañjana* und des Kompositums *padavyañjana* studiere ich weiterhin das Merkmal der drei Gegebenheiten, d. h. *nāmakāya*, *padakāya*, und *vyañjanakāya*. Das Suffix *-kāya* bedeutet konsequent eine Gruppe oder eine Ansammlung. Im Gegensatz dazu unterscheiden sich die Bedeutung der anderen Begriffe

nāman, *pada* und *vyañjana* zwischen den Texten. Diese Unterschiedlichkeit wird hauptsächlich durch die beiden folgenden Gründe verursacht. Erstens kann *vyañjana*, wie oben erläutert, entweder eine Silbe oder einen ganzen Ausdruck bedeuten, der aus vielen Silben besteht. Diese beiden Bedeutungen von *vyañjana* führen zu verschiedenen Verständnissen von *vyañjanakāya*. Einige Texte definieren *vyañjanakāya* als die Ansammlung von Silben, andere Texte interpretieren es als die Ansammlung aller Arten von Ausdruck. Zweitens unterscheidet jeder Text *nāman* von *pada* auf unterschiedliche Weise. Nach den frühesten Sarvāstivāda-Texten bedeutet *nāman* ein Wort als semantische Einheit, und *pada* bedeutet ein Wort als syntaktische Einheit, welches aus Silben besteht. In diesem Zusammenhang besteht *nāman* nicht aus Silben. Die späteren Sarvāstivādins, die Sautrāntikas und die Yogācārins zeigen jedoch die Tendenz, *nāman*, *pada* und *vyañjana* als drei verschiedene syntaktische Einheiten zu definieren. Dies führt zu den verschiedenen Interpretationen der drei Gegebenheiten auf folgende Weise.

Das *Apitanxinlun* 阿毘曇心論 (T1550), eine chinesische Übersetzung von Sarvāstivāda's *Abhidharmahṛdayaśāstra*, definiert *nāman*, *pada* und *vyañjana* als Wort, Satz bzw. Text. Das *Juedingzang lun* 決定藏論 (T1584), Paramārtha's chinesische Übersetzung der *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* (ViSg) der YoBh, erklärt die drei Gegebenheiten als Subjekt, Prädikat bzw. Text.

Das *Apidanbajiandu lun* 阿毘曇八犍度論 (T1543) und das *Apidamo fazhi lun* 阿毘達磨發智論 (T1544), welche als die *Jñānaprasthāna*-Texte bezeichnet werden, definieren die drei Begriffe als ein Wort, ein Teil eines Verses und eine Silbe. Diese Definition basiert auf einer Interpretation eines Verses, welcher angibt, wie man Verse komponiert. Es ist bemerkenswert, dass eine Passage des *Samyuttanikāya* (SN) denselben Vers unterschiedlich interpretiert. Laut dem SN bedeutet *vyañjana* (pāli. *viyañjana*) die Ansammlung der Silben, die einen Vers (*gāthā*) manifestieren. Die *Jñānaprasthāna*-Texte verwenden diesen Vers jedoch als Textbeweis, um zu beweisen, dass *vyañjana* eine einzige Silbe bedeutet.

Das *Apitanxinlun* 阿毘曇心論 (T1551) und das *Za ApitanXinlun* 雜阿毘曇心論 (T1552), die sog. Hṛdaya-Texte, zählen die drei Gegebenheiten auf, aber die Reihenfolge ist nicht *nāman*, *pada* und *vyañjana* wie andere Texte, sondern *pada*, *vyañjana* und *nāman*. Darüber hinaus identifizieren sie die drei buddhistischen Begriffe *pada*, *vyañjana* und *nāman* mit den drei grammatikalischen Begriffen, d. h. dem Satz (*vākya*), der Silbe (*akṣara*) und dem Wort (*pada*). Es sind die frühesten Texte, aus denen eindeutig hervorgeht, dass sich der buddhistische Begriff *pada* vom grammatikalischen Begriff *pada* unterscheidet.

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Im Gegensatz zu den Hṛdaya-Texten versuchen das *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (AKBh), das *Pañcaskandhaka* (PSk) und die Kommentare beider Texte, die widersprüchlichen Definitionen von *pada* zu harmonisieren. Zum Beispiel geben Yaśomitra und Sthiramati in ihren Kommentaren zum AKBh an, dass *pada* sowohl ein „Satz" (*vākya*) als auch ein „Wort mit nominaler Deklination oder verbaler Konjugation" (*suptiṅantaṃpadam*) ist. Das PSk und seine Kommentare erklären, dass *pada* eine Aussprache der spezifischen Eigenschaften (*viśeṣa*) der Gegebenheiten (*dharma*) ist. Die spezifischen Eigenschaften umfassen Aktivität (*kriyā*), Attribut (*guṇa*) und Zeit (*kāla*) der Gegebenheiten. Weil ein Verb oder ein Adjektiv eine bestimmte Qualität anzeigt, bedeutet *pada* Verb oder Adjektiv. Aus buddhistischer Sicht existieren die spezifischen Eigenschaften jedoch nicht allein, sondern erscheinen immer zusammen mit einem „eigenen Wesen" (*svabhāva*) der Gegebenheiten. Zum Beispiel erscheint „Vergänglichkeit" (*anityatā*), d. h. eine von spezifischen Eigenschaften, als die Vergänglichkeit einer verursachten Gegebenheit (*saṃskāra*). Entsprechend dieser Art der spezifischen Eigenschaften manifestiert sich *pada* immer syntaktisch als ein Verb oder ein Adjektiv in einem Satz oder einer Phrase wie „alle verursachten [Gegebenheiten] sind vergänglich" oder „alle vergänglichen verursachten [Gegebenheiten]" (*sarvadharmāḥ anityāḥ*). Deshalb erscheint *pada* in der Form eines Satzes oder einer Phrase. Auf diese Weise versuchen die Kommentare des AKBh und des PSk, die Definitionen von *pada* zu harmonisieren. Darüber hinaus unterscheiden sie *pada* von *nāman*, indem sie *nāman* als ein Substantiv erklären, das auf ein eigenes Wesen (*svabhāva*) der Gegebenheiten hinweist. Das AKBh und das PSk definieren *vyañjana* üblicherweise als ein Phonem, das ein Synonym für eine „Silbe" (*akṣara*) ist.

Die Untersuchung der Yogācāra-Texte zeigt auch, dass die „Gruppe der Namen" (*nāmakāya*), die „Gruppe der Phrasen" (*padakāya*) und die „Gruppe der Phoneme" (*vyañjanakāya*) als die wichtigen Gegebenheiten angesehen wurden in Bezug auf die Ausbildung des Yogācārins. Die drei Gegebenheiten repräsentieren alle Ausdrücke, die ein buddhistischer Praktiker lernen sollte. Ein interessantes Ergebnis der Untersuchung ist, dass der Umfang der drei Gegebenheiten erweitert wurde. In der *Śrāvakabhūmi* (ŚrBh) der YoBh zeigen die drei Gegebenheiten den Ausdruck der buddhistischen Lehre an, d. h. die „drei Körbe" (*tripiṭaka*). Aus der BoBh gehören zu den drei Gegebenheiten nicht nur die Ausdrücke der buddhistischen Lehre, sondern auch die der vier „Wissenschaften" (*vidyā*), d. h. „Medizin" (*cikitsā*), „Logik" (*hetu*), „Sprache" (*śabda*) und „die Künste und handwerkliche Arbeit" (*śilpakarman*). Die *Śrutamayībhūmi* (ŚrutaBh) der YoBh bezeichnet die buddhistische Lehre und die anderen vier Wissenschaften als „fünf Wissenschaftsbereiche" (*pañcavidyā-*

sthāna), die der buddhistische Praktiker meistern sollte, indem er die Gruppe der Namen, die Gruppe der Phrasen und die Gruppe der Phoneme lernt.

Diese drei Gegebenheiten werden in der YoBh auch als eine wichtige Grundlage für die buddhistische Kultivierung angesehen. In einer Passage der *Samāhitābhūmi* (SamBh) der YoBh werden die Gruppe der Namen, die Gruppe der Phrasen und die Gruppe der Phoneme als ein Handbuch der Meditationstechniken beschrieben, die gelernt werden sollten, bevor ein Praktiker eine Meditationstechnik anwendet. Eine Passage der ŚrBh erklärt den Vorteil des Lernens der Gruppe der Namen, Phrasen und Phoneme auf andere Weise. Die Passage erklärt, dass diese Gruppe ein Gegenstand der Kontemplation sein kann, weil das Nachdenken über die Natur dieser Gruppe zum Verständnis der Konzeptualisierung führen könnte.

Teil zwei ist eine englische Übersetzung von Passagen in Kommentaren des AKBh und des PSk, die die Natur von *nāman*, *pada* und *vyañjana* erläutern. Die Kommentare enthalten vier Kommentare der PSk und einen Kommentar der AKBh, nämlich das *Dasheng guang wuyun lun* 大乘廣五蘊 (*Guang wuyun lun*), die *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* (PSkV), das **Pañcaskandhavivaraṇa* (PSkViv), das **Pañcaskandhabhāṣya* (PSkBh) und die *Abhidharmakośaṭīkā Tattvārthā* (*Tattvārthā*). Durch das Lesen der Passagen in diesen Texten finden wir die eigenen Merkmale der indischen Yogācārins in Bezug auf die Erklärung der drei Gegebenheiten. Wie von mehreren gegenwärtigen Wissenschaftlern erklärt, betrachten die Sarvāstivādins die drei Gegebenheiten als die realen Einheiten (*dravya*), die sich von den Tönen unterscheiden. Demnach bewirken die Töne der Sprache die Manifestation der drei Gegebenheiten, und die Manifestation der drei Gegebenheiten führt zum Verständnis des Objekts (*artha*) der Sprache. Yogācārins stimmen nicht mit Sarvāstivādins überein. Nach den Yogācārins sind die drei Gegebenheiten nur der Ausdruck eines spezifischen Zustandes von Ton, daher sind sie nicht unterschiedlich von den Tönen.

In meiner englischen Übersetzung von Yogācāra-Passagen werden die drei Gegebenheiten, nämlich *namakaya*, *padakāya* und *vyañjanakāya* als „name set", „phrase set" bzw. „phoneme set" übersetzt. Ich vermeide es, sie als „word set", „sentence set" bzw. „phoneme set" zu übersetzen, weil diese Übersetzung zu Missverständnissen über die Beziehung zwischen *nāman* und *pada* führen könnte. In den Yogācāra-Passagen, welche ich im zweiten Teil untersuche, konnte *nāman* nicht alle Arten von Wörtern wie ein Substantiv, ein Adjektiv, ein Verb usw. angeben, sondern nur ein Substantiv oder ein Subjekt in einem Satz. In den gleichen Passagen könnte *pada* entweder einen ganzen Satz oder ein Prädikat in einem

Satz bedeuten. In diesem Sinne besteht ein *pada* nicht aus vielen *nāman*-s, so wie ein Satz aus vielen Wörtern besteht.

Es ist bemerkenswert, dass die spezifische Erklärung der indischen Yogācārins zu *nāman* und *pada* in Ostasien und Tibet nicht erhalten geblieben ist. Wie Keng (2018) gut gezeigt hat, betrachten die ostasiatischen Yogācārins *nāman* und *pada* als ein Wort und einen Satz und erklären daher, dass ein *pada* aus vielen *nāman*-s besteht. Verhagens (2001) Untersuchung zeigt, dass einige tibetische Grammatiker die Beziehung zwischen *pada* und *nāman* ebenso verstanden haben, wie es die ostasiatischen Yogācārins taten.

Part One

1. Introduction

This study focusses on three Sanskrit Buddhist terms "name set" (*nāmakāya*), "phrase set" (*padakāya*), and "phoneme set" (*vyañjanakāya*). Northern Indian Abhidharmikas and Yogācārins consider them the three "factors" (dharma) to establish a bridge between speech and object-referent (*artha*). My interest in these factors began with reading the *Abhidharmakośaṭīkā Tattvārthā* (*Tattvārthā*) and the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* (PSkV), both attributed to Sthiramati. [1] While reading the passages in the two texts, I continuously encountered some difficulties that I had not expected before reading. According to the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (AKBh) attributed to Vasubandhu, which has been the primary text with regard to the study of the three terms, defines *nāman* is a "cause of ideation" or "having ideation as a cause" (*saṃjñākaraṇa*), *pada* as a sentence (*vākya*), and *vyañjana* as a syllable (*akṣara*).[2] However, the *Pañcaskandhaka* (PSk) of Vasubandhu, which is the root text of the PSkV, defines the three terms in a different way. According to the PSk, *nāman* is the designation (*adhivacana*) of the own-being (*svabhāva*) of factors (*dharma*s).[3] *Pada* is the designation of the specific quality (*viśeṣa*) of factors. *Vyañjana* is the basis of *nāman* and *pada*.[4]

Padmanabh S. Jaini explains the definition of the AKBh as the definition of a Buddhist group belonging to the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika school and the definition of the PSk as the definition of another Buddhist group belonging to the Yogācāra-Vijñānavādin school.[5] His

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[1] For some general information on the *Tattvārthā*, see Matsuda 2013. On the PSkV, see Kramer 2014.

[2] AKBh, 80:12ff. Lee 1995, 49ff.

[3] The term *adhivacana* originally means metaphor or designation, but the commentaries of the PSk explain this term as "speech after superimposing" (*adhyāropya vacanam*). See PSkV, 84.16: "The designation is the speech after superimposing because the own-nature of factors is inexpressible" (*dharmāṇāṃ svarūpasyānākhyeyatvād adhyāropya vacanam adhivacanam*). D4066.229b (*chos rnams kyi ngo bo nyid brjod du med pa'i phyir sgro btags pa'i tshig la tshig bla dags zhes bya'o*).

[4] PSk, 15ff.

[5] Jaini 1959a, 97.

explanation is right in that the second definition is found in the texts related to the Yogācāra school like the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* (Saṃdhi), the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (AS), the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* (ViSg) of the *Yogācārabhūmi* (YoBh), and so on.

The difficulty that I encountered is that both definitions are found only in the northern Indian Abhidharma texts. According to both definitions, *vyañjana* is a syllable being a basic unit that constitutes *nāman* and *pada*. Robert Kritzer points out that this definition of *vyañjana* is not found even in the early Sarvāstivāda text like the Vibhāṣā texts.[6] The definition of *pada* is also conflicting with the general definition of this term. The *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, that is, the Sanskrit grammar of Pāṇini, defines *pada* as "a word with nominal declension or verbal conjugation" (s*uptiṅantaṃ padam*).[7] Buddhist texts also generally use *pada* as "word".[8]

Theodore Stcherbatsky suggests that the usage of the three terms as word, sentence, and phoneme shows the Buddhists', especially the Sarvāstivādins', desire to have their own terminology with regard to language.[9] Padmanabh S. Jaini suggests that the Sarvāstivādins developed their own explanation with the influence of the Mīmāṃsakas and the grammarians (*Vaiyākaraṇa*).[10]

Inspired by the previous studies, I examined the passages in Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra texts and found the multiple layers of interpretation concerning the three terms. This study aims to elaborate various definitions of the three terms and contextualize the two definitions in the

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[6] Kritzer 2005, 102 fn.123: "As far as I can tell, the Vibhāṣā does not state that *vyañjana* is in any way more basic than *nāman* or *pada*".

[7] Pāṇini 1.4.14. See also Jaini 1959a, 99 fn. 4; Lee 1995, 26 fn. 4.

[8] For example, K.R. Norman translated *dhammapada* as ″word of the Doctrine″.

[9] Stcherbatsky 1923, 24 and fn. 1.

[10] Jaini 1959a, 105ff.

AKBh and the PSk. On the ground of the research, I also attempt to translate the explanations of the three terms in the *Tattvārthā* and the commentaries of the PSk.

1.1 Previous Studies

Several modern scholars have studied the three terms in their investigation of the term "factor" (*dharma*). Many texts, which are related to the Sarvāstivāda, the so-called "Sautrāntikā", and the Yogācāra,[11] explain *nāmakāya*, *padakāya*, and *vyañjanakāya* as three factors. The three factors are included in the category of "the factors dissociated from mind" (*cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*),[12] which is a sub-category of the category "impulse (*saṃskāra*)", that is, the fourth of the "five constituents" (*pañcaskandha*).[13] The studies of the modern scholars find out that the Sarvāstivādin defines the factors in this category as real entities that are dissociated not only from mind but also from material factors (*rūpa-citta-viprayuktasaṃskāra*).[14] Specifically, the three factors in this category, that is, *nāmakāya*, *padakāya*, and *vyañjanakāya*, are defined as separated from the object-referent/meaning (*artha*) and the speech (*vāc*). The Sarvāstivādin in the AKBh explains in detail that the three factors bridge the speech (*vāc*) and the object-referent (*artha*). The AKBh also shows a discussion with regard to the nature of the three factors: The Sarvāstivādin considers them as real entities

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[11] I avoid using the terms "school" or "group" with regard to the Sautrāntika. I use the term "Sautrāntika" only as the opponent of the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika in the AKBh and the *Tattvārthā*. See also Kritzer 2005, xi.

[12] In Kramer 2014, Part 1, xvi, she explains why the word *saṃskāra* in the compound *cittaviprayukta-saṃskāra* should be translated not as "impulse", etc., but as "factor".

[13] The possible reasons why these factors had been included in the category "impulse" are well explained in several studies. See Cox 1995, 67ff and Kramer 2014, 1020ff.

[14] Cox 1995,70.

(*dravya*), but Vasubandhu in the AKBh does not agree with the Sarvāstivādin's explanation and considers them as mere expressions (*prajñapti*).[15]

It is notable that the three terms are not mentioned as a group related to language in the Theravāda Abhidharma texts. The three terms are only found individually in early Buddhist texts, and Jaini shows several examples of how each of these three terms is used on its own in Theravāda Abhidharma texts.[16] In contrast to the Theravāda Abhidharma, there are many passages showing that the texts of northern Indian Buddhism group the three factors as a set consisting of language.

Many of these texts of northern Indian Buddhism have been already studied by several scholars. The AKBh of Vasubandhu includes the most detailed discussion between Vasubandhu and a Sarvāstivādin, with regard to the nature of *nāmakāya*, *padakāya*, and *vyañjanakāya*. Stcherbatsky investigates the passages in this text, and translates the category *[rūpa]cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra* as "forces which can neither be included among material nor among spiritual elements".[17] He understands *nāmakāya* as "the force of imparting significance to words", *padakāya* as "the force imparting significance to sentences", and *vyañjanakāya* as "the force imparting significance to articulate sounds" respectively.[18] Kōgen MIZUNO studies various of Xuanzang's (玄奘) translations, including the translation of the AKBh (*Apidamo jushe lun* 阿毘達磨俱舍論), and shows how each Abhidharma text explains this category in its own way. Moreover, he suggests that the factors dissociated from mind could be closely

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[15] Cox 1995, 163.

[16] Jaini 1959a.

[17] Stcherbatsky 1923, 105.

[18] *Ibid.*, 106.

related to an Indian philosophical group other than Buddhism.[19] Critically reviewing Stcherbatsky's explanation, Padmanabh S. Jaini also studies the category of the "factors dissociated from mind" and the three factors of *nāmakāya*, *padakāya*, and *vyañjanakāya* in his two articles.[20] He also investigates in detail an explanation of the "factors dissociated from mind" found in the *Abhidharmadīpa* (*Dīpa*) by editing the Sanskrit text for the first time. Moreover, Jongcheol Lee has published a critical edition of the passages of *nāmakāya*, *padakāya*, and *vyañjanakāya* as found in the AKBh, together with an introduction and an annotated translation in Korean.[21] Another study that should be mentioned is Johannes Bronkhorst's contextualization of this AKBh explanation in the history of Indian philosophy of language.[22]

As is well known, the *Nyāyānusāra* (*Apidamo shun zhengli lun* 阿毘達磨順正理論 T1562, NA) of Saṅghabhadra is a response of a Sarvāstivādin against Vasubandhu in the AKBh.[23] The whole part of the category of the "factors dissociated from mind", including the section of *nāmakāya*, *padakāya*, and *vyañjanakāya*, has been translated by Collett Cox. She also contextualizes the explanation in the text with that in other Abhidharma texts, thus widening our knowledge of this category immensely, by investigating its meaning within the enormous collection of Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts, most of which remain available only in Chinese translation.

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[19] Mizuno 1956b, 38ff.

[20] Jaini 1959a and 1959b.

[21] Lee 1995.

[22] Bronkhorst 2011, 100ff. and Bronkhorst 2019, 19.

[23] Cox 1995.

The Sanskrit texts of Vasubandhu's *Pañcaskandhaka* (PSk) and Sthiramati's *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* (PSkV) were published, [24] and subsequently Jowita Kramer investigates the passages concerning *nāmakāya*, *padakāya*, and *vyañjanakāya* as found in the PSkV, comparing them with the passages in the YoBh, the AKBh, and AS. [25]

Ching Keng recently analyses the explanations of "sentence" (*pada*) among East Asian Yogācāra commentators including Kuiji (窺基), Woncheuk (圓測), and so on. [26]

However, the abovementioned studies do not explore the complexity of the definition of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* in detail. Some modern scholars point out the multiple layers of the definition and urge subsequent investigations. For example, Ulich Pagel states that Buddhist texts use *pada*, meaning both word and phrase, in his study of the expression *vajrapada*. [27] In the quotation of a passage from the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* (Aṣṭ) in his study of the genesis of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda, Lambert Schmithausen also points out that *nāmakāya* basically means "names", *padakāya* means "words", and *vyañjanakāya* means "letters", but they mean "words", "sentences", and "sounds" in later Abhidharma texts. [28] Pieter

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[24] The Sanskrit text of PSk has been published in a critical and diplomatic edition by Xuezhu Li and Ernst Steinkellner (Li and Steinkellner 2008). The Sanskrit text of PSkV has been published (also in a critical and diplomatic edition) by Jowita Kramer (Kramer 2014).

[25] Kramer 2013a, 1026.

[26] Keng 2018.

[27] Pagel 2007, 6ff.

[28] In Schmithausen 2014, 483 fn. 2043, Schmithausen translates the passage in Aṣṭ 231, 4-6, in the following way: ″The perfection of wisdom, o Ānanda, is, of course, unlimited. It is, mind you, [only] names, words and letters that are subject to limitation. This perfection of wisdom [however] is not subject to limitation." (*apramāṇā hy ānanda prajñāpāramitā. nāmakāyapadakāyavyañjanakāyāḥ khalu punar ānanda pramāṇabaddhāḥ. neyam ānanda prajñāpāramitā pramāṇabaddhā*) and explains that "in systematizing exegesis *nāmakāya*, *padakāya*, and *vyañjanakāya* refer to words, sentences and sounds".

C. Verhagen examines the various Tibetan interpretations of the three terms, especially with regard to *pada* as a "sentence" (*vākya*) and the one as a word.[29]

1.2 Methodology

Taking the previous studies as a basis, I aim to deepen our understanding of the tree terms of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana*, by exploring the diversity of definitions in the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra literature. My main starting point is the investigation of the text passages on the three terms that have not been studied as deeply as they should have been. I investigate the relevant passage in the *Tattvārthā* with the help of previous studies on the AKBh. I also examine the *Pañcaskandhaka* of Vasubandhu and its three commentaries, that is, the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* (PSkV) of Sthiramati, the **Pañcaskandhavivaraṇa* (PSkViv) of **Guṇaprabha*, and the **Pañcaskandhabhāṣya* (PSkBh).[30] These texts show how the three terms were understood by the Indian Yogācārins. Jaini explains that the Yogācārins' understanding of the three terms was completely different from the Sarvāstivādins'.[31] I also find, however, the similarity between both understandings. I examine the similarities and differences in detail by investigating the texts.

I also scrutinize various Chinese texts, especially the texts translated by various translators including but not limited to the most famous translator Xuanzang. Each translator chooses the own Chinese characters for translating *nāmakāya*, *padakāya*, and *vyañjanakāya*. These various translations show that the three terms have been understood in various ways.

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[29] Verhagen 2001, 240-251.

[30] The PSkBh has been attributed to **Pṛthivībandhu*, but the authorship was suspended by several scholars. See Schmithausen 1987, 575f; Kramer 2014, xxxi; Kramer 2015, p. 281 fn. 1.

[31] Jaini 1959a, 97.

Furthermore, other Yogācāra texts such as the YoBh, the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* (Saṃdhi) are also investigated in more detail. They include not only the definition of the three terms but the passages which show how the three factors are applied in the explanation of the Buddhist texts and the Yogācāra spiritual cultivation.

This study is the result of the investigation of the texts introduced above, and it consist of two parts: Part one is the research of various definitions and characteristics of the three factors. Part two is the translation of selected passages in the AKBh, the PSk, their commentaries, as well as some related passages.

I clarify how differently the passages in the texts define the three terms and show that there is not a "correct" definition among them. Furthermore, through examining the various definitions, I contextualize the two different definitions, that is, the definitions in the AKBh and the PSk. For example, all the texts included in the Sarvāstivāda texts do not share the same definition of the three terms. Likewise, all the texts included in the Yogācāra texts do not share the same definition. Sometimes it is also found that a certain Yogācāra text and a certain Sarvāstivāda text present the same definition of the three terms. This complexity shows that the definition in the AKBh does not represent the definitions of all the Sarvāstivādins, and that the definition in the PSK does not represent the definitions of all the Yogācārins. Therefore, only when we compare all the texts regardless the "school" to which each text belongs, we can understand the specific characteristics of the explanations in the AKBh and the PSk more deeply.

Besides the various definitions of the three terms, part one also studies the relationship between the Buddhist doctrine (*dharma*) and the three terms. From the early Sarvāstivāda texts, the set of the three factors means the expression of doctrine, opposed to the meaning (*artha*) of the doctrine. The difficulties that I could not easily understand are the fact that the term *vyañjana* and the compound *padavyañjana* are also used as the expression, opposed to the

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meaning, from the Pāli texts up to the Yogācāra texts. Thus, one of the questions I aim to answer is whether there is any difference between the terms *vyañjana*, *padavyañjana*, and *nāmapadavyañjana*. In order to find a solution to the question, I firstly investigate the terms of *vyañjana* (chapter 2) and *padavyañjana* (chapter 3), and then study the definitions (chapter 4) and the specific character (chapter 5) of *nāmapadavyañjana*.

2. *Vyañjana* as the Expression of the Doctrine

2.1 *Vyañjana* Opposed to *Artha*

My investigation begins with the research of the Sanskrit term *vyañjana*. This term has various meanings. It means phoneme, that is, the smallest unit of language by which any expression is manifested.[32] The AKBh and the PSk explain *vyañjana* as "syllable" (*akṣara*),[33] which is the basic unit to constitute the bigger units, that is, a word (*nāman*) and a phrase/sentence (*pada*). This term, however, does not exclusively mean an individual phoneme. It also means the expression itself, which consists of many phonemes. This usage of the term *vyañjana* is found from Pāli texts to Yogācāra texts:[34]

> Moreover, the paraphrasing-verse (*anugīti*) of the sutra should be properly assembled (*samānayitabbā*, skt. *samānayitavyā*) with regard to meaning (*atthato*) as well as to expression (*byañjanato*), because an expression without a meaning is idle chatter.[35]

> suttassa ca anugīti atthato ca byañjanato ca samānayitabbā, atthāpagataṃ hi byañjanaṃ samphappalāpaṃ bhavati.[36]

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[32] MW, 1029. SWTF 23, 169.

[33] In some contexts, modern scholars translate *akṣara* as letter, but I avoid this translation. Wezler (1994) explained that *akṣara* is basically more related to speech than to writing. This explanation is also applicable in my study, because the AKBh differentiates *akṣara* from *lipi*. In order to distinguish the two words, I translate the former as syllable and the latter as letter. Moreover, I translate *vyañjana* as "phoneme", when it is explained as the synonym of "syllable". Strictly speaking, a phoneme is the individual consonant or vowel, which is a smaller unit than a syllable. In this study, however, I use this translation in order only to distinguish *vyañjana* from *akṣara* in the English translation.

[34] NA also cites this passage. See Cox 1995, 383 and 402 fn.35.

[35] The English translation is based on Ñāṇamoli 1962, 35 with modification; Ñāṇamoli translates *byañjana* as "phrasing", when this term does not mean "consonant". See Ñāṇamoli 1962, xxxiv concerning the translation of *byañjana* as phrasing. See also Nance 2011, 169.

[36] Nettipakaraṇa, 21 (III.A.2).

In this passage, the expression (pāli. *byañjana*, skt. *vyañjana*) of the verse is opposed to the meaning (pāli. *attha*, skt. *artha*) of the verse. This usage of *vyañjana* is also found in various Yogācāra texts. The *Samāhitābhūmi* (SamBh) of the *Yogācārabhūmi* (YoBh) explains four kinds of a basis (*pratisaraṇa*) for the liberation from malice (*vyāpāda*), and so on. The four kinds of a basis are 1) the doctrine (*dharma*), 2) the meaning of the doctrine (*artha*), 3) the sūtra [having] a clearly defined meaning (*nitārthaṃ sūtram*), 4) [non-conceptual] knowledge (*jñāna*).[37] Each basis is opposed to 1) the person (*pudgala*), 2) the expression (*vyañjana*) of doctrine, 3) the sūtra of which the meaning needs definition (*neyārthaṃ sūtram*), 4) the [conceptual] knowledge (*vijñāna*), respectively:

> That which should be the basis for the liberation [from malice, and so on,] is called basis (*pratisaraṇa*). Moreover, four [bases] are taught by the Blessed One. "Not the person (*pudgala*) but the doctrine (*dharma*) is the basis. Not the expression [of the doctrine] but the meaning [of the doctrine] is the basis. Not the Sūtra of which the meaning needs definition (*neyārtha*) but the one [having] a clearly defined meaning (*nitārtha*) is the basis. Not the [conceptual] knowledge (*vijñāna*) but the [non-conceptual] knowledge (*jñāna*) is the basis.[38]

> tasmin niḥsaraṇe pratisartavyānīti pratisaraṇāni. tāni punaś catvāry uktāni bhagavatā: dharmaḥ pratisaraṇaṃ na pudgalaḥ. arthaḥ pratisaraṇaṃ na vyañjanam. nītārthaṃ sūtraṃ pratisaraṇaṃ na neyārtham. jñānaṃ pratisaraṇaṃ na vijñānam.[39]

> rton pa rnams zhes bya ba ni/ nges par 'byung ba de la rton par bya ba'i phyir te/ de dag kyang bcom ldan 'das kyis chos la rton gyi gang zag la ma yin/ don la rton gyi

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[37] BHSD, 485 differentiates *jñāna* from *vijñāna*, translating the former as "the theoretical knowledge" and the latter as "the practical knowledge".

[38] BHSD, 485 differentiates *jñāna* from *vijñāna*, translating the former as "the theoretical knowledge" and the latter as "the practical knowledge".

[39] SamBh I, 156.7ff.

tshig 'bru la ma yin/ nges pa'i don gyi mdo sde la rton gyi/ drang ba'i don la ma yin/ ye shes la rton gyi rnam par shes pa la ma yin zhes bzhi gsungs pa yin no.[40]

於出離時正可憑仗故， 名為依． 世尊說依略有四種． 一， 法是依非數取趣．
二，義是依非文． 三，了義經是依非不了義經． 四智是依非識． 此四種依.[41]

The BHSD explains that *vyañjana* in this context implies the "letter" opposed to the "spirit" (*artha,* the real meaning).[42] Given that my understanding is correct, the "spirit" in the explanation of the BHSD means the intention of the expression. The "letter" in this context means the expression through which only the literal meaning can be understood.

This explanation of the BHSD, however, should be elaborated in more detail, at least with regard to the Yogācāra understanding of *vyañjana*. According to a passage of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (BoBh) of the YoBh, *vyañjana* includes the expression through which even the literal meaning could not be understood:

In this context, how does a Bodhisattva apply himself to the four bases? In this case, a Bodhisattva hears the doctrine from others for the meaning [of doctrine], not for the formation of the [good] expression (*na vyañjanābhisaṃskārārthī*). Hearing the doctrine for meaning, not for expression, the Bodhisattva who relies on the meaning hears respectfully the doctrine which is explained even by means of the colloquial language (*prākṛtayā 'pi vācā*).

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[40] SamBh II, 328.3ff.

[41] T1579.30.332b8ff.

[42] BHSD, 514.

tatra kathaṃ bodhisattvaś [43] caturṣu pratisaraṇeṣu prayujyate? iha bodhisattvaḥ arthārthī parato dharmaṃ śṛṇoti.[44] na vyañjanābhisaṃskārārthī. so 'rthārthī dharmaṃ śṛṇvan[45] na vyañjanārthī prākṛtayā 'pi vācā dharmaṃ deśayamānam arthapratisaraṇo bodhisattvaḥ satkṛtya śṛṇoti.[46]

de la byang chub sems dpa' ston pa bzhi po dag la ji ltar sbyor zhe na/ 'di la byang chub sems dpa' ni don 'dod pa'i phyir gzhan las chos nyan par byed kyi/ tshig 'bru legs par sbyar bar 'dod pa'i phyir ma yin te/ de don 'dod pa'i phyir chos nyan gyi/ tshig 'bru 'dod pa'i phyir ma yin pas na/ phal pa'i skad kyis chos ston na yang byang chub sems dpa' don la rton pa ni gus par byas te nyan par byed do.[47]

云何菩薩修正四依？ 謂， 諸菩薩為求義故， 從他聽法. 不為求世藻飾文詞.[48] 菩薩求義， 不為求文， 而聽法時， 雖遇常流言音說法， 但依於義恭敬聽受.[49]

This passage clearly wants to show that the "expression" (*vyañjana*) is opposed to the "meaning" (*artha*). With regard to the expression, the distinction between the literal meaning and the real meaning is not found. Instead, we find the distinction between Sanskrit and the dialect. In this context, "relying on expression" means not focusing on the literal meaning but focusing on the language by which the expression is formulated. A good expression means not the expression through which any meaning is understood, but that which is articulated in Sanskrit. There could be a bad expression, which is expressed in a colloquial language but still having a correct

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[43] bodhisattvaḥ BoBh_W.

[44] śruṇoti BoBh_D.

[45] śuṇvan BoBh_D.

[46] BoBh_D, 175ff. BoBh_W, 256ff.

[47] D4037.136a.

[48] 詞【大】＝辭【明】

[49] T1579.30.539a08ff.

meaning, and the Bodhisattva, who relies on the meaning, respectively hears this expression regardless of its style, because he/she can learn from the expression. In this sense, this explanation of the BoBh should be understood as a criticism not towards those who attend only to the literal meaning of expression but towards those who attend to the correct and elegant formation of the expression, like the Sanskrit grammarians.[50]

Relying on meaning, not on expression, is regarded as important, especially when the practitioner attempts to attain a correct thought. The *Cintamayībhūmi* (CintaBh) of the YoBh describes it as one of nine aspects of the purified thought (*suviśuddhā cintā*):

In this context, what is the natural purification (*svabhāvaviśuddhi*)? It should be understood in nine aspects. ... (4) One contemplates [on the doctrine], relying on the meaning [of the doctrine], not on the expression [of the doctrine].

tatra svabhāvaviśuddhiḥ katamā? sā navākārā veditavyā. ... arthapratisaraṇaś ca cintayati, na vyañjanapratisaraṇaḥ.[51]

de la ngo bo nyid rnam par dag pa gang zhe na/ de ni rnam pa dgur rig par bya ste/ ... don la rton cing sems kyi/ tshig 'bru la mi rton pa dang.[52]

云何自性清淨? 謂九種相應知. ... 四者, 凡所思惟唯依於義不依於文.[53]

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[50] See also Eltschinger 2014, 204ff.

[51] The Critical Sanskrit edition of this passages is found in the *Śrāvakabhūmi the Second Chapter* by Śrāvakabhūmi Study Group, 318. This publication also records the location of the corresponding Tibetan and Chinese passages (Ms.236b4M, P.230b7, D.200b5, N.215a7, Ch.361b18).

[52] D4035.200bff.

[53] T1579.30.361b21ff.

A similar explanation is also found in the BoBh. This text describes relying on the meaning as one of eight aspects of the right thought (*samyakcintanā*):[54]

In this context, what is the right thought (*samyakcintanā*) of a Bodhisattva [with regard to the doctrine]? ... [A Bodhisattva with the right thought] is thinking [rightly] relying on the meaning [of doctrine], not on the expression [of the doctrine] ... (5) A Bodhisattva, relying on the meaning [of the doctrine], not on the expression [of the doctrine], understands (*anupraviśati*, *rjes su 'jug par 'gyur ro*) all the intended teachings of the awakened and blessed ones.

tatra samyakcintanā bodhisattvasya katamā? ... arthapratisaraṇaś ca bhavati cintayan, na vyañjanapratisaraṇaḥ ... arthaṃ pratisaran bodhisattvo na vyañjanaṃ buddhānāṃ[55] bhagavatāṃ sarvasandhyāyavacanāny anupraviśati.[56]

de la byang chub sems dpa'i legs par sems pa gang zhe na/ ... sems pa na yang don la rton par byed kyi/ tshig 'bru la rton par mi byed do// ... byang chub sems dpa' don la rton gyi tshig 'bru la mi rton na ni sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das rnams kyis dgongs te gsungs pa thams cad kyi rjes su 'jug par 'gyur ro.[57]

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[54] The BoBh explains the right thought as one of five kinds of ″practice of doctrine in a right way″ (*dharmānudharmapratipatti*, cf. CPD, 191: "In accordance with dharma" *anudhamma*). BoBh_D 76, BoBh_W 107: "In this context, what is a Bodhisattva's practice of the doctrine in a right way? In sum, it should be understood as of five kinds. It is the practice to follow the doctrines which are rightly investigated and rightly acquired, in body, speech, and thought. [It is also the practice] to think rightly and to cultivate oneself" (*tatra katamā bodhisattvasya dharmānudharmapratipattiḥ. samāsataḥ pañcavidhā veditavyā. teṣām eva yathāparyeṣitānāṃ yathodgṛhītānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ kāyena vācā manasā cānuvartanā samyakcintanā bhāvanā ca*). According to this explanation, the five kinds of this practice are 1) following the doctrine through the body (*anuvartanā kāyena*), 2) following the doctrine through the speech (*anuvartanā vacā*), 3) following doctrine through the thought (*anuvartanā manasā*), 4) thinking rightly (*samyakcintanā*), 5) cultivating [oneself as explained by the doctrine] (*bhāvanā*).

[55] buddhānaṃ BoBh_D.

[56] BoBh_D, 76. BoBh_W, 108.

[57] D4037.58bff.

云何菩薩於法正思? ... 凡所思惟, 但依其義不依其文. 由諸菩薩思惟法時但依

其義不依文故, 於佛世尊一切所說密意語言, 能隨悟入.[58]

2.2 *Vyañjana* as the Basis of Cultivation

The reason why relying on the expression is regarded as being inferior to relying on the meaning is explained in two ways. First, hearing or learning of expression of the doctrine is regarded as a preparatory step to understand the meaning of the doctrine. The Saṃdhi explains understanding the meaning of the doctrine in relation to three kinds of knowledge, that is, the knowledge arising from hearing (*thos pa las byung ba'i shes rab*, **śrutamayī prajñā*), the knowledge arising from thought (*bsams pa las byung ba'i shes rab*, **cintāmayī prajñā*), and the knowledge arising from cultivation (*bsgoms pa las byung ba'i shes rab*, **bhāvanāmayī prajñā*):

> [Maitreya] asked: "Blessed One, what is the difference between the correct understanding (*so so yang dag par rig pa*) of the meaning (*don*) [of the doctrine] through the knowledge arising from hearing, the correct understanding of the meaning through the knowledge arising from thought, and the correct understanding of the meaning through the knowledge arising from cultivation of calmness (*zhi gnas*, **śamatha*) and insight (*lhag mthong*, **vipaśyanā*)?"
>
> [The Blessed One] answered: "Maitreya, through the knowledge arising from hearing, a Bodhisattva understands the meaning [of the doctrine], which is based on the expression [of the doctrine] (*tshig 'bru la gnas pa*, *yizhiyuwen* 依止於文, **vyañjanāśrita*), corresponding [only] to [literal] words (*sgra ji bzhin pa*, *danruqishuo* 但如其說, **yathāruta*), not [leading to understanding] the purpose (*dgongs pa med pa*, *weishanyiqu* 未善意趣, **anabhisaṃdhi*), not [leading to] realization (*mngon du ma gyur pa*, *weixianzaiqian* 未現在前, **anabhimukha*), conformable to [the explanation of] liberation (*rnam par thar par'i rjes su 'thun pa*,

[58] T1579.30.0503c8ff.

suishunjietuo 隨順解脫, **vimokṣānulomika*), but not leading to [actual] liberation (*rnam par thar par byed pa ma yin pa*, *weineng lingshoucheng jietuo* 未能領受成解脫).

Maitreya, through the knowledge arising from thought, a Bodhisattva understands the meaning [of the doctrine], which is still based on the expression [of the doctrine] (*tshig 'bru la gnas pa kho na yin*, *yi yiyuwen* 亦依於文), but not corresponding [only] to [literal] words, [leading to understanding] the purpose, [leading to] realization, conformable to [the explanation of] liberation, but not leading to [actual] liberation.

Maitreya, through the knowledge arising from cultivation, a Bodhisattva understands the meaning [of the doctrine], which is not only based on the expression [of the doctrine] but also not based on the expression [of the doctrine], corresponding not only to [literal] words [but also not to literal words],[59] [leading to understanding] the purpose, [leading to] realization through the image that is resembling the thing to be known (*shes bya'i dngos po dang cha 'thun pa*, *suozhishi tongfen* 所知事同分, **jñeyavastusabhāga*), that is, the object-field of concentration (*ting nge 'dzin gyi spyod yul*, *sanmodi suoxing* 三摩地所行, **samādhigocara*),[60] and leading to [actual] liberation.

Maitreya, this is the difference among them".

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[59] The Tibetan version omits the phrase. Lamotte reconstructs the phrase "*sgra ji bzhin ma yin pa dang*" from the Chinese translation. See fn. 62.

[60] With regard to the English translation of the synonyms of ″image″ (*pratibimba*), I follow Pabst von Ohain 2018, 108 : "It is also called the object(/mental representation) in concentration (*samādhinimitta*), the object of the object-field of concentration (*samādhigocaraviṣaya*), the entrance into concentration, the gate to concentration (*samādhidvāra*), the support of concentrative attention (*manaskārādhiṣṭhāna*), the body of concentrative attention, the body of conceptualization inside, and the reflection. These should be known as the synonyms of the image that is resembling the thing to be known (*jñeyavastusabhāgam pratibimbam*)"; This English translation is based on the Sanskrit reconstruction of Sakuma 1990b, 7 (reconstruction in []): *[samādhinimittaṃ samādhigocaraviṣayaṃ samādhimukhaṃ samādhidvāraṃ manaskārādhiṣṭhānaṃ adhyātmavikalpaśarīraṃ pratibhāsaṃ ity apy ucyate.] itīmāni tasya jñeyavastusabhāgasya pratibimbasya paryāyanāmāni veditavyāni*; There are the Tibetan and the Chinese parallels. D4036.76a: *ting nge 'dzin gyi mtshan ma dang/ ting nge 'dzin gyi spyod yul dang/ ting nge 'dzin gyi thabs dang/ ting nge 'dzin gyi sgo dang/ yid la byed pa'i rten dang/ nang du rnam par rtog pa'i lus dang/ snang brnyan zhes kyang bya ste/ de dag ni shes bya'i dngos po dang cha mthun pa'i gzugs brnyan de'i ming gi rnam grangs yin par rig par bya'o*; T1579.30.427b24ff: 亦名三摩地相. 亦名三摩地所行境界. 亦名三摩地口. 亦名三摩地門. 亦名作意處. 亦名內分別體. 亦名光影. 如是等類當知名為所知事同分影像諸名差別; cf. ŚrBh_SG II, 46.

bcom ldan 'das thos pa las byung ba'i shes rab kyis don so so yang dag par rig pa gang lags dang/ bsams pa las byung ba'i shes rab kyis don so so yang dag par rig par gang lags pa dang/ bcom ldan 'das zhi gnas dang lhag mthong bsgoms pa las byung ba'i shes rab kyis don so so yang dag par rig pa gang lags pa de dag la tha dad du bgyi ba ci mchis lags/

bka' stsal pa/ byams pa byang chub sems dpa' thos pa las byung ba'i shes rab kyis ni tshig 'bru la gnas pa/ sgra ji bzhin pa/ dgongs pa med pa/ mngon du ma gyur pa/ rnam par thar pa'i rjes su 'thun pa/ rnam par thar par byed pa ma yin pa'i don so so yang dag par rig par byed do//

byams pa bsams pa las byung ba'i shes rab kyis ni tshig 'bru la gnas pa kho na yin la/ sgra ji bzhin ma yin pa/ dgongs pa can/ mngon du gyur pa/ rnam par thar pa'i rjes su ches 'thun pa/ rnam par thar par byed pa ma yin pa'i don so so yang dag par rig par byd do//

byams pa byang chub sems dpa' bsgoms pa las byung ba'i shes rab kyis ni tshig 'bru la gnas pa dang/ tshig 'bru la gnas ma yin pa dang/ sgra ji bzhin pa dang/ [sgra ji bzhin ma yin pa dang][61] dgongs pa can dang/ shes bya'i dngos po dang cha 'thun pa'i ting nge 'dzin gyi spyod yul gyi gzugs brnyan gyis mngon du gyur pa/ rnam par thar pa'i rjes su ches shin tu 'thun pa/ rnam par thar par byed pa'i don kyang so sor yang dag par rig par byed do//

byams pa de dag gi tha dad du bya ba ni de yin no zhes bcom ldan 'das kyis bka' stsal to.[62]

世尊, 若聞所成慧了知其義, 若思所成慧了知其義, 若奢摩他毘鉢舍那修所成慧了知其義, 此何差別?

佛告慈氏菩薩曰, 善男子, 聞所成慧, 依止於文, 但如其說, 未善意趣, 未現在前, 隨順解脫, 未能領受成解脫義.

思所成慧, 亦依於文, 不唯如說, 能善意趣, 未現在前, 轉順解脫, 未能領受成解脫義.

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[61] Lamotte adds this phrase based on the Chinese translation (T676.16.700c8).

[62] Saṃdhi, 105 (VIII, 24).

若諸菩薩修所成慧，亦依於文亦不依文，亦如其說亦不如說，能善意趣，所知事同分三摩地所行影像現前，極順解脫，已能領受成解脫義.

善男子，是名三種知義差別.[63]

This passage classifies *artha* into three kinds. The first *artha*, which should be understood through the knowledge arising from hearing, means the literal meaning of an expression. The second *artha*, which should be understood through the knowledge arising from thought, includes the literal meaning as well as the purpose or intention of the speaker, which is implied in the expression. The third *artha*, which should be understood through the knowledge arising from cultivation, includes the second *artha* but also the meditative object that is visualized by the practitioner for the realization of the doctrine. In this context, having heard the expression the practitioner should cultivate up to the level of experiencing the meditative object as if it were before his/her eyes.

To sum up, *vyañjana* does not exclusively mean a phoneme. The passages investigated in this chapter show that this term can mean the expression which is manifested by many phonemes. Especially when *vyañjana* is opposed to *artha*, this term should be understood as the expression. Moreover, in a passage of the BoBh, we find that "relying on the expression" does not necessarily mean attending to the literal meaning of the expression but attending to the language and the grammar of the expression. Some passages consider the expression as a helpful tool because it could be a preparatory step in the cultivation.

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[63] T676.16.700b28ff.

3. *Padavyañjana* as the Word and the Expression of the Doctrine

In this chapter, the compound *padavyañjana* is investigated. Like the single word *vyañjana*, this compound sometimes means "the expression of the doctrine", which is opposed to the meaning (*artha*) of the doctrine. We find the following passage in the *Nettipakaraṇa* (Netti):

The meaning [of the doctrine] is also wrongly guided by the wrongly arranged *padavyañjana*. Therefore, Sūtra possessed of a [good] meaning and a [good] expression (*vyañjana*) should be collected and investigated.[64]

dunnikkhittassa padabyañjanassa attho pi dunnayo bhavati. tasmā atthabyañjanupetaṃ saṅgāhitabbaṃ suttañ ca pavicinitabbaṃ.[65]

AN uses the compound in a similar way:

It is said: "Two factors, o Monks, lead to confusion (*sammosa*) and disappearance (*antaradhāna*) of the true doctrine (*saddhama*). What are the two? They are the wrongly arranged (*dunnikkhitta*) *padavyañjana* (*padabyañjana*) and the misguided meaning (*attha dunnīta*). Meaning, o Monks, is misguided by the wrongly arranged *padavyañjana*. These two factors, o Monks, lead to confusion and disappearance of the true doctrine".

dve 'me, bhikkhave, dhammā saddhammassa sammosāya antaradhānāya saṃvattanti. katame dve? dunnikkhittañ ca padabyañjanaṃ attho ca dunnīto. dunnikkhittassa, bhikkhave, padabyañjanassa atthopi dunnayo hoti. ime kho, bhikkhave, dve dhammā saddhammassa sammosāya antaradhānāya saṃvattantīti.[66]

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[64] See also Ñāṇamoli 1962, 35.

[65] Netti, 21.

[66] AN I, 58ff (Adhikaraṇavagga); See also AN II, 145 ff (Indriyavagga), AN III, 178ff (Saddhamavagga).

The compound *padavyañjana* in the passage can be understood in various ways: It could be a *tatpuruṣa*-compound, that is, *vyañjana* of *pada*. Alternatively, it could be a *dvandva*-compound,[67] that is, *pada* and *vyañjana*. Moreover, *pada* and *vyañjana* could mean "a phrase" and "a phoneme" respectively, as should be understood in the explanation of the AKBh.

However, *pada* could also mean "a word", and *vyañjana* could mean "an expression" as a phrase, that is, a bigger syntactic unit than *pada* which is manifested by phonemes. For example, a passage in the Aṣṭ uses this compound in the following way:

The perfection of wisdom, o Ānanda, should be well contemplated by you, well maintained, well studied, and well taught (*supravartita*).[68] It [should be] also well expressed (*sunirukta*, *yig 'bru dang nges pa'i tshig*) in the clear (*suparivyakta*, *shin tu gsal ba*) syllable (*akṣara*, *yi ge*), word (*pada*, *tshig*), and expression (*vyañjana*, *gsal byed*), and well apprehended (*udgrahītavya*, *bzang por gzung bar bya ba*).

sumanasikṛtā ca sudhṛtā ca suparyavāptā ca supravartitā ca tvayā ānanda iyaṃ prajñāpāramitā kartavyā. suparivyaktenākṣarapadavyañjanena suniruktā codgrahītavyā.[69]

kun dga' bo khyod kyis shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa 'di legs par yid la bya ba dang legs par zin par bya ba dang legs par kun chub par bya ba dang legs par rab tu gdon par bya ste/ yi ge dang tshig dang gsal byed shin tu gsal bas yig 'bru dang nges pa'i tshig bzang por gzung bar bya'o.[70]

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[67] SWTF III, 73.

[68] SWTF 3, 207ff "ins Rollen gebracht, in Bewegung gesetzt": "The wheel of the dotrine is set in motion by the blessed one" (*bhagavatā … dharmacakraṃ pravartitam*).

[69] Aṣṭ, 228.

[70] D12.ka249b.

We find the compound *akṣara-pada-vyañjana* in the passage. This compound should be understood as the enumeration from the smallest unit to the biggest unit, that is, a syllable (*akṣara*), a word (*pada*), and an expression [as a phrase] (*vyañjana*). The Tibetan translation (*yi ge dang tshig dang gsal byed*) also supports this interpretation.

This example shows that the compound *padavyañjana* should be not always interpreted as a word and a phoneme. In many passages, *vyañjana* is not an individual phoneme, that is, the synonym of a "syllable" (*akṣara*), but the expression manifested by phonemes. Another example, in which the term *vyañjana* in the compound *padavyañjana* means not a phoneme but a complete expression, is found in a passage of the Saṃdhi mentioning the expression "unlimited words and expressions of the doctrine":

> When the Tathāgatas' unlimited instructions of the doctrine (*chos bstan pa tshad med pa, wuliang rulaifajiao* 無量如來法教, **apramāṇadharmadeśanā*), the unlimited words and expressions of the doctrine (*chos kyi tshig dang yi ge tshad med pa, wuliang fajuwenzi* 無量法句文字, **apramāṇadharmapadavyañjana*), and the unlimited successive knowledge and "eloquence" (*gong nas gong du shes rab dang spobs pa tshad med pa, wuliang houhou huisuozhaole* 無量後後慧所照了, **apramāṇauttarottaraprajñā-pratibhāna,*pratibhāna*) are taken as a single one and contemplated,[71] it should be understood as [the calmness (*śamatha*) and insight (*vipaśyanā*)] taking the mixed and unlimited doctrines as the [meditative] object.

> de bzhin gshegs pa rnams kyi chos bstan pa tshad med pa rnams dang/ chos kyi tshig dang/ yi ge tshad med pa rnams dang/ gong nas gong du shes rab dang/ spobs pa tshad med pa rnams gcig tu bzlums te yid la byed pa ni 'dres pa tshad med pa'i chos la dmigs pa yin par rig par bya'o.[72]

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[71] In the next passage of the Saṃdhi, the successive insight and eloquence is expressed as "memory" (*dhāraṇī*) for the successive insight and eloquence.

[72] Saṃdhi, 95 (VIII.14).

若緣無量如來法教，無量法句文字，無量後後慧所照了，為一團等作意思惟，非緣乃至所受所思，當知是名緣無量總法奢摩他毘鉢舍那.[73]

This passage would not be clear if we interpreted *vyañjana* as a phoneme. Words and sentences can be articulated in unlimited ways, but the number of phonemes or syllables that are the basic elements of making words and sentences is fixed. Therefore, *vyañjana* cannot be unlimited when it only means "a phoneme". The *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* (MSA), attributed to Asaṅga, clearly explains that the number of *vyañjana* is limited in the passage where this term means an individual phoneme:

The contemplation (*manaskāra*)] applied for the understanding of the basis of [expressing the doctrine] (*vṛttyupalakṣaṇaprāyogika, gnas pa nye bar rtog par sbyor ba pa, jieju fangbian* 解具方便) is that through which two kinds of basis (*vṛtti, gnas pa, ju* 具) [expressing the doctrine] are understood. Phonemes (*vyañjana, yi ge, zi* 字) are [understood as] the limited basis (*parimāṇavṛtti, tshad yod par gnas pa*), and name (*nāman, ming, ming* 名) and phrase (*pada, tshig, ju* 句) are [understood as] the unlimited basis.

vṛttyupalakṣaṇaprāyogiko yena dvividhāṃ vṛttim upalakṣayate. parimāṇavṛttiṃ ca vyañjanānām aparimāṇavṛttiṃ ca nāmapadayoḥ.[74]

gnas pa nye bar rtog par sbyor ba pa ni gang gis gnas rnam pa gnyis nye bar rtog par byed pa ste/ tshad yod par gnas pa ni yi ge rnams so// tshad med par gnas pa ni ming dang tshig dag go.[75]

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[73] T676.16.699a19ff.

[74] MSA, 58.4ff.

[75] D4026.167b4ff.

解具方便. 具有二種. 一, 分量具, 所謂諸字. 二, 非分量具, 所謂名句等.[76]

Commenting on this passage, Asvabhāva in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāraṭīkā* (MSAṬ) also explains *vyañjana* as a phoneme, that is, the basis which is numerically limited:

> [Vasubandhu in the MSA explains:] "Phonemes are [understood as] the limited basis". Here, because phonemes (*yi ge*, *vyañjana) are 48 syllables (*yi ge*, *akṣara) from "a" and "ā" to "kṣa", they are limited. In this sense, phonemes are [understood as] the limited basis.

> **tshad yod par gnas pa ni yi ge rnams so** zhes bya ba ni 'di ltar yi ge rnams ni/ a ā zhes bya ba nas bzung ste/ kSha zhes bya ba la thug pa'i bar yi ge bzhi bcu rtsa brgyad yod pas tshad yod pa yin te/ de ltar na yi ge rnams ni tshad yod par gnas pa yin no.[77]

The exact number of phonemes is explained differently among the texts. This passage mentions the number of forty-eight, but the *Apitan piposha lun* 阿毘曇毘婆沙論 (the **Abhidharmavibhāṣāśāstra*, T1546), that is, one of the Vibhāṣā texts, explains that there are forty-five phonemes,[78] and the **Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* (D4053) and the **Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* (D4054) state that the number is forty-two.[79] Even though the exact number varies, they are limited numerically and not explained as unlimited. Therefore, *vyañjana* should be understood as an expression manifested by phonemes when it is explained as unlimited.

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[76] T1604.31.611a14ff.

[77] D4029.84a.

[78] T1546.28.057a16.

[79] D4053.96a and D4054.268a.

We find another passage in the Saṃdhi where *padavyañjana* is explained as unlimited:

The Blessed One said: "There are, o Avalokiteśvara, 22 kinds of ignorance (*kun tu rmongs pa*, *yuchi* 愚癡, **saṃmoha*) and 11 kinds of antidote (*mi mthun pa'i phyogs*, *weisuoduizhi* 為所對治, **vipakṣa*) to [those 22 kinds of] "badness" (*gnas ngan len*, *cuzhong* 麁重, **dauṣṭhulya*). … At the 9th stage, [that is, "the stage of right thought" (*sādhumatī bhūmi*),] there is the ignorance regarding the unlimited instruction of the doctrine, the unlimited words and expressions of the doctrine, and of the "spell for memory" (*gzung*, **dhāraṇī*) for the successive insight (*shes rab *prajñā*) and "eloquence" (*spobs pa *pratibhāna*).[80]

bcom ldan 'das kyis bkaḥ stsal pa/ spyan ras gzigs dbang phyug kun tu rmongs pa nyi shu rtsa gnyis dang/ gnas ngan len mi mthun pa'i phyogs bcu gcig ste/ … dgu pa la ni chos bstan pa dpag tu med pa dang/ chos kyi tshig dang yi ge dpag tu med pa dang/ gong nas gong du shes rab dang spobs pa la gzung kyi dbang la kun tu rmongs pa dang.[81]

佛告觀自在菩薩曰. 善男子, 此諸地中, 有二十二種愚癡, 十一種麁重為所對治...於第九地, 有二愚癡. 一者, 於無量說法, 無量法句文字, 後後慧辯, 陀羅尼自在愚癡.[82]

This passage of the Saṃdhi explains the unlimited words and expressions of the doctrine, together with the unlimited "instruction" (*deśanā*) of the doctrine and the "spell for

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[80] On the explanation of *dhāraṇī* and *pratibhāna*, see Braavig 1985. According to his explanation, *dhāraṇī* (*gzung*) is related to memory or a means of memory and **pratibhāna* (*spobs pa*) refers to eloquence or readiness of speech.

[81] Saṃdhi, 128 (IX.5).

[82] T676.16.704b05ff.

memory" (*dhāraṇī*). The *Śrāvakabhūmi* (ŚrBh) in the YoBh explains the relationship between the instruction and the words and expressions in the following way:

How does he/she become the one who teaches the doctrine (*dharmadeśaka*)? ... One sometimes gives an excellent speech related to the four noble truths, that is, concerning suffering, the origin [of suffering], the cessation [of suffering], or the path [to the cessation of suffering]. [One does it] in order to mature beings, or to purify beings, or to maintain the right doctrine for a long time. [One does it] through words and expressions (*padavyañjana, tshig 'bru, mingjuwenshen* 名句文身), which are proper (*yuktaiḥ*), related (*sahitaiḥ*), concordant (*ānulomikaiḥ*), suitable (*ānucchavikaiḥ*), obtained through a means (*aupāyikaiḥ*), corresponding (*pratirūpaiḥ*), auspicious (*pradakṣiṇaiḥ*), and accompanied by the characteristic of the wise people (*nipakasyāṅgasaṃbhāraiḥ*).[83]

kathaṃ ca dharmadeśako bhavati? ... kālena kālaṃ sāmutkarṣikīṃ caturāryasatyapratisaṃyuktāṃ kathāṃ kathayati, duḥkhaṃ vārabhya samudayaṃ vā nirodhaṃ vā mārgaṃ vā. sattvaparipākāya vā sattvavyavadānāya vā saddharmasya vā cirasthitaye, yuktaiḥ padavyañjanaiḥ sahitair ānulomikair ānucchavikair aupāyikaiḥ pratirūpaiḥ pradakṣiṇair nipakasyāṅgasaṃbhāraiḥ.[84]

ji ltar na chos ston par byed pa yin zhe na/ ... dus dus su sdug bsngal lam/ kun 'byung ba'am/ 'gog pa'am/ lam las brtsams te/ yang dag par 'dren par byed pa 'phags pa'i bden pa bzhi dang ldan pa'i gtam tshig 'bru 'byor pa dang/ 'brel pa dang/ rjes su mthun pa dang/ rjes su 'brong pa dang/ thabs dang ldan pa dang/ 'tsham pa dang/ mthun pa dang/ 'grus skyong gi yan lag gi tshogs dang ldan pa dag zer zhing.[85]

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[83] The Sanskrit version uses the term "word and expression" (*padavyañjana*), but the Tibetan version uses the term "expression" (*tshig 'bru*, *vyañjana). The Chinese version uses the term "the set of name, phrase, and phoneme" (*mingjuwenshen* 名句文身, **nāmapadavyañjanakāya*) in the Chinese version.

[84] ŚrBh I, 222ff.

[85] D4036.54bff.

云何名為善說正法? ... 又於時時宣說超勝四種聖諦相應言論, 所謂苦論集論滅論道論, 為諸有情得成熟故, 為諸有情得清淨故, 為令正法得久住故, 宣說相應助伴, 隨順清亮, 有用相稱, 應順名句文身所有言論. ... 如是名為善說正法.[86]

In this passage, the instruction (*deśanā*) means the teaching about the four noble truths. This doctrine is instructed for various purposes. One sometimes teaches beginners this doctrine in order to mature them (*sattvaparipākāya*), sometimes teaches the advanced ones in order to lead them into liberation (*sattvavyavadānāya*), sometimes speaks or writes this doctrine for preservation (*saddharmasya cirasthitaye*). One should choose the proper words and expressions (*padavyañjana*) according to the purpose. In this context, "word and expression" are the various kinds of expression as the means to teach the various people the Buddhist doctrine. Here, the term *vyañjana* should be understood as the expression manifested by phonemes, rather than as a single phoneme.

In the previous chapter, we investigated a passage of the BoBh, which explains the term of "expression" (*vyañjana*) with regard to the Sanskrit grammarian. In this context, relying on expression means attending to the language and the grammar of the expression, rather than attending to the meaning of the expression. Another passage of the BoBh explains the compound "word and expression" (*padavyañjana*, *tshig dang yi ge*, *yanyin wenju* 言音文句) with regard to the Sanskrit grammar. In the following passage, the BoBh explains that the Bodhisattva should learn the science of language (*śabdavidyā*) in order to teach the Buddhist doctrine to those who attend to the explanation only in Sanskrit:[87]

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[86] T1579.30.418a23ff.

[87] The English translation is based on Engle 2016, 190.

The Bodhisattva investigates the knowledge of language (*śabdavidyā*, *sgra'i rig pa*, *shenming* 聲明) in order to cause those who are devoted to well-composed [speech] (*saṃskṛtalapitādhimukta*, *legs par sbyar te brjod pa la mos pa*, *xinle dianyu zhongsheng* 信樂典語眾生) to develop [a firm sense of] trust toward [the Bodhisattva] himself by virtue of applying (*nirūpaṇatā*, *dpyod pa*, *chabie* 差別) well-derived words and expressions (*suniruktapadavyañjana*, *tshig dang yi ge nges pa'i tshig bzang po*, *guxun yanyinwenju* 詁訓言音文句). [88] Moreover, [the Bodhisattva investigates the knowledge of language] in order to engage in the orderly discourse (*anuvyavahāra-anupraveśa*, *rjes su tha snyad gdags pa la 'jug pa*, *suishuo* 隨說) that [provides] a variety of linguistic interpretations (*nirukti*) for a single object-referent.

śabdavidyāṃ bodhisattvaḥ paryeṣate, saṃskṛtalapitādhimuktānām [89] ātmani saṃpratyayotpādanārthaṃ suniruktapadavyañjananirūpaṇatayā. ekasya cārthasya nānāprakāraniruktyanuvyavahārānupraveśārtham. [90]

byang chub sems dpa' ni sgra'i rig pa tshol bar byed de/ tshig dang yi ge nges pa'i tshig bzang po dpyod pas legs par sbyar te/ brjod pa la mos pa rnams bdag la yid ches pa bskyed pa'i phyir dang/ don gcig la yang nges pa'i tshig rnam pa sna tshogs kyis rjes su tha snyad gdags pa la 'jug par bya ba'i phyir ro. [91]

若諸菩薩求聲明時，為令信樂典語眾生於菩薩身深生敬信，為欲悟入，詁訓言音文句差別，於一義中種種品類殊音隨說. [92]

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[88] sa-niruktapadavyañjana BoBh_D; us-niruktapadavyañjana BoBh_W. I assume "us-" in the BoBh_W is a typo of "su-".

[89] saṃskṛtalapitādhimuktān BoBh_D.

[90] BoBh_D, 74.9ff; BoBh_W, 105.16ff,

[91] D4037.57a.

[92] T1579.30.503a07ff.

This passage emphasizes the importance of learning the knowledge of language, stating that there are some people who only trust the teaching which is expressed in the highly elaborated Sanskrit language. In order to instruct them, the Bodhisattva should take care to use well-analyzed words and expressions (*saniruktapadavyañjana*). This explanation shows that *vyañjana* in the passage should be understood not as an individual phoneme but as an expression that can be analyzed and explained with regard to the etymology.

To sum up, the compound *padavyañjana* can be theoretically understood in various ways: 1) as a *tatpuruṣa*-compound, in which case it would mean "the expression of the word", 2) as "word (*pada*) and phoneme" (*vyañjana*), and 3) as "word (*pada*) and expression" (*vyañjana*). When investigating the actual usage of the compound, the last interpretation is more plausible in many passages. Like the expression *vyañjana*, the compound *padavyañjana* is also used in the sense of "the word and the expression of the doctrine", opposed to "the meaning of the doctrine".

Therefore, many passages show that the relationship between *pada* and *vyañjana* is not necessarily understood as "a word" and "a phoneme". The relationship can be understood in different ways. In the following chapter, I will investigate the relationship between *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana*, and we will find that some passages understand the three terms as a word, a phrase, an expression consisting of many phrases, respectively. This understanding should be understood not as a misunderstanding but as one of many possible interpretations with regard to the three terms.

4. The Various Definitions of *Nāman, Pada, and Vyañjana*

The expression of *nāmakāya-padakāya-vyañjanakāya* or *nāma-pada-vyañjana-kāya* is found only in texts related to the northern Indian Buddhist traditions, that is, the Sarvāstivādas, the so-called "Sautrāntikas", and the Yogācāras. The word *kāya* in the compound means "collection" or "set", thus, and the whole expression *nāma-pada-vyañjana-kāya* having the meaning of "the sets of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana*". The Saṃdhi identifies *nāmakāya-padakāya-vyañjanakāya* with "expression, [that is, phrasing]" (*vyañjana*):

Maitreya, the meaning of "expression" is "the name set", and so on. [93]

byams pa de la tshig 'bru'i don ni ming gi tshogs la sogs pa yin par blta bar bya'. [94]

善男子，言文義者，謂名身等. [95]

4.1 Chinese Translation of *Nāman, Pada, and Vyañjana*

When investigating the Chinese translations, we find that the Chinese translators understood the three terms of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* in various ways. In the following I list all the different variants found in the text which will be examined in the following chapters:

nāman: *ming* 名, *mingzi* 名字, *zi* 字
pada: *ju* 句, *jue* 絶, *zi* 字

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[93] The *Vivaraṇasaṃgrahaṇī* portion of the YoBh classifies "expression" (*vyañjana*), opposed to the meaning (*artha*), as being of six kinds (D4042.70b): This has six aspects: (1) name set (*ming gi tshogs rnams*, **nāmakāyāḥ*), (2) phrase set (*tshig gi tshogs rnams*, **padakāyāḥ*), (3) phoneme set (*yi ge'i tshogs rnams*, **vyañjanakāyāḥ*), (4) speech (*ngag*, **vāc*), (5) aspect (*rnam pa*, **ākāra*), (5) instruction (*bstan pa*, **deśanā*). See also Nance 2011, 169. He translates *vyañjana*, which I translate as "expression", as "phrasing". For an introduction to the **Vivaraṇasaṃgrahaṇī* portion, See Delhey 2013, 539.

[94] D4038.zi73a.

[95] T676.16.700b20.

> *vyañjana*: *wen* 文, *wei* 味, *ju* 具, *zi* 字
>
> *kāya*: *shen* 身, *zhong* 眾, *hehe* 和合

We find that *pada* is translated as "phrase" (*ju* 句), "verse" (*jue* 絶), or "word" (*zi* 字). The translation of *pada* as *zi* 字 shows that some translators understood *pada* not as a phrase but as a word.

It is also notable that *vyañjana* is translated in significantly different ways by each translator. Xuanzang translates this term as "phoneme" (*wen* 文), which is the most well-known translation of *vyañjana*. However, "syllable" (*zi* 字), "flavour" (*wei* 味), and "tool" (*ju* 具) are also used by other translators. The *Apitan wufaxing jing* 阿毘曇五法行經, attributed to An Shigao 安世高, uses "tool" (*ju* 具), and this usage is not found in other Chinese texts. However, "flavour" (*wei* 味) had been continuously used very often by other translators before Xuanzang has chosen *wen* 文. The texts using *wei* 味 for *vyañjana* include not only the Sarvāstivāda texts. The *Juedingzang lun* 決定藏論 translated by Paramārtha (Zhendi 眞諦), an alternative translation of the first half of the ViSg of the YoBh, translates *vyañjanakāya* as "arrangement of flavours" (*weihehe* 味和合).[96] The translation is possibly based on the usage of *vyañjana* in Sanskrit or *byañjana* in Pāli as meaning a sauce or condiment for food in the early Buddhist texts.[97]

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[96] T1584.30.1024c29ff. "'arrangement of flavours' (*vyañjanakāya*, *weihehe* 味和合): When the 'name' [of the own-being] and the 'phrase' [explaining the specific quality of the own-being] are combined and when both syllables and its object-referent are established, it is [called] 'arrangement of flavours'" (味和合者: 名與句合, 字義具足. 是味和合).

[97] See PTSD, 652: "Boiled rice with various kinds of curry (*sūpa*) and with various kinds of sauce (*vyañjana*)" (*odano anekasūpo anekavyañjano*).

4.2 *Nāman, Pada, and Vyañjana as* Word, Sentence, and Text

Translating *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* as word, sentence, and phoneme, respectively, Stcherbatsky explains that the usage of the three words shows the Buddhists', especially the Sarvāstivādas', desire to have their own terminology about three different syntactic units of language.[98] However, the investigation of the texts demonstrates that not all Sarvāstivādas shared the same desire. The *Apitan xinlun* 阿毘曇心論 (T1550),[99] one of the two versions of the **Abhidharmahṛdayaśāstra*,[100] defines *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* as word, sentence, and text:

> *Pada* (ju 句): A sentence (*suoshuo* 所說, **vākya*) [resulting from] the collection of the names (*minghui* 名會), like [the sentence of] "the conditioned factors are impermanent and have the property of arising and ceasing" (*suoxing feichang wei xingshuaifa* 所行非常 謂興衰法, **anityā bata saṃskārā utpādavyaya-dharmiṇaḥ*).[101] *Vyañjana* (*wei* 味): that which [results from] the collection of phrases (*juhui shi* 句會事廣說), as explained in detail in verses (*ji* 偈 **gāthā*) and *sūtras* (*qijing* 契經). *Nāman* (*ming* 名): an expression of an object-referent (*shuoyi* 說義) [resulting from] the collection of syllables (*zihui* 字會), like the expression "permanent" (*chang* 常, **nitya*).

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[98] Stcherbatsky 1923, 24 and fn. 1.

[99] Attributed to Fasheng 法勝 (*Dharmaśrī). Translated by Sengqietipo 僧伽提婆 (*Saṅghadeva) and Huiyuan 惠遠.

[100] For an overview of the *Hṛdaya* texts, see Willemen, Charles, Bart Dessein, and Collett Cox 1998, 255ff.

[101] The Sanskrit parallel is found in the *Udānavarga* (Berhard 1965, 96) and the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* (Waldschmidt 1950, 298): "Oh, the conditioned factors are impermanent and have the property of arising and ceasing. They arise and cease. Their cessation is happiness" (*anityā bata saṃskārā utpādavyayadharmiṇaḥ. utpadya hi nirudhyante teṣāṃ vyupaśamaḥ sukham*). The Pāli parallel is found in the DN II, 157 (*aniccā vata saṅkhārā uppādavayadhammino. uppajjitvā nirujjhanti tesaṃ vūpasamo sukho*); See also Keng 2018, 480 fn. 13.

句者: 名會所說, 如所行非常謂興衰法. 味者: 句會事, 廣說, 如偈及契經. 名者: 字會說義, 如說常.[102]

This passage considers *vyañjana* as the collection of phrases, that is, a bigger unit than a phrase (*pada*). This interpretation is in accordance with the meaning of *vyañjana* which is used alone or as the part of the compound of *padavyañjana*, in the sense that *vyañjana* is not limited to mean an individual phoneme but also a whole expression which is manifested by the phonemes.

Paramārtha's (Zhendi 真諦) Chinese translation of the ViSg, that is, the *Juedingzang lun* 決定藏論 (T1584) which is an alternative translation of the first half of the ViSg of the YoBh, also explains *vyañjanakāya* as the whole expression resulting from the collection of *nāman* and *pada*:[103]

Vyañjanakāya (*weihehe* 味和合): When name and phrase are combined, and when both syllables and object-referents are established, it is called *vyañjanakāya*.

味和合者: 名與句合, 字義具足. 是味和合. [104]

4.3 *Nāman*, *Pada*, and *Vyañjana* as Term, Word of a Sentence, and Phoneme
It is true that most of the available texts explain *vyañjana* as a synonym of a syllable (*akṣara*) when it is used together with *nāman* and *pada*. However, *nāman* and *pada* do not mean "word" and "sentence" in the Sarvāstivāda texts which are considered as having been composed in the

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[102] T1550.28.831a2ff.

[103] The definition of *nāman* and *pada* in this text is explained in the following chapter.

[104] T1584.30.1024c29ff.

early period of Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma.[105] Some of these texts define the three Sanskrit words as follows:

A. The Zhongshifen apitan lun 眾事分阿毘曇論 (T1541, *Prakaraṇapāda*)[106]

What is *nāmakāya* (*mingshen* 名身)? It is a designation (*zhengyu* 增語, *adhivacana*).[107] What is *padakāya* (*jushen* 句身)? It is the completion of syllables [in the sense that the syllables become to have a meaning] (*ziman* 字滿). What is *vyañjanakāya* (*weishen* 文身)? The syllable set (*zishen* 字身, *akṣarakāya*) is called *vyañjanakāya*.

云何名身？謂增語. 云何句身？謂字滿. 云何味身？謂字身說味身.[108]

B. The *Apidamo pinlei zu lun* 阿毘達磨品類足論 (T1542, *Prakaraṇapāda*)[109]

What is *nāmakāya* (*mingshen* 名身)? It is a designation (*zhengyu* 增語, *adhivacana*). What is *padakāya* (*jushen* 句身)? It is the completion of syllables [in the sense that the syllables become to have a meaning]" (*ziman* 字滿). What is *vyañjanakāya*? It is syllable set (*zizhong* 字眾, *akṣarakāya*).

名身云何？謂增語. 句身云何？謂字滿. 文身云何？謂字眾.[110]

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[105] On the periodization of the early Abhidharma texts, see Cox 1995, 30ff.

[106] Attributed to *Vasumitra (Shiyou 世友). Translated by *Guṇabhadra (Qiunabatuoluo 求那跋陀羅) and *Bodhiyaśas (Putiyeshe 菩提耶舍譯).

[107] See fn. 3.

[108] T1541.26.0628c23ff.

[109] Attributed to *Vasumitra (Shiyou 世友). Translated by Xuanzang (T1542). Another Chinese translation of the *Prakaraṇapāda*.

[110] T1542.26.694a28ff.

C. The *Sapoduo zong wushi lun* 薩婆多宗五事論 (T1556, *Sarvāstivādapañca-vastuka*)[111]

What is *nāmakāya* (*mingshen* 名身)? It is designation (*zhengyu* 增語, *adhivacana*). What is *padakāya*? It is the completion of *vyañjana*s [in the sense that they become to have a meaning]" (*wenyuanman* 文圓滿). What is *vyañjanakāya*? The syllable set (*zishen* 字身, *akṣarakāya*) is called *vyañjanakāya*.

云何名身? 即彼增語. 云何句身? 謂文圓滿. 云何文身? 即彼字身, 名為文身.[112]

D. The *Apitan wufaxing jing* 阿毘曇五法行經 (T1557, *Abhidharmapañca-vastuka*)[113]

What is *nāman* (*mingzi* 名字)?[114] It is the conceptualization of cognition (*zhifenbie* 知分別). What is *pada* (*jue* 絕). It is the completion of syllables [in the sense that they become to have a meaning] (*ziwei* 字為). What is *vyañjana*? It is the syllable set (*zihui* 字會).

名字為何等? 知分別. 絕為何等? 字為. 具政用為何等? 字會.[115]

The passages of A, B, and C define *nāmakāya* as a designation (*zhengyu* 增語, *adhivacana*).

The *Apitan Wufanxing jing* (D), attributed to An Shigao, defines *nāman* (*mingzi* 名字) as a

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[111] Author is anonymous. Translated by Facheng 法成. This is one of several texts called *Pañca-vastuka,* but this text is independent of the *Pañcavastuka* discovered in Turfan. See also Imanishi 1969, 4.

[112] T1556.28.997c27ff.

[113] Author is anonymous. Translated by An Shigao 安世高.

[114] In other passages, An Shigao uses *mingzi* 名字 as a technical term for *nāmarūpa*, which indicates the psycho-physical basis of individual existence in the context of rebirth, or all the constituents in the context of five constituents (*pañcaskandha*s). See also Vetter 2012, 55ff.

[115] T1557.28.1001a28ff.

conceptualization of cognition (*zhifenbie* 知分別), of which the corresponding Sanskrit word is uncertain. However, both *zhengyu* and *zhifenbie* are strongly related to the expression of "conception" or "ideation".

Contrary to *nāmakāya*, four passages relate *padakāya* and *vyañjanakāya* to a syllable (*zi* 字, *akṣara*). *Vyañjanakāya* is defined as a mere collection of syllables, and *padakāya* is explained as a "completion of syllables" (*zi* 字, *akṣara*) in A, B, and D, or of "phonemes" (*wen* 文, *vyañjana*s) in C.

In these definitions, *nāman* and *pada* are not differentiated as a word and a sentence. If I coin some linguistic terms, both are distinct in that *nāman* is related to a semantic aspect, and *pada* is related to a syntactic aspect. The definition of *nāman* shows the meaning of a word established through superimposition or conceptualization. The definition of *pada* shows that a word is actually manifested through syllables. In this sense, *vyañjana*, that is, a syllable, is a basis only of *pada*.

In this explanation, I do not find any implication that *nāman* and *pada* should be understood as a word and a sentence, respectively. Therefore, Stcherbatsky's explanation of the three terms is difficult to apply in the earliest Sarvāstivāda texts.

4.4 *Nāman*, *Pada*, and *Vyañjana* as Term, Portion of a Verse, and Phoneme

Two versions of the *Jñānaprasthāna*, which are considered as the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts later than the texts investigated in the previous chapter,[116] relate the three terms to the verse (*gāthā*):

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[116] Cox 1995, 30.

A. The *Apidan bajiandu lun* 阿毘曇八犍度論 (T1543, *Abhidharmajñānaprasthānaśāstra*)[117]

What is *nāmakāya* (*mingshen* 名身)? What is *padakāya* (*jushen* 句身)? What is *vyañjanakāya* (*weishen* 味身)?

[First,] what is *nāmakāya*? Answer: *Nāman* is the conceptualizing expression (*fenbieyu* 分別語). The expression (*shishe* 施設) of a superimposed characteristic (*youzengshuxiang* 有增數相) is called *nāman*. [The collection of the *nāman*] is *nāmakāya*.

What is *padakāya*? Answer: *Padakāya*s has a meaning (*yi* 義 **artha*) and completely records this and that activities (*ye* 業). The Blessed One said, "not practicing any evil, attaining what is virtuous, purifying one's own mind, this is the teaching of the awakened ones".[118] [In this verse,] "not practicing any evil" is the first *pada* (*ju* 句), "attaining what is virtuous" is the second *pada*, "purifying one's own mind" is the third *pada*, and "this is the teaching of the awakened ones" is the fourth *pada*. In this way, the *pada*s have meanings and completely record this and that activities. [The collection of the *pada*] is called *padakāya*.

What is *vyañjanakāya*? Answer: The syllable set (*zishen* 字身, **akṣarakāya*) is called *vyañjanakāya*. The Blessed One also said, "metre (*song* 頌, pāli. *chando*, skt. **chandas*) is the ground of verses (*jiexiang* 偈相, pāli. *nidānaṃ gāthānam*, skt. **nidānaṃ gāthānām*), syllables (*zi* 字, pāli. *akkarā*, skt. **akṣarāṇi*) are manifesting these [verses] (*shiweixiang* 是味相, pāli. *tāsaṃ viyañjanam*, skt. **tāsāṃ*

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[117] Attributed to *Kātyāyana (Jiazhanyanzi 迦旃延子). Translated by *Saṃghadeva (Sengqietipo 僧伽提婆) and Zhu Fonian 竺佛念.

[118] Dhammapada, 28 (DhP 183): *sabbapāpassa akaraṇaṃ kusalassa upasampadā. sacittapariyodapanaṃ etaṃ Buddhāna sāsanaṃ.*

Śarīrārthagāthā, 34 (cf. Uv 28.1): *sarvapāpasyākaraṇaṃ kuśalasyopasaṃpadā. svacittaparyavadamanam etaṃ buddhānuśāsanam.*

Nance 2012, 253 (fn. 2 of Appendix B) shows that the Tibetan version of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya* cites this verse: *sdig pa thams cad mi bya ste// dge ba phun sum tshogs par bya// rang gi sems ni yongs su 'dul// 'di ni sangs rgyas bstan pa'o.*

vyañjanam). [119] Verses are based on names (*mingshiyijie* 名是依偈, pāli. *nāmasannissitā gathā*, skt. **nāmasaṃniśritā gāthāḥ*). A poet is the basis of verses" (*zaozhejieti* 造者偈體, pāli. *kavi gāthānam āsayo ti*, skt. **kavir gāthānām āśraya iti*). [120] In this way, syllables are said to be *vyañjanakāya*. This is called *vyañjanakāya*.

云何名身? 云何句身? 云何味身?

　名身云何? 答曰: 名者, 分別語有增數相施設, [121] 說轉名. 是為名身.

　云何句身? 答曰: 如是句身得義, [122] 滿記彼此業. 世尊亦說 "諸惡莫作, 諸善奉行, 自淨其意, 是諸佛教". 諸惡莫作此一句, 諸善奉行此二句, 自淨其意此三句, 是諸佛教此四句. 如是, 句義滿記彼此業. 是謂句身.

　云何味身? 答曰: 字身 [123] 說味身. 世尊亦說 "頌是偈相. 字是味相. 名是依偈. 造者偈體". 如是, 字說味身. 是謂味身. [124]

B. The *Apidamo fazhi lun* 阿毘達磨發智論 (T1544)[125]

What are *nāmakāyāḥ* (*duomingshen* 多名身)?[126] Answer: They are various "appellations" (*minghao* 名號, **nāmadheya*), [127] "alternative terms" (*yiyu* 異語, **paryāya*?), "designations" (*zengyu* 增語, **adhivacana*), [128] "notions" (*xiang* 想, **saṃjñā*), "denominations" (*dengxiang* 等想, **samajñā*), "designations" (*jia* 假, **prajñapti*), and

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[119] The reason why I translate *vyañjana* as "manifesting" is explained in the following paragraphs.

[120] SN I, 36 (1.6.10 Kavisutta): *chando nidānaṃ gāthānam. akkharā tāsaṃ viyañjanam. nāmasannissitā gāthā. kavi gāthānam āsayo ti.*

[121] 相【大】. 想【宋】【元】【明】【宮】【聖】【聖乙】.

[122] 如是 【大】. 如 【宋】【元】【明】【宮】【聖乙】; 句身 【大】【宋】【元】【明】【宮】【聖】. 句【聖乙】.

[123] Omitted in【聖】【聖乙】.

[124] 謂【大】. 說【宋】【元】【明】【宮】. T1543.26.774b05ff.

[125] Attributed to **Kātyāyana (Jiaduoyannizi 迦多衍尼子). Translated by Xuanzang.

[126] Some texts use a plural form. See also PSk, 15: "What are name sets?" (*nāmakāyāḥ katame?*).

[127] See Jaini 1959, 100 fn. 3.

[128] See Jaini, loc. cit.

"conventional expressions" (*shishe* 施設, **vyavahāra*) are called various sets of *nāman*-s.[129]

What are *padakāyāḥ*? Answer: When the lines [of a verse], which have a complete or incomplete meaning,[130] are put together, they are called *padakāyāḥ*. The Blessed One said, "not practicing any evil, attaining what is virtuous, purifying one's own mind, this is the teaching of the awakened ones". In this way, when four individual lines, having a complete or incomplete meaning, are put together, they are called *padakāyāḥ*.

What are *vyañjanakāyāḥ*? Answer: Syllable sets are called *vyañjanakāyāḥ*. The Blessed One said, "metre (*yu* 欲, pāli. *chando*, skt. **chandas*) is the ground of verses (*songben* 頌本, pāli. *nidānaṃ gāthānam*, skt. **nidānaṃ gāthānām*), syllables are manifesting them (*wenjishizi* 文即是字, pāli. *akkarā tāsaṃ viyañjanam*, skt. **akṣarāni tāsāṃ vyañjanam*). Verses are based on name (*songyiyuming* 頌依於名, pāli. *nāmasannissitā gathā*, skt. **nāmasaṃniśritā gāthāḥ*), and [on] a poet" (*jizaosongzhe zhejieti* 及造頌者, pāli. *kavi gāthānam āsayo ti*, skt. **kavir gāthānām āśraya iti*).[131]

云何多名身? 答謂多名號.[132] 異語增語. 想等想假施設. 是謂多名身.

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[129] Some Buddhist texts enumerate four terms *saṃjnā, samajñā, prajñapti*, and *vyavahāra* in series. See BHSD, 561. See also Kramer 2004, 76 (de la ming dang/ brda' dang/ gdags pa dang/ tha snyad dang/ kun rdzob dang/ nye bar 'dogs pa dang/ brjod pa dang/ de lta bu la sogs pa ni ming gi rnam grangs yin no).

[130] *Zhuju nengmanweimanzuyi* 諸句能滿未滿足義: I understand this phrase as **yongs su rdzogs pa'i tshig dang yongs su ma rdzogs pa'i tshig*. The **Vivaraṇasaṃgrahaṇī* portion of the YoBh classifies *pada* as six kinds (D4042.70b; Nance 2012, 171): incomplete *pada* (*yongs su ma rdzogs pa'i tshig*), complete *pada* (*yongs su rdzogs pa'i tshig*), *pada* that establishes (*bsgrub pa'i tshig*); *pada* that is established (*sgrub pa'i tshig*), *pada* of teaching (*bstan pa'i tshig*), and *pada* of exposition (*bshad pa'i tshig*).

[131] Xuanzang translates the fourth line in an abbreviated way.

[132] 多【大】. 名【宋】【元】【宮】.

云何多句身？答：諸句能滿未滿足義，[133] 於中連合，是謂多句身．如世尊說，"諸惡莫作， 諸善奉行， 自淨其心， 是諸佛教"． 如是，四句各能滿足未滿足義，於中連合，是謂多句身．

云何多文身？答：諸字眾，是謂多文身．如世尊說， "欲為頌本，文即是字，頌依於名 及造頌者"．[134]

The passages of the *Jñānaprasthāna* cite two verses in order to show the relationship between a verse and the three terms. Introducing the first verse, the passages define *pada* as *pāda*,[135] or a portion/line of a verse.[136] In this explanation of *pada*, we do not find any explanation with regard to the relationship between *pada* and "sentence" (*vākya*), which is considered as the synonym of *pada* in the AKBh. Therefore, the explanation of *pada* could be another example to show that the definition of *pada* as a "sentence" is simply one of the interpretations of *pada*.

The second verse is used as the textual evidence to prove that *vyañjana* means "syllables" (*akṣara*) of the verses. According to the explanation of the passage, *vyañjana* should be understood as the synonym of a syllable. However, this interpretation of *vyañjana* is not aggregable to the context in which the verse is used in the Pāli text. The same verse is found in the *Saṃyuttanikāya* (SN). In the SN, the verse is the answer to the following question:[137]

What is the ground (pāli. and skt. *nidāna*) of verses? What is that which manifests (pāli. *viyañjana*, skt. **vyañjana*) them? What are verses based on (pāli. *sannissita*, skt. **saṃniśrita*)? What is the basis (pāli. *āsaya*, skt. **āśraya*) of verses?

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[133] 義【大】．意【明】．

[134] T1544.26.918b15ff.

[135] See also Jaini 1959a, 98ff.

[136] See also MW, 583: "A portion of a verse, quarter or line of a stanza"; PWG 4, 447: "Versglied, Versviertel".

[137] SN I, 38 (1.6.10).

kiṃsu nidānaṃ gāthānam. kiṃsu tāsaṃ viyañjanam.

kiṃsu sannissitā gāthā. kiṃsu gāthānam āsayo ti.

The passage of the SN explains four elements which contribute to the composition of verses. The first element that is the most basic ground (*nidāna*) of verses is metre (*chandas*). The second element that manifests verses (*vyañjana*) in the form to be heard or read is syllables.[138] The third element that the meaning of verses is based on (*saṃniśrita*) is a term (*nāman*). The fourth element that is the basis deciding which metre, syllable, and term to use is a poet (*kavi*). In this context, *vyañjana* does not mean an individual syllable, but an expression that results from the collection of individual syllables. It is noteworthy that *viyañjana* (skt. *vyañjana*) is used with the singular form and *akkara* (skt. *akṣara*) is used as the plural form in the Pāli passage (*akkharā tāsaṃ viyañjanam*).

We cannot judge which interpretation of the verse is more original and authoritative. However, this difference of interpretation between the SN and the *Jñānaprasthāna* demonstrates that the explanation of *vyañjana* in the *Jñānaprasthāna* is only one of possible interpretations of *vyañjana* based on this verse.

Moreover, according to the explanation of the *Jñānaprasthāna*, name (*nāman*) is one of four elements which are bases of the portion (*pada*) of a verse. This explanation is different from that of the early Sarvāstivāda texts which were investigated in the previous chapter, in the sense that the early Sarvāstivāda texts do not say the relationship between *nāman* and *pada*. However, the *Jñānaprasthāna* still considers *vyañjana* as the basic unit only of *pada*, but not of *nāman*.

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[138] See also the definition of *vyañjana* in MW, 1029: "manifesting, indicating"; PWG 6, 1431: "offenbar machend, bekundend"; Bhikkhu Bodhi 2001, 130 translates *viyañjana* in the passage as constituting phrasing: "What constitutes their phrasing"; C.A.F. Rhys Davids 1917,54 translates the term as issuing [from source, that is, *nidāna*]: "And what is it that issues from that source?"

To sum up, the passages of the *Jñānaprasthāna* define *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* in more detail than the early Sarvāstivāda texts. These passages explain *pada* as a portion of a verse, and state that *nāman* and *vyañjana* are the bases of *pada*. Moreover, these passages cite two verses in order to prove their explanations.

However, in spite of the quotation of the verses, there is no reason to conclude that this is a more "correct" exposition than that of the AKBh or the PSk, which consider *nāman*, *pada*, *vyañjana* as a word, a sentence, and a phoneme. The examination of the two verses in the *Jñānaprasthāna* demonstrates that the two verses do not necessarily lead us to understanding *pada* and *vyañjana* as a portion of a verse and an individual syllable respectively. This understanding is one of the possible interpretations of the verses. Therefore, the explanation of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* in the *Jñānaprasthāna* should be considered as one of the possible interpretations, which has been developed by the Sarvāstivādin in the *Jñānaprasthāna*.

4.5 *Nāman*, *Pada*, and *Vyañjana* as Word, Sentence, and Phoneme

The *Apitan xinlunjing* 阿毘曇心論經 (T1551) and the *Za apitan xinlun* 雜阿毘曇心論 (T1552) explain the three terms in a different way.[139] These texts relate the three terms not to a verse, but to the three different syntactic units, that is, a word, a sentence, and a phoneme respectively.

A. The Apitan xinlunjing 阿毘曇心論經

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[139] The first text is attributed to *Dharmaśrī (*Fasheng* 法勝), commented by *Upaśānta (Youposhanduo 優波扇多), and translated by *Narendrayaśas (Naliantiyeshe 那連提耶舍). The second text is attributed to *Dharmatrāta (Fajiu 法救) and translated by *Saṅghavarman (Sengqiebamo 僧伽跋摩).

Pada: When names *(ming 名, nāman)* and syllables *(zi 字)* are collected in accordance with various meanings which [a speaker] intends [to communicate], it is called *pada*. It is like what the grammarians *(poqieluona 婆伽羅那, *vaiyākaraṇa)* call "sentence" *(yanshuo 言說, *vākya)*. *Vyañjana*: The appearance of syllables *(zisheng 字生)*. *Nāman*: The term corresponding to an object-referent *(yi 義, *artha)*, like "cow", "horse", and so on. [It is] like what the grammar text *(piqieluolun 毘伽 羅論, vyākaraṇa)* calls "a word" *(ju 句, *pada)*.

句名字集，隨所欲說義分齊究竟，名句．如婆伽羅那云言說．味者：字生．名者：隨義名也，如牛馬等．如毘伽羅論言句.[140]

B. The *Za apitan xinlun* 雜阿毘曇心論

Pada is the collection of names and phonemes, which completely communicate a meaning *(jiujing xianyi 究竟顯義)*. *Vyañjanakāya* is a syllable set. [Comment:] *Vyañjana* is a syllable *(zi 字, *akṣara)*. Among foreign languages, there is the sound of *vyañjana*. It is the archetype of syllables and differs from the present syllable forms. It is the standard form of a syllable and is different from the present form of the syllable. *Nāman* is the name of various factors *(fa 法, *dharma)*. The object-referent *(yi 義, *artha)* is communicated by a name, like naming a man and a woman.

句者，集諸名味，究竟顯義．味身者，是字身．味者是字．胡音中有味聲.[141] 謂是字之模法，非今形色字也．名者，名諸法．以名顯義，如名男女.[142]

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[140] T1551.28.86a14ff.

[141] 胡＝梵【宋】【元】【明】.

[142] T1552.28.943a26ff.

The two passages explain the three terms in the order of *pada*, *vyañjana*, and *nāman*.[143] This order is different from the order of other passages, which explain *nāman* at first, that is, in the order of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana*. These different orders show the distinction between *nāman* and *pada-vyañjana*. As seen above, the early Sarvāstivāda texts relate a syllable (*akṣara*) to only *pada* and *vyañjana* and define *nāman* in a different way. In my opinion, the different orders we find in the two passages might also imply that *nāman* was added to the pair of *pada* and *vyañjana* later. This should be investigated further.

Moreover, the texts obviously are familiar with the terminology of Sanskrit grammar, and relate the Buddhist terms of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* to the Sanskrit grammatical terms of a "word" (*pada*), a "sentence" (*vākya*), and a "syllable" (*akṣara*) respectively. It is notable that the Sanskrit word *pada* (*ju* 句) is used in two ways. According to this explanation, *pada* in Buddhism means a sentence, and *pada* in Sanskrit grammar means a word. The Buddhists in the texts are aware that the Buddhist definition of *pada* does not correspond to Sanskrit grammar, but they do not change their terminology. We could explain the reason for this in the following way. Those who created and propagated the "Hṛdaya texts" understood *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* as a "word", a "sentence", and a "phoneme" respectively, that is, as three different syntactic units. Later they encountered the usage of these three terms in Sanskrit grammar, but did not want to change their own terminology and continued to use it.

Again, it should be understood that this explanation of the three terms in the "Hṛdaya texts" is specific and unusual. The term *vākya* is used as meaning a "sentence" in early Buddhist literature, more generally than *pada*.[144] I do not find any necessary reason why Buddhists should have not used *vākya* but *pada* when referring to a sentence.

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[143] There is another version of the *Abhidharmahṛdayaśāstra* (*Apitan xinlun* 阿毘曇心論, T1550), and this version also defines the three terms in the order of *pada*, *vyañjana*, and *nāman*.

[144] See PTSD, 606.

However, this definition of *pada*, which is established by some Buddhists, seems to have been influential. The northern Abhidharma and Yogācāra texts after the Hṛdaya texts relate *pada* to the sentence in various ways. One of the commentaries of the *Pañcaskandhaka* (PSk), that is, the **Pañcaskandhabhāṣya* (PSkBh) emphasizes this different terminology:

Pada in the [Buddhist] treatise is also explained as different from the worldly *pada*. Why? Regarding [the expression] "Devadatta boils rice", people consider "Devadatta" as one *pada*, "rice" also as one *pada*, "boils" also as one *pada*. However, in treatise, [the whole expression] "all the conditioned are impermanent" is considered as one *pada*.

gtsug lag gi tshig ni 'jig rten gyi tshig las kyang bye brag yod par ston to. ji lta zhe na? lha sbyin 'bras tshos zhes pa la, 'jig rten pa rnams lha sbyin zhes bya ba la yang tshig gcig tu lta, 'bras zhes bya ba la yang tshig gcig tu lta, tshos zhes bya ba yang tshig gcig tu lta la. gtsug lag las ni 'du byed kun mi rtag ces pa la tshig gcig tu 'dzin te.[145]

Among Yogācāra texts, the Saṃdhi also has a passage which defines the three terms as a word, a sentence, and a syllable:

Maitreya, [the Bodhisattva practicing calmness (*śamatha*) and insight (*vipaśyanā*)] understands (*so sor yang dag par rig pa*, zhi 知, **pratisaṃvedin*) factors (*chos*, *fa* 法, **dharma*) in five aspects, that is, name (*ming*, *ming* 名, **nāman*), phrase (*tshig*, *ju* 句, **pada*), phoneme (*yi ge*, *wen* 文, **vyañjana*), individuality [of factors] (*so so ba*, *bie* 別, **pṛthak*), and collectiveness [of factors] (*bsdus pa*, *zong* 總, **saṃgraha*).

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[145] D4068.90aff.

What is *nāman*? It is the designation (*ming du bya bar brtags pa*, *xiangjiashishe* 想假施設, *saṃjñāprajñapti*) of the own-being (*ngo bo nyid*, *zixing* 自性, *svabhāva*) and the specific quality (*bye brag*, *viśeṣa*) of all the defiling and purifying factors.[146]

What is *pada*? It is [an expression] that is the basis (*gnas*) and the support (*rten*), depending on (*brtan pa*) the collection of names, in order to express (*rjes su tha snyad gdags pa'i phyir*, *nengsuixuanshuo* 能隨宣說, *anuvyavahārārtham*) the meaning of defilement and purification.[147]

What is *vyañjana*? It is syllable (*yig 'bru*, *zi* 字, *akṣara*) which is the basis of both [name and phrase].

byams pa rnam pa lngas [chos][148] so sor yang dag par rig pa yin te/ ming dang tshig dang yi ge dang so so ba dang bsdus pas so/

ming gang zhe na/ kun nas nyon mongs pa dang/ rnam par byang ba'i chos rnams la ngo bo nyid dang/ bye brag gi ming du bya bar brtags pa gang yin pa'o/

tshig gang zhe na/ kun nas nyon mongs pa dang/ rnam par byang ba'i don rjes su tha snyad gdags pa'i phyir gnas dang rten ming de dag nyid kyi tshogs la brtan pa gang yin pa'o/

yi ge gang zhe na/ de gnyis ka'i gnas kyi yig 'bru gang yin pa'o.[149]

佛告慈氏菩薩曰: 善男子, 彼諸菩薩, 由五種相了知於法. 一者知名, 二者知句, 三者知文, 四者知別, 五者知總.

云何為名? 謂於一切染淨法中所立自性想假施設.

云何為句? 謂即於彼名聚集中, 能隨宣說諸染淨義, 依持建立.

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[146] In the Chinese translation, a word corresponding to *bye bra* is not found: "what is name' It is the designation of ideation about own-being of all the purifying and defiling factors" (云何為名? 謂於一切染淨法中所立自性想假施設).

[147] The corresponding Chinese translation could be understood as follows: "It is [an expression] that is based on, relies on, and depends on the collection of names, in order to express the meaning of defilement and purification".

[148] Lamotte adds it based on the Chinese translation. T676.16.699c2.

[149] Saṃdhi VIII.19 (p.98).

云何為文？謂即彼二所依止字.[150]

The Saṃdhi does not compare the three Buddhist terms to the Sanskrit grammatical terms but explains the three terms in the context of cultivation of calmness (*śamatha*) and insight (*vipaśyanā*). However, the definition of the three terms is similar to that of the "Hṛdaya texts". *Nāman* is explained as an individual word indicating the own-being (*svabhāva*) or a specific quality (*viśeṣa*) of factors (*dharma*). *Pada* is defined as a statement explaining the reason why the factors are defiling or purifying factors. *Vyañjana* is defined as syllables being the basis of both *nāman* and *pada*. In this way, the three terms are explained as three different syntactic units.[151]

4.6 *Nāman*, *Pada*, and *Vyañjana* as Subject, Predicate, and Phoneme

A passage in the ViSg of the YoBh defines *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* slightly differently than the definition of the Saṃdhi. According to the ViSg, *nāman* is related not to the specific quality (*viśeṣa*) but only to the own-being (*svabhāva*) or the intrinsic characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*). And the specific quality is related to *pada*.

> In this context, what are *nāmakāyāḥ*? With regard to the designation of the own-being of factors and the designation of the own characteristic (*rang gi mtshan nyid*) [of factors],[152] in order to conventionally express (*rjes su tha snyad gdags pa*), having perceived the conceptualized [objects], [we] express them only with names (*ming tsam du*). [These expressions] are *nāmakāyāḥ*.

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[150] T676.16.699b28ff.

[151] This explanation is different from that of the *Jñānaprasthāna* text, because the *Jñānaprasthāna* explains *vyañjana* as basis of not *nāman* but only *pada* (a portion of a verse).

[152] In this context, the own-being (*svabhāva*) and the own characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*) are not differentiated. The PSkV also identifies the own-being with the own characteristic. See PSkV, 84.16: "the own-being is the own characteristic" (*svabhāvaḥ svalakṣaṇam*).

What are *padakāyāḥ*? With regard to the designation of the specific quality (*bye brag*, chabie 差別, **viśeṣa*) of the factors, of which the own characteristic is [already] designated, [we] establish the proliferation (*spros pa*, **prapañca*) of virtue (*yon tan*), fault (*skyon*), defilement (*kun nas nyon mongs pa*), and purification (*rnam par byang ba*). [This proliferation] is *padakāyāḥ*.

What are *vyañjanakāyāḥ*? *Vyañjanakāyāḥ* are the syllable sets (*yi ge'i 'bru'i thsogs*) which appear as the entities which are the basis of *nāmakāya* and *padakāya*.

de la ming gi tshogs rnams gang zhe na/ chos rnams kyi ngo bo nyid du 'dogs pa dang/ rang gi mtshan nyid du 'dogs pa las brtsams te/ rjes su tha snyad gdags pa'i phyir yongs su brtag[153] pa nye bar bzung nas ming tsam du rnam par 'jog pa gang yin pa de dag ni ming gi tshogs rnams zhes bya'o//

tshig gi tshogs rnams gang zhe na/ rang gi mtshan nyid du btags pa'i chos de dag nyid kyi bye brag tu 'dogs pa las brtsams te/ yon tan dang skyon dang/ kun nas nyon mongs pa dang rnam par byang ba'i spros pa rnams pa 'jog pa ni tshig gi tshogs rnams zhes bya'o//

yi ge'i tshogs rnams gang zhe na/ ming gi tshogs dang/ tshig gi tshogs kyi rten[154] gyi dngos por yi ge'i 'bru'i tshogs rnams ni yi ge'i tshogs rnams zhes bya ste.[155]

復次, 云何名身？ 謂依諸法自性施設自相施設, 由遍分別為隨言說唯建立想, 是謂名身.

云何句身？ 謂即依彼自相施設所有諸法差別施設, 建立功德過失雜染清淨戲論, 是謂句身.

云何文身？ 謂名身句身所依止性所有字身, 是謂文身.[156]

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[153] *Ibid.*, p. 86. brtag D; btags P.

[154] rten P; brten D.

[155] D4038.zhi24a4ff.

[156] The *Yuqie shidi lun* 瑜伽師地論, translated by Xuanzang (T1579.30. 587c11ff).

According to the explanation of the ViSg, we designate own-being (*svabhāva*) of the factors and express it through *nāman*-s. Choosing the factor of which the own-being is designated, we conceptualize various qualities (*viśeṣa*) of the factor like virtue, fault, and so on and express the conceptualization through *pada*-s.

The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (AS) explains this relation as follows:

What are *nāmakāyāḥ*? The designations of the own-being of factors are called *nāmakāyāḥ*. What are *padakāyāḥ*? The designations of the specific quality of factors are *padakāyāḥ*. What are *vyañjanakāyāḥ*? The syllables, that is, the basis of both [*nāman* and *pada*] (*tadubhayāśrayāni akṣarāni*), are called *vyañjanakāyāḥ*, insofar as they manifest (*abhivyañjanatā*) both ["name" and "phrase"]. It is also sound (*varṇa*), insofar as it communicates (*saṃvarṇatā*) the object-referent (*artha*). It is also "the unchangeable thing" (*akṣara*), insofar as it is not changeable into any alternative (*paryāya*).

nāmakāyāḥ katame? dharmāṇāṃ svabhāvādhivacane nāmakāyā iti prajñaptiḥ. padakāyāḥ katame? dharmāṇāṃ viśeṣādhivacane padakāyā iti prajñaptiḥ. vyañjnakāyāḥ katame? tadubhayāśrayeṣv akṣareṣu vyañjanakāyā iti prajñaptiḥ, tadubhayābhivyañjanatām upādāya. varṇo 'pi saḥ, arthasaṃvarṇanatām upādāya. akṣaraṃ punaḥ, paryāyākṣaraṇatām upādāya.[157]

ming gi tshogs gang zhe na/ chos rnams kyi ngo bo nyid kyi tshig bla dags la ming gi tshogs zhes gdags so// tshig gi tshogs gang zhe na/ chos rnams kyi khyad par gyi tshig bla dags la tshig gi tshogs zhes gdags so// yi ge'i tshogs gang zhe na/ de gnyid ga'i gnas yi ge rnams la yi ge'i tshogs zhes gdags te/ de gnyi ga gsal bar byed pa'i phyir ro// rjod pa yang de yin te/ don yang dag par brjod pa'i phyir ro// yi ge ni rnam grangs su gtogs pa gzhan du mi 'gyur bar byed pa'i phyir ro.[158]

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[157] AS_G, 19; Kramer 2013a, 1026.

[158] D4049, 52b-53a.

何等名身？ 謂於諸法自性增言， 假立名身． 何等句身？ 謂於諸法差別增言，

假立句身． 何等文身？ 謂於彼二所依諸字， 假立文身， 此言文者能彰彼二故．

此又名顯， 能顯彼義故． 此復名字， 無異轉故． [159]

In the commentary *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* (ASBh) we find the following examples of

nāman, *pada*, and *vyañjana*:

The designations of the own-being are [expressions] like "eye", "ear", "god",
"human", and so on.[160] ... The designations of the specific quality are [expressions]
like "all the conditioned [factors] are impermanent", "all beings will die", and so on ...
Syllables ('gyur med, *zi* 字, **akṣara*) are [phonemes] like "a", "i", "u", and so on.

ngo bo nyid kyi tshig bla dags zhes bya ba ni mig dang rna ba dang lha dang mi zhes
bya ba la sogs pa'o// khyad par gyi tshig bla dags zhes bya ba ni 'du byed thams cad
mi rtag pa'o// sems can thams cad 'chi bar 'gyur ro zhes bya ba la sogs pa'o// … yi ge
rnams la zhes bya ba ni … yi ge a i u zhes bya ba la sogs pa'o.[161]

自性增言者， 謂說天人眼耳等事．… 差別增言者， 謂說諸行無常， 一切有情當死
等義．… 諸字者，… 如裒壹鄔等． [162]

The implication of this explanation of the three terms should be elaborated in more detail. The

passage of the Saṃdh, which I introduced in the previous chapter, explains the relationship

between *nāman* and *pada* as follows: *Nāman* corresponds to the two words constituting the

sentence, that is, "conditioned [factors]" (*saṃskāra*, the expression of an own-being) and

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[159] T1605.31.665c18ff.

[160] In the Chinese version (T1606.31.700c02), the examples are enumerated as follows: "'god' (*tian*
天), 'human' (*ren* 人), 'eye' (*yan* 眼), 'ear' (*er* 耳), and so on (*deng* 等)" (天人眼耳等).

[161] D4053.8bff.

[162] 壹鄔【大】＝鄔壹【元】【明】; T1606.31.700c02ff.

"impermanent": (*anitya*, the expression of a specific quality); *Pada* is the whole sentence "the conditioned [factors] are impermanent" (*saṃskārā anityāḥ*).

The passages found in the ViSg and AS explain this relationship in a different way: *Nāman* is a word expressing the own-being, that is, "conditioned [factors]" (*saṃskāra*); *Pada* is a word expressing the specific quality, that is, "impermanent" (*anitya*). However, because the specific quality refers to the quality attributed to the own-being ("impermanence of the conditioned [factors]"), the expression of the specific quality appears in the form of a sentence, for example, "the conditioned [factors] are impermanent" (*saṃskārā anityāḥ*). In this sense, there is no difference in the meaning of *pada* as defined in the former passage of the Saṃdhi and *pada* as characterized in the latter passages of the ViSg and AS.

Then, why was the definition of *pada* slightly modified? In my opinion, this change reflects the attempt of some Buddhists to harmonize the traditional Buddhist definition of *pada*, i.e., "sentence" with its definition in the Sanskrit grammar, namely, "word". My opinion is grounded on the explanation of the AKBh and its commentaries. Given my understanding is correct, these texts also attempt to harmonize the two conflicting definitions of *pada*. The AKBh defines *pada* in the following way:

> *Pada* is a sentence (*vākya*), in the sense that it completely defines (*parisamāpti*) the object-referent (*artha*), for example, "oh, the conditioned [factors are] impermanent", and so on. By this [*pada*], the specific qualities (*viśeṣa*) related (*saṃbandha*) to activity (*kriya*), attribute (*guṇa*) and time (*kāla*) are understood.

> vākyaṃ padaṃ, yāvatā 'rthaparisamāptis, tadyathā anityā bata saṃskārā ity evamādi. yena kriyāguṇakālasaṃbandhaviśeṣā gamyante.[163]

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[163] AKBh, 80:14ff.

ngag ni tshig ste/ dper na/ kye ma 'du byed rnams mi rtag/ ces bya ba de lta bu la sogs pa ji tsam gyis don yongs su rdzogs pa ste/ gang gis bya ba dang yon tan dang dus kyi 'brel ba'i khyad par rtogs par 'gyur ro.[164]

句者謂章詮義究竟， 如說諸行無常等章． 或能辯了業用德時相應差別． 此章稱句.[165]

句謂所立言． 隨量能成就所欲說義． 如有為皆無常， 如是等． 若由此言事得時相應差別顯現， 此言稱句． 如偈言善友一時遇.[166]

The AKBh defines *pada* as a sentence (*vākya*), and then adds the phrase "in the sense that [*pada*] completely defines the object-referent" (*yāvatā 'rthaparisamāptiḥ*). Jaini suggests that the phrase is probably added, in order to adjust the definition of *pada* to the definition of *pada* offered by Sanskrit Grammarians.[167] Jaini's suggestion appears convincing because as it is supported by the commentaries to the AKBh. Yaśomitra's *Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* (Vyākhyā) comments on the definition "*pada* is sentence (*vākya*)" in the following way:

Pada is a sentence (*vākya*). [A sentence] is understood by this [*pada*], that is, it is attained (*padyate*) [by this *pada*]. However, *pada* is a word with nominal declension or verbal conjugation.

vākyaṃ padam iti. padyate gamyate 'neneti. padaṃ tu suptiṅantaṃ padaṃ gṛhyate.[168]

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[164] D4090.ku84b.

[165] *Apidamo jushe lun* 阿毘達磨俱舍論, translated by Xuanzang (henceforth, AKBhX). T1558.29.29a12ff.

[166] *Apidamo jushu shi* 阿毘達磨俱舍釋, translated by Paramārtha (henceforth, AKBhP). T.1559.29.187b09ff.

[167] Jaini 1959a, 99.

[168] Vyākhyā, 182.3ff.

The phrase "a word with nominal declension or verbal conjugation" is the definition of *pada* found in Pāṇini's grammar *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.4.14.[169] According to this comment, *pada* is a sentence in that *pada* is an essential word to make one understand the meaning of a sentence. The *Tattvārthā* explains this aspect of *pada* as followings:

In this context, it is *nāman* because it illuminates the own characteristic (*rang gi mtshan nyid*, **svalakṣaṇa*),[170] like "[visible] matter (*gzugs*, **rūpa*)" and "sound (*sgra*, **śabda*).[171] It is *pada* because it manifests the specific quality (*khyad par*, **viśeṣa*) related to activity (*bya ba*, **kriya*), attribute (*yon tan*, **guṇa*) and time (*dus*, **kāla*).[172] [*Pada*] is a word with nominal inflection or verbal conjugation (*sup dang ting gi mtha' can*, ** suptiṅanta*).[173] In this context, "that which manifests the specific quality related to activity" is [the verb] like "[one] cooks" (*'tshed do*), "[one] recites" (*'don to*), and "[one] goes" (*'gro'o*). "That which manifests the specific quality related to attribute" is [the adjective] like "[one] is white" (*dkar po'o*) and "[one] is dark" (*nag po'o*). "That which manifests the specific quality related to time" is [the verb with tense] like "[one] cooks" (*'tshed do*, that is, the present form of the verb), "[one] will cook" (*'tshed par 'gyur ro*, that is, the future form of the verb), "[one] cooked" (*btsos so*, that is, the past form of the verb).[174] This is said in order to explain in detail (*'byung*

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[169] Böhtlingk 1887, 32.

[170] Vyākhyā, 182.31ff: "That which illuminates the own characteristic is *nāman*" (*tad evaṃ sva-lakṣaṇābhidyotakaṃ nāma*).

[171] AKBh, 80.13: "[Nāman is,] for example, matter and sound" (*tadyathā rūpaṃ śabda ity evamādhiḥ*).

[172] AKBh, 80.15: "The specific qualities related to activity, attribute, and time are understood by the [*pada*]" (*kriyāguṇakālasaṃbandhaviśeṣā gamyante*); Vyākhyā, 182.32ff: "It is said that *pada* is what illuminates the specific quality related to activity, and so on" (*kriyādisambandhaviśeṣābhidyotakaṃ padam ity uktaṃ bhavati*).

[173] Vyākhyā, 182.3ff: "*Pada* is included in the word with nominal inflection or verbal conjugation" (*padaṃ tu suptiṅantaṃ padaṃ gṛhyate*).

[174] Vyākhyā, 182.28ff.: "For example, 'cooking, reciting, and going', 'dark, yellow, and red', and 'cooking, being going to cook, and having cook' are understood as the specific quality related to activity, attribute, and time. It is *pada*" (*tadyathā pacati paṭhati gacchatīti kṛṣṇo gauro rakta iti. pacati pakṣyati apākṣīd iti kriyāguṇakālānāṃ sambandhaviśeṣā gamyante. tat padam*).

ba) the passage [in the AKBh] "in the sense that it completely defines (*parisamāpti*) the object-referent" (*artha*).

de la rang gi mtshan nyid gsal bar byed pas na ming ste/ **gzugs dang sgra zhes bya ba lta bu'o// bya ba dang yon tan dang dus dang 'brel pa'i khyad par ston par byed pa** ni tshig ste/ sup dang ting gi mtha' can no// de la bya ba dang 'brel pa'i khyad par ston par byed pa ni/ 'tshed do// 'don to// 'gro'o zhes bya ba lta bu'o// yon tan dang 'brel pa'i khyad par ston par byed pa ni dkar po'o nag po'o zhes bya ba lta bu'o// dus dang 'brel pa'i khyad par ston par byed pa ni/ 'tshed do// 'tshed par 'gyur ro// btsos so zhes bya ba lta bu ste/ **ji tsam gyis don yongs su rdzogs pa ste** zhes 'byung ba'i phyir ro.[175]

The *Tattvārthā* also explains *pada* as an inflected adjective or verb which modifies a subject. In this sense, *pada* is a word. However, it is identified with a sentence because it is essential for the meaning of the sentence. A similar definition of a sentence is also found in the explanation of the Sanskrit grammarians:[176]

A sentence is a single inflected verb-form.
ekatiṅ vākyam.

A sentence (*vākya*) is a verb(-form) (*ākhyāta*) along with the [related] indeclinables (*avyaya*), *kāraka* and qualifiers.[177]
ākhyātaṃ sāvyayakārakaviśeṣaṇaṃ vākyam.

In this definition, a verb is considered as the "keyword" of a sentence and is identified with the sentence itself, while the other components of the sentence are considered as sub-elements of the verb.[178] The AKBh's and its commentaries's explanations are different only in the sense that according to theses texts an adjective can also function as a keyword. In this way, the AKBh and its commentaries harmonize two conflicting definitions of *pada*, that is, *pada* as a sentence and *pada* as a word.

It is notable that the *Tattvārthā* introduces other Buddhists who insist that the whole sentence should be considered as *pada*. This shows that not all the Buddhists agreed with the harmonization of the two different definitions of *pada*.

Some say that *pada* is only a [complete] expression (*mngon par brjod pa*). They teach that [it is] the brief statement (*mdor bstan pa*) like "Oh, the conditioned [factors] are impermanent", by which the specific quality related to activity, attribute, and time is understood.

gzhan dag na re mngon par brjod pa gcig kho na tshig go zhes zer ro// kye ma 'du byed rnams mi rtag/ ces mdor bstan pa gang gis bya ba dang yon tan dang dus dang 'brel pa'i khyad par so sor rtogs par bstan to.[179]

To sum up, there are various kinds of definition of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* in northern Indian Abhidharma and Yogācāra texts. Each text interprets the meaning of the three terms on its own ground. Therefore, the two definitions of the AKBh and the PSk, which are the main focus of this study, are not supported by all the northern Indian Abhidharma and Yogācāra texts.

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[178] For the more detailed explanation, and also for the differences between the grammarian and the Nyāya schools, see Deshpande 1978, 200-201.

[179] D4421.tho252a.

Only some of those texts share some similarities with the AKBh and the PSk, with regard to the definition of the three terms.

The *Jñānaprasthāna* texts, that is, the *Apidan bajiandu lun* 阿毘曇八犍度論 (T1543) and The *Apidamo fazhi lun* 阿毘達磨發智論 (T1544), are the earliest texts which define *pada* as a phrase through interpreting *pada* as the portion of a verse (*pāda*). The earliest texts which explain *pada* as a "sentence" (*vākya*) are some of the "Hṛdaya" texts, that is, the *Apitan xinlun* 阿毘曇心論 (T1551) and the *Za apitan xinlun* 雜阿毘曇心論 (T1552). These Hṛdaya texts are also the earliest text which explain *vyañjana* as a syllable as the basis of both *nāman* and *pada*.

It is noteworthy that there are the remarkable variations even among the texts defining the three terms as a word, a sentence, and a syllable respectively in their own ways. Some define *pada* as a whole sentence, and some define *pada* as a keyword in the sentence. These variations could be understood as the various responses to the Sanskrit grammar.

These variations are also found among the *Tattvārthā* and the commentaries of the PSk. They all explain three terms as a word, a sentence, and a syllable, respectively. The *Tattvārthā* and the PSkV define *pada* as a sentence in the sense that *pada* is a keyword of a sentence, and the PSkBh rather defines *pada* as a whole sentence.

5. Characteristics of *Nāman*, *Pada*, and *Vyañjana*

5.1 Factor Dissociated from Mind

Even though the definitions of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* differ in the texts under discussion, all the available Sarvāstivāda works commonly characterize them as the "factors dissociated from mind" (*cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*). The previous studies show that many texts consider these factors as dissociated not only from mind but also from material factors (*rūpacittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*).[180] The Sarvāstivādins generally consider these factors as real entities, whereas the Sautrāntikas in the AKBh and the Yogācārins in general do not agree that there are such real entities. With regard to the nature of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana*, the main issue discussed controversially between the Sarvāstivādins and other traditions is the relationship between the three factors and sound. Sound belongs to matter (*rūpa*), and the Sarvāstivādins in the AKBh consider the three factors as real entities different from sound. They argue that sound is the own-being (*svabhāva*) of speech (*vāc*) but not of the three factors.

One of the Vibhāṣā texts, the *Apitan piposha lun* 阿毘曇毘婆沙論 (T1546) explains the three factors from various aspects. A passage states that the difference between the Sanskrit grammarian's understanding and the view of the the *Apitan piposha lun* 阿毘曇毘婆沙論 is as follows:

> Moreover, some like the Sanskrit grammarians want to [explain it as follows:] Syllables (*zi* 字, *akṣara*) belong to the factor "matter" (*sefa* 色法, *rūpa*). The own-being (*ti* 體 *svabhāva*) of a syllable is sound and sound is included in the "constituent of matter" (*seyin* 色陰, *rūpaskandha*).
>
> In order to refute this kind of opinion, [*Kātyāyanaputra, Jiazhanyanzi 迦旃延子,] composed this treatise. A syllable is a factor dissociated from mind, and [the factors

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[180] On the various interpretations of the compound *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra* in Sarvāstivāda texts, see Cox 1995, 69ff.

dissociated from mind] are included in the constituent of impulses (*xingyin* 行陰, **saṃskāraskandha*).[181]

復有說者， 如聲論家， 欲令： 字是色法. 字體是聲， 聲是色陰所攝.
為斷如是意故，作如是說，字是心不相應行，行陰所攝.[182]

It is not only the Sanskrit grammarians who have a different opinion. Another Vibhāṣā text, the *Apidamo da piposha lun* 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (T1545), introduces the viewpoint of the Dārṣṭāntika (*piyuzhe* 譬喻者) which also differs from the above explanation:

Moreover, some say that [this treatise was composed] in order to prevent other groups from explaining their own opinion. Some like the Dārṣṭāntika (*piyuzhe* 譬喻者) insist that the set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* (*mingjuwenshen* 名句文身, **nāmapada-vyañjanakāya*) are not the factors existing as real entities. Some like the Sanskrit grammarians insist that the set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* have sound (*sheng* 聲, **ghoṣa*) as their own-being. In order to refute this insistence and explain that the name set, and so on, are the factors existing as real entities and are included in the factors dissociated from mind, [that is, not included in the category of matter (*rūpa*)], [**Kātyāyanaputra, Jiazhanyanzi* 迦旃延子] composes this treatise.

有說，為止他宗顯己義故. 謂或有執名句文身，非實有法，如譬喻者. 或復有執名句文身，聲為自性，如聲論者. 為止彼執，顯名身等是實有法，是不相應行蘊所攝故，作斯論.[183]

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[181] On the relationship between this category and "five constituents" (*pañcaskandha*), See Kramer 2014, xvff.

[182] T1546.28.057a01ff.

[183] T1545.27.070a03ff.

This passage clearly shows that the Sarvāstivādins consider the three factors as real entities different from sound. It also shows that this opinion of the Sarvāstivādins was controversial. The *Abhidharmāvatāra (*rab tu byed pa chos mngon pa la 'jug pa*, D4098; *Ru apidamo lun* 入阿毘達磨論, T1554, attributed to *Skandhila Saijiantuoluo 塞建陀羅, translated by Xuanzang) explains the necessity of the existence of the three factors in the following way:

> For example, [The set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* are] like the cognition of seeing (*mig gi rnam par shes pa*, *yanshi* 眼識, *cakṣurvijñāna*), and so on, which arises depending on [the sense-faculty of] seeing (*mig*, *yan* 眼), and so on, which has the form (*rnam pa*, *yingxiang* 影像) corresponding to (*tshul gyis gnas lta bu*, *dai* 帶) the object of "matter" (*gzugs*, *se* 色), and so on, and which leads to the understanding of [its] own object (*rang gi don*, *zijing* 自境). It is not the case that the sound of speech can manifest (*brjod pa*) the object-referent [directly, that is, without the set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana*]. [If it were the case, the mouth] would undoubtedly (*ta re*) burn through expressing (*brjod pa*) "fire".[184] An expression [in the form of] speech (*ngag tu brjod pa*) [is not the expression of the object-referent but] the expression of the name "fire". The name leads to the understanding of the object-referent of fire. It, [that is, "leading to the understanding"] means giving rise to the cognition (*blo*, *buddhi*).

> dper na mig la sogs pa la rag las te/ skye ba mig gi rnam par shes pa la sogs pa/ gzugs la sogs pa'i don gyi tshul gyis gnas lta bu'i rnam par rang gi don khong du chud par byed pa rnams bzhin no// ngag gi sgras ni don brjod par mi 'gyur te/ me zhes brjod pas tshig par gyur ta re/ ngag tu brjod pas ni me'i ming brjod pa yin no// ming[185] gis ni me'i don khong du chud par byed de/ de'i blo skyed do zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go.[186]

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[184] According to the Chinese version: "It should not be insisted that the mouth burns when speaking fire".

[185] mig D.

[186] D4098.320a.

如眼識等依眼等生，　帶色等義影像而現，　能了自境. 名等亦爾. 非即,
語音親能詮義. 勿, 說火時便燒於口. 要, 依語故火等名生. 由火等名詮火等義.
詮者謂能於所顯義生他覺慧, 非與義合.[187]

This passage compares the three factors *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* with the cognition of each sense-faculty. The sense-faculty of seeing is the basic factor for perceiving a visible object, but the cognition of seeing should exist as an entity different from the sense-faculty in order to perceive the object. Likewise, the sound of the speech is the basic factor for communicating an object-referent, but the three factors should exist as entities different from the sound. These relations can be summarized as follows:

Cognition of seeing (*cakṣurvijñāna*), etc.	Name (*nāman*), phrase (*pada*), and phoneme (*vyañjana*)
Sense-faculty of seeing (*cakṣurindriya*), etc.	Sound of speech
Object	Object

The AKBh paraphrases the relationship between the three factors and sound in the following way:

> They, [that is, name set, phrase set, and phoneme set,] do not have speech as their own-being. Speech is indeed sound, but object-referents are not understood only through sound. Then how? The speech arises in the name,[188] [and] the name illuminates the object-referent.

> naite vāksvabhāvāḥ. ghoṣo hi vāk, na ca ghoṣamātrenārthāḥ pratīyante. kiṃ tarhi? vāṅ nāmni pravartate nāmārthaṃ dyotayati.[189]

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[187] T1554.28.0987c25ff.

[188] Vasubandhu in the AKBh continues to discuss the expression "the speech arises in the name" (*vāṅ nāmni pravartate, ngag ni ming la 'jug la*). He does not find this expression clear, especially the word "in the name" (*nāmni, ming la*), and requires elaborating the explanation. See chapter 10.7ff.

[189] AKBh, 80:23ff.

de dag ni ngag gi rang bzhin ma yin te/ ngag gi sgra yin na sgra tsam gyis ni don gang dag go bar mi 'gyur ro// 'o na ci zhe na/ ngag ni ming la 'jug la ming gis ni don rjod par byed do.[190]

此三非以語為自性. 語是音聲, 非唯音聲即令了義. 云何令了? 謂語發名, 名能顯義, 乃能令了.[191]

此法不以言說為性. 何以故? 音聲即是言說, 不由唯音聲諸義可解. 云何可解? 音聲起於名, 名能顯示義.[192]

In this passage, the Sarvāstivādin explains the relationship between speech sound and the three factors as follows: The speech causes the manifestation of the name, and the name illuminates the object-referent. The Sautrāntika in the AKBh does not accept the idea that there should be any real entities, which illuminate the object-referent but are different from the speech. The Sautrāntika argues that the name is the specific sound: A name is constituted by the specific syllables which are determined as a name by linguistic conventions. That is, when a sound is conventionally established to indicate an object-referent (*artha*), that sound is called a name:

The mere sound is not the speech, but the speech is the sound by which an object-referent is understood. In turn, by which sound is an object-referent understood? [It is through the sound] of which the limitation is made by speakers.

naiva ghoṣamātraṃ vāg. yena tu ghoṣenārthaḥ pratīyate sa ghoṣo vāk. kena punar ghoṣeṇārthaḥ pratīyate? yo 'rtheṣu kṛtāvadhir vaktṛbhis.[193]

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[190] D4090.ku84b.

[191] AKBh$_X$, T1558.29.29a24ff.

[192] AKBh$_P$, T1559.29.187b21ff.

[193] AKBh, 80.24ff.

sgra tsam kho na ni ngag ma yin gyi sgra gang gis don go bar 'gyur ba'i sgra de dag yin no// yang sgra gang gis don go bar 'gyur zhe na/ gang gis smra ba po rnams kyis don dag la mtshams bcad pa ste.[194]

非但音聲皆稱為語.　要由此故義可了知,　如是音聲方稱語故.　何等音聲令義可了? 謂能說者, 於諸義中已共立為能詮定量.[195]

不唯音聲稱言.　若由此音聲義可了知,　此音聲則稱言.　由何音聲而義可解? 若說者於義中已共立定法.[196]

Like the Sautrāntikas, the Yogācārins also do not consider the "factors dissociated from mind" as real entities. The PSkV explains the reason for this in the following way:

The dissociated factors are those which are expressed with regard to the states (*avasthā*) of material factors, mind and mental factors, and not expressed as being different from them.

ye rūpacittacaitasikāvasthāsu prajñapyante tattvānyatvataś ca na prajñapyante, te viprayuktāḥ saṃskārāḥ.[197]

gang dag gzugs dang sems dang sems las byung ba'i gnas skabs la gdags pa ste/ de nyid dang gzhan du mi gdags so zhes de dag spyir bstan te/ de dag ni mi ldan pa'i 'du byed yin pa.[198]

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[194] D4090.ku84b.

[195] AKBh~X~, T1558.29.29a26ff.

[196] AKBh~P~, T1559.29.187b23ff.

[197] PSkV, 74.8ff.

[198] D4066.225b.

The PSkV explains that the factors dissociated [from mind] are not real entities but the expressions of certain states (*avasthā*) of either matter (*rūpa*), the mind (*citta*), or a mental factor (*caitasika*). For example, when a sound is in the state of indicating an object-referent, this sound is called a name. In this sense, a name is a designation of a sound in a specific state, and it is not a real entity separated from the sound.

I could not find a clear answer to why the Sarvāstivādins included the three factors of *nāman*, etc., in the category of the "factors dissociated from mind". I cannot find any passages explaining the Sarvāstivādins′ motive for developing this idea. Thus, we can only speculate about the reasons. A possible problem that the Sarvāstivādins encountered might have been the relationship between the speech and the writing. The AKBh records the following discussion:

> [The Sautrāntika asks:] "Moreover, are syllables (*akṣara*) not the names of the [written] letters?" (*lipi*) [The Sarvāstivādin responds:] syllables are not established (*praṇīta*), [that is, they are not pronounced] in order to make one understand the [written] letters, but the [written] letters are established, [that is, they are written] in order to make one understand the syllables, with the thought 'how could [syllables] not being heard be understood by writing (*lekhya*)?' Therefore, syllables are not the names of those [members of the written letters].

> nanu cākṣarāṇy api lipyavayavānāṃ nāmāni? na vai lipyavayavānāṃ pratyāyanārtham akṣarāṇi praṇītāny akṣarāṇām eva tu pratyāyānārthaṃ lipyavayavāḥ praṇītāḥ, katham aśrūyamāṇāni lekhyena pratīyerann iti, nākṣarāṇy eṣāṃ nāmāni.[199]

[199] AKBh, 80.15ff.

yi ge rnams kyang yig[200] 'bru'i yan lag dag gi ming dag ma yin nam zhe na/ yi ge 'bru'i yan lag rnams go bar bya ba'i phyir yi ge rnams byas pa ni ma yin gyi/ ji ltar na mi{ng} thos pa bris pas go bar 'gyur zhes yi ge rnams go bar bya ba'i phyir ni yi ge'i 'bru rnams byas pa yin pas/ yi ge rnams ni de dag gi ming ma yin no.[201]

豈不此字亦書分名？ 非為顯書分製造諸字， 但為顯諸字製造書分. '云何當令雖不聞說而亦得解？' 故造書分. 是故諸字非書分名.[202]

為不如此耶？ 字者書類分別名？ 若不為顯書類分故造立字,[203] 為顯字故造立書類分. '若不聞說字, 此字由書方便云何應知？' 為令知故立書類分. 是故字非非書類分名.[204]

A syllable (*akṣara*) is a synonym of a phoneme (*vyañjana*) in the AKBh. The Sautrāntika considers a syllable as the name of a written letter (*lipi*). Contrary to this, the Sarvāstivādin explains that the sound of a syllable and the writing of a syllable are different from the syllable itself. According to the Sarvāstivādin, they are the cause or means of the manifestation of the syllable. Like the syllables, the set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* is also manifested by the speech or the writing.

Therefore, from the perspective of the Sarvāstivādin, the expression of the doctrine should be distinct from the speech of the doctrine, because the doctrine could be expressed not only through the speech but also through the writing. This Sarvāstivādin's explanation might reflect the fact that the Buddhist doctrine was transmitted through the oral transmission and the

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[200] yi ge D.

[201] D4090.ku84b.

[202] AKBh$_X$, T1558.29.29a22ff.

[203] 別名若【宋】【元】【明】【宮】, 名君【大】.

[204] 非【宋】【元】【明】【宮】, 非非【大】; AKBh$_P$, T1559.29.187b12ff.

written scriptures at that time.[205] This interesting topic should be studied further with more textual evidence.

5.2 Description of All Subjects to be Learnt

The set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* is often explained as the expression opposed with the concept of "meaning" (*artha*), in the same way as the term *vyañjana* is regarded as a counterpart to the meaning. The *Apidamo jiyimen zulun* 阿毘達磨集異門足論 (T1536, **Abhidharmasaṃgītiparyāyapādaśāstra* or **Saṅgīti-paryāya*) explains the expression of the doctrine (*dharma*) and the meaning of the doctrine in following way:

> Question: What is the doctrine (*fa* 法 **dharma*)?[206] Answer: The set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* is called the doctrine. That is, the previous great teacher (*dashi* 大師) and the respectable and wise fellow-students (*zunzhong youzhi tong fanxing zhe* 尊重有智同梵行者) explained and established [the doctrine] for them, [that is, for the monks and nuns,] through the set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana*. They awakened [people from] conceptualization and clarified [the doctrine]. Because of this, they are called those who explained the essence of the doctrine. The one who explains the essence of the doctrine rightly, as the great teacher or as a respectable and wise fellow-student, has the correct knowledge of [both] the right [expression] of the doctrine (*ruofa* 若法, **yathādharma*) and the right meaning [of the doctrine] (*ruoyi* 若義, **yathārtha*) with regard to the essence of the doctrine.
>
> Question: What does [the phrase] "having the correct knowledge of the right [expression] of the doctrine" mean? Answer: The set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* constitutes the doctrine. Because he/she masters various kinds of the doctrine firmly, exactly, and clearly, and attains the incomparable knowledge without retrogression

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[205] See also Hartmann 2009, 95ff.

[206] Stache-Rosen translates as "*Lehre*" in German. See Stache-Rosen 1968, 151

(*wutuizhuan* 無退轉, **anivartanīya*), he/she is called the one who has the correct knowledge of the right [expression] of doctrine.

Question: What does [the phrase] "having the correct knowledge of the right meaning [of the doctrine]" mean? Answer: That which should be illuminated, understood, explained, conceptualized, shown, taught, and introduced by the set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* is called the meaning. The one who masters various kinds of the meaning [of the doctrine] firmly, exactly, clearly, and attains the incomparable knowledge without retrogression is called the one having the correct knowledge of the right meaning [of the doctrine].

問: 法云何? 答: 名身句身文身是名為法. 即, 前大師尊重有智同梵行者, 以諸名身句身文身, 為彼宣說施設建立. 開顯分別, 明了開示. 由此故, 言為說法要. 如如大師或有隨一尊重有智同梵行者為說法要, 如是如是, 彼於法要能正了知若法若義者. [207]

問: 能正了知若法云何? 答: 名身句身文身是名為法. 彼於此法等了近了明了通達品類差別, 獲得無二無退轉智故, 名能正了知若法.

問: 能正了知若義云何? 答: 名身句身文身所顯所了所說所遍說所示所等示所開名義, 彼於此義等了近了明了通達品類差別, 獲得無二無退轉智. 是名能正了知若義. [208]

The *Apidamo da piposha lun* 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (T1545) elaborates the doctrine expressed by the set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* in the following way:

There are two kinds of the true doctrine (*zhengfa* 正法, **saddharma*). One is the mundane true doctrine (*shisu zhenfa* 世俗正法, **laukikaḥ saddharmaḥ*), and the other is the ultimate true doctrine (*shengyi zhengfa* 勝義正法, **paramārthaḥ saddharmaḥ*). The mundane true doctrine is the set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana*. It

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[207] 知【大】. 智【明】.

[208] Attributed to Śāriputra (*Shelizi* 舍利子). Translated by Xuanzang. T1536.26.425a1ff.

includes the sūtras (*sudalan* 素怛纜), the vinayas (*pinaiye* 毘奈耶), and abhidharmas (*apidamo* 阿毘達磨). The ultimate true doctrine is the noble path (*shengdao* 聖道, **āryamārga*). It includes "the uncontaminated" (*wulou* 無漏, **anāsrava*), the power (*genli* 根力, **mūlabala*), the limbs of awakening (*juezhi* 覺支, **bodhyaṅga*), and the limbs of the path (*daozhi* 道支, **mārgāṅga*).

有二種正法. 一世俗正法, 二勝義正法. 世俗正法謂名句文身. 即素怛纜毘奈耶阿毘達磨. 勝義正法謂聖道. 即無漏根力覺支道支.[209]

This passage clearly shows that the set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* is closely related to the "three baskets" (*tripiṭaka*). Although there are some variations, the set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* is explained as the expression of the Buddhist doctrine, through which the meaning of the Buddhist doctrine or the meditative technique could be attained. The ŚrBh also explains in the similar way:

In this context, what is a *sūtra*? [It is] that which is a speech (*kathā*) made here and there to these and those disciples by the Blessed One regarding these and those practices of the discipline, either related to the "constitutes" (*skandha*), or related to the "elements" (*dhātu*), or related to the "collection of elements" (*dhātusaṃgaṇa*), or related to the "sense-fields" (*āyatana*), or related to the "dependent origination" (*pratītyasamutpāda*), or related to the "foods" (*āhāra*) and the "truths" (*satya*), or related to the "disciples" (*śrāvaka*), the *pratyekabuddha*s and the Tathāgatas, or related to the "applications of mindfulness" (*smṛtyupasthāna*), to the "correct abandonings" (*samyakprahāṇa*), to the bases of supernatural power (*ṛddhipāda*), to the faculties (*indriya*), the powers (*bala*), the members of awakening (*bodhyaṅga*), and the members of the path (*mārgāṅga*), or a speech related to [the practice on] impurity, to the training of mindfulness of the breath (*ānāpānasmṛtiśikṣā*), and the serenity [based on] trusting faith (*avetyaprasāda*). This speech being collected

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[209] T1545.27.917c20ff.

(*parigṛhya*) by the "holders of recitation" (*saṃgītikāraiḥ*) is suitably (*yathāyogam*) arranged in order (*anupūrveṇa racitā*) and orderly joined [to doctrine] orderly (*anupūrveṇa samyuktā*) for the long preservation of the doctrine (*śāsanacirasthitaye*, *bstan pa yun ring du gnas par bya ba'i don du*), by means of the suitable (*pratirūpa*) "name set" (*nāmakāya*), "phrase set" (*padakāya*), and "phoneme set" (*vyañjanakāya*) for indicating (*sūcanāyai*) these and those virtuous object-referents (*artha*) accompanied by virtuous benefit (*arthopasaṃhitāna*) and accompanied by celibacy (*brahmacaryopasaṃhita*). This is called a *sūtra*.

tatra sūtraṃ katamat? yat tatra tatra bhagavatā tāṃs tān vineyāṃs tāni tāni vineyacaritāni cārabhya skandhapratisaṃyuktā vā kathā kṛtā, dhātupratisaṃyuktā vā kathā kṛtā, dhātusaṃgaṇapratisayuktā vā, āyatanapratisaṃyuktā vā, pratītyasamutpādapratisaṃyuktā vā, āhārasatyapratisaṃyuktā vā, śrāvakapratyekabuddhatathāgatapratisaṃyuktā vā, smṛtyupasthāna-samyakprahāṇa-rddhipādendriya-bala-bodhyaṅga-mārgāṅga-pratisaṃyuktā vā, aśubhānāpānasmṛti-śikṣāvetyaprasādapratisaṃyuktā kathā kṛtā. sā ca kathā saṃgītikāraiḥ parigṛhya śāsanacirasthitaye yathāyogam anupūrveṇa racitānupūrveṇa samāyuktā pratirūpair nāmakāyapadakāyavyañjanakāyair, yaduta teṣāṃ teṣām arthānāṃ sūcanāyai kuśalānām arthopasaṃhitānāṃ brahmacaryopasaṃhitānām. idam ucyate sūtram.[210]

de la mdo'i sde gang zhe na/ bcom ldan 'das kyis de dang de dag tu gdul ba de dang de dag dang gdul ba'i spyod pa rnams las brtsams nas phung po dang ldan pa'i gtam dang/ skye mched dang ldan pa dang/ rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba dang ldan pa dang/ zas dang/ bden pa dang/ khams dang ldan pa dang/ nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas dang de bzhin gshegs pa dang ldan pa dang/ dran pa nye bar gzhag pa dang/ yang dag par spong ba dang/ rdzu 'phrul gyi rkang pa dang/ dbang po dang/ stobs dang/ byang chub kyi yan lag dang/ lam gyi yan lag dang ldan pa dang/ mi sdug pa dang/ dbugs rngub pa dang/ dbugs 'byung ba dang/ bslab pa dang// shes nas dad pa dang ldan pa'i gtam gsungs pa gang yin pa dag yang dag par sdud par byed pa rnams kyis yongs su bzung nas/ bstan pa yun ring du gnas par bya ba'i don du 'di lta ste/ dge ba / don dang ldan pa/ tshangs par spyod pa dang ldan pa de dang de dag bstan par bya ba'i phyir/

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[210] ŚrBh 1:226-229

ming gi tshogs dang/ tshig gi tshog dang/ yi ge'i tshogs mthun pa dag gis[211] ci rigs par rim gyis bkod cing/ rim gyis sbyor ba gang yin pa de ni mdo'i sde zhes bya'o.[212]

云何契經？ 謂薄伽梵於彼彼方所， 為彼彼所化有情， 依彼彼所化諸行差別，宣說無量蘊相應語處相應語， 緣起相應語食相應語， 諦相應語界相應語， 聲聞乘相應語獨覺乘相應語， 如來乘相應語念住正斷神足根力覺支道支等相應語， 不淨息念諸學證淨等相應語. 結集如來正法藏者， 攝聚如是種種聖語，為令聖教久住世故， 以諸美妙名句文身， 如其所應次第安布次第結集， 謂能貫穿縫綴種種能引義利， 能引梵行， 真善妙義. 是名契經. [213]

However, the set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* is not limited to the Buddhist doctrine. In the YoBh we find that the four subjects were later added in the set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana*.[214] The BoBh introduces five kinds of subject which are learnt (*śruta*) by the Bodhisattva:[215]

In this context, why does the Bodhisattva investigate that which was learnt? (1) First (*tāvat*), the Bodhisattva investigates the Buddha's speech (*buddhavacana*) in order to correctly realize (*saṃpādana*) [it] through mastering (*pratipatti*) the completeness of the doctrine (*dharmānudharma*),[216] and in order to clarify (*saṃprakāśana*) [it] to others in detail. (2) The Bodhisattva investigates the science of logic (*hetuvidyā*) in order to correctly understand what is wrongly spoken or wrongly explained with

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[211] gi sa D.

[212] 55bff.

[213] T1579.30.418b23ff.

[214] Schmithausen and other scholars have shown that the YoBh is not a coherent work by a single author (Asaṅga) but the result of a complex of which each part reflects different stages of development and is not always homogenous. Therefore, through investigating the passages in the various parts in the YoBh, we are sometimes able to find the historical development of some Buddhist terms and ideas. See Schmithausen 1987a, 13ff and 183ff; Deleanu 2006, 154; Delhey 2013, 502.

[215] See the translation is based on Engle 2016, 190ff.

[216] SWTF 3, 535. See also PTS, 37 (*dhammānudhammapaṭipanna* "one who masters the completeness of the Dhamma").

regard to this treatise, in order to refute the teachings of others (*paravādanigraha*), in order to [instill] faith (*prasāda*) toward this [Buddhist] teaching (*śasana*) in those who lack it, and in order to further increase (*bhūyobhāva*) the faith of those who have engendered it. (3) The Bodhisattva investigates the science of language (*śabdavidyā*, *sgra'i rig pa*, *shenming* 聲明) in order to cause those who are devoted to the well composed [speech] (*saṃskṛtalapitādhimuktān*, *legs par sbyar te brjod pa la mos pa rnams*, *xinle dianyu zhongsheng* 信樂典語眾生) to devolop [a firm sense of] trust toward the [Bodhisattva] himself by virtue of applying (*nirūpaṇatā*, *dpyod pa*, *chabie* 差別) well-derived words and expressions (*suniruktapadavyañjana*, *tshig dang yi ge nges pa'i tshig bzang po*, *guxun yanyinwenju* 詁訓言音文句). Moreover, [the Bodhisattva investigates the knowledge of language] in order to engage in the orderly discourse (*anuvyavahāra-anupraveśa*, *rjes su tha snyad gdags pa la 'jug pa*, *suishuo* 隨說) that [provides] a variety of linguistic interpretations (*nirukti*) for a single object-referent (*artha*). (4) The Bodhisattva investigates the treatise of medicine (*cikitsāśāstra*) in order to cure various kinds of illness, and in order to promote the welfare of the great populace. (5) The Bodhisattva investigates the mundane fields of arts and crafts (*laukikāni śilpakarmasthānāni*) in order to amass wealth for benefiting the [sentient] beings with little effort, in order to generate in the [sentient] beings [an attitutude of] high regard [toward the Boddhistattva himself], and in order to benefit (*anugraha*) [them] and attract (*saṃgraha*) [them to the Buddhist doctrine] by sharing (*saṃvibhāga*) the knowledge of arts and crafts [with them]. Bodhisattva investigates all five of these fields of knowledge in order to perfect the accumulation[217] of great knowledge (*mahājñāna*) [that leads to the attainment of] the highest awakening. [The Bodhisattva who] fails to train in all [of the knowledges] does not attain in an orderly manner the knowledge of an amniscient being that is free of obstructions (*sarvajñajñānam anāvaraṇam*). It is [now] explained to what extent (*yattāvat*) Bodhisattva investigates, how he investigates, and for what he investigates.

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[217] Two kinds of accumulation (*saṃbhāra*) are introduced in the BoBh (BoBh$_D$22ff and BoBh$_W$33ff): The accumulation of knowledge and the accumulation of merit. Here this requisite seems to be related with the requisite of knowledge. See also Engle 2016, 191.

tatra kimarthaṃ bodhisattvaḥ śrutaṃ paryeṣate? [218] buddhavacanaṃ tāvad bodhisattvaḥ paryeṣate,[219] samyag dharmānudharmapratipattyā saṃpādanārthaṃ,[220] pareṣāñ ca vistareṇa saṃprakāśanārtham. hetuvidyāṃ bodhisattvaḥ paryeṣate, tasyaiva śāstrasya durbhāṣitadurlapitatāyā [221] yathābhūtaparijñānārtham, paravādanigrahārthaṃ cāprasannānām asmiṃcchāsane prasādāya prasannānāñ ca bhūyobhāvāya. śabdavidyāṃ bodhisattvaḥ paryeṣate, saṃskṛtalapitādhimuktānām[222] ātmani saṃpratyayotpādanārthaṃ suniruktapadavyañjananirūpaṇatayā [223] , ekasya cārthasya nānāprakāraniruktyanuvyavahārānupraveśārtham. [224] cikitsāśāstraṃ bodhisattvaḥ paryeṣate, sattvānāṃ nānāprakāravyādhivyupaśamanārthaṃ, mahājanakāyasya cānugrahārtham. [225] laukikāni śilpakarmasthānāni bodhisattvaḥ paryeṣate 'lpakṛcchreṇa[226] bhogasaṃharaṇārthaṃ sattvānām arthāya sattvānānāṃ[227] bahumānotpādanārthaṃ, śilpajñānasaṃvibhāgena cānugrahasaṃgrahārtham. sarvāṇi caitāni [228] pañca vidyāsthānāni bodhisattvaḥ paryeṣate, anuttarāyā [229] samyaksaṃbodher mahājñānasambhāraparipūraṇārtham. [230] na hi sarvatraivam

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[218] bodhisattvaḥ kiṃ paryeṣate BoBh$_W$.

[219] buddhavacanaṃ tadbodhisattvaḥ paryeṣate BoBh$_W$.

[220] samyagdharmāpratipattisaṃpādanārthaṃ BoBh$_D$. Ahn (2015), p, 147 fn.110. The correction is made based on Tibetan and Chinese translations.

[221] durbhāṣitadurlapitatāyāḥ BoBh$_W$.

[222] saṃskṛtalapitādhimuktān BoBh$_D$.

[223] saniruktapadavyañjananirūpaṇatayā BoBh$_D$; usniruktapadavyañjananirūpaṇatayā BoBh$_W$.

[224] nānāprakāra-**nirutty**-anuvyavahārānupraveśārtham BoBh$_D$.

[225] mahājanakāyasyānugrahārtham BoBh$_D$.

[226] alpakṛcchreṇa BoBh$_W$.

[227] sattvānāñ ca BoBh$_D$.

[228] ca etāni BoBh$_D$.

[229] 'nuttarāyāḥ BoBh$_D$.

[230] mahājñānasambhāraparipūṇārtham BoBh$_D$.

aśikṣamāṇaḥ krameṇa sarvajñajñānam anāvaraṇaṃ pratilabhate. yat tāvad bodhisattvaḥ[231] paryeṣate yathā ca paryeṣate yadarthañ ca paryeṣate, tan nirdiṣṭam.[232]

de la byang chub sems dpa' ci'i phyir thos pa tshol bar byed ce na/ byang chub sems dpa' ni chos kyi rjes su mthun pa'i chos kyi nan tan gyis yang dag par bsgrub par bya ba'i phyir dang/ gzhan dag la yang rgya char yang dag par bstan par bya ba'i phyir sangs rgyas kyi bka' yongs su tshol bar byed do// byang chub sems dpa' ni gtan tshigs kyi rig pa tshol bar byed de/ bstan bcos de nyid la nyes par bshad pa dang/ nyes par brjod pa yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du yongs su shes par bya ba'i phyir dang/ phas kyi rgol ba tshar gcad pa'i phyir dang/ bstan pa 'di la ma dad pa rnams dad par bya ba'i phyir dang/ dad pa rnams kyang phyir zhing 'phel bar bya ba'i phyir ro// byang chub sems dpa' ni sgra'i rig pa tshol bar byed de/ tshig dang yi ge nges pa'i tshig bzang po dpyod pas legs par sbyar te/ brjod pa la mos pa rnams bdag la yid ches pa bskyed pa'i phyir dang/ don gcig la yang nges pa'i tshig rnam pa sna tshogs kyis rjes su tha snyad gdags pa la 'jug par bya ba'i phyir ro// byang chub sems dpa' ni gso ba'i bstan bcos tshol bar byed de/ sems can rnams kyi nad rnam pa sna tshogs rnam par zhi bar bya ba'i phyir dang/ skye bo'i tshogs chen po la phan gdags par bya ba'i phyir ro// byang chub sems dpa' ni 'jig rten pa'i bzo dang las kyi gnas shes pa rnams tshol bar byed do// sems can rnams kyi don du tshogs chung ngus longs spyod bsgrub pa'i phyir dang/ sems can rnams kyis gces par bya ba bskyed pa'i phyir dang/ bzo dang las kyi gnas shes pa sbyin pa'i phan 'dogs pas bsdus pa'i phyir ro// byang chub sems dpa'i rig pa'i gnas lnga po 'di dag thams cad tshol yang bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub kyi (57b) ye shes kyi tshogs chen po yongs su rdzogs par bya ba'i phyir te/ thams cad la de ltar ma bslabs na rim gyis thams cad mkhyen pa'i ye shes sgrib pa med pa thob par mi 'gyur ro// byang chub sems dpa' gang tshol ba dang/ ji ltar tshol ba dang/ gang gi phyir tshol ba de ni bshad zin to.[233]

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[231] vodhisattvaḥ BoBh_D.

[232] BoBh_D 74ff; BoBh_W 105ff.

[233] D4037, 57aff.

菩薩何故求聞正法？ 謂諸菩薩求內明時， 為正修行法隨法行， 為廣開示利悟於他. 若諸菩薩求因明時， 為欲如實了知外道所造因論是惡言說， 為欲降伏他諸異論， 為欲於此真實聖教未淨信者令其淨信， 已淨信者倍令增廣. 若諸菩薩求聲明時， 為令信樂典語眾生於菩薩身 深生敬信， 為欲悟入詁訓言音文句差別於一義中種種品類殊音隨說. 若諸菩薩求醫明時， 為息眾生種種疾病， 為欲饒益一切大眾. 若諸菩薩求諸世間工業智處， 為少功力多集珍財為欲利益諸眾生故， 為發眾生甚希奇想， 為以巧智平等分布饒益攝受無量眾生. 菩薩求此一切五明， 為令無上正等菩提大智資糧速得圓滿. 非不於此一切明處次第修學能得無障一切智智. 如是已說一切菩薩正所應求， 如是而求， 為此義求.[234]

The names of the five kinds of knowledge are as follows:

A. Buddha's speech (*buddhavacana*, *sangs rgyas kyi bka'*, *neiming* 內明)
B. The science of logic (*hetuvidyā*, *gtan tshigs kyi rig pa*, *yinming* 因明)
C. The science of language (*śabdavidyā*, *sgra'i rig pa*, *shengming* 聲明)
D. The treatise of medicine (*cikitsāśāstra*, *gso ba'i bstan bcos*, *yiming* 醫明)
E. The mundane fields of arts and crafts (*laukikāṇi śilpakarmasthānāni*, *'jig rten pa'i bzo dang las kyi gnas shes pa rnams*, *zhu shijian gongye zhichu* 諸世間工業智處)

Comparing the explanation of the BoBh to the other passages in the YoBh, we find that these five subjects came to be categorized under the name of "science" (*vidyā*). In the *Śrutamayībhūmi* (ŚrutaBh) of the YoBh, they are explained as the "five fields of science" (*pañcavidyāsthāna*).

A. The inner science (*adhyātmavidyā*, *nang gi rig pa*, *neimingchu* 內明處)
B. The science of medicine (*cikitsāvidyā*, *gso ba rig pa*, *yifangmingchu* 醫方明處)
C. The science of logic (*hetuvidyā*, *gtan tshigs kyi rig pa*, *yinmingchu* 因明處)
D. The science of language (*śabdavidyā*, *sgra'i rig pa*, *shengmingchu* 聲明處)
E. The science of the field of arts and crafts (*śilpakarmasthānavidyā*, *bzo'i las kyi gnas kyi rig pa*, *gongyemingchu* 工業明處)

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[234] T1579.30.503a01ff.

Moreover, the ŚrutaBh relates these five fields to the set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana*. Because, as far as I know, the Sanskrit version of the passage has not been published so far, I shall give the Sankrit text on the basis of a manuscript:[235]

What is the stage arising from hearing? In summary, that stage arising from hearing is said [as follows:] with regard to the five fields of science, previously having perceived (*buddhim sapūrvam*) [the doctrine] on the basis of the "names" (*nāman*), the "phrases" (*pada*), and the "phonemes" (*vyañjana*), [the practitioner is] learning (*śravaṇa*), grasping (*udgrahaṇa*), [holding],[236] reciting (*svādhyāyakriyā*), recollecting (*anusmaraṇa*), and understanding (*upalakṣaṇa*) of the meaning (*artha*) of [the doctrine] based on the set of "name" (*nāman*), "phrase" (*pada*), and "phoneme" (*vyañjana*). The five fields of science are, namely, the inner science [i.e. Buddhism],[237] the science of medicine (*cikitsāvidyā*), the science of logic, the science of language and the science of arts and crafts.

Transliteration (MS83b5-6) [238]

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[235] Lambert Schmithausen kindly sent me a copy of the so-called "Yogācārabhūmi MS" photographed by Giuseppe Tucci, and Martin Delhey kindly sent me another copy of the same Manuscript photographted by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Inho Chu (Ven. Woonsaan Seok, University of Hamburg) is preparing a critical edition with an annotated translation of the section on "inner knowledge" (*adhyātmavidyā*) under the guidance of Harunaga Isaacson and Marin Delhey. His edition will include the introductory passage used here, but he generously agreed that I use it in advance. I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Schmithausen, Inho Chu, Prof. Isaacson, and Dr. Delhey.

[236] The translation of *'chang ba* in the Tibetan version.

[237] In the following passage, which explains the category of "the inner knowledge" (*adhyātmavidyā*), there is an exposition of *saṃjñā-prabhedha-prajñapti-vyavasthāna* ("establishing discourse with reference to [dogmatic] concepts, or technical term"). The exposition provides many kinds of *pada* (Ch. 句 "phrase", Tib. *gnas* "basic concept"), which indicates various Buddhist technical terms. These passages show that *pada* is used in various ways in the YoBh. See also Schmithausen 2000, 246.

[238] Editorial signs
.   illegible part of an *akṣara*
..   illegible *akṣara*
<< >>   addition by scribe
{{ }}   deletion by scribe
[ ]   demage or unclear reading
< >   addition by editor

(83b5) śrutamayī bhūmiḥ katamāḥ | sā samāsato yat* paṃcānāṃ vidyāsthānānāṃ nāmaśaḥ padaśaḥ | vyañja©naśaḥ buddhiṃ<<..>>pūrvaṃ śravaṇam udgrahaṇaṃ svādhyāyakriyām anusmaraṇaṃ nāmakāyapadakāyavyañjanakāyāśritasya cārthasya upalakṣaṇam ity ucyate | śrutamayī bhūmiḥ pañcavidyāsthānāni tadyathā a[dhy]ātma-vidyā vicikitsāvidyā | hetuvidyā | śabdavidyā | śilpakarmasthā(83b6)navidyā ca |

Reconstruction

śrutamayī bhūmiḥ katamā? sā samāsato yat paṃcānāṃ vidyāsthānānāṃ nāmaśaḥ padaśaḥ vyañjanaśaḥ buddhiṃ [sa]pūrvaṃ, śravaṇam udgrahaṇaṃ svādhyāyakriyām anusmaraṇaṃ nāmakāyapadakāyavyañjanakāyāśritasya cārthasya upalakṣaṇam ity ucyate śrutamayī bhūmiḥ. [239] pañca vidyāsthānāni tadyathā a[dhy]ātmavidyā, {vi}cikitsāvidyā, hetuvidyā, śabdavidyā, śilpakarmasthānavidyā ca.

thos[240] pa las byung ba'i sa gang zhe na/ de yang mdor bsdu na/ rigs pa'i gnas lnga gang yin pa de dag ming dang tshig dang// yi ge las blo sngon du btang ste/ nyan pa dang/ 'dzin pa dang/ 'chang ba dang/ kha ton byed pa dang/ rjes su dran pa dang/ ming gi tshogs dang/ tshig gi tshogs dang/ yi ge'i tshogs la brten pa'i don rtogs pa 'di ni thos pa las byung ba'i sa zhes bya'o// rig pa'i gnas lnga gang zhe na/ 'di lta ste nang gi rig pa dang/ gso ba rig pa dang/ gtan tshigs kyi rig pa dang/ sgra'i rig pa dang/ bzo'i las kyi gnas kyi rig pa'o.[241]

云何聞所成地？ 謂若略說，於五明處名句文身無量差別覺慧為先，聽聞領受讀誦憶念，又於依止名身句身文身義中無倒解了，如是名為聞所成地. 何等名五明處? 謂內明處, 醫方明處, 因明處, 聲明處, 工業明處.[242]

{}　　　　deletion by editor

*　　　　virāma

©　　　　string-hole

[239] Between *ity* and *ucyate*, there is no word such as *idam* which corresponds the Tibetan translation *'di ni*.

[240] thos D.

[241] D4035.tshi161a.

[242] T1579.0345a18.

The passage explains the Buddhist learning process in the stage arising from hearing. The Buddhist learns the set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana*, that is, the expression of the doctrine, and then repeatedly thinks about this set until understanding its meaning. In this context, the set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* is not limited to the expression of the Buddhist doctrine, but the expression of all the fields which the Yogācāra practitioner should learn.

The ViSg section of the YoBh more clearly characterizes the set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* as those which are established (*yongs su brtags pa*, *fenbiejianli* 分別建立, *dezhijiaming* 得知假名) with regard to the five sciences:

A. The inner science (*nang gi rig pa*, *neiming* 內明 in Xuanzang' translation, *neixue* 內學 in Paramārtha's translation)
B. The science of logic (*gtan tshigs kyi rig pa*, *yinming* 因明, *yinxue* 因學)
C. The science of language (*sgra'i rig pa*, *shengming* 聲明, *shengxue* 聲學)
D. The science of medicine (*gso ba'i rig pa*, *yifangming* 醫方明, *yifangxue* 醫方學)
E. The science of the field of the mundane arts and crafts (*'jig rten pa'i bzo dang las kyi gnas kyi rig pa dag*, *shijian gongqiao shiye chu ming* 世間工巧事業處明, *shi gongqiao xue* 世工巧學)

In the passage of the ViSg, we find this list of the five sciences together with the definidition of the set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañajana*. It is notable that the two Chinese translations define *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* differently. Xuanzang's translation defines them as a word, a phrase, and a phoneme respectively, and this definition agrees with the Tibetan version. However, Paramārtha's translation defines them as a word, a phrase, and a text that is the collection of phrases. According to Xuanzang, *vyañjana* is a basic syntactic unit of *nāman* and *pada*, but Paramārtha understands *vyañjana* as the biggest unit. This shows that there were various understandings of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana*, even when the five sciences were included in the set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana*. Below we read the passage of the ViSg. I

translate the Tibetan version, which agrees with Xuanzang's at first, and then I translate Paramārtha's.

A. The Tibetan version of the ViSg, together with Xuanzang's translation

In this context, what are name sets? With regard to the designation of the own-being of factors and the designation of the own characteristic (*rang gi mtshan nyid*) [of factors],[243] in order for the conventional expression (*rjes su tha snyad gdags pa*), having perceived the conceptualized [objects], [we] express them only with names (*ming tsam du*). [These expressions] are name sets.

What are phrase sets? With regard to the designation of the specific quality (*bye brag*, *chabie* 差別, **viśeṣa*) of the factors, of which the own characteristic is [already] designated, [we] establish the proliferation (*spros pa*, **prapañca*) of virtue (*yon tan*), fault (*skyon*), defilement (*kun nas nyon mongs pa*), and purification (*rnam par byang ba*). [This proliferation] is *padakāyāḥ*.

What are phoneme sets? Phoneme sets are the syllable sets (*yi ge'i 'bru'i thsogs*) which appear as the things being basis for [establishing] name set and phrase set.

With regard to the things (*dngos po*, *shi* 事, **vastu*) to be understood and expressed, the most brief [thing] is phoneme. The middle one is name. The most detailed one is phrase. Relying on the phonemes, one understands only the sound [of expression] but does not understand any object-referent. Relying on name, one understands not only the own-being of this and that factors but also the sound [of expression]. Based on phrase, one understands everything.

The name set, the phrase set, and the phoneme set are the conceptualization (*yongs su brtags pa*, *fenbiejianli* 分別建立) with regard to the five fields of science, that is, the inner science, [i.e., Buddhism], the science of logic, the science of language, the science of medicine, and the science of mundane arts and crafts.[244]

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[243] See fn. 147.

[244] The wordings and the order of the five fields of knowledge are differently between passages in the YoBh. See p, 68.

de la ming gi tshogs rnams gang zhe na/ chos rnams kyi ngo bo nyid du 'dogs pa dang/ rang gi mtshan nyid du 'dogs pa las brtsams te/ rjes su tha snyad gdags pa'i phyir yongs su brtag[245] pa nye bar bzung nas ming tsam du rnam par 'jog pa gang yin pa de dag ni ming gi tshogs rnams zhes bya'o// tshig gi tshogs rnams gang zhe na/ rang gi mtshan nyid du btags pa'i chos de dag nyid kyi bye brag tu 'dogs pa las brtsams te/ yon tan dang skyon dang/ kun nas nyon mongs pa dang rnam par byang ba'i spros pa rnams pa 'jog pa ni tshig gi tshogs rnams zhes bya'o// yi ge'i tshogs rnams gang zhe na/ ming gi tshogs dang/ tshig gi tshogs kyi rten[246] gyi dngos por yi ge'i 'bru'i tshogs rnams ni yi ge'i tshogs rnams zhes bya ste/

shes bya brjod par bya ba'i dngos po la/ thams cad las bsdus pa ni yi ge'o// 'bring ni ming ngo// rgyas pa ni tshig go// yi ge tsam la brten nas ni sgra tsam so sor rig par 'gyur gyi don ni 'ga' yang so sor rig par mi 'gyur ro// (zhi24b) ming la brten pas ni chos de dang de dag gi ngo bo nyid so sor rig pa dang sgra yang so sor rig par 'gyur gyi/ chos mang po rab tu rnam par 'byed pa so sor rig par ni mi 'gyur ro// tshig gi tshogs la brten pas ni thams cad so sor rig par bya'o//

ming gi tshogs dang/ tshig gi tshogs dang/ yi ge'i tshogs de dag kyang rig pa'i gnas lnga po nang gi rig pa dang/ gtan tshigs kyi rig pa dang/ sgra'i rig pa dang/ gso ba'i rig pa dang/ 'jig rten pa'i bzo dang las kyi gnas kyi rig pa dag las brtsams te yongs su brtags pa yin par rig par bya'o.[247]

復次, 云何名身? 謂依諸法自性施設自相施設, 由遍分別為隨言說唯建立想, 是謂名身. 云何句身? 謂即依彼自相施設所有諸法差別施設, 建立功德過失雜染清淨戲論, 是謂句身. 云何文身? 謂名身句身所依止性所有字身, 是謂文身.

又於一切所知所詮事中, 極略相是文.[248] 若中是名. 若廣是句. 若唯依文但可了達音韻而已, 不能了達所有事義. 若依止名, 便能了達彼彼諸法自性

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[245] *Ibid.*, p. 86. brtag D; btags P.

[246] rten P; brten D

[247] D4038.zhi24a4ff.

[248] 相【大】＝想【宋】【元】【明】【宮】【聖】【知】

自相，亦能了達所有音韻，不能了達所簡擇法深廣差別.[249] 若依止句，當知一切皆能了達.

又此名句文身，當知依五明處分別建立.所謂，內明，因明，聲明，醫方明，世間工巧事業處明.[250]

B. Paramārtha's Chinese Translation (*Juedingzang lun* 決定藏論, T1584)

Name set (*zihehe* 字和合, **nāmakāya*): Based on the own-being (*xing* 性, **svabhāva*) and the own characteristic (*xiang* 相, **svalakṣaṇa*) of factors,[251] the designations (*jiaming* 假名) are established. [The expression] based on these object-referents (*yi* 義, **artha*), [that is, the own-being and the own characteristic] is called name (*zi* 字). Phrase set: Having expressed factors which have the own characteristic, then one differentiates (*xuanze* 選擇) and conceptualizes (*fenbie* 分別) the factors as the wholesome factors (*shanfa* 善法, **kuśaladharma*), the unwholesome factors (*efa* 惡法, **akuśaladharma*), the purifying factors (*jingfa* 淨法), and the defiling factors (*bujingfa* 不淨法). [This differentiation and conceptualization] which is combined by name is called phrase (*ju* 句). [That is, the expression of the own-being together with the differentiating quality is phrase]. This is the phrase set. "Text set" (*weihehe* 味和合, **vyañjanakāya*):[252] When name and phrase are gathered, and the syllable and the object-referent are completely established, it is called the "text set".

Those which briefly explain (*lüe* 略) the object-referent, [that is, those which explain only the own-being or the own characteristic], are [called] name. Those which explain in some detail (*chuzhong* 處中, lit. "situated in the middle") the object-referent, [that is, those which explain the differentiating quality in the factor], are

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[249] 簡【大】＝揀【元】【明】

[250] The *Yuqie shidi lun* 瑜伽師地論, translated by Xuanzang (T1579.30. 587c11ff).

[251] See fn. 147.

[252] In this context, I do not translate *vyañjanakāya* as phoneme set, because the following explanation defines *vyañjana* as the whole expression resulting from the collection of the name and the phrase.

[called] phrase. Those which explain in full detail (*guang shuo* 廣說) the object-referent are [called] "text".

When one relies only on name, one can understand only the name but cannot understand the object-referent. When one relies on phrase, one understands the various natures of the factor. However, one [still] understands [the factors] which are spoken (*ming* 鳴, **ghoṣa*) but cannot understand the various kinds of factors. When one relies on "text", one can [completely] understand the object-referents of the factors.

Because of the name set and the set of phrase and "text",[253] the designations of the five fields of science (*wuxuechu* 五學處, **pañcavidyāsthāna*) can be known. Each dialect expresses them differently. It is because the sense faculty of hearing is different [between people] even though the sound is not different. What is the five fields of knowledge? They are the inner science [i.e., Buddhism], the science of logic, the science of language, the science of medicine, and the science of mundane arts and crafts.

字和合者： 依法性相而立假名. 依如是義， 是名為字. 句和合者： 已說依自相法， 善法惡法淨法不淨法選擇分別. 以名合為句. 是句和合. 味和合者： 名與句合，字義具足. 是味和合.

於諸略義， 悉皆是名. 於處中義， 是名為句. 於廣說義， 稱之為味. 唯依於名， 唯得知名， 不知於義. 若依於句， 知諸法性， 亦知於鳴， 不得知廣選諸法. 依於味身，知諸法義.

以此名身句味身為五學處得知假名. 隨方俗語， 立名不同. 若於鳴中， 無處不同， 耳相聞故. 何者五學處? 一者內學， 二者因學， 三者聲學， 四者醫方學， 五者世工巧學.[254]

To sum up, the set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* is generally explained as the expression of the Buddhist doctrine like the "three baskets" not only in the Sarvāstivāda texts but also in the ŚrBh of the YoBh. However, the YoBh shows that other various fields came to be included in the set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana.* In the ViSg section, we find that all the fields finally came to be categorized under the name of the "five fields of science" (*pañcavidyāsthāna*).

5.3 Basis of the Conceptual Knowledge

Investigating the passages of the YoBh, we also find that the set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* is considered as the important basis with regard to the spiritual cultivation. This set is explained as a kind of object to be contemplated. The SamBh introduces some Buddhists who consider this set as an object of concentration (*samādhi*):[255]

> "It is said by the Blessed One. There is a contemplator (*dhyāyin*) who is skilful in concentration (*samādhi*) and not skilful in attainment [regarding concentration] (*samāpatti*)". [This is found] in detail in a verse of a sutra.[256] ... Furthermore [it is]

[255] See also Pabst von Ohain 2018, 159 and 262.

[256] SN III, 264 (*Jhānasaṃyutta*, 34.1): "At Sāvatthi, it is said. O monks, are four kinds of contemplator (pāli. *jhāyin*, skt. *dhyāyin*). What four? Here, o monks, a contemplator is skillful in concentration regarding concentration but not skillful in attainment regarding concentration. Here, o monks, a contemplator is skillful in attainment regarding concentration but not in concentration regarding concentration. Here, o monks, a contemplator is skillful neither in concentration regarding concentration nor in attainment regarding concentration. Here, o monks, a contemplator is skillful both in concentration and in attainment regarding concentration. In this context, o monks, the contemplator who is skillful both in concentration regarding concentration and in attainment regarding concentration is the chief (pāli. *agga*, skt. *agra*), the best (pāli. *seṭṭha*, skt. *śreṣṭha*), the foremost (pāli. *mokkha*, skt. *mukhya*), the highest (pāli and skt. *uttama*), and the most excellent (pāli. *pavara*, skt. *pravara*) of these four kinds of contemplator. Just as, o monks, from a cow comes milk, from milk comes cream, from cream comes butter, from butter comes ghee, and from ghee comes cream-of-ghee, which is reckoned the best of all these, so too the contemplator who is skillful both in concentration regarding concentration and in attainment regarding concentration is the chief, the best, the foremost, the highest, the most excellent of these four kinds of contemplator" (*Sāvatthi, tatra kho voca. cattāro me bhikkhave jhāyī. katame cattāro? idha bhikkhave ekacco jhāyī samādhismiṃ samādhikusalo hoti na samādhismiṃ samāpattikusalo. idha pana bhikkhave ekacco jhāyī samādhismiṃ samāpattikusalo hoti na samādhismiṃ samādhikusalo. idha pana bhikkhave ekacco jhāyī neva samādhismiṃ samādhikusalo hoti na samādhismiṃ samāpattikusalo. idha pana ekacco jhāyī samādhismiṃ samādhikusalo ca hoti samādhismiṃ samāpattikusalo ca. tatra bhikkhave yvāyaṃ*

said: [There is a contemplator who] is skilful in concentration [but not skilful in attainment]. He understands the concentration on the basis of the "names", the "phrases", and the "phonemes", but does not [understand] the aspects (*ākāra*), the signs (*liṅga*), and the mental images (*nimitta*) of the attainment from which it arises.

How is he skilful in the attainment but not skilful in the concentration? He understands the aspects, the signs, and the mental images of each concentration, by means of which he attains [the concentration] (*samāpadyate*), and he who attains [the concentration] does not understand this concentration [conceptually] on the basis of the "names", the "phrases", and the "phonemes" in the following way: 'I have attained this and that concentration'. There are hundred and thousand kinds of concentration, which a Bodhisattva attains. And he does not understand the sets of "names", "phrases", and "phonemes" of those [concentrations] in the way 'I have attained the concentrations [expressed] in this and that [way]', as far as (*yāvat*) neither he hears/learns [them] from the Buddha or the Bodhisattvas who attain the highest [stage] nor he attains the highest [stage] by himself.

yad uktaṃ bhagavatā: asti dhyāyī samādhikuśalo na samāpattikuśala iti vistareṇa sūtroddānagāthā. ... punar āha: samādhikuśalo bhavati. samādhiṃ nāmapadavyañjanaśo jānīte, no tu tāny ākāraliṅganimittāni tasyāḥ samāpatteḥ, yaiḥ samāpadanaṃ bhavati.

kathaṃ samāpattikuśalo bhavati na samādhikuśalaḥ? yathāpīhaikatya ekatyasya samādher ākāraliṅganimittāni jānīte, yaiḥ samāpadyate, tathā samāpannaś ca taṃ samādhiṃ nāmapadavyañjanaśo na jānīte: "imaṃ cemaṃ cāhaṃ samādhiṃ samāpannaḥ" iti. santi ca tāni samādhiśatāni sahasrāṇi ca, yāni bodhisattvaḥ samāpadyate. na ca teṣāṃ nāmapadavyañjanakāyāñ jānīte: "imaṃ cemaṃ cāhaṃ samādhiṃ samāpannaḥ" iti, yāvan na buddhāt paramapāramiprāpte[bh]yo vā bodhisattvebhyaḥ śṛṇoti svayaṃ vā pāramiprāpto(?) bhavati.[257]

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jhāyī samādhismiṃ samādhikusalo ca samādhismiṃ samāpattikusalo ca ayam imesaṃ catunnaṃ jhāyinam aggo ca seṭṭho ca mokkho ca uttamo ca pavaro ca. seyyatthāpi bhikkhave gavā khīraṃ khīramhā dadhi dadimhā navanītam navanītamha sappi sappimhā sappimaṇḍo tatra aggam akkhāyati, evam eva kho bhikkhave yvāyaṃ jhāyī samādhismiṃ samādhikusalo ca samādhismiṃ samāpattikusalo ca ayam imesaṃ catunnaṃ jhāyinam aggo ca seṭṭho ca mokkho ca uttamo ca pavaro cāti); See also Bhikku Bodhi 2000 vol.1, 1034; Woodward 2002 vol.3, 205ff.

[257] SamBh 2009, 210ff (4.2.3.0ff).

bcom ldan 'das kyis bsam gtan pa ting nge 'dzin la mkhas pa/ snyoms par 'jug pa la mi mkhas pa yod do zhes rgyas par mdo'i sdom gyi tshigs su bcad pa gang gsungs pa la/ ... gzhan yang ting nge 'dzin mkhas la snyoms par 'jug pa la mi mkhas pa yod do zhes gsungs pa ni/ ting nge 'dzin gyi ming dang tshig dang/ yi ge las shes la ting nge 'dzin de'i rnam pa dang rtags dang/ mtshan ma gang dag gis snyoms par 'jug par 'gyur ba de ni mi shes pa'o// snyoms par 'jug pa la mkhas pa yin la ting nge 'dzin la mi mkhas pa ji lta bu yin zhe na/ 'di ltar 'di na la la ting nge 'dzin la la la'i rnam pa dang / rtags dang mtshan ma gang dag gis snyoms par 'jug pa rnams shes te/ de bzhin du snyoms par zhugs kyang / bdag ni ting nge 'dzin 'di dang 'di la snyoms par zhugs so zhes ting nge 'dzin de'i ming dang / tshig dang yi ge las ni mi shes pa lta bu'o// byang chub sems dpa' snyoms par 'jug pa gang yin pa'i ting nge 'dzin brgya dang / stong de dag kyang yod la/ nam sangs rgyas sam/ byang chub sems dpa' dam pa'i pha rol tu son pa dag las ma thos sam/ yang na bdag nyid dam pa'i pha rol tu son par ma gyur gyi bar du/ bdag ni ting nge 'dzin 'di dang 'di la snyoms par zhugs so snyam du/ de dag gi ming dang tshig dang / yi ge'i tshogs ni mi shes pa yang yod do.[258]

復次，"如世尊言，修靜慮者，或有等持善巧，非等至善巧". 廣說如經嗢柂南頌. ... 又說，等持善巧非等至善巧者，謂於等持名句文身善知差別，非於能入等至諸行狀相差別. 云何等至善巧非等持善巧? 謂如有一善知能入隨一等至諸行狀相，亦能現入，而不善知此三摩地名句文身差別之相，亦不能知我已得入如是如是等持差別. 有諸菩薩，雖能得入若百若千諸三摩地，而不了知彼三摩地名句文身，亦不能知我已得入如是如是 等持差別，乃至未從諸佛所聞，及於已得第一究竟諸菩薩所而得聽聞，或自證得第一究竟.[259]

In this passage, the "concentration" (*samādhi*) is explained, together with the "attainment" (*samāpatti*) of the concentration. The concentration is related to learning the theory of the concentration on the basis of the set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana*. The attainment means the

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[258] D4035.152aff.

[259] T1579.30.341b24ff.

praxis of the concentration. The contemplator (*dhyāyin*) who is skilful in the concentration can identify a certain concentration with that which is described in scripture or taught by the masters. This contemplator has a conceptual understanding arising from learning the doctrine. On the other hand, the contemplator who is skilful in attainment can apply the technique of the concentration and understand the aspects (*ākāra*), the signs (*liṅga*), and the mental images (*nimitta*).

This attainment can occur either with or without learning the manual of the concentration on the basis of the set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana*. According to the passage of SN,[260] however, the practitioner can perfect the cultivation when being skillful in both concentration and attainment. The reason of this statement could be inferred from the passage of the SamBh. When having learnt the manual of the concentration, the practitioner can identify his or her own experience of the concentration and understand which stage he or she has reached. This would be crucial in continuing the practice and applying the higher meditative technique.

By this reason, the set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* is considered in the SamBh as the important basis for the conceptual knowledge that is crucial in the meditative practice. We also find a passage of the ŚrBh that explains the set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* in a similar way. This passage contrasts the characteristic (*nimitta*) to the secondary characteristic (*anuvyañjana*) in the following way:[261]

There is another type (*jāti*) of the perception of a characteristic (*nimittagrāha*) and the perception of a secondary characteristic (*anuvyañjanagrāha*). In this context, the apprenhension of the characteristic is as follows (*yat*): one sees visual objects (*rūpāṇi*)

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[260] See fn. 208 above.

[261] Allon introduces these passages to contrast the mental image with the secondary image as they are found in the Gandhārī text of the Prasaṇasutra up to the YoBh. See Allon 2001, 261ff.

which arise (*ābhāsagata*) by means of [the sense faculty of] seeing, after having manifested (*saṃmukhīkṛtya*) the attention (*manaskāra*) arising with that [image] (*tajja, rnam pa de dang 'byung ba*).

In this context, the perception of the secondary characteristic is [as follows:] one sees visual objects which arise by means of [the sense faculty of] seeing, after having manifested the attention arising with that [image], but [only after] having previously heard (*anuśravapūrvaka*) [about it] from others. [That is,] one hears [from others as follows:] "the visual objects to be perceived by [the sense faculty of] seeing are of this and that kind" (*santi evaṃrūpāṇy evaṃrūpāṇi cakṣurvijñeyāni rūpāṇi*). There are the names (*nāma, ming*), the phrases (or words, *pada, tshig*), and the phonemes (or expressions, *vyañjana, mngon rtags*), which are accompanying (*anugata*) that [explanation], on which the person (*puruṣapudgala*) depends (*adhipatiṃ kṛtvā*), on which he relies (*niśritya*), on which he rests (*pratisthāya*), and then he conceptualizes (*vikalpayati*) the visual objects (*rūpa*) to be perceived by [the sense faculty of] seeing (*cakṣurvijñeya*) as he has heard. This is called the perception of the secondary characteristic.

aparā jātir nimittagrāhasyānuvaṃjanagrāhasya ca. tatra nimittagrāho yac cakṣuṣā rūpāṇy ābhāsagatāni tajjaṃ manaskāraṃ saṃmukhīkṛtya paśyati. tatrānuvyañjanagrāhaḥ, tāny eva rūpāṇi cakṣuṣābhāsagatāni tajjaṃ manasikāraṃ saṃmukhīkṛtya paśyati, api tu parato 'nuśravapūrvakam. śṛṇoti santy evaṃrūpāṇy evaṃrūpāṇi cakṣurvijñeyāni rūpāṇīti. yāni tāni tadanugatāni nāmāni padāni vyañjanāni, yāny adhipatiṃ kṛtvā yāni niśritya yāni pratiṣṭhāyāyaṃ puruṣapudgalo yathāśrutāni cakṣurvijñeyāni rūpāṇi vikalpayati. ayam ucyate 'nuvyañjanagrāhaḥ.[262]

mtshan mar 'dzin pa dang/ mngon rtags su 'dzin pa'i rnam grangs gzhan yang yod do// de la mtshan mar 'dzin pa ni mig gis gzugs snang bar gyur pa rnam pa de dang 'byung ba yid la byed pa mngon sum du byas nas mthong ba gang yin pa'o//

de la mngon rtags su 'dzin pa ni mig gis gzugs de dag nyid snang bar ma gyur cing/ de dang 'byung ba yid la byed pa mngon sum du byas nas/ mthong ba ma yin mod kyi 'on kyang gzhan las rjes su mnyam pa sngon du btang nas/ mig gi rnam par shes par

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[262] ŚrBh_SG vol. I, 107ff (Indriyasaṃvara, C.III.5).

bya ba'i gzugs 'di lta bu dang/ 'di lta bu dag yod do zhes thos shing/ de dang rjes su 'brel pa'i ming dang tshig dang mngon rtags gang dang gang dag yin pa gis rnam par shes par bya ba'i gzugs ji lta ba thos pa dag la rnam par rtog par byed pa ste/ de ni mngon rtags su 'dzin pa zhes bya'o.[263]

復有餘類，執取其相，執取隨好. 言取相者，謂色境界在可見處能生作意，正現在前眼見眾色，如是名為執取其相. 取隨好者，謂即色境在可見處能生作意，正現在前眼見色已，然彼先時從他. 聞有如是如是眼所識色，即隨所聞名句文身，為其增上為依為住，如是士夫補特伽羅. 隨其所聞種種分別眼所識色. 如是名為執取隨好.[264]

This passage elaborates the difference between the "characteristic" (*nimitta*) and the "second characteristic" (*anuvyañjana*), through relating the second characteristic to the set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana*. In this context, the perception of the characteristic (*nimittagrāha*) means that one sees (*paśyati*) a visual object (*rūpa*) through the sense faculty of seeing. The perception of the second characteristic (*anuvyañjanagrāha*) means that one conceptualizes (*vikalpayati*) the visual object: We see a visual object and identify this object with the concepts that we have learnt. When we cognize characteristics of an object with concepts, these characteristics are called the secondary characteristics. In this conceptualization, the set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* is considered as the basis in the sense that it is the element to manifest the explanation to be learnt.

Another passage of the ŚrBh also shows the relationship between the conceptualization and the set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana*. This passage explains the difference between the

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[263] D4036.27b.

[264] T1579.30.407a21ff.

"observation of arising" (*utpattyapekṣā*) and the "observation of designation" (*prajñaptyapekṣā*) in the following way:

What is the reasoning of observation (*apekṣāyukti*)? There are two kinds of observation, that is, the observation of arising (*utpattyapekṣā*) and the observation of designation (*prajñaptyapekṣā*). In this context, the observation of arising [is as follows:] When the constituents (*skandha*s) arise, these causes (*hetu*) and those conditions (*pratyaya*) are observed (*apekṣyante*), through which the constituents appear (*prādurbhāva*). [The observation of designation is as follows:] When the constituents are designated, the set of *nāman*, the set of *pada*, and the set of *vyañjana* are observed, through which the constituents are designated (*prajñapti*). This is called the observation of arising and the observation of designation, with regard to the constituents. This observation of arising and [this] observation of designation is the reasoning (*yukti*), the practice (*yoga*), and method (*upāya*) for [understanding] arising of the constituents and for designation of the constituents. Therefore, it is called reasoning of observation.

apekṣāyuktiḥ katamā? dvividhāpekṣā, utpattyapekṣā prajñaptyapekṣā ca. tatrotpattyapekṣā yair hetubhir yaiḥ pratyayaiḥ skandhānāṃ prādurbhāvo bhavati, tasyāṃ skandhotpattau te hetavas te pratyayā apekṣyante. yair nāmakāyapadakāyavyañjanakāyaiḥ skandhānāṃ prajñaptir bhavati, tasyāṃ skandhaprajñaptau te nāmakāyapadakāyavyñjanakāyā apekṣyante. iyam ucyate skandheṣūtpattyapekṣā prajñaptyapekṣā ca. yā cotpattyapekṣā yā ca prajñaptyapekṣā sā yuktir yoga upāyaḥ skandhotpattaye skandhaprajñaptaye. tasmād apekṣāyuktir ity ucyate.[265]

de la ltos pa'i rigs pa gang zhe na/ ltos pa ni rnam pa gnyis te/ skye ba'i ltos pa dang/ gdags pa'i ltos pa'o// de la skye ba'i ltos pa ni rgyu gang dag dang/ rkyen gang dag gis phung po rnams skye bar 'gyur ba'i phung po'i skye ba de ni rgyu de dag dang/ rkyen dang de dag las ltos pa yin no// ming gi chogs dang/ tshig gi tshogs dang/ yi ge'i tshogs

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[265] ŚrBh_SG vol. I, 236ff.

gang dag gi phung po rnams gdags par 'gyur ba'i phung po gdags pa de ni ming gi tshogs dang/ tshig gi tshogs dang/ yi ge'i tshogs de dag la ltos pa yin te/ de ni phung po rnams kyi skye ba'i ltos pa dang/ gdags pa'i ltos pa zhes bya'o//skye ba'i ltos pa gang yin pa dang/ gdags pa'i ltos pa gang yin pa de ni phung po skye ba dang/ phung por gdags pa'i rigs pa dang/ sbyor ba dang thabs yin pas na de'i phyir ltos pa'i rigs pa zhes bya'o.[266]

云何名為觀待道理？謂略說有二種觀待. 一生起觀待，二施設觀待. 生起觀待者，謂由諸因諸緣勢力，生起諸蘊，此蘊生起，要當觀待諸因諸緣. 施設觀待者，謂由名身句身文身，施設諸蘊. 此蘊施設，要當觀待名句文身. 是名於蘊，生起觀待，施設觀待. 即此生起觀待，施設觀待，生起諸蘊施設諸蘊，說名道理瑜伽方便. 是故說為觀待道理.[267]

In this passage, the "observation of arising" (*utpattyapekṣā*) is the observation of the phenomena like the arising of the constituents (*skanda*). In this observation, the practitioner contemplates the phenomena's causes (*hetu*) and the conditions (*pratyaya*). The "observation of designation" (*prajñaptyapekṣā*) is different from the first observation in the sense that the practitioner contemplates the conceptualization of things. In order to understand how things are conceptualized, the practitioner is recommended to think about the nature of the set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana*.

To sum up, the set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* is considered as an important basis for the Buddhist cultivation in the YoBh. The passage of the SamBh emphasizes that the practitioner should learn the manual of the meditative techniques before applying the technique, because he or she should be able to identify the own experience of the spiritual cultivation with

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[266] D4036.57b.

[267] T1579.30.419b08ff.

one of stages or techniques described in the manual. Only when understanding on which stage he or she has reached, the practitioner can know what should be done for the next stage.

A passage of the ŚrBh explains the benefit of learning the set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* in another way. This set can be the object of the contemplation. Through thinking about the nature of this set, the practitioner understands the conceptualization of things. This practice is introduced as the "observation of designation".

Part Two

6. Introductory Remark of Part Two

Part two is a translation of passages elaborating the nature of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* in commentaries of the AKBh and the PSk. The commentaries include four commentaries of the PSk and one commentary of the AKBh.

The four commentaries of the PSk are the *Dasheng guang wuyun lun* 大乘廣五蘊 (*Guang wuyun lun*), the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* (PSkV), the **Pañcaskandhavivaraṇa* (PSkViv), and the **Pañcaskandhabhāṣya* (PSkBh). The first two texts, that is, the *Guang wuyun lun* and the PSkV, are attributed to Sthiramati, but the former does not look like a Chinese translation of the Sanskrit version of the PSkV. The *Guang wuyun lun* is shorter and more concise than the PSkV. Therefore, I translate the two texts separately.[268] Because the Tibetan translation of the PSkV generally agrees with the Sanskrit version, each corresponding Tibetan passage is attached below the corresponding Sanskrit passage.

Some passages of the *Tattvārthā* of Sthiramati, that is, a commentary of the AKBh, are also translated in order to document my own understanding of these passages. This commentary was available only in the Tibetan translation. Recently a Sanskrit manuscript of this commentary was found, and scholars are cooperatively preparing a critical edition of this manuscript.[269] Unfortunately, however, some pages of the manuscript are missing, and these missing pages include the explanation of the set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana*. Moreover, as Matsuda already pointed out, the available Tibetan translation of the *Tattvārthā* does not seem to have gone through review and correction.[270] Hoping for the discovery of the missing Sanskrit manuscript, I attempt to translate the passages. Despite the limitation, many passages

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[268] By this reason, the authorship and the characteristics of the *Guang wuyzun lun* should be studied further.

[269] Matsuda 2013, 49.

[270] *Ibid.*, 50.

of the *Tattvārthā* can be understood on the basis of Yaśomitra's *Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* (*Vyākhyā*) and the PSkV of Sthiramati. With the help of the *Vyākhyā* and the PSkV, I could identify some passages and understand several arguments of Sthiramati concerning the nature of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* in the *Tattvārthā*. Therefore, I document my translation for investigating Sthiramati's explanation concerning *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* and for future study.

6.1 Unique Explanation of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* by Indian Yogācāra commentators

Through reading the passages, I examine the Indian Yogācāra commentators' understanding of the characteristics of the set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana*. The explanation that they have developed is different from not only the Indian Sarvāstivādins' but also the explanation which has been developed later in Tibet and East Asia.

Cox investigates the Indian Sarvāstivādins' exposition up to Saṅghabhadra in the *Apidamo shun zhengli lun* 阿毘達磨順正理論 (T1562, henceforth **Nyāyānusāra*). In her introductory remark and translation, we also find other research up to 1995.[271] These inform us of the crucial difference between the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntika in the AKBh. The Sarvāstivādins consider *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* as real entities distinct from sound. The Sautrāntikas disagree with this point of view and consider them as nothing but sound: They are specific sounds made based on the linguistic convention (*saṃketa*).[272] For example, there is a linguistic convention that the sound "gauḥ" indicates an individual object of cow. The

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[271] Cox 1995, 159-172; 377-408.

[272] The Buddhist theory of *saṃketa* has been studied by many scholars from various aspects. For example, Arnold (2006) analyses the exposition of *saṃketa* in the Buddhist Pramāṇa tradition.

Sautrāṇtikas consider this sound "gauḥ" as a *nāman*.[273] The Yogācārins basically follow the Sautrāntika. The PSkV explains that we call the sound *nāman*, *pada*, or *vyañjana* when the sound is in a state (*avasthā*) to indicate an object.[274]

As we already investigated in the previous chapters of part one, there are various understandings of the term *vyañjana* in the passages of the YoBh. However, the later Yogācāra commentators of the PSk and the AKBh consistently consider *vyañjana* as a phoneme, which is a synonym of a "syllable" (*akṣara*). It is momentary, the smallest unit of speech, and the basis to constitute *nāman* and *pada*.

Nāman is a name. In the discussion on the set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana*, the Indian Yogācāra commentators use *nāman* as a term indicating only a noun, especially, a subject in a sentence. An adjective or a verb is not considered as a "name". They are included in *pada*.

As seen in part one, *pada* is challenging to define. Sthiramati in the *Tattvārthā* and the PSkV explains *pada* as a predicate in a sentence, that is, all parts except a subject in a sentence. The PSkBh clearly states that *pada* is a sentence itself. According to this statement, *pada* is constituted by a "name", which appears as a subject in a sentence, and the rest parts of a sentence, that is, a predicate. Therefore, *pada* could be translated as "phrase" in the sense that a phrase could be either a part of a sentence or a sentence itself.[275]

According to this unique explanation by the Indian Yogācāra commentators, the relation among "phoneme" (*vyañjana*), the "name" (*nāman*), and the "phrase" (*pada*) should not be understood as corresponding to that among the "phoneme" (*varṇa* or *akṣara*), "word" (*pada*), and the "sentence" (*vākya*) in the Mīmāṃsā philosophy. As is well summarized by

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[273] This example is elaborated in the *Tattvārthā*.

[274] See chapter 7.2.3.

[275] This translation is adopted by Cox 1995, Pagel 2007, Kramer 2014, and so on.

Kataoka, the Mīmāṃsās generally explain "our cognitive process from speech (*śabda*) to sentence-meaning" (*vākyārtha*) as follows: Cognition of pronounced phonemes leads into recognition of a word. The recognition of a word causes understanding of a meaning of the word. Finally, understanding of the meaning of each word in a sentence causes cognition of a sentence-meaning.[276] In this explanation, a "word" is the sum of "phonemes", and a "sentence" is the sum of "words". This explanation is not applicable to the "phoneme", the "name", and the "phrase" in the Indian Yogācāra commentaries. Because the "name" means only the noun, it is not the same with the "word" (*pada*) in the Mīmāṃsā philosophy. Therefore, the "phrase" could not be the sum of "names".

However, this unique explanation by the Indian Yogācārins was not maintained in the East Asian Yogācāra commentaries. The East Asian Yogācārins do not differentiate a "name" (*nāman*, *ming* 名) from an adjective or a verb. They consider all kinds of the word as the "name". For example, with regard to the sentence "all the conditioned [are] impermanent" (*sarvāsaṃskārā anityāḥ*), the Indian Yogācāra commentators explain that the subject "the conditioned" (*saṃskāra*) is the "name" in this sentence. On the other hand, with regard to the Chinese translation of this sentence "*zhuxing wuchang* 諸行無常", the East Asian Yogācārins consider "the conditioned" (*xing* 行) or "all the conditioned" (*zhuxing* 諸行) as a "name", and "permanent" (*chang* 常) or "impermanent" (*wuchang* 無常) as another "name" in the sentence. According to the East Asian exposition, the Buddhist term "name" is not distinct from the Mīmāṃsā term "word", thus it could be said that a "name" is the sum of specific "phonemes", and a "phrase" is the sum of specific "names". This East Asian version of exposition and discussion is recently well investigated by Keng.[277]

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[276] Kataoka 2011, part 2, 205 fn. 114.

[277] Keng 2018.

On the other hand, Verhagen elaborates how the relation between the "name" (*nāman*, *ming*) and the "phrase" (*pada*, *tshig*) has been investigated by the Tibetan.[278] As example, he introduces a treatise entitled *Legs sbyar gces pa'i gnad bsdus mgrin pa'i lcags sgrogs rang grol* by the Tibetan scholar 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa I Ngag dbang brtson grus (1648-1721). This Tibetan scholar knows that the Sanskrit term *pada* has the two contradictory meanings in the Buddhist texts. As seen above, one of the two meanings of *pada* is a word with nominal declension or verbal conjugation (*suptiṅantam padam*).[279] In this context, *nāman* means a word without any inflection, and the relation between *nāman* and *pada* is explained by him as follows: "The combination of a specific verbal root (*dbyings, *dhātu*) with one or more specific suffixes results in a free, lexical form (*ming*). The combination of a specific free lexical word form (*ming*) with one or more specific suffixes results in a bound, syntactic word form (*tshig*)".[280] In this explanation, *dbyings* is the basis of *ming*, and *ming* is the basis of *tshig*. This explanation is called the model A by Verhagen.

'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa also knows that *pada* is also defined as phrase. In this context, he understands *nāman* as a word, and explains the relation between *nāman* and *pada* as follows: "The combination of specific phonemes (*yi ge, *vyañjana*) results in a word (*ming*). The combination of specific words (*ming*), or the combination of specific words with one or more specific enclitics results in a phrase" (*tshig*).[281] Verhagen calls this explanation model B and then states that the model B is related to *nāmakāya*, *padakāya*, and *vyañjanakāya* in the AKBh.[282]

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[278] Verhagen 2001, 240ff.

[279] See fn. 171.

[280] Verhagen 2001, 240.

[281] *Ibid.*, 241.

[282] *Ibid.*, 243ff.

Verhagen points out that Model A is derived from the explanation by the Sanskrit grammarian, and model B is based on the Buddhist explanation of set of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana*. However, like the explanation by the East Asian Yogācārins, a "phrase" (*pada*) is defined as the sum of "names" (*nāman*) and is different from the Indian Yogācārins' unique explanation of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana.* The current research does not find any evidence that the Indian Yogācārins' unique explanation of *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* was influential to Tibetan scholars.

6.2 Relation between Expression and Object

The BoBh explains the inexpressible nature (*nirabhilāpya-svabhāvatā*) of factors (*dharma*) in the following way:

The Bodhisattva indeed does not conceptualize (*kalpayati*) any factor in any way, except that he perceives only thing (*vastumātra*) or only suchness (*tathatāmātra*),[283] after having rightly understood (*viditvā*) the inexpressible nature of all factors by means of the "knowledge of the selflessness of all factors" (*dharmanairātmyajñāna*) attained for a long time (*dūrānupraviṣṭa*).

sa khalu bodhisattvas tena dūrānupraviṣṭena dharmanairātmyajñānena nirabhilāpyasvabhāvatāṃ sarvadharmāṇāṃ yathābhūtaṃ viditvā na kaṃcid dharmaṃ kathaṃcit[284] kalpayati nānyatra vastumātraṃ gṛhṇāti tathatāmātram.

byang chub sems dpa' de ni chos bdag med pa'i ye shes ring du zhugs pa des chos thams cad kyi brjod du med pa'i ngo bo nyid yang dag pa ji lta bzhin du rtogs pas

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[283] On the adverbial usage of the term ″except″ (*anyatra*), see BHSD, 41.

[284] na kaṃcid dharmaṃ kathaṃcit BoBh_W; na kiñcid BoBh_D.

dngos po tsam mam/ de bzhin nyid tsam du 'dzin pa ma gtogs par chos gang yang
rung ste/ ji lta bur yang rnam par rtog par mi byed do.[285]

又諸菩薩由能深入法無我智。於一切法離言自性。如實知已達無少法及少品
類可起分別。唯取其事唯取真如.[286]

With regard to the set of the "name", the "phrase", and the "phoneme", this inexpressible nature
of factors continues to be emphasized by the later Yogācārins.[287] For example, the PSkV
interprets the Sanskrit term *adhivacana* as the speech after having superimposed an object
because the own nature (*svarūpa*) of factors cannot be said (*anākhyeyatva*).[288] As Jaini points
out, the term *adhivacana* is explained as a synonym of the "appellation" (*saṃkhā*, skt.
saṃkhyā), the "designation" (*samaññā*, skt. *samājñā*), the "expression" (*paññatti*, skt.
prajñapti), the "conventional expression" (*vohāra*, skt. *vyavahāra*), the "name" (*nāman*, skt.
nāman), the "denomination" (*nāmakamma*, skt. *nāmankarman*), the "assigning of a name"
(*nāmadheyya*, skt. *nāmadheya*), the "interpretation" (*nirutti*, skt. *nirukti*), the "phrasing"
(*byañjana*, skt. *vyañjana*), and the "speech" (*abhilāpa*, skt. *abhilāpa*) in the Pāli text.[289]
Through interpreting this term as the "superimposition" (*adhyāropa*), the Yogācārins attempt
to explain that our expression of an object is the superimposition of any nature or quality on
the inexpressible thing.

According to the Yogācārins, the "name" (*nāman*) is the superimposition of the own-
being (*svabhāva*) with regard to the object, and the "phrase" (*pada*) is the superimposition of

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[285] D4037.23aff.

[286] T1579.30.487b18ff.

[287] Takahashi (2004) investigates the explanation of the relation between name and object in the early
Yogācāra texts.

[288] See below chapter 7.2.1.

[289] See Jaini 1959a, 100. He uses a passage in the *Dhammasangaṇi*.

the specific quality (*viśeṣa*). A "phoneme" (*vyañjana*) is not the superimposition but a momentary syllable (*akṣara*) which can cause the manifestation of the "name" and the "phrase".

In this context, the specific quality means the quality which the own-being has. For example, a thing, on which an own-being of "the conditioned" (*saṃskāra*) is superimposed, has a specific quality of "impermanence" (*anityatā*). All the conditioned have this specific quality. The PSkV expresses the relation between the own-being and the specific quality as follows: This specific quality of "impermanence" recurs (*anuvṛtti*) in each own-being of "the conditioned", and it ceases (*vyāvṛtti*) in each own-being of the "non-conditioned" (*asaṃskāra*). By means of the recurrence and the cessation of the "impermanence", we can distinguish the "conditioned" things from the "non-conditioned" things.[290]

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[290] See below chapter 7.2.2.

7. Exposition of the Set of *Nāman*, *Pada*, and *Vyañjana* in the PSk and its Commentaries

7.1 The Pañcaskandhaka of Vasubandhu[291]

What are name sets? They are the designation with regard to the own-beings (*svabhāva*) of factors.[292] What are phrase sets?[293] They are the designation with regard to the specific qualities (*viśeṣa*) of factors. What are phoneme sets? They are syllables (*akṣara*) insofar as they manifest (*abhivyañjanatā*) both of them [, that is, the name and the phrase]. They are also sounds (*varṇa*) insofar as they communicate (*saṃvarṇa*) the object-referents (*artha*) through being the basis (*āśraya*) of names and phrases. They are also the unchangeable [entities] (*akṣaratva*) insofar as they are not changeable into alternative [phonemes] (*paryāya*).

nāmakāyāḥ katame? dharmāṇāṃ svabhāvādhivacanāni. padakāyāḥ katame? dharmāṇāṃ viśeṣādhivacanāni. vyañjanakāyāḥ katame? akṣarāṇi tadubhayābhivyañjanatām upādāya. varṇā api te nāmapadāśrayatvenārthasaṃvarṇatām upādāya. akṣaratvaṃ punaḥ paryāyākṣaraṇatām upādāya.

ming gi tshogs gang zhe na/ chos rnams kyi ngo bo nyid kyi tshig bla dwags so// tshig gi tshogs gang zhe na/ chos rnams kyi khyad par gyi tshig bla dwags so// yi ge'i tshogs gang zhe na/ yi ge rnams te/ de gnyis ka gsal bar byed pa'i phyir ro// brjod pa yang de dag yin te/ ming dang tshig la brten nas don brjod pa'i phyir ro// yi ge yang rnam grangs gzhan du mi 'gyur ba'i phyir ro.

云何名身？ 謂諸法自性增語為性. 云何句身？ 謂諸法差別增語為性. 云何文身? 謂諸字為性，以能表彰前二種故. 亦名為顯，由與名句為所依止顯了義故. 亦名為字，非差別門所變易故.

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[291] PSk (Li and Steinkellner 2008), 15ff; D4059.15a.

[292] The PSkV interprets the word *adhivacana* as "*adhyāropya vacanam* (speech after superimposing)". See PSkV, 84:16.

[293] See chapter 6.1 for the explanation about the reason why *pada* is translated not as "word" but as "phrase".

7.2 Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣa of Sthiramati[294]

7.2.1 Name (*nāman*)

[In the PSk, it is said:] "Name sets are the designation with regard to the own-beings of factors". Because it leads the cognition (*jñāna*) toward (*nāmayati*) all those which are expressed (*abhidheyaṃ adhibheyaṃ prati*), it is [called] a name (*nāman*).[295]

nāmakāyā dharmāṇāṃ svabhāvādhivacanāni. abhidheyaṃ abhidheyaṃ prati jñānaṃ nāmayatīti nāma.[296]

ming gi tshogs gang zhe na/ chos rnams kyi ngo bo nyid kyi tshig bla dags so zhes bya ba ni brjod par bya ba dang brjod pa la rnam par shes pa gzhol bar byed pas ming ngo.

In turn (*punar*), it, [that is, the name] is a collection (*samudāya*) of sounds for which the limitation is done (*kṛtāvadhivarṇa*) with regard to the object-referent.[297] The collection of names or sounds [of which the limitation is done] is name set.[298]

tat punar artheṣu kṛtāvadhivarṇasamudāyaḥ. nāmnāṃ varṇānāṃ vā samudāyo nāmakāyaḥ.

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[294] PSkV (Kramer 2014), 84:13-86:12; D4066.229bff.

[295] The etymological explanation of "name" (*nāman*), based on the verbal root √*nam*, is also found in the *Tattvārthā*. See chapter 8.1.

[296] PSkV, 84:13. *brjod par bya ba dang brjod pa la rnam par shes pa* T for *abhidheyaṃ abhidheyaṃ prati jñānam*.

[297] The Sanskrit term *kṛtāvadhi* is translated into Tibetan differently in the Tibetan translations of the PSkV and the AKBh. This term is translated as *brda sprod ba* in the Tibetan version of the PSkV, but as *mtshams bcad* in the Tibetan version of the AKBh (See below chapter 8.8).

In the AKBh we find a discussion related to the term *kṛtāvadhi* (*mtshams bcad pa*, *yigongliwei nengquandingliang* 已共立為能詮定量 in T1558.29.29a29). In contrast to the Sarvāstivādin who argues that "name" exists as a real entity (*dravya*), the Sautrantika argues that "name" is not a real entity separated from sound but a designation of a special sound of which the limitation is done (*kṛtāvadhi*) by speakers. See below chapter 8.9 and 8.16.

[298] This explanation shows that the PSkV is on the side of not Sarvāstivāda but Sautrāntika in the AKBh. Sarvāstivāda differentiates name from sound, but Sautrāntika argues that name is nothing but the specific sound. See chapter 10.6 and 10.8.

de yang don rnams la brda sprod ba'i yi ge 'dus pa ste/ ming ngam yi ge rnams 'dus pa la ming gi tshogs zhes bya'o.

The designation (*adhivacana*, *tshig bla dags*) is the speech after superimposing (*adhyāropya vacanam*, *sgro btags pa*), because the own nature (*svarūpa*) of factors cannot be said (*anākhyeyatva*).[299]

dharmāṇāṃ svarūpasyānākhyeyatvād adhyāropya vacanam adhivacanam.

chos rnams kyi ngo bo nyid brjod du med pa'i phyir sgro btags pa'i tshig la tshig bla dags zhes bya'o.

The own-being (*svabhāva*, *ngo bo nyid*) is the own characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*, *rang gi mtshan nyid*). The expression (*abhidhāna*), by which the own nature (*svarūpa*) of factors having an inexpressible own nature is illuminated (*dyotyate*), is called a "name". For example, it is the sense faculty of seeing (*cakṣus*), the sense of hearing (*śrotra*), [visible] matter (*rūpa*), and sound (*śabda*).

svabhāvaḥ svalakṣaṇam. yenānabhilapyasvarūpāṇāṃ dharmāṇāṃ svarūpaṃ dyotyate, tad abhidhānaṃ nāmety ucyate, tadyathā cakṣuḥ śrotraṃ rūpaṃ śabda iti.

ngo bo nyid ni rang gi mtshan nyid do// chos rnams kyi rang gi ngo bo brjod du med kyang gang gis rang gi ngo bo gsal bar byed pa'i brjod pa de ming// zhes bya ste/ dper na mig rna ba gzugs sgra zhes bya ba lta bu'o.

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[299] See above chapter 6.2 for Yogācārinʹs unique interpretation of *adhivacana*.

7.2.2 Phrase (*pada*)

[In the PSk, it is said:] "phrase sets are the designation with regard to the specific qualities of the factors". Because the object-referent together with the specific quality (*saviśeṣo arthaḥ*) is understood by this [phrase], it is [called] a "phrase".[300]

padakāyā dharmāṇāṃ viśeṣādhivacanāni. padyate 'nena saviśeṣo 'rtha iti padam.

tshig gi tshogs gang zhe na/ chos rnams kyi khyad par gyi tshig bla dags so zhes bya ba ni 'dis khyad par gyi don shes par byed pas tshig ste.

In this way, the "phrase" (*pada*, *tshig*) is differentiated (*viśeṣita*) from the name (*nāman*, *ming*) and the "worldly word" (*laukikam padam*, *'jig rten pa'i tshig*), [that is, the usual usage of the term *pada*]. Although both name and phrase are not different (*aviśeṣa*) in the sense that they have the nature of the collection of sounds, [that is, the collection of phonemes, they are] different because of the difference of the object-referent. The name is the designation with regard to the own-being (*svabhāva*) of factors. The phrase is the designation with regard to the specific qualities of factors. Because a specific quality (*viśeṣa*) takes the own-being (*svabhāva*) as its basis (*adhiṣṭhānatva*), the designation with regard to the own-being, [that is the name,] is [explained] earlier [than the phrase].[301]

evaṃ nāmno laukikāc ca padāt padaṃ viśeṣitaṃ bhavati. nāmapadayoḥ varṇasamudāyātmakatvāviśeṣe 'pi, arthaviśeṣād viśeṣaḥ. dharmāṇāṃ svabhāvādhivacanaṃ nāma. viśeṣādhivacanaṃ padam. svabhāvādhiṣṭhānatvād viśeṣasya pūrvaṃ svabhāvādhivacanam.

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[300] This etymological explanation of "phrase" (*pada*), based on the verbal root √*pad*, is also found in the *Tattvārthā* and the Vyākhyā. See chapter 8.2.

[301] According to this explanation, the object-referent of the "name" is the own-being and that of the "phrase is the own-being together with a specific quality. For example, the expression "Devadatta" is a "name" and the expression "white Devadatta" or "Devadatta [is] white" is a "phrase"; The PSkV does not explain further what the "worldly word" (*laukikam padam*) means. According to the PSkBh, the worldly word means any individual word. See chapter 7.11.2.

de lta na ming dang 'jig rten pa'i tshig las tshig bye brag tu byas pa yin no// ming dang tshig gnyis yi ge 'dus pa'i bdag nyid yin par bye brag med kyang don gyi bye brag gis bye brag tu dbye ste/ chos rnams kyi ngo bo nyid kyi tshig bla dags ni ming yin la/ khyad par gyi gzhi ni ngo bo nyid yin pas sngar ngo bo nyid kyi tshig bla dags smos so.

In turn, because the specific quality, which is "impermanence" (*anityatā*), and so on, and has the nature of recurrence (*anuvṛtti*) and cessation (*vyāvṛtti*),[302] distinguishes the own-being (*svabhāva*) that does not exist elsewhere (*anyatrāvarttamāna*), it is the specific quality. For example, "all the conditioned [factors] are impermanent" (*anityāḥ sarvasaṃskārāḥ*), "all the factors have no self (*sarvadharmā anātmānaḥ*)", and "extinction is calm" (*śāntaṃ nirvāṇam*).

viśeṣaḥ punar anityatādiko 'nuvṛttivyāvṛttyatmakaḥ, anyatrāvarttamānaṃ svabhāvaṃ viśinaṣṭīti viśeṣaḥ. tadyathā anityāḥ sarvasaṃskārāḥ, sarvadharmā anātmānaḥ, śāntaṃ nirvāṇam.

khyad par ni mi rtag pa la sogs pa'o// 'jug pa dang ldog pa'i bdag nyid dang gzhan du mi snyegs pa'i ngo bo nyid las bye brag tu byed pa ni khyad par te/ dper na 'du byed thams cad ni mi rtag pa'o// chos thams cad ni bdag med pa'o// [m]ya ngan las 'das pa ni zhi ba'o zhes bya ba lta bu'o.

What has been said [means the following]: The name is nothing but the expression (*abhidhāna*) of the own-being of a thing (*vastu*) and the phrase is the expression (*abhidhāna*) of the differentiated (*viśiṣṭa*) own-being of a thing. The rest, [such as the terms *adhivacana*, *kāya*, and so on,] should be understood as [included in] the explanation of "name".

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[302] See above chapter 6.2. The PSkV does not explain further the terms "recurrence" (*anuvṛtti*) and "cessation" (*vyāvṛtti*). Although it does not mention both terms, the PSkBh gives a related explanation (see chapter 7.5.2). For example, a specific quality of "impermanence" (*mi rtag pa*, **anitya*) occurs and recurs at every conditioned factor (*saṃskāra*). This specific quality is excluded at every unconditioned factor (*asaṃskāra*). Through this recurrence and cessation of the specific quality "impermanence", the conditioned factors and the unconditioned factors are distinguished.

These terms are also found in a commentary of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* attributed to Dignāga. It is explained that the word "cow" causes a cognition (*buddhi*) in terms of "recurrence (*anuvṛtti*)" with regard to the cows, and also a cognition in terms of "exclusion (*vyāvṛtti*)" with regard to non-cows (see Pind 2015, 163 fn.547).

etad uktaṃ bhavati. vastusvabhāvābhidhānamātraṃ nāma viśiṣṭavastusvabhābhidhānam padam iti. śeṣaṃ tu nāmavyākhyānato vijñeyaṃ.

de ni 'di skad du dngos po'i ngo bo nyid brjod pa tsam ni ming yin la/ dngos po'i ngo bo nyid kyi khyad par brjod pa ni tshig yin no zhes bstan pa yin no// lhag ma ni ming bshad pa bzhin du shes par bya'o.

7.2.3 Phoneme (*vyañjana*)

[In the PSk, it is said:] "Phoneme sets are the syllables (*akṣara*) insofar as they manifest both of them (*tadubhaya*) [, that is, the name and the phrase]". It is phoneme because [name and phrase] are manifested (*vyajyate*) by this [phoneme]. Phoneme set is the collection (*kāya*) of phonemes. The word "*kāya*" [is used] in order to include all the phonemes.

vyañjanakāyā akṣarāṇi tadubhayābhivyañjanatām upādāya. vyajyate 'neneti vyañjanaṃ. vyañjanānāṃ kāyo vyañjanakāyaḥ. kāyagrahaṇaṃ sarvavyañjanopādānārtham.

yi ge'i tshogs gang zhe na/ yi ge rnams te de gnyi ga gsal bar byed pa'i phyir ro zhes bya ba ni 'dis gsal bar byed pas yi ge'o// yi ge rnams kyi tshogs ni yi ge'i tshogs so// tshogs smos pa ni yi ge thams cad bsdu ba'i phyir ro.

From the word "them" (*tat*) [in the expression "both of these" (*tadubhaya*)] alone, the connection (*sambandha*) only with the immediately [previous one, that is, the connection only with phrase] would be suspected. But from the word "both" (*ubhaya*) alone, it is not known which two [are connected]. Therefore, "both of them" (*tadubhaya*) [means] the expression of both [name and phrase]. In this way, it is called phoneme (*vyañjana*) because it manifests (*abhivyañjakatva*) the immediately [previously explained] name and phrase.[303]

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[303] As explained above in chapter 4.3 and 4.4, many of the Sarvāstivāda texts consider *vyañjana* as a basis only of *pada* but not of *nāman*. The Yogācāra texts and some later Sarvāstivāda texts understand *vyañjana* as a basis of both *nāman* and *pada*.

tacchabdāt kevalād anantarasyaiva sambandha āśaṅkyeta. **ubhaya**śabdād api kevalāt katamasyobhayasyeti na vijñāyate. ata ubhayābhidhānaṃ **tadubhayam** iti. evam anantarasyaiva nāmnaḥ padasya cābhivyañjakatvād vyañjanam ity uktaṃ bhavati.

de zhes bya ba'i sgra 'ba' zhig smos na ni gong ma nyid la sbyor du dgos la/ gnyi ga zhes bya ba nyi tshe smos na yang gnyi ga gang la bya bar gtol med de/ de'i phyir de gnyi ga zhes gnyi ga smos so// de ltar na bshad ma thag pa'i ming dang tshig gsal bar byed pa'i phyir yi ge zhes bshad pa yin no.

How does the manifestation (*abhivyañjana*) of the name and the phrase [arise] by means of syllables (*akṣara*)? It is because the "marks" (*prajñapana*) of the name and the phrase [arise] when the collected syllables are (*gata*, *gyur pa*) in the state (*avasthā*, *gnas skabs*) of the designation (*adhivacana*) with regard to the own-being and the specific quality.[304] Because the manifestation of the name and the phrase [arises] by means of syllables in this way [and the syllables themselves do not have their own object-referent],[305] the syllables do not have the vocal information (*vāgvijñapti*) as the own-being.[306]

kathaṃ punar akṣarair nāmapadayor abhivyañjanam? akṣareṣu samuditeṣu svabhāvaviśeṣādhivacanāvasthāṃ gateṣu nāmapadaprajñapanāt. evam akṣarair nāmapadābhivyañjanād, akṣarāṇi na vāgvijñaptisvabhāvāni.

ji ltar na yi ge rnams kyis ming dang tshig gsal bar byed ce na/ ngo bo nyid dang khyad par gyi tshig bla dags kyi gnas skabs su gyur pa'i yi ge 'dus pa rnams la ming dang tshig gdags pa'i phyir te/ de ltar na yi ge rnams kyis ming dang tshig gsal bar byed do// yi ge rnams kyi ngag gi rnam par rig byed kyi ngo bo nyid ma yin te.

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[304] For the term *prajñapana* ("Bezeichnung", "Kennzeichnung"), see SWTF 3, 161.

[305] *nāmapadābhivyañjanāt* in the Sanskrit version but *ming dang tshig gsal bar byed do* in the Tibetan version.

[306] According to the AKBh and the *Tattvārthā*, the three factors of "name", "phrase", and "phoneme" are different from speech (*vāc*). The Sarvāstivādin in the AKBh explains that speech is vocal information (*vāgvijñapti*) and the three factors are non-information (*avijñapti*). See also chapter 8.11.

It is well established (*prasiddha*) among people (*loke*) that the "sounds" (*varṇa*) are the sound (*kāra*) "a", and so on. In turn, they [, that is, phonemes,] are called sounds because they communicate (*saṃvarṇana*) the objects (*artha*) by means of being a basis (*āśraya*) of the names and the phrases. [When sounds] arise (*vyutpādyante*) with regard to the objects in whichever state, the manifestation (*prajñapti*) of the names and the phrases [arises] with regard to the objects-referents in that state. Therefore, they are said [to communicate the object-referents] by means of being their basis.

akārādayo **varṇā** iti prasiddhaṃ loke. **te** punar **nāmapadāśrayatvenārthasaṃvarṇanād** varṇā ucyante. yadavastheṣv artheṣu vyutpādyante, tadavastheṣv eva nāmapadayoḥ prajñaptir iti te tadāśrayatvenocyante.

yi ge [a][307] la sogs pa ni brjod pa'o zhes 'jig rten na grags so// de dag ni ming dang tshig gnas kyis don yang dag par brjod pa'i phyir brjod pa zhes bya'o// don gyi gnas gang dag la bstan pa'i gnas de dag la ming dang tshig gdags pas de dag ni de'i gnas zhes bya'o//

[It is said in the PSk:] "[They are] also the unchangeable [entity] (*akṣaratva*) insofar as they are not changeable (*akṣaraṇatā*) into alternative [phonemes] (*paryāya*)". To wit, "sense-faculty of seeing" (*cakṣus*), [that is, one of the "names" can be] changed to alternative [names such as] "guide" (*netra*) and so on. This means as follows: [the object-referent of the name *cakṣus*] is understood by means of being expressed by [various] alternatives.[308] However, there is no alternative of the sound (*kāra*) "a" in this way, by which the sound "a" could be understood without saying (*muktvā*) the sound "a".

akṣaratvaṃ punas teṣāṃ **paryāyākṣaraṇatām upādāya.** tathā hi cakṣur netrādiparyāyāntareṣu kṣarati. abhidheyatvena paryāyāntarair gamyata ity arthaḥ. na punar evam akārasya paryāyāntaram asti, yenākārābhidhānaṃ muktvākāro gamyeta /

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[307] omit. D.

[308] According to the Tibetan version, the case ending of *abhidheyatva* is not the instrumental but the nominative, that is, **abhidheyatvam*: "What is to be expressed is understood by means of [various] alternatives".

yi ge yang de dag gi rnam grangs su gtogs pa gzhan du mi 'gyur bar byed pa'i phyir te/ 'di ltar mig dang 'dren byed ces bya ba la sogs pa ni rnam grangs su gtogs pa gzhan dag tu 'gyur ba ste/ brjod par bya ba nyid rnam grangs su gtogs pa gzhan rnams kyis shes so zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go// gang gis a zhes brjod pa ma gtogs par a zhes bya ba shes par 'gyur ba a zhes bya ba'i rnam grangs de lta bu gzhan med do.

7.2.4 Summary of the three factors

Everything is like the [following:] All own-beings (*svabhāva*), specific qualities (*viśeṣa*), and the conventional expression (*vyavahāra*) of these two are designated (*anuvyavahriyate*) by these [three, that is, the name set, the phrase set, and the phoneme set]. Therefore, these sets of names, phrases, and phonemes are [conventionally] established. In this way, the establishment (*vyavasthāna*) of other (*anya*) [factors] dissociated from mind (*cittaviprayukta*) should be understood (*veditavya*) in relation to purpose (*prayojanāpekṣayā*) like [in the case of] the set of the names, the phrases, and the phonemes.

etāvac ca sarvam. yad uta svabhāvo viśeṣas tadubhayavyavahāraś ca, tat sarvam ebhir anuvyavahriyata ity ata ete nāmapadavyañjanakāyā vyavasthāpitā iti. evam anyeṣām api viprayuktānāṃ nāmapadavyañjanakāyavat prayojanāpekṣayā vyavasthānaṃ veditavyam.

thams cad ni 'di lta ste/ ngo bo nyid dang khyad par dang de gnyi ga'i tha snyad tsam du zad de/ de dag thams cad ni 'di dag gis rjes su tha snyad gdags pa yin pas de'i phyir ming dang tshig dang yi ge'i tshogs de dag rnam par gzhag go// de bzhin du ldan pa ma yin pa gzhan dag kyang tshig dang yi ge'i tshogs bzhin du dgos pa la ltos nas rnam par gzhag par rig par bya'o.

7.3 The *Dasheng guang wuyun lun* 大乘廣五蘊[309]

What is the name set? It has (*wei* 為) the designation (*zhenyu* 增語, **adhivacana*) with regard to the own-being (*zixing* 自性, **svabhāva*) of factors as its nature (*xing* 性), like the expression "the sense faculty of seeing" (*yan* 眼, **cakṣus*) and so on.[310]

云何名身？謂於諸法自性增語為性，如說眼等．

What is the phrase set? It has the designation with regard to the specific qualities (*chabie* 差別, **viśeṣa*) of factors as its nature, like the expression "all the conditioned [factors] are impermanent" (*zhuxing wuchang* 諸行無常) and so on.

云何句身？謂於諸法差別增語為性，如說諸行無常等．

What is the phoneme set? It is called syllables (*zhuzi* 諸字, **akṣarāṇi*), insofar as it manifests (*biaole* 表了, **abhivyañjanatā*) both of those two previous aspects (*xing* 性), [that is, the own-being and the specific quality].[311] It is also called sound (*xian* 顯, **varṇa*), insofar as it communicates (*xianle* 顯了, **saṃvarṇatā*) the object-referent (*yi* 義, **artha*) through being a basis (*suoyi* 所依, **āśraya*) of the names and the phrases. It is also called the "unchangeable [entity]" (*zi* 字, **akṣaratva*), insofar as it is not changeable into alternative [phonemes] (*wuyizhuan* 無異轉, **paryāyākṣaraṇatā*). "The two previous aspects" means the own-being

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[309] T1613.13.854b19ff, attributed to Sthiramati, translated by *Divākara (Dipoheluo 地婆訶羅). This text and the PSkV are attributed to Sthiramati, but it is much shorter than the PSkV. Therefore, I translate the passage separately.

[310] This explanation corresponds not to the PSkV but to the PSkViv. See chapter 7.4.1.

[311] The Chinese version of the PSk (chapter 7.1) translates *abhivyañjanatā* as *biaozhang* 表彰 instead of *biaole* 表了.

and the specific quality. "Sound" (*xian* 顯, *varṇa*) means "communicating" (*xianle* 顯了, *saṃvarṇatā*).[312]

云何文身? 謂即諸字, 此能表了前二性故. 亦名顯, 謂名句所依, 顯了義故. 亦名字, 謂無異轉故. 前二性者, 謂詮自性及以差別. 顯謂顯了.

[312] This sentence probably explains that *varṇa* and *saṃvarṇatā* are derived from the same etymology.

7.4 The *Pañcaskandhavivaraṇa*[313]

7.4.1   Name (*nāman*)

[It is said in the PSk:] "What is the name set? It is the designation with regard to the own-being of factors". For example, it is [the expression] "the sense-faculty of seeing" (*mig*, **cakṣus*) and so on.

ming gi tshogs gang zhe na/ chos rnams kyi ngo bo nyid kyi tshig bla dags so// 'di lta ste mig gi ces bya ba la sogs pa'o.

7.4.2   Phrase (*pada*)

[It is said in the PSk:] "What is the phrase set? It is the designation with regard to specific qualities of the factors. For example, it is [the expression] "Oh, the conditioned [factors] are impermanent" and so on. [In this context, *pada* is the "phrase"] in the sense that (*ji tsam gyis*, **yāvatā*) it completely defines (*yongs su rdzogs pa*, **parisamāpti*) the object-referent, which is intended to be expressed. This means that the specific qualities related to activity (*byed pa*), attribute (*yon tan*) and time (*dus*) are understood by means of a [phrase].[314]

tshig gi tshogs gang zhe na/ chos rnams kyi khyad par gyi tshig bla dags so// 'di lta ste kye ma 'du byed mi rtag ste zhes bya ba la sogs pa'o// ji tsam gyis brjod par 'dod pa'i don yongs su rdzogs pa ste/ gang gis byed pa[315] dang yon tan dang/ dus kyi 'brel pa'i khyad par rnams rtogs par byed ces bya'i tha tshig go.

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[313] D.4067.24aff, *Phung po lng'i rnam par 'grel pa*.

[314] See also below chapter 8.2. AKBh, 80.5ff: *"Pada* is a sentence (*vākya*) in the sense that it completely defines (*parisamāpti*) the object-referent (*artha*), for example, 'oh, the conditioned [factors are] impermanent' and so on. By this [phrase], specific qualities (*viśeṣa*) related (*saṃbandha*) to activity (*kriya*), attribute (*guṇa*) and time (*kāla*) are understood" (*vākyaṃ padaṃ, yāvatā 'rthaparisamāptis tadyathā anityā bata saṃskārā ity evamādi. yena kriyāguṇakālasaṃbandhaviśeṣā gamyante*; *ngag ni tshig ste/ dper na/ kye ma 'du byed rnams mi rtag/ ces bya ba de lta bu la sogs pa ji tsam gyis don yongs su rdzogs pa ste/ gang gis bya ba dang yon tan dang dus kyi 'brel ba'i khyad par rtogs par 'gyur ro*).

[315] *phyed pa* D.

For example, the sentence (*ngag*, **vākya*) "a pot is made (*bum pa byas*)" leads to the understanding of the specific quality related to an activity, [that is, the activity of "making"]. [The sentence] "Devadatta is evil (*nag po,* **kṛṣṇa*), wholesome (*dkar po*, **śukla*), or free from harm" (*sdo ba sangs*) [leads to the understanding of] the specific qualities related to attributes. [The sentence] "Devadatta cooks (*'thed do*, **pacati*), will cook (*'tshed bar 'gyur ro*) or cooked (*bstos so*)" leads to the understanding of the specific qualities related to time, [that is, past, present, and future]. In this way, [the sentences] completely expresses (*mngon par brjod pa*) the own characteristic (*rang gi mtshan nyid*, **svalakṣaṇa*). [Thus, the sentence is called] a phrase that expresses (*brjod pa*) the specific qualities related to activity, attribute, and time.

'di lta ste bum pa byas zhes bya ba'i ngag[316] 'dis ni byed pa'i 'brel pa'i khyad par rtogs par byed do// lha sbyin nag po dkar po sdo ba sangs zhes bya ba ni yon tan gyi 'brel pa'i khyad par ro// lha sbyin 'tshed do 'tshed bar 'gyur ro// btsos so zhes bya ba 'dis ni dus kyi 'brel ba'i khyad par rtogs par byed do// de ltar rang gi mtshan nyid mngon par brjod pa zhes bya ste/ byed pa dang yon tan dang dus kyi 'brel ba'i khyad par brjod pa'i tshig ces bya'o.

7.4.3   Phoneme (*vyañjana*)

[It is said in the PSk:] "What is the phoneme set (*vyañjanakāya*)? They are syllables (*yi ge*, *akṣara*), insofar as they manifest both". "Both" (*gnyi ga*, **ubhaya*) [means] the own-being (*ngo bo*, **svabhāva*) and the specific qualities (*khyad par*, **viśeṣa*) of factors. "Manifesting" (*gsal bar byed*, **abhivyañjana*) means "make appear" (*mngon par byed*).

yi ge'i tshogs gang zhe na/ yi ge rnams te de gnyi ga gsal bar byed pa'i phyir ro zhes bya ba la/ gnyi ga ni chos rnams kyi ngo bo nyid dang khyad par ro// **gsal bar byed** ces bya ba ni mngon par byed ces bya ba'i tha tshig go.

[It is said in the PSk:] "They are also sounds (*varṇa*) insofar as they communicate (*brjod pa*, **saṃvarṇatā*) the object-referent (*don*, **artha*) through being a basis (*brten*, **āśrayatva*) of names and phrases. A name, for instance, is "the sense-faculty of seeing" (*mig*, **cakṣus*). A

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[316] dag D.

phrase is, for instance, [the sentence] "the sense-faculty of seeing is impermanent". [A phoneme] is sound, insofar as they express the own-being and the specific qualities (*bye brag*) of the object through being a basis of both of them.

brjod pa yang de dag yin te/ ming dang tshig la brten nas don brjod pa'i phyir ro zhes bya ba la/ **ming** ni mig ces bya ba la sogs pa'o// **tshig** ni mig mi rtag ces bya ba la sogs pa'o// de gnyi ga la brten nas don gyi rang bzhin dang/ bye brag ces bya ba brjod pa'i phyir brjod pa'o.

[It is said in the PSk:] "They are also the unchangeable [entities] (*yi ge*, **akṣaratva*), insofar as they are not changeable into alternative [phonemes]". [This statement] should be known [as follows: they are also the unchangeable entities,] because the sound 'a' cannot be changed into alternative [phonemes].

(24a) **yi ge yang rnam grangs gzhan du mi 'gyur bar byed pa'i phyir ro** zhes bya ba ni a zhes bya ba 'di rnam grangs gzhan gyis brjod par mi nus pa'i phyir ro// zhes bya ba la sogs pa yang rig par bya'o.

7.5 The *Pañcaskandhabhāṣya*[317]

7.5.1   Name (*nāman*)

In order to explain the meaning of "name" (*ming*) with regard to the own-being (*rang bzhin*, *svabhāva*) of the name set, it is asked "what is the name set?". This [means] the question [asking] what is the own-being and the characteristic (*mtshan nyid*) of the name set.

ming gi tshogs kyi rang bzhin de la ming zhes bya ba'i don bstan pa'i phyir/ (89b) **ming gi tshogs gang zhe na** zhes dris te/ ming gi tshogs kyi rang bzhin dang/ mtshan nyid gang zhe na zhes dris pa'i don to.

In this [context], a name is [a noun such as] a "pot" (*bum pa*), a "cloth" (*snam bu*), "[visible] matter" (*gzugs*), a "sound" (*sgra*), and so on. Here, what is the [literal] meaning of the name? This and that expression (*rjod par byed pa*), which lead cognition (*rnam par shes pa*, *vijñāna*) toward (*gzhol bar byed*, *nāmayati*) and make it being engaged in (*gzhol bar byed zhing 'jug par byed pa*) the object-referent, or make one understand (*rtogs par byed pa*) the cognized object-referent (*rnam par shes pa'i don*),[318] is called a name.[319]

de la ming gi bum pa dang/ snam bu dang/ gzugs dang/ sgra zhes bya ba la sogs pa'o// de la ming zhes bya ba'i don ci zhe na/ don la rnam par shes pa gzhol zhing 'jug par byed pa'am rnam par shes pa'i don rtogs par byed pa'i rjod par byed pa dang/ rjod par byed pa la ming zhes bya'o.

In this context, the "expression" (*rjod par byed pa*) has fire (*me*), pot (*bum pa*), and so on, as the thing (*dngos po*, *vastu*), [that is, the object of the expression]. "Manifestation" (*brjod pa*, *abhilāpa*) is said with regard to sounds (*sgra, *ghoṣa*) [such as] "fire" (*me*) and "pot" (*bum*

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[317] D4068.89aff.

[318] I assume the Tibetan expression *'jug par byed pa* as the translation of "engagement" (*ābhujana*). See PSkV, 35: "What is the contemplation? It is the bending (*ābhoga*) of mind (*cetas*). 'Engaging' (*ābhujana*) is 'bending'" (*manaskāraḥ katamaḥ? cetasa ābhoga iti. ābhujanam ābhogaḥ*); The corresponding Tibetan passage (D4066.209b): *yid la byed pa gang zhe na/ sems kyi 'jug pa'o zhes bya ba ni 'jug par byed pas 'jug pa ste.*

[319] On the explanation of name, based on the verbal root √*nam*, see also chapter 7.2.1 and 8.1.

pa).[320] Through manifesting sounds [such as] "fire" and "pot", cognition (*rnam par shes pa*) understands and knows (*rtogs shing shes par byur ba*) the object-referent (*don*, **artha*) of fire and pot. Therefore, sounds [such as] "fire" and "pot" are called "names"[321]. [This] means that actually (*don du na*), the set of many sounds (*yi ge*) [like] "a", "ka", and so on, of which the limitation is made (*brda phrad par byed pa*) with regard to the object-referent, [in the form] of "fire", "pot", and so on, is called "name".[322]

de la rjod par byed pa ni me[323] dang bum pa la sogs pa'i dngos po'o// brjod pa ni me zhes bya ba'i sgra dang bum pa zhes bya ba'i sgra la bya ste/ me dang bum pa zhes bya ba'i sgra de brjod pas rnam par shes pas me dang bum pa'i don de rtogs shing shes par 'gyur bas na me dang bum pa zhes bya ba'i sgra la ming zhes gdags so// don du na me dang bum pa la sogs pa'i don brda phrad par byed pa'i yi ge a dang ka la sogs pa mang po tshogs pa la ming zhes bya'o zhes ba'i don to.

[A Question with regard to] "set" (*tshogs*, **kāya*): Is it a set (*tshogs*) because a name (*ming*) arises (*gyur pa*) from the collection of many phonemes (*yi ge*) like "a", "ka", and so on?[324] Or (*yang na*) is it a set because names (*ming*) such as "Devadatta" (*lha sbyin*), "Yajñadatta" (*mchod sbyin*), "[visible] matter" (*gzugs*, **rūpa*), or "sound" (*sgra*, **śabda*), and so on, are

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[320] This seems to be the summary of the Sarvāstivādin's explanation of the "name". According to the Sarvāstivādin, a name is an expression, and the expression is the real entity (*dravya*) that is different from another real entity "sound" (*ghoṣa*). For example, the sound "fire" is different from the expression "fire". The sound "fire" manifests the expression "fire", and the expression "fire" leads to the cognition of fire See above chapter 5.1 and below chapter 8.7.

[321] The Sautrantika and the Yogācārins generally disagree with the Sarvāstivādins' explanation. That is, the expression "fire" and the sound "fire" are the same entity. Therefore, the sound "fire" itself leads to the cognition of fire. See below chapter 8.6.

[322] See chapter 7.2.1 (PSkV, 84.14ff): "In turn, it, [that is, "name"] is the collection (*samudāya*) of the sound of which the limitation is made (*kṛtāvadhivarṇa*) with regard to object-referent" (*tat punar artheṣu kṛtāvadhivarṇasamudāyaḥ. nāmnāṃ varṇānāṃ vā samudāyo nāmakāyaḥ; de yang don rnams la brda sprod ba'i yi ge 'dus pa ste/ ming ngam yi ge rnams 'dus pa la ming gi tshogs zhes bya'o*). See also below chapter 8.8.

[323] ma D

[324] According to this explanation, *nāmakāya* means a "composition" in which the various parts of a "name", that is, various phonemes, are put together and arranged.

numerically many (*grangs kyis*, **saṃkhyayā*)?[325] Answer: [The name set] is the designation (*tshigs bla dags*, **adhivacana*) with regard to the own-being (*ngo bo nyid*, **svabhāva*) of factors (*chos*, *dharma*). In this [context], "cloth" (*snam bu*), "pot" (*bum pa*), "matter" (*gzugs*), "sound" (*sgra*), etc., and "earth" (*sa*), "water" (*chu*), "fire" (*me*), and "wind" (*rlung*), etc. are called [name] set (*tshogs rnams*).

tshogs zhes bya ba ni ming yang yi ge a dang ka la sogs pa mang po 'dus pa las gyur pas na tshogs zhes bya ba'am/ yang na lha sbyin zhe'am/ mchod sbyin zhe'am/ gzugs she'am sgra zhes bya ba la sogs pa'i ming nyid grangs kyis mang ba'i phyir tshogs zhes bya'o// de'i lan du/ **chos rnams kyi ngo bo nyid kyi tshig**[326] **bla dags so** zhes bya ba la sogs pa smos te/ de la snam bu dang/ bum pa dang/ gzugs dang/ sgra la sogs pa dang/ yang sa dang chu dang/ me dang/ rlung la sogs pa la tshogs rnams zhes bya'o.

"The own-being of factors" (*dharmāṇām svabhāva*) is the individual characteristic (*mtshan nyid*) of the factors,[327] for example, the characteristic of earth (*sa*) is hardness (*sgra*), the characteristic of water is wetness (*gsher ba*), and the characteristic of fire is heat (*tsha ba*, **uṣṇa*).

chos de dag gi ngo bo nyid ni chos de dag gi so so'i mtshan nyid la bya ste/ dper na sa'i mtshan nyid ni sra ba dang/ chu'i mtshan nyid ni gsher ba dang / me'i mtshan nyid ni tsha ba lta bu'o.

There, the own nature (*rang bzhin*) of the factors cannot be explained (*bstan cing*) and manifested (*brjod pa*) by speech (*tshig*, **vacana*).[328] If the characteristic of the factors could be manifested by speech, it would be reasonable [to say] that one is burned (*lce tshig par 'gyur*),

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[325] According to the second explanation, *nāmakāya* means a "collection", in which many "names" are put together and arranged.

[326] tshigs D.

[327] PSkV, 84.16: "The own-being is the own characteristic" (*svabhāvaḥ svalakṣaṇam*).

[328] Here, the Sanskrit word *adhivacana* (*tshig bla dags*) is commented on. The PSkBh explains *tshig* at first, and then *bla dags*. This is similar to the explanation of *adhivacana* in the PSkV, 84.16: "the speech after superimposing" (*adhyāropya vacana*, *sgro btags pa'i tshig la tshig bla dags zhes bya'o*).

because of the occurrence of fire, only by manifesting the [name] "fire" [by means of   speech], and thirst (*skom*) would be satisfied (*ngoms par 'gyur ba*) only by manifesting the [name] "water" (*chu*) [by means of speech]. [However,] because one is not burned only by manifesting the [name] "fire" and thirst is not satisfied only by manifesting the [name] "water" [by means of speech], the names of factors are [only] superimposing designations (*bla dags su btags pa*) with regard to [the object of] earth, water and so on. Because of this, [the name set] is the designation with regard to the own-being of factors.[329]

de la chos rnams kyi rang bzhin ni tshig gis bstan cing brjod par mi nus pa yin te/ gal te chos rnams kyi mtshan nyid tshig gis brjod par nus na ni me[330] 'gyur bas ni me zhes brjod pa tsam gyis lce tshig par 'gyur la/ chu zhe brjod pas skom ngoms par 'gyur ba'i rigs na/ me zhes brjod pa tsam gyis kyang lce tshig par mi 'gyur la/ chu zhes brjod pa tsam gyis kyang skom ngoms par mi 'gyur bas chos rnams kyi ming sa dang/ (90a) // chu la sogs par bla dags su btags pa yin pas na **chos rnams kyi ngo bo nyid kyi tshig bla dags** zhes bya'o.

In this way, the speech, which manifests the [name] "earth" with regard to this [object] and [manifests the name] "water" with regard to that [object], is called the name, although the characteristic of the factors [that is, earth, water, and so on,] is inexpressible.[331] Therefore, the name set exists as an expression but not as a real entity [different from the speech], as it designates (*gdags pa*) a state (*dus*, **avasthā*) of matter (*gzugs*, **rūpa*), mind (*sems*, **citta*) and a mental factor (*sems las byung ba*, **caitasika*).[332]

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[329] This explanation corresponds to that in the **Abhidharmāvatāraśāstra* (*rab tu byed pa chos mngon pa la 'jug pa*, *Ru apidamo lun* 入阿毘達磨論). See above chapter 5.1. See also Dhammajoti 2009, 118 and Franco and Notake 2014, 10ff.

[330] mi D.

[331] *brjod du med* [pa] is considered as the Tibetan translation of *anākhyeyatva*. See the passage of the PSkV in chapter 7.2.1: "the designation is the speech after superimposing, because the own-nature of the factors is **inexpressible**" (*dharmāṇāṃ svarūpasya**nākhyeyatvād** adhyāropya vacanam adhivacanam*; *chos rnams kyi ngo bo nyid **brjod du med pa'i phyir** sgro btags pa'i tshig la tshig bla dags zhes bya'o*).

[332] The Tibetan version of the PSkBh generally translates the Sanskrit word *avasthā* as *'dus*. Whereas the Tibetan translation of the PSkV uses *gnas skabs*. See the PSkV, 74.8ff: "Those which are expressed (*prajñapyante*, *gdags pa*) with regard to the states (*avasthā*) of matter, mind and a mental factor and [those which are] not expressed as being different from them are the factors dissociated

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de ltar chos rnams kyi mtshan nyid brjod du med kyang 'di ni sa 'di ni chu zhes brjod pa'i tshig de la ming zhes bya'o// de bas na ming gi tshogs 'di yang gzugs dang/ sems dang sems las byung ba'i dus la gdags pas btags par yod kyi rdzas su med do.

7.5.2 Phrase (*pada*)

In order to explain the own-being (*rang bzhin*) of the phrase set, it is asked "what is the phrase set?" [This] means that it is the question [asking] what is the own-being and the characteristic (*mtshan nyid*) of phrase set. The answer [said in PSk is as follows:] It is the designation with regard to the specific quality (*khyad par*, *viśeṣa*).

tshig gi tshogs kyi rang bzhin bstan pa'i phyir **tshig gi tshogs gang zhe na** zhes dris te/ tshig gi tshogs kyi rang bzhin dang mtshan nyid gang zhe na zhes dris pa'i don to// de'i lan du **chos rnams kyi khyad par gyi tshig bla dags so** zhes bya ba smos te.

A factor (*chos*, *dharma*) is pot (*bum pa*), cloth (*snam bu*), visible matter (*gzugs*), sound (*sgra*), and so on. A specific quality of the factors is a particular quality (*bye brag*) of the factors, that is, characteristics (*mtshan nyid*, *lakṣaṇa*) like impermanence (*mi rtag pa*, *anitya*), suffering (*sdug bsngal*, *duḥkha*), and so on.[333]

chos ni bum pa dang/ snam bu dang/ gzugs dang/ sgra la sogs pa'o// chos rnams kyi khyad par ni chos de dag gi bye brag ste/ mi rtag pa dang/ sdug bsngal la sogs pa'i mtshan nyid do.

[from mind]" (*ye rūpacittacaitasikāvasthāsu prajñapyante tattvānyatvataś ca na prajñapyante, te viprayuktāḥ saṃskārā*; D4066.225b: *gang dag gzugs dang sems dang sems las byung ba'i gnas skabs la gdags pa ste/ de nyid dang gzhan du mi gdags so zhes de dag spyir bstan te/ de dag ni mi ldan pa'i 'du byed yin pa*). The PSBh, D4068.79b: "that which is expressed (*gdags pa*) with regard to the state (*'dus*) of matter, that which is expressed with regard to the state of mind, and that which is expressed with regard to the state of a mental factor, are the factors dissociated [from mind]" (*gang gzugs kyi 'dus la gdags pa dang/ sems kyi dus la gdags pa dang/ sems las byung ba'i dus la gdags pa de dag ni 'du byed sems dang mi ldan pa'o*).

[333] In this context, the "specific quality" (*khad par*) and the "particular quality" (*bye brag*) are synonyms.

The meaning of phrase is also [explained like the name:][334] Because the specific quality (*khyad par*, **viśeṣa*) together with the object-referent (*don dang bcas pa'i khyad par*, **sārthaviśeṣa*) is understood (*khong du chud par byed cing*, **padyate*) and explained by this phrase (*pada*), it is called "phrase".[335] Or, because the object-referent together with the specific quality (*khyad par can gyi don*, **saviśeṣārtha*) is explained and understood, it is called phrase.

In this context, because phrase explains the specific quality of the object-referent, the phrase (*tshig*, **pada*) used in a treatise (*gtsug lag*, **śāstra*) is explained as different from name (*ming*, **nāman*) and the worldly word (*'jig rten gyi tshig*, **laukikam padam*).[336]

Why? Name explains the own-being of the factors, and phrase explains the specific quality of factors. Name explains only [the own-being] expressed as "fire". Then, expressing "fire is hot", phrase explains the specific quality with regard to the fire having the characteristic of heat. Moreover, because name expresses "the conditioned" (*'dus byas*, **saṃskāra*) and phrase expresses "the conditioned are impermanent" (*'dus byas mi rtag pa*), phrase explains "the conditioned" having the characteristic of impermanence. Therefore, it is explained that there is difference between name and phrase.

It is explained that phrase of treatise is also different from the worldly word. Why? With regard to [the expression] "Devadatta boils rice (*lha sbyin 'bras tshos*)", people consider "Devadatta" as a word (*pada*), "rice" also as a word and "boils" also as a word. [However,] in treatise, "all the conditioned are impermanent (*'du byed kun mi rtag*)" is considered as a phrase. Because it explains the object-referent together with the specific quality like all the conditioned [which have the characteristic of] impermanence, [phrase] is also explained as different from the worldly word.

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[334] Like the explanation of the name, the phrase (*pada*) is here explained with regard to the verbal root through √pad.

[335] See PSkV, 85.1ff: "Because the object-referent together with the specific quality is understood by means of this [*pada*], it is called *pada*" (*padyate 'nena saviśeṣo 'rtha iti padam*; 'dis khyad par gyi don shes par byed pas tshig ste). See also chapter 7.2.2 and 8.2.

[336] On the translation of *gtsug lag* as treatise, see Negi vol.11, 4690; On "name" and the worldly word, see PSkV, 85.2ff: "In this way, 'phrase' is differentiated from 'name' and the worldly word" (*evaṃ nāmno laukikāc ca padāt padaṃ viśeṣitaṃ bhavati*; de lta na ming dang 'jig rten pa'i tshig las tshig bye brag tu byas pa yin no). See also chapter 7.2.2.

tshig ces bya ba'i don kyang tshig ces bya ba 'dis don dang bcas pa'i khyad par khong du chud par byed cing ston par byed pas na tshig ces bya ba'am khyad par can gyi don ston cing khong du chud par byed pas na tshig ces bya'o//

de ltar tshig gi don gyi khyad par ston par byed pas na/ ming dang 'jig rten gyi tshig las gtsug lag tu byas pa'i tshig bye brag yod par ston to//

ci ltar zhe na/ ming gis ni chos rnams kyi ngo bo nyid ston la/ tshig gis ni chos rnams kyi khyad par nyid ston te/ ming gis me zhes brjod pa tsam du bstan pa las tshig gis me tsha ba zhes brjod na/ me tsha ba'i mtshan nyid du khyad par du ston par byed pa dang/ ming gis 'dus byas zhes brjod na tshig gis 'dus byas mi rtag pa zhes brjod pas 'dus byas mi rtag pa'i mtshan nyid du ston par byed pas na ming dang tshig gnyis la bye brag yod do//

gtsug lag gi tshig ni 'jig rten gyi tshig las kyang bye brag yod par ston to// ji lta zhe na lha sbyin 'bras tshos zhes pa la/ 'jig rten pa rnams lha sbyin zhes bya ba la yang tshig gcig tu lta/ 'bras zhes bya ba la yang tshig gcig tu lta/ tshos zhes bya ba yang tshig gcig tu lta la/ gtsug lag las ni 'du byed kun mi rtag ces pa la tshig gcig tu 'dzin te/ des 'dus byas kun mi rtag (90b) pa yin zhes khyad par gyi don ston par byed pas na/ 'jig rten gyi tshig dang yang bye brag yod par ston to.

Question (*smras pa*): Not only name "Devadatta (*lha sbyin*)" arises from the set of phonemes like "la", "ha", and so on, but also the qualifying word [together with the name] like "the conditioned are impermanent (*'dus byas mi rtag*)" arises from the set of sounds like "de", "ba", and so on.[337] Then, what is the difference between two?

Answer (*smras pa*): Although both "name" and "phrase" are not different in the sense that [they are] the collection of phonemes, they are different (*khyad par du dbyed ste*, **viśeṣaḥ*)

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[337] Here, the phonemes "la", "ha", and so on, are not the phonemes of the Sanskrit word "Devadatta", but the phonemes of the Tibetan translation of "Devadatta", that is, "*lha sbyin*". The phonemes of phrase "all the conditioned are impermanent" are also the phonemes of the Tibetan translation of this phrase, that is, "*'dus byas mi rtag*". This is an unusual transliteration. Usually the Sanskrit phonemes are enumerated even in the Tibetan translation. See the example of the Tattvārtha in chapter 8.3: "For example, it is [the sound] '*gauḥ*'", and so on. This sound, which is characterized by phoneme "g", phoneme "au", and *visarga* (*tseg drag*), is limited with regard to the nine object-referents by this order, [that is, the order of g-au-ḥ]. Due to this [sound], they, [that is, the nine object-referents], are understood" (*dper na goo: zhes bya ba la sogs pa la yi ge ga dang/ yi ge au dang/ tseg drag gi bdag nyid can gyi sgra ni go rims 'dis don dgu dag la mtsams bcad pa de las de dag rtogs par 'gyur ro*).

because of the difference of the object-referent.[338] It is because name explains only the own-being of factors and phrase explains the specific quality of factors. Therefore, that which explains only the own characteristic of factors is called name, and those which explain the difference of the object-referent, like "this factor is permanent", "that factor is impermanent", and so on, are called phrase set.

smras pa/ lha sbyin zhes bya ba'i ming yang la dang ha la sogs pa'i yi ge tshogs pa las gyur pa yin/ 'dus byas mi rtag ces bya ba'i tshig kyang de dang ba la sogs pa'i yi ge tshogs pa las gyur pa yin na/ de gnyis la khyad par ci yod/

smras pa/ ming dang tshig gnyis yi ge 'dus pa yin par khyad par med du zin kyang/ don gyi khyad par las khyad par du dbye ste/ ming gis ni chos rnams kyi rang bzhin tsam ston la/ tshig gis ni chos rnams kyi khyad par ston par byed pa'i phyir ro// de bas na chos rnams kyi rang gi mtshan nyid tsam ston pa la ming zhes bya la/ chos de rtag pa yin nam mi rtag pa yin pa la sogs pa don gyi khyad par du ston par byed pa la tshig gi tshogs zhes bya'o.

Question: Between both name [set] and phrase set, why is name set explained earlier than phrase set?

Answer: The basis (*gnas*) of the phrase like "factors are permanent", "factors are impermanent", and so on, is name. Based on the name such as "pot" (*bum pa*) and "cloth" (*snam bu*), the phrase such as "pot is permanent" or "pot is impermanent" arises (*'jug par 'gyur ba*). Therefore, name is explained earlier than phrase.

smras pa/ ming dang tshig gi tshogs gnyis las tshig gi tshogs pas ci'i phyir ming gi tshogs sngar bshad.

smras pa/ chos rnams rtag pa dang mi rtag pa la sogs pa'i tshig gi gnas ni ming yin te/ bum pa zhes bya ba dang/ snam bu zhes bya ba'i ming la brten nas bum pa rtag pa zhe'am bum pa mi rtag pa zhes bya ba'i tshig 'jug par 'gyur bas na tshig pas ming sngar bshad do.

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[338] See PSkV, 85.3ff: "Although both "name" and "phrase" are not different (*aviśeṣa*) in the sense that they have the nature of the collection of sound, [they are] different because of the difference of the object-referent". (*nāmapadayoḥ varṇasamudāyātmakatvāviśeṣe 'pi, arthaviśeṣād viśeṣaḥ*; *ming dang tshig gnyis yi ge 'dus pa'i bdag nyid yin par bye brag med kyang don gyi bye brag gis bye brag tu dbye ste*). See chapter 7.2.2.

With regard to the specific quality of factors, what does specific quality (*khyad par*, **viśeṣa*) mean? [Answer:] "Pot" is name. With regard to the pot, "impermanence" is the specific quality. Or, "permanent pot" is the specific quality.

Moreover, when there is an expression (*brjod pa*) of "all the conditioned are impermanent", one understands (*khong du chud la*) that all the existent conditioned (*ji snyed kyi 'dus byas thams cad*) [factors] are impermanent. The unconditioned (*'dus ma byas*, **asaṃskṛta*) [factors] not corresponding to those [conditioned factors] are [understood as] permanent ("not impermanent", *mi rtag pa ma yin te*). The phrase which explains permanence [through explaining] impermanence, and so on, is the phrase [expressing] the specific quality of factors.[339]

chos rnams kyi khyad par zhes bya ba la/ khyad par gyi don ji lta bu zhe na/ bum pa zhes bya ba ni ming yin la/ bum pa ni mi rtag pa zhes bya ba ni khyad par yin pa'am bum pa rtag pa zhes bya ba ni khyad par yin no//

yang na 'dus byas thams cad mi rtag pa zhes brjod pa dang/ ji snyed kyi 'dus byas thams cad ni mi rtag pa yin zhes khong du chud la/ de dang mi mthun pa'i 'dus ma byas ni mi rtag pa ma yin te/ mi rtag pa la sogs pas rtag pa yin par ston pa'i tshig ni chos rnams kyi khyad par gyi tshig ces bya ste.

What is [the example of] phrase? For example, it is like "all the conditioned are impermanent (*'dus byas thams cad ni mi rtag pa'o*)", "all the factors have no self (*chos thams cad ni bdag med pa'o*)" and "Extinction is calm (*zhi ba ni mya ngan las 'das pa'o*)".[340]

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[339] I think that this explanation corresponds to the explanation of recurrence (*anuvṛtti*) and exclusion (*vyāvṛtti*). See the PSkV, 85.5ff in chapter 7.2.2: "In turn, because the specific quality, which is "impermanence" (*anityatā*), etc. and has the nature of the recurrence (*anuvṛtti*) and the exclusion (*vyāvṛtti*), distinguishes the own-being (*svabhāva*) that does not exist elsewhere (*anyatrāvarttamāna*), it is the specific quality" (*viśeṣaḥ punar anityatādiko 'nuvṛttivyāvṛttyātmakaḥ, anyatrāvarttamānaṃ svabhāvaṃ viśinaṣṭīti viśeṣaḥ; khyad par ni mi rtag pa la sogs pa'o// 'jug pa dang ldog pa'i bdag nyid dang gzhan du mi snyegs pa'i ngo bo nyid las bye brag tu byed pa ni khad par te*).

[340] PSkV, 85.7ff: "For example, 'all the conditioned are impermanent', 'all the factors have no self', and 'extinction is calm' (*tadyathā anityāḥ sarvasaṃskārāḥ, sarvadharmā anātmānaḥ, śāntaṃ*

[The expression] "the conditioned" (*'dus byas*, **saṃskāra*) has the own-being as its object-referent (*rang bzhing gyi don*),[341] and this [expression] is "name". [The expression], including [name] "the conditioned" and explaining that all the conditioned are impermanent, has the specific quality as its object-referent. This [expression] is phrase.

[The expression] "factor" (*chos*, **dharma*) has the own-being as its object-referent, and this [expression] is "name". [The expression], including [name] and explaining that all the factors have no self, has the specific quality as its object-referent. This [expression] is phrase.[342]

tshig de'ang gang zhe na 'di lta ste/ 'dus byas thams cad ni mi rtag pa'o// chos thams cad ni bdag med pa'o// zhi ba ni mya ngan las 'das pa'o zhes gsungs pa lta bu'o//

'dus byas zhes bya ba ni rang bzhin gyi don te ming yin la/ 'dus byas bsdus nas 'dus byas thams cad mi rtag par bstan pa ni khyad par gyi don te tshig ces bya'o//

(91a) chos zhes bya ba ni rang bzhin gyi don te ming yin la/ bsdus nas chos thams cad bdag med par bstan pa ni// khyad par gyi don te tshig yin no.

Because the object-referent accompanied by a specific quality like "impermanence", and so on, is [actually] not able to be explained and expressed by phrase, the expression "all the conditioned are impermanent" is superimposition (*bla dags su sgro btags pa*). Therefore, it is called designation (*tshig bla dags*, **adhivacana*). With regard to phrase, because it [that is, phrase] is numerically many, it is called "phrase set". Therefore, phrase is designated (*gdags pa*) with regard to [the various kinds of inexpressible] state (*dus*, **avasthā*) of "matter" (*gzugs*, **rūpa*), mind (*sems*, **citta*) and mental factor (*sems las byung ba*, **caitasika*), it should be understood that [phrase] exists as expression, but not as a real entity.

mi rtag pa la sogs pa'i khyad par gyi don yang tshig gis bstan cing brjod par mi nus pa las 'dus byas mi rtag ces brjod pa 'di bla dags su sgro btags pa yin pas na tshig bla dags zhes bya'o//

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nirvāṇam; *dper na 'du byed thams cad ni mi rtag pa'o// chos thams cad ni bdag med pa'o// [m]ya ngan las 'das pa ni zhi ba'o zhes bya ba lta bu'o*). See chapter 7.2.2.

[341] I understand *rang bzhin gyi don* as a bahuvrīhi-compound.

[342] PSkV, 85.8ff: "'Name' is nothing but the expression of the own-being of thing and 'phrase' is the expression of the differentiated own-being of thing" (*vastusvabhāvābhidhānamātraṃ nāma viśiṣṭavastusvabhābhidhānam padam*; *dngos po'i ngo bo nyid brjod pa tsam ni ming yin la/ dngos po'i ngo bo nyid kyi khyad par brjod pa ni tshig yin no zhes bstan pa yin no*). See chapter 7.2.2.

tshig de la yang grangs kyis mang du yod pa'i phyir tshig gi tshogs zhes bya'o// de bas na tshig 'di ni gzugs dang/ sems dang sems las byung ba'i dus su gdags pas btags par yod kyi rdzas su med par rig par bya'o.

7.5.3 Phoneme (*vyañjana*)

In order to explain the own-being of phoneme set (*yi ge'i tshogs*, **vyañjanakāya*), it is asked "what is 'phoneme set'?". This is the question [asking] what are the own-being and the characteristic of phoneme set. The answer is [as follows:] It is syllables (*yi ge'i 'bru rnams*, **akṣarāṇi*) [like] "a", "ka", and so on.[343] All the syllables from "a" and "ka" up to "kṣa" are called "phoneme set".

yi ge'i tshogs kyi rang bzhin bstan pa'i phyir/ **yi ge'i tshogs gang zhe na** zhes dris te/ yi ge'i tshogs kyi rang bzhin dang mtshan nyid gang zhe na zhes dris pa'i don to// de'i lan du/ yi ge'i 'bru rnams te zhes bya ba smos te/ yi ge ni a dang ka la sogs pa'o// a dang ka nas brtsams te kSha'i bar du yi ge'i 'bru thams cad la yi ge'i tshogs zhes bya'o.

Phoneme is known as three kinds of name. It is "maker" (*'byed pa*, **kāra*),[344] "sound" (*brjod pa*, **vārṇa*), and "syllable" (*yi ge*, **akṣara*).[345]

yi ge de la ming rnam pa gsum du grags te 'byed pa dang/ brjod pa dang/ yi ge'o.

With regard to the meaning of phoneme (*vyañjana*), why is it called "maker"? Answer: it is because it, [that is, "phoneme"] causes (*'du byed pa*, **saṃskārayati*) both [name and phrase].

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[343] The PSkBh often translate *vyañjana* as *yi ge* and *akṣara* by *yi ge'i bru*, when these two Sanskrit terms should be differentiated.

[344] In this context, *kāra* is a synonym of syllable (*akṣara*). I translate it "maker" in order to show that this word is related to the verbal root *kṛ*.

[345] Only the PSkBh introduces "maker" (*byed pa*, **kāra*) as a synonym of "phoneme" (*vyañjana*). Other texts introduce "syllable" (*akṣara*), "sound" (*varṇa*), and "the imperishable thing" (*akṣara* or *akṣaratva*) as synonyms of phoneme.

Both name "Devadatta", which is explained immediately before, and phrase "the conditioned are impermanent" (*'dus byas mi rtag*), which is [also] explained immediately before, are manifested (*gsal bar ston par byed pa, *abhivyañjanatā*) by phoneme. Therefore, phoneme is called "maker".[346]

yi ge'i don de la ci'i phyir 'byed pa zhes bya zhe na/ de'i lan du de gnyi ga 'du byed pa'i phyir ro zhes bya ba smos so// gong du bshad ma thag pa'i lha sbyin zhes bya ba'i ming dang/ gong du bshad ma thag pa'i 'dus byas mi rtag ces bya ba'i tshig gnyi ga yi ges gsal bar ston par byed pas na yi ge la 'byed pa zhes bya'o.

How does phoneme manifest name and phrase? When (*nam*) phonemes are collected and arise as the designation of the own-being like "pot" and "cloth", and so on, this phoneme [set] is called name set. When phonemes are collected and arise as the designation like "the conditioned are impermanent", this phoneme [set] is called phrase set. In this way, phoneme manifests the set of name and phrase.

ji ltar na yi ges ming dang tshig gsal bar byed ce na/ nam yi ge rnams 'dus nas bum pa dang/ snam bu zhes bya ba la sogs pa'i ngo bo nyid kyi tshig bla dags su gyur pa'i tshe na ni yi ge la ming gi tshogs zhes bya la/ nam yi ge rnams 'dus nas 'dus byas mi rtag ces bya ba'i khyad par gyi tshig bla dags su gyur ba'i tshe na ni yi ge de nyid la tshig gi tshogs zhes bya bas na yi ge ni ming dang tshig gi tshogs gsal bar byed pa yin no.

Question: It is enough to say "the" (*tat*). What is the purpose to say "both (*ubhaya*)"?[347]

Answer: if [the PSk] said only "the" without saying "both", one would think that phoneme manifests phrase set alone, which is explained immediately before, but would not think that [phoneme also] manifests name set, which is explained before phrase set.

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[346] The PSk and the PSkV relate this explanation to "syllable" (*akṣara*). See chapter 7.1 and 7.2.3.

[347] The PSk, 16.2ff: "What are the phoneme sets? They are syllables (akṣara) in so far as manifesting **both of these** ['name' and 'phrase']" (*vyañjanakāyāḥ katame? akṣarāṇi **tadubhayā**bhivyañjanatām upādāya*; *yi ge'i tshogs gang zhe na/ yi ge rnams te/ **de gnyis ka** gsal bar byed pa'i phyir ro*). See also the explanation of the PSkV in chapter 7.2.3.

Question: In that case, it is enough to say "both". What is the purpose to say "the"?

Answer: If [the PSk] said "both" alone without saying "the", it would be uncertain (*gtol med par 'gyur te*) whether the word "both" refers to both of name and phrase, which are explained before, or other two factors, which are not [name and phrase]. Therefore, the word "the" and the word "both" are said [together].

smras pa/ de zhes bya ba'i sgra smos pas chog mod gnyi ga zhes smos pa'i sgra ci dgos she na/

lan du gal te de zhes bya ba'i sgra 'ba' zhig smos kyi gnyi ga'i sgra ma smos na ni yi ge bshad ma thag pa'i tshig gi tshogs 'ba' zhig gsal bar byed pa (91b) lta bur snyems kyi tshig gi tshogs kyi gong du bshad pa ming gi tshogs la gsal bar byed par mi snyems par 'gyur ro//

smras pa/ de lta na gnyi ga zhes smos pas chog mod de zhes bya ba'i sgra smos ci dgos she na

lan du gal te gnyi ga zhes bya ba'i sgra 'ba' zhig smos la/ de zhes bya ba'i sgra ma smos na ni gnyi ga zhes bya ba de gong du bshad pa'i ming dang/ tshig gnyis la bya ba'am 'on te de ma yin pa'i chos gzhan zhig gnyis la bya gang la bya gtol med par 'gyur te/ de bas na gong du bshad pa'i ming dang tshig gnyis gsal bar yi ges 'byed de zhes bstan pa'i phyir de zhes bya ba'i tshig dang/ gnyi ga zhes bya ba'i tshig smos so.

In order to explain the second name of phoneme, it is said "they are also sounds" (*varṇa*).[348] It means that sound (*varṇa*) is also used as a name of phoneme.

Why is phoneme called "sound"? Because of this [question], it is said "[phonemes are sounds] insofar as communicating (*rjod par byed pa*, **saṃvarṇanatā*) the object-referent through being a basis of name and phrase".[349]

Based on the syllables (*yi ge'i 'bru*, **akṣara*), the name "Devadatta" arises, and the name "Devadatta" expresses and explains (*brjod cing ston par byed pa*) the object-referent of the own-being of Devadatta. Based on the collected phonemes, the phrase "the conditioned are impermanent" arises, and the phrase "the conditioned are impermanent" expresses and explains

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[348] PSk, 16.3ff: "They are also sounds (*varṇa*) in so far as narrating (*saṃvarṇa*) the object-referent (*artha*) through being a base (*āśraya*) of 'name' and 'phrase'" (*varṇā api te, nāmapadāśrayatvenārtha-saṃvarṇanatām upādāya; brjod pa yang de dag yin te/ ming dang tshig la brten nas don brjod pa'i phyir ro*; 亦名為顯，由與名句為所依止顯了義故). See chapter 7.1.

[349] On the explanation of the PSkV, See chapter 7.2.3.

the object-referent of the specific quality which explains the characteristic of the impermanent conditioned factors, [that is, the impermanence]. Therefore, sound (*brjod pa*, **varṇa*) is used as a name of phoneme.

Or, based on phoneme, name and phrase arise [simultaneously],[350] and the name and phrase explain the object the object-referent without error (*ma nor bar*), phoneme is "that which communicating [the object-referent]" (*rjod par byed pa*, **saṃvaraṇatā*).

yi ge'i ming gnyis bstan pa'i phyir/ **brjod pa yang de dag yin te** zhes bya ba smos te/ yi ge de dag la ming du brjod pa zhes kyang bya ba'i don to//

yi ge la ci'i phyir brjod pa zhes bya zhe na/ de'i phyir **ming dang tshig de la gnas nas/ don yang dag par rjod par byed pa'i phyir ro** zhes bya ba smos te/

yi ge'i 'bru la brten nas lha sbyin zhes bya ba'i ming byung ste/ lha sbyin zhes bya ba'i ming gis lha sbyin zhes bya ba'i rang bzhin gyi don brjod cing ston par byed pa dang/ yi ge 'dus pa la brten nas 'dus byas mi rtag ces bya ba'i tshig 'byung ste/ tshig des 'dus byas mi rtag pa'i mtshan nyid du ston pa'i khyad par gyi don brjod cing ston par byed pas na yi ge la ming du brjod pa zhes bya'o//

yang na yi ge la brten nas ming dang tshig byung ming dang tshig gis ni don ma nor bar ston par byed pas na yi ge la **rjod par byed pa** zhes bya'o.

In order to explain the third name of phoneme, it is said "they are also 'the unchangeable thing' (*akṣaratva*) insofar as not being changeable into alternative [phonemes]" (*paryāya*).[351]

In turn, phonemes (*yi ge*, **vyañjana*), which are said with regard to the syllables (*yi ge 'bru*, **akṣara*) like "a", and so on, are [not like name set having the following nature:] Name set such as "the sense-faculty of seeing"(*mig*, **cakṣus*), "hand" (*lag pa*,**pāṇi*), "foot" (*rkang pa*, **pāda*) can be changed (*rnam grangs gzhan du 'gyur*) through (*sgo nas*) expressing other names. [For example,] whether [something] is called "the sense-faculty of seeing "(*mig*) or "seeing"

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[350] This explanation seems to assume that "name" explains the own-being such as "the conditioned" and "phrase" explains the specific quality such as "impermanent" and both name and phrase explain together a sentence "the conditioned are impermanent".

[351] PSk, 16.4ff: "They are also imperishable (akṣaratva) insofar as not being changeable into alternative [phonemes]" (*akṣaratvaṃ punaḥ, paryāyākṣaraṇatām upādāya*; *yi ge yang rnam grangs gzhan du mi 'gyur ba'i phyir ro*; 亦名為字, 非差別門所變易故). See chapter 7.1.

(*spyan*, **īkṣaṇa*), the object-referent (*don*) called "sense-faculty of seeing" can be understood by the alternative [word] "seeing" (*spyan*). [The phoneme set is not like this.] Concerning the syllable "a", there is no alternative [phoneme] of the expression (*ming*) "a", which does not belong to the expression "a". There is no other alternative [phoneme] for making understand "a", except the phoneme "a" making understand "a". Therefore, it is called "the unchangeable thing" (*akṣaratva*).

yi ge['i] ming gsum pa bstan pa'i phyir/ **yi ge yang rnam grangs gzhan du mi 'gyur bar byed pa'i phyir** zhes bya ba smos te/

 a la sogs pa'i yi ge 'bru[352] la/ yi ge zhes bya ba yang ji ltar ming gi tshogs mig ces bya ba dang/ lag pa zhes bya ba dang/ rkang pa zhes bya ba la sogs pa la ming gzhan brjod pa'i sgo nas rnam grangs gzhan du 'gyur te/ mig ces kyang bya/ spyan zhes kyang bya la/ mig ces kyang bya ba'i don rnam grangs gzhan spyan zhes bya bas shes par rung ba ltar/ yi ge a la sogs pa la a zhes brjod pa las ma gtogs par a'i ming gi rnam grangs gzhan med la/ a go bar bya ba'i phyir (92a) a go bar byed pa'i a'i rnam grangs gzhan med de/ rnam grangs gzhan du mi 'gyur bas na yi ge zhes bya'o//

Because this [phoneme] is designated on the [inexpressible] state (*dus*, **avasthā*) of matter (*gzugs*, **rūpa*), and so on, this also exists as expression, but not as a real entity.

'di yang gzugs la sogs pa'i dus la gdags pas btags par yod par zad kyi rdzas su med do//

7.5.4   Summary of three factors

Why did he, [that is, Vasubandhu,] explain name, phrase, and phoneme? He explained the three [factors] in order to make us familiar (*mkhas pa*, **kuśala*) with the conventional speech (*tha snyad*, **vyavahāra*) of the own-being, the conventional speech of the specific quality, and the conventional speech of [the basis] of these two.[353]

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[352] yig 'bru D.

[353] PSkV, 86.9ff: "All own-being, the specific quality, and the conventional expression of these two [own-being and specific quality] are designated by these [sets of 'name', 'phrase', and

de ci'i phyir ming dang tshig dang yi ge rnams bshad ce na/ ngo bo nyid la tha snyad mkhas par bya ba dang/ khyad par la tha snyad mkhas par bya ba dang/ de gnyi ga la tha snyad mkhas par bya ba'i phyir/ de gsum bshad de.

In order to make familiar with the conventional speech of the own-being of factors, the name set is explained. In order to make familiar with the specific quality, the qualifying word set set is explained. In order to make familiar with [the basis] of these two [name and phrase], the phoneme set is explained.

chos rnams kyi ngo bo nyid la tha snyad mkhas par bya ba'i phyir ni ming gi tshogs bstan to// chos rnams kyi khyad par la tha snyad mkhas par bya ba'i phyir ni tshig gi tshogs bstan to// de gnyi ga la tha snyad mkhas par bya ba'i phyir ni yi ge'i tshogs bstan pa'o.

'phoneme']"(*yad uta svabhāvo viśeṣas tadubhayavyavahāraś ca, tat sarvam ebhir anuvyavahriyata iti*; *ngo bo nyid dang khyad par dang de gnyi ga'i tha snyad tsam du zad de/ de dag thams cad ni 'di dag gis rjes su tha snyad gdags pa yin pas de'i phyir ming dang tshig dang yi ge'i tshogs de dag rnam par gzhag go*). See chapter 7.2.4.

8. Exposition of *Nāman*, *Pada*, and *Vyañjana* in the *Tattvārthā*[354]

8.1 Definition of Name

[AKBh, 80:11ff]

What is the name set, and so on? [It is said in the verse:] "The name set, and so on, are the collections of 'expressions' (*saṃjñā*), 'sentences' (*vākya*), and 'syllables' (*akṣara*)". [The phrase] 'the set of phrase and syllable' (*padavyañjankāya*) is included in the word 'and so on' (*ādi*). In this context, "name" is the cause of ideation (*saṃjñā*),[355] for example, 'matter', 'sound', and so on.

nāmakāyādaḥ katame? **nāmakāyādayaḥ saṃjñāvākyākṣarasamuktayaḥ** (2-47ab). ādigrahaṇena padavyañjanakāyagrahaṇam. tatra saṃjñākaraṇaṃ nāma, tadyathā rūpaṃ śabda ity evamādiḥ.

ming gi tshogs la sogs pa gang zhe na/ ming gi tshogs la sogs pa ni// ming dang ngag dang yi ge'i tshogs// sogs pa smos pas ni tshig dang yi ge'i tshogs gzung ngo// de la ming byed pa ni ming ste/ dper na gzugs sgra zhes bya ba de lta bu la sogs pa lta bu'o.[356]

名身等類其義云何? 頌曰： 名身等所謂， 想章字總說. 論曰：等者等取句身文身.[357]

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[354] The explanation of the three factors in the *Tattvārthā* begins from D4421.tho251bff. In order to show the context of the discussion, I introduce the passage of the root text, that is, the AKBh. For the Korean translation of this passage of the AKBh and the remarks concerning the differences among the Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese texts, see Lee (1995, 49ff).

[355] The *Vyākhyā*, 182.30 explains the term *saṃjñākaraṇa* in three ways: It could mean "appellation" (*nāmadheya*). It could mean either the means of ideation (*saṃjñāyāḥ karaṇaṃ saṃjñākaraṇam*) or the means as expression (*saṃjñaiva vā karaṇaṃ saṃjñākaraṇam*). According to this explanation, the term *saṃjñā* means either "ideation", that is, the third category of the five constituents, or "expression", that is, a factor dissociated from mind. See also Cox 1995, 400 fn.14.

[356] D4090.ku84aff.

[357] AKBh$_X$, T1558.29.29a09ff.

何者為名聚等？ [358]　偈曰：　名句及字聚，　號言文總集．　釋曰：　此中名謂所立號，如色聲等．[359]

[Tattvārthā, D4421. tho251b4ff; P5875.to290b4ff]

"The name set, and so on," (*nāmakāyādayaḥ*) [in the AKBh] means the name set, the phrase set, and the phoneme set. The name set (*ming gi tshogs*, **nāmakāya*) is the expression set (*ming gi tshogs*, **saṃjñākāya*).[360] The phrase set (*tshig gi tshogs*, **padakāya*) is the sentence set (*ngag gi tshogs*, **vākyakāya*). The phoneme set (*yi ge'i tshogs*, **vyañjanakāya*) is the syllable set (*yi ge'i tshogs*, **akṣarakāya*).

ming gi tshogs la sogs pa ni ming dang tshig dang yi ge'i tshogs rnams te ming gi tshogs ni ming gi tshogs so// tshig gi tshogs ni ngag gi tshogs so// yi ge'i tshogs ni yi ge'i tshogs so.

[The AKBh says:] "In this context, the name (*ming*) [means] *saṃjñākaraṇa* (*ming byed pa*)". *Saṃjñākaraṇa* (*ming du byed pa*) means the cause of ideation ('*du shes su byed pa*, **saṃjñāyāḥ karaṇa*), by which one is caused to imagine ('*du shes par byas te*, **saṃjñāpyate*) with regard to this [object] ('*dir*).[361] Because it makes one incline (*gzhol bar byed pa*, **nāmayati*) toward this and that mental factors (*sems las byung ba'i chos*, **caitasiko dharmaḥ*), it is the "name" (*nāman*).[362]

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[358] 等 【大】; omitted 【明】.

[359] T1559.29.187b07ff.

[360] The Tibetan translation does not differentiate *nāman* (*ming*) and *saṃjñā* (*ming*), when *saṃjñā* means not ideation, which is the third category of the five "constituents" (*skandha*), but expression.

[361] Vyākhyā, 182.30: "*Saṃjñākaraṇa* is the cause of ideation, by which ideation, i.e., the mental factor, is made and produced". (*saṃjñāyāḥ karaṇaṃ saṃjñākaraṇaṃ, yena saṃjñā caitasiko dharmaḥ kriyate janyate*). The Vyākhyā of Yaśomitra suggests three different definitions of *saṃjñākaraṇa*. This definition is the second. The first is the appellation (*nāmadheya*), the third is the expression. See also Lee 1995, 37ff.

[362] PSKV, 84.13: "Because it makes the cognition (*jñāna*) incline (*nāmayati*) toward each of what is expressed (*abhidheyaṃ adhibheyaṃ prati*), it is the "name". (*abhidheyaṃ abhidheyaṃ prati jñānaṃ nāmayatīti nāma*; D4066.229b *brjod par bya ba dang brjod pa la rnam par shes pa gzhol bar byed pas ming ngo*).

Or, [some state as follow:] Because it makes one incline toward this and that expression, it makes the stream of the mind and the mental factors (*sems dang sems las byung ba'i rgyud*, *cittacaitasikasaṃtati*) incline toward this and that object-referents which are conventionally established (*gnas pa*, *vyavasthita*) in a certain way and [incline toward] the specific object-referents (*don gyi khyad par*, *arthaviśeṣa*).[363] Therefore, it is the name.

de la **ming byed pa ni ming ste** zhes bya ba la/ ming du byed pa ni 'du shes su byed pa ste/ gang gis[364] 'dir 'du shes par byas te sems las byung ba'i chos de dang de la gzhol bar byed pas na ming ngo//
yang na ji lta ji ltar brjod pa de la gzhol bar byed pas don ji ltar gnas pa de dang de dag dang don gyi khyad par dag la sems dang sems las byung ba'i rgyud gzhol bar byed pas na ming ngo.

Other say that the name is only a state (*gnas skabs*, *avasthā*) of syllables which arise (*mngon par jug pa*) with regard to an object-referent. In this way, syllables and names are not differentiated.[365]

gzhan dag na re don la mngon par 'jug pa'i yi ge'i gnas skabs ni ming ngo zhes zer te/ de ltar na yi ge rnams dang ming tha dad med par 'gyur ro.

Other say [the following.] The name (*ming*, *nāman*) and the "appellation" (*mtshan*, *nāmadheya*) are interchangeable terms (*rnam grangs*, *paryāya*).[366] They are the ideations with regard to the object-referent. [That is, the "name", the "appellation", and the "ideation"

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[363] The specific object-referents (*don gyi khyad par*, *arthaviśeṣa*) probably indicate the specific qualities (*viśeṣa*) of factors (*dharma*). The PSk and its commentaries state that the name (*nāman*) superimposes only the own-being (*svabhāva*) and the phrase (*pada*) superimposes the specific qualities (*viśeṣa*). However, the Saṃdhi VIII.19 states that the name designates not only the own-being but also the specific qualities of factors. The author of the *Tattvārthā* probably introduce all kinds of explanation about the name. See chapter 4.5 and 4.6.

[364] gi P.

[365] The Sarvāstivādin does not agree with this opinion. See above chapter 5.1.

[366] Vyākhyā, 181.30: "*saṃjñākaraṇa* and 'appellation' are interchangeable terms" (*saṃjñākaraṇaṃ nāmadheyam iti paryāyaḥ*). See also Negi (2003), vol. 11, 4943.

are the same.] They explain in detail (*bye brag tu bshad pa*) and manifest (*gsal bar byed pa*) the object-referents which are the cause of that [ideation]. However, they do not exist as [real entities] (*yod pa tsam gyis ni ma yin no*).

Or, [other state as follows:] The result (*bya ba*, **kārya*), [that is, *saṃjñā*] and the cause (*byed pa*, **karaṇa*), [that is, *nāman*] are not [designated] with regard to the different object. [The same object] is conceptualized in many ways. One explains [the relationship between *saṃjñā* and *nāman*] just as one understands that the name causes the characteristic (*mtshan nyid*, **lakṣaṇa*).

gzhan dag ni ming dang mtshan zhes bya ba rnam grangs te de ni don du 'du shes te/ der byed pa'i don rnams la bye brag tu bshad pa dang don de gsal bar byed pa yin gyi yod pa tsam gyis ni ma yin no//

yang na bya ba dang byed pa don gzhan la ma yin no// de[367] yang mang du rnam par rtog pa zhes bya ste/ ji ltar ming gis mtshan nyid kho na byed par shes pa de ltar (Tho252a) bstan to.

[Question:] Then (*'o na*), in this way, it is enough with the word "ideation" (*saṃjñā*). What is the use of the word "cause" (*karaṇa*)?[368] [Answer:] If the word "cause" (*karaṇa*) would not be said, one would understand the name as the mental factor. Only when the word "cause" is said, one understands [the name] as the factor dissociated [from mind] (*mi ldan pa nyid*, **[citta]viprayukta*). The [name] is known (*blo*, **buddhi*) because it causes the result, [that it, ideation] with regard to a previous object-referent.

'o na de ltar ming zhes bya ba kho na smos pas chog mod byed pa smos pas ci bya zhe na/ byed pa ma smos na sems las byung ba la ming du go bar 'gyur ro// byed pa kho na smos na yang mi ldan pa nyid go bar 'gyur ro// de'i blo ni sngar gyi don la bya ba byed pas so.

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[367] da D.

[368] Vyākhyā, 181.30: "The term *saṃjñā* is used in order to exclude other causes. The term *karaṇa* is used in order to differentiate [this *saṃjña*] from [the *saṃjñā* "ideation", i.e.,] the mental factor. If it would be said that *nāman* is *saṃjñā*, then it would be possible that it is [the *saṃjñā*, that is] a mental factor. (*saṃjñāgrahaṇaṃ cānyakaraṇanivṛttyarthaṃ. karaṇagrahaṇaṃ caitasikaviśeṣaṇārthaṃ. yadi hi saṃjñā nāmety ucyeta caitasiko 'pi saṃbhāvyeta*).

8.2 Definition of Phrase

[AKBh, 80:14ff]

A phrase is a sentence, in the sense that it completely defines the object-referent, for example, [the sentence] 'oh, the conditioned are impermanent', and so on, by which the specific qualities related to activity, attribute, and time are understood.[369]

vākyaṃ padaṃ yāvatā 'rthaparisamāptiḥ, tadyathā anityā bata saṃskārā ity evamādiḥ, yena kriyāguṇakālasaṃbandhaviśeṣā gamyante.

ngag ni tshig ste/ dper na/ kye ma 'du byed rnams mi rtag/ ces bya ba de lta bu la sogs pa ji tsam gyis don yongs su rdzogs pa ste/ gang gis bya ba dang yon tan dang dus kyi 'brel ba'i khyad par rtogs par 'gyur ro.[370]

句者謂章，詮義究竟，如說諸行無常等章，或能辯了業用德時相應差別，此章稱句.[371]

句謂所立言，隨量能成就所欲說義，如有為皆無常，如是等，若由此言事得時相應差別顯現，此言稱句. 如偈言善友一時遇.[372]

[Tattvārthā, D4421. tho252a2ff; P5875.to291a1ff]

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[369] AKBh_P gives another example of a phrase: "One meets a good friend (*shanyou* 善友, *kalyāṇamitra*) on one occasion" (善友一時遇). A similar expression is found in the Chinese version of the *Saṃyukta-āgama* (*za ahanjing* 雜阿含經, translated by Guṇabhadra Qiunabatuoluo 求那跋陀, T99.02.25c23ff): "Moreover, on another occasion, he/she meets a good friend (*shan zhishi* 善知識, *kalyāṇamitra*), hears the speech of the true dharma (*zhengfa* 正法, *saddharma*), thinks rightly, practices the bodily wholesome conducts, and practices the vocally wholesome conducts" (復於餘時親近善知識，聞說正法，內正思惟，行身善行，行口善行).

[370] D4090.ku84b.

[371] AKBh_X, T1558.29.29a12ff.

[372] AKBh_P, T1559.29.187b09ff.

Because it makes one understand (*go bar byed cing, *padyate*) and eliminates doubt (*the tsom med par byed pa*), it is a phrase (*tshig, *pada*).[373] It, [that is, the phrase,] is also the sentence (*ngag, *vākya*), because [the sentence] eliminates doubts with regard to that [object-referent]. Therefore, it is said that a phrase is a sentence. Because the object-referent (*don, *artha*) of the phrase is determined on the basis of the specific characteristic (*bye brag, *viśeṣa*) which one wishes to describe, it is said [in the AKBh that a phrase is a sentence] "in the sense that [a sentence] completely defines the object-referent" (*ji tsam gyis don yongs su rdzogs pa ste, *yāvatā 'rthaparisamāptiḥ*).

'dis[374] go bar byed cing the tsom med par byed pas na tshig ste/ de yang ngag kho nas de la the tsom med par byed pa'i phyir ro// de nyid kyi phyir **ngag ni tshig ste** zhes smos so// 'chad par 'dod pa'i bye brag las tshig gi don nges par bya ba'i phyir/ **ji tsam gyis don yongs su rdzogs pa ste** zhes bya ba smos so.

The object-referents of the phrase are not determined as the object-referents of the name are done. In this context, it is a name because it illuminates the own characteristic (*rang gi mtshan nyid, *svalakṣaṇa*),[375] like "visible matter (*gzugs, *rūpa*)" and "sound (*sgra, *śabda*).[376] It is a phrase because it manifests the specific qualites (*khyad par, *viśeṣa*) related to activity (*bya ba, *kriya*), attribute (*yon tan, *guṇa*) and time (*dus, *kāla*).[377] [A phrase is a word] with nominal inflection or verbal conjugation (*sup dang ting gi mtha' can, *suptiṅanta*).[378] In this context, "what manifests the specific quality related to activity" is [a verb] like "to cook" (*'tshed*

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[373] Vyākhyā, 182.3: "The phrase is the sentence, because [the object-referent] is clarified and understood by the [sentence]" (*vākyaṃ padam iti. padyate gamyate 'neneti*).

[374] 'di sa D.

[375] Vyākhyā, 182.31: "That which illuminates the own characteristic is the name" (*tad evaṃ sva-lakṣaṇābhidyotakaṃ nāma*).

[376] AKBh, 80.12: "[A name is,] for example, matter and sound" (*tadyathā rūpaṃ śabda ity evamādhiḥ*).

[377] Vyākhyā, 182.27ff: "It is said that *pada* is what illuminates the specific quality related to activity, and so on" (*kriyādisambandhaviśeṣābhidyotakaṃ padam ity uktaṃ bhavati*).

[378] Vyākhyā, 182.3ff: "*pada* is included in the word with nominal inflection or verbal conjugation" (*padaṃ tu suptiṅantaṃ padaṃ gṛhyate*).

do), "to recite" (*'don to*), and "to go" (*'gro'o*). "What manifests the specific quality related to an attribute" is [an adjective] like "white" (*dkar po'o*) and "dark" (*nag po'o*). "What manifests the specific quality related to time" is [the verb with a conjugation] like "[one] cooks" (*'tshed do*, that is, the present form of the verb), "[one] will cook" (*'tshed par 'gyur ro*, that is, the future form of the verb), "[one] cooked" (*btsos so*, that is, the past form of the verb).[379] This is said in order to explain in detail (*'byung ba*) the passage [in the AKBh] "in the sense that it completely defines (*parisamāpti*) the object-referent (*artha*)".

ming gi don bzhin tshig dang tshig gi don nges pa med do// de la rang gi mtshan nyid gsal bar byed pas na ming ste/ **gzugs dang sgra zhes bya ba lta bu'o**// **bya ba dang yon tan dang dus dang 'brel pa'i khyad par ston par byed pa** ni tshig ste/ sup dang ting gi mtha' can no// de la bya ba dang 'brel pa'i khyad par ston par byed pa ni/ 'tshed do// 'don to// 'gro'o zhes bya ba lta bu'o// yon tan dang 'brel pa'i khyad par ston par byed pa ni dkar po'o nag po'o zhes bya ba lta bu'o// dus dang 'brel pa'i khyad par ston par byed pa ni/ 'tshed do// 'tshed par 'gyur ro// btsos so zhes bya ba lta bu ste/ **ji tsam gyis don yongs su rdzogs pa ste** zhes 'byung ba'i phyir ro.

Others say a phrase is only a complete explanation (*mngon par brjod pa*). [This is] a brief statement (*mdor bstan pa*) like "Oh, the conditioned are impermanent", through which specific qualities related to an activity, an attribute and time, are made understood.[380]

gzhan dag na re mngon par brjod pa gcig kho na tshig go zhes zer ro// kye ma 'du byed rnams mi rtag/ ces mdor bstan pa gang gis bya ba dang yon tan dang dus dang 'brel pa'i khyad par so sor rtogs par bstan to//

8.3 Definition of Phoneme

[AKBh, 80:15ff]

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[379] Vyākhyā, 182.28ff: "For example, 'cooking, reciting, and going', 'dark, yellow, and red', and 'cooking, going to cook, and having cooked' are understood as the specific qualities related to activity, attribute, and time. This is *pada*" (*tadyathā pacati paṭhati gacchatīti kṛṣṇo gauro rakta iti. pacati pakṣyati apākṣīd iti kriyāguṇakālānāṃ sambandhaviśeṣā gamyante. tat padam*).

[380] See also chapter 4.5.

A phoneme is a syllable,[381] for example, "a", "ā", and so on.

vyañjanam akṣaram, tadyathā a ā ity evamādi.

yi ge ni yi ge set/ dper na a ā zhes bya ba la sogs pa lta bu'o.[382]

文者謂字, 如說裒阿壹伊等字.[383]

字謂無義文, 如阿阿伊伊等.[384]

[Tattvārthā, D4421. tho252a6ff; P5875.to291a6ff]

[The AKBh explains that] "a phoneme (*yi ge*, **vyañjana*) is a syllable" (*yi ge*, **akṣara*). Because names and phrases are illuminated in or by the [syllables], they are, [that is, syllables, called] phonemes (*vyañjana*).[385] Because it is not changeable into any alternative, it is *akṣara*.[386] They do not occur for those who are in the [state of] the application of mindfulness (*dran pa nye bar gnas pa*, **smṛtyupasthāna*). By this ["phoneme"], one can accomplish certainty (*yena śaknoti asaṃdigdham ārādhāyitum*) or communicate (*nivedayitum*) to another (*anyasmai*).

yi ge ni yi ge ste zhes bya ste/ 'dir ram 'dis ming dang tshig gsal bar byed pas na yi ge'o// rnam grangs kyis na mi[387] 'gyur ba'i phyir yi ge'o// dran pa nye bar gnas pa dang ldan pa la mi 'gyur

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[381] AKBhP explains phoneme as the syllable having no meaning (*wuyi* 無義).

[382] D4090.ku84b.

[383] AKBhX, T1558.29.29a14ff.

[384] AKBhP, T1559.29.187b12.

[385] Here, the word *vyañjana* is explained with the verb "being illuminated" (*vyajyate*), which has the same root. See also PSkV, 85.11ff: "Because it [that is, all the *nāman* and *pada*] is illuminated by this, it is *vyañjana*" (*vyajyate 'neneti vyañjanam*).

[386] PSk, 16.4: "[*vyañjana*] is also *akṣaratva* ('not being perishable') in the sense that it is not changeable (*akṣarana*) into an alternative" (*akṣaratvaṃ punaḥ paryāyākṣaraṇatām upādāya*).

[387] ma gyur P.

ba rnams so// ye na shakno tya saṃ digdha m'a r'a dh'a[388] yi tu <</gang gi nus pa the tsom med par bsgrub pa/>> ma nya smee b'a <<gzhan pa por>>[389] ni be da yi tuṃ <<rig par byed pa>>.[390]

8.4 Sarvāstivādin argues that Phoneme is not the name of letter

[AKBh, 80:15ff]

Moreover, are syllables not the names of the [written] letter? [Answer:] Syllables are not established (*praṇīta*), [that is, they are not pronounced] in order to make one understand the [written] letters, but the [written] letters are established, [that is, they are written] in order to make one understand the syllables, while one is thinking 'how could [the syllables] not being heard be understood through writing [them]?' Therefore, the syllables are not the names [of the written letters]".

nanu cākṣarāṇy api lipyavayavānāṃ nāmāni? na vai lipyavayavānāṃ pratyāyanārtham akṣarāṇi praṇītāny akṣarāṇām eva tu pratyāyānārthaṃ lipyavayavāḥ praṇītāḥ, katham aśrūyamāṇāni lekhyena pratīyerann iti. nākṣarāṇy eṣāṃ nāmāni.

yi ge rnams kyang yig[391] 'bru'i yan lag dag gi ming dag ma yin nam zhe na/ yi ge 'bru'i yan lag rnams go bar bya ba'i phyir yi ge rnams byas pa ni ma yin gyi/ ji ltar na mi{ng} thos pa bris pas go bar 'gyur zhes yi ge rnams go bar bya ba'i phyir ni yi ge'i 'bru rnams byas pa yin pas/ yi ge rnams ni de dag gi ming ma yin no.[392]

豈不此字亦書分名?　　　　非為顯書分製造諸字,　　　　但為顯諸字製造書分.
云何當令雖不聞說而亦得解, 故造書分. 是故諸字非書分名.[393]

為不如此耶? 字者書類分別名? 若不為顯書類分故造立字,[394] 為顯字故造立書類分. '若不聞說字, 此字由書方便云何應知?' 為令知故立書類分. 是故字非非書類分名.[395]

[Tattvārthā, D4421.tho252a7ff; P5875.to291a8ff]

In this context, because they, [that is, the phonemes] make the names (*ming*) of the syllables (*akṣara*), such as "*ga*", arise, [the opponent in the AKBh asks] "are syllables also the names of [written] letters (*yig 'bru'i yan lag*, *lipyavayava*)?" Therefore, [according to the opponent in the AKBh,] the phoneme should not be explained as different from the name.

der de dag gis yi ge ga la sogs pa'i ming skyed par byed phyir **yi ge rnams kyang yig 'bru'i yan lag gi ming dag ma yin nam**/ de'i phyir yi ge ni ming las tha (252b) dad par brjod par mi bya'o zhe na.

Regarding [the phrase in the AKBh] "in order to make one understand the [written] letters" etc.: Just as the name is made in order to make one understand what should be expressed, the [written] letters are made in order to make one understand syllables. The rest [explanation in the AKBh] is easy to understand.

yig 'bru'i yan lag rnams go bar bya ba'i phyir ni zhes bya ba rgya[396] cher 'byung ba la/ ji ltar brjod bya go bar bya ba'i phyir ming byas pa de bzhin du yi ge rnams go bar bya ba'i phyir yig 'bru'i yan lag rnams byas pa yin no// lhag ma go bar zad do.

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[393] T1558.29.29a15ff.

[394] 別名若【宋】【元】【明】【宮】, 名君【大】.

[395] 非【宋】【元】【明】【宮】, 非非【大】; AKBh_P, T1559.29.187b12ff.

[396] bya brgya D.

8.5 Further Explanation of Name, Phrase, Phoneme, and Set

[AKBh, 80:18ff]

Moreover, the collections of the expressions are the set of the name, etc. They teach, [that is, the grammarians state] that the verbal root √ uc means assemblage (*uca samavāye*).[397] It is the collection of these [names], [for instance,] "matter" (*rūpa*). That which means assemblage (*samavāya*) means collection (*samukti*). In this context, the name set [includes names] such as "[visible] matter", "sound", "smell", "flavour", "touch", and so on. The phrase set [includes phrases] such as "all the conditioned are impermanent", "all the factors have no self", "extinction is calm", and so on. The phoneme set [includes phonemes] such as "ka", "kha", "ga", "gha", "ṅa", and so on.

eṣāṃ ca saṃjñādīnāṃ samuktayo nāmādikāyāḥ. uca samavāye paṭhanti. tasya samuktir ity etad rūpaṃ bhavati. yo 'rthaḥ samavāya iti so 'rthaḥ samuktir iti. tatra nāmakāyas tadyathā rūpaśabdagandharasaspraṣṭavyānīty evamādi. padakāyaḥ tadyathā sarvasaṃskārā anityāḥ sarvadharmā anātmānaḥ śāntaṃ nirvāṇam ity evamādi. vyañjanakāyas tadyathā ka kha ga gha ṅety evamādi.

ming la sogs pa de dag gi tshogs ni ming la sogs pa'i tshogs dag yin te/ mang po'i don gang yin pa'o// de la ming gi tshogs ni dper na gzugs sgra dri ro reg bya dag ces bya ba ste/ de lta bu la sogs pa'o// tshig gi tshogs ni dper na 'du byed thams cad mi rtag pa dag go // mya ngan las 'das pa ni zhi ba'o zhes bya ba ste/ de lta bu la sogs pa'o// yi ge'i tshogs ni dper na ka kha ga gha nga zhes bya ba ste/ de lta bu la sogs pa'o.[398]

云何名等身謂想等總說. 言總說者是合集義, 於合集義中說嗢遮界故. 此中名身者, 謂色聲香等. 句身者, 謂諸行無常, 一切法無我, 涅槃寂靜等. 文身者, 謂迦法伽等.[399]

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[397] Pāṇini's Dhātupaṭha 4.114. This paragraph elaborates what set (*kāya*) means.

[398] D4090.ku84b.

[399] T1558.29.29a18ff.

是名等三各總集稱聚. 　此中名聚者，　如色聲香味觸等.　　句聚者如一切有為無常，一切法無我，涅槃寂靜如是等. 字聚者，如迦佉伽伽餓等. [400]

[Tattvārthā, D4421. tho252b2ff; P5875.to291b2ff]

[Regarding the phrase] "in this context, the name set" etc., the master (*ācārya*) Saṃghabhadra explains: Formerly, the explanation "for example, matter, sound, and so on" was [taught in the AKBh] in order to explain the own-being of the name.[401] Now, the explanation "for example, [the names set includes names] such as matter, sound, smell, taste, touch, and so on" is [mentioned] in order to explain the name 'set' (*nāmakāya*). In this way, formerly [the example] was explained in order to teach the own-being of the phrase (*pada*), now [the explanation] "for example, all the conditioned", and so on, [is mentioned] in order to teach the phrase 'set' (*padakāya*). In the same way, phonemes (*vyañjana*) should be also explained.

de la ming gi tshogs ni zhes bya ba rgya cher 'byung ba la/ sngar dpe ni gzugs dang sgra zhes bya ba la sogs pa lta bu'o zhes gang bshad pa de ni ming gi ngo bo bstan par bya ba'i phyir yin la/ 'dir **dper na gzugs sgra dri ro reg bya dag ces bya ba ste/ de lta bu la sogs pa'o** zhes gang bshad pa de ni ming gi tshogs bstan par bya ba'i don du'o// de bzhin du sngar ni tshig gi ngo bo bstan pa'i phyir bshad la/ 'dir ni tshig gi tsogs bstan pa'i phyir dper na 'du byed thams cad ni zhes bya ba de lta bu la sogs pa'o// de bzhin du yi ge rnams la yang brjod par bya'o// zhes slob dpon 'dus bzang zer ro.

The master does not intend to explain [the "set" (*kāya*)] as having the characteristics of real existence. [He explains the "set" (*kāya*),] because he is asked with regard to "the assemblage" (*'dus pa*). Therefore, the name set is names (*ming gi lus*). It means that [set is not a real entity, but only] the name is a real entity.

slob dpon ni rdzas su yod pa'i mtshan nyid du brjod par 'dod pa med de/ 'dus pa la dri ba byas pa'i phyir ro// de'i phyir ming gi tshogs ni ming gi lus te ming gi rdzas zhes bya ba'i don to//

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[400] T1559.29.187b16ff.

[401] AKBh, 80.13ff: "For example it is 'the [visible] matter', 'sound', and so on" (*tadyathā rūpaṃ śabda ity evamādhiḥ*).

Why is "assemblage" (*'dus pa*) not required [to be a real entity] when having in mind the characteristics [of "the name"]? It has been taught in the treatise (*śāstra*): "What is the set of many names? It refers to names." etc.[402] If the word "set" (*kāya*) means [a real entity] "body" (*lus*), by this reason (*des*, **tena*), the expression "*ādikāya*" (*ti k'a ya gra bam*, *sogs pa'i tshogs lci ba*) is meaningless (*a nartha kaṃ*, *don ma yin pa can*, **anarthakam*),[403] because its own-being (*rang bzhin *svabhāva*), [that is, the own-being of *kāya*], is made understood from this and that names.

gang gi phyir mtshan nyid bsam pa la 'dus pas dgos pa med pa ci zhe na/ bstan bcos las bshad pa/ ming gi tshogs gang zhe na/ ming gang yin pa zhes rgya cher 'byung ste/ gal te tshogs kyi sgra ni lus brjod pa nyid des[404] ti k'a ya <<sogs pa'i tshogs>> gra ba <<lci ba>> ma nartha kaṃ <<don ma yin pa can>>/ ming dang ming kho na las de'i rang bzhin rjod par byed pa'i phyir ro.

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[402] A similar quotation is found in the **Nyāyānusāra* (*Apidamo shun zhengli lun* 阿毘達磨順正理論 T1562). In the quotation in the **Nyāyānusāra*, the treatise (*śāstra*) indicates the **Jñānaprasthāna* (*Apidamo fazhi lun* T1544). In the **Nyāyānusāra*, the **Jñānaprasthāna* is cited in order to argue that *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana* should be considered as real entities. The English translation of the passage in the **Nyāyānusāra* is found in Cox 1995, 378. The Chinese passage is found in T1562.26.413a14ff.

"There are other masters who state. 'It has been said in the *śāstra*. 'What is the set of many names? It refers to names, appellations, and so on.' Those masters of the śāstra, desiring to discuss names, and so on, as actually existing characteristics, do not raise this question with the assumption that [names] are provisional collocations. Therefore, their deliberative questions about the set of many names, and so on, should definitely be taken as questions about names, and so on, as characteristics that exist as real entities. In this consideration of names, and so on, as characteristics that exist as real entities, what use is it to question whether names, and so on, are provisional collocations?'" (有餘師說：本論中言，云何多名身．謂名名事等，非彼論師欲辯名等是實有相，而依假合以發問端．是故，彼問多名身等者，決定應問名等體實相．思擇名等體實相中，何用推徵名等假合).

[403] The Tibetan translator probably did not understand this sentence, and thus wrote the transliteration ("*ti k'a ya gra bam*" and "*a nartha kaṃ*") and the possible translation ("*sogs pa'i tshogs lci ba*" and "*don ma yin pa can*"). He seems to understand the phrase "*ti k'a ya gra bam*" as **ādikāyagauravam* (*sogs pa'i tshogs lci ba*, [regarding the expression] "*ādikāya*" as important). Unfortunately, I could not find any similar passage. Alternatively, I suspect that the phrase probably means **ādigrahaṇam* (the word "etc."). See also AKBh 80:12ff, "[The phrase] 'the set of phrase and syllable' is included in the word 'and so on'" (*ādigrahaṇena padavyañjanakāyagrahaṇam*).

[404] de sa P.

In this way, a "pot" (*bum pa*), and so on, should be also explained.[405]

de bzhin du bum pa la sogs pa la yang brjod par bya'o.

In the treatise, it is asked "what is the name set?". It is answered, "it is the expression (*saṃjñā*), etc.". [This is explained] in order to refute (*dgag pa*) a set of names which would have a different meaning from that [name set, that is, that which has been explained before].[406] As is asked in the treatise, in this way [the question is answered].[407] Which conflict [concerning the meaning of set] would be there to the master? Therefore, the master at first explains the nature of the [name] and later [explains that] the term "set" (*kāya*) [understood] as "collection" (*tshogs pa*, *samavāya*) and as "group" (*tshogs pa can*) has no different meaning.[408]

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[405] While the AKBh does not give this example for the name set, it is found in the *Nyāyānusāra* (T1562.26.413a1ff). For the English translation, see Cox 1995, 377:

"[Commentary:] The phrase 'and so on' (*ādi*, 等) includes the phrase set (*pādakāya*) and the phoneme set (*vyañjanakāya*), since the name, phrase, and syllable sets are mentioned in the treatise (*śāstra*), [that is, the AKBh.] The name set is precisely the collection of expressions (想 *saṃjñā*), the phrase set is precisely the collection of sentences (章 *vākya*), and the phoneme set is precisely the collection of syllables (字 *akṣara*). The term 'collection' (總說 *samukti*) has the meaning of "gathering" (合集 *samavāya*), because the verbal root (界 *dhātu*) uc (嗢遮) is used in the sense of "gathering". "Expressions" (想 *saṃjñā*) [properly] refer to [concepts] that grasp (取著 *udgrahaṇa*) a factor through conceptual discrimination (分別 *vikalpa*) and are issued forth from syllables that have been established in common: for example, the eye, the ear, a pot, clothing, a cart, and so on. Such an expression set is precisely the name set: that is, the eye, the ear, and so on.

論曰. 等者, 等取句身文身名句文身. 本論說故. 諸想總說, 即是名身. 諸章總說, 即是句身. 諸字總說, 即是文身. 言總說者, 是合集義, 於合集義中, 說嗢遮界故. 想謂於法分別取著. 共所安立, 字所發想. 即是眼耳瓶衣車等. 如是想身, 即是名身, 謂眼耳等.

[406] In the PSkBh we find a question with regard to the possible meanings of the name set: "Is it a set because a name arises from the collection of many phonemes like "a", "ka", and so on? Or is it a set because names such as Devadatta, Yajñadatta, [visible] matter, sound, and so on, are numerically many?" (*tshogs zhes bya ba ni ming yang yi ge a dang ka la sogs pa mang po 'dus pa las gyur pas na tshogs zhes bya ba'am/ yang na lha sbyin zhe'am/ mchod sbyin zhe'am/ gzugs she'am sgra zhes bya ba la sogs pa'i ming nyid grangs kyis mang ba'i phyir tshogs zhes bya'o*). For the detailed information, see chapter 7.5.1.

[407] The meaning of this Tibetan sentence is unclear to me.

[408] AKBh, 80.19. "The meaning of a collection is a group" (*yo 'rthaḥ samavāya iti so 'rthaḥ samuktir iti*).

bstan bcos su ming gi tshogs gang zhe na zhes dris te/ ji skad du ming gang yin pa dang zhes bya ba ni de las don gzhan du gyur pa'i ming gi tshogs dgag pa'i don to// ji ltar bstan bcos su dri ba bya ba de ltar slob dpon gyi 'di la 'gal ba ci zhig yod/ de nyid kyi phyir slob dpon gyis sngar ni de'i ngo bo bstan la/ phyis ni tshogs pa dang tshogs pa can gyi tshogs don gzhan ma yin pa'o.

8.6 Sautrāntika argues that the name set, the phrase set, and the phoneme set are not factors dissociated from mind

[AKBh, 80:22ff]

[The Sautrāntikas ask]: Do they, [that is, names, phrases, and phonemes] not have the nature of sound (*śabdātmaka*) because they have speech (*vāc*) as their own-being (*svabhāva*)? Therefore, they have matter (*rūpa*), [that is, sound] as their own-being. Why are they said to be "factors dissociated from mind"?

nanu ca te vāksvabhāvatvāc chabdātmakā iti rūpasvabhāvā bhavanti. kasmāc cittaviprayuktā ity ucyante?

de dag kyang ngag ni rang bzhin yin pa'i phyir sgra'i bdag nyid yin pas gzugs kyi rang bzhin dag ma yin nam ci'i phyir sems dang ldan pa ma yin pa rnams zhes bya zhe na.[409]

豈不此三, 語為性故, 用聲為體, 色自性攝. 如何乃說為心不相應行?[410]

為不如此耶? 此名聚等, 言說為體, 即是音聲性屬色自性. 云何說是心不相應法?[411]

[Tattvārthā, D4421.tho252b7ff; P5875.to291b8ff]

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[409] D4090.ku84b.

[410] AKBh_X, T1558.29.29a22ff.

[411] AKBh_P, T1559.29.187b19ff.

[The passage] "because they, [that is, the name set, the phrase set, and the phoneme set,] have speech (*vāc*) as own-being (*svabhāva*)", etc.: [The process of speech is explained by the Sautrāntika as follows:] At first (*sngon du 'gro ba*, **pūrva*), there is the intention of speaking (*brjod par 'dod pa*). Then the neck (*mgrin pa*), the mouth (*dkan*), the lips (*mchu*), the teeth (*so*), and the tongue (*lce*) meet and thereafter the sound having the nature of syllable "a", and so on, is called speech (*ngag*). The name set, and so on, are not perceived as different from the speech with regard to their own-being (*rang gi ngo bo *svabhāva*) and their result (*'bras bu *phala*). Therefore, they, [that is, the name set, the phrase set, and the phoneme set,] have speech as their own-being.

de dag kyang ngag[412] **gi rang bzhin yin** (P 292a) **pa'i phyir**/ zhes bya ba rgyas par 'byung ba la/ (D 253a) brjod par 'dod pa sngon du 'gro ba mgrin pa dang/ dkan dang/ mchu dang/ so dang lce phrad pa las yi ge a la sogs pa'i ngo bor gyur pa'i sgra la ngag ces bya la/ ngag las tha dad bar ming gi tshogs la sogs pa dag rang gi ngo bo 'am/ 'bras bu'i sgo nas 'dzin pa yang ma yin no// de'i phyir de dag ngag gi rang bzhin kho na yin la.

[In the AKBh, this is explained as follows:] "because they have speech as their own-being, they have the nature of sound. Therefore, they have matter, [that is, sound] as their own-being", because sound is included in the category of matter (*gzugs kyi phung po *rūpaskandha*).

ngag gi rang bzhin yin pa'i phyir sgra'i bdag nyid yin pas gzugs kyi rang bzhin du 'gyur te/ sgra ni gzugs kyi phung pos bsdus pa'i phyir ro.

Due to this, it is asked [in the AKBh by the Sautrantika]: "why are they [classified as] 'factors dissociated from mind'? [The opponent asks this] thinking "they are also accepted as being grasped by the faculty of hearing".

des na ci'i phyir sems dang ldan pa ma yin pa rnams zhes bya ste/ de dag rna ba'i dbang pos gzung bar 'dod bzhin du yang zhes bya bar bsams pa'o.

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[412] dag P.

8.7 Sarvāstivādin argues that the name set, the phrase set, and the phoneme set are factors dissociated from mind

[AKBh, 80:25ff]

[The Sarvāstivādin answers as follows:] They do not have speech as their own-being. Sound is indeed speech, but object-referents are not understood only by a sound. Then how? Speech (*vāc*) arises with regard to the name (*nāman*), and the name illuminates the object-referent (*artha*).

naite vāksvabhāvāḥ. ghoṣo hi vāk, na ca ghoṣamātreṇārthāḥ pratīyante. kiṃ tarhi? vāṅ nāmni pravartate nāmārthaṃ dyotayati.

de dag ni ngag gi rang bzhin ma yin te/ ngag gi sgra yin na sgra tsam gyis ni don gang dag go bar mi 'gyur ro// 'o na ci zhe na/ ngag ni ming la 'jug la ming gis ni don rjod par byed do.[413]

此三非以語為自性. 語是音聲, 非唯音聲即令了義. 云何令了? 謂語發名, 名能顯義, 乃能令了.[414]

此法不以言說為性. 何以故? 音聲即是言說, 不由唯音聲諸義可解. 云何可解? 音聲起於名, 名能顯示義.[415]

[Tattvārthā, D4421.tho253aff; P5875.to292a4ff]

[It is said by the Sarvāstivādin in the AKBh:] "They do not have speech as their own-being".[416] They, [that is, the name set, the phrase set, and the phoneme set,] do not have the nature of

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[413] D4090.ku84b.

[414] AKBh_X, T1558.29.29a24ff.

[415] AKBh_P, T1559.29.187b21ff.

[416] AKBh, 80.25: "[The Sarvāstivādin answers as follows.] they do not have speech as the own-being. Sound is indeed speech, but object-referents are not understood only by sound. Then how? Speech

sound. The explanation of the reason (*hetu*) for this [statement] is "speech is sound", etc. [The word] "only" (*mātra*) [in the phrase "object-referents are not understood only by a sound" (*na ca ghoṣamātrenārthāḥ pratīyante*)] is [used] in order to exclude the name and the phrase.

de dag ni ngag gi rang bzhin ma yin te zhes bya ba ni sgra'i bdag nyid ma yin pa'o// de nyid la rgyu smras pa ni **ngag ni sgra yin na** zhes bya ba rgyas par 'byung ba'o// **tsam** zhes bya ba'i sgra ni ming dang tshig rnam par gcad par bya ba'i phyir ro.

When the sound arises (*rgyud nas*), [it] illuminates the name and the phrase, it is a cause to understand an object-referent. However, [understanding an object-referent] is realized without depending on names and phrases. Therefore, by this reason, it, [that is, sound,] is different from the name set, and so on, which is the [direct] cause of understanding the object-referent.

sgra ni rgyud nas ming dang tshig gsal bar byed pa yin pa'i phyir don rtogs pa'i rgyu yin gyi/ ming dang tshig la bltos pa med par dngos su ni ma yin te/ de'i phyir gang gis don rtogs par byed pa ming gi tshogs la sogs pa dag las tha dad par yod do.

Therefore, speech does not make one understand the object-referent. "Then how?" Because speech makes the name visible (*gsal bar byed pa, *prakāśayati*) or makes the name arise (*skyed par byed pa*, **utpādayati*), "it arises with regard to the name, and the name manifests object-referent".[417] This explains that the name arises as a real entity (*dngos*) concerning [the own-being of] object-referents but the phrase does not.[418]

(*vāc*) arises with regard to name (*nāman*), and name illuminates object-referent (*artha*)" (*naite vāksvabhāvāḥ. ghoṣo hi vāk, na ca ghoṣamātrenārthāḥ pratīyante. kiṃ tarhi? vāṅ nāmni pravartate nāmārthaṃ dyotayati*).

[417] The Sautrāntika asks the meaning of "arising with regard to" in the AKBh, 81.06ff: "Moreover, it is not known 'how the speech arises with regard to the name'. Does it mean 'make it arise'? or 'make it visible'? (*idam cāpi na jñāyate kathaṃ vāṅ nāmni pravartata iti. kiṃ tāvad utpādayaty āhosvit prakāśayati?*).

[418] The translation of this sentence is uncertain.

de'i phyir ngag gis don rjod par byed pa ma yin te/ **'o na ci zhe na/ ngag ni** ming gsal bar byed pa 'am/ ming skyed par byed pa'i phyir **ming la 'jug la/ ming gi don rjod par byed de/** de go bar byed pa'i phyir ro// 'dis ni ming 'di don dag la dngos su 'jug gi/ tshig ni ma yin no zhes ston par byed do.

8.8 Sautrāntika responses that speech is a sound to which a limitation is given [AKBh, 80:24ff]

[The Sautrāntika responses as follows:] The mere sound is not speech, but speech is a sound by which object-referent (meaning) is understood. In turn, by which sound is object-referent understood? [It is understood by the sound] of which the limitation is made by speakers. For example, the sound of "gauḥ" is limited with regard to nine object-referents, that is, speech (*vāc*), direction (*diś*), earth (*bhū*), sunshine (*raśmi*), diamond (*vajra*), animal (*paśu*), eye (*akṣi*), heaven (*svarga*), and water (*vāri*). The wise would understand the sound "go" with regard to [one of] the nine object-referents.[419] The following should be definitely accepted by the one who thinks that the name manifests the object-referent: [The name illuminates the object-referent] if it has an acknowledged object-referent of a word (*pratītapadārthaka*). Moreover, only because of that sound, which has an acknowledged object-referent of word, that [name] is established. Therefore, what use is it to conceptualize the name as another [real entity different from the sound]?

naiva ghoṣamātraṃ vāg. yena tu ghoṣenārthaḥ pratīyate sa ghoṣo vāk. kena punar ghoṣeṇārthaḥ pratīyate? yo 'rtheṣu kṛtāvadhir vaktṛbhis. tadyathā gaur ity eṣa śabdo navasv artheṣu kṛtāvadhiḥ. vāgdigbhūraśmivajreṣu paśvakṣisvargavāriṣu. navasv artheṣu medhāvī gośabdam upadhārayed iti. yo 'pi hi manyate nāmārthaṃ dyotayatīti tenāpy etad avaśyam abhyupagantavyaṃ yadi pratītapadārthakaṃ bhavatīti. tac caitacchabdamātrād eva pratītapadārthakāt sidhyatīti kim arthāntaraṃ nāma kalpayitvā?

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[419] Paramārtha's Chinese version of the AKBh, that is, the AKBh$_P$, explains the passage from "*vāgdig*" up to "*upadhārayet*" as the quotation of the *Niruktaśāstra* (*niliuduo lun* 尼六多論). There is no same passage in the Yaska's Niruktaśāstra, but the explanation of the word "*gauḥ*" is found in the Niruktāśāstra 2.5ff (Sarup 1967, 46ff).

sgra tsam kho na ni ngag ma yin gyi sgra gang gis don go bar 'gyur ba'i sgra de dag yin no// yang sgra gang gis don go bar 'gyur zhe na/ gang gis smra ba po rnams kyis don dag la mtshams bcad pa ste/ dper na gau zhes bya ba lta bu'o// sgra de ni don dgu dag la mtshams bcad pa yin te/ ngag phyogs pa dang 'od zer dang// phyugs dang mig dang rdo rje dang// mtho ris chu dang don dgu la// mkhas pas gau sgra des gzung bya/ zhes bya ba lta bu'o// gang yang ming gis don rjod par byed do snyam du sems pa des kyang gdon mi za bar gal te don go bar byed pa yin zhes bya ba 'di khas blang bar bya dgos te/ de ni don go bar byed pa'i sgra tsam kho nas 'grub na don gzhan rdzas ming btags te ci zhig bya.⁴²⁰

非但音聲皆稱為語.　要由此故義可了知,　如是音聲方稱語故.　何等音聲令義可了? 謂能說者,　於諸義中已共立為能詮定量.　且如古者於九義中共立一瞿聲為能詮定量. 故有頌言,　方獸地光言,　金剛眼天水,　於斯九種義,　智者立瞿聲. 諸有執名能顯義者, 亦定應許如是義名.　謂共立為能詮定量.　若此句義由名能顯,　但由音聲顯用已辦.⁴²¹ 何須橫計別有實名?⁴²²

名不唯音聲稱言.⁴²³　若由此音聲義可了知.　此音聲則稱言.　由何音聲而義可解. 若說者於義中已共立定法.　譬如瞿音聲,　於九義已立定法.　如尼六多論偈說, 言方地光牛,⁴²⁴　金剛眼天水,　於此九種義,　智人說瞿名. 若人作如此執, 謂名能顯義, 此人亦應信受此義, 若名於義已定顯立.　若以名顯義, 由唯音聲於義定立,⁴²⁵　此用得成. 何用立名實有別法?⁴²⁶

[Tattvārthā, D4421.tho253a6ff; P5875.to292a7ff]

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⁴²⁰ D4090.ku84bff.

⁴²¹ 辦【大】；辯【宋】【元】【明】【宮】.

⁴²² ABKhₓ, T1558.29.29a26ff.

⁴²³ 君【大】；名【宋】【元】【明】【宮】.

⁴²⁴ 牛【大】；平【宋】.

⁴²⁵ 音【大】；立【宋】【元】【明】【宮】.

⁴²⁶ T1559.29.187b24ff.

[The Sautrāntika in the AKBh responses:] "the mere sound is not speech". Then what is [speech]? It is the specific sound (*sgra'i khyad par*, *ghoṣaviśeṣa*). Of what kind is it? Because of [this question], [the Sautrāntika in the AKBh] explains as follows. They are the [specific] sounds having the nature of syllable "ka", and so on, and making the object-referent understood.

sgra tsam kho na ni ngag ma yin gyi/ 'o na ci zhe na/ sgra'i khyad par ro/ yang de ci 'dra ba zhig ce na/ de'i phyir bshad pa/ yi ge ka la sogs pa'i bdag nyid sgra gang gis don go bar 'gyur ba'i sgra de dag yin no.

Because [the Sautrāntika] refutes that the set of names, and so on, exists [as real entities], this is asked: "By which sound is the object-referent understood?", and so on. [The object-referent is understood by] certain [sounds] (*gang zhig*), "of which the limitation is made by speakers with regard to object-referent". The order of [a certain amount] of syllable "a", and so on, illuminate the object-referent. Whatever [sound], of which the limitation is made with regard to the object-referent, makes us understand a certain object-referent. However, it is not that all [sounds can work like that.] Because of this, having depended on the linguistic convention [among speakers] (*brda*, *saṃketa*), [some] sounds make us understand object-referent, but it is not that all [the sounds are explained as working like this.][427] [Understanding object-referent] does not arise only because [sounds] exist. It was explained [by the Sautrāntika in the AKBh].

ming la sogs pa'i tshogs bkag pas 'dri ba ni/ **sgra gang gis don go bar 'gyur** zhe na zhes bya ba la sogs pa'o// (P 292b) gang zhig **smra ba po[428] rnams kyis don dag la mtshams bcad pa ste** zhes bya ba la/ yi ge a la sogs pa 'di snyed cig gi rim pa[429] 'dis don 'di rjod par byed pa ste/ gang zhig de ltar don gang dag la mtshams (D 253b) bcad pa des don rtogs par byed kyi/ thams cad kyis ni ma yin no//'dis ni brda la bltos nas sgra don go bar byed kyi/ thams cad kyis kyang ma yin la/ yod pa tsam gyis kyang ma yin no// zhes ston par byed do.

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[427] See also Vyākhyā, 183.16ff: "Because of this, the sound depending on the conventional agreement makes understand the object-referent" (*etena saṅketāpekṣaḥ śabdo 'rthaṃ pratyāyayati*).

[428] bo P.

[429] ba P.

[The phrase in the AKBh:] "For example, it is [the sound] '*gauḥ*'", etc.: The sound, which is characterized by the phoneme "g", the phoneme "au", and the visarga (*tseg drag*) [and arranged] by this order, [that is, the order of g-au-ḥ], is limited with regard to nine object-referents. Due to this [sound], they, [that is, the nine object-referents], are understood.

dper na goo: zhes bya ba la sogs pa la yi ge ga dang/ yi ge au dang/ tseg drag gi bdag nyid can gyi sgra ni go rims[430] 'dis don dgu dag la mtsams bcad pa de las de dag rtogs par 'gyur ro.

[The phrase in the AKBh] "the one who thinks that the name illuminates the object-referent (*gang yang ming gi don rjod par byed do snyam du sems pa, yo 'pi hi manyate nāmārthaṃ dyotayatīti*)", etc.: How do [names] have an acknowledged object-referent? [They have acknowledged object-referents] because [we] explain in detail that the name of this object-referent is that. It is not possible that one understands [any objects] by means of any names not having an acknowledged object-referent, [that is, it is not possible that] one understands [any object] without being familiar (*byang ba*) with the linguistic convention.

gang yang ming gi don rjod par byed do snyam du sems pa zhes bya ba rgyas par 'byung ba la/ ji ltar don go ba can yin zhe na/ don 'di'i ming ni 'di yin no// rgyas par byas pa las te/ don go ba can ma yin pas rtogs na ni brda byang ba med par yang go bar 'gyur ba zhig na/ 'gyur ba yod[431] pa ma yin no.

[The Sautrāntika in the AKBh states:] "Only because of the sound, which has an acknowledged object-referent, that [name] is established" (*de ni don go ba can gyi sgra tsam kho nas 'grub la, tac caitac chabdamātrād eva pratītapadārthakāt sidhyati*). [According to the Sautrāntika,] when one understands the object-referent through being familiar with relationship (*'brel pa*) [between an object-referent and a name], the existing [factor] is the sound having an acknowledged object-referent, because one is familiar with the relationship [between the

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[430] gau ri mas P.

[431] yang P.

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object-referent and the name] through the statement 'the name of this object is that'. [Therefore, the name is not a real entity different from sound].

de ni don go ba can gyi sgra tsam kho nas 'grub la zhes bya ba la/ don rjod par byed pa de ni ming dang bral zhing don go ba can gyi sgras 'grub po// 'brel pa la byang bas don go ba 'di la yod pa ni sgra don go ba can te/ don 'di'i ming 'di yin no zhes brdar btags pas 'brel pa la byang ba'i phyir ro.

8.9 Sautrāntika questions how speech arises with regard to name
[AKBh, 81:05ff]

The following is not known: 'How speech arises with regard to name?' Does it make [the name] arise (*utpādayati*) or make it visible (*prakāśayati*)? If it makes [the name] arise, all the mere sound will make name occur because speech has sound as the own-being. Or, [if] a certain specific sound is accepted as producer (*utpādaka*) of name, it, [that is, the specific sound,] will be that illuminating object-referent. [Therefore, it is not needed to assume name as existence]. Or, [if] it makes [the name] visible, all the mere sound will make name visible because speech has sound as the own-being. Or, [if] a certain specific sound is accepted as illuminator of name, it will be the one illuminating object-referent. [Therefore, it is not needed to assume name as existence].

idaṃ cāpi na jñāyate kathaṃ vāṅ nāmni pravartata iti. kiṃ tāvad utpādayaty āhosvit prakāśayati? yady utpādayati, ghoṣasvabhāvatvād vācaḥ sarvaṃ ghoṣamātraṃ nāmotpādayiṣyati. yādṛṣo vā ghoṣaviśeṣa iṣyate nāmna utpādakaḥ sa evārthasya dyotako bhaviṣyati. atha prakāśayati, ghoṣasvabhāvatvād vācaḥ sarvaṃ ghoṣamātraṃ nāma prakāśayiṣyati. yādṛśo vā ghoṣaviśeṣa iṣyate nāmnaḥ prakāśakaḥ sa evārthasya dyotako bhaviṣyati.

ji star na[432] ngag ming la 'jug pa 'di yang mi shes so// ci re zhig skyed par byed dam/ 'on te gsal bar byed/ gal te skyed par byed na ni ngag ni sgra'i rang bzhin yin pa'i phyir sgra tsam thams cad kyis ming skyed par 'gyur ro// 'on te sgra'i khyad par de lta bu zhig ming skyed par byed pa yin par 'dod na ni de nyid don rjod par byed pa yin par 'gyur ro// 'on te gsal bar byed pa yin

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[432] ṭā na D.

no zhe na ni ngag gi sgra'i rang bzhin yin pa'i phyir sgra tsam thams cad kyi ming gsal bar byed par 'gyur ro// 'on te sgra'i khyad par de lta bu zhig gsal bar byed pa yin par 'dod na ni de nyid don gsal bar byed pa yin par 'gyur ro.[433]

又未了此名如何由語發.　　為由語顯?　　為由語生?　　若由語生,　　語聲性故, 聲應一切皆能生名. 若謂生名聲有差別, 此足顯義. 何待別名? 若由語顯, 語聲性故, 聲應一切皆能顯名. 若謂顯名聲有差別, 此足顯義. 何待別名?[434]

此義不可知:　　云何音聲起於名?　　為音聲生名說起?　　為顯名說起?　　若生者, 言語以音聲為自性故, 應生一切名, 唯音聲為體. 復次是音聲差別如汝所許, 能生起名, 唯應此能顯義.　　若顯者,　　言語以音聲為自性故,　　應顯一切名,　　唯音聲為體. 復次是音聲差別如汝所許, 能顯了名, 唯應此能顯義.[435] 何用執名有別法?[436]

[Tattvārthā, D4421.tho253b4ff; P5875.to292b6ff]

[The phrase] "How [speech] arises with regard to the name", etc.: Speech has the nature of sound, and if it would be suitable to say that it, [that is, speech,] has its own specific quality (*rang gi bye brag*) to make the name arise or make visible, then all the sounds would make the name arise or make visible because any difference (*bye brag*) [among sounds] with regard to this [own specific quality] is not accepted. Rather if the sound, which shares the specific quality with the name, [that is, the sound which has an acknowledged object-referent] is accepted as speech, then [this following could be stated]: "or, [if] a certain specific sound" (*yādṛśo vā ghoṣaviśeṣa*), etc.

ji ltar na gang ming la 'jug pa 'di yang zhes bya ba la sogs pa rgyas par 'byung ba la/ ngag ni sgra'i bdag nyid yin na/ de gal te rang gi bye brag ming skyed par byed pa 'am gsal bar byed ba zhig yin grang/ de lta yin na 'dir bye brag khas ma blangs pa'i phyir sgra thams cad kyis

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[433] D4090ku85a.

[434] AKBh$_X$, T1558.29.29b06ff.

[435] 唯【大】＝惟【宋】【元】【明】【宮】.

[436] AKBh$_P$, T1559.29.187c04ff.

kyang ming skyed pa'am gsal bar byed par 'gyur ro// 'on te ming phan tshun khyad par du 'gyur ba kho na'i sgra ngag tu 'dod do zhe na/ **'on te sgra'i khyad par de lta bu zhig** ces bya ba rgya cher 'byung ngo.

"That which illuminates an object-referent (*arthasya dyotakaḥ*)" is that which makes the cognition ("knowledge" *shes pa*) of an objective sphere arise. It is the specific sound (*sgra'i khyad par*, *ghoṣaviśeṣa*), of which the limitation is made with regard to object-referents. Therefore, in this context, what is intended through expressing the name (*nāman*) as different from that [specific sound]?

don brjod pa ni don gyi yul can gyi shes pa skyed pa yin na/ de ni sgra'i khyad par don dag la mtshams bcad ba kho nas byed par 'gyur bas 'dir de la tha dad par ming btags pas ci dgos.

A specific sound does not make a specific name visible, because there is no definitive cause [to argue that only a specific sound makes a specific name visible]. It should be accepted that either all sounds make all names visible or [no sound] makes [any names] visible.

sgra'i khyad par gyis ming gi khyad par gsal bar byed pa yang ma yin te nges pa'i rgyu med pa'i phyir ro// sgra thams cad kyis ming thams cad gsal bar byed pa'am gsal bar mi byed pa nyid du khas blang bar bya'o.

If being familiar with the linguistic convention (*saṃketa*) is the definitive cause, then a [sound] having an [acknowledged] object-referent [due to the linguistic convention] makes [a name] visible. If it would be not accepted that [the sound having an acknowledge object-referent, that is, the speech makes the name visible] due to being familiar with the linguistic convention, then the speech and the name would be apprehended (*nye bar dmigs pa*) as different [beings].

gal te brda la byang ba nges pa'i rgyu yin no zhe na/ de lta na don yod pa nyid kyis (D 254a) gsal bar byed de/ brda la byang ba la bltos pa'i phyir zhes ci ste mi 'dod/ des na ming dang ngag tha dad par nye bar dmigs so.

[However], in this context, it is not reasonable to say that being familiar with the linguistic convention does not exist. The name, which is the mental image (*rgyu mtshan*, **nimitta*) being the object to be cognized [*shes bya*, **jñeya*], is perceived (*nges par gzung*) like the reflection (*gzugs brnyan*, **pratibimba*) because [the name] is not different from the cognition (*shes pa*, **jñāna*). Therefore, the cognition is that which is accepted as not making the object-referent makes visible, because it does not produce the sound having the nature of the reflection being the object to be cognized. [In other words, the cognition only perceives the mental image. It understands to which object-referent the mental image indicates due to the linguistic convention. If the linguistic convention is not assumed, the cognition does not know the object-referent of the mental image.]

de la brda la byang ba yod pa ma yin pa mi rigs te/ shes pa dang tha dad pa med pas gzugs brnyan bzhin du shes bya'i rgyu mtshan gyi ming nges par gzung ste/ de'i phyir shes pa kho na shes bya'i gzugs brnyan gyi bdag nyid can gyi sgra skyed pa ma yin pas don gsal bar mi byed par 'dod pa ci zhig yin zhes bya'o.

8.10   Sautrāntika argues that syllables cannot be collected in a single moment [AKBh, 81:10ff]

Indeed, there is no collection of sounds in a moment, and it is not reasonable to state that a factor, [that is, a name,] arises part by part, [because a factor (*dharma*) does not have parts]. Therefore, how could the arising speech bring forth the name? First, does the last moment of information (*vijñaptikṣaṇa*), [that is, the last moment of speech], which depends on the previous [moment of "information" (*vijñapti*)], bring forth the "non-information" (*avijñapti*), [that is, the name]? If it were like that, the one who listens to the single [last sound] would understand the object-referent, because the name would arise in the last sound.

na khalv api śabdānāṃ sāmagryam asti kṣaṇaikamilanam. na caikasya dharmasya bhāgaśa utpādo yukta iti katham utpādayantī vāṅ nāmotpādayet? kathaṃ tāvad atītāpekṣaḥ paścimo vijñaptikṣaṇa utpādayaty avijñaptim? evaṃ tarhi paścima eva śabde nāmna utpādād yo 'pi tam evaikaṃ śṛṇoti so 'py arthaṃ pratipadyeta.

yang sgra rnams ni tshogs pa med la chos gcig la cha shas kyi skyed pa yang rigs pa ma yin la/ skyed par byed pa na ji ltar ngag gis ming skyed par byed/ re zhig ji ltar na 'das pa la ltos pa'i rnam par rig byed kyi skad cig ma tha mas rnam par rig byed ma yin pa skyed par byed/ de lta na 'o na ni sgra tha ma kho nas ming skyed pa'i phyir gang gis de gcig kho na thos pa des kyang don go ngar 'gyur ro.[437]

又諸念聲不可聚集.　亦無一法分分漸生.　如何名生可由語發?　云何待過去諸表剎那最後表剎那, 能生無表? 若爾最後位聲乃生名, 但聞最後聲應能了義.[438]

復次諸聲無有聚集.　一法分分生,　是義不然.　若執言語能生名,　云何能生名?　云何觀過去教色剎那最後教色剎那, 能生無教色? 若爾於最後聲名生故, 若人但聞最後一聲, 是人便應能了知此義.[439]

[Tattvārthā, D4421.tho254a2ff; P5875.to293a4ff]

[In the AKBh, the Sautrāntika explains as follows.] "Indeed, there is no collection of sounds [in a moment]", and so on. Because the speech is based on the phonemes in [a specific] order, [and] because the individual phonemes are also momentary, the sounds of phoneme "a", etc., do not exist simultaneously. Because it has no parts, a single factor, [that is, a name,] does not arise part by part.

yang sgra rnams ni tshogs pa med pa zhes bya ba la sogs pa la/ ngag ni rim gyis yi ge dag la gnas pa'i phyir yi ge rnams kyang skad cig ma yin pa'i phyir yi ge a la sogs pa'i sgra rnams cig car yod pa ma yin la/ cha med pa'i phyir chos gcig cha shas kyis skye ba yang ma yin no.

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[437] D4090ku85a.

[438] AKBhₓ, T1558.29.29b12ff.

[439] AKBhₚ, T1559.29.187c11ff.

[The Phrase in the AKBh] "[the speech] brings forth the name" (*utpādayantī vāc*), and so on: The name consisting of various phonemes is determined (*yong su gcad par bya ba*, **paricchedya*) on the basis of many [moments of] sounds. Therefore, [it is asked] "how the arising speech brings forth the name" (*de skyed par byed pa na ji ltar ngag gis sked par byed de, katham utpādayantī vāṅ nāmotpādaye*). Does it bring forth [the name] in the past, the future, or the present? Here, with regard to many [moments of] sounds, the [phonemes of] speech do not exist simultaneously, because they arise in [a specific] order and [each of them] is momentary. Therefore, it is asked in detail [in the AKBh] "first, does [the last moment of 'information', that is, the last phoneme,] which depends on the previous [moments of 'information', that is, the previous phonemes, bring forth the name]?"

skyed par byed pa na zhes bya ba la sogs pa la yi ge du ma can gyi ming ni sgra du ma la bltos nas yongs su gcad par bya ba yin pas **de skyed par byed pa na ji ltar ngag gis skyed par byed de**/ ci 'das pa'am/ ma 'ongs pa'am/ da ltar byung ba zhig gis yin/ 'di ltar sgra rnams la ni cig car ba nyid yod pa ma yin te/ rim gyis 'jug pa'i phyir dang/ skad cig ma yin pa'i phyir ro// de'i phyir **re zhig ji ltar 'das pa la bltos pa'i** zhes bya ba rgyas par smras so.

[The possible answer of the Sarvāstivādin could be as follows:][440] when some undertake the vow of "the monastic code" (*prātimokṣa*), there is no collection of the bodily and vocal information (*rnam par rig byed*, *vijñapti*), [because each bodily or vocal information arises at a moment and thus they do not arise collectively].[441] However, there is the last moment of information, which depends on the previous moments of the bodily and vocal information. Likewise, speaking "I do not kill anyone" twice and three times brings forth the non-information, [that is, being an established monk who completed the ritual,] which is included in the vow of "the monastic code".[442] Likewise in this way, the last moment of sound of the

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[440] This explanation is not found in the AKBh. However, the Tattvārthā and the Vyākhyā introduce the process of the Buddhist vow in order to explain the Sarvāstivādin's perspective.

[441] Vyākhyā, 184.11ff: "When undertaking the vow of the monastic code (*prātimokṣa*), the bodily and the vocal information arise. [However,] there is not their collection". (*prātimokṣasaṃvarasamādāne kāyavāgvijñaptayaḥ pravartante. tāsāṃ nāsti sāmagryaṃ*).

[442] Vyākhyā, 184.12ff: "However, the last moment of information, which depends on the previous moment of the bodily and vocal information, brings forth the non-information, which is included in

speech, which depends on the previous moments of sound, brings forth the name.[443] Therefore, there is no wrong consequence that a single factor (*dharma*, that is, a name) arises part by part.

so sor thar pa'i sdom pa len pa'i tshe lus dang ngag gi rnam par rig byed rnams tshogs pa med mod kyi/ 'on kyang 'das pa'i lus ngag gi rnam par rig byed kyi skad cig la bltos pa'i rnam par rig byed kyi skad cig ma tha ma de bzhin du lan gnyis lan gsum du srog gcod pa spong bar bgyid do zhes bya ba'i sgra gang yin pas so sor thar pa'i sdom pas bsdus pa'i rnam par rig byed ma yin pa skyed par byed pa de bzhin du 'das pa'i sgra la bltos pa'i ngag gi sgra tha mas ming skyed par byed de/ de'i phyir gcig cha shas kyis skye bar thal bar mi 'gyur ro.

The master (*ācārya*) Saṃghabhadra (*slob dpon 'dus bzang*) states [as follows]: Having determined names which one wishes [to express], one thinks 'I will manifest (*brjod pa*) this and that [names]'. Then, the manifestation [of names] arise. In this way one manifests [names, and] the speech arises with regard to the name.

slob dpon 'dus bzang na re/ mngon par 'dod pa'i ming la yid bzhag nas 'di dang 'di brjod par bya'o snyam du dus phyi ma'i brjod pa 'jug par 'gyur bas de ltar brjod de/ ngag ni ming la 'jug go zhes zer ro.

Therefore, [first] one determines all the sounds [of phoneme] (*sgra mtha' dag*), of which limitation is made with regard to whatever object-referent (*don ji snyed dag*) [which one wishes to express], without [manifesting them] at different [moments], and then one [actually] manifests them in order, [that is, pronounce them for manifesting a name]. One who understands [the relationship between the object-referent and the name] also hears the manifestation [of each phonemes], and then one thinks about (*yid la byed*) all the phonemes

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the vow of the precept (*prātimokṣa*)" (*atha cātītakāyavāgvijñaptikṣaṇāpekṣaḥ paścimo vijñaptikṣaṇaḥ prātimokṣasaṃvarasaṅgṛhītam avijñaptim utpādayati*).

[443] Vyākhyā, 184.13ff: "In this way, the last moment of sound of the speech, which depends on the previous moment of sound, brings forth name." (*evam atītaśabdakṣaṇāpekṣaḥ paścimo vācchabda-kṣaṇo nāmotpādayati*). According to this explanation, the Sarvāstivādin considers the name as a non-information.

without differentiating [them with regard to the different moments of the manifestation of each phoneme, that is, one thinks about all the phonemes simultaneously in mind].

de'i phyir don ji snyed dag la mtsams (D 254b) bcad pa'i sgra mtha' dag bye brag med par yid la bzung ste/ phyis rim gyis rjod par byed la/ rtogs pa po yang rim gyis brjod pa kho na mnyan nas phyis thams cad bye brag med par yid la byed do.

Therefore, a mental object (*yid kyi yul*), [that is, a name,] is made as a single one without distinction [of time]. Due to the matter of sounds, [and] depending on being familiar with the linguistic convention (*brda*, *saṅketa*), one understands the object-referent [which a speaker wishes to communicate]. Because of this, it is not the case that there is the name which is [completely] distinct from all the matter of sound.

de'i phyir yid kyi yul gcig pur tha dad med par byas te sgra'i gzugs las brda byang ba la bltos nas don rtogs par byed do// des na sgra'i gzugs mtha' dag las tha dad pa'i ming yod pa de ltar yang ma yin no.

With regard to this [name], because of [various kinds of] conceptualization (*rnam par dpyad pa*), many [topics] to be explained (*brjod par bya ba*) arise. There is no wrong consequence with regard to this [explanation of name]. Therefore, by means of relating [the name] with the previous [moments of speech], one also conceptualizes [the name in another way], that is, [the name] which is explained in many ways because one establish the manifesting sounds and the [manifested] name and so on, as different objects.

'dir ni rnam par dpyad pas brjod par bya ba mang po 'byung ste/ de ltar thal bar mi 'gyur bas gang 'dir mngon par brjod pa'i sgra dang ming la sogs pa rnams don gzhan nyid du rab tu bsgrub pa'i phyir mang du bshad pa de yang 'das pa dang 'brel bas rnam par dpyad do.

[The Response of the Sautrāntika in the AKBh] "if it were like that, [one who listens to the single last sound would understand object-referent, because the name would arise] in the last

sound": With regard to the name, which consists of many phonemes, one who hears the sound that includes [only] the single last phoneme [of the whole phonemes of the name] would understand the object-referent, because the last sound makes name arise.

de lta na 'o na ni sgra tha ma kho nas zhes bya rgyas par 'byung ba la/ yi ge du ma can gyi ming la/ gang zhig yi ge[444] tha ma gcig gis bsdus pa'i sgra thos pa[445] des kyang don de go bar 'gyur te/ sgra phyi ma kho nas ming skyed par byed pa'i phyir ro.

If [the Sarvāstivādin would think that this explanation] would have no error because all the sounds [of a name], which depend on the previous [moments of] sounds, that is, the supports (*dmigs pa*) [of the name], then, in this case, it would be no example [of] "information" (*rnam par rig byed*, *vijñapti*). The last moment of information, [that is, the last moment of speech,] does not make a "non-information" (*rnam par rig byed ma yin pa*, *avijñapti*), [that is, the name], arise, depending on the previous moments of "information" which already have arisen and ceased (*dmigs shing 'gags pa*, "perceived and ceased"). Then, how? [The last moment of "information"] becomes the cause of "non-information", [that is, the name], depending on the existing [factor, that is, only the existing last moment of "information"].

gal te dmigs pa'i sgra 'das pa la bltos pa'i sgra thams cad ming skyed par byed pas nyes pa 'di med do zhe na/ de lta na 'o na rnam par rig byed dpe ma yin te/ rnam par rig byed kyi skad cig ma tha ma ni rnam par rig byed kyi skad cig sngar skyes pa dmigs shing 'gags pa dag la bltos

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[444] ga D.

[445] thog ma D.

nas rnam par rig byed ma yin ba skyed par mi byed kyi/ 'o na ci zhe na/ de yod pa tsam nyid la bltos nas rnam par rig byed ma yin pa'i rgyur 'gyur ba yin (P 294a) no.

If it were not like this, [that is, if the "non-information" would not depend on the present "information",] there would be no non-information to the distracted one and the stupid one (*sems med pa*, one without thinking), [because they do not remember the previous moments which have ceased]. Therefore, just like [other kinds of] "information", the last [moment of] sound makes the name arise, and it is not the case that the arising of name depends on the arising of the last [moment of] sound.

de lta ma yin na g-yengs pa dang sems med pa la rnam par rig byed ma yin pa med par 'gyur ro// de'i phyir sgra tha ma ni rnam par rig byed kho na ltar ming skyed par byed kyi/ sngar gyi sgra dmigs pa la bltos ba ni ma yin no.

8.11   Phonemes also cannot be collected simultaneously

[AKBh, 81:13f]

[The Sautrāntika continues:] Moreover, it could be also conceptualized [by the Sarvāstivāins] as follows: Speech makes phoneme arise and phoneme [makes] name [arise]. Even in this case, there is a wrong consequence because there is no collection of phonemes [in a moment].

athāpy evaṃ kalpyeta vāg vyañjanaṃ janayati vyañjanaṃ tu nāmeti. atrāpi sa eva prasaṅgo vyañjanānāṃ sāmagryābhāvāt.

'on te 'di snyam du ngag gis ni yi ge skyed par byed la/ yi ges ni ming skyed par byed do snyam du rtog par byed na/ 'di la yang skyon de nyid yod de/ yi ge rnams tshogs pa med pa'i phyir ro.[446]

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[446] D4090.ku58a.

若作是執, 語能生文, 文復生名, 名方顯義. 此中過難應同前說, 以諸念文不可集故.[447]

若汝執如此, 音聲生字, 以字生名. 此中同前立難, 字無聚集故.[448]

[Tattvārthā, D4421.tho254b6ff; D5875.to294a2ff]

[The phrase in the AKBh] "moreover, it could be also conceptualized as follows", and so on: In this case, there is no error that [name arises] immediately after stating [the last moment of sound], because [each] phoneme arises at each [moment] of sound and because these phonemes make name arise.

'on te 'di snyam du zhes bya ba la sogs pa la de ltar na smras ma thag pa'i skyon med de/ sgra re re la yi ge skye ba'i phyir dang/ yi ge dag gis kyang ming skyed par byed pa'i phyir ro.

[The phrase in the AKBh] "even in this case, there is a wrong consequence", and so on: the [moments of] sounds are those which make the name arise and manifest [it]. Why? Because there is no collection of phonemes [in a moment], because [phonemes] arise in an order just as sounds [do], and because [each phoneme] is momentary, there is no single [moment] with regard to [the arising of] phonemes. [Therefore, phonemes are not real entities different from sounds]. In this context, with regard to a name, which is produced by many phonemes and has no parts, it should not be understood that [a name] arises in an order and part by part.

'di la yang skyon de nyid yod do zhes bya ba ni sgra rnams ming skyed ba la bstan ba gang yin pa'o// ci ltar zhe na/ yi ge rnams ni tshogs ba med ba'i phyir dang/ sgra ltar rim rim gyis 'jug pa'i phyir dang/ sgra ltar rim gyis 'jug ba'i phyir dang/ skad cig ma nyid yin pa'i phyir ye ge rnams la yang cig car (D 255a) ba nyid med do// der ming yi ge du mas bskyed par bya ba cha med pa gcig la rim gyis cha shas kyis skyed par yang rigs pa ma yin no.

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[447] AKBh_X, T1558.29.29b15ff.

[448] AKBh_P, T1559.29.187c15ff.

Rather if it would be thought that the last phoneme which depends on the previous phonemes makes the name arise, then it should be as follows: one who hears the sound which makes the last phoneme arises would understand the object-referent [which the speaker wishes to state], because the last phoneme makes the name arise and the name illuminates the object-referent. [Therefore, the explanation of the Sarvāstivādins cannot be established].

ci ste 'das pa'i yi ge la bltos pa'i yi ge phyi ma kho nas ming skyed par byed do snyam na/ de lta na 'o na ni gang gis yi ge tha ma skyed par byed pa'i sgra thos pa des kyang don de go bar 'gyur te/ yi ge tha ma kho nas ming bskyed pa'i phyir dang/ ming gis kyang don rjod par byed pa'i phyir ro.

8.12 Speech also cannot make name visible

[AKBh, 81:14]

There would be also this wrong consequence if speech would be those which make the name visible.[449]

eṣa eva ca prasaṅgo nāmnaḥ prakāśakatve vācaḥ.

ngag ming gsal bar byed pa yin na yang skyon de nyid yod do.[450]

語顯名過, 應例如生.[451]

若說音聲顯字, 此中亦同前立難.[452]

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[449] Paramārtha's version, that is, the AKBh_P, has "phoneme" (zi 字, *vyañjana) instead of "name" (ming 名, *nāman), that is, "if speech would make phoneme visible" (若說音聲顯字). According to this version, the previous chapter discusses the possible argument of "speech makes phoneme arise (janayati)" and this chapter discusses the alternative argument of "speech makes phoneme visible (prakāśaktava)".

[450] D4090.ku58a.

[451] T1558.29.29b17ff.

[452] T1559.29.187c16ff.

[Tattvārthā, D4421.tho255a2ff; P5875.to294a6ff]

[The phrase in the AKBh] "if speech would make name visible, and so on: What does it mean? It is the explanation about making name arise. All sounds cannot be collected [in a moment], [a name] is a single factor, and thus it is not suitable to say that [the name] arises part by part. All [of these explanation] were explained in detail.

ngag ming gsal bar byed pa yin na yang zhes bya ba la sogs pa la/ gang zhig ce na/ ming skyed par byed pa nyid la bstan pa kho na'o// yang sgra rnams tshogs pa med la/ chos gcig la cha shas kyis gsal ba yang rigs pa ma yin no// zhes bya ba thams cad rgyas par brjod par bya'o.

8.13 Speech cannot be differentiated from phonemes

[AKBh, 81:15ff]

Even those who know that a phoneme is different from [a moment of] speech and have a concentrated mind cannot differentiate [phonemes from the speech] with regard to their characteristic. Therefore, it is not suitable to say that a speech makes a phoneme arise or a speech makes a phoneme visible.

vyañjanaṃ cāpi vāgviśiṣṭaprajñā apy avahitacetaskā lakṣaṇataḥ paricchettum notsahanta iti vyañjanasyāpi vāṅ naivotpādikā na prakāśikā yujyate.

yi ge yang ngag las khyad par du yod par shes rab dang ldan pa yid brtan pas kyang mtshan nyid gyi[453] sgo nas yongs su bcad par mi nus pas ngag ni yi ge skyed par byed pa yin par yang mi rung la/ gsal bar byed pa yin par yang mi rung ngo.[454]

又異語文, 諸明慧者, 注心思擇, 莫辯其相. 又文由語若顯若生, 准語於名皆不應理.[455]

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[453] gyi kyī D.

[454] D4090.ku85a.

[455] AKBh$_X$, T1558.29.29b18ff.

是字異音聲, 聰慧人安靜心約異相, 亦不能分別. 是故不可執音聲能生及能顯字.[456]

[Tattvārthā, D4421.tho255a3ff; P5875.to294a7ff]

In previous [passages], having assumed [the explanation of the Sarvāstivādins] that the phonemes are different from speech, [the Sautrāntika in the AKBh] negated that the phonemes make the name arise. Now, it is explained in detail that the phonemes are [actually] the speech, [that is, they are not different,] because there are no phonemes different from the speech.

gong du ni ngag las tha dad pa'i yi ge khas blangs nas yi ge ming[457] skyed pa nyid yin pa bkag pa yin la/ da ni ngag las tha dad pa'i yi ge yod pa ma yin pa de nyid kyi phyir yi ge yang dag ngag ces bya ba rgyas par smos so.

There are no phonemes different from speech. Therefore, how is it known that the speech makes the phonemes arise or visible, which do not exist [as different entities from the speech]? Therefore, [in the AKBh,] it is said, "those who know", and so on.

ngag las tha dad pa'i yi ge ni yod pa ma yin te/ de'i phyir yod pa ma yin pa'i yi ge ji ltar ngag gis skyed pa'am gsal bar byed pa 'di ji ltar zhes she na/ de'i phyir **shes rab dang ldan pa** zhes bya ba la sogs pa smos so.

Because the foolish have the defiled knowledge and because the wise also [sometimes] have a distraction, they cannot discern [the factors well]. Therefore, [by means of the phrase] "even those who know [speech and phonemes are different] and have a concentrated mind", both [people, that is, the foolish and the wise] are expressed.

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[456] AKBh_P, T1559.29.187c17ff.

[457] ming gis P, D.

shes rab 'chal ba ni shes rab nyams pa'i phyir la/ shes rab ldan pa yang g.yeng ba yod pa'i phyir yongs su bcad par mi nus pas **shes rab dang ldan pa yid bstad[458] pas kyang** zhes gnyis ka brjod do.

[The phrase] "with regard to [their] characteristics" means with regard to their own-being (*svabhāva*)". Therefore, because there is no phoneme different from the speech, it is neither suitable to say that the speech makes phonemes arise like the name, nor that [speech] makes [phonemes] visible.

mtshan nyid kyi sgo nas zhes bya ba ni rang gi ngo bo'i sgo nas so/ de'i phyir ngag las tha dad pa'i yi ge med pas ngag ni ming ltar yi ge skyed par byed pa yin par yang mi rung la/ gsal bar byed pa yin par yang mi rung ngo.

Some say [as follows:] "Because speech is nothing but only sound, all the mere sounds make phonemes arise or visible". [The meaning] of all [the mere sounds] in this [statement] should be explained in detail.

gzhan yang ngag ni sgra tsam yin pa'i phyir sgra tsam thams cad yi ge[459] skyed pa'am gsal bar byed par 'gyur ro// zhes thams cad 'dir yang rgyas par brjod par bya'o.

If the mere sound would be the name, even in this case, the name, that is, the sound which consists of many phonemes would not make one understand the object-referent at a single moment (*cig car*). Even those who concentrate on the manifestation of the sound of which the linguistic convention (*brdar*, **saṃketa*) is made would perceive (*dmigs*) sound but not cognize (*nges par 'dzin pa*) the object-referent [of the sound, if they do not know the linguistic convention of the sound]. Even through cognizing [the object-referent], one does not identify (*nye bar dmigs pa*) this [object with the sounds if they do not hear sound]. Only when one

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458 bstang D.

459 ges D.

cognizes the object-referent and hears [the sound] by ear, they identify [the object-referent with the sounds which the speaker pronounces].

gang zhig sgra tsam ming yin na de la yang ming gi yi ge du ma rnams kyi sgra cig car don go bar byed pa med de/ brdar byas pa'i sgra brjod pa la bstad pa rnams kyis kyang sgra dmigs kyi don nges par 'dzin pa ma yin no// yang de rnams nyid nges par (D 255b) gzung bas 'dir nye bar dmigs pa yang ma yin gyi de'i don nges par gzung ba dang de nam zhig rna bas thos pas kyang nye bar dmigs so.

Because the [name], which is different from sounds because it belongs to another [category, that is, the category of "factors dissociated from mind"], becomes associated (*mtshungs par ldan pa*) with the object-referents, the master (*ācārya*) Saṃghabhadra explains [as follows]: Having determined the names which one wishes [to state], thinking 'I will manifest this and that [names]', and then one manifests them. In this way, one manifests [the names]. [Therefore,] the speech arises with regard to the name.

de gzhan du gtogs pa las sgra dang tha dad pa de nyid don rnams dang mtshungs par ldan par 'gyur bas na/ slob dpon 'dus bzang gis/ mngon par 'dod pa'i ming la yid bzhag nas 'di dang 'di brjod par bya'o snyam du dus phyi ma'i brjod pa 'jug par 'gyur bas de ltar brjod de/ ngag ni ming la 'jug go zhes bshad do.

[A name] is produced (*bskyed pa*) due to the collection of all sounds, that is, the previous [moments of sounds] and the later [moments of sounds]. [Therefore, it should be understood] in the following way: when the individual phonemes, which are perceived by the ear-consciousness, subsequently become to be the object of memory [to lead into the recollection of the entire own-being (*rang bzhin mtha' dag*) due to [the cognition] through the ear-consciousness, then one understands the object-referent through being familiar with the linguistic convention. This does not happen only because of the existence of the phonemes.

gang yang sgra snga ma phyi ma'i tshogs thams cad bsdoms nas bskyed pas na/ de ltar yi ge so so rna ba'i rnam par shes pas dmigs pa rnams phyis rna ba'i rnam par shes pa'i stobs kyis rang

bzhin mtha' dag dran pa'i yul du gyur pa na brda la byang bas don go ba yin gyi/ yi ge de rnams yod pa tsam gyis ni ma yin no.

Even when one is familiar with the relation [between the sound and the object-referent], [the sounds should be] the object of memory [to lead into the recollection of] the entire [own-being]. [Then,] one understands the object-referent of the sounds, which agrees with the relation [between the sounds and the object-referent]. This does not happen in another way, because there is a wrong consequence that otherwise the relation [between the sounds and the object-referent] is useless.

'brel pa la byang ba'i dus nyid du yang mtha' dag dran pa'i yul du byas te brda la byang bar byas pas 'brel pa dang mthun par sgra'i don rtogs kyi/ gzhan du ni ma yin te 'brel pa don med par thal ba'i phyir ro.

That which has been explained [by Saṃghabhadra, that is,] "after having determined the name which one wishes to [state]" has also error, because the name is manifested in an order after one determined the sounds [which one wishes to pronounce]. [Therefore, this explanation cannot solve the problem with regard to the relationship between the name and the sounds which manifest the name].

gang bshad pa mngon par 'dod pa'i ming la yid bzhag nas zhes bya ba la sogs pa de yang gnod pa can te/ sgra mtha' dag yid la bzhag nas phyis rim gyis brjod pa'i phyir ro.

8.14   Name and object-referent cannot arise simultaneously

[AKBh, 81:17ff]

Rather if the name would be accepted as arising [simultaneously with] the object-referent like "caste" (*jāti*), in this case, there would be no name arising together with the past and future object-referent. The names of children are composed (*kalpyante*, "conceptualized") by [their] parents as [the parent] wish. [In this case, the children come first, then the names follow]. Therefore, which name could arise [simultaneously] together with the [object-referent]?

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Moreover, with which of the unconditioned factors would the name arise [simultaneously]? Therefore, this [assumption] is not accepted.

athāpy arthasahajaṃ nāma jātyādivad iṣyate, evaṃ saty, atītāgatasyārthasya vartamānaṃ nāma na syād. apatyānāṃ pitṛbhir yatheṣṭaṃ nāmāni kalpyanta iti, kataman nāma tatsahajaṃ syāt? asaṃskṛtānāṃ ca dharmāṇāṃ kena sahajaṃ nāma syād ity aniṣṭir eveyam.

'on te ming don dang lhan cig skyed pa yin te/ skye ba la sogs pa bzhin no zhes bya bar 'dod na ni de lta na don 'das pa dang ma 'ongs pa'i ming da lta ba yin par mi 'gyur ro// pha rnams kyis bu dag gi ming dga' mgur 'dogs na ming gang zhig de dang lhan cig skyes pa yin par 'gyur/ chos 'dus ma byas pa rnams kyi ming yang gang dang lhan cig skyes pa yin par 'gyur/ de lta bas na 'di (ku85b) nyid mi 'dod pa nyid do.[460]

又若有執, 名如生等與義俱生, 現在世名目去來義不應得有. 又父母等隨意所欲立子等名, 云何可言名如生等與義俱起. 又無為法應無有名, 無生義故而不應許.[461]

復次若汝許, 名與義必俱相應, 猶如生等, 此中過去未來義現世名不應有. 云何父隨意立子名? 云何名與無為法俱起? 是故, 此執不成正術.[462]

[Tattvārthā, D4421.tho255b4ff; P5875.to295a2ff]

[The phrase] "rather if the name would be accepted as arising [simultaneously with] the object-referent", and so on: In this [explanation], [the Vaibhāṣikas] would think that there is no error because no activity of speech [is stated].[463] [The Vaibhāṣikas would think that this explanation

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[460] D4090.ku85aff.

[461] AKBh_X, T1558.29.29b20ff.

[462] AKBh_P, T1559.29.187c19ff.

[463] The Vyākhyā, 185.15ff explains in the following way. "Then, thinking that there is not any wrong consequence of speech like the name is made arise or made visible by speech if the name is conceptualized as arising simultaneously with the object-referent, [the Vaibhāṣika] conceptualizes this another [form of] appearance [of the name]" (*atha sahaje nāmni kalpyamāne vācotpadyaṃ prakāśyaṃ vā nāmety evamādi-ghoṣaprasaṅgo na bhaviṣyatīti matvā prakāśāntaram idaṃ vikalpyate*).

supports their argument,] because one cognizes the existence of an activity [of sounds] which does not manifests [a name] from [the cognition of sounds] manifesting a name. Some explain in detail as follows: the speech arises with regard to the name. If [a speech] does not manifest [a name], it is not accepted as a word.

'on te ming don dang lhan cig skyes pa yin te zhes bya ba la sogs pa rgya cher 'byung ba la/ de la ngag gi bya ba med pa'i phyir skyon med do snyam du bsams pa'o// de ltar yang ming mngon par gsal ba nyid las mngon par mi gsal ba'i bya ba yod pa gzung ba'i phyir ro// gzhan du na ngag ming la 'jug ces pa 'gal te mngon par mi gsal ba ni tshig tu mi 'thad do zhes rgya cher bshad do.

[The phrase in the AKBh:] "in this case, there would be no [name] arising together with the past and future object-referent", and so on: Just as the past and future beings who were and will be born, living, aging, ceasing, and reborn are not the present [beings], the name [which arises together with the past and future object-referent] is also not the present [name which arises together with the present object-referent]. Therefore, the expressions of the past [object-referent] and [the expressions of] the future [object-referents] are totally different.

de lta na don 'das pa dang ma 'ongs pa'i zhes bya ba rgyas par 'byung ba la/ ji ltar 'das pa dang ma 'ongs pa'i skye ba dang/ gnas pa dang/ rga ba dang/ mi rtag pa nyid dang/ skye ba'i skye ba la sogs pa rnams da ltar ba ma yin pa de bzhin du ming yang da ltar ba yin par mi 'gyur ro// de'i phyir 'das pa dang ma 'ongs pa'i tha snyad kun tu 'chad par 'gyur ro.

Therefore, the past and future name cannot manifest the [present] object-referent (*'das pa dang ma 'ongs pa'i ming gis ni don brjod par mi nus te*, cf. Vyākhyā: *na hy atītānāgataṃ nāmārthaṃ dyotayitum arhati*), just as speech [cannot manifest the name].[464] The past and future speech

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[464] Vyākhyā, 185.13ff: "Just as the characteristics such as caste, and so on, are accepted as arising [simultaneously] with the object-referent, the present [characteristics] are not those of the past and future object-referent [but those of the present object]. If the 'name' is accepted in this way, the 'name' would be not that of the past and future object-referent [but that of the present object]. Therefore, the expression about the past and future object-referent cannot be done [by the 'name']. Indeed, the past and future 'name' cannot illuminate the object-referent, just as the past and future speech cannot make

cannot make the name visible (*'das pa dang ma 'ongs pa'i ngag gis ni ming gsal bar bya bar mi nus te*; cf. Vyākhyā: *yathātītānāgatā vāṅ nāma notpādayituṃ vyañjayituṃ cārhati*), because they have already ceased or do not arise yet.

'di ltar 'das pa dang ma 'ongs pa'i ming gis ni don brjod par mi nus te ngag bzhin no// 'das pa dang ma 'ongs pa'i ngag gis ni ming gsal bar bya bar mi nus te/ go rims (D 256a) bzhin 'gags zin pa'i phyir dang ma skyes pa'i phyir ro.

[The phrase] "by the parents, the names of children [are composed]" and so on: a single name arises together with a [child who is born], just as [the child is born with a single] caste (*jāti*), and so on. [The child] does not have many [names] because there is no establishment [between the name and the child if a child has many names]. Therefore, here, it is asked as follows: "which name could arise [simultaneously] together with the [object-referent]? Moreover, [with which] of the unconditioned factor [the 'name' arises simultaneously]?" Names [also] indicates the unconditioned factors. [Therefore, the explanation of the Sarvāstivādins could lead into a problem] because the unconditioned factors do not arise.

pha rnams kyi bu dag gis zhes bya ba la/ gcig gi[465] ming ni skye ba la sogs pa bzhin du gcig kho na[466] lhan cig skye'i/ rnam par gzhag pa med pa'i phyir du ma ni ma yin pas/ 'dir **ming gang gis de dang lhan cig skyes par brjod par bya/ chos 'dus ma byas kyi** zhes bya ba la/ ming ni mi skye ba'i chos can kho nar 'gyur te/ 'dus ma byas rnams mi skye ba'i phyir ro.

'name' arise and appear. Moreover, the simultaneously arising 'name' is not decided among many 'names'". (*yathā jātyādīni lakṣaṇāni arthasahajāny eveṣyante nātītānāgatasyārthasya vartamānāni bhavanti. etam eva yadi nāmeṣyate. atītānāgatasyārthasya vartamānaṃ nāma na syāt, tataś cātītānāgatārthavyavahāro na śakyeta kartuṃ. na hy atītānāgataṃ nāmārthaṃ dyotayitum arhati, yathātītānāgatā vāṅ nāma notpādayituṃ vyañjayituṃ cārhati. nāmabahutve ca na sahajaṃ nāma paricchidyeta*).

[465] gi D, P.

[466] khan D.

8.15   Sautrāntika cites a passage from Sūtra

[AKBh, 81:19ff]

The following has been said by the Blessed One: A verse (*gāthā*) is based on the name. The poet (*kavi*) is the basis of the verse.[467] [However, this does not mean that the name exists as the factor dissociated from mind.][468] A sound of which limitation is done with regard to an object-referent is a name. Because the specific arrangement of the names is a verse, [the verse] is based on the name. And the specific arrangement [of names] is not accepted as a different real entity [from the sounds]. It is like a chain [of ants] and the series of the mental moments.

yad apy uktaṃ bhagavatā "nāmasaṃniśritā gāthā gāthānāṃ kavir āśrayaḥ, iti. atrārtheṣu kṛtāvadhiḥ śabdo nāma. nāmnāṃ ca racanāviśeṣo gātheti nāmasaṃniśritā bhavati. racanāviśeṣaś ca dravyāntaraṃ nopapadyate, paṅktivac cittānupūrvyavac ca.

gang yang bcom ldan 'das kyis// tshigs bcad ming la brten pa ste// tshigs bcad gzhi   ni snyan dngags mkhan// zhes gsungs pa der yang don rnams la mtshams bcad pa'i sgra ni ming yin la/ ming rnams bkod pa'i khyad par yang tshigs su bcad pa yin pas ming la brten pa yin no// bkod pa'i khyad par yang rdzas gzhan du mi 'thad de phreng ba lta bu dang sems kyi rim pa bzhin no.[469]

然世尊說： 頌依於名及文生者． 此於諸義共立分量聲， 即是名． 此名安布差別為頌. 由如是義, 說頌依名. 此頌是名, 安布差別執有實物, 不應正理, 如樹等行及心次第.[470]

佛世尊所說： 依名伽他成， 工製造伽他． 此中於義所立定法音聲， 稱名． 別莊飾諸名稱伽他. 此莊飾即依名. 莊飾是製置差別無有別物, 譬如物行及心次第.[471]

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[467] This verse is also used in the *Jñānaprasthāna*. See chapter 4.4.

[468] In the following commentaries, Sthiramati explains that the Sarvāstivādins cite this passage in order to show the scriptural evidence to prove the real existence of the name.

[469] D4090.ku85b.

[470] AKBh_X, T1558.29.29b24ff.

[471] AKBh_P, T1559.29.187c22ff.

[Tattvārthā, D4421.tho256a2ff; P5875.to295a7ff]

[The phrase in the AKBh] "A verse is based on name": In this context, this is the [scriptural] source (*khungs*) to insist that the name, which belongs to [factors] dissociated [from mind], exists [as the real entity], because there is a wrong consequence that the verse (*tshigs su bcad pa, *gāthā*) does not exist if the name does not exist. That which depends on [a basis], [that is, the verse,] cannot exist without the existence of the basis, [that is, the name].

tshigs bcad ming la brten pa ste/ zhes bya ba la/ 'dir ldan pa ma yin pa'i ming yod de zhes bya ba'i khungs ni 'di yin te/ de med na tshigs su bcad pa med par thal ba'i phyir ro// rten med par ni brten pa yod par bya bar mi nus so.

It is true that the verse is based on the name. However, in this context, it is not admitted (*zhal gyis ma bzhes te*) that the name is [the real entity, that is,] the factor dissociated from mind.[472] Then how? "A sound of which the limitation is made with regard to an object-referent is a name, and the specific arrangement of the names is a verse". Therefore, the cause of manifestation of names (*ming brjod par byed pa*), [that is,] the arranged [sounds] (*bkod pa*), which are attained to be called a verse because of such an arrangement (*ji ltar bkod pa*), is the verse. Because it should be known that not all the [arrangements of sounds are called verse], it is stated that a specific arrangement [of sounds is called a verse].

(P295b) tshigs su bcad pa ming la brten pa bden mod kyi/ der[473] mi{ng} ldan pa ma yin pa ni zhal gyis ma bzhes te/ 'o na ci zhe na/ **don rnams la mtsams byas pa'i sgra ni ming yin la/ ming rnams bkod pa'i khyad par yang tshigs su bcad pa yin pas/** ming brjod[474] par byed pa ji ltar bkod pa rnams kyis tshigs su bcad pa zhes bya ba thob pa'i bkod pa de tshigs su bcad pa yin gyi thams cad ni ma yin no zhes shes par bya ba'i phyir bkod pa'i khyad par zhes bya ba smos so.

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[472] The Tibetan expression "*zhal gyis bzhes pa*" can be used as the translation of the Sanskrit "*upagamana*" or "*abhyupapanna*". See Negi (2003) vol.12, 5140.

[473] de dang D; der P.

[474] rjod D.

Because the past and future sounds do not exist [in the present moment], it is not suitable to say that [the verse] is a real entity (*dngos po*) being based on all [of sounds, that is, the past, the present, and the future sound]. Therefore, by this reason, "the specific arrangement [of the names] is not accepted as a different real entity".

'das pa dang ma 'ongs pa'i sgra rnams med pa'i phyir thams cad la brten pa'i dngos por mi rigs pas de nyid kyi phyir/ **bkod pa'i khyad par yang rdzas gzhan du mi 'thad do** zhes smos so//

What is [the verse] like? It is like a "chain". A chain [of trees, birds, ants, and so on] is not accepted as a different real entity which is separated from the successive staying of trees, birds, ants, and so on, because it is not cognized without perceiving the collection [of individual trees, and so on]. Likewise, this example (*dpe*) is similar [to the relationship between a verse and sounds], because one attains a chain from the specific arrangement of the present trees, and so on. Therefore, it is [also] like the series of mental moment.

ji ltar zhe na **phreng ba bzhin** no// ji ltar phreng ba ni shing ljon pa dang/ 'dab chags dang/ grog ma la sogs pa rnams phan tshun nye ba na gnas pa las ma gtogs pa'i rdzas gzhan du mi 'thad de/ dpungs pa[475] bzhin du de ma gzung na de'i blo med pa'i phyir ro// de lta na yang dpe ni mtshungs te/ shing ljon pa la sogs pa da ltar ba rnams kho na'i bkod pa'i khyad par las phreng du snyed pa'i phyir ro zhe na/ de'i phyir **sems kyi rim pa lta bu'o** zhes smos te.

There is not another succession [of the mind], which is separated from [the moments] of the mind and the mental factors ceasing and arising continuously in the past, the future, and the present. Likewise, there is no specific arrangement [of sounds, that is, a verse], which is separated from the sounds ceasing and arising continuously in the past, the future, and the present. Therefore, it is not contradictory to say that, like the mind, the past and the future sounds also have the own-being to be the bases of the specific arrangement.

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[475] dpung ba D.

ji ltar sems dang sems las byung ba dus snga phyir byung ba rnams la bar med par 'gag pa dang/ skye ba las ma gtogs pa'i rim pa gzhan yod pa ma yin pa de bzhin du sgra snga phyir byung ba rnams la yang bar mtshams med par 'gag pa dang/ skye ba (D 256b) las ma gtogs pa'i bkod pa'i khyad par mi dmigs so// de'i phyir 'das pa dang ma 'ongs pa'i sgra rnams kyang sems ltar bkod pa'i khyad par gyi rten gyi ngo bor mi 'gal lo.

8.16   It is useless to admit the existence of phonemes

[AKBh, 81:22ff]

Or, let the following conceptualization be true: Only phonemes exist as real entities separated from [sounds]. [Then,] only their collection will be the name set, and so on. Therefore, this conceptualization is useless.

astu vā vyañjanamātrasya dravyāntarabhāvaparikalpanā. tatsamūhā eva nāmakāyādayo bhaviṣyantīty apārthikā tatprajñaptiḥ.[476]

yi ge tsam zhig rdzas gzhan gyi dngos por yongs su rtog pa yin du chug na yang de'i tshogs kho na ming gi tshogs la sogs pa yin par 'gyur bas de dag tu rtog don med pa yin no.[477]

或唯應執別有文體. 即總集此為名等身. 更執有餘便為無用.[478]

復次唯於字中分別有別物.[479] 是字等總集說為名聚句聚字聚. 此但假說無有正用.[480]

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[476] The Vyākhyā (185.29) and the Tibetan version use *praklṛptiḥ* (*yongs su rtog pa*) instead of *prajñaptiḥ*.

[477] D4090.ku85b.

[478] AKBh_X, T1558.29.29b28ff.

[479] 唯【大】; 惟【明】.

[480] AKBh_P, T1559.29.187c27ff.

[Tattvārthā, D4421.tho256b1ff; P5875.to295b7ff]

[The phrase in the AKBh] "Only phonemes" and so on: One would think that [this assumption could be accepted] because this would be a small error. However, there are no phonemes which are distinguished from speech because they are not apprehended [without speech]. [The phrase in the AKBh] "This conceptualization is useless": It is useless to conceptualize that there are phonemes different from the name and the phrase.

yi ge tsam zhig zhes bya ba la/ nyes pa chung ba'i phyir ro snyam du bsams pa yin gyi/ nges par ma zin pa'i phyir ngag las khyad par 'phags pa'i yi ge yod pa ni ma yin no// **de dag tu rtogs pa don med pa yin na** zhes bya ba la/ yi ge dag las ming dang tshig tha dad par yongs su rtogs pa don med do.

The master (*ācārya*) Saṃghabhadra states [as follows:] "Because one does not perceive phonemes simultaneously, [that is, in a moment], because [phonemes] are momentary, and because the collection [of phonemes in a moment] is not accepted, the phoneme set is not the name set, and so on. The phonemes are perceived orderly and individually. Because of this [perception], one cognizes (*shes pa*) them through memorizing all the [phonemes] in the unconfused order and as a single unit. By this reason, those [phonemes] which are established as having the own-being to be the object of cognition should be explained as set. Therefore, there is no error with regard to this [explanation].

slob dpon 'dus bzang na re/ yi ge rnams cig car 'dzin pa med pa'i phyir dang skad cig ma nyid yin pa'i phyir dang tshogs pa mi 'thad pa'i phyir yi ge rnams tshogs pa ming gi tshogs la sogs pa ma yin no zhes zer ro// yi ge rnams ni rim gyis so so so sor dmigs pa de'i stobs kyis mtha' dag ma 'dres pa'i rim pas gcig tu dran pa'i shes pas shes pa'i yul gyi ngo bor bzhag pa tshogs su bstan par byas pas na 'di la skyon med do.

You also accept the phoneme set and explain as follows: Being based on the collection of this and that appearance [of beings] called tree, a shadow arises. It is not the case that this [shadow] is not appropriated (*nyer len*, **upādāna*) [by the trees], and it is also not the case that [this shadow] is separated from [trees]. When the collection of those phonemes is realized (*mgnon*

par mtshon pa), at that moment (*re zhig*), they arise as the set of name and phrase. It is not stated (*brjod pa*) that they are not different things.

khyed kyang yi ge'i tshogs 'dod pa nyid de/ 'di ltar bshad pa/ shing zhes bya ba 'byung ba dang 'byung ba las gyur pa'i tshogs pa la brten nas grib mar 'gyur te/ 'di nyer len med pa ma yin zhing tha dad par mi 'gyur ro// yi ge de'i tshogs pa mngon par mtshon pa ni re zhig ming dang tshig gi tshogs su 'gyur te/ don gzhan nyid ma yin par brjod pa ma yin no.

Therefore, the Blessed One also said as follows: "Because phonemes are not collected [in a moment], those which are the realization of the collection of phonemes arise as the set of name and phrase".[481] Because they are similar [but not same], they should not be explained as the same one. How can we [definitely] establish all of them, [that is, the three factors] as existing only as expression (*prajñapti*) or as real entities (*dravya*)? There are even names having a single phoneme. A single real entity which appropriated [things] do not arises as this and that specific entities existing as expression. [That is, if it is possible that some names have a single phoneme, and if phonemes are accepted as real entities, names are also accepted as real entities]. A real entity appropriates [names] due to the continuity of collection [of the real entities]. It does not arise only in a specific occasion.

(D256b5ff; P296a4ff) de'i phyir bcom ldan 'das kyis kyang yi ge tshogs pa med pa'i phyir yi ge'i tshogs pa mngon par[482] mtshon pa dag ming dang tshig gi tshogs dag tu 'gyur zhes gsungs so// mtshungs pa'i phyir gcig tu brjod par mi bya ste/ thams cad btags pa kho nar yod pa dang rdzas nyid du rnam par gzhag par yang ci ltar nus/ yi ge gcig pa'i ming yang yod do// nye bar len[483] pa'i rdzas gcig ni btags par yod pa dang yod pa'i khyad par yang ma yin no// rdzas gcig nyid tshogs pa'i rgyun gyis nye bar len pa yin te/ 'di gnas skabs kyi khyad par la yod pa ma yin no.

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[481] Unfortunately, I could not find the scripture which has this passage.

[482] par omit. P.

[483] lan D.

In this context, how does one cognize the name which is a different being from the phoneme? Those which have been explained, [that is, phonemes and names] should be considered (*bi bh'a bya*, *vibhāvya*) as being not different because of their similarity, just like the colours of walls (*rtsig pa*, **kuḍya*) and the sun (*nyi ma*) [should be considered as same]. One perceives the colours of wall and the sun respectively. One perceives the colours of walls as blue, yellow, and red, and [considers them] as being different from the [colours from] the sun. Because of this, one says that [their] colours are different. This arises due to proliferation.

de la ci ltar yi ge las don gzhan du gyur pa'i ming rtogs par byed/ gang bshad pa mtshungs par ldan pa nyid kyi phyir tha dad pa ma yin pa'i bi bh'a bya ste rtsig pa dang nyi ma'i gzugs bzhin zhes bya ste/ rtsig pa dang nyi ma'i (D 257a) gzugs dag ni so so so sor dmigs te/ 'di yang sngon po dang ser po dang dmar po dang rtsig pa'i gzugs la nyi ma tha dad du nye bar dmigs te de nyid kyi phyir kha dog tha dad pa'o zhes bya ba ste spros pas chog go.

8.17 Sarvāstivādin explains that it cannot be understood by logic that the factors dissociated [from mind] like the name set, and so on, exist as real entities

[AKBh, 81:23ff]

The Vaibhāṣikas say as follows: However, the name set, and so on, which are of the nature being the factor dissociated from mind, exist as real entities. Not all the factors are understood through reasoning (*tarka*).

santy eva tu viprayuktasaṃskārasvabhāvā nāmakāyādayo dravyata iti vaibhāṣikāḥ. na hi sarve dharmās tarkagamyā bhavantīti.

bye brag tu smra ba rnams na re chos thams cad rtog ge'i spyod yul ma yin pas ldan pa yang ma yin pa'i 'du byed kyi rang bzhin ming gi tshogs la sogs pa ni rdzas su yod pa kho na'o zhes zer ro.[484]

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[484] D4090.ku85b.

毘婆沙師說：　　有別物為名等身，　　心不相應行蘊所攝，　　實而非假．　　所以者何？
非一切法皆是尋思所能了故．[485]

毘婆沙師說：　　　　實有不相應行為性，　　　　謂名句字聚．　　　　何以故？
非一切法皆是覺觀思惟所能通達．[486]

[Tattvārthā, D4421.tho257a; P5875.to296b]

Some [Vaibhāṣika masters say] "not all the factors are understood through reasoning". Like this, [some factors] are established by means of the means of knowledge of the believable scripture (*yid ches pa'i lung gi tshad ma*, **āptāgamapramāṇa*). There are some factors which are the object of the insight of the Tathāgata.[487]

gzhan yang **chos thams cad rtog ge'i spyod yul ma yin pas** zhes bya ba la/ de ltar yid ches pa'i lung gi tshad ma las grub pa yin te/ chos kha cig de bzhin gshegs pa'i ye shes kyi spyod yul kho na yin pa yang yod do.

8.18 Sarvāstivādin explains the name set, etc., as follows. They belong to the realm of desire and the material realm. They belong to beings. They are homogenous [with cause]. They are neutral.

[AKBh, 82:01ff]

The following should be answered: [To which realm] do the name set, and so on, belong? Do they belong to [ordinary] beings or belong to divine beings? Do they arise after maturation, do they arise from accumulation, or are they homogenous [with cause]? Are they good, bad, or neutral? [The Vaibhāṣikas] answer: They belong to [the realm] of desire and matter (*kāmarūpāpta*). They belong to [ordinary] being (*sattvākhya*). They are homogenous [with cause] (*niḥṣyanda*). They are neutral (*avyākṛta*). They belong to [the realm] of desire and matter.

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[485] AKBh$_X$, T1558.29.29b29ff.

[486] AKBh$_P$, T1559.29.187c29ff.

[487] Vyākhyā, 185:31ff: "Those which belong to the object of the insight of the Tathāgata are not understood through reasoning" (*ye hi tathāgatajñānagocarapatitā eva, na te tarkagamyāḥ*).

Some say that they also belong to the immaterial [realm] but they are not expressible [in the immaterial realm]. They belong to the [ordinary] beings. One who illuminates [object-referent] is accompanied by them. That which is illuminated, [that is, the object-referent,] is not [accompanied by them]. They are homogenous [with cause]. They are not obscured. They are neutral.

atha kiṃ pratisaṃyuktā ete nāmakāyādayaḥ sattvākhyā asattvākhyā vipākajā aupacayikā naiḥṣyandikāḥ kuśalā akuśalā avyākṛtā iti vaktavyam. āha, **kāmarūpāptasattvākhyā niḥṣyandāvyākṛtāḥ** (2-47cd). kāmāptā rūpāptāś ceti, ārupyāptā api santi te tv anabhilāpyā ity apare. sattvākhyā ete, yaś ca dyotayati sa taiḥ samanvāgato na yo dyotyate. naiḥṣyandikā anivṛtāvyākṛtāś ca.

yang ci ming gi tshogs la sogs pa 'di dag ldan pa 'am/ sems can du ston pa 'am/ sems can du ston pa ma yin pa 'am/ rnam par smin pa las skyes pa 'am/ rgyas pa las 'byung ba 'am/ rgyu mthun pa las byung ba 'am/ dge ba 'am/ mi dge ba 'am/ lung du ma bstan pa dag cig ces brjod par bya zhe na/ smras pa/ 'dod dang gzugs gtogs sems can ston// rgyu mthun las byung lung bstan min// 'di dag ni 'dod par gtogs pa dang/ gzugs su gtogs pa dag yin no// gzhan dag na re gzugs med par gtogs ba yang yod mod kyi de dag ni brjod par bya ba ma yin no zhes zer ro// de dag ni sems can du ston pa yin no// gang zhig rjod par byed pa de dag dang ldan gyi brjod par bya ba gang yin pa dang ni ma yin no// rgyu mthun pa las byung ba dang/ ma bsgribs la lung du ma bstan pa dag yin no.[488]

此名身等何界所繫? 為是有情數? 為非有情數? 為是異熟生? 為是所長養? 為是等流性? 為善? 為不善? 為無記? 此皆應辯. 頌曰: 欲色有情攝, 等流無記性. 論曰: 此名身等, 唯是欲色二界所繫. 有說, 亦通無色界繫, 然不可說. 又名身等有情數攝. 能說者成, 非所顯義. 又名身等, 唯是等流. 又唯無覆, 無記性攝.[489]

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[488] D4090.ku84b.

[489] AKBh~X~, T1558.29.29c03ff.

名聚等不相應行, 於何界中相應? 為是眾生名? 為非眾生名? 為果報生? 為增長生? 為等流生? 為善? 為惡? 為無記? 此問應答. 偈曰: 欲色眾生數, 等流無記爾. 釋曰: 名等有欲界相應, 有色界相應. 亦有說於無色界相應, 此不可言說, 但思惟依止. 此名等即眾生名. 若人能顯此, 此人與其相應, 非所顯義. 此名但等流果. 是無覆無記.[490]

[Tattvārthā, D4421.tho257aff; P5875.to296bff]

Because they wish to state the explanation about to which specific kind [the "name set", and so on, belong], the following is asked: "to which do the name set, and so on, belong", and so on. "To which [do they] belong to" means to which realm [they] belong. "They belong to [the realm of] desire and the material [realm]", but do not belong to the immaterial [realm], because there is no speech in that [immaterial realm].

rnam pa'i bye brag bshad pa brjod par 'dod pas dri ba byed pa ni/ **yang ci ming gi tshogs la sogs pa 'di dag gang dang ldan pa'am** zhes bya ba rgya cher 'byung ba'o// **gang dang ldan** zhes bya ba ni khams gang dang ldan zhes bya ba'o// **'dod pa dang gzugs su gtogs pa kho na yin gyi**/ gzugs med par gtogs pa ni ma yin te/ de na ngag med pa'i phyir ro.

[The phrase in the AKBh] "some say that they also belong to the immaterial [realm] but they [in the immaterial realm] are not expressible", and so on: The speech belonging to a different realm, [that is, the realm of desire or the material realm,] cannot manifest the name set, and so on, belonging to the [immaterial] realm different [from the realm of speech]. Because there is no speech, [that is, there is no audible matter,] in the immaterial [relam], they cannot be manifested [by speech].

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[490] AKBh_P, T1559.29.188a02ff.

gzhan dag na re gzugs med par gtogs pa yang yod mod kyi de dag ni brjod par bya ba ma yin no zhes zer ro zhes bya ba la/ gzhan gyi sa pa'i[491] ngag gis sa gzhan gyi ming gi[492] tshogs la sogs pa dag brjod pa ni ma yin la gzugs med pa dag na ngag med pas brjod par bya ba ma yin no.

Some say as follows: Even with regard to the material realm, [the name set, and so on] exist in the first absorption (*bsam gtan *dhyāna*), in the second absorption, and [the higher absorptions]. Other say as follows: [The name set, and so on,] exist even in the second absorption, and [the higher absorptions], but they cannot be manifested [in those absorptions].

gzugs kyi khams su yang bsam gtan dang po dang gnyis pa la sogs pa rnams su'o zhes kha cig zer ro// gnyis pa la sogs pa rnams su yod kyang brjod par bya ba ni ma yin no zhes gzhan dag go.

On whatever stage (*sa*, *bhūmi*), there are speech and name which belong to that stage. What is activating on the realm of desire is the speech and the expression (*brjod pa*) which are activating on the realm of desire. They arise as the speech, the name, the "person" (*gang zag*, *pudgala*), and the object-referent, which belong to each stage. However, there are not those which belong to the third realm, [that is, the immaterial realm].

sa gang yin pa de'i sa pa'i ngag dang ming ngo zhes bya ste/ 'dod pa na spyod pa ni 'dod pa na spyod pa'i ngag dang brjod pa ste/ rang gi sa pa'i ngag dang ming dang gang zag dang don du 'gyur gyi/ khams gsum pa'i ldan pa ma yin no.

Likewise, the speech and the expression belonging to the first absorption [arise as] the speech, the name, and the object-referent which belong to the first absorption. [The "person" does not

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491 gzhan gyis pa′i D.

492 gis P.

arise in the first absorption]. Other say as follows: as before, this should be applied to those which arise in the first absorption. The "person" in whatever stage has the name in the same stage. They arise as the name, the "person", and the speech which belong to each stage [of the absorption]. That which arises in each stage [of the absorption] does not [belong to] other stages.

de bzhin du bsam gtan dang po'i sa pa'i ngag dang brjod pa ni bsam gtan dang po'i sa pa'i ngag dang ming dang don no/ snga ma kho na ltar bsam gtan dang por skyes pa la yang sbyar te/ gang zag sa gang gi yin pa de'i sa pa'i ming ngo zhes gzhan dag zer ro// de dag rang gi sa'i ming dang gang zag dang ngag tu 'gyur ro// rang gi sar 'gyur ba ni gzhan gyi[493] (P 297a) sa[494] ma yin pa'i don to.

As said before, the name set, and so on, cannot be manifested in the immaterial realm, because those which arise in that [realm] have no speech.

snga ma kho na ltar ming gi tshogs la sogs pa rnams gzugs med pa'i khams su brjod par bya ba ma yin te/ der (D 257b) skyes pa rnams la ngag med pa'i phyir ro.

[The phrase in the AKBh] "they, [that is, the "name set", the "phrase set", and the "phoneme set",] belong to the [ordinary] beings" (sattvākhyā ete): It is because they are not accompanied by those who do not belong to the [ordinary] beings, that is, those who do not attain two kinds of cessation.

de dag ni sems can du bgrang ba yin te/ 'gog pa gnyis ma gtogs pa'i sems can du bgrang ba ma yin pa dang ldan pa med pa'i phyir ro.

[The phrase in the AKBh] "the one who illuminates [the object-referent] is accompanied by them", [that is, the name set, the phrase set, and the "phoneme set]: Why (gang las) is there the

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[493] gyis D.

[494] omit D.

suspicion (*dogs pa*) to think if that which is illuminated, that is, the object-referent, is accompanied by them? It is because of the expression "this name has meaning" (*ming 'di ni don gyi yin no*).

gang rjod par byed pa de dag dang ldan gyi zhes bya ba la/ gang brjod par bya ba de dag dang ldan par 'gyur ro snyam pa'i dogs pa[495] 'di gang las she na/ ming 'di ni don gyi yin no zhes tha snyad 'dogs pa las so.

The sense-faculty of seeing (*mig gi dbang po*, **cakṣurindriya*) [belongs to] the one who sees [the object-referent] but not that which is seen. Likewise, here when there is one who illuminates [the object-referent], [the object-referent] is expressed by them, [that is, the name set, the phrase set, and the phoneme set] which are accompanied by [the speaker].[496]

ji ltar mig[497] gi dbang po lta ba po kho na yin gyi/ blta bar bya ba ma yin pa de bzhin du 'dir yang gang gi tshe mi[498] rjod par byed pa de'i tshe gang dag dang ldan pa de dag kho nas brjod par bya'o.

Because they arise from the homogeneous cause (*skal ba mnyam pa *sabhāga*), [it is said as follows:] "they, [that is, the name set, and so on,] are homogenous [with cause]". They do not

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arise from accumulation (*rgyas pa las byung ba*, **aupacayikā*), because they are not the composition of the atoms (*rdul phra rab*, **paramāṇu*). They also do not arise after maturation (*rnam par smin pa las skyes pa*, *vipākajā*), because they arise from the desire [of the speaker] (*'dod dgur*, **icchā*). The Blessed One said as follows: "Because it is the dominant result (*bdag po'i 'bras bu*, **adhipatiphala*) of the deed (*las*, **karman*), the name also arises from the deed".[499]

skal ba mnyam pa'i rgyus bskyed pa'i phyir/ **rgyu mthun pa las byung ba** kho na yin gyi/ rgyas pa las byung ba ma yin te rdul phra rab bsags pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro// rnam par smin pa las skyes pa yang ma yin te/ 'dod dgur 'byung ba'i phyir ro// bcom ldan 'das kyis ni las kyi bdag po'i 'bras bu yin pa'i phyir ming yang las las skyes par smra'o zhes gsungs so.

[The phrase in the AKBh] "they are also not obscured but neutral". Because of this, those whose wholesome roots are eradicated (*dge ba'i rtsa ba kun tu chad pa*, **samucchinakuśalamūla*) are accompanied not by merits but only by the name,[500] [even] when [the expression of] the wholesome factors are manifested.[501] Likewise, it should be explained that one who is liberated from desire [is not accompanied by the evils] [even] when [the expression of] the unwholesome factors are manifested.

ma bsgribs la lung du ma bstan pa dag kyang yin te/ de nyid kyi phyir dge ba'i rtsa ba kun tu chad pa chos dge ba rnams brjod pa na dge ba rnams dang mi ldan la/ de dag gi ming dang ni ldan pa yin no// de bzhin du 'dod chags dang bral ba chos mi dge ba dag brjod pa na zhes bya ba brjod par bya'o//

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[499] Unfortunately, I could not find the scripture which has this passage.

[500] On the term *samucchinakuśalamūla*, see also The Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism, 759.

[501] On the practice of the wholesome factors (*dge ba'i chos*), see also Ahn 2003, 135 and 330 ("heisame Faktoren").

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AKBh   *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (Vasubandhu), ed. by Prahlad Pradhan, Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1967.

Tibetan translation of Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (D4090).

AKBh$_P$ Paramārtha's (Zhendi 眞諦) Chinese version of AKBh (T1559).

AKBh$_X$ Xuanzang's (玄奘) Chinese version of AKBh (T1558).

AN   *Aṅguttaranikaya*, London: PTS.

vol. I = *Ekanipata*, *Dukanipata*, *Tikanipata*. ed. by Richard Morris. 1885

vol. II = *Catukkanipata*. Edited by R. Morris. 1888.

vol. III = *Pancakanipata*. Edited by E. Hardy. 1897.

Apidamo jiyimen zulun 阿毘達磨集異門足論 (T1536).

Apidamo pinlei zu lun 阿毘達磨品類足論 (T1542).

Apidamo da piposha lun 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (T1545)

Apitan piposha lun 阿毘曇毘婆沙論 (T1546).

Apitan wufaxing jing 阿毘曇五法行經 (T1557)

Apitan xinlun 阿毘曇心論 (T1550).

Apitan xinlun jing 阿毘曇心論經 (T1551).

AS   *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, reconstructed by Prahald Pradhan, Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati, 1950.

AS$_G$ "Fragments of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* of Asaṅga", ed. by Vasudea Vishwanath Gokhale, *Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, vol. 23, 1947.

AS$_T$ Tibetan translation of *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, D4049.

ASBh   *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* (Buddhasiṃha or Jinaputra), ed. by Nathmal Tatia, Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1976.

Tibetan translation of *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* (D4053).

Chinese translation of *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* (*Dasheng apidamo zaji lun* 大乘阿毘達磨雜集論, T1606)

ASV   Tibetan translation of *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* (D4054).

Aṣṭ	*Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, ed. by Paraśurāma Lakṣmaṇa Vaidya, Darbhanga: Mithilāvidyāpīṭha, 1960.
	Tibetan translation of *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* (D12).
BEFEO	*Bulletin de l'École française d'Extrême-Orient.*
BHS	Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit.
BHSD	*Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary*, vol. II: Dictionary, by Franklin Edgerton, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953.
BoBh	*Bodhisattvabhūmi.*
	Tibetan translation of Bodhisattvabhūmi (D4037).
BoBh$_D$	*Bodhisattvabhūmi*, ed. by Nalinaksha Dutt, Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1966.
BoBh$_W$	*Bodhisattvabhūmi: a statement of whole course of the Bodhisattva (being fifteenth section of Yogācārabhūmi)*, ed. by Unrai Wogihara, Tokyo: Sankibo Buddhist Book Store, 1971.
BSOAS	*Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies.*
CPD	*A Critical Pāli Dictionary*, ed. by Vielhelm Trenckner, Copenhagen: Royal Danish Academy of Letters and Sciences, 1924 -.
D	Derge edition of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka.
DhP	*Dhammapada: with a complete word index*, ed. by Oskar von Hinüber and Kenneth R. Norman, Oxford: PTS, 1995.
Guang wuyun lun	*Dasheng guang wuyun lun* 大乘廣五蘊 (D1613).
IBK	*Indogaku Bukkyōgaku kenkyū (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies).*
IIBS	International Institute for Buddhist Studies.
IIJ	*Indo-Iranian Journal.*
JIABS	*Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies.*
JIP	*Journal of Indian Philosophy.*
Jñānaprashtāna	*Apitan bajiandu lun* 阿毘曇八犍度論 (T1543).
	Apidamo fazhi lun 阿毘達磨發智論 (T1544).
MPS	*Das Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra: Text in Sanskrit und Tibetisch, verglichen mit dem Pāli nebst einer. bersetzung der chinesischen Entsprechung im Vinaya der Mūlasarvāstivādins, auf Grund von Turfan-Handschriften herausgegeben und bearbeitet. Teil I–III*, ed. by Ernst Waldschmidt, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1950–1951.

MSA	*Mahāyāna-sūtrālamkāra: exposé de la doctrine du grand véhicule selon le système Yogācāra*, vol. 1, ed. by Sylvain Lévi, Paris: Librairie Honoré Champion, 1907.
	Tibetan translation of *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* (D4026).
	Chinese translation of *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* (T1604).
MSAṬ	Tibetan translation of **Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāraṭīkā* (D4029).
MW	*A Sanskrit-English dictionary: Etymologically and philologically arranged with special reference to Cognate indo-european languages*, by M. Monier-Williams, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1899.
Netti	*The Nettipakaraṇa with Extracts from Dhammapāla's Commentary*, ed. by Edmund Hardy, London: Oxford Univ. Press.
Negi	*Bod skad dang legs sbyr gyi tshig mdsod chen mo: Tibetan-Sanskrit dictionary*, vol.1-16, ed. by Jita Sain Negi, Varanasi: Dictionary Unit, Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, 1993-2005.
ÖAW	*Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften.*
P	Peking edition of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka.
PSk	*Vasubandhu's Pañcaskandhaka*, ed. by Xuezhu Li and Ernst Steinkellner, Beijing/Vienna: China Tibetology Publishing House/Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, 2008.
PSk$_T$	Tibetan translation of *Pañcaskandhaka*, D4059.
PSkBh	Tibetan translation of **Pañcaskandhabhāṣya*, D4068.
PSkV	*Sthiramati's Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* (Part 1: Critical edition, Part 2: Diplomatic edition), ed. by Jowita Kramer, Beijing/Vienna: China Tibetology Publishing House/Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, 2014.
	The Tibetan translation of the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* (D4066).
PSkViv	Tibetan translation of **Pañcaskandhavivaraṇa* (D4067).
PTS	Pāli Text Society.
PTSD	*The Pali Text Society's Pali-English dictionary*, ed. by T. W. Rhys Davids and William Stede, London: PTS,1921-1925.
PWG	*Sanskrit-Wörterbuch*, by Otto von Böhtlingk and Rudolph von Roth. St. Petersburg: Kaiserliche Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1855–1875.
r	recto.

Śarīrārthagāthā "*Śarīrārthagāthā,* A Collection of Canonical Verses in the *Yogācārabhūmi,* Part 1: Text", *Sanskrit-Texte aus dem buddhistischen Kanon. Erste Folge: Neuentdeckungen und Neueditionen*, ed. by Fumio Enomoto, Jens-Uwe Hartmann, and Hisashi Matsumura, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989, pp. 17–35.

SamBh *Saṃhāhitā Bhūmiḥ. Das Kapitel über die meditative Versenkung im Grundteil der Yogācārabhūmi* (WSTB, vol. 73), ed. by Martin Delhey, Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien.

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   vol. III, ed. by L. Feer, 1890.

   vol. IV, ed. by. L. Feer, 1894.

   vol. V, ed. by L. Feer, 1898.

ŚrBh *Śrāvakabhūmi* of *Yogācārabhūmi*.

   Tibetan translation of *Śrāvakabhūmi* (D4036)

ŚrBh_{SG} *Śrāvakabhūmi*, by ed. Śrāvakabhūmi Study Group.

   vol. I = Yogasthāna I, ed. Śrāvakabhūmi Study Group, 1998.

   vol. II = Yogasthāna II, ed. Śrāvakabhūmi Study Group, 2007.

   vol. III = Yogasthāna III, ed. Śrāvakabhūmi Study Group 2008–2013.

SWTF Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden, vol.1-29, ed. by. Ernst Waldschmidt, Heinz Bechert, etc., Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1994–2018.

T *Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō*.

Tattvārthā The Tibetan translation of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyaṭīkā Tattvārthā*, P5591; D4421.

tib. Tibetan.

Uv	*Udānavarga: Sanskrittexte aus den Turfanfunden 10*, ed. by Franz Bernhard, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1965–1968.
v	verso.
ViSg	*Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*.
	Tibetan translation of *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* (D4038).
	Juedingzang lun 決定藏論 (Paramārtha's Chinese translation, T1584).
Vyākhyā	*Sphutārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, edited by Unrai Wogihara. Reprint, Tokyo: Sankibo, 1971.
WSTB	Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde
WZKS(O)	*Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd(- und Ost)asiens*
YoBh	*Yogācārabhūmi*.
	Chinese translation of Yogācārabhūmi (*Yuqie shidi lun* 瑜伽師地論, T1579).
	Tibetan translation of Yogācārabhūmi (D4035).

Za ApitanXinlun 雜阿毘曇心論 (T1552)

ZDMG *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft.*

Zhongshifen apitan lun 眾事分阿毘曇論 (T1541).

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