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# Disorderly And Inhumane: Explaining Government-Sponsored Mass Expulsion, 1900-2020

## Abstract

Since 2015 over two million people have been expelled, en masse, around the world. Mass expulsion is a major international issue that threatens peace and security around the globe. This dissertation examines why and how governments expel ethnic groups en masse. What motivates them to implement an expulsion policy and why don't more governments do the same? By isolating policies of intentional group-based population removal—distinct from genocide, massacre, and coercive assimilation—I show that the motivations of expulsionist governments are informed by the phase of nation-building and the perceived threat of the target group. The four clusters of motivations are: fifth column, anti-colonialism, nativism, and counterinsurgency/reprisal. Since not all governments with one of the identified motivations to expel go on to remove populations en masse, I also identify important constraints on governments' strategic choices. Through four paired-comparison case studies of similarly motivated governments with different outcomes (expulsion or non-expulsion), I show that alliances, target group homeland state(s), and the international community are the key contributing factors that enable or deter mass expulsion policies. The evidence is drawn from archival research conducted at the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the League of Nations archives in Geneva, Switzerland, as well as from other primary sources, secondary historical sources, and extant datasets. This dissertation contributes to the field of ethnic conflict and exclusionary politics. It fills a gap in the literature by systematically examining mass expulsion policies that intentionally remove ethnic groups over the *longue durée*. The argument expands existing explanations beyond war and security threats to highlight an entire class of expulsions that target economic threats, which requires scholarly and international policy attention. The dissertation also deepens our understanding of critical atrocity constraints and proposes tangible policy recommendations for deterring its use.

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Brendan O'Leary

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DISORDERLY AND INHUMANE:  
EXPLAINING GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED MASS EXPULSION, 1900-2020

Meghan M. Garrity

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in

Political Science

Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania

in

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Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

2022

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DISORDERLY AND INHUMANE: EXPLAINING GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED  
MASS EXPULSION, 1900-2020

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Meghan Mary Garrity

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There are many to thank for turning what was an interest in a single “population exchange” into a manuscript about expulsions from 1900 to today. First, my dissertation committee. Brendan O’Leary was the first person I met on new student’s visiting day and our conversations about ethnic conflict, eliminationist policies, and Kurdish politics have continued ever since. I could not have asked for an advisor with a greater generosity of time, advice, endless editing, and constant availability. This dissertation is a humble attempt to build on his work on ethnic expulsions. Beth Simmons’ Borders & Boundaries class, and subsequent conference at Perry World House, gave me my first opportunity to present my expulsion data, and receive constructive criticism, both in class and from a public audience. Her incisive feedback on multiple article drafts, grant applications, and conference papers helped me to articulate my ideas more precisely. Rudy Sil’s essay-long emails, sent between 2am and 4am, consistently provided in-depth analysis and insightful comments on any question at hand. His advice on methods, cross-regional comparisons, publishing, and job applications have been a masterclass in navigating the political science profession and sound social science. Finally, a course scheduling conflict fortuitously led me to Melissa Wilde’s Comparative Historical Methods class and broadened my understanding of both the method and the interdisciplinary nature of the approach. Her mentorship on the dissertation, journal publishing, and professionalization have been invaluable. This star-studded committee leaves all deficiencies in the manuscript attributable to me alone.

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The archival research in this project was only possible thanks to the deeply knowledgeable archivists who helped me navigate the various archives and identify the documents that I needed. Heather Faulkner and Anna Haward at the UNCHR were extremely

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This project was inspired by nearly a decade of work in the humanitarian and development sectors, responding to natural and man-made disasters, and refugee movements, some not unlike those discussed in this manuscript. The resilience of the refugees and IDPs, in the face of horrific, unimaginable events, motivated me to better understand the root causes of exclusionary policies, with the aspiration of identifying constraints and informing prevention strategies. This dissertation is a rough draft of those efforts. As atrocities unfold as I write this—in Ukraine, Ethiopia, Yemen, Myanmar, among so many others—solutions are urgent as ever.



I dedicate this work to my mom, Kathy Garrity. Her unending support, encouragement, advice, and wisdom was essential in completing this project. Without her sacrifices along the way, none of this would be possible.

## ABSTRACT

### DISORDERLY AND INHUMANE: EXPLAINING GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED MASS EXPULSION, 1900-2020

Meghan M. Garrity

Brendan O'Leary

Since 2015 over two million people have been expelled, *en masse*, around the world. Mass expulsion is a major international issue that threatens peace and security around the globe. This dissertation examines why and how governments expel ethnic groups *en masse*. What motivates them to implement an expulsion policy and why don't more governments do the same? By isolating policies of intentional group-based population *removal*—distinct from genocide, massacre, and coercive assimilation—I show that the motivations of expulsionist governments are informed by the phase of nation-building and the perceived threat of the target group. The four clusters of motivations are: fifth column, anti-colonialism, nativism, and counterinsurgency/reprisal. Since not all governments with one of the identified motivations to expel go on to remove populations *en masse*, I also identify important constraints on governments' strategic choices. Through four paired-comparison case studies of similarly motivated governments with different outcomes (expulsion or non-expulsion), I show that alliances, target group homeland state(s), and the international community are the key contributing factors that enable or deter mass expulsion policies. The evidence is drawn from archival research conducted at the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the League of Nations archives in Geneva, Switzerland, as well as from other primary sources, secondary historical sources, and extant datasets. This dissertation contributes to the field of ethnic conflict and exclusionary politics.

It fills a gap in the literature by systematically examining mass expulsion policies that intentionally remove ethnic groups over the *longue durée*. The argument expands existing explanations beyond war and security threats to highlight an entire class of expulsions that target economic threats, which requires scholarly and international policy attention. The dissertation also deepens our understanding of critical atrocity constraints and proposes tangible policy recommendations for deterring its use.

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

AFP	Agence France-Presse
AMCU	Association of Mineworkers and Construction Unions (South Africa)
ANC	African National Congress (South Africa)
ANCYL	ANC Youth League (South Africa)
ARIF	Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (Burma)
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
BAC	Business Allocation Committees (Uganda)
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India, China (economic grouping)
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (economic grouping)
BSPP	Burma Socialist Programme Party
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CEAO	<i>Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest</i>
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Union
CPB	Communist Party of Burma
CSC	Citizenship Scrutiny Cards (Burma)
CUKC	Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies
CUP	Committee of Union and Progress (Ottoman Empire)
DHA	Department of Home Affairs (South Africa)
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EEF	Economic Freedom Fighters (South Africa)
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization
FBIS	Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique ( <i>Liberation Front of Mozambique</i> )
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNPP	Great Nigeria People's Party
GSME	Government-Sponsored Mass Expulsion (dataset)
ICEM	Inter-governmental Committee for European Migration
ICJ	International Commission of Jurists
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
ILO	International Labor Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organization for Migration
KADU	Kenya African Democratic Union
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KNU	Karen National Union (Burma)
KNLA	Karen National Liberation Army (Burma)
KIA	Kachin Independence Army (Burma)
KPU	Kenya People's Union
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change (Zimbabwe)
MEC	Mining and Energy Complex (South Africa)
MENA	Middle East and North Africa

MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola ( <i>Movement for the Liberation of Angola</i> )
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières ( <i>Doctors Without Borders</i> )
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NLC	National Labour Congress (Nigeria)
NLD	National League for Democracy (Burma)
NPN	National Party of Nigeria
NPP	Nigerian People's Party
NRC	National Registration Cards (Burma)
NUM	National Union of Mineworkers (South Africa)
NUP	National Unity Party (Burma)
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PRP	People's Redemption Party (Nigeria)
RENAMO	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana ( <i>Mozambican National Resistance</i> )
RIF	Rohingya Independence Front
RPF	Rohingya Patriotic Front
RSO	Rohingya Solidarity Organization
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Council
SAPS	South African Police Service
SLORC	State Law and Order Restoration Council
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organization
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNPKO	UN Peacekeeping Operations
UNSC	UN Security Council
UPN	Unity Party of Nigeria
V-Dem	Varieties of Democracy (Index)
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front

## CHAPTER 1: Introduction

### 1.1 The Problem

Between 1900 and 2020 an estimated 30-42 million people were expelled, *en masse*, around the world. Far from being simply an historical phenomenon, of that total, over two million people have been expelled just since 2015: 250,000 Haitians from the Dominican Republic (2015-2019); 100,000 Nigerian refugees from Cameroon (2015-2019); 500,000 Afghan refugees from Pakistan (2016); over 800,000 Rohingya from Burma (2016-2018); nearly 70,000 sub-Saharan Africans from Algeria (2016-2020); 330,000 Congolese diamond miners from Angola (2018); and more than 130,000 Syrian Kurds from Turkish-occupied Afrin (2018).<sup>1</sup> Mass expulsion is a major international issue that threatens peace and security around the globe. This dissertation seeks to explain why and how governments expel. What motivates them to implement expulsion policies and why don't more governments do the same? In answering these questions, the manuscript amasses all major expulsions since 1900 in a new dataset, proposes a taxonomy identifying different government motivations for mass expulsion, documents the crucial enabling and constraining conditions necessary for its implementation or impediment, and offers tangible policy recommendations for deterring the decision to expel.

Mass expulsion is a rare event, but it is a recurring rare event, prevalent across time and space. One of the earliest documented mass expulsion episodes is the Assyrian expulsion of the Israelites in the eight-century BCE.<sup>2</sup> Expulsion continued throughout the Middle Ages in Europe, mostly targeting religious groups including Jews (from Crimea (1016), England

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<sup>1</sup> Garrity, forthcoming.

<sup>2</sup> Tägil, 1990: 64; Bell-Fialkoff, 1999: 8.

(1290), France (1306), Spain (1492)) and Muslims (from Spain (1609-14)). During the wars of the Reformation specific religious denominations such as Protestant Huguenots (from France (1685)) and Catholics (from Ukraine (1648-54)) were targeted.<sup>3</sup> Later during the colonial period, settler populations including the British, Americans, Australians, and Spanish, used expulsion to remove indigenous populations.<sup>4</sup> While mass expulsion is therefore not new, this dissertation focuses on modern mass expulsions, confined to the twentieth century and beyond, following in the footsteps of scholars such as Naimark, 2001; Midlarsky, 2005; Lieberman, 2006; Mann, 2005; Ther, 2014; and Bulutgil, 2016 among others. Because one of my aims is to identify key constraints on enacting expulsions, I have excluded pre-1900 cases since modern state structures and the international system have evolved substantially in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The years after 1900 saw the culmination of the age of large-scale global empires, followed by their progressive dissolution into formal nation-states; and the international system transformed from the hegemony of the “Great Powers,” to the League of Nations, and then to the United Nations and its affiliated agencies.

While mass expulsion policies date to the BC era, they have continued and expanded in frequency and geography throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. In the 120 years examined in this manuscript, governments around the world initiated 139 mass expulsion events, at an average rate of 1.56 expulsions per year, over the last 50 years. Despite its consistent use, expulsion is motivated by different reasons and implemented in different contexts. Expulsion occurs during war, immediately after war (via post-war peace treaties), and during peacetime. While government motivations are distinct (*see Argument below*) the policy

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<sup>3</sup> Bell-Fialkoff, 1999: 14-16.

<sup>4</sup> Bell-Fialkoff, 1999: 18-21.

intent of expulsionist governments is the same—to *remove* a target group outside of its sovereign jurisdiction.

Mass expulsion is distinct from other policies of eliminating ethnic difference like genocide, massacres, or coercive assimilation, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 2. But it is also different because of its normative ambivalence among politicians and scholars. Democratic liberal leaders, alongside their authoritarian brethren, have championed and employed expulsion policies in the modern era. Influential political figures such as Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Czechoslovak President Edvard Beneš, and United States President Herbert Hoover, as well as public intellectuals such as Joseph Schechtman and Eugene Kulischer advocated for expulsion as a policy to bring about peace and end deadly wars,<sup>5</sup> an assessment some still share today.<sup>6</sup> In fact, British historian Matthew Frank documents at least nine Nobel Prize laureates that have endorsed and supported the policy of expulsion,<sup>7</sup> with the most recent addition to his list being Aung San Suu Kyi of Burma.

In the early decades of the twentieth century, particularly after the first world war, minority groups were seen as a dangerous trojan horse that sowed instability and brought insecurity. Only by reuniting them with their co-ethnics and establishing homogenous nation-states, however fanciful that idea in practice, could world peace be sustainably achieved.<sup>8</sup> In post-conflict environments, mass expulsion was often considered a viable policy, typically

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<sup>5</sup> Mazower, 2009; Frank, 2017.

<sup>6</sup> Kaufmann (1996: 156) and Bell-Fialkoff (1999: 285-86) are two such proponents.

<sup>7</sup> Frank, 2017: 17n13. Frank's list includes: Fridtjof Nansen (1922); Austen Chamberlain (1925); Robert Cecil (1937); Winston Churchill (1950); Philip Noel-Baker (1959); Henry Kissinger (1973); Menachem Begin (1978); Czesław Miłosz (1980); Yitzhak Rabin (1994). While U.S. President Herbert Hoover never won the Nobel Peace Prize, he was nominated four times (1921, 1933, 1941, 1946).

<sup>8</sup> Frank, 2017.

disguised in the more benign-sounding language of “transfer,” “exchange,” or “resettlement.” Some scholars have argued that expulsion is effective because it achieves inter-state stability through the “unmixing” of antagonistic populations.<sup>9</sup> It was not uncommon for such policies to be pursued in the first half of the twentieth century, especially in post-war peace settlements, notably at international conferences such as Lausanne in 1923 and Potsdam in 1945.

Greek statesman Eleftherios Venizelos was not the first to propose the concept of population transfer, but he was the first statesman to champion the policy, in his case as the “‘only cure’ for the Greco-Turkish minority problems” in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars.<sup>10</sup> Decades later, Edvard Beneš, president of the Czechoslovakia government in exile, wrote in *Foreign Affairs* in the midst of WWII that, “It will be necessary after this war to carry out a transfer of populations on a very much larger scale than after the last war. This must be done in as humane a manner as possible, internationally organized and internationally financed.”<sup>11</sup> Scholars like Russian Jewish demographer Eugene Kulischer also argued in favor of expulsion: “If war in Europe—in the circumstances of the twentieth century—meant world war, exporting the continent’s surplus population provided the only scientific guarantee of world peace.”<sup>12</sup> Fellow Russian demographer, Joseph Schechtman, promoted expulsion as a global strategy, useful in places beyond Europe as well, “A ‘Babel of tongues and peoples,’ even if historically created and no matter in what part of the world’s area, can and must be disentangled if threatening the peace of the world.”<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Schechtman, 1962; Bell-Fialkoff, 1996; Kaufmann, 1998.

<sup>10</sup> Frank, 2017: 32.

<sup>11</sup> Beneš, 1942: 238.

<sup>12</sup> Mazower, 1999: 114-115.

<sup>13</sup> Schechtman, 1962: 369.

Examining such policies may seem anachronistic, but support for expulsion persists in the contemporary era. During the Yugoslav wars of secession in the 1990s, Andrew Bell-Fialkoff wrote, “As I watch thousands of refugees huddling in refugee camps...I keep thinking that a timely settlement, including a timely and humane population transfer, would have averted the tragedy.”<sup>14</sup> Chaim Kaufmann agreed writing, “Refusal or failure to organize necessary transfers does not protect people against becoming refugees, but inflicts disaster on them when they do.”<sup>15</sup> More recently a potential land swap has been proposed between Kosovo and Serbia which would, de facto, involve a population exchange.<sup>16</sup> Other scholars, by contrast, argue that quite aside from human rights violations, expulsion raises more expectations than it can satisfy and that expelling states often suffer economically and politically in the aftermath of an expulsion.<sup>17</sup> Unlike genocide which is universally condemned as abhorrent, expulsion has its exponents. Polarized views on mass expulsion’s utility, justice, and effectiveness make it an important subject for social scientific examination. It requires further investigation foremost because of its deep humanitarian implications but also because of its repercussions for political stability—international and domestic.

## 1.2 Existing Explanations

The dominant narrative in the existing historical and social science literature is that war and security threats facilitate mass expulsion. Expulsion either occurs during wars to remove rival groups from strategic territory, or in the immediate aftermath of war to remove groups that

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<sup>14</sup> Bell-Fialkoff, 1999: xv.

<sup>15</sup> Kaufman, 1998: 124.

<sup>16</sup> Dragojlo & Bami, 2020.

<sup>17</sup> Peil, 1971; Addo, 1982; Henckaerts, 1995; McGarry, 1998.

were disloyal, or who are newly identified as security threats.<sup>18</sup> Many wars in the early twentieth century followed the collapse of empires and the rise of nationalism among imperial subjects, therefore, a large sub-set of the literature focuses on the desire for homogenous nation-states as a critical driver of expulsion.<sup>19</sup> Closely connected to these explanations is that elite ideology, particularly governments with exclusionary ideologies—defined as a belief system that justifies the persecution of certain ethnic groups<sup>20</sup>—are more likely to expel.<sup>21</sup> Since the creation of a nation-state is often tumultuous, some predict that expulsion should closely follow political upheaval, or occur where a previous expulsion has taken place.<sup>22</sup> In unstable situations, governments may look for scapegoats and target minorities for expulsion.<sup>23</sup>

Non-war related explanations for expulsion are present, but less common. Some argue that regime type is the critical determinant: democracies, they suggest, are less likely to expel and autocracies more likely. This claim is closely linked to the exclusionary ideologies argument, typically correlated with non-democratic regimes.<sup>24</sup> Others argue that it is not democratic or authoritarian regimes, per se, that determines expulsion but rather the process of democratization.<sup>25</sup> Rather than, or in addition to, regime type, some scholars suggest that the ethnic characteristics of leaders is key, with governments led by ethnic minorities as an important determinant of expulsion.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Valentino, 2004; Mann, 2005; Mylonas, 2012; Straus, 2015; Bulutgil, 2016, 2018; Lichtenheld, 2020.

<sup>19</sup> Zolberg, 1983; McGarry, 1998; Jackson Preece, 1998; Naimark, 2001; Walters, 2002; Bell-Fialkoff, 1999; Mann, 2005; Lieberman, 2006; Ther, 2014.

<sup>20</sup> Harff, 2003: 63.

<sup>21</sup> Fein, 1993; Marx, 2002; Harff, 2003; Straus, 2015.

<sup>22</sup> Fein, 1993; Harff, 2003.

<sup>23</sup> Naimark, 2001; Lieberman, 2006; Adida, 2014; Ther, 2014.

<sup>24</sup> Harff, 2003; Marx, 2002; Mann, 2005; Straus, 2015

<sup>25</sup> Mann, 2005: 4.

<sup>26</sup> Harff, 2003; Adida, 2014.



Another strand of the literature sees expulsion as a foreign policy instrument. Weaker governments make rational cost-benefit calculations and use the forced removal of populations to extract concessions from stronger powers.<sup>27</sup> Or that expulsion is motivated by revisionist foreign policy objectives driven by territorial losses, when the target group is supported by an enemy state.<sup>28</sup> Others, argue that expulsion, particularly expulsions in Africa, occur because of economic chauvinism: when the economic resources of the non-dominant group are seen as a usurpation of the rights and privileges of the majority.<sup>29</sup> A related economic argument is that structural features of the economy enable expulsion to occur. These features include low trade openness or economies dependent on oil or high-value minerals that may isolate governments from the effects of expulsion.<sup>30</sup>

One reason most existing explanations focus on war and territorial objectives is because many of the most prominent books and articles of comparative ethnic cleansing are largely focused on Europe.<sup>31</sup> A European focus skews our understanding of mass expulsion toward events in the first half of the twentieth century. Quantitative studies like Bulutgil's (2016), *The Roots of Ethnic Cleansing in Europe*, documented 41 cases of European ethnic cleansing during 1900-2020, of which 37 (or 90 percent) occurred in 1950 or earlier. Mylonas's (2012), *The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities*, presents a quantitative dataset of nation-building policies in the post-WWI Balkans during 1919-1923. Similarly, historical works like Naimark's (2001), *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth*

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<sup>27</sup> Weiner, 1992; Greenhill, 2010

<sup>28</sup> Mylonas, 2012: 37, 41-43.

<sup>29</sup> Mabogunje, 1972; Adepoju, 1984; Adida, 2014; Honig, 2016

<sup>30</sup> Harff, 2003: 67; Straus, 2015: 50.

<sup>31</sup> Naimark, 2001; Lieberman, 2006; Mylonas, 2012; Ther, 2014; Bulutgil, 2016.

*Century Europe*, and Ther's (2014), *The Dark Side of Nation-States: Ethnic Cleansing in Modern Europe*, include minimal in-depth case studies after 1950—mainly just the dissolution of Yugoslavia. While the quantitative studies suggest that their arguments travel to contexts beyond Europe, the empirical evidence is confined to a single region, and largely a single period—the early twentieth century—which may explain why war and security explanations predominate in the literature. There is important non-European regional variation in expulsion policies that is obfuscated by the largely Eurocentric work on mass expulsion to date.

Another issue with the existing research on “ethnic cleansing,” including work that extends beyond Europe,<sup>32</sup> is that it is mostly confined to the targeting of citizens.<sup>33</sup> This despite evidence that governments target both citizens and non-citizens for expulsion, and in some cases both simultaneously. Given that mass expulsion is an ethnically targeted policy, the citizenship status of the ethnic group may be irrelevant, or at least less relevant, to the expelling authorities. The exclusion of non-citizen expulsions in the literature also biases the findings in favor of war and security-based explanations as I will show in the data analysis in Chapter 2.

While I agree that security threats have been and are an important driver of mass expulsion, my research shows that there is a sizable class of expulsions that are motivated not by security, but rather by the desire to remove *economic* threats. Expulsions targeting groups marked as economic threats were particularly prominent beginning in the late 1950s and beyond. After colonies obtained their political independence, focus turned toward their economic freedom. There is some useful literature on economically motivated expulsions in

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<sup>32</sup> Mann, 2005; Valentino, 2004; Midlarsky, 2005; Straus, 2015.

<sup>33</sup> Adida's (2014) chapter on mass immigrant expulsion in Africa is an exception here.

Africa,<sup>34</sup> but this is not an Africa-specific phenomenon. Expulsionist governments have targeted perceived economically threatening groups in all regions of the world including in East Asia, Europe, Latin America, Middle East and North Africa, North America, and South Asia, in addition to Sub-Saharan Africa. My dataset documents 50 expulsion episodes targeting groups seen as economic threats, or 36 percent of the sample, justifying a closer look at these cases.

Most of the existing work on this topic has focused on the determinants of compulsory removal and the conditions under which governments remove ethnic groups *en masse*.<sup>35</sup> Unfortunately, this approach ignores relevant cases where governments were motivated to expel, and expulsion was probable, but where it did not occur. Many of the same factors that the literature predicts should lead to expulsion—war, territorial disputes, ethnonationalism, exclusionary ideologies, regime type, previous expulsions, economic chauvinism—are present in cases where expulsion policies are not enacted. The literature on what constrains mass expulsion is underdeveloped.

There is a relevant, albeit nascent, literature about restraints regarding the most extreme forms of demographic engineering—genocide and politicide.<sup>36</sup> These phenomena are part of the same semantic field as mass expulsion but are distinct concepts. Governments that expel intend to *remove* the target group, whereas genocidal governments aim to annihilate or destroy their targets.<sup>37</sup> We should not assume similar decision-making processes, nor similar constraints on strategic choices, for these distinct policy options. Nevertheless, given the

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<sup>34</sup> Mabogunje, 1972; Adepoju, 1984; Adida, 2014; Honig, 2016.

<sup>35</sup> Adida, 2014; Valentino, 2004; Mann, 2005; Mylonas, 2012; Bulutgil, 2016, 2018; Lichtenheld, 2020.

<sup>36</sup> Straus, 2012; 2015.

<sup>37</sup> Straus, 2001: 363; Schabas, 2000: 200; Schabas, 2005: 118; Lieberman, 2010: 45.

paucity of literature on expulsion constraints, they provide a useful starting point to investigate if the same restraints on genocide apply to expulsion.

Scott Straus (2015) argues that counternarratives, capacity, economic incentives, and external conflict-mediation forces are the key restraints on large-scale violence against civilians.<sup>38</sup> He defines counternarratives as inclusionary alternative political visions that emphasize a multiethnic polity, peace, cooperation, neighborliness, and non-violence toward antagonistic groups. Straus states that when these views are put forward by influential elites they act as a restraint on genocide. Since authoritarian states are more likely to espouse exclusionary ideologies, he argues that regime type, e.g., democracy, dovetails with this restraint. Second, weak state capacity—the ability to coordinate, identify, control, and inflict violence on the target population—is another restraint.<sup>39</sup> Without this capacity, large-scale killing is less likely. Third, Straus contends that the type of economy of the perpetrating state matters. States that are dependent on revenue from sectors “highly sensitive to violence,” such as labor-intensive industries like manufacturing or agriculture, will be restrained in their use of mass violence.<sup>40</sup> Whereas insulated sectors like oil, particularly offshore oil or mining, are less affected if the country descends into violence and therefore are less likely to restrain. His fourth, and final restraining factor, is international and regional actors. He argues that these actors impose costs on would-be perpetrators through sanctions, travel bans, threats of international criminal justice, and the imposition of peacekeeping forces.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Straus, 2015: 75.

<sup>39</sup> Straus, 2015: 76.

<sup>40</sup> Straus, 2015: 50, 77.

<sup>41</sup> Straus, 2015: 78.

In my case study chapters, I test Straus' restraining arguments to see if they hold when it comes to mass expulsion. I pair cases that share the same traits along his four dimensions. For example, Uganda (1971-1972) and Kenya (1967-1969) were both authoritarian regimes with exclusionary ideologies favoring their ethnic minority group (West Nilotics and Kikuyu respectively). Both states had the capacity to inflict violence (against the Langi & Acholi in Uganda, and the Somalis in Kenya), and had labor-intensive agricultural economies. And far from sanctioning expulsion in the late 1960s-early 1970s, international and regional actors remained silent or facilitated expulsion. Straus' key restraints were absent in both Uganda and Kenya and thus both should have been more likely to expel, yet only Uganda implemented the policy. In another test case of Straus' argument, my paired comparison of Nigeria (1979-1983) and South Africa (2008-2012), examines two countries with inclusive, multi-ethnic "founding narratives," with economies dependent on oil and minerals respectively, that Straus would argue should constrain expulsion in both cases. And while South Africa did not expel, Nigeria did, further challenging the relevance of genocide restraints for explaining mass expulsion.

Why might genocidal restraints not pertain to mass expulsion? First, given that mass expulsion policies are less resource intensive than genocide in the sense that to remove a target group is tactically easier than annihilating it, state capacity for violence is less pertinent for mass expulsion. Similarly, genocidal violence is much more disruptive than expulsion, therefore the structural economic factors are less applicable to mass expulsion. I do agree with Straus that governments with what he calls "founding narratives," or with ideologies of inclusion that are most often democratic, are less likely to expel. However, in my case analysis, inclusive founding narratives are neither necessary nor sufficient to prevent expulsion. While

democratic regimes are less likely to expel, the puzzle is determining why two equally authoritarian regimes failed to resort to expulsion policies (e.g., Uganda versus Kenya), or why two democratic regimes (e.g., Nigeria<sup>42</sup> and South Africa) have different outcomes. Within case comparisons of authoritarian regimes with geographic variation (e.g., the Orthodox Greeks along the Aegean & Pontic littoral versus those in Istanbul) and temporal variation (e.g., the Rohingya in the early 1990s) in the use of expulsion policies are also useful to probe specifications of the regime type argument.

Regarding international and regional actors, I agree with Straus that they can be an important source of restraint on governments motivated to remove populations *en masse*. However, building on Midlarsky (2005), these same actors may also act as a crucial *facilitating* factor by supporting or acquiescing to mass expulsion. We should not only see international and regional bodies as benign actors in preventing mass atrocities, but as often complicit in their enactment or indifferent to their unfolding. In sum, genocide and mass expulsion are distinct concepts, so we should not expect the same restraints to apply to both phenomena although there is some overlap that serves as a useful launching point.

Writing about ethnic cleansing, which is conceptually closer to mass expulsion than genocide, but still conflates distinct concepts, Bulutgil (2016) argues that salient non-ethnic cleavages, either social or economic, in multi-ethnic societies, divide political elites and constrain ethnic cleansing decisions. She argues that dominant ethnic elites who oppose ethnic cleansing, because of their cooperation and engagement with members of the (potentially

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<sup>42</sup> Although Nigeria was not a consolidated democracy in 1983 and suffered a coup d'état at the end of that year, it is coded as a democracy by the Polity V index in the period examined.

targeted) non-dominant group, is the central factor in preventing ethnic cleansing.<sup>43</sup> Bulutgil goes on to argue that territorial conflicts can undermine the viability of the non-ethnic cleavage constraint, as ethnic considerations predominate in times of war, but we should expect the constraint to hold in periods without territorial conflict.

Like Bulutgil (2016), previous literature from economics and sociology emphasizes the importance of cross-cutting economic cleavages. Jha (2013) argues that inter-ethnic commercial complementarities are a source of moderating violence.<sup>44</sup> Similarly, Chirot & McCauley (2006) state that exchange between groups moderates violence because killing eliminates important buyers and sellers of labor and goods.<sup>45</sup> Harff, (2003) proposes a related, but slightly distinct economic constraint, of trade openness or economic interdependence.<sup>46</sup> She argues that states that are more deeply intertwined in global markets will be more constrained in the decision to expel than those that are more isolated.

My findings agree with the literature that argues cross-cutting non-ethnic cleavages, especially economic cleavages, can be an important constraint on mass expulsion. This is seen in the negative cases of Kenya—where the cross-cutting economic cleavage between the wealthy Kenya African National Union (KANU) party elites and the wealthy Asian businessmen was an important constraint—and in the negative case of Istanbul where the financial contribution of the Orthodox Greeks was an important consideration in their exemption from the population exchange. However, in both cases these cross-cutting economic cleavages were a necessary but insufficient factor for constraining expulsion.

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<sup>43</sup> Bulutgil, 2016: 2.

<sup>44</sup> Jha, 2013.

<sup>45</sup> Chirot & McCauley, 2006: 133.

<sup>46</sup> Harff, 2003: 67.

Transnational alliances, the homeland state of the target group, and the international community were also significant. Furthermore, as I shall show, it is not cross-cutting cleavages but domestic alliances that are the important constraint. The lens of alliance patterns is more expansive and, as such, also encompasses negative cases like South Africa and Burma where there were no cross-cutting cleavages between the leadership and the African migrants and Rohingya, respectively. Instead in these cases it was the domestic “corporatist” alliance between business, labor, and the state<sup>47</sup> that was key to restraining expulsion in South Africa, and in Burma (1992) it was fractures within the Tatmadaw that enabled the emergence of moderate forces that agreed to repatriate the Rohingya.

Finally, Mylonas (2012) examines a different dependent variable—nation-building policies—in explaining variation in accommodation, assimilation, and exclusion policies. His exclusionary policy category includes mass expulsion, as well as ethnic cleansing and genocide. While conflating distinct eliminationist policies, and not proposing constraints per se, we can assess whether his factors explaining non-exclusion policies are possible constraints. Mylonas argues that if the target group either has no external support, or has external support from an ally, then exclusion is unlikely. In addition, he states that governments with status quo, as opposed to revisionist foreign policy goals (that seek to regain lost territory), will not pursue exclusionary policies.<sup>48</sup>

My expulsion decision-making framework elaborated below concurs with Mylonas that international factors must be considered. However, my analysis suggests it is not about external support for the target group per se, but rather external support for the government—

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<sup>47</sup> Klotz, 2000: 841.

<sup>48</sup> Mylonas, 2012: 36-37.



both from transnational allies and the homeland state of the target group—that is key. In addition, status quo foreign policy objectives are not a sufficient constraint on mass expulsion. This observation is linked to my critique of the existing literature’s heavy focus on territorial conflict as a precondition for expulsion, which comes out of the Eurocentric nature of this literature. My framework of decision-making explains the full range of constraints on strategic choices—including domestic and international factors—as well as how these constraints are overcome to enable mass expulsion (Chapter 2).

This dissertation seeks to build on existing research on ethnic cleansing and expulsion, and the scholarship of political scientists, sociologists, and historians. It aims to make sense of the cacophony of explanations regarding the causes of expulsion, particularly the seemingly conflicting war and non-war determinants. It also builds on the burgeoning literature on the restraints of mass atrocities by proposing a framework which identifies the critical enabling and constraining factors that influence a government’s decision-making when it comes to mass expulsion. We now turn to the central argument of the dissertation.

### **1.3 The Argument**

This dissertation tackles two main research questions. First, why do governments expel? What motivates them to use this policy of demographic engineering to remove populations *en masse*. Second, how do governments expel? What factors enable the implementation of mass expulsion policies in some cases but constrain those choices in others? I argue that there are four main government motivations for, or “types” of, mass expulsion. These are outlined in my taxonomy in Figure 1 below: removing a fifth column, anti-colonialism, nativism, and counterinsurgency/reprisal.

Figure 1: Taxonomy of Mass Expulsions		
Phase of Nation-building	Target Group Threat	
	<u>Security</u>	<u>Economic</u>
	<u>Establishing</u> Fifth Column	Anti-Colonialism
	<u>Consolidating</u> Counterinsurgency/ Reprisal	Nativism

Governments are motivated to expel when they classify a target group either as a security or economic threat to the state during the establishing or consolidating phase of nation-building. Threats that governments identify may be real threats, based on specific actions or events, or perceived threats that lead to false accusations<sup>49</sup> of the group in question. Security threats manifest in threats to the territorial and/or political control of the state. These may include challenges to a state's sovereignty or claim to authority; relations with enemy external powers; secessionist movements; inter-state disputes; or "refugee warriors."<sup>50</sup> Economic threats are those related to control of state resources, industries, assets, and/or business and employment opportunities.

Nation-building is defined as the process of making the political and national boundaries of the state congruent.<sup>51</sup> In this process governments construct the boundaries of

<sup>49</sup> Drawing on Mylonas (2012: 173), groups falsely accused include those whom governments erroneously label as security or economic threats to the state, as well as those that are scapegoated (a sub-category of false accusation). Scapegoated groups are both falsely accused and simultaneously blamed, unfairly, for the problems facing the host state.

<sup>50</sup> Refugee warriors refers to militant elements of refugee populations that continue to engage in cross-border military operations against their home country and in turn associate the host country with acts of war (Zolberg, et al., 1986: 275-77).

<sup>51</sup> Mylonas, 2012: xx.

the dominant core and promote a common national identity.<sup>52</sup> My classification rests on two phases of nation-building: establishing and consolidating. The first is the process by which newly created states, or existing states with new borders because of territorial annexation or contraction, define their members—which groups should be included, and which (if any) should be excluded. In this phase, governments are defining citizens and the demos. The second phase, consolidating, is the process by which existing states re-define their membership. As the composition of the nation changes over time because of immigration, emigration, or demographic changes within the populous, state's return to the question of “who belongs,” and who does not, as they seek to consolidate, and strengthen, the nation.

To operationalize the nation-building phases, the first 15 years after a state gains its independence, or the first five years after territorial changes to state borders, are categorized as in the nation-establishing phase; and a state is considered in the nation-consolidating phase after 15 years of independence or changes to its borders. Any attempt to classify 139 events over the course of more than a century into four neat categories is bound to be challenging. Not every case is a perfect fit, but most cases are accurately captured by the four expulsion types, described in detail in Chapter 2.<sup>53</sup> In short, security threats in nation-establishing phases are fifth column expulsions; economic threats in nation-establishing phases are anti-colonialism expulsions; economic threats in nation-consolidating phases are nativism expulsions; and security threats in the nation-consolidating phase are counterinsurgency/reprisal expulsions.

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<sup>52</sup> Mylonas, 2012: 17.

<sup>53</sup> See footnote 109 for details on the deviant cases.

Fifth column expulsions seek to remove “disloyal” minorities that present a threat to the territorial integrity of the state. Anti-colonialism expulsions aim to remove alien populations that were privileged by colonial rulers and dominate key sectors of the economy. Nativism expulsions seek to remove ethnic groups that are an, alleged, strain on the local economy to improve conditions for national labor. Lastly, counterinsurgency/reprisal mass expulsions aim to remove populations identified as insurgents and/or to retaliate against a neighboring state. This taxonomy of government motivations to expel helps to clarify diversity within the class of events that is expulsion. The reasons motivating the Ottoman Empire to expel its Greek Orthodox minority, a fifth column expulsion, were not the same as those of Idi Amin in Uganda in expelling the country’s Asian population, an anti-colonial expulsion, despite both using the same demographic engineering policy. To validate this part of my analysis, in each of the empirical chapters I provide detailed evidence for each motivation and refute alternative explanations.

However, since not all governments with motivations to expel go through with removing populations *en masse*, I introduce a framework of mass expulsion decision making that explains the key factors that enable or constrain expulsion policy implementation (Table 1).

<b>Table 1: Factors that enable or constrain mass expulsion policy decisions</b>		
<i>Key Factors</i>	<i>Enablers</i>	<i>Constraints</i>
<b>Alliances</b>		
<i>Domestic Alliances</i>	Benefit	Harmed
<i>Transnational Alliances</i>	Indifferent / Support	Harmed / Opposed
<b>Homeland State(s)</b>		
<i>Relation to Government</i>	Weak ties	Strong ties
<i>Response/ Anticipated Response</i>	Acquiesce & resettle	Resist & deny entry

<b>International Community</b>		
<i>Relation to Government</i>	Weak ties	Strong ties
<i>Response/ Anticipated Response</i>	Support, facilitate, ignore	Resist

What differentiates governments that expel from those that do not—when motivation is held constant—is their alliances, the homeland state of the target group, and the international community.

### *Alliances*

A government motivated to remove a target group will consider the effect of an expulsion policy on its domestic alliances including political parties, military, business community, and trade unions. In many cases, the executive's internal allies would directly benefit—politically or financially—from removing the target group. Benefits would include eliminating a security threat to the ethnonational state, appropriating assets and income of an economically dominant group, opening new employment opportunities, or eliminating internal opposition. These benefits may assist governing elites in building a new nation state or in consolidating the ethnonational majority; they may also generate political good will in advance of critical elections. However, in other cases, the interests of the executive's core domestic allies would be harmed by expelling the target group—affecting an important source of revenue, cheap labor supply, political buffer, or future bargaining chip. For these governments, altering the existing political or economic status quo is too costly for domestic partners. In still other cases the effect of expulsion on domestic alliances is ambivalent, there may be some benefits but at the same time, some draw backs, creating mixed results for the alliance. When the costs of expulsion to domestic allies outweigh the benefits, then expulsion is constrained.

In addition to domestic alliances, the effect of expulsion on transnational alliances—bi-lateral economic and military relations with external states and/or foreign multi-national corporations—are a determining factor in government expulsion decisions. Governments with transnational alliances that are indifferent to or support expulsion, are more likely to expel; whereas governments concerned that expulsion may harm relations with their transnational allies or that those allies would oppose the removal of the target group will hesitate to implement expulsion. Concerns that expulsion may jeopardize critical transnational alliances act as an important constraint on the decision to expel.

*Homeland State (of the target group)*

When it comes to the effect of expulsion on the “homeland” state(s)<sup>54</sup> of the target group there are two important considerations. The first is the strength of ties between the expelling (or potentially expelling) government and the homeland state(s): strong or weak. The second is the anticipated, or actual, reaction of the homeland state(s) to the expulsion. Will it resist and deny entry to the expellees or acquiesce and resettle them? Strong ties between governments and homeland state(s) act as a constraint because expulsion could damage relations. Whereas weak ties between expelling governments and homeland state(s) are more likely to enable expulsion as there are fewer consequences to damaging the relationship. In addition, expelling governments also must consider the reaction, or anticipated reaction, of the homeland state(s) to the expulsion. Where the homeland state(s) responds, or announces

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<sup>54</sup> When a government expels non-citizens the expellee homeland is the state of citizenship. However, when citizens are expelled, the expellee “homeland” refers to the state(s) with co-ethnics where the target group is said to “belong” which is why the word is in quotations.

it would respond, by resisting and denying entry to the expellees then expulsion may be constrained. Whereas if the homeland state(s) acquiesces and resettles the expellees then the expulsion will be enabled. Governments faced with strong homeland state ties that resist and deny entry are the most likely to be constrained; but other cases are more mixed—strong ties but acquiesce & resettle, or weak ties but resist & deny entry—in these cases both aspects of the homeland state relations must be considered.

### *International Community*

The last factor is the relationship with, and the reaction of, the international community defined to include the “Great Powers” and the League of Nations in the first half of the twentieth century, and the United Nations, humanitarian organizations, international institutions, and regional bodies in the latter half of the twentieth and the twenty-first centuries. Like the homeland state(s) factor, governments with strong ties, or desiring to cultivate strong ties, with the international community are more likely to be constrained in their expulsion decisions than those with weak ties. But the response, or anticipated response, of the international community—whether to support, facilitate, ignore, or resist—further enables or constrains expulsion.

This framework seeks to explain why we do not see more mass expulsion given the many governments that may be motivated to do so. The effects of expulsion on alliances, target group homeland state(s), and the international community enables or constrains this demographic engineering policy option. Importantly, not all three of the key elements weigh equally on the minds of government officials. In different cases, some factors may take primacy over others. While the executive may be pulled in different directions, the relative

strength of the constraints will determine an expulsion outcome. This will be further explained in the empirical chapters when the framework is applied to each of the paired comparison cases through detailed process tracing.

## **1.4 Research Design: Methodology, Case Selection, Sources**

### *Methodology*

My dissertation research design is a mix of quantitative global analysis and qualitative in-depth cases. To establish the universe of cases to be examined I developed the Global Mass Expulsion Dataset (GSME) documenting expulsion events around the world from 1900-2020.<sup>55</sup> The new dataset isolates mass expulsion from the broader, and cloudier, concept of ethnic cleansing in order to isolate policies of population *removal*—as opposed to population destruction (genocide, massacre), assimilation (coercive assimilation), or a combination of the three (ethnic cleansing).<sup>56</sup> This comprehensive and systematic survey of mass expulsion introduces a significant amount of new data to the field because of its distinct concept, extended duration, cross-national nature, and inclusion of citizens and non-citizens.

To build and test my framework of government expulsion decision making processes, I constructed four paired-comparison case studies, one for each of the four types of mass expulsion: removing a fifth column, anti-colonialism, nativism, and counterinsurgency/reprisal. Pairing cases of expulsion and non-expulsion is an original attempt to determine the enabling conditions that facilitate expulsion in some cases, and the constraining conditions that deter it in others. The four paired comparison cases are:

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<sup>55</sup> Garrity, forthcoming.

<sup>56</sup> Further details on this distinction are outlined in the conceptual section in Chapter 2.



- Ottoman/Turkish expulsion of Greek Orthodox Christians from the Aegean and Pontic littoral (1913-1923) versus Istanbul;
- Uganda's expulsion of its Asian minority (1972) versus the treatment of Asians in Kenya (1967-1969);
- Nigeria's expulsion of West African migrants (1983) versus the treatment of African migrants in South Africa (2008-2012); and
- Burma's expulsion of Rohingya (1991-1992) versus their repatriation and the reversal of the expulsion policy (1992-1995).

The four case study pairs are illustrated below according to my taxonomy of government motivations to expel.

Figure 2: Case studies by expulsion type		
Phase of Nation-building	Target Group Threat	
	<u>Security</u>	<u>Economic</u>
	<u>Fifth Column</u> Ottoman littoral (1913-23) vs. Istanbul (1913-23)	<u>Anti-colonialism</u> Uganda (1972) vs. Kenya (1967-69)
	<u>Counterinsurgency</u> Burma (1991-92) vs. Burma (1992-95)	<u>Nativism</u> Nigeria (1983) vs. South Africa (2008-12)

#### *Case selection*

The four expulsion cases examined in this dissertation—Ottoman Empire, Uganda, Nigeria, Burma—are crucial cases, albeit each for different reasons. The Ottoman/Turkish expulsion

of Greek Orthodox included the first *compulsory* population exchange agreement in world history. Although the Ottomans had enacted a similar exchange with Bulgaria in 1913<sup>57</sup> that agreement was, in theory, voluntary, despite force being used by each side to remove the opposing population from the border regions. The Lausanne Convention of 1923, on the contrary, was an internationally negotiated post-war treaty in which both the Ottoman, soon-to-be Turkish, and Greek governments agreed to forcibly remove the Orthodox Greek and Muslim populations, respectively, from their territories. This agreement set an international precedent and was used as a model for future population exchanges.

The Ugandan expulsion of South Asians in 1972 seems to be a classic case of what some refer to as a “middleman minority” expulsion,<sup>58</sup> and it is an episode that first comes to mind for many when contemplating this phenomenon. Although the size was smaller in comparison to other episodes, it garnered international attention given the expulsion of tens of thousands of Asians with British citizenship, and the character of President Idi Amin who escalated the breadth of the expulsion as pressure intensified for him to change course. This is also an important case because it involved the expulsion of both citizens and non-citizens, creating stateless persons in the case of the former.

Nigeria’s expulsion of West African migrants in 1983 is a crucial case because it is the largest mass expulsion on the African continent and the fourth largest expulsion in the entire sample. An estimated 1-2 million Africans, mostly Ghanaians, were affected by Nigerian

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<sup>57</sup> After the Second Balkan War, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria signed the Treaty of Constantinople on September 29, 1913 (part of the larger Treaty of Bucharest that ended the war), which included the Protocol of Adrianople, outlining the first “voluntary” population exchange in an international agreement (Ladas, 1932: 18; Macartney, 1934: 434; Psomiades, 1968: 60; Psomiades, 2011: 216).

<sup>58</sup> Blalock, 1967; Bonacich, 1973.

President Shagari's decision to remove migrants *en masse* within two weeks, later extended to six weeks. While there were many West African expulsions in the immediate aftermath of independence, this expulsion episode came later, 23 years after Nigerian independence, and was associated with the consolidation of the nation, and the corresponding exclusion of foreigners, in the lead up to critical national elections. Finally, Burma's expulsion of Rohingya is a crucial case both for its contemporary relevance, with over 800,000 recently expelled to Bangladesh in 2016-2018, and for its persistent nature with expulsion episodes in 1978, 1991, 2012, and 2016. This case is also distinct because the government targeted a population with a precarious citizenship status, many of whom were stateless, and as such did not have a home state to which it could turn.

In addition to the crucial nature of each case, and the distinct government motivations for each expulsion, the four expulsion cases examined also vary in terms of period, region, target group, citizenship status, and regime type (see Table 2).

Table 2: Expulsion cases variation				
	Ottoman Empire	Uganda	Nigeria	Burma
<i>Temporal</i>	1920s	1970s	1980s	1990s
<i>Regional</i>	Middle East/Europe	East Africa	West Africa	East Asia
<i>Target Group</i>	Ethno-religious	Ethno-racial	National	Ethno-religious-racial
<i>Citizenship status</i>	Nationals	Nationals/resident aliens	Foreign nationals/resident aliens	Nationals ( <i>many stateless</i> )
<i>Regime Type (Polity V)</i>	Interregnum/Autocracy	Autocracy	Democracy	Anocracy

Temporally the expulsion cases occurred throughout the twentieth century with one case in the first half of the twentieth century and three in the latter. Two occurred during the Cold War (Uganda/Nigeria) and one after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Collapse of the Soviet

Union (Burma). Regionally, cases are drawn from the Middle East/Europe,<sup>59</sup> East and West Africa, and East Asia. By definition, a mass expulsion must specifically target an ethnic, racial, religious, or national group and each of the four cases targets a different category of persons. According to the population exchange agreement, the Greek Orthodox were expelled because of their Christian Orthodox religion, but their Greek roots were also clearly a key factor, making them an ethno-religious target. The Asians in Uganda were both ethnically and racially distinct from the black African majority. In Nigeria the expulsion was based on national origin with Ghanaians as the main target. And, in Burma the Rohingya were largely targeted for their Muslim religion (in opposition to the Buddhist majority), as well as their ethnicity and race—being excluded from the list of 135 “national ethnic races.” The citizenship status of the target groups also varied in the four cases with citizens (or nationals) and non-citizens (resident aliens, foreign nationals) expelled, as well as a stateless group (the Rohingya). Finally, the cases include variation in regime type ranging from states in transition (interregnum<sup>60</sup>), autocracies, democracies, and anocracies. This variation across my four expulsion episodes presents a “hard case” for my framework of government expulsion decision making.

To have variation on my key dependent variable, mass expulsion, I identified four negative cases where conditions and contexts were similar, with governments that that seemed likely to expel—i.e., had a similar motivation to expel the target group as the expelling government (e.g., fifth column, anti-colonialism, etc.)—yet where expulsion did not occur. The four negative cases are: Istanbul, Kenya, South Africa, and Burma (1992-1995). Istanbul and Burma are within case comparisons, whereas Kenya and South Africa are across-case

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<sup>59</sup> Parts of the Ottoman Empire during this time were in Europe, particularly relevant, Western Thrace.

<sup>60</sup> Polity V defines interregnum as “a complete collapse of central political authority.”

comparisons. The within case comparisons examine geographic and temporal variation. In the Ottoman Empire case I examine geographic variation in the expulsion decision—the Greek Orthodox were expelled from the Aegean and Pontic littoral (as well as Anatolia) but not from Istanbul. The Burma case looks at temporal variation, with the Rohingya expelled from the country between March 1991-July 1992, but then abruptly repatriated from September 1992-1995.

Using a most-similar systems design I selected the negative cases according to the “possibility principle” in which expulsion seemed possible, if not probable, based on the existing theories about this phenomenon.<sup>61</sup> These cases matched the expulsion cases along a series of key attributes that existing theories suggest explains the variation including the security environment, economy (GDP, GDP per capita, dominant sector), region, geography, regime type (Polity V and V-dem), population size, target group (size, percentage of total population), colonizer, and public opinion/sentiment toward target group. Holding these attributes constant I was able to deduce the key contributing factors that explained the government decisions to expel versus the decisions not to expel.

As depicted in Table 3 below, the negative cases varied, like the expulsion cases, adding temporal and regional range to the case study sample. Importantly, while none of the four negative cases expelled the target group, they responded differently to the group in question.

<b>Table 3: Negative cases variation<sup>62</sup></b>				
	<b>Istanbul</b>	<b>Kenya</b>	<b>South Africa</b>	<b>Burma</b>
<i>Temporal</i>	1920s	1960s	2010s	1990s

<sup>61</sup> Mahoney & Goertz, 2004; Straus, 2015.

<sup>62</sup> In the case of Istanbul and Burma, the expelling and non-expelling governments were the same since they are within-case comparisons, but as noted, these negative cases present geographic and temporal exemptions to the expulsion.

<i>Regional</i>	Middle East/Europe	East Africa	Southern Africa	East Asia
<i>Target Group</i>	Ethno-religious	Ethnic/racial	National	Ethno-religious-racial
<i>Citizenship status</i>	Nationals	Nationals/resident aliens	Foreign nationals/resident aliens	Nationals ( <i>largely stateless</i> )
<i>Regime Type (Polity V)</i>	Interregnum/Autocracy	Anocracy/Autocracy	Democracy	Anocracy
<i>Action against target group</i>	Accommodation (temporarily)	Discriminatory legislation encouraging departure	Individual deportation	Accommodation (temporarily)

In Istanbul the Orthodox Greeks were exempted from the 1923 population exchange and were accommodated by the regime, albeit temporarily.<sup>63</sup> In Kenya, the government passed discriminatory legislation that targeted Asian permanent residents and traders encouraging the departure of non-citizens, but not expelling them *en masse*. The South African government did not expel its African migrant population like Nigeria, but maintained a vast deportation machinery, one of the largest in the world, individually deporting tens of thousands of African foreigners each year.<sup>64</sup> And in Burma from 1992-1995 the government reversed its expulsion policy and repatriated the Rohingya refugees, temporarily<sup>65</sup> accommodating them while continuing to implement discriminatory policies.

After identifying the four paired comparison case studies, I conducted detailed process tracing of the six cases using comparative historical methods. First, I documented the contextual environment and predisposing conditions in each case and then traced how the expulsion episode unfolded on the ground, looking for evidence of the governments' motivations for the expulsion. As I studied the historical archive and secondary sources

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<sup>63</sup> In 1964 the remaining Greek Orthodox population in Turkey, largely concentrated in Istanbul, was expelled from the country in response to rising diplomatic tensions with Greece over Cyprus.

<sup>64</sup> Nshimbi & Fioramonti, 2014: 58; Vigneswaran, 2011a: 111.

<sup>65</sup> The Rohingya were expelled again during 2012-2013 and 2016-2018.

chronicling events, I noted any existing explanations for the expulsion. In each case I argue that my taxonomy of mass expulsion motivations is valid by refuting alternative explanations offered. I then detail the critical enabling or constraining factors that either facilitated or deterred government expulsion decisions by comparing the situations in the expulsion and non-expulsion cases.

### *Sources*

Since expulsionist governments are rarely transparent in their decision-making processes, nor have open access records on this topic, to find evidence for my case studies I conducted archival research at the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and at the League of Nations (LoN) archives in Geneva, Switzerland. Telegrams, cables, confidential memos, meeting minutes, reports, and documented conversations with expelling government officials helped to identify government expulsion motivations, detect new cases, and reveal the international community's response to expulsion events. By triangulating this data with governmental public statements, I was able to capture the discourse that motivated mass expulsion. The archival evidence was complemented with other primary sources including the U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants digital archive of Refugee Reports (1979-2006) and World Refugee Surveys (1961-2009), Kessing's Record of World Events, African Recorder, African Contemporary Record (1968-2000), government documents and speeches, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), and various news articles from a wide array of international media outlets.

Other evidence was gathered from reports and briefs published by the United Nations (U.N.) and its agency affiliates (UNHCR, OHCHR, IOM, OCHA, Human Rights Council),

human rights organizations, particularly Human Rights Watch (and the relevant regional watch organizations before 1988) and Amnesty International, humanitarian organizations (MSF, OFDA, ReliefWeb), and think tanks (International Crisis Group, Migration Policy Institute, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, among others). These sources were invaluable for understanding how governments used different tactics on the ground and the systematic nature of the expulsion episodes. Secondary historical sources, as well as biographies and memoirs of key government officials were also useful in understanding decision-making processes and external events unfolding at the time.

### *Disorderly & Inhumane*

This dissertation analytically focuses on the state as the perpetrator because its aim is to identify government motivations for expulsion and to determine how those governments decided whether to implement an expulsion policy, or not. Based on my findings I propose specific policy recommendations for deterring the use of mass expulsion in the future (*see Chapter 7 - Conclusion*). A project like this is at risk of overlooking the victims and survivors of mass expulsion, and the physical, psychological, emotional, economic, and political consequences of their removal.<sup>66</sup> International actors and governments have often described mass expulsion as an “orderly and humane” policy—a necessary short-term pain for a greater long-term security and peace gain.

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<sup>66</sup> There are many outstanding books of fiction and non-fiction that focus on the lives of expellees and offer their perspectives on the lived experience of expulsion such as: *Twice a Stranger: The Mass Expulsions That Forged Modern Greece and Turkey*; *Birds without Wings*; *Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans After the Second World War*, among many others.



The most famous, or infamous, usage of the phrase “orderly and humane” to describe mass expulsion was in the 1945 Potsdam Agreement, drafted by the Allied Powers after the Second World War. This communiqué facilitated the removal of 9-12 million ethnic Germans, the *Volksdeutsche* and *Reichsdeutsche*, from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary<sup>67</sup>.<sup>68</sup> Article XIII of the protocol stated,

“The Three Governments, having considered the question in all its aspects, recognize that the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be undertaken. They agree that any transfers that take place should be effected in an *orderly and humane* manner” [emphasis added].<sup>69</sup>

The idea that mass expulsion was orderly and humane was echoed nearly three decades later by the United Nations. In response to Idi Amin’s 1972 expulsion of the Ugandan Asians, the UNHCR Deputy High Commissioner, Charles Mace, stated in a cable to the UNHCR Director of the Protection Division: “We and international public opinion generally would wish departure (if it has to take place) to be conducted in [an] *orderly and humane* way, from [a] purely humanitarian viewpoint” [emphasis added].<sup>70</sup>

But it was not only internationally facilitated expulsions that adopted this language. Expelling governments themselves appropriated the phrase. Nigerian Minister of Internal Affairs, Ali Baba, announced his government’s extension of the African migrant expulsion timeline from two weeks to six weeks “in order to allow for *smooth and orderly* exist [sic] of the

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<sup>67</sup> The Allied Powers only authorized German expulsions from Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, but Yugoslavia, Romania and the Netherlands also expelled ethnic Germans from their territories at the same time.

<sup>68</sup> Mazower, 2009; Douglas, 2012; Garrity, forthcoming.

<sup>69</sup> U.S. Department of State – Office of the Historian, 1945.

<sup>70</sup> Outgoing Cable from UNHCR Deputy High Commissioner, Mace, to Dadzie, UNHCR Director Protection Division, 05.09.1972; 11/2/10-100.UGA.ASI[b] - Refugees from Asia in Uganda [Volume 2-1.UGA.ASI]; Series 2, Box 204; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

affected people” [emphasis added].<sup>71</sup> In later press briefings he again referred to “the *orderly departure* of aliens” [emphasis added].<sup>72</sup> Similarly, in 1978, after almost a year of expulsions, the Vietnamese government in Hanoi announced a “seven-point programme” for the “orderly departure” of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam.<sup>73</sup>

Even local news articles referred to the idea of expulsion as “humane” as noted in a *Uganda Argus* article from August 1972 entitled “Asian questions Answered,”

“General Amin has shown in his *typical humane* way that he is only sorting the chaff from the wheat in ordering British Asians, Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladesh nationals from Uganda’s borders in three months from now. He is merely pruning the very tree of life of the nation. Away with the dead and rotting fruit” [emphasis added].<sup>74</sup>

Perpetrators, facilitators, and observers alike used the language “orderly and humane” to describe the abhorrent atrocity of mass expulsion.

This dissertation, on the contrary, documents that expulsion is anything but orderly and humane. In fact, it is consistently and perpetually **Dis**orderly and **In**humane as the title indicates. As a result, the manuscript aspires to influence government officials and policy makers to abandon expulsion as a positive policy option and to take specific action to reduce the incidence of mass expulsion in the future. The greatest tribute to the victims and survivors of mass expulsion is to strive to reduce the number of future expellees.

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<sup>71</sup> Nigerian External Publicity Division, 1983: 4.

<sup>72</sup> Nigerian External Publicity Division, 1983: 11.

<sup>73</sup> Chang, 1982: 220.

<sup>74</sup> Uganda Argus. (1972, 04 August). Asian question answered. Retrieved from <https://carleton.ca/uganda-collection/the-bennett-collection-uganda-argus-newspaper/>

## 1.5 Dissertation Plan

This dissertation proceeds as follows. Part I outlines my theory of mass expulsion. It includes a detailed conceptual section arguing that ethnic cleansing, the term most often conflated with mass expulsion, should be dispensed with, and each of its distinct component parts should be individually analyzed. I then provide an overview of my Global Mass Expulsion Dataset and a descriptive synopsis of the phenomenon over the period 1900-2020. This is followed by a presentation of my taxonomy of government motivations for expulsion detailing the logic behind: fifth column, anti-colonialism, nativism, and counterinsurgency/reprisal expulsions. Subsequently I outline my framework of government expulsion decision making that explains what enables some governments to expel but constrains others.

Part II provides the empirical evidence for my theory with Chapters 3-6 dedicated to each of my four paired comparison cases studies. Chapter 3 examines the Orthodox Greek population in the Ottoman Empire from 1913-1923, particular near the conclusion of the Greco-Turkish War and in its aftermath at the Lausanne Peace Conference. Chapter 4 turns to post-colonial East Africa and investigates the Asian minorities in Uganda and Kenya, where economic freedom severely lagged political independence. Chapter 5 stays on the African continent but pivots to West and Southern Africa and the treatment of African migrants in 1983 Nigeria compared to 2008-2012 South Africa, both burgeoning democratic states in crucial election years with fledgling regimes trying to hold onto power and consolidate the nation. The last empirical case study chapter examines Rohingya in Burma during 1991-1995, a period in which they were expelled *en masse*, and then promptly repatriated. Lastly, Part III contains the conclusion and supplementary materials. Chapter 7 summarizes my argument and contributions, proposes policy recommendations based on my findings, and outlines

remaining questions that demand further investigation. The appendices provide supplemental details to the substantive chapters in Parts I and II.

I now turn to the foundational question—what is a mass expulsion?

## **PART I. Concepts & Theory**

## CHAPTER 2: Concepts, Data, Taxonomy, Decision Making Process

### 2.1 The Concept of Mass Expulsion

Mass expulsion is a government policy of demographic engineering. It is part of a broader repertoire of policies that aim to eliminate ethnic difference within a territory.<sup>75</sup> The literature on these policies includes a wide array of terms including genocide, mass killing, massacre, ethnic cleansing, expulsion, deportation, democide, forced/coercive assimilation, and forced displacement/migration.<sup>76</sup> This proliferation of terms has resulted in unexamined conceptual stretching—augmenting the extension without diminishing the intension<sup>77</sup>—particularly as it relates to ethnic cleansing, often deployed as an umbrella concept, encompassing many of the terms above.

In this dissertation I extract mass expulsion from the concept of ethnic cleansing to isolate policies of intentional population *removal*—as opposed to annihilation (genocide), control (massacre<sup>78</sup>), cultural elimination (coercive assimilation<sup>79</sup>), or a combination of the three (ethnic cleansing). Three of the concepts are policies of ethnic elimination (genocide, expulsion, coercive assimilation) and one is a policy of ethnic management (massacres intending to control<sup>80</sup>).<sup>81</sup> I argue that defining these concepts by the intention of the perpetrator(s) clarifies the semantic field of exclusionary politics by clearly bounding and

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<sup>75</sup> McGarry & O’Leary, 1993; McGarry, 1998.

<sup>76</sup> Garrity & Mylonas. (2022, April). *Nesting exclusionary politics approaches* [Paper presentation]. International Studies Association (ISA) Annual Convention 2022, Nashville, Tennessee.

<sup>77</sup> Sartori, 1970.

<sup>78</sup> Semelin’s (2007) concept of massacres aiming to subjugate, or force collective surrender, would fit here as well as Valentino’s (2004) “counterguerrilla mass killings.”

<sup>79</sup> Some scholars do not include coercive assimilation as a policy of exclusion (Mylonas, 2012; Bulutgil, 2016), although many quantitative datasets do (Bellamy, 2011; Ulfelder & Valentino, 2004; Butcher et al., 2020).

<sup>80</sup> See footnote 78.

<sup>81</sup> McGarry & O’Leary, 1993.

differentiating the concepts from each other. Much existing research in this field has aggregated some, or all, of these events,<sup>82</sup> often capturing the practices or tactics used in implementation (e.g., mass killing, deportation, displacement), rather than the policy or intention of the government. While the methods of governments intending to remove a group (mass expulsion) may in some cases be similar to those of governments intending to annihilate the target (genocide), or to control them (massacres aiming to subjugate or counter guerrilla mass killings<sup>83</sup>), these policies have different intents.<sup>84</sup> Focusing on specific policies, rather than on the practices or tactics implemented by the perpetrator(s), avoids the definitional discrepancies associated with ethnic cleansing. This allows for a better understanding of government motivations and policy choices, and in turn the causes and consequences of these atrocities.

This dissertation focuses on one slice of the exclusionary politics field: mass expulsion. I introduce mass expulsion as a neovalent—an existing term<sup>85</sup> given new meaning with increased denotation.<sup>86</sup> Mass expulsion is defined here as:

*a systematic government-sponsored policy to remove an ethnic, racial, religious, or national group, as such, with no individual legal review and with no recognition of the right to return.*<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> Harff, 2003; Ulfelder & Valentino, 2008; Orchard, 2010; Bellamy, 2011; Bulutgil, 2016; Butcher et al., 2020; Lichtenheld, 2020.

<sup>83</sup> See Valentino (2004) & Semelin (2007).

<sup>84</sup> Schabas, 2000: 200.

<sup>85</sup> Expulsion is codified (but not defined) in various human rights conventions including the Refugee Convention (1951); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966); European Convention on Human Rights, Protocol 4 (1968); American Convention on Human Rights (1969); African Charter on Human & Peoples' Rights (1981); and Arab Charter on Human Rights (2004).

<sup>86</sup> Sartori, 1984.

<sup>87</sup> Garrity, forthcoming.

Six core attributes form the core of this concept. The perpetrator of mass expulsion is the government of an established state—either directly through the military, police, or intelligence services or indirectly through a paramilitary force with state-support. The policy systematically intends to remove the target group—to force them to leave the territory of the state, not to annihilate the group or to control them within the territory. It is a group-based phenomenon, targeting a specific ethnic, racial, religious, or national group. To count as an expulsion the group must be targeted specifically because of its shared group characteristics, not because of larger indiscriminate violence. The expellees’ legal standing must not be individually evaluated by the perpetrator, thereby distinguishing mass expulsion from individual expulsion. Lastly, the expelling government must deny the expellees the right to return at the time of their removal.

This definition requires an empirical determination of a government’s aims in implementing the policy. In some mass expulsion cases the intention to remove is explicit. State authorities either officially announce an expulsion order or decree (Mexico, 1931; Uganda, 1972; Nigeria, 1983) or consent to a bilateral or multilateral population transfer or exchange agreement (Turkey-Greece, 1923; Czechoslovakia/Poland/Hungary, 1945). In most instances, however, the intent to remove must be inferred from official state actions such as announced and unannounced police and/or military “clearance” operations or raids that corral target populations, destroy or confiscate their legal documents, and force them across borders (United States, 1929; Uganda, 2010; Algeria, 2016). In these cases, physical force is used but violence is typically limited. In a small number of episodes, the intent is more difficult to discern because killing is used to induce flight—often, but not always, during inter- or intra-state war (Greece, 1912; Cyprus, 1974; Burma, 2016). Killing is also a tactic, or preliminary



evidence of, other eliminationist policies like genocide, or difference-management policies, including massacres that seek to control.<sup>88</sup> In these cases, other evidence must be used to assess a government's intention,<sup>89</sup> such as reports of state or state-sponsored actors threatening the target group to leave "voluntarily" or face violence, or tactical—as opposed to wholesale—authorized state force to provoke flight, or deliberate decisions not to restrain militia intent on expulsion. In such episodes, departure from the territory is coercively encouraged, not prevented.<sup>90</sup> This dissertation's focus is confined to events in which the government's policy is to systematically remove an ethnic group, regardless of the tactics used.

Governments may adopt different eliminationist or management policies for different groups.<sup>91</sup> For example, the Ottoman Empire implemented different policies toward its Orthodox Greek (mass expulsion) and Armenian (genocide) populations;<sup>92</sup> Idi Amin's regime in Uganda expelled South Asians (1972) but massacred rival Acholi and Langi ethnic groups (1970s); and the Burmese government repeatedly expelled Rohingya (1978, 1991-92, 2012-13, 2016-18) while using a combination of control and coercive assimilation strategies against the Karen, Kachin, and Chin minorities. Focusing on policies of systematic removal (e.g., Ottoman Greeks, Uganda Asians, Rohingya) allows us to better understand the phenomenon

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<sup>88</sup> As Schabas (2000: 200) notes, while the material acts of governments intending to remove a group (mass expulsion) may overlap with those of governments intending to annihilate the target or control them, these policies have different intentions.

<sup>89</sup> See Appendix A (Section 3) for relevant evidence to determine intent.

<sup>90</sup> Theories of why governments implement mass expulsion as opposed to policies of genocide or massacre are underdeveloped, but Valentino (2004) suggests territorial availability, cost, time, and the possibility of the target posing a continued threat are all important considerations.

<sup>91</sup> McGarry & O'Leary, 1993.

<sup>92</sup> Evidence from the Prime Ministerial Ottoman Archive outlines different government policies toward the Greek Orthodox and Armenian populations: "The Greeks...were deported and expelled with brutality, but the Armenians were targeted for outright annihilation" (Akçam, 2012: 21).

of mass expulsion. Having defined the concept of interest, we now turn to the universe of mass expulsion cases.

## **2.2 Global Mass Expulsion Dataset, 1900-2020**

The Global Mass Expulsion Dataset (GSME) developed for this thesis is a novel dataset that documents mass expulsion events around the world from 1900-2020.<sup>93</sup> For an event to be coded as a mass expulsion it must have met five criteria, drawn from the above definition, and two scope conditions.<sup>94</sup>

1. The event must be sponsored by the government of an established state<sup>95</sup>;
2. The government policy must be the systematic removal of the target population;
3. The target population must be an ethnic, racial, religious or national group;
4. The population must be removed because of its shared group characteristics, not incidentally displaced by violence; and
5. The target population must be denied the right to return at the time of the expulsion.

In addition to these five criteria, an expulsion episode must meet two scope conditions: 1) the expelled population must be moved across an international border, and 2) at least 1,000 persons must be expelled in an annual period.

The purpose of the first scope condition is to distinguish between episodes of internal and external expulsion. The main reason for excluding internal expulsion is empirical feasibility. Feasibility both in terms of determining what qualifies as an internal expulsion

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<sup>93</sup> Garrity, forthcoming.

<sup>94</sup> Appendix A.2 includes further details on coding decisions.

<sup>95</sup> Mass expulsion by non-state actors is not included in the dataset, nor are “from below” cases of violence initiated by individuals, or communities, that are not organized by the government.

event, and perhaps more importantly, access to reliable information for internal expulsions dating back to 1900. Coding internal expulsions would require a much larger number of, arguably more subjective, determinations for inclusion in cases ranging from development-induced internal displacement, displacement caused by natural disasters because of deliberate government neglect, or government “red-line” policies that disproportionately affect one ethnic group, forcing them to move internally. In addition, there are severe barriers to systematic data collection for cases of internal expulsion. Internal displacement was not a significant focus of the international community until recently. Data from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, the most authoritative source on internal displacement, does not begin until 1998. In contrast, cross-border mass expulsion, at least in cases involving the removal of citizens, creates refugees. And since 1920, the League of Nations and then the UNHCR (1950) have had the mandate to track and trace refugee populations. Other refugee-specific sources like the U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants digital archive of Refugee Reports (1979-2006) and World Refugee Surveys (1961-2009) have records dating to the early 1960s.

The second scope condition quantifies the scope of the “mass” in mass expulsion, an inherently contentious exercise. The minimum threshold of 1,000 persons expelled is an arbitrary limit, but it aligns with the international relations literature on civil wars,<sup>96</sup> and it excludes small-scale expulsions of a few hundred persons that are difficult to verify, as well as those without a confirmed number of victims. While ideally a relative proportion of the group affected would be used, that approach requires reliable census figures of the target group size,

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<sup>96</sup> Sambanis, 2004.

which are often unavailable. Regular censuses are not conducted in many countries, and manipulation and deliberate under counting of ethnic minorities is a chronic deficiency of country-level population data.<sup>97</sup> In addition, since the GSME dataset also includes the expulsion of foreign nationals, resident aliens, and refugees, a relative measure of persons affected would require population figures for categories of persons that are not included in national censuses. In many of the contexts examined here immigration statistics are either not available or are extremely unreliable, particularly because migrant workers, who may or may not have residency, are often transient. These are the reasons the GSME dataset documents the absolute size of the population expelled.

Despite best efforts to include all incidents of mass expulsion accurately, there are limitations to observational data. Particularly for events in the first half of the dataset (1900-1960), data quality and sources are more suspect because of the rudimentary nature of data collection at the time. Accuracy in the number of persons expelled is particularly variable. Therefore, the GSME dataset captures low- and high-end estimates which provide a range of the total persons affected in each case. The minimum number of persons expelled has been used in analyzing the data to err on underestimating rather than overestimating the phenomenon. Because expulsion is a political decision, sources documenting expulsion events are inherently politicized, with expellees and expellers presenting different versions of events. Efforts have been taken to collect data from both sides (e.g., from Turkish and Greek sources for the 1923 Turkey-Greece population exchange) as well as more neutral third parties (UN

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<sup>97</sup> Ulfelder & Valentino, 2008; Mylonas, 2015.

and human rights organizations). To overcome uncertainty, multiple sources were collected for each episode to verify its occurrence and event details.

Another possible limitation may be geographic bias, particularly for the first 50 years of the dataset, given the limited data collection available outside of Europe. However, of the 44 expulsion episodes that occurred before 1950, seven cases<sup>98</sup> (15 percent) are non-European. Given the establishment of UNHCR in 1950, and its slow, but steady, expansion outside of Europe in the late 1950s/early 1960s,<sup>99</sup> after 1960 any apparent geographic bias declines significantly. Lastly, given the importance of intent in the production of the dataset, there is potential for bias in interpreting governmental aims. The coding criteria decision tree is included in Appendix A.2 to document how case inclusion/exclusion was determined as well as the relevant evidence required. While the present dataset may not be exhaustive, due diligence has been performed to include most mass expulsion episodes during 1900-2020.<sup>100</sup>

The GSME dataset includes 139 episodes of mass expulsion during 1900-2020 across seven world regions.<sup>101</sup> Mass expulsion events have consistently been initiated throughout the period examined (see Figure 3).

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<sup>98</sup> United States, 1929-39; Mexico, 1931; Cuba 1933, 1937; Dominican Republic, 1937; Peru, 1942; Israel, 1947-48.

<sup>99</sup> Loescher, 2001.

<sup>100</sup> See Appendix A.1 for a full list of mass expulsion episodes during 1900-2020.

<sup>101</sup> These regions correspond to the World Bank's classification: East Asia & Pacific; Europe & Central Asia; Latin America & the Caribbean; Middle East & North Africa; North America; South Asia; and Sub-Saharan Africa.




Figure 3: Mass expulsion episodes initiated (1900-2020)

Ten or more expulsion events occurred in eight of the 12 decades examined. The first 15 expulsion cases (1900-1923) occurred during the First and Second Balkan Wars, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and the immediate aftermath of World War I. The Second World War and the post-war peace agreements (1938-1948) led to a surge of over 20 European cases of mass expulsion. Decolonization across Africa and Asia (1960-1980) and the end of the Cold War period (1981-1989) brought another wave of expulsion episodes as new states emerged following the collapse of colonial empires and as new governments vied to maintain and control power. The end of the Cold War in the 1990s saw political upheaval across the world with the first Gulf War, the collapse of Yugoslavia, the aftereffects of the Rwandan genocide, and the persecution of the Rohingya. All led to various mass expulsion episodes. As indicated by the continued expulsions in the last two decades examined (2000-2020), this instrument of demographic engineering remains favored by governments around the world.

Over the last fifty years an average of 1.56 expulsions have been initiated per year, or three expulsions every two years.

While Figure 3 indicates that the absolute number of mass expulsion events initiated has remained steady during the period examined, because the number of countries in the world increased in the latter half of the twentieth century, the relative number of expulsions has decreased over time. In the two peak periods (1912-1914 & 1944-1947) the number of countries in the state system actively expelling was between 7-11 percent. Since 1960, as more states arrived in the world system, the peak proportion of states expelling has been four percent (in 1964, 1978, & 1979). Figure 4 illustrates the number of active mass expulsion events during 1900-2020. To indicate the pervasiveness of this phenomenon, in 92 of the 120 years catalogued there was at least one ongoing mass expulsion event somewhere in the world.




Figure 4: Active mass expulsion episodes (1900-2020)

The duration of mass expulsion episodes, presented in Figure 5, indicates how long each expulsion event lasted. This data contains some uncertainty because while the starting

point of an expulsion episode is usually clear, its end date is less so. Nevertheless, mass expulsion is marked by a relatively short duration, compared to other related phenomena: 66 percent of cases lasted one year or less and 87 percent lasted two years or less. Only seven cases in the dataset (5 percent) lasted four years or more. The duration of genocide and politicide episodes, by comparison, is typically over three years (59 percent), with 45 percent lasting more than six years.<sup>102</sup> The expulsion data matches the intuition that a strategy of removal is more expeditious than one of destruction.




Figure 5: Duration of mass expulsion episodes

Geographically, mass expulsion occurs all over the world—no region has been spared (see Figure 6). Europe & Central Asia tops the chart with 51 cases (37 percent) in the period examined, with 73 percent of those incidents occurring in the first half of the twentieth century. Sub-Saharan Africa comes next with 31 percent of total mass expulsion events, all concentrated in the latter half of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century. The Middle East & North Africa (MENA), East Asia & Pacific, and Latin America & the Caribbean regions all hover around 10 percent each of total cases. South Asia and North

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<sup>102</sup> Harff & Gurr, 1988.



America were the least likely to expel with 3 percent and 1 percent, respectively, of the total caseload.




Figure 6: Number of mass expulsion episodes by world region

To see how the regional variation has changed in more recent years, the grey bars in Figure 6, show the geographic distribution of mass expulsion during 2000-2020. While the top three expulsionist regions remain the same, sub-Saharan Africa moves to the top (46 percent) followed by MENA (18 percent), with Europe & Central Asia moving down to third (14 percent). The rest of the regions remain in the same order when compared to the full period, although East Asia & Pacific's share rises (tied with Europe), and North America drops out of the sample with zero expulsion events during the last twenty years.

To determine if a small group of states was driving the geographic distribution of the data, distinct expulsionist countries, by region, are depicted in Figure 7. The results reveal that 61 countries account for the 139 expulsion events examined. Intra-regional variety in expulsionist states is shown by the relatively high proportion of countries expelling in five of

the seven regions with four over 30 percent (Sub-Saharan Africa, MENA, South Asia, and North America), and a fifth (Europe & Central Asia) just under at 27 percent.




Figure 7: Number of distinct expulsionist countries and proportion of expelling countries, by region

The mass expulsion data show that the phenomenon is widespread, recurring, and is implemented on a large scale. Although quantitative data on the number of persons expelled is imprecise as indicated in the methods section, low- and high-end estimates were collected from numerous sources. The sources indicate that from 1900-2020 between 30.35 million and 42.90 million persons were expelled. Figure 8 shows the minimum number of people removed in an expulsion episode. Just over one-third of expulsion cases (47) affected 5,001-50,000 persons, with another third (48) affecting 50,001-250,000. Seventeen percent of the cases (23) were small-scale expulsions with 5,000 or fewer persons expelled. The remaining 14 percent (21) expelled more than 250,000. Only five cases of expulsion removed more than one million persons.




Figure 8: Total number of persons expelled per expulsion episode  
(minimum estimates)

The GSME dataset documents four different categories of persons expelled: nationals, foreign nationals, resident aliens, and refugees. Oftentimes governments that claim to exclusively target non-citizens also sweep up citizens in their expulsions. Since the foundation of expulsion is group-based removal, legal status is often irrelevant (or at least less relevant) to the expelling regime. Therefore, to exclude cases of non-citizen expulsion, which much of the existing scholarship on ethnic cleansing does, is to overlook a large portion of expulsion events.

Over half of the 139 expulsion events examined—78 episodes, or 56 percent—targeted citizens of the expelling state. However, of those 78 episodes, only 47 incidents (34 percent of the total caseload) *exclusively* targeted citizens (see Figure 9). Almost all of the 47 cases that only targeted citizens occurred in Europe (89 percent) and 74 percent of those incidents took place in the first half of the twentieth century. The heavy focus in the existing

literature on European ethnic cleansing,<sup>103</sup> may explain why non-citizen expulsions have been largely overlooked.

The fact that only 12 cases of citizen-only expulsion occurred after 1950 may at first glance seem to indicate that the customary international law against expelling citizens has diffused around the world. But, on the contrary, the evidence suggests that expelling states have simply modified their strategy by removing citizens simultaneously with non-citizens. There are 31 documented cases (22 percent) of hybrid, citizen and non-citizen expulsions, of which 26 cases (84 percent) have occurred after 1950. These hybrid expulsions include the removal of citizens and a variety of combinations of foreign nationals, resident aliens, and refugees.




Figure 9: Percentage of total expulsion episodes by category of persons expelled


Perhaps surprisingly, the plurality of expulsion cases during 1900-2020 targeted only non-citizens (44 percent), a fact not captured in the existing literature. Most of these non-citizen expulsions (67 percent) targeted foreign nationals and/or resident aliens. The remaining 33

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<sup>103</sup> Naimark, 2001; Mann, 2005; Ther, 2014; Bulutgil, 2016.

percent expelled foreign nationals and/or resident aliens along with refugees (18 percent), or exclusively targeted refugees (15 percent). Refugees are often swept up in the expulsion of other non-citizens with 16 different states across four regions—East Asia & Pacific, MENA, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa—expelling refugee populations, *en masse*.

Finally, Map 1 shows the frequency of mass expulsion among the 61 countries that have implemented expulsion policies. Fifty-six percent of the countries in the dataset have expelled more than once: 21 percent have expelled twice, 18 percent have expelled three times, 7 percent have expelled four times and 10 percent five times or more. The remaining 44 percent of countries have implemented a policy of mass expulsion only once.



Map 1: Frequency of mass expulsion, 1900-2020

Since this dataset includes states with varying durations of existence as modern nation-states, one might conclude that these findings are biased against countries like Turkey, Bulgaria, and Greece (with seven to eight expulsion events each), which were sovereign for the full 120 years examined. Perhaps it is also unfair to compare new states that emerged in the latter half of the twentieth century with older states built on historic expulsions before 1900, such as the United

States, France, and England. Nevertheless, younger states such as Kenya, Libya, Uganda, and Burma have each expelled four to five times. Length of statehood does not seem to be a prerequisite for repeated use of mass expulsion. The frequency data support the finding of genocide researchers that governments with records of past mass atrocities are more likely to be repeat offenders.<sup>104</sup> Therefore, the GSME dataset could help inform early warning and prevention systems, providing researchers with a new list of high-risk countries for mass expulsion to complement those for genocide.

### **2.3 Taxonomy of Mass Expulsion**

While a variety of typologies of genocide and mass killing have been developed,<sup>105</sup> and some of ethnic cleansing,<sup>106</sup> none exist for mass expulsion. Typologies proposed by genocide scholars most frequently classify their cases by the perpetrator's objective or motivation.<sup>107</sup> Rather than creating a typology of mass expulsions, I have instead inductively used my GSME dataset to create a taxonomy of mass expulsion which maps the 139 expulsion events into four distinct categories based on the government's implicitly or explicitly stated motivation to expel: removing a fifth column, anti-colonialism, nativism, and counterinsurgency/reprisal. Figure 10 shows the distribution of the four types across the total sample of 139 expulsion events.

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<sup>104</sup> Harff, 2003.

<sup>105</sup> Smith, 1987; Harff & Gurr, 1988; Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990; Fein, 1990; Valentino, 2004.

<sup>106</sup> Bell-Fialkoff, 1999; Mann, 2005; Ther, 2014. These three scholars (two sociologists and one historian) offer 35 different types of ethnic cleansing based on diverse classification criteria. Bell-Fialkoff (1999) presents eight different categories, or "dimensions," of ethnic cleansing: historical; geographic; paradigmatic; ideological; strategic; economic; and temporal (51-56). Mann proposes 18 kinds of "violence and cleansing in intergroup relations" based on different types of cleansing combined with types of violence (2005: 12). And Ther (2014) proposes two typologies, one historical, similar to Bell-Fialkoff, and one based on "empirical findings" which describe the "character of ethnic cleansing"<sup>106</sup> (231-252). There is a proliferation of different types of ethnic cleansing but no consistent classification criteria.

<sup>107</sup> Straus, 2001: 368-369.

The plurality are fifth column expulsions (33 percent), followed closely by counterinsurgency/reprisal (31 percent) and nativism (27 percent) expulsions. The anti-colonialism type is the smallest, with nine percent.

Figure 10: GSME cases by expulsion type		
Phase of Nation-building	Target Group Threat	
	<u>Security</u>	<u>Economic</u>
	<u>Establishing</u>  Fifth Column (33 percent)	Anti-Colonialism (9 percent)
<u>Consolidating</u>	Counterinsurgency/ Reprisal (31 percent)	Nativism (27 percent)

These four types are based on the government's view of the target group as a real or alleged threat and the relevant phase of nation-building. The real or perceived threats posted by the target group—either security or economic—indicate the type of danger that the government believes the group poses. Security threats concern both territorial and political control of the state such as challenges to a state's sovereignty or claim to authority; relations with enemy external powers; secessionist movements; inter-state disputes; and “refugee warriors.”<sup>108</sup> Economic threats relate to the control of state resources, industries, assets, and employment opportunities. Threats that governments identify may be genuine, based on specific actions or events, or perceived based on false or manufactured information. In the latter case, government officials may use propaganda to win internal support and persuade public opinion.

<sup>108</sup> See footnote 50.

In short, the threats that motivate mass expulsion are those that affect the security or economic interests of the expelling state.

These threats combine with phases of nation-building to determine the type of, or motivation for, mass expulsion. The phase of establishing the nation is the process by which newly created states define their membership: who is included in, and who is excluded from, the demos. Given that this dataset examines the 120 years between 1900-2020, the nation establishing phase encompasses the creation of new nation-states after the collapse of empires, the emergence of new states after the end of colonial rule, and state expansion or contraction through territorial annexation or the cession of territory, respectively. Conversely, the nation consolidating phase is the process by which existing states re-define their membership as the composition of the nation changes over time because of emigration, immigration, and other demographic shifts. To operationalize these phases, the first 15 years after a state gains its independence, or the first five years after territorial changes to state borders, are categorized as in the establishing phase of nation-building; and a state is considered in the consolidating phase of nation-building after 15 years of independence or changes to its borders. Although not all 139 expulsion events fit precisely in the four specified categories,<sup>109</sup> most cases are accurately captured by the types outlined, which are described in detail below.

**Fifth Column Expulsions** (*security threat, establishing phase of nation-building*): Fifth column expulsions target groups that are believed to pose an existential security threat to the territorial

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<sup>109</sup> Empirically, all 139 expulsion episodes were coded into one of the four quadrants of the 2x2 taxonomy. Of the 59 expulsions that took place in the nation-establishing phase, four cases did not fit the operational criteria (Côte d'Ivoire, 1958; Libya, 1970; Cambodia, 1970 & 1975). And of the 80 expulsions that took place in the nation-consolidating phase, three cases did not fit (Uganda, 1970; Algeria, 1975; Bangladesh, 1978).



integrity of the state, most often based on their real or alleged ties to an external “kinstate.” These expulsions typically occur in the wake of imperial collapse (e.g., Ottoman Empire), following territorial annexation or cession (e.g., Germany’s *Anschluss*, 1938; Bulgaria, 1940), or in the aftermath of war as populations are “unmixed” to fit newly drawn borders (Turkey, 1923; Czechoslovakia, 1945). Governments engaged in expelling fifth columns seek to remove “disloyal” minorities as they homogenize their populations. Turkey removed its Christian minorities to become a Turkish-Muslim state (1913-1923), Israel expelled Palestinians to create a Jewish state (1947-1949), and Hungary removed Slovaks to establish a state for the majority Magyars (1946). The idea of homogenous nation-states, and the congruence of national and political boundaries, is the core of the Gellnerian explanation of nationalist sentiment and that is why this type of mass expulsion closely aligns with the establishing phase of nation-building.<sup>110</sup>

The modalities of fifth column expulsions are unilateral force or transfer (59 percent), bilateral population “exchange” agreements (26 percent), or multilateral population “transfers” or “exchanges” (15 percent). At the beginning of the twentieth century, particularly after the First World War, negotiated treaties to “unmix” populations, however involuntary, were widely viewed as the best solution for the maintenance of international peace and security.<sup>111</sup> However, by mid-century population transfers and exchanges fell out of favor and the usage of these agreements drastically declined, although they still have their proponents.

Fifth column expulsions comprise a third of the total cases in the mass expulsion dataset, 46 of 139 episodes (33 percent). Of the 46 instances, 85 percent occurred in Europe

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<sup>110</sup> Gellner, 1983.

<sup>111</sup> Frank, 2017: 28-29.

& Central Asia, with the remainder in Africa (Niger, 1963; DRC, 1964; Eritrea, 1998), East Asia (Cambodia, 1975; Vietnam, 1978), and MENA (Israel, 1947; Egypt, 1956). The predominance of European cases in this category aligns with the current literature that explains the drivers of expulsion as a combination of inter-state wars, territorial conflict and revanchism, extreme ethnonationalism, and utopias of homogeneity.<sup>112</sup> One possible reason for the lack of fifth column expulsions in other regions, particularly sub-Saharan Africa, is the stability of borders and the principle of *uti possidetis* in the post-colonial period. Most fifth column expulsions (78 percent) occurred in the first half of the twentieth century, but this form of mass expulsion could reappear with the emergence of new states, or changes to existing borders (e.g., Kosovo or Nagorno-Karabakh).

**Anti-Colonialism Expulsions** (*economic threat, establishing phase of nation-building*): Like fifth column expulsions, anti-colonialism expulsions occur in the establishing phase of nation-building, but rather than targeting populations that present a security threat, these governments seek to remove an economic threat, typically posed by “alien” minorities. During the colonial period, European commercial, mining, plantation, and urban centers attracted people throughout their empires seeking jobs and economic opportunities. As part of the colonial divide-and-rule strategy, Europeans preferred allegedly “industrious” outsiders to native inhabitants to keep the majority population economically, and in turn politically, subservient. These alien groups, or “strangers” as they were often called,<sup>113</sup> served as intermediaries between the colonizer and the colonized as traders or civil servants (Burma,

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<sup>112</sup> Bell-Fialkoff, 1999; Naimark, 2001; Mylonas, 2012; Ther, 2014; Bulutgil, 2016.

<sup>113</sup> Skinner, 1963; Shack & Skinner, 1979.

1962; Uganda, 1972), or as laborers in the colonial resource extraction machine (Sierra Leone, 1968; Ghana, 1969; Zambia, 1971). In the aftermath of colonial rule, economic independence often did not follow political independence and alien populations that controlled key sectors of the economy were targeted for expulsion to empower the “indigenous” population, however defined by the government.

Some might wish to label this category “middlemen minority” expulsions, however, it was not just alien middlemen (e.g., Asians in Uganda), those dominating the commercial, petite-bourgeoisie class who were expelled. Similar colonial-induced migrants, sometimes referred to as “enterprising African<sup>114</sup> foreigners,” such as bureaucrats, doctors, teachers, carpenters, and other skilled workers (e.g., Congolese in Gabon, 1962) were also expelled. Therefore, the anti-colonialism type encapsulates government policies to remove both alien middlemen as well as skilled workers and professionals that had been previously favored by the colonial regimes. Removing them “completed” the process of decolonization.

Anti-colonialism expulsions are the smallest proportion of the four types of mass expulsion: 13 episodes, or nine percent. These expulsions are concentrated in three regions—former colonies throughout Sub-Saharan Africa (69 percent), East Asia (23 percent), and MENA (8 percent). All but two of the cases (Indonesia, 1958; Libya, 1970) targeted fellow colonial subjects, many from neighboring countries. Pan-African and Pan-Asian sentiment quickly fell away as economic decline and inequality persisted. This type of expulsion occurred in the two decades between the late 1950s and late 1970s during decolonization when many countries began building their newly independent states. Since the colonization of territories

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<sup>114</sup> This could refer to “enterprising foreigners” from any region.

has been largely eliminated, anti-colonial expulsions are the least likely to occur in the present time. However, if currently occupied territories obtain their independence, such as the West Bank or Western Sahara, we could see a revival of this form of expulsion, targeting settlers.

**Nativism Expulsions** (*economic threat, consolidating phase of nation-building*): Nativism mass expulsions target groups that pose an economic threat to the state in the consolidating phase of nation-building. In these expulsions groups are accused of undermining the economic opportunities of the indigenous population and usurping their rights as natives. Governments state that they seek to remove these groups to improve conditions for national labor by nationalizing the labor force and riding the country of foreigners (Cuba, 1933, 1937; Uganda, 1970), or to remove a strain on the local economy (Bangladesh, 1978, 1992; Iran, 2007; France, 2009). Others falsely accuse the targets of undercutting domestic wages (United States, 1954) or appropriating the national wealth (Mexico, 1931; Honduras, 1969), and/or taking employment opportunities for natives in specific sectors, including trade and unskilled work (Republic of Congo, 1977; Angola, 2003). Expulsions motivated by nativism sometimes falsely accuse the target group of increasing crime in urban areas or for not being law-abiding residents (Chad, 1979; Kenya, 1980). In some of these cases the target group is scapegoated and branded as exclusively responsible for the fiscal woes of the state in times of economic crisis or decline (United States, 1929; Nigeria, 1983; Dominican Republic, 1991).

In many cases governments brand the target population as “illegal aliens” or “illegal immigrants,” regardless of their documentation status. Economic chauvinism is pervasive in these cases with governments justifying their expulsions to nationalize labor, augment native job creation, and increase wages by eliminating foreigners who work for a pittance. In many

nativism cases, the executive promises that the removal of the expellees will solve domestic economic problems. However, since the root causes are not successfully addressed via expulsion, the problems are not resolved and the same group is often targeted for expulsion multiple times (e.g., Mexican agricultural workers in the U.S., 1929 & 1954; Haitian sugarcane cutters in the Dominican Republic, 1991, 1996 & 1999; and Congolese diamond miners in Angola, 2003, 2008 & 2011).

Just over one quarter (27 percent) of the expulsion cases in the dataset are nativism expulsions. It is the only type that includes episodes in all seven world regions, the most in Sub-Saharan Africa (51 percent), Latin America & the Caribbean (22 percent), and MENA (8 percent). Nativism expulsions occur throughout the entire period examined, beginning in 1929 and continuing through 2018. These expulsions are likely to persist into the future given the default temptation among politicians to blame foreigners when domestic economies slump.

**Counterinsurgency/Reprisal Expulsions** (*security threat, consolidating phase of nation-building*):

Counterinsurgency/reprisal mass expulsions are motivated by a real or perceived security threat (like fifth column expulsions) in the consolidating phase of nation-building. In these cases, the expelling government is not trying to establish the nation but is instead trying to consolidate and strengthen the nation after migration or demographic changes altered the ethnic make-up of the state. Threats that motivate counterinsurgency/reprisal expulsions can be internal or external and include alleged domestic rebel or secessionist movements (Burma, 1991; Yugoslavia, 1990s), inter-state disputes (Turkey, 1964; Iraq, 1971), support for the hostile side in third-party conflicts (Peru, 1942; Saudi Arabia, 1990), and “refugee warriors”

(Thailand, 1979; Tanzania, 1996). These expulsions aim to remove entire populations branded as insurgents and/or to retaliate against a neighboring state.

Counterinsurgency/reprisal expulsions make up nearly a third of the total cases examined (31 percent). They occur throughout the entire period of study (the first instance in 1937 and the last in 2018) and in six of seven world regions (the majority in Sub-Saharan Africa, MENA, and Europe & Central Asia). While the counterinsurgency and reprisal elements of this type of expulsion occasionally go together, a plurality of these cases (47 percent) are instances of reprisal (e.g., Algeria, 1975; Mauritania & Senegal, 1989), most often in retaliation for a border or foreign policy dispute. Others (42 percent) are more clearly counterinsurgency expulsions (Israel, 1967; DRC, 1995) targeting groups seen to be internally dangerous to the state; and a smaller portion (14 percent) are a mixture of both counterinsurgency and reprisal elements (French Somaliland, 1967; Kuwait, 1991). This type of expulsion is likely to continue as climate change puts increasing strain on natural resources—potentially erupting in inter-state disputes over water and grazing rights—and as the size and duration of refugee flows increase with protracted intra-state conflicts.

Table 4 classifies each of the 139 mass expulsion events in the dataset by the type outlined in the taxonomy. Mass expulsions are motivated by security threats (fifth column & counterinsurgency/reprisal) in 64 percent of the cases, and by economic threats (anti-colonialism and nativism) in 36 percent of expulsions. To date, most of the research on mass expulsion (and ethnic cleansing) has been confined to the left side of the taxonomy depicted in Figure 10, where security threats drive the decision to expel. However, the new dataset presented here identifies nearly 40 percent of events that are not a result of security considerations, obliging us to widen our understanding of the drivers of mass expulsion.

<b>Table 4: Types of mass expulsion</b>	
Fifth column	46 (0.33)
Counterinsurgency/reprisal	43 (0.31)
Nativism	37 (0.27)
Anti-colonialism	13 (0.09)

All four expulsion types target citizens and non-citizens for removal, indicating the importance of incorporating both categories of persons into the analysis of this phenomenon. However, of the 47 expulsion episodes that *only* targeted citizens (34 percent), all are confined to fifth column and counterinsurgency/reprisal expulsions, indicating a security driver for citizen-only expulsion. Since much of the existing scholarship has excluded non-citizens from its analysis, it is perhaps not surprising that security explanations for mass expulsion are predominant. Hybrid expulsions, targeting citizens and non-citizens, and exclusively non-citizen expulsions are found across all four expulsion types.

The taxonomy also indicates that 42 percent of expulsions occur in the establishing nation-building phase (fifth column & anti-colonialism), while 58 percent occur in the consolidating nation-building phase (counterinsurgency/reprisal & nativism). This suggests that mass expulsion is not an outdated phenomenon confined to the emergence of new states, but rather a recurrently available government policy used to re-establish and consolidate the preferred demographics of the state and remove unwanted populations.

One of the challenges in determining the causes of mass expulsion is to ensure that like cases are being compared. The reasons motivating the Tatmadaw in Burma to expel the Rohingya (counterinsurgency expulsion) were not the same as those motivating the Nigerian government to expel African migrants (nativism expulsion), despite both using the same demographic engineering policy. The taxonomy presented here helps to clarify distinct

government motivations that lead to similar policies of mass expulsion. It also sheds light on how the two strands of the literature—war- and non-war explanations—can co-exist in our understanding of the phenomenon of mass expulsion.

## **2.4 Framework of Government Expulsion Decision Making**


Based on comparative historical research and detailed process tracing of governments similarly motivated to expel, where one does and the other does not, this manuscript presents a new framework conceptualizing the process of government mass expulsion policy decisions. Mass expulsion is a top-down, state-driven phenomenon therefore macro-level factors are central in explaining its constraints. Figure 11 illustrates the three contributing factors that enable or constrain mass expulsion policy choices: alliances, target group “homeland” state(s),<sup>115</sup> and the international community. In different situations some of these factors may be more or less salient. What is important in determining a government’s decision to expel is the relative strength of the constraints, compared to the enablers, and whether the constraints can be successfully overcome. The framework does not intend to suggest that governments progress through Figure 11 sequentially, but rather that each factor is considered in deciding to proceed, or not, with mass expulsion implementation. Each factor will be examined in turn.

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<sup>115</sup> In cases where expulsion targets non-citizens, the “homeland” state is the expellees’ state of citizenship; in cases where citizens (or stateless persons) are expelled, the homeland state is the state to which the expelling government believes the expellees belong, e.g., U.S citizens of Mexican descent expelled to Mexico (1929; 1954) or Rohingya expelled from Burma to Bangladesh. The latter is an example of expelling a stateless population that the government views as belonging to another state, e.g., Burmese government officials referring to Rohingya as “illegal Bengalis” despite many living in Burma for generations.



**Figure 11: Framework of Mass Expulsion Decision-Making Process**



One of the first considerations for a government contemplating mass expulsion is the effect of the policy on its domestic allies—political, military, business, etc. If expulsion politically or economically benefits its key friends and constituents, then it becomes more likely. Political gains from removing the target group may include eliminating internal political opposition or removing a security threat to the ethnonational state, as defined by the dominant group in

control of the government. Economic gains from removing the target may range from appropriating the assets and income of an economically successful minority or opening new employment opportunities by removing an ethnic group concentrated in a specific labor sector or that held key positions in the bureaucracy or in desirable skilled trades. If the governing executive believes expulsion will help consolidate its domestic alliances via the political or economic gains outlined, then this policy option becomes more attractive. Whereas if the joint interests of the executive and its internal allies would be harmed by expulsion, or if the payoffs are mixed, then the decision is likely to be constrained.

In addition to domestic alliances, transnational alliances—financial and military—are another determining factor in governmental expulsion decisions. These transnational alliances may be formal (treaties, agreements, defense pacts) or informal (strong trade relations, preferential arms sales) relations with external states or with foreign multi-national corporations (e.g., Royal Dutch Shell, Anglo American). States with core transnational alliances that are indifferent to or support expulsion, are enabled to expel. Indifference may manifest among key transnational allies by simply “looking the other way” or continuing business as usual in the face of the expulsion. Support occurs in cases where transnational allies have a common interest in removing the target group from the territory as in the case of Soviet, French, and Italian support to Mustafa Kemal and his Nationalist Army in removing Greece (and Greeks) from the soon-to-be Turkish state. However, in other cases governments may be concerned that expulsion would harm their transnational relationships or that those allies would oppose the decision to expel. This harm may result from real or anticipated instability and loss of confidence in the existing government, or damage to political ties and

trade relations. The joint dynamics of domestic and transnational alliances greatly influence government expulsion decisions, and either enable or constrain their policy choices.

Alliances are not the only important factor in decision-making regarding expulsion. Governments contemplating this policy option also must consider the reaction of the homeland state of the target group. The response or anticipated response of this state—often, but not always, a neighboring state—is a key aspect of the decision-making process. A government will evaluate both the strength of its ties with the homeland state—strong or weak—as well as whether the homeland state would respond to expulsion by acquiescing and resettling the expellees or by resisting and denying them entry. Importantly, the ability to deny entry to the expellees is contingent on the geography of the border region and the capacity of the homeland state.

While in some cases more than one homeland state is affected—e.g., Britain and India in the case of Uganda’s 1972 expulsion, or Ghana and other West African states in the case of Nigeria’s 1983 expulsion—governments’ decision calculus is typically based on the homeland state of the majority of the expellees. Since Asians with British citizenship were most of the target group in 1972 Uganda (approximately 50,000 of 80,000 expelled), the effect on Britain was more of a factor in Idi Amin’s decision than India, which only had 5,000 citizens living in the country at the time. Similarly, when Nigerian President Shagari expelled 1-2 million West African migrants in 1983, most of the expellees (estimated at 700,000-1,000,000) were Ghanaian, so Ghana was the primary homeland state of concern.

Finally, both a government’s ties with the international community and its response or anticipated response to an expulsion, also play a critical role in decision making. The international community is defined here to include “Great Powers” (in the early twentieth

century before the creation of international organizations), international organizations (League of Nations, UN and agency affiliates, IMF, World Bank, ICRC), and regional bodies (African Union, ECOWAS, ASEAN, SADC). Strong ties with the UN and respective regional bodies constrains expulsion because of concerns about damaging relations with, and status within these organizations, whereas weak ties will ease removal. In addition, the international community can enable expulsion by supporting, facilitating, or ignoring the policy, or it can resist the decision by pressuring governments to change course. Overt support from the international community most often appears in facilitating or backing bi-lateral or multi-lateral population “transfer” or “exchange” treaties.<sup>116</sup> But international support also materializes in the physical extraction of expellees from a territory on behalf of the government, as the UNHCR and ICRC did in 1972 Uganda. The international community also signals its indirect support by ignoring expulsion decrees, or small-scale expulsions, that may be testing the waters for larger events as in Uganda in 1970 (expulsion of Kenyan Luo) and early 1972 (expulsion of Israelis). However, the international community can also play a critical constraining role through resistance in the face of imminent or planned expulsion decisions as they did with the emerging Turkish Republic in 1923 at the Lausanne Conference, exempting the Orthodox Greeks in Istanbul from the population exchange.

In sum, not all governments motivated to expel implement an expulsion policy. Their decisions are conditional on the effect of expulsion on their alliances, the homeland state of the target group, and the international community. This framework of mass expulsion decision making explains why we do not see more expulsions, given the many countries that may be

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<sup>116</sup> Examples include Bulgaria/Greece 1919; Bulgaria/Romania 1940; Poland, 1944; Soviet Union, 1945; Czechoslovakia, 1945; Yugoslavia, 1945, among many others.

motivated to expel. While each of the three factors laid out here influence expulsion decision making on its own, it is when these factors operate in combination that the constraint on expulsion policy implementation is strongest. Importantly, not all three of the key elements weigh equally on the minds of government officials. In different cases, some factors may take primacy over others. Nevertheless, all influence the discourse of mass expulsion within the executive and shed light on how governments decide to expel.

Having presented the new taxonomy and framework of mass expulsion decision making, Chapters 3-6 will apply them to six different historical case studies. We begin in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars.

## **PART II. Empirical Evidence**

### CHAPTER 3. “Turkey for the Turks”: Greek Orthodox in the Ottoman Empire

Over the course of a decade, from 1913 to 1923, the Ottoman Empire reduced its Greek Orthodox Christian population from approximately 1.75 million<sup>117</sup> to less than 500,000.<sup>118</sup> The mass expulsion of the “Rum,” as Greek Orthodox Turkish nationals were known, coincided with the collapse of over 600 years of Ottoman rule and the birth of the Turkish Republic.<sup>119</sup> The removal of the Rum (“Romans” or Byzantines) spanned four wars—the First and Second Balkan Wars, World War I, and the Turkish War of Independence—and culminated in the first, internationally-sanctioned compulsory population exchange. Religion was used as the demarcation criterion: Turkish-speaking, Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox faith were forced from their homes in Turkey to Greece, and Greek-speaking, Greek nationals of the Muslim faith were forced from Greece to the new Turkish nation-state. In addition, refugees from Greece and Turkey, who had fled the two countries over the preceding decade, were prevented from returning to their homes and were required to adopt the citizenship of their country of refuge. According to the Allied Powers, the 1923 population exchange was

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<sup>117</sup> The size of the Greek Orthodox population in the Ottoman Empire during this period is estimated to be 1.5-2 million. A detailed discussion regarding population figures is included in the “*Population & Displacement Numbers*” section below.

<sup>118</sup> There is no precise figure of how many Greek Orthodox remained in the Turkish Republic in 1923. Ladas (1932) claims that 189,916 Rum of Turkish nationality were affected by the Lausanne Convention and were expelled between 1923 and 1926 (Ladas, 1932: 438-39). Estimates of the Greek Orthodox in Istanbul—exempted from the exchange—at the time of the Lausanne Conference were around 300,000 (Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 1922-1923: Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace, 1923: 318). Adding these two figures together, gives a rough estimate of just under 500,000 Greek Orthodox remaining in Turkey at the end of 1923 (including the 189,916 expelled in the subsequent three years).

<sup>119</sup> The Turkish Republic was officially declared on October 1923 with Mustafa Kemal as its first president, but the Ottoman Empire was *de facto* eliminated at the end of WWI in 1918.

necessary to bring sustainable peace. For those expelled from their ancestral homelands, never to return—both Orthodox and Muslim—it was an unjust sacrifice.

This chapter is organized into three parts. The first explains the contextual environment and predisposing conditions; description of the expulsion episode; the motivation for expulsion, per my taxonomy; and possible alternative explanations. The second part explains the critical factors—alliances, homeland state, and international community—that enabled the expulsion. Lastly, the final section examines the negative case of Istanbul.<sup>120</sup> This case highlights important constraints on mass expulsion to explain why the Istanbul Greeks were exempted from the 1923 population exchange and were temporarily<sup>121</sup> allowed to remain.

### **3.1 Contextual Environment and Predisposing Conditions**

#### *Greek Presence in Asia Minor*

The Greek presence in Asia Minor spanned millennia. For our purposes, a brief historical overview, beginning in the fourth century, must suffice. The Byzantine Empire, also known as the Eastern Roman Empire, ruled over Asia Minor for 1,123 years, from 330 until 1453.<sup>122</sup> It emerged when Constantine the Great, Emperor of Rome, decided to move the capital of

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<sup>120</sup> The imperial capital of the Ottoman Empire had a plethora of names with few people consistently using a single name. These names included Byzantium, Constantinople, Islambol (city of Islam), Stambul, Estambol, Kushta, Gosdantnubolis, Tsarigrad, Rumiyya al-kubra, New Rome, New Jerusalem, among many others (Mansel, 1996: xi). In 1926 the Turkish Post Office only accepted Istanbul (Mansel, 1996: 416), but the colloquial usage of “Istanbul” dates to the eleventh century. Some suggest Istanbul is an onomatopoetic transfer from the Greek phrase “eis tin Polin” or “to the city.” In much of the European archival materials the city is referred to as Constantinople, which Mansel (1996) states was “the name most often used in other languages” (xi). Here the name will be Istanbul; although names used in primary material quotations will be left unchanged.

<sup>121</sup> In 1964 the remaining 36,000-47,000 Greeks were expelled, mostly from Istanbul (Alexandris, 1983: 282; Alexandris, 2003: 119; Icdygu et. al, 2008: 372).

<sup>122</sup> Norwich, 2013: xxxvii.



the Roman Empire east and established a second, or “Eastern,” Rome with a new capital named in his honor: Constantinople. Byzantium reached its apogee under Basil the II, the Bulgar-Slayer, and its first great defeat came over 700 years after its founding, in 1071, to the Seljuk Turks, foreshadowing events to come.<sup>123</sup> In 1453 the expanding “House of Othman,” which gave its name to the Ottoman Empire, captured the Christian capital, Constantinople.<sup>124</sup> What remained of the Byzantine’s Christian Empire fell into Muslim hands. The famous Saint Sophia church was transformed into a mosque by twenty-one-year-old Sultan Mehmet, known as Mehmet the Conqueror.<sup>125</sup> For the next four and a half centuries the Ottomans ruled over large portions of Asia, Europe, and North Africa, forming a powerful multi-ethnic empire.

To govern its diverse empire the Ottomans established the “millet system” for peoples of the book: followers of Abrahamic, monotheistic religions; all pagans or non-believers had the Manichaean choice of conversion or the sword.<sup>126</sup> Each millet—the three largest were the Orthodox,<sup>127</sup> Armenian, and Jewish—was ruled by its respective religious authority, for example the Ecumenical Patriarchate had authority over the Greek Orthodox. The millets were subservient, but in return for ensuring their populations remained obedient to the Sultan, they were given complete autonomy over their religious institutions, civil courts, education systems, cultural associations, and tax collection, a portion of which was paid to Ottoman

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<sup>123</sup> Norwich, 2013: xxxvii.

<sup>124</sup> Norwich, 2013: xxxvii.

<sup>125</sup> Norwich, 2013: 381.

<sup>126</sup> Karpas, 1982: 148; Psomiades, 1968: 17.

<sup>127</sup> The Orthodox millet was composed of Orthodox dyophysites—Christians who believed that Jesus was both man and divine. This millet came under the jurisdiction of the Greek Patriarch but included Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbians, Albanians, Wallachians, Moldavians, Ruthenians, Croats, and Arab Christians among others. Orthodox monophysites—believers that Jesus only had one nature—were part of the Armenian millet under the jurisdiction of the Armenian Patriarch (Karpas, 1982: 146; Psomiades, 1968: 16).

authorities.<sup>128</sup> This system of separate and unequal was not a peaceful melting pot as is sometimes described but was a stable system of domination for centuries giving religious minorities significant autonomy and authority over their own affairs.

Greek Orthodox Christians were members of the Rum millet, a reference to Rome as the seat of Christianity, and were referred to as Rum or Romios. The word “Greek,” *Yunanli*, had no national significance until Greece gained its independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1830. Thereafter, *Yunanli* was used to describe citizens of the newly independent Greek state, and Rum continued to refer to Hellenes living outside of Greece, who were not Greek citizens, including those residing in the Ottoman Empire.<sup>129</sup>

Since Islamic law discouraged Muslims from engaging in commerce and banking, Christian populations, as well as Jews, dominated the economic and industrial sectors of the empire.<sup>130</sup> Rum were particularly prominent in commerce, shipping, manufacturing, banking, and foreign trade.<sup>131</sup> Trade with Europe increased significantly in the second half of the nineteenth century, augmenting the size of coastal trading hubs along the Aegean, particularly Smyrna, and Black Sea littoral controlled by Greek and Armenian merchants.<sup>132</sup> The Greek Orthodox population steadily grew over the nineteenth century largely because of Greek migration from the independent Kingdom of Greece. The Ottoman Empire offered more economic and entrepreneurial opportunities than the new Greek nation state and many left to join their kin on the eastern side of the Aegean.<sup>133</sup> Mid-century Ottoman railway concessions

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<sup>128</sup> Psomiades, 1968: 15-6; Alexandris, 1983: 24.

<sup>129</sup> Hirschon, 2003: xii; Oran, 2003: 98.

<sup>130</sup> Naimark, 2001: 19.

<sup>131</sup> Alexandris, 1982: 138.

<sup>132</sup> Morris & Ze’evi, 2019: 21.

<sup>133</sup> Clogg, 1982: 195; Alexandris, 1983: 49.

to the Great Powers opened the interior of the empire and corresponding vast trading opportunities. Ottoman Greeks set up trading posts and small shops along the rail lines and served as agents for the influx of foreign capital.<sup>134</sup> Although the Rum saw themselves as kin of the Greeks living in Greece, they traced their historical lineage back to Romano-Byzantine Constantinople.<sup>135</sup> They maintained cultural ties with the Greek population in the new nation-state, but politically were content within the Ottoman Empire.<sup>136</sup>

An important component of the long historical presence of Greek Orthodox in Asia Minor was the emergence of the pan-Hellenic nationalist idea known as the “Megali Idea,” or Great Idea. The core aim of this idea was to unite the Hellenic people within a single Greek nation-state, essentially reviving Christian Byzantium. The territorial scope of this idea included Epirus,<sup>137</sup> Macedonia, Thrace, western Anatolia, and the Aegean islands, which were all under Ottoman control before 1912. The culmination of the Megali Idea would be the recapture of Istanbul and its return to a Christian city.<sup>138</sup> Greek nationalist held firmly to this idea which guided Greek foreign policy for over a century.<sup>139</sup> The emotional connection with Byzantium was held to be stronger than that to ancient Athens.<sup>140</sup> But in the early twentieth century the Megali Idea was far from being realized with only 37 percent of the estimated seven million Greeks living in the Greek state by 1910.<sup>141</sup>

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<sup>134</sup> Llewellyn-Smith, 1998: 25-27.

<sup>135</sup> Oran, 2003: 98.

<sup>136</sup> Morris & Ze’evi, 2019: 25.

<sup>137</sup> Epirus is an historical region that is now shared between Albania and Greece.

<sup>138</sup> Alexandris, 1982: 137.

<sup>139</sup> Psomiades, 1968: 18; Alexandris, 1982: 137-38.

<sup>140</sup> Pentzopoulos, 1962: 26.

<sup>141</sup> Pentzopoulos, 1962: 27.

### *The “Sick Man of Europe”*

Throughout the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire acquired the unfortunate sobriquet, the “Sick Man of Europe,”<sup>142</sup> as its territory contracted and it lost much of its political status.<sup>143</sup> But its problems had begun earlier in the late eighteenth century, after which the Ottomans never won another war.<sup>144</sup> Serbia and Greece were the first subject peoples to break away from the Ottoman Empire, inspiring nationalist sentiment throughout the Balkans.<sup>145</sup> The Ottomans responded with a series of reforms known as *Tanzimat*, or reorganization. The reform period began in 1839 and ended with the first constitutional era in 1877. The Ottomans launched the reforms to quell nationalist movements within the empire by instituting Muslim and non-Muslim equality before the law. The idea of “Ottomanism” arose in this period to create Ottoman citizens that were defined secularly, based on territory, regardless of religious, ethnic, or linguistic affiliation.<sup>146</sup> Yet, the elimination of the millets, translated as “nations,” did not erase the cultural legacies of the institutions and the communities they comprised, both Muslim and non-Muslim.<sup>147</sup> The reform process ultimately failed with renewed war with Russia.

The Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878) led to further territorial losses, particularly in the Balkans.<sup>148</sup> The 1878 treaties of San Stefano and later the revised Treaty of Berlin, dictated by

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<sup>142</sup> This first appeared in print on May 10, 1860, in a *New York Times* article titled “Austria in Extremis” attributing the reference to Nicholas I of Russia (“Austria in Extremis,” 1860; Mylonas, 2012: 67).

<sup>143</sup> Naimark, 2001: 20.

<sup>144</sup> Anderson, 2008.

<sup>145</sup> Ladas, 1932: 5.

<sup>146</sup> Karpas 1982: 162.

<sup>147</sup> Karpas, 1982: 165.

<sup>148</sup> Morris & Ze’evi, 2019: 17-18.

European powers, also included substantive reforms for the empire's Armenian population such as increased autonomy, representation in local government, and security guarantees.<sup>149</sup> Soon after, the Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid II responded to these losses and concessions with an iron fist, overturning the reformist constitution, dissolving parliament, and resorting to repression.<sup>150</sup> The Armenians were the first to face his wrath.

### *Armenian Massacres (1894-1896)*

There is an immense literature on the origins of the Armenian conflict with the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent Armenian genocide.<sup>151</sup> This chapter only engages with the history of the Armenians to the extent that it shaped and influenced Ottoman policy in relation to the Greek Orthodox. Sultan Abdülhamid II believed the Treaty of Berlin concessions empowered secessionist minorities and increased Christian influence in the empire.<sup>152</sup> The Armenian patriarch's outreach to Russia, and the inclusion of minority protections and rights in the treaty, furthered Abdülhamid's suspicions about the loyalty of the Armenians and his fears that foreign interference would bring about Armenian statehood.<sup>153</sup>

Perceiving the Armenians as a security threat to the Empire, Abdülhamid responded with extreme repression. He outsourced the violence to a newly created paramilitary force, largely composed of Kurds, called the Hamidiye Light Cavalry Regiments, named after

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<sup>149</sup> Morris & Ze'evi, 2019: 18.

<sup>150</sup> Morris & Ze'evi, 2019: 39.

<sup>151</sup> Bryce & Toynbee, 2000 [1916]; Morgenthau, 2000 [1918]; Balakain, 2003; Dadrian, 1995; Bloxham, 2005; Akçam, 2006; Suny, 2015; Kieser, 2018; Morris & Ze'evi, 2019. These works on the Armenian genocide are simply illustrative, not an exhaustive list of scholarship.

<sup>152</sup> Morris & Ze'evi, 2019: 38.

<sup>153</sup> Morris & Ze'evi, 2019: 19.

himself.<sup>154</sup> The stated purpose of these regiments was to patrol the border with Russia and prevent territorial encroachment, but their deployment to heavily populated Armenian areas belied their true purpose.<sup>155</sup> By mobilizing the Kurds into the Hamidiye, Abdülhamid solved two problems at once. He suppressed the Armenian revolutionaries, killing an estimated 200,000 persons, and won over restive Kurdish tribes who had been imagining their own independence.<sup>156</sup> Although foreign powers had advocated for the Armenians during the Berlin treaty negotiations, they did little to intervene and stop the violence. These massacres foreshadowed the annihilation of the Armenians by the Young Turks, who deposed Abdülhamid in a coup after over three decades of his tyrannical rule.

### *The Young Turks*<sup>157</sup>

Sultan Abdülhamid II was not well liked by the army. The despotic ruler ignored the basic needs of his troops and they grew restless. Young cadets, mostly from the Ottoman's Balkan territories, and among its ruling elite, began mobilizing against the Sultan. Although these cadets had excellent military training, many abroad, they believed the Ottoman army was out of date and they were concerned about the shrinking Empire and its weak defenses.<sup>158</sup> Their political ideology centered on restoring the constitution and defending the fatherland.<sup>159</sup>

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<sup>154</sup> Morris & Ze'evi, 2019: 42.

<sup>155</sup> Morris & Ze'evi, 2019: 42.

<sup>156</sup> Morgenthau, 2000 [1918]: 192; Morris & Ze'evi, 2019: 486.

<sup>157</sup> Before the CUP Revolution in 1908, the word "Turk" was not a part of the Turkish language. It was appropriated from foreign languages that used the word as a pejorative. The revolutionaries known as the Young Turks, at the time, called themselves "New Ottomans" harkening back to the constitutional days of the late 1870s. In fact, supporters of the Palace first called these New Ottomans, *Jeunes Turcs*, or Young Turks in French, to express disdain toward what they perceived as foreign-influenced, infidel revolutionaries. The "Old Turks," the members of the old regime, thought of themselves as the true Ottomans and Mohammedans (Emin, 1930: 188). Today Young Turks is an idiom for any radical, revolutionary-minded group.

<sup>158</sup> Lewis, 2002: 206.

<sup>159</sup> Lewis, 2002: 206.

Growing frustrations bubbled over in 1908 with a series of mutinies and strikes across the empire from Anatolia to Rumelia.<sup>160</sup> The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) which had been secretly conspiring in Macedonia against the incompetent government, took leadership of the mutineers and called for the restoration of the constitution.<sup>161</sup> Turks, Armenians, Muslims, and Christians embraced and celebrated together in the streets; optimism for future unity and brotherhood was high.<sup>162</sup> Much of this optimism, particularly among the non-Muslim communities, was rooted in the belief that nothing could be as bad as Abdülhamid's reign.<sup>163</sup> But the Young Turks soon became as despotic as their predecessor.

The primary geopolitical aim of the Young Turks was to save the Ottoman Empire by restoring its sovereignty and protecting its territory. In restoring the constitution, the Unionist, as members of the CUP were known, "were Ottoman patriots rather than Turkish nationalists" fighting to restore the concept of "Ottomanism," uniting all persons within the empire, including minorities.<sup>164</sup> The CUP was not very Turkish and not very Muslim. Almost none of its leaders were "pure-blooded Turks," and most were secular in outlook.<sup>165</sup> Therefore, it is not surprising that their initial commitment was to Ottomanism rather than Turkish nationalism.

Although the Ottoman Empire was not a colony like India or Algeria, the Great Powers exerted significant influence over the empire's affairs through financing its public debt, regulating import/export duties, and meddling in the treatment of minorities through the

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<sup>160</sup> Lewis, 2002: 207.

<sup>161</sup> Lewis, 2002: 208.

<sup>162</sup> Ahmad, 1982: 401; Lewis, 2002: 210-11.

<sup>163</sup> Ahmad, 1982: 403.

<sup>164</sup> Ahmad, 1982: 406.

<sup>165</sup> Lewis, 2002: 212.

Capitulations.<sup>166</sup> The Capitulations were long-standing bilateral contracts between the Ottoman Empire and European powers, which expanded in the eighteenth century to include the right of Europeans to intercede on behalf of Christian minorities.<sup>167</sup> The Great Powers strategically used the Capitulations to interfere in the domestic affairs of the Ottoman Empire, and the Young Turks sought to break free from these semi-colonial chains.<sup>168</sup> However, while they despised European meddling, the Young Turks were not anti-Western; they sought to preserve the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and modernize the state in order to be seen as a peer of the powerful Western countries.<sup>169</sup>

While initially united in the restoration of the constitution, the Young Turks quickly divided into two main camps: the Unionist (CUP) who sought central authority and control, and the liberals who favored decentralization and autonomy for religious and national minorities—the latter divided into many factions.<sup>170</sup> The years between 1908 when the Young Turks first came to power, and the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) saw a dizzying power struggle between the Unionists, the Liberals, and the Porte. The details of this period are fascinating, but less relevant to the matter at hand. Suffice it to say, though the CUP came to power amid high hopes of unity and constitutionalism, it faced fierce opposition with competing visions of the empire, resulting in a bloody power struggle with each faction in control for brief periods. In the end, the CUP returned to power in a bloody coup d'état amid the tumultuous Balkan Wars and remained in power until the end of the First World War.

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<sup>166</sup> Ahmad, 1982: 403.

<sup>167</sup> Naimark, 2001: 20.

<sup>168</sup> Naimark 2001: 20-21.

<sup>169</sup> Ahmad, 1966: 305-06; Anderson, 2008.

<sup>170</sup> Lewis, 2002: 213.



*The Balkan Wars (1912-1913)*

In October 1912 the First Balkan War broke out over control of the Ottoman Empire's remaining European lands. Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria formed a secret alliance and defeated the Ottomans in six weeks.<sup>171</sup> In January 1913 the Young Turks returned to power in a coup d'état, fearing the Liberal Party cabinet would surrender Adrianople to Bulgaria leaving Istanbul vulnerable.<sup>172</sup> The subsequent peace treaty divided the spoils of the war, with Greece and Serbia the biggest winners. But disputes over the allocation of conquered lands left the situation unsettled. Bulgaria, unsatisfied with the allotment forced upon it, attacked Serbia and Greece, sparking the second war, which lasted barely a month.<sup>173</sup> The Ottomans, with the Unionists back in power, managed to regain portions of Eastern Thrace from Bulgaria in the second war, but the overall results were still disastrous.<sup>174</sup> The Second Balkan War formally ended on August 10, 1913, with the Treaty of Bucharest. The treaty granted Greece further territorial gains including Crete, a portion of Epirus, southern Macedonia, and the eastern Aegean islands.<sup>175</sup> The acquired islands put Greece mere miles from the Ottoman coast. Within a year the Ottoman Empire had lost more than 80 percent of its European lands and 70 percent of its European population.<sup>176</sup> Its European presence was essentially eliminated, ending over 500 years of territorial control.

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<sup>171</sup> Ladas, 1932: 10; Macartney, 1934: 138; Psomiades, 1968: 21; Mazower, 2004: 294.

<sup>172</sup> Morgenthau, 2000 [1918]: 10-11; Ahmad, 1966: 321.

<sup>173</sup> Psomiades, 1968: 22; Mazower, 2004: 297-98.

<sup>174</sup> Macartney, 1934: 139.

<sup>175</sup> Mylonas, 2012: 64.

<sup>176</sup> Akçam, 2012: xiv.

Population movements during the wars radically transformed the demographics of the repartitioned lands increasing nationalist sentiment and shaping population policies in its aftermath. The two wars displaced an estimated 890,000 persons, of which hundreds of thousands of Muslims<sup>177</sup> fled to the Ottoman Empire.<sup>178</sup> By 1914 the Ottoman Empire had become more than 85 percent Muslim.<sup>179</sup> Muslim refugees and migrants, known as *muhacir*, dispersed throughout the empire—along the coasts and into the Anatolian interior.<sup>180</sup> These populations became some of the fiercest advocates and proponents of expelling the Greek Orthodox.<sup>181</sup> Demographic and territorial changes contributed to growing nationalism in the Ottoman empire, which took on a new synthesis of Turkish and Islamic dimensions.

### *Turkish Nationalism*

The territorial losses of the Balkan Wars were different than any previous Ottoman dismemberment. Most of the previous losses were on the outskirts of the empire where there was minimal control and only nominal sovereignty. The Balkan territory, on the contrary, was “the life blood of the Ottoman Empire” and the home of many of the Young Turk<sup>182</sup> leaders.<sup>183</sup> This was personal. Although the winds of Turkish nationalism had been in the air before 1913, the Unionists had held firm in their commitment to Ottomanism and the preservation of the

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<sup>177</sup> A.A. Pallis (1925) notes that no records exist to precisely determine how many Muslims were killed or fled during the Balkan wars. However, he estimates the number is at least 125,000 (Pallis, 1925: 322-23); Ladas estimates 100,000 Turks fled the Balkans in 1912 and another 48,570 in 1913 (Ladas, 1932: 15).

<sup>178</sup> Mourelos, 1985: 389; Naimark, 2001: 27.

<sup>179</sup> Anderson, 2008.

<sup>180</sup> Kieser, 2018: 27.

<sup>181</sup> Naimark, 2001: 45; Mazower, 2004: 338.

<sup>182</sup> Unionist headquarters were in Salonika. After losing the city to Greece in the Balkan Wars of 1912 they moved to Istanbul (Lewis, 2002: 222).

<sup>183</sup> Ahmad, 1966: 320.

multi-ethnic empire. That ended in 1913. The party leaders became radical proponents of Turkish nationalism.<sup>184</sup>

After the Balkan Wars, the CUP's primary aim was to transform what remained of the Ottoman Empire into a Turkish nation-state. Influenced by sociologist Ziya Gökalp, the party sought to "Turkify" the country by creating a Turkish national identity in Ottoman Muslims.<sup>185</sup> The remaining territory of Asia Minor was deemed the Turkish homeland, *Türk Yurdu*, and the site of Turkification.<sup>186</sup> "Turkey for the Turks" became a popular nationalist slogan, likely drawn from similar European mantras of the time such as "Macedonia for the Macedonians" or "Poland for the Poles."<sup>187</sup> The trauma of the Balkan Wars led to the conclusion that only Muslims could be loyal to the empire; Christian communities were traitors, supportive of anti-Muslim tactics during the wars.<sup>188</sup> CUP leaders thought that non-Muslim minority populations posed an existential threat to the territory of the empire.<sup>189</sup> They had to be removed or eliminated.

### *Population & Displacement Numbers*

It is difficult to determine precise population and displacement figures during this period given their politicized nature and questionable measurement techniques. Turkish historian Taner Akçam argues that while it may seem that there is much disagreement between Greek and Turkish sources, the narratives are simply a mirror image of one another—one side's

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<sup>184</sup> Emin, 1930: 182; Kieser, 2018: 9.

<sup>185</sup> Üngör, 2008: 22.

<sup>186</sup> Kieser, 2018: 9.

<sup>187</sup> Mazower, 2004: 264; Üngör, 2008: 36.

<sup>188</sup> Emin, 1930: 193; Naimark, 2001: 27; Üngör, 2008: 23.

<sup>189</sup> Ladas, 1932: 13.

“voluntary” migrant is the other’s forcibly expelled refugee.<sup>190</sup> Therefore, statistics and evidence should be interpreted with knowledge of which side of the mirror one is examining.

Many of the figures in the existing literature come from Alexander Pallis and Alexandre Antoniadès—both Greek—which presents one side of the mirror. Pallis, held various positions with the Greek government<sup>191</sup> and data in his 1925 book, *Statistical Study of Racial Migrations in Macedonia and Thrace, 1912-1924*, is drawn from his own work on the ground as well as Greek government sources including the 1913 and 1920 censuses. Antoniadès, was a Greek civil engineer based in Istanbul, and published population figures in his 1922 work: *Le développement économique de la Thrace*. Stephen P. Ladas, another prominent Greek scholar of this period, was *attaché* to the Greek Embassy in Paris from 1921-1922.<sup>192</sup> The figures in his 1932 book, *The Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey*, are largely drawn from Pallis and Antoniadès, while adding some of his own information.<sup>193</sup> Ladas argues that while statistics were published by Turkish officials and the Greek Patriarchate, any pre-WWI statistics are unreliable: “the Ottoman Empire had no reliable statistics. All other statistics or maps are either subject to bias or purely speculative.”<sup>194</sup> He also stated that Balkan countries, including Greece, exaggerated their claims, making government-produced statistics unreliable. Other

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<sup>190</sup> Akçam, 2012: 90.

<sup>191</sup> Some of A.A. Pallis’s positions included Relief Officer in Macedonia (1913); Secretary-General of the Refugees’ Settlement Commission in Hellenic Macedonia (1914-1915); Deputy Governor-General of Salonika (1917-1918); Hellenic Commissioner for the re-settlement of Eastern Thrace and the Marmara littoral (1919-1920); and Hellenic Delegate on the Commission for the Exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey (1923-1924) (Pallis, 1925: 316).

<sup>192</sup> “Dr. Stephan Ladas,” 1976.

<sup>193</sup> Ladas, 1932: 17n15.

<sup>194</sup> Ladas, 1932: 9.

scholars support Ladas's claim, noting that Ottoman authorities historically underestimated the Christians present in the empire.<sup>195</sup>

On the other side of the mirror, Turkish historian Kemal Karpāt, steeped in Ottoman population statistics, wrote a 1985 book that compiled Ottoman demographic information from 1830 to 1914. Karpāt disagrees with Ladas: "the most consistently reliable sources of demographic data were the figures issued by the Ottoman government itself."<sup>196</sup> While acknowledging deficiencies and technical errors in the data—including general population undercounting, particularly of women—Karpāt agrees with the Greek sources, that population statistics were a crucial tool of political manipulation by various ethnic and religious groups.<sup>197</sup> He goes so far to say: "population statistics were the first weapons in the battle that was later carried forward with guns and bullets."<sup>198</sup> Nevertheless, since the two main purposes of the Ottoman census was to levy taxes on non-Muslims and conscript Muslim adult males into the military, Karpāt argues there were strong incentives for the information to be accurate.<sup>199</sup>

With that lengthy disclaimer, the sources largely agree that by 1914, the beginning of the period addressed in this chapter, there were between 1.5 and 2 million Greek Orthodox living in the Ottoman Empire.<sup>200</sup> The arguments and evidence outlined here are not dependent on precise population figures. It suffices to say that the size of the Greek Orthodox population in 1914 dramatically declined in the following decade as a direct result of the Ottoman government's mass expulsion policies.

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<sup>195</sup> Morris & Ze'evi, 2019: 24.

<sup>196</sup> Karpāt, 1985: ix.

<sup>197</sup> Karpāt, 1985: ix.

<sup>198</sup> Karpāt, 1985: 46.

<sup>199</sup> Karpāt, 1985: 9.

<sup>200</sup> Emin, 1930: 210; Macartney, 1931: 81; Ladas, 1932: 14; Pentzopoulos, 1962: 29-30 (cites "Polybius," 1910: 44); Karpāt, 1985: 45; Akçam, 2012: 262-63 (cites Karpāt, 1985); Morris & Ze'evi, 2019: 24.

### 3.2 Mass Expulsion of Greek Orthodox (1913-1923)

The mass expulsion of Greek Orthodox from the Ottoman Empire during 1913-1923 occurred in four phases: 1) the pre-WWI phase culminating in the first attempted population exchange between the Ottoman Empire and Greece; 2) the First World War phase (1914-1918), in which Greeks were not primarily targeted, but faced internal expulsion; 3) the Turkish War of Independence phase (1919-1922), in which civilian populations were expelled along with the retreating Greek armed forces; and 4) the final phase (November 1922-1923), the Lausanne Convention, part of the post-war Lausanne Peace Treaty, which agreed the first mandatory population exchange. These phases were cumulative, each building on the next, but were also distinct chapters in a larger governmental strategy of population removal.

#### *Phase 1: Pre-WWI, First Attempted Population Exchange (1913-1914)*

The Balkan Wars wounded Ottoman pride. The empire was diminished in both size and status. These losses were particularly distressing for the Young Turks, as many of the CUP leaders originated from the lost European territories. The shrinking empire was also saddled with hundreds of thousands of Muslim refugees, *muhacir*, in need of resettlement. Any lingering ethnoreligious solidarity crumbled with the Ottoman defeat in Europe. The Greek occupation of the Aegean Islands brought Greece perilously close to the prosperous Turkish coast, heightening concerns about securing the shoreline and resisting any further Greek conquests of over a million “unredeemed Hellenes.”<sup>201</sup> Anticipating those desires, and with the recent

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<sup>201</sup> Ladas, 1932: 20.

Ottoman-Bulgarian Protocol of Adrianople<sup>202</sup> in mind, the Young Turks began expelling the Rum.

The CUP knew that the Greek government would never willingly enter into an exchange agreement like Bulgaria, so they forced the issue by violently removing Orthodox Greeks from their homes.<sup>203</sup> They also hoped that these expulsions would pressure Greece to return the Aegean Islands that it had occupied during the Balkan Wars, and which the Allies had sanctioned.<sup>204</sup> In the months following the conclusion of the Balkan Wars, and into 1914, an estimated 100,000-270,000<sup>205</sup> Greeks were expelled from Eastern Thrace and Anatolia.<sup>206</sup> This deed was done by irregular bands of *chettés*, comprised mostly of Balkan refugees who had recently arrived, in collusion with Ottoman authorities.<sup>207</sup> Greek families were forced to flee through an official campaign of intimidation, threats, looting, and select killings—many Rum headed for Greece, just as the Ottomans wanted.<sup>208</sup>

Evidence for government involvement in, and direction of, these expulsions is found in a coded telegram from Interior Minister, Talat Pasha, to the District Governor on April 14, 1914: “‘Talat reports that a large number of Greek villagers had assembled on the coast and requests that it be ‘ensured that they emigrate by boarding steamships but without any

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<sup>202</sup> Previous international treaties facilitated “population exchanges” before 1923—the first following the Second Balkan War under the Protocol of Adrianople in 1913 as part of the Peace Treaty between the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria—but all were “voluntary” exchanges, although they were *de facto* compulsory (Macartney, 1934).

<sup>203</sup> League of Nations Archives (LNA), R84, 2/43317/31152: Article by A.A. Pallis, “The Exchange of Populations in the Balkans,” in the journal *The Nineteenth Century* (p. 378), March 1925; UN Archives at Geneva; Psomiades, 1968: 61.

<sup>204</sup> Pallis, 1925: 318; Llewellyn-Smith, 1998: 32; Psomiades, 2011: 217.

<sup>205</sup> LNA, R84, 2/43317/31152: Article by A.A. Pallis, “The Exchange of Populations in the Balkans,” in the journal *The Nineteenth Century* (p. 378), March 1925; UN Archives at Geneva.

<sup>206</sup> Pallis, 1925: 318; Ladas, 1932: 16; Macartney, 1934: 434; Psomiades, 1968: 62.

<sup>207</sup> Llewellyn-Smith, 1998: 31.

<sup>208</sup> Akçam, 2012: 55.

indication being given that [the process] is the result of [a government] directive.”<sup>209</sup> Not only did the government give directives, but it intentionally distanced itself from any evidence of involvement. The Ottoman government chartered steamships and provided free transport to Greece for the expellees.<sup>210</sup> Simultaneously, in 1913 and carrying into 1914, the Ottoman authorities organized an economic boycott<sup>211</sup> of Greek products and businesses with the goal of forcing Rum merchants to leave.<sup>212</sup> All these tactics, violent and non-violent, direct and indirect, were used to expel the Greek Orthodox population.

In May 1914 the Ottoman minister in Athens, Ghalib Kemaly Bey, wrote to Greece Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos to officially propose a population exchange on behalf of the Ottoman government.<sup>213</sup> Kemaly emphasized that this was the only way to bring peace to the region. Greece was keen to end the violence and believed an exchange could both assist in populating its newly acquired Balkan territories and in overcoming economic losses from the recent emigration of 1.5 million Greeks to the Americas during 1900-1914.<sup>214</sup> It was also believed that through a formal exchange, with an exchange commission, the expellees would be compensated for their losses.<sup>215</sup> Venizelos accepted the Ottoman proposal,<sup>216</sup> but insisted that the agreement be voluntary and that the properties of the emigrants should be appraised

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<sup>209</sup> Akçam, 2012: 71 (Cites Prime Ministerial Ottoman Archive: BOA/DJ.ŞFR, no. 40/11).

<sup>210</sup> Akçam, 2012: 77.

<sup>211</sup> Economic boycotts were a popular tool of protest in the Balkans: Greeks boycotted Bulgarian businesses and workers in 1907; Turks and Jews boycotted Austrian goods after the annexation of Bosnia in 1908; Turks boycotted Greek goods after the Cretan uprising, and Italian goods in 1911 after Italy invaded Libya (Mazower, 2004: 270).

<sup>212</sup> Akçam, 2012: 83.

<sup>213</sup> Macartney, 1934: 434; Mourellos, 1985: 393; Psomiades, 2011: 218; Akçam, 2012: 65.

<sup>214</sup> Psomiades, 2011: 219.

<sup>215</sup> Macartney, 1934: 435.

<sup>216</sup> The negotiated convention was drafted but never signed (LNA, R1617, 41/19720/19720: Commission Mixte de Smyrne: Projet de Convention, undated; UN Archives at Geneva & R1617, 41/19720/19720: Letter from H. Alitcha to Helmer Rosting, 24 Mars 1922; UN Archives at Geneva).



and liquidated by a Mixed Commission.<sup>217</sup> The Commission was established in Smyrna and began its work in August 1914, focusing on populations in Aydin Province (including Smyrna), Eastern Thrace, Greek Macedonia, and Epirus.<sup>218</sup> However, the outbreak of the First World War suspended the Commission's work and the exchange was never implemented.<sup>219</sup> Nevertheless, between the conclusion of the Balkan Wars in August 1913 and the Ottoman entry into WWI in November 1914, hundreds of thousands Greek Orthodox were expelled from the Ottoman empire.

While the 1923 Lausanne Convention is the most well-known population exchange agreement, conversations and plans to facilitate the exchange of Greek Orthodox and Muslim populations from the Ottoman Empire and Greece respectively, were in motion almost a decade before, interrupted only by contingent global events. The following phases of mass expulsion were all efforts to realize the spirit of the stymied 1914 exchange—the complete removal the Greek Orthodox population from Ottoman/Turkish soil.

#### *Phase 2: World War I (1914<sup>220</sup>-1918)*

After the Balkan Wars, aware of their isolated and weakened status and fearing Greek and Russian aggression, the Ottomans sought an alliance with a foreign power.<sup>221</sup> They first turned to the British and the French, but both refused support, driving them into the arms of the Germans.<sup>222</sup> The alliance with Germany was a return to the days of Sultan Abdülhamid II who

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<sup>217</sup> Ladas, 1932: 21; Mourelos, 1985: 394; Psomiades, 2011: 218.

<sup>218</sup> Psomiades, 2011: 218.

<sup>219</sup> Psomiades, 2011: 218.

<sup>220</sup> Phase 2 begins in November 1914 with the Ottoman entry into WWI and therefore does not overlap with Phase 1 (1913-1914) which ends in October 1914.

<sup>221</sup> Ahmad, 1966: 325.

<sup>222</sup> Emin, 1930: 57.

had established strong ties with the Germans in the late nineteenth century.<sup>223</sup> These relations frayed when the Young Turks sought to overturn all elements of the previous era. But unable to secure any other foreign backing, the Ottomans accepted German support. As early as January 1914, well before the outbreak of the Great War later that year, Germans held high-level positions in the Turkish military.<sup>224</sup> In July 1914, on the eve of the war, the Ottomans signed a defensive alliance with Germany “for the purpose of preserving peace.”<sup>225</sup> United States Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Henry Morgenthau Sr., described the German takeover of Ottoman military sovereignty in his memoirs. He quoted German Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Baron Von Wangenheim in August 1914: “we now control both the Turkish army and the navy.”<sup>226</sup>

While some scholars believe German attacks against Russia brought Turkey unwillingly into WWI,<sup>227</sup> others argue that the Ottomans were eager to enter to be free of foreign influence in their affairs, particularly regarding Armenia.<sup>228</sup> Furthermore, the Ottomans were already *de facto* at war with Russia in the Caucasus, so their formal entry was not a surprise.<sup>229</sup> There was a split in the Ottoman cabinet between those who were strongly against war and others, particularly Talaat and Enver Pasha, who were optimistic about the opportunities war might bring.<sup>230</sup> The anti-war cabinet members resigned after German

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<sup>223</sup> Aid from Germany in the 1880s led to Baghdad Railway concession, granting Germany permission to build a railway to Baghdad among other economic concessions (Emin, 1930: 38).

<sup>224</sup> Morgenthau, 2000 [1918]: 28.

<sup>225</sup> Emin, 1930: 67.

<sup>226</sup> Morgenthau, 2000 [1918]: 68.

<sup>227</sup> Emin, 1930: 75.

<sup>228</sup> Akçam, 2006: 118; Akçam, 2012: 131-32. The 1914 Armenian Reform Agreement with Russia was annulled in November 1914 after the Ottoman entry to the war on the side of the Central Powers.

<sup>229</sup> Akçam, 2012: 148.

<sup>230</sup> Morgenthau, 2000 [1918]: 83-84; Mansel, 1996: 370.

officers, on Turkish vessels, attacked Russia from the Black Sea without cabinet approval.<sup>231</sup> Russia immediately declared war on Turkey, followed by Britain and France on November 4. The Ottomans joined Germany and Austria on the side of the Central Powers.<sup>232</sup> The cabinet resignations left pro-war officials in charge of the Ottoman government, under the full control of the CUP.

Intuitively one might think that entry into the Great War would have expedited the ongoing Greek expulsions, however, it had the opposite effect. The Ottoman's new ally Germany wanted to court Greece, which had declared its neutrality in the war, to join the Central Powers. Thus, the Germans directed the Ottomans to stop expelling Greek Orthodox.<sup>233</sup> These orders were immediately implemented as seen in a cable from Talat Pasha to the provinces in November 1914, the same month the Ottomans entered the war: "in light of the state's current political situation, no attacks on or oppression of Greeks shall be allowed as such acts of oppression against them would not be appropriate."<sup>234</sup> The Rum expulsions of *Phase 1* came to an immediate end.

In *Phase 2*, because of a combination of German foreign policy desires and war contingencies, the Ottoman tactics toward the Greek Orthodox shifted from cross-border, external expulsion to internal expulsions.<sup>235</sup> The policy was focused on militarily securing the borders by removing an untrustworthy population from the Aegean and Black Sea coasts.<sup>236</sup>

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<sup>231</sup> Morgenthau, 2000 [1918]: 84.

<sup>232</sup> Emin, 1930: 77.

<sup>233</sup> Akçam, 2012: 99.

<sup>234</sup> Akçam, 2012: 75 (Cites Prime Ministerial Ottoman Archive: BOA/DJ.ŞFR, no. 46/133).

<sup>235</sup> Internal deportation is not the same as mass expulsion as defined in this manuscript (my scope conditions limit the concept to cross-border expulsions), but the Ottoman use of internal deportation is important for understanding the decisions of the government.

<sup>236</sup> Akçam, 2012: 97.

Not all coastal Rum were removed, just those in strategic areas that were militarily vulnerable.<sup>237</sup> From late 1914, until Greece's entry into the war in 1917, an estimated 500,000-550,000 Greek Orthodox were deported to the interior of the country.<sup>238</sup> Initially these deportations were concentrated among those along the Aegean coast, closest to Greece, but in later stages of the war, after Greece's entry, the Ottomans also targeted "Pontic Greeks" located along the southeastern coast of the Black Sea.<sup>239</sup> The Aegean deportations spiked during the Allied advance in the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus where, after an eight month struggle, the Ottoman military had its most significant victory in the war at the Battle of Gallipoli.<sup>240</sup>

Greek inhabitants in and around the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, as well as on islands in the Sea of Marmara, were targeted for internal expulsion. Many were deported on the orders of German General Liman von Sanders, who led the defense of the Gallipoli peninsula.<sup>241</sup> When western governments protested the expulsions, the Ottoman government responded that the target populations were in military zones and were therefore moved for military reasons.<sup>242</sup> Similarly, the Pontus expulsions were justified by Ottoman and German officials as a military necessity to protect the country's flanks and prevent fears of separatism.<sup>243</sup>

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<sup>237</sup> Akçam, 2012: 106.

<sup>238</sup> Psomiades, 2011: 223; Morris & Ze'evi, 2019: 385.

<sup>239</sup> Kieser, 2018: 355.

<sup>240</sup> The Entente Powers fought the Ottomans for control of the straits linking the Aegean to the Black Sea with their eyes on Istanbul. The Ottoman resistance was their only major victory in the War and is commemorated as "the place where the modern Turkish-Muslim nation had succeeded in defending its existence, 'our right to live'" (Kieser, 2018: 322). It also elevated the status Mustafa Kemal (Morris & Ze'evi, 2019: 387; Davison, 1965: 173).

<sup>241</sup> Morris & Ze'evi, 2019: 388.

<sup>242</sup> Morris & Ze'evi, 2019: 388.

<sup>243</sup> Kieser, 2018: 355.

Though the focus was on internal deportation, many Greek Orthodox fearing deportation fled to Greece<sup>244</sup> (and some to Russia)—a win-win outcome for the government.<sup>245</sup>

The entry of Greece on the side of the Allies in 1917 had important consequences for the outcome of the war, and for the future of the Greek Orthodox in the Ottoman empire. In January 1915, the Allies determined they needed Greece to assist with the Gallipoli campaign and made significant territorial promises to persuade Greece to join.<sup>246</sup> On behalf of the Allies, the British Ambassador to Athens, Sir Francis Elliott, dangled the territories of Northern Epirus, the Dodecanese islands (except Rhodes), and the western coast of Asia Minor in front of Greek Prime Minister Venizelos if Greece abandoned its neutrality.<sup>247</sup> The Greek government was divided on what to do: Venizelos, a strong supporter of the Megali Idea, was eager to join the Allies and potentially reap significant territorial gains; whereas King Constantine wished to remain neutral. Unable to reconcile, Venizelos broke away and established his own government in Salonica, where he joined the Allies and declared war on the Central Powers.<sup>248</sup> The Greek governmental schism officially ended in June 1917 with the abdication of the Greek King. Not surprisingly, Orthodox internal deportations rapidly increased in late 1917 after the Greek entrance on the Allied side.<sup>249</sup>

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<sup>244</sup> The Secretary General of the Greek High Commission in Smyrna estimated that 105,000 Greek Orthodox left for Greece during the war, but this is likely an underestimate (Llewellyn-Smith, 1998: 34). After the war the Allies authorized between 140,000-180,000 Greek civilians to return to their homes who were expelled from the empire before and during the war (see page 93). It is not clear how many were expelled before Turkey entered the war in November 1914 and how many left during the war (Pallis, 1925: 318-9; Ladas, 1932: 16).

<sup>245</sup> Morris & Ze'evi, 2019: 385.

<sup>246</sup> Pentzopoulos, 1962: 34-35; Psomiades, 1968: 23.

<sup>247</sup> Pentzopoulos, 1962: 34-35.

<sup>248</sup> Pentzopoulos, 1962: 35.

<sup>249</sup> Morris & Ze'evi, 2019: 392.

Four years after the Ottomans entered the war, they unconditionally surrendered with the signing of the Armistice of Mudros on October 30, 1918.<sup>250</sup> The simultaneous collapse of the Macedonian and Palestinian fronts had left the Ottomans exposed in the east and the south; by this time most of the Arab lands were already lost to the British.<sup>251</sup> The Ottomans, exhausted and with no defenses left, resigned in defeat. The armistice was negotiated in Mudros harbor on the British ship HMS Agamemnon.<sup>252</sup> In general, the Ottoman government and the Turkish people viewed the armistice agreement as fair, if not favorable. The Sultanate and Caliphate remained intact and although the empire was reduced in size, it still existed—the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres two years later would not be as generous.<sup>253</sup> Ottoman officials were most concerned about two articles in the agreement: Articles VII and XXIV. Article VII stated: “The Allies to have the right to occupy any strategic points in the event of any situation arising which threatens the security of the Allies” and Article XXIV: “In case of disorder in the six Armenian vilayets, the Allies reserve to themselves the right to occupy any part of them.”<sup>254</sup> The Ottomans viewed these articles as mechanisms for continued foreign intervention and ripe for abuse by minority nationalists.<sup>255</sup> Their instincts were right. In fact, it was not the terms of the armistice but the abuse of its terms that infuriated Turkish nationalists.<sup>256</sup>

### *Phase 3: Turkish War of Independence (1919-1922)*

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<sup>250</sup> Üngör, 2008: 27.

<sup>251</sup> Zürcher, 1998: 266; Davison, 1965: 174.

<sup>252</sup> Zürcher, 1998: 270.

<sup>253</sup> Zürcher, 1998: 273.

<sup>254</sup> Maurice, 1943: 85-87.

<sup>255</sup> Zürcher, 1998: 271.

<sup>256</sup> Zürcher, 1998: 274; Emin, 1930: 272.

Of the four expulsion phases considered here, the largest occurred during the Turkish War of Independence. May 1919 to September 1922 was a rollercoaster of competing nationalist aspirations. The period began with the realization of the Greek Megali Idea, uniting Hellenes within the Greek nation-state and those along the Ottoman Aegean littoral, albeit very briefly. And it ended with a Turkish nationalist revival, re-conquering some of territory lost in the Treaty of Sèvres. The former brought Greek Orthodox expellees back to their homes along the Aegean coast; the latter removed almost all traces of Ottoman Greeks from the country.

The Turkish War of Independence, known in Greece as the Asia Minor Catastrophe, or “the Catastrophe,” was a continuation of the war for Turkish sovereignty and freedom that began in 1913 and ended with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.<sup>257</sup> In the spring of 1919, empowered by the Allied victory and their promised territorial gains, Greece invaded Turkey before the Treaty of Sèvres was finalized.<sup>258</sup> British Admiral Calthorpe, who had negotiated the Armistice of Mudros just a few months before, informed Aydin’s Turkish Governor that the Greeks would occupy the area the next day based on Article VII of the armistice: the precise article the Turks had feared at its signing.<sup>259</sup> Many competing interests were at play: the Greeks sought to realize the Megali Idea, the Italians were advancing north from their occupation of Antalya to try to gain Smyrna as promised in a secret agreement during WWI, and the British wanted to block the Italian advances and therefore tacitly supported the Greek invasion—the Greeks got their way with British and French backing.<sup>260</sup>

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<sup>257</sup> Mazower, 2004: 356.

<sup>258</sup> Hirschon, 2003: 5.

<sup>259</sup> Morris & Ze’evi, 2019: 429.

<sup>260</sup> Psomiades, 1968: 27-28; Lewis, 2002: 240-41; Morris & Ze’evi, 2019: 429.

Twenty thousand Greek troops disembarked in Smyrna before advancing further into Ionia, the areas surrounding Smyrna. On the heels of the Greek troops were an estimated 140,000-180,000 Greek civilians—removed from Smyrna and Eastern Thrace before and during the war—who sought to re-inhabit their former homes.<sup>261</sup> The Allies had agreed, in November 1918, that Orthodox Greeks who had fled their homes in the Ottoman Empire during the war would be entitled to return home, a decision the Turks strongly resisted.<sup>262</sup>

Shortly after the Greek occupation of Western Anatolia, the victorious Allied powers signed the Treaty of Versailles in June 1919, ending the state of war between the Allies and Germany. However, it was not until a year later in August 1920 that the Levant-related Treaty of Sèvres was completed and signed. This treaty decapitated the Ottoman Empire and *de facto* proclaimed its final demise.<sup>263</sup> The Treaty of Sèvres was devastating for the Ottomans, promising multiple partitions of the empire. The empire lost all its European lands and some Aegean islands (to Greece); Armenia (to independence); Syria, Mesopotamia, and Palestine (to Allied administrative mandates); Hedjaz and the holy sites of Mecca and Medina (to independence); Egypt and Cyprus (to Britain); Morocco and Tunis (to France); and a string of islands in the Aegean Sea (to Italy).<sup>264</sup> The treaty also reinstated the Capitulations granting the Allied Powers large economic concessions.<sup>265</sup> Istanbul and the straits were deemed an “international zone” and occupied by the British. Although the new Sultan was *de jure* still in control, he was effectively an Allied stooge.<sup>266</sup>

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<sup>261</sup> Pallis, 1925: 318-19; Ladas, 1932: 16.

<sup>262</sup> Morris & Ze’evi, 2019: 393.

<sup>263</sup> Kieser, 2018: 399.

<sup>264</sup> Treaty of Sèvres, 1920. The territorial allocations outlined are from Articles 83/84, 88, 94, 98, 101, 116, 118, 120, 122, respectively.

<sup>265</sup> Treaty of Sèvres, 1920 [Article 261].

<sup>266</sup> Mansel, 1996: 381, 396; Anderson, 2008.



The treaty authorized a “reciprocal and voluntary emigration” of Turks and Greeks in the exchanged territories;<sup>267</sup> and compelled Turkey to allow the return of “the Turkish subjects of non-Turkish race who have been forcibly driven from their homes by fear of massacre or any other form of pressure since January 1, 1914.”<sup>268</sup> Before the treaty text was finalized, on August 10, 1920, Italian troops landed at Antalya (April 1919), Greece invaded western Anatolia (May 1919), and Britain occupied Istanbul (March 1920). These events roused Turkish nationalism in the heart of Anatolia and mobilized the Turkish resistance; the Treaty of Sèvres was additional fuel to the nationalist fire.<sup>269</sup> Importantly, Turkey never ratified the treaty.<sup>270</sup>

Not satisfied with their occupation of the Aegean coast, the Greek army pushed further east in July 1921 toward the newly established Turkish capital in Angora (today’s Ankara).<sup>271</sup> Hoping to displace Kemal’s government, by August Greek troops were 40 miles from Ankara on the banks of the Sakarya River.<sup>272</sup> Mustafa Kemal rallied his troops from disappointing defeats the year before and halted the Greek advance forcing them to retreat west. This victory won Kemal international attention and put the world on notice that he and his new government were the real leaders of the country.

In 1922, Turkish envoys to London and Paris attempted to negotiate a peaceful end to the war with Greece. But the Allies refused.<sup>273</sup> In the summer of 1922, the Greek army, weakened by internal divisions and regime change in Greece, was defeated by Mustafa Kemal’s

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<sup>267</sup> Treaty of Sèvres, 1920 [Article 143].

<sup>268</sup> Treaty of Sèvres, 1920 [Article 144].

<sup>269</sup> Psomiades, 1968: 31; Zürcher, 1998: 273-74.

<sup>270</sup> Psomiades, 1968: 30.

<sup>271</sup> Naimark, 2001: 45.

<sup>272</sup> Naimark, 2001: 45; Mazower, 2004: 341.

<sup>273</sup> Davison, 1965: 196.

forces in the final phase of the war and retreated to the Aegean coast using scorched earth tactics along the way.<sup>274</sup> Greek civilians followed the retreating Greek army, some on military orders,<sup>275</sup> and others in fear of Turkish reprisals.<sup>276</sup> The Turkish army entered Smyrna, on the morning of September 9, 1922 with no resistance.<sup>277</sup> The Allied Powers—Britain, France, Italy, and the U.S.—watched events unfold from their ships in the harbor but did not come to the aid of the Greeks.<sup>278</sup> The scene was chaos. Tens of thousands crowded into public buildings and along the quay desperately seeking transport across the Aegean Sea to Greece. In panic many jumped into the sea and attempted to swim to the allied ships, others crammed into small boats which capsized.<sup>279</sup> Four days later, the city burned to the ground.<sup>280</sup> Given the disorder, and risk of the fire to the masses of people along the quay, the Turkish authorities permitted the Allies to assist in transporting Orthodox Christians to Greece.<sup>281</sup> Simultaneously, the Turkish government deported an estimated 100,000 males, aged 18-45, inland to hold hostage as prisoners of war, and no doubt as potential bargaining chips during future peace negotiations.<sup>282</sup>

Shortly after the Greek withdrawal from Anatolia, the British reluctantly accepted the *fait accompli* of the Turkish victory. Britain signed the Armistice of Mudanya on October 11, 1922, pledging to return Smyrna, Eastern Thrace, the Straits, and Istanbul to Turkey, and

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<sup>274</sup> Hirschon, 2003: 5.

<sup>275</sup> ACICR Mis 15-5/524/1341; Proces-Verbal: Rapport de M. Burnier, délégué du C.I.C.R. à Constantinople, 27.11.1922.

<sup>276</sup> Morris & Ze'evi, 2019: 434.

<sup>277</sup> Morris & Ze'evi, 2019: 435.

<sup>278</sup> Psomiades, 2011: 222.

<sup>279</sup> Naimark, 2001: 47-48.

<sup>280</sup> Pentzopoulos, 1962: 46-47; Naimark, 2001: 49-52; Psomiades, 2011: 222. The origins of the fire are debated—the Turks blame an Armenian conspiracy, Greek historians blame the Turks (Naimark, 2001: 51-52).

<sup>281</sup> Naimark, 2001: 50; Morris & Ze'evi, 2019: 450.

<sup>282</sup> Morris & Ze'evi, 2019: 448.

authorizing a peace conference in Lausanne, Switzerland.<sup>283</sup> By the end of the month another 250,000 Rum followed the departing Greek troops overland from Eastern Thrace to Greek-controlled Western Thrace.<sup>284</sup> Similar to their strategy in 1913 with the Bulgarians, and in 1914 with the first, proposed, Greek-Turkey exchange agreement, the Turks sought to create a *fait accompli* and expelled as many Orthodox as they could in the fall of 1922.<sup>285</sup> It is estimated, that in the months leading up to the Lausanne Conference over one million Greek Orthodox were expelled to Greece.<sup>286</sup>

#### *Phase 4: Lausanne Conference & Exchange of Populations (1922<sup>287</sup>-1923)*

The Lausanne Conference began on November 20, 1922, in Lausanne, Switzerland on the banks of *Lac Lemán* at the Hôtel du Château. Delegates from the relevant Allied Powers—Great Britain, France, Italy, and the United States—attended along with representatives from Greece and Turkey. The aim of the conference was to create peace in the Near East and relitigate the defunct Treaty of Sèvres, redrawing the boundaries of the soon to be Turkish Republic. Ismet Pasha, Minister of Foreign Affairs, led the Turkish delegation to Lausanne and was its lead negotiator; Eleftherios Venizelos was the lead for Greece.<sup>288</sup> The conference lasted eight months, with a three-month hiatus in the middle, much longer than the Allies had anticipated. The reason was Ismet Pasha's obstinate negotiating tactics, refusing to be treated like the defeated empire it was in 1918, and instead negotiating from a position of strength as

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<sup>283</sup> Pentzopoulos, 1962: 47; Lewis, 2002: 254; Morris & Ze'evi, 2019: 455.

<sup>284</sup> Morris & Ze'evi, 2019: 453.

<sup>285</sup> Morris & Ze'evi, 2019: 456.

<sup>286</sup> Hirschon, 2003: 6; Morris & Ze'evi, 2019: 465.

<sup>287</sup> Phase 4 begins with the peace conference in November 1922.

<sup>288</sup> Pentzopoulos, 1962: 52; Davison, 1965: 199.

a new nation-state, victorious in war.<sup>289</sup> The conference culminated with the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne on July 24, 1923 and the ratification by Turkey and Greece on August 23 and August 25, respectively.<sup>290</sup>

A wide range of issues were tackled at the conference by three different commissions—Territorial and Military Questions, the Régime of Foreigners, and Economic and Financial Questions—and 13 corresponding sub-commissions tasked with thematic areas of concern, including demilitarizing the frontiers of Eastern Thrace; protecting minorities; legal/economic status of foreigners; financial questions, public debt, and reparations; ports, waterways, and railways; and sanitary matters, just to name a few.<sup>291</sup>

The third sub-commission of the first commission was the Exchange of Populations, and it held 24 meetings from December 2, 1922 to January 24, 1923.<sup>292</sup> The output of the sub-commission was the Lausanne Convention, signed on January 30, 1923, distinct and separate from the peace treaty of the same name, and arguably the most transformative aspect of the peace. The convention enacted the first internationally sanctioned, compulsory population exchange between two countries. The first article outlined who would be exchanged from Turkey and Greece, respectively. Although the convention title refers to an “exchange of populations” the criteria set in Article 1 establish a clear case of expulsion—a compulsory

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<sup>289</sup> Davison, 1965: 200.

<sup>290</sup> League of Nations Archives (LNA), R1618, 41/33595/807: Letter from Erik Colban to Mr. O’Molony, 26 January 1924; UN Archives at Geneva.

<sup>291</sup> Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 1922-1923: Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace, 1923.

<sup>292</sup> LNA, C1112/8/N15: Sub-Commission for Exchange of Populations Meeting Minutes, December 1922; UN Archives at Geneva; Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 1922-1923: Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace, 1923; Conférence de Lausanne sur les affaires du proche-orient, 1922-23: Recueil des actes de la Conférence, 1923.

removal, of a religious group, on the grounds of belonging to that religious<sup>293</sup> group, without individual legal review, and denying the expellees' right to return. It may seem strange for the new Turkish nation-state, with a leader fiercely committed to secularism, to have agreed to a religious criterion for expulsion. However, since many Greek Orthodox spoke Turkish and were not part of a single race, just as Muslims in Greece spoke Greek and were racially distinct from the Muslims of Anatolia, linguistic and racial criteria would not have sufficed.<sup>294</sup> Religion was the only criterion that united these national minorities.

The goal of removing national minorities is clear in the Convention's title—*Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations*—not the exchange of Greek Orthodox, or Christians, and Muslims.<sup>295</sup> Article 1 of the Convention created new refugees:

“As from the 1st May, 1923, there shall take place a compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals of the Moslem religion established in Greek territory. These persons shall not return to live in Turkey or Greece respectively without the authorisation of the Turkish Government or of the Greek Government respectively.”<sup>296</sup>

An estimated 355,635 Muslims from Greece and 189,916 Rum Orthodox from Turkey were affected by this article between 1923 and 1926.<sup>297</sup>

Article 3 affected the largest number of persons and endorsed the *fait accompli* of their forced expulsion. This article denied the right to return to both Greek and Muslim refugees who fled Turkey and Greece, respectively, at any time in the previous decade: “Those Greeks

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<sup>293</sup> A.A. Pallis (1925) argued that “the test of religion was...well chosen as being the one least likely to give rise to difficulties of interpretation” in LNA, R84, 2/43317/31152: Article by A.A. Pallis, “The Exchange of Populations in the Balkans,” in the journal *The Nineteenth Century* (p. 380), March 1925; UN Archives at Geneva.

<sup>294</sup> Ladas, 1932: 378.

<sup>295</sup> Ladas, 1932: 380.

<sup>296</sup> LNA, S356, 21/Dossier 5: Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations [Translation reprinted from the *British Treaty Series*—No.16/(1923).], 30 January 1923; UN Archives at Geneva.

<sup>297</sup> Ladas, 1932: 438-39.

and Moslems who have already, and since the 18th October, 1912,<sup>298</sup> left the territories the Greek and Turkish inhabitants of which are to be respectively exchanged, shall be considered as included in the exchange provided for in Article 1.”<sup>299</sup> This article disproportionately impacted Greece. The country had already received approximately one million Orthodox refugees following the defeat of the Greek army in 1922.<sup>300</sup> But it also included the hundreds of thousands of Muslims who had fled Greek territories during or after the Balkan Wars, albeit a much smaller population.

Article 7 accompanied Article 3 and denationalized these refugee populations who were denied the right to return; however, it did not make the refugees stateless because it immediately provided them the nationality of their new “home” country:

“The emigrants will lose the nationality of the country which they are leaving, and will acquire the nationality of the country of their destination, upon their arrival in the territory of the latter country. Such emigrants as have already left one or other of the two countries and have not yet acquired their new nationality, shall acquire that nationality on the date of the signature of the present Convention.”<sup>301</sup>

Article 2 outlined exemptions from the exchange: “The following persons shall not be included in the exchange provided for in Article 1: (a) The Greek inhabitants of Constantinople. (b) The Moslem inhabitants of Western Thrace.”<sup>302</sup>

This second article created national minorities. However, because the Convention defined the expellees in religious, rather than national terms (e.g., Orthodox Christians rather

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<sup>298</sup> October 18, 1912 was the day Greece declared war on the Ottoman Empire in the First Balkan War.

<sup>299</sup> LNA, S356, 21/Dossier 5: Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations [Translation reprinted from the *British Treaty Series*—No.16/(1923).], 30 January 1923; UN Archives at Geneva.

<sup>300</sup> Oran, 2003: 100.

<sup>301</sup> LNA, S356, 21/Dossier 5: Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations [Translation reprinted from the *British Treaty Series*—No.16/(1923).], 30 January 1923; UN Archives at Geneva.

<sup>302</sup> LNA, S356, 21/Dossier 5: Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations [Translation reprinted from the *British Treaty Series*—No.16/(1923).], 30 January 1923; UN Archives at Geneva.

than Greeks), the Turks were able to deny the presence of national minorities in their territory, insisting they only had religious minorities.<sup>303</sup> This explains the important linguistic distinction between Greek Orthodox (*Rum Ortodoks*) and Greeks (*Yunanlı*), the latter being nationals of the Greek state.<sup>304</sup> Approximately 240,000 persons were exempted under Article 2—130,000 Muslims in Western Thrace and 110,000 Greek Orthodox in Istanbul, roughly equal populations on both sides.<sup>305</sup> Throughout the Convention the word “emigrants” was used in reference to those being expelled, neither “expulsion,” nor “expel,” appear in the text.

The remaining articles of the convention outlined the role and duties of the Mixed Commission charged with overseeing the exchange of populations and the liquidation of the movable and immovable property and assets of the expellees. The treaty came into force after the ratification of the Lausanne Peace Treaty in August 1923. Because most of the Greek Orthodox population in Turkey had already departed by January 30, 1923, the signing of the Convention was largely a *fait accompli*, like the 1913 Ottoman-Bulgarian Convention. By refusing the return of any Greek Orthodox who left after October 18, 1912, the day Greece declared war on the Ottoman Empire in the First Balkan War, the Lausanne Convention finalized a process that began over a decade before.

While senior diplomats negotiated the terms of the Convention, exchanging people like cattle, the public outrage was immense. Greek refugees angrily protested not being allowed to return to Turkey, their country of birth and ancestral homeland for centuries. Refugees in Salonica, Greece protested against the “disgraceful bartering of bodies to the detriment of

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<sup>303</sup> Alexandris, 2003: 118.

<sup>304</sup> Alexandris, 2003: 118.

<sup>305</sup> Oran, 2003: 100; Alexandris, 2003: 118.

modern civilization.”<sup>306</sup> Many of these refugees saw themselves as Ottomans, and Anatolian Christians, not Greeks and thus felt like strangers in their new land.<sup>307</sup> The Muslims in Turkey also rejected the idea of leaving their homes in Greece and moving to a foreign land, abandoning their lives and livelihoods.<sup>308</sup> In addition to the outcry of the expellees themselves, international public opinion was also against the idea of a mandatory, forcible exchange of populations.<sup>309</sup>

In response to the public outcry, the Lausanne Convention delegates fiercely denied the paternity of the compulsory population exchange.<sup>310</sup> Yet in the end they agreed and supported its implementation. Turkey for the Turks had been achieved. Although a Mixed Commission was established to oversee the exchange of populations and compensation for their properties, by 1930 the Angora Convention abandoned all attempts at individual appraisals—the Greek and Turkish governments agreed to “wipe the slate clean” and most expellees were not properly compensated.<sup>311</sup>

### **3.3 Expulsion Motivation: Removing a Fifth Column**

The expulsion of the Greek Orthodox is well documented by scholars across a range of disciplines including history, law, and social science, as well as in the memoirs of government officials, survivors, and their descendants. Of the four types of mass expulsion explained in this dissertation, the fifth column category presented here is the most prominent and well-

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<sup>306</sup> Mazower, 2004: 344.

<sup>307</sup> Mazower, 2004: 360.

<sup>308</sup> Ladas, 1932: 340.

<sup>309</sup> Ladas, 1932: 340.

<sup>310</sup> Ladas, 1932: 340; Pentzopoulos, 1962: 62; Psomiades, 2011: 213.

<sup>311</sup> Macartney, 1934: 447.



treated in the literature. As noted in Chapter 2, this is likely because of the large scholarly focus on European mass expulsions, of which many episodes fit into the fifth column type.

Defining this case of mass expulsion as the removal of a fifth column is not a novel interpretation. Scholars seeking to explain why the Rum expulsion occurred have pointed to the Greek Orthodox connection to the Greek nation-state as a critical determining factor.<sup>312</sup> And, research on comparative eliminationist policies that seeks to either explain or describe expulsion has previously included case studies on the Greek Orthodox expulsion episode.<sup>313</sup> There are three novel aspects to my treatment. First, fifth column mass expulsions are a specific type of expulsion, and the case of the Greek Orthodox is illustrative of a larger pattern of government motivations for expulsion when security threats are coupled with nation-building. Second, this is the first study to introduce Istanbul as a negative case, where the Greek Orthodox were also a “fifth column” but were not removed. Third, I use League of Nations archives as evidence for my claims, documenting the discourse of mass expulsion among the key officials involved in deciding and negotiating the fate of the Rum population.

After the Balkan Wars the Unionists shifted their political strategy from preserving the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire to creating a modern Turkish nation-state. This shift began at the outset of the period examined here (1913) and culminated in the declaration of the Turkish Republic in October 1923. The four phases of Greek Orthodox expulsion took place during the height of Turkish nation-building and the establishment of the new Turkish national identity that defined a “Turk” as a (Sunni) Muslim. This historical resume places the Rum expulsion episode in the top row of Figure 12.

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<sup>312</sup> Mylonas, 2012; Bulutgil, 2016.

<sup>313</sup> Naimark, 2001; Lieberman, 2006; Bulutgil, 2016; Frank, 2017.

Figure 12: Taxonomy of mass expulsion – Ottoman Empire, 1913-1923			
Target Group Threat			
		<u>Security</u>	<u>Economic</u>
Phase of Nation-building	<u>Establishing</u>	Fifth Column	Anti-Colonialism
	<u>Consolidating</u>	Counterinsurgency/ Reprisal	Nativism

During this phase of establishing the Turkish nation, the Ottoman/Turkish government had two main security concerns: 1) the territorial integrity of the Ottoman/Turkish state, and 2) ending foreign interference in their domestic affairs. These threats were heightened after the Balkan Wars in which Greece nearly doubled in size, at the expense of Ottomans lands, coupled with Greece's occupation of eastern Aegean Islands bringing it closer than ever to the Ottoman coast.<sup>314</sup> Well aware of the Megali idea, CUP officials feared that Greek territorial ambitions would not cease with the new boundaries outlined in the Treaty of Bucharest and they would continue pressing east toward Aydin Province on the Aegean coast.<sup>315</sup> The loss of almost all of its European territory was a significant shock and blow to Ottoman officials and it impacted their view of the loyalty of

<sup>314</sup> Pentzopoulos, 1962: 27-28.

<sup>315</sup> Bulutgil, 2016: 117.

their subject populations. Loyalty was now equated with religion: Muslims were loyal and non-Muslims were disloyal. The latter were traitors by virtue of their spiritual kin.<sup>316</sup>

This shift in perceived loyalty was crucial in the government's appraisal of the threat posed by the non-Muslim, "non-Turkifiable," populations within the shrunken empire.<sup>317</sup> The Greek Orthodox population was regarded as a national minority, "a part of the population akin in race, language or religion to the neighboring state," in this case Greece.<sup>318</sup> Ottoman/Turkish officials identified Greek Orthodox Turkish nationals as an existential security threat to the survival of the state.<sup>319</sup> They had to be removed to eliminate this threat. In addition, Christian minorities in general, including the Greek Orthodox, but not exclusively, had been the main pretext for Great Powers involvement in Ottoman internal affairs.<sup>320</sup> After the Greek occupation of Smyrna in 1919, it was alleged that the Rum minority and the Greek Patriarchate had collaborated with the Greek military offensive, fueling security perceptions of implacable Greek irredentism.<sup>321</sup>

A fifth column is defined as, "a group within a country at war who are sympathetic to or working for its enemies."<sup>322</sup> The origin of the phrase in English dates from the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) during which Spanish General Mola, advanced toward Madrid with four columns of soldiers and declared that he had a fifth column within the city itself.<sup>323</sup> Although the concept's origin dates after the this case study, the phenomenon of a Trojan Horse used

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<sup>316</sup> Üngör, 2008: 17.

<sup>317</sup> Üngör, 2008: 19.

<sup>318</sup> Ladas, 1932: 1.

<sup>319</sup> Pentzopoulos, 1962: 53; Morris & Ze'evi, 2019: 3.

<sup>320</sup> Oran, 2003: 99.

<sup>321</sup> Oran, 2003: 99.

<sup>322</sup> Oxford English Dictionary, n.d.

<sup>323</sup> Oxford English Dictionary, n.d.

to conceal enemy combatants within the walls of the city is apropos. Perhaps even more so because the infamous Hellenic city of Troy is located on the Aegean coast of western Anatolia, a main site of Greek Orthodox expulsion.

The idea of a deceitful fifth column population in this case was combined with the fear of the irredentist tendencies of the Greek state. The Megali idea of uniting all Hellenes within the Greek nation-state included the “unredeemed Hellenes” in the Ottoman Empire. Though not all Greek Orthodox were complicit with the Greek government’s foreign policy strategy, they were the object of its desires and thus were seen as a fifth column, or potential fifth column, by Ottoman/Turkish officials. This view was linked to the long historical memory of the Capitulations and persistent Great Power inference in Ottoman domestic affairs on behalf of Christian minorities.<sup>324</sup> This perspective was not just the Turkish view, the Greek government also saw the Rum as a useful fifth column. Prime Minister Venizelos, the sternest advocate of the Megali Idea, told Greek King Alexander in 1919 that the city would be “conquered from within” after Greece had occupied the Aegean coast and Thrace.<sup>325</sup>

British historian Clement A. Macartney observed of the Turkish approach to the Lausanne Convention: “Their attitude was clear: they wished ‘to suppress the Greek irredentism in Turkey.’”<sup>326</sup> Ismet Pasha, Foreign Minister and Head of the Turkish delegation to the conference, stated this directly:

“The truth, as shown by historical evidence ever since the days of Mehmed II, was that the minorities, by continual and persistent misuse of the privileges granted to them

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<sup>324</sup> Macartney, 1934: 433; Pentzopoulos, 1962: 53; Alexandris, 1983: 25.

<sup>325</sup> Alexandris, 1982: 140.

<sup>326</sup> Macartney, 1934: 443.

and by *making themselves the instrument of foreigners*, had brought about the deplorable results which had ensued” [emphasis added].<sup>327</sup>

Riza Nour Bey, second Turkish delegate, reminded the sub-commission on the exchange of populations of the “real reason” motivating the Turkish government to push for the population exchange in a January 1923 meeting after eight weeks of negotiations: “[He] considers it necessary to recall the true reason which motivated, on the part of the Turkish Government, the proposal to exchange the populations. *The Turkish Government wishes to eliminate Greek irredentism in Turkey*” [emphasis added].<sup>328</sup> Both the first and second Turkish delegates emphasized throughout the conference that concerns about Greek irredentism, and the Greek Orthodox population as a potential fifth column, motivated their expulsion decision.

Although the 1913-1914 Ottoman government expulsion decisions may have been based on *perceived* security threats, by 1919 those threats were realized with the Greek occupation of Smyrna. The Greek Orthodox of the Aegean and Pontic littoral were now identified as real fifth columns who might assist the Greek army in their conquest.<sup>329</sup> Greece used the unredeemed Hellenes as justification for the annexation of Ottoman territory.<sup>330</sup> At the Lausanne Conference, Ismet Pasha further outlined the reason for a compulsory population exchange between Greece and Turkey:

“‘The amelioration of the lot of the minorities in Turkey depends above all on *the exclusion of every kind of foreign intervention and of the possibility of provocation coming from outside*’, which could best be attained by an exchange of Greek and Turkish populations, and for the remainder, by ‘the liberal policy of Turkey with regard to all communities

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<sup>327</sup> Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 1922-1923: Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace, 1923: 217.

<sup>328</sup> Conférence de Lausanne sur les affaires du proche-orient, 1922-23: Recueil des actes de la Conférence, 1923: 577 (translated from the French original).

<sup>329</sup> Morris & Ze’evi, 2019: 382.

<sup>330</sup> Macartney, 1934: 432.

whose members have not deviated from their duty as Turkish citizens” [emphasis added].<sup>331</sup>

Here Ismet Pasha specifically notes the “possibility of provocation” coming from minorities in Turkey—in this case a reference to the Greek Orthodox minorities, who therefore must be expelled. He went on to say that the Turkish view toward expelling the Greek Orthodox was, “based on their legitimate desire to prevent minorities in Turkey becoming *weapons in the hands of foreigners, capable of being utilised for subversive purposes*” [emphasis added].<sup>332</sup> Had the expression “fifth column” been available, Ismet Pasha would have used it to describe the Rum.

### *Alternative Explanations*

Given that there is meaningful consensus around the explanation that the Ottoman/Turkish government saw their Greek Orthodox population as a fifth column, there are limited alternative explanations to refute, unlike my other case studies. However, one alternative explanation is that the Greek Orthodox population was expelled simply because they were a Christian minority. This explanation, however, does not account for the different policy approaches that the Ottoman government implemented in relation to the Greek Orthodox and the Armenian communities. The grimly appropriate comparative question is: why did the government expel the Greek Orthodox but annihilate the Armenians?

From 1915-1916, an estimated one million<sup>333</sup> Armenians were systematically deported to death or killed on the spot in the Armenian genocide.<sup>334</sup> This was the completion of previous

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<sup>331</sup> Macartney, 1934: 256.

<sup>332</sup> Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 1922-1923: Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace, 1923: 207.

<sup>333</sup> Akçam calculates that 1.2 million Armenians were deported, of which only 200,000 survived, bringing the estimated total deaths to one million (2012: 258).

<sup>334</sup> Akçam, 2012: 258-61.

efforts under Abdülhamid II to eliminate the Armenian population from the empire. The Armenians and Orthodox Greeks were both Christian minority populations, intensely disliked by Turks, and seen as security threats by the government. Although some similar tactics, particularly deportation, were used against both populations, the government's intentions were different: the Armenians were to be annihilated, the Rum removed. Turkish historian Taner Akçam, prominent scholar of the Armenian genocide, states:

“Extant Ottoman documents reveal that the Unionist government made clear distinctions in its wartime policies between the Armenians and the empire's other Christian communities. The Greeks...were deported and expelled with brutality, but the Armenians were targeted for outright annihilation.”<sup>335</sup>

It is not necessary to debate the horrors of mass atrocities, but it is analytically important to examine why the government approached these two populations differently.

Armenian territorial claims, unlike previous nationalist groups that had broken off from the periphery of the Ottoman Empire, were located in the heart of Anatolia.<sup>336</sup> As a stateless minority their aim was not territorial augmentation but self-determination and the creation of a new state.<sup>337</sup> While there were multiple factions within the Armenian nationalist movement with different ideas of how to achieve their dreams of statehood, the two Armenian revolutionary groups—Dashnaks and Hunchaks—used violence as part of their overall strategy.<sup>338</sup> Although their views and tactics were not supported by the overall Armenian community, any violence was seen by the Turks as a direct threat by the Ottoman government. For example, a 1913 Armenian conspiracy to assassinate Talat Pasha, planned in Romania by

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<sup>335</sup> Akçam, 2012: 125.

<sup>336</sup> Valentino, 2004: 159.

<sup>337</sup> Morris & Ze'evi, 2019: 489.

<sup>338</sup> Dadrian, 1993: 194.

rogue elements of the Hunchak Party, but thwarted by the Ottoman authorities, was used as justification for later government massacres.<sup>339</sup>

The Armenians were seen by the Ottoman government as disloyal traitors for making alliances with Russia—a main geopolitical adversary at the time—and with other foreign powers to support their autonomy claims.<sup>340</sup> The Armenian reform process, initiated with the Treaty of Berlin in 1878, and culminating in the Armenian Reform Agreement with Russia in February 1914, was of major concern to the Unionists.<sup>341</sup> They believed the reforms would lead to the partition of Anatolia. With the Balkan War defeats fresh in their minds, the Russia Agreement—which combined the empire’s eastern provinces into larger provinces and appointed a foreign inspector for each—harkened back to a similar process in the Ottoman’s former European territories.<sup>342</sup> The Ottoman leadership wanted to avoid additional territorial losses at all costs. When the Great War began, some Armenians fought with the Russians in the eastern part of the empire, increasing fears of an Armenian uprising.<sup>343</sup> After a disastrous military loss against the Russians in the Battle of Sarikamış<sup>344</sup> in the east in January 1915, and the *Entente* naval attack on the Dardanelles in the west a month later, Ottoman fears were high that the war was about to be lost, spurring action against the Armenians.<sup>345</sup>

Because the Armenians were stateless, they had no haven to flee to for protection in their fight against the Ottomans.<sup>346</sup> And even if they had tried to flee—for those in the east

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<sup>339</sup> Dadiran, 1993: 190-91; Morris & Ze’evi, 2019: 489.

<sup>340</sup> Morgenthau, 2000 [1918]: 215; Morris & Ze’evi, 2019: 489.

<sup>341</sup> Akçam, 2006: 118; Akçam, 2012: 125, 129.

<sup>342</sup> Akçam, 2012: 131.

<sup>343</sup> Valentino, 2004: 163; Akçam, 2006: 139; Akçam, 2012: 170.

<sup>344</sup> The Ottomans are estimated to have lost over 60,000 soldiers in this battle in the Caucasus Mountains, most of whom froze to death in the sub-zero temperatures (Akçam, 2012: 157).

<sup>345</sup> Valentino, 2004: 163; Akçam, 2006: 126; Akçam, 2012: 157-58.

<sup>346</sup> Morris & Ze’evi, 2019: 489.



Russia was nearby—Ottoman policy was to contain the Armenians within the territorial bounds of the country. Akçam cites a coded telegram sent from the Ottoman Interior Ministry's General Directorate of Security to provincial governors and district officials in April 1915 stating that: "no Armenian male or female of any age be allowed to leave the country without a command from the High Command."<sup>347</sup> The Armenians were prohibited from leaving, to be massacred on the spot, whereas the Greek Orthodox were actively encouraged to depart. All these factors, in addition to Abdülhamid II's 1894-1896 massacres of over 200,000 Armenians, set the stage for genocide.<sup>348</sup> Although the Great Powers espoused strong rhetoric in support of the Armenians, and advocated treaties that *de jure* increased their autonomy and representation within the empire, in both 1894 and 1915 they did nothing to stop the killing.

Unlike the Armenian rebels, Greek Orthodox Turkish nationals did not rise up against the Ottoman state. There was no Greek Ottoman national movement within the empire, nor political demands for union with Greece, at least before 1919.<sup>349</sup> There was also no violence against the state.<sup>350</sup> Perhaps the most significant difference between the Armenians and the Greek Orthodox was the existence of the Greek state itself.<sup>351</sup> Fear of intervention by the Kingdom of Greece on behalf of persecuted Greek Orthodox was a concern for Ottoman officials who also feared potential reprisal attacks against Muslims living in Greece.<sup>352</sup> During the first part of WWI, Greece was neutral, and while violence against Armenians reached its

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<sup>347</sup> Akçam, 2012: 186 (Cites Prime Ministerial Ottoman Archive: BOA/DJ.ŞFR, no. 55/141).

<sup>348</sup> Morris & Ze'evi, 2019: 486.

<sup>349</sup> Llewellyn-Smith, 1998: 29-30.

<sup>350</sup> Morris & Ze'evi, 2019: 490.

<sup>351</sup> Morgenthau, 2000 [1918]: 34.

<sup>352</sup> Morgenthau, 2000 [1918]: 216; Morris & Ze'evi, 2019: 386.

peak, the Ottomans were careful not to provoke Greece into ending its non-belligerent status and entering the war, although it eventually did in 1917.<sup>353</sup> The Ottomans knew that the Greek state had the support of the European powers, even before its entrance on the side of the Entente, and a significant attack on Orthodox Greeks may have provoked their intervention as well.<sup>354</sup>

In addition, while both the Armenians and the Greek Orthodox suffered internal deportation, Rum property was not subject to liquidation, it was to be protected and preserved, while the Armenian property was to be appropriated by the state.<sup>355</sup> In some cases, Greek Orthodox were allowed to return home after deportation, or if it was discovered that Rum had been erroneously deported with Armenians, they were often set free.<sup>356</sup> In an angry telegram, Talat Pasha chastised the Governor of Diyarbekir for using violence against all Christians: “the policy of annihilation was to be limited to the Armenians and not to include other Christian groups.”<sup>357</sup>

In sum, up to 1919 the Armenians presented a different security threat to the territorial integrity of the empire than the Greek Orthodox based on their desire for an autonomous homeland, the international reform agreements, their violent tactics, and military support for Russia. They also did not have a state of their own to come to their aid, nor a state (before 1918<sup>358</sup>) to which they could be expelled. Therefore, the Ottoman/Turkish policies toward the Armenians and the Greek Orthodox took two different paths—an extraordinary proportion

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<sup>353</sup> Morris & Ze’evi, 2019: 490.

<sup>354</sup> Naimark, 2001: 43.

<sup>355</sup> Akçam, 2012: 119.

<sup>356</sup> Akçam, 2012: 119, 122.

<sup>357</sup> Akçam, 2012: 210. (Cites Prime Ministerial Ottoman Archive: BOA/DJ.ŞFR, no. 54-A/73).

<sup>358</sup> The short-lived First Republic of Armenia existed from 1918-1920 before being partitioned and taken over by Turkey and the Bolsheviks.

of Armenian population was murdered,<sup>359</sup> forbidden to leave, and forcibly deported to death within the empire, while most of the Greek Orthodox population was not killed, but expelled, encouraged to depart.<sup>360</sup> As Akçam succinctly puts it, the treatment of the two Christian groups “differed in scope, intent and motivation.”<sup>361</sup>

This dissertation does not aim to explain why governments choose mass expulsion instead of genocide—that is the subject of another book. However, this discussion suggests that Christianity in and of itself is not a sufficient explanation for why the Greek Orthodox were expelled, since other Christian groups, notably the Armenians (and the Assyrians), met a different fate. In fact, not even all the Greek Orthodox were expelled from the empire. The Rum of Istanbul were exempted from expulsion from 1913-1923, a puzzle examined shortly. Next, we turn to how the Ottoman/Turkish government expelled the Greek Orthodox, describing the critical enabling factors that facilitated their removal.

### **3.4 Enabling Factors for Ottoman Expulsions**

The presence of populations branded as “disloyal” in the early phase of establishing the nation is not unique to the Ottoman/Turkish state. As empires crumbled in the early twentieth century, many states had minority populations that did not “fit” within the newly drawn territorially boundaries of the state and had ethnic ties with kin in another state. Yet not all governments implemented expulsion policies to eliminate these minority groups. This section explains the key factors that enabled the Ottoman expulsion, given the motivation to remove

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<sup>359</sup> As estimated 90 percent of the total Armenian population was exterminated (Akçam, 2012: 261).

<sup>360</sup> Akçam, 2012: 125; Morris & Ze’evi, 2019: 488-89.

<sup>361</sup> Akçam, 2012: 123.

a fifth column target group. It underscores the critical role of alliances, of the homeland state of the target group, and of the international community in facilitating the expulsion. While, as noted above, the Greek Orthodox were expelled in four phases from 1913-1923, this section will focus on the latter two—events during 1919-1923. This is both for concision and because the majority of Greek Orthodox were removed in these two phases. Nevertheless, the three factors hold for the full period examined.

<b>Table 5: Factors that Enabled Expulsion in the Ottoman Empire</b>	
<i>Key Factors</i>	<i>Ottoman Littoral (1919-1923)</i>
<b>Alliances</b>	
<i>Domestic Alliances</i>	Benefit from expulsion (↑)
<i>Transnational Alliances</i>	Support expulsion (↑)
<b>Homeland State(s)</b>	
<i>Relation to Government</i>	Weak ties (↑)
<i>Response/ Anticipated Response</i>	Acquiesce & resettle expellees (↑)
<b>International Community</b>	
<i>Relation to Government</i>	(Cultivating) Strong ties (↓)
<i>Response/ Anticipated Response</i>	Support & facilitate expulsion (↑)

## Alliances

### *Domestic Alliances*

While the Sultan collaborated with the Allied forces that occupied the capital, Turkish nationalists mobilized throughout the country. War hero Mustafa Kemal arrived in Samsun on the Black Sea coast four days after the Greeks occupied Smyrna.<sup>362</sup> He was tasked by Istanbul with the demilitarization of Turkish troops as part of the Armistice, but he quickly began mobilizing soldiers and putting together a nationalist army.<sup>363</sup> Kemal resigned from his

<sup>362</sup> Davison, 1965: 176; Lewis, 2002: 242-43.

<sup>363</sup> Lewis, 2002: 242-43.

position as a military officer to avoid any direct conflict with the Ottoman government, and in the autumn of 1919 he chaired two unofficial congresses—the first at Erzurum with delegates from the eastern provinces and then at Sivas with delegates from across the country.

The Sivas congress drafted the first version of what became “the National Pact.”<sup>364</sup> The core demands of the pact were independence and territorial integrity—a sovereign Turkey for the Turks.<sup>365</sup> The aims of territorial integrity and sovereignty meant the preservation of the borders drawn in the armistice, and the end to foreign economic and political interference in Turkish affairs.<sup>366</sup> In January 1920 the nationalists officially separated from the Sublime Porte, proclaimed a new Turkish capital in Angora (Ankara), and released their National Pact—a declaration of principles.<sup>367</sup> In April 1920 the first parliament, known as the Grand National Assembly, was inaugurated in the Anatolian heartland, abandoning the imperial capital of Istanbul, which was under British control.<sup>368</sup>

Mustafa Kemal, and his nationalist domestic allies, knew that Greece’s territorial aspirations would continue while there were unredeemed Hellenes residing in the Turkish state. They feared that Greek advances in Smyrna and Eastern Thrace would turn the Aegean Sea into a “Greek lake.”<sup>369</sup> Turkish popular support was behind Kemal and the new nationalist government. Kemal’s domestic allies were in full agreement that the Orthodox Greeks had to be removed from the future Turkish sovereign state; the benefit was the realization of the National Pact’s goals.

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<sup>364</sup> Davison, 1965: 176; Lewis, 2002: 248.

<sup>365</sup> Davison, 1965: 173; Lewis, 2002: 249.

<sup>366</sup> Davison, 1965: 173.

<sup>367</sup> Emin, 1930: 276; Pentzopoulos, 1962: 37.

<sup>368</sup> Emin, 1930: 278; Psomiades, 1968: 32; Lewis, 2002: 251; Kieser, 2018: 393, 396.

<sup>369</sup> Pentzopoulos, 1962: 59.

### *Transnational Alliances*

After the armistice, Ottoman finances and defenses were controlled by the Allied forces—in January 1921 the Sultan handed over both the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of War.<sup>370</sup> In direct opposition to the Sultan and the Allied occupation of Istanbul, Mustafa Kemal worked to identify alternative sources of financial and military support for his nationalist forces. He first turned to the Soviets, a former nemesis of the Ottoman Empire, but who had just gone through a revolution. From 1920-1921 Kemal's nationalist government established close ties with the Bolsheviks who declared their support for the National Pact. With a shared enemy in the British, the Soviets and Turkish nationalists officially established diplomatic relations in August 1920 and signed a Treaty of Friendship in March 1921:<sup>371</sup>

“The Government of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic and the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, sharing as they do the principles of the liberty of nations, and the right of each nation to determine its own fate, and taking into consideration, moreover, the common struggle undertaken against imperialism, foreseeing that the difficulties arising for the one would render worse the position of the other, and inspired by the desire to bring about lasting good relations and uninterrupted sincere friendship between themselves, based on mutual interests, have decided to sign an agreement to assure amicable and fraternal relations between the two countries.”<sup>372</sup>

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<sup>370</sup> Mansel, 1996: 395.

<sup>371</sup> Psomiades, 1968: 32.

<sup>372</sup> Hurewitz, 1956: 95.

The treaty expressed solidarity against imperialism, and secured Turkey's eastern border.<sup>373</sup> This alliance crucially provided economic and military support for the nascent nationalist government and its military forces.

Kemal's impressive military victories in 1921 drew international notice and western states began to recognize that he and his new nationalist government, not the Sultan, were the real leaders of the country. Soon after solidifying support from the Soviets, Kemal secured additional military and financial support from the Italians and French who had begun to sour on the British. Both the Italians and French were concerned about Britain's increasing control of the Bosphorus and support for Greek expansionist aims.<sup>374</sup> A French newspaper jeeringly referred to Istanbul (Constantinople) as "Constantinobralter"—a reference to British control of Gibraltar, along another key trading route at the southern tip of Spain.<sup>375</sup> In the spirit of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend," the Italians negotiated a withdraw from southern Anatolia if they could retain the Dodecanese islands.<sup>376</sup> And in October 1921 the French agreed to evacuate Cilicia and drew a new border for Syria, more favorable to the Turks, allowing Turkish troops to turn their attention toward the Greeks.<sup>377</sup>

Trade deals with the Bolsheviks and French provided needed resources for the Turkish advance against the Greeks and removed the military threat from the Italians, who agreed to leave Antalya, and the French who departed Cilicia.<sup>378</sup> The Turks used Russian money to purchase Italian weapons.<sup>379</sup> Additional military supplies poured in after the January 1922

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<sup>373</sup> Davison, 1965: 191.

<sup>374</sup> Psomiades, 1968: 33.

<sup>375</sup> Mansel, 1996: 392.

<sup>376</sup> Davison, 1965: 192-93; Lewis, 2002: 254.

<sup>377</sup> Hurewitz, 1956: 97; Pentzopoulos, 1962: 45; Davison, 1965: 192-93; Lewis, 2002: 253-54; Kieser, 2018: 396.

<sup>378</sup> Pentzopoulos, 1962: 45; Davison, 1965: 191-93.

<sup>379</sup> Psomiades, 1968: 35.

Turkish-Ukrainian treaty.<sup>380</sup> Mustafa Kemal's skillful balancing of strange bedfellows—Russians and (some) Allied Powers—enabled him to acquire sufficient military and financial resources to fuel his nationalist campaign. These arms and funds enabled the Turks to detach public support from the Sultan and Istanbul through successive military victories, while simultaneously defeating the Greeks and their British backers.

These transnational alliances bolstered the international standing of Kemal and his forces and strengthened them militarily for their final assault. The treaties and agreements with both eastern and western powers showed Kemal's commitment to balancing the Turkish state between the east and west.<sup>381</sup> It is clear from their financial and military support that the Nationalists' transnational allies were supportive of Kemal's war of independence and corresponding removal of the Greeks, further enabling expulsion.

### **Homeland State**

In 1922 many Orthodox Greeks had resided in the Ottoman Empire for generations, and some spoke only Turkish and had never set foot in Greece. Yet from the Turkish nationalists' perspective Greece was the clear homeland state of concern. While Ottoman Greeks may have had no personal connection to the Greek nation-state, Mustafa Kemal and his government believed that is where Greek Orthodox Christians "belonged."

In the first decades of the twentieth century Greece was one of the Ottoman Empire's greatest enemies. When Greece invaded the Aegean coast in the spring of 1919, any possible

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<sup>380</sup> Davison, 1965: 194. This treaty was initiated by a Soviet mission from Ukraine, which in January 1922 was the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

<sup>381</sup> Davison, 1965: 192.



*détente* after the First World War evaporated. The war waged against the Greeks and the expulsion of the Rum was not at all constrained by the relations between the two states—their ties were extremely weak. Furthermore, the Nationalists' military victory over Greece in the autumn of 1922, made it difficult for Greece to resist Turkish expulsions and deny entry to the expellees. When the Nationalist Army reached Smyrna, Turkish troops compelled the Orthodox population to depart, forcing them into the sea. Greek ships, with Allied support, acquiesced to their defeat and resettled the expellees. Overland in Eastern Thrace the situation was similar. The Nationalists' triumph resulted in the removal of Greeks to Western Thrace and beyond, which the Greek government *de facto* accepted as the loser of the war. They had no capacity to resist and deny entry to the hundreds of thousands of refugees.

In the summer of 1914, the Ottoman's successful expulsion of tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of Rum first brought Greece to the negotiating table where they agreed to a bilateral exchange. Though this was interrupted by the First World War, the Turks used a similar strategy in 1922, expelling Orthodox Greeks at the conclusion of the Turkish War of Independence, forcing Greece to accept the expellees and negotiated from a position of strength at the Lausanne Conference. The Greek government was unable to constrain Mustafa Kemal and his nationalist government in their policy of full-scale expulsion of the Rum.

### **International Community**

In the period examined here, the international community was the “Great Powers” or the “Big Four”—Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, who were all represented at the Lausanne Conference—as well as the emerging League of Nations, founded in 1920. As the Ottoman Empire crumbled, the Turkish Nationalists believed military strength would breed diplomatic

and reputational strength—that only battlefield victories would bring political respect. Although the Turks wanted to cultivate strong ties with the international community, they knew they first had to secure military victories and reclaim territory to negotiate from a position of power. In a sense the Turkish desire for strong ties with the international community was predicated on first trampling those ties, at least with the British, to win the war. According to the mass expulsion decision making framework, this desire for strong ties with the international community should have constrained expulsion.

However, in the first phase of expulsion in late 1913, early 1914, the international community ignored the Ottoman expulsions of Greek Orthodox, which was directly related to the Allied decision to award Greece eastern Aegean islands mere miles from the Ottoman coast.<sup>382</sup> As Greece and Turkey moved forward negotiating a population exchange in 1914 before the outbreak of the First World War, there was no resistance from any of the Great Powers. During the Greco-Turkish War the Great Powers similarly ignored the expulsion of the Greek Orthodox and even facilitated their transportation from the coasts to Greece. In the final phase of expulsion, the Great Powers presided over the development of the first compulsory population exchange agreement. The international community endorsed both the *fait accompli* of the Orthodox refugees who had fled the Ottoman Empire from 1913-1923 by prohibiting them from returning home and removed the remaining Greek Orthodox populations through a forced exchange. This was negotiated under the purview of the League of Nations who provided international relief and coordination for the expulsion. In this case

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<sup>382</sup> Mylonas, 2012: 64.

the international community enabled mass expulsion by ignoring it in the early phases, and then after the war supporting and facilitating the expulsion of the Rum.

### **3.5 Istanbul, 1913-1923: A negative case, constraints on mass expulsion**

We now shift to the negative case of Istanbul to examine why the Greek Orthodox population of the imperial city were not expelled. Unlike the Ottoman Greeks along the Aegean and Pontic littoral as well as those in Anatolia, the Rum of Istanbul were spared throughout the decade from 1913-1923. At the conclusion of the 1923 peace treaty, unlike the rest of their co-ethnics, they were allowed to remain in the city and retain their Turkish nationality.

The case of Istanbul is puzzling because the Greek Orthodox of Istanbul should have been the most likely to be expelled of all the Greeks. These Rum were more powerful, educated, and connected to foreigners than Ottoman Greeks in any other part of the empire. The Ecumenical Patriarchate, the religious authority of the Greek millet, was located in the heart of the capital, and was an extremely powerful institution which influenced the ideological orientation of its entire flock. Of all the pockets of Greek Orthodox presence throughout the country, the Istanbul Greeks were the most irredentist. Their irredentism was most pronounced at the end of the First World War. Many Ottoman Greeks believed the Allied occupation of the city would quickly fulfill the Megali Idea and restore the Christian glory of Byzantium.<sup>383</sup> The Greek Orthodox cheered the Allies as they entered Istanbul, and Greek

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<sup>383</sup> Mansel, 1996: 384.

flags hung from homes, businesses, and the Patriarchate itself.<sup>384</sup> These displays of disloyalty were precisely what the Turks had accused them of back in 1912.<sup>385</sup>

Since the Ottoman/Turkish government's motivation in expelling the Rum was to remove a dangerous fifth column, those in Istanbul were arguably the greatest threat. Greek Prime Minister Venizelos had openly stated to King Alexander that the "city would be conquered from within," all but admitting that the Istanbul Rum were the Trojan horse he hoped to use to win back the imperial city.<sup>386</sup> After the Turkish war for independence, domestic public opinion among Ottoman Muslims was strongly in favor of expelling the Greek Orthodox from the reclaimed imperial capital city in 1922. They saw their continued presence as an enduring threat to the new nation state.<sup>387</sup> Yet throughout the period examined, from 1913-1923, in all four phases of Rum mass expulsion, the Greek Orthodox of Istanbul were not expelled. Before I explain why, a brief description of the Ottoman Greeks of Istanbul is necessary.

### *Greeks of Istanbul*

With its strategic location on the banks of Bosphorus, Istanbul is the gateway between the orient and the occident. Straddling both Asia and Europe it was a mosaic of languages, cultures, religion, and peoples; and a central hub of commerce, trade, and intellectual activity bringing together people from around the world. French was as likely to be heard on the

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<sup>384</sup> Alexandris, 1983: 59; Mansel, 1996: 385.

<sup>385</sup> Mansel, 1996: 411.

<sup>386</sup> Alexandris, 1982: 140; Alexandris, 1983: 53.

<sup>387</sup> Alexandris, 1983: 83.

streets of Istanbul as Ottoman, and the road signs were printed in both languages.<sup>388</sup> In addition to the Ottoman (Muslim) elites, including the Sultan and his advisors in the Sublime Porte, the city was full of Christian intellectuals and prominent businessmen, both Greek Orthodox and Armenian. For the Greek Orthodox, the capital was also their religious capital, the seat of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, religious and political authority of the Rum millet.<sup>389</sup> Although reports vary, an estimated 205,375 Ottoman Greeks resided in Istanbul in 1914, 23 percent of the total population.<sup>390</sup> To this total was an estimated 65,000 Greek citizens who lived in the capital as foreign nationals.<sup>391</sup> As the former capital of Byzantium, Istanbul held special significance for the Rum; they were symbolically more attached to city than any other place in the empire.

The Greek Orthodox of Istanbul, just as those outside of the capital, dominated commerce, banking, shipping, manufacturing, railways, and the professions.<sup>392</sup> The large influx of foreign capital into the empire in the mid-nineteenth century largely passed through Christian hands.<sup>393</sup> Of the total capital investment in the Ottoman Empire in 1914, 50 percent was Greek Ottoman, highlighting their economic dominance.<sup>394</sup> Compared to the Ottoman Greeks outside of the city they were generally wealthier, more educated, and more connected to Europe—with the Rum of Smyrna a close second. There were two main types of Ottoman Greeks in Istanbul, those who supported the status quo under Ottoman rule, and those committed to the Megali Idea—the idea that Istanbul, and large sections of the empire, should

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<sup>388</sup> Morgenthau, 2000 [1918]: 190.

<sup>389</sup> Alexandris, 1982: 139.

<sup>390</sup> Karpas, 1985: 170.

<sup>391</sup> Alexandris, 1983: 50.

<sup>392</sup> Clogg, 1982: 196.

<sup>393</sup> Alexandris, 1983: 31.

<sup>394</sup> Alexandris, 1983: 32.

be united with Greece. The former was composed of the Ecumenical Patriarchate elite, both religious and lay notables, government bureaucrats, and the commercial class; the latter largely the professionals: medical, legal, and literary.<sup>395</sup> These differences became more salient during 1913-1923, particularly in the aftermath of the Great War and the Greek invasion of western Anatolia.

Despite their differences, both factions were committed to Hellenization efforts, which were achieved through educational, cultural, and literary societies. In the late nineteenth century Greek cultural and educational institutions proliferated at a rapid rate, financed by wealthy Istanbul Greeks, with 20 cultural societies, including the most prominent Greek Literary Society, and more than 113 schools in the capital.<sup>396</sup> Although an 1894 Ottoman law mandated that Turkish be taught in all schools, the Rum millet otherwise had complete autonomy over the curriculum.<sup>397</sup> Not surprisingly, Hellenization efforts were more successful in urban areas where irredentism was more prominent.

Politically the Istanbul Rum held prominent roles in the Ottoman bureaucracy, as ambassadors and *attachés* to European embassies, including Great Britain.<sup>398</sup> When the Unionists came to power and reinstated the constitution, Greeks won 24 seats in the 1908 parliamentary elections.<sup>399</sup> Greek elected officials largely voted as a single bloc, upholding the interests of the Rum community, but they were split between the CUP and liberal parties, with the majority supporting the latter.<sup>400</sup> After the disastrous First Balkan War, Greek political

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<sup>395</sup> Clogg, 1982: 197.

<sup>396</sup> Clogg, 1982: 197; Alexandris, 1983: 45, 48.

<sup>397</sup> Clogg, 1982: 198; Alexandris, 1983: 45.

<sup>398</sup> Alexandris, 1983: 29-30.

<sup>399</sup> Clogg, 1982: 199; Boura, 1999: 194.

<sup>400</sup> Boura, 1999: 196-97.

participation was terminated ending the presence of Greek bureaucrats, diplomats, and cabinet officials in the Ottoman government.<sup>401</sup>

The Ecumenical Patriarchate, located in the Phanar district of Istanbul, also played an important political role in the empire. The Patriarch was a member of the Sultan's bureaucracy, and as head of the Rum millet, he had religious, political, and administrative power over his flock.<sup>402</sup> When the Young Turks came to power in 1908 with their ideas of Ottomanism and equality for all citizens, the Patriarchate resisted these changes because they threatened its power and control. Equality meant the dissolution of the millets, removing their political and administrative autonomy, and diminishing their role in the empire. These changes, as well as the introduction of mandatory military service for non-Muslims, were particularly unpalatable to the Patriarchate.<sup>403</sup> Its fears were justified. The Unionists introduced legislation to reduce the power of the millets, including in education—the core element of Orthodox Hellenization.<sup>404</sup> Unable to effectively resist the Young Turks, the Patriarchate acquiesced. But WWI brought unexpected changes to Rum fortunes.

After the armistice, and the election of a new Patriarch in October 1918, the two disparate factions of the Ottoman Greeks consolidated around the pursuit of the Megali Idea.<sup>405</sup> Both the Patriarchate and the Orthodox commercial class now sided with the Greek Ottoman professionals in their support for irredentism.<sup>406</sup> Even the previously non-political Greek Literary Society announced its desire for Istanbul to be incorporated into Greece.<sup>407</sup>

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<sup>401</sup> Alexandris, 1983: 43.

<sup>402</sup> Alexandris, 1982: 22.

<sup>403</sup> Clogg, 1982: 199; Alexandris, 1983: 33.

<sup>404</sup> Alexandris, 1983: 36.

<sup>405</sup> Alexandris, 1982: 143; Mansel, 1996: 385.

<sup>406</sup> Alexandris, 1982: 143-44.

<sup>407</sup> Alexandris, 1983: 61.

Emboldened by the Allied occupation, in March 1919, the Patriarch formally ended the Rum millet, issuing a resolution for the “Union with Greece,” breaking off all relations with the Ottoman government, and assuming “unilateral and complete sovereignty over the community.”<sup>408</sup> Ottoman Greeks were discharged from their civic duties as Ottoman citizens including voting and working in the Ottoman bureaucracy and the Patriarchate began issuing its own passports with Allied permission.<sup>409</sup> As directed, the Greek Orthodox did not participate in the 1919 elections, effectively opting out of Ottoman governance and government.<sup>410</sup> In December 1921 the Patriarchate went a step further, appointing a Greek national as Patriarch, breaking a centuries-old Ottoman tradition that the Patriarch be an Ottoman national, further infuriating the Turks.<sup>411</sup>

#### **Four Phases of Non-Expulsion in Istanbul**

The Greek Orthodox of Istanbul were not expelled in any of the four mass expulsion phases examined here. After the Balkan Wars (1913-1914) the Ottomans targeted the Greek Orthodox in Eastern Thrace and the Aegean littoral because they inhabited border regions and were the easiest to expel directly into Greek lands, in the case of Eastern Thrace, or toward Greek-controlled Aegean islands in the case of the coastal communities. This first Orthodox Rum expulsion used the 1913 Bulgarian exchange agreement as a model and specifically targeted border populations. Thus, the Greek Orthodox of Istanbul were unaffected.

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<sup>408</sup> Alexandris, 1982: 145; Alexandris, 1983: 57; Mansel, 1996: 385.

<sup>409</sup> Clogg, 1982: 200; Mansel, 1996: 385.

<sup>410</sup> Boura, 1999: 201.

<sup>411</sup> Alexandris 1983: 75-76.



In the second phase of mass expulsion during WWI (1914-1918), the expulsions of the Greek Orthodox in Eastern Thrace and along the Aegean largely stopped. Since the Germans were still trying to court Greece to join the Central Powers, they ordered the Ottomans to halt any activities, such as Rum expulsions, that might push Greece into the arms of the Entente.<sup>412</sup> During the war, the Ottoman government, together with the Germans, focused on strategic internal deportations<sup>413</sup> from vulnerable military areas, rather than on cross-border expulsions. Although in early 1915 during the Entente advance toward the Dardanelles there were concerns that Istanbul would fall to the Allied powers, and plans were made to evacuate the Sultan to Eskişehir,<sup>414</sup> the city itself was never a direct theater of war.<sup>415</sup> Targeted looting and violence did take place in the city, as well as economic boycotts against the Greeks prompting some Rum to flee, but the Istanbul Orthodox population escaped internal expulsion.<sup>416</sup>

Months after the Armistice of Mudros was signed, conflict reignited with Greece in May 1919. The Greek occupation began in Smyrna on the Aegean coast and moved east toward the new nationalist capital in Ankara. Istanbul was not a main front in the war. Allied troops unofficially occupied Istanbul at the end of 1918, and officially announced Allied, mainly British, occupation in March 1920. When Mustafa Kemal and his forces defeated the Greek army, after over three years of war, hundreds of thousands of Greek Orthodox civilians were expelled with the retreating troops. Many Greek Orthodox fled toward Istanbul for

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<sup>412</sup> Akçam, 2012: 99.

<sup>413</sup> Importantly, the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul did not protest the internal deportation of their fellow Rum during the war (Alexandris, 1983: 44).

<sup>414</sup> A city southeast of the capital and further inland.

<sup>415</sup> Morgenthau, 2000 [1918]: 128.

<sup>416</sup> Boura, 1999: 200.

safety, increasing the size of the Rum population in the imperial capital. Some Istanbul Greek Orthodox left the city for Greece during this period, but many remained. Once Kemal's forces reclaimed Smyrna they moved north, and a clash was set with the British for control of the Straits, the gateway to Istanbul and Eastern Thrace. A war between Britain and Turkey was avoided by the sage thinking of British General Harrington who ignored the U.K. Cabinet's instructions to give Kemal an ultimatum—to withdraw or fight—and an armistice was agreed.<sup>417</sup> Once again, this time during the Turkish War of Independence, the Greek Orthodox population in Istanbul was not expelled. Finally, Article 2 of the Lausanne Convention, as we have seen, exempted the Greek inhabitants of Istanbul from the population exchange. While the Orthodox Greek Turkish nationals throughout the rest of the country were forced to depart for Greece, the community in the imperial capital was once again spared. The last section explains what prevented the Ottoman/Turkish government from removing the Istanbul Rum despite all logic to the contrary.

### Constraints on Mass Expulsion in Istanbul

Table 6 displays a side-by-side comparison of the enabling and constraining factors in the Ottoman littoral and Istanbul. As will be discussed in detail, the same three factors—alliances, homeland state, and the international community—constrained the removal of the Istanbul Rum, unlike the rest of the Orthodox population in the Ottoman Empire.

Table 6: Mass Expulsion Decision Making Framework Applied to the Ottoman Empire		
Key Factors	Ottoman Littoral (1919-1923)	Istanbul (1919-1923)
<b>Alliances</b>		
Domestic Alliances	Benefit from expulsion (↑)	Harmed by expulsion (↓)
Transnational Alliances	Support expulsion (↑)	Opposed to expulsion (↓)

<sup>417</sup> Davison, 1965: 197-98.

<b>Homeland State(s)</b>		
<i>Relation to Government</i>	Weak ties (↑)	Weak ties (↑)
<i>Response/Anticipated Response</i>	Acquiesce & resettle expellees (↑)	Resist & deny entry to expellees (↓)
<b>International Community</b>		
<i>Relation to Government</i>	(Cultivating) Strong ties (↓)	(Cultivating) Strong ties (↓)
<i>Response/Anticipated Response</i>	Support & facilitate expulsion (↑)	Oppose & resist expulsion (↓)

## Alliances

### *Domestic Alliances*

Since this study is a within-case comparison, the domestic alliance between Mustafa Kemal and his nationalists' forces is the same for the negative case of Istanbul as outlined above in the Ottoman littoral section. However, their control over, and influence in, Istanbul was different than in the rest of the country, which altered the government's calculus of how expulsion would affect its domestic alliances.

Although the Armistice of Mudros did not authorize an occupation of Istanbul, at the end of 1918 an Allied military administration was established in the city, and 3,626 Allied troops *de facto* took control.<sup>418</sup> Although the occupying forces were composed of British, French, and Italian troops, almost three-quarters were British with a British Commander at the head.<sup>419</sup> The British claimed that the Ottoman Sultan was still *de jure* Head of State, but he was simply their puppet, providing legal cover for the occupation.<sup>420</sup> The Allies slowly took more and more power from the Sultan, establishing an International Police Commission with executive control of the city's police, creating military courts, and stationing their personnel at the prisons, hospitals, banks, and embassies.<sup>421</sup> Over the next four years a rotating group of

<sup>418</sup> Mansel, 1996: 380; Lewis, 2002: 240.

<sup>419</sup> Mansel, 1996: 380.

<sup>420</sup> Mansel, 1996: 396.

<sup>421</sup> Mansel, 1996: 380.

Allied High Commissioners were the *de facto* sovereigns of the city and the Allied presence expanded to over 28,000 British, Indian, French, and Italian troops by 1920.<sup>422</sup> Despite the occupation, the Sultan and his associates were pleased to have the façade of Allied endorsement of his sovereignty. Having lost all control to the CUP during the war, the Sultan was fiercely anti-nationalist and eager to cooperate with the Allies against them.<sup>423</sup>

When the new nationalist Grand National Assembly met in April 1920, under the direction of Mustafa Kemal, a sovereignty crisis emerged: the Sultan, with British backing, controlled Istanbul and the surrounding areas, and the nationalist controlled the rest of Asia Minor, at least the parts not occupied by Greece, from their new capital in Ankara.<sup>424</sup> The Sultan went so far as issuing a fatwa against Mustafa Kemal and authorizing British forces to go after him and his nationalist army.<sup>425</sup> Therefore, in the third phase of expulsion (1919-1922), the Sultan wanted Allied support and therefore did not want to expel the Rum, and with Allied troops occupying the capital, the Greek Orthodox in Istanbul were safe.

Mustafa Kemal's disgust at the Sultan's cozy relations with the Allied forces motivated him to move East and set up a new capital in Ankara where the Nationalists declared their aims in the National Pact and mounted their military resistance to the Greek invasion. Since the primary goal of the Nationalist Pact was to regain full territorial sovereignty and remove foreign powers, Kemal's domestic alliances would have benefited from the elimination of both the Greeks and their British backers from the country's largest city. However, unlike Smyrna and the Aegean coastal communities, at the conclusion of the Greco-Turkish War the

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<sup>422</sup> Mansel, 1996: 381, 392.

<sup>423</sup> Mansel, 1996: 387; Lewis, 2002: 245.

<sup>424</sup> Llewellyn-Smith, 1998: 103.

<sup>425</sup> Mansel, 1996: 393.

Orthodox Greeks in Istanbul did not face the wrath of the Nationalists because British General Harrington agreed to an armistice on October 11, 1922, eliminating the need for the city to be taken by force.<sup>426</sup> The fate of the Istanbul Greeks would instead be decided at the Lausanne Conference.

When the representatives of the soon-to-be Turkish Republic took their positions at the Lausanne Conference, they kept in mind how their decisions would impact their nationalist domestic allies back in Ankara who had supported not only the war effort, but also the risky break from the Sultan. Two considerations shifted the government's calculus regarding the expulsion of the Istanbul Greeks at the conference. The first was the economic cost.

At the outset of the conference Turkish negotiators strongly refuted Greek and Allied arguments that the expulsion of the Greek Orthodox from Istanbul would be "complete commercial and financial suicide."<sup>427</sup> Shukri Bey, an expert on population exchanges sent to Lausanne as a member of the Turkish delegation, argued to the sub-commission that the Istanbul Greeks "were not an indispensable element" to the city; they were simply "intermediaries, not producers" and could easily be replaced.<sup>428</sup> Ismet Pasha, Head of the Turkish Delegation, similarly argued to the First Commission that: "...everyone knew that [the Greeks of Istanbul] formed a class of small traders (grocers, &c.), and that it would not be difficult to replace them."<sup>429</sup> Rather than economic and social ruin, Tewfik Bey, another Turkish representative to the conference, contended that, "the disturbance to the commercial

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<sup>426</sup> Davison, 1965: 197-98.

<sup>427</sup> LNA, R1761/48/24318: Report by Dr. Nansen to the League of Nations Part 1: Reciprocal Exchange of Racial Minorities Between Greece and Turkey, 15 November 1922; UN Archives at Geneva.

<sup>428</sup> LNA, C1112/8/N15: Sub-Commission for Exchange of Populations Meeting Minutes, 05 December 1922; UN Archives at Geneva, p. 3.

<sup>429</sup> Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 1922-1923: Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace, 1923: 326.

life of Constantinople would be of short duration.”<sup>430</sup> Even if negative economic consequences would flow from the removal of the Rum from the city, Shukri Bey said: “In any case, the anxiety of the Turks to secure their independence and immunity from disintegrating influences at home was a reason which exceeded in importance any economic consideration.”<sup>431</sup>

However, domestic economic concerns were a real constraint. On January 19, in one of the last sub-commission meetings on the population exchange, Riza Nour Bey, second Turkish delegate, conceded:

The Turkish delegation has accepted the obligatory exchange as a necessity and it is in order to mitigate the painful consequences that she admitted that the Greek inhabitants of Constantinople were not subject to it. *The economic reasons for which this derogation was accepted* must also apply to the Strouma valley [emphasis added].<sup>432</sup>

Although Riza Nour Bey did not get an exemption for Muslims in the Strouma valley in Greece, he did reluctantly admit that “economic reasons” were a factor in the decision to accept the Istanbul Rum derogation. Given the high level of economic interdependence between Istanbul and European commerce, banking, and manufacturing, concerns about risking foreign financial investment in the country’s largest city, much of which passed through the hands of prominent Greek Orthodox financiers and traders, were important to the new nation-state. While it may have been difficult to accept, the removal of the Istanbul Rum was an economic catastrophe the nationalist government could not afford.

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<sup>430</sup> LNA, C1112/8/N15: Sub-Commission for Exchange of Populations Meeting Minutes, 07 December 1922; UN Archives at Geneva, p. 3.

<sup>431</sup> LNA, C1112/8/N15: Sub-Commission for Exchange of Populations Meeting Minutes, 05 December 1922; UN Archives at Geneva, p.3.

<sup>432</sup> Conférence de Lausanne sur les affaires du proche-orient, 1922-23: Recueil des actes de la Conférence, 1923: 607 (translated from the French original).

Another key Turkish delegation demand at the conference, stemming from Article 3 of the Turkish National Pact, was for a plebiscite in Western Thrace, Greece.<sup>433</sup> The Turks believed that given the right to choose, the residents of Western Thrace, largely Muslim, would vote to become a part of the new Turkish Republic. Western Thrace was particularly important to the Turkish government dating back to the loss of most of its European lands in the Balkan Wars, and they wanted to maintain a territorial presence in this area. Therefore, at the outset of the peace conference, the Turkish delegation put forward the request for a plebiscite in Western Thrace and in turn, argued for the Muslims of Western Thrace to be exempted from the exchange.<sup>434</sup> They tried to present their case as a numerical argument, suggesting that the numbers to be exchanged on each side would be roughly equivalent if the Muslims of Western Thrace were excluded and the Orthodox of Istanbul included, but Greece and the Allied Powers contested their figures.<sup>435</sup> Instead, the Allied Powers proposed the Muslims of Western Thrace and the Greek Orthodox of Istanbul both be exempted from the exchange.<sup>436</sup>

The Turkish government reluctantly decided it was willing to accommodate a small population of Greeks in Istanbul in the hopes of a future plebiscite in Western Thrace. Since the Allied Powers refused to allow the Muslims of Western Thrace to remain without also allowing the Greeks to stay in Istanbul, expelling the Greeks would have meant abandoning

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<sup>433</sup> Article 3 states, "The determination of the judicial status of Western Thrace also, which has been made dependent on the Turkish peace, must be effected in accordance with the votes which shall be given by the inhabitants in complete freedom." LNA, S18/18/1/3: Copy of the Turkish National Pact, 28 January 1920; UN Archives at Geneva.

<sup>434</sup> LNA, C1112/8/N15: Sub-Commission for Exchange of Populations Meeting Minutes, 04 December 1922; UN Archives at Geneva, p. 5.

<sup>435</sup> LNA, C1112/8/N15: Sub-Commission for Exchange of Populations Meeting Minutes, 05 December 1922; UN Archives at Geneva, p. 2.

<sup>436</sup> LNA, C1112/8/N15: Sub-Commission for Exchange of Populations Meeting Minutes, 07 December 1922; UN Archives at Geneva. p.27; Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 1922-1923: Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace, 1923: 122.

the possibility of reclaiming lost lands in Europe. Although the plebiscite never came to pass, it was an important consideration at the conference. In this case, the interests of the Turkish government and its domestic nationalist alliance would have been harmed by expelling the Istanbul Rum. The negative economic and political consequences for the newly emerging Turkish Republic outweighed the desire to remove the Orthodox, thereby constraining the decision to expel.

### *Transnational Alliances*

The Turkish Nationalist government's main transnational allies were the Soviets, France, and Italy. Two of the three—France and Italy—were present at the Lausanne Conference and thus could influence the decision on the Istanbul Rum expulsion. When Kemal and the Nationalists demonstrated their military prowess on the battlefield, the French and Italians switched sides, anticipating their takeover of the state and keen to counterbalance British influence and control in the region. Both France and Italy were pleased to see the British occupation of Istanbul come to an end—although French and Italian troops were also there, albeit in smaller numbers—but they were not willing to cede all their interests in the city to the new Turkish leaders.

France and Italy, along with other European Powers, had tremendous financial and strategic interests in maintaining a presence in Istanbul. With its strategic location on the banks of Bosphorus, it was a central hub of commerce and trade. The large influx of foreign capital into the empire largely passed through Christian hands, many of whom were Greek



Orthodox.<sup>437</sup> As noted above, of the total capital investment in the Ottoman Empire in 1914, 50 percent was Greek Ottoman.<sup>438</sup> Although France and Italy supported the Nationalists in the Greco-Turkish War, and approved of their reclaiming of Istanbul, they did not want to lose their key liaisons within the city, which were largely Greek Orthodox residents. Even though they no longer held political positions in the state, the Greek Orthodox were still financially dominant. Since European investments passed through their hands, French and Italian commercial interests would have been harmed if they were expelled. Thus, France and Italy opposed the Istanbul Rum expulsion. Their disapproval was part of the larger opposition by the “Great Powers.” The new Turkish government’s transnational alliances acted as an important constraint on the expulsion of the Greeks from the imperial capital.

### **Homeland State**

Greece and Turkey were enemies and the weak ties between them were not mended at the Lausanne Conference. While Greece had *de facto* accepted the expulsion of the Orthodox population from the littoral communities and Eastern Thrace, at the conference, the Greek negotiators mounted a fierce resistance to the expulsion of the remaining Orthodox in Istanbul. The Greek delegation tried to persuade the Allied Powers to sympathize with their appeals and resist the Turkish demand to expel the Rum from Istanbul.

First, Greece claimed that the expulsion of the Greek Orthodox from Istanbul would have international consequences. They argued that many of the Allied Powers had political and economic interests in the city that would be harmed by the removal of this population.

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<sup>437</sup> Clogg, 1982: 196; Alexandris, 1983: 31.

<sup>438</sup> Alexandris, 1983: 32.

Nicolas Politis, former Greek Foreign Minister, and Greek delegate to the peace conference, wrote to Fridtjof Nansen, League-appointed head of Near East refugee relief, before the peace conference began: “It is impossible that all the foreign nations which have interests in this city do not realize that the mass departure of Greeks would condemn Constantinople and would bring their interests to irremediable economic and social ruin.”<sup>439</sup> Later at Lausanne, Venizelos formally argued to the First Commission that, “such an expulsion would amount to an unprecedented political, economic and social catastrophe.”<sup>440</sup> When a special sub-commission was established to discuss details of the population exchange in greater depth, Demetrius Cacclamanos, Greece’s second delegate to the conference, “besought the Turkish Delegates to reconsider their position. If they persisted, they would repent of the loss of an indispensable factor, a loss which would be disastrous to the economic life of their capital.”<sup>441</sup>

Greece’s second argument was that the Greek Orthodox in Istanbul had no irredentist tendencies and that they should not be considered a threat by the Turkish government. Cacclamanos told the sub-commission that “Constantinople was not an irredentist centre” and that although some Greeks participated in demonstrations, “those who had taken part in them...had already left.” Venizelos argued to the First Commission that, “...the Greeks of Turkey hav[e never] revolted against the Turkish administration. Throughout the history of

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<sup>439</sup> LNA, R1761/48/24318: Letter from Le Gerant Ministre Plenipotentiaire, Ch. Sienopoulos, with message from Monsieur Politis to Nansen, 03 November 1922; UN Archives at Geneva (translated from the French original).

<sup>440</sup> Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 1922-1923: Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace, 1923: 121.

<sup>441</sup> LNA, C1112/8/N15: Sub-Commission for Exchange of Populations Meeting Minutes, 07 December 1922; UN Archives at Geneva, p. 5.

the Turkish Empire no Greeks had ever revolted against Ottoman rule at any place in Thrace or Asia Minor, or at Istanbul.”<sup>442</sup> Caclamanos concurred stating that,

“[The Greek Orthodox] had always lived on good terms with the Turks; they had continued to do so even after the outbreak of the general war and before Greece had joined in the war. Constantinople had been so little a centre of irredentism that the Constantinople Greeks were sometimes reproached by other Greeks with their failing in this respect.”<sup>443</sup>

The Greek delegation also advocated against the expulsion of the Rum from the perspective of the potential expellees themselves. The Greek Orthodox community in Istanbul was an urban community, and an urban people, they alleged, could not be settled in the agricultural areas that the Muslim Greeks were abandoning in the exchange.<sup>444</sup> Caclamanos insisted that this urban population “could not possibly be absorbed by Greece...[the] burden would be intolerable if she had to accommodate this large number of city-bred people in addition to the vast number of immigrants already on her hands.”<sup>445</sup> Greece pleaded that it simply could not absorb any more refugees,<sup>446</sup> that an additional 300,000 people would overwhelming their already strained capacity.<sup>447</sup>

The Turkish delegation, naturally, refuted each of the Greek arguments in turn. We have seen they initially rejected the economic case. They also vehemently disagreed with the

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<sup>442</sup> Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 1922-1923: Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace, 1923: 226.

<sup>443</sup> LNA, C1112/8/N15: Sub-Commission for Exchange of Populations Meeting Minutes, 05 December 1922; UN Archives at Geneva, p. 5.

<sup>444</sup> LNA, C1112/8/N15: Sub-Commission for Exchange of Populations Meeting Minutes, 07 December 1922; UN Archives at Geneva, p. 5.

<sup>445</sup> LNA, C1112/8/N15: Sub-Commission for Exchange of Populations Meeting Minutes, 04 December 1922; UN Archives at Geneva, p. 5.

<sup>446</sup> By the time the Peace Conference started in November 1922 it is estimated that Greece had received one million refugees from Turkey (Ladas, 1932: 392; Hirschon, 2003: 6; Mazower, 2004: 345; Morris & Ze’evi, 2019: 465.).

<sup>447</sup> Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 1922-1923: Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace, 1923: 318.

Greek claim that the Rum of Istanbul were not irredentist. Shukri Bey confessed that previously the Greeks of Istanbul lived peacefully with their Turkish neighbors, but

“a point had been reached at which the only thing to do was to separate them out from each other...Turkey could not agree to make an exception in favour of the Greek population of Constantinople which was the main centre of Turkish life and a political centre of Greek political activity if the Greeks remained.”<sup>448</sup>

Tewfik Bey added that: “So long as [the Greek Orthodox] remained Constantinople would be a centre of conflict which would provoke European intervention.”<sup>449</sup> Removing the Greek Orthodox from Istanbul would increase European security by extracting “a hot-bed of trouble” from the East.<sup>450</sup> Tewfik Bey said that, “the Turks wanted to be friends after peace; but...their experience had shown that Turks and Greeks could no longer live together side by side and all the Greeks must leave.”<sup>451</sup> Regarding the Greek arguments that it was unfair to have an urban-for-rural population swap, the Turks argued that the Muslim population in Greece also included “townspeople” and thus the Orthodox expulsion would be an even trade.<sup>452</sup> Finally, to the point of Greece being overwhelmed with refugees, the Turks argued that they also had absorbed hundreds of thousands of Muslim refugees.<sup>453</sup>

Although the Greeks resisted the expulsion of the Orthodox from Istanbul at the Conference, their efforts would have likely come to naught without the backing of the Great

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<sup>448</sup> LNA, C1112/8/N15: Sub-Commission for Exchange of Populations Meeting Minutes, 04 December 1922; UN Archives at Geneva, p. 6.

<sup>449</sup> LNA, C1112/8/N15: Sub-Commission for Exchange of Populations Meeting Minutes, 07 December 1922; UN Archives at Geneva, p. 3.

<sup>450</sup> LNA, C1112/8/N15: Sub-Commission for Exchange of Populations Meeting Minutes, 05 December 1922; UN Archives at Geneva, p. 4.

<sup>451</sup> LNA, C1112/8/N15: Sub-Commission for Exchange of Populations Meeting Minutes, 07 December 1922; UN Archives at Geneva, p. 7.

<sup>452</sup> Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 1922-1923: Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace, 1923: 326.

<sup>453</sup> Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 1922-1923: Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace, 1923: 120.

Powers. It was up to the Allied Powers, running the peace conference, to adjudicate these competing claims. In this case the homeland state factor and international community factor worked in tandem to constrain the expulsion of the Greek Orthodox from Istanbul.

### **International Community**

It was clear to all that the Treaty of Sèvres had to be renegotiated given the success of the new Turkish nationalist government. The Turkish delegations' diplomatic strategy was not to isolate itself from the Great Powers but rather to become an equal. Ismet Pasha announced that Turkey was willing to join the League of Nations at the end of the proceedings and become a member of the international community.<sup>454</sup> This desire to cultivate strong ties with the international community negated the possibility of completely ignoring Allied arguments. However, that did not deter the Turks from driving a hard bargain, extending the duration of the conference much longer than the Allies wanted or anticipated. While there was strong, albeit reluctant, backing from all parties at the peace conference for the population exchange, there was no international support for the exchange of the Istanbul Rum. From the outset, key Allied figures empathized with the Greek side. The Allied arguments against expelling the Rum from Istanbul largely mirrored those of the Greek delegation. They included: economic anxieties, political concerns, refugee absorption, and making a fair trade.

The Great Powers were concerned about their financial interests in Istanbul. Erik Colban, Director of Administrative Commissions and the Minorities Questions Section for

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<sup>454</sup> Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 1922-1923: Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace, 1923: 221.

the League Secretariat, wrote in a letter to British politician, Noel Buxton, two days after the peace conference began, that: “The Great Powers with strong economic interests in Istanbul would never agree to the total evacuation of the Christians from that town...because all the European business in Istanbul is based upon the collaboration of the Greek element.”<sup>455</sup> While the Allied Powers were openly concerned about their own economic interests, they also believed the economic losses would be too great for Turkey to handle. Nansen wrote to the Greek delegate Politis on October 31, before the peace conference opened, that he believed: “...the Turkish government will find it cannot afford to expel the Constantinople Greeks if it has to pay for their possessions.”<sup>456</sup> Furthermore in an official report to the League on November 15, five days before the start of the conference, Nansen wrote: “It would be superfluous to stress what a complete commercial and financial suicide would result from the flight of the Greek and Armenian populations from Constantinople; in effect by such an event...Turkey will sacrifice her richest asset.”<sup>457</sup>

Sentiment was similar within the Political Section of the League Secretariat. Thanassis Aghnides, a League official and an Ottoman Greek born and raised in Istanbul, wrote in an internal report that: “...the removal of the non-Turkish elements will mean financial ruin for Turkey including instant ruin for Constantinople and Smyrna. Turkey would be reduced to a country of no economic importance whatever.”<sup>458</sup> Lord Curzon, British Foreign Secretary and President of the Conference’s First Commission stated that the removal of the Greek

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<sup>455</sup> LNA, S18/18/1/3: Note from Mr. Colban to Major Buxton, 22 November 1922; UN Archives at Geneva.

<sup>456</sup> LNA, R1761/48/24318: Letter from Nansen to Monsieur Politis, 31 October 1922; UN Archives at Geneva.

<sup>457</sup> LNA, R1761/48/24318: Report by Dr. Nansen to the League of Nations Part 1: Reciprocal Exchange of Racial Minorities Between Greece and Turkey, 15 November 1922; UN Archives at Geneva.

<sup>458</sup> LNA, S18/18/1/3: Report on “The Expulsion of Non-Turkish Elements from Asia Minor” by T. Aghnides, 23 November 1922; UN Archives at Geneva.

Orthodox from Istanbul “would entail a very serious economic and industrial loss to Turkey herself. He believed this population was vital to the existence of Constantinople as a great city of commerce and industry, and that without it Constantinople would be in danger of losing its authority, wealth and trade.”<sup>459</sup> Later in the conference proceedings, reflecting generally about the number of Rum expelled from Turkey in the last few months of 1922, Curzon remarked to the Commission: “I sometimes wonder if the Turkish Government have at all fully considered the economic results of this gigantic transference of peoples, to which there is no parallel in modern history, and by which I expect that in many cases Turkey will lose much more than she gains.”<sup>460</sup>

Other League of Nations officials expressed political concerns, such as the possibility of Russia benefiting from the Rum expulsion. Internal correspondence from Aghnides, stated,

“In my opinion, the real motive of the Turks...is the political motive....You have, perhaps, observed that the Russians back up the Turks in this respect, as in many others. Again I must point out, the reason for this is that to-day [sic], as in the past, Russia has an eye on Constantinople.”<sup>461</sup>

He continued on to say that removing the Christians from Istanbul would make it less a city of international commerce and complex politics, making it easier for Russia to pursue its aims: “that explains both the Russian attitude and also why the Allies are against the expulsion of the non-Turks from Constantinople.”<sup>462</sup> Importantly, British troops still occupied Istanbul in November 1922 when the peace conference began, and they did not leave until a year later in

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<sup>459</sup> Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 1922-1923: Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace, 1923: 122.

<sup>460</sup> Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 1922-1923: Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace, 1923: 177.

<sup>461</sup> LNA, S18/18/1/3: Letter from Mr. Aghnides to Major Buxton, 23 November 1922; UN Archives at Geneva.

<sup>462</sup> LNA, S18/18/1/3: Letter from Mr. Aghnides to Major Buxton, 23 November 1922; UN Archives at Geneva.

October 1923<sup>463</sup>.<sup>464</sup> Control of and influence in the city was still an open question in early 1923. The Great Powers were keen to maintain their political advantage in the city, and not to cede it to rival powers.

Nansen, as head of the League's refugee relief effort, was very concerned about the number and state of refugees in Greece and the consequences of adding any more. He advocated that Greece could not accept any more refugees, that it was fully saturated.<sup>465</sup> Lord Curzon agreed with Nansen, and said in a Commission meeting on January 10, 1923, that "...it would enormously aggravate the difficulty experienced by Greece in finding homes for all these refugees" if the Greek Orthodox from Istanbul were included.<sup>466</sup> The Allies also echoed the Greek argument about the inability of Greece to accommodate an urban population: "residents in towns could not be exchanged for residents in country districts."<sup>467</sup> H. G. Dwight of the American Delegation, observers at the conference, said that the Americans also could not approve of the Istanbul expulsion, "particularly under conditions which will send an urban people used to artizanship [sic] and commerce to a rural district."<sup>468</sup>

Giulio Cesare Montagna, second Italian delegate, and chair of the sub-Commission for the Exchange of Populations, summarized the general sentiment of the international

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<sup>463</sup> The nationalists deposed the Sultan in the same month—allowing him to remain as Caliph but not Sultan—and solidified themselves as the sole governing power (Mansel, 1996: 405, 407). They would abolish the Caliphate later on March 3, 1924 (Mansel, 1996: 413; Lewis, 2002: 264; Kieser, 2018: 415).

<sup>464</sup> Mansel, 1996: 410-11.

<sup>465</sup> LNA, R1762/48/24888: Message from Nansen to Lord Curzon, M. Poincaré and Italian MFA, 06 November 1922; UN Archives at Geneva.

<sup>466</sup> Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 1922-1923: Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace, 1923: 318.

<sup>467</sup> Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 1922-1923: Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace, 1923: 326.

<sup>468</sup> LNA, C1112/8/N15: Statement made by Mr. Dwight at the Meeting of the Sub-Commission on Prisoners of War and the Exchange of Populations, 07 December 1922; UN Archives at Geneva.



community, urging the Turkish delegation to reconsider its insistence on expelling the Greek Orthodox from Istanbul:

“...[you] should not bring about catastrophe by expelling the Greek population of Constantinople...everyone including the American Representative [is] against [you] on this question. [You] were wrong from every point of view, including the political point of view. [You] were preparing [your] own ruin. If the Greeks in Constantinople had compromised themselves, those compromised Greeks had left.”<sup>469</sup>

Although the Allied powers were united against the Turks regarding expulsion of the Greek Orthodox of Istanbul, Lord Curzon tried to appear unbiased by suggesting that if the Muslims of Western Thrace were exempted from the exchange, then the Rum of Istanbul should be too: a fair trade.<sup>470</sup> French delegate, de Lacroix, agreed and offered that the Moslems of Western Thrace and the Greeks of Istanbul should be “left over for a future possible exchange.”<sup>471</sup> In the end, there was significant international resistance to expelling the Greek Orthodox from Istanbul, constraining the Turkish government’s policy.

### *Summary*

This first case study has explained why and how the Ottoman/Turkish governments expelled its Orthodox Greek minority population during 1913-1923, and why the Greeks of Istanbul—the most irredentist, wealthiest, most political active—were allowed to remain. The Ottoman/Turkish governments were motivated to expel the Ottoman Greeks because they saw them as a dangerous fifth column. The expulsions occurred as the leaders—first the CUP

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<sup>469</sup> LNA, C1112/8/N15: Sub-Commission for Exchange of Populations Meeting Minutes, 07 December 1922; UN Archives at Geneva, pp. 6-7.

<sup>470</sup> Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 1922-1923: Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace, 1923: 122.

<sup>471</sup> LNA, C1112/8/N15: Sub-Commission for Exchange of Populations Meeting Minutes, 07 December 1922; UN Archives at Geneva, p. 7.

and then the Nationalists—sought to cast off the idea of multi-ethnic “Ottomanism” and instead usher in a new phase of Turkish nationalism. This new phase of nation-building created a Turkish national identity among Ottoman Muslims—a “Turkey for the Turks”—that in turn required the removal or elimination of non-Muslims. The Orthodox Greeks, with their co-ethnic ties to the Greek nation-state, and the continued territorial incursions of Greece into Ottoman lands, were a security threat that had to be removed. The application of my mass expulsion decision making framework to the situation of the Greek Orthodox along the Aegean and Pontic littoral (as well as Anatolia) versus those in the imperial capital of Istanbul, explains the key enabling and constraining factors for mass expulsion. Alliance patterns, the homeland state of the target group—in this case Greece, and the international community enabled expulsion in the case of the former, while constraining expulsion in Istanbul.

## CHAPTER 4. “They only milked the cow”: Asians in Post-Colonial Uganda and Kenya

On August 4, 1972, President Idi Amin gave a speech to his troops from the Airborne Regiment in Tororo, eastern Uganda. He told them there was no place, “for the over 80,000 Asians holding British passports who are sabotaging Uganda’s economy and encouraging corruption,”<sup>472</sup> and that the Ugandan economy should be in the hands of indigenous African Ugandans. Five days later, he announced that Asians in the country had 90 days to leave.<sup>473</sup> Amin’s decree set off an international scramble to resettle tens of thousands of individuals of Asian descent, with the United Kingdom both leading the efforts and deflecting responsibility to absorb 50,000 of its own citizens residing in Uganda. Although the expulsion order targeted Asians with foreign citizenship,<sup>474</sup> Amin declared that the government would “double-check” the citizenship of Asians who were registered as Ugandan citizens.<sup>475</sup> Through the citizenship verification process many Asians had their legitimate claims rejected.<sup>476</sup> The United Nations and international organizations coordinated the documentation, transportation, and resettlement of approximately 20,000 Asians who had Ugandan citizenship but were left *de facto* stateless by the expulsion order.

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<sup>472</sup> Patel, 1972: 17.

<sup>473</sup> Statement by H.E. The President of Uganda Concerning the Status of the Asian Community in Uganda, 09 August 1972; 11/2/64-641.UGA[c] Expulsion and Deportation – Uganda [1972-1984] Volume 3; Series 2, Box 1281; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>474</sup> Official Decree 17 stated that “any person of Asian origin” from the U.K., India, Pakistan, or Bangladesh must leave, extending the expulsion to all Asians with foreign citizenship, not just British Asians.

<sup>475</sup> Daily Telegraph newspaper article, “Expulsion Decree by Amin After ‘Divine Message,’” 10.08.1972; 11/2/10-100.UGA.ASI[a], Refugees from Asian in Uganda [Volume1-1.UGA.ASI]; Series 2; Box 204; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>476</sup> East Africa Standard. (1972). “Now All Ugandan Asians are Ordered Out.” *August 20*. In Z. Lalani (1997), *Ugandan Asians Expulsion: 90 Days and Beyond Through the Eyes of the International Press* (pp. 25-26). Tampa, FL: Expulsion Publications.

Explaining the expulsion, Amin claimed that, “Uganda will not be independent until the Asians have gone...I want to see all Ugandan African faces in Kampala streets and offices.”<sup>477</sup> While initially the expulsion garnered international headlines and outrage, within three months only 1,500 Asians remained in Uganda.<sup>478</sup> In comparison to other twentieth century mass expulsions, one might be tempted to describe this episode as relatively smooth—minimal deaths, a coordinated international response, and a safe and swift resettlement of expellees—but that would be to overlook the devastation of thousands of individual lives and livelihoods, and the damage to Uganda’s development.

#### **4.1 Contextual Environment & Predisposing Conditions**

##### *Asians in Uganda*

Asian traders had facilitated the exchange of goods in the Indian Ocean corridor, along the East African coast, long before the arrival of the British.<sup>479</sup> Their presence increased with the British colonization of East Africa, particularly in Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania. The British proclamation of the Protectorate of Uganda in 1894 drew Asians deeper inland as Indian indentured laborers built the railway network from Mombasa, Kenya to the White Nile in present day Uganda.<sup>480</sup> These indentured laborers largely originated from the Indian states of Gujarat and Punjab but also from what was then the Portuguese colony of Goa.<sup>481</sup> Most of

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<sup>477</sup> Daily Telegraph newspaper article, “Expulsion Decree by Amin After ‘Divine Message,’” 10.08.1972; 11/2/10-100.UGA.ASI[a], Refugees from Asian in Uganda [Volume1-1.UGA.ASI]; Series 2; Box 204; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>478</sup> Hoagland, Jim. (1972). “Kampala Exodus: Asian Quarter Like A Ghost Town.” *Washington Post*, November 13. In Z. Lalani (1997), *Ugandan Asians Expulsion: 90 Days and Beyond Through the Eyes of the International Press* (pp. 138,140). Tampa, FL: Expulsion Publications.

<sup>479</sup> Herzig, 2006: 10.

<sup>480</sup> Mattausch, 1998: 122.

<sup>481</sup> Herzig, 2006: 15.

these workers returned home to India at the end of their contract, died in Uganda, or were invalided home. Only 6,724 of the estimated 32,000 laborers permanently settled in Uganda.<sup>482</sup> By 1960 this group was just 10 percent of the total Asian community in East Africa.<sup>483</sup>

A larger group of Asians arrived in East Africa in a second wave of immigration in the 1920s and 1930s.<sup>484</sup> These voluntary immigrants often called *dukawallahs*<sup>485</sup> were motivated by adventure and economic opportunity, and served middle-class functions, engaging in small-scale trade, cotton ginning, transportation, and clerical services for the colonial administration.<sup>486</sup> Most of these migrants were male and rarely stayed for long—they came to Africa to work, and then returned home in a circular migration pattern. These immigrants opened and developed the interior of East Africa extending the monetary economy into previously subsistence areas. They brought consumer goods to rural, indigenous populations and served as the main outlet for surplus produce from African farmers, controlling most of the export-import trade.<sup>487</sup> The Asians in Uganda lived a much higher quality of life than their kin in India, and after World War II greater opportunities encouraged family migration and more permanent settlement in Uganda.<sup>488</sup> As depicted in Table 7, a combination of family reunification and high birth rates increased the Asian population in East Africa between 1910 and 1972.

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<sup>482</sup> O'Brien, 1972: 16.

<sup>483</sup> Mattausch, 1998: 122.

<sup>484</sup> O'Brien, 1972: 16.

<sup>485</sup> *Dukawallah* comes from the Swahili word “duka” meaning shop (from the Hindi “dukaan” for store), and the Hindi word “wallah” meaning owner (Herzig, 2006: 19n9; Ghai & Ghai, 1971: 6; Tandon & Raphael, 1978: 17n4)

<sup>486</sup> Tandon, 1972: 3.

<sup>487</sup> Ghai & Ghai, 1965: 37.

<sup>488</sup> Mattausch, 1998: 128.

Table 7: Asian Population in Uganda, 1910-1972 <sup>489</sup>							
Year	1910	1921	1935	1948	1959	1969	1972
Population	2,000	5,000	15,000	34,000	69,000	70,000	74,000

Despite similar circumstances drawing them to Uganda, the Asian community was far from homogenous. There were divisions along caste, religious, occupational, and after the partition of India in 1947, national lines. Most Uganda Asians were Hindus of the Lohana or Patidar caste, but there were also Muslims (mostly Ismailis), Sikhs, and Catholics.<sup>490</sup> There were three main occupational classes: skilled professionals, commercial businessmen in wholesale or processing, and retail traders, of which the traders made up the majority.<sup>491</sup> While the Asians lived segregated, by choice, from their African neighbors, the Ismailis did the most to integrate into Ugandan society, investing in schools and hospitals to support both Asian and African populations.<sup>492</sup> At Ugandan independence the Aga Khan, spiritual leader of the Ismailis, strongly encouraged Ismailis in Uganda to adopt local citizenship, suggesting their future lay in Africa.<sup>493</sup> Nevertheless, when it came to the 1972 expulsion decree these intra-Asian differences were ignored and the Asians were treated as a single racial group.

### *Tripartite Societal Divisions*

The British Protectorate government in Uganda institutionalized a tripartite separation of races: European, Asian, and African.<sup>494</sup> The Europeans controlled political power and owned

<sup>489</sup> Adapted from text in Uche, 2017: 823; and Jamal, 1976: 613.

<sup>490</sup> Mamdani 1975: 32; Parson, 1973: 63.

<sup>491</sup> Mamdani 1975: 33.

<sup>492</sup> Mutibwa, 1992: 115.

<sup>493</sup> Note for the File: The East African Asians, J.E.R. Candappa, Legal Division, 09.03.1970; 11/1-1/0/KEN/ASI, Refugees situation - Refugees from Asia in Kenya; Series 1, Box 26; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>494</sup> Mattausch, 1998: 128.

the major industries, including financial institutions and many of the larger distribution enterprises. Asians filled the middle-class functions. Africans were the third rung on the racialized British ladder, politically and economically marginalized, working mostly in agriculture but also as wage laborers, taxi drivers, and servants.<sup>495</sup>

The Asian population was economically successful, socially segregated, and political isolated.<sup>496</sup> Their near monopoly on medium-sized commerce and industry constrained the entrepreneurial aspirations of local Africans.<sup>497</sup> Besides the colonial restriction on Asian land ownership, the Protectorate policies favored Asian businesses to the exclusion of Africans, giving them a foothold in the territory. This hierarchy was by design. An alien mercantile class ensured Africans could not easily obtain the resources, skills, or vision to organize against colonial rule. It also facilitated the circulation of goods within the British Empire as Asian traders imported British iron and cotton from Bombay to sell in Uganda, and exported domestic, African cash crops to the metropole.<sup>498</sup>

The economic separation between Asians and Africans was also a geographic segregation between urban and rural areas. Systems of trade licensing dating back to the early colonial era, and policies such as the Trade Act of 1938, meant that Asians were confined to large towns, particularly Entebbe, Kampala, and Jinja, three cities located in south-central Uganda along Lake Victoria.<sup>499</sup> This geographic segregation was reinforced by the close

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<sup>495</sup> Mattausch, 1998: 129.

<sup>496</sup> Amor, 2003: 6.

<sup>497</sup> Mattausch, 1998: 131-32.

<sup>498</sup> Mamdani, 1975: 31-32.

<sup>499</sup> Sharma & Woolridge, 1974: 397.

relations and connections that Asian immigrants maintained with their relatives in India.<sup>500</sup>

Endogamy was standard; mixed marriages between Asians and Africans were rare.

Although Africans and Asians were physically segregated, they had regular, hierarchical interactions as retailer-customer or master-servant. Africans purchased their consumer goods from Asian shops and worked in Asian homes as servants. Most African retailers did not have access to banks and thus Asians were retailers and lenders, with debt cementing the subordinate relationship of the African buyer.<sup>501</sup> Even successful African traders had trouble advancing because Asian networks controlled the wholesale-retail and export-import supply chain, making it difficult to break their market monopoly.<sup>502</sup>

In the late 1940s, Africans protested the Protectorate's discriminatory treatment in a series of peasant uprisings and working-class strikes. The economic disparities between the African and Asian traders are illustrated in Table 8. In 1952, although African traders made up 69 percent of all traders, they only accounted for 27 percent of retail trade, making just over one-sixth of their Asian counterparts.<sup>503</sup> Most of the African trade was in traditional, low-cost products including meat, fish, produce, and other local goods.

Table 8: Retail trade in Uganda, 1952 <sup>504</sup>			
Retailers	No. of traders	Annual revenue (£)	Avg revenue per trader (£)
Asians	5,227	28,400,000	5,433
Africans	11,634	10,600,000	911

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<sup>500</sup> Mattausch, 1998: 130.

<sup>501</sup> Mamdani 1975: 34.

<sup>502</sup> Parson, 1973: 66.

<sup>503</sup> Jamal, 1976: 613.

<sup>504</sup> Adapted from text in Jamal, 1976: 612-13.



The British responded to the African protests with reforms, embarking on a series of Africanization policies during 1951-1955.<sup>505</sup> The colonial administration passed two major ordinances in 1951: the Acquisition of Ginneries Ordinance and the Cotton Ordinance. Under the former, the Protectorate appropriated ginneries from Asian owners and transferred them to African cooperatives. And in 1955 a Committee on the Advancement of Africans in Trade and Commerce was established.<sup>506</sup>

After these largely cosmetic policy changes, the historically powerful Buganda Province organized the first major trade boycott against Asian traders. Led by aspiring Baganda businessman, Augustine Kamyia, the boycott lasted from March 1959 to mid-1960. The aim was to pressure the colonial authorities to bring about political and economic change in Uganda. While the boycott was directed at all non-African shops, Asian traders were the primary target.<sup>507</sup> Asian shops were burned, rudimentary bombs were thrown into shops and public areas, thousands of coffee farms were laid waste, and dozens were assaulted.<sup>508</sup> As the boycott unfolded, violence and intimidation were directed not only at Asian shopkeepers but also at Africans who violated the boycott.<sup>509</sup> Africans were disproportionately affected by higher prices and reduced supply.<sup>510</sup>

The Protectorate authorities condemned the boycott and demanded its end. Interestingly, the boycott remained confined to Buganda and did not spread throughout the rest of the country. An undeveloped African business class in other regions of Uganda may

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<sup>505</sup> Mamdani, 1993: 269.

<sup>506</sup> Mamdani, 1993: 269.

<sup>507</sup> Ghai, 1970: 766.

<sup>508</sup> Ghai, 1970: 757-58.

<sup>509</sup> Ghai, 1970: 756.

<sup>510</sup> Ghai, 1970: 766-67.

explain the variation in support for the boycott, as well as the fact that at this time African political elites were more focused on decolonization than economic control. While the violence associated with the Baganda trade boycott was relatively contained and did not reach the status of a pogrom, or a deadly ethnic riot, it highlighted serious inter-group tensions, even if provincially concentrated. A harbinger of events to come.

Although Asians dominated almost the entire distributive trade, the British owned Uganda.<sup>511</sup> Three British banks controlled Uganda's commercial bank assets. Wholesale trade in raw materials, machinery, and goods for heavy industry were all managed by businessmen in London.<sup>512</sup> Even after independence, the British controlled the commanding heights of the economy. But outside Kampala, few Africans saw many Englishmen, rather it was the Asian trader who was omnipresent. The daily buyer-seller interactions reinforced the colonial hierarchies, deepening resentment and frustration.

#### *Post-Colonial Political Transition (1962-1971)*

Uganda was granted independence from Britain on October 9, 1962. The first democratic election in 1962 was won by an alliance between two parties: the Uganda People's Congress and Kabaka Yekka. The Kabaka (king) of Buganda Province became the first president and Milton Obote, the prime minister.<sup>513</sup> Though the Kabaka was the head of state, Obote had political control in a standard version of the Westminster model. The military structure

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<sup>511</sup> Tandon, 1972: 6.

<sup>512</sup> Kramer, 1974: 52.

<sup>513</sup> Southall, 1975: 94.

remained unchanged at independence with the Nubian<sup>514</sup> ethnic group at the core of the army, and Idi Amin as its central figure.<sup>515</sup>

The British pushed Uganda to automatically grant British Asians local citizenship at independence, but the newly installed government demurred. According to Chapter II, Article 7(1) of the 1962 Ugandan constitution, a person automatically became a Ugandan citizen at independence if he was born in Uganda and at least one of his parents was also born in Uganda.<sup>516</sup> If neither of his parents were born in the country, he had two years to apply for citizenship.<sup>517</sup> Therefore, most Asians had three choices: retain foreign citizenship, return to their country of origin, or naturalize and adopt Ugandan citizenship. The majority chose to retain their existing citizenship, not confident in the new government and wanting to keep British (or other) citizenship as an insurance policy.<sup>518</sup> Even among those who did obtain Ugandan citizenship, most had at least one family member with alternative citizenship.<sup>519</sup>

The Ugandan Citizenship Ordinance stated that after registering as a Ugandan citizen, one had to renounce any other nationality or citizenship, and take an oath of allegiance within three months of approved registration.<sup>520</sup> Since dual nationality was not permitted, without this renunciation Ugandan citizenship was invalid. Ignorant of this clause, or not realizing its

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<sup>514</sup> Although Nubians (sometimes referred to as Nubi) are considered an ethnic group in Uganda, they are a fusion of multiple ethnic units who became “Nubian” by adopting Islam and speaking Nubi - an African-version of Arabic. (Kasfir, 1976: 220). The name was given to the group by the Baganda in reference to their geographic origin in the Nuba mountains of Sudan (Woodward, 1978: 155). They are also one of the ethnic groups referred to as West Nilotics.

<sup>515</sup> Southall, 1975: 92.

<sup>516</sup> Memorandum, Ugandan Asians – Statelessness, 22.09.1972; 11/2/10-100.UGA.ASI[b] - Refugees from Asia in Uganda [Volume 2-1.UGA.ASI]; Series 2, Box 204; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>517</sup> Sharma & Woolridge, 1974: 398.

<sup>518</sup> Amor, 2003.

<sup>519</sup> Sharma & Woolridge, 1974: 399.

<sup>520</sup> Sharma & Woolridge, 1974: 399.

importance, some Asians did not submit evidence of their renunciation, or the British government did not process their renunciation on time. Therefore, in many cases Ugandan citizenship was nullified, often without the person's knowledge, making them effectively stateless.

Importantly, there was a distinction in the status of Asians who had lived in British India and Asians from the Princely states. The former were British subjects, and the latter were British Protected Persons. Under UK law, British subjects could have dual citizenship, thus they could hold UK and Ugandan citizenship, although this was illegal from the Ugandan side. British Protected Persons lost that status on the acquisition of Ugandan citizenship and were particularly vulnerable after the expulsion.<sup>521</sup> Five years after independence, 10,527 Asians who had applied for Ugandan citizenship were still waiting for their applications to be processed. These pending applications would lead to further confusion during the expulsion episode.<sup>522</sup>

Democracy did not last long in Uganda. In January 1964, Obote announced his desire to create a one-party state to consolidate control. In response the army mutinied, inspired by the successful revolution in Zanzibar, and as similar events were occurring in Kenya and Tanzania.<sup>523</sup> Obote turned to the British for help, and British paratroops suppressed the army revolt. While Obote had preached transcending ethnic identity and destroying tribal divisions, after the mutiny, he packed the military with his Langi and Acholi ethnic kin and put in place policies to disadvantage his ethnic rivals, particularly the Baganda.

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<sup>521</sup> Memorandum, Ugandan Asians – Statelessness, 22.09.1972; 11/2/10-100.UGA.ASI[b] - Refugees from Asia in Uganda [Volume 2-1.UGA.ASI]; Series 2, Box 204; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>522</sup> Mamdani 1975: 52.

<sup>523</sup> Southall, 1975: 95.

Obote's authoritarian behavior continued in May 1966 when government military forces, led by Amin then Commander of the Army, removed President Kabaka in a bloody coup in which 2,000 Baganda police and civilians were killed.<sup>524</sup> Obote took over as president and quickly dissolved Uganda's federal structure—abolishing kingdoms, provinces, and autonomous regions—and created a unitary state. He pushed for a centralized Ugandan national identity and the elimination of ethnic and sub-national identities: "...the problem of people putting the tribe above national consciousness is a problem that we must face, and an issue we must destroy."<sup>525</sup> The unitary state model emphasized cohesion and solidarity, but it also clipped the wings of Obote's biggest rival: the Baganda. In one fell swoop Obote replaced the constitutionally elected Baganda president as leader of the country and restricted Buganda's historic privileges and autonomy.

During his rule Obote greatly expanded the size of the army from 1,000 personnel at independence to 7,680 in less than a decade.<sup>526</sup> This growth came at a high cost: in 1968, 10.2 percent of the national budget was allocated to military spending compared to 3.8 percent in Tanzania and 6.9 percent in Kenya, two neighboring countries with much larger populations.<sup>527</sup> Obote intended to protect his rule with the stick, but he also offered carrots. He introduced three Africanization initiatives in 1969, modelled after those in Kenya—the National Trading Corporation, the Trade Licensing Act, and "Operation Bring African

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<sup>524</sup> Amor, 2003: 57.

<sup>525</sup> Kasfir, 1976: 197.

<sup>526</sup> Jørgensen, 1981: 274-75.

<sup>527</sup> Kasozi, 1994: 88.

'Traders Into Town.'"<sup>528</sup> In the same year he also ordered a national census: the Asian population numbered 74,308 of whom 34.5 percent were citizens.<sup>529</sup>

On Labor Day, May 1, 1970, Obote launched his socialist "Move to the Left" policies which included plans to nationalize large sectors of the economy in a 40:60 split between state and private ownership.<sup>530</sup> He also imposed strict currency controls limiting the amount of money that could be sent out of the country.<sup>531</sup> Although Obote advocated Africanization and partial nationalization, his "Move to the Left" was crafted to exclude the Baganda, the most established and experienced of the African traders. Forcing out non-citizens residing in Uganda through Africanization policies, as Kenya was doing next door, would have directly benefited Baganda landlords and property-owning classes. Since this would have threatened Obote's plans, he stifled the emergence of an African (i.e., Baganda) merchant class and allowed Asians and Europeans to continue to dominate the commercial and industrial sectors respectively, with the state as a junior partner—profiting but not controlling.<sup>532</sup> To many Africans, the façade of Obote's nationalization and Africanization policies merely perpetuated the status quo.

In the summer of 1970, amid Obote's Africanization efforts, the first group expelled from Uganda was not Asians but Africans. On July 10, the Minister of Labor announced that the *wage-earning sector* was comprised of too many non-Ugandans,<sup>533</sup> and that the positions

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<sup>528</sup> Uche, 2017: 828.

<sup>529</sup> Patel, 1972: 17.

<sup>530</sup> Tandon, 1972: 5.

<sup>531</sup> Mazrui, 1979: 266.

<sup>532</sup> Kasozi, 1994: 92.

<sup>533</sup> The Uganda MoL estimated 285,000 persons were employed in the wage-earning sector of whom 80,000 (approximately 28 percent) were non-Ugandan (Mazrui, 1979: 262).

needed to be “Ugandanized” within two months.<sup>534</sup> The largest group among these non-Ugandans were approximately 20,000-30,000 Kenyan Luos who were expelled across the border to Kenya.<sup>535</sup> Obote initially distanced himself from his labor minister’s decision, but when outrage rose in Kenya Obote defended him, and stated that he did not want unemployed Kenyan workers to be exported to Uganda because of President Jomo Kenyatta’s failed capitalist policies.<sup>536</sup> Fierce ideological battles over the best economic model—capitalism or socialism—were prominent in late 1960s, early 1970s East Africa. The expulsion was news for a day but then largely forgotten.

### *British Immigration Policies*

British immigration policies are a crucial component of the 1972 Ugandan expulsion story. The story begins after WWII when in 1946 Canada passed citizenship legislation that breached the British Imperial “common code.” The common code was a 1911 agreement about freedom of movement for British Dominion<sup>537</sup> subjects throughout the British Empire. Under the new Canadian citizenship law, British subject status was derivative of Canadian citizenship, which undermined the “common” basis of imperial nationality.<sup>538</sup> The Canadian legislation set off a cascade of events that resulted in the 1948 British Nationality Act. This Act extended citizenship and immigration privileges to the New Commonwealth countries—India, Pakistan, and Ceylon<sup>539</sup>—in addition to the Old Commonwealth British Dominions creating a new

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<sup>534</sup> Mazrui, 1979: 262.

<sup>535</sup> Kasozi, 1994: 120.

<sup>536</sup> Mazrui, 1979: 272.

<sup>537</sup> British Dominions included: Canada, Australia, Newfoundland, South Africa, New Zealand, and the Irish Free State/Ireland (until 1949). India was also a dominion between 1947 and 1950 until it became a Republic.

<sup>538</sup> Hansen, 1999: 815.

<sup>539</sup> In 1972 Ceylon changed its name to Sri Lanka.

status: Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies or CUKC.<sup>540</sup> The act was largely symbolic. It aimed at maintaining cohesion within the Empire during decolonization.<sup>541</sup> Not anticipating large-scale immigration of former colonial subjects, extending the right to free entry seemed, at the time, like a benign policy.

However, the 1948 British Nationality Act combined with decolonization, brought a wave of immigrants to the UK. New Commonwealth, sometimes referred to as “non-white Commonwealth,” immigration increased rapidly in the 1950s, peaking in 1961-1962 and then falling by the mid-1960s (see Table 9).<sup>542</sup> As domestic opposition to these immigrants grew in England, the UK tightened its immigration controls.

<b>Table 9: New Commonwealth Immigration to the U.K., 1955-1966<sup>543</sup></b>						
Year	1955	1956	1960	1961	1962 <sup>544</sup>	1966
No. of Immigrants	42,700	46,850	57,700	136,400	100,000	46,953

Domestic nativist anger at non-white immigration culminated in race riots, which prompted the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act. The act instituted immigration controls over Commonwealth citizens, distinguishing between persons with personal connections to the UK, either by birth or by naturalization, and those without such personal connections.<sup>545</sup> This distinction effectively eliminated, if not seriously reduced, CUKC immigration from newly independent African and Asian states.<sup>546</sup>

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<sup>540</sup> Uche, 2017: 824.

<sup>541</sup> Deakin, 1969: 82.

<sup>542</sup> Memorandum from UNHCR London Representative to High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, 29.01.1969; 11/1-1/0/KEN/ASI, Refugees situation - Refugees from Asia in Kenya; Series 1, Box 26; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>543</sup> Adapted from text in Tandon & Raphael, 1978: 11-12.

<sup>544</sup> This figure is only the first six months of 1962.

<sup>545</sup> Uche, 2017: 824; Aiyar, 2015: 285.

<sup>546</sup> Uche, 2017: 826.



Back in Uganda, President Obote closed observed UK immigration policy. Commenting on its relevance to Uganda's Asians, he stated: "We will keep non-Ugandan citizens at our pleasure, but if, for national interests, that pleasure runs out, they will have to go to their countries."<sup>547</sup> East Africa was an unstable place for Asians in the late 1960s.

### *The Second Coup*

On January 25, 1971, while Obote attended a Commonwealth Conference in Singapore, Major-General Idi Amin led a military coup.<sup>548</sup> A week later Amin announced that the powers previously vested in the president would now reside with him as Military Head of State and Commander in Chief. He dissolved Parliament and stated that the new government would legislate by his decrees, with advice from the Cabinet.<sup>549</sup> Despite taking power undemocratically, Amin was heralded by many inside and outside Uganda. Local African and Asian traders, along with international governments—Britain, Israel, Ethiopia, and South Africa—hoped he would steer the state toward capitalism and cast off Obote's socialist policies.<sup>550</sup> But not all countries were happy with Amin's coup, particularly regional African countries. Neither Kenya<sup>551</sup> nor Tanzania recognized Amin's government. Tanzanian

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<sup>547</sup> Note for the File: The East African Asians, J.E.R. Candappa, Legal Division, 09.03.1970; 11/1-1/0/KEN/ASI, Refugees situation - Refugees from Asia in Kenya; Series 1, Box 26; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>548</sup> Kasozi, 1994: 103.

<sup>549</sup> Keesing, 1971: 24451.

<sup>550</sup> Jørgensen, 1981: 271-72.

<sup>551</sup> Country Status Report on Uganda, 15.03.1971; 11/2/10-100.GEN.UGA, Refugees from Uganda - General; Series 2; Box 34; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

President Nyerere offered refuge to Obote and his political allies, and Zambia President Kaunda discouraged Western leaders from recognizing the new regime.<sup>552</sup>

Amin placed his ethnic kin into key military positions and initiated a campaign to purge any traces of the previous regime. Large-scale killings of Langi, Acholi, and Teso members of the armed forces, intelligence, and police ensued.<sup>553</sup> Although Amin criticized Obote for imprisoning his enemies, within four months Amin had detained 500-800 persons without trial, far exceeding the less than 100 who were imprisoned at the time of the coup.<sup>554</sup> Estimates of the total persons killed in the first years of Amin's reign vary dramatically from low estimates of 12,000 to high estimates of 300,000, but almost all are aggregated based on his eight-year rule.<sup>555</sup> Historian Jan Jelmert Jørgensen (1981) wrote that most figures are exaggerated and based on peak killing periods rather than averages. He estimated the total killed by the state during Amin's rule at 12,000-30,000, or approximately 1,500-3,750 per year.<sup>556</sup> These figures are similar to those cited in the 1974 International Commission for Jurists (ICJ) report to the UN on the Violations of Human Rights in Uganda that stated several hundred people were killed in the first five months of Amin's rule.<sup>557</sup>

### *Amin & the Asians*

In the aftermath of the coup, Amin did not directly target the Asian population in Uganda. Instead, he focused on eliminating his African military rivals. However, the Uganda Asian

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<sup>552</sup> Mutibwa, 1992: 87; Keesing, 1971: 24450.

<sup>553</sup> Kasozi, 1994: 110; Mutibwa, 1992: 88.

<sup>554</sup> Posner, 1974: 16.

<sup>555</sup> Jørgensen, 1981: 315; Kasozi, 1994: 104.

<sup>556</sup> Jørgensen, 1981: 315.

<sup>557</sup> Posner, 1974: 31.

community's optimism about the new president was short lived. On October 12, 1971, Amin called for a census of all Asians—citizens and non-citizens—a clear racial targeting. Asians were required to participate or forfeit any claims to live in Uganda and many had their passports confiscated during this process, rendering them stateless.<sup>558</sup> After the census, Asians were required to carry green passes to indicate they had been counted, without which their movement was banned.<sup>559</sup> The results of the census were not made public until after the expulsion decree. Many suspect that Amin was not happy with the data indicating that 23,242 Asians were Ugandan citizens.<sup>560</sup>

Shortly after the census, in response to public statements and letters complaining about the Asian population, Amin convened an “Indian Conference.” During December 7-8, 1971, Asians from across the country travelled to Kampala for the meeting, an event that inadvertently united a population that had strong internal divisions.<sup>561</sup> To open the meeting the Asians presented the First Indian Memorandum in which they graciously thanked Amin for convening the meeting between the Asian community and the President. Their message addressed social integration, education, civil rights, citizenship, immigration, and the economy, while refuting the attacks against them, particularly racial propaganda in the media.<sup>562</sup> The next day, Amin attended the conference and delivered a speech about his views on the Uganda Asian community which foreshadowed events to come.

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<sup>558</sup> Sharma & Woolridge, 1974: 400.

<sup>559</sup> Tandon, 1972: 5.

<sup>560</sup> Tandon, 1972: 5; O'Brien, 1973: 93.

<sup>561</sup> Patel, 1972: 13.

<sup>562</sup> Patel, 1972: 13.

Amin began his speech by placing the conference in the context of a series of meetings that the government was conducting with “different groups of persons” in Uganda such as the Muslim Leaders Conference and the Church of Uganda Leaders Conference.<sup>563</sup> Amin described his intentions, “My aim is to ensure that, like a father in a family, understanding and unity between the different communities in this country are established on a permanent basis.”<sup>564</sup> The speech began with praise for the Asian community and their contributions to commerce and trade, employment opportunities, education and medical facilities, and various fields of government. However, after a few pleasantries, his speech took a negative turn. Amin criticized the Asian community for their disloyalty, refusal to integrate, commercial malpractice, and citizenship choices. He also announced that the pending citizenship applications of 12,000 British Asians were cancelled.<sup>565</sup>

In the new year, on January 4, 1972, Indian leaders met again with Amin to present a Second Indian Memorandum in response to the December conference. Shortly after this meeting Karim Aga Khan,<sup>566</sup> spiritual leader and Imam of the Nizari Ismaili Shias, visited Uganda and was greeted warmly by Amin who gave him a lavish welcome and assured him that he had been misunderstood regarding the Asian community. Amin told the Aga Khan that he did not blame all Asians for the current problems. Many Asians were hopeful for improved conditions after this positive visit.<sup>567</sup>

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<sup>563</sup> O'Brien, 1972: 25.

<sup>564</sup> O'Brien, 1972: 25.

<sup>565</sup> Keesing, 1972: 25023; Tandon & Raphael, 1978: 10.

<sup>566</sup> The visit of Karim Aga Khan was on behalf of the 11,200 Asian Ismailis living in Uganda. (Reference: Newspaper article from *L'actualité Internationale*, by Bertrand Bellaigue, “Les Ismaéliens d’Afrique, 28.08.1972; 13/1/4-11, Ismailis (1972-1975); Series 4, Box 41; Fonds 11 Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.).

<sup>567</sup> Patel, 1972: 17.

## 4.2 Mass Expulsion (August-November 1972)

In 1972 the total Ugandan population was approximately 10 million, of which an estimated 100,000 were non-Africans (See Table 10). Most of the 74,000 Asians were of Indian descent and approximately one-third of this group, 24,500, believed they had Ugandan citizenship.<sup>568</sup>

Table 10: Uganda Population Figures, 1972 <sup>569</sup>	
<i>Group</i>	<i>Total Population</i>
Africans	9,900,000
Asians	74,000
Europeans	10,000
Arabs	3,000

When Amin announced the expulsion on August 4, 1972, it was not immediately clear if the 80,000 Asians, “holding British passports who are sabotaging Uganda’s economy and encouraging corruption,”<sup>570</sup> referred to all the Asians in the country or only Asians with British citizenship. Amin’s August 9 presidential statement,<sup>571</sup> followed by the release of Official Decree 17 and Statutory Instrument No. 124, clarified and formalized what Amin had first announced to the troops in Tororo. Decree 17 stated:

“On and after the commencement of this Decree, every entry permit or certificate of residence issued or granted under the provisions of the Immigration Act, 1969, to any person who is of Asian origin, extraction or descent and who is a subject or citizen of any of the countries specified in the Schedule to this Decree shall cease to have any validity whatsoever.”<sup>572</sup>

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<sup>568</sup> Melady & Melady, 1976: 1.

<sup>569</sup> Adapted from text in Melady & Melady, 1976.

<sup>570</sup> Patel, 1972: 17.

<sup>571</sup> Harper, Stephen. (1972). “Cold-Comfort Curry: Amin Asks Asians to Lunch, Then Issues New Threat.” *Daily Express London, August 10*. In Z. Lalani (1997), *Ugandan Asians Expulsion: 90 Days and Beyond Through the Eyes of the International Press* (pp. 9-10). Tampa, FL: Expulsion Publications.

<sup>572</sup> Confidential Memorandum from The Representative, UNHCR Branch Office for Uganda—photostatcopies of Decree No. 17 and Statutory Instrument No. 124/72, 14 September 1972; 11/2/64-641.UGA[a] Expulsion and Deportation – Uganda [1972] Volume 1; Series 2, Box 1281; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

The schedule of countries in the decree included: the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Republic of India, the Republic of Pakistan, and the Republic of Bangladesh. Thus, the official government decree extended the expulsion to all Asians with foreign citizenship, not just British Asians.<sup>573</sup> The corresponding Statutory Instrument No. 124 outlined exemptions from Decree 17. Two categories of persons would not be expelled:

- “1. All persons in the employment of Government, Government bodies, the co-operative movement, the East African Community and international organisations.
2. Professionals such as teachers, practising lawyers, medical practitioners, pharmacists, dentists, chemists, auditors, architects, accountants, surveyors, quantity surveyors, engineers; technicians in industries, commercial and agricultural enterprises; managers or owners of banks and insurance companies; owners of and professionals and technicians engaged in plant, animal, agriculture and forestry production, processing and marketing of these products; and school owners.”<sup>574</sup>

In short, Statutory Instrument No. 124 exempted Asian civil servants and Asian professionals. This was significant. Asian sources estimated that 10,000 people, approximately 12.5 percent of the total Asian population, qualified under this provision.<sup>575</sup> Although mass expulsion appealed to the Ugandan public, many bureaucrats and Cabinet officials favored broad exemptions from Amin’s initial announcement.<sup>576</sup>

Despite events foreshadowing Amin’s expulsion announcement, the Uganda Asians and the international community were caught off guard. Given Amin’s history of erratic

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<sup>573</sup> India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh were independent countries in 1972, although they were all former British colonies.

<sup>574</sup> Confidential Memorandum from The Representative, UNHCR Branch Office for Uganda—photostatcopies of Decree No. 17 and Statutory Instrument No. 124/72, 14 September 1972; 11/2/64-641.UGA[a] Expulsion and Deportation – Uganda [1972] Volume 1; Series 2, Box 1281; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>575</sup> Daily Telegraph newspaper article, “Expulsion Decree by Amin After ‘Divine Message,’” 10.08.1972; 11/2/10-100.UGA.ASI[a], Refugees from Asian in Uganda [Volume1-1.UGA.ASI]; Series 2; Box 204; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>576</sup> Jørgensen, 1981: 286.

behavior, many were not convinced that he would follow through with his plans.<sup>577</sup> For almost six weeks the Asians and the British government took limited actions in the hopes that Amin would change his mind.<sup>578</sup> But Amin continued to ratchet up his rhetoric stating, “I must emphasize that after the 90-day period has expired, any of these people still in Uganda will face the consequences. They will be sitting on a fire and they will not sit comfortably.”<sup>579</sup> It was not until mid-September, over a month after the initial announcement, that evacuations began in earnest.<sup>580</sup> Before departure, Asians were required to declare all their assets and liabilities to the Register of Properties and Businesses,<sup>581</sup> and complete income tax and foreign exchange clearances at the Bank of Uganda.<sup>582</sup> They were only allowed to take £50 per person<sup>583</sup> and a maximum of 485lbs of personal effects out of the country.<sup>584</sup>

Although Decree 17 targeted Asian non-citizens, Amin announced in his presidential statement of the same day that the government would “double check” the citizenship of Asians who were registered as Ugandan citizens in the 1971 census.<sup>585</sup> On August 14 a spokesman for the Ministry of Internal Affairs fulfilled Amin’s order and instructed Asian

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<sup>577</sup> ACICR B AG 252 152-001; Confidential Report on the Current Situation in Uganda, 05.10.1972.

<sup>578</sup> Tandon & Raphael, 1978: 13.

<sup>579</sup> Harper, Stephen. (1972). “Cold-Comfort Curry: Amin Asks Asians to Lunch, Then Issues New Threat.” *Daily Express London*, August 10. In Z. Lalani (1997), *Ugandan Asians Expulsion: 90 Days and Beyond Through the Eyes of the International Press* (pp. 9-10). Tampa, FL: Expulsion Publications.

<sup>580</sup> O’Brien, 1973: 96.

<sup>581</sup> Confidential Memorandum regarding the Legal and Policy Aspects of Compensation Claims, 17.04.1974; 11/2/66-660.1[a], Compensation Claims of Ugandan Asians in any Country [Volume 1]; Series 2; Box 1293; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>582</sup> ACICR B AG 232 152-002.04; United Nations Centre IPS Building Kampala: Importance Notice, 30.10.1972.

<sup>583</sup> ACICR B AG 252 152-001; Confidential Report on the Current Situation in Uganda, 05.10.1972.

<sup>584</sup> Munnion, Christopher. (1972). “Asians Searched to Skin by Uganda Customs.” *September 1*. In Z. Lalani (1997), *Ugandan Asians Expulsion: 90 Days and Beyond Through the Eyes of the International Press* (pp. 43). Tampa, FL: Expulsion Publications.

<sup>585</sup> Daily Telegraph newspaper article, “Expulsion Decree by Amin After ‘Divine Message,’” 10.08.1972; 11/2/10-100.UGA.ASI[a], Refugees from Asian in Uganda [Volume1-1.UGA.ASI]; Series 2; Box 204; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

citizens to report to the Immigration Office in Kampala by September 10 to verify their documents or they would be considered non-citizens.<sup>586</sup> The spokesman outlined a timetable, by region, for reporting to the Immigration Office and noted that all documentation must be original—no duplicates, photocopies, or carbon copies would be accepted.<sup>587</sup> The stated purpose of the verification campaign was to eliminate “false citizens” who illegally obtained citizenship or who held dual citizenship, which was illegal under Ugandan law. Illustrating Amin’s frank views, he was quoted as saying, “If all of them go I’ll be very, very happy.”<sup>588</sup>

Confidential cables sent between the UNHCR Branch Office in Kampala to the UNHCR High Commissioner in Geneva indicate concerns that the citizenship verification exercise was a façade: “We suspect that the scrutiny of citizenship will be used as a means of rejecting the bulk of the Asian community holding Ugandan citizenship. The [Asian] community leaders fully share our views.”<sup>589</sup> Through the verification process over half of the 23,000 Asians claiming Ugandan citizenship had their claims rejected. There were four main modes of rejection: lack of renunciation of secondary citizenship, or delayed renunciation,<sup>590</sup> photocopies or carbon copies, rather than original documents; omission of Ugandan Central Registry page numbers from birth certificates; and destruction or confiscation of documents

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<sup>586</sup> Document from UNHCR/Kampala: Uganda Asians, 09.10.1973; 11/2/60-600.UGA[a]; Series 2; Box 1012; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>587</sup> Uganda Argus. (1972). “These Asians are Required to Report.” *August 15*. In Z. Lalani (1997), *Ugandan Asians Expulsion: 90 Days and Beyond Through the Eyes of the International Press* (pp. 15,18). Tampa, FL: Expulsion Publications.

<sup>588</sup> Times Newspaper Limited, London. (1972). “Kampala Fear that More Will Become Stateless.” *August 16*. In Z. Lalani (1997), *Ugandan Asians Expulsion: 90 Days and Beyond Through the Eyes of the International Press* (pp. 19, 20). Tampa, FL: Expulsion Publications.

<sup>589</sup> Confidential Cable from UNHCR Branch Office Kampala, August 24, 1972; 11/2/64-641.UGA[a] Expulsion and Deportation – Uganda [1972] Volume 1; Series 2, Box 1281; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>590</sup> Many Asians whose citizenship was invalidated on this criterion during the 1972 verification exercise blamed the British Home Office which took several months (more than the 90-days allowed) to process the renunciation papers. Most were unaware that their renunciation had not gone through.



by officials, which Amin vehemently denied.<sup>591</sup> Verified Asian citizens remaining in the country were required to purchase special identification cards to facilitate their continued stay and movements.<sup>592</sup>

Additional confusion ensued on August 16 when Amin rescinded the exemption outlined in Statutory Instrument 124. Now all Asian professionals would be expelled. Amin explained his about-face: “they [the Asians] could not serve their country with a good spirit after the departure of the other Asians.”<sup>593</sup> Adding to the chaos, three days later at a mass rally in Rukungiri in south-western Uganda, Amin stated that even Ugandan Asian citizens would have to leave.<sup>594</sup> He also ordered all refugees residing in Uganda to return home, including an estimated 100,000 from Rwanda, 80,000 from southern Sudan, 30,000 from Zaire, and some from Burundi.<sup>595</sup>

Student leaders from Makerere University protested against Amin’s decision to add citizens to the expulsion decree.<sup>596</sup> They were joined by members of the Cabinet and regional

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<sup>591</sup> Times Newspaper Limited, London. (1972). “Kampala Fear that More Will Become Stateless.” *August 16*. In Z. Lalani (1997), *Ugandan Asians Expulsion: 90 Days and Beyond Through the Eyes of the International Press* (pp. 19, 20). Tampa, FL: Expulsion Publications.

<sup>592</sup> Pamphlet on “Uganda’s Economic War” from the High Commission for the Republic of Uganda in New Delhi, 17 November 1972; 11/2/64-641.UGA[c] Expulsion and Deportation – Uganda [1972-1984] Volume 3; Series 2, Box 1281; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>593</sup> News compilation. (1972). “Asians Queue to Beat Citizenship Deadline.” *August 19*. In Z. Lalani (1997), *Ugandan Asians Expulsion: 90 Days and Beyond Through the Eyes of the International Press* (pp. 21). Tampa, FL: Expulsion Publications.

<sup>594</sup> East Africa Standard. (1972). “Now All Ugandan Asians are Ordered Out.” *August 20*. In Z. Lalani (1997), *Ugandan Asians Expulsion: 90 Days and Beyond Through the Eyes of the International Press* (pp. 25-26). Tampa, FL: Expulsion Publications.

<sup>595</sup> Ibid, pp. 25.; Coded Cable from UNHCR High Commissioner to Secretary General OAU, 20.08.1972; 13/1/3-129; Series 3; Box 31; Fonds 13, Sub-Fonds 1, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>596</sup> Memorandum from Frank A. Bauman, Representative UNHCR Branch Office for Australia and New Zealand to UNHCR/HQ Geneva—Newspaper Clippings, “Asian Airlift to Britain Soon,” August 25, 1972; 11/2/64-641.UGA[a] Expulsion and Deportation – Uganda [1972] Volume 1; Series 2, Box 1281; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

African leaders.<sup>597</sup> The next day, on August 22, Amin shifted course again, returning to his previous position that Asian citizens would not be expelled if they could prove their citizenship status; he also agreed the refugees could stay but should return home soonest.<sup>598</sup> Not fully acceding to the student demands, Amin said that a “second phase operation” would look at the remaining Asian citizens.<sup>599</sup> Much of the confusion stemmed from the fact that Amin’s personal declarations often contradicted or preempted official policy decisions; thus, Asians and government officials were left guessing which declarations would become official decrees and which were simply musings from the president.

On August 31, 1972, UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim weighed in on the matter during a press conference at the Vienna airport. He told reporters that “Uganda had declared the matter an internal one and Article 2, para. 7 of the Charter<sup>600</sup> forbade Unations [sic] to intervene in domestic affairs. However Unations [is] always ready to help in humanitarian matters.”<sup>601</sup> Amin was resistant to any international meddling, and rebuffed UN involvement or any persuasion to reverse course.

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<sup>597</sup> Jørgensen, 1981: 287.

<sup>598</sup> East African Standard. (1972). “Gen. Amin Relents on Expulsion of Citizens.” *August 23*. In Z. Lalani (1997), *Ugandan Asians Expulsion: 90 Days and Beyond Through the Eyes of the International Press* (pp. 29). Tampa, FL: Expulsion Publications.

<sup>599</sup> Memorandum from Frank A. Bauman, Representative UNHCR Branch Office for Australia and New Zealand to UNHCR/HQ Geneva—Newspaper Clippings, “Asian Airlift to Britain Soon,” August 25, 1972; 11/2/64-641.UGA[a] Expulsion and Deportation – Uganda [1972] Volume 1; Series 2, Box 1281; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>600</sup> United Nations, 1945 – Article 2(7): “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”

<sup>601</sup> Incoming Cable from UNHCR/New York, 31.08.1972; 11/2/10-100.UGA.ASI[b] - Refugees from Asia in Uganda [Volume 2-1.UGA.ASI]; Series 2, Box 204; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Taking advantage of the chaos, on September 17, 1972, supporters of former Ugandan President Obote based in Tanzania attempted to invade Uganda to remove Amin.<sup>602</sup> Local newspapers reported that Tanzanian troops invaded Uganda, captured three towns, and advanced within 100 miles of Kampala. Tanzania claimed that the fighting was between Amin's troops and dissidents from the Uganda "People's Army," i.e., Obote's troops backed by Tanzania.<sup>603</sup> The Government of Uganda accused Britain of supporting the invasion.<sup>604</sup> Nonetheless, Amin repelled the attack.

On October 19, Amin expanded the expulsion scope announcing that Asians with Kenyan, Tanzanian, and Zambian citizenship would also be expelled because of the "continued sabotage by the Asians" and allegations that Asian citizens of neighboring countries were helping Uganda Asians smuggle property out of the country.<sup>605</sup> With less than a month to go it was clear that all Asians would be expelled. The UN was concerned about the humanitarian consequences, especially the approximately 25,000 Asians with Ugandan citizenship who were being rendered stateless. Although Amin initially refused UN involvement, stating that it was the responsibility of the U.K. to resettle the Asians—even though not all expellees were U.K. citizens—he eventually relented, but did "not wish to make any official statements to this effect."<sup>606</sup>

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<sup>602</sup> Uche, 2017: 832.

<sup>603</sup> News Compilation. (1972). "Uganda claims 'invasion by Tanzania.'" *September 18*. In Z. Lalani (1997), *Ugandan Asians Expulsion: 90 Days and Beyond Through the Eyes of the International Press* (pp. 63). Tampa, FL: Expulsion Publications.

<sup>604</sup> Uche (2017: 832) claims there is some archival evidence that the UK may have supported an attempt to overthrow Amin.

<sup>605</sup> Keesing, 1972: 25599.

<sup>606</sup> Confidential Cable from Komorsky (UNHCR Representative Kampala) to UNHCR High Commissioner, 20.10.1972; 13/1/4-18, Uganda Asians [Volume 1]; Series 4, Box 43; Fonds 13, Sub-Fonds 1, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

In a two-day meeting on October 24 and 25, 1972, the UN and the Ugandan Ministry of Foreign Affairs discussed the modalities of international assistance to facilitate the removal of Asians of undetermined nationality.<sup>607</sup> The three main areas of assistance were: travel documentation, temporary and permanent resettlement, and transportation from Uganda to the resettlement sites. It was agreed that the United Nations Development Program would have overall responsibility for the operation, the ICRC would provide travel documentation,<sup>608</sup> the UNHCR would organize resettlement, and the Inter-governmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM)<sup>609</sup> would facilitate transportation.<sup>610</sup> Although the UN issued a press release on October 26 outlining this division of responsibilities, the UNHCR had already been contacting UN member states and non-member states regarding financial support and resettlement of stateless Asians.<sup>611</sup> Since the U.K. only accepted 27,000 of its 50,000 citizens,<sup>612</sup> the UNHCR negotiated resettlement for the remaining British Asians as well as those of “undetermined nationality” to various countries including Canada, India, United States, Pakistan, Sweden, Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, Norway, New Zealand, Gulf States, Iran,

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<sup>607</sup> The UNHCR used the language “undetermined nationality” because it did not want to make legal status determinations. In most cases the British government claimed that persons were Ugandan citizens, while the Uganda government claimed they were British citizens. The UNHCR was not in a position to adjudicate who was “right,” and since neither government claimed them as citizens, they were *de facto* stateless. (Document from UNHCR/Kampala: Uganda Asians, 09.10.1973; 11/2/60-600.UGA[a]; Series 2; Box 1012; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the High Commissioner for Refugees).

<sup>608</sup> The ICRC travel documents are internationally recognized travel papers, valid for three months, that allow undocumented refugees to travel to a transit center or resettlement country. Upon arrival, the refugee must obtain permanent documentation and the travel papers are returned to the ICRC. (ACICR B AG 232 152-002.02; Communiqué de presse No 1139, 27.10.1972).

<sup>609</sup> The ICEM later became the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

<sup>610</sup> Incoming Cable from UNHCR/New York, 26.10.1972; 11/2/10-100.UGA.ASI[c] - Refugees from Asia in Uganda [Volume 3-1.UGA.ASI]; Series 2, Box 205; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>611</sup> Ibid.

<sup>612</sup> Mattausch, 1998: 134; Jørgensen, 1981: 288.

and Latin America.<sup>613</sup> As the November deadline approached, most Asians departed Uganda on commercial flights or with support from international organizations.

Another surprise came on November 2 when Amin announced that any Asian citizens remaining in Uganda after the deadline would have to leave the towns and move to the villages.<sup>614</sup> Amin directed the Minister of Public Service and Local Administrations and the Minister of Internal Affairs to count all Asians remaining in Uganda beginning on November 9.<sup>615</sup> Amin believed this forced resettlement to rural areas would facilitate Asian mixing with African people and allow the commercial sector to be taken over by Ugandans, i.e., black African Ugandans. Confidential internal memos between UNHCR officials in Kampala expressed skepticism about Amin's order: "It is reasonable to believe that President Amin is whipping up fear amongst the remaining Ugandan Asians to force them to leave the country and claim later that Ugandan Asians left on their own. It is unlikely, for the time being, that he will implement his threats."<sup>616</sup> His threats were effective because many Asian citizens left after this announcement for fear of being forced to move to the countryside. In the last 24 hours before the expulsion deadline, 2,000 stateless Asians departed on a dozen flights, the highest number in one day since the Asian airlift began. The remaining 800 departed by Friday,

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<sup>613</sup> ACICR B AG 234 019-003, Statistical Report on the Departure of Stateless Asians from Uganda to Overseas Countries, 10.11.1972; Cosemans, 2018: 102.

<sup>614</sup> Confidential Cable from Kampala, November 2, 1972; 11/2/64-641.UGA[c] Expulsion and Deportation – Uganda [1972] Volume 2; Series 2, Box 1281; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>615</sup> Uganda Argus. (1972). "Asians to be Counted—Person by Person." *November 7*. In Z. Lalani (1997), *Ugandan Asians Expulsion: 90 Days and Beyond Through the Eyes of the International Press* (pp. 125). Tampa, FL: Expulsion Publications.

<sup>616</sup> Confidential Memorandum between Mr. A. Komorsky and Mr. R. Mkanda, 14.12.1972; 11/2/10-100.UGA.ASI[d] – Refugees from Asia in Uganda [Volume 4-1.UGA.ASI]; Series 2; Box 205; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

November 10.<sup>617</sup> An estimated 1,500 Asian citizens remained in Uganda after the expiry of the 90-day timeline. They were counted, and their citizenship verified again, at special registration centers in Kampala and other towns.<sup>618</sup>

Despite Amin's assurances that the expelled Asians would be fully compensated, this did not happen. Over the weekend of December 16, a Ugandan government spokesman announced that properties left behind, as well as other assets, would be taken over by the government without compensation.<sup>619</sup> Amin later requested a loan from the British to pay the Asians for their assets, citing the same British actions in Kenya,<sup>620</sup> but this loan never came through.<sup>621</sup> The Asian middleclass was replaced largely by an aspirant Nubian, Muslim, West Nilotic middleclass, one ethnic monopoly for another.<sup>622</sup> The unequal asset redistribution left the poorest income groups—peasants, pastoralists, and urban workers—in the same difficult economic state as before. Africans who had supported Amin's expulsion soon complained that the newly enriched African traders were worse than the Asians, calling them "black Asians" or "black Patels."<sup>623</sup> In a midnight address on December 17, 1972 Amin explained the justification for his "economic war": "We are determined to make the ordinary Ugandan master of his own destiny, and above all to see that he enjoys the wealth of his country. Our

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<sup>617</sup> Kaipe, Michael. (1972). "Only 800 Stateless Asians Left as Amin Deadline Expires." *Times Newspaper Limited, London, November 9*. In Z. Lalani (1997), *Ugandan Asians Expulsion: 90 Days and Beyond Through the Eyes of the International Press* (pp. 127,128). Tampa, FL: Expulsion Publications.

<sup>618</sup> Hoagland, Jim. (1972). "Kampala Exodus: Asian Quarter Like A Ghost Town." *Washington Post, November 13*. In Z. Lalani (1997), *Ugandan Asians Expulsion: 90 Days and Beyond Through the Eyes of the International Press* (pp. 138,140). Tampa, FL: Expulsion Publications.

<sup>619</sup> Confidential Memorandum from the Representative, UNHCR Branch Office for Kampala, 18 December 1972; 11/2/64-641.UGA[c] Expulsion and Deportation – Uganda [1972-1984] Volume 3; Series 2, Box 1281; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>620</sup> Kramer, 1974: 54.

<sup>621</sup> Uche, 2017: 834.

<sup>622</sup> Mutibwa, 1992: 115-16.

<sup>623</sup> Jørgensen, 1981: 293.

deliberate policy is to transfer the economic control of Uganda into the hands of Ugandans, for the first time in our country's history.”<sup>624</sup>

Following the speech Amin did something Obote had promised but never delivered, he nationalized British industries with the state takeover of British tea plantations, Brooke Bond (the major tea brand), the Ugandan Transport Company, British Metal Corporation, and Kampala Club just to name a few.<sup>625</sup> Although the British were not expelled, their companies and assets were confiscated without compensation, completing the second phase of the “economic war.”

#### **4.3 Expulsion Motivation: Anti-Colonialism**

In my taxonomy of government motivations to expel, Uganda's 1972 expulsion is an anti-colonial expulsion. Anti-colonial expulsions aim to complete the decolonizing process, after independence, by removing minority groups that held privileged status under the colonial regime.<sup>626</sup> These expulsions occur when a country is in the phase of establishing the nation and when a target group is identified as an economic threat to the state. In 1972, Uganda was a decade removed from independence and in the early stages of establishing which groups should be included in the nation, and which excluded. It was also seeking to establish itself as fully independent, free from the vestiges of European rule, securing economic freedom alongside its political freedom. Part of that process was to reward the indigenous population with economic fruits so long denied.

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<sup>624</sup> Jørgensen, 1981: 288.

<sup>625</sup> Mutibwa, 1992: 97.

<sup>626</sup> See Chapter 2 pp. 56-58.

Figure 13: Taxonomy of mass expulsion – Uganda, 1972		
Phase of Nation-building	Target Group Threat	
	<u>Security</u>	<u>Economic</u>
	<u>Establishing</u> Fifth Column	Anti-Colonialism
	<u>Consolidating</u> Counterinsurgency/ Reprisal	Nativism

One of Amin’s favorite metaphoric lines regarding the Asians in Uganda was that “they only milked the cow...but did not feed it to yield more milk.”<sup>627</sup> In his speech at the Indian Conference Amin enumerated specific examples of Asians “milking the cow”: commercial malpractice, abuse of foreign exchange, smuggling, creating artificial shortages, tax evasion, and bribing public officials—all acts enriching themselves at the expense of Ugandans.<sup>628</sup> Asian businessmen were also accused, perhaps accurately, of discriminating against their African counterparts in renting retail space, hiring African labor, and increasing prices for African clients. While many of these complaints were common business practices, since the Asian community had a monopoly on wholesale and retail trade, this was racially charged.<sup>629</sup>

In his September 1972 UN General Assembly address, Uganda’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Grace Ibingira, detailed the government’s rationale in expelling the

<sup>627</sup> Uganda Argus. (1972). “Asians milked the cow: They did not feed it – Gen.Amin.” *August 7*. In Z. Lalani (1997), *Ugandan Asians Expulsion: 90 Days and Beyond Through the Eyes of the International Press* (pp. 5). Tampa, FL: Expulsion Publications.

<sup>628</sup> O’Brien, 1972: 30.

<sup>629</sup> Ghai & Ghai, 1965: 40.



Asians in a five-page speech titled, “Historical Background of Asians in Uganda Explained to the World Body.”<sup>630</sup> He described the history of the Asian arrival in Uganda and the British support for their privileged economic position:

“...the British organized [the Asians] and engaged them to settle and to provide an instrument for promoting colonial trade and commerce. ... [the Asians] established their mastery over our trade and commerce. The British, who administered Uganda until 1962, systematically ensured that their nationals of Asian extraction continued to dominate our economic life, without any reasonable effort to promote the interests of the indigenous people in this field.”<sup>631</sup>

Ibingira recalled the 1959 Buganda Trade Boycott as evidence of Ugandans trying to shake off the Asian trading monopoly for decades. He stressed that despite Uganda’s political independence the country was not fully sovereign: “In 1962 Uganda became an independent sovereign State and was admitted as a Member of this Organization. But the economy was still almost totally dependent on these foreign nationals.”<sup>632</sup> The Asians were an economic threat to the realization of their full independence.

To combat this threat, the government embarked on an “economic war,”<sup>633</sup> a continuation of the decolonization process to destroy the colonial economic hierarchy, by removing the Asians, and returning the economy to the native, African Ugandans. Amin articulated this when he first announced his expulsion decision: “I want the economy to be in the hands of Ugandan citizens, especially black Ugandans.”<sup>634</sup> In fact, the hasty 90-day timeline for the Asians to leave the country was a reference to the 90-days’ credit typically extended by

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<sup>630</sup> G.S. Ibingira, Uganda Permanent Representative to the UN, speech to the UNGA “Historical Background of Asians in Uganda Explained to the World Body” September 27, 1972; 11/2/64-641.UGA[c] Expulsion and Deportation – Uganda [1972-1984] Volume 3; Series 2, Box 1281; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>631</sup> Ibid.

<sup>632</sup> Ibid.

<sup>633</sup> Jamal, 1976: 615; Melady & Melady 1976: 44; Mazrui, 1979: 261; Avirgan & Honey, 1982: 5; Amor, 2003: 64.

<sup>634</sup> Keesing, 1972: 25469.

Asian businessmen to African customers.<sup>635</sup> Amin further stressed themes of economic control and independence in his speech on September 21 where he described the motivation for the expulsion:

“...our policy is designed purely and simply to place the economy of this Country in the hands of the nationals of Uganda. We know that in 1962 we got political independence from Britain. We also know that despite that political independence, *the economy of the Country remained under the control of foreigners*, as it had been for all the years during colonial rule. It became obvious to my Government that *political independence without economic control of the resources of our Country was of very little use*. We therefore took a decision which we are determined to implement, and that is to *transfer the economy of this country firmly into the hands of the nationals*”<sup>636</sup> [emphasis added].

Even the human rights NGO, International Commission of Jurists, seemed to sympathize with the rationale, if not the policy of expulsion. Its September 4, 1972, press release stated: “The Commission recognizes that the motive of this decision stems from the legitimate aspirations of freedom and independence of Africans. Like many other countries, Uganda does not want its economy to be owned or controlled by foreigners.”<sup>637</sup> Although the organization deplored President Amin’s racist statements, it understood its logic.

Regional papers shared similar sentiments. The *Nigerian Observer*, a Benin-based paper, characterized Amin’s predicament as typical of African leaders, “Many African governments have come to realise that for their political independence to be meaningful, they cannot afford

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<sup>635</sup> Mattausch, 1998: 134.

<sup>636</sup> Pamphlet on “Uganda’s Economic War” from the High Commission for the Republic of Uganda in New Delhi, 17 November 1972; 11/2/64-641.UGA[c] Expulsion and Deportation – Uganda [1972-1984] Volume 3; Series 2, Box 1281; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>637</sup> Communiqué de Presse, Commission Internationale de Juristes, 04.09.1972; 13/1/4-18, Uganda Asians [Volume 2]; Series 4; Box 43; Fonds 13, Sub-Fonds 1, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, (translated from the French original).

to leave their economy in the hands of aliens.”<sup>638</sup> The former Ugandan Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, Mr. Kakonge, said to Amin, “the economic war...will help in establishing a very good foundation for nation-building.”<sup>639</sup>

This discourse illustrates that the Ugandan government’s motivation for expelling the Asians was driven by their identification of the Asians as an economic threat during the foundational years of nation building. This is not to condone, or agree with, the threat identified by the Uganda government, but to outline the language used as evidence for categorizing the 1972 case as an anti-colonialism expulsion. The Ugandan government believed that expelling the Asians would resolve the economic threat. As Amin stated himself, “these people milked away a lot of our economy and when they go Uganda will be alright economically.”<sup>640</sup> The goal in removing the Asians *en masse* was to remove all remnants of colonial rule and replace them with a new, indigenous, middle class.

### *Alternative Explanations*

This section examines three alternative explanations for the 1972 expulsion of Uganda Asians: Asians expelled as a scapegoat, Asians expelled to punish the British, and Asians expelled because of Amin’s personalist’s rule as a brutal dictator. Although each of these explanations have merit, they can be refuted in sequence.

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<sup>638</sup> Daily Telegraph, “Expulsion Decree by Amin After ‘Divine Message,’” 10.08.1972; 11/2/10-100.UGA.ASI[a], Refugees from Asian in Uganda [Volume1-1.UGA.ASI]; Series 2; Box 204; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>639</sup> Uganda News, 04.10.1972; 11/2/10-100.UGA.ASI[b] - Refugees from Asia in Uganda [Volume 2-1.UGA.ASI]; Series 2, Box 204; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>640</sup> Uganda News, 04.10.1972; 11/2/10-100.UGA.ASI[b] - Refugees from Asia in Uganda [Volume 2-1.UGA.ASI]; Series 2, Box 204; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

The scapegoat theory of prejudice suggests that cumulative frustration breeds aggression, which builds and generates rage, which is taken out on weak, defenseless, innocent victims.<sup>641</sup> In many cases these targets are minority groups, stereotyped as homogeneous, and collectively blamed for problems, sometimes those caused by the perpetrators themselves. In times of social or political instability, such as 1971 Uganda after Amin's coup, minorities are increasingly at risk of being scapegoated. The Asians in Uganda held coveted economic positions which was a deep source of frustration for indigenous Africans, particularly the Baganda; and they were an easy and unarmed target for immediate seizure of property, capital, and employment.<sup>642</sup> Amin knew that any actions against the Asians would be popular with the public.<sup>643</sup>

The scapegoat theory explains the public "need" for the victim—a target for pent-up frustration—but not the choice. There were other minorities, albeit smaller, in Uganda in 1972, both Europeans and Arabs,<sup>644</sup> yet the Asians were singled out in Decree 17. The scapegoat explanation does not help us understand why Asians were targeted. The idea of Asians as a scapegoat is predicated on the idea that they were entirely falsely accused.<sup>645</sup> However, they were not all innocent bystanders. The Asians had benefited from the preferential colonial economic structure that had allowed them to dominate the wholesale-retail and export-import trade.<sup>646</sup> After independence, most Asian businessmen did not incorporate or support African traders. In addition, as illustrated by the sizable majority who retained British citizenship, most

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<sup>641</sup> Zawadzki, 1948: 128.

<sup>642</sup> Amor, 2003: 64.

<sup>643</sup> Sharma & Woolridge, 1974: 400.

<sup>644</sup> Arabs would have been a highlight unlikely scapegoat as Amin had allied himself with Libya and the Pan-Arab cause.

<sup>645</sup> Mylonas, 2012: 173.

<sup>646</sup> O'Brien, 1973: 92.

Asians did not place their confidence in the young Ugandan state. This description does not condone the expulsion of the Asians, but it qualifies the notion of the group as a blameless victim, required for the scapegoat theory.

In any case, in August 1972, there was no need for a scapegoat. Amin was in control of his military regime with ongoing killings against his political rivals. Given the climate of fear, few spoke about Amin's management of the economy. At the beginning of Amin's rule, Uganda had the most viable economy in East Africa, and despite some economic decline there were low levels of hunger and poverty and no shortages of essential goods—the latter thanks to Asian traders.<sup>647</sup> Since most Ugandans were subsistence farmers, and Uganda is well known for its fertile soil, life was manageable for average Ugandans. Thus, there was no urgent need for a scapegoat. While there was much unfair stereotyping and blame during the Asian removal, scapegoating is an insufficient explanation of the expulsion.

Another alternative explanation is that the 1972 expulsion was motivated by foreign policy concerns. Scholars such as Kelly Greenhill (2010) promote the idea of strategic forced displacement as a “weapon of mass migration” that weaker states use to target stronger ones. Greenhill cites Uganda's Asian expulsion as an example:

“...these expulsions happened at the same time that Amin was trying to convince the British to halt their drawdown of military assistance to his country. In short, Amin announced his intention to foist 50,000 refugees on Britain, but did so with a convenient ninety-day grace period to give the British an opportunity to rescind their decision regarding aid.”<sup>648</sup>

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<sup>647</sup> Mutibwa, 1992: 123.

<sup>648</sup> Greenhill, 2010: 14-15.

Amor (2003) concurs, arguing that in addition to the immediate “booty” available from the mass expulsion of the Asians, the expulsion would “punish” Britain.<sup>649</sup> Amin often referred to the Asian population in Uganda as a British creation and “Britain’s responsibility,” regardless of their nationality.<sup>650</sup>

In an address to East African traders on August 8, after Amin had announced the expulsion, he said:

“If it were not for the British these Asians would not have been faced with the situation in which they have found themselves now. Instead of the British Government being grateful to the Uganda Government for having looked after her citizens for many years we are being criticized by Whitehall for having taken such a decision.... Uganda is therefore determined to *teach Britain a lesson*. Whatever is said in Whitehall regarding economic and military aid to Uganda, this cannot worry us at all” [emphasis added].<sup>651</sup>

Another angle of this argument is that Amin was motivated to expel the Asians *en masse* because of the recent more restrictive UK immigration policies which would have elongated the time horizon for their removal through legislation, potentially taking ten years to lawfully get rid of all the British Asians.<sup>652</sup> These arguments portray the Asians as unfortunate pawns in a strategic move targeting Britain. There was certainly no love lost between Amin’s government and that of the United Kingdom, but this is an incomplete explanation for the expulsion.

First, the expulsion did not just target Asians with British citizenship. Decree 17 included, “any person who is of Asian origin, extraction or descent and who is a subject or citizen of any of the countries specified in the Schedule to this Decree.”<sup>653</sup> The schedule listed

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<sup>649</sup> Amor, 2003: 64.

<sup>650</sup> Tandon, 1972: 3.

<sup>651</sup> Keesing, 1972: 25469.

<sup>652</sup> Sharma & Woolridge, 1974: 411.

<sup>653</sup> Confidential Memorandum from The Representative, UNHCR Branch Office for Uganda—photostatcopies of Decree No. 17 and Statutory Instrument No. 124/72, 14 September 1972; 11/2/64-641.UGA[a] Expulsion

citizens of the UK, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. If Britain was the main target, why were exemptions not made for citizens of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, also victims of British colonization? In his December 1971 address Amin had specifically called out those with “back-up” nationalities, indicating his frustration with *any* Asians without Ugandan citizenship, not just the British ones: “many of you have not shown sufficient faith in Uganda citizenship.”<sup>654</sup> The lack of Ugandan citizenship seemed to be of greater concern to Amin. The *Uganda News*, published by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, wrote that, “[Amin] reminded the ex-Ministers how the Asians were asked to take up Ugandan citizenship, but refused.”<sup>655</sup> Further evidence of Amin’s dislike of all Asian non-citizens, not just those with British citizenship, may be found in the decision to add Asians with Kenyan, Tanzanian, or Zambian citizenship to the list of those expelled.<sup>656</sup> He accused them of colluding with the Uganda Asians in “continued sabotage” of the economy.<sup>657</sup> These non-citizens Asians of other African nationalities had no legal ties to Britain, and thus hardly count as a strategic weapon against the British government.

After the August 1971 census Amin cancelled the processing of 12,000 outstanding Asian citizenship applications, indicating his dislike not just of British Asians, but also those trying to become Uganda citizens.<sup>658</sup> The “verification exercise” undertaken after the expulsion

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and Deportation – Uganda [1972] Volume 1; Series 2, Box 1281; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>654</sup> O’Brien, 1972: 30.

<sup>655</sup> *Uganda News*, 04.10.1972; 11/2/10-100.UGA.ASI[b] - Refugees from Asia in Uganda [Volume 2-1.UGA.ASI]; Series 2, Box 204; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>656</sup> *Daily Nation*. (1972). “Now Amin Tells Kenyan Asians to Quit Uganda.” *October 20*. In Z. Lalani (1997), *Ugandan Asians Expulsion: 90 Days and Beyond Through the Eyes of the International Press* (pp. 21). Tampa, FL: Expulsion Publications.

<sup>657</sup> Keesing, 1972: 25599.

<sup>658</sup> Keesing, 1972: 25023.

announcement to validate Asians with Ugandan citizenship was a clear effort to rescind their status and expel *Asian citizens* as well as non-citizens.<sup>659</sup> In fact, in a Q&A with reporters, Amin stated that, “the Asian problem in Uganda was entirely a British problem” while also stating, “Uganda will not be independent until the Asians have gone.”<sup>660</sup> While Amin may have blamed the British for bringing the Asians, and wanted their citizens out, he wanted all the Asians gone.

Greenhill (2010) argues that the Asian expulsion was a means of negotiating with Britain to “halt their drawdown of military assistance [and aid] to his country” by threatening to “foist 50,000 refugees on Britain.”<sup>661</sup> But the timing does not work. Britain did not halt any of its assistance to Uganda until August 29, twenty days after the official expulsion decree was released. It was then that Britain froze a £10 million loan to Uganda, to try to persuade Amin to change course.<sup>662</sup> Hence, it is inaccurate to say that “...these expulsions happened at the same time that Amin was trying to convince the British to halt their drawdown of military assistance to his country.”<sup>663</sup> By the spring of 1972, Amin had already found other sources of military and financial support, securing \$2 million from Libya and other Arab donors. Amin did not need to expel the Asians to negotiate with the British and re-secure their military support.

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<sup>659</sup> Confidential Cable from UNHCR Branch Office Kampala, August 24, 1972; 11/2/64-641.UGA[a] Expulsion and Deportation – Uganda [1972] Volume 1; Series 2, Box 1281; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>660</sup> Daily Telegraph newspaper article, “Expulsion Decree by Amin After ‘Divine Message,’” 10.08.1972; 11/2/10-100.UGA.ASI[a], Refugees from Asian in Uganda [Volume1-1.UGA.ASI]; Series 2; Box 204; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>661</sup> Greenhill, 2010: 14-15.

<sup>662</sup> News Compilation. (1972). “Britain Freezes £10 million loan to Uganda.” *August 30*. In Z. Lalani (1997), *Ugandan Asians Expulsion: 90 Days and Beyond Through the Eyes of the International Press* (pp. 39). Tampa, FL: Expulsion Publications.

<sup>663</sup> Greenhill, 2010: 14.



Lastly, Greenhill describes Amin's threat as "his intention to foist 50,000 refugees on Britain," but the British Asians, strictly speaking, were not refugees, but citizens of the United Kingdom. While the mass expulsion of Asians, citizens and non-citizens, was a human rights violation given its discriminatory character and the lack of individual evaluation, the expelled British citizens were not refugees, they were going to their country of citizenship. Britain may have been inconvenienced because of the rapid influx, combined with its domestic racial tensions, but its responsibilities were clear under Article 3 of the Fourth Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights: "no one shall be deprived of the right to enter the territory of the state of which he is a national."<sup>664</sup> The clarification that the British Asian citizens were not refugees is important because Greenhill's argument may hold in other cases where governments use refugee populations as a "weapon of mass migration" such as by Cuba against the U.S. in the 1980s. However, the Asian expulsion is not one of those cases. Though the expelled Ugandan *citizens* became refugees, they were resettled in numerous countries around the world with the UK accepting very few.

The last alternative explanation is that Amin was a brutal, tyrannical dictator and he expelled the Asians simply because he was a vicious, unpredictable autocrat who lashed out as part of his violent rule. Proponents of this rationale often highlight Amin's mental state, pointing to his announcement that the Asian expulsion was inspired by a dream.<sup>665</sup> None would disagree that Amin was a cruel dictator who repressed many populations within Uganda: African and non-African, citizen and non-citizen. The brutality of Amin's rule is well

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<sup>664</sup> Council of Europe, 1963.

<sup>665</sup> At one point Amin said that God had spoken to him in a dream telling him that the Asian problem had reached "explosive proportions" and he must "act immediately to save the situation" (Keesing, 1972: 25469; Melady & Melady, 1976: 8).

documented, but it is important to remember that his coup d'état was initially praised by Britain and Israel, and western states maintained their support throughout most of 1972—up until the expulsion.<sup>666</sup> The viciousness of Amin's regime grew with his time in office. His later actions should not cloud the analysis of this earlier period.

While these alternative explanations highlight features of the expulsion decision, none are as convincing as, nor provide enough evidence to overturn, the anti-colonialism explanation.

#### 4.4 Enabling Factors for Uganda's Asian Expulsion

Unfinished decolonization was not a unique feature of independent Uganda. Many former British colonies, as well as former colonies of other European powers, had dominant or middlemen minorities that controlled key sectors of the economy or held coveted positions in the civil service. Yet not all newly independent colonial states expelled these economically dominant minority populations, as is demonstrated in the Kenya case below. So, what factors enabled the Ugandan government, motivated by anti-colonialism, to expel its Asian population *en masse*? This next section examines the critical role of alliances, the target group homeland state, and the international community in facilitating expulsion in Uganda.

Table 11: Factors that enabled expulsion in Uganda	
<i>Key Factors</i>	<i>Uganda (1972)</i>
<b>Alliances</b>	
<i>Domestic Alliances</i>	Benefit from expulsion (↑)
<i>Transnational Alliances</i>	Indifferent to expulsion (↑)
<b>Homeland State(s)</b>	
<i>Relation to Government</i>	Weak ties (↑)

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<sup>666</sup> Curtis, 2004: 249.

<i>Response/ Anticipated Response</i>	Acquiesce & resettle expellees (↑)
<b>International Community</b>	
<i>Relation to Government</i>	Weak ties (↑)
<i>Response/ Anticipated Response</i>	Facilitate expulsion (↑)

## Alliances

### *Domestic Alliances*

While Obote had outwardly eschewed ethnic clientelism in favor of a united Ugandan national identity, though internally promoting his own groups, Amin, a Kakwa,<sup>667</sup> actively and publicly emphasized ethnic identities.<sup>668</sup> After successfully overthrowing Obote, Amin's main concern was strengthening his power and purging any traces of the previous regime. He placed ethnic groups from his home region into key military positions, including West Nilotics (Kakwa, Madi, Lugbara, Alur, Nubians) and co-ethnic foreign nationals from Zaire and Sudan.<sup>669</sup> Amin expanded the armed forces from 7,680 to 20,000 persons (by 1974) and more than tripled military expenditure by the end of his first year in power.<sup>670</sup> Amin used military patronage to buy loyalty and maintain his rule.

Amin's ethnic preferences were combined with religious preferences to reverse the legacy of British bias against Islam.<sup>671</sup> Muslims had been excluded from the colonial educational system, which subsidized Christian missionary schools and educated the

<sup>667</sup> Arbitrary colonial borders divided the Kakwa across Uganda, Sudan, and Zaire. They are a "Sudanic" group closely related to the Bari in what was then southern Sudan (Woodward, 1978: 154). This helps explain why Amin drew military support from Sudanese and Zairean soldiers.

<sup>668</sup> Kasfir, 1976: 219.

<sup>669</sup> Kasfir, 1976: 219-20; Mutibwa, 1992: 88; Kasozi, 1994: 110-11.

<sup>670</sup> Jørgensen, 1981: 274-75; Avirgan & Honey, 1982: 7.

<sup>671</sup> At the time, Muslims constituted about five percent of the total Ugandan population. The two main Christian denominations were Roman Catholics and Protestant Anglicans with Catholics outnumbering Anglicans 3:2 (Pirouet, 1980: 13).

intellectual elites who became the post-independence leaders.<sup>672</sup> Ethnic, religious, and regional identities were important to Amin, “As he became older and acquired power, he considered himself first and foremost a Nubian/Kakwa, secondly a Muslim, thirdly a West Niler, and fourthly a Ugandan.”<sup>673</sup>

To gain legitimacy Amin first turned to the Baganda, the largest and formerly most powerful ethnic group in the country, and Obote’s main rival.<sup>674</sup> Under the Obote regime, the Baganda had been politically and economically marginalized, and Amin quickly restored their power and status, seeking to undo the work of his predecessor.<sup>675</sup> He made a series of concessions including releasing Baganda detainees, holding a state funeral for the Kabaka, and renaming districts that were previously part of the Buganda Kingdom, from East and West Mengo to East and West Buganda.<sup>676</sup> Despite these adjustments, the Baganda made further demands for the Africanization of trade; but, Amin, like Obote before him, was initially cautious in making economic policy changes. Amin knew that if the Baganda became economically powerful, political aspirations would follow—a risk he wanted to avoid.

In August 1971 Amin held a meeting with Baganda elders to discuss their demands for Africanization. During the meeting Amin argued that “the Baganda were already advancing rapidly in trade and warned that Ugandanisation of commerce and industry must not lead to tribal discrimination, a veiled warning against commercial hegemony.”<sup>677</sup> Amin was hesitant to replace the Asian commercial monopoly with a Baganda monopoly. Although Amin initially

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<sup>672</sup> Jørgensen, 1981: 306; Woodward, 1978: 155.

<sup>673</sup> Mutibwa, 1992: 81.

<sup>674</sup> Kasfir, 1976: 216-17; Avirgan & Honey, 1982: 5.

<sup>675</sup> Kasfir, 1976: 216-17.

<sup>676</sup> Kasfir, 1976: 216-17.

<sup>677</sup> Jørgensen, 1981: 285.

ignored Baganda calls to Africanize the economy, he did take actions to appease them including the October 1971 Asian census;<sup>678</sup> the December 1971 “Indian Conference”;<sup>679</sup> and the cancellation of 12,000 Asian citizenship applications.<sup>680</sup>

While Amin wanted Baganda political support to bolster his domestic legitimacy, the Baganda were not his core domestic allies. Those were his military co-ethnics.<sup>681</sup> This ethnic alliance eliminated Amin’s military rivals and helped to consolidate his rule. By the summer of 1972, Amin had been in power for over a year and violence against his domestic African rivals continued. Amin’s expanded military size and spending required liquid financial resources to reward his loyal supporters and continue his patronage system. As these resources dried up, the appropriation of Asian assets and income was the most expeditious policy to, at least temporarily, achieve his aims. Expulsion of the Asians would open a windfall of new economic assets and opportunities for his co-ethnics, strengthening his domestic alliance.

The political elites amongst Amin’s ethnic kin who may have been able to persuade him to reconsider his expulsion order were not consulted about the decision.<sup>682</sup> The civil service and the Baganda aristocracy were as surprised as the Asians when they heard the news.<sup>683</sup> Some, albeit limited, domestic constraints on Amin’s expulsion decision can be seen in the issuance of Statutory Instrument No. 124 that permitted expulsion exemptions for Asian professionals and government workers.<sup>684</sup> While advocating exemptions is not the same as

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<sup>678</sup> Sharma & Woolridge, 1974: 400.

<sup>679</sup> O’Brien, 1972: 25.

<sup>680</sup> Keesing, 1972: 25023.

<sup>681</sup> Kasozi, 1994: 111; Kasfir, 1976: 220; Avirgan & Honey, 1982: 7.

<sup>682</sup> Daily Telegraph newspaper article, “Expulsion Decree by Amin After ‘Divine Message,’” 10.08.1972; 11/2/10-100.UGA.ASI[a], Refugees from Asian in Uganda [Volume1-1.UGA.ASI]; Series 2; Box 204; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>683</sup> Melady & Melady, 1976: 7.

<sup>684</sup> O’Brien, 1973: 95; Jørgensen, 1981: 286.

contesting the expulsion decision, this addendum to Decree 17 indicates some influence by Ugandan bureaucrats and Cabinet officials. However, shortly after the Statutory Instrument was released, it was rescinded by Amin demonstrating his disregard for any dissenting opinions within his inner circle.

Amin's ethnic allies were the main beneficiaries of the looting and theft during the Asians' 90-day departure, with limited redistribution to the wider population.<sup>685</sup> Amin was cunning enough to know that the symbolism of Asian removal, and retaking control of business and trade in black African hands, was more important than financial redistribution. The spoils included 5,655 firms, factories, ranches, and agricultural estates, along with all the abandoned Asian assets—vehicles, homes, household goods—neatly registered as part of the exit clearance process.<sup>686</sup> Civilian Business Allocation Committees (BAC) were established to distribute Asian properties, allocating large, technical companies to parastatal corporations and the rest to African traders, civil servants, and soldiers. However, the BACs were quickly coopted by the military because of alleged delays in allocating properties, and therefore most Asian businesses were divided among Amin's military allies and their families.<sup>687</sup>

Through this maneuver, Amin was able to economically marginalize the Baganda while simultaneously removing the Asian "buffer class." Expelling the Asians achieved a briefly expanded pie for Amin's military allies and created opportunities for African relatives of military loyalists to fill middle-class economic functions, spurning the Baganda and enriching his allies. Since the strength and maintenance of Amin's regime was reliant on ethnic military

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<sup>685</sup> Kyemba, 1977: 64.

<sup>686</sup> Jørgensen, 1981: 289.

<sup>687</sup> Jørgensen, 1981: 289.

patronage, the benefit of expulsion to his domestic allies was a critical enabler in the Ugandan case.

### *Transnational Alliances*

Uganda was neither economically nor militarily self-sufficient, thus the risk of alienating its transnational alliances—including the United Kingdom, United States, and Israel—should have acted as a significant constraint on Amin’s decision to expel; and may have done so until early 1972. But Amin gradually cultivated new transnational alliances which opened alternative sources of financial and military support shifting his expulsion calculus.

Before Amin’s August 1972 expulsion decree, Uganda had robust transnational alliances with western states, receiving an estimated \$25.5 million per year in aid from OECD countries and multi-lateral institutions.<sup>688</sup> Much of that aid came from the U.K., Israel, and the U.S. all of whom ignored Amin’s anti-democratic seizure of power and repression of his domestic opponents.<sup>689</sup> In 1972 the U.S. provided over \$2.1 million in grants for technical assistance in education, agriculture, and healthcare.<sup>690</sup> Israel increased its in-kind support after Amin displaced Obote from power, including £1 million worth of arms, tanks, aircrafts, military trainers, and technical advisors.<sup>691</sup> And in July 1971, amid local massacres, Britain signed a £2 million defense contract with Uganda to provide military training and armored personnel vehicles, and the following month offered a three-year £10 million loan.<sup>692</sup> British-

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<sup>688</sup> Jørgensen, 1981: 307.

<sup>689</sup> Martin, 1974: 164; Curtis, 2004: 254; Walton, 2013: 273.

<sup>690</sup> Welles, 1972: 4.

<sup>691</sup> Oded, 2006: 72; Bishku, 2017: 83.

<sup>692</sup> Curtis, 2004, 254-55.

Ugandan military cooperation continued into 1972<sup>693</sup> with a visit to the U.K. by Uganda Defense Minister Oboto-Ofumbi in January to purchase additional equipment and armored cars.<sup>694</sup>

In February 1972, after Amin's current donors refused to fund his plans for aggressive military action against Tanzania, where Obote had fled after the coup, Amin sent his Minister of Education, Abu Baker Mayanja, to Egypt to meet with Egyptian President Sadat.<sup>695</sup> Sadat could not offer any support given Egypt's financial strain, but he referred Mayanja to Libyan President Gaddafi.<sup>696</sup> Gaddafi was willing to assist Amin, a fellow Muslim, on the condition that he align with the Arab cause and expel Israelis<sup>697</sup> from Uganda.<sup>698</sup> This was no small request. Israel had played a prominent role in post-colonial East Africa, providing military and financial support across the continent to counteract its Arab enemies, principally Egypt and Sudan.<sup>699</sup> Uganda was acutely attractive given its shared border with Sudan and Israel had developed a close relationship with Obote to arm the Anyanya, southern Sudanese rebels, in their civil war against the Arab, and Muslim, north.<sup>700</sup> After Amin took power, his first international visit was to Israel and the country agreed to continue, and even augment, its military and economic support to Uganda. But resources for an invasion of Tanzania were a

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<sup>693</sup> It was not until June 1972, two months before the Asian expulsion decree, that the British government considering pausing military support and hesitated in sending additional military trainers. But this was not because of Amin's human rights abuses, but rather his anti-imperialist statements and naval cooperation with the Soviets (Curtis, 2004: 258-59).

<sup>694</sup> Curtis, 2004: 256-57.

<sup>695</sup> Martin, 1974: 161; Pondi, 1988: 142; Oded, 2006: 73; Bishku, 2017: 84.

<sup>696</sup> Oded, 2006: 73.

<sup>697</sup> This offer was part of Gaddafi's larger pan-Islamic and anti-Zionist strategy to remove Israel from the African continent—aid was conditional on severing diplomatic ties with Israel (Lemarchand, 1988: 11; Pondi, 1988: 141-42).

<sup>698</sup> Martin, 1974: 163; Lemarchand, 1998: 11; Oded, 2006: 73.

<sup>699</sup> Jacob, 1971: 175; Oded, 2006: 66; Bishku, 2017: 77.

<sup>700</sup> Martin, 1974: 159; Oded, 2006: 67; Bishku 2017: 82.



bridge too far.<sup>701</sup> Eager for unconstrained financial and military support, Amin complied with Gaddafi's request, and in March 1972 Uganda expelled an estimated 700 Israelis—military advisors, diplomats, and their families.<sup>702</sup>

After meeting with Gaddafi, Amin visited seven Arab states including Morocco, Sudan, Syria, and Jordan, and he sent his Foreign Minister to Iraq and Somalia—Amin even went on the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca.<sup>703</sup> In addition to Libya, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait became key donors, pleased with Amin's militant anti-Zionism and support for pan-Islam. Libya and the Palestinian Liberation Organization swiftly replaced the military aid and training gap left by the Israelis.<sup>704</sup> By the summer of 1972 Uganda was no longer reliant on its previous transnational alliances. Amin received substantial economic and military support from Arab states.<sup>705</sup>

Consequently, the economic leverage the U.K., and other western countries, may have had to convince Amin to repeal or modify his expulsion decision had vanished. Amin was immune to the retaliatory U.K. and U.S. withdrawal of £10 million<sup>706</sup> and \$3 million loans, respectively, in response to his expulsion decree. He had already replaced the \$25.5 million in western support with an estimated \$26-33 million from Arab states and OPEC sources.<sup>707</sup> Amin's new transnational alliances had no concerns about expulsion<sup>708</sup> as a viable policy

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<sup>701</sup> Avirgan & Honey, 1982: 11; Oded, 2006: 71.

<sup>702</sup> Keesing, 1971: 25236; Tandon, 1972: 6; Oded, 2006: 75.

<sup>703</sup> ACICR B AG 252 152-001; Confidential Report on the Current Situation in Uganda, 05.10.1972.

<sup>704</sup> ACICR B AG 232 152-002.03; Frank Schmidt, Rapport de mission Ouganda, 25.11.1972; Jørgensen, 1981: 316; Foltz, 1988: 62; Oded, 2006: 76

<sup>705</sup> Martin, 1974: 163; Foltz, 1988: 62.

<sup>706</sup> News Compilation. (1972). "Britain Freezes £10 million loan to Uganda." *August 30*. In Z. Lalani (1997), *Ugandan Asians Expulsion: 90 Days and Beyond Through the Eyes of the International Press* (pp. 39). Tampa, FL: Expulsion Publications.

<sup>707</sup> Welles, 1972: 1; Jørgensen, 1981: 307; Oded, 2006: 74.

<sup>708</sup> Although a small portion of the Uganda Asians were Muslim, they were Ismaili Shias and thus not a concern of Amin's Sunni Arab transnational alliance.

option—in fact, in 1970, shortly after coming to power in a coup, like Amin, Gaddafi had expelled 20,000 Italians.<sup>709</sup> The shift in Amin’s transnational alliances opened alternative sources of financial and military support and overcame this potential constraint on the decision to expel. These new alliances were indifferent to Asian expulsion, further enabling the policy implementation.

### *Homeland States*

Most mass expulsions involve the removal of a population to a neighboring state where there are co-ethnic kin of the targets. However, the Uganda expulsion is distinct. The “homeland” states for most of the expellees—Britain and India—do not share a border with Uganda, and for those with Ugandan citizenship, the “homeland” state was Uganda itself. In addition, after Amin’s expulsion announcement, two of the country’s neighbors, Kenya and Tanzania, where at least some Asians would likely have fled because of their proximity and sizable Asian populations, immediately closed their borders with Uganda.<sup>710</sup>

Kenyan Vice President and Minister for Home Affairs, Daniel Arap Moi, stated Kenya would not, “allow Asian British passport holders from Uganda to flock into the country since Kenya is not a dumping ground for citizens of other countries...maximum border patrols will be deployed to combat any intended influx.”<sup>711</sup> Tanzanian Minister for Home Affairs, Saidi Maswanya, expressed similar sentiments, albeit more diplomatically, “our policy is very clear

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<sup>709</sup> Martin, 1974: 165; Pondi, 1998: 141.

<sup>710</sup> Patel, 1972: 18.

<sup>711</sup> Daily Nation, Nairobi. (1972). “Kenya Shuts the Door to Uganda Asians.” *August 9*. In Z. Lalani (1997), *Ugandan Asians Expulsion: 90 Days and Beyond Through the Eyes of the International Press* (pp. 5,8). Tampa, FL: Expulsion Publications.

on this question that Uganda Asians are not our responsibility, and therefore allowing them to settle or giving them refuge was far from thought.”<sup>712</sup> Although there were other neighboring states with porous borders and weak capacity—Rwanda, DRC, Sudan—Uganda’s Asians were unlikely to seek refuge there because of limited familial connections and low levels of development. Thus, although there were neighboring states with co-ethnics, their borders were sealed removing cross-border flight as an option.

Since Uganda’s Asian community was composed of non-citizens (an estimated 50,000 with British citizenship and 5,660 with Indian citizenship) and citizens (an estimated 24,500) the two key “homeland” states of concern were the U.K. and India.<sup>713</sup> Since most of the target group was British nationals, and the U.K. was then more powerful than India, it is the key homeland state to assess.

As previously outlined, Uganda had reduced its dependence on Britain in early 1972 and by August the ties between Uganda and its former colonizer had weakened. Just over a month after the expulsion announcement Uganda’s defense council gave Britain’s military training mission four days to leave the country.<sup>714</sup> Amin was not concerned about damaging relations with the U.K.—this constraint was no longer operative.

The U.K. initially “lived in a twilight period of false optimism,” taking limited action and hoping Amin would change his mind.<sup>715</sup> There were doubts that he would follow through with the expulsion policy.<sup>716</sup> After realizing Amin would not relent, the U.K. government

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<sup>712</sup> News Compilation. (1972). “Tanzania Says No.” *August 10*. In Z. Lalani (1997), *Ugandan Asians Expulsion: 90 Days and Beyond Through the Eyes of the International Press* (pp. 7). Tampa, FL: Expulsion Publications.

<sup>713</sup> Patel, 1972; Melady & Melady, 1976; Tandon, 1972; O’Brien, 1973; Cosemans, 2018.

<sup>714</sup> The Times of India, 1972.

<sup>715</sup> Tandon & Raphael, 1978: 13.

<sup>716</sup> ACICR B AG 252 152-001; Confidential Report on the Current Situation in Uganda, 05.10.1972.

launched overt and covert operations to pressure Amin.<sup>717</sup> British officials' main concern was the anticipated domestic backlash to the absorption of 50,000 non-white immigrants and the possibility that Kenya and Tanzania might follow Amin's example.<sup>718</sup> The UK first tried lobbying concerned states—Tanzania, Kenya, India, Pakistan—to try to convince Amin to reverse course.<sup>719</sup> Tanzanian President Nyerere condemned Amin's actions, calling him an animal and accusing him of "racialism," but also called on Britain to accept responsibility for its citizens and stop "pursuing racist immigration policies."<sup>720</sup> Kenyan Vice President Moi, in contrast, announced his support for Amin's expulsion decision. And while President Kenyatta did not endorse Moi's statement of support, he refused the U.K.'s requests to intervene with Amin.<sup>721</sup>

When bi-lateral and regional efforts failed, the U.K. took its case to the UN General Assembly urging member states to support a revision to Uganda's "arbitrary and inhumane" expulsion policy, or at least extend the 90-day deadline and to help resettle Asian expellees.<sup>722</sup> They advocated for an assembly debate and stated that the U.K. was ready to table a UN resolution.<sup>723</sup> The irony of the U.K. accusing an African state of racial discrimination was not lost on Grace Ibingira, Uganda's Permanent Representative to the UN. He pointed out the

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<sup>717</sup> Uche, 2017: 819, 829-30.

<sup>718</sup> Uche, 2017: 830.

<sup>719</sup> Uche, 2017: 829-30.

<sup>720</sup> Memorandum from Frank A. Bauman, Representative UNHCR Branch Office for Australia and New Zealand to UNHCR/HQ Geneva—Newspaper Clippings, "Black African Reacts at Last to Asian Expulsion," August 23, 1972; 11/2/64-641.UGA[a] Expulsion and Deportation – Uganda [1972] Volume 1; Series 2, Box 1281; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>721</sup> Uche, 2017: 830.

<sup>722</sup> Shannon, Don. (1972). "Britain Seeks U.N. Help for Uganda Asians." *Los Angeles Times*, September 28. In Z. Lalani (1997), *Ugandan Asians Expulsion: 90 Days and Beyond Through the Eyes of the International Press* (pp. 88). Tampa, FL: Expulsion Publications.

<sup>723</sup> Shannon, Don. (1972). "Britain Seeks U.N. Help for Uganda Asians." *Los Angeles Times*, September 28. In Z. Lalani (1997), *Ugandan Asians Expulsion: 90 Days and Beyond Through the Eyes of the International Press* (pp. 88). Tampa, FL: Expulsion Publications.

hypocrisy of the UK's concerns, "Britain had never protested when East African countries expelled black Africans from neighboring countries<sup>724</sup> in the early post-colonial era."<sup>725</sup> The U.K. dropped its request for a UN debate after an African initiative to send Zaire's<sup>726</sup> President Mobutu Sese Seko to Uganda to negotiate with Amin. Mobutu travelled to Kampala at the request of the African UN members to try to dissuade Amin from expelling the Asians, but his efforts failed.<sup>727</sup> The U.K. finally acquiesced and resettled most of its citizens with the UN resettling the remaining U.K. passport holders.<sup>728</sup>

Regarding India, Uganda's ties with the country were moderate. But given India's foreign policy, Amin would not have anticipated any backlash to his expulsion decree. When African states achieved independence, then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had encouraged Indians abroad to adopt local citizenship and integrate with indigenous Africans, stating they should "cease to seek a separate and better destiny from their fellow countrymen."<sup>729</sup> Therefore, the Lok Sabha statement on August 11 did not come as a surprise: "the Government of India recognized the right of the Ugandan government to regulate their internal affairs according to their best judgement."<sup>730</sup> India's foreign policy was focused on the non-aligned movement among former colonies, like itself, and it was not willing to risk those ties on behalf of Indians living in Uganda.<sup>731</sup> The Indian government acquiesced to Amin's

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<sup>724</sup> They also did not protest similar mass expulsions in West Africa (e.g., Ghana 1969).

<sup>725</sup> Shannon, Don. (1972). "Uganda Hits Plea for U.N. Debate on Asians." *Los Angeles Times*, September 29. In Z. Lalani (1997), *Ugandan Asians Expulsion: 90 Days and Beyond Through the Eyes of the International Press* (pp. 89,90). Tampa, FL: Expulsion Publications.

<sup>726</sup> In 1971 Mobutu changed the name of the Democratic Republic of Congo to Zaire.

<sup>727</sup> Tandon, 1972: 1.

<sup>728</sup> Jørgensen, 1981: 288; Mattausch, 1998: 134.

<sup>729</sup> Gupta, 1974: 317; Lall, 2001: 89.

<sup>730</sup> Lall, 2001: 117.

<sup>731</sup> Gupta, 1974: 317; Lall, 2001: 90.

expulsion decision, swiftly repatriating its citizens living in Uganda. Thus, the two principal “homeland” states enabled expulsion in Uganda.

### *International Community*

Amin was not concerned about the effect of expulsion on Uganda’s relations with the international community, nor did he anticipate fierce resistance. In 1972 Uganda had weak ties with the international community. Amin’s disposition is demonstrated in a telegram he sent to UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim and Israel Prime Minister Golda Meir after the September 1972 Munich Olympic massacre. In it he praised the killings of Israeli athletes, stating that Germany was the appropriate site for the attack given Hitler’s murder of more than six million Jews.<sup>732</sup> In addition, had Amin reflected on recent history, he would have good cause to be unconcerned about the international response. There had been no reaction to Obote’s expulsion of Kenyan Luos in 1970 nor to many other African expulsions in the late 1960s—from Gabon, 1962; Côte d’Ivoire, 1964; Ghana, 1969; and Libya, 1970.

But, unlike some mass expulsions in the first half of the twentieth century, Amin’s 1972 expulsion decree was not internationally endorsed. On the contrary, immediate condemnation flowed from the international press and from countries around the world. The African press also spoke out against Amin’s actions. The Nigerian newspaper, *Renaissance*, condemned the decision calling it “rash and unrealistic,” the *Malawi Times* said, “Amin’s move would help neither his country’s economy nor its international image,” and the *Times of Zambia*

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<sup>732</sup> Welles, 1972: 1; Martin, 1974: 11; Oded, 2006: 75.

said, “Idi Amin is a buffoon. Period.”<sup>733</sup> Presidents Nyerere of Tanzania and President Kaunda of Zambia both spoke out against Amin’s decision.

While there was no international approval for the expulsion, the international community, particularly agencies such as the UNHCR, ICEM, and ICRC, played a critical role in facilitating Asian departures. Since expellees could not flee to neighboring states, removal required air transportation and, in some cases, train journeys to ships for oceanic transport. In 1972 the United Nations, and its affiliated agencies, were still young. Both the UN and the UNHCR had their origins after the Second World War, and the latter had been exclusively focused on Europe. It was not until the 1960s, responding to the Algerian War (1954-1962), that the UNHCR had assisted non-Western refugees.<sup>734</sup> The UNHCR also had to tread a fine line to remain true to its mandate—the protection of refugees—persons who had fled their countries *across* an international border in fear of persecution. Domestic civilian persecution was outside its remit.

With Kenyan and Tanzanian borders closed most Asian expellees were stuck within Uganda. Although some were able to purchase commercial airline tickets and fly out of the Kampala airport, others needed support with documentation, resettlement, and transportation. UNHCR correspondence shows that the agency was aware of, and monitoring, the situation in Uganda immediately after Amin’s expulsion declaration. The UNHCR High Commissioner, Sadruddin Aga Khan, was personally connected to the Ismaili community in

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<sup>733</sup> News compilation. (1972). “Press Reactions.” *August 10*. In Z. Lalani (1997), *Ugandan Asians Expulsion: 90 Days and Beyond Through the Eyes of the International Press* (pp. 7). Tampa, FL: Expulsion Publications. And Times of Zambia newspaper clipping, September 9, 1972; 11/2/64-641.UGA[c] Expulsion and Deportation – Uganda [1972] Volume 2; Series 2, Box 1281; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>734</sup> Loescher, 2001: 97.

Uganda, as the uncle of Karim Aga Khan, the head of the Ismailis sect who had met with Amin in January 1972.<sup>735</sup>

There is much recorded communication about the Asian crisis between the UNHCR branch offices in Kampala and Nairobi and the headquarters in Geneva. The UNHCR's main concern was the protection of refugees. The High Commissioner wrote to Uganda's Minister of Foreign Affairs expressing concern about, "reported statements made in Kampala to the effect that the refugees having received asylum in Uganda would now be compelled to leave your country."<sup>736</sup> Although at the time of his letter, Decree 17 had been in effect for 11 days, the High Commissioner concluded his message stating, "I should like to renew my appreciation of the generous policy practised hitherto by the Government of Uganda in these matters..."<sup>737</sup> In this case, "these matters" related to refugee policies, but the positive tone at the end of his letter, and the absence of commentary on the likely refugee flows associated with the Asian expulsion decree, is notable.

On the same day the High Commissioner sent a confidential cable to Nxo Ekanagaki, Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), about his concerns regarding potential refugee expulsion as well as the Asians, the latter which he omitted from his letter to the Ugandan Minister of Foreign Affairs:

"I am also concerned over other measures announced in Kampala which would, if implemented, lead to [the] creation of new refugee groups either by expulsion [of] residents of Uganda who are at present stateless as they have no defined nationality or

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<sup>735</sup> Newspaper clipping, "UN Body will Aid 'Stateless' Asians," September 20; 11/2/64-641.UGA[c] Expulsion and Deportation – Uganda [1972] Volume 2; Series 2, Box 1281; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>736</sup> Copy of a Letter sent to the Ugandan Minister of Foreign Affairs from the UNHCR High Commissioner, August 20, 1972; 11/2/64-641.UGA[a] Expulsion and Deportation – Uganda [1972] Volume 1; Series 2, Box 1281; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>737</sup> Ibid.



by expulsion of other groups who would be de jure or de facto deprived of their Ugandan nationality.”<sup>738</sup>

The lack of criticism of the Asian expulsion policy in the High Commissioner’s communication with the Ugandan government was likely a diplomatic sleight of hand because on August 31 the Ugandan Foreign Minister responded to his message stating that refugees would not be forced to return to their countries of origin. Instead, contradicting the previous declaration by Amin, he wrote, “there is no intention whatsoever of sending back to Rwanda or any other country refugees who are in Uganda who are not themselves willing to return to Rwanda or any other country concerned.”<sup>739</sup>

This dialogue highlights one reason why the UNHCR may not have more actively negotiated with the Government of Uganda to rescind or modify its Asian expulsion decree. It was primarily concerned with its mandate: refugee protection. These sentiments are documented in notes from a meeting between the UNHCR and representatives from 22 countries held at the Palais des Nations in Geneva on Friday, October 13:

“There was a UNHCR Branch Office in Uganda but he [the High Commissioner] had naturally not felt it desirable to involve that office in the problem. Great caution had to be exercised to avoid a situation which might lead to members of the staff of that Branch Office being declared *persona non grata*, a development which would be most undesirable in view of the large number of refugees from Rwanda, Southern Sudan and Zaire at present in Uganda and receiving help from the UNHCR through that Branch Office.”<sup>740</sup>

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<sup>738</sup> Confidential Cable from UNHCR High Commissioner to Nairobi to be forwarded to OAU Secretary General, August 20, 1972; 11/2/64-641.UGA[a] Expulsion and Deportation – Uganda [1972] Volume 1; Series 2, Box 1281; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>739</sup> Letter from Wanume Kibedi, Uganda Minister of Foreign Affairs to UNHCR High Commissioner, August 31, 1972; 11/2/64-641.UGA[a] Expulsion and Deportation – Uganda [1972] Volume 1; Series 2, Box 1281; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>740</sup> Notes on the Informal Meeting of the Representatives on the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, October 13, 1972; 11/2/64-641.UGA[b] Expulsion and Deportation – Uganda [1972] Volume 2; Series 2, Box 1281; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

The Government of Uganda made repeated statements that the expulsion was not a problem for the UN, but rather the responsibility of the UK—even though not all expellees were U.K. citizens.

Although the international community did not endorse, or approve of, the expulsion as they had at Lausanne (1923) and Potsdam (1945), it effectively facilitated the Asian removal with minimal resistance or pressure applied to the Uganda government to reconsider or modify its position. Echoing the exact language from Article XIII of the 1945 Potsdam Agreement regarding the expulsion of Germans, the UNHCR Deputy High Commissioner, Charles Mace, stated in a cable: “We and international public opinion generally would wish departure (if it has to take place) to be conducted in [an] *orderly and humane* way, from [a] purely humanitarian viewpoint” [emphasis added].<sup>741</sup> No archived correspondence between the UNHCR and the Government of Uganda indicates any attempts to influence the decision to expel Asians, nor highlights the relevant human rights violations. Only one internal UNHCR cable from Mace to the UNHCR Director of the Protection Division on September 5, 1972 gently suggested mentioning Uganda’s obligations under the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons<sup>742</sup> which states in Article 31 that: “The Contracting States shall not expel a stateless person lawfully in their territory save on grounds of national security or public order.”<sup>743</sup> While the Asians were accused of many things, they were never presented as a national security concern, nor as a concern to public order.

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<sup>741</sup> Outgoing Cable from UNHCR Deputy High Commissioner, Mace, to Dadzie, UNHCR Director Protection Division, 05.09.1972; 11/2/10-100.UGA.ASI[b] - Refugees from Asia in Uganda [Volume 2-1.UGA.ASI]; Series 2, Box 204; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>742</sup> Ibid.

<sup>743</sup> United Nations, 1954.

Rather than condemning the Ugandan government, the UN praised its cooperation. A cable from the UNHCR/New York office describing decisions made between the Ugandan authorities and the UN about international assistance stated, “the Government of Uganda has been most cooperative in working with the United Nations Officials involved.”<sup>744</sup> Moreover, the day after the expulsion deadline, on November 10 the UN held a press briefing in New York in which Under Secretary General Bradford Morse stated,

“...the operation on behalf of the Asians of undetermined nationality in Uganda had been successfully concluded...We have had in the last several weeks the full co-operation of the Ugandan Government...The President of Uganda has gone out of his way to express his respect for the Secretary-General’s part in this and for other elements of the United Nations family which did participate.”<sup>745</sup>

Read out of context, this statement could be confused with a successful UN partnership with a democratic government, jointly responding to a natural disaster, rather than the UN responding to a military dictatorship violating human rights in expelling an entire ethnic group *en masse*. It is not surprising that the Uganda authorities would have been most pleased to collaborate with the UN in implementing its expulsion order.

The ICRC, by contrast, seemed to question its involvement in the operation, albeit in hindsight. Frank Schmidt, ICRC Regional Delegate for East Africa, expressed concern about assisting Amin to “finish his dirty work.” In the conclusion of his final report, dated November 25, 1972, after the expulsion was complete, he wrote:

“From a humanitarian point of view our intervention is not without ambiguity. *In the end we have helped Amin finish his dirty work on time.* So far no one has reproached us, not even the concerned Asians, and our action is perfectly defensible from the point of

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<sup>744</sup> Incoming Cable from UNHCR/New York, 26.10.1972; 11/2/10-100.UGA.ASI[c] - Refugees from Asia in Uganda [Volume 3-1.UGA.ASI]; Series 2, Box 205; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>745</sup> Cable from New York to UNHCR/Geneva, November 10, 1972; 11/2/64-641.UGA[c] Expulsion and Deportation – Uganda [1972] Volume 2; Series 2, Box 1281; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

view of ICRC doctrine. However, documenting these families, some already separated, and sending them to distant, unknown and cold countries has not been a perfectly positive achievement” [emphasis added].<sup>746</sup>

There was likely a high level of anxiety among international organizations about what may have happened without their intervention, although this is not documented in the archives. Given the ongoing and escalating violence in Uganda against Amin’s African opponents, and his comments endorsing the Holocaust, concern about potential Asian massacres may have been front of mind. Nevertheless, the international community facilitated the Asian removal further enabling Uganda’s expulsion policy.

In sum, alliances, the homeland states, and the international community enabled expulsion in Uganda. The conducive enabling environment, combined with the motivation to remove the Asians as the last vestiges of colonial rule, and to replace them with indigenous black Africans, resulted in the mass expulsion of the Uganda Asians.

#### **4.5 Kenya, 1967-1969: A negative case, constraints on mass expulsion**

The Asian population in Kenya was similar to its counterpart in Uganda in its arrival time on the continent, colonial sponsor, occupations, and segregated status. Kenya Asians formed the majority of the middle class and were accused of taking jobs from black Africans, not integrating into Kenya, and unscrupulous business practices that were discriminatory toward Africans. Anti-colonial sentiments and black nationalism were prominent in public discourse. The indigenous Kenyan public despised Europeans and Asians.

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<sup>746</sup> ACICR B AG 232 152-002.03; Rapport de mission Ouganda, Frank Schmidt, 25.11.1972 (translated from the French original).

Examining the contrasting treatment of Asian minorities in Uganda and Kenya is legitimately comparable on multiple dimensions. At independence Uganda and Kenya both had small Asian populations, roughly 0.8 and 1.8 percent of their populations respectively.<sup>747</sup> Indigenous Africans believed the structural privileges previously enjoyed by the Europeans and Asians during the colonial period would be eradicated, or reversed, and public opinion favored the expulsion of Asians.<sup>748</sup> Members of Kenya's Parliament referred to Asians as "blood suckers" and "devils."<sup>749</sup> Kenyan President Kenyatta told Asians "who were unwilling to work with Africans to 'pack their bags and go.'"<sup>750</sup> The Kenyan government-run Voice of Kenya radio station broadcasted: "...Indians [are] a hangover from the colonial past...[they are] onerous to the nation...The 'lip service' they had paid to integration...[was] evidence of their continuing 'racist' and 'exploitative' colonial attitudes."<sup>751</sup> In short, African-Asian tensions ran high in both countries and many favored Asian expulsion.

Uganda and Kenya had similar histories and structural conditions. Great Britain had colonized both countries in the late nineteenth century—Uganda as a Protectorate and Kenya as a white settler colony—with different administrative structures but the same exploitative, extractive rule. Uganda obtained its independence in 1962, Kenya followed the next year. They were East African neighbors with a shared border, similar geographic environments, and populations of approximately 10 million<sup>752</sup> inhabitants.<sup>753</sup> Their economies were nearly the

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<sup>747</sup> An estimated 75,000-80,000 Asians resided in Uganda (1972) and 176,613 in Kenya (1962) (Gertzel et. al, 1969: 21; Ghai, 1965: 92; Melady & Melady, 1976: 1). There were two censuses conducted in 1960s Kenya (1962 & 1969), therefore the precise Asian population estimates for 1967-1968 are unknown.

<sup>748</sup> Ramchandani, 1973: 2301; Parsons, 2007: 56; Cullen, 2017a: 163.

<sup>749</sup> Aiyar, 2015: 270.

<sup>750</sup> Aiyar, 2015: 270.

<sup>751</sup> Aiyar, 2015: 269-70.

<sup>752</sup> Estimated population size for late 1960s Kenya and 1972 Uganda.

<sup>753</sup> World Bank, 2020a.

same size and composed of similar sectors. Uganda's GDP in 1972 was \$1.49 billion (\$150.22 per capita) while Kenya's average GDP during 1967-1969 was \$1.35 billion<sup>754</sup> (\$127.68 per capita).<sup>755</sup> Subsistence agriculture employed most people. The principal exports were coffee and tea as well as sugar, cotton, sisal, and hides/skins.<sup>756</sup> Each country had some manufacturing, largely of food stuffs, textiles, and timber, as well as wholesale and retail trades. Kenya was more industrialized and had more developed tourism and transportation sectors, given its Indian Ocean coastline, but the two economies were very similar.<sup>757</sup>

Uganda and Kenya were both autocracies. The Polity V Project categorized both governments with a polity score of -7 ("autocracy"),<sup>758</sup> and the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)<sup>759</sup> electoral democracy index ranked them both in the lowest quartile: 0.085 and 0.217,<sup>760</sup> respectively.<sup>761</sup> Although Kenya initially had an active parliament, regular elections, and constitutional checks on executive power, Kenyatta used colonial-era authoritarian tactics to cement and maintain his power.<sup>762</sup> What began as a two-party system was quickly dissolved into a one-party state.<sup>763</sup> When the left-wing KANU faction broke away and formed a new

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<sup>754</sup> The years 1967-69 is the period examined in this paper therefore this figure is an average GDP over those three years. In 1969 Kenya's total GDP was 1.46 billion (133.67 per capita), almost exactly equivalent to 1972 Uganda.

<sup>755</sup> World Bank, 2020b, 2020c.

<sup>756</sup> Keesings, 1963: 19778; Ghai, 1965: 100.

<sup>757</sup> Ghai, 1965: 95; Howell, 1968: 42, 45.

<sup>758</sup> A Polity V score of -10 is the most autocratic and +10 the most democratic. Since the Kenya case looks at events from 1967-69 the Polity V scores during this time were -1 (1967), -1 (1968), and -7 (1969). While in 1967 and 1968 Kenya's Polity V scores codes the country as an "anocracy," the -7 score ("autocracy") in 1969 shows that Kenyatta's policies became increasingly authoritarian in the period examined.

<sup>759</sup> V-Dem measures the degree to which a country approximates Dahl's concept of polyarchy. The V-Dem electoral democracy index scores countries on a continuum from 0.0 indicating no attainment of the relevant attributes to 1.0 indicating the full realization of electoral democracy.

<sup>760</sup> Kenya's score here is the average of its scores from 1967-69.

<sup>761</sup> Marshall & Jagers, 2018; Coppedge, M., et al., 2020.

<sup>762</sup> Ghai, 1967: 1; Gertzel, 1970: 41; Mueller, 1984: 401; Branch & Cheeseman, 2006: 11, 24.

<sup>763</sup> Gertzel, 1970: 127; Aiyar, 2015: 264.

political party, the Kenya People's Union (KPU), in 1966, Kenyatta responded with an iron fist. He orchestrated a series of constitutional amendments to undermine the new party and expanded executive powers including discretion over detention without trial, emergency powers, censorship, control of the press, and the denial of opposition party organization.<sup>764</sup> These changes culminated in the banning of the KPU in October 1969 and the jailing of its leaders.<sup>765</sup> The similar autocratic regime challenges one of the most common (mis)explanations for Uganda's expulsion: Amin was simply a brutal military dictator. Kenyatta was not as brutal, but he wielded dictatorial power, nonetheless.

Finally, from a methodological standpoint, Kenya is a "hard case." Intuitively Kenya should have been more likely to expel. Unlike Uganda which had a peaceful transition from colonial rule, Kenya had a violent anti-colonial struggle. The British killed thousands of Kenyans in the Mau Mau rebellion, imprisoned and exiled future President Kenyatta as the alleged head of the insurgency, and incarcerated tens of thousands of Kikuyu in camps or reserves.<sup>766</sup> Given this experience, one might have expected the Kenyan government to be more likely to retaliate against the British, and the comparatively privileged colonial-derived Asian minorities. But the Kenyan government did not expel its Asians, which makes this paired comparison even more puzzling.

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<sup>764</sup> Keesings, 1966: 21525, 21718; Ghai, 1967: 12; Gertzel, 1970: 147, 152; Mueller, 1984: 408.

<sup>765</sup> Mueller, 1984: 415; Ochieng, 1995: 100.

<sup>766</sup> Anderson, 2005: 4-5; Elkins, 2005: xiv, 358; Walton, 2013: 237.

## Contextual Environment & Predisposing Conditions

### *Asians in Kenya*

Established in 1895, Kenya was part of the British East Africa Protectorate. In 1920 it was transformed into a British Crown colony and was directly administered by imperial officials with no indigenous legislature, becoming a site of significant settler colonization. The first British census conducted in 1911 estimated 11,787 Asians in Kenya. This figure roughly doubled in each of the next four decades, peaking in 1962 with an estimated 180,000 Asians (see Table 12).

Table 12: Kenya Population Figures, 1911-1969 <sup>767</sup>						
Population Group	1911	1921	1931	1948	1962	1969
Asians	11,787	25,253	43,623	97,687	176,613	139,037
Europeans	3,175	9,651	16,812	29,660	55,759	40,593
Arabs	9,100	10,102	12,166	24,174	34,048	27,886
Africans	1,750,099	2,250,525	2,801,346	5,254,445	8,369,843	10,735,189
Total	1,774,161	2,295,531	2,873,947	5,405,966	8,636,263	10,942,705

As in Uganda, Asians in Kenya were initially coastal traders who moved into the interior with the arrival of the British as laborers constructing the railroad from Mombasa to the White Nile in Uganda. During the first half of the twentieth century, significant Asian population growth occurred because of both increasing local births as well as immigration from India.<sup>768</sup> The Asian population in Kenya was largely concentrated in urban areas; the 1962 census estimated approximately 85 percent of Asians lived in the five largest cities.<sup>769</sup> A sizable population reduction had occurred in the late 1960s, because of Africanization policies and U.K. immigration restrictions.

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<sup>767</sup> Adapted from Nowik (2015: 121) and Herzig (2006: 30).

<sup>768</sup> Herzig, 2006: 31.

<sup>769</sup> Ghai, 1965: 93.



### *Tripartite Societal Divisions*

The societal structure of colonial Kenya was very similar to that of Uganda with three segregated, hierarchical groups—Europeans, Asians, and Africans—with minimal economic, social, or political integration. Racial segregation manifested in separate schools, hospitals, residential areas, and social spaces.<sup>770</sup> As in Uganda, the Asians in Kenya formed the middle class. In the public sector they worked in skilled and semi-skilled positions, especially railways and schools, and mid-/lower-level positions in the civil service serving in clerical and secretarial roles. In the private sector they worked as professionals—doctors, lawyers, teachers—or provided technical services to European firms as clerks, accountants, or sales assistants.<sup>771</sup> Finally, as in Uganda, the Asians dominated the Kenyan retail and wholesale trade.<sup>772</sup>

Inequality within the Crown colony was stark with vast gaps in wealth and income both between the British and Asians and between the Asians and Africans. The colonial government paid Asian workers an average of 400 shillings per month, compared to 56 shillings per month for Africans. Although Asians typically held more skilled positions, income disparities existed even at the same level.<sup>773</sup> The private sector was no different with 18 percent of Asians earning more than £750 per year, compared to one percent of Africans earning £600 per year.<sup>774</sup> Inequalities in education existed as well: at independence 59 percent of Asians had received at least nine years of schooling compared to four percent of Africans.<sup>775</sup> Not

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<sup>770</sup> Herzig, 2006: 18.

<sup>771</sup> Ghai & Ghai, 1971: 9.

<sup>772</sup> Maxon, 1995: 112.

<sup>773</sup> Aiyar, 2015: 231.

<sup>774</sup> Aiyar, 2015: 267.

<sup>775</sup> Aiyar, 2015: 266.

surprisingly, low levels of education reduced employment opportunities—23 percent of Indian adult males held technical positions, compared to only one percent of African men.<sup>776</sup> Few Africans worked in the private sector, and they occupied the lowest levels of public sector jobs, receiving the lowest wages.<sup>777</sup>

As independence approached, Africans were skeptical of Asian commitment to the new order and were resentful of their presence. As in Uganda, the Asian monopoly on trade was a particular focus of resentment. Many Africans saw Asians as the immediate obstacle to their participation and success in commerce. They were accused of remitting all their savings to India, exporting capital, bribery, tax evasion, price raising, false bookkeeping, and bargaining.<sup>778</sup> Similar to Uganda, dishonest business practices took on a racial dimension because of the high concentration of Asians in trade. During the colonial period almost all commercial transactions in imports and local produce went through Asian networks.<sup>779</sup> In post-independence Kenya, Africans hoped the structural privileges previously enjoyed by the Europeans and Asians would be abolished in favor of the native population.

#### *Independence and KANU Rule*

Kenya was the third country to obtain independence in its East African neighborhood—Tanganyika<sup>780</sup> was first in 1961, followed by Uganda in 1962, and then Kenya in 1963. After independence Kenya wanted to grant automatic citizenship to all Africans and contingent

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<sup>776</sup> Aiyar, 2015: 266.

<sup>777</sup> Tignor, 1998: 293.

<sup>778</sup> Tangri, 1966: 121.

<sup>779</sup> Himbara, 1994: 40.

<sup>780</sup> In October 1964, three years after Tanganyika gained its independence, the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar was renamed the United Republic of Tanzania.

citizenship to non-Africans, based on applications. But the British insisted on modifications. Kenya's final citizenship scheme was similar to Uganda's, granting automatic citizenship to all those born in Kenya, including non-Africans, with the proviso that at least one parent had to have been born in Kenya.<sup>781</sup> Given the long presence of Asians in Kenya, 48,000 Asians qualified for citizenship under this automatic *de jure* policy, approximately 30 percent of the Asian population at that time.<sup>782</sup>

As in Uganda, Asians who did not automatically qualify for Kenyan citizenship had two years to apply.<sup>783</sup> Few Asians took advantage of this opportunity, uncertain of the new Kenyan government and wanting to keep their British, or other, citizenship as insurance. Since Kenya, like Uganda, did not allow dual nationality, applications for Kenyan citizenship required renunciation of other citizenships. During the first 22 months of Kenya's two-year grace period, less than 12,000 Asians registered for citizenship; slightly less than 10 percent of the relevant population.<sup>784</sup> As the deadline approached at the end of 1965, a surge of 10,000 applications were submitted.<sup>785</sup> An estimated 20,000 of the 130,000 non-citizen Asians, 15 percent, applied for Kenyan citizenship, but the majority opted to maintain their British, or in some cases Indian or Pakistani, citizenship.

The low level of Asian citizenship applications was not just because of uncertainty, or disloyalty. The application process was expensive and cumbersome. Not all Asians could afford the £200 security deposit per applicant and a bond from a Kenyan citizen with

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<sup>781</sup> Hansen, 1999: 825.

<sup>782</sup> Rothchild, 1970a: 28.

<sup>783</sup> Rothchild, 1970a: 11

<sup>784</sup> Rothchild, 1970a: 11.

<sup>785</sup> Rothchild, 1970a: 11.

immovable property in the country. For an average family of five or six the cost was £1,000-£1200, out of reach for most petty traders.<sup>786</sup> In addition, not all Asians had the necessary documentation, such as birth certificates, required to apply. Regardless of the rationale for their citizenship decisions, many Africans perceived Asians who adopted Kenyan citizenship as simply “economic” or “paper” citizens.<sup>787</sup> Thus, even Asians with Kenyan citizenship were viewed negatively by the African majority.

In 1964, as Kenyatta assumed the presidency, he urged his fellow countrymen to start anew and “erase [from its memory] all the hatreds and the difficulties...which now belong to history.”<sup>788</sup> He called on Kenyans to unite under the slogan “harambee,” Swahili for “all pull together” putting aside differences to focus on the common goal of nation building. Kenyatta’s rhetoric indicated he wanted to build an inclusive state, but his actions signified it was one in which he maintained full control from which his ethnic kin, the Kikuyu, benefited.<sup>789</sup>

Kenyatta was fully committed to developing an indigenous capitalist bourgeoisie believing capital brought prosperity, and prosperity peace.<sup>790</sup> To articulate his vision, Kenyatta asked Tom Mboya, Minister of Labor, to produce a policy paper which became *Sessional Paper No. 10, African Socialism*. The almost 60-page document sought to clarify the meaning of African Socialism and articulate its practical application to Kenya’s Development Plan. The main goals outlined in Sessional Paper No. 10 were rapid economic growth, which would bring economic development and social progress for Kenyans; a commitment to non-alignment,

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<sup>786</sup> Aiyar, 2015: 279.

<sup>787</sup> Confidential Report: The Asians in East Africa, B. Sjollema, World Council of Churches, 30.04.1969; 11/1-1/0/KEN/ASI, Refugees situation - Refugees from Asia in Kenya; Series 1, Box 26; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>788</sup> Aiyar, 2015: 263.

<sup>789</sup> Aiyar, 2015: 263.

<sup>790</sup> Aiyar, 2015: 265.

rejecting Western capitalism and Eastern communism; Africanization of the economy and public service, but without doing harm to the economy; and building the Kenyan nation.<sup>791</sup>

Section 53 of Sessional Paper No. 10 best summarizes these aims:

“The most important of these policies is to provide a firm basis for rapid economic growth. Other immediate problems such as Africanization of the economy, education, unemployment, welfare services, and provincial policies must be handled in ways that will not jeopardize growth. The only permanent solution to all of these problems rests on rapid growth...Growth, then, is the first concern of planning in Kenya.”

Despite the stated commitment to African Socialism, never defined in the document, and neutrality on capitalist and communist approaches to development, the Government of Kenya had clearly taken a side—it had no intention of changing property rights in industry and commerce and was committed to capitalist development. What was essentially proposed was the substitution of colonial elites with African elites.<sup>792</sup> In May 1965 Parliament voted unanimously to approve Sessional Paper 10 as the blueprint for Kenyan development.<sup>793</sup>

#### *Africanization Part I – Public Sector*

The Kenyatta government prioritized land redistribution as its first Africanization initiative since access to land had been a key demand of the Mau Mau struggle, and the indigenous, African population was largely agricultural. In one of its first initiatives, KANU oversaw the compensated transfer of 1.5 million acres of European lands in the “White Highlands,” the prime agricultural land, to African farmers.<sup>794</sup> This policy brought the majority of Kenyan land under indigenous control for the first time since colonization, albeit at a significant debt

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<sup>791</sup> Republic of Kenya, 1965.

<sup>792</sup> Mohiddin, 1969: 8.

<sup>793</sup> Maloba, 2017: 86.

<sup>794</sup> Cable, 1969: 231.

because Kenya had to borrow money from Britain to pay the European land holders.<sup>795</sup> Asians could not own land under the colonial administration, so they were not affected by this initial Africanization effort.

After land, the next priority area for Africanization was the civil service. In 1963 the Kenya African Civil Servants' Union demanded the removal of all non-Africans from the civil service, and the government began its efforts in earnest.<sup>796</sup> Table 13 shows the demographic composition of the Kenyan Civil Service in 1962, shortly before independence. Asians comprised an estimated 29 percent of the civil service workforce—largely in clerical or secretarial positions—despite making up less than 2 percent of the total population.

<b>Table 13: Kenya Civil Service, 1962<sup>797</sup></b>				
<i>Position</i>	<i>European</i>	<i>African</i>	<i>Asian</i>	<i>Total</i>
Upper Administration	71	18	-	89
Provincial Administration	193	181	-	374
Professional and Sr. Technical Staff	2,820	180	-	3,000
Clerical	-	2,600	2,100	4,700
Secretarial	-	1	417	418
Total	3084	2980	2517	8581

By 1965 most of the administrative positions within the civil service had been replaced with Kenyan citizens—by mid-1967, 91 percent of the civil service was Africanized.<sup>798</sup> There was also a drastic expansion of the public service.<sup>799</sup> From 1961 to 1969 the total number of

<sup>795</sup> The British government provided a £9.7 million grant (one third of the total cost) to the Government of Kenya, but the remaining £17 million had to be borrowed from Britain and other outside agencies (Tignor, 1998: 385).

<sup>796</sup> Himbara, 1994: 115.

<sup>797</sup> Adapted from data in Himbara, 1994: 115.

<sup>798</sup> Himbara, 1994: 116; Maxon, 1995: 113.

<sup>799</sup> The public service was comprised of government positions that provided “services of general interest” such as courts, schools, electricity, railways, telecommunication, military, police, health care, etc. It included the civil service, but the civil service was distinct.

employees in the public sector increased from approximately 10,000 to over 200,000.<sup>800</sup> Many Africans coveted these public sector positions because they paid well, with excellent benefits, and provided job security.<sup>801</sup>

The Africanization of the public sector resulted in the first wave of Asian emigration. Between 1961 and 1969, an estimated 4,800 Asians lost their jobs affecting 24,000-28,800<sup>802</sup> persons, with others departing in anticipation of the next phase of Africanization targeting the private sector.<sup>803</sup>

#### *Africanization Part II – Private Sector*

When it came to the private sector, Kenyatta's Africanization efforts relied more on rhetoric than policy change. Kenyatta and his cabinet showed no interest in nationalizing industry or creating a state-dominated economy. Unlike in Uganda, many in the KANU conservative block saw no issue with continued foreign economic dominance.<sup>804</sup> KANU's solution to low levels of African participation in the economy was to expand commercial and industrial opportunities which required private, usually foreign, capital investment.<sup>805</sup> But not all KANU politicians agreed with this approach.

It was an open secret within the government that Sessional Paper No. 10 was the brainchild of a single man, Tom Mboya, and that many within the party, particularly KANU's

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<sup>800</sup> Ghai & Ghai, 1971: 39 and Vinnai 1974: 183.

<sup>801</sup> Mueller, 1984: 418.

<sup>802</sup> An average household size of five to six persons is estimated (Citation: Confidential Report: The Asians in East Africa, B. Sjollem, World Council of Churches, 30.04.1969; 11/1-1/0/KEN/ASI, Refugees situation - Refugees from Asia in Kenya; Series 1, Box 26; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.)

<sup>803</sup> Ghai & Ghai, 1971: 39 and Vinnai 1974: 183.

<sup>804</sup> Tignor, 1998: 384.

<sup>805</sup> Rothchild, 1970b: 747.

left-wing faction, disagreed with its core message. Despite its unanimous endorsement, Sessional Paper No. 10 was not submitted to the Party for review and feedback, although it was shared with the Cabinet and the Cabinet Development Committee.<sup>806</sup> While KANU's left and right factions agreed on the nationalist slogan "Africa for Africans," they disagreed about the means to achieve it. Ideological Cold War battles occurred within the party. Notwithstanding the stated commitment to non-alignment, the left-wing accused Kenyatta and the conservatives of being Western capitalists, and the right-wing criticized the dissidents for bringing a foreign ideology, communism, to Kenya.<sup>807</sup> In addition to internal government discord, the trade unions were upset with the African socialism outlined in Sessional Paper No. 10 and started to speak out in favor of "real socialism."<sup>808</sup>

Sensing a credible threat, Kenyatta dissolved the Kenya Federation of Labour and the Kenya African Workers Congress, and created a new organization, the Central Organization of Trade Unions with significant government oversight.<sup>809</sup> Other government officials raised motions in parliament to Africanize the private sector and to remove Asians from managerial positions, but Kenyatta remained focused on solidifying his power and removing any challengers to his authority. He continued to promote the growth of the Kenyan economy above all else.<sup>810</sup> In a speech to Kenyan businessmen at Nairobi City Hall Kenyatta stated: "...we are determined that the development of African business and industry should be carried

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<sup>806</sup> Mohiddin, 1969: 10.

<sup>807</sup> Aiyar, 2015: 265-66.

<sup>808</sup> Maloba, 2017: 90.

<sup>809</sup> Maloba, 2017: 91.

<sup>810</sup> Aiyar, 2015: 271.



out without damaging the existing fabric of the economy. A simple transfer of a business from one man to another does not necessarily expand business or develop a country.”<sup>811</sup>

Although Mboya had announced some restrictions on certain kinds of trade and business in 1965, no systematic Africanization of the economy was implemented. Five years after independence, many African Kenyans were upset that they had not seen the economic fruits of post-colonial government and Asian’s continued to dominant commerce and petty trade. Kenya’s population was growing fast, at three percent per year, and the economy was saddled with chronic unemployment. Approximately 80,000 students entered the job market annually, many moving from rural to urban areas to seek employment, but only a fraction of that total was absorbed into the formal labor market.<sup>812</sup>

In March 1966, internal KANU disagreements reached their apogee and KANU’s left-wing faction formally split from the party and formed the new Kenya People’s Union (KPU). KPU advocated socialist—not African Socialism—policies with the support of urban workers, trade unions, and students.<sup>813</sup> In his resignation speech, Oginga Odinga, former KANU Vice President and new head of KPU, stated:

“...this government [KANU] represents first, international forces purely concerned with [the] ideological colonization of the country and has no genuine concern for the development of the people. Secondly it also represents the commercial interests, largely foreign, whose primary concern is big profits for the shareholders. Here, too, the interest of the people of Kenya is only secondary to the profits and understandably not their concern.”<sup>814</sup>

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<sup>811</sup> Kenyatta, 1968: 237.

<sup>812</sup> Cable, 1969: 227.

<sup>813</sup> Ochieng, 1995: 98.

<sup>814</sup> Ochieng, 1995: 99.

The first objective of the KPU constitution was to fight for the economic independence of the people of Kenya. In their war of words from 1966 to 1969, KPU consistently described KANU's "African Socialism" as merely a guise for tribalism and capitalism.<sup>815</sup> By October 1969 Kenyatta had had enough of KPU and banned the opposition party throwing their leaders in jail.<sup>816</sup>

Facing populist pressure, in 1967 the government passed two legislative bills: the Kenya Immigration Bill (July) and the Trade Licensing Bill (October). The Immigration Bill cancelled permanent residency certificates that allowed non-citizens to work in Kenya and replaced them with work permits. The work permits would be issued by the government and only licensed businesses that employed and trained Kenyan citizens would be eligible.<sup>817</sup> In addition, certain skilled and semi-skilled workers—clerks, secretaries, shop assistants, tailors, carpenters, plumbers, construction workers—also had to apply for work permits.<sup>818</sup> Applying for work permits was expensive, and they were issued only for a limited duration of three to six months. Each application cost £25 and required a £150 security bond.<sup>819</sup>

The Trade Licensing Bill, passed three months after the Immigration Bill, required all businesses to apply for new trade licenses and restricted the trade of basic goods—sugar, posho, and other staples—to citizens. It also restricted the areas of the country where Asians could trade, designed to remove Asian traders from rural areas, although this was only 10 percent of the total.<sup>820</sup> The government believed these two legislative actions would create

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<sup>815</sup> Ochieng, 1995: 100.

<sup>816</sup> Ochieng, 1995: 100.

<sup>817</sup> Aiyar, 2015: 276.

<sup>818</sup> Aiyar, 2015: 276.

<sup>819</sup> Aiyar, 2015: 283.

<sup>820</sup> Cable, 1969: 229.

20,000 private-sector jobs for Africans.<sup>821</sup> Importantly, the Trade Licensing Act did not apply to manufacturing licenses, a sector dominated by Asians and which generated significant economic revenues for Kenya.<sup>822</sup> This legislation deeply affected non-citizen Asians in Kenya, many of whom were permanent residents and worked in occupations restricted by the new bill. Kenya's economic Africanization initiatives encouraged many Asians to leave the country.

*The "Asian Exodus" 1967-1969*

Racial tensions were high and growing in 1960s Britain because of the approximately 750,000 non-white Commonwealth citizens<sup>823</sup> who had arrived in the country between 1962 and 1968.<sup>824</sup> In reaction to Kenya's Immigration Bill, the U.K.'s Conservative opposition party strongly lobbied the British government to restrict the entry of Asians with British passports.<sup>825</sup> Fearing both Kenya's new Africanization measures and the possibility of limited U.K. immigration access, British Asians in Kenya rapidly fled the country, with a total of 13,600 Asian U.K. passport holders arriving by the end of 1967.<sup>826</sup> Thus began the "Asian exodus."

Some scholars argue that rather than Kenya's legislative action, it was the impulsive and imprudent British immigration policy that resulted in large-scale Asian emigration from Kenya during 1967-1969. British Home Secretary, Labour's Roy Jenkins, a liberal in the

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<sup>821</sup> Aiyar, 2015: 276.

<sup>822</sup> Rothchild, 1970b: 750.

<sup>823</sup> These included citizens from New Commonwealth countries in the West Indies, Pakistan, India, and East Africa (Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika).

<sup>824</sup> Memorandum from UNHCR London Representative to High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, 29.01.1969; 11/1-1/0/KEN/ASI, Refugees situation - Refugees from Asia in Kenya; Series 1, Box 26; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>825</sup> Aiyar, 2015: 285.

<sup>826</sup> Hansen, 1999: 818; Cullen, 2017a: 163.

cabinet, argued that the threat of British legislation that was causing the exodus.<sup>827</sup> The Kenya government denied responsibility for the surge in emigration. It blamed the British government and their hastily enacted immigration policies which pushed Asians to depart before the British legislation was enacted and came into force.<sup>828</sup> According to Kenya's Attorney-General Charles Njonjo:

“There was ‘no intention on the part of the Kenya Government to, irrationally, throw these British nationals out of the country’...[instead] what they sought was a smooth transition to full African participation, not a hasty change-over which would have adverse effects upon the country’s growth prospects or relationships to the Western capitalist market.”<sup>829</sup>

Njonjo's comments are consistent with Kenyatta's policies, dating back to Sessional Paper No. 10, with a clear emphasis on policies fostering rapid economic growth. Since a hasty removal of Asian traders would have negatively impacted growth, it is plausible to believe that increased out-migration was not the government's intent. In addition, although the Trade Licensing Bill was passed in October 1967, it did not come into effect until January 1969, almost a year after the UK Commonwealth Immigration Act, giving more weight to the argument that the “Asian exodus” was a reaction to U.K. immigration policy change rather than the implementation of Kenya's Africanization policies.

Regardless, by mid-1969, after the dust had settled from the “Asian exodus,” the Kenyan Government enforced its Trade Licensing Act and withdrew, or did not renew, 3,000 licenses affecting approximately 15,000 Asians.<sup>830</sup> It is difficult to specify how many Asians

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<sup>827</sup> Aiyar, 2015: 286.

<sup>828</sup> Rothchild, 1973: 385.

<sup>829</sup> Rothchild, 1973: 385.

<sup>830</sup> Confidential Report: The Asians in East Africa, B. Sjollem, World Council of Churches, 30.04.1969; 11/1-1/0/KEN/ASI, Refugees situation - Refugees from Asia in Kenya; Series 1, Box 26; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

left Kenya in the late 1960s because of the politicized nature of the figures, but combining public sector Africanization data with 1967-1969 emigration figures, an estimated 39,000-46,800 Asians left Kenya between independence and 1969.<sup>831</sup>

Unlike Uganda, the Government of Kenya did not expel its Asian population *en masse*. Although Kenyatta, like all post-colonial leaders, wanted to Africanize his country's political and economic systems, he did not implement change through mass expulsion. Instead, Kenya implemented various Africanization initiatives, through legislative means, which gradually reduced the *non-citizen* Asian population in the country, while protecting Asian-dominated manufacturing and Asians with Kenyan citizenship. Thus, although both Kenya and Uganda shared the motivation to remove the Asian remnants of their colonial pasts, Kenya did not expel its Asian population. The next section explains the constraining factors that prevented Kenya from doing just that.

### Constraints on Mass Expulsion

Table 14 displays a side-by-side comparison of the enabling and constraining factors in the Uganda and Kenya cases. As indicated in the first column, Amin's government overcame all four constraints to enable expulsion in Uganda, while in Kenya, by contrast, the constraints outweighed the enablers deterring expulsion.

Table 14: Mass Expulsion Decision Making Framework Applied to Uganda & Kenya		
Key Factors	Uganda (1972)	Kenya (1967-69)
<b>Alliances</b>		
Domestic Alliances	Benefit from expulsion (↑)	Harmed by expulsion (↓)
Transnational Alliances	Indifferent to expulsion (↑)	Opposed to expulsion (↓)
<b>Homeland State(s)</b>		
Relation to Government	Weak ties (↑)	Strong ties (↓)

<sup>831</sup> Rothchild, 1973: 374-75; Hansen, 1999: 818; Ghai & Ghai, 1971: 21.

<i>Response/ Anticipated Response</i>	Acquiesce & resettle expellees (↑)	Resist & deny entry to expellees (↓)
<b>International Community</b>		
<i>Relation to Government</i>	Weak ties (↑)	Strong ties (↓)
<i>Response/ Anticipated Response</i>	Facilitate expulsion (↑)	(Likely to) ignore expulsion (↑)

## Alliances

### *Domestic Alliances*

Like Amin, Kenyan President Kenyatta was primarily focused on maintaining control of the Kenyan state, including resource distribution to his Kikuyu co-ethnics, and he cultivated domestic alliances that ensured the stability and continuity of his rule.<sup>832</sup> After the British transferred power to Kenya in 1963, an African elite inherited the top positions in the independent government. An alliance developed between Kenyatta, wealthy conservative KANU members, and the Provincial Administration, all of whom had shared economic interests in maintaining the status quo.<sup>833</sup> These officials, in Nairobi and in the countryside, were keen to maintain their newfound wealth and status which largely came through politics rather than successful economic endeavors. By extracting rents for state programs and contract allocation they enriched themselves and their allies. To maintain this status quo, Kenyatta needed the Kenyan economy to continue functioning smoothly and Asian dominance of commerce and manufacturing, particularly the latter, generated significant economic growth for the country.<sup>834</sup>

Despite its one-party state structure, there was intense debate in the Kenyan National Assembly about nationalization—really Africanization—of the economy with internal factions disagreeing about what to do about the Asian minority. The KANU left-wing faction, led by

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<sup>832</sup> Parsons, 2007: 57.

<sup>833</sup> Branch & Cheeseman, 2006: 20-22.

<sup>834</sup> Rothchild, 1970a: 750.

Vice President Odinga, wanted (black) Africanization—the removal of non-indigenous control of the economy through the nationalization of industry, the institution of state-mandated racial preferences, and the removal of Asians from managerial positions.<sup>835</sup> Urban workers, trade unions, and students were supportive of these policy positions, so this was far from an isolated stance. The right-wing faction, supported by Kenyatta and led by Mboya, preferred piecemeal policies rather than major structural change, advocating Kenyanization, really *partial* Kenyanization, targeting non-citizens.<sup>836</sup>

Although the parliamentary debate around Africanization of the economy, and the fate of the Asian minority, was robust and public, the legislative institution lacked teeth.<sup>837</sup> It was a colonial artifact, “verbally vigorous but politically impotent.”<sup>838</sup> Kenyatta and the majority right-wing faction resisted demands by the KANU leftists for structural economic changes that would have threatened their positions.<sup>839</sup> Instead, they responded to internal opposition with piecemeal policies, such as the Africanization of the civil service and expansion of the public sector, but not robust Africanization of the private sector. Even the title of their capitalist, development plan—*African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya*—was a rhetorical sleight of hand.<sup>840</sup> By coopting and repackaging the “socialist” language of the left-wing, Kenyatta and the conservative faction outwardly projected concessions and compromise, while proceeding undeterred with their plans for rapid economic growth.

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<sup>835</sup> Gertzel et. al, 1969: 30; Gertzel, 1970: 51; Aiyar, 2015: 271.

<sup>836</sup> Gertzel, 1970: 54; Branch & Cheeseman, 2006: 21; Aiyar, 2015: 269.

<sup>837</sup> Ghai, 1967: 11; Gertzel, et. al, 1969: 10; Branch & Cheeseman, 2006: 23-24.

<sup>838</sup> Mueller, 1984: 401, 405.

<sup>839</sup> Mueller, 1984: 405-06; Branch & Cheeseman, 2006: 25.

<sup>840</sup> Atieno-Odhiambo, 1987: 196.

Members of Kenyatta's tripartite alliance benefited politically and economically from the economic status quo, which would have been harmed by Asian expulsion. Despite internal KANU opposition and popular pressure to remove the Asian minority, expulsion was constrained in Kenya.

### *Transnational Alliances*

Throughout the early 1960s Kenya leveraged transnational alliances with Eastern and Western states to get the best deals and the most support.<sup>841</sup> With Cold War rivalries running high at independence, Kenya found willing donors in the Soviet Union, China, Britain, U.S., Israel, and West Germany. In 1964 the Soviets were the first to sign an economic agreement with Kenya. They provided a technical college for 1,000 students, a 200-bed hospital, loans for agricultural and industrial development, and technical experts. Two weeks later the Chinese gave the Kenyan state a \$3 million grant and a £5.3 million interest-free loan for development projects.<sup>842</sup> Not to be outbid in its former colony, Britain delivered enormous support with £50 million, in both grants and loans, for civil and defense programs, including capital development, arms, equipment, vehicles, aircraft, and British military trainers.<sup>843</sup> Israel contributed with small loans and investments in construction projects and agricultural and water management training; it was also the first country to build an embassy in independent Kenya.<sup>844</sup> In addition to donor governments, multi-lateral institutions such as the International

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<sup>841</sup> Keesing, 1964: 20128; Cullen, 2017a: 149.

<sup>842</sup> Gertzel, et. al, 1969: 586; Keesing, 1964: 20088.

<sup>843</sup> Keesing, 1964: 20128.

<sup>844</sup> Naim, 2005: 79; Bishku, 2017: 77, 80.



Development Association and the World Bank provided loans of \$2.8 and \$4.5 million, respectively, for enhanced tea production and road improvement.<sup>845</sup>

Post-colonial Africa was not only underdeveloped, requiring large economic investment, it was also politically precarious with coups and mutinies threatening new leaders. Kenya was not immune. In January 1964, mere weeks after independence, army mutinies swept across East Africa, originating in Zanzibar and then spreading to Tanganyika, Uganda, and finally Kenya.<sup>846</sup> Kenyatta, like Obote in Uganda and Nyerere in Tanzania, immediately turned to Britain for military support, and the small-scale mutiny was quickly put down by British soldiers.<sup>847</sup> Afterward, Kenya signed a major defense agreement with Britain including military equipment, arms, technical assistance, and the continued presence of 160 British troops to assist in “dealing with internal disturbances.”<sup>848</sup>

Britain’s military support extended to intelligence collaboration. Kenyatta and his inner circle received regular access to detailed British intelligence reports and Kenyatta retained MI5’s colonial-era Nairobi-based Security Liaison Officer as an “advisor” to the Kenyan government.<sup>849</sup> Kenyatta deployed the same colonial intelligence apparatus once used against him to surveil the activities of his political rivals.<sup>850</sup> Kenyatta also collaborated with Israel’s intelligence agency, meeting with the Head of Mossad as early as 1962: Nairobi became Mossad’s East Africa hub.<sup>851</sup> Asian expulsion would have harmed Kenya’s transnational

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<sup>845</sup> Keesing, 1965: 20619.

<sup>846</sup> Parsons, 2007: 51; Clayton, 1986: 222.

<sup>847</sup> Parsons, 2007: 51, 62; Cullen, 2017a: 115.

<sup>848</sup> Keesing, 1964: 19964; Parsons, 2007: 67; Cullen, 2017a: 125; Cullen, 2018: 46.

<sup>849</sup> Walton, 2013: 271.

<sup>850</sup> Walton, 2013: 272.

<sup>851</sup> Jacob, 1971: 178; Naim, 2005: 79; Bishku, 2017: 81-82.

alliances: jeopardizing investor confidence, hindering economic growth, and risking military support.

The pertinent counterfactual question arises: if Kenya was not self-sufficient and relied on transnational alliances—like Uganda—why couldn't Kenyatta have identified new allies and alternative resources like Amin? Some options were not open to Kenyatta. Amin was Muslim, which opened the door to Islamic sources of funding with pan-Islamic, and anti-Zionist, objectives that were not available to Kenyatta. Kenya was also closely aligned with Israel, receiving military and financial support as well as collaborating with Mossad. Israel's strongest African partner was Ethiopia, with whom Kenya had signed a mutual defense pact in 1963—both countries were battling Somali insurgencies.<sup>852</sup> The Shifta War against Somali nationals fighting to secede and become part of “Greater Somalia” in Kenya's Northern Frontier District was one of Kenya's most significant domestic-cum-foreign policy issues in the mid-1960s.<sup>853</sup> The agreement with Ethiopia was a crucial insurance policy. Abandoning Israel would likely have meant harming relations with Ethiopia.<sup>854</sup> Kenya's direct ties with Israel for economic and military support, as well as its indirect ties through Ethiopia, meant alternative funding from Arab states was not a viable option.

Another possible alternative, given the Cold War environment, would have been the Soviets or the Chinese, and, as noted, Kenya had relations with, and received financial support from, both countries. However, in 1965 rumors spread about a planned coup against the

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<sup>852</sup> Keesing, 1963: 19809; Howell, 1968: 40; Bishku, 2017: 82.

<sup>853</sup> The British also signed a military agreement with Kenya in 1966-1967 regarding support for the Shifta War (Cullen, 2017a: 156).

<sup>854</sup> Howell, 1968: 37-38; Cullen, 2017a: 118.

Kenyatta regime headed by Odinga with Soviet support.<sup>855</sup> Although many scholars retrospectively agree these rumors were unfounded, both Kenyatta and the British took them seriously, and on Kenyatta's request, Britain made plans to intervene if necessary.<sup>856</sup> The Soviets also provided significant financial support to Somalia—an estimated \$30 million in 1963—against whom Kenya was fighting in its border region.<sup>857</sup> Kenyatta's capitalist leanings and Soviet support for the Kenyan opposition—internally and externally—ruled out an alternative alliance with the Soviets.

Relations with communist countries continued to deteriorate in 1967 when the Chinese Chargé d'Affairs was ordered to leave Kenya after the Chinese Embassy made statements attacking Mboya, one of Kenyatta's closest advisors.<sup>858</sup> Although outwardly committed to a policy of non-alignment, the Kenyatta regime had clearly chosen sides—its relationships with the West, especially Britain, were prioritized.<sup>859</sup> Given this context, there were no viable alternative transnational allies to turn to, leaving Kenyatta highly dependent on British, Israeli, and American financial and military support to develop the economy and protect his rule. Since Asian removal would have jeopardized these transnational alliances, and no alternatives could be identified, mass expulsion of the Asian minority was further constrained in Kenya.

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<sup>855</sup> Cullen, 2017b: 791.

<sup>856</sup> Cullen, 2017b: 792.

<sup>857</sup> Cullen, 2018: 42.

<sup>858</sup> Keesing, 1967: 22280; Cullen, 2018: 47.

<sup>859</sup> Cullen, 2018: 46.

### *Homeland State*

What distinguishes the homeland state factor from the transnational alliance factor in this case is the U.K.'s response to the "Asian exodus." Given that Kenya is a negative case, there was no expulsion decree for the homeland states to respond. But the U.K. government's response to the 1967-1969 "Asian exodus" is a useful parallel to examine.<sup>860</sup> Kenya's Asian community was slightly larger than Uganda's—176,000 compared to 80,000—but it was composed of a similar proportion of non-citizens and citizens: approximately 108,000 British/Indian citizens<sup>861</sup> and 68,000 Asians with Kenyan nationality. Therefore the U.K. and India were the pertinent homeland states in this case, with the majority of the potential target group U.K. citizens.

To try to halt the "exodus" of Asians from Kenya the U.K. Cabinet sent its Special Representative in East Africa, Malcolm Macdonald, to meet with Kenyatta. In their Nairobi meeting in February 1968, Macdonald tried to persuade Kenyatta to put a stop to the rapid emigration of Asians from Kenya.<sup>862</sup> Kenyatta refused. On March 1, 1968, the U.K. parliament passed the Commonwealth Immigrants Act imposing an immigration quota for British citizens without at least one parent or grandparent born, or naturalized, in the UK.<sup>863</sup> This law directly targeted former colonial subjects and restricted Asian immigration to the UK to 1,500 heads of households, and their dependents, per year—approximately 6,000-7,000 persons, half the

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<sup>860</sup> Africanization legislation, although resulting in Asian emigration, is not the same as mass expulsion. These bills were based on occupational and citizenship, not ethnic, criteria, and the new restrictions were implemented on an individual, not group, basis. However, given the negative case, it is the closest comparison.

<sup>861</sup> A precise breakdown of the number of British versus Indian citizens in Kenya's non-citizen population is not available, however the number of Asians with British citizenship was understood to be significantly larger just as in Uganda.

<sup>862</sup> Hansen, 1999: 820.

<sup>863</sup> Mattausch, 1998: 132.

amount that had arrived the year before.<sup>864</sup> Through this legislation the U.K. effectively barred additional Asians in Kenya from moving home to Britain. If the Kenyan government had wanted to reduce its Asian population, Britain was shutting its door, or leaving it slightly cracked with the new quota. Unlike in Uganda, where the U.K. acquiesced and resettled its expelled citizens, in the Kenya case the U.K. resisted and denied entry to its Asian citizens seeking admission.<sup>865</sup> Sensing that it would become a dumping ground for denied U.K. immigrants and dismayed at Britain's abdication of its responsibility toward its citizens, India announced that it would not resettle Asians with British passports.<sup>866</sup>

Back in Kenya, President Kenyatta did not bend to the U.K.'s requests to rescind the Africanization legislation, nor did he openly encourage Asians to remain. However, he did not object to the new British legislation and indicated to various British representatives that their immigration policy would not damage Kenya-British relations.<sup>867</sup> Kenyatta announced that the private sector Africanization legislation would be gradually phased in over a two-year period and that the government would not "endanger the buoyant state of the economy by forcing the pace of localization," in line with the country's development strategy.<sup>868</sup> Vice President Moi further clarified that this gradual implementation would only affect certain positions where unemployed Kenyan citizens had the skills to replace non-citizens—a low percentage given high rates of illiteracy and low levels of education among Africans. Moreover, the new

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<sup>864</sup> Hansen, 1999: 821.

<sup>865</sup> Again, since this is a negative case where expulsion did not happen, the "Asian exodus" episode is being used as a parallel.

<sup>866</sup> Mattausch, 1998: 133; Lall, 2001: 100. Although, by the summer of 1968, the U.K. and India agreed that some of Kenya's Asian U.K. passport holders could enter India temporarily if the British High Commission ensured that the persons would be admitted to the U.K. (Lall, 2001: 100; Gupta, 1974: 319).

<sup>867</sup> Cullen, 2017a: 164-65.

<sup>868</sup> Aiyar, 2015: 289-90.

trade licensing legislation would first restrict the types of goods sold rather than immediately withdraw all licenses.<sup>869</sup> Therefore, both the strong ties between Kenya and the U.K., and the U.K.'s fierce resistance to Kenya's 1967 Africanization legislation, constrained expulsion when it was most likely in Kenya.

### *International Community*

The Kenyatta government had strong ties with both the UN and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) which acted as an important constraint on the decision to expel. Kenya was keen to be recognized by the international community and to play a part on the global stage.<sup>870</sup> Supporting the UN and its founding principles was a key component of Kenyan foreign policy and Kenya had achieved "a steady growth in prestige abroad."<sup>871</sup> At the regional level, Kenyatta was a prominent figure in the OAU, as a well-respected nationalist leader across the continent. He was selected as chairman of the Congo Conciliation Commission in 1964, although it failed, and was the diplomatic leader of the African Commonwealth.<sup>872</sup> The Kenyan government's stability, amid much turmoil and leadership changes across the continent, was another reason Kenya played a prominent regional role in the OAU.<sup>873</sup> Given Kenya's desire to be recognized on the international stage and its championing of the human rights of "small states," its strong ties with the international community constrained the implementation of a policy that could damage its reputation or contradict its stated goals.

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<sup>869</sup> Aiyar, 2015: 290.

<sup>870</sup> Howell, 1968: 34-35; Mazrui, 1964: 517.

<sup>871</sup> Howell, 1968: 32, 34.

<sup>872</sup> Howell, 1968: 46-47.

<sup>873</sup> Howell, 1968: 46, 48.

Given that this is a negative case, it is not possible to determine exactly how the international community would have reacted to a Kenyan expulsion of its Asians, however it can be argued that it likely would have ignored the policy. In the 1960s expulsion was rampant across Africa<sup>874</sup> with seven different expulsion events during 1962-1969, with little outcry at the United Nations. However, actors within the international community were closely monitoring events in Kenya. The UNHCR High Commissioner travelled to Kenya in January 1969 and reported concerns about its Asian minorities. Internal UNHCR communication highlights that the agency did not view the current situation in Kenya as “within the realm of our offices” but,

“...the problem may be of concern to this Office at some stage, whether on the basis of ‘good offices’ or otherwise. He [the High Commissioner] also believes that it belongs to the duties of the High Commissioner to try and prevent the emergence of a refugee or statelessness problem, if at all possible.”<sup>875</sup>

A year later, in 1970, the UNHCR was still focused on this issue and the High Commissioner asked his legal division to prepare a study on the status of East African Asians in regard to potential refugees and stateless persons.<sup>876</sup> The report criticized the U.K. policy of different citizenship rights for different categories of citizens, but concluded, “It remains to be seen, of course, exactly what we can actually do in terms of permanent solutions for these people.”<sup>877</sup>

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<sup>874</sup> Gabon, 1962; Republic of Congo, 1962; Niger, 1963; Democratic Republic of Congo, 1964; Côte d’Ivoire, 1964; Sierra Leone, 1968; Ghana, 1969. See GSME Dataset for more details (Garrity, forthcoming).

<sup>875</sup> Letter from UNHCR Director, Africa and Asia Division, Gilbert Jaeger to J.D.R. Kelly UNHCR Representative for the United Kingdom, 10.01.1969; 11/1-1/0/KEN/ASI, Refugees situation - Refugees from Asia in Kenya; Series 1, Box 26; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>876</sup> Letter from Mr. J. Colmar to the High Commissioner, 08.04.1970; 11/1-1/0/KEN/ASI, Refugees situation - Refugees from Asia in Kenya; Series 1, Box 26; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>877</sup> Letter from the High Commissioner to J. Colmar, 09.04.1970; 11/1-1/0/KEN/ASI, Refugees situation - Refugees from Asia in Kenya; Series 1, Box 26; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Because Kenya pursued legal, legislative approaches that exclusively targeted non-citizens, there was nothing for the UN or the OAU to resist, although they did openly criticize U.K. immigration policies. While it cannot be conclusively determined how the international community would have responded, given the apathy toward other African expulsions occurring at the same time, it may have simply ignored the expulsion. Therefore, the strong ties Kenya had with the international community was the more relevant constraint associated with this factor.

### *Summary*

This chapter has explained why and how the Ugandan government expelled its Asian population in 1972, and why the Government of Kenya, with similar motivations, and a similar colonial history and contextual environment, did not. The Ugandan government expelled its Asian population because it saw them as an economic threat during the early phase of nation-building. In the terms of my taxonomy, it executed an anti-colonial mass expulsion. But motivation alone is not enough to bring about expulsion. The decision making framework developed here highlights how Uganda expelled, detailing the key enabling conditions that facilitated expulsion: alliances, the target group homeland state, and the international community.

Stopping here would effectively have been selecting on the dependent variable, explaining mass expulsion by only looking at a mass expulsion case. That is why this chapter has also considered the negative case of Kenya, a country comparable to Uganda, with similar anti-Asian sentiments and strong post-colonial desire for native economic control. Kenya's decision not to expel its Asian population allows for a robust application of the framework.



The Government of Kenya also wanted to Africanize its economy and replace the colonial Asian commercial hierarchy with Africans. But Kenya successfully reduced its non-citizen Asian population through legal, legislative maneuvers. Kenyatta's administration was constrained from executing a mass expulsion policy because of its alliances, the homeland state, and the international community.

## CHAPTER 5. “Ghana must go,” “makwerekwere<sup>878</sup> go home”: African migrants in Nigeria and South Africa

On January 17, 1983, Nigerian Minister of Internal Affairs Alhaji Ali Baba stepped up to the podium at a press briefing and announced the expulsion of two million “illegal migrants.” He accused them of roaming the streets without employment, taking jobs in violation of immigration policies, contributing to religious violence, and destroying property and lives. They had two weeks to leave. The bombshell announcement took West African migrants, neighboring countries, the international community, and Nigerian officials by surprise. No one saw it coming. Even Idi Amin had given the expelled Uganda Asians 90 days to depart. The expulsion order set off a mass scramble of Ghanaian, Nigerian, Cameroonian, Chadian, Beninese, and Togolese migrants to pack and exit in a fortnight. Roads, ports, and flights were jammed with West Africans trying to get home, and sturdy plastic bags piled high on trucks, acquired the unfortunate moniker “Ghana must go” bags.<sup>879</sup> The uncoordinated, unexpected nature of the announcement left the affected countries unprepared to resettle hundreds of thousands of their citizens. The Western press severely condemned Nigerian President Shagari’s decision describing it as “The Cruel Exodus.”<sup>880</sup> But neighboring countries and regional organizations were muted in their response, and Western governments remained indifferent. Official figures ranged from 1-2 million persons affected, making Nigeria’s 1983

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<sup>878</sup> Makwerekwere is an onomatopoeia—it is used as an interlinguistic slang word for foreigner, more specifically black, African foreigners in South Africa. It is derived from an imitation of the “unintelligible sound” that foreigners allegedly make who cannot speak the local language (Matsinhe, 2011: 296, 302; Hickel, 2014: 103).

<sup>879</sup> Lawal, 2019.

<sup>880</sup> LeMoyne et al., 1983: 32.

expulsion the largest twentieth century expulsion on the African continent and one of the largest twentieth century mass expulsions in the world.

### **5.1 Contextual Environment & Predisposing Conditions**

#### *West African migration*

West Africa has a long history of economic migration. While much is made of the colonial influence on labor and trading patterns, pre-colonial migration had been present before being disturbed by European colonizers. Pre-colonial West African migration was relatively small, with merchants and their families transporting goods and news throughout the region.<sup>881</sup>

Foreigners were subject to the local hierarchies and stayed at the pleasure of local chiefs or headmen. European colonizers disrupted historic trade routes and transformed the relationship between foreigners—locally known as “strangers”—and natives. Local structures were ignored as migrants operated under European rules and authority.<sup>882</sup>

Within the British and French Empires labor migration increased significantly with Africans gravitating toward new urban, commercial, plantation, and mining centers in search of work.<sup>883</sup> Improved transportation, communication networks, and common currency systems eased barriers to travel and allowed migrants to remain connected with their home communities while away.<sup>884</sup> Europeans often preferred the “enterprising African foreigner,” viewed as more industrious and ambitious, over native inhabitants.<sup>885</sup> Migrants worked as cash-

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<sup>881</sup> Skinner, 1963: 308.

<sup>882</sup> Skinner, 1963: 308-09; Wallerstein, 1965: 149; Peil, 1971: 207.

<sup>883</sup> Skinner, 1963: 309.

<sup>884</sup> Wallerstein, 1965: 150; Mabogunje, 1972: 117-18, 131.

<sup>885</sup> Skinner, 1963: 310.

crop laborers on plantations, as bureaucrats in the colonial civil service, and as self-employed traders—all in both temporary and permanent migration patterns.<sup>886</sup>

The situation changed after West African countries obtained their independence. While migration continued, constraints were introduced through the enforcement of new national borders and new citizenship laws.<sup>887</sup> When economic independence did not directly follow political independence, expulsions of “non-native” populations proliferated.<sup>888</sup> Nigeria, however, was not one of these places. The country had long been an attractive, and relatively hospitable, destination for migrants from the pre-colonial through the post-colonial periods. Push and pull factors brought West African migrants to Nigeria. The largest pull factor was the 1970s oil boom, which created immense economic opportunities in the formal and informal sectors. Migrants flocked in droves, particularly Ghanaians. Nigeria’s oil boom, and subsequent decline in agricultural production, also led to increased internal migration with many Nigerians moving from rural to urban areas seeking employment.<sup>889</sup> Migrants were also pushed by myriad factors ranging from natural disaster (drought in the Sahel), conflict (in Chad), and deteriorating economic and political security (in Ghana).<sup>890</sup> Nigeria’s economic prosperity, and its long and porous borders,<sup>891</sup> made entry attractive and feasible.

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<sup>886</sup> Wallerstein, 1965: 152-53; Peil, 1971: 210-11.

<sup>887</sup> Wallerstein, 1965: 158; Peil, 1971: 213; Mabogunje, 1972: 121.

<sup>888</sup> Examples of African expulsions in the post-independence period include: Côte d’Ivoire (1958, 1964); Gabon (1962); Republic of Congo (1962); Sierra Leone (1968); Ghana (1969); Zambia (1971); and Uganda (1970, 1972), among others (Garrity, forthcoming).

<sup>889</sup> Falola & Ihonvbere, 1985: 148.

<sup>890</sup> Adepoju, 1984: 429; Henckaerts, 1995: 66.

<sup>891</sup> Nigeria borders four states: Benin, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, with the Gulf of Guinea to the south. The Benin-Nigeria border is 500 miles; Niger-Nigeria 1,000 miles; Chad-Nigeria 50 miles; and Cameroon-Nigeria 1,200 miles.



Map 2: Political boundaries of Nigeria<sup>892</sup>

West African migrants took up a variety of positions in Nigeria. Skilled foreigners worked as teachers, doctors, engineers, technicians, and bureaucrats, many employed by the federal government to work in remote “hardship posts” where natives refused to go.<sup>893</sup> The majority of migrants worked in the informal sector, estimated at three to four times the size of the formal sector, in menial jobs shunned by Nigerian citizens who favored government or white-collar jobs.<sup>894</sup> These unskilled or semi-skilled positions—domestic workers, drivers, watchmen, manual laborers (in factories, farms, construction, docks), traders, hawkers—came with low wages and unpleasant working conditions.<sup>895</sup> Nigerian employers, including the Nigerian state, often preferred foreigners to natives because they could pay them less than the ₦125 minimum wage.<sup>896</sup> Foreign migrants played complementary, non-competing roles in the Nigerian economy, filling unglamorous but essential functions.

<sup>892</sup> Map sourced from Google Maps.

<sup>893</sup> Fashoyin, 1988: 61; Van Hear, 1988: 76; “Booted out,” 1983: 22.

<sup>894</sup> Adespoju, 1984: 431; Fashoyin, 1988: 55, 61.

<sup>895</sup> Adespoju, 1984: 431; Fashoyin, 1988: 59, 62.

<sup>896</sup> Gravil, 1985: 528; Fashoyin, 1988: 654.

### *Nigeria's Oil boom*

Before the 1960s oil was a cheap, abundant energy source for the industrialized world. However, the West's growing energy demands soon exceeded supply and by the late 1960s, early 1970s global oil reserves contracted for the first time in history.<sup>897</sup> International oil companies could not discover new fields fast enough and oil became "black gold" for producing countries.<sup>898</sup> Nigeria was one of those countries. In 1970 it produced 396 million barrels of oil per day (bpd) with annual petroleum revenues of ₦166 million. Just two years later that total rose to 643 million bpd with revenues of ₦767 million—a mammoth 462 percent increase.<sup>899</sup> Nigeria quickly became the richest country on the African continent.<sup>900</sup>

Joining the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1971, Nigeria's oil fortunes were linked to world events, including the Yom Kippur War in October 1973 between Israel and a coalition of Arab states.<sup>901</sup> In response to the West's support for Israel during the war, OPEC countries embargoed western oil sales.<sup>902</sup> Oil prices skyrocketed. In October 1973 a barrel of oil cost \$3.80, three months later: \$14.70.<sup>903</sup> As a result, the "Seven Sisters"<sup>904</sup> lost control over oil price setting and the producing countries realized their power on the global stage. Nigeria's oil production rose further to 823 million bpd by 1974 with revenues of nearly ₦4 billion.<sup>905</sup>

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<sup>897</sup> Onoh, 1983: 126.

<sup>898</sup> Onoh, 1983: 126.

<sup>899</sup> Khan, 1994: 50; Falola & Heaton, 2008: 182.

<sup>900</sup> Falola & Heaton, 2008: 181.

<sup>901</sup> Falola & Heaton, 2008: 182.

<sup>902</sup> Onoh, 1983: 126.

<sup>903</sup> Falola & Heaton, 2008: 182.

<sup>904</sup> The "Seven Sisters" oil companies included: British Petroleum, Exxon Corporation, Gulf Corporation, Mobil Oil Corporation, Royal Dutch Shell Group, Standard Oil Company of California, and Texaco Incorporated (Onoh, 1983: 88).

<sup>905</sup> Khan, 1994: 50; Falola & Heaton, 2008: 182.

Before the discovery of oil, Nigeria had a cash-crop economy, producing groundnuts, palm oil, cocoa, cotton, sugar, and timber.<sup>906</sup> Through the mid-1960s, most of Nigeria's exports were agricultural products (See Table 15) and over 70 percent of the labor force worked in agriculture.<sup>907</sup> That quickly shifted in the 1970s, and Nigeria became a single-commodity export economy.

<b>Table 15: Share of Nigeria's agriculture and petroleum exports, 1960-1980<sup>908</sup></b>					
<i>Export</i>	<i>1960</i>	<i>1965</i>	<i>1970</i>	<i>1975</i>	<i>1980</i>
Agriculture	75.8	54.9	28.6	4.4	2.4
Petroleum	2.7	25.9	57.6	92.7	96.1

Nigeria dramatically expanded imports using its oil wealth to purchase finished goods, luxury items, weapons, labor, and food.<sup>909</sup> Until the mid-1970s the country was relatively self-sufficient in food production, but the oil boom accelerated the shifting economy and Nigeria soon imported much of its food from the West, including many of the staples it used to produce.<sup>910</sup> To capture the size of the import shift, in 1971 Nigeria imported ₦88 million worth of agriculture products, a decade later in 1982 the country spent ₦2 billion on food imports.<sup>911</sup> The oil rents captured from the West went straight back to western governments via imports, further depleting the country's foreign exchange. Despite government rhetoric about economic diversification, with oil prices high the Nigerian government allowed the economy to be dominated by oil to the detriment of all other sectors.<sup>912</sup>

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<sup>906</sup> Onoh, 1983: Preface.

<sup>907</sup> Zartman & Schatz, 1983: 16; Falola & Ihonvbere, 1985: 126.

<sup>908</sup> Adapted from the text in Falola & Ihonvbere, 1985: 126.

<sup>909</sup> Falola & Ihonvbere, 1985: 96.

<sup>910</sup> Falola & Ihonvbere, 1985: 88.

<sup>911</sup> Falola & Ihonvbere, 1985: 89.

<sup>912</sup> Onoh, 1983; Falola & Ihonvbere, 1985: 94.

Using its oil profits, in the 1970s the Nigerian government launched massive federal development projects, promising to build, or rebuild, roads, schools, irrigation systems, and hospitals.<sup>913</sup> The expansion of the construction sector, along with commercial services, attracted large-scale labor migration from neighboring states.<sup>914</sup> Nigeria's Head of State at the time, General Yakubu Gowon, expanded the size of the public sector, raised wages for government employees, and massively increased defense spending.<sup>915</sup> Public sector employment grew from 500,000 to 1.5 million during 1973-1981, with generous benefits to senior officials.<sup>916</sup> People throughout the region flocked to the "land of milk and honey."<sup>917</sup>

#### *Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)*

On May 28, 1975, Nigeria and 15 other West African states signed the Treaty of Lagos establishing the Economic Community of West African States or ECOWAS. The organization was the culmination of Nigeria's commitment to regional economic integration dating back to the early 1960s.<sup>918</sup> Given the significant rift and competition in West Africa between Francophone and Anglophone states, ECOWAS had not been inevitable.<sup>919</sup> The Francophone *Conseil de l'Entente* and *Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest* (CEAO) were competing economic institutions that impeded the creation of a single regional organization. Not only were colonial ties and linguistic differences a barrier to cooperation, Francophone countries, particularly Côte d'Ivoire—the strongest of the Francophone states—did not want to join a

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<sup>913</sup> Van Hear, 1988: 145; Falola & Heaton, 2008: 183.

<sup>914</sup> Forrest, 1993: 137.

<sup>915</sup> Falola & Heaton, 2008: 183.

<sup>916</sup> Fashoyin, 1988: 54; Forrest, 1993: 147.

<sup>917</sup> Brown, 1989: 263; Henckaerts, 1995: 66.

<sup>918</sup> Ojo, 1980: 572.

<sup>919</sup> Ojo, 1980: 572.



project dominated by Nigeria.<sup>920</sup> During the Nigerian civil war<sup>921</sup> Côte d'Ivoire recognized Biafra and pressured French President de Gaulle to do the same, demonstrating its strong anti-Nigerian bias.<sup>922</sup>

After the Nigerian civil war, which disrupted economic trade and integration, President Gowon embarked on an aggressive effort to revive a regional economic arrangement both to gain regional hegemony and to remove western, particularly French, political and economic influence.<sup>923</sup> Thanks to the 1970 oil boom, Nigeria was able to persuade others to its side. Gowon's deft political negotiations and "spraying diplomacy"<sup>924</sup> led to the signing of the Treaty of Lagos. The aim of the "Community" was to promote economic, social, and cultural cooperation and development.<sup>925</sup> ECOWAS negotiated a key Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment at the Dakar Summit in May 1979.<sup>926</sup> The protocol outlined a three-phase process with the goal of creating "community citizens" who could travel, reside, and eventually work in any member state.<sup>927</sup> The first phase abolished visas and granted the right of entry for up to 90-days for any Community citizen into an ECOWAS member state, with valid travel papers. After three months, Community citizens needed to regularize their stay with the relevant authorities.<sup>928</sup> Nigeria's ratification of the protocol in

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<sup>920</sup> Ojo, 1980: 576.

<sup>921</sup> The Nigerian civil war, also known as the Biafran War, was a two-and-a-half-year conflict that resulted in the death of an estimated 2 million people, many of starvation from the Federal Military Government's economic blockade, and another three million displaced (Falola & Heaton, 1008: 158, 180).

<sup>922</sup> Ojo, 1980: 580; Brown, 1989: 258-59.

<sup>923</sup> Ojo, 1980: 584.

<sup>924</sup> International relations scholar Olatunde Ojo described Gowon's introduction of "a Nigerian phenomenon called 'spraying' into diplomacy" in which he "literally wrote checks on the spot for every cause" (Ojo, 1980: 593).

<sup>925</sup> Treaty of Lagos, 1975.

<sup>926</sup> Okolo, 1984: 429.

<sup>927</sup> Afolayan, 1988: 4.

<sup>928</sup> ECOWAS Protocol, 1979.

1980 resulted in a surge of regional immigration.<sup>929</sup> ECOWAS was soon described by some outside observers as “Greater Nigeria.”<sup>930</sup>

#### *Nigeria's Second Republic (1979-1983)*

After rotating through five leaders and four military coups, democracy was restored in Nigeria in 1979, inaugurating the Second Republic with the election of President Shagari of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN).<sup>931</sup> Although the 1979 presidential election results were contested by the opposition, Nigeria was considered the fourth largest democracy in the world and the largest African democracy.<sup>932</sup> The new constitution of the Second Republic was influenced by the United States' model and established a three-branch federal structure with a President and Vice President in the executive, a National Assembly with a House of Representatives and a Senate, and a judiciary.<sup>933</sup> Below the federal level, power was shared with 19 states run by Governors and Deputy Governors.<sup>934</sup> The new constitution intentionally strengthened the power of the states loosening the reins of the center by raising the share of state and local revenue allocation from a combined 24 percent to 40.5 percent.<sup>935</sup> Nevertheless, the focus of political competition was less over ideas and more over the capture of the purse, or as it was known in Nigeria “the national cake.”<sup>936</sup>

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<sup>929</sup> Afolayan, 1988: 8.

<sup>930</sup> Asante, 1983.

<sup>931</sup> Falola & Heaton, 2008: 201.

<sup>932</sup> Akinola, 1983; African Recorder, 1983: 6135; Africa Contemporary Record, 1982-1983: B534.

<sup>933</sup> Falola & Heaton, 2008: 198.

<sup>934</sup> Falola & Heaton, 2008: 199.

<sup>935</sup> Forrest, 1993: 81-83.

<sup>936</sup> Falola & Ihonvbere, 1985: 97.

Despite the return to democracy, the Second Republic was marred by corruption and patronage. The NPN inherited an economy coming out of minor recession during 1978-1979, but it enjoyed an 18-month honeymoon before a major recession hit in mid-1981.<sup>937</sup> NPN government officials used their positions to purchase luxury goods including cars, homes, and private jets—extravagant, ostentatious living was the norm.<sup>938</sup> One of the first pieces of legislation the new National Assembly passed was a salary and fringe benefit increase for all legislators.<sup>939</sup>

Using the state oil profits, the Shagari administration rolled out a \$175 billion Fourth National Development Plan (1981-1985) focused on agricultural production, education, housing, industries, and economic infrastructure.<sup>940</sup> The plan was based on projections of an oil production output of 2.19 million bpd at a price of \$55/barrel, assuming continued rising prices because the 1982 price of oil was \$41/barrel.<sup>941</sup> The massive investments in the development plan enriched international contractors and Nigerian middlemen, but benefits did not trickle down to the urban and rural poor.<sup>942</sup> Although Nigeria had more money than ever before, a culture of what was called “squandermania” developed and the wealth remained concentrated in the hands of the elite.<sup>943</sup>

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<sup>937</sup> Falola & Ihonvbere, 1985: 174; Forrest, 1993: 135, 165.

<sup>938</sup> Onoh, 1983: 12; Falola & Ihonvbere, 1985: 179; Amuwo, 1988: 279.

<sup>939</sup> Forrest, 1993: 167.

<sup>940</sup> Falola & Ihonvbere, 1985: 100.

<sup>941</sup> Falola & Ihonvbere, 1985: 97, 100.

<sup>942</sup> Amuwo, 1988: 271.

<sup>943</sup> Amuwo, 1988: 276.

### *The Oil Glut*

The global oil glut was driven by myriad factors including a widespread recession among industrialized countries, increased efficiencies in oil usage, and the discovery and production of new, non-OPEC, oil sources in the North Sea, Alaska, and Mexico.<sup>944</sup> The global oversupply of oil meant Nigeria had to cut production, reducing government revenues which were 95 percent dependent on oil.<sup>945</sup> In 1981 Nigeria's production dramatically fell (See Figure 14).




Figure 14: Nigeria's Oil Production (bpd), 1981-1982 (in millions)<sup>946</sup>

The corresponding blow to oil revenues was the loss of ₦4.5 billion in two years from 1980 to 1982.<sup>947</sup> GDP annual growth dropped 17.3 percentage points (1980-1981) and inflation rose between 30-50 percent.<sup>948</sup> Balance of payment deficits and the rapid depletion of foreign reserves led to government cash shortages. In mid-1981 the government even skipped several months of payments to federal and state workers, and many laborers and unskilled workers

<sup>944</sup> Shepard, 1991: 130-31; Forrest, 1993: 145.

<sup>945</sup> Falola & Ihonvbere, 1985: 125.

<sup>946</sup> Falola & Ihonvbere, 1985: 115.

<sup>947</sup> Khan, 1994: 50; Falola & Heaton, 2008: 203-04.

<sup>948</sup> Forrest, 1993: 135, 169; Falola & Heaton, 2008: 204.

were fired.<sup>949</sup> With a depleted treasury and rising debts, Shagari's government responded with massive borrowing, seeking loans of billions of naira from European, American, and Middle Eastern Banks, as well as funds from the World Bank.<sup>950</sup>

By early 1982 the oil glut reached its peak. To stop the bleeding, the Shagari administration sought National Assembly approval to institute the Economic Stabilization Act—the stiffest austerity measures the country had ever seen.<sup>951</sup> The Act aimed to drastically reduce imports, encourage domestic production, improve balance of payments deficits, and stop smuggling.<sup>952</sup> The government hoped the difficult economic cuts in 1982 would lead to a “clean balance sheet” the following year heading into the 1983 national elections.<sup>953</sup> However, while implementing austerity measures, the government failed to sufficiently cut its own spending, accumulating massive internal and external debts.<sup>954</sup>

The 1982 cuts in oil production led to mass layoffs across all major firms, particularly in the manufacturing and construction sectors.<sup>955</sup> Between 1980 and 1984 the construction workforce contracted from 300,233 to 112,579 employees.<sup>956</sup> The government struggled to pay for food imports, given the rising prices of finished goods from industrialized countries and its limited foreign exchange, leading to widespread food shortages.<sup>957</sup> Unemployment and

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<sup>949</sup> Falola & Heaton, 2008: 204.

<sup>950</sup> Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1983: 32611; Falola & Ihonvbere, 1985: 113.

<sup>951</sup> Onoh, 1983: 98; Falola & Ihonvbere, 1985: 106.

<sup>952</sup> Onoh, 1983: 98, 104.

<sup>953</sup> Onoh, 1983: 105.

<sup>954</sup> Forrest, 1993: 83, 177.

<sup>955</sup> Aluko, 1985: 552; Falola & Ihonvbere, 1985: 175.

<sup>956</sup> Forrest, 1993: 176.

<sup>957</sup> Akulo, 1985: 546; Falola & Ihonvbere, 1985: 116.

sky-high prices for basic goods led to increased poverty and crime in urban areas.<sup>958</sup> Anti-foreigner sentiment grew among the hungry, out-of-work Nigerian population.<sup>959</sup>

By January 1983 the situation in Nigeria was unstable—a tinder box waiting for the match. Austerity measures crippled the economy and political anxieties climbed with the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections. The “match” came on the night of January 3, 1983, when armed robbers, including some foreigners, attempted to break into the Vice President’s residence.<sup>960</sup> Less than two weeks later, the Ministry of Internal Affairs prepared a memo regarding illegal aliens, writing: “enough is enough.”<sup>961</sup> Expulsion was on the agenda.

## **5.2 Mass expulsion of “illegal” migrants, 1983**

In the Nigerian government’s expulsion announcement, it accused migrants of desultory and unlawful behavior, and of violating ECOWAS protocols overstaying the 90-day-visit allowance. Ali Baba explained that the government had to act: “[it] cannot, and will not, fold its hands and allow such unwholesome developments to continually plague the nation.”<sup>962</sup> To ensure compliance with the expulsion order, government agents were to inspect businesses and households to identify and “repatriate” any defaulting aliens placing them on “stop lists” to “ensure that they do not return to Nigeria.”<sup>963</sup> The announcement came as a shock.<sup>964</sup> President Shagari had recently stated at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs’ Patron’s Dinner that Nigerians must accept the “minor discomforts” of the alien presence in the

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<sup>958</sup> Falola & Heaton, 2008: 204.

<sup>959</sup> Adepoju, 1984: 432.

<sup>960</sup> Okoli, 1983: 190; Aluko, 1985: 551, 556.

<sup>961</sup> Aluko, 1985: 551.

<sup>962</sup> Nigerian External Publicity Division, 1983: 1.

<sup>963</sup> Nigerian External Publicity Division, 1983: 3.

<sup>964</sup> African Recorder, 1983: 6132; Aluko, 1985: 551; Brydon, 1985: 572.

country given the great benefits of the ECOWAS protocol of free movement.<sup>965</sup> The lack of advanced notice and short timeline to depart created panic.

Migrants fled in droves, scrambling to depart by land, sea, or air. At the Nigeria-Benin border the gridlock of trucks, minibuses, and cars backed-up over two miles.<sup>966</sup> Hundreds of thousands massed at the port in Lagos waiting for ships to take them on the 17-hour sea voyage to Accra: “the dockside was a deafening babble of noise as people crowded around a fleet of articulated trucks to bargain fares home for themselves and their luggage, which lay around them in large piles.”<sup>967</sup> At the airport, the wealthiest migrants waited to board \$150 USD flights, a cost out of reach for most expellees, with approximately 1,000 people departing per day on special chartered flights.<sup>968</sup> A Nigerian journalist described the scenes: “the borders were a disaster, crammed with desperate people carrying chairs on their heads, dragging their checked bags and selling off whatever they couldn’t lift to make money to pay for fares that had doubled. Millions streamed out through any possible exit they could find.”<sup>969</sup>

While the Nigerian government emphasized that there was no violence by Nigerian officials or Nigerian citizens toward the expellees, and observers noted few reports of violence, the millions who had to pack their bags and leave on a moment’s notice suffered great hardship.<sup>970</sup> Many Ghanaians, the largest national group expelled, were harassed, robbed, and assaulted on their way out Nigeria.<sup>971</sup> Some were blocked by landlords from obtaining their belongings before departure, and others were denied payment of their last wages and

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<sup>965</sup> African Recorder, 1983: 6132; Acheampong, 1983.

<sup>966</sup> Reuters, 1983; African Recorder, 1983: 6132.

<sup>967</sup> African Recorder, 1983: 6127, 6132.

<sup>968</sup> African Recorder, 1983: 6127; Verdon, 1983.

<sup>969</sup> Lawal, 2019.

<sup>970</sup> Verdon, 1983; Aluko, 1985: 543.

<sup>971</sup> Africa Contemporary Record, 1982-83: B453; Bentsi-Enchill, 1983b.

salaries.<sup>972</sup> Fearing for their safety and acts of reprisal, many documented, legal immigrants fled in addition to those without papers.<sup>973</sup> Nigerian transporters exploited migrants with price gouging for exit transportation.<sup>974</sup> As they scrambled to get on departing ships some migrants died in stampedes and others drowned in Lagos harbor.<sup>975</sup> Many suffered from hunger, dehydration, exhaustion, and exposure as they waited at border points in the sweltering heat with minimal provisions.<sup>976</sup>

The uncoordinated expulsion announcement, with no notice given to the expellee home countries, increased the suffering.<sup>977</sup> In September 1982 Ghana had closed its eastern border with Togo because of smuggling and concerns of political subversion, despite the ECOWAS protocol for the free movement of people.<sup>978</sup> To avoid becoming a dumping ground for transient expellees, Benin quickly closed its eastern border with Nigeria, and Togo its border with Benin, denying the expelled migrants a western land border to depart.<sup>979</sup> These closures caused the miles-long lines at Nigerian-Benin border posts, where anxious migrants waited to return home.

Nigerian officials learned of the expulsion announcement at the same time as ordinary Nigerians and foreign migrants.<sup>980</sup> The Cabinet was not consulted before the Minister of Internal Affairs' press briefing—they met two days later on January 19, to ratify the order.<sup>981</sup>

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<sup>972</sup> Bentsi-Enchill, 1983b; Brydon, 1985: 576.

<sup>973</sup> Brydon, 1985: 572, 576.

<sup>974</sup> "Exodus from Nigeria 2: Northern escape route," 1983.

<sup>975</sup> Clarity, 1983; Brydon, 1985: 571.

<sup>976</sup> Verdon, 1983; Bentsi-Enchill, 1983b; Bentsi-Enchill, 1983c.

<sup>977</sup> Brydon, 1985: 570.

<sup>978</sup> Grivil, 1985: 526; Brydon, 1985: 567.

<sup>979</sup> Grivil, 1985: 526.

<sup>980</sup> Aluko, 1985: 551.

<sup>981</sup> Aluko, 1985: 551-52; Grivil, 1985: 526-27.



Indicative of the lack of planning, the Nigerian public sector was severely affected by the decision, at risk of losing some of its most talented staff.<sup>982</sup> Approximately 35,000 Ghanaian teachers were employed throughout the country; Ghanaian doctors, lawyers and accountants worked in the Nigerian civil service; foreign pilots and engineers were employed by Nigeria Airways; and 7,000 Ghanaian dock workers played a critical role at the chronically over-stretched Lagos port.<sup>983</sup> In addition to these technical personnel, the Nigerian government benefited from employing illegal migrants, paying a much lower rate than Nigerian nationals.<sup>984</sup> Demonstrating Shagari's nonchalance about the expulsion order, he travelled to New Delhi, India for a state visit on January 25, a week after the expulsion decree, followed by trips to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.<sup>985</sup> Shagari doubled down on the expulsion decision, announcing from India that those living illegally in Nigeria would be "arrested, tried and sent back to their homes' if they did not leave by the deadlines set by the Government."<sup>986</sup>

Eight days after the expulsion announcement, Ali Baba called another press briefing outlining important extensions and exemptions to the original order. He acknowledged that officials from neighboring homeland countries had requested extensions to the deadline to allow for the "smooth and orderly" exit of expellees.<sup>987</sup> In response to ECOWAS members, the Nigerian government granted a four-week extension, to February 28, for all skilled workers. However, the unemployed, self-employed, and unskilled workers had to leave by the original deadline.<sup>988</sup>

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<sup>982</sup> Grivil, 1985: 527.

<sup>983</sup> Bentsi-Enchill, 1983; Grivil, 1985: 527.

<sup>984</sup> Grivil, 1985: 528.

<sup>985</sup> African Recorder, 1983: 6135-36; "Shagari's visit to India," 1983: 444.

<sup>986</sup> "Shagari's visit to India," 1983: 444; Aluko, 1985: 544.

<sup>987</sup> Nigerian External Publicity Division, 1983: 4.

<sup>988</sup> Nigerian External Publicity Division, 1983: 4-5.

After outlining the extensions, Ali Baba announced three important exemptions to the original expulsion order: 1) professionals; 2) pre-1963 immigrants from ECOWAS countries (plus Cameroon and Chad); and 3) public sector employees. Professional and technical foreign workers were allowed to remain if their stay was regularized by their employers and the employers met the state quota for local staff. Immigrants who arrived in Nigeria before 1963, the year of the Immigration Act, from ECOWAS countries as well as Cameroon and Chad, were allowed to remain in the country even if they were undocumented.<sup>989</sup> Finally, those working in the Federal or State Governments, as well as parastatal companies, were exempted from expulsion, but were advised to regularize their status “as soon as practicable.”<sup>990</sup> These extensions and exemptions announced just over a week after the original order, indicated additional reflection within the government regarding the feasibility and appropriateness of removing 1-2 million persons in two weeks, and the impact of the loss of skilled workers on government offices.

With three days remaining until the first expulsion deadline, Ghana and Togo opened their borders, and then Benin followed suit on January 29.<sup>991</sup> Hundreds of thousands of stranded expellees streamed across Benin, through Togo, and into Ghana making the 180-kilometer trek along the coast road on truck beds, in minibuses, or by foot.<sup>992</sup> Ghanaian and Togolese police estimated 300,000 Ghanaians crossed the border within 36 hours.<sup>993</sup>

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<sup>989</sup> The government rationale here was that those who arrived before 1963 were employed, assimilated, inter-married, and had developed roots in the community (Nigerian External Publicity Division, 1983: 5).

<sup>990</sup> Nigerian External Publicity Division, 1983: 5-6.

<sup>991</sup> African Recorder, 1983: 6126.

<sup>992</sup> African Recorder, 1983: 6132.

<sup>993</sup> African Recorder, 1983: 6132.

Western media outlets documented the suffering associated with the expulsion decision. *Newsweek's* foreign correspondents in Lagos reported in an article titled *Nigeria's Outcasts: The Cruel Exodus*, "...up to 2 million people had fled Nigeria in the largest forced march in Africa's recent memory...In the mass exodus, food, water and toilet facilities were luxuries. Dozens died. Those who completed the exhausting journey were happy simply to be alive."<sup>994</sup> The *London Times* reported from Lagos that, "...walls are daubed with 'Ghana go home!' slogans...some fear for their lives if they fail to get away by the deadline."<sup>995</sup> *TIME* magazine wrote an article titled *Exodus of the Unwanted*, that "...the repatriation was frequently marred by acts of abuse. Some reported that Nigerian police had taken their possessions or asked for bribes to permit them to pass."<sup>996</sup> The *Economist* concurred writing, "...the thugs of Lagos systematically robbed the departing families of their luggage."<sup>997</sup> And the French-language Pan-African magazine, *Jeune Afrique*, harshly condemned the expulsion publishing a cover story—"La Honte" (Shame)—which described the expulsion as "a barbarism hitherto unknown in Africa."<sup>998</sup> The irony was lost on the former colonial power.

Ali Baba held a third press briefing on February 14 to emphasize the "jubilations and support" of Nigerian citizens for the expulsion and the understanding of the ECOWAS Secretariat and affected countries.<sup>999</sup> He accused western media of "mount[ing] an orchestrated campaign of vilification and culumy [sic] against this country," which he categorized as "the carry-over of the colonialist 'divide and rule' mentality of the Western Press."<sup>1000</sup> He blamed

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<sup>994</sup> LeMoyne et al., 1983: 32.

<sup>995</sup> "Nigeria relaxes expulsion order against foreign workers," 1983.

<sup>996</sup> Johnson, 1983: 20.

<sup>997</sup> "Omo-Ghana, you no go-go?", 1983: 49.

<sup>998</sup> "Media Fireworks," 1983: 389.

<sup>999</sup> Nigerian External Publicity Division, 1983: 13.

<sup>1000</sup> Nigerian External Publicity Division, 1983: 13.

the initial closure of the Ghanaian border for much of the suffering covered by the media and claimed that the “lack of consultation” accusation was false. Ali Baba said: “the persistent public outcry reported in Nigerian dailies against rising unemployment amongst Nigerians and [the] increased crimed [sic] wave attributed to illegal aliens should serve as sufficient notice that [the] Government would have to take such action in the national interest.”<sup>1001</sup> In other words, the neighboring countries should have known expulsion was coming.

Government officials circled the wagons. Minister of External Affairs Ishaya Audu defended the government’s actions stating, “the aliens themselves [were] to blame for the crisis.”<sup>1002</sup> Nigeria’s Ambassador to the UN stated, “Nigeria has no apology to offer anyone.”<sup>1003</sup> In an interview with the BBC, Shagari said that it was “an act of grace” to give the migrants two weeks to get out.<sup>1004</sup> Federal Attorney General, Richard Akinjide, asserted “Nigeria owed no apology for expelling aliens who had not observed the 90-day Ecowas limit.”<sup>1005</sup> Nigeria’s Ambassador to Germany, Mohammed Rafindadi stated that “the expulsion order was carried out humanely, with no confirmed cases of molestation and departing aliens were allowed to go with their possessions.”<sup>1006</sup> He added that “Nigeria’s expulsion of illegal immigrants is not designed to induce suffering, and any hardship encountered by those expelled could not have been foreseen and was also not intended.”<sup>1007</sup> National Planning

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<sup>1001</sup> Nigerian External Publicity Division, 1983: 15.

<sup>1002</sup> Momoh, 1983, 386.

<sup>1003</sup> “Booted Out,” 1983: 22.

<sup>1004</sup> “Omo-Ghana, you no go-go?” 1983: 49.

<sup>1005</sup> Brown, 1989: 270.

<sup>1006</sup> “Migrants ‘involved in crime,’” 1983, 519.

<sup>1007</sup> “Migrants ‘involved in crime,’” 1983, 519.

Minister, Ebun Oyagbola, summed up the government's stance in his statement "despite the international outcry there could be no turning back: 'the aliens must go.'"<sup>1008</sup>

Estimates of the total number of persons expelled by the February 28 deadline are wide-ranging. In 1983 Nigeria had no reliable statistics on the size of its own population, let alone the number of foreigners.<sup>1009</sup> On February 13 Ali Baba announced that 1.2 million West Africans had been expelled—700,000 Ghanaians, 180,000 Nigeriens, 150,000 Chadians, and 120,000 Cameroonians.<sup>1010</sup> By the end of February the number was revised up to 1.3 million.<sup>1011</sup> In mid-April Ali Baba announced that 2.2 million illegal immigrants had been "repatriated" and 3,569 had regularized their status.<sup>1012</sup>

### **5.3 Expulsion Motivation: Nativism**

The Nigerian government's expulsion of African migrants is an example of an expulsion motivated by nativism per my expulsion taxonomy (See Figure 15). Nativist expulsions occur in a state's nation consolidating phase when the target group is seen by the government as an economic threat to the state.<sup>1013</sup> The label nativism denotes an expulsion that is driven by the government's desire to protect the interests of native-born<sup>1014</sup> over those of immigrant foreigners.

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<sup>1008</sup> Brown, 1989: 270.

<sup>1009</sup> Africa Contemporary Record, 1982-1983: B542.

<sup>1010</sup> The number of Togolese and Beninoise expelled is estimated at 5,000 each (Adepoju, 1984: 432).

<sup>1011</sup> Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1984: 32610.

<sup>1012</sup> Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1984: 32610; "2.2m. aliens deported," 1983.

<sup>1013</sup> See Chapter 2, pp. 58-59.

<sup>1014</sup> Native-born or established inhabitants of the country, as in the case of the exception of the 1963 migrants.

Figure 15: Taxonomy of mass expulsion – Nigeria, 1983		
Phase of Nation-building	Target Group Threat	
	<u>Security</u>	<u>Economic</u>
	<u>Establishing</u> Fifth Column	Anti-Colonialism
	<u>Consolidating</u> Counterinsurgency/ Reprisal	Nativism

By 1983 Nigeria had been independent for over two decades and had fought a brutal civil war (1966-1970) preventing the secession of Biafra, and firmly establishing the multi-ethnic Nigerian state. However, the composition of the nation had changed because of large-scale immigration. In the run up to the 1983 elections, the Nigerian government returned to the question of “who belongs,” and who does not, as it sought to consolidate and strengthen the nation. At the same time, the gravity of the Nigerian economic crisis faced by the Shagari administration cannot be overstated. Figure 16 depicts several key economic indicators over the course of the Shagari’s four years (1980-1983) as well as one year before (1979) and one after (1984).




Figure 16: State of the Nigerian Economy, 1979-1984<sup>1015</sup>

Annual oil output declined in three consecutive years (1980, 1981, 1982) before the January 1983 expulsion. At the end of 1982, oil output was almost half of the 1979 total. Oil revenues fell in tandem, with a slight lag, plunging ₦4.53 billion (from ₦12.35 billion in 1980 to ₦7.81 billion in 1982) in the lead up to the expulsion.<sup>1016</sup> GDP annual growth declined significantly with negative growth rates between 1981 and 1984.<sup>1017</sup> Although Shagari inherited a balanced trade portfolio in 1979, and maintained that balance in his first year in office, during 1981-1982 imports exceeded exports resulting in a negative trade balance of ₦1.8 billion heading into 1983.<sup>1018</sup> The federal government ran a consistent budget deficit under Shagari, peaking in 1982 at ₦5.4 billion.<sup>1019</sup> Finally, for the average Nigerian, soaring inflation—estimated to be 30-50 percent between 1981-1983—and stagnant, or unpaid, wages reduced already limited

<sup>1015</sup> Forrest, 1993: 135; World Bank, 2020d.

<sup>1016</sup> Forrest, 1993: 135.

<sup>1017</sup> World Bank, 2020d.

<sup>1018</sup> Forrest, 1993: 146.

<sup>1019</sup> Forrest, 1993: 143.

purchasing power.<sup>1020</sup> Those with wages were the lucky ones; unemployment climbed to an estimated 20 percent with even higher underemployment.<sup>1021</sup> By the end of 1982 Nigeria's economy was in a free-fall, with another year of negative growth on the horizon.

Amid the worsening recession, Nigerian newspapers and tabloids, widely read and a strong force in shaping public opinion, increasingly blamed all of the country's ills on illegal aliens.<sup>1022</sup> Unemployment, crime, prostitution, smuggling, vagrancy, and religious strife were only some of the accusations hurled at the sizable number of foreign workers in the country. While the Nigerian government, along with business and academic elites, championed economic integration across administrations,<sup>1023</sup> the public was less supportive.<sup>1024</sup> Labor unions were particularly frustrated because ECOWAS migrants accepted lower wages and inferior working conditions.<sup>1025</sup> One branch of the National Union of Construction and Civil Engineering Workers called for a review of the Community agreement complaining that, "contractors in [Gongola] state had indulged in employing cheap labour from neighboring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger Republics while Nigerians roam about without jobs."<sup>1026</sup> Nigeria's *Daily Times* wrote in 1978, before the protocol on free movement was signed or ratified, "If the influx into Nigeria continues and it becomes clear that Nigeria is merely paying the Ecowas piper without knowing what tune to call, this is likely to further weaken the already weak

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<sup>1020</sup> Falola & Heaton, 2008: 204.

<sup>1021</sup> Aluko, 1985: 552.

<sup>1022</sup> African Recorder, 6132; Brown, 1989: 271.

<sup>1023</sup> Nigerian government support for ECOWAS extended across the Gowon, Obasanjo, and Shagari administrations (Onwuka, 1982: 196).

<sup>1024</sup> Onwuka, 1982: 196; Brown, 1989: 258.

<sup>1025</sup> Onwuka, 1982: 200.

<sup>1026</sup> Onwuka, 1982: 200.



domestic support for the Community.”<sup>1027</sup> As the Nigerian public’s frustrations grew, pressure built for government action.

The government gave myriad reasons for the “illegal alien” expulsion in its public announcements. But if one digs beneath the rhetorical surface its nativist motivations are clear. It consistently emphasized the protection of native, Nigerian economic interests, over those of immigrants. In his second of three press briefings, Ali Baba commented on the Nigerian public’s positive response to the expulsion announcement and said “...the departure of the illegal aliens would mean additional job opportunities for thousands of Nigerians...it is hoped that employers of this departing labour will quickly replace their work forces with the thousands of Nigerians now unemployed.”<sup>1028</sup> Later in the briefing he emphasized, “...erstwhile employers [should] engage the services of Nigerians so as to continue with their respective business without undue disruption.”<sup>1029</sup> Perhaps the most direct indication of the economic-cum-political motives of the government are illustrated in the closing comments of Ali Baba’s January 25 press briefing:

“Now, Ladies and gentlemen of the Press, the Federal Government relies on you and all well-meaning Nigerians to help this exercise which is *crucial to our economic and political survival* by continuous exposition of defaulting aliens and their employers. This co-operation of all and sundry, especially, states and Local Governments is needed to lead us to success. Thank you” [emphasis added].<sup>1030</sup>

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<sup>1027</sup> Brown, 1989: 257.

<sup>1028</sup> Nigerian External Publicity Division, 1983: 4.

<sup>1029</sup> Nigerian External Publicity Division, 1983: 5.

<sup>1030</sup> Nigerian External Publicity Division, 1983: 8.

Given the ineffectiveness of the Shagari administration's austerity measures, and with elections only eight months away, it is widely agreed that in January 1983 "the time was ripe to start looking for scapegoats."<sup>1031</sup>

Unfortunately for the Nigerian government, the temporary satisfaction of the public's nativist sentiment was quickly forgotten as the country's economic decline continued, unemployment remained high, and basic needs were not met.<sup>1032</sup> Coverage swiftly dissipated, and the expulsion was largely forgotten, "the measure is not likely to be a major issue in the general elections coming up later in the year...the populace too appear no longer interested."<sup>1033</sup> The departure of foreign workers did not resolve the economy's fortunes. Since in the end the expulsion largely targeted migrant workers in the informal sector, few new economic opportunities, at least ones Nigerians were willing to take, were opened. The menial jobs shunned by citizens thus remained vacant. In fact, as early as April 1983 foreign workers returned to Nigeria, some at the behest of Nigerian companies.<sup>1034</sup> Nevertheless, through corruption and cooption of the police, the Federal Electoral Commission, and the state media, the NPN won the 1983 presidential election.<sup>1035</sup> However, their victory was short-lived. On December 31, 1983, Shagari was deposed in a military coup d'état bringing his second term, and Nigeria's second attempt at democracy, to a swift end.<sup>1036</sup>

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<sup>1031</sup> Grivil, 1985: 535.

<sup>1032</sup> Africa Contemporary Record, 1982-83: B543; Fashoyin, 1988: 66.

<sup>1033</sup> "After the expulsions," 1983: 531, 533.

<sup>1034</sup> "Return of illegal immigrants," 1983.

<sup>1035</sup> Keesing's Contemporary Archive, 1984: 32841; Falola & Ihonvbere, 1985: 213; Forrest, 1993: 80-81, 86-87.

<sup>1036</sup> Falola & Ihonvbere, 1985: 228.

### *Alternative Explanations*

There are two possible alternative explanations as to why the Nigerian government expelled West African migrant workers: aliens as a security threat (for their criminal behavior, and as perpetrators of religious violence) and expulsion as a foreign policy instrument used against rivals. Each alternative explanation will be examined and refuted in turn.

The Nigerian government used rising rates of “illegal alien” criminal activity as a core rationalization for the expulsion decision. Ali Baba stated that the illegal foreigners “...just roamed our streets and committed all sorts of crimes” and that “this flagrant abuse of our laws could no longer be tolerated.”<sup>1037</sup> Nigeria’s Attorney General and Minister of Justice, Chief Richard Akinjide, said, “no country would allow the violation of its laws...the aliens had been responsible for most of the crimes in the country as well as threatening the nation’s security.”<sup>1038</sup> Nigerian Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, Mohammed Rafindadi, said that “Nigeria had been forced to issue an expulsion order last month because of the immigrants’ involvement in crime.”<sup>1039</sup> It would seem that a security concern over criminal activity was at least one reason for the expulsion decision.

However, further investigation reveals that foreigners were not responsible for more crime in Nigeria than Nigerian citizens. The Interior Ministry released official statistics (reproduced in Table 16) on foreigners convicted of crimes during 1980-1983. Although it pledged to release national statistics, information was only shared about criminal convictions in Nigeria’s largest, and then capital city, Lagos. According to the figures, over three years, 328

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<sup>1037</sup> Nigerian External Publicity Division, 1983: 9.

<sup>1038</sup> Aluko, 1985: 544.

<sup>1039</sup> “Migrants ‘involved in crime,’” 1983: 519.

foreigners were convicted of crimes.<sup>1040</sup> Without the total number of criminal convictions, it is difficult to evaluate these statistics, however given that the population of Lagos at the time was an estimated 6 million, 328 convictions make foreigners look more like angels than villains; just over 100 convictions per year.<sup>1041</sup>

<b>Table 16: Foreign convicted criminals, Lagos (1980-1983)<sup>1042</sup></b>	
<i>Country of origin</i>	<i>No. of convictions</i>
Ghana	163
Niger	51
Benin	30
Chad	30
Togo	29
Mali	9
India	16
Total	<b>328</b>

A more likely explanation for the high crime wave was the increasingly desperate economic conditions in Nigeria and the proliferation of weapons in the post-civil war period. While crime in Nigeria was high, objectively migrants were not the main source of that problem as the government's own selective data show. Therefore, removing migrants because they were a criminal threat is not a plausible explanation for the 1983 expulsion.

Government officials also blamed illegal aliens for religious unrest in the country. Ali Baba connected aliens with past religious conflict:

“The recent Kano, Maiduguri and Kaduna religious disturbances when the whole nation witnessed, with dismay, wanton destruction on properties and lives were *traceable to the lawless activities of aliens*. In fact, *the central figure in these violent religious episodes, Maitatsine, was an alien*. No responsible Government can fold its arms and allow such

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<sup>1040</sup> Gravel, 1985: 533.

<sup>1041</sup> Gravel, 1985: 533.

<sup>1042</sup> Adapted from the text in Gravel, 1985: 533.

unwholesome development to plague the Nation; hence the decision to require illegal aliens to leave the country within 14 days” [emphasis added].<sup>1043</sup>

Shagari stated in an interview with BBC Newsnight that “there was evidence that some of the illegal aliens were involved in crimes and *religious violence*” [emphasis added].<sup>1044</sup> Foreign Minister Audu echoed this sentiment stating that, “...most of those deported were unemployed or unskilled workers linked with religious riots and violent activities.”<sup>1045</sup> And Rafindadi said that “the immigrant’s involvement in crime and in fomenting religious unrest” together justified their removal.<sup>1046</sup>

However, the religious explanation was a false distraction. The timing, previous responses, and the make-up of Maitatsine’s followers, refute its plausibility. The first significant outbreak of religious unrest in the Second Republic occurred in Kano in 1980. Controversial Islamic teacher, Mohammadu Marwa, known as Maitatsine, had gathered a sizable following rejecting western materialism and technology and speaking against the corruption and profligacy of the “infidel” Nigerian political elite.<sup>1047</sup> In December 1980 Maitatsine and his followers, known as the ‘Yan Tatsine, clashed with Kano police and local authorities in 11-days of violence.<sup>1048</sup> The Nigerian military’s response resulted in 4,000-6,000 persons being killed, including Maitatsine, and property destruction valued at over ₦3 million.<sup>1049</sup> Hundreds of people were arrested and sent to prison.<sup>1050</sup> Undeterred by the government’s harsh crackdown, the Maitatsine movement unleashed a second round of

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<sup>1043</sup> Nigerian External Publicity Division, 1983: 10.

<sup>1044</sup> ““We did not expel anybody,”” 1983: 578.

<sup>1045</sup> BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1983.

<sup>1046</sup> “Migrants ‘involved in crime,’” 1983: 519.

<sup>1047</sup> Isichei, 1987: 196; Falola & Heaton, 2008: 206.

<sup>1048</sup> Isichei, 1987: 197; Falola, 1988: 153.

<sup>1049</sup> Chirstelow, 1985: 71, 73; Olupona, 1988: 125; Falola, 1998: 137.

<sup>1050</sup> Chirstelow, 1985: 74.

violence in October 1982, after 16 of its members were arrested in Maiduguri.<sup>1051</sup> The ‘Yan Tatsine rioted across Maiduguri and Kaduna burning and destroying buildings—an estimated 500 persons were killed including 100 riot police.<sup>1052</sup> If there was a clear connection between foreigners and the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, then why did the government wait so long to take action and expel the culprits? The timing of the expulsion refutes the religious rationalization.

After the Kano unrest, the federal government set up a special commission to investigate the incident. The Aniagolu Tribunal’s report cited the participation of foreign nationals, particularly post-harvest rural youth along the border who became “vulnerable to temptations,” but it did not recommend wholesale migrant expulsion, instead it called for improved Border Patrol Units to control their influx.<sup>1053</sup> In response to the Kaduna riots in November 1982 the government deported 133 foreigners for their suspected involvement.<sup>1054</sup> This targeted expulsion of individuals, contrasts with the mass expulsion a few months later of all foreign migrants. In addition, after arresting hundreds of Maitatsine supporters in 1980 the government released most of them from prison and Shagari granted clemency to 923 prisoners in October 1982 to “decongest the prisons and save money.”<sup>1055</sup> An allegedly severe national security threat is incompatible with a policy of pardon.

The government accused *aliens* of fomenting religious unrest, but the evidence suggests that the majority of Maitatsine’s followers were Nigerians.<sup>1056</sup> His disciples were poor,

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<sup>1051</sup> Africa Contemporary Record, 1982-1983: B540; Isichei, 1987: 198.

<sup>1052</sup> Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1984: 32609; Falola & Heaton, 2008: 206.

<sup>1053</sup> Aluko, 1985: 554; Lubeck, 1985: 370.

<sup>1054</sup> Africa Contemporary Record, 1982-83: B542.

<sup>1055</sup> Isichei, 1987: 198; Falola, 1998: 161.

<sup>1056</sup> As documented in the Aniagolu report, in the aftermath of the Kano violence the Nigerian authorities arrested 917 people: 732 (80%) were Nigerian and 185 were foreigners (20%) from Niger (162), Chad (16), Cameroon

marginalized Muslim youth who suffered from increased inflation and few job opportunities.<sup>1057</sup> Some of these youth came from Hausa-speaking areas of the neighboring countries, but they were a minority of the total movement.<sup>1058</sup> Of the 1,000 Maitatsine arrested after the Kano riots, 185 were foreigners and there was no evidence that they were arrested during the riots. Rather many were stopped by police at checkpoints outside of the city.<sup>1059</sup> Lastly, given that most of the people expelled in 1983 were Christian Ghanaians, it is not clear how removing this population was intended to solve the problem of Muslim fundamentalism.<sup>1060</sup>

The last possible alternative explanation is that the Nigerian government's 1983 expulsion was a foreign policy tactic designed to exact revenge against the Rawlings regime in Ghana, and/or Ghana more generally for its 1969 expulsion of foreigners, including a large group of Nigerians. *The Sunday Times* quoted Ghanaian leader Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings accusing, "the Nigerian government of plotting against his regime by expelling its Ghanaian immigrants so that they should cause chaos in Ghana's already crippled economy."<sup>1061</sup> The Ghanaian media concurred, arguing that the expulsion was "a deliberate effort to undermine the Ghanaian revolution."<sup>1062</sup> Another version of the retaliation hypothesis linked it to revenge for Ghana's 1969 expulsion of an estimated 200,000-1,000,000 foreigners, including tens of thousands of Nigerians.<sup>1063</sup> The *African Recorder* noted, "the memory of that insult still lingers

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(4), Mali (2) and Upper Volta (1) (Chirstelow, 1985: 74). Interestingly, no Ghanaians were arrested, the largest group expelled in 1983.

<sup>1057</sup> Hickey, 1984: 253; Isichei, 1987: 201; Olupona, 1988: 125.

<sup>1058</sup> Chirstelow, 1985: 83; Lubeck, 1985: 387n1.

<sup>1059</sup> Falola, 1988: 159.

<sup>1060</sup> Gravi, 1985: 535.

<sup>1061</sup> Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1984: 32610.

<sup>1062</sup> Africa Contemporary Record, 1982-1983: B453.

<sup>1063</sup> Peil, 1974: 367; Addo, 1982: 34.

in the minds of many Nigerians who have faced harsh treatment in other African countries.”<sup>1064</sup> While these explanations may seem plausible, investigation quickly refutes their merits.

If the expulsion was intended to punish Rawlings, who came to power in a coup d'état in December 1981, we would have expected the expulsion to accompany other sanctions placed on the country in early 1982.<sup>1065</sup> However, it was not until nearly a year later that the expulsion order was issued. If the expulsion, on the contrary, was intended to retaliate against Ghana for its 1969 expulsion of Nigerians, the time-lag was even longer, 14 years, and it does not account for the non-Ghanaians who were also expelled. Furthermore, the timing does not match the pattern of tit-for-tat reprisal expulsions that typically occur within days of the offending charge, e.g., Gabon, 1978; Uganda, 1982; Mauritania, 1989; Senegal, 1989.<sup>1066</sup> Although relations between Shagari and Rawlings were not cozy, they were not the motive for Nigeria's 1983 expulsion decision.

While these alternative explanations highlight other possible motivations for the Nigerian government's expulsion, none are as convincing as, nor provide enough evidence to overturn, the nativism explanation.

#### **5.4 Enabling Factors for Nigeria's Migrant Expulsion**

Nativism is not unique to Nigeria. Policies protecting natives over immigrants are widespread, but not all governments turn to expulsion policies, as will be demonstrated in the negative case

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<sup>1064</sup> African Recorder, 1983: 6132.

<sup>1065</sup> Otoghile & Obakhedo, 2011: 139.

<sup>1066</sup> Garrity, forthcoming.



of South Africa. So, what factors enabled Nigeria's government, motivated by nativism, to implement expulsion? This next section examines the critical role of alliances, the target group homeland state(s), and the international community in enabling expulsion in Nigeria.

Table 17: Factors that enabled expulsion in Nigeria	
Key Factors	Nigeria (1983)
<b>Alliances</b>	
<i>Domestic Alliances</i>	Benefit from expulsion (↑)
<i>Transnational Alliances</i>	Indifferent to expulsion (↑)
<b>Homeland State(s)</b>	
<i>Relation to Government</i>	Weak ties (↑)
<i>Response/ Anticipated Response</i>	Acquiesce & resettle expellees (↑)
<b>International Community</b>	
<i>Relation to Government</i>	Strong ties (↓)
<i>Response/ Anticipated Response</i>	Ignored expulsion (↑)

## Alliances

### *Domestic Alliances*

Nigeria's Second Republic was marked by the establishment of a new constitution. The 1979 constitution established a presidential system of government with a creative electoral system that required presidential candidates to transcend ethnic partisanship and gain votes across states. The design aimed to encourage the development of political parties formed along national, instead of ethnic lines.<sup>1067</sup> To win the presidency a candidate had to win a majority (or plurality if there were more than two candidates) of the popular vote, plus at least 25 percent of the votes in at least 2/3 of the 19 states.<sup>1068</sup>

<sup>1067</sup> Horowitz, 1978: 197.

<sup>1068</sup> Horowitz, 1978: 197.

Shagari and the NPN party won a plurality of the votes in the 1979 presidential election with 33.8 percent.<sup>1069</sup> The next closest was Chief Obafemi Awolowo of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) with 29.2 percent.<sup>1070</sup> Shagari also won at least 25 percent of the votes in 12 states, more than double any other candidate—Awolowo won six states (See Map 3).<sup>1071</sup> However, Shagari was still short of the constitutional requirement of winning at least 25 percent of the votes in 2/3 of the states, interpreted to be 13 out of 19 for the 1979 election.<sup>1072</sup> Thus, the race should have gone to a run off between Shagari and Awolowo, but the military government,<sup>1073</sup> in coordination with the Federal Electoral Commission, creatively re-interpreted section 126, 2(b) of the constitution. They determined that 2/3 of 19 was not 13 but “one-quarter of the votes cast in 12 states and one-quarter of two thirds, that is, at least one sixth of the votes cast in the 13<sup>th</sup> state.”<sup>1074</sup> Based on that interpretation, no runoff was needed. Awolowo and the UPN challenged the result in the courts, but their efforts failed, and Shagari was ruled president.

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<sup>1069</sup> Oyediran, 1981: Appendix 5; Falola & Ihonbere, 1985: 71.


<sup>1070</sup> Oyediran, 1981: Appendix 5; Falola & Ihonbere, 1985: 71.

<sup>1071</sup> Oyediran, 1981: Appendix 5; Falola & Ihonbere, 1985: 71.

<sup>1072</sup> Falola & Ihonbere, 1985: 70.

<sup>1073</sup> Although pledging to remain neutral during the election, the military and General Obasanjo (a Yoruba) preferred the NPN because it believed it would protect the military’s political and economic interests, unlike the more radical UPN (Falola & Ihonbere, 1985: 69).

<sup>1074</sup> Gravil, 1985: 524-25; Falola & Ihonbere, 1985: 70.



Map 3: Nigeria Presidential Election Results by State, 1979<sup>1075</sup>

Despite this questionable interpretation of the new constitution, the NPN won the most votes across the country. While each of the five parties had ethnic ties—NPN (Hausa & Fulani), UPN (Yoruba), Nigerian People’s Party - NPP (Igbo), Great Nigeria People’s Party - GNPP (Kanuri), and People’s Redemption Party - PRP (Hausa)—the NPN had the most nation-wide support.<sup>1076</sup> The NPN was the most conservative and “boldly capitalist” of the five parties, emphasizing the essential role of private capital in national development.<sup>1077</sup> Its

<sup>1075</sup> Election data from Oyediran, 1981: Appendix 5; Falola & Ihonbere, 1985: 71.

<sup>1076</sup> Falola & Ihonbere, 1985: 66, 74; Diamond, 1983: 35.

<sup>1077</sup> Diamond, 1983: 41.

electoral success was based on widespread bourgeois support across the country that saw the NPN as their best chance “to advance their business and political interests” or access “state power and federal protection.”<sup>1078</sup> Although the NPN was dominated by the Hausa-Fulani aristocracy of the north, it widened its appeal by attracting Yoruba, Igbo, and minority political and business elites from across the country.<sup>1079</sup> Indicating its cross-ethnic structure, NPN’s Vice Presidential candidate was Dr. Alex Edwueme, an Igbo, and Chief Akinloye, a Yoruba, was NPN party Chairman.<sup>1080</sup>

The NPN patronage web extended from the center out to the states and local governments, distributing resources to cement loyalty among politicians, businessmen, and constituents to ensure continued NPN rule.<sup>1081</sup> The party was soon referred to as the “Naira Party of Nigeria.”<sup>1082</sup> The NPN’s coalition of support built on existing clientelist networks, and after its victory it repaid key allies with administrative appointments, government contracts, loans, and subsidies as well as exclusive import and export licenses.<sup>1083</sup> NPN government and party officials at the federal, state, and local levels were gatekeepers to public services and business activities and profited sizably from bribes and kickbacks as a result.<sup>1084</sup> Private sector companies who supported the NPN financially were awarded government contracts in the lucrative construction, industrial, manufacturing, and trading sectors.<sup>1085</sup> Loyal technocrats were selected as key liaisons between the state and multi-national corporations,

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<sup>1078</sup> Diamond, 1983: 36; Othman, 1984: 444.

<sup>1079</sup> Diamond, 1983: 35; Falola & Ihonbere, 1985: 74-75.

<sup>1080</sup> Diamond, 1983: 35; Falola & Heaton, 2008: 199.

<sup>1081</sup> Falola & Heaton, 2008: 202.

<sup>1082</sup> Iroh, 1983: 19.

<sup>1083</sup> Othman, 1984: 442; Joseph, 1987: 150; Forrest, 1993: 89.

<sup>1084</sup> Othman, 1984: 451; Brown, 1989: 263.

<sup>1085</sup> Brown, 1989: 263; Forrest, 1993: 90.

using their skills and networks to extract additional payments from foreign firms.<sup>1086</sup> To indicate the level of corruption during the Second Republic, a Nigerian Ministerial Committee estimated that government contracts were 200 percent more expensive than those in Kenya and 130 percent more than those in Algeria.<sup>1087</sup> Shagari's domestic allies were well compensated for their support.

Although the NPN won the 1979 elections by drawing support from across the country, the party was effectively controlled by northern, largely Muslim, elites.<sup>1088</sup> Therefore, in addition to NPN governing officials, businessmen, and professionals, another key domestic ally was traditional and religious leaders. In fact, the NPN party's manifesto described "preserv[ing] the role of traditional rulers 'as instruments of stability in the maintenance of law and order'" as a key political aim.<sup>1089</sup> Although religious elites did not play a prominent role in the 1979 election, they were an important lobby that NPN officials relied on for governing support throughout the Second Republic.<sup>1090</sup> They built on a long history of close ties between Islamic leaders and colonial-era Nigerian governments in order to control religious dissent.<sup>1091</sup> As oil profits flowed freely, the Shagari administration's domestic allies got what they wanted: access to, and control over, the "national cake." However, the oil glut, and the resulting economic collapse, public dissatisfaction, and political unrest, threatened the party's control of power.

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<sup>1086</sup> Othman, 1984: 451; Brown, 1989: 263.

<sup>1087</sup> Othman, 1984: 450-51; Falola & Ihonvbere, 1985: 90.

<sup>1088</sup> Othman, 1984: 446; Joseph, 1987: 130.

<sup>1089</sup> Diamond, 1983: 41.

<sup>1090</sup> Olupona, 1998: 123.

<sup>1091</sup> Kastfelt, 1989: 84-85.

With elections looming NPN Governors hesitated to be associated with Shagari given the hostility the public felt toward the president, blaming him for the dismal state of the economy. NPN needed to shore up support in the states it won in 1979 but NPN officials were not sure which states they could win.<sup>1092</sup> They hoped to increase their vote share in three UPN-dominated states in the southwest including in Oyo, Ondo, and Bendel states where UPN lost some of its key “strongmen.”<sup>1093</sup> However, crime and rising unemployment was significantly impacting urban areas, particularly in the south.<sup>1094</sup> The dramatic signal of removing millions of migrants *en masse* was intended to show the lengths the government would go to address the concerns of indigenous Nigerians across the country, to create additional job opportunities for the masses of unemployed, and in turn garner their votes. The expulsion was also a spectacular diversion, shifting attention, albeit temporarily, away from the crumbling economy. Amid a situation in which Shagari and the NPN were losing electoral support, expulsion served to remake its image as a powerful government, cracking down on foreign infiltrators who were stealing jobs and causing disturbances. Expulsion was a last-ditch effort to rebuild the NPN’s coalition to retain power and satisfy domestic allies.<sup>1095</sup>

#### *Transnational Alliances*

Nigeria’s vast oil wealth granted it significant autonomy and independence from foreign aid, but its lack of domestic technology, machinery, and skilled personnel made it dependent on

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<sup>1092</sup> Falola & Ihonbere, 1985: 213.

<sup>1093</sup> Falola & Ihonbere, 1985: 212.

<sup>1094</sup> Brown, 1989: 263-64; Falola & Heaton, 2008: 204.

<sup>1095</sup> Falola & Ihonbere, 1985: 214.

international, largely Western, support to drill and extract its oil.<sup>1096</sup> Multinational oil corporations—many of which were owned and operated by Western firms in the U.S., U.K., Netherlands, and France—paid the Nigerian government rents for access to its oil fields.<sup>1097</sup> These corporations also dominated the sectors that supported oil: petrochemicals, telecommunications, and manufacturing.<sup>1098</sup> Although the Nigerian government nationalized some, or portions of, these companies in the 1970s, it still relied on Western companies for technical expertise, investment, and markets.<sup>1099</sup> Furthermore, through a combination of corruption and mismanagement, domestic markets and domestic capacity were neglected leading to an increased reliance on foreign companies to implement local projects.<sup>1100</sup> The Nigerian government awarded contracts to local companies, who then re-awarded them to foreign firms.<sup>1101</sup>

Despite its claims of non-alignment, the Nigerian government was closely tied to Western governments in trade and finance.<sup>1102</sup> Nigeria exported most of its oil to OECD countries with the U.S., Britain, France, and the Netherlands as the top buyers.<sup>1103</sup> The Shagari administration purchased most of its industrial, consumer, and food imports from the West. And it received significant credit from Western sources including sizable loans from the U.K., Euromarket, and the World Bank.<sup>1104</sup> The West was a vital consumer, supplier, and financier.

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<sup>1096</sup> Falola & Ihonvbere, 1985: 187.

<sup>1097</sup> Falola & Heaton, 1988: 11.

<sup>1098</sup> Nzimiro, 1975: 222; Aluko, 1976: 130.

<sup>1099</sup> Shaw, 1983: 223; Khan, 1994: 23-24; Falola & Heaton, 2008: 157.

<sup>1100</sup> Falola & Ihonvbere, 1985: 90, 94.

<sup>1101</sup> Falola & Ihonvbere, 1985: 90, 99.

<sup>1102</sup> Africa Contemporary Record, 1982-1983: B545; Falola & Ihonvbere, 1985: 178.

<sup>1103</sup> Ogunbadejo, 1976: 31.

<sup>1104</sup> Africa Contemporary Record, 1982-1983: B548; Keesing's 1984: 322611; Falola & Ihonvbere 1985: 197; Soremekun, 1988: 229; Forrest, 1993: 146.

Britain was Nigeria's largest trading partner with billions of dollars of trade and investments.<sup>1105</sup> The U.S. was a close second, expanding its trading relationship with Nigeria during the Second Republic. It exported over \$1 billion each year from 1980-1982 (compared to \$630 million in 1979) and imported even more (mostly oil<sup>1106</sup>), running multi-billion-dollar trade deficits from 1978-1984, the largest of its major trading partners.<sup>1107</sup> In Europe, Nigeria was France's second largest African market after Algeria, importing cars, machinery, and sugar products.<sup>1108</sup> Other European countries like West Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland, and Italy had important trading relations with Nigeria.<sup>1109</sup> The country did have economic dealings with non-Western states including the USSR and China, exporting raw materials such as cocoa, groundnuts, palm oil, and some petroleum, but all in significantly smaller quantities.<sup>1110</sup> Given the importance of Nigeria's transnational alliances to its economic stability and growth, opposition to an expulsion policy by these allies would have considerably constrained its implementation. However, the transactional nature of its transnational alliances, meant that these allies were likely to ignore the policy.

Nigeria was the most powerful sub-Saharan African country on the continent: the most populous, the strongest economy, and the largest democracy. In the early 1980s, one out of every four Africans was a Nigerian.<sup>1111</sup> As regional hegemon it dominated the politics of West Africa, serving as the headquarters of ECOWAS, the center of continental anti-apartheid

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<sup>1105</sup> Ogunbadejo, 1976: 31.

<sup>1106</sup> Nigeria provided approximately 12 percent of U.S. oil in the early 1980s (Ayam, 2008: 122).

<sup>1107</sup> Shepard, 1991: 147; Young, 1980: 654.

<sup>1108</sup> Africa Contemporary Record, 1982-1983: B545; Ogunbadejo, 1976: 23.

<sup>1109</sup> Ogunbadejo, 1976: 31.

<sup>1110</sup> Aluko, 1976: 129; "China to Buy Nigerian Oil," 1983: 905.

<sup>1111</sup> Baker, 1984: 89.



efforts, and the source of mediation on the Chadian conflict.<sup>1112</sup> It earned international accolades for its new constitution modeled on that of the U.S.<sup>1113</sup> Western and Eastern superpowers courted this African giant.<sup>1114</sup> Although the oil glut significantly damaged Nigeria's economic prowess, its status largely remained intact. Amid previous political disputes with Western powers—Nigeria's recognition of the MPLA in Angola, its criticism of the U.S.'s support for apartheid South Africa, and the nationalization of British Petroleum in response to Britain's resistance to black majority rule in Zimbabwe—economic ties were maintained.<sup>1115</sup> While political arguments occasionally got heated, the money and oil kept flowing.

Nigeria was not dependent on international sources for economic or military aid, nor did it garner much international investment, it was simply a massive market. With 80 million people, and a large bourgeois elite, Western countries and firms saw Nigerians as valuable consumers for their finished goods.<sup>1116</sup> As economist Tom Forrest notes: “international capital has been reluctant to invest in the Nigerian market rather than to sell to it.”<sup>1117</sup> Nigeria's transnational alliances were based on business exchanges between governing and corporate elites. Therefore, while there was outrage from the Western press in response to Nigeria's mass expulsion, the reaction from key Western government allies and multi-national firms, aside from a few one-line statements, was substantially one of indifference, with no sanctions.

Ali Baba noted as much in his February 14 press briefing:

“I am glad, though, that there is a silver lining in the clouds; I believe that the governmnts [sic] of the countries from which these unwholesome attacks have been

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<sup>1112</sup> Shaw, 1983: 208.

<sup>1113</sup> Baker, 1984: 90; Horowitz, 1978: 193.

<sup>1114</sup> Aluko, 1976: 129.

<sup>1115</sup> Onoh, 1983: 94; Soremekun, 1988: 219; Ayam, 2008: 117, 122.

<sup>1116</sup> Falola & Ihonvbere 1985: 199.

<sup>1117</sup> Forrest, 1993: 177.

launched on us [referring to the Western media] do not share the views nor have they been a aprty [sic] to the media's disgraceful roles.”<sup>1118</sup>

Economic relations continued, unimpeded, in the aftermath of the expulsion. In February 1983, just weeks after Nigeria announced its expulsion decree, the Shagari administration negotiated a \$1 billion Eurocredit loan and signed an education agreement with the U.K. to support Nigerian teachers.<sup>1119</sup> And in June the World Bank announced a \$120 million loan for the Nigerian Industrial Development Bank. Nigeria's transnational allies' indifference to the expulsion, preferring business as usual, further enabled Shagari's expulsion policy.

#### *Homeland states*

The Nigerian government's expulsion targeted West African migrants from Ghana, Niger, Cameroon, Chad, Benin, and Togo but the largest population affected—an estimated 1 million of the 1-2 million—were Ghanaians. Since independence, Nigeria-Ghana relations oscillated between competition and cooperation.<sup>1120</sup> At the outset of the Second Republic, Shagari had close relations with Ghanaian President Dr. Hilla Limann, who was democratically elected in the same year.<sup>1121</sup> When Lieutenant Rawlings removed Limann in a coup d'état on December 31, 1981, the Shagari administration was not pleased. Nigeria responded harshly, reinstituting economic sanctions,<sup>1122</sup> including cutting off oil exports—a severe penalty for a country dependent on Nigeria for 90 percent of its oil.<sup>1123</sup> However, in March 1982, after a Rawlings

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<sup>1118</sup> Nigerian External Publicity Division, 1983: 13.

<sup>1119</sup> Africa Contemporary Record, 1982-1983: B545, B548.

<sup>1120</sup> Aluko, 1985: 548; Otoghile & Obakhedo, 2011: 135.

<sup>1121</sup> Otoghile & Obakhedo, 2011: 138.

<sup>1122</sup> The Obasanjo administration had done the same after Rawlings' first coup in May 1979 (Otoghile & Obakhedo, 2011: 137-38)

<sup>1123</sup> Aluko, 1985: 549; Otoghile & Obakhedo, 2011: 139.

delegation visited Nigeria, relations between the two nations cooled and Nigeria resumed oil sales.<sup>1124</sup> In early 1983 ties between the two states were weak, marked by a stark regional rivalry, a factor that enables expulsion decisions.

Furthermore, the target group homeland states<sup>1125</sup> acquiesced and resettled their expelled populations with almost no resistance. Although Nigeria's expulsion clearly violated the spirit of ECOWAS, the affected countries did not push back on Nigeria's decision to expel, but rather criticized the lack of coordination and the timeline for removal.<sup>1126</sup> Though Rawlings described the expulsion as a "calculated plot" against his government,<sup>1127</sup> his actions were muted.<sup>1128</sup> Similarly, Ghanaian Foreign Secretary, Dr. Obed Asamoah, expressed concern about the expulsion but stated, "the global economic situation is such that no country will allow large numbers of foreign nationals living illegally on its economy."<sup>1129</sup> While there was certainly frustration among Ghanaian officials at the unexpected mass expulsion, and the task of resettling over one million persons—nearly 10 percent of Ghana's total population of 12 million—the government "reacted with coolness and circumspection."<sup>1130</sup>

The Ghanaian government chartered ships at its own hefty expense, \$43,000 per trip, to return its nationals from Lagos.<sup>1131</sup> Hundreds of private vehicles joined the government's effort to return expellees to their homes once back in Ghana, in an exercise compared to the

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<sup>1124</sup> Africa Contemporary Record, 1982-1983: B543.

<sup>1125</sup> In this case the expellees' state of citizenship: Ghana, Niger, Cameroon, Chad, Benin, and Togo.

<sup>1126</sup> "'Strangers' and ECOWAS," 1983.

<sup>1127</sup> From a *Sunday Times* of London story published on February 13, almost four weeks after the initial expulsion announcement (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1984: 32610). Hardly a swift or loud response.

<sup>1128</sup> Aluko, 1985: 543.

<sup>1129</sup> "'Strangers' and ECOWAS," 1983.

<sup>1130</sup> Africa Contemporary Record, 1982-1983: B455.

<sup>1131</sup> Bentsi-Enchill, 1983b.

British response at Dunkirk during World War II.<sup>1132</sup> Rather than resisting the Nigerian government's expulsion decision by pushing back on the *en masse* removal of its nationals, many of whom legally had the right to remain, Ghana quickly acquiesced and facilitated the return of its citizens.

The second largest population affected by the expulsion after Ghanaians were Nigeriens. Unlike the tough rhetoric, but empty actions, of Rawlings, the Nigerien Government made no public statement on the expulsion.<sup>1133</sup> In fact, Radio Niamey welcomed the decision in a broadcast.<sup>1134</sup> Like Niger, Cameroon made no public comments about the quit order, and Cameroonian President Paul Biya made a state visit to Nigeria in mid-April, just two months after the expiry of the expulsion deadline, to sign an economic agreement with the Shagari administration. During his visit the two nations reaffirmed, "their desire to pursue, intensify and consolidate the co-operation between their countries."<sup>1135</sup>

The Togo and Benin governments were also subdued in their responses. The Togolese Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Anani Kuma Akakpo-Ahianyo, met his Nigerian counterpart in Lagos on January 23. Akakpo-Ahianyo tried to persuade the Nigerian government to extend the deadline for immigrant departure but, importantly, not to change course.<sup>1136</sup> Benin President Ahmed Mathieu Kérékou met with Shagari in February, on behalf of the *Conseil de l'Entente*,<sup>1137</sup> "to gain a better insight into the situation in the interest of understanding and confidence in the sub-region," but not to persuade the President to rescind his expulsion

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<sup>1132</sup> "Booted Out," 1983: 23.

<sup>1133</sup> "Exodus from Nigeria 2: Northern escape route," 1983.

<sup>1134</sup> "Booted Out," 1983: 22-23.

<sup>1135</sup> Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1983: 32361.

<sup>1136</sup> "Nigeria: Togo lends a hand," 1983.

<sup>1137</sup> The *Conseil de l'Entente* is a regional institution for economic cooperation that included Benin, Ivory Coast, Niger, Togo, and Upper Volta (Ojo, 1980: 576n29).

decision.<sup>1138</sup> Limited information is available about Chad's response to the expulsion, but it did describe it as "sudden and brutal."<sup>1139</sup> The country was engrossed in its own domestic strife, which Nigeria was mediating, and its expelled nationals were largely refugees who had fled Chad.

The Nigerian government recognized the lack of homeland state resistance. In Ali Baba's February 14 press briefing he stated that there had been "understanding on the part of...some countries including those whose nationals have been affected by the orders."<sup>1140</sup> And while the Nigerian government partially responded to requests from the homeland states to extend the timeline for migrant removal—agreeing to a four-week extension for skilled workers<sup>1141</sup>—the expulsion decision remained. Heads of state of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone—three ECOWAS countries in the far west of the West Africa region, and not directly affected by the expulsion—were the lone countries to appeal to Shagari to *reconsider* his decision, without success.<sup>1142</sup>

Why the affected countries submitted to the Nigerian government's expulsion with minimal resistance can largely be explained by three factors: their weak position vis-à-vis Nigeria; their own expulsionist pasts; and their desire to maintain the ECOWAS Community despite the serious breach of its spirit. As sub-Saharan Africa's largest and richest oil exporter, the oil glut notwithstanding, Nigeria was the economic giant of West Africa. Regional neighbors were hesitant to challenge Nigeria's expulsion decision for fear of its economic,

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<sup>1138</sup> Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1983: 32248.

<sup>1139</sup> Johnson, 1983: 20.

<sup>1140</sup> Nigerian External Publicity Division, 1983: 13.

<sup>1141</sup> Although unskilled workers were much larger in number and were still required to leave within two weeks.

<sup>1142</sup> Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1984: 32610.

military, or political wrath.<sup>1143</sup> Many of the affected countries had joint development plans that would have been at risk with heavy criticism of the Nigerian government. The hypocrisy of condemning Nigeria's expulsion when their countries had implemented expulsionist policies in the past (e.g., Niger, 1963; Chad, 1979; Ghana, 1969) may have also weighed on the minds of the neighboring country leaders. Furthermore, neighboring governments may have been looking to the future, as *West Africa* magazine wrote "Every country in the area has a greater or lesser problem with immigrant population[s] and might wish to reserve the right to take similar measures if, indeed, they have not already done so in the past."<sup>1144</sup>

Lastly, although Nigeria's expulsion was a massive blow to the spirit of ECOWAS and its protocol on free movement, West African states significantly benefited from the economic community. There was concern that strongly condemning Nigeria's expulsion decision could jeopardize the integrity of the young organization, less than eight years old in January 1983.<sup>1145</sup> In sum, the weak ties between Nigeria and Ghana and its acquiescence to the expulsion decision, including swift resettlement of its nationals, further enabled Nigeria's mass expulsion.

### *International Community*

The Shagari administration had strong ties with the international community, including the United Nations, ECOWAS, and the Organization of African Unity. As the most populous, strongest economy, largest military, and biggest democracy on the continent, Nigeria was an important international actor. Its sizable army of 120,000-140,000 troops, the largest in sub-

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<sup>1143</sup> Baker, 1984: 81, 94.

<sup>1144</sup> "Nigeria and her neighbours," 1983: 303.

<sup>1145</sup> Brown, 1989: 273.

Saharan Africa, was a critical contributor to UN peacekeeping missions.<sup>1146</sup> Nigeria played a foundational role in the creation of both the OAU and ECOWAS and served as the latter's largest donor and host to its headquarters in Lagos.<sup>1147</sup> The mass expulsion decision-making framework predicts that these strong ties with the international community would constrain expulsion. However, the lack of response of the international community was a more important enabling factor here. Although the key international actors rhetorically condemned the expulsion, they effectively ignored its implementation, contributing to a conducive enabling environment for Nigeria's expulsion.

Initial international responses to Nigeria's expulsion were verbally harsh. The U.S. State Department called the expulsion order "shocking" and "a violation of every imaginable human rights."<sup>1148</sup> British Opposition leader, Michael Foot, described the expulsion as "an act of heartlessness, and a failure of common humanity" in a letter to the Nigerian High Commissioner in London, while the British Foreign Office remained mum.<sup>1149</sup> The European Parliament condemned the expulsion, and the European Economic Community "deplored the quit order" in a press release from Brussels.<sup>1150</sup> Pope John Paul II joined the international chorus describing the expulsion as "the largest, single and 'worst human exodus this century'" in an address to crowds in St. Peter's Square.<sup>1151</sup> While the international community was "alarmed" by the expulsion announcement, its rhetoric largely focused on extending the expulsion timeline and providing humanitarian assistance to the affected countries. Given that

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<sup>1146</sup> Baker, 1984: 90.

<sup>1147</sup> Okere, 1992: 329.

<sup>1148</sup> Aluko, 1985: 541; Brown 1989: 254.

<sup>1149</sup> Brown, 1989: 254.

<sup>1150</sup> "EEC condemns expulsion," 1983; Aluko, 1985: 541.

<sup>1151</sup> Aluko, 1985: 541.

there was minimal violence toward the expellees, there was less “reaction and sympathy” than toward similar events.<sup>1152</sup> For example, UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar’s statement on January 27 expressed “profound disquiet” at the expulsion of two million persons from Nigeria, but he limited his comments to “minimizing suffering” of the expellees, increasing international aid, and opening borders for migrants to return home.<sup>1153</sup> De Cuellar urged Nigeria “to slow down” the expulsions, not to stop them.<sup>1154</sup>

The focus of the UN on extending the timeline and reducing expellee hardship is illustrated in a cable from the Director-General of the International Labor Organization (ILO) to the Nigerian Minister of Labor:

“Deeply concerned about scale and gravity of the problems connected with decision of your Government to invite large numbers of foreign workers to leave Nigeria as quickly as possible. I should like to appeal to your Government to do everything possible for humanitarian reasons to safeguard the interests of foreign workers regularly employed in your country and to grant the others, particularly those with families, in consultation with their countries of origin, the time and facilities that would protect them against undo [sic] hardship...*the International Labour Office is ready to offer your Government and the Governments of the neighbouring countries concerned all assistance in its power*” [emphasis added].<sup>1155</sup>

Despite expressing “deep concern,” the ILO offered “all assistance in its power” to the expulsionist Nigerian government, scarcely pressuring it to reconsider its decision. While UN humanitarian agencies are, by mandate, non-political and charged with responding to crises, rather than preventing them from happening, the United Nations itself and organizations like the ILO, to which Nigeria had been a member since 1960, failed to attempt to persuade the Nigerian government to change course.

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<sup>1152</sup> Fouquet, 1983; Verdon, 1983.

<sup>1153</sup> “Nigeria: Togo lends a hand,” 1983.

<sup>1154</sup> Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1984: 32610.

<sup>1155</sup> African Recorder, 1983: 6155.



Regional organizations responded similarly. Although Nigeria's expulsion clearly violated the ECOWAS protocol, its Executive Secretary, Dr. Aboubakar Diaby Ouattara defended the expulsion. He stated that Nigeria was acting within the organization's rules and that "Nigeria's action did not constitute a breach of the ECOWAS protocol on the movement of goods and people."<sup>1156</sup> This comment overlooked multiple violations of the Free Movement Protocol including: Article 7 (regarding settling disputes by direct agreement or via the Tribunal of the Community); Article 11.1 (regarding notifying the citizen, government, and Executive Secretary of an expulsion); and 11.4 (regarding notifying the government of origin in case of repatriation).<sup>1157</sup> The lack of coordination between Nigeria and the affected countries, as well as with ECOWAS, was ignored by the Executive Secretary. Dr. Ouattara instead advised would-be migrants to study the free movement protocol before undertaking a trip.<sup>1158</sup> That the expulsion was not formally raised at the May 1983 ECOWAS summit, just four months after the quit order, underscores the lack of resistance by the regional organization and its members.<sup>1159</sup>

The *Conseil de l'Entente* also tepidly responded to Nigeria's expulsion. While not assertively responding as individual states, the heads of state of Togo, Benin, Ivory Coast, and Upper Volta jointly issued a *communiqué* at the conclusion of a two-day meeting in early February. It expressed "regret that thousands of the deportees were nationals of the Conseil de l'Entente," emphasized that "the African states affected should have been notified in advance so that they could organize the reception of their nationals beforehand," and

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<sup>1156</sup> Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1983: 32611.

<sup>1157</sup> ECOWAS Protocol, 1979.

<sup>1158</sup> "Nigeria and her neighbours," 1983; "Ouattara on expulsions," 1983.

<sup>1159</sup> Africa Contemporary Record, 1983-1984: B527.

expressed solidarity with the deportees as well as pledging humanitarian aid.<sup>1160</sup> In line with other international actors, the *Conseil de l'Entente* simply complained of no advance notification of the expulsion policy, but did not advocate a policy reversal. President Ouédraogo of Upper Volta, a country with minimal nationals expelled from Nigeria, stated in an interview the day the meeting concluded that the *Conseil* “understood that [the expulsion] was a sovereign decision and therefore abstained from judging it. In spite of this we deplored the situation.”<sup>1161</sup>

The OAU was also hushed in its response. It sent a delegation to Lagos and the affected countries but exerted no effort to change minds in the Shagari administration, focusing instead on greater flexibility.<sup>1162</sup> OAU Secretary General, Edem Kodjo of Togo, limited his calls to “humanitarian treatment” of the expellees.<sup>1163</sup> This despite Nigeria’s clear violation of Article 12(5) of the African Charter of Human and People’s Rights—“The mass expulsion of non-nationals shall be prohibited”—which was ratified by the Shagari administration in 1981 and codified to domestic law through the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act on March 17, 1983.<sup>1164</sup> While the initial expulsion order of January 17 did not violate this new legislation passed in March, migrants continued to be expelled through April 1983, so it did violate domestic law after March 17. Nevertheless, Nigeria was one of the OAU’s key founders and, like ECOWAS, the organization hesitated to speak out against it. In sum, neither international nor regional organizations pressured the Nigerian government to rescind its expulsion policy.

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<sup>1160</sup> Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1983: 32248.

<sup>1161</sup> BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1983.

<sup>1162</sup> Africa Contemporary Record, 1982-1983: B542; Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1984: 32611.

<sup>1163</sup> Clarity, 1983.

<sup>1164</sup> African (Bangul) Charter, 1981; Ojukwu, 2000: 140; Oba, 2004: 275.

Nigeria’s alliances and the response of the target group homeland states were key contributing factors in enabling expulsion in Nigeria. In addition, the possible constraint of Nigeria’s strong ties with the international community was outweighed by the limited resistance of both international and regional organizations in the face of the expulsion policy. The nativist motivation to remove “illegal aliens,” combined with a conducive enabling environment, resulted in the mass expulsion of millions of West African migrants.

### 5.5 South Africa, 2008-2012: A negative case, constraints on mass expulsion

The pairing of Nigeria and South Africa, arguably the two giants of Africa, is legitimately comparable on multiple dimensions. In the two time periods examined (Nigeria, 1979-1983; South Africa, 2008-2012), the two countries experienced significant demographic changes because of immigration, and there was public and elite pressure to consolidate the demos by differentiating those who belong from those who do not—particularly along citizenship lines. Both countries were also facing serious economic crises, the oil glut in Nigeria and the fallout from the 2008 global financial crisis in South Africa. As depicted in Tables 18 and 19, the two countries faced economic recession.

Table 18: Nigeria GDP Annual Growth Rate (1979-1983) <sup>1165</sup>					
Year	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
Percentage	6.8	4.2	-13.1	-6.8	-10.9

In South Africa, GDP growth dropped nearly five percentage points in 2009, to negative 1.5 percent. The bottom of the economic recession hit each country 2-3 years before the expulsion

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<sup>1165</sup> World Bank, 2020d.

or likely expulsion.<sup>1166</sup> Both Nigeria and South Africa struggled to reach their pre-crisis growth rates in the years following the respective crises.<sup>1167</sup>

<b>Table 19: South Africa GDP Annual Growth Rate (2008-2012)<sup>1168</sup></b>					
Year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Percentage	3.2	-1.5	3.0	3.2	2.4

In South Africa the 2008 financial crisis exacerbated the existing inequalities and economic hardship of the majority black population. Over one million jobs were lost amid already high unemployment (24-25%), underemployment (30-40%), and youth unemployment (up to 60%).<sup>1169</sup> The South African government raised public sector wages during the recession, contributing to “one of the largest job-shedding experiences amongst emerging markets during the global financial crisis.”<sup>1170</sup> The recession affected all aspects of the economy with manufacturing production declining nearly 20 percent as well as decreased output and retrenchment in mining, the financial sector, real estate, and business services as well as wholesale and retail trade.<sup>1171</sup> All of this was combined with nearly 50 percent of the population living below the poverty line, over a third of the population food insecure, and a quarter of children under six malnourished.<sup>1172</sup> And despite a return to growth, albeit low, in 2010, economic challenges remained, and jobs were not swiftly restored. Importantly, 1983 in

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<sup>1166</sup> This is in line with Adida’s (2014) finding that African mass immigrant expulsions are more likely following “a two-year decline in per capita economic growth” (144). While this may help to explain why Nigeria expelled its migrant population, it does not explain why South Africa, under similar conditions, refrained.

<sup>1167</sup> Although South Africa’s post-crisis growth rates are less dramatic than Nigeria’s, it is estimated that 6-7% growth is needed to eliminate chronic unemployment and poverty and ensure sustainable economic development (Herbst, 2005: 97; Alden & Schoeman, 2013: 120). The country’s 2012 growth rate of 2.2 percent was a third of this recommended total.

<sup>1168</sup> World Bank, 2020d.

<sup>1169</sup> Pillay, 2010: 24, 34; Verick, 2012: 381, 383.

<sup>1170</sup> Johnson, 2015: 175.

<sup>1171</sup> Mohamed, 2010: 40; Verick, 2012: 377.

<sup>1172</sup> Hanekom & Webster, 2009: 92; Pillay, 2010: 24.

Nigeria, and 2012 in South Africa, were politically salient years with national elections in Nigeria and African National Congress (ANC) leadership elections in South Africa.

Other aspects of the two country's economies were also comparable. Both were heavily dependent on extractive industries, particularly Nigeria with most of its state income coming from the oil sector. South Africa's economy was more diversified, but still dominated by the mining and energy complex which was similarly affected by the economic crisis. Geographically, both countries had long porous borders (See Maps 2 & 4) through which migrants from neighboring countries easily entered. The economic disparities between Nigeria and South Africa, and their neighbors, created attractive pull factors.<sup>1173</sup>



Map 4: Political boundaries of South Africa<sup>1174</sup>

Nigeria had a larger population than South Africa, 80 million, compared to 50 million, but South Africa's estimated total migrants (2.5-3 million) was approximately 5% of the total population, double that of Nigeria (2.5%).<sup>1175</sup> The sectors of the economy in which the migrant

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<sup>1173</sup> Campbell, 2006.

<sup>1174</sup> Map sourced from Google Maps.

<sup>1175</sup> Figures for the number of foreign migrants in South Africa vary widely. The best estimate, as extrapolated from government census, World Bank, and UN figures, is likely around 2 million legal migrants and asylum

communities worked, and their skill portfolios, were similar, employed in construction, industry, mining (in South Africa), services (drivers, cleaners, domestic workers), and petty/informal trades. The two countries were colonized by the British, although the Boers were also involved in the South African case. The latter was a settler colony as opposed to Britain's administrative mode of colonial indirect rule in Nigeria, but both suffered under European exploitation. Regarding regime characteristics, both presidents, Shagari and Jacob Zuma, were democratically elected and according to Polity V, both countries were democratic regimes.<sup>1176</sup>

Existing theories of mass expulsion suggest that countries with ethnic minority elites, previous histories of expulsion, and leaders with exclusionary ideologies are more likely to expel. In this comparison it was South Africa, the non-expelling country, that was ruled by an ethnic minority president—Zuma is ethnically Zulu,<sup>1177</sup> albeit the plurality group within the black, racial majority—whereas Nigeria's president was part of the ethnic Muslim majority.<sup>1178</sup> Similarly, and contrary to existing theory, it was South Africa that had a prior history of expulsion—Mozambican refugees were expelled in 1993 under the apartheid regime, whereas

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seekers (Crush & Ramachandran, 2014: 14-15; World Bank, 2018: 16). However, Statistics South Africa estimates another 500,000 to 1 million undocumented migrants (Hlatshwayo, 2013: 229). That would put South Africa's total foreign migrants at 3-3.5 million, 5.7-6.6% of the country's total population of 53 million in 2012, significantly higher than Nigeria's 2.5 percent.

<sup>1176</sup> Polity V coded Nigeria (1983) a 7 and South Africa (2012) a 9; V-Dem scored Nigeria a 0.242 and South Africa a 0.78 on its polyarchy continuum measuring the level of electoral democracy.

<sup>1177</sup> The Zulu are South Africa's largest ethnic group, an estimated 18 percent of the country's total population (Gordin, 2008: 53; Johnson, 2015: 28; BBC, 2021).

<sup>1178</sup> In 1983 Nigeria the religious demographic breakdown was 47.4% Muslim, 37.7% Christian, and 14.6% indigenous religions (Association of Religion Data Archives, 2022).

Nigeria had never previously expelled.<sup>1179</sup> Lastly, elites in both countries held exclusionary ideologies when it came to African migrants.

Exacerbated by their respective economic slumps, anti-migrant sentiment was high in both countries. The Nigerian public cry “Ghana must go” was echoed on the streets of Johannesburg in “Makwerekwere go home.”<sup>1180</sup> Indeed, the South African population was arguably far more anti-foreigner than its counterparts in Nigeria, particularly toward black African foreigners. A 2006 national survey conducted by the South African Migration Project documented that 84% of South Africans thought there were “too many” foreigners in the country, 76% supported (re)electrifying the border fences to keep migrants out (a practice of the apartheid regime), and 74% said any foreign national not contributing to the economy should be deported.<sup>1181</sup> The survey documented views of foreign nationals as “a threat to the social and economy well-being of their country,” competing for scarce economic resources, stealing jobs, engaging in criminal behavior, and bringing disease—language echoed by their Nigerian brethren in the 1980s.<sup>1182</sup> Anti-migrant attitudes in South Africa cut across class, race, ethnicity, and region.<sup>1183</sup> South African nationals were more hostile to immigrants than any of the other countries surveyed including Nigeria, Philippines, India, Egypt, and China among others.<sup>1184</sup>

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<sup>1179</sup> Nigeria did not have a history of expulsion, but there was large-scale violence against the Igbo (under a different administration) during the civil war of 1967-1970. However, the Igbo were reincorporated into the state at the end of the war.

<sup>1180</sup> Crush, 2008: 25; Landau & Pampalone, 2018: 88.

<sup>1181</sup> Crush, 2008: 2.

<sup>1182</sup> Croucher, 1998: 650; Crush, 2008: 3.

<sup>1183</sup> Crush, 2008: 7, 19.

<sup>1184</sup> Crush, 2008: 22.

Similar sentiments were shared by government officials. In the early days of the ANC-led government, Minister of Home Affairs Mangosuthu Buthelezi called on South Africans to “aid the [Home Affairs] Department and the South African Police Services in the detection, prosecution and removal of illegal aliens from the country...cooperation of the community is required in the proper execution of the Department’s functions.”<sup>1185</sup> Former Minister of Defense, Joe Modise, threatened to turn on the apartheid-era “Killer fence”—a 15,000-volt electric fence along parts of the country’s borders with Zimbabwe and Mozambique—to deter and reduce illegal migration.<sup>1186</sup>

The negative case of South Africa is particularly apt given the outburst of anti-migrant violence in May 2008 initiated by the burning to death of 35-year-old Mozambican national Ernesto Alfabeto Nhamuave.<sup>1187</sup> Over the course of two weeks, beginning in Alexandra township in Johannesburg and spreading throughout the country, more than 60 people were killed, 700 injured, 100,000 displaced, and hundreds of homes, property, and businesses were looted and destroyed.<sup>1188</sup> The government responded with denial (there was no crisis), blame (criminal elements), and conspiracy theories (“the hidden hand of white rule”).<sup>1189</sup> One man interviewed after the violence said that, “...The government is not doing anything about this, so I support what the mob is doing to get rid of foreigners in our country.”<sup>1190</sup>

More than two weeks after the May 2008 outbreak of violence, President Thabo Mbeki addressed the nation, stating:

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<sup>1185</sup> Crush, 2008: 17.

<sup>1186</sup> Hanekom & Webster, 2009: 105-06; Murray, 2003: 451.

<sup>1187</sup> Landau & Pampalone, 2018: 6.

<sup>1188</sup> Crush, 2008: 11; Hanekom & Webster, 2009: 94; Landau, 2011: 1; Landau & Pampalone, 2018: 7.

<sup>1189</sup> Landau, 2011: 1; Matsinhe, 2011: 308; Landau & Pampalone, 2018: 8.

<sup>1190</sup> Landau, 2011: 13.



“The dark days of May which have brought us here today were visited on our country by people who acted with criminal intent. What happened during these days was not inspired by a perverse nationalism, or extreme chauvinism, resulting in our communities violently expressing the hitherto unknown sentiment of mass and mindless hatred of foreigners.”<sup>1191</sup>

This denial continued under the Zuma administration with the Minister of Police describing attacks against migrants as opportunistic crimes, and the police spokesperson stating, “holistically speaking, South Africans are not xenophobic.”<sup>1192</sup> Senior Department of Home Affairs (DHA) officials lent further credence to the arguments that foreigners were criminals, blaming them, without evidence, for rising crime in South Africa, as in Nigeria before its expulsion.<sup>1193</sup> To deal with these “criminal aliens” the Deputy Minister of Safety and Security, was quoted as saying “shoot the bastards.”<sup>1194</sup>

Citizen-migrant tensions were arguably much higher in South Africa in the late 2000s, early 2010s, than they were in 1980s Nigeria, which makes this a grimly fascinating case to examine.

## **Contextual Environment & Predisposing Conditions**

### *African Migrants in South Africa*

Under apartheid, the movement of black Africans, both within South Africa and from outside, was highly regulated. Internally, black movement was controlled through the formation of Bantustans and the introduction of pass laws. Externally, the immigration of black Africans to South Africa was prohibited, and borders with neighboring states were highly patrolled, albeit

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<sup>1191</sup> Warby et al., 2008: 4.

<sup>1192</sup> Crush & Ramachandran, 2014: 9.

<sup>1193</sup> Murray, 2003: 452.

<sup>1194</sup> Harber, 2008: 165.

still porous. Labor contracts between South Africa and its neighbors facilitated foreign African “guest workers” to work in South African mines.<sup>1195</sup> Enforcement of these movement controls was divided across nine departments but the South African Police Service (SAPS) *de facto* took control.<sup>1196</sup> The harsh implementation of influx control laws was intended to deter “black criminality.” When these laws were rescinded in 1986, the police simply shifted their attention from “illegal” black South Africans to “illegal” black foreigners.<sup>1197</sup> The shift was evident in the drastic increase in deportations from the country from 732 in 1980 to 53,418 in 1990, further increasing after full democracy was restored in 1994, with over three million migrants deported in the 19 years between 1994 and 2012,<sup>1198</sup> mostly to neighboring countries.<sup>1199</sup>

While the ANC government overturned many aspects of the previous regime, the apartheid-era immigration restrictions largely remained in place.<sup>1200</sup> The oppressive Aliens Control Act of 1991<sup>1201</sup> was among the last pieces of legislation to be reformed. The new Immigration Act was not passed until 2002 and not put into effect until 2005—more than a decade after the end of apartheid.<sup>1202</sup> Politicians were hesitant to push for immigration reforms

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<sup>1195</sup> Croucher, 1998: 640; Nshimbi & Fioramonti, 2014: 55.

<sup>1196</sup> Vigneswaran, 2011b: 158.

<sup>1197</sup> Human Rights Watch, 1998; Vigneswaran, 2011b: 161; Segatti, 2016: 97.

<sup>1198</sup> South African deportation statistics are unreliable. There are no figures on repeat deportations despite many reports that deported migrants simply re-enter South Africa, only to be deported again later (Klaaren & Ramji, 2001: 40; Nshimbi & Fioramonti, 2014: 62). Nevertheless, South Africa’s deportation scheme is one of the largest in the world (Nshimbi & Fioramonti, 2014: 58; Vigneswaran, 2011a: 111).

<sup>1199</sup> Vigneswaran, 2011b: 161; Segatti, 2016: 97.

<sup>1200</sup> Peberdy & Crush, 1998: 19; Klotz, 2000: 831; Klaaren & Ramji, 2001: 35; Hanekom & Webster, 2009: 105; Segatti, 2011: 32; Vigneswaran, 2011b: 157, 164.

<sup>1201</sup> The 1991 Aliens Control Act entrenched the white supremacist apartheid-era immigration legislation rooted in the 1913 Immigration Regulation Act, which tightly restricted immigration and reinforced arbitrary discretion by immigration officials to determine “prohibited” persons (Peberdy & Crush, 1998: 19; Klaaren & Ramji, 2001: 37-38). The Act also kept in place the “two gates” policy with an open front gate for white immigrants and a back gate only open (temporarily) to black laborers for the mining and agriculture industries (Peberdy & Crush, 1998: 34; Segatti, 2011: 34).

<sup>1202</sup> Hanekom & Webster, 2009: 105; Segatti, 2011: 34.

given the robust anti-foreigner sentiment within society, and fears of being perceived as protecting the rights of foreigners over those of struggling South Africans. Even with the new legislation in place, actions on the ground *de facto* remained the same.<sup>1203</sup>

Migrants flocked to ANC-led South Africa from across the continent,<sup>1204</sup> but most came from neighboring Zimbabwe (31 percent) and Mozambique (18 percent). While official sources only track the number of legal migrants, Zimbabwe and Mozambique are also reported as the countries of origin of the largest numbers of undocumented migrants.<sup>1205</sup> Immigrants flocked to the country in search of economic opportunities as well as safety from conflict and political unrest.

As in Nigeria, African migrants in South Africa work both in the formal and informal sectors, but the majority are concentrated in the informal marketplace particularly in construction, agriculture, petty trade, and domestic work.<sup>1206</sup> While South African regulations tightly control foreign labor in the mining sector, migrant labor in commercial agriculture, construction, and services “takes place in a regulation vacuum.”<sup>1207</sup> Businesses in these sectors benefit from foreign workers that are typically paid less than their South African counterparts with no legal protections.<sup>1208</sup> Foreign traders, who are often the main target of violence in urban areas, are typically engaged in circular migration patterns arriving in the country to sell goods not available in the domestic market and then returning to their home countries.<sup>1209</sup> The

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<sup>1203</sup> Klaaren & Ramji, 2001: 38; Segatti, 2011: 49.

<sup>1204</sup> Most foreign migrants in South Africa are from African countries, with nearly 70 percent from SADC countries (World Bank, 2018: 21).

<sup>1205</sup> Campbell, 2006; World Bank, 2018: 21.

<sup>1206</sup> Oucho & Crush, 2001: 146; Murray, 2003: 459; Campbell, 2006; World Bank, 2018: 22.

<sup>1207</sup> Segatti, 2016: 87-88, 96.

<sup>1208</sup> Hicks, 1999: 402; Human Rights Watch, 1998; Landau & Pampalone, 2018: 52.

<sup>1209</sup> Human Rights Watch, 1998; Murray, 2003: 459.

foreign labor market in South Africa is analogous to Nigeria's in 1983—simply swap Zimbabwean or Mozambican for Ghanaian.

*Post-Apartheid ANC Politics & President Zuma*

In 1983, the Nigerian national elections and the prospects of NPN losses due to mismanagement of the oil glut, was a serious concern for the Shagari administration. The analogous situation in South Africa was the 2012 ANC leadership elections. Since the South African government has been dominated by one-party since 1994—the ANC—the leadership elections that nominate the party's candidate for president have been more important in determining the head of government than the national elections. President Zuma had multiple reasons to be concerned that the December 2012 party conference would not seamlessly anoint him for a second term: corruption scandals, threats from the ANC Youth League (ANCYL) and the Congress of South African Trade Union (COSATU) leaders, and ANC losses in 2011 local elections. In fact, the 2012 party conference was the first in which an incumbent was challenged for ANC leadership.<sup>1210</sup> Zuma's back was against the wall.

Zuma, like all South African Presidents to date, had been part of the anti-apartheid struggle. He was imprisoned for ten years on Robben Island alongside Nelson Mandela, and after his release he became a member of the ANC's National Executive Committee and served in various roles, including Chief of Intelligence.<sup>1211</sup> After returning to South Africa in 1990, after 15 years in exile, Zuma rose through the leadership ranks from the ANC's Deputy Secretary General (1991) to National Party Chairman (1994) to Deputy Party President (1997)

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<sup>1210</sup> Johnson, 2015: 82.

<sup>1211</sup> Gordin, 2008: 16, 26; Feinstein, 2009: 75; Johnson, 2015: 24.

and then Deputy South African President under President Thabo Mbeki (1999-2005).<sup>1212</sup> Much of Zuma's rise to power was because of his ethnic background rather than his administrative acumen. Mandela wanted an ethnic balance in party leadership and there were not many Zulus in senior positions, despite being the country's largest ethnic group.<sup>1213</sup> Although the ANC was founded by John Dube, a Zulu, and led by Zulu Chief Albert Luthuli in the 1950s, the following three leaders (and first two presidents)—Tambo, Mandela, and Mbeki—were all Xhosa.<sup>1214</sup> With Zuma's rise to Deputy President, and assumed future presidency, "there was a feeling that at last the ANC was 'coming home.'"<sup>1215</sup> Zuma assumed the presidency of South Africa in May 2009.

With Zuma's ascendance came the belief that South Africa's wealth would finally be redistributed to disadvantaged citizens instead of the neoliberal policies pursued under Mbeki.<sup>1216</sup> However, scandal followed Zuma to Mahlabisa Ndlopfu, the South African White House, and expectations of economic and political change were quickly dashed. From his early days in politics, Zuma had incurred large debts supporting his extravagant lifestyle—including infamous upgrades to his Nkandla homestead—which made him dependent on, and vulnerable to, bribery and corruption.<sup>1217</sup> Zuma placed his family members and close allies into positions of power at the national, provincial, and local levels giving them *carte blanche* to enrich themselves in return for their loyalty.<sup>1218</sup> Although there was corruption within the ANC

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<sup>1212</sup> Gordin, 2008: 55, 64, 69.

<sup>1213</sup> Johnson, 2015: 24, 28.

<sup>1214</sup> Johnson, 2015: 28, 35.

<sup>1215</sup> Johnson, 2015: 35.

<sup>1216</sup> Landau, 2011: 12; Basson & du Toit, 2017.

<sup>1217</sup> Gordin, 2008: 68; Johnson, 2015: 25.

<sup>1218</sup> Southall, 2014: 64; Johnson, 2015: 43, 52, 57; Basson & du Toit, 2017.

before Zuma, he oversaw the “criminalization of the South African state,” similar to Nigeria’s “tenderpreneurship.”<sup>1219</sup>

Unrest within the ANC party emerged as expectations for concrete change under Zuma were not fulfilled. COSATU, having thrown its weight behind Zuma’s candidacy, was particularly disappointed that its proposals were largely ignored, and corruption was growing.<sup>1220</sup> The union’s General Secretary, Zwelinzima Vavi, first spoke out against the Zuma administration and the lack of progress in 2010. Vavi accused the ANC of being “hellbent on their agenda of self-enrichment and crass materialism” and of becoming “a full-blown predator state, in which a powerful, corrupt and demagogic elite of political hyenas increasingly controls the state as a vehicle for accumulation.”<sup>1221</sup> Julius Malema, head of the ANCYL, looking to elevate his own status, similarly attacked Zuma in his rousing militant speeches to large crowds, channeling popular discontent over persistent inequality and rising unemployment.<sup>1222</sup> Malema advocated nationalizing the banks, mines, and large corporations as well as land reform and land redistribution.<sup>1223</sup>

These internal critiques were validated by the public in the ANC’s disappointing 2011 local election results.<sup>1224</sup> The party suffered significant losses in large urban centers while maintaining control across most of the country. These substandard results raised the stakes of the 2012 party conference. Amid this discontent, two challengers—Tokyo Sexwale and Kgalema Motlanthe—ran against Zuma for the party leadership, the first time an incumbent

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<sup>1219</sup> Pillay, 2010: 35; Southall, 2014: 63; Johnson, 2015: 45.

<sup>1220</sup> Basson & du Toit, 2017.

<sup>1221</sup> The Economist, 2010.

<sup>1222</sup> Johnson, 2015: 65; Basson & du Toit, 2017.

<sup>1223</sup> The Economist, 2010; Johnson, 2015: 65; Basson & du Toit, 2017.

<sup>1224</sup> Johnson, 2015: 64.

president<sup>1225</sup> was internally opposed.<sup>1226</sup> Despite internal pressure on them to withdraw their candidacies, they refused.

On top of this internal ANC discord, in August 2012, South Africa experienced one of its greatest tragedies since the 1960 Sharpeville massacre. At a platinum mine in Marikana, 34 striking mine workers were killed by the police with many miners shot in the back.<sup>1227</sup> The origin of the strike was over a split between rival unions, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Unions (AMCU), the former backed by the ANC and its ruling allies. Rumors swirled that the ANC had ordered the police to suppress the threat of the split—another blow to Zuma’s leadership mere months before the party elections.<sup>1228</sup> The parallels drawn between Sharpeville and Marikana, and in turn apartheid and the ANC, were extremely poor optics. In November 2012 the opposition Democratic Alliance scheduled a vote of no confidence following the public release of details that Zuma used over \$29.3 million in public funds to improve his private residence in Nkandla.<sup>1229</sup> Although the motion was blocked from coming to the floor of parliament, both the attempted vote, and the scandalous details of the appropriation of state funds for personal use, were two more strikes to Zuma’s legitimacy.

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<sup>1225</sup> Zuma had challenged Mbeki at the 2007 ANC party leadership conference, but Mbeki was in his second (of two) terms as South African president. Since the ANC has no term limits on party presidents, Mbeki tried (and failed) to run for a third term as party leader. The 2012 party conference was different in that Zuma had only served part of one term as South African president and thus was the incumbent for both the party and national elections. The challengers to him at the 2012 conference were *de facto* challenges to unseat him as the sitting South African president.

<sup>1226</sup> Johnson, 2015: 80, 82.

<sup>1227</sup> Johnson, 2015: 82.

<sup>1228</sup> Johnson, 2015: 82.

<sup>1229</sup> Southall, 2014: 58; Basson & du Toit, 2017.

Given the lack of results in Zuma's first three (of five) years in power, and the particularly tumultuous events of 2012, mass expulsion could have been both a useful diversion from the president's challenges as well as a populist appeal to unemployed South Africans. Malema had used xenophobic, populist appeals to launch his Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) party in the wake of Marikana, demonstrating its utility as a political strategy—there was clear public support for economic chauvinism and nativist policies.

After Zuma's election to the presidency in 2009, the ANC had been shifting to Zulu dominance. Nativism was strongest among ethnic Zulus, so mass expulsion would have appealed to Zuma's core ethnic base.<sup>1230</sup> Zuma was also losing support in urban areas which also happened to be where anti-migrant sentiment was highest. Expulsion might have won back some of those urban ANC defectors who had shifted to opposition parties in the 2011 local elections, and were losing confidence in the ANC. Finally, mass expulsion could have bolstered Zuma's image as a strongman, in control of the borders and enforcing the rule of law which may have played well among the ANC base. In sum, expulsion could have been a useful policy tool for Zuma in 2012 in advance of the party leadership elections, as deployed by Shagari in advance of Nigeria's national elections in 1983.

### **Constraints on Mass Expulsion**

Despite the perceived economic threat posed by African migrants in South Africa, the desire among the public and key government officials for a "South Africa for South Africans," and a precarious political situation for the Zuma regime, mass expulsion was not implemented.

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<sup>1230</sup> It was reported that foreigners would be stopped and asked to correctly state the Zulu word for elbow, a xenophobic test related to authentic "Zulu-ness" (a proxy for South African-ness), or face violence (Glaser, 2008: 58; Worby et al., 2008: 16; Landau & Pampalone, 2018: 133).



Unlike in Nigeria, the key contributing factors—alliances, homeland states, and the international community—constrained mass expulsion (See Table 20).

<b>Table 20: Mass Expulsion Decision Making Framework Applied to Nigeria &amp; South Africa</b>		
<i>Key Factors</i>	<i>Nigeria (1983)</i>	<i>South Africa (2012)</i>
<b>Alliances</b>		
<i>Domestic Alliances</i>	Benefit from expulsion (↑)	Harmed by expulsion (↓)
<i>Transnational Alliances</i>	Indifferent to expulsion (↑)	Harmed by expulsion (↓)
<b>Homeland State(s)</b>		
<i>Relation to Government</i>	Weak ties (↑)	Strong ties (↓)
<i>Response/ Anticipated Response</i>	Acquiesce & resettle expellees (↑)	Acquiesce & resettle expellees (↑)
<b>International Community</b>		
<i>Relation to Government</i>	Strong ties (↓)	Strong ties (↓)
<i>Response/ Anticipated Response</i>	Ignored expulsion (↑)	(Likely) resisted (↓)

## Alliances

### *Domestic Alliances*

Domestic politics in South Africa are run by a “corporatist” alliance between business, labor, and the state.<sup>1231</sup> The mining and agriculture sectors of the business alliance, as well as the immigration and policing arms of the state, benefited immensely from status quo policies regarding African foreigners. An important constraint on expulsion in South Africa was the potential harm to the status quo immigration arrangement.

Although South Africa has seen a dramatic growth in services, up to 60 percent of GDP, the mining and energy complex (MEC) is still incredibly powerful, and brings in most of the country’s crucial foreign exchange.<sup>1232</sup> While the sector has reduced its dependence on foreign labor since 1994, African migrants are still a crucial part of its workforce, both skilled workers and undocumented “back-door” entries through legal loopholes.<sup>1233</sup> In post-apartheid

<sup>1231</sup> Klotz, 2000: 841.

<sup>1232</sup> Crush & Tshitereke, 2001: 57; Mohamed, 2010: 43-44, 60-61; Southall, 2014: 63; Johnson, 2015: 106, 154.

<sup>1233</sup> Crush & Tshitereke, 2001: 53; Segatti, 2016: 86, 89.

South Africa, ANC-led governments have protected the interests of the mining sector.<sup>1234</sup> Expulsion would have been a major deviation from that approach. The commercial agriculture sector, the largest employer of migrant labor, also benefited from the foreign migrant status quo, as did other sectors like construction and manufacturing.<sup>1235</sup> Large corporate farms in the northernmost Limpopo Province, reported up to 80 percent foreign farm workers, many coming across from Zimbabwe during planting and harvest seasons.<sup>1236</sup> In Mpumalanga and Free State, two of Zuma's core provinces, large numbers of Mozambican and Basotho were employed on farms.<sup>1237</sup> While agriculture does not have the same exemptions from labor regulations as the mining sector, *de facto* the laws are not enforced. It has been reported that police occasionally work in tandem with farmers, deporting laborers just before their payday.<sup>1238</sup> The expulsion of migrant workers would have significantly harmed the commercial agriculture sector, a key corporate ally protected by the state.

The South African immigration system, with lax, exploitative implementation of the laws is immensely profitable for police and immigration officials. Bribery and extortion enriches DHA and SAPS officials at all levels.<sup>1239</sup> Cracking down on this lucrative business by removing the target—foreign migrants—would have upset some of Zuma's core allies who benefited enormously from the status quo.<sup>1240</sup> In addition, given South Africa's high rates of violent crime,<sup>1241</sup> the police are under intense pressure to produce results. Immigration-related

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<sup>1234</sup> Segatti, 2016: 87, 101.

<sup>1235</sup> Klotz, 2000: 841; Oucho & Crush, 2001: 146; Segatti, 2016: 90.

<sup>1236</sup> Segatti, 2016: 90, 95.

<sup>1237</sup> Crush & Tshitereke, 2001: 57.

<sup>1238</sup> Hicks, 1999: 402n52; Crush & Tshitereke, 2001: 66n4; Segatti, 2016: 98.

<sup>1239</sup> Klotz, 2000: 838; Klaaren & Ramji, 2001: 42; Crush, 2008: 3; Landau & Pampalone, 2018: 160.

<sup>1240</sup> Coplan, 2008: 130; Johnson, 2015: 43.

<sup>1241</sup> In 2012 South Africa ranked as the most violent country in Africa and the 8<sup>th</sup> most violent in the world (BusinessTech, 2014).

arrests and deportations pad government statistics and show the public that the government is doing something. Migrant arrests are viewed as a “prophylactic measure.”<sup>1242</sup> Mass expulsion would have eliminated this vital data pipeline for the police.<sup>1243</sup> Moreover, tacit agreements existed between the state and employers for “periods of tolerance” in advance of key public events such as the 2010 Football World Cup, during which large cohorts of migrant laborers were needed.<sup>1244</sup> Just as the business side of the corporatist alliance benefited from foreigners in the country, so did the state—expulsion would have harmed these interests.

Although labor is not a homogenous bloc in South Africa, key unions, like COSATU and NUM, have supported migrant rights, albeit with divergent opinions among the national leadership and local branches.<sup>1245</sup> COSATU consistently spoke out against rising anti-migrant sentiment and discrimination against immigrants, and called on the state and civil society to combat it.<sup>1246</sup> In fact, COSATU dispelled the notion that migrants were responsible for high unemployment and poor government service delivery and instead blamed unscrupulous employers as well as the police and DHA.<sup>1247</sup> Despite COSATU’s verbal support for international solidarity with African workers, the organization had to delicately balance national-level policies with local membership views, which were far more anti-migrant.<sup>1248</sup> Mass expulsion would have directly opposed COSATU’s activism around African workers’ camaraderie and collective rights.

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<sup>1242</sup> Klaaren & Ramji, 2001: 37.

<sup>1243</sup> Klaaren & Ramji, 2001: 42, 44; Murray, 2003: 453; Vigneswaran, 2011a: 109, 2011b: 168; Johnson, 2015: 177.

<sup>1244</sup> Segatti, 2016: 97-98.

<sup>1245</sup> Klotz, 2000: 842; Crush & Tshitereke, 2001: 58, 63; Hlatshwayo, 2010: 22.

<sup>1246</sup> Crush, 2008: 19, 47; Hlatshwayo, 2010: 13, 19.

<sup>1247</sup> Hlatshwayo, 2010: 16, 20.

<sup>1248</sup> Hlatshwayo, 2010: 29, 31, 38.

In sum, all elements of the domestic corporatist alliance—business, labor, and the state—favored the immigration status quo. Mass expulsion would have negatively affected those key allies, disrupting essential partnerships the Zuma administration wanted to maintain.

### *Transnational Alliances*

In 2012, South Africa's key transnational partners were southern African countries and China. As the world heralded South Africa's full embrace of democracy, its neighbors were cautious. They had been through decades of aggressive "destabilization"<sup>1249</sup> by the apartheid regime and were unsure how the new ANC government would wield its power. To rebuild relations with its African neighbors, South Africa adopted a foreign policy strategy deemed its "African Agenda."<sup>1250</sup> Although still deeply linked to the west economically, the ANC sought to distance itself from its former colonial master, and the West in general.<sup>1251</sup> Nelson Mandela stated that South Africa would not continue the apartheid regime's tactics of using "economic muscle to bully and intimidate small neighbors."<sup>1252</sup> Through increased trade and investment, South Africa attempted to reposition itself as an, "African power rather than a mouthpiece of the West or a vestige of colonialism and white domination."<sup>1253</sup>

To gain the support, respect, and trust of African countries, the ANC-led government sought to improve political and economic relations with the Southern African Customs

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<sup>1249</sup> As South Africa became more isolated in the 1980s the apartheid government implemented a "destabilization campaign" against the "frontline" states (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe) attacking them militarily, economically, and politically (Hanlon, 1986: 4; Adedeji, 1996: 9; Hicks, 1999: 397).

<sup>1250</sup> Hammerstad, 2012: 12; Olivier, 2013: 401; Landsberg, 2014: 157; Saunders, 2014: 223.

<sup>1251</sup> Olivier, 2013: 402; Johnson, 2015: 194-95.

<sup>1252</sup> Alden & Soko, 2005: 371.

<sup>1253</sup> Hammerstad, 2012: 14-15; Alden & Soko, 2005: 370-71; Landsberg, 2014: 157.

Union<sup>1254</sup> (SACU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).<sup>1255</sup> Table 21 shows that South African exports to SADC countries in 2012 totaled \$23.79 billion—the largest of any regional block. Of those \$23.79 billion in exports, \$17.05 billion, or 72 percent, went to South Africa’s six immediate neighbors. The shift away from the West, particularly the EU, which at that time included former colonial power Britain, was an intentional strategy to signal independence.<sup>1256</sup> Africa, particularly southern Africa, was an immense market for South Africa’s goods and the country actively linked its economic fate to that of the region, albeit with South Africa in the driver seat.

<b>Table 21: South African exports/imports by regional block, 2012 - USD (billions)<sup>1257</sup></b>		
<i>Regional Block</i>	<i>Total Exports</i>	<i>Total Imports</i>
SADC (15) <sup>1258</sup>	23.79	7.76
Neighboring countries (6)	17.05	4.23
EU (27)	17.50	29.22

South Africa not only augmented its trade relations with African states after 1994, but it also became the continent’s second largest developing country investor, after Malaysia, and the largest foreign investor in Southern Africa.<sup>1259</sup> The country channeled billions of dollars into the continent particularly in mining, wholesale, and healthcare products.<sup>1260</sup> In 2012 South Africa’s FDI outflows totaled \$4.4 billion.<sup>1261</sup> The country aggressively tried to overcome its tainted past of apartheid-era destabilization, and to strengthen its regional partnerships.<sup>1262</sup> The

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<sup>1254</sup> Established in 1910, the SACU is the oldest existing customs union in the world. It includes South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Eswatini, and Lesotho.

<sup>1255</sup> Landsberg, 2014: 161-62.

<sup>1256</sup> Johnson, 2015: 162.

<sup>1257</sup> Data from the South African Revenue Service, 2012.

<sup>1258</sup> There are now 16 total countries in the SADC but in 2012 Comoros was not yet a member (added in 2017), therefore the total SADC member countries was 15.

<sup>1259</sup> Alden & Soko, 2005: 374; United Nations Conference on Trade and Investment, 2013: xvi.

<sup>1260</sup> Alden & Soko, 2005: 380; United Nations Conference on Trade and Investment, 2013: 4.

<sup>1261</sup> United Nations Conference on Trade and Investment, 2013: 214.

<sup>1262</sup> Alden & Soko, 2005: 379.

burst of xenophobic violence in May 2008 had “damaged South Africa’s reputation in the eyes of Africans to the north.” Mass expulsion would have harmed both economic and political relations with its southern African transnational allies and jeopardized the solidarity it was trying to rebuild.

While Southern Africa was a key transnational ally, China was South Africa’s most important individual trading partner.<sup>1263</sup> Zuma elevated Chinese-South African relations in 2010 during a state visit to Beijing in which the two countries announced a “comprehensive strategic partnership” and nearly 400 South African business representatives signed dozens of investment agreements with Chinese companies.<sup>1264</sup> Table 22 shows that in 2012 China was South Africa’s top export (\$10.34 billion) and import (\$14.65 billion) partner.<sup>1265</sup> China was a large market for South African goods including agricultural products and raw materials; and South Africa was a large market for Chinese goods—so much so that Chinese textile imports destroyed South Africa’s domestic textile market.<sup>1266</sup> In 2011 South Africa was also the largest recipient of Chinese FDI of all African countries, albeit a modest amount in comparison to Western investment.<sup>1267</sup> Fostering strong relations with China was another way that South Africa signaled its reorientation away from the West and white domination.

Table 22: South Africa’s top export/import partners, 2012 - USD (billions) <sup>1268</sup>			
<i>Exports</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Imports</i>	<i>Total</i>
China	10.34	China	14.65
U.S.	7.87	Germany	10.26
Japan	5.70	Saudi	7.85

<sup>1263</sup> Oliver, 2013: 315; Saunders, 2014: 230.

<sup>1264</sup> Oliver, 2013: 311; Alden & Wu, 2014: 9-10.

<sup>1265</sup> South African Revenue Service, 2012.

<sup>1266</sup> Hlatshwayo, 2010: 14; Johnson, 2015: 200.

<sup>1267</sup> United Nations Conference on Trade and Investment, 2013: 5; Alden & Wu, 2014: 18.

<sup>1268</sup> Data from the South African Revenue Service, 2012.

Botswana	5.06	U.S.	7.46
Germany	4.55	Japan	4.62

However, the importance of China as a transnational ally went beyond bilateral relations. In 2009 the “BRIC” countries<sup>1269</sup>—Brazil, Russia, India, and China—were officially codified at a summit in the Ural Mountains in western Russia.<sup>1270</sup> At the time, these four countries represented a combined GDP of \$18.5 trillion and were seen as powerful emerging economies and smart investment opportunities.<sup>1271</sup> For our story the critical date is Christmas Eve 2010 when BRIC became BRICS.<sup>1272</sup> By all metrics South Africa should not have been invited to join the BRIC grouping (see Table 23), the other four members dwarfed it in GDP and population size.<sup>1273</sup>

<b>Table 23: BRICS - Comparative Economic Overview, 2011<sup>1274</sup></b>					
Country	Population (millions)	Surface area (millions sqkm)	Size of economy (USD, billions)	Annual growth rate (%)	Per capita income (USD)
Brazil	204	8.5	2,170	7.5	10,800
Russia	139	17.0	1,477	3.8	15,900
India	1,200	3.3	4,600	10.4	3,500
China	1,300	9.6	10,090	10.3	7,600
South Africa	51	1.2	524	2.8	10,700

South Africa’s position in the club had been described as, “an alliance in which the South African rowing boat is towed behind the Chinese battleship.”<sup>1275</sup>

<sup>1269</sup> Investor Jim O’Neill, British economist and former Chairman of Asset Management at Goldman Sachs, was the first to coin the concept ‘BRIC’ to indicate lucrative investment markets given the size of the four country’s combined populations and GDP; the grouping soon took on a life of its own (Olivier, 2013: 406; Johnson, 2015: 196)

<sup>1270</sup> Olivier, 2013: 404; Johnson, 2015: 196.

<sup>1271</sup> Olivier, 2013: 406.

<sup>1272</sup> Olivier, 2013: 406; Johnson, 2015: 197.

<sup>1273</sup> Alden & Schoeman, 2013: 115; Olivier, 2013: 400.

<sup>1274</sup> Adapted from text in Alden & Schoeman, 2013: 115.

<sup>1275</sup> Johnson, 2015: 203.

China advocated for South Africa's inclusion, seeing it as the "gateway to Africa"—a strategic partner through which to access the African continent.<sup>1276</sup> South Africa's regional power status and continental leadership was expected to "represent the 'whole of Africa' in the [BRICS] power club."<sup>1277</sup> Since China does not concern itself with the domestic politics of other states, particularly its partners, South Africa's bilateral economic partnership with China would not in itself have constrained mass expulsion. However, an expulsion policy would have damaged South Africa's relations with neighboring states and threatened its gateway status, the core reason for its rather unwarranted entry into the BRICS. Concern about harming relations with its core transnational alliances was an important constraint on the possibility of mass expulsion in South Africa.

#### *Homeland states*

Since nearly half of all foreign Africans in South Africa are Zimbabwean or Mozambican, this section focuses on those two countries as the central homeland states of concern. Zimbabwe and Mozambique are situated along South Africa's northeastern border and have shared kin, culture, and languages.<sup>1278</sup> Similar to the position of Nigeria's neighbors in 1983, if South Africa had decided to expel African migrants neither Zimbabwe, nor Mozambique, would have had the capacity to close their borders and deny entry to the hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people that would have returned home. It was not a hardened border or the ability of its neighbors to resist that constrained South Africa from expelling. Instead, it was concern about

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<sup>1276</sup> Calland, 2013: 103; Oliver, 2013: 313, 315; Olivier, 2013: 407; Alden & Wu, 2014: 20; Saunders, 2014: 230.

<sup>1277</sup> Olivier, 2013: 407; Kornegay, 2013: 16.

<sup>1278</sup> Amusan, 2008: 133.



damaging the strong relations it had with the two important homeland states. These concerns are clustered around three themes: solidarity with fellow liberation leaders and movements; domestic political boomerang effects; and energy and water interdependence.

The ANC party leadership view themselves as part of a regional club southern African liberation movements-cum-party states: ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe, FRELIMO in Mozambique, MPLA in Angola, and SWAPO in Namibia.<sup>1279</sup> This solidarity with neighboring liberation movements translated into largely unflinching support for their heads of state. Many SADC country leaders saw themselves as part of a “club of brother presidents in sister parties”—freedom fighters, turned leaders, with intertwined histories of struggle against white minority rule.<sup>1280</sup> In South Africa this solidarity was clearly depicted in Mbeki’s, and then Zuma’s, continued support for Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe. While the rest of the world condemned Mugabe’s confiscation of white farms, repression of political dissidents, and destruction of the country’s economy, Mbeki adopted “quiet diplomacy” in negotiating with the Zimbabwean president.<sup>1281</sup> Mbeki refused to openly condemn Mugabe’s actions or support economic sanctions, instead keeping his mediation efforts away from public view.<sup>1282</sup> Despite his desire to differentiate himself from his predecessor, Zuma largely continued Mbeki’s approach, adopting a non-confrontational, accommodative stance, and encouraging western states to remove sanctions.<sup>1283</sup> To indicate the ANC’s unflinching support, in advance of the 2012 Zimbabwean elections the ANC party Secretary General Gwede Mantashe stated, “Our

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<sup>1279</sup> Amusan, 2008: 131; Feinstein, 2009: 108; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011: 7; Saunders, 2014: 229.

<sup>1280</sup> Gevisser, 2007: 441; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011: 7; Hammerstad, 2012: 20; Calland, 2013: 94-95.

<sup>1281</sup> Gevisser, 2007: 432; Amusan, 2008: 123; Feinstein, 2009: 105.

<sup>1282</sup> Gevisser, 2007: 432; Feinstein, 2009: 106.

<sup>1283</sup> Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011: 14; Calland, 2013: 94; Landsberg, 2014: 159-61.

relationship [with ZANU-PF] is steeped in blood, the ANC wishes to affirm her commitment as a trust-worthy neighbor.”<sup>1284</sup> The political ties with homeland states were strong.

The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) was also a member of the “old boys club” as a liberation movement turned one-party state. After winning independence from Portugal in 1975, FRELIMO fought a brutal civil war against the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), trained and supplied by the apartheid regime, extending both the duration and devastation of the conflict.<sup>1285</sup> Ties between the ANC and FRELIMO were strong. Many South Africans spent time in Mozambique as exiles or refugees.<sup>1286</sup> They included Zuma who spent over a decade in exile in Maputo as the ANC’s chief representative.<sup>1287</sup> This solidarity with liberation parties and politicians meant South Africa was much less likely to implement a policy that would negatively affect one of its fellow freedom fighters.

The South African government was also aware of the possible boomerang effect of its actions on domestic politics. ANC-led South Africa did not want to take actions that could potentially support opposition parties challenging the supremacy of the one-party-states (e.g., Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in Zimbabwe and RENAMO in Mozambique). Zimbabwe’s opposition MDC was made up a coalition of anti-ZANU-PF groups, but one of the largest factions was the trade unions. One reason Mbeki did not more strongly condemn Mugabe’s actions was because of concern that the ANC’s own, even stronger, trade unions might break away and challenge the ANC.<sup>1288</sup> There was a fear among liberation leaders that

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<sup>1284</sup> Calland, 2013: 94.

<sup>1285</sup> Hanlon, 1986: 140-41; Newitt, 2017: 161-62.

<sup>1286</sup> Gqada, 2012: 3; Saunders, 2014: 224; Newitt, 2017: 160-61.

<sup>1287</sup> Gordin, 2008: 25-26.

<sup>1288</sup> Gevisser, 2007: 441; Feinstein, 2009: 108.

if the MDC took power in Zimbabwe it would “set an uncomfortable precedent.”<sup>1289</sup> Thus, the South African government focused on maintaining the regional status quo, preserving trusted leaders in fellow SADC countries that would further South Africa’s own interests.<sup>1290</sup> Mass expulsion would have flooded Zimbabwe with hundreds of thousands of its citizens, destabilizing an already fragile political and economic situation, to the advantage of the opposition MDC.

In Mozambique FRELIMO had a tighter hold on power, but the opposition RENAMO had come close to winning the 1999 elections and remained a formidable competitor in subsequent elections (2004, 2009).<sup>1291</sup> Politically, Mozambique was fragile with recurring anti-government riots (2008, 2010, 2012) against the rising cost of food, fuel, and transport, as well as the return of low-level guerilla fighting with RENAMO in 2010 after the national elections.<sup>1292</sup> The disgruntled public blamed the government, particularly FRELIMO President Armando Guebuza—infamously known as “Mr. Gue-Business” because of his lucrative commercial holdings—for the growing inequality and the lack of government support.<sup>1293</sup> A surge of expellees would have added to the turmoil, possibly shifting more support to the opposition. In both cases, expulsion would have had a destabilizing effect on the homeland states, damaging the rule of the liberation party regimes which could have augmented cracks in the ANC’s rule at home.

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<sup>1289</sup> Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011: 14, 16; Hammerstad, 2012: 20.

<sup>1290</sup> Amusan, 2008: 131; Hammerstad, 2012: 29; Saunders, 2014: 233.

<sup>1291</sup> Newitt, 2017: 173

<sup>1292</sup> de Brito et al, 2014: 19-20; Newitt, 2017: 181, 188.

<sup>1293</sup> Nhachote, 2012; de Brito et al, 2014: 25-27.

Lastly, climate change, particularly rising temperatures and desertification, is increasing South Africa's interdependence with its neighbors for future water and energy needs.<sup>1294</sup> Dating back to apartheid, Pretoria saw the country's shortages of oil, electricity, and water as vital national security concerns.<sup>1295</sup> The largest Southern African hydro and water resources are concentrated in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Zambia along the Zambezi river.<sup>1296</sup> Since the 1980s, South Africa has been moving toward a permanent water deficit and water demands are increasing because of population growth, urbanization, and expanding industrial and agricultural production.<sup>1297</sup> In this case "upstream users wield formidable power over downstream users," making South Africa particularly dependent on Zimbabwe and Mozambique for its future water needs.<sup>1298</sup>

South Africa has enormous coal reserves, which has meant its energy generation is inefficient, costly, and high in carbon emissions.<sup>1299</sup> It has been under some pressure to identify cleaner sources of power, not only to reduce emissions but to combat problems of acid rain and air pollution.<sup>1300</sup> A power crisis in 2007-2008 caused weeks of rolling blackouts, sparking public cries to move away from coal and a government declaration of an "electricity emergency."<sup>1301</sup> That South Africa could not provide reliable power was a severe blow to the Mbeki regime, one Zuma wanted to avoid. The discovery of massive natural gas resources—estimated among the largest in the world—off the coast of Mozambique in 2011 was a

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<sup>1294</sup> Swatuk, 2000: 228; Hentz, 2005: 40.

<sup>1295</sup> Hanlon, 1986: 73.

<sup>1296</sup> Hanlon, 1986: 73.

<sup>1297</sup> Swatuk, 2000: 228.

<sup>1298</sup> Hudson, 1996: 9.

<sup>1299</sup> Swatuk, 2000: 221-22; Gqada, 2012: 2.

<sup>1300</sup> Swatuk, 2000: 222.

<sup>1301</sup> Bearak & Dugger, 2008; Gqada, 2012: 2.

significant development for South African energy security.<sup>1302</sup> Months later Zuma and Guebuza established a Binational Commission to increase engagement between the two countries, and South Africa's national oil company (PetroSA) signed a "strategic partnership agreement" with Petromoc of Mozambique.<sup>1303</sup> Bilaterally, and as part of the SADC, South Africa has taken steps to cooperate around water and energy interdependence.<sup>1304</sup> South Africa has the technical capacity to exploit these resources, which other SADC countries lack, creating a symbiotic relationship between states.<sup>1305</sup> The essential water and energy resources of Zimbabwe and Mozambique further intertwined the fates of these three countries. Although South Africa, like Nigeria, was a regional power, and had asymmetrical relations with its neighbors, it had strong historical, political, and economic ties with Zimbabwe and Mozambique that constrained a policy of mass expulsion.

### *International Community*

A key thread in understanding South Africa's decision-making is its goal of becoming, or in its eyes maintaining its status as, a global player.<sup>1306</sup> Since the founding of the Republic, the country's leaders have seen the nation as separate from the rest of the continent—a "European outpost" in the club of states like Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.<sup>1307</sup> While there were many breaks with the white minority regime after 1994, this aura of continental superiority stuck. South Africa's self-image is that of an African giant with serious Great Power

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<sup>1302</sup> Gqada, 2012: 1.

<sup>1303</sup> Gqada, 2012: 3.

<sup>1304</sup> Swatuk, 2000: 224, 226.

<sup>1305</sup> Swatuk, 2000: 211; Gqada, 2012: 4.

<sup>1306</sup> Alden & Soko, 2005: 385; Alden & Schoeman, 2013: 118.

<sup>1307</sup> Adedeji, 1996: 5; Klotz, 2000: 837; Hammerstad, 2012: 16.

ambitions.<sup>1308</sup> These goals were important constraints on the implementation of a mass expulsion policy.

South Africa was elected, with an overwhelming majority, as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) for two terms in the period examined: 2007-2008 and 2011-2012. South Africa's repeated election signaled the strong support of the SADC, which nominated South Africa for the seat, and of the African Union (AU), which endorsed its candidature.<sup>1309</sup> In this role, South Africa promoted its "African Agenda" focused on peace, security, and development. Although the South African government was pleased with its status as a non-permanent member, its real ambition was to become a permanent member of a reformed and expanded UNSC.<sup>1310</sup> While other African countries have also served on the UNSC, South Africa is the only African state included in the exclusive G20 grouping, another signal of its "gateway to Africa" standing.<sup>1311</sup> International prestige and recognition are key drivers of South Africa's foreign policy.

To be the voice of Africa on the global stage, South Africa had to maintain the confidence and backing of the continent, particularly the African Union. Although South Africa was a regional hegemon and a recognized African leader, by 2012 its status was not unchallenged.<sup>1312</sup> Nigeria was a key rival for African supremacy with a growing economy and population, and its own regional hegemonic status.<sup>1313</sup> Nigeria-South African competition came to a head in 2012 over the AU Commission Chairmanship.

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<sup>1308</sup> Alden & Schoeman, 2013: 118; Johnson, 2015: 196.

<sup>1309</sup> Alden & Schoeman, 2013: 111.

<sup>1310</sup> Olivier, 2013: 399; Saunders, 2014: 231.

<sup>1311</sup> Alden & Wu, 2014: 13; Saunders, 2014: 230.

<sup>1312</sup> Alden & Soko, 2005: 386.

<sup>1313</sup> Alden & Soko, 2005: 386; Johnson, 2015: 197; Saunders, 2014: 233-34.

The AU Commission election illustrates the lengths South Africa was willing to go to maintain its position as continental leader. The AU Commission is the African Union's secretariat, serving as its executive and administrative body, like the EU Commission. The head of the Commission is the AU Chairman or Chairwoman, a prestigious and coveted role. In 2011 Zuma put forward Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, former Minister of Health, Foreign Affairs, and Home Affairs for the post, successfully persuading the SADC to back her nomination.<sup>1314</sup> Dlamini-Zuma challenged the incumbent chair, Jean Ping from Gabon, drawing criticism from other African states, particularly Francophone and West Africa.<sup>1315</sup> South Africa was accused of dividing the continent and ignoring the unwritten rule that continental powers should not run for the position. African rivals including Nigeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Kenya, all opposed Dlamini-Zuma.<sup>1316</sup>

Nevertheless, after a tumultuous campaign and four rounds of voting, Dlamini-Zuma defeated Ping in the July 2012 election and became AU Chairwoman.<sup>1317</sup> Ping's loss was a blow to Nigeria, who had supported Ping as ECOWAS's preferred candidate. A former Nigerian Minister of Foreign Affairs described Dlamini-Zuma's victory as "the most successful projection of South African power over the African continent" and an "unacceptable defeat for Nigeria's status and policies in Africa."<sup>1318</sup> Zuma achieved his goal of leading the regional body and secured South Africa's status as global and African leader.

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<sup>1314</sup> Saunders, 2014: 229-30.

<sup>1315</sup> Alden & Schoeman, 2013: 123.

<sup>1316</sup> Affa'a-Mindzie, 2012.

<sup>1317</sup> Alden & Schoeman, 2013: 123.

<sup>1318</sup> "Nigeria's bloody nose at the African Union", 2012.

A South African mass expulsion would have destabilized a vital African region, severely affecting its regional and international reputation. The 2008 xenophobic violence tarnished the country's character, but these events were confined within the country and were relatively small-scale. The mass expulsion of African migrants from South Africa would have been an international and regional issue that would have damaged South Africa's status as continental leader. Particularly in 2012, as a rotating UNSC non-permanent member, and while pursuing the AU Commission Chairmanship, mass expulsion was not a viable policy option. Concern about risking relations with the international community—here the UN and AU—deterred expulsion in South Africa.

### *Summary*

This chapter introduced mass expulsion motivated by nativism as a third type of expulsion, driven by the perceived economic threat of a target group, during a critical phase of consolidating the nation. In 1983 the world oil glut drastically affected Nigeria's economy, causing a multi-year recession in the lead up to national elections. The Shagari administration identified African migrants as a scapegoat for the government's mismanagement of the crisis and announced their expulsion, *en masse*, giving them a mere two weeks to leave the country. Favorable domestic and transnational allies and weak responses of the homeland states and the international community facilitated its expulsion policy. The negative case of South Africa illustrates a population and government arguably even more nativist than its Nigerian counterparts. The 2008 global financial crisis exacerbated existing economic malaise and President Zuma was particularly vulnerable in the 2012 ANC leadership elections given allegations of corruption and his failure to deliver on political promises. However, unlike 1983



Nigeria, South Africa's domestic (business, labor, and the state) and transnational (SADC countries and China) alliances, and desire to preserve relations with homeland states and maintain its status as a regional and global leader, constrained mass expulsion.

## CHAPTER 6. “You are not Burmese”: Rohingya in Burma

This chapter investigates the expulsion of Rohingya Muslims from Burma<sup>1319</sup> in the early 1990s—systematically removed from March 1991 through July 1992, but then systematically repatriated beginning in September 1992. This final case study returns to a within case design, like that in Chapter 3, which examined the Ottoman Empire’s treatment of Orthodox Greeks, who were expelled from the Aegean and Pontic littoral, but not from Istanbul. From 1991-1992, over 250,000 Rohingya were forced out of Burma, *en masse*, by the Burmese military, paramilitary, border guards, military intelligence, and police.<sup>1320</sup> But less than a year later, in April 1992, Burma signed an agreement with Bangladesh to “repatriate” the Rohingya refugees, with the support of the international community and the facilitation of the UNHCR—despite no changes in the environment in Arakan State. Between September 1992 and the end of 1995, nearly the entire expelled population returned to Burma.<sup>1321</sup> This case illustrates that my expulsion decision-making framework can both explain why Burma expelled its Rohingya minority in 1991-1992 as well as why it immediately shifted course and agreed to take them back within one year. The concluding section briefly discusses the similarities between the most recent 2016-2018 expulsion of the Rohingya and that of 1991-1992.

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<sup>1319</sup> I use the country name Burma, as well as the older state and capital names (i.e., Arakan instead of Rakhine; Akyab instead of Sittwe), for the sake of consistency in discussing the colonial and post-colonial periods, and because of the political nature of the 1989 English language name change of the country from Burma to Myanmar. This decision by the SLORC will be discussed at length throughout the chapter.

<sup>1320</sup> Amnesty International, 1992 (Apr): 13-14; Amnesty International, 1992 (Sept): 24; Piper, 1994: 14; Smith, 1994: 29, 56; U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 1993: 6; Van Hear, 1998: 94; Human Rights Watch, 2000.

<sup>1321</sup> Loescher, 2001: 286.

## 6.1 Contextual Environment & Predisposing Conditions

### *Ethnicity in Burma*

Burma is one of the most ethnically diverse countries in the world. Over 100 languages have been identified in the country and over 135 ethnic/racial groups.<sup>1322</sup> In the early 1990s, ethnic minorities made up least a third of the country's 40 million people, inhabiting half the land.<sup>1323</sup> The majority of the population is ethnic Burmese, or Burmans, estimated to comprise 60-70%,<sup>1324</sup> with the remaining 30-40% ethnic minorities, the largest of which are the Karen, Shan, Arakanese, and Mon.<sup>1325</sup> Buddhism is the dominant religion of over 80% of the population.<sup>1326</sup> Its special status is outlined in Article 21(1) of the 1947 constitution: "The State recognizes the special position of Buddhism as the faith professed by the great majority of citizens of the Union."<sup>1327</sup> Minority religions include Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Animism.<sup>1328</sup> Though census figures are highly politicized, the 1983 census specified the Muslim population in Burma was 3.9 percent of the total population of 34 million, or 1.3 million.<sup>1329</sup>

Sub-national ethnic and religious diversity is also salient. In the 1990s, the SLORC government estimated the total population in Arakan State was 2.4 million, of which 690,000 (or 29%) were Muslim, and the rest (71%) Arakanese Buddhist.<sup>1330</sup> However, Muslims contested that figure claiming their population was more than half of the total, or 1.4

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<sup>1322</sup> Smith, 1991: 29-30; Smith, 1994: 17-18; Cheesman, 2017: 468; Center for Diversity & National Harmony, 2018: 202; MacLean, 2019: 88.

<sup>1323</sup> Smith, 1994: 17.

<sup>1324</sup> Walton, 2013: 6.

<sup>1325</sup> Smith, 1994: 34.

<sup>1326</sup> Smith, 1994: 18.

<sup>1327</sup> Constitution of the Union of Burma, 1947. Interestingly no specific mention of Buddhism, or any other religions, was included in the 1974 Constitution.

<sup>1328</sup> Smith, 1994: 34.

<sup>1329</sup> Yegar, 2002: 358; International Crisis Group, 2014: 18.

<sup>1330</sup> Smith, 1994: 57.

million.<sup>1331</sup> Regardless, while the Muslim population in Burma as a whole is quite small, Muslims are a sizable minority in Arakan state, and in northern Arakan they are the majority.<sup>1332</sup> Most Muslims in Arakan are Rohingya, and they largely reside in the two northernmost townships of the state—Maungdaw and Buthidaung—which border Bangladesh (See Map 5).<sup>1333</sup> The Kaman are another Muslim group in Arakan, but their population is estimated to be in the low tens of thousands.<sup>1334</sup> The Rohingya speak an Indo-Aryan language—a combination of Arakanese, Bengli, and Urdu—that is distinct but mutually intelligible to the Bengali dialect spoken across the border by the Chittagonian people in Bangladesh.<sup>1335</sup>

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
<sup>1331</sup> Smith, 1994: 57.

<sup>1332</sup> Van Hear, 1998: 95; Human Rights Watch, 2000.

<sup>1333</sup> Van Hear, 1998: 95; Human Rights Watch, 2000.

<sup>1334</sup> Kyaw, 2017: 284.

<sup>1335</sup> Yegar, 2002: 51; Ibrahim, 2018: 21; Myint-U, 2021: 27.



Map 5: Ethnic groups and ethnic minority state political boundaries in Burma<sup>1336</sup>

During the colonial period, the British governed Burma in two distinct parts: “Ministerial Burma” including Rangoon and the Irrawaddy delta, and the “Frontier [or Excluded] Areas” composed of the territory in the border regions.<sup>1337</sup> The colonial government’s focus was on central Burma where the Burmese majority was concentrated. This division of center and periphery, Burmese and non-Burmese, would have important implications for the post-colonial state. The geographic division of ethnicity continued in the post-colonial period with the 1947 constitution codifying three ethnic minority states (Shan,

<sup>1336</sup> Source: Smith, 1994: 51; Callahan, 2003: 28; Aljazeera, 2019; Euro-Burma Office (EBO) Myanmar, 2022.

<sup>1337</sup> Walton, 2013: 7; Ibrahim, 2018: 26.

Kachin, Karenni), a special ethnic region (*Kaw-thu-lay*),<sup>1338</sup> and a special ethnic division (Chins).<sup>1339</sup> These minority areas enjoyed some local autonomy from 1948-1962, but that was rescinded under the dictatorship of General Ne Win (1962-1988), who established Burma as a unitary state.<sup>1340</sup>

From its founding, ethnicity has been highly charged in Burma and language and names are contentious. In 1989, the new SLORC government changed the official English-language name of the country from Burma to Myanmar,<sup>1341</sup> while the name in Burmese remained unchanged: *Myanma pyi*.<sup>1342</sup> The government claimed that the new [English language] name, was more inclusive toward country's indigenous peoples.<sup>1343</sup> However, many ethnic minorities in Burma rejected the name on the grounds that "Myanma" only referred to the Burmese majority, accusing the government of a larger campaign of Burmanization.<sup>1344</sup> Burmese opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi also criticized the name change while under house arrest:

“No one should be allowed to change the name of the country without referring to the will of the people. They [the government] say that ‘Myanmar’ refers to all the Burmese ethnic groups, whereas ‘Burma’ only refers to the Burmese ethnic group, but that is not true. ‘Myanmar’ is a literary word for ‘Burma’ and it refers only to the Burmese ethnic group. Of course I prefer the word ‘Burma.’”<sup>1345</sup>

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<sup>1338</sup> Constitution of the Union of Burma, 1947. Article IX (Part III, Section 180) of the 1947 Constitution allowed for a Special Commission to be appointed by the President to determine if the majority of people in Karenni State, the Salween District, and the adjacent areas occupied by the Karens, desired to form a state. Thus Section 181 created the Special Region of *Kaw-thu-lay* until (and if) Karen State was constituted under Section 180.

<sup>1339</sup> Constitution of the Union of Burma, 1947.

<sup>1340</sup> Steinberg, 1980: 182; Smith, 1999: 200.

<sup>1341</sup> Walton, 2013: 12; Myint-U, 2021: 43.

<sup>1342</sup> Permanent Committee on Geographical Names, 2007: 7; Myint-U, 2021: xvii.

<sup>1343</sup> Walton, 2013: 12; Ferguson, 2015: 16; Myint-U, 2021: xviii.

<sup>1344</sup> Amnesty International, 1992 (Sept): 43; Smith, 1994: 18; Walton, 2013: 11-12, 21; Ferguson, 2015: 16; Myint-U, 2021: 44.

<sup>1345</sup> Cockett, 2015: 82.

Burma has been, and continues to be, at war with its ethnic minorities in the world's longest running civil conflict.<sup>1346</sup> The Rohingya have been a unique target in this complex ethnic landscape.

### *Rohingya in Pre-Colonial & Colonial Burma*

The Muslim presence in the boundaries of contemporary Burma dates to the arrival of Moorish, Arab, and Persian traders who settled in the area between the ninth and tenth centuries and intermarried with the local population.<sup>1347</sup> European travelogues from as early as the fifteenth century document bustling Muslim settlements conducting commercial trade from ports that were conveniently located at the halfway point along shipping routes from the Red Sea to the Spice Islands and China.<sup>1348</sup> Over the following centuries, Muslim migration continued across the Bay of Bengal. Many settled in Arakan which is topographically separated from the rest of Burma by a coastal mountain range, which made contact with—and migration from—the west much easier than from the east (See Map 6).<sup>1349</sup> In 1785 the Kingdom of Burma annexed Arakan, putting the Burmese on a collision course with British imperial hegemony in South Asia.<sup>1350</sup>

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<sup>1346</sup> Myint-U, 2021: 3.

<sup>1347</sup> Piper, 1994: 12; Van Hear, 1998: 94; Yegar, 1972: 72; Yegar, 2002: 19; Ibrahim, 2018: 21.

<sup>1348</sup> Yegar, 2002: 19-20.

<sup>1349</sup> Yegar, 2002: 23; Ibrahim, 2018: 18.

<sup>1350</sup> Christie, 1996: 163; Yegar, 2002: 24; Cockett, 2015: 6; Ibrahim, 2018: 18.



Map 6: Topography of Burma<sup>1351</sup>

Beginning in 1824, the British fought multiple wars (1824-1826; 1852-1853; 1885) against Burmese monarchs to expand their South Asian colonial territories, eventually conquering all of Burma's contemporary boundaries.<sup>1352</sup> In the first war of 1824-1826, the British annexed Arakan; in the second (1852-1853) they conquered "Lower Burma," including the Irrawaddy Delta and Rangoon; and finally in the third Anglo-Burmese war of 1885 they captured the Burmese heartland of "Upper Burma" with aspirations to open trade with China.<sup>1353</sup>

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<sup>1351</sup> Sources: Maphill, 2022.

<sup>1352</sup> Human Rights Watch, 2000; Yegar, 2002: 27; Callahan, 2003: 22-23; Myint-U, 2021: 14.

<sup>1353</sup> Christie, 1996: 164; Cockett, 2015: 7; Ibrahim, 2018: 18, 26; Myint-U, 2021: 15.



From 1885, the British ruled Burma as a province of their larger Indian empire with the administrative capital in Calcutta (later New Delhi).<sup>1354</sup> The territory served as a convenient buffer between French Indochina and British India.<sup>1355</sup> By ruling Burma as an Indian appendage, the British stifled the political development of Burmese society. They used the Indian Army to maintain “internal security” and repress any resistance to their rule.<sup>1356</sup> The British invested most of their resources in central “Ministerial Burma,” with its capital in Rangoon, which became a major commercial hub, exploiting the territory’s vast natural resources including oil, rubber, jade, tungsten, teakwood, and rice.<sup>1357</sup> The Frontier Areas, by contrast, were largely left alone, with limited penetration by the colonial state, and were thus less developed.<sup>1358</sup> As indicated in Map 6, the Frontier Areas were geographically more mountainous and physically separate from the Burmese core, which practically contributed to the decision for the dual governance structure. Given the freedom of movement within the British Indian Empire, many Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, and others came by ship to the capital to work as laborers, administrators, and professionals.<sup>1359</sup> They were preferred by the British over the local Burmese inhabitants and by the early 1930s the Indian-origin population in Burma grew to one million, or 7% of the total population—most of whom fled Rangoon with the British during the Japanese invasion (more below).<sup>1360</sup>

This pattern of migration was not confined to the capital. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, migration to Arakan increased significantly. Many Muslim

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<sup>1354</sup> Callahan, 2003: 23; Cockett, 2015: 9-10; Ibrahim, 2018: 26.

<sup>1355</sup> Callahan, 2003: 21.

<sup>1356</sup> Callahan, 2003: 22, 43.

<sup>1357</sup> Callahan, 2003: 23; Cockett, 2015: 12-13.

<sup>1358</sup> Callahan, 2003: 27.

<sup>1359</sup> Yegar, 2002: 27; Cockett, 2015: 16; Myint-U, 2021: 18.

<sup>1360</sup> Tinker, 1990: 43-44; Cockett, 2015: 17; Myint-U, 2021: 18.

Chittagonians from Bengal moved to the area to work as agricultural laborers.<sup>1361</sup> Burma's Irrawaddy Delta was the global center of rice cultivation, and Arakan a hub for rice-export trade.<sup>1362</sup> Some of the Chittagonian Muslims were returning to homes their ancestors had fled during the Kingdom of Burma's annexation of Arakan.<sup>1363</sup> Colonial figures estimate that in 1872, 58,000 Muslims lived in Arakan, and nearly 40 years later, in 1911, there were three times as many.<sup>1364</sup> During the same period, the Arakanese Buddhists population only slightly outnumbered the Muslims with a total population of 209,000.<sup>1365</sup> In addition to the influx of Muslims, many Burmese also flocked to Arakan, gravitating to the economic opportunities of its main port town of Akyab (Sittwe), which became the fourth largest city in colonial Burma.<sup>1366</sup> Large-scale Muslim migration, and rising Burmese nationalism coupled with Buddhist religious revival, contributed to growing resentment toward these "unwanted outsiders" in Arakan.<sup>1367</sup>

The British did not use the term "Rohingya" to describe the Muslim population in Arakan.<sup>1368</sup> Some Muslims in northern Arakan used the label, which translates into English as "of Rohang," or "of Arakan."<sup>1369</sup> Some Muslims referred to themselves as Arakanese Mohammedans, descendants of the ancient Burmese Mrauk-U kingdom, terms the British also used.<sup>1370</sup> Others were Chittagonian immigrants who intermarried with "Rohang" or

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<sup>1361</sup> Van Hear, 1998: 94; Yegar, 2002: 28; Cockett, 2015: 37; Myint-U, 2021: 18.

<sup>1362</sup> Cockett, 2015: 13, 37.

<sup>1363</sup> Myint-U, 2021: 26.

<sup>1364</sup> Cockett, 2015: 37.

<sup>1365</sup> Cockett, 2015: 37.

<sup>1366</sup> Cockett, 2015: 36-38; Myint-U, 2021: 26.

<sup>1367</sup> Yegar, 2002: 28, 30.

<sup>1368</sup> Myint-U, 2021: 27.

<sup>1369</sup> Myint-U, 2021: 27.

<sup>1370</sup> Myint-U, 2021: 36.

“Arakanese Mohammedans” that had lived in the region for generations.<sup>1371</sup> Many Rohingya therefore had roots in Arakan before British colonization, but many more arrived with British colonial expansion into Burma.<sup>1372</sup> Intermarriage between these various groups created a complex picture of “descent” and “origin.”

In 1922, the British granted Burma a semi-elected parliament, like its other Indian provinces, with a Governor and a Legislative Council, but final decision making on key issues remained with the British.<sup>1373</sup> Then in 1937 the British partitioned its Indian Empire, creating Burma as a separate colony, but without independence.<sup>1374</sup> A few years later in 1942, during the Second World War, the Japanese invaded Burma. The Japanese invasion destroyed the British colonial and administrative structure that had been in place for more than five decades.<sup>1375</sup> Burmese nationalists seeking an independent state, initially supported the Japanese invasion, to remove their British colonizer.<sup>1376</sup>

After their swift defeat by the Japanese, the British recruited and trained ethnic minorities in clandestine intelligence and formed paramilitary organizations to fight against the Japanese.<sup>1377</sup> The British “psychological warfare” officers used propaganda to woo recruits to their side, praising “loyal” ethnic minorities against “treacherous” Burmans supporting the Japanese.<sup>1378</sup> The Rohingya, and other ethnic minorities, supported the British, fearing Buddhist majority rule. They were also optimistic about the British promise of post-war self-

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<sup>1371</sup> Myint-U, 2021: 30.

<sup>1372</sup> Cockett, 2015: 38.

<sup>1373</sup> Callahan, 2003: 32; Myint-U, 2021: 27.

<sup>1374</sup> Callahan, 2003: 32; Ibrahim, 2018: 26; Myint-U, 2021: 29.

<sup>1375</sup> Callahan, 2003: 45.

<sup>1376</sup> Piper, 1994: 12; Cockett, 2015: 47; Ibrahim, 2018: 27.

<sup>1377</sup> Yegar, 1972: 96; Christie, 1996: 165; Callahan, 2003: 71

<sup>1378</sup> Callahan, 2003: 72, 85.

determination—in the case of the Rohingya, autonomy in the form of a Muslim National Area.<sup>1379</sup> However, as with its promises to the Kurds, Assyrians, and Palestinians, the British failed to deliver. In late 1944, the British joined forces with the Burmese nationalists, who had become disillusioned by the Japanese occupation, and they jointly defeated the Japanese in August 1945.<sup>1380</sup> The British briefly retook control of a war-ravaged Burma, but as part of imperial down-sizing it was granted independence on January 4, 1948.<sup>1381</sup>

### *Post-Colonial Political Transition*

The independent government of Prime Minister U Nu tried to govern the country as a unitary state, something the British had never tried to do. The 1947 Constitution established three ethnic minority states, granting them some local autonomy, and allowing for the possibility of secession via a plebiscite after a ten-year period.<sup>1382</sup> These autonomy concessions did not prevent the outbreak of civil war.<sup>1383</sup> Various insurgencies sprouted with different political (communist) and ethnic factions fighting for civil, economic, and territorial control. The central government tried, unsuccessfully, to contain them but the fighting raged on leading to an “equilibrium of instability.”<sup>1384</sup> Although Burma was perpetually in crisis in its early independence period it did manage to hold elections in 1951-1952, 1956, and 1960.<sup>1385</sup> However, its short life as a parliamentary democracy ended in 1962 when General Ne Win

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<sup>1379</sup> Yegar, 1972: 96; Christie, 1996: 166; Yegar, 2002: 34; Callahan, 2003: 85; Walton, 2013: 9; Ibrahim, 2018: 7, 27.

<sup>1380</sup> Callahan, 2003: 78-85, 96; Walton, 2013: 9.

<sup>1381</sup> Rau, 1948; Smith, 1991: 27; Myint-U, 2021: 30.

<sup>1382</sup> Constitution of the Union of Burma, 1947.

<sup>1383</sup> Myint-U, 2021: 3, 30.

<sup>1384</sup> Christie, 1996: 78.

<sup>1385</sup> Callahan, 2003: 142, 144, 208.

took power in a military coup d'état.<sup>1386</sup> One of the driving forces for Ne Win's coup was the military's fear that Prime Minister U Nu was granting too many concessions to the ethnic minority states, risking Burma's territorial sovereignty.<sup>1387</sup> On the morning of the coup, Ne Win was quoted as saying, "Federalism is impossible; it will destroy the Union."<sup>1388</sup>

After taking power, Ne Win quickly suspended the constitution, dissolved parliament, outlawed political parties, and ruled through a "Revolutionary Council."<sup>1389</sup> The Revolutionary Council introduced a Marxist-Leninist state ideology with one-party rule of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) and the Burmese Way to Socialism as the guiding strategy to create a centralized, command economy, without foreign influence or control.<sup>1390</sup> Ne Win pursued a dual track strategy of centralizing control in Rangoon and conducting ruthless counterinsurgency programs in the periphery to crush the ethnic insurgent opposition.<sup>1391</sup> Though he successfully pushed some insurgent groups into more remote areas of the border regions, he could not fully suppress them.<sup>1392</sup>

In 1974 the government introduced a new constitution which officially established Burma as a unitary state and renamed the country the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma. The Constitution rescinded the local autonomy previously granted to some of ethnic minorities and created a new administrative structure. Article 31 outlined seven ethnic minority states<sup>1393</sup> (Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kayah (formerly Karenni), Mon, Arakan, Shan), alongside

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<sup>1386</sup> Smith, 1991: 28.

<sup>1387</sup> Smith, 1999: 196; Walton, 2013: 14.

<sup>1388</sup> Smith 1999: 196.

<sup>1389</sup> Steinberg, 1980: 180-81; Callahan, 2003: 208; Cockett, 2015: 53-54.

<sup>1390</sup> Callahan, 2003: 209; Cockett, 2015: 54.

<sup>1391</sup> Smith, 1999: 199.

<sup>1392</sup> Smith, 1991: 28.

<sup>1393</sup> Arakan and Mon were added to the five (states, special region, and special division) outlined in the 1947 constitution.

seven Burmese divisions (Sagaing, Tenasserim, Pegu, Magwe, Mandalay, Rangoon, Irrawaddy).<sup>1394</sup> However, these ethnic minority states had no devolved political power, they were simply administrative units. The new constitution eliminated any possibility of their autonomy, secession, or independent political representation.<sup>1395</sup> There was no division of powers between the center and the states.<sup>1396</sup>

Economically, Ne Win's Burmese Way to Socialism had devastating consequences. The government nationalized businesses in the 1960s, driving out hundreds of thousands of private businesses dominated by Indian and Chinese traders, to create a "Burman run economy solely for the Burmans."<sup>1397</sup> International travel was banned, except for a privileged military elite, with the intent of eliminating any foreign engagement or influence.<sup>1398</sup> The country became further economically and politically isolated and the people suffered as a result. This economic and political repression would lead to the 1988 student uprisings.

### *Rohingya in Independent Burma*

Violence in Arakan bridged the pre- and post- colonial periods. As mentioned above, the Rohingya supported the British during WWII and fought against the Japanese—and their Arakanese Buddhist backers—to re-take control of the territory. The Arakanese Buddhists resented the Rohingya for supporting the British, viewing them as national traitors.<sup>1399</sup> This resentment, and competition over land and resources, led to localized inter-communal

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<sup>1394</sup> Constitution of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, 1974.

<sup>1395</sup> Smith, 1999: 200.

<sup>1396</sup> Steinberg, 1980: 182.

<sup>1397</sup> Yegar, 2002: 52; Cockett, 2015: 54.

<sup>1398</sup> Smith, 1999: 200.

<sup>1399</sup> Piper, 1994: 12; Smith, 1994: 55; Van Hear, 1998: 95.

violence, with previously mixed Rohingya-Arakanese (Buddhist) communities segregating into a largely Muslim north and Buddhist south.<sup>1400</sup> During this period a new wave of immigrants from Chittagong moved into northern Arakan together with returning Rohingya who had fled to Bengal during the war.<sup>1401</sup>

In the post-war, but pre-independence, period the Muslim community in northern Arakan was politically divided. In May 1946 some Muslim leaders called for secession of the Muslim-majority areas of Arakan to join what was soon to be East Pakistan.<sup>1402</sup> Later in July, the North Arakan Muslim League called for self-determination and the creation of an independent Muslim state.<sup>1403</sup> Both of these movements were largely supported by Chittagonian Muslims rather than the Rohingya.<sup>1404</sup> However, these ideas were quickly squashed by Ali Jinnah, head of the Muslim League of India, who did not want to arouse Burmese hostility and did not support Arakan secession.<sup>1405</sup> Jinnah told General Aung Sang, the lead Burmese negotiator with the British, that he did not back the irredentist Muslims groups.<sup>1406</sup> In April of 1947, at a meeting in Maungdaw, a third group called for a special Muslim region, or “Frontier State,” that would be separate from Buddhist Arakan but within the state of Burma.<sup>1407</sup> Many Muslims of Arakan, including the Rohingya, supported this proposal.

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<sup>1400</sup> Yegar, 1972: 95; Christie, 1996: 165; Ibrahim, 2018: 27.

<sup>1401</sup> Yegar, 1972: 96; Christie, 1996: 166.

<sup>1402</sup> Yegar, 1972: 96-97; Christie, 1996: 167-68; Smith, 1999: 64; Human Rights Watch, 2000; Yegar, 2002: 34-35; Ibrahim, 2018: 27; Myint-U, 2021: 36.

<sup>1403</sup> Yegar, 2002: 35.

<sup>1404</sup> Yegar, 1972: 96-97; Christie, 1996: 168; Yegar, 2002: 35.

<sup>1405</sup> Christie, 1996: 168.

<sup>1406</sup> Yegar, 2002: 35.

<sup>1407</sup> Christie, 1996: 168; Yegar, 2002: 38.

After Burma's independence in January 1948, violence continued in Arakan and the Rohingya took up arms against the state.<sup>1408</sup> Arakanese Buddhists replaced Muslim civil servants, police, and headmen in political positions, and they allowed Buddhists to claim Muslim land and homes that they had been removed from during the Japanese sweep.<sup>1409</sup> In April 1948, four months after independence, Muslim religious leaders called for a jihad.<sup>1410</sup> When the government failed to recognize the Mujahideen's demands for autonomy, language and education rights, and legal status for their movement they continued their guerilla warfare.<sup>1411</sup> From 1948-1951 the Mujahideen, sometimes called the Mujahid movement, fought for control of northern Arakan. While the Burmese government was focused on battling the communist insurgency in the north, and larger ethnic minority insurgencies in the east, the Mujahideen successfully reclaimed large portions of northern Arakan.<sup>1412</sup> During this period, competing ideas of secession versus autonomy persisted within the rebel movement.

Without the capacity to suppress the Muslim insurgency, the Burmese government embarked on scattered short-term scorched-earth policies before departing to fight a different insurgency in another part of the country.<sup>1413</sup> This only further galvanized support for the Mujahidden. From 1951-1954 the government allocated more resources to repressing the Mujahideen. Eventually in November 1954 the government launched a major offensive called Operation Monsoon killing many Mujahideen leaders and breaking the strength of the

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<sup>1408</sup> Smith, 1994: 55; Myint-U, 2021: 30.

<sup>1409</sup> Yegar, 1972: 98; Christie, 1996: 168; Yegar, 2002: 37.

<sup>1410</sup> Christie, 1996: 168; Yegar, 2002: 37.

<sup>1411</sup> Yegar, 1972: 96; Yegar, 2002: 40.

<sup>1412</sup> Christie, 1996: 168; Yegar, 2002: 38, 40.

<sup>1413</sup> Yegar, 2002: 42.



group.<sup>1414</sup> Small-scale skirmishes continued in the late 1950s but eventually, in 1961, the remaining Mujahideen fighters surrendered to the Burmese army.<sup>1415</sup>

Throughout the 1950s, Muslim political leaders continued to lobby the government for a separate autonomous area within Burma, apart from a future Arakan state, which the Arakanese Buddhists advocated.<sup>1416</sup> In 1961, the same year the rebels surrendered, the government created the Mayu Frontier Administration—including Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and western Rathendaung—giving the Muslims the separate area they had demanded. But it was far from an autonomous territory; instead, it was established under direct military control and administered by army officers.<sup>1417</sup> With limited room for negotiation, the Rohingya leadership agreed to the new arrangement. The following year, all thoughts of ethnic autonomy within Burma were crushed by the 1962 Ne Win coup.

Ne Win's military government sought to suppress all ethnic minority claims, fearing territorial disintegration of the state. Although the Muslim insurgency was suppressed in 1961, underground organizations emerged throughout the 1960s and 1970s. In 1963 the Rohingya Independence Front (RIF) and the Muslim/Arakan National Liberation Party were created, now seeking separation from Burma rather than autonomy.<sup>1418</sup> A little over a decade later, the Rohingya Patriotic Front (RPF) broke away from the RIF in 1974, aspiring to obtain territorial autonomy for two areas in northern Arakan—Maungdaw and Buthidaung.<sup>1419</sup> The RPF quick fractured into the Islamic-oriented Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) in 1982, and the

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<sup>1414</sup> Christie, 1996: 169; Yegar, 2002: 44.

<sup>1415</sup> Yegar, 1972: 101; Smith, 1999: 194; Yegar, 2002: 46.

<sup>1416</sup> Christie, 1996: 168-69; Yegar, 2002: 49.

<sup>1417</sup> Christie, 1996: 170; Yegar, 2002: 51.

<sup>1418</sup> Smith, 1999: 219; Yegar, 2002: 53; MacLean, 2019: 86.

<sup>1419</sup> Yegar, 2002: 54, 59; MacLean, 2019: 86.

Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF), which was known for being more moderate.<sup>1420</sup> The RSO and the ARIF were the main Rohingya armed groups at the time of the 1991-1992 expulsion.

While other ethnic minority insurgent groups were militarily targeted by the state, the Ne Win regime questioned the Rohingya's very right to reside in Burma, branding them as "aliens" and accusing them of being "illegal migrants" from Bangladesh. No other minority group was targeted as being outside of the state, labelled as non-citizens or foreigners. Ne Win first went after the Rohingya in 1978 in Operation Nag-min (Dragon King). The operation was presented as a routine check of "illegal immigrants" in advance of a national census.<sup>1421</sup> The alleged administrative process quickly turned violent and the military expelled over 200,000 Rohingya Muslims to Bangladesh between April and July.<sup>1422</sup> Reports by human rights groups and refugees documented the Burmese military's use of torture, rape, eviction at gunpoint, the desecration of mosques, and the burning of homes to force Rohingya to flee Burma.<sup>1423</sup> The government claimed to be responding to illegal immigrants who had razed villages and attacked government buildings, declaring that "wild Muslim extremists" had ransacked indigenous Buddhist villages.<sup>1424</sup> They suggested that those who had left were evading scrutiny of their documentation, or the lack thereof, despite evidence that many Rohingya had been long-term residents of Arakan and held valid citizenship papers.<sup>1425</sup>

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<sup>1420</sup> Piper, 1994: 12; MacLean, 2019: 86-87.

<sup>1421</sup> Piper, 1994: 13; Van Hear, 1998: 96; MacLean, 2019: 87.

<sup>1422</sup> Smith, 1991: 37; Weiner, 1993: 157; Piper, 1994: 13; Smith, 1994: 56; Van Hear, 1998: 93; Loescher, 2001: 224; Myint-U, 2021: 37.

<sup>1423</sup> Outgoing Cable from UNHCR/Geneva, 12.01.1978; 11/2/10-100.BGD.BMA[a] – Refugees from Burma in Bangladesh [Volume 1 - 100.BIB.BMA]; Box 56; Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; Piper, 1994: 13; Van Hear, 1998: 96; Yegar, 2002: 56.

<sup>1424</sup> Smith, 1999: 241; Yegar, 2002: 55.

<sup>1425</sup> Piper, 1994: 13; Van Hear, 1998: 96.

Bangladesh did not want to host this influx of Burmese residents, and swiftly reached a bilateral agreement with the government, sanctioned by the UNHCR, to send the Rohingya back to Burma.<sup>1426</sup> This reversal occurred despite no change in the environment in Arakan state. It was reported that some refugees returned to find Buddhist settlers occupying their homes.<sup>1427</sup> Nevertheless, nearly 200,000 expellees had returned by the end of 1979.<sup>1428</sup>

Although the Ne Win regime was stymied in its design to remove the Rohingya, the government, continued its efforts to encourage their voluntary departure. In a public speech in 1979 Ne Win doubled down on the necessary exclusion of foreigners or “mixed bloods.” He stated: “Today you can see that even people of pure blood are being disloyal to the race and country but are being loyal to others. If people of pure blood act this way, we must carefully watch people of mixed blood.”<sup>1429</sup> The reference to disloyal “pure bloods” was a nod to ethnic insurgents such as the Karen and Kachin whose inclusion within the state was never questioned. The “mixed bloods” referred to the Rohingya, who were separated as a distinctly disloyal group to be “carefully watch[ed].”

Not discouraged by the failure of Operation Dragon King, the Ne Win regime passed a new Citizenship Law in 1982 which further marginalized the Rohingya. In a speech to the Central Committee members, General Ne Win explained the rationale for the new law:

“During the period between 1824 and the time we regained independence in January 1948, foreigners, or aliens, entered our country un-hindered under various pretexts...We then find that our country comprised true nationals, guests, issues from unions between nationals and guests or mixed bloods, and issues from unions between

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<sup>1426</sup> Memorandum from Pierre Coat to the UNHCR High Commissioner for Refugees, 13.07.1978; 11/2/10-100.BGD.BMA[d] – Refugees from Burma in Bangladesh [Volume 4 - 100.BIB.BMA]; Box 56; Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; Van Hear, 1998: 97; Loescher, 2001: 224-25.

<sup>1427</sup> Piper, 1994: 14; Yegar, 2002: 58.

<sup>1428</sup> Loescher, 2001: 225; Cheesman, 2017: 472.

<sup>1429</sup> Smith, 1999: 37.

guests and guests... This became a problem after independence. The problem was how to clarify the position of guests and mixed bloods.”<sup>1430</sup>

To resolve this issue, the 1982 law created three categories of citizens—full, associate, and naturalized—all of which were limited to members of Burma’s “national ethnic races.”<sup>1431</sup> Ne Win declared that “racially, only pure-blooded nationals will be called citizens.”<sup>1432</sup>

Table 24: Categories of Citizens in the 1982 Citizenship Law <sup>1433</sup>	
Full citizens	Descendants of ethnic groups residing in Burma before 1823
Associate citizens	People who obtained citizenship under the 1948 Union Citizenship Law
Naturalized citizens	Residents of Burma before 1948 but who failed to obtain citizenship under the Union Citizenship Law

The Burmese military regime used 1823 as the critical date for determining citizenship.<sup>1434</sup> Those whose ancestors lived in Burma before 1823—the year before Britain first invaded Burma and annexed parts of Arakan—were considered natives, whereas those whose ancestors arrived after were classified as foreigners.<sup>1435</sup> This decision particularly affected the Rohingya who the Burmese government, and large segments of the Burman majority as well as the Arakanese Buddhists, saw as *kala*<sup>1436</sup> or Bengalis.<sup>1437</sup> The claim that the Rohingya were not indigenous but rather “illegal Bengali” migrants from Bangladesh was used to justify discrimination and their persecution.

<sup>1430</sup> Ne Win, 1982.

<sup>1431</sup> Kyaw, 2015: 55; Cheeseman, 2017: 471; MacLean, 2019: 88.

<sup>1432</sup> Ne Win, 1982.

<sup>1433</sup> Center for Diversity & National Harmony, 2018: 205, 249; MacLean, 2019: 99.

<sup>1434</sup> Smith, 1991: 37; Ibrahim, 2018: 50; Myint-U, 2021: 15

<sup>1435</sup> Yegar, 2002: 61; Myint-U, 2021: 15.

<sup>1436</sup> In general *kala* is a term used to describe a foreigner. In pre-colonial times *kala* was used to describe people to the west, or from overseas, e.g., India. Later it took on a derogatory connotation to describe the outsider – either Bengali or Muslim – sometimes perceived as one in the same in the Rohingya case. *Kala* also has a racial dimension, used as a slur for anyone with dark skin. Currently it is reserved for Muslims, including the Rohingya. (Kyaw, 2015: 55-56; Myint-U, 2021: 11, 35).

<sup>1437</sup> Human Rights Watch, 2000; Myint-U, 2021: 36.

The 1982 Law also stated that the Council of State would “decide whether any ethnic group is national or not.”<sup>1438</sup> It provided a specific body to which one could appeal citizenship disputes, but the law did not set forth how the Council of State would determine who qualified as an ethnic group, nor did it provide an authoritative list of the “national ethnic races.”<sup>1439</sup> These determinations were left up to Council—a political, not a judicial body. The Rohingya were thus not denied citizenship because of the 1982 law, but rather through the application of the law and the absence of any safeguards against discrimination.<sup>1440</sup>

Ne Win’s focus on citizenship, and the deliberate exclusion of the Rohingya from the allegedly indigenous “national/ethnic races,” made their situation distinct from the other ethnic minorities. In addition, during the 1970s and 1980s, in the face of ethnic heterogeneity, the military shifted to seeing Buddhism at the litmus test for national belonging.<sup>1441</sup> The largest ethnic minorities—Shan, Karen, Mon—were majority Buddhist. Therefore there was a cross-cutting religious tie with the majority Burmese, that was absent with the Muslim Rohingya. From the perspective of the government, the Rohingya were ethnic, national, and religious outsiders. Therefore, their policy was not just to suppress and control Rohingya insurgencies, like their policy toward other ethnic insurgent groups, but to remove them. While Ne Win failed in his efforts to do this, the new SLORC regime would try again.

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<sup>1438</sup> This is stated in Chapter II (4) of the law (Center for Diversity & National Harmony, 2018: 50).

<sup>1439</sup> Cheeseman, 2017: 471; Center for Diversity & National Harmony, 2018: 203-04.

<sup>1440</sup> Center for Diversity & National Harmony, 2018: 207.

<sup>1441</sup> Ibrahim, 2018: 37.

*Student Uprisings & the SLORC regime*

By 1988, Burma had been ruled by the military junta, known as the Tatmadaw, for 26 years.<sup>1442</sup> The junta's "Burmese Way to Socialism" was an abysmal failure and the economy was in tatters.<sup>1443</sup> Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the Tatmadaw isolated itself from the people of Burma and focused on its own financial enrichment, to the detriment of society.<sup>1444</sup> In September 1987, Ne Win decided to demonetize major currency notes resulting in an estimated 70 percent of all currency being immediately rendered valueless, wiping out the limited savings that people had.<sup>1445</sup> The currency devaluation occurred in tandem with shortages of goods and the collapse of the rice market, Burma's main connection with international trade.<sup>1446</sup>

In March 1988, in response to the economic collapse and years of restricted civil and political rights, student-led protests erupted across the country calling for the end of one-party military rule, the introduction of democratic reforms including free and fair multi-party elections, and the end to human rights abuses.<sup>1447</sup> The government responded with repression and introduced new restrictions, including a ban on all public gatherings.<sup>1448</sup> Hundreds of non-violent protestors were arrested and killed. In response to popular pressure, and pressure within the Tatmadaw, General Ne Win resigned as head of the ruling party in July 1988.<sup>1449</sup> But protests continued, unsatisfied with the new leaders of the BSPP. On August 8

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<sup>1442</sup> Amnesty International, (Apr) 1992: 4.

<sup>1443</sup> Ibrahim, 2018: 38.

<sup>1444</sup> Ibrahim, 2018: 38.

<sup>1445</sup> UN Commission on Human Rights, 1993: 5; Ibrahim, 2018: 39.

<sup>1446</sup> UN Commission on Human Rights, 1993: 5.

<sup>1447</sup> Amnesty International, 1992 (Sept): 3-4; Yegar, 2002: 62; Holliday, 2005: 330.

<sup>1448</sup> UN Commission on Human Rights, 1993: 5.

<sup>1449</sup> Amnesty International, 1992 (Sept): 3-4; Yegar, 2002: 62; Charney, 2009: 151; Ibrahim, 2018: 38-39.

demonstrators called for a nationwide general strike and slowly gained the support of workers, Buddhist monks, government ministries, state media, and even some police.<sup>1450</sup> The strike resulted in the bloodiest days of the year with the UN Commission on Human Rights estimating that 3,000 people were killed during August 8-12.<sup>1451</sup> The army reasserted control on September 18, replacing the previous BSPP with the SLORC under the chairmanship of Chief of Staff Senior General Saw Maung—more of a rebranding than any real break with the past.<sup>1452</sup>

The SLORC imposed martial law, suspended the 1974 constitution, banned opposition parties, arrested party leaders, and detained protestors, while simultaneously announcing democratic elections to be held in May 1990 and opening the country's economy.<sup>1453</sup> While the Tatmadaw espoused a preference to move toward democratization, repression continued and the military expanded dramatically from an estimated 180,000 troops in 1988 to between 250,000 and 300,000 by mid-1992.<sup>1454</sup> Thousands of student protestors fled to the eastern border areas to build an armed resistance against the new government. Ethnic insurgent groups offered them weapons and training.<sup>1455</sup> The military government viewed the demonstrators, like the ethnic insurgencies, as an existential threat to the state and mounted a fierce counterinsurgency campaign across the country to snuff out any protestor-insurgent partnerships as well as insurgent secessionist or autonomy revivals.<sup>1456</sup> Yet, the

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<sup>1450</sup> Van Hear, 1998: 97; Yegar, 2002: 62; Myint-U, 2021: 38.

<sup>1451</sup> UN Commission on Human Rights, 1993: 5.

<sup>1452</sup> Amnesty International, 1992 (Sept): 4; UN Commission on Human Rights, 1993: 5; Smith, 1994: 27; Yegar, 2002: 62; Callahan, 2003: 210; Charney, 2009: 159-60; Myint-U, 2021: 43.

<sup>1453</sup> Amnesty International, 1992 (Apr): 4; Smith, 1994: 27; Callahan, 2003: 210.

<sup>1454</sup> Amnesty International, 1992 (Sept): 4; Smith, 1994: 28.

<sup>1455</sup> Smith, 1994: 45, 79; Charney, 2009: 163.

<sup>1456</sup> Charney, 2009: 169.

SLORC decided, simultaneously, to negotiate ceasefires with some insurgent groups that included economic and territorial autonomy compromises.<sup>1457</sup> Between 1989 and 1992 the government negotiated ceasefires with nine armed ethnic opposition groups, and another five between 1994-1995.<sup>1458</sup> Importantly, ceasefires were not offered to the two Rohingya insurgent groups (ARIF and RSO).<sup>1459</sup>

Relatively free elections were held in 1990. To the military's great surprise, the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) won a landslide victory, winning 80.8 percent of the parliamentary seats, compared to 2.1 percent for the military's National Unity Party (NUP).<sup>1460</sup> The SLORC ignored the results, refused to transfer power to the NLD, and announced that it would remain in power until a new constitution was drafted.<sup>1461</sup> After the elections, the military arrested some of the newly elected NLD politicians and continued its repression. Amnesty International documented over 1,500 political prisoners arrested and serious human rights abuses throughout the country—charges the SLORC vehemently denied.<sup>1462</sup>

Like the rest of the country, the electorate of Arakan, including the Rohingya, largely voted against the NUP, and in favor of various opposition parties, including the Muslim National Democratic Party for Human Rights.<sup>1463</sup> Military repression in Arakan state did not begin until late 1989, and in the northernmost areas where the Rohingya were concentrated,

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<sup>1457</sup> Charney, 2009: 188; Callahan, 2003: 220; Ferguson, 2015: 16.

<sup>1458</sup> Smith, 1999: 16-17; Callahan, 2003: 215, 220; Myint-U, 2021: 51.

<sup>1459</sup> Smith, 1999: 17.

<sup>1460</sup> Charney, 2009: 168; Ibrahim, 2018: 41.

<sup>1461</sup> Ibrahim, 2018: 41.

<sup>1462</sup> Amnesty International, 1992 (Apr): 4; Amnesty International, 1992 (Sept): 6.

<sup>1463</sup> Asia Watch, 1992: 5; Piper, 1994: 13; Smith, 1999: 416.



not until late 1990.<sup>1464</sup> As in the other ethnic minority areas—particularly those of the Karen and Mon—the Burmese military forced Rohingya men into hard labor, arbitrarily arrested alleged political opponents, confiscated livestock and crops, raped women, and beat or killed anyone who did not comply.<sup>1465</sup> This repression was meted out across the country to regain military control and punish those who rebelled—at the ballot box or in the streets. Muslims that had participated in anti-government protests were punished with distinct severity, despite country-wide, multi-ethnic, participation in the demonstrations.<sup>1466</sup>

## **6.2 Mass Expulsion of Rohingya (1991-1992)**

Rohingya refugees began fleeing to Bangladesh in March 1991, with numbers slowly increasing throughout the early part of the year.<sup>1467</sup> In August 1991, the conflict intensified with a dramatic increase in the military presence in the area—an estimated 10,000-20,000 troops arrived in Mawdaung and Buthidaung townships—double the total from the year before.<sup>1468</sup> The military personnel deployed included various army contingents, local riot police, and the Lone Htein, a paramilitary border force known for its brutality.<sup>1469</sup> While some of the tactics used against the Rohingya resembled those used against other ethnic minorities in Burma, others were distinct. The Lone Htein destroyed mosques and Muslim cemeteries, burned Muslim villages, and evicted Rohingya from their homes, replacing them with Arakanese

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<sup>1464</sup> Asia Watch, 1992: 5; Piper, 1994: 16.

<sup>1465</sup> Amnesty International, 1992 (Apr): 2, 13; Amnesty International, 1992 (Sept): 24; Asia Watch, 1992: 1, 5; Piper, 1994: 15.

<sup>1466</sup> Yegar, 2002: 63.

<sup>1467</sup> Asia Watch, 1992: 21.

<sup>1468</sup> Piper, 1994: 17; Charney, 2009: 184-85.

<sup>1469</sup> Piper, 1994: 17; Smith, 1994: 56

Buddhists.<sup>1470</sup> They confiscated the Rohingya's National Registration Cards, in addition to money and other goods, and in some cases destroyed their documents—a clear attempt to deny their right to reside in the country.<sup>1471</sup> The army forced the Rohingya to construct new villages for Arakanese Buddhists.<sup>1472</sup>

In September 1991, the Tatmadaw launched a “border development programme” in Arakan in which Rohingya were deliberately expelled from the area and Muslim lands and property were forcibly transferred to Arakanese (Buddhist) or Burmese settlers.<sup>1473</sup> The first among these settlers were 70 families of former military personnel, who moved north from Akyab, the capital of Arakan, to Maungdaw.<sup>1474</sup> It was alleged that the resettlement of Buddhists into former Muslim areas and homes was to create a “religious and ethnic buffer” along the Burma-Bangladesh border.<sup>1475</sup> While many minority groups, as well as Burman protestors, faced repression in the early 1990s, the ethnically distinct tactics used against the Rohingya and the deliberate and systematic abuses to remove Rohingya from northern Arakan and to force them into Bangladesh made their treatment unique in Burma.<sup>1476</sup>

By October, concern rose within the Bangladesh government about the rising number of refugees, no doubt with memories of the 1978 Operation Dragon King in mind, and Dhaka officials raised the forced removal of the Rohingya with their Burmese counterparts.<sup>1477</sup> These diplomatic efforts fell on deaf ears. According to one Bangladeshi official: “The Burmese

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<sup>1470</sup> Amnesty International, 1992 (Sept): 24; Asia Watch, 1992: 1; Piper, 1994: 15-16; Lambrecht, 1995: 4; Van Hear, 1998: 98; Yegar, 2002: 63.

<sup>1471</sup> Amnesty International, 1992 (Apr): 14; Asia Watch, 1992: 5; Lambrecht, 1995: 14.

<sup>1472</sup> Amnesty International, 1992 (Apr): 2.

<sup>1473</sup> Amnesty International, 1992 (Sept): 24; Smith, 1994: 56, 82; Charney, 2009: 184; Van Hear, 1998: 98.

<sup>1474</sup> Smith, 1994: 82.

<sup>1475</sup> Smith, 1994: 82.

<sup>1476</sup> Piper, 1994: 15.

<sup>1477</sup> “Burmese Refugee ‘Problem’ Continues.” Hong Kong AFP (20 October 1991).

military government has not responded positively to our letter on the exodus of the refugees and we will seek international help if diplomatic initiatives bear no fruit.”<sup>1478</sup>

During this period, the RSO and ARIF tried to revitalize their armed struggles, although they shifted their demand away from independence or local autonomy toward support for the coalition NLD government, hoping that Aung San Suu Kyi would offer the Rohingya improved civil and political rights.<sup>1479</sup> In November 1991 the RSO clashed with Burmese armed forces.<sup>1480</sup> The same month, Bangladesh sent its Foreign Minister, Mustafizur Rahman, to Rangoon to discuss the expulsion and the necessity of returning the Rohingya Muslims.<sup>1481</sup> Dhaka Radio broadcast that the Foreign Minister “received firm assurance from his Myanmar counterpart that Yangon [Rangoon] will take expeditious steps in this regard.”<sup>1482</sup> Yet in early December, a refugee from Labadogh village, Buthidaung told Asia Watch that “soldiers announced that all Muslims must leave.”<sup>1483</sup>

Tension between Burma and Bangladesh increased in December when the Lone Htein attacked the Rejupara border outpost in Bangladesh—allegedly in pursuit of Rohingya rebels.<sup>1484</sup> The Burmese paramilitary unit killed four Bangladeshis including one soldier, wounded 22, and stole weapons and ammunition from the border post.<sup>1485</sup> The Burmese junta accused Bangladesh of harboring insurgents and allowing them to use their territory as a base

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<sup>1478</sup> “Burmese Refugee ‘Problem’ Continues.” Hong Kong AFP (20 October 1991).

<sup>1479</sup> Smith, 1999: 422; Yegar, 2002: 67.

<sup>1480</sup> “Paper Calls for ASEAN Change on Burma.” Bangkok The Nation (26 January 1992); Smith, 1999: 422.

<sup>1481</sup> “Commentary: Restoration of Burma Ties ‘Imperative.’” Dhaka Radio Bangladesh External Service (08 January 1992); Yegar, 2002: 64.

<sup>1482</sup> “Commentary: Restoration of Burma Ties ‘Imperative.’” Dhaka Radio Bangladesh External Service (08 January 1992).

<sup>1483</sup> Asia Watch, 1992: 11.

<sup>1484</sup> Asia Watch, 1992: 6.

<sup>1485</sup> Amnesty International, (Sept) 1992: 25; Asia Watch 1992: 6; “Parliament Begins Debate on Burma Border Tension.” Dhaka Radio Bangladesh Network (03 February 1992).

from which to launch attacks against the army, a charge Dhaka fiercely denied.<sup>1486</sup> The *Working People's Daily*, a state-controlled Burma newspaper, reported on January 27, 1992 that, "Fighting along the border will continue as long as there are insurgents who cross and re-cross the border carrying out their operations."<sup>1487</sup> Atrocities against the Rohingya intensified at the end of January with an increase in killings of forced laborers and death because of starvation and inhumane conditions.<sup>1488</sup> Toward the end of January and early February, between 40,000-45,000 Rohingya had fled to Bangladesh, with hundreds crossing the border daily.<sup>1489</sup>

Throughout the first two months of 1992, Bangladesh and Burma held four rounds of talks to deescalate border tensions and avoid inter-state war.<sup>1490</sup> By mid-February the SLORC retracted its explanation that the border raid was in pursuit of Rohingya rebels and returned the stolen weapons, but refused to apologize for the deaths.<sup>1491</sup> For its part the Burma government blamed external forces for "trying to drive a wedge between Myanmar and Bangladesh."<sup>1492</sup> By the end of February, the number of Rohingya in Bangladesh had doubled to 80,000.<sup>1493</sup>

The expulsion outflows reached their apex in March 1992, one year after the first expellees arrived in Bangladesh, with 5,000 Rohingya crossing the border daily.<sup>1494</sup>

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<sup>1486</sup> "Karens, Nagas Report Army Atrocities; Aid Urged." Bangkok The Nation (28 January 1992); "Fears of War with Bangladesh Allayed." Hong Kong AFP (27 January 1992).

<sup>1487</sup> "Fears of War with Bangladesh Allayed." Hong Kong AFP (27 January 1992).

<sup>1488</sup> Asia Watch, 1992: 10.

<sup>1489</sup> "Commentary: Restoration of Burma Ties 'Imperative.'" Dhaka Radio Bangladesh External Service (08 January 1992); "Ministry Says Burmese Border Under Control." Dhaka Radio Bangladesh External Service (04 February 1992).

<sup>1490</sup> "Sources Say Burma Returns 'Looted' Weapons." Hong Kong AFP (11 February 1992).

<sup>1491</sup> Asia Watch, 1992: 6.

<sup>1492</sup> "Foreign Ministry Statement on Rohingya Muslims." Rangoon Radio Burma (21 February 1992); Amnesty International, (Apr) 1992: 3.

<sup>1493</sup> "'Dialogue' With Burma on Refugees." Dhaka Radio Bangladesh External Service (25 February 1992).

<sup>1494</sup> "Burmese Muslim Exodus Termed Great 'Tragedy.'" Kuala Lumpur Voice of Malaysia (10 March 1992); "Dhaka Denies Claim on Refugees' Immigrant Status." Hong Kong AFP (12 March 1992).

Bangladesh's Prime Minister Khaleda Zia announced that the total number of refugees had risen to more than 200,000.<sup>1495</sup> The Bangladeshi authorities established 12 refugee camps, with support from the UN, to shelter the Rohingya refugees—temporarily.<sup>1496</sup> The Burmese military demonstrated the intended permanence of the expulsion by increasing its security along the border with Bangladesh to prevent refugees from returning to their homes.<sup>1497</sup>

Once in Bangladesh, Rohingya refugees reported a consistent pattern of abuse by the Burmese armed forces. They told the Rohingya that they “should leave and...weren’t wanted in Burma,” that they were “Bangladeshi tourists,” that “this is not your land, it is ours,” and that they “would be killed if [they] tried to go back.”<sup>1498</sup> When one Rohingya refugee tried to report the rape of several women to the local police he was arrested and told, “You are not Burmese. We are torturing you so you will leave this country. We will continue until you are gone.”<sup>1499</sup> Another said, “When we were beaten at different times we were often told that we should leave and that we weren’t wanted in Burma. They said also that we would be killed if we tried to go back.”<sup>1500</sup> Refugees reported that their documents were confiscated by the Lone Htein border guards who told them that they would “shoot them if they returned.”<sup>1501</sup> The common refrain was “go back to your own country,” and “get out of Burma and go to Bangladesh.”<sup>1502</sup>

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<sup>1495</sup> “Zia Apprises UN of Burmese Refugee Problem.” Dhaka Radio Bangladesh Network (21 March 1992).

<sup>1496</sup> “Minister Discusses Refugees, List Given to Burma.” Dhaka Radio Bangladesh Network (29 March 1992); “Muslim Rebels to Increase Anti-Rangoon Offensive.” Bangkok Post (15 April 1992).

<sup>1497</sup> “Envoy Summoned Over ‘Oppression.’” Kuala Lumpur Radio Malaysia Network (10 March 1992).

<sup>1498</sup> Amnesty International, 1992 (Apr): 3; Asia Watch, 1992: 14.

<sup>1499</sup> Asia Watch, 1992; 18; Smith, 1994: 82.

<sup>1500</sup> Amnesty International, 1992 (Apr): 3; Piper, 1994: 24.

<sup>1501</sup> Amnesty International, 1992 (Sept): 24; Piper, 1994: 24.

<sup>1502</sup> Amnesty International, 1992 (Apr): 15; Asia Watch, 1992: 10, 19.

The ethnic targeting, the pattern of language used by the military units, and the public announcements from senior government officials, indicate a clear intention to remove the Rohingya from Burma through a policy of expulsion. By July 1992, more than 250,000 Rohingya had been expelled, an estimated 18-36 percent of the total Rohingya population of the country.<sup>1503</sup>

### 6.3 Expulsion Motivation: Counterinsurgency

Burma's expulsion of Rohingya Muslims is an episode of a counterinsurgency expulsion (see Figure 17). Counterinsurgency expulsions occur when governments seek to consolidate, and strengthen, the nation and when the target group is perceived to be a security threat to the state.

Figure 17: Taxonomy of mass expulsion - Burma, 1991-1992		
Phase of Nation-building	Target Group Threat	
	<u>Security</u>	<u>Economic</u>
	<u>Establishing</u> Fifth Column	Anti-Colonialism
<u>Consolidating</u>	Counterinsurgency/ Reprisal	Nativism

<sup>1503</sup> Piper, 1994: 14; Van Hear, 1998: 99. Using the SLORC Arakan population figures (see p. 313), the percentage of Rohingya expelled was 36%, using the Muslim figures the total was 18%, and if the true population figures are somewhere in the middle (1,050,000) then the percentage of the population expelled was 24%. In both absolute and relative terms this was a large-scale expulsion, targeting a significant portion of the group.

After it took power in September 1988, the SLORC initiated a new phase of nation-building. The junta first changed the official *English-language* names of administrative units throughout the country, affecting not only the name of the state (Burma to Myanmar) but also the names of lower administrative units such as Arakan State to Rakhine State, and the capital city Rangoon to Yangon.<sup>1504</sup> The government explained these changes as an effort to distance itself from the British colonial era and revise names in line with its ancient roots that were more inclusive to all people in the country.<sup>1505</sup> However, during the colonial period, the British had recorded the English-language names of locations in the country based on transliterations of the local names in the respective local languages.<sup>1506</sup> Therefore, the SLORC's English-language name revisions were an effort by the authorities to reflect the *Burmese language* pronunciation of names in locales throughout the country.<sup>1507</sup> For example, instead of the English-language place names in Karen state reflecting the local toponyms, the toponymic spellings were changed to reflect the place name in the language of the dominant Burman ethnic group.<sup>1508</sup> This explains why many ethnic minorities complained that these seemingly benign name changes were part of a larger government strategy of coercive Burmanization.<sup>1509</sup>

The name changes were the first of several such actions toward the “Burmanization” of the country.<sup>1510</sup> The SLORC also re-wrote textbooks emphasizing the unifying Burmese identity over generations.<sup>1511</sup> It launched initiatives to rehabilitate the Mandalay Palace where

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<sup>1504</sup> Permanent Committee on Geographical Names, 2007: 6; Charney, 2009: 172; Walton, 2013: 12; Myint-U, 2021: 43.

<sup>1505</sup> Permanent Committee on Geographical Names, 2007: 7; Walton, 2013: 12; Ferguson, 2015: 16.

<sup>1506</sup> Permanent Committee on Geographical Names, 2007: 7.

<sup>1507</sup> Charney, 2009: 171.

<sup>1508</sup> Permanent Committee on Geographical Names, 2007: 7.

<sup>1509</sup> Amnesty International, 1992 (Sept): 43; Smith, 1994: 18; Walton, 2013: 12.

<sup>1510</sup> Smith, 1991: 30; Cheesman, 2017: 467-68; MacLean, 2019: 89.

<sup>1511</sup> Walton, 2013: 12, 15.

the last Burmese monarch resided, and restored Buddhist stupas, emphasizing the centrality of Buddhism to the Burma nation.<sup>1512</sup> These efforts aimed to consolidate the nation around the dominant Buddhist, Burman ethno-religious identity.

Given the ethnic diversity in the country, and the lack of a unifying civic or political identity, the SLORC instituted another nation-building effort in 1990, releasing a list of 135 “national ethnic races”<sup>1513</sup> that identified the “true” people of Burma—the “pure-blooded nationals” Ne Win had described in 1982. These national races became the central determinant of membership in the political community of the new Burma, rebaptized as Myanmar.<sup>1514</sup> The government did not explain how the 135 races were selected, nor release any data to support their classification.<sup>1515</sup> Some of the national races were categorized based on their language, others based on their location or home area, and one group—the Mro/Wakim—was listed twice.<sup>1516</sup> Some have argued that the SLORC’s new national/ethnic race list, with 135 “distinct” groups, was a government strategy to divide the ethnic minorities into sub-groups, diluting the power of the larger ethnic groups like the Shan and Kachin.<sup>1517</sup> The new list separated the Shan into 33 ethnic groups and the Kachin into 12 groups, but it did not create any new administrative units or provide any autonomy for them.<sup>1518</sup> While the naming of the 135 national/ethnic races may have seemed like the Tatmadaw’s recognition of the diversity

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<sup>1512</sup> Hein, 2018: 362-63; MacLean, 2019: 89; Myint-U, 2021: 44.

<sup>1513</sup> Cheesman, 2017: 468; Center for Diversity & National Harmony, 2018: 202; MacLean, 2019: 88.

<sup>1514</sup> Cheesman, 2017: 462-63.

<sup>1515</sup> Smith, 1994: 18; Ferguson, 2015: 15; Cheesman, 2017: 468-70.

<sup>1516</sup> Ferguson, 2015: 15.

<sup>1517</sup> Callahan, 2003: 225; Charney, 2009: 189; Walton, 2013: 6.

<sup>1518</sup> Aung, 2007: 267.



of Burma, it was a part of their counterinsurgency strategy to divide-and-rule the ethnic minorities.<sup>1519</sup>

The Rohingya were not included in the list of 135 national races.<sup>1520</sup> Given that citizenship in Burma was predicated on membership to a national race, this solidified the Rohingya's exclusion from the state. In February 1992, during the expulsion, Burma's Minister of Foreign Affairs, U Ohn Gyaw, stated in a press release that:

"In actual fact, although there are 135 national races living in Myanmar today, *the so-called Rohingya people is not one of them*. Historically, *there has never been a 'Rohingya' race in Myanmar*...Since the First Anglo-Myanmar War in 1824, people of Muslim faith from the adjacent country *illegally entered Myanmar* Naing-Eng, particularly Rakhine State...It should be categorically stated that *there is no persecution whatever based on religious ground*" [emphasis added].<sup>1521</sup>

The SLORC rejected the use of the term "Rohingya," and denied that they were a distinct group.<sup>1522</sup>

The last component of the SLORC's nation-consolidating strategy was a change in identity documentation with the introduction of Citizenship Scrutiny Cards (CSCs) to replace the National Registration Cards (NRCs).<sup>1523</sup> The SLORC required that all citizens obtain a CSC which documented the nationality and religious status of the card bearer in addition to his residence, occupation, father's name, and blood type.<sup>1524</sup> These identification cards further cemented the bond between race/ethnicity and citizenship in Burma, and further marginalized

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<sup>1519</sup> Callahan, 2003: 225; Charney, 2009: 189; Walton, 2013: 6.

<sup>1520</sup> Ferguson, 2015: 16; Cheesman, 2017: 462; MacLean, 2019: 88.

<sup>1521</sup> "Foreign Ministry Statement on Rohingya Muslims." Rangoon Radio Burma (21 February 1992).

<sup>1522</sup> Smith, 1994: 56-57.

<sup>1523</sup> Charney, 2009: 167-68; Center for Diversity & National Harmony, 2018: 209.

<sup>1524</sup> Aung, 2007: 278-79; Center for Diversity & National Harmony, 2018: 203; Hein, 2018: 371.

the Rohingya. To obtain a CSC one had to surrender his NRC. The Rohingya who did so were not issued CSCs<sup>1525</sup> and were thus left undocumented.<sup>1526</sup>

Although the Tatmadaw implemented Burmanization programs, national consolidation policies are not sufficient to bring about expulsion, a target group must also be identified as a security or economic threat. In 1991-1992, the Burmese government unmistakably designated the Rohingya as a security threat. The SLORC claimed that their increased military presence in Arakan was in direct response to “insurgent activity in the area.”<sup>1527</sup> They blamed Muslim armed opposition groups, specifically the RSO and the ARIF for causing the crisis and precipitating their response.<sup>1528</sup> In fact, the SLORC blamed the Bangladesh border incident in December 1991, in which the Lone Htein killed three Bangladeshi civilians and one soldier, on Muslim insurgents whom the Burmese border guards were simply pursuing across the border.<sup>1529</sup>

During a government coordination meeting in January 1992, broadcast on Rangoon TV, the Chairman of the SLORC and commander-in-chief of the defense forces, General Saw Maung, stated, “I should say I saved Myanmar, and you must completely *crush all insurgents* who are engaged in the armed struggle against the state” [emphasis added].<sup>1530</sup> A Ministry of Foreign

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<sup>1525</sup> Some Rohingya were issued Temporary Registration Cards (TRCs), but many others remained undocumented (Center for Diversity & National Harmony, 2018: 209).

<sup>1526</sup> Center for Diversity & National Harmony, 2018: 209; Hein, 2018: 371.

<sup>1527</sup> Amnesty International, 1992 (Sept): 25; Piper, 1994: 17; Van Hear, 1998: 99.

<sup>1528</sup> Smith, 1994: 56.

<sup>1529</sup> “Paper Calls for ASEAN Change on Burma.” Bangkok The Nation (26 January 1992); Amnesty International, (Sept) 1992: 25.

<sup>1530</sup> “Saw Maung: Arakan Muslim Situation ‘No Problem.’” Rangoon Burma Television Network (21 January 1992).

Affairs press release the following month reinforced General Saw Maung's message. In response to government actions against the Rohingya it stated:

"The very name Rohingya was a creation of a *group of insurgents in the Rakhine State*...It should be categorically stated that there is no persecution based on religious grounds...Like all other countries of the world, Myanmar exercises its inherent *right of self-defense in suppressing insurgents* in the country, but it needs to emphasize that the action has no connection with race or religion, but was undertaken to *suppress armed terrorists*" [emphasis added].<sup>1531</sup>

Burma's Foreign Minister Gyaw stated at a press conference in March 1992, "May I take this opportunity to stress that there exists an inter-relationship between *the insurgency in the country* and the so-called cross-border human traffic" [emphasis added].<sup>1532</sup> Later in May 1992, Gyaw told the BBC in an interview that "The Rohingyas had left Myanmar for their own reasons, possibly being incited to do so by *rebel insurgents*"<sup>1533</sup> [emphasis added].

The state-run media also emphasized that the Rohingya were a threat to the state. The *Working People's Daily* consistently referred to them as "terrorists."<sup>1534</sup> Echoing senior Burma officials' language it wrote that,

"The Defense Services has no reason to go on watching those *Rohingya insurgents* as admirable objects of beautify [sic]. The Defense Services therefore goes out to remove them. These *insurgents fled to sanctuaries across the border*. They regroup on the west of the border and make preparations to renew their incursions" [emphasis added].<sup>1535</sup>

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<sup>1531</sup> "Foreign Ministry Statement on Rohingya Muslims." Rangoon Radio Burma (21 February 1992); Amnesty International, 1992 (Apr): 3.

<sup>1532</sup> Amnesty International, 1992 (Sept): 25.

<sup>1533</sup> Amnesty International, 1992 (Sept): 25.

<sup>1534</sup> "Foreign Ministry Statement on Rohingya Muslims." Rangoon Radio Burma (21 February 1992); "BBC, VOA Accused of Exploiting Rohingya Issue." Rangoon Radio Burma (07 February 1992); "More on Foreign Manipulation of Rohingya Issue: Part Two." Rangoon Radio Burma (08 February 1992); "Muslims Deny Rape, Prosecution." Rangoon Radio Burma (04 April 1992); "Rebels Surrender in Western Military Command." Rangoon Burma Television Network (02 April 1993).

<sup>1535</sup> "Part Two." Rangoon Radio Burma (05 February 1992).

Similarly, the Rangoon TV Network covered an international visit to the Burma-Bangladesh border in March 1992, led by Foreign Minister Gyaw, reporting that:

“The members of the delegation were briefed on and shown propaganda fabricated and distributed by *Rohingya insurgent organizations* RSO [Rohingya Solidarity Organization], ARIF [Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front], and RPF [Rohingya Patriotic Front] in U Ottama Hall in Buthidaung” [emphasis added].<sup>1536</sup>

The government and its media organizations explained the military action in northern Arakan as a response to Rohingya insurgents.

Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh corroborated the military’s accusations about insurgent activity in Arakan. A Rohingya farmer from Buthidaung township told Amnesty International that, “One day the MI 18 [military intelligence] came and dragged me from my house and beat me with a stick stuck through with two nails. They accused me of having *contact with the insurgents* and of going to Bangladesh to meet them”<sup>1537</sup> [emphasis added]. Two students reported a similar experience of being arrested and interrogated by the military and police accused of “having contacts with *the insurgent group* the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation”<sup>1538</sup> [emphasis added]. Others were not so lucky. Refugees described a 30-year-old man who was shot outside his home: “They said he was an *RSO [Rohingya Solidarity Organization] insurgent*, but he was just an ordinary farmer” [emphasis added].<sup>1539</sup>

Given the continued armed struggle of the RSO and the ARIF, and the history of insurgent activity in northern Arakan, the SLORC viewed the Rohingya a security threat.<sup>1540</sup> In early 1992, the leaders of the RSO and ARIF fed into this narrative. In February 1992 as

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<sup>1536</sup> “Regime Leads Diplomatic Tour of Arakan.” Rangoon Burma Television Network (30 March 1992).

<sup>1537</sup> Amnesty International, 1992 (Apr): 14.

<sup>1538</sup> Amnesty International, 1992 (Apr): 14.

<sup>1539</sup> Amnesty International, 1992 (Sept): 25.

<sup>1540</sup> Smith, 1999: 443.

Rohingya refugees were flooding into Bangladesh in their thousands, a leader of the RSO told the media that, “50,000 Rohingyas inside Burma were trained and ready to fight Burmese troops deployed in Arakan.”<sup>1541</sup> Nurul Islam, chairman of the ARIF, told Agence France-Presse (AFP) in March 1992: “We are determined to fight to free our homeland from the tyranny of the Burmese military junta.”<sup>1542</sup> Yet despite claims of sizable armed forces, evidence on the ground indicated that the RSO and ARIF exaggerated their tactical military capabilities.<sup>1543</sup> When compared with other insurgent groups such as the Karen or the Kachin guerrillas, the Rohingya groups were small, unorganized, and poorly armed.<sup>1544</sup> In the early 1990s it was estimated that the ARIF had 200 fighters and the RSO 600; neither group was organized into regular fighting units; and they were armed with outdated submachine guns, a few automatic rifles, and some more modern weapons.<sup>1545</sup> The RSO and ARIF also had limited support within the broader Rohingya civilian community; unlike other ethnic armed groups in Burma, they lacked strong political leadership and organization.<sup>1546</sup>

Nevertheless, the Tatmadaw believed any sign of weakness would cause the country to break apart.<sup>1547</sup> The Tatmadaw saw itself as embodying the “true spirit of the nation” and the sole institution capable of defending the new “Myanmar nation” from any threats to the state.<sup>1548</sup> Once the Rohingya were identified as such, the military moved in to remove them *en masse*.

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<sup>1541</sup> “Dissident Muslims: Rangoon Wants Bangladesh War.” Hong Kong AFP (24 February 1992).

<sup>1542</sup> “Burmese Guerilla Chief Asks for Military Aid.” Hong Kong AFP (13 March 1992).

<sup>1543</sup> Yegar, 2002: 66.

<sup>1544</sup> Amnesty International, 1992 (Sept): 20; Asia Watch, 1992: 2; Piper, 1994: 12-13; Walton, 2013: 8.

<sup>1545</sup> Piper, 1994: 12-13.

<sup>1546</sup> Parnini, 2013: 282; MacLean, 2019: 86.

<sup>1547</sup> Smith, 1999: 424.

<sup>1548</sup> Smith, 1999: 423; Ibrahim, 2018: 46; MacLean, 2019: 93.

### *Alternative Explanations*

To further validate my theory that Burma's expulsion of Rohingya Muslims in 1991-1992 was motivated by counterinsurgency objectives, I evaluate and refute four alternative explanations: anti-Muslim motivation; the Rohingya as a political threat; the Rohingya as an economic threat; and the argument that the Rohingya were treated similarly to other ethnic minority groups like the Karen or Kachin.

The first intuitive alternative explanation for the Rohingya expulsion is that the SLORC wanted to rid the country of Muslim minorities. In the late 1980s, early 1990s, the SLORC implemented a nationalist revival of the ethno-religious, Burman-Buddhist state. Since Muslims were excluded from the new national image it is plausible that anti-Muslim sentiment motivated the expulsion. However, this explanation can be rejected for several reasons. In 1972 Burma's Ministry of Home and Religious Affairs documented four categories of Muslims in their instruction booklet for the 1973 population census: Burman Muslims, Arakan Muslims (including Rohingya and Kaman), Panthay Muslims (Chinese), and Pashu Muslims (Malay).<sup>1549</sup> If the Burmese government aimed to remove all Muslims from the Burman-Buddhist majority Burma, why only single out one Muslim group for removal? If the goal was Muslim expulsion, writ-large, all Muslim groups should have been targeted, but they were not. Furthermore, the SLORC's list of 135 national races included the Muslim Kamans as a sub-group of the Arakan (Rakhine) ethnic group, while excluding the Rohingya.<sup>1550</sup> The

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<sup>1549</sup> Thein, 2012: 396; Hein, 2018: 369. Interestingly, the names of the Panthay and Pashu Muslims are followed by the respective country name—China and Malay—indicating the government's view of the foreignness of these groups. However, foreign ties are not an exclusionary requirement from the 135 national/ethnic races as the Kokang Chinese are included as a sub-group of the Shan in the 1990 list (Aung, 2007: 267; Cheesman, 2017: 479n17)

<sup>1550</sup> Aung, 2007: 267; Cheesman, 2017: 479n17; Kyaw, 2017: 283.

fact that the Kaman were not expelled in 1991-1992 is more evidence that the junta was not targeting Muslims, nor Muslims specifically in Arakan State, but rather a specific sub-population of Muslims: the Rohingya.

A second possible alternative explanation is that the Rohingya were a political threat to the state, and that their political behavior motivated their expulsion. Although most Rohingya were disenfranchised because of the citizenship laws, the government did allow Rohingya politicians with identity cards issued in 1982 to run for office in the 1990 elections, and eight candidates joined the Rohingya party platform: the National Democratic Party for Human Rights.<sup>1551</sup> The party won four seats in the election, a victory for the party, but less than one percent of the 485 seats in parliament.<sup>1552</sup> After the Tatmadaw refused to accept the election results, and decided to remain in power, Rohingya electors were accused of using fake identification documents to run. Some were arrested like other elected officials, particularly those from the NLD.<sup>1553</sup> In general, the political organization among the Rohingya was limited and cannot explain the government's expulsion motivation. If the military aimed to expel serious political threats, the Rohingya would have been far down their list of targets.

Another alternative motivation for the Tatmadaw's expulsion of the Rohingya could have been removing an economic threat, like the Asians in Uganda. However, while there were some successful Rohingya traders and businessmen, they were very few, and the northern townships targeted in 1991-1992 were the poorer areas of the Muslim-majority sections of

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<sup>1551</sup> Ibrahim, 2018: 41; Aurora Humanitarian Initiative, 2018; Alam, 2019: 13.

<sup>1552</sup> Ibrahim, 2018: 41; Alam, 2019: 13.

<sup>1553</sup> Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), 2015; Ibrahim, 2017: 41-42; Aurora Humanitarian Initiative, 2018.

Arakan state.<sup>1554</sup> Arakan, like many of the ethnic minority areas, was economically neglected by both the British and the Burmese government.<sup>1555</sup> Without the natural resources of some of the other minority states, Arakan was one of the poorest regions in the country.<sup>1556</sup> Moreover, at the local level, rather than being seen as economic competitors, the Arakanese Buddhist view the Rohingya as “backward,” with high rates of illiteracy.<sup>1557</sup> In fact, the “Asians of Burma”—Indian (Tamil) traders, largely concentrated in Rangoon—had already been expelled by Ne Win back in 1962, at the outset of his Burmese Way to Socialism, an example of what I have called anti-colonial expulsion.<sup>1558</sup> Economic motives cannot explain this case.

One final explanation to interrogate is that the Rohingya were treated just like other threatening ethnic minorities during this period, such as the Karen or Kachin. The Karen were favored by the British during the colonial period and were recruited into the colonial armed forces along with the Kachin and Chin.<sup>1559</sup> After supporting the British against the Japanese during WWII, they were promised independence but that did not materialize.<sup>1560</sup> After initially playing a key role in the independent Burmese Army, suppressing other political and ethnic insurgencies, the Karen mounted an armed rebellion when the Burman government refused political concessions.<sup>1561</sup> Since 1949 the Karen National Union (KNU), and their armed wing the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), have been at war with the government—at first for independence, and over time, for greater autonomy.<sup>1562</sup>

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<sup>1554</sup> Van Hear, 1998: 101.

<sup>1555</sup> Smith, 1994: 23; Ibrahim, 2018: 9.

<sup>1556</sup> Ibrahim, 2018: 9.

<sup>1557</sup> Yegar, 2002: 58; Ibrahim, 2018: 9.

<sup>1558</sup> Chakravarti, 1971: 183-84; Tinker, 1990: 45; Yegar, 2002: 52; Hein, 2018: 368.

<sup>1559</sup> Smith, 1994: 23, 38-39; Christie, 1996: 54-55.

<sup>1560</sup> Smith, 1994: 23; Christie, 1996: 64; Yegar, 2002: 34.

<sup>1561</sup> Smith, 1991: 28; Callahan, 2007: 34.

<sup>1562</sup> Smith, 1994: 44; Christie, 1996: 77-78; Yegar, 2002: 35; Callahan, 2007: 34.



The Ne Win and SLORC regimes violently repressed the Karen using their “four cuts” counterinsurgency strategy to cut them off from food, finance, intelligence, and recruits, but they were always included within the idea of the Burma “nation.”<sup>1563</sup> In the 1974 constitution, Karen state became an official administrative unit, albeit without local autonomy, and their citizenship status, and membership in the state, were never questioned.<sup>1564</sup> Although the Tatmadaw feared Karen separatism, they did not seek to remove the Karen from Burmese territory. Instead, they sought to suppress them by cutting off support to the insurgents from the local communities.

The Burmese military distrusted all ethnic minority groups—including both the Rohingya and the Karen—fearing the dissolution of the state. “Pure blood” non-Burmans were seen as having to “prove” their loyalty by overcoming their ethnic identity and becoming “modern” Burmese-speaking people,<sup>1565</sup> whereas “non-pure” bloods, like the Rohingya, could never be incorporated within the Burmese nation. The Tatmadaw approached the two groups with different policies. The Rohingya were targeted for expulsion, with the intent to remove, while the Karen were targeted with various control strategies to suppress their insurgency but to manage the people within the state. There are other features about the Karen that make their treatment different than the Rohingya. Geographically, the Karen population is dispersed along the Burma-Thailand border in southern Shan, Kayah, and Karen States as well as in Mon State, Tenasserim Division, and Irrawaddy Division,<sup>1566</sup> making it more difficult to remove them. In addition, while Karen elites are largely Christian, the majority of Karen are

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<sup>1563</sup> Smith, 1994: 45-46, 79; Callahan, 2003: 209-210; Callahan, 2007: 33.

<sup>1564</sup> Yegar, 2002: 61; Aung, 2005: 273.

<sup>1565</sup> Callahan, 2003: 222; Walton, 2013: 13.

<sup>1566</sup> Smith, 1994: 42; Callahan, 2007: 34; Christie, 1996: 54, 60.

Buddhist, with a smaller minority animist.<sup>1567</sup> Therefore, most of the group shares the religion of the dominant Burman majority.

One might then contend that the variation in Tatmadaw treatment toward the Rohingya and Karen was simply because of religion. However, that cannot explain why the Kachin, and their powerful insurgent arm—the Kachin Independence Army (KIA)—who are predominantly Christian, were not expelled.<sup>1568</sup> While the Burmese army fought against the KIA during the Ne Win and the SLORC regimes, using harsh counterinsurgency tactics, just like those against the Karen and Rohingya, they were not targeted for removal.<sup>1569</sup> During the Tatmadaw’s counterinsurgency campaigns in 1988-1992 tens of thousands of Kachin were “forcibly relocated” to army-controlled camps *within* the state. These internal expulsions are juxtaposed with the military’s cross-border expulsion policy toward the Rohingya.<sup>1570</sup> Furthermore, in 1994, the KIA reached a ceasefire agreement with the SLORC, which was never proposed to the Rohingya insurgent groups.<sup>1571</sup> One key difference, again, is that government saw the Kachin as “pure bloods,” members of Burma from the “beginning,” that needed to be punished and reformed, but not excluded from the nation-state. They were a security threat to be controlled, not eliminated.

In sum, none of the alternative explanations—anti-Muslim, political threats, economic threats, or ethnic insurgents—can explain the Burmese government’s motivation for expelling the Rohingya *en masse*. While many ethnic groups presented security threats to the state after

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<sup>1567</sup> Smith, 1994: 42-43; Christie, 1996: 56; Permanent Committee on Geographical Names, 2007: 4.

<sup>1568</sup> Smith, 1991: 28; Smith, 1994: 38-39; Permanent Committee on Geographical Names, 2007: 4.

<sup>1569</sup> Smith, 1994: 40.

<sup>1570</sup> Smith, 1994: 40-41.

<sup>1571</sup> Smith, 1994: xvi, 40; Callahan, 2007: 42; Myint-U, 2021: 51.

1988, demanding local autonomy and civil and political rights, and many mounted significant attacks against government forces, only the Rohingya were expelled. It is the distinct combination of national consolidation and security threat that motivated the counterinsurgency mass expulsion.

#### 6.4 Enabling factors for Burma's expulsion

Government counterinsurgencies are manifold, yet not all counterinsurgency operations involve mass expulsion. As with the previous three case studies, I will now examine the role of alliances, the target group homeland state, and the international community in enabling expulsion in Burma.

Table 25: Factors that enabled mass expulsion in Burma (1991-1992)	
Key Factors	Burma (1991-mid-1992)
<b>Alliances</b>	
<i>Domestic Alliances</i>	Benefit from expulsion (↑)
<i>Transnational Alliances</i>	Indifferent to expulsion (↑)
<b>Homeland State(s)</b>	
<i>Relation to Government</i>	Moderate ties (--)
<i>Response/ Anticipated Response</i>	Acquiesce & resettle expellees (↑)
<b>International Community</b>	
<i>Relation to Government</i>	Weak ties (↑)
<i>Response/ Anticipated Response</i>	Mixed (--)

#### Alliances

##### *Domestic Alliances*

The military had been in power in Burma since 1962. Although Ne Win resigned, and the BSPP was ousted by the new SLORC government under the leadership of General Saw Maung, Tatmadaw control of the state continued. The Tatmadaw was not simply a group of officers but rather an entire social class made up of active military personnel, veterans, and

their families, which dominated the political, social, and economic institutions of the country.<sup>1572</sup> Throughout the 1970s and 1980s it further isolated itself from the rest of the country and focused on its own enrichment.<sup>1573</sup> When the SLORC decided to abandon socialism and pursue a capitalist, market-oriented economy in 1988, the junta and their families became “Burma’s nouveau riche,” while the rest of the country remained in poverty.<sup>1574</sup>

The countrywide protests in 1988 threatened the military’s hold on power and it fiercely fought back, repressing protestors and any appearance of dissent. The 1990 elections may have looked like an attempt by the SLORC to gain public support, but it expected a rubber stamp of approval for its military party, the NUP.<sup>1575</sup> It viewed civilian party politics as disorderly and ripe for the disintegration of the country.<sup>1576</sup> Thus, when the NUP lost miserably in the elections, the SLORC reneged on its promise to accept the election results. The SLORC’s key constituents were its own members and dependents. The Tatmadaw’s main domestic concern was maintaining power at all costs, believing it was the only organization capable of maintaining the unity of the country.<sup>1577</sup> The name of its failed military party—National Unity Party—indicates as much.

The military however was not a homogenous block. There were factional disputes within the Tatmadaw about the best way to maintain control, and the best tactics to achieve its objectives.<sup>1578</sup> Internal clashes appeared in the decision for Ne Win to step down, or be

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<sup>1572</sup> Smith, 1994: 29.

<sup>1573</sup> Charney, 2009: 171; Ibrahim, 2018: 38.

<sup>1574</sup> Charney, 2009: 150, 171.

<sup>1575</sup> Callahan, 2003: 210; Charney, 2009: 168; Ibrahim, 2018: 41.

<sup>1576</sup> Charney, 2009: 165.

<sup>1577</sup> Smith, 1994: 423; Callahan 2003: 207.

<sup>1578</sup> Charney, 2009: 159-160; Ibrahim, 2018: 38.

forced out, in 1988 when the protestors were gaining strength.<sup>1579</sup> Internal disputes were always over how to protect the power of the military, including its political and economic privileges, not about offering concessions to civilian parties.<sup>1580</sup>

A critical event that affected the military's domestic strategy toward insurgents, and its ability to maintain power, was the disintegration of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and the resulting 1989 ceasefire agreement with the SLORC.<sup>1581</sup> Conflict between the military and the CPB dated to the early days of Burma's independence and was the oldest, and largest of the country's domestic insurgencies.<sup>1582</sup> The CPB mutinies occurred at the same time as, but were not coordinated with, the student protests in Rangoon. As discussed, at this moment the junta's power was threatened, and the country's economic crisis had depleted its financial reserves.<sup>1583</sup> Seeing an opening to end the conflict with the ex-communist armies to their mutual advantages, in 1989 General Khin Nyunt engaged a local drug kingpin, Lo Hsing-han, to broker a deal with the communist insurgents.<sup>1584</sup> The two sides agreed to a ceasefire, and the Tatmadaw granted each of the four ex-communist armies of the collapsed CPB a specific area of operation in which they could conduct business "as they pleased."<sup>1585</sup> The military, in turn, redirected its forces toward insurgencies in the rest of the country and reaped the financial windfall of the booming illicit narcotics trade.<sup>1586</sup>

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<sup>1579</sup> Ibrahim, 2018: 38.

<sup>1580</sup> Charney, 2009: 159; Ibrahim, 2018: 38-39.

<sup>1581</sup> Amnesty International, 1992 (Sept): 31; Callahan, 2003: 13; Charney, 2009: 188; Myint-U, 2021: 48-50.

<sup>1582</sup> Charney, 2009: 164; Myint-U, 2021: 48.

<sup>1583</sup> Myint-U, 2021: 49.

<sup>1584</sup> Amnesty International, 1992 (Sept): 31; Callahan, 2003: 13; Myint-U, 2021: 50.

<sup>1585</sup> Amnesty International, 1992 (Sept): 31; Myint-U, 2021: 50-51.

<sup>1586</sup> Myint-U, 2021: 51.

With additional troops and funds at its disposal, the Tatmadaw aggressively suppressed opposition to its rule and resistance to the suspension of the 1990 democratic election results. In implementing its expulsion policy in northern Arakan, the SLORC aimed to succeed where General Ne Win had failed—permanently removing the Rohingya. While the military struggled to repress ethnic minorities in frontier areas that were better armed and trained, the Rohingya were both more easily removed and their expulsion fit with the junta’s ethno-nationalist “Burmanization” strategy.

In addition to the benefit of achieving something the previous regime had failed to do, anti-Rohingya sentiment united both the SLORC and the opposition NLD.<sup>1587</sup> After the 1990 election, NLD politicians colluded with the military in accusing the newly elected Rohingya members of parliament of falsifying their identity documents to run for office and stripped them of their seats.<sup>1588</sup> In oppressing the Rohingya, the SLORC and the NLD were on the same page. Although the SLORC did not seek NLD approval of, or support for, the expulsion of the Rohingya, these unified objectives bolstered the policy. In sum, the expulsion of the Rohingya benefited the SLORC and its domestic military allies in completing the failed 1978 Operation Dragon King; achieving a tactical win against a group that had spawned several insurgent movements; furthering its ethnonationalist objectives; and removing a group that the majority Burmans rejected as alien—all which further cemented its hold on power.

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<sup>1587</sup> Ibrahim, 2018: 42.

<sup>1588</sup> Ibrahim, 2018: 42.

### *Transnational Alliances*

In the late 1980s and early 1990s Burma's junta was isolated from the rest of the world by economic and political sanctions because of its authoritarian rule and human rights abuses.<sup>1589</sup> The Tatmadaw's engagement in illicit industries, and domination of the domestic economy, enabled its financial survival despite its isolation. Its transnational alliances were limited, but two transnational partnerships were critical—those with China and Thailand.

Burma and China had a tenuous relationship since Burma's independence. The two countries share a long border in the northeast, and there was a sizable ethnic Chinese minority in the country, approximately 400,000 in the early 1990s.<sup>1590</sup> After Ne Win's 1962 coup, a time of tense anti-foreigner sentiment prevailed in Burma, illustrated by the expulsion of 300,000 Tamil Indians in the effort to nationalize the economy.<sup>1591</sup> In 1967, violent anti-Chinese riots erupted throughout the country, allegedly incited by the government. Hundreds of Chinese were killed or injured, property was looted and destroyed, and many fled the country.<sup>1592</sup> The Chinese government responded to the riots by financially and militarily supporting the CPB insurgents.<sup>1593</sup>

In the 1980s, as part of Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping's reformist shift, China cut off military aid to the communist insurgents.<sup>1594</sup> Not long after, the CPB collapsed, and the four ex-communist armies signed the ceasefire agreement with the Tatmadaw. Soon after, the Burma-China border reopened to trade and movement.<sup>1595</sup> These dramatic internal events

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<sup>1589</sup> Holliday, 2005: 329, 332; Steinberg & Fan, 2012: 263, 331.

<sup>1590</sup> Smith, 1994: 64.

<sup>1591</sup> Chakravarti, 1971: 183-84; Tinker, 1990: 45.

<sup>1592</sup> Smith, 1994: 63-64; Myint-U, 2021: 35.

<sup>1593</sup> Smith, 1994: 64; Myint-U, 2021: 49.

<sup>1594</sup> Myint-U, 2021: 49.

<sup>1595</sup> Steinberg & Fan, 2012: 210, 316; Myint-U, 2021: 59.

occurred in the spring of 1989 while simultaneously across the border, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was facing its own student uprisings. Like the Burmese junta, the CCP ruthlessly suppressed the protestors, notably in the Tiananmen Square Massacre.<sup>1596</sup> After the massacre, SLORC Secretary Khin Nyunt, called China's Ambassador to Burma and "expressed sympathy and understanding on the Chinese government[']s] use of force against the demonstration at Tiananmen Square in Beijing."<sup>1597</sup> As the CCP partially opened to the forces of globalization, and launched its communist market economy, it created tremendous economic growth.<sup>1598</sup> Large numbers of Chinese businessmen returned to Burma. Since the passage of new foreign investment laws in the late 1980s, most of Burma's foreign investment has come from the Chinese.<sup>1599</sup> The end of the CPB insurgency and the events of Tiananmen Square, brought Burma and China together, in what would become a very close relationship.<sup>1600</sup>

In 1989, trading relations between China and Burma rapidly increased. They agreed to a \$1.2 billion arms deal, including aircraft, patrol boats, tanks, armored personnel carriers, and military training—critical to the dramatic expansion of the Tatmadaw in the early 1990s.<sup>1601</sup> China also invested in large-scale development projects including the construction of roads and hydroelectric dams, and provided cheap consumer goods.<sup>1602</sup> In addition to its official

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<sup>1596</sup> Holliday, 2005: 331.

<sup>1597</sup> Steinberg & Fan, 2012: 401.

<sup>1598</sup> Myint-U, 2021: 50.

<sup>1599</sup> Steinberg & Fan, 2012: 253.

<sup>1600</sup> Smith, 1994: 64; Smith, 1999: 426; Steinberg & Fan, 2012: 315.

<sup>1601</sup> Asia Watch, 1992: 23; Smith, 1994: 90; "ASEAN Called to Act on Burmese Situation." Bangkok The Nation (05 March 1992); "Burma's Policy, Muslim Rohingyas' Plight Viewed." Kuala Lumpur New Strait Times (11 March 1992); "Rohingya Leader Demands Citizenship Guarantees." Hong Kong AFP (05 April 1992); Crossette, 1991; Smith, 1999: 426; Holliday, 2005: 331; Charney, 2009: 187; Steinberg & Fan, 2012: 163, 317.

<sup>1602</sup> Crossette, 1991; Smith, 1994: 90; Steinberg & Fan, 2012: 187, 210, 317.



trade relations, the Chinese were involved in illicit trading and smuggling in the timber, gems, and narcotics sectors.<sup>1603</sup> Lo Hsing-han, who helped to broker the historic ceasefire with the ex-communist armies on behalf of the Tatmadaw, was a prominent Chinese drug smuggler.<sup>1604</sup> Between 1988 and 1995, trade between the two countries grew at an average annual rate of 25 percent.<sup>1605</sup> While China in 1989 was not the behemoth that it is today, Burmese government officials prioritized this relationship as one of mutual interest and economic gain.

Burma was also a strategic security partner for the Chinese. Establishing strong relations with Burma—including access to its transportation network and ports—gave Beijing a route to the Bay of Bengal, a strategic waterway to bolster its naval presence, influence over the Straits of Malacca, and closer proximity to monitor India.<sup>1606</sup> Therefore in 1991 at the outset of Burma’s expulsion of the Rohingya, China was the country’s preeminent transnational ally—its largest trading partner and arms dealer. If there was a country with leverage over the military junta, it was China.<sup>1607</sup> However, China did not interfere in the domestic politics of Burma, pursuing a “no strings attached” investment approach.<sup>1608</sup> The Chinese government was indifferent to the expulsion of the Rohingya and put no pressure on the Tatmadaw to change course.<sup>1609</sup> This lack of opposition to the expulsion decision, further enabled the removal to proceed.

Burma’s second important transnational ally at the time was Thailand. The two countries historically had close economic ties, and the Thai-Burmese militaries had especially

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<sup>1603</sup> Crossette, 1991; Steinberg & Fan, 2012: 208.

<sup>1604</sup> Myint-U, 2021: 50.

<sup>1605</sup> Steinberg & Fan, 2012: 208-209.

<sup>1606</sup> Steinberg & Fan, 2012: 312-13, 318, 340.

<sup>1607</sup> Asia Watch, 1992: 22.

<sup>1608</sup> Steinberg & Fan, 2012: 187.

<sup>1609</sup> “Burma Duplicity, Foreign Pressure Viewed.” Bangkok The Nation (02 May 1992).

close relations.<sup>1610</sup> After the SLORC reasserted control in September 1988, Thailand was the first ASEAN country to respond. The new regime's first high-level foreign visitor was the Thai Commander of the Army, General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, in December 1988.<sup>1611</sup> The two countries signed lucrative cross-border logging contracts during his visit, allowing Thai companies with links to the ruling junta to "clear cut" forests along the southeastern border.<sup>1612</sup> Like China, trade relations between the two countries included official and unofficial trade—the latter including large-scale timber smuggling.<sup>1613</sup>

Given these close economic and military ties, Thailand could also have influenced the actions of the SLORC. However, Thailand was facing its own domestic turmoil in the early 1990s with a military coup toppling the democratically elected Prime Minister in February 1991.<sup>1614</sup> The leader of the coup, Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army General Suchinda, had very close ties to the Tatmadaw.<sup>1615</sup> Thus, Thailand was indifferent to the Rohingya expulsion policy and refused to condemn the Tatmadaw, despite growing international pressure to do so. In March 1992, the Thai Foreign Minister stated, "Everybody shares concern, but there is no need for us to take part in any official declaration to condemn Burma."<sup>1616</sup> Thailand had battled its own Muslim insurgency in the south of the country since the 1960s.<sup>1617</sup> Although relations with its Muslim insurgents had thawed in the 1980s, the military's fresh takeover in 1991 was laden with memories of battling Islamic challenges to the

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<sup>1610</sup> Crossette, 1991; Asia Watch, 1992: 22.

<sup>1611</sup> Steinberg & Fan, 2012: 326.

<sup>1612</sup> Smith, 1994: 90; Steinberg & Fan, 2012: 326; Myint-U, 2021: 49.

<sup>1613</sup> Crossette, 1991; Steinberg & Fan, 2012: 263-64.

<sup>1614</sup> Croissant, 2007: 2.

<sup>1615</sup> Asia Watch, 1992: 22.

<sup>1616</sup> "Bangkok Not to Condemn Burma Over Muslims." Bangkok Post (13 March 1992).

<sup>1617</sup> Croissant, 2007: 2; Parnini, 2013: 289.

dominant Buddhist state. In sum, neither influential transnational ally—China, nor Thailand—exerted any pressure on the SLORC to halt the Rohingya expulsion.

### **Homeland State**

Bangladesh is the relevant “homeland state” in this case—the country to which the government alleged the expellees “belonged.” The ties between Burma and Bangladesh were moderate. The 168-kilometer border between the two countries is short and geographically isolated from lower Burma by a coastal mountain range.<sup>1618</sup> After the partition of India, and Bangladesh’s subsequent secession from Pakistan, the poor, Muslim-majority country was not a priority partner for the Buddhist military regime. The two countries had limited trade relations. Moreover, since Bangladesh’s independence there had been an ongoing dispute about the maritime boundaries in the Bay of Bengal related to oil exploration.<sup>1619</sup> Nevertheless, the two countries had maintained cordial ties—not strong but not weak.

Bangladesh was no stranger to the Tatmadaw’s efforts to remove the Rohingya from its territory and to force them into Bangladesh. They had done this in 1978 and they were aware of the SLORC’s renewed targeted rhetoric in this regard after they took power in 1988. Nevertheless in 1991 and early 1992, by *force majeure*, Bangladesh acquiesced and resettled the Rohingya refugees in 12 camps along the border.<sup>1620</sup> Overwhelmed by the influx, the Bangladeshi public was initially sympathetic to the Rohingya refugees.<sup>1621</sup> The area of concern was in a peripheral region in the southeast of the country, far from the center of power in

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<sup>1618</sup> Hein, 2018: 365; Ibrahim, 2018: 18; Myint-U, 2021: 9.

<sup>1619</sup> Yegar, 2002: 54; Parnini, 2013: 288, 294.

<sup>1620</sup> “Minister Discusses Refugees, List Given to Burma.” Dhaka Radio Bangladesh Network (29 March 1992).

<sup>1621</sup> Lambrecht, 1995: 5.

Dhaka, and not of immediate political concern.<sup>1622</sup> Bangladesh was also a very poor country with a GDP per capita in 1991 of less than \$300 USD, with limited resources to patrol and prevent refugees crossing the border.<sup>1623</sup> In addition, in April 1991, just as the Rohingya began fleeing, a violent cyclone struck south and south-eastern Bangladesh affecting 15 million people, killing over 135,000, and causing more than \$1.5 billion in damages.<sup>1624</sup> As the expulsion began, the country was focused on responding to the humanitarian disaster. Bangladesh had neither the capabilities nor resources to deny entry to the Rohingya refugees and the moderate ties between the two countries did not dissuade Burma from moving forward with its decision to expel.

### **International Community**

The Tatmadaw had long been an international pariah. Its international isolation increased after its aggressive, militarized response to the 1988 student protests, the arrest of then international darling and Nobel Prize winning NLD opposition leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, and its annulment of the 1990 elections. After the SLORC took power in 1988, western countries, like the United States, cut off aid to the country and the few UN agencies that remained had their budgets slashed.<sup>1625</sup> In the summer of 1991, European countries formalized an arms embargo and encouraged other countries around the world to do the same.<sup>1626</sup> Western countries such as the U.S. and members of what was becoming the European Union had

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<sup>1622</sup> Parnini, 2013: 287.

<sup>1623</sup> World Bank, 2020c.

<sup>1624</sup> Asia Watch, 1992: 21; Khalil, 1993: 263-265.

<sup>1625</sup> Smith, 1994: 90; Myint-U, 2021: 46.

<sup>1626</sup> Asia Watch, 1992: 23.

supported Burma's democracy movement. After the nullified elections and gross human rights violations, they were united in ending financial support to the country, imposing further sanctions, and funding the opposition government in exile.<sup>1627</sup> In the face of these external pressures the Tatmadaw was unfazed. It had survived since 1962 without much international engagement and it perceived international actors as suspicious, intrusive, and with aspirations of regime change.<sup>1628</sup> Thus, when the government began implementing its expulsion policy toward the Rohingya, its ties with the international community were not only weak, but non-existent, eliminating a potential constraint.

The response of the international community was mixed. The UN, western states, and some Muslim-majority countries condemned the expulsion while the regional Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) largely took the stance of "constructive engagement," which manifested in non-interference. The UN and western states were more vociferous in their response to the suppression of the democracy movement than they were to the Rohingya expulsion. Nevertheless, when the expulsion reached its peak in March 1992, the U.S., Australia, European Union, Japan, Kuwait, and others responded with pledges to the UN and Bangladesh for refugee support.<sup>1629</sup> Muslim-majority states including Iran, Indonesia, and Malaysia condemned the expulsion.<sup>1630</sup> In March 1992 the UN Commission on Human Rights passed a resolution calling for a Special Rapporteur to Burma to investigate human rights abuses and for an end to "the exodus of Myanmar refugees to neighboring countries as well

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<sup>1627</sup> Steinberg & Fan, 2012: 333, 339; Myint-U, 2021: 64.

<sup>1628</sup> Steinberg & Fan, 2012: 308; Ibrahim, 2018: 44, 46.

<sup>1629</sup> Asia Watch, 1992: 21; "Islamic Envoys Briefed." Dhaka Radio Bangladesh Network (27 February 1992).

<sup>1630</sup> Asia Watch, 1992: 22.

as to facilitate their early repatriation.”<sup>1631</sup> However, the UN had minimal leverage with the Tatmadaw since its presence in the country was small and Burma had not signed on to the international refugee conventions.<sup>1632</sup> Their condemnations of, and resistance to, the expulsion went unheeded.

The key regional organization was ASEAN, and in the early 1990s it had six members: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Although Burma was not a member of ASEAN in 1991, the organization could have exerted influence on the country. Throughout early 1992 as the expulsion reached its apogee, ASEAN members collectively agreed not to condemn Burma over the Rohingya removal. The Foreign Minister of Thailand, Asa Sarasin, stated on March 13, “ASEAN will not take a collective position on Burma’s repression of its Muslim minority.”<sup>1633</sup> The organization’s official policy was “constructive engagement,” resisting western pressure to apply sanctions or to be more critical of the ruling junta.<sup>1634</sup> Brunei and Singapore voiced “concern” and called for a “peaceful solution” but took no actions to convince the Tatmadaw to change course.<sup>1635</sup> Sarasin stated that, “despite its ‘concern’ over the influx of Rohingya refugees to Bangladesh, Thailand will not join the chorus of condemnation of the Rangoon military regime’s operations.”<sup>1636</sup> ASEAN resisted interfering in Burma’s domestic politics and refused to compel the SLORC to improve its human rights record.<sup>1637</sup>

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<sup>1631</sup> Asia Watch, 1992: 23; “ASEAN Called to Act on Burmese Situation.” Bangkok The Nation (05 March 1992).

<sup>1632</sup> Loescher, 2001: 225.

<sup>1633</sup> “Bangkok Not to Condemn Burma Over Muslims.” Bangkok Post (13 March 1992).

<sup>1634</sup> Crossette, 1991; Asia Watch, 1992: 22; “ASEAN Ministers Discuss Cambodia, Burma, Spratlys.” Bangkok Post (25 July 1992); Yegar, 2002: 65; Charney, 2009: 184.

<sup>1635</sup> Asia Watch, 1992: 22.

<sup>1636</sup> “Bangkok Not to Condemn Burma Over Muslims.” Bangkok Post (13 March 1992).

<sup>1637</sup> “ASEAN Called to Act on Burmese Situation.” Bangkok The Nation (05 March 1992).

Muslim-majority Indonesia and Malaysia, however, were more outspoken in their criticism than the other four ASEAN states. In a statement to the Indonesia House of Representatives, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Alatas, said “Indonesia appeals to the Myanmar [Burmese] Government to take the necessary steps to solve the problem regarding the Rohingya ethnic group and to deal with the fundamental questions that have led to the flow of refugees into neighboring countries.”<sup>1638</sup> Yet he also noted that the “problems inside Myanmar [are] essentially its internal affairs” but that “recent developments show that the situation inside Myanmar has carried over into some international dimensions and tends to have an adverse effect on the peace and stability in Southeast Asia.”<sup>1639</sup>

Domestically, Indonesia was being pressured to address the Rohingya situation. In January, the Indonesia Committee of Muslim Solidarity advocated for the government to do more on behalf of the Rohingya, releasing a statement comparing the SLORC to the Nazis and the treatment of Rohingya Muslims to the persecution of the Jews.<sup>1640</sup> The Aceh chapter of the Indonesia Ulemas Council wrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairs appealing to the government to “adopt a more resolute stand on the violation by the Burmese military regime of the human rights of the Muslims.”<sup>1641</sup> Despite this internal pressure, and its own strong statements, Indonesia supported ASEAN’s approach of constructive engagement and did not propose any alternative means of addressing the situation.<sup>1642</sup>

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<sup>1638</sup> “Jakarta Wants Burma to Solve Rohingya Problem.” The Jakarta Post (12 March 1992).

<sup>1639</sup> “Jakarta Wants Burma to Solve Rohingya Problem.” The Jakarta Post (12 March 1992).

<sup>1640</sup> “Paper Calls for ASEAN Change on Burma.” Bangkok The Nation (26 January 1992).

<sup>1641</sup> “Burmese Crisis Assumes ‘International Dimension.’” Jakarta Radio Republik Indonesia Network (05 May 1992).

<sup>1642</sup> “Jakarta Wants Burma to Solve Rohingya Problem.” The Jakarta Post (12 March 1992); Yegar, 2002: 65.

Malaysia similarly spoke out against the Tatmadaw's human rights violations, specifically its treatment of Muslim refugees.<sup>1643</sup> In early March the Malaysian government demanded that the Tatmadaw "immediately cease acts of alleged oppression and expulsion of about 135,000 Rohingyas from the country's Arakan Province."<sup>1644</sup> The Deputy Prime Minister, Ghafar Baba, stated a few days later that he hoped Burma would take its criticism over the Rohingya issue "as that from a friend."<sup>1645</sup> The Malay Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the Burmese Ambassador over the Rohingya issue to "immediately cease the oppression of Rohingya Muslims and be prepared to accept them back."<sup>1646</sup> Later in the month the Malaysian Foreign Minister Abdullah Dawai announced in a television broadcast that the "government was deeply concerned over the attacks on Moslems in Myanmar."<sup>1647</sup>

Like Indonesia, local organizations in Malaysia pressured their government over the Rohingya expulsion. The United Malays National Youth Organization protested against the treatment of Rohingya and raised funds for the refugees in Bangladesh.<sup>1648</sup> While speaking out against the Rohingya abuses, and summoning the Burma ambassador to outline its concerns, Malaysia did not directly engage with the SLORC. Instead it preferred to go through the United Nations. Foreign Minister Badawi stated, "it would only be proper for Malaysia to openly declare its firm stand on the matter and any of the necessary action by the UN."<sup>1649</sup> Malaysia was very careful to ensure its concerns about the Rohingya did not violate Burma's sovereignty

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<sup>1643</sup> "ASEAN-Burma Links May Strain Western Ties." Bangkok The Nation (28 July 1992).

<sup>1644</sup> "Ghafar Appeals to Burma." Kuala Lumpur Bernama (12 March 1992).

<sup>1645</sup> "Ghafar Appeals to Burma." Kuala Lumpur Bernama (12 March 1992).

<sup>1646</sup> "Envoy Summoned Over 'Oppression.'" Kuala Lumpur Radio Malaysia Network (10 March 1992).

<sup>1647</sup> "Burma's Impact on Regional Stability Criticized." The Jakarta Post (14 March 1992).

<sup>1648</sup> "Cabinet Seeks Full Report on Rohingya Muslims." Kuala Lumpur Radio Malaysia Network (12 March 1992).

<sup>1649</sup> "Minister To Go Through UN on Rohingya Issue." Kuala Lumpur Radio Malaysia Network (12 March 1992).



or constitute any form of domestic interference.<sup>1650</sup> Deputy Prime Minister Ghafar affirmed his confidence that the Rohingya issue would “not affect Malaysia-Myanmar relations.”<sup>1651</sup>

Despite UN and western condemnation of the Rohingya expulsion, the international community’s weak ties with the expelling regime meant any harsh rhetoric had little influence. This combined with ASEAN’s indifference and firm pledge to “constructive engagement,” bolstered the Tatmadaw and further enabled expulsion. In sum, Burma’s international isolation meant the international community had limited influence to sway the decision of the Tatmadaw, and the lack of regional resistance undermined the opposition from the United Nations and western states.

In this case the benefit of expulsion for the Tatmadaw, the indifference of China and Thailand, the acquiescence and resettlement of the Rohingya refugees by Bangladesh, and Burma’s weak ties with the international community, combined with ASEANs lackluster response, contributed to enabling expulsion in Burma. Yet, unlike any of the other cases analyzed in this dissertation, the same three factors shifted in the late spring, early summer, of 1992 resulting in the complete reversal of the Rohingya expulsion. We now turn to how this “repatriation” unfolded.

## **6.5 Burma, mid 1992-1995: Expulsion reversal & Rohingya repatriation**

Between April 1991 and July 1992, Burma’s military government expelled over 250,000 Rohingya from Arakan state. Yet in a surprising reversal, on April 28, 1992, the governments

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<sup>1650</sup> “Burmese Muslim Exodus Termed Great ‘Tragedy.’” Kuala Lumpur Voice of Malaysia (10 March 1992); “Ghafar Urges Caution.” Kuala Lumpur Radio Malaysia Network (15 March 1992); Yegar, 2002: 65.

<sup>1651</sup> “Ghafar Urges Caution.” Kuala Lumpur Radio Malaysia Network (15 March 1992).

of Burma and Bangladesh signed a bi-lateral agreement for the “safe, voluntary return” of the Rohingya expellees.<sup>1652</sup> After five days of talks between the foreign ministers of the two countries, the Burmese government agreed “to take all necessary measures that would halt the outflow of Myanmar (Burmese) residents to Bangladesh, and encourage those who left Burma to return voluntarily and safely to their homes.”<sup>1653</sup> So, what prompted this shift in policy from removing Rohingya “insurgents” and “terrorists” to one accommodating and accepting their return? The answer is that the key factors of alliances, homeland state, and international community, shifted to reverse the mass expulsion in mid-1992 (see Table 26).

Table 26: Mass Expulsion Decision Making Framework - Burma		
Key Factors	Burma (1991-mid-1992)	Burma (mid-1992-1995)
<b>Alliances</b>		
Domestic Alliances	Benefit from expulsion (↑)	Harmed by expulsion (↓)
Transnational Alliances	Indifferent to expulsion (↑)	Opposed to expulsion (↓)
<b>Homeland State(s)</b>		
Relation to Government	Moderate ties (--)	Moderate ties (--)
Response/ Anticipated Response	Acquiesce & resettle expellees (↑)	Resisted expellees (↓)
<b>International Community</b>		
Relation to Government	Weak ties (↑)	(Cultivating) strong ties (↓)
Response/ Anticipated Response	Mixed (--)	Mixed (--)

## Alliances

### *Domestic Alliances*

When General Saw Maung’s plans for democratic reform, with the NUP in control, failed, and the Tatmadaw responded with increased repression, economic sanctions tightened, foreign businesses withdrew, and international condemnation grew. While initially, international

<sup>1652</sup> UN Commission on Human Rights, 1993; Weiner, 1993: 158; Lambrecht, 1995: 5; Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Union of Myanmar and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 05 November 1993; 10a/1-1993/10; Series 1, Box 9; Fonds 10a, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>1653</sup> “Burmese Pact Unacceptable to Refugee Leaders.” Hong Kong AFP (28 April 1992).

pressure on Burma's government was focused on its actions to suppress democratic reforms, throughout the spring of 1992 there was growing outcry over the treatment of the Rohingya. As this pressure increased, so did internal dissension within the SLORC. Moderate factions within the Tatmadaw pushed senior SLORC leaders to temper their policies to increase domestic legitimacy.<sup>1654</sup>

Seeds of this growing moderate faction within the Tatmadaw began to emerge at the end of March 1992 when Burma's Foreign Minister, Ohn Gyaw, led an international delegation to northern Arakan, followed by a visit by UN Undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Eliasson, in an attempt to change the narrative about the situation of the Rohingya.<sup>1655</sup> By April, dissent within the Tatmadaw reached a boiling point and the SLORC reshuffled its top leadership, removing General Saw Maung and replacing him with the more pragmatic General Than Shwe.<sup>1656</sup>

In addition to leadership changes, the SLORC also instituted policy changes. In the last week of April, they rescinded most of the martial law restrictions, released political prisoners, including former Prime Minister U Nu, and agreed to repatriate the Rohingya refugees—an impressive about-face from the policy stance just a few weeks before.<sup>1657</sup> After ignoring invitations to visit Bangladesh for talks on the Rohingya in March, at the end of April Foreign Minister Gyaw travelled to Bangladesh and met with President Biswas assuring him

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<sup>1654</sup> Smith, 1999: 425; Charney, 2009: 177; Hein, 2018: 374.

<sup>1655</sup> "Thai Paper Cites Diplomatic Source on Arakan Tour." Bangkok The Nation (02 April 1992); "Muslims Deny Rape, Prosecution." Rangoon Radio Burma (04 April 1992).

<sup>1656</sup> "Burma Duplicity, Foreign Pressure Viewed." Bangkok The Nation (02 May 1992); Smith, 1999: 425; Charney, 2009: 177; Hein, 2018: 374; Mying-U, 2021: 45.

<sup>1657</sup> "Burma Duplicity, Foreign Pressure Viewed." Bangkok The Nation (02 May 1992); Smith, 1999: 425; Charney, 2009: 178.

of Burma's "sincerity to resolve the Rohingya refugee problem."<sup>1658</sup> Speaking about the meeting afterward Gyaw said, "[Myanmar and Bangladesh] are two close neighbors who have trust and complete understanding and good neighborliness."<sup>1659</sup> A swift reversal from ignoring Bangladesh's previous invitations to meet and resolve the issue. The Thai newspaper, *The Nation*, noted that "the recent concessions may indicate that there are elements pushing for reform within military circles in Rangoon...their tolerance within SLORC has its limits."<sup>1660</sup> Under the leadership of General Shwe, the SLORC was captured by the moderates, however relative, within the Tatmadaw.

Importantly, these changes in domestic alliances within the military junta did not overturn the previous approach or ideology of the SLORC. In May, Foreign Minister Gyaw again denied the Rohingya were being persecuted by the government, and told the BBC in an interview that "the Rohingyas had left Myanmar for their own reasons, possibly being incited to do so by rebel insurgents."<sup>1661</sup> The reversal of the expulsion had not negated the motivation of the Tatmadaw to remove the Rohingya, a target group that it saw as a security threat in the phase of strengthening the nation. While the motivation remained constant in the two periods examined, the key factors that had enabled expulsion from April 1991-March 1992, had become constraints by April 1992.

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<sup>1658</sup> "Zia Apprises UN of Burmese Refugee Problem." Dhaka Radio Bangladesh Network (21 March 1992); "Burmese Foreign Minister Vows to End Disputes." Dhaka Radio Bangladesh Network (26 April 1992).

<sup>1659</sup> "Burmese Foreign Minister Vows to End Disputes." Dhaka Radio Bangladesh Network (26 April 1992).

<sup>1660</sup> "Burma Duplicity, Foreign Pressure Viewed." Bangkok *The Nation* (02 May 1992).

<sup>1661</sup> Amnesty International, 1992 (Sept): 25.

### *Transnational Alliances*

Burma's two key transnational allies during this period, China and Thailand, had ignored the expulsion of the Rohingya and continued their strong economic relations. China however, was a vital ally of both Burma and Bangladesh, and the Bangladeshi government lobbied China to help resolve the issue. Although China had no concerns with the SLORC's repressive policies per se—in fact, it shared a common experience of suppressing student dissent—it was worried about maintaining regional stability for its own economic and strategic benefit.<sup>1662</sup> In January 1992, shortly after the border clashes between Burma and Bangladesh, the Chinese authorities assured Bangladesh they would use their influence with Burma to “diffuse the tension” between the two countries, but did not pledge to stop the human rights abuses.<sup>1663</sup> A senior Bangladeshi government official told the AFP that, “China, which has close ties with both Bangladesh and Burma [*noting Beijing was a major source of weapons for both countries*], has extended its helping hand to ensure that the two neighbouring countries can settle their problems amicably.”<sup>1664</sup>

Throughout 1992, Bangladesh held conversations with senior Chinese officials about repatriating Rohingya refugees to Burma. In November, Bangladesh's Foreign Secretary held talks with Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Xu Dunxin.<sup>1665</sup> Dunxin stated during the talks that the Chinese government, “would utilize its close relationship with Myanmar...to persuade the Myanmar authorities toward speedy repatriation of Rohingya refugees.”<sup>1666</sup>

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<sup>1662</sup> Steinberg & Fan, 2012: 309-10.

<sup>1663</sup> Asia Watch, 1992: 22.

<sup>1664</sup> “PRC Helping to Restore Ties with Burma.” Hong Kong AFP (27 January 1992).

<sup>1665</sup> “Talks Held with PRC Vice Foreign Minister.” Dhaka Radio Bangladesh Network (04 November 1992).

<sup>1666</sup> “Talks Held with PRC Vice Foreign Minister.” Dhaka Radio Bangladesh Network (04 November 1992).

Human rights protections were of no concern to the Chinese, “except insofar as their absence, or perceived absence...contributes to instability.”<sup>1667</sup> Bangladesh asserted that the massive refugee influx was destabilizing.

Since access to conversations between Chinese and Burmese authorities are not available, public statements by Bangladeshi and Chinese officials, after their meetings, serve as a useful proxy for China’s intentions. Although Chinese recommendations to senior Burmese authorities were conveyed in private, given the crucial economic support that China provided the SLORC, their views would have been taken seriously.<sup>1668</sup> The Tatmadaw calculated that repatriating the Rohingya was useful for both its domestic and transnational alliances, contributing to the expulsion policy reversal.

## **Homeland State**

The strength of ties between Bangladesh and Burma did not change dramatically from 1991 to 1992. While their relations were strained in December 1991 when Lone Htein forces crossed into Bangladesh and killed four people, the Bangladeshi government was upset but remained committed to communication and amiable relations with its neighbor. Bangladeshi Information Minister, Najmul Huda, described the country’s approach to dealing with the situation as “pursuing quiet diplomacy to resolve the crisis.”<sup>1669</sup> The moderate ties between the two countries were constant in the two periods examined here. What changed was Bangladesh’s reception of the Rohingya refugees.

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<sup>1667</sup> Steinberg & Fan, 2012: 330.

<sup>1668</sup> Steinberg & Fan, 2012: 311, 333-34.

<sup>1669</sup> “Parliament Begins Debate on Burma Border Tension.” Dhaka Radio Bangladesh Network (03 February 1992).

In early 1992, Prime Minister Zia and Foreign Minister Rahman mounted an international lobbying campaign for relief funds to *temporarily* accommodate the Rohingya refugees, and for commitments to return them to Burma as soon as possible. In February, Rahman travelled to eight European and Middle Eastern countries to brief leaders on the refugee situation and to plead for their support.<sup>1670</sup> The next month, Prime Minister Zia travelled to Washington D.C. and met with President Bush, securing his support for refugee assistance, followed by a trip to New York to brief UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali on the Rohingya situation.<sup>1671</sup> Prime Minister Zia “urged the secretary general to take urgent measures to create pressure on [the] Myanmar Government to settle [the issue] so that the refugees can go back to their country with safety and dignity.”<sup>1672</sup> While Bangladesh was unable to resist the entry of Rohingya into Bangladesh, it fiercely resisted their remaining. The worldwide campaign by the Bangladeshi government to force Burma to take back the Rohingya refugees—from the United Nations in New York to powerful governments around the world—was essential to their return to Arakan.

One possible bargaining chip that allowed Bangladesh to “punch above its weight” in convincing the UN to repatriate the Rohingya was its dramatically increased contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO). Although Bangladesh began contributing personnel to UNPKO in 1988, it was not until four years later in 1992 that it provided substantial personnel. While there is no direct evidence of a quid pro quo, Bangladesh increased its peacekeeping troops from 5 in January 1992 to 1,128 by December, rising further to 3,451 by

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<sup>1670</sup> “Rahman Leaves for Europe, Middle East Visit.” Dhaka Radio Bangladesh Network (14 February 1992)..

<sup>1671</sup> “Zia Apprises UN of Burmese Refugee Problem.” Dhaka Radio Bangladesh Network (21 March 1992); Asia Watch, 1992: 21.

<sup>1672</sup> “Zia Apprises UN of Burmese Refugee Problem.” Dhaka Radio Bangladesh Network (21 March 1992).

the end of 1993.<sup>1673</sup> In December of 1991 Bangladesh was the 49<sup>th</sup> largest contributor of forces to UNPKO, tied with Romania, Thailand, and Turkey—a year later it rose to 13<sup>th</sup> largest, and by December 1993 it was the fourth largest contributor in the world.<sup>1674</sup>

Senior Bangladesh officials noted their increased contributions to, and prioritization of, UN peacekeeping in public statements. On September 29, in Bangladesh’s 1992 UN General Assembly speech, Foreign Minister Rahman stated,

“...we have *purposefully* contributed to United Nations peace-keeping efforts through the dispatch of military and civilian contingents...We strongly support the strengthening of the financial and institutional base of peace-keeping and its growth in new and imaginative directions” [emphasis added].<sup>1675</sup>

Separately, after a week-long visit to the UN in January 1993, Rahman told reporters that,

“...his talks with [UNSG] Dr. Butrus Ghali [sic] went on very well. The secretary general has assured all possible help of the world body for an early repatriation of all refugees from Bangladesh...Mr. Ghali...also commended Dhaka for its participation in the peacekeeping operations in the trouble spots in the world.”<sup>1676</sup>

While the UN and its affiliated agencies were supportive of repatriation as a policy, the small, impoverished country marshaled support at the UN far above its fighting weight. It may have used contributions to UN peacekeeping as a bargaining chip—the correlation is certainly conspicuous.

## International Community

Moderate elements in the Tatmadaw were concerned about growing international condemnation of the SLORC. To rehabilitate its international legitimacy, the regime of

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<sup>1673</sup> United Nations Peacekeeping, 2021.

<sup>1674</sup> United Nations Peacekeeping, 2021.

<sup>1675</sup> U.N. General Assembly, 47th Sess., 17th mtg., U.N. Doc A/47/PV.17 (Oct. 8, 1992).

<sup>1676</sup> “Rahman on UN, U.S. Talks, Burmese Refugees.” Dhaka Radio Bangladesh Network (28 January 1993).



General Than Shwe promised a “new direction” and sought to improve relations with the international community.<sup>1677</sup> This was a dramatic shift from General Saw Maung. The desire to cultivate relations with the international community meant the views of the United Nations and its member states were of greater concern to the SLORC’s new leadership. This is not to say that the SLORC improved its human rights record under Than Shwe, but it was more strategic about how it engaged with the international community—for example, facilitating international delegations to Arakan state and access to civilians, however scripted. Under General Saw Maung ties with the international community had been nonexistent. This changed under Than Shaw who sought to cultivate stronger ties with the UN and agency affiliates, which influenced the decision to reverse the expulsion.

Critically linked to Bangladesh’s efforts to gain international support for sending the Rohingya back to Burma, was the backing of the UNHCR. According to international refugee law, it is illegal to send refugees back to a country where they face a well-founded fear of persecution.<sup>1678</sup> As the institution charged with refugee protection, the UNHCR’s clearance of a country as “safe” for refugee return was critical for repatriation. Thus, when the UNHCR sanctioned the [forced] return of the Rohingya, despite the lack of an improved context in Arakan State, and the absence of guarantees of their safety upon return, the organization enabled the repatriation.<sup>1679</sup>

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<sup>1677</sup> Hein, 2018: 374; Myint-U, 2021: 45.

<sup>1678</sup> Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention states, “No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”

<sup>1679</sup> Loescher, 2001: 225.

Conveniently, Bangladesh's priority to remove the refugees from its territory, aligned with the UNHCR's shifting policy priorities toward repatriation as the priority solution.<sup>1680</sup> Previously, the UNHCR's position, and that of the Refugee Convention, had been that repatriation was a voluntary choice made by refugees themselves.<sup>1681</sup> However, the agency's new policies in the 1990s, and new terminology like "safe return," meant that the UNHCR, not refugees, would determine if conditions in the home country had improved to allow for return.<sup>1682</sup> The UNHCR also shifted its determination of "safe" countries to when conditions improved "appreciably" rather than "substantially."<sup>1683</sup> Scholar of refugees and historian of the UNHCR, Gil Loescher, described this internal policy shift: "there was a growing view that refugee safety did not necessarily always outweigh the security interests of states or broader peace-building and conflict resolution goals."<sup>1684</sup> ASEAN's policy of constructive engagement remained unchanged, therefore the opinions of the UN were more of a concern for the SLORC.

As part of Than Shaw's new direction as SLORC chairman, he acceded to the repatriation of the Rohingya according to the bi-lateral agreement with Bangladesh signed on April 28, 1992.<sup>1685</sup> The new Burmese leadership's shift in policy to strengthen ties with the international community, combined with the stance of the UNHCR in favor of refugee repatriation as the preferred solution, contributed to the swift reversal of the expulsion.

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<sup>1680</sup> Human Rights Watch, 1996; Loescher, 2001: 284.

<sup>1681</sup> Loescher, 2001: 284.

<sup>1682</sup> Loescher, 2001: 284.

<sup>1683</sup> Loescher, 2001: 284.

<sup>1684</sup> Loescher, 2001: 284.

<sup>1685</sup> Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Union of Myanmar and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 05 November 1993; 10a/1-1993/10; Series 1, Box 9; Fonds 10a, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; Myint-U, 2021: 45.

## Epilogue

This chapter does not cover the details of later events. Nevertheless, a brief discussion of how the Rohingya refugee repatriation unfolded over the following three years is warranted. The UNHCR approved of Rohingya repatriation based on a May 1992 agreement with the Government of Bangladesh that it could independently interview refugees about their *voluntary* decision to return.<sup>1686</sup> However, in September 1992, Bangladesh began sending Rohingya back to Burma in large numbers and denied the UNHCR access to the camps to monitor this process.<sup>1687</sup> Human rights organizations documented the Bangladeshi authorities' use of coercion and abuse to force the Rohingya to leave.<sup>1688</sup> The Bangladeshi government denied this, and Foreign Minister Rahman told the press on December 26 that, "no Rohingya refugee has been repatriated from Bangladesh to Burma against his will," refuting accusations by the UNHCR otherwise.<sup>1689</sup> Negotiations to resolve this issue failed, and the UNHCR withdrew from the refugee camps in December as returns continued.<sup>1690</sup>

The following year in July 1993 the SLORC and UNHCR agreed "in principle" to a "framework of assistance and cooperation in the context of the voluntary repatriation programme from Bangladesh," which was followed in November with an official memorandum of understanding to allow UNHCR to monitor the return of refugees in Arakan State.<sup>1691</sup> This agreement was signed despite evidence that there had been no improvement in

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<sup>1686</sup> Loescher, 2001: 285.

<sup>1687</sup> Lambrecht, 1995: 5.

<sup>1688</sup> Weiner, 1993: 159; Piper, 1994: 26; Lambrecht, 1995: 5-6; Human Rights Watch, 1996.

<sup>1689</sup> "Foreign Secretary Denies Forced Repatriation." Dhaka Radio Bangladesh Network (26 December 1992).

<sup>1690</sup> Piper, 1994: 25; Lambrecht, 1995: 5; Loescher, 2001: 285.

<sup>1691</sup> Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Union of Myanmar and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 05 November 1993; 10a/1-1993/10; Series 1, Box 9; Fonds 10a, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; Piper, 1994: 11.

the Tatmadaw's protections for the Rohingya in northern Arakan.<sup>1692</sup> Human Rights Watch documented continuing discrimination and abuse of Rohingya Muslims including "denial of citizenship...forced relocations and forced labor," which had led to renewed refugee flight to Bangladesh as the repatriation was in progress.<sup>1693</sup> Yet returns from Bangladesh continued and the UNHCR actively promoted the repatriation in 1994 once its staff had access to the area.<sup>1694</sup> Refugees reported signs in front of UNHCR offices in Bangladesh stating, "There is peace in Myanmar. You can return."<sup>1695</sup> The accuracy of this determination is questionable since the Burmese military often accompanied UNHCR staff to the field when they visited returnees, an approach they had similarly used in the spring of 1992 during international delegations to Arakan, and impartial translators were difficult to find.<sup>1696</sup> Nevertheless, by 1995 nearly all 250,000<sup>1697</sup> Rohingya had returned to Burma, reversing the mass expulsion.

### *Summary*

This final case study illustrates the fourth of the mass expulsion motivations in my expulsion taxonomy: counterinsurgency. The Burmese government was motivated by their national consolidation efforts in the late 1980s, early 1990s, and their identification of the Rohingya as a distinct security threat, labelling them "insurgents" and "terrorists." While the identification of counterinsurgency as a motivation for mass expulsion is not novel, the comparison of the SLORC's shifting policies—expelling the Rohingya beginning in March 1991 but then swiftly

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<sup>1692</sup> Lambrecht, 1995: 6.

<sup>1693</sup> Human Rights Watch, 1996.

<sup>1694</sup> Human Rights Watch, 1996; Loescher, 2001: 285-86.

<sup>1695</sup> Lambrecht, 1995: 8.

<sup>1696</sup> Lambrecht, 1995: 15, 22; Loescher, 2001: 286.

<sup>1697</sup> Human Rights Watch, 1996; Loescher, 2001: 286.

agreeing to repatriate them a year later—highlights that the motivation to remove the Rohingya was not enough to explain the expulsion decision. The new leadership of the SLORC in April 1992 had the same views as the previous regime regarding the Rohingya. What changed was that the previous enabling conditions had reversed to constrain the policy.

In March 1991, the SLORC, under the leadership of General Saw Maung, aimed to achieve something the previous Ne Win regime had failed to do—permanently remove the Rohingya. With a united Tatmadaw, mass expulsion achieved this security objective and strengthened its control over the revitalized ethno-national state. Simultaneously, it capitalized on anti-Rohingya public sentiment to gain domestic support, if not legitimacy. Burma's two key transnational allies at the time, China and Thailand, refused to intervene in the internal affairs of their neighbor and partner, and proceeded to strengthen their political and economic ties with the SLORC government as the expulsion unfolded. Bangladesh, the alleged home of the Rohingya, was overwhelmed by the influx and acquiesced and resettled the expellees. After decades of international isolation, and further western sanctions following the harsh crackdown of the student protests, Burma was immune to international condemnation, and ASEAN opted for “constructive engagement” rather than pressuring the government to reverse course. Together, the state of domestic and transnational alliances, the homeland state, and the international community enabled expulsion in Burma.

But less than a year later the situation changed. General Than Shwe took the helm of the SLORC and under his “new direction” he moderated the Tatmadaw's position toward the Rohingya and agreed to a bi-lateral agreement with Bangladesh to repatriation the refugees. Shwe's moderate faction of the Tatmadaw pushed out General Saw Maung over concerns of losing domestic legitimacy. China, allied with both Bangladesh and Burma, and concerned

about instability in the region, quietly encouraged Burma to take back the Rohingya, while not commenting on its human rights abuses. China's move occurred in parallel with Bangladesh's fierce lobbying campaign at the UN and with countries around the world to support the immediate repatriation of the refugees. The UN, particularly the UNHCR, supported repatriation as its preferred refugee solution, and facilitated the repatriation and sanctioned the "conducive and congenial"<sup>1698</sup> environment in Arakan for the Rohingya's return. Interested in shedding its international pariah status, the Tatmadaw worked with the UNHCR to resettle the Rohingya, while continuing its human rights violations.

Unfortunately, but perhaps not surprisingly, the Rohingya faced further persecution once back in Burma. In 2012-2013 Burma's government, under the administration of Thein Sein, expelled 20,000 Rohingya.<sup>1699</sup> Then three years later, during 2016-2018, over 800,000 Rohingya were expelled from Arakan in the largest expulsion of the group to date.<sup>1700</sup> Using my framework of expulsion decision making I would anticipate that this latest expulsion of the Rohingya is likely, at least in the short term, to remain permanent unlike the previous large-scale expulsions in 1978 and 1991-1992. Burma's alliances are currently entrenched in their positions. The Tatmadaw refused to accept the most recent election results and mounted a coup in February 2021, followed by the mass repression of student protests, very reminiscent to events in 1988-1990.<sup>1701</sup> The junta is not seeking domestic legitimacy and no moderate wing has emerged to push the military in a "new direction."

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<sup>1698</sup> Stephano Severe, UNHCR Head of Cox's Bazaar Sub-Office in Bangladesh, described the situation in Myanmar in July 1994 as "conducive and congenial for the refugees to return" (Lambrecht, 1995: 12).

<sup>1699</sup> Human Rights Watch, 2013.

<sup>1700</sup> Human Rights Council, 2018.

<sup>1701</sup> Goldman, 2022.

Furthermore, in the three decades since 1991, China has only increased its influence in Burma, turning the country into a client state. It is unlikely that China will pressure Burma to take back the Rohingya since there is not a similar fear of instability in the region with this most recent wave. Initially it seemed that Bangladesh would pursue a similar strategy of repatriation in response to this largest refugee influx, and in fact a bilateral agreement was signed with Burma in that regard in October 2018.<sup>1702</sup> However, no action has been taken to implement the agreement. That is likely because, unlike in 1992, neither the UN nor the UNHCR supports the repatriation of the Rohingya; and the Burmese government is not seeking international legitimacy. The key enabling factors of alliances, the homeland state, and the international community are why the latest expulsion of the Rohingya is likely to remain longer lasting, if not permanent.

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<sup>1702</sup> Refworld, 2018.

### **PART III. Conclusion and Supplements**



## CHAPTER 7. Conclusion

### 7.1 Summary of argument

This dissertation is the first systematic, and cross-regional, examination of why and how governments expel ethnic groups, *en masse*, over the *longue durée*. Three main findings emerge out of this macro historical approach. The first is that mass expulsion is a distinct phenomenon of intentional group-based population removal that has a different intention than related phenomena like genocide, ethnic cleansing, or coercive assimilation. Conceptually extracting mass expulsion from the ambiguous concept of ethnic cleansing allows for a more precise apples-to-apples comparison of government policies that seek to remove target groups. This, in turn, allows for a more systematic examination of the causes and consequences of mass expulsion policies. The distinct intent of mass expulsion is documented empirically in the novel Government-Sponsored Mass Expulsion Dataset (GSME) which records 139 expulsion events, affecting over 30 million people, around the world in the 120-year period from 1900-2020. While descriptive, this dataset documents when, where, who (is targeted), and how often mass expulsion occurs, illuminating the prevalence and persistence of this phenomenon in the modern era.

The second main finding is that while governments use similar policies of mass expulsion to remove unwanted ethnic groups, their motivations for doing so are varied. This variation is mapped in my taxonomy of perpetrator motivations for mass expulsions that introduces four main types: fifth column, anti-colonialism, nativism, and counterinsurgency/reprisal. Governments motivated to remove “fifth columns,” identify a target group as an existential security threat to the state because of real or alleged ties to an

enemy state or an external kinstate. Anti-colonialism mass expulsions aim to complete the decolonizing process, after independence, by targeting “alien” minority groups that held privileged status under the colonial regime. Governments motivated by nativism, expel target groups to protect the interests of native-born citizens over those of immigrant foreigners. Lastly, expulsions motivated by counterinsurgency/reprisal seek to either remove domestic rebel or secessionist movements or dangerous “refugee warriors,” or seek to retaliate against another country because of an inter-state dispute or for supporting a hostile side in a third-party conflict. These four types may be further specified by the phase of nation-building (establishing or consolidating) in which they occur, and by the real or perceived threat posed by the target group (security or economic). The taxonomy helps us identify specific configurations found in many expulsion cases.

Lastly, building on the genocide studies literature that outlines key restraints on policies seeking to annihilate targets,<sup>1703</sup> this dissertation introduces a framework of government decision making in implementing mass expulsion policies. When a government is motivated to remove a target group, I find that three contributing factors enable or constrain mass expulsion policy decisions: patterns of alliances, the homeland state of the targeted group, and the international community. Understanding these key constraints leads to important policy recommendations for deterring the use of mass expulsion, which I outline below. In sum, these findings improve our understanding of the phenomenon of mass expulsion, why governments choose this policy option, and what might hold them back even when they are motivated to expel.

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<sup>1703</sup> Harff, 2003; Straus, 2015; Bulutgil, 2016.

## 7.2 Contributions

The findings in this dissertation contribute to the fields of national, ethnic, and sectarian conflict, forced migration and citizenship studies, and exclusionary politics. The manuscript fills gaps in the conceptual, theoretical, and empirical literature. Conceptually this dissertation proposes mass expulsion as a neovalent to identify and explain this distinct form of demographic engineering more precisely than before. While not the final word on this subject, the manuscript aims to contribute to the long tradition of conceptual clarification in political science.<sup>1704</sup> Theoretically, my argument expands explanations for mass expulsion beyond war and security threats, and contestation over territory, that currently dominate the literature, to highlight an entire class of expulsions targeting alleged economic threats that have been neglected by scholars and policymakers. This finding highlights that most of what we know about ethnic cleansing and expulsion comes from detailed case studies of Europe, where identified motives that have driven expulsion have largely been confined to security threats emanating from fifth column or insurgent populations. The GSME dataset and cross-regional comparisons illuminate expulsions driven by the intent to target perceived economic threats, a class of expulsions largely neglected in the analytical record. The dissertation also expands our understanding of constraints on atrocities, demonstrating the importance of alliances, both domestic and transnational, the role of the “homeland” state of the target group, and the critical function of the international community in both deterring and *facilitating* expulsion policies—the latter which has been particularly overlooked.

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<sup>1704</sup> Sartori, 1984; Baldwin, 1997; Collier & Levitsky, 1997; Straus, 2001; Chandra, 2006.

The dissertation contributes to our empirical understanding of mass expulsion through the introduction of the GSME dataset. This dataset augments the work of other scholars of mass expulsion and ethnic cleansing (see Table 27), by expanding the temporal, geographic, and target group scope of the data collection. The last row in Table 27 shows that a significant amount of new data on the incidence of mass expulsion is documented in the GSME dataset. The lack of overlap between the GSME dataset and these three others relates to scope conditions (i.e., episodes with less than 1,000 persons affected, or without an estimate of persons affected are excluded); the lack of government intent in removing the target or a different intent (i.e., deportation with individual legal review or destruction – genocide are excluded); or internal expulsion—specifically many Soviet cases in Bulutgil’s (2016) dataset.

<b>Table 27: Comparison of GSME dataset &amp; existing expulsion-related dataset</b>							
<i>Existing Datasets</i>	<i>Concept</i>	<i>Temporal Coverage</i>	<i>Geographic Coverage</i>	<i>Target Group</i>	<i>No. Cases</i>	<i>GSME Case Overlap</i>	<i>Percentage overlap</i>
Henckaerts (1995)	Mass Expulsion	1945-1995	Cross-national	Citizens & Non-Citizens	53	37	70%
Adida (2014)	Mass Immigrant Expulsion	1956-1999	Sub-Saharan Africa	Non-Citizens	44	26	59%
Bulutgil (2016)	Ethnic Cleansing	1900-2000	Europe & Africa	Residents <sup>1705</sup>	69	35	51%
Garrity (2021)	Mass Expulsion	1900-2020	Cross-national	Citizens & Non-Citizens	139	-	-

The distinctiveness of the mass expulsion concept proposed in this dissertation is illustrated in Table 28. This table compares the GSME dataset to existing data collection efforts on related concepts including genocide, politicide, refugee mass movements, regime-induced displacement, mass atrocities, and large-scale (or mass) killing.

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<sup>1705</sup> Excluding temporary workers & refugees.

Table 28: Comparison of GSME dataset & existing datasets on related concepts					
<i>Existing Datasets</i>	<i>Concept</i>	<i>Temporal Coverage</i>	<i>No. Cases</i>	<i>GSME Case Overlap</i>	<i>Percentage overlap</i>
Harff (2003)	Genocide & politicide	1955-2001	37	4	10.8%
Ulfelder & Valentino (2008)	State-sponsored mass killing	1945-2006	120	6	5.0%
Greenhill (2010)	Coercive-engineered migration	1951-2006	56 <sup>1706</sup>	7	12.5%
Orchard (2010a)	Refugee mass movement	1991-2006	44	3	6.8%
Orchard (2010b)	Regime-induced displacement <sup>1707</sup>	1991-2006	31	3	9.7%
Bellamy (2011)	Mass atrocities & armed conflict	1945-2010	103	3	2.9%
Straus (2015)	Large-scale violence against civilians	1960-2008	33	0	0.0%
Butcher et al. (2020)	Targeted mass killing	1946-2020 <sup>1708</sup>	205	8	3.9%
Lichtenheld (2020)	Strategic population displacement	1945-2008	160	6	3.8%

The far-right column of Table 28 indicates that there is minimal overlap in the cases documented in the GSME dataset and other high-profile datasets. This highlights the boundedness of the mass expulsion concept proposed and examined here and justifies the dataset's utility as a research tool in and of itself and as a complement to this existing data. I also aspire for the data to be useful not just to readers of this manuscript but for further research into mass expulsion as a dependent variable or an independent variable.

In addition to the introduction of new data on mass expulsion, this dissertation provides new, in-depth empirical information on crucial cases of mass expulsion, and key negative cases of non-expulsion. The four case study chapters provide freshly researched

<sup>1706</sup> Greenhill (2010) has 64 total cases of coercive engineered migration of which 56 are definitive and 8 are suggestive. Table 28 documents the overlap with Greenhill's definitive cases (7 of 56, or 12.5%). The total case overlap rises to 10 of 64, or 15.6 percent, if the suggestive cases are included.

<sup>1707</sup> This only includes regime-induced displacement in cases of refugee mass movement; regime-induced displacement for IDP movement is excluded for a more accurate comparison since internal expulsions are not included in the GSME dataset.

<sup>1708</sup> This reflects the TMK Version 1.1 update (2021) with additional data for 2018-2020 that extends the original dataset (1946-2017) in the Butcher et al. (2020) article: <https://politicsir.cass.anu.edu.au/about-targeted-mass-killing-dataset>

accounts of how mass expulsion unfolded in each context, particularly in Uganda (1972), Nigeria (1983), and Burma (1991-1992), which are less researched than the Ottoman Empire's expulsions. They also present a "hard case" for my decision-making framework given the temporal, regional, target group, citizenship status, and regime type variation across the four expulsion cases. The use of negative cases to tease out the key constraints on mass expulsion is a research design used by Straus (2015) in explaining why perpetrators escalate from large-scale killing to mass categorical violence, or genocide, but this is the first time the approach has been used to explain mass expulsion. The detailed analyses of Istanbul (1913-1923), Kenya (1967-1969), South Africa (2008-2012), and Burma (1992-1995) provided here are the first case studies to examine the motivations of these governments to expel a specific target group (e.g., Orthodox Greeks, Asians, African migrants, and Rohingya), and the key factors that constrained the decision to expel, or reversed the decision in the Burmese case. The project illustrates the methodological utility of negative case studies in identifying key explanations as well as the value of cross-regional comparisons.<sup>1709</sup>

Finally, the dissertation introduces new primary sources to the political science of exclusionary politics, exploiting the archives of humanitarian agencies like the UNHCR and the ICRC that contain rich insights into how mass expulsions unfolded on the ground and the role of the UN and other international agencies in liaising with expelling governments and host states. While some historians have used these archives,<sup>1710</sup> they are underutilized by political scientists. Similarly, though the League of Nations Archives are widely used by

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<sup>1709</sup> Ahrām, Köllner, Sil, 2018.

<sup>1710</sup> Loescher, 2001; Cosmans, 2021; Lipman, 2020; Elie, 2010

historians,<sup>1711</sup> this is the first project to leverage the Records of Proceedings from the Lausanne Convention as well as the population exchange sub-committee meeting minutes to explain the exemption of the Orthodox Greeks in Istanbul from the 1923 population exchange agreement.

### 7.3 Policy recommendations

My findings suggest six core policy recommendations that translate beyond my cases and have broad application. The recommendations are directed toward multiple policy audiences, particularly the United Nations (and UNHCR), governments committed to reducing human rights abuses, and regional organizations (AU, ASEAN, ECOWAS, etc.). They are relevant at the institutional level, but also at the practitioner level for UNSG-appointed special envoys or special advisors (such as the Special Envoy for Myanmar or the Special Advisor on the Responsibility to Protect), or government-appointed special envoys (such as USG Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa or Libya), with direct connections to and, potentially, influence on government decision making. Furthermore, the recommendations may be useful to human rights organizations, or other NGOs focused on atrocity prevention, who have various early-warning tracking systems. Indicators could be created for some of these recommendations—such as mapping the alliance structure of high-risk countries—that could further enhance existing early warning mechanisms. The proposed policy recommendations are:

- The international community can both constrain *and* facilitate government decisions to expel—internationally negotiated “exchanges” and government-assisted population removals should be abandoned.

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<sup>1711</sup> Frank, 2017; Pedersen, 2015; Robson, 2017.

- The lack of international reaction, or response, to small-scale expulsion episodes emboldens governments to later enact much larger expulsion policies. All expulsions must be identified and condemned, and governments dissuaded from implementing this policy option.
- Concerns about risking transnational support (financial or military) critically constrains government expulsion decisions. Therefore, the transnational allies of high-risk countries should be systematically included in prevention strategies.
- Governments motivated to expel, that are constrained by their existing transnational allies, may seek to identify new allies who will provide financial or military support for their expulsionist objectives. Therefore, shifting alliances of high-risk countries should be closely monitored.
- Relationships with the executive's core domestic allies can be a useful point of leverage with high-risk countries. Emphasizing the potential economic and political harm of expulsion to these groups, using evidence from previous episodes in other contexts, may help to restrain its implementation from within.
- Reducing intra- and inter-state conflict helps reduce expulsion episodes.

The international community has a key role to play when it comes to constraining mass expulsion. This dissertation has highlighted episodes in which the international community has pressured governments not to expel, but it has also shed light on incidents when the international community has directly facilitated and enabled expulsion. To reduce the incidence of mass expulsion, internationally negotiated population “transfers” or “exchanges” should be exorcized from diplomatic negotiations as well as any support to expelling



governments to assist them in removing ethnic groups. In addition, in some cases, expelling governments “test the waters” with small-scale expulsions to gauge the international appetite for a much larger expulsion later. The international community should condemn and resist mass expulsion, no matter the size, as the lack of reaction to small-scale expulsion episodes often emboldens governments to later enact larger expulsions.

Governments motivated to remove a target group are significantly constrained by risks of alienating key transnational allies and their financial or military support. Given this constraint, the transnational allies of countries at high-risk for expulsion, should be included in dialogue and negotiations about prevention strategies. In the same vein, shifting alliances among high-risk countries should be monitored because alternative sources of financing from new transnational allies can lead to a *carte blanche* for human rights violations, paving the way for potential expulsion. Since domestic alliances play an important role in either enabling or constraining government expulsion decisions, in high-risk countries, raising awareness of the negative economic and political consequences of expulsion among the domestic allies of the government can be a potential tactic in reducing its implementation. Lastly, I have argued that the expulsion of targets seen by governments as economic threats are an overlooked aspect of mass expulsion, but most expulsion episodes in the past 120 years have targeted security threats (64 percent). Many of these expulsions occurred during intra- or inter-state conflicts and therefore a final fundamental policy recommendation is that efforts toward reducing conflict within or between states also has a positive effect in reducing the likelihood of expulsion.

## 7.4 Remaining questions

While this dissertation aimed to answer the questions, why and how mass expulsion occurs, it inevitably opened other areas of inquiry that merit further investigation and scholarly attention. There are five broad research areas that are ripe avenues for additional exploration: variation in eliminationist strategies, indirect mass expulsion, mass internal expulsion, pre-twentieth century versus post-twentieth century expulsions, and the consequences of expulsion.

### *Variation in Eliminationist Strategies*

This project exclusively examined the governmental policy of mass expulsion. However, the logical corollary to the question why governments expel, is why governments expel rather than using another eliminationist policy. Thus, another fruitful area of inquiry is why governments implement different eliminationist strategies<sup>1712</sup> including genocide, mass expulsion, coercive assimilation, partition, or the recognition of secession. While there are seeds of answers to this question in the work of Valentino (2004), Mylonas (2012), Butt (2017), and others, choices among these grim strategies are yet to be comprehensively analyzed. Important questions to be answered include why do governments implement one eliminationist policy rather than another? What kinds of groups are most likely to be targeted by each? And what are the advantages and disadvantages of the various policy options from the perspective of the government? One means of tackling these questions would be to use a cross-regional comparative approach and examine the treatment of different ethnic groups within a single

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<sup>1712</sup> McGarry & O'Leary, 1993.

state, such as the variation in treatment of the Armenians, Orthodox Greeks, and Kurds under the Ottoman Empire, or the Tamils, Rohingya, and Karen minorities in Burma.

### *Indirect Mass Expulsion*

In this dissertation I have sought to show that governments in all parts of the world have expelled ethnic groups *en masse*. Yet some governments have internalized the human rights norms against mass expulsion and refugee refoulement and have instead turned to other means of removing “unwanted” populations. One area of further research is to examine systems of control in which governments create unbearable conditions that induce some of the targeted group to leave the country “voluntarily.” This inducement of what could be called “voluntary removal” seems to be an indirect form of mass expulsion that should be analyzed alongside more explicit eliminationist policies. Examples of this type of indirect expulsion include the Japanese approach to the Zainichi Koreans after the Second World War, the Tanzanian government’s tactics against its Asian minority in the post-colonial period, and more recently policy in Lebanon toward Syrian refugees. The question of how discriminatory segregation efforts, or “urban renewal” policies in the United States may fit into this framework is an open question. The fact that black residents in Detroit referred to the city’s 1950s-1960s urban renewal efforts as “Negro removal” highlights the utility of bringing the U.S. into a comparative framework. While government efforts at indirect mass expulsion through various systems of control may not achieve *en masse* removal as effectively or expeditiously as mass expulsion, the use of discriminatory legislation and ethnic or racially targeted policies to provoke removal is an insidious tool of demographic engineering than deserves further investigation.

### *Mass Internal Expulsion*

In compiling the GSME dataset I specifically excluded cases of internal expulsion. The main reason was empirical feasibility. Coding internal expulsions would have required a much larger number of, arguably subjective, determinations for inclusion. For example, in cases of development-induced internal displacement it is difficult to assess if the government is removing a group specifically *because of* their group characteristics or rather because a specific group “happens to be in the way” of a development project. In the event of internal displacement resulting from a natural disaster, if an ethnic group affected was living in a flood- or drought-prone area would deliberate government neglect in preventing or mitigating the disaster count as expulsion? Internal expulsion also opens the question of segregation. Are government “red-line” policies that limit access to loans disproportionately affecting one racial group, and in turn forcing them to move out of one area to another, an expulsion? There are many difficult decisions about inclusion or exclusion of internal expulsion events, which for now radically complicate the process of developing a scientific dataset for widescale usage. While this complicated my data collection process, the complexity is ripe for further investigation.

Another reason I excluded internal expulsions was because of data issues. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) is “the world’s definitive source of data and analysis on internal displacement,”<sup>1713</sup> but their data collection does not begin until 1998. Since my data collection began in 1900 this was a significant limitation. However, research into internal removal beginning in 1998, and using the IDMC data, is a fertile area for future research. Key

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<sup>1713</sup> Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2020.

constraining factors for cross-border expulsion including the homeland state, transnational alliances, and the international community would likely be less important, if at all relevant, when it comes to constraining internal expulsion thus this is fruitful area for further inquiry.

### *Pre-Twentieth Century vs. Post-Twentieth Century Expulsions*

This manuscript specifically focused on modern mass expulsions from the beginning of the twentieth century to our present moment. However, as noted in the introduction, mass expulsion is far from a new or modern phenomenon—it dates as far back as the Assyrian Empire in the eighth century BCE.<sup>1714</sup> One potential area of future research would be to compare pre- and post-twentieth century mass expulsions, perhaps with a particular focus on colonial or settler expulsions, to see how, or if, the motivations for expulsion have changed over time. Examining the legacies of these expulsions would be particularly interesting and leads to the final proposed area of future research.

### *Consequences of Expulsion*

The literature on mass expulsion almost exclusively focuses on its causes and constraints, which is both essential for understanding the phenomenon and preventing its use. However, an underexplored area of research is the aftermath of mass expulsion. How did the expulsion of the *Volksdeutsche* from Czechoslovakia in 1945 affect the later Czech Republic, or the Asians from Uganda who were invited to return by President Museveni in 1986, 14 years after their expulsion? Or in contrast, how do expellees affect the societies to which they are expelled

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<sup>1714</sup> Bell-Fialkoff, 1993.

to—the *Volksdeutsche* in Germany or the Asians in the United Kingdom? How were expellees' experiences of return similar or different? Since expulsion continues around the world, these are important questions to investigate.

These are five potential areas for further research among many others. The GSME dataset demonstrates that mass expulsion is a government policy option that it still very much in global use. In the decade between 2010 and 2020, thirteen new expulsion events were initiated, and in every year that decade there was at least one ongoing expulsion somewhere in the world. Given the millions affected by this abhorrent policy, additional research is both urgent and essential.

## APPENDICIES

### A. Mass Expulsion Episodes (1900-2020)

#	Expelling Country	Years	No. Persons Expelled <sup>1715</sup>	Target Group(s)
1	Greece	1912-1912	10,000	Muslims
2	Serbia	1912-1913	10,000-20,000	Albanians
3	Greece	1913-1913	15,000	Bulgarians
4	Bulgaria	1913-1914	70,000	Greeks
5	Bulgaria	1913-1914	48,500-48,570	Muslims
6	Turkey	1913-1914	46,700-46,764	Bulgarians
7	Greece	1913-1914	100,000-125,000	Muslims
8	Turkey	1913-1914	150,000-279,000	Greeks
9	France	1919-1921	100,000-150,000	Germans
10	Bulgaria	1919-1928	30,000-50,000	Greeks
11	Greece	1919-1919	53,000-100,000	Bulgarians
12	Turkey	1922-1922	868,186-1,000,000	Greeks
13	Turkey	1922-1924	35,000	Armenians
14	Greece	1923-1926	355,635-356,000	Muslims
15	Turkey	1923-1926	189,916-190,000	Orthodox Christians (Greeks)
16	United States	1929-1939	500,000-2,000,000	Mexicans
17	Mexico	1931-1932	3,000	Chinese
18	Cuba	1933-1934	8,000	Haitians

<sup>1715</sup> Figures listed indicate the range of low- and high-end estimates.

19	Dominican Republic	1937-1938	10,000-30,000	Haitians, Dominico-Haitians
20	Cuba	1937-1939	29,900	Haitians
21	Germany	1938-1939	40,000-50,000	Jews (Austrian)
22	Germany	1939-1941	365,000-1,000,000	Jews (Polish), Poles
23	Bulgaria	1940-1940	100,000	Romanians
24	Romania	1940-1940	61,000	Bulgarians
25	Germany	1941-1941	100,000-130,000	Jews (French), French
26	Bulgaria	1942-1943	210,000	Greeks, Serbs
27	Peru	1942-1943	1,771-1,800	Japanese
28	Greece	1944-1945	18,000	Albanians
29	Poland	1944-1946	482,000-518,000	Belorussians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians
30	Soviet Union (Russia) <sup>1716</sup>	1944-1946	1,496,000-2,100,000	Poles, Jews (Polish)
31	Czechoslovakia	1945-1946	50,000-91,079	Ukrainians
32	Soviet Union (Russia)	1945-1946	33,961-42,000	Czechs, Slovaks
33	Czechoslovakia	1945-1947	2,252,544-3,000,000	Germans
34	Poland	1945-1947	6,000,000-8,250,000	Germans
35	Hungary	1945-1947	176,843-500,000	Germans
36	Romania	1945-1947	50,000-300,000	Germans
37	Yugoslavia	1945-1947	250,000-271,000	Germans
38	Czechoslovakia	1946-1946	200,000	Magyars (Hungarians)
39	Hungary	1946-1946	200,000	Slovaks
40	Hungary	1946-1946	40,000	Serbs, Croats
41	Yugoslavia	1946-1946	40,000	Magyars (Hungarians)

<sup>1716</sup> For consistency the country is referred to as “Soviet Union (Russia)” throughout, even after the collapse of the Soviet Union.



42	Netherlands	1946-1948	3,000-3,691	Germans
43	Israel	1947-1949	600,000-800,000	Palestinians
44	Bulgaria	1950-1951	152,000-155,000	Turks
45	United States	1954-1955	1,000,000-1,300,000	Mexicans
46	United Kingdom (British Imperial Sierra Leone)	1956-1957	30,000-50,000	Guineans
47	Egypt	1956-1957	20,200-25,000	Jews
48	Indonesia	1957-1958	50,000-60,000	Dutch
49	Cote d'Ivoire	1958-1958	1,000-2,000	Togolese, Beninese
50	Burma (Myanmar)	1962-1964	300,000	Indians (Tamils)
51	Gabon	1962-1962	2,700	Congolese (Brazzaville)
52	Republic of Congo	1962-1962	3,000	Beninese
53	Niger	1963-1964	6,918-16,000	Beninese (Dahomeyans)
54	Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)	1964-1964	1,000-3,000	Congolese (Brazzaville), Burundians, Malians
55	Cote d'Ivoire	1964-1964	16,000	Beninese
56	Turkey	1964-1965	36,000-47,000	Greeks
57	France (French Somaliland)	1967-1967	2,000-10,000	Somalis
58	Israel	1967-1968	270,000-390,000	Palestinians
59	Sierra Leone	1968-1968	2,000-8,000	Ghanaians
60	Honduras	1969-1969	60,000-130,000	Salvadorans
61	Ghana	1969-1970	200,000-1,000,000	Nigerians, Togolese, Burkinabe, Nigeriens
62	Uganda	1970-1970	30,000	Kenyans (Luo)
63	Libya	1970-1970	20,000	Italians
64	Cambodia	1970-1970	200,000-250,000	Vietnamese

65	Zambia	1971-1972	150,000	Rhodesians, Batswana, Zaireans, Tanzanians, Somalis
66	Iraq	1971-1971	11,000-60,000	Iranians
67	Uganda	1972-1972	50,000-80,000	Asians
68	Iraq	1974-1974	60,000	Iranians, Kurds
69	Turkey	1974-1975	168,000-200,000	Greek Cypriots
70	Cyprus	1974-1975	37,000-60,000	Turkish Cypriots
71	Algeria	1975-1976	30,000	Moroccans
72	Cambodia	1975-1978	150,000-200,000	Vietnamese
73	Libya	1976-1976	13,700	Tunisians
74	Republic of Congo	1977-1977	5,000-6,000	Maliens
75	Vietnam	1977-1979	400,000-1,000,000	Ethnic Chinese
76	Burma (Myanmar) <sup>1717</sup>	1978-1978	200,000	Rohingya
77	Burundi	1978-1978	40,000-50,000	Zaireans
78	Gabon	1978-1978	6,000-12,000	Beninese
79	Bangladesh	1978-1979	187,000-190,000	Rohingya
80	Chad	1979-1979	1,000	Beninese
81	Kenya	1979-1979	2,500-4,000	Ugandans
82	Zambia	1979-1979	4,000	Zaireans, Tanzanians, Malawians, Somalis, Mozambicans
83	Thailand	1979-1980	49,000-54,000	Cambodians
84	Iraq	1980-1980	20,000-25,000	Iranians
85	Kenya	1980-1981	3,000	Tanzanians, Ugandans

<sup>1717</sup> For consistency the country is referred to as “Burma (Myanmar)” throughout the dataset. Officially the country’s name was changed from the Union of Burma to the Union of Myanmar in 1989.

86	Gabon	1981-1981	5,000-10,000	Cameroonians
87	Sierra Leone	1982-1982	1,000	Guineans (Foulah)
88	Uganda	1982-1982	44,000-75,000	Banyarwanda
89	Mongolia	1983-1983	1,764-10,000	Chinese
90	Nigeria	1983-1983	1,500,000-2,000,000	Ghanaians, Nigeriens, Cameroonians, Chadians, Togolese, Beninese
91	Nigeria	1985-1985	200,000-700,000	Ghanaians, Nigeriens, Cameroonians, Chadians
92	Cote d'Ivoire	1985-1985	10,000	Ghanaians
93	Libya	1985-1985	42,000-80,000	Tunisians, Egyptians
94	Mauritania	1989-1989	70,000-85,000	Senegalese, Mauritaniens
95	Senegal	1989-1989	80,000-100,000	Mauritanians
96	Bulgaria	1989-1989	250,000-310,000	Turks
97	Kenya	1989-1990	5,000	Somalis
98	Kenya	1990-1990	1,000	Ugandans, Rwandans
99	Saudi Arabia	1990-1990	750,000-1,000,000	Yemenis
100	Bhutan	1990-1992	106,000-110,000	Nepalis
101	Kuwait	1991-1991	200,000-400,000	Palestinians, Iraqis
102	Dominican Republic	1991-1991	35,000-60,000	Haitians, Dominico-Haitians
103	Burma (Myanmar)	1991-1992	250,000-260,000	Rohingya
104	Yugoslavia	1991-1992	250,000	Croats
105	Yugoslavia	1992-1995	2,000,000	Bosnians (Muslims & Croats)
106	Bangladesh	1992-1997	230,000	Rohingya
107	South Africa	1993-1994	136,279-152,205	Mozambicans
108	Greece	1993-1994	96,000-100,000	Albanians
109	Croatia	1995-1995	180,000-200,000	Serbs


110	Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)	1995-1995	14,000-15,000	Rwandans, Burundians
111	Libya	1995-1995	80,000	Sudanese, Mauritians
112	Tanzania	1996-1996	250,000-500,000	Rwandans, Burundians
113	Dominican Republic	1996-1997	30,000	Haitians, Dominico-Haitians
114	Ethiopia	1998-1999	54,000-75,000	Eritreans
115	Yugoslavia	1998-1999	740,000-900,000	Kosovar Albanians
116	Eritrea	1998-2000	49,000-70,000	Ethiopians
117	Dominican Republic	1999-2000	10,000-20,000	Haitians, Dominico-Haitians
118	United Arab Emirates	2002-2002	1,200	Afghans
119	Angola	2003-2005	80,000-300,000	Congolese (Kinshasa)
120	Tanzania	2006-2007	17,000-60,000	Rwandese, Burundians
121	Soviet Union (Russia)	2006-2007	2,300	Georgians
122	Iran	2007-2007	160,000	Afghans
123	Angola	2008-2009	154,000-160,000	Congolese (Kinshasa)
124	Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)	2009-2009	30,000-40,000	Angolans
125	Thailand	2009-2009	4,689	Hmong
126	France	2009-2011	23,014-28,955	Roma
127	Uganda	2010-2010	1,700	Rwandans
128	Angola	2011-2012	60,590-105,000	Congolese (Kinshasa)
129	Iran	2011-2012	349,500	Afghans
130	Burma (Myanmar)	2012-2013	19,000-20,000	Muslims (Rohingya & Karman)
131	Tanzania	2013-2013	8,509-52,576	Rwandese, Burundians, Ugandans
132	Republic of Congo	2014-2014	179,000-245,000	Congolese (Kinshasa)
133	Cameroon	2015-2019	100,000-109,000	Nigerians

134	Dominican Republic	2015-2019	250,000-310,000	Haitians, Dominico-Haitians
135	Pakistan	2016-2016	500,000-565,000	Afghans
136	Burma (Myanmar)	2016-2018	812,000-831,500	Rohingya
137	Algeria	2016-2020	67,000	Sub-Saharan Africans
138	Angola	2018-2018	330,000-400,000	Congolese (Kinshasa)
139	Turkey	2018-2018	137,000-300,000	Syrian Kurds (Afrin)

## B. Mass Expulsion Coding Criteria

### *Coding decision tree*

For an event to be coded as a mass expulsion, the five questions in the coding decision tree below had to be answered in the affirmative.




#### *Relevant Evidence:*

- Explicit state-issued expulsion decree or policy
- Involvement of state military, paramilitary, police and/or intelligence forces in the physical removal of the target group

If yes:

2) Was the intent to remove?




#### *Relevant Evidence:*

- Documented govt expulsion decree/order
- Statement by head of state/govt announcing expulsion decision/policy
- Reports of state or state-sanctioned armed actors deliberately expelling the target group
- Systematic removal of whole populations
- No govt intervention to prevent systematic removals
- Govt announcement supporting the removals
- Multi-lateral or bi-lateral 'population transfer/exchange' agreements or treaties

If yes:

3) Was the target an ethnic, racial, religious, national group?




#### *Relevant Evidence:*

- Description of one of the four groups (ethnic, racial, religious, national) cited in govt expulsion decrees
- Displaced persons documented by response organizations/host govts as a collective (ethnic, racial, religious, national) group

*Coding decision tree continued...*

If yes:

**4) Was the group expelled because of its shared characteristics**



No. Population indiscriminately targeted


Yes

*Relevant Evidence:*

- Target group is instrumentally, not incidentally, removed
- Expellees originate from locations with large populations of target group

If yes:

**5) Was the expulsion intended as permanent?**



No. Government temporarily removes target group

Yes

*Relevant Evidence:*

- Govt authorities prevent expellees from returning home
- Expellees forced to sign documents that they are leaving 'voluntarily' and/or will not return
- Burning target group residences
- Govt confiscation of property and/or assets of target group
- Resettling dominant populations into the vacated residences/areas of the expelled group

***Scope condition coding criteria***

Below is the type of evidence required to indicate the expulsion episode met the two scope conditions:

1. The target population must be moved across an international border
  - a. Evidence of cross border expulsion:
    - i. Removal of members of the target group from their country of legal residence to another country
    - ii. Removal of members of the target group out of territory newly annexed by a foreign power, or out of territory newly ceded to another state
    - iii. UN / humanitarian organizations document expellees in neighboring states
    - iv. News media report the arrival of expellees in host (or home) states
2. At least 1,000 persons from the target group must be expelled in an annual period
  - a. Evidence of at least 1,000 persons expelled in an annual period:
    - i. Numerical figures from governments, UN, humanitarian organizations and/or news media
      1. While quantitative evidence is often lacking or politicized with each side increasing or decreasing the figures, there must be recorded estimates of at least 1,000 persons expelled over the course of a year
      2. High and low-end estimates are collected to show the range of available information



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LNA	League of Nations Archives (UN Archives at Geneva), Geneva
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva

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<sup>1719</sup> O'Brien was a pseudonym for Yash Tandon and Indian scholar, born in Uganda, who taught at Makerere University in Kampala (1964-1972) and then at the University of Dar es Salaam after being expelled (Tandon & Raphael, 1978; Peterson & Taylor, 2013: 77n34).

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