### Designing for Security: A Cybersecurity Introduction for Aerospace Education

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### **Goal and Structure**

Goal: serve as an introduction of topics, with the purpose of exposing the next generation of aerospace engineers to key areas where cybersecurity will prove essential.

#### > Structure:

- Background
- Area 1: Autonomous Navigation
- Area 2: Communications
- Area 3: Control Systems
- Conclusion
- Acknowledgements



# Background

Background Autonomous Communications Control Systems Conclusion Acknowledgements



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### What is Cybersecurity?

"Security in cyberspace (i.e., cybersecurity) is about technologies, processes, and policies that help to prevent and/or reduce the negative impact of events in cyberspace that can happen as the result of deliberate actions against information technology by a hostile or malevolent actor."

Computer Science and Telecommunications Board; National Research Council





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#### Why care about Cybersecurity?

- > **Digitalization**: Everything is moving towards digitalization
- Sophisticated Methods: dedicated groups with the goal of attacking systems
- > Widely Available Hacking tools: many free and easy to use tools
- > **Personal Security:** protecting your own data (files, photos, etc.)
- > Data Protection: data breaches are common, personal details can be exposed
- > Legal Obligations: companies must follow certain practices & disclosures
- > Notable examples from this year:
  - Microsoft Exchange
  - Solar Winds





### **Key Stakeholders**

- Many large technology companies have cybersecurity division or are solely devoted:
  - **Google Project Zero**
  - Microsoft >
  - Cisco

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- FireEye  $\geq$
- Even entities not focused on technology have cybersecurity teams (e.g. universities)
- Governments ("nation state actors") have entire devoted agencies
  - Intelligence gathering (NSA, NRO, CIA, FBI)
  - CISA (Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency)  $\succ$

#### In an increasingly digital world, we are all stakeholders



### **Cybersecurity in Aerospace**

- Within the Aerospace sector, the integration of communications, sensors, and data collection (often referred to as "Digital Enterprise" or "Digital Engineering") is starting to become widespread
- As the number of systems grows, so does the attack surface

#### > Examples:

- > 2019: Boeing 787 source code leak
- > 2020: Operation North Star, attacks on F-22 production and projects, likely North Korea
- > 2020: DEFCON satellite hacking event put on by the USAF







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# Autonomous Navigation

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### What is Autonomous Navigation?

- Vehicle navigates with minimal or no human intervention.
- The most common instance of this is self-driving cars.
- Often these systems operate using cameras assisted by machine learning models to "understand" the environment and act accordingly.
- Potential Attacks:

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- 1. Adversarial objects- e.g., printing a logo that looks like a stop sign
- 2. Environmental modification- e.g., modifying a sign via stickers or graffiti







### **Adversarial Objects**

- Modifying the object at an interpretation level.
- Causes misclassification
- > Aerospace application:

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- Entry, descent, and landing (EDL) systems support computer assistance.
- An adversary could modify runway indicators, throwing off the landing.







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### **Environmental Modification**

- Modifying the object at a physical level
- Causes misclassification or ignores the object
- Simpler due to minimal setup and knowledge of target system
- > Aerospace application:
  - > Entry, descent, and landing (EDL) systems support computer assistance.
  - > An adversary could modify runway indicators, throwing off the landing.





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### **Mitigation and Counters**

- Attacks are limited to physical modifications, their effects are less so when compared to direct attacks, e.g., hijacking the navigation system itself.
- > Attacks are exploiting the visual aspect of autonomous navigation systems.
- Engineers should not only seek to protect that specific avenue of attack, but also consider integrating a wider range of sensors into their design (i.e., sensor fusion).
- Every additional sensor and integration adds further risk, so additional exploration and consideration is encouraged.



## Communications

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#### **Defining Communications**

- Communications are a critical component of any interconnected system.
- The simplest definition of such is simply the process of relaying information from one place to another
- Potential Attacks:

- 1. Eavesdropping
- 2. Man in the middle (MITM)
- 3. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)



#### **Defining Communications**



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Karl Roush // Public Information

SHAPING THE FUTURE OF AEROSPAC

### Eavesdropping

- Data integrity of the information transmitted between components requires:
  - Confidentiality
  - Availability
  - Completeness
- Eavesdropping= unauthorized interception or sniffing of a conversation, communication, or data transmission
- Aerospace application:
  - Consider a fighter aircraft transmitting target coordinates
  - Should that communication be intercepted, it could have disastrous consequences





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#### Man in the middle (MITM)

- Extension of eavesdropping
- Attacker sits between the communicating parties.
- Can see all sides of the conversation.
- Aerospace application
  - Consider the same fight jet example
  - MITM could prove even worse as the attacker could feed parties incorrect information or simply block communications.







#### Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)

- Blocks service using a distributed network. The purpose of the attack is to degrade or block the availability of services to users.
- Botnets (a large number of often hacked devices, united for a single purpose) are commonly used to conduct DDoS attacks against networks and services
- Aerospace application:

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- Flight scheduling software gets DDoS'd and air traffic controllers are no longer able to coordinate flights.
- Communication itself gets knocked offline





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#### **Mitigation and Counters**

Eavesdropping and MITM

- Rely on obtaining access to the communications.
- Best defense is to secure the network.
- Usage of virtual private networks (VPNs), monitoring network traffic, and extensive filtering.
- In contrast, DDoS attacks are harder to counter and are much more prevalent.
  - February 2021: over 100 financial services were targeted by DDoS attacks conducted by a single threat actor
  - The best counter to this kind of attack is to leverage services provided by Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) or specific filtering services like Cloudflare.
- Attacks against communications systems and protocols are the most common simply due to the sheer number of them.
- Given the interconnectivity of aerospace systems, it is paramount that engineers consider how to secure those communications when designing them



# **Control Systems**

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#### What are Control Systems?

- Control systems broadly refer to systems related to regulating the behavior of the parent system.
- > As an example, the flaps on an airplane are part of the control system.
- Often there is an overlap between control systems and communications systems, with the latter conveying information to the former.
- Potential attacks:

- 1. Sensor modification
- 2. Fake command data





#### **Sensor Modification**

Exactly what it says: modifying the output of a sensor.

#### Aerospace application:

- Consider an attacker that has control over the angle of attack sensor
- Attacker could change the sensor to say the aircraft was at an angle of 15 degrees instead of the actual angle of -15 degrees
- Plane pitches down instead of up
- This is bad





#### Fake Command Data

- Instead of the operator's commands, the attacker inputs their own commands (similar to a MITM attack).
- Aerospace application
  - Consider the case of a commercial quadcopter.
  - The attacker commands the drone to fly forward into the tree, crashing the aircraft
  - Could be even more hazardous around airport





#### **Mitigation and Counters**

- Attacks against control systems often involve the attacker gaining access to a system,
- Best counter is to protect said systems,
- Example defenses:
  - Firewalls
  - Restricting system access
  - > Additional authentication
- However, assuming an attacker manages to gain control of a control system, there are two main techniques to reduce their effects:
  - Sandboxing- systems are separated from each other
  - Redundancy- information is cross checked with additional sources



# Conclusion

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### What's Next?

- Cybersecurity is a fast-growing field
  - US Bureau of Labor Statistics predicting a 39% growth between 2019 and 2029 (much higher than the average of 4%)
- Much of the focus in the aerospace sector is on porting existing standards, recommendations, and practices from other fields to aerospace applications
- The best way to protect a system is to consider the cybersecurity aspects early in the design phase
- Aerospace engineers should be exposed to these concepts early on in their career as they learn to implement development processes.



### What's Next?

"Publicly available information and policy actions to date have been insufficient to motivate an adequate sense of urgency and ownership of cybersecurity problems afflicting the United States as a nation."

Computer Science and Telecommunications Board; National Research Council



# Acknowledgements

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