BARRIERS TO SUCCESSFUL POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS FOR WOMEN: A CASE STUDY OF COLOMBIA'S PDET MUNICIPALITIES

by
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Abstract

To understand what hinders women's political participation in conflict-ridden contexts, this thesis studies the greatest barriers to successful political campaigns for women in Colombia's PDET municipalities. Through an exploratory statistical study, this thesis found campaign success to increase with low gender-based violence rates, high life expectancy for women, the smallest gaps between men and women's hours dedicated to unpaid care work, plurinominal electoral systems, high campaign incomes, and with the smallest gaps between men and women's labor force participation rates. The solutions and next steps identified through the use of the Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation methodology diverged from the current "best-practice solutions" being implemented on the ground, like gender quotas; identified key agents of change different to the government, like private corporations that make donations to campaigns; and highlighted important avenues for action, like the feminization of the existing resourcing ecosystem.

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Introduction

In Colombia's government, women are under-, if not un-, represented. The country has never had more than 22% of women in Congress, despite having a 30% gender quota for party lists since 2011.[1] Only two of the country's 32 departments have a woman governor and 132 of its 1,112 municipalities have a woman mayor.[2] The problem does not exist solely on the number of women in elected posts, despite this number being low, but on the overall number of women candidates and, especially, on their campaigns' success rate. Women comprised less than one fifth of the total number of candidates for elections held in 2015 and 2019, with a success ratio for women elected to the total number of women campaigns of about 2:10. Not surprisingly, Colombia ranks 21st out of the 35 countries of the Americas region included in the Women's Power Index, behind neighboring countries like Venezuela, Ecuador, and Peru.[3] In the scale of 0 to 100 (100 meaning women have parity), Colombia scores 30.[4]

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[1] *El Camino Hacia la Paridad en el Congreso Colombiano: La Representación Política de las Mujeres Después de las Elecciones de 2018* (UN Women and Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, 2019), 8, 36.
[2] *Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil y ONU Mujeres presentan un balance de gobernadoras y alcaldesas electas para el periodo 2020-2023[1],* (UN Women and Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, 2019), 3.
[3] "Women's Power Index," *Council on Foreign Relations,* accessed on February 11, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/article/womens-power-index#chapter-title-0-3
[4] This thesis' statistics and data reflect the country's reality before the 2022 Congressional and Presidential elections.

Figure 1: Americas region Political Parity Score map, Council of Foreign Relations

Despite being represented by other groups – like men – women are not representing women in Colombia, which translates into flawed democratic accountability and an important state capacity challenge. Representatives feel less, and at times, no, responsibility towards their constituents when they do not have shared experiences or belong to the same group.[5] Men representing women, thus, leaves women constituents at a disadvantage, without channels for accountability, and without a voice. State capability, on the other hand, is increased when more women participate in government and when the playing field is level for both men and women candidates.[6] Colombia's government is not representing the whole body of its constituents and is also not working under its full potential.

Colombia's history, on the other hand, is also characterized by violence. The country's longest internal conflict, which lasted for over 60 years, ended with a Peace Agreement in

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[5] Jane Mansbridge, "Rethinking representation," *American political science review* 97, no. 4 (2003): 523.
[6] Caroline Criado-Pérez, *La Mujer Invisible* (Bogotá: Editorial Planeta, 2019), 12.

2016. Yet, experts estimate that five internal armed conflicts still exist.[7] Women disproportionately carry differentiated weight and consequences when in war. For instance, between 1958 and 2017, women in Colombia represented 97% of the 15,076 victims of sexual violence associated with the conflict.[8] It is also evident how conflict negatively reinforces women's participation in government, since they remain under-represented and locked out of directly participating in local government. When looking at Colombia's municipalities that belong to Development Programs with Territorial Focus (PDET in Spanish, Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial) – those prioritized in the 2016 Peace Agreement for being the ones hardest-hit by the internal conflict – only 2% of PDET municipalities have a woman mayor and 3% of PDET departments a woman governor.[9] This is lower than the national proportions.

To better understand the low participation and representation of women in Colombia's government, the low success rate of women campaigns, and the uneven relationship between conflict and gender, this thesis portfolio asks what the greatest barriers to successful political campaigns are for women in Colombia, especially in PDET municipalities. The hypothesis is that specific institutional, financial, and, especially, cultural barriers affect campaign success, but that few of the policies implemented on the ground account for these barriers, instead importing "best practice" solutions that do not thoroughly understand the more fundamental issues.

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[7] "Cinco conflictos armados en Colombia ¿qué está pasando?" Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja, accessed on April 11, 2021, https://www.icrc.org/es/document/cinco-conflictos-armados-en-colombia-que-esta-pasando

[8] "Memoria Histórica con Víctimas de Violencia Sexual: Aproximación Conceptual y Metodológica," *Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica,* Bogotá: 2018, 43.

[9] Own analysis with data from Cnecuentasclaras.gov.co and Colombia.com

The first chapter provides an extensive review of the existing literature on cultural, institutional, structural, and financial barriers to successful political campaigns for women. While the conventional wisdom agrees institutional factors, such as electoral and party systems, weight the most in determining success, cultural factors are expected to have the strongest correlation in this paper. The chapter then describes the current behavior of women's participation and representation in Colombia's PDET municipalities to show how these stand below the national average. The chapter ends with a presentation and explanation of this thesis' dataset (a sample of forty-four successful and unsuccessful women's campaigns of candidates from Colombia's PDET municipalities for the 2015, 2018, and 2019 elections), and an explanation of the statistical methodology the second chapter follows, with campaign success as the dependent variable and 12 independent variables belonging to the categories of cultural, institutional, or financial barriers.

The second chapter runs an exploratory statistical study using the sample presented in the previous chapter, to identify what barriers influence and correlate with campaign success the most. This pilot study finds, first, that the majority of successful events happened for campaigns with low gender-based violence rates, high life expectancy for women, the lowest gaps in the hours dedicated to unpaid care work hours between men and women, plurinominal electoral systems, and with the highest campaign incomes. The number of independent variables is then reduced based on these preliminary findings and on the existing literature, in order to run a logistic regression model. Even though the regression does not result in statistically-significant correlations, and, thus, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, it does support the direction of the relationships identified in the exploratory statistical study and

highlight other important correlations, such as success and women's participation in the labor force.

The third chapter asks what solutions can help overcome the barriers to successful political campaigns for women identified in Chapter 2's pilot study. The chapter follows Harvard's Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA) methodology to identify solutions and a roadmap to action tailored to Colombia's context.[10] The solutions and next steps identified diverge from the current "best-practice solutions" being implemented on the ground – like gender quotas – and identify key agents of change different to the government – like private campaign donors, nonprofit organizations, and civil society organizations.

Finally, the findings of two focus groups carried out with nine women candidates for Colombia's 2022 congressional race are shared. [11] The purpose of the focus groups was to debate this thesis' results with the women who experienced these barriers on the ground in order to better understand their significance. The groups are discussed within Chapter 3, since they followed the PDIA methodology and represent its first iteration.

The following brief summary of Colombia's political structure and of the existing literature precedes Chapter 1.

Colombia's Political Structure

Colombia is a unitary, decentralized, democratic, participatory, and pluralist Republic, under the rule of law.[12] Sovereignty comes from its people, who are protected with

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[10] Matt Andrews, Lant Pritchett and Michael Woolcock, *Building State Capability: Evidence, Analysis, Action* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 135.

[11] This portion of my research was supported by Johns Hopkins University – Center for Advanced Governmental Studies' Student Scholar Award. The focus groups were carried out alongside *Extituto Política Abierta,* a nonprofit organization in Colombia that works on leadership strengthening for political innovation and democratic accountability.

[12] Constitución Política de Colombia 1991, título 1, art 1.

fundamental, inalienable, and inviolable rights.[13] The country has a multiparty party system and a presidential system of government, with an executive, a legislative, and a judiciary branch. The legislative branch consists of Congress, divided into a lower and an upper house: its House of Representatives, with 172 members, and its Senate, with 108 members, respectively. Colombia's administrative divisions consist of 32 departments and 1,112 municipalities/cities.

Colombia's president, vice-president, senators, and representatives are chosen every four, even years (e.g., 2014, 2018, and 2022) in a general election. The president and vice-president are elected under a single-member district, majority-required electoral system. Members of Congress are elected under a proportional representation-, plurinominal-electoral system, with the possibility of using both open/preferential vote- or closed-lists.[14] Colombia's regional authorities (the municipalities' mayors, departments' governors, National Assembly's deputies, municipalities' councils and Juntas de Acción Comunal's members) are also elected every four years, but on uneven years (e.g., 2011, 2015, and 2019) in territorial elections.[15] These officials are selected under a proportional representation electoral system.[16]

Summary of Literature Review

Cultural, institutional, financial, and structural barriers to women's successful political campaigns are widely studied. Cultural barriers are the social norms and attitudes towards women that play against them when they seek office. Institutional factors relate to electoral and party systems. Financial barriers relate to campaign and political finance, its regulation,

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[13] Constitución Política de Colombia 1991, título 2, art 1.

[14] Misión de Observación Electoral, *Sistema Político Colombiano: Elecciones Generales, Congreso & Presidencia 3ra Edición* (Bogotá, Colombia).

[15] Misión de Observación Electoral, *Sistema Electoral: Elecciones de Autoridades Locales 5ta Edición* (Bogotá, Colombia).

[16] Ibid.

and how traditional campaign finance opportunities are not usually as available to women as they are to men. Finally, structural factors relate to day-to-day practices and realities that, facilitated by written and unwritten norms and structures, disfavor women and their opportunities to participate in politics. Even though this thesis studies variables for the categories of institutions, campaign finance, and culture, the literature on structural barriers is still reviewed because the relationships identified in the other three categories can shine light to more structural issues that then act as barriers.

The literature surrounding cultural barriers agrees that culture influences campaign success, but not as strongly as other institutional factors. Variables like the existence of second wave feminist movements, measures of women's social and economic equality, ratification of international gender equality agreements, a country's socioeconomic development, and traditional attitudes towards women affected women's participation in government.[17] Culture in Colombia is also affected by violence and conflict. Studies have shown that conflict hinders the process of identity-building for women and acts as a barrier to participation.[18]

The conventional wisdom is that institutional barriers are the strongest determinants of success for women candidates. Authors have, thus, ranked electoral systems from most women-friendly to most women-unfriendly, identifying proportional representation (PR) as the system that benefits women the most.[19] Specificities within PR systems need to exist, however, in order to actually augment women's chances of getting elected. These will be

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[17] Paxton (1997), Kenworthy and Malami (1999), Norris and Inglehart (2004), Matland (2005).
[18] Cockburn (1998), Zulver (2021), True (2010).
[19] Rule (1994), Paxton (1997), Kenworthy and Malami (1999).
Proportional Representation: "electoral system that seeks to create a representative body that reflects the overall distribution of public support for each political party." (Britannica, accessed March 5, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/topic/proportional-representation).

further discussed in Chapter 1. This thesis hypothesizes that, while institutional factors are important in determining success, cultural factors are more consequential.

Financial barriers are also widely studied, especially with regards to campaign income and expenses and with the legal framework that exists to regulate campaign finance. Studies have shown that for every COP$1,000,000 a woman candidate has access to, a man candidate has access to COP$1,500,000.[20] They are both, however, expected to spend the same in order to have a chance at winning. The literature also shows Colombia has a robust legal framework for campaign finance that is not being implemented on the ground, especially with regards to the State fulfilling its law-mandated role as the main campaigns financier.[21] Authors argue, then, for gendered electoral financing that alleviates these financial barriers.[22]

Finally, structural barriers come about because of an underlying belief that dictates women belong to the private (house), and not the public, sphere. This belief is embodied in issues like unpaid care work responsibilities; lack of access to informal, usually male-dominated, meeting spaces; the behavior of campaign contributions; and political violence.[23]

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[20] Transparencia (2019).
[21] Falguera, Jones, and Ohman (2014).
[22] Muriaas, Wang, and Murray (2019).
[23] Casas-Zamora and Falguera (2016), Restrepo (2016).

Chapter 1: Literature, Behavior, and Data on Women's Barriers to Successful Political Campaigns

Since the conventional wisdom on the cultural, institutional, financial, and structural barriers to women's political participation represents the foundation against which this thesis' findings are analyzed, an in-depth review the existing literature on the subject is necessary. The conventional wisdom argues institutional factors are the strongest barriers to women's political participation and that cultural factors, albeit important, do not have a statistically-significant effect. This is important because the expectation is for this thesis' findings to position culture as the most significant barrier.

After an exploration of the existing literature, this chapter briefly describes the current behavior of women's political representation and participation in Colombia's PDET municipalities. Women's participation and representation in government for these municipalities stands below the national average, with an important number of municipalities or departments not even having had women candidates for the 2015, 2018, and 2019 electoral cycles. These numbers reflect the urgency with which the problem of women's under-representation in these regions needs to be better understood and intervened.

Finally, the data that is used for this study is presented and explained. A sample of forty-four successful and unsuccessful campaigns was collected for women's candidates in the 2015, 2018, and 2018 elections from Colombia's PDET municipalities. These campaigns' success is being measured against 12 independent variables belonging to the categories of culture, institutions, or campaign finance.

Literature Review

Cultural Barriers

The conventional wisdom finds culture to be an obstacle, albeit not as strong as other variables like electoral systems. Paxton tested whether social-structural variables—women's education or employment level—influenced women's political participation.[24] After sampling countries in six regions (Eastern Europe, Middle East, Southern Africa, South America, Caribbean, and Asia) and studying two different periods, she found "social structural variables to not have the expected influence on the percent of women in national legislatures."[25] Interestingly, cultural variables Paxton ascribed to her "ideology" category did have an impact, like second-wave feminist movements and measure of women's social and economic equality.[26] The existence of the former results in higher percentages of women in legislatures, while economic inequality hinders women's participation in government.[27] Thus, while a woman's education and employment level are not significant determinants of representation, other measures of culture and gender equality are.

Kenworth and Malami built from Paxton's study to find that measures of culture are statistically significant determinants of the share of parliamentary seats held by women, although not as significant as, for instance, electoral systems structure. The authors studied two samples—one of 146 nations and the other of the 20 wealthiest long-standing democracies—and political, socioeconomic, and cultural determinants, with the share of parliamentary seats as the dependent variable.[28] They found traditional attitudes towards

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[24] Pamela Paxton, "Women in National Legislatures: A Cross-National Analysis," *Social Science Research* 26, no. 4 (1997): 447.
[25] Ibid., 454.
[26] Ibid., 449-450.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Lane Kenworthy and Melissa Malami, "Gender Inequality in Political Representation: A Worldwide Comparative Analysis," *Social Forces* 78, no. 1 (1999), 248-249.

women negatively affected the independent variable, while ratification of the CEDAW Convention positively affected it.[29] The only cultural variable that did not hold a statistically significant correlation was the existence of abortion rights.[30]

Norris and Inglehart looked at the correlation between a country's socioeconomic development and traditional attitudes towards women, to find that the least developed the country, the most traditional the views.[31] They then established that egalitarian views towards women are correlated with higher numbers of women in parliaments.[32] When testing how much this correlation actually mattered, or if something else was driving the relationship, they found the relationship to be heavy and significant.[33] In other words, egalitarian views towards women in society result in higher percentages of women in parliaments.

Finally, Matland argued a country's political culture is biased and skewed in favor of men, thus affecting "the degree of openness to women candidates."[34] Women who aspire to get elected need to meet the challenges of three stages: selecting themselves, being selected as candidates by the parties, and being selected by the voters.[35] During the second stage, women's opportunities are enhanced with clear rules and procedures that allow entrances into inner circles of power.[36] During the third stage, culture affects women the most because of existing traditional views toward women as belonging to the private, and not the public sphere.[37]

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[29] Ibid., 257.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, "Cultural Barriers to Women's Leadership: A Worldwide Comparison," *Journal of Democracy* (2004): 7.
[32] Ibid., 8.
[33] Ibid., 9-12.
[34] Richard E. Matland, "Enhancing Women's Political Participation: Legislative Recruitment and Electoral Systems," *Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers* 2 (2005): 93-94.
[35] Ibid., 93.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid., 98.

Understanding the intersection between culture, conflict, and identity building is also fundamental for this paper since Colombia has been war-torn for over 60 years. Cockburn found violence shapes identities. She studied three women's groups; one in Bosnia-Herzegovina, one in Israel, and one in Ireland, to better understand the process of identity building in conflict and post-conflict countries.[38] When at war, the groups with the guns—usually male-dominated—are trying to assert a dominance that, among others, is also a gender dominance.[39] This male dominance reasserts identity in dualisms throughout society: women are victims, and men are warriors.[40] Usually, the creation of safe spaces allows the processes of identity building and democracy to positively-reinforce each other.[41] The existence of gendered regimes in conflict and post-conflict scenarios halts and even prevents the existence of these spaces.[42] A ceasefire, thus, does not decommission militarized masculinity, it hurts the process of identity building for women, and it negatively impacts democracy.[43]

On the other hand, True wanted to understand the relationship between women's poor access to productive resources—such as land, property, income, employment, technology, credit, and education—and their likelihood of experiencing gender-based violence and abuse.[44] She finds that, "Violent conflict, which often results from struggles to control power and productive resources, normalizes violence and spreads it throughout the societies involved."[45] Thus, women's low representation is not only due to the inequality existent in

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[38] Cynthia Cockburn, *The space between us: Negotiating gender and national identities in conflict* (New York: Zed Books, 1998).

[39] Ibid., 13.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Julia Margaret Zulver, *High risk feminism in Colombia: women's mobilisation in violent contexts* (USA: Rutgers University Press, 2021).

[42] Cockburn, *The space between us,* 209.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Jacqui True, "The Political Economy of Violence Against Women: A Feminist International Relations Perspective," *Australian Feminist Law Journal* 32, no. 1 (2010): 40.

[45] Ibid., 45.

economic and social resources, but also to violence.[46] While True was trying to understand how gender inequality exists and has been exploited inside a bigger context, her highlighted relationship between violence and political representation is innovative and linked to culture. This paper will now look at the literature surrounding campaign finance as an obstacle.

Campaign Finance Barriers

Transparencia por Colombia (Transparency International's chapter for Colombia) and the United Nations Women's 2019 report highlight how campaign finance is an important barrier for women candidates in Colombia. In the 2018 Congressional elections, a woman candidate had access to one million Colombian pesos (approx. US$260) for every 1.5 million pesos (approx. US$400) a man candidate had access to.[47] The highest income source for both men and women candidates were natural and corporate entities ("private" sources), but women received about one-third of these contributions: 238 women candidates compared to 443 men candidates.[48] This disparity in access to funds became evident when looking at the candidates' expenses: for every one million Colombian pesos spent in publicity by a woman candidate, a male candidate spent two million pesos.[49] Regardless of this disparity, women were expected to spend the same amount as men to have a chance at winning the election.[50] Scholarly literature supports Transparencia's findings.

Muriaas, Wang, and Murray introduced the concept of gendered electoral financing (GEF) and found it can alleviate gender bias and augment the supply of women candidates,

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[46] Ibid., 57.
[47] *Análisis sobre el acceso a recursos para la inclusión efectiva de las mujeres en la política* (Bogotá: Transparencia por Colombia, 2019), 56.
[48] Ibid., 51.
[49] Ibid., 36.
[50] Ibid., 56.

especially in countries where candidates fund their campaigns via private means.[51] Gendered electoral financing are the "interventions that use funding as a remedy to promote gender balance in political office," with two types existing: party-directed and candidate-directed.[52] The type that works the most for a specific country depends on its electoral system, type of public funding framework, and regulations on campaign spending.[53] Public financing efforts were found to have the strongest effect in alleviating gender bias.[54] Since Colombia not only has an existing public funding framework—notwithstanding its lax enforcement—but also has candidates funding their campaigns, mostly through private means, GEF's strategies are pivotal in correcting the existing financial barrier.

Lack of thorough campaign finance regulations and enforcement mechanisms also impedes the rise of emerging female leaderships in government.[55] One study analyzed political and campaign finance regulatory frameworks and identified that Latin America's problem with political and campaign finance did not result from "lack of regulation but from an inability to enforce regulations."[56] A case-specific study, on the other hand, found Colombia's political finance laws and regulations to have reached a "level of sophistication only comparable to its irregular fulfillment." [57] Colombia's campaign finance and election law (Ley Estatutaria 1475 de 2011, by which rules of organization and operation of political parties and movements, and of electoral processes are adopted, and other provisions are

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[51] Ragnhild L Muriaas, Vibeke Wang, and Rainbow Murray, eds., *Gendered Electoral Financing: Money, Power and Representation in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Routledge, 2019), 171.

[52] Ibid., 2.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid., 172.

[55] Kevin Casas-Zamora and Elin Falguera. *Financiación política y participación equitativa de las mujeres en Colombia: análisis de la situación* (Bogotá: International Idea and Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, 2016), 34.

[56] Falguera, Elin, Samuel Jones, and Magnus Ohman, *Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns: A Handbook on Political Finance* (Sweden: International Idea, 2014), 130.

[57] Casas-Zamora and Falguera. *Financiación política*, 14. Own translation.

dictated) establishes a mixed campaign financing framework, where public finance – meaning that provided by the State – is to be the candidates' and political parties' main source of income.[58] This is not the case in reality. As Transparencia's study showed, and as this thesis sample supports, the majority of the candidates' income came from private sources.[59] The State, however, received no sanctions for not fulfilling its role as financier. Since women are receiving about one-third of the private contributions, the lack of thorough enforcement mechanisms leaves women candidates at a disadvantage, despite regulations existing on paper.

Coate, in his article "Pareto-Improving Campaign Finance Policy," finds that providing an alley for a more equitable distribution and access to funds through the enactment of contribution limits and matching public financing is Pareto-improving—harms no one but benefits many—in the field of campaign finance.[60] Unlimited distributions incentivize the exchange of favors from candidates to interest groups while at the same time de-incentivizing the rise of qualified candidates, which is ineffective.[61] This thought process is the reasoning behind limited contributions and matching public funds, where the public funds make up for the gap the limit on contributions would leave.[62] In this way, favors are reduced but the rise of qualified candidates is increased.[63] Thus, Coate provides a solution to this issue of money as an obstacle, even though he does not specifically focus on gender.

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[58] Congreso de la República de Colombia. *Ley 1475 de 2011: Por la cual se adoptan reglas de organización y funcionamiento de los partidos y movimientos políticos, de los procesos electorales y se dictan otras disposiciones.* Bogotá: Congreso de la República, 2011.
http://www.secretariasenado.gov.co/senado/basedoc/ley_1475_2011.html
[59] Ibid., 19.
[60] Stephen Coate, "Pareto-improving campaign finance policy," *American Economic Review* 94, no. 3 (2004): 628-629.
[61] Ibid., 628.
[62] Ibid., 644.
[63] Ibid.

Institutional Barriers

Literature surrounding institutional factors focuses on the interplay between electoral systems and party systems, especially on the way in which certain systems favor women's participation in government. Matland argues that institutional characteristics, like breadth of participation, degree of centralization, patronage-oriented or bureaucratic selection systems, and party rules determine whether women get selected or not.[64] Thus, electoral systems like proportional representation (PR) favor of women's representation, as opposed to plurality/majority, single-member districts.[65] However, specificities within each PR system need to exist in order to actually empower women, such as high district magnitude and high electoral threshold.[66] Rule and Paxton reach similar conclusions.

Rule ranks electoral systems from "women-friendly" to "women-unfriendly."[67] Developed countries with PR systems have an average of 19.5% of women in parliaments, compared to an 8% in countries that do not.[68] The picture is not too different in developing nations, where those with PR systems and reserved seats for women (gender quotas) still have the highest percentage of women in parliaments.[69] She coincides with Matland in that the percentage of women in PR systems is affected by high district magnitude and high threshold rules, but adds to the list the preference vote and the formula for allocating parliamentary seats.[70] As a result, Rule ranks electoral systems from most friendly to most unfriendly to

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[64] Richard E. Matland, "Enhancing Women's Political Participation: Legislative Recruitment and Electoral Systems," Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers 2 (2005), 95-97.
[65] Ibid., 94-106.
[66] Ibid., 98-106.
[67] Wilma Rule, "Parliaments of, by and for the People: Except for Women?" In *Electoral Systems in Comparative Perspective: Their Impact on Women and Minorities,* edited by Wilma Rule and JF Zimmerman (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994), 16.
[68] Ibid., 18.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Ibid.

women candidates, the most friendly being party list/proportional representation[71] and the least friendly being single-member district/majority required for nomination or election[72] and alternate vote (multiple preferential vote)/majority required for election.[73] [74]

Paxton found less democratized and industrialized regions to have fewer women in their legislatures. Countries with PR systems have, on average, 3.5% more women in their lower house, a percentage that is also positively correlates with variables like democracy and industrialization.[75] Other studies have also reinforced this argument that PR systems are the most influential variable for the election of women in national legislatures, both in developed and developing nations.[76]

Structural Barriers

Casas-Zamora and Falguera identify Colombia's political culture as a structural problem. The authors define structural factors as deep social and cultural phenomena that "position women at a disadvantaged position."[77] Women rarely have access to informal meeting settings in which informal negotiations take place – late night dinners, men-only saunas, weekend golf outings – since, in a patriarchal society like Colombia's, women carry

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[71] System in which representatives are chosen nationally or in large electoral districts with multiple representatives for each district. Usually, voters vote for parties and parties must pass a threshold to gain representation, but this system allows for smaller parties to be represented the most. Two modes exist, closed-list, where voters vote for parties and not candidates, and open-list, where voters vote for candidates, and the ones with the most votes, get the seats the party wins. In addition, each party can choose how to present their lists, be it through zipper lists – one man, one woman, one man, one woman – or random lists, among others (Drogus and Orvis, 2012).

[72] System where each district selects one representative, but the winner needs to gain an absolute majority to win (50% plus one). If no candidate gets the majority, a second round is run between the two top candidates of the first round (Drogus and Orvis, 2012).

[73] A subsystem of Single Member District, where voters rank all candidates instead of voting for them. As a result, the first-place votes for the candidate with the least votes in a district are reallocated to those voters' second-choice candidate, until one candidate wins the majority. Alternate vote yields one representative per district (Drogus and Orvis, 2012).

[74] Rule, "Parliaments of, by and for the People," 26-30.

[75] Paxton, "Women in National Legislatures," 454.

[76] Kenworthy and Malami, "Gender Inequality in Political Representation," 236.

[77] Casas-Zamora and Falguera. *Financiación política*, 34.

the weight of unpaid care work.[78] Even formal settings pose a challenge for women:

Congress's plenary meetings begin at 4:00pm and end at midnight, a schedule that conflicts

with women's unpaid care work responsibilities.[79] A testimony in Casas-Zamora and

Falguera's study illustrates this reality:

> The most important obstacle for women to participate in politics is the two work shifts they do: the normal shift outside the house and then the 8 or 10 hours a day they dedicate to their home. For a woman, it is very difficult to abandon the care of her children to participate in politics. If you force her to choose, you kill her. If women choose not to enter politics, it is something to be respected. But we should demand that men support the same two work shifts that are expected of women. Most men only do one shift. [80]

The previous review of the literature on cultural, financial, institutional, and structural

barriers sets the groundwork upon which this thesis bases its research. The next chapter uses a

sample of forty-four women's campaigns to identify which of these barriers influenced the

most whether the candidates won or lost the election. The formulation of the independent

variables drew from the existing and aforementioned literature.

Women's Participation and Representation in Colombia's PDET Municipalities

Colombia's PDET municipalities were born with the 2016 Peace Agreement (Acuerdo

Final para la Terminación del Conflicto y la Construcción de una Paz Estable y Duradera),

signed between the government and the FARC-EP guerilla organization, after more than 60

years of internal armed conflict. These municipalities were prioritized based on poverty levels,

especially extreme poverty and unmet needs; degree to which the conflict affected the

municipality; weakness of administrative and management capacity; and existence of illegal

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[78] Ibid., 36.
   Criado-Pérez, *La Mujer Invisible,* 450.
[79] Casas-Zamora and Falguera. *Financiación política,* 36-37.
[80] Ibid., 37.

crops or other illegitimate economies.[81] As a result, 170 municipalities, belonging to 19

departments, were prioritized, representing 36% of the national territory, 24% of Colombia's

rural territory, and 25% of the country's ethnic groups (Figure 2).[82]

Figure 2: Colombia's PDET municipalities

Women's under-representation in Colombia's PDET municipalities is evident. Five out

of the 19 PDET departments did not have women candidates for either the 2015 or the 2019

territorial elections (Antioquia, Caquetá, Cauca, Nariño and Putumayo); one department did

not have women candidates for the 2018 Congressional elections (Guaviare); and 45 out of the

170 PDET municipalities did not have women candidates for either the 2015 or the 2019

territorial elections (Annex B). These numbers reinforce Matland's argument that the first

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[81] Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, *Acuerdo Final para la Terminación del Conflicto y la Construcción de una Paz Estable y Duradera* (Bogotá, 2016).
[82] "PDET en Cifras," *Gobierno de Colombia,* accessed on March 1, 2022, https://www.renovacionterritorio.gov.co/especiales/especial_PDET/

barrier women candidates face is that of selecting themselves.[83] In these departments and municipalities, women are being denied the opportunity to even participate in politics in the first place, locked into their traditional role of belonging to the private, and not the public, life. While this thesis focuses on barriers to successful political campaigns, this entry barrier is also important. Authors have argued it occurs because of salient traditional gender roles and fears of facing political violence.[84] Unfortunately, not much changes once this entry barrier is broken.

Successful women's political campaigns have been the exception, not the norm, in PDET municipalities and departments. For the 2015 and 2019 races for governor, only 15.6% and 3.1% of women candidates won, respectively (Annex B).[85] For those same years, but in the races for mayor, only 2.1% and 1.9% of women candidates won (Annex B).[86] In Colombia's current House of Representatives, 12 of the 19 departments that have PDET municipalities are represented by women.[87]

Data

In order to identify and understand the barriers to successful political campaigns for women, this thesis studies a sample of forty-four women's campaigns (twenty-one unsuccessful and twenty-three successful) for the 2015 and 2019 territorial elections and the 2018 race for House of Representatives from Colombia's 170 PDET municipalities and the 19 departments to which these municipalities belong (Annex D). This is a non-random sample,

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[83] Matland, "Enhancing Women's Political Participation," 93.
[84] Norris and Inglehart, "Cultural Barriers to Women's Leadership," 9-12.
Juliana Restrepo Sanín, "Violence against women in Politics: Latin America in an era of backlash," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 45, no. 2 (2020): 302-310.
[85] Own analysis. Sources: Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil; ONU Mujeres; Colombia.com/elecciones/2019/regionales/; Colombia.com/elecciones/2015/regionales/.
[86] Ibid.
[87] Ibid.

selected based on the availability of data and information and on trying to have candidates from as many PDET territories as possible. Sixteen out of the nineteen PDET departments are represented in this sample, with exception of Arauca, Guaviare, and Putumayo. As Table 1 shows, each of the samples' candidates' name, city/department, political party, date of the elections, office sought, and whether the campaign was successful or unsuccessful, was registered.

	Name	Department	Political Party	Date of elections	Office	Successful
1	Francia Marquez	Valle del Cauca	Consejo Comunitario del Río Yurumangui	2018	Congress	No
2	María Fernanda Perdomo	Caquetá	MIRA	2018	Congress	No
3	Gema López de Joaqui	Cauca	Liberal	2018	Congress	No
4	Rosina Ibeth Galeano Berrocal	Córdoba	Coalición Colombia	2018	Congress	No
5	Delcilia Díaz Estrada	Norte de Santander	MIRA	2018	Congress	No
6	Yolanda Wong Baldiris	Bolivar	U	2015	Governor	No
7	Esperanza Andrade de Osso	Huila	Aico	2015	Governor	No
8	Nigeria Rentería Lozano	Chocó	Alianza Social Independiente	2015	Governor	No
9	Claudia Margarita Zuleta Murgas	Cesar	Centro Democrático	2019	Governor	No
10	María Milene de Jesus Andrade García	Córdoba	Colombia Justa Libres	2019	Governor	No
11	Nohora Stella Tovar Rey	Meta	Centro Democrático	2019	Governor	No
12	Sonia Rosa Gómez Taboada	Sucre	Sucre Renace	2019	Governor	No
13	Rosmery Martínez Rosales	Tolima	Cambiando el Tolima	2019	Governor	No
14	Rubiela Tulane Urrea	El Tambo, Cauca	Centro Democrático	2019	Mayor	No
15	Indra María Nuñez Amaya	Agustín Codazzi, Cesar	Aico	2019	Mayor	No
16	Rubiela Mosquera	Condoto, Chocó	Centro Democrático	2019	Mayor	No

17	Mayra Alejandra Gaona Pinzón	San Calixto, Norte de Santander	Aico	2015	Mayor	No
18	Luz Giovana Velandia Sarmiento	Uribe, Meta	Colombia Justa Libres	2019	Mayor	No
19	Ana María Pérez Ramírez	Tibú, Norte de Santander	Pasión por Nuestra Tierra	2019	Mayor	No
20	Mauricia Rosa Vanegas Contreras	Coloso, Sucre	Colombia Humana	2019	Mayor	No
21	Silvia Mercedes Ospino	Dibulla, La Guajira	Centro Democrático	2019	Mayor	No
22	Juanita Goebertus Estrada	Bogotá D.C.	Verde	2018	Congress	Yes
23	Catalina Ortiz Lalinde	Valle del Cauca	Verde	2018	Congress	Yes
24	Flora Perdomo Andrade	Huila	Liberal	2018	Congress	Yes
25	Margarita María Restrepo Arango	Antioquia	Centro Democrático	2018	Congress	Yes
26	Astrid Sánchez Montes de Oca	Chocó	Social Unidad Nacional / U	2018	Congress	Yes
27	Jennifer Kristin Arias Falla	Meta	Centro Democrático	2018	Congress	Yes
28	Karen Violette Cure Corcione	Bolivar	Cambio Radical	2018	Congress	Yes
29	Adriana Magali Matíz Vargas	Tolima	Conservador	2018	Congress	Yes
30	Milene Jarava Díaz	Sucre	Opción Ciudadada	2018	Congress	Yes
31	Diela Liliana Benavides Solarte	Nariño	Conservador	2018	Congress	Yes
32	Oneida Pinto	La Guajira	Cambio Radical	2015	Governor	Yes
33	Claudia Marcela Amaya Garcia	Meta	Verde / Liberal	2015	Governor	Yes
34	Clara Luz Roldán González	Valle del Cauca	Todos por el Valle del Cauca	2019	Governor	Yes
35	Griselda Janeth Restrepo Gallego	Valle del Cauca	Por un Valle Incluyente	2019	Governor	Yes
36	Maria Edith Rivera Bermeo	Curillo, Caquetá	Conservador	2019	Mayor	Yes
37	Elisabeth Barbosa	Rioblanco, Tolima	Liberal	2019	Mayor	Yes
38	María Emilsen Angulo Guevara	Tumaco, Nariño	Tumaco Nuestra Pasión	2015	Mayor	Yes
39	Liyis Rocío Rivas Benitez	Medio San Juan, Chocó	Verde	2015	Mayor	Yes
40	Raquel Victoria Sierra Cassiani	María la Baja, Bolívar	U	2019	Mayor	Yes
41	Mallath Paola Martínez Cantillo	Fundación, Magdalena	Liberal	2015	Mayor	Yes

42	Maria Emilsen Angulo Guevara	Tumaco, Nariño	Conservador	2019	Mayor	Yes
43	Lucia del Socorro Carvajal	Antioquia	Cambio Radical	2015	Mayor	Yes
44	Gladis Rebera Miguel Vides	Antioquia	Liberal	2015	Mayor	Yes

Table 1: General information of sample's candidates

The dependent variable for this study is campaign success: yes/no. Below, an explanation of the 12 independent variables against which campaign success is being measured. Each independent variable belongs to one of the study's categories: institutions, culture, or finances. While this paper has been and will continue reviewing and discussing structural barriers, these are not studied independently because of how intertwined they are with cultural barriers and how difficult the differentiation can become. The relationships identified are expected to, in any case, highlight more structural issues that will be discussed both in the analysis and conclusion sections of this thesis.

The independent variables were selected based, mainly, on the existing literature, but also based on the indicators Colombia's National Statistics Department (DANE in Spanish) had recorded. For instance, Rule and Matland's studies guided the selection of the institutional independent variables, looking to measure electoral systems but also characteristics within electoral systems that, according to the authors, increased the chances of women getting elected. The financial independent variables were selected based on Transparencia's study. The independent variables belonging to the cultural category either were used by authors like Paxton and Kenworthy and Malami in their own studies, accounted for the relationship between conflict and campaign success that authors like Cockburn argued existed, or that the DANE had specifically measured and disaggregated based on sex.

Independent Variables

Campaign Finance Independent Variables

In Colombia, all candidates must upload their campaign finances to the government website, *Cnecuentasclaras.gov.co*, through Form 5B. The following four variables make up the campaign finance category, sourced from each of the sample's candidate's Form 5B:[88] The expectation is to find that the higher the campaign income and campaign expenses, the higher the chances of success. Understanding the highest expenditure and income source then shines light to possible solutions.

i.   Income: total campaign income (in Colombian pesos). For this sample, the average income was COP$357,108,009.

ii.   Expenses: total campaign expenses (in Colombian pesos). For this sample, expenses averaged to COP$356,971,676.

iii.   Highest income (amount and source): highest income source for each candidate. The sample's candidates sourced income from private people or corporations, their own patrimony, their political party, or through a loan from a bank/financial institution.

iv.   Highest expenditure (amount and description): biggest expense by each candidate. The sample's candidates' biggest expense related to political advertisement, public acts, transportation and mailing services, administration costs, materials and publications, legal issues, or political training and research.

Institutional Independent Variables

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[88] "Cuentas Claras en Elecciones," Consejo Nacional Electoral, accessed on December 14, 2021, https://www.cnecuentasclaras.gov.co/

The following variable makes up the category of institutions, sourced from Colombia's election oversight office – Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil.[89] The expectation is for this variable to show which characteristics need to exist within Colombia's proportional representation electoral system to augment women's chances of winning elections.

i.   Electoral system: electoral system under which each election took place. The sample consisted of candidates for Mayor, Governor, or House of Representatives. These posts are selected either through a proportional representation, uninominal vote (Mayor and Governor: one seat available), or through a proportional representation, plurinominal vote (House of Representatives: more than one seat available).

Cultural Independent Variables

The following five variables make up the category of culture, sourced from Colombia's DANE.[90] The expectation is for these variables to greatly influence campaign success, especially at their minimum and maximum values, i.e. the greater the life expectancy, the greater the success or the lower the homicide rate, the greater the success. These identified relationships then guide the conversation on possible roads for action and also allow for a conversation of cultural barriers that become structural issues.

i.   Women homicides: Rate of women homicides for every 100,000 women inhabitants in the department of each candidate in 2019.[91]

ii.   Gap between men and women in the global participation rate (GPR): The GPR is the percentage relationship between the economically-active population and the working-

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[89] "Elecciones", Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, accessed on April 1, 2021, https://www.registraduria.gov.co/-Electoral,3634-.html

[90] Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística-DANE, *Mujeres y hombres: brechas de género en Colombia* (Bogotá, Colombia: 2020).

[91] Ibid., 123.

age population; this variable is looking at the gap in the GPR between men and women in the department of each candidate in 2019.[92]

iii.   Femininity index: Femininity index of poor households, which measures the number of women who live in poverty with respect to every 100 men who live in poverty in the department of each candidate in 2018.[93]

iv.   Unpaid care work hours: Gap between men and women's unpaid care work hours, which looks at the gap between the hours men and women dedicate daily to unpaid care work, in the region of each candidate from 2016-2017, sourced from Colombia's DANE.[94]

v.   Life expectancy: Women's life expectancy in the department of each candidate in 2018, sourced from Colombia's DANE.[95]

Table 2: Independent variables

Category	Variable	Description	Unit
Campaign finance	Income	Total campaign income recorded by each candidate in Form 5B in *Cuentas Claras*.	Numerical: Colombian pesos (COP)
	Expenses	Total campaign expenses recorded by each candidate in Form 5B in *Cuentas Claras*.	Numerical: COP
	Highest income source	Highest income source recorded by each candidate in Form 5B in *Cuentas Claras*.	Categorical: text
	Amount of highest income source	Amount of highest income source recorded by each candidate in Form 5B in *Cuentas Claras*.	Numerical: COP
	Highest expense	Highest expense recorded by each candidate in Form 5B in *Cuentas Claras*.	Categorical: text

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[92] Ibid., 23.
[93] Ibid., 44.
[94] DANE, *Brechas,* 60.
[95] Ibid., 9.

	Amount of highest expense	Amount of highest expense recorded by each candidate in Form 5B in *Cuentas Claras*.	Numerical: COP
Institutions	Electoral system	Plurinominal (more than one seat disputed) or uninominal (only one seat disputed).	Categorical: Uninominal or plurinominal
Culture	Women homicides	Homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants, per department, according to the sex of the victim, 2019.	Numerical: decimal
	Gap between men and women in the global participation rate	Gap in the global participation rate between men and women, per department, 2019.	Numerical: decimal
	Femininity index	Number of women in poverty with respect to every 100 men in poor households, per department, 2018.	Numerical: integer
	Unpaid care work hours	Gap between men and women's average daily hours dedicated to unpaid domestic and care work, by region, 2016-2017.	Numerical: hours
	Life expectancy	Life expectancy, per department, per sex, 2018.	Numerical: age

Table 2: Independent variables and the category to which each belongs

The next chapter conducts a statistical exploratory study using the sample, dependent, and independent variables described above. This pilot study measures each of the sample's campaigns is against each independent variable to understand how, and if, it affects success. The trends, patterns, and relationships identified then feed Chapter's 3 roadmap to action, as well as the overall thesis' conclusions.

Chapter 2: Women's Barriers to Successful Political Campaigns:

A Case Study of Colombia's PDET Municipalities

The following statistical exploratory study identifies which variables correlate the most with campaign success for women in Colombia's PDET municipalities. Accounting for the limitations of a small sample, the trends and patterns identified still contribute to the debate around barriers to successful political campaigns for women. Important relationships are first identified through the use of descriptive statistics, like the formula for allocating seats, violence against women, life expectancy, campaign income, campaign expenses, and unpaid care work hours. Based on these preliminary findings, a logistic regression model is run, which identified the gap between men and women in the labor force participation rate as the most statistically-significant correlation and also supported the direction of the relationships that had been identified through the use of descriptive statistics. The regression, however, did not allow for the null hypothesis to be rejected.

Methodology

This chapter, and thesis, uses the forty-four women's campaigns sample for all of its statistical models. Descriptive statistics are first used to observe how the 12 independent variables affect the dependent variable of campaign success. Each category – institutions, culture, and campaign finance – is studied separately. This preliminary study, along with the existing literature, then dictates the independent variables to be included in a logistic regression model; the variables that are found to influence campaign success the most – both in this study and in the existing literature – are included in the model. What follows is a discussion of, first, the findings reached through descriptive statistics and, then, a discussion

on the logistic regression model. Each independent variable is written in **bold** to allow for easier identification and reading.

Hypothesis Test

- H_0: No relationship exists between campaign success and cultural, institutional, and financial variables.

- H_A: A relationship exists between campaign success and cultural, institutional, and financial variables.

Institutions

Women's participation in government was found to decrease despite elections being held under the same **electoral system** (PR), but women seeking plurinominal posts won in higher proportions. From the 2015 to the 2019 territorial elections, women's representation in PDET municipalities and departments decreased from five to two women governors and from 134 to 132 women mayors (Annex B).[96]

On the other hand, ten out of the 15 **plurinominal campaigns** and 13 out of the 29 **uninominal campaigns** were successful, meaning 66% of plurinominal campaigns were successful, compared to 45% of uninominal campaigns.

Culture

When looking at the relationship between the rate of **women homicides** for every 100,000 women inhabitants and campaign success, the study shows 69% of the sample's successful campaigns occurred in departments that scored equal or below the sample's average homicide rate. As Figure 3 shows, the average rate was 5.2 (in red); only seven

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[96] Own analysis.

successful campaign occurred in departments with rates higher than that, with the remaining 16 in departments with rates below 5.2.

Number of successful campaigns per rate of women homicides for every 100,000 women inhabitants (more than one department share the same rate)

Figure 3: Number of successful campaigns per rate of women homicides for every 100,000 women inhabitants, with mean in red.

When cross-referencing the **GPR gap** with campaign success, no relationship becomes apparent. The average GPR gap in successful campaigns was of 22.5%, while the average in unsuccessful campaigns was of 24.8%.

Cross-referencing the **femininity index** of poor households with campaign success reveals an odd relationship: the majority of successful campaigns registered high femininity indexes. The sample's average femininity index was 118.4; successful campaigns had an average index of 120 and unsuccessful campaigns had an average index of 116.

The variable of **life expectancy** for women was found to influence campaign success: the higher the life expectancy, the more successful campaigns. Figure 8 shows how the sample's average life expectancy was of 78.4 (in red); seventy-four percent of the sample's

successful campaigns occurred in departments above that average. Antioquia and Valle del Cauca, with life expectancies of 79.5 and 79.9, had the highest number of successful women candidates.

Relationship between successful and unsuccessful campaigns and life expectancy

Figure 4: Relationship between successful campaigns and women's life expectancy, with mean in red

The gap in the hours dedicated to **unpaid care work** between men and women was also found to influence campaign success. Fifty-six percent of successful campaigns occurred for candidates in departments below or at the sample's mean of 4:00 unpaid care work hours, meaning the smaller the gap, the more success.

Campaign Finance

As shown on Figure 4, an upward trend was found when cross-referencing successful campaigns with **total campaign incomes and expenses**. Women in successful campaigns raised and spent almost double of what women did in unsuccessful campaigns. Figure 5 also shows how the departments with the highest aggregate of total incomes and expenses were also the departments with the highest share of successful campaigns: Valle del Cauca, with

COP$4.2 billion raised and spent and three successful out of four total campaigns; and Meta, with COP$1.8 billion raised and spent and two successful out of four total campaigns.

Figure 5: Sum of campaign income and campaign expenses, per successful and unsuccessful campaigns

Figure 6: Map of departments with highest campaign incomes and expenses

With regards to the **most common income source,** women candidates raised the most from private sources and from their own patrimony: twenty from the former and nineteen from the latter. Candidates for mayor, especially, used their own patrimony as their main income source, with 15 out of the 20 campaigns studied reporting it as their main income source. With regards to the **most common expense,** women candidates spent the most on political advertising, with fifty percent of the candidates reporting it as their highest expense.

Figure 6 and Figure 7 show a different angle to the relationship between campaign finances and success: women candidates who spent the most on political advertisement won the most, while those who received money from private sources won the most. Specifically, 60% of the candidates that spent on political advertisement won and 43% of the candidates that received money from private sources won.

Figure 7: Proportion of campaign expenses in successful campaigns

Figure 8: Proportion of campaign income in successful campaigns

Logistic Regression

The previous statistical overview identified campaign success was more common for candidates with the following characteristics: seeking plurinominal posts, with low rates of women homicides, with high campaign income, with high life expectancy for women, and with low gaps between men and women's hours dedicated to unpaid care work to be the variables. The femininity index showed the opposite relationship to what was expected. The following logistic regression model incorporates these six, plus the GPR gap, to see if these relationships are statistically-significant correlations ($p \leq 0.05$). The GPR gap is added because the existing literature strongly suggest a relationship exists between a women's socioeconomic standing and their participation in politics.

Table 3: Independent Variables for the Logistic Regression Model

Category	Variable	Description	Unit
Campaign finance	Income	Total campaign income recorded by each candidate in Form 5B in *Cuentas Claras*.	Numerical: Colombian pesos (COP)
Institutions	Electoral system	Plurinominal (more than one seat disputed) or uninominal (only one seat disputed).	Categorical: Uninominal or plurinominal

Culture	Women homicides	Homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants, per department, according to the sex of the victim, 2019.	Numerical: decimal
	Gap between men and women in the global participation rate	Gap in the global participation rate between men and women, per department, 2019.	Numerical: decimal
	Femininity index	Number of women in poverty with respect to every 100 men in poor households, per department, 2018.	Numerical: integer
	Unpaid care work hours	Gap between men and women's average daily hours dedicated to unpaid domestic and care work, by region, 2016-2017.	Numerical: hours
	Life expectancy	Life expectancy, per department, per sex, 2018.	Numerical: age

Table 3: Independent variables for logistic regression model

Table 4: Logistic Regression Model on Campaign Success and Seven of the Study's Independent Variables

Variable	Coefficient	mod1	mod2	mod3	mod4	mod5	mod7	mod8	(full model)
Financial									
Income	1.10E-09	0.226							0.226
Institutional									
Electoral system (Uninominal)	-0.9008		0.174						0.174
Cultural									
Women homicides	0.0442			0.779					0.779
Gap in global participation rate	-15.695				0.067				0.0674
Femininity index	0.10724					0.058			0.058
Gap in unpaid care work hours	-2.285						0.107		0.107
Life expectancy for women	0.1508							0.349	0.349

Table 4: Logistic Regression Results

The null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The regression shows a somewhat strong correlation between campaign success and the femininity index of poor household, and between campaign success and GPR gap, with more moderate / weak relationships between campaign success and the other financial, cultural, and institutional variables.

Analysis

The null hypothesis of a statistically-significant relationship between campaign success and cultural, institutional, and financial factors cannot be rejected based on these results, but this exploratory statistical study still highlights interesting relationships that can be analyzed. For instance, the coefficients support the direction of all the preliminary relationships. It is important to emphasize that the following analysis and these estimates, including those of the odds, are not made with high confidence, but they reflect the data from the limited sample that this thesis has. They also point to factors that warrant additional scrutiny when more data on this topic can be obtained.

Institutions

The findings on the relationship between campaign success and institutional variables reinforce the argument that specificities need to exist in order for PR to be the system most conductive to increasing women's participation in government. Women candidates seeking plurinominal posts won in higher proportions than women seeking uninominal posts (66% to 45%), meaning the formula for allocating seats is important for women candidates.[97] This result was also supported by the regression, which showed women candidates had about 40% less chance of success when seeking uninominal posts:

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[97] Ibid.
Matland, "Enhancing Women's Political Participation," 93.

ln ($odds$ Electoral_systemPR_uninominal) = ((EXP(-0.9008)-1)*100%) = -59%

Equation 1: Interpretation of regression coefficient for Electoral System variable

Culture

The pilot study found culture does affect a woman's chances of getting elected. The majority of successful campaigns happened for candidates in departments with below-the-average rate of women homicides for every 100,000 women inhabitants, agreeing with Cockburn's and True's argument that violence against women hurts women's participation in government.[98] This is important, given these departments are already the most impacted by the country's internal armed conflict, which means they already stand above the national average in terms of violence against women.

The existence of a strong correlation between campaign success and the GPR gap in the regression could, on the other hand, be explained by Paxton's finding that women's position on the labor market does influence women's political participation.[99] The regression found that the lower the gap, the more success.

The odd relationship between campaign success and the femininity index of poor households, reinforced by the regression, is harder to explain. The average index for successful campaigns was 120, meaning 20 women live in poverty in relation to every 100 men in poor households. Unsuccessful campaigns had an average of 116. In other words, successful campaigns occurred for candidates whose departments had more women living in poverty. The regression not only supported the direction of this finding – the more women in poverty, the more success – but supports the correlation with almost 95% confidence. This challenges the ideas set forth in this thesis and warrants a deeper study.

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[98] Cockburn, *The space between us;* True, *The Political Economy of Violence Against Women.*
[99] Paxton, "Women in National Legislatures," 459.

The majority of successful campaigns occurred for candidates in departments with above-the-average life expectancy, hinting towards a deeper, more structural barrier faced by women. The regression supported the direction of this relationship: these variables positively-reinforce one another. The existing literature has not covered the connection that could exist between life expectancy and campaign success, which means this finding opens an opportunity to further research the phenomenon.

Unpaid care work hours also signaled towards an important trend: the less of a gap that exists between men and woman's unpaid care work hours, the more chances of success for women candidates. In other words, the more evenly-distributed care responsibilities are within households, the better the chance for women to be able to have time to jump from the private to the public sphere. This findings coincides with the existing literature that argues women have to be responsible for two jobs, their professional job and their work withing the house.[100] Limitations in the availability of data and in the research of this cultural phenomena might explain the lack of strong correlations, even though the regression supports the direction of the relationship.

Campaign Finance

The more a woman candidate raised and spent, the more she won. This finding reinforces Transparencia por Colombia's argument that a relationship exists between money and politics, where access to resources translates into higher possibilities of getting elected.[101] With regards to the most common income source and expense, women candidates raised the most from private sources and from their patrimony, and spent the most on political advertising. This is important, considering Transparencia found women candidates only

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[100] Casas-Zamora and Falguera. *Financiación política,* 36-37.
[101] Transparencia, "Análisis sobre el acceso a recursos," 15.

received about one-third of the totality of contributions by private donors and that men spent double the amount women spent on political advertisements, given men had access to more funds.[102] This behavior also reinforces Casas-Zamora and Falguera's finding that, even though candidates are entitled to public funds, in reality public funds become the least relevant of income sources.[103] With regards to campaign income, the regression results support the argument that money is power: the more money, the more success.[104] Altogether, these findings are enough to argue for new, gendered, avenues of funding for women candidates, or for feminizing/gendering existing ones.

This statistical exploratory study did not allow for the null hypothesis to be rejected, but allowed for the identification of more subtle relationships, especially with regards to the direction each coefficient signaled, that not only coincide with the existing literature, but also position culture as an important barrier. The femininity index variable, on the other hand, behaved opposite to what was expected. All these findings highlight the need for wider datasets and further research on the matter, to be able to assert these variables correlate with campaign success for women. The next chapter of this thesis portfolio will use the Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA) methodology to identify solutions to the problem of barriers to successful political campaigns for women in Colombia's PDET municipalities, based on Chapter 1's and Chapter 2's findings.

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[102] Ibid., 51, 36.
[103] Casas-Zamora and Falguera. *Financiación política,* 19.
[104] Muriaas, Wang and Murray, *Gendered Electoral Financing*, 1.

Chapter 3: Roadmap to Action to Overcome Barriers to Successful Political Campaigns for Women in Colombia's PDET Municipalities

The Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA) methodology is used in this chapter to design a roadmap for action based on Chapter 2's results and findings. Despite being a more qualitative methodology, it follows the quantitative analysis of the previous chapter and strengthens the overall thesis. PDIA is here used, thus, to find solutions and not to determine new relationships between campaign success and this study's variables. This because PDIA is a methodology created, one, to help solve "super-wicked" problems that usually challenge the building of state capability through evidence, analysis and action, and, second, to arrive to action and/or solutions by truly understanding the problem and not solely by framing a problem based on its pre-conceived, "best practice" solution.[105] The problem of barriers to successful political campaigns for women in Colombia fits the PDIA framework.[106] PDIA allows for the conversion of "unknown unknowns" to "known unknowns" that can then be turned into action, thus becoming an innovative way to design solutions to the barriers women candidates face.[107]

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[105] Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock, *Building State Capability,* 140.

[106] Ibid., 137.

[107] Ibid., 159.

Nate Silver, *The Signal and the Noise: Why Some Predictions Fail – but Some Don't* (USA: Penguin Random House, 2020), 420.

Methodology: Problem-driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA)

PDIA sets forth a three-step methodology where (1) problems are deconstructed and sequenced as entry points; (2) solutions are identified and iterated; and (3) the authorizing environment is identified. [108]

Problem Deconstruction and Sequencing

PDIA's first step is to break down the problem into possible causes and sub-causes, because "deconstructed problems are manageable problems."[109] To do so, the problem has to be identified, deconstructed, and schematized.[110] After deconstruction comes sequencing, or the timing and framing of interventions given contextual opportunities and constraints.[111] Sequencing allows for the identification of each of the sub-causes' space for change through a triple-A—authority, acceptance, and ability—analysis.[112] As a result, entry points for aggressive reform are identified as well as entry points with low space for change that need to be acted upon.[113]

Construction of Design Space and Searchframe

PDIA's second step is to establish a framework for the implementation of the solutions identified. This is based on a find and fit process that focuses on iteration and experiential learning: "try, learn, adapt."[114] The design space identifies solutions with varying degrees of administrative and technical correctness that will then aid in the creation of a detailed action plan. [115] Existing practices are those "to scrutinize, understand, learn from and potentially

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[108] Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock, *Building State Capability*, 140-214.
[109] Ibid., 150.
[110] Ibid., 150-152.
[111] Ibid., 158.
[112] Ibid.
[113] Ibid., 160.
[114] Ibid., 168-171.
[115] Ibid., 172.

improve"; latent practices are those "to provoke thought through rapid engagement, codify, and diffuse"; positive deviance are those "to find, celebrate, codify and diffuse"; and external best practices are those 'to identify, translate, select and try, adapt and diffuse."[116]

Management of Authorizing Environment

PDIA's final step is to ensure the plan has implantation authority. This involves not only identifying what authority the government might need, but also how to create it and implement it as necessary.[117]

This paper only reaches the elaboration of a design space, because the definition of a detailed action plan (searchframe), experiential learning strategy, and authorizing environment are beyond the scope of the research. The findings, in any case, feed future research and policy implementation initiatives.

Analysis - PDIA in Action

Problem Deconstruction and Sequencing

The majority of the problem construction and deconstruction process was carried out through the exploratory statistical study in Chapter 1 and 2 of this thesis. Table 5 fits these findings into PDIA's problem-construction framework.

What is the problem? (and how would we measure it or tell stories about it?)	Women candidates from Colombia's PDET municipalities encounter financial, cultural, and institutional barriers that affect their chances of winning an election.
Why does it matter? (and how do we measure this or tell stories about it?)	It matters because, in Colombia, women are under-, if not un-, represented, especially in PDET municipalities It matters because the playing field is not level, especially in PDET municipalities. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 highlighted how: -Women candidates had 40% less chance of success under uninominal elections; -The majority of successful campaigns occurred in departments that registered a below-the-average women homicides rate;

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[116] Ibid., 172-174.
[117] Ibid., 197.

	-Successful candidates spent and raised double what unsuccessful campaigns did, but women candidates only receive about one-third of private contributions; -Women candidates had less chance for success in departments with a higher gap in men and women's hours dedicated to unpaid care work; - Women candidates had less chance for success in departments with a higher gap between men and women's global participation rate; and -Women candidates won more when their departments had higher life expectancy.
To whom does it matter? (In other words, who cares? other than me?)	It matters to women who aspire to enter the public sphere (not candidates yet), to women candidates, and to organizations that support gender equality in government.
Who needs to care more?	The government (its three branches altogether), political parties, private contributors, and men candidates.
How do we get them to give it more attention?	We get these actors to care more by having a: -Straightforward and simple presentation of the problem, -Straightforward and simple presentation of target-based solutions, and -A positive-sum / Paretto-improving scenario.[118]
What will the problem look like when it is solved? Can we think of what progress might look like in a year, or 6 months?	Increased rate of successful political campaigns for women in the 2022 and 2023 elections.

Table 5: Problem construction

Five-Why Technique

After having constructed the problem, PDIA asks for it to be deconstructed into identifiable causes and sub-causes. [119] Table 6 follows this thought process using the methodology's "5-why technique." Institutional barriers are not included in the analysis because of the unlikeliness of changing the country's electoral system. The final points find that financial barriers occur because of lax enforcement of campaign finance laws and no innovative avenues of private funding for women, and that cultural barriers occur because the phenomena are not thoroughly studied, understood, and part of mainstream discourse.

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[118] Coate, "Pareto-improving campaign finance policy," 628-629.
[119] Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock, *Building State Capability,* 151.

Why are women not being successful in their political campaigns?	*Answer 1:* **Financial barriers**	*Answer 2:* **Cultural barriers**
Why does this happen?	Campaign financing is not equally accessible to men and women candidates.	Unsuccessful candidacies occur in departments with high women homicide rates and high gaps in the hours dedicated to unpaid care work between men and women.
Why does this happen?	Women candidates receive one-third of private contributions, the main source of campaign finance.	Unsuccessful candidacies occur in departments with low GPR gaps and low life expectancy for women.
Why does this happen?	Electoral financing, public and private, is not gendered.	The system does not account for these factors when crafting solutions and regulations for gender equality in government.
Why does this happen?	Lax enforcement of campaign finance laws and no innovative avenues of private funding for women.	These cultural phenomena are not thoroughly studied, understood, and part of mainstream discourse.

Table 6: Five-why technique

Fishbone Diagram and Triple-A Analysis

The next step in the PDIA methodology is to schematize the problem's causes and sub-causes identified in Table 6, and to map their change space. [120] While the triple-A analysis that PDIA calls for was carried out in Annex C, Figure 9 represents the resulting fishbone diagram and change space.

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[120] Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock, *Building State Capability,* 152.

Figure 9: Fishbone diagram and Triple-A analysis

Construction of Design Space and Searchframe

Table 7 shows this study's design space, drawing from the change space analysis and literature review carried out in previous sections.[121] The table uses the PDIA template, and each solution identified is expanded on below.

Technically correct solution (vertical axis, left)

Gender quotas (external best practice)			Campaign finance regulation scheme reform (positive deviance)
		New avenue of private funding for women candidates (latent practice)	Social initiatives (latent practice)
			Capacity-building schools (existing practice)

Administratively correct solution

Table 7: Design space (follows PDIA's template)

This study's fishbone diagram, triple-A analysis, and design space challenge the most-common solutions to combat gender inequality in government, while also shining light to important realities unique to PDET municipalities. This reinforces PDIA's main tenet that problems are usually approached through pre-conceived solutions instead of through a processes of deconstruction and identification of sub-causes.[122] Figure 9 introduces a new framework to understand the problem and reach solutions. While all sub-causes list at least one branch of government as a key agent, no sub-cause depends solely on the government to be addressed. For instance, the feminization of the resourcing ecosystem necessitates the active participation of private contributors but not of the government. Cultural barriers can also begin to be addressed primarily through actors outside the public sphere, to close the change space and bring about more understanding about the phenomena. Both nonprofit organizations and civil society organizations that work in these territories can conduct

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[121] Table 7 is following PDIA's template.
[122] Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock, *Building State Capability.*

campaigns and activities to further understand the behavior of these cultural variables. These solutions are further discussed below.

New and/or improved avenues of private funding for women candidates, along with social initiatives, are the latent practices ready to be designed and implemented. The former would address financial barriers to successful political campaigns for women in Colombia. Instead of pushing for reform, strengthening capabilities, or enacting gender quotas, a primary focus should be given to opening new avenues for funding, be in the form of new political parties, new organizations or new fundraising events, or to feminizing already existing ones. This solution has a strong change space, which allows for quick implementation.

Social initiatives need to address cultural barriers: gender-based violence, life expectancy for women, unpaid care work hours, GRP gap, and the femininity index. A deeper understanding of the phenomena can not only increase the change space needed for reform, but also provide insightful information that can be then used to improve the problem deconstruction process. Studies have highlighted how conflict hinders women's identity-building process and agency.[123] By implementing social initiatives that understand and account for these intricacies, women can escape cycles of gender-based violence and can decrease the load of unpaid care work hours. Understanding how these cultural phenomena affect women's chances of winning elections will allow for the design of programs or public policies.

Capacity-building schools are the existing practice that facilitates the identification of lessons learned, good practices, and opportunity gaps. The literature mentions the importance of capacity building as a tool to eradicate barriers, but also acknowledges this tool barely

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[123] Cockburn, *The space between us,* 213.
True, "The Political Economy of Violence Against Women," 40.

achieves the expected results. For instance, studies have underlined capacity building efforts in Ireland, Ghana, Honduras, Costa Rica, among others, as successes. Those same studies, however, note that, in Ireland, the efforts did not translate into funding for candidates; in Ghana, women candidates themselves criticized capacity-building; and that parties would rather be fined than follow the regulation that mandates them to spend a small percentage (mostly lower than 5%) of their budget in capacity-building for women candidates.[124] For Colombia's 2022 election cycle, efforts and funds are being channeled, both within and outside political parties, for capacity building for women candidates. This analysis calls for an improvement of this practice; the literature supports it.

Gender quotas are the external best practice to translate, adapt, and diffuse. Gender quotas are a common too used to combat gender inequity in government. Several studies support the use of gender quotas as a tool used to combat the problem as well.[125] Colombia has had a 30% gender quota for party lists since 2011, increased to 50% for elections to be held after 2020.[126] Women's participation in government, however, has never been above 21% in Congress, lagging even more far behind in posts for Mayor and Governor.[127] For quotas to be effective, they not only need to have stricter enforcement mechanisms, but also penetrate deeper into the field. For instance, quotas could also exist for posts within each political party directory.[128] Financial incentives could also be provided to parties to augment

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[124] Muriaas, Wang and Murray, *Gendered Electoral Financing*, 147.
[125] Falguera and Ohman, *Funding of Political Parties*.
Casas-Zamora and Falguera. *Financiación política.*
Muriaas, Wang and Murray, *Gendered Electoral Financing.*
[126] Consejería Presidencial para la Equidad de la Mujer, "Colombia avanza en equidad con aprobación de listas electorales paritarias," accessed November 15,2021.
[127] UN Women and Registraduría, *El Camino Hacia la Paridad,* 9.
Casas-Zamora and Falguera. *Financiación Política,* 24.
[128] Casas-Zamora and Falguera. *Financiación Política,* 25.

their share of women candidates.[129] Finally, some authors argue for the use of closed lists that ensure women candidates will win a seat after the election.[130] Gender quotas for the sake of gender quotas do not work or tackle any of the sub-causes described in this analysis.

The application of PDIA to the problem of barriers to women candidates in Colombia's PDET municipalities led to important findings. These women candidates encounter a financial barrier fueled by lax enforcement of existing regulations, by the State not fulfilling its role as the main financier, by the unequal distribution of private corporations' contributions, and by a lack of gendered financing alternatives. Existing solutions have failed to address these barriers because the problem has not been properly deconstructed and because the State was given a crucial role that other key agents can fulfill. The analysis identified strong space for change, and, thus, for action, in two solutions: enactment of stronger sanction mechanisms and opening of new, gendered, financing alternatives for women candidates. The analysis also called for the cultural phenomena to be further researched.

Before evaluating these conclusions, this thesis carries out the first iteration of the PDIA's methodology, through two focus group with nine women candidates for Colombia's 2022 race for House of Representatives.

First Iteration: Focus Groups

PDIA is based on iteration. To this end, two focus groups were carried out in Bogotá, Colombia, with eight women candidates who had been unsuccessful in Colombia's 2022 race for House of Representatives, and one woman candidate who had been successfully elected under Bogotá's constituency.[131] These focus groups represent this thesis' first PDIA iteration,

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[129] Muriaas, Wang and Murray, *Gendered Electoral Financing*.
[130] Matland, "Enhancing Women's Political Participation," 104.
[131] These focus groups were carried out with the support of Colombia's NGO Extituto's Ocupar la Política project. They were also funded by Johns Hopkins Advanced Governmental Studies Student Scholar Award.

because "answers cannot be pre-planned or developed in a passive or academic fashion by specialists applying knowledge from other contexts. Answers must be found within the change context through active engagement and learning."[132] The meetings followed the PDIA methodology as it was followed in Chapter 3, but without disclosing to the candidates the results identified in Chapter 1 and 2. The problem of barriers to successful political campaigns for women was first presented, and then the step-by-step methodology was followed. The findings of these focus groups are presented below and contrasted with this thesis' findings.

Focus Group 1: Central Node Candidates

The first focus group was carried out with three women candidates from Colombia's central node: Boyacá, Cundinamarca, Bogotá, and Huila departments. The group met in-person in Bogotá, Colombia, to discuss about the barriers they had faced as candidates for the 2022 race for House of Representatives. Of the three of candidates, one won a seat in the House.

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[132] Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock, *Building State Capability,* 169.

Figure 10: Nodo Centro Focus Group Fishbone Diagram

The candidates identified barriers for each of the categories. In terms of culture, the biggest barriers resulted from Colombia's *machista* culture; in their own words, "there is no space for anything female in politics." The candidates recounted how they were met with sexist comments when giving out flyers on the streets: "you, as a woman, do not belong in Congress," "you are too young to be running for office," or "you still have a long trajectory ahead of you before being worthy of running for office." They were frequently asked to prove their worth and knowledge. Their physical appearance was also always a point of dispute for them, and their ideas were presented by other men candidates as their own. But what stood out the most was the political violence these candidates were subject to. One of them recounted how she received dozens of unsolicited pictures of penises on her campaign phone; the other recounted how she once handed a man on the streets her flyer, he kissed it repeatedly, and then pushed it down his pants while saying "this way I will remember to vote for you, sweetie;" while the other candidate said she was told by men they would vote for her in exchange for a kiss or a date. In spite of them not directly categorizing these as political violence but as harassment, these acts have been widely studied to deter women from either entering the race or running again.

In terms of campaign finance, they identified how the State did not fulfill its role as main financier and how they faced challenges to access loans from banks. The political party of one of the candidates disbursed more funds to women candidates as a form of affirmative action, but the disbursement came only three weeks before the election. This candidate said: "what am I supposed to do three weeks before the election with COP$25,000,000?" Before that, she had only spent COP$5,000,000. Another candidate mentioned Colombia has a "begging culture" when it comes to campaign finance. It is interesting to highlight that, out of

the three candidates that participated in this focus group, only one won. The two unsuccessful candidates recounted they raised, one, no more than COP$10,000,000, and the other, COP$30,000,000. The successful candidate raised over COP$100,000,000, and the average income for the successful candidates of this thesis' sample was COP$340,00,000.

With regards to institutions, the candidates identified the workings of political machineries and the lack of access to historically male-dominated unofficial political places as barriers. The second was especially important throughout the conversation, because it is through these spaces that the candidates mentioned men candidates not only get ahead in terms of political trajectories but also find mentors that accompany them all throughout. What was interesting was the mention of incumbency advantage as one of these "unofficial" places men candidates have access to. While definitely being skewed in favor of men because Congress had never had more than 30% of women in its body, being an incumbent is an official place of power.

These candidates also talked about the inequality in the distribution of care work hours and the lack of political and civic knowledge women candidates have when compared to men. One candidate mentioned how she had to hire a person to care for her mother, who she was in charge of taking care of, just so she could focus on her campaign; an expense she could not afford but had to anyway. Another one mentioned how the solution to the unequal distribution of unpaid care work hours proposed by a man candidate was to begin formalizing and paying women for the unpaid care work they did. This does not solve anything because women would still be left with 15+ hours work days. With regards to the lack of political culture and knowledge, the candidates mentioned it was due to the historical absence of women in public and political spaces, even in schools, which leaves them at a disadvantage when running for

office. All candidates advocated, applauded, and participated in "political schools" that NGOs created just for the elections; they mentioned these were of utmost importance for them and their campaigns.

Even though the conversation focused on the identification of barriers and not on the design of solutions, the candidates did recognize that the exercise had led them to better understand the problem and allowed them to understand that the playing field was not level for them to begin with, which felt somewhat reassuring to them.

Focus Group 2: CTEP Candidates

The second focus group included six women candidates from Colombia's Special Transitory Peace Constituencies (CTEP in Spanish, Circunscripciones Transitorias Especiales para la Paz), born out of the 2016 Peace Agreement.[133] Candidates from El Bagre, Antioquia; Urabá, Antioquia; Cesar; La Paz, Cesar; Tierralta, Córdoba; and Valencia, Córdoba participated in the group. All six candidates are victims of Colombia's conflict, some even having survived the worst attacks of the country's history (El Aro massacre and La Chinita massacre). The meeting, thus, took place online, through Zoom, to discuss about the barriers they had faced as candidates for the 2022 race for House of Representatives; a race none of the six candidates won. This focus group was especially important to this paper, since the CETP constituencies are in PDET municipalities, which are the territories under study throughout the paper.

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[133] Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, *Acuerdo,* 54.

Figure 11: CTEP Focus Group Fishbone Diagram

These six candidates identified important barriers throughout the conversation. In agreement with the first focus group, they also identified the *machista* culture to be an important barrier. For instance, they discussed how, despite having been social leaders for years and for countless projects within their communities, they were now somehow unfit and unprepared to run for a political office. They argued how a belief exists that men are the only capable political actors. These candidates, however, did emphasize – and the discussion supported this argument – that the barriers rural women candidates face are unique and different to the barriers urban women candidates face. It seemed like all of the barriers identified by the women candidates who participated in the first focus group were amplified for these rural candidates, and some additional structural barriers appeared.

Culturally, these women mentioned they not only dedicate uneven hours to unpaid care work when compared to their partners, but were expected to dedicate these hours without challenging the status quo. They also mentioned the lack of political knowledge, but emphasized that efforts to train them in these matters were inadequate because they did not reflect their rural contexts. The same happened with campaign finances, where the efforts to correct the bias that exists against women candidates focus on the urban centers of the country and not on these rural territories. A clear example of this financial barrier is that the majority of financial institutions do not have offices in the municipalities these women live, meaning they have to commute for hours in order to ask for a loan that, in many cases, gets rejected.

In terms of institutional barriers, however, is where these women found the more barriers. The State, dictated by law, has to provide women candidates with security safeguards and with political participation guarantees. One candidate mentioned how the day after the election, her security detail was withdrawn despite the numerous warnings by different actors

that candidates from CTEP municipalities were under important safety threats.[134] Another one, who herself had been a victim of one of the worst massacres in Colombian history, suffered an attack against her life during the campaign because the state was not safeguarding her life. Another one mentioned that, even though laws exist on paper that are supposed to incentivize and safeguard women's political participation in the rural regions of the country, no budget is ever given to these laws, thus making them inoperable. This was one of the causes identified during the discussion to which the candidates proposed a solution: to secure a budget to these laws in order to make them operable.

Altogether, these focus groups identified *machismo* as an important barrier that then triggers other important barriers. The candidates also highlighted the saliency violence has in Colombia – the urban candidates face political violence, while the rural candidates lived and endured more traditional forms of violence, both of which hinder their ability to participate in politics. Campaign finance was also agreed to be lacking, as well as political knowledge that has been traditionally provided to men, both formally and informally. The conversations around unpaid care work also untapped how this barrier acts on the ground. These women are nothing short of brave when they decided to run for an office that, right off the start, promises to be an uphill battle.

[134] "Elecciones 2022: los riesgos que enfrentan las curules de paz," *Verdad Abierta,* accessed March 30, 2022, https://verdadabierta.com/elecciones-2022-los-riesgos-que-enfrentan-las-curules-de-paz/

Conclusion

Institutional, financial, and, especially, cultural barriers affect campaign success, but few of the policies being implemented on the ground account for these barriers or understand the sub-causes of the problem. This conclusion, however, is nuanced. The trends and relationships identified also indicate important areas that call for further investigation and understanding, particularly with regards to the relationships between cultural variables and campaign success. Moreover, the exploratory statistical study did not allow for the rejection of the null hypothesis, which means the points under discussion are not based on strong correlations.

Chapter 1 discussed the conventional wisdom surrounding barriers to women's political participation. Studies have found institutional factors, such as electoral and party systems, to be the variables that correlate with campaign success the most. Scholars also find that financial factors, like access to resourcing opportunities and the existing legal framework for campaign finance, are important for women's political participation. Cultural variables, however, are usually not found to be strongly correlated with participation throughout the existing literature, despite studies emphasizing how contexts of conflict – like Colombia's – amplify the effect culture has in hindering participation. Given the municipalities under study for this thesis are those most heavily-affected by the country's conflict, the results were expected to agree with the conventional wisdom but also find culture to be a stronger determinant of success. This is exactly what happened.

Chapter 2 found the most important relationships between campaign success and cultural, institutional, and financial variables. Using descriptive statistics first, the most important trend for the category of institutions uncovered the favorability of plurinominal post

for campaign success: 66% of the sample's successful campaigns were for plurinominal posts. For the category of culture, the most important trend related to gender-based violence: 69% of successful campaigns occurred in departments that registered a rate of women homicides for every 100,000 women inhabitants below the sample's average rate. Moreover, 74% of successful campaigns were from candidates whose departments life expectancy rate was above the sample's average and that 56% of successful campaigns occurred for candidates in departments below or at the sample's mean of four unpaid care work hours. With regards to campaign finance, successful campaigns spent and raised double what unsuccessful campaigns did, spent the most on political advertisement, and raised the most funds from private sources.

Based on these findings, a logistic regression model was run. Even though the regression did not provide enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis, it did allow for the identification of more moderate correlations that serve as entry points for future investigations and/or policy interventions. The GPR gap showed the strongest correlation, demonstrating how culture may relate with campaign success in Colombia. Other variables, despite not showing strong correlations, did support the direction of the relationships identified through descriptive statistics: high unpaid care work hours, uninominal posts, low life expectancy, and limited income decrease the chances of success. The correlation explained the "how" question by uncovering the direction of each relationship. Now the question lies on the "why": why do lower rates of unpaid care work hours and longer life expectancy increase campaign success? With a better understanding of the phenomena will come better and more thorough data that will allow for future quantitative studies and stronger correlations that explain that why.

Moreover, the moderate relationships identified for cultural variables do highlight important results. Using the regression's formula:

$$logit(\text{cs})=ln(\text{cs}/(1-\text{cs})) = (\beta_0 + \beta_{\text{ElectoralSystem}} \cdot x_1) + (\beta_0 + \beta_{\text{UnpaidCareWorkHours}} \cdot x_2)$$

Equation 2: regression formula from Chapter 2

It is possible to identify how Adriana Magali Matíz Vargas, candidate from Tolima – the department with the lowest gap in unpaid care work hours and who was seeking a plurinominal post – had about 83% probability of success compared to Mayra Alejandra Gaona Pinzón, candidate from Norte de Santander – the department with the highest gap in unpaid care work hours and who was seeking an uninominal post – who had the odds of success stacked against her.

These findings align with the existing literature and also highlight intricacies unique to this problem in Colombia's PDET municipalities. Women candidates from these municipalities faced less of a barrier when they experienced less violence and when they expected to live longer. These municipalities, however, usually rank below the national average in these indicators, given they have historically been the most heavily-impacted by conflict and violence.[135] These indicators – gender-based violence and life expectancy – are already stacked against them when they decide to run for office, compared to women candidates from Colombia's main cities (i.e. Bogotá, Cali, Medellín).

The same can be concluded with regards to campaign finances. Funding is more readily-available in Colombia's main cities because these are where the majority of formal economic activity is located. Chapter 2's findings reinforce this conclusion: Valle del Cauca had the women candidates that raised and spent the most, and Valle del Cauca is the third

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[135] DANE, "Brechas."

department – after Bogotá and Antioquia – that contributes the most to the national GDP.[136]
Women are, thus, not entering a level-playing field to begin with when they decided to run for
office and enter the electoral race. This finding on campaign income, however, is nuanced,
since the sample studied campaigns for different posts that require different amounts of funds.
Campaigns for governor, for instance, raised an average of COP $826,000,000 (approx.
US$212,000), whereas campaigns for mayor raised an average of COP $81,000,000 (approx.
US$20,700). Disaggregating future regressions based on the post sought could yield different
results.

Chapter 3 designed a roadmap for action based on these findings and through the use
of Harvard's PDIA methodology. In conclusion, the Chapter found women candidates in
Colombia encounter a financial barrier fueled by lax enforcement of existing regulations, by
the State not fulfilling its role as the main financier, by the unequal distribution of private
corporations' contributions, and by a lack of gendered financing alternatives. Existing
solutions have failed to address these barriers because the problem has not been properly
deconstructed and because the State was given a crucial role that other key agents can fulfill,
like private entities, nonprofit organizations, and civil society organizations. The analysis
identified strong space for change, and, thus, for action, in two solutions: enactment of
stronger sanction mechanisms for the State and feminization of the resourcing ecosystem for
women candidates.

The analysis also found cultural barriers affect campaign success, primarily fueled by a
lack of understanding of these cultural phenomena. It is essential to understand better how
gender-based violence, life expectancy, the GPR gap, the femininity index, and unpaid care

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[136] "PIB por Departamento," *Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística,* accessed February 22, 2022,
https://dane.maps.arcgis.com/apps/MapSeries/index.html?appid=9d091f802200470d816eb1f063aa6aee

work hours affect campaign success for women in order to widen the problem's space for change. Conflict plays an important role for women in Colombia, which needs to be accounted for when crafting programs and public policy. PDIA calls for these future investigations on cultural barriers, however, to occur on the ground, alongside potential women candidates and stakeholders, to not miss intricacies unique to each context and to better understand, and then communicate, the phenomena. The lack of data does not indicate the problem does not exist, but that it needs to be studied further.

The two focus groups conducted reinforced this thesis' findings. Both groups identified *machismo* as an important barrier that triggers other barriers itself. These candidates faced violence in different forms that affected their race, the way they conducted themselves, and even their well-being. One candidate had to leave the discussion because of the panic attacks she had been having after an attack on her life occurred during the campaign. It was agreed that campaign finance is lacking, and, for the rural women, the State is also lacking. Women are not believed to be capable of occupying political posts, thus they have to work harder to prove themselves. The focus groups' findings agreed with this thesis' findings; culture does play an important role in obstructing campaign success.

Interestingly, and opposed to what was expected, all of the participants supported and called for political training. This thesis had argued political training schools to be a solution that did not understand the problem well. After hearing the experiences these candidates recounted, the existence of political training schools seems to be a necessity to enhance women's participation and to fight the uneven playing field.

Before presenting research and policy recommendations, this thesis' limitations have to be discussed. The findings and conclusions were based on a small, non-random sample of

women candidates. Future research could not only widen the sample but also include men candidates, to study how gender acts as a barrier to campaign success. Moreover, considerations on race and gender fluidity need to also be included, to bring into the research a more intersectional approach. Finally, and in line with what the candidates discussed in both focus groups, political violence needs to be included as a variable. Its quantification is fundamental to understand its impact on campaign success.

The findings themselves also had limitations. Scholarly literature agrees, across a wide spectrum of disciplines and studies, that proportional representation is the electoral system that advances women's participation the most. Since this study did not have a sample that allowed to compare and contrast different electoral systems, that question remains open. Other questions that arise pertain to the femininity index variable, that also behaved contrary to what the literature postulates and contrary to what was expected. This finding needs to be studied further.

These limitations notwithstanding, these findings, especially the ones that follow the application of PDIA, allow for the following research and policy recommendations:

1. Feminization of the existing resourcing ecosystem: this recommendation goes two ways; incentivize the existing private donors to contribute to women campaigns and create new, gendered, resourcing alternatives.

2. Incentivize political parties to increase their funding to women candidates: political parties are gatekeepers for women's political participation. The legal framework already requires them to use 5% of their budget towards activities related with gender equality. Similar initiatives, that come from within the parties themselves and not from outside through public policy, to fund women campaigns more aggressively, are

necessary. Some political parties already pursued this recommendation for the 2022 Congressional race, demonstrating the strong space for change this initiative has.

3. Enforce stricter sanction mechanisms for the State: even though this recommendation requires public policy reform, thus making it less feasible, it is still a worthy medium-to long-term goal. If the State does fulfill its role as an equal, public financier, the playing field becomes more level by removing the inequalities that exist within the private resourcing ecosystem.

4. Research cultural phenomena, especially femininity index, women homicides, life expectancy, GPR gap, and unpaid care work hours, to better understand why they impact campaign success, alongside women candidates. A bigger emphasis has to be given to understanding why these variables affect campaign success, in order to craft policy and interventions that tackle the barrier. Moreover, a deeper study can highlight how some of these barriers become more structural in nature.

5. Continue creating political training schools. The candidates that participated in the focus groups applauded the political training schools they had participated in, and mentioned they were necessary for women to close the gap. They did mention, however, that these schools should not be a week-long project, but a more long-term accompaniment to women candidates to better construct the bases through which female leaderships are built upon. This recommendation was discussed and analyzed in Chapter 3 as the existing practice that facilitates the identification of lessons learned, good practices, and opportunity gaps.

The first solution – feminization of the resourcing ecosystem – was identified to have a mid-to-strong change space in Chapter 3, which means it has the authority, ability, and

acceptance to be carried out. Since the main source of income for women candidates were private corporations; since women candidates who raised the most, won the most; and since the biggest private contributors have been identified (two out of the three biggest contributions in the 2018 Congressional race came from corporations owned by the same family), a strategy and action plan can be easily designed and implemented to incentivize and materialize a higher share of private donations to women candidates.[137] This solution does not necessarily need the government as an actor, which means public policy is not the mean to the end and, in turn, the usually-slow legislative process can be skipped. On the contrary, the use of existing partnerships can be exploited to this end, since many third sector and private organizations already prioritize gender equality in their work. If, for instance, multilateral banks exploit their existing relationship with private organizations to feminize the resourcing ecosystem for women candidates, and even tie their aid to such a purpose, much could be advanced in shattering this financial barrier.

The second solution is also easily actionable, since the existing regulation already reserves 5% of each party's budget for the purpose of increasing women's participation. Instead of using this money to host events or celebrate the day of the secretary – as has been shown happens – political parties should use this money to fund their women candidates' campaigns.[138] In 2018, for instance, the Partido Alianza Verde reported in *Cuentas Claras* its expenses accounted to COP$7,120,167,088.*[139]* Of that amount, they reported COP$537,180,523 was used in compliance with the 5% regulation (Article 18 of Law 1475 of 2011). Despite this corresponding to 7.5% of the total budget, Article 18 calls for this money

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[137] Transparencia, "Análisis sobre el acceso a recursos," 15.
[138] Ibid.
[139] "Formulario 1B, Partido Alianza Verde," *Cuentas Claras,* accessed March 30, 2022, https://app.cnecuentasclaras.gov.co/Funcionamiento/Consultas/BuscarOrganizacionCon/Reporte/2/3

to be used in 7 activities. If that 7.5% is split between that seven activities – one of which is "For the effective inclusion of women, youth and ethnic minorities in the political process" – this item gets about 1% of the budget, or about COP$76,740,000.[140] This thesis found successful congressional campaigns to raise an average of COP$340,000,000, the 1% amount Partido Alianza Verde has to contribute to a women's campaign is insufficient. If each party follows the regulation as it is stipulated: 5% to increase women's participation, then more money would be readily available to women candidates.

The lack of strict enforcement and sanction mechanisms, however, makes the previous solution harder to implement, and also becomes one of this thesis' most difficult-to-implement recommendations. The challenge lies in executing the existing regulations, not on drafting them. As was argued before, Colombia's regulatory framework is not lacking, it is just not enforced. The reasons and solutions to this challenge are outside the scope of this research paper but are important to study, identify, and solve, in order for this barrier to successful political campaigns for women to be overcome. Important questions that need to be addressed with regards to the implementation of strict enforcement and sanction mechanisms pertain the incentives for the government to be stricter on itself and the capability of the State to actually take up the role of main financier; is the money readily available?

Increasing the understanding and research on the cultural phenomena that act as barriers to successful political campaigns for women candidates in Colombia's PDET municipalities is the first step needed to overcome cultural barriers. In PDIA-terminology,

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[140] Congreso de la República de Colombia. *Ley 1475 de 2011: Por la cual se adoptan reglas de organización y funcionamiento de los partidos y movimientos políticos, de los procesos electorales y se dictan otras disposiciones.* Bogotá: Congreso de la República, 2011. http://www.secretariasenado.gov.co/senado/basedoc/ley_1475_2011.html

further researching these phenomena widens the change space needed to act upon them and to craft better solutions. Thus, the *why* question needs to be addressed: *why* do unpaid care work hours act as a barrier? *Why* is life expectancy an indicator of success? *Why* does violence affect success, in a country so intrinsically traversed by conflict and violence? The women candidates who participated in the focus groups began answering these questions just by speaking about their experience as candidates: without a security detail provided by the State, the CTEP candidates' life was at risk, and so was their campaign; two candidates from Bogotá mentioned they stopped campaigning after nightfall because they feared for their safety; and examples abounded on the political violence all candidates faced.

Whatever recommendation is implemented, however, needs to account for and understand the different ways in which these institutional, cultural, and financial barriers affect rural women who have historically lived and who are actively campaigning in municipalities affected by the country's conflict. The effects are differentiated and, almost always, stronger. Violence, for instance, takes a different form, and so does the underlying assumptions of unpaid care work. The women candidates from CTEP municipalities had to navigate territories with active armed conflicts and actors that actively wanted to silence them. The women candidates from CTEP municipalities had to fight the stigma, which, at times, meant challenging their own partner, to break away from unpaid care work responsibilities and be able to campaign. Financial opportunities are not lacking, they are non-existent. This thesis focused on these women because of the unique ways in which the barriers manifested themselves against them; the solutions and further research here proposed take these differentiated effects into account; and the thesis asks for them to always be taken into consideration.

References

Appendices

Appendix A: Colombia's PDET Municipalities, and the Departments to which they Belong

Department	Municipality
Antioquia	Amalfi
Antioquia	Anorí
Antioquia	Briceño
Antioquia	Cáceres
Antioquia	Caucasia
Antioquia	El Bagre
Antioquia	Ituango
Antioquia	Nechí
Antioquia	Remedios
Antioquia	Segovia
Antioquia	Tarazá
Antioquia	Valdivia
Antioquia	Zaragoza
Antioquia	Murindó
Antioquia	Vigía del Fuerte
Antioquia	Yondó
Antioquia	Apartadó
Antioquia	Carepa
Antioquia	Chigorodó
Antioquia	Dabeiba
Antioquia	Mutatá
Antioquia	Necoclí
Antioquia	San Pedro de Urabá
Antioquia	Turbo
Arauca	Arauquita
Arauca	Fortul
Arauca	Saravena
Arauca	Tame
Bolívar	Córdoba
Bolívar	El Carmen de Bolívar
Bolívar	El Guamo
Bolívar	María La Baja
Bolívar	San Jacinto
Bolívar	San Juan Nepomuceno
Bolívar	Zambrano

Bolívar	Arenal
Bolívar	Cantagallo
Bolívar	Morales
Bolívar	San Pablo
Bolívar	Santa Rosa del Sur
Bolívar	Simití
Caquetá	Albania
Caquetá	Belén de Los Andaquíes
Caquetá	Cartagena del Chairá
Caquetá	Curillo
Caquetá	El Doncello
Caquetá	El Paujíl
Caquetá	Florencia
Caquetá	La Montañita
Caquetá	Milán
Caquetá	Morelia
Caquetá	Puerto Rico
Caquetá	San José del Fragua
Caquetá	San Vicente del Caguán
Caquetá	Solano
Caquetá	Solita
Caquetá	Valparaíso
Cauca	Argelia
Cauca	Balboa
Cauca	Buenos Aires
Cauca	Cajibío
Cauca	Caldono
Cauca	Caloto
Cauca	Corinto
Cauca	El Tambo
Cauca	Jambaló
Cauca	Mercaderes
Cauca	Miranda
Cauca	Morales
Cauca	Patía
Cauca	Piendamó - Tunía
Cauca	Santander de Quilichao
Cauca	Suárez
Cauca	Toribío
Cauca	Guapi
Cauca	López de Micay

Cauca	Timbiquí
Cesar	Agustín Codazzi
Cesar	Becerril
Cesar	La Jagua de Ibirico
Cesar	La Paz
Cesar	Manaure Balcón del Cesar
Cesar	Pueblo Bello
Cesar	San Diego
Cesar	Valledupar
Chocó	Acandí
Chocó	Bojayá
Chocó	Carmen del Darién
Chocó	Condoto
Chocó	El Litoral del San Juan
Chocó	Istmina
Chocó	Medio Atrato
Chocó	Medio San Juan
Chocó	Nóvita
Chocó	Riosucio
Chocó	Sipí
Chocó	Unguía
Córdoba	Montelíbano
Córdoba	Puerto Libertador
Córdoba	San José de Uré
Córdoba	Tierralta
Córdoba	Valencia
Guaviare	Calamar
Guaviare	El Retorno
Guaviare	Miraflores
Guaviare	San José del Guaviare
Huila	Algeciras
La Guajira	Dibulla
La Guajira	Fonseca
La Guajira	San Juan del Cesar
Magdalena	Aracataca
Magdalena	Ciénaga
Magdalena	Fundación
Magdalena	Santa Marta
Meta	La Macarena
Meta	Mapiripán

Meta	Mesetas
Meta	Puerto Concordia
Meta	Puerto Lleras
Meta	Puerto Rico
Meta	Uribe
Meta	Vistahermosa
Nariño	Cumbitara
Nariño	El Rosario
Nariño	Leiva
Nariño	Los Andes
Nariño	Policarpa
Nariño	Barbacoas
Nariño	El Charco
Nariño	Francisco Pizarro
Nariño	La Tola
Nariño	Magüí
Nariño	Mosquera
Nariño	Olaya Herrera
Nariño	Ricaurte
Nariño	Roberto Payán
Nariño	San Andrés de Tumaco
Nariño	Santa Bárbara
Norte de Santander	Convención
Norte de Santander	El Carmen
Norte de Santander	El Tarra
Norte de Santander	Hacarí
Norte de Santander	San Calixto
Norte de Santander	Sardinata
Norte de Santander	Teorama
Norte de Santander	Tibú
Putumayo	Puerto Leguízamo
Putumayo	Mocoa
Putumayo	Orito
Putumayo	Puerto Asís
Putumayo	Puerto Caicedo
Putumayo	Puerto Guzmán
Putumayo	San Miguel
Putumayo	Valle del Guamuez
Putumayo	Villagarzón
Sucre	Chalán
Sucre	Coloso
Sucre	Los Palmitos

Sucre	Morroa
Sucre	Ovejas
Sucre	Palmito
Sucre	San Onofre
Sucre	Tolú Viejo
Tolima	Ataco
Tolima	Chaparral
Tolima	Planadas
Tolima	Rioblanco
Valle del Cauca	Florida
Valle del Cauca	Pradera
Valle del Cauca	Buenaventura

Appendix B: National and PDET-only Statistics on Women's Participation and

Representation in Colombia's 2015 and 2019 Territorial Elections

Territorial elections	2015	2019
National		
Total number of candidates (men and women)	11,3426	12,1194
Governor		
Total number of candidates for Governor	155	165
Total number of women candidates for Governor	25	20
Total number of women elected for Governor	5	2
Total number of posts for Governor	32	32
Percentage of women candidates for Governor	*16.1%*	*12.1%*
Percentage of women candidates who won, of the total number of candidates	*3.2%*	*1.2%*
Percentage of posts for Governor won by women	*15.6%*	*6.3%*
Mayor		
Total number of candidates for Mayor	4,636	4,959
Total number of women candidates for Mayor	649	754
Total number of women elected for Mayor	134	132
Total number of posts for Mayor	1,112	1,112

	2015	2019
Percentage of women candidates for Mayor	*14.0%*	*15.2%*
Percentage of women candidates who won, to total number of candidates	*2.9%*	*2.7%*
Percentage of posts for Mayor won by women	*12.1%*	*11.9%*
PDET	**2015**	**2019**
Total of PDET departments	19	19
Total PDET municipalities	170	170
Governor		
PDET departments with women candidates for Governor	12	6
PDET departments with women elected to Governor	5	1
Percentage of PDET departments with women as Governor	*26.3%*	*5.3%*
Mayor		
PDET municipalities with women candidates for Mayor	79	92
PDET municipalities with women candidates elected to Mayor	23	21
Percentage of PDET municipalities with women as Mayor	*13.5%*	*12.4%*

Appendix C: PDIA's Change-Space Analysis

The purpose of this analysis is to identify which sub-causes allow for quick interventions that can yield quick wins, while at the same time identifying which sub-causes need to have their change space widened for future interventions to occur.[141] This yields an action plan that is aggressive at the same time as it is progressive and long-term. It is worth noting that all "ability" analyses came back as "low" in the change space analysis, because an intervention is outside of the scope of this research. The analysis, in any case, will prove useful when planning future interventions and deciding which gaps to fill.

Cause 1: Financial barriers			
Sub-cause 1: Campaign financing is not equally	Describe context	AAA estimation (low, mid, large)	Assumptions

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[141] Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock, *Building State Capability*, 161.

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accessible to men and women candidates.			
Authority to engage 1. Who has the authority to engage? Legal? Procedural? Informal? 2. Which of the authorizer(s) might support engagement now? 3. Which probably would not support engagement now? 4. Overall, how much acceptance do you think you have to engage, and where are the gaps?)	1. Government – legal and procedural; political parties – legal, procedural, informal; private contributors – legal and informal; third sector – informal and procedural.[142] 2. Private contributors and third sector. 3. Government and political parties, because we are close to elections. 4. Gaps in public sector, opportunities in private and third sector.	Mid-large	2022 Congressional and presidential elections in Colombia.
Acceptance 1. Which agents (person/organization) have an interest in this work? On a scale of 1–10, think about: a. how much are they likely to support engagement? b. How much influence each agent has over potential engagement? 2. What proportion of "strong acceptance" agents do you have (with above 5 on both estimates)? 3. What proportion of "low acceptance" agents do you have (with below 5 on both estimates)? 4. Overall, how much acceptance do you think you have to engage, and where are the gaps?)	1. Third sector: 8 / 8 Private sector: 7 / 7 Government: 3 / 2 Political parties: 3 / 2 Women candidates: 9 / 5 Men candidates: 5 / 5 2. 49% 3. 51% 4. Mid acceptance, gaps in public sector.	Mid	Assumes private sector is given correct incentives to accept and engage.
Ability 1. What is your personnel ability? a. Who are the key (smallest group of) agents you need to	1. Key agents: private sector, third sector, women candidates. Time needed: at least one year before elections. 2. Money: whatever is needed to contribute to women's	Low	

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[142] Third sector will be understood as organizations that are not part of government or of the private sector: NGOs, IOs, civil society organizations, etc.

"work" on any opening engagement?
  b. How much time would you need from these agents?
2. What is your resource ability?
  a. How much money would you need to engage?
  b. What other resources do you need to engage?
3. Overall, how much ability do you think you have to engage, and where are the gaps?)
	campaigns, which also depends on the type of post each candidate is seeking. According to chapter 1, a congressional candidate spent, in average, US$63,000; a candidate for mayor spent, in average, US$22,000; and a candidate for governor spent, in average, US$230,000. Resources: incentives for both third and private sector.
	3. Low. This thesis portfolio provides the backbone of a future intervention. But current ability is low.		

Sub-cause 2: Electoral financing, public and private, is not gendered.	**Describe context**	**AAA estimation (low, mid, large)**	**Assumptions**
Authority to engage	1. Government – legal and procedural; political parties – legal, procedural, informal; private contributors – informal; third sector – informal. 2. Third sector and private sector. 3. Public sector. 4. Mid. While third and private sector can engage, public sector has procedural and legal authority.	Mid	
Acceptance	1. Government: 2 / 9 Political parties: 2 / 2 Private sector: 7 / 7 Third sector: 7 / 4 Women candidates: 8 / 2 Men candidates: 2 / 2 2. 16% 3. 84% 4. Low – given Colombia has a public financing scheme for political campaigns, change would have to come from government.	Low	
Ability	1. Key agents: Government, its legislative branch.	Low	

	Time needed: one legislative period. 2. Money and / or resources needed for lobbying. 3. Low. This thesis portfolio provides the backbone of a future intervention. But current ability is low.		
Sub-cause 3: Lax enforcement of campaign finance laws and no innovative avenues of private funding for women.	**Describe context**	**AAA estimation (low, mid, large)**	**Assumptions**
Authority to engage	1. Judicial branch – legal and procedural; private sector – legal, procedural, informal; political parties – legal, procedural; third sector – informal. 2. Private sector, third sector, judicial branch. 3. Government, political parties. 4. Mid-large	Mid-large	
Acceptance	1. Government: 5 / 4 Private sector: 8 / 8 Judicial branch: 8/ 8 Third sector: 8 / 8 Political parties: 3 / 3 Women candidates: 8 / 5 Men candidates: 4 / 4 2. 66% 3. 34% 4. Mid-large	Mid-large	
Ability	1. Key agents: judicial branch, third sector, private sector. Time needed: at least one year before elections. 2. Money and resources depend on intervention. New avenues of funding follow the logic of sub-cause 1. Enforcement mechanisms require lobbying and legislation. 3. Low. This thesis portfolio provides the backbone of a future intervention. But current ability is low.	Low	
Cause 2: Cultural / structural barriers			

Sub-cause 1: Unsuccessful candidacies occur in departments with high women homicide rates.	Describe context	AAA estimation (low, mid, large)	Assumptions
Authority to engage	1. Government – legal, procedural; social leaders – informal; third sector – informal; citizens – informal. 2. Social leaders, third sector, citizens. 3. Government. 4. Large with informal actors, mid with government.	Large	Assumes current government and historical government interventions, but sees opportunity gap in change of government in 20222.
Acceptance	1. Government: 4 / 7 Social leaders: 10 / 7 Third sector: 10 / 7 Citizens: 10 / 5 2. 75% 3. 25% 4. Large	Large	
Ability	1. Key agents: social leaders and third sector. Time needed: long-term intervention. 2. Money and resources would need to be calculated based on a project for intervention. 3. Low. This thesis portfolio provides the backbone of a future intervention. But current ability is low.	Low	
Sub-cause 2: Unsuccessful candidacies occur in departments with low life expectancies.	Describe context	AAA estimation (low, mid, large)	Assumptions
Authority to engage	1. Government – legal, procedural; social leaders – informal; third sector – informal; citizens – informal. 2. Social leaders, third sector, citizens. 3. Government. 4. Large with informal actors, mid with government.	Large	
Acceptance	1. Government: 4 / 7 Social leaders: 10 / 7 Third sector: 10 / 7	Large	

	Citizens: 10 / 5 2. 75% 3. 25% 4. Large		
Ability	1. Key agents: social leaders and third sector. Time needed: long-term intervention. 2. Money and resources would need to be calculated based on a project for intervention. 3. Low. This thesis portfolio provides the backbone of a future intervention. But current ability is low.	Low	
Sub-cause 3: The phenomena are not thoroughly studied, understood and part of mainstream discourse.	**Describe context**	**AAA estimation (low, mid, large)**	**Assumptions**
Authority to engage	1. Third sector – procedural and informal; government – legal, procedural, informal; candidates – informal; social leaders – informal. 2. Third sector, social leaders, candidates. 3. Government. 4. Large	Large	
Acceptance	1. Third sector: 10 / 10 Government: 6 / 8 Candidates: 8 / 8 Social leaders: 10 / 10 2. 100% 3. 0% 4. Large	Large	
Ability	1. Key agents: all. Time needed: long-term intervention. 2. Money and resources would need to be calculated based on a project for intervention. 3. Low. This thesis portfolio provides the backbone of a future intervention. But current ability is low.	Low	

Table 8: Change space analysis

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Curriculum Vitae

DANIELA SÁNCHEZ GALVIS

EDUCATION

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY – MA in Government   May 2022
- Thesis: *Financial, cultural, and institutional barriers to successful political campaigns for women candidates in Colombia's PDET municipalities, and possible roads for action.*
- Center for Advanced Governmental Studies Student Scholar Award.

BOSTON UNIVERSITY – B.A. Political Science and B.A. Sociology   May 2016
- Honors: American Sociological Association Departmental Prize.
- Dean's List: 2013, 2014, 2015.

BU GENEVA - Global governance, economic development, and human rights   Summer 2014

EXPERIENCE

democraciaAbierta / openDemocracy   August 2021 – March 2022
Managing and Development Editor – Washington D.C., USA
- Identified , maintained and strengthened partnerships, with achievement of 100% conversion rate between partnerships established to projects delivered in partnership across Latin America.
- Prepared, reviewed, and managed donor- and project-related budgets, as well as quarterly, mid, and final monitoring and evaluation reports.

Editor for Latin America – Bogotá, Colombia   August 2019 – July 2021
- Proposed and delivered new initiatives, i.e. two e-Books; over four multimedia projects, one on social leaders in Colombia and one on gender equality; and two video- and audio-columns.
- Managed a four-person team in Colombia and Brazil.

International Committee of the Red Cross   September 2018 - May 2019
Regional Protection Data Manager Assistant – Bogotá, Colombia
- Elaborated the America's region 2018 Annual Report, with visualization and analysis of indicators related to human rights and conflict, with inclusion of gender perspective.
- Participated in support missions to Perú and Panamá to support and train resident data managers.

Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz   January 2018 - August 2018
Analista – Bogotá, Colombia
- Led and published first Statistics Bulletin, with design and analysis of indicators.
- Contributed to elaboration of selection criteria to call ex-combatants to testify for Case 01 on kidnappings, integrating gender perspective and harm inflicted on the victims.

Fundación TECHO   October 2017 - January 2018
Coordinadora Nacional Investigación Social – Bogotá, Colombia
- Implemented TECHO's information collection strategy (Estrategia de Levantamiento de Información) in its five national offices via workshops, supervision, and assistance.

Inter-American Development Bank   August 2016 - August 2017
Innovation for Citizen Services Consultant – Bogotá, Colombia
- Delivered reports for four projects in government entities, collecting and disseminating best practices, innovations, and lessons learned.
- Assisted in design and presentation of the Procuraduría General de la Nación and Defensoría del Pueblo's Project Profile.

CERTIFICATES AND DISTINCTIONS
Political Innovation School "Es con Acciones" – Representative Juanita Goebertus and Senator Angélica Lozano (2021)
PODEROSAS Colombia – Sexual and reproductive rights nonprofit, m&e volunteer (2021)
Certificate in data for public policy - BID / IDB (2020)
Certificate in social project management - BID / IDB (2017)
NCAA Varsity Sports D1 Athlete - Boston University Women's Golf (Scholarship, 2012-2016)

PUBLICATIONS
E-book: Tejiendo Lazos, Futuro del Multilateralismo en LatAm democraciaAbierta (2022)
E-book: A Chant from the South democraciaAbierta (2020)
Boletín Estadístico: Primera Iteración Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (2018)
The Vicious Cycle of Corruption in Brazil IR Review (2015)
openDemocracy publications

SKILLS
Languages Spanish (native) and English (TOEFL: 113)
Programs R, Tableau, HTML, CRM, Microsoft Office, Adobe Creative Suite