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'From my ashes I am reborn': The revolt for 'to Romaiko'

Examining the role of a 'Byzantine' identity in the 1821 'Hellenic Revolution'

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Abstract

On Tuesday May 29, 1453, Constantinople fell to the Ottoman Empire. With it, 'Rome', as an entity, fell into the annals of history. Or did it? In 1821 swathes of the Orthodox population of the Balkans -many of whom still self-identifying as 'Romans'- revolted against Ottoman rule. The rebellion was eventually successful, and an independent Greek state was born.

Often this revolution has been portrayed as an attempt by neo-Hellenes to bring about a modern and liberal regenerated Hellas: a nation state worthy of the rightful heirs to a classical legacy. The Roman's ideals and identity, meanwhile, are often portrayed as being solely religious phenomena which cannot be defined as a national consciousness. While the depiction of the -largely westernised Greek- neo-Hellenes certainly seems to be accurate, my research has found that the representation of the average illiterate and insulated Greeks (the people who were still identifying as Romans in 1821) has been mishandled by the scholarship. Here I lay out an evidenced argument that their Roman ideals and identity (what I call Byzantinism) constitutes a national consciousness and that the rebellion was, at its outset, perceived by the majority of its' participants as an attempt to bring about 'to Romaiko': the divinely mandated resurrection of God's earthly Kingdom.

Yet today Greece is known as 'Hellas', her people 'Hellenes'. Greece's 19th Century westernised and educated minority, I argue here, are responsible for the new Greek state's Hellenic façade: a rendering which was more in line with their own specific version of Greek nationhood. Consequently, a valuable piece of the historical record has been diminished, misrepresented, and almost lost. This thesis is an attempt to bring that fragment of the picture back into the historiography of the movements for Greek independence. In so doing this analysis serves as a case study for the examination of nation-building in other parts of the world. Perhaps Greece is not the only nation to have emerged onto the world stage only to appear as unrecognisable to the very people whose efforts facilitated that emergence in the first place.

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Acknowledgement

With all my heartfelt thanks and eternal gratitude for her unending support and belief in me throughout this odyssey, I dedicate this thesis to my wife, Chantal, and to the family we are building together.

Semper Tecum Ero.

I am also extremely grateful to my family, friends, and my supervisors, Mike Rapport and Jelmer Vos, for all their feedback, patience, and understanding.

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Author's Declaration

"I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, that this thesis is the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any other degree at the University of Glasgow or any other institution."

Christopher J. A. Blyth

Glossary

Armatoli – Armed members of the Rum millet employed by the Porte to keep areas clear of bandits. There are many incidences of armatoli switching to klepht (and back, and back again). These bands were led by a Capetani, a post which would be passed from male relative to male relative.

Autocephaly – An Orthodox Church which is independent of any other Church Bodies. For example, the Church of Cyprus has been autocephalous since the 5th Century.

Byzantinism – A phrase I use here to refer to the Roman identity and ideal and to differentiate it from neo-Hellenism. Although Byzantium is an anachronism and an exonym, I use it here in order to distinguish a specific identity which was pinned to feelings of belonging to -and yearning for- the Byzantine Empire. 'Byzantinism' has been used here instead of a Romaic form (such as 'Romanism') in order to differentiate between the Roman identity as it is presented -erroneously, in my view- in the scholarship (as a bond of common Orthodox Christianity alone) and the identity I have identified here as being one which was centred upon Orthodoxy *and* statehood. Byzantinism, in my view, can therefore be said to be a form of national consciousness. Lastly, although primarily based upon notions of citizenship -and ergo categorizable in traditional theories of nationhood as a 'civic nationalism'- I also present here evidence of a Greek chauvinism within the Byzantinist model which undermines the usability of the ethnic-civic dichotomy of nationalism.

Danubian Principalities – The principalities of Moldovia and Wallachia. Rich Greeks from the Phanariot class practically held a monopoly over the title of Hospodar (which was, in essence, leased for a fixed term from the Porte). The idea was that they would run the administration of the regions and reap the tax rewards.

Enosis – Literally meaning 'union' this was the word used after the war to refer to the various movements of Greeks in 'unliberated' regions of the Ottoman Empire that attempted to bring about a union between their region and the new Greek State.

Filliki Hetereia / The Hetereia – 'The Friendly Society', a secret society formed in 1814 which was dedicated to the liberation of Greece. They lay the foundations and established the communication networks for the revolt. Once the revolt was crushed in the North and in full swing in the South, however, the Hetereia declined in importance and the rebellion took on an 'every man for himself' nature with limited co-operation. Many Heterists were in prominent roles in the rebellion however and many played an active role in the attempts at state craft the Greek revolutionaries made in the early years of the rebellion. Although there were other 'Hetereias' (societies) formed during the Tourkokratia this one is often referred to as *the* Hetereia due to its status as being the main conspiracy behind the 1821 revolt.

Hellenised – The process of adopting the Greek language and culture to the point that one 'passed' as a Greek. However, many Hellenised peoples still carried names such as 'Voulgaris' ('the Bulgarian') which denoted their non-Grecophone origins.

Hellenism / Neo-Hellenism – Used here to refer to the ideal which held the Greeks to be the heirs of a classical heritage (usually via a belief in the continuity of the Greek language from classical times to modern). By extension 'Hellenism' here also refers to the celebration and promotion of the Greek language, learning, and culture. Neo-Hellenism, in turn, is the ideal that the modern Greeks could -and should- emulate their classical forebears and thus become 'regenerated' to their perceived former greatness.

Hospodar – The 'Prince' of one of the Danubian Principalities

Klepht – A bandit. The term literally translates as 'thief' however the Klephts often enjoyed a status as 'freedom fighter' or 'patriot' during the Tourkokratia. At sea the term pirate or privateer is used.

Megali Idea – Literally meaning 'the great idea' this was the ideal of a Greek takeover of a loosely defined land mass that incorporated regions of high Greek populations (or

regions which were significant to Greek ideals of self). This largely corresponded with a restored Byzantine State.

Millet System – the system of governance used by the Ottoman Empire which divided people into millets (by what religion they adhered to). The heads of said faith would be responsible for their flock in spiritual and temporal matters.

Morea – The region more commonly known as the Peloponnesus. People from the Morea were called Moriotes. The suffix, 'iote', is common in Greek to denote 'being form that place' so, for example, someone from Corfu would be known as a Corfiote and plurally they would be referred to as Corfiotes.

Orlov Revolt – The widespread Greek revolt in 1770 which failed, ultimately, due to the Orlov brother's promises of Russian assistance failing to materialise.

Patriarchate – The Patriarch is the head of a see of the Orthodox Church. In this paper it is used to refer to the office of the Patriarch of Constantinople.

Phanariot – A Greek -usually a wealthy member of Greece's de facto aristocracy- from the Phanar district of Constantinople. This 'class' of notables held a monopoly on the offices of the Rum Millet's administration as well as some positions within the Porte itself.

Philhellene – Usually a westerner who is a supporter of Greek culture and, by extension, of Greece (And usually the Greek cause) itself.

Porte – Sometimes called 'The Sublime Porte', This is the term used to denote the Ottoman Empire's government and administration. The term literally denotes 'from the high gate' of the Sultan's palace and, as such, is often used as a substitute for 'The Sultan' himself.

Roumeli / Roumelia – Meaning 'Land of the Romans', when this term is used by Greeks it is used to refer to Continental Greece (from the Gulf of Corinth in the South to as far North as the Balkans Mountains (in modern Bulgaria) and the borders of Serbia.

Rum Millet – The 'Millet' of the 'Romans' meaning, in this context, all Orthodox Christian subjects of the Empire. The Etymology of the word comes from the term the Byzantine subjects (all of which were Orthodox Christian, as per the legal definition of a Byzantine citizen at the time) used to define themselves.

To Romaiko – Literally meaning 'The Roman Thing' this was a colloquialism for 'the restoration of the Roman State': a commonly held belief in Greek discourse throughout the Tourkokratia.

Tourkokratia – The Greek word used to refer to the era of Ottoman rule. Usually this dates form the Fall of Constantinople until the date of liberation.

Vlach – The term was used at the time to refer to the Aromanian speaking peoples (the Vlachoi) of the Balkan peninsula. Largely speaking these were semi-nomadic peoples although increasingly from the 18th Century onwards many settled in towns and became 'Hellenised'. They were Orthodox Christian and were mostly engaged in transhumance shepherding. The term has evolved in modern Greek to now mean something akin to 'bumpkin'. The term was also often used at the time to refer to the peoples of Walachia and Moldavia.

Chapter I: Introduction

Part I: The scholarship so far

> *"When, in 1821, the Greeks eventually rose against the Turks, the decision as to whether the form of the society that was to issue from their struggles would be more in accordance with the Orthodox than with the 'Hellenising' myth had already been made in the national consciousness, and made in favour of the latter."[1]*

In only a handful of lines the above excerpt from Toynbee summarises the broad scholarly consensus that the 'Hellenic Revolution' of 1821 was borne of -and for- a 'Neo-Hellenic' identity. More specifically, this consensus holds that the Greeks revolted against the Ottoman Empire for the sake of an ideal which embraced the modern Greeks as the descendants of the heroes of antiquity and, as such, called for their self-sovereignty in the form of a liberal nation state styled after western Europe (whose nations states in their modern form had, in turn, been founded upon the legacy of Classical Greece). Toynbee, here, also managed to express another facet of said 'broad scholarly consensus': the mutually exclusive nature of the two possible versions of Greece. To Toynbee, and most of the scholarship, the two possible versions of Greece that could issue forth from the struggle of the 1820's were incompatible: the Greece that would be modelled along the lines of the 'Hellenising myth' on one hand, and the Greece that would be modelled along those of Byzantium (this is what he meant by 'the Orthodox', to Toynbee this was the modern Greek's principal inheritance form their Byzantine past)[2] on the other.

In the scholarship -western scholarship particularly- the turning of the Ottoman Greeks from their Orthodox and Byzantine identity (and ideology) towards that of the 'Hellenising myth' (a process which occurred courtesy of an economic and intellectual 'renaissance' of the late 18th and early 19th Century) has been placed front-and-centre among the explanations as to why the Greeks revolted against the Porte in 1821. St. Claire dedicated an entire chapter in his history of the Greek revolution to the *"Return of The Ancient Hellenes"*.[3] Similarly, Brewer also dedicated a chapter of his monograph on the War of

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[1] Toynbee, Arnold. 1981. *The Greeks and their heritages. United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.* p.165
[2] Toynbee, 1981. p.136-154
[3] St. Claire, William. 1972. *That Greece Might Still Be Free.* London: Oxford University Press. p.13-22

Independence to the theme of Greece's intellectual *"regeneration"*.[4] Dakin contextualised the revolt as being the end result of the Greek's *"Economic and Intellectual Progress"*.[5] Meanwhile Woodhouse depicted the emergence of the Greek independence movement as being the climax of a *"Greek renaissance"* which served to pull the Greeks out of a 'Dark Age'.[6] In any one of the sources mentioned above -and in virtually any other English-written texts covering early 19th Century Greek history- one will find the same general narrative as that which I summarise now (the following summary takes its information from those monographs -and particularly, those chapters- mentioned above and from Denis Skiotis' research towards Ali Pasha's role).[7]

> In the second half of the 18th Century the Balkans experienced a Grecophone led renaissance in commerce and learning (the two going hand in hand) that would last right through to the 1821 revolt. This was the result of a boom in Balkan commercial activity which was headed by Grecophones (due to Greek being the lingua Franca of Balkan towns, trade, and the local educated classes). Subsequently a mercantile Greek diaspora developed throughout Europe. Wherever there was a trade hub to be found on that continent, a Greek community emerged. Further, wherever a hub of learning was to be found, said community's sons could, similarly, be encountered. Consequently, ideas and information began to spread from the towns and cities of Europe back to the Balkans via this new enlightenment-infused and western-educated Grecophone mercantile diaspora. Soon a Greek literati class emerged which began identifying itself with the 'modern' ideas of the West on one hand; and the feeling of being the rightful heirs of a classical Hellenic past on the other. Contrary to what one might expect, knowledge of the classical past was not organic knowledge to the Greeks of the diaspora: in their homeland ignorance and superstition reigned supreme when it came to anything to do with the pre-Christian past. In fact, this 'Classical Hellas' had been discovered by those modern Greeks who had travelled to Europe when they found the classically educated peoples of their new homelands to be in a state of obsession with *their* ancestors. They were *their* ancestors, there was no doubt, because great celebration was made of the linguistic continuity between ancient and modern Greek (and so too, therefore, of the continuity between the *speakers* of the ancient and modern tongues themselves). Soon the diaspora began to transfer these ideas of a Hellenic heritage (alongside western enlightenment ideals) back to the literati Greeks of Ottoman Greece. This was done via the sponsoring of publications and schools for the education of Greeks throughout the Ottoman Empire and the Ionian Isles (the latter had never -and would never- belong to the Ottomans). Centres of Greek learning were soon bustling not only among the Greek diaspora, but also, thanks to the efforts of said overseas Greeks, in some towns in the Balkans and Islands as well. This intellectual renaissance and revival of classical knowledge was further bolstered by the ever-increasing

[4] Brewer, David. 2011. *The Greek War of Independence*, London: Overlook Duckworth. p.8

[5] Dakin, Douglas 1973. *The Greek Struggle for Independence, 1821–1833*. Berkeley: University of California Press. p.21-25

[6] Woodhouse, C.M. 1991. *Modern Greece, A Short History*. London: Bookmarque. p.124-5

[7] Skiotis, Dennis. N. 1976. *The Greek Revolution: Ali Pasha's Last Gamble.* Nikiforos P. Diamandouros, John P. Anton, John A. Petropulos, Peter Topping. Eds. 1976. *Hellenism and the First Greek War of Liberation (1821-1830): Continuity And Change.* Institute of Balkan Studies. Thessaloniki. p.100-102

arrival of classically educated western travellers on their 'Grand Tours' to 'The Orient' and by the arrival of western rule in the Ionian Isles during the Revolutionary Wars. These ideas and this knowledge -and appreciation- of the classical past evolved, in time, into a new identity (at least among the Greek diaspora and the literati classes of the Ottoman Greeks): one which celebrated a Hellenic past and was coupled with the desire for the realisation of a liberal politics in the Balkans. As a result of this new identity (and as a result of the economic prosperity which facilitated this new arrival) the Greeks now desired for themselves a new political status quo which would be more befitting their heritage and more conducive to their social and commercial enterprises. This, in turn, led to many Greeks feeling (including non-Greeks who had become Hellenised via the adoption of Greek language and culture) that they could -and should- rule either the Ottoman Empire itself, or a hypothetical post-Ottoman State of some description by virtue of the superiority of their language, their learning, and their culture. The result of all of this was the emergence of influential networks of Greeks who were willing and -to varying degrees- able to achieve independence for themselves and their compatriots from the Porte. Their compatriots, it was almost universally agreed by the Hellenists, were people who had proficiency in the Hellenic language and who had subsequently inherited, or adopted, Hellenic culture. In 1814, therefore, a selection of oversees Greek merchants hatched a conspiracy, the Philliki Hetereia (the friendly society) to make preparations for a revolution, an uprising which eventually engulfed the Balkans in 1821. The conspirators, therefore, capitalised on the fact that, at that time, the Porte's military capabilities were distracted by the open rebellion of one of its' Pashas in the Balkans: Ali Pasha of Ioannina. Due to said struggle resulting in Ali Pasha's call for local Greeks to lend them his arms, the conspirators also cashed in on the fact that some Greeks were already in armed conflict with the Sultan's forces: and not just any Greeks either, but the renowned warrior clansmen of Souli, a mountain enclave of Epirus, whose exploits were celebrated by song and tale across Greece, and whose current open participation in war against the Sultan bequeathed incalculable capital to those who sought to whip up a revolution among the Greeks.

Clogg, in my reading of the English histories of the 'Greek War of Independence', places the least amount of emphasis on this 'Hellenising myth' courtesy of the diaspora and even he depicted this process as:

"their [the diaspora's] *indirect contribution to the development of the movement for independence was nonetheless to prove of the greatest significance… the merchants were responsible for sustaining the material base of the intellectual revival of the last three decades of the eighteenth and the first two of the nineteenth centuries that was such a vital factor in the development of a national consciousness, an awareness of a specifically Greek rather than merely Orthodox Christian identity. They endowed schools and libraries, and subsidised the publication, principally outside the boundaries of the* [Ottoman]

Empire, of a growing, and increasingly secular, body of literature aimed at a specifically Greek audience." [8]

Alluded to above is the western provenance of Hellenism. This is widely agreed upon in the scholarship. It was because of this western origin of Hellenism that ideas of Hellas arrived in Greece packaged alongside the revolutionary ideals that were circulating western European literati circles at that time. St. Claire clarifies this by pointing out that, in Europe, Hellas was the model upon which enlightenment ideas and liberal politics was based upon.[9] When this mindset was applied to Greece and to the Greeks themselves an evolution occurred which hyper-inflated the Hellenist aspect of the thinking: these were the heirs of the heroic past which enlightened Europe so renowned, and this land was the same land that said heroes had called their own. St. Claire explains this creation of what could be described well as 'Liberalism with Hellenic Characteristics' when he explains that, by 1821, knowledge of -and the political idealising of- ancient Hellas in Ottoman Greece was -in reality- a collection of:

> *"Western European ideas which had been taken back to Greece by Europeans and by Greeks educated in Europe. The classical tradition which lay at the heart of European civilization* ['enlightened' political theory] *had been brought back to Greece after an absence of many centuries…. The new-found enthusiasm… became a political force. It was linked with the ideas of political liberty and national independence, which were spread widely over Europe by the wars of the French Republic and Empire. The leaders of the movements that regarded themselves as representing all that was most humane and progressive claimed Ancient Greece as their model and their guide."[10]*

Thus, when the Greek diaspora became exposed to western imaginings of what was assumed to be the modern Greek's 'lost' heritage, alongside the flourishing 'revolutionary ideas' of the era, the result was the formation of a national identity based upon the westerner's perception of who and what Greeks were and should become: the modern heirs of the ancients on whom the new western political utopia had been modelled.

St. Claire – who based his analysis on accounts of western philhellenes who were eye-witnesses to events in Greece during the revolutionary period- drew a distinction between

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[8] Clogg, Richard. 2002. A Concise History of Greece. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. p.25
[9] St. Claire, 1972. p.14-15
[10] St. Claire,1972. p.14-15

'Greeks in Greece' and 'Oversees Greeks': a distinction that also appears in some form or other in the wider scholarship.[11] Largely this is a distinction between the mostly illiterate and insulated -and mostly rural- Greeks living in the Ottoman Empire on one hand and: and, on the other, the Greeks educated in Europe and their literati ilk (the Greek 'reading public') in the Ionian and Balkan towns which served as centres of the imported 'intellectual revival'.[12] The two groups, the scholarship -and St. Claire specifically- tells us, had diverging motivations and desires: hence the necessity to draw a distinction in the first place.[13]

The scholarship defines this division in terms of a divergence in identity between the 'Oversees Greeks' and the 'Greeks in Greece': a divide which is also usually noted to have continued to exist even after the revolt had broken out. This division in identity was alluded to by Clogg above, who explained that the 'new and specifically Greek national consciousness' replaced an identity based solely on an 'Orthodox Christian identity'. St. Claire explains this division via his remarks upon the manifesto of the Messenian Senate. The senate (which was convened at Kalamata in the Peloponnesus in the opening days of the revolt in the Morea) elected to have their leader (the Maniote chieftain, Petrobey Mavromichalis) address the nations of Europe as the commander-in-chief of the 'Spartan' forces. The manifesto solely uses the terms 'Hellenes' to mean 'The Greeks' and 'Hellas' to mean their territory: this was to invoke the sympathy -and aid- of the philhellenic classically educated ruling classes of Europe at the time. However, on how this manifesto would have been received by the people in the liberated regions themselves St. Claire wrote:

> *"To the average Peloponnesian Greek of 1821, even had he been able to read, the manifesto would have been incomprehensible. He would probably not have recognised the appellation of 'Hellene' as applying to himself and he would certainly have had no appreciation of the conception of 'Hellas' as a nation-state. The inhabitants of Olympia, Delphi, and Sparta knew little or nothing of the interesting history of the towns they occupied... A few manuscripts of ancient authors survived in the libraries... but, with few exceptions, the libraries rotted undisturbed. The surviving ruins of ancient temples were ignored or used as*

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[11] St. Claire,1972. p.22
[12] St. Claire,1972. p.13-22
[13] St. Claire,1972. p.13-22.

> *building materials. The priests taught their parishioners to despise them as relics of the pagans."*[14]

This notion, that the 'average Greek' would not have identified themselves as a Hellene at that time is corroborated in the scholarship. Dakin, for example, discussed how Hellene was used in 1821 to refer to the fighters only.[15] He, meanwhile, also identified further division within the literati camp itself, separating 'the westernised' from 'the traditionalists'. He explained that:

> *"It was among an intelligentsia, rather than among the toiling masses, that revolutionary ideas from western Europe found a hearing. That intelligentsia could hardly have exceeded two percent of the population and among that two percent a considerable proportion was antagonistic to the impieties of the West, preferring to remain within the traditional ideological structure. As in France before the revolution, so in the Greek world publications which expounded new ideas were met with a counterblast of time-honoured doctrine."*[16]

Roughly speaking, therefore, it can safely be said that the historiography accepts that a distinction -in terms of self-identity- existed between the westernised and Hellenist Greeks on one hand; and the 'traditionalists' of the literati class alongside the average -that is to say, the more insulated and less literate- Greeks living in the Ottoman Empire on the other. It is in relation to this division, an examination of the identity of the non-westernised camp, that this thesis concerns itself. It appears that, while many aspects of these peoples' identity has been identified and discussed, the entirety of said identity has been misunderstood and misrepresented in the scholarship thus far.

Evidently it is agreed in the scholarship that not all Greeks desired a liberal and westernised Hellas: the presence of a 'traditionalist' camp and the distinction between 'Oversees Greeks' and 'Greeks in Greeks' speaks to this. Given that -according to Dakin- roughly 98% of Greeks fell outwith the literati camp one would expect the scholarship to cover more broadly the motivations and ideas behind the decision of the 'average Greek' to take up arms against the Sultan in 1821.[17] Yet the tale of the Hellenic revolution almost

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[14] St. Claire, 1972. p.13-14
[15] Dakin, 1973. p.22
[16] Dakin, 1973. p.22-23
[17] Dakin, 1973. p.23

always begins with the emergence and spread of the 'westernised' school of thought. But if this was the desire of 'Oversees Greeks', then what was the desire of the 'Greeks in Greece'? On this topic the scholarship is more thinly spread but a broad consensus here has still been reached.

St. Claire -albeit briefly- discussed this camp's actions in 1821 as being borne of *"the simple wish to vent religious hatred which inspired the Greeks in Greece* [to revolt].*"*[18] The point is articulated more clearly by Roudometof, who wrote:

> *"Since the 'Greeks' constituted a group scattered widely over Ottoman territory and since, for the peasantry, it was religious identity that counted ("Greeks" versus "Latins" or "Turks"), the goal… [of the revolutionary conspiracy was] to create a Balkan Orthodox Christian movement…. prior to the 1821 revolution the names "Hellene," "Hellas," and "Hellenic" existed in literary discourse but had not yet prevailed in common discourse… it was religious and not ethnic solidarity that shaped the popular attitude vis-à-vis the revolt"[19]*

In his conclusion Roudometof clarified this statement, writing: "*during the Ottoman period, Christians may have desired their liberation from Ottoman rule, but this was a religious and not a national dream of liberation."*[20] To Roudometof (and the wider scholarship) the identity of the traditionalist camp of the Greek literati and of the average illiterate and insulated Greek, was that of a 'Roman' and, in his view (and that of the scholarship), this 'Roman' identity was a pan-Rum Millet identity: a religious ideal based upon the feelings of a shared membership of the Orthodox faith. Again, this view is commonly accepted in the wider scholarship to be accurate.

Miller highlights the way in which the division in motivation and identity is depicted in the scholarship as being one of overseas Greeks on one hand -who by-and-large kept their hands clean) and the Greeks in Greece who carried out the grim business of the revolution. In drawing the comparison he comments that the Greeks in Greece were not acting out of a national ideal and were rather revolting out of religious motivations: implying that the

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[18] St. Claire, 1972. p.30
[19] Roudometof, V. 1998. *From Rum Millet to Greek Nation: Enlightenment, Secularization, and National Identity in Ottoman Balkan Society, 1453-1821.* In the Journal of Modern Greek Studies, Vol 16, No.1 p.31
[20] Roudometof, 1998. p.34

westernised Hellenists, on the other hand, were being moved by notions of a 'national consciousness'. He wrote:

> *"The Philhellene idea was, in profane reality, strongly underwritten and propagandized for by the Greek middle-class mercantile elite in diaspora, and by intellectual inspirers of the revolution like Adamantios Korais, men who were never directly involved in the fighting. In marked contrast, the Greek population on the ground, and a fortiori the commanders of the irregular (klephtic or guerrilla) bands who did do the fighting, acted from religious motives more than from any sense of national identity; their great dream was to Romaiko, the rebirth of the old 'Roman' domination, meaning the expulsion of the Moslem Turk and the recovery of an imperial political glory, with its renewed golden capital not in old pagan Athens but in Holy Constantinople... This millenarian Romaic-Orthodox vision was modified considerably as the war went on, not least because the shrewder Greek commanders and revolutionaries saw how well the Philhellene idea, and the propaganda friendly to a new Hellas, served them and sold abroad."*[21]

Such is the usual representation of the motivations and identity of the 'Greeks on the ground' who desired 'to Romaiko' (the resurrection of the Byzantine State) rather than a regenerated Hellas. Yet, despite this aspiration being centred around the desire to bring about the re-establishment of a temporal state -albeit an utterly Christian one- this has been repeatedly defined as a) a religious ideal and b) as a non-national ideal. the historiographical agreement outlined above can therefore be summarised as:

> The literati classes were -largely- acting out of a westernised and modernist Hellenist mindset which, by 1821, remained elusive to a) the more 'traditional' Orthodox members of the social elite and b) to the insulated and illiterate classes of Greeks in the Balkans (who made up the majority of the population and the majority of the revolution's forces). These peoples were defining themselves as 'Romans' -meaning Orthodox Christian- and rebelling more out of religious motivation than liberal, 'national', or neo-Hellenic sentiments and aspirations.

Although the historiography has -broadly speaking- separated the identity and the motivations of the Greeks in 1821 between those influenced by western ideas on one hand and those acting more out of religious identity on the other the reality was that the

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[21] Miller, Dean. A. 2000. *The epic hero*. United Kingdom: Johns Hopkins University Press. p.22

boundary was rather porous. In the course of the thesis below it will become evident that very few Greeks abandoned their Orthodox faith completely and that the ideas from the west (some more than others) slowly began to filter down to the 'Greeks in Greece'. Meanwhile the ideas of the 'Greeks in Greece' can be evidenced to have either 'filtered up' to the literati classes, westernised or otherwise, or to have never been completely abandoned by them in the first place. Indeed, it will be a recurring theme of this thesis that we often encounter a synthesis between the Byzantine and Hellenic identities and ideals, a finding which flies in the face of the above excerpt from Toynbee that opened this discussion.

Before detailing the outlines of the arguments to be put forward in this thesis it should be noted that there are further layers of scholarly investigation regarding the motivations of these illiterate and insulated peoples. St. Claire discussed the self-serving nature of some elites' decisions to throw in their lot with the insurgents. [22] Sperber presented the motivations of the warbands of the Greeks in Greece to join the rebellion in a similar light when he claimed that *"the uprising found favour with many of the highland chieftains who promptly joined the rebellion, as it seemed to offer unprecedented opportunities for looting and pillaging".*[23] Such perceptions portray the motivations of the average illiterate and insulated Greek insurrectionist to be merely concerned with self-centred desire (in stark comparison to the idealist and identity driven desires of the literati Greeks). Such A presentation locks any discussion of the ideals and identity of the 'average participants' out of the historiographical debate. Meanwhile, other scholars pursuing a similarly materialist line of inquiry have also investigated the material desires and motivations of the Greek rebels. Hupchick -rather fairly, it should be said- summarised said materialist motivations for both the emerging liberal mercantile classes as well as the peasantry:

> *"secularist merchants longed for the benefits and stability of liberal constitutional rule, technological development, and infrastructural improvement along western European lines. The secularists were joined by numerous illiterate peasants, who proved highly receptive to [...] calls for throwing off oppressive landowners and acquiring their own land."*[24]

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[22] St. Claire, 1972. p.22
[23] Sperber, Jonathon. 2000. *Revolutionary Europe*. Malaysia: Pearson Education. p.346
[24] Hupchick, D. P. 2002. *The Balkans, From Constantinople To Communism.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p.220

The land question alluded to above has provided some interesting discussion on the extent to which the desire to own their own land provided a powerful enough push factor to cause the lower classes to revolt.[25] The extent to which the Greeks acted out of frustration over relative depravation and out of class-consciousness in the 19th Century is an on-going debate. The object of this discussion is primarily going to be focussing on questions of identity and so material push and pull factors will largely lay outwith the scope of this thesis' argument.[26]

Part II: A new line of inquiry

The position taken here is not a revisionist one. It is not the intention of this examination to prove that the scholarship summarised above is wrong. Rather, in the chapters to come, I present the case that the scholarship so far is simply missing a piece of the proverbial puzzle. It just so happens that, in my surmising, said piece is of major importance. Thus far in the scholarship the identity of the vast majority of the Greeks has been understudied. It has either been ignored, represented as being submissive to that of the intelligentsia discussed above, or simply categorised as religious (and not categorizable as a form of national consciousness) and subsequently set to one side for the scholarship to focus on the topic most familiar -and most related- to the west. In shining so much light on the turning of the Greeks towards a newly imported ideal of Hellenism, however, a shadow has been cast upon the identity and desires which pushed the majority of the insurrectionists into action, and which were already extant in Greece long before any Grecophone merchant picked up a copy of enlightenment theory.

This, it should be said, should come as no surprise. Naturally, historians will focus more on the written record and, ergo, the scholarship will more reflect the world according to the

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[25] See McGrew, William. W. 1976, *The Land Issue In The Greek War of Independence*. In Diamandouros, N. Anton, J.P, Petropoulos, J.A. and Topping, P. eds. 1976, *Hellenism And The First Greek War of Liberations (1821-30): Continuity and Change.* Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki. p. 111-130

[26] That being said, I would like to point out that it could be surmised that identity facilitates the means by which material grievances can be vented. We see this to be the case with Hupchick's 'secularist merchants' whose identity, it can be broadly agreed, became Hellenised in the same process that they became politically secularised and liberalised. So if the mercantile classes were acting out of materialist grievances said materialists grievances were being expressed within the framework of a national (Hellenic) consciousness. The same pattern, therefore, could surely be said to have happened with the lower classes of 'Greeks in Greece'? The only difference is that the peasant classes would be expressing their material grievances though a framework which, by acceptance of the scholarly consensus previously discussed, was not (as was the case with the mercantile classes) formed around notions of a neo-Hellenic 'nationality' but, in my view here, a Byzantinist one.

literati. History is, after all, not only written by the victors: but also, by those who can actually write. And it is written for those who can read. It is natural, therefore, to encounter a version of the story more familiar to that particular caste of people's views and experienced to be found in the historiography. Indeed, it is possible that this particular issue of the study and recoding of history is precisely to blame for the lack of coverage of 'insulated and illiterate' Greek's motivations to rebel. The western travellers and the Greek diaspora treated the peasantry and their priests with patronising prejudice at best, and outright hatred at worst. It is only to be expected, therefore, that 'the Greeks in Greece' would be misrepresented in the primary sources that emerged from their writings (some of which are blatantly elitist). These sources, it must be remembered, have, in turn, informed the scholarship that has been outlined above. It may be, useful to -briefly- showcase some examples of this poor treatment. Olga Augustinos, in her research, found that travel writers -French travel writers in particular- often treated the local Greeks they encountered as *"shadows in their own land"*,[27] meaning, that they barely mentioned them or recorded any interactions with them because said travellers were in Greece to see classical remnants, not to interact with the Modern Greeks who were often depicted (if depicted at all) as 'degenerates', as Angelomatis-Tsourgakis so often found in her research of western travel writing on Ottoman Greece. For example, she found numerous cases of the 'Greeks in Greece' being depicted as degenerate, often for the simple sin of having no classical knowledge: and more often than not the clergy (and especially the lower clergy) were blamed and despised for cultivating this unfavourable situation.[28] Lord Byron, meanwhile, was quoted by Parry as praising -quite patronisingly- the Greek peasantry for being the redeeming quality of the nation due to their hardiness and their good qualities (humility and honesty).[29] Millingen, meanwhile, recorded that the Greeks who had travelled were the first to ridicule the clergy.[30] This blatant disregard for the thoughts and opinions of the lower castes among the 'Greeks in Greece' is quite likely to have affected the perception, representation, and study of said people's motivations to rebel in 1821: and to have skewed the narrative so as to showcase the 'Greeks in Greece' to either be acting in concert with the lofty ideals of their more westernised compatriots or to be acting out of 'baser'

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[27] Augustinos, O. 1994. *French odysseys : Greece in French travel literature from the Renaissance to the romantic era.* United Kingdom: Johns Hopkins University Press. p.193

[28] Angelomatis-Tsougarakis. Helen.1990. *The Eve of the Greek revivial*. London: Routledge Routledge. p.84-92

[29] Parry, William. 1825. *The Last Days of Lord Byron: With His Lordship's Opinions On Various Subjects Particularly On The State And Prospects of Greece*. London: Knight and Lacey. p.126 Retrieved from http://lordbyron.cath.lib.vt.edu/contents.php?doc=WiParry.1825.Contents (Last accessed 12/12/2014).

[30] Millingen, Julius. 1831. *Memoirs Of The Affairs Of Greece.* London: John Rodwell. p.171 Retrieved from http://lordbyron.cath.lib.vt.edu/contents.php?doc=JuMilli.1831.Contents (last accessed 12/12/2014)

motivations such as the desire to vent religious hatred or to appropriate some loot for themselves.

One would also naturally expect western historians to do just what they have done on this topic: focus on the western aspect of the revolt (modern and/or romantic nationalism) and on the role of liberalism. If one were to read the history of the Greek Revolution as presented in English histories and then read the story of any other revolt from the age of revolutions the same story unfolds with different characters and place names. The basic plot line being: the emergence of a reading public who are bombarded with new and exciting ideas; the activities of a handful of proto-revolutionary thinkers who, long after their untimely death, inspire later thinkers and insurrectionists; the incompatibility between the status quo and the new socio-economic landscape; and, lastly, the eventual spark which erupts into a flame. Roughly speaking that story reflects the scholarly representation of almost every 'liberal revolution' between 1776 and 1848.

The Greek revolution has, in effect, been made to fit an already familiar story. It just so happens that this has been achieved via the amputation of important information. Let us remember that Dakin pointed out that only two percent of the Greeks were members of the intelligentsia and many of them were traditionalists, abroad throughout the war, uninterested in the revolt, or kept their hands clean despite their sympathy. The 'average Greeks', the people who did the lion's share of the fighting, killing, and dying on the other hand have left behind a relatively thin written record and so we are left with no choice but to strain to hear what their voices are whispering to us through the ages while the voices of their literati contemporaries are shouting. Once identified those whispers, although easily drowned out by the noise on their own, speak volumes as a collective. Their evidence, circumstantial threads on their won, combine to create an additional panel in the tapestry of modern Greek history. However, it should be noted here that due to the relatively scant written evidence left behind by the 'Greeks in Greece', the few pieces of evidence that does speak to the mindset of the 'average Greek' will be repeatedly examined in the following chapters.

To be clear, it is the position here that by painting the 1821 revolt as being the result of the intrigues of the diaspora and of the social, economic, and intellectual renaissance of the

Greeks of the Ottoman Empire (which was also courtesy of the diaspora) no error has been made whatsoever. This was certainly a major factor. The point of departure between this research and said 'broad scholarly consensus' lies in the following: to attribute the feelings and desires of the literati and westernised to the illiterate and traditionalist; and to ignore the latter camp completely, or to simply define their motivations as 'religious' is an approach which does not withstand the pressure of deeper investigation. This 'point of departure' is informed by the research (which I will outline in this thesis) which has uncovered and examined evidence that the Greek liberation movement was:

a) Not unique to the Balkan enlightenment, rather it was sustained throughout the Tourkokratia by the presence and influence of a Roman identity and ideal. And, even if this was not the case in reality, many of the revolutionaries still saw their acts of rebellion as simply being the latest manoeuvres of a protracted peoples' struggle against a foreign occupier (The Sultan).

b) That said Roman identity and ideal pre-dates the emergence of neo-Hellenism and that it was this identity -which I refer to as 'Byzantinism'- which the average Greek (the illiterate and the insulated peoples who made up the backbone of the rebellion) held to in 1821. Further, it was the identity and ideal which the westernised Greeks of 1821 had possessed prior to the Neo-Hellenisaiton process and, by 1821, this Byzantinism was usually just synthesised with the newer Neo-Hellenism rather than being usurped by it in the minds of those who supported the Neo-Hellenic cause.

c) That the Roman identity and ideal cannot solely be categorised as a religious sentiment (therefore justifying my use of 'Byzantinism' as a term which encapsulates the religious and the political nuances of the Roman's ideas of themselves and their destiny).

d) And that, by extension, the identity which drove thousands to take up arms to achieve 'to Romaiko' can be categorised as a form of national consciousness. This research, in turn, offers fresh contribution towards the current argument between the modernists and essentialist camps of nationalism theory (a contribution in favour of the latter).

This Byzantine identity, I showcase here, was one based not only on Orthodoxy (which, albeit was a major feature) but on the collective memory of citizenship of the Greek-dominated Orthodox Roman Empire. I also show here how, throughout the Tourkokratia, this State was popularly believed to merely be in a God-ordained hiatus (and ergo destined to return).

It should be reiterated here that this Roman identity, I argue, was not one which was at odds with Hellenism. In fact, I present evidence below which suggests that Hellenism blended with this pre-existing ideal and identity. Previous scholars have examined how such a Byzantinism -as well as being the prevalent identity among the average Greek- was also a common ideal among the 'Traditionalist' members of the Greek Orthodox intelligentsia. The scholarly examinations here have more specifically been geared towards an analysis of the actions and subtle desires of the Phanariotes to bring about a revitalised Byzantium (in their own image) via appropriation of the Ottoman Empire's administration and apparatus. Even more specifically this is often focussed on the Phanariot rule in the Danubian Principalities.[31] Although this examination is more concerned with the mindset of the people who carried out the gruesome task of the rebellion of 1821, this analysis will inevitably include some examination of these Byzantinists. A conscious effort will be made here, however, to avoid tilling too much soil which previous scholars have already ploughed and so the majority of the focus will be on 'the Greeks in Greece', the 'insulated and illiterate' Greeks rather than the conservative and traditionalist branches of the Greek reading public. Similarly, this thesis, having outlined the reality that is the prime role of the diaspora in the review of the scholarship provided above, will not dedicate any more space to exploring the motivations of the diaspora, the literati, and/or the westernised (given that they enjoy the lion's share of the pages within the 'broad scholarly consensus' so far). What this thesis *will* do, however, is use sources from these camps when they shed light on the identity and ideals of 'the Greeks in Greece' and when they shed light upon the extent to which Hellenism and Byzantinism became synthesised within the mindset of even the most westernised of the Greeks. Very few of them, after all, abandoned the Orthodox faith entirely.

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[31] See Iorga, Nicolae. 1971, *Byzance après Byzance: Continuation de l'Histoire de la vie Byzantine*. Romania: Association Internationale d'Études du Sud-Est Européen, Comitée National Roumain.

The solely religious interpretation (discussed above) of what the appellation 'Roman' meant to the Greeks in the early 19th Century is not confined to the analysis of the aforementioned evidence from Roudometof or St. Claire. This is also what Toynbee meant by 'the Orthodox' in the opening excerpt of this thesis (in his work he conflated 'the Orthodox' with the 'heritage' of Byzantium.) [32] On one hand, to conflate the Byzantine Empire's legacy with the Orthodox Church is unhelpful, yet on the other -for the purposes of this analysis specifically- it is quite useful.

'Unhelpful' because it largely ignores the rest of that Empire's artefacts which former citizens inherited (artefacts which the Greeks of the early 19th Century knew to be of Byzantine provenance). This, in turn, has allowed a vacuum to form in the scholarship which has been taken up by the obsession of what western thought brought to the proverbial table. 'Useful', on the other hand, because conflating the legacy of such a real and political entity as the Byzantine Empire with 'religion', Orthodoxy in particular (and, often, the Orthodox institution), sets a precedent in the scholarship for part of my argument below that -to the Greeks of the early 19th Century themselves- 'Orthodoxy' and 'civic' identity were seen as so intricately intertwined that they should not be -and that, indeed, they cannot effectively be- separated in our present-day analysis. On this (in the next chapter) I put forward the case that the notion of a divide between the religious and the secular did not exist in the mindset of the average Greek at the time.[33] Ergo, for the scholarship to be content to label the average Greeks as acting out of religious motivation half my point has already been made; all that is left to do is to show how said religious motivations were intricately connected to feelings of belonging to an Orthodox polity.

Another way in which this usual portrayal is helpful is regarding one of the foundations the scholarship has already laid; a foundation upon which this argument depends. This foundation is the consensus that the 'Roman' identity was the extant identity of the Greeks throughout the Tourkokratia and that, subsequently, it was the more prevalent sentiment among the 'more traditionalist Greeks' and the 'more illiterate and insulated Greeks'. Regarding the scholarship, this is not a controversial statement in and of itself and so this

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[32] *Toynbee, 1981. p.*136-154

[33] This should not be seen as a far-fetched conclusion: after all the notion of a religious-secular dichotomy has a similar western and enlightenment provenance to both the liberal political ideas motivating the Greek intelligentsia and the 'Hellenising myth'. If notions of Hellenism and understanding of national and liberal politics had not yet filtered down to the illiterates and the insulated of the Ottoman Balkans in 1821 -as per the broad scholarly understanding- then why would we expect notions of the division (or, indeed, the divisibility) of 'Church and State' to have done so?

will be relatively straightforward. The difficulty comes with the more original aspect of this thesis' contribution to the scholarship: that the historical identity of 'Roman' was not confined to sentiment of shared Orthodoxy but also manifested itself in the form of political ideal and feelings of a pre-determined political destiny. The logical next step from such a conclusion would be that the Roman ideal and identity can be seen as a form of national consciousness. Indeed, said 'step' is taken here.

If this argument proves to be well founded, among the ramifications would be the likelihood that said Byzantinism was not just *a* contributing factor to the motivations to revolt against the Sultan's rule. Rather, instead of being 'less of a factor' or 'on par with neo-Hellenism', it is possible that this 'Byzantinism' -due to being the ideal and identity most of the revolt's participants adhered to in 1821- was *the* principal factor and theme which pushed the Greeks into rebellion against the Porte. Thus, contra to what Toynbee's excerpt said at the opening of this thesis, this thesis' argument would suggest that, had the Greeks actually been presented with a choice between their revolution leading to Hellas on one hand, or to Byzantium on the other, the road to 'Rome' would bear the majority of the traffic. Indeed, to continue with the analogy of a 'fork-in-the-road', the argument made here is that in several ways these two paths converged to such an extent that the end destination was a synthesis of both: as the old saying goes, 'all roads lead to Rome'. Such a conclusion would require a re-editing of the broad scholarly consensus as laid out above. Histories covering the Greek revolution would be required to include the power and the ubiquitous-ness of the pre-existing Byzantinism among the Greeks as well as the arrival of liberal ideals and the *"return of the ancient Hellenes"*.

Part III: Synopsis, sources and method

Before going deeper into the analysis, it is necessary here to make a few brief notes on sources and methodology. The first note is to highlight the decision I have taken to standardise the spelling of non-English words to avoid confusion. The fact that this is required highlights a major issue in the research: translation and mistranslation. In quotes I have left the lettering as the quoted author penned it.

Throughout the historiography of modern Greece not only the spelling of certain words or terms, but the terms themselves have been translated into a standardised framework which,

although done with best intentions, has muddied the waters. Some standardisation has been necessary: the Greeks of 1821 spoke -and wrote in- several different dialects and foreign observers wrote the words they heard in different ways. However, some words have been translated into the modern equivalent and this has brought problems of mistranslation and dilution of nuance and context.

The prime example of this issue is, in fact, directly linked to the central theme of this thesis. Often the words corresponding to Roman territory (Roumeli), a Roman person (Romaio), and the Roman language (Romaika), have been translated into the modern equivalents: the Hellas, Hellene, and Hellenic respectively. For example, in the translation of Righas' war song *Thourios*, the stanza: *"Bulgarians, Albanians, Armenians and Romans… for freedom the sword let us all gird, and everyone should hear that brave we will be"* is often mistranslated in that the term 'Romans' has been modified to 'Hellenes' as that is the modern equivalent of the term 'Romans' as it was used at the time.[34] However this translation dilutes the nuance and context of the song and can lead to significant confusion. Righas used the term Roman deliberately, as we shall see, to invoke the feelings of the lower classes. When he wrote for a more educated and westernised audience he used 'Hellene'. So to translate 'Roman' to 'Hellene' not only dilutes, it erases entirely this important distinction that played into Righas' hand as he penned his works.

This thesis, as a necessary step towards accomplishing the core objective, highlights these issues of mistranslation and dilution and attempts to rectify them. In order to do this I have, where possible, returned to original copies of the primary source material: copies unaffected by translation, linguistic purges (katheravousa), or standardisation. I have translated these myself. Thankfully, in the case of one of the main sources I use here, -the memoirs of General Makriyannis- the original wording has been preserved in its entirety due to its importance as a piece of ethnography. It is such a valuable artefact of writing in the Greek vernacular of the time that even Makriyannis' spelling mistakes have even been preserved. Often I have used works that have been translated by other authors: but only

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[34] Righas, Velestinlis. 1797, *Thourios*. Vienna. Reproduced in Karaberopoulos, D. Ed. And Zervoulakos, Z.K. Trans. 2002. *Revolutionary Scripts*. Athens: Scientific Society of Studies Pheres-Velestino-Rhigas. Digitised at http://www.karaberopoulos.gr/en/books-rigas/rhigas-velestinlis-revolutionary-scripts/. (Last accessed 15/05/2020).

after consulting the original texts myself to make sure the translation is sound (such is the case with Kolokotrones' memoirs which are also used extensively).

Other than eye-witness accounts and the memoirs of notable figures I have tried to examine the culture of the Greeks themselves. Part of this examination is aided by foreign observations, but this has been taken with a critical eye: there are many incidences of exaggeration, invention, politicisation and exoticisation in the writings of Westerners on Greece and the Ottoman Empire at that time. A particularly recurring theme, for example, is the utter disdain western observers have for the Greek clergy due to their perception that it was this caste of Greeks that were holding the Greeks back from being worthy of their classical heritage. Meanwhile, despite the fact that Greek priests were often peasants who toiled in the fields alongside their flocks, the same travel writers heap patronising praise upon the peasantry as being the salt of the earth. However, the travel writings have often identified details which were not well recorded by the Greeks themselves due to them being a mundane or everyday reality. To the outside perspective of the western travellers this information was novel and noteworthy and so the information has, thankfully, been preserved. A number of western observers, such as Millingen and Howe, made observations about religious ceremonies that I have only found to be recorded in writings such as theirs: Greeks haves simply not recorded that it was customary to bless oneself or bow to an icon of the virgin a dozen times each morning because it was simply the done thing and there was no point in putting pen to paper to record such an every day occurrence. But the likes of Millingen and Howe -protestants both- found such activities noteworthy enough to record them.[35]

However, in order to gain as full an appreciation for the average person's mindset in the Southern Balkans at the time I have also examined the products of their culture and society: their tales and songs, their popular culture, their icons and artwork, and their material artefacts (where they have survived). Such examinations and translations have not been without their inherent problems. This is not unique to this research and is an issue for all historians and anthropologists. With each new layer of historiography, try as we may to be objective, we find that more and more subconscious bias has been smuggled into the

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[35] See Howe, Samuel. G. 1828. *An Historical Sketch of The Greek Revolution.* New York: White, Gallagher and White. Or Millingen. 1831.

discussion. We cannot escape our own context: we cannot help viewing the sources of the past through our modern eyes. One particular issue in this regard is the tendency to assume that a separation of the secular and the religious -as is common in the Western weltanschauung today- existed also within the culture and period under examination. This is simply because this notion is so common, and felt to be so natural, in modern western academia. Thanks to the works of anthropologists and religious studies scholars -particularly of the Constructivist School- we know that such a dichotomy is not necessarily found across all cultures and eras. Indeed, the school of religious studies has provided several comprehensive cases for such a binary being a very modern -and a very western European- invention. This issue is relevant to this research because, as has been previously mentioned, examination of the Roman identity of the Greeks in 1821 tends to stop at religion. This, in my view, fails to consider that the existence of a religious-secular dichotomy is far from 'a given' in vernacular Greek discourse of the early 19th Century and that, therefore, it is actually the case that said 'Roman identity' is as political as it was religious (this is the central theme of the discussion in the following chapter).

One serious issue when attempting to analyse the mindset of the Greeks of 1821 is widespread illiteracy. The life experiences of the literate and the illiterate were so different that we cannot expect the illiterate's experiences or ideals to be accurately recorded by their better-educated compatriots (many of whom spent considerable periods of time outside of Greece). Varying degrees of education, westernisation, travel, and life experience as well as differences in dialect, ideals, and identity mean this 'minefield' needs to be navigated carefully by the examiner. Examining the pieces of popular culture that have survived to this day is one good step to take in any attempt to garner an understanding of said popular culture. Going further I have also analysed the revolutionary symbols (themselves often containing recurring tropes). The hope here is that one can uncover as much -if not more- of an understanding of an illiterate population by analysing the banners and symbols under which they fought and died as one can by reading what a foreign observer has written about them. The thinking behind this is that if these are the symbols one would create and hoist before going on to fight, kill and die beneath then said symbols should, logically, reflect the mindset of the participants (in as far as *the cause* was concerned).

The historiography of the Greek War of Independence has, as has been stated, been dominated by examination of the diaspora, the mercantile class, the literati, the westernised, and the Neo-Hellene (and usually they are all considered as a singular group, which makes sense as it was possible, and indeed common, to be all of these at the same time). This is simply because the vast majority of the paper trail in the historical record has been left by this caste of Greeks. What this research is interested in, as has been stated, is an examination of the national consciousness of the Greeks in Greece. The sources selected, therefore, are dedicated to that purpose. Where the sources of the literati Greeks are used, they are used because they had an influence or because they possibly reflect the mindset of 'the Greeks in Greece' (such as Righas, who did most of his writing in France and Austria).

This thesis acknowledges the huge importance of the diaspora to the revolution; but that contribution essentially saturates the historiography of the revolution. It is a matter of historical acceptance that the diaspora and the 'Greeks in Greece' had wildly different visions and ideas about their nation (as has been shown earlier). This thesis, therefore, uses said acceptance as a foundation and explores, from there, whether or not the representation the 'Greeks in Greece' -the insulated and illiterate Greeks who would not have travelled or understood the writings of those who did even if they could read it- is accurate in the historiography. As has been said it was these Greeks who actually brought about an independent Greek State, and as has also been said, this thesis will evidence that they have been misrepresented in the same texts that dedicate chapter after chapter to the writers and thinkers who stayed behind their desks while their illiterate compatriots carried out the revolution.

Before I move on to present a synopsis of the argument to come (which I will present alongside a more detailed exploration of the sources and methods I employed in order to formulate the argument), it would be prudent to highlight particular tactic I have employed in this thesis: mutual corroboration. Some of the evidence to be presented below which speaks to the 'Greeks in Greece' acting out of Byzantine national consciousness is blatant. Some of it is not so blatant. Taken as a whole it is my hope that each line of inquiry, being intricately connected (in that they all speak to the self-perception of the 'Greeks in Greece'), shore each other up to withstand the weight of counter-argument. The weaker lines of inquiry, (weak simply because of the nature of the sources), when threaded to

together with the more blatant 'smoking guns', form a chord which can hold the weight of the argument.

In the next chapter I put forward the case that in the vernacular discourse of the Greeks of the early 19th Century there existed little-to-no concept of a separation of the religious spheres of life with the non-religious. This allows for the argument to be made that a 'Roman' in 1821 cannot be wholly categorised as a 'religious identity' for this argument allows for the possibility that the Roman religion, the Roman fatherland, and the Roman people were seen at the time as being intertwined and inseparable yet, at the same time, as limited (the Romans had a clear boundary, for there were non-Roman people living in non-Roman lands). A key aspect of this discussion is an examination of the extent to which 'Church and State' were still married in the independent Greek state, despite the influence of western liberalism and secularism. The first half of this particular chapter is largely one which engages with the theories of the School of 'Religious Studies'. As the chapter moves on to the presentation of evidence form the Greek cases in respect of this theoretical debate, I employ a number of primary sources. These are: the various constitutions of the new Greek State and those of the Ionian Isles; the memoirs of General Makriyannis (which are used a lot in this thesis); and the 'Revolutionary Scripts' that Righas produced in the last years of the 18th Century. The latter two are used so often here that I will dedicate a section to them at the end of this synopsis. The constitutions are used in order to demonstrate the relationship between the religious and the secular institutions in the constitutional history of Greek independence. Thankfully, as these sources constitute an important aspect of the history of the Greek state, they have been well preserved and digitised. One potential limitation of these sources is that they are written, usually, by and for westernised Greeks. This, however, lends strength to the analysis for, even if the secularised and westernised Greeks wrote a relationship between Church and State into the fabric of their state, then this in itself implies that which I argue: it is not possible to separate 'religion' and 'secular' in this context. Even if there were individuals who contested: the fact these sources look and read they way they do implies that the Greek population (for the governance of whom these sources were drafted) would not have -by-and-large- found themselves within the camps of those who had protested. I have gained access to, and read these articles in their original format and translated them myself. The method of source interpretation relies, itself, upon the implications of these articles: basically if an article in the constitution creates a link between religion and state, I take this

as evidence for the existence of said link in the minds of its' creators or, at least, in the minds of the people in general.

Following on from the platform I establish in the opening chapter of the main argument, the next chapter seeks to track the meaning and the evolution of the terms 'Roman' and 'Hellene'. The object of this section is to show that 'Roman' could be used to refer to a people, a faith, and a temporal state. Meanwhile this section also highlights how 'Hellene' came to be adopted as an appellation meaning 'heroes' by the fighters of the revolution (thus throwing doubt upon the extent to which these largely illiterate and insulated Greeks had abandoned their Byzantinism in favour of Hellenism). From here the discussion will focus on how official state-sponsored definitions of 'Hellene' intersected with previous definitions of 'Roman'. The implications are two-fold here: firstly, it would imply that the Greeks were seeing themselves as Roman in 1821 and were therefore rebelling out of Roman grievances and desires. Second it implies that although the appellation changed to 'Hellene', the identity of the Greeks remained largely unchanged. The sources that I make use of in this section of the argument are overwhelmingly concerned with the use (and contextual meaning) of the terminologies 'Roman' and 'Hellene'. Once again the constitutions, the memoirs of Makriyannis, and the 'Revolutionary Scripts' of Righas are used. In addition to these, I make use of the various revolutionary proclamations that were issued in the opening phases of the war; folk songs; and some of the writings of Greek thinkers who were engaged in the evolving debate at the time over what a 'Roman' or a 'Hellene' was. Thanks to the rigorous ongoing investigations into the Greek language question (the role the Greek language played in the formation of national identity, and the way it was then used by the Greek state) most of these sources have been well used in historiography: especially in the works of Mackridge. [36] The method here is one of comparative analysis: I seek out the uses of key words and translate the sections I find them in in order to find the context. This, in turn, allows me to interpret the way in which the term was used by different authors. This also allows me to interpret the meaning the author applied to the term itself and, at times, why that particular term was selected by the author (for example, it will be shown that Righas used Roman to address the lower classes

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[36] See Mackridge Peter. 2008. *Aspects of language and identity in the Greek Peninsula since the eigthennth century.* https://www.farsarotul.org/nl29_1.htm#_ftn9 (Last accessed 21/7/2018), Mackridge, Peter. 2010. *Language and National Identity in Greece, 1766-1976.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. and Mackridge, Peter. 2014. *The Ionian Islands: Aspects of their History and Culture.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

of Grecophones, but Hellenes to address the upper classes). In regards to the various revolutionary proclamations: these have been analysed in the knowledge that they were usually authored by and for -or, at least, heavily influenced by- westernised Greeks. They were also often authored for the international audience and so these have been taken as a form of propaganda. Within these lines of propaganda or mission statements, however, the undertones of the national story have been spotted: in essence, how the Greeks viewed - and how they chose to represent- the story of their struggle. This is what is interpreted from the sources by asking: 'why did they say it like this? Proclamations are carefully scripted, so the message must be deliberate, so what is the message, and how does that message shed light on the question of the thesis?

The third chapter in this examination then turns its' attention to the heterogeneity of the Romans in an attempt to explore the bonds that bound the Greeks together in 1821. This is done with the intention of showing that a common faith was not the only adhesive and that there was, once again, a clear supralocal -Byzantinist- identity among the Romans meaning 'Roman' was an appellation to which some -but not all- Orthodox Christians of the Ottoman Empire belonged; or, at least, to which some Orthodox subjects felt they belonged to more -or less- than others. This section also explores the reasons why said co-Orthodox people did or did not opt to throw their lot in with the rebellious Greeks (again, arriving at the same conclusion of there existing an additional element of a feeling of some form of Byzantine nationhood). A third aspect of this section is a review of the imperialist and chauvinistic elements inherent within the Roman identity (in that it was swayed towards Grecophones). This particular theme is explored with the intention of reviewing the possibility that such chauvinism could be a hangover of an imperial identity: a memory of being a dominant people of an Empire. The logic here is that it appears that Roman identity was deeply fractured and heterogenous yet, also, served to align a mixed conglomerate of peoples (principally this being Orthodox Albanians, Hellenised non-Greeks, and the various Grecophone 'ethnies') under the dual banner of Cross and State. crucially, however, these were always specifically a Greek Cross, and a Greek State. The first thing that should be said about this section is that it relies, heavily, upon the exceptional research carried out by Angelomatis-Tsourgakis on the western travel writer's records of what they found when they arrived in Greece. She encountered numerous occasions when said writers would record observations (often corroborating each other) on the peoples of the Balkans (the Albanians and the Vlachs in particular). As Angelomatis-

Tsourgakis' research was dedicated to travel writings that give insight into the state of Greece prior to 1821, I have sought to supplement this understanding with the records of western travellers who went to Greece during the War itself. Here I analysed what these Philhellenes had to say about the situation in Greece. Strength is added to accuracy of their statements -not only because they are eye-witnesses- but because often what they recorded flew in the face of the cause for which they were fighting. I also make use here of the records of revolutionary fighters themselves, namely Kolokotrones (his autobiography) and, once again, the memoirs of Makriyannis. Kolokotrones' autobiography has been translated into English but I also analysed it in its original Greek. The autobiography was written long after the war and Kolokotrones clearly aimed at painting his chequered history in a more positive light. However, again, strength is lent to the accuracy of his statements by virtue of the fact that what he has to say on the diversity of Greece seems to contradict the idea of a Greek nationalism. The very self-aware record he leaves on ignorance of other parts of Greece, for example, is taken as accurate evidence for there appears to be no reason for it to be fabricated (indeed, it would be more plausible for him to fabricate the existence of a notion of widespread feelings of compatriotism among the Greeks).

Doubling down on the concept of the Greeks belonging to a bygone Empire waiting to return I then turn the attention of the discussion towards exploring the millenarian oral traditions of the Greeks in the following chapter. Here the point is, once again, to show how 'Roman' was an appellation which applied to a people bound together not by religion alone but by feelings of a shared citizenship of a temporal state in hiatus (albeit said State being seen as the earthly reflection of the Kingdom of Heaven). These millenarian expectations of a Roman restoration, it is argued, served to foster a civic element within the Roman identity throughout the Tourkokratia. By extension it is argued here that these traditions, feelings, and expectations speak to the existence of a Roman national ideal and consciousness which must have served as a major motivation behind the rebels' decisions to take up arms, not only in 1821, but in the various uprisings and revolts which predated that fateful watermark in the history of Greek resistance to Ottoman rule. The existence of millenarian prophecies -particularly concerning the deliverance of Constantinople -and, therefore, of liberation from the Turkish yolk- is well accepted in the historiography. It is also well accepted that these prophecies were widely believed long before, and long after the War of Independence itself. Seeking to explore more deeply these prophecies,

extensive use is made of the prophecies of Father Kosmas in the late 18th Century in this section. Father Kosmas is not the only one who left a record of millenarian prophecies of 'to Romaiko', however. Righas published the prophecies of the 13th Century mystic Agathangelos (which appear to be starkly similar to that of Father Kosmas) in Vienna in 1795 and a copy was published in Missolonghi in 1824 (with further copies being published in Greece in the late 1830's).[37] However, I have been unable to find a copy of these prophecies in a reliable format. However, I have managed to find Kosmas' prophecies in a reliable medium, having been compiled and published by Church historians using the small archives of local churches in Greece and Albania. So, between the ubiquitous acceptance that these prophecies existed in the historiography, and the fact that church historians have found these prophecies in their archives, I have enough cause to accept them as being accurate enough. I should also say that the appear strikingly similar to other records of prophecies, and they are even more strikingly similar to each other (there are a number of compilations of his prophecies). The important thing to note here is that these records were not written by Kosmas himself. It appears they were either written down by people who listened to his sermons in various places; or that they were later collected and recorded from an oral tradition that had sprung up in his wake. The similarity mentioned above is which makes me, as a researcher, confident that they are accurate.

From here the discussion turns towards the ways in which the Byzantine Empire survived within the Ottoman Empire. By showing a sense of continuity of identity, rule, and State apparatus throughout the Tourkokratia the discussion in this section is dedicated towards showing how membership of a temporal Byzantine state was not merely a millenarian expectation but that, to the Ottoman Greeks, it was a lived reality. This in turn, it is argued, may imply the existence of a civil Byzantine identity among the Romans of the Ottoman Empire. From here the discussion examines the reputation of the klephts had as being 'freedom fighters' since 'The Fall' (a reputation which was fully endorsed by the klephts themselves, it would seem). From this platform the discussion then directs itself towards re-contextualising the 1821 revolt as the latest in a long line of revolts to liberate the Greeks, Greece, and their state from Ottoman rule. The point of this section is to highlight that the revolt can be depicted in an alternative context to the traditional view which, as we have seen, depicts the revolt as the end result of a process of Hellenist

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[37] Frary, Lucien J. 2015. *Russia and the Making of Modern Greek Identity, 1821-1844*. United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. P.199-200

'regeneration' on one hand, and as the inevitable consequence of the spread of revolutionary ideals on the other. On the theme of statehood, included towards the end of this chapter is an overview of the attempt by Ali Pasha to court the Greeks into aiding his own battle with the Porte via appeals being made to restoring said statehood. Because much of the evidence of this 'gamble' of Ali Pashas comes from letters sent to Metternich, this chapter then concludes with an overview of the extent to which the Powers of Europe at the time knew about the Byzantinist currents circulating Greece. The sources I consult in this section are varied. I make use of depictions of the Greek struggle in art, mostly compiled and analysed by the Byzantinist Eugenie Drakopoulou. I also make use of newspaper articles from London which reported communications from France, Odessa, Constantinople, and Corfu upon the first reports of war. This is not analysed with the idea of being accurate: it is just used to showcase suspicion of Russia and a passing acquaintance with Byzantinism among the general reading public of the British Isles. These papers are well preserved and digitized by the British News paper Archive. Unfortunately, a trip to the Kew Archives in London revealed that reports from the Colonial Office in Corfu between 1821-26 have been lost. This is quite the blow to the analysis here as this is the corpus of information that would most likely have revealed information pertaining to this question in English. However I have made use of other sources: the Hansard Parliamentary Papers archives are a good source of information here, so too is the various memoirs, despatches, letters, and journals of famous statesmen at the time (specifically, Metternich, Kapodistrias, and Wellington). The analysis, again, here is not concerned with accurate depictions of the struggle: rather with revealing a passive knowledge of Byzantinism. It is certainly the case that the western records of the war are not concerned so much with the political aspirations of the Greeks in Greece at the time than they are with their own geo-political and economic concerns. Therefore one rarely finds the Greeks' desires or reasons for revolt recorded in the vast tract of information in sources concerning the Eastern Question save for the occasional reference to 'liberty', 'the cross', 'humanity', or 'emancipation'.

Turning, finally, to the 1821 revolt itself, I then dedicate the penultimate chapter of this examination to the symbols of the revolutionaries and the new state which they engendered. The purpose here is to highlight the swathes of Roman symbolism which appeared in the revolutionary -and Kapodistrian- era. Another element of this section is a discussion on the extent to which some symbols (such as the blue and white flags which

appeared all over Greece in 1821) were indicators of Orthodox *and* Byzantinist identities and ideal. The logical conclusion of this analysis is the argument that the symbols of the revolution -being indicative of the ideals of the revolutionaries themselves- reveal that the revolutionaries were revolting out of a sense of Byzantinism and attempting to realise the Byzantinist ideal: 'to Romaiko', the restoration of the Eastern Orthodox Roman Empire. Overwhelmingly, here, the argument relies upon material artefacts. Where textual evidence has been used, it is because the textual evidence corroborates (by virtue of its containing a recording of what said material artefacts looked like or should look like). Due to the revolution's success, material artefacts pertaining to it have been extremely well preserved (and many are now to be found in museums throughout Greece). Overall, the research here begins with accepting that these artefacts look the way they do because someone took the time to make it that way (or to design it that way). So, the question that drives the analysis here is why did they deliberately make the artefact look like this? What were they trying to say? It is the interpretation of this message that lends itself to answering the question of this thesis as a whole. However, the interpretation of material artefacts is only as reliable as an interpretation of the culture which created and used them (this is particularly true regarding the analysis of the symbols emblazoned upon said material artefacts). Here I have relied on a knowledge of early 19th Century Greek culture. This, itself, is the result of this research as a whole: particularly the reading of the 19th Century Greek folk culture; the reading of the records of the likes of the travel writers and memoirists; analysing the ways in which the Greeks represented their revolt in print; and the works of secondary historians. From this I am confident that my interpretations are corroborated (they also often corroborate each other). The interpretation of symbols, however, always has the potential for misinterpretation. This is why -where possible- I have presented the evidence I have found that speaks blatantly to why something looks the way it does (evidence left behind by the people involved in the decisions that dictated the form which these artefacts took themselves). Unfortunately, many records have been lost: the government minutes behind the decision to adopt the Greek flag, for example, being one such corpus of evidence that would have been useful for this analysis.

Lastly, the discussion closes with a brief investigation of the hundred years or so of Greek history following on from the establishment of independence. In several ways -most notably in the 'Megali Idea'- the spectre of Byzantium reared its head time and time again throughout the 19th and early 20th Centuries of Greece. The point here is to highlight the

continuity of the Greeks' Roman identity -and their Byzantinism- from Ottoman years to independence and beyond. A key element of this discussion is to show how Byzantium, previously held with disdain by westernised intellectual elites until the arrival of 'the father of Greek historiography' (Constantine Paparrigopoulos) in the latter half of the 19th Century had already been a celebrated theme within vernacular Greek discourse: an affinity which inevitably would have pushed events in and around Greece both before, and after independence. The primary evidence used in this section is a parliamentary speech made in Greece which has been thoroughly examine din the historiography due to its importance in the Megali Idea (which is a well-studied aspect of Greek history). The other piece of evidence is a piece of war propaganda form the Balkan Wars. This is not interpreted as literal: rather, the fact that it has been designed to appeal to the masses (and therefore presents a narrative held in common by them) is why it has been selected and analysed.

Finally, in the conclusion, I highlight how this examination has showed repeated evidence of the clear and present role of a Byzantine identity and ideal in the Hellenic Revolution and subsequently call for supplement to be added to the broad scholarly consensus: that the average participant of the Greek War of Independence was acting out of a Byzantine national consciousness. In addition to this I also use Byzantinism as a case study to explore the theories of nation, nationality, and nationalism regarding the debate around constructivists/modernists and primordialists/essentialists. As Byzantinism is a pre-industrial and pre-literate form of nationalism which happened to burst onto the world stage 'in the age of nationalism' this case offers useful insight as to whether or not one can speak of 'nationalism' in pre-modern societies. This particular enquiry is aided by the previous discussion around recontextualising the Greek War of Independence: showing that, in some ways, the conflict had been going on since before the watershed moment (in theories of nationalism) that is industrialisation. In short, this thesis argues that national consciousness, nation, and nationalism can and did exist in pre-modern Greece; and so the findings here sit most comfortably with the primordialist/essentialist school of thought.

Returning, then, to Makriyannis and Righas, these two authors works have been preserved in their original language remarkably. Translation issues exist, however the original versions -which are easily accessible due to their importance in Greek history- have been preserved. So important a piece of ethnography is Makriyannis' writings, for example, that

his spelling mistakes survive to this day in reprints in Greek. Starting with his memoirs, I have used these as the only written record I have found that was written by a first hadn witness to events who was also a 'Greek in Greece'. He was one of the insulated and illiterate Greeks this thesis is dedicated to understanding. He only learned to write much later in life. Although his memoirs are an attempt to paint his colourful involvement in the revolution and the intrigues that followed in a positive light, his works have been very helpful to this research by virtue of them offering a written record of the mindset the 'Greeks in Greece'. His regular breaks in narrative to offer critique, often self-critique, of events and his actions, provide a strength to the accuracy of his depictions. Often, however, I am less concerned with what he has to say than I am with how he says it. Much use is made here of analysis Makriyannis' word choice and, therefore, his mindset. This, in turn, allows for an analysis of the language, the ideas and ideals, the concepts, and the mindsets of his fellow 'lower caste' Greeks.

Righas, on the other hand, came form the opposite side of the political spectrum to Makriyannis. However by virtue of his writing for audiences in both groups I have been presented with the opportunity to compare his word choice decisions (which imply that the different groups had different terminologies and ideals). Then, by virtue of his being the pinnacle of westernised Greeks, I have been able to examine the persistent hangovers of Byzantium in his heavily westernised writings. This, like Makriyannis, has been treated as a case study: if even he could not escape the chauvinism and orthodoxy of the Byzantinist Greek mindset, then it is likely that others of his caste were in the same situation. Righas' writings are, like those of Makriyannis, very easy to access in their original Greek online, thanks to his prime position in the history of the Balkan enlightenment.

Another source type I use here often is material artefact (referenced throughout the above synopsis). Here this research has benefitted from the methodology recommended by Karen Harvey.[38] Harvey states here that Objects are reflective of the society and culture which begat them, and of the individual who created them. However they are also active and autonomous: they drive change and meaning among the society and culture itself (once created). For example, in the case of coins (analysed later) these are items with symbols upon them which are reflective of how the people running the state, for example, want people in the country to view the nation-state itself. They act as a broadcaster of meaning,

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[38] Harvey, Karen. Ed. 2013. *History and Material Culture : A Student's Guide to Approaching Alternative Sources.* United Kingdom: Taylor & Francis Group. p.5

intent, and ideal thus either confirming or persuading the citizens mindset. So the task here is to analyse the message: regardless of whether or not it was (well, or at all) this provides evidence of the fact that such messages were being broadcast. Said messages are, in turn, evidence of such ideas circulating the region at the time. As Harvey then goes on to clarify, the study of material culture:

> *"is the study of material to understand culture, to discover the beliefs - the values, ideas, attitudes, and assumptions - of a particular community or society at a given time. The underlying premise is that human-made objects reflect, consciously or unconsciously, directly or indirectly, the beliefs of the individuals who commissioned fabricated, purchased, or used them and, by extension, the beliefs of the larger society to which these individuals belonged. Material culture is thus an object-based branch of cultural anthropology or cultural history."[39]*

This is one of the tools I use to overcome the lack of written sources. Written sources are, of course (and as has been seen) used but they are used when written by people who (with the exception of Makriyannis, and perhaps Kolokotrones) were not 'Greeks in Greece' and so the written texts are either outsider observations or articles which reflect, in some way, broad sentiments in the region. Material culture, alongside the analysis -where possible- of folk culture (stories, prophecies, klephtic ballads) reveals an insight into the ideals and identity of the 'Greeks in Greece'. As they are all products of the same society and culture, they can all mutually corroborate one another, as they are all giving evidence for the existence of an ideal within said culture.

Part IV: Byzantinism, and the debate in 'Nation' theory

If 'Byzantinism' can be shown to be a form of 'national consciousness', and the political actions that issued forth from it as acts of 'nationalism' then this research will have an impact on the current debate between constructionists/modernists and primordialist/essentialists in the theory of nation and nationalism. If the pre-industrial, stateless, and pre-literate community that was 'the Greeks in Greece' of 1821 can be proven to be possessed by a true national consciousness (no matter how 'invented' or 'constructed' the idea of their Greek nation was) then serious challenges to the constructivist/modernist camp can be brought forward. This will be a line of inquiry that will be fleshed out in the concluding chapter of this thesis (once the supporting evidence

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[39] Harvey, 2013. p.25

for the existence of said national consciousness has been put forward). It would, however, be prudent to take space here to outline that debate.

The debate is, in essence, one of 'chicken and egg': what came first, the modern state, or the nation? Did nationalists -either actively or passively- bind their neighbours up into nations and establish for themselves a modern state with modern apparatus (which then served to perpetuate the bond?) Or did modern states create, whether that be advertently or inadvertently, a nation by binding their subjects together (once again, through the use of their various state apparatuses)? The primordialist/essentialist school argues that nations pre-exist modern states, or, at least, the bare necessities for the construction of a nation existed prior to the development of moderns states. Constructivists/modernists, on the other hand, purport that the nation is a construction of modernity (and, specifically, of modern -industrial- states).

Tackling the latter school's theories first, the principal thinkers are Gellner[40], Hobsbawm[41], and Anderson[42]. The latter defined a nation as an imaged political community, one which was limited (there were people who did not belong to the community elsewhere in the world) and sovereign.[43] Imagined, because, as he wrote, *"the member of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion."*[44] Anderson's overall argument was that 'nation' was born in western Europe in the 18th Century when dispersed communities were stitched together via the rise of a wide-spread circulation of a print media among the masses (which was printed in a common dialect).[45] This undoubtedly speaks to the 'Hellenising myth' mentioned previously, but Anderson's framework is not compatible with a national consciousness which existed among those who adhered to a Byzantinism by virtue of the latter group's being, mostly, illiterate and insulated form the circulation of print media. While it is possible to argue that the Byzantinist Romans of 1821 constituted an 'imagined community' in the Andersonian sense by virtue of the widespread oral circulation of stories that depicted the Greeks as a 'limited' community (as opposed to literature specifically). The folk tales of the Greeks (to be discussed) could possibly be compared to Anderson's 'national stories' (that formed, according to

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[40] Gellner, E. 1983. *Nations And Nationalism.* Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
[41] Hobsbawm
[42] Anderson, B. 1991. *Imagined Communities*. London: Verso.
[43] Anderson, 1991. p.6
[44] Anderson, 1991. p.6
[45] Anderson, 1991

Anderson, was the result of the continual circulation of newspapers. Anderson, after all, finds agreement with this thesis in that he argues that just because nation is 'imagined' this does not necessarily render it 'not real'. However, Anderson's insistence that it was newspapers, reporting on current affairs, that created 'imagined communities' renders moot any possibilities of the 'Greeks in Greece' possessing an Andersonian imagined community.[46] He further argued that capitalism fuelled this spread of 'national stories', and so, it seems unlikely that Anderson would agree that nationalism could be found in a society (by whom, I mean, the 'Greeks in Greece') which had neither a print media nor capitalism.

In his framework of nation, Hobsbawm also placed capitalism and the state front-and-centre.[47] Again, then, it seems highly unlikely that Hobsbawm would agree that Byzantinism is a form of nationalism given that it was, in my view, the version of national consciousness that was clung to by a people living in a pre-capitalist society who, crucially, did not have a state (they may have been waiting for it to come back, but they did not actually have a state which could 'invent' and perpetuate 'tradition', which he argued were behind the formation of nations). In *The Invention of Tradition*, Hobsbawm essentially argued that a state and its' apparatus are necessary preconditions for the emergence of nations.[48] Nation, he clarified, were created and spread in a top-down manner when states 'invented traditions' with the aim of fostering social cohesion while legitimising state institutions and social hierarchies.[49] Now, this is not completely at odds with the case of Byzantinism: there did exist, as will be shown, state apparatus which maintained the distinct idea of a Roman people (the Orthodox Church). However, to Hobsbawm, the continuity and attachment with/to the Byzantine past would be an invention of a more recent time (albeit one which was based on perceptions of the past). In this case evidence will be presented that the distinct feeling of being Roman was centuries old in 1821. Further, to Hobsbawm, this 'invention' would have been conjured and perpetuated for the purpose of legitimising the status quo. But, as will be seen, the only institution belonging to the 'Greeks in Greece' was the Orthodox Church, which did not preach nationalism, rather it preached peaceful and patient obedience to the Sultan's reign (to render unto Caesar that which was Caesar's). The faith may have demarcated the Greeks, and it may have been central to the nation-forming myth that the Roman State

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[46] Anderson, 1991
[47] Hobsbawm, E. 2021. *On Nationalism*. United Kingdom: Little, Brown Book Group.
[48] Hobsbawm, H. 1992. *The Invention of Tradition*. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
[49] Hobsbawm. 1992.

would be returned to them, but the institution of the Church itself can not be accused of preaching Byzantine nationalism (in that it did not seek to whip Byzantine nationalists up into action for the sake of the betterment of a Greek elite). Rather the opposite was true, the Church institution in Greece -as will be shown- actively supported the Sultan's rule and so it can hardly be said that the last remaining apparatus of the Byzantine state endeavoured to spread a Byzantine nationalism. Again, the faith itself may have -indeed, it will be shown that it did- but the institutions of the faith did not. Lastly, it must be highlighted that, to Hobsbawm, nationalism is something invented and perpetuated by the state to keep up with the demands of capitalism.[50] Hobsbawm built his argument that nation was constructed via the process of industrialisation (and the use of state apparatus) upon the theory put forward by Gellner. Gellner argued that, above all else, education (specifically state education, to meet the needs of an industrial complex) was the factor which stitched peoples together and engendered the birth of nations.[51]It is simply not possible for either theory to apply to any national consciousness that can be shown to have existed prior to statehood, capitalism, state-education, or industrialisation.

Before I move on to outlining the arguments of the primordialist/essentialist camp, there is much in the constructivist school that this research's findings are capable of coexistence with, or even in complete agreement with. Principally, there is no argument here that 'nation' is not a social construct, and that 'feelings of continuity with the past' is actually 'feelings of continuity with *contemporary perceptions or representations* of the past'. The *ways* in which nation is constructed, and the necessary preconditions for its' creation, however, are. That, according to the essentialist camp, nations are persistent and universal phenomena, is, on the other hand, contested: the evidence here does not prove that nor do I attempt to make that case. Rather the case I make here, like that of Smith (to be detailed more fully below), is that 'Nation' can -and did, in the case of the Byzantinist national consciousness of the 'Greeks in Greece'- pre-exist modern industrial states with widespread literacy (which, as outlined above, are the constructivist/modernist's required pre-conditions for a 'nation' to be constructed). Indeed, for the sake of complete transparency, it should be highlighted here that I fully employ the school of constructivism's theories and methods in the realm of Religious Studies (in Chapter Two of this thesis). Indeed, I stand upon the shoulders of giants of the School in that regard, relying on their methods and research heavily in order to make my point in that particular

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[50] Ozoglu, H. 2012. *Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State: Evolving Identities, Competing Loyalties, and Shifting Boundaries.* United States: State University of New York Press.
[51] Gellner, 1983.

section. It would be an academic 'own-goal' to argue the case for the construction of 'Religion' in one chapter, and the persistence -and, ergo, the non-constructivist origins- of 'Nation' in the other. So, for clarity, my research sees no disagreement with a constructivist school of thought, and indeed, agrees with the school that 'nationality' is not an inherent trait someone is born with (a theory which was based upon questionable -to the say the least- science and originated in a bygone age of romantic-era German nationalism: in short, it is a theory which has been roundly critiqued and disproven for decades now). The argument here, then, is simply -and only- between whether or not nations require preconditions that are unique to modern states.

Returning, then, to a brief overview of this ongoing debate, I will now outline the argument put forward by the primordialist/essentialist whose theories have a) not been based upon an outdated idea of race, volk, and/or nation and b) still stand up to the rigorous critique of the constructivist/modernist school: Smith.[52] He described a nation as a: *"named population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for its members."*[53] This does not necessarily place Smith at odds with the constructivist school: indeed there is much this finds in common with that school, such as the presence of a mass public culture, the existence of state apparatus (a system of law and duties), and the existence of a common economy could see Smith's definition labelled as that of a constructivist/modernist. The point of departure between Smith and that school, however (and the reason why he is labelled -more often than not- as a 'primordialist') is that, to him, the key necessary precondition for the construction of 'nation' is ethnicity which itself is the evolved form of an 'ethnie'. Further, to Smith, these ethnies are pre-modern in their provenance: hence why his theory is one of primordialism. They are primordial because, even though nations are constructed in the modern era, the raw materials pre-exist that epoch. For clarity, Smith defined ethnies as: *"named units of population with common ancestry myths and historical memories, elements of shared culture, some link with a historic territory and some measure of solidarity."*[54] The final part of that definition, Smith clarified, was that said measure of solidarity exists at least among the upper echelons of said community.[55] Smith's argument was that 'nation' evolves when one particularly dominant ethnie annexes and/or appropriates neighbouring communities with their own distinct -but closely related

[52] Smith, A.D. 2013. *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*. Germany: Wiley.
[53] Smith, 2013. p. 57
[54] Smith, 2013. p.57
[55] Smith, 2013. p.57

enough- ethnies to the dominant one.[56] As the ethnie expands and engulfs its' neighbours the notion of a distinct ethnicity (binding the various ethnies up into one) is born; and out of which is born the notion that the peoples of said ethnicity constitute a nation. In the concluding chapter it will be shown that this research's findings fit comfortably with much of Smith's theory. That is not to say, however, that there are no points of departure between Smith's argument and this research's findings.

Given the primal role religion plays in this thesis, and the key role it played in the formation, and persistence of a Byzantine national consciousness, it would be prudent to outline another key primordialist (one who also happened to place the institution of the Church -and religion more widely- front and centre in the formation of nation): Hastings.[57] He presented six points in his definition of 'nation'. Although primordialist, some of his 'six points' could be construed as modernist (principally here I refer to his first -and *"by far the most important and widely present factor"*- the existence of a widely used vernacular literature).[58] In pre-modern times, one could argue that said literature can only foster the emergence of a sense of ethnicity or nationhood among a certain elite caste. There is, however, always the potential for said sense to then 'trickle down' from the elites to 'the volk', and there is always the point that the Bible and other religious texts, which one did not have to be able to read in order to encounter, can be counted in many cases as part of the corpus of 'vernacular literature'. Alongside a widely used vernacular literature, Hastings also listed further preconditions necessary *"for the development of nationhood from one or more ethnicities"*.[59]

> *"A long struggle against an external threat may also have a significant effect…* [his second point then begins with] *An ethnicity is a group of people with a shared cultural identity and spoken language. It constitutes the major distinguishing element in all pre-national societies, but may survive as a strong subdivision with a loyalty of its own within established nations…* [his third point then follows as] *Formed from one or more ethnicities, and normally identified by a literature of its own, it* [a nation] *possesses or claims the right to political identity and autonomy as a people, together with the control of specific territory, comparable to that of biblical Israel…* [then, moving on to his fourth point, he states] *A nation-state is a state which identifies itself in terms of one specific nation whose people are not seen simply as 'subjects' of the sovereign but as a horizontally bonded society to whom the state in a sense belongs. There is thus an identity of character between state and people. In some way the state's*

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[56] Smith, 2013. p.39
[57] Hastings, A. 1997. *The Construction of Nationhood, Ethnicity, religion and Nationalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[58] Hastings, 1997. p.2-3
[59] Hastings, 1997. p.2-3

> *sovereignty is inherent within the people, expressive of its historic identity…* [the penultimate point then contains the following] *As something which can empower large numbers of ordinary people, nationalism is a movement which seeks to provide a state for a given 'nation' or further to advance the supposed interests of its own 'nation-state' regardless of other considerations… nationalism can also be stoked up to fuel the expansionist imperialism of a powerful nation-state, though this is still likely to be done under the guise of an imagined threat or grievance.* [And, lastly, with his sixth point Hastings states that] R*eligion is an integral element of many cultures, most ethnicities and some states. The Bible provided, for the Christian world at least, the original model of the nation. Without it and its Christian interpretation and implementation, it is arguable that nations and nationalism, as we know them, could never have existed. Moreover, religion has produced the dominant character of some state-shaped nations and of some nationalisms. Biblical Christianity both undergirds the cultural and political world out of which the phenomena of nationhood and nationalism as a whole developed and in a number of important cases provided a crucial ingredient for the particular history of both nations and nationalisms."*[60]

To briefly take these points one by one, I will showcase how each of them will be evidenced in the case study to follow. The existence of a vernacular literature, although to Hastings being the most important factor, is the only factor which -it could be argued- did not exist among the 'Greeks in Greece' who were largely illiterate. However, there *did* exist a literature -although not in the form of the vernacular- that the 'Greeks in Greece' had access to: religious texts (which were in koine). On top of this it will be shown that there existed a heavy corpus of folk tales that were passed around orally which detailed the exploits of freedom fighters and the promise of 'to Romaiko'. Hasting's next point, however, requires no 'mental gymnastics': there did exist a long struggle against an enemy (who were utterly other to the Greeks, by virtue not only of their different language, but their different faith as well). In this thesis it will also be shown that the 'Greeks in Greece' constituted a compilation of different communities each with their own cultural identity and spoken language. This would normally pose a problem to the formation of a nation that encompassed these diverse communities; but as Hastings goes on to show, nations can be the product of the coming together of a number of said communities (he calls them ethnicities). This is strikingly similar to Smith's theory of nations forming via ethnies being swallowed up and appropriated by neighbouring -and more dominant- ethnies. That Hastings' framework allows for the continued subdivision of ethnicities *after* the formation of the nation strikes a chord with this thesis' findings that the Albanians and Vlachs were grafted into the Roman and Hellenic vines, but often remained a distinct community within

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[60] Hastings, 1997. p.2-3

the wider national grouping. Following on from this, Hasting's definition that a nation will possess or claim to 'ought to possess' a specific territory (and autonomy within it) once again finds parallel with the following thesis' findings that the Byzantine national consciousness sought to regain control of a clearly defined Byzantine territory. That he compares this with the notion of Biblical Israel is even more stark, given the Greeks, like the Hebrews, saw themselves as God's elect nation (as will be shown). Hasting's fourth point, on the face of it, feel like the least relevant to this research. However, it will be shown that the Greeks in Greece saw themselves as citizens of Byzantium even after three and half centuries of its' 'fall'. And so, it could be argued, that Byzantium's sovereignty was inherent in the Greeks of the 19th Century. The penultimate 'point' again, chimes with the argument below. Specifically, this is in relation to the use of Byzantinist nationalism to fuel the irridentism of the modern Greek State after it gained independence. Further, it could be argued that in the case of Byzantinism, we see a nationalism that did not merely seek to establish a state for itself; but rather, it sought to reclaim, or regenerate a state for itself from the hands of the Sultan or from the ashes of 'the Fall'. Lastly, as has been mentioned, the key role religion and the institution of the Church played in the survival of Byzantine national consciousness is a major theme of this research, and so this thesis will find agreement with Hasting's sixth point.

All that remains, therefore, is to highlighted that, between the large-scale agreement with Smith that will be presented in the concluding chapter of this thesis, and the resounding similarity between this research's findings and Hastings' six points presented above this thesis will find itself arguing, firmly, in favour of the primordialist school.

Chapter II: Pistis Kai Patrida

The fallacy of separating 'religion' and 'secular' when examining the Greeks of the early 19ᵗʰ Century

Part I: A brief history of 'Religion'

> *"Before the modern age in the West, what is now called religion permeated the culture and was inseparable from other aspects of the culture. There was no term for the so-called religious aspect of a culture as opposed to the so-called nonreligious aspects. Moreover, there was no term for the religion of one's own culture as opposed to the religions of another culture, and so there had been no term for something of which Christianity was but one type of several… the concept is not universal. There is no word in classical Sanskrit for the concept and so 'religion' does not appear in Hindu scriptures. There is also no word in Pali and so it does not appear in Buddhist scriptures. There is no term for religion in Chinese or Japanese or Egyptian or in Native American Languages. There is not even a word for religion in the Hebrew Bible or in the Greek New Testament. It is only modern European Christians who generalised or abstracted from their own practices and developed the word 'religion' as a term for sorting a certain kind of activity. The term 'religion' in its modern sense is thus not a concept shared universally but rather a product of a particular modern, European, and Christian history."*[61]

The excerpt above is a summary of the evidenced argument put forward by the so-called 'Constructionist' school of thought (a school of thought within Religious Studies). Evidenced, it should be said, by Cantwell-Smith's thorough comparative investigation into the presence -or lack thereof- of a word meaning 'Religion' in the modern sense of the term in the languages of the very cultures that bequeathed to the world said 'Religions'. [62]

The 'Constructionists' have traced this evolution in the meaning and use of 'Religion' and so, below, is a broad overview of that school of thought's argument. It largely follows that of Bossy[63] and Fitzgerald [64][65]:

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[61] Schilbrack, Kevin. 2014. *Philosophy and the Study of Religions*: *A Manifesto*. Philippines: Wiley. p.86
[62] Smith, Wilfred Cantwell. 1991. *The Meaning and End of Religion.* United Kingdom: Macmillan. p.15-50
[63] Bossy, John. 1985. *Christianity in the West, 1400-1700*. United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
[64] Fitzgerald, T. 2000. *Ideology of 'religious' Studies.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[65] Fitzgerald, T. 2007. *Discourse on Civility and Barbarity.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

By around the 16th Century 'religion', out of necessity borne of increased experiences of a plurality of belief systems, had evolved in western discourse from a term used to describe the lifestyle of the 'religious' (meaning -almost exclusively- medieval monastics) into 'Religion': an umbrella term by which any -and all- monotheistic faiths could be referred to. Over the course of the next few centuries, as Europe 'modernised' and the Church went through cycles of reformations, the term evolved further. This phase of the term's evolution was symbiotic with the emergence and evolution of the notion of 'Civil Society' (what has, by now, become known as the 'Secular' sphere) which was borne out of the necessity to refer to a sphere of activity which had been divorced from the sphere of 'Religion'. By the enlightenment a clear binary had emerged between the two terms which had evolved into each other's antithesis and, as such, the two had come to mutually define one another by 'being that which the other is not'. On one pole lay 'Religion' and the other 'Secular': each by now being used to denote a separate category into which some-but-not-all aspects of life could be placed. In the camp of 'Religion' was placed 'the Religions' (beliefs) and their assorted paraphernalia including their physical spaces, their established structures, and their hierarchies. Into the camp of 'Secular' was placed things like government, trade, law, public office, and public life. Then, via colonialism (and post-colonialism), the western world exported said binary which had now become so normal in western everyday life that it was assumed to be natural and universal or, at least a desirable hallmark of modern civilisation. Consequently, languages that had no word or concept for 'Religion', 'Religions' and 'Religious' or for 'secular', 'society', or 'civic' were having these terms imposed or invented out of their pre-existing vocabulary: the meaning and use of their own words began to evolve into an equivalent of the western binary-centric discourse.

The consequent debate that arises from this data is over how 'useful' 'Religion' is in global discourse. The 'constructionists' argue that, due to the specific context from which the concepts emerged, 'Religion' and 'Secular' are too laced with cultural (and chronological) bias towards the modern West to be accurately applicable to cultures removed (culturally, geographically and chronologically) from said specific context. In other words: due to the terms not being universal, they should not be applied universally as to do so would allow for too many misinterpretations and misrepresentations.

Since this school of thought reared its' head, a debate has ensued in Religious Studies departments as to the term's usefulness in global discourse when said discourse is pertaining to current -or, at least, to post-colonial- affairs. Leaving that particular debate for the Religious Studies departments; this chapter is concerned with an examination of the extent to which the terms and categories of 'Religion' and 'non-religion' are applicable to vernacular Greek discourse in-and-around 1821. The point here being to challenge the existing scholarly consensus that the average Greeks of 1821 were acting out of a religious (and ergo, non-nationalist) identity alone; a 'Roman' identity which served to bind together the various Orthodox communities in the Ottoman Balkans. Once said challenge has been laid down the argument then moves on to a recommendation: that, if religious and secular notions cannot be separated in the context of early 19th Century Greece then that implies that said 'Roman' identity can be both a religious and a civic identity and ergo corroborating my argument that the average participant in the revolt was acting out of a Byzantinist national consciousness.

In order to assess how accurately these terms can be used while examining this topic it is necessary to explore whether the concepts of 'Religion' or 'Secular' existed in the way they exist to modern English speakers today at that time and place. This is a more nuanced discussion as one may initially think. The 'Romans' were divided in many ways and one of these was between the westernised and the insulated. It is a matter of no controversy that the westernised Grecophones had been exposed to the notion of a 'Religious-Secular' dichotomy and so, here, it is the insulated and the illiterate that are the main focus. Another group, of course, also existed: those who had received the western enlightenment but had subsequently rejected it in favour of a more 'traditionalist' (Orthodox universalist) world view.

Returning to the school of Religious Studies for a moment; whether the concepts of 'Religion' or 'Secular' existed is only half the issue. Even if the concept did exist in vernacular discourse at the time, it can still be argued that the dichotomy is a false one: that very few -indeed, if any- aspects of Ottoman Balkan culture can neatly fit within one of the two camps. Fitzgerald, among others, has argued that even in discourse pertaining to modern western Europe these constructs are -to put it in layman's terms- really rather poor at their job. He makes the case that 'Religion' falls short of practical usability because it *"straddles all dominant ideologies, and does not tell us how a 'religious' ideology differs*

from a non-religious one."[66] Elsewhere he argued that 'Religion' is used: *"so loosely that almost any 'cultural' datum can be included in it… the word is indistinguishable from 'culture'."* [67] And that there *"exists no clear and consistent analytical concept defining 'religion' and demarcating 'religion' from non-religion."*[68] Rather than include Fitzgerald's supporting evidence from his own monographs which pertain largely to his own areas of expertise (Indian and Japanese cultures and 'religions') it would be more pertinent here to evidence the porous boundary between the two antithetical concepts of 'Religion' and 'secular' via a closer inspection of the case study at hand. This will be done via showcasing how 'religious' the manifestations of the so-called liberal, secular and neo-Hellenic political movements really were.

For clarity, then, this chapter is dedicated to two main concepts. Firstly, to highlighting how the religious-secular dichotomy did not exist within -and is therefore unapplicable in modern analysis of- vernacular Greek dialogue in the early 19th Century. Secondly, to showcasing how -even if one insists on using said binary's frameworks- that the political manifestations of the Greeks of the early 19th Century -even the most liberal of political declarations influenced or directly penned by the westernised literati- actually straddles both camps of the religious-secular dichotomy: thus undermining said dichotomy's usefulness while simultaneously underlining how erroneous it is to depict the actions, desires, and supralocal bonds of the early 19th Century Greeks (vernacular, literati, or otherwise) as religious (or even as non-religious) alone.

The ramifications of this re-examination of 'Religion' in relation to the 'Romans' are, I surmise, seismic. Principally because it corroborates the argument that the Roman identity was not only centred around Orthodoxy; but also around the feeling of inherited citizenship of a temporal kingdom: a 'civic identity' (which, according to the usual framework belongs to the so-called 'Secular' sphere). From that foundation it is a small step towards the overarching argument of this thesis that the Roman identity -and the revolutionary activity of the Greeks of 1821- was centred around a feeling of national consciousness which was itself centred around the feeling of being a Byzantine citizen (and the desire to see that

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[66] Fitzgerald, T. 2011. *'Religion' and Politics in International Relations: the Modern Myth*. Critical Religion. https://criticalreligion.org/2011/02/21/religion-and-politics-in-international-relations-the-modern-myth/ Last accessed 15/07/2019
[67] Fitzgerald, 2000. p.12
[68] Fitzgerald, 2000. p.27

State restored); a sentiment which was permeated by Orthodoxy, but should not be conflated with Orthodoxy or Religion alone.

By showcasing how even the liberal and neo-Hellenist manifestations of the Greek revolutionary era straddled the religious-secular dichotomy, this part of the discussion also showcases how erroneous it is to treat neo-Hellenism (once it had arrived in Greece) as something entirely separate from the pre-existing Byzantinism. Rather, it will be shown that Hellenism did not replace or usurp Byzantinism as implied by Toynbee in the opening chapter of this thesis: rather, by the time either ideology could manifest into reality, the two had -albeit to varying degrees- synthesised. This specific point will only be implied here, it is a topic of deeper investigation in a later chapter.

Part II: 'Threskeia' and 'Pistis'

The Greek word that is often translated to 'Religion' is 'Threskeia' and it has been in use since at least the writing of the New Testament. There, according to Strong's Concordance, 'Threskeia' has several possible translations. It should be said that Strong did cite one of these meanings as 'Religion' (he was, after all, a western theologian). However, he also pointed out that it can be translates as *"reverence or worship of the gods... worship as expressed in ritual acts".* [69] We see the latter meaning in the translation of Colossians 2:18: "*Do not let anyone who delights in false humility and the 'Threskeia'* [Translated as 'worship'] *of angels disqualify you."*[70] Arguably the use of the term in James 1:26-27[71] should also be taken to mean 'worship' or an 'act of reverence' given that it is used in the context of an argument for the importance of acts over belief (as seen in Chapter 2, verse 14 which asks: "*What good is it... if someone claims to have 'belief' but has no deeds?"*).[72]

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[69] Strong, James. 1890. *The Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible*. United States: Hunt & Eaton. Entry 2356. https://biblehub.com/greek/2356.htm (last accessed 01/04/2019)

[70] The Holy Bible. Colossians 2:18 NIV Translation
https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=colossians+2%3A18&version=NIV (Last accessed 10/05/2019).

[71] The Holy Bible. James 1:26-27 NIV Translation
https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=james+1%3A26-27&version=NIV (Last accessed 10/05/2019).

[72] The Holy Bible. James 2:14-26. NIV Translation
https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=James%202%3A14-26&version=NIV (Last accessed 10/05/2019).

By the 18th and, arguably, the 19th Century the term 'Threskeia' had evolved to mean something similar to how 'Religion' was used by 16th Century western Europeans: a vague enough umbrella term which could be used to describe a monotheistic belief. This neither proves nor disproves whether the term was also being used to refer to a category of life separate from the contents of the 'Secular' sphere. These two themes are not the same thing, and not necessarily mutually exclusive.

When comparing the political writings of Righas Velestinlis (including the more vernacular *Thourios*);[73] Ypsilantis' proclamation at Iasi;[74] The 1822 Constitution of the First National Assembly of Epidaurus;[75] and Makriyannis' memoirs;[76] two important details emerge:

a) 'Threskeia' and 'Pistis' (meaning 'faith' or 'belief' and sometimes 'trust') are used by different texts to refer to the exact same thing: a monotheism, usually in reference to Orthodoxy. It is possible therefore that, to the insulated and illiterate Balkan Greeks, there was no distinction between their 'faith' and their 'religion': the two merely being used to refer to one of the monotheistic beliefs in the Balkans at the time (specifically in these cases that 'belief' would be Orthodoxy). This, in turn, would imply that -to them- their 'Threskeia' did not mean anything other than 'Christ's teachings as passed down by his Orthodox Church' while 'Pistis' meant 'belief in said teachings'. This does not carry with it the same connotations of denoting a sphere of life divorced from an antithetical 'Secular'.

b) Starting with Righas' writings, it is only in political documents -written by and for westernised or, at least, literate Greeks- that 'Threskeia' is seen as being divorced from a 'Secular' sphere. Even here, however, the rift is not finalised and by the time

[73] Righas, Velestinlis. 1797. *Thourios.* Vienna; Righas, Velestinlis. 1797. *The Constitution.* Vienna. Righas, Velestinlis. 1797. *Human Rights*. Vienna. and Righas, Velestinlis. 1797. *Revolutionary Proclamation.* Vienna. All reproduced in Karaberopoulos, D. ed. And Zervoulakos, Z.K. Trans. 2002. Revolutionary Scripts. Athens: Scientific Society of Studies Pheres-Velestino-Rhigas.

[74] Ypsilantis, Alexander. 1821. *Proclamation.* Iasi. Translated and reproduced in *Clogg*, Richard. ed. 1976. *The Movement for Greek Independence 1770–1821: A Collection of Documents*. London: Macmillan Press. p.202

[75] Constitution of First National Assembly at Epidaurus. 1822. Scanned and digitised at https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a23-7696-49db-9148-f24dce6a27c8/syn06.pdf (last accessed 05/01/2021)

[76] Makriyannis, Yiannis. 1907. *Memoirs*. Athens. Digitised in Greek and available at http://www.snhell.gr/testimonies/writer.asp?id=102 (last accessed 05/01/2021)

the Greeks got round to making their own constitution at Epidaurus in 1822 it is clear that 'Threskeia' had not been divorced from what western observers would refer to as the 'Secular' sphere: a pattern which is repeated in the subsequent constitutions that emerged in the 19th Century.

'Pistis' is exclusively used by Righas in *Thourios* (his war song) and -again exclusively- by Ypsilantis in his revolutionary proclamation: both of which were designed to address the masses in a vernacular dialogue. 'Threskeia', on the other hand, was exclusively -and extensively- used in the 1822 constitution and in Righas' political documents. When the subsequent constitutions of the revolutionary period also used 'Threskeia' they did not deviate from the way in which it was used in 1822. The constitution, as well as Righas' political documents were written with the educated, often westernised, often diasporic Grecophones as well as their philhellenic contacts in mind. In other words, they were written with the intention of being read by those who were well educated enough to read and understand such complex documents as constitutions and declarations of human rights. Interestingly Makriyannis, who famously wrote his memoirs in the vernacular, almost exclusively used 'Threskeia' (he uses 'Pistis' almost exclusively as 'trust' only, as in 'the trust one has in what another has said to be true'). In the records pertaining to vernacular discourse, then, we can observe an interchangeability of the uses of 'Pistis' and 'Threskeia'. If there is no distinction in the vernacular use, then that could allow us to conclude that there was no distinction in the vernacular meaning of the terms; and ergo that 'Threskeia' meant 'a monotheistic belief system' while Pistis meant 'belief in said system'.

Still, this does not necessarily prove that 'Religion' (as a category divorced from the secular) was a non-existent concept in the mindset of the vernacular Grecophones. All it implies, at this point, is that the vernacular use of the term may have not carried with it such a connotation. However, the argument that, in vernacular usage at least, Pistis or Threskeia was not divorced from the secular sphere is strongly corroborated by the sheer number of times the above documents (Makriyannis' memoirs, *Thourios*, and Ypsilantis' proclamation in particular) refer to Pistis or Threskeia alongside 'Patrida' ('fatherland') in the same breath. Although the existence of two words entails that the faith and the fatherland were two separate things the number of times they are mentioned in the same breath in these documents implies that, in vernacular discourse, the notions were married.

Such a line of argument will be more thoroughly addressed in the next section. First, however, Makriyannis' memoirs have one more piece of evidence to corroborate the current argument.

Makriyannis perhaps gives us the best window into the illiterate and insulated culture of Greece at the time. Not only are his memoirs written in the Greek vernacular, but the author himself was a Roumeliote illiterate who taught himself to read only after the conclusion of the revolution. This lends itself towards the usefulness of Makriyannis' writing as a window into the language, mindset, and culture of the illiterate and insulated Greek of the early 19th Century. Makriyannis makes ninety-three uses of 'Threskeia' or a variation of that term which includes 'Threskeftikos' (sometimes 'Threskeftikoi' in accordance with grammatical rules of the time). As previously mentioned, in the vast majority of the instances where he uses 'Threskeia' he uses it in the context of 'Threskeia and Patrida'. It is, however, the meaning and use of 'Threskeftikos' which is pertinent to this section of the discussion at hand.

'Threskeftikos' is usually translated as 'religious' (as in a 'religious person') in modern Greek. Usually Makriyannis' use of the term is in the context of discussing 'Threskeftikos, military men, and politicians' being collectively responsible for something happening (or, at other times, for something else not happening). This use of 'Threskeftikos' (meaning 'Threskeia-men') is a limited one: it demarcated 'Threskeia-men' from military men and politicians and ergo implies that some people are Threskeia-men and some people are not. Given the term's limited usage, then, we can see that 'Threskeftikos' is not being used to refer to religious people in general. If this were the case; he would have to refer to the vast majority of Greeks at that time (including the military men and the politicians) as 'Threskeftikos'. Rather, by referring to a specific group of people as 'Threskeia-men' we can see that he is using the term to refer to the Orthodox clergy alone. However, when specifically wanting to refer to a priest he does so via use of the term 'Pappas'. From this, therefore, we can see that 'Threskeftikos' is a generic term for 'men of cloth' of various ranks. In his sole reference to members of the Islamic clergy Makriyannis uses "Tourkos Threskos" (literally meaning 'religious Turks' but referring only to Muslim clerics).[77] This

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[77] Makriyannis, 1907.

shows that, in the Greek vernacular as penned by Makriyannis, 'Religious person' was not being used to refer to all Christians or all Muslims but, rather, to people's whose professional capacity was concerned with the operations of a 'Threskeia'.

It is significant that a word meaning 'religious people' means 'clergy' for two reasons. First, because it requires no further description to denote the Orthodox clergy (contra to the situation for Muslim clerics). This gives us a glimpse towards the attitude vernacular Greeks had regarding the 'special' status of their own Church. Second – and more specific to the purposes of this argument- because almost everyone in Greece at that time would be described by modern onlookers as 'Religious' in that they adhered to the Orthodox faith. Yet here we see that only official members of the clergy are referred to as 'Religious' in the vernacular language of the time.

This, I surmise, corroborates the argument that 'Threskeia' and 'Pistis', although being generic in the face of a plurality of monotheistic belief systems, so deeply permeated pre-revolutionary Ottoman Greek society, culture, and every-day life that no word or concept was ever invented for a non-ordained religious person. This, clearly, was just taken as a given aspect of everyday existence. Furthermore, somewhat connected to this, this also implies that no word was ever invented for a non-religious person. This in turn corroborates the argument that the notion of a category of religion, a category of non-religion, and a binary between the two terms was non-existent in the vernacular Greek worldview.

This would ergo imply that it is erroneous and anachronistic to refer to the Roman identity or to Roman acts of revolt as 'Religious' alone; for although 'Religion' had permeated all aspects of daily thought and life it had never been seen -in vernacular discourse- to be divorced -or, indeed, divorceable- from political ideals. The implication therefore being that the Romans were capable of thinking, feeling, and acting out of ideals and identities which contained political, temporal, and civic nuances alongside sentiments pertaining to Orthodoxy. The argument here, therefore, is that not only were the Romans capable of the above, but that the 1821 revolt is actually evidence of them realising said capability.

Part III: 'Threskeia' and 'Secular'

Section I: Still married in 1821

In Righas' political writings 'Threskeia' is segregated from the 'Secular' sphere, but this 'divorce' is far from complete. Further, in the 'real' constitutions that emerged during the War of Independence (and afterwards) the rift between the two was drastically reduced in comparison. By exploring these it is possible to demonstrate that a) not only was the notion of a 'Religious' and an antithetical 'Secular' sphere yet to fully develop even among the members of the intelligentsia who penned the documents but b) the boundary between the two spheres was a porous one.

Righas opened the first chapter of Greek constitutional history in Vienna in 1797 by penning a series of political documents for a hypothetical pan-Balkan democracy that would emerge from a hypothetical pan-Balkan uprising against the Sultan. Righas' constitution was, essentially, the French constitution of 1793 with added extras ('extras' which suited either his own fantasies or the specific situation in the Balkans).[78] He uses 'Threskeia' to refer to the various religions of the Balkan peoples throughout the documents; specifically he repeatedly infers that divisions between religions are, in essence, not an issue.[79] In article 7 of his human rights he enshrined *"the freedom of all 'Threskeia', Christianity, Islam, Judaism and others, are not restricted…".*[80] This was mirrored in article 122 of his constitution.[81] While in article 7 of said constitution he wrote

> *"The dominant people are all the citizens of this country, Greeks, Bulgarians, Albanians, Vlachs, Armenians, Turks and every other race, no matter what their 'Threskeia' or dialect is."*[82]

While this use of 'Threskeia' does not prove that the term was being used in accordance to the framework of the 'Religious-Secular' dichotomy there are several reasons to take this

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[78] Zervoulakos, Z.K. 2002. *Translator's Notes*. In Karaberopoulos, D. ed. And Zervoulakos, Z.K. Trans. 2002. Revolutionary Scripts. Athens: Scientific Society of Studies Pheres-Velestino-Rhigas. p.13
[79] Righas, 1797. *Constitution.* Article 1&2
[80] Righas, 1797. *Human rights.* Article 7
[81] Righas, 1797. *Constitution.* Article 122
[82] Righas, 1797. *Constitution.* Article 7

to be the case. The French republican provenance of the document's ideology is one. The other is that the constitution sets up an entirely 'civil' body for the administration of the State. 'Threskeia', it should be said, is not locked out of the government, the civil service, or the judiciary in Righas' utopia so there is no outright constitutional policy of 'separation of Church and State'. However, Righas' desire was certainly to have such institutions set up completely independently of any and all of the institutions of the Balkans' 'Threskeia'. This is significant when we bear in mind that the judiciary and much of the governance of the Greeks during the Tourkokratia lay in the hands of the religious establishments.

However, the clergy and the state are left with one -albeit small- bond in Righas' vision. Article 27 of his constitution states that the clergy are to act as kingmakers in an election stalemate. He wrote: *"If the number of votes are equal… then the eldest should be preferred… But if both are of the same age, the clergy should make the choice."*[83]Righas does not make clear which 'Threskeia's' clergymen are to be used, given that delegates are to be elected for every 40,000 people regardless of said population's demographic makeup it may be that he envisioned the Clergymen from the local area to decide: in which case, with few exceptions, the power would lie with The Orthodox out of sheer numerical superiority alone. It is also possible that Righas uses clergy in much the same way as Makriyannis used 'Threskeftikos' to solely refer to the Orthodox clergy.

Fast forwarding to 1822, we find that the separation of Church and State was virtually non-existent in the constitution of Epidaurus. In fact, we will see that it remained non-existent throughout the constitutions of the 1820's. Although these documents set out how the new Greek State would be administered in accordance with liberal and democratic principles; and although they indicated how new administrations would be set up independent of the Church; the 'Religion' of the Greeks permeated the primordial constitutions completely.

First, the 1822 document begins with the declaration *"In The Name of The Holy and Indivisible Trinity"*.[84] Then -similar to Righas' hypothetical constitution- the body of the 1822 document opens with a section on 'Threskeia'. Here, however, the similarity ends: the 1822 document declared that the 'predominant' 'Threskeia' of the new state was "The Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ."[85] Most profoundly of all, however, was the answer to

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[83] Righas, 1797. *Constitution.* Article 27
[84] Constitution of First National Assembly of Greece at Epidaurus. 1822. Epigraph
[85] Constitution of First National Assembly of Greece at Epidaurus. 1822. Thema A

the question of 'who were the Greeks?' This was the next order of business following on from the establishment of the Orthodox Church as the predominant religion of the new 'Hellenic State'. The new State's citizens, officially called 'Hellenes', were defined thus: "*All the indigenous inhabitants of the Hellenic Territory who believe in Christ are Hellenes.*"[86] This was vague enough to encompass the tiny number of Catholics and protestant residents of the New State. Muslims and Jews, numbering less by the day due to the ongoing genocide that characterised the opening years of the War of Independence, however, were evidently locked out of citizenship. Although this could be seen as a vague Christian-centric stance we have to consider the context of the definition coming immediately after the special status of the Orthodox Church had been set out. This, then, was clearly an indication that -to those who compiled the document- the defining character of the new state -and its' citizens- was their 'Orthodoxy'. This is a clear indication that 'Religion' and 'Secular' was not being completely divided in the new Hellenic State. Ergo, it could be argued, that such a division was not present in the popular mindset. Also evident here is the extent to which Hellenism, contra to popular consensus, traversed the Religious-Secular dichotomy's two polemic camps (by defining the citizens of this temporal State, Hellenes, in respect of their religion). These three aspects, the epithet, the predominance of Orthodoxy, and the Christian-centric definition of a 'Hellene' became common themes of the subsequent constitutions that emerged over the coming decade. This strong influence of Orthodoxy upon the Constitution could further be taken as an example of vernacular understanding of self-identity and nationhood among the 'Greeks in Greece' 'filtering up' towards the Greek literati who had been defining 'Hellenes' in respect of language.[87]

This seemingly 'Orthodox Conservative' element may be part of a deliberate strategy to appear as illiberal as possible to the Holy Alliance in Europe at the time. It should be said that it may be the case that the 1822 constitution may have been a strategically refined document in this regard and as such deliberately engineered to cause the least amount of alarm to the rest of Europe which was, at that time, still reeling from the chaos of revolution. However, the 1823 constitution (often referred to as The Law of Epidaurus) which emerged out of the second national assembly at Astros serves to discredit that argument. The 1823 document largely follows that of the 1822 constitution with only slight amendments however it made direct reference to the American Revolution as a source of

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[86] Constitution of First National Assembly of Greece at Epidaurus. 1822. Thema B
[87] Mackridge, Peter. 2010. *Language and National Identity in Greece, 1766-1976*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p.108

inspiration and included as an appendix a Greek translation of the American constitution.[88]
Clearly these documents, then, were not engineered in such a way as to avoid antagonising
the counter revolutionary heads of Europe's Great Powers.

The 1823 constitution appears to have dropped the epigraph (I have not found any
surviving original document which included it) however it maintained the special status of
Orthodoxy as predominant. Interestingly the definition of a Hellene was supplemented
slightly. Here the 1823 document declared that in addition to residents who believe in
Christ the following categories of people are also 'Hellenes': *"those who speak
Hellenic"*[89], and "*those who believe in Christ and appeal to be resettled in the Hellenic
Territory"* may also be citizens of the Hellenic State. [90] Again, even without the epigraph,
this is evidence of a political movement which on one hand was informed by western
liberalism and secularism and, on the other, was Orthodox to its' core.

The 1827 constitution, ratified by the third national assembly at Troezen and which
ushered in Capodistrias as Governor, is also noteworthy here. It was a decidedly liberal
document which included, for the first time, a segment on popular sovereignty:
*"Sovereignty lies with the people; every power derives from the people and exists for the
and the Nation and it is exercised as defined by the Constitution".*[91] So liberal was this
statement that it is not seen again in Greek constitutions until 1864 when Greece
transitioned from what was, by then, Otho I's reluctant constitutional Monarchy system to
a 'Crowned Republic' under the Danish imported George I. Again, therefore, it can hardly
be said that the war-time constitutions of the new Greek State were deliberately measured
to appease the Holy Alliance. The 1827 constitution also featured the epigraph of *"In The
Name of The Holy and Indivisible Trinity"*[92]and, for the third time, declared the
predominance of the Eastern Orthodox Church. This constitution's definition of a
'Hellene' was again tweaked in that five types of 'Hellene' were listed. *"Those natives*

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[88] Constitution of Second National Assembly of Greece at Astros, 'Law of Epidaurus'. 1823. Appendix. The Constitution of the United States of America. Scanned and digitised at: https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a23-7696-49db-9148-f24dce6a27c8/syn07.pdf (last accessed 01/05/2021).
[89] This, it should be said, is a manifestation of the Greek chauvinism within the various forms of supralocal identity circulating the Greek world at the time; as will be seen shortly, the war effort included a significant number of Albanians and although many of their menfolk were bi-lingual there was still an important distinction made in Greece between Grecophone and Albanian communities.
[90] Constitution of Second National Assembly of Greece at Astros, 'Law of Epidaurus'. 1823. Thema B
[91] Constitution of Third National Assembly of Greece at Troezen. 1827. Scanned and digitised at https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a23-7696-49db-9148-f24dce6a27c8/syn09.pdf (last accessed 01/05/2021).
[92] Constitution of Third National Assembly of Greece at Troezen. 1827.

who believe in Christ" maintained pole position in said list.[93] Below the following criteria were also laid out:

> *"Those under Ottoman yoke who believe in Christ and come to Hellenic territory to fight for it or to live in it…Those born in any country who have a Hellenic father… Those, natives or not, as well as their children, who were citizens of another state… who… come to Hellas and take the Hellenic Oath…[and] Those who come and become naturalised as citizens."*[94]

Notable here is the removal of the linguistic criterion, an indication of the linguistic heterogeneity of the Greeks in the revolutionary era. The Hellenic Oath mentioned in the penultimate criteria opened with an invocation of God (which, again, was uttered in the same breath as an invocation of the 'Patrida') it read as follows:

> *"I swear in the name of the All-Highest and of the fatherland to always come to the assistance of the freedom and well-being of my nation, sacrificing for it even my life, if the need should arise. Further I swear to submit to the laws of my fatherland, to respect the rights of my co-citizens, and to fulfil without fail the obligations of a citizen."*[95]

Whereas the naturalisation process was for those who had taken the Hellenic Oath after living in the territory for several years or who had established important commercial endeavours.[96] From this it can be determined that from 1822 through to the Othonian era the political manifestations of the neo-Hellenes (being, by far, the group of people capable of reading, writing, and understanding a modern national constitution) centred upon Orthodoxy and the Orthodoxy of the new states' citizens. Even in these liberalist documents -documents which set up provisions for the administration of Greece to operate independently from of the Church- there was still very little separating 'Threskeia' and 'Secular'.

Although the notion of the two spheres (and their separation) would have been evident to many of the attendants of these national assemblies -many of whom being members of the literati or inspired by their writings- it has been shown that the fruits of said assemblies did not completely reflect the rising tide of liberalism and secularism which had been coming

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[93] Constitution of Third National Assembly of Greece at Troezen. 1827. Paragraph B.
[94] Constitution of Third National Assembly of Greece at Troezen. 1827. Paragraph B.
[95] Constitution of Third National Assembly of Greece at Troezen. 1827. Hellenic Oath.
[96] Constitution of Third National Assembly of Greece at Troezen. 1827. Paragraphs 30-35

from the West. It has also been shown that this resistance to said tide was not part of a strategy to appease the Holy Alliance. Lastly it was shown at the opening of this section that it is possible that in vernacular discourse the notion of a 'religious' and 'secular' sphere may have been non-existent. This, in turn, may explain why the constitutions look the way they do: instead of reflecting the ideals of the westernised and the literate alone they also reflected the mindset of the new state's average -that is, insulated and illiterate- citizen. The evidence is clear: the 'Greeks in Greece' were not holding 'religion' as something which was divorced from a 'secular sphere' and so to claim that these peoples' actions were purely religious is erroneous: there was clearly a temporal element to the Romans' political ideals and manifestations. It has also been shown that it would be similarly erroneous to describe Greek national consciousness -Byzantinist or Hellenist or otherwise- as being divorced in any way from religion.

Section II: The Constitutions of the Ionian Isles

The Ionian Isles are often treated as the portcullis via which western European ideas of liberalism and Hellenism entered Ottoman Greece. Here, however, I show evidence that when those populations formed their own self-governance that the result was a state which deeply intertwined the Religious and the Secular spheres. Moreover, it should be noted that these islands' constitutions undoubtedly served as inspiration for the documents that would soon be penned by the National Assemblies on the mainland.

The first constitution (1800), as far as my research can tell, handed the Islands back into the hands of the Italian nobles who had been ousted by the French Republic.[97] Although it was printed in Greek it was, as far as I can tell, a return to the pre-French status quo and modelled after the Republic of Ragusa. The new status quo, however, proved deeply unpopular and soon, in 1803, a new constitution was issued. This was decidedly more progressive and laid the foundations of a functioning state. In the years that followed a series of laws were brought into existence via the powers granted by this constitution; including laws which reformed the local church's administration. Also becoming set in stone here was the notion of an official language; although no such declaration was actually made here, it was in these documents that candidates for public offices, for the first time, were commanded to have a grasp of the dominant language of the islands (a

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[97] Mackridge, P. 2014. *The Ionian Islands: Aspects of their History and Culture.* Anthony Hirst and Patrick Sammon. Eds. Cambridge, p.5 from https://www.cambridgescholars.com/download/sample/61768 (Last accessed) 09/01/2020.

local vernacular form of Greek).[98] Crucially, there is evidence of a sea change in the region; for the first time the Greek Orthodox Church is accepted as having 'dominant status' -a trend that really takes off with the advent of the United States of the Ionian Isles in 1815. The third constitution (1806) maintained much of the ground established by the earlier document, the differences being that it rolled back some of the more progressive reforms and essentially handed the state into the hands of a small number of pro-Russian oligarchs. Once suffrage was made more - yet far from wholly – universal under the British, the constitutions begin to reveal more of what was going on in the mindset of the Greeks, rather than that of the Urbanites and Italian nobility.

The constitution of 1817[99] hits the ground running when it comes to matters of religion. In the opening segment of the document the third article brazenly states: *"The dominant religion of these states is the Greek Orthodox religion. Any other form of Christian religion, as will be seen below, is protected there."*[100] It is noteworthy that neither Judaism nor Islam is offered protection here: the Ionian islands may be split between Orthodoxy and Catholicism but woven into the very fabric of its' foundations is the intention that it be a Christian state. Article four highlights this, it reads: *"There shall be no public form of religious worship permitted in the states, except such as relates to the Christian orthodox churches before-mentioned."*[101] Although Catholicism is protected here, then, public Catholic worship is banned alongside that of Islam and Judaism: The United States of the Ionian Islands was, therefore, an Orthodox Christian State which exercised a measure of tolerance towards the religion of its former colonisers.

The extent to which the Church and the State are inseparable in this new, bold, Orthodox state is highlighted in Article 23:

> *"the morals as well as the religion of the country requiring that above all ecclesiastics receive a liberal and convenient instruction, it is declared that one of the first duties, immediately after the meeting of the parliament… will be to take the appropriate measures, first of all for the introduction of elementary schools, therefore for the establishment of a college for the various branches of science, literature and the arts."*[102]

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[98] Constitution of the United States of the Septinsular Republic, 1803. Digitised at http://www.dircost.unito.it/cs/docs/settinsula (Last accessed 09/01/2020).

[99] Constitution of the United States of the Ionian Isles, 1817. Digitalised from *Collection of all the ancient and modern Constitutions, vol. I,* Cassone Typography, Turin 1848. at: http://www.dircost.unito.it/cs/docs/isolejonie.htm (Last accessed 09/01/2020).

[100] Constitution of the United States of the Ionian Isles, 1817. Chapter 1. Article 3.

[101] Constitution of the United States of the Ionian Isles, 1817. Chapter I. Article 4.

[102] Constitution of the United States of the Ionian Isles, 1817. Chapter I. Article 23.

This article, with one hand, places Orthodoxy at the heart of education on the islands whilst, on the other hand, places the burden of said education with the state itself. Such a measure, carried out at federal level, is not alone in evidencing the marriage between state and Church in these islands. At the local level there was also a clear marriage between the Orthodox Church and the Ionian Republic. Section three of the constitution, entitled lists the functions and duties of the municipal administrations amongst them is the notable inclusion of *"religion, morals and public economy".[103]* This is listed alongside themes pertaining to education, industry, agriculture, and trade -religion, here, is given a central place within socio-economic and political life on the islands.

So central is the Church's place in this first Greek Orthodox state in fact, that an entire chapter of the constitution is dedicated to 'the ecclesiastical establishment' which, in section one, lays out in law the make-up of the religious establishment (along the parameters of the already pre-existing Orthodox hierarchy).[104] This section is followed by section two where the constitution reveals the State's role in the Church itself. Outlined here, in constitutional law, are the boundaries and jurisdictions of the Church's bishops.[105] Here the state carves out a role for itself regarding deciding what islands would have bishops, who among them would have the right to address the Patriarch in Constantinople, and even goes as far as to forbid said bishops from extracting any additional funds from the Church's establishment in Constantinople. Article One reads:

> *"It is convenient to grant an archbishop or bishop equally to the island of Ithaca and a bishop to the island of Paxo. It is also stated that the times and means of addressing the most holy head of the Greek Orthodox religion in Constantinople to this purpose will be reserved to… the protector king* [The King of Great Britain]*: well understood, however, that the appointment of these dignitaries of the church should not draw any additional expense from him to the annuities of these states."[106]*

The influence does not only flow from State to ecclesiastical establishment here; Article three sets out the preference for the Bishop of Corfu, or Zakynthos, to be present at the seat of Government for the duration of an entire parliamentary session.[107] Lastly, the following

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[103] Constitution of the United States of the Ionian Isles, 1817. Chapter 3.
[104] Constitution of the United States of the Ionian Isles, 1817. Chapter 5. Section 1.
[105] Constitution of the United States of the Ionian Isles, 1817. Chapter 5. Section 2.
[106] Constitution of the United States of the Ionian Isles, 1817. Chapter 5. Section 2. Article 1.
[107] Constitution of the United States of the Ionian Isles, 1817. Chapter 5. Section 2. Article 3.

article provides the State with the authority *"to make modifications"* to the election of Church dignitaries: if said changes were in line with the decisions of the Patriarch in Constantinople.[108]

In this constitution we therefore observe that the Church has strong ties with the State with both having legal authority to exert influence upon the other. In the meantime, although the Church is in some ways severed from the Patriarch's influence, the Patriarch is gifted what is effectively the power of veto over the state's candidates for ecclesiastical office. In 1817, then, we can see the emergence of a state which, woven into its' very fabric, is a fundamental Orthodoxy whilst we also see an Archbishopric which is placed at the centre of state power. This can be taken as direct evidence of the inability we have to divorce state and faith in our analysis of Greek political aspirations at this time and place. This constitution served as one of the new Hellenic State's inspirations in 1822 when they came to draft their own documents and the continued trend of a deep, inseparable bond between ecclesiastical and political power is corroborates the position taken here that the Ionian State's constitution can be taken as evidence of a wider Greek attitude on the topic of Religion and State. This being despite, of course, the fundamental differences in experiences between the Islanders (who had never experienced Ottoman rule) and the Mainland.

Part IV: Conclusions

In terms of the problematic nature of the religious-Secular dichotomy this has been a fruitful investigation. It has revealed that, to the vernacular Greeks of the early 19th Century, the concept of 'religion' did not exist in the form of a category into which some-but-not-all aspects of their lives could be placed. A further case has been made which showed that no word for 'religious person' or 'non-religious' existed in the way we use it today. Rather everyone was assumed to be 'religious' and it was taken to be a natural aspect of everyday life. So intertwined with everyday life, in fact, that no word or concept existed for 'a religious person' if said person was not an official 'man of cloth'.

The evidence brought forward here has also showcased the non-existence -or at least the diluted strength- of a binary between the categories of 'religion' and 'non-religion' while also highlighting the porous nature between them. Even in the western liberal and secular

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[108] Constitution of the United States of the Ionian Isles, 1817. Chapter 5. Section 2. Article 4.

inspired constitutions, after all, 'Orthodoxy' was held to be the soul of the new Greek States. Still more, the evidence has suggested that in the more vernacular records the 'fatherland' is almost always married up with the Orthodox faith. This in turn implies that the two -the religion and the temporal state- were married in the mindset of the majority of 'Greeks in Greece' at that time. Such a marriage of concepts, I argue, amounts to the Roman identity bearing some form of national consciousness (which I call Byzantinism); contrary to the treatment the Roman identity and the Romaic ideal receive in the current scholarship.

I propose, then, that to frame the revolt, the identity, and the bonds between the rebels as 'religious' or even as 'secular' risks misrepresenting the reality of the time. That reality being that -to the majority of the revolutionaries and the new state's citizens- 'religion' just meant 'a faith' and did not also mean 'the not-secular'. In turn this implies that the bond uniting the Greeks was not a religious sentiment alone for phenomena of the 'secular' sphere were, in their mindset, yet to be partitioned from phenomena of the 'religious' sphere.

Chapter III: From Roman to Hellene

Tracking the meanings, evolutions, and convergences of the Greek endonyms

Part I: Defining 'Roman'

When the terms 'Roman' and 'Hellene' were used in -and in the decades prior to- 1821 they could mean several different things. 'Roman' could refer to: 'a speaker of the Roman tongue (Greek)'; 'an Orthodox Christian'; or, I argue, 'a citizen of the 'to Romaiko' (Roman restoration) to come. Then, after the revolutionary war had erupted, 'Roman' could also mean 'civilian', perhaps even 'apathetic Ottoman subject' or 'willing slave'; or 'an Orthodox subject of the unliberated regions'. Meanwhile, in that time period, 'Hellene' transitioned from meaning 'Pagan' to 'hero' and then to 'fighter' before becoming the official appellation of a citizen of the liberated Greek State. 'Hellene' also meant -to the westernised literati- 'speaker of the Hellenic language' or 'someone who had become culturally Hellenic' (via adoption of said language, culture, and way of life). At the same time 'Roman' was also an exonym used by the Porte to refer to all Orthodox Christians. Meanwhile, all, some, or only one of these meanings could be inferred by the term's use at any one time. To tackle the confusing nature of this issue I will attempt to trace a chronological development of 'Roman', and of 'Hellene' with the idea of highlighting the intersection of the two terms as meaning 'a Christian citizen of a Christian State'.

It is tempting to portray 'Roman' as an exonym imposed by the Ottoman Millet system. Indeed, this was the case for a number of communities such as the Serbs and the Bulgars who, upon Ottoman conquest, found themselves stripped of autocephaly and subsequently grafted into the Rum Millet under the leadership of a hitherto foreign patriarchate at Constantinople. Yet swathes of the Ottoman Empire were inhabited by people -or, rather more accurately, peoples- who had been identifying themselves as 'Roman' for centuries prior to the Tourkokratia.

At the time when the Sultan's armies conquered them, most Greek-speaking communities had been defined (and had self-identified) as 'Romans' by virtue of their Roman

citizenship. Said citizenship had been rolled out to the Greeks (and all other inhabitants of the Empire) by the edict of Caracalla in 212 AD (officially known as the *Constitutio Antoniniana*) which granted *"to everyone in the Roman world the Roman citizenship".[109]* Essentially, therefore, Caracalla's edict granted the appellation of 'Roman' to all free-born inhabitants of the Empire.[110]

Amendments would come to the definition of Roman citizenship (and, ergo, of 'Roman') in the 6th Century AD when Justinian I – the Emperor of what was, by then, an officially Christian State based at Constantinople and inhabited primarily by Grecophones- set about issuing legal reforms. These reforms, in effect, stripped all non-Chalcedonian Christians of Roman citizenship. The result of this soon meant that:

> *"the one and only necessary and sufficient requirement to become a fully-integrated Byzantine citizen after the 6th Century was to be an Orthodox Christian, a member of the Christian society that the Empire represented, a terrestrial image of the Kingdom of Heaven"[111]*

Remaining virtually unchanged throughout the turbulent years between the compilation of Justinian's codex in 529-534 and the fall of Constantinople to Mehmet the Conqueror in 1453 a 'Roman' -in the Greek speaking world view at least- was a Roman citizen: and therefore, by definition, an Eastern Orthodox Christian. 'Roman', then, on the eve of the Tourkokratia meant 'Roman citizen' a temporal and legal status conferred upon all Orthodox Christian inhabitants of the dwindling Empire's territory: but on Orthodox Christians alone. Meanwhile, the language these people spoke (Greek) had become known as 'Roman' during the Byzantine period. [112] As will be shown soon, there is evidence of the term 'Roman' maintaining connotations of both a civic identity and a linguistic (ethnic) identity right up until the eve of the revolt at least.

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[109] Emperor Caracalla. Giessen Papyrus, 40,7-9. AD 212. Quoted in Imrie, Alex. 2018. *The Antonine Constitution: An Edict for the Caracallan Empire*. Netherlands: Brill. p.41

[110] Olivier Hekster, 2008. *Rome and Its Empire, AD 193–284.* United Kingdom: Edinburgh University Press. p. 47.

[111] Ellis, Steven G., Isaacs, Ann Katherine., Hálfdanarson, Guðmundur. 2006. *Citizenship in Historical Perspective.* Italy: Edizioni Plus, Pisa University Press. p.98

[112] Just, Roger. 2016. *Triumph of the Ethnos.* In Tonkin, E. Chapman. M.K. and McDonald, M Eds. *History and Ethnicity.* United Kingdom: Taylor & Francis.

'Roman', remained in use as an endonym by these Greek speaking and Orthodox Christian peoples (and, crucially, their descendants) throughout the Tourkokratia right up until the 1820's where it was substituted for Hellene' (substituted, I say, because the definition of a 'Hellene' given at that time was arguably, that of a 'Roman'; this will be discussed shortly). The question that needs to be answered, then, is this: what did 'Roman' mean in 1821, and, by extension, what hallmarks was one required to possess in order to be a 'Roman'?

Righas', in *Thourios*, reveals that 'Roman' was treated as an ethnie in the vernacular of the time. He called upon the *"Bulgarians, Albanians, Armenians and Romans… for freedom the sword let's all gird and everyone should hear that brave we will be."*[113] Here it is obvious that 'Roman' does not mean 'member of the Rum Millet' (as it so often interpreted as): all but one of the ethnicities Righas listed were a part of that millet. It is also obvious, for the same reason, that he was not using 'Roman' to mean 'Orthodox Christian'. Instead, he was using 'Roman' to demarcate the Grecophones from the likes of Albanians, and Bulgarians to name but a few. This use of the term Roman is repeated by Daniel of Moscopole, a Hellenised Vlach, who in 1794 published a phrasebook to encourage the learning of the Greek language among Bulgars, Vlachs, and Albanians. The phrasebook opened with the following call for said peoples to adopt the Roman language (Greek) in favour of their own tongues:

> *"Albanians, Vlachs, Bulgarians, speakers of other languages, rejoice, and prepare yourselves all of you to become Romans, leaving the barbarian language, voice and customs, that to your descendants will appear like myths."*[114]

We can confidently say, therefore, that at the turn of the 19th Century 'Roman' was being used to refer to 'Grecophones' as a distinct ethnie within the mosaic of people in the Balkans. We also know that this use of 'Roman' persisted right up until 1821, and beyond. This is because of the numerous accounts of Thourios being sang in that time-period. For example, Kordatos claims that Thourios was sang on the island of Spetses in 1821 when

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[113] Righas. 1797, *Thourios*

[114] Daniel of Moscopole, 1794. *Introductory Instruction*. Venice. p.4 Scanned and digitised at https://digitallibrary.academyofathens.gr/archive/item/5599?lang=el (last accessed 05/04/2021).

the revolution was declared there.[115] And the survivors of the battle of Dragastini, before being executed, are reported to have sang Thourios in a last act of defiance. [116] It is noteworthy that Righas, in his other writings designed with a more learned (and more westernised) Grecophone audience in mind, used the term 'Hellene' to refer to the same Greek-speaking community as he referred to as 'Romans' in Thourios. This highlights how 'Roman' as an appellation for the Greek speaking subjects of the Porte remained the appellation of choice in vernacular dialogue among the peoples of the Balkans long after their literate compatriots in the diaspora and the towns had adopted the name of 'Hellene'.

Yet 'Roman' was also being used to mean 'Orthodox Christian' in the early 19th Century. Pappa Evthymio Vlachavas, a priest and a klepht, led a rebellion in Thessaly which was eventually crushed by Ali Pasha who subsequently had Vlachavas executed.[117] In the aftermath of Vlachavas' death a 'klephtic ballad' spread throughout the Ottoman Greek world which detailed a likely fictitious account of his final moments. While not being reliable as an historical account, these ballads, Sung by klephts and their supporters in the vernacular Greek and passed orally from person to person, region to region, provide us today with some insights into the mindsets of the Greeks who were living in and around the mountainous areas that served as Klephtic strongholds. The Ballad of Vlachavas recounts a tale of his final hours where Ali Pasha presses him to convert to Islam (to *"become a Turk, priest, and I will forgive you all"*) yet Vlachavas is said to have replied *"A Roman I was born, a Roman I will die"*.[118] Clearly, in this context 'Roman' was a reference to Vlachavas' Orthodox faith. Mackridge has stated that this 'religious' meaning of 'Roman' was the default understanding of most Ottoman Christian subjects at the time, writing that:

> *"to most Ottoman Orthodox Christians of that time, the world was divided chiefly into Romioi (Orthodox Christians) Aremnides (members of the Armenian Church), Tourkoi (i.e. all of the Muslims), Ovrioi (Jews) and Frangoi (i.e. Catholics and – since the Reformation- Protestants)."[119]*

[115] Kordatos, Yanis. 1957. *History of Modern Greece,* vol. 2. Athens: 20th Century Publications. p.227
[116] Vitti, Mario.1987. *History of Modern Greek Literature*. Athens: Odysseas. p.177
[117] Baggally, John Wortley. 1968. *Greek Historical Folksongs: The Klephtic Ballads in Relation to Greek History, 1715-1821*. United States: Argonaut. p.84-5
[118] Ballad of Vlachavas. Reproduced in Baggally, 1968. p.84
[119] Mackridge Peter. 2008. *Aspects of language and identity in the Greek Peninsula since the Eighteenth century*. https://www.farsarotul.org/nl29_1.htm#_ftn9 (Last accessed 21/7/2018)

In 1815, the term 'Roman' is used in an interesting way in a pamphlet published by the former Metropolitan of Wallachia and penned by an anonymous author. The pamphlet was highly critical of Neophytos Doukas for his early form of Hellenic chauvinism (he wanted Patriarchal backing to extend 'Hellenism' to the rest of the Rum Millet).[120] The anonymous writer replied to this with:

> *"The Hellenes* [Grecophones]*, the Bulgarians, the Vlachs, the Serbs, and the Albanians today form nations of which each has its language. All of these peoples however… united by faith and the Church form one body and nation under the name Graikoi* [Greeks] *or Romans."* [121]

Here the anonymous writer appears to have yielded the linguistic definition of 'Romans' to 'Hellenes' while maintaining the definition of a 'Roman' as an Eastern Orthodox Christian. Interestingly however the statement reads that these people, united under faith and church are 'Greeks or Romans'. This is probably because the liturgy was in the Greek language and so any member of the Church that used the Greek liturgy was ergo a 'Greek'. So, we see here, then, that in the years running up to the 1821 revolt the term 'Roman' was being used to denote the Orthodox religious community. Meanwhile, increasingly, the term Hellene was being used to refer to Greek speakers also.

Here one important distinction must now be drawn. The anonymous pamphlet describes the Romans as being formed out of the Hellenes, the Bulgarians, the Serbs, the Albanians and the Vlachs, (here meaning Wallachians, Moldovians, Vlach shepherds and settled Vlachs elsewhere in the Balkans as they were all Aromanian speakers). This is an exhaustive list of what a 'Roman' was, but it is far from an exhaustive list of the various tribes of peoples who made up the Orthodox community. Rather this is a list of peoples who, at that time, came under the authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople. Hence 'united by Church *and* faith'.

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[120] Mackridge, 2008.
[121] Anonymous. 1815. *Apologia Istoriki.* Quoted in Mackridge, 2008.

Ergo 'Roman' should be seen less as a 'catch all' term to refer to a follower of the 'Orthodox faith' and more as a term with a more limited remit which was used only to refer to the members of the Church of the Romans. This anonymous pamphlet then is informing us that in 1815 the term being used to refer to all peoples whose church used the Greek liturgy were 'Graikoi'. Meanwhile it also informs us that 'Roman' was a term used to refer to the Patriarch's flock: The Rum Millet.

As far as the Greeks were concerned this was consistent with how the term had always been used. 'Roman', had meant 'Roman citizen' and, by definition, meant member of the Church of Constantinople. The two were the same thing until the Tourkokratia. It is unsurprising therefore that after the Fall of Constantinople the Greeks would continue to refer to all members who lived under in the territory of the See of the Church of the Roman State as 'Romans'. Once again, then, we see here that 'Roman', while being used in a very religious way, is still laced with associations with a physical territory (and, perhaps more loosely, with connotations of the State whose citizens made up the congregation).

In the immediate prelude to the 1821 revolt Roman was used in an additional way that is particularly noteworthy. In Makriyannis' memoirs he records a conversation with an excitable man in Roumelia (literally meaning 'land of the Romans' this was the term used to demarcate Continental Greece) amid the rising pre-revolutionary tensions. The man asked him *"What are you thinking, is 'to Romaiko' going to be slow in coming? We'll go to bed with the Turks and wake up with the Romans!?"*[122] This is an interesting piece of evidence; in the context of rumours of a revolt of the Romans Makriyannis is being asked if he believes that the 'Roman' revolt will bring about 'to Romaiko'. 'Romaiko' is the neutral adjectival form of 'Roman' and ergo meant 'The Roman Thing', a colloquialism for 'The Roman Restoration'.

The short excerpt above goes on to specify that in 'to Romaiko' the 'Romans' will have usurped the Turks (this is what is meant by 'we will wake up with the Romans'). Makriyannis' excitable agitator here reveals something else that is interesting about the use of 'Roman' in 1821: it is still being used to refer to a State and to a citizenship status (hence 'wake up with the Romans'). In another excerpt he discusses some of his compatriot's hopes for Ali Pasha to deliver 'to Romaiko'. He wrote that they said *"they*

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[122] Makriyannis, 1907

wanted him to… liberate them, that this tyrant should bring about 'to Romaiko' and the freedom of our Patridia".[123] The use of 'to Romaiko' alongside 'fatherland' here corroborates the argument that 'Roman' was being used to demarcate a temporal 'thing'; a land, a state, and its' people. Also noteworthy here is the implied intertwinement between notions of the fatherland (the physical space) and 'to Romaiko', the restored State of the Romans.

Then, after witnessing a particularly brutal attack and robbery on a woman in the opening months of the revolt Makriyannis became disillusioned with the cause of bringing about 'to Romaiko'. Interestingly, in this excerpt he includes himself as one of the Romans by using 'we'. He wrote: *"And from that point onwards, seeing such virtue practiced, I was sick of 'to Romaiko'; for we are cannibals."*[124] Again, here, it is noteworthy that he is using 'Romans' to refer to the people of 'to Romaiko'.

It is noteworthy that, as Makriyannis' memoirs go on (especially from this clear point of departure) he abruptly transitioned from using Romanisms towards using Hellenisms. Importantly, however, he transitioned into using 'Hellenes' only to refer to the freedom fighters (leaving 'Romans' to mean something more like civilians). In another excerpt, for example, he tells of a priest who performed his duties in front of the Romans yet spied on the 'Hellenes' (the revolutionaries).[125]

The reality is that 'Roman' in Greek vernacular usage could -and did- mean both 'member of the Roman Church (at Constantinople)' and a 'Greek speaker' in the early 19th Century Ottoman Balkans. The two terms were not mutually exclusive because, originally, the majority of the Byzantine Empire's citizens (and, by definition, all members of the congregation of Constantinople) were Greek speakers. The two 'communities' had always been one in the same and, therefore, 'Roman' linguistic community and 'Roman' religious community were not mutually exclusive.

Said community had been calling themselves Roman since gaining citizenship of the Empire and had continued to do so throughout the Byzantine era and Tourkokratia. We

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[123] Makriaynnis, 1907
[124] Makriyannis, 1907
[125] Makriyannis, 1907

then saw how this connection to a Roman state was still being used in the evidence from Makriyannis. In 1821 'Roman', therefore meant the same thing it always had: 'citizens of the Roman state'; it just so happened that in 1821 said state was waiting to be restored (we will see more evidence of this destined restoration in a later chapter). Meanwhile, it also just so happened that the vast majority of people who felt an attachment to said State-in-stasis were Grecophones (it is a matter of no controversy to say that, although the Byzantine Empire had always been polyglot it had been dominated by Greek speakers for over a millennia prior to the Fall). I say 'vast majority', however, because there is a strong case to be made that Albanian Christians (even non-Hellenised ones) and Hellenised non-Grecophones also felt said attachment to that bygone culturally-religiously-and-linguistically-Greek-dominated state via either their own Hellenisation or due to their own community's historical memory of Byzantine citizenship (again, this is the subject of a later discussion). For now, it can be concluded that in 1821 those who self-styled themselves as 'Romans', therefore, were always Orthodox Christians, often Grecophone (so much so that Greek was named 'the language of the Romans') and were doing so out of a historical connection to the Greek-dominated Orthodox Empire of Constantinople.

Confusion in this model arises, however, when we delve deeper into who the conspirators wanted to be involved in the revolt, who they wanted to be involved in the new State, and who, in the end, did get involved. This is covered in closer detail in the following chapter. For now, it is sufficient to say that it is well known that the conspirators envisioned (and many assumed) a pan-Rum millet revolt. The assumption was that the restoration of a Christian multi-ethnic and polyglot Empire (albeit dominated by Greeks, as the Rum Millet had been and the Byzantine Empire before that) would be something that the likes of Roumanians, Bulgarians, and Serbs would like to see out of an assumed shared sense of 'Orthodox Universalism' and a shared hatred of Turkish dominion, regardless of these peoples' total lack of historical attachment to the Roman State. Indeed, many of these peoples had experienced a taster of how a Greek dominated State would affect them via the Phanariot monopoly of the Rum Millet's administration and had found the taste bitter indeed. In the end the lure of achieving 'to Romaiko' was only strong enough to pull 'the masses' of three very specific groups into the conflict: Greeks; Hellenised non-Greeks; and other Christian former citizens of the Empire (principally, Albanians). This will all become evidenced in the following chapter.

Before going on to cover the evolution and convergence of 'Hellene' with 'Roman' there is one last conclusion to draw from the evidence above. The very fact that Makriyannis implied in his memoirs that the fight had originally been for 'to Romaiko' should be seen as a 'smoking gun' for the presence and power of a Roman identity (in the political sense) in the mindset of the 'average Greek' of 1821 and ergo corroborates the argument that the revolutionaries were taking up arms to see the core objective of Byzantinism realised: 'to Romaiko', the Roman restoration itself.

Part II: Hellene

The way 'Hellene' was used prior to 1821 -in literati circles at least- has been alluded to above already: to refer to a linguistic group. This was the result of the enlightenment, however, by 1821, the 'Hellenes' had evolved from 'linguistic group' to 'ethnicity'. This can be traced in the repeated usage of terms like 'Descendants of the Hellenes'. Alexander Ypsilantis' proclamation ended with such an image:

> *"Let us, therefore, call again, O brave, and generous Hellenes, to freedom in the classical land of Hellas. Let us organize a battle between Marathon and Thermopylae. Let us fight in the tombs of our Fathers, who, in order to set us free, fought and died there. "[126]*

Meanwhile, in January 1822 at the national assembly of Epidaurus, the 'ethnic' nuances of 'Hellene' reared their heads also. Here the 'declaration of independence' was issued which began with the following line: *"We, the descendants of the wise and noble people of Hellas".[127]*

The extent to which vernacular discourse at this time, however, reflected the above usage is up for debate. The above were documents penned by westernised literati Greeks and were largely designed for such a readership or, -especially in the case of the latter source-

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[126] Ypsilantis, Alexander. 1821. *Proclamation of February 24, 1821.* Issued at the general camp of Iasi. Digitised at http://www.myriobiblos.gr/texts/greek/1821_na_ipsosomen_to_simeion.html (Last accessed 14/04/2020).
[127] *Proclamation of Independence*. Given the Greek National Assembly at Epidaurus on January 27, 1822. Reproduced in Roupp, Heidi. 1996. *Teaching World History: A Resource Book*. New York: M. E. Sharpe Inc. p.222

western Europe itself. Ideas of a defined linguistic community called 'the Hellenes' (a community who enjoyed a line of continuity reaching back to Marathon) had existed in these circles for decades by 1821. Meanwhile, in the opening years of the war of so-called Hellenic liberation, Greek vernacular dialogue had begun to use 'Hellene' to denote the fighters of the revolution alone (who we will see in the next chapter were quite a heterogenous group, ethnically speaking). This was the trend revealed in Makriyannis' memoir mentioned above and was also confirmed by Dakin's research.[128]

The term 'Hellene', in vernacular use, had clearly followed a different evolutionary path. It is well accepted that 'Hellene' in popular discourse meant 'pagan' during the Tourkokratia.[129] However Livanios has traced the development of an association between the pre-Christian pagan Hellenes of Hellas and the notion of a 'superhuman': the result of which is that by the 19th Century peasant dialogue particularly was associating 'Hellene' with 'hero'. Livanios explained that:

> *"'Helene' became in their eyes a mythological superhuman, a hero with tremendous power and endurance, capable of performing astonishing feats. The physical prowess of the 'Helene' was profoundly admired, and this admiration left some traces in folk songs, folk tales, and legends."*[130]

It is important in this context to note that such qualities as noted above were noted by Baggally in his research of klephtic ballads to have been highly regarded by the klephts (who made up much of the Greek warbands' numbers). [131] clearly, therefore, these superhuman Hellenes possessed -according to 19th Century Greek vernacular culture- qualities which were cherished by the warriors of the revolution.

Such an evolution from 'pagan' to 'hero' is certainly traceable: Roudometof's research corroborated the association of 'Hellene' with 'superhuman' in the late 18th Century. He wrote that, at that time:

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[128] Dakin, 1973. p.22
[129] Livanios, Dimitris. 2008. *Religion, Nationalism, and Collective Identities*. In Zacharia, Katerina Ed. 2008. Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity. United Kingdom: Ashgate. p.258
[130] Livanios, 2008. p.258
[131] Baggally, 1968. p.15

> *"the ethnic Greeks' view of their ancient Greek ancestors, the Hellenes… they considered* [them to be] *mythical beings of extraordinary stature and power, capable of superhuman tasks. Popular folk tales dated the Hellenes' existence to the dawn of time."[132]*

Similarly, Kakrides' research concluded that the oral traditions among the Greeks in the early 19th Century continued to imagine the 'Hellenes' as a mythical race of giants *"tall as aspens… with long hands… [able to] carry marble masonry with one hand"*.[133] Kaplanis has also identified a continuity in the way 'Hellene' was used between this oral tradition and some of the memoirs of the revolutionaries of 1821.[134] In this sense it is likely that the adoption of the term 'Hellene' to denote the fighters of 1821 was the result of this emerging association of 'Hellene' meaning 'superhuman' or 'hero' in these early 19th Century oral traditions.

This usage of 'Hellene' would have been quite compatible with a wider 'Roman' identity. However, there is strong evidence to suggest that the fighters -and possibly the civilian vernacular Greeks in the revolutionary regions as well- began to actively replace 'Roman' with 'Hellene' when identifying themselves (which will be covered shortly). It is likely the case, then, that the average participants of the revolt originally adopted the term 'Hellene' in a way that was merely a reference to oneself as a 'hero'. However, this seems to have rapidly changed (as will be shown soon). That being said, it is stark that the fighters of the Hellenic revolution have been oft evidenced in the historiography to have been yet to adopt a Hellenic identity even after the revolt broke out in 1821. This implies that they were identifying via the pre-existing Roman terminology and framework which is accepted to have been extant at the time.

Returning, however, to the adoption of the appellation 'Hellene' sometime soon after 1821, Baggally, in his collection of folk songs from Greece prior to the 1821 revolt noted that:

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[132] Roudometof, 1998. p.19
[133] Kakrides, Ioannis. 1956. Ancient Greeks and Greeks of 1821. Greece: Thessaloniki. p.83
[134] Kaplanis, Tassos. A. 2014. *Antique names and self-identification: Hellenes, Graikoi, and Romaioi from late Byzantium to the Greek Nation-State. In Tziovas, Dimitris. 2014. Re-imagining the Past: Antiquity and Modern Greek Culture.* United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

The bond of Christianity and of spiritual allegiance to the Byzantine Empire is felt, and occasionally finds expression in such phrases as 'Quit yourselves like Christians and Romei [Romans]'; but not until the actual beginning of the War of Independence do we find in a klephtic ballad (that of Diakos) the phrase 'Quit yourselves like Hellenes and like Greeks [Graikos]'. The Hellenic idea had been growing in the nation for some time before but in this respect the klephts and armatoli were actually behind the rest of the nation…."[135]

The klephtic ballad about the death of Diakos mentioned above was heard and written down in 1822 commemorated the death in the first months of the war of one of the klephtic warlords, Athanasios Diakos, and is the first klephtic ballad -as far as I or Baggally can tell- to include the term 'Hellenes'. Notably the line *"quit yourselves like Hellenes and Graikos"* replaced here a pre-existing trope of the Klephtic ballads: *"quit yourselves like Christians and Romans".[136]* The interesting thing here is the way in which 'Hellenes' is used as something separate from -yet associated with- 'Graikos'. Similarly notable here is the way 'Roman' was evidently seen also as something separate -yet associated- with 'Christians'. In terms of the latter this corroborates the previous argument that not all Christians were Romans, but all Romans were Christians.

'Graikos' was rarely used by Greeks themselves, but we saw earlier how 'Greeks' was used to refer to people who belonged to a Greek Church (in the liturgical sense) and so Graikos here probably corresponds with 'Christians'. This implies that 'Hellenes' replaced 'Romans'. It is possible here that 'Hellene' is being used to refer to fighters (possibly fighters capable of heroism and/or superhuman acts as seen above) as opposed to civilians. This would tie in with the evidence from Makriyannis' memoirs and Dakin's research alluded to above.

Perhaps the starkest piece of evidence for the adoption of Hellenisms among the average participants of the rebellion, comes from the eye-witness account of Ambrosius Phrantzes. Phrantzes explained the reasoning behind the Greek massacre of the Turks at Neokastro:

[135] Baggally, 1968. p.84-5
[136] Baggally, 1968. p.84-5

> *"They* [the surrendering Turks] *said to the* [low ranking soldiers] *'you Romans'. It was as if they called them 'you slaves'! The Hellenes not bearing to hear the word...* [killed them]*."*[137]

This implies the existence of a rift between 'Romans' and 'Hellenes' in vernacular dialogue as early as the fall of Neokastro in August 1821. The implied distinction being between heroic fighters (Hellenes) and ergo 'liberated' on one side and 'unliberated' Romans (and ergo, still seen as 'slaves' and perhaps even as 'willing slaves') on the other. It is easy to see how this usage of Hellene evolved from 'active participant in the revolt' to 'liberated'. Similarly, it is easy to see how Roman evolved from 'non-combatant' to 'unwilling to revolt' to 'willing slave', especially in the context of 'Roman' continuing to be the term used by the Turks for all the Porte's Orthodox subjects. Perhaps, by August 1821, it became an insult to be homogenised alongside the other Romans (Greek or no) who (for whatever reason) did not rise for liberty.

It appears, then, that after the war had broken out 'Hellene' began to be adopted by the fighters who, in turn, rejected 'Roman' which had now evolved to refer to those Greeks who were 'unwilling' or 'unable to rise'. Given that the latter were by far the most numerous of the two groups and had remained under the authority of the Sultan (against whom the former were actively rebelling) this seems like a logical progression.

Yet all of this evidence dates only to after the outbreak of the 1821 revolt and from after the arrival of swathes of westernised Greeks and European philhellenes. Further, most of the evidence dates from after the establishment of national councils and assemblies (made up largely of members of the intelligentsia); and after said councils chose to portray a very specifically engineered image of the Greek's and their struggle which was designed for maximum impact amongst the classically educated ruling classes of early 19th Century Europe (as seen by Miller's evidence in the introduction to this thesis). And so, it is almost a moot point to make that the liberated and/or revolutionary Greeks of August 1821 onwards were calling themselves 'Hellenes', for it is accepted that when they rose in March they were not. At that moment they were calling themselves Romans and were thus following their Roman identity to the realisation of a political destiny which was

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[137] Phrantzes, Ambrosius. 1839 'Abridged history of the Revived Greece' vol. 1. Greece: Athens. p. 398

mentioned above by Makriyannis ('to Romaiko'). Furthermore, this adoption was originally an invocation of oral traditions about big brave men further indicating that it was not until well after making the decision to rebel against the Porte that the average revolutionary began to morph into a self-styled Hellene; and it was longer still before what they meant by 'Hellene' corresponded with what the literati did.

Regardless, the usage of the appellation of 'Hellene' would have been strengthened in 1822 when the revolutionaries found themselves to be officially named 'Hellenes' via their citizenship of the provisional government's territories. Afterall this 'citizenship factor' has been shown to have been the foundation of the pre-existing Roman identity. The same assembly who put out the above proclamation about the modern Greeks being the descendants of the ancients also penned a constitution. This constitution, as we saw in the previous chapter, defined 'Hellene' in black and white and this time they did not draw upon notions of classical continuity, oral traditions of giants and heroes, or ethnocentrism. Instead, the definition of a 'Hellene' which was set in writing in 1822 (and remained as such all the way through the war and beyond), was essentially a plagiarism of the definition of a Roman citizen in the Byzantine Empire: any resident who believes in Christ.[138]

Here, then, the definition of 'Hellene' can largely be seen to have converged with that of 'Roman'. 'Hellene' transitioned from 'Greek speaker' to 'Greek speaking descendant of classical Hellenes' to 'Christian inhabitant of the Hellenic Government's territory' in literary circles. Meanwhile, in vernacular circles, it evolved first from 'pagan' to 'superhuman', and then to 'hero' before transitioning into 'fighter' then to 'liberated' before arriving at 'Christian inhabitant' of the aforementioned government's territory. Only in the second national assembly (as we saw previously) the definition of 'Hellene' was supplemented with 'Greek speaking' and this was subsequently dropped again in 1827 (again, as we saw previously). So, by mid-way through the war, while the vernacular discussion was calling all fighters and possibly all liberated peoples 'Hellenes' the official position was that a 'Hellene' was a Christian inhabitant of the Hellenic territory who more than likely spoke Greek. Meanwhile, the definition of 'Roman' had always been Christian inhabitant of the Roman State (regardless of whether it was asleep or not) who -more likely

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[138] Constitution of First National Assembly at Epidaurus, 1822. Thema B.

than not- spoke Greek. Although 'Hellene' seems to have been adopted in place of 'Roman' at some point during the war this does not constitute a transformation of the vernacular Greek's identity. The semantics may have changed, but the meaning of the appellation that the Greeks were now willing to massacre the likes of the prisoners at Neokastro for had remained largely steadfast.

Part III: Synthesis of 'Byzantinism' and 'Hellenism'

It is not only in the way in which the appellations collided to form a new meaning of Hellene that one can find evidence of a synthesis between the Roman and Hellenic ideals. In numerous publications by neo-Hellenes themselves, as well as in more official documents such as the constitutions alluded to above we can find that, contrary to the traditional depiction of the revolt being the brainchild of the westernised liberals among the literati and mercantile classes, the gradual move towards Greek liberation constantly operated within a Byzantinist framework. This is somewhat surprising for the traditional view of Greek historiography is that the Byzantine era was rejected by said classes until the arrival -in the 1860's and 70's- of Constantine Paparrigopoulos whose tomes recentred the Byzantine era within the narrative of Hellenic continuity.[139] Yet here, as will be shown now, the spectre of Byzantium makes its' presence known in the written record.

Section I: Proclamations

One of the sources cited above, the 'Proclamation of Independence' is a good starting point. Buried in amongst such neo-Hellenic nuances as the aforementioned reference to being the descendants of the Hellenes is a subtle, yet profound, nod to the Byzantine past. The document proclaims that, to the Greeks, it was:

> *"no longer possible to suffer to the point of numbness and self-contempt the cruel yoke of the Ottoman state, which has weighed upon us for more than four centuries… After years of slavery, we have finally been compelled to take up arms, to avenge ourselves and our country against a tyranny so frightful and in its very essence unjust as to be neither equal nor even comparable to any other. The war we are waging against the Turks, far from being founded in*

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[139] Karakasidou, Anastasia N. 2009. *Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood: Passages to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia, 1870-1990*. Ukraine: University of Chicago Press. p.90

demagoguery, seditiousness or the selfish interests of any one part of the Greek nation, is a national and holy war, the object of which is to reconquer our rights to individual liberty, property and honor," [140]

First of all, the mention of the Ottoman State weighing upon 'us' for a period of four centuries brings the Greek struggle of 1821 into direct continuity with the fall of the Byzantine Empire. Inclusion of the word 'we' here means that the picture painted is one of the descendants of the Byzantines rising to regain their independence. This is clearly, therefore, evidence of a feeling of a Byzantine identity and ideal amid the Greek statesmen and warriors of 1821.

This continuity with Byzantium and the feeling of affinity to a Byzantine State is further implied by the reference to 'we have finally been compelled to take up arms, to avenge ourselves and our country'. Then, moving on from here, the proclamation challenges the assertion that the fight for 'to Romaiko' was a religious and ergo not a national ideal: it directly references the fight to avenge Byzantium as both a 'national' and a 'holy' war. This notion of faith and the nation being intertwined can be taken as both a continuation of the common 'faith and fatherland' trope we saw earlier, and as an indication that the Roman ideal was centred around the re-establishment of the Christian State at Constantinople.

Earlier in the war another proclamation was issued which also showcases this hybrid between Hellenic and Byzantine concepts. When Alexander Ypsilantis issued his proclamation at Iasi on February 24, 1821, he concluded the call to arms with a direct invocation to ancient Hellas which read:

> *Let us, therefore, call again, O brave, and generous Greeks, to freedom in the classical land of Greece. Let us organize a battle between Marathon and Thermopylae. Let us fight in the tombs of our Fathers, who, in order to set us free, fought and died there. The blood of the tyrants is accepted in the shadow of Epaminondas Thivaios, and of the Athenian Thrasyboulos, who defeated the*

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[140] Proclamation of Independence by the Greek National Assembly at Epidaurus on January 27, 1822. Reproduced in Heidi, 1996. p.222

thirty tyrants; and Syracuse, in fact to that of Miltiades and Themistocles of Leonidas and the Three Hundred, [141]

Clearly Ypsilantis was laying on a thick layer of Hellenic imagery here. However, a more subtle nod to the Byzantine heritage of the Greeks was made around half way up that proclamation where he penned: *"It is time to shake off this unbearable yoke, to liberate the Homeland… to raise the point by which we always win… the Cross".* [142] On one hand a clear reference is made here to a physical territory which the Greeks will be liberating: an important detail in the argument that the Byzantine ideal constituted a form of national consciousness. The Byzantine element of this excerpt, however, is the reference to 'raising the point by which we are always victorious… the cross'. This, in my surmising, is a clear reference to the founder of that homeland, Constantine The Great's slogan 'En Tou To Nika' (meaning 'In this, victory'), the Greek variance of 'In Hoc Signio Vinces' (in this sign thou shalt conquer). This may provisionally seem like a far fetch, but in the context of Ypsilantis' flag (which will be a topic of a later chapter) it is quite likely: the flag he raised at Iasi bore a cross with the epigraph corresponding to En Tou To Nika in the blank spaces created by the cross's lengths (the same design is shown on the title image of this thesis).

Section II: The 'foreign' author of the national anthem

If any single source can highlight the cohabitation which Hellenism and Byzantinism enjoyed in the early 19th Century it is the poem that has since become the modern Greek state's (and Cyprus') national anthem. Currently only the first two stanzas are sung but the 'Hymn to Liberty' originally ran to 158 stanzas in length. [143] The Hymn was written by Solomos in 1823 on Zakynthos (called Zante today, it was one of the islands of the Septinsular Republic in Solomos' time) and was printed later that year in Missolonghi (which was at that time the capital of Western Continental Greece).

A number of Solomos' stanzas clearly highlight the author's neo-Hellenism. Stanza two (which is repeated periodically throughout) and stanza 13 are the best examples of this. In the second stanza Solomos writes: *"By the bones of the Hellenes coming out* [from their

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[141] Alexander Ypsilantis. 1821. *Proclamation*. Given at Iasi on February 24. Digitised at http://www.myriobiblos.gr/texts/greek/1821_na_ipsosomen_to_simeion.html (Last accessed 21/05/2020).

[142] Alexander Ypsilantis. *Proclamation*.

[143] Solomos, Dionysios. 1823. *Hymn to Liberty*. Missolonghi. Digitised at at http://www.greek-language.gr/digitalResources/literature/tools/concordance/browse.html?cnd_id=10&text_id=3384 (Last accessed 09/01/2020).

consecrated graves], *and by your former valour – hail, oh, hail, liberty!"[144]* In the thirteenth Stanza, meanwhile the poet writes: *"your feet taking you* [homeward], *moving too swiftly, you stumble upon the stones and soil which remember your glory"*.[145] The context of this section of the poem is important to the translation here: in the stanzas running up to this section Solomos is telling how 'liberty' is being rejected by Europe and being sent back to the Greeks (Solomos writes 'to your children' but the context could be taken to even imply 'orphans'). It is important to note that the tone of the poem leaves the reader under no illusion: liberty is not being sent back to Greece as a gift, the tale Solomos recants here is more akin to liberty being 'sent packing' – he describes her as being turned away at every door she knocks upon.

In my surmising Solomos here is referring to ancient Hellenes specifically (due to the references to coming out from graves, stones that 'remember' 'past glory', and 'former valour'). However, Solomos does certainly use 'Hellenisms' throughout the poem in reference to the modern era also (he refers to the Greek people as Hellenes and to Greece as Hellas). This, then, can be taken as strong evidence to suggest that Solomos is firstly, invoking classical Hellas; and secondly, treating classical Hellas and contemporary Greece as being two points in a continuous line. This interpretation fits well with the theme of the poem: the story of 'liberty' returning to Greece with inference being made to Greece being the birthplace of 'liberty'. This is a clear reference to the democracy of the classical period. We can be confident, therefore, that Solomos is referencing the Hellenes of the classical period, but not exclusively: he clearly writes as if there is no exclusivity between modern Greeks and their forebears of antiquity. There is no evidence, it should be pointed out, of Solomos treating the Roman era as being divorced from said line of continuity. It should also be highlighted that this poem was written two years after the outbreak of the war (and, ergo, it was written after the establishment of a provisional state which bore the title of 'Hellenic').

It must be pointed out, before I delve deeper into this analysis, that up for debate is Solomos' credibility and his reliability as a witness to the mindset of the Greeks of Zakynthos (his home Island) - never mind the Greeks of the other Ionian Isles amd let alone the Greeks of the mainland. Although taking pains to write the hymn in a demotic

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[144] Solomos, 1823
[145] Solomos, 1823

Greek it is an inescapable fact that he had an entirely different lived experience and background to the speakers of the various vernacular Greek dialects. Solomos was the naturalised illegitimate son of Italian and he spoke - and wrote, profusely - in Italian as his mother tongue. I have found no evidence of him ever setting foot on the mainland and it is accepted in the historiography that he was not a fluent speaker of Zantiote Greek, let alone the demotic dialects of the mainland. It is possible that his mother (a housemaid in his father's service) was originally from the Mani, but this is not definitively known. Besides, even if she were, his lack of grasp of demotic Greek would imply that they conversed in Italian more so than in his mother's tongue. What is uncontroversially known, however, is that Solomos was classically educated in Italy and was greatly inspired by Western European poets (Lord Byron being a notable member of that club). It is little wonder, therefore, that he would emulate common notions of Hellenic continuity in his poetry; such was the school of thought amidst the educating establishments of Europe at the time. A cursory read through of Byron's *'The Isles of Greece'* would testify to that![146] Ergo the extent to which his penmanship is reflective of the average agent of the rebellion is certainly within doubt. In my surmising, however, it speaks volumes to Solomos' appreciation and familiarity of the average Greek vernacular that he made great effort to depart from writing his poetry in Italian (at which he was already a recognised master) and to subsequently switch to writing in Greek (and not the Greek of the classically educated, but the vernacular Greek he would have heard all around him in the 1810's and 20's in the Ionian Isles).

I have found that even in this poem - written by someone who ought to be considered a foreign observer to the revolution - Solomos carries with him notions of a 'Byzantinist' nature -which I will go on to highlight below. If even he - a classically educated Italian who never set foot on the mainland - could emulate Byzantinist notions in his works then it would be little wonder that his contemporaries on the mainland would reveal Byzantinism in their respective works also. These notions, after all, would be more common in an area which had actually experienced a lengthy period of distinct Byzantine rule -a description which does not sit comfortably with the Ionian Isles. Also, it should be said, as far as my research has found, these notions were not present in the classical curricula of Europe and

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[146] Baron Byron, George Gordon Byron. 1887. *The Isles of Greece: With Notes.* United Kingdom: J. Wilson and Son, University Press.

they were equally absent from the mindset of the likes of Byron and other western philhellenes who frequented Solomos' Isles.

Before I go on to show examples of this Byzantinism within Solomos' '*Hymn to Liberty*' it is an interesting thought that this Byzantinism possibly came to him via his mother who was a poorly educated maid and possibly from the Mainland. Although this can never be proven there is logic within this possibility. As will be seen in a following section, where I go on to analyse the Ionian Isles more generally, such cross pollination between the mainland and the isles was not a rarity. Therefore, if Solomos' Byzantinist tropes did not come from his mother then there is a strong chance that they are the result of a more general influence from mainlanders arriving on the islands (in their thousands) throughout the decades precluding 1821.

As the story of 'Liberty' returning to Greece gets to Solomon's recanting of the war that was currently raging between Greek and Turk the poet begins to reference a number of religious themes. This is to be expected; the war was largely accepted as being one of Orthodox (if not Christian as a whole) versus Muslim. In Stanza 68, for example, Solomos paints a scene of one side crying Allah in battle whilst the other side, who are winning, are described as 'Christians' whose war cry is 'Fire!'.[147] This segment of the poem includes reference to the siege of Tripolitsa and the massacre of the Muslims which followed: the notion of the 'Cross overcoming the Crescent' is repeated in stanza 73.[148] Here Solomos then further indicates in stanzas 151-3 that the Kings of Europe should 'look to the Cross' in Greece and see how malignantly Christianity has been treated by the Turks.[149] Again, the appeal here is for European intervention on the grounds of bonds of religion, despite the split between Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant.

It is not only in the context of Christian versus Muslim that Solomos invokes Christianity. Towards the end of the poem, he turns his attention to the civil conflict between the Greeks referring to 'innocent' 'Christian' blood being spilt by 'brothers' in stanzas 144-156.[150] In this section, and in the final two stanzas, Solomos sticks with Christian imagery in calls to

[147] Solomos, 1823
[148] Solomos, 1823
[149] Solomos, 1823
[150] Solomos, 1823

Europe to stand with the Greek revolutionaries.[151] In the final two stanzas, for example, Solomos essentially accuses the 'Kings of Europe' of 'striking down the Cross' if they opt not to intervene.[152] We see here, then, a notion that the Greek cause is one of Christianity but to say that it is so, simply because they are fighting non-Christians is disingenuous for he acknowledges some Christians are fighting one another, and that Christians in Europe are just as capable of threatening this 'Christian cause' as Turkish Muslims are.

So, if we accept that the struggle is not seen as Christian solely due to the fact that the war is against a Muslim people then we can begin to see Solomos' indication that the cause is a Christian one simply because the notion of Christianity and the notion of an independent Greek State are inseparable. This would, in my surmising, place Solomos' views of the struggle within the sphere of 'Byzantinism'. Further evidence of such views is revealed by Solomos' depictions of a symbiosis between 'Christianity', 'liberty', 'fatherland' and the clergy. This is where the Byzantinist tropes most obviously rear their heads. In Stanza 148 Solomos blatantly writes that the fighting is: *"for Religion and for fatherland'*.[153] In Stanza 115 religion and liberty are linked even more (the mere inclusion of religion in a theme to liberty would infer a link anyway): here he writes *"let every stone be a headstone to religion and liberty"*.[154] The indication here that religion and liberty share the same physical space for memorialisation in the graves of martyrs to the Greek cause. Such imagery, of Christianity and the liberty of the Greeks (which infers Greek self-sovereignty under a Greek State) sharing a physical space can be, I argue, an invocation of the image of the Greek's attempts to bring about -or, more accurately, to restore- a State in the temporal sphere which reflects the Kingdom of Heaven (this will be further explored in a following chapter). Also important here is the link between the stones that remember liberty's past glory in stanza 13 and the stones which now commemorate religion and liberty in this stanza: this can be taken as evidence of Solomos' view that the Christian period sits comfortably within the line of continuity between the Hellenes of the classical age and the Hellenes of the rebellion. Lastly, in stanza 89, Solomos references 'religion' coming to the cause of liberty as an ally.[155] Specifically, here he is referencing men of cloth who,

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[151] Solomos, 1823
[152] Solomos, 1823
[153] Solomos, 1823
[154] Solomos, 1823
[155] Solomos, 1823

literally, joined the revolt in high numbers (especially the lower echelons of the Orthodox priesthood).

Such strong ties between the notions of fatherland; faith; and freedom here is evidence of these themes being held by Solomos -and ergo, possibly, to the Greeks in general- as something which was indivisible. Such a feeling of an oppressed population within a physically defined fatherland which is indivisible from Christianity can, in my surmising, be taken as evidence of notions of Byzantinism even within a poem as rich with neo-Hellenisms as this one.

This is cemented in stanza 113 where Solomos makes a direct reference to Constantinople, and to Rome, writing "*and to where Hagia Sophia lays amidst the seven hills*".[156] This is clearly an invocation of the Byzantine heritage of the Greeks in their fight to bring about liberation and serves as an indication of the ways in which Byzantinism and Hellenism were blended and merged, just as the definitions of 'Hellene' and 'Roman' intersected.

[156] Solomos, 1823

Chapter IV: A Heterogenous Revolution

The regional, linguistic, and ethnic diversity of the Greeks in 1821

Part I: Regional and vernacular divisions

When one dives into the details of a national uprising -a war of independence especially- one may reasonably expect to find that the people in question felt that they collectively constituted 'a nation' and as such felt themselves to be homogenous. The Greeks of 1821, however, were extremely heterogenous. Examining the ways in which the Greeks were divided is an important undertaking for the understanding of the identity of the revolutionaries. It is only in appreciating the divisions (specifically pertaining to identity) within the Greek camp that we can truly understand the bonds that united them. It is with the aim of achieving said understanding that this chapter seeks to highlight the heterogeneity of the Greeks and to subsequently explore the factors which made them feel homogenous regardless. Said factors, which bound the Greeks into a supralocal community, are then defined in order for a definition of the complex nature of said identity to be provided.

At Missolonghi in 1823, Byron, in the midst of the war for Greek liberation, commented to his companion (William Parry, who later published a work detailing his experiences as the famous Philhellene's confidant) that the Greeks, essentially, did not constitute a nation. Although principally concerned with the lack of distinctive features among the Greek peoples (to demarcate them from their neighbours, a common view at that time of what constituted 'a nation') Byron also highlighted the regional and cultural divisions within the Greek camp. His monologue was recorded by Parry as follows:

> *"We must not forget, though we speak of Greece and the Greeks, that there is no distinct country and no distinct people. There is no country, except the Islands, with a strongly-marked boundary separating it from other countries, either by physical properties, or by the manners and language of the people which we can properly call Greece. The boundaries of ancient Greece are not the boundaries of modern Greece, or of the countries inhabited by those to whom we give the name of Greeks. The different tribes of men, also, to whom we give this one general name, seem to have little or nothing in common more than the same faith and the same hatred of the Turks, their oppressors… they are now divided by more local jealousies, and more local distinctions, than in the days of their ancient glory, when Greece had no enemies but Greeks. We must not suppose under our name of Greeks, an entire, united, and single people, kept apart from all others by strongly-marked geographical or moral distinctions. On the*

contrary, those who are now contending for freedom are a mixed race of various tribes of men, having different apparent interests, and different opinions. Many of them differ from and hate one another, more even than they differ from and hate the Turks, to whose maxims of government and manners some of them, particularly the primates, are much attached. It is quite erroneous, therefore, to suppose under the name of Greece, one country, or under the name of Greeks, one people."[157]

Although it is noteworthy that Byron noted that the Greeks were united by two things (hatred of the Turks and a common faith) this is an oversimplified representation. As we will see there were many Orthodox communities who looked upon the Greek cause with apathy and others, still, who had experienced Turkish rule via their coreligionist Greeks. The important element here is that Byron could identify little to demarcate the Greeks from their neighbours and, when looking for such a feature, found only regional and local divisions among the "mixed race of various tribes". The striking thing about this excerpt is that Byron, a Philhellene and a romantic to the end, would desperately have wanted the Greeks to be a united and distinct people (specifically he, and other philhellenes, would have wanted to find the modern Greeks to be a distinguishable image of their classical forebears). Yet, after extensive travel and correspondence throughout Greece, and after months of attempting to bring the disparate factions of the Greeks into an accord, he could not help but recognise the reality on the ground: 'Greek' was a fluid appellation and the 'Greeks' themselves were a kind of confederation of clans and locales rather than a national body moving towards one goal. St. Claire explained the regional divisions more specifically, writing that:

"Peloponnesians felt themselves different from the Roumeliotes across the Corinthian Gulf, the Islanders felt different from the mainlanders. Within these divisions there were innumerable smaller local loyalties. The inhabitants of Western Greece had little contact with those of Eastern Greece. Every island had its own character. There were age-old petty feuds between neighbouring communities. The mountains and seas of the Greek Archipelago divided the people so completely that virtually every town and plain had a distinct character of its own."[158]

Even within larger areas such as the Morea, Roumelia, and Crete there were regional fractures. Morea was held as being distinct to the Mani peninsula in a similar way to how Crete and Sphakia were divided. Roumelia, the larger of the landmasses of Greece was split, officially, between East and West 'Continental Greece' while within each of these

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[157] Parry. 1825. p.171
[158] St. Claire, 1972. p.36

there were distinct communities and regions such as Epirus and Thessaly, Souli and the mountain fasts of Olympus.

Parry highlighted how these regional divisions manifested themselves in the war effort (even when the Greeks were not engaged in full blown civil war). In a letter to Jonathan Bowring Esq. dated March 20, 1824, he noted that:

> *"The Hydriot fleet are laid up, and the Spessiots nearly in the same condition: indeed I am sorry to say that in this department there seems to be no uniformity of action, but separate interests and separate views still exist. The army, if it may be called so, is divided into separate companies, under separate captains, and acting separately, agreeable to their own ideas and means, Prince Mavrocordato at Missolonghi; Ulysses at Athens; Londa at Volitze; Zaim at Calaventa; Colocotroni at Tripolitza, acting against the existing government; Jahacus at Mistra; and M. Tombassi at Candia…"[159]*

This regional heterogeneity made itself apparent in the course of the revolution itself. Not only because the 'Greek War of Independence' was interspersed with routine outbreaks of civil conflict (which were, at least in part, the result of regional rivalries and divisions) but because the Primate's, the chief's, and their respective follower's ideas of independence were, according to Woodhouse, local in character because they "*wanted to feel that they were masters in their own house rather to become cogs in a national machine.*"[160] It is important to note that these were the people who, for the most part, carried out the gritty work of the rebellion. For them to be known in the historiography to be less concerned with a 'national machine' and more concerned with the events in their own locale is an important feature.

One year prior to the letter above a despatch from Kolokotrones to the Roumeliote Capetani in Western Continental Greece warning them not to interfere in the affairs of the Morea highlights the bitter factionalism between the different regions (and, in so doing, highlights the regionalist fractures which caused the eventual civil war). The letter, given its' context of brewing civil war between the Capetani of the Morea and Eastern Continental Greece on one side and the Government (with the aid of the Islanders and, possibly, the Roumeliotes of Western Continental Greece) on the other, sums up both the regional divisions and -somewhat paradoxically- the sense of unity between them. The

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[159] Parry, 1825. p.343
[160] Woodhouse, 1991. p.128

letter, dated from some time in 1823, was included by Julius Millingen in his memoirs on affairs in Greece. It reads:

> *"In order to assert the rights and defend the interests of our country* [Patrida], *Peloponnesus, we have taken up arms against the tyranny of a few individuals. Being patriots, we are unwilling to create a civil war. If you are Greeks* [Hellenes] *and patriots, you must not interfere with the affairs of Peloponnesus; but remain neutral… Should you, however, meddle with the affairs of Peloponnesus, look to the consequences; we shall be no longer responsible."*[161]

In Kolokotrones' letter a paradox emerges. With one hand he refers to the Morea (the Peloponnesus) as 'our' -the Moriotes- 'country' (the Greek word would have been 'Patrida', fatherland). Yet with the same pen he reveals that the Moriotes are 'patriots' and ergo unwilling to wage war with the Roumeliotes. Meanwhile he advises the Roumeliotes that their status both as Greeks and Patriots is dependent on their own reluctance to spark a civil war with their southern neighbours. From this brief threatening letter, we can discern that -to the Greeks of the revolutionary years- one was defined by their patria (what we would call their region) but that there was a further -supralocal- layer to their identity which bound together -albeit loosely- the Roumeliotes and Moriotes, among others. It is the nature of said supralocal identity that will be the topic of discussion shortly. For now, it is necessary to highlight that Kolokotrones appealed to the patriotism and common nationhood of the Capetani of Roumelia and not their Christianity (which Byron briefly mentioned was their unifying factor). This is what he meant by 'Greeks' (Kolokotrones would have -as he always did- used 'Hellene'). Evidently this is a form of patriotism -what we might call national consciousness- that extended beyond the bitter regional divide between Kolokotrones and the western Roumeliote factions.

For the meantime, sticking with the theme of heterogeneity, Greek regionalism also gave rise to unnumerable local dialects. These versions of the vernacular were, to varying degrees (and determined by relevant proximity), heavily supplemented with and influenced by Slavic tongues, Latin languages, and Turkish. This regional variance between the vernacular forms of the Greek language resulted in a diminished sense of mutual intelligibility between the dialects. Although these were still dialects of Greek it meant that there was no common Greek vernacular language to speak of. This in turn meant that the illiterate and insulated Greeks were -linguistically speaking- isolated within their own

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[161] Letter by Theodore Kolokotrones to the Roumeliote Capetani, dated 1823. Reproduced in Millingen, 1831. p.58

specific communities. This is evidenced by the comedy *Babel* which emerged in Athens shortly after the war. The plot to this play circulates around various Greeks from different regions trying to communicate with one another and failing to hilarious effect. Trencsenyi and Kopecek explained the comedic observation the playwright behind the drama made: writing that when one listened to a:

> "*social gathering of different Greeks… Chiots, Cretans, Albanians, Byzantines* [Phanariotes]*, Orientals* [Anatolians]*, Ionian Islanders and others… one mixes in Turkish words, the other Italian ones, the other Albanian ones, the other corrupted ones, and in the same gathering while they are all Greek, they cannot understand each other without the use of a translation or an explanation of each word as it is uttered, with the gathering thus turning into babel.*" [162]

Even today, with the aid of a modern State and fairly universal education curriculum, modern Greek is divided by several distinct dialects. Ergo, in the early 19th Century, in a time when education was scant -and the demographic of the regions was more ethnically diverse- it is of little surprise that the Greek vernacular was so fractured. This would have been especially acute in 1821 for, according to Kolokotrones, it was not until that year that Greeks came into communion with other Greeks outside of their own communities. In his memoirs he wrote:

> "*It was not until out rising that all the Greeks were brought into communication. There were many men who knew of no place beyond a mile of their own locality. They thought of Zante as we now speak of the most distant parts of the world. America appears to us as Zante appeared to them. They said it was in France.*"[163]

The natural question which results from all of this, then, is thus: 'What tied the Greeks of these various, distinct, and isolated communities together? Was it religion alone? Or was there also a feeling of supralocal patriotism (an imagined community); even among people who had never wandered more than a mile from their own home or communicated with an inhabitant of a different region of Greece? By exploring the ethnic diversity among 'the Greeks' we can take one step closer to an answer.

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[162] *Trencsenyi, B. And Kopecek, M. Eds.* 2007. *National Romanticism: The Formation of National Movements: Discourses of Collective Identity in Central and Southeast Europe 1770–1945, volume II* . Budapest: Central European University Press. p.141

[163] Kolokotrones, Theodoros. 1896. *I Kolokotrones. The klepht and the warrior. Sixty years of peril and daring. An autobiography.* Edmonds, E.M. Trans. London: T. Fisher Unwin. p.128

Part II: Ethnic diversity

The historiography of the ethnic diversity within 'Greece' in the early 19th Century has leaned disproportionately towards the Albanians (with less -yet not insignificant- attention given to the Vlachs and negligible attention given to other Aromanian speakers, to Serbs, and to Bulgarians). In this case the historiography can largely be forgiven: the Albanian clans, it seems, were the largest of the non-Grecophone revolutionaries followed by the Vlachs (at least, it appears, by 'Hellenised' Vlachs). There were notable cases of Serbs and Bulgars participating as well but these seem to have been much fewer than the other two and, in my research, many of these seem to have gotten themselves involved for purposes of personal loyalty or as mercenaries. Meanwhile the peoples of Moldovia and Wallachia in the Danubian Principalities had their own revolt going on at the time and it was very quickly at odds with that of the Hetereia. I will first here cover the presence of these non-Greek groups in the revolution (starting with the Albanians) before going on to discuss why said groups felt attached -or unattached in some cases- to the cause of Greek independence.

Woodhouse commented on the 'striking fact', that so many peoples of Albanian origin nailed their colours so solidly to the Greek mast; he wrote:

> *"the leading defenders of Greek liberty at this time* [1822] *were largely non-Greek. Koundouriotis* [a Hydriote shipping magnate and the second President of the Provisional Greek Government] *'was descended from the Albanian invaders of Greece in the 14th Century, and spoke Greek only with difficulty. His principle colleague was John Kolettis, a Vlakh who had been Ali Pasha's court doctor at Ioannina. One of the few leaders who maintained resistance far to the North of the Gulf of Corinth was the Souliote Marko Botsaris, whose followers were largely Albanian."*[164]

Southern, an eyewitness, also noted the widespread presence of Albanian Orthodox communities throughout Roumelia, the Morea, and the islands which he saw as quite distinct from their Greek speaking neighbours. He wrote that:

> *The people are divided into Roumeliotes and other inhabitants of the continental part of Greece, and who are chiefly Albanians; a distinguished branch of this portion are the Souliotes. The Moreotes or inhabitants of the Peloponnesus, with*

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[164] Woodhouse, 1991. p.139

the exception of some Albanian districts, as the Maniotes, are more genuine Greeks, and form another class. The islanders, though chiefly of Albanian race, from the nature of their abode and their different habits of life, are entitled to rank as a class of themselves.[165]

Notable here is the fact that so many of the communities in Greece famous for their role in the Greek War of Independence are said by Southern to be distinctly Albanian: Maniotes Souliotes, and the Islanders (Hydra and Spetses were almost entirely populated by Albanians and Samos and Psara had sizeable populations also). Additionally notable here is the notion that this divide between Albanian and Greek served as yet another fracture within the regional fault-lines of the Greeks. A good example of the relationship -or lack thereof- that these different ethnic communities enjoyed with one another at the time of the revolution (specifically regarding the Albanians of the Islands and the Grecophones of the Morea) is found in the comments of another eyewitness, Samuel Gridley Howe, who wrote that:

"The Hydriotes and Spetziotes are the descendants of an Albanian colony; they are still called Albanians by the rest of the Greeks, who though they unite with them for the great national work of independence, feel little union of sentiment, and look upon them as strangers of the same religion. This arises in some measure from their language, but not a little from the pertinacity with which the descendants of Albanians cling to the manners and ways of thinking of their ancestors: a Greek of the Peloponnesus would feel more like a neighbour and countryman toward a Cypriote, whose native island is far distant, than he would toward an inhabitant of Hydra, which is only 12 miles from the [Peloponnese]."[166]

'Hellenisation', the adoption of Greek language and subsequent abandonment of Albanian culture in favour of a Greek one is often given as one of the ties that bound the Albanians to the Greeks. This undoubtedly happened, many Albanians (especially wealthy Albanians) could speak Greek. Greek, after all, was the language of commerce, towns, and of their neighbours. Meanwhile the Albanian's church liturgy was in koine Greek (although, few Grecophones could understand that either by all accounts).[167]

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[165] Southern, Henry. 1826. *Greece in 1825*. London Magazine vol. NS 13 (January 1826) p. 13 Retrieved from http://lordbyron.cath.lib.vt.edu/doc.phpchoose=HeSouth.1826.Greece.xml
(last accessed 12/12/2014)
[166] Howe. 1828. p.220
[167] Hupchick, 2002. p.150

However many -if not most- also retained their Albanian culture and tongue. The Albanians of Greece, it seems, were slower than any other non-Greek community to abandon their mother tongue in favour of Greek. Indeed, many of the leading communities in the war effort seem to have been Albanian speaking ones in which few could even speak Greek. St. Claire noted that the Albanians of Hydra and Spetses, for example, could not speak Greek and so it would be inaccurate to say that these particular clans of Albanians who were so crucial to the war effort rose alongside their Greek neighbours out of a feeling of shared Hellenism.[168] Indeed, we have just seen evidence that suggested that the Greeks also regarded these Albanian speakers as foreigners.

Angelomatis-Tsougarakis, in her comparison of foreign writer's representations of Greece and the Greeks, found that many western Europeans noted that Albanian settlers, particularly more recent arrivals (as opposed to most Moreote Albanians who seemingly arrived in a much earlier wave of migration) retained their language and that subsequently all over Greece there were communities where Albanian was exclusively used (despite the men of the communities knowing Greek) and there were even villages where Greek was barely known if, indeed, at all.[169] The travellers, Angelomatis-Tsougarakis also noted, routinely reported that the Greek and Albanian children were kept apart and that intermarriage was uncommon (indeed, it seems to have been commonly reported that Albanian communities often discouraged marriage outside their own community, even to other Albanians).[170] Overall the picture that was painted was one of separate and distinct regions and communities which were distinctively Albanian or distinctively Greek, and rarely a mixture.

Even in continental Greece, Finlay, another eye-witness who later penned a history of Greece, noted that he had been to hundreds of villages in Greece and that even in Attica, despite being part of the Greek Kingdom, there were very few women and children who could understand Greek.[171] Elsewhere he noted that around a third of Athenians were Albanians who could be heard conversing in Albanian in the city's streets even after it

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[168] St. Claire, 1972. p.9
[169] Angelomatis-Tsougarakis.1990. p 111
[170] Angelomatis-Tsougarakis, 1990. p 111
[171] Finlay, George. 1861. History of the Greek Revolution. United Kingdom: W. Blackwood and sons.

became the capital of the Greek Kingdom (this is one of the rarer examples of a mixed community).[172] He further commented that swathes of the territory that would, in 1821, erupt into popular revolt against the Porte had been populated by Albanians (and he also hinted that they had also resisted the process of Hellenisation): he reported that by the early 19th Century:

> *"Albanian peasants had cultivated "the fields of Marathon and Plataea, drove their ploughshares over the streets of the Homeric Mycenae, and fed their flocks on Hellicon and Parnassus. The whole of Boetia, Attica, Megaris, Corinthia, and Argolis, a considerable part of Laconia, several districts in Messenia, and a portion of Arcadia, Elis, and Achaia, were colonised by Albanians whose descendants preserve their peculiar language and manners…"[173]*

This is perhaps why the Albanian communities tended to be more distinct and less 'Hellenised' than the Vlachs (who will be discussed shortly). This picture depicted by Finlay and the travellers corroborates that which was painted by St. Claire and the observers cited above. Said picture being the clear existence in the years prior to 1821 of non-Greek speaking (or, at least, non-Hellenised) Albanian communities throughout the Balkans. Communities which, undeniably, went on to play a disproportionately large part in the so-called 'Hellenic Revolution'.

The second largest body of 'foreign' participants in the movements for Greek independence however, the Vlachs, do certainly seem to have been Hellenised. Synak explained that in the case of the Vlachs, they were:

> *"almost all Orthodox Christians and belonged to the Greek-Orthodox church. Through the church and their trade activities… trade was dominated by the Greeks… many Vlachs became 'Hellenized'…* [and] *lost their Vlach language and consciousness."[174]*

This is certainly known to have been true: one need only remember that Daniel of Moscopole and Righas himself -in many ways considered a founding father of the Greek

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[172] Finlay, 1861. p.123
[173] Finlay, 1861. p.126
[174] Synak. Brunon Ed. 1995. *The Ethnic Identities of European Minorities: Theory and Case Studies.* Poland: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego.

revolution- were Hellenised Vlachs.[175] Righas was so Hellenized in fact that, despite including Vlachs in his political writings, he omitted them quite noticeably from his war song 'Thourios' which called on nearly every community within the Ottoman Empire to revolt save the community of his own birth!

It appears that the Vlachs, an Aromanian speaking peoples who were primarily involved in a form of transhumance and shepherding, can be split into several groups. There were the settled and more urban Vlachs of the towns who were more likely to become Hellenised due to Greek being the lingua Franca of the Balkans and of the Balkan merchants particularly. Roudometof actually showed how one became a 'Greek' in common parlance just by settling in a town.[176] It was this group of Vlachs which contributed the lion's share of people of Vlach origin to the Greek liberation movements. There were also Vlachs who continued to concern themselves in the lifestyle of transhumanism throughout the Balkans.[177] And then there were the Aromanian speakers of the Danubian principalities. All three were largely Orthodox Christian and all three were members of Churches which had always fallen under the Patriarchate of Constantinople. It appears that the people of Vlach origin who attached themselves to the Greek cause were either Hellenised or had been military men prior to the war. I have found little evidence of people from Vlach shepherding communities joining in the battle. Indeed, in Western Roumeli, for example, the Vlach shepherds at Mitka took no part in the war and opted instead to continue to shuttle their sheep away from the violence.[178] Meanwhile, in the Danubian principalities, events soon made it abundantly clear that the local Aromanian speaking Moldavians and Wallachians would be less than willing to fight alongside the Greeks. The revolt there manifested not as a rebellion against the Turks, but as a revolt against Greek rule in the Principalities.[179] This can be quickly demonstrated via an observation of two quotes from Tudor Vladiemriscu, the leader of the Roumanian rebellion:

a) *"I can't be impelled to shed the blood of Romanians for the Greek country."*[180]

[175] Gallant, Thomas W. 2016. Modern Greece: From the War of Independence to the Present. India: Bloomsbury Academic. p.29
[176] Roudometof, 1998. p.13
[177] Angelomatis-Tsougarakis, 1990. p 115
[178] Dontas, Domna N. 1966. *The last phase of the War of Independence in western Greece (December 1827 to May 1829)*. Greece: Inst. for Balkan Studies. p.27
[179] Radoiu, Nicolas. 1995. *Don't Harm Thy Neighbour.* United States: Harlo. p.295
[180] Andrei, Pippidi. 2021. *Balkan Hinterlands: The Danubian Principalities* in. Kitromilides, P and Tsoukalas, C. eds. *The Greek Revolution: A Critical Dictionary.* United States: Harvard University Press. p.23

b) *"Indeed, what can the Dacians and the Hellenes have in common? What benefit may come to Dacians from the future prosperity of the Hellenes?"*[181]

Among the Vlachs in the towns, however, the increased incidence of Hellenisation was also evident in the travel writings analysed by Angelomatis-Tsougarakis. By the early 19th Century the language difference between settled Vlachs (and even some of the wealthier shepherds) and Greeks was widely reported to be quickly disappearing if indeed present at all.[182] By all accounts the process of Hellenisation was relatively quick and self-replicating for, once settled in towns, the Vlachs opened Greek schools with the aim of imparting a Greek education upon the next generation.[183] Interestingly, while Albanian women were noted to be non-Greek speakers Vlach women were (in the years immediately prior to 1821) reported to be mostly Grecophone like their menfolk. Likewise, intermarriage between Vlachs and Greeks were reported to have been fairly common whereas Albanian women rarely married Greeks and Albanian men, according to the travellers, would rarely have received the blessings of a Greek father to take his daughter's hand in marriage.[184] It is quite likely that this increased integration between Vlachs and Greeks compared to that of Albanians and Greeks came as a result of Albanians forming their own distinct communities (as seen above) whereas the Vlachs who settled seem to have done so in larger towns alongside Greeks. Returning to Righas once more for an example, his hometown of Velestino was a hub of Hellenised Vlachs but it also sported a sizeable population of Greeks. Once Hellenised the Greeks appear to have quite openly embraced the Vlachs as their own, according to the records of the western travellers as well as those of contemporary Greeks.[185]

The presence of Bulgarians, Montenegrins, and Serbs within the Greek struggle for independence is occasionally noted yet it is chronically understudied (as is the presence of Greeks within the Serbian revolts). It is important, however, to note that there were many Serbs (including Montenegrins) and Bulgars who took part in the war of independence (perhaps as many as a few hundred of each). However, it is also the case that there was no rousing of the Serbian or Bulgarian masses contra to what the Philliki Hetereia had hoped

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[181] Andrei, 2021. p.23
[182] Angelomatis-Tsougarakis, 1990. p.115
[183] Angelomatis-Tsougarakis, 1990. p.115
[184] Angelomatis-Tsougarakis, 1990. p.111-5
[185] Angelomatis-Tsougarakis, 1990. p.115

for.[186] The killing of Karageorge in Serbia put an end to any prospect -ambitious as they were- of the Serbs unilaterally throwing in their lot for the Greeks. Similarly, although a rising in Bulgaria had been planned and Hetereia recruitment had been active in Bulgaria since around 1818 (as it was in Serbia) no such rising occurred. As Runciman noted:

> *"With his* [Karageorge's] *death any hope of interesting the Serbs in the coming Greek rebellion faded out; and there was no one capable of rallying the Bulgars to the cause. Karageorge alone could have given the hetaireia the air of not being exclusively Greek"*[187]

What undeniably happened was that some Serbs and Bulgars (as well as some Hellenised Wallachians and Moldovans) travelled to the southern Balkans or to the Danubian Principalities to take part in the revolutions there.

In my research, however, the numbers of these people were relatively small and seem to have followed individual leaders. The presence of most of these non-Greeks can be explained by Hellenisation of the merchant and literati classes; feelings of common religious struggle against a common oppressor; feelings of personal bonds; mercenary activity; or the actions of men whose primary employment had been warfare long-prior to 1821.

Perhaps the most notable of these was Hadjichristou, a Bulgarian who in conflicting accounts either reneged to the Greeks from the Turks at Tripolitsa or was captured and turned. Either way he is reported to have been unlettered (and ergo it is quite possible that he was not Hellenised).[188] He later became a general of the Greek army's cavalry and is reported to have had a sizeable number of Bulgarians under his command. Meanwhile Vasos Mavrouniotis was another non-Hellenised individual (a Serbian speaking Montenegrin) who travelled to Greece with a company of warriors to aid in the revolt. These two are not in any way an exhaustive list of Serbian or Bulgarian speaking revolutionaries in the Greek war but they are indicative of the motivations this relatively small number of foreign warriors were acting on. In the case of Mavrouniotis, he was leading his warband over the mountains to aid the Greeks out of loyalty to a long-term fellow klepht. Hadjichristou, on the other hand, had previously participated in the Serbian

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[186] Dakin, 1973. p.43
[187] Runciman,Steven. 1968. *The Great Church in Captivity*. New York: Cambridge University Press. p.402
[188] Trelawny, Edward John. *Trelawny's Journal. Literary Gazette* No. 734 (12 February 1831). London p. 98

revolt and so it should be taken as little surprise that he would participate in the Greek one (especially if he was captured or left with little choice but to defect at Tripolitsa before it fell to the Greek forces). It is likely he, being a non-Hellenised illiterate, was acting out of a feeling of religious brotherhood. It is certainly unlikely the case he was acting out of loyalty to the Greek cause specifically given his previous activities in Serbia. It should also be noted here that the surnames of these two men in Greek were direct references to their ethnicity (Voulgaris and Mavrouniotis meaning 'the Bulgarian' and 'the Montenegrin' respectively). This was a common practice in Vernacular dialogue at the time and underlines how foreigners may have been forever noted in Greek discourse as never being quite fully Greek: despite the fact they fought for Greek liberation.

As well as the lack of uprising in Bulgaria, there is evidence to suggest that non-military and non-Hellenised Bulgarians felt apathy for the Greek cause. An 1834 publication on James Hamilton Browne's observations in Greece in 1823 tells of an encounter between a group of Bulgarian shepherds and a company of Philhellenes (including Browne himself and Trelawney) who were guided by local Greeks. Travelling through the Morea to meet Kolokotrones the company sought shelter among the Bulgarian shepherd's cottages in the mountain district of Agrapha. Browne recorded that they observed that their hosts were:

> *"jabbering in their own dialect, which our guides did not understand, because they were one of those erratic tribes of Bulgarians, who bring their flocks to pasture in the Morea. War had not changed this practice; they looked on the contest with indifference, and, being well armed and resolute men, feared neither Turk nor Greek."[189]*

Clogg, overall, summed up the lack of support the Greeks enjoyed from Serbs, Bulgars, and Wallachians and Moldovans (a lack of support that, it should be said, came as a surprise to some conspirators). He noted that these peoples had grown increasingly resentful of Greek ecclesiastical and cultural hegemony on one hand while, on the other, they already had some varying forms of their own national movements (which was particularly evident in Serbia).[190]

A couple of questions arise from all of this which require further examination:

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[189] Browne, James, Hamilton. 1834. *Narrative of A Visit, in 1823, To The Seat o War Im Greece.* Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine. Vol 35. No.118. (September 1834) Edinburgh. p.401
[190] Clogg, 2002. p.32

a) What bound the Greeks, the Hellenised, and even some non-Hellenised groups together? And

b) If it was feelings of co-orthodoxy in the face of a Muslim oppressor, why was this sentiment not shared by sizeable portions of the peoples of the Danubian Principalities, the Bulgars, and the Serbs?

The question 'why did 'Hellenised' non-Greeks rise in such numbers for the cause of Greek independence' is answered in the title: they were 'Hellenised'. As such they had assumed an identity identical to that of their Grecophone neighbours (and had begun to pass as such). It should be noted here that the term 'Hellenised' does not in itself imply an attachment or feeling of continuity to ancient Hellas but merely an adoption of Greek language and culture (specifically this was often an urban variety of Greek vernacular and lifestyle).

The more pressing question here is: 'why did Albanians from distinctly Albanian communities rise alongside the Greeks?' Other than feelings of Hellenism -which have been shown to have likely been too weak a factor in many of the notable Albanian communities that contributed to the liberation movement- one other factor has been suggested by the historiography and it has been referenced previously in this section: a co-Orthodox bond. However, as will now be discussed, feelings of a common faith alone were not strong enough bonds.

Feelings of a common religion were most certainly an adhesive factor between these yet-to-be-Hellenised Albanian communities and their Greek neighbours. Byron mentioned it above, while Finlay (also cited above), claimed that the Albanians of Hydra and Spetses, despite falling outwith the influence of Greek literary developments, felt tied to the Greeks due to their religion.[191] But feelings of common religion cannot simply be the only factor. If it were then other Balkan Orthodox groups would have displayed less apathy. Meanwhile the Albanians -and the Greeks- would have been similarly more-present (in whatever capacity they could have been) in the Serbian revolutions.

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[191] Finlay, 1861. p.287

The usual answer to this riddle is also provided in the historiography in two different ways. Clogg, above, mentioned both: the feelings of resentment at experiencing Turkish rule via the Greeks and the presence of distinct national consciousnesses. Specifically, ecclesiastical hegemony was mentioned: both the Bulgarian and the Serbian Churches were brought into the fold of the Patriarch of Constantinople by the Porte during the 1760's.[192] Meanwhile, the revolt in the principalities was anti-Phanariote, not pro-Hellenist.[193] Such feelings of resentment of Greek hegemony (specifically in the context of lost rights and diminished autocephaly) are tied up with the second version of the answer to the above.

Meanwhile, the notion of separate (meaning non-Greek) national identities rising in these regions should come as no surprise. Even though the churches in the Principalities had always fallen under the authority of the Patriarchate there had been clear developments of local characteristics to the Church there. For example, since the 17th Century the local vernacular had been used in Church services. Meanwhile, Bulgarians and Serbians possessed clear notions of self-identity based upon strong historical ties with their own medieval pasts, their own languages, and their own churches (pasts, it should be said, which were quite distinct from that of the Greeks).[194] Although the literati and mercantile classes among these groups appear to have been at least partially Hellenised, the presence of a local and vernacular lower clergy maintained a distinct nationality (especially in the less urbanised regions).[195] The reason, therefore, that is often given for why the Greeks' cause was looked upon with apathy by their Orthodox neighbours is this: despite their feelings of common religion these peoples had their own distinct identity which had suffered specifically at the hands of Greek hegemony within the Ottoman Empire. It is the position of this thesis that, just as the Greeks retained a vernacular cultural memory of their medieval imperial and Orthodox past throughout the Tourkokratia so too did the Serbs and Bulgars respectively.

The implied extension of that train of thought however is this: the Albanians rose out of religious loyalty to their fellow Christians because they lacked their own specific historical identity. Whether that is true or not will be discussed shortly. Perhaps the optics need to be

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[192] Mackridge, 2010. p.75

[193] Runciman, 1968. p.402

[194] Alex N. Dragnich 1994. *Serbia's Historical Heritage*. East European Monographs. University of Michigan. pp. 29–30.

[195] Crampton, R. J. 1987. *Modern Bulgaria*. Cambridge University Press. p. 8

altered slightly, however? Perhaps instead of looking at the Albanians as being embroiled in the Greek cause due to a lack of their own identity (save for religion) we should examine whether or not there existed a supralocal identity among the Albanians which tied them to the Greeks but not to, for example the Serbs? After all, if the Albanians were travelling throughout the Balkans in order to wage war alongside their fellow Christians, then why are the Albanians noticeably more absent from the revolutions in Serbia than they were in Greece in 1821? Why is it only the revolution in Greece that enjoyed such widespread support from Albanian communities?

The evidence points towards two important features: first, that the Albanians did have their own identity. Second, that they saw themselves (and were likewise seen by the Greeks) as being fellow Romans. Not only in the sense of being fellow Christians, but fellow citizens of the Empire of Constantinople. The first is easy to prove. Indeed, it has already been evidenced above: the Albanian communities in Greece at the time have been shown to have been distinct and to have been held as separate both by Greek speakers and by the Albanians themselves: ergo, they had their own distinct identity. The next section, therefore, is dedicated towards showing how the Albanians, despite this, were seen as -and seen themselves as- Romans.

Part III: Albanians, Romans?

The first undisputed mention of an Albanian people dates from the 11th Century, by which point they were already fully Christian and had become subjects of the Byzantine Empire.[196] Over the next few centuries some Albanians evidently became Muslim with the arrival of the Ottomans, some became Catholic with the arrival of 'Franks' and some remained Orthodox. It also appears that the Albanians remained subjects of the Byzantine Empire and its' rump states throughout the medieval period with only a handful of short interruptions. This ended with the Albanian's brief incorporation into the Serbian Empire in the 14th Century before that Empire crumbled and became an Ottoman vassal state by the end of the Century. Clearly, therefore, the Albanians enjoyed centuries of Byzantine citizenship if not direct Byzantine rule; Orthodox temporal leadership (which continued under the brief period of Serbian rule); and connection to Byzantine culture. At least at

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[196] Madgearu, Alexandru; Gordon, Martin 2008. *The wars of the Balkan Peninsula: Their medieval origins*. Lanham: Scarecrow Press. p. 25

some point in their history, then, they enjoyed the status of 'Roman': something that their fellow Orthodox Serbs and Bulgars did not.

That being said it is still -at this stage- a far stretch to argue that the Albanians were acting in 1821 out of a political and ideological attachment to a Roman past. However, there is evidence to suggest that the Albanians, non-Hellenised as they were, were accepted by Greeks as being fellow Romans. And so, if the rest of this thesis can show that the Greeks were acting in 1821 out of a feeling of Romanism then perhaps this could corroborate the existence of such a sentiment among the Albanians. This would certainly explain why Albanian communities were unroused by events in neighbouring Serbia yet rose so willingly alongside the Greeks (some of them with much to lose and little to gain by joining in a revolution such as the successful maritime and mercantile colonies of Hydra and Spetses). It would also help explain why the Greek cause received little sympathy from the likes of their fellow Christian Serbs and Bulgars: because they had no historical ties to a civic Roman identity.

In this regard Angelomatis-Tsougarakis, once again, has noted that many western travellers in the 18th and early 19th Centuries recorded that the Greeks accepted the Albanians as a constituent part of their own nation because they were fellow *"Roman Christians"*.[197] This, she notes, is not something that should be surprising: since the days of the Roman Empire the Balkan peoples had gotten used to *"being citizens of the same empire regardless of nationality."*[198]The noteworthy thing about this evidence is that the Albanians were not being accepted as members of the same supralocal community by virtue of their faith alone. The dual nature of 'Roman Christians' implies that 'Roman' here was not being used to refer to an Orthodox person or to a member of the Rum Millet (this would make the 'Christian' part obsolete). Rather the case here is that the Greeks were accepting the Albanians into their fold by virtue of their dual status as Christians *and* as Roman citizens.

This is somewhat corroborated by the use of the term 'Albanian' (Arvanitiki) and 'Roman' In Makriyannis memoirs. In the entirety of his memoirs Makriyannis makes 17 references to 'Albanians' (or to something pertaining to 'Albanians').[199] Exclusively these references

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[197] Angelomatis-Tsougarakis, 1990. P.12
[198] Angelomatis-Tsougarakis, 1990. p.112
[199] Makriyannis, 1907

are made in relation to Albanians (and often Muslim Albanians) who were in the employ of the Ottoman forces or Ali Pasha. However, many times more that number of references are made to 'Romans' as a collective group. Never in these references does he clarify whether or not the 'Romans' were Greeks or Albanians or any other linguistic group. It is near impossible, given he is reporting on events in regions with high populations of Christian Albanians, that he is not making reference to the Romans as incorporating both Greek and Albanian Christians. Yet he was not using the term as a religious marker: he makes over twenty uses of the term 'Christian' and 'Christians' to denote a group of Christians and so if he meant 'Christians' he would have wrote 'Christians'. Somewhat corroborating what was covered earlier regarding the Vlachs, Makriyannis does refer to Vlachs periodically throughout his memoirs where there is no connection to the Ottoman forces and so, it appears, that to Makiryannis that 'Roman' could encapsulate Greek and Albanian speakers but not to non-Hellenised Vlachs.

'Roman', therefore, to Makriyannis (who, we must remember, was writing in the vernacular) was an appellation which carried with it more nuance than a religious marker alone. This was likely an identity which could be applied to Albanian and Greek Christians (indeed, we have seen that this was reported to be the case by western travellers) and, ergo, he was using it to refer to 'the Romans' as a nationality (it just so happened this was a multi-lingual and heterogenous nationality). In a similar way it is likely that he also included Albanians under the appellation of 'Hellene' given the fact that he seems to transition towards referring to the fighters as Hellenes (and we know the fighters included multitudes of Albanians) and the civilians as Romans: in one passage he tells of a priest who performed the sacrament to 'the Romans' but spied on the 'Hellenes'.[200]

Some of the strongest evidence of Albanians and Greeks appearing to enjoy a common heritage of some sort comes from the Ionian Isles. Shortly after the Souliote refugees (who were Albanian) arrived in the Septinsular Republic the Russian military decided to raise a local legion which eventually comprised of the displaced Souliotes alongside other Albanian Christian clansmen from the mainland with whom the Russians had struck an alliance in an attempt to hem in Ali Pasha. As well as these a number of Greeks (from all over the Balkans) were enrolled in the short lived Jager regiment. Their commander, Emmanouil Papadopoulos was a Greek in the service of the Russian Empire and he, it

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[200] Makriyannis, 1907

should be said, seems to have been a neo-Hellene (probably owing to his education alongside Russia's aristocratic youths with whom he would have shared his military cadet class). In 1805 he published a set of regulations for his mixed legion entitled *An Explanation for the combined Legion of Epirote-Souliots and Himariot-Peloponnesians.*[201] Although referring to his troops by their clannish and regional identities here (and thus not calling his soldiers Hellenes in this work) it does seem that he was in the habit of referring to his Albanian and Greek warriors collectively as Hellenes judging by the military manual he wrote up for the regiment the year before: it was entitled *Military Teaching for the use of the Hellenes.*[202] That being said it is noteworthy that in the work of 1805 he called upon his troops, who are specifically demarcated in the title as being a mix of Greeks and Albanians, to remember that they are descendants of the ancient Hellenes and to take inspiration from their deeds, naming Pyrrhus in particularly.[203] Yet, in the same segment he also implores his soldiers to remember the deeds of Albanian warrior Skanderbeg. This is noteworthy because it was whilst in these Islands - in the acquaintance of Sir Maitland - that Kolokotrones later encountered the history of Skanderbeg which, according to his memoirs, was a source of inspiration to him.[204]

Papadopoulos split his command into six brigades, each having their own flag. Each banner was a different colour, demarcating said individual brigade. However, according to Kallivretakis, every banner featured: a cross; a crowned eagle; a laurel; and a quote from scripture (specifically "God is with us", and "huddle together, o nations, and be shattered" taken from Isaiah 8:).[205] Isaiah 8, it should be noted, is a passage which declares that God will sweep away his people's enemies, particularly those to the East. The presence of scriptures pertaining to such acts of divine providence is no accident in this context, it was commonly held in Greece at the time that God would one day deliver the Greeks, his people, a victory against their enemies to the East. The fact that a classically educated Greek in the service of the Russian Emperor would refer to the troops in his command as Hellenes as well as by their various regional and clannish identities (which included Albanian speaking clans) and encourage them to be inspired by Albanian as well as ancient Hellenic heroes is an interesting one. It implies that to Papadopoulos, and possibly to others, that the Greeks and the Albanians were interchangeable peoples, heirs to a common

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[201] Kallivretakis 2003, p. 190.
[202] Kallivretakis 2003, p. 190.
[203] Kallivretakis 2003, p. 190.
[204] Kolokotrones, 1896. p.127
[205] Kallivretakis 2003, p. 189.

legacy. This may be explained via a common experience of Ottoman rule: but it can also be explained, I think more fully, by the fact that both groups, being undeniably of a different linguistic culture, were both seen as members of one, Orthodox family. And the fact that other Orthodox peoples, such as Russians and Serbs, do not seem to have been incorporated into said family would imply that the two were brothers because of a shared inheritance of a Roman citizenship. This seems to be backed up by the evidence of the regiment's banners bearing crosses, crowned eagles, scripture and laurels (the Byzantinism here hardly needs stressing). The interchangeability between Albanian and Hellene is highlighted by what happened to the regiment shortly after it was disbanded (when the Islands were ceded to France in 1807). The regiment was re-hired and named as *Le Regiment Albanais* ("The Albanian Regiment").[206] This is all evidence of the Greeks and Albanians serving together and being treated as being virtually the same peoples.

To summarise, then, on the identity of the Romans (Christian Greeks and Albanians): these peoples, often including other Hellenised Orthodox peoples, were deeply divided by region and ethnicity yet they also possessed a supralocal 'Roman' identity which was more than a 'religious' bond. As we saw from Kolokotrones' letter, these people held each other to be patriots belonging to the same Patrida (a 'Patrida' larger than their respective local homelands). So, what was this supralocal Patrida? Given that the historiography accepts that knowledge of Hellas was scarce in vernacular Greek understanding in 1821; and given that the Albanian communities -though Romans- were unlikely to have been 'Hellenised', then said Patrida cannot be 'Hellas'. It can only be the multi-lingual Orthodox Empire of Constantinople.

Meanwhile, the other Orthodox peoples of the Balkans who had not been Hellenised, and who hailed from communities who had their own sense of historical identity had retained their own distinct and separate identities despite falling under the authority of the ethnarch of the Rum Millet. Feelings of common church and common oppressor were not enough to pull these peoples, patriots of a separate Patrida, into a war for Greek liberation or, perhaps more accurately, for a chauvinist Greek domination of the Balkans.

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[206] Pappas, Nicholas. C. 1982. *Greeks in Russian Military Service in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries*. USA: Stanford University. p.266–267.

Part IV: Greek chauvinism

Within this identity of 'Roman' there is clear evidence of a pecking order; not only between classes -which is to be expected- but between Greeks and non-Greeks. In short, there was a sense that anyone could become Greek, but that this was a promotion. Attached to this feeling of natural superiority was that the Greeks would naturally assume a dominant and leading position among their fellow Balkan Orthodox. Such an assumption of superiority reared its head repeatedly in the course of the liberation movements. And, in many ways, led to the disastrous decision by the military men in the Hetereia to start the revolution in the Danubian Principalities. Said chauvinism, however, not only existed in the mindset of the literati or the Phanariotes, but it also even existed in the mindset of the lower classes of the Greeks, as will be shown. First, I will show evidence for the existence of such a Greek chauvinism before going on to making an attempt to explain why such a concept existed.

One of the main manifestations of said sense of chauvinism was alluded to above when it was mentioned that Greek families were reported to be reluctant to allow their daughters to marry Albanian men. The same observers, however, noted that when intermarriage occurred it was more likely to have been between a Greek man and an Albanian woman.[207] This is a clear -and highly gendered- example of a feeling of privilege and dominance, even among the Greek peasantry, over non-Greek Romans. Indeed these travellers observed that such mergers between Greek and Albanian families happened more often in the towns between the higher ranks of Albanians and the Greek artisans and merchants.[208] The same Athenian Albanians, although noted previously to have discussed between themselves in Albanian, appear to have been Hellenised (indeed, it was likely a requirement to be Hellenised in order to be able to rise to 'the higher ranks of Albanians').[209] Such feelings of superiority, a feeling that became less and less pronounced depending on how Hellenised the Albanians were, was described by Angelomatis-Tsougarakis as being a feeling of *"general cultural superiority"*.[210] She also went on to note than when the Albanians excelled in activities highly regarded by the Greeks (such as

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[207] Angelomatis-Tsougarakis, 1990. p.111
[208] Angelomatis-Tsougarakis, 1990. p.112
[209] Angelomatis-Tsougarakis, 1990. p.109
[210] Angelomatis-Tsougarakis, 1990. p.112

the famous resistance of the Souliotes or the trading activities of the islanders) the latter were reported by westerners to have no difficulty in accepting the former as their own.[211]

The Vlachs received similar treatment according to these travel writers. When they became Hellenised they were reported to have built 'better houses' and 'Greek schools' and 'employed doctors'.[212] However the ability of a Hellenised Vlach or Albanian to 'pass' as a Greek was limited: when their success outstripped that of their Greek brethren the travellers noted how the Greeks, out of envy, reverted to despising them for their 'inferiority'.[213] Such feelings of cultural superiority were encountered among all classes of Greeks, however the more literate Greeks have left the clearest evidence for Greek chauvinism.

Returning to Daniel of Moscopole, the Hellenised Vlach whose 'introductory instruction' was examined previously, his intention was to aid Albanian, Bulgarian, and Aromanian speakers to learn 'Romaika' (Greek).[214] In and of itself this does not imply an air of Grecophone cultural superiority. However, we must remember that this instruction was accompanied by the invitation that was quoted previously:

> *"Albanians, Vlachs, Bulgarians, speaker of other languages, rejoice, and prepare yourselves all of you to become Romans, leaving the barbarian language, voice and customs, that to your descendants will appear like myths."[215]*

One brief important note to take from the above is that one could become a Roman (meaning a Greek here) by adopting the language and culture of the Greeks (and therefore it was not something which ethnicity made unattainable. However we have just seen than one's acceptance as a Greek could be precarious and ethnic background was never really forgotten. There is a clear indication here of how the Hellenised and the Grecophone viewed their non-Greek speaking neighbours. And we must remember also that this instruction was designed for people who could read in their own languages meaning that even the literati classes of non-Greeks in the Balkans were being seen by Greeks and the Hellenised as 'Barbarians'.

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[211] Angelomatis-Tsougarakis, 1990. p.112
[212] Angelomatis-Tsougarakis, 1990. p.115
[213] Angelomatis-Tsougarakis, 1990. p.116
[214] Daniel of Moscopole, 1794. p.4
[215] Daniel of Moscopole, 1794. p.4

Such an emphasis on the importance of Greek language was repeated by the two most notable men behind the Greek enlightenment: Korais and Righas. Korais was very much the father of katheravousa (the form of modern Greek that is left after its' vernacular is purged of foreign influence and brought back into the linguistic framework of classical Greek). Such an undertaking, which was literally called the act of 'purifying language' is another clear indication of the disdain Greek intellectuals had for the influence of seemingly inferior languages upon their own. Meanwhile Righas, for all that he campaigned for a pan-Balkan confederacy which embraced ethnic diversity left no doubt that he viewed the Greeks as a superior culture and as such he intended his Balkan democracy to be heavily Hellenised. In article 22 of his declaration of human rights he wrote:

> *"Everybody, without any exception, has the duty to be literate. The country has to establish schools for all male and female children in all villages, since the education brings the progress which makes free nations shine. The old historians should be explained and… the Ancient Greek language must be indispensable."*[216]

Such an emphasis on all peoples of the Balkans having as part of their compulsory curriculum an instruction in ancient Greek and 'the old historians' (meaning ancient Greek history) is indicative of Righas' feelings of Greek cultural and historical superiority. Meanwhile this is corroborated by his constitution. First, he declared the name of the pan-Balkan democracy to be 'the Hellenic Democracy'.[217] Second, in article 55, he declared that the language of the administration will be Greek.[218] And Third, in article 4, he declared that those who can speak Greek, both ancient and modern, are to be citizens of the state: even if they live as far away as the antipodes.[219]

Arguably, it is because of this natural assumption of a leadership role in the post-Ottoman Balkans, that many influenced by Righas (such as Ypsilantis) believed that non-Greeks would rise alongside Greeks in a liberation struggle against the Sultan. The Hetereia, as we have seen, originally envisioned uprisings in Wallachia, Moldavia, Bulgaria, and Serbia alongside revolts in regions where Greeks were the majority. So powerful was this

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[216] Righas Velestinlis. Declaration of Human Rights. Article 22.
[217] Righas Velestinlis. Constitution. Article 1.
[218] Righas Velestinlis. Constitution. Article 55.
[219] Righas Velestinlis. Constitution. Article 4.

assumption that the Greeks would enjoy the support of their fellow Orthodox Balkan peoples that rumours spread like wildfire in 1821 that tens of thousands of Bulgars and Serbs had rallied to Ypsilantis' flag in the Principalities.[220] Rumours which, events soon showed, were unfounded.

The rediscovery of a classical past which was celebrated by the western Europeans they so desperately wanted to emulate will be one reason why the Hellenist literati such as Korais and Righas exuberated such an air of cultural superiority to their Balkan neighbours. The fact that said heritage was traced back to the classical age via the apparent continuity of language (and ergo, of culture) would have supported this.[221] However, even in vernacular Greek culture where notions of the classics, of western European perceptions, or of the notion of linguistic continuity were relatively scarcer there was still an opinion of Grecophone superiority. This is often explained via reference to the role of the Greek language in the Church and in Christianity in general. Once covering that aspect, I will then go on to show how such cultural superiority could also have had its' origin in the memory of Byzantium.

Returning to the recording of travellers' observations in the years prior to 1821, Angelomatis-Tsougarakis observed repeated reference to the Greeks, the peasant Greeks particularly, having a 'high opinion of themselves' because they believed that *"since they belonged to the one true religion, they were the favourites of heaven… however… at the present time they were suffering severe punishment for their sins"*.[222] Finlay observed that the official position of the Greek Church was that said 'sins' were the sin of Constantine, for his 'fall from Orthodoxy' and his turning to the Papal West at the council of Florence in the 1440's.[223] This feeling of being an 'elect nation' is a direct hangover from the Byzantine era and evidence of a common supralocal identity (an identity which went beyond feelings of shared faith and which incorporated notions of being a historically and spiritually distinct people) surviving through to the modern era from Byzantium

Dakin noted that the Byzantine Empire held that the Roman people were *"God's chosen people inhabiting God's earthly kingdom"*.[224] Elsewhere Dakin noted that, throughout the

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[220] St. Claire, 1972. p.23.
[221] Mackridge, Peter. 2010. p.47
[222] Angelomatis-Tsougarakis, 1990. p.148
[223] Finlay, 1861. p.137
[224] Dakin, Douglas. 1972. *The Unification of Greece, 1770-1923*. London: Ernest Benn Ltd. p.5

Tourkokratia, this chosen people believed that god would liberate them and revive -both in the spiritual and temporal sense- the glories of their Roman Christian Empire.[225] Meanwhile, Eshel has noted that the concept of the Romans constituting God's elect nation stemmed from parallels drawn in Byzantine times between the biblical role of the Hebrew's as God's chosen people and the Byzantine State which had adopted the status of an elect nation.[226] This, according to Eshel, was pinned on the exclusive and consistent identification between the Orthodox faith and the Roman State and, subsequently, this translated into the Orthodox Byzantine Empire as being seen by it's Orthodox citizens as a "*sacred and universal empire or rather the sacred and exclusive polity of the Romans.*"[227] Thus, to Eshel, the Byzantines had a national identity of being an elect nation not only by virtue of their Orthodoxy but also via the close association their State enjoyed with the one true faith.[228] It is the position here that this identity survived the fall of Constantinople (indeed this is corroborated by Dakin above who noted that the Greeks during the Tourkokratia looked forward to God's reviving of said Empire).

However, the Roman Empire was multi-lingual as we have seen. So why were Grecophone's exhibiting cultural chauvinism towards their fellow Orthodox and even towards their fellow non-Greek speaking Romans? I believe that this was because of the special role of the Greek language in said Empire, in the later Rum millet, and in said Orthodox faith. It is not controversial to state that Greek is the language of Orthodoxy (it being the language that God ordained to bring the New Testament to the world). Similarly, it is not controversial to claim that the Byzantine Empire, The Orthodox Church, or the Rum Millet, were dominated by Grecophones. This all ties in with the evidence above that the Greeks as a linguistic community saw their supralocal identity as being a part of God's chosen people: not only in terms of membership of a Greek Church, but also of the Greek Empire of God at Constantinople. Although regrettable it may be, one would therefore expect the Grecophone descendants of said Empire (or, more accurately, citizens of said Empire in waiting) to exhibit such bigoted behaviour towards their non-Grecophone fellow-Romans.

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[225] Dakin, 1973. p.15
[226] Eshel, Shay. 2018. *The Concept of the Elect Nation in Byzantium*. Netherlands: Brill. p.5
[227] Eshel, 2018. p.5
[228] Eshel, 2018. p.5

Finally, this should come as no surprise. We saw in the previous chapter how 'Roman' meant 'Greek speaker', 'Orthodox Christian' and 'Heir to Byzantium' in common Balkan discourse in the early 19th Century. That a religious, linguistic, and political appellation should be the exclusive possession of the Greeks alone implies a hierarchy within the 'Roman' camp which placed Grecophone Roman citizens at the top with non-Grecophones Romans and then Orthodox peoples whose culture was not a constituent part of the former Roman Empire falling in behind. To coin the famous saying: all Romans were Roman, but some were more Roman than others. Such an imperialist mindset which we have seen as being extant among the Greeks of the Balkans in the early 19th Century can, in my view, be taken as a manifestation of a Byzantine imperial, and national, identity.

Part V: "String Theory"

Let us imagine then, that the identity of the revolutionaries was a rope: a collection of strands tightly wound together to form a thicker and stronger material which bound 'the Greeks' together. A rope which was capable of holding greater weight and withstanding greater damage than its' constituent parts. 'Damage' such as the cut of a Turkish sabre seeking indiscriminate retribution for revolutionary activity or the subtle abrasion caused by growing senses of alternative national identity elsewhere in the Balkans. 'Weight' such as the sheer mass of millions of people from thousands of distinct communities scattered across a massive geographical area. Despite the heterogeneity of the Greeks these strands combined held them together across said wide geographical space all the while in the face of the threat of Ottoman reprisals for the acts of distant compatriots and the developing alternative nationalities in the Balkans.

This begs the question: what were these strands made of? Alone Greek language is not a strong enough cord, not all who had a vested interest in the revolt had Greek as a mother tongue meanwhile there were Greek speaking communities (Muslims and Catholics) which held the liberation cause with apathy and who themselves were 'cut off' from the 'Greek rope'.[229] Similarly Orthodoxy was not a strong or thick enough string: there were many Orthodox who saw themselves as non-Greek and, likewise, many who were seen by the Greeks as foreign. Allegiance to the Patriarchate of Constantinople, similarly, would not have served as strong enough on its' own: Cypriots, who were involved and supportive and

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[229] St. Claire, 1972. p.9

seen as compatriots, had enjoyed autocephaly for over a millennia whereas other subjects of the Patriarch of Constantinople were largely apathetic (Danubian Principalities) or had been grafted into Constantinople's vine unwillingly by the Porte (Serbs and Bulgars). Somewhat related is the cord of Greek liturgy. Membership of a Church which conducted its' affairs in the language of the New Testament would have been a powerful strand -and one that was possessed by many non-Grecophones, particularly Orthodox Albanians- but there is scant evidence of members of the Church of Antioch, Jerusalem, or Alexandria bearing a desire to liberate Greece (it appears these communities, although descended from former Byzantine populations, had drifted across the centuries from the political identity of 'The Greeks', possibly aided by the fact they fell outwith the traditional and historical heartlands of the Empire). Similarly, the Danubian Principalities' Churches, although using local languages in services used the Greek liturgy and, as has been said, there was large-scale apathy there for the Greek liberation movement.

Figure 1: Greek 'Strands'

Collectively these strands form constituent parts of the Greek's supralocal identity. Yet nothing here is exclusively or specifically 'Greek' in the sense that none of these elements are the sole possession of the communities who felt 'Greek' and who -more specifically- felt they had a vested interest in Greek liberation. In my surmising there should exist additional strands which bring with them sufficient strength to the 'rope' for none of the above either individually or as a collective, account for the entirety of Greek identity in 1821.

Simply put, some other strands must have existed which served to splice together feelings of: Orthodoxy; common Greek language (or, at least, a common lingua-franca); the use of

an archaic version of said language in the divine liturgy; and connection to the Patriarchate of Constantinople. One argument is that this additional strand was the feeling of being the heirs to Classical Hellas. This must certainly have been the case for many, but it has already been noted that ignorance or apathy towards Hellas remained widespread among the communities that would form the backbone of the revolt in 1821. Nonetheless, it is an important enough -and exclusive enough- strand to warrant inclusion in the graphic below.

The picture, however, would still be incomplete. It is my surmising that the only element that was common across the entirety of these heterogenous peoples (with the odd idiosyncratic exception) is the existence of a feeling of being the descendants of Roman citizens (particularly of Byzantine Citizens: the largely Greek-speaking, Chalcedonian Orthodox, and Greco-liturgical, Empire based at Constantinople).

Indeed, this feeling was more than a matter of heritage: the feeling, as will be more fully explored in later chapters, was a clear and present one in the contemporary reality of 'The Greeks' which also incorporated a feeling of common destiny as well. Over and above this, it should be said that the presence of a number of the strands in the above figure were direct results of the Byzantine era. Specifically, these were the 'strands' of: the Patriarchate; the Greek liturgy; and, more loosely, the strand of the Greek language. Ergo the figure should look something more like this:

Figure 2: Greek 'Rope'

Combined these stands formed a rope, an identity, thick enough and strong enough to hold such a heterogenous people together in the face of alternative identities and the fear of Ottoman reprisals for the actions of their countrymen. Yet, at the same time, there are only two strands (Roman and Hellenic heritage) in there that could be seen as being exclusive to this mosaic of peoples called 'the Greeks' and only one of these (the Roman one, according to this argument) was widespread enough to incorporate the insulated and illiterate Greeks who actually carried out the revolt. It should be noted that I deliberately did not design the 'Roman strand' above to run the full distance of the spectrum because there were some individual Greeks -such as Dionysius Pyrrhus- who outright rejected the Greek's 'Roman-ness'). [230]

The above graphic also explains -in part, at least- the assumption among many conspirators that other communities (who shared some of the non-exclusive strands) would have involved themselves in the Greek liberation movements. The reality, however, was that the 'strand' of Orthodoxy -to take one example- despite being spliced into the 'rope' of both the Greeks and the Serbs, was not strong enough to pull Serbia into the Greek revolution (or vice versa). Whereas, despite the string of the patriarchate not extending to the Cypriots, and the 'Roman' strand being significantly older there, the tether there was still strong enough to cause Cypriots to be pulled into conflict with the Porte alongside their compatriots on the mainland.

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[230] Dionysius Pyrrhus. 1810. *Cheiragogy*,

Chapter V: 'to Romaiko' Foretold

The millenarian tradition of a Roman restoration

"Before the revolution… the common people of Greece were ignorant of the sacred word eleuthera (liberty). And whenever they wanted to talk about their future liberation, they would always say 'when we achieve to Romaïko', or, 'when to Romaïko will happen'."[231]

Part I: 'to Romaiko'

The millenarian beliefs and folk tales of the Greeks of the Ottoman era (and the Greeks of the latter 19th and early 20th Centuries as well) survived and spread in the vernacular oral tradition of a largely illiterate population whose culture was deeply permeated with Orthodoxy and deeply insulated from western enlightenment ideals. As a corpus these stories nourished the expectation that the *"day would surely dawn when God would lift the infidel yoke from his chosen people and would restore to them the Christian Roman Empire in all its majesty and splendor"[232].*

Understanding these attempts to explain the fall of their Empire and to foretell the coming of 'to Romaiko' ('The Romaic Restoration' discussed earlier in the context of Makiraynnis' memoirs) is, in Vryonis' words, *"of fundamental importance in understanding how the Greeks perceived their historical identity and destiny".[233]* By examining these oral traditions, we can identify common thoughts, feelings, and assumptions pertaining to the Greek's identity and political aspirations. These traditions, by virtue of their long lifespan (centuries for some) and their ubiquitous-ness, can be taken as evidence for a general feeling among the average Greeks that the Roman Empire based at Constantinople was theirs and that one day it would be restored to them.

This, in turn, can be read as corroboration for the argument that the average participant of the rebellion in 1821 had something more pertaining to a Byzantine national consciousness

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[231] Vryonis, Speros. The "Past" in Medieval and Modern Greek Culture. United States: Undena Publications, 1978. p.157
[232] Vryonis,, 1978. p.157-8
[233] Vryonis,, 1978. p.157-8

in mind than the neo-Hellenic ideal. It is, after all, accepted in the historiography that said oral traditions were frequently found among the Greeks in the revolutionary period. [234]

Overall, the common theme of the millenarian traditions of the Ottoman Greeks is that their State had fallen as a result of God's divine punishment but that one-day God would restore said State to them.[235] Ergo the Tourkokratia was assumed at the time to only ever be temporary. According to Clogg, this hope of an eventual deliverance *"not through human agency but through divine intervention… reflected the persistence of Byzantine modes of thought which saw all human endeavour as constituting part of divine dispensation."[236]* Additional common themes are the involvement of a blonde race in their liberation (often assumed to be the Russians); the additional involvement of a great fleet and red-clad soldiers in said struggle; the re-animation of Constantine XI Palaiologos and other figures from the fall of Constantinople; the driving back of the Turks to their mythical homeland at an Armageddon-type battle for 'The City'; the arrival of a god-appointed ruler and liberator; and the eventual conquest of Constantinople (and said City's Empire at its' apogee) – an assumed destiny that would become known after the War of Independence as 'the Megali Idea' but which as a concept had pre-existed the revolution of 1821.

All of these tropes above are evidence of a known feeling of a Byzantine heritage, of a Byzantine destiny and, in my view, of a Byzantinist national consciousness which traversed any dichotomy between 'religious' and 'political' ideology. Said ideal, I argue, must be taken not only as evidence of the spectre of the Roman Empire being present in the popular culture of the Greeks, but also as being present among the very motivations which pushed the average participant of the 1821 revolt to take up arms for their liberation. If this prove plausible this, then, would in turn imply that said arms were taken up not for Hellas but for 'to Romaiko'.

Part II: The prophecies of Father Kosmas

Kosmas of Aetolia, a missionary sent out from Constantinople into Thrace by the Patriarch (and who later became a wandering preacher in Epirus), is an important source of

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[234] Clogg, 2002. p.19
[235] Vryonis,, 1978. P.157-8
[236] Clogg, 2002. p.17

information for the examination in question. Throughout the course of his travelling sermons in the late 18ᵗʰ century he made numerous prophecies of which over 120 survive today. These were probably noted down during his travels in Epirus in the last decade of his life. While it is likely that the teachings and prophecies were recorded in writing directly from his sermons or written down shortly after the events themselves it is also thought that the prophecies were passed throughout Epirus and possibly further afield via oral transmission.[237]

For these reasons I surmise that the prophecies are, on one hand, a relatively accurate account of Kosmas' prophetic sermons. On the other hand, meanwhile, they are indicative of late 18ᵗʰ Century oral culture in Epirus if not Ottoman Greece as a whole. Additionally, when one considers Kosmas' popularity in the early 19ᵗʰ Century it is not controversial to state that the travelling preacher's popularity -and the popularity of his prophetic messages in particular- outlasted his own life. For evidence of Kosmas' 19ᵗʰ Century popularity, one need only observe Ali Pasha of Ioannina's commissioning of a shrine to the oracle in 1813.[238] It is reasonable to suggest, therefore, that in 1821 the revolutionaries would have been familiar with his prophecies and teachings.

As will become apparent as the analysis of his prophecies goes further, a degree of mutual corroboration will appear in the form of the striking similarity between Kosmas' teachings and the other sayings and millenarian beliefs that were recorded as being popular throughout Greece on the eve of the revolution. The selected prophecies below are from the book *Kosmas of Aitolos* by Augustinios Kantiotou, the late Metropolitan of Florina and were digitised alongside an online article by Professor Stergiou Sakkou of the Aristotle University in September 2019.[239] The prophecies have been translated from the Greek by myself.

Prophecy 1 of the collection is perhaps the most blatant in relation to this particular inquiry; it reads: *"This [land], one day, will be Roman and fortunate* [will be] *whoever*

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[237] Kitromilides, Paschalis M. 2013. The Making of Modern Greece . Harvard: Harvard University Press. p.126

[238] Elsie, Robert. 2000. *A dictionary of Albanian religion, mythology, and folk culture.* New York University Press. p.60

[239] Father Kosmas. *Prophecies*. Late 18ᵗʰ Century. Epirus. Reproduced in Sakkou, Stergiou. *A few words about the Prophecies* Digitised at http://users.uoa.gr/~nektar/orthodoxy/tributes/patrokosmas/profhteiai.htm (last accessed 20/12/2020).

lives in this kingdom."[240] The initial noteworthy aspect of this particular prophecy is the appellation 'Roman' in relation to a geographical space; evidence that in the era in question the Greeks were referring to their hypothetical-state-to-come as 'Roman'. From the use of 'Christian' to refer to Orthodox Christians elsewhere in his prophecies it is clear that Kosmas is not referring to 'Roman' as in 'a Christian State' but rather to 'the State of Rome'. The other interesting revelation from this evidence is the comment that said State would be a Kingdom; perhaps evidencing a natural assumption in the Greek mindset of the time that the Roman State to come would naturally be headed by a monarch.

This notion, of physical spaces becoming part of the 'Roman State' is repeated. In prophecy 7 Kosmas said: ***"The red-capped will come and then the English for 54 years, and then this will become Roman."***[241] An important detail here is that this was said in Cephalonia in the Ionian Islands and 'the red-capped' is probably a reference to the French army of the time.

Kosmas not only made mention of a geographical Roman territory; he also referred in his prophecies to a Roman people. In Prophecy 8 he preached that *"the borders of the Romans will be the Vovousa"* this is now called the River Aoos which flow from Northwest Greece into Southwest Albania.[242] In his next prophecy (number 9) he indicated to the people of the Epirote town of Preveza the directions from which *"The Romans will come."*[243] Lastly, in prophecy 61 he warned of a *"pseudo-Roman"* meaning a false Roman in whom the parishioners were not to place their trust.[244]

As well as the reference to the red-capped, Kosmas made a number of prophecies regarding foreign intervention in the liberation of the Romans. In Prophecy 62 he said: "*the 1000-ship-navy will be gathered in Salona and the red-vested will come to fight for you*".[245] The red-vested are, possibly, a reference to the red-coated soldiers of the British Army of the time. The important theme here is the 1000-Ship-navy. This stupefyingly sized fleet is referred to in another prophecy, number 19, in which Kosmas said: *"When you will see the one thousand ship navy in Greek waters, then the issue of Constantinople*

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[240] Father Kosmas. Late 18th Century. Prophecy 1.
[241] Father Kosmas. Late 18th Century. Prophecy 7.
[242] Father Kosmas. Late 18th Century. Prophecy 8.
[243] Father Kosmas. Late 18th Century. Prophecy 9.
[244] Father Kosmas. Late 18th Century. Prophecy 61.
[245] Father Kosmas. Late 18th Century. Prophecy 62.

will be resolved".[246] This reference to 'the issue of Constantinople' is a repeated phrase in Kosmas' teachings and, given the context of foreign fleets and foreign armies coming to fight 'for you' (presumably meaning, the Greeks) it stands to reason that 'the issue of Constantinople' is the conflict over who shall reign over it, the Sultan, or the Roman King.

This conflict over Constantinople featured in a number of Kosmas' prophecies, such as number 110 which reads: *"The army will not reach the City* [Constantinople]*; in the middle of the road* [journey] *will come the news that the coveted one has arrived".*[247] This anointed one is another common theme of the popular legends which traced right back to the fall of Constantinople: according to one of these legends The Virgin Mary asked the Emperor (Constantine XI Palaiologos) to give her back the crown of the City which she would keep until such a figure as the aforementioned 'coveted one' will come to regain God's City for the Christians.[248]

In another collection of prophecies compiled by theologian, K. Triantafylou, Kosmas is reported to have foretold that, regarding this march on Constantinople: *"The great battle will be in the City…. The victor will be the blond race. We will be with the blond race."*[249]This reference to a race of blonde-haired people liberating the Greeks, specifically Constantinople, is a common theme in the millenarian beliefs of the Ottoman Greeks; it probably referred to the Russians.

The Idea of the Fall of the Roman Empire in the East being reversed by a race of blondes actually pre-dates the Fall itself: it is originally attributed to the oracles of Emperor Leo VI 'The Wise' who ruled from AD 886-912.[250] After the fall in 1453 this prophecy received new strength when the Muscovites, perceived in the Southern Balkans to be almost all blonde, became the sole 'unconquered' Orthodox power.[251] The Russo-Turkish war of 1768-74 aroused 'particular excitement' among the Greeks because Leo VI's prophecy specified that the City would be liberated by the blonde race exactly 320 years after its'

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[246] Father Kosmas. Late 18th Century. Prophecy 19.
[247] Father Kosmas. Late 18th Century. Prophecy 110.
[248] Torres Prieto, Susana. 2014. *Between The Third Rome And The New Jerusalem: The Fall of Constantinople Viewed By Russians*. In New Perspectives on Late Antiquity in the Eastern Roman Empire. Ed. Ana de Francisco Heredero, David Hernandz de la Fuenta, and Susana Torres Prieto. Cambridge Scholars Publishing p.262.
[249] Triantafyllou, K. 2005. *Saint Kosmas the Aetolian, Life and Prophecies.* Aetolia: Mikra Zymi.
[250] Clogg, 2002. p.19
[251] Vryonis, 1978. p.158

fall.[252] Although this war (and the Orlov revolt in Greece that coincided with it) ended mostly in disappointment for the Greeks the feeling that the co-orthodox Russians would bring about (or help bring about) 'to Romaiko' persisted among the Greeks after this 320-year-deadline: evidenced by Kosmas' prophetic activity dating to years after 1773 and to his popularity persisting into the 19th Century. In the first decade of the 19th Century there was rebellious activity which called upon Russian intervention and the Philliki Hetereia is known to have duped many Greeks into thinking the Tsar was pulling the strings of the conspiracy that engendered the 1821 revolt. Obviously, there were clear pragmatic reasons for a pro-Russian sentiment (and pro-Russian factions) in Greece during the revolutionary era; but the power of the folk tales telling of deliverance by the hands of the Russians must have played a significant part in garnering support for rebellious activity in Ottoman Greece.

These cataclysmic prophecies of an Armageddon-like event climax in Kosmas' prophecies in number 30 and number 63. In the former he preached *"The antichrists will leave, but shall come again. Then you will chase them to the red apple tree."*[253] The reference to a 'red apple tree' is repeated in the latter prophecy: **"The Turks will… come back again… you will drive them back… a third will be killed, the other third will be baptized, only one third will go back to the Red Apple Tree".**[254] Here the interesting piece of information is 'The Red Apple Tree' to which 'the Turks' will be pushed back from the battlefield of Constantinople. 'The Red Apple Tree', the mythical homeland of the Turks in Byzantine-era folklore (a myth that survived into the modern era) features in the 'Marble Emperor' legend which will be discussed shortly.

For now, there is another feature of this legend to be analysed which directly connects the myth to Constantinople and the Byzantine heritage -and ideology- of the early 19th Century Greeks. The Statue of the Emperor Justinian (The Column of Justinian) situated close to the Haghia Sophia in Constantinople was often depicted by Western travellers as grasping an apple in his left hand (it was actually the *globus cruciger*, the orb that symbolised the global power of the Roman emperor).[255] This mistranslation found its way into Greek folk lore (or, possibly, the folklore misled the western interpretation) as a representation of the

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[252] Clogg, 2002. p.19
[253] Father Kosmas. Late 18th Century. Prophecy 30.
[254] Father Kosmas. Late 18th Century. Prophecy 63.
[255] Philippides, Marios; Hanak, Walter K. 2011. *The Siege and the Fall of Constantinople in 1453: Historiography, Topography, and Military Studies*. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. p.214–217.

mythological homeland of the invading Turks (which, in Greek folklore of the Byzantine, and Ottoman eras, was 'The Red Apple Tree'), situated somewhere in Central Asia.[256]

Due to the turmoil of this struggle, in prophecy 14 Kosmas told the people of Larissa that *"at the feet of Mt Kissavos they will go to sleep as slaves, and wake up free".*[257] This notion, of waking to find oneself in a new state (or State) seems to have been a common trope in Greece at the time: in Makriyannis memoirs we already saw that he reported someone saying to him that 'to Romaiko' would be as if *"we will go to sleep with the Turks and wake up with the Romans".*[258]

In Kosmas' prophecies, therefore, we can trace a feeling among the Greek population of the Ottoman Empire of a kind of divinely decreed destiny. The Greeks would be liberated one day when the Ottoman Empire would be overthrown with the aid of foreign powers (chief among them being the blonde race, the Greeks' fellow Orthodox Russians) in a battle that would drive the Turks back to their mythical homeland in Central Asia and, in the place of the Turkish Empire, a Roman Kingdom would emerge (or, more accurately, re-emerge) which would be centred at Constantinople. This is evidence, I argue, of there being present within vernacular Greek discourse of the late 18th and early 19th Century a desire for a Roman restoration and that said restoration was assumed to have been divinely pre-destined. A final conclusion from this evidence is centred around the colour red: it is possible that red being the pre-determined official colour of the rebellion (which will be discussed in a later chapter) was a nod towards prophecies of red-clad armies marching for the cause of Roman liberation.

Although not mentioned by Kosmas himself, the war that would push the Turks back from Constantinople to 'The Red Apple Tree' would be headed -in some versions of the prophecy- by a re-animated Constantine XI Palaiologos (the last emperor of the Byzantine Empire who had fallen in the defence of Constantinople in 1453). Dating from as early as the 16th Century[259], the legend

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[256]Philippides, and Hanak, 2011. p.214–217.
[257] Father Kosmas. Late 18th Century. Prophecy 14.
[258] Makriyannis, 1907
[259] Clogg, 2002. p.18

> *"held that Constantine Palaiologos, as he was about to be struck down by a Turk had been seized by an angel and taken to a cave near the… 'Golden Gate', one of the gates of Constantinople and turned to marble. There he awaited the day when the angel would return to arouse him, whereupon he would expel the Turks to their reputed birthplace, the… 'Red Apple Tree'… in Central Asia."*[260]

Another legend from the fall of the City that was also commonly heard throughout Greece in the early 19th Century held that two priests who had been saying the divine liturgy over the crowd of people seeking sanctuary in the Haghia Sophia had disappeared into the very walls of the building itself just as the first Turkish soldiers entered. The priests, the legend continues, would appear again on the day that Constantinople fell back into Christian hands.[261]

Between these two legends one can trace the importance of the City of Constantinople and her most important landmark in the popular ideas of the Greek population even after nearly four full centuries had passed since the 'The Fall' where the City -and the Haghia Sophia with it- was lost to them. Again, another clear line of thought that rears its' head here is the natural feeling that not only their City, but their state (in the form of the fallen emperor) would be restored at a time of God's choosing (being He who would send the angel back to rouse the 'Marbled King'). This 'millenarian expectation' of a day when God would restore the Roman Empire engendered a corpus of folk songs that persisted from 16th to 19th Century (and beyond) which, on the topic of the City and the Haghia Sophia specifically, included the refrain *"Again with years, with time, again they will be ours."*[262] In this way the desire and belief in 'to Romaiko' is a precursor of what would one day become the Megali Idea: which was chiefly the desire to regain of the City (as the seat of an enlarged Orthodox State: a restored Rome).

In this section I have displayed evidence of there existing a belief that the Roman Empire would be restored to the Romans one day. Said evidence has also shown how Russian aid was assumed to feature in the coming re-conquest and that, therefore, when the Russians did intervene much excitement would have been aroused among the Greeks. Additionally, I have shown how the foretelling of 'to Romaiko' meant that when the War of Independence ended many were dissatisfied with the result: setting the new state on a path

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[260] Clogg, 2002. p.19
[261] Runciman, Steven 1965. *The Fall of Constantinople, 1453*. Canto ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.147
[262] Young, Kenneth. 1969. *The Greek passion: a study in people and politics*. London: Dent. p.120

of destruction and expansion which would last another hundred years. At all times Constantinople, and its' empire has been shown to be at the centre of the Greek's feeling of historical identity and destiny. Lastly, as these beliefs and ideas are accepted to have been present before, during, and after the revolutionary years this is all clear evidence, I argue, of the revolutionary forces of 1821 being made up of people who felt a strong connection to a 'Roman' identity and destiny (more so than 'Hellene'): made up of people who wanted to bring about 'to Romaiko' not the rebirth of Hellas. This will be corroborated in a later chapter which covers the years which followed the establishment of the Greek kingdom where these millenarian beliefs reared their heads again. Crucially, here, a clear trend has been identified: although the prophecies were infused with Orthodoxy it is important to note that this was not just an apocalyptic tale of Christianity versus Islam. Although deeply religious in nature it is abundantly clear that this was also a desire to resurrect a fallen state and therefore the desires and the efforts to bring about 'to Romaiko' should be seen as ideals and acts which were equally of a religious and a political nature. Ultimately, it is the argument her that the desire -and expectation- of 'to Romaiko' was a central pillar to what we should refer to as a 'form of national consciousness'. The evidence above would demand this: it paints a clear picture of the Romans being comprised of a demarcated people (demarcated not only by religion) who had an attachment to a specified territory and who possessed a clear belief in a common political (and spiritual) destiny.

Chapter VI: Feelings and realities of Roman statehood throughout the Tourkokratia to 1821

Part I: A state within a state

Although up to this point Byzantium has been portrayed as being in a long hiatus throughout the Tourkokratia until 1821 this depiction is not -truth be told- entirely accurate. In many ways, in reality and in the minds of its' former citizens, Byzantium endured -and, indeed, may even have been strengthened by- the Tourkokratia in a number of different ways (namely the extension of the Constantinopolitan See and the nurturing of a burgeoning 'mercantile empire in the last few decades of the time period in question). Here I will outline a selection of the more relevant artifacts of Byzantine rule which survived the Tourkokratia; these being the Patriarchate (indeed, the institution of the Orthodox Church itself) and the legal system (which was intricately connected to the former and remained Byzantine in nature until well after the establishment of independence). Loosely speaking it could be said that the civil service of the Rum Millet, the judiciary, and even the system of law and order were remnants of the times before 'The Fall'. The latter is only a minor point: the armatoli, the state-sponsored warbands that patrolled the narrow mountain passes -keeping them free from klephts as they did so- were hangovers of the Byzantine era.[263] By-and-large, the only things that the Romans did not have in 1821 that they did have in 1453 was a Christian King, a military, and possession of the realm itself (including, of course, notable sites in the Greek cultural psyche such as the Hagia Sophia and 'The City').

Far more profound than the durability of the armatoli system was the newfound role of the Patriarch who, essentially, found himself to be the spiritual leader of the entirety of the See of Constantinople (a See which the Porte enlarged for him, at the expense of the Patriarchates of the Greek's Slavonic neighbours) as well as the temporal leader of all the Sultan's Orthodox Christian subjects. Never before had an Orthodox ruler -Emperor, Patriarch, or otherwise- been the temporal or indeed the spiritual head of such a massive population. Given this synthesis of temporal and religious authority, it is of little wonder, then, that the vernacular Greek world view was so incompatible with western liberal notions of a religious-secular divide. Dakin summarised the situation well when he wrote that:

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[263] Angelomatis-Tsougarakis, 1990. p.80

> *"[the Turks] regarded them [the bishops] as state officials of a subordinate theocracy which in purely religious matters -matters of doctrine, forms of worship, education, marriage- was autonomous within its own system of law and its own financial administration. The Christian bishop in his judicial capacity held a position somewhat analogous to the Kadi, or Moslem judge. In his judicial capacity he applied Roman Law which he learned from the Exavivlos of 1345 (a work which in 1741 was translated into simpler language) or from the Nomocanon of 1561…. Like the Bishops, the Patriarch, as a result of the powers conferred upon him by the Sultan, was in a large degree a temporal ruler – much more so indeed than he had been in Byzantine times. In his temporal capacity he was a kind of minister of state for Christian affairs. He was the national ruler, the ethnarch (millet-bashi). He was the lord and despot of the Christians, thus inheriting the title of the emperors. He also inherited their emblem, the two-headed eagle, which he displayed upon his mitre; and like the emperors he had his own imperial guard."* [264]

In administering and regulating the Christians, then, the Church -by invitation of the conquerors- stepped in to fill the vacuum created by the loss of the Roman Emperor. The result of this being that the Greeks, although now being ruled by a Muslim Sultan, never experienced a break in how they were ruled or by which legal codes they were to adhere to. Runciman clarifies that, in this arrangement, the Turkish courts (run in accordance to Koranic Law) maintained jurisdiction over the Christian population of their empire only in criminal matters and those few civil cases where a Muslim was concerned. [265] Civil law and canon law, however -as Dakin alluded to above- remained not only in the hands of the Romans, but remained itself Roman by virtue of its being dominated by the legal codes of the Byzantine Empire (or, at least, legal codes which had been staunchly influenced by earlier Byzantine laws; the *Nomocanon* of 1561, for example, was little more than a compilation of much earlier legal codes dating from the time of the Empire). [266] Between the two legal codes, civil and canon, the everyday life of the Patriarch's subjects would have been dominated via their respective roles in regulating public and family interactions (baptisms, marriages, funerals, and wills) as well as holy and feast days (of which there were scores) and day-to-day parish administration.

So strong, in fact, was this Byzantine legal tradition that Brewer noted that the provisional Greek Governments in the 1820's decreed that -until such a time as new laws could be drawn up to meet the demands of the modern era- the judiciary were to continue to operate

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[264] Dakin. 1973, p.8-9
[265] Runciman, 1965. p.147
[266] Runciman, 1965. p172

in accordance to Byzantine law for both criminal and civil cases (except in commercial matters where French law was adopted.)[267] Byzantine criminal law, it should be noted, had not been practiced since 'The Fall', yet some thirty-five decades later those codes would be revived by the provision government of a seemingly 'Hellenist' State. According to the legal historian, Sherman, the legal code that was used by the government was the 9th century *Basiliki*.[268] Sherman goes on to point out that in 1835 the *Basiliki* was replaced in the modern Greek civil code with the *Hexabiblios* mentioned by Dakin above; a 14th Century document which was latterly heavily revised and expanded upon in connection to the *Basiliki*.[269] The importance of the use of Byzantine legal codes, some of which were a thousand years old at the time they were adopted, cannot be stressed enough. From Brewer we know that the Greek lawyers of the post-independence era were well versed in French law (this would make sense, with many of them gaining their education abroad) yet the earlier Imperial laws were used for generations after the establishment of a modern Greek State. The logical conclusion for this would be that it mattered not that the lawyers of the new State were educated in the modern legal codes Of Europe: the local population were - as yet- not. Subsequently it would make sense for them to continue to be governed, regulated, and ruled in the manner in which they had always been: Byzantine law. We must keep in mind that the administration which was to adopt these Byzantine Codes was no longer to be the Church (whose clergy, it could have been argued, were just being left to use the codes they were already familiar with). The Church was essentially stripped of its secular power by the provisional governments; rather the people who would be using these codes was a branch of the Government's civil service, an independent judiciary: an office that the westernised Greek literati -and only said literati-would have been able to fill. Yet still the new Greek state opted to adopt Byzantine codes. It could be argued, therefore, that a) the Byzantine State survived throughout the Tourkokratia and beyond via the longevity of its legal system; and that b) the adoption of said legal system in the 1820's is indicative of a feeling of continuity with the former Byzantine state among the Greeks at the time where the newly independent state found itself in need of its own state apparatus.

From before the Fall, right through the Tourkokratia, and into the first decades of independence, therefore, there was a clear line of continuity of the Greeks falling under the

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[267] Brewer, 2011. p.130

[268] Sherman, C. 1918. *The Basilica. A Ninth Century Roman Law Code Which Became the First Civil Code of Modern Greece a Thousand Years Later. University of Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law Register, 66*(7/8), 363-367. doi:10.2307/3314161

[269] Sherman p. 363

jurisdiction of a corpus of legal codes which were utterly Byzantine. In this regard the Tourkokratia can be looked at with a different perspective: the 'Kratia', the rule under which the Greeks lived, had, in reality, always been Roman Law. The Sultan was not even, technically, their new head of State: the patriarch wore that mantle. The key thing that had changed was that the Greeks were now second class citizens under Muslims (who were headed by said Sultan) and that their ethnarch -the Patriarch of Constantinople- was subordinate to him. But in the majority of regions where the Greeks lived, especially 'the Greeks in Greece' the 'Turk' was very much the demographic minority (and almost always relegated to the urban landscape). The peoples primarily under investigation here, the 'insulated' and 'isolated' Greeks of the Greek countryside could have gone months -if not years- without ever setting eyes on a Turk. What, then, had changed for them? I surmise that in most ways nothing had save for two elements which were largely concerned with situations hundreds of miles removed from said communities. The first being the lack of an Orthodox Emperor: although the patriarch assumed his mantle, he still answered to the Sultan The second being the fact that key sites in the Greek national consciousness - Constantinople and her famous church, in particular- were thoroughly in the possession of said non-Orthodox Sultan.

The Church, as well as being responsible for the continuation of a Temporal Roman tradition, was also responsible -as it had always been- for the spiritual guidance of its flock. The role the Orthodox faith played in fostering feelings of 'Byzantinism' has been well examined previously in this thesis; however, the role the institution of the Church itself played is worth some consideration. In this capacity too, the Church fostered a feeling among its flock of a distinctly Byzantine consciousness, and it promised a distinct Byzantine destiny ('to Romaiko'). Dakin noted that:

> *"Only through the Church would the chosen people attain absolution: and hence only through the Church would the Holy City, the Holy Emperor and the Holy Empire be restored... It* [the Church] *taught the Christians that they were a chosen people and that their communities belonged to a greater whole."*[270]

This, however, did not amount to officially encouraging sedition. Runciman explained this when he noted that the official position of the Orthodox Church, regarding the identity and the destiny of its' flock, was that said flock was to render unto Caesar that which was Caesar's and that the Sultan's rule had been divinely mandated to come into power at the

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[270] Dakin, 1973. p.15

very moment the Byzantine state had slipped into heresy (a reference to the attempts at union between Catholic West and Orthodox East at the Council of Florence in the 1440's) and that, therefore, as good Christians the Greeks should behave as good citizens.[271] Everything that was mandated to happen (that which is referenced in the quote from Dakin above) would come in God's time as God intended, and so the Greeks were not to actively seek to bring about said destiny: it would happen in its' own time. This anti-revolutionary position of the Church was the official line adopted throughout the Tourkokratia. The restoration that was promised, it was therefore implied, would be delivered unto the Greeks by God via the actions of a foreign people (usually the Russians, the only independent Orthodox power) who had no theological duty to render unto the Sultan that which was the Sultan's. Thus, the institution of the Orthodox Church, with one hand, demanded patient obedience to a transitory state which existed only to punish the Greeks back into pious adherence to the one true faith. While, on the other hand, the Church fostered within the Greeks the notion that they were not, and never would be, Ottomans: they were Romans and one day, in God's own time, Rome would be delivered -by His hand- back to them.

All of this translated into the Greeks enjoying -courtesy of the offices of their Church- a distinct identity (an identity which was both civic and religious) throughout the Tourkokratia. One key conclusion to take from this is the (oft-stressed in this thesis) challenge to the notion that 'Roman' was a religious and non-national ideal in 1821. Meanwhile, it is clear that the lived reality of the Greeks was one of continuity with the time before 'The Fall', courtesy of the institution of the Church's use of Byzantine legal codes as they performed in their capacity as a type of civil service for Greek affairs within the Ottoman Empire. It is for this reason that this section of the chapter is entitled 'a state within a state' because the institution of the Church went far beyond the spiritual and was the key administrator of the Greek's secular and temporal affairs.

The aforementioned 'dominant role' the Church played in the 'lived reality of the Greeks' was not only the result of canon and civil law combining to regulate the key life stages mentioned above (baptisms, marriages, funerals, wills etc): it was also the result of the Church's tole in regulating the key events of the year. Again, it has already been discussed that the Greeks were overwhelmingly Orthodox and that the peoples under examination here, 'the Greeks in Greece' were overwhelmingly observant in their faith. The point being made here, then, is not about church attendance or the frequency of prayers throughout the

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[271] Runciman,Steven. 1968. *The Great Church in Captivity*. New York: Cambridge University Press. p.395

day (which, no doubt, would have played a major role in the cementing of bonds between the members of the Greek communities). Few factors of everyday lived realities can surpass the importance of food to a culture and to communal, familial, and gendered interactions. So, it is worth exploring how the Greek Church dominated the realm of food in order to highlight the extent to which the Orthodox faith and the Orthodox Church dominated the lived reality of 'the Greeks in Greece' during the Tourkokratia and the revolutionary era.

The Orthodox Church of the early 19th Century (and today) set aside 180-200 days of the year for fasting. [272] On these specific days the Greeks are to avoid olive oil, meat, fish, and dairy products. There are four specific fasting periods scattered throughout the year where the faithful fast throughout the week with additional restrictions to their diet on Wednesdays and Fridays. The first of these periods in the Orthodox liturgical calendar (which starts in September) is the forty days running up to Christmas (where meat, dairy products and eggs are forbidden while fish and olive oil are allowed except on Wednesdays and Fridays). [273] Then there is the forty-eight days preceding Easter (known as Lent) during which fish is allowed on two days of the week while meat, dairy, and eggs are forbidden and olive oil is only permitted during weekends. [274] The next fasting period, the Fast of the Apostles, lasts for one to six weeks and runs from the eighth day after Pentecost until the Feast of Saint Peter and Paul (at the end of June). The fourth fasting period comes in August (fifteen days for The Assumption) when the same dietary rules as Lent apply with the exception of fish consumption (which is only allowed on August 6th). [275] On top of this there are thirteen great feasts in the Orthodox Church, as well as innumerable additional feast or fast days dedicated to the numerous saints and martyrs of the Church.

In 1850 Captain Edmund Spencer toured 'European Turkey' and the young independent Greece, before publishing his travel writings the following year. In said writings he made the following observation on the fasting and feasting traditions of the local Christian populations which corroborates the extent to which the Church dominated everyday life (there is little reason why the scene he depicted in 1850 could not be an accurate depiction of Greece in any other decade in the 19th Century).

[272] Sarri, K. O., Tzanakis, N. E., Linardakis, M. K., Mamalakis, G. D., & Kafatos, A. G. 2003. *Effects of Greek Orthodox Christian Church fasting on serum lipids and obesity. BMC public health*, *3*, 16. https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2458-3-16 (Last Accessed 01/06/22)
[273] Sarri, K. O., Tzanakis, N. E., Linardakis, M. K., Mamalakis, G. D., & Kafatos, A. G. 2003.
[274] Sarri, K. O., Tzanakis, N. E., Linardakis, M. K., Mamalakis, G. D., & Kafatos, A. G. 2003.
[275] Sarri, K. O., Tzanakis, N. E., Linardakis, M. K., Mamalakis, G. D., & Kafatos, A. G. 2003.

"Fasting is considered in the Oriental Church as one of the most important duties of a Christian; and so numerous are the days prescribed, that there are only a hundred and thirty in the year free from the obligation. As for the vigils, they are without end. These fasts are always succeeded by festivals, then the numbers of holidays, the midnight masses, the endless processions to the Shrine of some favoured saint… Taken collectively, the Modern Greeks, like every other nationality, are characterized by certain customs and manners; still it must be observed, that in a mountainous country like Greece, divided by the hand of nature into distinct cantons, each within its natural boundary, inhabited by tribes differing from the other in extraction, dialect, and tradition, we must expect to find considerable variety . This is not the case with their religion, which… is regulated by a synod of bishops, from whose decision there is no appeal, and which extends throughout the entire country, for although the Oriental Church professes to acknowledge no other head than our Lord Jesus Christ ; the sentence of its Synod of patriarchs… in all matters relating to church affairs, is in its effects equal to the thunder of the Vatican… as political pontiff of the Oriental creed, these Spiritual fathers wield a power… not much inferior to… the Pope."[276]

Again, it cannot be stressed enough, that during the Tourkokratia said 'Church matters' were temporal and ecclesiastical -civic and religious- and their effects infiltrated into family life via being the sole proprietor of baptisms, marriages, and funerals as well as the feast and fast days which took up the lion's share of the calendar year.

Returning, then, to the way in which the Greek Church dominated the food culture of the Greeks, Millingen -who was in Greece at the time of the War- offers a number of helpful insights which corroborate the argument thus far, and which add additional understanding to the scale of the complex rules around feasting and fasting and the extent to which the Greeks observed them (including the extent to which the Klephts and soldiers -beside whom Millingen was fighting- observed the fasts in the midst of their campaigns). He wrote:

"During the better half of the year, obliged to observe the fasts it [the Orthodox Church] prescribes, and which are far more rigid than those of the Catholics - fish, eggs, milk, and in fact every produce of red-blooded animals, being interdicted, a piece of Indian corn bread, baked under the embers, a dozen pickled olives, a few raw onions, or boiled wild herbs, amply satisfy the appetite of a Greek. At the end of a day's march, it is a singular sight for a newcomer, to see the Greek soldiers spreading themselves all about the fields to botanize, as they say… After filling their handkerchiefs with roots, frequently fifteen or twenty different species, they form a general mess; and, after boiling them, sit down in circles to enjoy this simple fare. The Greek religion, among the common people, is entirely a religion of the stomach; for superstition, which constantly

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[276] Spencer, Edmund (Capt.). 1851. *Travels Through European Turkey in 1850 Volume II*. London: Colburn and Co. Publishing p.280-285

presides at his board, teaches that the orthodox use of food is the chief thing necessary to arrive at salvation; that it is equally his duty as a Christian, who wishes to please the saints, the Panagia, and Christ, to fast at the appointed epochs, and to gorge himself, as much as possible, with the various viands under which the tables literally groan at their celebration of festivals… Fasting is looked upon by the Greek as a sacrament, which even divine justice cannot violate. Let no one accuse me of exaggeration; for so strictly convinced is a kleftes of the all - atoning power of fasting, that no consideration will induce him to break it; though, on the very same day, he will, without hesitation, commit the most dreadful atrocities.''[277]

Millingen further expanded on the Orthodox attitude to food, writing that:

"The Greeks retain in their religion various Jewish ceremonies: they consider it a sin, for instance, to eat the flesh of an animal that has been smothered, as fowls and pigeons frequently are by us. This prejudice is so deeply rooted, that, after shooting a bird or hare, they cut the throat of the animal, and refuse to eat it afterwards unless it bleeds.''[278]

Samuel Gridley Howe, the American Philhellene, experienced something similar. According to his memoirs a priest instructed his wife to clean out their kettle because Howe had cooked a pigeon in it the day prior *"and some of the juice may remain to contaminate it* [the kettle]".[279] Howe also reveals in his memoirs a similar picture as that painted by Millingen regarding the piousness of the soldiery (although this time the spotlight is on the Greek 'pirates' circulating the Archipelago hunting for Ottoman fleets during the war).

"The most desperate, abandoned crew of pirates that cruise the Archipelago would hardly be found to have one man aboard who would dare to go forth on a thieving voyage without lighting a lamp before the picture of the Virgin, or to level his gun to shoot a man without making the sign of the cross ; nay, should they succeed, and their consciences become a little more burdened by some outrageous robbery, they have only to enter the first church (of which every barren rock has one), make the cross some dozen times, fill up the Virgin's lamp, leave a few paras for the priest, and all is well ; they are as good candidates for heaven as their most pious neighbours. I found a very good old woman to-day, with whose expression I was pleased. "I will crawl on my belly " (for she could not walk) "and beg my bread in the streets, rather than [that] my daughter shall be dishonoured, or the lamp of the Virgin be not filled day and night."[280]

One important note to take from this evidence at this juncture is that two separate sources have indicated that the institution of the Church, although being -officially- pro-

[277] Millingen. 1831. p.171-172
[278] Millingen. 1831. p.172
[279] Howe.1828. p.301
[280] Howe.1828. p.260

establishment, was also the pathway -the only pathway- through which the faithful could carry out the gruesome acts of rebellion without suffering damnation, so long as they performed their religious duties of blessing themselves before an altar, fasting, and keeping the candles and lamps of the Virgin and the Saints burning in their shrines and holy sites. Another key piece of information from this source is the observation that the physical manifestation of the institution of the Church dominated the every-day landscape of Greece: 'every barren rock' had a Church building or monastery, and shrines were ubiquitous.

The piety of the Greek soldiery was also observed by Howe. His observations add further insight towards the extent to which the Orthodox faith infiltrated the interactions and everyday life experience of the Greeks at the time. He wrote:

> *"Four or five Greeks may sleep in the same room; in the morning they lie and talk, but when one gets up, he washes his face and hands, bows and crosses himself a dozen times to the Holy Virgin, says his prayers aloud, then turns round and wishes the rest good morning."*[281]

The extent to which the Greek faith, and the Greek institutions themselves a) infiltrated the lived realities of the Greeks, b) maintained a material and ideological link with the Byzantine past, and c) facilitated rebellious activity has therefore been laid out.

However, in order to fully grasp this issue, the role the Church played in the rebellion itself needs to be further explored. It is generally accepted that the Church, as mentioned, was anti-revolutionary and that it preached -and practiced- a patient obedience to the temporary status quo of the Sultan's rule. However, that being said, it is a matter of acceptance that the Church *did* play a key role in the revolution. That role being two-fold: firstly, maintaining the distinct identity of the Greeks and unifying them despite their various factions. And secondly, the major role they played in sparking the rebellion in the Morea. The first has been referred to throughout this research and is widely discussed and accepted in the historiography. The second is worth further investigation because the usual narrative presented is that the Church -at least the upper echelons of that institution- had interwoven themselves so thoroughly to the establishment[282] that it was noted to be a common saying throughout Greece before the revolution that *"the country labours under three curses, the*

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[281] Howe.1828. p.135
[282] Millingen. 1831. p.173

priests, the Cogiabashis [the Primates]*, and the Turks; always placing the plagues in this order"*.[283] It should be said that this specific saying was reported by an English traveller: and almost all western travellers were scathing in their perceptions of the Greek clergy whom they blamed for holding the Greek's back from their Classical inheritance.

Millingen offers exceptionally useful insights into the role the Greek clergy played in the revolution in the following -admittedly lengthy- excerpt of his account. This does not give evidence for the Church being a revolutionary force. Rather it is more to be taken as supplementary evidence of the supreme power the Church hierarchy had over 'the Greeks in Greece'. He wrote:

> *"The Hetareia, far from attempting to make proselytes among men of this class* [the clergy]*, scrupulously concealed from them all their plans… The Hetareia expected to meet in the clergy the principal obstacle to the accomplishment of their wishes . In fact, as soon as the Turkish authorities in Peloponnesus began to entertain apprehensions, on hearing the news of the insurrection in Moldavia and Wallachia, the presence of a Russian army on the banks of the Pruth, the disturbances at Constantinople, and the discontent of the Greeks throughout the empire, they felt the necessity of adopting measures to prevent disturbances in the peninsula; and, in order to deliberate on this question, they judged it expedient to assemble their most trustworthy counsellors… the principal dignitaries of the Greek church, and the primates. So little aware had these persons been of a revolution being on the point of bursting out in their country, that they unsuspectingly went to Tripolitza; and were proposing the readiest means of disarming the people, and of lessening the daily increasing number of kleftes, when the explosion [of revolt] took place. Germanos, bishop of Patras, was on his way to the assembly; when he received information of the massacre of the patriarch, of the first dignitaries of the Greek church, at Constantinople, and of part of the whole Greek population in that city. He immediately changed his direction; and concluding that the Turks in Peloponnesus would follow the example of their sultan, and that the extermination of the heads of the clergy and every individual of note was decreed, despair pointed out to him, as the sole expedient, to unfurl the standard of the cross, and without delay to make every man of influence in the country aware of the conspiracy, formed against their religion and lives. This intelligence spread over the Morea with the rapidity of lightning. Everywhere the clergy, seeing no alternative, between death, spoliation, persecution, and exile, or open revolt, shaking off their apathy, employed all the influence and eloquence they would otherwise have used to smother the rising flame of liberty, in order to produce a more rapid and general conflagration… The bishops of Helos, of Modon, numerous hegoumeni, and monks, placed themselves at the head of armed bodies of peasants, whose ardour they increased… representing the war not only as one for independence, but for the defence of their faith and their own existence… in less than a week, every province had risen in arms. Thus, the class, which, according to all human probability, was to prove most hostile to the insurrection, from unforeseen circumstances, became its principal support. Without this coincidence, the*

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[283] Woodhouse. 1991. p.128

revolution never could have taken place… their words at once started the armed legions from every part of the land; and this proves, that the Greek insurrection owed its origin not, as most writers have asserted, to preconceived plans and fortunate combinations…"[284]

The conspiracy of the Hetereia, of the intellectuals, and of the diaspora had -in reality- failed miserably. And although the Maniote clansmen and the klephts of the Morea were headed by Heterists and were throwing themselves into revolt, the rebellion would have -in all likelihood- suffocated like the disastrous campaign in the North or like all the other klepht and clan revolts in the decades prior (which are themselves the subject of analysis later in this chapter). The major difference in 1821, then, was not the existence of Hellenism or of the long fingers of the Hetereia, nor was it the involvement of the 'warrior class' of Greeks or of the arrival of foreign sympathisers: it was the full mobilisation of the Greek population (courtesy of the influence of the Church hierarchy) that added the necessary momentum to push the uprising in the South into a full-scale revolution. The participation of the people, so fatally missing in the Northern revolt, was facilitated by -and only by- the truly unique factor about the 1821 revolution: it was the first to be fully endorsed by the upper echelons of the Church (at least locally). Priests and monks had lent aid to rebellions before: but never before had the bishops raised the standard themselves. This is the key piece of knowledge to take away from any examination of the role the Church played in the rebellion: they may have stood against liberalism, secularism, Hellenism, and insurrection. But as soon as the establishment turned against them (for actions they had nothing to do with) they found themselves in a situation where they were fighting for their very survival. Subsequently the clergy were freed from their obligation to render unto Ceasar that which is Ceasar's and, consequently, they threw in their lot with the revolutionaries, bringing their vast flocks of armed peasants and villagers with them.

Most of the historiography, indeed most of the western sources, ridicule and despise the Greek clergy and focus overwhelmingly on the conspiracy, on the enlightenment, and on the diaspora. Just before the excerpt above Millingen himself noted that:

> *"Most of the Greeks, who had travelled, or received some education, were… the first to ridicule the endless mummeries of their church ; and it may be perceived, on perusing the Provisory Constitution of Greece, that the representatives of the nation, rather sought to reduce the authority of the clergy still more, than to augment them ."* [285]

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[284] Millingen. 1831. p.175-178
[285] Millingen. 1831. p.175-178

However, it could be argued that the singular act of throwing in their lot with the revolt instead of heading for Triploitza (where the rest of the clergymen were strangled, justifying Germanos' fears) did as much for the revolution as the Hetereia, the intellectuals, the merchants, or the diaspora ever did. So how did it come to pass that the people followed the upper clergy -en masse- into violent revolt against the sultan after nearly four centuries of hearing said Church preach patient obedience (while exacting their own 'curse' upon their flocks)?

The answer is two-fold. The first is referenced by Millingen in the excerpt: they convinced the people that they were fighting against extinction and religious persecution. Given the recent events in Constantinople alone this was not a particularly 'hard sell'. The second part of the answer to this question is, it appears, because of the respect the 'Greeks in Greece' had not for the bishops, but for the office the upper clergy occupied itself. Because of this respect (to be evidenced shortly) the likes of Bishop Germanos were very influential and powerful in pre-revolution Greece. Once again Millingen, being one of the only English speaking writers to write at any length on the clergy (beyond passing remarks of criticism) gives the best insight (as insight which is very much in keeping with the historical consensus). He wrote:

> *"The Greek clergy is divided into two classes, the monastic and the secular: the former are, from their youth, entirely educated in convents; and, after making vows of perpetual celibacy, are admitted into holy orders. All the learning, wealth, and dignities* [offices] *of the church, were in their absolute power, and, by means of these three omnipotent engines, they had, at all times, maintained a powerful authority over the people. The latter class… entered into holy orders after marriage… They lived among the people… fated to depend chiefly on their manual exertions; and they never could aspire to further advancement… The insulation of the hierarchy from the rest of society, the total separation and even opposition of their interests, inevitably gave rise to an aristocratical influence which imposed a yoke on the neck of the Greek, almost as oppressive as that of the pasha. In order to conciliate the protection of the Turkish authority, the bishop made them handsome annual presents, which naturally came from his flock. Having thus tacitly purchased impunity, he could indulge his rapacious inclinations uncontrolled; or, if ambition tormented him, accumulate sums, which might procure him from Constantinople the nomination to a wealthier see; and even to the dignity of patriarch; places always given to the highest bidder… Whenever they [the prelates] appeared in public, they were accompanied by a train, only inferior to that of the pasha himself."*[286]

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[286] Millingen. 1831. p.174-175

Howe corroborated what Millingen observed. He made the observation that, at the ceremony for the festival of the Epiphany, he witnessed:

> *"an exemplification of the profound respect that the Greeks have for their religion and its ceremonies, a respect more strange when one thinks of the just contempt in which they hold its ministers. They know their priests to be vile and dissolute, yet kiss most reverently the hand of a bishop when he is clad in his robes, though they know the bishop to be a beastly man."* [287]

The respect for the office and the ceremony is therefore evident, and it is of little wonder that the bishops -all of whom having been instrumental in Turkish rule, and most of whom being guilty of exacting their own heavy yoke upon their flocks- were able to stir those same flocks into an open revolt alongside the klephts and clansmen of the mountains.

Before I go on to present -in closing- corroborating evidence for the central role the Church played in the revolution it would be pertinent to return to the overall theme of Byzantinism. How does this all, thus far, provide evidence for the existence of a form of Byzantine national consciousness among 'the Greeks in Greece' in throughout the Tourkokratia and in 1821 in particular? Firstly, because the Orthodox Church and the byzantine empire were inseparable, as has been established, in the minds of the Greeks of the time. Secondly, because outwith 'the minds of the Greeks of the time' and into the realm of material reality, the Church was the steward, the care taker, and the civil service of the Greek State during Ottoman rule. The apparatus of the Byzantine state, far form being dashed into history, was maintained as the Church set about ruling over the Sultan's Orthodox subjects. The institution had been in that position since 1453, and would continue to rule the Greeks as they awaited their deliverance and their emperor until such a time as God saw fit. Furthermore, both the Church and the faith not only maintained a distinct identity for the Greeks during the Tourkokratia, but also promised that one day said Tourkokratia would be replaced by Byzantium reborn. That is why the Church institution, and the Orthodox faith in general, can be taken as evidence of a Byzantinism existing among 'the Greeks in Greece'. Then, over and above all that, evidence has been presented that speaks to the power and influence the upper clergy had over the Greeks, despite everything they were blamed and hated for. So much so that the clergymen were able to whip up their flocks into open rebellion with remarkable speed. This not only spoke to the extent to which the Church -and faith- dominated the lived reality of the Greeks at

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[287] Howe.1828. p.325

the time, but it also highlights that the people saw in their bishops -the last remnants of the Byzantine state- leaders whom they would follow into battle for the cause of 'faith and fatherland'.

The central role the Church played in the revolution, and the degree to which the Orthodox faith nurtured the ideology of national independence can be further corroborated via examination of art (in particular art that depicts the Greek resistance and 'to Romaiko' before, during, and after the revolution). There are two pieces of art, icons both, dated eight decades apart (1756 and 1838 respectively), that will serve to illustrate the point well that the institution of the Church was -before, during, and after the war- bound up with a Byzantinist idea of the Greek's identity and their political destiny. The older piece (presented below) is an icon painted by Zantin Stylianos Stavrakis and it depicts 'to Romaiko'. Constantinople is portrayed in the background with Constantine Palaiologos driving out 'The Turk' accompanied by an angel. The sign of the Cross is directly in front of the emperor, with his hands gesturing towards it: a clear indication that the artist was depicting 'to Romaiko' as being an event infused with Orthodoxy (the artwork is literally called 'The sign of the Cross').[288] A key element of this is that this piece was a portable icon, to be used as part of the worship ceremonies within a number of the Church's physical spaces during the Tourkokratia.

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[288] Drakopoulou, Eugenia. 2021. *La Révolution grecque et l'héritage de Byzance; le témoignage des œuvres picturales.* In Costell Azioni. Rivista Di Lingue e Letterature Diretta Da Giuseppe Massara. 2021. p.142-143

[289] Stavrakis, S. *Icon of The Vision of the Cross.* Byzantium Museum, Athens. Reprodcued in Drakopoulou, 2021. p.157

Figure 3: 'The Sign of the Cross' Icon

The latter icon, meanwhile, depicts a post-independence martyr as a martyr and as a 'heroic Byzantine' (a genre of icons depicting real people -and their holy and heroic deeds- from the time of the Empire). This is done via the adoption of traditional methods of iconography which presents the subject of the painting as such to the audience (the congregation, who would recognise the hallmarks of the 'Byzantine hero' and 'martyr' genres) Eugenie Drakopoulou describes the subject, a martyr, known only as George (anachronistically he is called Neomartyr George of Ioannina) who was killed in Ioannina (which was still part of the Ottoman Empire at that time) in 1838 (and proclaimed as a martyr and cannonised a saint in 1840) for refusing to convert to Islam: *"He is represented wearing the clothes of the fighters of 1821, and at the same time he has been given the features of a Holy Byzantine".*[290]Saint George of Ioannina, it should be said, was in the service of a local Turkish notable at the time of his martyrdom and as such would not have worn the fustanella kilt of the -mostly Albanian- clansmen. In the Icon the Saint is depicted as grasping a palm leaf (the symbol of a martyr); he is garbed all in red (the imperial colour); he wears a luxurious royal robe; he is holding a sceptre-cross; and is receiving a crown (the martyr's crown). The noteworthy element of this is that, again, it is a religious icon, to be used in private and public worship of a martyr saint. Most importantly, however, Georges is depicted in the garb of the revolutionaries of 1821. This means that in 1838 the story of the fighters of 1821 and those of more recent Orthodox martyrs were being blurred into one narrative (all the while being depicted not only in a traditional Byzantine style, but as Byzantine heroes specifically). What is not immediately obvious to the untrained eye in this particular icon (presented below) is that George is stood before the walls of Constantinople. In most other icons the city in the background is more recognisable while Saint George himself is always depicted in 1821 regalia and always with a royal red robe. Not only is this further evidence of the Church's position on the revolution, on 'to Romaiko, and on the city of Constantinople rightfully belonging to the fighters of 1821: it is also evidence of the blurred lines between the ethereal and corporeal in the minds of the Orthodox (both the people and the institution). Constantinople is a real place, yet the Saint is always depicted there post-martyrdom as he would appear in the Kingdom of Heaven (with palm leaf, robes, and martyr's crown). The fact that the City is being depicted as The Kingdom of Heaven is further evidenced by the constant -and dominant- presence of the colour blue in the background (be that the dominant portion of the icon given over to the clear blue sky as is the case in this icon, or the similarly

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[290] Drakopoulou, 2021. p.145

dominant blue of the water of the Bosporus in others): blue being the colour associated with The Kingdom of Heaven in Orthodox iconography (due to it being the colour of the sky). To point to takeaway being, then, that to the Greeks of the 18th and 19th Century (and indeed, many even today) the Kingdom that would emerge in Constantinople from 'to Romaiko' was the Kingdom of Heaven itself, or -at the very least- its' earthly manifestation.

Figure 4: Saint George of Ioannina Icon

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[291] Zikou, M, 1838. Icon of George of Ioannina. Reproduced in Drakopoulou, 2021. p.159

One again this can all be taken as evidence of the way in which the Orthodox faith, and the physical Orthodox spaces and its' material items, speak to the existence of a Byzantine identity among the Church's flock at the time. And, as this identity crosses from the realm of spirituality and Church affairs and into the realm of the political, the temporal, and the physical, it can comfortably be presented as a) more than just a 'religious' phenomena and b) as a form of national consciousness.

Part II: 'The King's garrison'

In the previous section the uniform of the kleftes was observed in religious iconography upon a Saint before the walls of Constantinople. Regardless of what the klephts were -or were not- in reality, there was -as will be seen shortly- a perception among many Greeks (and non-Greeks) during the Tourkokratia (a perception which lasted well into the War of Independence and beyond) that the klephts were more 'patriot' than brigand. In English histories the patriotism of klephts has almost always been questioned. St. Claire noted that the perception of klephtic patriotism was a later invention.[292] Clogg added to this by arguing that the patriotic perception was conjured in order to reconcile the klephts role in the uprising with their previous employ as brigands who preyed on Greek and Turk alike and were often in the service of the occupiers.[293] Angelomatis-Tsougarakis' research found that a pattern emerged in the English travel writer's account on Greece in that they all dismissed the Klephts as bandits.[294] However, it is important to note that the British accounts agreed with one another that the Greek peasantry lent a great deal of support to the klephts.[295]

Meanwhile, the French travel writers seem to have regarded them differently. Angelomatis-Tsougarakis summarised that, in stark contrast to the English depictions, the French *"considered the Kleftes as slaves in revolt inspired by the love of their country."*[296] Breaking with the English tradition slightly, Dakin came close to such a depiction in his research. He argued that the klephts had no conception of a Greek nation state.[297] He did, however, point out that they *"possessed at least some of the*

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[292] St. Claire, 1972. p.9
[293] Clogg, Richard. 2002. Minorities in Greece: Aspects of a Plural Society. United Kingdom: Hurst. p.170-1
[294] Angelomatis-Tsougarakis, 1990. p.80-81
[295] Angelomatis-Tsougarakis, 1990. p.81
[296] Angelomatis-Tsougarakis, 1990. p.81
[297] Dakin, 1972. p.19

characteristics that made for a feeling of nationality."[298] These characteristics that Dakin identified, however, were *"a rooted hatred of the infidel"* and a *"veneration for their Church"*.[299] There seems to be a debate, then, as to whether or not the klephts did possess a feeling of patriotism of national consciousness and what exactly said consciousness contained.

Here it is important to note that the klephts themselves were widely reported in the travel writing as perceiving themselves as carrying out an on-going religious and national war against the Turks, a kind of 'protracted peoples war' in the remote mountains fasts of Greece.[300] The reports that Angelomatis-Tsougarakis analysed, we must remember, all date from the years prior to the revolt in 1821. It is therefore the case that the klephts themselves were siding with the French perception even prior to the war that Clogg argued would force a reconfiguration of the klepht's image.

The starkest evidence I have found, however, of the klephts possessing -and being seen by contemporaries and compatriots to possess- a national consciousness (a consciousness which placed their ongoing banditry within the context of an on-going war against the Turks) comes from Kolokotrones in 1823. He is quoted as rejecting proposals to accept a vassal state settlement for Greece (which would remain under Ottoman suzerainty) by invoking the image of his -and his contemporaries- protracted and centuries-long war against the occupation. He recorded the full conversation in his memoirs (the conversation has been corroborated: in the same memoirs the translator also included a comment from "Monnseur J. Gennadius", the Greek envoy to the Court of St James which almost word-for-word matches Kolokotrones' account. The following is the reply quoted by Monnseur Gennadius:

> *"when our King fell in battle he made no treaty with the Turks, but left a will bidding his garrison carry on the war and free the nation. His garrison has never given up the struggle, and our two fortresses have never capitulated… The Garrison of our king are the so-called klephts, and the two fortresses are Maina [Mani] and Suli [Souli]"*.[301]

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[298] Dakin, 1972. p.19
[299] Dakin 1972. P.19
[300] Angelomatis-Tsougarakis, 1990. p.81
[301] Theodroe Kolokotrones to 'Commander Gawen William Rowan Hamilton, Commnder of a Royal Navy Squadron anchored in the bay of Nauplia, shortly after the capitulation of the town to Kolokotrones' forces in 1823. Quoted by Monnseur J. Gennadius, Greek envoy to the Court of St James. 1892. *Preface.* In Kolokotrones, 1896. p.xii

The following, meanwhile, is Kolokotrones' recollection of the exchange:

> *"Our war was a war with a people whom [we] never desired to acknowledge as ruling [us]; to whom [we] had never taken oaths of fealty, except when made to do so by force ; neither had a Sultan at any time any inclination to regard the Greek people as his people, but only as his slaves. Once, when we had gone to Nauplia, Hamilton came to see me.*
>
> *"You Greeks must have a treaty," he said, "and England will act as mediator."*
>
> *"This will never come to pass," I made answer; " with us it is freedom or death. Captain Hamilton, we have never yet made a treaty with the Turks… Our king was killed, he made no bond [he did not surrender or make arrangements with the conquerors], and his citadel has carried on a never-ending battle against the Turks and there are two fortresses which have never surrendered."*
>
> *"Where is this royal garrison which are your fortresses? "*
>
> *"Our royal garrison is with the bands called Klephts; the fortresses are Mani, Souli, and the hills."[302]*

This is a clear indication of the notion of a national consciousness being present among the Greeks and among the ranks of the klephts themselves within vernacular discourse in Greece at the time. This goes completely beyond Dakin's depiction of klepht's motivations merely being a combination of their Christianity and their sectarian hatred of the Turks. And not just any national consciousness either: this is clearly evidence of a Byzantine national identity, one which nurtured and justified the resistance to Turkish rule by invoking the spirit of the Emperor Constantine Palaiologos' last stand at Constantinople so many centuries prior.

Also noteworthy here is the inclusion of the Souliots within the description of 'the King's garrison'. Given that the Souliotes were very well known to the Greeks (and especially to Kolokotrones) to be Albanians this is further evidence of the Greeks and the Albanians feeling a common identity not because of sentiments of a shared faith alone but because the Albanians were accepted by the Greeks to have been co-citizens of their bygone State.

This notion that the klephts were carrying out an inter-generational national conflict with the occupiers is corroborated, once again, in art. The evidence presented earlier, of Saint George of Ioannina somewhat corroborates the notion of continuity between the klephts

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[302] Kolokotrones, Theodoros. 1896. *I Kolokotrones. The klepht and the warrior. Sixty years of peril and daring. An autobiography*. Edmonds, E.M. Trans. London: T. Fisher Unwin. p.252-253 (Digitised at https://archive.org/details/kolokotronesklep00kolorich/page/n301/mode/2up, last accessed 09/06/2022).

and the ongoing struggle for 'to Romaiko'. However, there is another painting which makes the point: and it makes it blatantly.

Figure 5: The Fall of Constantinople

The painting presented above is remarkable for a number of reasons. Firstly, although it was painted by the hand of Panagiotis Zografos in 1836 (as part of a wider set depicting key events of the War of Independence) it was commissioned, and -most importantly- it was directed, by General Ioannis Makriyannis himself.[304] That such a key figure of the revolt, a figure used elsewhere in this thesis as an example of the 'illiterate' and 'insulated' Greek mindset, is important. It is important because this painting, the opening of the series depicting the history of the revolution, evidences that to the people, and to the fighters of the revolution itself, they saw the war of independence as being utterly inseparable from 'The Fall' nearly four centuries prior. The painting, however, offers more to this thesis than just its' context. In the upper right Constantinople and the Bosporus is represented. Below it is the Sultan and his soldiers: he is commanding his armies to place a yoke upon the Churchmen and the notables (meanwhile, just above them, more clergymen and notables are depicted as having a purse of coins exacted from them, depicting the reality that those Christians who would hold office in the Sultan's government would pay dearly

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[303] Zografos, P. c.1836, *The Fall of Constantinople*. National History Museum of Greece, Athens. Reproduced in Drakopoulou, 2021. P160
[304] Drakopoulou, 2021. p.145-6

for the privilege). To the Left, Hellas sits on a rock between two palm trees (all of the trees in the picture a palms, possibly an attempt to highlight the martyrdom of those who died, or possibly a subtle nod to the notion of Greece being reborn: the Greek words for phoenix and for palm tree are virtually indistinguishable as they both literally just mean 'the pheonecian' one being 'the pheonecian bird' and the other being 'the pheonecian tree'). Above the stylised Hellas is Righas, sowing the seeds of the revolution and preaching to a klepht. It is the klepht and his ilk that are the most noteworthy element of the painting (in as far as this argument goes at least). They are depicted as being small in number and as fleeing for the hills from the city (and from the Sultans vast army). The image that is being represented is that the Greek fighters of 1453 who defended Constantinople fled to the hills when The City fell and became the klephts: and so, according to the narrative this painting portrays, the klephts, fighters of 1821, were carrying on the same war.

Not only is this strong corroboration for the argument that Kolokotrones put forward (that the Klephts were the King's garrison, and that the hills were the King's last fortresses which had not yet capitulated to the Sultan) but it is also strong evidence for the existence of a Byzantine national consciousness, one that involved the perception of the klephts being Byzantine freedom fighters who had carried out a protracted peoples war against the Sultan from 1453 until the revolution. In this section we see, then evidence of the fighters of 1821 seeing their actions as being in the context of a centuries long struggle to regain independence: not as the historiography puts it, as the pinnacle of decades of enlightenment, liberalism, westernisation, and the arrival of 'Hellenism'. This evidence, hopefully, recontextualises the war, at least as in as far as the mindset of those who actually carried out the war goes. This recontextualization of the revolt is useful, as it places the starting point of the struggle for independence to long before the arrival of Hellenism (and, ergo, implies that the struggle was one of Byzantinism at least in regards to matters of ideology). It is possible to recontextualise the revolt in another way and, in the following section, it will be shown that the 1821 revolt was itself merely the latest in a long string of resistance to Ottoman rule. For example, many of the klephts who were active in 1821, as will be shown, had either participated in earlier revolts (particularly since the relatively less-studied 1807 klephtic uprising), or had been in a state of open conflict with the Porte since then.

Part III: Recontextualising the 1821 revolution

If the 1821 revolution was the result of the planning and preparation of the Filliki Hetereia, then said Hetaireia was the result of a convergence of a number of networks of societies; conspiracies; and Masonic Lodges dating back to around three decades prior. The earliest evidence of a secret society that conspired to overthrow the Turks dates back to, at the latest, 1782. Considering the 1821 revolt is usually contextualised as a result of economic and intellectual 'renaissance'; the westernisation of Greek literati; and the Filliki Hetereia's conspiracy it is important to note -as is done below- that this contextualisation misses or minimises some major developments and themes in Greek history. Chief among these being that the hatching, in 1814, of a conspiracy to revolt against the Porte was the sequel to a whole series of illicit movements which spanned at least two generations prior to the meeting of the Hetereia's three founding members in Odessa in 1814.

Alexander Ypsilantis, the grandfather of the man who would later issue the revolutionary proclamations at Iasi, became Hospodar of Wallachia in 1774. Here he amassed a regular army -comprised almost entirely of Greeks- 12,000 strong. The officers of that army, among them the Prince's sons, Konstantinos and Dimitrios, formed what is, as far as I can tell, the first conspiracy to rebel against the Sultan.[305] It appears that this society; the prince's sons; and possibly the Prince himself (who may or may not have been a member), plotted a revolt against the Porte which would liberate the Principalities; form a westernised State; and eventually take Constantinople.[306] Dakin explained this situation whilst highlighting how Righas -who would later form his own conspiracy- may have been involved or had some form of knowledge of the plot; he wrote:

> "*as a youth* [Righas] *entered the service of Alexander Ipsilantis, the Dragoman of the Porte. When in 1774 his patron became the prince of Wallachia, he remained in Constantinople with the prince's sons to complete his education. Subsequently he travelled extensively. Towards 1780 he went to Bucharest to become the prince's secretary. Meanwhile in Wallachia Alexander had established a regular army of 12,000 men, nearly all of whom were Greeks. The officers of this army had formed a secret society, of which the prince's sons, Konstantinos and Dimitrios, who had gone to join their father, had become members. Following the discovery by the Turks of the plot in 1782, the two sons fled to Transylvania. The prince returned himself to Constantinople to clear his name.*"[307]

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[305] Dakin, 1972. p.20
[306] Dakin, 1972. p.26-7
[307] Dakin, 1972. p.20

When this plot was discovered by the Turks in 1782 the two sons fled and the prince went back to Constantinople to try and clear his name. Righas, meanwhile, seems to have received the sponsorship of a string of notable Greeks before finally coming under the patronage of the Baron de Langenfield who took him to Vienna. It was whilst he was in Vienna (and then Trieste) that Righas began to be influenced by the French Revolution and it was here also that he first started putting pen to paper, resulting in the eventual publication in 1797 of the various political scripts we examined previously.

It was during this time that Righas may have created a Hetereia of his own which aimed to assist Napoleon's assumed invasion of the Ottoman Balkans.[308] It is unknown whether this Hetereia was anything more at this stage than his masonic contacts or his network of pamphlet distributors but -even if it was a bigger conspiracy- it was snuffed out in its' infancy after Righas was arrested and then killed in 1798.

The following decade saw a number of Hetereias springing up. Dakin mentions the actions in 1800 of a Greek by the name of Stamatis who reported to the French that a revolutionary society had been formed in Epirus and the Morea.[309] In 1806 Dakin then describes the creation of a 'so-called second Hetereia' which he states "*included klefts in the Ionian Islands…* [had been] *founded in Italy and planned* [like Righas,] *to obtain Napoleon's aid.*"[310] Dakin also detailed how one of this conspiracy's members, Kolokotrones, had composed an appeal to the Tsar asking for assistance for the Greeks on the mainland; this evidently fell on deaf ears and so he, Dakin reports, had then planned to seek Napoleon's support against Ali Pasha.

Kolokotrones, it seems, had spent much of the 1810's at war with the Pasha and his son (Veli, the Pasha of the Morea) in 1807 he was part of a klephtic war band (comprising of klephts from all over Greece) that waged a campaign against Ali.[311] This had come a year after Vlachavas had begun his relatively widespread revolt in Thessaly (which was eventually put down by Ali).[312] The 1807 insurrection had come after the leading klephts had met at the monastery on the isle of Skiathos. From here Yiannis Stathas took 70 ships

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[308] Dakin, 1972. p.22
[309] Dakin, 1972. p.23
[310] Dakin, 1972. p.23
[311] Dakin, 1972. p.23
[312] Gordon, 1832. p.40

and embarked on a 10-month long campaign.[313] Then, in 1809, Kolokotrones among others sought significant French aid (which was forthcoming) to wage further war against Ali and Veli.[314] Later, in 1812, when Major Church briefly returned from the Ionian Isles to London, he carried a memorial from the Greeks to London asking for assistance in the cause of liberation of their country.[315]

Meanwhile, in Paris, in 1807 another Hetereia was formed ('the Greek speaking hotel') which aimed to organise a Greek revolt aimed at liberation.[316] In Moscow another two societies emerged, 'Athena', said to be a continuation of Righas' Hetereia, and 'Phoenix', which was said to have been formed by a Alexander Mavrocrodatos (the second cousin of the man of War of Independence Renown) during his exile in Russia.[317] One of the members of this society, Nikolaos Skoufas, went on to be a founding member of the more successful Filliki Hetereia.[318] Both Athena and Phoenix actively plotted, according to Dakin, for Napoleon to invade the Balkans.[319]

Meanwhile Prince Ypsilantis' son, Constantine (the father of the man who would later spark the 1821 revolt) had dabbled yet again in a conspiracy to revolt against the Porte. Indeed, when the son crossed into the Danubian Principalities and declared open revolt against the Porte in 1821 he was not so much etching into the annals of history a new era as he was following in his father's footsteps.

Constantine Ypsilanti, during his brief tenure as Hospodar of Wallachia (1802-5) had also attempted to bring about a liberation movement in the Balkans by raising the Danubian Principalities into a state of war against the Porte with Russian backing. Jelavich noted that Constantine had turned to Russia instead of the Porte to send an occupying force to the Principalities in order to quell the raiding activity of Pasvanoglu (a renegade Pasha based at Vidin) into his Principality.[320] It seems likely, however, that the raiding merely provided Constantine a convenient excuse to invite a Russian invasion.

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[313] Hatzilyras, Alexandros-Michail. 2003. The establishment of the Greek flag. Digitised at www.army.gr/n/g/publications/articles/GreekFlag0/GreekFlag1/ (Last accessed 12/09/2020).
[314] Dakin, 1972. p.23
[315] Dakin, 1972. p.23
[316] Dakin, 1972. p.23
[317] Dakin, 1972. p.23
[318] Dakin, 1972. p.23
[319] Dakin, 1972. p.23
[320] Jelavich, Barbara. 1983. *History of the Balkans*. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. p.125

Constantine had been closely associated with Righas. And he had previously, at the end of the 18th Century, become active in another revolutionary conspiracy. The timeline would imply that this was possibly one of the networks of conspirators connected to Righas' plan for Napoleon to invade the Balkans. In 1799 he was pardoned by Selim III and installed, first, as Hospodar of Moldavia and then, in 1802, as Hospodar of Wallachia. Dakin explains how Constantine, like his father before him, had then planned:

> *"to make the Principalities into a westernised, independent state, and he hoped one day to take Constantinople… His first task was to curb Pasvanoglu… his second, to recreate his father's army".*[321]

Otetea and MacKenzie have noted that by 1805 Constantine had:

> *"organized an army of Romanians and Balkan people, got in touch with the leaders of the anti-Ottoman uprising which had broken out in Serbia 1804, and maintained close relations with Russia."*[322]

This conspiracy, however, was interrupted by the Serbian revolt. Constantine flew too close to the sun by trying to send aid (and trying to get the Russians and Austrians to send aid also) to Serbia. When the Porte discovered his activities he fled to the Russians, who had him installed as Hospodar of Moldavia from whence he sent food and military aid to the Serbs and encouraged them *"to massacre the Moslems of Belgrade; and he planned to assist them with an Hellenic legion composed of Vlachs, Christian Albanians, Bulgarians, and Greeks"*[323] However, in finding it difficult to organise such a venture he resorted instead to sending a single warband under the leadership of Georgakis Olympios (a later comrade of Constantine's son in his respective revolution) who happened to be the blood brother of the rebel Karageorge in Serbia.[324]

One of the soldiers in Ypsilanti's army was Tudor Vlademeriscu; the man whose rebellion would later coincide with that of Ypsilanti's son's revolt in 1821. The father's -likely justifiable- removal from office sparked the Russo-Turkish War of 1806-12 and, during the course of that war Constantine Ypsilantis, under a Russian flag, marched on Bucharest as part of the Tsars army which brought about a general Russian occupation of the

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[321] Dakin, 1972. p.23
[322] Andrei Oțetea and Andrew MacKenzie. A Concise History of Romania. United Kingdom: R. Hale, 1985. Pg 267
[323] Dakin, 1972. p.23
[324] Dakin, 1972. p.23

Principalities. From Belgrade he is alleged to have begun to plan for the liberation of Greece to the South. However, the Treaty of Tilsit between Russia and Napoleon saw him unseated once again in the face of French demands for the departure of Russian forces from the Danubian Principalities.[325]

Despite Ypsilanti's undoubtful disappointment the Russo-Turkish War would have more roles to play in the unfolding saga of the Greek liberation movements. Despite the French demand to mediate a peace deal between the Sultan and the Tsar at the peace of Tilsit the war would rage on for another five years and saw Russian troops re-entering the Danubian Principalities where they scored crushing victories and occupied tracts of Ottoman Territory as far as the northern banks of the Danube. Had it not been for the looming threat of Napoleon's invasion of Russia the war likely would have continued to push Russian occupation southwards towards the regions of Serbia which were already in flames and beyond. Despite a crushing victory in the Danubian Principalities in 1812 the Tsar swiftly brokered a peace deal with the Sultan in time to march his southern army back to the Polish Front to face Napoleon.

The result was the Russian annexation of eastern Moldavia (Bessarabia). Within a decade this border region between Ottoman-ruled-Phanariote Wallachia and the Russian Empire would later serve, in 1821, as a springboard for Ypsilantis Jnr's revolutionary invasion.[326] Long before the peace of Bucharest was reached in 1812, however, amid the context of the on-going revolt in Serbia and the Russian occupation of the Principalities some 'average Greeks' further South soon began to throw in their lot with the anti-Ottoman wave. Most notable among these was the rebellions of Vlachavas and Stathas, which were mentioned above. However, it would be the rising of the infamous Albanian clans of Souli into open conflict against the Porte (alongside Ali Pasha) that would soon ignite the passions of the Greeks. As Skiotis put it:

> *"the news of the rising of the most famous and heroic among the Greeks could not fail but spread like wildfire through the land… on several occasions in the past, these heroic mountain warriors had formed the shock-troops of peasant rebellion and consequently they had a powerful hold over the minds of the vast majority of the Greek people. It was not realistic to assume that the people would remain uninvolved while the military Greeks did battle with the Ottomans."*[327]

[325] Roberts, A. 2014. Napoleon: A Life. Penguin Group. p.458-9
[326] Jelavich, 1983. p.207
[327] Skiotis 1976. p.106

Orthodox Albanian clans had revolted in the 1430's and then again under Skanderbeg between the 1440's-60's (this protracted act of resistance would be cited by Kolokotrones more than three centuries later as an inspiration to his own generation's acts of resistance).[328] Skanderbeg's son would go on to lead a further revolt (which was much shorter lived). In the centuries prior to the 1821 revolt there are two specific Epirote Albanian groups who experienced near continuous history of resistance and rebellion to the Porte: The Souliotes and the Himariotes (with whom the former was often allied).

In 1821, and for the decades prior, the Souliotes, an Albanian Orthodox Christian confederation of clans who lived among the mountains of the Souli region in Epirus, enjoyed pan-Balkan renown as warriors who had resisted the Porte and their Beys for centuries. From 1685 to their fall and exile to the Ionian Isles in 1803 the people of Souli scarcely saw a single generation of peace with the Ottoman Empire.[329]

The Souliotes first rose against the Ottoman occupation in 1685 when they rebelled against the local authorities during the Ottoman-Venetian war.[330] In 1721 the Souliotes then rejected the Porte's proposal that they should submit to the Pashalik of Ioannina; sparking an unsuccessful Ottoman invasion.[331] In 1732 the Souliotes rebelled again alongside the villagers of nearby Margariti in Thesprotia.[332] Then, from 1754 through to 1772, the Souliotes repelled a further five Ottoman invasions.[333] A further two invasions intended to subdue the mountain clans were then repelled in 1775 and 1785 respectively.

These latter invasions had come in response to the Souliote's activity during the 1770 Orlov revolt when they, alongside their Epirote neighbours *"mobilised on a considerable scale".[334]* This willingness to rebel against the Ottoman authorities was repeated in 1789 when they indicated to the Russians that they were willing to rise against the newly appointed Ali Pasha and to invade Rumelia.[335]

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[328] Kolokotrones, 1896. p.127
[329] Vranousis, L, Sfyroeras, V. 1997. *From the Turkish Conquest to the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century. Epirus, 4000 Years of Greek History and Civilization.* Athens. Ekdotike. p.247
[330] Vranousis, 1997. p.247
[331] Vranousis, 1997. p.247
[332] Vranousis, 1997. p.247
[333] Pappas,1982. p.26
[334] Vranousis, 1997. p.247
[335] Vranousis, 1997. p.247

The resistance against Ali Pasha is what the Souliotes were most renowned for by 1821. Again, the clans exhibited here a prolonged resistance to the Ottoman authority. Ali Pasha, as soon as he rose to power, concerned himself with subjugating the thorn in the Pashalik of Ioannina's side. Again, his invasion was repelled; a defeat which was repeated in 1790;[336] and again in 1792.[337] The 1790's saw Ali Pasha switch to taking two French controlled towns on the Ionian coast which the Souliote's depended on. Subsequently, in 1800, a fresh invasion was mounted against the weakened clans. When this too was defeated, the entire area was besieged for more than two years.[338] The siege concluded in 1803 when the Souliotes were finally defeated and exiled.

From 1803 to the outbreak of the revolt in 1821 the Souliote community existed in exile in the Ionian Isles where, alongside other exiled anti-ottoman warriors from Mani, Himara, and the Klephtic and Armatoli communities of Central Greece, they swelled the ranks of the Russian Greek Legion, and then the Macedonian Battalion and the Albanian Regiment of the French after the islands changed hands (and the Greek light infantry regiments of the British thereafter).

By 1817 the last of the exiled warriors' various regiments under French and then British control were disbanded. Some veterans petitioned to Russia for commission into the Imperial Army. It was probably during this unsuccessful expedition that Souliote leaders came into contact with the Filliki Hetereia and, on returning to the Ionian Isles, they set about recruiting their fellow exiles and veterans for the liberating revolt to come.[339] The important point here is that by now these exiled clans had been living in the non-Ottoman controlled Ionian Isles for the best part of two decades; and still they joined the conspiracy to liberate their co-religionists in the Ottoman Balkans en masse.

When Ali Pasha and the Porte entered a state of open war in 1820 both the Porte and the Souliotes' former nemesis appealed for their aid in the military engagements to come. Kapodistrias encouraged the Souliotes to enter into the service of Ali Pasha on the basis that they would regain the right to live freely in their ancestral homeland.[340] Thus the Souliotes declared war against the Sultan in 1820: the first Greek community to do so.

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[336] Vranousis, 1997. p.248
[337] Pappas,1982. p.253:
[338] Pappas,1982. p.254-255
[339] Pappas,1982. p.254-255
[340] Skiotis, 1976. p.105-106:

The coalition with Ali Pasha was short lived, but it lasted long enough for the Souliotes to achieve their objective: the reclaiming of Souli. When the rebellion broke out in the Morea the following Spring the last semblance of union with Ali Pasha deteriorated and the Souliotes nailed their colours to the Greek mast further South. Again, the important thing for this argument is that the Souliotes, having achieved their own aims, could have simply stayed in Souli and watched Ali Pasha's inevitable demise form a safe distance in the knowledge that their mountain holds were unlikely to be harassed by the Porte: especially if there was a rebellion to the South to subdue. Despite this the Souliotes threw their lot in with the Greek uprising. Thus, the undefended Souli region was again evacuated by the Souliotes after Ali Pasha's death in 1822. Meanwhile, in the Morea to the South, the Souliotes played a pivotal role in the war effort of the revolution and when peace finally emerged alongside a new Greek State the Souliote clans emigrated en masse to the new country that their efforts had helped to create.

This state of constant war against the Ottoman Empire, the willingness to come to the aid of the Greek cause in 1770 and again in 1821, and the way in which their deeds inspired rebels elsewhere in the Balkans challenges the argument that Hellenism was the major force behind the war of independence. First, these clansmen were Albanian speakers so - although they enjoyed European contacts- the philhellenism of Europeans would have had little relevance to them.

Secondly, the significance of a confederation of Albanian clans inspiring Greeks to rebel against the Porte cannot be downplayed here: it has to be acknowledged that the Grecophones of the Balkans saw in the Souliotes their kin. Crucially the Souliotes did not rise or mobilise, as far as my research can tell, in any specific way to aid the Serbs in their revolts: only the Greeks. This is in itself indicative of an intense feeling of attachment to the Greeks which has to be part of a national ideal for it was not felt for the coreligionist Serbs who also bordered their lands.

Oft allied with the Souliotes were the Himariotes; the Albanian Orthodox residents of the mountainous region of Himara in Epirus. These clans were similarly celebrated for their long history of resistance to the Porte. A decade prior to the Orlov revolt locals in the employ of the Russian Empire reported to the Tsar that the Himariotes would support an expedition geared towards the liberation of the Ottoman Empire's Christian subjects (in

short, they were signing up for the wars to come for the realisation of Catherine's 'Greek Project' to bring about an Orthodox state in the Balkans).[341] In 1797 the Himariotes then supported the Souliote rebellion against the Pashalik of Yannina (Ali Pasha's domain). Then, in 1821, the Himariotes rose in revolt and, after their local rebellion was subdued, they travelled in number to the Morea where they played a major role in the southern war effort. [342]

The point of this discussion has been to showcase how, in the decades immediately prior to the revolt, and often involving the same groups and individuals who would appear in 1821, the Greeks were continuously probing at the Ottoman defences. Throughout evidence has been provided to show that the Greeks appealed to whatever Great Power was in a position to help them at any one particular time but that at all times one thing remained constant: the desire to liberate the Greeks from Ottoman rule. This, then, can allow us to recontextualise the 1821 revolt as one which took place less because of a rise in liberal and Hellenic thinking and more because, finally, in 1821, the conditions were ripe enough for one of these plots to succeed. Ali Pasha, who had put down so many revolts, was at war with the Porte and the Greeks had established communication routes which managed to go undetected by the Sultans agents and which subsequently allowed them to conspire and coordinate with one another in unprecedented ways.

In short, the position taken here is that when we combine the continued series of plots and attempted uprisings in Greece to the evidence already presented about a Byzantine identity, we can conclude that -on the balance of probability- the 1821 revolt would have happened with or without liberalism (or Hellenism for that matter). Meanwhile, further evidence has once again been put forward here to suggest that the Greeks and the Albanians shared a bond which ran deeper than 'feelings of a shared orthodoxy'. Thus, corroborating the assertion made in a previous chapter that the two saw each other not only as common members of the came Church but as common members of the same polity. Said polity, again, has been alluded to in previous chapters but here it has been shown that there is a strong case to be made that the Greeks not only felt a strong connection to a Roman State, but that they actively wanted to -and tried to- see it materialise.

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[341] Pappas, 1991. p.69
[342] Pappas, 1991. p.318

Part IV: Ali Pasha's offer

Another way in which we can trace the clear presence -and power- of a feeling of Roman statehood during the Tourkokratia is via an examination of Ali Pasha of Ioannina's offers to the Greeks which, essentially, offered to transform and expand his Pashalik into a Greek State based on, in my surmising, the Byzantine model. Before delving into the details of this particular episode it must be noted that is unlikely that he ever fully intended to do such a thing. Rather it is likely the case he was merely trying to get Greek help in his own brewing war with the Porte by telling the Greeks what he thought they wanted to hear. It is precisely this reason however, that the detail is worth investigation. It matters not that the offer was insincere: rather the important detail here is that it was an offer which Ali Pasha knew would be tempting to the Greeks.

When, in a previous chapter, we saw that Makriyannis recollected in his memoirs that some Greeks in 1821 were under the impression that Ali Pasha of Ioannina was going to bring about 'to Romaiko' he was noting a belief that seems to have been quite common.[343] There had been some Heterists who thought that Ali could be converted to Christianity and that, subsequently, the revolution could be directed by him from his established powerbase in Epirus.[344] Indeed Ali's own advisors, in the face of a looming Ottoman invasion of his de facto independent territory, urged him to convert to Christianity in the hope that the Greeks would be more willing to rise in his support.[345] Skiotis commented that Ali's policy of excluding Turks from all positions of authority within his Pashalik (relying solely on Greeks and Albanians) led many Greeks to believe that he might be *"won over to the idea of becoming the monarch of an independent Greco-Albanian State"*.[346] Ali, however, went further with his offers: in receipt of Russian and Greek aid Ali offered to establish not only a Greco-Albanian State situated within his own territory, but for a revived Byzantium.

This offer is evidenced in several places. Skiotis noted that, at a meeting with the Dragoman of the Russian consulate, Paparregopoulos (who was also a Hetereia member) at Preveza in 1820, Ali urged the diplomat to immediately go to St Petersburg to relay the following offer to the Tsar:

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[343] Makriyannis, 1907
[344] Skiotis p.102
[345] Skiotis, 1976. p.102
[346] Skiotis, 1976. p.102

> *"he* [Ali] *would be willing to raise his subjects in revolt against the Sultan and assist Russia in conquering the whole of European Turkey. In return, Russia was to recognise him as an autonomous ruler owing allegiance to the tsar."*[347]

With the aim of garnering the Greeks' support in said revolt Ali then proceeded to display a public profile which depicted him as a fellow Christian. First he sent his son, Veli Pasha, to communicate a message to Odysseus Androutsos (at that time the most renowned Capetani in Roumelia) which stated that, in return for support, Ali would *"throw off his turban and put on a Russian hat"*; in essence meaning he would convert to Christianity.[348] This offer seems to have been well received, Gordon recorded that Andreas Londos (by that time a Hetereia member in the Morea) commissioned a reply to the offer stating that the Greeks would be prepared for such a revolt and that Ali should send one of his sons to lead them. [349] It is noteworthy here to point out that Gordon, although not being present in Greece at the time, later travelled to fight in the revolution and would have met the likes of Odysseus and Londos.

As well as sending out his sons to make overtures to the Greeks, Ali also held a number of public assemblies between April and June 1820 which were attended by all the notable Capetani, primates and clergymen in Roumelia.[350] The Austrian Consul in Patras relayed details of these meetings back to Metternich informing him that Ali had *"spoke of liberty"* and of *"restoring the Empire of the Romans".*[351] Meanwhile Ali sent letters of his own to notable Greeks requesting fighters which were addressed as *"my brother Christians"* and ended with *"Consider me as one of your own".*[352] By June the Consul at Patras was reporting to Metternich in another letter[353] that there were rumours circulating throughout the *"European portions of the empire that the Greeks were about to rise en masse behind Ali, who was to regain for them the empire of Constantine."* [354]

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[347] Skiotis, 1976. p.100
[348] Gordon, Thomas. 1832. *History of the Greek Revolution.* United Kingdom: W. Blackwood. P.180
[349] Gordon, 1832. p.180
[350] Skiotis, 1976. p.102
[351] Report of Austrian Consul in Patras, 20 May 1820, filed as insert Lutzow to Metternich, 10 July 1820, Turkei, VI, 8, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna
[352] Letter from H. Pouqueille to Pasquier 9 July 1820, Correspondence Consulaire, Patras III, Achives des affaires Etrangeres, Paris
[353] Letter from Lutzow to Metternich, 3 June 1820, Turkei VI, 8 Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna.
[354] Skiotis, 1976. p.102

All of this almost worked and, perhaps, if it had then Ali and his sons -with an army of Greeks at their back- would have brought about something that at least looked like 'to Romaiko'. The Greeks of Roumeli were preparing to rise for Ali's cause when the Ottoman army eventually arrived in Epirus in 1820 but, at the eleventh hour, the Hetereia stood them down out of a lack of trust for Ali's intentions. In terms of this thesis' argument, it matters little that the overtures to the Greeks ultimately failed. The important detail here is that Ali offered the Greeks (and the Russians) 'to Romaiko' on a silver platter and, subsequently, the word spread like wildfire and everywhere Greeks either hoped it would happen (as we saw in Makriyannis' evidence) or actively began to mobilise as Skiotis highlighted above.

This, then, is not only a clear indication of a desire to bring about 'to Romaiko' existing in Greece in 1820 but it also highlights how the Greeks thought their state could seamlessly re-emerge via only two things. The first being conversion of the head of state to Orthodoxy. Such a notion, as we will see in a later chapter, was not confined to the Greeks of the Tourkokratia. Later, after independence, a conspiracy to force Otto to convert or abdicate (in favour of an Orthodox monarch) was hatched in the Greek Kingdom. The feeling that the Greeks needed to have an Orthodox head of state in order to fulfil their destined 'to Romaiko' was clearly making itself known in the 1830's and 40's as much as it had in the first three decades of that century. Secondly, in order for Ali to bring about 'to Romaiko' it would not be sufficient for him to simply convert. He had to wage war against -and usurp- the Sultan at the City which was the very soul of the Byzantinist ideal and world view. This all, in turn, is further evidence of a supralocal national consciousness in Greek discourse immediately prior to the War of Independence which was pinned upon a Byzantine heritage and ideal.

Part V: Knowledge of 'Byzantinism' outside Greece

In the previous section the report to Metternich concerning Ali Pasha's 'offer' in 1820 was briefly discussed. Aside from being evidence of Ali Pasha knowing about -and, indeed, trying to capitalise on the Byzantinism of the local Greek population, this is also evidence of -at least one of- the Great Powers being aware of the Byzantinist currents flowing through the Greek population of the Ottoman Empire at the time. At this juncture it would be prudent to examine deeper the extent to which the powers of Europe a) knew about the Byzantinism of the 'Greeks in Greece' and b) the extent to which they acted upon it. Unfortunately, the records from the British Colonial Office in the Ionian Islands (dating

April 1821-26), which would have been the corpus of documents within which one would be most likely to find evidence of that nature, have been lost. There are some useful snippets of information within the Kew Archives' other depositories, but they remain scant due to the missing corpus of information: a common problem in the study of an event which is separated from the present by two hundred years, and a multitude of material upheavals (for example, the Ionian Isles did, eventually, change hands from Britain to Greece. Loss of records, therefore, is inevitable. Naturally, as this researcher is an English speaker, this particular problem in this particular case is a difficult one to adapt to: the loss of such a large and rich haul of sources written in the English language is certainly a blow.

Other sources of information do, however, exist. And in this section, I will make thorough use of them. Much of paper trail left by Wellington in the course of his negotiations for the 'pacification of Greece' (leading up to the 1830 London Protocol) have been well preserved (and many have been digitised). These contain some useful insights towards the question at hand. The Hansard archives of parliamentary papers, and various newspaper archives give great insight into the information flowing into Britain (and elsewhere), the reactions to said information, and of the debates which this all sparked among British Statesmen. Meanwhile, Metternich's memoirs and private correspondences have been translated to English and provide yet another rich insight into the information and decisions taken by Austria on the 'Eastern Question'. Much of the paper trail for the various protocols and conferences that took place in the course of the War of Independence has not only survived, and been translated, but much of it has been digitised and thoroughly researched due to the 'Eastern Question' being a particularly well researched topic. Similar to Metternich's records, the correspondences of Count Nesselrode, the Russian foreign minister, have also survived and they provide some further insight as well. Further evidence can be drawn from the various travel writings by Philhellenes and 'Grand Tourists' (written in French and in English) have survived which give a glimpse of the 'Greeks in Greece', despite the fact this source base is almost always more concerned with the landscape and ancient history of the region than it is its' inhabitants.

Much of the text in all the above records is concerned little with the question of this thesis (what the 'Greeks in Greece' actually wanted), and more concerned with what the Powers wanted. Indeed, when the desires of the Greeks are discussed, the overwhelming majority of the text is dedicated to what the Greeks may -or may not- be willing to accept in the peace protocols. Within all of this, however, there are whispers of the political aspirations

of the 'Greeks in Greece'.

The question as to whether or not the Byzantinist political aspirations of the revolting Greeks was known outside the Ottoman Empire can be answered fairly simply by first looking to Bavaria. The answer, simply, is yes: King Ludwig, a prolific poet on the Greek War of Independence, wrote a poem that referenced said Byzantinism. In the very opening months of the revolt, he wrote a poem which concluded with the following stanza which, although laced with neo-Hellenisms (which is to be expected from the Bavarian King, he was, after all, one of the most notable of the Philhellenes at the time), the poem does contain one obvious symbol of the Byzantinist ideology:

> *"Onwards Hellenes! All to the guns!*
> *Sparta's sons! Fight with old courage!*
> *As the Persians died, the Turks will die,*
> *Colour Platea's field with their blood!*
> *Onwards, courageous soldiers of Athens and Corinth,*
> *...Become what your fathers were,*
> *Old times will become new again,*
> *Nurtured from the teat of art and science will you be,*
> *And from Sophia's spire,*
> *the Cross of humanity will shine, what delight!"[355]*

The clear reference to the Hagia Sophia in Constantinople here may be taken as evidence that Ludwig knew the revolting Greek's aim was not just liberation in isolated regions of the Ottoman Empire but the reconquest of Constantinople and the establishment of a revied Greek State. This, I argue, is a clear indication that the Byzantinist political aspirations of the Greeks in Greece were known to Ludwig and it is highly likely therefore, that others like him (learned men, statesmen, and philhellenes) knew about it too. And if they did not, they would know about it once they came across his poetry.

Can this be corroborated? In reference to the desire to regain Constantinople and to replace the crest above the Hagia Sophia with the Cross, there is another source, also dating from the first months of the revolution, that speaks to this. In 1821 the German-Danish writer and artist, Harro Harring, created the following piece:

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[355] Ludwig Von Bayern, 1829, Gedichte des Königs Ludwig von Bayern: 2. (1829). Germany: Cotta. Au Hellas Im Frühling des 1821 Jahre Stanza 9. p.6. Translated by this researcher.

Figure 6 'The Liberation of Greece'

In this engraving there are several key points which directly speak to Harring's knowledge of the Byzantinism of the Greek revolutionaries. The first are the rays of divine providence (emanating from the upper left) that then morph into a lightning bolt that strikes the crescent from the top of the Hagia Sophia (and replaces it with a Cross) is the first. This is an artistic depiction of 'To Romaiko' itself: God intervening at a time of his choosing to liberate Constantinople and place it from the hands of the Ottoman Muslims into the hands of the Christian Greeks. Many of the male figures are armed, but the unarmed ones can be seen breaking yokes (a clear symbolic representation of the casting off of the Ottoman yoke). Again, this is evidence of the existence of a knowledge outside of Greece that the Greeks were seeking nothing short of complete political independence (indeed, as we shall

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[356] Harring, H. 1821. *La libération de la Grèce des Turcs*, gravureNationla Museum of Germany. Nuremberg. Reproduced in Drakopoulou, 2021. p.156

see later, this was an oft repeated line in European dialogue on the Eastern Question). The clearest representation of the Greek's Byzantinsim, however, is the female figure who commands the piece's center (indeed, she is the subject of the engraving). She, is an anthropomorphism of Greece herself (a common occurrence in art at the time). However, the most immediate observation once can make is that this Greece is not dressed in the garb of the ancients as she is so often depicted. This Greece is dressed in the trappings of a Byzantine Empress. According to Drakopoulo, she is rendered in the image of Saint Helen (Constantine the Great's mother) grasping the Cross[357] The poem, also by Herring, that appears below the picture also speaks to the Greek's Byzantinism:

> *"Now or never! The dice of fate lie;*
> *It's now, die or win; Your fatherland is calling you.*
> *Take up arms, sons of the Hellenes!*
> *A beautiful victory will crown your deeds,*
> *the pledge of posthumous fame.*
> *It's now or never... break the slave chains!*
> *Do everything to save yourself the freedom, life's greatest asset.*
> *The flames of vengeance have flared up high,*
> *they lash out over Mah'med's throne,*
> *quench them with Turk's blood.*
> *On Stambul's walls plant the mark of faith!*
> *The crescent must give way to the cross,*
> *To the Greek the barbarian.*
> *And even if they were like sand on the sea,*
> *victory remains for you, God is with your army,*
> *So courageous, brave crowd!"*

Despite being laced with Neo-Hellenisms, the poem's mention of the Greeks answering the call of their fatherland to render vengeance upon the Turks and to regain their freedom, to mark Constantinople's walls with the mark of their faith and to overthrow the Crescent and replace it with The Cross are all blatant references to the Byzantinist political identity and aspirations of the Greeks. The fact that this was engraved and written in 1821 cannot be understated: this is evidence of Herring -and therefore, of others- knowing that, from the outset, the Greeks were revolting in an attempt to bring about the revival of Byzantium. Before moving on, it is important to note that the poem by King Ludwig of Bavaria, and the work of Herring above both speak to the coexistence of Byzantinism and Hellenism: for example, Herring, above, called upon the sons of the Hellenes to regain their national

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[357] Drakopoulou. 2021. p.141

independence and to revitalize Byzantium. To many the identity and ideology of Byzantinism and Hellenism were not mutually exclusive: indeed, they were intertwined to the point that they were indistinguishable. This is a line of inquiry that has been discussed already in this thesis, that the two were blended to varying degrees. It is therefore entirely possible that when we observe the actions and desires of 'Hellenists' we are seeing, in them, those of Byzantinists as well. Kolokotrones, as seen earlier for example, showcased that he was of the opinion he and the klephts were carrying on a resistance against the Turks: but he also, as has been seen, embraced Hellenism once he learned of it in the Ionian Isles. The two, therefore, should not be seen as incompatible camps, rather two sides of the same coin. Drakopolou argued that the cases of Ludwig and Harring were not unique. Her research found that at the time of the Greek revolution the prevailing German ideology on what would later become known as the Eastern Question was -especially in Bavaria- dedicated to the idea that a multi-ethnic empire should be formed in South-East Europe which would be directly linked to the regeneration of the Byzatnine Empire.[358] Drakopolou's research further found that the philhellenes and European intellectual elites actively called upon the memory of Byzantium in their defense of the revolutionaries at the opening of the war (a defense rendered necessary by the political conditions in Europe being, at that time, vehemently opposed to any resistance to the legitimate rule of a sovereign by his subjects). She found that, despite:

> *"the indifferent, even hostile attitude of the European intellectuals for Byzantium… the direct relation of the insurgent Greeks with Byzantium is mentioned… in all the philhellenic texts born in the first hour [of the revolt] which questioned the legality of Turkish rule over the Greeks. Their main argument was that Ottoman rule had not been recognized by the Greeks themselves, the fall of Byzantium not having been sealed by any oath of submission to the Ottomans… Some, moreover, mentioned the great destruction wrought by the crusades, the consequence of which was that Byzantium, which remained without defense, was left at the mercy of the infidel conqueror."[359]*

Once again this is evidence of the existence of the Byzantinist undercurrents circulating Greece at the time. It is even evidence of sections of Europe using it to legitimise the revolution itself. Lastly, there is clear evidence that German States, Bavaria in particular, sought to act upon this undercurrent by attempting to bring about Byzantium's rebirth. This, we will see, is something that was not unique to Germans.

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[358] Drakopoulou,. 2021, p.145-6
[359] Drakopoulou,. 2021, p.145-6

Turning from art and poetry of the Western European Philhellenes, Kings and otherwise, I will now turn to the extent to which the Great Powers knew about the Byzatninism of the 'Greeks in Greece'. First, it should be said, that the corpus of historical works on the Great Power involvement in the Greek War of Independence is largely dedicated to the 'eastern Question'. A well studied topic of 19th Century European history thanks to the way it challenged the Holy Alliance and brought changes to Great Power international policy. In all my research of this topic, including the primary sources of Nesselrode's letters, Metternich's correspondences, and the vast paper trial surrounding the various protocols and conferences on the Eastern Question in the 1820's and 30's the identity and political aspirations the Greeks had is barely addressed. There are snippets, but very rarely does someone put pen to paper to record how the Greeks saw themselves and what they wanted. What is recorded is what the Great Powers were willing to accept or concede, and what they wanted to do. For example, Schroeder's excellent coverage of the Eastern Question never once addresses this aspect of the Greek question save to suggest that irredentism cam naturally to them because they felt the rump state that emerged as a direct result of the war was too small, and did not contain all that was 'Greece'.[360] On top of this, many records have been lost: for example, a trip to the Kew archives revealed that the records from the Colonial Office in the Ionian Isles dating from 1821-6, the records that would have bene most likely to contain information this research seeks, have gone missing. That being said, due to the importance of the topic and the fame of a number of the key agents within it, a number of sources have been made easily accessible. On top of this, as one reads through the Eastern Question and the reactions of, say, Britain to the news of the outbreak, one can read a real fear that a Greek state would navigate, naturally, to Russia due to the common bond of Orthodoxy. As Schroeder states, other nations could gain influence, but Russia would always be seen as a sibling to the Greeks, regardless of any ill treatment that nation may have bestowed upon them.[361] This could be taken as a whisper of evidence of the Byzantinism of the Greeks in revolt. However, it is not as stark as some of the other evidence that exists: for example, the British and Austrians had to have known about it: It was -briefly- official British policy to re-establish Byzantium, and Metternich, in a letter, made reference to wanting nothing less than to establish a Greek Empire. First, however, this section will look to Russia: for the Foreign Minister of Russia in 1821 was Ioannes Kapodistrias, the man who would later become governor of the independent Greek nation.

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[360] Schroeder, P. W. 1994. *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848*. Greece: Clarendon Press. p.
[361] Schroeder. 1994. p.

If any of the Great Powers of Europe knew of the Byzantinism of the Greek State it was Russia. In 1770 the Orlov revolt was instigated on the basis of Catherin the Great's Greek plan (reviewed alter in this thesis) which aimed at reviving the Greek Empire at Constantinople. However, the Revolutionary Wars of the early 19th Century in Europe changed official Russian policy: they sought not to encourage revolutionary activity anywhere through fear of having to deal with such activity within their own borders. It also suited Russia to maintain the Ottoman Empire as a weak buffer that it did to try and create something else in its' place. However, that being said, the Russian state had to have known about it because their own foreign minister was himself quite the Byzantinist. When Ouilmot Orton, deputy minister for the Colonies, asked Kapodistrias what and who the Greek nation was in 1827, Kapodistrias replied:

> *"The Greek nation consists of those people, who since the fall of Constantinople did not stop confessing their orthodox faith and speaking the language of fathers, and remained under the spiritual or secular jurisdiction of their church, wherever they lived in Turkey"*.[362]

Here Kapodistrias corroborates the argument of this chapter thus far while also pinning Greek national identity to Byzantium via defining it vis-a-vis 'The Fall'. So, regardless of both Tsar Alexander's and Tsar Nicholas' reluctance to act upon the Byzantinism of the Greeks, they certainly must have known that the Greek national identity was pegged to Byzantium: not only was Alexander's foreign minister defining Greece as a Byzantine heiress in 1827, but the two Tsar's grandmother, Catherine the Great, had tried to realise 'to Romaniko' and place Constantin, their brother, on the throne.

Metternich, meanwhile, also briefly played with the idea of establishing a Greek Empire. In a letter dated April 1826, addressed to the Austrian diplomat Phillip Von Neuman Metternich reflected on his views of Tsar Nicholas' approach to the Eastern Question (he was highly critical of the St Petersberg Proposal). In the letter he expressed that, had

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[362] Answer of I. Kapodistrias to the questions of the British deputy minister for the Colonies, Ouillmot Orton, Paris, 3/15 October 1827. Cited in Ioannis Kapodistrias Archives, vol. 7, p. 286. http://kapodistrias. digitalarchive.gr/aik.php.

Nicholas stayed upon the same course as his recently deceased brother, Tsar Alexander, and avoided coming into conflict with the Porte over the Greek Question specifically then:

> *"a civilized existence could have been procured for them [the Greeks] with ease : which is what the Emperor Alexander desired , and what we desired with him .We wished for nothing better than to see a free and independent Greek Empire! We proposed it".*[363]

However, in the letter, Metternich also expressed that, this proposal was 'exclaimed against', presumably by the other Powers of Europe. Metternich spent the 1820's trying to avoid the fires of rebellion and revolution being stoked by a successful outcome in Greece: the only way he would have been open to a successful conclusion there is if the Greece that was to issue forth from the rebellion was distinctively more Byzantine than western/modern. If he felt that could have been possible (hence the proposal) then this must in turn mean that he knew about the undercurrents there. In another letter, dated June 1826, Metternich wrote to Esterhazy in London to express that:

> *"Nevertheless, whenever a great independent Christian State shall replace the Ottoman, that State will become our natural and active ally… in a word, it will not be Austria that will be feared by the new Greek Empire"*[364]

Metternich here is expressing the assumption that one day 'to Romaiko' will happen. Later on in the same letter, he notes that this is not something the cabinets of Europe are discussing, but he records that the people of Europe are excited by the prospect; giving further evidence to the fact that western Europe knew of the Byzantinism of the modern Greeks0.[365] Between this and the evidence earlier from Ali Pasha's offer being reported to him then Austria, as well as Russia, must have known.

It was the British who, in 1829, more seriously proposed the revival of Byzantium, and

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[363] Letter from Metternich to Neuman in Vienna, Vienna May 12, 1826. Reproduced in Metternich, 1881. P.684

[364] Metternich to Esterhazy, in London, Vienna, June 8, 1826. Reproduced in Metternich, 1881. p.709

[365] Metternich to Esterhazy, in London, Vienna, June 8, 1826. Reproduced in Metternich, 1881. p.709

were the first to do so since Metternich noted that the cabinets did not discuss it. In 1829, when it seemed that Russia's Army under Diebtitsch would take Constantinople (they were at Adrainople) Europe was sent into a panic. What would happen if the Sultan's rule collapsed? All of a sudden nations who had been doing their best to pacify Greece and to bring an end to the conflict began squabbling over who would have the most influence in the state that was to issue from the imminent fall of Istanbul. To this solution Wellington wrote to the Earl of Aberdeen on September 11, 1829, to propose the following:

> *"My opinion is that the Power which has Constantinople and the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, ought to possess the mouth of the Danube; and that the sovereign of these two ought not have the Crimea and the Russian Empire. We must reconstruct a Greek empire, and give it Prince Frederick of Orange, or Prince Charles of Prussia; and no Power of Europe ought to take anuythiong for himself..."*

Here Wellington expresses in black and white that British official policy should be the restoration of Byzantium. Now, this does not necessarily prove that such a desire was extant in Greece at the time. But it does suggest that Wellington had cause to think this could work: which in turn implies the existence of Byzantinism in Greece. Again, the primary sources form the Great Powers regarding the Greeks in 1820 are all overwhelmingly self-centred and concerned with achieving the most agreeable outcome to the Great Powers themselves. However, they seemed ready to adopt the Byzantine model for Greece as soon as it was convenient for them to do so. As it turned out, this was never required, Russia signed a peace with the Sultan at Adrianople and Constantinople did not suffer yet another 'fall'. Nevertheless, 'Greek Empire' became common parlance to the British Statemen of the time for referring to the potential state to emerge from the war (and then, once said state did emerge, this is how they continued to refer to it). For example, in the Hansard Papers, the new Greek State was referred to -by members of the British Parliament during parliamentary debates- as such. For example, in 1832, at the close of the war, Earl Grey referred to the Arta-Volos line as being, officially, the boundary of 'The Greek Empire'.[366]

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[366] Earl Grey in debate on the Bill for the Greek Loan Convention. House of Lords, August 13, 1832. Greek Loan Convention Volume 14. https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1832-08-13/debates/ba5b08e8-bfe1-4e35-a022-8cbea576c5a7/GreekLoanConvention (Last accessed 01/06/2022)

The reactions of the Great Powers, both in terms of their reading public and their officials, was one of Russophobia when they heard of the outbreak of revolution. This, in my surmising, is evidence that they knew that an independent Greece would naturally drift towards Russia due to the inevitability of Orthodoxy to infuse the politics in the new state. In the report that were printed, there is also evidence that there was a knowledge that the Greeks were aiming for a restoration at Constantinople. Fore example, in April, 1821, London's Morning Chronicle was awash with rumours of imminent total war, thanks to Russia. On Friday April 6, it was reported that:

> *"We have to announce a most important event. Letters were yesterday received in town* [London] *from Corfu, stating that an Insurrection had broken out in the Greek Islands of a most formidable kind, and for which secret preparations had been making for a long time. It is understood that the Insurgents have been supplied from Odessa with warlike stores of every description, that numbers of Officers have received Russian passports to pass over to the Islands, and that considerable treasure has been amassed to forward the attempt. There is no doubt but that the Greeks act in concert with Russia, and that what was foreseen by every able statesman will speedily be realised. The Emperor Alexander will make the emancipation of the Greeks the pretext for an attack on Constantinople… Here then, if this news, which is communicated to us by letters of high authority, should be confirmed, we have the commencement of a war in which we cannot fail to be involved"*[367]

Here the fate of the Greek insurrection, and on the emancipation of the Greeks, although blamed on Russia, is directly pegged to the fate of Constantinople. The following day, the same paper released the following report which criticised another paper's reaction while doubling down on the finger pointing at Tsar Alexander (who, it should be said, has been routinely proven to have had nothing to do with the revolt):

> *"The Courier is mightily jocose and flippant on the subject of the threatened insurrection in Greece, instigated as it is, and supported by the legitimate power of the Emperor of ALL THE RUSSIANS!... It is well known that it.has been the policy of ALEXANDER to encourage the… Greeks in Odessa… [who have] nurtured* [the plot which]*… is now brought to maturity. The design is no longer concealed… A proclamation, avowing the determination of accomplishing the deliverance of Greece, was actually printed, and was to have been publicly read in the Greek Church the Sunday after, but this, for the moment, was prevented by the Governor, though passports were freely given by him to the inhabitants*

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[367] The *Morning Chronicle*, London, 6 Apr. 1821. *British Library Newspapers*, link-gale-com.ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/apps/doc/BC3207288318/GDCS?u=glasuni&sid=bookmark-GDCS&xid=7dd6c563. (Last Accessed 09/11/2021)

to proceed to Kershmnar, near Jassy, which was appointed the rendezvous, and where Russian officers were ready to regiment and discipline them.' Above 200,000 Russian troops are actually assembled on the borders of the Black Sea, and the insurrection of the Greeks is to be simultaneous with an attack by Russia on the Turkish provinces on the Danube. So says the account!… Now… [Alexander] *may crown a Constantine… before the summer".*[368]

Again, here, reference is made to the restoration of Byzantium (a crowned Constantine) alongside strong and detailed accusations (now known to be rumours) of Russian involvement (and an imminent Russian invasion). This staunch suspicion of Russia carried on in the newspapers (and in the official negotiations for the pacification of Greece) throughout the 1820's.

Between the reports filtering back to Metternich and the newspapers; the art work of Herring and the poetry of Ludqwig; the 'playing with the possibility' of a revived by Byzantium by Wellington and Metternich; and the emergence of 'Greek Empire' in political vernacular of parliamentary debates, there is strong evidence, therefore, that the Byzantinist desires of the Greeks in Greece were known and -to a lesser extent- acted upon outwith Greece. It would have suited few in Europe for Byzantium to be restored, for such a power as that described by Wellington above, controlling such important geo-political locations, would have quickly become a dominant competitor with Russia, France, Austria, and Britain. A weak Ottoman Empire, a Russia hemmed in to the Black Sea -yet free from distraction and costly far-off wars- and only small rump breakaway regions with home-rule in the Balkans suited the Great Powers most (which is why the latter is what they repeatedly called for, despite knowing the Greeks would never settle for 'Ottoman suzerainty').[369] Nevertheless, the evidence here suggests that the grand idea of a resotred Byzantium was known, and it is what some of the Powers may have been ready to support as a last resort. This, in turn, implies that Byzantinism was a strong force in Greece at the time. It is the evidence, however, that the Greeks in Greece themselves hoisted symbols of Byzantium: under which they fought, killed, and died, that speaks to the extent to which the Byzantinism was motivating the 'Greeks in Greece'.

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[368] The *Morning Chronicle*, London, April 7, 1821. *British Library Newspapers* https://link-gale-com.ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/apps/doc/BC3207288326/GDCS?u=glasuni&sid=bookmark-GDCS&xid=82cd368e. (Last Accessed November 9, 2021).
[369] For an in-depth examination of the political debates among the Great powers, the jealousies and intrigues, see Schroeder, 1994.

Chapter VII: The Phoenix Reborn

The symbols of the revolution

Part I: Flags

In order to interpret the mindset of the revolutionaries, particularly those who left little-to-no written record of their own, the examination of the symbols of the liberation movements is of great importance. It is surmised here that the flags under which the revolutionaries fought, killed, and died would have broadly reflected their ideals and identity. This is indeed likely to have been the case: it will become apparent below that there is enough evidence to suggest that -in lacking formalised revolutionary symbols- most of these banners were created by each separate group quite independently of each other and so it is more-than-likely that these flags are reflective of said group's individual mindsets. Similarly, the symbols of the revolt, and the State that it engendered, should -in theory- also reflect the ideals of the revolutionaries and the new state's citizens. At the very least these symbols were deliberately designed to reflect a specific version of the popular identity and a version of the new State.

No discussion on the symbols of the Greek state, the liberation movements, or the Greek imagined community, can be complete without an examination of the design and colours that would one day be established in law as the 'official' symbols of Greece (and, by extension, of the Greeks themselves). The Cross (specifically a 'Greek Cross' with four branches of equal length) and the colours of blue and white (specifically, a white cross upon a blue field) were enshrined in law as being the official symbols of Greece at the national assembly of Epidaurus in 1822.[370] However the archives containing the minutes of those discussions were lost during the subsequent civil conflicts and we are left today with little option but to guess as to the reasons for that decision.[371]

One thing simply has to be true, however. By 1821 blue, white, and the 'Greek Cross', had been adopted by the Greek populations of the Ottoman Empire as symbols of self-representation. This can be evidenced by the fact that so many flags bearing the cross in a

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[370] Smith W. 1967. *Flag Bulletin* vol 15-17. Winchester: The Flag Research Centre. P.63
[371] Smith, 1967. p.63

blue-white colour scheme simultaneously emerged among the various warbands of the early period of the revolution in 1821. Indeed, we will see shortly that many of the people involved in the 1821 revolt were from regions or families which had sported such symbols during previous rebellions (for example, during the Orlov revolt in 1770).

The National Museum of Greece holds a number of flags which feature a blue cross upon a white background which were used in 1821.These include a flag used by the chieftain Dimitrios Plapoutas; a flag used by Cypriot volunteers; another used by revolutionaries in Macedonia; and a flag belonging to an unknown revolutionary group.[372] There are numerous other sources detailing how such a design was used by the Mavromichalis family in the Mani peninsula during the Orlov revolt and then by Ioannis Mavromichalis in 1821.[373] Meanwhile, before the 18th Century came to a close, other chieftains had adopted the symbol including Yiatrakos and Zacharias and, possibly most importantly, the Kolokotrones family (including Theodoros who is also noted to have unfurled such a flag in 1821).[374] Kokkonis and Corre-Zografou have noted that this design was possibly the most widely used of the revolutionary years.[375] It should be said that it is quite remarkable that a loose conglomerate such as the warbands of 1821 would have among them so many groups (rival groups divided by bitter factional disputes at that) choosing to represent themselves by the same symbols. This, in itself, speaks to the presence of a feeling of common identity and possibly also of a common cause. It also speaks to the existence in popular Greek culture of a pre-existing cultural trope which held that said symbols were symbols of 'Greekness'. A trope that was present in the Morea (Kolokotrones), the Mani (Mavromichalis), Cyprus, Macedonia, Epirus (Plapoutas) and Crete.

Although the above examples were all white flags bearing a blue cross, the reverse design also appeared prior to the decision taken at Epidaurus in 1822. Perhaps the most notable of these is the flag of Papaflessas at Tripolitsa. The flag was probably real, but the story of how it came to be is possibly a later embellishment. Smith described the scene:

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[372] Mazarakis-Ainian. I.K. *Flags of Freedom*. National Historical Museum. Athens. 1996.
[373] Nouchakis. I. 1908. *Our Flag*. Athens: Sideris. Digitised at
    http://digital.lib.auth.gr/record/136890/files/8315_1.pdf?version=1 Last accessed 15/05/2020).
[374] Nouchakis. 1908.
[375] Kokkonis, H.P, Corre-Zografou. 1997. *Hellenic Flags, Insignia, Emblems*. Athens: G. Tsiveriotis

> *"A priest, probably Papaflessas , tore a piece from his cassock and from the soldier Kefalas, two strips from his fustanella . With the strips they constructed a cross that was sewn on the cassock, the flag thus created being flown on the governor 's office when the fighters entered Tripolitsa".[376]*

Notable here is the implication that Orthodox priest's cassocks were (or could be) blue at that time. The association between the colour and Orthodoxy may have had something to do with the decision (or, rather, the evolution) to adopt the colour as a national symbol (as explored below).

The white cross on a blue field, the design which would be adopted as the official symbol of the Greek people, their struggle, and their independent state, appeared in the annals of Greek history years prior to Papaflessas' improvised banner, however. Yannis Stathas, an Armatoli and Admiral of a squadron of pirate ships, is also noted to have flown such a banner, probably from 1800.[377] In 1807, the flag was blessed at the Monastery of the Annunciation on the Island of Skiathos during the meeting discussed in the previous chapter between prominent Greek military men (including Stathas, Vlachavas, Kolokotrones and Miaoulis). It was convened in order to discuss a general Greek uprising after the disappointment of the Treaty of Tilsit (which put a temporary end to the Russian March South through the Danubian Principalities during the Russo-Turkish war).[378] At said meeting the attendants swore an oath before the blessed flag.[379] In this context, then, it is of little surprise that fourteen years later a revolution which involved many of those who attended said meeting, would enshrine the same symbol in law as the national symbol of Greece. Clearly, then the blue-white colour schemed Cross was a symbol which held a lot of capital in the context of Greek self-representation prior to 1821.

In examining the flag that Stathas sailed under we encounter the first explanation as to why blue and white may have been adopted as national symbols. The blue represented the islanders present at the meeting in Skiathos (their traditional costume was blue) and the white represented the traditional costume of mainlanders.[380] However, as we have seen (and will see) the use of that colour scheme predates Stathas' conspiracy of 1807.

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[376] Smith, 1967. p.63
[377] Skartsis, Labros. S. 2017. *Origin and Evolution of the Greek Flag.* Athens: Bookstars. p.42
[378] Hatzilyras, 2003
[379] Hatzilyras, 2003
[380] Skartsis, 2017. p.42

There are only two possible reasons for such widespread adoption of a blue-white cross design:

a) These were symbols which had been agreed upon during the 'conspiracy phase' of the revolution.

b) The flags were the result of numerous communities independently and simultaneously tapping into a pre-existing cultural trope: symbols which were already recognised and recognizable throughout the Balkans as pertaining to a wider 'imagined community' to which the revolutionaries (and their respective communities) belonged.

For reasons which will become clearer later on (when I examine the flags bearing Hetereia symbols) the only logical option in my view is the latter. A simple banner sporting a cross in a blue-white colour scheme is noticeably absent among the number of flags which were directly influenced by the symbolism of the Philliki Hetereia (of which there were a sizeable number). Meanwhile, of the flags that are not emblazoned with Hetereia symbols, the blue-white coloured themes Cross design is the most common; but it is far from the only theme or design. For example, there is evidence of banners bearing depictions of various saints.[381] It is therefore reasonable to assume, then, that the blue-white cross design was not pre-conspired or agreed upon by some committee. It was just the 'go-to' design of the Greeks for the purpose of their own self representation due to some unidentified pre-existing cultural tropes.

This, then, begs two questions, the second of which gives rise to a third:

a) Why was a blue-white colour schemed cross the symbol of the Greek people prior to 1821?

b) Was this an artefact of the Greek's Roman heritage?

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[381] Smith, 1967. p.61

And, if so:

   c) was this known to the Greeks of 1821, or was it merely a self-replicating symbol which had 'always just been accepted' to be pertaining to Greece but, by 1821, its' origins had become unknown in popular understanding?

The cross is of least concern here; a cross is a simple enough design to be hurriedly put together yet also a stark enough emblem that one is left with no doubt as to the intention: it is a banner made to represent a Christian host. Given that the defining feature of the Greeks was their Christianity (as seen already), the cross -it is therefore safe to assume- is a matter which is in need of little discussion. Even the name of the variant of cross (the 'Greek Cross') speaks to the fact that this is a design that had been commonly encountered in the Southern Balkans for centuries. It is likely that this was the version of the Christian Cross most commonly encountered by the revolutionaries and so it was simply this version that was copied when the time came to assemble a war banner which represented their faith.

It is a non-controversial statement to say that, to the Greeks of 1821, their Christian faith was known to be tied to the legacy of their bygone Orthodox State. The argument can hardly be made that the Cross was being used in a way to portray Hellenist sentiments. The argument that could be made however is this: such a display of the Greek's faith, the faith that defined them as a community, may not have been anything more than that (simply a display of their Orthodoxy). By now, however, this thesis has outlined numerous ways in which, to the Greeks of 1821, their political and their religious ideals and identity, were intricately intertwined and infused with feelings of a temporal Byzantine heritage.

It is possible that the use of the colour white is partially explained for, in the design of another flag, Righas Velestinlis chose the colour white as a representation of the Greek's innocence and, by extension, their rights against tyranny. [382] This could go some way

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[382] Righas, 1797, *Constitution*

towards explaining the inclusion of the colour in the 1821 revolt's symbolism. There are other possibilities, however. Given these flags were all made of cloth which -presumably- would have been readily available then white -by virtue of its low cost and ubiquity- seems a logical choice. Another possible explanation is that white was a representation of something that is physically white such as the foam of the blue seas around Greece, the clouds in the blue sky, or the white silhouette of the snow-capped mountains amidst those same skies and waters.

There are other more historic and symbolic reasons for the adoption of the blue-white colour scheme, however. Blue had been synonymous with the Orthodox communities of the Ottoman Empire for generations by 1821. Prior to gaining the right to sail under the Russian flag – which came in 1774 courtesy of the treaty of Kucuk Kaynarka- Greek merchant vessels flew a flag which was red at the top and bottom (representing the Ottoman Empire) and blue in the middle (representing the Orthodox).[383] A painting at the national historical museum in Athens dating from the 1790's depicts this Grecotourkiki (Greco-Ottoman flag).[384]

The civil ensigns of the Ottoman Empire at this time had the red tops and bottoms in common however the colour in the middle differed depending on the particular group (millet) of subjects it was representing.[385] This implies an association between the Greeks and the colour blue in the eyes of the Ottoman administration. This is corroborated by Vakalopoulos' observation that members of the Rum millet were only allowed to wear turbans which were made of blue or stripped blue cloth.[386] After 1774 Greek vessels sailed under the Russian's sea flag which was a blue saltire upon a white background (this design had been in use as the maritime ensign of Russian vessels since 1712).[387] There is evidence to suggest, for example, that Theodoros Kolokotrones used both the Russian naval ensign as well as the blue Greek cross on a white background and various points in his colourful career.[388] This gives the distinct possibility that the Greeks simply took the naval ensign

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[383] Smith 1967. p.57
[384] Mazarakis-Ainam. *Flags of Freedom*. National Historical Museum. Athens. 1996
[385] Kokkonis and Corre-Zografou, 1997.
[386] Vakalopoulos. A.E. 2000. *The Greek Society and Economy After the Ottoman Conquest of Constantinople, 1453-1669*. Herodotos. Athens.
[387] Encyclopaedia Britannica: A New Survey of Universal Knowledge. United States: Encyclopædia Britannica, 1953. p.348
[388] Skartsis, 2017. p.26

under which they had been sailing for a generation or so and simply rotated the design from saltire to Greek cross to better represent Christ instead of St. Andrew alone.

If this indeed was the case it is noteworthy that the flag by which the Greeks identified themselves was based upon the flag -which thanks to the activities of the Greek merchant marine and the logistical likelihood that Russia would have more often than not been encountered via their navy- that the Greeks associated the most with the only independent Orthodox nation. In this case, not only would the revolutionary flags be a representation of the Greek's faith but, also, they would be a representation of positive sentiment towards the Ottoman Empire's greatest rival; and the Greek's assumed (if the millenarian prophecies were anything to go by) greatest ally. This two-fold manner in which the Greek symbol of the revolution harked to Orthodoxy would -if true- be an important detail for this argument. It would imply that it was primarily symbols of Orthodoxy -and by extension all that their specific Orthodoxy encompassed, the political ideal, the historic past, and the divinely ordained destiny- that the Greeks primarily chose to emblazon upon their revolutionary banners.

There is strong evidence of the Greek merchant marine sailing under a blue and white coloured flag prior to the revolution. This flag was not a Russian one, rather it appears it was an Ottoman flag which seems to only have been flown in Ottoman waters. Cunningham has wrote than in circa 1810 Greek merchant ships were flying a blue and white stripped flag in Greek waters.[389] Elsewhere Koch and Schoell wrote that *"the flag hoisted by Greeks* [during naval operations in 1821] *consisted of eight blue and wite horizontal stripes*".[390] The same flag appears in descriptions of events in 1823 in the Encyclopaedia Americana of 1831.[391] Meanwhile, a British book dated from 1823 described a similarly designed flag with a cross and owl in the middle (the symbol of wisdom).[392] Elsewhere it has also been noted that the Greeks of Smyrna had, at that time, a similar flag (with five alternating stripes of blue and white).[393] Kokkonis and Corre-

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[389] Cunningham. Allan. 1993. *Anglo-Ottoman Encounters in the Age of Revolution*. Collected Essays Vol 1. Edward Ingram (Ed.) Frank Cass. London.

[390] Koch. C.D and Schoell. F. 1836. *History of the Revolutions in Europe: from the Subversion of the Roman Empire in the West to the Congress of Vienna*. N.B Pratt. New York.

[391] Encyclopaedia Amerciana (Vol VI) Cary and Lea. Philadelphia (1831).

[392] Ribau. G. 1823. *History of Modern Greece from 1820 to the Establishment of Grecian Independence*.

[393] Mansel. P. 2012. *Levant: Splendour and Catastrophe on the Mediterranean*. Yale University Press. New Haven.

Zagrafou have also identified a war ensign which was horizontally stripped white-blue-white in use in 1821 (prior to the adoption of a naval ensign design in 1822, a design which incidentally would one day become the current flag of Greece).[394] This was probably a modification of the merchant ensign alluded to above.

All of this speaks to the pre-revolutionary use of blue and white as symbols of Greece prior to -and in the early stages of- the revolution before state symbols were standardised at Epidaurus. We have already seen how such symbols had been used during the Orlov revolt, and by Greek vessels prior to the 1821 revolt. The adoption of the Epidaurus assembly of the blue-white colour scheme must have been influenced by a pre-existing aspect of popular Greek culture which held these colours as a national symbol. The choice of that assembly to adopt symbols which pre-dated the arrival of Hellenism would lend strength to the notion that the Greeks rallying to these banners had something other than the Hellenic ideal in mind at the moment of taking up arms against the Sultan. This pre-existing ideal, according to the established historiography, can only be a Roman identity.

There have been dozens of suggestions as to why blue and white were pre-established Greek national symbols. Many of these border upon the fantastical. Many more, if true, would have been so far removed from popular Greek dialogue that the average Greek would have been ignorant of the provenance of their national symbols. Meanwhile many simply do not explain why the colour scheme was chosen, only that it arbitrarily represents some value or trait. Hatzilyras summarised many of the various theories which have circulated the topic over the last two centuries, he wrote:

> *"There are many different versions, which try to decipher the meaning of the two colours: the predominant one bears the blue and white to symbolize the blue sky and the blue sea that surrounds Greece and the white clouds and the white foam of the sea-waves . Another version has white to symbolize the purity of the Greek Revolution, the pure and undefiled purpose of the Greeks, while blue the celestial power, which protected the fighters (sky-coloured and like a field lily white). The same colours, however, during the Greek Revolution signified "justice and faith blue, moral purity and purity of purpose white". It could also be said that the white symbolizes the snowy mountains and the blue the seriousness of the Greek people. It has been argued that the two colours come from the classical Greek antiquity of Athens, since white and blue were the*

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[394] Kokkonis and Corre-Zografou, 1997.

colours of the veil of the rite of the goddess Athena. The same view connects the flag of the land with the flag of Nikiforos Fokas [a Byzantine Emperor] and the flag of the sea with the flag of the Kallergids (who were descendants of Nikiforos Fokas), while for the blue and white combination it correlates with the official uniform of the Byzantines and the flag of the Byzantine fleet... the marks (flags) of the constitutions of Alexander the Great were in blue and white... the Jews distinguished the Greeks from the white garments with blue belts, as mentioned in the New Testament... Coats of arms and the imperial flag of the Macedonian dynasties (9th - 11th century) and the Palaeologans (13th - 15th century), as well as the throne of the Ecumenical Patriarch. There is also the version that bears the colours to symbolize the sailor's breeches and the mainland frock coat..."[395]

Alongside these explanations are the possibility that the blue-white colour scheme had existed in popular Greek imaginations of the Greek State since the earliest centuries of Constantinople's era as capital of the Roman Empire. The 'blues and whites', a chariot racing team's supporters who made up one half of the Constantinople mob and a primordial political party -allegedly a 'Greek party'- and whose colours were subsequently the colours of choice of said supporters (including a number of Emperors and officials in high offices of State). [396] Furthermore, the uniform of some Byzantine State officials and military units, as well as the garb of the Emperor (when he isn't depicted as being clad in purple) were blue.[397]

Although it is tempting for the purposes of this argument to land on the side of 'blue and white colour coding was based on a Byzantine heritage' it seems unplausible, at least in so far as the above reasons go. In my surmising, in order for the blue and white colour coding to have been so widespread and prevalent in Greece in 1821, the colour scheme would probably have been visually seen by the very peoples who flocked to the symbol in 1821. In order for the various Greek peoples to associate themselves with a certain colour that certain colour has to have been commonly and publicly encountered in a context which was directly associated with their own self-identity. This would mean that most of the explanations posited above would be more than unlikely.

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[395] Hatzilyras, 2003.
[396] Skartsis, 2017. p.13-4
[397] Skartsis, 2017. p.14

The explanation which is most plausible rests in the association between the colour blue and the Orthodox faith. The use of blue in Orthodox icons and in the cassocks of their clergy is therefore, in my view, the most likely explanation as to why Christians and Turks alike would have come to associate the colour with the faith (and, by extension, the faithful). We have already seen that the story around Papaflessas' flag is only plausible if, at the time, the clergy were commonly found to be wearing blue cassocks. Additionally, the Virgin Mary -and often her son- is usually depicted as being garbed in blue (when not depicted in blue both are usually in red or purple to denote their royal status).[398] Being a fairly expensive pigment it makes sense that blue would become associated with the central figures of Orthodox Iconography.

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Figure 7: Iconography of Christ and Mary in typical blue garb

Further, at some point in the history of icon painting blue -probably due to it being the colour of the sky- blue has come to connote heavenly nature, particularly the presence of

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[398] Skartsis, 2017. p.26

[399] Early 11ᵗʰ C. Byzantine Mosaic in Haghia Sophia in Constantinople depicting Jesus Christ between Emperor Konstantinos IX Monomachos (1042-1055) and Empres Zoe Porphyrogenita (1042) and 12ᵗʰ C. mosaic in Haghia Sophia in Constantinople depicting the Virgin Mary holding The Child Christ on her lap, between Emperor Ioannis II Komnenos (1118-1143) and Empress Irene (1104-1118). Reproduced in Skartsis, Labros. S. 2017. *Origin and Evolution of the Greek Flag.* Athens: Bookstars. p.26

such in this realm (as in Mary's heavenly nature, and that of her Son).[400] It is possible, therefore, that the use of blue in Greek flags before and during the revolt is not only a nod to the Greek's Orthodox faith (via an invocation of their priests, the Virgin and the Son of God himself) but that it is also an allegorical representation of Heaven (as in, God's Kingdom) on earth.

It does not require a leap of the imagination to accept that the continued and consistent use of blue to depict the central figures of Christianity brought about an association between the colour and the faith. Subsequently, as this faith was *the* defining marker of Greek identity since the times of Justinian I it is not unlikely that blue evolved from a symbol of Orthodoxy to a symbol of the Orthodox people themselves. The question as to whether or not this was known to the Greeks as being a nod their Roman heritage is clearly answered if this is the case. Not only because the Greek's orthodox faith, identity and heritage were well known to be the product of their Byzantine past. But also because the association between the colour, the faith, and the faithful would have been repeatedly reaffirmed whenever the Greeks encountered these icons (which would have been very often). It is also possible that, if the colour blue did equate to an allegory of the kingdom of heaven, then this would have clearly been seen by the Greeks of 1821 as a symbolism of their Roman past, present, and destiny. The Roman Kingdom in the Balkans, after all, was seen by its citizens at the time of its' fall (and by the Christians who would see it returned to them in the subsequent centuries) as being the eternal and earthly reflection of God's Kingdom of Heaven.[401]

Therefore, throughout the examination of why blue and white became national colours of the Greeks, we encounter the same answer for at least one of the colours. Blue was a symbol of the Orthodox faith. It was blue that designated the Rum millet to the Ottomans; blue was the cross of co-religionist Russian maritime vessels; blue was the colour of the Kingdom of Heaven; it was often the colour of the virgin and her son; and the cassocks of at least some of their priests were blue as well.

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[400] Skartsis, 2017. p.26

[401] Nicol, Donald MacGillivray. 1972. *The Last Centuries of Byzantium, 1261-1453*. Netherlands: Hart-Davis. p.79

Every single one of these examples would have been in public spaces as well as in private displays and so the public and private association between Orthodoxy and the colour blue would have been obvious. It is for this reason that I surmise that the flags of the revolution so often appeared to be a version of a blue-white Cross: because the revolution was a rebellion of the Orthodox against the Sultan for the establishment of the independence of said Orthodox peoples (an independence which would be a restored Kingdom of Heaven). Blue therefore would have been the natural go-to for many. White, on the other hand, was widely available and bore connotations of purity, innocence, and the rights of that same Orthodox population against the tyranny of the Porte.

Before departing from the blue-white Cross it is important to note that some historians have posited that this design and colour scheme may have been deliberately chosen by the assembly at Epidaurus in favour of other colours and symbols that would have alarmed the rest of Europe.[402] Such symbols that were allegedly excluded would have been deemed to have been too revolutionary: be they symbols of a revived Byzantium (which would have alarmed anyone who had a vested interest against coreligionist Russia's hegemony in the Eastern Mediterranean) or symbols of liberal revolutionary ideals which would have alarmed nearly every head of State in the continent. By opting for symbols of a purely Orthodox nature it is possible that the participants of Epidaurus had voted in favour of symbols which would have been less alarming to European policy makers who would have recognised the second class-citizen status of Orthodox Christians within the Ottoman Empire as being a reality (and a naturally unwelcome reality at that). A liberation movement would have been much more appetising to the Council of Europe than a revolt to bring about social reform in the Balkans or a large new State situated in a strategically important and geopolitically fragile region (a State which would have natural allegiances to co-Orthodox Russia). This would explain why other -also common- symbols and designs were abandoned (which will be explored shortly) for their overly Byzantine or revolutionary connotations.[403] Nevertheless, it is very likely the case that the symbols and designs that were adopted were deeply Orthodox and, by extension, Roman: they just happen to be more subtle to outside audiences.

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[402] Skartsis, 2017. p.56
[403] Hatzilyras, 2003

There were, however, other flags and symbols used in the 1821 revolt which had clearer, and more obvious, connotations of the Greek's Byzantine heritage. The history of the national flags of Greece starts with Righas Velestinlis. Alongside his proposed constitution and declarations, he also provided the Greeks with a very detailed proposal for a flag with which to adorn his hypothetical pan-Balkan state. As an appendage to the *New Constitution,* he wrote:

> *"The symbol, placed in colours and banners of the flags of the Greek Democracy, is Heracles' club with three crosses upon. The banners and colours are of three colours, black, white and red; the red is above, the white is in the middle and the black is below. The red indicates the imperial purple and the sovereignty of the Greek People; it was used by our predecessors as a war cloth, because the wounds were not obvious when blood was coming out and so the soldiers did not hesitate. The white colour indicates the innocence and our rights against Tyranny. The black colour indicates our death for our Country and Freedom."[404]*

The striking element of this design is the blending of Romanism and Hellenism, of Greek mythology and Christianity. The club of Heracles, clearly being a nod to the Greek's classical past, serves here to indicate what Righas thought about Greek continuity. Upon the symbol of their classical heritage Righas places three crosses, and in so doing, showcases the thought process that the Christian Greeks are the same people who were once pagans in the time of Heracles. The three crosses may be a depiction of the crucifixion scene (Jesus flanked by the two sinners) but it is also possible -indeed, given Righas' political ideal, it is quite likely- that this was a reference to the three types of Christianity that would peacefully co-exist in the post-revolutionary state: Chalcedonian Orthodoxy; Catholicism; and Armenian Orthodoxy. Either way, for a state that was supposed to be a polyglot and multi-faith conglomerate it is certainly noteworthy that the official state symbol was to be so heavily adorned with Hellenist and Christian symbolism. Herein Righas betrays not only the chauvinism of an assumed Grecophone superiority (discussed earlier) but the sheer implausibility that any Greek state in the Balkans could ever exist without Christian trappings. Although it should be reiterated here that Righas himself was a Hellenised Vlach and as such he was a living personification of his political ideology: that Hellenism was the possession of all those who spoke and embraced Greek language (and, ergo, Greek thought and culture).

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[404] Righas, 1797. *Constitution*.

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Figure 8: Righas' proposed flag

The colours, and the reasons for their choice, that Righas provides are clearly the most noteworthy element in relation to this argument. His choice and explanation for the colour red, that it emulates the Imperial Purple (which, contrary to popular belief, would have looked a lot 'redder' than is often depicted) is clearly an example of a manifestation of the Roman identity. Also important, however, is the parallel he draws between the Roman heritage of the Greek people and their sovereignty. Implied here is that the Greek's sovereignty was tied to -and lost alongside- the fate of the Roman Empire. Presumably therefore the logical next step would imply that the regaining of sovereignty by the Greeks would also be tied to the re-emergence of the Imperial State. At the very least here is a clear indication that the legacy and the memory of Byzantium was making itself felt in the political aspirations for independence in the mindset of -at least some- of the modern Greeks of the late 18th Century. The fact that Righas was, however, one of the most liberal and anti-clerical thinkers of his time is stark when we consider just how Byzantinist this manifestation of his ideal is.

The extent to which this is all confined to Righas' individual ideas is an important question to raise at this point. Was he revealing his own mindset, the mindset of the prospective citizens of his hypothetical state, or both? In my surmising Righas has designed this flag with the average Balkan citizen in mind. Righas was deeply influenced by the French Revolution (his constitution and declaration of rights are practically acts of plagiarism in this regard); contemptuous of the Orthodox Church (but not of the faith); committed to

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405 A drawing of Righas' proposed flag from his own manuscript. Righas, Velestinlis. 1797. *The Constitution.* Vienna.Reproduced n Skartsis, Labros. S. 2017. *Origin and Evolution of the Greek Flag.* Athens: Bookstars

establishing a multi-faith and multi-ethnic democratic state; and broadly influenced by the re-discovery of Greece's classical past which had occurred during the four-or-so-decades which preceded his publications. This explains the tri-colour design, the club of Heracles, and the inclusion of details such as red being a symbol of sovereignty. He could have stopped there. However, something forced his pen to move beyond this point and to include crosses and an emulation to the Roman Empire. These elements are probably less a reflection of the man himself and more a reflection of what said man believed the Balkan people would want to see. There is evidence to corroborate this interpretation. The question above is, in some respects, answered by events in 1821: more than two decades after his death not only did Righas' tri-colour design reappear but the colour red was specifically chosen as the 'official' colour of the revolutionaries as well.

First, the latter. It is possible that red was adopted as an official colour of the rebels in that each individual was demarcated as a fighter on the Greek side by wearing a red scarf or at least some other clearly visible red fabric. The evidence from this comes from Kolokotrones' memoirs. In a scene where he describes how he had to hide when the Greek forces were routed from the battlefield he writes:

> *"I concealed myself beneath some branches… The Turks passed over; I saw them, for they passed quite close to me. I was saved by the capote which I was wearing; for I had on a red scarf and the capote concealed it".[406]*

If this does indeed imply that a red scarf served to demarcate a revolutionary on the battlefield (where uniforms would not appear for several more years) then the choice of red is a significant one and it is possible that it was a decision made for the same 'Byzantinist' reasons that Righas opted to include the colour in his banner. Alternatively (or, more accurately, somewhat connected to this) is the possibility that the decision was made in accordance to pre-existing tropes of 'to Romaiko' being achieved by warriors clad in red (as seen previously). I would surmise that this could be seen as being corroborated from the evidence seen from Kolokotrones in a previous chapter about his claim that the klephts were the continuation of the Emperor's army all these years later.

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[406] Kolokotrones, 1896. p.137

When Alexander Ypsilantis declared a revolution at Iasi in February 1821, he did so under what was probably a number of different flags. Alexander Pushkin, who was a member of the Philliki Hetereia, either witnessed events in Iasi at the time or had encountered Ypsilantis and his band in nearby Kishinev where he was in exile from Russia and, presumably, would have received word rather quickly about events in Iasi. In a letter dated from early March to Vasily Davydov, Pushkin described the scenes:

> *"On February 21, General Prince Alexander Ypsilantis with two of his brothers and Prince George Kantakuzen arrived in Iasi from Kishinev… he was met there by three hundred Arnauts, by Prince Sutzu, and by the Russian consul, and he immediately took over the command of the city. There he published proclamations which quickly spread everywhere – in them it is said that the Phoenix of Greece will arise from its own ashes, that the hour of Turkey's downfall has come, etc. and that a great power approves of the great-souled feat! The Greeks have begun to throng together in crowds under his three banners, of these one is tricoloured, on another stands a cross wreathed with laurels with the text by this conquer, on the third is depicted a phoenix rising from its' ashes. I have seen a letter by one insurgent: with ardour he describes the ceremony of consecrating Prince Ypsilintis' banners and sword, the rapture of the clergy and the laity, and beautiful moments of Hope and Freedom."[407]*

Pushkin's account is corroborated by Alexander Ypsilanti's younger brother Nikolaos. Nikolaos accompanied his brother in the abortive campaign in the principalities and, as part of his role in the conspiracy, he drafted a text which provided military instructions for the 'Sacred Band' (Ypsilantis' regiment of Greeks raised in Odessa and the Danubian Principalities in February 1821). Specifically, on the regiment's flag Nikolaos is quoted by Filimon as writing that:

> *"The Greek flag both in land and naval army must be composed by three colours: white, red and black. The white colour means the innocence of this operation against the tyrants; the black colour means our death for the country and freedom and the red colour means the independence of Greek people and their pleasure to fight for the country's resurrection"[408]*

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[407] Letter from Alexander Pushkin to Vasily Davydov dated March 1821. Reproduced in Balkan Studies: Biannual Publication of the Institute for Balkan Studies. Greece: The Institute, 1992.
[408] Filimon, Timoleon. 1861. Historical essay on the Greek Revolution. Athens: Typois, P. Soutsa & A. Ktena p.96

Although not specifically penning the connection of the colour red to the Roman legacy of the Greeks the connotation still exists in this particular flag for Nikolaos is also quoated to have additionally instructed that on one side there will be a *"Phoenix with the epigraph 'From my ashes I am reborn' and on the other side a cross with a wreath".*[409] Accompanying this symbol, Nikolaos wrote, there will be letters which represent 'En Tou to Nika' meaning 'In this sign, conquer' (The slogan of Constantine the Great).[410] The flag of the sacred band, then, was a combination of the three banners which Pushkin depicted in his letter. So, either the sacred band had a special flag made up of the three components, or Pushkin was mistaken in his report of there existing three separate banners. Either way, it is useful for the historical analysis that two separate sources should corroborate each other so well. Another note that should be stressed is this: it is worth bearing in mind that Righas has already been shown to have been a close associate of Ypsilantis' father and uncle (and grandfather) and Ypsilantis' flag is strikingly similar to that of Righas' design. It is possible therefore, that Righas' reasons for adopting the colour red was also the reasoning behind Ypsilantis' decision.

This flag was essentially the same tricolour of Righas but now, instead of Heracles' club with crosses, a new design had appeared: the phoenix rising from the ashes and the cross and wreath accompanied by the Greek equivalent of Constantine The Great's 'In Hoc Signo Vinces'. In addition to this, we have also previously seen how the Philliki Hetereia had been formed by a man who had also been a member of Alexander Mavrocrodatos' Phoenix Society in Russia. We will also see shortly that the phoenix symbol appears again and again in the early years of Greece's history as an independent nation and always in relation to high concentrations of Hetereia members or to individuals who had spent considerable time among the Greek diaspora in Russia (or, latterly, members of the Russian party). It is no surprise, then, that Alexander Ypsilanti, a Philliki Hetereia member (and leader of their military operation) who had spent considerable time in Russia would unfurl a flag emblazoned with a phoenix as he declared the revolution.

Vasdravelles has noted that the army of Ypsilantis had three flags, all with similar themes to the flag of the sacred band. As well as a white, red and black emblem he also noted the existence of a tricolour bearing a cross with the words 'long live liberty' and a phoenix

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[409] Filimon. 1861. p.96.
[410] Filimon. 1861. p.96.

rising from its' ashes; another banner depicting Saint George on one side and Christ's resurrection on the other as a symbolic representation of the Greek nation's resurrection; and a third banner which was all white with a pelican (a common allegorical symbol of the Eucharist) in the middle with the words 'god be with you'.[411]

From all of this the evidence is clear; the revolutionaries -in the Danubian principalities at least- were hoisting symbols which invoked the notion of resurrection. It could be argued that this was an invocation of the resurrection of Hellas. However, even if notions of Hellenic regeneration are being invoked here, they are not being invoked as mutually exclusive of the Romana heritage: the portrayal of which is beyond doubt. Aside from the colour red -which by the time we get to 1821 may or may not be a reference to the imperial purple as Righas had intended- we also have numerous displays of Christian symbolism. This goes beyond a mere display of a Christian identity, however. The specific theme of resurrection speaks to the notion of the resurrection of a Christian State. As well as this the inclusion of Constantine's slogan is a clear indication of the Greeks' political and religious affiliation to the Roman Empire: this was the state which they aimed to, in some way, resurrect. One side of this flag is depicted in the title image of this thesis. That image, of Nikos Mitropoulos raising the flag at Salona (known as Amfissa) is reproduced below:

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Figure 9: Image depicting the red-black-white tricolour with cross

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[411] Vasdravellēs, Iōannēs K.1968. *The Greek Struggle for Independence: The Macedonians in the Revolution of 1821.* Greece: Institute for Balkan Studies. p.52

[412] Dupré, Louis. *Nikos Mitropoulos raises the flag with the cross at Salona on Easter day 1821.* Published in Dupré, Louis. 1825. *A Voyage from Athens to Istanbul.* France. Alexander S. Onassis Public Benefit Foundation Collection. Athens: Hellenic Library. Public Domain.

Importantly, Dupré painted this image after meeting with Mitropoulos in Rome in 1824 and so it is likely that Mitropoulos provided an accurate depiction of the flag he bore at that battle.[413] Also noteworthy here is the red fabric around Mitropoulos' neck and torso: possibly serving the same purpose as seen by Kolokotrones above.

The presence of this cross, wreath, and slogan alongside the image of a phoenix would imply that the phoenix is designed to be a symbol of the rebirth of the Roman State. The fact that the phoenix symbol virtually disappears from public display after the arrival of the Bavarian Regency in 1832 (which was hyper neo-Hellenistic) possibly speaks to this. This line of inquiry is corroborated by the fact that the phoenix symbol lived on during Otto's reign in the form of a secret society (the 'Philorthodox' conspiracy which was probably borne out of another Phoenix society) which conspired to bring about an enlarged Orthodox State by embracing the Megali Idea and planning either to force Otto's conversion or to replace him with an Orthodox -and so probably a Russian- King.[414] Clearly, then, the phoenix was synonymous in the minds of the revolutionaries with the notion of the rebirth of the Greek's Orthodox State.

While the phoenix banner was being raised in the North, the first flag to be raised in the Peloponnesus was Andreas Londos' black cross on a red field.[415] No reason for the banner's design has survived to this day as far as I can tell but it is noteworthy that it was a red banner bearing a cross. It is possible that the use of the colour red here was also an invocation to the Roman Imperial heritage. Meanwhile other groups began raising their own standards featuring various saints. Diakos and Botsaris both hoisted a banner with the image of St George upon it.[416] Since Byzantine times, it is important to note, St George had been the patron saint of Greek soldiers and this possibly survived as a tradition among the Armatoli.[417] Other leaders hoisted images of Saint Demetrius and Saint Constantine.[418] The former design had been used by Lambros Katsonis during his pirate activity (directed

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[413] *Vlachos, Manolis. 1994. Louis Duprè, Journey to Athens and Istanbul. Athens: Olkos publications. Digitised at https://www.olympia.gr/143475/ellada (Last accessed 14/01/2021).*
[414] Dakin, 1972. p.72
[415] Skartsis, 2017. p.42
[416] Smith pg 61
[417] Smith pg 56
[418] Smith pg 61

against the Porte) during the Russo-Turkish war of 1787-1792.[419] The use of Constantine, as said previously, can be taken as evidence for a nod towards the Roman heritage of the Greeks: Constantine being the founder of the Orthodox Greek State itself.

Despite the depiction of various saints being recorded the more prevalent symbol used to portray the Greek's and the liberation movement was the Cross, and it had been so since Constantine founded that civilisation.[420] A number of the Cross flags of the 1821 revolt depict some additional symbols which are clearly the result of a popular memory of symbols used prior to the fall of Constantinople.

Anthimos Gazis, in Thessaly, hoisted a white flag bearing a red Greek Cross in the middle with a further four crosses (one in each square created by the central cross).[421] Meanwhile, in Psara, the commander of the rebellious fleet flew a white pennant with a red border and red Greek Cross bearing the epigraph standing for 'En Touto Nika' (in this sign, conquer), a clear exhibition of Byzantine heritage.[422] Additionally, Dimitrios Plapoutas flew a white flag bearing a blue Greek Cross with the squares sporting an I, an X, an N and a K respectively (standing for Jesus Christ Victorious).[423] Each of these designs are strikingly Byzantine (and ergo the symbols were either deliberately modelled on Byzantine designs or on a cultural memory dating back to that era). The cross with the blank spaces filled with further symbols or letters is so ubiquitous in Byzantine symbolism that it can safely be said to be a very common, and long-lasting Byzantine design. [424]

While the flags of the mainland were predominantly simple designs sporting crosses or saints, the flags of the islands were -largely- more complex being that they were infused with Hetereia symbolism. For reference here is a representation of the Hetereia's standard:

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[419] Skartsis, 2017. p.39
[420] Skartsis, 2017. p.56
[421] Skartsis, 2017. p.45
[422] Skartsis, 2017. p.45
[423] Skartsis, 2017. p.45
[424] Skartsis, 2017. p.45

Figure 10: Filliki Hetereia flag

After the revolution had been proclaimed the Bishop Germanos is said to have ordered the construction and distribution of white flags bearing the symbols of the Hetereia (like the one above).[426] The letters in the flags on the banner represent "either liberty or death", a slogan of the revolutionaries. Meanwhile it is again noteworthy that the cross, the only Christian symbol here, is red. Akin to the flag of Ypsilantis' these flags also bore a wreath, importantly these symbols also contained a fasces (symbolised by 16 columns bound together): another possible nod to a Roman heritage.

A Fasces also appears in the below standard of Nikitaras (which originally belonged to Kolokotrones, his uncle).[427] Noteworthy here, apart from the red cross, is how the cross is positioned upon an upturned crescent (probably meaning that Christianity will triumph over the Ottoman Empire as, at this time, the crescent was yet to become a symbol for Islam in general).[428] This is further suggested with the lettering in the Cross's blank space: they stand for 'Jesus Christ Victorious'.

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[425] Filiki Hetereia flag. National History Museum collection. Athens. Reproduced in Skartsis, 2017. p.43
[426] Skartsis, 2017. p.43
[427] Skartsis, 2017. p.44
[428] Skartsis, 2017. p.44

Figure 11: Nikitaras and Kolotrones' flag

On the islands' banners the same symbols of the Hetereia appear again and again: crosses upon upturned crescents; spears and anchors at "10 to 2" positions beside the cross; and a host of other symbols such as snakes, birds, letters, slogans, and letters.[430] These are in stark contrast to the simple depictions of saints and crosses that the warbands of the mainland hoisted. A good example of these islands' flags is the representation of one of the flags of Spetses below:


431

Figure 12: Flag of Spetses

[429] Nikitaras and Kolokotrones flag. Benaki Museum collection. Reproduced in Skartsis, 2017. p.44
[430] Kokkonis and Corre-Zografou, 1997.
[431] Flag of Spetses. National Museum of Athens. Skartsis, 2017. p.45

It is important to note that, these islands flags were almost always dominated by the colours blue, or red.[432]

On the Islands, however, the Phoenix symbol appeared once again in a revolutionary flag. Laskarina Bouboulina envisioned her flag to be an eagle clutching an anchor in one claw (a common symbol among the islanders' flags) and the Phoenix rising form its flames in the other.[433] Again this Symbol was primarily of a blue background but with a red banner (again this red banner was common on the flags of the islands and is starkly similar to icons of martyred saints where the red boundary depicts the martyrdom).[434]

Repeatedly, then, the symbols of the revolution centred around a number of main themes. These being: the colour blue, as an allegory of Orthodoxy and perhaps even as a symbol of the Kingdom of Heaven and its' temporal reflection; the colour red, perhaps as a symbol of the former empire and the Greek's sovereignty as citizens of said empire; the presence -in some banners- of Hetereia symbols; images of saints; images of the phoenix as an allegory of the resurrection of the Greek state; and, above all, the Cross as representing not only Christianity, but often the Christian State and Christianity's victory over the Ottomans. Said victory being -it could be argued- an allegory of 'to Romaiko', given that, by definition, 'to Romaiko' was going to be a victory of Christianity over the Ottoman Empire.

These symbols, as reflections of the identity of the Greeks at the time, speak to the complexities of said identity. On one hand deeply Orthodox on the other profoundly attached to notions of belonging to a State; and wanting said state to be resurrected. This flies in the face of the historiography that would have us believe that the Greeks a) were acting out of religious motivations and allegiances alone and b) that the average Greek did not possess at this time a feeling of national consciousness.

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[432] Skartsis, 2017. p.43
[433] Kokkonis and Corre-Zografou, 1997.
[434] Kokkonis and Corre-Zografou, 1997.

Part II: Phoenix symbol

In the first three decades of the 19th Century the image and the name of the Phoenix appears repeatedly in the evidence. The connotations of rebirth could, logically, be taken to be a reference to a regeneration of Hellas. That may very well be true (the phoenix does, after all, appear alongside neo-Hellenic terminology, particularly from 1822 onwards, as we will see shortly). However, it is more likely that the symbol was used as an allegory for the regeneration of the Greek Empire. This is strongly backed up by the evidence presented in the previous section on Alexander Ypsilantis' standard depicting a phoenix on one side with a cross and Constantine's slogan on the other. The direct association between the phoenix and the founder of the Greek Empire and the divinely ordained victory of the Cross is plain. The most obvious interpretation of the standard is that 'Through a victorious Christ, Constantine's Christian kingdom will be reborn'.

Ypsilantis' standard was not the first time the image of the phoenix was conjured in the context of Greek liberation, and neither would it be the last. Alexander Mavrocordatos second cousin of the same name, according to Dakin, formed a secret society called 'The phoenix society' in the early 19th Century which aimed to conspire an invasion and partition of the Ottoman Empire.[435] So popular was the regenerative image of the phoenix however that Mavrocordatos' conspiracy was not even the only society named as such. A later society existed in Capodistria's Greece which had most likely been formed in the months prior to his arrival. Aside from sharing a name it was not related to Mavrocordatos' earlier conspiracy: This new phoenix society was rumoured to have either been organised by Capodistria himself or by his loyal supporter base (such as Kolokotrones).[436] Both of these men had little tolerance for Mavrocordato or his politics.

According to Dakin this society evolved after Capodistrias' assassination into the Philorthodox society, a clandestine wing of the pro-Russia faction in post-independence Greek politics (sometimes called the Nappists).[437] This is quite likely. Both societies appear to have had the same networks, members and roughly the same vision which was

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[435] Dakin, 1972. p.29

[436] Petropulos, John Anthony. 1968. *Politics and statecraft in the kingdom of Greece, 1833-1843*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. p.111-12

[437] Dakin, 1972. p.59

centred not only around an Orthodox identity; but a desire to bring the leadership of the new State into the Orthodox fold (again the porous boundary between civic and religious identity is evident here). The conspiracy, discovered in 1839 with Nikitas and Georgos Capodistrias (the former premier's younger brother) at the helm, likely evolved out of the Phoenix society of the earlier years of that decade and ergo both societies likely sought the same thing which, according to Jelavich, was:

> *"to continue the struggle against Ottoman rule, to free all of the Orthodox Greeks from Moslem rule, and to establish a new Byzantine state with an Orthodox ruler. If Othon could not be converted, he would be deposed.*[438]

We see here, again, therefore, the relationship (in the minds of at least some Greeks) between the phoenix symbol and the desire for a rebirthed Orthodox state: specifically in the form here of an expanding temporal territory. This, I surmise, is another manifestation of the Byzantinism at play within the vernacular Greek national consciousness.

During his premiership Capodistrias used the phoenix as a national symbol. The *phoenix* even became the new currency of the liberated state, with each coin bearing the symbol. These coins of the new state would be the State artefacts which would be disseminated the most throughout the country. People of all languages, dialects, cultures, and social strata would see the symbol that their new state had adopted as its' official emblem. Importantly, this was the image of the state that would be projected the most onto the illiterate. The symbol it bore, then, would be the symbol used by the state to communicate its' identity to its' the citizens (and foreign onlookers). It stands to reason therefore that the phoenix would have been a universally recognised and understood trope in the region at that time. Across the islands and mountain valleys of the new kingdom the new political entity was communicating a message of rebirth to its' citizens. Rebirth of what, then, of Hellas, Rome, or both?

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[438] Jelavich. B. 1966. *The Philorthodox Conspiracy of 1839.* In Balkan Studies: Biannual Publication of the Institute for Balkan Studies. Greece: The Institute for Balkan Studies

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Figure 13: Phoenix coin

Above is an image of a 1 phoenix coin. On the left, the phoenix emerging from the flames is clearly noticeable. Directly above the head, a cross is situated. At around 10 o'clock is an impression that is supposed to represent rays of light from heaven, a common symbol of divine providence. At 6 o'clock we find 1821 written in Greek numerals whilst, at 12 o'clock we can see a six-pointed star. The anchor at 7 o'clock and the symbol at 5 o'clock are the symbols of the mint. The writing translates as *Elleniki politeia*, (the Hellenic State). The intended message of the coin is therefore this: "The Hellenic State, a Christian (Orthodox) state reborn by God's providence in 1821".

The reverse side of the coin indicates the coin is from 1828 and bears the title and name of Governor I.A. Kapodistrias. In the centre it details that this is a 1 phoenix coin. The wreath is the most interesting factor here. The wreath is fairly unique to Greek designs from this specific era as far as my research can tell. One side is constructed of a Bay laurel branch: the other of an olive branch bearing fruit. The purpose of this design has remained elusive but in my surmising it as an attempt to convey the dualistic nature of the new Greek state: neo-Hellenism on one side (the olive wreath, from the Olympian tradition) and Byzantine (a laurel wreath, a symbol of Roman martial victory) on the other.

Below is an 1831 10 lepta coin (A lower denomination), containing most of the same symbols (with the exception of the Aegina mint's stamp).

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439 Phoenix coin. private collection

Figure 14: Lepta coin

Interestingly, here, in the 10 Lepta coin we now find two six-pointed stars. This (as well as the single star on the 1 phoenix coin) is quite likely to be another direct nod to the Byzantine State and to the City of Constantinople specifically. One, or sometimes two, six-pointed stars (and sometimes eight-pointed stats) appeared very often in Byzantine coins as a symbol of the City of Constantinople.[441] Originally the City was symbolised by a star and a crescent however, as the crescent had come to symbolise the Islamic Ottoman Empire by the 1820's (As we saw in the flags previously) it would come as little surprise to see the crescent dropped by the designer of these modern coins. That being said it appears that the crescent was often dropped in the Byzantine coins also, leaving the star (or stars) alone to symbolise The City. Such is the case of the coin from the era of Justinian II (705-11) below:

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[440] 10 Lepta coin. private collection
[441] Skartsis, 2017. p.49-51

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Figure 15: Coin of Justinian II

Use of the symbol of the phoenix in official state imagery was not unique to Capodistrias' reign: it was a prominent feature in the imagery used by the revolutionary regional assemblies at the start of the war of independence. Below is the seal of the Peloponnesian Senate of 1824. Many of the above symbols are again present. The phoenix rising from the ashes, the year, the name of the state and a wreath (what looks to be the bay laurel variety only). Above the phoenix is a Cross with the Greek letters corresponding to IS, XC, NIKA meaning 'Jesus Christ, Victorious'. Again the clear image being portrayed here is of a regeneration of a Christian state made possible by Christ's victory (presumably over the Turks).

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442 Coin of Justinian II. Private Collection

Figure 16: Seal of Peloponnesian senate

In both of these cases the symbol of the Phoenix, given the additional symbols accompanying it, fits more comfortably with an allegory of a rebirthed Byzantium than with a regenerated Hellas. However, it should be noted that in both of these cases there is an interesting point: alongside the clear Byzantine imagery they also contain neo-Hellenic terminology (Hellenic State on the coins, and the use of 'Peloponnesus' instead of the more vernacular 'Morea' on the Seal). This, in my surmising, evidences the way in which neo-Hellenism could be a world view also held by people who saw themselves as heirs to Rome. It is also proof, I argue, that neo-Hellenism by 1824, 1828, and 1831 had far from usurped the Roman identity's place; rather it had begun to synthesise with it.

To conclude, then, the use of the phoenix in the public sphere of state imagery was clearly an attempt to portray a message of 'we are reborn' to the population. Further, due to always being accompanied by Byzantine trappings it is clear that the symbol specifically meant a 'reborn Orthodox State'.

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[443] Scan of Seal of the Peloponnesian senate. General State Archives, Athens. Digitised at http://arxeiomnimon.gak.gr/search/resource.html?tab=tab02&id=482532&start=40. (last accessed 21/4/2020). Image in public Domain.

Chapter VIII: The Next 100 Years

The struggle for a revived Byzantium in the age of Greek independence

Part I: Introduction

Before concluding this paper, it would be prudent to highlight a few key areas in which feelings of a Roman heritage influenced the Greek people and state *after* the war for independence. The assumption here is that if feelings of a Roman identity and ideal can be shown to have persisted long after the establishment of an independent Greek Kingdom then said feelings could be used to corroborate the argument that feelings of a Roman consciousness were present and influential in 1821.

Collective feelings of a Roman Heritage can be observed to continuously command great levels of influence over the Greek people for the rest of the 19th Century, and for much of the 20th. Indeed, it is likely the case that this legacy has continued to wield some form of influence over the collective feelings, identity, and decision making of Greeks to this day. In 2020 a statue of Emperor Constantine XI was unveiled in Athens, for example, – but that is beyond the remit of this particular research.[444] One small note that must be made here is that I am not arguing that the feelings of national identity were identical in 1821 as they were by the end of the 19th Century or the beginning of the 20th. The geopolitics of the region, indeed the world, had changed drastically across that time period.

However, given that I have shown the presence of a feeling of Byzantine consciousness before the war for independence, it stands to reason that when these feelings reared their heads later on in the 19th Century that they have not appeared out of nowhere: rather they had evolved out of already extant cultural tropes and collective feelings of identity which had always been -to varying degrees- influencing how the Greeks saw themselves and their place in the world around them.

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[444] Antonopoulos, Paul. 2020. *Statue of the Last Byzantine Emperor Is Unveiled in Piraeus.* Greek City Times. 09/06/2020. https://greekcitytimes.com/2020/06/09/statue-of-the-last-byzantine-emperor-is-unveiled-in-piraeus/#:~:text=Yesterday%20a%20statue%20of%20the,Constantine%20XI%20Palaiologos%2C%20was%20unveiled. (Last accessed 10/10/2020)

The most obvious topic of examination here is the Megali Idea; the irredentist ambition of the new Greek State to expand and to encompass yet un-liberated Greeks (and territories) where fellow Greeks had continued to live in large numbers. This will be examined - briefly- at the close of this section. First, I will examine the Greek monarchy which, as it turned out, became intertwined with perceptions of the Megali Idea and so it makes sense to cover these in more detail first before moving on to Greek irredentism.

Part II: The King of the Hellenes

As can be seen by the popularity of the Russian party, and the monarchist sympathies of the French and English parties, monarchism was the political stance which most politically active Greeks (and their supporters) sympathised with throughout the 19th Century. There was, of course, much debate about the extent of the monarch's authority, but outright rejection of a monarch of some kind rarely appears in the evidence available for the lion's share of the 19th Century. Certainly it is true that the Kings of Greece experienced reigns which were relatively long-lived compared the rest of 19th Century Europe. Evidently a considerable number of Greeks were in fact keen to have a monarchy. According to Parry, Byron, in his relatively short time in Greece, received many offers to be a King in Greece.[445] Let us remember also that there was some appetite, at the earlier stages of the war at least, to have a Baptised Ali Pasha usurp the Sultan's place (as seen in a previous chapter). Another individual would also be invited to take up the throne before Otto I finally arrived: Leopold of Saxe Coburg was offered the throne by the London Protocol. It is a matter of debate whether or not Capodistrias opposed or supported Leopold's offer of the Crown, Dakin, who has informed some of the discussion in this thesis sided with the latter argument.[446]

Given, therefore, that Greece was largely accepted by Greeks throughout the 19th Century to be in need of a King, it did not take long for a new King to be imported when Otto I was deposed in 1862. By the close of 1863, the 17-year-old George I had been crowned. Noteworthy is the fact that George I was crowned not 'King of Greece', but 'King of the

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[445] Parry, 1825. p.179-82
[446] Dakin, 1973. p.102

Hellenes'. The change in style was the doing of the Greek parliament; and I surmise it was a deliberate decision to indicate that George and his heirs would be the rightful rulers of all Greeks, even those who lived beyond the Kingdom's borders. Written into the very fabric of George's Greece therefore was the intention of territorial expansion and 'liberation' of fellow Greeks living in Ottoman territories. I will analyse Greek irredentism in the next section, for now, the important details regarding this argument are, firstly, concerned with the Russian Tsar's and their family.

In 1866, three years after George I was crowned, his younger sister became the wife of the future Tsar Alexander III (who had only recently become heir apparent, following his brother's death in 1865). For much of his reign therefore George I's brother-in-law was either the future Tsar or the sitting Tsar of the Orthodox Empire which has already been shown to have been commonly seen in Greece as a natural ally (and potential saviour). To some extent chance is at play here; but there are some decisions which were made by the new Greek dynasty which can best be described as conscious decisions to appeal to the Roman consciousness of their new subjects.

Chief amongst these is George I's choice of wife in the 16-year-old Grand Duchess Olga Constantinovna of Russia. George first met the duchess when he visited Tsar Alexander II's court en route to Athens after he had been elected as Greece's next king. The fact that the Danish prince first visited St Petersburg before he even arrived in Greece could be taken as a further testament to the high standing the Russian Empire had in George's future Kingdom. Olga was the niece of Alexander II, and therefore was also the cousin of George's future brother-in-law. The decision to marry Olga has largely been painted as a deliberate one based on Olga's religion. Van Der Kiste pointed out that George, being a Lutheran, believed that marrying a Romanov Grand Duchess would signal to his subjects that his heirs would be Orthodox, like their mother.[447]

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[447] Van der Kiste, John. 1999. *Kings of the Hellenes: The Greek Kings 1863–1974*. Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing. p.24

This can be seen to have been an appeasement made to the more hard-line members of the pro-Russian faction in Greece (the people who had formed the philorthodox society during Otto's reign). Jelavich pointed out that:

> *"To many the occupancy of the Greek throne by any but an Orthodox ruler was an absurdity. The church had played a major role in the revolution; Orthodoxy and Greek nationalism were inseparable as conceptions in the minds of most Greeks. The issue of the King's religion and that of his possible successor thus remained a major disturbing factor in Greek life."[448]*

I argue that there may have been an additional dimension to George's choice of spouse. Olga was not just 'any Orthodox Romanov': she was the closest (in lineage) to the Tsar that George could get. There was only one other surviving Romanov female higher up in the imperial pecking order who was not yet married at the time: the princess Maria, who had only just turned 14 when George and Olga married. And was therefore too young.

The choice of an Orthodox wife in order to reassure the Greek's that their future monarchs would be fellow Orthodox Christians can be taken as further evidence of the interplay between faith, politics, statehood (and therefore, of identity) in Greece at that time. That Greece as a kingdom, and the Greeks as a people, should be ruled by an Orthodox king corroborates the argument that there was a real and present Byzantine consciousness at play at the time. The fact that there was also a possible dynastic and political manoeuvre taking place here which tied the Greek Crown as close as physically possible to the ruling dynasty of the Orthodox Empire to the North would, if true, solidify this argument. George and Olga provide some corroboration for this argument themselves, however, in the form of their son, Constantine.

Olga and George married in Russia and left for Greece in November 1867. Their first son was born on August 2. The fact that their king had went to Russia and married an Orthodox Christian who happened to be the Tsar's closest available female relation, and then subsequently arrived from Russia with his new bride would have been electrifying to Greeks who desired expansion and an Orthodox Head of State. So when Olga gave birth to

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[448] Jelavich, 1966. p.89-90

a son in Athens, the occasion was met with a wave of enthusiasm in the city. The Grand Duchess Georgia (daughter of Olga and George) describes the scene in her memoirs (it has to be noted that she was not yet born at this time, and so is likely repeating something she picked up orally from her family or elsewhere within the court. Before the King had time to address the Athenian crowd, Georgia writes,

> *"the whole crowd roared "Constantine!" I suppose there may have been rumours that my parents had already chosen this name; but in any case its enormous popularity was due to the tradition -very old and fully believed- that when a Cosntantine was born again to rule in Greece, the Byzantine Empire would be restored, and all the Hellenes re-united in freedom from the Turkish Yoke."[449]*

Immediately noteworthy here is the evidence of how millenarian traditions were still pushing Greek identity and beliefs. It was likely -but not guaranteed- that this was always going to be the boy's name as it was the name of the child's maternal grandfather, but it still makes for a very interesting choice by the royal couple. It was the name of the last Greek King at Constantinople and was believed to be the name of the King who was promised to reconquer The City and bring to an end the Roman Interregnum.[450] The mass enthusiasm, and pre-emptive chants of the Athenian crowd certainly corroborate the existence and power of a Byzantine identity at that stage of the 19th Century. Constantine, quite by chance, would later cause more excitement regarding this prophecy for at least one legend specifically detailed that The City would be reconquered by a King Constantine and a Queen Sophie: It just so happened that he later married Sophie of Prussia.[451]

Constantine, throughout his life, yields yet further evidence for this argument. A nickname he picked up (it is unclear when this was, but it was certainly in place by the time he was crowned in 1913 during the Balkan wars) was "the son of the eagle".[452] Some sources refer to crowds (and at other times, soldiers) singing a popular Hymn to Constantine or in

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[449] Romanov, Geogria. 1988. *Autobiography of Grand Duchess Georgia of Russia.* In Eilers, Marlene A.., Tantzos, G. Nicholas. *A Romanov Diary: The Autobiography of H.I. & R.H. Grand Duchess George.* United States: Atlantic International Publications. p.2

[450] Aronson, Theo. 1973. *The Grandmama of Europe: The Crowned Descendants of Queen Victoria.* Bobbs-Merril. Indianopolis.. p.201

[451] Aronson. 1973. p.201

[452] Aronson. 1973. p.201

honour of him which was titled "Hymn to the son of the Eagle".[453] It is unclear if the hymn was penned in honour of Constantine I, or if his name took inspiration from a pre-existing hymn. Regardless, the connotations of both the title and the song (which is about 'the son of the eagle' leading the Greeks to war against 'the enemy' and liberating their fellow Greeks from the Sultan with his sword) are undoubtedly Byzantine. The very existence of this hymn within the vernacular discourse of Greece speaks to the existence of an irredentist, and Byzantinist ideal among the Greek masses.

Aronson writes that during the second Balkan War shortly after he was crowned Constantine gifted a photograph of himself to his soldiers which he autographed as 'Constantine' accompanied by the Greek letter 'Beta' which simply meant 'King'. When hand-written (in the thousands) by the King however Aronson points out that this signature looked like 'Constantine IB', meaning Constantine XII to his excited soldiers.[454] Whether this was deliberate or not is impossible to tell, but it is not the only time that Constantine I of the Hellenes is given the title of Constantine XII (thus implying continuity with Constantine Palaiologos XI, the last Emperor). Constantine was routinely referred to as the 12th in his time, as I will show soon. It is unclear the extent to which he himself did this directly, although anecdotal evidence exists that he did style himself thus; the New York Times, upon the death of Constantine I's son, King Paul, showed that in their March 1964 report that such connotations of Byzantine continuity were still circling the Greek monarchy:

> *"23-year-old Crown Prince Constantine, was proclaimed King at the royal palace in Athens. It is not yet known whether he will take the title of Constantine XIII or Constantine II. His grandfather styled himself Constantine XII to symbolize Greece's link with the Byzantine Empire."[455]*

Constantine's styling as the 12th is fairly common from his reign, and even from the years prior to coronation. He was even referred to as XII in his own sister's memoirs.[456] Leon and Castellan both make reference to Constantine taking the title XII when he was crowned in 1913 with Castellan making the case that this was a deliberate decision by the

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[453] Michael Llewellyn Smith. *Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor, 1919-1922*. p. 161
[454] Aronson. 1973. p.201
[455] New York Times. March 7, 1964. p.1. https://www.nytimes.com/1964/03/07/archives/greek-king-dead-son-23-will-reign.html. (Last accessed 21/3/2018).
[456] Romanov, 1988. p.27

King to show himself as Constantine XI's successor.[457][458] A 1913 Balkan war propaganda poster contained celebratory images of King Constantine I with captions reading "The greatest of the Constantines, the Bulgar-slayer, XII" which not only showed him as Constantine XI's successor but also placed him upon a pedestal with Emperor Basil II (the original Bulgar-Eater).[459] Posters were also produced during the second Balkan War which depicted Greek soldiers blinding their Bulgarian enemies and presented actions of the "Bulgar-Eater" a direct reference to Basil II who famously blinded his enemies and won many victories against the Bulgars during his reign as Emperor at Constantinople from 976-1025.[460] The use of such elements of Byzantine history in war time propaganda implies, it should be said, the existence in vernacular dialogue of a 'memory' o these incidents and speaks to the possibility that the modern Greeks' culture inherited a sense of a historical tie from Byzantium.

Perhaps the starkest incidence of this legacy appearing in relation to Constantine I in popular Greek media is in a 1912 war propaganda poster entitled *The Anastasis of The Marbled King* meaning, 'the resurrection of Constantine XI'. It predates Constantine's assumption of the throne and depicts the Crown Prince Constantine (who led the Greek forces in the first Balkan War) leading his men into battle towards Istanbul (the City's skyline is clearly visible in the background) with his sword unsheathed. Beside him, situated in the background but slightly ahead of the Crown Prince, rides Constantine XI in Imperial Byzantine garb, who is looking the Crown Prince in the eye and pointing to The City. The positioning of Constantine XI behind Prince Constantine could be taken as an artistic attempt to show that the prince was either following the spirit of his forebear or had become his forebear incarnate. Either way, the inference is clear, Constantine I's wars in the Balkans in the early 20th Century were being portrayed, and presumably received, to and by the Greek population as a struggle which had been going on since at least the reign of Basil II, Centuries before Constantine XI's Constantinople fell to the Ottoman siege in 1453.

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[457] Leon, George B. 1990. *Greece and the First World War: From Neutrality to Intervention, 1917-1918.* Boulder: Columbia University Press. p.11-15

[458] Georges Castellan. 1992. *History of the Balkans: From Mohammed the Conqueror to Stalin.* Trans. Nicholas Bradley. Boulder: East European Monographs, Columbia University Press. p.401

[459] Panov, Mitko, B. 2019. *The Blinded State: Historiographic Debates about Samuel Cometopoulos and His State (10th-11th Century).* N.P. BRILL. p.304

[460] Moutafov, Emmanuel. 2014. "Za Istorijata v izkustvoto I zhivopisnoto v istoriiata," in *The age of King Samuel as treated by Bulgarian artists.* An exhibition catalogue, ed. Emmanuel Moutafov (Sofia: Institute of art studies) p.14-16

Η ΑΝΑΣΤΑΣΙΣ ΤΟΥ ΜΑΡΜΑΡΩΜΕΝΟΥ ΒΑΣΙΛΗΑ[461]

Figure 17: Depiction of the Marble King with King Constantine

One final note needs to be made here. By the time of these Balkan Wars Byzantium's popularity had been revived in Greek literary circles and so the argument could be made that this Byzantine ideal which manifested itself among the Greeks of the latter 19th Century could be the product of Paparrigopoulos' profound impact in Greek Historiography. [462] However, I would argue against this position by pointing out that, throughout this thesis, a clear presence of a Byzantine consciousness has been presented as being extant in Greek vernacular discourse. Long predating Paparrigopoulos' birth. Clogg argued that this historiographical project in Greek literary circles was part of a scheme to justify the irridentism of the Magali Idea and thus corroborates the argument that the desire to bring about a revived Byzantine State predates the 'renaissance' Byzantine studies had among the Greek historians of the late 19th Century.[463]

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[461] "The resurrection of the Marble King Konstantinios Palaiologos 1453 – The Crown prince Konstantinos 1912" Greek Poster from 1912. Historical and Ethnological Society of Greece, National Historical Museum, Athens, ID 4951-4

[462] Karakasidou, Anastasia N. 2009. *Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood: Passages to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia, 1870-1990*. Ukraine: University of Chicago Press. p.90

[463] Clogg, 2002. p.3

Part III: The Megali Idea

The significance of Constantine I's image in Greek popular culture in the early 19th Century, and the cries of 'Constantine' at his birth in the 1860's are the direct result of the Megali Idea. The Megali Idea (literally meaning, 'the Great Idea') was the belief that all Greek populations and territories should fall within a Greek state. The term was first used in 1844 and the desire for territorial expansion and the 'liberation' of their 'unredeemed' compatriots in Ottoman lands dominated Greek foreign policy for the first 100 years of the country's life. Notions of a large 'Greek' state of some kind predated the 1844 speech by Prime Minister Kolettis in which the concept was given a name. The notion had been rearing its head in Russian foreign policy; Greek intellectual circles; and Greek political thought since the 18th Century, and, indeed, had been the assumed outcome of the foretold 'to Romaiko' which had been prophesised since even before The City had fallen to Mehmed II in 1453. It is in this association, between the notion of a divinely promised Roman restoration and the Greek irredentism of the 19th Century, that this argument is most concerned with. With this perspective in mind I will first here track the presence, influence, and evolution of the Megali Idea from the 18th Century through to the 1821 revolution and beyond into Constantine's wars of the early 20th Century for, at each stage of the development, the presence, and influence, of a Byzantine consciousness makes itself felt.

The 1770 Orlov Revolt may, on the face of it, appear to be irrelevant to the Megali Idea. The Revolt, after all, was the product of Greek notables in Mani (in the Morea) and Sphakia (in Crete) being seduced by Catherine's promise of Russian backing in a revolt against the Sultan. The intention was two-fold. On one hand Catherine intended the revolt to open a second front against the Ottomans (she was at war with them in the North). Secondly, and decidedly more ambitious, was the intention to create some manifestation or other of an independent Greek state under Russian protection in the Balkans (thus giving Russia access to ports on the warm waters of the Aegean). The revolt targeted the Maniotes and Sphakiots for good reason, these were the two regions which had resisted Ottoman control the most. But the intended revolt was to spread throughout Crete and the Morea (which to varying degrees, it did) and, eventually, beyond the Isthmus of Corinth. The revolt lost momentum quickly and was put down almost as suddenly (although some

factions managed to maintain hostilities with the Ottomans for up to 20 years afterwards such as Lambros Katsonis who was finally defeated in 1790).[464] Russian failure to deliver the promised support is largely accepted to be the cause for the revolt's ultimate failure.

Afterwards however Catherine began embarking on her 'Greek Plan' which envisioned the defeat and break up of the Ottoman Empire with Russia, the Hapsburgs and the Venetians receiving the spoils alongside a new state: a new Byzantium based in Constantinople with Catherine's grandson Konstantin upon the throne.[465] Hanink writes that when that child was born (1779), Catherine issued a commemorative medallion for the occasion which featured the Hagia Sophia, showing her intentions for the future child.[466] Somewhat poetically the Constantine that eventually sat on the throne of an independent Greek throne (albeit, not based at Constantinople) was a direct descendant of Catherine's: Constantine I was named after his grandfather (the Grand Duke Constantine) who was Catherine's great grandson and the nephew of her hopeful future Emperor Konstantin.

Throughout the subsequent years repeated attempts to whip up Greek support for an independence campaign ultimately fell upon deaf ears. Rather than a rejection by the Greeks of the concept of a Russian-sponsored revival of their Orthodox Kingdom based at Constantinople it is generally accepted that the failure to rouse the Greeks to action in the aftermath of the Orlov revolt was the result of the previous disastrous revolt, the failure of the Russian's to deliver on their promises, and the brutal crackdown inflicted by Albanian irregulars (Muslims) in the Porte's employ. They had stayed in the Morea for years afterwards, reaping a fortune by raiding the local Greek population to the point that the local Pashas had to take military steps to put an end to the years of plundering. In such a climate the appetite and capability of the Greeks to rise once more alongside the Russians was low. The relevant point here is that the Russian policy and vision was not conjured out of thin air, rather it was based upon extant notions among the Ottoman Greeks. As far as a 'Megali Idea' is concerned, Catherine's Greek plan envisioned quite a different geographical boundary than the one that came to pass sixty years later. The 'Greek Plan' envisioned the new Byzantium's territory to be constituted of Macedonia, Thessaly,

[464] Dakin, 1973. p.26–27.
[465] Frary. 2015. p.24
[466] Hanink, Johanna. *The Classical Debt: Greek Antiquity in an Era of Austerity*. NP: Harvard University Press

Bulgaria, Constantinople, and the straights.[467] None of these would be part of the new Kingdom's boundary in the 1830's. Indeed, only Thessaly and parts of Macedonia were annexed by the Greek state several generations after the War of Independence. This is significant because the envisioned state was to contain swathes of territory in which Bulgars and Slavonic peoples lived (as well as Turks and Vlachs), people who had little-to-no history of Greek rule outwith the Greek Patriarch's authority within the Ottoman Empire. This notion of the Greeks naturally being destined to rule over territories containing other Balkan peoples who did not necessarily identify as Greeks or Romans (beyond the scope of the millet system) is one that crops up time and again in the political ambitions of the Greeks. Perhaps the starkest case is that of Righas' 'Hellenic Democracy' which was examined in light of its' Greek chauvinism in an earlier chapter.

In another previous chapter it was discussed how the Greeks possessed a corpus of oral traditions and folk songs which spoke of the day that The City and the Haghia Sophia would be returned to them: *"Again with years, with time, again they will be ours."*[468]After the War of Independence had concluded these, however, had remained in the hands of the Turks. Indeed, most of the territory in which Greeks were a majority (or which held a special place in their national consciousness) fell outwith the new Kingdom's borders. This, in turn, meant that the desire for 'to Romaiko' evolved into the irredentist Megali Idea. This expansionist ideal, and the various revolts in the 'unliberated' areas of Greece throughout the remainder of the 19th Century were borne of the expectation that their Empire had been mandated by God to be restored to them, his chosen people (as was seen in said previous chapter). The war that was triggered by the events of 1821, in this sense, ended with disappointment and over the course of the next century the new Greek Kingdom became obsessed with recovering unliberated lands: a goal which was clearly the *"restoration of the Byzantine Empire at its apogee."*[469]This is clearly the intention portrayed by Ioannis Kolletis in his 1844 parliamentary speech which introduced the term 'Megali Idea' to popular discourse:

> *"The Kingdom of Greece is not Greece; it is only a part, the smallest and poorest of Greece. A Greek is not only he who lives in the Kingdom but also he who lives in Yanniona, or Thessaloniki, or Serres, or Adrianople, or Constantinople, or Trebizond, or Crete, or Samos, or in whatever country is historically Greek, or*

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[467] Christos Rozakis & Petros N. Stagos. 1987. *The Turkish Straits.* Netherlands: Springer Netherlands, p.21
[468] Young, 1969. p.120
[469] Bölükbasi, Deniz. 2012. *Turkey and Greece: The Aegean Disputes.* United Kingdom: Taylor & Francis. p.22

whoever is of the Greek race… the Heroes of the independence do not belong solely to the kingdom, to the small kingdom of Greece. They belong to all the provinces of the Greek world from the Haimos to the Tainaron from Trebizond to Cilicia… there are two great centres of Hellenism: Athens and Constantinople. Athens is only the capital of the kingdom. Constantinople is the great capital, the City, the joy and hope of all Greeks. "[470]

Interestingly 'Hellenism' here was conflated with the desire to achieve 'to Romaiko', indicating how the neo-Hellenic ideal imported from western Europe and the Roman ideal which had existed for centuries had become blended with one another by 1844.

The ideal was a powerful political force and it dominated the political capital of the Greek Kingdom until the 1920's. During that 100 years the Greek State, it appears, needed little encouragement to attempt to expand its' borders to incorporate unliberated Greeks.

One interesting development however occurred between 1821 and 1844. In 1821 the revolt had aimed at a pan-Balkan rising which would engender a Greek dominated revived Byzantium but under which the Greek's fellow Christians would also reside. The disappointment felt at the lack of a general rising among these fellow Christians was a bitter taste well remembered it seems. Never again would the Greeks expend political or military energy to incorporate peoples or territories which they did not see as belonging to their own specifically Grecophone Orthodox (Byzantine) nation. This is the picture painted by Kollettis above and it is in stark contrast to Catherine's plan for an enlarged Greek State; it is in even starker contrast with Righas' ideal; and it is quite different to the conspiracy of 1821.

However, it could be argued that the end goal had always been the same: the establishment of a revived Byzantine Empire (this is what 'to Romaiko' was promised to be, after all). This was exactly what Kollettis described and it is exactly what his fellows in the Russian party particularly tried to push for.

So how much of a break was this? The Byzantine consciousness was clearly present in 1821 (as has been argued throughout this thesis); and it was clearly present in 1844 as seen

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[470] Parliamentary Speech made by Ioannes Kolletis, January 1844. Reproduced in Smith, Michael Llewellyn. 1998. *Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor, 1919-1922.* United Kingdom: Hurst. p.22

above; and It was most definitely seen in the Balkan wars at the turn of the next Century. The only difference was that the Greeks no longer assumed that their non-Greek Balkan Christians neighbours would want to be a part of their Empire (save for the notable exception of the Albanian clans in Epirus and the odd Hellenised member of the Balkan literati).

The difference, on the face of it, appears to be the adoption of an ethnocentric ideal in place of a more civic ideal based upon ideas of citizenship (or albeit, connected to this notion, an oecumenical ideal based upon shared membership of the Orthodox faith). Yet this only appears to be the case. An element of ethnocentrism and Greek chauvinism had existed within the Byzantine national consciousness during the Tourkokratia as we saw earlier. Said chauvinism was partially based upon the assumption that the Greeks were 'God's chosen people' not only because of their membership o the one true faith but because of their citizenship of the reflection of God's Kingdom on earth (which we also saw earlier) and so this also undermines the notion of ecumenicalism.

Also seen in previous chapters, is how the roman ideal had always been more strongly centred around proximity to the Roman State than it had been to Orthodoxy in and of itself. It is my view, therefore, that the Greeks were not going to waste their time trying to liberate people who had never been, and had never wanted to be, Roman citizens; not whilst there was a City, a few million fellow Greeks, and swathes of Byzantine territory out there to reclaim.

An important point needs to be taken from all of this. The Megali Idea, as indicative of the political will of the Greeks, was no longer concerned in forging multi-ethnic States in the Balkans. However, inside every Roman (meaning Greek speaking Orthodox subject of the Porte) was a Hellene in waiting. In the framework of the Megali Idea the only thing differentiating between a Hellene and a Ottoman Roman was the border; as soon as the border shifted, the population of Hellenes grew. This implies two things. Firstly, that, once again, there is a merger between the Byzantinist and the Hellenist frameworks at play here. Second, that Hellene and Roman were the same thing in all respects but one: the state to which they belonged. And so, although there were ethnic aspects to the identity of both, the two appellations were primarily civic.

Chapter IX: Conclusion

Part I: The new line of inquiry, and its contribution

The study and understanding of Greece and her history, particularly her modern history, is -in my view- of profound importance. Not only in academic circles, but to the wider public as well. She is, after all, perched upon the crossroads of three continents and three religions; situated in a historically volatile region which has been the graveyard of Empires for millennia; positioned -for the last few centuries- upon the battleground of competing 'Great Powers'; and popularly perceived as the cradle of western civilisation. All the while: Greece's uncertain future; Balkan geopolitics; the ongoing after-effects of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire; war; revolutions; nationalism; religious violence and intolerance; memory of -and yearning for- a better past; the culture shock at the loss of hegemony; protracted warfare; and heterogeneity are all issues that periodically dominate the News that the whole world wakes up to: and they just so happen to be themes which this thesis is concerned with in one way or another. If this work has contributed -even in the slightest way- to a better understanding of just one of the above, it will have been worth-while.

It is the quality of this paper's contribution to historiography, however, that needs to hold water. In my view that contribution has been original and well-founded. In the introduction I presented the current scholarly consensus of the Greek War of Independence as 'missing a piece of the tapestry'. The study of the episode has been well carried out: but has focussed much of its' energy on the attitudes -and effects- of the Grecophone westernised literati. The revolution is constantly contextualised as being the result of a process of renaissance, a rediscovery of a Hellenic identity, and the consequence of the spread of Revolutionary Ideals into the Balkans. I have not tried to make a case that any of this is incorrect.

However, I also identified in the introduction that the scholarly examinations thus far into the reasons (pertaining to identity and ideal) why so many of the average illiterate and insulated Greeks who carried out the fighting, the killing, and the dying for the purposes of bringing forth the Hellenic nation has reached a consensus with which my research finds no agreement. Said consensus being that the 'Greeks in Greece's' ideals and identity have been

described as 'religious' alone and not categorizable as pertaining to a national consciousness. The Roman identity which bound these peoples together has, in my view, been too briefly analysed in these investigations.

The research here challenges this consensus. In the opening chapter of this work, I indicated that my research has revealed that:

a) A desire for national independence was sustained and driven throughout the Tourkokratia by the presence and influence of a Roman identity and ideal.

b) That said Roman identity and ideal -what I have referred to as Byzantinism- pre-dated the emergence of neo-Hellenism and that it was this identity which the average Greek (the illiterate and the insulated peoples who made up the backbone of the rebellion) held to at the precise moment they took up arms for the cause of said national independence.

c) That this Byzantinism cannot solely be categorised as a religious sentiment.

d) And that, by extension, the identity which drove thousands to take up arms to achieve 'to Romaiko' can be categorised as a form of national consciousness.

Subsequently, woven throughout the discussion above, I have discussed -and shown evidence for- the existence of a kindred between Albanians and Grecophones within the 'Roman' framework which surpassed all other inter-Orthodox bonds (save, possibly, for the bond between Greeks and Hellenised non-Greeks). Similarly, I have repeatedly shown how the imported neo-Hellenism and the extant Byzantinism were fused together into a synthesis so that, very quickly, the manifestations of one were usually the manifestation of the other. This, I have suggested, was caused by the attitudes and feeling of the illiterate and insulated Greeks either still being present within the literati circles or filtering up to said circles at the moment in time when these people's various aspirations were manifesting.

In my view each of these themes above constitutes -to varying degrees- an original contribution to historiography. With the possible exception of the first two: it is well known in the historiography that the extant Greek identity during the Tourkokratia (at least until the Greek enlightenment and renaissance) was the Roman model. Neither do I think that it is controversial to suggest that this Roman community, via the feeling of being Romans and not Turks, maintained a desire for liberation from the Ottoman Empire. It is also a matter of little controversy that the average Greeks of 1821 were viewing themselves, the wider world, and their future in terms of that Roman framework.

The most original contributions here then are the following: that the Roman supralocal bond was more than a co-religious sentiment (despite it being a framework in which the Orthodox faith was immersed). And that it was a form of national consciousness rooted in feelings of possessing -or inheriting, rather- citizenship of the Byzantine Empire. Connected to this is the argument I have made that said Empire was assumed in vernacular discourse to merely be in a state of hiatus. Then, lastly, the argument has been made here that it was this national consciousness -a particularly Byzantinist national consciousness- that the average revolutionary had in mind when they took up arms against the Porte: that they thought they were bringing about 'to Romaiko', that they would go to sleep in Turkey, and wake up in Rome. The question that remains, then, is whether or not the discussion above has provided a strong enough case to back these arguments up. In my view, for the following reasons, it has.

In the opening chapter of the argument itself I consulted the School of Religious Studies and Cultural Anthropology to show how -at least in the vernacular discourse of 19th Century Greece- the notion of a division between religious and non-religious ideals, identities, and acts did not exist. Ergo I laid a foundation to the argument that it is erroneous to treat the Roman identity and ideal as religious alone. Principally because it is a moot point: every ideal, identity, and act (including Hellenism) at that time and place was permeated in Orthodoxy and ergo 'religious'. As a historian I then evidenced this by showcasing how even liberal political manifestations at the time were saturated with Greek Orthodoxy. The religious and the secular spheres of life in Greece, I therefore argued, were still married in as far as the neo-Hellenic State was concerned.

In this aspect of the discussion two conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, that the 'Roman' bond of the Greeks may not, therefore, have been only a bond of common Orthodoxy. Secondly, that neo-Hellenism's manifestations were also inseparable from 'religion'. So religious were the manifestations of neo-Hellenism in the revolutionary era, in fact, that it was the Hellenic State itself that laid the first foundation stone of the new Byzantium when it defined Hellenes in a carbon copy way to how the Roman State had always defined its' citizens. In this regard there is a strong case to be made that -due to the fusion between the import of neo-Hellenism with the pre-existing thick layer of Byzantinism on the ground in Greece- one cannot differentiate easily between the manifestations of the Byzantinist and the neo-Hellenic ideals and identities.

Moving on from this foundation I then traced the evolutionary path that the appellations of 'Roman' and 'Hellene' followed in the run up to, and in the years after, 1821. Here I highlighted a number of key points. Firstly, that 'Hellene' was not adopted by the fighters of the revolution until after the outbreak of the war itself. This in itself implies that it was not Hellenism (And ergo, presumably, that it was the pre-existing Roman ideal instead) that pushed these people into a state of open conflict with the Ottoman Empire. Open conflict, it should be said, that -if 1770's aftermath and the indiscriminate killings of Greeks elsewhere in the Empire in response to the 1821 revolt was anything to go by- was literally a case of 'liberty or death'.

From here I highlighted how when 'Hellene' was adopted, although it replaced Roman, it originally meant 'hero' before evolving to mean what is best described as a 'liberated Roman'. This is because, on one hand, during the revolutionary war itself 'Roman' picked up a connotation of someone who had not participated in the revolt. This, combined with the connotation of being someone still under the Ottoman Empire's rule implies that the meaning of 'Roman' soon picked up connotations of a 'willing slave'. By extension a 'Hellene' was someone who had not shared this fate. On the other hand, when Hellene was officially defined by the State as being 'a Christian inhabitant' the only thing that distinguished a Hellene from a Roman was the border between the territories of the Provisional Government on one side, and the Sultan's domain on the other. Once that boundary was moved (as it was repeatedly throughout the first hundred years of Greece's life) the ranks of the Hellenes instantly swelled. In essence, the appellations may have changed, but the identity said appellations alluded to, remained largely unchanged.

This all combines to make two points both of which are reiterations and corroborations of points already made. Firstly, that the Hellenic ideal and the Byzantinist model merged at some point during the first year of the war. This in itself, surely, proves that the Roman ideal and identity was a national consciousness at least once it had merged with Hellenism. Secondly, that the average Greek -who the scholarship accepts to have been slow to receive knowledge and understanding of Hellas and western ideals- was not identifying as a neo-Hellene until after the war for national liberation had already started. Again, this heavily implies that the Byzantine model was a national consciousness even prior to the fusion with the neo-Hellenic model.

In the third chapter of this discussion I then examined the internal workings of the Roman identity. Here the heterogeneity of the Romans was highlighted in terms of linguistic, regional, and ethnic diversity. The central question posed here was 'what held these heterogenous groups together?' Commonly religion is the go-to answer in the scholarship. However here I identified several factors which render that explanation to be too simplistic and narrow. Principally this weakness was revealed by a simple line of questioning: why were the only non-Greeks in the Balkans to rise en-masse (it was accepted that there were a number of warriors from all ethnicities) the Hellenised and the Albanians (who were shown to not be easily described as 'Hellenised'). This implied a supralocal identity which was at play alongside the bond of a common faith. The Hellenised were easily explained: they were as close to Greeks as one could be.

The Albanians, however, were shown to be former citizens of the Roman Empire themselves. The position taken here, then, was that the Albanian communities were not waging a war against the Sultan in the name of the Cross alone (if they were these war-like clans would probably have had a larger role in Serbia's revolt). The alternative is that they, and the Greeks, were also operating out of patriotic feelings. Crucially it was also shown here (and throughout this thesis) that frequently the Greeks -Albanian clans especially- were willing to -and often did- fight the Turks for the sake of the liberation of their compatriots in a different region: despite the deep regional divides among them. This all, it is argued, implies the existence of a supralocal bond -explicitly referred to as patriotism in

the letter of Kolokotrones- that was operating in the mindset of the Romans alongside the bond of Orthodoxy.

This supralocal bond, it was argued, was the feeling of shared Roman citizenship; of them all belonging to God's elect nation; and to being the heirs of the 'Patrida' into which 'to Romaiko' would come into its' own. The memory of being members of an Orthodox Empire allows for these various groups to feel a bond with one another despite the deep divides between them. This divide, however, was then investigated in more depth and the argument to issue forth from said investigation was that elements of a Grecocentric chauvinism were present within the Roman identity. This power dynamic which placed the Albanians in a subordinate position to the Greeks, I argued, corroborates the existence of an imperialist identity. A national consciousness pinned to the memory of a multi-ethnic yet Greek dominated Orthodox Empire, is, in my view, the only thing that could have united these peoples -but only these peoples- together in a cause against the Porte under the dual banner of the Cross and the expectation of 'to Romaiko'.

That millenarian expectation, an oral tradition in vernacular Greece since even before The Fall, was then examined. That analysis corroborated, in my view, the argument thus far. Via looking at the Prophecies of Father Cosmas (among other millenarian traditions) it was revealed that, to the Romans, the Byzantine Empire was only ever in a state of hiatus and that it was destined by God himself to return and to once again be the temporal reflection of the Kingdom of Heaven. Let us remember that Makriyannis' memoirs reveal that a number of people in 1821 were viewing the events as being the beginning of 'to Romaiko'. This, in my view, highly supports the argument that the Romans maintained a distinct identity which was not purely based on their Church, but also on their Statehood. This, surely, must be taken as evidence of a national consciousness among the Romans of the Tourkokratia, and of 1821 specifically.

However, instead of that statehood being something which the Greeks were waiting to regain, the next chapter highlighted how being a Roman citizen was a lived reality of the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire. This was because virtually all the offices and apparatus of the Roman State remained largely intact after The Fall. They were simply transferred to the Patriarch. Despite this, and despite the Patriarch being the ethnarch of the Romans of the

Ottoman Empire, the Sultan was still a Muslim, and he was still occupying God's Kingdom of Heaven. To the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire, then, although they -in many ways- maintained their State and possessed a strong sense of continuity with their pre-Fall forebears, the dream of 'to Romaiko' could never be realised until the head of State was an Orthodox Christian and was taking communion in the Haghia Sophia.

This element of Roman feelings of statehood was explored via an investigation of Ali Pasha's -albeit likely disingenuous- offer to 'restore the kingdom of Constantine' by converting to Orthodoxy and waging war against the Sultan with the aim of taking (with Russia's help) The City. This likely contributed to what Makriyannis evidenced as a real feeling among some Greeks that Ali would liberate the Patrida, and bring about 'to Romaiko'. Once again, it must be stressed, this -in my view- is a clear indication of the Roman identity possessing enough hallmarks of a nationalism to constitute a national consciousness.

This discussion transitioned from here into a discussion on the pre-1821 revolts and conspiracies to liberate 'the fatherland'. This served two purposes. Firstly, it highlighted how 1821 was not the first time Greeks had waged a war of independence against the Porte. Merely 1821 was the first widespread revolt and the first to be met with success. Secondly, the argument here highlighted that the 1821 revolt itself could legitimately be seen in a different context to the usual way it is contextualised as the end-result of a neo-Hellenic and socio-economic renaissance. Rather, it was shown that the Greeks -specifically a number of the 1821 revolt's participants or family members- had previously engaged in conflict with the Porte. This recontextualisation brings into question -it is argued here- the role that neo-Hellenism and revolutionary thinking really did have in the wider Greek independence movement.

One of the key discoveries of this chapter, it should be said, was that even after independence the Greek State maintained these strong links of continuity with the Byzantine Empire by adopting (or, rather, maintaining) the use of Byzantine Law in the new State. In this way then, the Greeks have experienced a solid and unbroken line, not only of language and faith, but of 'Nomarchia' (meaning 'rule of Law') since Constantine converted the Roman Empire into a Christian Kingdom.

Setting sights, finally, on the revolt itself, I then examined the various symbols and tropes which manifested in the revolt (the early stages in particularly) and the first years of the new state (prior to the state's 'takeover' by Otto's hyper neo-Hellenic Bavarian Regency). This examination revealed that the revolutionaries were fighting under banners they had made independently of one another which were all heavily Orthodox. However it was also pointed out that these symbols and tropes were also nods to Byzantium. Form the simple use of 'En Touto Nika', crosses with their blank spaces filled in a very Byzantinesque manner, and the depiction of saints on one hand; to the use of red (possibly as an allegory of the imperial purple) blue (possibly as an allegory of the Kingdom of Heaven) and the Phoenix (which was clearly evidenced to symbolise a regenerated Christian State, which can only be Byzantium) on the other. This, it is argued, is one more clear compilation of evidence which suggests that the Greeks were not only acting out of religion, but out of a Byzantine-esque supralocal community which can best be described as a national consciousness.

I then brought the presentation of this research to a close with a brief overview of the way in which millenarian expectations and the desire to fully realise 'to Romaiko' dominated Greek dynastic and foreign policy for the next century or so after independence. This, I argue, highlights the continuity of a Roman identity among the vernacular Greeks before, during and after the war of liberation. Lastly, it was also pointed out here that the rediscovery and celebration of Byzantium in literati circles in the latter half of the 19th Century was the end result of two things: the 'filtering up' of vernacular ideas of national consciousness to the hitherto neo-Hellenic literati on one hand; and an attempt to justify the Megali Idea (which was, for all intents and purposes, a protracted policy of attempting to bring about 'to Romaiko' by restoring The City as the Greek capital and the historical heartlands of the Byzantine Empire). One last time, covered here was the notion that Hellenism and Byzantinism had merged and synthesised in the manifestation of Greek irredentism.

To conclude then, the vernacular Greeks of 1821 -contra to the scholarly consensus as depicted in the opening section of this thesis- possessed for themselves a clearly defined historical identity and -connected to this- a feeling of a political destiny which was centred

around statehood just as much as it was centred around faith. In my view, this is inseparable from 'religion', yet it should not be conflated with it, as per the argument around the religious-secular dichotomy. All that remains, then, is whether or not this identity and ideal constitutes a national consciousness.

Part II: Can Byzantinism be a national consciousness?

There are at least two questions to navigate when discussing whether or not the above evidence allows for the conclusion 'the roman ideal and identity constitute a form of national consciousness' to be drawn. First among these is the ongoing debate between constructivist/modernist and primordialist/essentialist theories of 'nation'. Second, is the discussion around an ethnic-civic dichotomy.

The latter is the easiest to navigate here. Alluded to above in the section covering the religious-secular dichotomy is the notion that binaries tend to be inadequate. In particular regards to the ethnic-civic model this research draws two conclusions. First, it agrees with Baycroft, Hewitson, and the contributors to their volume *What Is A Nation?* in that I agree that *"the dichotomy between civic and ethnic forms of nationalism corresponds, at most, to an ideal type"* and that ultimately it fails to accurately describe, categorise, and frame nationalism.[471] The research here contributes to the scholarly debate. Although great stress has been placed on 'Roman' accounting to a civic identity just as much as it was a religious identity there was adequate evidence displayed of a Greek cultural, linguistic, and racial chauvinism within the Roman and Hellenist models. Thus, effectively, this undermines the stability of the dichotomy. Just as Byzantinism and Hellenism have been shown to traverse the religious-secular dichotomy so too do they traverse the ethnic-civic dichotomy. Thus, this research would join the chorus containing the likes of the editors and contributors of the aforementioned volume in advocating for studies of 'Nation' to move beyond the ethnic-civic tradition.

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[471] Baycroft, Timothy. And Hewitson, Mark. Eds. 2012. *What is a Nation? Europe 1789-1914*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p.7

Regarding the constructivist/modernist versus primordialist/essentialist debate on whether or not a national consciousness can even exist prior to the emergence of modern nation-states, this research sits in an unusual position (making it, in my view, a worthwhile investigation). On one hand the events under investigation here all date from after that watermark moment. On the other hand, however, it has been repeatedly argued (and corroborated in the scholarly consensus) that vernacular Greek discourse had been well insulated from the political sea changes happening in Europe due to the illiteracy and insulated life experiences of the vast majority of Greeks. While on one hand there can be little doubt that the neo-Hellenes certainly fall under the definition of modern nationalists; on the other hand the same cannot be said for their illiterate and insulated compatriots who, it has been argued, still adhered to the same identity and ideals that had been in existence since, at least, the years immediately after 'The Fall' in 1453.

Being a stateless, pre-industrial, and pre-literate population deeply infused with Orthodox Christianity there is little doubt that the supralocal identity of the vernacular 'Greeks in Greece' and their corresponding political aspirations do not sit comfortably within the modernist theories of 'Nation' outlined in the introductory chapter of this thesis. They do, however, fit well within the pre-modernist camp; particularly in concurrence with the theories presented by Anthony Smith. The Byzantinist supralocal identity of the Romans is described rather well when it is presented alongside Smith's description of nation (which was presented in the introduction of this thesis, but is re-presented here with additional comments):

> *"named population* [Romans, God's elect people] *sharing a historic territory* [the former empire, also the Temporal reflection of the Kingdom of Heaven]*, common myths and historical memories* [of said formal empire and it's divinely ordained restoration]*, a mass public culture* [klephtic ballads, common tropes as apparent in flags, and common beliefs centred around Orthodoxy and the Roman nation's destiny, including the immensely popular genre of apocalyptic prophecies and literature that foretold the coming of 'to Romaiko']*, a common economy* [for the vernacular Greeks being largely centred around maritime and pastoral pursuits] *and common legal rights* [Roman law, even under the Tourkokratia] *and duties for its members* [such as 'remain a Roman' like Vlachavas did, and resist the Turkish occupation like the klephts repeatedly claimed they were doing].*"*[472]

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[472] Smith, A.D. 2013. Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era. Germany: Wiley. p. 57

His division between 'nation' and 'ethnie' also fits rather well here in the face of the heterogeneity and diversity of the Greeks alluded to above. He definition of ethnies as:

> *"named units of population with common ancestry myths and historical memories, elements of shared culture, some link with a historic territory and some measure of solidarity, at least among their elites"*[473]

could easily apply to each and every one of the clans, factions, and communities which formed the mosaic that was the Greek nation in 1821.

A possible point of departure, however, between this research's findings and Smith's theories has to be noted. Smith claimed that nations were formed when one particularly dominant ethnie effectively annexed its' neighbours.[474] This appears to be what happened when the Greek mercantile literati class formed its own 'ethnie' (they named their unit of population 'Hellene'; adopted a classical ancestry myth and historical memory; reformed and printed en masse in the Hellenic language, thus creating a shared culture; had a link to the territory of classical Hellas; and saw each other, despite the miles and ethnic barriers between them, as a single bloc of speakers of a common language and heirs of a common heritage and culture). In this context it is easy to view the formation of a Hellenic national consciousness as a process which involved this ethnie annexing and appropriating from the various ethnies of Greeks in the Ottoman Empire. Although, it is noteworthy to point out that the merger of Byzantinism and Hellenism demonstrated to have taken place here could be said to be the result of this annexation and appropriation of the Hellenic ethnie of the various Roman ethnies, this discussion is primarily focussed on whether or not Byzantinism in and of itself can be said to be a national consciousness.

There are two important points to make here in this regard. Firstly, that Byzantinism itself appears to have been a form of national consciousness formed out of the process of one ethnie annexing and appropriating other ethnies. It just so happens that the timeline this

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[473] Smith, 2013. p.57
[474] Smith, 2013 p.39

happened in seems to have been in the medieval era. It could be argued that the obsession with The City coupled with the Greek chauvinism (both of which have been evidenced above) could be indicative of the Byzantine national consciousness being the end result of a Grecophone -specifically, of an elite Constantinopolitan- ethnie, annexing the various ethnies of the Byzantine Greek world. So much so that -even centuries and countless generations later- Greeks who would never cast eyes upon the Haghia Sophia -people who would never wander more than a mile away from their own community- would dream about the day their 'nation' would reclaim her.

Secondly, by the eve of the revolution in 1821, the Byzantine national consciousness held the Romans as one single body centred around the faith and the promise of 'to Romaiko'. However, the form of the restoration that was to issue from the Greek's struggles was very specific. The Romans of the 19th Century, although centralised under the Roman identity and ideal, were undeniably fractured by region and language. The supralocal bond which served as an adhesive to this plethora of peoples consisted of two forms. Allegiance to the two thrones (of the Patriarch and of the ethnarch which, as has been discussed, was probably considered by most vernacular Greeks in 1821 to be a monarch). They were God's chosen people and citizens of God's chosen Kingdom and adherents of the one true faith. Their identity was based upon loyalty to these institutions of the State.

However, instead of being centralised or homogenised, it appears that the Byzantinist framework more easily sat within the notion of a confederacy of ethnies under the two thrones God would rule them by. This can be corroborated not only by the evidence presented in the section on heterogeneity, but also by the repeated references philhellenes made to the need for Greece to be a confederacy post-independence (which are taken here to be indicative of the Philhellene's recognition that a centralised nation state would never be able to hold the various communities of Romans together). Parry, for example, wrote that:

> *"I say, therefore, the Grecian confederation must be one of states, and not of republics. Any attempt of an individual or of any one state to gain supremacy will bring on civil war and destruction… On some plan of this kind a federation of the States of Greece might be formed, and it would be recommended to the*

Greeks by bearing some faint resemblance to the federation of their glorious ancestors; but any attempt to introduce one uniform system of government in every part of the country, however excellent in principle, will only embroil the different classes, generating anarchy, and ending in slavery.''[475]

Parry's warning seems to have been well-founded. Millingen later noted how the civil wars in Greece were waged between Greeks in Greece who wanted such a confederacy as Parry recommended and Greeks (mostly westernised) who tried to form a western-style and centralised nation state.[476]

On one hand, then, we have a view of Byzantinism as being a national consciousness (as per Smith's definition of a nation above). However, on the other, we have what could be construed as a pre-national and medieval identity. It has all the hallmarks of the traditional perception of a medieval identity: regionalist; based upon kingship and subjecthood; and highly centred around the Church. In the case of 19th Century Byzantinism this is irrefutable.

The answer to the question 'is Byzantinism a national consciousness' rests, then, on whether or not the two realities described above are compatible. The fact that they were both realities of the time would indicate that they are. The average Greeks may not have taken up arms in 1821 to bring forth a modern nation state which sought to centralise or homogenise them (beyond the bonds they already shared) but, in my view (and, seemingly, in Smith's) the Roman's supralocal identity based upon the feeling of being a defined and demarcated people (an elect people, no less); the memory of a State and the subsequent attachment to a defined territory; and their desire to restore said state constitute the hallmarks of a national consciousness. It just so happens that said model of consciousness allowed for the existence of clearly defined and varied regional and ethnic identities within it, albeit, within a clearly established hierarchy (with Grecophones at the top, as has been shown here). Said hierarchy, I argue, can be taken to be a tell-tale sign of there existing some form of framework which placed one group (an ethnie, the Grecophone Romans) in a dominant position over another within the same Roman ethnicity (for example, we saw evidence that speaks to the Albanians as being annexed and appropriated into the Roman

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[475] Parry, 1825. p.171
[476] Millingen, 1831. p. 58

ethnie, yet never being able to fully forget their non-Grecophone roots). This, I argue, brings the analysis of the Byzantine national consciousness of the early 19ᵗʰ Century back into comfortable compliance with Smith's definition and framework.

Before reaching a final conclusion on this research's contribution to the ongoing debate, it would be prudent to cover the other primordialist outlined in the introduction: Hastings. Using the same method as above (re-quoting his definition of nation accompanied with comments as to how these chime with the research presented here) I aim to outline how well his framework marries up with the my research and the subsequent arguments put forward in this thesis. He defined 'nation' thus:

> *"A long struggle against an external threat* [the Ottoman occupier] *may also have a significant effect… An ethnicity is a group of people with a shared cultural identity and spoken language* [which could define any of the regional groups of Greeks, Romans, or Vlachs who felt or were referred to as 'Roman']. *It constitutes the major distinguishing element in all pre-national societies, but may survive as a strong subdivision with a loyalty of its own within established nations* [again, such as the way the Albanian's retained a distince Albanian identity within the Roman framework]*… formed from one or more ethnicities* [such as the various ethnic and regional groups of the Greeks of 1821]*, and normally identified by a literature* [stories, particularly of continued Byzantine resistance and of the promised 'to Romaiko'] *of its own, it* [a nation] *possesses or claims the right to political identity and autonomy as a people, together with the control of specific territory,* [the Eastern Roman Empire, especially Constantinople] *comparable to that of biblical Israel* [who, like the Greeks, saw themselves as God's elect nation]*… A nation-state is a state which identifies itself in terms of one specific nation whose people are not seen simply as 'subjects' of the sovereign but as a horizontally bonded society to whom the state in a sense belongs. There is thus an identity of character between state and people* [hence how the Greeks of the Tourkokratia were able to keep the political aspiration of a reborn Byzantium alive even through three and a half centuries] *In some way the state's sovereignty is inherent within the people, expressive of its historic identity… As something which can empower large numbers of ordinary people, nationalism is a movement which seeks to provide* [regenerate] *a state for a given 'nation' or further to advance the supposed interests of its own 'nation-state' regardless of other considerations… nationalism can also be stoked up to fuel the expansionist imperialism of a powerful nation-state, though this is still likely to be done under the guise of an imagined threat or grievance* [such as the Megali Idea]. R*eligion is an integral element of many cultures, most ethnicities and some states* [and Orthodoxy, in the Greek case, is a prime example of this]*… Biblical Christianity both undergirds the cultural and political world out of which the phenomena of nationhood and nationalism as a whole developed and in a number of important cases provided a crucial ingredient for the particular history of both nations and nationalisms."*[477]

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[477] Hastings, 1997. p.2-3

This research has shown that it is quite possible for a national consciousness to exist within a pre-modern and pre-literate society; one which had been thoroughly insulated from the modern world. It has shown that national consciousness may very well have existed for centuries prior to 1821 (since, perhaps the years after 'the Fall' of 1453, or perhaps even prior to that). This research has further shown that a national consciousness existed among a people, mostly rural, who were not subject to nationalisation via education or employment in an urban/ or industrial complex. While not arguing against the theory of nation being a construction, this research poses challenge to the arguments of constructivist/modernist school with one hand; and offers support to the arguments put forward by Smith Hastings, and the wider primordialist/essentialist school with the other. And, finally, the case has been put forward here that the 'Greeks in Greece' held a Byzantine national consciousness.

Hastings' 'six points' were rendered plausible by his evidenced argument that the history of the English nation serves as a prototype. It is a plausibility that, in my view, my research backs up. His findings on the history of English national consciousness essentially engendered his theory and definition of nation as a whole. It is a plausibility that, in my view, my research backs up. It would be a missed opportunity here, though, if I did not offer up a primordialist definition of nation based upon the prototype offered up by the Byzantinist Greeks of the Ottoman Era: specifically regarding the pre-conditions required for the premodern construction of nation.

The element which other theorists always place front and centre (including Smith and Hastings) is the presence of a common language, a common culture, and a vernacular literature. This, according to the pre-literate Byzantine prototype, is not the keystone. In said prototype, however, there is a clear hierarchy of ethnies (according to the dominant ethnie) which is based upon the extent to which an individual or community can 'pass' as a member of the dominant ethnie (in this case, Grecophones, and learned Grecophones especially). The key element is a commonly accepted perception that the diverse groups constitute a community regardless of the lack of shared language, literature, or culture. It should be noted that there is a possibility that some ethnies within said community believe

that other groups are also part of it, regardless of the fact that said groups do not feel the same way (hence the assumption other Ottoman-ruled Christian communities would rise alongside the Greeks). This community is, in reality, a compilation of communities; a 'confederacy which is, as Anderson puts it, an 'imaged community. So what, according to the Byzantine prototype, binds this compilation of communities together as a confederacy?

The first bond that binds these peoples (yet excludes others) is the commonly accepted feeling that the confederate peoples possess a continuity with the past and are, as a collective, heirs to its legacy (an origin myth, which in this case, is the Byzantine Empire). However, as important as an origin story is this: the commonly accepted feeling that the confederate peoples possess, collectively, the same destiny (the restoration of the Byzantine Empire). This is something which has fuelled other nationalisms (one need only look to the promised thousand-year Reich promised by the Nazis which was as important as the image of continuity with the previous Reichs which they broadcast). This feeling of inheritance of a common legacy carries with it a strong association with a territory, a fatherland: so much so that one could speak of having as a fatherland all of 'Rome' while also purporting to be a Maniote, a Souliote, or a Hydriote. Another element which this common feeling of continuity and destiny carries is the feeling of a commonly accepted perception that the confederacy possesses a sovereignty (or, at least, *ought* to possess it). This is a key pre-requisite for the formation of nation and is facilitated by the confederate peoples feeling that they are collective heirs of the past on one hand; and shareholders of a collective future on the other. And so, by virtue that the peoples collectively constitute heirs and shareholders of the same story, they also feel a sense of attachment to a distinguishable territory over which they feel they are, or are destined to be, sovereign.

There are other elements, aside from the perception that a people are placed within the same story arc, which bind together this confederacy. The bonds are usually theorised (especially by constructivists) as being applied 'top-down'. I have shown here that the Byzantine protype implies the bonds are made of grass-roots: they are applied bottom-up. So, what makes lower echelons of different communities feel as if they are bound together in the same story? It is that very thing: stories. In place of a print media or vernacular literature, I surmise that the required precondition for the formation of nation is the presence of a folk culture, a corpus of shared stories (which could be song-form, tale-form,

or the religious story of the Ottoman faith as a whole, including its saints, and its martyrs). In the Byzantine prototype these stories, aside form the official ones of the Church, come form a number of genres such as the millenarian prophecies of 'to Romaiko', the klephtic ballads, and the memories of Ottoman conquest and repression. As a collective corpus these stories were spread throughout the confederate communities, with minor changes in sub-plot, sub-character, and location in each region but always shared the same common theme (which, basically, depicted the side of 'Good' and the side of 'Evil' and served to foster the feeling that 'we are the good guys'). These stories define what groups are part of the nation and what groups are not, and -most importantly- they provide the nation with an antithetical other (in this case, the Turks). They also serve as the medium through which the feeling of attachment to past and future is transmitted. Another important element of this folk culture, aside form the common tropes, themes, and enemies of their culture, is the presence of a universally understood language, but not one which is spoken or written, but one which is spoken via the medium of symbols. In the Byzantine prototype these symbols are, as discussed, the crosses, the symbols of saints, and the phoenix to name but a few. These shared symbols are the unifying language of the polyglot confederacy in the Byzantine prototype and they are directly related to the aforementioned stories (depicting the religion, the past, and the future which demarcated them from others and put them at odds with their antithetical enemy).

So, to recap, I present my own 3 points which constitute the pre-requisites for the pre-modern, pre-literate, pre-industrial, and bottom-up formation of nation:

1) The presence of a corpus of orally transmitted stories (which is inclusive of, but not limited to, 'a one true Faith') and related symbols and tropes, which binds the people together into a defined group of 'good guys' that a) worship the same God (and in the same way), b) who have experienced the same past, c) who will experience the same future, and d) who have faced, and will face again, the same enemy. Where the story changes, so too, does the nation.

2) The stories of one group may preach that another group is 'one of them', but the latter has their own distinct stories. This can result in either the existence of a distinct sub-group within the nation (Albanians, in the Byzantine case) or another nation entirely who will not view the former group as their kin (the Serbs in this case, for example).

3) Although a shared language and literature is not necessarily required to create the confederacy of ethnies that form a nation, a shared culture (vis-à-vis said stories), and shared understanding of a language of symbolism is. However, within said confederacy there can exist a hierarchy, the place one enjoys on which is determined by the extent to which they 'pass' as a member of the dominant ethnie: and this heavily involves a shared language and its' culture and, to a lesser extent, a shared vernacular literature.

Once said nation had gained real temporal sovereignty, it is then possible that the elites and the bureaucrats of said nation-state used the state apparatus as tools to legitimise, perpetuate, homogenise, and proselytise said national consciousness in a top-down constructivist manner as argued by Anderson, Gellner, and Hobsbawm. This does not mean this definition abandons primordialism: rather this is an accusation that the modernists/constructivist school has presented the history of a certain phase (a post-state assumption/creation phase) in the story of nation as the whole history of that phenomenon itself and of thus ignoring the primordial and bottom-up origins of the formation of a confederacy of ethnies into said nation in the first place.

Part III: Proposals

To finally conclude, then, it is my position that I have achieved what I set out to do. I have demonstrated how it is erroneous to treat the Roman identity and Ideal as a purely religious sentiment. I have then gone on to showcase how said Roman identity and ideal constitutes a national consciousness. And I have outlined how said national consciousness was the ideal and identity that the majority of the people who carried out the 'Hellenic Revolution' adhered to. Along the way I have also demonstrated how the Hellenic ideal blended with the Roman one when the time came to, as Toynbee put it, formulate the 'society which was to issue forth from their struggle'. The result being that Hellenes, essentially, became defined within the same parameters that 'Roman' had always stuck to: a Christian inhabitant of the temporal Orthodox State.

I therefore propose an amendment to the current scholarly understanding of the Greek War of Independence. This being a call for future tomes and volumes to abandon the inadequate

religious-secular binary. And to contain -alongside such themes as the bonds of a common faith, the renaissance of the middle classes, and the return of the ancient Hellenes- the vernacular voices of the insulated and illiterate Greeks (whose grim labour actually brought forth the Greek nation) which collectively speaks of a Byzantinist national consciousness. For when, in 1821, the image of the phoenix appeared throughout the Greek world; when the Imperial colours and symbols of the Orthodox faith were hoisted; and when the Greeks cried 'En Touto Nika' beneath the Cross; Byzantium, from its' ashes was reborn and 'to Romaiko' had come.

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