Pew Research Center

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Seven-in-Ten Americans Now See Russia as an Enemy

Attitudes toward NATO increasingly positive

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How we did this

Pew Research Center conducted this study to gauge American opinion of Russia and NATO amid the invasion of Ukraine. For this analysis, we surveyed 3,581 U.S. adults from March 21 to 27, 2022. Everyone who took part in this survey is a member of the Center's American Trends Panel (ATP), an online survey panel that is recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses. This way nearly all U.S. adults have a chance of selection. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the ATP's methodology.

Here are the questions used for the report, along with responses and its methodology.

Seven-in-Ten Americans Now See Russia as an Enemy

Attitudes toward NATO increasingly positive

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has led to a dramatic shift in American public opinion: 70% of Americans now consider Russia an enemy of the United States, up from 41% in January. And on this topic, Democrats and Republicans largely agree, with 72% of Democrats and 69% of Republicans describing Russia as an enemy.

Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Americans much more likely to consider Russia an enemy

% who say that, on balance, Russia is a(n) __ of the U.S.



Note: Those who did not answer not shown.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 21-27, 2022. Q61.
"Seven-in-Ten Americans Now See Russia as an Enemy"

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A new Pew Research Center survey, conducted March 21-27, finds that just 7% of U.S. adults have an overall favorable opinion of Russia. Only 6% express confidence in its leader, President Vladimir Putin. In contrast, 72% have confidence in Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

The ongoing war has brought renewed attention to NATO. Ukraine is not a NATO member, but it borders several member states, and NATO leaders have worked together in recent weeks to coordinate their responses to the crisis. Attitudes toward the alliance have grown more positive since Russia's invasion: 67% express a favorable opinion of the organization, up from 61% in 2021. Meanwhile, 69% say the U.S. benefits a great deal or a fair amount from being a NATO member.

While both Democrats and Republicans (including those who lean to each party) hold largely positive views about NATO and U.S. membership in the organization, Democrats are consistently more positive, especially liberal Democrats. For instance, 85% of liberal Democrats think the U.S. benefits a great deal or a fair amount from NATO membership; among conservative Republicans, only 51% hold this view.

Still, partisan differences over NATO have shrunk somewhat over the past year. The share of Democrats and Democratic leaners with a favorable overall opinion of NATO has held steady at nearly eight-in-ten, but among Republicans and GOP leaners, positive views have increased from 44% in spring 2021 to 55% today.

Democrats more likely to believe the U.S. benefits from NATO membership

% who think the U.S. benefits __ from being a member of NATO



Note: Those who did not answer not shown.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 21-27, 2022. Q62a.
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The partisan gap on Russia favorability has also decreased. In 2020 – the last time this question was asked – there was a 17 percentage point difference between the share of Democrats with a *very* unfavorable opinion of Russia and the share of Republicans with that view; now the gap is only 5 points.

Democrats and Republicans are also now more closely aligned on views about the threat posed by Russia. In the current survey, 66% of Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents say Russia is a major threat to the U.S., similar to the 61% registered among Republicans and Republican-leaning independents. However, when this question was last asked in 2020, only 48% of Republicans considered Russia a major threat, compared with 68% of Democrats.

These are among the key findings of a new survey conducted by Pew Research Center on the Center's nationally representative American Trends Panel among 3,581 adults from March 21 to 27, 2022.

A smaller partisan gap on views of NATO and Russia



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 21-27, 2022. Q5e, f & Q43c.
"Seven-in-Ten Americans Now See Russia as an Enemy"

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Most Americans have a very unfavorable opinion of Russia

Public opinion of Russia is overwhelmingly negative: 92% of Americans say they have an unfavorable view of the country, including 69% who have a *very* unfavorable view. Since the last time this question was asked on Pew Research Center's online panel in 2020, almost two years prior to Russia's recent invasion of Ukraine, this strongly negative sentiment has increased by 28 percentage points.

Before switching to online surveys, Pew Research Center tracked Americans' ratings of Russia in phone surveys between 2007 and 2020. In that time, assessments of Russia were never very positive, but they turned sharply negative in the spring of 2014, immediately following Russia's annexation of Crimea, which few countries have recognized – and never recovered.

While negative sentiment toward Russia has increased substantially among both Democrats and Republicans since 2020, Republicans' views have changed more drastically. Around a third of Republicans and Republican leaners had a very unfavorable view of Russia in 2020, compared with 67% who now hold this view – a 35 percentage point increase. In the same period, the share of Democrats with a very negative view of Russia increased by 23 points. A small partisan gap in views of Russia remains, but Republicans and Democrats are not as divided on Russia as they once were.

Very unfavorable views of Russia have increased sharply since 2020

*% who have an **unfavorable** view of Russia*



Note: Those who did not answer not shown.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 21-27, 2022. Q5f.
"Seven-in-Ten Americans Now See Russia as an Enemy"

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Americans ages 65 and older (83%) are much more likely than adults under 30 (55%) to have a very unfavorable view of Russia.

A large majority of Americans now see Russia as an enemy

Changes in overall views of Russia have come alongside changes in how Americans perceive relations between the two countries. Just two months ago, Americans were more likely to describe Russia as a competitor of the U.S. rather than its enemy (49% vs. 41% at the time). Now, Americans overwhelmingly call Russia an enemy: 70% say so, with just 24% preferring to call Russia a competitor of the U.S. Merely 3% of Americans see Russia as a partner, down from 7% two months ago.

Older and more educated Americans more likely to see Russia as an enemy

% who say that, on balance, Russia is a(n) __ of the U.S.



Note: Those who did not answer not shown.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 21-27, 2022. Q61.
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While broad cross-sections of Americans primarily see Russia as the United States' enemy, those ages 65 and older are especially likely to hold this view, with 83% saying so. And while a majority of the youngest adults polled agree that Russia is an enemy (59%), they are far more likely than older adults to label Russia as a competitor.

More educated Americans are also particularly likely to name Russia an enemy – 77% of those with a postgraduate degree say this, while roughly two-thirds of both those with some college education and those with a high school degree or less education say the same.

While Democrats and Republicans largely agree that Russia is an enemy, there are some differences between partisan and ideological camps. Moderate and liberal Republicans are the least likely to name Russia an enemy (63% say this), while liberal Democrats are the most likely (78%).

Perception of Russia as a major threat at all-time high

With most Americans viewing Russia as an enemy, the share who believe that Russia is a threat to the U.S. is higher now than it has ever been since the Center first began polling on this topic in 2008. Overall, 64% of Americans say that Russia's power and influence is a major threat to their country, 30% say it is a minor threat and only 5% say Russia is not a threat.

Mirroring overall views of Russia, Americans became more wary of the country in 2014, when just over half said it was a major threat to the U.S. At that time and in 2016, Republicans were more likely than Democrats to be concerned. This partisan difference both widened and flipped in following years, however, with Democrats much more likely than Republicans to view Russia as a major threat in each survey between 2017 to 2020. Since then, the share of Republicans who see Russia as a threat has increased, narrowing the partisan gap.

Shrinking partisan gap on views of Russia as a threat

*% who say Russia's power and influence is a **major** threat to the U.S.*



Note: "Russia's power and influence" asked as "tensions with Russia" in 2016; in 2014 and 2009, asked as "growing tensions between Russia and its neighbors." 2022, 2021 and 2020 data from Pew Research Center's online American Trends Panel, other data from telephone surveys.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 21-27, 2022. Q43c.
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Though views of Russia as a major threat have shifted somewhat over time, the share of Americans who say Russia *is not* a threat to U.S. interests has never been higher than 10%.

Majorities of adults in all age groups see Russia as a significant threat, but this view is even more common among adults ages 65 and older (70% vs. 57% among those ages 18 to 29).

Amid Russia-Ukraine war, Americans positive on NATO, though partisan divides persist

As NATO faces increased scrutiny in light of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the political and military alliance is seen in a positive light by most Americans. Two-thirds have a favorable opinion of NATO. This marks a significant increase from the roughly six-in-ten who said the same of the organization in 2020 and 2021.

Prior to 2020, U.S. opinion of NATO was somewhat mixed. Roughly half or more of Americans expressed a favorable view of the organization, with opinion ranging from 49% in 2013 and 2015 to 64% in 2018. However, these figures are from phone surveys and are not directly comparable to more recent online American Trends Panel data.

While Democrats and Republicans are both generally more favorable toward NATO than not, Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents are more likely than Republican counterparts to have a positive view. About eight-in-ten (78%) Democrats see NATO in a positive light, compared with 55% of Republicans. This pattern was observed in 2021, though Republicans have grown somewhat more favorable on NATO since this question was last asked.

There are notable differences within each partisan coalition: Liberal Democrats are somewhat more likely to hold a favorable opinion of the alliance than conservative or moderate Democrats (83% vs. 75%, respectively). Among Republicans, those who describe their political views as moderate or liberal are more positive about NATO than conservatives (61% vs. 53%, respectively).

Americans of all ages tend to have favorable opinions of NATO overall, but those ages 65 and older are more likely to hold a favorable view of NATO than younger adults. Roughly three-quarters (73%) of older Americans have a positive opinion of the organization, compared with 64% of those ages 18 to 29. Eight-in-ten of those with a postgraduate degree express a favorable opinion of NATO – significantly more than the share with a bachelor's degree (73%), some college (64%) or a high school degree or less (59%).

The degree to which U.S. adults pay attention to world affairs impacts NATO favorability. Those who are interested in foreign policy (71%) are more likely to express a positive view than those who are not (56%).

About seven-in-ten Americans (69%) say the U.S. benefits a great deal or a fair amount from being a member of NATO, with 31% saying the U.S. benefits a great deal. In contrast, 29% say the U.S. benefits not too much or doesn't benefit at all. The share who believe the U.S. benefits from NATO membership has held steady since 2021, when 71% held the same view.

Democrats, older adults and those interested in world affairs more favorable toward NATO

% who have a ***favorable*** *opinion of NATO*



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 21-27, 2022. Q5e.
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Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents are more likely than Republicans and Republican leaners to believe the U.S. benefits from belonging to the alliance. Roughly eight-in-ten Democrats (82%) express this opinion, compared with 55% of Republicans who say the same.

Age and education impact the way NATO membership is perceived. Older Americans (those ages 65 and older) are more likely than younger adults to believe the U.S. benefits from being a member of NATO. About three-quarters of those 65 and older (77%) hold this view, compared with 69% of those ages 18 to 29. And 79% of those with a postgraduate degree are positive about NATO membership – significantly more than in any other education group.

Interest in international affairs is also linked to support for NATO membership. U.S. adults who say they are interested in keeping up to date on foreign affairs are more likely than those who are not to believe the U.S. benefits from membership in NATO (72% vs. 64%, respectively). Similarly, those who follow international news very or somewhat closely are more likely to have a favorable view of U.S. NATO membership than those who do not (72% vs. 66%, respectively).

Acknowledgments

This report is a collaborative effort based on the input and analysis of the following individuals.

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Methodology

The American Trends Panel survey methodology

Overview

The American Trends Panel (ATP), created by Pew Research Center, is a nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults. Panelists participate via self-administered web surveys. Panelists who do not have internet access at home are provided with a tablet and wireless internet connection. Interviews are conducted in both English and Spanish. The panel is being managed by Ipsos.

Data in this report is drawn from the panel wave conducted from March 21 to March 27, 2022. A total of 3,581 panelists responded out of 4,120 who were sampled, for a response rate of 87%. The cumulative response rate accounting for nonresponse to the recruitment surveys and attrition is 3%. The break-off rate among panelists who logged on to the survey and completed at least one item is 1%. The margin of sampling error for the full sample of 3,581 respondents is plus or minus 2.3 percentage points.

Panel recruitment

The ATP was created in 2014, with the first cohort of panelists invited to join the panel at the end of a large, national, landline and cellphone random-digit-dial survey that was conducted in both English and Spanish. Two additional recruitments were conducted using the same method in 2015 and 2017, respectively. Across these three surveys, a total of 19,718 adults were invited to join the ATP, of whom 9,942 (50%) agreed to participate.

American Trends Panel recruitment surveys

Recruitment dates	Mode	Invited	Joined	Active panelists remaining
Jan. 23 to March 16, 2014	Landline/ cell RDD	9,809	5,338	1,598
Aug. 27 to Oct. 4, 2015	Landline/ cell RDD	6,004	2,976	938
April 25 to June 4, 2017	Landline/ cell RDD	3,905	1,628	470
Aug. 8 to Oct. 31, 2018	ABS	9,396	8,778	4,425
Aug. 19 to Nov. 30, 2019	ABS	5,900	4,720	1,625
June 1 to July 19, 2020; Feb. 10 to March 31, 2021	ABS	3,197	2,812	1,694
May 29 to July 7, 2021 Sept. 16 to Nov. 1, 2021	ABS	1,329	1,162	935
	Total	**39,540**	**27,414**	**11,685**

Note: Approximately once per year, panelists who have not participated in multiple consecutive waves or who did not complete an annual profiling survey are removed from the panel. Panelists also become inactive if they ask to be removed from the panel.

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In August 2018, the ATP switched from telephone to address-based recruitment. Invitations were sent to a stratified, random sample of households selected from the U.S. Postal Service's Delivery Sequence File. Sampled households receive mailings asking a randomly selected adult to complete a survey online. A question at the end of the survey asks if the respondent is willing to join the ATP. Starting in 2020, another stage was added to the recruitment. Households that do not respond to the online survey are sent a paper version of the questionnaire, $5 and a postage-paid return envelope. A subset of the adults returning the paper version of the survey are invited to join the ATP. This subset of adults receive a follow-up mailing with a $10 pre-incentive and invitation to join the ATP.

Across the four address-based recruitments, a total of 19,822 adults were invited to join the ATP, of whom 17,472 agreed to join the panel and completed an initial profile survey. In each household, the adult with the next birthday was asked to go online to complete a survey, at the end of which they were invited to join the panel. Of the 27,414 individuals who have ever joined the ATP, 11,685 remained active panelists and continued to receive survey invitations at the time this survey was conducted.

The U.S. Postal Service's Delivery Sequence File has been estimated to cover as much as 98% of the population, although some studies suggest that the coverage could be in the low 90% range.[1] The American Trends Panel never uses breakout routers or chains that direct respondents to additional surveys.

Sample design

This study featured a stratified random sample from the ATP. The overall target population for this survey was non-institutionalized persons ages 18 and older, living in the U.S., including Alaska and Hawaii.

Questionnaire development and testing

The questionnaire was developed by Pew Research Center in consultation with Ipsos. The web program was rigorously tested on both PC and mobile devices by the Ipsos project management team and Center researchers. The Ipsos project management team also populated test data that was analyzed in SPSS to ensure the logic and randomizations were working as intended before launching the survey.

[1] AAPOR Task Force on Address-based Sampling. 2016. "AAPOR Report: Address-based Sampling."

Incentives

All respondents were offered a post-paid incentive for their participation. Respondents could choose to receive the post-paid incentive in the form of a check or a gift code to Amazon.com or could choose to decline the incentive. Incentive amounts ranged from $5 to $20 depending on whether the respondent belongs to a part of the population that is harder or easier to reach. Differential incentive amounts were designed to increase panel survey participation among groups that traditionally have low survey response propensities.

Data collection protocol

The data collection field period for this survey was March 21 to March 27, 2022. Postcard notifications were mailed to all ATP panelists with a known residential address on March 21, 2022.

Invitations were sent out in two separate launches: Soft Launch and Full Launch. Sixty panelists were included in the soft launch, which began with an initial invitation sent on March 21, 2022. The ATP panelists chosen for the initial soft launch were known responders who had completed previous ATP surveys within one day of receiving their invitation. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking panelists were included in the full launch and were sent an invitation on March 22, 2022.

All panelists with an email address received an email invitation and up to two email reminders if they did not respond to the survey. All ATP panelists that consented to SMS messages received an SMS invitation and up to two SMS reminders.

Invitation and reminder dates

	Soft Launch	Full Launch
Initial invitation	March 21, 2022	March 22, 2022
First reminder	March 24, 2022	March 24, 2022
Final reminder	March 26, 2022	March 26, 2022

Data quality checks

To ensure high-quality data, the Center's researchers performed data quality checks to identify any respondents showing clear patterns of satisficing. This includes checking for very high rates of leaving questions blank, as well as always selecting the first or last answer presented. As a result of this checking, four ATP respondents were removed from the survey dataset prior to weighting and analysis.

Weighting

Weighting dimensions

Variable	Benchmark source
Age x Gender Education x Gender Education x Age Race/Ethnicity x Education Born inside vs. outside the U.S. among Hispanics and Asian Americans Years lived in the U.S.	2019 American Community Survey (ACS)
Census region x Metro/Non-metro	2020 CPS March Supplement
Volunteerism	2019 CPS Volunteering & Civic Life Supplement
Voter registration	2018 CPS Voting and Registration Supplement
Party affiliation Frequency of internet use Religious affiliation	2021 National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS)

Note: Estimates from the ACS are based on non-institutionalized adults. Voter registration is calculated using procedures from Hur, Achen (2013) and rescaled to include the total U.S. adult population.

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The ATP data is weighted in a multistep process that accounts for multiple stages of sampling and nonresponse that occur at different points in the survey process. First, each panelist begins with a base weight that reflects their probability of selection for their initial recruitment survey. The base weights for panelists recruited in different years are scaled to be proportionate to the effective sample size for all active panelists in their cohort and then calibrated to align with the population benchmarks in the accompanying table to correct for nonresponse to recruitment surveys and panel attrition. If only a subsample of panelists was invited to participate in the wave, this weight is adjusted to account for any differential probabilities of selection.

Among the panelists who completed the survey, this weight is then calibrated again to align with the population benchmarks identified in the accompanying table and trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the loss in precision stemming from variance in the weights. Sampling errors and tests of statistical significance take into account the effect of weighting.

Some of the population benchmarks used for weighting come from surveys conducted prior to the coronavirus outbreak that began in February 2020. However, the weighting variables for panelists recruited in 2021 were measured at the time they were recruited to the panel. Likewise, the profile variables for existing panelists were updated from panel surveys conducted in July or August 2021.

This does not pose a problem for most of the variables used in the weighting, which are quite stable at both the population and individual levels. However, volunteerism may have changed over the intervening period in ways that made their 2021 measurements incompatible with the available (pre-pandemic) benchmarks. To address this, volunteerism is weighted using the profile variables that were measured in 2020. For all other weighting dimensions, the more recent panelist measurements from 2021 are used.

For panelists recruited in 2021, plausible values were imputed using the 2020 volunteerism values from existing panelists with similar characteristics. This ensures that any patterns of change that were observed in the existing panelists were also reflected in the new recruits when the weighting was performed.

The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the survey.

Group	Unweighted sample size	Plus or minus ...
Total sample	3,581	2.3 percentage points
Half sample	At least 1,764	3.2 percentage points
Rep/Lean Rep	1,600	3.3 percentage points
Half sample	At least 790	4.6 percentage points
Dem/Lean Dem	1,881	3.1 percentage points
Half sample	At least 927	4.4 percentage points

Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

Dispositions and response rates

Final dispositions	AAPOR code	Total
Completed interview	1.1	3,581
Logged onto survey; broke-off	2.12	44
Logged onto survey; did not complete any items	2.1121	27
Never logged on (implicit refusal)	2.11	463
Survey completed after close of the field period	2.27	1
Completed interview but was removed for data quality		4
Screened out		0
Total panelists in the survey		**4,120**
Completed interviews	I	3,581
Partial interviews	P	0
Refusals	R	538
Non-contact	NC	1
Other	O	0
Unknown household	UH	0
Unknown other	UO	0
Not eligible	NE	0
Total		**4,120**
AAPOR RR1 = I / (I+P+R+NC+O+UH+UO)		87%

Cumulative response rate	Total
Weighted response rate to recruitment surveys	12%
% of recruitment survey respondents who agreed to join the panel, among those invited	69%
% of those agreeing to join who were active panelists at start of Wave 105	43%
Response rate to Wave 105 survey	87%
Cumulative response rate	**3%**

Topline questionnaire

Pew Research Center
Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey
April 6, 2022 Release

Methodological notes:

- Survey results are based on national samples. For further details on sample designs, see Methodology section and our international survey methods database.

- Due to rounding, percentages may not total 100%. The topline "total" columns show 100%, because they are based on unrounded numbers.

- Since 2007, Pew Research Center has used an automated process to generate toplines for its Global Attitudes surveys. As a result, numbers may differ slightly from those published prior to 2007.

- The U.S. survey was conducted on Pew Research Center's American Trends Panel. Many questions have been asked in previous surveys on the phone. Phone trends for comparison are provided in separate tables throughout the topline. The extent of the mode differences varies across questions; while there are negligible differences on some questions, others have more pronounced differences. Caution should be taken when evaluating online and phone estimates.

- Not all questions included in the Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey are presented in this topline. Omitted questions have either been previously released or will be released in future reports.

		Q5e. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of...? e. NATO, that is, North Atlantic Treaty Organization					
		Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Spring, 2022	14	53	22	9	3	100
	Spring, 2021	12	49	26	10	4	100
	March, 2020	10	50	26	9	4	100

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		Q5e. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of...? e. NATO, that is, North Atlantic Treaty Organization					
		Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Summer, 2020	15	42	16	9	17	100
	Spring, 2020	15	40	17	8	20	100
	Spring, 2019	15	37	18	8	22	100
	Fall, 2018	30	34	14	9	14	100
	Spring, 2017	20	42	15	8	15	100
	Spring, 2016	12	41	18	7	21	100
	Spring, 2015	9	40	20	11	20	100
	Spring, 2013	9	40	17	10	24	100
	Spring, 2012	12	39	15	7	26	100
	Spring, 2011	14	40	17	7	22	100
	Spring, 2010	13	41	15	6	25	100
	Fall, 2009	11	42	14	10	23	100

		Q5f. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of...? f. Russia					
		Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Spring, 2022	1	6	23	69	1	100
	March, 2020	1	14	42	41	2	100

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		Q5f. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of...? f. Russia					
		Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Summer, 2020	2	17	34	37	11	100
	Spring, 2020	3	19	34	34	10	100
	Spring, 2019	2	16	31	36	14	100
	Spring, 2018	3	18	33	31	15	100
	Spring, 2017	3	26	35	28	9	100
	Spring, 2015	3	19	40	27	12	100
	Spring, 2014	3	16	34	38	9	100
	Spring, 2013	4	33	29	14	20	100
	Spring, 2012	5	32	27	13	24	100
	Spring, 2011	8	41	22	10	19	100
	Spring, 2010	7	42	24	8	19	100
	Spring, 2009	7	36	27	12	18	100
	Spring, 2007	4	40	24	11	21	100

		Q43c. I'd like your opinion about some possible international concerns for (survey country). Do you think that each of the following is a major threat, a minor threat, or not a threat to (survey country)? c. Russia's power and influence				
		Major threat	Minor threat	Not a threat	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Spring, 2022	64	30	5	1	100
	March, 2020	58	37	5	1	100

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		Q43c. I'd like your opinion about some possible international concerns for (survey country). Do you think that each of the following is a major threat, a minor threat, or not a threat to (survey country)? c. Russia's power and influence				
		Major threat	Minor threat	Not a threat	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Spring, 2020	56	35	7	2	100
	Spring, 2018	50	36	9	4	100
	Spring, 2017	47	41	9	3	100

		Q61. On balance, do you think of Russia as a partner of the U.S., a competitor of the U.S. or an enemy of the U.S.?				
		Partner	Competitor	Enemy	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Spring, 2022	3	24	70	3	100
	January, 2022	7	49	41	3	100

		Q62a. How much, if at all, do you think the U.S. benefits from being a member of each of the following organizations? a. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO					
		A great deal	A fair amount	Not too much	Not at all	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Spring, 2022	31	38	21	8	2	100
	Spring, 2021	30	41	20	7	2	100