SOVEREIGNTY DISCOURSE: SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT

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ABSTRACT

This article aims to explain the paradox of sovereignty in the South China Sea conflict which has the potential to create an open war. In this day and age, the tensions between the sovereignty states do not lead to a war. Thus, it becomes interesting to reveal the mystery of the absence of war in the South China Sea. This phenomenon will be analyzed using Michel Foucault's genealogy, to show the paradox of sovereignty as the grand narrative and Pierre Bourdieu's symbolic power to show the power of local culture as a minor narrative in the battle arena. It will also use Derrida's deconstruction to dismantle the logic of sovereignty. The study found that the absence of war in the South China Sea has been a result of the symbolic power of Confucianism that greatly influences the Chinese foreign policy. It is widely known as a peaceful development.

Keywords: Sovereignty, Confucianism, South China Sea

1. Background

This article seeks to reveal the *logocentrism* that becomes a grand narrative of modernism in the South China Sea (SCS). It has been the primary cause of the conflict so it is important to find the origin of the regime. Grand narrative focuses on constructing the dominant discourse of modern culture that shapes the state behavior to act in the conflict and tension constellation. This article will also explore the minor narative that cause the absence of an open war in the SCS. Grand narrative is a cognitive structure that is historically considered as an absolute truth. Foucault calls it, *regime of truth*. The regime is like *software* in the state body -it is given so it can manifest the mystical state into reality. It appears in the form of discourse or text. It is accepted by modern culture as a legitimate principle to regulate the state behavior to act peacefully. Discourse in each society produces knowledge, power, and truth that are reinforced (and redefined).

The state's conflict behavior in the SCS is closely related to the modern concept constructed by the treaty of Westphalia. This treaty constructs various texts of truth as a condition for the establishment of a sovereign state. It implies to the similarities of states' behavior in the SCS, that is, to maintain their existences in region. The states' behaviors are driven by the dominant power which appears in the form of sovereignty text. This bodiless text attempts to live in the state body and succeeds in the treaty of Westphalia, 1648. Bourdieu calls it, *the power of discourse*. It motivates claimant states in the SCS to behave aggressively which potentially leads to an open war. According to John Mueller, a war is *an armed conflict between governments in cases of interstate war or between government and at least organized civilian armed groups* (Mueller 2009). In line with Muller's thinking, the US Marine Corps' Warfighting defines war as *a clash of interests or between organized groups characterized by military power, these groups are traditionally a nation state*. (U.S. Marine Corps, 2007, p. 3). From both definitions, we can identify that an open war as a significant event of politics which is declared in an organized manner because of conflicts of interest between countries by utilizing fully armed military violence on a large scale to achieve the political interests of countries. Based on this understanding, the phenomenon in the SCS can lead countries into conflict and open war. The increasing of China's military reach, the presence of security alliances such the Philippines and the United States security alliance and Malaysia and The Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) alliance, and Vietnam's experience in war- all show that countries in the SCS are ready for an open war.

Besides, the claimant states' conflict behavior which is based on political and socio-cultural characters built by the fragmentation of different national identities have the potential to be a cause of war. Territorial sea sovereignty is reflected in the imagination of the coastal and maritime boundaries set by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982. This imagination has an impact on the claimant states' behaviour in the SCS. China claims the Spratly and Paracel islands and the surrounding waters, while Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia also claim similar waters as part of their maritime territories. These overlapping claims have a significant impact on conflict (Buszynksi 2010, 84-104).

However, to this day, there is no an open war in the SCS. This phenomenon is an anomaly because the paradox of sovereignty and the meaning of sovereignty should lead to an open war. This anomaly indicates the availability of *text* or *text reproduction* to balance the dominant discourse in the SCS. Therefore, it is important to reveal the paradox of sovereignty text and reproduction of other knowledge that force states' behavior in the SCS with a high tendency of conflict to create negative peace.

2. Grand narrative

According to Foucault, there is no single historical reality but many variants of historical links related to knowledge and power. Genealogy shows a variety of historical links that still survive and have been cut off in influencing the behavior of subjects, objects, actions, and realms of the knowledge (Foucault 2017, 146-147). Genealogy theory is an anti-essentialist. It emphasizes that knowledge occurs at a certain place and time and is dominated by a perspective. Science always has conditions as a consequence of maintaining its existence in the battle arena. Foucault said *there is no single truth* but the perspectives and the *regime of truth* instead. Regime of truth reveals itself when both knowledge and power survive. This term refers to the discourse which is accepted as a *general politic of truth* in accordance with the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements and influence one's behaviour (Foucault 2012, 66-67).

The regime of truth does not seek for truth. It shows the battle of truths in the arena and and conquers them. The winning discourse will influence the actors' behavior. There is a battle within the regime of truth itself and there is also a hierachy so that power will influence the knowledge claims (Foucault 2012, 69). Through this framework, the exploration of grand narrative will be divided into three sections. First, it will reveal the state concept which becomes the idol text of its society. Second, it will deconstruct the sovereignty text to show the regime of truth. Finally, it will show the implication of sovereignty text in the SCS.

A. Statolatry

Before we continue the paradox of the sovereignty text, we will dismantle a text contained in the state centrism. The text is inseparable from the meaning of *unity* which shapes the excessive love of the state of its people. The logic of unity in an excessive sense

builds a national identity behavior that creates antagonism between *we* and *others*. The phrase *we* forms communal micro-fascists of nation-states to oppose *them* (the other countries). Trough the fragmentation of nationality, *intimate relations* is established between the state and its people. Gramsci called it *statolatry*.

Etymologically, statolatry is a combination of two concepts namely *state* and *idolatry* (Gramsci 1971, 268). Historically, this term was first introduced by Giovanni Gentile in doctrine of fascism in 1931. Gentile described the characteristics of fascism in Italy. But in a deeper understanding, Gramsci called it an effect of hegemonic power. Hegemony is the expansion of the reach of state power in sectors that have not yet been reached. Based on the logic of the state, the conventional reach of the state is the doctrine of unity as an instrument of citizens' compliance with the state. If so, then hegemony extends its reach to non-political things, namely culture. The target of hegemony is not repression through weapons of arms and military apparatus, but on cultural, intellectual and moral control (Polimpung 2014, 84-84).

Through hegemony, the state receives the people's approval regarding its existence. The bond between the state and its people becomes more intimate; the state leader will be *able to present itself as an integral 'state,' possessing all intellectual and moral forces is needed to organize a complete and perfect society* (Gramsci 1971, 271). This explains the state in an effort to expand the range of *fine slavery* to its people. However, the people take it for granted, as if the state is something essential. This hegemony creates an intimate relationship between the state and the people. The state becomes a people's idol, even if the state commits violence or injustice; it remains a *god* for its people. The disease of comfort experienced by citizens is the implementation of cultural, intellectual, even moral hegemony. This voluntary servitude that later becomes the basis of cultural and moral legitimacy, in an unconscious situation given by the people.

In statolatry, the state becomes something normal, so it is impossible to live outside the country. This confirms that there is no normal life outside the state. Civil society will feel comfortable living in a state without discovering the other side of the state. Finally, this voluntary servitude makes the state something ahistorical, meaning something natural or given. Various types of faces are used by the state to realize statolatry, for example nationalism and citizenship. Through nationalism, the state builds knowledge to its people to love their country and put the interests of the country above personal or group interests. In

4

addition, citizenship identifies its people to be involved in political affairs (Polimpung 2014, 723).

Historically the state was a representation of the king, while the king was a representation of *god*. This statement is in line with Carl Schmitt's claim which was reinforced by Thomas Hobbes and Rene Descartes. Schmitt states that *all significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts*. Thomas Hobbes called his Leviathan as *a mortal god* (to which we owe, under the immortal God, our peace and defense). Rene Descartes called for *It is God who established these laws in nature just as a king establishes laws in his kingdom* *(Hobbes 1651, 106)*. Schmitt, Hobbes and Descartes' view can be confirmed back on the thoughts of *fortuna*, Nicollo Machiavelli and *legibus solutus*, Jean Bodin. Both also have strong arguments to prove that the concept of state is rooted in the secular theological concepts. Thus the state in various forms of theology; *mortal god*, *fortuna* and *legibus solutus* is a historical imagination enshrined in civil society as if it were ahistorical (Polimpung 2014, 90). This framework revives discussions about nationalism and citizenship as instruments to achieve statolatry imagination. Benedict Anderson calls nationalism as a community imagination limited by the concept of state sovereignity.

This article is in line with the thoughts of Schmitt and Polimpung who will reveal the paradox of sovereignty in the body of state that affects the countries to behave in conflict in SCS. What kind of *fortuna* lives in the body of state that becomes the regime of truth? The immanence of the state power and the knowledge of mortal god is the focus of the revelation of the hidden mystery in the body of state. This is in line with the classic story of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil in the garden of Eden that inhabits the bodies of Eve and Adam which gave birth to a discourse of good and evil deeds or even a sin. It is also in line with Polimpung's efforts to explore an immanent precondition for the emergence of political theology called sovereignty by referring to the story of Jesus who needed Mary's womb and a sheep shed for his birth. We imagine that the tree of knowledge in the form of sovereignty that inhabits the womb of the country produces conflict behavior in the South China Sea. Doxa or individual thought schemes that become the universal truths will reveal this complex problem. This is the origin of a micro-fascist state. Doxa - which was built by Leviathan Hobesian - has a significant impact on interstate relations in SCS. Doxa created totalitarianism by state leaders by presenting a mortal god in the womb of the state and

practicing the truth of wolves in SCS. Therefore, deconstruction is needed to dismantle the cruelty of the sovereign text of the state.

B. Deconstruction of Sovereignity

The mystery of sovereignty spirit in the state body as the dominant text that forges the states to behave in conflict in SCS will be shown paradoxically. Sovereignty is the regime of truth of modern society produced into a universal knowledge of the nation state. Of course, all countries in the world have sovereignty and sovereignty is an absolute requirement for the state behaviour in relations with other countries. The sovereignity regime can survive as the dominant knowledge in every country. Foucault says *power is specialized through sciences*. He calls it, *the rule of immanence*. Thus, power is decentralized and pluralized (Burchill, Scott; Linklater, Andrew; Devetak, Richard; Donnelly, Jack; Paterson, Matthew; Reus-Smit, Christian; True, Jacqui; 2005, 248).

The sovereignty text has a strong relationship in the cognitive structure of civil society and political society. It is rooted in the knowledge that idolizes the state. The imposition of sovereign state knowledge in paternalistic identity is universal. Laclau called it discursive hegemony. In SCS conflicts, sovereignty is the root cause. It becomes the dominant knowledge and the local knowledge was buried. China and the countries around SCS, through sea sovereignty, are in conflict, in order to defend their national interests.

Discussing sovereignty is inseparable from the medieval thinker, Thomas Hobbes. According to him, the nature of man - which he analogous with a wolf / *lupus* – will always seek security so that in the condition of *homo homini lupus* (a man is a wolf to a man), man will always be haunted by fear and threats from other man. This condition is claimed by Hobbes as a natural condition and the prevailing doctrine is *bellum omnium contra omnes* (all war against war) (Foucault 2003, 112). In Leviathan, Hobbes writes: *during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man* (Hobbes, Leviathan, 77). In this condition, the lupuses urge the birth of a Leviathan to dispel fear and give them a sense of security. Unfortunately, many Leviathans eat the lupuses who have served them so that Leviathan is from lupus, by lupus, and for lupus is no longer ideal.

From another angle, Foucault observed that in the condition of homo homini lupus, a lupus sees that security is a shared commodity. He calls it - *micro-powers* - which

6

emphasizes how power produces a subject through discourse and then controls it. Lupus created insecurities that forced Leviathan to rule over him/her with a guarantee of security. This encourages the subject to give everything he/she has to Leviathan to protect him from other wolves. Finally, the individualistic nature of man creates Leviathan's sovereign concepts such as nationalism and citizenship. The surrender of security to Leviathan provides the opportunity for sovereignty to stay within the state body by reproducing insecurity. The discourse of nationalism and citizenship become dominant in maintaining the existence of Leviathan's sovereignty by controlling the subject to keep thinking in need of Leviathan.

To trace the mystery of Westphalia sovereignity as a power of discourse, the discursive hegemony of Leviathan sovereignty which arises from the antagonism of lupuses must be seen as a general discourse. Westphalia is a set of principles, rules, and norms that produce various kinds of knowledge; one of them is the sovereignty regime. Regime is defined as *sets of implicit explicit principles, norms, rules, and decisions making procedures around which actors expect converge in a given area* (Kresner 1983, 2). Thus Westphalia regimesovereignty is a process of historical knowledge created by the actors of Westphalia treaty, not naturally given. The Westphalia regime is an attempt to end the 30-year war in Europe. This war consists of four phases. First, the Bohemia phase (1618-1625), a civil war between the Catholic League led by King Ferdinand against the evangelical Union led by Prince Frederick of Palatine. Second, the Danish phase (1625-1629) which involved King Christian IV of Denmark by defending the Protestants. However, the victory remained on the Catholic League's side. Third, the Swedish Phase (1629-1635) was a Protestant victory. King Gustavus Adolphus succeeded in forcing Denmark, Poland, Finland and other small countries and even France to support the Protestants. The fourth phase (1635-1648) marked the internationalization of the Thirty Years' War by joining the French, Dutch, Scottish and German mercenaries to strengthen the Protestants. No one wins the war in this final phase. The stalemate situation left the kings / queens with no choice but to think of a peace agreement to stop the war. This war ended with the Treaty of Westphalia (Polimpung 2014, 114-115).

If Westphalia is seen from Foucault's perspective, it is necessary to trace the power relation of King of France, King of Sweden, King of Rome and others to construct a discourse which still survives in the post-Westphalia era. The deconstruction reading shows that the sovereignty text is the most effective instrument to maintain the mortal god principle.

The kings still desire to maintain their divine existences by legitimizing the principles, norms, rules, and procedures of decisions in a historic agreement. In other words, sovereignty or Hobbesian Leviathan is not something that is given but rather a power effort in the form of discourse aimed at maintaining the existence of the Kings in the contemporary era. Through this discourse of power (sovereignty), the state and its leaders (such as kings and kingdoms) exist in global politics. The birth of modern sovereignty through relations of Westphalia power chose the country as its womb, and the international arena as its birthplace. Significant implications for the birth of this sovereignty can be confirmed in World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. Countries with a desire for sovereignty and power produce wolf's behavior to other countries. An anomaly occurred in which the Westphalia agreement was supposed to create peace but instead resulted in the behavior of wolves.

Therefore, Polimpung in his book entitled *the origins of sovereignty* said "*If the discourse of sovereignty is born because of the relations of the power of Westphalia, then it can be destroyed by other discourse powers*. In other words, a *thing* can be born, a *thing* can also die. Bourdieu said that the battle of discourse continues in the arenas of power such as the cultural, social, political, and economic. The deconstruction of Westphalia's sovereignty reveals the evil side of sovereignty so that the country will continue to have nightmares about security. Leviathan instruments such as military reinforcement, defense equipment, and sophisticated weapons became the choice to defend themselves from the wolves. In the next section, this article will show the implications of the birth of sovereignty in the battle arena of South China Sea.

C. Sovereignity implications in the South China Sea

Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines and Vietnam are faced with tensions related to the problem of claims of territory in the South China Sea (SCS), especially around the Spratly Islands. The South China Sea conflict is caused by overlapping claims between Southeast Asian countries and China. China claims Spratly, the Paracel islands and surrounding waters and has tried to prevent other claimants, while Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia also claim the waters of the South China Sea as part of their territory. These mutual claims result in prolonged conflicts and may pose security issues of territorial sovereignty based on the national interest related to its strategic border. (Buszynksi 2010, 85-104)

8

Political interests or power, as assumed by realism, became evident in the South China Sea conflict. Every country tries to self-help and survive by maintaining territorial sovereignty. The political interests of each Southeast Asian country involved in defending claims makes the conflict prolonged. The South China Sea dispute has a greater potential for conflict in the future. War may be unavoidable from the dispute because diplomacy is considered a failure to bring peace. Settlement efforts through negotiations began to weaken; negotiations within the framework of ASEAN regional organizations do not produce solutions or progress in diplomatic forums. For example, at the 2012 Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, ASEAN did not succeed in uniting views on negotiations with China regarding the governance of behavior in the disputed region of the South China Sea. This condition caused tensions between the countries in dispute.

Indeed, peace efforts to avoid open war have been carried out several times by ASEAN within the framework of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In July 1994, China was committed to resolving the Spratly island dispute with Vietnam on the basis of peace negotiations or diplomacy. In 1995, China agreed to discuss the Spratly dispute with ASEAN countries. This has evolved since China hosted the discussion of the Spratly dispute in 1997. In 1999, China and ASEAN agreed to consider the principles of the code of ethics for SCS. In addition, an approach using international law has been carried out, including the 1982 UN convention on the Law of Sea (LOS), which has been recognized by China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Laos. Other approaches such as using the court or the International Court of Justice (ICJ) have been pursued by Southeast Asian countries (Thao 2001, 108-109)

In April 2004, representatives of the Taiwanese East Asia and Pacific Division Lin Sung-Huan on two occasions met Huang Ru Li, Director of the Vietnam Office of Economy and Culture in Taipei, to submit a request that the Vietnamese government be restrained to avoid tensions in the region (Chong 2013, 25-26). Vietnam is one of the countries that claim territory around the South China Sea, especially the Nansha islands. Tensions in the Nansha Islands since Vietnam placed its military on the island higher. Huang tried to reduce tensions by banning Vietnamese people from traveling to the area.

However, this effort is not an effective peace strategy; disputes are difficult to resolve by means of diplomacy. Political and security issues that have colored the SCS dispute must be taken seriously because it concerns the issue of territorial sovereignty which is the most

important part of each country. Even though various diplomatic efforts have been made, the resolution of the dispute has not made any significant progress. The SCS dispute continues despite diplomatic and legal efforts. The conflict comes from each country's logic about sovereignty, which is the dominant discourse in SCS.

Security stability in the South China Sea is full of friction, conflict and tensions that color relations between regional countries so that they are very dangerous and sensitive. The power of discourse on sovereignty has implications for conflict countries trying to improve their military power posture with a large defense budget from 2005 to 2017 and a comparison of military power in 2019 (see graph 1 and table 1). Increasing the defense and defense equipment budget of each country is the implementation of the sovereignty text.

Graph 41. Defense budget of conflict countries in the South China Sea (in billions of dollars) 'The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,' *SIPRI* <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>

	Malaysia	Vietnam	Philipina	Brunei	China
2017	3,492	5,074	4,378	347	228.231
2015	4,357	4,662	3,252	419	204.505
2013	4,015	3,858	3,243	368	176860
2011	3,863	3,168	2,813	376	149.022
2008	4,180	2,771	2,740	382	108.457
2005	3,741	1,854	2,418	318	76.605

Axis values: 200,000 / 180,000 / 160,000 / 140,000 / 120,000 / 100,000 / 80,000 / 60,000 / 40,000 / 20,000 / 0

Axis Title

11

Table 1. COMPARISONS OF MILITARY STRENGTHS 2019

SUBJECT	CHINA	VIETNAM	PHILIPPINES	MALAYSIA
GFP Rank	3 (of 137)	23 (of 1370	64 9137)	41 (of 137)
Total population	1.384.688.986	97.040.334	105.893.381	31.809.660
Manpower available	752.855.402	51.043.216	51.887.757	15.201.837
Fit-for-service	621.105.706	41.804.394	42.547.960	12.587.121
Reaching military age	19.614.518	1.651.274	2.127.394	526.147
Active personnel	2.183.000	482.000	125.000	116.000
Reserve components	510.000	5.000.000	180.000	300.000
Total military personnel	2.693.000	5.000.000	305.000	4.100.000
Defense budget	$224.000.000.000	$3.365.000.000	$3.000.000.000	$4.700.000.000
External debt	$1.598.000.000.000.	$96.580.000.000	$76.180.000.000	$217.200.000.000
Foreign reserve	$3.236.000.000.000	$49.500.000.000	$81.570.000.000	$102.400.000.000
Purchasing power	$24.810.000.000.000	$686.500.000.000	$931.000.000.000	$977.500.000.000
Total aircraft	$3.187	318	171	187
Tank strength	$13.050	2.575	18	74
Tota naval assets	714	65	119	61

Source : Comparisons of World Military Strengths , "Global fire power " <https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-comparison.asp>, Accessed April 18, 2019.

The data from graph 1 and table 1 show the paradox of Leviathan. Classical realism reads that the balance of power between countries as an instrument is not a war in the South China Sea. The above behavior is more indicative of an effort to maintain its existence as the king maintained his existence in the Westphalia treaty. The data shows that there is no balance of power between countries. The potential of large war makers in SCS can only come from China, with regard to the defense budget graph which continues to rise until 2019, the completeness of sophisticated war defense equipment compared to other countries. In this way, the allied states try to present an intrusive system in the SCS region. They are strong countries outside the region such as the United States and Russia. If this presence is read from discourse power, the alliance pact does not exist out of security reasons, but relations of power and ideology are strong reasons.

Other sections have come to offer the game of *"prisoners' dilemma"* as a discourse on neoliberalism. Anarchy is overcome through absolute and relative benefits. This will result in discursive hegemony affecting social movements based on nationalism. If the logic of sovereignty is maintained as a principle of achieving peace, then this is a veiled lie of the espoused by the country's elite. State logic and sovereignty will never produce knowledge of peace, because it comes from the same tree, namely the power of Westphalia's sovereignty discourse. This tree of knowledge has the fruits of conflict and war which are proven in the World War I and World War II.

The behavior of countries in conflict on the graphs and tables above proves that even though sovereignty in the contemporary era seems weak in power, on the one hand countries continue to make it a driving regime in international politics. It strengthens the data that the countries remain worried about their existence. Realism considers that strengthening military defense equipment and increasing the defense budget can have implications for maintaining security. For them, the state must be militarily strong to ensure its people are safe.

The implication of the text of territorial sovereignty can be confirmed again by the significant participation of China, namely military intervention, seen in the SCS conflict. This can be seen from the Chinese policy of placing military bases in the SCS to safeguard its interests (see Figure2). During April 2010, for example, China launched military intervention in the South China Sea by building Fiery Cross Reef, which could make it easier for Chinese fishermen to enter the SCS (Scott 2012, 1036).

Figure 2. Chinese Military Base at SCS (*Fiery Cross Reef*)

Since August 2014 the Chinese military has continued to expand Fiery Cross Reef on the western edge of the Spratly Islands. Expert from the Center for International and Strategic Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. and the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) believe that the bamboo curtain country is building an air base with a length of three kilometers and a width of 200 to 300 meters. The runway was able to accommodate Chinese H-6 long-range bombers. The Chinese military intervention is a manifestation of the sovereignty discourse. The Chinese military base in the South China Sea is possibly large enough to accommodate Y-20 military transport aircraft, H-6 bombers and J-10 fighters (amti.csis.org n.d.). This behavior has triggered an arms race at the SCS. The spread of Chinese power in the South China Sea is not only frightening in the region, but also internationally. This is not just a matter of threatened economic interests - the South China Sea is a trade route that delivers international goods and services estimated at $ 5 trillion annually (Bhatnagar 2016)-- but also it is a threat to general perspective, wherein now, border tensions and conflicts are no longer determined by diplomatic efforts, but through power military. This can be seen from the response of several countries, such as the US which sent its military to the South China Sea to test freedom of navigation. Vietnam,

Malaysia and the Philippines continue to conduct bilateral regulatory policies with non-regional countries in response to China.

Seeing the implications of the territorial sovereignty struggle in the SCS, ranging from border disputes, interstate tensions, to response of increased military power, it can be argued that this region has a unique security reality. There has not been a war in the SCS in these decades, but that does not mean that the area is free of potential war. Increased defense equipment and defense expenditure budgets from each regional country indicate that SCS is prepared to face the possibility of open warfare, especially those arising from border conflicts and territorial claims.

The constellation of conflict and tension in the SCS region is an important security issue because it involves the existence of the country and the lives of its citizens. Traditional security issues still color the international politics of the region, where prolonged conflicts in the region can trigger interstate war. The entire conflict in this region has the same issue, namely the territorial sovereignty of the country. The potential for war is strengthened by the show of strength between countries as shown by the increase in defense and defense equipment budgets. These countries have also balanced power by establishing military relations with strong countries outside the region. Based on this, it can be argued that the root of the SCS conflict is the presence of sovereignty discourse as the power to lead countries to the same behavior (the same logic of sovereignty), so that this logic is believed to be able to produce open war in the SCS. In Bourdieu's view, it takes the power of other cultural discourses to balance the power of the discourse of modern sovereignty. In this case, a minor narrative that is born of Chinese culture will be traced, so as to realize the absence of war.

3. MINOR NARRATIVE

Revealing the local discourse that has been politically buried will be shown through the power approach that was initiated by Bourdieu to show social movements who support local minor texts using Laclau and Mouffe about hegemony discursive. This section is very interesting to explore because it can give birth to view new in international relations. The clash of power of Chinese culture and the power of modern culture will make a major contribution to conflict in SCS. The minor text is believed offset the text of sovereignty through Chinese foreign policy in the SCS. Power is not something understood by

structuralist thinkers; however, power is domination of legitimate discourse and through the process in the battle arena. Said in other words, 'discourse' is real power. Bourdieu describes power in three important ways; habitus, capital, and arena. To show the meaning of Chinese minor texts that affect each power's arena, it will be mapped three stages of search; first, it shows Confucianism as habitus including all types of cultural activities; production; perception; and evaluation against the practice of everyday life. Confucianism's habitus occurs in social spaces through experience over long periods of time. Social experiences forms doxa, which then control the elites in formulating policies in SCS. Doxa meant the schemes of thought and perception of the political elite produced by social structures. Thus, the agent/actor is of the nature producing discourses that are influenced by the cultural environment, as opposed to being the doxa that controls it.

Second, it shows the elite or power in relation to the Confucian text. This matter is the capital used by Chinese elites to achieve their dominance. Among them is contained economic, social, and cultural or symbolic capital. Economic capital is related to ownership of property owned by someone. Social capital is someone who has economic and cultural capital. Cultural capital or symbolic power is verbal ability, skills, education, and knowledge possessed by someone. Bourdieu explains that one type of capital can blend with other forms of capitals. For example, someone could possibly possess all forms of capital: economic, social and cultural. To achieve power is gambling and struggle in certain arenas that have doxa (structure) well-established in that arena. The construction of Confucian texts in the arena will distinguish it from the dominant structure that has been legitimized; Third, it shows the arena/domain/field as a battle room for sovereignty and Confucianism which has several specific indicators; conservation strategy is an attempt to maintain the dominant discourse or doxa; succession is an effort to achieve power by using capital; subversion is an attempt to tear down a mature structure or offer discourse reproduction. It is believed to be an orthodox or belief about something right. In the arena, there is always a battle of discourses because there are heterodoxa or the many schemes of thought and perception produced by the objectives of social structures. Thus, the incorporation of habitus and capital in the arena will produce dominant discourse that reaches legitimacy. The power will influence the behavior of state actors to act not to fight in the SCS. The following will show the implications of Confucian policy in the SCS.

16

A. Confucianism habitus

Confucianism discourse is important in political discourse, though at in fact no Confucian seems to have become a political actor significant during the Classical period. However, in the contemporary era, the Confucianism text attracted intellectuals of ethnology and anthropology and even international relations. After the cold war, international phenomena shifted to cultural clashes. It seems that Fukuyama was not completely right when he universalized the knowledge about the end of world civilization is liberal democracy, even though the knowledge of liberalism has a relationship with strong power so that both (power and knowledge) still exist in the era contemporary.

Fukuyama's hasty hypothesis was criticized by Samuel Huntington in his famous book, The clash of civilizations. He shows that liberalism is not the end of human's civilization, but in the future there will be a clash of Western & Islamic civilizations and the west & east. The WTC 9/11 2001 event proved Huntington 's prediction was approaching the truth. In 2002 in China, Zheng Bijian declared the peaceful rise based on values Confucianism. This illustrates that western values are dealing with local values. This section will elaborate on Confucian values which are the text counter to western knowledge. Confucius was a great teacher who comes from plain of China. He was born in 551 BC, during the reign of King Ling of the Zhou Dynasty, with the first name Khung Chiu or Zhong Ni. Confucius is known for his teachings on morality or virtue as the main foundation for living a life harmoniously. Michael Hart, in his book The 100: A Ranking of the Most Influential Persons in History; Fermi-Hart paradox, positioned Confucius in fifth place after the Prophet Muhammad, Isaac Newton, Prophet Isa and Buddha.

Confucian's teachings are rooted in cultural values of harmony. He taught that every human life is always based on love for others. In its development, Confucius's teachings were used as the rationale for various things aspects of life for centuries. Limitation of this harmonization value has been rooted in Chinese society. They maintain harmony between humans and nature; between individual and society; between different community members; and between mind and body. Of all the teachings of Confucius, the core value is harmony. The intended harmonies are not necessarily all the same. The harmony of Confucius is different from uniformity. This textual foundation is a difference, so values are needed to produce a culture of harmony. Furthermore, the value of Confucian harmony has become an

17

energy unifying China, causing it to develope from an uncoordinated country to a country coordinated; from asymmetry to symmetry; and from imbalance to balance (Lihua 2013).

The scheme of Chinese people's thinking is based on the value of Confucian harmony. Values of traditional Chinese culture about harmony, virtue, truth, politeness, wisdom, honesty, loyalty, and filial piety are manifested in external Chinese policy through the concept of harmony (Lihua 2013). The value of harmony then developed into value Asia in economics. For example, in the past few decades, Asian politicians like Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore, or Mahathir from Malaysia has supported this myth with drawing attention to the 'decadence' of Western individualism and by declaring that the economic strength of their country is caused by a strong culture of collectivity based on Confucian family values (originating in China) such as order, respect, hierarchy, and harmony (Price n.d.).

Historically the value of Confucian harmony has become a habitus that developed into a scheme of economic development thinking. Among these, there are four values in the text of Confucian harmony; Confucianism and prosperity, Confucianism and inner circle, Confucian relationship, and joining the Confucian family. Confucianism Values can be said to have encouraged high savings rates and hence contributes much capital for economic growth. The Average savings rate in China is around 50 percent of income, one of the highest in world. Confucian values also stem from the attitude that family interests and close friends in the group must be protected by all means and placed before public interests. In addition, economic value is based primarily on trust, leading to reciprocity and obligations that originates from Confucian values. Therefore they are not subject to contracts or transactions but to trust, sincerity and loyalty. Again, the value of Confucian economic development is based on good relations long established in sincerity and loyalty (Price n.d.).

B. Confucianism capital

The values of Confucian harmony receive very high cultural capital in the elite's Chinese politics. Starting from the first Chinese president, Mao Zedong, to the president of China, Xi Jinping, Confucianism has become specialized, pluralized knowledge. Relationship between the power of Confucian culture and elite capital in the political arena contributed greatly to the formation of cultural capital. However, implementation of Confucianism has only been seen since Hu Jintao became president. Confucian texts of cultural power are the truth of

Chinese people that has long been buried. Even though political elites are products of Confucian knowledge, this discourse is beginning to rise in the post-cold war era.

President Hu had been trying to stabilize China's rotating moral direction in the construction of socialist knowledge. The direction of China in the Hu era was returned to the teachings of Confucius. This is because he felt greater cultural debt than Mao Zedong. The prominent figure Zheng Bijian was known as a thinker and strategist as well as political adviser to the leader of the People's Republic of China, Hu. This suggests that the basis of the rise of China in the future will be the resurrection of Confucian values.

In addition to Confucian cultural capital that is inherent to political elites, it is also true that many scholars continue to produce Confucian knowledge. For example, the scholar Martin Stuart Fox stated that, "Confucius believed in the order social and moral relies on universal recognition and acceptance of social hierarchy and political. It is very important that everyone must know their place in the world, accept their duties and responsibilities, and recognize their superiors and subordinates." In addition, Tan See Seng and Amitav Acharya said that Confucianism was (Seng, Tan See; Acharya, Amitav; 2004, 60)

> Mutual trust ("huxin", or non-hostility and non-suspicion sustained by regular, multiple-track dialogue and communications), mutual benefits ("huli", or economic-integration-driven common security), equality ("pingdeng", or equality of voice regardless of differences in wealth, size, and power, and respect for diversity of cultures and ideologies), and cooperation ("xiezuo", or non-exclusion, non-targeting of third parties, tolerance of differences, peaceful and equal consultation resolves disputes and prevent military conflicts, and gradualism).

Furthermore, the harmonization values that exist in the above ethics are understood by the scholar Na Chen in that "Confucianism has become a part of it de facto inherent in Chinese socio-cultural life, revival Confucianism came spontaneously and in some cases was carried out without realize it. The revival of Confucianism was accompanied by rebuilding Chinese cultural identity."

Through the capital possessed by the Confucian text above, it can be assumed that Confucianism as a minor text has the power of discourse because it is related to political elites and scholars. At the cultural and ethical levels, Confucian morality occupies the highest value in the science that is focused on peace. Therefore, this minor text is worthy of partaking in the combative discursive battles in the social, economic and political arena.

19

C. The arenas of Confucianism

In this section, Confucianism is faced with dominant discourses, such as sovereignty. The grand narrative of sovereignty still dominates the life of the Chinese state. For example, the increase in defense equipment and military reinforcement shown earlier is evidence that the power of the sovereignty text became Chinese knowledge. But in reality Confucian efforts by using various forms of capital can become rivals of the text in every arena. In this discussion, three arenas will be described important in the struggle for discourse on state sovereignty and Confucianism. Nowadays, the Westphalia version of the sovereign nation produces knowledge of political economy based on western neoliberalism. The forced adoption of this understanding took place throughout parts of the world. It is not only influenced the politics of the nation state, but also more became the power of cultural hegemony in modern lifestyles. The contemporary era of the state is no longer empowered where the sovereignty of the country appears as gloomy, lethargic, helpless, and weak, as if the country lacks vital nutrients. However, in fact there was quiet fighting against hegemony targets in culture, intellectual, and moral fields. China is one country that is different in understanding logical neoliberalism. The state controls every aspect of its people's economic life or centralistic system. This level of cultural hegemony is higher compared to countries that embrace decentralization. Is China's sovereignty melting because of Confucian culture or increasing ? In the previous discussion, it was explained that the logic of a sovereign state is the logic of "fear" of circumstantial security. This requires universal legitimacy that justifies its actions (God & Devil), whereas Confucian logic is the logic of harmonization, where it does not justify fans who commit acts of violence for any reason. This matter is interesting if traced in the discursive arenas of culture and politics.

In the cultural arena, the basic philosophy of Chinese life is based on teachings Confucianism. Through culture, Confucian moral values and ethics were introduced to the community. There is a scheme of thought inherent historically to each Chinese society. This cultural capital encouraged the rise of China with harmonious values. Confucianism through the Hu government has carried out succession and subversion, for example the teaching curriculum for secondary schools included in teaching classical Confucianism, and some experimental schools have been established which are mostly focusing on the classic

teachings of Confucius. Overseas, the government has promoted Confucianism through the branches of the Confucius Institute, the center of Chinese language and culture compete with *France's Alliance Française and Germany's Goethe Institute* (www.nytimes.com 2006). For government, the promotion of Confucian values has several advantages. In the country, the affirmation of harmony is intended to reflect the party's concern with power over all classes. Abroad, the call for peace and harmony intended to disarm worries about China's rapid rise.

In the political arena there is a Confucian struggle to become the foundation of the foundation peaceful and harmonious Chinese foreign policy. For example in Zheng's speech it is suggested that, "*Over the next 10 to 20 years, or maybe even throughout the first half of the 21st century, Asia has historically unique opportunities for rise peacefully. China's peaceful rise is only part of a peaceful awakening Asia. This not only means that the process of modernization and reform, and the rise of China, directly related to the experience and development of other Asian countries, more than that indicates that China as part of Asia's main constituency will have an increasingly positive effect on the development, prosperity and stability of countries Other Asia, especially the closest neighboring countries*" (Zheng, Y; Tok, K; 2005, 4)

His speech further reinforced the statement of Chinese foreign policy terminology, namely *peaceful rise* that comes from the harmonious value of Confucianism, that (Bijian n.d.)

> *China hopes to rise not through territorial expansion or challenges to other strengths but as a result of his own hard work and international environment that is peaceful. Unlike the strength that has increased in the past, which disrupts the order international both to facilitate their revival or as a result. China look for different paths and will try to integrate themselves into the order the world instead of challenging it. This requires ongoing efforts from China to seek and supporting interdependence, a development path that will also direct China to seek cooperative economic and security relations.*

There is no discourse resistance. Moral emptiness is being filled by sects Christianity, Falun Gong and extreme forms of nationalism. But the government assumes that such an alternative threatens peace and stability won with difficulty which sustained China's development, so it has been encourage the revival of Confucianism. Therefore, in February 2015, Hu said Harmonization originating from Confucius must be respected. Struggles in the political arenas were intensified through conservation. Several months later, he ordered a

cadre of Chinese parties to build a "community's harmony." Carrying the theme of Confucianism, Hu said China must promote values such as honesty and unity, as well as establishing closer relationships between people and government.

Besides Hu, Chinese president Xi Jinping continued to fight for teachings Confucianism in political institutions through political speeches. Confucius is part of Xi's reform team. For 2,000 years, the doctrine of Confucius established a code of ethics for good behavior in China. In 2013, Xi issued a statement that "*China boasts a long traditional culture, and China will create a new glory of its culture. Confucian thought can play a positive role in China's development today* (Samaruga 2013). "Through Xi's statement, we can see that he believed Confucianism could play a harmonious role in the development of peaceful China.

He also appealed to government officials to manifest values Confucianism; Mr. Xi's point is "both good policy and faithful to the Confucian tradition: If government officials expect the common people to "pay homage" to the government, it must be evident that they are trustworthy and are working for the well-being of the community as a whole. In other words, they must manifest the Confucian virtues of righteousness and benevolence" (Norden 2017). The appeal was based on the concept of the Confucian elite namely "If the masses don't like someone, you have to check it; if the mass likes someone, you have to check it out." Xi's basic policy refers to two important parts delivered, namely, good policies from government elites and loyal to value the value of Confucian harmony (Norden 2017).

The second basic policy of Xi is his opposition to "Western values", He believes that Confucianism is better than the liberal values of the United States. This statement can be confirmed historically through the thinking of Jian Qing, who states that "constitutional Confucianism" is a more appropriate government system for China than Western liberal democracy. The confucian advantage in the battlefield is politics because it has participating capital. Like Foucault's words, knowledge is always related with power, and conversely, the life of power is determined by knowledge relations. Knowledge of harmony dominates Chinese culture through Confucian teachings, because this understanding also talks about collective life. Through collectivist Confucian values, China crafted its foreign policy on how to live peacefully under one harmonious umbrella of human life which is in line with Zhaohe Chen strengthened Xi's statement: "The Chinese Cultural Root of the Community of Common Destiny for All Mankind (Cheng 2017).

22

The participation of political elites in building Confucian local discourse as a basis for Chinese foreign policy influences all aspects of the discourse battle arena, so that Confucianism became the foundation of China's foreign policy. This has been seen since Hu came in power and began promote the peaceful rise resulting from the value of Confucian harmony, and the text changed to peaceful development in 2005. This was due to the political situation and international view of China's rise as a threat to the global order. The next principle in peaceful development is the cornerstone of Xi's policies in the world, especially in the SCS. Thus impacting the discursive hegemony of the government is to universalize Confucian knowledge.

D. Confucianism Implications in the South China Sea

The South China Sea region covers the waters and land, namely Spratly and Paracel Islands, and the banks of the Macclesfield and Coral Rivers Scarborough which extend from the Malacca Strait to the Taiwan Strait. Because this region is very broad and has a history of domination that changes frequently, there is often conflict of interest in this region. Today, several Southeast Asian countries – Brunei Darussalam, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia – are involved in mutual claims with China and Taiwan for part of or all of the area. In addition, the South China Sea has various natural resources, for example very large oil reserves. Natural wealth in this region has caused multilateral conflict. Political economic interests trigger claims to overlap and give rise to traditional security issues that have implications for the possibility of open war between countries.

Disputes over territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea actually refer to sea and land areas on Paracel Island and the Spratly Islands. China claims the two islands, while Vietnam and the Philippines also claim the same. Malaysia only claims part of Spratly based on the EEZ, which is also followed by Brunei. Conflict and tension in the South China Sea region is a dispute which concerns the territories of sovereign countries, where settling the dispute with diplomacy has so far not been successful. What was said by Sir Ernest Satow is that diplomacy is the application of intelligence and tact to conduct of the official relations betwen the government of independent state, the conduct if bussiness between states by peaceful means," (Woods 1960, 19) which has not successfully been applied in the South

China Sea. It appears that The South China Sea represents a failure to practice the concept of diplomacy. It is interesting, alternatives to diplomacy, namely war, also do not occur in the region. According to the war strategist Carl Von Clausewitz, "where war is identified as a political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means." (Clausewitz 1976, 87). Clausewitz taught that war is a political instrument which is a continuation of political activities in another way. When diplomacy fails to run or the effort to take the path of peace is unsuccessful, then war is the last resort. In other words, war is an implication of diplomacy that is deadlocked. However, what Clausewitz said was also not proven in the SCS.

This situation creates uniqueness in the South China Sea. Even though there is a constellation high political conflict and tension, also the deadlock of diplomacy that gave rise to the reality of prolonged conflict, but open war between countries has not occured. What is present is a conflict without war in a tense situation. Various territorial interests colliding in this region could incite a great war between countries to acquire national interests. Peaceful failed settlement efforts lead to show of force in the region.

In addition, competition also arises from the countries in dispute for modernizing their armies and increasing their respective military budgets. These efforts produce political and security tensions, but each state continues in this way. China has many sophisticated military personnel and war equipment, and continues to increase its military budget in these past several years. Modernization of the armed forces of the Southeast Asian countries involved in the dispute of SCS by means of a defense alliance with countries outside the region is the implication of the power of sovereignty.

In fact, China is a country that is able to rise become the main competitor figure world powers through its increased economic and defense capabilities. Nevertheless, the idea of "a peaceful rise" is a basic foundation that has always been the doctrine of the rise and behavior of foreign policy China in the global political arena. This precedent is proven in many political cases of China overseas that tend to be low profile while carrying an idea of peace rather than confrontational or aggressive connotations when interacting with international actors, including who are rivals inside global political scene.

In the white book issued by the Chinese government on December 22, 2005 entitled "China's Peaceful Development Road," it was explained in detail about the term "peaceful rise" and how Chinese foreign policy will always be based on five key base namely, first,

peaceful development is an inevitable way to modernization of China; second, promoting world peace and development with China's own growth; third, development by relying on its strength own; fourth, reform and innovation: seeking mutual benefits and development together with other countries; and fifth, to build a harmonious world of peaceful sustainable and shared prosperity (Lei 2005).

The concept of peaceful development that comes from the value of Confucian harmony show a more flexible attitude and a big chance to appear as the power of the text balancing desires of territorial sovereignty in SCS. The peaceful development implications can be confirmed through Chinese foreign policy which is actively in development economic and security regionalism in SCS. A good example of this is the ASEAN plus Three multilateral framework (APT).

In some cases, Chinese foreign policy behavior relates to international organization and regional organizations such as the WTO as a world trade organization production of western countries. Since 2001, China has officially begun to recognize and became a member of the WTO until it became effective on January 1, 2002. Then, China also began to join actively in regional organizations such as the G-20, OPEC and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) (Hadi 2012, 151).

The same goes for ASEAN regional organizations, China approach with peace and understanding the sensitivity of Southeast Asian countries through the efforts of a partnership dialogue approach found in the the Treaty of Amity and Cooperaton (TAC), the ASEAN regional forum (ARF) arrived the signing of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, so that fostering the trust of ASEAN Countries towards China related to disputes in the SCS. This step was followed by the signing of a free trading business between China and ASEAN within the framework of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) with transactional value reaching 200 billion dollars (Hadi 2012, 152).

The ACFTA has four important objectives: strengthening and enhancing cooperation economy, trade and investment between member countries; liberalizing progressive and increase trade in goods and services and create a system transparent to facilitate investment; exploring fields of new cooperation and develop appropriate policies in the context of economic cooperation between member countries; facilitating more effective economic integration of ASEAN's newest members - Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam - and

bridging economic development disparity among member countries (Direktorat Kerjasama Regional; Ditjen Kerjasama Perdagangan Internasional; 2010).

Through the peaceful development foreign policy, Hu and Xi have implemented the Confucian harmony policy in SCS. Confucian discourse which is embraced in the history of Chinese society which was adopted frame of mind of political elites in conducting international relations, more specifically is intertextual harmony. Evidently power relations and Confucian texts are able to win discourse battles in the economic, cultural, and political arena. They are armed with tough elitist capital, Hu and Xi. Confucianism became a movement social together to achieve peace with everyone. In the context of external politics of a country, the power of Confucian text is implemented through a peaceful policy development. This is what causes Chinese foreign policy in SCS to be more flexible and cooperative through multilateral and bilateral peace frameworks.

This is not an absolute victory of Confucianism. It must always stand face to face with the logic of sovereignty in SCS. China itself, even though it claims SCS from historical aspects, but the implications of territorial sovereignty discourse on SCS still occur. Therefore, Confucianism discourse must be the power of the balancing text that is always present discourse battle arenas. It can only survive if there is a hegemonic class alliance to defend Confucian discourse. Borrowing Laclau and Mouffe, "the hegemonic relationship itself can only be built when differences unites."

4. Conclusion

Sovereignty is a contradiction. It is an authoritative discourse born of insistence by the Kings of France, the King of Sweden and their allies and the Great King of Rome to end 30 year war. His birth was considered spectacular and had an impact on the existence of the Kings. Through the birth of Westphalia's sovereignty, the Kings remained in power. This matter proved that power is an implication of discourse. From 1648 to the era contemporary, the meaning of the sovereignty text persists by showing the implications for international relations, especially in the South China Sea. The production of sovereignty discourse has implications to behavior countries in the South China Sea because of territorial desires or sea boundaries. The resilience of sovereignty in the body the state generates endless potential conflicts.

26

The birth of sovereignty is a Westphalia scandal. Thus, discourse or knowledge is the implication of power. Apart from revealing the discourse of sovereignty as the root of the conflict in the South China Sea, Confucianism as a local Chinese discourse also has implications for external policy of the harmonious Chinese country. It was manifested in brilliant Chinese policies, namely peaceful development. The Confucian Declaration as the basis of all aspects Chinese life began with Hu's reign and continued by Xi. Armed with capital strong elitist, Confucianism becomes the dominant discourse in China (minor discourse) in global politics). It won the battle of discourse in the cultural, economic and political, leading to the realization of the power of Confucian discourse as implemented through the "Peaceful development" of China. The implications posed in the South China Sea are life without war. China acts very flexibly through various multilateral and bilateral frameworks.

Even though conflicts and political tendencies concerned with the struggle for territorial sovereignty in the SCS occur frequently, they do not cause open war between countries. By paying attention to China's strong and large military power, which has the potential to create a major war in the SCS. In addition, diplomatic efforts did not produce the desired peaceful results. However, alternative diplomacy, namely war also does not occur. This research claims that the absence of an open war in the SCS because of the application of the values of the Confucian harmony manifested in peaceful development. In other words, war does not occur because of the power of Confucian discourse.

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