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## U.S.-UKRAINE RELATIONS AND THE CONCEPT OF STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

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**U.S.-UKRAINE RELATIONS AND THE CONCEPT OF STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP**

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**Thesis submitted to the Eberly College of Arts and Sciences  
at West Virginia University**

**in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Dual Degree in Master of Arts in  
International History and Security Studies**

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## **Abstract.**

### **U.S.-UKRAINE RELATIONS AND THE CONCEPT OF STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP**

**Khrystyna Pelchar**

A strategic partnership has become particularly relevant in the wake of the Russian war in Ukraine. Most studies focus on the historical perspective of particular special relations leaning toward the long-standing nature and stability of those relations. Others describe interstate partnerships as dynamic developments rather than static phenomena. Conventionally, strategic partnerships are multifaceted, including the spheres of economic cooperation, military assistance and partnership, and democracy promotion. Scholars also single out cultural proximity as an important factor facilitating mutual trust and feasibility of strategic partnership.

This thesis will discuss the historical background of the U.S.-Ukraine economic, socio-political, and military cooperation and its strengths and weaknesses compared to the US-Georgian Strategic Partnership. Finally, this study helps answer the following questions: How is the Georgian case similar to and different from the situation in Ukraine? Has the U.S. response, in 2008 and again in 2014, been an effective and adequate approach to conflicts in the post-Soviet space, which now seem to defy diplomatic resolution? Defense and security cooperation has been another central pillar of the strategic partnerships in Ukraine and Georgia, getting the most attention in the wake of the 2008 August war. Thus, answering these questions is critical in assessing the significance of recent U.S.-Ukraine relations and U.S.-Georgian relations, in light of emerging U.S.-Ukrainian strategic partnership.

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## **Introduction.**

Ukraine is a state with a century-long history, favorable climate conditions, and numerous natural riches. Without exaggeration, Ukraine has been a “breadbasket” of Europe. It stands at the crossroad between Europe and Asia, playing a strategic role in both trade and the security of its European partners. It has been debated whether Ukraine was gifted with geopolitical luck or challenged with misfortune by neighboring Russia, an autocracy that once headed the Eastern Bloc in the Cold War. Despite the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian imperial appetite persevered. The old Eastern Bloc included a large portion of what we now call the European Union. Yet, Ukraine is left at the intersection between democracy and dictatorship. Since the declaration of its independence Ukraine has made numerous efforts to deepen its partnerships with the U.S. and the European Union. But the cliché of the post-Soviet republic, as well as financial hardships and political instability, stood in the way of realizing the great potential. It has always aspired to democratic values and Western culture. However, the invitation to join the "free world" has been constrained by Russian interference in Ukraine's domestic and foreign affairs.

The armed Russian aggression in Crimea and the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine has revealed the truth of Russia's "brotherhood" (Pifer 2017). Russia perceived its neighbor as an extension of its territory, regularly posing problems for Kyiv after 1991, intervening in its national affairs (presidential elections 2004) and foreign policies (Putin continuously warns Ukraine not to join NATO), dictating its rules and vision of Ukraine's future. President Putin came to justify Russian aggression in Crimea and the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine by saying that those actions were necessary security measures. Putin repeated his longstanding argument that Ukraine's borders were an artificial creation of Soviet planners who unjustly cordoned rightful Russian land within the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (Fisher 2022). On April 18, 2014, he recalled the West's broken promises not to enlarge NATO to the East with the deployment of military infrastructure (kremlinnews 2014). Furthermore, he stressed that those security assurances, as well as Ukraine, are part of Russia's post-Soviet identity" (Rühle 2014).

Did the Cold War ever end, or was there a transformation from the Soviet Union's sphere of influence to an imagined contemporary Eastern bloc driven by Russian neo-imperialism? Some scholars argue that Russian aggression in Ukraine was a response to American politics in its sphere of influence. Mearsheimer states, "the annexation of Crimea and the war in the East of Ukraine

was a response to NATO enlargement" (McFaul, Sestanovich, and Mearsheimer 2014). Others believe that the crisis was about Putin and his unconstrained, erratic adventurism (McFaul, Sestanovich, and Mearsheimer 2014). Despite the differences between the present and 1945, the Cold War ideology persevered: "anything benefiting Russia is damaging for the West, and vice versa." (Yazici and Yildirim 2021).

On February 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. Russia escalated a ruthless war on a scale that has not been seen in Europe since World War II. The world has pledged to "never again" permit massacres or genocide. But the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine dispelled the illusion of civilized 21<sup>st</sup> century world. On the night of the February 24th Ukraine woke up in horror, fire, and war. The world has observed the deliberate massacre in Bucha, the horrors of Mariupol, and the destruction of Kharkiv, Lugansk, Odesa, and others. The Russian Federation is now widely recognized for its atrocities and war crimes in Ukraine. Putin's Russian army has shelled those survivors whose families were executed in 1941 by Nazis. Ukrainian people are writing their new history of heroic resistance and national tragedy. Ukrainian people value freedom more than themselves, demonstrating true devotion, endurance, and faith. Ukrainian leadership impressed the world with its defiance. Despite being a prime target in the invasion, wartime President Volodymyr Zelensky turned down a U.S. offer of evacuation. "Since the battle for Ukraine is here; I don't need a ride, but ammunition," Zelensky responded to the U.S. President Joe Biden (Mackinnon 2022).

This thesis is limited in its study to the pre-war period, the beginning of 2022. This paper looks through the history of an independent Ukraine since 1991, accounting for internal (the Orange Revolution of 2004, the 2014 Maidan) and external (2014 Russian armored annexation of Crimea with subsequent developments in Eastern Ukraine) dynamics in comparison to Georgia, another post-Soviet republic. It aims to understand better the evolution of the US-Ukraine relations with the socio-political and cultural transformation of Ukraine. Has it ever reached the height of strategic partnership, or was it mere rhetoric of 2008, when the Russo-Georgian war questioned the collective security and revealed a growing Russian ambition? In the same year, the US-Ukraine relations were officially upgraded to a strategic partnership (U.S., Ukraine Sign Charter on Strategic Partnership 2008). This thesis also aims to understand what meanings the states attached to this Strategic Partnership and did they comply with the theoretical concept of "strategic partnership."

Although Washington's efforts to turn Ukraine into a modern democracy could not help it to stand up to Russian aggression in 2014, the United States has generally succeeded in its major foreign policy goals in Ukraine, such as Ukraine's accession to the NPF Treaty in 1994, military cooperation, and implementation of major political and economic reform (Pifer 2017). However, the 2014 Russian aggression became a litmus test for the U.S. commitment to the Budapest Memorandum and the West's ability to hold Russia accountable for its malevolent aggression. Observers assumed that the U.S. response to Ukraine's crisis was delayed and lacking in strategy due to the Obama administration's hesitation to provide lethal military assistance, Donald Trump's controversial relations with Vladimir Putin, and the first impeachment of President Trump (2019) related to withholding Congress-approved military support for Kyiv to benefit his reelection (Pifer 2020). Others perceive the U.S. response as harsher toward Russia than its measures taken to resolve the conflict in Georgia.

Indeed, it is unreasonable to separate the U.S.-Ukraine strategic partnership from either the context of the Russian aggression in 2014 or Ukraine's promised integration into NATO. Comparison to Georgia supports the idea that strategic partnerships do not necessarily have an endpoint—although, in Eastern Europe, most partnerships have ultimately led to NATO (Welt 2010). Democracy has been a foundation for the US-Ukraine and US-Georgian strategic partnerships. The US-Ukraine charter on strategic partnership in Section I, para. 2 says that democracy is the key guarantee that of free and prosperous Ukraine (United States-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Washington, DC 2008). Defense and security cooperation has been another central pillar of the strategic partnerships in Ukraine and Georgia, getting the most attention in the wake of the August war. Thus, conflict resolution is critical in analyzing the political, economic, and military tiers of strategic partnerships. The Russian Reset during the Obama administration weakened the deterrence of Russian aggression in Ukraine (Zabakhidze 2021).

However, the U.S. response to Ukraine's crisis in 2014 has demonstrated its strategic interest in the region and has produced positive results despite the continuation of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict. An alliance is, above all, an agreement to a committed security cooperation (Lazarević 2009). The strategic nature depends on vital spheres of the partnership directed toward long-term cooperation and mutual goals of the states. National security has become the top priority for Ukraine since the 2014 Russian war. The U.S. has exercised all possible solutions to restore the

balance of powers in the region, helping Ukraine institutionalize stronger democracy, providing military assistance and training, and threatening Russian aggression with the economic sanctions while insisting on restoring Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty in the contested regions. Meanwhile, Russia felt unrestrained after not being punished for the Georgian war; the measures taken after the annexation of Crimea proved the weaknesses of the Western response to Russian brutality in the wake of the February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Despite the hesitancy to disrupt relations with Russia, which shaped Russian strategy in its planned 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. maintained its commitments to political support, military assistance, and long-term orientation in partnering with Ukraine.

This thesis will be organized thematically. The first section will introduce the concept of strategic partnership, its introduction to the Ukrainian legislature. It will focus on the growth of US-Ukraine exports and imports as vital economic vessels of the states' partnership. Although the state of the U.S.-Ukraine trade does not fully satisfy the strategic partnership economic criteria, the nature of the relations can be assessed based on spheres of cooperation more relevant to Ukraine's national security. The second section will discuss the military aspects of US-Ukraine relations and deepening cooperation in defense and security matters. The third section will narrate socio-cultural developments in Ukraine and their relationship with the pro-Western political direction. The paper hypothesizes that the recent developments, such as "Maidan" 2013/2014 and U.S. support for Ukraine in the current war with Russia, demonstrate US-Ukraine's close socio-cultural and political ties. The fourth section will compare the U.S. partnership with Georgia to the one with Ukraine. It will first narrate the historical and political similarities and differences, the conflict of interests between the West united in supporting independence and the Russian so-called "sphere of influence" in Eastern Europe. It will also examine military, socio-political, and economic relations between the U.S. and Georgia. And finally, the thesis will contrast the U.S. response to Georgia's and Ukraine's crises to see how the commitment to "strategic" partnership works in practice.

## **What Partnership is Strategic?**

### **The extraordinary closeness of the strategic partners.**

The modern literature in political science offers many ways to define alliances. Although characteristics vary, they are not contradictory. Stefanowicz distinguishes between the two types: one is narrower and more traditional, and the other is wider, prevailing nowadays (Stefanowicz 2000). On the one hand, the *sensu stricte* alliance describes the relations between the states on the military basis with the combination of socio-political and economic forces to avert a threat from the outside (Michałowska 1996). On the other hand, through the *sensu largo*, we understand Alliance as every “form of cooperation between the subjects of international law” (Czechowska 2013). Political scientists have not yet agreed on a single definition and structure of a strategic partnership. Some scholars argue that strategic partnership requires a mutual declaration of the strategic partnership and the commonality of strategic landmarks with the mechanisms for implementing the strategic partnership and the legal consolidation of the content and mechanisms (Sedliar and Kravchenko 2018).

Based on scholarly research I. Zhovkva proposed four models of strategic partnership: 1) "representative"; 2) "against the common threat"; 3) "tactical partnership for strategic results" and 4) "asymmetric" (Zhovkva, 2005). The context of the object and subject of research that deserves special attention is "asymmetric partnership," as the relationship between states where one country benefits more from another due to the historical development of relations or if one country is more dependent on the second one. Classic examples of the "asymmetric strategic partnership" model are the US-UK special relationship and the US-Canada asymmetric relationship. It should be noted here that the concept of "asymmetric partnership" differs from the concept of "asymmetric relationship" because the latter arises only when there is inequality between two actors in a particular area of relations. In contrast, in the case of an "asymmetric strategic partnership," any inequality is excluded (Toghrol 2014).

Similarly, Lucyna Czechowska credits strategic partnerships for the proximity and longstanding nature of the relations between their subjects (Czechowska 2013). She articulates that sharing the vision of strategic goals between the partners effectively facilitates their successful

realization. Unlike the special relations established between the U.S. and Great Britain in the 20th century, strategic partnership is not limited to the bilateral relations between the states. Still, it can embrace many potential subjects, including international legal actors and entities, even federated states (Czechowska 2013). As a foreign policy tool, a strategic partnership can assist both liberalist internationalists and realists. Despite the competing theories on human nature and the state's role, the provision of shared goals is consistent with many explanations of the strategic partnership. Realists explain that the concurrence of the troubling issues is the reason to establish and maintain strategic partnerships.

In Chinese diplomacy, the concept of 'partnership' came after the end of the Cold War (Zhongping and Jing 2014). Chinese leaders communicated their thoughts on the key features of strategic partnership. During his European trip in 2004, the Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao, called Sino-EU relations a strategic partnership, adding that it was comprehensive. His understanding of comprehensive partnership included the multi-dimensional, wide-ranging, and multi-layered nature of cooperation that covers political, cultural, and other spheres; long-lasting nature and stability made the partnership strategic. Finally, the partnership was understood as an equality-based, mutually beneficial arrangement. Moreover, China has tried to combine bilateral relations and multilateralism with its strategic partnerships, for example, Sino-Russian cooperation in the United Nations. China has hardly relied on political and economic muscle to protect its interests worldwide. Its tightening cooperation with Russia has caught international attention since President Xi visited Russia in March 2013. Against the Ukraine crisis in late May 2014, Beijing concluded a major natural gas deal with Moscow (Zhongping and Jing 2014).

Bobo Lo assessed the Russo-Chinese strategic partnership through the prism of culture. He said that the mutual security interests, threat perceptions, and a common view of the post-9/11 international security agenda kept this partnership close (Lo 2004). Russia and China are concerned about spreading democratization's effect on their leadership and domestic legitimacy. Chaka Ferguson agreed that since the end of the Cold War, both states sought to offset U.S. military superiority and deny any attempts to change the international balance of power (Ferguson 2012). Without a military and economic dimension, this strategic partnership has ended up working within the frames of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The states employed indirect and non-confrontational tactics to support one another in an international arena, as is visible in the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council voting patterns and other practices (Ferguson 2012). Lo

also argues that economic ties – previously assumed to be the weakest dimension of the strategic partnership – are now considered an important foothold to any cooperation. Commercial relations are diversifying and involve political and security aspects of the countries involved. Joint economic projects encompass technological transfer and include sectors of outstanding importance for security, such as energy, infrastructure, and defense.

The strategic partnership is a dynamic rather than a static phenomenon (Lo 2004). Nivedita Kapoor's work demonstrates that Russia-EU strategic partnership has ended (Kapoor 2021). After the E.U. Commission Vice-President Joseph Borrell accused the E.U. diplomats of participating in protests against the Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny's detention, the EU-Russian relations hit rock bottom after steadily moving downward since the 2014 Ukrainian crisis. Despite Russia's proclamation of "European choice" and joint efforts to establish close economic and socio-cultural ties, and security cooperation, its authoritarian political culture became a bone of contention. A clash of values and Russia's geopolitical ambitions arrested the growth of the EU-Russian partnership. Kapoor explains that the Russian foreign policy concept approved in November 2016 proclaims NATO and E.U. expansion as a "containment policy" against Russia (Kapoor 2021). Moreover, cooperation has become a competition for influence after the E.U.'s Eastern Partnership was launched in 2009.

Ukraine's partnership with the U.S. reflects the continuing struggle for Ukraine's independent foreign policy from Russia, its integration with the West, and the pursuit of closer ties with the European Union. Unlike Moscow and Beijing, the U.S. and Ukraine share common values better to understand each party's desires (Lo 2004). In 2018, the U.S. accused Russia of deploying 9M729 missiles, violating the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces between the U.S. and Soviet Union. With no resolution, the states suspended obligations under the treaty impinging on European security. This development, Kapoor argues, can quickly escalate at any point of the conflict in the region between NATO and Russia (Kapoor 2021). Shared interests, values, and a threat – Russia – helps to strengthen the transatlantic Alliance by leaving the disputes behind and uniting efforts in a confrontation with an external threat.

## **Strategic Partnership in the Context of the US-Ukraine Relations.**

As a new form of cooperation and collaboration, the strategic partnership is widespread and has received various forms of interpretation and reflection in scientific thought in different parts of the world. Ukrainian research centers' studies provide a comprehensive analysis of Ukrainian foreign policy. Before the existence of the U.S.-Ukraine strategic partnership, the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense (O.S.D.), in its 1995 Security Strategy for Europe and NATO, stated the following: "An independent and democratic Ukraine is a cornerstone to European stability and peace " (Demchenko and Kozyryeva 2015).

The first Ukrainian conceptual document to introduce the concept of "strategic partnership" was the Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of July 2, 1993, "On the Main Directions of Ukraine's Foreign Policy," which remained in force until the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Law of Ukraine "On Principles of Domestic and Foreign Policy" on July 1, 2010. The resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine "On the Main Directions of Ukraine's Foreign Policy" on July 2, 1993, stressed that "the priority strategic directions in the field of bilateral relations are the active development of political, economic, scientific, technical, cultural and other relations" (The Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine "On the Main Directions of Ukraine's Foreign Policy" 1993). Since the concept of "strategic partnership" appeared in the concept paper of the Ukrainian parliament, bilateral relations of this level have been proclaimed and documented from time to time in official political texts and international agreements of Ukraine. During the two terms of Kuchma's Presidency (1994-2005), the practice of officially declaring Ukraine's strategic ("special," "key") partners affected as many as twenty countries. Analogous was Ukraine's relations with leading international organizations at the end of the 1990s. Under the E.U. Joint Strategy for Ukraine of December 11, 1999, the European Union proclaimed itself a strategic partner. Although it was a unilateral document of the European Union, Ukraine fully shared its position. Following the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between Ukraine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from July 9, 1997, NATO has been declared a special partner of Ukraine. The nature of Ukraine's relations with both organizations is quite similar, and the acquisition of E.U. membership, as well as a constructive partnership with NATO, became

"the basic principles of Ukraine's foreign policy" (Law of Ukraine "On Principles of Domestic and Foreign Policy" 2010).

In October 2000, the experts of the O. Razumkov Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Studies conducted a nationwide poll of 100 experts, including representatives of the Presidential Administration, the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the National Security and Defense Council, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Economy and influential media, and also summarized the positions of leaders of all parliamentary factions and groups in an attempt to outline the meaning of the concept of "strategic partnership." The abovementioned analytical report emphasized that, in contrast to the normal bilateral relations, which serve to achieve tactical (local) goals or establish cooperation in a particular area, a strategic partnership is focused on the long term (Demchenko and Kozyryeva 2015). According to experts, a strategic partnership is based on 1) the mutual interest of partners in fruitful cooperation, 2) mutual recognition of the strategic level of relations, 3) willingness to take into account the interests of the other party, and compromise to achieve strategic goals, 4) equality is essential, even if in relations are of an asymmetrical character (one is more dependent on the other), 5) reciprocal refusal of discriminatory steps against each other, 6) the long-term nature of the partnership, as the strategic partnership is established not for two or three years, but for the longer term, and 7) legal consolidation of the cooperation with its well-defined policies, and goals, 8) effectiveness of the partnership, that directly benefits not only the overall states' economies but their businesses, and citizens (Demchenko and Kozyryeva 2015).

Therefore, the strategic partnership is a special instrument of the state's foreign policy, allowing it to coordinate its actions in the international arena with other states. At the same time, the coincidence of ways and methods of using this instrument and the coincidence of strategic national interests of different states in several areas leads to the emergence of this type of interstate cooperation. Since 1991, Ukraine's cooperation with the United States has been significant in building our country's strategic partnership with other international actors. The development of Ukrainian-American interstate relations can be divided into several periods, characterized by breakthroughs in Ukrainian diplomacy, great gains, and no fewer mistakes and losses. However, only after the victory of the Revolution of Dignity in 2014 did Ukrainian-American relations approach the level of strategic partnership in terms of the degree of cooperation.

Yulia Sedliar and Natalia Kravchenko believe that the situation has changed after the victory of the Revolution of Dignity (Sedliar and Kravchenko 2018). The United States' comprehensive assistance to Ukraine during the crisis reinforced the existence of special bilateral relations. Significant in the context of supporting the national security of Ukraine was the "Act in Support of Freedom in Ukraine" signed by the former U.S. President Barack Obama. Based on the provisions of the document, the United States began to view Ukraine as an important partner to which Washington was ready to provide support in addressing the following strategic objectives: restoring and maintaining Ukraine's territorial integrity; strengthening Ukraine's economic and political independence, as well as its independence as a democratic state with a market economy; achieving political and economic stability; transformation of Ukraine into a leader of the Black Sea region and among the C.E.E. states; integration into international economic and regional political organizations; effective use of Ukraine's strategic location as a chain to strengthen trade and stability in the region (United States-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Washington, DC 2008).

Therefore, after Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine, the strategic partnership with the United States has been vital for Ukraine. It has helped to ensure its territorial integrity and gain foreign financial and economic support for effective democratic reforms and economic restructuring and addressing the adequate response of the world community to the presence of Russian troops in Donbas and the annexation of Crimea (Sedliar and Kravchenko 2018). Furthermore, the U.S. assistance to Ukraine increased after the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022. That is why Ukrainian-American relations in today's geopolitical realities are becoming a factor in ensuring the national security of Ukraine. Therefore, systematic cooperation with the United States of America in the military-political, military-technical, and military spheres is a key external factor in ensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Ukrainian state. (Sedliar and Kravchenko 2018).

Ukraine's National Security Strategy in 2015 was the first document after the Revolution of Dignity and the proclamation of a clear European and Euro-Atlantic course of the state, which also presented a certain understanding of who is identified as a strategic partner of Ukraine. In this document, the United States was named a strategic partner of Ukraine: "At the global level, Ukraine considers deepening its strategic relations with the U.S. serve as an international security assurance of the Euro-Atlantic region" (Decree of the President of Ukraine On the decision of the

National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine "On the National Security Strategy of Ukraine" 2015). Nowadays, two legislative pieces define the principles of Ukraine's foreign policy and identify the U.S. as a strategic partner of Ukraine - the National Security Strategy 2020 and the Foreign Policy Strategy 2021.

Formally, the Strategy of the Foreign Policy sets the criterion by which the state's best strategic nature of relations is selected. Such as in Art. 96 "The development of people with other states of a critical strategic nature adheres to the best foreign policy systems and reflects a special level and cooperation based on valuable interests and price democracy, the rule of law, respect for rights" (Decree of the President of Ukraine On the decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine "On the Strategy of Foreign Policy of Ukraine" 2021). Art. 97 specifies that "The key elements of the system of optimal energy nature are bilateral cooperation in the political, security and military spheres, in particular, to counter the Russian Federation's aggression and strengthen the stability of the state" (Ibid).

During the expert discussion, certain expectations of Ukrainian specialists regarding the strategic level of relations with partners were identified, and systematized criteria for a strategic partnership were 1) signing relevant documents on strategic relations; 2) providing assistance and support in the international arena, and the fight against Russian aggression; 3) lack of hidden destructive influence from such a partner; 4) systematic support at multilateral platforms - within international organizations; 5) actual coincidence of key interests of partners; 6) imposition of sanctions against Russia; 7) the degree of vulnerability of the strategic partnership to change political elites in both countries; 8) availability of military-technical cooperation and relevant security agreements; 9) signed free trade agreements (Shelest 2021). Anna Shelest, Director of the Security Studies Program, Ukrainian Prism Foreign Policy Council, agrees that simultaneously defining a strategic partnership using all the proposed criteria is impossible. Although the United States and Ukraine do not have a Free Trade Agreement, economic cooperation alone cannot indicate a strategic partnership. Given Ukraine's national interests, the security component is no less important and even more significant. Accordingly, political analysts saw the U.S. responsibility under the strategic partnership framework to strengthen Ukraine's defense capabilities; so that it would be able to cope with a possible military conflict (Toghrul 2014).

### **Economic Criteria for Strategic Partnership.**

The collapse of the Soviet Union led to a severe economic contraction in Ukraine and other post-Soviet states. Although Ukraine has never been a full member of the C.I.S., it has been considered a part of the Post-Soviet Space decades after its independence. Since Ukraine's independence in 1991, the U.S. expected that Ukraine would soon integrate into Euro-Atlantic structures and become a prosperous state with a free-market economy (Pekka Sutela 2012). Official consolidation of trade and economic cooperation between the United States and Ukraine took place in 1992 in a new agreement on trade relations. This and other documents set out the basic principles of cooperation, such as non-discriminatory treatment for goods and services, optimization of mutual commercial opportunities, expansion of commercial contacts, the consistent operation of commercial representations, and the fair procedure for dispute settlement (Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) 1992).

The legal framework of Ukraine-US relations includes 134 documents covering a wide spectrum of areas for cooperation. The main Ukrainian-American intergovernmental body is the Bilateral Strategic Partnership Commission (P.S.C.). It first convened in Washington at the end of 2009. The P.S.C. coordinates cross-sectoral mechanisms covering political dialogue and the rule of law, non-proliferation and export controls, energy and nuclear security, science and technology, trade and investment, defense, and consular issues. Dialogue in the trade and economic sphere is institutionally organized as a bilateral Trade and Investment Council. The United States traditionally remains one of Ukraine's leading partners in trade and economic cooperation. Despite the risks and differences, the countries have worked together to reduce trade barriers and ensure free mutual market access.

In particular, in 2005, Ukraine introduced a visa-free regime for U.S. citizens. The United States, in turn, re-registered Ukraine as a member of the Generalized System of Preferences in 2006 and lifted trade sanctions imposed in 2002, allowing Ukraine to export 3,400 types of goods to the United States duty-free. In the same year, Ukraine was recognized by the United States as a market economy country, and the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to Ukraine was banned, which prohibited government loans and imposed discriminatory taxes and tariffs on Ukrainian imports to the United States. With substantial U.S. support, Ukraine became a member of the World Trade

Organization in May 2008. The same year the United States and Ukraine joined the United States-Ukraine Trade and Investment Cooperation Agreement, which created an effective mechanism for ensuring the development of trade and economic cooperation between Ukraine and the United States in the activities of the Ukrainian-American Trade and Investment Council, its working bodies, and groups. In addition, an expert group on trade issues was established to speed up and increase the efficiency of bilateral negotiations at the working level on trade, investment, and commercial issues, having its first meeting in early February 2013. As for bilateral trade, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce, the relations between Ukraine and the United States have only intensified (Figure 1).

Ukrainian-American trade cooperation has been characterized by uneven revivals and declines over the past 30 years since the 1990s. Foreign trade began to decline in the late 1990s and reached its lowest level since 1994. Then a period of rapid growth in exports and imports of goods due to the political events of the Orange Revolution of 2004-2005 and the changing vectors of Ukraine's foreign economic strategy. Since 2004, there has been a clear positive trend towards a sharp increase in foreign trade between the two countries (Figure 1). During the analyzed period, a positive foreign trade balance was observed from 2003 to 2006. In 2008, foreign trade revenues between the two countries reached their highest level in 20 years at \$ 4.7 billion, up 3.9 times from 2003. In 2009, due to the global economic crisis, there was a sharp decline in foreign trade. Exports amounted to \$ 250 million and imports to \$ 1.2 billion. In 2010, the situation improved, and foreign trade increased about 1.6 times compared to 2009.




Figure 1. The U.S. trade in goods with Ukraine (U.S. Department of Commerce 2022).

At the beginning of the XXI century, exports dominated Ukraine's foreign trade with the United States. Still, since 2007 there has been a tendency to increase imports and the negative balance of trade in supplies of high-quality high-tech products from the United States and reduce demand for Ukrainian products. The foreign trade balance of Ukraine and the United States has been positive since 1994 due to supplies of raw materials to the United States. Still, in 2007-2011 it changed to negative and in 2009 reached more than 1 billion U.S. dollars due to increased imports of mechanical engineering products. The negative form of the trade balance was influenced by the rapid growth of imports of American products to the Ukrainian market in recent years. As a result, the United States ranked eighth in 2010 (\$ 1.76 billion, or 2.9% of total imports from Ukraine). However, Ukraine is not the main trading partner of the United States, as its share in U.S. foreign trade turnover is small (less than 0.2%).

From 2013 to 2015, foreign trade has become less active due to deteriorating relations between Ukraine and one of its most important trading partners, the Russian Federation, and the instability in Ukraine's economy. In 2013, there was a slight decline in foreign trade - by 12% in exports and 5% in imports. In 2014, the downward trend continued. In addition, instability and the war in eastern Ukraine have called into question the possibility of developing foreign policy with the United States. It should be noted that since 2014 the statistics are given without taking into

account the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. Over the past five years, foreign trade between the United States and Ukraine has increased at the expense of the need to diversify foreign trade.

In 2016, foreign trade in goods between the two countries intensified markedly. Exports in 2016 amounted to 426 million U.S. dollars, and imports 1687.9 US dollars. In 2017, the trend continued, with exports and imports growing to \$ 828.1 and \$ 2.52 billion, respectively. At the same time, exports of Ukrainian goods to the United States increased by 51% and imports by 66.8%. 2018 was characterized by a revival of exports, which amounted to 1.11 billion U.S. dollars, 25.5% more than in 2017, and imports - 2.96 billion U.S. dollars, which, in turn, increased by 14%. In 2019, exports decreased by 11% and amounted to 978.6 million U.S. dollars; imports increased by 9.8% to -3.28 billion U.S. dollars. In 2020, exports amounted to 983.1 million U.S. dollars, which is 0.4% more than in 2019, and imports decreased by 10% and amounted to 2.95 billion U.S. dollars. The growth of the negative balance in trade in goods is due to the growth of supplies of high-tech high-value products from the United States (ANNEX 1), as well as the decline in demand for Ukrainian goods due to the instability of the Ukrainian economy.

The main reason for the negative balance is that Ukraine mainly exports raw materials and semi-finished products. Production and trade in raw materials and semi-finished products have significant shortcomings for the country's economy due to the following reasons: low added value, prices for these products are variable (as over the years, the world may form a certain surplus of basic materials and food), profit from the sale of such products depends on the scale of production and demand in foreign markets, the presence on the world market of competitors who produce these products at lower prices, scientific and technical potential is not developing (Proshchalykina and Polishchuk 2021). The main types of imported goods are mineral fuels, oil, land vehicles, nuclear reactors, polymeric materials, plastics, appliances, and more (Annex 1). Ukraine imports mainly finished products. Regarding the export of U.S. goods to Ukraine, it should be emphasized that the main problem remains unresolved: the advantage of raw materials exports over finished products (ANNEX 2). Thus, according to ANNEX 2, the main products exported from Ukraine to the United States are ferrous metals, which account for more than half of the total structure of exports.

One of the important features of U.S.-Ukraine relations is Ukraine's significant dependence on foreign trade with the United States (Proshchalykina and Polishchuk, 2021). Therefore, the US-

Ukraine trade intensity index was also calculated (World Bank Official Website - Bilateral US-Ukraine Trade Intensity Index). Since the indicator estimates trade intensity in one direction, it is advisable to consider them bilaterally. The closer the index is to one, the greater the trading intensity. As we see, trade intensity for the United States is higher than for Ukraine (Figure 1). However, this indicates higher volumes of exports from the United States to Ukraine than from Ukraine to the United States (ANNEX 1 and 2). Thus, we can discuss the strategic partnership between Ukraine and the United States based on empirical assessments and sociological surveys. However, the trade intensity index between the two countries is another important feature. The index shows that trade is more intense in the United States than on the part of Ukraine. Therefore, the political and military spheres rather than the economic ones support the hypothesis of strategic partnership ties between the United States and Ukraine. Therefore, Ukraine should analyze the possibilities of strengthening economic cooperation.

## **Transatlantic Security: The US-Ukraine Military Partnership.**

### **The Establishment of US-Ukraine Military Cooperation.**

Defense and resistance are the only effective tactics tested by time. For centuries Ukrainians have held their nation together at the cost of human life. Ukraine has never been a tabula rasa on which Russia was free to make whatever imprint it wanted. And today, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, Ukrainians fight back again for their freedom, families, and the great nation's future. Even other Europeans believe that their fate is being decided in Ukraine. For the first time in history, the war is amorphic. The physical part is taking place in Ukraine, but the information component is spread worldwide. Russia uses the heavy artillery of propaganda directed toward Ukraine, its history, self-identity, and leadership. Looking back to the very origins of Ukraine-West relations, many have questioned whether the importance of Ukraine has been properly considered. Did the U.S. and other states realize their strategic role in the stability and security of Europe?

Hallenberg and Karlsson characterized the transatlantic security relations between the United States, the European Union, and the Russian Federation as a strategic triangle (Hallenberg and Karlsson 2006). Initially, this concept described the politics between the U.S., China, and the Soviet Union (Hallenberg and Karlsson 2006). The New Strategic Triangle has significantly impacted other relationships, particularly among states in the post-Soviet space (Georgia,

Ukraine). Despite significant cooperation and commonality of interests, the abovementioned relations oft represented a clash of political cultures and political norm systems. Dating back to the Cold War, these tensions between the West and the former Soviet Bloc continued to exist after the collapse of Russia's empire. Moscow continued to regard NATO and the U.S. as an opposing bloc and to secure its spheres of influence (Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Kazakhstan) with all measures disregarding the international treaties and agreements (Hallenberg and Karlsson 2006).

Ukraine has no territorial claims against any country and has strived to live in peace since the early 1990s. The key political figures have viewed Ukraine as a significant factor in stability and peace in Europe. Independent Ukraine is a key to sustaining geopolitical pluralism in the C.I.S. and serves as "a barometer of Russia's international behavior" (Pavliuk, 2002). Michael Mandelbaum stated in the mid-1990s: "So long as it remains independent, it is a shield for Europe. More important, an independent Ukraine is the best assurance that Russia will remain a peaceful nation-state" (Mandelbaum 1995). Ukraine has always been a primary target for Russian control. Being the first Republic to access the Soviet Union, Ukraine proved to be a valuable resource for the Russian economy, industrial complex, and security. "Given its geopolitical location, favorable climate, and natural riches, it is not surprising that territory has been attracting conquerors from all around the world" (Polyakov 2004). The Declaration of State Sovereignty, adopted on July 16, 1990, proclaimed that Ukraine "as a sovereign nation-state, is developing within its existing borders based on the realization by the Ukrainian people of its inalienable right to self-determination (Section I)" (Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine 1990). After independence, creating a Ukrainian army appeared to be the basis for political compromise and cooperation between the official leadership and the opposition. President Kravchuk asked Ukrainians never to forget the history lessons of the existential threat from Russia to militarily weak Ukraine (Strekal and USAF Institute for National Security Studies 1994).

Pavlik named four periods that characterize the evolution of the West's Ukrainian policy in the late 20th century ranging from neglect and skepticism in 1991-93 to support in 1995-96, followed by growing frustration, fatigue, and disbelief in 1997-99 and the beginning of disengagement in 2000 (Pavliuk 2002). In the early 1990s, Ukraine's foreign policy orientation took a Western turn. Relations with the West were seen in Kyiv as critically important for two sets of reasons: (1) to consolidate Ukraine's sovereignty and independence and (2) to shape Ukraine's geopolitical identity (Pavliuk 2002). In many respects, U.S. policy toward Ukraine is created by

nuclear disarmament (Garnett 1996). While some believed that a better-armed Ukraine could be a brake on Russian ambitions, others were highly concerned about the nuclear weapons threats. As expected, nuclear weapons dominated all political discussions. It was openly stated in a 1992 joint declaration issued by the U.S. and Ukrainian presidents that Ukraine would eliminate all nuclear weapons on its territory with assistance from the United States (Pifer 2017). Soon after Bill Clinton's inauguration as the forty-second president of the United States in 1993, the presidents of both states continued to address the nuclear issue as a security priority and a precondition for strengthening their economic and political relations.

### **1994 – A Turning Point in Ukraine's History.**

As a successor to the Soviet Union, Ukraine received “the world's third-largest nuclear stockpile” (Polyakov 2018). As a result, Ukraine was facing a dilemma: to keep the weapons as a deterrence mechanism, first of all for Russia, or to start a more constructive dialogue on its integration with the West. On the one hand, Kyiv's unwillingness to eliminate nuclear weapons contributed to Western indifference and skepticism about Ukraine's prospects. On the other hand, discouraged by the absence of Western support and understanding, Ukrainian leaders had to emphasize state-building and did not have enough confidence to make difficult decisions on nuclear disarmament. In October 1993, during his official visit to Ukraine, Secretary of State Warren Christopher clarified that economic support for Ukraine on the U.S. side would be attached to progress on the nuclear issue (Dixon and Parker 2021). Pavlik argued that for this very reason, Ukraine-West relations did not go beyond mere diplomatic recognition in the early 90s.

A breakthrough came in November 1994, when Ukraine joined the N.P.T. Under the Budapest Memorandum, Washington, London, and Moscow provided security assurances to Ukraine in return for relinquishing its nuclear weapons (Zabakhidze 2021). It marked a new stage in the countries' bilateral relations. During his visit to the United States in 1994, Kuchma proclaimed that the main objective of Ukrainian policy was to integrate Ukraine into European economic and political structures to strengthen ties with NATO in the Partnership Framework for Peace (Shcherbak 1998). That same year, Ukraine joined NATO's Partnership for Peace (Espinas 2010). Ukraine has greatly contributed to Euro-Atlantic security by joining U.N. and NATO peacekeeping operations (Zabakhidze 2021). It consistently demonstrated its commitment to

regional and global security. Ukraine joined NATO forces in the Middle East, Balkans, and the maritime missions in Mediterranean (Espinás 2010). In December 2008, in the aftermath of Russia's armed support of separatist enclaves in Georgia, the U.S.-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership established the legal basis for strategic nature of the relations. Moreover, the Charter reaffirmed the Budapest security guarantees.

Ukraine's accession to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty on December 5, 1994 opened up new opportunities for Ukraine. Back in the fall of 1994, Kuchma announced a long-awaited program of liberal economic reforms, and Western assistance was needed to ensure the success of those reforms. U.S.-Ukrainian military-political cooperation has been incredibly proactive, both bilaterally and within the NATO partnership framework for the peace program with Ukraine, the first of the C.I.S. countries to join on February 8, 1994. In this program's framework, Ukrainian military units participated in multinational P.F.P. exercises between Ukraine and the United States, followed by joint US-Ukrainian marine exercises. The following two years - 1995 and 1996 - brought some promising progress in Ukraine's domestic reforms and its relations with the West. International financial institutions - the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.), the World Bank (W.B.), and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) - launched their assistance programs to Ukraine (the first I.M.F. loans were granted to Ukraine only in 1994). By the fall of 1996, Ukraine had curtailed its unprecedented inflation, achieved macroeconomic stabilization, introduced a new and stable currency, and adopted a democratic constitution (Pavliuk 2002).

In 1996, the U.S. allotted \$10 million to support participation in the P.F.P. program. It enabled Ukrainian Armed Forces to fully engage in the program's first stage with a minimal burden on the national budget. Ukraine commenced on integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions and declared future membership in the E.U. as its strategic goal. From 1996-to 1997, Ukraine called for NATO enlargement, for which the U.S. responded with the NATO-Ukraine special partnership adopted at the 1997 Madrid Summit (Garnett 1996). Departing from initial concerns and fears, Kyiv endorsed NATO's eastward enlargement and negotiated a Charter on Distinctive Partnership with the Alliance. Under these circumstances, the West increasingly recognized the sovereignty and stability of Ukraine as 'a crucial factor' and 'a key component' of regional and European stability and security (Pavliuk 2002). In June 1998, President Kuchma signed a decree adopting the Strategy of Ukraine's integration into the E.U.; in November of that year, Kyiv adopted a

comprehensive three-year program of deepening cooperation with NATO. The beginning of 2000 brought new political momentum and hope to Ukraine.

Garnett argues that these and other positive steps in the relationship directly resulted from successful nuclear talks (Garnett 1996). Shcherbak also claims that National security issues are attached to the economic situation in the country (Shcherbak 1998). At the end of the 20th century, a state's power was measured not solely by its military capabilities but also by its people's well-being, steady economic development, and technological and intellectual advancement. Shcherbak described the situation of the late 1990s as a grave structural crisis. By the end of 1997 and early 1998, it became evident that the country's economic reforms remained limited to macroeconomic stabilization (Shcherbak 1998), while the necessary microeconomic structural changes did not come along (the U.S.-EU Summit Washington, DC 1997). Ukraine's successful transition to a market economy was met with political obstructions: persisting political tensions between branches and centers of power, inconsistent economic policies of two consecutive governments - Lazarenko (1996-97) and Pustovoitenko (1997-99), non-transparent political processes, the lack of responsibility and accountability, and corruption (the U.S.-EU Summit Washington, DC 1997). The hopes of Ukrainian transformations similar to those of its more advanced Central European neighbors had almost vanished. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, Ukraine faded from the radar screen of Western attention. In the early 2000s, Ukraine and the West passed decisive tests of their relationships. First, the political crisis that plagued Ukraine in late 2000-early 2001 revealed the unfinished nature of Ukraine's transition and the fragility of its geopolitical standing. It has also challenged the effectiveness of Western influences vis-a-vis Ukraine in the decade following independence. The shocking terrorist attacks against the U.S. impacted the major powers' foreign and security policies. It added more uncertainties about the future of Ukraine-West relations.

Nevertheless, the Ukrainian leadership continued to push for Ukraine's European integration. The re-election of Kuchma as President in November 1999 led to the formation of a non-leftist (and largely president-oriented) parliamentary majority and a new government's appointment under Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko, who had a reputation as a reformer and enjoyed the trust of a majority of the Ukrainian people (Pavliuk 2002). The Yushchenko government committed itself to long-awaited reform policies. However, Ukraine's reform continued to be an overwhelmingly difficult task due to the country's diversity of interests. Friction between Kuchma

and Yushchenko also acted as a restraint on the government's reforms. As a result, Ukraine did not achieve the necessary consolidation for sustainable development that would have enabled it to turn the corner. Ukraine's situation was further complicated by its persisting energy dependence on Russia and the latter's much more coherent and assertive policy vis-a-vis Ukraine after President Putin's election, aimed at forcing Kyiv to make geopolitical concessions.

### **Military Cooperation after Russian Aggression.**

Ukraine has pursued two major objectives in military policy since its independence: to prevent its Army from being disobedient and its involvement in national political affairs and develop a strong army capable of protecting Ukraine. The establishment of Ukraine's national military went through two major phases – peacetime regression (1991-2013) and wartime transformation that came along after the victory of the Revolution of Dignity, as the United States provided comprehensive assistance to Ukraine. The Law of Ukraine "On Fundamentals of National Security of Ukraine" defines the main direction of state policy following the 2014 Russian war (Polyakov 2018). On August 24, 1991, the parliament of Ukraine adopted a resolution "On military formations in Ukraine," followed by the Concept of Defense and Construction of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in October of the same year (The Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine "On military formations in Ukraine" 1991; The Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine "Concept of Defense and Construction of the Armed Forces of Ukraine" 1991). These legal documents became the regulatory framework for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In mid-June 1992, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine ratified the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which set maximum armaments and military equipment levels for Ukraine. However, due to the disbandment of some units and improvement of organizational and staffing structure, the Armed Forces of Ukraine at the end of 1995 was reduced to 400 thousand people (Ministry of Defence of Ukraine 2013).

The 2014 legal framework between Ukraine and the United States remained in place as the Russian threat to Ukraine increased. Thus, the framework did not fully meet the challenges and threats of the existing geopolitical situation and the needs of the Ukrainian state in countering Russian aggression in Crimea and Donbas. As such, immediately after the Euromaidan, the United States provided comprehensive assistance to Ukraine. Prior to the Revolution of Dignity, the

parliament of Ukraine agreed that "Deepening cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to achieve the criteria necessary for membership in this organization" is critical for Ukraine's security (Verkhovna Rada 2010). At the same time, Ukraine could only rely on its own forces in resolving the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine (Decree of the President of Ukraine On the decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine "On the National Security Strategy of Ukraine" 2015). In such circumstances, Ukraine can count, first of all, on its forces and the support of the United States, E.U. member states, and NATO, which believe that preserving the independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine is one of the determinants of global and regional stability."

The main intergovernmental document regulating the military-political relations between Ukraine and the U. S. is the 2008 US- Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership. In existing geopolitical realities, this document is one of the international legal factors that confirms the Ukrainian state's security guarantees, enshrined in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. Furthermore, the Charter underlined the U.S. commitments to Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity (United States-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Washington, DC 2008). In 2021, Joint Statement by President Biden and President Volodymyr Zelenskyi testified that the relations between the United States and Ukraine have never been stronger than now; what makes the partnership particularly strong is the common values between the U.S. and Ukraine, and the American commitment to overall stability and peace in Europe (Joint Statement by President Biden and President Volodymyr Zelenskyi of Ukraine on the United States-Ukraine Strategic Partnership 2021).

November 10, 2021, the 2008 United States-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership has been revised and improved. The new document emphasized the U.S. recognition of Crimea as an inevitable part of Ukraine, and the growing threats to regional peace and stability. "Therefore, today, the main principle of Ukrainian-American relations is the observance of inviolability of Ukraine's borders. Manifestation of this principle is American military assistance to Ukraine. It is also important to note the appearance of the wording "hybrid threats" in the text of the Charter because Russia is carrying out hybrid aggression against Ukraine, where, in addition to military confrontation, there is also information warfare, economic pressure, and cyberattacks.

In order to increase the defense capabilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (A.F.U.) and bring them closer to NATO standards, the U.S. military began to retrain A.F.U. officers as part of

military exercises (Ministry of Defence of Ukraine 2022). Thus, in April 2015, joint Ukrainian-American exercises under the command of paratroopers of the 173rd U.S. Brigade within the framework of the Fearless Guards mission began at the Yavoriv test site. During the implementation of this program, the American side planned to train approximately 900 service members of the National Guard, special forces, and military units (Sedliar and Kravchenko 2018). Furthermore, in May 2015, the annual Platinum Eagle military exercises helped the Ukrainian military improve its skills in neutralizing enemy aircraft and holding doubles competitions on various combat vehicles. From September 8 to 23, 2017, at the first phase of the Rapid Trident 2017, 2,500 Ukrainian soldiers and servicemen from partner countries took part in the Rapid Trident 2017 exercise (V Ukrayini pochalysya navchannya NATO Rapident-2017 - Minoborony [NATO Rapident-2017 exercises have started in Ukraine - Ministry of Defense] 2017).

## **Democratic ideals and political contestation.**

### **The strategic importance of Ukraine.**

Ukraine has been known for centuries not merely as a vast territory in Eastern Europe with rich soil and important deposits of natural resources. But also for its audacious warriors, enormous cultural heritage, and unconditional patriotism of its people. Indeed, similarly to the United States, born in rebellion against Great Britain, Ukraine won its independence from Russia. Nevertheless, both states did not take their freedom for granted. Thus, they pursued democratic ideals and international security from the incipience of statehood. Although the intellectual foundations of contemporary Ukrainian democracy were laid by Mykhailo Drahomanov, who advocated liberal values and social equality, personal freedom, and civil rights, in practice, the Constitution of Pylyp Orlyk of 1710 was among the first constitutions that provided a separation of powers and a system of checks and balances (Kozachenko 2019). The analysis of the text of the Constitution gives grounds to claim that the separation of powers was the basis for the organization of state power (Pacts and Constitutions of Rights and Freedoms of the Zaporozhian Army). The highest organs of state power are enshrined in Articles VI-IX of the Constitution of Pylyp Orlyk of 1710. These included the General Council, the Hetman and the General Officers, and the General Court. Furthermore, the Constitution speaks of Ukrainian independence and war with the Russian

predecessor - the Moscow Tsarist state. "The clairvoyant hetman must also write... so that both our slaves, who are now in the Moscow state, will be freely returned to us after the war, and all damages caused by the Moscow state in the current war in Ukraine will be rewarded and rightly replenished" (Pritsak 1998).

From its earliest history, the area of the Black Sea has played a pivotal role in the structure of broad international trade. It was not merely the waterway for trade, but it proved to be a military route and petroleum deposit. Greece occupied this area to secure the Balkan flank from Athens (Shcherbak 1998). The regional power struggle in the Black Sea continued through World War I, II, and the Cold War. Throughout its history, the territory of Ukraine has been targeted by various invading powers for its rich grazing lands, coal, metal, grain, and mineral resources. The country's natural riches and wide expanses have favored agricultural development. Historians have calculated that Ukraine has been an object of more than two hundred invasions, wars of aggression, or devastating occupations (Shcherbak 1998). Parts of present-day Ukraine fell under various other entities in the centuries after 1240: the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Ottoman Empire, Muscovy, the Crimean Khanate, Poland, the Russian Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Pifer 2017). It is little known that Ukraine was one of both warring sides' primary goals in the Great War. During the meeting on October 25, 1917, German Chancellor Georg Michaelis and the head of the German Army's political directorate General Berthenverfer discussed the industrial interests in Ukraine (Shcherbak 1998). German politicians reaffirmed that splitting Ukraine from Russian Empire would substantially weaken its power. However, the Russian plan was to expand the conquest of Ukraine to its western part - Galicia, the province of the Austrian Empire. The Russian governor of occupied Galicia declared, "Eastern Galicia and the Lemko territories, nowadays Western Ukraine, have long been an integral part of Russia" (Shcherbak 1998). Steady imperial disintegration under the pressures of the war and revolution in Russia opened a new door in the history of Ukraine – the war of independence. One of the remarkable things about Ukraine is that the national identity stayed alive for so long—hundreds of years—absent a physical nation-state (Pifer 2017).

By the third year of the war, the multinational empires moved toward their downfall. The deteriorating situation in the Russian Empire gave rise to the February Revolution of 1917. Ukraine used the revolution to its advantage and already called for independence from Russia. Germany recognized Ukraine's independence in 1918 and as did the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. However,

the spread of the communists put the state in new peril. The five-year brutal conflict ended in the Bolshevik victory and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Poland and Soviet Russia divided Ukraine: Poland gained the West, and Russia acquired the East, including Crimea; Romania and Czechoslovakia occupied some regions. In 1920 Ukraine hoped to counterweight communism by allying with Poland, but when the fighting was over, the Russian communists annexed Ukraine into the Soviet Union.

Unlike Ukraine, the U.S. has not always seen Russia as its enemy. Not until the beginning of the Cold War has Russia been recognized as the "evil empire" (Lundestad 2003). European integration and the Atlantic military alliance were thought to contain the Soviet threat. Geir Lundestad has rightly noticed that the U.S. used the exact combination of arms and diplomacy in relations with the Soviet Union (Ibid). Maryna Bessonova argues that the role of Ukraine cannot be understood without analyzing the greater "East-European" scale of U.S. foreign policy (Bessonova, 2013). The definition of "Eastern Europe" has been primarily based on the East-West confrontation during the Cold War. The "Central and Eastern Europe" has held the Soviet Bloc cliché for decades. The American East-European politics was subordinated toward US-Soviet relations in the context of anti-Soviet policy (Bessonova, 2013).

### **The new history of U.S. East- European relations.**

A number of members of the Ukrainian American community became active in the early 90s to support the civil-political movement Rukh - People's Movement of Ukraine for Reconstruction [Narodnyy Rukh Ukrayiny za perebudovu] (Pifer 2017). The December 1 referendum reaffirmed huge public support and will to form a Ukrainian state. The overwhelming vote for independence impressed not only Americans but Ukrainians themselves. However, not until the termination of the Soviet Union as "a subject of international law" did the U.S. formally recognize Ukraine. After the Soviet Union formally ceased to exist, the U.S. proceeded to the establishment of foreign relations not only with the newly independent successor states but also with the Russian Federation. Relations with the West were seen in Kyiv as critically important for two sets of reasons: (1) they should have helped to consolidate Ukraine's sovereignty and independence, and (2) they were essential for shaping Ukraine's geopolitical identity (Pavliuk 2002).

The starting point in the US-Ukraine diplomatic relations development was arranging the embassies from both sides. The first trip by the President of Ukraine to America was before the Declaration of Independence (August 24) in May 1991. Leonid Kravchuk expressed concern that Russia was not yet ready to accept Ukraine's independence. Kravchuk was not mistaken, considering the contested by the Russian government status of Crimea, subject to the upcoming summer referendum. During his visit to the Crimean Peninsula, Russian Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoy's "aggressive statements" emphasized that ethnic Russians in Crimea, which constituted more than half of the population, disliked its accession to Ukraine (Pifer 2017). Besides, Russia claimed its power over the Black Sea Fleet. Undoubtedly, Russian interest in Crimea was supported by the strategic and economic benefits of the peninsula. The U.S. leaders believed that Ukraine's choice would determine the future of the Soviet Union. Although the Bush administration was hesitant to support Ukraine to moderate the relations with Russia, in his speech on August 1, 1991, the President recognized that "Kyiv is history. Centuries ago, your predecessors named this land Ukraine or your frontier because its steppes were linking Europe and Asia. Today you explore the frontiers of liberty..." (The White House Television (WHTV) crew, provided by the George Bush Presidential Library and Museum 1991).

Not only Russia, but the weak leadership among the political elites has presented the greatest challenge to Ukrainian national security. The culture of political corruption posed an enormous obstacle to Ukraine's successful development in the early 1990s. Under Leonid Kravchuk's leadership, Ukraine in a "de-jure" sense followed the pro-Western domestic and foreign policy model. However, "de-facto" remained a part of the Soviet system. In the late 1990s, the government's centrists had transformed into oligarchs and attempted to establish an authoritarian state to defend their political power and wealth (Kuzio 2005). During Kuchma's second term in office, Ukraine shared many common features with hybrid regimes (Kuzio 2005). Although the media became vibrant and more open, the critics of the administration were subject to harassment. Notably, during the Kuchma presidency, the murder of journalist Georgy Gongadze was not a coincidence (Ukraine's Leonid Kuchma "implicated" in Gongadze's death in 2013).

The oligarchy dominated Ukraine's political system for a decade under President Leonid Kuchma. The incumbent wanted Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich to succeed against an opposition pro-reformist candidate Viktor Yushchenko. Before the election, the U.S. and other states emphasized the lack of press freedom in Ukraine as an obstruction to democratic governance

and protecting human rights (Steven Woehrel 2005). Observers from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe reported that government employees, factory workers, and students were aggressively recommended to support Yanukovich in the elections (Steven Woehrel 2005). The proclamation of Yanukovich's victory caused outrage from Yushchenko supporters and the international community. At a press conference in October 2004 State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said that it was hard to watch the campaign in Ukraine that violated every international standard for presidential elections (Steven Woehrel 2005). On November 26, President Bush stressed that the Ukraine's elections could not be considered as valid and that repercussions would follow (Steven Woehrel 2005).

Like the Georgian experience in 2003-2004, Ukraine underwent a democratic revolution in 2004. The Orange Revolution was a turning point in Ukrainian history. On November 22, the crowd of hundreds of thousand had exploded at Kyiv's Independence Square. It screamed, "*Razom nas bahato! Nas nepodolaty!*" ("Together, we are many! We cannot be defeated!") (Adrian Karatnycky 2005). During the Orange Revolution in 2004, many Ukrainians believed the newly elected President would bring the country the promised change (Kuzio 2005). The popular protests during the Orange Revolution gave birth to the development of civil society in Ukraine (Stepanenko 2006). However, Yushchenko's Presidency was not the major reason or concern for the Orange Revolution. Indeed, the main driver was the choice of the Ukrainian public to be Ukrainian and not Russian. Besides, this revolution constituted the will of the Ukrainian nation to conduct the independent domestic and foreign policies to preserve cultural identity and national sovereignty.

The Yushchenko administration honored the United States as a bedrock supporting Ukraine's democracy and the rule of law (Adrian Karatnycky 2005). On April 4, 2005, the presidents proclaimed "a new era of the U.S.-Ukraine strategic partnership" (Office of the Press Secretary, the White House 2005). President Bush remarked that the people of Ukraine took a brave stand to elect their leadership freely, and the Orange Revolution was "a triumph of democracy over tyranny and oppression" (Office of the Press Secretary, the White House 2005). The heads of the states concluded "A New Century Agenda for the Ukrainian-American Strategic Partnership" (Kuzio 2005). At a Joint Press Availability in 2008, the U.S. and Ukraine's presidents met again. In Kyiv, Yushchenko asked if Russian excessive pressure intended to stop NATO's expansion, to which President Bush answered – "Just because there were a bunch of Soviet-era

flags in the street yesterday doesn't mean Russia could affect the course of actions in Bucharest” (Office of the Press Secretary 2008). The U.S. also assured it would work hard to ensure that Ukraine and Georgia would be accepted into Military Assistance Program. President Bush admitted that Ukraine’s and Georgia’s integration in NATO is in the best U.S. interests as well (Office of the Press Secretary 2008).

### **National revolutions and Russian retaliation.**

Despite the collapse of the Soviet system, the legacies of the Russian sphere of influence remained the same. Since they achieved independence in 1991, Ukraine and Georgia have been dogged by Russian interference. Moscow deemed the pro-western forces' victory in the post-Soviet Ukraine and Georgia as a triumph of nationalists in Kyiv and Tbilisi (Matsaberidze 2015). Russia would not allow NATO to expand eastwards further; the 'Cold War' patterns continued to govern aggressive decision-making. At the NATO Bucharest Summit in April 2008, Putin publicly declared that he viewed the appearance of NATO on Russia's borders as a "direct threat" to national security (Kofman 2018). NATO's formal announcement of Ukraine and Georgia’s prospective membership was a significant turning point for European security. In response, Moscow promised to do whatever it took to prevent this from happening, followed by the Russian-Georgian war.

Meanwhile, in Ukraine, when President Viktor Yanukovich came to power (2010-2014), he managed to usurp the 2004 constitution and concentrate all power in his hands. During his Presidency, the new Language Law ("On the principles of the State language policy" 2012), later declared unconstitutional, slowly exacerbated the East-West division of Ukraine. Historically, south-eastern Ukraine has been under the Russian Empire for centuries. Similarly, Western Ukraine has been dominated by contemporary European powers. Although independence mitigated the country's regional, linguistic, and ethnic differences, it was unconventional to hear a conversation half in Russian and half in Ukrainian. Hence, different historical legacies in Eastern and Western parts of Ukraine generated regional disparities. Moscow viewed the regional status of the Russian language as a victory in Ukraine's South-Eastern territory. It was later used as a tool in hybrid warfare against Ukraine.

The administration of President Viktor Yanukovich and the government led by Mykola Azarov had an active pro-Russian foreign policy. Intrinsicly, an important stage in the history of

independent Ukraine was the Vilnius Eastern Partnership on November 28-29, 2013. But shortly before that, an unexpected statement of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine announced its decision to suspend preparations for the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union, which became the catalyst for the first acts of protest. What started as a student and activists peaceful protest supporting Ukraine's integration into Europe became a physical confrontation with the police forces. On November 24, a large procession and rally took place in Kyiv on Independence Square, which gathered more than 100,000 supporters of European integration. Subsequent events on Independence Square become more acute. The government cracked down on the demonstrators killing over 100 civilian protesters. The protests did not merely stand for the pro-European direction in politics but also vetoed injustice as a way of life and the post-Soviet corruption politics. Nevertheless, a robust, diverse, and motivated civil society has developed, strong enough to overturn a stolen election in 2004 and bring down an authoritarian government in 2014 (Pifer 2017).

After President Yanukovich had fled the country in February, Petro Poroshenko became the new President of Ukraine (May 25, 2014). In his interview with Radio Europe, Vladimir Putin expressed concern for the safety of the Crimean population based on the Russian language and ethnicity and the possibility of ethnic cleansing in the aftermath of the coup in Kyiv (kremlinnews 2014). Indeed, there were no grounds for concerns about Russian-speaking people's safety in Ukraine. However, according to the International Criminal Court (I.C.C.) preliminary findings issued on November 14, there was a reasonable ground to believe that Russia had committed a crime falling within the jurisdiction of the Court on the Crimean and Donbas territories (Roderick Gregory 2019).

The 2014 Russian aggression violated the Budapest Memorandum and demonstrated its hostilities toward the Ukrainian nation. Through its narratives of "the civil war in Ukraine" and "Slavic brotherhood," Russia is trying to restore mystical historical glory, convincing itself that its history is different from historical facts. Recalling his comment to Bush in 2008 that "Ukraine is not a nation," Putin once again declared "Russians and Ukrainians are one people" in 2021 in the Article "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians" (kremlinnews 2021). Putin sees Ukraine as a part of Russia, although the people of Ukraine have exercised their right to self-determination and independence. Ukrainian efforts to join NATO and EU Putin translates as ambitions imposed by Western powers - "In recent years the wall between Russia and Ukraine,

the parts of what is largely the same historic and spiritual space. Now we can see the result of deliberate efforts (of the West) to undermine our unity” (kremlinnews 2021). Since the declaration of Ukrainian independence in 1991, there has been a wall between Ukraine and Russia – the Ukrainian national border. There are, indeed, no external forces that promote Westernization in Ukraine. Ukrainians have been more united than ever on the decision to take a pro-Western and independent stance from Russia foreign politics - the 2004 Orange Revolution and 2013/2014 Euromaidan are the evidence of this.

Although Washington's efforts to turn Ukraine into a modern democracy could not help that country stand up to Russian aggression in 2014, the Ukrainian cultural, political, and ideological world was no longer under the Russian sphere of influence. Russia's fruitless attempts to subdue and subvert Ukrainian uniqueness and identity, territorial integrity and national sovereignty have only united the people of Ukraine with the West. The Maidan events and Russia's aggressive actions toward Ukraine have significantly affected the geopolitical orientations of Ukrainians. From September 2013 until February 2015, the share of supporters of E.U. accession increased by six percentage points (from 41% to 47%) (Sakhno 2015). According to the public opinion survey conducted by KIIS, in February 2015, 47.2% of respondents said that Ukraine should join the E.U., while in 2013, less than 33% of the respondents considered that Ukraine should join the European Union (Thoughts of the population of Ukraine on the Customs Union and European Union 2013b). A December 2021 poll survey reported that 72 percent of Ukrainians consider Russia a hostile power (Dixon and Parker 2021).

Social psychologist Albert Hadley Cantril explains that people's opinion is highly sensitive to important issues (Chapman 1942). Unusual events can temporarily direct public opinion from one extreme to another. For example, in the light of the Russian aggression in 2014, the public views toward Ukraine's foreign policy orientation have significantly changed. While the Revolution of Dignity in 2014 had finally rallied the people of Ukrainian around Euro-Atlantic integration, Russia's unilateral annexation of Crimea undermined public support for a pro-Moscow orientation (Zabakhidze 2021). A 2014 USAID opinion poll reported that nearly fifty percent of the population in Ukraine supported deeper and closer relations with the West (Zabakhidze 2021).

The traditional Ukrainian proverb says that "information rules the world." The information obtained has a decisive influence on the content and dissemination of public opinion. Hence, events strongly influence public opinion unless the words themselves are interpreted as events. An

example of such words, which were a significant event, is the speech by Winston Churchill at Westminster College in Fulton (Missouri) about the "Iron Curtain," which symbolized the beginning of the Cold War. In his speech in Fulton, former British Prime Minister Churchill warned of the threat of tyranny and totalitarianism emanating from the USSR (which created an "iron curtain" from Szczecin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic). Similarly, Putin's warnings at the Munich Security Conference (February 2007) were the red flags of the growing Russian hostility toward the West (Galen Carpenter 2022).

During the years 2019-2021, the readiness to vote for NATO membership increased somewhat: the share of the country's population which expressed readiness to vote for NATO membership increased from 40% in 2019 to 48% in 2021 (Sakhno 2021). Results of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) all-Ukrainian public opinion poll conducted on December 13-16, 2021—before the Russian military buildup, confirmed that 75.7% of referendum participants would vote in favor of joining the E.U., and 67.8% would support Ukraine's accession to NATO (Attitudes towards Ukraine's accession to the E.U. and NATO, attitudes towards direct talks with Vladimir Putin and the perception of the military threat from Russia: the results of a telephone survey conducted on December 13-16, 2021). After the full-fledged invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, public support for the E.U. and NATO was nearly unanimous. In March 2022, 76 percent of surveyed Ukrainians supported their country joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), marking an increase of over 40 percent compared to March 2014 (Public opinion on Ukraine joining NATO 2014-2022).

### **How is the Georgian Case Similar to the Situation in Ukraine?**

Moscow sees Ukraine and Georgia as the core of its strategic interests, while for the U.S., they are not the priority in its foreign policy. The democratic anti-totalitarian revolutions in the early 1990s started a new period in the U.S. East-European relations. In a comparatively short time, Eastern Europe took a pivotal place among the U.S. foreign policy interests. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, independent Ukraine and Georgia decisively moved toward integration with the West. However, the Russian Federation has claimed its strong historical and cultural ties and the immediate vicinity with the post-Soviet states. The colored revolutions, in particular, fed Russia's fears of losing its spheres of interest to the West.

Ukraine and Georgia declared independence in early 1991 as the Soviet Union fell apart. Georgia and Ukraine have prioritized closer integration with the E.U. and NATO. However, the internal problems have obstructed them from gaining memberships in the Alliance, such as Russian claims over the territories in Georgia and Ukraine, political instability, and the low capacity of the military sector (Lazarević 2009). Like contemporary Ukrainian developments, Georgia has faced war with two pro-Russian separatist groups – from South Ossetia and Abkhazia. After Putin came to power (2000) in Russia, the Revolutions of Color – Orange in Ukraine (2004) and Rose in Georgia (2003) over the fraudulently reported results of democratic elections made it clear that nations chose the West over Russia. Separatist attacks in 2008 in Georgia started the sequential tensions that escalated the earlier crises. In parallel Russian annexation of the Crimean peninsula in 2014 was immediately followed by a subsequent war in the East before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Unlike Belarus, Georgia and Ukraine were immune to the growing authoritarianism in the post-Soviet space since the Rose Revolution of Georgia, and the Orange Revolution of Ukraine laid the foundation for the political transformations (Delcour and Wolczuk 2015). After the so-called Color Revolutions, the Russian Federation was concerned about these two countries' independent/pro-Western orientation. Therefore, Moscow ordered "peacekeeping operations" in pro-Russian separatist territories (Lavrov 2008). Russia called the wars in Georgia and Ukraine humanitarian missions to protect national minorities. During the August 2008 war between Georgian and South Ossetian and Russian forces, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin condemned Georgian forces for a 'genocide' in South Ossetia (Nielsen 2009). Analogously, the annexation of Crimea was justified by Russian leadership as a salvation of the Russian-speaking population.

Eight years before the Russo-Georgian war, the Russian leadership passionately condemned NATO intervention in Kosovo, calling it an aggression that caused the severe humanitarian consequences it aimed to avert. Russia representative Lavrov added that "The aggressive military action unleashed by NATO against Serbia without the authorization and in circumvention of the Security Council is a real threat to international peace and security and a gross violation of the United Nations Charter and other basic norms of international law" (Lavrov 1999). Thus, the Russian government was well-informed of its own continuously committed violations in Georgia and Ukraine. During the Russian–Georgian war of August 2008, Russia claimed its "responsibility

to protect" South Ossetians from genocide and ethnic cleansing. Shortly afterward, Russia recognized that its operations in South Ossetia and Abkhazia (2008) were similar to the deployments of NATO forces in Kosovo (1999).

### **US-Georgian strategic partnership.**


On December 25, 1991, the U.S. officially recognized the independence of the former member states of the Soviet Union. U.S. President George W. Bush then started diplomatic relations with Georgia (Lomia 2019). Shortly afterward, the embassies were opened on both sides (1992-1993). The U.S. policy aimed to strengthen stability and peace in the region. The U.S. economic support to Georgia was not only embedded in the legal assurances of the economic partnership but supported by the solid investment of more than \$3 billion. A big portion of these funds was granted through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which primarily focused on humanitarian assistance. President Clinton declared that "the U.S. should support Georgia's efforts to secure a United Nations peacemaking effort and have the conditions that will permit the peacemaking to succeed..." (Clinton 1994). These funds were particularly helpful after the civil war in Georgia in the early 1990s (Vanishvili 2020).

Promoting democracy and reform is an essential pillar of the U.S. foreign policy. Since 1992, international democracy assistance programs have been operating very actively in Georgia. Still, the most productive work has been carried out by the USAID and the Open Society- Georgia Foundation (Vanishvili 2020). The Joint Declaration on the U.S.–Georgia Strategic Partnership of June 2019 called for domestic reforms and democratization in Georgia (Smolnik and Stiftung Wissenschaft Und Politik 2020). Since gaining independence, Georgia has successfully fought corruption at home. However, the Georgian people have chosen to be integrated into Euro-Atlantic structures, and to achieve this goal, it needs a strong, reliable partner, such as the United States (Vanishvili 2020).

The United States has steadfastly committed to Georgia's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. In turn, Georgia participated in NATO's Kosovo Force (1999) and US-led international operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Central Africa. Meanwhile, Georgia's bid to join NATO in 2002-2008 failed amid strong Russian opposition. In the aftermath of the 2008 August war, the U.S. participated in the Geneva International

Discussions on the Conflict in Georgia. The U.S. condemned the Russian attack as unjustified and unacceptable. Yet despite assisting Georgia, Washington refrained from military actions, fearful of the escalation. Later, the United States allocated a billion dollars to help Georgia with the post-war recovery. Under the Obama administration, in 2009, the US-Georgia Strategic Partnership Charter was adopted, which remains a vital platform for dialogue.

Similar to the situation with Ukraine, the overall economic potential of the U.S.-Georgian partnership has remained unrealized. Meanwhile, the US-Ukraine exports/imports are greater than the Georgian trade with the United States. Furthermore, Georgian imports from the U.S. heavily outweigh its exports. For example, in 2019, U.S. exports to Georgia accounted for almost \$680 million, while U.S. imports reached \$130 million. Even worse was the situation with the trade diversification. Such as in 2018, iron and steel accounted for more than 90 percent of Georgia's exporting goods, while 85 percent of its imports were machinery and transport equipment (Smolnik and Stiftung Wissenschaft Und Politik 2020). Similar to the situation in Ukraine, Georgian exports to the U.S. are dominated by unprocessed goods.



**Figure 2.** The U.S. trade in goods with Ukraine and Georgia (U.S. Department of Commerce 2022).

### **Key traits in the U.S. strategic partnerships with Georgia and Ukraine.**

Along the lines of US-Ukraine relations, Georgia has developed deep socio-political, military, and economic ties with the U.S. Relations between the U.S. and Georgia and Ukraine began with the collapse of the Soviet Union (Zabakhidze 2021). Since 1991, the U.S. has generously assisted Georgia and Ukraine with democratic state-building. Eduard Shevardnadze, the former Foreign Minister of the USSR, and the former head of Georgia, affirmed on his trip to Washington in 1994 that economic assistance from outside is vital for the future development of a democratic country - "If it were not for the assistance of the American people, the Georgian people in the full sense of the word would be starving" (Vanishvili 2020).

Similar to Ukraine, the U.S.- Georgia relations went through gradual development. Natia Gamkrelidze singled out three periods in the US-Georgia partnership: 1991–2003, from Georgia's independence to the Rose Revolution; 2003–2012, from the Rose Revolution to the election of the new Georgian Dream political party in Georgia in 2012; and from 2012 to 2020 (Gamkrelidze 2021). Among other C.I.S. states, Georgia has been classified as a 'transitional government' or a 'hybrid regime.' The first phase of the US-Georgian relationship has been characterized by skepticism toward democratic progress and the overall state survival. It was widely believed among US-NATO political elites that the Russian tendency to interfere impeded Georgian security and advance in other spheres (Gamkrelidze 2021). Meanwhile, Shevardnadze's period evidenced the cultural proximity between the U.S. and Georgia. A dominant view among U.S. and NATO respondents was that they saw Georgia as a country that aspired to U.S. and NATO friendship (Gamkrelidze 2021). However, even though Georgia was viewed as a reliable partner, the perception of a failing state of corruption endured.

The revolution of November 2003 and the election of the new President, Mikhail Saakashvili, in January 2004 has been considered a great success for future democratic consolidation. Similarly, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine brought new hopes of regime change and closer ties with the West. It is argued that "Saakashvili's leadership has helped Georgia emerge from the stagnation and decay of the Shevardnadze period into a period of rapid economic growth critical to its security" (Gamkrelidze 2021). Meanwhile, the concerns about the external threat, mainly from Russian intervention, have only mounted. According to the interviews with the U.S. representatives, Russian hostilities escalated due to the fear of the color revolutions' potential spread to Russia. The former U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, remarked that the Orange

Revolution in Ukraine was the last straw for Russia, who saw the revolutions as further cause for intervention in Georgia, increasing the likelihood of the war (Gamkrelidze 2021).

In the official statements by Senator Barak Obama towards Georgia, before he was elected the 44th president of the United States, he declared: "...very aggressive Russia is a threat to the peace and stability of the region. Their actions in Georgia were unacceptable. They were unwarranted... It is absolutely important that we have a unified alliance and that we explain to the Russians that you cannot be a 21st-century superpower or power and act like a 20th-century dictatorship... And to countries like Georgia and Ukraine, I think we have to insist that they are free to join NATO if they meet the requirements, and they should have a membership action plan immediately to start bringing them in" (Obama 2008). In the same speech, Mr. Obama added: "Now, we also can't go back to a Cold War posture in our relations with Russia. We recognize that there are some mutual interests, such as nuclear proliferation," to which his opponent, John McCain, responded that Senator Obama "doesn't understand that Russia committed serious aggression against Georgia. And Russia has now become a nation fueled by petro-dollars that is a K.G.B. apparatchik-run government" (Ibid). John McCain's comment on the gravity of Russian aggression and the savagery of the new regime hit the nail on the head. The 2014 annexation of the Crimean peninsula and subsequent developments in Eastern Ukraine revealed the need to strengthen NATO partners in Eastern Europe.

On December 19, 2008, the strategic format of bilateral relations between Ukraine and the United States was enshrined in the Charter on Strategic Partnership. Similarly, the U.S.- Georgian Charter on Strategic Partnership established in January 2009 manifested a new stage of U.S.- Georgia relations. These agreements substantially complemented the legal framework of U.S. relations with Ukraine and Georgia. Among the priority issues for Ukraine's and Georgia's cooperation with the United States was mobilizing the international community to protect the states' sovereignty and territorial integrity, strengthening defense and energy security, and attracting international assistance for wide-ranging reforms in the state.

While the new strategic partnerships are often traced to the longstanding U.S. relationship with Georgia and Ukraine, it is impossible to separate their development from the August war in Georgia and Russian aggression in Ukraine (Welt 2010). Defense and security cooperation often preceded the strategic partnership declarations between the U.S. and other Eastern European states. For instance, Romania had become a full member of NATO and a reliable military partner to the

U.S. (accession to NATO 2004, Defense Cooperation Agreement with the U.S. 2005) before the 2011 "Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century Between the United States of America and Romania" (U.S. Department of State 2021). The United States concluded a Defense Cooperation Agreement with Georgia in 2002. Although the military sphere is a foundation for the strategic relations between the states, U.S. Strategic Partnership Frameworks with its allies often involve economic, trade, and energy cooperation followed by strengthening democracy and the rule of law. Being built upon the success of the 2006 Defense Cooperation Agreement, US-Bulgaria Strategic Partnership has further penetrated the economic sphere, trade, energy, and democratization (U.S. Department of State 2019).

The United States-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership appears to be the blueprint for the U.S.-Georgian Strategic Partnership Framework. The Preamble of the United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership nearly replicates the first three paragraphs of the U.S.-Ukraine Charter, in which the states "1. Affirm the importance of our relationship as friends and strategic partners. We intend to deepen our partnership to benefit both nations and expand our cooperation across a broad spectrum of mutual priorities. 2. Emphasize that this cooperation between our two democracies is based on shared values and common interests. 3. Stress our mutual desire to strengthen our relationship across the economic, energy, diplomatic, scientific, cultural and security fields" (United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Washington, DC 2009). Likewise, Sections I, II, III, IV, and V proclaim the same objectives for U.S. cooperation with Ukraine and Georgia, recalling the shared democratic values and deepening integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions (United States-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Washington, DC 2008).

A comparative perspective on the nature of strategic partnerships reinforces the notion that these kinds of partnerships have no single endpoint (Welt 2010). However, as it appears in Eastern Europe, most partnerships with the U.S. have ultimately led to inclusion in NATO. For example, at the Bucharest summit in April 2008, NATO announced in its declaration, para. 28: "Ukraine and Georgia will become members of NATO. Both nations have made valuable contributions to Alliance operations." (Bucharest Summit Declaration 2008). "At Bucharest, Russia's primary concern was the one of NATO expansion...Indeed, there are no threats coming out of the enlargement. Russia's fears are the relics of the past, inconsistent with the 21st-century concepts

of fostering human development through free, prosperous, secure societies" (The United States. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe 2008).

Until recently, the United States and Russia were quite capable of providing Ukraine with reliable military security guarantees. After the Obama administration came to power in 2009, the U.S. improved economic relations and nuclear issues cooperation with Russia, ending the Bush-era plan of sending missile-defense systems to Poland and the Czech Republic and lifting sanctions imposed by George W. Bush on the Russian Federation imposed immediately after it attacked Georgia in 2008 (Cooper 2018). However, the political crisis that erupted in Ukraine in late November 2013 signaled that the peril driven by Russian neo-imperialism was on-going. Following the escalation of the Russian war in Eastern Ukraine, the U.S. intensified its support to Ukraine and Georgia. Despite the earlier "Russia Reset" policies of the Obama Administration, the U.S. condemned Russian aggression and reconsidered its foreign policy priorities (Cooper 2018). There is also a view that Ukraine's and Georgia's geostrategic role is inextricably linked to how the U.S. perceives Russia. In the reflections of the U.S. and NATO respondents, the Ukrainian situation gave the U.S. and NATO the opening to step up the security relationship with Georgia (Gamkrelidze 2021). Still, President Obama, willing to avoid the escalation of the Russian hostilities, refused lethal military equipment to Georgia and Ukraine (Zabakhidze 2021). However, in the forthcoming years (2017-2018), the Trump administration encouraged the sale of anti-tank Javelin missiles to both countries, substantially increasing Ukraine's defense capabilities by providing lethal military aid and political support. In addition to military and economic assistance to Ukraine and Georgia, the new list of sanctions has been elevated against Russian Federation and individuals operating in occupied territories.

### **U.S. Response to the Georgian and Ukrainian Crises.**

NATO's formal announcement of prospective membership of Ukraine and Georgia was a significant turning point for European security. In response, Russian leaders promised to do whatever it took to prevent this from happening. So far, Russia has stayed committed to its promises, considering the events of 2008 and 2014. The Georgian and Ukrainian crises from 2008 and 2014 have many shared features: Russian aggression disguised as "separatism," Russia's direct interests in the wars, its claims over territories, and the lack of an effective international response

from the E.U., the U.S., and NATO. During the Russo-Georgian conflict, the lack of international support for the Georgian government set a precedent for Russia's lack of restraint in its actions toward Ukraine. First – advice on bolstering the dialogues with Russia, and finally, the economic sanctions. But, as we can see from the 14-year war in Georgia, these strategies have not been particularly helpful in mitigating the conflict.

Following the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, the U.S. humanitarian assistance to Georgia has accounted for over \$38 million. The U.S. starting aid package to Georgia was \$1.04 billion for the 2008-2009 fiscal years (Welt 2021). Analogously, following the Russian war in Eastern Ukraine (April 6, 2014), the IMF appropriated the Stand-By Arrangement (S.B.A.) for Ukraine that totaled around \$17.01 billion, which is 800 percent of the quota (Press Release No. 14/189 2014). On March 11, 2015, that arrangement was replaced by a new extended four-years arrangement increasing the quota to 900 percent. The Press Release showed that growth in selected economic indicators of Ukraine, such as nominal G.D.P., almost doubled in the years 2016-2020 (Press Release No. 18/483 2018). From 2014 to 2021, U.S. assistance totaled over \$3.7 billion, with additional funds allocated to sovereign loan guarantees (U.S. Assistance to Ukraine Overview 2021). For the 2020 fiscal year, Congress approved almost \$700 million with about \$448 million for State/USAID programs, another \$250 million specifically for USAID, including \$50 million for lethal assistance to Ukraine (Ibid). In the aftermath of 9/11, the U.S. prioritized security matters, increasing the military aid to Ukraine and Georgia as part of its war on terror. In 2018 U.S. and Georgia set the 2019-2021 initiative to train Georgian forces, known as the Georgia Defense Readiness Program. The program aimed to strengthen Georgi's national defense (Welt 2021). Similarly, the U.S. training programs have assisted the Ukrainian armed forces with training and military equipment since 2014.

The Obama administration applied similar economic measures to Russia as did the Bush administration. Although penalizing sanctions on Russia has severely affected its economy, they did not achieve the desired results. The economic outcomes were not as damaging as the breakdown in oil prices (Dobbins et al., 2019). As a result, President Obama added a new penalty: visa and financial sanctions targeting individuals (Pifer 2014). In the new executive order on March 20, 2014, the Obama administration added sanctions against Russia and its defense and energy sectors. But the broad economic sanctions could be the end of the Russian relapse to violation of the international norms. Thus, the U.S. and the other Western nations

applied more individualized sanctions on specific persons, businesses, and even transactions with Russia. The punitive character of these sanctions challenged Russian institutions and companies and greatly impacted the American general public's understanding of Russia's wrongdoing. Earlier research shows that sanctions against legal and physical persons tend to impact the state more than broad economic measures (Ahn and Ludema 2016). According to Pifer, U.S. and European states "appeared to more ready to sanction Russia in 2014 rather than in 2008" (Pifer 2014).

On March 6, 2014, the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) implemented the Ukraine/Russia-related sanctions program, followed by Executive orders 13660, 13662, and 13685 (Sanctions 2016). Altogether, the U.S. designated 111 individuals and 82 entities on its S.D.N. List related to its Russia/Ukraine-related sanctions program and 136 on its S.S.I. List facing sectoral sanctions (Ahn and Ludema 2016). The research shows that sanctions directed at legal and physical persons tend to have a greater impact on the state as a whole rather than broad economic measures targeting physical persons, businesses in Russia, and those abroad associated with Russian individuals and entities (Ahn and Ludema 2016).

Conflict resolution is important in analyzing the U.S. strategic partnerships with Ukraine and Georgia. The strategic partnership encompasses U.S. support in defending the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia and Ukraine. Thus, negotiations with Russia are a mandatory step in promoting the goals of the U.S. strategic partners. Besides, a peaceful settlement and ceasefire in the countries adjacent to NATO are vital for U.S. security interests and regional stability. Unfortunately, despite the efforts to negotiate a feasible ceasefire plan for Ukraine and Georgia, neither the six-point plan for Georgia nor the Minsk Agreements for Ukraine met the compliance from the Russian side (Welt 2021). Since 2008, Moscow has only intensified control over the region.

Similarly, in Ukraine, Normandy-format talks and the Minsk agreement were insufficient to stop the ongoing conflict. Although negotiations with Russia did not restore Georgian territorial integrity or stop the war in Ukraine, they contributed to a relative relaxation with a short-term ceasefire. Ukraine's expectation of strong U.S. support that could deter attack could not be actualized due to the prolonged process of NATO membership, multilateral decision-making, and U.S. prioritization in foreign policy, where Ukraine was not on the top priority list. Meanwhile, the U.S. has continuously demonstrated its commitment to supporting Ukraine's

aspirations toward E.U. and NATO, assisting economically and politically, and providing essential defense and military equipment. Nevertheless, the ongoing war in Ukraine demonstrates that the measures taken to contain Russian aggression were insufficient to stop the Russian invasion but necessary to notify Russia of the US political commitment to Ukraine. In conclusion, the relatively soft response from the United States and its NATO allies in Georgia created an irresistible temptation for President Putin to try to do something in Ukraine at the right time.

### **Conclusions.**

Although there is no single definition of strategic partnership, the starting point would be to identify the existing socio-political, economic, and military ties to understand the proximity of US-Ukraine relations. Similar to the Georgian situation, the US-Ukraine strategic partnership is asymmetric, with the U.S. as the dominating power. But the greater dependence does not make Ukraine an unequal partner. On the contrary, America supported Ukraine's drive toward democratization and integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. Since 1991, Ukraine's cooperation with the United States has grown in significance and spheres, extending the partnership to economic, socio-cultural, and security matters. The development of Ukrainian-American interstate relations can be divided into several periods characterized by breakthroughs in Ukrainian diplomacy, its substantial gains, and no fewer mistakes and setbacks. After the victory of the Revolution of Dignity in 2013, Ukrainian-American relations approached a meaningful level of strategic partnership in terms of the degree of cooperation.

Still, despite a few positive instances of cooperation and substantive partnership in political and military spheres of cooperation (Ukraine's nuclear disarmament in 1994, some encouraging signs of inclusion into plans for NATO enlargement, and the US-Ukraine Strategic Partnership Agreement in 2008), the economic potential has remained unrealized considering the absence of a free trade agreement and Ukraine's poor import diversification to the U.S. What makes this partnership strategic are shared values, mutually beneficial cooperation in various spheres, and long-term goals. The existence of the US-Ukraine Strategic Partnership Charter and the High-Level Body for Interstate Cooperation - the Strategic Partnership Commission, allows us to assert the existence of a strategic partnership, at least at the legal level. At the same time, support from

international organizations and condemnation and sanctions of Russia demonstrate the two states' common political and cultural interests. Moreover, amid Russia's attack against Ukraine, the strategic partnership with the United States has become a resource for protecting Ukraine's vital interests – territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state, supporting its Euro-Atlantic aspiration. Since 2014, the State Department and the U.S. Department of Defense have provided \$ 2.5 billion in assistance to train and equip the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Concerning security cooperation, the United States is promoting the reform of Ukraine's Armed Forces and deepening integration with the Alliance. Such support continues thanks to the Joint Multinational Training Group — Ukraine, established in 2014, whose main mission is to train and provide doctrinal assistance to the Ukrainian army. Among other things, the United States is also a country that provides mentoring support to reform Ukrainian management as well as the military-industrial complex.

Many trials have confirmed Ukraine's commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration. This destiny for Ukraine is the biggest fear of the Russians. It is far easier to satisfy the Russian domestic consumer with the propaganda of a NATO threat rather than admit that Ukraine's success is a threat to authoritarian domestic order by a dysfunctional Russian economy, the violation of human rights, and the creation of a sense of a fake identity rooted in Ukraine's stolen history. Putin traces the history of Russia to the political center of Ukraine. The dissolution of the Soviet Union did not merely change the map of Europe but allowed for the expansion of Western tradition and civilization. However, the process of democratic and Euro-Atlantic growth has been opposed by Russian Federation. By generating its sovereign boundaries in the former Soviet space in defiance of definitions of human rights and international legal norms of intervention, Russia has trespassed on the territory of Ukraine. Although Russia's unilateral annexation of Crimea was penalized, Western sanctions have not stopped Russia. While its difficult Russian neighbor regularly posed problems for Kyiv after 1991, the second challenge only emerged in such stark terms in 2014: dealing with armed Russian aggression in Crimea and the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine (Pifer 2017).


The Cold War has shown that the demonstration of power is the right tool to induce communication with Moscow. Although the U.S. delayed military assistance until the situation in Ukraine had become exacerbated to the point of open war, it showed its commitment to Ukraine politically and economically. Furthermore, the research shows that the transformation in Ukraine since 2014 has helped it manage domestic challenges, such as a high level of corruption and

financial stress, along with its ability to endure the conflict with Russia. This study has found that U.S. foreign policy in the new strategic triangle is a combination of initiatives for the peaceful settlement of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, efforts to support democratic reforms in Ukraine, tough economic sanctions on Russia, and military aid to Ukraine. The United States began to view Ukraine as an important partner to which Washington was ready to provide support in strengthening Ukraine's economic and political independence and stability, as well as its integration into international economic and regional political organizations.

# ANNEX 1.



**ANNEX 2.**



### ANNEX 3.

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) within the US Department of Treasury hold the records of US sanctions related to Ukraine. In the Sanctions List Search, we found 131 results for Ukraine. However, analyzing the section on Ukraine-/Russia-related Sanctions on the webpage of the OFAC, we can observe that not all of the sanctions are related to Ukraine-/Russia conflict. Excluded were the sanctions related to Ukraine-/Russia conflict. We excluded the sanctions related to the US Election interference (EO 13848); Executive Order 13850 of November 1, 2018 (“Blocking Property of Additional Persons Contributing to the Situation in Venezuela”), and other sanctions not related to the conflict; Executive Order 13694 of April 1, 2015, “Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber- Enabled Activities”; Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 594; Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 561; Transnational Criminal Organizations Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 590; Executive Order 13581; Belarus Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 548; Executive Order 13405.

|     |   |            |                 |         |                    |
|-----|---|------------|-----------------|---------|--------------------|
| 1.  |   | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685 | SDN     | December 19, 2014. |
| 2.  | <u>ALTABAEVA, Ekaterina Borisovna</u>           | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660 | SDN     | March 6, 2014.     |
| 3.  | <u>ANTIPOV, Igor Yurievich</u>                  | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660 | SDN     | March 6, 2014.     |
| 4.  | <u>AO ZAVOD FIOLENT</u>                         | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685 | SDN     | December 19, 2014. |
| 5.  | <u>BASOV, Aleksandr Vasilevich</u>              | Individual | CAATSA - RUSSIA | SDN     | June 15, 2017      |
| 6.  | <u>BASOVA, Lidia Aleksandrovna</u>              | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660 | SDN     | March 6, 2014.     |
| 7.  | <u>BM BANK PUBLIC JOINT STOCK COMPANY</u>       | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13662 | Non-SDN | March 20, 2014.    |
| 8.  | <u>BULGAKOV, Vadim Viktorovich</u>              | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660 | SDN     | March 6, 2014.     |
| 9.  | <u>CENTRAL REPUBLIC BANK</u>                    | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13660 | SDN     | March 6, 2014.     |
| 10. | <u>CHERNOMORNEFTEGAZ</u>                        | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13660 | SDN     | March 6, 2014.     |
| 11. | <u>CRIMEAN ENTERPRISE AZOV DISTILLERY PLANT</u> | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685 | SDN     | December 19, 2014. |
| 12. | <u>CRIMEAN PORTS</u>                            | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685 | SDN     | December 19, 2014. |
| 13. | <u>CRIMEAN RAILWAY</u>                          | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685 | SDN     | December 19, 2014. |
| 14. | <u>DANILENKO, Sergei Andreevich</u>             | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660 | SDN     | March 6, 2014.     |

|     |   |            |                   |         |                    |
|-----|---|------------|-------------------|---------|--------------------|
| 15. | <u>DART AIRLINES</u>  | Entity     | IFSR; SDGT        | SDN     |                    |
| 16. | <u>DIKIY, Aleksey Aleksandrovich</u>  | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660   | SDN     | March 6, 2014.     |
| 17. | <u>DONBASS PEOPLE'S MILITIA</u>   | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13660   | SDN     | March 6, 2014.     |
| 18. | <u>DONETSK PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC</u>  | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13660   | SDN     | March 6, 2014.     |
| 19. | <u>FAU 'GLAVGOSEKSPERTIZA ROSSII'</u>   | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685   | SDN     | December 19, 2014. |
| 20. | <u>FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INSTITUTION PRETRIAL DETENTION CENTER NO 1 OF THE DIRECTORATE OF THE FEDERAL PENITENTIARY SERVICE FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA AND SEVASTOPOL</u> | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685   | SDN     | December 19, 2014. |
| 21. | <u>FEDERAL SUE SHIPYARD 'MORYE'</u>   | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685   | SDN     | December 19, 2014. |
| 22. | <u>FEODOSIYA ENTERPRISE</u>   | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13660   | SDN     | March 6, 2014.     |
| 23. | <u>FIDES SHIP MANAGEMENT LLC</u>  | Entity     | VENEZUELA-EO13850 | SDN     | Exclude            |
| 24. | <u>GOTSANYUK, Yuri Mikhailovich</u>   | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660   | SDN     | March 6, 2014.     |
| 25. | <u>GRANOVSKY, Aleksey Ivanovich</u>   | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660   | SDN     | March 6, 2014.     |
| 26. | <u>GUP RK KTB SUDOKOMPOZIT</u>  | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685   | SDN     | December 19, 2014. |
| 27. | <u>IS BANK, AO</u>  | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685   | SDN     | December 19, 2014. |
| 28. | <u>JAROSH, Petr Grigorievich</u>  | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660   | SDN     | March 6, 2014.     |
| 29. | <u>JOINT STOCK COMMERCIAL BANK RUBLEV</u>   | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685   | SDN     | December 19, 2014. |
| 30. | <u>JOINT STOCK COMPANY BLACK SEA BANK OF DEVELOPMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION</u>   | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685   | SDN     | December 19, 2014. |
| 31. | <u>JOINT STOCK COMPANY GENBANK</u>  | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685   | SDN     | December 19, 2014. |
| 32. | <u>JOINT STOCK COMPANY SANATORIUM AY-PETRI</u>  | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685   | SDN     | December 19, 2014. |
| 33. | <u>JOINT STOCK COMPANY SANATORIUM DYULBER</u>   | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685   | SDN     | December 19, 2014. |
| 34. | <u>JOINT STOCK COMPANY SANATORIUM MISKHOR</u>   | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685   | SDN     | December 19, 2014. |
| 35. | <u>JOINT STOCK COMPANY SEVASTOPOLSKY MORSKOY BANK</u>   | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685   | SDN     | December 19, 2014. |
| 36. | <u>JOINT-STOCK COMPANY COMMERCIAL BANK NORTH CREDIT</u>   | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685   | SDN     | December 19, 2014. |
| 37. | <u>JSC SBERBANK OF RUSSIA</u>   | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13662   | Non-SDN | March 20, 2014.    |
| 38. | <u>KAMSHILOV, Oleg Anatolievich</u>   | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660   | SDN     | March 6, 2014.     |
| 39. | <u>KARANDA, Pavel Leonidovich</u>   | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660   | SDN     | March 6, 2014.     |
| 40. | <u>KHORS AIRCOMPANY</u>   | Entity     | IFSR; SDGT        | SDN     |                    |
| 41. | <u>KHORSHEVA, Natalya Ivanovna</u>  | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660   | SDN     | March 6, 2014.     |
| 42. | <u>KHRYAKOV, Alexander</u>  | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660   | SDN     | March 6, 2014.     |

|     |   |            |                                      |     |                    |
|-----|---|------------|--------------------------------------|-----|--------------------|
| 43. | <u>KILIMNIK, Konstantin Viktorovich</u>                                     | Individual | ELECTION-EO13848;<br>UKRAINE-EO13660 | SDN | March 6, 2014.     |
| 44. | <u>KORNET, Igor Aleksandrovich</u>  | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660                      | SDN | March 6, 2014.     |
| 45. | <u>KOSTENKO, Elena Nikolaevna</u>   | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660                      | SDN | March 6, 2014.     |
| 46. | <u>KOSTRUBITSKY, Aleksey Aleksandrovich</u>                                 | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660                      | SDN | March 6, 2014.     |
| 47. | <u>KPSK, OOO</u>  | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685                      | SDN | December 19, 2014. |
| 48. | <u>KRYMTETS, AO</u>   | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685                      | SDN | December 19, 2014. |
| 49. | <u>KULINICH, Larisa Vitalievna</u>  | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660                      | SDN | March 6, 2014.     |
| 50. | <u>LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY GARANT-SV</u>                                  | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685                      | SDN | December 19, 2014. |
| 51. | <u>LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS MANAGEMENT COMPANY</u> | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685                      | SDN | December 19, 2014. |
| 52. | <u>LLC SK CONSOL-STROI LTD</u>  | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685                      | SDN | December 19, 2014. |
| 53. | <u>LUHANSK PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC</u>  | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13660                      | SDN | March 6, 2014.     |
| 54. | <u>MALAKHOVA, Svetlana Anatolievna</u>                                      | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660                      | SDN | March 6, 2014.     |
| 55. | <u>MALGIN, Pavel Vladimirovich</u>  | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660                      | SDN | March 6, 2014.     |
| 56. | <u>MALYSHEV, Mikhail Grigorevich</u>  | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660                      | SDN | March 6, 2014.     |
| 57. | <u>MATYUSHCHENKO, Ekaterina Sergeevna</u>                                   | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660                      | SDN | March 6, 2014.     |
| 58. | <u>MEDVEDEV, Valery Kirillovich</u>   | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660                      | SDN | March 6, 2014.     |
| 59. | <u>MELNIKOV, Andrei</u>   | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660                      | SDN | March 6, 2014.     |
| 60. | <u>MELNYCHUK, Oleksandr</u>   | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660                      | SDN | March 6, 2014.     |
| 61. | <u>MELNYCHUK, Serhiy</u>  | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660                      | SDN | March 6, 2014.     |
| 62. | <u>MIKHAILIUK, Leonid</u>   | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660                      | SDN | March 6, 2014.     |
| 63. | <u>MINISTRY OF STATE SECURITY</u>   | Entity     | CAATSA - RUSSIA                      | SDN | June 15, 2017      |
| 64. | <u>MOZGOVOY, Aleksey</u>  | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660                      | SDN | March 6, 2014.     |
| 65. | <u>MRIYA RESORT &amp; SPA</u>   | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685                      | SDN | December 19, 2014. |
| 66. | <u>MURATOV, Aleksey</u>   | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660                      | SDN | March 6, 2014.     |
| 67. | <u>NEMTSEV, Vladimir Vladimirovich</u>                                      | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660                      | SDN | March 6, 2014.     |
| 68. | <u>NIKITINA, Irina</u>  | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660                      | SDN | March 6, 2014.     |
| 69. | <u>NIKONOROVA, Natalya Yurievna</u>   | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660                      | SDN | March 6, 2014.     |

|   |            |                 |         |                    |
|---|------------|-----------------|---------|--------------------|
| 70. <u>NOVOROSSIYA PARTY</u>  | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13660 | SDN     | March 6, 2014.     |
| 71. <u>ОАО SHIP REPAIR CENTER 'ZVEZDOCHKA'</u>                                      | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685 | SDN     | December 19, 2014. |
| 72. <u>ОАО 'URANIS-RADIOSISTEMY'</u>  | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685 | SDN     | December 19, 2014. |
| 73. <u>ООО SHIPYARD 'ZALIV'</u>   | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685 | SDN     | December 19, 2014. |
| 74. <u>OPEN JOINT STOCK COMPANY COMMERCIAL BANK VERKHNEVOLZHISKY</u>                | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685 | SDN     | December 19, 2014. |
| 75. <u>OPEN JOINT STOCK COMPANY KRASNODAR REGIONAL INVESTMENT BANK</u>              | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685 | SDN     | December 19, 2014. |
| 76. <u>OPLOT</u>  | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13660 | SDN     | March 6, 2014.     |
| 77. <u>OVSYANNIKOV, Dmitry Vladimirovich</u>  | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660 | SDN     | March 6, 2014.     |
| 78. <u>PASECHNIK, Leonid Ivanovich</u>  | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660 | SDN     | March 6, 2014.     |
| 79. <u>PASHKOV, Vladimir Igorevich</u>  | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660 | SDN     | March 6, 2014.     |
| 80. <u>PAVLENKO, Vladimir Nikolaevich</u>   | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660 | SDN     | March 6, 2014.     |
| 81. <u>PJSC VTB BANK (KIEV)</u>   | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13662 | Non-SDN | March 20, 2014.    |
| 82. <u>PRIVATE JOINT-STOCK COMPANY MAKO HOLDING</u>                                 | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13660 | SDN     | March 6, 2014.     |
| 83. <u>PROFAKTOR, TOV</u>   | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13660 | SDN     | March 6, 2014.     |
| 84. <u>PROMINVESTBANK</u>   | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13662 | Non-SDN | March 20, 2014.    |
| 85. <u>PYRKOVA, Ekaterina Eduardovna</u>  | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660 | SDN     | March 6, 2014.     |
| 86. <u>RADOMSKAYA, Elena Vladimirovna</u>   | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660 | SDN     | March 6, 2014.     |
| 87. <u>RAZVOZHAEV, Mikhail Vladimirovich</u>  | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660 | SDN     | March 6, 2014.     |
| 88. <u>RESORT NIZHNYAYA OREANDA</u>   | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685 | SDN     | December 19, 2014. |
| 89. <u>RIVIERA SUNRISE RESORT &amp; SPA</u>   | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685 | SDN     | December 19, 2014. |
| 90. <u>RUDENKO, Miroslav Vladimirovich</u>  | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660 | SDN     | March 6, 2014.     |
| 91. <u>SAVCHENKO, Petr</u>  | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660 | SDN     | March 6, 2014.     |
| 92. <u>SMT-K</u>  | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685 | SDN     | December 19, 2014. |
| 93. <u>SOUTH-EAST MOVEMENT</u>  | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13660 | SDN     | March 6, 2014.     |
| 94. <u>STATE BANK LUHANSK PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC</u>                                     | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13660 | SDN     | March 6, 2014.     |
| 95. <u>STATE CONCERN NATIONAL PRODUCTION AND AGRICULTURAL ASSOCIATION MASSANDRA</u> | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685 | SDN     | December 19, 2014. |
| 96. <u>STATE ENTERPRISE EVPATORIA SEA COMMERCIAL PORT</u>                           | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685 | SDN     | December 19, 2014. |

|   |            |                 |     |                    |
|---|------------|-----------------|-----|--------------------|
| 97. <u>STATE ENTERPRISE FACTORY OF SPARKLING WINE NOVY SVET</u>         | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685 | SDN | December 19, 2014. |
| 98. <u>STATE ENTERPRISE FEODOSIA SEA TRADING PORT</u>                   | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685 | SDN | December 19, 2014. |
| 99. <u>STATE ENTERPRISE KERCH SEA COMMERCIAL PORT</u>                   | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685 | SDN | December 19, 2014. |
| 100. <u>STATE ENTERPRISE MAGARACH OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF WINE</u> | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685 | SDN | December 19, 2014. |
| 101. <u>STATE ENTERPRISE SEVASTOPOL SEA TRADING PORT</u>                | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685 | SDN | December 19, 2014. |
| 102. <u>STATE ENTERPRISE UNIVERSAL-AVIA</u>                             | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685 | SDN | December 19, 2014. |
| 103. <u>STATE ENTERPRISE YALTA SEA TRADING PORT</u>                     | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685 | SDN | December 19, 2014. |
| 104. <u>STATE SHIPPING COMPANY KERCH SEA FERRY</u>                      | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685 | SDN | December 19, 2014. |
| 105. <u>SUE RC 'FEODOSIA OPTICAL PLANT'</u>                             | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685 | SDN | December 19, 2014. |
| 106. <u>SUSHKO, Andriy Volodymyrovych</u>                               | Individual | CAATSA - RUSSIA | SDN | June 15, 2017      |
| 107. <u>TAATTA, AO</u>  | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685 | SDN | December 19, 2014. |
| 108. <u>TERENTIEV, Vladimir Nikolaevich</u>                             | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660 | SDN | March 6, 2014.     |
| 109. <u>TIMOFEEV, Aleksandr Yurievich</u>                               | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660 | SDN | March 6, 2014.     |
| 110. <u>TSARYOV, Oleh Anatolievich</u>                                  | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660 | SDN | March 6, 2014.     |
| 111. <u>VVB, PAO</u>  | Entity     | UKRAINE-EO13685 | SDN | December 19, 2014. |
| 112. <u>ZHEREBTSOV, Yuriy Gennadievych</u>                              | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660 | SDN | March 6, 2014.     |
| 113. <u>ZIMA, Pyotr Anatoliovych</u>                                    | Individual | UKRAINE-EO13660 | SDN | March 6, 2014.     |

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13849 - September 20, 2018.  
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13662 - March 20, 2014.  
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