

The Impact of Father's Political Status on Father Involvement in China

著者	Xu Yingchun
学位授与機関	Tohoku University
学位授与番号	11301甲第20148号
URL	http://hdl.handle.net/10097/00134987

令和 3 年度博士論文

**THE IMPACT OF FATHERS' POLITICAL STATUS ON FATHER INVOLVEMENT
IN CHINA**

(中国における父親の政治的地位が育児関与に与える影響)

東北大学大学院文学研究科総合人間学専攻

Yingchun XU

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to express my deep gratitude to my research supervisor, Prof. Yoshimichi Sato for his patient guidance and constructive suggestions during the planning and development of this research in keeping my progress on schedule, for his continuous support and assistance for my study and life in Japan during the past three years. Besides, I have learned a lot more than the research itself from him in terms of self-responsibility, self-discipline, and time management. Without his support and assistance, I would not have been able to complete my doctoral program successfully.

My grateful thanks are also extended to Prof. Hiroshi Hamada who introduced me to books referring to my research and also gave me useful critiques during my writing of the dissertation. And his knowledge and insights in statistical methods help me better clarify my thoughts. Prof. Katsunori Ogawa is always generous with his comments, which helps me easily focus on my problems in my study. Prof. Kikuko Nagayoshi introduced me to statistical analysis methods in her class and her book during her stay at Tohoku University. She is always really nice and friendly to students, offering help without hesitation when I turn to her. Prof. Hiroki Takikawa generously gives his comments on my study, helping me strengthen my study.

I would also like to thank my predecessors, Liang Su for his feedback and support during my dissertation writing, Shun Gong for his introducing me to join in Inter-Graduate School Doctoral Degree on Science for Global Safety (G-Safety) program for my horizons broadening and financial support, Maoxin Ye for his advice on my research during my Ph.D. program. In addition, I am very grateful to my friends who make my life and study in Japan so interesting and fulfilling.

Finally, I would like to thank my family for their persistent love, support, and encouragement even though they have no idea about my work.

ABSTRACT

This dissertation attempts to explore how fathers' CCP membership affects father involvement in Chinese society.

Chapter 1 introduces the background, raises the research question, and further proposes the study structure. Based on the structure, Chapter 2 presents a more detailed review of the literature. And then, the remaining three chapters present the empirical demonstrations.

Chapter 3 seeks to empirically test whether party membership has a positive effect on individuals' economic well-being. By employing the national data in China, it indicates that party membership positively contributes to individuals' earnings. Besides, compared with non-CCP member fathers, high education has a positive effect on CCP members to get higher income.

Chapter 4 attends to investigate whether fathers' political status influences father involvement. Using the national data focusing on junior high school students, the results provide two main findings: (1) compared with non-CCP member fathers, educational expectations let CCP member fathers spend less time on the play and study but more time on daily activities with children; (2) contrary to the first finding, educational expectations let CCP member fathers are more willing to communicate with their children, compared with non-CCP members.

Chapter 5 attempts to estimate whether fathers involve with childrearing by gender preference. The results from the same data used in Chapter 4 yields two main findings: (1) CCP member fathers are more willing to spend time on daily activities, study and play with boys than with girls, compared with non-CCP member fathers; (2) CCP member fathers are more willing to communicate with boys than with girls, compared with non-CCP member fathers.

Finally, Chapter 6 gives a summary of this study and lists research contributions to the previous studies. Besides, it also shows some limitations of this study.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1. Introduction	6
CHAPTER 2. Literature Review	18
CHAPTER 3. The Effect of Political Status on Economic Well-being.....	25
CHAPTER 4. The Effect of Fathers' Political Status on Father Involvement	32
CHAPTER 5. The Effect of Children's Gender on Father Involvement.....	49
CHAPTER 6. Conclusion and Discussion.....	79

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.1 Study Structure

Because of the drastic increase over the past decade in the number of working mothers, setting the stage for more nurturant and involved fathers in childcare. According to Bianchi et al. (2006) and Pew Research Center Analysis of American Time Use Survey in 2016, fathers were found in 2016 to spend an average of eight hours per week on child care, almost triple the time fathers spent in 1965. And prior empirical evidence has suggested that involved fathers are positively related to less dropout, less teen birth and less violence as well as a moral guide, sociability building and responsibility forming, contributing to children's social, emotional, and intellectual development (Andrews et al. 2004; Flouri and Buchanan 2003; Parke et al. 2005; Carlson 2006; Goncey and van Dulmen 2010, Conger, Conger, and Martin 2010). Even if fathers are more involved in childrearing than before, they are still less involved than mothers. The data based on OECD (The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) across 18 countries from 1998 to 2010 have shown fathers still spend less time on childcare than mothers (Huerta et al. 2013). What exactly influences father involvement has attracted academic attention. Focusing on Western societies, Belsky's parenting process model (1984) is the first among the previous studies to theoretically postulate the determinants of parenting from three aspects of the parent, family, and child, which is specified as personality and psychological resources of the parent, contextual sources of stress and support and characteristics of the child. Compared to the latter two, the personality and psychological resources of fathers exert a direct impact on father involvement.

Personality and psychological resources refer to a person's developmental history and characteristics, such as personality, education, attitudes to childrearing, and psychology (Lamb and Levine 1983; Belsky 1984 [1991]; Van IJzendoorn and DeWolff 1997; Kelly and Lamb 2000; Gray 2006). With respect to fathers' personality, some studies indicate that fathers described as more affiliative, caring, and nurturant appear more playful and supportive with their children

(Levy-Shiff and Israelashvili 1988; Fox and Bruce 2001). Consistent with such evidence are findings suggesting fathers with less depression and anxiety, high levels of interpersonal trust, and an active coping style display higher involvement with childrearing (Heath 1976; Mondell and Tyler 1981; Bronte-Tinkew et al. 2007; Wilson and Durbin 2010; Paulson, Dauber, and Leiferman 2011). Father role identity, that is father, husband, and financial provider, is relevant to father's behavior. Some studies reported that men with more child-centered attitudes participate more in child care. That is to say, a father who addressed himself as a "father" would prefer more engaged in childrearing, while a father who treated himself as a "financial provider" would spend less time on childrearing (Fox and Bruce 2001; Cowan and Cowan 1987). Moreover, according to Gaertner et al. (2007), fathers' authoritarian views were negatively correlated with their relative engagement, and this relationship remained over time in caregiving and play activities as well. In addition, education background differences in father involvement are also well documented (Henz 2019). Some researchers argued that high education predicted more active father involvement (Sullivan 2010; Putman 2015; Fofonoff 2018). Whereas less-well-educated fathers are less involved in childcare because of more economic stress, lack of free time, poor social network, and even low self-esteem (Sayer, Gauthie, and Furstenberg Jr. 2004; Gray 2006; Craig 2006; Fofonoff 2018).

A growing body of research focusing on Western countries has provided plentiful empirical evidence based on Belsky's parenting process model. However, prior studies mainly focus on the impact of fathers' personality, economic and psychological aspects on involvement in childrearing in both theoretical and empirical analyses, with little attention paid to the political status of fathers. To fill this gap, this study will explore how fathers' political status affect father involvement in Chinese society.

Actually, Chinese society is an appropriate example for testing this demonstration. On the one hand, in China, The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has absolute power in politics. Anyone who wants to join the CCP needs to go through a rigorous 2-3-year vetting process and remains under the supervision of the party organization after joining. In addition, its dominant position of social resources and its occupancy of administrative positions indicate that holding party membership is accessible to financial benefits for individuals. In contrast, in the political systems

of Western countries, parties rotate into power. Meanwhile, parties are relatively open to recruiting new members because they need to compete with each other for power, and these parties fund and staff this political competition (Appleton et al. 2009). For individuals, membership in a political party tends to be perceived primarily as a political-ideological affiliation, so party membership is unlikely to have a direct impact on individuals' development or economic well-being.

On the other hand, although the number of female party members has been increasing in recent years, men party members are still the majority. According to the data from the Chinese Communist Party Organization Department, the rate of male CCP members accounts for more than 70 percent, which lays the foundation for the study of the impact of fathers' political status on childrearing.

The theory of intergenerational advantage transmission provides a theoretical basis for CCP member fathers involving in childrearing. Intergenerational transmission of advantage is largely affected by education (Blau and Duncan 1967; Breen and Jonsson 2005), which has been extensively studied. But previous studies based on western countries do not refer to individuals' political status. Besides, some studies have demonstrated that fathers' CCP membership positively contributes to children's educational achievement (Guo and Guo 2016; Yang, Wang, and Liu 2010). There is little empirical research referring to parenting process. Parenting process plays a major role in the intergenerational transmission of human capital and presents important implications in interpreting children's adult life outcomes (Heckman and Cunha 2007; Del Boca et al. 2014; Fiorini and Keane 2014). Hence, compared with non-CCP member fathers, whether CCP member fathers are more willing to involve in childrearing to realize intergenerational advantage transmission needs to be explored.

Therefore, based on Belsky's parenting process model (Belsky 1984), this study tries to explore how fathers' political status affects childrearing in Chinese society. The structure of this study is shown in Figure 1.1. Section 1 will explore whether CCP membership has a greater effect on an individual's economic well-being, compared with non-CCP membership. Section 2 will estimate whether educational expectations have a greater effect on CCP member fathers on father involvement, compared with non-CCP member fathers. And section 3 will present whether CCP

member fathers are more likely to involve with boys than girls, compared with non-CCP member fathers.

I employ interaction effect in this study structure as well as empirical analysis. It can be hypothesized that the impact of CCP member fathers on father involvement is positively strengthened when educational expectations are present as well as the child is boy, compared with non-CCP member fathers. Therefore, the interaction effect of fathers' political status and educational expectations as well as the interaction effect of fathers' political status and child's gender need to be considered when I attempt to explore empirically the impact of fathers' political status and father involvement. Theoretically, this study extends the theory of intergenerational advantage transmission from education to political status in investing their children to realize advantage transmission. It seeks to further discover new perspectives based on Chinese society, contributing to the original theory. Empirically, this study explores father involvement among CCP member fathers and non-CCP member fathers, showing how fathers' political status affects father involvement to realize advantage transmission. The results will provide a clearer understanding of the current situation of Chinese fathers' parenting and the issue of gender preference in parenting process.




Figure 1.1 Study Structure

1.2 The Effect of Political Status on Economic Well-being

Political status is personally related to party membership (Szelenyi 1978; Nee 1996; Xie and Hannum 1996). Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the sole ruling political party in China, which leads another eight legally permitted subordinate minor parties uniformly called Democratic Party. Political status generally refers to membership of Communist Party, membership of eight Democratic Party, and Masses (a person without any party membership). As a sole ruling Party, CCP recruits its members from all walks of life through lengthy and rigorous screening process and continues scrutiny of its members after joining the party to ensure their political beliefs and loyalty (Appleton et al., 2009). Since party members are given a rigorous selection process, some researchers argue that the capability of party members is higher than that of non-party members (Bian et al. 2001). After submitting applications, applicants are required not only to study party policies and rules but also to be active in political activities and volunteering in the community. Also, the party branch will assign one or two formal CCP members as liaisons, who regularly paper-based report to the party branch authority about their evaluation of the applicants' performance and progress to the criterion of being qualified party membership (Bian et al.2001). Beginning with a written application, applicants are required to pass assessments in different stages before becoming formal CCP members, which will take two or three years. In other words, to be accepted as a formal CCP member, the applicant must have a proven combination of knowledge of public policy and party rules, commitment to the party, and social skills (Bian et al. 2001). Therefore, Walder (1995:313) pointed out "Party membership signifies that the party organization at some point has examined the individual's background and behavior, and certified that the person meets the organization's standards for political trustworthiness".

Because of the high criteria and long screening process that signify individual political trustworthiness, CCP's acceptance rate always remains low. According to data from CCP Organization Department, the acceptance rate is at 8.8 percent in 2015. It should be noted that CCP members are composed of people from all walks of life, and most of them do not hold high education. As per data from CCP Organization Department by 2015, the number of CCP members is 88.758 million, nearly 40 percent of CCP members are from general workers, fishermen and,

farmers respectively, 55.7 percent do not have a higher education background, and 74.9 percent are male.

CCP membership in China is able to provide access to social networks, and further contribute to individual economic benefits, so it is an effective means to realize intragenerational besides high education acquisition (Zang 2004). However, CCP member recruitment excludes education background as a selection condition (Walder 1995; Weiss and Fershtman 1998; Morduch and Sicular 2000; Walder, Li and Treiman 2000; Bian et al. 2001; Li et al. 2007; Appleton et al. 2009; Wu et al. 2012). Therefore, individuals are inclined to join in CCP to get more social resources, especially those without high education. Yet, prior studies on the contribution of party membership to personal development mainly focus on citizens in cities, which cannot show the situation across China. Therefore, residents in rural areas also need to be considered to provide empirical evidence.

1.3 The Effect of Fathers' Political Status on Father Involvement

In addition to fathers' personality, attitudes to childrearing, and psychological health, studies in Western societies focus more on the impact of fathers' socioeconomic status on father involvement. Abundant previous studies have shown that fathers with low-income jobs are directly correlated with being less involved with children because low-income jobs are usually entailed with low SES, leading to stress, lack of free time, poor relationships, and even low self-esteem. For example, according to Kwon and Roy (2007), compared to fathers with low SES, fathers with high SES can adapt and take on more involvement in the responsibility, even if they are probably busy and fail to spend more time on daily care activities.

As to fathers' political status, some Chinese researchers explored the impact of fathers' CCP membership on children's academic outcomes. For example, by employing a dataset from the Chinese College Students Survey in 2010, Yang and Chen (2016) found that CCP member fathers would significantly increase their children's access to elite high schools and elite colleges. Similarly, according to Guo and Guo (2016), fathers' political status exerted a crucial impact on years of education and quality of education of children: "the opportunity will increase by 26

percent for attaining high school, by 70 percent for attaining community college, and by 80 percent for attaining regular college.” (Guo and Guo 2016:256). Furthermore, among all fathers holding CCP membership, compared to children whose fathers are in the managerial position, children whose fathers are advanced professional personal and working-class have fewer opportunities to get college education. Besides, Yang and his colleagues (2009) stated that fathers with Chinese Communist Party membership positively contributed to their children’s income after graduation.

Previous studies give an empirical explanation about the impact of fathers’ CCP membership on children’s educational achievement but not on the parenting process (Guo and Guo 2016; Yang, Wang, and Liu 2010; Yang and Chen 2016). The parenting process is a way that parents interact and communicate with children to provide recognition and guidance which involves setting of boundaries to enable the full development of children (Offerman-Zuckerberg 1992). The parenting process needs parents develop children’s cognitive and non-cognitive abilities purposefully so that children can manage issues and make better decisions. CCP membership as political capital can bring social resources and economic well-being in Chinese society, so CCP member fathers are supposed to involve more in childrearing, compared with non-CCP member fathers. It can be interpreted from two points.

On the one hand, the theory of intergenerational advantage transmission provides a theoretical basis for CCP member fathers involving in parenting. Intergenerational transmission refers to behaviors and characteristics of individuals from one generation are recurring in offspring to some extent (Thornberry et al. 2003). This transmission involves genetic and non-genetic factors (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1973; Eaves 1976), while more emphasis is placed on the acquired environmental factors in the field of sociology. the theory of intergenerational advantage transmission means parents invest in their children by using their strengths to achieve the intergenerational transmission of advantageous behaviors or characteristics (Blau and Duncan 1967; Becker and Tomes 1986; Breen and Jonsson 2005). Intergenerational transmission of advantage is effectively achieved mainly through parenting process. According to Coleman (Coleman and Hoffer 1987; Coleman 1987), human capital can only be effectively transferred from one generation to the next if there is sufficient parent-child interaction, including

communicating with them about school life and making demands on their children's academic performance. If parents are absent from their children's daily lives, this intergenerational transfer process is blocked. Psychological research has also shown that parenting processes are more closely related to children's healthy social, emotional, cognitive, and motivational development than family socioeconomic status itself (Dornbusch and Wood 1989).

CCP membership, as political affiliation in Chinese society, positively contributes to individuals' well-being (Walder 1995). As mentioned previously, people without high education background comprise the majority of party members. Thus, for fathers without high education, party membership is the only effective way to boost income and gain access to social resources. In order to achieve an effective transmission of individual advantages, CCP member fathers are more willing to use their own resources to increase economic investment and parenting practices in children than non-CCP member fathers.

On the other hand, both class inheritance and reflection on mobility experiences determine childrearing values. Bourdieu (1980 [1984]) emphasized that family origins determined childrearing values, whereas Lipset and Bendix (1991) argued that the childrearing values were the result of class inheritance and reflection on mobility experiences. Whether or not the parents in the original family are CCP members, individuals' membership has an impact on childrearing values. For CCP member fathers from the families that their fathers also hold CCP membership, they inherit childrearing values of their own class. As to CCP member fathers whose fathers do not hold CCP membership, they gain career promotion and income increase through CCP membership to realize intragenerational social upward mobility. Parents with intragenerational social upward mobility experiences are more inclined to be aligned with their class destination, so they have conscious tendency to rely on the knowledge gained in the workplace and from professionals to learn from child-rearing values of their class destination (Lipset and Bendix 1991). Therefore, the mobility experience will rebuild individuals' childrearing values (Sieben 2017). Based on education acquisition (Hong 2016), the child-rearing values can be used as the standard to ascertain which abilities are most required by children to realize intergenerational advantage transmission (Kohn 1977; Sieben 2017). Therefore, parents with upward mobile experiences are

inclined to form high educational expectations in parenting practices.

Generally, both CCP member fathers and non-CCP member fathers are willing to invest in their children, but CCP fathers hold more social resources to invest in children, compared with non-CCP member fathers. Moreover, for CCP member fathers whose fathers hold CCP membership, they will inherit childrearing values based on their family origins. And for the CCP member fathers whose fathers do not hold CCP membership, they realize intragenerational social upward mobility through CCP membership. Therefore, they will imitate and learn from child-rearing values of their class destination. As the basis of childrearing values, educational expectations enhance the willingness of CCP member fathers on father involvement. Hence, compared with non-CCP member fathers, educational expectations have a greater positive effect on father involvement. Based on the analysis above, it can be hypothesized that CCP membership of fathers has a positive effect on father involvement and educational expectation further strengthens this positive effect.

1.4 The Effect of Children's Gender on Father Involvement

Fathers are more involved with young boys than girls (Manlove and Vernon-Feagans 2002; Lundberg, McLanahan, and Rose 2007; Raley and Bianchi 2006; Pleck and Hofferth 2008) because of utility gender-specific parenting skills and son increasing marriage stability (Lundberg, McLanahan, and Rose 2007). Besides, fathers are more involved with first-born children, and gradually weaken the interaction from the first-born to the last-born because of resource dilution and attention weakening (Flouri and Buchanan 2003; Price 2008).

As to Chinese society, owing to traditional values such as men outside the home and women inside, social custom such as lineage ties extension, and economically-based benefits such as male's advantage in the labor market, financial provider for the family, and old-age support for parents, or to combinations of these diverse cultural, social, and economic attributes (Hillier 1988; Greenhalgh 1994; Hannum and Xie 1994; Buchmann and Hannum 2001; Steelman et al. 2002; Lu and Treiman 2008; Hannum, Kong, and Zhang 2009; Lei and Pals 2011), there is a son preference in Chinese context. It is easier for boys in multi-child families to get more investment than female

siblings (Parish and Willis 1993; Lei et al. 2016). That is Even if one-child policy since 1979 seriously challenged traditional son preference, it is still accessible to find evidence from the policy implementation process. On the one hand, the one-child certificate was issued to encourage compliance with the policy. Those who abided by the policy would have access to a variety of benefits, including monthly cash payment, free nursery as well as medical care, free primary and secondary schooling, as well as the priority of house allocation and job hiring (Banister 1987; Tien 1991). On the other hand, the abortion would be used as a backup to prevent unplanned pregnancies (Tien 1991). However, in the rural areas, policy implementation did not strictly follow the rules. That is when women had a second birth without official permission, they should submit fines to local birth planning officers for the unplanned births (Banister 1987; Cooney, Wei and Powers 1991; Greenhalgh 1994). Therefore, in rural areas, if the first birth is a daughter, local peasants prefer to submit fines to have a second or even third birth rather than accept one-child certificate.

Besides, even if female party members are increasing in recent years, the ratio that men acquire CCP membership is approximately three times higher than that of women (Yan 2019). Moreover, compared to female CCP members, male CCP members are more likely to attain top positions (Dickson and Rublee 2000), which may have an impact on fathers' gender preference in childrearing for fathers with CCP membership. In addition, male CCP members from rural areas received more influence from their parents' thoughts of son preference (Wang 2005). Even if party members themselves have migrated from rural areas to urban areas, such kind of effect still cannot change in a very short period.

Because of lineage ties extension, financial provider for the family, and old-age support for parents, son preference still exists within families. Hence, both CCP member fathers and non-CCP member fathers have son preference in investing children. But CCP member fathers' son preference is supposed to be even more pronounced than non-CCP member fathers. The male is much easier to join CCP and get job promotion as CCP member than female, so male has more opportunity to get more social resources, which contributes to intergenerational advantage accumulation and transmission. Male gender advantage in society enables CCP member fathers to prefer gender over birth order in parenting. In other words, CCP member fathers are more involved

boys, regardless of their birth order. Therefore, it can be hypothesized that the gender of child has a greater impact on CCP member fathers' parenting than that of non-CCP member fathers.

Based on the aforementioned information shown in the introduction, there is much research about the impact of fathers' personality, economic and psychological aspects on father involvement, but little research refers to the impact of fathers' political status on childrearing. Chinese society provides a basis for this research. Chinese Communist party is the sole ruling party in China, holding absolute power of social resources allocation. Holding CCP membership can be treated as some kind of political affiliation for individuals, which can bring economic well-being. CCP membership is the other effective way to realize income increase and position promotion in addition to education acquisition. Therefore, this study attempts to explore how fathers' political status affects father involvement. Through the analysis above, the study not only fills the empirical research gaps referring to the effect of fathers' political status on father involvement as well as but also makes us gain a better understanding of childrearing situation among CCP member fathers in Chinese society.

To test how fathers' CCP membership affect father involvement, three types of empirical evidence will be presented in this study: (1) using the data from CHIP (Chinese Household Income Project) in 2013, Chapter 3 presents whether CCP membership positively contributes to individual economic well-being; (2) employing the data from 2014-2015 CEPS (China Educational Panel Survey), Chapter 4 will portray whether educational expectations positively contribute to CCP member fathers' childrearing, compared with non-CCP member fathers; (3) Chapter 5 will explore whether CCP member fathers involve with boys more than girls, compared with non-CCP member fathers. Finally, the conclusion and discussion will be presented in Chapter 6.

The results show the following: (1) party membership has a positive effect on individuals' economic well-being and high education has a positive effect on CCP members to get higher income; (2) educational expectations make CCP member fathers spend less time on play with children but more time on daily activities than non-CCP fathers. Educational expectations have a greater effect on CCP member fathers on communication with children, compared with non-CCP member fathers; (3) it indicates that CCP member fathers are more inclined to involve in

interaction and communication with boys than girls, compared with non-CCP member fathers.

CHAPTER 2

Literature Review

2.1 The Effect of Political Status on Economic Well-being

China's breakthrough economic development since the reform and opening-up and one-party political system provide an ideal context for studying the interplay between individuals' political status and economic outcomes. Many previous studies have found that CCP members receive a wage premium compared to non-party members in the Chinese labor market. (Johnson and Chow 1997; Dickson and Rublee 2000; Zhou 2000; Liu 2003; Wu and Xie 2003; Knight and Yueh 2008; Appleton et al. 2009). These findings suggest that party membership positively contributes to individuals' wages in the labor market based on Chinese context.

Rational choice theory is a powerful analytic tool to explain individuals without high education choose to join in CCP in China. Rational choice theory argues that "individual actions and their social outcomes can be explained by assuming goal-directed behavior which is consistent with certain rationality criteria" (Abraham and Voss 2002). In other words, an actor chooses an alternative that can optimize his / her utility under constraints (Sato 2013). Besides actor personal choice, Coleman (1990) also highlighted the social conditions for actors, like constraints, beliefs, and alternatives to realize his or her choice.

From the macro aspect, on the one hand, as sole ruling party in China, CCP needs active and extensive cooperation and participation from the rank – and – file, who are the majority of CCP member composition (Walder 1995). Even if more high- educated persons join in CCP in recent years, both recruit criteria and screening process do not refer to the educational background but political loyalty, which gives ordinary people to realize social status raising in Chinese society. The educational background of annually newly-recruited CCP members is still mainly from persons without high education. According to the Chinese Communist Party Organization Department, 70 percent of the party members in 2009 did not have a bachelor's degree, and in 2015, 60 percent still did. Therefore, having party membership is an additional political capital compared to those without party membership. On the other hand, Chinese governments possess extensive power of resources. Individuals and organizations that are politically affiliated with

governments tend to possess a “privilege” of resource allocation (Chen and Wei 2017). Holding CCP membership for individuals represents such kind of political affiliation, which positively contributes to personal career development and economic well-being (Li and Walder 2001; Chen and Wei 2017).

From the micro aspect, individuals without high education choose to join in CCP based on two main variables: personal constraints and advantages of having CCP membership. Personal constraints refer to family resources and personal education background. China’s comprehensive urbanization and expansion of university admissions began in 2000, according to China’s Fifth Population Census in 2000, the rural population accounted for 63.91 percent and only 0.7 percent had college degrees and above. Thus, for most CCP members from rural areas, their families are not able to provide a variety of material, cultural and social capital to contribute to college entrance. A large proportion of party members who already have children coming from rural areas and without high education. Therefore, such families are unable to provide rich human capital and social capital for individual development. Moreover, not only the CCP controls the top administrative positions in many sectors, but also many employers reportedly treat individuals holding party membership as more dependable and competent employees because they have already passed the official and strict screening process (Dickson 2014). Therefore, when party membership can provide political capital to make themselves more competitive in the workplace, they tend to join in CCP membership.

As to how CCP membership benefits individuals in the labor market, some factors are accounting for such relationship. First, there has been a unique institutional feature in China known as the “government job assignment program” since the 1980s, which means the local governments have dominant power over employment (McLaughlin 2017). The jobs assigned by governments are always characterized by stable salaries and favorable benefits packages. Owing to the completely dominant position of the Communist Party in the Chinese political system, party membership stands for political loyalty and political affiliation. As a result, government authorities are inclined to show preference to party members when they allocate jobs. Next, by being in contact with other party members on different occasions, party members can thereby expand their

social relationships and increase their social capital. And these relationships may lead to job referrals (Zhang and Anderson 2014). And Bian (1994 [1997]) also found that party members were more prone to use such social connections to get jobs than non-party members. Social networks have proven to be pervasive and well-documented to jobs in labor markets (Rees 1966; Granovetter 1973[1995]). Finally, because of the fixed costs related to ensuring access to certain jobs, party membership potentially converts to higher salaries. That is to say, some high-paid jobs referring to managerial positions are exclusively offered to party members. Moreover, in general, management positions in state-run institutions are exclusively open to party members (Bian 1994).

About the empirical analysis of the impact of CCP membership on individual income increase, Walder (1995) made a comparison between CCP members with high education and those without high education, concluding that CCP members with high education would get higher salaries and positions. Dickson (2000) suggested that cadre party members could get higher positions and incomes compared to rank and file party members. While through comparison between rural areas and urban areas, Yan (2019) argued that CCP members from urban areas got much higher economic returns rather those from rural areas. Still, Appleton et al. (2009), McLaughlin (2017), Nikolov et al. (2020) mainly focused on urban areas about the difference between party members and non-party members. On the one hand, previous studies only indicate the difference in CCP membership in different groups. On the other hand, prior studies on the contribution of party membership to personal development mainly focus on citizens in cities, which cannot show the situation across China. Therefore, the evidence is insufficient to prove whether party membership has a facilitating effect on individual economic well-being. Therefore, further research is necessary to conduct a more comprehensive empirical demonstration around China to prove whether party membership has a promoting effect on individual economic well-being.

2.2 The Effect of Fathers' Political Status on Father Involvement

Intergenerational transmission refers to individual abilities, traits, behaviors, and outcomes transmitted from parents to offspring from the genetic and non-genetic processes (Cavalli-Sforza

and Feldman 1973; Eaves 1976). In the social study, researchers mainly focus on non-genetic processes, which are influenced by environmental factors. As to Intergenerational advantage transmission, it largely involves that parents invest in their children by using their own strengths to achieve the intergenerational transmission of advantageous behaviors or characteristics (Blau and Duncan 1967; Becker and Tomes 1986; Breen and Jonsson 2005).

Intergenerational transmission of advantage is mediated by education to a large extent (Blau and Duncan 1967; Breen and Jonsson 2005), which has been extensively studied. Parents get social resources through education, and then invest their children by using this advantage. But previous studies based on western countries do not refer to fathers' political status. As I mentioned in the introduction, party membership is a political-ideological affiliation in Western countries, so it is unlikely to have a direct impact on an individual's development. And then fathers' political status cannot exert an impact on children's development like fathers' educational background. However, holding Communist Party membership is beneficial to career promotion in Chinese society, especially in governmental agencies and state-owned enterprises (Walder 1995; Li, Walder, and Treiman 2000). That is because the Chinese Communist Party is the sole governing political party of China, and those with party membership dominate the social resources (Walder 1995; Li, Walder, and Treiman 2000). Therefore, For the majority of CCP members without high education, party membership is the only advantage to gain access to social resources. After getting party membership, CCP member fathers are more willing to invest their children to keep social class stable than non-CCP member fathers. Some studies have demonstrated that fathers' CCP membership positively contributes to children's educational achievement (Guo and Guo 2016; Yang, Wang, and Liu 2010).

There is little empirical research referring to parenting process. Parenting process plays a major role in the intergenerational transmission of human capital and presents important implications in interpreting children's adult life outcomes (Heckman and Cunha 2007; Del Boca et al. 2014; Fiorini and Keane 2014). Coleman (1987) also highlighted that effective parent-children interaction contributed to the formation of good behavioral norms and a sense of social network attachment for children, and therefore further facilitated intergenerational transmission of human capital within families. Lipset and Bendix (1991) indicated that parenting practice is the

result of class inheritance and reflection on mobility experiences. In particular, parents with intragenerational social upward mobility experiences will make them form new child-rearing values, and such values let parents make rational choices in parenting process (Kohn 1977).

The child-rearing values can be treated as the standard to define which abilities are the most desired for children to realize intergenerational transmission (Kohn 1977). Generally, education is basic for the abilities that children need to acquire (Kohn 1977). Therefore, educational expectations affect the level of parenting practice. Parents who have higher expectations for their children's education tend to involve more in childrearing (Seginer 1983; Zhan 2006; Sewell et al. 1970; Sewell et al. 2004). Moreover, parenting process better reflects how advantages are passed from generation to generation and provides a better picture of class mobility than the results of intergenerational transmission.

For the CCP member fathers, their upward mobility experiences shape their childrearing values, so they are more inclined to make rational choices in parenting practice. Because education is basic for the abilities that children need to acquire in childrearing values, CCP member fathers involve in childrearing main through educational expectations. Therefore, this section mainly attempts to explore the association between fathers' political status and father involvement, as well as whether fathers' educational expectations have an impact on such association. That not only fills a gap in the research on this topic but also gives us a better understanding of the significance of fathers' political status for children's development in the Chinese context.

2.3 The Effect of Children's Gender on Father Involvement

Compared to mother involvement, father involvement is more affected by child characteristics, such as gender of the child (Cummings et al. 2000). A host of findings have presented that fathers' preference for boys in childrearing, and fathers are more involved with young boys than girls (Manlove and Vernon-Feagans 2002; Lundberg, McLanahan, and Rose 2007; Raley and Bianchi 2006; Pleck and Hofferth 2008). Specifically, fathers are inclined to spend more time accompanying sons than daughters, particularly in companionship activities, achievement-related activities (Yeung et al. 2001; Yeung and Stafford 2002), and discipline as

well as schoolwork (Lamb, Pleck, and Levine 1987; Morgan et al. 1988). Moreover, Morgan et al. (1988) reported that fathers had a greater emotional attachment to sons than to daughters. On the one hand, fathers can receive greater utility from spending time with sons, like the birth of a son can increase marriage stability. On the other hand, because of gender-specific parenting skills and gender differences in the developmental process, fathers may be perceived to be more crucial for raising happy and successful sons than for raising daughters (Lundberg, McLanahan, and Rose 2007).

In addition to gender, there is a sizeable number of studies regarding the impact of birth order on father involvement. Take the situation of the United States for example. According to the existing research in the United States' social context, fathers are interactive and responsive to their first-born children, and gradually weaken the interaction from first-born to last-born (Flouri and Buchanan 2003; Bègue and Roché 2005; Price 2008; Schoppe-Sullivan et al. 2013; Hotz and Patano 2015). Price (2016:241) also found that "the first-born child received about 20 more minutes of quality father-time than the later-born child." That phenomenon can be figured out from two aspects: first-born children are usually expected to be adult models and to comfort to adults' expectations (Baskett 1985; Mendelson et al. 2010); also, over anxiousness about the first child and then attention will be divided among the siblings as the second child arrives, which is supported by parental investment theory (Trivers 1972) and resource dilution theory (Anastasi 1956; Blake 1981; Downey 1995).

As to China, son preference has been deeply rooted in Chinese society owing to a complex interaction of cultural, economic, and social reasons (Li and Cooney 1993; Arnold and Liu 1986; Liang 2008). Culturally speaking, the Confucian influence has promoted a universal preference for sons, who are considered to maintain the lineage of the family (Hardee 1984; Croll 1985; Wong 2005; Jin, Li, and Feldman 2007). From an economical aspect, men have been participating in the labor market longer than women, and are therefore more capable of providing better economic support to their families. From a social point, sons not only are family financial providers but also offer old-age support for parents. Generally, in China, because of the deficient pension system, the family is still seen as the basic unit of old-age support, and social welfare services are regarded as

a supplement to pension, not a substitute (Selden and You 1997; Liu and Sun 2016). Hence, the seniors have to rely on their sons physically and financially both in rural areas and in urban areas (Davin 1985; Zeng 1988; Liang 2008). As stated above, increased investment in boys is an effective resource allocation model (Strauss and Thomas 1995), which will lead parents to prioritize boys' needs in education investments.

The results from Western societies mainly focus on preschool-aged children, which cannot explain the situation of father involvement with adolescents. Nor does the birth order preference of Western fathers in childrearing explain the gender preference that Chinese fathers may have in childrearing. As to the study on Chinese society, there is still no reliable evidence on the situation of father involvement by gender preference. Although some studies have shown that there is a trend toward increasing equality between men and women in terms of high education acquisition (Lavelly et al. 1990; Zhang and Chen 2014), those results are unable to explain whether there is still a son preference in father involvement and on whether this preference for sons has changed since the implementation of the one-child policy and college enrollment expansion. Therefore, this section aims to offer some important insights into the effect of children's gender on father involvement based on Chinese society.

CHAPTER 3

The Effect of Political Status on Economic Well-being

3.1 Introduction

As mentioned in Chapter 2, the literature mentioned above has shown that party membership positively contributes to ones' economic well-being, but previous studies only present the difference of CCP membership in different small groups. Also, the evidence is insufficient to prove whether party membership has a facilitating effect on individual economic well-being. Based on the literature above, I propose two hypotheses for this chapter.

Hypothesis 1: Compared with non-CCP members, CCP members can get higher income.

Hypothesis 2: Compared with non-CCP members, high education has a greater effect on CCP members to get high income.

Using a national longitudinal dataset from the Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) in 2002, this chapter attempts to empirically explore whether CCP membership positively contributes to individual economic well-being. The outline of this chapter is as follows. First, data sources, variable measurements, and analytical methods are presented. And then, analysis results will be laid out. At last, a short conclusion is shown.

3.2 Methods

3.2.1 Data

The data used in this study from the CHIP is a nationwide survey conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) between 1988 and 2013. The two main advantages of the survey for this study are the quality of the data on earnings and the wealth of information it provided on educational background, job networking, social network features, management responsibilities, and leadership roles. Data from these domains are useful in examining the variety of mechanisms underpinning the relationship between party membership and incomes. For the purpose of this study, I choose the data from 2002, which is conducted around China and the

samples are selected by using a multistage stratified probability sample.

3.2.2 Variables

Dependent Variables

Monthly income

The economic well-being of an individual's political status is evaluated by monthly income.

Independent Variables

Political status

Education background

As mentioned in the introduction, personal political status is divided into CCP members and non-CCP members in this study, excluding Democratic Party members. According to CCP Organization Department, CCP members' education generally is divided into junior college or above and junior college below. And junior college or above is considered as high education and junior college below as low education. Therefore, individual education background in this analysis is also divided into junior college or above and junior college below.

Controlling variables

Controlling variables are gender, age, hukou, ethnicity, marital status, job, way to get a job, potential working experience.

Hukou is a system of household registration used in mainland China. A household registration record officially identifies a person as a permanent resident of an area and includes identifying information such as birthplace, name, date of birth, family members, and marriage situation. More importantly, each citizen is classified in an agricultural and non-agricultural hukou (commonly referred to as rural and urban). The social resources for individuals holding different hukou are different. That is why the hukou type is so important to the Chinese.

Current job is divided into two main categories: managerial position refers to the owner (manager) of a private firm, director or department director of the government agent, institution and enterprise, village, town and enterprise cadre; non-managerial position involves general staff

including clerical and office staff, salesclerk or service worker, as well as professional, skilled workers and self-employed.

Way to get a job refers to how to get this job for an individual. There is a unique institutional feature in China known as the “government job assignment program” since the 1980s, which means the local governments have dominant power over employment (McLaughlin 2017). The jobs assigned by governments are always characterized by stable salaries and favorable benefits packages. Based on the questionnaire, the way to get a job can be divided into two parts: assigned by local government and not assigned by local government (including introduced by the labor service company, introduced by family, relatives or friends, found it on your own, inheritance and starting your own business).

As to potential working experience is potential years of experience are defined as individuals’ age minus the years of schooling minus 6.

Because there are multiple categorical and continuous variables, for each set of data, I separate the two types of variables in two tables for a clearer illustration. The variable definition and code are shown in Table 3.1, and the descriptive statistics of variables are shown in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3.

Table 3.1 Variable Definition and Code

Variables	Code
Monthly income	Salary earned every month
Political status	CCP member=1, Non-CCP member=0
Education	Junior college and above=1, Junior college below=0
Gender	Male=1, Female=0
Hukou	Urban=1, Rural =0
Ethnicity	Han=1, Minority=0
Marital status	Married=1, Single=0
Job	Managerial position=1, Non-managerial position=0
Way to get a job	Assigned by local government=1 Not assigned by local government=0

Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics of CCP Members and Non-CCP Members, CHIP2002

Variables		CCP Members		Non-CCP Members	
		N	%	N	%
Gender	Male	2805	70.5%	6708	56.8%
	Female	1085	29.5%	5102	43.2%
Ethnicity	Han	3516	90.4%	10475	88.7%
	Minority	374	9.6%	1335	11.3%
Hukou	Urban	2770	71.2%	4641	39.3%
	Rural	1120	28.8%	7169	60.7%
Marital status	Married	3707	95.3%	8822	74.7%
	Single	183	4.7%	2988	25.3%
Job	Managerial position	1244	32.0%	507	4.3%
	Non-managerial position	2646	68.0%	11303	95.7%
Way to get job	Assigned by local government	2606	67.0%	1842	15.6%
	Not assigned by local government	1284	33.0%	9968	84.4%
Education	Junior college and above	1212	37.9%	1653	14.0%
	Junior college below	2678	62.1%	10157	86.0%
	N	3890	100%	11810	100%

Table 3.2 presents the number of CCP members is much more than non-CCP members in general. Among them, male CCP members are more than female members, and Han Chinese is much more than the minority Chinese. Also, CCP members from urban areas are more than ones from rural areas. As to occupation, Table 3.2 shows that the ratio of CCP members in managerial positions is larger than that of non-CCP members. Jobs of CCP members are mainly assigned by local government, while jobs of non-CCP members are largely found on their own. In terms of education, the education background of CCP members and non-CCP members is largely focused on junior college below.

Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics of CCP Members and Non-CCP Members, CHIP2002

Variables	CCP Members			Non-CCP Members		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
Monthly income	3890	834.2	641.3	11810	616.8	532.6
Age	3890	45.5	9.46	11810	37.1	11.0
Potential work experience	3890	28.6	10.3	11810	21.0	11.7

As seen in Table 3.3, CCP members are older, have more potential work experience, and then obviously earn more than non-CCP members.

3.2.3 Analytic Methods

To explore the relationship between personal political status and income, I employ Mincer's human capital earnings function (1974) with the index of political status as the fundamental framework. The specification can be generally expressed as follows:

$$\text{Log}(\text{Income}_i) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Pol}_i + \beta_2 \text{Edu}_i + \sum \beta_j X_j + \varepsilon_i$$

Income_i denotes individual's monthly earnings; Pol_i is an indicator of an individual's political status; Edu_i is the number of years of education that individual has attained; and X_j is an indicator of individual-level controls including gender, age, ethnicity, marital status, job, way to get a job, potential working experience. ε_i is the random error.

3.3 Results

In order to clarify if these associations are significant and not mediated by other controlling variables, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression will be employed in Table 3.4. And Table 3.4 displays the results of personal political status and earnings. Three models are included in Table 3.4. After controlling all other variables, party membership has a positive and significant effect on individuals' monthly income.

Table 3.4 The Impact of Political Status on Monthly Income (OLS)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Political status (ref: non-CCP)	0.158** (0.01)	0.131*** (0.01)	0.173*** (0.03)
Education (ref: junior college below)		0.035*** (0.00)	0.027*** (0.01)
Political status*Education			0.092*** (0.01)
Potential experience	0.013** (0.00)	0.006** (0.00)	0.010** (0.00)
Gender	-0.140*** (0.01)	-0.125*** (0.01)	-0.000*** (0.00)
Ethnicity	0.056* (0.03)	0.044 (0.03)	0.041 (0.03)
Marital status	0.143*** (0.03)	0.114*** (0.03)	0.092*** (0.04)
Hukou	0.184* (0.03)	0.165* (0.03)	0.071* (0.02)
Job (ref: non-managerial position)	0.311* (0.05)	0.124** (0.05)	0.115** (0.05)
Way to get a job (ref: not assigned by local government)	0.123* (0.03)	0.014* (0.03)	0.154* (0.04)
_cons	9.130*** (0.12)	8.654*** (0.13)	8.230*** (0.10)
Observations	15700	15700	15700
R-squared	0.373	0.386	0.399

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

3.4 Conclusion

The main objective of this chapter is to investigate whether party membership has a positive effect on individuals' earnings in the Chinese context. According to the analysis, it has shown that Chinese governments possess extensive power of resources. Individuals and organizations that are politically affiliated with governments tend to possess a "privilege" of resource allocation (Chen and Wei 2017). Holding CCP membership for individuals represents such kind of political affiliation, which has a positive effect on individuals' economic well-being. This finding support hypothesis 1. Besides, compared to non-CCP members, high education has a positive effect on CCP members to get higher incomes, which supports hypothesis 2.

CHAPTER 4

The Effect of Fathers' Political Status on Father Involvement

4.1 Introduction

Previous studies have suggested that the parenting process is an effective way to achieve intergenerational advantage transmission (Bourdieu 1980 [1984]). Then social mobility experiences shape individuals' childrearing value, which further enhances rational choice in the parenting process, in addition to family origins (Lipset and Bendix 1991; Sieben 2017). Moreover, education acquisition is the basis of childrearing values. Therefore, educational expectations determine the level of parenting practices. Some researchers focused on Chinese society argued that fathers with CCP membership were strongly associated with their children's education achievement (Yang, Wang, and Liu 2009; Yang and Chen 2016; Guo and Guo 2016). However, whether fathers' CCP membership has an effect on father involvement remains unknown. For CCP member fathers, their mobility experiences contribute to new childrearing values formation, which guides parenting behaviors. Therefore, the level of their involvement in childrearing is basically determined by their educational expectations for their children. To empirically test whether educational expectations have a positive effect on CCP member fathers' involvement, this chapter employs national data from CEPS 2014-2015. Lamb and his colleagues (Pleck, Charnov, and Levine 1985) grouped previous studies and reintroduced the definition of father involvement. According to Lamb et al. (1985), father involvement can be divided into three components: the extent of the father's actual interaction with his children, the extent of the father's accessibility to his children, and the degree of responsibility assumed for his children.

Interaction refers to the time that a father has a direct contact with his children, in forms of caretaking, play, or leisure (Lamb et al. 1985; Pleck 2010). Accessibility concerns "the father's potential availability for interaction, by virtue of being present or accessible to the child whether or not direct interaction is occurring" (Lamb et al. 1985:884). For example, Parents are cooking in the kitchen while the child is playing at parents' feet or in the next room (Lamb 2000). Responsibility reflects "not to the amount of time spent with or accessible to children, but to the role father takes in making sure that the child is taking care of and arranging for resources to be

available for the child. For example, this might be related to how much father cares about the child's well-being, such as purchasing clothes, arranging pediatrician appointment and communicating with child about study and life" (Lamb et al. 1985:884). This conceptual framework of father involvement informs an understanding of three dimensions of involvement (Pleck 2010). Moreover, Palkovitz (1997) suggested that interaction, availability, and responsibility were qualitatively different aspects of father involvement, and it was important to investigate them separately. Among them, accessibility is not specifically reflected in the questionnaire. Therefore, based on the survey, this study will use interaction and responsibility as indexes to indicate two different aspects of father involvement. Based on the literature above, two hypotheses are proposed for this chapter.

Hypothesis 3: Compared with non-CCP member fathers, educational expectations have a greater effect on CCP member fathers on spending time taking care of their children's daily activities, study, and play.

Hypothesis 4: Compared with non-CCP member fathers, educational expectations have a greater effect on CCP member fathers communicating with their children.

In addition, the data from China Education Panel Survey is panel data. The survey in 2013-2014 about students of Grade 7 and Grade 9 is wave 1. The survey in the 2014-2015 about Grade 8 students is a follow-up to the previous survey of Grade 7 students, which is wave 2. However, the questionnaires of the two surveys are a little bit different. Specifically, the time fathers spending on children's daily activities, study and play, and fathers' political status only appear in 2014-2015 follow-up survey. Therefore, although China Education Panel Survey is panel data, the data I employ for this study only refers to 2014-2015, which is cross-sectional data.

Even though the data I employ is not designed for father involvement, as it stands, this data is the most relevant to my analytical purposes. On the one hand, it is a national longitudinal dataset with a huge and rich sample size. On the other hand, it covers detailed situations of father involvement, including the time fathers spend on daily care activities, study, as well as father-child

communication. Besides, unlike previous surveys of father involvement in preschooler children, this survey is targeted at adolescents. Adolescence is a critical period that shapes educational attainment and thus subsequent life chances (Van de Werfhorst and Mijs 2010). Moreover, in this life phase, individual characteristics and activities become increasingly important compared to parental influences during childhood (Beyers et al. 2003). Therefore, its analysis results are more reflective of the differences. The outline of this chapter is as follows. First, data sources, variable measurements and, analytical methods are presented. And then, analysis results will be demonstrated. At last, a short conclusion is provided.

4.2 Methods

4.2.1 Data

This chapter uses data from the 2014–2015 China Education Panel Survey (CEPS) to analyze the impact of fathers' CCP membership on father involvement. China Education Panel Survey, a national longitudinal survey, is conducted by National Survey Research Center at Renmin University of China, cooperating with 19 local universities and institutions of China Social Survey Network (CSSN) system. Selecting nationally representative sample of 10750 students from 112 schools in 28 county units (county, district, municipality) across 20 provinces in China, the survey project documents and interprets the educational process of students at secondary educational stages. Respondents included eighth-grade students, their parents, teachers, and principals. Based on the analysis of this chapter, only data from students and their parents will be adopted.

4.2.2 Variables

Dependent variables

Father involvement: Interaction and communication

Based on the discussion above, father involvement in this study involves interaction and responsibility. Interaction is measured by caretaking activities, referring to ask children from Grade 8 how long their fathers spend on average on taking care of their daily life, on taking charge

of their assignment, and study and on accompanying them to play in total.

Responsibility is measured by father-child communication, referring to ask children how often fathers discuss “things happened at school”, “the relationship between you and your friends”, “the relationship between you and your teachers” and “your worries and your troubles” with you? The answers offered are “Never, Sometimes, Often”. The answer “sometimes” and “often” is difficult to be measured by times, while “never” is certain. Therefore, I put “sometimes” and “often” together as “Yes”, “never” as “No” to analyze the probability of father-child communication.

Independent Variables

Independent variables, divided based on prior research, involve fathers’ political status, educational expectations. The details are presented as follows.

Fathers’ political status

According to the aforementioned literature, political status is personally related to party membership (Szelenyi 1978; Nee 1996; Xie and Hannum 1996). As to China’s context, political status generally refers to membership of the Communist Party, membership of eight Democratic Party, and Masses (a person without any party membership), which I will employ in the analysis of this section. According to the descriptive analysis, the Democratic Party member is only 34, whereas the Communist Party member is 796. To eliminate analytical bias, the Democratic Party member will be removed. So, fathers’ political status will be divided into CCP members and non-CCP members.

Educational expectations

Educational expectations in the questionnaire refer to drop out now, junior high school, technical school, vocational high school, senior high school, junior college, Bachelor’s degree, Master’s degree, and Ph.D. In this analysis, educational expectations are treated as the continuous variable.

Controlling variables

To control the characteristics that may influence dependent and independent variables,

controlling variables are included. They are fathers' education, fathers' hukou, fathers' current occupation, mothers' hukou, mothers' political status, mothers' education background, mothers' current occupation, time of mothers spend on daily care, study and play, mother-child communication, time of grandparents spend on daily care activities, study and play.

Among them, the current job of parents is divided into four main categories: managerial position refers to the cadre of government, public institutions, and enterprises; advanced technician involves scientist, engineer, professor, doctor, lawyer, accountant, computer programmer, and school teacher; general technician includes ordinary worker, like driver, porter, agent, secretary; general staff is farmer, guard, sanitation worker, and self-employed worker. In the empirical analysis, I introduce general staff as a reference, advanced technician, general technician and managerial position separately as dummy variables into the model. The descriptive statistics of variables are shown in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2.

Table 4.1 Variable Definition and Code

Variables	Code
Father's time on daily activities	The time fathers spend on taking care of children's daily activities
Father's time on study	The time fathers spend on accompanying children to study
Father's time on play	The time fathers spend on accompanying children to play
Communication with father on school	Often=1, Never=0
Communication with father on friends	Often=1, Never=0
Communication with father on teachers	Often=1, Never=0
Communication with father on worries	Often=1, Never=0
Educational expectations	Drop out now, Junior high school, Technical school, Vocational high school, Senior high school, Junior college, Bachelor degree, Master degree, PhD
Father's political status	CCP member=1, non-CCP member=0
Father's education	Bachelor degree or above =1, Bachelor degree below =0
Father's hukou	Rural =1, Urban=0
Father's job	Managerial position, Advanced technician, General technician
Mother's hukou	Rural =1, urban=0

Father's hukou	Rural	794	52.10%	357	81.78%
	Urban	730	47.90%	79	18.22%
Father's job	Managerial position	173	11.35%	208	47.66%
	Advanced technician	106	6.96%	66	15.19%
	General technician	466	30.58%	72	16.59%
	General staff	779	51.12%	90	20.56%
Mother's hukou	Rural	807	52.95%	361	82.71%
	Urban	717	47.05%	75	17.29%
Mother's political status		1524	100%	436	100%
Mother's education	Below bachelor degree	1,370	89.90%	283	64.95%
	Bachelor degree and above	154	10.10%	153	35.05%
Mother's job	Managerial position	114	7.48%	100	22.9%
	Advanced technician	165	10.83%	109	25.00%
	General technician	312	20.47%	105	24.07%
	General staff	933	61.22%	122	28.04%
Communication with mother on school		1524	100%	436	100%
Communication with mother on teachers		1524	100%	436	100%
Communication with mother on worries		1524	100%	436	100%

Table 4.2 shows that mothers spend more time on daily care activities, study and play with children as well as communicate more with children than fathers. The proportion of male CCP members is higher than that of females, and the educational background of males is higher than that of females. Also, it indicates that the proportion of rural hukou is slightly higher, and the difference of hukou type between males and females is not significant. Both CCP member fathers and non-CCP fathers hold high educational expectations for their children. Among jobs, the occupational advantage is more pronounced for males. And the ratio of CCP members in managerial positions is more than that of non-CCP members.

4.2.3 Analytic Methods

First, I will explore the relationship between fathers' political status and educational

expectations, and time of fathers spend on daily care activities, study and play. Fathers' political status is categorical variable, whereas educational expectations as well as time fathers spend on daily care activities, study, and play are defined as continuous variables, so I employ ordinary least squares (OLS) in analysis. The equation and the detailed description are as follows.

$$Y_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 Z_{Fatherpol} + \alpha_2 Z_{Educationalexp} + \sum \alpha_j X_j + \varepsilon_i$$

Y_i means the time fathers spending on daily care activities, study and play. $Z_{Fatherpol}$ means fathers' political status and $Z_{Educationalexp}$ means educational expectations for their children. X_j stands for controlling variables of this analysis. α_0 is the intercept, and ε_i is the random error.

Next, I will explore the relationship between fathers' political status and educational expectations, and father-child communication. Here I use logistic regression model. The equation and detailed description are as follows.

$$Logit(p_i) = \log\left(\frac{p_i}{1-p_i}\right) = \alpha_1 Z_{Fatherpol} + \alpha_2 Z_{Educationalexp} + \sum \alpha_j X_j + \mu_i$$

Where p_i means the probability of father-child communication, $Z_{Fatherpol}$ means fathers' political status and $Z_{Educationalexp}$ means educational expectations for their children. X_j stands for controlling variables of this analysis. μ_i is the random error.

4.3 Results

Before conducting ordinary least squares to explore the relationship between the time of fathers' spending on daily care activities, study, and play and fathers' political status, I employ variance inflation factor (VIF) to examine whether there is multicollinearity between the independent variables and controlling variables.

As seen in Table 4.3, the results are shown: the maximum value of VIF for the independent and control variables in model 1 is 2.810; the maximum value of VIF for the independent and control variables in model 2 is 3.490; the maximum value of VIF for the independent and control

variables in model 3 is 3.100. The VIF values in the three models are much smaller than variance inflation factor 10, therefore, the three models do not present significant multicollinearity problems.

Table 4.3 Multicollinearity Diagnosis

M1			M2			M3		
Variables	VIF	1/VIF	Variables	VIF	1/VIF	Variables	VIF	1/VIF
Father's hukou	2.810	0.356	Father's hukou	3.490	0.287	Father's hukou	3.100	0.322
Mother's hukou	2.760	0.362	Mother's hukou	3.470	0.288	Mother's hukou	3.040	0.329
Educational expectations	1.950	0.513	Father's education	2.070	0.483	Father's education	1.990	0.502
Father's education	1.890	0.529	Educational expectations	2.050	0.488	Educational expectations	1.960	0.511
Mothers' time on study	1.730	0.579	Mothers' time on study	1.870	0.536	Mothers' time on daily activities	1.820	0.551
Mothers' time on play	1.730	0.580	Mothers' time on daily activities	1.850	0.541	Mother's job	1.780	0.561
Mother's job	1.710	0.586	Mothers' time on play	1.830	0.546	Mothers' time on study	1.750	0.570
Mothers' time on daily activities	1.710	0.586	Mother's job	1.770	0.564	Mothers' time on play	1.700	0.588
Mother's education	1.610	0.623	Mother's education	1.680	0.596	Mother's education	1.610	0.622
Communication with mother on school	1.600	0.624	Communication with mother on teachers	1.620	0.618	Communication with mother on teachers	1.600	0.623
Father's job	1.510	0.661	Communication with mother on school	1.590	0.629	Father's job	1.550	0.646
Communication with mother on teachers	1.500	0.666	Father's job	1.550	0.644	Communication with mother on school	1.540	0.650
Communication with mother on worries	1.430	0.701	Mother's political status	1.420	0.704	Communication with mother on worries	1.450	0.692
Mother's political status	1.270	0.788	Communication with mother on worries	1.400	0.712	Mother's political status	1.340	0.744

In order to explore the relationship between father involvement and fathers' political status, I will divide the analyses into two parts: the impact of fathers' political status on the interaction between fathers and children, and the impact of fathers' political status on communication between fathers and children. The analyses will be shown in Table 4.4 and Table4.5.

Table 4.4 The Impact of Fathers' Political Status on Interaction between Fathers and Children (OLS)

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	Daily activities	Study	Play	Daily activities	Study	Play	Daily activities	Study	Play
Father's political status (ref: non-CCP)	-0.051 (-0.26)	-0.078 (-0.90)	-0.121** (-2.19)	-0.052 (-0.26)	-0.086 (-0.98)	-0.115** (-2.10)	0.102* (1.79)	-0.047 (-0.50)	-0.144** (-2.42)
Educational expectations				0.075** (2.15)	0.022* (1.97)	0.042*** (2.83)	0.063** (2.12)	0.074** (2.38)	0.051*** (3.10)
Father's political status * Educational expectations							0.190*** (2.68)	-0.063 (-1.21)	0.099*** (2.25)
Father's education (ref: bachelor degree below)	0.230 (0.95)	-0.022 (-0.21)	-0.003 (-0.04)	0.225 (0.93)	-0.030 (-0.28)	0.014 (0.19)	0.208 (0.85)	-0.020 (-0.18)	0.005 (-0.08)
Father's hukou (ref: rural)	0.356 (1.52)	-0.167 (-1.44)	0.0723 (1.04)	0.345 1.47	-0.168 (-1.45)	0.0765 (1.10)	0.347 (1.48)	-0.17 (-1.46)	0.0773 (1.11)
Father's job: (ref: general staff)									
Managerial position	0.0221 (0.32)	0.031 (0.75)	0.0501* (1.96)	0.0258 (0.22)	0.0236 (0.78)	0.0454* (1.94)	0.0305 (0.25)	0.0225 (0.77)	0.0502* (1.95)
Advanced technician	0.0112 (0.32)	0.0254 (0.54)	0.0412 (1.58)	0.0145 (0.24)	0.0189 (0.52)	0.0249 (1.85)	0.0249 (0.21)	0.114 (0.56)	0.0241 (1.84)

General technician	-0.0152 (-0.39)	-0.025 (-0.75)	-0.0231* (-1.86)	-0.0125 (-0.25)	-0.0225 (-0.75)	-0.0354* (-1.92)	-0.019 (-0.22)	-0.0224 (-0.75)	-0.0314* (-1.93)
Mother's hukou	0.002 (0.01)	0.022 (0.18)	-0.069 (-0.99)	-0.004 (-0.02)	0.022 (-0.19)	-0.078 (-1.12)	-0.003 (-0.01)	0.021 (0.18)	-0.080 (-1.14)
Mother's political status	0.003 (0.01)	0.205* (1.69)	0.131* (1.69)	0.013 (0.05)	0.212* (1.74)	0.121 (1.56)	0.022 (0.08)	0.206* (1.68)	0.126 (1.62)
Mother's education	-0.0679 (-0.27)	-0.161 (-1.36)	-0.0579 (-0.79)	-0.0693 (-0.27)	-0.164 (-1.38)	-0.0537 (-0.73)	-0.0818 (-0.32)	-0.151 (-1.27)	-0.0602 (-0.82)
Mother's job: (ref: general staff)									
Managerial position	0.0421 (0.52)	-0.0345* (1.85)	-0.0299 (-1.23)	0.0425 (0.59)	-0.0685* (-1.93)	-0.0236 (-0.89)	0.0423 (0.44)	-0.0428* (-2.01)	-0.0214 (-0.93)
Advanced technician	0.0243 (0.35)	-0.0124 (1.25)	-0.0124 (-0.89)	0.0287 (0.35)	-0.0521 (-1.92)	-0.0109 (-0.65)	0.0354 (0.39)	-0.0298 (-1.61)	0.0124 (-0.84)
General technician	-0.0332 (-0.32)	0.0485 (1.05)	0.0220 (0.52)	-0.0302 (-0.42)	0.0421 (0.98)	0.0125 (0.48)	-0.0241 (-0.41)	0.0365 (0.98)	0.0124 (0.54)
Mother's time on daily activities	0.733*** (47.16)	0.0313*** (4.29)	0.00425 (0.92)	0.728*** (46.37)	0.0317*** (4.28)	0.00547 (1.18)	0.727*** (46.28)	0.0319*** (4.31)	0.00524 (1.13)

Mother's time on study	0.202*** (4.12)	0.647*** (30.68)	0.0298** (2.10)	0.208*** (4.23)	0.646*** (30.44)	0.0277* (1.96)	0.208*** (4.24)	0.646*** (30.43)	0.0275* (1.94)
Mother's time on play	0.0605 (1.25)	0.0855*** (4.12)	0.697*** (49.52)	0.0642 (1.32)	0.0880*** (4.20)	0.694*** (49.13)	0.0678 (1.38)	0.0854*** (4.05)	0.696*** (49.00)
Communication with mother on school	-0.218 (-1.48)	-0.143** (-2.13)	-0.0223 (-0.52)	-0.237 (-1.59)	-0.153** (-2.24)	-0.00797 (-0.18)	-0.237 (-1.59)	-0.154** (-2.26)	-0.00739 (-0.17)
Communication with mother on teachers	0.172 (1.38)	0.0954* (1.68)	0.0219 (0.60)	0.176 (1.40)	0.0995* (1.74)	0.0199 (0.54)	0.176 (1.41)	0.0992* (1.74)	0.0211 (0.58)
Communication with mother on worries	-0.0908 (-0.79)	-0.0532 (-1.04)	-0.0249 (-0.75)	-0.0909 (-0.79)	-0.0558 (-1.09)	-0.0192 (-0.58)	-0.0914 (-0.80)	-0.0564 (-1.10)	-0.02 (-0.60)
_cons	-0.13 (-0.28)	0.466** (2.23)	0.367*** (2.78)	-0.128 (-0.22)	0.315 (1.20)	0.647*** (3.85)	-0.0271 (-0.05)	0.233 (0.86)	0.701*** (4.04)
Observations	1960	1960	1960	1960	1960	1960	1960	1960	1960
R-squared	0.7185	0.7563	0.8161	0.7035	0.7357	0.8273	0.7268	0.7466	0.8452

T value in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Tables 4.4 presents the impact of fathers' political status on the interaction between fathers and children. According to the interaction of fathers' political status and educational expectations into model 3, the main effect of daily activities is positive, and the interaction of it is positive. It shows that educational expectations have a positive effect on CCP member fathers spending time on children's daily activities, compared to non-CCP member fathers. As to play, educational expectations have negative effect on CCP member fathers spending time on children's play, compared with non-CCP member fathers. That is probably because CCP member fathers are busy with their work and social network so that they cannot spare time to accompany children. There is no significant change in the study. Therefore, the findings are unable to fully support hypothesis 3.

Table 4.5 The Impact of Fathers' Political Status on Communication between Fathers and Children (Logit)

	Model 4				Model 5				Model 6			
	Communication about school	Communication about friends	Communication about teachers	Communication about worries	Communication about school	Communication about friends	Communication about teachers	Communication about worries	Communication about school	Communication about friends	Communication about teachers	Communication about worries
Father's political status (ref: non-CCP)	0.124 (0.83)	0.412*** (2.69)	0.326** (1.98)	0.036 (0.22)	0.114 (0.76)	0.418*** (2.72)	0.318* (1.92)	0.011 (0.07)	0.208 (1.20)	0.505*** (2.96)	0.272* (1.89)	0.126 (0.66)
Educational expectations					0.103** (2.21)	0.118** (2.39)	0.120** (2.41)	0.094* (1.87)	0.123** (2.42)	0.140** (2.79)	0.090* (1.70)	0.117** (2.15)
Father's political status * Educational expectations									0.129*** (2.05)	0.133** (2.12)	0.209* (1.69)	-0.159 (-1.16)
Father's education (ref: bachelor degree below)	0.337* (1.83)	0.114 (0.59)	0.375* (1.78)	0.0798 (0.40)	0.299 (1.62)	0.102 (0.52)	0.335 (1.59)	0.061 (0.31)	0.316* (1.70)	0.121 (0.62)	0.306 (1.44)	0.0832 (0.42)
Father's hukou (ref: rural)	0.104 (0.53)	0.265 (1.28)	0.367 (1.64)	0.012 (0.06)	0.0957 (0.49)	0.263 (1.26)	0.364 (1.63)	0.0164 (0.08)	0.0966 (0.49)	0.263 (1.26)	0.367 (1.64)	0.0165 (0.08)
Father's job: (ref: general staff)												
Managerial position	0.0354 (0.78)	-0.0754 (-0.99)	-0.123 (-1.01)	0.124 (1.21)	0.0524 (0.78)	-0.0654 (-0.58)	-0.125 (-1.63)	0.136* (-0.65)	0.0548 (0.83)	-.0564 (-0.95)	-.128 (-0.66)	0.121 (1.63)
Advanced technician	0.0301 (0.67)	-0.0641 (-0.85)	-0.1046 (-0.87)	0.1054 (1.04)	0.0445 (0.67)	-0.0556 (-0.50)	-0.1063 (-1.40)	0.1240 (-0.56)	0.0466 (0.71)	-0.0479 (-0.82)	-0.1088 (-0.57)	0.1029 (1.40)

General technician	-0.0505 (-0.82)	0.0615 (0.94)	0.104 (1.51)	-0.107 (-1.61)	-0.0506 (-0.81)	0.0598 (0.91)	0.111 (1.60)	-0.108 (-1.62)	-0.0516 (-0.83)	0.0592 (0.90)	0.114 (1.63)	-0.108 (-1.61)
Mother's hukou	0.12 (0.60)	-0.253 (-1.19)	-0.229 (-1.00)	-0.0991 (-0.45)	0.129 (0.64)	-0.249 (-1.17)	-0.206 (-0.90)	-0.0932 (-0.42)	0.129 (0.64)	-0.248 (-1.17)	-0.215 (-0.94)	-0.0938 (-0.42)
Mother's political status	0.271 (1.34)	-0.0257 (-0.12)	0.112 (0.49)	0.496** (2.27)	0.298 (1.47)	-0.0189 (-0.09)	0.152 (0.66)	0.533** (2.44)	0.284 (1.40)	-0.0347 (-0.16)	0.183 (0.79)	0.514** (2.34)
Mother's education	-0.109 (-0.57)	-0.00296 (-0.01)	-0.0917 (-0.42)	0.0179 (0.09)	-0.13 (-0.68)	-0.00959 (-0.05)	-0.118 (-0.54)	0.00689 (0.03)	-0.116 (-0.60)	0.0069 (0.03)	-0.148 (-0.68)	0.0231 (0.11)
Mother's job: (ref: general staff)												
Managerial position	-0.0163 (-0.23)	0.0561 (0.78)	-0.0771 (-0.97)	-0.0024 (-0.03)	-0.021 (-0.31)	0.0565 (0.78)	-0.0864 (-1.07)	-0.0144 (-0.20)	-0.0243 (-0.35)	0.0527 (0.72)	-0.080 (-1.00)	-0.0164 (-0.23)
Advanced technician	-0.0125 (-0.19)	0.0428 (0.68)	-0.0594 (-0.74)	-0.0021 (-0.03)	-0.0158 (-0.25)	0.0432 (0.62)	-0.0658 (-0.83)	-0.0126 (-0.16)	-0.0196 (-0.29)	0.0328 (0.58)	-0.0654 (-0.75)	-0.0125 (-0.18_)
General technician	0.0142 (0.20)	-0.0488 (-0.68)	0.067 (0.84)	0.0021 (0.03)	0.0183 (0.27)	-0.0491 (-0.68)	0.0751 (0.93)	0.0125 (0.17)	0.0211 (0.30)	-0.0458 (-0.63)	0.0696 (0.87)	0.0143 (0.20)

Mother's time on daily activities	0.011 (0.89)	0.0047 (0.37)	-0.00132 (-0.10)	0.00473 (0.36)	0.00841 (0.67)	0.00197 (0.15)	-0.0033 (-0.24)	0.00331 (0.25)	0.00866 (0.69)	0.00238 (0.19)	-0.00366 (-0.27)	0.00351 (0.26)
Mother's time on study	0.0475 (1.22)	0.0266 (0.67)	0.0513 (1.19)	0.0927** (2.16)	0.0541 (1.37)	0.0293 (0.74)	0.0549 (1.25)	0.0950** (2.20)	0.053 (1.34)	0.0289 (0.72)	0.056 (1.27)	0.0946** (2.19)
Mother's time on play	-0.018 (-0.43)	0.0834** (2.12)	0.0105 (0.24)	0.00386 (0.08)	-0.0113 (-0.27)	0.0856** (2.16)	0.0185 (0.41)	0.0136 (-0.29)	-0.0128 (-0.30)	0.0837** (2.11)	0.0225 (0.50)	0.0124 (0.27)
Communication with mother on school	1.503*** (9.59)	0.413*** (2.74)	-0.086 (-0.51)	-0.316** (-1.98)	1.461*** (9.23)	0.388** (2.55)	-0.114 (-0.67)	-0.347** (-2.15)	1.464*** (9.24)	0.391** (2.57)	-0.122 (-0.72)	-0.352** (-2.17)
Communication with mother on teachers	0.216** (2.03)	0.873*** (7.00)	2.655*** (14.52)	0.142 (1.20)	0.230** (2.16)	0.885*** (7.06)	2.665*** (14.5)	0.133 (1.11)	0.229** (2.15)	0.881*** (7.05)	2.679*** (14.51)	0.134 (1.12)
Communication with mother on worries	0.306*** (3.13)	0.434*** (4.04)	0.166 (1.48)	2.454*** (14.39)	0.310*** (3.15)	0.436*** (4.04)	0.147 (1.31)	2.447*** (14.3)	0.308*** (3.13)	0.438*** (4.06)	0.146 (1.30)	2.448*** (14.30)
_Cons	-6.585*** (-13.20)	-5.958*** (-12.30)	-9.104*** (-15.23)	-7.006*** (-12.77)	-7.303*** (-12.18)	-6.050*** (-10.46)	-9.950*** (-14.23)	-7.625*** (-11.61)	-7.458*** (-12.03)	-6.226*** (-10.34)	-9.732*** (-13.68)	-7.795*** (-11.55)
Observations	1960	1960	1960	1960	1960	1960	1960	1960	1960	1960	1960	1960
Pseudo r2	0.2485	0.2567	0.2891	0.2964	0.2638	0.2875	0.3187	0.3238	0.2819	0.3253	0.3398	0.3654

T value in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4.5 shows the impact of fathers' political status on communication between fathers and children. In model 6, it can be seen that the main effect of communication about the school, friends, teachers as well as worries are positive, and interaction of fathers' political status and educational expectations on communication about the school, friends as well as teachers is positive. It can be concluded that compared with non-CCP member fathers, educational expectations have a positive effect on communication between CCP member fathers and children. This finding supports hypothesis 4.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter mainly explores the effect of fathers' political status on father involvement and whether educational expectations influence non-CCP member fathers' and CCP member father's childrearing. According to analyses, there are two findings. First, educational expectations make CCP member fathers spend less time on play with children but more time on daily activities than non-CCP fathers, which does not fully support hypothesis 3. This is probably because CCP member fathers are so busy with their work that they cannot spare full time with their children. But as resident CCP member fathers, they still can offer some help in their daily life. As to study, most CCP member fathers do not hold high education background, so they are unable to tutor their children. Second, contrary to the first finding, educational expectations enable CCP member fathers to communicate more with their children than non-CCP members, which supports hypothesis 4.

The two findings indicate that parenting styles are different at different ages of children. According to previous studies, when children are in pre-school age, fathers are more likely to spend time on specific caregiving issues. As children grow up and become teenagers, parenting style tends to be two-way emotional communication. This is also beneficial to the healthy growth of the children's bodies and minds.

CHAPTER 5

The Effect of Children's Gender on Father Involvement

5.1 Introduction

A host of findings have presented that fathers' preference for boys in childrearing because of greater utility and gender-specific parenting (Manlove and Vernon-Feagans 2002; Lundberg, McLanahan, and Rose 2007; Raley and Bianchi 2006; Pleck and Hofferth 2008). In addition to gender, the impact of birth order on father involvement always refers to the first-born child received more fathers' time than the later-born child (Flouri and Buchanan 2003; Bègue and Roché 2005; Price 2008; Schoppe-Sullivan, Kotila, Jia, Lang, and Bower 2013; Hotz and Patano 2015), based on parental investment theory (Trivers 1972) and resource dilution theory (Anastasi 1956; Blake 1981; Downey 1995). However, as to Chinese society, there is gender preference, namely, son preference. Owing to traditional values, economically-based benefits, and old-age support for parents, (Hillier 1988; Greenhalgh 1994; Hannum and Xie 1994; Buchmann and Hannum 2001; Steelman et al. 2002; Lu and Treiman 2008; Hannum, Kong, and Zhang 2009; Lei and Pals 2011), it is easier for boys to get more investment than female siblings (Parish and Willis 1993; Lei et al. 2016). Therefore, evidence from Western societies cannot explain Chinese fathers' potential preference for sons in the parenting process. Based on the literature above, I propose two hypotheses for this chapter.

Hypothesis 5: Compared with non-CCP member fathers, CCP member fathers are more likely to spend time caring for boys in daily activities, study, and play than girls.

Hypothesis 6: Compared with non-CCP member fathers, CCP member fathers are more likely to communicate with boys than girls.

Using a national longitudinal dataset from the 2014–2015 China Education Panel Survey (CEPS), this chapter attempts to empirically test the impact of children's gender on father involvement, and further examine whether there is son preference in Chinese society nowadays using birth order. The outline of this chapter is as follows. First, I will give a detailed description

of the dataset, variables, and analytic methods. Then, I will analyze data from the 2014–2015 China Education Panel Survey (CEPS) to investigate how children’s gender affects father involvement, as well as whether son preference still exists in Chinese society nowadays, and then give results. Finally, a short conclusion will be provided.

5.2 Methods

5.2.1 Data

This chapter uses data from the 2014–2015 China Education Panel Survey (CEPS) to analyze the impact of fathers’ CCP membership on father involvement. China Education Panel Survey, a national longitudinal survey, is conducted by National Survey Research Center at Renmin University of China, cooperating with 19 local universities and institutions of China Social Survey Network (CSSN) system. Selecting nationally representative sample of 10750 students from 112 schools in 28 county units (county, district, municipality) across 20 provinces in China, the survey project documents and interprets the educational process of students at secondary educational stages. Respondents included eighth-grade students, their parents, teachers, and principals. Based on the analysis of this chapter, only data from students and their parents will be adopted.

5.2.2 Variables

Dependent variables

Father involvement: Interaction and communication

As mentioned in Chapter 4, father involvement refers to interaction and responsibility in this study. Interaction is measured by caretaking activities, referring to ask children from Grade 8 how long their father spends on average on taking care of their daily life, on taking charge of their assignment and study, and on accompanying them to play in total. While responsibility is measured by father-child communication, referring to ask children how often fathers discuss “things happened at school”, “the relationship between you and your friends”, “the relationship between you and your teachers” and “your worries and your troubles” with you? The answers offered are

“Never, Sometimes, Often”. The answer “sometimes” and “often” is difficult to be measured by times, while “never” is certain. Therefore, I put “sometimes” and “often” together as “Yes”, “never” as “No” to analyze the probability of father-child communication.

Independent variables

Father’s political status: CCP member and Non-CCP member.

Gender of child: male and female.

Controlling variables

To control the characteristics that may influence dependent and independent variables, controlling variables are included. They are fathers’ education background, fathers’ hukou, fathers’ current job, mothers’ hukou, mothers’ political status, mothers’ education background, mothers’ current job, time of mothers spend on daily care, study and play, mother-child communication, time of grandparents spend on daily care, study and play. The descriptive statistics of variables are shown in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2.

Table 5.1 Variable Definition and Code

Variables	Code
Father’s time on daily activities	The time fathers spend on taking care of children’s daily activities
Father’s time on study	The time fathers spend on accompanying children to study
Father’s time on play	The time fathers spend on accompanying children to play
Communication with father on school	Often=1, Never=0
Communication with father on friends	Often=1, Never=0
Communication with father on teachers	Often=1, Never=0
Communication with father on worries	Often=1, Never=0
Father’s political status	CCP member=1, non-CCP member=0
Gender of child	Male=1, Female=0
Father’s education	Bachelor degree or above =1, Bachelor degree below =0
Father’s hukou	Rural =1, Urban=0
Father’s job	Dummy variables: managerial position, advanced technician, general technician. Yes=1, No=0
Mother’s hukou	Rural =1, urban=0
Mother’s political status	CCP member=1, non-CCP member=0

Father's job	Managerial position	163	11.05%	45	47.96%
	Advanced technician	104	7.050%	14	14.63%
	General technician	448	30.37%	16	17.27%
	General staff	760	51.53%	19	20.14%
Mother's hukou	Rural	782	53.02%	78	82.49%
	Urban	693	46.98%	17	17.51%
Mother's political status		1475	100%	436	100%
Mother's education	Below bachelor degree	1,326	89.90%	62	65.71%
	Bachelor degree and above	149	10.10%	32	34.29%
Mother's job	Managerial position	107	7.25%	22	22.78%
	Advanced technician	161	10.92%	24	24.94%
	General technician	304	20.61%	23	24.70%
	General staff	903	61.22%	26	27.58%
Communication with mother on school		1475	100%	395	100%
Communication with mother on teachers		1475	100%	395	100%
Communication with mother on worries		1475	100%	395	100%

From Table 5.2, it can be seen that mothers spend more time on daily care activities, study and play with children as well as communicate more with children than fathers. The proportion of male CCP members is higher than that of females, and the educational background of males is higher than that of female. Also, it indicates that the proportion of rural hukou is slightly higher, and the difference of hukou type between male and female is not significant. Among jobs, the occupational advantage is more pronounced for males. And the ratio of CCP member fathers in managerial positions is more than that of non-CCP member fathers. From the ratio of gender, it can be seen that the gender of children is roughly the same.

5.2.3 Analytic Methods

First, I will explore the relationship between children's gender and the time fathers spend on daily care activities, study and play. The equation and the detailed description are as follows.

$$Y_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 Z_{Fatherpol} + \alpha_2 Z_{Gender} + \alpha_3 Z_{Birth\ order} + \sum \alpha_j X_j + \varepsilon_i$$

Y_i means the time fathers spending on daily care activities, study, and play. Z_{Gender} is children's gender, $Z_{Birth\ order}$ stands for children's birth order and $Z_{Fatherpol}$ represents fathers' political status. X_j stands for controlling variables in this model. α_0 is the intercept, and ε_i is the random error.

Next, I will explore the relationship between the gender of children and father-child communication. The equation and the meanings are described as follows.

$$Logit(p_i) = \log\left(\frac{p_i}{1-p_i}\right) = \alpha_1 Z_{Fatherpol} + \alpha_2 Z_{Gender} + \alpha_3 Z_{Birth\ order} + \sum \alpha_j X_j + \mu_i$$

Where p_i means the probability of father-child communication, Z_{Gender} is children's gender, $Z_{Fatherpol}$ means fathers' political status and, and $Z_{Fatheredu}$ stands for fathers' education background. X_j stands for controlling variables in this model. ε_i is the random error.

5.3 Results

According to the aforementioned information above, father involvement includes interaction and communication in this analysis. Therefore, whether there is gender preference in interaction will be presented in Table 5.3, Table 5.4, and Table 5.5. And whether there is gender preference in communication will be shown in Table 5.6, Table 5.7, and Table 5.8.

Table 5.3 The Impact of Children' Gender on Interaction between CCP & Non-CCP Member Fathers and Children (OLS)

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	Daily activities	Study	Play	Daily activities	Study	Play	Daily activities	Study	Play
Father's political status (ref: non-CCP)	-0.054 (-0.24)	-0.074 (-0.85)	-0.120** (-2.21)	0.217 (1.04)	0.136** (2.14)	-0.138** (-2.51)	0.351 (1.27)	0.094** (2.13)	-0.070 (-0.96)
Gender (ref: female)				0.203 (1.33)	0.108** (2.34)	0.086** (2.09)	0.263 (1.53)	0.090* (1.72)	0.117** (2.53)
Father's political status* Gender							0.272* (1.75)	0.185** (2.77)	-0.136 (-1.44)
Father's education (ref: bachelor degree below)	0.23 (0.95)	-0.022 (-0.21)	-0.003 (-0.04)	0.170 (0.64)	0.268*** (3.35)	0.011 (0.16)	0.173 (0.66)	0.266*** (3.34)	0.010 (0.15)
Father's hukou (ref: rural)	0.356 (1.52)	-0.167 (-1.44)	0.072 (1.04)	-0.065 (-0.24)	-0.067 (-0.83)	0.049 (0.68)	-0.065 (-0.24)	-0.067 (-0.83)	0.048 (0.67)
Father's job: (ref: general staff)									
Managerial position	0.0188 (0.24)	0.0328 (0.90)	0.0502** (2.17)	0.0741 (0.86)	0.0716** (2.75)	0.0549** (2.34)	0.0748 (0.87)	0.0714** (2.75)	0.055** (2.34)
Advanced technician	0.0129 (0.16)	0.0226 (0.62)	0.0346 (1.50)	0.0512 (0.59)	0.0495* (1.90)	0.0379 (1.61)	0.0516 (0.60)	0.0493* (1.90)	0.0380 (1.61)

General technician	-0.0143 (-0.18)	-0.0249 (-0.69)	-0.0382 (-1.65)	-0.0564 (-0.65)	-0.0545** (-2.09)	-0.0418* (-1.78)	-0.0569 (-0.66)	-0.0544** (-2.09)	-0.0419* (-1.78)
Mother's hukou	0.00261 (0.01)	0.0212 (0.18)	-0.0695 (-0.99)	0.437 (1.63)	0.220*** (2.70)	-0.0241 (-0.33)	0.439 (1.63)	0.219*** (2.69)	-0.0233 (-0.32)
Mother's political status	0.00343 (0.01)	0.205* (1.69)	0.131* (1.69)	0.069 (0.24)	0.123 (1.39)	0.148* (1.87)	0.0664 (0.23)	0.124 (1.40)	0.146* (1.86)
Mother's education	-0.0679 (-0.27)	-0.161 (-1.36)	-0.0579 (-0.79)	-0.245 (-0.90)	-0.272*** (-3.30)	-0.0531 (-0.71)	-0.241 (-0.89)	-0.273*** (-3.31)	-0.0519 (-0.70)
Mother's job: (ref: general staff)									
Managerial position	0.0393 (0.44)	-0.0540 (-1.31)	-0.0243 (-0.94)	0.0897 (0.93)	-0.0151 (-0.52)	-0.0199 (-0.76)	0.0875 (0.90)	-0.0145 (-0.49)	-0.0205 (-0.78)
Advanced technician	0.0271 (0.30)	-0.0373 (-0.90)	-0.0168 (-0.65)	0.0619 (0.64)	-0.0105 (-0.36)	-0.0137 (-0.52)	0.0604 (0.62)	-0.0100 (-0.34)	-0.0141 (-0.54)
General technician	-0.0299 (-0.34)	0.0411 (1.00)	0.0185 (0.71)	-0.0683 (-0.71)	-0.0115 (-0.40)	-0.0151 (-0.58)	-0.0666 (-0.69)	0.0110 (0.37)	0.0156 (0.59)

Mother's time on daily activities	0.733*** (47.16)	0.0313*** (4.29)	0.00425 (0.92)	0.395*** (23.9)	-0.00976* (-1.95)	0.00496 (1.04)	0.395*** (23.9)	-0.00980* (-1.96)	0.00497 (1.05)
Mother's time on study	0.202*** (4.12)	0.647*** (30.68)	0.0298** (2.10)	0.159*** (2.94)	0.220*** (13.48)	0.0263* (1.81)	0.158*** (2.93)	0.220*** (13.49)	0.0261* (1.80)
Mother's time on play	0.0605 (1.25)	0.0855*** (4.12)	0.697*** (49.52)	0.135** (2.23)	0.0526*** (2.86)	0.749*** (47.71)	0.135** (2.22)	0.0526*** (2.86)	0.749*** (47.70)
Communication with mother on school	-0.218 (-1.48)	-0.143** (-2.13)	-0.0223 (-0.52)	-0.177 (-1.07)	-0.0888* (-1.77)	-0.0172 (-0.39)	-0.175 (-1.06)	-0.0894* (-1.78)	-0.0163 (-0.37)
Communication with mother on teachers	0.172 (1.38)	0.0954* (1.68)	0.0219 (0.60)	0.178 (1.27)	0.0664 (1.56)	0.046 (1.24)	0.177 (1.26)	0.0668 (1.57)	0.0455 (1.22)
Communication with mother on worries	-0.0908 (-0.79)	-0.0532 (-1.04)	-0.0249 (-0.75)	-0.0958 (-0.76)	-0.0512 (-1.34)	-0.038 (-1.12)	-0.1 (-0.79)	-0.0498 (-1.30)	-0.0407 (-1.20)
_cons	-0.28 (-0.28)	0.468 (2.52)	0.358* (2.58)	0.163 (0.30)	0.481*** (2.93)	0.224 (1.57)	0.136 (0.25)	0.489*** (2.97)	0.213 (1.49)
Observations	1870	1870	1870	1870	1870	1870	1870	1870	1870
R-squared	0.7178	0.7521	0.8154	0.7054	0.7459	0.8237	0.7215	0.7342	0.8410

T value in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5.3 shows that children's gender has a positive effect on CCP member fathers' interaction with children, especially on daily activities and study. Specifically, CCP member fathers are more likely to spend time on boys' daily activities and study but less likely to spend time accompanying boys to play, compared with non-CCP members. As I explained before, that is possible because CCP member fathers are busy with their jobs, they fail to spare full time to play with children even though the children are boys. Next, I will add the birth order of the child into the model to further verify whether there is gender preference in interaction.

Table 5.4 The Impact of Children' Gender on Interaction between CCP & Non-CCP Member Fathers and Children (OLS)

	Model 4			Model 5			Model 6		
	First- born Child			First-born child			First-born child		
	Daily activities	Study	Play	Daily activities	Study	Play	Daily activities	Study	Play
Father's political status (ref: non- CCP)	-0.025 (-0.34)	-0.054 (-0.74)	-0.118* (-1.87)	0.020 (0.03)	0.152** (2.55)	0.095 (1.44)	0.398 (0.84)	0.214* (1.68)	0.421*** (1.15)
Gender (ref: female)				2.023** (0.38)	0.435** (1.96)	0.509 (1.23)	0.751* (1.69)	0.214* (2.14)	0.365* (2.19)
Father's political status* Gender							0.154* (1.87)	0.187** (2.54)	0.284** (1.98)
Father's education (ref: bachelor degree below)	1.325** (2.26)	0.797*** (2.98)	-1.530** (-2.06)	0.491 (0.41)	0.406 (0.90)	0.151 (0.52)	1.853** (2.35)	0.800*** (3.87)	-0.466 (-1.18)
Father's hukou (ref: rural)	-0.306 (-0.42)	-0.0346 (-0.19)	-1.178** (-2.43)	1.009 (1.30)	0.0556 (-0.19)	-0.265 (-1.27)	-0.654 (-1.32)	0.0371 (0.29)	0.0874 (0.29)
Father's job: (ref: general staff)									
Managerial position	0.0544 (0.20)	-0.0421 (-0.66)	-0.2686 (-1.19)	0.1854 (0.62)	0.1476 (1.32)	-0.0337 (-0.43)	-0.3397* (-1.90)	0.0154 (0.33)	-0.1110 (-1.01)
Advanced technician	0.0387 (0.16)	-0.0299 (-0.53)	-0.1912 (-0.95)	0.1319 (0.49)	0.1051 (1.04)	-0.0240 (0.34)	-0.2417 (-1.51)	0.0110 (0.26)	-0.0790 (-0.80)

General technician	-0.0380 (-0.19)	0.0294 (0.61)	0.1876 (1.10)	-0.1294 (-0.57)	-0.1031 (-1.21)	-0.0236 (-0.39)	0.2372* (1.75)	-0.0108 (-0.30)	0.0775 (0.93)
Mother's hukou	0.577 (0.78)	0.115 (0.64)	1.232** (2.35)	-0.113 (-0.15)	-0.292 (-1.01)	0.131 (0.65)	0.154 (0.31)	0.023 (0.17)	-0.010 (-0.03)
Mother's political status	1.18 (0.79)	0.53 (1.46)	2.242* (1.95)	2.612** (2.04)	0.846* (1.75)	0.471 (1.35)	-0.0895 (-0.12)	-0.0229 (-0.12)	1.391* (1.88)
Mother's education	1.695 (0.87)	-0.406* (-1.85)	0.193 (0.15)	-0.405 (-0.24)	-0.744 (-1.19)	-0.0582 (-0.12)	-1.247 (-1.37)	-0.559** (-2.33)	-0.297 (-0.54)
Mother's job: (ref: general staff)									
Managerial position	0.5395 (1.34)	0.0546 (0.56)	1.5873 (4.55)	-0.5894 (-1.54)	-0.2431* (-1.68)	-0.1776* (-1.69)	-0.0033 (-0.01)	-0.0356 (-0.58)	-0.0579 (-0.45)
Advanced technician	0.3839 (1.06)	0.0389 (0.45)	1.1297** (2.61)	-0.4195 (-1.22)	-0.1730 (-1.34)	-0.1264 (-1.34)	-0.0023 (-0.01)	-0.0254 (-0.46)	-0.0412 (-0.36)
General technician	-0.3767 (-1.23)	-0.0381 (-0.52)	-1.1083 (-4.19)	0.4115 (1.42)	0.1697 (1.55)	0.1240 (1.56)	0.0023 (0.01)	0.0249 (0.54)	0.0405 (0.41)

Mother's time on daily activities	0.431*** (12.59)	0.0128 (1.54)	0.0609** (2.54)	0.169*** (3.55)	0.0455** (2.54)	0.154* (1.79)	0.337*** (15.10)	0.00478 (0.82)	0.103*** (5.15)
Mother's time on study	0.556* (1.78)	0.2101** (2.13)	-0.012 (-0.10)	0.341** (2.21)	0.220*** (3.78)	0.0153 (0.28)	0.341** (2.21)	0.220*** (3.78)	0.0153 (0.28)
Mother's time on play	-0.172 (-0.33)	0.0501 (0.39)	0.656*** (3.90)	0.239 (1.52)	0.121** (2.05)	0.794*** (15.45)	0.239 (1.52)	0.121** (2.05)	0.794*** (15.45)
Communication with mother on school	0.161 (0.45)	0.127 (1.44)	0.33 (1.11)	0.636 (1.41)	0.0538 (0.32)	-0.0046 (-0.03)	-0.157 (-0.62)	-0.00975 (-0.15)	-0.0415 (-0.26)
Communication with mother on teachers	0.552* (1.65)	0.152** (2.25)	0.0257 (0.09)	0.237* (1.69)	0.104* (1.69)	0.149 (1.17)	0.407* (1.83)	0.196*** (3.37)	0.168 (1.09)
Communication with mother on worries	-0.258 (-0.88)	-0.03 (-0.42)	-0.0555 (-0.23)	-0.267 (-0.82)	-0.0933 (-0.76)	-0.0223 (-0.23)	-0.142 (-0.71)	-0.0082 (-0.16)	-0.131 (-1.12)
Cons	0.698 (0.43)	-0.152 (-0.38)	5.146*** (3.84)	3.858** (2.03)	-0.0000585 (-0.00)	-0.823 (-1.55)	-0.774 (-0.76)	-0.0649 (-0.24)	0.40 (0.68)
Observations	768	768	768	768	768	768	768	768	768
R-squared	0.2541	0.1875	0.2320	0.3014	0.2158	0.2468	0.3542	0.2254	0.3219

T value in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Model 4 in Table 5.4 presents that CCP member fathers are not willing to spend time on the first child's daily activities, study, and play. After adding the child's gender and interaction of fathers' political status and child's gender into model 5 and model 6, the effect becomes positive. That is to say, CCP member fathers are more willing to spend time on taking care of first-born boys' daily activities, study, and play than that of first-born girls, compared with non-CCP member fathers. Before adding birth order, CCP member fathers can spare time to take care of children's daily activities and study, but fail to play with children. However, after introducing birth order, both the main effect and interaction effect becomes positive. That is to say, CCP member fathers are more willing to spend time playing with boys, especially as the boy is the first-born. Therefore, it is meaningful to introduce birth order into the analysis. Also, this finding reflects boy preference among CCP member fathers within families in Chinese society.

Because of effective resource allocation and family investment strategy, previous studies argued that father involvement will decrease from first-born child to the last-born child. To verify whether the evidence suits Chinese society, I further analyze the situation of fathers' time on the last-born child based on Chinese data. The analysis will be shown in Table 5.5.

Table 5.5 The Impact of Children' Gender on Interaction between CCP & Non-CCP Member Fathers and Children (OLS)

	Model 7			Model 8			Model 9		
	Last-born child			Last-born child			Last-born child		
	Daily activities	Study	Play	Daily activities	Study	Play	Daily activities	Study	Play
Father's political status (ref: non-CCP)	-0.221 (-0.21)	-0.042 (-0.54)	-0.254** (-2.19)	0.404 (0.37)	0.197 (0.41)	0.425** (2.03)	0.514 (1.54)	0.221* (1.99)	0.211* (1.85)
Gender (ref: female)				0.521* (1.84)	0.185** (2.56)	0.2426** (2.24)	0.122* (1.41)	0.145** (2.05)	0.254** (2.05)
Father's political status* Gender							0.145 (1.21)	0.206** (2.24)	0.214** (2.03)
Father's education (ref: bachelor degree below)	0.976* (1.79)	0.975** (2.24)	-0.877* (-1.79)	2.510 (1.19)	1.008* (1.93)	0.570* (1.90)	1.742* (1.66)	1.001*** (3.97)	0.253 (0.54)
Father's hukou (ref: rural)	-1.057** (-2.12)	-0.0944 (-0.66)	-0.0371 (-0.07)	-1.161** (-2.12)	0.0904 (0.27)	0.170 (0.66)	-1.889*** (-3.01)	-0.0128 (-0.08)	0.0589 (0.16)
Father's job: (ref: general staff)									
Managerial position	-0.2554 (-0.51)	0.0424 (0.87)	0.07 (0.52)	0.3195 (0.62)	0.0302 (0.23)	0.0713 (0.80)	0.0586 (0.28)	-0.0511 (-1.00)	-0.1366 (-0.99)
Advanced technician	-0.1997 (-1.18)	0.0331 (0.68)	0.0547 (0.41)	0.2499 (0.48)	0.0236 (0.18)	0.0557 (0.63)	0.0459 (0.22)	-0.0399 (-0.78)	-0.1069 (-0.78)

General technician	0.2022 (1.07)	-0.0335 (-0.61)	-0.0554 (-0.37)	-0.2529 (-0.44)	-0.0239 (-0.17)	-0.0564 (-0.57)	-0.0464 (-0.20)	0.0404 (0.71)	0.1082 (0.70)
Mother's hukou	1.590*** (3.25)	0.147 (1.05)	0.0455 (0.09)	1.363** (2.26)	-0.0287 (-0.08)	-0.158 (-0.58)	1.616*** (2.64)	0.061 (0.42)	0.315 (0.90)
Mother's political status	-0.725 (-0.84)	0.0103 (0.04)	0.9 (1.44)	-1.796 (-0.59)	0.00887 (0.01)	-0.866* (-1.70)	-1.297 (-1.18)	-0.307 (-1.16)	0.0696 (0.11)
Mother's education	0.706 (-0.74)	-0.452* (-1.65)	-0.354 (-0.47)	-0.607 (-0.20)	-1.498* (-1.98)	-0.316 (-0.73)	-1.654 (-1.35)	0.317 (1.08)	-0.0743 (-0.12)
Mother's job: (ref: general staff)									
Managerial position	1.2906** (2.20)	0.103 (1.44)	0.2985 (1.47)	-0.3384 (-0.57)	0.0668 (0.45)	0.1461 (1.38)	-0.1356 (-1.60)	0.1345 (1.88)	0.1818 (1.19)
Advanced technician	1.0094 (2.06)	0.0806 (1.13)	0.2334 (1.15)	-0.2647 (-0.44)	0.0523 (0.35)	0.1143 (1.08)	0.106 (2.03)	0.1052 (1.47)	0.1422 (0.93)
General technician	-1.0217 (-2.69)	-0.0815 (-1.02)	-0.2363 (-1.05)	0.2679 (0.40)	-0.0529 (-0.32)	-0.1156 (-0.98)	0.1073* (1.84)	-0.1065 (-1.33)	-0.1439 (-0.84)

Mother's time on daily activities	0.359*** (15.83)	0.00542 (0.83)	0.116*** (6.53)	0.322*** (4.17)	-0.0227 (-1.19)	-0.00635 (-0.36)	0.366*** (11.74)	0.00303 (0.40)	0.0801*** (4.06)
Mother's time on study	-0.189 (-0.98)	0.0441 (0.76)	-0.137*** (-2.92)	0.148 (0.47)	0.069 (0.89)	0.0534 (0.92)	-0.148 (-0.47)	0.069 (0.89)	-0.103* (-1.92)
Mother's time on play	0.233 (0.98)	0.164** (2.26)	0.902*** (16.32)	-0.709* (-1.81)	-0.0539 (-0.56)	0.423*** (5.02)	0.709* (1.81)	-0.0539 (-0.56)	0.423*** (5.02)
Communication with mother on school	-0.0784 (-0.33)	-0.00429 (-0.06)	0.15 (0.74)	-0.985 (-1.29)	-0.206 (-1.09)	0.141 (1.09)	-0.791** (-2.37)	-0.0378 (-0.47)	0.09 (0.46)
Communication with mother on teachers	0.238 (1.07)	0.115* (1.79)	0.654*** (3.46)	0.622** (1.24)	0.116* (1.65)	0.197 (1.52)	0.0564 (0.77)	0.509* (1.66)	0.429** (2.02)
Communication with mother on worries	0.0866 (0.44)	0.0793 (1.38)	0.521*** (3.15)	1.055 (1.50)	0.0208 (0.12)	0.575** (2.34)	-0.265 (-0.97)	0.0166 (0.25)	0.151 (0.92)
_Cons	2.775** (2.54)	0.392 (1.25)	1.24 (1.41)	1.717* (1.54)	1.183 (1.51)	1.000* (1.82)	1.165 (0.86)	0.672** (2.08)	0.701 (0.95)
Observations	428	428	428	428	428	428	428	428	428
R-squared	0.3314	0.2456	0.3145	0.3289	0.2647	0.3661	0.3732	0.2678	0.3656

T value in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Model 7 in Table 5.5 presents that CCP member fathers spend less time on last-born children' daily activities, study, and play without considering gender. After adding the child's gender and the interaction of fathers' political status and child's gender into model 8 and model 9, the effect becomes positive. It shows that CCP member fathers are more likely to spend time with last-born boys than last-born girls, compared with non-CCP member fathers.

Based on analyses in Table 5.3, Table 5.4, and Table 5.5, CCP member fathers are more inclined to spend time on daily activities, play as well as study with boys without considering they are the first-born or the last-born. The finding supports hypothesis 5.

Next, I will explore whether there is gender preference existing in the communication. Analyses will be shown in Table 5.6, Table 5.7, and Table 5.8.

Table 5.6 The Impact of Children' Gender on Communication between CCP & Non-CCP Member Fathers and Children (Logit)

	Model 10				Model 11				Model 12			
	Communication about school	Communication about friends	Communication about teachers	Communication about worries	Communication about school	Communication about friends	Communication about teachers	Communication about worries	Communication about school	Communication about friends	Communication about teachers	Communication about worries
Father's Political status (ref: non-CCP)	0.124 (0.83)	0.412*** (2.69)	0.326** (1.98)	0.0363 (0.22)	0.140 (0.92)	0.404*** (2.59)	0.359** (2.14)	0.0793 (0.48)	0.256* (1.33)	0.414** (2.56)	0.278* (1.82)	0.020 (0.09)
Gender (ref: female)					0.216** (2.02)	0.159** (2.34)	0.242* (1.92)	0.430*** (3.45)	0.280** (2.37)	0.211** (1.82)	0.151*** (2.05)	0.398*** (2.79)
Father's political status* Gender									0.257** (1.98)	0.289** (2.71)	0.384** (2.31)	0.131 (0.46)
Father's education (ref: bachelor degree below)	0.337* (1.83)	0.114 (0.59)	0.375* (1.78)	0.0798 (0.40)	0.330* (1.77)	0.103 (0.52)	0.33 (1.54)	0.0476 (0.24)	0.332* (1.78)	0.102 (0.52)	0.333 (1.56)	0.0466 (0.23)
Father's hukou (ref: rural)	0.104 (0.53)	0.265 (1.28)	0.367 (1.64)	0.012 (0.06)	0.0343 (0.17)	0.241 (1.13)	0.418* (1.81)	-0.0371 (-0.17)	0.0341 (0.17)	0.241 (1.13)	0.418* (1.81)	-0.0368 (-0.17)
Father's job: (ref: general staff)												
Managerial position	0.0571 (0.97)	-0.0695 (-1.11)	-0.1175 (-1.78)	0.1209* (1.90)	0.0381 (0.63)	-0.0638 (-1.00)	-0.1209* (-1.78)	0.1277* (1.95)	0.0397 (0.65)	-0.0650 (-0.01)	-0.1243* (-1.83)	0.1277* (1.95)
Advanced technician	0.04 (0.68)	-0.05 (-0.78)	-0.08 (-1.25)	0.08 (1.34)	0.03 (0.44)	-0.04 (-0.71)	-0.08 (-1.25)	0.08 (1.37)	0.03 (0.46)	-0.04 (-0.71)	-0.08 (-1.29)	0.08 (1.37)

General technician	-0.0399 (-0.71)	0.0486 (0.81)	0.0822 (1.30)	-0.0845 (-1.38)	-0.0266 (-0.46)	0.0446 (0.73)	0.0845 (1.30)	-0.0893 (-1.42)	-0.0277 (-0.47)	0.0454 (0.74)	0.0869 (1.33)	-0.0893 (-1.42)
Mother's hukou	0.12 (0.60)	-0.253 (-1.19)	-0.229 (-1.00)	-0.0991 (-0.45)	0.139 (0.68)	-0.232 (-1.06)	-0.32 (-1.35)	-0.0527 (-0.23)	0.143 (0.70)	-0.234 (-1.07)	-0.324 (-1.37)	-0.0565 (-0.25)
Mother's political status	0.271 (1.34)	-0.0257 (-0.12)	0.112 (0.49)	0.496** (2.27)	0.267 (1.29)	-0.0122 (-0.06)	0.105 (0.45)	0.456** (2.05)	0.266 (1.28)	-0.0105 (-0.05)	0.108 (0.46)	0.459** (2.06)
Mother's education	-0.109 (-0.57)	-0.00296 (-0.01)	-0.0917 (-0.42)	0.0179 (0.09)	-0.105 (-0.54)	0.0149 (0.07)	-0.0651 (-0.30)	0.0464 (0.23)	-0.10 (-0.52)	0.0114 (0.06)	-0.0736 (-0.34)	0.0431 (0.21)
Mother's job: (ref: general staff)												
Managerial position	-0.0186 (-0.27)	0.0641 (0.90)	-0.0880 (-1.11)	-0.0028 (-0.04)	-0.0290 (-0.41)	0.0492 (0.67)	-0.1254 (-1.56)	-0.0175 (-0.24)	-0.0313 (-0.45)	0.0511 (0.70)	-0.1209 (-1.49)	-0.0172 (-0.24)
Advanced technician	-0.01 (-0.19)	0.04 (0.63)	-0.06 (-0.78)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.02 (-0.29)	0.03 (0.47)	-0.08 (-1.10)	-0.01 (-0.17)	-0.02 (-0.32)	0.03 (0.49)	-0.08 (-1.05)	-0.01 (-0.17)
General technician	0.0130 (0.20)	-0.0448 (-0.65)	0.0615 (0.81)	0.0020 (0.03)	0.0203 (0.30)	-0.0344 (-0.49)	0.0877 (1.14)	0.0122 (0.17)	0.0219 (0.33)	-0.0357 (-0.51)	0.0845 (1.08)	0.0120 (0.17)
Mother's time on daily activities	0.011 (0.89)	0.0047 (0.37)	-0.00132 (-0.10)	0.00473 (0.36)	0.0113 (0.90)	0.00397 (0.31)	-0.000223 (-0.02)	0.00812 (0.61)	0.0117 (0.93)	0.00375 (0.29)	-0.000604 (-0.04)	0.00803 (0.60)

Mother's time on study	0.0475 (1.22)	0.0266 (0.67)	0.0513 (1.19)	0.0927** (2.16)	0.0436 (1.10)	0.0282 (0.70)	0.0603 (1.37)	0.0827* (1.91)	0.0425 (1.07)	0.0292 (0.73)	0.0626 (1.42)	0.0831* (1.92)
Mother's time on play	-0.018 (-0.43)	0.0834** (2.12)	0.0105 (0.24)	0.00386 (0.08)	-0.0201 (-0.43)	0.0919** (2.06)	-0.0106 (-0.21)	0.00586 (0.12)	-0.0204 (-0.43)	0.0917** (-2.05)	-0.0119 (-0.24)	0.00609 (-0.12)
Communication with mother on school	1.503*** (9.59)	0.413*** (2.74)	-0.086 (-0.51)	-0.316** (-1.98)	1.547*** (9.50)	0.466*** (3.00)	-0.0204 (-0.12)	-0.258 (-1.57)	1.552*** (9.51)	0.466*** (3.00)	-0.0174 (-0.10)	-0.257 (-1.57)
Communication with mother on teachers	0.216** (2.03)	0.873*** (7.00)	2.655*** (14.52)	0.142 (1.20)	0.215** (2.00)	0.830*** (6.59)	2.663*** (14.13)	0.11 (0.91)	0.214** (1.98)	0.830*** (6.59)	2.663*** (14.13)	0.108 (0.90)
Communication with mother on worries	0.306*** (3.13)	0.434*** (4.04)	0.166 (1.48)	2.454*** (14.39)	0.306*** (3.08)	0.448*** (4.09)	0.182 (1.59)	2.498*** (14.18)	0.300*** (3.02)	0.452*** (4.12)	0.186 (1.63)	2.502*** (14.18)
Cons	-6.585*** (-13.20)	-5.958*** (-12.30)	-9.104*** (-15.23)	-7.006*** (-12.77)	-6.831*** (-12.90)	-6.154*** (-12.00)	-9.574*** (-14.97)	-7.433*** (-12.77)	-6.860*** (-12.93)	-6.135*** (-11.94)	-9.541*** (-14.90)	-7.427*** (-12.75)
Observations	1870	1870	1870	1870	1960	1960	1960	1960	1870	1870	1870	1870
Pseudo r2	0.2561	0.2574	0.2887	0.2960	0.2734	0.2751	0.2721	0.2754	0.2789	0.3240	0.3312	0.3458

T value in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Model 10 in Table 5.6 presents that fathers' CCP membership has a positive effect on communication between fathers and children. After adding child's gender as well as the interaction of fathers' political status and child's gender into model 11 and model 12, it shows that CCP member fathers are more willing to communicate with boys than girls, compared with non-CCP member fathers.

To further explore gender preference in father involvement, I will add the birth order of the child into the model. The birth order of the child will be divided into first-born child and last-born child. The analyses will be shown in Table 5.7, and Table 5.8.

Table 5.7 The Impact of Children' Gender on Communication between CCP Member Fathers and Children (Logit)

	Model 13				Model 14				Model 15			
	First-born child				First-born child				First-born child			
	Communication about school	Communication about friends	Communication about teachers	Communication about worries	Communication about school	Communication about friends	Communication about teachers	Communication about worries	Communication about school	Communication about friends	Communication about teachers	Communication about worries
Father's political status (ref: non- CCP)	0.121 (0.75)	0.354*** (2.14)	0.314** (1.86)	0.1351 (0.54)	0.696 (1.13)	0.629** (2.03)	0.129** (2.17)	0.937* (1.85)	0.458* (1.58)	0.521* (1.84)	0.198* (1.74)	0.265* (1.82)
Gender (ref: female)					0.718** (2.04)	0.506** (2.31)	0.155 (0.14)	1.348 (0.68)	0.363*** (2.88)	0.454** (2.53)	0.547* (1.74)	0.854** (2.52)
Father's political status* Gender									0.201* (1.85)	0.314** (2.24)	0.187* (1.54)	0.254* (1.98)
Father's education (ref: bachelor degree below)	0.422 (0.40)	-0.442 (-0.38)	0.795 (0.73)	0.401 (0.35)	-0.647 (-0.54)	-1.179 (-0.95)	0.754 (0.71)	1.832 (1.10)	-0.421 (-0.66)	0.106 (0.17)	0.349 (0.47)	0.265 (0.41)
Father's hukou (ref: rural)	-0.596 (-1.02)	0.544 (0.88)	0.176 (0.30)	0.186 (0.31)	-0.377 (-0.52)	0.931 (1.26)	0.0428 (0.05)	0.448 (0.47)	0.293 (0.79)	0.04 (0.10)	0.255 (0.61)	0.411 (0.93)
Father's job: (ref: general staff)												
Managerial position	0.1522 (0.70)	0.1369 (0.63)	-0.1664 (-0.69)	-0.1782 (-0.65)	0.2478 (0.88)	0.3599 (1.34)	-0.2242 (-0.71)	-0.1864 (-0.55)	-0.0307 (-0.23)	-0.0520 (-0.37)	-0.2006 (-1.36)	-0.0656 (-0.41)

Advanced technician	0.1115 (0.56)	0.1002 (0.51)	-0.1218 (-0.55)	-0.1305 (-0.52)	0.1814 (0.70)	0.2635 (1.07)	-0.1642 (-0.57)	-0.1365 (-0.44)	-0.0225 (-0.19)	-0.0381 (-0.29)	-0.1469 (-1.09)	-0.0480 (-0.33)
General technician	-0.1144 (-0.51)	-0.1029 (-0.46)	0.1251 (0.51)	0.1339 (0.48)	-0.1863 (-0.64)	-0.2705 (-0.99)	0.1685 (0.52)	0.1401 (0.41)	0.0231 (0.17)	0.0391 (0.27)	0.1508 (1.00)	0.0493 (0.30)
Mother's hukou	1.348** (-2.15)	-0.432 (-0.70)	1.037* (-1.66)	-0.0257 (-0.04)	0.39 (0.56)	0.604 (0.81)	0.0715 (0.09)	0.283 (0.31)	0.0874 (-0.24)	-0.0443 (-0.11)	0.189 (-0.45)	0.398 (-0.91)
Mother's political status	-0.648 (-0.63)	0.359 (-0.35)	0.0923 (-0.09)	1.583* (1.89)	1.544 (1.39)	0.906 (0.87)	-0.708 (-0.55)	6.462*** (3.28)	0.508 (0.97)	0.41 (0.76)	0.0626 (0.10)	1.477** (2.40)
Mother's education	0.855 -0.52	-0.612 (-0.92)	-0.347 (-0.47)	-0.712 (-0.88)	-0.740 (-0.45)	-0.150 (-0.10)	-0.314 (-0.53)	-3.956 (-1.44)	-1.289 (-1.45)	-0.728 (-0.93)	-0.625 (-0.80)	-0.731 (-0.87)
Mother's job: (ref: general staff)												
Managerial position	0.2348 (0.75)	0.2785 (0.93)	0.5511* (1.70)	0.1416 (0.40)	-0.2502 (-0.72)	0.1062 (0.32)	-0.2053 (-0.43)	-0.4814 (0.92)	0.0253 (0.16)	0.0872 (0.49)	-0.0275 (-0.14)	-0.2124 (-0.98)
Advanced technician	0.1719 (0.60)	0.2039 (0.75)	0.4035 (1.36)	0.1037 (0.32)	-0.1832 (-0.58)	0.0778 (0.26)	-0.1503 (-0.35)	-0.3525 (0.74)	0.0185 (0.12)	0.0638 (0.39)	-0.0201 (-0.12)	-0.1555 (-0.78)
General technician	-0.1765 (-0.55)	-0.2093 (-0.68)	-0.4142 (-1.25)	-0.1064 (-0.29)	0.1880 (0.53)	-0.0798 (-0.24)	0.1543 (0.32)	0.3619 (-0.68)	-0.0190 (-0.11)	-0.0655 (-0.36)	0.0207 (0.11)	0.1597 (0.72)

Mother's time on daily activities	-0.0301 (-0.99)	0.0289 (-1.07)	-0.0402 (-1.30)	0.0313 (1.10)	0.000921 (0.02)	-0.0211 (-0.42)	-0.0174 (-0.39)	-0.0374 (-0.67)	-0.0114 (-0.64)	-0.00814 (-0.43)	0.0195 (1.08)	-0.0105 (-0.51)
Mother's time on study	1.260* (1.78)	-0.237 (-0.89)	0.339 (1.39)	0.0792 (0.30)	0.222 (1.33)	-0.154 (-0.96)	0.240 (1.49)	0.0722 (0.40)	1.222* (1.73)	-0.154 (-0.96)	0.24 (1.49)	0.0722 (-0.40)
Mother's time on play	1.781** (2.00)	0.805* (1.82)	0.00524 (-0.01)	-0.0206 (-0.05)	1.058*** (2.47)	0.240* (1.72)	0.141 (0.95)	0.0868 (0.45)	1.082** (2.47)	1.240* (1.34)	0.141 (0.95)	0.0868 (0.45)
Communication with mother on school	1.645*** (4.36)	0.777** (2.18)	0.159 0.44	-0.239 (-0.67)	2.234*** (4.19)	0.279* (1.69)	0.0904 (0.18)	-0.115 (-0.22)	1.727*** (7.17)	0.449** (1.97)	-0.258 (-1.10)	-0.33 (-1.26)
Communication with mother on teachers	0.164 (0.61)	0.397 (1.39)	1.847*** (5.19)	-0.167 (-0.57)	-0.559 (-1.50)	0.414 (1.04)	2.526*** (4.25)	0.0651 (0.15)	0.147 (0.84)	0.796*** (3.92)	2.828*** (10.29)	0.124 (0.58)
Communication with mother on worries	0.622** (2.49)	0.372 (1.45)	0.512** (1.98)	2.788*** (5.87)	0.323 (1.00)	0.397 (1.17)	0.0623 (0.17)	3.419*** (4.03)	0.6738** (2.48)	0.216 (1.27)	-0.0149 (-0.09)	2.862*** (8.65)
_Cons	-6.927*** (-4.66)	-4.456*** (-3.29)	-6.857*** (-4.61)	-8.015*** (-4.46)	-7.176*** (-3.63)	-2.713 (-1.54)	-10.24*** (-3.81)	-12.66*** (-3.62)	-6.229*** (-7.03)	-5.069*** (-5.74)	-8.553*** (-8.38)	-9.380*** (-7.39)
Observations	768	768	768	768	768	768	768	768	768	768	768	768
Pseudo r2	0.2321	0.1762	0.1857	0.2645	0.2656	0.1788	0.1872	0.2990	0.2876	0.2070	0.2067	0.2908

T value in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5.7 presents that CCP member fathers are more likely to communicate with first-born boys than first-born girls, compared with non-CCP member fathers.

The analysis about the last-born child's gender will be shown in Table 5.8.

Table 5.8 The Impact of Children' Gender on Communication between CCP Member Fathers and Children (Logit)

	Model 16				Model 17				Model 18			
	Last-born child				Last-born child				Last-born child			
	Communication about school	Communication about friends	Communication about teachers	Communication about worries	Communication about school	Communication about friends	Communication about teachers	Communication about worries	Communication about school	Communication about friends	Communication about teachers	Communication about worries
Father's political status (ref: non- CCP)	0.085 (0.54)	0.259*** (2.14)	0.248** (1.76)	0.045 (0.12)	0.085 (1.45)	0.229** (2.04)	0.288* (1.25)	0.037 (0.30)	0.241* (1.76)	0.645* (1.85)	0.257* (1.25)	0.287 (0.24)
Gender (ref: female)					1.157* (1.87)	0.805* (1.96)	4.301*** (2.89)	1.009 (1.26)	0.264* (1.85)	0.369* (1.86)	0.466** (1.54)	0.641** (2.08)
Father's political status* Gender									0.236** (1.92)	0.225** (2.02)	0.254** (1.28)	0.085 (0.68)
Father's education (ref: bachelor degree below)	-0.118 (-0.20)	-0.0953 (-0.17)	1.051* (1.79)	0.107 (0.17)	-1.699 (-1.00)	-1.578 (-1.02)	2.184* (1.86)	-1.12 (-0.62)	-0.538 (-0.63)	0.0284 (0.04)	0.559 (0.61)	0.945 (1.05)
Father's hukou (ref: rural)	0.797* (1.65)	0.0917 (0.21)	-0.311 (-0.69)	-0.358 (-0.71)	0.786* (1.97)	0.733 (0.72)	-1.39 (-0.92)	-0.535 (-0.46)	0.659* (1.69)	0.883* (1.75)	0.288 (0.57)	-0.191 (-0.33)
Father's job: (ref: general staff)												
Managerial position	-0.1405 (-0.85)	0.0027 (0.02)	0.0051 (0.03)	0.2091 (1.33)	-0.7754 (-1.78)	-0.0241 (-0.05)	-0.1405 (-0.93)	-0.0158 (-0.03)	0.1873 (0.99)	-0.1764 (-0.88)	0.0910 (0.48)	-0.0860 (-0.36)

Advanced technician	-0.1115 (-0.65)	0.0022 (0.02)	0.0041 (0.03)	0.1659 (1.02)	-0.6152 (-1.37)	-0.0191 (-0.04)	-0.1115 (-0.72)	-0.0125 (-0.03)	0.1486 (0.76)	-0.1400 (-0.68)	0.0722 (0.37)	-0.0683 (-0.28)
General technician	0.0935 (0.62)	-0.0018 (-0.02)	-0.0034 (-0.02)	-0.1392 (-0.97)	0.5162 (1.31)	0.0160 (0.04)	0.0935 (0.69)	0.0105 (0.02)	-0.1247 (-0.73)	0.1175 (0.65)	-0.0606 (-0.35)	0.0573 (0.26)
Mother's hukou	1.068** (2.21)	-0.0451 (-0.11)	0.604 (1.34)	0.316 (0.64)	0.611* (1.81)	-0.197 (-0.20)	1.366 (0.89)	1.204 (1.04)	0.223 (0.44)	0.930** (1.98)	-0.645 (-1.31)	-0.265 (-0.47)
Mother's political status	-1.397* (-1.78)	-0.521 (-0.78)	-0.13 (-0.20)	0.000132 (0.00)	-1.309* (-1.69)	2.097 (0.99)	4.81 (0.99)	0.0251 (0.525)	-1.401* (-1.99)	-0.282 (-0.31)	-0.471 (-0.48)	0.0874 (-0.07)
Mother's education	-0.21 (-0.25)	-1.149 (-1.30)	-1.133 (-1.43)	-0.446 (-0.57)	-1.254 (-1.18)	1.241 (0.87)	1.445 (0.36)	0.513 (0.65)	-1.361 (-1.12)	-0.0492 (-0.05)	1.115 (1.26)	-0.171 (-0.14)
Mother's job: (ref: general staff)												
Managerial position	0.4650 (2.21)	0.1111 (0.55)	0.3104 (1.47)	0.4770 (2.24)	1.1053 (2.25)	0.4911 (1.11)	0.3528 (0.41)	0.7177 (1.41)	0.7002 (3.05)	0.5412 (2.30)	0.2690 (1.07)	0.2951 (1.04)
Advanced technician	0.3689 (1.70)	0.0881 (0.43)	0.2462 (1.13)	0.3784 (1.72)	0.8770 (1.73)	0.3897 (0.85)	0.2799 (0.32)	0.5694 (1.09)	0.5556 (2.35)	0.4294 (1.77)	0.2134 (0.82)	0.2341 (0.80)
General technician	-0.3096 (-1.62)	-0.0740 (-0.41)	-0.2066 (-1.08)	-0.3176 (-1.64)	-0.7359 (-1.65)	-0.3270 (-0.81)	-0.2349 (-0.30)	-0.4778 (-1.04)	-0.4662 (-2.24)	-0.3603 (-1.69)	-0.1791 (-0.78)	-0.1965 (-0.77)

Mother's time on daily activities	-0.0102 (-0.46)	-0.00497 (-0.25)	-0.0254 (-1.23)	-0.0420* (-1.83)	0.0555 (0.75)	-0.0704 (-0.90)	-0.240* (-1.86)	-0.0659 (-0.81)	0.0229 (0.92)	0.0126 (0.50)	-0.00109 (-0.04)	-0.00391 (-0.14)
Mother's time on study	-0.213 (-1.39)	-0.0702 (-0.56)	-0.0546 (-0.35)	0.347* (1.66)	0.08 (0.28)	0.0488 (0.21)	-0.0158 (-0.05)	0.133 (0.61)	0.08 (-0.28)	0.0488 (0.21)	-0.0158 (-0.05)	0.133 (0.60)
Mother's time on play	-0.022 (-0.11)	0.244 (1.59)	0.154 (0.86)	-0.281 (-1.07)	-0.393 (-0.90)	0.287 (1.05)	0.671* (1.69)	0.0121 (0.04)	-0.393 (-0.90)	0.287 (1.05)	0.671* (1.69)	0.0121 (-0.04)
Communication with mother on school	2.224*** (8.76)	0.767*** (3.54)	0.123 (0.55)	0.0153 (0.06)	2.506*** (3.16)	1.540** (2.35)	-1.456 (-1.35)	-0.641 (-0.91)	1.981*** (6.10)	0.657** (2.21)	0.037 (0.13)	0.126 (-0.38)
Communication with mother on teachers	0.0713 (0.36)	0.510*** (2.62)	2.240*** (9.52)	-0.336 (-1.51)	0.0981 (0.17)	-0.116 (-0.21)	6.247*** (3.53)	-0.00648 (-0.01)	0.266 (1.04)	0.838*** (3.07)	2.538*** (7.96)	0.0697 (0.24)
Communication with mother on worries	0.301* (1.74)	0.349** (2.06)	0.224 (1.29)	2.778*** (10.16)	0.288* (1.85)	0.738*** (2.25)	2.317** (2.14)	4.129*** (2.23)	0.379* (1.67)	0.494** (2.09)	0.211 (0.90)	3.219*** (7.88)
Cons	-7.469*** (-7.09)	-5.304*** (-5.60)	-6.899*** (-6.95)	-5.462*** (-5.41)	-4.671* (-1.79)	-6.680** (-2.46)	-26.23*** (-3.63)	-8.970*** (-2.67)	-5.756*** (-5.19)	-5.496*** (-4.77)	-6.761*** (-5.58)	-8.996*** (-5.83)
Observations	428	428	428	428	428	428	428	428	428	428	428	428
Pseudo r2	0.1731	0.1256	0.2355	0.3160	0.1789	0.1667	0.2765	0.2831	0.1855	0.1882	0.3005	0.3041

T value in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5.8 shows that CCP member fathers are more likely to communicate with last-born boys than last-born girls, compared with non-CCP member fathers.

Based on analyses in Table 5.6, Table 5.7, and Table 5.8, there are two findings. On the one hand, CCP member fathers are more inclined to communicate with boys whether they are first-born or last-born. On the other hand, compared with non-CCP member fathers, CCP member fathers are more willing to communicate with boys than girls. The findings support hypothesis 6.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter aims to examine the impact of children's gender on father involvement and further investigate whether there is son preference still exists within families. There are two main findings.

First, as to the interaction between fathers and children, CCP member fathers are inclined to spend less time on children's daily activities, study, and play. After adding interaction effect of the child's gender and fathers' political status, CCP member fathers become active in taking care of children's daily activities and study. Furthermore, after employing child's birth order, CCP member fathers become active in taking care of children's daily activities, study as well as play. Therefore, it is meaningful to introduce birth order into the analysis. This finding reflects boy preference among CCP member fathers within families in Chinese society to some extent.

Next, as to communication between fathers and children, CCP member fathers are more willing to communicate with boys regardless of birth order. The two findings suggest that there is son preference among CCP member fathers in the parenting process within families. For CCP member fathers, their social mobility experiences make them tend to invest boys than girls to realize advantage transmission because boys can maintain their family lineage, have a competitive advantage in the labor market, and provide old-age support.

CHAPTER 6

Conclusion and Discussion

Studies regarding the factors influencing father involvement based on Belsky parenting process model (1984) have provided rich empirical evidence. However, some empirical gaps remain. First, previous studies focusing on Western societies mainly refer to the impact of fathers' personality, educational background, attitudes to childrearing, and psychological health on father involvement in childrearing, little attention drawn to fathers' political status. While in Chinese society, CCP as the sole ruling political party provides specific context for individuals' development when they hold CCP membership. Party membership as political capital can bring rich social resources to individuals in Chinese context. Therefore, how the CCP member fathers involve with childrearing and what differences in parenting between CCP member fathers and non-CCP member fathers need to be empirically explored. This not only complements prior research but also allows Chinese context to be well understood. Next, prior research on father involvement has been largely focusing on preschool-aged children, and mainly refers to daily care activities, study, and play. However, such results are unable to explain the parenting situation when children become adolescents. Adolescence is a critical period that shapes educational attainment and thus subsequent life chances (Van de Werfhorst and Mijs 2010). Moreover, in this life phase, individual characteristics and activities become increasingly important compared to parental influences during childhood (Beyers et al. 2003). Therefore, this study employs the national data from junior high school students, further explores daily interaction and communication between fathers and children. Finally, previous studies have indicated that fathers tend to spend more time with sons than with daughters because of gender-specific parenting skills (Lamb, Pleck, and Levine 1987; Morgan et al. 1988; Lundberg, McLanahan, and Rose 2007). Also, fathers are interactive and responsive to first-born children, and gradually weaken the interaction from first-born to last-born (Flouri and Buchanan 2003; Hotz and Patano 2015). However, son preference has been deeply rooted in Chinese society owing to a complex interaction of cultural, economic, and social reasons (Li and Cooney 1993; Arnold and Liu 1986; Liang 2008). The evidence based on Western societies cannot exactly explain fathers' gender preference in childrearing in Chinese

context. Therefore, this paper will introduce gender and birth order of child into analysis to show gender inequality in the parenting process within families. The analyses confirm the following points.

First, the result concerning the relationship between party membership and individuals' economic well-being shows that holding CCP membership for individuals represents such kind of political affiliation, which has a positive effect on individuals' economic well-being. Besides, compared to non-CCP members, high education has a positive effect on CCP members to get higher income. Therefore, party membership positively contributes to individuals' economic well-being in Chinese society.

Next, concerning the results on the relationship between fathers' political status and father involvement, there are two main findings. Educational expectations make CCP member fathers spend less time on play with children but more time on daily activities than non-CCP fathers. That is probably because CCP member fathers are busy with their work so that they are unable to spare full time on play and study with children. In this analysis, fathers refer to resident fathers. As live with children, CCP member fathers still can offer some help in daily life to increase attachment with children. Contrary to the first finding, educational expectations enable CCP member fathers to communicate more with their children than non-CCP members. The two findings indicate that parenting styles are different at different ages of children. Previous studies find that fathers are more likely to spend time on specific caregiving issues when children are in pre-school age. As children grow up, parenting style shifts from specific caregiving issues to two-way emotional communication.

Finally, the results on the impact of children's gender on father involvement display two findings. On the one hand, CCP member fathers are inclined to spend less time on children's daily activities, study, and play. After adding the interaction effect of the child's gender and father's political status, CCP member fathers are more willing to spend time on children's daily activities and study but not on play. After introducing birth order, CCP member fathers are more willing to spend time caring for first-born boys' daily activities, study, and play than that of first-born girls, compared with non-CCP member fathers. It seems that even though CCP member fathers are busy

with their jobs, they still manage to spare time to accompany first-born boys to play. That is different from the situation that fathers are more interactive and responsive to their first-born children in Western societies. Meanwhile, for the last-born children, CCP member fathers still tend to spend more time caring for boys' daily activities, study, and play than that of girls. On the other hand, CCP member fathers tend to communicate more with boys than with girls regardless of birth order, compared with non-CCP member fathers. The two findings suggest that there is son preference among CCP member fathers in the parenting process within families. For CCP member fathers holding more social resources, boys can maintain their family lineage, have a competitive advantage in the labor market, and provide old age support. Hence, they are more willing to invest boys to realize intergenerational advantage transmission.

This study is based on Belsky's parenting process model (1984), contributing to the previous literature in three ways. First, theoretically, the theory of intergenerational advantage transmission largely focuses on parents' education. That is to say, parents gain social resources through their education, and then invest what they get to their children to realize intergenerational transmission. While in this study, I mainly concentrate on fathers' CCP membership to gain access to social resources. By adding the other important indicator into the theory of intergenerational advantage transmission, namely, fathers' political status, this study explains the impact of fathers' political status on father involvement. Second, by introducing birth order and gender of the child into analysis, this study empirically explores CCP member fathers' son preference in the parenting process. It reflects gender inequality within families in Chinese society. Finally, previous studies about father involvement mainly refer to preschool-aged children, which only explain one-way communication between fathers and children. Adolescence is a critical period that shapes educational attainment and thus subsequent life chances (Van de Werfhorst and Mijs 2010), and individual characteristics and activities become increasingly important in this life phase (Beyers et al. 2003). Two-way emotional communication between fathers and children during adolescence better illustrates CCP member fathers' rational choice in the parenting process.

This study is subject to certain limitations. First, for the impact of CCP membership on individuals' economic well-being, family background such as parents' education and parents'

political status is not included in the database, which may cause selection bias. Research in the future should take this into account. Next, the sample size gap of CCP members and non-CCP members is relatively large, and the data of CCP members are rather small-scale, which is consistent with the fact. For the time being, the number of CCP members accounts for less than 10 percent of China's overall population. Undoubtedly, such a disadvantage will cause omitted coefficients in the analysis. Finally, the data employed about the impact of fathers' political status on father involvement is cross-sectional data. Currently, the abolition of the one-child policy, the emergence of government incentives for childbirth, and the change of Chinese fertility attitudes to some extent affect changes in fathers' parenting attitudes as well as in their styles. Therefore, long-term follow-up studies are needed to clarify such changes and to enhance the robustness of the study.

References:

- Anastasi, Anne. 1956. "Intelligence and Family Size." *Psychological Bulletin* 53(3):187-209.
- Appleton, Knight J., Lina Song, and Qingjie Xia. 2009. "The Economics of Communist Party Membership: The Curious Case of Rising Numbers and Wage Premium during China's Transition." *The Journal of Development Studies* 45(2):256-275.
- Andrews, Luckey I., Errol Bolden, Judith Whiting- Fickling, and Katherine A. Lind. 2004. "Public Perceptions about Father Involvement: Results of a Statewide Household Survey." *Journal of Family Issues* 25(5):603-633.
- Abraham, Martin and Thomas Voss. 2002. "Contribution of Rational Choice Theory to Modern Sociology: An Overview." Pp.127-150 in *Advances in Sociological Knowledge*, edited by Nikolai Genov. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden
- Banister, Judith. 1987. *China's Changing Population*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
- Baskett, Linda M. 1985. "Sibling Status: Adult Expectations." *Developmental Psychology* 21(3):441-445.
- Belsky, Jay. 1984. "The Determinants of Parenting: A Process Model." *Children Development* 55(1):83-96.
- Becker, Gary S. and Nigel Tomes. 1986. "Human Capital and the Rise and Fall of Families." *Journal of Labor Economics* 4(3, pt. 2): 1-39.
- Bègue, Laurent and Sebastian Roché. 2005. "Birth Order and Youth Delinquent Behavior: Testing the Differential Parental Control Hypothesis in a French Representative Sample." *Psychology, Crime and Law*. 11(1):73-85.
- Bianchi, Robinson J. and Melissa A. Milkie. 2006. *Changing Rhythms of American Family Life*. NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Bian, Yanjie. 1994. "Guanxi and the Allocation of Urban Jobs in China." *The China Quarterly* 140:971-999.
- Bian, Yanjie. 1997. "Bringing Strong Ties Back in: Indirect Ties, Network Bridges, and Job Searches in China." *American Sociological Review* 62(3):366-385.

- Bian, Shu X. and John R. Logan. 2001. "Communist Party Membership and Regime Dynamics in China." *Social Forces* 79(3):805-841.
- Blake, Judith. 1981. "Family Size and the Quality of Children." *Demography* 18(4):421-442.
- Blau, Peter M. and Otis D. Duncan. 1967. *The American occupational structure*. New York: Wiley.
- Breen, Richard and Jan O. Jonsson. 2005. "Inequality of opportunity in comparative perspective: Recent research on educational attainment and social mobility." *Annual Review of Sociology* 31: 223–243.
- Bronte-Tinkew, Kristin M., Gregory Matthews, and Jennifer Carrano. 2007. "Symptoms of Major Depression in a Sample of Fathers of Infants: Sociodemographic Correlates and Links to Father Involvement." *Journal of Family Issues* 28(1):61-99.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. 1990. *The Logic of Practice*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. 1984. *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Coleman, James S. and Thomas Hoffer. 1987. *Public and Private High Schools: The Impact of Communities*. New York: Basic Books.
- Cavalli-Sforza, Luigi L. and Marcus W. Feldman. 1973. "Cultural versus Biological Inheritance: Phenotypic Transmission from Parents to Children (A Theory of the Effect of Parental Phenotypes on Children's Phenotypes)." *American Journal of Human Genetics* 25(6):618-637.
- Cooney, Jin W. and Mary G. Powers. 1991. "The One Child Certificate in Hebei Province, China: Acceptance and Consequence, 1979-1988." *Population Research and Policy Review* 10(2):137-155.
- Coleman, James. 1990. *Foundations of Social Theory*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Carlson, Marcia. 2006. "Family Structure, Father Involvement, and Adolescent Behavioral Outcomes." *Journal of Marriage and Family* 68(1):137-154.
- Conger, Conger K. and Monic J. Martin. 2010. "Socioeconomic Status, Family Process, and Individual Development." *Journal of Marriage and Family* 72(3):685-704.
- Cowan, Carolyn P. and Philip A. Cowan. 1987. "Men's involvement in parenthood: Identifying

- the antecedents and understanding the barriers.” Pp.145-174 In *Men's Transitions to Parenthood: Longitudinal Studies of Family Experience*, edited by Phyllis W. Berman and Frank A. Pedersen. New York: Psychology Press.
- Craig, Lyn. 2006. “Parental Education, Time in Paid Work and Time with Children: An Australian Time-diary Analysis.” *British Journal of Sociology* 57(4): 553–575.
- Chen, Gang and Yanqing Wei. 2017. “Does the Parents’ Political Identity Help Their Children to Enter the ‘System’?” *Journal of Nanjing University of Finance and Economics* 6:79-87.
- Croll, Elisabeth. 1985. “Introduction: Fertility Norms and Family Size in China.” Pp. 1-36 in *China's One-child Family Policy*, edited by Elisabeth Croll, Delia Davin and Penny Kane. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cummings, Patrick D. and Susan B. Campbell. 2000. *Developmental Psychopathology and Family Process: Theory, Research, and Clinical Implications*. New York: Guilford Press.
- Davin, Delia.1985. “The Single-child Family Policy in the Countryside.” Pp.37-82 in *China's One-child Family Policy*, edited by Elisabeth Croll, Delia Davin, and Penny Kane. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Del Boca, Christopher F., and Matthew Wiswall. 2014. “Household Choices and Child Development.” *Review of Economic Studies* 81(1):137–185.
- Dickson, Bruce J. and Maria Rost Rublee. 2000. “Membership Has Its Privileges: The Socioeconomic Characteristic of Communist Party Members in Urban China.” *Comparative Political Studies* 33(1):87-112.
- Dickson, Bruce J. 2000. “Cooptation and Corporatism in China; The Logic of Party Adaptation.” *Political Science Quarterly* 115(4):517-540.
- Downey, Douglas B. 1995. “When Bigger Is Not Better: Family Size, Parental Resources, and Children’s Educational Performance.” *American Sociological Review* 60(5):746-761.
- Dornbusch, Sanford M. and Kenneth D. Wood. 1989. “Family Process and Educational Achievement.” Pp.66-95 in *Education and American Family: A Research Synthesis*, edited by William J. Weston. New York: New York University Press.
- Eaves, Lindon. 1976. “The Effect of Cultural Transmission on Continuous Variation.” *Heredity* 37:41-57.

- Fiorini, Mario and Michael P. Keane. 2014. "How the Allocation of Children's Time Affects Cognitive and Noncognitive Development." *Journal of Labor Economics* 32(4):787 - 836.
- Flouri, Eirini and Ann Buchanan. 2003. "What Predicts Fathers' Involvement with Their Children? A Prospective Study of Intact Families." *British Journal of Developmental Psychology* 21(1): 81-97.
- Fox, Greer L. and Carol Bruce. 2001. "Conditional Fatherhood: Identity Theory and Parental Investment Theory as Alternative Sources of Explanation of Fathering." *Journal of Family and Marriage* 63(2):394-403.
- Fofonoff, Emily. 2018. "How Socioeconomic Status Influence Fathers' Involvement with Their Children and the Cycle It Produces." *Canadian Journal of Family and Youth* 10(1):53-71.
- Fred, Arnold and Zhaoxiang Liu. 1986. "Sex Preferences, Fertility and Family Planning in China." *Population and Development Review* 12(2): 221-246.
- Greenhalgh, Susan. 1994. "Controlling Births and Bodies in Village China." *American Ethnologist* 21(1):3-30.
- Goyette, Kimberly and Yu Xie. 1999. "Educational Expectations of Asian American Youths: Determinants and Ethnic Differences." *Sociology of Education* 72(1):22-36.
- Guo, Shinbao and Yan Guo. 2016. *Spotlight on China: Changes in Education under China's Market Economy*. Rotterdam/Boston/Taipei: Sense.
- Goncey, Elizabeth A. and van Dulen Manfred. 2010. "Father Do Make A Difference: Parental Involvement and Adolescent Alcohol Use." *Fathering* 8(1):93-108.
- Gray, Anne. 2006. "The Time Economy of Parenting." *Sociological Research Online* 11(3): 1-15.
- Hannum, Emily and Yu Xie. 1994. "Trends in Educational Gender Inequality in Rural China." *Social Stratification and Mobility* 13:73-98.
- Hannum, Kong P. and YuPing Zhang. 2009. "Family Sources of Educational Gender Inequality in Rural China: A Critical Assessment." *International Journal of Educational Development* 29(5):474-486.
- Hardee, K. 1984. "Implications of China's one-child Policy." *International Demographics* 3(5): 11-12.
- Henz, Ursula. 2019. "Father's Involvement with Their Children in the United Kingdom: Recent

- Trends and Class Difference.” *Demographic Research* 40:865-896.
- Heath, Douglas H. 1976. “Competent Fathers: Their Personalities and Marriages.” *Human Development* 19(1):26-39.
- Heckman, James and Flavio Cunha. 2007. “The Technology of Skill Formation.” *American Economic Review* 97(2):31-47.
- Hillier, Sheila. 1988. “Women and Population Control in China: Issues of Sexuality, Power, and Control.” *Feminist Review* 29:101-113.
- Hotz, Joseph V. and Juan Pantano. 2015. “Strategic Parenting, Birth Order, and School Performance.” *Journal of Population Economics* 28(4):911-936.
- Hong, Xiao. 2000. “Structure of Child-Rearing Values in Urban China.” *Sociological Perspective* 43(3):457-471.
- Huerta, Adema W., Jennifer Baxter, Wen Jui-hua, Mette Lausten, RaeHyuck Lee, and Jane Waldfogel. 2013. “Fathers’ Leave, Fathers’ Involvement and Child Development: Are They Related? Evidence from Four OECD Countries.” *OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers*, No.140, OECD Publishing.
- James S. Coleman. 1987. “Families and Schools.” *Educational Researcher* 16(6):32-38.
- Johnson, Emily and Gregory C. Chow. 1997. “Rates of Return to Schooling in China.” *Pacific Economic Review* 2(2):101-113.
- Jin, Shuzhuo L. and Marcus W. Feldman. 2007. “Marriage Form and Son Preference in Rural China: An Investigation in Three Counties.” *Rural Sociology* 72(4):511-36.
- Kwon, Young In and Kevin M. Roy. 2007. “Changing Social Expectationss for Work and Family Involvement Among Korean Fathers.” *Journal of Comparative Family Studies* 38(2):285-305.
- Knight, John and Linda Yueh. 2008. “The Role of Social Capital in the Labor Market in China.” *Economics of Transition and Institutional Change* 16(3):389-414.
- Kelly, Joan B. and Machiael E. Lamb. 2000. “Using Child Development Research to Make Appropriate Custody and Access Decisions for Young Children.” *Family and Conciliation Courts Review* 38: 297-311.
- Kohn, Melvin L. 1977. *Class and Conformity: A Study in Values (2nd Edition)*. Chicago and

- London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Lamb, Micheal E. and James A. Levine. 1983. "The Swedish Parental Insurance Policy: An Experiment in Social Engineering." Pp.39-51 in *Fatherhood and Family Policy*, edited by Lamb, Michael E. and Abraham Sagi. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Lamb, Joseph P. and James Levine. 1987. "Effects of Increased Paternal Involvement on Fathers and Mothers." *Marriage and Family Review* 9(3-4):67-83.
- Lamb, Joseph P. and James A. Levine. 1985. "The Role of the Father in Child Development: The Effects of Increased Parental Involvement." Pp. 229-266 in *Advances in Clinical Child Psychology*. New York: Plenum.
- Lamb, Michael E. 2000. "The history of research on father involvement." *Marriage and Family Review* 29: 2-3.
- Lamb, Joseph P., Eric L. Charnov, and James A. Levine. 1985. "Paternal Behavior in Human." *American Zoologist* 25(3):883-894.
- Levy-Shiff, Rachel and Ruth Israelashvili. 1988. "Antecedents of Fathering: Some Further Exploration." *Developmental Psychology* 24(3):434-440.
- Lundberg, Sara M. and Elaina Rose. 2007. "Child Gender and Father Involvement in Fragile Families." *Demography* 44(1):79-92.
- Lu, Yao and Donald J. Treiman. 2008. "The Effect of Siblingship Size on Educational Attainment in China: Period Variations." *American Sociological Review* 73(5):813-834.
- Lei, Lei and Heili Pals. 2011. "Son Preference in China: Why is it Stronger in Rural Areas?" *Population Review* 50(2):27-46.
- Lei, Shen Y., James P. Smith, and Guang-su Zhou. 2017. "Sibling Gender Compositions Effect on Education: Evidence from China." *Journal of Population Economics* 30(2):569-590.
- Lipset, Seymour M. and Reinhard Bendix 1991(1959). *Social Mobility in Industrial Society*. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.
- Li, Jiali and Rosemary S. Cooney. 1993. "Son preference and the One Child Policy in China: 1979-1988." *Population Research and Policy Review* 12(3):277-296.
- Liu, Tao and Li Sun. 2016. "Pension Reform in China." *Journal of Aging and Social Policy* 28(1):15-28.

- Liang, Hong. 2008. "The Desired Childbearing Gender Preference of Guangdong Population and Its Affecting Variables (Guang Dong Ren Kou Yi Yuan Sheng Yu Xing Bie Pian Hao DeYing Xiang Yin Su Fen Xi)." *South China Population* 23(1):25-33.
- Lavelly, Zhenyu X., Bohua Li and Ronald Freedman. 1990. "The Rise in Female Education in China: National and Regional Patterns." *The China Quarterly* 121(March):61-93.
- Li, Pakwai L., Junsen Zhang, and Ning Ma. 2007. "Economic Returns to Communist Party Membership: Evidence from Urban Chinese Twins." *The Economic Journal* 117(523):1504-1520.
- Liu, Zhiqiang. 2003. "The Economic Impact and Determinants of Investment in Human and Political Capital in China." *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 51(4):823-850.
- Li, Bobai and Andrew G. Walder. 2001. "Career Advancement as Party Patronage: Sponsored Mobility into the Chinese Administrative Elite, 1949-1996." *American Journal of Sociology* 106(5):1371-1408.
- McLaughlin, Joanne Song. 2017. "Does Communist Party Membership Pay? Estimating the Economic Returns to Party Membership in the Labor Market in China." *Journal of Comparative Economics* 45(4):963-983.
- Mendelson, Fitch T., Eileen P. de Villa, and Francine G. Goodman. 2010. "Adults' Expectations for Children's Sibling Roles." *International Journal of Behavioral Development* 20(3):549-572.
- Morgan, Diane L. and Gretchen A. Condran. 1988. "Sons, Daughters, and the Risk of Marital Disruption." *American Journal of Sociology* 94(1):110-129.
- Manlove, Elizabeth E. and Lynne Vernon-Feagans. 2002. "Caring for Infant Daughters and Sons in Dual-earner Households: Maternal Reports of Father Involvement in Weekday Time and Tasks." *Infant and Child Development* 11(4):305-320.
- Morduch, Jonathan and Terry Sicular. 2000. "Politics, Growth, and Inequality in Rural China: Does It Pay to Join the Party?" *Journal of Public Economics* 77(3):331-356.
- Mondell, Sid and Tyler Forrest B. 1981. "Parental Competence and Styles of Problem Solving / Play Behavior with Children." *Developmental Psychology* 17(1):73-78.
- Mincer, Jacob A. 1974. "The Human Capital Earning Function." Pp. 83-96 in *Schooling*,

- Experience, and Earnings*, edited by Jacob A. Mincer. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Nikolov, Hongjian W. and Kevin Acker. 2020. "Wage Premium of Communist Party Membership: Evidence from China." *Pacific Economic Review* 25(3):309-338.
- Nee, Victor. 1996. "The Emergence of a Market Society: Changing Mechanisms of Stratification in China." *American Journal of Sociology* 101(4): 908–949.
- Offerman-Zuckerberg, Joan. 1992. "The Parenting Process: A Psychoanalytic Perspective." *Journal of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis* 20(2):205-214.
- Paulson, Sarah D. and Jenn Leiferman. 2011. "Parental Depression, Relationship Quality, and Nonresident Father Involvement with Their Infants." *Journal of Family Issues* 32(4):528-549.
- Parish, William L. and Robert Willis. 1993. "Daughters, Education, and Family Budgets Taiwan Experiences." *Journal of Human Resources* 28(4):863-898.
- Parke, Dennis J., Flyr Mary, Morris Kristie, Leidy Melinda, and Schofield Thomas. 2005. "Fathers: Cultural and Ecological Perspectives." Pp.103-144 in *Parenting: An Ecological Perspectives*, edited by Tom Luster and Lynn Okagaki. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Palkovitz, Rob. 1997. "Reconstructing 'Involvement': Expanding Conceptualizations of Men's Caring in Contemporary Families." Pp.200-216 in *Generative Fathering: Beyond Deficit Perspectives*, edited by Alan J. Hawkins and David C. Dollahite. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage.
- Pew Research Center. 2016. "Analysis of American Time Use Survey." Retrieved June 12, 2019(<https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/12/fathers-day-facts/#:~:text=Dads%20are%20much%20more%20involved,from%20four%20hours%20in%201965.>)
- Putnam, Robert D. 2015. *Our Kids: The American Dream in Crisis*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Pleck, Joseph H. and Sandra L. Hofferth. 2008. "Mother Involvement as an Influence on Father Involvement with Early Adolescents." *Fathering* 6(3): 267–286.

- Price, Joseph. 2008. "Parent-child Quality Time: Does Birth Order Matter?" *Journal of Human Resources* 43(1):240–265.
- Price, Joseph. 2016. "Parent-Child Quality Time: Does Birth Order Matter?" *The Journal of Human Resources* 43(1):240-265.
- Pleck, Joseph. 2010. "Paternal Involvement: Revised Conceptualization and Theoretical Linkages with Child Outcomes" Pp.58-93 in *The Role of the Father in Child Development*, edited by Michael E. Lamb. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
- People's Daily Online 2019. "Implementing the National Policy of Gender Equality." Beijing: People's Daily Online. Retrieved January 5, 2021 (<http://zj.people.com.cn/n2/2019/1118/c186327-33551457.html>)
- Raley, Sara and Suzanne Bianchi. 2006. "Sons, Daughters, and Family Processes: Does Gender of Children Matter?" *Annual Review of Sociology* 32:401–421.
- Sayer, Anne G. and Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr. 2004. "Educational Differences in Parents' Time with Children: Cross-national Variations." *Journal of Marriage and Family* 66(5): 1152–1169.
- Sato, Yoshimichi. 2013. "Rational Choice Theory." *Sociopedia.isa*.
- Seginer, Rachel. 1983. "Parents' Educational Expectationss and Children's Academic Achievements: A Literature Review." *Merrill-Palmer Quarterly* 29(1):1-23.
- Sewell, William H., Archibald O. Haller, and George W. Ohlendorf. 1970. "The Educational and Early Occupational Status Attainment Process: Replication and Revision." *American Sociological Review* 35(6):1014-1027.
- Sewell, William H., Robert M. Hauser, Kristen W. Springer, and Taissa S. Hauser. 2004. "As We Age: A Review of the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study, 1957-2001." *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility* 20:3-111.
- Sewell, William H. and Vimal P. Shah. 1968b. "Social Class, Parental Encouragement, and Educational Aspirations." *American Journal of Sociology* 73(5):559-572.
- Sewell, William H. and Vimal P. Shah. 1967. "Socioeconomic Status, Intelligence, and the Attainment of Higher Education." *Sociology of Education* 40(1):1-23.
- Selden, Mark and Lai-yin You. 1997. "The Reform of Social Welfare in China." *World*

- Development* 25(10):1657-1668.
- Sieben, Inge. 2017. "Child-rearing Values: The Impact of Intergenerational Class Mobility." *International Sociology* 32(3):369-390.
- Strauss, John and Duncan Thomas. 1995. "Human Resources: Empirical Modeling of Household and Family Decisions." Pp.1883-2023 in *Handbook of Development Economics*, edited by Jere Behrman and T.N. Srinivasan. North Holland, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.
- Stafford, Frank and Wei-jun Jean Yeung. 2005. "The Distribution of Children's Developmental Resources." Pp. 289-313 in *The Economics of Time Use*, edited by Daniel S. Hamermesh and Gerard A. Pfann. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
- Schoppe-Sullivan, Kotila L., Rongfang Jia, Sarah N. Lang, and Daniel J. Bower. 2013. "Comparison of Levels and Predictors of Mothers' and fathers' Engagement with Their Preschool Aged Children." *Early Child Development Care* 183(3-4):498-514.
- Szelenyi, Ivan. 1978. "Social Inequality in State Socialist Redistributive Economies." *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 19(1-2):63-87.
- Sullivan, Oriel. 2010. "Changing Difference by Educational Attainment in Fathers' Domestic Labor and Child Care." *Sociology* 44(4):716-733.
- Steelman, Powell B., Regina Werum, and Scott Carter. 2002. "Reconsidering the Effects of Siblings Configuration: Recent Advances and Challenges." *Annual Review of Sociology* 28:243-269.
- Thornberry, Hyman H., Rand D. Conger and Deborah M. Capaldi. 2003. "Replicated Findings and Future Directions for Intergenerational Studies: Closing Comments." *Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology* 31(2):201-203
- Trivers, Robert L. 1972. "Parental Investment and Sexual Selection." Pp.136-178 in *Sexual Selection and the Descent of Man*, edited by B. Campell. Chicago: Aldine.
- Tien, H. Yuan. 1991. *China's Strategic Demographic Initiative*. New York: Praeger.
- Van IJzendoorn, Marinus H. and Marianne S. De Wolff. 1997. "Sensitivity and Attachment: A Meta-Analysis on Parental Antecedents of Infant Attachment." *Children Development* 68(4):571-591.
- Wilson, Sylvia and C. Emily Durbin. 2009. "Effects of Parental Depression on Fathers' Parenting

- Behaviors: A Meta-analytic Review.” *Clinical Psychology Review* 30(2):167-180.
- Walder, Andrew G. 1995. “Career Mobility and the Communist Political Order.” *American Sociological Review* 60(3):309-328.
- Walder, Li B. and Donald Treiman. 2000. “Politics and Life Chances in a State Socialist Regime: Dual Career Paths into Urban Chinese Elite, 1949-1996.” *American Sociological Review* 65(2):191-209.
- William, Parish L. and Robert J. Willis. 1993. “Daughters, Education, and Family Budgets: Taiwan Experiences.” *Journal of Human Resources* 28(4):863-898.
- Wong, Wendy. 2005. "Son Preference and Educational Opportunities of Children in China--'I Wish You Were a Boy!'" *Gender Issues* (Spring):3-30.
- Wu, Xiaogang and Yu Xie. 2003. “Does the Market Pay Off? Earnings Returns Education in Urban China.” *American Sociological Review* 68(3):425-442.
- Weiss, Yoram and Chaim Fershtman. 1998. “Social Status and Economic Performance: A Survey.” *European Economic Review* 42(3-5):801-820.
- Wu, Chongfeng W. and Oliver M. Rui. 2012. “Ownership and the Value of Political Connections: Evidence from China.” *European Financial Management* 18(4):695-729.
- Xie, Yu and Emily Hannum. 1996. “Regional Variation in Earnings Inequality in Reform-era Urban China.” *American Journal of Sociology* 101(4): 950-992.
- Yang, Wenhui and Ling Chen. 2016. “Political Capital and Intergenerational Mobility: Evidence from Elite College Admissions in China.” *Chinese Journal of Sociology* 2(2):194-213.
- Yang, Yufeng W. and Hewang Liu. 2009. “Father’s Political Status, Political Connection and Children’s Income.” *China Economic Quarterly* 9(3):871-890.
- Yeung, John S., Pamela Davis-Kean, and Sandra L. Hofferth. 2001. "Children's Time with Fathers in Intact Families." *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 63(1):136-154.
- Yan, Shanping. 2019. “The Changing Faces and Roles of Communist Party Membership in China: An Empirical Analysis Based on CHIP1988, 1995 and 2002.” *Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies* 8(1):99-120.
- Zang, Xiaowei. 2004. *Elite Dualism and Leadership Selection in China*. New York: Routledge Curzon.

- Zhou, Xuegang. 2000. "Economic Transformation and Income Inequality in Urban China: evidence from panel data." *American Journal of Sociology* 105(4):1135-1174.
- Zhang, Saijun and Steve Anderson. 2014. "Individual Economic Well-being and the Development of Bridging and Bonding Social Capital." *Social Development Issues* 36(1): 33-51.
- Zhang, Zhaoshu and Qi Chen. 2014. "The Expansion of Higher Education Admissions and the Gender Equalization of Higher Education Opportunity: An Empirical Study Based on Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS2008) Data." *The Journal of Chinese Sociology* 1.
- Zhan, Min. 2006. "Assets, Parental Expectationss and Involvement, and Children's Educational Performance." *Children and Youth Services Review* 28(8):961-975.
- Zeng, Yi. 1988. "Changing Demographic Characteristics and the Family Status of Chinese Women." *Population Studies* 42(2): 183-203.