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VERTICALITY METAPHORS IN CLASSICAL HEBREW REVISITED:  
REFINING THE ANALYSIS USING PRIMARY METAPHOR THEORY

by

Andrew Scott Hodge  
Bachelor of Arts, Moody Bible Institute, 2017

A Thesis  
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty

of the

University of North Dakota

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

Master of Arts

Grand Forks, North Dakota

August  
2022

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This thesis, submitted by Andrew Hodge in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts from the University of North Dakota, has been read by the Faculty Advisory Committee under whom the work has been done and is hereby approved.

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School of Graduate Studies

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Andrew Hodge  
July 27, 2022

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## ABBREVIATIONS

1 Sam.	1 Samuel
CMT	Conceptual Metaphor Theory
Exod.	Exodus
Gen.	Genesis
Isa.	Isaiah
Jer.	Jeremiah
Lam.	Lamentations
MIPVU	Metaphor Identification Procedure, Vrije Universiteit
PMT	Primary Metaphor Theory
Psa.	Psalm

## ABSTRACT

This thesis applies a new theory to old data. It reanalyzes VERTICALITY metaphors for distress in Classical Hebrew using Primary Metaphor Theory. Previously, this pattern of metaphors in Hebrew was analyzed by King (2012) within the general framework of Conceptual Metaphor Theory. This study focuses on the ways that Primary Metaphor Theory radically changes the organization of conceptual structure as dictated by Conceptual Metaphor Theory and as used by King in his analysis of Hebrew VERTICALITY metaphors. The reorganization of conceptual structure following Primary Metaphor Theory hinges on the assumption that conceptual structures with direct, independent experiential motivations also have independent statuses in our minds. Equally, this study focuses on theoretical reasons for why this adjustment to the organization of conceptual structure should be preferred.

King (2012) understood the metaphorical mapping of VERTICALITY onto DISTRESS as existing in a hierarchy in which there were two sub-schemas—spatial and postural VERTICALITY. I discard the higher-level structure and treat the mappings of the “sub-schemas” onto DISTRESS as independent structures and as construals of primary metaphors. This affects the generalizations made over metaphorical expressions that are supposed to be motivated by these structures. In this thesis, the reanalysis of Hebrew metaphor data is driven by the simple application of a new theoretical framework. Though valid, data-based arguments are made, the data themselves have not pushed the reanalysis.

# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Introduction

This thesis shows the development of Primary Metaphor Theory (Grady et al. 1996; Grady 1997a, b) out of Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff 1993) (§1.2, chaps. 2-3) and shows how the theoretical advancements offered by Primary Metaphor Theory can improve King’s (2012) earlier analysis of Classical Hebrew VERTICALITY metaphors<sup>1</sup> for distress (e.g., being in “the depths” (Psa. 130:1), or “collaps[ing] and fall[ing]” (Psa. 20:8))—an analysis that was based on Conceptual Metaphor Theory (§1.3, chaps. 4-5). In this thesis, based on Primary Metaphor Theory, I reanalyze Hebrew VERTICALITY metaphors in a way that makes generalizations over the linguistic data that are different from King’s (2012) (§1.4, chap. 6).

### 1.2 Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Primary Metaphor Theory

Conceptual Metaphor Theory makes the important claim that “metaphor is not just a matter of language, that is, of mere words...[O]n the contrary, human *thought processes* are largely metaphorical” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 5). In this view, metaphorical

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<sup>1</sup> See Cian (2017) for a review of the literature on VERTICALITY metaphors. Though his discussion is explicitly set within Conceptual Metaphor Theory, the literature that he reviews comes mainly from the fields of psychology and marketing. Additional articles for consideration are Krzeszowski (1993), Gibbs et al. (1994), and Hampe (2005).

expressions in language arise from and reflect metaphorical thought, the kind of thought that maps elements from one conceptual domain onto another. Lakoff (1993) and Lakoff & Johnson (1980) suggest that conceptual metaphors consist of coherent, relatively stable mappings between a source and target conceptual domain. They illustrated this with the now classic example THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS.<sup>2</sup> Linguistic examples that are supposed to reflect this conceptual mapping include the following (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 46):

- (1) a. Is that the *foundation* of your theory?
- b. The theory needs more *support*.
- c. The argument is *shaky*.
- d. We need some more facts or the argument will *fall apart*.
- e. We need to *construct* a *strong* argument for that.
- f. The theory will *stand* or *fall* on the *strength* of that argument.
- g. So far we have put together only the *framework* of the theory.

A building has a foundation; its framework needs to be constructed; the whole of it needs to be given support so that it is strong rather than shaky and so that it stands rather than falls. Similarly, a theory has a *foundation* too; its *framework* also needs to be *constructed*; the theory as a whole needs to be given *support* so that it is *strong* rather than *shaky* and so that it *stands* rather than *falls*. When referring to buildings, the terms in italics are literal, but when referring to theories, those terms are metaphorical, yet equally coherent. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) take this as evidence for the existence of the conceptual metaphor

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<sup>2</sup> Labels for concepts and for conceptual metaphors are written in small caps throughout this thesis. Conceptual metaphors follow the format TARGET CONCEPT IS SOURCE CONCEPT.



THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS, a metaphorical mapping of the domain of BUILDINGS onto the domain of THEORIES. Similar evidence is given to support the existence of numerous other conceptual metaphors.

Despite the coherence of the examples that Lakoff and Johnson used to support their claim regarding the mapping of the domain of BUILDINGS onto the domain of THEORIES, Grady (1997a, b) pointed out three problems: First, there are gaps in the mappings. Many salient and central aspects of the domain of BUILDINGS do not map onto the domain of THEORIES. It is difficult to understand what *French windows* would be in a theory or what it would mean for a theory to have tenants who were falling behind in their rent. Second, there is a lack of experiential motivation that would bring the domain of BUILDINGS into a metaphorical relationship with the domain of THEORIES. Third, there is a lack of distinction from other metaphors. Solid premises may be the *foundation* of a good theory, but healthy families may also be the *foundation* of a good society, and so forth.

In answer to these problems, Grady proposes that THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS “is a metaphor composed of distinct and independently motivated metaphorical correspondences” called primary metaphors (1997a: 45). Specifically, Grady proposed that THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS derives from the combination of the more basic mappings LOGICAL ORGANIZATION IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE and VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS.<sup>3</sup> This analysis accounts for the gaps in the mappings of THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS by suggesting that all the mappings that do occur have to fall out from these two more basic metaphors; the rich domains of BUILDINGS and THEORIES are not the structures that fundamentally

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<sup>3</sup> Grady actually proposed VIABILITY IS ERECTNESS (1997a: 45). I have simply changed the term from ERECTNESS to UPRIGHTNESS but with the same intended meaning.

correspond. This analysis also accounts for the lack of experiential motivation discernible in THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS. Specifically, the primary metaphors LOGICAL ORGANIZATION IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE and VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS can be viewed as arising from momentary, goal-oriented scenes that correlate our sensorimotor experiences with our subjective judgments. Finally, this analysis also accounts for the way that THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS does not make natural distinctions between itself and other similar metaphors. The target concept VIABLE LOGICAL ORGANIZATION does not need to specify THEORIES but may equally specify SOCIETY, and so forth; the generalization appears to be more accurate. Additionally, it suggests that just as each primary metaphor is motivated independently, so they are also able to function independently. While some entities may be either upright or not upright, their physical structure (the organization of various parts) may not always be in view. And while some states of affairs may either obtain or not obtain, they do not always concern logical organization as in (2).

(2) The speed record for the mile *still stands/ fell/ was toppled*. (Grady 1997a: 47)

### **1.3 King's analysis of VERTICALITY metaphors for distress and its problems**

King (2012: 99-139) proposed the Classical Hebrew conceptual metaphor BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE. Following Lakoff (1993) and others, King understands this conceptual metaphor to exist within a larger hierarchy. Thus, King describes the source concept THE VERTICAL SCALE (aka VERTICALITY) as an image schema with two sub-schemas—spatial VERTICALITY (e.g., being in “the depths” (Psa. 130:1)) and postural VERTICALITY (e.g., “collaps[ing] and fall[ing]” (Psa. 20:8)) (King 2012: 133). The resulting metaphors are presented below. Level 1 maps the source concept VERTICALITY

onto BEING IN DISTRESS while Level 2 maps the two sub-schemas of VERTICALITY onto BEING IN DISTRESS.

- (3) Level 1: BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE  
Level 2: BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE;  
BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE POSTURAL SCALE

As I will show in chapter five, King assumes that example (3) exists as a very small piece within a much larger hierarchy that ultimately includes all events. Metaphorical hierarchies as they have been defined (Lakoff 1993; Lakoff & Johnson 1999) imply that lower levels depend to some extent on the higher levels for their structure; they are generally characterized as “special cases” of the higher levels. Using the framework of Primary Metaphor Theory, I point out, first, that *the current analysis is inefficient* (e.g., see Grady et al. 1996: 179-80) because it requires a “huge...system” (Lakoff 1993: 227) of entrenched conceptual structure to account for the two very basic correspondences on the lower level. Second, *it obscures the experiential basis of conceptual structure*. The experiential bases of the lower-level metaphors in example (3) are plausibly independent and direct rather than derived from higher-level structures as suggested by the hierarchy. Third, *it obscures the nature of the relationships that exist between the metaphorical expressions that fall under one sub-schema and those that fall under the other*; it suggests that the relationship between these conceptual metaphors (and thus, their associated metaphorical expressions) can be defined by their mutual inheritance of higher-level structures rather than by reference to the primary metaphors that they either do or do not share (Grady et al. 1996: 185).

## 1.4 A new framework and its application in analyzing metaphorical expressions

This thesis proposes a different organization of conceptual structure based on Primary Metaphor Theory rather than the one used by King based on Conceptual Metaphor Theory. Instead of the hierarchy in which VERTICALITY has two sub-schemas all of which map onto DISTRESS, I treat the metaphors on Level 2 as primary metaphors (or construals of primary metaphors already used in the literature) that, though compatible, are independent of each other and are also independent of any higher levels. As part of this, I discard Level 1 BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE.

Consider sentence (4):

- (4) דָּלַפָּה אֲפִשִׁי מִתּוֹגָה קִמְנִי כְדָבָרְךָ:  
Psa. 119:28: I *have collapsed* with intense sorrow: *make me stand upright*, as your word promises.<sup>4</sup>

In my reading of King (e.g., 2012: 131), the following hierarchy of conceptual structure is supposed to be responsible for motivating the metaphorical expressions that use the verbs דָּלַפָּה *dlp*<sup>5</sup> ‘to collapse’ in the qal and קוּם *qwm* ‘to make erect’ in the piel.

- (5) Level 1: The location Event Structure Metaphor  
Submapping: STATES ARE LOCATIONS  
Level 2: EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE IS BEING IN A SPATIAL LOCATION  
Level 3: BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE  
Level 4: BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE POSTURAL SCALE

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<sup>4</sup> All English quotations of the Bible are copied using Logos Bible Software from *The Holy Bible: English Standard Version (ESV)* (Crossway Bibles 2016). Italics are added to show metaphorically used lexical items. The Hebrew quotations are copied using Logos Bible Software from *Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia: SESB Version (BHS)* (German Bible Society 2003).

<sup>5</sup> Transliterations of Hebrew follow closely the guidelines found in *The SBL Handbook of Style* (SBL Press 2014: 56-58).

To be clear, Levels 1-3 would all branch out in more directions than just the one shown in this example; the hierarchy shown here is just a small sliver of a huge system.

For comparison consider Figure 1.1 which uses primary metaphors and their unification to describe the conceptual structure that is supposed to motivate the metaphorical expressions in sentence (4). As regards the structure represented in Figure 1.1, all the relevant conceptual structure is present; there is not more to the hierarchy than what is shown.




Figure 1.1. Conceptual structure based on Primary Metaphor Theory that is supposed to motivate the metaphorical expressions from Psa. 119:28

While the implications of this organization of conceptual structure versus the one in example (5) will be explored more thoroughly in the body of this thesis, some differences between the two are worth pointing out here. First, when we consider that the hierarchy in example (5) is only a sliver of a much larger hierarchical structure, then it becomes obvious that the analysis represented in Figure 1.1 invokes altogether less structure than the one shown in example (5). All things being equal, an application of Occam’s Razor would

likely prefer the structure in Figure 1.1 based on Primary Metaphor Theory over the hierarchy in example (5) based on Conceptual Metaphor Theory.

Second, the experiential motivation (i.e., the correlations in experience called primary scenes) of these conceptual structures is the source from which everything else flows in Figure 1.1 following Primary Metaphor Theory. In example (5), on the other hand, the experiential motivation is at least not shown, but as I will argue, it is simply less clear in Conceptual Metaphor Theory.

Third, Conceptual Metaphor Theory claims that the lower-level structures are special cases of the higher-level structures. According to the theory, nearly all metaphors are supposed to be special cases of the Event Structure Metaphor as shown in example (5); that is, nearly all metaphors inherit the Event Structure Metaphor which characterizes events in terms of motion in space. If we define the relationships that can exist between metaphors by their mutual inheritance of higher-level structures, then there is nearly always a way to relate metaphors to one another, if by nothing else, then by their mutual inheritance of the Event Structure Metaphor.

If, on the other hand, we define the relationships that can exist between metaphors in terms of the primary metaphor(s) that they either do or do not share, then nearly all metaphors and their relationships to each other are put in an entirely new light. Based on Figure 1.1, we can say that the metaphorical expressions in Psa. 119:28 are related to all other metaphorical expressions that share the primary metaphor FUNCTIONALITY/VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS; their relationships are defined by this shared structure. This results in an analytical generalization that groups the metaphorical expressions in Psa. 119:28 with those of Job 21:26 (6) and Gen. 9:9 (7) based on the fact that they share the primary

metaphor FUNCTIONALITY/VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS. Since Psa. 119:28 also reflects the primary metaphor HAPPY IS UP<sup>6 7</sup> (or its negative construal), a relationship can be drawn between the metaphorical expressions of Psa. 119:28 and other metaphorical expressions such as Psa. 130:1 (8) that reflect HAPPY IS UP (or its negative construal).

- (6) יָחַד עַל־עָפָר יִשְׁכְּבוּ וְרִמָּה תִכְסֶה עֲלֵיהֶם:  
Job 21:26: They *lie down* alike in the dust, and the worms cover them.
- (7) וְאֲנִי הִנְנִי מְקִים אֶת־בְּרִיתִי אִתְּכֶם וְאֶת־וְרֵעֵכֶם אֶחְרִיכֶם:  
Gen. 9:9: “Behold, I *establish* [(*make upright*)] my covenant with you and your offspring after you,”
- (8) מִמַּעְמְקֵי קְרִאתֶיךָ יְהוָה:  
Psa. 130:1: Out of *the depths* I cry to you, O LORD!

While King’s analysis cannot see any connection<sup>8</sup> between *establishing* (*making upright*) a covenant in Gen. 9:9 קום *qwm* ‘to make upright’ in the hiphil and the psalmist’s plea that God *make him stand upright* in Psa. 119:28 קום *qwm* ‘to make someone get up’, Primary Metaphor Theory suggests a tight relationship between the two on the basis of the shared primary metaphor FUNCTIONALITY/VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS.

## 1.5 Orientation to the research and its methodology

Steen (2007) suggested that ideal research on metaphor will focus on one of eight areas. These areas are defined by the intersection of three two-way distinctions: grammar vs. usage, language vs. thought, and symbol vs. behavior.

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<sup>6</sup> The term UP here and elsewhere refers to VERTICAL ELEVATION. The same can be said for SPATIAL VERTICALITY, THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE, HEIGHT, and BEING ABOVE.

<sup>7</sup> This metaphor is discussed briefly in §5.5.1.

<sup>8</sup> Except at the level of the Event Structure Metaphor or some unmentioned level between that and Level 2 EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE IS BEING IN A SPATIAL LOCATION.

When cognitive-linguistically inspired researchers of language investigate metaphor, they typically do so by looking at language as either grammar or usage. Moreover, they have to make a choice in focusing on metaphor in grammar or usage as either language, analyzing linguistic forms, or thought, examining conceptual structures, or both. And finally, they have a further choice in adopting either a sign-oriented, symbolic perspective on metaphor, or a behavior-oriented, social-scientific perspective on the processes and products of metaphor in cognition. (Steen 2007: 13)

To a large extent, this thesis investigates metaphor in grammar as thought—it examines entrenched or conventionalized conceptual structures. It does this with a sign-oriented, symbolic perspective—its focus is not on cognitive processing with human subjects, but on the content and identity of conceptual structures developed in theoretical systems such as Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Primary Metaphor Theory.

This thesis applies Primary Metaphor Theory to a set of metaphorical expressions from King’s corpus. However, its focus is not on the expressions themselves; instead, it is on better describing the conceptual structures that motivate those expressions. While a better description of conceptual structure would normally flow from a closer look at linguistic data, this thesis instead takes advantage of the way that Primary Metaphor Theory has already refined the framework of Conceptual Metaphor Theory—influencing one’s view on the organization of conceptual structure—then applying Primary Metaphor Theory to King’s data, and seeing the influence it has on the analysis of his data.

Steen brings out another important methodological distinction. He says,

[I]t is of methodological importance that researchers decide either that the analysis fixes the language data and then explores which conceptual structures may be related to it (the ‘semasiological’ route), or that it fixes the conceptual metaphors and then looks for potential linguistic expressions (the ‘onomasiological’ route). (Steen 2007: 15)



Following Steen's distinction between the semasiological and onomasiological routes to analysis, it is notable that King's original analysis of metaphors for distress in Classical Hebrew took the onomasiological route; he searched his corpus for instances of specific image schemas (VERTICALITY, CONSTRAINT, and FORCE) that mapped onto the specific target concept of DISTRESS. My thesis seeks to improve the predetermined categories of conceptual structure into which metaphorical linguistic expressions from King's corpus are placed. I use Primary Metaphor Theory to make this improvement with the anticipation that future research will complement this move with a more semasiological approach (e.g., looking at all the uses of *מד* 'to stand' and describing its metaphorical uses and the hypothesized conceptual structure that would motivate them).

Three stages of research are commonly identified. These are data collection, data analysis, and interpretation of the findings (see Steen 2007: 4). In this thesis, I have chosen simply to reanalyze data that King had already collected. Methods for systematically gathering data such as MIPVU (Metaphor Identification Procedure, Vrije Universiteit) (Steen et al. 2010) were unnecessary. My method for analyzing the data, though primitive, is the simple assignment of individual metaphorical expressions to the categories provided by Primary Metaphor Theory. Finally, the interpretation of my findings again falls to Primary Metaphor Theory as the interpretive framework.

## **1.6 Overview**

Following the present introductory chapter, chapter two introduces Conceptual Metaphor Theory and highlights key features particular to King's adaptation of it. Chapter three reviews Primary Metaphor Theory. I have adopted Grady's theoretical framework in

its major components. In particular, I have given special attention to four specific notions from Grady's work (1997a; 1997a: 100, 101-112; 1997b; 2000: 342) listed below in (9).

- (9) a. Primary metaphors and the primary scenes from which they arise
- b. The unification of primary metaphors into complex metaphors
- c. The free specification of metaphorical source and target concepts
- d. The way that cognition is built on fundamental local processes

Grady's perspective on conceptual structure guides much of my thinking.

Chapter four briefly summarizes the findings of King's research on Classical Hebrew metaphors that map VERTICALITY onto DISTRESS.

Chapter five highlights key theoretical differences between Lakoff (1993) and Lakoff & Johnson (1999) on the one hand and Primary Metaphor Theory on the other hand. Since King (2012) leans explicitly on Lakoff (1993) and Lakoff & Johnson (1999), I also show that the same differences already observed between Lakoff & Johnson and Primary Metaphor Theory can also be observed between King's (2012) framework and the framework of Primary Metaphor Theory.

For this reason, the first part of chapter five highlights problems with hierarchical structure within Lakoff (1993) and Lakoff & Johnson's (1999) framework and how King's analysis (set within their framework) suffers the same problems. After highlighting problems with King's account, the latter part of the chapter constructively builds a new analysis based on Grady's Primary Metaphor Theory (e.g., 1997a). In so doing, I present

my case for dividing King's VERTICAL scale into the two concepts VERTICAL ELEVATION and UPRIGHTNESS<sup>9</sup> while discarding the higher-level, unifying structure of VERTICALITY.

Chapter six revisits metaphorical expressions from King (2012), reconsidering some of the same data that he considered, but this time in light of a slightly different organization of conceptual structure. Chapter seven summarizes the argument of the thesis, the implications of the research, and future directions.

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<sup>9</sup> These two concepts are equivalent to spatial VERTICALITY and postural VERTICALITY respectively.

## CHAPTER 2

### CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR THEORY

#### 2.1 Conceptual Metaphor Theory

Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) was initially developed in Lakoff and Johnson's book *Metaphors We Live By* (1980/2003). Subsequently, Lakoff, Johnson, and many others have sharpened and developed the theory in many ways. A key feature of the theory is its stance on the conceptual nature of metaphor. According to CMT, metaphorical *thought* gives rise to metaphorical expressions in speakers, and metaphorical expressions prompt for metaphorical *thought* in hearers. Metaphor is a conceptual phenomenon. Ultimately, the conceptual nature of metaphor is defined by mappings that exist at the conceptual level between two concepts, a source concept and a target concept.

Kövecses (2005: 5-8) outlines CMT in a fairly standard form<sup>10</sup> by introducing eleven important components. Areas of divergence from standard CMT will be introduced throughout this thesis. The eleven components are as follows:

1. Source domain
2. Target domain
3. Experiential basis
4. Neural structures corresponding to (1) and (2) in the brain
5. Relationships between the source and the target
6. Metaphorical linguistic expressions
7. Mappings
8. Entailments
9. Blends
10. Nonlinguistic realizations
11. Cultural models

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<sup>10</sup> As I understand it, standard CMT tends to follow closely with theoretical works by Lakoff, Johnson, and Kövecses, especially Lakoff and Johnson (1980/2003, 1999), Lakoff and Turner (1989), Lakoff (1993), and Kövecses (2002, 2010).

(Kövecses 2005: 5)

A classic example illustrating these components of CMT is the conceptual metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY (Lakoff 1993). Following (1) and (2) above, theorists claim that A JOURNEY is a concrete source domain structuring our knowledge of the abstract target domain of LOVE. Evidence gathered to support the claim include coherent metaphorical expressions such as *Look how far we've come* or *We're at a crossroads* as applied to a romantic relationship.

This mapping of JOURNEYS onto ROMANTIC RELATIONSHIPS has an experiential basis (3). Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 60-73) trace the conceptual metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY back to a set of correlations in experience that together constitute its experiential basis. These experiences correlate a sensorimotor aspect of a scene with a subjective judgment. They give rise to conceptual mappings called primary metaphors which can be unified to form complex metaphors such as LOVE IS A JOURNEY. The primary metaphors constituting LOVE IS A JOURNEY are as follows: PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS, ACTIONS ARE MOTIONS, A RELATIONSHIP IS AN ENCLOSURE,<sup>11</sup> and INTIMACY IS CLOSENESS. The primary metaphor PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS arises from the primary experience of “[r]eaching destinations throughout everyday life and thereby achieving purposes (e.g., if you want a drink, you have to go to the water cooler)” (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 53). Similar experiences give rise to the other primary metaphors underlying LOVE IS A JOURNEY. We could potentially rephrase the individual primary metaphor mappings as PURPOSEFUL

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<sup>11</sup> The kind of correlation in experience that Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 53) claim gives rise to RELATIONSHIPS ARE ENCLOSURES does not cohere with Grady's (1997a: 139) original description of primary metaphor. Instead, Grady et al. (1996: 185) suggest that RELATIONSHIPS ARE CONTAINERS is a complex metaphor composed of three different individual primary metaphor mappings.

ACTION IN THE CONTEXT OF AN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP IS MOTION TOWARD A DESTINATION WITH A COMPANION IN A SMALL VEHICLE, or more simply LOVE IS A JOURNEY/ROAD TRIP.

Neural structures (4) corresponding to the domain of JOURNEYS are associated with those corresponding to the domain of LOVE. When one set of neural structures is activated, the other is activated as well.

Furthermore, some publications (especially Kövecses 2000, 2002, 2005, 2010) have given attention to various relationships that can exist between source and target (5). For example, Kövecses (2005: 121-23) claims that the “range” of a target domain is the set of source domains used to structure it. Conversely, the “scope” of any specific source domain is the set of target domains that it structures. For some speakers, it may be that LOVE is structured, not only by the JOURNEY domain, but also by the BUSINESS domain with two business partners. This illustrates what may constitute the range of the target domain of LOVE. On the other hand, the JOURNEY domain may structure, not only LOVE, but also LIFE, A CAREER, and so forth. These domains constitute the scope of the source domain of JOURNEYS. Thus, in an important respect, the relationship that exists between the source domain of JOURNEYS and the target domain of LOVE is the simple observation that the JOURNEY domain structures several target domains including LOVE in a comparable way, and that LOVE is structured by more domains than just that of JOURNEYS.

Metaphorical conceptual structures (i.e., conceptual metaphors) give rise to metaphorical linguistic expression (6). The choice of words or phrases used to give expression to metaphorical thought is not a determined feature of the conceptual mapping, but word choice does frequently contribute viewpoint, evaluation, and sociolinguistic

information to the utterance. Metaphorically used words or phrases are called metaphorical (linguistic) expressions.

Once two domains have been conceptually linked as metaphorical source and target, the various participants, parts, stages, linear sequence, causation, and purpose within each domain (see Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 77-86) can be construed as counterparts and mappings (7) can be formed. Kövecses gives the following example:

Conceptual metaphor:

LOVE IS A JOURNEY

Mappings:

travelers → lovers

vehicle → love relationship

destination → purpose of the relationship

distance covered → progress made in the relationship

obstacles along the way → difficulties encountered in the relationship

(Kövecses 2005: 6)

Entailments (8) can result from the elaboration of the scene prompted for by the conceptual metaphor and its mappings. Inferences drawn from the elaborated scene are also mapped onto the target domain. Thus, if the romantic relationship is conceptualized as a sinking ship, then the conceptualizer can naturally infer that the lovers need to get out of the relationship on their own or else face an even more tragic end.

The notion of a metaphoric blend (9) is borrowed from Fauconnier and Turner's Conceptual Integration Theory (e.g., 2002). The most salient contribution of this notion is the fact that both source and target can contribute elements to the final metaphorical image or scene. In fact, when conceptualizing a romantic relationship as a sinking ship, it is quite natural to conclude that the ideal action on the part of the lovers is to get out of the relationship rather than to sink with the ship. However, the logic of jumping ship only

works in the target domain. The treacherous waters that may be outside the ship in the source domain may be completely ignored in the reasoning process. This is because, drawing from the target domain, the marked state of the lovers is that they are *in* a relationship with each other. The unmarked, default relationship status is that they are not dating, but single. Thus, not being in the ship means everything is normal regardless of what that would mean if the source imagery were elaborated further. In addition to many imagistic and logical features of the source domain in this example, we have seen the projection of a feature of attention from the target domain into the metaphoric blend, thus affecting the overall logic. The integration of blending with CMT is a theoretical question under discussion (e.g., Grady et al. 1999; Grady 2005a; Kövecses 2002, 2010; Dancygier and Sweetser 2014), but it is generally accepted as complementary. In Primary Metaphor Theory, the process of unification by which multiple primary metaphors are unified to form a single complex metaphor can easily be interpreted as an instance of blending such as posited in Conceptual Integration Theory.

Conceptual metaphors can be “off-loaded” (see Gibbs 1999) into the culture and realized non-linguistically (10). Social structures and behaviors can reflect conceptual metaphors and so can the material culture. A possible example from the Hebrew Bible of a non-linguistic realization of the metaphor VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS is found in Gen. 31:51-52 when Laban refers to a pillar that he has set up representing a covenant between him and Jacob. Presumably, the upright orientation of the pillar metaphorically represents the viability of the covenant, that the covenant is in effect. The pillar would not serve its metaphorical purpose if the pillar were placed horizontally on the ground.



Finally, Kövecses (2005: 7) describes cultural models (11) as “culturally specific mental representations of aspects of the world” (see also Evans 2007: 23). Consider our cultural model for the concept TIME. Kövecses states, “[O]ur cultural model of time is based on (created by) the conceptual metaphor TIME IS A MOVING ENTITY” (Kövecses 2005: 8). Part of Kövecses’ point here is that our concept for TIME does not exist independent of a metaphor that structures it. Our knowledge of MOVING ENTITIES constitutes and even *creates* our knowledge of TIME in some important way (see Kövecses 1999, 2005: 193-228; Grady 2005b: 41-44). While we may have ways that we experience time directly, central aspects of our knowledge about TIME are irreducibly metaphorical. Thus, our cultural model for TIME is at least partially constituted by a set of conceptual metaphors.

## **2.2 Conceptual Metaphor Theory in King (2012)**

The eleven basic components identified by Kövecses (2005: 5-8) remain intact in King’s (2012) research. However, emphases do differ between them. Both King and Kövecses are concerned with areas of cultural variation in metaphor. As I will show below, King appears to be more sensitive to the ways in which the experiential bases of metaphor are culturally situated. This difference plausibly accounts for the way that King uses the experiential bases of metaphor as the primary tool for the organization, analysis, and presentation of his data.

King organizes his discussion of distress metaphors around embodied experiences, specifically image schemas and primary metaphors. Johnson defines an image schema as “a recurring, dynamic pattern of our perceptual interactions and motor programs that gives coherence and structure to our experience” (Johnson 1987: xiv). For example, regarding the embodied basis for the UP-DOWN (or VERTICALITY) image schema, Evans comments,

[G]ravity ensures that unsupported objects fall to the ground; given the asymmetry of the vertical axis, we have to stoop to pick up fallen objects, look in one direction (downwards) for fallen objects, and in another (upwards) for rising objects. In other words, our physiology ensures that our vertical axis, which interacts with gravity, gives rise to meaning as a result of how we interact with our environment. (Evans 2007: 106)

Thus, it is claimed that the image schematic concept labeled VERTICALITY arises from a set of recurring experiences that are saliently structured according to the vertical axis.

Image schemas are one kind of experiential structure King uses to organize the metaphors he discusses. King categorizes metaphorical expressions for DISTRESS according to the image schema(s) that the metaphorical expression reflects, whether VERTICALITY, CONSTRAINT, or FORCE. Thus, a set of metaphorical expressions for DISTRESS from King's corpus reflect VERTICALITY and are grouped together, analyzed together, and presented together (King 2012: 99-139). Another set of metaphorical expressions for DISTRESS from King's corpus reflect CONSTRAINT; they too are grouped together, analyzed together, and presented together (King 2012: 140-209). The same can be said for the FORCE image schema (King 2012: 210-88). King's organization of his data according to the specific image schemas that they reflect demonstrates the impressive ability that image schemas have to divide up metaphorical expressions into coherent groups.

Other metaphorical expressions in King's data are categorized according to the primary metaphor(s) that they reflect. King follows Lakoff and Johnson who describe primary metaphor as being "grounded in the everyday experience that links our sensory-motor experience to the domain of our subjective judgments" (2003: 255). In other words, sensory-motor experiences and our subject judgments regarding those experiences are repeatedly correlated in local, goal-oriented scenes. These correlations in experience give rise to primary metaphor. King identifies primary metaphors such as BEING IN DISTRESS IS

BEING LOW ON THE POSTURAL SCALE (2012: 126) along with BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING IN A DARK PLACE (2012: 307) and EXPERIENCING DISTRESS IS TASTING BITTER FOOD (2012: 97). As regards the primary metaphor BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING LOW ON THE POSTURAL SCALE (King 2012: 126), it arises from the repeated sensory-motor experience of being less than fully upright correlated with our subjective judgment (or emotion) of being in distress.

In sum, King organizes the metaphorical expressions for DISTRESS from his corpus around two kinds of bodily experiences—image schemas (VERTICALITY, CONSTRAINT, and FORCE) and primary metaphors (subjective judgments correlating with experiences of DARKNESS and BAD TASTE). For King, the relationships that exist between otherwise disparate metaphorical expressions are defined by the embodied experiences that they reflect.

Regarding these embodied experiences, Kimmel observes,

The cognitive linguistic mainstream to date retains a relatively a-cultural take on how basic cognitive forms emerge from embodiment (Sinha 1999). What looms large are universal patterns of bodily experience [(i.e., those that give rise to image schemas and primary metaphors)] that developmentally prefigure conceptual discourse. (Kimmel 2005: 297)

But both Kimmel and King are interested in understanding cultural variation as well. While Kövecses (e.g., 2005: 11-12), in an effort to comprehend cultural variation in metaphor, moves his attention away from embodied experiences, Kimmel does the opposite and zeroes in on embodied experiences, showing how they are situated culturally and how they arise in culturally motivated compounds, that is, groupings of image schemas. King reflects on his own research, saying, “Kimmel’s concept of compound image schema was significant here in directing attention not just to the canonical universal image schema but also to the way they have been specifically consolidated in the Hebrew language” (King

2012: 362). Thus, the experiential basis of metaphor takes a central role in King's application of CMT.

## CHAPTER 3

### PRIMARY METAPHOR THEORY

#### 3.1 Primary Metaphor Theory

This chapter surveys Primary Metaphor Theory (PMT)<sup>12</sup> which is Grady's version of CMT. It critiques and refines CMT as it had been described in Lakoff (1993) and Lakoff & Johnson (1980) among others.<sup>13</sup> Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 19-21) briefly discuss the experiential bases of metaphor. They comment on their "ignorance in this matter" (19) while at the same time pointing out the central role of experiential grounding in any adequate representation of metaphor. They say, "*In actuality we feel that no metaphor can ever be comprehended or even adequately represented independently of its experiential basis*" (19). Grady's (1997a) work on primary metaphors develops Lakoff and Johnson's (1980: 19-21) notion of correlated experiences as it seeks a robust definition of the experiential bases underlying metaphor.

It is important to note that both Lakoff & Johnson and Grady claim that their conceptual structures arise from bodily experiences.<sup>14</sup> As I see it, Lakoff and Johnson's original claim regarding the experiential basis of metaphor is simply comprehended more fully within Grady's framework. This is because he maintains a logical connection between

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<sup>12</sup> The name Primary Metaphor Theory comes from Grady and Ascoli (2017: 29). Its unique name reflects the unique status it has in relation to CMT. Dancygier and Sweetser also recognize its unique status and call it Experiential Correlation Theory (2014: 25). In the same vein, Steen describes it as a "major theoretical and empirical upheaval" (2007: 37).

<sup>13</sup> Lakoff and Johnson (2003: 243-74) later explicitly align themselves with Grady on several important points. Nevertheless, I am not aware of them having analyzed any conceptual metaphors within a conscientiously PMT framework.

<sup>14</sup> Kövecses notably moves away from this claim.

the independent experiential bases for primary metaphors and their corresponding independent statuses in our minds allowing the experiential bases to drive the formation of the entire analytical framework.

To begin, Grady noted certain inadequacies in Lakoff and Johnson's earlier analyses of conceptual metaphors. Among other test cases, Grady holds up Lakoff and Johnson's (1980: 46, 52-53) proposed conceptual metaphor THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS to the scrutiny of the claim that it must be grounded in some kind of correlated experience. THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS is expressed in example sentences such as *The theory needs more support*, *The argument is shaky*, and *These facts are the brick and mortar of my theory* (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 46, 53). But theories and buildings do not co-occur in our experience in any kind of salient, repeated, local, and goal-oriented scene. Grady concludes, "There is no relevant experiential correlation of these domains, as there is for quantity and height" (1997a: 41).

Furthermore, Grady applies a deductive logic to Lakoff and Johnson's THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS metaphor. Steen summarizes his logic in the form of a *modus ponens* argument:

If theories are buildings, then theories have windows  
Theories are buildings  
THEREFORE  
Theories have windows  
(Steen 2007: 38)

But, as Grady points out, a sentence like *This theory has French windows* is not readily interpretable (Grady 1997a: 40). The deduction that says that theories have windows does not hold to be true in actual fact, a point that Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 52; cf. Steen 2007: 38) also recognize. Grady concludes, "Only a very limited subset of our basic knowledge

about buildings is called upon by this metaphor, and we may well wonder just how this subset is defined, or whether it is arbitrary” (Grady 1997a: 41). For Grady, the partial nature of the mappings of one domain onto another is theoretically problematic.

Finally, Grady pointed out that “the same terms which apply to theories seem to apply to various other target domains as well, and with very parallel meanings” (1997a: 42). Not only is it felicitous to talk about facts being the *brick and mortar* of a theory, but with equal felicity, we can speak of kindness being the *brick and mortar* of civilized society, or of efficiency being the *brick and mortar* of a company. Expressions previously associated with the mapping of BUILDINGS onto THEORIES clearly participate in mappings to other domains as well. According to Grady, examples such as these “call into question the status of THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS as a distinct cognitive object” (1997a: 42).

This same descriptive issue can easily be repeated in Classical Hebrew. Consider Isa. 1:8:

(10) וְנוֹתְרָה בְּתִצִּיּוֹן כְּסֻכָּה בְּכַרְם כְּמִלוּנָה בְּמִקְשָׁה כְּעֵיר נְצוּרָה:

Isa. 1:8: And the daughter of Zion is left like *a booth in a vineyard*, like *a lodge in a cucumber field*, like *a besieged city*.<sup>15</sup>

A booth, a lodge, and a besieged city are all specific examples of structures that will not remain upright or viable for long. Varying levels of specificity might propose themselves to us from sentence (10). Lakoff (1993: 211-12) suggests that metaphorical mappings should be described at the superordinate level. For example, a building or structure is a

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<sup>15</sup> Sentence (10) contains similes. While it is common to distinguish metaphor from simile on the basis of the word ‘like’, this distinction is not relevant for the examples in this thesis. Rather, I have regarded simile as a subset of metaphor. Both metaphors and similes involve similar conceptual structure in that they both map a source concept onto a target concept. For an exposition of the nature and function of simile, see Croft and Cruse (2004: 211-16).

superordinate category that includes basic level categories such as booths, lodges, huts, city walls, towers, fortresses, etc. (see Lakoff 1993: 211). Following this suggestion, we could either propose the hypothetical metaphor VIABLE POLITICAL ENTITIES ARE UPRIGHT BUILDINGS or perhaps simply POLITICAL ENTITIES ARE BUILDINGS. This latter metaphor is particularly attractive in light of passages such as 2 Sam. 7:11-16 which refers repeatedly to David's kingdom as a house.<sup>16</sup>

The problem we face with this proposal, however, is that metaphorical expressions evoking the BUILDING domain can be applied to more domains than simply that of POLITICAL ENTITIES. For example, literally speaking, houses (Ezra 3:12) and temples (Isa. 44:12) can *have their foundations laid* (יָסַד *yāsad* and נִסְּדָה *nōsad* respectively). This same terminology can be used metaphorically in that a political entity can *be founded*, that is, it can be enabled to exist. This is what we see in Exod. 9:18 where we see that Egypt *was founded* (נִסְּדָה *nōsad*) in a metaphorical sense. Yet in addition to mapping יָסַד *yāsad* 'to lay foundations' and נִסְּדָה *nōsad* 'to be founded' from the BUILDING domain to the domain of POLITICAL ENTITIES, we find mappings to other domains as well. One instance of this is in Psa. 119:152 where we find that testimonies or precepts are also able to *be founded* (יָסַד *yāsad*). All of this leads us to conclude that the conceptual metaphor POLITICAL ENTITIES ARE BUILDINGS is too specific.<sup>17</sup> A more satisfying representation of metaphorical conceptual structure will account for the breadth of use of conventional metaphorical expressions.

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<sup>16</sup> See Grady (1997b: 279-84) for an informative discussion on metaphors that have 'house' as the metaphorically used lexical item.

<sup>17</sup> POLITICAL ENTITIES ARE BUILDINGS would also demonstrate the problems of poor mappings and a lack of experiential motivation as discussed in Grady et al. (1996: 177-79), Grady (1997a: 81-82; 1997b: 270-71), etc.



In sum, Grady pointed out three problems with the older account of metaphor: (1) conceptual metaphors such as THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS lack experiential bases; (2) the mappings between the domains of THEORIES and BUILDINGS are partial, not all elements in the BUILDING domain are mapped onto the THEORIES domain; and (3) the expressions that supposedly instantiate the conceptual metaphor THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS also instantiate mappings to other target domains, “and with very parallel meanings” (Grady 1997a: 42). Together, these problems “call into question the status of THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS as a distinct cognitive object” (Grady 1997a: 42).

In answer to these issues, Grady proposes an analysis based on primary metaphors. These are mappings between concepts that emerge in our patterns of thinking through correlated experiences. We see an example of this in APPEALING IS TASTY in which the experience of tasting and then our affective evaluation of that taste correlate again and again in what Grady calls a primary scene. “[P]rimary scenes are minimal(temporally-delimited) episodes of subjective experience, characterized by tight correlations between physical circumstance and cognitive response” (Grady 1997a: 24).

The kinds of experiences that give rise to primary metaphors in Grady’s framework are local, “temporally-delimited” episodes. They “take no more than a ‘moment’ to unfold” (Grady 1997a: 71). While the primary scenes motivating APPEALING IS TASTY may occur in the context of a meal at home or in a restaurant, each with their associated scripts, the primary scene itself is not constrained to the meal-at-home frame or to the restaurant frame. Ultimately, the frames in which the primary scenes occur are markedly less salient or relevant (taken as whole units) to our goals than the local, momentary experience (see especially Grady 1997a; 1997a: 100, 101-12; 1997b; 2000: 342).

The conceptual links between the concepts APPEALING and TASTY arising from repeated, correlated experiences motivate expressions such as *Even the thought of going about it that way leaves a bad taste in my mouth* (Grady 1997a: 292). VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS is another example of a primary metaphor, one that we have already discussed above. In both cases, the source concepts (TASTY and UPRIGHTNESS) consist of sensorimotor experiences. Tasting is self-evidently a sensory experience; UPRIGHTNESS is something we perceive visually as well as something we experience in our bodily posture. As for the target concepts APPEALING and VIABILITY, they both consist of internal, subjective judgments in response to sensorimotor experiences.

Primary *target* concepts stand out more for what they are not than for what they are. They are non-sensory and they lack “image content” (i.e., sensorimotor content). For Grady, primary target concepts are the “mental dimension” of a primary scene (Grady 1997a: 88), they are “our cognitive response to the world” (Grady 1999: 84), they are “responses to sensory input” (Grady 1997a: 229); one way of characterizing this notion is to say that they have “response” content (Grady 1997a: 229; 1997b; 2005b: 1606). Grady’s original bullet-pointed list characterizing primary target concepts is as follows:

- They lack image content [(i.e., sensorimotor content)]—or are, at least, less tied to image content than corresponding source concepts are.
  - They refer to basic units or parameters of cognitive function, at or just below levels to which we have direct conscious access.
- (Grady 1997a: 152)

Much more can be said about primary *source* concepts. Consider Grady’s bullet-pointed list characterizing primary source concepts:

- Primary source concepts have “image content”—they are related to bodily sensation and perception (in any modality).
- This image content is at a particular, “schematic” level of specificity.

- Primary source concepts refer to “simple” experiences rather than complexes of more basic scenes and concepts. Like the primary scenes in which they figure, these are experiences which take no more than a “moment” to unfold.
  - These experiences relate in predictable ways to our goals and goal-oriented actions.
  - They are “self-contained” enough to be distinct, salient components of goal-oriented scenes.
  - Primary source concepts must (plausibly) refer to universal elements of human experience.
  - Primary source concepts are relational. They do not include things, such as dogs or trees.
- (Grady 1997a: 139)

The second bullet point states that the image content (i.e., sensorimotor content) is “at a particular, ‘schematic’ level of specificity.” We can see the significance of this when we recognize that if the metaphor is proposed at too high of a level of generality, then the metaphor loses its distinct, consistent semantic content. UPRIGHTNESS (e.g., *The record still stands* (Grady 1997a: 282)) has metaphorical associations distinct from VERTICAL ELEVATION (e.g., *at the height of his career*). Although both concepts are positive, joining them together under the one heading of VERTICALITY fails to account for the consistent, non-overlapping semantic patterns that they exemplify. On the other hand, if the metaphor is proposed at too specific of a level, then we lose our ability to generalize over the relevant data. THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS accounts for *the foundation of a theoretical argument* but fails to take into account *the foundation of society*.

The theory of primary metaphors argues persuasively for a principled determination of the schematic level proposed for any conceptual structure reflected in metaphorical expressions. Specifically, proposed conceptual structure must be traceable back to correlations in experience having the characteristics of primary scenes.

Grady (2005b: 1605-07) points out that not just any correlation in experience leads to metaphoric associations. Instead, the two correlated dimensions of the experiential scene

must meet the following conditions: (1) One dimension must be sensory (leading to the source concept) and the other non-sensory (leading to the target concept). See above for descriptions of source and target concepts. (2) They must share superschematic structure. Grady (2005b: 1606) elaborates, “The two correlated concepts must also be construable as having the same highly schematic structure. For instance, they must both be construable as states (viability-erect posture), as scalar properties (bright-happy), as temporal relations (inside X-member of category X), [etc.] ...” While superschemas are highly schematic structures such as scalar properties and states, primary scenes usually instantiate very specific scalar properties and specific states. The two correlated dimensions of the experiential scene must share the higher-level structure. (3) They also must covary. Producers and products frequently correlate in our experiences. But if the product ceases to exist, the producer is typically unaffected. Correlations in experience that do not covary may motivate metonymies but do not motivate metaphor.

Within Grady’s framework, primary metaphors are able to be unified with each other forming complex metaphors. A classic example of this is the unification of VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS with LOGICAL ORGANIZATION IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE. When unified, these primary metaphors become the complex metaphor VIABLE LOGICAL ORGANIZATION IS UPRIGHT PHYSICAL STRUCTURE. This complex metaphor may motivate sentences such as *We need some more facts or the argument will fall apart*, *The argument collapsed*, and *We will show that theory to be without foundation* (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 46).

Finally, primary and complex metaphors are able to be freely specified. As they stand, they are fairly schematic units of conceptual structure. They may optionally specify or “pick out” richer and more specific instantiations of the schematic concept. UPRIGHTNESS

may pick out the more specific concept TREE. It is theoretically possible that UPRIGHT PHYSICAL STRUCTURE may pick out BUILDING and VIABLE LOGICAL ORGANIZATION may pick out THEORY resulting in the conceptual metaphor THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS. Free specification of the source concept UPRIGHTNESS is apparently what motivates the specific upright structures mentioned in sentence (10) (Isa. 1:8) above.

Figure 3.1 illustrates the relationships between perceptual experiences, concepts, and language as they relate to primary metaphors.<sup>18</sup> Primary scenes (correlations in perceptual experiences) give rise to primary metaphors (concepts), which give rise to metaphorical expressions from the speaker. When the hearer hears a metaphorical expression, that expression prompts the hearer to reconstruct the conceptual structure (i.e., the primary metaphor) that originally gave rise to that metaphorical expression.




Figure 3.1. Perceptual experience, concepts, and metaphorical expressions

Figures 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate specific details that may exist in the primary metaphor box from Figure 3.1. Figure 3.2 illustrates a primary metaphor that has not been specified,

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<sup>18</sup> The structure of Figure 3.1 is inspired by Figure 1.2 in Evans (2019: 7).

it has not picked out a specific instantiation of its source concept UPRIGHTNESS. Figure 3.3 illustrates a primary metaphor whose source concept has been specified conceptually, it has picked out BUILDINGS as a specific instantiation of UPRIGHTNESS. The boxes should not be read as categories illustrating inclusion; instead, the primary source concept (represented by the inner box) specifies a concept richer and more specific than itself (represented by the outer box).

<u>Source</u>	→	<u>Target</u>	<u>Grounding</u>
UPRIGHTNESS		VIABILITY	{Experiences with objects (including our own bodies) where erectness [(i.e., uprightness)] correlates with functionality, health} (Grady 1997a: 68)

Figure 3.2. Binding table: Primary metaphor (VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS)




Figure 3.3. Binding table: Specification of primary source concept (VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS)

### 3.2 Conclusion

Grady’s theory of primary metaphors stands out, not only for providing a more robust definition of the experiential bases underlying metaphor, but also for giving the experience-types that give rise to primary metaphors a central role in structuring all metaphorical thought and language. For Grady et al., “All metaphors either are, or are

composed of, primitives [(i.e., primary metaphors)]” (1996: 185). In the same vein, Grady complains that “complex domains have continually been referred to as though they, and not the more basic domains which structured them, were the source of the terms and concepts which were mapped by metaphorical processes” (1997a: 56). This is the issue that he addressed in his decomposition of THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS into the two primary metaphors VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS and LOGICAL ORGANIZATION IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE.

## CHAPTER 4

### VERTICALITY IN KING (2012)

This chapter briefly summarizes the findings of King's research on Classical Hebrew metaphors that map VERTICALITY onto DISTRESS.

#### 4.1 Universal factors affecting VERTICALITY

In his discussion of the VERTICALITY image schema, King (2012: 100) observes that “all humans experience gravity and, from infancy, unconsciously employ numerous processes to stay upright against it.” Culture-specific instantiations of VERTICALITY that would fit an ancient setting include “drawing water from a well; building a wall; or forming a mental image of a tent pole” (100). However, note that drawing water from a well instantiates spatial VERTICALITY (aka VERTICAL ELEVATION) whereas building a wall and forming a mental image of a tent pole more likely instantiate UPRIGHTNESS.

King cites Cienki (1998: 111) and Johnson (1987: 122-23) who suggest that the image schemas STRAIGHT, BALANCE, and SCALE regularly co-occur with VERTICALITY. The SCALE schema is significant. First, it is relevant to consider whether or not it co-occurs at all, especially with UPRIGHTNESS (King argues that it does (2012: 129)). Second, it is helpful to recognize whether or not the SCALE is bounded with end-points. A bounded scale seems more likely to occur with UPRIGHTNESS while an unbounded scale seems more likely to occur with VERTICAL ELEVATION.

King also considers whether or not there are any values (positive or negative) attached to different ends of the VERTICAL SCALE. “Although Hampe questions whether values inhere in the primitive VERTICALITY image schema or just in specific embodied



instantiations of it [(Hampe 2005: 106)], this chapter [(i.e., King 2012: 99-139)] shows further contexts (the Hebrew conception of the universe and discourse of distress) in which ‘up’ is viewed positively and ‘down’ negatively” (King 2012: 101).

## 4.2 Culture-specific factors affecting VERTICALITY

In his discussion of culture-specific factors affecting the VERTICALITY image schema, King notes that it is difficult to discuss VERTICALITY in Classical Hebrew as though it were a single category without making the finer distinctions between spatial and postural VERTICALITY. He says, “The English word *up* in *he went up* and *he stood up* cognitively links erect posture and spatial upward movement. There is no comparable word in Hebrew, with only derivatives of רוּם [rwm] ‘to be high’ used in both spatial and postural domains” (King 2012: 102). For this reason, he divides his discussion between spatial and postural VERTICALITY while maintaining that they are two special cases of the more general structure BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE (133).

Regarding spatial VERTICALITY, his discussion of the way this image schema is situated culturally centers around the Hebrew conception of the universe. Here he describes the prototypical location of cosmological places such as שָׁמַיִם *šāmayim* ‘heaven, sky’ at the top of the scale down to שְׁאוֹל *š’ol* ‘Sheol’ at the bottom. Between the extreme ends of the scale are located tangible places such as mountains, valleys, and so forth. See King 2012: 102-08 for a full discussion. Finally, King observes that the basic-level verbs for moving up and down on the spatial verticality scale are עלה *lh* ‘to go up’ and ירד *yrd* ‘to go down’ respectively.

King (2012: 108-10) focuses his description of postural VERTICALITY around lexical items that prototypically prompt for it. Basic verbs for moving up or down the postural scale include קום *qwm* ‘to get up’ for moving up the scale and שכב *škb* ‘to lie down’ (if intentional)

and *npl* ‘to fall’ (if unintentional) for moving down the scale. Other lexical items describing involuntary movement down the postural scale include *dehî* ‘stumbling’, *šl* ‘to limp, stumble’, and *šwl* ‘to be thrown down’ (in the hophal).

Verbs that describe a person assuming a particular posture include the following: “*hwh* [‘to bow down’] (in the ishtaphal) focuses posturally on bending over at the waist, prostrating oneself before gods in worship, before kings, or to show respect... *qdd* [‘to bow down’] often occurs with *hwh* [‘to bow down’], ...potentially highlighting putting the head to the ground, within the posture described above” (Kings 2012: 109). Also included are the verbs *kr* ‘to kneel, crouch’, *kpp* ‘to bend down’, *šhh* ‘to be bowed down’, and *šyh* ‘to bring down’. *šyh* ‘to bring down’ can also be associated with disintegration or dissolution. King (2012: 110) comments, “[M]elting, flowing, or spreading is potentially linked to being down, in that something that spreads out also decreases in height.”

### **4.3 Mappings and entailments for BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE**

At various places in King’s (2012: 99-139) chapter on VERTICALITY metaphors, he puts forward a total of six different renderings of VERTICALITY conceptual metaphors. King understands spatial and postural VERTICALITY to be related conceptually in some important ways (King 2012: 132). As I understand King’s position, spatial and postural VERTICALITY exist as two distinct metaphors that are special cases of the more general conceptual metaphor BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE (King 2012: 132-33); he refers to them as “sub-schemas” (King 2012: 133).

King’s corpus revealed that locations such as mountains, valleys, pits, mire, watery deeps, and so forth are salient and frequent instantiations of the spatial geographical scale. He states, “The most fundamental mapping here [(that is, as regards the spatial geographical scale)] is that EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE IS BEING IN A SPATIAL LOCATION” (King 2012: 114). Later, he gives BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING IN A LOW PLACE as a conceptual metaphor (125-26) which may highlight the fact that many instances of BEING DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE are construed as identifiable physical places.

After walking through a number of examples from his corpus, King presents the following summary of the mappings for BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE. This summary presents mappings of participants, causation, parts, stages, and linear sequence from the SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE to experiences of DISTRESS.

Position low on geographical scale (pit, Sheol, mighty waters)	→	Situation of distress (sickness, opposition)
Person in low position	→	Person in distress
(Agentive) cause of being low (God, hunters)	→	(Agentive) cause of distress (God, opponents)
Perceptual experience in low place (crashing waters, darkness)	→	Perceptual experience of distress (taunts of opponents)
(Vertical) proximity to Sheol	→	Likelihood of distress situation resulting in death

(King 2012: 122)

The cause of distress being God, hunters, and opponents, King observes that “[t]he petitioner neither desires nor has any control over his low position, highlighting external causes and hiding the lamenter’s own part in the situation” (2012: 119). He also notes that, “since the only indication of a downward trajectory occurs in the fixed idiom ירדו בור [yôrādê bôr ‘those who go down to the pit’], the ‘path’ part of the mapping is not as elaborated as in English, where verbs like *spiraling*, *nose-diving*, *crashing*, *sinking*, *going*

*downhill*, and *plunging* elaborate the manner of worsening emotional distress” (121-22). Thus, “the downward trajectory is elaborated in English whereas the place that is down is elaborated in Hebrew” (138).

King identifies several entailments that follow from this set of mappings. “First, if distress is being low, *relief* becomes movement upwards...Second, gravity means descending bodies continue falling if nothing supports them and no one pulls them up...Third, pleading for quick action uses experiences where the longer the time spent descending, the deeper something becomes. Thus, the distance down highlights the duration of distress” (122-24). King notes that, between English and Hebrew, “the ‘relief’ entailments differ” (137):

In English, the entailment that moving upwards is harder than moving downwards means sufferers have to hit *rock bottom* and then try to *climb out*, or *get back up again* after being *knocked down*. That is, prototypically, relief requires the individual making their own, difficult ascent. Conversely, the Hebrew corpus never refers to making one’s own ascent, on either the postural or spatial scale. Rather, God always raises the petitioner, and the verbs never suggest difficulty. This is entailed by the different cultural prototypes for low places. In Hebrew, people cannot rescue themselves from the prototypes of cistern or sea. (King 2012: 137)

#### **4.4 Mappings and entailments for BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE POSTURAL SCALE**

Again, after walking through a number of examples from his corpus, King presents the following summary of the mappings for BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE POSTURAL SCALE.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> I take this conceptual metaphor to be identical to another he mentions, that is, BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING LOW ON THE POSTURAL SCALE (King 2012: 126). If there is a difference between BEING DOWN and BEING LOW, that difference is not clear to me.

Position low on postural scale (bowed, prostrate, low)	→	Situation of distress
Person in low posture	→	Person in distress
Agentive cause of low posture (God, enemies)	→	Agentive cause of distress (God, opponents)
Adopting low posture (falling, stumbling, being pushed)	→	Entering state of distress
Returning to upright posture	→	Relief from distress

Entailments:

The lower the posture the more intense the distress.

(King 2012: 132)

The entailment linking lower posture with more intense distress does not follow ipso facto from the mappings. Hypothetically, there could be a binary division between upright posture and non-upright posture. But King notes that, in Psa. 142:6[7], “the modifier  $\text{מְאֹד}$  [*mə’ōd* ‘very’] deepens the low posture to strengthen the cry of distress” (King 2012: 129). However, it is questionable whether or not  $\text{דָּלָל}$  *dll* ‘to be brought low, diminished’ in Psa. 142:6[7] actually describes postural lowness or just spatial lowness (or both) (cf. Isa. 19:6 where it reflects QUANTITY IS VERTICAL ELEVATION).

## 4.5 Summary

King’s work (2012: 99-139) is a treatment of the image schema VERTICALITY and the ways that it maps metaphorically to DISTRESS in Classical Hebrew. For the purposes of this thesis, the most essential point to grasp is that the postural and spatial scales, as they map onto experiences of distress, are considered by King to be metaphors that are members of the same more general category. That is, they share higher-level structure.

King explains, “Conceptual metaphor theory claims that metaphors fit within larger hierarchies...For example, the metaphor EXPERIENCING DISTRESS IS TASTING BITTER FOOD fits with the higher-level (more schematic) conceptual metaphor LIFE EVENTS ARE INGESTED SUBSTANCES” (2012: 97). In the case of VERTICALITY metaphors, we have at least

three conceptual metaphors: (1) BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE, (2) BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE, and (3) BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE POSTURAL SCALE. King refers to THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE and THE POSTURAL SCALE as “sub-schemas” (2012: 133) of THE VERTICAL SCALE. Presumably, this constitutes the kind of hierarchical structure such as King references in the statement above. Thus, BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE is a higher-level (more schematic) conceptual metaphor under which are subsumed BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE and BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE POSTURAL SCALE as special cases. All three of these conceptual metaphors are treated as entrenched units of conceptual structure.

## CHAPTER 5

### REFINING THE ANALYSIS, I: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

#### 5.1 Introduction

In the context of metaphors with source and target concepts, King sees VERTICAL ELEVATION (aka SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL VERTICALITY) and UPRIGHTNESS (aka POSTURAL VERTICALITY) as source concepts that are subsumed under the more general concept VERTICALITY. The pivotal role that Grady gives to primary metaphors in the structuring of metaphorical terms and concepts also calls for a reevaluation of King's hierarchical organization of VERTICALITY concepts. I propose that VERTICAL ELEVATION and UPRIGHTNESS are independent concepts and that there is therefore no formal connection between the them.

My proposal contradicts a hierarchical model of conceptual structure such as what King (e.g., 2012: 97) espouses (likely drawing on Lakoff (1993) and Lakoff & Johnson (1999)). For this reason, in order to refine King's analysis, §5.2 evaluates Lakoff (1993) and Lakoff & Johnson's (1999) hierarchical model. My evaluation follows critiques previously presented in Grady et al. (1996) and Grady (1997a). They suggest that Lakoff's (1993) hierarchical model is inefficient in its analysis, that it assigns meaning to sets of metaphorical expressions for which there is no linguistic evidence, and that it does not capture the "more direct cognitive motivation" (Grady et al. 1996: 180) for some mappings whose place in the hierarchy implies a derived status. In §§5.3-4, I extend these critiques to King's organization of VERTICALITY concepts. Using the framework of PMT, §5.5 constructs refined categories into which we can place the very same metaphorical expressions that King (2012) previously analyzed.

## 5.2 The organization of conceptual structure

In this section, I evaluate what Feyaerts (2000) terms “the inheritance hypothesis.” This hypothesis originates in Lakoff (1993) who gives the following description: “Metaphorical mappings do not occur isolated from one another. They are sometimes organized in hierarchical structures, in which ‘lower’ mappings in the hierarchy inherit the structures of the ‘higher’ mappings” (1993: 222).

Lakoff’s influence on King (cf. King 2012: 9, footnote 48) can be seen in the following statement: King says, “Conceptual metaphor theory claims that metaphors fit within larger hierarchies...For example, the metaphor EXPERIENCING DISTRESS IS TASTING BITTER FOOD fits within the higher-level (more schematic) conceptual metaphor LIFE EVENTS ARE INGESTED SUBSTANCES” (2012: 97). This statement is instructive for us as we consider the relationship that exists for King between VERTICALITY and its two “sub-schemas” (King 2012: 133)—spatial and postural VERTICALITY.

### 5.2.1 *Lakoff (1993) and Lakoff & Johnson (1999) on hierarchies and inheritance*

Inheritance in standard CMT is a mechanism “whereby one metaphor shares and elaborates the structure of a more general one—as LOVE IS A JOURNEY inherits the more general LONG-TERM PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEYS (Lakoff 1993)” (Grady 1997a: 14). However, the higher-level structures do not always share everything with the lower-level structures. Lakoff and Johnson describe inheritance using the example of the way the concept ELECTRIC CAR inherits the more general concept CAR. They say, “We ‘inherit’ all the information we can from our prototypical idea of a car, *provided it is consistent with the new information*” (1999: 201, emphasis added). If some higher-level element is inconsistent with new, lower-level structure, then the higher-level structure does not share



that element with the lower-level structure. Grady summarizes “current theory” in a way that concurs with Lakoff and Johnson’s caveat regarding consistency as a condition for sharing structure. He uses the qualifier “all (or nearly all).” He says, “In current theory, a metaphor inherits another metaphor if the first includes all (or nearly all) the structure of the second, plus some additional structure—e.g., LONG-TERM PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEYS inherits ACTION IS BODILY MOTION” (Grady 1997a: 71).

Lakoff illustrates hierarchical structure and inheritance with example (11) below:

- (11) Level 1: The event structure metaphor  
Level 2: A PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A JOURNEY  
Level 3: LOVE IS A JOURNEY; A CAREER IS A JOURNEY  
(Lakoff 1993: 222)

Level 1 is the Event Structure Metaphor. This is a complex of mappings that characterizes events in terms of motion in space. Lakoff and Johnson list the mappings of the Event Structure Metaphor as follows:

- (12) States Are Locations (interiors of bounded regions in space)  
Changes Are Movements (into or out of bounded regions)  
Causes Are Forces  
Causation Is Forced Movement (from one location to another)  
Actions Are Self-propelled Movements  
Purposes Are Destinations  
Means Are Paths (to destinations)  
Difficulties Are Impediments To Motion  
Freedom Of Action Is The Lack Of Impediments To Motion  
External Events Are Large, Moving Objects (that exert force)  
Long-term, Purposeful Activities Are Journeys  
(Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 179)<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> These mappings for the Event Structure Metaphor are updated from Lakoff’s (1993: 222-23) original proposal. The set of mappings listed above includes two additional mappings—Causation Is Forced Movement (from one location to another) and Freedom Of Action Is The Lack Of Impediments To Motion. Conversely, Lakoff’s (1993: 222-23) original proposal included one mapping that was not

The eleven mappings in this metaphor do not hold equal status. In Lakoff and Johnson's description, some mappings are logically prior to other mappings, and the other mappings have a more derived status:

States are conceptualized as locations (bounded regions in space). This elementary mapping fixes the possibility for what change and causation can be. The Changes Are Movements metaphor combines with States Are Locations to construe a change in an entity as the movement of that entity from one location to another. The Causes Are Forces metaphor combines with these to provide a conceptualization of causation as the forced movement of an entity from one location to another.

With these metaphorical parameters fixed, the other mappings are pretty well determined. (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 194-95)

Ultimately, lower-level mappings inherit the Event Structure Metaphor. But when we say that a lower-level structure inherits the higher-level Event Structure Metaphor, it is not a single mapping that is inherited by the lower levels, but the whole complex of mappings in whatever ways it is consistent with the new information added to the lower levels.

For the second level in Lakoff's hierarchy in example (11) above, we understand that life is a long-term, purposeful activity; and since we already have the mapping LONG-TERM, PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEYS, we are able to have at a lower level the mapping A PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A JOURNEY. Level 2 inherits all the mappings of the Event Structure Metaphor, but it also adds more structure of its own. In the structure of Level 2, the person leading a life is a traveler, events generally are specified as life events, and purposes are life goals (see Lakoff 1993: 223).

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included in Lakoff and Johnson's (1999: 179) later list; that mapping is "Expected progress is a travel schedule; a schedule is a virtual traveler, who reaches prearranged destinations at prearranged times" (Lakoff 1993: 223).

Finally, regarding Level 3, Lakoff explains,

Just as significant life events are special cases of events, so events in a love relationship are special cases of life events. Thus, the LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor inherits the structure of the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor. What is special about the LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor is that there are two lovers who are travelers and that the love relationship is a vehicle. The rest of the mapping is a consequence of inheriting the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor. (1993: 223)

According to Lakoff (1993: 218-28) and Lakoff & Johnson (1999: 194-201), there are two branches of the Event Structure Metaphor—the location branch (which we saw above in example (11)) and the object branch. These two branches are called metaphorical duals and are related to each other in that the primary difference between them is the perceptual reversal of figure and ground. In the location Event Structure Metaphor, states are construed as locations and purposes as destinations. Thus, we have STATES ARE LOCATIONS, PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS, and by extension, ACHIEVING A PURPOSES IS REACHING A DESIRED LOCATION. In the object Event Structure Metaphor, attributes are construed as possessions and purposes as desired objects. Thus, we have ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS, PURPOSES ARE DESIRED OBJECTS, and by extension ACHIEVING A PURPOSE IS ACQUIRING A DESIRED OBJECT. In one case, the ego moves to the desired location; in the other, the desired object moves to be co-located with (and thus possessed/acquired by) the ego. As for the relationship between the two branches of the Event Structure Metaphor, there is no neutral Event Structure Metaphor; a choice is always made between one figure-ground organization and the other. Further details are available in Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 198) along with proposed mappings for the object Event Structure Metaphor.

This cognitive ability to reverse the figure and the ground in the Event Structure Metaphor affects all metaphors lower down in the hierarchy. LOVE IS A JOURNEY inherits

the location Event Structure Metaphor, and accordingly, events are construed as the ego's movement through space. At the same time, LOVE IS A JOURNEY has the dual LOVE IS A PARTNERSHIP in which events are construed as acquisitions or losses (i.e., movements) of the stationary ego's possessions. I represent Lakoff's description of this hierarchy in example (13):

- (13) Level 1: The object Event Structure Metaphor  
Submapping: ACHIEVING A PURPOSE IS ACQUIRING A DESIRED OBJECT  
They just handed him the job.  
Level 2: A PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A BUSINESS  
He has a rich life.  
Level 3: LOVE IS A PARTNERSHIP  
marriage contract  
(see Lakoff 1993: 226-27)

Lakoff concludes his discussion of hierarchies and figure-ground reversals with the following statement: "The major point to take away from this discussion is that metaphor resides for the most part in this *huge, highly structured, fixed system*, a system anything but 'dead.' Because it is conventional, it is used constantly and automatically, with neither effort nor awareness. Novel metaphor uses this system, and builds on it, but only rarely occurs independently of it" (Lakoff 1993: 227-28, emphasis added). It is assumed that metaphorical expressions such as *We've hit a dead-end street* as applied to a romantic relationship (reflecting LOVE IS A JOURNEY) and *marriage contract* (reflecting LOVE IS A PARTNERSHIP) both instantiate the huge, highly structured, fixed system with its complexes of metaphors, figure-ground reversals, hierarchies, and inheritance of higher-level structures.

### 5.2.2 Grady et al. (1996) on the Event Structure Metaphor

Grady et al. (1996) argue that many of the submappings in the Event Structure Metaphor are better taken as independent, both because their experiential bases are independent and because it produces a simpler account of the data. This has implications for the “shape” of conceptual structure and the magnitude of inheritance hierarchies.

Grady et al. (1996) comment that, “Current theory often invokes huge metaphorical complexes in order to account for basic correspondences, and corresponding linguistic evidence, which seem to be explainable more directly on their own terms” (Grady et al. 1996: 179). They demonstrate their claim using the following example:

(14) He’s *weighed down* by lots of assignments. (Grady et al. 1996: 179)

Regarding sentence (14), they summarize an analysis implied in Lakoff (1993). They say, “The current analysis is that this use of *weighed down* has the meaning it does because it is an instance of the mapping DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS, which is a special case of DIFFICULTIES ARE IMPEDIMENTS TO MOTION, which in turn is a submapping of the ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION [(location)] branch of the EVENT STRUCTURE METAPHOR... (see Lakoff, 199[3])” (Grady et al. 1996: 179).

Rather than invoking such a large metaphorical complex to account for sentence (14), they suggest a simpler, more efficient, and motivationally more transparent account: “We suggest instead that DIFFICULTIES/OBLIGATIONS ARE BURDENS is a metaphoric primitive [(i.e., a primary metaphor)]. Such a mapping has independent motivation: enduring difficulties and discharging obligations require effort, attention, and expenditure of energy, just as supporting heavy weights does, independent of whether the burdened person is trying to move” (Grady et al. 1996: 183).

An important point highlighted by Grady et al. (1996) is that there is no linguistic evidence in sentence (14) that the heavy weights are construed as impediments to motion. This contrasts with any account invoking Lakoff's Event Structure Metaphor. According to a Lakoffian account, DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS ultimately inherits the location branch of the Event Structure Metaphor in which events are construed in terms of the ego's movement through space. Thus, the BURDEN in DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS is necessarily a special case of IMPEDIMENTS TO MOTION. Grady et al. (1996: 180) suggest that DIFFICULTIES/OBLIGATIONS ARE BURDENS is *compatible* with ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION but question its status as an *instance* of ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION. They state that "linguistic contexts in which there is no direct evidence for interpreting heavy weights as impediments to motion are not hard to come by" (Grady et al. 1996: 183).

In sum, Grady et al. (1996) argue that many submappings in the Event Structure Metaphor arise independently and function independently. Rather than assuming a "huge, highly structured, fixed system" (Lakoff 1993: 227), linguistic evidence, efficiency of analysis, and motivationally transparent mappings suggest that many metaphorical expressions are best accounted for with the mappings of individual primary metaphors without any need to invoke the whole complex of mappings known as the Event Structure Metaphor.

### 5.2.3 *Grady on hierarchies, inheritance, and complex metaphors*

Grady's approach to hierarchies and inheritance is connected integrally to the broader framework of PMT. Refer to §3.1 for an overview. Grady states that "metaphorical 'inheritance' (as discussed in Lakoff 1993, for instance) can be interpreted in the Primary Metaphor framework as the relationship between a complex metaphor and the more basic

metaphors of which it is composed” (Grady 1997a: 112). When considering VIABLE LOGICAL ORGANIZATION IS UPRIGHT PHYSICAL STRUCTURE and VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS, “the former is a compound of which the latter is a component (and, as it happens, a primary metaphor)” (Grady 1997a: 71). When two or more primary metaphors are unified to form a complex metaphor, “[a]t its simplest,<sup>21</sup> the result...is simply the list of all correspondences and propositions from the component metaphors” (Grady 1997a: 48).

#### 5.2.4 *The “shape” of conceptual structure in Grady (1997a) and Lakoff (1993) and Lakoff & Johnson (1999)*

It is important to highlight that the highest level of metaphorical structure for Grady is the primary metaphor. Every primary metaphor has its own unique experiential basis. Not surprisingly then, primary metaphors are assumed to maintain a fundamentally independent status; they may optionally unify with other primary metaphors but can always function on their own as well (see Grady et al. 1996: 185).

In contrast, the highest level of metaphorical structure presented in Lakoff (1993) is the Event Structure Metaphor either as the location or the object branch. Immediately after listing the eleven submappings of the location Event Structure Metaphor, Lakoff and Johnson state, “This is a single, complex mapping with a number of submappings. The source domain is the domain of motion-in-space. The target domain is the domain of events. This mapping provides our most common and extensive understanding of the internal structure of events, and it uses our everyday knowledge of motion in space to do so” (1999: 179). Despite the fact that Lakoff and Johnson recognize many of the Event

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<sup>21</sup> I understand Grady to have used the phrase “[a]t its simplest” because emergent mappings may result from the unification. These emergent mappings are comparable to Conceptual Integration Theory’s emergent features that may arise in blended spaces after composition (see Fauconnier and Turner 2002).

Structure Metaphor's submappings to be primary metaphors (1999: 179), their fundamental status in Lakoff and Johnson's framework remains as "submappings," as members of a more complex whole, rather than as independent units of conceptual structure.

Consider the following example sentences from Grady (1997a) in light of the two models of conceptual structure:

- (15) The tax *burden* on people in their bracket has grown considerably. (Grady 1997a: 104)
- (16) The *burden* of emotional instability has kept her from *getting very far* in life. (Grady 1997a: 105)

From the perspective of PMT, these two sentences could potentially prompt for the same complex metaphor—DIFFICULTIES IN ACHIEVING PURPOSES ARE BURDENS THAT MAKE REACHING A DESTINATION DIFFICULT. This complex metaphor stands as a unification of PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS and DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS. Nevertheless, there is no linguistic evidence in sentence (15) that PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS is part of the underlying conceptual structure. For this reason, sentence (15) and sentence (16) (without further contextual clues) have different analyses even at the highest level of conceptual structure. Sentence (15) is analyzed as arising from the primary metaphor DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS, while sentence (16) is analyzed as arising from the unification of DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS with PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS. This is possible only because the primary metaphors are independent mappings in PMT.

In contrast, within standard CMT as laid out by Lakoff (1993) and Lakoff & Johnson (1999), sentences (15) and (16) have the same structure at the highest level, i.e., they both reflect the location Event Structure Metaphor. An issue that arises from Lakoff



(1993) and Lakoff & Johnson's (1999) account is that the source domain for sentence (15) is necessarily viewed in the context of motion in space, a point for which there is no linguistic evidence. Second, Lakoff (1993) and Lakoff & Johnson's (1999) account suggests that a "huge, highly structured, fixed system" (Lakoff 1993: 227) is necessary to account for the basic correspondences reflected in sentences (15) and (16). This system includes the Event Structure Metaphor which Lakoff points out is "a rich and complex metaphor whose parts interact in complex ways" (Lakoff 1993: 220). However, Grady et al. wonder "whether there might be an analysis which requires less structure" (1996: 180). Finally, many of the submappings of the Event Structure Metaphor, being that they are primary metaphors, have their own, independent experiential bases. The implications of this fact do not appear to be fully appreciated in Lakoff and Johnson's framework.

Figures 5.1-5.2 illustrate the way that conceptual structure has a different "shape" in Lakoff and Johnson as compared with Grady.<sup>22</sup> In Lakoff and Johnson, there is a single, complex mapping at the highest level of conceptual structure. From there, lower-level mappings branch out. This is illustrated by Figure 5.1. In Grady, multiple basic, independent mappings may be at the highest level of conceptual structure, each with their own independent experiential bases; these mappings are primary metaphors. Primary metaphors are able to unify to form complex metaphors, thus bringing multiple units of conceptual structure into one. The "shape" of Grady's organization of conceptual structure is illustrated by Figure 5.2.

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<sup>22</sup> Figures 5.1-5.2 place independent units of conceptual structure (i.e., the Event Structure Metaphor and primary metaphors) at the highest levels. Lower levels are considered to be dependent on the higher levels.

The location Event Structure Metaphor  
 Submapping: DIFFICULTIES ARE  
 IMPEDIMENTS TO MOTION




Figure 5.1. The “shape” of conceptual structure with inheritance hierarchies




Figure 5.2. The “shape” of conceptual structure with primary and complex metaphors

### 5.2.5 Local experience-types

Grady asks, “Is conceptual knowledge organized into strongly entrenched and tightly coherent wholes—e.g., domains, frames, etc.—or more loosely distributed in assemblies that can be more or less entrenched, but whose elements are available for individual recruitment?” (2000: 342). Grady argues for the latter perspective and ultimately gives “locally-defined experience-types” (1997a: 98) a foundational role in the organization of conceptual knowledge.

Local experience-types are (1) “instantaneous” (1997a: 87), taking “no more than a ‘moment’ to unfold” (1997a: 139), and (2) basic, “not decomposable into smaller, more

local mappings” (1997a: 70). Within Grady’s framework, primary scenes are by definition local (e.g., see Grady 1997a: 177). Primary metaphors, since they arise from primary scenes, are therefore not decomposable into other subsidiary metaphorical structures nor do they map rich domains that cannot plausibly trace back to local, momentary scenes.

We have seen how the primacy of local experience-types has numerous implications for complexes of mappings such as the Event Structure Metaphor. It also has similarly dramatic implications for metaphors involving rich domains such as ACQUIRING IDEAS IS EATING (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 241-43). Whenever we are dealing with rich domains, it is the local mappings of primary metaphors that structure those domains rather than the rich domains themselves. Grady points this out, saying, “[C]omplex domains have continually been referred to as though they, and not the more basic domains which structured them, were the source of the terms and concepts which were mapped by metaphorical processes” (Grady 1997a: 56). An important consequence of this for the analyst is that any metaphor supposedly arising from correlations in experience that is not a primary metaphor or simple composition of primary metaphors<sup>23</sup> is simply not valid.

While in our case the kinds of local experiences that we are concerned with are primary scenes, it is helpful to see them in their capacity as local experience-types. One exceptional feature of this kind of experience is that it produces much stronger conceptual and neural connections than connections arising from more extensive experiences (such as the connections of home with family or of dinner with family, connections that are neither instantaneous nor basic and that are not necessarily universal). In other words, the

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<sup>23</sup> This is not intended to imply that processes such as elaboration and specification cannot come into play. These processes, however, do not undermine the conceptual “entities” that feed them (see Grady 1997a: 13).

metaphorical connections arising from primary scenes are markedly more entrenched than other kinds of conceptual connections (see Grady 2000: 342). This makes logical sense of the foundational role that PMT gives to primary metaphors in structuring metaphorical terms and concepts.

All in all, the centrality of local experience-types as the primary contributors of metaphorical conceptual structure and the building blocks for meaning construction has important implications for how we will evaluate King's organization of conceptual structure in which VERTICALITY has two sub-schemas—postural and spatial geographical VERTICALITY.

### **5.3 King's VERTICALITY hierarchy**

There are at least three relevant metaphorical conceptual mappings presented in King (2012: 99-139). These are (1) BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE, (2) BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE, and (3) BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE POSTURAL SCALE. Figure 5.3 illustrates the hierarchy.




Figure 5.3. VERTICALITY hierarchy

King does not address issues regarding whether all three of these structures have their own unique experiential bases or whether they somehow depend on the single primary scene associated with the higher-level BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE. While his discussion implies an assumption that experiential correlations motivate each of the structures individually, he neither expresses this explicitly nor discusses why this would be or how it would work.

Furthermore, he does not give any detailed discussion regarding the relationships that exist between each of the structures. Do the lower-level structures add extra structural content? Or are they mere instantiations of the higher-level structure? If they do add extra structural content, what is the added structure and how is it differentiated from the inherited structure? If they are mere instantiations of the higher structure, can expressions reflecting the postural scale replace expressions reflecting the spatial scale without significant semantic effects. These questions highlight difficulties with King's hierarchy as it stands.

The following discussion demonstrates three points regarding King's perspective on the structures in Figure 5.3. First, King sees each of these mappings as structures that are cognitively real. Second, the mappings from Figure 5.3 constitute hierarchical structure. Third, despite difficulties in reconciling King's VERTICALITY hierarchy with Lakoff's views, the following discussion presents evidence indicating that King understands his hierarchy to fit within a broadly Lakoffian hierarchical view of metaphor.

There are a number of different ways in which King indicates that he sees each of the three mappings in Figure 5.3 as cognitively real. These include, first, the fact that he presents each of the mappings with their own unique labels, mapping BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE, BEING DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE, and BEING DOWN ON THE POSTURAL SCALE onto BEING IN DISTRESS. Second, his presentation and analysis of the Hebrew mappings is divided into two sections corresponding to the two sub-schemas of VERTICALITY. Third, he verbally indicates the uniqueness of each of the mappings. He expresses the unique status of the higher-level metaphorical mapping BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE, referring to the source concept as a "basic image schema[]" (King 2012: 11) and also pointing to evidence demonstrating "the entrenchment and conventionality of BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE" (King 2012: 133). He also expresses the unique status of the lower-level metaphorical mappings by referring to them as "sub-schemas" (King 2012: 133). Fourth, in King's presentation and analysis of the mappings, he presents a unique set of mappings and entailments for each of the sub-schemas. Fifth, when construed positively, King brings attention to the fact that postural VERTICALITY maps onto certain target concepts such as "solidity and stability, or the readiness to act" (King 2012: 208) that spatial VERTICALITY does not. Similarly, King

associates BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE with the more basic correspondence EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE IS BEING IN A SPATIAL LOCATION (King 2012: 114). While not precluding the possibility, King does nothing to suggest that this more basic metaphorical correspondence has any comparable association with the postural scale. Sixth, King presents evidence that the linguistic examples shown throughout his presentation (King 2012: 99-139) “indeed represent significant conceptual metaphors”<sup>24</sup> (King 2012: 132). King shows that the VERTICALITY conceptual metaphors are able to make consistent generalizations over polysemy patterns of the lexical items instantiating them, “whether spatial-geographic or postural” (King 2012: 132). The “variety of verbs and nouns [for which these generalizations can be made] demonstrates the entrenchment and conventionality of BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE” (King 2012: 133). He also presents similar kinds of evidence demonstrating the way these conceptual structures provide an ability to make consistent generalizations over inference patterns, showing how certain inference patterns can be the same for “both scales” (King 2012: 133). In summary, it is relatively clear that King sees each of the three conceptual metaphors presented in Figure 5.3 above as distinct, though related structures that are cognitively real.

King expresses his view regarding the hierarchical organization of metaphorical conceptual structure in general and its existence in larger-scale systems in the following statement:

[T]he existence of a conceptual metaphor is supported by its *coherence* with larger-scale metaphorical systems. Conceptual metaphor theory claims that metaphors fit within larger hierarchies...For example, the metaphor

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<sup>24</sup> Note the plural here: “...*conceptual metaphors*” (King 2012: 132, emphasis added).



EXPERIENCING DISTRESS IS TASTING BITTER FOOD fits with the higher-level (more schematic) conceptual metaphor LIFE EVENTS ARE INGESTED SUBSTANCES. (King 2012: 97)

Recall that, in the location Event Structure Metaphor, events are construed as the ego's movement to a desired location. In contrast, in the object Event Structure Metaphor, events are construed as a desired object's movement to be co-located with (and thus, possessed/acquired by) the stationary ego. In one case, the ego moves from one location to another; in the other case, a desired object moves to or from the ego. King's example in the above excerpt in which LIFE EVENTS ARE INGESTED SUBSTANCES appears to assume the object branch of the Event Structure Metaphor.

Yet similarly, King also places spatial VERTICALITY within the Event Structure Metaphor framework. Under the section heading BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE (King 2012: 114), he begins by saying, "The most fundamental mapping here is that EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE IS BEING IN A SPATIAL LOCATION" (King 2012: 114). This "fundamental mapping" recalls the submapping of the location branch of the Event Structure Metaphor STATES ARE LOCATIONS. Thus, given King's Lakoffian influence, we may suggest that he views BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE as being a special case of EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE IS BEING IN A SPATIAL LOCATION, which can then be viewed as a special case of STATES ARE LOCATIONS, which we know to be a submapping of the location branch of the Event Structure Metaphor. Though it would be logical to do so, King is not entirely clear whether or not he would additionally include BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE between the lower-level structure BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN

ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE and the higher-level structure EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE IS BEING IN A SPATIAL LOCATION. Example (17) illustrates this hierarchy:

- (17) Level 1: The location Event Structure Metaphor  
Submapping: STATES ARE LOCATIONS  
Level 2: EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE IS BEING IN A SPATIAL LOCATION  
(Level X: BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE)  
Level 3: BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE

Additionally, King discusses the spatial and postural VERTICALITY SCALES as distinct structures, discussing unique experiential bases for each scale (cf. e.g., King 2012: 125 for the spatial scale and King 2012: 100, 108 for the postural scale). He also discusses the more general VERTICAL SCALE as its own distinct structure, a structure that unifies the two sub-schemas under one heading. He even does this, suggesting that the more general VERTICALITY SCALE has an experiential basis that crosscuts the lower structures. He says,

[N]egative experience is partially understood within this corpus as movement up and down, or position upon, a vertical scale. Perceptual bodily experiences of being low are certainly used to help understand distressing experiences. The most highlighted parts of this mapping are that the experience of distress is being in a place or posture low on the VERTICALITY scale, and that relief from such a situation is therefore being raised up on the scale. (King 2012: 139)

Overall, when King refers to spatial and postural VERTICALITY as “sub-schemas” (2012: 133), it appears that he has in mind a hierarchy very much like the one presented in Figure 5.3. Nevertheless, the precise relationships obtaining between each of the structures in Figure 5.3 are not clearly worked out in King’s presentation.

Thus far, we have seen that there is good reason to believe that King sees each of these mappings presented in Figure 5.3 as structures that are cognitively real and that those mappings constitute hierarchical structure. As we will see in a later section, there are

difficulties in reconciling King's VERTICALITY hierarchy with Lakoff's views. Nevertheless, it is also clear that King approaches the organization of conceptual structure in a conscientiously Lakoffian fashion.

Initially, we can note King's explicit dependence on Lakoff and Johnson. At the very beginning of his book, he states, "The Cognitive Linguistic framework of George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, and Zoltán Kövecses then provides a basis to investigate the most significant *image schemas* (recurring patterns of bodily experience) and *primary metaphors* (basic associations between perceptual and other more abstract domains) used to conceptualize distress" (King 2012: 1-2). Later, King specifies dependence on both Lakoff (1993) and Lakoff & Johnson (1999) (see King 2012: 9, footnote 48).

When King discusses the VERTICALITY schema with its two sub-schemas, it is reasonable to assume that, in his mind, this hierarchy coheres with "larger-scale metaphorical systems" (King 2012: 97) as in Lakoff (1993: 227). Other aspects of King's description express a largely Lakoffian framework. We have seen several already. We see an additional example when he presents analyses of the mappings of each of the sub-schemas; he presents, as extensively as he could, specifically their (sub)mappings and entailments (see §§4.3-4). In PMT, however, the notions of submappings and entailments have slightly more restricted roles. Consequently, the list of mappings would be shorter in the framework of PMT. Thus, altogether there is ample evidence to see that hierarchical structure, specifically such as Lakoff and Johnson's framework would suggest, has a natural place in King's description of Hebrew metaphors for distress. More specifically, there is ample reason to prioritize evaluating King's VERTICALITY hierarchy through the framework presented in Lakoff (1993) and Lakoff & Johnson (1999) over frameworks such

as Grady's. This is important because, regarding the relationships obtaining between each of the structures in Figure 5.3, King's presentation does not give us detailed descriptions.

## 5.4 Problems with the VERTICALITY hierarchy

### 5.4.1 *Problems when viewed within Lakoff (1993) and Lakoff & Johnson's (1999) framework for hierarchical structure*

Assuming that King's conceptual metaphors based on the VERTICALITY image schema are intended to fit within a Lakoffian framework for hierarchical structure, we can construct the hierarchy presented in example (18). In relation to example (17) above, example (18) is less conservative in its assumptions regarding King's (2012: 99-139) intended organization of conceptual structure. Regardless of whether or not King had fully worked out his own view on the issue, the conceptual metaphors that he presents in King (2012: 99-139) are not accompanied with explanatory comments sufficient enough for the reader to construct with certainty the relationships (hierarchical or otherwise) that he envisions obtaining between them. Ultimately, his dependence on Lakoff (1993) and Lakoff & Johnson (1999) helps complete the picture. Thus, example (18) is a liberal attempt at fitting King's (2012: 99-139) VERTICALITY metaphors into a coherent Lakoffian hierarchy.

- (18) Level 1: The Event Structure Metaphor  
    Submapping: STATES ARE LOCATIONS  
    Level 2: EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE IS BEING IN A SPATIAL LOCATION  
    Level 3: BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE  
    Level 4: BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE;  
            BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE POSTURAL SCALE

Level four has two conceptual metaphors since they branch out from level three.

Example (18) is really just a small sliver of the “huge, highly structured, fixed system” (Lakoff 1993: 227) of metaphors that Lakoff has in view. The higher levels shown in example (18) would branch off in many more directions than what we see represented here. In a hierarchy such as this, we understand sentence (19) to be motivated by this “huge, highly structured, fixed” metaphorical system.

(19) מִמְצַמְקִים קְרָאֲתִיךָ יְהוָה:  
Psa. 130:1: Out of the *depths* I cry to you, O LORD!

The *depths* in sentence (19) is understood as a linguistic expression motivated by the conceptual metaphor BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE which is a special case of BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE which is a special case of EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE IS BEING IN A SPATIAL LOCATION which is a special case of STATES ARE LOCATIONS which is a submapping of the location branch of the Event Structure Metaphor. However, such a large amount of structure to account for the simple metaphorical expression in sentence (19) lacks efficiency, that is, “a great deal of content is invoked to account for data which might be explained more economically” (Grady et al. 1996: 179). The simple correspondence BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE is sufficient to account for the metaphorical expression in (19) and others like it without any need for recourse to higher levels of structure.

To be clear, higher levels of structure would be useful if they provided accurate generalizations. However, it is difficult to discern from the hierarchy in (18) what that generalization is for THE VERTICAL SCALE on Level 3. This is because the independence of VERTICAL ELEVATION and UPRIGHTNESS can easily be seen when considering the high end of their scales (that is, when someone his *high* or *standing* respectively). When considering

the high end of their scales, VERTICAL ELEVATION and UPRIGHTNESS, on the one hand, map onto certain target concepts that are not shared between them. For example, VERTICAL ELEVATION maps onto STATUS and UPRIGHTNESS does not. And on the other hand, there are not any target concepts that they do share (at least, none that can be identified with any certainty). Consequently, these two source concepts seem independent of each other (see also §5.4.2).

Treating BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE and BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE POSTURAL SCALE as metaphors that are independent of each other is especially sensible when we consider that they can easily be understood as primary metaphors<sup>25</sup> for which there are independent and direct experiential bases.

This leads us to another problem regarding the role of embodiment in the organization of conceptual structure. In the hierarchy above (18), assuming that the structures in Level 4 have independent and direct experiential bases, the role of the independent emergence of those structures is unclear. Cognitive linguists have generally agreed to the hypothesis that meaning in language is ultimately embodied. This is called the embodiment hypothesis. One central claim of the embodiment hypothesis is that “[r]eason and conceptual structure are shaped by our bodies, brains, and modes of functioning in the world. Reason and concepts are therefore not transcendent, that is, not utterly independent of the body” (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 128).

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<sup>25</sup> Or as a construal of another primary metaphor such as GOOD IS UP and/or HAPPY IS UP (discussed in §5.5) based on VERTICAL ELEVATION

For this reason, a full account of any conceptual structure should account for its motivation in our bodies' experience. The hierarchical structure for metaphor seen in example (18) obscures this experiential motivation in the following way: If the lower-level structures (i.e., BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE and BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE POSTURAL SCALE) arise independently and directly from correlations in experience, then positing the existence of a higher-level structure (i.e., BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE along with even higher first and second levels) would obscure the independent experiential motivation of the lower-level structures,<sup>26</sup> suggesting that their structure derives from the higher levels and that they are fundamentally members of a more complex whole (see Grady et al. 1996: 179-80). If, on the other hand, it is proposed that the higher-level structure arises directly from correlations in experience and is supposed to partially account for the existence of the lower-level structures, then it raises the question how this might be reconciled with the natural assumption that the lower-level structures also arise directly from correlations in experience. Rather than reconciling the two, it is better to recognize that the higher-level structure (i.e., BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE) is superfluous both to our ability to account for patterns in metaphorical expressions as well as to our ability to account for the experiential bases of the relevant (i.e., the lower-level) conceptual structures. It can, therefore, be discarded.

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<sup>26</sup> Alternatively, the higher-level structure could be an abstraction from the lower-level structures and reverse the derivational relationship. While possible, a reversal such as this would give very different meaning to the notion of inheritance and would probably be represented with a differently shaped hierarchy. While abstraction is plausible as regards the relationship that Level 3 has with Level 4 in example (18), its applicability to the entire hierarchy of example (18) would be strained. This is because it would question the basicness of the Event Structure Metaphor, suggesting that it is a grand abstraction from hundreds of more basic, low-level conceptual metaphors.

I do not suggest that all higher-level structures are to be discarded (though some should be). Rather, I propose that structures lower in the hierarchy of example (18) should not be viewed as *instances* of but simply as *compatible* with the higher-level structures. The distinction of levels between such mappings should also be discarded. If we follow the hierarchical structure of example (18) in which lower-level structures are *instances* (or special cases) of the higher-level structures, then metaphorical expressions reflecting one “sub-schema” or the other are ultimately brought under a single heading at some higher conceptual level (in this case, Level 3). Whether or not they are motivated by the metaphorical mapping of VERTICAL ELEVATION or the metaphorical mapping of UPRIGHTNESS, they are represented theoretically as being part of the same conceptual pattern; their relationship to each other is defined by their mutual inheritance of the higher-level structure, that is, the structure BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE. I propose instead that metaphorical extensions of VERTICAL ELEVATION and UPRIGHTNESS are distinct and independent (not instances of higher-level metaphors) but are nevertheless compatible both with each other and with metaphors such as STATES ARE LOCATIONS. Since they are compatible, all of these metaphors may unify to form complex metaphors. This proposal is made on the belief that the lower-level metaphors BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE and BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE POSTURAL SCALE as well as the higher-level metaphor STATES ARE LOCATIONS are all primary metaphors and that the independent experiential bases of primary metaphors correlate with their independent statuses in our minds.

In summary, three significant inadequacies can be observed when we view the hierarchies of example (18) and Figure 5.3 within Lakoff (1993) and Lakoff & Johnson’s



(1999) framework: First, *they are inefficient in their analysis* (e.g., see Grady et al. 1996: 179-80); they require a “huge...system” (Lakoff 1993: 227) of entrenched conceptual structure to account for two very basic correspondences. This inefficiency is further pronounced when we see how THE VERTICAL SCALE in King’s analysis and the generalization that it implies is undermined by a lack of overlap between VERTICAL ELEVATION and UPRIGHTNESS and the target concepts they map onto (see also §5.4.2). Second, the experiential bases of these lower-level, basic correspondences are plausibly independent and direct rather than derived from higher-level structures. Thus, *the hierarchies of example (18) and Figure 5.3 obscure the experiential basis for conceptual structure* by suggesting that the lower-level structures are derived from higher levels. Third, *they obscure the nature of the relationships that exist between the metaphorical expressions that fall under one sub-schema and those that fall under the other*; they suggest that relationships between conceptual metaphors (and thus, between their associated metaphorical expressions) can be defined by their mutual inheritance of higher-level structures rather than by reference to the primary metaphors that complex metaphors either do or do not share (Grady et al. 1996: 185). As I show in §5.5.1, there are more than just two primary metaphors (one for each source concept) that account for the metaphors analyzed by King (2012) under the headings of spatial and postural VERTICALITY; instead, based on PMT, the relationships between metaphorical expressions in King’s corpus can be defined by reference to six different primary metaphors and which of them they share (if any).

5.4.2 *Problems when viewed within Grady's (1997a) framework for hierarchical structure*

Figure 5.3 is re-presented below as Figure 5.4.




Figure 5.4. VERTICALITY hierarchy (second presentation)

There is one way (see Figure 5.5 below) that this hierarchy could be maintained even within Grady's framework. While it has legitimate potential, its insufficiency will become apparent when we discover that it makes unlikely predictions regarding linguistic and semantic possibilities.




Figure 5.5. The VERTICALITY hierarchy placed within Grady’s framework

In order to fit the VERTICALITY hierarchy into the framework of PMT, it is necessary to make a difficult assumption. Because primary metaphors are not derived from other structures but have an independent status, they can only exist at the top of the hierarchy. Thus, we are forced to assume that the only primary metaphor in the hierarchy is BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE (see Figure 5.5).

This assumption is neither intuitive nor what King suggests when he points out the “physiological metonymic motivation” (King 2012: 126)<sup>27</sup> of BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING

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<sup>27</sup> King suggests that the metaphorical mapping of the postural scale onto distress experiences is a primary metaphor when he says, “Posturally, the basic mapping is BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING LOW ON THE POSTURAL SCALE. There is potentially a physiological metonymic motivation here, in the involuntary ‘downward’ position of head, face, shoulders, and hands characteristic of sadness, listlessness, or depression” (King 2012: 126). Kövecses (2002: 173; 2010: 205-06; see also Kövecses 2000: 91, endnote 1; 2002: 156; 2010: 184; 2020: 34-49) expresses an understanding of the emergence of correlation metaphors (i.e., primary metaphors) on the basis of “conceptualized physiology (i.e., the

DOWN ON THE POSTURAL SCALE. In other words, King assumes that one of the lower-level metaphors has a direct experiential basis. Assuming the framework of PMT, we should either not assume that BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE POSTURAL SCALE has a direct experiential basis or we should not maintain the hierarchy. I suggest that we should not maintain the hierarchy.

It is also necessary to point out that the lower-level structures that specify the primary metaphor are derived structures; they are products of a process, and logically, there is less reason for them to be entrenched or for them to be entrenched to the same degree. This stands in contrast to the Lakoffian approach in which the whole hierarchical structure is generally treated as an entrenched system in need of discovery and description. He announces that “a huge system of everyday, conventional, conceptual metaphors has been discovered...The discovery of this enormous metaphor system has destroyed the traditional literal-figurative distinction” (Lakoff 1993: 204). He also highlights its description, saying that, in “the metaphor system of English...hundreds of...mappings have been described to date” (Lakoff 1993: 227). However, while specified structures in PMT can have a degree of entrenchment, it is logical to assume that their entrenchment (if at all) should be categorically weaker than the entrenchment of primary metaphors. Consequently, despite the fact that the lower-level structures in Figure 5.5 have the feel of entrenched (even primary) metaphors, maintaining the hierarchy within a PMT framework pushes us to hold lightly to their existence as distinct, long-term, off-line cognitive objects. This is intuitively

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conceptual metonymies)” which King’s “physiological metonymic motivation” apparently echoes. While I do not mean to suggest that a metonymic view on the emergence of correlation metaphors is always correct, I do intend to point out King’s more or less explicit identification of BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE POSTURAL SCALE as a primary metaphor.

problematic and is an issue that will ultimately converge with other evidence to demonstrate the invalidity of the hierarchy in Figure 5.5.

As an aside, for the sake of comprehending the figure, it is necessary to note that, in Figure 5.5, there is no unification of BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE with other primary metaphors. The only process illustrated is that of specification. This is why this conceptual structure does not have the normal “shape” of a complex metaphor as illustrated in Figure 5.2.

Another visually significant way that the structures illustrated in Figure 5.5 differ from those illustrated in Figure 5.2 is that the primary metaphor in Figure 5.5 is shown specifying two structures, whereas the complex metaphor in Figure 5.2 is shown specifying only one structure. Regardless, any entrenchment of the specified structures cannot be taken for granted. The fact that these two illustrations differ in this regard is inconsequential.

If we view the hierarchy of Figure 5.4 from a Lakoffian perspective, then lower-level structures inherit higher-level structures *and add some new structure of their own*. This being the case, two sister nodes<sup>28</sup> in a Lakoffian hierarchy each have meaningful structure not shared with the other node, making them not substitutable for one another. However, in a hierarchy within the framework of PMT, sister nodes only exist in the case of structures produced through the process of specification. Specification does not add any meaningful structure (defined as additional primary metaphors) to the metaphorical correspondence; instead, it simply picks out in the conceptual world an instantiation of the

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<sup>28</sup> *Sister node* is not a term used in the literature. Nevertheless, it seems like a clear and fitting label for the concept.

primary or complex metaphor. Thus, the hierarchy in Figure 5.5 illustrates that BEING DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE is simply an instance (with no other signification) of BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE. In a parallel way, BEING DOWN ON THE POSTURAL SCALE is also illustrated as being a mere instance (with no other signification) of BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE. The meaning of both of the specified structures is simply the meaning of BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE.

Based on the structure in Figure 5.5, a helpful prediction available within the framework of PMT is that any structures that are specifications of the same primary or complex metaphor should be substitutable for one another without changing the meaning in any significant way, that is, they are still able to be construed as reflecting the same primary or complex metaphor. Note that, while this is a logical prediction within the formulation of PMT, the suggestion that specifications of the same primary or complex metaphor may be substituted with other specifications of the same is my own suggestion and does not come directly from any of Grady's publications. We can see the substitutability of specified structure demonstrated in Isa. 1:8:

(20) וְנוֹתְרָה בַת־צִיּוֹן כְּסֻכָּה בְּכַרְמִים כְּמַלְוֵנָה בְּמִקְשָׁה כְּעֵיר זָצוּרָה:

Isa. 1:8: And the daughter of Zion is left like *a booth in a vineyard*, like *a lodge in a cucumber field*, like *a besieged city*.

In this example, the primary metaphor VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS is successively specified in three different ways—first, as a booth in a vineyard, then as a lodge in a cucumber field, and finally as a besieged city. Broadly speaking, the same meaning is conveyed with each of the successive similes. VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS has been freely specified to A VIABLE

NATION IS AN UPRIGHT BOOTH IN A VINEYARD, and so forth for the other similes.<sup>29</sup> Though successive similes do semantically inform one another, let us suppose that Isa. 1:8 only had one simile: Suppose it said, “And the daughter of Zion is left like *a booth in a vineyard*,” and stopped there. Strictly speaking, this individual simile is sufficient to prompt for the conceptual metaphor VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS. The same would be the case if it said, “And the daughter of Zion is left like *a lodge in a cucumber field*,” and stopped there. This example simply demonstrates the phenomenon of free specification and the ease with which multiple specified structures that arise from the same primary or complex metaphor are substitutable for each other without changing the broader meaning. Note, though, that there is no commitment to the entrenchment of specified structures such as A VIABLE NATION IS AN UPRIGHT BOOTH IN A VINEYARD.

We have seen that any structures that are specifications of the same primary or complex metaphor are substitutable for one another without changing the meaning; that is, regardless of how they are specified, they will still reflect the same primary or complex metaphor. This has been demonstrated using the set of similes from Isa. 1:8. Thus, in our case, if the source concepts of VERTICAL ELEVATION and UPRIGHTNESS (i.e., spatial and postural VERTICALITY) are in fact merely two specifications of VERTICALITY, then contexts should allow one to be exchanged for the other without significant semantic effects. In fact, this should be true regardless of the target concept.

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<sup>29</sup> These similes communicate the threatened state of the daughter of Zion, that in a metaphorical sense, she is ready to topple over. ‘Booths’ recall the Israelite wandering in the wilderness and the temporary booths that they erected while they were traveling. ‘Lodges’ etymologically refer to structures intended to last only a night; Isa. 24:20 further emphasizes their unsteady nature. ‘A besieged city’ is more difficult, but may suggest that the city is destined to fall soon.

A full demonstration of whether or not VERTICAL ELEVATION and UPRIGHTNESS are able to be substituted for one another is beyond the scope of this thesis. The following example demonstrates the kinds of patterns we expect to see in language. Without native speaker intuition and the ability to generate a variety of authoritatively negative examples, a substitution test such as what follows may be most useful for the analyst who is making initial hypotheses. After that, subsequent research would do well to systematically gather data from the available Classical Hebrew corpus and then look for clear contradictions to some particular hypothesis or until the supporting examples have reached a point of saturation. The value of the substitution test is that it plays off of a kind of pattern in language predicted by PMT's framework.

Example sentence (21) gives us a context within which we can consider (if inconclusively) the substitutability of VERTICAL ELEVATION and UPRIGHTNESS.<sup>30</sup>

(21) כִּי כֹה אָמַר יְהוָה וְנִשְׂאָה שָׁכֵן עַל יְקֻדּוֹשׁ שְׁמוֹ מֵרוֹם וְקֻדּוֹשׁ אֲשַׁכֵּן וְאֶת־דַּבָּא וְשִׁפְלֵ־רוּחַ לְהַחְיֹת רוּחַ שְׁפִלִים  
וְלְהַחְיֹת לֵב גְּדַכָּאִים:

Isa. 57:15: For thus says the One who is *high and lifted up*, who inhabits eternity, whose name is Holy: “I dwell in the high and holy place, and also with him who is of a contrite and lowly spirit, to revive the spirit of the lowly, and to revive the heart of the contrite.”

Sentence (21) clearly reflects VERTICAL ELEVATION and it demonstrates the positive end of the scale of VERTICAL ELEVATION. Though I do not discuss it here, the “*lowly spirit*” later on in the verse reflects the negative end of the scale. The metaphorically used lexical items are רוּם *rwm* ‘to be high’ and נִשְׂאָה *ns’* ‘to be lifted up’ in the niphal (see King 2012: 122, 128). For the negative end of the scale, it is possible that BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN

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<sup>30</sup> Other examples that I have considered informative are Job 14:1, 2 and Isa. 40:8.



ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE could be a fitting conceptual description. For the positive end of the scale in relation to sentence (21), SOCIAL STATUS IS VERTICAL ELEVATION is apt. Regardless of what the most fitting label is for the target concept, what is clear is that the source concept is VERTICAL ELEVATION. It is also clear that the source concept in sentence (21) is not UPRIGHTNESS. The question is whether or not the metaphorical expression in sentence (21) reflecting VERTICAL ELEVATION can be substituted easily with new metaphorical expressions reflecting UPRIGHTNESS without significant semantic affects.

I now consider the substitutability of source concepts in the metaphorical expression from sentence (21). The metaphorical expression in sentence (21) refers to God as *רם ונשא רם ram waniśśā* ‘high and lifted up’. I have already suggested that the primary metaphor reflected in sentence (21) is SOCIAL STATUS IS VERTICAL ELEVATION. Could it equally be SOCIAL STATUS IS UPRIGHTNESS? Intuitively, the following sentences do not communicate the same thing as God being “*high and lifted up*,” that is, they communicate something other than high status.

(22) <sup>31</sup> כי כה אָמַר נָכוֹן וְעֹמֵד אֲשֶׁר לֹא נָפַל וְרַגְלוֹ לֹא תָמוּט

? For thus says the One who is *erect and standing*, who *has not fallen over* and whose foot *does not slip*...

Observably, this example does not communicate that God has high status, that he is glorious, etc. Rather, it seems to communicate that he remains viable, existent, functioning, persisting in his role and in his actions, moral, and so forth. In conclusion, this example

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<sup>31</sup> This sentence is constructed by the author for the sake of illustration and does not come from any Classical Hebrew corpus.

suggests that SOCIAL STATUS IS UPRIGHTNESS is neither a conceptual metaphor nor that it is a viable substitute for SOCIAL STATUS IS VERTICAL ELEVATION.<sup>32</sup>

In summary, the VERTICALITY hierarchy in Figure 5.4 is not compatible with the theoretical framework of PMT. Several lines of reasoning converge on this point: First, a lower-level structure in the hierarchy, specifically BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE POSTURAL SCALE, is identified by King as having a direct experiential basis; or in other words, it is a primary metaphor. If we agree with this identification, it is not also possible to maintain the hierarchical structure that we see in Figure 5.5. If instead we do maintain the hierarchy, we are forced to acknowledge only BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE as having a direct experiential basis. Second, if the lower-level structures in Figure 5.5 are merely specifications of BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE, then each one should be able to be substituted for the other. While inconclusive, non-native speaker intuition<sup>33</sup> suggests that the meaning is significantly changed when substituting VERTICAL ELEVATION for UPRIGHTNESS and vice versa.

### 5.4.3 Conclusion

In the previous subsections, we have seen the inadequacies (or even impossibility) of the VERTICALITY hierarchy as presented in Figure 5.4. Lakoffian hierarchies have already been shown to be problematic. When viewing the VERTICALITY hierarchy of Figure 5.4 within a Lakoffian framework, first, *it is inefficient in its analysis* (e.g., see Grady et al. 1996: 179-80) and requires a “huge...system” (Lakoff 1993: 227) of entrenched conceptual

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<sup>32</sup> Being based merely on non-native speaker intuition, this example, though valuable, is distinctly inconclusive. Another possible, and even likely, explanation would say that this merely demonstrates selectional differences (see Langacker 1987: 117).

<sup>33</sup> mine and those I asked

structure to account for two very basic correspondences. Second, *it obscures the experiential basis of conceptual structure*. The experiential bases of the lower-level metaphors in Figure 5.4 are plausibly independent and direct rather than derived from higher-level structures as suggested by the hierarchy. Third, *it obscures the nature of the relationships that exist between the metaphorical expressions that fall under one sub-schema and those that fall under the other*; they suggest that relationships between conceptual metaphors (and thus, their associated metaphorical expressions) can be defined by their mutual inheritance of higher-level structures rather than by reference to the primary metaphors that complex metaphors either do or do not share (Grady et al. 1996: 185).

When viewing the VERTICALITY hierarchy of Figure 5.4 within the framework of PMT, first, we might come to the conclusion that the lower-level structures are not grounded directly in bodily experience but derive their experiential motivation from the higher-level structure; this is unlikely. I suggest instead that we do away with the hierarchy in favor of the lower-level mappings as primary metaphors. Second, it predicts that the lower-level structures are semantically similar such that they each prompt the hearer to recruit the same primary metaphor. Consequently, one should be able to substitute for the other without significant semantic effects. On the basis of intuition, on the hand, and the theory of primary metaphors on the other, this does not appear to hold. I conclude that a VERTICALITY hierarchy in which VERTICALITY has two sub-schemas—VERTICAL ELEVATION and UPRIGHTNESS—is simply not valid as it stands and needs reanalysis.

## 5.5 A refined analysis

In §5.4.1, I presented example (18) which attempts to fit King's (2012: 99-139) VERTICALITY metaphors into a coherent Lakoffian hierarchy. Example (18) is repeated below as example (23).

- (23) Level 1: The Event Structure Metaphor  
Submapping: states are locations  
Level 2: EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE IS BEING IN A SPATIAL LOCATION  
Level 3: BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE  
Level 4: BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE;  
BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE POSTURAL SCALE

Figures 5.3-4 illustrate the third and fourth levels from example (23). That figure is presented again below as Figure 5.6.




Figure 5.6. VERTICALITY hierarchy (third presentation)

Having already shown the inadequacies of this hierarchical structure, I propose instead (1) that we maintain the two lower-level structures as distinct cognitive objects and that we discard the higher-level structure BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE. In other words, the two “sub-schemas” VERTICAL ELEVATION and UPRIGHTNESS are no longer

considered sub-schemas, but are considered their own independent image schemas. Consequently, primary metaphors such as GOOD IS UP and VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS are no longer viewed as being formally related to one another. Theoretically, any metaphorical expressions motivated by one have no necessary relation to metaphorical expressions motivated by the other. Furthermore, I propose (2) that we can view these metaphors, not as sub-metaphors, but as independent structures that arise directly from correlations in experience. That is, I propose that we categorize them as primary metaphors, or as variations on primary metaphors such as those presented below in §5.5.1.

*5.5.1 Relevant primary metaphors with the source concepts VERTICAL ELEVATION or UPRIGHTNESS*

I have proposed that a distinction be made between metaphors with the source concept VERTICAL ELEVATION and those with the source concept UPRIGHTNESS. This distinction, however, does not simply result in two primary metaphors (e.g., GOOD IS UP and VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS). Rather, VERTICAL ELEVATION in particular is a source concept that participates in several primary scenes. King cites from his corpus 81 instances of VERTICALITY metaphors. The primary metaphors relevant for a reanalysis of those metaphorical expressions are given below along with their experiential motivations:

- (24) Metaphor: FUNCTIONALITY/VIABILITY IS ERECTNESS  
Motivation: The correlation between erect position and state of functionality, for objects and people.  
(Grady 1997a: 282)
- (25) GOOD IS UP; BAD IS DOWN  
...  
Physical basis for personal well-being: Happiness, health, life, and control—the things that principally characterize what is good for a person—are all UP.  
(Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 16)

- (26) Metaphor: BEING IN CONTROL IS BEING ABOVE  
 Motivation: The correlation between being in a higher physical position and having greater control over objects, people, situations.  
 (Grady 1997a: 290)
- (27) Metaphor: SOCIAL STATUS IS VERTICAL ELEVATION  
 Motivation: (Corollary of BEING IN CONTROL IS BEING ABOVE)  
 And/or the tendency to defer to taller, bigger people.  
 (Grady 1997a: 294)
- (28) Metaphor: ACCESSIBLE TO PERCEPTION/AWARENESS IS “UP”  
 Motivation: The correlation between being in a higher position—e.g., at eye level, or out from under an obstruction—and being perceptible.  
 (Grady 1997a: 297)
- (29) Metaphor: “HAPPY IS UP” (See Lakoff & Johnson 1980)  
 Motivation: The correlation between happiness and erect body posture.  
 And/or correlation between being in a higher position (e.g., on a hill) and feeling safe, in control, etc.  
 (Grady 1997a: 295)

The metaphor GOOD IS UP above requires some explanation. Grady (1997a) does not include it in his list of primary metaphors. I have included it here both for its necessity in accounting for the data and for its plausibility as a primary metaphor. The experiential basis given by Lakoff and Johnson and listed above is that “[h]appiness, health, life, and control—the things that principally characterize what is good for a person—are all UP” (1980: 16). When they say that those things that are good for a person are all UP, I interpret this to mean that they are UP in a metaphorical sense. Future research may clarify what kind of scene in particular might motivate GOOD IS UP as a primary metaphor. For now, we may note that the concepts GOOD and BAD are basic concepts. Grady points this out:

The fact that there is, for instance, a neural mechanism (or *somatic marker*, in Damasio’s (1994) terminology) which associates unpleasant “gut” sensations with certain types of stimulus, and another which associates pleasant sensations with other stimulus, suggests that the target concepts

GOOD and BAD may have some physiological basis. They may refer in some sense to very specific types of sensations, rather than merely being vague terms whose meanings vary freely from person to person and according to the domains in which they are applied. (Grady 1997a: 161; see also Damasio 1994: 159, 164)

The particular scene that would correlate UP with GOOD and DOWN with BAD has yet to be satisfactorily identified. It may even arise from a scene in which our bodies are either upright or prone (see Grady 1997a: 114), but in such a way that our attention is drawn specifically to the height of our bodies or to our vantage point rather than to postural uprightness itself.

The metaphor HAPPY IS UP also deserves some explanation. While the primary scene correlates erect body posture with happiness, the source concept is categorized as VERTICAL ELEVATION and not as UPRIGHTNESS. This is clear from the term *UP* which has been consistently used in the sense VERTICAL ELEVATION. Additionally, Grady points to another correlation—that of “being in a higher position (e.g., on a hill) and feeling safe, in control, etc.” (1997a: 295). The idea then is that, while an instance of this primary scene may involve erect body posture, attention is given to height rather than posture. Thus, VERTICAL ELEVATION is abstracted from a variety of scenes some of which involve posture and others of which do not. This accounts for metaphorical expressions in English such as “She is in *high spirits*” (Grady 1997a: 219) which do not reflect any focus on posture.

### 5.5.2 *An analysis organized around primary metaphors*

Grady et al. (1996: 185) proposed that “[a]ll metaphors either are, or are composed of, primitives [(i.e., primary metaphors)].” My proposal above that VERTICAL ELEVATION and UPRIGHTNESS should be viewed as two distinct source concepts flows directly from this proposal. The composition (or unification) of primary metaphors along with their

specification results in a number of possible arrays of conceptual structure. King had analyzed 81 metaphorical expressions from his corpus as reflecting the VERTICALITY image schema and its metaphorical mapping onto experiences of distress. In chapter six, I will reanalyze those metaphorical expressions and show how they may be analyzed within PMT.

While King's analysis, on the one hand, treats spatial and postural VERTICALITY as two sub-schemas, and my analysis, on the other hand, treats them as fully independent concepts, there are nevertheless two ways in PMT that VERTICAL ELEVATION and UPRIGHTNESS can still overlap in the same metaphorical expression. The first way is through unification, the second is through specification. First, if we consider VERTICAL ELEVATION and UPRIGHTNESS to be two separate source concepts that are also compatible with each other, then metaphors such as BEING IN CONTROL IS BEING ABOVE and VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS can unify to form a complex metaphor (e.g., Psa. 3:1[2]). Thus, through unification VERTICAL ELEVATION and UPRIGHTNESS can both feature as distinct meaningful aspects of the same metaphorical expression.

Second, these two concepts can also overlap through the process of specification. Because an upright entity is higher than an entity that is prone, VERTICAL ELEVATION is able to specify to an upright entity. However, in cases of specification, the fact that the entity is upright is incidental to the specified concept.



Placing primary metaphors based on King’s two “sub-schemas” into the framework of PMT yields the following representative possibilities. Each of the structures below is supposed to motivate metaphorical expressions directly.<sup>34</sup>




Figure 5.7. The primary metaphor SOCIAL STATUS IS VERTICAL ELEVATION




Figure 5.8. The primary metaphor VIABILITY/FUNCTIONALITY IS UPRIGHTNESS

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<sup>34</sup> For simplicity’s sake, I only show the relationships that can exist between SOCIAL STATUS IS VERTICAL ELEVATION and FUNCTIONALITY/VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS. Nevertheless, all of the primary metaphors mentioned in §5.5.1 are compatible with each other.




Figure 5.9. The primary metaphor SOCIAL STATUS IS VERTICAL ELEVATION specified to A PERSON WITH HIGH SOCIAL STATUS IS AN UPRIGHT PERSON

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<sup>35</sup> The organization of structure in Figure 5.9 can remain the same while having different values. Technically, I could have added another figure to cover the same organization of conceptual structure but using VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS as the primary metaphor instead. That is, I could have had a figure that displayed VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS specified to something such as AN UPRIGHT PERSON or A TOWER, and so forth. Similarly, the structure that is displayed in Figure 5.9 could be shown with any number of specified structures such as A PERSON IN THE GRAVE or AN ENTITY IN THE SKY. The structure displayed in Figure 5.9 was intentionally chosen to illustrate the particularly confusing case in which VERTICAL ELEVATION specifies to AN UPRIGHT PERSON.




Figure 5.10. The complex metaphor A VIABLE, HIGH-STATUS ENTITY IS A TALL, UPRIGHT ENTITY




Figure 5.11. The complex metaphor A VIABLE, HIGH-STATUS ENTITY IS A TALL, UPRIGHT ENTITY specified to A NATION THAT USED TO HAVE HIGH STATUS BUT NOW IS BOTH DESTROYED AND OF LOW STATUS IS A TALL CITY WALL THAT HAS FALLEN DOWN OR BEEN RAZED

If, on the one hand, we are clear about which primary metaphors may be involved in giving rise to particular metaphorical expressions and, on the other hand, we understand the processes of unification and specification, then the possible arrays of conceptual structure such as those in Figures 5.7-5.11 should be easily accessible when describing both individual metaphorical expressions as well as whole patterns. In the next chapter, I reanalyze the

Classical Hebrew expressions in King's corpus that he had originally analyzed as mapping  
VERTICALITY onto EXPERIENCES OF DISTRESS (King 2012: 99-139, 367-82).

## CHAPTER 6

### REFINING THE ANALYSIS, II: APPLICATION

#### 6.1 Introduction

In this thesis, I propose that the metaphors on the lower level of King's VERTICALITY hierarchy (see Figures 5.3-4, 5.6) be treated as independent metaphors and that the higher level be discarded. This proposal is based on the framework of PMT and especially the central role that it gives to certain locally-defined experience-types called primary metaphors in structuring metaphorical thought and language. King's lower-level metaphors BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE and BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE can be reinterpreted as negative construals of primary metaphors such as HAPPY IS UP and VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS among others (see §5.5.1). Based on the processes of unification and specification, Figures 5.7-11 presents a variety of arrays of conceptual structure that illustrates the kinds of conceptual organization that should account for the metaphorical expressions in King's corpus.

The focus of this chapter is to show how PMT applies to Hebrew data by reanalyzing the particular metaphorical expressions from King's corpus that reflect the VERTICALITY image schema (King 2012: 99-139, 367-82). It is important to keep in mind that this task takes the onomasiological route to analysis; that is, the analysis fixes the conceptual/primary metaphors and then looks for potential linguistic expressions that are compatible with those categories.<sup>36</sup> Chapter five has established the relevant

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<sup>36</sup> The semasiological route in which the analysis fixes the language data and then explores which conceptual structures may be related to it would complement King's work as well as my own.

conceptual/primary metaphors, and this chapter looks for metaphorical expressions in King's data that may reflect those metaphors. As a consequence of the onomasiological route, it is understood that any particular metaphorical expression may reflect more conceptual structure than what I have identified, but not less.

My reanalysis is presented first in §6.2 where I provide a table that suggests, for each metaphorical expression, which primary metaphor (or primary metaphors) accounts for its conceptual motivation. Second, in §6.3, I discuss in greater detail the analysis of seven specific examples. I discuss the experiential grounding of the metaphors, along with whether and in what ways they have been specified, as well as any additional details that King highlights in his discussions. Finally, for each example, I illustrate the array of conceptual structure that is supposed to (partially) account for it.

## **6.2 King's VERTICALITY metaphors reanalyzed**

Table 6.1 below suggests which primary metaphor (or primary metaphors) motivates the metaphorical expressions previously analyzed as VERTICALITY metaphors in King's corpus (see especially King 2012: 367-82). The analyses provided in Table 6.1 represent how an idealized hearer might interpret the metaphorical expressions; it does not claim to represent how every hearer will interpret the metaphors. As Fauconnier and Turner point out, "[L]anguage does not represent meaning directly; instead, it systematically prompts the construction of meaning" (2002: 142; cf. Langacker 1987: 66-67). Thus, linguistic expressions may have multiple "correct" interpretations. An important benefit of linking metaphorical expressions with the primary metaphors that may have motivated them is that we gain an understanding of the kinds of constraints on the hearer's process of interpretation.

Table 6.1. Reanalysis of metaphorical expressions from King's corpus

	FUNCTION-ALITY/VIA-BILITY IS UPRIGHT-NESS	GOOD IS UP	BEING IN CONTROL IS BEING ABOVE	SOCIAL STATUS IS VERTICAL ELEVATION	ACCESSIBLE TO PERCEPTION/AWARENESS IS UP	HAPPY IS UP
Job 3:22		X				
Job 7:8-10					X	
Job 12:22					X	
Job 14:11-12	X					
Job 14:13					X	
Job 16:15						X
Job 17:1		X				
Job 17:13-14		X				
Job 17:15-16		X			X	
Job 21:26	X					
Job 30:19		X				X
Psa. 3:1[2]	X		X			
Psa. 7:5[6]	X		X	X		
Psa. 9:13[14]		X				
Psa. 17:11	X					
Psa. 18:5[6]		X				
Psa. 18:16[17]		X				
Psa. 22:15[16]		X				
Psa. 28:1		X				
Psa. 30:1[2]		X	X			
Psa. 30:3[4]		X				
Psa. 30:9[10]		X				
Psa. 35:7-8		X				
Psa. 38:6[7]						X
Psa. 38:16-17[17-18]	X					
Psa. 40:2[3]		X				X



	FUNCTION-ALITY/VIA-BILITY IS UPRIGHT-NESS	GOOD IS UP	BEING IN CONTROL IS BEING ABOVE	SOCIAL STATUS IS VERTICAL ELEVATION	ACCESSIBLE TO PERCEPTION/AWARENESS IS UP	HAPPY IS UP
Psa. 41:8[9]	X					
Psa. 42:5[6]						X
Psa. 42:6[7]						X
Psa. 42:7[8]		X	X			
Psa. 44:25[26]	X		X			
Psa. 56:13[14]	X					
Psa. 57:6[7]						X
Psa. 62:4[5]						X
Psa. 69:1-2[2-3]	X	X	X			
Psa. 69:14-15[15-16]		X	X			
Psa. 71:20		X				
Psa. 86:13		X				
Psa. 88:3[4]		X				X
Psa. 88:4[5]		X				
Psa. 88:5[6]	X				X	
Psa. 88:6[7]		X				
Psa. 116:3		X				
Psa. 116:6		X				
Psa. 119:25						X
Psa. 119:28	X					X
Psa. 119:85		X				
Psa. 130:1		X				X
Psa. 140:9-11[10-12]	X					
Psa. 142:6[7]		X		X		
Psa. 143:3	X		X			
Psa. 143:7		X				
Psa. 144:7		X	X			
Isa. 38:10		X				

	<b>FUNCTION-ALITY/VIA-BILITY IS UPRIGHT-NESS</b>	<b>GOOD IS UP</b>	<b>BEING IN CONTROL IS BEING ABOVE</b>	<b>SOCIAL STATUS IS VERTICAL ELEVATION</b>	<b>ACCESSIBLE TO PERCEPTION/AWARENESS IS UP</b>	<b>HAPPY IS UP</b>
Isa. 38:14		X				
Isa. 38:17-18		X				
Jer. 18:20		X				
Jer. 18:22		X				
Lam. 1:13			X			
Lam. 3:16						X
Lam. 3:20						X
Lam. 3:28						
Lam. 3:29		X				
Lam. 3:55		X				X
Jonah 2:2[3]		X				X
Jonah 2:3[4]		X	X			
Jonah 2:5[6]		X	X			
Jonah 2:6[7]		X				
1QH 10:20-21		X				
1QH 10:27-28						
1QH 11:6		X				
1QH 11:7-18		X				
1QH 11:19-20		X				
1QH 13:36-39		X				
1QH 14:22-24		X				
1QH 15:2-3						
1QH 16:28-29		X				
1QH 17:3-4						
1QH 17:8-9	X		X			
1QH 18:33-34				X		X
11Q6 (Plea for Deliverance) 19:9-11						

### 6.3 Several examples discussed in greater detail

The following examples will be discussed with respect, first, to their experiential motivations, second, to any ways that they specify primary or complex metaphors, and third, to any additional information gathered from King's observations. Included in the analysis of each example will be a figure illustrating the underlying conceptual structure.

#### 6.3.1 Psalm 71:20

(30) אֲשֶׁר הִרְאִיתֵנִי צָרוֹת רַבּוֹת וְרָעוֹת תְּשׁוּב תַּחֲיִינִי וּמִתְהַמּוֹת הָאָרֶץ תְּשׁוּב תַּעֲלֵנִי:<sup>37</sup>

Psa. 71:20: You who have made me see many troubles and calamities will revive me again; *from the depths of the earth you will bring me up* again.

The italicized metaphor in Psa. 71:20 reflects the primary metaphor GOOD IS UP. The schematic concepts in the metaphor GOOD IS UP are specified to BEING IN A BAD STATE IS BEING IN THE DEPTHS OF THE EARTH. King (2012: 116-17) points out that תְּהוֹם *təhôm* 'depths' in this verse does not refer to water as it usually does.

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<sup>37</sup> Qere readings are represented in this thesis without reference to their Kethiv counterparts.




Figure 6.1. Conceptual structure motivating the metaphor from Psa. 71:20

### 6.3.2 Psalm 56:13[14]

(31) קַי הַצִּלְתָּ נַפְשִׁי מִמָּוֶת הִלֵּא רַגְלִי מִיָּדָי לְהִתְהַלֵּךְ לִפְנֵי אֱלֹהִים בְּאֹר הַחַיִּים:

Psa. 56:13[14]: For you have delivered my soul from death, yes, *my feet from falling, that I may walk* before God in the light of life.

The italicized metaphor in Psa. 56:13[14] reflects the primary metaphor FUNCTIONALITY/VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS. The schematic concepts in the metaphor FUNCTIONALITY/VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS specify to BEING FUNCTIONAL IS BEING UPRIGHT AND ABLE TO WALK. However, it may be the case that another primary metaphor such as GOOD IS BRIGHT/BAD IS DARK unifies with it, which would make it a complex metaphor.




Figure 6.2. Conceptual structure motivating the metaphor from Psa. 56:13[14]

### 6.3.3 Psalm 44:25[26]

(32) כִּי שָׁחָה לְעַפְרָר נַפְשֵׁנוּ דְבַקְהָה לְאַרְצָא בְטַגְנוּ:

Psa. 44:25[26]: For our soul is *bowed down to the dust*; our belly *clings to the ground*.

Psa. 44:25[26] is set within the context of military defeat and the question of why God has hidden his face from his people. The italicized metaphor in sentence (32) reflects the primary metaphors FUNCTIONALITY/VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS and BEING IN CONTROL IS BEING ABOVE.

The term נֶפֶשׁ *nepes* translated here as ‘soul’ can also be translated anatomically as ‘neck’ or ‘throat’. Thus, “For our neck is bowed to the dust, our belly clings to the ground” (Alter 2019: 2976-977). Translated this way and put in contrast with the imperative of the next verse “Rise up; come to our help!” (Psa. 44:26[27]), the psalmist’s incapability to help because of his posture, with his neck in the dust and his belly on the ground, is put in contrast to God’s ability to help if only he would rise up. Here we see not only the concept of being *ready to act* when upright but also the *ability to act* in an upright position. Thus,

I have suggested that the metaphorical expressions in sentence (32) are partially motivated by the primary metaphor FUNCTIONALITY/VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS.

Furthermore, if we see defeat rather than sorrow or emotional distress in the posture of the psalmist in Psa. 44:25[26], then the psalmist, representing the whole nation,<sup>38</sup> describes himself in the position of a forced defeat, perhaps implying someone standing over him and putting his neck in the dust. The psalmist is the controlled and his enemy is his controller. Thus, I have suggested that the metaphorical expressions in sentence (32) are partially motivated by the primary metaphor BEING IN CONTROL IS BEING ABOVE.

After unifying, these primary metaphors yield the complex metaphor BEING IN CONTROL AND ABLE TO ACT IS BEING UPRIGHT AND ABOVE ANOTHER ENTITY. In this verse, it is construed negatively and specifies to BEING DEFEATED AND INCAPABLE OF HELPING ONESELF IS HAVING ONE'S NECK IN THE DUST AND ONE'S BELLY STUCK TO THE GROUND.

With regards to Psa. 44:25[26], King points out that, in comparison with having a bowed head, “the verb *קבץ* [*dbq* ‘to stick’] evokes a much lower posture, ‘stuck’ to the ground” (2012: 128). He suggests that verses such as this one “demonstrate lower physical posture entailing greater distress” (2012: 129).

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<sup>38</sup> MEMBER OF A CATEGORY FOR THE CATEGORY part-for-whole metonymy (see Kövecses 2010: 181)




Figure 6.3. Conceptual structure motivating the metaphor from Psa. 44:25[26]

#### 6.3.4 Job 7:8-10

(33) לֹא־תִשׁוּרְנִי עֵינַי רְאִי עֵינֶיךָ בִּי וְאִינִי: כָּל־הָעָנָן נִגְלָה בְּנִי יוֹרֵד אֲשֶׁאֹל לֹא יַעֲלֶה: לֹא־יָשׁוּב עוֹד לְבֵיתוֹ וְלֹא־יִפְרָחוּ עוֹד מִקְמוֹ:

Job 7:8-10: The eye of him who sees me will behold me no more; while your eyes are on me, I shall be gone. As the cloud fades and vanishes, so *he who goes down to Sheol does not come up*; he returns no more to his house, nor does his place know him anymore.

The italicized metaphor in Job 7:8-10 reflects in this context the primary metaphor ACCESSIBLE TO PERCEPTION/AWARENESS IS UP. The schematic concepts in the metaphor ACCESSIBLE TO PERCEPTION/AWARENESS IS UP specify to BEING IMPERCEPTIBLE IS BEING IN SHEOL.




Figure 6.4. Conceptual structure motivating the metaphor from Job 7:8-10

### 6.3.5 Psalm 40:2[3]

(34) וַיַּעֲלֵנִי מִבּוֹר שְׁאוֹן מְטִיט הַגֶּן נִקְמָם עַל־סַלְע רַגְלִי כּוֹנֵן אֲשֶׁר־י:

Psalm 40:2[3]: He drew me up from the pit of destruction, out of the miry bog, and set my feet upon a rock, making my steps secure.

The metaphorical expressions in Psa. 40:2[3] may reflect the primary metaphors HAPPY IS UP and GOOD IS UP. In this verse, David refers to God bringing him up from a lowly, negative place to a high, good place. HAPPY IS UP seems especially likely given the following verse which begins, “He put a new song in my mouth, a song of praise to our God” (Psa. 40:3[4]), reflecting David’s good emotion. GOOD IS UP reflects a focus on David’s situation more than just on his emotion. David was in a bad situation; he was metaphorically down in a pit of destruction and in a miry bog. God caused his situation to change from a bad one to a good one; he brought him up and set his feet upon a rock. Though not included in this analysis, there is also a possibility that UPRIGHTNESS is in view in this passage. The Hebrew terms קוּם *qwm* ‘to cause to stand’ (Clines 1993-2011: Vol. 7,



234) and כון *kwn* ‘to establish’ (Clines 1993-2011: Vol. 4, 373) have been collocated in other parts of the Hebrew Bible to refer to making entities upright (cf. 2 Sam. 7:12-13).

After unifying, these primary metaphors yield the complex metaphor BEING IN A GOOD SITUATION WITH GOOD EMOTIONS IS BEING IN A HIGH LOCATION. This specifies to BEING IN A GOOD SITUATION WITH GOOD EMOTIONS IS BEING SET HIGH ON A ROCK. Construed negatively, it specifies to BEING IN A SITUATION OF DESTRUCTION WITH BAD EMOTIONS IS BEING IN A PIT AND A MIRY BOG.

Another primary metaphor that may unify with HAPPY IS UP and GOOD IS UP in motivating the metaphorical expressions in sentence (34) is CONSTRAINTS ON ACTIONS ARE PHYSICAL BOUNDARIES. This would suggest that additional meaning is intended in the phrase בור שאון *bôr šā’ôn* ‘pit of destruction’.

Additionally, King points out the entailment that, “if distress is being low, *relief* becomes movement upwards” (2012: 122). He suggests that Psa. 40:2[3] demonstrates this entailment with its use of עלה *lh* ‘to cause to go up’ in the hiphil (2012: 122).

Finally, King (2012: 134) suggests that the phrases בור שאון *bôr šā’ôn* ‘pit of destruction’ and טיט היגון *ṭîṭ hayyāwēn* ‘miry bog’ are more novel reflections of the VERTICALITY image schema mapped onto situations of physical and emotional distress. This is especially in contrast to a conventional phrase such as יורדי בור *yôradê bôr* ‘those who go down to the pit’. Thus, in the PMT framework, I suggest that בור שאון *bôr šā’ôn* ‘pit of destruction’ and טיט היגון *ṭîṭ hayyāwēn* ‘miry bog’ may be viewed as more novel reflections of GOOD IS UP than יורדי בור *yôradê bôr* ‘those who go down to the pit’.




Figure 6.5. Conceptual structure motivating the metaphor from Psa. 40:2[3]

### 6.3.6 Psalm 62:4[5]

(35) אֵף מְשֹׂאֲתוֹ | יַעֲצוּ לְהַדִּיחַ? יִרְצוּ כְּגֵב בְּפִי | בְּרָכּוּ אֲבִיקְרָבָם? קַלְלוּ-סֵלָה:

Psalm 62:4[5]: They only plan *to thrust him down from his high position*. They take pleasure in falsehood. They bless with their mouths, but inwardly they curse. *Selah*

The italicized metaphor in Psa. 62:4[5] may reflect HAPPY IS UP. If this is the case, then the high position signifies David's good emotion, perhaps because all is well so long as he metaphorically remains in his high position. This then specifies to A PERSON FORCED BY OTHERS TO HAVE NEGATIVE EMOTIONS IS A PERSON WHO IS FORCED DOWN FROM A HIGH

POSITION. While this is the current analysis, there is another possible way of looking at this metaphor.

It is possible that Psa. 62:4[5] reflects the primary metaphors FUNCTIONALITY/VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS and SOCIAL STATUS IS VERTICAL ELEVATION. After unifying, these primary metaphors would yield the complex metaphor A VIABLE, HIGH-STATUS PERSON IS AN UPRIGHT, HIGH PERSON. This complex metaphor then specifies a context in which another person causes the viable, high-status person to become defeated and humbled.

Based on Psa. 62:4[5] alone, this metaphor would not clearly evoke the primary metaphor FUNCTIONALITY/VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS. However, within the context of the preceding verse which speaks of attacking and battering a man who is “like a leaning wall, a tottering fence” (Psa. 62:3[4]), v. 4[5] does seem to assume that both primary metaphors are active together. This seems especially likely in light of the similar sounds in the verb הָדָדָה *haddəḥûyâ* ‘tottering’ in the phrase “tottering fence” and לְהַדִּיחַ *ləhaddîaḥ* ‘to thrust down’. This is sufficient motivation for Alter (2019: 3032) to translate the first verb as ‘shaky’ and the second as ‘to shake’.

The following figure follows the first analysis using HAPPY IS UP.




Figure 6.6. Conceptual structure motivating the metaphor from Psa. 62:4[5]

### 6.3.7 Psalm 119:28

(36) דלָפָה וּפְשִׁי מִתּוֹגָה קִמְּנִי כְדַבְרְךָ:

Psa. 119:28: *I have collapsed with intense sorrow: make me stand upright, as your word promises.* (Allen 2002: 170)

The italicized metaphors in Psa. 119:28 reflect the primary metaphors FUNCTIONALITY/VIABILITY IS UPRIGHTNESS and HAPPY IS UP. After unifying, these primary metaphors yield the complex metaphor A VIABLE, HAPPY PERSON IS A FULLY UPRIGHT PERSON. This complex metaphor is not clearly specified any further. King comments, “Restoration to an erect posture then describes rescue from distress, or the ability to withstand it” (2012: 130). Psa. 119:28 illustrates both the entrance into a state of distress (דלָפָה *dlp* ‘to collapse’) and the plea for restoration (קִמְּנִי *qwm* ‘to set upright’ (used metaphorically) in the piel).




Figure 6.7. Conceptual structure motivating the metaphor from Psa. 119:28

## CHAPTER 7

### CONCLUSION

#### 7.1 Summary of the argument

King (2012: 99-139) analyzed a pattern of metaphorical expressions in Classical Hebrew that maps the image schema VERTICALITY onto BEING IN DISTRESS. In his analysis, he treats VERTICALITY as having two sub-schemas—spatial and postural VERTICALITY. This results in a hierarchy such as the one presented in Figure 7.1. I argued, on theoretical grounds, that the higher-level metaphor should be discarded and the two lower-level metaphors be maintained.




Figure 7.1. VERTICALITY hierarchy (fourth presentation)

The theoretical basis for this adjustment to King’s organization of conceptual structure follows the framework of PMT and can be summarized as follows. King (being influenced by Lakoff (1993) and Lakoff & Johnson (1999)) organizes metaphorical conceptual structure in such a way that it does not give primary metaphors their logical role. Primary metaphors arise independently from local experience-types called primary

scenes. These experience-types are goal-oriented correlations in experience between physical and mental aspects of a momentary scene. In King's analysis, primary metaphors are not treated as independent structures; instead, they are treated as dependent structures within larger hierarchies. In my analysis, I considered the lower-level structures in Figure 7.1 to be primary metaphors. If primary metaphors are given their proper role as independent structures, then the conceptual metaphors BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE SPATIAL GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE (reflecting the source concept VERTICAL ELEVATION) and BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE POSTURAL SCALE (reflecting the source concept UPRIGHTNESS) will be viewed as independent structures, not as instances of BEING IN DISTRESS IS BEING DOWN ON THE VERTICAL SCALE (reflecting the source concept VERTICALITY) as King suggests.

I highlighted two processes that could apply to metaphorical conceptual structure. The first is *unification* in which multiple primary metaphors unify to form a complex metaphor on the conceptual level. The second is *specification* in which the source and/or target concept of a primary or complex metaphor specifies, or picks out, a conceptual instantiation of it. Thus, the schematic concept UPRIGHT ENTITY could specify A PILLAR. Importantly, specification does not (without further processes) invoke additional primary metaphors.

Within the framework of PMT, primary metaphors treated as independent entities along with the processes of unification and specification can equally account for the metaphorical expressions in King's corpus that he had based on the VERTICALITY image schema (King 2012: 99-139, 367-82). Yet an analysis within the framework of PMT better accounts for the role that experiential correlations have in motivating metaphors.

## 7.2 Significance

### 7.2.1 *A more accurate description*

Though there are numerous aspects of metaphor that are not fully accounted for in PMT, the analysis that I have offered here takes into account the role that locally-defined experience-types have in influencing conceptual structure. For this reason, assuming the legitimacy of PMT, this thesis has genuinely refined the earlier analysis of metaphors describing experiences of distress in Classical Hebrew.

Having dissolved the previously assumed connection between VERTICAL ELEVATION and UPRIGHTNESS, a result of my analysis is that metaphorical expressions previously analyzed as related to each other on the basis of shared inheritance of higher-level structure are now treated as fully independent conceptual patterns. In my thesis and in PMT generally, “[b]oth commonalities and differences among metaphors can be accounted for specifically by reference to the primitives [(i.e., primary metaphors)] which complex metaphors either do or do not share” (Grady et al. 1996: 185).

### 7.2.2 *Theoretical contribution to metaphor research in Classical Hebrew*

To my knowledge, metaphor research in Classical Hebrew has developed up to this point with minimal influence from Grady or PMT. For example, while King makes explicit use of primary metaphors in his (2012) publication, he also explicitly cites Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 45-58) as his source rather than Grady (King 2012: 34). A similar situation seems to hold in other metaphor research in Biblical Hebrew. While most of the theoretical work in this thesis is a mere juxtaposition of Grady’s ideas with those of Lakoff and Johnson’s, the refinements that Grady proposed for Lakoff and Johnson’s framework of CMT deserve to be heard in its application to metaphor research in Classical Hebrew.



### *7.2.3 An application of Primary Metaphor Theory*

Grady's (1997a; etc.) work on primary metaphors has been widely appreciated among metaphor theorists and researchers. However, there have not been many applications of the theory to sets of examples such as what we have in King's corpus, at least not many that do so within a conscientiously PMT framework. While my work remains cursory, it is still a valuable attempt to test a theoretical framework with real linguistic data.

### **7.3 Future directions: A hypothesis using the notions of evaluation and markedness**

A significant strength of PMT is the priority that it gives to conceptual structures arising from local experience-types. While valuable, there are still a host of other factors influencing metaphorical thought and language. In considering areas for future research, I would like to suggest, first, that the evaluative nature of primary source concepts such as UP and UPRIGHT and their counterparts DOWN and PRONE be given greater attention; second, that the markedness of one evaluative elaboration over the other be explored; third, that implications of evaluation and markedness be considered for the relationship between VERTICAL ELEVATION and UPRIGHTNESS in Classical Hebrew as well as other languages.

I believe tentative suggestions can be made regarding each of these areas. First, Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 14-21) have long noted the evaluative nature of what they called orientational metaphors. In their work, they proposed the metaphor GOOD IS UP; BAD IS DOWN. While Grady (1997a) did not include that metaphor in his list of primary metaphors, I have argued (see §5.5.1) for its plausibility as one. Krzeszowski (1993) has also explored the evaluative nature of image schemas, but his arguments need to be supplemented.

Supplying us with cultural and linguistic evidence, King “shows further contexts (the Hebrew conception of the universe and discourse of distress) in which ‘up’ is viewed positively and ‘down’ negatively” (2012: 101). I tentatively suggest that UP and UPRIGHT can be viewed positively while DOWN and PRONE can be viewed negatively.

Second, Channell (2000: 55) and Hampe (2005: 89-90) indicate that “we [may be] more acutely aware of negative connotations than of positive ones, both as participants in verbal communication and as analysts” (Hampe 2005: 89-90). This suggests that negative polarity is marked while positive polarity is not (see also Damasio (1994: 267) for a similar perspective from a neuroscientist). Thus, DOWN and PRONE are marked while UP and UPRIGHT are unmarked. Intuitively, a marked concept or situation captures our attention while an unmarked concept or situation does not. If a person is upright, their attention will be drawn to aspects of the scene that are most salient. The fact that it is good that they are upright is not a salient aspect of that scene; instead, their attention may be drawn toward the ability that they have in an upright position to achieve their goals (such as walking across the room and retrieving a desired object). If another person pushes them and they fall down, their attention is most likely drawn to the negativity of their situation more than to their particular lack of ability to walk across the room without changing postures. If this is true, we could recast the primary metaphor as BEING FUNCTIONAL/VIABLE IS BEING UPRIGHT; BAD IS BEING PRONE. If we juxtapose this with GOOD IS UP; BAD IS DOWN, then the negatively valued elaborations of both VERTICAL ELEVATION and UPRIGHTNESS would map to the same target concept and might even converge conceptually while the positively valued elaborations would remain distinct. If such a hypothesis can be substantiated, then the framework of PMT in its current state would need revision.

Third, because King's research focused on the negative elaborations of VERTICAL ELEVATION and UPRIGHTNESS, this hypothesis suggests that many of the examples in his corpus either do not clearly determine which source concept is intended—VERTICAL ELEVATION or UPRIGHTNESS—or they do clearly reflect one or the other source concept, but on a semantic level, they are interchangeable with language reflecting the other source concept. While this may be readily observed in examples with negatively valued metaphorical elaborations (e.g., 1QH 11:19-20), I have already pointed out in §5.4.2 that a different situation seems to hold for positively valued elaborations. Perhaps Lakens (2012) can be a starting point for research in these areas.

One of the aims of this thesis was to bring Grady's contributions to metaphor theory (i.e., PMT) to the fore so that we can see the influence it can have on current analyses. While there certainly are many factors affecting the final product of metaphorical expressions in the Hebrew Bible, Grady highlights the significant role that locally-defined correlations in experience have on metaphorical thought and language. By reanalyzing metaphors for distress from King's corpus, this thesis shows significant ways that a theory built around primary scenes and primary metaphors affects the analysis of linguistic data. By giving attention to this piece of the puzzle of metaphor, we have been able to see the bigger picture with more clarity and to gain insights that recent research has overlooked.

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