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CULTURALLY THERAPEUTIC APPROACHES TO PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION: FORMULATIONS, INTERVENTIONS, AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE

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ABSTRACT

CULTURALLY THERAPEUTIC APPROACHES TO PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION:

FORMULATIONS, INTERVENTIONS, AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE

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November, 2021

Dissertation supervised by Elizabeth Fein, Ph.D.

Aims. Though psychologists are generally well-positioned to implement micro- and macro-level interventions from their roles as clinicians, educators, researchers, and consultants, there is a paucity of formal guidance on how to approach client-generated or structural prejudice and discrimination. The current study addresses this literature gap by integrating previous literature and implementation models from a related field toward a novel treatment approach.

Background. A critical literature review supported intervention-focused conceptualizations of "supremacism" and demonstrated that mutually reinforcing micro- and macro-level discrimination generates demographic disparities in safety, liberty, and well-being. This typically emerges in the United States as White supremacist heteropatriarchy while distinct discrimination hierarchies also appeared in every nation-state and in pre-history. Syndromal patterns of personality difficulty, cognitive distortion, emotional disturbance, and behavioral aggression consistently constituted individual expressions.

Methods. This project employed multi-sited ethnography, situated grounded theory, and critical analysis. Field study included interviews with "exit work" practitioners (N=11) from four countries who staffed "violent far-right extremist" and organized crime counter-recruitment programs. Approximately 75% were former neo-Nazis or White supremacists; approximately 36% had advanced mental health care degrees.

Results. This study articulated exit work examples which address severe supremacist ideological presentations through assessment protocols, case formulations, and intervention approaches. Exit organizations developed these strategies since the 1990s and report positive intervention outcomes.

Conclusions. Exit interventions were closely related to existing psychological interventions. The project concludes by integrating exit workers' collective experiences with the existing intervention literature. This "exit-informed approach" introduces interventions for micro- and macro-level supremacism in an actionable format.

DEDICATION

To the memory of my grandmother, who taught me how to approach the world with curiosity,

and showed me that perfection is not a prerequisite for deep love.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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Introduction

The startling changes occurring within some of my psychotherapy clients, family members, and childhood friends during Donald Trump's campaign and administration motivated this project. Their intensified bitterness, paranoia, and aggression reminded me of stories I heard growing up, about bigotry and violence perpetrated by my parents' generation and the generations before them in their deliberate attempts to maintain White segregation and social status over other groups based on race, class, and heteropatriarchy. The changes represented in both geographical locations of my youth—Southern and Midwestern United States—did not offer a single portrayal of a Trump enthusiast. The temptation of reductionistic and simplifying stereotype notwithstanding, in my experience such changes were represented across all sectors of rural, poor, criminal, uneducated *and* educated, law abiding, and middle-class people—expressed frequently as a revival of vigilantism via Confederate "rebel" pride in some, and an entrenchment of moralism via bureaucratic xenophobic religiosity on the other. And, sometimes both at the same time.

Not altogether dissimilar to a broader narrative simplification, an initial temptation might be to attribute such dynamics to the particularities of my personal history. Given its rural, poor, white, working class, minimally educated locations, one might "expect" the patterns and changes described above among family, friends and acquaintances—a prototypical "republican" and "MAGA crowd." I've already suggested that such stereotyping simplification would be erroneous, an observation driven to the fore when I noticed similar trends among some of my clients in therapy—in an urban, middle class to affluent, educated, overwhelmingly "democratic" setting—as well as among acquaintances and friends who fall outside of the "typical" Trump

supporting stereotype. Something more "widespread", something "cultural" and/or historical, something structural and systemic was happening here, and in this moment, I suspected. Moreover, whatever was happening, whatever inchoate feeling I experienced of a "time out of joint," seemed also to be broader than the United States—countries as far afield as Brazil, Poland, Russia, Hungary, Turkey, the Philippines, or India, for example, took a decided conservative policy turn, marked by a discourse and public sentiment that mirrored, in many ways, that of Donald Trump and the United States. There, as here, dramatic increases in the number and visibility of "hate" activist groups, and increasing incidents of violent attacks against nationally disenfranchised groups, were noticed.

Right from the outset, then, I noticed a dual—or perhaps parallel—kind of demand and question: "something" was happening in the broader world to which I was called, by my social position and inheritance, to be accountable, and "something" (an echo of that world?) was happening in the therapy room to which, as a clinician, right there and then, I was responsible to respond. And in both cases, I did not quite know how—at least not in the sense of an "expert" or "professional" and scientific manner; at least not with the confidence of a preparatory training.

Responding to this vague unease, and by the practical demand of a response in the therapy room, I turned for guidance—even answers—to the clinical literature and was disappointed by the dearth of resources for addressing supremacism[12] psychotherapeutically.

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[1] In *Mirriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary,* "supremacy" is "the quality or state of being supreme; *also*: supreme authority or power" (2011, p. 1257). Supremacy, as in "White supremacy," or "male supremacy," asserts superiority. To avoid conflating supremacism for genuine superiority, this text avoids using "supremacy" when describing dominating groups.

[2] The shift from White supremacy to supremacism present throughout much of this text followed encounters with literature reporting pre-historical, historical, and international examples of societal domination (colonialism, enslavement, group-based disenfranchisement), which highlight the failure of "White supremacy" to encompass supremacism's cross-cultural expressions and development in pre-European antiquity. As Sidanius and Pratto (1999) proposed, taken further in this section, domination is predicated on visible characteristics. They called race an "arbitrary" (p. 33) category for domination to undermine White supremacist explanations for racial hegemony and amplify racist supremacism as a *process* of domination rather than an essential feature of intergroup relations.

Further, it became apparent that whether the emotional lability, aggression, and paranoia occurring in some of my clients and family members could or should be addressed psychotherapeutically was up for debate despite the obvious distress their presentations caused them and others. Though psychological research findings are largely in agreement that oppression has deleterious effects on wellbeing, efforts that promote equity are often focused on supporting victims in managing discrimination rather than intervening on its sources. One barrier relates to the complexity of the problem, since interventions that effectively address inequitable dynamics may require sustained investment with individuals and communities as well as difficult to access players such as governmental and finance institutions. Psychologists are in a good position to develop and implement interventions due to our specific training in individual and institutional processes and our work as clinicians, consultants, and researchers.

The present study explores interventions that promote individual and cultural exit from supremacism toward a more egalitarian society. Supremacism, as used here, includes but is more than holding prejudicial beliefs. Supremacism is the individual or structural support for or acceptance of social domination and discriminatory denial of a subordinated person's or group's access to resources, safety, and social influence. Supremacism is a current socioeconomic and cultural reality so entrenched with historical precedents that the world histories' not acknowledging the oppression of subordinated groups are acts of omission, complacence, and complicity.

It is also a call for psychologists to become more fluent in the history of supremacism that dominant groups and their members perpetuate against subordinated groups and individuals and interventions for discrimination. The intervention recommendations at the conclusion of this document rely on interviews with exit workers located in four countries and intervention

literature produced by researchers of clinical and structural interventions. Exit programs provide a social service to those trying to extract themselves from a totalizing group membership such as political or religious groups, organized criminality or gangs, and cults. The exit workers interviewed are primarily former supremacists and mental health care professionals who support individuals trying to leave supremacist or criminal groups and impacted loved ones.

This project responded to the need for increased research in psychological assessment and psychotherapeutic treatment for supremacist presentations. The barriers to individual change created by structural limitations, expressed by exit workers as well as by Metzl and Hansen (2013) resulted in a broadening of scope to include structural interventions. Unlike related humanities, instruction in psychology typically offers little foundation in historical or contemporary real-world occurrences of social domination and oppression. Existing diversity-focused competencies in psychological training fail to prepare future clinicians for the prevalence of supremacism they will almost certainly encounter in the session room, within the institutions employing them for clinical positions or consultation, and in society. Further, the field does not take accountability for how it perpetuates supremacism, and thus does not instruct those entering the field in how to do so.

Part 1 clarifies this study's formulation of supremacism, addresses psychology's role, historically situates the topic, and outlines the project's methodology. Part 2 reviews the foundational histories, concepts, previous intervention literature, and critical analysis that contributed to the project's concluding recommendations. Part 3 reports the findings of an ethnographic study with exit workers regarding their interventions and personal exits from supremacist activism. Part 4 then discusses these findings in light of previous literature and concludes with a novel approach for addressing individual and structural supremacism.

Chapter 1: Focus and Frame

Formulating Prejudice and Discrimination

It makes good sense that an intervention-focused project needs a clear and solid conceptualization of what exactly supremacism is, and who supremacists "are." As it is, though, the literature often provides varied and contradictory answers and responses to that very demand. Indeed, prefiguring the results of this study, so did the interview data. Even so, however, I needed a working definition of supremacism and supremacists, being open of course to modify and adapt such understandings by the experience and emerging understanding of the data and results. Below, I provide a narrative of the trajectory towards a working definition of supremacism and supremacists, inclusive of individual supremacists and structural supremacism, and extending to the ways supremacist policies are directly supported in action and policy, as well as the dynamics of complicity with supremacist policies through inaction.

One scholarly route to the delineation (and "understanding") of supremacy and supremacists is to catalogue, theorize, and/or research supposed distinguishing traits, characteristics, or psychological structures and dynamics. Even so, however, individual differences displayed by those who express supremacist characteristics present a challenge for innovating interventions. How do we identify effective interventions with so many unique individuals? By analogy, whereas one is able to catalogue distinguishing features for mental health disturbances and syndromes, the presentation of such disturbances may differ widely across individuals. In such clinical instances, a "way out" is to use a standard psychological case formulation; it makes sense to do the same for supremacist presentation, defined by McWilliams (1999) as, "how the person's symptoms, mental status, personality type, personal history, and current circumstances all fit together and [make] sense" (p. vii). In addition to helping structure

the project, considering supremacism through a case formulation lens was especially useful when weighing the benefits and limitations of classifying supremacism as a diagnosable mental disorder.

McWilliams's respective identification of symptoms, mental status, personality type, personal history, and current circumstances as data for case formulation, can be understood as follows. *Symptoms* signal an underlying problem and may cause distress for the individual and negatively impact those around them. Somewhat simplistically, it is an externalized expression of an internal condition, conflict, or—especially in a medical or biological sense—"cause". In psychological intake assessment, *mental status* refers to general appearance, comportment, and the presence or absence of bizarre beliefs or perceptions. Applied to supremacism, these may include tattoos and clothing signifying membership in a supremacist activist group, visible emotional lability (aggression, hostility, paranoia), belief in conspiracy theories, and the assumptions about others found in discriminatory views. *Personality* refers to personal traits and states that make up a person's unique character ("supremacist personality type(s)" is covered extensively later in the dissertation, in discussions about supremacist personality state and trait, social dominance orientation, and authoritarian personality). Lastly, *Personal history and current circumstances* describe events over a lifespan, inclusive of environmental factors. These are focused on as contextual and structural issues, intergenerational transmission, supremacist histories, and particular manifestations of supremacism.

If the scholarly investigation of supremacism at the level of the psychological and the orbit of the individual poses theoretical and intervention difficulties, another route—that of supremacism expressed at the level of culture—proves as, if not more, thorny and resistant to definitional capture. This difficulty is exacerbated even more if one wishes to demonstrate the

relational nature of the cultural and the psychological. To address cultural supremacism, the project focused on structural forces in terms of measurable and quantifiable factors such as those affecting access to resources, safety, and social influence. This structural framework for supremacism leaned heavily on Metzl and Hansen's structural competency model, which attempted to avoid abstract reliance on "cultural" issues as explanations for client's presentations. Instead, they suggested that clinicians increase their "recognition of the ways in which social and economic forces produce symptoms[3]" (2013, p. 126). By centering measurable impact and access issues, a structural formulation accounts for the mechanisms of change influencing supremacism's proliferation or reduction, regardless of whether it manifests within the individual or more diffusely across culture.

Kendi's (2019) reframing of racism[4] emphasized that *support* for policy and *inaction* impacts outcomes as much as direct expressions of racist ideas (p. 13). The current formulation of supremacism integrated Kendi's logic that "inaction" supports racist policies as much as active support (2019), and extended the definition of supremacism to include support for supremacist policies through one's actions or inaction, or expressing supremacist ideas. This formulation of supremacism opposes the view of supremacism as a phenomenon on the cultural fringes, or "extreme," proposing instead that Western cultural development through colonialization, genocide, and enslavement structured the polity such that supremacism remains inextricable and culturally pervasive. In this context, complacency, inaction, and legitimized structural supremacism measurably contribute to subordinated groups' disenfranchisement. The destructive impacts of such structural supremacism, complacency and inaction easily outpace the

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[3] For this project, expressions of supremacism are viewed as "symptoms"
[4] "Racist: One who supporting a racist policy through their actions or inaction or expressing a racist idea …
Antiracist: One who is supporting an antiracist policy through their actions or expressing an antiracist idea." (Kendi, 2019, p. 13).

most virulent forms of so-called "extremist" supremacism.

Who are Supremacists? The current project seeks to remove barriers to intervention and make identifying individual and structural supremacism easier. Despite the focus fringe supremacist activists are given in the literature and media, they have a notable yet limited impact on society, because their movements are restricted legally and by the court of public opinion; their radical presentation risks attention to the neglect of insipid supremacisms of everyday life which then remain unacknowledged or even condoned but are in fact more pernicious tools of inegalitarianism. Intervention projects that map social problems risk creating a psychic distance between their audience and the "other." Direct focus on maladaptive human behaviors magnifies them, so the lived real-world presentations are more difficult to see in their unassuming forms: the grandparent, the neighbor, the teacher, the religious leader. Yet when we ask how a society comes to legitimize slavery, genocide, internment camps, and segregation, we must also face the reality that a large percentage of society condemns people they have never met or have only interacted with superficially.

A large body of literature from the social dominance orientation and authoritarianism research tradition provided some guidance to such questions (Altemeyer, 2006; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Referred to in the present text as facets of supremacism, social dominance orientation and authoritarianism relate to individual preferences for social hierarchies, domination and submission, bigoted beliefs, and capacity for discrimination (Altemeyer, 2006; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). A detailed engagement with social dominance orientation and authoritarianism clarifies individual differences in supremacism's expression, including differences in cognition, emotion, personality, and behavior.

Hegemonic Society. Social hierarchies are the foundation of supremacism, and when a

social group has greater access to resources, safety, and social influence to the detriment of others, the society is hegemonic, or structured with dominant and subordinated social hierarchies (Gramsci, 1971; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Supremacism is a manifestation of hegemonic culture that has variable institutional, local, and individual expressions. Some anthropologists have assumed cultural hegemonies to be universal to human social structures (Lévi-Strauss, 1944). Their critics have cautioned that assumptions about social hierarchies' ubiquity apply fallacies of presentism and project today's dominant frameworks of social organization onto antiquity (Pyburn, 2004). By considering alternative interpretations for archaeological data, they have argued that prehistoric social roles were as likely to be "heterarchical" or "unranked or when they possess the potential for being ranked in a number of different ways" (Crumley, 1995, p. 3; Pybrun, 2004).

Archaeological science has further indicated that when societies consolidate hegemonic power into states, they tend to become more rigidly hierarchical and exchange an "ideologically based hierarchy to an economically based hierarchy" (Pyburn, 2004, p. 29). The etiology of economics thus reveals how abstracting the power exchanges in direct transactions through currencies make it possible to disproportionately allocate and accumulate power over time. It is on this basis that this project argues for economics as the language of hierarchy wherein global power is crystalized into formalized social hierarchies, or hegemonies, visible in the form of economic classes and castes, and through numerous techniques (often called "structural inequalities") which manage economic distribution.

In their exploration of global hegemony, social psychological researchers Sidanius and Pratto (1999) argued that in hegemonic states, power holders functionally depend on the labor and wealth extracted from subordinated groups to produce "positive social value" (p. 31) for

dominant groups in the form of wealth, political power, cultural influence, and status. In contrast, they found subordinated groups in the same states ubiquitously accumulated "negative social value" (p. 32) such as low social status, poor housing options, limited, often hazardous employment opportunities, low political power, and penalties. They determined power to flow based on three common distinctions: age, gender, and "arbitrary sets" such as "socially constructed group distinctions that happen to be relevant within specific situational and historical contexts" (p. 55).

The arbitrary sets used to categorize subordinated groups are typically based on visible differences so that those regulating power can less effortfully manage economic distribution (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Though the visible traits that mark subordinated classes are arbitrary and play a functional role to minimize the resource investment required to produce negative social value, arbitrary set traits often become synonymous with inferiority in the hegemonic cultural imagination. Through the production of positive and negative social value, hegemonic societies' norms and values reflect the social hierarchies that define them, and, thus, cultural forms replicate economic structures and structural inequality.

Like the critical archeological and cultural psychological theories introduced in this section, this project will suggest alternative interventions for hegemonic social organization. It argues that culturally therapeutic interventions for supremacism require reshaping economics to reduce inequitable resource distribution. It similarly views economics as the primary means for actualizing heterarchical forms of social organization—egalitarianism and democracy—that are currently culturally idealized and structurally devalued.

Psychology's Role

This project sees the relative lack of attention by the organized leadership of the

American Psychological Association (APA)—in calls to action, task forces, and other means used to bring attention to issues of importance—as complacence and complicity in the underdevelopment of formulations of supremacism and treatment strategies for addressing individual and structural supremacist presentations. The American Psychological Association is strangely quiet regarding the role of psychologists in addressing supremacism. For example, in "APA's action plan for addressing inequality: A message from APA President Sandy Shullman, Ph.D., and APA CEO Arthur Evans, Ph.D." (Shullman & Evans, 2020) the President and CEO of the APA presented an action plan addressing racism without including clinical interventions. The absence of clinical practice is especially glaring given that the APA's website describes clinical psychology as "one of the largest specialty areas within psychology" (APA, 2014). Addressing psychology's potential for reducing supremacism is a central goal of this project.

Literature Gap. Psychology's literature gap became salient to me when, in response to a few clinical interactions with White clients' racial prejudice, I began looking for evidence supported guidance and was alarmed by how little clinical support appeared in psychological literature. Early cursory searches produced a few articles from the 1990s and 00s regarding White identity formation and racism, for example Carter et al. (2004) and Helms (1997), as well as a small stack of papers focusing on clinical interventions for client-generated racism and less for other forms of supremacism (Bartoli & Pyati, 2009; Guindon et al., 2003; Thompson & Neville, 1999). In all, I found fewer than 100 papers spanning roughly 80 years that were directly relevant to interventions for supremacism.

Accountability in Psychology. A rather curious observation is that whereas there are precious few resources for clinical intervention work with supremacy or supremacist clients and patients, this is not to say that psychology has not been called upon to "assist" in a "war on

terror" or "deradicalization". The fact of the matter is, though, that such work is deeply

problematic. There is little transparency or accountability for psychologists' work in

counterterrorism, specifically in deradicalization programs with Middle Eastern activists. [5] Here

Middle Eastern activist replaces "Jihadist," "foreign fighter," and "homegrown terrorists" in

response to scholars and historians of Islam, who explained that, as applied by the security

industries, their use represents cultural misunderstandings of contextual nuances (Baidhawy,

2011; German & Robinson, 2018; Hazelwood, 2019; Streusand, 2006). When employed in

counterterrorism and other security industries, psychologists are implicated in their cultural

misinterpretations, biased assumptions, and unethical behavior.

Lacking well-developed guidance and agreement within the field, psychologists in these

areas are vulnerable to the formulations and treatment standards dictated by their employers and

political powers, rather than guided by client safety and well-being. A critical analysis of

counterterrorism literature supports this position and models how psychologists can develop

structural competencies in these areas. Then in Part 4, this analysis contributes to culturally

therapeutic structural intervention recommendations.

Exit programs are often categorized within counterterrorism efforts (Bjørgo & Horgan,

2009; Koehler, 2017a). This raises concerns due to psychologists' history of unethical interaction

within counterterrorism (Hoffman et al., 2015). The infamous ethical compromise, malpractice,

and abuse in the practice of psychology at CIA black sites[6] was published following an APA

internal investigation, in what has come to be called "the Hoffman report" (Hoffman et al.,

2015). Psychology has a responsibility to assess and account for overlaps between standard

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[5] The term "Middle Eastern activist" is an imperfect replacement for a problematic labeling system that began with security agencies' scattershot targeting of a loosely assorted group of people based on ethnicity and stereotype rather than more specific characteristics.
[6] (*viz.,* Guantanamo Bay and others)

clinical practice in deradicalization settings in prison environments and other governmental sites, and the ethical violations described by the Hoffman report. For instance, psychologists have historically worked in the coercive or mandated treatment of Middle Eastern activists and the gathering of political information masquerading as exit work or psychological treatment (Hoffman et al., 2015; Jackson, 2016; Demant et al., 2008).

The APA's leadership mirrors counterterrorism agencies in their infamous resistance to transparency in the APA's role in counterterrorism operations at CIA black sites (Hoffman et al., 2015). The APA's leadership was so entrenched in its ethical compromise that they defended its 2005 PENS guidelines—which permitted psychologists to take part in torturing the enemies of the United States government—for an entire decade as they obscured and downplayed the role of psychologists to APA membership and the public (Aldhous, 2015; LoCicero et al., 2016). While the APA incident of torture appears to be one of few such direct engagements by psychologists to partner with the state as a political implement and engage in ethically comprised positions, counterterrorism agencies have maintained their well-established trajectory of bias and discrimination, especially against Middle Eastern activists in counterterrorism operations (Lindahl, 2017; German & Robinson, 2018; Pettinger, 2017).

Psychologists continue to lack guidance for ethically addressing supremacism or the related field of Middle Eastern activism, which counterterrorism agencies lump together under labels like "violent extremism" or "radicalization." The APA's protracted ethical fiasco vis-à-vis "enhanced" interrogation revealed the problems with over-relying on the regulations and laws of any government-associated clinical setting rather than establishing stable and transparent ethical guidelines for clinicians to carry into all mandatory treatment settings. Ethical guidelines of this nature should be predetermined in accordance with responsibility to patients rather than

conforming to government demands or employer agendas. The implications for ethical practice in psychology are immense.

For the field of psychology to sincerely engage in supremacism reducing practices, it must also address its own supremacism. Abuses of power, political motivations, and complicity with torture apply to the various carceral institutions in which psychologists conduct mandated interventions with political activists and discriminated against groups, despite their role in structural supremacism and ongoing torture measures such as solitary confinement practices (Bierie & Mann, 2017; Koehler, 2017a). To return to this study's primary concerns, psychology's motivations in deradicalization and exit work, its duty to mandated clients versus employers, and its complicity in the maintenance of supremacism's many structures deserve serious exploration. While this project works to address the gap in research and development of structural competencies, there is much work to do to understand why our leading professional organization has neglected serious inquiry into this area of interest and how to best address the systemic issue of supremacism in psychology (Collela et al., 2017; Fernando, 2017).

Exit-Informed Interventions in Psychology. Exit programs were first developed by former supremacists and began integrating mental health care professionals into their program structures and technical innovation in the last 20 years. By bringing together existing psychological intervention literature with techniques suggested by exit workers, the current project offers several evidence-informed suggestions for intervening with supremacism. At the same time, the exit tradition being drawn from is in progression, so the suggestions here may benefit from continued modification that reflects advancements in exit. Similarly, addressing clients' discrimination, bigotry, and related personality disturbances has only recently gained some momentum in the field of psychology, and reliable outcomes data for treating supremacism

is needed to assess what techniques are most appropriate.

Therefore, the recommendations made here are a call for further outcomes research and intervention modification. They therefore contribute to, but do not in themselves represent an evidence-informed basis for recommended treatments, which I have argued is a failing of psychology; a failure made more egregious by the unwillingness to implement suggestions, some as old and historical as 80 years already. The present study supplements such existing suggestions and offers direction from qualitative interview data representative of exit groups' practical intervention work with supremacists over a 30-year period. The study concludes by presenting the information in a workbook format for ease of implementation so that the work of building an evidence basis for treating client supremacism can continue.

Finally, conceptualizing supremacism as therapeutically treatable suggests, on some level, formulating it as a mental health disorder, and therefore arguments for categorizing supremacism as a personality disorder, mental health disorder, and feature of personality are examined in this text. The work that can be achieved by such a designation must be considered alongside potential drawbacks, for instance, the potential that these analyses would come to excuse supremacism and facilitate avoidance of consequences rather than augmenting accountability practices.

Ethical Considerations

Three ethical considerations guided many of the current study's decision points—potentially overtaxing research participants, possible counterproductive impacts, and complicity with unethical counterterrorism practices. In addition to a personal commitment to ethics in research, exit literature warned that careless researchers could strain exit groups (RAN, 2016). For the first of these concerns, methodological "safeguards" were crucial, for example a

commitment to action research that provided a concrete deliverable for participants.

The latter ethical dilemmas were more difficult to address concretely. Having the opposite intended effect is a potential that should be closely considered by intervention research. In this case, I feared that interventions suggested here could deepen, rather than reduce, existing discriminatory practices, such as is described in examples from judiciary interventions (Hirsh & Cha, 2017). Yet, unintentional harm is an unavoidable risk when those working from within positions of privilege attempt to address present and past inequities. Anxiety about causing further harm have prevented White people in America, including myself, from acting. Upon deeper reflection, I also realized that the internalized pressure to "not hurt anyone" has functioned as a psychological defense, displacing my own fears of being hurt and my desire for protection onto an imagined "other." Accepting that even unintended consequences provide more data, this text is both a call to action and an explicit invitation for discussion, debate, and critique.

Lastly, the angle with which the project approached interventions came under a different scrutiny when I discovered that exit groups are categorized as a form of counterterrorism intervention by the field of terrorism studies. As I explored counterterrorism's carceral practices and mapped the well-developed connections between corrections, prisons, and counterterrorism agencies, the information sat with me awkwardly in relation to the fundamentally destructive, rather than restorative, forces of intergenerational incarceration in my own family, which, in my observation, has served to deepen my family's racial prejudices, White victimization narratives, and aggressive reactions to "dethroned masculinity" (Brown, 2019).

In contrast to these views, the impressions I gathered from counterterrorism research did not fit the sense of effusive warmth, care, and earnest desire to intervene on supremacism I

gained in my hours of interviews with exit workers, nor with their tendency to work exclusively with voluntary clients and their supportive focus on redemption rather than retribution. In response to ethical concerns related to counterterrorism in exit and psychology, how exit work is positioned in counterterrorism and the stark contrast between the treatment of former supremacists and other similarly classified political activists was emphasized and discussed in chapters focused on exit work and counterterrorism.

Between Gilded Ages and the Changing Landscapes of Supremacism

Supremacist milieus' adaptability to the cultural landscape over time allows their survival and presents a challenge for researchers who must identify and interpret supremacist trends (Blee, 2018). This section introduces several instructive examples: individual supremacist presentations, structural supremacism, and supremacist populism. Their historical parallels reveal stable and emerging trends in supremacism and suggest areas of examination needed to identify supremacism's etiology.

The development of postbellum emergent racist organizations, the legal ascension of the Third Reich, the adoption of the Southern Strategy by American politicians, and entrance of the self-described "alt-right" into American right-wing populism punctuate 150 years of supremacist history. Their distinct and corresponding relationships to cultural norms, economics, legality, technology, targeted groups, and violence offer much toward understanding the cocreation of supremacism and culture. First, a portrayal of the Ku Klux Klan and the Alt-Right illustrate the emergence of popular supremacism occurring centuries apart but within analogous economic contexts which brings to relief the historically consistent effects of particular structural forces. A similar approach then examines their correlations with the American Southern Strategy, whose legitimized supremacism was perpetrated by national political leaders. At the section's closing,

relevant themes from these histories are connected to the project's data set and the intervention strategies recommended at the project's conclusion.

Scholars use "Gilded Age," sardonically coined by Twain (1873), to mark the cultural and economic resemblances between the end of the 18th and beginning of the 21st century (HoSang & Lowndes, 2019). Twain's Gilded Age described a failed promise for a "golden era" following the Civil War, as the exploitation of formerly enslaved Black Americans, industrial workers, the urban poor, and the environment stood in stark contrast to the excesses of America's Gilded class (Nichols & Unger, 2017). The mirrored demographic divides along the lines of race, class, and gender between both Gilded Ages and their corresponding surges in regressive populism speak to the impact economic structures and technology have on supremacism (HoSang & Lowndes, 2019).

The First and Second Gilded Ages most striking parallel is the adoption of globalization as the dominant economic system. Jacks et al. describes the birth of economic globalization around 1870, as a shift in fiscal policy by major imperialist powers from protectionism to relatively low-barrier global trade agreements, global industrialization, and technological boom (2010). Technological shifts alchemized working class labor into wealth, as globalized circulating wealth returned from foreign markets to port at the offices of large global finance managers. In this way, globalization, incorporation, and technological advancements favored Northern industrialism and economically alienated the war-devastated South. Twain's criticism proved to be incisive, and Gilded Era economic reorganization deepened Southern postwar poverty and intensified the racial and class tensions implicated in both surges of the Ku Klux Klan (Blee, 2018; Jacks et al., 2010; Trachtenberg, 2007).

The context within which the KKK emerged supports Harvard economist Rodrik's

(2017) argument that scapegoating is a hallmark response of supremacist populist leaders to sudden economic precarity. The KKK started in Tennessee, when a group of men responded to postwar precarity by forming a paramilitary group (Blee, 1991; Simi & Futrell, 2010). The Klan's use of scapegoating as a response to economic and cultural change is exemplified in a Klan Grand Wizard's 1871 appeal to Senate, where he defended the necessity of the Klan by racializing the economic devastation of the South (Blee, 1991). His speech rhetorically separated the "great insecurity" faced by "Southern Whites" from postwar economic sanctions and the changing economic landscape and displaced it onto a fantasy of Black violence. In contrast to his appeal, the Klan worked to defend White Protestant men's position as the Southern ruling class and maintain entrenched systems of privilege through a campaign of intimidation, sexual violence, and physical torture against Black Southerners (Blee, 1991). Furthermore, "great insecurity" accurately described the Southern landscape, White and Black, as international trade deals dropped the prices of Southern agricultural products, and post-war penalties sent profits North.

Around the turn of the Twentieth Century, enough popular support gathered to meaningfully disrupt globalization's unfettered wealth accumulation and "the encroachment of the powerful few on the rights of many" (La Follette, 1913, p. 760; Nichols & Unger, 2017). Progressive Era reformers addressed reforms in electoral policies, education, suffrage, workers' health and safety, labor laws, and environmental protections (Nichols & Unger, 2017). It is notable that the Progressive reform efforts carried shadows of the supremacism they worked against, and trends in humanitarian movements are as evident as those in supremacist movements. Progressive movements were largely segregated and not universally interested in human equity, and the Progressive reforms did not drastically alter entrenched patterns of

structural hegemony. Still, reforms did greatly shift the living conditions of some of the urban poor and advanced ideals of socioeconomic equality and humanitarianism. They also angered those who wanted to conserve existing social hierarchies.

Progressive movements fell under attack from the state, economic elites, and civilian supremacists who enacted "countersubversive campaigns . . . against immigrants, racial, ethnic, and religious minorities, radicals, reformers, and antiwar activists" (Goodall, 2013, p. 1). Backlash efforts were made more successful by their use of new technologies, such as the use of propaganda like "The Birth of a Nation," released in 1915. The film became widely popular and is often credited with the sweeping shifts in culture at the end of the Progressive Era. When World War I began, the weakened Progressive Era completely gave way to a period of regressive nationalism packaged alongside religious moralism.

In the fertile soils of economic instability, increased migration, rapid technological changes, cultural shifts, WWI nationalism, national urbanization, and the Northern migration of millions of Southern Black Americans, the Birth of a Nation inspired Southern revivalist minister William J. Simmons to revive the KKK (Blee, 1991; Kendi, 2017). Joined by Elizabeth Tyler and Edward Clarke, the team revamped the Klan by applying a corporate model that commodified hatefulness and Protestantism through "modern marketing and advertising techniques" (Blee, 1991, p. 21). In one application of corporate technologies, Klan members would travel nationwide as scouts and then operationalize the local context of Protestant communities with instructions to "scapegoat local 'enemies,'" then "offer the Klan as a solution" (Blee, 1991, p. 21). As the Klan's targets grew to include "Catholics, Jews, nonwhites, Bolsheviks, and immigrants" (Blee, 1991, p. 21), so did its earning potential and popularity. Its paid membership boomed to roughly 4 million members by the mid-1920s, making it one of the

most popular American social clubs of its era (Blee, 1991).

Supremacism is adaptive for survival. The KKK was situated and normalized in the
postbellum Reconstruction-era South and then again in post WWI newly corporatized Protestant
Americana. As will be discussed in more depth with the Southern Strategy, the underlying goals
of supremacism can conform to fit the demands of the environment. Though the Klan diminished
by the mid-1930s, White supremacist ideologies persisted in White Americans' public opinion,
and the Klan saw resurgences in membership in the 1950s and 1960s (Simi & Futrell, 2010). In
another example of supremacist adaptation in the 1990's, Blee (2018) illustrated shifting
supremacist configurations, as a strategic response to increased surveillance. In this case, leaders
of organized racist heteropatriarchal groups encouraged their membership to continue their
mission in "unconnected cells" (Blee, 2018, p. 21) which have been referred to as the "lone
wolf" style of supremacist activism. Since 2008, a relatively stable revival continues to flourish
and popular supremacist groups are reentering the public sphere (ADL, 2020).

In the United States, hegemonic social divisions and economic distribution largely
correspond with few token examples to the contrary, and the neoliberal era reintroduced familiar
ghosts of Reconstruction-era structural supremacism. HoSang and Lowndes (2019) report that in
the New Gilded Age, "the United States is undergoing the most massive upward transfer of
wealth it has experienced since the Gilded Age of the late nineteenth century" (p. 6). Extending
this point, Rodrik (2017) explained that capital redistribution is the known result of liberalizing
trade, "redistribution is the flip side of the gains from [liberalizing] trade. No pain, no gain. This
is standard economic fare—familiar to all trade economists, even if not voiced too loudly in the
public" (Rodrik, 2017, p. 7). In other words, changes to financial policies shift the demand to
globalized trade, also called free trade, over domestic markets and defunding social

programming. This set of policies, referred to as neoliberalism, guts domestic markets and changes the circulation of wealth so that profit returns redistribute and accumulate to the financial managing classes unless they distribute the capital back into the economy.[7]

Echoing Twain's Gilded age, the most recent example of liberalized trade corresponds with environmental shifts, such as technological advancements and mass migration, that compound wealth accumulation by the upper classes at the working classes expense (Muhammad, 2019; Neuberger, 2013; Rodrik, 2017). For instance, new technologies requiring highly educated labor forces have come to represent status, and consequently, income. At the same time, advances in automation are pushing into obsolescence many entry-skill positions which typically employ members of subordinate classes. The resources available for social programs are also spread more thinly as political instability, climate crises, and global employment markets fuel international migration rates (Allan & McElhinny, 2017).

These developments in structural supremacism fuel other manifestations of supremacism. This is evident when examining the shifting landscape of subordinated classes and characteristics of emergent supremacist populist movements. For instance, though the percentage of poor people in Western nations is rising the industries and social program funding that were stripped during the austerity policies of the neoliberal era have not been restored (Allan & McElhinny, 2017). In their absence, under resourced communities are forced to reify conflations of race, poverty, and criminality and rely on expansions within the carceral system for housing, addictions support, and youth behavioral management (Allan & McElhinny, 2017; Gruner, 2018). In another example, Hosang & Lowndes report instances where the dehumanizing language originally

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[7] Well-funded social welfare programs as exemplified in several European and Northern European economies are an example of this form of distribution and an imperfect but more equitable alternative to the United States economic model.

weaponized to justify racial segregation and mass incarceration during the Drug War is being applied to rationalize the lack of structural support received by rural White "welfare queens" (2019, p. 3).

The presence of popular supremacism is another area of correspondence between the two Gilded Ages. Popular supremacism in the current era supports arguments for supremacism's adaptability. Like supremacist movements in other eras, contemporary supremacism is making use of the latest technologies. Their online communities are successfully organizing new recruits in virtual spaces, reflecting a contemporary formation of supremacism whose diffuse virtual structure strengthens their real space presence in public street marches and protests. Philosophically, contemporary supremacism is responsive to traditional supremacist discourses and postmodern identity trends. Though recent supremacist configurations house a variety of superficially discrete philosophies, they ultimately share a supremacist worldview and investment in cultural hegemony.

A popular current in supremacist organizing, self-identified as the "Alt-Right," (Anti-Defamation League [ADL], 2020, para 1), view themselves as an alternative to the supremacism of previous generations, one which rejects mainstream conservativism while maintaining standard supremacist targets like immigration, leftist movements, and equity-based public policy change (Cooper & Jenkins, 2019). Richard Spencer, one of the movement's prolific propagandists, is responsible for coining the term, and describing it as a youth movement. While this is true in its adoption of a largely virtual propagandizing platform, generational disagreements do not prevent contemporary supremacist groups from sharing platforms, tactics, or rhetorical strategies who widely reproduce the legacies of archetypal victimhood, patriotism, and independence invoked by Tennessean Klansmen two centuries earlier.

Further complexity is introduced to contemporary supremacist movements by changes in discourses of race and gender, which is evident in grassroots supremacism of some Alt-right groups such as Patriot Prayer and The Proud Boys. HoSang and Lowndes connect these groups' roots with their White supremacist turn: "Violent masculinity is the identity and practice that brings together explicit racists with fascist people of color… [It] came out of the men's-rights and male-supremacy movements that have proliferated in the last few years among young men particularly in online imageboard communities such as 4chan and 8chan" (HoSang & Lowndes, 2019, p. 121). For them, the White supremacism of leaders like Joey Gibson, the Asian American founder of Patriot Prayer, is better assessed by neo-Nazis and White nationalists that attend his rallies than his self-identification with antiracism (HoSang & Lowndes, 2019). Similarly, they argue that the Proud Boys' identification with "'Western chauvinism,' … suggests the link between racism and patriarchy," (2019, p. 121) despite their vocal rejection of racism.

Supremacist tactics often rely on the inability or unwillingness of others to critically assess or address the contrast between their stated goals and their impacts. Plausible deniability has long been employed by mainstream power holding supremacists, whose names rarely appear on lists of "extremist" supremacists but whose ideologies and actions negatively affect the civil rights of subordinated groups in far grander ways than any underground White supremacist heteropatriarchal activist group (Kendi, 2017; Muhammad, 2019). Southern Strategy, for example, was developed for the Nixon campaign amidst public pressure to dissemble the Jim Crow caste system of physical and economic segregation between White and Black Americans (Boyd, 1970; Kendi, 2017; Perlstein, 2012). It hoped to win the White Southern vote by promising to maintain White supremacism without alienating voters who would reject such a

proposition if it were stated explicitly.

By stating its goals in the language of economic reforms rather than racial oppression, the Southern Strategy's use of plausible deniability maintained structural supremacist measures for decades (Kendi, 2017; Perlstein, 2012). Though leaked audio of an interview with political consultant Harvey LeRoy "Lee" Atwater exposed his intentional use of economic supremacism and plausible deniability to implement adverse effects on Black and poor communities, the public shock was not backed with structural changes (Perlstein, 2012). Central to the issue of plausible deniability, is the strategy's continued endorsement and implementation by Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush who staffed Atwater to consult on their campaigns (Boyd, 1970; Kendi, 2017; Perlstein, 2012). In the latter examples, the impacts of the Southern Strategy were available for assessment, and yet the lacking judicial reaction betrays such endorsement or apathy toward structural supremacism that all three presidents maintained the policies during their administrations. Even after the intentional deployment of duplicity and political manipulation was exposed by mainstream platforms, the supremacist policies and their ascendents remained intact (Boyd, 1970; Perlstein, 2012).

Supremacist history brings into relief how supremacism adapts through the use of technology, conformity and cooptation of cultural trends, and economic manipulation. Even supremacist movements occurring decades or centuries apart rely on some of the same mechanisms of propagandizing such as identifying shared targets, scapegoating, segregation, recalling tradition, plausible deniability, and encouraging desire for power over others. Many of these tactics work at the emotional level, prefiguring the need for intervention to also address emotion. Other tactics were based in structural realities, and in these cases equitable structural changes are necessary to make society less prone to supremacism. At the interstices between the

two, tactics like plausible deniability and economic manipulation require assessments of impact over stated intention for intervention success.

Several of the interventions recommended at the close of this text focus on concrete structural change to address structural supremacism via economic discrimination and access issues, economic precarity's activating impact on supremacism, and structural barriers to exit work. The supremacist histories described here corroborate exit workers' frustrations with structural limitations. Though exit work is largely focused on the individual, the structural barriers to exit work demonstrate the codependence of individual and structural supremacism. For example, exit workers reported that clients in impoverished environments have less promising outcomes than well-resourced clients. On a larger scale, exit workers in countries with strong social welfare programs evidenced fewer signs of burnout and, relatedly, less frequently voiced concern for clients' structural needs or their program's long-term continuation than exit workers in less economically supportive countries. In addition to these problems, exit workers from several groups discussed how the rise of xenophobia and other supremacist narratives in political discourses impacted their clients and their funding structures. These examples argue for the cocreation of individual and structural supremacism and support the current project's integration of structural concerns into clinical intervention.

Chapter 2: Methodology

The research paradigm for the current study is presented here in three parts. The first section, ontology, illustrates how the project came to be — prior assumptions, defining the scope, ethical concerns, and pragmatic considerations. The second part clarifies the epistemological framework — theory, methodology, discourse, and techniques for data collection and analysis. The third and final section reports on challenges and limitations faced by

the project.

Ontology

The concept of ontology refers to the most basic framing categories of social existence...

These are modes of being-in-the-world, historically constituted in the structures of human

interrelations. (James, 2006, p. 324)

In its preliminary stages, the first and broadest research question of this project was: what

avenues are available to clinical psychologists to intervene on White supremacy[8]? The obvious

answer was to use clinical training to address bigotry and discrimination when expressed in

clinical settings, thus leading to the second question: what interventions are available to

psychologists when their clients present with the various maladaptive emotional, cognitive, and

behavioral pathologies that are part-in-parcel of White supremacist ideologies?

Psychological intervention literature and training did not provide a well-developed

tradition of interventions with supremacist clients. I then looked outside the field, and developed

a third question: who is intervening on White supremacy using techniques available to

psychologists? Researchers of supremacism have developed a large body of research dedicated

to supremacist activism, often called hate groups[9], and the experience of becoming, being, and

exiting group identities. Though they clarify identity development and the relationship between

individual psychology and environment related to supremacist activism, they typically stop short

of actionable intervention techniques.

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[8] The shift from White supremacy to supremacism followed encounters with literature reporting historical and international examples of societal domination and subordination, which highlight the failure of "White supremacy" to encompass supremacism's cross-cultural expressions and the "arbitrary" selection of race as a category for domination as proposed by Sidanius and Pratto (1999).

[9] To maintain the project's orientation to measurable action and strategy, this text forgoes the term "hate groups" for supremacist or White supremacist "activist groups," highlighting the groups' function as organizations promoting social change.

Net-casting for interventions yielded various organizations working to end racism, sexism, or xenophobia through public education, community support, and legal reform. The groups tended to center relief to victims and survivors, while the sources of harm were noticeably missing from action proposals. The search term "therapy[10] with White supremacists" produced the website of a small exit program that discussed concrete action, "intervention," and other language that appealed to my clinical sensibilities: "helping people leave," "compassion," "connect with humanity" (identity preserved)[11]. They also explained their program's use of practitioners' past hate group experiences to develop counter-recruitment interventions. With a rough sketch of a research topic and cursory literature review, I approached local expert Dr. K. M. Blee who generously agreed to contribute to this project, and with her consultation, finalized the project's goal of exploring interventions for supremacism by applying qualitative methodologies to exit worker's experience and use of intervention techniques. Finally, I sent a research proposal to the group, who graciously and with much hospitality accommodated my request to contribute interviews to the study and facilitate snowball sampling.

As I became immersed in relevant literature, *e.g.,* exit, orthodox and critical terrorism studies, criminology, cultic studies, sociology, psychology, and international relations I observed discursive gaps, whose portrayal of supremacism as fringe and criminal did not account for my lived experience in White supremacist heteropatriarchal Christian culture. Moreover, their legalistic frameworks for intervention did not appropriately respond to the prejudices expressed by my clients, family, and childhood friends who inspired the study. I then situated my efforts to explain supremacism through the available literature by rooting my search in topics relating to

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[10] The Exit workers interviewed in this study do not diagnose or provide clinical treatment from their positions in Exit programs.
[11] The Exit workers and programs who participated in this study have been deidentified.

the effectiveness with which my inconspicuous church-going Grandparents propagated

supremacist ideologies. As depictions of supremacism more in line with my experience surfaced,

largely in anthropology, sociology, social psychology, cultural studies, economics, and critical

theory, the interventions concerned structural and institutional supremacy, intergenerational

transmission, and personality factors, and social norms. A final foundational question completed

the frame of this study: How can psychologists intervene on the persistent structural forces that

have maintained supremacism throughout history?

The parameter of the current study is defined by its contribution to psychology and the

avenues available to psychologists to intervene on supremacism. As defined by the APA (2017)

Multicultural Guidelines, psychologists have a range of available roles such as "clinician,

educator, researcher, [and] consultant" (American Psychological Association [APA], 2017, p.

10). Following the guideline to consider "contextual factors" (APA, 2017, p. 8) when addressing

social problems, the scope of this study is limited to interventions available for psychologists to

act on the "dynamic, nested systems that transact over time" (p. 9). As interpreted here, this

includes psychologist's interventions with individual and structural supremacism, and their

combined potential to constitute cultural level change.

Ethical Concerns and Resolutions. Returning to the ethical concerns first introduced in

Chapter 1, ethical concerns intrinsically affected the project's methodology. The first issue

related to reciprocity between researchers and participants. In a paper outlining ethics in research

with exit groups, the Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN, 2016) stated, "Sometimes the

academic attention is regarded as overwhelming...due to the small number of exit workers," (p.

3) and suggested research should confer "perceived mutual benefits" (p. 3) to both participant

and researcher. In response, a participatory action research framework was implemented into the

methodology which produced a collaborative self-study and thorough report back[12] with the primary contact group.

The second ethical concern regarded discourses within the orthodox deradicalization literature cannon, which situates a corpus of exit intervention literature. Ahistorical analyses, false equivalencies, unstated assumptions, and narrow legalistic conceptualizations of supremacism as "extreme" permeate the texts. In practice, their rhetorical issues become normalizing forces as the literature guides best practices in intervention for counterterrorism agencies and informs the creation of local and national policies. To address this, a critical literature review addressing the field's discursive trends resulted in a critical analysis that is presented in Parts 3 and 4.

Lastly, psychological interventions and research have been operationalized against subordinated groups as a disciplinary technology in support of Western ethnocentrism, racist discrimination, and patriarchal state power. This set of ethical issues highlights a tension in psychology between its investment in governmental institutions' biopolitical dominance through law and order and trends in the field to divest from these relationships. The current project's methodology responded to these ethical concerns through its commitment to critical analysis[13] and by limiting its sample to nongovernmental exit programs working with clients on a volunteer basis.

Research Questions

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[12] The 33-page report back was framed by the organizational stated questions, which I agreed not to publish and maintain for their internal use.

[13] Critical analysis includes: Exit groups' relationship to funding, direct support, and multiagency relationships with counterterrorism agencies, APA officials collusion with the Pentagon and the CIA in coercive investigation tactics and torture methods at black site military prisons (Hoffman et al., 2015; Risen, 2015), and the employment of psychologists in the field of de/radicalization in the United States and at military sites in the Middle East.

The research questions reported in this section guided semi-structured interviews.[14] The three methodological aspects described here are returned to for greater exposition later in this chapter.

Participatory Action Research. Research participants from the primary contact group consulted in the development of the following participatory action research questions, many of which reflect their self-study goals.

- What is your organizational mission, and in what ways is your organization accountable to that mission?

- Who staffs your organization, what credentials do they hold, and what roles are they positioned? How is work divided in your organization?

- What are your organization's policies and procedures? How is your staff accountable to them?

- What outcomes data have you collected? Demographic data? Self-study data?

- What programs are you currently running and how do they define success?

- How is your organization funded, and how are funds channeled within the organization?

- What is your long-term plan for program development and implementation and what steps are you taking toward these goals?

Fieldwork Data Collection. The following research questions were added to the action research questions and guided fieldwork data collection with representing 5 distinct programs.

- How are exit groups structured?

- What intervention strategies and methods are used with clients?

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[14] See Appendix 1 for an example.

- o How did they develop their strategies?

- o How have their programming and techniques changed over time?

- o How do exit workers conceptualize individual cases, supremacist activist groups, and cultural supremacism?

- How are clinicians and clinical techniques employed in exit work?

  - o What makes a non-former mental health care provider good at exit work?

- What draws exit workers to exit work?

  - o What characteristics do successful exit workers possess?

- How do exit groups integrate research and scholarship?

- How do exit groups define efficacy and track outcomes?

- How do exit workers address supremacist ideologies and violence?

Critical Analysis. A critical literature review and critical analysis assisted in formulating supremacism and assessing interventions. Critical analysis was guided by the following research questions:

- What dynamics produce supremacism individually, structurally, and culturally?

- How is supremacism maintained within these dimensions over time?

- In what ways do supremacism impact society's institutions, and how do institutions impact supremacism?

- What interventions have promising outcomes for cultural and structural exit from supremacism?

- What barriers limit sustained cultural and structural exit from supremacism?

Epistemology

A matrix is a substrate that provides structure for something else to develop (Oxford,

2020). This project's epistemological matrix consisted of four methodological scaffolds holding up all other methods and data units — grounded theory, multi-sited ethnography, participatory action research, and critical analysis. Critical analysis provided supportive to the structure by connecting theory to practice and bringing attention to negative space.

Grounded theory provided the basic methodology for data collection and analysis. Grounded theory emerged within a positivist method and was later reformulated using a postmodern framework. This latter tendency in grounded theory, called situational analysis by Clark (2005), was ultimately adopted for this study. The project also made use of the methods provided by a multi-sited ethnography framework, which provided the tools needed to reflect data collection across several sites. The tenets of participatory action research addressed my ethical commitment of reciprocity to research participants. Finally, Foucault's (1977) critical analysis, viz., theories of subjectification, knowledge production, and discursive forces helped to square the practical data collected within historic contexts.

Methodology: Grounded Theory and Situational Analysis. As reported by Charmaz (2006) her former mentors Glaser and Strauss established grounded theory amidst and responding to a wave of anti-qualitative, postpositivist sentiment. Designed as a marriage between "two contrasting-and competing-traditions in sociology...Columbia University positivism and Chicago school pragmatism and field research" (Charmaz, 2006, p. 6), the method introduced Glaser's "rigorous" "empirical" positivist tradition to Strauss's "constructed" "interpretive" and often "ethnographic" pragmatism (p. 7). As human science research shifted its definitions of acceptable inquiry toward positivistic methodologies, Glaser and Strauss are credited with establishing a rigorous and empirical qualitative method that earned legitimacy in the sciences and, ironically, collected a reputation for having "positivist assumptions" (Charmaz,

2006, p. 9).

The grounded theories developed in the current study were derived by first following

Charmaz's (2006) constructivist articulation of the method (see Figure 1) and later augmenting

this approach with Clarke's (2003, 2005, 2015) situational analysis mapping. Charmaz differed

from her mentors by holding a constructivist view of qualitative research rooted in anti-

essentialism. Charmaz's (2006) analytical products are derived by the researcher rather than

emerging organically, objectively, from the data set, which she describes this way: "My

approach explicitly assumes that any theoretical rendering offers an interpretive portrayal of the

studied world, not an exact picture of it" (p. 10). For her, all grounded theories construct reality

as truth-objects produced at the interstice of the data set and the researcher's positionality.

Charmaz's (2006) method begins with initial research questions and flexible sampling

criteria. The initial data collected is coded and analyzed into memos and additional data

collection is narrowed through theoretical sampling (see Figure 1.). Tentative theoretical

categories are assigned during this process and inform theoretical sampling wherein new data

points are introduced to answer specific questions (Charmaz, 2006).

As questions resolve, coding becomes more focused, and memos more specific. When

the data set has reached saturation or when the research questions have been sufficiently

answered, data collection stops. The researcher then sorts and integrates memos and diagrams

concepts. The results are categories of meaning and grounded theories, representing the

researchers' theories about the data set grounded closely in the data. Figure 1 shows this project's

implementation of Charmaz's method.

Figure 1.

Grounded Theory Processes, the Current Project and Charmaz (2006)

After applying Charmaz's (2006) process, the resulting grounded theories felt decisively descriptive rather than analytic. Admittedly, this may have been due to my developing skill applying the method. More importantly, some of my research questions lacked the sociological and cultural dimensions needed to accurately depict supremacism.

Clarke's (2005) situational analysis mapping method solved my epistemological problems by examining grounded theory findings through discursive construction. Charmaz's (2006) description of Clarke's work spoke directly to the data set's challenges: "[Clarke] argues that we already know much about our research sites and problems before officially collecting data and that maps are one way to make fruitful use of this knowledge" (p. 118). Clarke's situational mapping applies postmodern strategies to grounded theory by exploring presences *and* absences in the data and by situating the research questions within their discursive frameworks. After applying Clarke's diagramming technique, relational mapping, the codes and categories developed using Charmaz's method more effectively responded to the project's research questions (see Figure 2).

Figure 2.

Relational Map from Situational Analysis

Relational Map from Situational Analysis: Focus on Exit Worker Experiences

For example, the situational map of exit worker's experiences brought into relief contrasts in exit worker's descriptions of poverty, drug addiction, and suicidality. The relevant memos and codes revealed that the exit workers who reported these topics more consistently were working in contexts not supported by robust social welfare systems. I then mapped the experiences of exit workers according to their descriptions of exit workers' needs. Consistently, across groups, exit workers who reported their clients to have support meeting their basic needs in housing, medical care, and mental health care never reported[15] client homelessness or suicide

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[15] This is not a denial that these issues occur in these contexts, but that they are not foregrounded in the speech of Exit workers.

and rarely mentioned drug abuse. Further, exit groups grappling with their clients' unmet needs became distressed during these discussions and showed more signs of burnout — this realization connected economic and structural literature with exit worker experiences through *silences* rather than *presences*. I returned to the data set another time and compared observable distress in exit workers speech (through words related to stress, worry, and frustration), differences in the frequency and duration of discussions about client needs, and organizational impact statements.

These data points contributed to a theory about the impact of economic deprivation and social welfare systems on exit work, which was later conceptually supported in member checks with an exit worker mental health care practitioner and an international expert in exit work. It is returned to in Results and Discussions.

Methodology: Multi-Sited Ethnography. A self-reflexive critique of ethnography is widely accepted within anthropology and accounts for the method's development as a tool used by colonial powers to increase their understanding of groups they intended to colonize (Clair, 2003; Clifford & Marcus, 1986; Griffin, 2000; Marcus & Fischer, 2014). Similarly, psychology's Eurocentric biases are more recently established (Pederson, 2003; Poortinga, 1995), which is propelling psychologists to increase their cultural sensitivity and awareness by adopting self-reflective positions and increasingly integrating qualitative methods such as ethnography (Griffin, 2000). Clair (2003) traced ethnography's development from a tool of economic privilege and power through its reappropriation as a tool used to lateralize social power dynamics.

For Clair (2003), ethnography's development is imbricated with four distinct waves of colonialism. The first wave of Greek expansion preceded Herodotus' studies of cultures, and the second wave marked the documentation of "disappearing" global cultures from the mercantilist

period to the 1800s (Clair). Wave three followed the mid-1900s rapidly globalizing power, and neoliberal globalization led the fourth wave, within which the current study is situated (Clair). Schools of thought contributing to the "linguistic turn" of the fourth wave include "the interpretive, the critical, feminist theories, the postmodernist, and the postcolonial perspectives" (Clair, p. 13). Like many ethnographies in the fourth wave, this dissertation's critical perspectives follow the postmodern tradition, so intend to disrupt social hierarchies and deconstruct existing categories without making claims for authoritative truth.

The present study fulfills the criteria of a multi-sited ethnographic inquiry, defined by anthropologist Marcus (1998) as "an exercise in mapping terrain" (p. 83). Marcus expanded classic ethnography's single site field study, and instead saw gathering data from multiple sites to better befit phenomena appearing in a globalized world, which he described as "practices of construction through (preplanned or opportunistic) movement and of tracing within different settings of a complex cultural phenomenon" (p. 90). This ethnography views supremacism and exit interventions as international cultural formations whose study benefited from tracing relevant discourses through several settings worldwide.

A multi-sited approach was specifically pragmatic for understanding exit interventions, since the practice arose across Europe in response to an international reemergence of neo-Nazi organizations in the 1990s and were later collectively reshaped by the discourses of the Global War on Terror. Investigation within multiple settings required various strategies, as a three-prong ethnographic approach comprised of participatory action research, exploratory data collection, and critical analysis. Field data were gathered on site in three locations, one in North America, one in Europe, and one during a several session virtual training. Additional sites' data were collected through virtual interviews.

Ethnography Data Set. This section describes the study's ethnographic field data, and
explains when, where, how, and why data entered the study.

Participants and Recruitment: Recruitment of participants and field data collection was
achieved according to standard grounded theory practice. In the preliminary data collection
stages inclusion criteria were loosely defined and became more selective as theories developed.
After the data was collected, analyzed, compared against existing data, and theorized through
coding and memo writing, new questions and initial hypotheses informed the research direction
and scope. Field data continued to be collected until they reached the point of saturation or until
research questions were answered.

Table 1

Participant Groups and Date of First Data Collection

Group	Start Dates
Group 1 North America	8/2018
Group 2 North America	3/2019
Group 3 Europe	5/2019
Group 4 Europe	2/2020
Group 5 Europe	1/2020

Memo comparison between the first two groups revealed both groups were relatively new
to intervention implementation. Among the first groups who interviewed, one group was
building capacity through forming relationships with individual mental health care providers.
The other was based on a self-help model and its membership was exclusively formers[16]. The
resulting data raised questions about how intervention strategies developed over time in longer-
standing groups and procedural differences between groups at different developmental stages.

Following the developing research questions, the next participants represented two well-

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[16] Formers is a term often used to describe those who were formerly members of supremacist groups or violent
criminal gangs.

established groups. At the end of data collection, I had conducted interviews with two relatively new groups who had been in operation roughly five years at the time of interview and two well-established groups who have been in operation since the 1990s. Participants were recruited through snowball sampling. Interviewing members represented four groups across three countries: two from North America and two from Europe. I later obtained a procedural manual, from an early but defunct exit group, and utilized translation software to create a copy in English.

Interviews. Semi-structured interviews with exit workers from four exit groups contributed to the present study between August 2018 and February 2020. Interviews ranged from 1.5 to 5.5 hours, including a review of consent forms (see Table 1). Interviews took place in person or via video call using a Skype account created for these purposes. Two participants requested to use their personal Zoom accounts. Individual interviews were recorded using a handheld audio recording device. They were then transcribed by the researcher, a paid transcriber, or research practicum undergraduate student. Interview memos were recorded into a password protected Microsoft Word file following every interview and added to during both passes of coding, situational mapping, and final data analysis.

Table 2

Participant Totals

Interview Participant	11
Participant Observation	21
Expert Consultants	4
Member Recheck Interviews	6
Member Recheck Emails	13

Individual and group-level memos held initial impressions and comparisons between interviewees' data. After recruiting a group, participants' initial interviews occurred quickly to facilitate assessment of saturation and whether research questions were sufficiently answered.

Member checks, second interviews, and participant observation opportunities happened over a more protracted timeline.

Topic lists used to guide the semi-structured interviews conducted with the initial two sites were broad and exploratory, while the topic lists created for subsequent sites represented focused categories based on theoretical sampling. Specific data entered in to "develop properties of categories or theory" (Charmaz & Henwood, 2008, p. 242), which here, related to the specific mechanics of exit intervention, the experience of exit workers, and exit workers conceptualizations of supremacism.

Transcriptions in all interviews from the first two groups were coded in NVivo12 using a line-by-line open coding strategy articulated by Charmaz (2006). For group members in Groups 3 and 4, one transcript was open coded using meaning units, and then the deductive or focused codes were applied to the remainder of interviews. Initial inductive line-by-line coding was applied to seek novel information or meaning and ensure that the data set's theoretical categories were grounded. After each interview, the new data were compared to previous data, often organically during the post-interview memo writing.

After completing inductive line-by-line open coding with the first two groups, interview categories were added or removed from the semi-structured interview list to reflect the grounding of categories and theoretical sampling in the data. After concluding data collection and initial analysis, memos compiled data summaries, and a larger group document was created, recording all collated codes (categories), impressions, and comparisons. In later data collection, additional coding added depth and thickened the theoretical analysis. Revisiting the original data set consistently offered depth to coded observations.

Participant/Observation. Three groups allowed me to participate or observe as a form of

data collection. On March 30, 2019, I was a participant-observer for a weekly meeting. Though the group declined recording, I was permitted field notes. Text data from this site visit included the group's onboarding manual, given to new members at their first meeting. Field notes included the spatial arrangement, interactions between group members, quotations, group process observations, and impressions regarding the intervention's specific mechanics.

Starting on June 29, 2019, I was a participant-observer in mental health care practitioner volunteers' training. The training was held on Zoom and spanned 3 hours per training every other week for five weeks. I took field notes during and following each training. I received all materials released to participants and functioned as a full participant throughout the training. They later requested detailed feedback following the training through a survey form.

One group allowed me to observe the day-to-day functioning of the larger shared space of their organization. A participant guided me through their organization's office space. On May 21, 2019, I observed for 3 hours and May 24, 2019, for 2 hours, and gathered field notes during these observation periods. With permission, I also took photographs in public areas of the site.

Existing Data. Existing texts contributed data points to the ethnographic analysis. Some texts came from publicly available forums such as websites, academic journals, or news sources. Others were not available to the public and were collected through my request or offered by group members. An example of this process is the program manual for a defunct exit group "collected" by following a link at the bottom of a research article, finding that the link did not allow access to the document, and then emailing the founder to request the procedure manual. I translated the document using translation software, Googletranslate, and had selections rechecked by a native speaking colleague. Additional language barriers to some internet data was traversed automatically via Google Chrome's translation feature.

In the spirit of saturation, textual materials contributed meaningful information clarifying that which was present in the interview data:

Group 1 contributed two sets of self-study demographic data representing the total clients supported from August 2017-December 2019, a Programs Assistant Manual, and materials for training mental health care providers, a manual for the mental health care provider volunteer program, video and audio recording of each of five training sessions of which I was a participant-observer, and the Cohort 2 June 2019 volunteer training packet. Internet sources also produced meaningful data (organization's website, Facebook, YouTube, Twitter) as did published texts (books and articles).

Group 2 contributed a packet for new members, not publicly available, collected on a site visit. Data were also gathered from Group 2's web presence (Facebook, Twitter, TEDx) and published texts (books and articles).

Group 3 shared a PowerPoint presentation of their standards and practices for presenting at a government funding meeting. Their web presence included various texts (website, Facebook, Twitter, TEDx, YouTube).

Methodology: Participatory Action Research. Participatory action research (PAR) is typically a tool for social reform or collective empowerment (Kemmis et al., 2014). In contrast, many participants in this study have benefitted from and defended the supremacism that disenfranchises PAR's usual participants. This project extended the edges of PAR's implementation while adhering to its mission and methods. The participants of this collaboration identify as former hate group and gang members, who now dedicate their lives through self-work, activism, and intervention to upending the discrimination they once participated in, specifically, by supporting other's exit from supremacist activism. In the PAR tradition, the

current study delivered "broad social analysis, the self-reflective collective self-study of practice, and transformational action to improve things" (Kemmis et al., 2014, p. 12).

The group's collaboration in developing a self-study report provided the current study with a thick understanding of exit work and exit worker's experience that would have otherwise been inaccessible. The self-study report back also addressed RAN's (2016) call for reciprocity between researchers and exit groups. The method followed the initial phases of ethnographic field study, as outlined in the previous section. The deliverable was crafted in the form of an organizational consultation report and addressed exit workers organizational questions. In addition to reporting back on basic procedural and systems development, it also provided specific recommendations to support its adherence to best practices in exit, such as those provided by Koehler (2017a) and an expert in the field who reviewed the report and offered additional recommendations. Participants initially collaborated in the process by conferring on research questions. Later they provided a detailed member-check of the deliverable, where they consulted on the presentation of self-study findings, and reported having implemented several of the recommendation, which "totally streamlined our client work."

PAR Data Set. The PAR data set is reported in the ethnographic methodology section, above, as "Group 1."

Methodology: Critical Analysis. Critical analysis was applied to the project's field data and reviewed literatures to address gaps between the two, pursue theoretical challenges, and thicken descriptions of supremacism. A critical literature review illustrated how discursive forces in counterterrorism discipline the field of exit through funding and determination of "best practices," wherein compliance with suggested intervention technique increases access to funding bodies and nonconformity risks allegations of client harm, misappropriation of funds,

loss of status with funding bodies, and potential disbanding. Exit worker's relationship to counterterrorism's power holders and knowledge production is grounded in the data. Clarke's (2005) situational analysis provided critically oriented analysis and augmented interpretations of codes and memos by integrating Foucault's (1980) foundational concept of discursive power. This work elevated meaning units to theoretical hypotheses relating counterterrorism agencies to power/knowledge production and linking structural supremacism to exit worker's experiences.

Apart from grounded theory, but similarly borrowing from Foucault's discursive practices, a critical literature review also highlighted flows of power and structural supremacism. The application of critical understandings allowed for deeper connections within the literature review, especially related to the historical progression of supremacism and the implications of structural factors on supremacist power. Additionally, these methods resulted in theoretical analyses from a critical perspective which appear throughout the document.

Critical Analysis Data Set. Existing data comprised the critical analysis data set, which drew from all other data appearing in the project including field data and literatures reviewed. In addition, it relied heavily on external data provided by publicly available forums, websites, academic journals, and news sources.

Methodological Overview

In the first phase of this study, the participatory action research project began by establishing sampling criteria, conducting interviews, collecting textual data, and observing participants. The analysis started immediately, including coding interviews, memo writing, forming initial categories, and preliminary theoretical sorting through the initial collation of line-by-line codes into focused codes. The theoretical sampling phase added several additional sites by pursuing connections through snowball sampling. Other sites represented a selection of exit

efforts in North American and Europe.

Marcus (1998) specified that multi-sited ethnographies typically trace how topics are appear in various spaces by following a distinct phenomenon, material item, or other stable category through spaces. In this ethnography, intervention strategies were prioritized, and traced through their development within exit groups over time and space by comparing more recently emergent organizations' strategies to longer-standing organizations. Data collection started in North America, and additional sites followed according to their place in the timeline of exit group history. The hope was to gain insight about intervention techniques' generalizability and viability across contexts, including clinicians' employment in exit.

Data collection responded to my dissatisfaction with the available literature's cursory representation of specific interventions, superficial descriptions of clinical tools, and brief descriptions of the role mental health practitioners take in exit work. When reading the literature as a clinician, I was not given a clear picture of implementable techniques and wanted this knowledge to be available to psychologists interested in developing an evidence-basis for practice. After recruiting a site, I collected all accessible and relevant data, which varied between sites and included interview data, publicly accessible web-based data, organizational texts not available to the public, and research publications. The data collection ended when research questions were satisfactorily answered.

The data collected was operationalized into an action research based deliverable and analyzed using grounded theory and critical analysis. Broader discourses within the data were developed by implementing Clarke's (2005) situational mapping. Additional critical analyses borrowed from her method and applied Foucauldian discursive techniques to the literature review resulting in a critical component throughout the literature review and a theoretical results

section.

Part Two: Foundations

Chapter 3: Individual Expressions of Supremacism

> I don't think there is actually…a universal form of subject that one might find
>
> everywhere…I think on the contrary, that the subject is constituted through
>
> practices of subjection, or, in a more autonomous way, through practices of liberation,
>
> of freedom…starting of course, from a number of rules, styles and
>
> conventions that can be found in the cultural setting. (Foucault, 1984, p. 452)

The "supremacist subject" encompasses more than simply one who is a supremacist. As

described in Chapter 1, supremacist *subjectivity* develops as an experiential response to specific

historical moments such as times of high economic precarity, rapid technological advancement,

and contentious social change. Extending the more resolutely constructionist Foucauldian

application, I use "subject" here to also account for individual differences in how we digest and

respond to our environment. This chapter introduces several portraits of the supremacist subject,

which, in addition to the data set and my experiences within supremacist culture, contributed to

this project's formulation of the supremacist subject as a prevalent figure in hegemonic societies.

Supremacism in Personality

The framework of supremacism that situates the current study is indebted to often-

integrated social dominance orientation and authoritarian personality traditions[17]. Hundreds of

studies have shown that the two metrics predict distinct pathways to prejudicial attitudes and

discriminatory behavior (Kende et al., 2018). Whereas most of Part 2's foundational literatures

offer evaluations of supremacism informed by observation and scholarship, the self-report survey

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[17] Often referred to as "rightwing authoritarian personality" (RWA). Altemeyer (1998) underestimated the prevalence of "leftwing authoritarianism" and limited the scales' generalizability across cultures by attaching a political framework. This has been addressed by Sidanius and Pratto (1999), who addressed the phenomenon as authoritarian personality (pp. 6-8).

data reported in this tradition provide an experience-near perspective. In addition to these findings, cross-cultural studies in dozens of societies and longitudinal research have increased the data's generalizability and transferability to real world application (Kende et al., 2018; Pratto et al., 2013; Osborne et al., 2021).

Whether supremacist traits are features of personality, attitude, or belief system, is contested by social dominance orientation and authoritarian personality researchers (Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Altemeyer, 2006; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Researchers arguing against the notion of supremacist traits as features of personality have largely defined personality as stable in expression and over the lifespan; for example, Duckitt and Fisher described personality as "individuals' relatively enduring dispositions to behave in consistent ways across situations" (2003, p. 201). In contrast, personality research has demonstrated personality to express variably in daily behavior, respond to priming events and context, react to psychotherapeutic and pharmaceutical treatment, and change over the lifespan (Fleeson & Jayawickreme, 2015; Roberts et al., 2017; Roberts & Mroczek, 2008; Tang et al., 2009;).

The current project sees utility in classifying supremacism, comprised of authoritarianism and social dominance orientation, as a personality facet when formulating supremacism's widespread prevalence in the global population and innovating intervention. Together, authoritarianism and social dominance orientation make up a sizable subset of two distinct groups of people, which only overlap in a small percentage of the whole (Altemeyer, 2006; Fischer et al., 2012; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Vargas-Salfate & de Zúñiga, 2020). This proposed structure of supremacist personality is modeled on a functionally similar multi-variant personality type, narcissism, that has both overt and covert expressions (Heaven & Bucci, 2001; Thomaes et al., 2009). Exactly how many people endorse metrics of supremacism changes

depending on the context, indicating a state-dependent effect, wherein a priming event impacts the expression of the supremacist personality characteristic (Fischer et al., 2012; Giacomin & Jordan, 2014, 2018; Liu et al., 2008; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

Akin to the Dark Triad personality characteristics (narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy), supremacist personality is proposed as a maladaptive and anti-social yet widespread facet of human expression in Chapter 9's analysis.

Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation. Authoritarianism and social dominance orientation research are rooted in an early study conducted by German critical theorists during the emergence of the Third Reich (Jay, 1996). When industrial workers' reactions to Nazism defied Marx's theory of the revolutionary working class, the critical theorists implemented survey research using the F-scale, a 6-point Likert scale measure of fascistic tendencies (Jay, 1996). Their data revealed preferences for submission, conformity, and sexual conservatism, and they concluded that German working-class populism was regressive and authoritarian rather than egalitarian (Jay, 1996).

Twenty years after the Third Reich's fall, Auschwitz survivor and sociologist Steiner and psychologist Fahrenberg (1970) returned to Germany with the F-scale to survey former SS members (n=229). Their participants endorsed among the highest F-scale scores ever recorded in a single population (group mean = 5.23). As an Auschwitz survivor, Steiner studied brutality's political institutionalization throughout his life and believed that individual intervention, "early recognition and concerted action" (Steiner, 2013, p. XVI), could prevent genocide.

Authoritarianism. The F-scale was later applied in hundreds of studies worldwide and eventually surpassed by its intellectual offspring, especially Altemeyer's (1982) Rightwing Authoritarianism (Adorno, 1950; Meloen, 1993). In authoritarianism research samples collected

world-wide, religious dogmatism, low educational level, political conservatism, widespread ethnocentrism, and domination/ submission themes correlate consistently (Altemeyer, 2006; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

Altemeyer (1998, 2006) saw authoritarianism scales as measuring submission to authority more than authoritarian dominance, the latter of which he found to be equally likely to endorsed by men and women. Similarly, Asbrock et al. (2010) described it as a conformity measure of within-group behavior, rules, and regulations. Altemeyer's (1998, 2006) authoritarianism positively correlated with desire for central leadership, submission to authority, self-righteousness, authority-condoned violence and self-unawareness about their relatively high endorsement of prejudice (Altemeyer, 1998: see Figure 3). Those endorsing authoritarianism overlay hierarchies onto social order by idealizing and submitting to authority and by promoting harsh punishments for rebelliousness (Altemeyer, 2006; Pratto et al., 1994). They are also likely to endorse self-justified acts of violence as acts of allegiance to authority (Altemeyer, 2006). Authoritarianism research is highly relevant for individual interventions at the level of personality, cognitive flexibility, and emotional tolerance.

Though leftwing authoritarianism (LWA) was not supported in Altemeyer's early data, LWA was found in ex-communist countries in Eastern Europe nearly 20 years ago (Costello et al., 2020; Djintcharadze, 1996; Krauss, 2002; McFarland et al., 1996; Regt et al., 2011; Todosijević, 2008; Todosijević & Enyedi, 2008). The concept is gaining traction and supports this project's hypothesis that supremacism presents across the political spectrum. Costello et al.'s "heart of authoritarianism" (2020, p. 72) defined the qualities at the interstice of rightwing and leftwing authoritarianism, which consisted of "social uniformity, prejudice towards different others, willingness to wield group authority to coerce behavior, cognitive rigidity, aggression and

Figure 3

Altemeyer's (1998) Rightwing Authoritarianism Scale[18]

Exhibit 1
The 1997 Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale

This survey is part of an investigation of general public opinion concerning a variety of social issues. You will probably find that you *agree* with some of the statements, and *disagree* with others, to varying extents. Please indicate your reaction to each statement by blackening a bubble on the bubble sheet, according to the following scale:

Blacken the bubble labeled −4 if you *very strongly disagree* with the statement.
−3 if you *strongly disagree* with the statement.
−2 if you *moderately disagree* with the statement.
−1 if you *slightly disagree* with the statement.

Blacken the bubble labeled +1 if you *slightly agree* with the statement.
+2 if you *moderately agree* with the statement.
+3 if you *strongly agree* with the statement.
+4 if you *very strongly agree* with the statement.

If you feel exactly and precisely *neutral* about an item, blacken the "0" bubble.

You may find that you sometimes have different reactions to different parts of a statement. For example, you might very strongly disagree (−4) with one idea in a statement, but slightly agree (+1) with another idea in the same item. When this happens, please combine your reactions, and write down how you feel "on balance" (i.e., a −3 in this case).

1. The established authorities generally turn out to be right about things, while the radicals and protestors are usually just "loud mouths" showing off their ignorance.
2. Women should have to promise to obey their husbands when they get married.
3. Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to destroy the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us.
4. Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else.*
5. It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in people's minds.
6. Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt every bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly.*
7. The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our traditional values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad ideas.
8. There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps.*
9. Our country *needs* free thinkers who will have the courage to defy traditional ways, even if this upsets many people.*
10. Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs.
11. Everyone should have their own life-style, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, even if it makes them different from everyone else.*
12. The "old-fashioned ways" and "old-fashioned values" still show the best way to live.
13. You have to admire those who challenged the law and the majority's view by protesting for women's abortion rights, for animal rights, or to abolish school prayer.*
14. What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil, and take us back to our true path.
15. Some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our government, criticizing religion, and ignoring the "normal way things are supposed to be done."*
16. God's laws about abortion, pornography, and marriage must be strictly followed before it is too late, and those who break them must be strongly punished.
17. It would be best for everyone if the proper authorities censored magazines so that people could not get their hands on trashy and disgusting material.
18. There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse.*
19. Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the authorities tell us to do, and get rid of the "rotten apples" who are ruining everything.
20. There is no "ONE right way" to live life; everybody has to create their *own* way.*
21. Homosexuals and feminists should be praised for being brave enough to defy "traditional family values."*
22. This country would work a lot better if certain groups of troublemakers would just shut up and accept their group's traditional place in society.
23. There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to ruin it for their own godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action.
24. People should pay less attention to the Bible and the other old forms of religious guidance, and instead develop their own personal standards of what is moral and immoral.*
25. What our country needs *most* is discipline, with everyone following our leaders in unity.
26. It's better to have trashy magazines and radical pamphlets in our communities than to let the government have the power to censor them.*
27. The facts on crime, sexual immorality, and the recent public disorders all show we have to crack down harder on deviant groups and troublemakers if we are going to save our moral standards and preserve law and order.
28. A lot of our rules regarding modesty and sexual behavior are just customs which are not necessarily any better or holier than those which other people follow.*
29. The situation in our country is getting so serious, the strongest methods would be justified if they eliminated the troublemakers and got us back to our true path.
30. A "woman's place" should be wherever she wants to be. The days when women are submissive to their husbands and social conventions belong strictly in the past.*
31. It is wonderful that young people today have greater freedom to protest against things they don't like, and to make their own "rules" to govern their behavior.*
32. Once our government leaders give us the "go ahead," it will be the duty of every patriotic citizen to help stomp out the rot that is poisoning our country from within.

Note. Only items 3–32 are scored. Items 1 and 2 are "table-setters" to help familiarize the respondent with the subject matter and the −4 to +4 response format.
* indicates a con-trait item, for which the 1–9 scoring key is reversed.

punitiveness towards perceived enemies, outsized concern for hierarchy, and moral absolutism"

(p. 72). Both left and rightwing authoritarians also endorsed similarities in cognitive, affective,

and motivational attributes, including "psychopathic meanness, cognitive reflectivity, the

Dogmatism Scale, conscientiousness, need for closure, disinhibition, and psychopathic boldness"

(Costello et al., p. 73). Ideologically, they shared "fatalistic determinism beliefs, belief in

conspiracy theories, and belief in a dangerous world" and "low openness" to new experiences

(Costello et al., p. 73). Costello et al.'s findings are in line with exit workers' reports that some

people join other groups willing to tolerate their inflexible ideological style after exiting

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[18] In contrast to Altemeyer's use of the construct, in this dissertation rightwing authoritarianism (RWA) will be described as authoritarian personality to address misunderstandings introduced by political labels.

supremacist groups rather than becoming more cognitively flexible.

Social Dominance Orientation. Pratto et al.'s (1994) social dominance orientation

(SDO), is the dominant correlate to authoritarian submission (Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt &

Fisher, 2003). Pratto et al. (1994) summarized social dominance orientation like this:

> Finally, SDO showed strong consistent correlations with scales assessing opposition to
>
> social programs, racial policies, and women's rights, and with support for military
>
> programs. SDO was also consistently correlated with opposition to gay and lesbian rights,
>
> environmental programs, and miscegeny and was consistently correlated with support for
>
> U.S. chauvinism, law-and-order policies, and Republican party identification. (p. 754)

Their findings have been replicated in dozens of empirical studies since its inception, with

increasingly valid and consistently reliable scales (Ho et al., 2015: see Figure 4,).

Those who endorse social dominance orientation are more concerned than most people

with the relationship between in-groups and out-groups, and promote discrimination against

outgroups to secure their individual and group position in accordance with their belief in a highly

competitive cut-throat world (Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Contrasting with

individuals high in authoritarianism, they are generally well-reasoned and reflexive (Duriez &

Van Hiel, 2002; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Additionally, elitism, or idealization of status, is

consistently endorsed alongside social dominance orientation and relates to social dominance

orientation's overexpression in dominant groups (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

Several cross-cultural studies have found social dominance to be overexpressed in high-

status groups [19] (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Likewise, researchers found that individuals endorsed

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[19] Race (whichever race is dominant reports more social dominance), gender (in patriarchal societies men more than women), sexual orientation (heterosexual more than gay), and ethnicity (culturally dependent) (Pratto et al., 1994).

higher social dominance orientation immediately after their demographic's social status

increased, for instance, after winning an election (Liu et al., 2008; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

Figure 4

Social Dominance Orientation Scale (SDO6; Ho et al., 2015)

These finding have potential implications for structural interventions, but further research is

needed to understand how and when social dominance orientation decreases. The data provided

by social dominance research are referred to throughout this text in discussing the maintenance

of cultural hegemony.

Altemeyer's "Lethal Union." Those who endorse social dominance orientation and

authoritarianism have much in common, for example racial, ethnic, sexist, and sexual orientation

prejudices as well as "ethnocentrism, racism, nationalism, and conservatism" (Pratto et al., 1994,

p. 751; Altemeyer, 1998, 2004; Azevedo et al., 2019). They both prefer hierarchical social

structures to egalitarianism and are statistically more likely to promote policies that entrench

hegemonic social control through economic and carceral discrimination (Altemeyer, 2006;

Azevedo et al., 2019; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). They are also more likely to be aggressive than

others, though their aggression is also differentially motivated. As reported by Altemeyer (2006)

authoritarians "aggress when they believe right and might are on their side" (p. 21), whereas for

social dominators "might makes right" (p. 169). Relatedly, both endorse harsher punishments

than average, with political dissidents evoking prejudice from both, authoritarians targeting

deviants, and social dominators targeting subordinated groups (Asbrock et al., 2010; Pratto et al.,

1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

From the findings of several simulation studies, Altemeyer (2006) theorized that a "lethal

union" (p. 187) occurs when social dominators' desire for power meets authoritarians'

preference for authoritarian leadership. He reported that social dominance orientation and

authoritarianism attract each other and collectively contribute to inequity. From a pool of survey

respondents, participant groups were selected for their high/low endorsement of authoritarianism

or social dominance orientation, grouped, and then tasked to build and maintain a simulated

society (Altemeyer, 2006). In the high authoritarianism simulation, the authoritarians were

isolationist and showed relatively low aggression, yet in both confederate-leader and social

dominance orientation-leader trials, authoritarian followers were more likely than others to

support the leader's unethical decisions (Altemeyer, 2006). Leaders who endorsed social

dominance orientation made more violent and discriminatory decisions than the average

participant when paired with either authoritarians or confederates (Altemeyer, 2006). In trials

pairing socially dominant leaders with authoritarian followers, the "lethal union" (Altemeyer,

2006, p. 176) made more unethical decisions, and engaged more frequently in bullying and

intergroup violence than any other participant pairing (Altemeyer, 2006).

The lethal pairing findings support the argument that supremacists use unethical tactics to promote their own dominance and cultural hegemony. Findings that authoritarianism correlates with low self-reflexivity and social dominance orientation's correlation with manipulation and dishonesty, reveals the need for equity assessments and structural interventions to be outcomes focused.

Double Supremacism. Altemeyer (2004) described "dominating authoritarians" as "among the most prejudiced persons in society" (p. 421). This group accounted for the 5%-10% of participants—primarily men—who endorsed both high social dominance orientation and high authoritarianism. Dominating authoritarians exhibited both metric's antisocial features (Altemeyer, 2006). Like those with social dominance orientations, dominating authoritarians "want power, want to dominate, and want inequality" (Altemeyer, 2006, p. 435), alongside authoritarian adherence to religious fundamentalism, dogmatism, and self-righteousness. If we recall the lethal union, dominating authoritarians more effectively appeal to the religiosity of authoritarians than secular social dominators, thus increasing their odds of attracting authoritarian followers (Altemeyer, 2006). Altemeyer's (2004) caution supports this project's assertion that legitimated supremacist activism contributes to oppression more than fringe supremacism: "Although they are small in number, such persons can have a considerable impact on society because they are well-positioned to become the leaders of prejudiced right-wing political movements" (pp. 425).

Personality Clusters. Personality researchers found a variety of tendencies to cluster with supremacist personalities. The Big Five and the HEXACO (six) are widely used personality taxonomies. Researchers found several personality factors to cluster with social dominance

orientation and authoritarianism (Heaven & Bucci, 2001; Nicol & France, 2016; Sibley et al., 2010), which offered a uniquely internal portrayal of supremacist personalities. Endorsers of social dominance orientation and authoritarianism both rejected new experiences, yet expressed differing morality (Sibley et al., 2010). Social dominance orientation clustered with low expressions on the Big Five's agreeability and openness to new experiences, as well as low scores on the HEXACO's emotionality, openness to experiences, and honesty/humility (Heaven & Bucci, 2001; Nicol & France, 2016; Sibley et al., 2010). Authoritarianism correlated weakly but significantly with the Big Five's high conscientiousness and low openness to new experiences and the HEXACO's low openness and high honesty/ humility (Heaven & Bucci, 2001; Nicol & France, 2016; Sibley et al., 2010).

Results from several studies support the hypothesis that social dominance orientation is a covert form of supremacism that shares features with Dark Triad personalities. First, social dominance orientation endorsement was significantly correlated with the Dark Triad: "narcissism ($r = .23$), Machiavellianism ($r = .37$), and psychopathy ($r = .38$)" (Hodson, 2009, p. 689). In contrast, social dominance orientation negatively correlated with "empathy, tolerance, communality, and altruism" (Pratto et al., 1994, p. 741). Those who endorsed high social dominance orientation also reflexively endorsed metrics of "Exploitive Manipulative Amoral Dishonesty," "Personal Power, Meanness, and Dominance" (Altemeyer, 1998, pp. 73, 76), and tended to overtly admit prejudice and discrimination.

Authoritarianism is hypothesized here to be a more covert form of supremacism, though it also has maladaptive and antisocial characteristics. Altemeyer (2006) demonstrated through a variety of studies, that authoritarian personalities lack self-reflexivity, promote double standards, and are generally "unintegrated, highly compartmentalized, and rife with inconsistencies"

(Altemeyer, 1998, p. 48), which, in his view, accounted for their deferential loyalty to corrupt leaders and their endorsement that they are not more prejudiced than others, despite scoring higher in prejudice measures. In contrast to social dominance orientation who often overtly endorse desire for inequality and drive for power, authoritarians' overexpression of fear and disgust and under-expression of emotions correlated with well-being appeared to motivate their prejudice (Onraet et al., 2013; Van Hiel & Kossowska, 2006).

Cognitive Distortions and Emotional Intolerance

Cognitive distortions and defenses are similar but distinct misperceptions. Supremacist cognitive distortions range from subtle departures from fact to delusions and illustrate how supremacist thinking manages threat perception. Supremacist psychological defenses are maladaptive coping strategies that emerge due to an inability to tolerate difficult or painful emotion states (Layton, 2010). Supremacist cognitive distortions are a type of psychological defense, with particularly harmful impacts on targeted groups.

Layton (2010) hypothesized that individuals experience existential terror and trauma responses when public institutions fail to meet their basic needs. The self-protective avoidance cycles frequently associated with trauma produce cognitive distortions that help them to avoid intolerable emotions by displacing blame away from trusted institutions and leaders onto others (Layton, 2010). In this way, economic trauma leads to psychic fractures and "bring about perverse modes of subjectivity" (Layton, 2010, p. 304).

In her work as a psychotherapist, Layton (2010) observed clients' reactions to several infamous institutional failures during the neoliberal era and determined that the psychological defenses they presented with were avoidance of shame, disconnection, and fear. She hypothesized that institutional failure prompted an individual and collective "turning away from

the truth" (Layton, 2010, p. 304) which results in misplaced aggression, scapegoating, delusions of superiority, and engulfment into populist identities. Layton's portrayal of psychological defenses and emotional intolerance provides a psychological explanation for the cognitive distortions reported by Berlet and Lyons (2000).

Berlet and Lyons (2000) organized supremacist cognitive distortions into four categories: "producerism," "demonization and scapegoating," conspiracist" thinking, and "apocalyptic narrative and millennial vision" (pp. 6-12). Producerism is the misperception that the most productive groups of society are being exploited by manipulative elites on one side and lazy parasites on the other (Berlet & Lyons, 2000). Those who engage in producerist thinking see themselves as producing society's value:

> the virtuous, striving, and browbeaten producer struggles to fend off the parasite, a dependent subject that consumes tax dollars and productive labor to subsidize a profligate and extravagant lifestyle. These representations have long been racialized and gendered; subjects marked as "welfare queens" and "illegal aliens" among others have been similarly condemned as freeloaders and parasites who feed off the labor of hardworking (white) taxpayers." (p. 19)

Though producer distortions create targets opportunistically, and can even be targeted toward structural policies, targets often fall along lines of existing social disparities (HoSang and Lowndes, 2019).

Demonization and scapegoating distortions are an ill-assessed displacement of blame onto others for one's difficulties (Berlet & Lyons, 2000). Many stereotypical views of subordinated groups result from demonization and scapegoating, and in some distortions, such as in the example of the so-called "welfare queen," demonization and scapegoating and

producerism are both apparent. When misappropriated blame misidentifies how power functions in society and who holds it, supremacists target subordinated groups (Berlet & Lyons, 2000). Supremacist conspiracy theories are created by distortions that center the supremacist as the victim of a large-scale plot. They often integrate producerism and demonization and see scapegoated groups as the villain (Berlet & Lyons, 2000). Berlet and Lyons described how conspiratorial delusions manifest in violent attacks when accompanied by the belief in their power to expose or stop the conspiracy.

Apocalyptic narrative and millennial visions are cognitive delusions wherein individuals believe themselves to be heroic soldiers in an ongoing battle of good and evil against the attacking conspirators (Berlet & Lyons, 2000). A common White supremacist apocalyptic narrative and millennial vision sees White supremacism as a necessary violence to combat a Jewish shadow government called the Zionist Occupied Government (ZOG). Demonization and scapegoating are frequent features of this distortion, wherein Black Americans are believed to hold elevated standing with ZOG (Berlet & Lyons, 2000). This final example shows how targeting perceived elites frequently coincides with and motivates subsequent targeting of frequently discriminated against groups.

This section demonstrated how expressions of everyday supremacism pose public safety concerns, maintain emotional distress for those exhibiting supremacism, and informs intervention. Supremacist distortions put targeted groups in danger. The cognitive distortion categories provided by Berlet and Lyons (2000) differentiated supremacist cognitive distortions from harmless individual belief systems. The psychological explanations provided by Layton (2010) connected trauma, economic precarity, and underlying emotional distress to supremacist cognitive distortions. They offered support for the interventions addressing emotional

intolerance, cognitive distortions, and paranoid thinking, that are reported later in intervention-focused chapters and field data with exit workers.

Intersectional Supremacism

> The groups most likely to be the targets… are the most salient... Social class defined the primary continuum for social stratification for much of modern European history, and therefore has been the group distinction most likely to engage social dominance drives, while for most of U.S. history, race rather than social class has been and remains the primary basis of social stratification…. (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, p. 61)

Typically used to describe an expression of layered subordinated identities, intersectionality is also useful to describe how dominant group membership impacts assemblages of identity. This work is indebted to civil rights attorney Crenshaw (1991), who conceptualized intersectionality to illustrate the unique experiences that women of color, especially Black women, face in legal institutions and society following incidents of sexual assault or domestic violence (1991). For Crenshaw, intersectionality "highlights the need to account for multiple grounds of identity when considering how the social world is constructed" (p. 1245) and is primarily expressed as "structural", "political", and "representational" (pp. 1245, 1251, 1282). She applied structural intersectionality to describe how identity predicts institutional support and access to resources (Crenshaw, 1991). Political intersectionality depicted the often-opposed political goals of identity groups and conflicts they present for people with multiple identities. Representational intersectionality articulated the barriers erected by equity activists when working against each other's goals, and was demonstrated this way:

> feminism contributes to the forces that produce disproportionate punishment for Black men who rape white women, and when antiracists represent the case solely in terms of

racial domination, they belittle the fact that women particularly, and all people generally, should be outraged by the gender violence the case represented." (Crenshaw, 1999, p. 1282)

Like Crenshaw's work, Sidanius and Pratto's "interlocking hierarchical system" (1999, p. 263) described how subordination is organized into categories of mutually reinforcing characteristics, primarily, "gender, age, and arbitrary sets" (p. 299). While arbitrary sets[20] are socially constructed and culturally dependent, they reported that status is conferred by age and gender in all hegemonic societies (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). The discourses that configure subordinated groups as targets uphold hegemonic states' control apparatuses and determine the types and severity of discrimination they mete out (Morlin, 2019; Pratto, 1999).

The same discursive work also interplays with individual supremacism, as evident in self-report measures[21], which found high endorsement for supremacism overall to correlate with self-justification for discrimination, including violence (Altemeyer, 1998, 2004; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Together with Crenshaw's intersectionality work, Sidanius and Pratto's interlocking hierarchical system provided a foundation from which to theorize intersectional supremacism. This concept is revisited in Chapter 9's critical analyses, and links alignment with hegemonic identities to the support for supremacism exhibited by some members of subordinated groups.

Summary and Conclusions

This chapter examined supremacist subjectivity including features of personality, emotion, cognition, and identity. Large scale self-report survey data contributed nuanced understandings of supremacists' internal experience to the observational descriptions of

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[20] "based on factors such as ethnicity, race, class, tribe, and nation" (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999, p. 299).
[21] Tools included: social dominance orientation, rightwing authoritarianism, ethnocentrism, antisemitism, rape myth acceptance, attitudes toward women, attitudes toward the LGBTQIA+ community, economic philosophy

supremacism provided by most researchers. A thematic review of supremacist cognitive distortions provided guidance for differentiating between personal belief systems and distortions that foster discrimination. Finally, an extension of intersectionality began to clarify often confusing manifestations of supremacism that are expressed by those with subordinated identities. Together, the sections in this chapter highlighted how individual differences impact our interpretations and responses to social context, resulting in distinct expressions of supremacism.

Chapter 4: Supremacist Socialization

> Systems of group-based social hierarchy and oppression do not just fall from the sky, nor … result from the accidents and vicissitudes of human history. Rather, while the proximal forces constructing and maintaining oppressive systems are complex and multifaceted, they are also the expressions of human will, agency, and mind… perhaps psychology's greatest insight is that the human mind both forms and is formed by human society. (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, p. 61)

Chapter 4 takes us from individual expression to the contexts that activate and shape supremacism's expression.

Socialization

During the socialization process, a form of social learning, we learn what is acceptable and reproachable by interacting with people and social messages in our environments. The following discussions describe several socialization studies that explored supremacist family systems and the socialization processes fostered by segregation and interaction. Their findings illustrated the pathways by which supremacism is integrated or transformed and identified several mitigating and risk factors for supremacist socialization. They then provided a research

basis for assessing interventions offered in clinical literature and by exit workers.

Supremacist Family Systems. That social dominance and authoritarianism are passed from parent to child, or intergenerationally transmitted, is well-established by the literature (Altemeyer, 2006; Avdeenko & Siedler, 2016; Dhont & Van Hiel, 2012; Duriez & Soenens, 2008). Altemeyer (1998, 2006) found that father's social dominance orientation was transmitted to children more than their mother's while authoritarianism was transmitted equally by both mother and father. Altemeyer (1998) also reported that students endorsing high social dominance were more frequently encouraged into competitive activities, and more often reported that their fathers "had encouraged their drives to be Number One" (p. 85). In a German longitudinal study Avdeenko and Siedler (2017) similarly found gender to impact intergenerational transmission. Fathers passed down right-wing political ideologies and xenophobia more than mothers, and sons absorbed parental political beliefs more than daughters (Avdeenko & Siedler, 2017). In contrast, daughters and sons were about as likely to adopt their parents' xenophobia (Avdeenko & Siedler, 2017). These findings raise questions about the role played by masculinity, competitive sports, and political ideology in generational supremacism, that would benefit from further research.

Some intergenerational transmission studies have direct implications for intervention, such as Dhont and Van Hiel's (2012) work on intergroup contact. They found that adolescents from supremacist family systems reported relatively lower rates of racial prejudice, authoritarianism, and xenophobia compared to peers of similar backgrounds if they endorsed "high levels of intergroup contact" (Dhont & Van Hiel, 2012, p. 11). Together the findings in this section demonstrate the socializing effects of supremacist family system, and also evidence the capacity of later life experiences to introduce more egalitarian worldviews.

Segregation practices. In my experience in White supremacist culture, two contrasting attitudes toward interactions with other groups prevailed: out of sight out of mind separatism in the Midwest and regular contact with structurally reinforced fantasies of White superiority in the South. I was not surprised then to find that the same sentiment had been repeated during the Civil Rights movement: "In the South, the white man doesn't care how close you get, as long as you don't get too high. In the North, he doesn't care how high you get, as long as you don't get too close" (McClelland, 2010). The anecdotal observations I made while coming to terms with White supremacist culture and the observations made by Civil Rights activists are supported by several findings in intergroup contact literature.

Intergroup contact research looks at interactions between differently identified social groups and their impact on prejudice. In one of a series of similar studies, Belgian adults who endorsed high supremacism (as either social dominance orientation or authoritarianism) had relatively fewer intergroup experiences than their peers, and they rated intergroup experiences more negatively (Dhont & Van Hiel, 2009). The authors related participant's negative outgroup experiences to the individual characteristics that cluster with supremacism: authoritarian's high anxiety and threat perception and social dominator's low empathy and emotionality. In another study, college housing assignments and positive interactions with out-group college roommates reduced social dominance orientation within the first week (van Laar et al., 2005). In a similar longitudinal study, positive longer-term housing experiences reduced social dominance orientation for years after the experience (Dhont et al., 2013).

As indicated by the emphasis on "positive" experiences above, context greatly impacts intergroup contact's effectiveness for reducing prejudice. Echoing the 'close but not high' observations of Civil Rights activists, a large meta-analysis of 459 studies across 36 countries (n

= 186, 961) found that intergroup contact more effectively reduced prejudice in egalitarian than hegemonic societies (Kende et al., 2018). In addition to this finding, hegemonic societies required greater intention in the type of contact, where "equally structured" (Kende et al., 2018, p. 888) interactions reduced prejudice more than hierarchically structured interactions.

The findings reported in this section support the use of intergroup contact interventions for reducing supremacism, such as amends interventions and interventions that increase group interaction promoted by exit workers. They also clarified the barriers presented by hegemonic cultures and highlighted importance of emphasizing structurally equal interactions when implementing intergroup contact interventions in these contexts.

Structural Effects and Cultural Narratives

This literature reported here inform the current project's assessment of structural and cultural level interventions by demonstrating how supremacism is impacted by structural effects and cultural narratives. First, the contextual processes that shape and activate supremacism were established by large scale cross-cultural and longitudinal data. Then, the processes by which cultural narratives are transmuted into structural supremacism were demonstrated by exceptions to the widely accepted cultural narrative that "college liberalizes."

Supremacism in Context. The studies reported in this section found that contextual factors impacted supremacism's expression and prevalence (Cohrs & Stelzl, 2010; Fischer et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2008; Vargas-Salfate & de Zúñiga, 2019).

Several studies reported specific relationships between structural inequality and supremacism's expression. Though authoritarians are typically more nationalistic than average, a cross-cultural sample of 19 countries (n = 17,150) found that contexts with "less respect for civil liberties" (p. 1) are correlated with more nationalistic authoritarians (Vargas-Salfate & de

Zúñiga, 2019). Though supremacists tend to be more xenophobic than average, an analysis of 155 samples across 17 countries (n = 38,522) found that authoritarianism and social dominance orientation are differentially implicated in xenophobic discrimination (Cohrs & Stelzl, 2010). Authoritarianism correlated with xenophobia in countries whose cultural narratives linked immigration with crime and economic problems to immigration, whereas social dominance orientation correlated with xenophobia in countries where immigrants had higher immigrant unemployment rates and thus lower economic and social standing than naturalized citizens (Cohrs & Stelzl, 2010). In the other direction, egalitarianism in cultural narrative and concrete structural measures (income equality, gender equity, economic stability, egalitarian political policies) correlated with lower rates of social dominance orientation in a 95-sample meta-analysis representing 27 societies (n = 50,971; Fischer et al., 2012).

Context can also impact the prevalence of supremacism. A clear example of this was reported in three-sample longitudinal study (N = 1364, 403, and 211) that found increases in the electorate of an electoral victor directly after the election despite their relatively lower rates compared to the opposing party previously (Liu et al., 2008). Before the 2004 election, a single party had maintained 50-year control over the Taiwanese electoral system, and members of the long-controlling party showed predictably higher levels of social dominance orientation and authoritarianism in both samples taken pre-election (Liu et al., 2008). In the post-election sample, authoritarianism prevalence rates had reversed by predictably increasing in the new victors and decreasing in the opposing party. The prevalence of social dominance orientation, however, were matched between the two parties, due to prevalence increase for the new victors without corresponding decrease from the opposing party (Liu et al., 2008). These findings lend support to previous understandings that social dominance orientation increases in accordance to

social status (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). They also offer insights about social dominance orientation's resilience to loss, which has implications for intervention when comparing factors that have been found to reduce its prevalence such as equally structured intergroup contact and social science education.

These studies emphasized the impact of context on supremacism's expression and prevalence and demonstrated the mutually reinforcing dynamic between individual and structural supremacism. Together, they supported the argument that interventions seeking to reduce supremacism should account for both individual and structural supremacism and offered insights about what contextual factors may increase outcomes or act as barriers to interventions.

University Contexts. Sidanius and Pratto (1999) reported that relatively few members of high-status groups make most of society's decisions, so understanding the process by which high-status young people are socialized into their roles is necessary for identifying "how institutions in society shape citizens" (Mendelberg et al., 2017, p. 622). This section seeks to clarify how highly educated policy makers develop inclinations toward economic supremacism given the common belief that "college liberalizes" (Mendelberg et al., 2017, p. 606).

Contrary to popular opinion, Mendelberg et al. (2017) argued that affluent university experiences are not inherently liberalizing. Rather, they have a conservatizing effect that shape the views of future policy makers: "college socialization partly explains why affluent Americans support economically conservative policies" (Mendelberg et al., 2017, p. 606). In their analysis, the "pro-wealth" (p. 606) policies promoted by affluent campuses entrench existing social hierarchies and "shape [affluent students'] views to be in line with their parents' economic class interests" (Mendelberg et al., 2017, p. 622).

The Greek-letter system also reproduces cultural hegemony through the intergenerational

transmission of wealth and status. 50% of all US presidents, (85% Republican) since 1881 were Greek-life participants (Change, 2014). Participants are also overwhelmingly wealthy, as evident in Princeton's internal audit which reported that 95% of Greek life participants were from the top 20% income bracket (Chang, 2014). Greek-letter organization participants were also found to have higher rates of racism, sexism, and elitism than other students (DeBruin, 2019; Mara et al., 2018; Samson, 2018). The latter finding is supported by FBI data that linked Greek-letter organization prevalence to hate crime incidents on college campuses (Van Dyke & Tester, 2014).

Structural supremacism is maintained by affluent youth's inheritance of wealth, status, and political agency. Affluent university experiences play an essential role in their socialization (Chang, 2014). These findings outline how structural supremacism is also facilitated by cultural myths about education. Finally, the findings reported in this section point to sites of potential structural interventions for increasing institutional egalitarianism.

Structural Supremacism: The Apple and the Barrel

Drawn from the saying "one bad apple spoils the barrel…' and the common reduction of this saying to merely 'a few bad apples' as a rhetorical technique to minimize the impact of individual participants in a system, the "bad apple" is a scapegoating trope that assigns responsibility to individuals for the social problems within structurally supremacist systems. The "bad barrel" counter-narrative assigns responsibility for bad apple behavior to supremacist system's structural dynamics, or barrel. The literatures introduced here demonstrate how individuals and structural factors cocreate supremacism. This foundation supports the argument that both individual and structural interventions should be included in intervention approaches for increasing societal equity.

Economic Supremacism and Populism. Harvard economist Rodrik (2017) described

the rise in worldwide supremacist populism as a "backlash" (p. 10) against "advanced stages of globalization" (p. 2). Egalitarian and supremacist populist movements, he explained, predictably occur in response to "[c]hanges in technology, rise of winner-take-all markets, erosion of labor-market protections, and decline of norms restricting pay differentials…" (p. 2). Populist leaders' mobilizing capacity relies on their rhetoric's ability to give their followers a shared narrative for unwanted shared experiences.

"Ethno-national/cultural cleavages" (Rodrik, 2017, p. 13) are integrated into supremacist populist rhetoric when globalization shocks get displaced onto migration. Notably, he explained that "larger important shock is associated with support for nationalist parties and a shift toward radical right-wing parties" (p. 22). For example, former President Donald Trump provided a narrative that explained his base's struggles and offered to solve them. Trump's opportunity to offer solutions indicated a larger problem with "fairness and redistributive justice" (p. 13). As profit was redistributed from workers (labor investors) to firms (capital and infrastructure investors) the domestic working class' poverty increased, thus increasing their precarity to economic shocks and populist rhetoric.

Open markets produce winners and losers, necessarily, as part of the nature of their structure. The longer markets are open, said Rodrik (2017), redistribution accumulates exponentially for the biggest winners as the market's barriers fall away. In his view the question was not whether liberalized trade is fair—his answer was no. He was more concerned with how to address it. The most significant barrier to addressing the current system of exploitative distribution, according to Rodrik, is "the political one" (2017, p. 12). He attributed the state's failure to follow-through on redistribution promises to a lack of political incentive and explained, "The winners need the losers' assent for the agreement. But once the agreement is passed, there

is little reason for the winners to follow through." (Rodrik, 2017, p. 10).

Rodrik (2017) highlighted the mistake of automatically attributing the rise of Donald Trump and similar supremacist populist leaders worldwide to the electorate's individual or bad cultural choices. Instead, "underlying grievances" (p. 24) should be assessed related to globalization's distributional effects and the absence of a robust social welfare system. In support of this suggestion, he argued that the undercurrent feeding populist struggle is material reality supplied by "the economic anxiety and distributional struggles exacerbated by globalization…." (p. 17). He warned that what may appear to be a cultural turn to the right may be a global reaction to globalization's many shocks and increased migration. Further, he proposed that supremacist populism is less likely to be effective without the anxieties caused by globalization shock and threat perception.

Reaganomics as Intervention. Early neoliberal theorists imagined an economic program divested from state power that could prevent a recurrence of the Third Reich's totalitarianism (Madra & Adaman, 2018). In the Neoliberal system that was realized, referred to in the United States as Reaganomics, state power was divested from social and political protections, reorganized to focus primarily on capital accumulation, and made more powerful in the process (Yamawaki, 2000). Power consolidation and the formation of a new Republican base from the business class, religious sphere, and White Southerners defined the Reagan years (Carbone, 2018). In addition to neoliberalism, Reagan administration also martialed a totalizing intervention campaign called the Drug War, whose racialized law and order platforms exacerbated rather than addressed addiction in poor Black communities and overturned gains achieved by mid-twentieth century rights movements (Davidson & Saull, 2016; Kendi, 2016; Nunn, 2002; Soss et al., 2011).

The structural changes during the Reagan era reshaped culture by reproducing existing producing hegemonies and producing new approaches to supremacism. While neoliberal economic austerities individualized the economic struggles of the White working-class and reduced class solidarity, the Drug War's national publicity campaign racialized drug use, ignited fear, and maligned the public against Black addiction (Davidson & Saull, 2016; Kendi, 2016; Soss et al., 2011). The effective messaging incisively primed middle-class and White voters to support inegalitarian policies, and in many important ways, the Drug War was maintained by White and Black middle-class voters' consent and support (Fortner, 2014; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Neoliberal social welfare programming divestments also worked in tandem with the Drug War's investment in mass incarceration and policing to produce evidence of its social benefit (Kendi, 2016; Nunn, 2002). As reductions in structural support destabilized Black and poor communities, crimes of poverty increased, and in turn, justified the Drug War's carceral programs.

When considering to what extent internal supporters of the Reagan administration were aware that his economic and social policies reproduced cultural hegemony, we may recall his adoption and endorsement of the Southern strategy described in Chapter 1. Reagan's adviser author of the Southern Strategy Harvey "Lee" Atwater said, "And all these things you're talking about are totally economic things, and the byproduct of them is blacks get hurt worse than whites… And if it is getting that abstract and that coded, then we're doing away with the racial problem one way or another…" (Perlstein, 2012). Reagan era policies and their proponents demonstrate the centrality of supremacists and structural supremacism in hegemonic states, and thus support the argument that stated goals should be largely ignored when assessing intervention approaches which should, rather, be assessed according to their impact.

Segregation, Mobility, and Supremacism. In the twentieth century, institutional and economic supremacy mediated geographic and class mobility and reinforced residential segregation along race and class lines. These forces served to deepen existing social tensions. Though interventions for disrupting structural supremacism were found to have some success, the barriers to change created by neoliberal economic and political policies offer instructive examples for informing future intervention approaches.

As reported by Bishop (2008), domestic residential mobility reached all-time highs following the economic changes instituted by neoliberalism, "40% of the country's 320 metropolitan areas lost white population in the 1990s.... 9 out of 320 cities lost black residents" (pp. 98–99). Highly educated workers' wages and education levels steadily increased in the neoliberal system, and they relocated to high amenity politically liberal cities (Bishop, 2008). White entry-level workers faced pay stagnation or job loss and left post-industrial gentrifying cities in search of employment and lower living expenses (Bishop, 2008). In contrast, Black entry-level workers were less likely to relocate from cities (Bishop, 2008). As a result, America's counties became a fourth more politically segregated and slightly less racially segregated between 1980-2000 (Bishop, 2008).

These trends were also documented in memoir and ethnography. Frank's (2004) recollection of his home state Kansas put it this way: "a reliable hotbed of leftist reform movements a hundred years ago that today ranks among the nation's most eager audiences for… conservatism" (p. 10). Bageant (2007) shared similar observations of rural Virginia, as did ethnographer Russel Hochschild (2016) in her work with the Louisiana Tea Party. In each case political loyalty shifted away from class solidarity and self-advocacy and toward inegalitarian progressive movements (Bageant, 2007; Frank, 2004; Hochschild, 2016). In Bageant's view,

increased political segregation and economic austerity set the stage for the rural White working class's appropriation by the political right. While the right offered advocacy and someone to blame for their increasing poverty, "no real liberal voice, the kind that speaks the rock-bottom, undeniable truth, ever enters their lives" (2007, p. 72).

The relative immobility of Black entry-level workers demonstrates several additional dimensions of economic and institutional supremacism. Rather than relocating, Black entry-level workers generally remained in neglected neighborhoods of gentrifying cities (Muhammad, 2019). Muhammad (2019), Massey and Denton (1998), and Sharkey (2013) linked segregation and Black immobility to structural and individual barriers faced by the Civil Rights Movement's intervention attempts, which included the United States' legacy of racist segregation practices and neoliberalism's implementation of economic and legal restrictions.

When five million formerly enslaved people[22] and millions of international immigrants migrated to cities outside the South between 1940 and 1970, cities responded by ghettoizing newcomers' residence and employment opportunities (Massey & Denton, 1998; Muhammad, 2019). Muhammed's (2019) analysis revealed that crime rates in European immigrant and Black neighborhoods were similarly high until White social reformers interceded on European immigrants' behalf with stigma-reducing publicity campaigns, expanded employment opportunities, and social welfare programs. Within two decades European immigrant poverty and crime ceased to be of interest to law enforcement (Muhammad, 2019). In contrast, crime in Black neighborhoods continued to be correlated with characterological flaws rather than circumstances and met with harsh punitive measures rather than social welfare (Muhammad,

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[22] The migration of formerly enslaved people immediately after the Civil War and then beginning in 1940 is often referred to as "The Great Migration" (Massey & Denton, 1998; Muhammad, 2019)

2019). Later, when Civil Rights era initiatives attempted to address Black class mobility and segregation, they faced impossible barriers.

Massey and Denton (1998) illustrated how institutionally supported segregation before 1968 magnified barriers to change. Sharkey (2013) argued further that the institutional support achieved through the Civil Rights Act, the Fair Housing Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act were not supported with the oversight or means necessary for successful implementation. As entrenched geographic divides and institutional barriers facilitated continued segregation practices, proponents of neoliberalism within political and financial institutions were easily able to further erode federal rights initiatives by defunding related programming and oversight (Massey & Denton, 1998; Sharkey, 2013; Travis, 2008). As a result, when Black neighborhoods faced relatively higher crime following neoliberal restructuring, institutional responses focused on punitive measures rather than social welfare (Massey &Denton, 1998; Sharkey, 2013).

Economic supremacy reproduces individual and structural supremacism through segregation, disparities in mobility, and institutional discrimination. This is expressed as direct discrimination and support for supremacist political movements and policies. The interventions that effectively reduced European immigrant poverty, crime, and segregation have not been replicated with other subordinated groups, which offers some explanation for the persistence of disparities in crimes of poverty. This analysis is revisited in later chapter's structural intervention recommendations.

Summary and Conclusions

Chapter 4 focused on the enculturation of supremacism, or a process by which individuals and societies are socialized into a supremacist framework by supremacist environmental conditions. Here, we saw how supremacism's expression and prevalence is

shaped according to socialization within the family system and institutions, in relation to structural factors and cultural narratives, and as a product and producer of institutional and economic factors. The findings and arguments reported by this chapter have important intervention implications that is further considered alongside exit workers' descriptions of socialization, family interventions, and structural impacts in the final chapters of the project.

Chapter 5: Supremacist Activism

Supremacist activism reproduces group dominance within a hierarchical social system and includes expressing superiority over members of subordinated groups, acts of discrimination, and support for hegemonic policies. In addition to elaborating key concepts that are relevant to addressing supremacist activism—recruitment, discrimination platforms, tactics, and disengagement—Chapter 5 advances two discursive moves that were prefigured in earlier chapters and will be further developed in this text. The first rejects assumptions that supremacism occurs more frequently in uneducated working-class people. The next challenges narrow frameworks of supremacism and expands supremacist activism to include all organized groups whose efforts perpetuate supremacist narratives, discriminate against members of subordinated groups, and support hegemonic policies. These reformulations of supremacist activism anticipate findings from the present study's interviews with exit workers, specifically their reports that economic deprivation created barriers to leaving supremacist activism and their observations that overlapping views between mainstream political parties and fringe supremacist groups impacted the occurrence of supremacism in their clients as well as how governmental organizations have interacted with exit work. In addition, the literatures on vulnerability factors and disengagement processes support several intervention strategies espoused by exit workers related to existential meaning-making, social skill-building, and distress tolerance.

Vulnerability to Supremacist Activist Recruitment

Vulnerability, as applied here, refers to individual risk factors that increase susceptibility to supremacist activist recruitment. Risk factors provide guidance for intervention by informing prevention strategies, potential relapse triggers, and potential areas of focus for practitioners. Self-report survey research with high school and university students (n = 567) produced several risk factors including: friendship with existing members, consuming White power music, verbally abusive family systems, juvenile criminality, pre-existing conservative political affiliation, and pre-existing racist beliefs (Turpin-Petrosino, 2002). Physical abuse was not found to be a risk factor, while criminality and verbal abuse more significantly increased vulnerability to recruitment in high school students than college students (Turpin-Petrosino, 2002).

Turpin-Petrosino's (2002) underlying premise coupled low education and supremacist activism, which conflicted with conclusions from social dominance orientation research that supremacism is overexpressed in dominating groups and with hate crimes data that affluent teenage boys from the suburbs were responsible for the majority of reported hate crime incidents (Moser, 2004; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Returning to arguments introduced in Chapter 4, Turpin-Petrosino's (2002) factors of vulnerability—long-held conservative and racist beliefs— were also found to be regularly associated with affluent Greek letter organizations and elite academic institutions who reinforce these risk factors by promoting institutional discriminatory practices and structural supremacism (DeBruin, 2019; Mara et al., 2018; Mendelberg et al., 2017 Samson, 2018; Van Dyke & Tester, 2014). Turpin-Petrosino's early assumptions about the mutual exclusivity of higher education and supremacist activism were flawed, yet a basis for her general intuition that deprivation plays a role in supremacist activism was provided by the current study where exit workers endorsed pursuing higher education as a support for clients

disengaging from supremacist activism and marked deprivation factors such as financial instability and poor health care access as barriers to disengagement.

Male Rights of Passage. From his ethnographic work with former supremacist activist group members from Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, Kimmel (2007) suggested that membership in racist organizations and acceptance of racist ideology provided a rite of passage from adolescence to adulthood for young men. For Kimmel, the individuality, isolation, and rootlessness observed in postindustrial era societies corresponded with a pattern of unmet needs, especially for young people who do not attend university. Supremacist organizations responded to the affective deprivation felt by young men by fostering a sense of belonging, shared identity, and collective aesthetics (Kimmel). Kimmel's conclusions are supported by findings that supremacist activism attracts more young men than women and that male-supremacist trends in supremacist activism are pervasive (Cooper & Jenkins, 2019; HoSang & Lowndes, 2019; Moser, 2004; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Kimmel's (2007) work also lends theoretical support to the use of meaning making and identity-formation interventions in exit work reported by exit workers in the current study.

Kimmel (2007) perceived Scandinavian supremacist activism as anomalous to "normally tolerant social democracies" (p. 206) and did not conceptualize supremacism as an enduring feature of Scandinavia's sociopolitical narrative. While he depicted unmet individual needs that had been sacrificed to infrastructural change, he did not extend his structural critique, as some other scholars have, to include Scandinavia's colonial past, institutional racism, and cultural xenophobia (Bangstad, 2018; Mulinari & Neergaard, 2014). In this way, Kimmel missed an opportunity to contribute to a conversation being advanced by some Scandinavian political analysts who describe the historic circulation of supremacist political platforms within

mainstream and fringe supremacist groups as key to supremacism's cultural normalization and growth (Bangstad, 2018; Mulinari & Neergaard, 2014). The current study roots its conceptualization of supremacist activism in its historic societal acceptability and the related view, shared by some of the project's interviewees, that individual interventions are not sufficient to change cultural supremacism in the absence of interventions that address institutional and economic supremacism.

Common Supremacist Activist Platforms

Unifying platforms are topical themes around which activists present a basis for recruitment and organized action. As observed by Sidanius and Pratto (1999), narratives that emphasize differences between subordinated and dominating groups based on age, gender, and arbitrary sets, *i.e.*, race, class, or sexual orientation, are the grounds upon which dominating groups manufacture consent to enact the many forms of discrimination that maintain hegemony. Recognizing supremacist activism is a necessary antecedent to intervention, so this section provides a foundation for understanding common supremacist platforms in contemporary supremacist activist rhetoric.

Racism. In Western supremacism race is a highly prevalent feature in supremacist activist platforms, wherein racial inequality is justified by centering White supremacism. Racism is expressed as supremacist beliefs, support for supremacist policies, and discrimination behaviors (Kendi, 2017; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Some persisting elements have been maintained in supremacist rhetoric since the enslavement of African people, such as the myths of superior White intellect, morality, and work ethic (Williams et al., 2012).

At one time, explicit racism was central to supremacist politician's political agendas, for instance, to promote colonialism, enslavement, rights inequity, and forced segregation. Racist

narratives continue to covertly feature in the platforms of United States' public and private institutions including political platforms that are antagonistic to social welfare, desegregation interventions, and policing reforms (Kendi, 2017; Massey & Denton, 1998; Muhammad, 2019; Pager & Shepherd, 2008; Pratto et al., 2013; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Furthermore, supremacist activists who recruit a racially diverse membership and include people of color in leadership still contribute to White supremacist hegemony by organizing alongside White supremacist milieus, supporting racist electoral candidates, and promoting overlapping supremacist platforms—nationalism and male supremacism (Cooper & Jenkins, 2019; HoSang & Lowndes, 2019).

Nationalism and Xenophobia. Nationalism and xenophobia are two outgrowths of ethnocentric supremacism, wherein supremacist activists center their cultural norms and practices as the standard for assessing the inferiority of others. Nationalism prioritizes national identity as a unifying platform (Vargas-Salfate & de Zúñiga, 2019). Some hegemonic states deploy an inclusion strategy and strategically support members of subordinated groups to further nationalism, called "homonationalism" (Puar, 2007, p. 4) when referring to inclusion of gay and trans people. Xenophobic platforms promote supremacist discrimination toward people from other countries (Lee, 2019). Historically and presently, xenophobic and nationalistic platforms frequently overlap with racism and promote supremacist practices such as colonialism, imperialism, internment, forced assimilation, and deportation (Fischer-Tahir & Wagenhofer, 2017; Lee, 2019).

Hegemonic states continue to receive wealth from formerly colonized and less industrialized nations, and exploit supremacist immigration practices which maintains global power disparities (Bhambra, 2020; Bulhan, 2015). For instance, in the United States, industry employers invite migrant laborers to fill labor market gaps under the auspices of potential

naturalization, then after the demand for their labor is reduced, governmental bodies carry out mass deportations (Golash-Boza, 2015). While supremacist activists apply xenophobic and nationalistic platforms to deny noncitizens legal protection and rights under the law, economic and institutional supremacist practices dehumanize migrant laborers into disposable resources (Bonds & Inwood, 2016; Golash-Boza, 2015).

Religious Supremacism. Religious platforms are used in supremacist activist rhetoric to subjugate others based on religiously defined moral assessments and to set parameters of good and evil in supremacist cultural narratives (Berlet and Lyons, 2000). Religious intolerance or religious persecution are present in every global region (Grim & Finke, 2007; Majumdar, 2020). Religious and race platforms are also frequently overlapping, for instance, anti-Jewish and anti-Islam ideologies may target Judaism and Islam on the basis of race rather than faith (Considine, 2017; Simi & Futrell, 2010).

Counterterrorism literature and mainstream media outlets deemphasize dominant forms of religious supremacism, such as the Christian supremacism of many White supremacist groups (Berlet & Lyons, 2000; Davis & Perry, 2021; Simi & Futrell, 2010). At the same time, a growing misperception among White American evangelicals promotes a platform of defensiveness and holy war based on the belief that Christians face the same discrimination as subordinated groups (Jones et al., 2016; Berlet & Lyons, 2000). Their belief contrasts Pew Research Center findings that Americans expressed relative warmth toward Christians compared to other religions (Mitchell, 2017). These misperceptions may be accounted for by American evangelical's overidentification with the violent discrimination faced by subordinated Christian groups from other hegemonic countries and recent findings that leftwing authoritarians do discriminate against Christian evangelicals (Costello et al., 2020; McAlister, 2019).

Gender Supremacism. The rhetoric of many contemporary supremacist populist movements relies heavily on male and cis[23] supremacist platforms, which are used to promote gender-based institutional discrimination (ADL, 2018; Elias, 2019; Ging, 2019; Hirsh & Cha, 2017; Varas & Tarancón, 2017). The origin and historical basis of gender supremacism is debated in anthropological and archeological circles, while the contemporary presence of multiple-gender-based societies, matrilineal social organization, and intersexuality complicates male and cis-gender supremacist narratives (Fausto-Sterling, 2000; Graham-Davies, 2010; Pyburn, 2004).

Gender supremacism has been linked to incidents of violence by researchers of the "manosphere," which is comprised of Pickup Artists (PUAs), Involuntary Celibates (Incels), and Men's Rights Activists (MRAs; ADL, 2018; Ging, 2019; Hoffman et al., 2020). Similarly, authoritarianism and social dominance orientation researchers found that general supremacism correlates with a variety of gender-specific forms of discrimination: hostile and benevolent sexism; Rape Myth Acceptance (RMA); Acceptance of Modern Myths About Sexual Aggression (AMMSA); dehumanization of women; sexual coercion (Austin & Jackson, 2019; Canto et al., 2020; Kelly et al., 2015; Manoussaki & Hayne, 2019; Milesi et al., 2019; Rollero et al., 2019; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Süssenbach & Bohner, 2011; Walker et al., 1993). Despite male and cis-supremacists' relatively high incidents of violence and murder, misogyny and transphobia are not well addressed by social interventions (ADL, 2018; Lee, 2017; Marganski, 2019).

Heterosexism. Before a 2003 Supreme Court ruling and peaking in the 1950s, supremacist discrimination was institutionalized, and anti-sodomy laws prosecuted consensual gay acts (Weinmeyer, 2014). The fields of psychiatry and psychology contributed to institutional

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[23] Compared to nonbinary and trans genders.

supremacism and diagnosed homosexuality as pathology until 1973, which meant that families could petition the courts to forcibly commit a family member to conversion therapy via "castration, lobotomy, and electroshock therapy" (Russo, 2019, p. 6). As recently as 2018, a gay panic defense earned the defendant a homicide rather than murder conviction and the much-reduced accompanying sentence (Russo, 2019).

Despite findings that correlated authoritarianism and heterosexism, some supremacist organizations in the United States and Europe recruit gay and trans people or express support for gay and trans people to promote supremacism (Minkowitz, 2017). Inclusion of gay members by supremacist movements is not new for supremacist groups, however, and has not protected gay members from supremacist violence (Wackerfuss, 2015). One infamous gay supremacist, Ernst Rohm, cofounded the Nazi paramilitary group that was instrumental in Hilter's legal ascension to power (Wackerfuss, 2015). After political rivalries lead to Rohm's assassination by the Nazi party, they immediately instated anti-gay legislation, arrested gay Germans, and sent them to concentration camps (Wackerfuss, 2015). In another example, vocally heterosexist White-nationalist Butch Leghorn recalled the supremacist meme campaign he produced following the Pulse nightclub shooting:

> This shooting [is] a very valuable wedge issue.... We simply need to hammer this issue
> .... Drive this wedge. Smash their coalition. Make it cool to be anti-Muslim because
> Liberalism… We are currently driving this wedge as deeply as possible to break off the
> Pro-Gay coalition into the Trump camp. (Minkowitz, 2017, paras. 17-18)

Supremacist activism gains strategic benefits from courting diverse membership and manipulating their various political platforms, and hegemonic interests remain the primary beneficiaries of supremacist activism.

Overt and Covert Supremacist Activism

The strategic shift from overt to covert supremacism calls for an emphasis on oversight and assessment in interventions hoping to reduce supremacism. The legacy of overt supremacism was reported in previous sections including colonial and imperial projects, the trans-Atlantic and Pacific enslavement industry, and segregation laws. This section discusses a tactical modification found in both mainstream and fringe supremacist activism that presents a challenge for intervention, wherein supremacist messaging is intentionally repackaged to increase its public palatability.

As described previously, Republican party strategist Lee Atwater authored the Southern Strategy, which was widely adopted by Republican Party politicians. He also directly advised Ronald Reagan and George Bush, Sr. (Perlstein, 2012). In a leaked footage, Atwater described the Southern Strategy's tactical exchange, wherein supremacist goals were achieved economically rather than through more overt means:

Here's how I would approach that issue… as a psychologist, which I'm not. Is is how abstract you handle the race thing. In other words you start out. And now don't you quote me on this? [I won't]. You start out in 1954 by saying [n-word], [n-word], [n-word], by 1968 you can't say [n-word], that hurts you. Backfires. So you say stuff like, well, "forced bussing," "states' rights" and all that stuff. And you're getting so abstract now, you're talking about cutting taxes. And all these things you're talking about are totally economic things, and the byproduct of them is blacks get hurt worse than whites… And if it is getting that abstract and that coded, then we're doing away with the racial problem one way or another, you follow me? Cuz obvious sitting around saying "we want to cut taxes, we want to cut this" is much more abstract then even the bussing thing. Um. And a

hell of a lot more abstract that [n-word] [n-word] [n-word]. (Perlstein, 2012, para 5)

Atwater traded overtly racist language for a set of covertly racist policies (Perlstein, 2012). This

strategy was massively effective and contributed to misguided calls for a "color-blind" approach

to race by former Civil Rights activists, who falsely believed structural racism to have been

abolished by Civil Rights efforts (Lasch-Quinn, 2001).

Some fringe supremacist activist groups have also moved away from overtly supremacist

imagery, to increase their recruitment potential and reduce surveillance (Khan, 2017). As

explained by Jeff Schoep, self-described commander of the American National Socialist

Movement [Nazi], his group's removal of obvious Nazi iconography from their shields and

banners was part of their preparation for the now infamous 2017 supremacist street march in

Charlottesville, Virginia. He said, "It's part of, uh, trying to bring the party's image into a more

mainstream image, for the new millennium" (Khan, 2017).

Covert tactics allow supremacist activists to publicly promote goals and then implement

interventions that achieve their opposite. Lacking oversight, these differences may never be

noticed, and the burden of proof falls on those challenging supremacist powers (Elliott-Cooper,

2018). This strategy also sets the stage for plausible deniability, a well-documented tactic of

supremacist activists in institutions and on the fringes (Hall et al., 2016; Hodges, 2020; White,

2018).

Former Supremacist Activists

The findings reviewed in this section are drawn from interviews with former[24]

supremacist activists. Former supremacist activist's experiences of leaving supremacist groups

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[24] The term "former" frequently refers to former supremacist activists and other former-supremacists who have exited supremacism with the help of exit groups or otherwise. Former is used extensively throughout the rest of this text.

offer valuable contribution to intervention formulations by tracing the pathways away from supremacism and individual coping strategies.

   The Five Stages of Exit. Barrelle (2010) conceptualized the process of leaving supremacism using Social Identity Theory (SIT) and exit Sweden's 5-stage exit model from interviews with former members of three Australia-based supremacist groups (Barrelle, 2010). Her work introduces exit Sweden's 5-stage exit model which was referenced by several exit workers in the current study, and her analyses of us-versus-them thinking and hostile alienation corresponded with exit worker's formulations of polarized thinking and dehumanization.

   Barrelle (2010) located enmeshment as the source of polarized thinking, wherein supremacist's self-identities were so integrated with activist group-identity that a rigid boundary was erected between the in-group-as-self and the rest of society. Separating from the group, then, presented an identity crisis as the activist imagined joining society though "some if not all members of that community deserve to die" (Barrelle, 2010, p. 2). Cullberg[25], whose stage theory was the basis for exit Sweden's 5-stage model,[26] conceptualized crisis as universal human experience best met by addressing what emerges and accepting the unavoidable discomfort (Jacobsson & Åkerström, 2015). Exit Sweden's 5-stage exit model presented supremacist activism as one of many possible human mistakes, whose resulting crises could be resolved when faced and worked through.

   Barrelle's (2010) application of SIT anchored Exit Sweden's 5-stage model in social reintegration rather than behavioral change. In stage one, *motivation*, the supremacist activist is between worlds—they maintain relationships with the activist group while desisting from active

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[25] Psychoanalytically oriented psychiatrist Cullberg's stages of crisis, "shock, reaction, adaptation, and re-orientation" (Jacobsson & Åkerström, 2015, p. 234), the 5-stages of exit are based on the concept that all-consuming crises are a universal human experience.
[26] Cullberg's contribution to Exit Sweden's model was shared by a participant of the present study.

participation, and they may seek intervention support (Barrelle). Increased distance from the activist group may catalyze a period of isolation in stage two, *disengagement,* as they continue to categorize members of mainstream society as out-group (Barrelle). Identity change occurs in the *settlement* stage, when they no longer seek support from activist networks to meet their basic needs and may identify as a "former" supremacist activist[27]. Their new identity is fragile, however, and if their social needs remain unmet, those in stage three are prone to activism relapse (Barrelle, 2010). The fourth stage, *reflection,* often presents the most challenging crisis, as supremacist ideologies fade and responsibility for past actions is starkly revealed. The Results section of the present study reports exit worker's efforts to address the cognitive dissonance, anxiety, guilt, sleep disturbance, and substance abuse that frequently develops in stage four. Lastly, the former-supremacist activist enters the *stabilization* stage when they have achieved relative stability in the major areas of life required for independence. The former supremacist activist may always contend with the shadows of their past or maintain remnants of their previous belief-system, but they are at low risk for relapse or physical violence.

Non-Linear Exit and Barriers. Former supremacists have reported an abundance of motivations for leaving supremacist activist groups including disappointment with the reality versus the expectation of movement activities, conflicts with developmental milestones, conflicts with employment opportunities, ethical crises, ingroup conflict, and broadening social networks (Bjorgo, 1997; Bubolz & Simi, 2015; Gadd, 2006; Kimmel, 2007). The barriers experienced by those leaving supremacist movements and correlations with mental health disorders, substance abuse, and suicidality reported by Bubolz and Simi (2015) were particularly relevant to the current study's focus on interventions and anticipate some of its findings. Moreover, the

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[27] For instance, former-Nazi, former-KKK, former-identitarian, etc.

prevalence of factors frequently addressed in psychotherapeutic treatment—persisting cognitive,

emotional, and social difficulties; mental health disorders; and suicidality—supports the notion

that therapeutic settings are well-equipped to address the inherent challenges faced by those

exiting supremacism (Bubolz & Simi, 2015).

Drawn from 34 exploratory life history interviews with former supremacists from the

United States, Bubolz and Simi's (2015) longitudinal interview data found that their participants

endorsed higher rates of mental health diagnoses (32%), lifetime suicidality (44%), and

substance abuse (58%) than the general population. Their findings contradicted other studies

which they suggested may demonstrate differences in the prevalence of mental health diagnoses

in exit populations from different countries (Bubolz and Simi, 2015; Schmid, 2013). This topic is

returned to later, when reporting the current study's findings that exit workers whose clients are

not supported by national infrastructure programs and had less reliable access to mental health

care and substance abuse treatment described higher incidence of completed suicides, suicidal

ideation, and substance abuse.

Lastly, the barriers to participants' exit from supremacism reported by Bubolz and Simi

(2015) are especially instructive for intervention work. Struggles with guilt for past actions and

beliefs, anxieties about their ability to change, and complicated attachments to supremacist

activists who remained in the movement were all reported to compromise motivation for exit

(Bubolz & Simi, 2015). Further research is needed to better understand to what degree these or

related barriers could impact the treatment of supremacism in therapeutic settings.

Emotional Addiction. Simi et al. (2017a) examined the "traces on the remainder of a

person's life" (p. 1182) left by supremacist activism as observed in interviews with former

supremacist activists. "Addictionlike" (Simi et al., 2017a, p. 1171) barriers to exit included

isolation, automatic (intrusive) cognitive processes, and physiological reactions. Several former supremacists in Simi et al.'s (2017a) study reported successful outcomes with self-healing strategies that supported their continued abstinence from supremacist ideologies. These findings contributed to a growing evidential basis in support of the use of interventions for reducing supremacism.

For Simi et al. (2017a) "identity residual" (p. 1168) formed during intense and immersive enculturation involving "a totalizing set of experiences that permeate all aspects of a person's thoughts, emotions, body presentation, and actions" (p. 1175). Even years later, reminders of the formative experiences elicited interviewees "hot" "automatic" (p. 1170) cognitions and unwanted physiological responses (Simi et al., 2017a). Despite barriers, the self-healing strategies used by formers, or "self-talk" (Simi et al., 2017a, p. 1180), maintained their rejection of supremacism.

The former supremacists in Simi et al.'s (2017a) research intuited several techniques endorsed by exit workers in the current study. For example, when "Darren" (p. 1179) recounted a traffic incident with a person of color, his self-intervention evidenced the use of identification, self-compassion, mindfulness, imagery, perspective-taking, and reframing (Simi et al., 2017a). After experiencing intrusive supremacist thoughts, he first identified the pattern, compared the incident to past incidents, and focused on his desired goal. He also practiced perspective taking, "maybe he's just having a bad day" (Simi et al., 2017a, p. 1179) and mindful emotional detachment, "You just kind of step back…" (Simi et al., 2017a, p. 1179). Darren intervened with self-compassion and employed an imaginal exercise to separate his present self from a past self, "I constantly remind myself that you're not that guy anymore" (Simi et al., 2017a, p. 1179).

The second former supremacist, "Teddy" (p. 1180) employed a faith-based intervention

that employed the use of identification, committed action, meditation, and thought replacement (Simi et al., 2017a). Like Darren, he identified the here-and-now process. Once a trigger was recognized, he immediately engaged in committed action and physically disrupted unwanted cognitive processes, "if I get them, I just drop on my knees, and I just start praying" (Simi et al., 2017a, p. 1180). After taking physical action, he began a spiritual meditation, or prayer, which replaced unwanted thoughts (Simi et al., 2017a).

Simi et al.'s (2017a) findings support the foundational hypothesis of the current project, that supremacist presentations are likely to benefit from targeted psychotherapeutic modalities. This, in turn, supports the assertation that reducing supremacism through psychotherapeutic techniques is understudied in psychological research and neglected in clinical psychological practice.

Summary and Conclusions

As supremacist activism is defined in Chapter 5, many institutionally and structurally supported groupings within universities, governmental and financial institutions, and private industry are supremacist activist groups. The foundations provided here supported the project's overarching argument that effective approaches to social change require simultaneous interventions at every impacted level of society. Additionally, this chapter introduced several conceptualizations of supremacist activism that are applied later in recommendations for addressing supremacism in therapeutic and institutional settings: risk factors predicting recruitment, common supremacist rhetorical platforms, supremacist tactics that present challenges for interventions, and lessons offered by research with former supremacists.

Chapter 6: Clinical and Structural Interventions for Supremacism

Chapter 6 emphasizes that intentional cultural change follows from simultaneously

engaged, mutually reinforcing, and concentrated individual and institutional interventions. It advocates for the field of psychology to develop culturally therapeutic approaches for supremacism and supports this effort by presenting relevant clinical theory, practical intervention recommendations, and ethical considerations from existing literature. The second half of the chapter provides a foundation for developing structural competencies including institutional interventions suggested by social scientists and historians and responses to frequently misunderstood concepts and critiques of individual intervention approaches found in structural intervention discourse.

Treating Client-Generated Supremacism: An Ethical Rationale

Supremacism pervades hegemonic societies at the cultural, group, and individual levels, which, of course, include the field of psychology, its institutions and members. To avoid complacence and complicity in discrimination practices, psychologists are called to intervene on supremacism in their roles as clinicians, researchers, and consultants. Because psychology is a scholar-scientist-practitioner field, the literature it produces is a fair reflection of its norms and values. The accumulation of literature pertaining to client victimization compared to client or clinician generated discrimination strongly suggests that the latter have been less prioritized by psychologists (Guindon et al., 2003; MacLeod, 2013). This notable absence maintains psychology's focus on victims rather than transgressors and was described by Guindon et al. (2003) as a form of ethnocentrism, or centering of hegemonic values, that "blatantly disregards the perpetration of personal and systemic intolerant and oppressive actions" (p. 171).

Supremacism's harmful impacts on society compel psychologists to address discrimination. Mbroh et al., (2019) contended that, in addition to targeted groups, "patient-generated prejudice" (p. 285) negatively impacts the patient, their immediate community, and

society. In their view, intervening clinically is therefore ethically defensible, provided that clinicians appropriately navigate tensions with client autonomy (Mbroh et al., 2019). While some may formulate supremacism as a personal belief system, due to its consistent intersections with religious or political affiliation, many studies in this literature review as well as the current work focus on the psychopathologies—*i.e.*, defense mechanisms, cognitive distortions, paranoia, distress intolerance—underlying client-generated prejudice that are already commonly addressed in clinical settings.

In support of this point, the APA's standard for professional ethics requires a commitment from practicing psychologists to benefit and prevent harm to their patients and the wider community. Psychologists who become aware of client-generated supremacism, then, have a duty to "provide the patients with the tools they need to start questioning inaccurate prejudices and assumptions" (Mbroh et al., 2019, p. 285). At the same time, White socialization's "racial contract" (citing Mills; Drustrup, 2020, p. 187), which encourages avoidance and ignorance of race and other forms of domination, results in clinicians' discomfort in discussing supremacism in treatment settings. Even so, the application of psychotherapeutic techniques to reduce client's supremacism is understudied, and trainees in clinically focused programs receive little guidance to inform their responses to the client-generated supremacism they will almost certainly encounter in practice (Abrams, 2018; Drustrup, 2020; Guindon et al., 2003; MacLeod, 2013; Mbroh et al., 2019; Stone, 2013; Thompson & Neville, 1999).

In addition to this problem, the current study's findings indicated that therapists have been unwilling to take on exit clients who are attempting to leave supremacist activism. More detrimentally, exit workers reported that clinicians had abandoned or shamed clients after finding out about existing clients' history of supremacist activism. Psychologist's ethical commitments

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to beneficence, nonmaleficence, fidelity, and dignity present an imperative to address exit worker's statements of need for psychological services and clinician incompetence adequately and urgently.

Clinical Interventions

This section presents a short review of the literature regarding interactions between clinicians and client-generated supremacism. The limited data available suggests that these recommendations continue to be anecdotal, as there is not yet clarity on implementation prevalence and efficacy of these or similar recommendations. The clinical papers included in this section were selected from a relatively small number of apposite texts, because they offered concrete clinical guidance for addressing patients' supremacism. It is also notable that, with the exception of *The Counseling Psychologist* a joint venture of *APA Division 17: Society of Counseling Psychology* and *Sage Journals*, no APA publication generated more than a handful of papers on client-generated prejudice. The current project addresses this literature gap and seeks to contribute to advancements in clinical practice for addressing supremacism by integrating the psychological intervention literature presented here to exit worker's practical intervention applications in Part 4.

McLean (1946). McLean's scant biographical data suggests her to have been "one of the country's top women psychiatrists" ([Photograph of Helen V. McLean], ca. 1949). She first published on the psychological basis of prejudice in 1944, when she introduced psychoanalytic talk therapy interventions for addressing White supremacism (Mendes, 2010). After updating racial signifiers, McLean's (1946) statement of psychiatric care's negligence continues to accurately summarize the current problem:

To date, very few psychiatrists have made any serious psychodynamic studies of the

[Black][28]-white problem… The large literature on [Black America] … has no counterpart in any literature by white men concerning the irrational psychological motivation of their own attitudes toward [Black people]. (p. 162)

McLean (1946) drew on cultural symbolism and conceptualized supremacism as societally induced but self-inflicted. She saw racist aggression, "myths of [Black] inferiority" (p. 163) and "nostalgia [for Southern] feudalism" (p. 163) as the products of insecurity and fear of competition. White supremacism endured because it could not tolerate its own insignificance. From these "meshes of modernity" (p. 164), arose maladaptive coping strategies such as "daydreams of a glorious past" (p. 163).

McLean (1964) saw White culture as projecting guilt and temptation onto Black bodies, whereby the imagination of Black impulsiveness represented the shadow side of over-controlled White culture. The fantasy that Black culture possessed what lacked in White culture deepened White insecurity and aggression and resulted in treating Black bodies like their own forbidden impulses: out of sight or punished. McLean put it this way: "seeking a victim to punish for all manner of forbidden impulses, [White culture] must keep in subservience those who represent temptation… lynching relieves the corporate guilt of the white community" (p. 164).

McLean (1964) encouraged clinicians to confront their client's projective defenses and encourage client's awareness of their unconscious motivations. The clinician then supports the client in working through their unacknowledged insecurity about the "omnipotence and power which he does not possess [and resulting]… pent-up frustrated hostility" (p. 166).

Helms (1997). Helms (1997) suggested that "White identity" (p. 49) interrelates with

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[28] Racialized terminology was revised here, to reflect changes in acceptable language used to refer to Black Americans. This replacement will likely be outdated at some future time.

racism insofar as acknowledgement of White identity can be a foundation for racism and its denial inhibits the potential for developing a self-reflective relationship with race. Helms proposed that developing a "healthy White identity, defined in part as a nonracist identity" (p. 49) is a necessary aspect of addressing racism in psychotherapy. Although Helms's process for developing a healthy White identity was not described in an intervention formulation, the implications were taken up by others toward these goals and are similarly useful for the current project's purposes (Thompson & Neville, 1999). For Helms, developing a healthy White identity occurred in three steps:

1.   Confront areas of racism that persist within the individual's self-identity: internalized racism, positionality within institutional racism, and White cultural hegemony.

2.   Acknowledge one's Whiteness and its sociocultural implications.

3.   Engage in racialized identity development that is not predicated on the domination and subordination of groups.

The process of transcending a racist identity to nonracist healthy White identity as advocated by Helms closely reflects the process of identity transformation promoted by exit workers. The series of clinical theory and research conducted by Helms (1990, 1997, 1999) thus provides evidential support for exit worker's identity transformation interventions described in the results of the current project.

Thompson and Neville (1999). Thompson and Neville (1999) asserted that a systemic analysis of individual and structural racism is foundational to anti-racist intervention work, which they described like this: "history and context help craft the phenomenon of racism as both a societal and interpersonal pathology that, in turn, leads to dissociations of the self" (p. 157). They suggested that our engagement with "racial stimuli" (Thompson & Neville, p. 184) can be

adaptive or maladaptive, with the latter consisting of "three main components of microlevel racism" (p. 184). For White people endorsing racist prejudices, these include psychological defensiveness (denial, rationalization, intellectualization, introjection, projection), racism's relational impact (separation and alienation), and the reproduction of an unstable racialized self-identity (simultaneously reproducing and being unaware of one's relationship with Whiteness and White supremacism).

The following steps summarize Thompson and Neville's (1999) treatment plan for addressing White supremacism in a psychotherapeutic context:

1. Clinician education, self-reflectivity, and confrontation of maladaptive engagements with race precedes implementing interventions with clients.

2. Assessment of the presence of White supremacism in clients' histories informs treatment planning, and should be built into all intake assessments so that race is an expected part of the therapeutic conversation.

3. Then assess clients' "racial identity profile" (p. 206) using supportive questioning, while at the same time affirming the client's areas of strength and adaptive coping mechanisms.

4. In addition to a talk therapy framework, they endorsed "exposure to racial stimuli" (p. 206) techniques including increased education, self-evaluation, and working through rather than suppressing or avoiding real-world experiences and interactions.

Thompson and Neville (1999) also cautioned that grappling with racism may be rejected by the client and that client's desires for therapy should ultimately be respected by the clinician.

Guindon et al. (2003). Guindon et al. (2003) proposed a diagnosis of *Intolerant Personality Disorder* (IPD) and mapped its treatment. Much like the current study, they detached intolerance from a specific target and focused on the perpetuation of harm and the mechanisms

through which it develops. To address IPD, Guindon and colleagues offered a 5-step approach based on standard psychiatric personality disorder treatments.

1. To emphasize client autonomy, discuss the approach with the client, and seek informed consent for treatment.

2. Develop motivation for change, for instance by aligning the client's existing values with therapeutic change work, pointing out incongruencies, and focusing on any "subpersonality" (p. 172) or part-of-self that is invested in the work.

3. Increase empathy using techniques that encourage perspective-taking or cognitively address prejudicial core-beliefs.

4. Self-esteem building follows empathy, whereby supremacist grandiosity is replaced with genuine self-respect based on accomplishments and personal attributes, which may be accomplished through cognitive restructuring and assertiveness training.

5. Finally, identify and then resolve any relevant existential and traumatic issues.

Guindon et al.(2003) addressed literature gaps by offering a theoretical formulation of intolerant personality and suggesting practical recommendations alongside each step. Further discussion of IPD is taken up later in this chapter.

Bartoli & Pyati (2009). In Bartoli and Pyati's (2009) formulation, client-generated prejudicial comments held "multiple meanings" (p. 147) that were likely to have varying interpretations "depending on the racial composition of the therapeutic dyad" (p. 145). Such comments could result from "countertransference" (Bartoli & Pyati, p. 152), a "test" (p. 153) of the clinician's capacity to tolerate racialized content, an extension of the client's existing presenting concern, or adjacent pathology. Bartoli and Pyati offered the following five-step model for clinicians to implement before intervening on client-generated prejudice:

1.   Formulate client-generated racism within the larger systemic context.

2.   Where possible, discuss racist cognitive distortions defense mechanisms and in terms of the client's presenting concern.

3.   Assess: meaning of racialized content, the racial makeup of the therapist/client dyad, the client's racial identity.

4.   Engage in clinician self-reflectivity "to ensure that one's interventions have primarily therapeutic, rather than self-soothing or damaging, purposes" (p. 155).

5.   Determine the appropriate moment for intervention implementation.

Bartoli and Pyati's (2009) 5-step intervention preparation model provided theoretical support for propositions made by exit workers in the current study. For instance, both exit workers and Bartoli and Pyati emphasized the importance of practitioners having previously addressed their personal racism as a prerequisite to interventions and the prominence of non-judgment in their intervention approach. They also both endorsed systemically contextualizing client-generated racism and modeling "ways to constructively and safety discuss racial issues" (p. 152). Finally, Bartoli and Pyati supported the importance of exit worker's timing as well as pace in assessment and intervention.

Menakem (2017). Menakem (2017) addressed White supremacism starting with body-centered, trauma healing practices and awareness of one's interlocking position within institutional and cultural racism. He endorsed distinct but interrelated interventions for those with "white bodies" and those with "Black bodies" for addressing distinct but interrelated trauma. White supremacism, in his view, is often produced by unacknowledged untreated intergenerational trauma related to the impacts on White people of hierarchical social dynamics. His resulting approach was not geared toward clinical practice, but its application to clinical

settings is evident.

Menakem's (2017) approach integrated interventions from the somatic intervention tradition, including individual body-focused interventions, guided peer-to-peer consultation, group therapy, and didactic workshops, and included the following interventions for addressing individual White racism:

1. Begin with insight-oriented education about White intergenerational trauma and White defensiveness.

2. Practice body-awareness training (body scans, self-touch, breathwork, present mindfulness, cultivate ambiguity about future, visualization) to "help your body settle" (p. 208) in relation to personal traumas first, then progressively become more race-aware by combining these techniques with exposure through imaginal exercises focused on proximity to Black bodies.

3. Increase exposure by increasing contact with Black bodies in one's natural environment, for example, increase exposure by choosing to work with Black professionals. Engage bodily awareness and relaxation techniques when in physical proximity to Black bodies and identify how physiological sensations respond in "the presence of an unfamiliar Black body" (p. 208).

4. Implement perspective taking and role-playing visualization during contact exposures. Track any inclination to treat them differently or tip differently. "Ask yourself, 'What would I do if this person was white?'" (p. 208).

Menakem (2017) encouraged clients to identify activations in their bodies' stress systems and research their own intergenerationally transmitted trauma. He said, "We've tried to teach our brains to think better about race. But white-body supremacy doesn't live in our thinking brains. It

lives and breathes in our bodies" (p. 5). Though the use of somatic techniques were not reported by exit workers, Menakem's clinical recommendations and the evidential traction similar approaches are gaining in the neuroscientific community indicate that somatic techniques could benefit treatment with supremacists in clinical settings and in exit work (Grabbe & Miller-Karas, 2018).

Drustrup (2020). Drustrup's (2020) approach to intervening on White client-generated racism was tailored for "white therapists who align with antiracism in their self-identity and practice" (p. 181). He posited that client-generated prejudice typically presents alongside other mental health concerns such as psychological defenses, self-esteem concerns, and cognitive distortions. On the grounds of accountability to client well-being and community safety, he argued that psychologists have an ethical duty to address client-generated racism.

Drustrup's (2020) model was crafted to augment existing treatment plans, and fits within the client's presenting concern:

1. Clinician self-reflectivity and education related to "racial literacy" (p. 186) are antecedent to interventions with clients and posited as a "lifelong" (p. 187) process.

2. To preserve the working alliance and client motivation, the first clinical engagement with client-generated material involves compassionately listening and then affirming (without agreeing with) client experiences in such a way that verbally identifies the client's racialized content.

3. The third step does not have a specific end point and is ongoing through the process. Here the clinician assesses, with probing questions, the client's awareness of race and their racial identity, for instance, by connecting racialized material to the client's history.

4. Support the client's connection of racialized experiences and racism to their reason for

coming to therapy, their presenting concern.

5.   Continue supporting the client's racial literacy and self-reflectivity through techniques such as "psychoeducation, bibliotherapy, and encouragement to engage in new experiences" (p. 190) which can include greater interaction with people of color.

Two nuanced interactions were unique to Drustrup's (2020) model. Like several others Drustrup encouraged therapists to support increased contact between White clients and people of color along with the added recommendation to include psychoeducation and social skill training regarding respectful engagement with "non-white space" (p. 190). In a departure from some others, Drustrup's interpretation of the APA ethical guidelines did not presume a mandate to gain informed consent from his clients to address racism. Rather, client-generated racism was viewed as auxiliary, even symptomatic, of other mental health concerns (Drustrup, 2020). The application of the professional codes to client-generated supremacism remains a question for the profession.

(In)competency in Training

The ethical call for psychologists to intervene on client-generated supremacism and provide adequate services to supremacist activists and formers was established earlier in this chapter. To meet this need, psychological training could be required to address interventions competence for client-generated supremacism and supremacist activism in the formal training of psychology programs. As it stands, psychologists are not well-prepared in their training to address client-generated supremacism or supremacist activism (Bartoli & Pyati, 2009; Mbroh et al., 2019; Stone, 2013).

APA-accredited programs include individual and cultural diversity as a core training competency, which ostensibly prepares training clinicians to ethically address issues of diversity,

including bias and discrimination (APA, 2021; Yale, 2021). At the time this document was drafted, the APA's discussion of diversity in training did not address client-generated prejudices, and issues explicitly relevant to interventions for supremacism were not addressed elsewhere in the core training competencies (APA, 2021; Yale, 2021). In the absence of well-developed self-reflectivity, psychologists who are identified with dominant groups are likely to uphold their cultural views as the standard (of appropriateness, morality, etc.) to which the rest of the world compares (Sue & Sue, 2015). The implication is that competence in issues of cultural supremacism could reduce the extent to which psychologists identified as White, straight, Christian, cisgender, or male enable patients' supremacism.

Without formal training, clinicians are at greater risk of ineffectively engaging client-generated supremacism to the detriment of their clients and the safety of communities. Clinical training in psychological intervention for client-generated supremacism remains briefly addressed in the literature, yet existent data indicates that the trainees do not currently receive sufficient guidance. In Stone's (2013), sample of psychology and social work trained psychotherapists, none had received formal technical training in interventions for supremacism in therapy. Guidance for incidents of client-generated supremacism was largely absent from training, and those that occurred emerged in limited informal discussions in supervisory settings or class discussions (Stone, 2013). The resulting incompetence was reflected in the clinician's misunderstanding of their interventions. Though they endorsed their intervention techniques to be "antiracist," Stone's analysis revealed them as "more consistent with colorblindness than antiracism" (Stone, 2013, p. 2). Relatedly, Gushue and Constantine (2007) emphasized the barrier created by colorblind attitudes, or the purposeful minimization of race, in psychology trainees, reporting that trainees endorsing colorblind attitudes were more likely to minimize the

presence and prevalence of racism than those who presented with a more developed race consciousness.

In response to these dynamics, Brown (1991) recommended that clinicians create learning environments where they increase their knowledge about cultural oppression and also "agree to confront one another" (p 124). Menakem (2017) suggested that the self-work of White people should involve engaging resistance to anti-oppression work, particularly that which is rooted in intergenerational trauma. Thompson and Neville (1999) extended this to include clinicians of color and proposed that all clinicians "constantly examine their racism or internalized racism" (p. 203).

Diagnosing Supremacism

Some authors have called for the further development of a psychiatric diagnostic category for supremacism (Guindon et al., 2003; Myers, 1998). Supremacism causes substantial harm to society, yet because supremacism is often ego-syntonic and congruent with hegemonic culture, supremacists may have a variety of coinciding psychopathologies and still not meet the clinical criteria for existing mental health disorders (Guindon et al., 2003; Thompson & Neville, 1999). Moreover, Bubolz and Simi (2015) established the higher-than-average prevalence of mental illness in samples of former supremacist activists, yet a number of authors have recognized that no existing diagnosis predictably accounted for supremacist activism (Bubolz & Simi, 2019; Gøtzsche-Astrup & Lindekilde, 2019).

Numerous studies have investigated how maladaptive personality facets cluster with supremacism, yet no single personality trait or facet universally predicted supremacism (Hodson et al., 2009). Social dominance orientation was found to correlate with the Dark Triad Personality types, low honesty-humility, and low agreeableness, while authoritarianism

correlated with low openness to new experience, cognitive rigidity, and need for cognitive

closure (Costello et al., 2020; Crowson et al., 2006; Heaven & Bucci, 2001; Hodson et al., 2009).

Like mental health diagnoses, personality is at once stable and state-dependent, dormant in some

settings and periods over the lifespan and prominent in others (Fleeson & Jayawickreme, 2015).

Guindon et al.'s (2003) intolerant personality disorder (IPD) combined personality and

diagnostic formulations, which they conceptualized this way: "closely aligned with antisocial

personality disorder and narcissistic personality disorders but does not meet the criteria to be

considered either" (p. 171). Guindon et al.'s proposed diagnosis would require an endorsement

of least one of the following seven criteria: (a) "rigid set of beliefs that assert the intrinsic

superiority" (p. 171) of a group in which they closely identify; (b) does not extend empathetic

responses to out-group(s); (c) interpersonal "antagonism or hostility to exploitation" (p. 171) of

members of out-group(s); (d) engaging in any form of interpersonal or structural discrimination

toward others based on their outgroup identity; (e) any attempt to stop the "free expression of

contrary or intolerable ideas" (p.171); (f) a sense of "entitlement [detached from] achievements

or valid credentials" based on membership in a hegemonic cultural group (p. 171); (g) disregard

for the "human rights" (p. 171) of outgroups; (h) hardheartedness to having discriminated against

members of outgroups. Like other personality disorders, these symptoms would be "inflexible

and pervasive" (Guindon et al., 2003, p. 171) in several settings, leading to distress or

impairment of self or others, of long duration throughout the lifespan, and not accounted for by

another diagnosis or substance use.

The current study's findings were insufficient to determine whether supremacism is a

personality disorder; a more systematic and theoretical analysis is required to construct

diagnostic criteria and validity. Additional studies are also required to understand more

completely the key tenets of supremacist's personality structures and how these interact with supremacist activism and a more in depth discussion toward this end is taken up in Chapter 9's analysis.

Structural Competency

Psychiatrists Metzl and Hansen (2013) saw stigma in treatment settings as the product of structural forces rather than individual interactions and observed "how diseased or impoverished economic infrastructures can lead to diseased or impoverished, or imbalanced bodies or minds" (Metzl & Hansen, p. 127). When patient's distress is rooted in economic deprivation, they argued that the clinical arena "must engage politically if it wishes to help its patients clinically" (Metzl & Hansen, p. 127). This then requires alternative approaches to financing, institutional management, legislation, and ethical guidelines (Metzl & Hansen). Metzl and Hansen recommended that clinicians tackle structural issues directly from our positions in treatment settings by developing "structural competency" (p. 126) in addressing systemic inequality, or structural supremacism.

Metzl and Hansen (2013) reflected on the enabling relationship between treatment settings and structural supremacism as "knowing a lot about the health effects of wealth imbalances and doing little to address them" (Metzl & Hansen, p. 127). They called for clinical training to prepare future clinicians more adequately to "impact stigma related health inequalities" (p. 127). They imagined structural competencies to include a) the ability to identify the structural issues that impact treatment settings; b) proficiency in articulating structural issues; c) discussing social dynamics between groups in terms of structure; d) identifying and innovating "structural interventions" (Metzl & Hansen, p. 126); e) "structural humility" (p. 131) or self-reflectivity about one's biases and inability to understand the experience of structural

(in)equality as fully as those who experience its hardships.

The current project accepts that structural competencies in psychology are needed to facilitate a cultural exit from supremacism, specifically regarding economic inequity, supremacist responses to societal management by carceral institutions, and individual acts that maintain structural supremacism. This framework guides structurally competent interventions for supremacism presented in the next section. The last chapter of this text integrates structural competency into interventions as part of a culturally therapeutic approach for supremacism.

Structural Interventions

Much like Metzl and Hansen's (2013) structural competency, the APA (2017) *Multicultural Guidelines* provided a standard for multicultural competence that specifically designated structural issues in the purview of psychologists in each of five sociocultural levels: 1. the self and closest relationships (p. 10); 2. group "family, community, school, neighborhood…" (p. 10); 3. institutions; 4. national and global "societal context and… human rights" (p. 11); 5. "outcomes" (p. 11) or the impact of the interactions between the levels. The Multicultural Guidelines' emphasis on outcomes encouraged psychologists to "understand which level or levels in the model have directly (or indirectly) contributed to specific outcomes and consider ways to improve them" (APA, 2017, pp. 11-12) in their roles as "clinician, educator, researcher, or consultant" (p. 10). This section reviews strategies that are aligned with structural and multicultural competence.

Lewin (1940s). Lewin, a social psychologist and Jewish immigrant to American, fled Germany in the 1930s. His interest in group dynamics followed from his prejudicial experiences in the United States and Germany (Marrow, 1977, p. 210). He pioneered the first sensitivity training model called a "T Group" in 1946, which involved several day-long immersive

experiences with components of learning, interaction, and direct feedback between participants and trainers. A foundation was transparency between trainers and participants, and trainers shared participants' observed prejudices—covert and overt—with them throughout the process (Marrow, 1977).

Contemporary sensitivity training models that maintained Lewin's model were described by outcomes researchers to have increased short-term and longitudinal outcomes across several important change metrics, including cognitive learning and behavioral change (Bezrukova et al., 2016). Meta-analytical findings from 260 studies (n = 29,407) reported experiential learning, a variety of training methods, combined diversity education with concrete application, longer, more intensive training (versus single-incident), and training combined with other systemic diversity procedures were more effective than frequently applied single-encounter passive-learning models (Bezrukova et al., 2016). Lewin's model included these training characteristics alongside structural change as part of integrated organizational development, the latter of which was determined to be more successful than employee awareness training in present-day real-world institutional implementation (Hirsh & Cha, 2017; Marrow, 1977).

Cobbs (1968). Cobbs, a psychiatrist, civil rights activist, and co-author of *Black Rage*, developed the "interracial encounter" group (Lasch-Quinn, 2002)along with George Leonard, former president of the Esalen Institute and the Association for Humanistic Psychology (Esalen, 2020; Grier & Cobbs, 1968; Lasch-Quinn, 2002). Esalen's organizational problems are covered here alongside Cobbs' techniques due to their relevance for White psychologists' development of ethical standards and practices.

Cobbs and Leonard's first interracial encounter group was called "Racial Confrontation as Transcendental Experience" and held at Esalen. The promotional materials offered a "vehicle

for transcendental experience" that would intervene on "racial segregation" through "[r]acial confrontation… past superficial niceties and role-playing" (cited by Lasch-Quinn, 2002, p. 88). The weekend intensive group therapy intervention included an all-night "marathon," intense confrontation, physical touch, emotional intimacy, sensory exercises, and mandates for total honesty, formulated as weakening cognitive defenses to promote authenticity (ibid., pp. 88-94).

When Esalen leader, Bill Smith, threatened to call the police on a young Black psychology student during a typical-to-Esalen aggressive confrontation and later continued to deny the possibility that self-unaware racism motivated his threat, the Black psychologists left Esalen. In a mediation, Black leadership pointed out that Smith's reaction to the young Black man represented a coded escalation of aggression compared to his reaction to similar scenarios with White colleagues (Lasch-Quinn, 2002). The rift anticipated recent cultural conversations reiterating that racist stereotyping underlies Whites' overreliance on the police to intervene in social conflicts with people of color (Lockhart, 2018).

While on faculty at the University of California at San Francisco Medical Center, Cobbs continued developing interracial encounter groups into a clinical model of intervention called "ethnotherapy," which was evidentially supported by analyses of 100 groups with roughly 1400 participants (Lasch-Quinn, 2002). The two-day model emphasized "interracial honesty" in "the here and now," racial confrontation, attempts to strip participants of defenses, and nonverbal sensory-based "micro-lab experiences" (Seiderman, 1974). Group leadership dyads represented diversity in gender and race. Leaders demonstrated competence and reflexivity in "feelings and attitudes about race" (Seiderman, 1974, p. 174). Participants were equally mixed in gender and race (Seiderman, 1974, p. 174). Small groups had participants explore race within their racial category and then in diverse groups. Leaders first confronted the "façade" of Black solidarity and

the White participant's "anxiety and obsessive maneuverings to avoid [anxiety]" (Seiderman, 1974, pp. 183-184). Emotional disintegration eventually gave way as participants developed "an integrative process designed to help the participant move toward using the new insights acquired during the weekend to determine [their] future behavior" (Seiderman, 1974, pp. 188).

Thompson & Neville (1999). Thompson and Neville (1999) promoted psychologist's engagement in efforts to reduce structural and economic racism. They saw psychologists as well-positioned within institutions to bridge interventions at the individual and group levels of social organization (Thompson & Neville, 1999). Their recommendations included networking with other anti-racists, developing organizations for confronting systemic racism, and crafting contextually appropriate interventions for awareness-building, targeted education, and structural change (Thompson & Neville, 1999).

Pratto et al. (2013). Pratto et al. (2013) determined that the "stability" (p.132) of hegemonic cultures, or their proneness to social change, relied on how they distribute resources, create interconnectedness, manage institutions, and provide social safety. Interventions for reducing hegemony can achieve their intended ends and increase equity or have unintended opposite or even harmful effects. Pratto et al. categorized ways that social change approaches can fall short of their goals, which provided an instructive tool for those conducting outcomes assessment and intervention oversight: "(1) progressive or regressive 'tweaking' that maintains the current hierarchy and may re-legitimize it; (2) high levels of conflict that de-stabilizes, divides, or destroys societies; (3) separatism; (4) imperialism; (5) genocide; and occasionally, (6) intractable conflict" (p. 142).

Pratto et al. (2013) also provided examples of effective institutional interventions that reduced social hierarchies by implementing small changes in the economic landscape. For

example, in Guatemala, a grassroots organization provided small loans for those who were deemed "unbankable" (p. 144). When larger institutions noted the low default rate, they opened banking to the poor (Pratto et al.).

When providing intervention oversight or assessing intervention's effectiveness, Pratto et al. cautioned that hegemonic institutions, such as finance managers and large companies, frequently co-opt public service branding to increase their economic gains despite negatively impacting subordinated groups. To avoid social manipulation, they endorsed ignoring institutions' marketing of social interventions (Pratto et al.). Instead, they recommended assessing interventions by examining institutional practices, actual impact, and outcomes.

Rodrik (2017). Rodrik (2017) contended that structural changes could ameliorate the problems created by globalization and "maintain a reasonably open world economy while curbing its excesses" (p. 27). He recommended rebalancing efforts to address several power differentials: financial sectors and workers, global powers and domestic governments, and industries that accumulate capital and the rest. Later he amended his recommendations and advocated specifically in these terms:

> The interests of labor—good pay, high labor standards, employment security, voice in the workplace, bargaining rights—get little lip service. To move forward, labor must be given an equal say in setting the rules of globalization. In practical terms, this requires reconsidering which multilateral institutions set the agenda of the global conversation and who sits at the bargaining table when trade agreements are negotiated (Rodrik, 2018, p. 32).

For Rodrik, structural change did not follow a simple map but implemented and balanced the needs of all those impacted through representative decision-making power, effective protections,

and equitable capital distribution. As an example, he contrasted the United States to Europe, noting that the European enactment of free trade included "much greater redistribution and social insurance" (Rodrik, 2017, p. 11) in the form of "strong social protections and a generous welfare state" (p. 11).

Hirsch & Cha (2017). The $8-Billion diversity training industry has become a contentious topic on which psychologists may be asked to consult, and the APA (2017) Multicultural Guidelines proposed that psychologists acting as third-party consultants should be well-versed in reducing institutional discrimination. Hirsh and Cha's (2017) findings provided much needed guidance and revealed that policy initiatives and deeper structural changes coupled with oversight efforts had better outcomes than the rudimentary bias trainings more frequently offered within institutions. In response, Hirsch and Cha recommended that institutional equity initiatives and mandates should focus on structural changes, be highly precise, and include effective monitoring.

Hirsh and Cha's (2017) intervention assessment revealed that many bias reduction efforts carry unintended consequences, and they offered an evidential basis for several intervention models. In addition to this problem, they found that legal directives rarely adopted an outcomes-driven model and mandated the most effective interventions less than 10% of the time. In a related problem, judicial dictates following discrimination reprimands more consistently increased managerial opportunities for White women and rarely increased representation in management for people of color (Hirsh & Cha, 2017). For instance, training-based interventions and monetary fines over $100k often reduced rather than increased diversity unless structural changes were included in the mandates (Hirsh & Cha, 2017). In contrast, diversity oversight taskforces, hiring and promotion mandates, and institutional transparency initiatives consistently

increased institutional diversity and reduced discrimination (Hirsch & Cha, 2017).

      Muhammad (2019). The historical intervention examples provided by Muhammad (2019) revealed how interventions conducted by White liberal reformers excluded Black communities and ushered European immigrants from a racialized group into middle-class White citizens. He believed, "it is possible to see what change looks like using the past" (2019, p. xxii). The specific techniques implemented by reformers and Muhammad's analysis are useful for informing psychologists' structural competence.

      Reformers addressed the structural inequality of poor European immigrant communities in the early 1900s by building networks in the courts and social services agencies and using these coalitions to reframe definitions of criminality (Muhammad, 2019). They waged a public relations campaign using visual imagery of young mothers and helpless children in slums (Muhammad, 2019). They also contextualized the behavior of European immigrants from a failure of morality to a product of the environment and "avoided the language of personal responsibility" (Muhammad, 2019, p. xxiii). External factors such as brutal policing and classism were held accountable, and even in cases of violence they argued for "less policing and more prosocial interventions" (Muhammad, 2019, p. xxiii).

      They also implemented structural initiatives and "built on-ramps to higher-paying jobs and exit ramps out of poverty" (Muhammad, 2019, p. xxiii). Reformers provided support infrastructure: housing in safer areas, labor protections, employment opportunities, and criminal legal system reform (Muhammad, 2019). Alternative diversion courts emerged which saw defendants as victims of poverty rather than assigning "blame for their crimes" (Muhammad, 2019, p. xxiii). Within 30 years, the stigma of criminality had culturally faded from European immigrant groups, evidenced by a decision in 1934 to no longer collect crime statistics

(Muhammad, 2019). They "were decriminalized as a racial group… and became part of the statistical baseline of a white universal norm" (Muhammad, 2019, p. xxiv). In this way, class supremacism was further racialized by the middle of the Twentieth Century.

Racism (Is/Not) Something to Fix with Therapy

In July of 2020, *The Guardian* published Malik's (2020) Opinion-editorial condemnation of therapeutic interventions with White supremacism titled, "Enough of the psychobabble. Racism is not something to fix with therapy" in which he concluded that "psychobabble" interventions, structural work, and policy change are mutually exclusive. Malik was understandably skeptical of the unregulated high profit diversity training industry and justifiably frustrated by the conflation of police brutality with "unconscious bias" (2020, para. 5). He was also reasonably wary of an over-reliance on ineffective diversity training models by institutions and cautioned that ineffective inexpensive training was supplanting effective expensive structural changes (Malik, 2020). These critiques were supported by the literature reviewed in this chapter. However, the literature and the findings of the current project also suggested his premise was over-generalized when he asserted therapeutic interventions to be incongruent with structural interventions.

Malik's (2020) editorial demonstrated several misunderstandings of intervention, and despite the title's implication, he did not evidentially address therapeutic practice. For example, the assertation that "personal therapy" (para. 9) interventions harm social movements by "focusing on whiteness and personal psychology" (para. 9), were coupled with examples of assessment tools and pedagogical approaches rather than clinical techniques (Malik, para. 7). In addition, his rejection of therapeutic approaches relied on a twenty-year-old argument for colorblind responses to race "hypersensitivity" (Lasch-Quinn, 2001, p. 129) written by a White

woman, that was reviewed by a Black psychiatrist with this description, "most European Americans will love it and most African Americans will hate it" (Bell, 2001, para. 1; Malik, 2020; Lasch-Quinn, 2001).

Despite its technical and conceptual flaws, Malik's (2020) critique was shared from the Guardian's website nearly 2000 times. The article and its popularity support the current project's argument that psychologist's failure addressing client-generated supremacism in research and practice creates a vacuum within which non-clinical commentators can set a misinformed narrative. Moreover, it emphasized that psychologists are becoming bystanders in a critical moment, wherein therapeutic approaches to supremacism are entering the conversation with or without us.

A Color-Blind Critique of Race Experts. Lasch-Quinn (2001), saw therapy as inherently alienated from social movements and structural change. Her critique of "race experts" (p. XII) revealed some conceptual problems with colorblind thinking and demonstrated a line of argumentation to which psychologists who advocate for therapeutic tools with supremacists should be prepared to respond.

For Lasch-Quinn (2001), race experts, such as psychiatrists, therapists and teachers, coopted the Civil Rights Movement in their roles as "interracial etiquette advisers [and]…diversity trainers" (p. XIII). She believed race experts to have elicited a hypersensitive "self-obsessed wallowing in emotional outpouring" (Lasch-Quinn, 2001, p. XVI) from Black Americans who then began "crying wolf" (p. XVII) and finding "racism in every action and phrase" (p. XVII). This assessment scapegoated Black activists and race experts and asserted White innocence in perpetuating racism. Here, Lasch-Quinn (2001) underestimated the impact on structural supremacism of individual bias, stereotyping, and emotion-driven discrimination.

Lasch-Quinn (2001) alleged that the Civil Rights Movement ended most forms of racism, except those perpetuated by hypersensitivity. In his review, psychiatrist and academic Bell disagreed with her assessment and illustrated her false premise in the following vignette:

> Lasch-Quinn maintains that the instruments of white supremacy—slavery and segregation—are gone but that the "race experts" would have America believe that "virulent white racism and white supremacist attitudes" are still omnipresent... She attacks African-American sensitivity to these slights, suggesting that these minor irritants get confused with overt racial slurs... As I recall my experience in college of being stereotyped by a white male guidance counselor…who tried to discourage me from thinking about medical school and directed me toward auto mechanics school, I completely disagree with her assessment that such "minor faux pas" are negligible. Such an assumption about a developing child or even an adult can have disastrous consequences (Bell, 2002, para 3).

Multiply Bell's experience by every Black student his counselor interacted with and aggregate this with all students discouraged by similarly biased counselors, and experiences like Bell's represent a form of structural discrimination called *career funneling*. In this way, Bell's example powerfully illustrated how everyday forms of supremacism become structural.

The backlash perpetuated by individual supremacism has undermined egalitarian structural change (Fraser et al., 2015; Hernandez, 2019; Sletcher, 2016; Unzueta et al., 2012). Individual supremacism calls for individual intervention. Therapy *alone* may not be able to fix racism, yet clinical intervention contributes to a many-pronged approach necessary to effectively address social domination.

Summary and Conclusions

Chapter 6 established an ethical basis for addressing supremacism in therapy. It then proceeded to recommend several avenues for psychologists to intervene on client-generated and structural supremacism and addressed issues of clinical competence. It also responded to argument critical of clinical interventions for supremacism that saw clinical responses to supremacism as occluding systemic and structural interventions. The literature reviewed here contributed to a central conclusion of this project, laid out most plainly in Part 4, that individual, institutional, and cultural levels of intervention should be implemented simultaneously to facilitate a cultural exit from supremacism.

Chapter 7. Exit Programs

This review of exit literature predominantly discusses several types of exit groups and their related techniques, outcomes assessments, histories, and reception. As of 2017, there were roughly 40 exit programs worldwide (Horgan, 2017). Exit[29] programs and the exit workers who staff them provide supportive services to those exiting from supremacist ideologies and supremacist activism and may also lend support to supremacists' family and friends (Christensen, 2015). The programming is largely focused on a change process whereby the minimum definition of success is cessation of *illegal*[30], violent actions and whereby the ideal outcome is behavioral, ideological, and identity transformation (Koehler, 2017a).

Terminology

Exit programs' attachment to counterterrorism agencies is well-documented in the terrorism studies discipline, which contributed much of the literature sample presented here (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Koehler, 2017a). Returning to a key point made in Part 1, the link

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[29] Exit programs, as characterized in the literature, often contrasted with my impressions of exit programs and their staff.
[30] I qualify "illegal" to denote the presence of "state terrorism" and the state's *legal* use of coercive violence.

between exit programming and counterterrorism is an ethical concern for psychologists. Exit work is also a strange fit within counterterrorism due to its prioritization of therapeutic contact over security or intelligence gathering as well as their relationship with non-governmental organizations versus state agencies (Koehler, 2017a).

The current project generally avoids some of the common terms in terrorism studies literature due to the biases they represent. *Deradicalization* is a highly debated term for the process of ideological transformation (Koehler, 2017a; RAN, 2016). *Disengagement*[31] often refers to "behavioural (like abstaining from violence) and practical (like work, housing and school) changes" (RAN, 2016, p. 2). *Disaffiliation* implies a social separation from supremacism, regardless of ideological change (Koehler, 2017a).

Terminology more ontologically and epistemologically aligned with the current project's goals, and more value-neutral compared to other relevant terms, includes "exit" and "activism." *Exit* combines the definitions of "deradicalisation and disengagement" (RAN, 2016, p. 2) and denotes any initiative to leave supremacism. *Activism/ist* replaces *extremism/ist* and refers to social change efforts from any ideological position.

Exit's History

Tore Bjørgo partnered with Adults for Children of the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Children and Family to create the first exit program for supremacist activism in Oslo, Norway (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Demant, 2008; Fekete, 2015). Their work responded to the mid-1990s youth-propelled surge in neo-Nazism. Bjørgo called the program "exit" in connection with cultic studies scholarship, and similarly formulated exit from Nazism as the

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[31] Deradicalization discourses do not often account for the egalitarian and humanizing societal changes radical movements have catalyzed (Barrelle, 2010).

product of "push and pull factors" (Bjørgo, 2002, p. 17; Dubrow et al., 2017). Exit Norway's model was modified and replicated first in Sweden, then Germany, and is now represented across the globe following the European Commission's suggestion that "all EU Member States set up de-radicalisation or exit programmes for extremists" (Fekete, 2014, p. 1; Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Demant, 2008; Fekete, 2014; Koehler, 2017a).

From Anti-Cult to Exit. While deployed as a military psychiatrist during the Korean War, Lifton (1961), supported American prisoners of war in healing from "the official Chinese Communist program of *szu-hsicmg kai-tsao* (variously translated as 'ideological remolding'…." (p. 4) and later published his experiences. Lifton interviewed prisoners of war then innovated clinical techniques to reverse the effects of psychological and physical torture, which he called "approaches to re-education" (Lifton, 1961, p. 438). His work represented the earliest example of widely publicized exit strategies. Activists and academics, including Lifton, later applied his findings, first to exit from sects and then to exit from Nazism (Aho, 1986; Lifton, 1991).

Lifton's work later informed the "deprogramming" (Barker, 1986, p. 331) efforts of the 1970s "anticult movement" (p. 329) which responded to the new religious movements of the mid-20th century. "Cult" refers to "the initial form of a religion, characterized by charismatic personal leadership, small size, minimal organization, and unconventional or novel beliefs" (Shupe & Darnell, 2006, p. xv). The early anticult movement began as a small community of impacted families. At its peak, the anticult movement was comprised of large, faith-based NGOs that applied coercive deprogramming[32] tactics in the name of Christianity (Shupe & Darnell,

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[32] Deprogramming was defined by the Supreme Court as "the abduction and confinement of a person to apply intense emotional, and sometimes physical pressure to force the renunciation of religious beliefs" (Coyne, 1982).

2006). After a 1980s court ruling[33] prohibited coercive nonconsensual deprogramming tactics, the anticult movement professionalized and rebranded their tactics as "exit counseling" (Shupe & Darnell, 2006, p. xv).

Aho (1988) saw many correlations between the religiously oriented Aryan nation and religious cults, following two years of participant observation with the Christian Patriot group of the Aryan Nations in Idaho. Citing Richardson et al., 1986, Aho appears to be the first scholar who applied "exit" and the "push" and "pull" factors first developed in cultic studies to neo-Nazis research. These concepts are now part of the supremacist exit scholarship canon (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Koehler, 2017a).

Exit Group Types

Exit groups emerged across the globe in response to gang activity, sects, and political activism and effectively exchanged practical techniques and theoretical understandings despite the distinct identities of their target demographics (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Koehler, 2017a; Windisch et al., 2016). Koehler (2017a), who defined exit programs as "intervention" (p. 115) rather than "prevention [or] repression" (p. 115), showed that exit programs are one of several interventions on supremacism that are most effective if they simultaneously occur at the systemic, group, and individual levels, for instance, by applying "counter-narrative projects, family counseling, and deradicalization programs" (p. 115) respectively.

Koehler's (2017a) categorization of exit groups divided them according to their relationship to the state, their position on confronting ideology, their administrative structure, and their policies for establishing a relationship with clients (2017a).

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[33] Federal Regulation of Federal Regulation of Intra-Family Deprogramming Conspiracies Under the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: Ward v. Connor case, where a young man sued after being abducted for 35 days by his family and an anticult organization for "deprogramming" following his membership in a new religious movement (Coyne, 1982).

Supremacist Activism. Ramalingam's (2012) work described several types of supremacist activist exit groups. Youth-focused exit groups limited their clientele base by age and implement mentorship and activity-based interventions (Ramalingam, 2012). Peer support programs were typically led by former supremacist activists and relied on credibility and mentorship (Ramalingam, 2012). Prison-based programs tailored their programming for incarcerated members of supremacist groups (Ramalingam, 2012).

Middle Eastern Activism. Exit efforts with Middle Eastern activists warrant the urgent ethical concern of psychologists (Borger, 2020). Demant et al. (2008) reported that exit programming targeted toward Middle Eastern activism often revealed discrimination, biases in sentencing, and relatively higher rates of mandatory participation. They also found Middle Eastern activist exit programming more frequently mandated ideological change than programs with supremacist activists and questioned whether the intervention priorities being applied to Middle Eastern activist exit were rooted in cultural discrimination (Demant, 2008). In a more explicit condemnation, Pittinger (2017) accused deradicalization efforts of metonymically conflating Middle Eastern activism with terrorism and ignoring the violence of White supremacist groups. These assessments are further developed in Chapter 8 by additional examples of discrimination toward Middle Eastern activism and negligence in investigation and intervention with supremacist activists (German & Robinson, 2018; Jackson, 2016).

Gangs. Adamson (2000) established that divergences between "European-American and African-American" youth gangs (p. 272) emerged from structural White supremacism. Before 1970, gang membership "facilitated cultural assimilation" (Adamson, 2000, p. 272) and even acted as political gateway for European-Americans youth, while Black gang membership was cited as a justification for increased segregation. In the present day, Järvå (2018) reported that

members of supremacist activist groups and gangs learn from each other and sometimes share membership. At the same time, supremacist activist group members are omitted from gang research, and are less policed by security services than gangs (Reid & Valasik, 2018). Though they remain discursively segregated, Järvå contended that the techniques useful for facilitating exit from gangs and supremacist activist groups overlapped considerably, and this was supported by exit workers from the present study who applied similar interventions with both gang members (within the context of organized crime) and supremacist activists.

Cults. Supremacist activist groups and supremacist ideologies have been compared to the totalizing experience of sects or cults (Aho, 1988). The International Cultic Studies Association (ICSA) contributed intervention informing insights related to recruitment, manipulation, and identity rebuilding to exit work which have increased the efficacy of exit work with supremacists (Dubrow-Marshall et al., 2017).

Exit Intervention Processes and Techniques

Exit programs are unregulated and while some may strive to employ evidence-based practices, there is not yet a well-developed evidential basis by which exit programs can judge their interventions (Koehler, 2017a). Though exit interventions can be informed by an amassing body of evidence and intervention literature from related fields, differences in groups' target demographics and contexts prevent the generalization of practices (Koehler, 2017a). This section reviews a sample of exit intervention literature from which exit programs inform their practices. Much of the literature in this section comes from the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), a network and subsidiary of the European Commission[34] (RAN, 2020a).

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[34] As the executive branch of the European Union (EU), the Commission is responsible for developing and writing EU policies, including counterterrorism policies and procedures, and RAN's literature often reproduces their assumptions.

Exit Workers. As previously stated, exit workers staff exit programs and directly implement interventions (RAN, 2016). Their role is to transmute clients' motivation into actionable strategies or "realistic steps" (p. 3). A post-conference paper produced by exit workers emphasized the role of a strong working alliance, which they put like this, "Trust derives from the credibility of the exit workers on four levels: personality, ability to connect, reliability, and being knowledgeable" (RAN, 2016, p. 3).

Assessment. Needs assessment, assessment for former supremacists working in exit settings, and risk assessment are all frequently included in exit work (RAN, 2016, 2017). At intake, a needs assessment identifies clients' struggles and informs intervention planning (RAN, 2016). Assessing formers often takes place by monitoring their performance in volunteer positions (RAN, 2017). Risk assessment is one of the most controversial assessments in exit settings, and it particularly implicates psychologists (RAN, 2020)

Risk assessment is part of a move across governmental systems toward "actuarial justice" (RAN, 2018, p. 2) which relies on "risk profiles" (p. 2) to preemptively respond to the predicted future actions. In the following passage, the RAN Mental Health Working Group described risk assessment as an ethically fraught application of clinical expertise:

> Professionals have indicated that they feel particularly challenged with risk
> assessments and/or predictions of harm and consequently confidentiality and information
> sharing… There is considerable fear amongst practitioners of stigmatising vulnerable
> individuals and damaging the patient–doctor relationship, which ideally is built on
> trust (RAN, 2020).

Assessing risk is commonplace in the judicial system, which has drawn criticism from those in the clinical world who problematize whether the input of clinicians should determine the freedom of individuals based of possible rather than completed actions (McSherry, 2014).

Theory of Change. Wouterse and van de Donk (2019) applied the "Theory of Change (TOC)" (p. 4) model to assess potential interventions in exit settings and explain "what works, how, and why?" (p. 4). For them, the complexity of ideological and identity change calls for well-reasoned individualized intervention approaches. To apply the TOC model, first identify the desired outcome; then determine the requirements for achieving the goal; lastly, assess the former two in light of the potential barriers presented by each step (Wouterse & van de Donk, 2019). They saw the theory of change assessment as a dynamic process that assessed and reassessed intervention factors as information is gathered about unexpected outcomes, how practitioners adapted, and the results.

Motivation. Walkenhorst et al. (2020) viewed genuine motivation for change as a necessity for exit intervention success. They also noted that motivation is difficult to assess, as clients may defensively refuse to engage with interventions covertly through insincere compliance. Understanding motivation, then, requires analyzing "the person's underlying personality structures" (Walkenhorst et al., 2020, p. 15) including cognitive and emotional factors.

Understanding the barriers to motivation was suggested by Walkenhorst et al. (2020) to increase exit practitioners' ability to identify and address the underlying reasons for poor outcomes in exit work. Emotional resistance decreased investment in change, particularly uncomfortable emotional states such as "shame, guilt, low self-esteem, or apathy" (Walkenhorst et al., 2020, p. 35). They also observed that motivation flagged when supremacist belief systems

facilitated meaningful relationships and were socially beneficial to the person. Finally, "trust issues" (Walkenhorst et al., 2020, p. 35) in the exit dyad reduced client dedication to leaving supremacism, which they noted could originate in "personal history and biographical development" (p. 35) or be a feature of supremacist ideologies.

Ideology Change. Exit literature did not agree on the importance of ideological change in exit work (Demant et al., 2008). Some intervention models directly confronted clients' ideologies (Demant et al., 2008; Koehler, 2017a). Other models deprioritized clients' ideological transformation and prioritized behavioral change (Demant et al., 2008; Koehler, 2017a). A point of emphasis in the literature was the slow and incremental process of ideology change (RAN, 2016). RAN (2016) called too quickly pushing "an utopic picture of a perfect democratic citizen" (p. 5) a risk factor for regression or relapse, and instead proposed presenting "tempting and realistic" (p. 5) replacements for supremacist ideologies.

Restorative Justice. In the exit context, "restorative justice" (Biffi, 2020, p. 1) refers to a "victim-perpetrator dialogue" (Koehler, 2017a, p. 120) between those who caused harm and their targets. Advocates of restorative justice cautioned that it is a viable intervention that was found to impact the exit of many people positively and spontaneously in the natural environment (Biffi, 2020). However, in manufactured settings some researchers reported that incidents of manipulation or increased victim suffering resulted from restorative justice models (Alonso & Diaz Bada, 2016; Clubb, 2016; Koehler, 2017a). Lacking agreement about the ideal methodology for restorative justice interventions, three foundational recommendations were made by practitioners, "there is no standardised practice except free consent of the parties, good preparation and no time pressures" (p. Biffi, 2020, p. 13). Additional suggestions for practitioners included ensuring practitioner competence through training and seeking

practitioners who "assume a neutral position … [with] sufficient cultural understanding of the context" (p. 14).

Credible Messengers. "Credible Messengers" (RAN, 2017) refers to the credibility an exit worker has with their clients, which is most frequently achieved in supremacist activist exit work by the inclusion of formers. RAN (2017) stated, "Formers are often well placed to discredit extremist propaganda, prevent radicalisation, contribute to disengagement and deradicalisation, and through reliance-building, support those who chose to leave a violent extremist movement" (p. 7). They also emphasized the necessity of assessing a former's goodness of fit for the position by considering the former's temperament and growth trajectory.

Family Support. Families and friends who are unaffiliated with supremacist groups have been found to increase the resilience of those exiting (Bjørgo and Horgan, 2009; Sikkens et al., 2017). Offering supportive services to those in close relationships with supremacists was described by RAN (2016) as an alternative to securitization called "safeguarding" (RAN, 2016, p. 2) whereby resources are allocated toward "an emphasis on understanding the problems, but also the needs families have to overcome these problems" (p. 2). The process of providing family support included forming a strong and consensual working alliance with families from a family systems approach (RAN, 2016). In addition, they emphasized that family support in exit work was, in and of itself, ineffective without the support of "social services, schools and health institutions" (p. 6).

Outcomes Data and Self-Study

Exit programs' difficulties in assessing and evaluating outcomes was a frequent source of concern in previous literature (Fekete, 2015; Horgan & Braddock, 2010; Koehler, 2017a; Pittenger, 2017). Obstacles to effective assessment were rooted in the intervention model's

structure: interventions are highly individualized, many people disengage from groups on their own without intervention, and relapse is difficult to monitor for clients voluntarily participating (Demant, 2009). Outcomes data was compromised by the pervasive use in exit programs of self-reported client outcomes assessments (Bjorgo & Horgan, 2009).

Despite the limitations in outcomes data, researchers found that some scenarios consistently produced positive outcomes: integrating mental health care professionals, voluntary programs with motivated clients, and working with "newcomers and followers" (Demant et al., 2009, p. 52; Koehler, 2017a; RAN, 2017). Other strategies were associated with reduced client outcomes and issues with programming, such as mandated participation in exit programs, proactively seeking highly ideological clients, and contextual factors, *e.g.*, low community receptiveness to exit programs and clients' reintegration (Bjorgo, 1997; Demant et al., 2009; Koehler, 2017a).

Self-study. Koehler (2017a) discussed the establishment of an evidential basis for disengagement interventions by reviewing a representative collection of existing disengagement literature and his own experience in German disengagement programs. He recommended centering the following elements when assessing exit programs: 1. financial stability; 2. adequate conflict mediation; 3. a well-defined "empirically validated and thorough theoretical framework" (p. 178) that explicates the key demographic, ideal outcomes, and strategy; 4. thorough procedure and programming documentation regarding intervention implementation and planning and outcomes assessment; 5. built-in programming assessments that overview resource utilization and target goals. These metrics allow exit groups to perform their own self-studies so they can ensure that they are achieving their intended goals.

Context: State Agency and NGO. Koehler (2017a) problematized the merger of exit programs and governmental programs, which he described this way:

> one of the most problematic aspects of modern deradicalization programs is the widespread tendency of 'securitization,' meaning the shift to include [deradicalization programs] as part of security agencies' responsibilities, with police or intelligence officers as case managers, or establishing rehabilitation programs with the specific goal of intelligence gathering…[and is] inherently risky for the overall success and credibility of deradicalization programs (p. 96).

Here, he described how the securitization of exit programs presents ethical and practical issues related to client confidentiality, client safety, and the program's broader impact on society (Koehler, 2017a). Additionally, Koehler linked exit program securitization to client endangerment when he reported that the retaliation from supremacist groups faced by former activists was proportional to their collusion with security agencies (Koehler, 2017a). Bjørgo and Horgan (2009) were less critical of exit programs' integration with security forces and noted the greater access to governmental funding and use of monitoring apparatuses available through governmental exit programs (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009).

Despite funding instability, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) report higher success rates than state programs, which Bjørgo and Horgan (2009) attributed to their inability to monitor for relapse (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009). Bjørgo and Horgan (2009) also described the state's relatively higher barriers to services, which employed zero tolerance policies for substance use and social contacts with previous networks (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009). However, zero tolerance policies have been correlated with ineffective interventions in a variety of settings (APA, 2008; Holmes, 2006). Taken together, NGOs comparatively higher effectiveness despite

their lower resources is not surprising given participants' likelihood of failing out of zero

tolerance programs due to the high proportion of former supremacists who were eventually

successful in exit but struggled throughout exit the process with substance abuse relapse, cutting

all previous supremacist contacts, and intermittent relapse (Barrelle, 2010; Bubolz & Simi,

2015).

Critiques of Exit Programs

As a relatively recent development being allotted attention and resources, particularly

with religious exit from Islamic activists, exit programs have collected various constructive

comments regarding programming and structure in addition to direct criticism and skepticism

about the project's central precepts.

Silencing Social Change. Pittinger (2017) asked whether deradicalization facilitates

control society and raised concerns about its potential to silence conversations about social

change. In his analysis, the emphasis on "counter-radicalization" (p. 26) redefined "radicalism

itself…. as dangerous" (p. 26). He concluded that deradicalization programming and their

discursive impact on culture could have a narrowing effect and reduce the types of radicalism

that previously blossomed into humanitarian social change.

Underemphasizing Systemic Causes. Some critics targeted exit groups for working on a

microlevel that frames societal problems as an individual failing rather than in terms of

macrosystemic causes (Glaser, 2006; Pittinger, 2017; Sedgwick, 2010). Locating systemic

problems with the individual categorizes them as aberrances and deepens existing otherness

narratives (Pittinger, 2017). Pittinger (2017; quoting Sedgwick, 2010) noted that this shift

obscured "root causes" (p. 34) and prevented "declared grievances" (p. 34) from being taken

seriously. Demant et al. (2008) described how, in the case of legitimate grievances, obstructions

in societal change through democratic means escalates activist activity (p. 98). Further, they explained how effectively addressing injustice decreases activists' motivation to demand justice by any means necessary. The current project addresses this critique by exploring how exit workers framed their work in terms of both individual and macrosystemic change.

Funneling Resources to Causes of Harm. Some researchers pointed out that competition for scarce governmental funding exacerbates anxieties about the resources allocated to exit programs, and the fear that they funnel attention and funds away from victims to those causing harm (Demant et al. 2008; Fekete, 2015). Some concrete suggestions have developed from this, for instance, a suggestion to minimize economic aid to exit clients and focus on "support in finding paid employment" (Demant et al., 2008, p. 182) and "advice regarding any necessary debt repayment" (p. 182). Another recommendation was to match the funds allocated to support exit from supremacism "in proportion to the aid given to victims" (p. 182).

Exit Programs Contributed to the 1990s Neo-Nazi Surge. Fekete (2015) implicated Exit Sweden's support in the infamous mainstreaming and global fame of Swedish White power music in the 1990s. In support of this, Deland (1997) reported that Exit Sweden, located in Stockholm's youth center, Fryshuset, allowed racist bands to play in the space, let a supremacist bookstore function out of the building, used the youth center buses to move White power merchandise, and provided transportation across the country to White power concerts. Because these activities are used to recruit youth to White power movements, Deland asserted that Exit Sweden supported supremacism rather than achieving its stated goal.

Summary and Conclusions

Chapter 7 began by reintroducing terminology relevant to exit work and providing additional background and reasoning for their use or avoidance. The ethical problems presented

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by "deradicalization" in exit work are continued in Chapter 8 then linked to the current study's data set in Part 3's Ethnographic Results. Some potential resolutions and directions for further consideration are then returned to in Part 4's Discussion.

This chapter contained additional details about exit work related to its staff, target demographics, methods, and effectiveness. The outline of exit's history revealed shared ontological and epistemological foundations of prisoner of war reintegration and exit work with sects/ cults and supremacist ideologies. A cursory review of several distinct types of exit programming touched on deganging, anticult, and Muslim activist exit work in addition to the supremacist activist exit programs centered by the current study. The next section reviewed literature that described processes and techniques in exit and highlighted several ethical implications for psychologists and the current project's data set. In light of reported complications with assessing outcomes in exit, the chapter included outcomes-focused literature and recommendations from prior research on self-assessment in exit programs. The final section conveyed several critiques of exit programming, which, in their totality call on those implementing interventions to do so intentionality and with vigilance for any negative impacts from exit interventions.

Chapter 8: Carceral Supremacism

[Multicultural] Guideline 5. Psychologists aspire to recognize and understand historical and contemporary experiences with power, privilege, and oppression. As such, they seek to address institutional barriers and related inequities, disproportionalities, and disparities of law enforcement, administration of criminal justice, educational, mental health, and other systems…. (APA, 2017, p. 45)

This chapter relies on Foucault's (1977) carceral framework, where he demonstrates how

the technologies being employed in the first penitentiaries produced discourses of misconduct and punishment. In his report, the mid-19th century's societal view of and reaction to transgression took on the penitentiary's carceral conceptualizations and models of punishment as, "this great carceral network reaches all the disciplinary mechanisms that function throughout society.… the prison transformed the punitive procedure into a penitentiary technique; the carceral archipelago transported this technique from the penal institution to the entire social body" (p. 298). Foucault's conceptualization of "carceral" applies in the current study to the security sector, especially counterterrorism agencies, and their impact on discourses on exit programs, the field of psychology, and societal safety.

Psychologists committed to best intervention practices and a cultural exit from supremacism need well-developed structural analyses related to carceral interventions. Those hoping to reduce cultural and institutional supremacism should be aware of the carceral system's history of supremacist violence and discrimination before agreeing to work in its proximity. This chapter contributes to a competent structural understanding of carceral institutions and their relationship to supremacism in the United States.

The topics covered here have increased relevance following the events of January 06, 2021, when attendees at a rally of then-President, Donald Trump took his invitation "to the Capitol" to "take back our country" (AP, 2021). Supremacist activists breached the Capitol building with deadly force, attempting to undermine the Senate's agenda to instate Biden and consecrate Trump's loss into law (Follman, 2021; Kornfield, 2021). The Capitol's attack is part of a larger dynamic which is this chapter's focus.

Many of the authors in Chapter 8 have recognized that White supremacist activism has a marginal position in counterterrorism's resource allocation and research interest relative to other

perceived threats, while it accounts for roughly half of the known deaths from (nonstate) politically motivated violence in the United States since 2001 (German & Robinson, 2018; Schuurman, 2019). Still, some news outlets such as the Washington Post and Mother Jones uncritically turned to the Department of Homeland Security for guidance on appropriate responses to January 2021's supremacist strike (Follman, 2021; Kornfield, 2021). Their accounts adopted the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) analysis and called for counterterrorism interventions as the frontline approach for supremacist organizing (Follman, 2021; Kornfield, 2021).

A closer look to the literature on security agencies, particularly counterterrorism departments, however, presents evidence that carceral systems support cultural hierarchy formation, reinforcing and producing rather than reducing supremacism. Moreover, it reveals a number of barriers to security agencies' successful outcomes in interventions with supremacist activists. The following sections critically review the literature related to the carceral systems. Counterterrorism institutions, within which exit groups are often situated, take a central position as does the academic discipline that arose to generate its research, terrorism studies.

Carceral Socialization

This section's literature reported the co-reinforcing individual and societal effects of the carceral industry. A central risk factor presented by enforcement and intelligence agencies is the state's power to undemocratically set the terms of violence, determining who can use violence, when, for what purposes, and appropriate punishments for those who break the rules of violence (Jackson et al., 2011). Sidanius and Pratto (1999) described how its institutions produce and maintain hierarchies "by channeling positive resources up in the social hierarchy, by channeling negative resources down in the social hierarchy, by accentuating group boundaries, and by

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generally supporting the relative advantages for dominant groups" (p. 94). Their analysis found that several societal roles, of which carceral employees comprised the majority, were directly implicated: "prison guard, police officer, internal security officer (e.g., FBI, KGB, Shinbet), prosecutor, and corporate lawyer" (1999, p. 94).

A series of studies republished in Sidanius and Pratto's (1999) text demonstrated that those who endorsed social dominance orientation self-selected into carceral careers. In a Los Angeles-based study, police officers reported relatively higher social dominance orientation compared to random samples of jurors or public defenders, even after controlling for demographic differences (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999). In two later studies, participants who endorsed social dominance endorsement selected careers implicated in increased societal inequality—"criminal prosecutor, police officer, FBI agent, and business executive" (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999, p. 94)—over careers that promoted social equity—public defender, civil rights lawyer, social worker, and human rights advocate (p. 94). These findings suggested that those with a social dominance orientation, as well as its correlated threat over-reaction, bigotry, and discrimination, are drawn to carceral careers in law enforcement and security agencies.

Several studies also reported that socialization into enforcement roles, for example in law enforcement and the military, increased prejudicial beliefs and social dominance orientation (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999; Charbonneeau et al., 2007). Some studies found these effects impacted White officers most, for instance, Sidanius and Pratto (1999; Citing Teahan, 1975) linked the gradual increase of anti-Black racism and xenophobic views over a longitudinal study and found increases in White (but not Black) cadets during their police academy training. In another example with Los Angeles police officers, White officers also endorsed higher social dominance than Black or Latino officers (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999). These findings imply that

proximity to carceral institutions presents a risk factor for developing social dominance orientation and social prejudices, and that these are also shaped by the identity of individual officers.

Examples of supremacist behavior in carceral institutions corroborated this conclusion. Jones (2015) recalled a 2006 FBI report entitled, "White supremacist infiltration of law enforcement represents a significant national threat" (p. 104) and described several overlaps between policing and supremacism. This was illustrated by examples such as the firing of a "Chicago police officer" after his KKK membership was exposed and he was found to have "tortured over 100 Black male suspects" (Jones, 2015, p. 105). In a related situation, the US District Court issued a sanction to curb supremacist activism within the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, referred to by Jones as "a neo-Nazi gang [who] habitually terrorized the Black community" (2015, p. 104). These represent only two of dozens of incidents cited by the FBI report where White supremacists recruited and enacted violence from their roles in police departments nationwide (Jones, 2015).

Domestic violence was another indicator of carceral employees' supremacism. Compared to 4-15% of the general population, up to 40% of law enforcement families and up to 30% of military families were linked to at least one report of domestic violence (Anderson & Lo, 2011; Kwan et al., 2020). Also, meta-analytical literature reported "hostile" sexism (a risk factor for domestic violence) was moderately to strongly correlated with social dominance orientation (Sibley et al., 2007). A recent sample indicated both authoritarianism and social dominance correlated moderately with hostile sexism (Austin & Jackson, 2019). In addition to racial prejudice, these studies revealed that gender supremacism is also linked to carceral employment.

Taken all together and considering this literature's earlier discussions on police brutality

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and the mass incarceration of Black Americans, there is basis for asserting that a new approach is needed to provide societal safety. Many questions remain unanswered, but these findings challenge the prudence of almost exclusively funding carceral systems to implement interventions whose goals of reducing and preventing supremacism are functionally opposed to many of their observed outcomes.

Carceral Counterterrorism

Counterterrorism is the frontline mainstream intervention institution for addressing supremacism in the United States, yet its outcomes are often opposed to its own professed goals, including the goal central to front-line exit programs of reducing cultural supremacism. This section's review of literature suggests that elements of supremacism are iatrogenic or produced by the ostensible cure. In addition, the history of counterterrorism reveals supremacism or as Jackson et al. (2011) described, hegemonic states' global primacy, to be its most consistent objective.

Western military forces introduced "terrorism" into contemporary political discourse in the mid-20th century, to describe local efforts organized to oppose imperial occupation, which as Jackson et al. (2011) observed, was typically used to refer to "anti-colonial movements, left-wing guerilla groups, and revolutionary insurgencies…. As part of the broader struggle against communism and decolonization" (Jackson et al., 2011, p. 10). Its reconceptualization as an existential threat followed the September 11, 2001, declaration of the War on Terror. This trajectory was, however, predicted much earlier by scholars such as Chomsky and Herman (1979) who called terrorism a discursive tool used to recast hegemonic states' aggression as self-defense and "frighten and manipulate the populace of democratic states" (p. 6) into approving and funding expansive international military operations. Acts of violence were not categorized as

"terrorism," then, because they met established criteria, but rather, violence motivated in opposition to hegemonic power was designated as terror because it was socially constructed this way in Western states' policy and research (Chomsky & Herman, 1979; Jackson et al., 2011).

When the Bush administrations declared itself at war with terror, it expanded its definition of terrorism and adopted a policy of "either for us or against us" (Jackson, 2011, p. 17). At home, the Patriot Act expanded terrorism's legal definition to include "domestic terrorism" which increased surveillance and investigation capabilities and mandated little oversight (ACLU, 2020, para 1). The state also funneled nearly 6 trillion dollars from 2003-2019 from the national budget toward a thriving terrorism industry, the Department of Homeland Security, and terrorism research (Boukalas, 2015; Jackson, 2016; Jarvis, 2019). Over the same period, counterterrorism was afforded discretionary power and few consequences despite its responsibility for international violence estimated as "a total of 480,000 war deaths and 21 million refugees or displaced persons" (Jarvis, 2019, p. 343). The terrorism market's unrestrained expansion primed it to provide a stabilizing, and therefore indispensable, economic role, which in Jackson et al.'s (2011) analysis, incentivized industry growth rather than effective reduction of the problems it was created to solve.

Counterterrorism discourses inherently encouraged group-based domination by defining which violence qualified as terror and which constituted justified self-defense (Jarvis, 2019; Crowson, 2009). Its response models, corresponding intervention techniques, and cultural narratives were globally exported, as states worldwide absorbed the discourses of counterterrorism to varying degrees (Jackson et al., 2011). For instance, the hegemonic Western worldview inherent to post-9/11 counterterrorism efforts recast all people of Middle Eastern descent as potential terrorists which increased institutional and interpersonal discrimination

against Middle Eastern communities in many countries (Cifuentes, 2014; Demant et al., 2008; Norris & Grol-Prokopczyk, 2018). Researchers have called the resulting cultural hostility a "push factor" that catalyzed some Middle Easterners to join violent organizations out of fear of discriminatory violence and desire for revenge (Cifuentes, 2014; Demant et al., 2008).

In this way, counterterrorism agencies realized Foucault's (1977) concern with the normalizing effects carceral institutions and their "new disciplines" have on society. Further, their interventions often generated the problems they purported to solve and thus supported global supremacism.

Bias in Research. The field of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) developed in reaction to terrorism scholarship within a wave of increasing critical attention following the Abu Ghraib scandal's exposure in April 2004 and inspired by early critics of the terrorism industry (Chomsky, 1979; Jackson, 2016). In their assertation, terrorism research "emerged in the context of state-based attempts to defeat challengers and has since worked primarily in the service of Western states" (Jackson et al., 2011, p. 11). Accordingly, orthodox terrorism research is overly focused on political enemies of Western states and relatively quiet on supremacist activism.

Jackson (2016) accused terrorism studies of perpetuating "the silence on state terrorism" (Jackson, 2016, p. 22). He defined "state terrorism" as the state's implementation of "terror-directed violence for political purposes" (Jackson, 2016, p. 28), and reported that, before critical terrorism studies emerged, "state terrorism was notable by its absence in the field's journals, publications, and conferences" (Jackson, 2016, p. 23). In Jackson's analysis, terrorism scholars disambiguated terrorism from the state for many reasons: ahistorical pedagogy; conflicts of interests resulting from the state's funding of the terrorism research industry; uncritical adoption of the state's definition for terrorism; and the personal principles of the researchers. He saw

documenting and studying state terrorism as essential for holding power accountable and working with "human rights activists, lawyers, and victims of abuses to pursue justice and discover the truth" when states attempt to "hide and deny the existence of" state violence (Jackson, 2016, p. 29).

A central point of focus here is that counterterrorism researchers are incentivized with funding to perpetuate the cultural biases that maintain supremacist hegemony. Schuurman's (2019) analysis of 3,442 articles from the field's nine leading research journals spanned 2007-2016 and demonstrated the conflicts of interest inherent to holding multiple relationships as auditor, expert advisor, and financial dependent (Schuurman, 2019). He explained that the state is the principal funder of counterterrorism research, which has embedded researchers in government interests and limited the scope of their inquiry to fit within counterterrorism agencies' accepted narratives (Schuurman, 2019).

The research produced in terrorism studies informs the funding streams that flow from research to interventions and media coverage (Schuurman, 2019). Though German and Robinson (2018) reported that Middle Eastern and supremacist activism resulted in equal fatalities, Schuurman's findings revealed 74.5% of research articles focused on Middle Eastern activism and only 2.1% covered supremacist activism (See Figure Schuurman, 2019; also see Figure 5). The media followed scholarship's trends in ignoring supremacism though supremacist violence was "more prevalent in terms of attacks launched in the post-2010 period" (Schuurman, 2019, p. 467).

German and Robinson, (2018) explained that the impacts research bias reportedly has on media coverage, intervention development, and intervention funding reflect ethnocentrism and overidentification between researchers and supremacist activists. More egregious is role state

funding has been said to have on the deterring researchers, and therefore the public and practical

interventions, from adequately addressing supremacism (Schuurman, 2019).

Figure 5

Schuurman (2017), Groups and Individuals by Ideology

Table 2. Groups and individuals by ideology.	
Jihadist	74,5%
National liberation	7,8%
LWEX	7,6%
Religious (other)	2,7%
State terrorism	2,1%
RWEX	1,9%
Pro-government	1,6%
Criminal	1,0%
Eco	0,7%
Single-issue	0,4%

Bias in Intervention. Schuurman (2019) pointed out that evidence-based interventions

reflect biases reported in research. Norris and Grol-Prokopczyk's (2018) findings supported this

point and showed how an aggressive set of interventions—sting operations[35] and entrapment[36]—

followed the research trends outlined by Schuurman (2019) and increased from 1989 to 2014.

Given the feedback loop between research and intervention, it is not surprising then that

interventions disproportionately targeted Middle Eastern activists while supremacist organizing

proliferated relatively unobserved over the same period (Norris & Grol-Prokopczyk, 2018). At

the same time, supremacist groups were relatively ignored by counterterrorism operations,

except for an instructive outlier period immediately following the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing

when stings (but not entrapment) temporarily targeted supremacist activists (Norris & Grol-

Prokopczyk, 2018).

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[35] A sting operation was defined as "a law enforcement technique in which an undercover agent or informant plays some role in a defendant's attempted commission of a crime, so that the person may be arrested and charged with the offence" (Norris & Grol-Prokopczyk, 2018, p. 245).
[36] Entrapment was defined as "the US government's practice of using informants to induce law-abiding but somewhat radical-leaning individuals to commit terrorism offences, often by befriending them, repeatedly pressuring them, and offering them large sums of money" (Norris and Grol-Prokopczyk, 2018, p. 244).

Norris & Grol-Prokopczyk (2018) accounted for counterterrorism's differential response in frontline interventions with supremacism through Brewer's (1999) "in-group leniency effect" (2018, p. 259) and showed how in-group values were operationalized to prevent the effectiveness of post-Oklahoma City bombing gun control reform efforts. During the militia movement of the 1990s and the coinciding "Republican resurgence," (p. 260) a concord formed between supremacists and policymakers around firearm policy. After the bombing, calls for gun control were met by a consolidation of ranks between rights-to-bear-arms advocates, including a majority in Congress, the right-wing militia movement, and law enforcement agencies (Norris & Grol-Prokopczyk, 2018).

At that time, self-identified conservative radio hosts advocated for militia groups to challenge the federal government, while Republicans gained control of Congress on campaigns to reduce federal regulations (Norris & Grol-Prokopczyk, 2018). When militias were planning violent plots of civil disobedience, "[s]ome Republican lawmakers even claimed to be more afraid of the federal government than they were of domestic extremists" (Norris & Grol-Prokopczyk, 2018, p. 260). Through this lens, the commonalities between the counterterrorism community and most supremacist activist groups represented an in-group bias:

> [N]early all right-wing extremists have been white males. Gun rights supporting, conservative white males constitute a sizable proportion of government officials at the federal, state and local levels; they may thus have greater sensitivity to the rights violations of those who share these characteristics (Norris & Grol-Prokopczyk, 2018, p. 259).

Brewer's in-group leniency effect should be taken into account when considering how researchers, psychologists, and politicians minimize the dangers of supremacist organizing.

Bias in Psychology: CIA Collusion and Torture. Dickson's (1975) "How the CIA backed research on mind control," published in Nature, introduced a stranger-than-fiction history that connects the origins of exit programs, the origins of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), mid-20th century psychiatry/psychology, and Nazism. When the CIA's MK-ULTRA project was exposed by Watergate, a Senate investigation's Freedom of Information Act request revealed that a billion-dollar per year research project on thought control had been started during the Korean War (Dickson, 1975; Melley, 2011).

MK-ULTRA's payroll included former Nazi and Japanese concentration camp medical experimenters, and in 1955, grew to include Cornell University's neurology and psychiatry professor Harry Wolff[37] (Dickson, 1975; Gross, 2019). Wolff received sizeable funds from the CIA to open and head the Society for Investigation of Human Ecology,[38] which maintained the CIA's anonymity by allocating CIA funds to researchers working on projects relevant to "enhanced interrogation" (Melley, 2011, p. 29; Dickson, 1975).

MK-ULTRA gathered data from concentration camp medical experiments and then staffed psychological and psychiatric professionals to research torture tactics, including "the effects of sensory deprivation, hypnotism, drugs, and electroshock" (Melley, 2011, p. 29). The human subject research was deeply unethical and experimented "on often unwitting prisoners, recovering drug addicts, [and] hired prostitutes" (Melley, 2011, p. 29). Later, the CIA's "1963 KUBARK *Counterintelligence Interrogation* manual" (Melley, 2011, p. 29) heavily cited MK-ULTRA's psychological research and compiled the results into a technical model to conduct

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[37] Harry Wolff would later become the president of the American Neurological Association (Dickson, 1975).
[38] "Human ecology" was "at the time the catchphrase for psychological warfare and deprogramming" (Teacher, 1993, p. 15).

"mentally intolerable" (p. 30) interrogations. Ultimately, according to Melley (2011), "This simulation in turn became the real basis for interrogating detainees in the war on terror" (p. 30).

These techniques contributed directly to post-9/11 torture practices. At the end of the Korean War, military psychologists, including James Mitchell, applied MK-ULTRA data toward the development of the "Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape (SERE)" (Melley, 2011, p. 20) simulation program. SERE sought to prepare American troops for capture by simulating "brainwashing" (p. 20) and torture techniques (Melley, 2011). Years later, the CIA hired Mitchell to apply his experience with SERE to the 9/11 detainee interrogation program (Hoffman et al., 2015; Melley, 2011).

Mitchell, alongside his colleague Bruce Jessen, started a small company to contract with the CIA, and provide the agency with SERE-like investigation techniques along with "most of the interrogators and most of the security staff at the 'black sites,' secret detention facilities" (Borger, 2020, para 4). They were compensated 81 million dollars in four years (Borger, 2020). Though the APA's top officials were revealed by the Hoffman report to be implicated in the practices by adjusting the professional ethics codes to allow for Mitchell and Jessen's professional development with the CIA, it responded by removing their licenses for violating the ethics codes (Borger, 2020; Hoffman et al., 2015; Melley, 2011). The APA also distanced the professional organization from interrogation torture techniques by revising its ethics codes to prohibit psychologists from direct involvement in "national security interrogations" (APA, 2015, para 1; Borger, 2020; Hoffman et al., 2015; Melley, 2011).

In two related historical periods, psychology and psychiatry benefited financially from supporting unethical state practices. Psychologists continue to engage in domestic security investigations, however, which have been cited for ethical challenges much like the problematic

ethical tensions that occurred in national security interrogations (APA, 2015; Birgden & Perlin, 2009). Psychologists are also still employed by the CIA, FBI, and DHS with detainees in prisons and deradicalization programs worldwide, including at black sites, where they are governed by few specific ethical guidelines and have little access to professional consultation with peers (APA, 2015; Olson et al., 2008).

The Carceral Industry and Economic Supremacism

The carceral system and its embeddedness in the financial system prioritizes profit and hegemonic power over effective approaches to public safety. According to Jackson (2015), the for-profit terrorism industry "drives the War on Terror security project but simultaneously renders it unending, redundant and hysterical" (p. 3). This description can be similarly applied across the carceral industries generally, which remain well-funded though their history of discrimination and power abuses are well-known: Boukalas (2015) reported that the Department of Homeland Security's annual budget was between $31 and $76 billion (Boukalas, 2015); the 2020 annual U.S. military budget was over $700 billion (DOD, 2020); an annual $180 billion was reportedly allocated to policing and incarceration (McCarthy, 2017).

Findings by Mitchell and Sidanius (1995; cited in Sidanius and Pratto, 1999) demonstrated how economic supremacism and carceral supremacism are jointly invested in maintaining cultural hegemony. They tested whether the social unrest incited by increased societal hierarchy would be used to justify "more formal and informal [state] terror… to keep the system in place" (p. 200). Across 147 countries, they found that economic inequality consistently predicted the death penalty in a nearly linear progression and concluded, "the greater the economic inequality within a nation, the more likely that nation was to put its citizens to death" (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999, p. 220).

The country's primary counterterrorism organization, the DHS also reinforces economic supremacy. Counterterrorism prevents expressions of unrest resulting from economic supremacism "through the stigmatization of antagonistic politics, their constant monitoring by the police, and their repression once they break onto the public sphere" (Boukalas, 2015, p. 68). When financial institutions choose profit margin increases at the detriment of underclass's economic stability, such as increased unemployment or cuts to public welfare programs, economic crises threaten to become political crises (Boukalas, 2015). In this way, counterterrorism's bifurcated security and financial roles have a united goal of sustaining hegemonic governmentality.

Since its founding in 2002, DHS has maintained inegalitarian financial structures through its frequently overlooked roles as an employer and in public finance management (Boukalas, 2015). The DHS is congruent in its roles, and its reputation as an employer and impact on financial institutions are fundamentally inegalitarian much like its performance as a security agency. It also combines two employment institutions—enforcement and finance—found by Sidanius and Pratto (1999) to be highly attractive to social dominators. Its organizational structure, economic impact, and intervention biases reflect the impacts expected of social dominators' fiercely competitive out-group discrimination.

The DHS's inegalitarian internal structure is symbolic of its general approach to economic issues. Boukalas described the DHS as the "largest employer on US soil" (Boukalas, 2015, p. 62). The DHS is purported to foster a highly competitive, rigidly hierarchical work environment that maintains anti-union at-will employment, unreliable pay grades, and no contractual guarantees of upward mobility (Boukalas, 2015). These instructive examples of DHS's employee policies exemplify the cut-throat competition expected of socially dominant

hierarchies and the precariousness found in neoliberal economic systems.

The DHS has a protective relationship with corporate entities and private industry that overrides its dedication to the public good (Boukalas, 2015). DHS leaders and the United States President comprise a small economic committee outside democratic oversight that makes major economic decisions and regulates markets to protect major financial investors from capital loss (Boukalas, 2015). "Capital entities" (p. 61) are designated "critical infrastructure" (p. 61) and given immunity from loss and legal liability related to "vulnerabilities of the infrastructure" (p. 61) even in cases of "criminal negligence" (Boukalas, 2015, p. 61). "Advisory committees" (p. 61) are comprised of DHS officials and private sector representatives and distribute "public money to the private sector" (Boukalas, 2015, p. 61). Their decisions remain unpublished and lack democratic oversight. The DHS's financial track record, its financial policies, and its nontransparent proceedings regarding financial aid within the private corporate sector have garnered criticism that the DHS directly supports economic supremacism (Boukalas, 2015).

Whether economic forces have a causative or exacerbating effect on the rise of supremacism, a link has been demonstrated between the two, which indicates that the Department of Homeland Security's role in maintaining financial hierarchies works in the service of maintaining structural and systemic supremacism, even as it simultaneously funds exit programs.

Domestic Terrorism Statutes

German became a vocal critic or whistleblower of the FBI's counterterrorism practices after he resigned from the FBI in 2004 (Brennen Center for Justice, 2020). In his recommendations for increased efficacy and ethical practice in interventions with supremacist activists, which relied on 16 years of specializing in domestic terrorism and covert operations

with supremacist organizations, German cautioned against implementing new domestic terrorism statutes or instituting new agencies (German & Robinson, 2018). Along with his colleague, Robinson (2018), he indicted the state for misallocating resources to target its ideological opponents instead of innovating effective interventions for addressing threats to public safety.

Calls for new domestic terrorism statutes or departments, according to German and Robinson (2018), are an "inadequate response to rising far-right violence" (p. 1) and misrepresent existing agencies' history of poor intervention outcomes. They pointed out that agencies and agents currently have adequate but underutilized legal statutes to effectively address, "the violent acts committed by racists, white nationalists, and other far-right militants" (German & Robinson, p. 2). German and Robinson's analysis of violent crime data, existing statutes, and security agencies' responses revealed their failure up to this point to be better accounted for by bias, discrimination, and lack of oversight.

New legislation would increase the Justice Department's power and likely not address its mishandling of supremacist violence, which German and Robinson explained this way:

> Moreover, there is reason to fear that new laws expanding the Justice Department's counterterrorism powers will not make Americans safer from terrorist violence. Instead, they may further entrench existing disparities in communities the government targets with its most aggressive tactics, with serious implications for Americans' free speech, association, and equal protection rights. (German & Robinson, 2018, p. 2).

Here, German and Robinson (2018) pointed to the state's history of underreacting to supremacist activist violence and overreacting to "minority activists and far-left protest movements" (p. 2). This argument was supported by discrepancies between "victim surveys, which recorded approximately 250,000 hate crimes per year from 2004 to 2015" (p. 15) and the 19 to 36 hate

crimes prosecuted in federal court between 2009 and 2016 (German & Robinson, 2018).

They presented additional evidence that bias hindered efficacy by contrasting agents' statements with activist-generated fatalities data. FBI director Christopher Wray stated on October 10, 2018 that homegrown violent extremists[39] are "the greatest threat to the Homeland" (German & Robinson, 2018, p. 4). His declaration stands in opposition to four research papers spanning from 2001 to 2018 reporting supremacist and Middle Eastern activist groups to have been equally responsible as supremacist activists and exponentially more responsible than left-wing activists and activists of color for total deaths (German & Robinson, 2018).

Support for a new domestic terrorism agency and new statutes have persisted from federal law enforcement agencies despite the under and unequal use of existing terrorism statutes, contrary to evidence that power consolidation would increase institutional discrimination, and notwithstanding indications that existing agencies allocate resources toward a poorly performing intervention model (German & Robinson, 2020). As a counterproposal, German and Robinson (2018) recommended increasing oversight over resource allocation and intervention implementation, improving accuracy in threat-assessment, and using existing legal channels to address threats. They also proposed restructuring counterterrorism practices away from political disagreement and toward the "acts harmful to human life" (2018, p. 14) clause within the federal terrorism statute.

This section addressed how bias and discrimination overdetermines policy and intervention agendas away from addressing supremacist violence. The concepts presented here provide a foundation to discuss precarious ethical and practical issues that emerge for exit

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[39] "The federal government characterizes American Muslims acting in the U.S. with no direct connection to foreign terrorist groups not as "domestic" terrorists but as "homegrown violent extremists" (HVEs)" (German & Robinson, 2018, p. 4)

workers in proximity to counterterrorism agencies.

Alternative Approaches and Interventions

CTS Counterterrorism Reform Proposal. Lindahl's (2017a) paper and (2017b) dissertation envisioned counterterrorism interventions through the Critical Terrorism Studies framework. For Lindahl (2017b), human suffering is an unacceptable side effect of counterterrorism interventions. He suggested that structural interventions would better prevent terrorism than punishment and force by addressing the inegalitarianism underlying hegemonic states' social, economic, political, and security practices (Lindahl, 2017b). Under improved structural conditions, Lindahl (2017b) predicted both international and domestic attacks would organically decline.

Lindahl's (2017a, b) proposal for alternative international security interventions offered a useful model for centering humanization. The model was shaped by the principles "dare to know" (reflexivity); "emancipation" (increasing safety to provide greater autonomy for all); "means/ends relationship" (pre-figurative approaches to security); "non-violence" (using the least force possible); and "holism" (consistently uniting these principles in interventions) (Lindahl, 2017b, pp. 5-8).

Lindahl struggled to apply the model to interventions with domestic supremacist activists. He said, "in its current shape [the proposal is] better suited to gauge international counterterrorism" (2017b, p. 208). While some supremacist violence is likely rooted in economic disenfranchisements, many supremacist activists, such as the infamous "alt-right killers," are middle-class White men from stable backgrounds (Case & Deaton, 2020; Hankes & Amend, 2018; Lindahl, 2017b). Their grievances are primarily motivated by racist conspiracy theories and aggression and characterized by cognitive distortion, delusion, and paranoia (Hankes &

Amend, 2018). In the cases of two alt-right killers identified as mixed-race, their grievances were focused on misogynistic tropes, along with concerns with social status and peer rejection (Hankes & Amend, 2018). The alt-right killers reveal interventions premised on legitimate grievance and increased emancipation to be inappropriate for addressing supremacist activism.

The current study contributes to Lindahl's imaginal exercise, asking how interventions on supremacism might look outside carceral counterterrorism practices? To adequately translate Lindahl's approach into a humanizing model for addressing domestic supremacist violence, humanely responding to illegitimate, hateful, and even delusional grievances must be considered. The discussion of the current study returns to Lindahl's proposal and offers alternative considerations for addressing domestic supremacist violence by integrating exit workers' formulations for addressing supremacists humanely.

The Think Project and Ethnic Youth Support Team (EYST). Cifuentes (2014) offered an alternative approach to carceral intervention. His described the lessons learned in exit work as the Ethnic Youth Support Team director (EYST; Cifuentes, 2014). EYST's 3-year projects—"the Positive Street Project" (p. 124) and "the Think Project" (p. 125)—spanned six years. The first was focused on exit with Middle Eastern activist youth. The second "aimed at preventing vulnerable White young people from being drawn into far-right extremism" (Cifuentes, 2014, p. 124).

When directing the Positive Street Project, Cifuentes (2018) became frustrated by law enforcement's dismissive responses to xenophobic and racist attacks from White supremacist attacks against Middle Eastern EYST clients and their families. He observed law enforcement's worsening impact through dismissal or further discrimination on the vulnerability to recruitment or violence of Middle Eastern youth (Cifuentes, 2014).

Cifuentes was inspired by law enforcement's negligence and innovated an alternative to address White youth perpetuators of racist violence. He asked a crucial question of this dissertation:

Do white communities need resilience-building in the same way as Muslim communities were once (and still are) deemed to? Or, as with Muslims, is it part of a wider rhetoric that is arguably demonising the white working class, and perhaps turning them into "suspect communities"? … Can similar concepts of "vulnerability" be used, can similar methodologies or interventions work, and do similar pitfalls exist? (Cifuentes, 2014, p. 123).

The Think Project concluded that vulnerability to Middle Eastern and supremacist activism were etiologically similar, based on "poverty, offending behaviour and exit from mainstream education" (p. 133).

Cifuentes (2014) intervened from an intersectional position, recalling recruitment research and hate crime data in Wales that found working class youth to be almost exclusively represented in hate crime perpetration. Like Hosang and Lowndes (2019), Cifuentes proposed that class-based grievances were displaced and "imagined or acted out as race-based ones" (2014, p. 134). The Think Project "kept in mind the class-based reality of [clients], which was high unemployment, as well as the gender-based expectations such as masculinity and violence…" (p. 133). Its interventions included education, open discussion, and "providing contact with and humanizing the 'other,' rather than alienating and demonizing such groups" (Cifuentes, 2014, p. 133). Facilitators also adopted a nonjudgmental stance to invite honest sharing. When addressing ideology, they respected but did not enable White clients' opinions, which they framed this way, "however politically incorrect or unpalatable…it is necessary to

hear a view before it can be challenged" (Cifuentes, 2014, p. 133).

Cifuentes observed how the grievances of clients from both projects hardened after a negative interaction with the other. From this experience, he assessed some youths' recruitment into violent activism to be iatrogenic, resulting from the public hostility toward young people created when standard counterterrorism's practices reify them as dangerous (Cifuentes, 2014). He concluded that counterterrorism tactics exacerbated rather than reduced violence and had relatively poor outcomes compared to The Think Project's approach (Cifuentes, 2014).

Differences between who engages in supremacist violence in Wales and the United States limit the application of Cifuentes' work in a US context. Wales hate crimes data found working class young men most responsible (Cifuentes, 2014). Similar data analysis applied in a United States context revealed relatively affluent suburban young men to be largely responsible, correlated hate crimes with the affluent university Greek Letter programs, and revealed the backgrounds of the alt-right killers to be largely middle or upper-middle-class (Moser, 2004; Hankes & Amend, 2018; Van Dyke & Tester, 2014). Interventions for supremacism in the United States are therefore required to conceptualize clients' supremacism as emerging from dominance and privilege from economic deprivation, which is addressed in the result section by interview data with exit workers.

Combatting Counterterrorism's Cultural Narratives. Jarvis (2019) put forth three conceptual problems in dominant terrorism narratives. First, counterterrorism discourse limits terrorism to "non-state groups" (p. 3) and ignores the civilian victims of states' politically motivated violence. Second, it views terrorism as pervasive, irrational, and unavoidable, rather than socially constructed, rationally produced from specific circumstances, and thus in many cases, preventable (Jarvis, 2019). Third, it frames terrorism as an existential threat that is most

effectively minimized through consistent hypervigilance and investing mass resources into aggressive reactivity (Jarvis, 2019).

Jarvis challenged these premises and described the state's politically motivated violence as "incursions on civil liberties and human rights…facilitated by new and increasingly expansive frameworks involving the construction of new criminal offences and expanded powers of arrest, detention and deportation" (2019, p. 343). Here, he explained how counterterrorism initiatives exacerbate domestic and international hierarchies rather than reducing them.

In Jarvis's (2019) analysis, the state maintained cultural consent to continue implementing ineffective harmful interventions through well-propagated myths (2019). He analyzed real-world intervention examples from "a range of political, cultural and everyday practices" (p. 340) implemented to critique counterterrorism narratives. He found five intervention styles for confronting cultural myths: "(i) repudiate; (ii) question; (iii) subvert; (iv) replace, or (v) deconstruct" (p. 339) and described several considerations that impacted their outcomes. These are discussed in greater detail along with other interventions in the conclusion of this text.

Summary and Conclusion

Despite their mandate to promote the general population's safety and security, the carceral system's primary role is to promote the state's maintenance of hegemonic control which it achieves through biased research and intervention practices. The literature reviewed by Chapter 8 supported the arguments that carceral interventions for supremacism impede the effectiveness of a cultural exit from supremacism, and carceral responses to social problems produce iatrogenic supremacism. It emphasized counterterrorism rather than the military or prison industries due to counterterrorism's role in supremacist intervention and link to exit

groups. Chapter 8 aggregated data relevant for developing structural competencies in carceral institutions such as literature describing the prevalence of supremacism in carceral systems and the security industry's role in maintaining economic supremacy. It also shared recommendations made by former security agents and researchers related to increased oversight, accurate assessment, and reducing bias in intervention and research. Finally, it described a few alternatives and intervention devised to address the problems with carceral supremacism outlined throughout the chapter.

Chapter 9: (Re)Constructions of Supremacism

Chapter 9 transitions the text from foundations to findings. It reports critical analysis conclusions responding to the research questions: What psychological, interpersonal, sociological, and cultural dynamics produce supremacism? How is supremacism maintained within these dimensions over time? What is the impact on supremacism of a society's institutions? Lastly, what barriers exist to sustainable cultural and structural exit from supremacism? Chapter 9 responds to these research questions by suggesting alternative conceptualizations of hegemony, power, and status.

When I first questioned how psychologists could intervene on supremacism, specifically, what I can do from my position as a psychologist to address the intergenerational legacy of White supremacism, heteronormativity, and patriarchy in American families like mine, I approached the problem using the tools gained in my training as a psychologist. The process involves sorting out psychological, interpersonal, intergenerational, cultural, and socioeconomic factors to determine which aspects within the totality of human lived experience account for distress. A single diagnosis or several may apply. A complex case may call for a "differential diagnosis" determination, which is a method of "ruling out" suspected diagnoses as symptoms

present throughout treatment. A similar process occurred throughout Part 2, and the following analyses offer some concluding remarks from this section. The concepts introduced here are also present in Part 3's Ethnographic Findings and reemerge in Part 4's Discussion.

Supremacist Personality Theory

This section explores how individual supremacism may be described through personality theory. It suggests in line with Guindon et al. (2003) that there is clinical utility in further research for establishing criteria for supremacist personality. Such a designation lays a foundation for attaining agreement in the field of psychology on the presentation of supremacism and guiding treatment research and innovation. Rather than a tool for avoiding accountability, supremacist personality is akin to narcissistic personality and antisocial personality disorders in predicting maladaptive harmful behavior.

This section relies on the overlapping traditions of authoritarianism and social dominance orientation research, most notably the work of Altemeyer (2006) as well as Sidanius and Pratto (1999), discussed in Chapter 3. In the current formulation, authoritarianism and social dominance orientation describe two variants of a supremacist personality type that each cluster personality facets and attitudes. Based on a large corpus of studies conducted worldwide, the metrics for measuring authoritarianism and social dominance orientation have consistently showed them to be "… theoretically and conceptually distinct" (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, p. 74). At the same time, those scoring high in either "… are both expected to be relatively racist, sexist, homophobic, ethnocentric, and politically conservative, and to show little empathy for lower-status others" (p. 74).

Supremacist personalities present with a heightened sensitivity to social hierarchies which are either primarily concerned with in-group/ out-group status (social dominance

orientation) or a rigid conscientiousness of in-group norms (authoritarianism) or a combined presentation (dominating authoritarians). Each presentation increases prejudice for outgroups, dissidents, non-normative identities, and marginalized identities (Asbrock et al., 2010; Altemeyer, 2006; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

Supremacist personality theory replicates the structure of narcissistic personality and is formulated as a spectrum of supremacist personality across state, type, and perhaps, as suggested by Guindon et al. (2003), personality disorder. The theory of personality proposed here is in line with researchers such as Fleeson and Jayawickreme (2015), Roberts and Mroczek (2008), and Roberts et al. (2017) among others who shifted notions of personality from static and adopted personality theories that accept personality's plasticity over the course of one's lifetime, in response to situational priming, and due to treatment interventions. Like "state narcissism" (Giacomin & Jordan, 2018, p. 105), which depicted narcissism's increase and decrease in response to environmental stimuli, state supremacism recalls social dominance orientation and authoritarianism research that indicated environmental impacts on endorsement of either variant (Cohrs & Stelzl, 2010; Fischer et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2008; Vargas-Salfate & de Zúñiga, 2019). Findings that social dominance orientation consistently correlated with lower romantic relationship satisfaction and, in the absence of self-perceived high status, predicted lower life satisfaction also supported a formulation of supremacist personality type that mirrors narcissism in its negative impact on self and others (Bareket et al., 2018; Yeagley et al., 2007).

Previous research with former supremacists, social dominance orientation and authoritarianism research, the statements of former supremacists and exit workers in the current study, and clinical research offer some theoretical support for a supremacist personality type theory. Former supremacists in previous studies described severely compromised functioning in

several essential areas of life and persisted despite desire for change so that some supremacists continue to "relapse" repeatedly (Kimmel, 2007; Simi et al., 2017). Sidanius and Pratto (1999) and Altemeyer (2006) found social dominance orientation and authoritarianism to be relatively stable over time yet reactive to events over a lifespan. The majority of exit workers agreed with the notion that supremacism resists extinguishing completely, and one exit worker former said their struggle to shed supremacism felt like trying to change a "personality trait" (G1).

Another supportive data point is the correlation between the duration of change reported in a meta-analysis of personality change and that which was reported by exit workers. Roberts et al., (2017) found that change occurs in treatment within 24 weeks. Exit workers reported that the duration of client work to produce transformation from supremacism was within one year, with many cases wrapping up within six months. While none of the points provided here are sufficient to determine whether supremacist personality is an appropriate classification, they do provide several data points from existing research and practical intervention sufficient to justify further exploration. In this way, and others forthcoming in the results and discussion, the experiences reported by exit workers and their clients did not refute, and in many ways supported, the arguments for a supremacist personality classification.

Biocultural Versus Biological Essentialism. Discussing the human experience as "hardwired" can encourage the common misconception that biological tendency determines cultural manifestation. A biological framework apart from a cultural framework increases the likelihood that essentialists could apply biological theories to interpret the hierarchical organization of dominant culture as "natural," ergo essential and unchanging. Yet, in-built systems relevant to social and cultural processes have potentially infinite "natural" manifestations. Expressions of language and gender exemplify the universality of in-built

systems across cultures that are also highly divergent in their manifestation. Importantly, the histories of both have shown how imperial hegemonies reduce diversity and increase suffering for non-normative presentations of in-built social processes.

The potential that there is a biological basis for hierarchy sensitivity, which relates to cultural manifestations, speaks to the responsibility and potential to facilitate inner and outer harmony and well-being by supporting the human needs presented by biology. Koski's (2015) findings in neuropsychology suggested there may be "an underlying neural network, including regions involved in executive, emotional, and reward processing, that is sensitive to status information" (p. 527). This sensitivity to status, hierarchy, and social position affects cognitive functioning related to systems of "attention, memory, and social interactions" (Koski, 2015, p. 527). Fournier (2020) additionally found that social status imbued "…better health and happiness than those below … in the hierarchy and poorer health and happiness than those above" (p. 110).

Cross-cultural findings that supremacist personality manifested differently in response to socialization and environmental factors supported a biocultural model of supremacism instead of a biological essentialism model. Across the globe, supremacism was found in every population assessed, and, regardless of other cultural factors, it is consistently positively correlated with inegalitarianism (Cohrs & Stelzl, 2010; Fischer et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2008; Vargas-Salfate & de Zúñiga, 2019). In a large metanalysis of "27 societies," controlling for other factors, researchers concluded "a particular institutional and social climate" to be most predictive of higher frequencies of social dominance endorsement (Fischer et al., 2012, p. 437). Interpreting this data set alongside supremacist personality theory indicates that societal structure impacts the expression and prevalence of supremacist personality and state-supremacism.

This section put forth a theory of supremacist personality that includes a spectrum of presentations, including personality state, type, and disorder. Rather than justifying the prejudices and discrimination prompted by hierarchy sensitivity, a biocultural basis for supremacist personality emphasized the benefit to society of implementing hierarchy-sensitivity reducing supports. It also encourages clinical professionals to be aware that supremacist personality is a risk factor for causing harm to others and the community. This analysis presents an urgency for intervention on society's systemic and structural relationships to hierarchy and status sensitivity that better support individual well-being and social harmony.

Intersectionality and Structural Analysis

Extending Crenshaw's (1991) intersectionality of oppression, this section returns to the concept of intersectional supremacism introduced in Chapter 3 and describes how supremacism interacts within an individual's constellation of oppressed and dominant identities. Whiteness, Christianity, and masculinity have signified group dominance and increased economic stability and enfranchisement inverse to subordinated groups in Western culture, yet cultural shifts have also introduced nuance into supremacism's stereotypic profile. These changes must be accounted for to formulate supremacism accurately.

The postmodern proliferation of identity categories described in Chapter 4 and the many global examples of group-based domination worldwide revealed by the social dominance orientation and authoritarianism tradition complicates formulations of supremacism as "White, male, and Christian," despite its accuracy in a Western context. Global narratives have impacted the rhetoric of US supremacism, adding a multicultural dimension; for instance, an example introduced in Chapter 5 suggested that some American Christians claim victimization despite their high status in American hegemony by identifying with minority Christian groups in other

parts of the globe (McAlister, 2019; Mitchell, 2017). In an inverse example, US supremacist milieus have increased in racial diversity under the narrative of "West is the best" (Cooper & Jenkins, 2019, p. 3) hegemonic ethnocentrism.

Flat understandings of supremacism result from underdeveloped intersectional and structural frameworks. The benefit of applying intersectional analysis alongside structural analysis is illustrated in the rest of this section. The resulting reconceptualization of supremacism disrupts existing cultural myths and demonstrates a process for challenging supremacist discourses with structural analysis.

Supremacist Diversity and Inclusion. Supremacists with dual subordinated and dominant identities often align their identity primarily with status. Even if they are structurally positioned by a subordinated identity, aligning with dominance shapes their perception of prejudice and discrimination. Some examples include multiracial supremacism (masculinity, nationalism); homonationalism (hegemonic national identity); class supremacism (affluence); White women supremacists (Whiteness); White gay male supremacists (Whiteness, masculinity); (Cooper & Jenkins, 2019; Puar, 2007; Senders & Mahalingam, 2012).

Several empirical findings support this analysis. Pratto and Stewart (2012) reported that members of subordinated groups higher in social dominance orientation were more likely to identify with dominant groups than subordinated group identities. Rabinowitz's (1999) finding that those high in social dominance orientation who saw themselves as disenfranchised by injustice could come to reject dominant culture in favor of promoting their own-group domination while still perpetuating inegalitarian and prejudiced beliefs added nuance to this understanding. Additionally, those who are higher in authoritarianism are likely to express

prejudice regardless of their identity, for instance Schulte (2002) found that authoritarianism in Black Americans correlated with heterosexism, sexism, and racial prejudice.

There are many interpretations that could and certainly do account for these findings. The critical thread to note is that those seeking to have status or gain status sometimes align with status at others' expense, which then reinforces social hierarchies. Supremacism's adaptability is also revealed by these findings.

Integrating the intersectional framework presented here with current and historical examples offers additional guidance to address the confusion evoked when those with subordinated identities promote supremacist policies and join supremacist milieus. Intersectional supremacists draw from both dominant and subordinated identity positions by appealing to their experiences with oppression to bolster their personal goals for social hierarchy while discriminating against others rather than working toward greater egalitarianism. For instance, the racially inclusive Proud Boys and Patriot Prayer supremacist groups advocate for multiracial supremacism and "fuse antiracist language into otherwise nationalist, misogynistic, libertarian, and xenophobic platforms" (Cooper and Jenkins, 2019). Organizing as antiracists provided them a broader support base and facilitated recruitment.

In another example, women's suffrage proponent Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, became so enraged when the proposed 14th Amendment offered Black men but not women the vote that they split from their former platform of equality for all (Weiss, 2020). Their intersectional supremacism was explicitly expressed when they then aligned with racist White anti-Reconstruction activists to promote White women's suffrage with the goal of maintaining a White electoral majority (Weiss, 2020). During the same era, many Southern White supremacist

women rejected women's suffrage and promoted male supremacist repeals to women's rights and myths of female domesticity (Weiss, 2019).

This analysis indicates that supremacists with intersectional identities align with their highest status identities. What may be a more useful point for the purpose of intervention, is the consistent extension by dominant groups of access toward members of coalitions with which they share some identity, which, as a result, splits coalitions and weakens rights movements overall.

Structural Intersections in Race and Class. Misunderstandings regarding race and class intersections are common in mainstream and fringe supremacist rhetoric. Frustrated by my inability to succinctly and clearly challenge White supremacist assertions that affluent Black Americans were more privileged than poor White Americans, I simultaneously implemented two methods of inquiry proposed by the current project's literature review—intersectional analysis and structural competence—to explore the validity of the supremacist claim. This produced several conclusions useful for implementing interventions on supremacism, and the process offered an example of implementing structural competence.

The structural analysis proceeded from three metrics of affluence: the impact of college education, intergenerational mobility, and safety. Not only did the literature show that discrimination against Black Americans persists regardless of wealth, but it also demonstrated how the benefits of social status afforded by affluence are different for Black Americans than other people of color (Chetty et al., 2020; Tran et al., 2019). In addition, the analysis revealed that a confluence of two interconnected myths—meritocracy and Black poverty—undermines more accurate reflections on the role played by discrimination in cultural hegemony.

Meritocracy attributes success, especially economic status, to individual merit or personal failure. The myth of Black poverty attributes Black Americans' social disenfranchisement to poverty and minimizes the role played by discrimination (Williams, 2019). Combining meritocracy and Black poverty myths produces an insidious fabrication that constructs Black Americans as individually responsible for their relative economic disadvantage compared to more economically privileged groups. This represents an a=b=c logical fallacy: If a. Black oppression is solely a result of poverty; and b. One's economic status is the consequence of their merit and value; then c. Black disenfranchisement is evident of personal underachievement and inferiority.

I first looked to the impact of college education to compare how it impacts class in light of race. The Congressional Joint Economic Committee reported that college graduates' employment opportunities reduced (but did not eliminate) the unemployment gap between Black and White Americans (Beyer, 2020). However, they also determined that the wage gap between Black Americans and White Americans (already $.59 for every $1.00) increased with higher education (Beyer, 2020). Black college graduates also report experiencing higher rates of discrimination than non-college attendees (Anderson, 2019). From just a few data points, I could reasonably conclude that achieving higher education did not prevent Black Americans from being impacted by White supremacism.

Intergenerational mobility appears to also be impacted by discrimination. Unlike the children of White parents, 7 out of 10 Black children born into middle-class households are economically worse off than their parents in adulthood (Rodrigue & Reeves, 2015). Reeves and Pulliam described the difference this way, "While white children at the top have a substantial glass floor to help them stay at the top, the chances of black children staying at the top are less

than random" (2019, para 5). Hardy and Logan (2020) demonstrated through a historical analysis that intergenerational immobility was related to specific policy decisions impacting education and segregation. Together, these findings suggest that intergenerational economic mobility barriers are the result of economic and institutional supremacy rather than poverty or personal merit.

The last metric I looked at was safety. This element became salient to me after observing a frequent repetition by critics of the Black Lives Matter protests during the summer of 2020 that more White Americans are killed by police annually than Black Americans. Feldman (2020) responded to assertions that White Americans experience more lethal force by police officers by identifying police-perpetrated deaths per million in each income bracket and comparing these across racial categories. The following data points were useful in interrogating who was most in danger of police violence: The 9.6% of White Americans who inhabit the severest poverty bracket are four times more likely to experience police-perpetrated death than the 27% of White Americans who encompass the wealthiest economic category (Feldman, 2020); the 36.6% of Black Americans who inhabit the severest poverty bracket are roughly two times more likely to experience police-perpetrated death than the 10.1% of Black Americans represented in the highest economic class. Feldman's findings revealed that wealth offered substantial protection from police-perpetrated death for White but *not* Black Americans, thus indicating that Black Americans face discrimination unrelated to poverty.

Undeniably, financial security affords privileges relative to poverty, yet discrimination is disproportionately incurred by Black people in America regardless of wealth. The structural intersections of race and class presented here indicate that discrimination impacts the ability of Black Americans to attain and maintain wealth and safety. This analysis did not clarify whether

Black middle-class Americans are "less oppressed" than poor White Americans. However, it did provide sufficient evidence to deduce that White supremacism likely affords White Americans privilege compared to Black American by facilitating greater safety regardless of class, more ease leaving poverty, and fewer barriers to accumulating and maintaining wealth.

Here, a literature analysis demonstrated the benefit afforded structural analysis by intersectional thinking. It also modeled how structural competence can be applied to address familiar tropes in White supremacism.

Foucault, Counterterrorism, Terrorism Studies

The role of carceral institutions in maintaining social hierarchies cannot be understated. Among carceral system's abundant techniques for producing inegalitarianism, one of the longest impacting is determining for society what is normal and abnormal, innocent and criminal. Foucault (1977) explained how "new disciplines" (p. 306) of academic investigation developed alongside the penitentiary and, through their scholarship and production of knowledge, translated discourses of control to the public. In the academy today, fields of inquiry similarly manifest in relation to emergent carceral forms.

Foucault (1977) cautioned that the penitentiary's discourses, as proliferated by new disciplines connected to them, would intensify rather than mediate the criminality's destructiveness and make all the world a prison. This warning was a premonition in many crucial ways, evidenced by the devasting impacts of mass incarceration and the move to make prisons into social service sites (Gruner, 2019). Counterterrorism and the field of terrorism studies also represents a contemporary amplified example of Foucault's carceral archipelago (1977a), its punitive discourses, powerful new disciplines, and cultural transfusion.

Counterterrorism's interventions magnified cultural supremacism even as they purported to increase safety. Counterterrorism delineated the boundaries of "extreme" to exclude all but the most violent forms of White supremacism while incorporating a much broader net of activism efforts from anticolonial movements, people of color, Middle Eastern immigrants, and leftists (Chomsky, 1979; German & Robinson, 2018; Norris & Grol-Prokopczyk, 2018; Jackson et al., 2011). It disseminates normalizing discourses from counterterrorism agencies to academic disciplines, then to nongovernmental organizations, the media, and the public.

As Part 3 will further explain, exit workers' relationships with counterterrorism illustrate carceral normalization and conformity. Several exit workers reported self-monitoring and standardizing their language and interventions in conformity with the definitions set by carceral institutions and counterterrorism agencies. Counterterrorism agencies were described as having the power to sanction exit worker's outspoken views. Further considerations related to exit intervention best practices that were shaped by counterterrorism discourses and the limitations these presented in the development of new techniques.

For Foucault (1977), the normalization produced by carceral systems is a regressive anti-egalitarian tool of control. In this way, self-monitoring and shaping interventions with counterterrorism agencies potentially positions exit workers who remain confined within counterterrorism's discourses as normalization mechanisms, and thus mechanics of anti-egalitarian conformity. Exit programs also function quite differently than most counterterrorism agencies, and these differences are highlighted in Parts Three and Four.

This analysis, drawn from scholars' work in critical terrorism studies and others, gives reason to be concerned that counterterrorism is a barrier to optimal outcomes in individual and cultural exit work. In response, this current study attempts to imagine interventions on

supremacist violence, including the work being produced by exit workers, outside carceral frameworks and the language proliferated by counterterrorism.

Summary and Conclusions

In this chapter, I presented concluding remarks on the etiology of supremacism. To arrive at these analyses, I applied personality theory, Crenshaw's (1991) Intersectionality theory, Metzl and Hansen's (2013) structural competency strategies, and Foucault's concepts of normalization and control. With these theoretical devices, along with skills developed from training in psychological case formulation, clinical assessment, and differential diagnoses, I interrogated the assumptions underlying social constructs of supremacism.

Several alternative constructions of supremacism resulted from this process. First, Supremacist Personality Theory accounted for supremacism's stability over time and reactivity to environmental change. This section also presented some potential benefits and dangers of considering biological inheritance models. Intersectionality and structural analysis then supported new ways to approach supremacism's contested or confusing matters. The last section examined the discipline of Terrorism Studies through Foucault's conceptual work on the carceral archipelago and questioned how Terrorism Studies has normalized its discourses within society.

Part Three: Ethnographic Findings

The findings reported in Chapters 10, 11, and 12 draw from two years (2018-2020) of noncontinuous multi-sited ethnographic data collection gathered from five nongovernmental (NGO) exit projects. I conducted fieldwork on location in two countries, in North America and Northern Europe. Virtual field research included virtual training for mental health care volunteers and interviews with participants from four countries representing five unique exit groups. The procedure manual from a defunct early example of exit programming was also counted in this data set, representing a sixth group; at the time of collection, many of its interventions and formulations were still in use in exit programs worldwide.

Four exit groups in the sample worked explicitly with supremacism. Two exit groups focused on organized crime and gang affiliation and remained closely affiliated with exit groups for supremacism by sharing clients and staff. Interviews represented five exit groups, and each group's sample included between one and seven exit workers.

Exit workers' interviews comprised the bulk of ethnographic data. Their contributions were de-identified[40]. Direct transcript excerpts were categorized by group—(G1) through (G6). Important contextual details, such as gender[41], title, and location, were generalized to preserve the privacy of the groups and protect individual interviewees' identities. Groups' procedure manuals and publicly available sources were designated in text. Field note data is not directly cited, but rather provided contextual information during analysis.

Exit workers' decades of intervention implementation provide practical implementation examples that are largely absent from the clinical literature on client-generated supremacism.

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[40] All deidentifying modifications appear in brackets for clarity. Interviewer's speech appears in italics.
[41] Interviewees were deidentified by applying the gender-neutral pronoun "they" throughout. Specific titles such as Licensed Clinical Social Worker are referred in general terms such as mental health care professional, practitioner, or clinician.

Part 4 integrates the literature review formulations of supremacism and recommended clinical interventions with exit worker's practical implementation data toward an exit-informed model for addressing client-generated supremacism in clinical settings. This focus on exit workers' practical implementation responds, in part, to my observation that previous literature offered little by way of implementable techniques for client-generated supremacism supremacists in terrorism studies and psychological literature offered minimal technical descriptions, which limited practical interventions innovation and the creation of an evidential basis for interventions with client-generated supremacism in psychology.

Chapter 10: Change Work with Exit Clients

Chapter 10 reports findings from ethnographic interviews with exit workers, taking a particular interest in their theoretical approaches to client work, formulations of client presentations, and the practical implementation of interventions and techniques. Exit workers' client bases depended on their roles within exit programs and were comprised of individual exit clients, supremacist's family and friends, and support groups.

This data set responded to several of the project's research questions: Who is intervening on White supremacism using techniques available to psychologists? How do exit workers conceptualize supremacist ideologies and violence? How do exit groups define efficacy? What are their intervention strategies and methods? Finally, how do exit groups integrate research and scholarship into their interventions?

Exit Work: Clients and Supportive Frame

The supportive frame of the exit interventions included in this study hinged on clients' voluntary participation whether they were exiting supremacism, organized criminal groups, or gangs. However, some clients' attendance in exit programs counted toward sentencing terms,

which was described as a "gray area" (G2) on the voluntary to mandated spectrum. Exit workers observed that many clients benefited from similar approaches regardless of which fringe lifestyle they were exiting, and a small portion of clients had intersectional membership in supremacist activism and organized criminal behavior or gangs.

Clients. Exit groups differed according to the criteria under which they accepted clients, representing a continuum. of steep access barriers to relatively few barriers preventing clients' access to supportive services. On one end, an exit worker reported a policy of only taking "high ranking" (G5) clients who had been in leadership roles within supremacist activist groups after a throughout fact-checking process. On the other side of the continuum, an exit worker described accepting clients with little exclusion criteria. It is notable that the first example provided substantial resources to support clients' exit, while the latter's supportive style functioned like a peer-support group and did not provide resources.

Clients typically entered exit programs with moderate insight about their goals and some motivation to completely transform, or at least alter, their supremacist affiliation. A unifying presentation in exit clients was their struggle to change their ideological beliefs and lifestyles without support.

Most clients were described on a continuum of functioning which presented as impairment by their supremacism or fringe lifestyle in one or more important life area. The stereotypic characterization of an active long-term supremacist activist from a physically violent supremacist organization, who struggled to reintegrate into society represented a severe exit client presentation. Such acuity comprised a small to moderate portion of the exit cases described in the current data set. Supremacists seeking exit services were not always formal supremacist organization members and many accounts were related to clients who interacted with

supremacism online or as "weekend warriors." They often maintained life activities more or less typically, including family, work, and church.

A client's formal association should not detract from our assessments of the dangers presented by unaffiliated supremacists who were responsible for a number of the violent attacks in recent years (ADL, 2020; Blee, 2018). Moreover, low severity[42] did not necessarily indicate a lower risk for violence or harm to self or others however, and some clients who seemingly required little support due to their distance from ideology and activism completed suicide, began abusing substances, or exchanged one fringe lifestyle for another.

Socially skilled, economically independent, recently recruited clients who did not independently endorse supremacism before group membership were depicted as more typically open to ideology and identity change. Socially unskilled clients drawn to supremacist milieus for socialization posed a potentially intensive and lengthy challenge for exit workers. Client descriptions which portrayed self-recruited clients who invested ideologically and sought out virtual supremacist milieus or formal organizations shared several commonalities with descriptions of committed long-term supremacists. Both were portrayed as rigidly ideological and struggled with the social aspects of reintegration.

Supportive Frame. Exit programs were distinct in their styles of structuring services which included: delivery of supportive services; case management; duration of services; and cases' developmental trajectories.

An amalgamated definition of the service offered by exit work representing the overlapping themes described by exit workers was this: exit work delivered some form of

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[42] Severity is the language of the researcher, amalgamating several descriptions used interchangeably by most groups including "level of extremism," (G1) and "more or less radicalized" (G3)

support in order to facilitate an individual's exit from supremacism, a fringe lifestyle, or both.

This ideally included an ideological rejection and minimally required exit from the problematic

behavioral aspects of the client's previous lifestyle. The support was preferably based on

collaboratively set goals which aligned with and deepened clients' preexisting insight and

motivation.

Exit case management included one or more exit workers, which was determined

according to clients' need. A team approach to client cases was the most typical form, where

cases were shared or at least consulted on by several exit workers.

An average duration of exit support was reported to be around one year, and cases

commonly ranged from between six months to two years. The outer limits described a single

phone call, and the longest case was ongoing and reported to have spanned nearly a decade.

All the active supremacism exit groups in the current sample had a peer support

component and included formers in exit work, with marked variation in how peer-support was

integrated into exit work. Several exit workers were former supremacist activists or had

previously espoused supremacist ideologies. Three groups selectively offered peer-support

volunteer roles to graduating exit clients which provided them an opportunity to continue their

contact with the exit group, and one group functioned primarily as a peer-support group.

Assessment

Every exit worker discussed conducting some form of needs or risk assessment. Needs

assessments helped exit workers facilitate services within multi-agency support systems, where

available, and to determine case management approaches. Previous literature reported the

prevalence of risk assessments in exit settings, which was supported here (RAN, 2018).

Assessing Needs. Needs assessments were applied by many exit workers as part of the

intake process. In countries with a robust social welfare state, needs assessments facilitated collaboration with agencies to provide housing services, safety from retaliatory hate groups, medical care, drug treatment, educational opportunities, or employment. In these settings, exit workers referred clients to meet basic needs, and then focused primarily on interventions. Exit workers without access to social welfare support systems often highlighted the impact of clients' unmet needs on exit work[43].

A few exit workers described assessing various cognitive, emotional, motivational, and relational aspects of their clients' presentation through observation. They gauged relevant windows of tolerance: affect tolerance, distress tolerance, and tolerance for difference. Assessments of supremacism included information about clients' persisting ideologies, group memberships, and previous activism. Several exit workers assessed clients' interests outside supremacism. Motivational interviewing approach proponents had sophisticated descriptions for assessing and increasing motivation.

These findings suggest that exit groups could benefit from implementing more sophisticated assessments for individual client variations that are relevant to intervention. This recommendation is revisited in Part 4's discussion of assessing social dominance orientation and authoritarianism.

Assessing Risk. Several exit workers described risk assessments. The risk assessments reported in this data set consisted of background checks or protocols for building trust with individuals before introducing them into settings with other formers. Several exit workers endorsed methods to assess client genuineness: Is the potential client who they say they are? Are they trying to infiltrate and harm formers (with former's online communities) or gain material or

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[43] Described in more detail in the "Comparing Exit Workers" section of this chapter.

legal support? Several exit workers from an online-based group discussed their difficulties developing a risk assessment tool to assess potential "troll" infiltration of their online formers' community.

Several practitioners voiced a desire to develop or make use of risk assessments, and they were unaware of the proliferation of formal risk assessments or the ethical quandaries related to their use in exit. This evidenced the presence of barriers to shared knowledge in some settings.

Case Formulations of Supremacist Clients

"…[I]t is more important for the clinician to understand people than to master specific treatment techniques…." (McWilliams, 1999, p. 11).

Understanding is central to client work. As stated by McWilliams (1999), case formulations develop understanding and "make sense of the diverse pieces of information we get…. [so practitioners have] ….more choice about how to influence him or her in all these areas and to contribute to … improvements in life" (p. 11). This section reports exit workers' formulations for putting together various pieces of information about supremacism that contributed to their intervention implementation.

Supremacism: Addiction or Personality? Several exit workers observed that recovering from supremacist ideologies meaningfully overlapped with addiction recovery. One exit worker in a family-specialist role emphasized the resemblances between loved ones of substance abusers and supremacists. They saw the rigidity of supremacism as eliciting a similar response from family and friends as families similarly impacted by substance abuse. Here they described the similarity in working with parents of substance abusers and supremacists:

When it comes to someone being close to someone that have alcohol problems or other addictions, the techniques it's the same within this job.

What makes working with somebody leaving a hate group similar to working with somebody who's addicted?

For me, like, most of the people that come to me are parents. Uh, they wanna like, trying to understand the things that they can't understand… You go into that person's problem, and you and time passes, and you are addicted to that person's addiction… "Okay, my son have a big problem that I wanna solve, and I try to solve it in so many different ways. Because he doesn't wanna listen to me. Because he doesn't see he has a problem. He's just getting annoyed." So my job is more, one thing is more, about, "Okay, so how can you connect in a conversation? How can you reach each other? And, and they're drifting apart. And the son is drifting closer to the group… Like, your son—you've just realized your son has an addiction. It's the same picture (G3).

In substance abuse and supremacist activism, they explained, an individual's lifestyle centered on social taboos, which elicited judgment from their community. The resulting relational tension pushed them further into fringe lifestyles. Substance abusers and supremacists often experienced loved ones' enmeshed overinvolvement and self-righteousness as intrusive, propelling them further into rather than away from the lifestyle. Exit workers noted that families' expressions of grief, rage, and shame elicit avoidance from both substance abusers and supremacists.

In this exit worker's formulation, loved ones frequently misunderstand the pathways to supremacism, and "most parents" (G3) who become exit clients were overly responsible for their child's actions. Counterproductive dynamics similarly produced depressive hopelessness, enabling patterns, and overly authoritarian or passive relational styles in family and friends of substance abusers and supremacists. This family support specialist cautioned that loved ones isolated themselves from support when they hid problematic situations from family, friends, and

coworkers out of embarrassment and fear of blame, which in turn tended to exacerbate the central relational tension.

Other exit workers also applied substance abuse intervention strategies to exit work, e.g., motivational interviewing (MI) as well as community reinforcement and family training (CRAFT). These innovative intervention applications were reported to yield consistently positive outcomes. Exit workers' experiences implementing these techniques in both exit and addiction settings led them to conclude that the barriers to recovery are similarly compromised by resource deprivation, mental illness, financial precarity, strained social ties, and chaotic family systems.

Talking about supremacism's apparent difficulty to extinguish, an exit worker said that the intrusive thoughts they experienced in the early phases of their own exit mirrored the preoccupation observed in substance abuse recovery. The excerpt below illustrates their reflections on the intermittent yet persistent rage they continue to experience 20 years after exit:

> When I was in prison… So, like I'm making new friends. I'm making black friends, and I would see a Black woman and automatically think a racial slur. And I would get so angry, you know, and that was something that took me years to try and work through. It took education. It took working on myself. It took, you know, making amends. So, as of now, technically, I have been out of the movement for 20 years. There are times when I feel myself getting angry like I used to. Which I think is less of a, less of something that had to do with being in the movement and more like a personality trait, haha, you know? … When I talk about the fact that I would see someone and automatically think something, even now, now that I talked about it, it's going to happen for a few days. And it will be my brain saying, "fuck you, fuck you," and that's just the way it goes (G1).

Their description corresponded to a process that occurs with "egosyntonic" traits or qualities that

are viewed as intrinsic rather than symptomatic. During change work, egosyntonic qualities can become salient and begin causing distress yet remain difficult to change.

Power and Control. Power and control were essential to the conceptual frameworks of several exit workers and were foundational to their case formulations of supremacist identity/ideology formation, supremacist affective experience, and supremacist behavior and motivation.

In a particularly adept description of exit theories of change and intervention strategies, one exit worker offered three concepts for understanding the role that power and control plays in supremacist identity formation: "low affect tolerance," "God mode," and "authority dichotomy" (G3). They theorized that low affect tolerance manufactured a drive for power and control, and described here how power and control replaced intolerable emotions:

> Most of our clients replace most feelings with anger, hate, jealousy, or er, what's it called when you don't feel anything? Er. Apathy (G3).

They also noted a common gender difference in expressions of power and control and observed that women clients frequently replaced intolerable emotions with power and control over their bodies, which was then expressed as self-harm and anxiety. In this conceptualization, women were socialized to internalize, men to externalize, and both expressions functioned as techniques for avoiding primary emotions through displacement and replacement.

In a related formulation, God mode, their (typically male) clients replaced intolerable emotions by exerting power and control over others, as aggression and anger. God mode defined the self-perception of superiority—"the liberty of putting myself above someone else" (G3) and "enforc[ing]" (G3) power. Here, they explained that God mode represented an escape from intolerable emotions granted by controlling the environment, the self, and others:

It's going to make me feel good right now because I enforced my (long pause) . . . for example, people who are robbing other people . . . if they perceive that their life is meaningless and they have no, no power over others or their own life, in that moment when they see the fear in that person to hand over their objects, they are the most important thing in that person's life right now, and it's God mode (G3).

The struggle with meaninglessness and a felt-sense of powerlessness was ameliorated by power-over-others, thus unwanted emotions were replaced by grandiosity and a felt-sense of control.

The third concept, "authority dichotomy" was defined as a state of simultaneous opposition to societal authority while consenting to an authoritarian "prophet" (G3):

They really hate authority. Unless they have given their permission. They might take a lot of abuse from someone who—who they had. "I've chosen you to be my trainer in this." That's not God mode…. "I hate authority, but I'm really comfortable with it." There's a dichotomy there (G3).

From this relationship with power, they manifested self-importance and meaning. The internalization of the authority dichotomy provided a tool for avoiding intolerable emotions, which were supplanted with the thoughts and feelings of a leader.

Another exit worker offered a formulation of supremacist hate and aggression to explain supremacists' drive to control others through intimidation. They said:

It's a very central part of violent extremism that you use aggression and hate to intimidate others. You gain power and control and you can dictate a lot of, of, you know, things around you. You can also control people that way (G1).

In this way, expressions of hate, aggression, and intimidation increase supremacists' felt-sense of control over their environment.

Another formulation of supremacist affect explored shame. Here, an exit worker described shame as central to White power and violence:

Shame is, shame is the root of a whole host of anti-social outcomes, and shame and unresolved anger that, I think in the majority of cases, is done to the self. Whose ultimate expression at the far end is suicide… And then on the other side, it's, it's, we do it to other people. And the ultimate expression of that on the other side is uh murder. You know, part of your childhood or whatever, feeling less than, feeling not good enough, weak, powerless, not smart enough, not pretty enough, not whatever… And sometimes, and I did this, and sometimes we adopt an ideology that tells us we're greater than. What's the word, what's a word that's the opposite of shame?

Oh, what? Would it… (long pause) what, do you think, it's narcissism?

Pride. And what are, what are these groups all about? White pride. White pride worldwide (G1).

Much like the previous low affect tolerance formulation, White pride functioned as an escape from an intolerable emotional state—shame—and mirrored the role shame plays in some narcissistic presentations (Poless et al., 2018).

A formulation of supremacist behavior and motivation also operationalized the power and control framework. The exit worker responsible for this formulation described the supremacist's behavior and motivation by an attempt to gain total power and control over others:

[a public Sieg Heil salute] is for him a sense of gaining power and control, having total power over everybody he meets. Everybody he looks in the eye, 7 a.m. in the morning, gets terrified of him. They don't think about dinner or next week's vacation or whatever. They think about him, and this is terrifying. And this feeling of power and control is

enormous for him (G1).

Similarly, another exit worker described supremacists' behaviors as motivated by the desire to strike the "fear of god" into others and be "the extremely most important thing in [another] person's life right now" (G3). In both examples, a drive for power and control motivates supremacist behavior.

The exit workers in this section agreed that effective exit work with power and control required attending to power relations in practitioner-client relationships. As the first exit worker presented in this section explained, inattentive practitioners may inadvertently become clients' "new prophet" (G3). To disrupt this potential outcome, interventions were recommended to model consent practices, build clients' autonomy, and encourage client independence.

Intergenerational Supremacism. Case formulations often describe how family history contributes to the presenting problem, and the formulation presented here explains how supremacist family systems promote supremacist ideologies. In this account, the family dynamics increased the individual's vulnerability to supremacist activism and intergenerationally transmitted supremacist ideologies.

Recalling their past supremacist activism, an exit worker rooted the development of their supremacist ideology in their parents' bigotry:

It could depend on how a person was raised, you know? For instance, I was raised in a racist, homophobic household …They weren't involved in, you know, organized White supremacy. Then again, we have individuals who were raised in that. Who were raised, you know, in the Klan, you know, or in Christian fundamentalist cults ... There are all these different factors that contribute to that. I can really only look at my own experience, and that's what I can give the most definitive answer about, and I can say that it took a

long time, and it's a process that is going to be a lifelong process...when I was in prison, and I knew I wanted to change, there were so much that had been drilled into my head for so long that I couldn't help but think certain things. You know? So, like I'm making new friends. I'm making Black friends, and I would see a Black woman and automatically think a racial slur (G1).

A conceptual parallel was drawn here between supremacist ideology development in a household with prevalent supremacist beliefs and households where supremacist activism was present. Even outside formal activist networks, their family's bigotry and use of racial expletives were "drilled into" them, and importantly, their supremacist family history was experienced as a barrier to transformation.

In a notable example of intergenerational supremacism, an exit worker from a country reputed to be relatively higher in metrics of egalitarianism explained that intergenerational transmission was partially responsible for the maintenance of supremacist groups in their country over time:

We have a history of those groups. So there's also the history of it, and it's intergenerational. That's one part of it (G3).

Though they explained that the country has increased in egalitarianism over time, the continued presence of supremacist groups supported the view that supremacism is ideologically persistent within some families and communities. In addition to structural change and prevention campaigns, family-focused exit interventions offered a promising intervention for targeting intergenerational supremacism.

Lone-Wolf. Exit workers voiced that "lone actor/ lone wolf" formulations minimize the importance of online communities and, consequently, ignore data needed to inform effective

individual and community intervention and prevention strategies. They cautioned me to avoid conceptualizing attacks or supremacist recruitment as "lone-wolf" and asserted that supremacists who appear to be acting alone are likely in connection with supremacist milieus online or surreptitiously in their communities.

Demographic-Specific Formulations. Demographic differences impacted the exit process. The exit workers on the whole innovated interventions to address the needs of specific demographics and specialized in specific demographics. In one case, an exit worker focused on families of supremacists and innovated an Alanon-style weekly meeting and a monthly workshop series to support families and friend in encouraging their loved ones' exit. Another exit worker who reported maintaining a limited case load of women and LGBTQIA+ clients used a peer-support model based in shared identities.

Age, sex/gender, race, incarceration status, mental health diagnosis, specific role/duration in supremacist activism, and substance abuse impacted intervention.

Age. According to exit workers, young age predicted successful exit outcomes. Middle age often coincided with longer activism duration and ideological dedication. A few exit programs in the current sample targeted youth culture under the age of 25, and one exit program limited its caseload to seasoned supremacist activists in their late 20s and 30s.

Interventions with adult clients required sensitivity toward delayed developmental milestones and age-inappropriate deficits in knowledge. As an exit worker specializing in middle-aged exit clients described:

> When working with an older person, even though they need help figuring out how to live
>
> a life apart from their ideology, you have to figure out how to support without them
>
> feeling like you are "giving them a lesson" (G5).

They explained how adults feeling patronized may react by rejecting the exit relationship.

Exit workers focused exclusively on youth shared that the supremacist activist milieus in their contexts were countries with primarily youth cultures. A manual from (G6) also characterized supremacist activism as a youth culture, where members "retire around the age of 20" (G6). Because youth were observed to defect from activist movements when their activism conflicted with typical developmental milestones, exit workers responded to this phenomenon by implementing normative lifestyle-enhancing interventions, addressing isolation, and working toward age-appropriate milestone markers such as employment, school attendance, relationships, and hobbies.

Gender. Cis men comprised the majority of reported exit clients, followed by cis women. Exit workers also described two trans clients, and a few participants discussed increases in gender diversity over time:

> Maybe also there's more rising of female activists in exit counseling. Not so much
>
> as male clients. But there's a rising (G5).

A defunct exit group's manual shared a history of "a number of only-girl groups" (G6) that functioned briefly during the 1990s.

Exit workers who discussed gender tended to define women and men's distinct exit needs. An exit worker with a history of supremacist activism related their case formulations to their own gender-based aggression experienced when they were an activist, from which they rooted their approaches working with women clients.

> You know, we get very few women, but the ones we do get often they just won't open up
>
> to men in the same way… I can say that in every single case with a female, um, there is
>
> reports of some kind of abuse, um, having to do with the men…. You know, they may

feel more comfortable [working with a woman]. They may just not like men or have had

really bad experiences (G1).

The women in their caseload struggled to connect with male practitioners, and the group

responded by offering women agency in choosing to work exclusively with women.

Here, an exit worker explained that women were minimized and frequently sexualized in

supremacist movements. Their program responded to women's experiences and emphasized the

need for safety:

A lot of the women say it's the first time they're in an environment where they're taken

seriously and not sexualized . . . they're not gendered out of being formers….So, it's

created somewhat of a safe space for women coming out of that lifestyle to be accepted

and to participate (G2).

Another discussion focused on supremacist movements' high rates of gender-based violence.

While other responses to this topic included an exit worker's comment that young girls presented

as "tougher" than the societal expectation of femininity in reaction to "macho" (G3) supremacist

subcultures:

You can't approach and say, "Yeah, but tell me about your feelings." They'd be

outraged (G3).

Here, they directly linked effective intervention to an awareness of gender presentations.

In this final example, an exit worker attributed their development of gender-based

formulations and approaches to a woman's observation:

We do the exact same thing, but we don't create anger. We create anxiety. We do self-

harm behavior. Makes you feel good right now. Makes you feel more anxiety in the long

run (G3).

After testing the client's theory and observing the phenomenon over time, they endorsed its validity and integrated it into their formulation for supremacism. They began applying the interventions and formulations used for men's anger and violence with female clients who self-harm, which produced successful outcomes.

Multiracial Supremacism. A case example of multiracial supremacism described a young person of color and former member of a White supremacist group. The exit worker who worked closest with the client formulated a constellation of factors related to unmet needs that motivated the client's supremacism—a distant and unaffectionate family; early-life displacement; and racist bullying. The case history was as follows:

> [Name of small town] They're conservatives. They don't like—they're more racist and anti-immigration also. But this [person] … [they were a specified identifiable race]. And so [they] had been bullied, you know, in a—there are bullies everywhere. But in a way, that's more—I think it's harder for kids to do that in [name of bigger city]. But [the other kids] had been like um—called them [n-word]. On [the] chair in [their] classroom, [the kids] put signs with uh, that said "Whites only." And also grownups. Who could say things like that? But you know what I think? The most important thing to learn from [their] life and history is to never—grownups should never let children become such outcasts. And that's actually our responsibility. And I mean, teachers must have seen that [they] were called [n-word] all the time. We went to [their] home village, and we met a lot of nice people there. But all the time, I was wondering, "why didn't you do anything" (G3)?

This practitioner focused on the impact of context on the client's vulnerability to supremacist recruitment. They saw the client as having joined supremacist activism seeking acceptance and

approval. In their case formulation, the client's pervasively unmet needs crystalized into "enormous insecurity" and "enormous need for contact" (G3).

The client's identity transformation centered around relational interventions. They defined care as the primary "pull" factor. As the client's trust in the exit workers generalized to other areas of their life, they sought novel social experiences. Their emotional independence and stability grew, and the exit worker deemed the intervention successful.

Class. Three exit workers—two who had advanced degrees as mental health care professionals and one non-former mental health care professional—explicitly linked resources to outcomes:

People who have more resources or come from other backgrounds, we would, we would you know expect more types of change from them (G1).

Several participants shared that exit clients whose basic needs were met more easily invested in personal transformation work.

There were also instructive absences in the data set related to class. Though most exit workers did not relate their clients' struggles to class, they often reported poverty-associated difficulties: struggles gaining employment, lack of access to substance abuse treatment, financial stressors, and homelessness. There was a notable absence of poverty-associated distress in interviews with exit workers from countries with strong social safety nets. In comparison, exit workers whose clients' lacked social welfare support reported more client suicidality or completed suicide, concerns about healthcare, lack of access to drug treatment, and homelessness.

Incarceration. Incarceration facilitated exit for some exit workers and clients and was the site of recruitment for others. Exit workers did not advocate for or against incarceration, and

similarly to researchers, they saw incarceration as sometimes resulting in exit and frequently increasing recruitment or deepening ideology. One expert consultant pointed out that women are less likely to be recruited to supremacist groups while incarcerated.

Exit groups offered several inmate-specific interventions. An interviewee reported a trend of clients who had been recruited into supremacist groups while incarcerated later contacting the exit group in preparation for release and reentry. Exit programs' inmate support programs included letter writing, visits, and group programs within their local prisons. Exit workers' inmate support interventions included supporting clients to making meaning from their incarceration and focused on achieving stability in the clients' exit process sufficient for sustaining motivation during the clients' reentry into society. All exit workers discussed examples of reentry support.

Psychiatric Diagnoses. Most exit groups addressed mental health distress by providing referrals to mental health care practitioners in the community. No group offered mental health care treatment for psychiatric diagnoses. Some groups worked closely with or staffed mental health care providers. One group teamed formers with mental health care professionals for exit interventions when clients presented with co-occurring psychiatric disorders or life distress.

Every exit group discussed the prevalence of substance use disorders, and interview absences were as informative as the interview content. For example, in the country with the most accessible mental health care treatment, substance use and abuse were mentioned only in passing to describe the protocol for connecting the client to needed services. In countries with steep barriers to mental health care access, substance abuse emerged in interviews frequently, and multiple exit workers reported it to be a barrier to exit.

The mental health diagnoses most frequently represented by the data set were PTSD and

substance use disorders, followed by anxiety, Asperger's Syndrome (now considered part of Autism Spectrum Disorder), antisocial personality disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and depression.

In all cases but one exit workers reported that their clients frequently presented with posttraumatic incidents in early life or during supremacist activism, and a few posited that traumatic early life increased clients' vulnerability to recruitment. Several exit workers also reported frequent sexual abuse and violence in supremacist organizations. A few participants also explained that taking violent actions against others was experienced as traumatic in their own supremacist past. One exit worker stated that high trauma symptoms predicted poorer client outcomes.

Exit workers also expressed anxiety about retraumatizing clients. Reflecting on this issue, one of the exit workers shared a few memories of re/traumatizing clients early in their exit career. They regretted the incidents and highlighted the insight provided about their role and abilities as an exit worker. Lacking interest in intervention training, this exit worker responded to their experience by putting boundaries on their role:

> I understand my role and our role as formers here. I think we're great at facilitating that first contact, but without any further training, uh, it ends here, you know, we have to hand it off to someone with, with experience (G1).

They responded to the potential harm caused in the absence of competence and appropriate boundaries and later invited more mental health care practitioners into the exit program.

Other responses to the question of psychiatric diagnoses included OCD symptoms emerging within the exit process. When the recovering supremacist stopped controlling others or themselves with aggression, the exit worker explained, the client replaced control of self and

others with environmental control:

> We have many clients who, when they couldn't harm others or harm themselves, they
>
> started, you know, cleaning their house 50 times a day and stuff like that (G3).

This practitioner recommended intervening on the original presentation by implementing emotional tolerance interventions, rather than overly focusing on the specific OCD manifestation. They predicted that OCD symptoms would resolve when the identity and ideology concerns were addressed.

Intervention Approaches and Techniques

As applied here, approaches were described by exit workers as intervention systems that provided general guidelines that could apply to a variety of specific interventions and techniques. Some exit workers endorsed a single approach, yet most participants mentioned a variety of approaches. This section demonstrates theories of change, approaches to change work, and techniques in exit interventions.

The Five-Stage Exit Approach. This approach included five stages, "analysis, credible messenger, alliance, normalize deradicalization behavior, and influence" (G3). A seasoned exit worker with experience as a former and licensed mental health care provider contributed the five-stage intervention approach and some of the interventions and techniques. They structured the stages as a timeline of exit goals, which they applied to determine techniques and intervention strategies based on clients' stage of exit. The model's technical flexibility encouraged practitioners to individualize techniques according to their personality and clients' needs.

Numerous interventions and techniques could likely be successfully implemented within this approach, and the catalog of strategies represented in this section is limited to interventions

and techniques named by exit workers in this project's sample.

Analysis. In exit work, analysis was the first stage. It provided the information needed for planning subsequent steps. Accurately assessing clients' views, relational style, and needs clarified how to initiate a strong alliance and gain legitimacy.

Credible Messenger. Credible messenger defined someone believed by clients to be a legitimate source of information. The credible messenger stage could be a "short cut" (G3) to alliance-building when clients presented with "basic mistrust" (G3) or rigidly ideological core identities. Exit workers observed that distrustful and ideological clients in every setting were more receptive when interventions and suggestions came from a credible messenger, such as a former, whom they viewed as a "trusted person" (G1).

Exit workers often worked in teams of formers plus another exit worker. Not every exit process required a credible messenger stage. With time and after forming working alliances with clients, non-formers organically became credible to clients.

Alliance. Alliance resulted from trust and strength-building interventions that occurred within the context of a professional and relational bond. With time, trust, and investment from both parties, the dyad formed a "working alliance" to collaboratively tackle exit goals. The stability provided by alliance-building interventions made the alliance stage the home base of the five-stage approach. The model's creator endorsed returning to alliance when clients needed relational strength and safety, such as after experiencing acute loss, during a crisis, or after a rupture in the exit relationship.

Exit workers' alliance-building interventions fell into three categories: presence, actions, and conversational techniques. Presence facilitated bonds with clients, was measurable, and did not require preexisting trust. Techniques that achieved presence included spending time,

establishing availability for sessions and crises, and visibly investing in the exit relationship despite clients' ambivalence. Action interventions facilitated bonds by completing tasks alongside clients which built trust, demonstrated competence, and displayed investment.

Techniques such as reaching out first, solving a practical problem, and sharing an activity strengthened exit relationships with direct action. Conversational interventions presented a low-impact way to deepen exit relationships. Conversational techniques incorporated collaboratively defining and meeting small easily achievable goals, offering support during crises, verbally indicating a commitment to the relationship, indicating curiosity and interest by asking open-ended questions, summarizing and reflecting back for understanding, verbal affirmation of client strengths/ non-judgmental acceptance/empathy, as well as honestly and transparently answering questions or giving feedback.

When forming or repairing an alliance, the majority of exit workers discouraged challenging the client, giving advice, and teaching which they linked to potential destabilization of the client and exit relationship. Commenting on destabilization and stable alliances, one exit worker recommended avoiding techniques that quickly formed unstable bonds, such as taking an authoritative role and "negative bonding" (G3) focused on shared dislikes/enemies.

Normalizing Exit. The normalizing exit and influence stages frequently alternated or coincided. During the normalizing exit[44] stage, clients proactively adopted interventions to change their behaviors and exposed themselves to environments and social interactions outside supremacist circles. The normalizing exit stage had four main goals: building needed skills, increasing tolerance for new experiences, discerning between supremacist milieu norms and

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[44] Called "normalizing deradicalization behavior" (G3) by exit workers, this is referred to herein as "normalizing exit behavior" in line with this projects critique of the language of "radicalization."

broader social norms, and establishing external needs previously met by supremacist milieus such as social networks, "life's passions" (G1), employment, and basic material needs. Several interventions met these goals: building self-compassion, practicing emotion regulation, cognitive restructuring, and exposure to new experiences and environments.

A self-compassion strategy instructed practitioners to support clients in tracking their present achievement's relative to low points in their past. Other techniques for building self-compassion included identifying skills and strengths; praise; offering humanizing empathy and emotional connection; making amends; and acts of services to those harmed.

Emotion regulation interventions involved identifying antecedents to overreactions, strategies to reduce physiological reactions, and cognitive reasoning. Exit workers supported clients in their attempts to gain self-control with emotional regulation, cognitive restructuring, and exposure interventions.

Cognitive restructuring interventions began with self-awareness—identifying unwanted thoughts or reactions and their antecedents—then implemented plans to replace them. Replacement techniques included learning appropriate social norms by observing and mirroring others, identifying core personal values, behavioral modification, and self-reasoning.

Exposure interventions were widely applied to normalize the exit process. Exit workers cautioned that too much exposure too fast and in the absence of adequate preparation and support could prompt regression and put the client and others in danger. Exposure occurred passively and actively, by no longer avoiding or by seeking new experiences. Techniques for implementing the exposure intervention included, in order: 1. identifying the window of tolerance, 2. self-monitoring reactions, 3. managing physiological responses, and 4. ending the exposure before exceeding the window of tolerance. With repetition, clients' windows of tolerance increased. The

intervention was successful when experiences and interactions caused little anxiety and no longer resulted in intrusive thoughts (such as racial expletives) or compulsions to respond inappropriately (such as with violence).

Influence. Addressing ideology, offering guidance, and providing constructive feedback fell within the influence stage. Exit workers saw the influence step as a risk factor for ruptures to the alliance. The creator of the intervention approach outlined the influence stage like this:

> I've established credible messenger, done all my homework for the three first steps, and then I might skip normalizing and go straight to influence. And if I've done that for like 45 minutes, I might have three sentences I can influence. Like a fire extinguisher. Pull out the safety part, direct the nozzle toward the fire, push in … So, repeat those three a couple times … Bury them deep. It's like sowing the seeds of doubt. (G3)

In this vignette, interventions from early stages happened before influence within the same session. The exit worker worked to create safety and stability, then implemented concise and targeted influence interventions. These influences were comprised of a few pointed statements and repeated.

In another portion of the interview, the same exit worker reported clients' overwhelm, rejection of influence, half-hearted effort, or compulsive (rather than intentional) compliance as potential pitfalls of unsuccessful influence.

Combining the Stages. The five-stage exit intervention approach was nonlinear and earlier stages could be returned to during client crises and relational ruptures. Order was also important. For instance, the challenging later stages were more likely to be successful if they were supported by the skills and self-awareness achieved in earlier stages. Formers' contributions were particularly beneficial in the analysis, credible messenger, and normalizing

exit stages. Success in the alliance-building stage was characterized as imperative for non-former exit workers. This approach influenced the current project's model for addressing client supremacism presented in Part 4's Discussion and Conclusions.

Influencing Ideology. Echoing RAN (2016), the current study's data set defined ideological transformation as a high-priority goal and ideal outcome that was realistically unobtainable in some cases. Exit workers emphasized the importance of nonconfrontation in addressing clients' ideologies. Exit workers immediately addressed tension or ruptures during ideology confrontations and innovated specific strategies to address ideology nonconfrontationally and repair inevitable relational ruptures.

The exit workers in this data set did not refer to "confrontations" with ideology and reframed the discussion as "influencing" (G4), "discussing" (G2), "talking through" (G3), "pointing out blind spots" (G5), and "using questions to open up doubt" (G1). Clients' ideology change was characterized by a series of small shifts within an extensive replacement process. Exit workers acknowledged the need for flexible individual goals and nonlinear timelines. Flexibility and new perspectives slowly replaced rigid ideologies over months or years.

A few practitioners facilitated increases in clients' flexibility by restructuring underlying cognitive distortions and emotional difficulties. Not pushing clients too far outside their window of tolerance was another common theme when working with ideology change.

When recounting their process for addressing ideology, several exit workers accounted for individual communication styles and clients' needs. Most practitioners favored frequent low-intensity discussions, though some preferred intense direct interactions. When addressed successfully, the clients' ideological material became a comfortable conversation within the exit repartee.

Influencing Ideology: Case Examples. The following excerpts were responses to interview questions eliciting case examples of a "best-case scenario" and "a time you felt like it didn't go well." In the first case, an exit worker shared their perception of an ideal intervention interaction:

> **…** it was about privilege. We talked about White privilege and things like that. And at first, he was very defensive. He was like, "I don't understand this. Did we talk about this before?" He was very upset at first and was like, "I need to just kind of step out of this conversation and walk away." And I was like, "okay, take your time with it, you know? Let that stuff marinate." And um, he did. He came back and was like, "I can't believe that like I never considered this in this way." And he seems to really get it. And so there are those really inspiring, breakthroughs you know, um, with him (G1).

The above excerpt concluded of a case example with an adult client who was transitioning into peer support. It illustrated the dyad's first major rupture. Because the two shared a strong working alliance, the exit worker was not anxious about the exit relationship's resilience. They engaged until the client was just outside their window of tolerance, and when the client detached from the interaction to work independently, they supported his autonomy.

When discussing White privilege, the exit worker maintained their position with patience and respect. The exit worker modeled healthy boundaries by not overly accommodating, overreacting to his incredulousness, or soothing his emotional reaction. Respecting the client's request for distance without rejection and maintaining availability reinforced healthy assertiveness and boundary setting as relational norms.

The second example is an excerpt from the middle of a detailed case example of a failed intervention for influencing ideology, which occurred when the exit worker was a novice

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practitioner. This interaction recounted a first meeting.

> You can't *connect* with political shit. Yet, what is—what is the normal way to connect with someone that's not radicalized? Or hasn't been radicalized? Okay, so I did, uh, spoke one time. A 19-year-old guy. He'd been—he refused to talk to me about anything else than political views. So I went, "Okay. I'm going to talk to him for like an hour-and-a-half or something like that." And it was like a fight. It was like he was saying something. I was answering it. I was cross-referencing things. So we were—we were in a space that —say this is the space. [picks up a sheet of paper]. And whenever I say something, I'm trying to—to limit his—his space [folds paper in half]. And then I say something else that limits it, that contradicts this [folds in half again]. So after a while, I've—I've boxed him into a corner (G3).

This first exit meeting contrasted with the previous example's strong alliance. The exit worker had not assessed the client's window of tolerance or response to emotion. The client evidenced strong emotional reactions and categorized the exit worker into an "outgroup." The exit worker hypothesized that the interaction likely increased the client's defensiveness and ideological dedication.

While the exit worker hoped to connect over similar reference points, they pointed out their mistake in attempting to win the debate. Debate was consistently noted in interviews for producing defensiveness, vulnerability, and shame. Because the client was portrayed as requesting a political discussion, I asked a follow-up question, "what could you have done differently?" The exit worker suggested forming intentional boundaries around interactions when engaging political topics was required, avoiding temptation to "win," maintaining position but letting the client have the last word, and ending the exchange after a short time.

Motivational Interviewing. Most exit workers championed (MI). One group adopted MI as their primary approach, and they provided motivational interviewing training to every staff member, whether or not they interacted with clients, hoping to reduce the turn-over and the well-documented conflicts that sometimes erupt in exit groups (Koehler, 2017a). Exit workers who centered MI in their interventions described MI as the anchor approach to which specific techniques and intervention modalities could be "tacked on, like magnet" (G2). One exit worker illustrated their implementation of MI like this:

> Rather than a directive versus nondirective approach, um, you need to be guiding, which is in the middle … You need to have high levels of reflection, which means that you're conveying understanding in your reflection process to the client, which just means that you're not giving your opinion. Right? That's, that's critical, um. Unsolicited advice and opinions are contrary to MI. So you have to be able to reflect, which means you're keeping, you're keeping your ego in check in that conversation, right? High levels of affirmation, high levels of reflection, high levels of open-ended questions, uh, and high level summaries because all of those things indicate um how you are listening and conveying understanding of what you're hearing (G1).

Exit workers from this group augment the general MI approach with several additional interventions and techniques so that it effectively supports exit work: alliance building (between the exit worker and the client); shame reduction (to reduce the need to have power over others) victim engagement (where empathy, forgiveness, and making amends become tools toward healing prejudicial beliefs), mentorship of clients by exit workers, self-disclosure (with formers), conflict resolution training, anger management training, development of alternative passionate interests, nonjudgmental compassion extended toward the client, nondirective support (of the

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client's trajectory out of supremacism), family-focused interventions (where the family of supremacist activist allies with the exit workers in the goal of disengagement), narrative work (to reframe a person's path out of supremacism), trauma-focused care (to prevent re-traumatization), re-education (to address common supremacist myths), strength-bases (which honor strengths facilitating recovery held by the client), and risk assessment (suicidality, homicidality, abuse).

Family and Friends Counseling and Coaching. Family and friends approaches offered an alternative to directly implementing exit interventions with supremacists. Counseling and coaching the support systems of supremacists typically resulted after a concerned loved one reached out to the exit group. This approach facilitated exit indirectly by allying with supremacists' friends and family, counseling them to improve the health of their relationships with the supremacist loved one, and then coaching their intervention efforts.

Due to each relationship's idiosyncrasies, the specific interventions within this approach varied per situation. More involved interventions of longer duration and were explained as a series of steps: 1. assess the situation and determine the needs and intervention plan, 2. provide counseling to the loved one to prepare them to implement exit interventions, 3. coach loved ones through the exit intervention process, and 4. support outcomes maintenance.

Assessments followed a standard needs assessment. As the family member or friend prepared to implement exit interventions, the exit worker provided information about typical supremacist presentations and counseling related to strengthening their relationship, providing effective support, and gaining skills related to commonly identified problem areas, *e.g.,* communication, boundaries, enmeshment, and enabling. The second step may also include referrals if needed. When prepared, the client begins the third intervention step while the exit worker coached them in effective interventions. Regardless of outcome, the exit group remained

in contact and provided maintenance support.

Support, Boundaries, and Consequences*.* A family-specialist exit worker saw a support-boundaries-consequences approach as central to supporting supremacists' family and friends. Though supremacists' loved ones were well positioned to facilitate the exit process, they frequently pushed them further into supremacism.

Exit workers observed that doubt organically emerged for people with rigid identities. Isolation promoted recommitting to the ideology. Connection with loved ones that balanced support, boundaries, and consequences promoted exit by presenting an alternative path. Exit workers instructed parents in methods for strengthening the connection and thus reducing a common tendency among supremacists to isolate from everyone except the supremacist milieu.

Clients included anyone connected to supremacists, yet parents made up the bulk of their caseload. They focused on parents here:

[The parent] can try to think that, "Okay, what you're doing right now is not who you are." But it's two different things. So, something I always tell them—like, "an important thing to tell your kid, it's like, I don't agree what your beliefs are within this group. I don't like that you are a part of it. I actually hate it. But I love you. You are still my son" …

And what impact does this have on the relationship?

Because—it's easier to be connected to your, um, your son. Because um—it's easier to not lie. Saying, "Okay, I love you. I love *you*, but there's a need to fight, because I hate what you do." So, put it into words, that these are two different things. And then it's easier for your kids to lower their guard and say what—how they are. Within everything you do, uh, there's—there's times when you feel like, "Is this really right for me? … Should I really continue doing this?" And if you are in this point, and you have other

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options that looks nicer, uh, the chances that you, that you switch to something else is bigger. So, for these kids, uh, when they have have this moments of, "Ehhh." When they're not sure they're doing the right things. They look around, and they look at their family, and if they look at their family and think, "They hate me. I have nothing there. They don't, they don't want me. And I have no friends. I have nothing else." Even though they don't feel sure of what they're doing, they stay within the group. But in this moment, and they look at their family, and they feel like, "Okay. They hate what I am doing, but there are still, um, a big support, and they will welcome me." It's a big chance that they will go to their families.

A lot of the families might say, "Well, we need to show them tough love." And say, "We will not talk to you anymore until you leave."

You wanna grab him out, but you can't do it, and you get frustrated. And maybe the person leaves. You're like "Yay, yay!" and they go back again. And you're like, "Why? Ugh!" and get angry… But you, you can't force a person to feel different. And you, you have to stay where you are, and have them really, really sure, "Okay, we are here. We don't think that this—this situation that you are in—we don't believe in it, but we respect your decisions. And we are here when you are ready." (G3)

In the first intervention, the parents reframed their child's ideology/activism as distinct from their child and adopted a narrative that supremacism is a changeable state. In the second intervention, the parent communicated their position by dividing their delivery into three parts: 1. honesty about disapproval of the supremacism (boundaries-consequences) and 2. expressing unwavering love (support) and 3. affirming the relationship "you are still my son" (support).

Exit workers prepared parents for expected but devastating relapses, and supported

parents' emotional regulation, expectation management, and acceptance of ambiguity. In the second intervention, the parent again communicated with their child, reaffirming their honest disapproval of their child's choice (boundary and consequence) while affirming respect, the relationship's continuation, and hope for exit (support).

Another exit worker discussed enabling behavior to illustrate the difficulty some loved ones have simultaneously maintaining support and boundaries:

> … Cause they're so frustrated they go, "should I let them use my computer or my credit card [for supremacist events/ propaganda]?" And I go, "Uhhhhh, no." But if you've worked addiction, I mean you've seen this too, where people who are close to them, they go, "should I buy the heroin for them, or should I? what should I? Oh, they owe this person this and that. Should I solve this problem?" No. (G4)

The exit worker observed a similar pattern in exit and addictions work, where loved ones offered support without boundaries or consequences. In this intervention, they suggested parents stop materially supporting their child's supremacism, thus limiting support to relational and emotional.

Exit workers also applied the same approach broadly. Exit worker formers described having "no room to judge" (G1) and believed "if I can change, they can too" (G2). The self-work required to transform their identities led them to form approaches that balance support, honesty, and personal and professional boundaries, with their clients' accountability for past harm caused. The support-boundaries-consequences approach was presented by one exit worker like this:

> … Our mission statement is to inspire people to a place of compassion and forgiveness for themselves and for all people. We have compassion for everybody else, but not ourselves. That's about ego. We have compassion for ourselves and nobody else. That's

narcissism. To have, to properly be compassionate, we have to have within and without. Um and that's a, that's a hard thing to do. The hardest thing for a former White supremacist is to have compassion for the self. I talk about compassion with healthy boundaries and consequences and [my colleague], you know, before we even met each other, [their] um, way of describing that was never concede, never condemn (G1).

This group's advocacy of "compassion with healthy boundaries and consequences" and "never concede, never condemn" underscores the common themes of support-boundaries-consequences to the client being encouraged to focus on the future without enabling them to "pretend it [Nazism] didn't happen" (G3).

Dehumanization to Rehumanization. The theory of change described in this section focused on dehumanization and what reverses it. The current study refers to this approach as the dehumanization principle. [45] This approach reportedly emerged after the exit worker observed a similar pattern in "almost all propaganda," their clients' thought patterns, their thought pattern as a supremacist activist, and soldiers with whom they were acquainted. Because people are inclined to connect and have empathy, they explained, alienating others with the dehumanization formula allows people to more easily "enforce violence" (G3). From their theory of dehumanization, they created an approach for reversing dehumanization.

The formula for dehumanization proceeded as "black-and-white thinking then distance, you get dehumanization" (G3). They explained that dehumanization is produced through this mechanism by an individual's socialization into violence promoting groups or ideologies such as supremacist milieus or the military. First, those targeted are perceived in polarized terms (good

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[45] Originally called the development of "radicalized thinking patterns." Responding to critiques problematizing the use of "radicalization" to narrowly refer to violent activism, I refer to this as the "dehumanization principle."

versus evil/ safe versus threat), then avoided (mentally, through self-segregation, or on a mass scale, ghettoization/deportation), and finally, lacking any connection, they come to perceive the other as the embodiment of their polarized caricature (pure evil/ existential threat), and thus, no longer human.

The approach to reversing dehumanization, or rehumanization, works through the formula's inputs (black-and-white thinking + distance) reversing each step. The exit worker first addressed black-and-white thinking with a cognitive restructuring intervention, implementing following techniques in order: 1. point out clients' distorted thought patterns until clients see the pattern in themselves 2. work to find "middle points" by questioning their conclusion and considering other possible explanations/perspectives. When successful, clients purportedly have greater flexibility and tolerance for differences and alternative perspectives.

They addressed distance using an exposure intervention.[46] The exit worker cautioned not to begin exposures by directly interacting with hated/feared people. Instead, the second intervention introduced abstract content (conversations, visual media) or coming into organic proximity, *i.e.,* in public spaces.

The first two interventions often precluded the third. As clients develop non-dichotomous thinking and proximity, they are often more flexible, present, connected, and empathetic. In this way, the clients' identity and ideology are sometimes changeable without directly addressing ideology.

Authoritarian to Autonomous. Using formulations of power and control, either over-control or helplessness, some exit workers shared their approaches for disrupting power and control and supporting the transformation from authoritarianism to "autonomized" (G3).

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[46] See the above *The Five-Stage Exit Approach* Normalizing Exit section for a description of exposure

Supporting client independence was called "a balance beam" (G3) of influencing clients enough to promote change but not inadvertently encouraging submission or over-influencing. The working alliance ideally included shared responsibility and promoted client accountability. As stated by one exit worker:

Make them their own prophets because if they don't have a prophet, they will search for one (G3).

With some clients, exerting influence was immediately rejected. With others, exerting influence was well-received. This excerpt describes why client over-compliance presented a temptation best resisted:

The easy way would be, "well, just follow me out. Just do what the fuck I say. You'll be fine." But then they'll be susceptible to influence from others, and that's not the point. You want that kid to think for themselves? You want them to have a high capacity of questioning incoming information? Don't be surprised if they don't listen to you (G3).

The intervention approach for client independence was comprised of regularly assessing the client relationship for signs of over-compliance, involving clients in collaborative goal setting, and refining from over-influencing.

When clients' power and control issues manifested as helplessness, several exit workers focused on accountability and personal responsibility. In the next example, the exit worker discussed clients who struggle to accept the control and power they have in their lives:

When we blame everybody else for stuff, when we're, you know, when we live in victim hood, um, is the most disempowering place to be… And you know there's certain things like that when you can get someone to take ownership of their lives and make different choices, that's, that's a cool thing to watch (G1).

This exit worker utilized reframing interventions that encourage clients to shift from blaming others by reframing responsibility as empowering and ownership over one's life.

Another practitioner saw clients' active investment in exit as a prerequisite for continued exit support:

> We don't work for the persons… So we try to do it together with them. Not for them. Or also if they want to leave, there's a need of self-motivation and activity. So I can't help somebody who isn't active… Sometimes they think it works in that way, so they only sit there and they hope there's somebody who is doing everything for them… If I see there's no way to speak to them anymore, or there's no motivation, from that point I will exit the exit process and say, "Okay, that's the end for us." Because if there is no motivation, there's no motivation for me to work with them (G5).

This exit worker assessed motivation and only accepted motivated clients. Their interventions to build autonomy included modeling skills and working toward clients' goals alongside clients. In cases of clients' underinvestment over a long period, they consider ending the exit relationship and transparently communicate this to the client.

Supporting clients' existential meaning-making impulses and drive toward complexity achieved client autonomy for another exit worker. They saw the desire for meaning and complexity as a response to being controlled while in supremacist activist groups:

> The existential part is interesting because a lot of the clients that I meet and work with uh have these, I mean exactly these type of issues. They want to find themselves in a very complex world. They want to find something that is meaningful. They've been involved in something that's very, very strongly dictates who they are and what they should think or what they should feel and how they should dress and all of this. This type of work is to

to figure out, "Who are you, and where do you want to go, and where do you want to uh develop?" (G1)

The interventions they suggested included asking open-ended questions about core identity, clients' futures, and personal development.

The practitioners in this section cautioned that clients' submissive compliance to the exit worker might obscure their continued struggle with power and control. Interventions to increase autonomy included supporting independence, encouraging accountability and responsibility, and existential meaning-making.

Transparency to Heal Shame. One program viewed transparency as the antidote to shame and their policies included having weekly open-to-the-public meetings. Rather than minimizing or ignoring the past harm caused, they endorsed facing it directly. In their approach, transparency supports "strength, solutions, and confidence" (G2). Here, an exit worker in this peer-support group differentiated between remorse and shame and advocated for authentic self-acceptance:

> So, we believe that there's, if there's nothing to hide, there's nothing to hide and no energy needs to be spent on hiding anything, including your identity… You can learn to talk about yourself and what you've done, the process that you're in, what you're trying to become, uh, openly with no shame and guilt. You know? You can obviously express remorse, which is often confused with shame and guilt, right. It's not the same (G2).

This support group conceptualized avoiding difficult emotions as a catalyst for harmful behavior and saw violence as an addiction. To address shame, they identified avoidance tendencies and encouraged each other to develop narratives for their past, present, and future, "This is what brings me to the table, this is what I bring to the table" (G2). Their approach also used

interventions such as being witnessed in the change process and separating remorse from shame.

Transformative Justice. Three interviewees experienced personal transformation through transformative justice, also called victim reparations and amends[47]. Transformative justice facilitated meaningful humanizing contact between perpetuators of harm and their (past or present) targets.

One exit worker was befriended in prison by a group they had previously targeted. They experienced the acceptance and forgiveness offered to them as transformative. Another exit worker shared that their therapist eventually revealed himself to be part of a previously targeted group. The therapist encouraged them to make amends:

> He said there is one thing to say you're sorry. It's another thing to say, "how did what I do affect you?" You say that and then shut up and listen to it and take it in and feel it. And um, so I did that with all my family members, my children, my parents, and uh, you know. He came with me to the [place of worship] where I did my very first [discrimination] act 30 years ago. You know, some people have difficulty wrapping their brains around it, but it's uh (trails off). The thing I've learned about forgiveness. It's not something I can ask for or demand from, from anybody… And in doing that, um, I presented myself and gave them the opportunity to forgive me which, which is healing for them. In that process I had acknowledged their pain, and if if they wanted to scream and yell at me and get it out of the system that way, I was prepared to be there for that too. It was just a whole lot of healing. And to be giving that to them, you know, that helped, uh, you know, heal some of the shame (G1).

The exit worker emphasized that amends work must be free of expectation. They did not expect

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[47] See "restorative justice" (Bazemore, 1998) or "victim-perpetrator dialogue" (Koehler, 2017).

forgiveness and were open to the potential anger of the communities they had harmed. For them, working to heal others' pain to which they had contributed, translated into their own healing from shame. There was instructive overlap in exit workers' stories such as feeling accountable to their past, healing the self through healing the harm caused, making amends, and experiencing grace and forgiveness.

Exit workers described exposing clients to volunteers from targeted groups in controlled, supervised settings, often in acts of reparations or amends. Sometimes these meetings involved religious ceremonies or prayer or occurred in mental health care treatment. One exit worker recalled meeting with a client who had just been apprehended attempting a hate crime at a place of worship. The religious leader volunteered to meet with the would-be attacker, and the exit worker facilitated their meeting. After meeting in discussion for a long time, they prayed together, and the attacker committed themselves to exit. Several exit workers endorsed similarly successful outcomes when implementing this approach yet cautioned that this high-risk approach should be handled carefully.

Outcomes

Previous literature reported in Chapter 7 related the difficulty gathering and comparing exit groups' outcomes data to differences in local legal protections restricting client data collection and nongovernmental organizations' inability to track client recidivism (Bjorgo & Horgan, 2009; Horgan & Braddock, 2014; Koehler, 2017a). Differences in the groups' client bases and approaches to client support were the prominent factors that prevented a useful comparative analysis of the effectiveness between the current sample's exit programs. For instance, one exit worker conveyed a felt pressure to define exit success goals in terms of desistance rather than ideological transformation to shorten case durations and increase capacity

to meet demand.

However, the exit workers in the current study provided several ways of assessing efficacy and identified factors that contributed to successful outcomes or acted as barriers. Client presentations that exit workers associated with better or worse outcomes and impacted the duration of support needed to achieve exit included factors related to engagement, variations in individual presentation, features of the exit relationship, and program structure. Engagement factors were relayed as clients' pathways into supremacism or fringe lifestyles and clients' level of dedication when active. Individual variations consisted of clients' motivation, social skill level, economic stability, history of substance use, and willingness to engage novel behavior.

The relationship or "working alliance" (G1, G3, G5) was highly factored into outcomes discussion and included voluntarism, collaboratively determined goals, mutual trust, and time spent. These factors, along with exit groups' supportive rather than punitive or judgmental framework, were endorsed as the primary contributors to NGO exit programs' consistently positive outcomes compared to mandatory governmental programs.

Outcomes were consistently defined as existing across exit groups, with little variation. Participants unanimously endorsed a cessation of violent behavior as the minimum most urgent exit goal. For a few exit workers, ideological change was a primary goal, but for the majority of those interviewed it was an ideal outcome.

Exit's Interactions with Mental Health Care

When exit clients had co-occurring mental health disorders, exit workers attempted to refer them to suitable therapists. Exit workers in some locations reported preparing clients for potential rejection. They reported that many mental health care professionals are unwilling to work with exit clients and two exit workers reiterated therapists' feedback that stigma and fear

prevent many therapists from working with exit clients. They recounted experiences shared with them by their clients who reported having services terminated and of clinicians' abandonment once the client revealed their supremacism (present or past). In only one context, did the exit worker deny provider stigma, which they related to the country's unique history of supremacism and exit work.

Exit workers' personal stories included support and harm in mental health care. Some felt judged, misunderstood, or simply unhelped by the approaches taken by their therapists. A few exit workers suggested working with "far-right ideologies" (G1) should be a specialized field with specific training.

Access. Location greatly impacted clients' access to mental health care services due to available health care systems and level of awareness about exit within mental health care services. The country where exit workers reported their clients to have the most difficulty accessing therapy services lacked both a robust social welfare system and a broad public narrative about exit from supremacism. They observed their clients' lack of healthcare as the primary barrier, and therapists' rejection of supremacist clients made finding therapists even more challenging. In a country with a well-developed social welfare state, mental health crisis care was immediately available, but they reported roughly one-year wait times for psychotherapy, rendering therapy referrals largely unhelpful. Only in one context did exit clients benefit from both a well-developed social welfare system and a readiness among providers to accept exit clients. Exit workers in this context recalled clients' relative ease accessing mental health care services.

Access to therapy services predicted exit workers' accounts of clients' substance abuse and suicidality. The topic of suicide created the sharpest divide in exit worker interviews. Exit

workers whose context was unsupported by clients' access to mental health care, crisis care, and substance abuse treatment mentioned suicide frequently, recalling recent complete or attempted suicides of formers or clients. In contrast, suicide was completely absent from interviews where exit occurs alongside easy access to treatment. In member-check, an exit worker in the high access setting recalled that their group had infrequently engaged with suicidality and reported confidence in the supportive structures available to manage client crises. In the country reporting the most accessible mental health care treatment, clients' recurrent substance abuse, suicidality, and completed suicides were meaningful in their relative absence from the data set. In the countries with steep barriers to mental health care access, due to long waits or lack of health care coverage, unsuccessful exit processes were attributed to substance abuse in several cases throughout the data set.

These findings do not claim that substance abuse and suicidality are not present in contexts with accessible services. It suggests that the exit processes with clients who have access to treatment may be less hindered by suicidality and substance abuse than those with clients who do not have mental health care access.

Mental Health Volunteers. Two exit groups integrated mental health care provider volunteers into exit work. One group recruited mental health care providers to volunteer as client coaches and paired volunteers and exit workers on teams for complex cases. As client coaches, the mental health care provider volunteers promoted client change work, consults with exit workers, and provides therapy referrals. Another group coordinates with a volunteer organization of psychologists who provide assessment services for exit work. One exit worker summarized their interaction with clinicians like this:

They are colleagues of psychologists, and we worked together in special cases in co-

working, or they made some notes for us to get a better understanding of diseases or problems in special cases, or they opened up the network to consult or to bring the clients into special, um, um, special networks for their diseases. Maybe diseases like Asperger, tramata, or um, depression. It's not the daily work of counseling, but it's a part, and sometimes it's very important for us to have this connection (G5).

In email correspondence with the volunteer network of psychologists, they described their contribution to exit work this way:

"…to find out if the client's behavior has any direction to any psychiatric diagnosis (like schizophrenia, autism, depression, personality disorders, and so on), in this way the work includes the diagnostical nomothetic and idiographic approaches to find out, if the client will represent any risk for society, social environment, for himself or if any organization he or she is connected with, may endanger the client and his environment as well. Oriented on this prognosis, we advise every client during the disengagement process, and if it's needed, we help them to find a therapist or treatment aligned on the RNR principles (risk, need responsivity) (G5).

For both groups, mental health care providers use their expertise to help exit workers assess clients' needs, make referrals for therapy, and consult about approaches, interventions, and techniques.

Summary and Conclusions

This chapter's findings outlined formulations of supremacism and practical approaches, interventions, and techniques exit workers reported using in exit work. It provided an actionable array of translatable strategies. Chapter 10 provided instructive examples for psychologists hoping to address client-generated supremacism. Though exit clients who were formerly

supremacist activist group members may differ considerably from clients in clinical settings, many of the clients described by exit workers were, to the extent needed to make the current point, everyday people in society. This finding supported the prediction that the strategies used by exit workers are translatable into clinical contexts with client-generated supremacism.

Chapter 10 provided a general description of exit clients, outlined the basic structure and central goals of exit work, and illustrated case formulations and intervention approaches. It provided practical methods for assessing exit clients and defined what information exit workers gather during the intake process. Exit workers developed a variety of case formulations for understanding client supremacism from their observations as exit clients and personal experiences exiting supremacism. These were then applied to descriptions of the mechanisms by which exit workers facilitate change. The chapter ended by reporting exit workers' and exit clients' experience accessing formal mental health care treatment, which acts as a call to psychologists to mind the ethical issues reported by exit workers and makes the strongest argument within this project for psychologists to more urgently develop training and techniques for addressing client-generated supremacism.

Chapter 11: Exit Programs

Turning now from the technical implementation of exit work to the programs themselves, Chapter 11 narrates findings related to exit practitioners and exit's structural frame. Together these results provide important insights into exit workers' experiences, interrelationships in types of exit, exit's developmental history, and the tensions inherent to exit's securitization.

Chapter 11 responds to the following research questions: Who staffs exit programs, what credentials do they hold, and in what roles are they positioned? What characteristics do successful exit workers possess? How are exit organizations funded? How did exit groups come

to adopt their strategies? How have exit groups changed over time? How do exit groups integrate research and scholarship?

Exit Workers' Experiences

All the exit programs in the current sample staffed exit workers, and their experiences were highly prevalent in the data set. In addition to paid staff, two groups also retained a well-developed volunteer network. The majority of exit workers were either former supremacists or former supremacists who attained advanced mental health care degrees. One exit worker was formerly in a street gang. One was a non-former mental health care professional, and two exit workers were neither formers nor mental health care professionals.

Exit workers can be categorized as *formers* and *nonformers.* This section relays how exit workers described their roles and the factors they found to benefit or detract from their efficacy in client work, as well as specific issues impacting their experiences in exit work. In addition to the administrative aspects of exit programming, exit workers are expected to effectively function as emotional supports, social supports, and mentors to their clients as well as provide care until clients could establish supports in their natural environment.

Exit Worker Formers. Participants were unanimous in the view that formers, specifically those with advanced degrees in mental health care, were especially well-positioned to implement exit interventions. Exit worker formers with mental health care degrees stood apart from other exit workers at communicating particularly insightful and thorough case formulations, analyses of supremacism, and intervention approaches. Though advanced degrees are not universal for exit workers, pursuing advanced degrees reportedly supported the exit transformation process and increased resilience to exit work's intensity. Advanced degrees in

mental health care, social services, or public health were said to benefit formers entering the exit field.

Exit worker formers who exclusively provided peer support did not have mental health care degrees. Several peer support formers did have advanced degrees and had taken a variety of relevant formal trainings. Exit worker formers without mental health care degrees were more likely to function within exit programs' administration or other roles primarily and in direct client work on a part time basis.

Personal transformation development also appeared in the data set as a discrepancy between formers. For exit workers, several qualities signaled formers' sufficient transformation from supremacism and increased chances of successful client work and reduced risk for enabling, projection, or retraumatization: time and distance from personal involvement, long investment in personal healing work, deep reflexivity, and effective tools to mitigate vicarious/secondary trauma from clients' similar experiences.

Former-specific challenges also impacted formers' personally or affected exit groups as a whole: the impact of personality traits that attracted formers to supremacist activism on exit group dynamics and client work; increased risk for vicarious trauma and secondary traumatic stress by clients' traumatic content or previous life-style related content; intrusive thoughts following client work; and maladaptive coping with client-material, *e.g.*, relapses into substance abuse.

Exit Worker Non-Formers. It was suggested that some skills involved in exit work (such as credible messenger and making an initial assessment)[48] were more easily acquired by formers, though most participants also endorsed non-formers' effectiveness on the whole. Non-

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[48] See Chapter 10 for definitions of credible messenger and assessment

formers were sparsely represented in the current sample. The case formulations and intervention approaches of the single non-former mental health care professional were compelling, if not as insightful as formers, however non-former non-therapists case formulations and approaches were not well developed. Exit workers pointed out that some personality characteristics (warm, easily connected) compensate for technical skill. The examples appearing in the current data set corroborated their observation and revealed non-former non-therapists to focus primarily on descriptions of alliance and relationship rather than approaches, interventions, and techniques.

Some qualities described by formers as bolstering non-formers' success in exit work included: personal insight into transference and countertransference; comfort/ assertiveness working with individuals who attempt to exert power and control; ability to resist client's antagonism; a belief in redemption; compassion for those who cause harm; firm boundaries; tolerance for regression; and the ability to maintain a non-judgmental approach.

Safety. Safety concerns were described by several exit workers and comprised fears of retaliation from supremacist activist groups, gangs, or criminal organizations; reports of experienced or perceived stigma attached to their role; impacts on mental health, *e.g.*, secondary or vicarious trauma, pervasive fear-related anxiety, burn-out; and, in rare cases, stories of periods where the exit group being described represented a hostile "macho" (G3) work environment.

Vetting potential clients was endorsed as important to provide safety by several exit workers. Online, client-generated risks to exit worker safety included "trolling" (G1), that was said to have diverted time from legitimate interventions and forced unwanted exposure on an exit worker when a fake support phone call was publicized (G1). Additional risks existed for exit workers conducting face-to-face interventions, which required them to be in physical proximity with exit clients.

Gender. The current sample included four women, and the majority of participants were men. In one case an exit worker referred to themselves as "the token woman of [the exit group]" (G1) and how it was both challenging and practically rewarding as it increased their ability to relate to women clients' gender-related trauma in supremacist movements. Another other exit worker related successful experiences connecting with young women in exit work to a shared gender-identity. Of note, three of the four women expressed specific exit work-related fears about safety and the possibility of physical attack while only one man explicitly shared their related anxieties.

Economic Context. As reported in Chapter 10, economic context impacted exit workers' approach to needs assessments which appeared to be related to differences in their capacity to provide assistance. The point relevant to this discussion about exit worker's experiences, is that those in low support contexts showed more signs of strain and burnout compared to exit workers in supportive systems. They became more affectively charged when discussing needs assessments, their voices sometimes raised in volume, and some gestured, shrugged, or shook their heads. With one exception exit workers who had available resources (typically as a result of their country's robust social service sector) rarely appeared burdened by their clients' needs and spent little time discussing them. Here again, these findings suggested meaning in the *absence* of discussion about unmet needs in these contexts.

Overlapping Methods: Supremacism, Organized Crime, and Cults

Returning to a theme of Chapter 7's literature review, exit programs for supremacism, gangs/ organized crime, and cults are interrelated. This notion was supported by the current study's findings. All the exit programs that focused on supremacism, exclusively, had affiliation to "sister projects" (G3) that focused on "organized crime" (G4) or "criminal lifestyle" (G2), and

two of the exit projects also affiliated with groups that work in anti-cult exit. Around a third of the exit workers interviewed were currently or previously working in both settings.

A program manual that was developed early in the developmental history of exit programs deemphasized ideological features of supremacist subjectivity and focused instead on motivation and behavior, describing supremacism as a type of criminality, and drawing parallels between supremacist groups, gangs, and "satanic communities" (G6). A more recent program manual from a peer-support exit group proposed that membership in fringe groups, whether street gang or neo-Nazi group, functions as an addiction to "criminal lifestyles" (G2). The manuals proposed membership in fringe groups to be best understood by deemphasizing the particular ideology and instead identifying the function group membership serves for the individual. Particularly, how did group membership address their unmet needs and psychological difficulties? Common themes were identity formation, status seeking, belongingness, and seeking protection.

Incidents of exit clients who dropped one ideological position and adopted another were provided in support of the view that dogmatic ideologies are related to function more than content. One exit worker recalled a client who exited from a neo-Nazi group and then joined a cult. In another case, an exit client rejected supremacism and then, out of regret for the harm they caused, joined a violent Muslim activist group.

The paralleled experiences of the family and friends of gangs, cults, and supremacists was also used to support the correlation between exit from these groups. In their accounts of family and friend support, clients who believed that were pulling their loved one from a fringe lifestyle were often pushing them deeper in due to enabling or rejecting relational dynamics. In

these cases, exit workers reported that they supported exit by improving the relational skills of the support system.

One exit worker, however, argued that supremacism can only be compared to street gangs and cults in the case of supremacist activism. They highlighted how many supremacists are not affiliated with activism:

Gangs tend to be geographically located, socioeconomically the same, and, you know, they um, tattoo themselves to identify, "yeah I'm in a gang." But, uh, you'd get a lot of the White supremacist population, "well, I don't even call myself White supremacist." You know? They don't. They're resistant to label. That transcends geography, class, uh, all of those things. So, it's very, it's a very different animal so to speak (G1).

For this exit worker, the cultural diffusion of supremacism transcended the typical bounds faced by fringe lifestyles, placing supremacism in a category of its own.

Innovation, Demand, and Funding

The related themes of exit intervention innovation, client demand, and funding concerns are discussed in this section. These themes were present in each group's data set. Substantial overlaps between long-standing organizations' early experiences and more recently established groups' recent histories were notable. Exit programs' developmental trajectories and current stage of intervention innovation are outlined here as they presented in the data set. This section also emphasizes the tensions that emerged in relation to underfunding, expansion, and unmet demands.

Development and Intervention Innovation. Most exit groups in this data set were conveyed as small former-led projects that developed into professionalized organizations later. Exit workers recalled "learning by doing" (G3) and gaining skills and knowledge as they

overcame challenges and grew to meet demand. Some formers attributed the motivation to begin exit work as originating in the lack of existing supports available during their own exit processes. As exit groups developed, one exit worker imparted, the entrance of skilled practitioners improved their methods and increased intervention efficacy. These external and internal pressures impacted intervention innovation, as did exit groups' decisions to change ineffective methods.

A shared sense of doing something no one had done before was communicated often, for instance, in the following example:

We are building the boat as its going out on the water. You know, we're building and running at the same time. We're trying to meet a need in ways that we were not prepared to, so we're thinking about how to prepare ourselves on the way to meeting the need right (G1).

Because no current structure was perceived before them, this exit worker expressed an urgent commitment to working with supremacist clients and innovating effective strategies. This sentiment was linked to the experience of building competence through trial and error endorsed by several exit workers.

The under-development and often unethical implementation of available support during the next contributor's incarceration was linked to their decision to enter mental health care education and later to take up exit work. They rooted the failure of supportive systems to socioeconomic disparities and the limitations of care work within carceral structures:

As a [mental health care field], you're, you're trained to, to challenge the system, like pull it out and see if it works. You know, you look at socioeconomic factors, things like that…And where it ultimately led me was realizing that systems, existing systems, are

broken. The criminal justice system is broken, law enforcement systems are broken, education systems are broken, social service systems are broken… which is what ultimately led to latching onto the research around reentry and realizing, you know, it was there in writing. The federal research through [federal department] discovered that corrections was a major contributing factor in elevated recidivism rates. That *it* was, and for the first time, somebody was saying, "it's not the inmate" (G2).

They saw their life's calling as reforming the systems that had failed them. Their commitment to exit work applied the education they received in the mental health care fields to innovating more effective alternatives.

A frequent sentiment related to exit intervention development was the benefit to exit programs of introducing individuals to mental health education. Exit workers recounted that mental health care professionals provided knowledge about the functioning of social service agencies and intervention skills. This impact on one exit group's trajectory was put this way:

So, I will say that when we originally started, everybody all together, it was a great idea, but nobody knew how to run a nonprofit… So there was always a mix up going on— switching positions, changing titles, you know, figuring out, "oh hey, this area um, requires more than I thought…" When [Colleague] came in, the whole premise behind bringing [them] in, it wasn't just because [they are] a former and a cofounder, it's because [they have] so much experience and so much training beyond what any of us had that we felt, "this is definitely the way we take it in a more professional way, and the way it needs to go" (G1).

When a mental health care professional, former, and co-founder began directing the program, their insight was perceived to streamline the group's daily running.

Another example illustrates the changes introduced to an exit group's structure by a non-former mental health care provider. Two participants recalled this moment in the program's history as a turn toward its development into a reliable social service that provided "therapeutic" (G3) intervention strategies. In the following vignette an exit worker who graduated the exit program illustrates the changes they witnessed when years later they returned as a staff member:

> One of my near colleagues there who was a [specific type] therapist, [they] had 20 years of [specific type] psychotherapy background, so [they] would also help us to kind of professionalize the work, and develop, and just to put it into a therapeutical context where we talk about "clients" and "alliances" and "change…" [They] had trainings in psychodynamic psychotherapy and I think there were a team of psychoanalytic colleagues that [they] worked with.… [They] put it in more of a professional kind of exit setting.

> *So [they] really helped shape [your group]?*

> [They] really did, yeah. [They] put it in more of a professional kind of setting. And I did myself the psychoanalytic psychotherapy training then also.

> *And was that due to [their] influence?*

> For sure. She actually recruited me back and said, "come back and work with us, and we'll look at the therapy training…" (G3).

Adjustments to the exit group's structure and theoretic position as described here, benefitted the group and changed how they implemented interventions.

Innovations to the groups' approaches, interventions, and techniques were reported to have occurred when exit workers self-assessed their groups' outcomes and exit workers' experience and adjusted their strategies accordingly. One exit group reduced their offering of

self-help groups and school presentations and related this decision to clients' benefit and staff's comfort. In their assessment, increased proximity with other formers was a barrier to sustained motivation for exit, because the "macho" (G3) contact triggered cognitive distortions and social problems.

In a more recent innovation, groups opened their caseloads to the loved ones of individuals in destructive fringe lifestyles. Shifting the relational dynamics in their closest relationships, increased the support they received, and was presented as a pull factor that resulted in their questioning of their lifestyle and ideology. In some cases, the loved ones facilitated a connection to exit workers, and the supremacist began associating with exit in the absence of their organic individual motivation. Several exit workers endorsed family and friends approaches to exit work as a highly effective exit innovation breakthrough.

Acceptance and continuing with their mission despite criticism was connected to continued dedication in the final excerpt of this section:

> … and we're just like (shrugs). We're overcoming that… because what we're actually
>
> bringing, like transforming what we're doing . . . right? It just works out" (G1).

The confidence proposed by this statement extended from a commitment to focus on the impact of exit groups to reduce supremacism and transform society. Exit workers described similarly "big picture" commitments as increasing their resilience to criticism while doing controversial, pioneering work.

Expansion and Contraction. Several pressures related to client care and funding concerns were cited as primary reasons for moving away from small grassroots organizations into larger NGO structures. High client demand was a primary motivation for expansion. Exit workers shared that they incurred costs in their innovative pursuits including increased strain and

burnout symptoms. One expert consulted during this study cautioned that groups should be reserved in their expansion until they are stable, which the findings presented by this section also suggest.

Funding was consistently related by participants as increasing exit groups' precarity. For example, several long-standing groups faced reduced income when cultural shifts reduced public and political interest in their services. Groups worldwide operating primarily through state funding reported that budget cutbacks were consistently paired with rightwing administrations. Leftwing administrations also lowered their budgets, in their assessment, if few headlining violent incidents had occurred in recent years. National budget issues and an over-reliance on short-term programming-specific grants also led funding reductions for exit groups, in their estimation. These examples communicated caution in funding-related decisions, and they revealed exit groups' income to be context-dependent and irregular.

Nevertheless, exit workers imparted an urgent need to expand their services in response to high unmet demand. Participants endorsed a deep sense of responsibility to meet the needs of those contacting them for support, yet they were also self-aware that sudden funding issues could detract from their mission. This was expressed by one exit worker like this:

> I have a feeling there's some substantial changes in store for our organization. If we don't change something, we're not gonna be around a whole lot longer. Something really needs to change, and I think part of that will be probably having to sideline some things that we're really passionate about, that we feel are important, but that are not helping us grow right now or get closer to being sustainable. And that's gonna be really difficult because it always feels like we're letting someone down somewhere (G1).

While exit workers frequently discussed financial anxiety, only one participant from a country with a robust social services sector described a strain from clients' unmet needs. In this passage they referenced a reduction in income faced by their exit group during a national recession.

> We had budget cuts… we couldn't take on new clients. It was just: sustain the ones you've got. Can't get new cases. And if you do, you've got no resources for it. The only thing you can invest is time, which is annoying, but it can't be helped…. So I had a client that was out of work and he had huge debts. And during the time we had budget cuts, it was Christmas, and he's got three kids. And I was like, "if I had the fucking budget, I would buy gifts for your kids," and that's also solving practical problems [alliance building] and those are the things that they kind of remember (G3).

This exit worker referred to a client's unmet needs with a similar level of distress often observed in interviews with their colleagues who have operated without the support of robust social service institutions.

In the next example, a long-developed group operated primarily on state allotted funds and responded to funding issues by narrowing its client base. They explained the situation like this:

> People who are, a little bit involved, they move—they go two times or three times to a demonstration. So, it's not our major cowork. So mostly, we would refer this persons to other partners…. We have no resources for this work. And so we—mostly we do refer this cases to social workers and their social environment or whatever (G5).

The exit workers from a newer exit group predicted that increased productivity and expansion would draw interest from large funding bodies such as the state, research groups, and

public interest groups. However, this discussion indicated good reason to be cautious from the experience of long-standing groups; while it may be possible to attract attention and funds initially, investment once did not equate to sustained investment over time.

Exit groups' shared experiences of having less funding than was needed to meet client demand, regardless of their funding source, challenged the assumption that expansion and appeals to large funding bodies would reduce financial precarity. In contrast to this view, growth also increased program's dependence on funders, which may present an ethical dilemma if funders later place demands that compromise a group's mission.

An exit worker described this possibility as a statement of what they were not willing to do to attract funds:

> I think the other thing that I would never do is I would never sell out our mission to chase money. Um, and I've seen that happen before where people start to shift focus or shift mission because they're desperate for income. And I've been the victim of nonprofits that have done that. And then next thing you know, we're not doing anything like we signed up to do . . . The mission is the forefront of decisions that I make (G1).

For a nonprofit organization, being "desperate for income" is another way to say being unable to maintain programming on which clients rely. It may be prudent for exit groups considering expansion to consider the many conflicting compromises that could be presented when the stability of a vast network of client programs relies on financial support to survive.

Counterterrorism or Cultural Therapeutic in Exit

Exit literature frequently represented exit programs as a counterterrorism operation yet exit workers' descriptions of their work in the current data set straddled a somewhat uneasy line between counseling, support, surveillance, and reentry. Drawing from critical analyses of

"extremism," this section reports how the language of counterterrorism appeared in some exit workers' client formulations and ways some exit workers conflated "centrism" and "mainstream" with "ideal." It then reviews several difficulties experienced by some exit programs when working in proximity with counterterrorism departments. This section ends by relaying the relationship between carceral systems and their economic impacts on exit groups.

Counterterrorism Discourses: Extreme Versus Mainstream. Terrorism studies literature tends to frame supremacism as "extreme" or "radical," yet this project's literature review and findings suggested that supremacism is woven into the culture and expressed by many people in dominant groups. "Deradicalization" is a standard yet controversial qualifier used by some exit advocates and a frequent point of attack for exit's critics who argue that deradicalization conflates "centrism," "mainstream" and "ideal/healthy" (Christensen, 2015; Fekete, 2015; Pittinger, 2017).

In this section's findings exit workers promoted conformity to mainstream dominant ideals when discussing client work. Their descriptions uncritically included controversial counterterrorism language: "deradicalization," "terrorism," and "countering violent extremism" (G3). In two interviews, exit workers who uncritically used counterterrorism terminology even more frequently applied the word "normal" when referring to a good or ideal state. Moreover, the same individuals pejoratively used "abnormal" and "strange," reinforcing their idealization of mainstream dominant norms. Further emphasizing the point, "normal" and "abnormal" or their conjugates infrequently appeared in the rest of the data set.

Addressing this last point of emphasis, exit groups and individual exit workers displayed high variability in their adherence to mainstream norms. A few exit workers were critical of the state and were well-versed in literature that provided structural analyses of carceral coercion,

unethical handling of individuals in counterterrorism based on ethnicity/race, and deprioritizing interventions with supremacist activism for Middle Eastern activism. Here, an exit worker verbally expressed their aversion to counterterrorism language due to its association with power abuses and responded to a question regarding what labels they use most to discuss exit work:

> Countering violent extremism. But I wouldn't… I say it because it's quick but and it's a term every—most people are familiar with, but I don't like the term at all … it's been tarnished. Yeah, I think, um, I think CVE has become synonymous with police surveillance, and abuses of the Muslim community (G1).

This exit worker was cautious in their endorsement of censorship and stated that such interventions risked violating individual rights. They continued:

> Once you start down the road of censorship, now someone's a member of a group doing illegal activity like the Klan or whatever, that's still, that's totally different. Um, but where does it, where do you draw that line? … It's a difficult thing to start having to police people's ideas (G1).

This exit worker advocated tolerance for difference and intellectual freedom, and they connected the concepts of "police surveillance" with censorship, qualifying censorship as "police people's ideas" (G1).

These results beg the question of whether counterterrorism language use, *viz*., "deradicalization" is correlated with narratives of "normalcy" and mainstream ideal conformity. Of note, exit workers who referred to supremacist activism as "extremism" did not reflect a normalization effect in the interviews that in any way mirrored the effect found in "deradicalization" laden interviews. Relatedly, the exit worker who problematized deradicalization discourses continued applying its terminology, citing ease of communication.

Proximity to Counterterrorism. Exit workers voiced support for and criticism against counterterrorism institutions. Some exit workers working in proximity to counterterrorism operations experienced stress and strain related to the relationship. They voiced changing expectations in counterterrorism linked to electoral cycles and changes within the state when administrations shift between parties and policies. These frequent changes created strain in exit groups who felt pressured to court counterterrorism operations.

Tensions existing between security agencies introduced an additional complication. One question that emerged from this data set, given exit's goal to create alternative care models, is whether exit workers would benefit from maintaining a clear separation from counterterrorism agencies? This move would avoid the impact of cyclical changes in electoral administration cycles and as noted by a few exit workers, maintain a separation between exit and the state in clients' eyes. Issues of funding, reliance on state-funded research, and the need to ensure client safety contributed to exit groups' proximity to carceral systems and limited their capacity to divest from these relationships.

Exit workers' experiences suggested that funding issues promoted a reliance on carceral structures. Exit groups, even those that are state-funded, reported severe budget cuts at various points through the 2000s, which they related to a shift in counterterrorism emphasis from "right-wing extremism" to "foreign fighters/jihadist extremists" (G3/G5). In one case, that meant a freeze on new clients and reduced support for clients. Funding shifts, as described earlier, were implicated. Additionally, cultural narrative shifts were observed to follow administrations' minimization of supremacism which frequently asserts "the rightwing extremist threat was over" (G2) despite evidence to the contrary.

The post 9/11 shift in global priorities perpetuated by counterterrorism discourses were cited as particularly impactful for exit:

> They geared towards the big threat at, um, Islamic terrorism, and then everybody wanted
>
> to give money to those causes instead (G3).

At the time these interviews were collected, exit groups had not returned to their previous level of funding, and groups reported higher demand than their supply of exit services. Exit groups described implementing self-monitoring public relations strategies geared to appeal to counterterrorism's mold and related their courting of counterterrorism agencies to funding anxiety.

Newly established groups felt the dissonance acutely and had high self-awareness about their efforts to adopt the carceral language and appeal to the state. Several exit workers reported adopting aspects of the state's counterterrorism operations as part of a strategy that hoped to increase their legitimation and result in state funding. Long-established groups did not report their conformity with state expectations as self-reflexively. However, they did describe having to make considerable efforts to reestablish waning relationships with the state at various points in their lifespan to maintain the funding needed to continue functioning.

One group explicitly defined itself apart from carceral frameworks. However, its founder admitted to code-switching in their programming and relayed that their techniques and methods used language that was "[governmental program] friendly," (G2), which reportedly increased their access to provide services to incarcerated clients and gained referrals from probation and parole departments. They said:

> I implemented some of their model components into the language of (our group) because
>
> it doesn't compromise it. It actually just reinforces it. So, you know, we talk about victim

empathy, we talk about pro-social activity or pro-social relationships. That's all

[governmental program acronym] language that I took and incorporated and layered it.

And that's why it's so [governmental program] friendly (G2).

The same group avoids integrating governmental frameworks into members' self-identity. Their

manual labels members as "formers" and views carceral identification as connected to shame and

guilt:

If shame and guilt can be said to drive the forces that bind us to insanity how wise is it to

associate shame and guilt with the foundation of our change and recovery? We leave

the world of self-proclaimed and institutional labels such as criminal and addicts and

embrace the title of Former. We move from the static position of living with a problem to

the dynamic state of asset building through change and recovery (G2 manual).

The manual referred to distancing from carceral frameworks as a central aspect of transformative

change and personal transformation.

Exit workers echoed the relative benefits and drawbacks of maintaining relationships

with the state reflected in exit literature. They described a general lack of trust in carceral

systems from their groups' staff, clients, and the general public. One participant put it this way:

I think as a brand, um, it just brings up mistrust and um, and that's the perception (G1).

This exit worker framed the absence of investment to reduce supremacism as, essentially,

promoting supremacism when they stated:

I think it's also a signal from states, you know? Do you sponsor this type of project? Do

you? Or organizations. Do you invest in this time? Do you want your citizens to

actually be able to come back, or do you promote people to be there? So, do you want to

invest in, in in organizations to help people come back to society or, or do you promote

the people are in (pause) in those type of environments. And that's quite a (long pause)

It's a difference" (G3).

Several organizers had a felt sense of tension and competition between government agencies and across administrations. Unlike criticisms levied against exit groups, working with exit groups did always protect clients, such as in the following case relayed by an exit worker who described that a client was sanctioned after being transparent in their work with an exit group,

Like this guy is homeless. Um, his community has shunned him because he was highlighted as a White supremacist. And I, when I say shun, I mean shun. The fact that we were helping him was used against him in child family court, even though I went to court with him to support him, um, they said, well, "you must be a serious offender if [G1] is in your life," like instead of giving them credit for being involved with us. They pinged him for it, and, and uh, I don't know (exasperated sigh; G1).

This groups' relationship with the state was portrayed as stressful, relating to participants' sense that state agencies are competitive with nongovernmental organizations.

To balance the benefits and drawbacks of state counterterrorism, exit groups frequently relied on negotiation techniques, whereby they resisted efforts to become intelligence agents and, whether consciously or not, made their negotiations plain. Recall the exit worker who referred to their group as a branch of CVE, and then undid their pronouncement in the same breath just before reasserting its use for ease of communication. Another participant recited the exact mandated reporting policy in their location and discussed this policy with clients. Here they negotiate their willingness to report only in the case of violent harm to others:

> If we had a case like someone will tell me there's a, um, terrorist act in two weeks, and he
>
> don't want to speak with the police, and whatever. I don't know. I think at least I would
>
> say okay, then it's my job to do this. Sorry for it (G5).

One group negotiated the pressure to give the state client information by limiting, within legal

limitations, what client information they documented.

Though exit groups are an extension of counterterrorism operations, several of the exit

workers in this data set voiced hopefulness that their work can effect change on a meta-cultural

scale, what this project calls a "culturally therapeutic" change. They aspired to contribute to

community policing efforts, reducing police violence, and reducing police bias that benefits

supremacists. Several exit organizers also described how their work offers a transformation

model based on connection and support rather than punitive reactions to human mistakes.

Though some participants minimized the role of supremacism in the military, policing, and the

carceral system, others were well versed in the available literature on this problem and described

a vision of exit that reduces the emphasis on carceral frameworks, thus reducing the capacity of

supremacists working within the carceral system to cause harm.

Compared with the state, exit groups shifted their approaches from coercive to voluntary,

punishment to support, and zero-tolerance to low barrier support, which has been highlighted as

possibly accounting for a higher percentage of successful outcomes in supremacist exit reported

by NGOs than are reported by the state (Bjorgo & Horgan, 2009; Demant et al., 2008; Koehler,

2017a). Though other factors may be at play, such as reduced ability to monitor and potential

manipulation, supremacist exit groups' intentional shift away from carceral frameworks could be

accounting for successful exit outcomes, and this possibility deserves further examination.

A potential alternative framework is provided by "models of care" which situate exit groups within mental health care rather than the carceral apparatus.

Summary and Conclusions

This chapter focused on exit workers' roles, types of exit programs, exit groups' development and intervention innovation, and the interplay between exit groups and carceral institutions. This section emphasized the work-related stressors inherent to exit work and suggested the need to further investigate supporting exit staffs' unique experiences. The results also suggested an association between types of exit groups for supremacism, gangs, and cults, as well as the difference introduced by supremacism's high prevalence in society.

Several questions remain unanswered about how exit programs can best be structured to reduce existential and financial precarity, and these questions complicate exit groups' complicated proximity to counterterrorism. The next chapter considers exit from a broader view by examining structural narratives and interventions offered by exit workers toward this project's goal to develop "structural formulations" of supremacism.

Chapter 12: Structural Formulations from exit Workers

Chapter 12 follows Metzl and Hansen's (2013) suggestion to replace "cultural formulations" (p. 126) with structural formulations and reports exit workers' articulation of supremacism's transmission, structural forces, and structural interventions. It expands the scope of interrogation relating to exit workers' contributions to exit from cultural supremacism.

The analyses presented here responded to these research questions: What is the impact on supremacism of a society's institutions? What barriers exist to sustainable cultural and structural exit from supremacism? What interventions have promising outcomes for cultural and structural exit from supremacism? How can psychologists intervene on the structural forces that have

maintained supremacism over time?

Structural Competency in Exit

Overall, the results in this section indicate that the relationship between socioeconomic conditions, client outcomes, exit worker strain, and the impact of a program's proximity to social welfare systems and public safety nets has been underrepresented in exit literature. In response to this literature gap, this section contributes to structural competence in exit work by addressing the impact of economic forces on exit.

Infrastructural Impacts on Clients and Practitioners. One of the most striking findings to emerge from the data was a sentiment expressed by several exit workers that client outcomes diminished as a consequence of compromised socioeconomic circumstances. Exit workers connected client financial instability to unmet basic needs, re-engagement, substance abuse, or, in most cases, some combination of these factors. Their vignettes illustrated clients who lacked safety, food, clothing, shelter, medical insurance, legal representation, mental health care treatment, and substance abuse treatment. Moreover, in the analysis of these excerpts, the additional challenges introduced when working with clients impacted by material deprivation appeared to play a critical role in bringing about exit workers' demand-related stress, efficacy-related anxiety, and a felt-sense of helplessness.

To reiterate an earlier related finding, substance abuse and suicidality were mentioned more frequently and discussed for a longer duration by exit workers servicing areas not supported by robust social welfare systems. One exit worker referenced "suicide by despair" (G1) and cited research linking increased suicide rates to working-class White men in the United States.

In a few cases, clients' dire economic strain compelled an exit program to provide

material needs, which occurred despite the exit program's staff being comprised largely of unpaid volunteers. As one exit worker said:

> You know, sometimes we need to go see formers, sometimes formers need assistance that you know we might dig in our pockets to try to assist them with. Um, I had a guy who was not eating or drinking, you know, and we got, we got him some food (G1).

Another person from the same organization proposed a connection between clients' outcomes and access to resources like this:

> You know, for some of our clients, we're happy if they, if they go into nonviolent ways of dealing with conflicts... You know, that's, that's the minimum. And you know, that might be good enough for our work because it's so much damage and trauma and things. We simply cannot, you know, we don't have the resources or mandate to work with it, but we would at least, you know, say that as a minimum. Whereas other people who have more resources or come from other, other backgrounds, we would, we would you know expect more types of change from them (G1)…

In contrast, exit workers reported that clients' economic stability predicted positive exit outcomes. One long-time exit worker from a country with a strong social welfare system also serves as a consultant to exit programs worldwide. Comparing exit work in countries without strong social welfare systems, such as the United States, to groups with strong social welfare systems, such as many in Europe and Northern European states, they had this to say:

> I think the difference also between [country with strong social welfare system] and [a country without strong social welfare programs] is [strong social welfare system] has a very well or, you know, fairly well-developed social systems. So, when we work with clients um and you know somebody needs to move because they're threatened there is

resources from social authorities, the police would go in and help, you know, somebody would take at least some of the costs and pay for it. Whereas my understanding, at least from distance [a country without strong social welfare programs], this is not the case. It's going to be much more difficult to find somebody who will actually pay for these type of interventions, which also then leads to, I mean, either we develop a system where we have this type of resources in our organization. I think that's gonna be difficult. It sounds like it's going to be very resource craving, or we help to, to develop a program where we support individuals, um, more more doing it themselves (Expert 1).

A striking observation that developed in the analysis of these results was the trend linking exit workers' work-related stress, higher interview prevalence of substance abuse and suicidality, and exit programs' economic context. Exit programs in nation-states with strong social welfare systems often responded to questions about clients' basic needs in the early stages of exit by describing their country's social welfare system. Those from countries without well-developed public services described clients' unmet basic needs as sources of organizational stress and barriers to positive exit outcomes. Though the countries' overall wealth was comparable, the economic supports available for struggling individuals differed considerably.

Structural Impacts on Programming. Programs in countries with social safety nets are still vulnerable to budget cuts and there were some suggestions that cuts predictably occurred when rightwing parties were in office. As described previously, after the priority of counterterrorism (and funding) shifted to Middle Eastern activism post 9/11, caseloads froze in one exit group that relied heavily on government-issued grants. Similarly, exit groups' reliance on financing from carceral institutions appeared to exacerbate the precarity of funding sources, as temporary grants followed the priorities of the security sector and required exit groups to fold

effective programming when the funding dried up.

Another funding-related programming change was a shift in the exit intervention model of some groups. A few exit workers reported that the graduate-to-peer-support track was considerably reduced in their group, and clients rarely became peer-support volunteers in the current program structure. Though the peer support and graduation models have been upheld as an important part of supremacist exit programs by the RAN (2016) exit working groups, exit workers indicated that funding stream issues dictated actual programming. This observation was made by one or more participants representing each exit group sample interviewed, even in countries with consistent state funding.

The examples in this section highlight the economic struggles of exit groups, particularly related to economic policies that weaken social welfare systems, fiscally conservative political administrations, and priority shifts in counterterrorism. This project also found exit programs across the board to report underfunding such that their capacity does not meet client demand whether or not they are receiving state funding. These findings suggest that clients' economic precarity increased exit workers' work-related stress and reduced exit interventions' long-term outcomes. Further research is necessary to explore the strengths and limits of these connections.

Public Forums and Representation

This section describes several scenarios related to supremacism in public forums or content representation, as it related to intervention, prevention, and counter-recruitment. These findings suggested strategies for avoiding unnecessary and potentially harmful interactions with supremacists in public forums, where interventions occur outside a preexisting relationship, rely on representation (rather than connection), and are targeted toward a general audience or passively receptive individuals. For the exit workers who discussed this intervention strategy,

this counter-productive situation appeared to reduce the potential for positive outcomes since audiences' reception cannot be predicted.

This section addresses the concept of reception relative to intention and suggests some insights to avoid accidentally catalyzing deeper ideological identification or inadvertently colluding with supremacists' recruitment strategies.

Audience-Focused Representations. While a minority of exit workers mentioned representation-based interventions (media, historical atrocity site, museum) they all agreed that these strategies have a better chance of success and are less likely to cause harm if care is taken to center the intervention's reception by the audience rather than the intention of those implementing it. Predicting audience reception was described as challenging. With a new client or with a public audience, information has to come from another source.

Audience members are likely to have various perspectives, and as one exit worker argued, the interventions' goals, the target audience, and the intervention strategy should be well-developed to prevent interventions from having effects opposite to what was intended. They recommended getting as much previous knowledge about the intended audience as possible to maximize potential success. Specifically, they assess their flexibility and the types of messages they might be open to.

It was suggested that an interventions' effectiveness changes depending on the audience's identity. Some alluded to an information filter that impacts individuals with fixed identities, so they perceive information in rigid schemas that confirm rather than disrupt existing perceptions. With potentially supremacist audiences, this could result in an intervention "backfiring" (G3).

From two instructive examples—film and encounters with past atrocities— an exit worker illustrated the themes in this section through observations of loved ones and youth

mentors who poorly implemented well-meaning interventions. The first vignette, below, discussed showing films, *viz*., Schindler's List and American History X, as a counter-recruitment intervention:

> Show them Schindler's List. There are individuals that's going "go play on the phone" when they don't want to see shit. If they're inclined to radicalism… when something bad is happening to a Nazi, then they're going to go [makes popping sound, looks down at phone] "I'm going to zone out." They can choose what they want. … American History X? They go, 'cuuuurb stooooomping!' [cheering] … after that, when he starts learning to know the guy in jail, they're laughing… [click sound, gestures away] Have we radicalized them further? Probably. Is the message with the movie not that? Yeah. So, I mean, there's no movie that you can show anyone that goes, 'this is the truth' (G3).

Whether Holocaust hero histories or violent Nazi redemption stories contributed to prevention work or further instigated supremacism was viewed as dependent on the audience's reception rather than on the quality of the representation. They explained, supremacist audience members can shift their attention and ignore messages that disrupt their worldview, so the intervention reinforces existing perceptions regardless of the intervention's intention. One cannot individually address each audience member, the exit worker emphasized, so predicting the audience's likely reception offers at least a meager hope for preventing ideological reinforcement.

In the next example a type of exposure subjected at-risk youth to historical artifacts of atrocity. Once again, representation was the basis of intervention, and the interventions' reception determined its effectiveness. They indicated this intervention to be a common misstep by concerned adults:

> Parents, teachers, social workers, youth leaders, police, whatever. We say, "If you are

worried about something, call us. We'll help you out." [to the caller] "How are you going to address this?" "Ohhh, you're going to drag this person into Auschwitz?" "Ok. Yeah. Ummm . . . that's some valid information to have, but it might not be the best way to deradicalize people if they're not susceptible to it." [back to me] Because it, you have to make the analysis—is this person ready for this or not? And how are they going to? We let people go to Auschwitz and they say, "Yeah, that was real horrible but that was necessary." Okay, did you solve any problems? Is this person less radical? No. He's more convinced. And you just used the biggest card you had (G3).

The exit worker noted that atrocity representations are potentially useful in intervention work. However, the effectiveness depended on the receiver's perceptual filter. The relational dynamics between those involved also contributed to intervention outcomes. If there is antagonism and someone must be "dragged" to a representation-based intervention, their perception will almost certainly be filtered through antagonism and less receptive.

The Free Speech Debate. In the United States, whether or not individual supremacists are entitled to appear in public forums, *e.g.,* media appearances, public debates, and social media, is debated by media personnel, human rights experts, scholars, and policymakers (Wermiel, 2018). The controversy has several sides. Some debate whether blacklisting supremacists from public forums is anti-democratic (Wermiel, 2018). There are several pertinent questions in this debate: Are supremacist ideologies included in free speech protections? If free speech protections extend to supremacist speech, are all arenas that promote democratic ideals obliged to include them? Does withholding invitations from public forums violate free speech?

Another quandary is the question of effective intervention. Does including supremacists in mass media conversations, public debates, or public interviews serve as prevention work by

raising awareness? Conversely, does supremacist inclusion play into supremacist recruitment strategies, proliferate supremacist ideologies, or legitimize supremacist groups?

Exit workers described several considerations to hold when determining the relationship between censorship, democratic values, and the ethics of free speech related to supremacists appearing on public platforms. Their experience in supremacist milieus, uniquely contributed a supremacists' perspective to the free speech debate. As suggested by one exit worker, the goals supremacists are seeking to further when advocating for their rights, are more likely related to promoting their cause than democratic values. While anecdotal, exit workers' viewpoints illustrate a relationship between public platforms and supremacist organizing that may not otherwise be apparent to non-formers.

These first points are related to the platform's goals, the goals of supremacist groups, and the actual versus the desired outcome. Returning to the discussion outlined in the previous section, the gulf between intention and reception poses challenges for interventions. The purpose of a platform may not align with its actual impact. Supremacists organizing through public appearances were reportedly well-versed in their opponents' arguments, attempted to predict their audiences, and were prepared to instrumentalize the likely talking points to their advantage. As one interviewee explained, there are multiple ways to interpret a debate's outcome, and supremacists try to win from every angle.

An exit worker's personal history within supremacist movements mirrored some others when they reported their strategic approach to recruitment. They recalled altering their aesthetic to assimilate into the mainstream and rejecting outward markers of supremacist milieus:

[About visually marked supremacists] They like to scare people. But they're not going to accomplish anything…. They're not gonna change society…. No one in the general

public is gonna listen to them … if we dressed normally, grew our hair out a bit, got

sneakers instead of boots … everyone thought that I was being deradicalized. But I was

not. I was being more radicalized (G3).

In this recollection, downplaying their intentions increased their capacity to proliferate their

message since they were not visibly affiliated with a supremacist group. As predicted, their

strategy succeeded, and they gained access to public platforms. Ideologically, they were more

rigidly supremacist, yet they could reach a wider audience. They also reported speaking in layers

of meaning, intending to simultaneously attract susceptible recruits and fly underneath the

general public's radar.

The exit worker suggested that a pyrrhic victory is a best-case scenario in public debates

with supremacists. They explained that there are two key audiences at stake in public debates:

the supremacist debater and audience members vulnerable to recruitment. The counter-

recruitment of the individual being debated, and the counter-recruitment of the audience were

portrayed as mutually exclusive. To win one was to lose the other. Yet the debater's rigid

ideology and agenda limits their reception and the likelihood of perspective change. They offered

a vignette that illustrated why debating a supremacist in a public forum is unlikely to change

their mind:

He finds himself in a situation, "If I say no this, I'm not a Nazi. If I say yes to this, I'm not

a Nazi." Because the views are usually contradictory at some point. So, it's not based on

what I've been saying. It's been based on what he's been saying for an hour-and-a-half. So

that happens. He looks at me and he goes, "You might know more than me about Nazis. I

don't give a fuck. You're brainwashed by the Jews. And you can go to hell." …So what

happens with that guy? Okay. He leaves. What are his views now? He met a race traitor.

That's me. That promotes democracy. That just made him . . . who shamed him. He feels

stupid, ashamed, not prepared enough.

Like he didn't know his own beliefs enough.

Know his own fucking beliefs. He's going to go home and study. Next time a person

takes him on, he's prepared.

So, what could you have done differently? You said he came to you looking for a debate.

Let him, let him throw the last punch. Walk away. With that discussion technique, of—

of—mm, two people having a facts discussion, that's not really based on, "I'm gonna

change your mind." That's based on the Greek philosophy, you know, two agitators

discussing to win a prize…. If I had 22 listeners that were thinking about becoming Nazi.

I might have won the crowd. But I lost him (G3).

Here, the exit worker demonstrated that allying with a supremacist during a debate requires

focusing more on relating than winning and gives the appearance of having a relatively weaker

position. Centering the alliance in this circumstance could mean conceding a win to the

supremacist, and thus increasing their attractiveness to vulnerable audience members. On the

other hand, winning the debate reduces the supremacists' attractiveness to the types of audience

members susceptible to recruitment, and thus reduces recruitment efficacy. It also alienates the

supremacist and reduces the potential for an individual intervention. Finally, winning encourages

the supremacist fortifying their arguments and strengthening their position.

Taken together, these results disagree with a vein of liberal discourse promoting universal

access to public podiums as a democratic principle. Conversations about censorship sometimes

conflate exclusion from invitations and rejection of applications with censorship and

misunderstand that actively platforming supremacism is not upholding free speech.

Media Coverage of Hate Crimes. How media coverage after a large-scale violent attack impacts supremacist violence is another media debate. Responding to the past decade's rash of supremacist mass murders targeting people of color, women, and religious groups, including several during this study, several exit workers supported media coverage of supremacists' violence. They explained that media coverage encourages realistic views of supremacist violence and support for exit programs.

Participants in almost every group described encountering, at some point, the cultural narrative that "racism is over" (G3) or "in the past" (G1). As one exit worker said:

> And then, at some point also the nobody wanted to sponsor [our group] anymore because people claimed that the, um, um, rightwing extremist threat was over, you know, and now it's really, the issues really begin again with rightwing extremism. When [exit worker's name], he knew it all the time, you know (G3).

This view was echoed by another informant who stated that the accurate reporting of supremacist violence increased cultural interest in exit interventions which resulted in influxes of donations to the exit program. Another mentioned increased volunteer interest following an incident:

> And I think that's what drove us going viral and drove those donations because people saw what happened in [location of violent attack], and then they're reading that our government is not only doing nothing about White supremacy, organized White supremacy, they're ignoring it (G1).

The comment below illustrates that media coverage of violence increased defection:

> But then (G3) started really to work and there were lots of people who, um, were young neo-Nazis who turned to and wanted help to leave the movement. Especially after this. Because, you know, it made them, this horrific incident, sort of made people's conscious

come forward, you know (G3)?

These results are contrary to some opinions that describe media coverage of hate crimes as sensationalism (Warren-Gordan, 2018). Rather, participants described media coverage as having a positive effect on cultural narratives and exit work.

Single-Encounter Presentation Interventions

An exit worker weighed in on discussions about diversity training and shared their skepticism that single-encounter public presentation interventions effectively address supremacist narratives or reliably achieve prevention and counter-recruitment goals. In their experience implementing public presentation interventions, they presented topics related to their former supremacist activism. As they evaluated the efficacy of their efforts, they identified several barriers to their intended outcomes: the single-encounter structure, host indifference, hosts' structural limitations, and lack of clear follow-up procedures.

Insufficient protocol for clear follow-up between the audience and the exit worker was a barrier to successful outcomes:

> Sometimes you get people that were—that were vulnerable, that were in like, a similar situation that I was in when I was a kid. You'd open a hole. I'm like, "Sorry, I'm here for 45 minutes. I gotta go" (G3).

Though they offered audience members an invitation to contact the exit group, the single-encounter structure reduced the likelihood that audience members who were vulnerable to ideological thinking received support.

Hosts who invited exit workers to present out of obligation rather than genuine interest in intervention and prevention work created another barrier.

> The problem in [country] is that we have these theme days that are like, "Okay, so this is

theme-based with the Holocaust or something about Nazism." So, you call someone in, and they do what they do…. But that's more like, "Can you sign this waiver that we as a school has done this work?" Sure, I'll sign it. But have we done any real change? No. It's not sustainable. I'm like, "I could open up the door, but you have to work from there." And that takes time. And if they don't reinforce it, I don't know how we get results (G3).

After 20 years of such presentations, the exit worker concluded that audiences who perceived low leadership investment did not take presentations seriously when given under these circumstances:

But the thing that really struck me is how many times I got questions from kids that were, "Have you ever killed anyone?" I was like, "You're not getting the point." If they want to get some action movie, they're not here for good reasons (G3).

In response, the exit worker developed narrow criteria for conducting single-encounter presentations for counter-recruitment or prevention.

They cautioned that exit programs should accept invitations to implement single-encounter public programming only when the host plans to independently reinforce the messages and follow up with a supportive framework for change work in addition to the presentation. To reduce the barriers to this interventions' efficacy, they recommended pre-planning with the host during the intake call, building on the host's independent efforts, and finally, having a protocol to follow up and connect with vulnerable audience members.

Dehumanization in Enforcement Agencies

The dehumanization principle's creator suggested that dehumanization is produced in enforcement contexts, such as carceral[49] institutions. They drew from experience as former and

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[49] Carceral includes the military due to its role in policing domestic and international conflicts.

military personnel and explained that the mechanism underlying supremacists' dehumanization creates similarly distorted thinking in enforcement institutions.

The dehumanization principle (black-and-white thinking + distance = dehumanization; BW + D = Dh), as it is applied here, recalls discussions of carceral violence reviewed in Chapter 8. The comment below illustrates how this principle functioned in a military setting:

Yeah. So, distance is basically, "How do I distance myself from other individuals in this world?" And if you have the three thought patterns that [pause] "Okay, so everyone is bad to me that's not part of my group, and I have a lot of distance to other human beings" that [pause] "Okay, we don't have anything in common.'" You can see this in the armed forces, too. When they do horrific crimes against the civilian public. "Okay, so these people are enemy, um, we have zero in common with this er general public. They have strange cultural behaviors. They live in mud huts… They have strange clothes. They have strange hygiene… Um, you know, strange beards. They sound strange." …so some of the armed conflicts, the troops would go, they'd, they'd go through the radicalized thought patterns … and that fills a purpose if you're in a combat zone because you have to do quick decisions… And also, in order to not feel anxiety towards people I might have to enforce on, I need to have distance to them. If I have to shoot someone at a roadblock or something, I need to think that these are not my kind of people (G3)….

In the dehumanization principle's cultural application, polarized thinking began when soldiers internalized a cultural narrative of "the enemy," "everyone is bad," and "we have nothing in common." Soldiers then focused on the differences between themselves and others and maintained physical distance with roadblocks and combat zone segregation. Physical and mental distance and seeing others as "enemy" removed psychological barriers to murder.

Individuals in power positions can apply the dehumanization principle to an enhanced level by controlling others' physical bodies. Here they focused on dehumanization:

And you can do dehumanization physically and mentally too…. If you look at the Holocaust, they're like, "Oh, they're cockroaches…." You can use er, an animal trait… Um, physically, in order to not make anyone feel like they look human. If you can rob someone of human traits, arms, legs, it doesn't look like a human form anymore. Uh, if you can remove eyes, uh, if you can remove hair. If you can put someone in a uniform. Let's say the Holocaust. We've got zebra patterns (motions up and down). It doesn't look like individuals anymore. It looked like a clump of flesh. That's physical dehumanization… So, if you have these three thought patterns, you can do horrible things towards others without feeling remorse or anxiety (G3)…

In this excerpt, the strategies outlined correlated with techniques used in a variety of carceral settings. They gave the example of striped clothing during Holocaust death camps, and yet their description transposes onto prisoners' jumpsuits. Erasing human traits recognizability, mentally or physically, dehumanized them into a "lump of flesh," eliminating remorse and anxiety from violence, murder, or, extending their application, genocide.

When carceral systems encourage the dehumanization principle, there are intrinsic costs to their employees and broader society, which the exit worker described this way:

And the military's kinda good at this… But that's also the problem with having people coming out of war and not being debriefed out of war because they use these thought patterns as veterans, and that's why they kill themselves.

That's right. My family has a lot of military. My mom's side. And my cousins. When they get out, they're really lonely.

Yeah. And they're like. They're distanced to others. And they're trying to make use of a

world, for a world where three weeks ago you were being shelled or somebody shot at

you. And now you're sitting at like a social group which goes, "Are we going to have

light blue or blue on the public restrooms?" You go, "This does not apply to my world"

(G3).

They formulated veterans as suffering from the same struggles to reintegrate into society as

formers. When they attempt to return to less ideological contexts, they feel alienated. Black and

white thinking and distance from others[50] inhibits connection and is thus a risk factor for

dehumanizing others. The dehumanization and violence occurring across the carceral institutions

and the many instances of carceral agents enacting violent bigotry or neglect may also be

attributed to this cognitive, emotional, and physiological process.

Increased Oversight to Reduce Bias in Carceral Institutions

An exit worker with a background in incarceration reform described their history working

to reduce carceral institutions' biases. Before entering exit work, they reportedly innovated and

implemented policies and procedures that removed subjectivity from a measurably biased

carceral institution. Their history catalyzed an interview discussion, wherein they consulted

about the 2006 FBI report exposing White supremacist infiltration into law enforcement (Jones,

2015).

In response to a question about supremacists working in enforcement positions, this exit

worker hypothesized that the innovation they established in a carceral institution worked to

provide inmates official protection from bias despite supremacists' employment in the carceral

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[50] This assessment connects to the work of Belew (2018) and Lindahl (2017a), who reported veterans' high levels of recruitment into supremacist groups.

system. Their approach involved several interventions, including carceral agents' mandatory use of the Motivational Interviewing (MI)[51] approach, monitoring systems ensuring agents' fidelity to the model, and non-subjective assessments. MI was used to communicate with all parties at every level, including communicating with power holders and gaining intervention buy-in. The model described centered oversight and included frequent audits of agents' adherence to the use of non-subjective assessments, which in turn, was proposed to increase the likelihood that agents were unbiased in their decisions. The comment below illustrates the model:

I didn't use MI just with the clients. I used MI with the community, and we, we have to use MI on all of those high-level partners too … I didn't go to [carceral agency] and say the research shows that um, "your practices and supervision are actually the number one reason why recidivism is so high?" You know, we really took a, we took a lot of steps to really make sure that the system and the [carceral] community responded to the research that we had done. And because, [carceral agency] was like one of the top two driving factors that increased revocation or recidivism … we had to get community buy in. Law enforcement and getting all the probation and parole trained in MI across the state. Getting them to move from subjective assessments to um, uh, to evidence-based assessments. Things that had been vetted out, you know? Taking subjectivity away from uh determination of risk levels and revocation. So now you have to validate it, so that we all have the same language and expectation of how we're going to approach the person. Um, so that no one's ramrodding any of these people shaming, guilting….

Do you think they would keep following the policy when no one was looking?

Um, and that's why it's important to partner with people who will evaluate and monitor

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[51] See Chapter 11: Approaches for a full description of the motivational interviewing approach.

progress, because you're really trying to evaluate fidelity to the model (G2)

This exit worker emphasized that in institutional environments, mandates, evaluation, and

monitoring are necessary to ensure adherence to equitable models. They mandated motivational

interviewing communication (non-judgmental, non-directive approaches) for use by carceral

agents with inmates, as well as non-subjective assessments. They suggested this model as one

way of protecting individuals from White supremacist carceral agents who were reported by the

FBI to have infiltrated law enforcement.

Summary and Conclusions

The structural formulations offered by exit workers in this chapter contributed to this

project's conceptualization of supremacism's transmission within cultural narratives. Institutions,

systems of power, and dominant trends in cultural narratives are implicated in supporting

supremacism. Exit workers views provided a unique perspective to current debates on public

interventions, which furthered this project's goal of developing structural interventions and

structural competencies.

Chapter 12 then discussed two elements functioning in carceral institutions. These results

suggested a pathway toward developing interventions for dehumanization to reduce the negative

impacts of supremacist bias in carceral settings.

Part 3's interview data set contributed to the larger project's goals of developing practice-

based conceptualizations for supremacism and documenting exit interventions for psychologists.

These provide templates and potential strategies for treating client-generated supremacism, as

well as offering some cautionary tales related to the experiences that may emerge for

practitioners working with supremacists. These findings indicated that psychologists effectively

working with exit from cults, in addiction work, and with members of street gangs have many of

the tools necessary for successfully addressing client-generated supremacism.

Part 3 also explored exit program's position within counterterrorism and control society, and how exit diverges from typical security agencies. These results also provided important insights into the interactions between social safety nets, economic disenfranchisement, and treatment outcomes with supremacism. Finally, Part 3 provided several unique approaches to structural interventions for addressing supremacism and suggested that those intervening with individuals are also well-positioned to contribute important insights to structural interventions.

Part Four: Culturally Therapeutic Approaches to Supremacism

Up to now, this text covered three key aspects of culturally therapeutic approaches to supremacism: formulation, intervention, and intervention outcomes. In the process of formulating supremacism[52] the analysis revealed White supremacist Christian heteropatriarchy to be the dominant form of supremacism perpetuated by individuals and infrastructure in the United States as well as Western Europe. It also demonstrated, through cross-cultural and historic examples, that supremacism's discrimination categories are adaptable and culturally specific.

The project's review of intervention models revealed that many approaches compartmentalized their focus to one of several common sites: individual-generated supremacism, institution-generated supremacism, or infrastructural supremacism. Yet historic examples demonstrated that successful cultural change occurred when it integrated each of these sites simultaneously. For an example, we can refer to the increases in status European immigrants experienced following the reformers' work to change the minds of individual community members, reform economic access, and institute carceral protections as demonstrated in Chapter 6 by Muhammad (2019). In a second example, transposed results were achieved when the Reagan administration's application of this approach produced the disenfranchisement of Black Americans (Kendi, 2016; Nunn, 2002).

The principle theoretical implication of this study is that culturally therapeutic approaches to supremacism will almost certainly require the simultaneous implementation of individual and structural interventions. In accordance with this analysis, each of Part 4's chapters model the components of a culturally therapeutic approach to– individual and structural—in an actionable intervention workbook format and integrate previous intervention literature alongside

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[52] This formulation is proposed most completely in Chapter 9.

the study's field data with exit workers. Together, they provide a culturally therapeutic and exit-informed approach to addressing supremacism.

Chapter 13. An Exit-Informed Model for Treating Client-Generated Supremacism

Chapter 13 provides an "exit-informed" model for addressing client-generated supremacism which integrates exit workers' intervention experience reflecting decades of accumulated implementation experience and relevant literature spanning 80 years, however sparse. Practical treatment concerns are the model's central focus—clinician competence, case formulation, assessment, diagnosis, and intervention. Conclusions about questions of theoretical importance thematic to the text, for example regarding personality theory, variations in supremacists' presentations, *viz.,* intersectionality, and the ethical responsibility of psychologists contributed to the formation of these recommendations.

Competence in Exit-Informed Interventions

2.01 Boundaries of Competence

(a) Psychologists provide services, teach, and conduct research with populations and in areas only within the boundaries of their competence….

(b) Where scientific or professional knowledge in the discipline of psychology establishes that an understanding of factors associated with… race, ethnicity, culture, national origin… is essential for effective implementation of their services or research, psychologists have or obtain the training, experience, consultation, or supervision necessary to ensure the competence of their services…

(c) Psychologists planning to provide services, teach, or conduct research involving populations, areas, techniques, or technologies new to them undertake relevant education, training, supervised experience, consultation, or study.

(d) When psychologists are asked to provide services to individuals for whom appropriate mental health services are not available and for which psychologists have not obtained the competence necessary, psychologists with closely related prior training or experience may provide such services…if they make a reasonable effort to obtain the competence required by using relevant research, training, consultation, or study… (APA, 2017, p. 5)

In line with the field's commitment to specific ethical standards and practices, this intervention model begins with psychologists' ethical obligation to demonstrate competence in practice (APA, 2017). The APA (2017) ethical standard 2.01 Boundaries of Competency excerpted above, made clear that the need for competence sometimes precedes standards of practice. This is the case with training models for client-generated supremacism.

Clinical literature emphasized the need for practitioners to develop an awareness of their identities in relation to hegemonic power and assessment of their motivations for treating client-generated supremacism (Bartoli & Pyati, 2009; Drustrup, 2020). Likewise, for many exit workers, minding one's counter-transference and assessing internal reactions was an important aspect of establishing appropriate boundaries with supremacist clients. Due to the likelihood for client-generated supremacism to arouse intense reactions in the clinician, competence, training, and consultation are vital to the successful implementation of exit-informed practices.

This section addresses the current literature gap by providing competency benchmarks[53] to prepare psychologists for implementing exit-informed interventions. These suggestions integrated exit workers' practical knowledge, as represented in the current study's findings and previous literature.

Exit-informed Intervention Competence. Before implementing interventions for client-

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[53] Organized using the American Psychological Association's Competency Benchmarks (2012).

generated supremacism, psychologists should demonstrate competence related to individual supremacist presentations, supremacist institutional practices, and cultural supremacism within the following domains: reflective practice and self-assessment skills; education; assessment; intervention; and appropriate consultation. These represent benchmarks of competence for addressing supremacism:

Reflective Practice/ Self-Assessment.

1. Develops identity and social status awareness, including intergenerational history of social status, trauma, and poverty.

2. Assesses and manages reactions to supremacist material, *e.g.,* avoidance, guilt, intervention goals, transference, and countertransference.

3. Practices reflective self-assessment about biases.

4. Demonstrates comfort/assertiveness with relational power and control, including holding firm boundaries.

5. Identifies and creates strategies for managing fear/anxiety responses.

   (Bartoli & Pyati, 2009; Helms, 1997; Mbroh et al., 2019; Menakem, 2017; Pratto & Stewart, 2012; Sue & Sue, 2015; Thompson & Neville, 1999)

Education:

1. Engages in personal education about supremacism's impacts and structural oppression.

2. Identifies adherence to and tendencies to remain silent with regards to structural and cultural supremacism norms and narratives.

   (Drustrup, 2020; Thompson and Neville, 1999)

Assessment:

1. Accurately identifies etiology and incidents of client-generated, intergenerational, and structural supremacism.

2. Selects and implements appropriate assessment tools.

3. Utilizes accurate formulations and assessment results to craft interventions.

   (Bartoli & Pyati, 2009; Guindon et al., 2003; Thompson & Neville, 1999; Menakem, 2017; Mbroh et al., 2019)

Intervention:

1. Demonstrates a non-judgmental rapport and compassion in relation to clients' experiences, which extends to assessing appropriate tolerance and boundaries in response to incidences of regression.

2. Demonstrates appropriate timing of interventions.

3. Seeks informed consent, where appropriate.

4. Identifies and applies appropriate exit-informed interventions.

   (Bartoli & Pyati, 2009; Drustrup, 2020; Guindon et al., 2003)

Consultation:

1. Forms consultation and accountability relationships.

2. Engages awareness-promoting community resources.

   (Brown, 1991; Thompson & Neville, 1999; Menakem, 2017)

   Training. Formal training for addressing client or institution-generated supremacism in psychology graduate programs did not surface in the research for the current project, as discussed in Chapter 6 (Gushue & Constantine, 2007; Stone, 2013). At the least, I had no awareness of such training at the time this document was drafted.

The competencies outlined in this section invite psychologists to integrate competence in client and institutional-generated supremacism into training programs. The current project's results suggested that training in related fields such as exit from street gangs, organized crime, and cults provided training that, in addition to gaining exit specific knowledge, prepared exit workers to implement exit interventions. This also meets the criteria of APA (2017) Standard 2.01 Boundaries of Competence that states, in the absence of available training, "psychologists with closely related prior training or experience" (p. 5) can implement related interventions. Additional guidance for seeking training was presented by exit workers, who discussed training opportunities offered by their programs. Lastly, in the summer of 2020 at least one psychology professional organization sponsored a webinar for ethically treating client-generated prejudice in clinical settings (Pennsylvania Psychological Association, 2020).

Previous research and the current data set suggested potential challenges to quality training. For instance, psychologists should avoid models promoting a "color-blind" attitude toward racism or similarly "identity-blind" approaches to marginalized identities, as these may promote covertly discriminating beliefs (Gushue & Constantine, 2007; Stone, 2013). Training models should also avoid single-encounter models, such as hour-long webinars or short presentations. Exit workers in the current study and previous researchers deemed these methods insufficient to adequately address such entrenched cultural and individual difficulties (Bezrukova et al., 2016).

Psychology departments hoping to educate their students in effective interventions for client-generated supremacism should also reduce supremacism in their departments. This assertation was supported by the literature which found passive learning models ineffective in making headway on prejudicial beliefs and behaviors in academic settings (Hirsh & Cha, 2017).

Along with Lewin's early yet highly effective training models, recent researchers endorsed matching interactive intensive training models with organizational development as the most effective way to reduce supremacism (Hirsh & Cha, 2017; Marrow, 1977). These recommendations are also aligned with the clinical literature that recommended self-reflexivity regarding clinician's role in cultural hegemony as the starting point for competence in interventions for client-generated supremacism.

Exit-Informed Assessment of Supremacism

For exit workers, quality assessment data improves outcomes, and this likely extends to exit-informed approaches. The exit-informed assessment interview guide provided here integrates exit workers' suggestions for conducting assessments with relevant data from previous literature (see Table 3; Altemeyer, 2006; Bartoli and Pyati, 2009; Berlet & Lyons, 2000; Crowson et al., 2006; Drustrup, 2020; Guindon et al., 2003; Helms, 1997; Hodson, 2009; Layton, 2010; Macleod, 2013; Mbroh et al., 2019; Thompson & Neville, 1999; Stone, 2013).

Exit-informed assessments may respond to incidents of client-generated supremacism or, ideally, may be included general intake assessment protocols. Rather than an exact protocol, this guide assumes competence in assessment, as defined in the previous section, and represents a summary of assessment dimensions, focus areas, and assessment criteria. In addition to this guide, several survey assessment tools appeared in the exit-related literature. Because of the low self-reflexivity and insight reported by exit workers and authoritarianism literature, assessment tools may be a helpful addition to interviews. These tools included: Big Five Inventory; HEXACO-PI-R; social dominance orientation and authoritarianism scales; and White Racial Affect Scale (Altemeyer, 2006; Guindon et al., 2003; Grzanka et al., 2020; Heaven & Bucci, 2001; Nicol & France, 2016; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Sibley et al., 2010

Assessing Supremacist Subtypes. Few exit workers weighed the relevance of social dominance orientation and authoritarianism assessments for exit intake assessments, primarily because the theory was introduced into the project's literature review after the bulk of data was collected. Those who were asked about the metrics were not familiar with the research, though they appeared genuinely intrigued and had positive responses to the premise of varying presentations. Unsurprisingly, exit workers' descriptions of supremacism frequently corresponded with findings from the social dominance orientation and authoritarianism tradition.

Though the social dominance orientation and authoritarianism personality scales were initially developed for research settings they could theoretically translate well into clinical assessment contexts (see Figures 3 & 4, Chapter 3). Clinicians who implement these assessments would instantly have access to evidence-supported predictors of individual cognitive, emotional, and behavioral traits, as these cluster in the majority of prejudiced people (Costello et al., 2020; Cohrs and Stelzl, 2010; Fischer et al., 2012; Giacomin & Jordan, 2014, 2018; Liu et al., 2008; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Vargas-Salfate & de Zúñiga, 2019).

Table 3

Exit-Informed Assessment Interview Guide

Dimensions	Assessment Focus	Criteria
Background and History	Ideally gathered at intake, include relevant important background information.	family history (trauma, supremacism, mental illness); demographic data (age, race, gender, biological sex, sexual orientation, economic standing, religious beliefs); identity awareness (dominant group, racial); political affiliation; passionate interests prior to ideology
Treatment History	Is supremacism a feature of an existing diagnosis or connected to the presenting concern?	history of treatment; psychiatric diagnoses; presenting concern; goals for therapy
Cognitive/ Emotional Factors	Identify cognitive and emotional features that may inhibit or strengthen treatment.	supremacism beliefs / narratives (conspiratorial thinking, prejudicial views and paranoias, supremacist grandiosity, paranoias); cognitive distortions (polarized thinking, threat perception, rigidity, punitiveness, moral absolutism, dogmatism, need for cognitive closure); emotional intelligence (accurate self-perception, accurate other perception; accurate interaction awareness); avoidance patterns; windows of tolerance; insight (self-reflexivity, thoughtfulness, curiosity); reality testing capacity; tolerances (affect, distress, and for difference); motivation (treatment, reduce supremacism)
Relational Factors	How is supremacism reflected in interpersonal interactions?	support structures; relational aggression (hostility, meanness, blame); history of violence/ discrimination violence; discrimination targets
Defense Mechanisms	Identify clients' psychological defenses.	disavowal; avoidance; grandeur; rationalization; intellectualization; identification; introjection; projection; repression; suppression; and denial
Risk	Determine risk posed by or to the client.	suicidality; self-harm; homicidally; violence history; discriminatory behavior (group-based segregation, microaggressions; slurs; hostility); retaliation from supremacist activist group or community
Client Needs	Explore unmet needs and potential barriers to treatment.	economic stability; housing; physical safety; medical care access; mental health care/ substance abuse treatment access; education opportunity access; employment; clients' likely benefit/cost if supremacism reduces
Client/ Practitioner Relational Data	Is the working alliance quality sufficient for exit-informed interventions?	reception of interventions; dominance/ submission dynamics; underlying meanings of client-generated supremacist comments (e.g., internalized prejudice in clients with subordinated-group identities/ hostility toward a clinician of color/ ingroup alliance test for a White clinician)

Tables 4 and 5 do not illustrate perfect likenesses, however. Altemeyer (2006) cautioned us in the dangers of making characters out authoritarians and social dominance orientation, lest we miss the real-world examples before our eyes. The differences in mild and severe presentations of social dominance orientation and authoritarianism alter the degree to which their more antisocial characteristics present. Despite the limitations inherent to diagnostic categories, the robust corpus of data are promising supports for their generalizability and transferability to

clinical settings.

In the absence of formal assessment, clinicians can make use of Tables 4 and 5, below, which summarized commonly correlated characteristics that cluster in social dominance orientation and authoritarianism presentations (Altemeyer, 2006; Azevedo et al., 2019; Bareket et al., 2018; Canto et al., 2020; Crowson et al., 2006; Dambrun et al., 2002; Duriez & Soenens, 2009; Fischer et al., 2012; Gerber & Jackson, 2016; Heaven & Bucci, 2001; Kunst et al., 2017;

Table 4

Social Dominance Orientation Correlated Traits

• egosyntonic (self-aware) prejudice	• motivated by status
• Dark Triad traits	• desires hierarchical environments
• disagreeableness	• elitism,
• uncooperativeness	• patriotism
• takes advantage	• nationalism
• vengefulness	• belief in rape myths
• sadism	• romantic relationship dissatisfaction
• loss aversion (sore loser)	• likely male
• competitiveness	• politically "rightwing,"
• hostile sexism	• have a socially dominating father
• high ambition	• endorse harsh punishments to lower-status groups
• low neuroticism	
• low positive emotionality	
• manipulation	• disinterest in the arts
• self-identifies with dominant groups	• child athlete
• empathy restricted to "ingroup"	• seeks power / status careers (enforcement, business, law)
• indifference to suffering	

Table 5

Authoritarianism Correlated Traits

• unaware (higher than average) prejudice • self-unreflexivity • double standards • self-righteousness • dutifulness • conscientiousness • agreeableness • low openness / inhibition • high threat perception • dangerous world myth • anti-intellectualism • benevolent sexism • anti-choice • fear instigated aggression • heterosexist / homophobic • promotes law and order	• traditionalism • religiosity • nationalism • desires hierarchical environments • as likely men or women • belief in rape myths • at least one authoritarian parent • economically conservative • compliance to authority • endorse harsh punishments for rule-breakers • gives up "rights" for morality (i.e. censorship)

Pratto et al., 1994; Rollero et al., 2019; Sibley et al., 2007).

Case Formulations of Client-Generated Supremacism

The clinical portraits provided by this section are structured according to McWilliams's case formulation's dimensions—"the person's symptoms, mental status, personality type, personal history, and current circumstances" (1999, p. vii). These concepts are returned to in the Chapter's upcoming intervention recommendations.

Symptoms. Symptoms or problems related to a treatable complaint impact clients' psychological, emotional, and behavioral functioning. Previous research argued for conceptualizing supremacism as symptom, citing distress and community harm (Guindon et al., 2003). The symptoms provided in this section come from exit workers, social dominance and authoritarianism empirical survey data, and relevant literature.

Psychological Symptoms. Supremacists may experience heightened neurophysiological responses to their supremacist beliefs, which are barriers to exit (Simi et al., 2017a). Exit workers described a number of psychological symptoms, such as the dehumanization

principle (black-and-white thinking + distance = dehumanization), power and control distortions, meaninglessness, compulsive thinking, self-hate, conspiracy theory beliefs, and projections of toughness. Additional cognitive distortions were provided in the literature: scapegoating; producerism; demonization; psychological avoidance; delusions of grandeur; racist comments as cognitive distortions; and superiority (Bartoli and Pyati, 2009; Berlet & Lyons, 2000; Layton, 2010).

A conspiracy theory is a cognitive distortion of the collective, that catastrophizes or polarizes. Familiarity with relevant conspiracy theories is helpful for identifying supremacism, due to their prevalence in dogmatic ideologies. Despite the interest conspiratorial thinking garnered from researchers, exit workers were relatively silent on the issue. This may connect to their policy of avoiding confrontations with ideology. Because there is a great deal of overlap between conspiracy theories and other cognitive distortions, several of the interventions Exit workers suggested are applicable.

Emotional Symptoms. Avoiding emotion by overexpressing power (violence, judgment) was thematic throughout the data set and literature review. Exit workers and researchers described several intolerable emotions experienced by supremacists that may catalyze compensations: shame, apathy, powerlessness, fear, loneliness, "primary emotions," guilt, anger, alienation, White anxiety, hate, disconnection, and precarity (Bartoli & Pyati, 2009; Kimmel, 2007; Thompson & Neville, 1999). The physiological nature of heightened emotional states, well-known to clinicians and reported as a feature of supremacist exit by Simi et al., (2017a), highlights the need for care when implementing interventions that result in heightened emotions.

Behavioral Symptoms. Supremacist behaviors included violence toward self and others, discrimination, covert acts of supremacism, lies, manipulating policy, and "macho" (G3)

behavior. Exit worker formers described histories of violence and discrimination. The same trend presented in their clients. These findings corroborated previous research that suggested supremacists were more likely than the general population to endorse or enact discrimination-based violence targeting groups of lower-status (social dominators), and those they fear (authoritarians), and dissidents (both; Asbrock et al., 2010). (Altemeyer, 2006; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

Aggression is not always physical and may be covert. Discriminatory often lethal policies, anti-egalitarian backlash, personal segregation practices, support for segregation policies, outward verbal or gestured expressions of prejudice and bigotry, and complacency in the presence of discriminatory behaviors, policies, and expressions were also referred to as supremacist behaviors (Hernandez, 2019; Kendi, 2017; Marrow, 1977; Massey &Denton, 1998; Muhammad, 2019). This latter point is underemphasized in exit literature, which classifies supremacist behavior purely through the lens of violent attacks.

Other behaviors described by exit workers had specific risk and clinical importance. In one formulation, women formers were described as prone to self-harm rather than outward violence. In a different trend, several exit workers remarked on the high rates of gender-based violence reported in supremacist milieus which mostly targeted women, though one exit worker recounted increased reporting of sexual assault from male clients as well. These results tied in well with previous studies that detailed torture, sexual violence, and domestic violence in carceral employees, and supports Chapter 8's premise that carceral employment draws supremacists and acts as a socializing event for supremacists who enter the field (Anderson & Lo, 2011; Kwan et al., 2020; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

Personality. In standard case formulations and psychological treatment, personality is

central, due to its substantial impact on treatment planning if not diagnosis. The near-absence of explicit personality discussion in exit intervention literature and exit worker interviews was striking in comparison. At the same time, a good amount of exit workers' case formulations were highly psychological, drawing on their secondary education in clinical fields, and their descriptions easily mapped onto personality research.

Personal History. Turning now to the impact life experiences have in supremacism's expression, vulnerability to recruitment was found by previous research to be at least partly accounted for by life history. Incidents such as cultivation of friendships with supremacists, listening to White power music, verbal abuse, criminal history, and preexisting conservative or racist beliefs were implicated (Turpin-Petrosino, 2002). Several of these factors overlapped with experiences common within supremacist family systems, which has implications for formulations of supremacism's intergenerational transmission and family support interventions.

Supremacism was also related to dominant group membership, political conservatism, a felt-sense of isolation and alienation, religious fundamentalism, employment and training in carceral institutions, attending homogenous elite academic institutions, membership in Greek life organizations, majoring in power-focused university disciplines (business, law, finance), proximity to anti-egalitarian social narratives, and group-based segregation (Altemeyer, 2006; DeBruin, 2019; Kimmel, 2007; Mara et al., 2018; Samson, 2018; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Identifying these predictive factors prepares clinicians to identify risk factors or covert expressions of supremacism.

Current Circumstances. This section adopted a broad conceptualization of "current circumstances," and focuses on environmental factors. Here, a characterization of likely differences between affluent versus economically compromised supremacist presentations were

drawn from relevant large-scale survey research data.

The discursive narratives within a society and their shaping effect on expressions of supremacism were thematic throughout much of the data reviewed by the current study (Fischer et al., 2012). They emphasized how hegemony is produced by layers of conflicting social mores which both encourage supremacism through economic supremacy, systemic discrimination, and allusions to dominant group superiority, while at the same time configuring particular incidents of discrimination as immoral (Thompson & Neville, 1999).

These social dynamics have lived consequences. Economically disadvantaged supremacists have been increasingly siloed into rural settings, sequestered from social services and living wages. Social mobility for the educated classes has shielded supremacists from differences in opinion through phenomena like "brain drain," in addition to the physical distancing of the left-wing political establishment from rural and industrial workers (Frank, 2004; Russell Hochschild, 2016). Hosang & Lowndes (2019) formulated systemic economic disenfranchisement as undergoing a period of "racialization" (p. 59) which subjects the poor to dehumanizing "parasite" (p. 19) narratives that were, throughout much of the 20th century, reserved for people of color. Lacking social safety nets and financial crises have resulted in factors related to "deaths of despair" (p. 37) such disappearances of viable employment, drug overdoses, suicide, and alcohol-related liver disease (Case & Deaton, 2020).

These analyses of previous literature were first introduced in Chapters One, Three, and Four. They are reintroduced here in light of a central findings of the current project, that exit workers whose clients lacked social welfare support reported more client suicidality, completed suicides, and substance abuse. An expert in exit and several exit workers connected financial precarity to worse outcomes in exit work. Relatedly, the exit workers themselves appeared to

wear the strain of their clients' struggles which increased their risk of burn out. These risk factors are cause for concern for psychologists working with clients in similarly precarious circumstances.

Affluent supremacists, on the other hand, have different circumstances. Members of power-holding groups are likely to be less aware of their relative privilege, experience the world as reflecting their worldview, and are accustomed to having a relative influence on their environment (Davidson & Saul, 2016; Pratto & Stewart, 2012; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Affluence was pinpointed as a factor increasing segregation, interaction with anti-egalitarian pro-wealth cultural narratives, and political and economic conservatism (DeBruin, 2019; Mara et al., 2018; Mendelberg et al., 2017; Samson, 2018).

Affluence is concentrated in dominant groups, and the factors described here are interrelated with the consistent finding that social dominance is over-represented in dominant groups, such as in affluent populations (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Additionally, researchers connected status and social position to well-being, and revealed them to predict relative improvements in cognitive functioning, health, and general life satisfaction (Fournier, 2020; Koski, 2015). A finding from social dominance orientation research underscored the implications of this research for intervention, which found that social dominators from affluent backgrounds endorsed higher than average life satisfaction, but those in lower-status economic brackets were less resilient to the difficulties of low economic status than average (Fournier, 2020; Koski, 2015). From this we can infer that supremacists in treatment are likely to have vastly different presentations depending on their contexts.

Supremacist Personality Disorder

This section concludes the project's investigation of personality throughout this text

about supremacist personality theory and diagnosis. A sufficient analysis has hopefully been outlined up to this point to merit supremacism's classification as a maladaptive, frequently destructive feature of a person's psychological and emotional landscape. This was put forward most completely in Chapter 9. In sum, there is a good argument to be made for supremacism as a feature of personality, within a biocultural framework.

Turning now to the focus of this section, while setting aside the question of whether diagnostic labels represent a fundamental good or harm to psychological care; setting aside criticisms of personality disorders, which have described the negative impact of "sticky" diagnoses; diagnosis is currently the access point to treatment for much of the population that cannot or do not prefer to pay for medical care without health insurance. Clinicians are ethically obligated to accurately assess and assign a diagnostic category.

Through the lens of these obligations, I return to the question posed by Guindon et al. (2003). The diagnostic sciences have invested a great deal of energy and resources into diagnosing the intensities of human life, so why not supremacism? Supremacism is highly prevalent. Guindon et al. (2003), demonstrated that it easily meets the basic criteria.

Exit literature outlined intervention-resistant impairment in several areas of life and underscored the *criteria* of personality disorder, albeit from within their own frameworks (Barrelle, 2010; Kimmel, 2007; Simi et al., 2017). The stubbornness of personality may also account for observations made by sociologists that supremacism has an "addictionlike" (p. 1171) quality, which they called "identity residual" (Simi et al., 2017, 1168). As one exit worker stated regarding their lifelong management of internal reactions, the persisting but unwanted traits were "less of something that had to do with being in the movement and more like a personality trait" (G1).

Yet the application of personality research to conceptualize exit processes has been controversial. Neither exit workers nor intervention research integrated socially dominant or authoritarian personality theories into their models. Two examples are specifically relevant. First, Koehler (2014) noted the correlation between authoritarian personality, xenophobia, and socialization, yet dismissed the theory on the grounds of "individuals in right-wing extremist circumstances who do not exhibit a classic 'authoritarian personality" (p. 352). In a second example, Blee's (2017) wariness about personality theories' application to supremacism reacted to formulations, such as Hofstadter's (1967), that verged on conflating disposition with predetermination and saw supremacism personality as the working class's defiance of economically oppressive systems (Blee, 2017).

It was precisely in response to conceptual issues like these that Pratto et al. (1994) developed social dominance orientation, which was later formulated by Altemeyer (1998) as the calculating dominant counterpart to authoritarian's neurotic unreflexive aggression. In the current iteration of these traditions the scales are typically applied together due to their robust correlations with metrics of prejudice and weak correlation with each other.

The supremacist personality theory suggested here addresses previous researchers' concerns, first, by adopting Altemeyer's bi-variant (rather than single) formulation, and in a second sense, by formulating supremacism at the interstice of intentionality and predisposition, as, first and foremost, a productive force of cultural hegemony.

An Exit-Informed Approach for Client-Generated Supremacism

The exit-intervention outcomes reported by exit workers suggest that supremacism may respond well to treatment. In addition to these findings, an evidential basis for personality change revealed that personality does respond to treatment (Roberts et al., 2017). More support comes

from the authoritarianism and social dominance research, reviewed in Chapter 4, which revealed that a number of factors mitigated supremacism.

Now, an exit-informed clinical intervention model for client-generated supremacism introduces the intervention portion of the discussion. This series of recommendations is rooted in the current study's results as well as previous clinical literature.

A Model for Initiating Exit-Informed Interventions. This section presents an actionable summary of strategies, organized into models, for addressing supremacism. These strategies represent exit workers' practical implementation experience and clinical literature. The theory of change underlying this model proposes that interventions with inflexible ideologies require trust, respect, and time. It suggests that developing a distinct case formulation through assessing the client's unique supremacist features is likely to improve treatment outcomes.

The results of the current study suggest that these guidelines could be more effective when tailored to address specific features of supremacist personalities, support other mental health concerns, manage stressors, and minimize structural difficulties.

1. *Assessment.* Accurately assess the client with an exit-informed assessment.

2. *Transparency.* Clinicians utilizing transparency-based clinical approaches should consider addressing ideology in the first meeting. Modeling directness regarding clients' observable blind spots may facilitate clients' directness with the clinician. Exit workers suggested that transparency builds trust and autonomy.

3. *Treatment Plan.* Building a unique treatment plan and addressing clients' needs as established in the assessment reduces barriers to treatment and may strengthen the working alliance. Some presentations may require foundational work before directly addressing ideology.

4. ***Meet the Presenting Concern.*** The client's presenting issue and mental health diagnosis may affect how supremacism manifests and their response to treatment for supremacism (Bartoli & Pyati, 2009). Discuss Exit-informed interventions in the context of the presenting concern.

5. ***Attend to the Alliance.*** Building a trusting alliance is necessary before directly addressing ideology. Exit workers suggested building an alliance based on warmth, reliable attentiveness and time spent, evidencing knowledgeability, and practical support. ***Practical Solutions First.*** Build trust, alliance, and motivation for change by solving practical problems in the early part of the relationship. Clients struggling to connect due to paranoia, distrust, or avoidance, such as clients exhibiting conspiratorial cognitive distortions, may respond better to direct practical support from the practitioner than collaborative goal setting and achievement.

6. ***Achievable Goals.*** Like practical solutions, collaboratively working toward easily achievable client goals builds trust, alliance, motivation, and confidence. This is especially useful for paranoid clients (i.e., conspiratorial, competitive). Frequently assess the alliance and add more small goals as necessary. Undertaking small goals in the early phases of exit work also builds in an observation period for assessment.

7. ***Cognitive and Emotional Foundations.*** Ideological work can begin indirectly by restructuring underlying cognitive distortions and building emotional distress tolerance. During foundational interventions, ideologies may disintegrate spontaneously. Clients may also start questioning ideologies and independently raise ideological discussions.

8. ***Timing.*** Intervention style and alliance building should reflect the clinician's personality and competence. Refrain from addressing ideology until a strong and trusting alliance

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develops and consider explicitly avoiding political discussions early in treatment.

9. ***Match Pace.*** Accurately assessing the client's communication style was viewed by some as a prerequisite for avoiding unproductive conflict. One exit worker described matching clients' pace, waiting until clients question their ideology independently, and then supporting clients in their reflections.

10. ***Window of Tolerance.*** Assessing where the client is at in relation to their window of tolerance should regularly precede beginning an ideological conversation. Client reactions communicate when they are beyond their window of tolerance, and the practitioner should shift gears away from difficult content once the window of tolerance closes. Over time, effective treatment should expand clients' window of tolerance.

11. ***Do Not Debate.*** Active ideological debates are likely to rupture the client/practitioner alliance. Exit clients are prone to start debates, and skillfully ending debates without a relational rupture requires skill and strategy. If discussions become heated, temporarily pause and encourage de-escalation and relational repair. If a longer pause is needed, the practitioner is responsible for re-establishing the connection. Assess what needs the client is trying to express by being conflictual and connect with the client by otherwise meeting the need.

12. ***Keep it Simple***. Investments in the client create small openings for influence that must be used wisely. Once the relationship can tolerate influence, assess tolerance. Do not overwhelm the client. In a given session, avoid giving more than three suggestions to prevent overwhelm or distrust.

13. ***Expect and Accept.*** When addressing ideology, accept and expect ruptures. Avoid over-responsibility for the outcome. Assess supremacist symptomatology's impact on

reactions. Apply repair interventions that respect clients' windows of tolerance. Strategies to repair ruptures are an opportunity to model taking responsibility for missteps and holding appropriate boundaries.

14. ***Adjust to Diagnoses.*** Some exit workers noted more frequently seeing high functioning autism spectrum disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, substance abuse, and anxiety than is typical in non-clinical populations. It may be prudent to explain interventions for supremacism through the lens of its benefit to their personal goals for therapy and the presenting concern

15. ***Exit-Informed Model of Intervention for Influencing Supremacist Ideology.*** Exit workers and clinical literature reporting positive outcomes did endorse similar clinical approaches. In this way, exit-informed approaches endorse a factor model of intervention and encourages an integrative approach best suited to the clients' needs and clinicians' disposition.

16. ***Motivational interviewing*** **(MI).** Build motivation for changing supremacism using the principles outlined by MI. This approach is easily integrated with many interventions and relies on attentiveness, non-judgement, and attentively reflecting back change speech.

17. ***The Five-Stage Exit Approach.*** Structure exit-informed interventions using the five-stage intervention approach: analysis, credible messenger, alliance, normalizing exit, influence. The first three stages are related to building a solid working relationship needed to implement change-work. The latter two prescribe several possible paths to addressing supremacism. Tailor interventions to clients' stage of change and follow guidelines offered by exit workers to repair ruptures by returning to the alliance during client crises or if tension develops.

18. ***Addressing Power and Control Issues.*** Clients may experience moments of God mode (power over and control) or an authority dichotomy (domination and submission). These were related to low emotional distress tolerance. Expanding supremacist clients' range of emotions and distress tolerance while avoiding client over-compliance (submission) are useful for addressing power and control issues.

19. ***Reversing Dehumanization.*** The dehumanization principle reduces empathy and increases capacity for violence. The pathway (black-and-white thinking + distance = dehumanization) can be reversed in time by implementing several interventions in sequence: 1. address polarized thinking patterns 2. address avoidance / segregation patterns and strategies 3. implement cognitive restructuring

20. ***Cognitive Restructuring and Flexibility.*** Reversing dehumanization, or rehumanization, reverses the dehumanization formula in stages (black-and-white thinking + distance = dehumanization). This intervention appropriately addresses the cognitive distortions underlying caricature, stereotype, or other polarized projection, and is therefore an appropriate intervention to address conspiratorial thinking.

    1. verbally address clients' distorted thought patterns until clients see the pattern in themselves 2. introduce nondichotomous thinking and ambivalence by examining clients' foregone conclusions, considering other possible explanations, and encouraging (or teaching) perspective taking.

21. ***Encouraging Autonomy***. Authoritarian clients may be looking for leadership. Providing leadership in this context is contraindicated. Interventions fostering autonomy such as collaborative goal setting, encouraging existential meaning-making, and refraining from becoming a direct "influencer" supports clients' independent decision-making.

22. ***Shame Reduction.*** Transparency is one pathway to heal shame. Encouraging clients' transparency and vulnerability with loved ones, victims, and treatment providers is potentially shame-reducing.

23 ***Transformative Justice.*** Where appropriate, unlikely to cause harm to victims or over-exposure to the client, encourage the client to address past harm caused through reparations and amends. Notably, amends must be free of expectation and seek to provide healing rather than procure forgiveness. Accountability and healing work offer transformative effects for guilt and shame, motivate change-working, and maintain outcomes.

24. ***Exposure.*** Several of the approaches used by exit workers rely on the principle of exposure. To implement exposure techniques safely, first identify clients' window of tolerance. Then promote self-monitoring of reactions and techniques for managing physiological stress. Finally, gradually build exposure to new/ distressing stimulus while managing physiological responses, and end exposures when meeting the edge of but not exceeding the window of tolerance. As this process repeats, clients' window of tolerance increases. The intervention is successful when experiences and interactions create little reactivity.

25. ***Emotional Resilience.*** Low emotional tolerance was recurrent in interview data and clinical literature. It was linked to superiority, anxiety, aggression, and "fight or flight" crisis responses. First assess clients' window of tolerance, and expand windows of tolerance and build emotional resilience by encouraging clients to approach their limit. Stop before exceeding the edge of tolerance. Pushing clients too far was associated with retraumatization and increased intervention aversion. Consider including self-esteem-

focused interventions centered on insecurity/shame, emotion regulation skills (anger management, self-talk, conflict resolution, self-compassion), and exposure.

An Exit-Informed Family Systems Approach

"Intergenerational supremacism" as it is used here refers to the relational transmission of supremacism and is implicated in its reproduction within communities over time. This section discusses previous literature that reported peer to peer and parent to child socialization and recorded commonly implicated relational dynamics (racism, xenophobia, ideological views, domination behaviors; Altemeyer, 1998; Avdeenko & Siedler, 2017; Duriez and Soenens, 2009; Turpin-Petrosino, 2002). It then links this research to interventions from the literature and from exit workers' family and friend exit-interventions. Here, the findings from the current study corroborated the existing data and contributed practice-relevant insights not found in literature.

Generational Effects and Family Systems. Several studies reviewed in Part 2 investigated intergenerational supremacism. Findings from social dominance orientation and authoritarianism literature revealed that supremacism was often endorsed by several members of the same family, and children's supremacist views were highly correlated with their parents' supremacism (Altemeyer, 2006). However, another study found that racial prejudice and xenophobia were transmitted from parents to their children more than political affiliations (Avdeenko & Siedler, 2017). A somewhat counterintuitive finding that familial verbal abuse, but not physical abuse, increased high schooler's positive assessments of supremacist activism added additional nuance to the portrait of relational supremacism (Turpin-Petrosino, 2002).

In accordance with these convergent findings, several exit workers reported supremacist beliefs and dynamics in their own families of origin as well as in the families of clients and clients seeking exit support to address the supremacism of a loved one. Contrasting the literature,

exit workers' conceptualizations of shame language were often entwined with abusive behavior and power and control issues. For exit workers, the effectiveness of family and friend interventions relied on addressing problematic relational styles and establishing more effective systems of communication, and reports that shaming communication acted as a barrier to exit interventions also contributed to previous understandings.

Improving family relationships was suggested as a useful intervention to counter recruit individuals from supremacist activism, and exit workers suggested several approaches to address destructive relational dynamics in family and friend interventions. These included motivational interviewing, dialectical behavioral therapy (DBT), and community reinforcement and family training (CRAFT).

Desegregation. Some forms of desegregations reduce supremacism, according to the intergroup contact literature reviewed in Chapter 4. In addition to implications for intervention, some cautionary suggestions should also be considered. A series of studies found that supremacists endorsed less intergroup contact (more segregation) than the average person and concluded that "[h]igh levels of intergroup contact" can be a protective factor disrupting belief system inheritance in supremacist families (Dhont & Van Hiel, 2012, p. 11; Dhont & Van Hiel, 2009; Dhont et al., 2013). Researchers also reported that going to college (other than small homogenous elite institutions) reduced authoritarianism in the children of authoritarian parents by 10% and found this effect size to persist across a thirty-year longitudinal study (Altemeyer, 2006). Intergroup contact was one of the rationales provided for the transformative justice intervention endorsed by exit workers, which was described as a challenging but powerful intervention with the potential to create rapid change by introducing former supremacists to individuals from groups they once targeted.

Interventions with Family and Friends. This intervention style was endorsed by several exit workers in the current study, who saw it as the only effective method for engaging supremacists not freely volunteering their services. Clinicians working with clients' supremacism should consider family therapy intervention models. Families seeking exit support for their loved ones' supremacism provide an opportunity to counter-recruit the supremacist activist and to address supremacism's intergenerational transmission factors directly. Exit workers' successful adaptation of motivational interviewing, DBT, and CRAFT indicate that other popular and effective family-systems approaches might also effectively translate into interventions for reducing supremacism.

Considering the findings of the current study alongside previous research suggests that interventions addressing supremacist ideologies in parents may reduce the transmission of supremacism to their children. Targeting the within-family features of supremacist personalities that researchers investigated (e.g., competitiveness, threat perception, polarized thinking, and aversion to new experiences) is a promising method for addressing supremacism within families. The method suggested here integrates findings in intervention literature and exit workers' practical implementation experience.

An Exit-Informed Family Systems Approach.

1. **Intergenerational Transmission.** Assess the presence of supremacism, including hateful speech, domination/submission dynamics, racism, xenophobia, social dominance orientation, and authoritarianism.

2. **Relational Environment.** Address overexpression of fear, competitiveness, or shame in addition to enabling, enmeshment, porous boundaries, and other relational difficulties within the home.

3.   **Verbal Abuse**. Identify the presence of verbal abuse within the home, implement system-based interventions by facilitating effective communication.

4.   **Cognitive and Barriers.** Address any cognitive barriers to intervention, especially narratives targeting non-dominant groups, using interventions, such as cognitive restructuring.

5.   **Intergroup Contact.** Assess intergroup segregation dynamics and, where appropriate, encourage intergroup contact or transformative justice approaches.

6.   **Previous Models**. Consider the utility of models commonly used in exit-work family and friend interventions, such as motivational interviewing, DBT, and CRAFT.

Summary and Conclusions

This chapter delineated an "exit-informed" approach for addressing client-generated supremacism and intergenerational supremacism in clinical settings based on field research with exit workers and relevant literature. I divided the model's presentation into five sections, each concerned with a factor salient to clinicians approaching a novel treatment population and its therapeutic needs: competence issues, assessment, case formulation, diagnosis, and intervention.

The model's primary motivation was to provide an evidence-informed approach for addressing a largely misunderstood and dangerously underserved treatment population and its disorders. I began the chapter by offering data-driven recommendations on ideal competency requirements for psychologists working with supremacists in exit or clinical settings. I then laid out recommendations for intake assessments designed to support exit-workers in developing individualized treatment plans to improve treatment outcomes, including assessing for supremacist subtype (social dominance orientation/ authoritarian personality) and supporting system-based interventions.

Additionally, using McWilliams' (1999) case formulation model, I framed a supremacist case formulation, focusing on symptoms, personality, personal history, and current circumstances. I completed Chapter 13's treatment recommendations by integrating the approaches and interventions offered by exit works and related clinical literature, organized as actionable exit-informed intervention models for client-generated supremacism and intergenerational supremacism.

Chapter 14. Structural Intervention Models for Addressing Supremacism

Chapter 14 concludes Part 4's culturally therapeutic approach to supremacism by offering structural intervention models for addressing supremacism in each of the project's focal structural categories: cultural narratives, institutions, economic infrastructure, and the carceral industry. These exit-informed models incorporate exit workers' interventions, especially the structural analyses found in Chapters 11 and 12, along with critical histories, institutional critique, intervention literature, and cross-cultural economic structural analyses reviewed in Part 2.

Competency in Structural Interventions

> Our light-speed, globally connected economy has led to the rise of a new super-elite… Its members are hardworking, highly educated, jet-setting meritocrats who feel they are the deserving winners of a tough, worldwide economic competition (Freeland, 2012).

The notion, "absolute power corrupts absolutely," was thematic in cross-cultural social dominance orientation and authoritarianism literature that investigated structural forces' impact on cultural change. Self-perceived accumulations of power and status increased the frequency and severity of domination drives in every society studied (Cohrs & Stelzl, 2010; Fischer et al., 2012; Kende et al., 2018; Liu et al., 2008; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Vargas-Salfate & de Zúñiga,

2019). While no demographic or political organization was impervious to power's corrupting force, infrastructural differences amplified or mitigated the changes (Fischer et al., 2012; Kende et al., 2018). Given the reported impact of structural factors on supremacism's cultural prevalence, there seems to be a definite need for effective structural interventions for reducing supremacism in hegemonic societies.

Structural Competency Approach. Throughout the text, Metzl and Hansen's (2013) structural competency framework grounded the project's formulation of structural interventions. Before implementing interventions for addressing structural supremacism, psychologists would likely have better outcomes and reduced risk of unintended effects if they demonstrate Metzl and Hansen's 5 areas of structural competence:

1. *Identify.* Recognizes what structures pose barriers to successful outcomes.

2. *Develop Structural Language.* Demonstrates familiarity with structurally relevant vocabulary.

3. *Reframe Cultural as Structural.* Accurately frames abstract "cultural formulations" (p. 126) as concrete structural forces.

4. *Interventions Implementation.* Effectively assesses and implements structural interventions.

5. *Structural Humility.* Acknowledges the inability to fully understand others' hardship.

Narrative Therapeutic Approaches to Supremacism

Cultural narratives play a crucial role in manifesting supremacist and egalitarian cultural dynamics, according to cross-cultural researchers (Cohrs & Stelzl, 2010; Fischer et al., 2012; Kende et al., 2018; Vargas-Salfate & de Zúñiga, 2019). Fischer et al. (2012) concluded that

supremacism reduced[54] when "a society encourages individuals to cooperate with others and feel concern for the welfare of other[s]…" (p. 450). In response these findings, this section opens with Jarvis' model for intervening on cultural narratives. It then models structural competency by reframing several hegemonic cultural myths from Chapters 4 and 8 in terms of the structural forces at play.

Cultural Myth Interventions. This section recalls interventions for addressing hegemonic counterterrorism myths presented in Chapter 8. Strategies for transforming cultural myths may need to be context specific. Rather than exhaustive, Jarvis' (2019) suggestions are starting points:

1. ***Repudiate.*** Reject dominant discourses with a straightforward, public rejection of a narrative's core arguments. Because repudiation typically requires asserting another truth, it risks exchanging truth for truth, thus falling into an unending culture war.

2. ***Question****.* Force powerholders to explain and justify their narratives by questioning: Under whose authority is the cultural narrative legitimate? Is a given narrative leading to effective interventions? Are causes and effects proportionate? Is the cultural narrative consistent, or does it promote incongruent/unequal understandings and reactions? Because questioning is a receptive rather than generative intervention, it is limited to dominant discourses.

3. ***Subvert.*** Oppose narratives through parody or performativity. Subversive interventions are successful when they cast a wide net and point out irrationality. Because subversion

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[54] Societal dynamics consistently predicted to lower rates of supremacism included: cultural egalitarianism, civil liberties, citizens' intellectual and emotional autonomy, democratic social organization, economic security, flexible social mobility, low rates of institutional discrimination, high gender equality, inter-group contact (as equals), and low rates of institutional hostility toward emigrants (Cohrs & Stelzl, 2010; Fischer et al., 2012; Kende et al., 2018; Vargas-Salfate & de Zúñiga, 2019).

may be quickly disregarded and viewed as fringe, and they often fail to achieve substantial political impact. Also, "subversion based on laughter" (p. 352) may devolve into inegalitarian or dehumanizing caricatures.

4. ***Replace.*** Exchange dominant narratives with the "marginalised (sic) stories" (p. 352) of everyday impacted people. The dominant narrative is recapitulated through a new perspective that humanizes subordinated groups. Because marginalized narratives may be merely instrumentalized for intervention, there may be cause for ethical concern. There may also be difficulty generalizing anecdotal experience.

5. ***Deconstruct.*** Deconstruct cultural narratives to reveal their specific origins and culturally bound premises. Myths previously accepted as self-evident truths are shown to be subjective and susceptible to change. Because deconstruction disrupts what exists, this intervention does not produce alternatives.

Several of these strategies were utilized in the critical literature review, demonstrating that psychologists can disrupt and replace dominant narratives from their position as researchers. A few examples appear in the following section.

Hegemonic Cultural Myths. Identification of hegemonic cultural myths is part of building a competent structural vocabulary. In Chapter 13, I referred to "conspiracy theory" as a cognitive distortion of collective consciousness. The cultural myths defined here are as distorted and conspiratorial as any supremacist fantasy, such as those presented in Chapter 3. A cursory glance over both lists makes clear which has the worse reputation.

Hegemonic cultural myths are related to cognitive distortion but are more aptly framed as distortions of the collective *un*conscious, since they are rendered *truth* for enough people through the manufacturing of consent by hegemonic powers. From this privileged position, the cultural

myths in this section remain hiding in plain sight; much like the mainstream supremacists in the enforcement, financial, and political realms, they beget graver consequences for human life, basic rights, equality, and freedom than their fringe counterparts. These hegemonic cultural myths—which can also be understood correctly as legitimizing myths or discourses—were frequently implicated throughout this text as barriers to reducing societal supremacism.

  Extreme vs. Mainstream. Myths of "extremism" or "radicalism" position supremacism as fringe, limiting its standard conceptualization to violent White supremacist grassroot activists. This convenient line in the sand creates a near enough and far enough correlate for mainstream supremacists who can be rallied for shared causes at same time as being blamed for elements that are unseemly to the mainstream media circuit. This myth regularly shields institutional supremacy from intervention by isolating and punishing "bad apples" for the supremacist crimes being perpetuated by institutions. In this way, the extreme versus mainstream duality also serves a normalizing function and promotes authoritarian in-group policing.

  State Terrorism. Counterterrorism narratives position Western states as defensive or neutral and non-state actors as terrorists though both meet the federal statute definition (German & Robinson, 2018). Counterterrorism offenses aggressed the world over as hegemonic nation states attempted to exterminate movements for decolonization and other geopolitical rejections of Western financialization's democratic masquerade beginning in the 1960s (Chomsky, 1979).

  The United States relied heavily on this cultural myth during post-9/11 securitization and alchemized a national loss into a net gain that simultaneously reproduced its global supremacy and manufactured national consent to further defund public institutions. These actions dispelled the question of whether United States citizens would receive the redistributive benefits of the robust social welfare systems their European counterparts enjoyed.

This has had dire implications that interact directly with the current study's finding that related stronger public institutional support with reduced threat perception related to risk of client suicidality, substance abuse, and abject poverty. This discussion of counterterrorism's role supremacism also connects to an analysis made in light of the current study's critical literature review and findings, that exit's mission of reducing supremacism is in conflict with the function served by global counterterrorism.

Protection and Threat. Protection and threat myths can produce a "fox in the hen house" problem, by positioning supremacists to define who receives protection and who is a threat. Previous literature described carceral and legal institutions as primarily protecting the interests of dominant groups and managing the unrest of subordinated groups (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Myths of protection are also revealed for their deception by a 2006 FBI report, published by Jones (2015), that infiltration of enforcement agencies by the police was an existential threat to national security.

Consistent with this discussion and pertinent literature, a psychological explanation is supported in the current study's findings relating securitization and enforcement to the development of polarizing thinking and avoidance patterns; in turn, these cognitive patterns facilitate dehumanization. Distancing from perceived threats, mentally, physically, or aesthetically lends to dehumanization in both settings.

The common illustration of this concept that exit workers offered can usefully be referred to as the "dehumanization principle," which theorizes that negative cultural narratives develop within enforcement agencies which are applied to members of outgroups. This dehumanization principle authorizes individuals to harm others by a "quick decision" without "remorse or anxiety" and was defined as the underlying path to discriminatory violence and atrocities. These

findings support the concept that carceral institutions develop cultural narratives that promote dehumanization.

Exit-Informed Guide to Engaging Supremacists in Public Forums

Interventions for effective supremacist counter-recruitment, as described by exit workers reporting previous supremacist organizing and recruitment, made use of cultural narrative strategies. Their recommendations to account for the setting in intervention planning was underemphasized in intervention literature, where interventions for client-generated supremacism in a formal supportive relationship were often quite different than those implemented in public settings, for example whether to "win" ideological debates. This section offers guidance for implementing strategies by factoring in the setting. It also underscores the risks inherent to implementing public interventions.

Private versus Public. This study's findings suggest that supremacists are unlikely to change if confronted directly, especially in public[55]. Yet, given the recruitment potential inherent to public appearances, there may still be value in public interventions. Drawing from the findings described in Chapter 12, it seems that postures of strength and victory attract those vulnerable to supremacism. Consequently, no public contact with supremacists would therefore be preferable to interactions that end by giving supremacists the appearance of a "win."

In response to increased public supremacist presence—online, on university campuses, in planned debates, and in classroom settings—several colleagues asked me if engaging individual supremacists in public was advisable and requested specific strategies. This project's literature review underemphasized supremacist recruitment strategies, however, and few authors

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[55] Public refers to any setting with an audience, and audience can be any number of onlookers.

mentioned encountering supremacists in public forums[56]. This omission is notable considering

the headline-grabbing popularity of supremacist figureheads whose popularity emerged as a

cultural trope over the last decade, i.e., White nationalist talk show host Tucker Carlson's record-

setting "highest-rated quarter of any cable news program—ever" in June of 2020 (Joyella, 2020).

In accounts of supremacist public appearance, exit workers suggested that some

supremacists utilize an evangelical strategy for recruitment and try to recruit as many people as

possible. One exit worker who reported formerly implementing this kind of recruitment

commented that recruitment was among the central goals of supremacists. Their description of

supremacist tactics was reminiscent of the Southern Strategy, a political approach used by racist

politicians, (most infamously the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George Bush, Sr.) for

decades in the United States. The Southern Strategy encoded White supremacist discrimination

in rhetoric salient to other White supremacists yet illegible to others in the voting public (Boyd,

1970; Perlstein, 2012).

This analysis may help us understand how supremacists' public performances obscure the

most alienating aspects underlying their messaging from mainstream audiences while remaining

more legible to audience members receptive or vulnerable to their ideologies. According to this

data, we can infer that interacting with supremacists in public forums risks becoming an

accidental tool for recruitment. Therefore, the implication is not only the intended interventions'

inefficacy but also inadvertently supporting supremacist activists' tactics for recruiting

audiences.

The following intervention guidelines augment exit worker formers' emic understanding

of supremacist activists' recruitment strategies as reported in the current study with related trends

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[56] This may be accounted for due to the project's focus on the interplay between active supremacism and exit.

described in social dominance orientation and authoritarianism research (Altemeyer, 2006; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

Exit-Informed Guide to Engaging Supremacists in Public Forums.

1. ***Don't.*** Public debate was called an ineffective tool for changing supremacists' minds by exit workers. It increases defensiveness and fortifies ideological loyalty. It gambles escalating their commitment, increasing the sophistication of their arguments, and inadvertently helping them recruit. Publicly debating supremacists should be avoided when possible.

2. ***Focus on the Audience***. In public debates, the primary goal should be the audience's counter-recruitment. Public engagement intended to prevent or counter-recruit may have the opposite effect and play into recruitment strategies devised by supremacist organizers.

3. ***"Wins" (Counter)Recruit***. What defines a win or loss is mainstream and (sub)culturally constructed. Counter-recruitment debaters must accurately gauge the audience, familiarize themselves with the audience's likely positions, and know opponents' arguments well. Presentation is also important. Self-control, openness to alternatives, respect, and politeness are likely to be read as deference and submission by those drawn to violence and machismo, whereas religious supremacists may view angry bullying with scorn.

4. ***Investigate Outward Conformity***. Outward social norms (debate styles, aesthetic choices) are instrumentalized for enhancing supremacists' recruitment capacity. Conformity increases legitimacy, provides access to potential recruits, and widens audience appeal. Investigating a likely supremacists' following, peer group, and publication locations may be instructive.

5. ***Talk Back to Doublespeak***. Supremacists intentionally speak in subcultural particularity and increasingly confounding coatings of (il)legibility, offering ideological messaging to susceptible audience members. This tactic includes coding their language to downplay anti-egalitarian ideologies, making subcultural references missed by a general audience, and preemptively denying their statements' implications. To effectively address this dynamic, one must be well-versed in their arguments and tactics and confront them persuasively.

6. ***Expect (Anti-) Democratic Appeals***. Excluding a supremacist from an invitation or rejecting their application is not censorship. When supremacist activists defend their rights to public forum appearances based on "free speech" by appealing to democratic values, their goal is to advance their undemocratic worldview, not promote the democratic values they oppose.

The findings discussed in this section suggest that individual interventions are apt to fail to elicit change if they are coupled with public confrontation of supremacists. However, such interventions may still be prudent due to their counter-recruitment effects on observers vulnerable but not yet identified with supremacist ideologies. Caution should almost certainly be exercised, as the risk of having an opposite impact and supporting supremacist recruitment is likely high.

Media Coverage of Supremacists and Hate Crimes. While exit workers acknowledged the "copy-cat" (G1) effect that sometimes results from public representations—especially media coverage of supremacist violence—they also reported benefits. Public representation reportedly catalyzed some individuals' exits, increased interest (and resource investment) in anti-supremacist intervention work, and combated myths that racism is over. An implication of this is

the possibility that the impact of public representations (*e.g.,* supremacist attacks, formers' exit stories) on supremacism appears to depend on several factors.

The recommendations introduced below integrate both exit workers' analyses and related trends described in social dominance orientation and authoritarianism research (Altemeyer, 2006; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999)[57].

1. ***Be Informed.*** Exit workers attributed much of the unintentional harm caused by public representation to thin understandings, so sufficient knowledge is needed. Centering the voices of freshly exited formers who have not "done the work" (G1) sufficient for transformative identity change reportedly built false expectations of exit that could not be met. "Newbies" (G1) appeal to the media was also said be a source of distress and relapse in formers out of the "honeymoon" (G1) phase of change, who struggled to maintain exit. Other accounts centered non-experts whose misguided narratives delegitimized exit groups in the public arena. In each case, increased information on the part of the journalist could have prevented problematic impacts.

2. ***Do Not Sensationalize or Glamorize.*** Accounts of attackers and violence should not focus on supremacists' efficacy and strength. Such narratives are attractive to those vulnerable to supremacist recruitment.

3. ***Emphasize Inefficacy and Negative Consequences.*** Promote narratives that emphasize the negative consequences/inefficacy of supremacism from the perspective of supremacists. For instance, attacks may increase social cohesion, promote egalitarianism narratives, and funnel support and resources toward those attacked.[58]

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[57] These are not exhaustive. Consider alongside other discussions on the topic.
[58] For instance, after it was revealed that the National Socialist Underground attacks' coverage relied on biased police accounts and increased governmental discrimination of Turkish immigrants, calls were made to reduce societal discrimination and offer victims reparations.

4.   ***Do Not Center Supremacists.*** Present supremacists as a single part of a larger narrative and do not overly center supremacists. It may be prudent to withhold attackers' names, thus reducing notoriety and fame; however, naming attackers may benefit larger narratives about an individual's responsibility and poor choices.

5.   ***Be Wary of the Recently Reformed.*** Exit has several stages that recent formers have not experienced; consequently, recently exited formers may portray an unrealistic expectation. Public attention may also catalyze relapse in recently exited formers struggling with narcissism or power/control issues.

6.   ***Fact-Check Cultural Narratives.*** False narratives of supremacism's decline hinder exit work, according to exit workers. Reiterating a theme central to the cultural narrative discussion appearing earlier in this Chapter, controlling the population through narrative is a favored and highly effective tool for hegemonic power. Checking and correcting representations of cultural supremacism is (contextually) useful intervention.

Institutional Exit

Chapter 6 presented a critique of using therapeutic approaches to address racism. The analysis of the current project concluded that both structural and individual therapeutic approaches are almost certainly needed to activate transformative cultural change. The author's well-meaning condemnation of the eight-billion-dollar diversity training industry lamented the resources being spent on many poorly implemented interventions (Malik, 2020). This section returns to findings related to institutional interventions and presents them as an actionable strategy for addressing institutional supremacism.

Institutions and organizations are the primary customers of training interventions, which are used to prevent or to address employees' supremacist behaviors and attitudes. Ineffective

models nevertheless provide a convenient alternative to structural change for large companies and institutions including "Fortune 500" companies and police departments (Malik, 2020). They are sometimes implemented for an organization's public profile and to avoid consequences, each of which typically involve little intention of producing change (Bezrukova et al., 2016, p. 1230). Illustrative of this cynical though realistic appraisal is that less than 10% of court sanctions with institutional discrimination mandated the interventions reported most likely to increase diversity; worse still, many sanctioned institutions reported less diversity in the years following these interventions (Hirsh & Cha, 2017).

Exit-Informed Guidelines for Diversity Interventions. An exit worker with reported expertise in institutional bias reduction, recommended mandated change, outcomes evaluations, and increased oversight to affect institutional change and reduce bias. This finding was supported by Bezrukova et al., (2016) and Hirsh and Cha, (2017) which is reported here in an actionable format and integrates recent outcome data with the pioneers in organizational equity work Lewin (1946) and Cobbs (1968) with whom these more recent exponents of the theories considerably overlapped.

Intensive Interventions Over Time. A substantial time investment is needed to facilitate change. Researchers, exit workers, and clinicians agreed that short-duration, single-encounter interventions were ineffective and emphasized the importance of invested time (Bezrukova et al., 2016). The pioneer of sensitivity training, Lewin (1946), implemented an effective model of two weeks with consecutive full days of programming. [59] Cobbs' (1968) racial encounter groups were

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[59] Lewin developed several other interventions to address discrimination, also described by Marrow (1977), though a full account of his life's work is beyond the scope of this project.

weekend intensives. Exit workers' interventions most correlated to the diversity and sensitivity model were a full day or, in another group, two afternoons per month for three months.

Exit Informed Guidelines for Diversity and Sensitivity Intervention

1. ***Experiential Learning.*** Change is facilitated by experiential rather than passive learning. Observation and feedback from both group facilitators and peers are beneficial for experiential learning. Exit workers and clinical researchers both relayed that interventions should optimally provide education, skills training, concrete experience, and feedback. Interventions include skill application and experiential learning such as role-playing, group processing, sensory exercises, and intergroup dialogue (Bezrukova et al., 2016; Cobbs, 1968; Lewin, 1946).

2. ***Many Training Methods***. Include varied training methods. In addition to those named above, intervention examples described in clinical literature included group confrontation, real-world applications, physical touch, emotional intimacy, intermittent between group/intergroup dialogue, confrontation, candid expressions of beliefs, and dialogue between trainers and participants (Cobbs, 1968; Lewin, 1946). Having many modalities was correlated with increased outcomes over time (Bezrukova et al., 2016).

3. ***Intergroup Contact***. Facilitate intergroup contact. Researchers, clinicians, and exit workers emphasized the value of intergroup contact during interventions (Bezrukova et al., 2016; Cobbs, 1968; Lewin, 1946). For Cobbs and Lewin, this method is foundational to their methodology, and a good deal of intervention time was dedicated to intentional and candid intergroup dialogue and processing.[60]

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[60] Though exit workers did not integrate this into their training models, a similar principle was applied in victim reparations and amends interventions described in Chapter 11.

4.   ***Feedback***. Feedback is integral. Feedback between participants and facilitators is ideally integrated into the intervention module (Cobbs, 1968; Lewin, 1946). The exchanges should include feedback about individuals' prejudices and behavior in sessions and constructive feedback related to skill acquisition.

5.   ***Structural Change.*** Structural changes were the most correlated with long-lasting reliable institutional change. Structural changes should be applied with specificity and include "specific recruitment, hiring, or promotion plans" as well as oversight and monitoring to increase diverse representation (Hirsh & Cha, 2017, p. 42). In the absence of structural change, outcomes researchers reported that bias awareness training frequently *reduced* institutional diversity over the year following the intervention (Hirsh & Cha, 2017). Lewin's (1946) model implemented structural change alongside employee training and reported lasting positive impacts. Contemporary outcomes researchers reported that training programs integrated with structural considerations were more effective than training by itself (Bezrukova et al., 2016). Similarly, exit workers stressed the importance of monitoring institutional interventions to ensure fidelity and reduce bias.

The APA's (2017) Multicultural Guidelines and this project align with Malik's (2020) view that much of the work in addressing supremacism must happen on a structural rather than individual level. This section illustrated how interventions with individuals also intervene in structural supremacism. The conclusion here is that the transformation of individuals, systemic structures, and cultural narratives cannot be extricated from structural change within institutions.

Economic Exit

Economic supremacy was connected to global financial policy and domestic infrastructure throughout this text. This section first highlights an unexpected finding relating

client outcomes and exit workers' experiences to economic infrastructure. It then represents a historical example of successful intervention on economic supremacism as actionable steps, suggesting that past events could offer structurally competent intervention models.

Resource Craving Exit Programs. Exit workers practicing in countries which provided mental health care and social services through public institutions rarely mentioned suicidality, substance abuse, or abject poverty. Nonetheless, these themes and associated signs of work-related distress were regularly present in contexts with relatively few available public services or "resource craving" (Expert 1) environments. Exit programs with access to well-established social services also appeared to implement more effective case management[61] procedures, which was likely a feature of their ability to refer to multi-agency social services institutions.

These results reflect the analysis of Rodrik (2017). He explained that during the implementation of neoliberal economic policy, some hegemonic states implemented robust social services that redistributed a portion of the capital accumulations open trade produced. The resources provided by these public institutions have buffered those with access to them from the worst effects of global trade shocks (Rodrik, 2017). The implications emerging from the current finding relate specifically to national redistributive policies' impacts on exit workers' work-associated stress and exit outcomes, or put differently, the *lived* differences of neoliberal economics.

Muhammad's "Exit Ramps Out of Poverty." Muhammad (2019) demonstrated how the same tool was used simultaneously for the liberation of European immigrants and the subordination of Black Americans. In the second example, crime statistics were weaponized against Black Americans to justify economic supremacy, over-policing, incarceration, and

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[61] As described in Part 3, case management is separate from intervention but contributes to its success.

ghettoization. At the same time, White progressive era reformers operationalized crime statistics to promote equity for poor White Americans and soon-to-be-White light-skinned European Immigrants. With the help of crime statistics, reformers advocated against ineffective carceral solutions, increased supportive structures, and shifted cultural narratives about poor Whites and recent immigrants.

The comparative histories provided a detailed description of several highly effective interventions Muhammad called "on ramps to higher-paying jobs and exit ramps out of poverty" (2019, p. xxii). Rather than stages proceeding from one discretely to the next, these principles were applied broadly, working in tandem throughout their application.

The approach described here is recommended to address economic supremacism. Exit groups implement many of the strategies outlined here, as do public narratives advocating for reparations for communities of color, against mass incarceration, for defunding/ accountability of carceral institutions, and for developing alternatives to incarceration-based models of justice. The following intervention guidelines were translated from the interventions implemented by progressive era reformers as narrated by Muhammad (2019) and reviewed in Chapter 4.

1.   ***Reframe Oppression***. Recode crime in disadvantaged communities as effects rather than causes of oppression and repression. Instead of individual moral failing, decenter moralistic evaluations and reframe anti-social behavior as desperation, necessity, and crimes of poverty.

2.   ***Center Systemic Responsibility.*** Focus on structural accountability. Publicly bring awareness to the systemic impacts of unsafe and precarious housing, unsupported single parenting, unfair employment compensation, inadequate workers' protections, biased incarceration models.

3.   ***Discard Carceral Solutions.*** Impede police brutality. Use crime and court statistics to clarify the inefficacy of carceral solutions to social problems and publicize the data widely. Focus on diversions rather than incarceration. Offer alternatives to carceral interventions.

4   ***Provide Material Support.*** Implement material support broadly. Advocate for discrimination/bias reducing legal reform in criminal justice proceedings and labor protections. Provide better conditions in housing, employment, and education.

5   ***Alter the Collection and Reporting of Crime Statistics***. Separate crime statistics from their attached cause/effect narratives. Recognize and reject the underlying supremacist biases in their historic use.

The goals of the section were to clarify economic barriers to exit, illustrate the power of cultural narratives to maintain or erode supremacism, and demonstrate a culturally therapeutic approach to institutional supremacism produced by multiple-level interventions.

Exiting Carceral Supremacism

Punishing individual supremacists does not disrupt the structures maintaining and producing systems of supremacism. The cultural narratives that emerge in response to supremacist violence often employ the dehumanization principle, reinforcing supremacism's underlying structures: polarized thinking, distance, and dehumanization. Leading critical race theorist Angela Davis defines the problem of scapegoating individual supremacists for the violence of a White supremacist culture like this:

Neoliberal ideology drives us to focus on individuals, ourselves, individual victims, individual perpetrators. But how is it possible to solve the massive problem of racist state violence by calling upon individual police officers to bear the burden of that history and

to assume that by prosecuting them, by exacting our revenge on them, we would have

somehow made progress in eradicating racism (Davis, 2016)?

In line with Davis, this Chapter seeks alternative approaches to addressing supremacism outside

carceral institutions, not to support them avoiding accountability, but rather, to propose instead

drastic changes be made proportional to the problem the institution currently faces.

As described in detail in Chapter 8, Supremacist personalities are overrepresented in the

employees of carceral fields and college students seeking careers in carceral institutions

(Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Studies also reported a socialization effect, where cadets endorsing

low social dominance developed higher social dominance, anti-Black prejudice, and

ethnocentrism throughout their training (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999). Carceral institutional

infiltration is well-documented, as is supremacists' targeted recruitment of retired carceral

employees and veterans (Belew, 2018; Jones, 2015; Jüttner 2013; Koehler, 2017b; Pau &

Renner, 2015). More than simply a question of "bad apples," the environment is implicated.

A striking finding from the current study supported this analysis. In this example, an exit

worker linked their lengthy military service and violent history in supremacist activist groups as

part of a socialization theory for dehumanization. Contrasting these experiences, they observed

being similarly indoctrinated—socialized—into polarized thinking. Both the military and the

violent supremacist group told them what was good and what was bad, as well as the difference

between us versus them. The initial mental distancing of polarized thinking instigated physical

avoidance and segregation. They explained, from a distance grows stereotypic thinking,

caricaturing the other in terms of their cognitive distortion (pure evil, pure threat). This, over

time, facilitates dehumanization.

They illustrated several parallels between military service and supremacist activist

identity development's emotional, cognitive, and physiological processes. They cited the real need in both settings to quickly respond to threats without being delayed, for instance by questioning right and wrong or by empathy. This finding responded to previous literature relaying the socializing effects of carceral institutions, *viz*., increases in supremacism following police academy training and higher rates of social dominance orientation in law enforcement than the general population (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). They also experienced these cognitive distortions to remain within their cognitive landscape. The experience of being indoctrinated into dehumanization is corroborated by the work of Belew (2018), who found spikes in supremacist group participation membership when soldiers returned home after international conflicts ended.

Guidelines for Divesting from Carceral Interventions. Interventions for addressing carceral supremacism conclude with the following guidelines for restructuring responses to supremacism: divesting from carceral interventions, extricating financial decision making from carceral institutions, and replacing carceral responses to supremacism with alternative models for addressing supremacist activism.

1. ***Halt Expansion.*** German and Robinson (2018) showed that bias rather than lack of avenues for prosecution disrupted counterterrorism agencies' focus on supremacism. Rather than creating new agencies, halt expansion and implement structural changes (*viz.,* oversite, bias).

2. ***Reframe from Carceral to Culturally Therapeutic.*** Reframe polarized good and evil thinking and dehumanizing harsh punishments. The supremacism reducing potential of cultural narrative, exit groups' needs-based approaches, culturally therapeutic approaches, and transformative justice offer potential alternatives to carceral infrastructure.

3. ***Individual Interventions with Carceral Employees:*** The overrepresentation of supremacism in carceral employees almost certainly requires individual interventions to reduce supremacism. The well-documented socialization effects of intergroup contact, transformative justice, and exit-informed clinical approaches may be appropriate interventions. High-quality diversity and sensitivity interventions with infrastructural change and oversight offer an additional pathway (Bezrukova et al., 2016; Hirsch & Cha, 2017).

4. ***Implement Structural Changes****:* Structural interventions are needed to address bias, reduce employee supremacism, reduce institutional harm, and improve intervention outcomes. As Hirsch and Cha (2017) and exit workers described, structural change decisions should be outcomes-driven and monitored. This should also include equity-focused hiring and promotion practices (Hirsch & Cha, 2017)

5. ***Encourage/Fund Alternatives:*** Alternative intervention approaches, such as exit programs or the Think Project (Cifuentes, 2014), already exist and reported better outcomes than carceral interventions. Rather than reforming carceral intervention strategies, reallocating funds to existing better-performing alternatives and infrastructural support is likely more cost-effective and could provide some immediate benefits.

6. ***Democratize Financial Decisions:*** The immediately concerning enmeshment of financialization and counterterrorism agencies is further complicated by the opacity of decisions and decision making (Boukalas, 2015; Jackson, 2016; Jarvis, 2019). Reduce supremacist bias in decision-making by extricating financial decisions from carceral structures and place them within the context of democratic oversight.

7. ***Monitor:*** Effective structural changes in carceral institutions should acknowledge the

system's expected prevalence of supremacists as reported Jones (2015). Diversity task forces effectively implemented oversight in organizational settings (Hirsch & Cha, 2017). Both and workers and previous literature suggested institutionalizing transparency and monitoring protocols to ensure fidelity to change models.

A Culturally Therapeutic Approach for Community Harm. Current approaches to address supremacist activist violence either minimize and ignore supremacism, *i.e.*, counterterrorism approaches, or advocate purely punitive dehumanizing responses, which occurred in discussions following the January 2021 storming of the United States Capitol. Neither approach has the likely potential to change individual supremacism, and both ignore entirely systemic supremacism.

This model for addressing community harm integrates Lindahl's (2017a/b) critical approach with the supportive practices of exit workers. The following guiding principles illustrate a culturally therapeutic framework that divests punitive carceral models, polarized thinking, and dehumanization from approaches to community harm, including supremacist activism:

1. ***Dare to Know.*** Exit workers emphasized the need to begin all interventions by assessing the situation. Assessments would likely benefit from including Lindahl's suggestions for reflexivity and structural assessment in addition to the assessment guidelines for supremacism provided in Chapter 13. Structural assessments with supremacist activists may reveal a history of privilege, emphasizing the need for egalitarian societal structural changes to reduce supremacism.

2. ***Emancipation***. Responding to community harm requires a community needs analysis. The principle of emancipation does not indicate supremacist activists are oppressed and

need emancipation. Instead, it promotes decisions increasing emancipation for all, which sometimes include restricting the actions of those who cause harm. This principle also precludes draconian responses and fearmongering since these reduce community autonomy (Lindahl, 2017b).

3. ***Means/Ends Relationship.*** Increased suffering caused by responses to past harms only increases community suffering. Responses to community harm are likely more effective if they are prefigurative and interact with perpetuators of harm using means that reflect end goals for healing and transformative justice. This includes a commitment to humanize rather than dehumanize and maintain balanced rather than polarized views of those who caused community harm.

4. ***Non-violence***. Where possible, avoid causing physical confrontation when addressing community harm. Exit workers approached supremacists from a place of "compassion with healthy boundaries and consequences." In this application, a non-violent commitment is not a ban on force but rather a decision to fully assess situations so that interventions increase total safety and reduce total violence. In other words, sometimes reducing total violence requires forceful action to stop violent action.

5. ***Holism.*** Lindahl included holism to reflect the combination of the first four principles with a commitment to structural interventions. Here, this includes interventions to reduce supremacism, for example, through cultural narrative campaigns and desegregation in addition to addressing individual supremacism.

This model suggested a reformulation of interventions implemented in response to community harm. It promoted assessment, structural change, oversight, and outcomes-based monitoring of power-holding institutions. It avoided supremacist thinking that portrays others as

caricature or in polarized terms, and it rejected unwarranted physical distancing, harsh punishments, and dehumanization.

One implication from existing research on carceral socialization is that the cultural environments increase individuals' supremacism. An exit worker suggested a potentially viable psychological explanation for this socialization. Given the power of narrative change and structural intervention reported in the literature, as described earlier in this section, the intervention recommended here could theoretically reduce the supremacism increasing socialization of carceral environments by replacing carceral forms of interaction with culturally therapeutic ones.

Summary and Conclusions

Chapter 14 concluded this discussion by delineating a culturally therapeutic model for exiting supremacism, based on the present study's findings and critical review of literature in Parts 1-4. I divided the model's presentation into seven sections, each concerned with aspects of change found to be implicated in cultural transformation: structural competency, cultural narratives and myths, media representations, institutions, economics, and carceral agencies. The model's primary motivation was to provide a culturally therapeutic approach for addressing a cultural problem that has, up to now, resisted change over several hundred years despite ongoing intervention.

The chapter began with outcomes-driven recommendations on structural competencies for psychologists' evaluations of structural barriers. I then laid out considerations and research and practice-informed recommendations for addressing the intergenerational transmission of supremacism. Next, barriers to a cultural exit from supremacism were closely examined, arguing that cultural narratives are a central barrier, and practice-informed intervention models suggested

avenues for publicly representing supremacism and intervening on cultural myths.

The last three sections targeted three arenas of social organization: institutions, economics, and the carceral apparatus. Here, I argue how each is foundational to hegemonic society, explore the barriers they present to cultural exit, and offer specific data and practice-informed recommendations for structural changes within them. Institutional exit focused primarily on increasing diversity, reducing institutional discrimination, and maximizing the supremacism-reducing effects of university experiences. Economic exit took a historical approach in analysis and recommendations and argued that culture is produced by economics such that economic systems must be structured in a way that reflects egalitarian values if an egalitarian culture is to result. Finally, the carceral apparatus was shown to be guided by supremacist cultural narratives and perform poorly in outcomes measures evaluating its role in supremacism reduction intervention efforts. I then recommended an alternative outcomes-driven model that provided a pathway to transition carceral approaches to a culturally therapeutic model for addressing community harm.

Limitations and Future Research Directions

Given the need for establishing an evidential basis for addressing client-generated supremacism, future study is warranted. The current study's sample size—only 11 interview participants and four consulting experts—was a primary limitation. It was also limited by its narrow methodology. One potential way to address this could be with the addition of outcomes metrics, for instance, utilizing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation survey data to measure treatment responses to interventions on client-generated supremacism.

The theme of personality was fruitful in establishing intervention recommendations due to the prevalence of available data. One promising direction could include further exploring a

diagnosis for supremacist personality disorder, which previous literature suggested might extend the explanations of the Dark Triad personalities and increase interest in studying client-generated supremacism. Still, minimal investigation has been undertaken relating the observed differences in authoritarian personality or social dominance orientation in clinical settings. The current literature also does not adequately account for severity in the presentations of social dominance orientation and authoritarianism, though several studies alluded to their presence (Altemeyer, 2006; Altemeyer, 1998). Moreover, Altemeyer (2006), who conducted simulation studies with high endorses of the metrics, warned that building caricatures based on undesirable qualities risked falling into a kind of authoritarianism that obscures authoritarianism's presence in social dominance orientation in real-world examples.

Finally, additional research is needed to compare the results of single intervention approaches with a combination of individual and structural approaches. Though the existent research is clear that the latter is more effective in creating institutional and cultural change, a saturation of such data is likely needed to shift research approaches from narrowly focusing on single interventions to broader multi-intervention approaches.

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Appendix A
Semi-Structured Interview Topic List

- Who is part of your organization, and how do they work together?
  - How are the organizers and supporters organized?
  - What roles exist, and how are roles decided?
  - Are there any trainings?
  - Do you interact with existent mental health professionals? (psychologists, therapists, social workers, case workers)
- How does your exit group define efficacy?
- What are your strategies and methods?
  - How did you come to adopt the current protocols you are using?
  - When a method or strategy was not working and in need of revision, how did you know?
  - How did you address the issue?
  - Do you use mental health strategies or work with practitioners?
- If your program goes in an ideal direction, what will it look like in 5 years?
  - How does that compare to the current program?
- If your program is unsuccessful, what will it look like in 5 years?
  - What is your worst case scenario?
- How have you worked with other exit groups?

Appendix B
Interview with Exit Workers, Consent Form

DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY
600 FORBES AVENUE   ♦   PITTSBURGH, PA 15282

CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY

TITLE:
Exiting White Supremacy: A Mixed Methods Exploration of Interventions

INVESTIGATOR:
Jayme Jenkins, MA
PhD Candidate, Clinical Psychology
Duquesne University
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219.798.1333

ADVISOR:
Elizabeth Fein, PhD
Duquesne University Psychology
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SOURCE OF SUPPORT:
This study is being performed as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the doctoral degree in
Clinical Psychology at Duquesne University.

PURPOSE:
You are being asked to participate in a research project that seeks to investigate and compare
several discrete exit groups. The goal of this comparison is to better understand the particular
way different exit groups have come to define efficacy and the various strategies, methods, and
tools for refinement that have been employed by each group as they support former radical right-
wing hate-group members in exiting the white supremacist lifestyle.

In order to qualify for participation, you must be:
18 year or older and affiliated with an existing or former exit group.

PARTICIPANT PROCEDURES:
To participate in this study, you will be asked to:
Conduct an interview with the potential for follow-up as needed, provide records where possible
and applicable, and fill out an online survey. Each of these procedures is optional or may be
irrelevant to a given participant. A maximum of 1 survey will be offered to participants, and will
take no more than approximately ½ hour to complete. In addition, you will be asked to allow me

to interview you. The interviews will be recorded via audio and/or video and transcribed. Interview lengths are flexible—most last about an hour, but some may be shorter, and we also have the option of talking for longer if you would like. You may be asked for further information several times throughout the study, as information from other participants creates new questions. Later follow-up interviews will take no more than 45 minutes. For telephone and Skype conversations, researcher will be located in a private uninterrupted space in either their home or in a private office in the Duquesne Psychology department. For in person interviews, these will take place in a previously determined neutral but private location in the city where the participant lives, for instance in the office of a hotel or library that is commonly utilized for meetings. These are the only requests that will be made of you.

RISKS AND BENEFITS:
Although participation in this study will not directly benefit you, you may appreciate the opportunity to be part of the development and increased understanding of exit intervention programming. In addition to the final dissertation, the researcher will craft a concise documentation of findings. Through the dissertation work exit groups will come to have a more complete understanding of the similarities and differences between the techniques and strategies of exit groups worldwide, which may facilitate dialogue between exit groups through increased transparency and shared understanding.

A few risks are involved with participation in this study. The potential of a confidentiality breach is always possible, but the researcher will be making efforts through the use of encrypted files, de-identification, and locked files to protect your information. Also, interviews could bring up difficult emotional states. Should this happen, the researcher will provide you will resources to help you address this.

COMPENSATION:
There will be no compensation for participating in this study.
Participation in this project will require no monetary cost to you.

CONFIDENTIALITY:
Your participation in this study and any personal information that you provide will be kept confidential at all times and to every extent possible.

Your name will never appear on any survey or research instruments. All written and electronic forms and study materials will be kept secure. Your response(s) will only appear as statistical data summaries and alongside a pseudonym in both analysis and in reporting of findings. Any study materials with personal identifying information will be maintained for three years after the completion of the research and then destroyed.

All data will be de-identitied and anonymized. Pseudonyms and codes will be used to protect the identity of the subject's information. Since all study participants will be given pseudonyms, there will be no way to identify the subjects in the publication of the research data. I will use study codes and pseudonyms on data documents (e.g., field notes, audio recording). Each participant will be assigned a study ID prior to data collection. On a separate document I will type participants' name along with their unique study ID (e.g. 01). I will keep a separate document

that links the study code to the subjects' identifying information locked in a separate location. Further, I will keep original identifying audio or visual data in a separate encrypted location, separate from the de-identified encoded data.

RIGHT TO WITHDRAW:
You are under no obligation to participate in this study. You are free to withdraw your consent to participate at any time by 02/01/2020. If you would like to withdraw, please email the contact information listed above, and research will be deleted where electronically saved or shredded if in paper form.

SUMMARY OF RESULTS:
A summary of the results of this research will be supplied to you, at no cost, upon request.

VOLUNTARY CONSENT:
I have read the above statements and understand what is being requested of me. I also understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw my consent at any time, for any reason. On these terms, I certify that I am willing to participate in this research project.
I understand that should I have any further questions about my participation in this study, I may call Jayme Jenkins 219.798.1333. Should I have any questions regarding protection of human subject issues, I may contact Dr. David Delmonico, Chair of the Duquesne University Institutional Review Board, at 412.396.1886.

By engaging in an interview, you are consenting to participate in this study.

By agreeing to participate in this study, you are agreeing that:
- you have read this consent form (or it has been read to you) and have been given the opportunity to ask questions and have them answered;
- you have been informed of potential risks and they have been explained to your satisfaction;
- you are 18 years of age or older;
- your participation in this research is completely voluntary;