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The Formation of Proxy Force and External State Relationships: Prospect Theory and Proxy Force Decision Making

Brandon Temple

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THE FORMATION OF PROXY FORCE AND EXTERNAL STATE
RELATIONSHIPS: PROSPECT THEORY AND PROXY FORCE DECISION
MAKING

by

Brandon W. Temple

A dissertation
submitted to the Graduate School,
the College of Arts and Sciences
and the School of Coastal Resilience
at The University of Southern Mississippi
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Approved by:

Dr. Robert J. Pauly, Jr., Committee Chair
Dr. Tom Lansford
Dr. Joseph St. Marie
Dr. Joseph Weinberg

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ABSTRACT

Proxy war is a common tactic employed by great powers as a safer alternative to direct conflict, especially in the era of nuclear weapons. While proxy war is common, there is a lack of research on the formation of proxy-external state relationships. Previous research has typically examined the phenomena of proxy war through the perspective of the external state power, leaving a gap in the literature. This dissertation fills that gap by assessing the conditions under which armed groups enter into proxy relationships with external states. Using prospect theory as a framework for understanding more clearly armed group decision making (an original approach theoretically), Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis as a testing methodology, existing intrastate warfare data sets and 10 individual proxy relationship case studies, this study finds that armed groups enter into proxy force relationships with external state powers when they are in a domain of losses and are risk accepting. Furthermore, the dissertation identifies two standalone significant risk conditions and six risk condition recipes which effect armed group domain and increase the likelihood of a proxy relationship outcome. As the international system continues down the path of multipolarity, proxy wars will likely increase as an alternative to direct conflict between great powers. A thorough understanding of the phenomena will be of great importance to academia and policy practitioners in the United States alike.

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DEDICATION

First, I would like to thank the Lord, Jesus Christ, for the gifts He has given me and for His constant forgiveness for my shortcomings. Nothing is possible without His love.

This dissertation is dedicated to my wife Kristyn, and my children Gavin, Aidan, and Harper. Thank you for your love and support throughout this process and throughout my educational career. This is the culmination of hours spent locked away researching and writing, time spent away from you. Your love, support, and encouragement made this possible. I am forever indebted to you all. I love you.

This dissertation is also dedicated to my parents, Gary and Cheryl Temple. Throughout my life you have believed in me, loved me, and encouraged me. When I was not living up to my potential, you were there to remind me. I would not be where I am today without your love and support. I love you both.

I do not care much for accolades, awards, or public recognition for my accomplishments. You all know this. The satisfaction I derive from my accomplishments is knowing the people mentioned on this page, my family, are proud of me. That is all that ever matters to me. Hopefully, this dissertation is fridge worthy...

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CHAPTER I - Introduction

Since 2014, a coalition led by the United States has waged war on the Islamic State Group (ISIS), an Islamist extremist terrorist organization that emerged and spread across Iraq and Syria from 2011-2014. The American public, war weary from 19 years of continuous armed conflict, has little appetite for its prized sons and daughters to die in Middle Eastern war zones. Thus, the American strategy in the defeat ISIS campaign (D-ISIS) in Syria has centered on the support of a majority Kurdish force, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and their efforts to take back land once held by ISIS. Supported by coalition special operations forces (SOF), intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and close air support (CAS), the SDF, led by General Mazloum Kobane, successfully destroyed the physical caliphate of ISIS in Syria. This battlefield success came at the cost of 11,000 SDF killed and 21,000 wounded (Said, 2019).

The United States found a capable and willing proxy force in the SDF. However, this relationship, born out of necessity and the unwillingness to risk significant American casualties, has added strain to an already fractured relationship between Washington and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally Turkey. Ankara views the SDF as nothing more than an offshoot of Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a terrorist group active in Turkey since the mid-1980s. As a result, the United States was impotent to act when Turkish forces invaded the SDF controlled city of Afrin in January 2018. In late October, Turkey commenced a large scale invasion of northern Syria, shelling cities with artillery and airstrikes over several days before a ceasefire was put in place. Nonetheless, American forces could only pull back from their positions as their partners in the D-ISIS campaign faced elimination.

This situation prompted some scholars to ask why a proxy force would become a pawn to an external state power (Byman, 2018). In this case, the SDF achieved the objectives of the United States in defeating the physical ISIS caliphate. However, once Turkey decided to wage war against the American proxy in Afrin, Washington did little to stop it. American history is replete with examples of this phenomena. The botched Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in April 1961 by Cuban exiles fell apart when the United States failed to provide promised intelligence and fire support to its proxy. After the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the United States pulled away from its proxy force, the Mujahedeen, leaving a power vacuum in Afghanistan, which led to civil war, and the rise of the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

To call proxy forces “pawns,” however, misunderstands the nature of these groups. Non-state proxy forces like the SDF are political entities and, while often lacking recognized sovereign territory, they behave like states. They have strategies, objectives, and ideologies. They have governing structures, political institutions, and military hierarchies. Thus, one can surmise that armed groups engaged in an internal conflict make rational decisions on who they enter into proxy relationships with. Further, these relationships are much more complex than a simple pawn doing the bidding of another with blind allegiance and obedience.

Armed groups face certain circumstances and conditions which affect their risk calculus. This, in turn, drives them to a rational decision to enter into proxy relationships with external state powers in order to achieve their objectives. There are examples throughout history where armed groups involved in intrastate conflict have “gone in alone” and have not turned to an external power for military support. From 1975 to 2016,

approximately one-third of all intrastate conflicts have involved no external state support of any kind (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2016). Thus, the formation of a proxy-external state relationship during intrastate conflict is not a given. It is a specific phenomenon which merits study.

Statement of Purpose and Introduction of Theoretical Approach

The purpose of this dissertation is to better understand the formation of proxy-external state relationships. Specifically, it will examine the decision making processes of armed groups, seeking to overthrow a sitting government or carve out an independent state within another sovereign state's territory. Using Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), and 10 cases of proxy-external state relationships between 1945-present day, this study will examine which circumstances and conditions have the greatest effect on an armed group's risk calculus, and how those variables drive them to the decision to enter into a proxy relationship vice going in alone.

Contemporary studies on proxy-external state relationships have utilized a variety of theoretical approaches. Three approaches, or research programs, have prevailed. First, scholars have developed hybrid theories based on multi-theoretical approaches (Groh, 2010; Mumford, 2013). Mumford, for example, concludes that "...reliance on one single theoretical school" blinds scholars to the interconnected nature of proxy war and its theories. A second approach is to examine proxy war and relationships through sociological theories, those sociological theories of states in particular (Ahram, 2011; Krieg and Rickli, 2019). Krieg and Rickli challenge the traditional notions of the "Trinitarian" relationship between the society, soldier, and state (Clausewitz, 1832; Huntington 1957; Waltz, 1959) in an increasingly "apolar" world (2019, p.12). Finally,

scholars have examined specific facets of proxy-external state relationships using existing theoretical frameworks (Borghard, 2014).

This dissertation takes a unique theoretical approach, which, to this author's knowledge, has yet to be employed as a theoretical framework in the corpus of work on proxy-external state relationships. This study utilizes prospect theory as a theoretical framework, which is a fitting theoretical framework given the focus on risk calculus prior to a decision point. Prospect theory will be covered in depth in a subsequent section. However, an introduction to the theory is fitting here. Prospect theory is an economic theory developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1979). Its aim was to create a model for decision making under conditions of risk and domain. Those in a domain of "losses" were said to be risk accepting, while those in the domain of "gains" were risk adverse. It was a direct challenge to expected utility theory and earned Kahneman and the Nobel Prize in Economics.

Kaheman and Tversky (1979, p.288) conclude that prospect theory "should be extended in several directions." Specifically, they specify applications to political science and international relations, noting the theory could apply to policy decisions involving, "...the number of lives that could be lost or saved as a consequence of a policy decision" (p.288). Jack Levy (1992a,) was the first to explore the utility of prospect theory in political science and international relations (p.183). Writing in June of 1992, Levy introduced prospect theory in an article in *Political Psychology*. He concludes that prospect theory "...provides an important alternative theoretical framework for the analysis of social and political behavior" (p.183). Jonathan Mercer (2005) stated,

“Prospect theory is the most influential behavioral theory of choice in the social sciences.”

Heng and Fe (2011) linked prospect theory to alliance theory in their exploration of an Asian alliance system comparable to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Consequently, He and Feng linked prospect theory to one of the most utilized theoretical models in proxy-external state relationships. It is the author’s intent to explore that link. He and Feng conclude that alliance relationships are determined as such:

(1) high threats frame decision-makers in a domain of losses, and multilateral alliances become a favorable alliance choice because states are more likely to take the risk of constraining their freedom of action in return for more help from multiple allies as well as for avoiding further strategic losses;

(2) low threats position leaders in a domain of gains, and bilateral alliances win out because states are risk-averse in terms of maintaining their freedom of action in seeking security through alliances with fewer allies.

The conclusion above is a natural tie to the exploration of proxy-external state relationships. He and Feng conclude that states in a domain of gains and low risk will decrease their alliances to maintain autonomy and freedom of action. Conversely, states in a domain of loss and high risk are willing to strike alliances with more states, sacrificing autonomy to move into the continuum of gains. If armed groups, seeking to overthrow a sitting government or carve out an independent state within another sovereign state’s territory, behave like states, as is argued here, then they should act similar to states in the same situations. Thus, under certain circumstances and conditions, armed groups may seek a proxy relationship with an external state power when in they

are in a domain of “losses” and therefore are risk accepting in terms of their autonomy. Conversely, external state actors may not enter into such a relationship when they are in the domain of “gains” and risk adverse, where they seek to preserve autonomy.

Prospect theory is unique to theories of decision making as it examines decision making within the context of past and current events, and how those events change an actors risk reference point and determine an actors “domain” defined in terms of gains/losses. This is in contrast to other decision making models, such as game theory, two-level games, and the like, which focus decision making based on expected future outcomes. Thus prospect theory shows how an actor’s historical and present experience affects their current risk/domain which in turn drives decision making.

Specification of Research Questions, Hypothesis, and Central Arguments.

Under the tenets of prospect theory, risk drives proxy-external state relationships, such that armed groups, trying to overthrow a sitting government or create an independent state, seek external state support when in the domain of losses, increasing their risk acceptance. On the outcome side, the risk of entering into such a relationship may include but is not limited to, external state powers view proxy relationships as transactional (hierarchical). External state powers may cut off support when support is deemed no longer beneficial to their national interests (abandonment). Armed groups may lose credibility internally as a nationalist/ideological cause by aligning with an external state power (identity). State support may be conditional, causing a loss in operational control (autonomy). States may not publicly acknowledge support and restrict support to maintain secrecy (covert).

This study, however, will focus on the conditions and circumstances that drive armed groups to enter into such relationships prior to the decision point, while acknowledging the aforementioned risks of outcome. Variables which drive armed groups to enter into proxy relationships are, but may not be limited to, regime type, magnitude of the fighting, economic factors such as per capita GDP, regional and global instability factors, and the nature of the incompatibility between the armed group and the state. These variables will form the foundations of the Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis approach to be explained in greater detail in the methodology chapter.

The decision to enter into such a relationship is not obvious. Armed groups have to factor in these risks when considering entering into such relationships in relation to their domain (gains/losses) at a particular point in time within the given circumstances and conditions. Consequently, the following research questions will be addressed in this dissertation:

Research Questions: Under what conditions do armed groups enter into proxy relationships with external states? What risk factors have the most effect on the risk reference point and change the armed group's domain (gains/losses)?

In response to these two questions, the following hypothesis, informed by the relevant literature and theory, will be presented, investigated, and assessed in the dissertation.

H1: Armed groups, seeking to overthrow a sitting government or create an independent state, enter into proxy-state relationships when in the domain of losses, increasing risk acceptance.

The central arguments of this dissertation are as follows. First, it will be shown that armed groups make deliberate decisions to enter into proxy relationships informed by past and current circumstances, conditions, and experience. Further, these circumstances, conditions, and experiences effect risk tolerance levels and domain status at the decision point. Second, prospect theory is a fitting theoretical framework for understanding the choice of an armed group to enter into a proxy relationship. This will open up the possibility to apply prospect theory frameworks to a number of armed conflict scenarios. Third, it will be shown that armed groups act similar to states and, therefore, their actions can be understood through traditional international relations theories, such as classical realism. Finally, proxy-external state relationships are a unique subset of third-party intervention.

Significance of the Dissertation

This dissertation is significant in several ways. First, it is unique. The vast majority of academic work on proxy-external state relationships examine the phenomena from the state perspective (Bertil, 1981; Groh, 2010, Ahram, 2011; Hughes, 2012; Mumford, 2013; Borghard, 2014; Krieg and Rickli, 2019). These studies are rich, their contributions valuable, and they form the foundations of proxy-external state relationships research. However, these studies are tinted by Westphalian notions of international relations, where the state is the center and all else are the periphery. They are tinted by realist notions of state power and supremacy. If the last few decades have taught us any lessons, it has been that armed groups can throw the international system into disarray, leaving states perplexed on how to respond, and how to consolidate gains

for long term strategic success. The wars in Afghanistan against the Taliban and in Iraq and Syria against ISIS are notable in this regard.

Second, this study is a first. To the author's knowledge, this is the first use of prospect theory to examine the choice of an armed group to enter into a proxy relationship with an external state. To this author's knowledge, it is the first use of prospect theory in proxy war studies in general. Prospect theory is fitting and proper as military decision making is driven primarily by risk. Thus, to examine the decision making of an armed group, and how those decisions are come to based off risk and domain at the decision point is realistic. The use of prospect theory will enrich the body of work on proxy-external state relationships and act as a jump off point for future studies.

Third, this study is timely. Studies on proxy war gained steam during the Cold War as a myriad of factors rendered great power war unattractive and unlikely. The concept of mutual assured destruction made it clear that a direct confrontation between the two superpowers of the time would be catastrophic, and this forced the two enemies to find other ways to combat one another on the fringes. Proxy war was one such method. This is why it gained so much academic attention during the Cold War. As the international system moves into multipolarity, with the United States and China as the primary superpowers, Russia as a lesser power, and regional powers who challenge the status quo such as Iran and North Korea, the international security framework is fragile. Nonetheless, direct conflict between any one or combination of these states and others could have catastrophic results. Thus, it stands to reason that proxy wars will increase as a method for these states to impose costs on one another indirectly. The Syrian example

is a telling one, with a host of state and non-state armed groups fighting in a small space for seemingly limited strategic gains.

Finally, this study is immediately applicable to the planning and conduct of American foreign policy. It has applications to policymakers in Washington, for more than just the reasons stated in the previous paragraph. Entering into a relationship with an armed group has its risks, especially for a state like the United States, which tries more than some to adhere to international norms and laws of armed conflict. To understand the risk reference point and domain of a prospective proxy will allow policymakers to make more informed decisions. For example, policymakers could war-game how a proxy's actions may change if they move into the domain of gains. As argued here, armed groups will feel less compelled to follow the lead of their state sponsor when things are going well. This could cause them to act out, perhaps committing human rights violations as they gain the upper hand in their struggle. This would be a nightmare for the United States in the information space and runs counter to its explicitly identified values and exceptionalism.

Structure of the Dissertation

The balance of this study will progress through 5 subsequent chapters. The second chapter, a literature review, will trace proxy wars place within the broader study of warfare, analyze the major works on proxy war and place them within the proper context of intrastate conflict and third-party intervention. The chapter will analyze the major theoretical frameworks used to date to study the phenomena of proxy-external state relationships, and demonstrate how this study fits and builds upon the corpus of knowledge. Theories on decision making will be analyzed. In doing so, it will show why

prospect theory is an appropriate framework and expose the limitations of outcome based decision models.

Chapter three will cover methodology, which, broadly, will define terms, operationalize variables, specify the rationale behind case selection, and outline the structure for conducting the case studies. More importantly, it will make explicit the usefulness of fsQCA, explain data parameters and collection in detail, and make clear the testing procedures to be used to test the hypothesis.

Chapter four will focus on data collection and analysis for the cases. This will unfold through a background on each case, followed by the raw variable scores for each case using the specified fuzzy set memberships outlined in Chapter three. Chapter five will analyze the general outcome of the 10 case studies, through the results of fsQCA testing, and present findings. Finally, a concluding chapter will assess the extent of the validity of the hypothesis, link findings to real-world applications and policy, and identify topics that require further research.

CHAPTER II – Literature Review

The intent of this chapter is to guide the reader through the literature in a methodical way to clearly demonstrate the author's line of thought. It will flow from the broad to specific and is composed of three main sections. The first section will focus on the practical concepts and literature associated with intrastate conflict and third-party intervention. Specifically, the first section will define intrastate conflict. It will discuss the causes and types of intrastate conflict. It will examine who participates in intrastate conflict and assess why third parties intervene. Further, it will be shown that third-party intervention is not a given; instead, there is a typology of third-party intervention. Within this typology, exists proxy war. Proxy war scholarship and existing definitions will be critiqued. This section will conclude with a revised definition of proxy war for use during this study.

The second main section of this chapter will shift from the practical to the theoretical. It will briefly examine the main theories associated with intrastate conflict, third-party intervention, and proxy war. This will provide the reader with the requisite background on the subject matter. From there, the section will shift to theories of alliances, relationships, and, most importantly, decision making. It will analyze the principal theories of international relations that attempt to explain why states and non-state actors alike form mutually beneficial relationships and what conditions and circumstances may lead to the formation of these relationships. From there, it will turn to the theoretical literature on decision making processes. It will analyze what composes a decision making unit. For example, is it a unitary rational actor or an interplay of bureaucratic processes and outcomes (Allison, 1979)? From there, this section will

compare and contrast outcome-based decision making theories with risk and pre-decisional events and conditions theory, the most significant of which germane to the dissertation is prospect theory. It will be shown that prospect theory is a fitting theoretical framework for this study and guide the reader through that rationale. Finally, the third section will synthesize the first two sections and explain how this study adds to the body of existing literature on the subject. Furthermore, it will punctuate the need for this study in the contemporary international system.

Section 1 – Intrastate War and Third-Party Intervention: From Armed Group to Proxy

*What country before ever existed a century & half without a rebellion? & what country can preserve its liberties if their rulers are not warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit of resistance? Let them take arms. The remedy is to set them right as to facts, pardon & pacify them. What signify a few lives lost in a century or two? **The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots & tyrants. It is its natural manure.***

– **Thomas Jefferson**

Thomas Jefferson makes two key points above. First, rebellion against one's government is common and has been since the creation of organized states. Second, in some cases, intrastate conflict can be just and, more to Jefferson's point, a great phenomenon for mankind and the cause of liberty. However, Jefferson was caught up in the revolutionary spirit of his time, painted upon the backdrop of Enlightenment principles. In reality, intrastate conflict is often brutal and unrelenting. The first point made by Jefferson, that civil war, or as it will be referred to here, intrastate conflict, has been ubiquitous throughout organized human history is acknowledged.

The purpose of this section is thus: first, intrastate conflict will be defined and placed within the broader context of armed conflict to include interstate conflict.) Second,

this section will explore the literature for the causes and types of intrastate conflict. Third, this section will examine the phenomenon of third-party intervention. Fourth, it will be shown that proxy war is a specific type of third-party intervention. A deeper explanation of proxy war will follow, defining what proxy war is and what is a proxy force and its relation to a supporting external state power. This section will leave the reader with a clear understanding of the foundations of intrastate conflict, third-party intervention, and proxy war.

What is Intrastate War?

To begin, it is important to clarify the terms “civil war” and “intrastate war,” which are often used interchangeably. This has been noted and accepted in several scholarly works on the subject (Hazen, 2013, p.1; Human Security Report, 2012; Sarkees, Wayman, and Singer, 2003, p.55). For the sake of consistency, this study will use the term intrastate conflict throughout. However, the Sarkees, Wayman, and Singer (2003) citation is notable. J. David Singer, along with Melvin Small, authored *The Wages of War* in 1972, “...a work that established a standard definition of war that has guided the research of hundreds of scholars since its publication” (Correlates of War Project).

Singer and Melvin’s (1994) Correlates of War (COW) along with Gleditsch et al. Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) (2002) are the “...two most common data sets” used to define and study intrastate conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2006, p.5). A review of the relevant literature shows this is indeed the case and citing the multitude of examples could fill many pages. Once more, the latter cites and generally agrees with the former on the various definitions of conflict. This creates a situation which is often illusive in academia; a general consensus on defining a social phenomenon. Therefore, intrastate

conflict “occurs between the government of a state and internal opposition groups without intervention from other states” (Gleditsch et al. 2002, p.619). To add specificity, Small and Singer (1982) define intrastate conflict as any armed conflict that involves (1) military action internal to the metropole of the state system member; (2) the active participation of the national government; (3) effective resistance by both sides; and (4) a total of at least 1,000 battle-deaths during each year of the war. Intrastate conflict is one of the four types of armed conflict identified and defined in the ACD and COW. The other types are interstate conflict, extrastate armed conflict, and internationalized internal armed conflict. The last type mentioned is where this study will spend the majority of its efforts.

Causes and Typology of Intrastate Conflict

While there is a general consensus on definition and data sets as pertains to intrastate conflict, the causes are open to considerable debate. Scholars have discovered many potential causes of intrastate conflict, each backed up by convincing evidence. The social sciences focus on human interactions and armed conflict is but a type of human interaction. Therefore, singular causes are elusive, if not impossible. Dixon found between the years of 1999 and 2009, studies on the causes of intrastate war contained “...200 hundred independent variables, there is some degree of consensus on the effects of fewer than 30 and a high degree of consensus on no more than seven” (2009, p.707). Armed conflict, like most human interactions, are better understood through the study of a confluence of causes. This section will begin by exploring those causes and scholars whom have dominated intrastate war scholarship.

Socioeconomic causes of intrastate war have found ample resonance in the scholarly field. (Please specify which academic disciplines or sub-disciplines here.) In fact, they dominate the field. Collier and Hoeffler (1998) find that low per capita income increases the likelihood of a state's susceptibility to intrastate war, along with abundant natural resources and high populations. The natural resource link has been the cornerstone of Michael Ross' study of intrastate conflict. Ross (2004) found that natural resource wealth is positively correlated to intrastate war onset in general, but could not trace a single casual mechanism. In other words, natural resources are a cause, but not one sub variable, such as oil versus mineral resource dominates causal links.

The socioeconomic focus, according to Cederman et al. (2009, p.404) have "relied heavily on materialist interpretations of civil wars at the country level while downplaying specific interactions involving ethnic groups. "Ethnic and cultural causes of intrastate conflict gained prominence in the wake of genocides in the Balkans, Rwanda, and Sudan in the 1990s. To be sure, these conflicts were driven by cultural, ethnic-and/or religious factors. Yet they represented only three cases in the overall number of intrastate conflict studies prevalent in the aftermath of the Cold War. The scale of their brutality and the fact that the accompanying massacres were broadcast across the globe through improved communications technology may have led to an exaggeration of the ethnic causes of intrastate conflict. Fearon and Laitin (2003, p.75) agree, finding "more ethnically or religiously diverse countries have been no more likely to experience significant civil violence." Rather, it is the conditions that support insurgency, according to Fearon and Laitin, namely poverty, large populations, and rural terrain that increase the likelihood of intrastate conflict.

Moving beyond the state level of analysis, Blanton and Apodaca (2007, p.599) find that the global economy is yet another indicator, arguing globalization defined as access to global markets, is a driver of peace and security. At both the state and international levels of analysis, socioeconomic causes of intrastate conflict dominate the field. Still, some scholars are not convinced. Refuting the socioeconomic hypothesis, Djankov and Reynal-Querol (2007, p.1) conclude that political institutions namely, “property rights, rule of law and the efficiency of the legal system, are a fundamental cause of civil war.” Political institutional weakness has been correlated elsewhere to state instability. For example, Maya Tudor (2017) concludes that Pakistan has experienced a number of coups and changes in government control whereas India has remained stable because the former lacked mature political institutions at the time of state creation. The Indian Congress Party had well established leaders, processes, and support from the populace. This gave the Indian state a solid political foundation. On the other hand, Pakistan’s Muslim League lacked these attributes which, according to Tudor, set the stage for the endless cycle of coups which followed Pakistani independence.

While socioeconomic issues have clearly dominated the scholarly work on the causes of intrastate conflict, those associated with ethnic-religious, political institutional, post-colonial, and international systemic structural factors must also be considered. However, the most nuanced explanations of what causes international conflict are likely found at the crossroads of these casual mechanisms. The Rwandan genocide of the Tutsis (and “trader Hutus”) at the hands of the Hutu majority in the spring of 1994 is a case in point. The crux of the Rwandan genocide was ethnic. Hutus slaughtered Tutsis because they were ethnically different. However, there is more to the story. Post-colonialism is

also a fitting causal link. The Belgians put a system in place where the Tutsis were privileged and the Hutus were deemed second class citizens, despite the fact that they constituted the majority of the population. Once Rwanda gained its independence in 1962 the Hutus took power with much anger and resentment remaining from the colonial era.

In both cases, during the colonial period and after, political institutions can also be cited as a cause. In both cases they were weak, and each was based upon the subjugation of the other. Rwanda was also a poor state and access to its few resources was a primary mover of ethno- exclusionary policies, both during colonialism and after. Finally, the international system, at the time led by the United States as the lone superpower allowed the slaughter to continue as it was reluctant to act in Africa after the debacle in Somalia in October 1993 when 18 American Special Operators were killed and dragged through the streets of Mogadishu and footage was shown by international media outlets. War, intra or interstate, is complex, and the causes can rarely be traced back to a singular variable. Thus, it can be concluded that the aforementioned studies all have value and aided in our understanding of the onset of intrastate war.

While most intrastate conflicts trace their origins to a myriad of often interconnected variables, typologies of intrastate conflict within academia have focused primarily on three brands: ethnic, ideological, and religious (Gurr, 1993; Regan 1996; Kaufmann, 1996). Kaufmann (1996, p.138) defines ethnic conflict as war between communities with distinct identities based on language, religion, and culture, while ideological conflicts involve war within a community based on how to best govern the community. Kaufmann brings the religious and ethnic aspects into one definition, while Regan separates the two (1996, p.338). Some conflicts involve a combination of all three

types, with the breakup of the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s offering a poignant example.

Third-party Intervention

Thus far, intrastate conflict has been defined. The relevant literature has been analyzed to identify and explain the various causes of intrastate conflict. Finally, the types of intrastate conflict have been included. However, intrastate conflict does not exist in a vacuum. Often, intrastate conflicts evolve into regional interstate conflicts. The Rwanda genocide and subsequent civil war spilled into neighboring Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Still others draw the attention of third-party states which, for one interest or another, intervene in the intrastate conflict. In the first instance, an intrastate conflict spills over into the international arena, while in the second instance, international factors affect states domestically. This section focuses on the latter phenomena, third-party intervention.

The ACD defines two types of intrastate conflict. The first type was defined above where an intrastate conflict remains internal between the warring factions. The second type is “internationalized internal armed conflict,” which occur “between the government of a state and internal opposition groups with intervention from other states” (Gleditsch et al, 2002, p.619). Third-party intervention can take many forms. It can be singular, with one state intervening on either the behalf of the government or the rebels. It can also be a multinational, involving two or more states intervening on behalf of the government or the rebels, without an international mandate from the United Nations Security Council. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) intervention in Libya is an example of a coalition third-party intervention. Third-party intervention can

be international, defined as an intervention sanctioned by the United (UN) Nations Security Council. UN missions have been established and international troops deployed to numerous intrastate conflicts around the globe (Bobrow and Boyer 1997).

More broadly, Regan (2002) identifies three categories of third-party intervention: economic, diplomatic, and military, irrespective of the number or nature of the intervener. The nature of these types of intervention are evident and each has various applications. For example, a military intervention could include the deployment of third-party troops into direct combat, the deployment of advisors/trainers, or the supply of military arms and advice. Economic interventions may include providing funds or, by contrast, sanctioning one of the warring parties or their leaders. Finally, diplomatic interventions can be unilateral, multinational, or international, again sanctioned by the United Nations.

Military Intervention

This study is primarily concerned with military intervention, whether it be direct intervention by a third-party state's military, advising and training missions, or material/intelligence support. There are many reasons why third parties intervene militarily in intrastate conflicts. However, it must be acknowledged that most cases of third-party interventions involve a confluence of all instruments of national power: diplomatic, information, military, and economic. With that caveat, an analysis of why third-party states intervene in intrastate conflicts is in order.

There has been much ink spilled on the topic of determinants of third-party intervention, as well as the desired outcomes of third-party intervention. Jun Koga (2011, p.1143) provides a succinct overview of these topics citing the giants in intrastate conflict scholarship. From the academic literature, Koga (2011, p.1143) finds several reasons why

a third-party may intervene militarily in an intrastate conflict, most notably interest and ideology, ethnic affinities, regional and/or global security, regime type, previous interventions in the conflict state, and humanitarian. Furthermore, possible desired outcomes of third-party intervention include shortening, or prolonging, the intrastate conflict, intervention to loot the target state's natural resources, and/or influencing the outcome of the conflict.

The contention of this study finds its basis in the realist school of international relations. When Koga lists interest as a determinant to intervention, she cites Hans Morgenthau's 1967 *Foreign Affairs* article "To Intervene or Not to Intervene". Morgenthau, a seminal classical realist, contends that "All nations will continue to be guided in their decisions to intervene and their choice of the means of intervention by what they regard as their respective national interests" (p.430). This is the umbrella rationale for third-party intervention under which all others must fall. Whether or not a third-party shares ethnic affinities, desires to loot resources, or to save a people from massacre, in every instance the state has judged that intervention is a national interest. This is not to disparage the study of downstream causes. However, national interest must be the supreme rationale for one state's decision to intervene in the domestic affairs of another.

This finding, that national interest is the overarching rationale as to why a third-party state intervenes in an intrastate conflict, brings one a step closer to identifying proxy war as a type of third-party intervention. Morgenthau (1967) was more concerned with what were legitimate causes for intervention within national interest. Morgenthau (p.430) uses a theoretical example which is helpful to the main argument here:

Let us suppose that nation A intervenes on behalf of the government of nation B by giving it military, economic and technical aid on the latter's request, and that the government of B becomes so completely dependent upon A as to act as the latter's satellite. Let us further suppose that the local opposition calls upon country C for support against the agents of a foreign oppressor and that C heeds that call. Which one of these interventions is legitimate? Country A will of course say that its own is and C's is not, and vice versa, and the ideologues on both sides will be kept busy justifying the one and damning the other. This ideological shadowboxing cannot affect the incidence of interventions.

Using this example, suppose the real interest and intent of nation A's intervention is to challenge and act contrary to the interests of country C. Thus, nation B and the local opposition have become party to an indirect conflict between two external state powers, nation A and country C. This third-party intervention can now be classified as a "proxy war" as the intent of the external actors is to harm one another through the means of the conflict between nation B and the local opposition group. From here a deep dive into proxy warfare scholarship is warranted to understand of this proposition is consistent with the relative literature.

Proxy War: From Antiquity to Present

At the time of this writing, proxy forces are engaged in proxy warfare throughout the world. In Syria, the SDF is at once combatting ISIS with American support and desperately fending off Turkish attacks into its territory. The United States is directly challenging Russia, Syria, and Iran through the SDF. Iran has mobilized Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) to fight in Syria, whether against ISIS or the Al Qaeda affiliated Jab hat Fatah al-Sham, and assisting the Syrian regime in retaking the country. More importantly, the Iranians are able to work against U.S. and Israeli interests in the region. Russia has employed a mixture of regular military, Special Forces, and private military and security

companies (PMSC) such as the Wagoner Group in this same space. Russian support of the Syrian regime is a direct challenge to the United States and the West.

In Ukraine, Russia has supported separatists in Eastern Ukraine, using these forces to expand its sphere of influence into the former Soviet Republics while directly challenging the interests of the European Union (EU) and NATO. Further, Iran is arming and providing advisors to the Houthis in Yemen, who have attacked Saudi Arabia on several occasions and have shot down American drones. The Houthi proxies allow Iran to engage its regional rival, Saudi Arabia, as well as challenging the interests of the United States. On 2 January, 2020, in arguably the most provocative act the United States has taken since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, U.S. Drones killed the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force (QF) General Qasem Soleimani, who built, directed, and sustained Iranian proxy forces in the Middle East and elsewhere for over two decades. These current events only begin to scratch the surface of the current state of proxy wars around the globe.

Likewise, scholars have turned their attention toward the study of proxy wars with a vigor not seen since the Cold War. This is a product of the current events described above. Think tanks such as the Brookings Institute (Byman, 2018) and magazines such as *Foreign Policy* (Pfaff and Grandfield, 2019) have published pieces on the topic. Authors such as Tyrone Groh (2019), Andreas Krieg and Jean-Marc Rickli (2019), and Eli Berman and David A. Lake (2019) have all written monographs on the topic. The renewed interest on proxy warfare demonstrates the timeliness and relevance of this study. However, it is appropriate here to trace the lineage of proxy war thought from its origins to present time.

The Classics: Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Clausewitz

Mumford (2013, p.1) explains that proxy warfare “represents a perennial strand in the history of warfare,” as “war on the cheap” has motivated nation-states for centuries. Hughes (2012, p.2) suggests that three of the most important theorists on warfare, the Classical Greek historian Thucydides, Renaissance Italian diplomat and political philosopher Niccolo Machiavelli, and 18th century German military strategist Carl von Clausewitz, writing in “completely different eras,” illustrate the perpetual use of proxies by external state powers.

It must be noted at the outset that the terms “proxy war” or “proxy force” do not appear in any of the works of Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Niccolo Machiavelli, and Carl Von Clausewitz. However, these classical treatises on warfare and statecraft provide foundational support for the idea that proxy wars and proxy forces are an integral part of the broader study and theory of warfare. Taken in chronological order, these seminal theorists on warfare and statecraft plant the seeds for both the support of a proxy force strategy and the downfalls of such a strategy from the state perspective.

Sun Tzu, writing in the fifth-century BCE, is perhaps the most renowned theorists on warfare. In his classic, *The Art of War*, Sun Tzu covers the gambit of military operations, including strategy, mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fire support, military deception, protection, and logistics. All of these subjects can be found in current U.S. military doctrine. One maxim Sun Tzu returns to time and again is the principle of winning wars without actually giving battle. In Book 3, Sun Tzu states, “to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence

consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.” Further, Sun Tzu stresses, “Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops without any fighting.”

To be sure, Sun Tzu is not referencing proxy war when he made these statements. Rather, he was outlining a general strategy that allows a state and/or an army to achieve its objectives with as little cost and effort as is feasible. There is no sense, after all, in expending all of one’s blood and treasure in pursuit of a political objective. However, the maxims presented by Sun Tzu form the foundation for the principles from which proxy warfare has been conducted in practice and understood in theory. For example, the United States was able to assist in subduing its enemy, the Soviet Union, in Afghanistan by shifting the cost of blood to local forces, in this case the Mujahedeen. On the contrary, this principle was also the basis for an unsuccessful effort by the United States when it attempted to subdue its enemy, this time Cuba, by sending a hastily trained and ill-supported army of Cuban exiles to overthrow the regime of Fidel Castro during the “Bay of Pigs” fiasco in April 1961.

Sun Tzu also touches on a theme present throughout the corpus on proxy warfare practice and theory, alliances. The use of “alliances” in Sun Tzu’s parlance is not necessarily congruent with contemporary notions of formal alliances. For instance, Sun Tzu does not go into detail on forming formal treaties akin to the formation of NATO or, for that matter, bilateral security relationships. First, Sun Tzu viewed alliances as natural course of action to position a state and/or an army to achieve its objectives, if the ally’s objectives were closely aligned. Second, Sun Tzu felt that it was essential to align with “local guides” who spoke the native tongue, knew the local customs, and were experts in navigating what would otherwise be foreign terrain.

Thus, there is a natural linkage from Sun Tzu to contemporary practice and theoretical understandings of proxy warfare. First, the idea that an external state power and a potential proxy have some kind of mutual objective skirts the line between theory and law. How could a proxy relationship develop in the absence of an aligned interest? Second, the use of local forces to assist in navigating foreign terrain and waging war against a mutual enemy is as a natural tie one can find between Sun Tzu and proxy warfare.

Thucydides, a contemporary of Sun Tzu in the fifth century BCE, expanded upon the former's operational and tactical emphasis areas and delved into the art of statecraft and international relations as pertains to international conflict. Scholars and practitioners alike have noted the ties Thucydides has to contemporary understandings of proxy warfare (Walling, 2013, p.1; Amos, 2019, p.54). However, like Sun Tzu, Thucydides does not use the term proxy in his *History of the Peloponnesian War* (431 BCE). What Thucydides does do is explore the nature of alliance systems, the interactions of "strong" and "weak" actors, and the application of indirect approaches to warfare. Each has utility in understanding the nature and practice of proxy warfare.

The main thrust of Thucydides' masterful history is exploring the complex web of alliance and treaty systems headed by the two superpowers of the region at the time, Sparta and Athens. Studies of Thucydides and his take on alliances have been well covered over the past 2,000 years and will not be revisited here. However, it will be shown in a subsequent section, alliance theories, in the vein of Waltz's neorealism (1979) have been a staple in theoretical frameworks on proxy war and proxy-external state relationships.

Another interesting link between Thucydides and contemporary studies of proxy-external state relationships is the exploration of the nature of relations between “strong” and “weak” actors. Thucydides, recounting the Melian Dialogue, famously proclaimed “the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.” This link has been explored as recently as 2018 when Daniel Byman asked why proxy forces would choose to be pawns in a state power’s geopolitical game. Under these conditions and understandings of proxy relationships, proxy forces should only serve under the thumb of the external state, as they are the weak party and must accept what they must. This may be true in some cases. This study explores a proxy’s ability to exercise autonomy, and/or concede it, which places state-proxy relationships in a more dynamic setting, rather than the static strong and weak.

Finally, Thucydides explores the nature of indirect means of waging warfare. This should not be confused with Basil Henry Liddell Hart’s theory on war by indirect means (1954). To Hart, indirect means of warfare flows from Sun Tzu’s strategy to concentration forces in areas of weakness avoiding the main body of an enemies forces. Rather, indirect means in the context of this study refer to the means through which irregular warfare is conducted (Larson et al, 2008, p.10). To be sure, the term “indirect” lacks precision. Furthermore, strategy and warfare scholar Colin Gray (2007, p.43), argues that “irregular, indirect, and asymmetrical are all inherently empty concepts.” Gray argues that Sun Tzu, Thucydides, and Clausewitz provide the foundational nature of warfare and all other so-called forms of war flow from these. This may be true. It is also true, however, that while the root nature of irregular, indirect, or proxy war may be static

(and interchangeable in definition), the ways and means by which these warfare strategies are carried out are varied and nuanced.

Machiavelli (1469-1527) is silent on proxy warfare as well, within the context of contemporary understandings of the phenomena. When contemporary scholars or policymakers think of proxy war, it is understood that the proxy force has its own interests in the conflict which preexists the external state-proxy relationship. For example, the MPLA in Angola was interested in overthrowing Portuguese colonial rule prior to any relationship with an external power. Likewise, the SDF had an interest in expelling ISIS prior to any relations with the United States. The intersection of interest is the starting point for external state-proxy relationships.

Machiavelli, for his part, defined and described the usefulness of mercenary and auxiliary forces. This is as close as he comes to exploring proxy forces. Mercenaries, according to Machiavelli, are “useless,” as they are motivated only by a “salary” (2003, p.52). Auxiliary forces, troops from a third-party state a prince asks to defend him, are likewise considered useless for a variety of reasons (203, p.58). Machiavelli was clear in his distrust and disdain for both types of forces. However, Machiavelli’s understanding of these third-party forces do not align with modern conceptions of proxy forces as the key element, interest, is absent. Mercenaries, then and now, are motived primarily by profit and not interest. Auxiliary forces may not have a common interest with the requesting state. Rather, they may be requested for simple reasons such as a martial reputation, read Spartan, or the fact that they are simply stronger than the requesting states own army. The absence of interest is a primary discriminator in Machiavelli’s understanding of third-party forces.

Machiavelli's *Art of War* (1520) focuses on the internal composition and employment of a state's army. There is not a natural bridge between *Art of War* and contemporary employment of a proxy force strategy. The only linkage between the two is a principle Machiavelli shares with Sun Tzu, which is, "good Captains never come to an engagement unless necessity compels them..." Machiavelli's was not speaking on proxy war here, but the principle applies. Why employ forces when it is not necessary? This principle is foundational to proxy strategies alongside common interests. Finally, Machiavelli is not against alliances outright (Forde, 1997, p.157), however, his realist understandings of them are clear. In *The Prince*, he states, "...a prudent ruler cannot, must not, keep his word, when keeping it would work against him..." (2003, p.75).

Carl Von Clausewitz (1780-1831) is perhaps most known for explicitly stating that war is the continuation of politics by another means. War has been a constant throughout human history and from time to time, commentators have questioned the reasoning of war. War is not a pretty sight which has led some to conclude is nothing more than an outward manifestation of the animal nature of man, barbaric, cold, and irrational. Clausewitz rightly concludes this mindset is flawed. War is calculated. It is undertaken for specific objectives which are political in nature. Thus, proxy wars as a subset of the general subject of war are guided by the same foundational principles. Proxy wars are political.

Proxy wars typically fulfill multiple political objectives. First, states enter into relationships with proxies when there is an intersection of interest. The interest typically defined as a political outcome. For example, the United States had a political geopolitical interest in keeping communism out of the Western Hemisphere. Likewise, Contra forces

in Nicaragua had a political interest in overthrowing the socialist Sandinista government. It is at this intersection of interest that the proxy force relationship between the United States and the Contras formed. Perhaps most importantly, proxy forces serve a domestic political objective of state governments, which is keeping their citizens out of the fight. In the above example, the American citizen is much more comfortable with Nicaraguans fighting Nicaraguans. The American populace has little appetite for loss of its men and women of the armed forces, especially in cases where there was not a direct attack or an existential threat.

The classic theorists on warfare and statecraft discussed above did not extrapolate proxy war specifically as we understand it today. However, they did identify foundational concepts that ground a common understanding of the phenomena. First, proxy war, like war in general, is political and grounded in an expected political outcome. Second, proxy-state relationships, like all alliance relationships, are found at the intersection of shared interest. Once the interests of one or more parties no longer intersect or diverge to some degree, it is right to dissolve the relationship. Finally, the most efficient and politically acceptable way for a state to enter into a non-existential war, is to not give battle using one's own troops at all, but rather by employing a third-party to bear the cost of blood. These principles were handed down to the Cold War scholars who led the movement to identify and study proxy war and state-proxy relationships as a separate and unique phenomena within the broader study of war.

The Cold War and the Rise of War by Proxy Scholarship

On 1 September 1950, the three great powers of the West, the United States, United Kingdom, and France, all permanent members of the UN Security Council, held a

meeting in Washington to discuss Soviet intentions in light of the recent invasion of South Korea by the communist forces of North Korea and to coordinate countermeasures. The three powers agreed (emphasize added),

The Soviet Union probably does not wish to become involved in general war in the immediate future. It may, however, engage in further aggression *by proxy, either in the guise of civil war or of attack across frontiers by satellites without overt involvement of Soviet forces*, even at the risk of provoking general war. It will in any case continue its sustained effort to subvert free peoples and undermine their will to resist aggression (U.S. Department of State, September, 1950).

A search of the State Department and the National Archives, shows that the concept of “war by proxy” entered into official phraseology in 1950 after the start of the Korean War. The passage above is the most direct and complete idea of war by proxy in its early usage, but there had been references in the proceeding months. In August 1950, the Western powers met in Paris to discuss the same topic. There it was agreed, that, “the Soviets were employing the technique of aggression by proxy in a new form” and “Soviet aggression by proxy is not new, this is the first occasion of an unconcealed aggression by proxy” (U.S. Department of State). In the same meeting, speaking on the broader implications of the Korean War and the potential spread of communism throughout Asia, specifically in Vietnam, the United Kingdom warned, “it is entirely probable that China would continue within its own borders to support the Viet-Minh and that this was but another manifestation of the technique of aggression by proxy” (U.S. Department of State).

It is clear that Western governments began to view proxy war as a key Communist strategy in 1950. It was during these meetings held in the wake of the beginning of the Korean War that the concept of “war by proxy” or “proxy war” began to become a common parlance among the Western powers. Therefore, it is quite logical that

academia would pick up on this parlance and begin to study proxy war as a specific phenomenon. This is exactly what transpired. The Cold War period can easily be called the golden age of proxy war scholarship. Throughout, scholars studied, argued, and refined concepts, definitions, applications, and ramifications of proxy war. What follows is an analysis of the major contributions to Cold War-era studies on proxy war.

Definitions of proxy warfare find their foundations in Cold War scholarship. Political scientist Karl Deutsch is often cited as the first scholar to study the phenomenon of proxy war in his 1964 book chapter “External Involvement in Internal War” (Eckstein, 1964). Deutsch defines proxy war as “...an international conflict between two foreign powers, fought out on the soil of a third country, disguised as a conflict over an internal issue of that country; and using some of that country’s manpower, resources and territory as a means for achieving preponderantly foreign goals and foreign strategies.” The Korean War (1950-1953), under Deutsch’s definition would be considered a proxy war as the two superpowers, the United States and Soviet Union, and at the time fought the first battle of the Cold War era, along with a lesser power, China, on the soil of a third-party.

It is clear that the Korean War had a profound effect on the study of third-party intervention broadly and the conception and study of proxy war as a distinct phenomenon. The Western powers, as evidenced by the aforementioned State Department archival information, first identified the war by proxy strategy employed by the Soviet Union and China during this conflict. Deutsch’s definition describes the Korean conflict well. In 1964, when Deutsch published his study on proxy war, his thinking was likely shaped by the US-USSR-Cuba security issue as well as American involvement in Vietnam.

Deutsch's definition touches the heart of proxy war, namely, that two foreign powers, who are actively in security competition, are using a third-party state to challenge one another. Their involvement in the state is often framed as a foreign power trying to solve a local issue. This is the key distinction which later definitions of proxy war fail to account for, often opting to reduce proxy war to a third-party state off-loading the warfighting responsibility to a target state or armed group only to conserve blood and treasure, regardless of another third-party state is a target or not. This will be covered more in depth later.

Towle (1981, p.21) cites the invention of nuclear weapons as a catalyst for the development of proxy warfare or "vicarious belligerency" as he alternately referred to it, though not the only cause. Nuclear weapons made direct conflict between the superpowers undesirable, in accordance with the concept of mutual assured destruction, and thus, proxy states were needed. Towle focused mainly on why proxy war became a necessity, as the risk of great power war became too high in a nuclear age.

Dunér (1981) disagrees with Deutsch and Towle, arguing that small states had their own national interests and act accordingly. He concludes it seemed "...impossible to demonstrate a single example of a state acting as a proxy for another state" (p.359). Therefore, according to Dunér, small states, or lesser powers, are not "pawns" in a larger game as Byman (2018) may suggest, but rather rational actors who are acting in accordance with their own interests to achieve their national security goals.

There are two shortcomings with Dunér's conception of proxy war. First, it should be a given that any state, regardless of size, has national interests and must pursue them as their capabilities allow. This does not exclude the possibility that more powerful

states will use the smaller state for its own purposes, and can either engage or withdrawal from the small state at will. This is the intersection of interest discussed earlier. So, while not pawns, in some cases, small states can be used as proxies even if they are pursuing their own interests when their interests align with a greater power. Second, Dunér limits our understanding of proxy war by singling out small states and not including non-state actors.

Deutsch, Towle, and Dunér all define the concept of proxy war, even when they disagree, though the lens two similar frameworks. First, each scholar made their arguments during the Cold War and their work reflects it both in word and deed. More fundamentally, however, each scholar accepts Westphalian notions of international actors. The state-centrism is evident throughout their works. The concept of non-state actors was not as clearly defined, nor their importance and standing appreciated, in the Cold War era. State or non-state, any entity doing the bidding of a superpower was a proxy and, accordingly, was serving a larger geopolitical gain for one of the competing sides.

Bar-Siman-Tov (1984, p.265), contrarily, stated that proxies can either be state or non-state actors. The actor was not as important as the questions of whether or not a force of some kind had been asked to wage war on behalf of a third-party. This definition opens the door not only to non-state actors, but also mercenary groups, which recently scholarship has dubbed PMSC (Banks, 2012, xi). The introduction of non-state actors opened a door to new understandings of proxy war and its meaning. It now seems evident that academic conceptions of proxy war should have expanded beyond state actors during the Cold War. Often, proxy forces during the Cold War took the form of armed groups

who were attempting to overthrow existing governments or carve out independent areas within the recognized borders of an existing state. Until an armed group succeeds at one of these goals, it should be considered a non-state actor. Still, the Korean and Vietnam Wars, along with other events such as the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979, shed some light on why states were the focus of the proxy war scholarship as those events gained the most notoriety and were the most volatile Cold War security issues. The scholarly attention increased substantially in the post-9/11 era which saw a spike in the inclusion of non-state actors as the Al Qaeda led terror attacks of 9/11 led to a spike in the study of non-state actors are major players in international security, challenging Westphalian notions of the international security framework.

Post 9/11 to Present

Mumford (2013, p.11) defines proxy war in state or non-state terms like Bar-Siman-Tov, stating it is a "...indirect engagement in a conflict by a third parties wishing to influence its strategic outcome". In Mumford's definition, the proxy can be state or non-state as can the third-party intervener. Mumford, however, disqualifies any conflict in which an external power participates in a direct way. For example, according to Mumford, the United States' support of the SDF would not constitute a proxy war since there are American SOF on the ground and American airpower is in direct support.

Mumford's inclusion of non-state actors as target for third-party state proxy or as the external power influencing a target state or group surely expanded the aperture of proxy war studies and is welcome. However, limiting the understanding of proxy war by excluding direct intervention from the concept is questionable. In this sense, the Korean

and Vietnam Wars would not be proxy wars. Direct intervention, a third-party using its own military capabilities in an internal conflict should not be excluded from proxy war scholarship. Beyond the Cold War implications, the United States would have been hard pressed to find a vital national security interest in Korea or Vietnam separate from their security competition with the Soviet Union and China. Thus, direct military intervention or covert interventions, such as American support to the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan against Soviet forces, should both be included within the scope of proxy war. In each case, the third-party power is the security target even if internal actors are actually the target of military power.

While Cold War scholars focused on states as proxies, and Mumford expanded to both state and non-state actors, Hughes (2012) focuses primarily on the non-state entities engaged in an internal struggle. Specifically, he defines a proxy as a “non-state paramilitary group receiving direct assistance from an external power.” The parameters set by Hughes are focused enough to enhance preciseness, but are open enough to include phenomenon excluded by other authors. For example, the “direct assistance” mentioned by Hughes leaves open the possibility of advisors, ISR, and airpower from a third-party, which is explicitly prohibited by Mumford. However, Hughes fails to mention states acting as proxies. Furthermore, Hughes does not mention any security competition between the external state power and another third-party state as the catalyst for involvement. This study argues it cannot be defined as a proxy war without this condition.

Proxy war has clearly been identified to a specific type of warfare broadly, as well as a specific type of third-party intervention more specifically. There seems to be general

disagreement on defining proxy war. Specifically, who can act as a proxy? Why do proxies act on behalf of a third-party? What are the goals of the external state in entering into a proxy relationship with a state or armed group? This author believes the conditions were laid out plainly by Hans Morgenthau (1967). Recall the example Morgenthau provided:

Let us suppose that nation A intervenes on behalf of the government of nation B by giving it military, economic and technical aid on the latter's request, and that the government of B becomes so completely dependent upon A as to act as the latter's satellite. Let us further suppose that the local opposition calls upon country C for support against the agents of a foreign oppressor and that C heeds that call. Which one of these interventions is legitimate? Country A will of course say that its own is and C's is not, and vice versa, and the ideologues on both sides will be kept busy justifying the one and damning the other. This ideological shadowboxing cannot affect the incidence of interventions.

In Morgenthau's example, "Nation A" intervenes on behalf of "Nation B". Thus, states can be a proxy of a third-party state. Furthermore, "local opposition groups," read non-state actors, call upon "Country C" for support against "foreign agents." Therefore, non-state actors, can be proxy forces as well. The only criteria missing here explicitly is the preexisting security competition between "Nation A" and "County C". Therefore, proxy war can be defined as: a military intervention by a state, directly or indirectly, on behalf of another state or non-state actor, that is contrary to the security interests of a third state who is actively engaged in security competition with the intervening state.

Section 2 – Theoretical Frameworks, Decision Making, and Prospect Theory

The approach of this literature review from the outset has been to not assume prior knowledge of the topic by the reader. Hence, a methodical approach has been taken to guide the reader through the relevant literature to "connect the dots" of the author's line of thinking. It is the author's intent to make the connections on concepts and theory

without taking any “leaps of faith.” Thus, this section walks the reader from the big to small, general to the specific. It will lead the reader through the prevailing theoretical frameworks of intrastate conflict, third-party intervention, and proxy war. From there, the author will examine the prevailing theoretical concepts on the decision making processes of political entities. This will conclude with an explanation of prospect theory and why it is useful as a theoretical framework for studying the formation of proxy-external state relationships.

Theories of Intrastate Conflict

When it comes to intrastate conflict, Collier and Sambanis (2002, p.12) conclude, “Until the profession has a body of well-specified theory, substantiated by quantitative analysis and the more informal evidence from case studies, the world of policy practitioners will continue to rely on rules of thumb.” In short, theoretical developments in the field are wanting. Furthermore, as Dixon (2009, p.707) points out, there are hundreds of variables which have been tested and linked to various degrees as causes of intrastate conflict. Thus, policymakers are left with few workable frameworks and are overwhelmed by variables of causation. However, to be sure, social scientists have used common theoretical frameworks to study intrastate conflict.

One of the most commonly cited theories of intrastate conflict is the Collier and Hoeffler (CH) model of civil war onset (2000). The CH model is economic in nature and focuses at the lowest level, down to the individual’s decision to participate in an intrastate conflict (Sambanis, 2003, p.3). Sambanis found, however, that the CH “micro economic model...tested empirically using macro-level data” (p.3). Sambanis took issue with this approach and argued in favor of a case studies approach to theoretical development.

However, Sambanis concludes that his work, and that of the CH model, is rooted in expected utility theory (2000, p.9). Expected utility theory will be discussed in depth in a subsequent section focusing on outcome based theoretical approaches. However, it is worth mentioning here that prospect theory, which will form the theoretical framework for this study was developed as a direct challenge to expected utility theory.

Political theories, rooted in traditional international relations theory, have also been employed to study intrastate conflict. Toft (2007) compared and contrasted the international relations theories of power transition and balance of power to see which theory had more explanatory value in why a state with multiple ethnic groups may be more likely to engage in intrastate conflict. Balance of power theory holds that “that peace in an anarchic international system was most likely to obtain when no single state or coalition of states could gain enough of a power advantage over other states to make military conquest easy” (Toft, 2007, p.5). On the other hand, power transition, as conceived by Organski (1958), that rising powers will attack once the power parity has been met or surpassed.

Theories of Third-party Intervention

The vast majority of literature on third-party intervention focuses not on the “why” but rather on the “how” and, more importantly, the outcome. Jones (2017) addresses the “how” in his study, identifying three types of third-party intervention: “indirect (bolstering the capabilities of the supported side), direct-conventional (degrading the capabilities of the opposition), and direct-unconventional (imposing costs on the opposition)” (p.52). Still, Jones’ work ultimately seeks to find how these types of interventions effect the conflicts outcome in terms of duration.

The effects of third-party intervention on conflict duration and/or outcome seems to be the most popular line of inquiry within the field. However, social scientists of the highest caliber come to different conclusions which confuses the matter greatly. For example, Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000, p.638) conclude third-party interventions “stalemate...the civil war...for a significantly longer period of time.” Thus, third-party intervention is a net negative on intrastate war duration. Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (2004) conclude third-party intervention and its effect on duration is heavily dependent on type of intervention as well as other variables such as ethnicity and economic factors. Thus, the conclusion varies to a sometimes intervention prolongs, others it does not. Finally, Regan and Aydin (2006, p.754) conclude third-party intervention in and of itself does not have a particular effect on duration or termination. Rather, it is “...the conditions under which interventions are implemented” that has a significant effect.

With the mixed results on duration and termination, some have inquired into why a third-party decides to intervene. Decision making theories are the foundation for asking why a third-party intervenes. How did they come to that decision? As will be shown later, decision making and the variables which effect it is the principle matter under observation. Practically speaking, however, scholars such as Yarmolinsky (1968, p.234) point to internal domestic pressures at its effect on a state’s decision to intervene. Carment and James (2000) point to cultural affinities in the decision to intervene in intrastate war, specifically ethnic civil war. Belchman (2005) focused on the humanitarian grounds for intervention. However, the idea of theory is to trace it down to the evident foundational basis. Again, as aforementioned, Morgenthau (1967) did just that. States intervene because for one reason or another, they decided it was in their

interest. The reasons and conditions which led to the state being an interested party is where we can explore more deeply. However, one would be hard pressed to argue against Morgenthau's point.

The theory of realism, at its foundation, is primarily concerned with power and interest. The study will seize on the interest part of that focus. When actors decide on a certain course, they have determined it is in their best interest to do so. If it was not, the decision would be folly. Even if it turns out the decision was not in the actors best interest, at the deciding point it was determined to be. What conditions effect this decision of interest is what will be explored in this study, underpinned by realist theory. For the moment, however, this literature review will shift from intrastate war and intervention to relationships between actors as viewed through theories of alliance formations, again underpinned by realist theory and the distribution of power.

Alliances

Within the broader field of realism, Alliance theory, as explained through Waltz's (1979) neorealism, has been a popular theoretical approach within the field of proxy warfare (Groh, 2010; Broghard, 2014). The nature of armed groups forming a relationship with an external state actor can be broken down to its most basic component, which is a mutually beneficial relationship between two political actors. Traditional notions of alliance theory, as defined by Waltz (1979), focus on interstate relationships. However, within the scholarly work on intrastate warfare generally, and proxy warfare specifically, it is understood by some that non-state actors are political entities who behave and make decisions like states (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1984; Mumford, 2011; Borghard, 2014).

Consequently, like small states, non-state actors often must ally with stronger external state powers to protect their self-interests, namely security. This approach can be seen in interstate relationships. The Baltic States, for example, cannot protect themselves from Russia. They are too small and their armed forces are simply no match for the Russian military. Therefore, in the wake of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Baltic States were among the first states to gravitate toward joining NATO in the aftermath of the Cold War during the 1990s.

The theoretical framework presented in this study is rooted in realist theories, in terms of power distribution and interest. Hence, one can draw the theoretical line from Morgenthau and his conclusion that states intervene because it is in their interests to Waltz' focus on the formation of alliances to swing the distribution of power within a system to one's side. It makes perfect sense. If State X is threatened by State Y, and State Y enjoys the preponderance of power capabilities, then it behooves State X to align with State Z to close the power gap or, perhaps, eclipse it.

While the theoretical framework for this study is rooted in realism, it will be expanded upon to include prospect theory. Prospect theory will be discussed in greater detail in a subsequent section, however, it is important to draw lines of linkage between theories to demonstrate the logic of creating such a framework. This prevents the dreaded "leap of faith" in developing theory. In this case, He and Feng (2011) made the connection between alliance theories and prospect theory, focusing on the decision of an actor to align or not align.

Heng and Fe (2011) linked prospect theory to alliance theory in their exploration of the lack of a NATO-like alliance system in Asia. He and Feng conclude that alliance relationships are determined as such:

- (1) High threats frame decision-makers in a domain of losses, and multilateral alliances become a favorable alliance choice because states are more likely to take the risk of constraining their freedom of action in return for more help from multiple allies as well as for avoiding further strategic losses;
- (2) Low threats position leaders in a domain of gains, and bilateral alliances win out because states are risk-averse in terms of maintaining their freedom of action in seeking security through alliances with fewer allies.

The conclusion above is a natural tie to the formation of proxy relationships and the hypothesis presented here. He and Feng conclude that states in a domain of gains and low risk will choose to decrease their alliances to maintain autonomy and freedom of action. Conversely, states in a domain of loss and high risk are willing to decide to enter alliances with more states, sacrificing autonomy to move into the continuum of gains. If non-state proxies behave like states, as is argued here, than they should act similar to states in the same situations. Before actors act, however, they must make decisions. The decision to form the relationship is effected by certain circumstances and conditions. In order to better understand what those circumstances and conditions may be, one must first look at decision making processes as relates to political actors.

Decision Making Theories in terms of Political Actors

Decisions are complex. They are so complex that academics in the fields of politics, psychology, economics, criminal justice, and the like have dedicated thousands upon thousands of pages over countless studies examining the phenomena of decision. A full explanation and examination of all decision making models is beyond the limits of this study. For its part, this subsection will briefly examine theories of political decisions,

most of which have been applied to the process of states and their decisions. As it is argued here, armed groups, seeking to overthrow a sitting government or create an independent state, act as state actors do as they are a political-military entity. The desired end-state is a reader's understanding of why prospect theory has been selected to build upon realist notions of alliance relationships.

Perhaps no work on political decision making is more renowned than Graham Allison's 1971 book *The Essence of Decision*. In this seminal work, Allison outlines three models for government decision making. First, the rational actor model views states as a unitary being, which makes decisions based on a thoughtful process of weighing costs and benefits of certain choice(s), ultimately deciding on the course that maximizes utility. This approach is related to Waltz' neorealism and is a political vein of expected utility theory. Prospect theory is a direct challenge to expected utility.

The main distinction between the two is rational actor models focus on outcomes after an assessment of several costs and benefits of competing choice. The inclusion of domain and risk into the calculus, on the other hand, examines how a decision is made based on past and current events. This approach is more fitting for this study, as it tries to understand what conditions and circumstances effect the domain and risk of an armed group and how those variables lead to armed groups entering into a proxy relationship, as opposed to the various outcomes of such a decision. The focus is "left of bang" rather than "right of bang" in military parlance.

Allison's remaining models, organizational process and government politics model are not fitting here. The former focuses on the well-defined organizational process of substate elements and how they influence decision making. For example, an

organizational Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) at the Department of Defense may provide an output which drives a certain government choice. The key factor in this model is well defined and strong internal government institutions. This is an attribute that many armed groups' lack. These groups have committees and different functional wings, but the nature of their existence, a state of rebellion, does not lend well to crafting SOPs and building governing infrastructure. These attributes are reserved for more sophisticated states. To be sure, many recognized states, what 21st century scholars would call fragile or failed states, lack such structures.

Finally, Allison explores decision as a matter of government bureaucracy and the competing circles within. For example, a decision made by a U.S. president is influenced, according to this model, by executive departments (State, Defense), political party, Congress, and the like. All of these entities influence decision. However, what this model lacks, as is the case of the others, is how conditions of risk influence the decision-making process. President James E. Carter certainly had to maneuver through all of these entities in his decision to attempt the rescue of American hostages held in the Iranian Embassy in April 1980 following the eruption of the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979. However, as McDermott (1992) demonstrated, through prospect theory, Carter was in a domain of losses and risk acceptance based on past and current events. This led him to make a decision he otherwise would not have made.

This last model can be tied to two other widely used decision models: game theory and two-level game theory. In short, game theory examines the decisions and outcomes between competing entities with a focus on outcome. It is closely related to both Allison's rational actor model and expected utility. Thus, the focus on outcome fails

to account for an actor's domain/risk preference due to past and current events. Rather, this model focuses on choices of future action and how those choices lead to certain outcomes. In two-level games, Robert Putnam (1988) brings two levels of inquiry into the model, one international the other domestic. An actor here would have to weigh the outcomes of a certain choice at the international level, but also account for how that decision will/will not be supported at home within domestic politics and public opinion. This approach is more inclusive, to be sure, but it is still a focus on outcomes and future events.

To be sure, the decision making models of Allison, expected utility, game theory, and two level games have contributed immensely to the study of decision. Allison's book is widely considered the seminal work on political decision making at the state level. Likewise, expected utility, game theory, and two-level games are employed often to this day and will continue to be used to frame decision making in the future. The success of these theoretical frameworks does not, however, stop the exploration of new frameworks of decision. The key distinction between these esteemed frameworks and prospect theory is their focus point in relation to decision. The theories above generally focus right of the decision point, weighing competing outcomes. Prospect theory, contrarily, focuses left of the decision point, and how past and present circumstances and conditions have shaped the choices a political entity can make.

Prospect Theory

Prospect theory is part behavior psychology and part economics. The theory was developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky in 1979. Its aim was to create a model for decision making under conditions of risk. It was a direct challenge to expected

utility theory and earned Kaheman the Nobel Prize in Economics. In **Table 1** below, Kaheman and Tversky (1979, p.267) show how respondents violate expected utility when given a simple choice under different risk conditions. In the problem, the numbers in parentheses represent a dollar amount and a probability of obtaining said amount. Thus, in Problem 3, respondents were asked to choose between an 80% chance of winning \$4,000 or the certainty of winning \$3,000. The bracketed number represent the percentage of respondents (total respondents = N) who chose an outcome.

Table 1 - Expected Utility vs. Prospect Theory

PROBLEM 3: A: (4,000,.80), or B: (3,000).		
N = 95	[20]	[80]*
PROBLEM 4: C: (4,000,.20), or D: (3,000,.25).		
N= 95	[65]*	[35]

Problem 3 demonstrates what Kaheman and Tversky called the “certainty effect” (p.265). Respondents were more likely to choose the certain outcome of \$3,000 over an 80% chance of winning \$4,000. Interactions and decisions in the political sphere, however, are rarely certain. Problem 4 shows people do not always choose in accordance with the theory of expected utility. With expected utility, a rational person would choose Option D in Problem 4 as it has a higher probability of success. In small variations, people were less risk adverse when their prospect to gain was greater. The example above simplifies the theory, but provides the basic idea; risk levels at the time of decision effect the decision. In example 4, a person may be having financial difficulties left of the decision point leading to a higher tolerance to risk.


Kaheman and Tversky (1979, p.288) conclude that prospect theory “should be extended in several directions.” Specifically, they mention possible applications to political science and international relations, noting the theory could apply to policy decisions involving, “...the number of lives that could be lost or saved as a consequence of a policy decision” (p.288). Jack Levy (1992a,) was the first to explore the utility of prospect theory in political science and international relations. (p.183). Writing in June 1992, Levy introduced prospect theory in an article in *Political Psychology*. He concludes that prospect theory “...provides an important alternative theoretical framework for the analysis of social and political behavior” (p.183). Later, Levy (1992b) began a deeper exploration of the contributions and challenges prospect theory could provide to international relations.

Levy’s work on extending prospect theory in other “directions” led to others creating research programs and applying the theory to case studies in decision making in international relations. Boettcher (1995) identified gaps in the application of prospect theory in international relations exploring actors in military and economic domains of “gains” and “losses”. McDermott (1992) applied prospect theory to the decision by American President James E. Carter to direct American SOF to attempt to rescue American hostages in the American embassy in Tehran following the 1979 Revolution. She concludes President Carter, “...was in a domain of losses both internationally and domestically at the time of the crisis. In this context, loss aversion predisposed him to take military risks to secure the release of the hostages that he would not ordinarily have been willing to do” (p.237).

Jonathan Mercer (2005) stresses that “Prospect theory is the most influential behavioral theory of choice in the social sciences.” Prospect theory differs from other decision models, such as game theory, which focuses on outcomes. The focus on risk(s) in the choice model of prospect theory, and the idea that the risk reference point can move in relation to certain circumstances and conditions, defined as domain (gain vs. losses), sets prospect theory apart from other theories, particularly those in the field of international relations. For example, an American president may find him/herself in a domain of losses (high unemployment, low approval ratings, international crisis). In the domain of losses, prospect theory would predict the president to be risk accepting, and therefore make choices he/she would not make if things were “going well” (gains), which would push choice into the risk adverse category.

“Prospect theory’s main features are perhaps best illustrated by the so-called (hypothetical) value function” (Vis, 2010, Kaheman and Tversky 1979) presented in **Table 2**. In this Model, Line B in the domain of gains steadies off, demonstrating risk adverse behavior. Line A, conversely, demonstrates risk acceptance in the domain of losses. “Theoretically, the S-shaped curve means that people are risk averse in the domain of gains and risk acceptant in the domain of losses – prospect theory’s central finding” (Vis, 2010, p.112).

Table 2 - Risk Reference Point Model



Under the tenets of prospect theory, risk drives proxy-state relationships, such that armed groups, trying to overthrow a sitting government or create an independent state, seek external state support when in the domain of losses, increasing their risk acceptance. The domain of losses left of the decision point may include the power capabilities of the state which the armed group is at war with. This can be expressed in terms of military capabilities or government power and its control of the people and the states institutions. It may also include, but is not limited to, economic position, the presence of competing armed groups, regional or global instability, and the relationship between the armed group and the external states ideology.

The risk right of the reference point, in terms of the relationship with the external state may be a transactional relationship between state and armed group (hierarchical). External state powers may cut off support when support is deemed no longer beneficial to their national interests (abandonment). Armed groups may lose credibility internally as a

nationalist/ideological cause by aligning with an external state power (identity). State support may be conditional, causing a loss in operational control (autonomy). Further, states may not publicly acknowledge support and restrict support to maintain secrecy (covert). However, these are possible outcomes, and the risk left of decision, in the domain of losses, drives the decision more than the outcome.

Therefore, the decision to enter into such a relationship is not obvious. Armed groups have to factor in risks, left of decision, when considering entering into such relationships in relation to their domain (gains/losses) at a particular point in time within the given circumstances and conditions. The focus here are those conditions and circumstances left of the decision point, which may have moved the armed group into the domain of losses, increasing risk acceptance of possible outcomes right of the decision point.

Section 3 – Why This Study? Why Now?

The idea to study the formation of proxy-external state relationships began to germinate in the brain of the author in 2017. The author, by the nature of his work, was closely involved in the relationship between the United States and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Syria. At that point, the relationship was going well. The SDF, with American military support, was advancing against ISIS in Raqqa, Syria. Every day, the SDF gained territory and the defeat of the so-called caliphate of ISIS, geographically speaking, was drawing ever near, after years of fighting.

Then, in 2018, Turkey, led by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, decided to push back against SDF gains in Northeast Syria. The SDF, mainly composed of Kurdish fighters, is viewed by Ankara as a terrorist organization. The idea of having this force on

its border was a non-starter for Turkey. Therefore, in January 2018, Turkey deployed troops to seize the Syrian town of Afrin, once held by the SDF. The objective in the long term was to create a Turkish controlled buffer zone on the Syrian side of the border to insulate itself from land controlled by the SDF. The SDF did not stand a chance in Afrin against the power of the Turkish Army and fire support unless their American partners could come to their aide, either militarily or diplomatically. The United States ultimately did neither, as Turkey is a NATO ally. The SDF was abandoned in Afrin.

This is not to say that the decision was ultimately wrong on the part of the United States. Long term, as the United States shifts its focus to great power competition, the long term strategic relationship with Turkey outweighs the proxy relationship with the SDF. After all, proxy relationships are fickle things and a change in interest on the part of the external power can dramatically change or even conclude the relationship abruptly. However, the whole affair led the author to consider the position and decision making of the SDF as a political entity. It was clear the SDF had options in its relationships as the space it occupied was surrounded by the US, Russia, Syrian Regime, and Iran. They had chosen the United States and now the SDF must have been reconsidering that decision in the long term.

In October 2019, the situation in Northeast Syria had culminated. Turkey launched a massive offensive into Syria, with the explicit consent of the United States, as President Donald J. Trump ordered American forces out of the area, clearing the way for Turkey's military success. The SDF was facing an existential threat. In January 2020, the author found himself in a meeting between American military leaders and the commander of the SDF, General Mazloun Kobani. It was clear the United States was still his choice

of partner. However, it was also apparent that the SDF's domain had changed. The SDF was beset on all sides, and they now seemed to be in the domain of losses. In this domain, risk acceptance increases, and it was clear the SDF would consider deals with Russia and the Regime in order to save it from Turkish forces and American inaction. These are deals Mazloum would have never considered a year prior. Levels of risk and domain, however, effect decision making. It was at this point, the author was determined to explore relationships between proxy forces and external state powers.

What distinguishes this study from other studies on proxy war and proxy-external state relationships? The majority of the literature approaches proxy relationships from the perspective of the external state power and/or the question of smaller states acting as proxies for more powerful states (Bertil, 1981; Groh, 2010, Ahram, 2011; Hughes, 2012; Mumford, 2013; Borghard, 2014; Krieg and Rickli, 2019). This study addresses the research questions from the perspective of the proxy, which fills lacunae in the corpus of work. Furthermore, this study will employ prospect theory as a theoretical framework for understanding proxy decisions to enter into a relationship with an external state power under certain conditions of risk. This is a first in the study of proxy war generally, as well as in the formation of proxy-external state relationships specifically.

The study is also timely. The bipolar Cold War system gave rise to proxy wars both in theory and practice as the United States and Soviet Union alike were reluctant to fight head on. As the international system progresses toward multipolarity, one could reason that global powers (United States, China, and Russia) and regional powers (North Korea, Iran, India, and the like) will be reluctant to face each other in direct combat. If that is the case, proxy wars may increase in prevalence and importance. In Syria, Russia

has fielded PMSCs such as the Wagoner Group. These forces have joined “Pro Regime Forces” (PRFs) to assist the Syrian Army. Iran has fielded Shia militias in Iraq and Syria. Non-state actors, such as ISIS and Al Qaeda and its affiliates are also fighting. The United States has supported the SDF. Thus, global and regional powers are mashed together in a small space and have avoided direct combat. This situation may play out more in a multipolar system.

The possible implications of this study go beyond academia as well. While theories of proxy war can have explanatory value, it is policymakers and practitioners, in the capitals and on the battlefields, who have to manage these relationships in real time. One of the greatest fears of a state like the United States is supporting a proxy that becomes too autonomous and commits human rights violations. Other less democratically inclined states such as Russia may not care as much, but in an information environment like today's, information warfare can be the decisive point in a battle. States, therefore, have to manage their proxies in such a way that objectives are met in both the battlespace and the information space. If prospect theory is proven to be a useful tool to assess proxy relationships in an ever changing tactical and operational environment, policymakers could look for signs of proxy force starting to “go in alone” or deviating from agreed upon boundaries. In such cases, policymakers may be able to anticipate the changes in domain/risk by employing prospect theory. This study will provide the foundation for policymakers to do just that.

CHAPTER III - Methodology

The research question asks under what conditions armed groups enter into proxy relationships with external states. What risk factors have the most effect on the risk reference point and change the armed group's domain (gains/losses)? The central hypothesis is armed groups, seeking to overthrow a sitting government or create an independent state, enter into proxy-state relationships when in the domain of losses, increasing risk acceptance.

To address the research question and test the extent of the validity of the hypothesis under consideration, this dissertation will employ Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) as developed and iterated upon by Charles Ragin (2000). Cragun et al. (2015) described fsQCA as the "hybrid approach," which was purpose built to "bridge the qualitative and quantitative research gap." The qualitative nature of fsQCA integrates case study research. On the quantitative side, fsQCA assigns numerical values to variables within a specific set of cases, based on established written qualitative criteria. Thus, the cases can be compared in a numerical way to assess how dependent variable(s) affect the independent variable(s), resulting in measures of significance. Theoretically, the foundation of this study is realism, focusing on political entities acting in self-interest defined in terms of power (Morgenthau, 1948). Further, prospect theory will provide the framework to assess decisions by political actors under conditions of risk.

The balance of this chapter unfolds as follows. The first section provides a general explanation of the methodological approach to be employed, including a review of the relevant literature involved. Specifically, this section explains case study research, the movement towards mixed methods, and finally fsQCA. Section two explains the rationale

for and application of fsQCA. The third section identifies and explains the case studies to be presented and analyzed. Section four identifies and explains the measurement of variables and relationships between those variables. Finally, a concluding section provides a synopsis of this study's objectives.

Section 1 – Explanation of the Methodological Approach

This section explains the methodological approach this study will employ, focusing specifically on the “what”. The “why” will be explained in a subsequent section. First, this section will briefly cover case study research as a distinct subset of qualitative methods. Second, this section will explore the critiques of and protestations against case study research in an empirical setting. Third, this section briefly addresses the call by some scholars for a mixed methods approach to heal the wound between qualitative and quantitative methodologists. Fourth, and most importantly, fsQCA will be explained and examined.

Case Study Methodology

The foundation of the fsQCA approach is the comparison of cases. Thus, a brief discussion on case study methodology in social inquiry is in order. Case study analysis is a common research design in the social sciences. So common, Creswell (2013) categorized qualitative research methods into five archetypal categories, one of which is comparative case study analysis. However, the relevant literature demonstrates the varying perspectives on use, definition, methodology, and even validity (Yin 2014, Berg, 2009, 317-337, Gray et al., Van Evera, 1997, 49, George and Bennett, 2005, Verschuren, 2003, and Creswell, 2013, 97-102). Proponents of case studies research typically argue they are not strictly teaching tools as some would claim. Rather, they are a research

methodology, useful for testing hypotheses and theory development (George and Bennett, 2005, 19)

Yin (2014, 200-206), a prolific writer on case study methodologies, explains the first criteria in the research design process for a successful case study analysis is ensuring the cases measure an actual, topical, and relevant geopolitical phenomena. The formation of proxy-external state relationships fits Yin's criteria. Creswell (2013, 97) expands on processes and provides a sweeping definition of case study research and design. "Case study research...explores a real-life, contemporary bounded systems (cases) over time, through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information." Again, inquiry into the phenomena of proxy-external state relationship formation applies. Furthermore, the methodology applied in this study will fulfill Creswell's demand for rigorous and varied data collection, comparison, and analysis.

The Case against the Case Study

The case against the case study approach can be understood by taking a step back and examining the divide between proponents of quantitative and qualitative research methodologies, respectively. The qualitative versus quantitative battle within the social sciences is well documented. As Goertz and Mahoney (2006) observe, "Comparisons of the quantitative and qualitative research traditions sometimes call to mind religious metaphors." The reality, however, is not always as dogmatic. Champions of both approaches are sometimes "privately suspicious or skeptical of the other though usually more publicly polite" (Goertz and Mahoney). So where does the divide begin? Berg (2009) explains that quantitative methods are usually given more respect than qualitative

methods. He points to the precision in numbers and their relation to science. Some in the social sciences have aimed to achieve maximum precision.

The most damning critique of qualitative methods in general comes from Fred Kerlinger, who proclaims, “There is no such thing as qualitative data. Everything is either 1 or 0” (Berg, 2009). Kerlinger is referring to the issue of measurement. The explanatory power of quantitative methods through precise measures provides researchers seemingly concrete empirical data on a wide range of social topics. For example, a study of the learning habits of children, quantitatively speaking, can provide precise numerical data on grades and progress in a given subject. This information can provide profound insights into the learning outcomes of a modern classroom, but does it tell the whole story?

Berg (2009) explains that certain aspects of a child’s classroom environment cannot be captured by numerical data. For example, perhaps the walls of the classrooms are filled with distractions. Quantitative data collected on a sample of children does not allow the study to take into account the individual cases of each child. The family life, sleep habits, social anxieties, etc. are all contributing factors to a child’s academic performance that cannot be captured by mere 1s and 0s. In short, there is qualitative data that affects the numerical data. Each case, in this example, would be informed by qualitative data and quantitative data. This has come to be known as a mixed methods approach.

Bridging the Gap: Mixed Methods

Kelle (2008) observed the “paradigm wars” between the two research methodologies may be giving way to a “mixed methods” approach in social science methodology. Laitin (1995) agrees, noting that research “transcending the quantitative

and qualitative divide should ensue” which will only “spawn” creativity. However, defining mixed methods research has proven difficult. Small (2011) explained, “even though the term "mixed method study" is ubiquitous, consensus on its meaning has been elusive.” There are nuanced answers to the definition question, which can depend on the research question, data collection methods, and analytical techniques. Broadly speaking, however, mixed methods research can be summed up as the utilization of quantitative and qualitative methods to complement one another in order to draw inferences with increased explanatory power.

This is where fsQCA comes into play. Ragin (2000) describes qualitative and quantitative methodologies in different terms. Ragin prefers “case oriented” research (qualitative) and “variable oriented” research (quantitative) (2000, pp.28-29). Ragin (2000, p.29) concludes the “complementary and mutual dependence” of the two research methodologies “undermines” the notion that a clearly defined “division of labor” exists. In short, each method needs the other to enhance or understanding of social phenomena. Thus, fsQCA provides a mixed methods approach, which will be employed here to better understand the phenomena of proxy-external state relationships. With the preamble complete, a deeper look into QCA is in order.

What is QCA?

Before diving into fsQCA, it would be prudent to take a step back and briefly outline QCA or “Crisp Sets,” which was Charles Ragin’s first iteration of his mixed methods approach. QCA is a “case-oriented analytic technique that systemically addresses small numbers of cases (i.e. 5–50) by applying Boolean algebra to implement principles of comparison used by scholars engaged in the qualitative study of macro

social phenomena” (Ragin 2005, 34). On the qualitative side, QCA employs the structured, focused approach. In a given set of cases, each case is assessed, on the basis of the same “questions” using the same variables. Ragin suggests, given the “...small number of cases, the appropriate number of variables should be four to six” (1987, 67). Thus, a series of case outcomes (the dependent variable) can be assessed given combinations of four to six independent variables.

On the quantitative side of QCA, Ragin’s approach uses Boolean algebra to “implement principles of comparison” through a binary, nominal system. In QCA, each independent variable is assessed as either “In = 1” or “Out = 0”. QCA is unique as it focuses on configurations of variables which may or may not produce an outcome. The process is similar to using dummy variables in regression analysis. (I would suggest noting that this is essentially the same as using dummy variables in regression analysis.) For example, consider Michael Ross’ finding (2004) that natural resources are positively correlated to intrastate war onset. Linear regression models isolate variables and assess their individual significance in relation to the outcome. Hence, linear regressions have issues in assessing how combinations of variables act with and without one another to cause an outcome. Thus, it could be that natural resources do in fact correlate to intrastate war onset. But, how do other combinations of variables, such as government type, economic strength, and ethnic composition, for example, interact with and influence the natural resource variable in outcome causation. This is how QCA enhances its explanatory power, even while having wherewithal to understand that social sciences are rarely, or ever, clear cut.

Truth Tables

Thus far, it has been established that QCA uses a structured focused approach combined with Boolean algebra to assess how various configurations of independent variables lead to the presence or absence of the outcome (dependent variable). After variables have been identified and data collected, the researcher must display the data in some intelligible form. This is where truth tables come into play. According to Ragin, “The idea of the truth table is simple. Once the data have been recoded into nominal-scale variables and represented in binary form (as in 1s and 0s), it is necessary only to sort the data into their different combinations of values on the independent variables” (1987, 86).

Consider the truth table in Table 3.1 below. In **Table 3** there are four independent variables (A, B, C, D) and the dependent variable, or outcome, Y examining 16 cases. Line 3 provides an example of when the outcome the researcher was looking is present (Y=1). Thus, that case can be expressed as $abCd = Y$. The lower case letters in the expression represent the absence of the variable while the capital C indicates the variables presence. Likewise, Line 5 has an outcome of Y=1 but in that case, the variable combination producing the outcome is $aBcd$. Conversely, in lines where Y=0 (y, indicating absence), the outcome is absent and expressions can be written for those cases as well. For example, in Line 2 $abcD = y$ and in Line 15 $ABCd = y$.

Table 3 - Truth Table (Ragin, 1987)

Representative Truth Table with Four Causal Conditions

A	B	C	D	Y	# Instances
0	0	0	0	0	8
0	0	0	1	0	6
0	0	1	0	1	10
0	0	1	1	0	5
0	1	0	0	1	13
0	1	0	1	0	7
0	1	1	0	1	11
0	1	1	1	1	5
1	0	0	0	1	9
1	0	0	1	1	3
1	0	1	0	0	12
1	0	1	1	0	23
1	1	0	0	0	15
1	1	0	1	1	5
1	1	1	0	0	8
1	1	1	1	1	6

The outcome of the truth table is two expressions, one where the outcome is present (Y=1) and the other is absent (y=0). Using the example in Table 3.1, the Y=1 expression would be all combinations within the cases where the outcome is present.

$$Y = aBcD + aBcd + aBCd + aBCD + Abcd + AbcD + ABcD + ABCD$$

Likewise, the remaining cases where the outcome was not present would be expressed as

$$y = abcd + abcD + \dots$$

The truth table sorts the combinations of variables which produce (or not produce) the expected outcome. However, the expressions are not easily interpreted and need further refinement.

Boolean Minimization

The key to the assessment of the interplay between variables is the concept of Boolean minimization. The researcher can begin to simplify the expressions, experimenting with the data to minimize the configuration of variables which produces (or does not produce) the expected outcome. This creates a “parsimonious” expression which “presents the necessary and/or sufficient (combinations of) condition(s) for the outcome” (Vis, 2010, p.35). Consider the example above in **Table 3**.

In Line 16, $ABCD=Y$. In Line 8 we find $aBCD=Y$.

Thus, it can be concluded that outcome Y is present with (A) or without (a) condition A. The expression can then be minimized from $A*B*C*D + a*B*C*D = Y$, to, **$B*C*D=Y$.**

This process continues considering all of the data and configurations, typically using QCA software.

From this point, the data is analyzed in an open matter. That is to say, QCA gives the researcher flexibility in adding and subtracting conditions, analyzing why missing cases may affect the outcome, expand the theory, and make generalizations consistent with the data (Harvard Business School). Furthermore, the researcher has the ability to set parameters for level of error, as outcomes considering multiple configurations of variables are bound to have some contradictions. Think of these as “outliers” as would be shown in a standard bell curve. The world of social interactions amongst humans is rarely, if ever, binary. This allows researchers using QCA to explain contradictions and leave room for error, while making generalizations with the remaining data. This flexibility makes QCA an attractive option. Once more, its most attractive attribute is its

honest assessment of the human condition. Social interactions cannot be regressed to a single cause. To do so would move the research from the scientific to the philosophic or theological. However, the binary nature of QCA, the “in” or “out” was open to critique, as certain conditions are not easily explained in such a fashion. A variable such as economic strength, expressed as per capita GDP is not easily expressed in binary forms. The conditions vary and can be scaled. This critique led to Ragin expanding QCA to fsQCA to account for variables such as this.

fsQCA

The primary limitation of crisp set QCA is that it does not allow for “partial membership of cases in a set” (Ragin, 2000, p.121). That is to say, membership in a case set variable are binary, in or out. As social sciences progress in method and knowledge, and traditional truths are challenged, assigning definite membership is becoming more complicated. For example, for much of human history, gender has been understood in a more or less binary fashion, male or female. In 2014, Facebook had over 50 different gender types and associations to choose from (Oremus, 2014). Ragin argues that case sets such as “Protestant” can be given a range of membership, rather than a simple “yes” or “no”, “in” or “out” if informed by “substantive and calibrated knowledge” (2000, p.7).

For example, the concept of “rich” is relative in its common parlance. What is rich? How much money does one need to be monetarily rich? What makes a country rich? It would be easy to conclude by assessing GDP that the United States is rich and Somalia is not. However, this still not does not provide the accuracy required for determining set membership. Consider **Table 4**, which assigns fuzzy membership in the set of “rich countries”. Using “substantive and calibrated knowledge” Ragin was able to

create membership values in the Set “rich countries” using per capita GDP ranges as a measure. Thus, one can assign each country in the set a value based off their fuzzy membership.

Table 4 - Set “Rich Countries” (Ragin, 2000)

Fuzzy Membership in the Set of “rich countries”		
GNP/Capita (U.S. \$)	Membership (M)	Verbal Labels
100 → 1,999	$M = 0$	Clearly not rich
2,000 → 7,999	$0 < M < .5$	More or less not rich
8,000	$M = .5$	In between
8,001 → 17,999	$.5 < M < 1.0$	More or less rich
18,000 → 30,000	$M = 1.0$	Clearly rich

FsQCA allows the researcher to assign values on many scales, providing flexibility and nuance to set cases under examination. Consider **Table 5**. The first set is the “crisp set,” which was covered under QCA in the subsequent section. The remaining four sets are different approaches a researcher can employ to assign case membership to a given set variable. The researcher must consider their data and employ the value set that best measures their combination of variables.

Table 5 - Calibration (Ragin, 2005)

Crisp set	Three-value fuzzy set	Four-value fuzzy set	Six-value fuzzy set	“Continuous” fuzzy set
1 = fully in	1 = fully in	1 = fully in	1 = fully in	1 = fully in
		.75 = more in than out	.9 = mostly but not fully in	Degree of membership is more “in” than “out”: $.5 < x_i < 1$
	.5 = neither fully in nor fully out	.25 = more out than in	.7 = more or less in	.5 = cross-over: neither in nor out
			.3 = more or less out	Degree of membership is more “out” than “in”: $0 < x_i < .5$
0 = fully out	0 = fully out	0 = fully out	.1 = mostly but not fully out	
			0 = fully out	0 = fully out

“FsQCA measures coverage (i.e., the relative importance of different configurations for a specific outcome) and consistency (i.e., the proportion of cases consistent with the pattern)” (Ospina-Delgado and Zorio-Grima, 2016, p.1326). For example, for fuzzy membership in a set “proxy force relationship” (the outcome), it could be found that the combination of variables presence of competing armed groups, proxy force ideology, and sitting government strength demonstrates the highest relative importance when compared to other combinations of variables among cases. That combination is then tested against all the cases to find how consistent it is within the cases. In this theoretical exercise, the researcher could hone in on those variables, create future tests, and continue to hone the theory of how proxy force relationships are formed at any given point in the analytical process.

The foundation underlying all of this is the principle of casual complexity. Ragin (2000, p.88) notes all of the different ways a country may democratize. Taking it to a lower level, he asks the reader to ponder how many different ways a conversation is started. In these examples, the combinations of necessary conditions that can produce an outcome are many. In social science there rarely, if ever, is one root cause for a particular outcome. Correlation models attempt to isolate variables as individuals to see how well they correlate with an outcome. FsQCA, on the other hand, takes an approach that is more in tune with reality. Instead of isolating, fsQCA works to assess the combinations which are necessary and sufficient to produce an outcome. Contrarily, in the same process, the researcher can find which combinations of variables are not necessary and sufficient.

Section 2– Rationale for the Application of fsQCA to this Study

In the early stages of the research design process, the intent was to address the research question through a traditional structured, focused case study design. This type of design has been successfully employed in recent dissertations on proxy warfare (Groh, 2010; Borghard, 2014). However, upon reflection and sage guidance, it was decided to take an alternative approach. Hence, fsQCA was integrated into the study, instead of the purely structural, focused case study design. Although, the fsQCA method borrows from the structured, focused approach in examining each case through the same set of variables.

The intent of this research design is to assess 6-10 cases to seek the conditions and circumstances which lead an armed group to enter into a proxy relationship. A larger number of cases allows for broader generalization on the conditions and circumstances, which can then form the foundation of follow on studies to research the most prominent explanatory variables. However, a case study approach utilizing 6-10 cases in a purely structured, focused approach exceeded the capacity of this study. The narrowing of cases is commonplace. For example, Groh (2010) started broadly, looking at 28 cases, but ultimately narrowed them down to three to create focus. Similarly, Borghard's dissertation closely examined two cases, and then applied the theory to another four in a small-*n* analysis. Many of the books written on the topic of proxy war take a similar approach, taking a broad look at proxy warfare before settling on 3-4 cases (Groh, 2019; Mumford, 2013; Hughes, 2012).

Using fsQCA, however, allows for an expansion of cases beyond 2 or 4, because data collection is simplified. For example, Instead of reading through the economic

history of each case country to collect data on economic strength, the researcher only need to create a precise metric and apply it to each case. Using the economic example, the researcher could use **Table 3.2** as a measure of economic strength and quickly obtain the needed data for each case. This decreases data collection time, but increases the number of cases a researcher can realistically handle in a research design such as this.

Why case studies one may ask. Put simply, all social science research, whether quantitative, qualitative, or mixed methods is case oriented. Every study asks questions on social phenomena. In order to answer those questions, researchers must find instances, or cases, of that phenomena to test hypothesis, aiming toward the finding of causation. It's all case study, only the measurement is different. Therefore, it is easy for one to conclude the exploration of the formation of proxy relationships between armed groups and external state powers ought to examine cases in which such relationships have existed. As previously stated, the fsQCA approach allows the researcher to include more cases, focus on small number of independent variables, to see which combinations of variables are, or are not, sufficient to cause the outcome of an armed group forming a proxy relationship with and external state.

Broadly, the methodology will be applied as such. The researcher will identify cases where armed groups, seeking to overthrow or succeed from the state, formed a proxy relationship with an external state power within a bounded time period. Next, the identification of the 4-6 independent variables will be selected based on their hypothesized likelihood to cause the outcome. These variables will be assigned fuzzy membership score ranges. Each case will be assigned fuzzy membership scores in each variable category. All of the cases and fuzzy membership scores will be run through

fsQCA software to measure which conditions and circumstances are necessary and sufficient to cause, or not cause, the outcome. These scores, or outputs, will be analyzed to form conclusions, general theory, and inform future research on the phenomena.

Section 3 – Identification and Explanation of Case Studies to be Presented and Analyzed

The use of proxies in warfare is as ancient as armed conflict itself. Thus, the potential case load in a comparative study on proxy war is tremendous. In order to focus the study and provide scope, there must be bookends. The golden age of proxy war studies is undoubtedly the post-World War II era. Groh (2010) understood this, and in his comparative study he used the bookends of the end of World War II on the left and the Al Qaeda led terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, and the immediate response from America, on the right. The date range between the periods is 1945-2001. This time period is also significant because the left bookend can be recognized as the beginning of the international order which provided the framework for international relations in the post-war world. 9/11, on the other end, arguably, dealt a significant blow to that system, which is now in a period of change and uncertainty.

Within that time frame, Groh (2010) identified 28 cases of armed groups establishing a proxy relationship with an external state power. These cases were used as the starting point for this dissertation. The intent for the study was to select 8-12 cases from Groh's list, covering a mix of regions, external state powers, over time. Further, cases involving the United States as the external state power were selected in greater numbers than those associated with other states. The idea here was to find generalizations about the formation of proxy relationships in broadly, while providing the author the

opportunity to later focus in on the United States' proxy relationships in potential future studies.

Finally, the initial list of cases was whittled down due to problems in consistent data collection. Many fsQCA studies employ "substantive knowledge" to assign membership scores to cases. For example, a researcher studying the effects regime type has on conflict resolution would conduct a thorough study of the regime in question and draw a conclusion based on their understanding. Country X is "mostly authoritarian". This study takes a different approach to add rigor to the tests. Instead of drawing conclusions that could be subjective and open to bias, this study uses metrics/data that have been established by the leading datasets and indices in the field. This will be covered in depth later. However, many of these datasets are missing pertinent data for many of the countries that were on the initial list. For example, the author used the most reputable datasets and indices in the field and could find little to no data on Angola in 1964, within the MPLA had established a proxy relationship with the Soviet Union at that juncture. This case, therefore, was not useable in this study. The final list of cases to be included in this study is listed in **Table 6**.

Table 6 – List of Case Studies

Proxy	External State Power	Country/Year
Castillo Armas' Forces	United States	Guatemala/1953
Pathet Lao	China	Laos/1954
Brigade 2506	United States	Cuba/1961
Mukti Bahin	India	East Pakistan/1971
South Lebanese Force (SLF)	Israel	Lebanon/1976
Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO)	South Africa	Mozambique/1980
Contras	United States	Nicaragua/1981
Tamil Tigers (LTTE)	India	Sri Lanka/1983
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)	United States	Angola/1985
Northern Alliance	United States	Afghanistan/2001

Section 4 – Hypothesis, Variables, Propositions, and Fuzzy Set Membership

Calibration

Hypothesis: Armed groups, seeking to overthrow a sitting government or create an independent state, enter into proxy-external state relationships when in the domain of losses, increasing risk acceptance.

The theoretical framework employed uses a combination of classical realism, which provides the foundation, and prospect theory, which analyzes decisions under conditions of risk.

Dependent Variable: Armed Group Risk Tolerance (adverse/acceptance).

Independent variable: Proxy Domain (gains/losses).

These variables can be expressed as:

Domain of Losses → Increases Risk Acceptance → Increases likelihood of forming proxy relationship.

Domain of Gains → Increases Risk Aversion → Decreases likelihood of forming proxy relationship.

Measurement will be achieved by assessing the relative importance of five variables/combinations of variables, in fsQCA of the 10 case studies under consideration.

Each variable includes a corresponding proposition. The expected outcome is a better understanding of what specific circumstances and conditions, and combinations thereof, affect an armed groups domain and risk, leading to the outcome of a proxy relationship.

The variables, propositions, and fuzzy set membership for each are as follows:

1. Regime Type (REGIME)

Proposition: Citizens of an authoritarian state have fewer means to address grievances and have limited access to power. When formed into an active rebellion, this condition remains. Thus, armed groups find themselves in the domain of losses/risk acceptance, which can be expressed as:

Authoritarian → Fewer Means to Address Grievances/Access Power → Require Support → Risk Acceptance → Proxy Relationship

The POLITY5 project (Marshall and Gurr) categorized regime types for all states from 1800-2018. Scores ranged from -10 (Authoritarian) to +10 (Democracy). Using this scale, a fuzzy set membership was created for set “Regime Type”.

Fuzzy Membership in Set “Regime Type”

Authoritarian Score = -10 – (-6) / M= 1.0 / Fully in

Somewhat Authoritarian Score = -5 – 0 / M=.67 / More in than out
Somewhat Democratic Score = 1-5 / M=.33 / More out than in
Democratic Score = 6-10 / M=0 / Fully out

2. Number of Rebel Combatants or Activists/Magnitude of Fight (MAG)

Most countries have seen their fair share of antigovernment activists. Many still have had

Militant antigovernment groups that have grown into armed groups in active rebellion or secession. Governments respond to these acts of rebellion according to their size and scope. For example, a small group of armed rebels may easily be dispatched by a small infantry unit or police force. By contrast, as armed groups grow in numbers, their threat to the government in power increases. This causes the government to expend more resources to crush the rebellion. An infantry company and/or police force will no longer suffice. Ground forces, tanks, airpower, and the like may be used to put down the rebellion. The advantage to the government is clear.

Proposition: armed groups that have grown in size/capability posing a serious threat to the government requires support even as their numbers continue to grow in order to tip the scales. They are in the domain of losses as the government increases its response, even as their relative strength increases. Armed groups in this situation are risk accepting, and are willing to form a proxy relationship. This proposition can be expressed as:

Higher Number of Combatants/Activists → Increased Government Response → Require Support to Tip the Scale → Risk Acceptance → Proxy Relationship

The Systemic Peace Project dataset “State Failure Problem Set: Internal Wars and Failures of Governance, 1955-2018” (Marshall, Gurr, and Harff), created a variable for which accounts for the magnitude of the fight by assigning a magnitude score ranging

from 1-4 based on the number of fighters/activists present in an intrastate conflict. This dataset contained data for all but two cases: Cuba in 1961 during the infamous “Bay of Pigs” invasion and the CIA supported coup in Guatemala in 1954. Instead, the number of armed combatants for these cases were found in Husain (2005) for the Cuban case and Fraser (2005) for Guatemala.

Fuzzy Membership in Set “Number of Combatants/Activists”

> 15,000 combatants or activists / M = 1.0 / Fully In
5,000 → 15,000 combatants or activists / M = .67 / More in than out
1,000 → 5,000 combatants or activists / M = .33 / More out than in
< 1000 combatants or activists / M = 0 / Fully Out

3. Variable/Membership: GDP/per Capita/ “Poor Countries” (GDPC)

Proposition: States with lower per capita GDP have a poorer population. It is from this population that armed groups form. These armed groups lack adequate resources to accomplish their objectives. Therefore, they are in the domain of losses and risk accepting. This can be expressed as:

Poor Country → Poor Population → Armed Fighters Lack Resources → Risk Acceptance → Proxy Relationship

Data for each case country’s GDP was found at the Clio Infra Project (Bolt and van Zanden, 2015), which maintains data on a state’s per capita GDP over time, in constant US\$. This allows for a stable comparison over each case even as the cases covered range over a period of nearly 50 years. The fuzzy membership score for this variable was calibrated by Ragin (2000).

Fuzzy Membership in Set “Poor Countries”

GNP/Capita (U.S. \$) / Membership (M) / label
10 → 1,999 / M = 1.0 / Fully In
2,000 → 8000 / M = .67 / More in than out
8001 → 17,999 / M = .33 / More out than in
18,000 → 30,000+ / M = 0 / Fully Out

4. Variable/Membership: Nature of Conflict (Territory, Government, Both, Neither) “Incompatibility” (INCOMP)

Proposition: Armed groups fighting to overthrow a sitting government or fighting to create an independent government seek international recognition to legitimize their cause. The need for recognition causes them to be risk accepting and thereby willing to enter into a proxy relationship. This can be expressed as:

Armed Groups fighting for control of a government require international legitimacy/recognition → Risk Acceptance → Proxy Relationship.

The UCDP/PRIO database (Gleditsch, et al, 2002; Pettersson and Öberg) contains a dataset, Armed Conflict 1946–2001, that categorizes armed conflicts over the defined span of time. One such category is the type of “incompatibility” the armed group has with its adversary. There are three categories given in this dataset: fighting over the central government, fighting over government and territory, and fighting over territory. To these, a fourth category was added by the author which is “other”. Current conflicts show that some proxies, such as Iranian proxies in Iraq and Syria, are not necessarily fighting to overthrow a government, or over territory. Rather, they are doing to bidding of an external power to for its benefit and a perceived benefit of its common cause.

Fuzzy Membership in Set “Incompatibility”

Fight over Government / M= 1.0 / Fully In

Fight over Government and Territory / M= .67 / More in than Out

Fight over Territory / M=.33/ More out than In

Other / M=0) / Fully Out

5. Variable/Membership: Regional Instability (INSTA)

Proposition: Armed groups involved in intrastate conflict are at increased risk when their region is generally unstable. Regional instability invites competing armed groups, regional state interventions, and great power interventions. In these situations,

risk increases and the likelihood of forming a proxy relationship increases. This can be expressed as:

Higher Levels of Regional Instability → Risk Acceptance → Proxy Relationship

The Major Episodes of Political Violence and Conflict Regions (1946-2018) (Marshall, 2019) calculates regional instability by assigning each state to a particular region, then, for a given year, arrives at the sum total of intrastate and interstate conflicts and violence present among the states assigned to the region. The fuzzy set membership below was created by the author to show a measured scale of levels of regional instability.

Fuzzy Membership in Set “Regional Instability”

≥ 30 / M=1.0 / Fully In
20-29 / M=.67 / More in than Out
10-19 / M= .33 / More out than In
0-9 / M= 0 / Fully Out

Section 5 - Concluding Synopsis of Objectives of the Dissertation

The vast majority of studies on proxy war and proxy relationships examine the phenomena from the perspective of the external state power. What are the costs and benefits of the United States, for example, to outsource its warfighting to a third-party proxy? How much control does a state have over proxy forces? The objective of this dissertation is to view the relationship from the perspective of the armed group that decided to be the proxy, thereby approaching the subject from an often overlooked angle.

This dissertation argues that armed groups are political entities and, therefore, act as unitary political actors similar to states. Armed groups make decisions based on the principles of risk/reward. Using the theories of realism and prospect theory, the research is grounded in the principle of risk. The cases under examination here all end in a proxy

relationship. Through the measurement of the specified variables, this dissertation will look for individual variables or combinations of variables that have a greater effect on that outcome. The results will help to ensure academics and policymakers alike will have a better understanding of the circumstances and conditions that lead an armed group to seek and form a proxy relationship with an external state power.

CHAPTER IV – Cases and Data Collection

The purpose of this chapter is data collection for each case presented. Each case will be examined individually. To accomplish this, each case will contain a summary to provide readers with familiarity and background. Second, each case will conclude with a table, presenting the cases' membership with the risk variables. This approach differs from many Fuzzy Set Qualitative Analysis (fsQCA) case studies. The author will not base membership scores and analysis solely on “substantial knowledge”. That approach includes in-depth analysis of cases, which concludes with the researcher assigning membership scores based upon their own assessed criteria. Rather, the data collected for these cases has been categorized based upon well-defined parameters and criteria in the most authoritative datasets in the field. This information will be coupled with substantial knowledge informed by the case studies to draw conclusions that amplify the quantitative data. Ultimately, upon completion of the chapter, cases will have been fully presented, all data collected, categorized in membership sets, and ready for testing using fsQCA software.

Risk variables for each cases' Membership are: Regime Type (REGIME), Magnitude of Fighting (MAG), Per Capita GDP (GDPC), Incompatibility (INCOMP), and Regional Instability (INSTA). Definitions and measurements for each are contained in the previous chapter.

Case 1 – Proxy: Castillo Armas' Forces / Country: Guatemala / External State: United States

On 18 June 1954, a Guatemalan Army Officer in exile, Carlos Castillo Armas, leading a force of roughly 480 men supported by the United States, invaded Guatemala from four locations along the Honduran border (Cullather, 1994, p.65). The

invasion was carefully planned, supported, and controlled by the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) under code name Operation PBSUCCESS. Without the support of the CIA, the invasion forces would have easily been defeated, as they were overwhelmingly outmanned and out equipped. Instead, by 7 July 1954, Castillo Armas was firmly in control of the country. Operations PBSUCCESS was a “success”.

Political Background

The 23 years preceding the Guatemalan coup d'état of 1954 ran the governmental gambit, from military dictatorship to transitional military juntas to reasonably fair democratic elections. Overall, the political institutions were weak, lacking a foundation in democratic values, and politics were heavily influenced by the military. This institutional weakness plagued Guatemala well into the 1990s. What follows here is a brief description of the political institutions and climate in Guatemala beginning with the uncontested election of General Jorge Ubico Castañeda in February 1931.

Ubico ruled Guatemala as a totalitarian dictator from 1931-1941. Initially, Ubico took positive steps to improve the plight of the poor Central American country. Ubico undertook massive public works projects aimed at improving infrastructure, and by consequence, the economy writ large. For example, Ubico directed the expansion and improvement of roads and communications infrastructure, which, according to Grieb (1976, p.525), resulted in a massive expansion of the economy. Furthermore, the general rooted out government corruption, which was endemic in earlier Guatemalan governments (Grieb, 1977, p.377).

However, Ubico's ruled Guatemala with an "iron fist" admiring the tactics of German dictator Adolf Hitler and Italian dictator Benito Mussolini while terrorizing the country with his secret police (Grieb, 1977, p.379; Global Nonviolent Action Database). His oppressive rule and failure to incorporate the emerging middle class (a result of his successful economic policies) led to a general dissatisfaction with Ubico's rule throughout the country. Ultimately, middle class citizens composed of intelligentsia and junior military officers led an insurrection against Ubico, leading to his resignation in July 1944.

Ubico, lacking a clear successor, passed his ruling power to military junta composed of three senior army officers, Federico Ponce Vaides, Eduardo Villagrán Ariza, and Buenaventura Pineda. This move was a departure from the legal procedures for transfer of power in accordance with the Guatemalan constitution. Had the constitution been strictly followed, three top members of the legislature would have been granted the power to oversee the transitional government. However, the top legislatures were loyal to Ubico, who feared that installing loyalists would only exacerbate the matter (Grier, 1976, p.531). The military junta appointed by Ubico, led by the interim president "appointed" by the legislature, Federico Ponce, continued the oppressive rule of Ubico. The celebration of Ubico's resignation was short lived, as it was soon apparent the government would continue with business as usual. Many in the military became disenchanted resulting in a military coup in October 1944.

The military coup of 1944 was a battle between the old guard and the rising, educated and professionalized officer corps of the Guatemalan Army. The leaders

of the coup were able to use a list of grievances and draw upon a sense of duty to sway junior officers over to the side of revolution (Grier, 1976). Once most of the officer corps had sided with the revolutionaries, the game was up for President Ponce. On October 20, he surrendered the government to the revolutionaries. His administration was replaced by yet another transitional junta composed of Francisco Javier Arana, Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán, and Jorge Toriello who was the only civilian in the junta's leadership.

True to its stated intentions, the transitional junta moved swiftly to hold a presidential election. In December 1944, only two months since the revolution, Juan José Arévalo was elected president of Guatemala. Interestingly, none of the members of the ruling junta had been a candidate in the election. Furthermore, Arévalo was not a military man. Rather, he was an academic which was appealing to the large youth movement within the revolutions power centers. This movement was largely considered leftist in nature and the presidency of Arévalo held true to that nature, declaring a doctrine of "spiritual socialism" combining elements of "...socialism, Christianity, social welfare, and democracy" (Harms, 2011, p.117). Furthermore, the fathers of Guatemala's first ever democratic government had a disdain for the landed class who worked hand and hand with big business, namely the American owned United Fruit Company. This was a key component of the conditions leading up to the coup of 1954.

The shift to the political left in Guatemala continued after the peaceful transfer of power in the election of 1950. While the election and the transfer of power from Arévalo to the newly elected president Jacobo Árbenz was peaceful, the principal opposition candidate, Francisco Javier Arana, was gunned down prior to the election. Arana, a

military man and former Chief of the Armed Forces, had threatened a coup against the Arévalo administration, so he was not a peaceful candidate per se. However, once he was killed, there was no real contender who could challenge Árbenz. After the death of Arana, many of his military supporters were exiled from the country, to include Carlos Castillo Armas.

Jacobo Árbenz drew the ire of the United States for what they interpreted as a shift towards communism. The communist party in Guatemala was supportive of Árbenz. His policies aimed at taking large swathes of land from the United Fruit Corps and returning them to the people. While there were no direct ties between Árbenz and Moscow, many in the region, as well as Guatemalan exiles such as Castillo Armas, warned of a Sovietization of Guatemala. The Cold War was increasingly becoming a zero-sum game in Washington, and a communist state in the Western Hemisphere was not palatable to the United States.

The tensions mounted and the CIA began plotting a coup, where the United States would support a rebel leader and his forces to overthrow the government of Árbenz. President Harry S. Truman approved Operation PBFortune in 1952, however, the operation was canceled after some internal disagreements within the Washington bureaucracy. Coming off a successful CIA orchestrated coup in Iran in 1953, the confident Americans turned their attention back to Guatemala and Operation PBSuccess was approved and executed in June of 1954. Árbenz' government collapsed and within a month, America's chosen successor, Carlos Castillo, was in control of the country.

Economic Background

Guatemala at the time of the 1954 coup was much like the rest of Central America economically: poor, underdeveloped, export dependent, and considered a “banana republic” with vast swathes of land controlled by the United Fruit Company. According to Philip Taylor (1956, p.787) Guatemalans of that time were, “bitterly experienced in the ways of dictatorship, economic exploitation, and grinding poverty.” Much of the political turmoil in the country and the swings from right to left and back to right again were rooted in economic factors. The right leaning dictators bolstered the United Fruit Company to line their pockets at the expense of the people, while the left leaning governments would swing the opposite direction, alienating the political power centers in the country that depended on the kickbacks from supporting United Fruit.

Economic inequality was also rampant. Approximately two-thirds of the population was pure indigenous, and these Guatemalans subsisted on an annual per capita income of \$70 USD while the mixed blood nobility share was \$246 USD (in 1953 Dollars) (Britnell, 1953, p.104). 75% of the labor force in 1953 was engaged in agricultural activities, exporting bananas of course, but mostly coffee which accounted for three-quarters of the country’s export value (Britnell, 1953, p.105). Poverty, uneven access to natural resources, inequality, and the like are common in cases of political instability and armed conflict. Guatemala in 1954 had all the hallmarks.

Regional Stability

The Central American/Caribbean region after World War II was characterized by dictatorships, coups, popular uprisings. The region was in a constant state of political turmoil. CIA historian Nicholas Cullather notes that the post-World War II political

climate saw popular uprisings in Cuba, Venezuela, and El Salvador (1994, p.4). Guatemala, after all, and transitioned through five political regimes in ten years. Economically, the region shared a basic model of agricultural export driven economies, poor populations, and influences from the United Fruit Company and other western corporations.

There were, however, attempts at coordination between the Central American states. The Organization of Central American States, including Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua was established in 1951 and still exists today. However, at the time, Norman Padelford noted (1957, p.52) “The frequent recurrence of political disturbances and changes in leadership through armed uprisings and other coups d’état have kept the region in a condition of political uncertainty and complicated relations among the states”.

Perhaps the most telling sign of regional instability with regards to the 1954 coup d’état in Guatemala is that throughout its planning and conception, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic actively supported, through money and arms, the rebel forces (Cullather, 1994, p.18). Furthermore, the coup was launched from four locations within Honduras where the forces of Castillos Armas had been staging. Surely, the Honduran government was complicit in the coup. The region was unstable, which proved to be a contributing factor in the success of the Guatemalan coup in 1954.

The Proxy

Carlos Castillo Armas was an unlikely choice to lead a rebellion and assume control over a national government. Castillo was a protégé of the gunned down presidential candidate Francisco Javier Arana. After his assassination, Castillo seemed

hell-bent to see Arana's vision for the country carried out. Or, at least have his revenge on the government that killed his mentor. Shortly after the assassination and before the election, Castillo led an attack on a Guatemalan military base which the official CIA history dubbed "quixotic" (Cullather, 1994, p.18). Castillo falsely believed the army would rise with him after the raid. He was captured by them and thrown in jail (Cullather, 1994, p.18).

After he bribed his way out of prison, Castillo set up in Honduras where he would continue to plot his coup. The CIA history paints a picture of Castillo as the best option for a leader in a group of bad options. His recruitment message was labeled delusional by the CIA as he told potential recruits and backers that he had the support of the Guatemalan Army. Perhaps the most concerning trait of this proxy leader who sought to rule Guatemala is his lack of a plan to rule. In fact, there was a total absence of an organizing political philosophy.

The only attempt by Castillo at such a principle was his manifesto "Plan de Tegucigalpa". Which was referred to by Cullather (2006, p.50) as a vague denunciation of the perceived "Sovietization" of Guatemala. In fact, this was probably little more than an attempt to garner more support from the United States by playing up Cold War geopolitics. The CIA had described Guatemala as potential "Soviet beachhead in the Western Hemisphere" (Cullather, 1994, p.16) and Castillo seemed to be playing on that assessment for his own gain.

Daniel Byman's assessment (2018) that proxy forces may be nothing more than pawns is borne out in the case of Castillo Armas. The CIA was impressed by his "unassumed receptiveness to advice" (Cullather, 2006, p.50). This can be read as a man

easily controlled and manipulated. He was a middle grade military leader lacking any political organizing principles. He led a force under 500, composed of ill-trained and equipped men, including mercenaries to take on an army numbering over 5,000. Many of the battles during the rebellion were losses. His rebellion had no chance at success on its own. Without the support of the United States, Castillo Armas and his rebels would have perished. It can be assessed that Castillo was a man who was driven by revenge, angered by the killing of his mentor and his subsequent exile. While he may have enjoyed some success, ultimately becoming the president of Guatemala, his rule was short and oppressive. He was assassinated in 1957.

The External State

While some theories hold that the United States orchestrated the Guatemalan coup of 1954 to secure the business interests of a few high-ranking government officials with connections to United Fruit, the record shows that the containment of communism was the driving factor, even if those fears were exaggerated markedly in the case of Guatemala. The actions of the United States were driven by the confluence of standing and emerging national strategies and current events and geopolitics.

The Monroe Doctrine, the Roosevelt Corollary, and the strategy of Containment combined to form an outlook on the situation that called for action. Furthermore, at that temporal juncture, the United States was less than a decade removed from victory in World War II. It was a nuclear power. It was a superpower. The United States had the ability to act around the world with near impunity. This was most recently on display in the successful CIA orchestrated coup in Iran in August 1953. Policy, self-confidence, and

the fear of the spread of communism were the driving factors, and Castillo was the chosen vessel to carry out the strike.

Table 7 - Membership of Guatemala with Risk Variables (Raw Scores)

Variable/Membership	Fully In	More In Than Out	More Out Than In	Fully Out
REGIME			X (2)	
MAG				X (1)
GDPC		X (2032)		
INCOMP	X (1)			
INSTA				X (5)

Case 2 – Proxy: Pathet Laos / Country: Laos / External State: China

The communist forces of the Pathet Lao emerged as the victor of the Laotian Civil War in December of 1975 after a 16-year struggle against the Royal Lao Government. Throughout the civil war, the Pathet Laos was supported and, in some cases, directed by foreign states. Locally, the North Vietnamese government of Ho Chi Minh had a constant and almost fatherly relationship with the Pathet Lao. The Soviet Union was also supportive through propaganda, guidance, and mostly indirect military aide through the Vietnamese communists. However, China was the most significant external state supporter and the Pathet Lao backed the government of Mao Zedong in the Sino-Soviet split (Brazinsky, 2017, p.249).

Political Background

Prior to World War II, Laos was part of the French colonies of Indochina. During the war, the French were expelled by the Japanese, and Laos fell under firm Japanese control. The French returned to their colonies at the conclusion of the war and reestablished colonial rule. Laos was granted “limited independence” by the French in 1949 (Gilkey, 1958, p.94). The Royal Lao Government was able to administer its internal

affairs, to include democratic elections, but the foreign policy and defense of the country was still in French control (Evans, 2002, p.92). By 1954, France was sustaining heavy military losses in the Indochina War and support at home eroded. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 created the independent Kingdom of Laos, officially ending French colonial rule in Southeast Asia.

The political development of Laos throughout the Indochina wars and, ultimately, independence shares a common story with other post-colonial states. The political institutions were weak, and the country was not in a self-sustaining position economically. There was little hope, seemingly, to reconcile the three main factions of the Royal Laos Government that emerged in post-colonial Laos. Patit Paban Mishra (2001, p.873) put it succinctly, “The three major strands in Laos; Pathet Lao, neutralists and the rightists became a constant feature of Lao politics. Neither 1957 Vientiane Agreements nor 1962 Geneva Accords gave the country any respite from civil war.”

The years between Laos’s independence and the ultimate victory of the Pathet Lao in 1975 were marked by civil war, unsuccessful attempts at coalition governments, failed cease fires, and constant interference from external states, on both sides of the civil war. The government was described as a constitutional monarchy, which was democratic in nature. However, the government was never able to fully incorporate and integrate the Pathet Lao. This, and other regional and global factors will be discussed in a subsequent section. Most predominately, the Vietnam War would have detrimental effects on Laos. The U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973 and the subsequent victory of the North doomed the Royal Government of Laos. Fearing more bloodletting and reading the

regional political situation, the Royal Government handed over the capital to the Pathet Laos in 1975.

Economic Background

The Kingdom of Laos was one of the poorest and underdeveloped countries in the world. During colonial times under French rule, Laos was described as a “colonial backwater” (Evans, 2002, p.39) since it received little economic attention from France. The majority of the population supported itself on subsistence farming and agriculture. There was almost a total lack of Laotian domestic industry. The one industry that did bring in revenue was illicit, the opium trade. One commentator suggested that opium was the only economic resource that allowed the Laotian government to live within its means (Evans, 2002, p.53).

Peasants constituted the vast majority of the Laotian population, 95% of the population by some estimates (Gilkey, 1958, p.92). Gilkey (1958, p.92) sums up the socio-economic peril of Laos at the time:

There is no question that Laos needs aid. Though the peasants meet most of their basic needs through subsistence farming, they suffer from disease and debilitation. Only about half of the children born live to the age of 10. The per capita income (estimated at about \$50 a year) is one of the lowest in Asia. The literacy rate (about 15 percent) is also the lowest (it is about 20 percent in India and China). Until last summer there were no newspapers, but only mimeographed newsletters published by the government and privately by politicians at irregular intervals, and still written as often in French as in Laotian

The dismal economic conditions made the idea of a sustainable standing military impossible. The Royal Laos Government’s military forces were funded entirely by the United States, the only country in the world at the time to hold such a distinction (Mishra, 2001, p.874). The economic conditions, lack of a defense force, poor political

institutions, and high percentage of the population living in extreme poverty combine to form a country ripe for a Marxist-Leninist movement, which the Pathet Lao was (Groh, 2010, p.55). Hence the formation of the Pathet Lao who received the bulk of its economic and military assistance from communist China.

Regional Stability

When people think on contemporary regional security issues and their ties to global security over the past 20 years, they will likely be drawn to the Middle East. The confluence of civil war, internal uprisings, global jihadi movements, and great power competition have made the Middle East a focal point for practitioners of security studies. In the period between 1960-1975, roughly, Southeast Asia served the same purpose. Regional instability was a constant, and when tied into the larger global context of the Cold War, Southeast Asia was the epicenter of global instability.

J.L.S. Girling, writing in 1971 (p.56), sums up the situation in Southeast Asia as follow, “Violence is the great source of uncertainty, and violence through external intervention or civil war has touched every country in Southeast Asia, some almost continuously, at one time or another in the past thirty years.” Southeast Asia was an epicenter, along with Africa, in the fight against European colonialism in the post-World War II era. The governments of the independent states that emerged from colonialism were weak, lacking the institutional foundations of self-government.

In this vacuum, the struggle between authoritarianism, quasi-democratic, and communist models of government led to constant violence. Furthermore, in the Cold War context, Southeast Asia was impressionable, and thus ripe to be led out of colonialism and swayed to one side of the Cold War or another. Consequently, in this context, the

region had constant interference by external powers, to include both superpowers and all veto wielding permanent members of the Security Council.

The Proxy

The Pathet Lao anti-colonial resistance and independence movement is the story of three Laotian princes: Prince Souphanouvong, Prince Souvanna Phouma, and Prince Boun Oum of Champasak. Each of them had their own vision for the future of Laos, one right and royalist, one center, and one left. The origins of the Pathet Lao, the leftist faction, however, is the story of Prince Souphanouvong, who led the Pathet Lao from its creation until his death in 1991. The Pathet Lao, both as an armed group and a political movement is traced back to the anti-colonial wars against France. In the beginning, the Pathet Lao were not a communist movement.

Prince Souphanouvong was ardently anti-French. However, passion and conviction alone do not win wars of independence. Furthermore, they do not build the foundation for the governance of a newly independent state. Understanding the need for assistance, alliance, and an organizing political ideology, Prince Souphanouvong drifted into the orbit of the Viet Minh. The Viet Minh was a Marxist armed group and political organization created and led by Ho Chi Minh, dedicated to Vietnamese independence. It was at the Viet Minh Headquarters near Hanoi in 1950 that Prince Souphanouvong declared the creation of the Pathet Lao (Castle, 1991, p.9). Timothy Castle (1991, p.9) concludes “From this point forward, the Vietnamese Communists would support the Pathet Lao as military allies and ideological mentors.

In the regional struggle against French colonialism and the ideals of a Marxist society, the Pathet Lao acted as a minor proxy for the North Vietnamese. The Viet Minh,

after all, were the big brother and mentor. The Viet Minh provided assistance to the Pathet Lao, led attacks on Laotian territory, and garrisoned troops in Laos. In the broader global context, however, China remained the main external state power supporting their Laotian proxy in their fight to establish a communist government in Vientiane.

Unlike the forces of Castillo Armas in the Guatemala case, the Pathet Lao had a political philosophy, built political institutions, and ran a shadow government long before they took power of the country in 1975. International agreements had given the Pathet Laos political legitimacy. The Geneva Agreement of 1954, which officially ended French colonialism, allowed the Pathet Laos to establish a political regime in the northern part of the country due to imprecise wording (Langer and Zasloff, 1969, p.78). The Pathet Lao were not recognized at the conference but were represented by the Vietnamese and China (Langer and Zasloff, 1969). The Pathet Laos, therefore, held territory, performed governing functions, and fielded a fighting force. The Pathet Laos participated in Laotian elections, forming coalition governments with its political rivals. However, like most communist movements at the time, forming coalitions with rivals was never the ultimate goal. Creating communist governments was the goal. Therefore, political agreements and coalition governments in Laos were doomed to fail.

At its height, the Pathet Lao fielded a fighting force of over 48,000 troops, all heavily supported and trained by the Vietnamese and Chinese (Zasloff, 1973, p.70). The composition of the Pathet Lao was upper to middle class Laotians (by Laotian standards), who came from the lowlands of Laos, an area considered to be more sophisticated and educated than the “backwards” highlands (Zasloff, 1973, p.6). However, Zasloff notes that while lowland Laotians, who share a common language, religions, and traditions,

were successful in recruiting minorities into the Pathet Lao organization (1973, p.5). This diverse force, led by a coherent political structure and ideology, well supported by North Vietnam and China, was able to stay in the game for 25 years before it was finally able to take full control of the country. This shows that proxy wars and relationships with external state powers can be long games.

The External State

China, like the Soviet Union, was interested in supporting communist groups and movements around the globe. For the Soviet Union, ground zero was Europe, its proverbial backyard. Likewise, China focused its main effort in supporting communist movements in Asia. Its history and prestige, according to Mao, made China the natural leader and beacon in the region. Furthermore, the geopolitics of the Sino-Soviet split led Mao to take a more active approach in the region to be seen as the ideological leader and alternative to Soviet communism. However, in the case of Laos, and its Vietnamese neighbor, China had to take a different approach than it had in its last attempt to support an Asian communist movement. In the 1950-1953 Korean War, Mao chose direct intervention, at a tremendous cost of blood and treasure. In Southeast Asia, Mao chose war by proxy.

Throughout the Laos civil war, China did, at times, send Chinese troops and equipment directly to Laos. However, these troops would not fight directly and were typically used to protect construction and other projects (Groh, 2010, p.87). The Chinese were keen to repeat the disaster of the Korean intervention. This is a key aspect of war by proxy. Experience had demonstrated that direct intervention in a conflict where another great power, in this case a superpower (the United States), is already directly

involved is too costly. Indirect intervention, or war by proxy, allows a state to achieve its objectives through violence conducted by another agent. In sum, over the course of the Laos civil war, it is estimated that China provided the Pathet Laos with “115,000 guns, 34 tanks and armored vehicles, 170 million bullets, and 920,000 grenades” as well as officer training in doctrine and combined arms warfare, changing the nature of the Pathet Laos from a purely guerilla force to that of a regular army (Brazinsky, 2017, p.249).

Table 8 - Membership of Laos with Risk Variables (Raw Scores)

Variable/Membership	Fully In	More In Than Out	More Out Than In	Fully Out
REGIME			X (4)	
MAG	X (4)			
GDPC	X (642)			
INCOMP	X (1)			
INSTA			X (16)	

Case 3 – Proxy: Brigade 2506 / Country: Cuba / External State: U.S.

On 17 April 1961, a paramilitary unit dubbed “Brigade 2506” composed of approximately 1,300-1,500 Cuban exiles trained by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) attempted to invade Cuba with the overall objective of overthrowing the communist regime of President Fidel Castro in what came to be known as “The Bay of Pigs”. The operation was disaster. The majority of Brigade 2506 were either captured or killed. The government of the United States, led at the time by President John F. Kennedy, was reluctant to go all in for fears of provoking a Soviet response. President Kennedy withheld crucial military support, namely air support, which sealed the fate of the doomed invasion force. In the end, the mission was a failure, Castro strengthened his position by defeating the invasion forces, and the United States was left with a geopolitical black eye. Cuba is still ruled by a communist regime as of this writing.

Political Background

In 1961, Cuba was a relatively new independent state and had not established strong political institutions prior to the assumption of power and the establishment of Marxism as an organizing ideology by Castro. The Spanish ruled Cuba for over 400 years, only losing control of the country following its defeat by the United States in the Spanish American War in 1898. After the war, Cuba was de facto ruled by the United States until 20 May 1902. The United States maintained heavy influence over the country after independence, thanks to American law and pressure, most notably through the Platt Amendment which the Cubans were forced to accept. The Platt Amendment, for all intents and purposes, allowed the United States to intervene in Cuban affairs, as it saw fit.

In March 1952, Fulgencio Batista, a former president and military officer, staged a coup and took control of the Cuban government. Cuba had long suffered from poor governance. In fact, it was the rule rather than an exception. At the time of the coup, Cuba had endured years of “political gangsterism” and widespread government corruption (Thomas, 1987, 170). Batista ruled in much of the same way, extending patronage to supporters by corrupt means and brutally repressing any opposition (Foran, 2009, 19). The military dictatorship of Batista grew ever more unpopular, but it was propped up by the United States which viewed Batista through the lens of Cold War geopolitics, willing to accept his authoritarianism if he remained anti-communist and supportive in international forms (Morely, 1982, 144).

In this setting, Fidel Castro and his 26th of July Movement, named after the date of a rebel attack on a military barracks, fought a nearly five-and-a-half-year revolution against the Batista regime. The movement ultimately adopted a Marxist ideology;

however, some have concluded that Castro adopted Marxism only after determining it was the fastest way to unite the revolution and overthrow the Batista regime (Gallo, 1974, 90-91). The overthrow was completed on New Year's Eve, 1959 and Castro took power. Regardless of what Castro truly believed, he jumped in fully with Marxism as an organizing political ideology along with becoming a patron of the Soviet Union. These two facts were unacceptable to the United States. It became U.S. policy to overthrow the communist government of Castro. Given the recent successes of CIA orchestrated coups in Iran and Guatemala, the logical conclusion was to use a similar game plan. Hence, the creation of Brigade 2506 and the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion.

Economic Background

The Cuban economy leading up to the revolution in 1959 can be characterized as monocultural and colonial. Monocultural economies focus/specialize on one commodity. In the case of Cuba, that product was sugar. In pre-revolutionary Cuba, sugar cane covered 61 percent of arable land, accounting for a third of national income and 85 percent of total exports (Wiesel, 1968, p.203). During colonial times and through the nearly 60 years after independence, the wealth created by the sugar trade was concentrated in the hands of the few wealthy landowners and government officials, and goods and money often ended up abroad in the capitals of Spain, the United States, and Great Britain. Roughly 40 percent of the population was employed in agriculture, yet 75 percent of the agricultural lands themselves were concentrated in hands of 10 percent of the population (Wiesel, 1968, p.204).

These conditions are perfect if a group is trying to start a Marxist revolution. It is almost a textbook example of what a Marxist would rally against: wealth in the hands of

those who own the means of production, poor peasant workers not receiving their share, goods and wealth transported away from the homeland to other capitalist states. Of course, Castro used the pre-revolutionary economic model as an example to strengthen his cause and the revolution that followed. This is the promise of all communist strongmen.

Castro did not disappoint. He immediately began the process of cutting out external state powers from the Cuban economy, nationalizing \$1 billion in direct investment from the United States within the first-year post-revolution (Leogrande and Thomas, 2002, 326). An attempt was made to industrialize, through central planning on the Soviet socialist model, of course. However, unlike the Soviet Union, who had long industrialized and a great power, Cuba did not have any experience or capacity for industrialization. They had to start from scratch. This was a case of too much, too soon, and a government that was over its head. The experiment was a failure. By 1963, two years after the failed invasion at the Bay of Pigs, Castro accepted the reality of Cuba's means at the time and returned to the specialization of sugar (Leogrande and Thomas, 2002, p.327). What did not change from colonial times through the revolution is that most of the population was poor, living on a subsistence means.

Regional Stability

Cuba is regionally grouped with the states of Latin America and the Caribbean. This United Nations (UN) recognized regional grouping of states covers Mexico, Central and South America, and the Caribbean states. At the time of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the region was experiencing many upheavals and there was instability. However, that instability was typically contained within individual states and was characterized by

revolving door governments. The previous case in Guatemala stands as an example. This is to say that regional interstate war was not prevalent. Rather, civil wars, coups, and revolutions ruled the day.

The United States was a superpower and its influence over the region was heavy. Of course, this had been stated American policy since the presidency of James Monroe. President Theodore Roosevelt made the Monroe Doctrine more pointed with his own corollary, which justified intervention in the affairs of Latin America and the Caribbean. At the time of the Bay of Pigs, the United States viewed the region through the lens of the Cold War. Thus, post-war administrations abandoned the American principles of justice and democracy for all in favor of governments that provided security assurances and alignment against communism.

This policy, consequently, meant supporting dictators and tyrants. Many of the same ilk of the fascists America had fought during World War II. The people of Latin America and the Caribbean at times rebelled against these rulers, of course. The Guatemala example has already been laid out in full. In 1956, the U.S. backed dictator of Nicaragua, Anastasio Somoza, was assassinated, as was the U.S. backed dictator of the Dominican Republic, Rafael Trujillo, in 1961. The United States supported dictators Papa and Baby Doc Duvalier in Haiti. Finally, and most importantly to this case, is that the United States supported the Batista dictatorship in Cuba. With Castro grabbing on to the Marxist ideology and courting Moscow, Washington's policy towards revolutionary Cuba was simple, regime change.

This is the key distinction between the case of Cuba and those of other U.S. interventions or influence in the region during the Cold War, namely that of Guatemala.

In Guatemala, the United States was concerned about it becoming a doorway for Moscow into the region. However, those links were spurious. In Cuba, the links were very real. Castro was a Marxist who understood the support of the other superpower would strengthen his position. The Soviet-Cuba relationship, and Cuba's proximity to the United States (just over 100 miles), coupled to make the tiny island of Cuba the most volatile potential flashpoint of the Cold War, next to perhaps the European theater. As is known, the closest the United States and the Soviet Union came to direct conflict and potential nuclear war, transpired in and around the tiny island of Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, a short 18 months after the failed Bay of Pigs invasion.

The Proxy

Brigade 2506 was the creation of the CIA. The process of recruiting and training the Brigade and its stated objectives are, not surprisingly, very similar to the CIA orchestrated coup in Guatemala. Philip Zelikow (2000, p.319) describes it as the "lulling Guatemala precedent," an operation "almost as feckless" yet, successful, nonetheless. There is a tendency for organizations to go with what they know. To do what has "worked". This was the approach taken by the CIA during Operation Zapata, the official code name for the Bay of Pigs invasion. However, unlike PBSUCCESS, the Bay of Pigs ended in failure, and the majority of the proxy force was captured or killed in a rout.

The formation of Brigade 2506 as a proxy force began in Miami, where the CIA recruited and brought together groups of Cuban exiles. In 1961, an estimated 100,000 exiles from all ends of the political spectrum had landed in Miami (Moore, 1966, p.9). The CIA has estimated close to 200 groups existed in the Miami area dedicated to the overthrow of Fidel Castro's regime, however, Langley focused on three main umbrella

groups (Dunne, 2011, p.452). These groups had leaders with military and political experience, a must for a successful coup.

The leaders of Brigade 2506 had backgrounds similar to that Castillo Armas in Guatemala. The political leader of the unit was Manuel Artime, who headed the Movimiento Recuperación Revolucionario (MRR) and was previously a player in Castro's revolution. The Brigade commander, Pepe San Román was an Army officer during the Batista regime, took part in a plot against Batista, and served in the Army after the revolution. Both Artime and Román fell from the graces of Castro and regime escaped to the United States.

It was abroad they plotted their revenge, and the CIA was willing to help. The similarities to PBSUCCESS are apparent. In fact, Brigade 2506 received their training at a camp called JMTrax in Guatemala. In all, this proxy force of around 1,599 men were all dedicated to returning to their homeland and the ousting of Fidel Castro and his regime. These seem to be the two uniting objectives of the force.

The External State

Many volumes of books, articles, and commentaries have been written on the United States and its relations with Cuba. The Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, after all, is often described as the closest the United States and the Soviet Union came to nuclear war. That event is etched in the minds of all who lived through it. Thus, it is apparent the United States formed Brigade 2506 to meet strategic objectives. Namely, keeping communism out of the Western Hemisphere. The thought of having a Soviet stooge 100 miles from its shores was unpalatable. The Cuban Missile Crisis shows the

United States' concerns were well warranted. Even though the operation was a failure, the intent was in line with U.S. national security policy.

We must not be too quick, however, to discount other motivations. After all, there is rarely a singular cause for anything in the social sciences. As noted previously, Castro nationalized over \$1 billion in American direct investment. Those American businesses that made the investments lost that money. Access to and the protection of commerce has been a vital national security objective of the United States since independence. Thus, there were economic concerns.

The Monroe Doctrine, and Roosevelt's corollary, were also at play, layered over the containment strategy. The United States was (is) a regional hegemon. It has been stated and established U.S. policy since President James Monroe proclaimed his administration's doctrine in 1823 to act like a regional hegemon. This tiny island, in America's own backyard, could not be tolerated as a source of trouble at this magnitude. A bit of hubris to be sure, but great powers often act accordingly. Finally, it is often forgotten in the analysis of U.S. relations with Cuba post-revolution that the United States had fought a war to liberate Cuba. Over 300 Americans gave their lives in Cuba, with another 1,300 wounded (McSherry). Blood had been spilled and treasure expended. Foreign liberations, often undertaken under the banner of selfless benevolence, become less benevolent when its time collect the spoils of the blood and treasure spent.

Table 9 - Membership of Cuba with Risk Variables (Raw Scores)

Variable/Membership	Fully In	More In Than Out	More Out Than In	Fully Out
REGIME	X (-7)			
MAG			X (2)	
GDP		X (2050)		
INCOMP	X (1)			
INSTA				X (1)

Case 4 – Proxy: Mukti Bahini / Country: East Pakistan / External State: India

On 26 March 1971, Bengali nationalist leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman declared East Pakistan was now the independent state of Bangladesh. This followed years of ethnic Bengali exclusion and suppression from West Pakistan, where political power was concentrated, in the then non-contiguous state of Pakistan. The political breakdown between East and West was met by a genocidal military operation from West Pakistan called Operation Searchlight. This marked the beginning of the Bengali Liberation War between the forces of the Bengali Mukti Bahini and the Pakistani Army. In December 1971, India officially entered the war on the side of the Mukti Bahini after months of training and equipping the insurgent forces. India’s formal entrance into the conflict was preceded by a Pakistani air attack on Indian forces. India’s entrance into the war tipped the scales rapidly and on 16 December 1971, the forces of West Pakistan surrendered. East Pakistan became the independent state of Bangladesh and West Pakistan became what is known today as Pakistan.

Political Background

The Bangladeshi War of Independence is counted as one of several violent outcomes in the process of European decolonialization in South Asia. The colony of

British India was composed of modern-day India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, a large territory with a diverse population, ethnically and religiously. As the British moved toward handing over independence of British India, it became clear to many Muslims they may be trading the yoke of London for that of the Congress Party in India, which was led by Mahatma Gandhi. The Congress Party was the primary political entity in the Indian independence movement. In fact, it was essentially the only established party with strong and enduring political leaders and institutions.

The problem for many leaders in the Muslim community was Hindu dominance of the Congress Party. An independent India dominated by the majority Hindu Congress Party was unpalatable to many Muslims. In response, Muhammad Ali Jinnah and other Muslim leaders formed the Muslim League and advocated for an independent Muslim nation on the Sub-Continent. Although ethnically distinct from Jinnah and most of the League leadership, the Bengalis nonetheless supported the Muslim League along religious lines. In 1946, Bengalis rejected the Congress Party and in a 1947 referendum, chose to join the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Ludden, 2011, p.81).

In July 1947, the British Parliament passed the Indian Independence Act, creating the sovereign state of India, and the united, yet noncontiguous state of Pakistan, separated into West and East. From the beginning, political and economic power was centered in Islamabad in West Pakistan. Perhaps more important was the exclusion of Bengalis from senior positions in the Pakistani Army, which became (and remains) the most powerful institution in Pakistan. The British considered Bengalis to be militarily inept as a race, “nonmartial,” and thus were never truly integrated into the military (Paul et al. 2013, p.341).

The sense of separation and exclusion was apparent to Bengalis from the start. David Ludden (2011) notes that Bengali ideals of autonomy manifested in two forms, federalism within Pakistan and independence. Leading up to the war of independence, federalism as a means to securing greater autonomy was the stated policy goal of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his Awami League. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman did everything in his power to access political representation for his people through peaceful and democratic means. In Pakistan's first national elections in 1970, the Awami League won a majority of the seats in parliament (Murshid, 2011, p.54). This would have allowed Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to form a government, represented a huge power shift from West to East, and would have enabled Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to implement the federalist plan he envisioned for autonomy in East Pakistan.

The powers in West Pakistan did not support the outcome of the elections. West Pakistan's Pakistan People's Party (PPP), led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, did not support the federalist idea and refused to participate in a constitutional convention. At the time, Pakistan was ruled by General Yahya Khan who came to power after the fall of military dictator Ayub Khan in 1969. It was Yahya Khan who had called for national elections after he assumed power. His reign was to be transitional. The elections of 1970 were problematic for Yahya Khan. He was from West Pakistan. The Pakistani Army's power was in the West. Khan, being a general in that army, had an interest in maintaining the institutional power. The PPP in West Pakistan did not support the election outcome. Khan could have saved his country and kept it united.

Instead, he chose to overturn the elections of 1970, and launch a military campaign in East Pakistan to bring those calling for Bengali independence to heel. Thus

began the Bengali War of Liberation, as Sheikh Mujibur Rahman declared independence following the launch of Operation Searchlight. Operation Searchlight is widely considered a genocide, having resulted in an estimated three million dead, 10 million refugees flooding into neighboring India, and 30 million displaced within Bangladesh, with an estimated 200,000 women and girls raped in nine months of war (Paul et al., 2013, p.340). The result, however, after India entered the war, was the creation of the sovereign state of Bangladesh.

Economic Background

Both West and East Pakistan would have been part of the “Third World” in 1971. Both territories had populations in extreme poverty. Most of the population was rural, accounting for 80% of the total population (Nazeer, 1966, p.310). In these areas, the populations depended on subsistence farming and trading, making just enough to survive. However, tea, and a few other agricultural exports were bringing income into the country prior to the conflict. The tea industry became a focus of the Mukti Bahini, limiting the export of tea in a form of economic warfare against the government in West Pakistan (Qureshi, 1971, p.38). To make matters worse for the already poverty-stricken nation of East Pakistan, in 1970, it had suffered “one of the greatest natural disasters in history” (Qureshi, 1971, p.46).

The economic conditions within Pakistan were dismal, except for the few at the top who exploited the countries riches, particularly in the military. More concerning, however, in terms of West and East Pakistan relations, was the disparity between the West and East Pakistan in terms of share in economic benefits. Rehman Sobhan (1971, p.6) provides a summary of descriptive statistics of these disparities:

\$2.6 billion worth of East Pakistan's resources were transferred to the West between 1949 and 1969. In 1969, per capita income in West Pakistan was 61% higher than in the East. In the twenty years leading up to the war, East Pakistan accounted for 50-70% of Pakistan's export earning, but only received 25% of the imports. With 55% of Pakistan's total population, East Pakistanis accounted for 16% of civil service jobs and 10% of military jobs.

The list of economic indications supporting the West's exclusion and exploitation of the East continues like this. The economic conditions matched the political, contributing to East Pakistan's conclusion that fighting would be the only way to secure their rights and future prosperity.

Regional Stability

South Asian security was, and is today, dominated by the rivalry between India and Pakistan. These two states dwarf their South Asian neighbors in both area and population. This was especially true in 1971 when what is now Bangladesh remained a part of Pakistan. Therefore, South Asia is seemingly in a constant state of pending instability. By 1971, the rivals had already fought two wars in the Jammu and Kashmir region in the north, and both were at a constant state of readiness. However, perhaps due to their size and conventional military capabilities, these wars, and the rivalry itself, were generally contained between the two states. Their wars have not sucked in their smaller neighboring states into a broader conflict. Furthermore, the wars have not drawn in other great powers into the conflicts, like was seen in the Laos case and what has been transpiring in Syria in modern times. Therefore, in 1971, the region was considered a

possible flashpoint for conflict. However, there was not widespread regional instability on the scale of other regions, like Southeast Asia.

The Proxy

The Mukti Bahini, typically translated as “liberation army” or “freedom fighters,” was the armed wing of the Bangladeshi independence movement. It was formed, officially, in April of 1971 in response to West Pakistani aggression during Operation Searchlight and the declaration of independence in Bangladesh. The composition of this force included former Pakistani Army, border guards, police, and citizens. The total force included, “about 18,000 regular forces, about 150 officers and around 130,000 guerrillas” (Jamal, p.7, 2008). Furthermore, outside of the Mukti Bahini command structure there were several independent groups, numbering approximately 27,000 (Jamal, p.7, 2008). With the help of their Indian sponsors, the Mukti Bahini would have a rudimentary Air Force and Naval capability as well.

The numbers above suggest a formidable guerilla force, which, in sheer numbers is correct. However, some 150,000 members of the Mukti Bahini lacked structure, organization, and leadership. According to Salil Tripathi (2016, p.127), “The Bengalis were surprisingly unprepared for a war that many of them had deemed possible, even likely, for years”. This is not too surprising if you consider the marginalization of Bengalis in the Pakistan Army. There were few senior military leaders of Bengali ethnicity. Furthermore, their equipment was old and rundown, indicative of their place in the broader Pakistani Army.

Recognizing these shortfalls, the Bengali leadership appointed General M. A. G. Osmani as the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces. A local military legend, Osmani

had served under the British Raj, fought in World War II, and also served in the Pakistan Army after the partition of British India. With the fighters and leaders in place, the Mukti Bahini began the fight in earnest. They still were in a significant position of risk as the Army of West Pakistan continues to slaughter their countrymen, women, children, and civilian men included. It was clear, the Mukti Bahini must appeal to India, who was the most powerful state in the region, shared West Pakistan as a common enemy, and stood to benefit significantly from an independent Bangladesh.

The External State

In the Bangladesh War of Independence, India had a grand opportunity to weaken its primary geopolitical rival, Pakistan. A win by the Bengalis would cut Pakistan in half, alleviating the strategic problem of sharing a border with your enemy on two sides. Further, using the genocide in the international arena to weaken Pakistan's position and support in international organizations such as the United Nations. India had much to gain from supporting the Mukti Bahini.

However, additional issues complicated the situation. A proxy relationship with the Mukti Bahini was a no brainer on the surface, but geopolitics cut both ways. Overt support and recognition could bring the international community against India, sympathizing with the government of West Pakistan. Understanding this, the Indian government tread carefully. Tyrone Groh finds, "India justified its support of Mukti Bahini in East Pakistan because the government crackdown caused millions of refugees to seek shelter inside India's border. As a result, other states in the international system stood by as India supported East Pakistan's secession and significantly weakened

Islamabad’s strategic position” (2010, p.31). However, Navine Murshid (2011) finds international interest in the conflict to be low, which also lowered the risk of intervention.

Covert support in funding, training, and equipment started almost immediately, as did overt political support. By 31 March 1971, the Indian Parliament had pledged its full support to the secessionists (Faruki, 1971, p.25). The Indian government held its cards tightly and executed a campaign to maintain its position internationally while actively supporting the rebellion. The turning point in the war, and for India’s involvement, came on 3 December 1971, when Pakistan conducted airstrikes against Indian airbases. This decision on the part of Islamabad sealed its fate. India now had a clear justification to enter the war and provide overt support to the Mukti Bahini. Less than two weeks later, Pakistan surrendered.

Table 10 - Membership of East Pakistan with Risk Variables (Raw Scores)

Variable/Membership	Fully In	More In Than Out	More Out Than In	Fully Out
REGIME		X (-1)		
MAG	X (4)			
GDPC	X (931)			
INCOMP			X (.25)	
INSTA			X (26)	

Case 5 – Proxy: South Lebanese Army / Country: Lebanon / External State: Israel

The Lebanese Civil War lasted 15, from 1975-1990. The cost was heavy, with an estimated 120,000 deaths and millions of displaced people (UN Human Rights Council, 2006, 18). Many foreign powers intervened with military power, including Syria, Israel, Iran, United States, France, Italy, and the United Nations (UN). Many of the belligerents had a corresponding proxy in the form of local militias. These militias were aligned on

religious of “confessional” lines, reflecting Lebanon’s diverse polity. Israel supported the South Lebanese Army (SLA), a Christian group, which it used to combat the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Hezbollah, in the territories Israel occupied in Southern Lebanon. The civil war ended in 1990, but Israel continued to occupy Southern Lebanon. In 2000, the Israeli government ordered a full withdrawal. The SLA collapsed shortly after.

Political Background

Lebanon provides another case of example of post-colonial instability and war. The territory of modern-day Lebanon was conquered by the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century and remained part of the Empire until its collapse following the end of World War I in 1918. The prewar world was carved up amongst the victors through the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 and other mandates by the newly formed League of Nations. In 1926, the League approved the “French Mandate,” which gave control of Lebanon to the French. World War II ushered in an era of decolonialization, which saw colonial maps and control turned over to local governments and newly independent nations. Thus was the case with Lebanon, who gained independence from France in 1943.

The Lebanese government was set up along confessional lines. As Imad Harb (2006) notes, “Confessionalism is a system of government that proportionally allocates political power among a country's communities—whether religious or ethnic—according to their percentage of the population.” Thus, the government established at independence was a representation of the religious proportions of the time. A Maronite Christian would hold the presidency, with a Sunni Muslim and a Shi’a Muslim serving as the prime minister speaker of the Parliament, respectively. The parliament itself allocated seats

proportionally to the main religious groups, and others, such as the Druze. The Maronite Christians held a 6:5 proportional majority in the parliament (Harb, 2006).

Often, civil wars and internal conflicts draw in regional and global powers. This is generally the norm in the studies of proxy war and foreign interventions. The case of Lebanon, however, is backwards. Lebanon had created a power sharing agreement, which, had it worked, would have been an instructive model for other nations. The fact it was agreed to is a feat in and of itself. However, as regional tensions began to rise and the Cold War loomed over the globe, the fabric of that agreement began to unravel.

Pan-Arabism was on the rise as an ideology. The Palestinian conflict with Israel was engulfing the region and states were picking sides in the Cold War. Lebanon found itself in the middle of these tensions. The government it had created in good faith at independence was a natural tinder box, collecting and igniting all of these tensions in one state. The Maronites were Christian, and, even though they were also Arabs, they felt more aligned with Western values and politics. The Sunni and Shi'a factions were drawn to Pan-Arabism and the plight of the Palestinians. The West, led by the United States, supported Israel. The Soviet Union, of course, had to take the opposite course, and used Arab allies, in Egypt, for example, to support the Pan-Arab and Palestinians. Palestinian refugees and militants from the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) spilled over into Lebanon. The first clashes between Maronite Christians and the PLO commences in 1975, beginning the Lebanese civil war.

Economic Background

In the years leading to the outbreak of civil war in 1975, Lebanon was considered a developing country. However, unlike many cases in this study, Lebanon had many

positive socioeconomic attributes could have resulted in a period of economic growth had war not broken out in 1975. Lebanon invested heavily in education, resulting in a 73% adult literacy rate, the highest in any Arab nation at the time (Kubursi, 1999, 70).

Lebanon had a robust foreign trade percentage, where import duties comprised a third of revenues for over a decade (Kubursi, 1974, 87). Its geography was favorable. Situated on the Eastern Mediterranean, Lebanon had sea and land trade roots, centrally located to access the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe.

While there were many positives in Lebanon's economic outlook, its fatal flaw was that the economic power centers mirrored its political composition. Atif Kubursi (1999, 71) explains, "The Lebanese economy was and is basically a confessional." The economy was controlled by powerful Maronites and Sunnis, with the minority groups clamoring for access. Like the National Pact on the political side, this confessional arrangement was a net positive economically. However, that economic success depended on the strength of the political institution. Once that system broke down, and the war began, the trust and interoperability which made the economy succeed, fell apart. As is often the case, civil war ruins a national economy, and the average citizen feels most of that weight. For nearly 15 years, most Lebanese lived in an uncertain security and economic position.

Regional Stability

The Middle East was a hub for regional instability in the 1970s, most notably through the ongoing Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. In October 1973, Egypt and Syria, supported by a coalition of nine Arab states, launched a full-scale war against Israel. The PLO Palestine carried out its Munich Massacre during the 1972 Summer

Olympics. The PLO moved its headquarters to Southern Lebanon, after having a confirmed military presence there since at least 1969 (Hamid, 1975, 108). The presence of the PLO in Southern Lebanon, and later Hezbollah, coupled with the general instability in the country during the civil war had obvious security implications for Israel who would use the conflict to occupy Southern Lebanon, using its Lebanese proxy from early on.

Regional instability in the Middle East had broader geopolitical implications as it sucked in the two Cold War superpowers. The United States sided with Israel in the 1973 war while the Soviet Union provided support to the Arab coalition. There was a tenuous détente building between the two superpowers, but international events put a heavy strain on it. Both sides had cooperated on a ceasefire during the 1973, but also faced a direct confrontation which President Richard M. Nixon compared to the Cuban Missile Crisis (Smart, 1974, 4). Thus, the region was a hotbed for regional and international insecurity. It was in this context and condition that the Lebanese Civil War erupted and drew in the usual regional and international suspects.

The Proxy

The SLA was a military-political reflection of the broader civil war in Lebanon. The Lebanese confessional political system disintegrated as tensions between Christian and Muslim groups, and other minority groups, increased as a result of broader regional and geopolitical tensions. Ersun Kurtulus (2012, 1291) explains, "...in March 1976 the Lebanese army, which had so far taken a neutral stance in the conflict, disintegrated in the aftermath of a mutiny of Muslim troops under the leadership of Lieutenant Ahmad Khatib and the creation of the Lebanese Arab Army. "This mutiny of Muslim forces from

the integrated Lebanese Army, as expected, had a counter effect and the Army of Free Lebanon was created by Christian forces under the leadership of Colonel Antoine Barakat.

As Oren Barak (2009, 104) emphasizes, “Instead of one unified national army, Lebanon...had at least five major military factions.” The Army of Free Lebanon, being one, broke up as well, and the SLA was created in 1977 under its leader Saad Haddad. Haddad proclaimed a separate independent state called the “Free Lebanon State” in 1979. The “independent state” did not gain formal recognition from any state in the world, save a weak endorsement by Israel. Haddad had overgrown aspirations of leading newly independent state, separate from the government in Beirut. In fact, his organization grew to be a totally dependent proxy of Israel, which was used to secure Israel’s northern flank from incursions by the PLO and Hezbollah.

Writing on Haddad and his “state” and militia, the *Journal of Palestinian Studies* (1980, 156) concludes that he was “totally dependent on Israel for everything”. This may seem like a biases account coming from a Palestinian perspective. However, the historical record confirms the challenge of the Free State’s actual freeness. A U.S. *Congressional Research Service* report written by Joshua Ruebner (2000) reports “Israel paid an average monthly salary of between \$500 and \$800 to SLA members.’ Together with maintenance and infrastructure expenditures, it is estimated that Israel spent a total of \$35 million annually on the SLA and its dependents.” Furthermore, Israel equipped the SLA with main battle tanks, armed personnel carriers, towed artillery pieces, mortars, anti-aircraft shoulder-fired missiles and anti-aircraft guns (2).

Examining the amount of support given to the SLA from Israel, one can conclude that the militia essentially was a component of the Israeli Defense Force. Militiamen and their families depended on their Israeli paid salary to live. It would seem the job stability, coupled with protecting their neighborhoods, was the motivating factor in SLA membership, which at its peak numbered around 5,000. The dependence on Israel became clear as Israel grew less committed to the fight.

The people of Israel grew tired of the occupation and the expenditure of blood and treasure. Prime Minister Ehud Barak pledged to withdrawal Israeli forces and carried out the withdrawal in 2000. It became clear to the SLA that it could not stand against the encroaching Hezbollah without Israeli support. A report from the *BBC* on May 24, 2000 captured the reality of the proxy's position after the Israeli withdrawal, "The sight of Saad Haddad's statue being dragged through the streets of the Lebanese town of Marjayoun was a sure sign that the South Lebanon Army was gone." The SLA was disbanded and merged back into the population or fled to Israel for fear of retribution from Hezbollah.

The External State

Israel's intentions in using the SLA as a proxy are clear. There was a civil war to its North where groups like the PLO, and later Hezbollah, established strongholds that directly threatened its own security. Employing a proxy in the region would offset costs and operations to a force which lived in the area and knew the people and terrain. However, Israel did have troops in the area throughout the conflict. It was an occupying force that fought and suffered casualties. Having the SLA allowed Israel to send fewer troops of its own and offset costs to achieve its objectives.

Israel had been in a constant state of conflict or preparation for conflict. It remains that way today. In 1975, however, it was only two years removed from the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, which was the fourth conventional conflict with Arab forces since its independence in 1948. The Syrian Army also occupied Lebanon, which only heightened Israel's fears. However, conventional attacks decreased, and it was terror type of attacks and guerilla warfare which increased through organizations like the PLO and Hezbollah. A common way to combat local guerilla groups is for states to co-op local likeminded forces. This was the approach Israel took in Lebanon. Like many counterinsurgencies and occupations carried out by democracies, when the support of the people wanes, it is tough to remain. Proxies are often set aside. This was the case with the SLA.

Table 11 - Membership of Lebanon with Risk Variables (Raw Scores)

Variable/Membership	Fully In	More In Than Out	More Out Than In	Fully Out
REGIME			X (5)	
MAG	X (4)			
GDPC		X (3523)		
INCOMP	X (1)			
INSTA			X (15)	

Case 6 – Proxy: Mozambican National Resistance/Country: Mozambique / External State: South Africa

Mozambique gained independence from Portugal in 1975 after 477 years of colonial rule. The Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) led the insurgency against the Portuguese. FRELIMO convinced Portugal to allow the insurgents it to take over the country upon independence without elections or political participation from other groups. FRELIMO, a Marxist group, was supported by the Soviet Union and

China, and its takeover was viewed as a threat to neighboring Rhodesia and South Africa, with broader Cold War implications as well. In this context, the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) was formed as a counter to the FRELIMO government in Mozambique. The two groups, supported by external states, fought a bloody civil war between 1977-1992, with both sides committing war crimes and atrocities. After a brief period of peace between the two groups, a second conflict began in 2013. In 2019, a peace treaty was signed between the two groups. Today, FRELIMO remains the dominant political party in Mozambique, while RENAMO remains the primary opposition party.

Political Background

The political background of Mozambique leading to the civil war in 1977 shares some familiar attributes with other cases in this dissertation. First, this conflict is traced to the power vacuum and lack of political institutions in the post-colonial world. Like Laos and Bangladesh, thus far, European colonial powers transitioned their holdings to local authorities in a haphazard way, causing uncertainty and upheaval. Second, the geopolitics of the Cold War were present as the Soviet Union and China backed the Marxist FRELIMO movement, resulting in a win for the East Block. Third, and most germane to this study, the two primary competing groups were used as proxies by third-party external states, regionally and internationally.

Mozambique, like its sister Luso-African Portuguese colonies Angola and Guinea-Bissau, was colonized almost purely for extraction and exploitation purposes. Almost a quarter into the 19th century, 85% of Portuguese revenue from the colonies was derived from the slave trade, with the best lands were given to Portuguese settlers, as by a

general rule the, "... Portuguese were not much interested in improving the living conditions of the indigenous population of the colonies" (Mormul, 2018, 47). The Portuguese did little to prepare for a transfer of power to Africans in its colonies (Mormul, 2018, 47). They held on to their overseas possessions as long as they could, given their own political and economic weaknesses. The 25 April 1974 military coup in Portugal dubbed the "Carnation Revolution" precipitated a rapid decolonization process. By 1975, Mozambique had gained its independence.

After years of insurgency and the end of Portugal's colonial rule, FRELIMO was handed the keys to the country as the sole government authority of independent Mozambique. FRELIMO viewed its revolutionary cause against Portugal through the lens of Marxist-Leninist ideology (Henriksen, 1978, 445). Thus, its post-independence government took on all the ugliness of similar regime changes in Russia and China. For example, Mozambique was a single party system. The government was run totally by FRELIMO. More ominously, the parallels extended to mass violence, purges, unpopular land reforms, reeducation camps, and forced labor programs. (Igreja, 2010). In this context, RENAMO emerged as an anti-communist force supported by the external states of Rhodesia and South Africa. RENAMO wanted political access and the overthrow of the communist regime while their external state supporters viewed the ascendance of FRELIMO as a threat to their white minority government rule in their respective countries.

Economic Background

The transition from a colonial economy to an economy of an independent state was challenging to Mozambique, to put it mildly. As aforementioned, the Portuguese

were highly extractive, exploitative, and paid little attention on building the institutions required to transfer the economy to the independent government ran by FRELIMO. A Marxist commentator, Azinna Nwafor (1983, 57) summed up the economic situation at the time of Mozambique's independence, "Thus, at independence, FRELIMO inherited an economy in extremity, with industrial production on the verge of collapse and rural agricultural production threatened with paralysis."

Being a Marxist movement, FRELIMO, at independence, quickly set out to implement the tenets of a socialist economy. In his first speech, Samora Machel (1975, 20), the first President of an independent of Mozambique and the leader of FRELIMO, explicitly stated his intention to lead an "ideological offensive" to "wipe out" the capitalist mentality. This took the form of similar Marxist takeovers of the economy to include the nationalization of the country's resources and businesses, especially those owned by foreigners. Any aspirations of economic development were stymied by nearly continuous conflict and civil war. The war was a "heavy assault" on the economy, handicapping the country's GDP by upwards of 50% of potential (Hanlon, 2010, 80). The result, of course, affects the average citizen, and most Mozambican citizens found themselves in extreme poverty after independence and through the civil wars.

Regional Stability

Mozambique's independence thrust the county into the middle of a tense situation in the region, namely its relations with neighboring Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South Africa. The latter's involvement in Mozambique will be covered in a subsequent section. Rhodesia, at the time, was dealing with its own insurgency, led by black Africans who sought greater political participation. Although Africans enjoyed an overwhelming

demographic majority in the country, 20 times more than whites, they had little to no political power and the Rhodesian government refused to budge (Gesheker, 1975, 32). In this context, African insurgents under the national banner of Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) were engaged in an armed conflict with the Rhodesian government. To combat this insurgency, the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) created RENAMO in 1976, which, overtime, gained exiled and dissatisfied individuals from Mozambique, fleeing the FRELIMO regime (Morgan, 1990, 605).

The FRELIMO government in Mozambique was an obvious foil to the regime in Rhodesia. FRELIMO cast itself as the shining example of African nationalism, pointing to its ability to fight off their former colonial masters and restore African dignity. The government in Rhodesia was the antithesis to this ideal. Therefore, FRELIMO looked the other way as Zimbabwean rebels used Mozambique as a base of operations from which to launch attacks on Rhodesia, whose troops often crossed into Mozambican territory during the war. In response the deteriorating situation, the FRELIMO government closed the border “to Rhodesian transit traffic to and from ports in Mozambique” (Henriksen, 1978, 443). There was a constant state of conflict between the two until the eventual fall of the Rhodesian government in 1980. The regional instability, as was the case with numerous armed conflicts around the world, sucked in great powers, in varying degrees, to include the Soviet Union, China, Great Britain and several lesser powers, ideologically aligned in some fashion to the competing sides.

The Proxy

RENAMO is unique case indeed. It acted as a proxy on behalf of two external powers, Rhodesia and South Africa. Its name, the Mozambican National Resistance,

implies a political cause. It still exists today as a legitimate political opposition to FRELIMO in Mozambique. However, the real story of RENAMO up until the early to mid-1990s is much more sinister and baffling. For years, RENAMO operated in terror, mass killings, forced conscription, rape, and the like. There seemed to be no other overarching goal except to cause chaos and violence for the first twenty years or so of its existence.

Most scholars agree that from its creation in 1976 until approximately 1994 RENAMO had no discernable political agenda (Manning, 1998, 1961). It was created by the CIO, and composed of ex-colonial trained commandos, escaped prisoners from Mozambique reeducation camps, and forced conscripts, to include child soldiers (Hall, 1990). In fact, when one thinks of African militias in the Sub-Saharan region in real life or examples in popular culture (*Blood Diamonds*, for example), RENAMO would fit the description. Roving bandits, young, forced, wonton violence, rape, mutilation, killing babies in their mother's arms, the horrific list goes on and on.

From 1976 until the creation of Zimbabwe following the end of the Rhodesian Bush War, RENAMO was an instrument of Rhodesia. It ran spy networks, brut squads, and conducted raids in Mozambique with the full support of the Rhodesian government. Margret Hall (1990, 40) describes the transition from Rhodesian to South Africa proxy, "The end of the Rhodesian war brought first disarray and then a change in mid-1980 to a more supportive patron in the form of the South African military." The transition from Rhodesia to South Africa proxy was a welcome one, to be sure. Rhodesia was beset by problems, it was crumbling, it was not recognized by the international community, and its grip on power was always tenuous. South Africa on the other hand was a powerhouse in

Africa, even it held onto to the same African subjugation program through its Apartheid regime. The government had money, the military was well trained and provisioned.

At its height, RENAMO had an estimated 10,000 guerrillas in its force (Hall, 1990, 40). However, it had to find a new identity again, as the situation changed within the political climate of its second external state supporter, South Africa. With the end of Apartheid and the rise of African nationalism in South Africa under Nelson Mandela, support for RENAMO dried up. It is not coincidence that around this time, RENAMO decided to transform itself into a legitimate political entity. RENAMO participated in its first elections in Mozambique in 1994, losing to FRELIMO. This is the same year that Nelson Mandela won the presidency in South Africa. The insurgency against FRELIMO flared up again in 2013 but ended in 2019 after a peace agreement was reached between the two sides. RENAMO is the primary opposition party in Mozambique as of this writing.

The External State

The prevailing academic conclusion on South Africa's objective in supporting RENAMO is weakening a neighboring black majority government in order to preserve its white dominance at home through its Apartheid regime (Nesbitt, 1988, 119; The Black Scholar, 1987, 47). The obvious objective that South Africa used was an anti-communist one, playing to the West in the Cold War context. However, then South African Minister of Defense, General Magnus Malan, alluded to the preservation of the Apartheid regime when he described the objective of the "total onslaught" the country faced referred to in South Africa's "Total National Strategy, "the overthrow of the present constitutional

order and its replacement by a subject communist-oriented black government" (Geldenhuys, 1981, 3).

South African support to RENAMO commenced as Rhodesia was falling. In fact, it was a planned, methodical transition of support from the CIO to South Africa (Young, 1990, 496). However, unlike Rhodesia, South Africa made its support overt and initiated a campaign to legitimize RENAMO, portraying it as a legitimate political entity looking to overthrow the oppressive communist regime in Mozambique (Young, 1990, 496). Yet, like Rhodesia, the South African Defense Forces did conduct cross border operations into Mozambique.

South Africa's regional strategy aimed to weaken border-states with black African nationalist movements. South Africa ran a similar campaign via proxy in Angola. The support provided to RENAMO was typical of proxy force relationships, including arms, munitions, logistical support, political support, and direct involvement through cross border raids. However, as the internal political dynamics in South Africa changed, and the international community steadily came to support the end of Apartheid, so, too, did South Africa's support to proxies. The situation had changed and when Apartheid had officially ended, RENAMO went mainstream. It had no other option.

Table 12 - Membership of Mozambique with Risk Variables (Raw Scores)

Variable/Membership	Fully In	More In Than Out	More Out Than In	Fully Out
REGIME	X (-8)			
MAG			X (3)	
GDPC	X (1220)			
INCOMP	X (1)			
INSTA				X (9)

Case 7 – Proxy: Contras / Country: Nicaragua / External State: U.S.

In July 1979, the armed forces of the Sandinista National Liberation Front entered the Nicaraguan capital of Managua and assumed power, following years of revolution against the U.S. -backed Somoza family dictatorship. The Sandinistas adopted a Marxist ideology and allied themselves with other revolutionary movements in the region, namely, with Cuba. The United States was against all communist regimes in the Western Hemisphere. In 1981, President Ronald W. Reagan authorized the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to begin taking actions to subvert and overthrow the Sandinista Regime. A number of opposition groups were formed, dubbed “counter-revolutionaries” by the Sandinista Regime, or “Contras” for short. The United States organized, funded, and equipped the Contras. After years of violence and terror, the Sandinista Regime was voted out of office in 1990. The Sandinistas continued as a political party, in opposition. Today, Daniel Ortega, who served as the leading member of the Sandinista junta in 1979, is the president of Nicaragua. Ortega was reelected in 2016 with over 70% of the vote.

Political Background

The political background of Nicaragua at the time of the Sandinista Revolution in 1979, and the subsequent Contra insurgency, is intrinsically linked to the United States’ long and continued direct and indirect influence on the small Central American nation. From 1912 to 1933, the United States had a military occupational presence in the country. The initial occupation was ordered by President William H. Taft, whom, being a protégé of former President Theodore Roosevelt, was continuing to exercise his famous corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. The United States had an economic interest in the region, which

was used to justify numerous occupations in Latin America. These occupations were later dubbed the “Banana Wars” by Professor Lester Langley (1983).

In 1933, Juan Bautista Sacasa, an American educated physician, was elected president of Nicaragua. He was able to gain the support of the revolutionary commander of the forces who fought Washington’s occupying forces, Augusto Sandino. The United States, however, had installed its own man at the head of the powerful National Guard, Anastasio Somoza García. Somoza consolidated power quickly. As William LeoGrande (1979, 29) explains, “One of Somoza's first achievements was to lure the legendary Sandino to Managua on the pretext of arranging peace, only to have him assassinated. In 1936, Somoza forced the civilian president from office” and “...arranged his own election.”

Once Somoza was in power, he or his sons, ran Nicaragua, directly or indirectly, until the Sandinista revolution in 1979, which ousted Somoza’s son Anastasio Somoza Debayle. Like most hereditary dictatorships, the Somozas used their position to syphon wealth from the nation, expand their land holdings, and oppress the populace to maintain control. In one egregious example, Anastasio Somoza Debayle used disaster relief funds following a catastrophic earthquake in 1972 to line his own pockets (Vilas, 1992, 314) in spite of the estimated 18,000 of his citizens killed (New York Times, 1972). This event, along with years of oppression, led to the Sandinista resistant movement against the Somoza government. The Sandinistas led a bloody struggle against the government throughout the 1970s. After the Sandinistas secured almost all of the country, President Somoza resigned in July 1979. With the leftist Sandinistas in control, the United States started thinking opposition immediately.

Economic Background

The Somoza Family ran Nicaragua as “if it were their personal fiefdom” (Goodsell, 1982, 92). Its extortion of the country came at the cost of its citizens and, over time, the country’s willingness to put up with the corrupt dynasty. Like the case of Guatemala under Jorge Ubico Castañeda, the Somoza Family did improve infrastructure and education access (Pearson, 1979, 78), but most of the country’s wealth went right back in the Somoza’s pockets, a fact that was well known among the citizenry.

The Nicaraguan economy in the years leading to the revolution in 1979 was chiefly agricultural export-based. James Nelson Goodsell (1982, 94) notes, “...in 1978, the last year of normal production, totaled \$646 million, with 94 percent coming from the agricultural sector.” However, the Somoza family owned most of the lucrative producing farms. In the cities, mainly the capital of Managua, citizens were still picking up the pieces from the 1972 earthquake which left the city in ruins. The earthquake, a magnitude 6.3, was described many as “Judgment Day” and “delivered to every home...attendant suffering, confusion, and economic distress” (Conliffe and Walker, 185, 1978). As previously mentioned, the Somozas even used this as a money-making scheme.

When the Sandinistas came to power, they had to get the population back to work. The revolution had drawn in most of the country’s 2.4 million people (Goodsell, 1982, 93). That means most military age males, the primary demographic of the workforce, were engaged in fighting and supporting an insurgency, not making money for the country. The Sandinistas inherited “...about US\$580 million of debt” which they vowed to honor unlike the Cuban example who denied all debts from the Batista regime” (Weinert, 1981, 187-188). Still, the economic conditions in the country were dismal, and

the Sandinistas looked to rebuild the economy in a socialist context. Citizens supporting the government and the Contras alike would have been in hard times.

Regional Stability

Relative to other regions of the Western Hemisphere, Central America is small, consisting of only five countries, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. In the grand scheme of international and Western Hemispheric security affairs, this region did not take up much of the bandwidth for security and diplomatic professionals in 1979, the year of the Nicaraguan revolution. Richard Millet (1980, 99) writes, “The Office of Inter-American Affairs was in fact a State Department backwater, usually manned by undistinguished individuals with little, if any, experience in the area.” The region was dominated by the United States, which had a long history of interventions and influence in Central America. That active role had waned in the years prior to the Nicaraguan revolution, as Millet’s description above demonstrates.

However, Central America seemed to be simmering at the time. Jorge Domínguez (1980, 126) called the regional security situation “troublesome”, concluding that war in Central America is more “thinkable” when compared to the neighboring regions of the Caribbean and South America. Millet (1980, 99) sums up the region’s troubles, where “problems abound,” as “...an incipient civil war in El Salvador, a flailing economy and a Marxist-influenced government in Nicaragua, increased political violence in Guatemala, and lagging economic and political development in Honduras and Costa Rica”. These problems could generally be overlooked by the United States, at the time, except for Nicaragua. During the Cold War, Marxist takeovers of governments in the Western Hemisphere garnered much attention of the regional and global superpower.

The Proxy

The Nicaraguan Contras (derived from the Spanish word for counterrevolutionaries) were a mixed group of former Somoza National Guardsmen, disenchanted Sandinistas, and peasants who had not taken part of the revolution but were recruited to the side of the Contras, in large numbers (Stoll, 2005). Initially, the Contras consisted of several groups, but the CIA was able convince many to consolidate under the banner of the Nicaraguan Democratic Forces (FDN) which grew to approximately 15,000 guerillas by 1985 (Booth, 1986, 406). It is not lost on the author that the Contras official name is the same as America's latest proxy in Syria, the Kurdish led Syrian Democratic Forces. Later, the Contras further consolidated into a political-military organization, the United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO).

The message used by the Contras to recruit was plain, the Sandinistas, "...want to take your liberty, they want to take your children, they want to take your religion, you're going to have to sell your crops only to them, and the bit of land that you have, they are going to take that too" (Stoll, 2005, 147). This a classical anti-Marxist/socialist argument, and it served the Contras well in their recruitment. Peasant and/or rural societies tend to be conservative, in the sense they value the traditions they have which nobody can take away. They may be poor and lack material goods, but they have their family, history, and heritage. The thought of losing that was enough to bring many fighters into the fold.

The Contras were heavily dependent on the United States for funding and equipping. From 1981 to 1990, Washington appropriated \$332 million in direct aid (Sobel, 1995, 289). This was "on the books" aid, approved by Congress, not associated with the secret funding provided through President Ronald W. Reagan's National

Security Council and Lt Col Oliver North obtained from selling military arms to Iran in the Iran-Contra Scandal. This aid was used in a campaign by the Contras which included human rights violations and atrocities against civilians, with explicit support of the United States (Forsythe, 1992, 390). The Sandinista government committed atrocities as well. By 1990, all parties in the conflict, and the people, had grown tired of civil war. In a surprise win, the UNO candidate Violeta Barrios de Chamorro won the national election of 1990, unseating Daniel Ortega. The success, however, was short lived and the UNO disbanded in the mid-1990s. Daniel Ortega, the original Sandinista president, is the current Nicaraguan president, as of this writing.

The External State

In 1980, Reagan ran for the U.S. presidency on a strong anti-communist/Soviet platform. He coined the term “peace through strength”, which set a policy agenda of military expansion through investments at home and in partners abroad. The Sandinista’s Marxist government in Nicaragua, right in America’s backyard, therefore, became an immediate policy priority. During his first full fiscal year (FY82), corresponding to his first Presidential Budget Request in 1981, the Reagan administration secured \$19 million in military aid to the Contras through Congressional appropriations (Sobel, 1995, 289).

President Reagan had taken a similar approach to that of his predecessors, namely presidents Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and John F. Kennedy. The problem presented to each was a communist takeover of a state within the Western Hemisphere, producing an intersection at the policies of Containment and Roosevelt’s corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. As was the case in Guatemala (1954) and Cuba (1961), Reagan employed the CIA to handle the issue. More like, Kennedy and the failed Bay of Pigs

invasion, however, the Contra support would become an embarrassment to President Reagan, engulfing his administration in scandal through the Iran-Contra Affair.

Many high-ranking government officials were indicted, including Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger. There was worry in the administration about possible impeachment charges. It can be argued that the policy was successful, after the election of Violeta Barrios de Chamorro in 1990. However, overall, American support for the Contras has been more of net negative in the court of posterity, marred by atrocities and scandal.

Table 13 - Membership of Nicaragua with Risk Variables (Raw Scores)

Variable/Membership	Fully In	More In Than Out	More Out Than In	Fully Out
REGIME		X (-5)		
MAG	X (1)			
GDPC		X (2195)		
INCOMP	X (1)			
INSTA		X (21)		

Case 8 – Proxy: Tamil Tigers / Country: Sri Lanka / External State: India

The Sri Lankan Civil War (1983-2009) was waged between the armed forces of Sri Lanka and separatists from the Tamil ethnic group, primarily members of the terrorist organization known as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Ethnic Sinhalese make up nearly three -quarters of Sri Lankan populace, while the Tamil ethnic group accounts for approximately 11% of the population (CIA, 2021). Claiming marginalization, the Tamils sought, at first, an independent nation in the north and east of the island nation. Later, they proposed an autonomous zone within the Sri Lankan government structure. India, through its intelligence agency the Research and Analysis

Wing (RAW), supported the LTTE between 1983-1987, and later, fought against them. After 26 years of civil war, hundreds of thousands of deaths, and atrocities committed by all belligerents, the Sri Lankan government finally defeated the LTTE in May 2009.

Political Background

Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon), like its South Asian neighbors India and Pakistan, was formerly a British colony. The country gained its independence from Great Britain on 4 February 1948. Ethnic Sinhalese make up the overwhelming majority of the Sri Lankan population, roughly 75 percent. However, during colonial rule, the Sinhalese teamed up with the ethnic Tamils, and other groups, to speak with one voice to Great Britain. There were arguments over whether independence or dominion status should be sought, but, overall, there the two groups arrived at a consensus on their political goals and dealings. In fact, the first parliament after independence had a minority representation of 40 percent (University Teachers for Human Rights, 2010).

This general consensus began to unravel, however, shortly after independence. The Ceylon parliament passed the Ceylon Citizenship Act in 1948. This act effectively denied citizenship to ethnic Indian Tamils residing in the country, rendering them stateless and politically powerless. This law was opposed by ethnic Tamils in the country and also represented a “turning point” in relations between Ceylon and India (Mukerji, 1957, 41). Later, in 1956, the parliament passed the Sinhala Only Act, which made Sinhalese the only official national language, which angered the Tamil minority. This situation draws parallels to the case of East Pakistan, where West Pakistan made Urdu the official language at the expense of ethnic Bengalis.

The Sinhala Only Act can be viewed as a watershed moment in the conflict between the ethnic Sinhalese and the Tamils. Robert Kearny (1986, 109) explains the aftermath of the Acts passing:

In the same year, the first Sinhalese-Tamil communal riots broke out, followed two years later by more widespread and more deadly rioting. In addition to the official language question, Tamil grievances have centered on the government's sponsorship of migration by Sinhalese into areas viewed by Tamils as their ancestral homeland, the special status accorded Buddhism and alleged official discrimination in education and public employment.

This tension between the two sides continued to build into the 1970s. During this time, the Tamils took two parallel approaches. Tamil political parties began to coalesce into a single political movement, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), while other groups engaged in armed local insurgencies (Kearny, 1986, 109). They each had the same goal in mind: an independent nation for Tamils. Over time, the LTTE became the dominant group and voice in the Tamil independence movement. They were violent and made it explicit they wished to form an independent state, by force and terrorist tactics. In these conditions and circumstances, the Sri Lankan Civil War commenced in earnest in 1983.

Economic Background

Like most European colonial powers, London exploited the Sri Lanka's economy prior to independence, using the land and harvest to supply Britain with tea, Sri Lanka's primary commodity at the time, and drive revenue in foreign trade. The system was described by N. Shanmugaratnam (1981, 70) as a "... powerfully organised

planterocracy.” Therefore, again like most European colonies in their immediate post-independence economies, Sri Lanka was rural, agrarian, and poor, on the whole.

These trends continued into the 1980s as the civil war drew near. As Richard Hooley notes, “Sri Lanka had a per capita income of approximately US\$270 in 1980, which is less than half that of most of the ASEAN states but above that of the poorer countries of Southeast Asia, such as those of the Indochina peninsula.” Thus, Sri Lanka was considered in the middle of the pack in terms of poverty when compared to other states in the region. Nonetheless, the average citizen was living in poverty.

The Tamil population was hit hard economically by policies implemented by the Sinhalese majority. Writing in 1982, Tissa Fernando (212) explains, “Tamils feel discriminated against in language rights, education and employment.” The language act, for example, creates second and third order effects that may (or may not) have been considered. For example, by mandating a single language, primary and secondary education can be difficult for young Tamil students living in primarily Tamil areas. Access to civil service jobs is also affected, as civil service exams and interviews were limited to Sinhalese. Finally, military service is affected, as senior leadership posts were difficult to access. It was in this context and conditions that calls for independence began within the Tamil community.

Regional Stability

Sri Lanka is categorized as a South Asian nation. The South Asian region includes seven states: Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, India, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives (Kizilbash, 1983). In the years leading up to the civil war, the region had witnessed its fair share of instability. The India-Pakistan conflict dominates the regional security

situation in South Asia, then and now. In 1971, the two states fought a war which was a direct result of the war between then East Pakistan (Bangladesh) and West Pakistan. The Kashmir conflict, a subset of the broader India-Pakistan conflict, was also a destabilizing factor. In May 1974, India conducted its first nuclear weapons test, which accelerated the regional nuclear arms race between Delhi and Pakistan. Sri Lanka, in the years leading up to the civil war were marked by communal violence and terror attacks for which both Sinhalese and Tamils were responsible.

The regional dynamics were also affected by global geopolitics as well as Asian security dynamics. India set itself as a third way, leading the non-aligned movement against the U.S. and Soviet camps. There were tensions between India and China, having fought a war over a border dispute in 1962 with renewed clashes into the 1980s. The most significant geopolitical issue in the broader region was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This brought the Americans into Pakistan's orbit, as they supplied the Mujahedeen in its resistance against the Soviet Union. . India watched these events closely. It is clear that India was the center of the region, being involved in all of the above conflicts/issues in some way or another. It should not be surprising then that India would be involved in the Sri Lankan civil war from its beginning.

The Proxy

The political background of independent Sri Lanka in the years leading to the civil war was covered from a purely legal, policy, and institutional perspective. Omitted was the communal violence waged against the Tamils by ethnic Sinhalese. From the 1950s and into the 1980s there were several instances of Sinhalese led pogroms against ethnic Tamils. When these events are coupled with the political discriminatory actions,

one can easily see how an extremist organization like the LTTE could spring up. The LTTE was founded in 1972 by Velupillai Prabhakaran, who led the terrorist group until his killing by government forces in Jaffna Peninsula in May 2009 (Stanford University, 2015). Throughout the years leading to the civil war, the group gained more power and became more violent.

In July 1983, the LATTE conducted an ambush, killing 13 Sri Lankan soldiers. This led to the “Black July” pogrom, which resulted in 387 Tamils killed, with unofficial estimates placing the number near 2,000; 18,000 Tamil homes destroyed and 5,000 businesses ruined; At least 100,000 people were displaced (Frerks and van Leeuwen, 2004, 27). This led to an explosion of young Tamils joining the LTTE. They were fed up with the marginalization and brutalization imposed by the government. Many fighters and potential recruits fled into the Tamil Nadu province in Southeast India. It was here that many received training and equipping from the Indian RAW.

Indian support was crucial in the beginning years of the civil war. Vastly outnumbered, poorly trained and equipped, and lacking experience, the surge of recruits after Black July needed the assistance. Realizing their disadvantages when compared to the Sri Lankan government forces, the LTTE undertook a campaign of guerilla war and terrorist attacks. These attacks included atrocities against civilians, most notably torture, assassinations, forced conscription of child soldiers, and executions. The LTTE was a pioneer of the suicide vest which has since become popular with Islamist extremist terrorist organizations. The organization grew to an estimated 18,000 forces (IISS Armed Conflict Database, 2019)

These tactics led to their designation as a terror organization by several states, including the United States. Throughout the civil war, the LTTE used a mix of these tactics and political negotiations to gain concessions, influence, and the like. However, their position weakened over the years as Sri Lanka's resolve to finish them off increased. There was international support against terror movements after Al Qaeda's attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001, which gave Sri Lanka additional political support to finish off the LTTE in May 2009.

The External State

India's involvement in the Sri Lankan Civil War presents an interesting case. In the initial years, 1983-1987, India supported, trained, and equipped the LTTE. In 1987, India signed a deal with Sri Lanka to end the conflict by providing some autonomy to the Tamil areas, agreeing the LTTE would turn in its arms, and sending in an occupation force to keep the peace and oversee the implementation. The LTTE only abided by the accords for a short time, and shortly after the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) occupied parts of Tamil, they were in a direct conflict with the LTTE until 1990. Thus, India was a supporter of a proxy and then a belligerent against the proxy.

C. Christine Fair (2002, 35) describes India's objectives and support in the years prior to the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord:

In 1983, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi made the decision to support the Tamil insurgency both for domestic (placating India's increasingly disgruntled Tamil population) and foreign policy considerations (stemming the increasing regional instability). India's external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), executed this policy of supporting the LTTE. Within one year there were 32

training camps in Tamil Nadu, and some 20,000 Sri Lankan Tamil insurgents were receiving sanctuary, financial support, training, and weapons.

The Indian government wanted to simmer down regional instability to prevent a foreign intervention from Pakistan, their regional foe, or the United States who as a superpower at the time in the Cold War context, was prone to intervention in regional conflicts abroad (Hagerty, 1991, 354). India, as the leader of the so-called “Non-aligned Movement” aimed to steer clear of the East-West rivalry, offering like-minded states an alternative to being driven by geopolitical forces that were really of no concern to them. Instability draws attention, and when states were fragile they may be prone to join West or East for support. An intervention by a superpower in Asia would force New Delhi to choose sides.

Indira Gandhi was assassinated in 1984. That same year, her son, Rajiv, became the Prime Minister. He continued his mother’s policy until it became politically untenable to do so. Facing a reelection and domestic issues, Rajiv Gandhi used the war in Sri Lanka as a means to change his public image to peace keeper (Economic and Political Weekly, 1997, 2980). Thus, the policy of India switched overnight from supporting the LTTE to disarming them and sending troops to oversee the implementation. The result was a fiasco, costing thousands of Indian deaths as well as Indian forces committing human rights violations. All Indian forces withdrew by 1990, and the civil war recommenced in earnest. In 1991, Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by an LTTE suicide bomber.

Table 14 - Membership of Sri Lanka with Risk Variables (Raw Scores)

Variable/Membership	Fully In	More In Than Out	More Out Than In	Full y Out
REGIME			X (5)	
MAG			X (2)	
GDPC		X (2050)		
INCOMP			X (.25)	
INSTA	X (43)			

Case 9 – Proxy: Union for the Total Independence of Angola / Country: Angola / External State: U.S.

Angola, like Mozambique, was a Portuguese colony for 400 years until it gained independence in November 1975. During the independence movement, two of the main competing groups, the Marxist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), jockeyed for position anticipating the fall of colonial Portugal, while, at times, working together toward the common goal of independence. Upon independence, a coalition government was formed with the major parties represented. This government was short-lived and civil war broke out almost immediately. The Angolan Civil War immediately became a proxy war, with the Soviets, Cubans, and Chinese supporting the MPLA, while the U.S. and South Africa supported UNITA. The war went on for 26 years, ending in April 2002 with a victory by the MPLA.

Political Background

The colonial administration of Portuguese Angola was typical of other European colonies generally, and Luso-African colonies specifically. In short, Africans had little access to government institutions, were underrepresented in government administration,

and did not enjoy the same rights and privileges of native Portuguese. Many of the Portuguese inhabitants arrived after World War II, as economically challenged Portugal needed a place to offload “surplus” citizens (Irvine, 1963, 322). Many of these colonists were unskilled, both in industry and agriculture, labeled as “excess” in Lisbon, and were thus dumped in Angola (Irvine, 1963, 322; Chabal, 2001, 222). Still, these colonists enjoyed more privileges under the government under the colonial administration than local Africans.

Discrimination by the Portuguese colonial government was rampant. Over time, Africans grew tired of their oppression. Resistance formed, the goal being independence. The two main groups were the MPLA and UNITA, with another guerilla group, the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), also playing a significant role. The armed resistance started in earnest 1961, after the suppression of an uprising resulted in the deaths of an estimated 50,000 Africans (Sadiqali, 1976, 24). Angola started the model for other Luso-African colonies. This struggle continued until 1974 when a coup in Lisbon, the Carnation Revolution, brought about rapid decolonialization. (A reference to the late Samuel P. Huntington’s *The Third Wave* would also be helpful here.)

The Alvor Agreement, signed on 15 January 1975 between Portugal and the African factions, granted independence and outlined the structure for a coalition government composed of the “three legal nationalist parties” MPLA, UNITA, and FNLA (Wheeler, 1975, 21). The agreement never came to pass as each “legal” group sought to advance its position. Civil war started almost immediately.

Economic Background

Portugal's economic interest in Angola at its birth was the slave trade. The transatlantic slave trade ended in 1836. However, the colonial government continued to operate an economy of exclusion, based on race. This is a similar economic model used in the case of Mozambique. In fact, the Portuguese instituted a set of conditions which Africans could meet to become officially civilized. As B.T.G. Chidzero (1960, 468) explains,

An assimilado is the African who has attained the status of a full Portuguese citizen by (i) adopting European culture and abandoning his native customs, (ii) being able to speak Portuguese fluently and also to write it, (iii) possessing some trade, profession, or calling which gives him a recognized financial status, and (iv) completing his military service. Having met these conditions, he becomes, on application, a civilized person..."

The exports were largely agricultural, including coffee, which was the cash crop of the colony. Much of the rebel's activity focused on the coffee producers and their farms since, "...coffee is an important export article" (Neumann, 1965, 669). The plight of the average African was dismal. Those who did obtain "assimilado" status had more access but were viewed and treated as traitors by their fellow Africans. This situation continued up to and through independence. A review of the Angolan economy under MPLA rule during the civil war found "sheer inefficiency, wholesale corruption and a general apathy towards such serious problems as the rampant black market (which now surpasses the official market)" (Munch, 1980, 101). The economies of war-torn countries

often have these characteristics. The black-market funding much of the fight was driven by the illicit trade of natural resources, including oil and “blood diamonds”.

Regional Stability

The regional stability of Southwest Africa leading up to Angolan independence was primarily affected by the Portuguese internal to Angola and South Africa in the broader region. The struggle for independence within Angola was destabilizing by its very nature as multiple groups were fighting the Portuguese forces, often uncoordinated and at odds with one another. Therefore, the average African citizen in Angola came under the influence, protection, or persecution of multiple groups depending on which party to the conflict controlled the territory at a particular place and time.

Much like the case of Mozambique, South Africa was heavily involved in Angola at the time of independence and during the civil war, to include direct interventions. Regionally, South Africa was fighting for control over Namibia, which desired complete independence. In 1972, South Africa declared there was complete peace in Namibia, which prompted a response from Namibia leaders that it was peaceful “at the point of a gun” (American Committee on Africa, 1972). Consequently, South Africa continued to be the primary regional power charged with destabilizing the region. International involvement in the regional security dynamic fell under the typical Cold War East-West dynamic with the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba supporting communist groups and governments and the United States supporting governments and groups judged friendly to U.S. national security interests.

The Proxy

The MPLA was the de facto government of Angola after independence as it was able to occupy and secure the capital region of Luanda. The MPLA dominates Angolan politics to this day. Thus, the MPLA has cast itself as the only legitimate governing body of Angola since independence. However, Ball and Gastro (2009, 12) clear the air on this point, noting that “MPLA was never the uncontested leader of the anti-colonial struggle. Its claims of sole legitimacy were always contested.” The main contestant in this fight was UNITA, which remains a political party to this day.

UNITA was created in 1966 during the independence movement. It was founded and led, until his death in 2002, by Jonas Savimbi. UNITA was primarily composed of Angola’s majority ethnic group the Ovimbundu, “...which made up approximately 35–40 percent of the population” (Paul et al, 2013, 365). Although they did not control the capital, they were able to control large swaths of territory under their leader, who had a cult like following. During the initial years of the civil war, UNITA was primarily supported by South Africa. Yet South Africa was active throughout the region, which may have spread thin its ability to decisively sway the Angolan Civil War in its favor. The MPLA, on the other hand, received military and economic support from the Soviet Union, along with the deployment of Cuban troops, which had a presence in Angola until 1991.

The 1980s may have been UNITA’s prime decade, as the United States ramped up its support under President Ronald W. Reagan. Support came in the form of sophisticated arms, such as Stinger missiles, in a model similar to that of their support given to the Mujahedeen. Having an air-to-air capability gave UNITA the ability to challenge MPLAs

air supremacy (Paul et al., 2013, 366). In 1991, a cease fire was negotiated in the Bicesse Accords, which paved the way for democratic election between the MPLA and UNITA. When Jonas Savimbi was defeated in the elections of 1992, he cried foul and the two parties went back to war. This continued until April 2002 when Savimbi was killed during an MPLA ambush. UNITA crumbled and turned in its arms shortly afterwards, demonstrating the grip Savimbi had over the organization. Without him, they felt they could no longer continue the fight. UNITA continues to be an active political party in Angola as of this writing.

The External State

The United States took an interest in Angola immediately as it became apparent that the Soviet Union, and more so, Cuba were directly supporting the MPLA. The whole region of South Africa became a central point of proxy war during the Cold War. Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Namibia were all unstable new governments, each with communist influences and support, as well as interferences from South Africa. The United States chose a more covert involvement following Angolan independence, authorizing \$30 million for the CIA to run operations and support forces hostile to the MPLA and their Soviet and Cuban sponsors (Walters, 1981, p.3).

A key turning point came in 1976 when Iowa Senator Dick Clark successfully added an amendment to the U.S. Arms Export Control Act of 1976 outlawing aid to warring groups in Angola. Thus limited, the United States had to work through third parties to advance its interests in Angola. In 1985, the Clark Amendment was repealed, and the Reagan administration began supporting UNITA in Angola. Herbert Howe (1986, 232), explains,

In the Angolan debate, the administration revised its Angolan policy by agreeing to supply UNITA covertly with \$15 million in military equipment. Two Reagan policies were involved - the globalist "Reagan doctrine," which calls for aid to third world "freedom fighters" against Communist domination, and the more regional policy of constructive engagement.

This support of third world freedom fighters was consistent with support to the Contras in Nicaragua and the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan, being a prong in a campaign to present multiple dilemmas to Moscow and stretch them thin.

Reagan's policies were ultimately successful, and President George H.W. Bush presided over the end of the Cold War. In Angola, the Cuban's departed in 1991 and Soviet support dried up. The MPLA was able to read the tea leaves, and precipitously denounced Marxist ideology in 1992. This opened the door to possible recognition by the United States, which took place under the President William J. Clinton in 1995. The United States' hasty halt in assistance to UNITA and the subsequent recognition of the MPLA government in Luanda demonstrates how much the Cold War drove policy and efforts to intervene in foreign civil wars.

Table 15 - Membership of Angola with Risk Variables (Raw Scores)

Variable/Membership	Fully In	More In Than Out	More Out Than In	Fully Out
REGIME	X (-7)			
MAG	X (4)			
GDPC	X (779)			
INCOMP	X (1)			
INSTA			X (17)	

Case 10 – Proxy: Northern Alliance / Country: Afghanistan / External State: U.S.

The first modern civil war in Afghanistan in 1989 after the withdrawal of Soviet forces that occupied that state since Moscow invaded in December 1979. From 1989-

1992 various Mujahedeen factions fought to topple the government of Mohammad Najibullah, who had ruled since 1986. Najibullah was tortured and killed by Taliban fighters in September 1996. After Najibullah's death, a power vacuum was created in Kabul, ushering in the second civil war between various Mujahedeen factions from 1992-1996. In 1996, the Taliban emerged as the strongest militant group, with support from Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), took Kabul and declared the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

From 1996-2001, a third civil war took place as a group of fighters under the command of former Mujahedeen fighter Ahmad Shah Massoud, dubbed the Northern Alliance, fought against Islamist extremist Taliban rule, which was based largely on a bizarre, perverted interpretation of the Qur'an. After the Al Qaeda led terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001, which also coincided with Al Qaeda's assassination of Massoud, the United States invaded Afghanistan in October 2001 after the Taliban failed to deliver on an ultimatum issued by President George W. Bush to hand over Al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden to the United States. The United States teamed with the Northern Alliance to fight against the Taliban, which was routed, with its theocratic regime falling in December 2001. The Taliban continued to fight an insurgency against the American-backed government for 20 years. Upon the mismanaged withdrawal of American troops under President Joseph R. Biden, the Taliban swept through the country, sacking Kabul on 15 August 2021.

Political Background

In 1978, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) overthrew the government of Daoud Kahn in a military supported coup, in what was called the Saur

Revolution. The PDPA was a Marxist-Leninist group that, according to custom of the time, brought the new government in Kabul within the orbit of the Soviet Union, which also shared a border with Afghanistan. A treaty was signed between the two countries, which left the door open for Soviet military commitments to maintain peace. The PDPA's efforts to change the traditional power structure of Afghanistan angered many powerbrokers in the country outside of Kabul, which turned into an armed resistance (Väyrynen, 1980, 96). At the PDPA's request, the Soviet Union invaded and occupied the country in 1979, ostensibly to keep the peace and defend the government of the Mujahedeen.

The PDPA remained in power throughout the occupation, but control over the country and was de facto in Soviet hands. The Soviet invasion caused an international backlash, which included the United States boycotting the 1980 Summer Olympic Games in Moscow. More germane to this study, however, is the proxy war that took shape in Afghanistan. As previously mentioned, this tactic was a favorite tool in President Ronald W. Reagan's Anti-Soviet strategy, the Reagan Doctrine. The Doctrine was announced to the American people during Reagan's State of the Union address on February 6, 1985. Reagan stated, "We must not break faith with those who are risking their lives, on every continent from Afghanistan to Nicaragua, to defy Soviet-supported aggression". The Mujahedeen and civilians were taking heavy casualties from the Russian military. The United States funneled weapons, to include Stinger shoulder fired anti-air missiles, through Pakistan to the Mujahedeen. This support continued throughout the Soviet occupation and was a highly successful covert action on the part of the United States.

In February 1989, the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan. The United States also withdrew support and interest, its objective being complete. Forced to stand on its own feet as the Soviet Union crumbled, the PDPA quickly disintegrated as the Mujahedeen kept up the fight. The PDPA folded in 1992, at which point Afghanistan entered a period of general lawlessness as competing military factions of the Mujahedeen struggled for power. This portion of the civil war ended in 1996, when, the Taliban, supported by the Pakistani ISI, took Kabul and the country. Under Taliban rule, strict Sharia Law was practiced, which all but banned the rights of women and mandated draconian punishments with little, if any legitimacy under the tenets of the Qur'an, sunna or ahadith. Once more, the Taliban cozied up to international terror groups, like Al Qaeda, the leader of which, Bin Laden, bankrolled and provided Arab warriors to the Mujahedeen. Using Afghanistan as a base of operations, Bin Laden was able to use his terror cells to plan the 9/11 attacks, which, led to the U.S. invasion and Washington's partnership with the Northern Alliance proxy.

Economic Background

The economic situation in Afghanistan leading up to the U.S. - led invasion in 2001 was a dismal. Most scholars rightfully cite the years of warfare, both international and civil, destroyed any sense of a functioning national economy (Khalilzad, 1997; Ghufran 2001). Most Afghans lived in rural areas, farming on a subsistence level. The society was almost feudal, with citizens working in small communities run by the local warlord. As in any feudal society, money often flowed from the worker to the local tough man or Taliban representative.

The most lucrative commodity in Afghanistan was opium and the illegal drug trade, an interesting side note for a regime based on strict interpretations of Islamic law. Najam Rqfique (1998, 486) notes, for example, “According to UN calculations, 93% of Afghanistan's annual opium production comes from Taliban controlled areas. An estimated 200,000 families, about one million people out of a population of 17 million are involved in the trade. 80-90% opium is grown in Taliban-controlled areas particularly in Qandahar region, Nanghar, and Kabul province”. While the Taliban claimed to try to halt the trade, the reality is that it brought in a steady source of income for the regime.

Finally, half of the country's population was forbidden from taking part in the country's formal economy, relegated to simple household chores. Women suffered the most of the Taliban's regime. This is well documented, but it is summed up here by Chris Johnson (1998, 121):

Women's rights in Afghanistan are under attack from conservative, religious forces. The enforced veiling of women and their exclusion from public life has to be seen as part of a wider strategy of silencing dissent. Though the issue of women's rights came to the forefront with the arrival of the Taliban, the reality is that the situation regarding women's rights has been deteriorating for many years and as long as there is conflict in Afghanistan, control over women will always be used as part of the struggle for supremacy.

Regional Stability

The term regional stability may be a misnomer in the case of Taliban controlled Afghanistan prior to the U.S. - led Operation Enduring Freedom. Internally, there were several competing militias and warlords in competition for local, provincial, and national

control in a constant state of civil war. The international involvement in Afghanistan is mindboggling, considering the country is landlocked and had little economic opportunities for foreign investment. Still, this is the historical paradox of Afghanistan. Writing in 1997 (48), the current (2021) U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, Zalmay Khalilzad explains:

Internationally, the Afghan civil war has become a mini "great game." Pakistan is the most important outside player in Afghanistan. Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, the United States and India are other important actors. The policies of these powers are influenced not only by developments in Afghanistan, but also by one another's actions. Competition among regional powers has increased since the Taliban takeover of Kabul.

What makes the Afghanistan case unique among the cases selected in this study is Al Qaeda. The previous cases presented involve recognized states and armed groups who seek to overthrow an existing government or carve out a piece of independent land from an existing state. This case has all of that. However, it also has Al Qaeda, which is a global terror group who has not been keenly interested in pursuing control of a state or territory. It uses weak or sympathetic states to set up bases for global operations conducted by dispersed cells controlled loosely from the center, which, at the time, was run by the group's founder, former Mujahedeen fighter Osama Bin Laden.

The main hub for Al Qaeda, and Osama bin Laden's headquarters was in Afghanistan at the time of the U.S. -led invasion in 2001. The Taliban knew this and refused to turn him over to the United States. Al Qaeda had been conducting attacks around the world for many years by 2001. This case presents the non-state actor variable

which would be present in proxy wars in the post-9/11 world, currently in Iraq and Syria, for example. This phenomenon will require future studies but suffice to say that the case of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan leading up to the U.S. led invasion with the Northern Alliance in 2001 represents a transition from the proxy wars of the Cold War to the proxy wars of the post-9/11 order.

The Proxy

The Northern Alliance, formally called the United Islamic National Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, was a group created in opposition to the Taliban after they seized control of Afghanistan in 1996. The Taliban is mainly composed of ethnic Pashtuns, Pashtun being the majority ethnic group in the country at ~44% (CIA, 2002). The Northern Alliance represented the ethnic minority groups in the country, broadly speaking, and was mainly composed of Tajiks, Uzbeks and the Hazaras (BBC, 2001). Its leader was an ethnic Tajik, Ahmad Shah Massoud, who was a military commander in the Mujahedeen during the war with the Soviets and Minister of Defense in the post-communist government of Afghanistan. He led the Northern Alliance until his assassination by Al Qaeda operatives two days prior to the attacks of 9/11.

In its struggle against the Taliban, the Northern Alliance were supported externally by, Iran, Russia, India, and the Central Asian Nations of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan (Rashid, 1999). Although it received some external support, the Northern Alliance never made much progress in gaining territory and were cornered into the Badakhshan Province in the Northeast of the country. External support was often counter balanced as Pakistan's ISI actively supported the Taliban and was the most active foreign actor in the country, exerting significant influence.

The Northern Alliance lost its leader, Massoud, on 9 September 2001 when two Al Qaeda operatives, disguised as journalists, assassinated him in a suicide with bombs hidden in their cameras. After years of struggle, and little progress, this loss may have been the undoing of the anti-Taliban coalition. However, after 9/11, the United States offered the Taliban an ultimatum: hand over Bin Laden and Al Qaeda operatives or face the consequences. The Taliban refused, and the United States prepared to invade. Unlike most invasions, the United States acted very quickly in their invasion, commencing the operation less than a month after 9/11 on 7 October 2001. Washington did not take the time to build combat power and prepare for a large-scale invasion with conventional forces like was seen in 2003 in Iraq. Instead, the United States employed groups of special operators, supported by air power, with some conventional troops. They needed a reliable partner who knew the terrain, customs, and local leaders. The Northern Alliance was the natural choice. With the United States providing the needed military power, the Northern Alliance was able to help topple the Taliban regime in just two months. Afterward, they were disbanded and integrated into the new Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

The External State

This case is unique insofar as the external state brought its full military might in support of a proxy group. In actuality, had the Northern Alliance turned down the offer of support from Washington, the United States would have invaded anyway. Al Qaeda's attacks were the worst attack on America's homeland since the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. The nation was united in action and purpose. The 9/11 attacks would be avenged, and President George W. Bush put it plainly to the world,

“Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.” The invasion of Afghanistan was the initial salvo in what would become the Global War on Terrorism. The Northern Alliance seized the opportunity. They had been a position of intense risk for many years. Now, the world’s lone superpower, at the time, came knocking and wanting to work together. The choice was clear, President Bush’s ultimatum to the world notwithstanding.

Table 16 - Membership of Afghanistan with Risk Variables (Raw Scores)

Variable/Membership	Fully In	More In Than Out	More Out Than In	Fully Out
REGIME	X (-7)			
MAG	X (4)			
GDPC	X (507)			
INCOMP	X (1)			
INSTA	X (31)			

CHAPTER V – Test Outcomes and Analysis

The previous chapter presented each case under consideration and categorized membership sets within each case according to the five conditions selected for testing. Furthermore, the collected data set is ready for testing using Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) software. **Table 17** contains a full summary of the adherence to factors model of the case studies in Chapter 4. This chapter will validate the theoretical framework based off substantial knowledge gleaned from the case studies, run tests associated with fsQCA methodology germane to this study, specify test outcomes, analyze those outcomes, and discuss the extent of the validity of propositions and the hypothesis.

Table 17 - Summary of Adherence to Factors of Model

Case	Regime Type (REGIME)	Magnitude of Fight (MAG)	GDP/per Capita (GDPC)	Incompatibility (INCOMP)	Regional Instability (INSTA)	Outcome
Castillo Armas' Forces/Guatemala	More Out Than In	Fully Out	More In Than Out	Fully In	Fully Out	Proxy
Pathet Lao/Laos	More Out Than In	Fully In	Fully In	Fully In	More Out Than In	Proxy
Brigade 2506/Cuba	Fully In	More Out Than In	More In Than Out	Fully In	Fully Out	Proxy
Mukti Bahin/East Pakistan	More In Than Out	Fully In	Fully In	More Out Than In	More Out Than In	Proxy
South Lebanese Force (SLF)/Lebanon	More Out Than In	Fully In	More In Than Out	Fully In	More Out Than In	Proxy
Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) Mozambique	Fully In	More Out Than In	Fully In	Fully In	Fully Out	Proxy
Contras/Nicaragua	More In Than Out	Fully In	More In Than Out	Fully In	More In Than Out	Proxy
Tamil Tigers (LTTE)/Sri Lanka	More Out Than In	More Out Than In	More In Than Out	More Out Than In	Fully In	Proxy
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)/Angola	Fully In	Fully In	Fully In	Fully In	More Out Than In	Proxy
Northern Alliance/Afghanistan	Fully In	Fully In	Fully In	Fully In	Fully In	Proxy

Validation of Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework for this study was built upon two existing and distinctive theories: classical realism and prospect theory. The former holds that states will act in pursuit of their interests defined in terms of power. The latter holds that actors make decisions based upon conditions of risks at the time of a given decision. This study proposes that armed groups are by their very nature political entities, and thus, while technically non-state actors at the time, act as states do, in pursuit of interests defined in terms of power. Furthermore, this study proposes that a proxy relationship is formed with external state powers when armed groups are in a domain of losses and are, therefore, risk accepting. The case studies prove the validity of the theoretical framework.

Classical Realism

In all cases, except for Brigade 2506 in Cuba, the proxy group either took over control of the national government and/or provided governance in areas they controlled. Prior to taking over the government, and/or during times providing governance in occupied territories, each proxy group had political wings, rational decision-making bodies, and provided public services such as policing, sanitation, education, and public utilities. They made decisions as rational actors and acted in accordance with their vital interests as states do. For example, the Marxist groups in the cases sided with Marxist external powers. They sought like-minded, powerful countries to support their cause. This is also in line with the neo-realist Waltz's theory of alliances, where small states band with large states to benefit from their share of the distribution of power. Even in the exceptional case, Brigade 2506, the group had a political wing and political leadership

that spoke on the group's behalf, posturing as anticommunist and thus allying with the United States.

The long-term success or wisdom of their decision is immaterial. Morgenthau reminds academics and policy makers and practitioners alike that “We cannot conclude from the good intentions of a statesman that his...policies will be...politically successful...we can say nothing about the probability of their success. And how often have they sought one goal, and ended by achieving something they neither expected nor desired?” (1978). All of the proxy groups in this study acted in their best interests, as they judged at the time, based upon the assumption that the formation of a proxy relationship would increase their chances of maximizing their power and corresponding interests. Examples abound, and classical realism is validated as the foundation for the theoretical framework employed. However, forecasted future outcomes are not the sole determinant of why particular decisions are made. At the point of decision, actors are shaped by past experiences and present realities. These elements define their domain (win/losses) and their risk tolerance. This is where prospect theory fills in the lacunae left by expected utility.

Prospect Theory – Case by Case Assessment of Domain/Risk / Theory Validation

The author used prospect theory to form a theoretical proposition pertaining to the decision-making process of armed groups. Under the tenets of prospect theory, risk drives proxy-state relationships, such that armed groups, trying to overthrow a sitting government or create an independent state, seek external state support when in the domain of losses, increasing their risk acceptance accordingly. The case evidence validates this theoretical proposition and application.

Castillo Armas' Forces: Domain of Losses/Risk Acceptance

The Castillo Armas' Forces, and their leader, Carlos Castillo Armas, were intent on taking over the government of Guatemala. They lacked manning, equipment, supplies, and training. In a straight fight, they would have been easily defeated by the Guatemalan Army. However, they were supplied, equipped, trained, and supported from the air during execution by the CIA and its mercenaries. The CIA ran a sophisticated PSYOPS campaign which led the Guatemalan Army to believe a U.S. invasion would follow. In short, the Castillo Armas' Forces were totally dependent on the United States for any chance of success.

Pathet Lao: Domain of Losses/Risk Acceptance

The Pathet Laos were, initially, a mere offshoot of the Viet Minh, under the ideological direction of Ho Chi Minh. Throughout the Laotian Civil War, the Chinese supplied the Pathet Lao with most of their military equipment. The Viet Minh supported the Pathet Laos with leadership, direction, supplies, and troops, with forces of Ho Chi Minh occupying parts of Pathet Lao occupied territory. During the Geneva Agreement of 1954, which gave the Pathet Laos political legitimacy and territory to occupy, the Pathet Laos were not officially recognized, but were represented by the Chinese and Vietnamese. From top to bottom, the Pathet Lao was dependent on foreigners to continue the struggle.

Brigade 2506: Domain of Losses/Risk Acceptance

The members of Brigade 2506 and their political and military leadership were exiles, mainly in Miami, Florida. They had no territory and little support in Cuba. They were shipped to bases in Central America by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),

where they were organized, trained, and equipped. From there, they were transported to the Bay of Pigs invasion by the United States. When Washington withheld promised air support, the already tenuous mission was doomed. Washington then had to assist in negotiating the release of those who were captured. Brigade 2506 was totally dependent on the United States.

Mukti Bahin: Domain of Losses/Risk Acceptance

The people of Bangladesh were being massacred by the armed forces of West Pakistan. The Mukti Bahin had little to no ability to confront West Pakistan head on. Consequently, India took charge of their training and equipping. India also helped provide them with legitimacy on the international stage. The war was only swung firmly into the favor of the Mukti Bahin after India became directly involved. The cause of the Mukti Bahin may have been doomed if not for India. The Mukti Bahin was dependent on Indian support.

South Lebanese Army (SLA): Domain of Losses/Risk Acceptance

The South Lebanese Army was able to establish control of territory only with the support and presence of Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). The state of Israel provided services and paid the salaries of SLA members. The SLA was a de facto hired arm of the IDF. Once Israel pulled out of Lebanon, the SLA collapsed. Many fled straight into Israel. The SLA was dependent on Israeli support.

Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO): Domain of Losses/Risk Acceptance

The case of RENAMO is an interesting one. Initially, it was created by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization (CIO). RENAMO was cobbled together

from a diverse array of groups with no identifiable organizing principle other than it opposed the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO). The CIO organized, trained and equipped them. Once Rhodesia collapsed, South Africa took over the support of RENAMO. This continued until the Apartheid regime in South Africa crumbled. After support from South Africa dried up, RENAMO moved to become a legitimate political party. It has not enjoyed much success in Mozambique, but it is no longer dependent. However, for most of its time as a guerilla force, it was.

The Contras: Domain of Losses/Risk Acceptance

Like the RENAMO case in Mozambique, the Contras were not always dependent on an external power. However, at their formation, consolidation, and much of the civil war they were heavily dependent on the United States for funding and arms. Furthermore, the Contras initially consisted of several competing groups that required unity and purpose if they were to be successful. The CIA provided that support. As the United States grew weary of supporting the Contras, the group was able to change its risk domain, eventually moving into the domain of gains, leading to the election of its leader, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, as president in April 1990.

Tamil Tigers: Domain of Losses/Risk Acceptance

The Tamil Tigers had an organized resistance and terror organization but were largely ineffective until after the Black July pogrom in 1983 when the Sinhalese majority carried out systemic violence against Tamils. It was during this time that many new recruits fled to India, where they received training and equipment. It was during this phase until the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accords were signed that Tamils remained in the

loss domain. After the accords, they entered a unique situation comparatively to the other cases. The external state power became the occupying force and foe of the proxy.

Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA): Domain of Losses/Risk Acceptance

UNITA entered independent Angola in a domain of gains as it was included in the coalition government. However, the mutual distrust between the groups led to war. The MPLA was able to secure the capital and was the de facto government of the country. The MPLA also had support from the Soviet Union and Cuba. These events pushed UNITA out of the capital region. The group controlled large swaths of territory but could not make meaningful headway. This status quo scenario when coupled with the direct intervention of foreign forces on the side of the MPLA places UNITA in the domain of losses, causing risk acceptance.

The Northern Alliance: Domain of Losses/Risk Acceptance

The Northern Alliance was stuck in a status quo scenario, confined to the Northeast corner of Afghanistan for years. When the United States invaded, it brought its full force in exchange for the Northern Alliance's help in understanding the culture and terrain. It was also beneficial for Washington to have Afghans enter the capital when Kabul fell. If Al Qaeda had not carried out its terrorist against the United States on 11 September 2001, and Washington thus did not invade, it stands to reason the Northern Alliance would have remained in the status quo. Hence, they were in the domain of losses.

Prospect Theory Validated

Taken together, the use of prospect theory is validated as a theoretical framework for understanding proxy force decision making and the formation of proxy force

relationships. In every case, the armed group, at the time of proxy relationship formation, found itself in a domain of losses and risk acceptance. Recall that Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky aimed to create a decision-making model driven by conditions of risk. He and Feng connected this model to a state's decision-making process to join multilateral alliances or bilateral alliances based on risk. This model was then applied in this study to armed groups whose domain/risk drives them to enter into a proxy relationship with external states. The cases validate this application of the model first provided by Kahneman and Tversky and expanded upon by He and Feng.

There is more work to be done to create better models of risk reference point and risk assessment in relation to armed groups which can be addressed in future research. However, the substantial knowledge gained from the case studies show the armed groups needed the assistance of an external power to have any chance of success. They were each in the domain of losses/risk acceptance, which drove them towards a proxy relationship with external powers vice going in alone. The perceived long-term outcome of the decision was not as relevant as the need for action in the immediate to improve one's lot.

Necessary Conditions and Evaluation of Propositions

The research question addressed in the dissertation asks under what conditions armed groups enter into proxy relationships with external states. To that end, this study assesses which particular risk conditions have the most effect on the risk reference point and changes the armed group's domain (gains/losses), leading to the outcome of a proxy relationship. Thus, a set of five conditions were identified, drawn from the leading data sets on armed conflict, intrastate conflict, and civil war, most notably the Correlates of

War Project and POLITY5 project: Regime Type (REGIME), Magnitude of Fighting (MAG), Per Capita GDP (GDPC), Incompatibility Type (INCOMP), and Regional Instability (INSTA). The full explanation of each condition is found in Chapter 3. The method of testing is fsQCA, developed by Charles Ragin, who also notes that most studies employing fsQCA work with 3-8 causal conditions at a time (2017, 6). The five conditions used here, therefore, represent a first step in assessing which conditions and/or combinations of conditions are necessary and/or sufficient in producing the outcome of a proxy relationship.

The first test run in the fsQCA software version 3.1b (Ragin and Davey, 2016) was an analysis of necessary conditions for each condition individually, to assess consistency and coverage of the condition across all cases. The outcome of this test is displayed in **Table 18**. According to Ragin (2008, 44), “Consistency assesses the degree to which instances of the outcome agree in displaying the causal condition thought to be necessary, while coverage assesses the relevance of the necessary condition—the degree to which instances of the condition are paired with instances of the outcome” (Ragin 2008, 44–45).

Note that coverage for each is listed as 1.0. This result is a factor of the proxy relationship outcome being present in each case. Future studies will need to compare conflicts where the outcome of proxy relationship is not present. Furthermore, Pappas and Woodside (2021, 15) state that overall consistency scores should be $>.75$ to be significant. Each possible condition was tested individually across all cases in order to assess the validity of each proposition outlined in Chapter 3. What follows is an assessment of each proposition’s validity considering the test's outcome.

Table 18 - Necessary Conditions

Analysis of Necessary Conditions		
Outcome variable: PROX		
Conditions tested:		
	Consistency	Coverage
REGIME	0.666000	1.000000
MAG	0.699000	1.000000
GDPC	0.835000	1.000000
INCOMP	0.866000	1.000000
INSTA	0.499000	1.000000

Proposition Regime Type: Authoritarian → Fewer Means to Address Grievances/Access Power → Require Support → Risk Acceptance → Proxy Relationship.

Consistency Score: 0.66 (Below Significance Threshold)

The regime type proposition predicts that armed groups in an authoritarian state would be at a higher risk level and in the domain of losses due to their lack of legitimate means to address grievances with the state. The results of the analysis suggest that the model, while present in over half the cases, is not significant enough as a condition to the outcome. This is the result of four cases (Guatemala, Laos, Lebanon, and Sri Lanka) being categorized as “More Out Than In” in their regime type score. Thus, in the cases covered, states that were more democratic than authoritarian still produced armed groups who formed proxy relationships with external powers.

The four cases scoring more democratic, however, all have a common characteristic. Each of them can be considered weak democracies institutionally. At the time of proxy relationship formation, each country was relatively new, having emerged from colonialism or authoritarianism in the recent past. Sri Lanka had been a democracy for nearly forty years at the time the LTTE had formed a proxy relationship with India. However, that democracy openly discriminated against ethnic Tamils. Sri Lanka was not

free and open. Lebanon had a tenuous confessional system that was troubled from the start. Laos had just emerged from colonialism and its coalition government was never really accepted by the Pathet Lao. Finally, Guatemala had only two elections in its history between authoritarianism and the coup led by Castillo Armas and the democratic institutions were weak.

In future studies, an added measure to democratic states to account for institutional strength would likely improve the model. Not all democracies are equal or effective. For example, at face value Afghanistan in 2020 may have scored “More Out Than In,” as it was technically a democracy. However, in the face of the Taliban’s assault on the country in August 2021, the government collapsed without a fight. Maya Tudor (2017) explains the importance of the institutional strength of democracies. Using the cases of India and Pakistan, she demonstrates that India’s Congress Party had built strong democratic institutions in India, while Pakistan cobbled together its own democratic institutions at the last minute. The result for India has been a democracy that has endured while Pakistan had fluctuated between democracy and military authoritarianism.

**Proposition Magnitude of Fight: Higher Number of Combatants/Activists → Increased Government Response → Require Support to Tip the Scale → Risk Acceptance → Proxy Relationship
Consistency Score: 0.69 (Below Significance Threshold)**

The magnitude of fighting condition did not rise to a point of significance on its own, even if it was consistent in over two-thirds of the cases. However, results of the tests and substantial knowledge gained from the case studies provided some interesting results which could be operationalized for future research. Four cases, Castillo Armas’ Forces, Brigade 2506, RENAMO, and the LTTE, that were either “fully out” or “more out than in”. Three of these cases, Castillo Armas’ Forces, Brigade 2506, and RENAMO,

were each created, organized, trained, and equipped by intelligence organizations. The LTTE was already an active guerilla movement in Sri Lanka but did not start to build capacity until the Indian intelligence organization, RAW, began organizing, training, and equipping the force in 1983. Thus, since the proxy relationship started from conception of the armed group, the number of fighters at the time of relationship formation was low. The LTTE, for example, ending up growing to an estimated 18,000 fighters, which would place it, at that point, in the “fully in” category.

Another key distinction drawn from this condition is the difference in armed groups built as a guerilla force for a long, pitched battle, and those which were built as a precision strike tool for an organized coup. For example, the United States used Castillo Armas’ Forces in Guatemala and were successful with approximately 400-500 forces, with air support and psychological operations. They tried a similar approach in Cuba. The intent was to keep the force small and take the government over quickly. For the Contras and UNITA, on the other hand, the United States used a long game approach with the same objective of regime change. Each of those forces was “fully in,” meaning they had considerable forces. Not all armed groups are built alike even if they have similar objectives, like overthrowing a government. A coup force may be much smaller and swifter than a guerrilla force who is dug in for a long fight. This factor will have to be controlled for in future studies.

**Proposition Per Capita GDP: Poor Country → Poor Population → Armed Fighters
Lack Resources → Risk Acceptance → Proxy Relationship
Consistency Score (.83 Significant)**

The condition of Per Capita GDP in set “poor countries” tested at a significant level as a measure for proxy force relationship formation. Every case in the study was

either “fully in” or “more in than out,” meaning the states in which the conflicts took place were generally considered poor. In poor states, especially when coupled with autocratic regimes or institutionally weak democracies, the average citizen struggles to make it day-to-day while elites live lavish lifestyles. This disparity is a source of tension in and of itself. When armed groups are formed to contest the government in power, they require resources and funding that are not readily available. Thus, a proxy force relationship with an external state is more likely. The model here confirms this.

This finding is in line with similar studies on conflict onset and prevention. Collier et al. (2003), for example, conclude that developing states are more prone to intrastate war than the developed states. Similarly, Jeffrey Dixon (2009, 714) states, “The most widely accepted relationship between economic factors and civil war is that high-income nations are less likely to experience civil wars than low-income nations.” Economic factors, especially poverty and inequality, were perfect factors for Marxist-Leninist groups to exploit during the Cold War. Similarly, Western nations sought to counter leftist governments who exploited these economic disparities with their own proxies. Of the 10 cases covered, six were Cold War orientated. The test here supports previous findings in the field and validates fsQCA as a testing methodology in studies on intrastate war.

Proposition Incompatibility: Armed Groups fighting for control of a government international legitimacy/recognition → Risk Acceptance → Proxy Relationship. Consistency Score (.86 Significant)

The incompatibility condition measured as significant. Only two cases, the LTTE in Sri Lanka and the Mukti Bahin in East Pakistan, were not “fully in”. The Mukti Bahin did not attempt to overthrow the government in Islamabad, but rather sought to create a

new independent government within territory where they already existed as a majority as ethnic Bengalis. Still, it did not prove an easy task, as the forces of West Pakistan committed genocide and the Bengalis needed help from India. The LTTE in Sri Lanka moved back and forth between two types of incompatibility, but for the most part sought an independent state in their own territory, like the Bengalis. There were times, however, when they entertained the idea of regional autonomy within the Sri Lankan government.

The key finding here is the contrast between two incompatibilities and their prevalence in proxy war cases. Of the proxy relationships formed in the examined cases, 8 of 10 were groups seeking to overthrow an existing central government. All intrastate wars are tough and brutal. However, when a group is trying to overthrow an entrenched government, it becomes much more difficult. The LTTE and Mukti Bahin needed assistance, to be sure. However, they had home turf. They were ethnically driven and also benefited from a core group of ethnic supporters in their territories they could draw strength and support from. Counterinsurgencies have proven time and again that the insurgents have a home field advantage. It is harder for a foreign force to come in and establish control. It is also more palatable to the international community to recognize an ethnic group's right to self-determination, especially if they are discriminated against by the central government they oppose. It may not always play out this cleanly, but the idea is more palatable.

Contrarily, taking over new territory and overthrowing an existing recognized government is much more difficult. These groups need to gain territory, often through force. This takes manpower, equipment, training, and funding. Further, these groups must convince other citizens of their cause, stitching together support from unlike groups. To

be sure, many groups who wish to take over a government force support by violence and brutality. These groups need some international recognition of their cause. They need external states, powerful ones, to give their plan legitimacy. This may be why most proxy wars, in the cases chosen here, are of this type of incompatibility. More work and research must be done on this score.

**Proposition Regional Instability: Higher Levels of Regional Instability → Risk Acceptance → Proxy Relationship
Consistency Score (.49 Below Significance Threshold)**

The results of the effect of regional instability on proxy formation is not surprising considering the cases involved in the test. Only three of the cases in the test, the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, the Mukti Bahin in East Pakistan, and the LTTE in Sri Lanka, were not Cold War centered cases. They were either regional issues (LTTE/Mukti) or post-Cold War (Northern Alliance). Thus, systemic or structural causes, in line with Waltz's neorealism, are at play. Most of the cases were Cold War cases. These proxy relationships were formed on the part of external powers to advance their respective Cold War geopolitical agenda. Therefore, regional stability, while important, was not the main objective for the external powers.

However, the scoring model here may need to be reworked in future studies. While the scores are created by reputable data bases, the fact remains that each case, save perhaps Cuba and Brigade 2506, had regional instabilities. The scores and membership offer one look at its effects, but newer more precise models will need to be created and tested to see their effect on proxy force relationships as well as their interplay with international security measures. Plus, the adage that all politics are local is certainly true

in cases of intrastate conflict. They may start within, but their first effect outside of the conflict zone is regional.

Significant Conditional Recipes

The previous section utilized the necessary conditions function of fsQCA to test individual conditions, in isolation, across all the cases. This is the necessary first step in determining which conditions are significant and which, as a standalone condition, are not. However, this is social science and there is rarely, if ever, one explanation for phenomena. The answer is always more complex, and combinations of conditions are more powerful in explaining an outcome. This is one truth that seemingly all social scientists agree on. Human interactions are by nature complex.

The subset/superset function of fsQCA testing allows researchers to provide, “scores of consistency and coverage for conditions and configurations of conditions, as well as a combined score. It provides a way to examine the sufficiency of a hypothesized causal recipe, as well as all subsets of conditions in the given recipe” (Ragin and Davey, 2017, 21). **Table 19** is the subset/superset output of the “recipes” of casual conditions that could lead to an outcome of proxy relationship. Again, note that consistency is always 1.000 as every case has a proxy relationship outcome. Future studies will need to compare cases with and without proxy relationships. A combined score of $>.75$ is considered significant.

Table 19 - Subset/Superset Test Results

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*****
SUBSET/SUPERSET ANALYSIS
*****

Outcome: PROX

                                raw
                                coverage
consistency                    combined
-----
REGIME*MAG*GDPC*INCOMP*INSTA  1.000000    0.365000    0.601124
REGIME*GDPC*INCOMP*INSTA      1.000000    0.432000    0.653972
REGIME*MAG*INCOMP*INSTA       1.000000    0.365000    0.601124
REGIME*MAG*GDPC*INCOMP        1.000000    0.465000    0.678491
REGIME*MAG*GDPC*INSTA         1.000000    0.365000    0.601124
MAG*GDPC*INCOMP*INSTA         1.000000    0.365000    0.601124
REGIME*INCOMP*INSTA           1.000000    0.432000    0.653972
REGIME*GDPC*INCOMP            1.000000    0.599000    0.770071
REGIME*MAG*INCOMP             1.000000    0.465000    0.678491
REGIME*GDPC*INSTA             1.000000    0.432000    0.653972
GDPC*INCOMP*INSTA            1.000000    0.432000    0.653972
REGIME*MAG*INSTA              1.000000    0.365000    0.601124
MAG*INCOMP*INSTA             1.000000    0.365000    0.601124
REGIME*MAG*GDPC               1.000000    0.499000    0.702858
MAG*GDPC*INCOMP              1.000000    0.566000    0.748559
MAG*GDPC*INSTA               1.000000    0.365000    0.601124
REGIME*INCOMP                 1.000000    0.632000    0.790999
REGIME*INSTA                  1.000000    0.432000    0.653972
INCOMP*INSTA                  1.000000    0.432000    0.653972
REGIME*GDPC                   1.000000    0.633000    0.791625
GDPC*INCOMP                   1.000000    0.734000    0.852444
REGIME*MAG                    1.000000    0.499000    0.702858
MAG*INCOMP                    1.000000    0.632000    0.790999
GDPC*INSTA                    1.000000    0.466000    0.679220
MAG*INSTA                     1.000000    0.365000    0.601124
MAG*GDPC                      1.000000    0.633000    0.791625

```

Significant Two Condition Recipes

Five sets of two conditions recipes tested at a significant level for the outcome of proxy relationship: MAG*GDPC (.79), MAG*INCOMP (.79), GDPC*INCOMP (.85), REGIME*GDPC (.79), and REGIME*INCOMP (.79). Of these recipes, the highest significance score, GDPC*INCOMP (.85), is not surprising considering these two

conditions tested significant in standalone necessary conditions test. Taken together as a casual recipe, the findings suggest that armed groups seeking to overthrow a standing government (INCOMP), in a poor country (GDPC), are more likely to form a proxy relationship with an external power.

Armed groups in the membership group “poor country,” which all of the cases under examination were either “fully in” or “mostly in,” face a lack of resources in general. The population is poor. And the government, on the whole, is poor in comparison to other countries. Thus, the government will likely absorb most of the country's wealth, while the average citizen or group is left grasping for the scraps. This has much to do with regime type as well, which will be covered later. Lack of resources, such as means to generate wealth and military needs such as arms and provisions, are hard to come by. Armed groups, therefore, need to find ways to generate revenue and equip their forces. An external supporter, especially from a recognized state with power and wealth, is a quick way to achieve these ends.

The other side of this recipe, the incompatibility of the conflict, was covered in depth in a previous section. When an armed group seeks to create an independent state from within an existing state, it is a difficult objective to achieve. States have shown time and again throughout history that they are reluctant to concede any territory. States will typically fight to preserve their territorial integrity. However, in these cases, the armed group has territory it administers in some fashion, or at a minimum has local support. There is some advantages the armed group enjoys. However, when the armed group wishes to overthrow the existing government and take over a whole country, the task becomes more difficult. There is a need for the means to achieve victory, through

financial and military support from an external state power, but also through some recognition of legitimacy from the existing international system. Consequently, a sponsoring external power, or powers, provides some of that needed legitimacy, even if it is only implied, as would be a case in covert support arrangement.

The more interesting two condition recipes of significance are the four combinations including conditions that were not significant as standalone conditions: MAG*GDPC, MAG*INCOMP, REGIME*GDPC, and REGIME*INCOMP. First, when Magnitude of the Fight is combined with condition Per Capita GDP and, separately, when combined with Incompatibility, it results in a significant recipe. There are several explanations for these outcomes. First, examine the recipe of MAG*GDPC. As an armed group grows in number it naturally requires more resources to feed and equip its forces. As the number of fighters increases so does the cost of sustainment. Thus, when an armed group, in a poor country with limited resources, finds itself with a growing fighting force, the group finds itself risk accepting as it must provision and train the force or risk losing the support of the fighters. A soldier does not prefer to enter a fight without a weapon, ammunition, or food. This was the case with the LTTE in Sri Lanka after the Black July pogroms. Recruitment in LTTE swelled, the government response increased with the threat, and the LTTE found itself sending the new recruits into India to be trained and equipped by the Indian intelligence agency RAW.

Second, consider the recipe MAG*INCOMP. When an armed group grows in number, the magnitude, it also corresponds to an increase in threat to the sitting government it is attempting to defeat. This is when the incompatibility is of the nature where an armed group is seeking to replace a sitting government. A threat to the sitting

government once thought to be small and insignificant can quickly become the opposite as fighters join the ranks of the armed group. This in turn increases the government response and the conflict escalates. The armed group must grow in order to have a chance at success, except in cases of coups, as the Guatemala case demonstrates. Coups are swift and secret, requiring fewer fighters as they rely on speed and stealth. In a protracted fight, however, the armed group must grow in number to have a chance to overthrow the existing government. In this effort, the armed group is at a natural disadvantage. Thus, the group seeks to increase its capability to a tipping point at which it can overcome the government's capability. This is a risk condition resulting in risk acceptance, and proxy relationship formation.

Now consider the effect of regime type, which as a standalone condition was not significant, when coupled with incompatibility and Per Capita GDP, respectively. First, in the recipe REG*INCOMP, authoritarian governments and/or weak or fragile democracies as the cases demonstrate, aim to maintain power at all costs, and will increase their armed response in proportion to the threat to be unseated as rulers of the state. In theory, a democratic state, with sound institutions, would be less prone to conflict, as groups have legitimate means short of conflict to address their grievances. In an authoritarian state, and/or in a weak or fragile democracy, the sitting government will use overwhelming force to maintain power and defeat the armed group. Authoritarian regimes are also less concerned with international norms, human rights, and the truth. As a result, when threatened, they tend to act with ruthlessness. Thus, an armed group finds itself risk accepting, resulting in a proxy relationship.

Now consider the recipe REG*GDPC. There is a constant state of economic balance in poor, authoritarian states. The balance being, authoritarian or oligarchy regime types, funnel money from the state into their pockets and into the pockets of those who keep them in power. There is a vast economic discrepancy between those in power and the citizens they govern. Resource and wealth access is a common cause of conflict onset. Thus, the recipe of REG*GDPC makes perfect sense as a significant condition recipe in proxy relationship formation. Armed groups composed of citizens in a poor country lack the resource and wealth access to fund their movement. The more authoritarian the regime, the harder it is to access those means. Therefore, the armed group finds itself in a state of financial risk and risk acceptance in terms of risk domain, leading to an increased likelihood of a proxy force relationship with an external state power.

Significant Three Condition Recipe

The three-condition recipe REGIME*GDPC*INCOMP is a significant outcome with a combined score of .77. Of all the possible recipes computed by the fsQCA software, only this three-recipe set of conditions, tested at a significant level. This recipe is the most significant of all the findings in the testing outcome, which is not surprising given the significant two-recipe condition set results. There were no significant results above this three-condition recipe set, (i.e. a four-condition recipe). The finding concludes that armed groups are more likely to form a proxy relationship when the sitting government is authoritarian, their country is poor, and they seek a total overthrow of the sitting government.

It is helpful to think about these quantitative outcomes with a qualitative scenario. A group of citizens has a grievance with the sitting government. Its attempts to seek

redress do not bear fruit as the sitting government is authoritarian. Authoritarian governments are not known to be well meaning negotiators. Consequently, the group decides there is no other recourse than to take up armed resistance. However, the armed group is in a poor country and lacks resources. The resources and wealth available are syphoned off by the authoritarian regime. The armed group needs assistance in funding and equipping. Finally, the group has determined to take the most difficult course of action by subduing and taking over the entire country. It will need the capabilities to achieve the objective along with the legitimacy given when supported by an existing state. The armed group is at a significant disadvantage and requires a lot of support to tip the scale in their favor. The armed group is in the domain of losses, and is therefore risk adverse, resulting in a proxy relationship.

CHAPTER VI – Conclusions

The purpose of this concluding chapter is to revisit and assess the extent of the validity of the hypothesis, identify and explain the shortcomings of the research, explore opportunities for future research, explain the importance of the contributions this research provides to the field of study, and present a set of closing policy recommendations for practical application. Being a first in both method Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) and theory (Prospect Theory) in the study of proxy force relationships and decision making, there much work still to be done to refine and reassess the nature of proxy force relationships going forward.

Evaluation the Hypothesis

Restating the Hypothesis:

H1: Armed groups, seeking to overthrow a sitting government or create an independent state, enter into proxy-external state relationships when in the domain of losses, increasing risk acceptance.

The theoretical framework employed uses a combination of classical realism, which provides the foundation, and prospect theory, which analyzes decisions under conditions of risk.

Dependent Variable: Armed Group Risk Tolerance (adverse/acceptance).

Independent variable: Proxy Domain (gains/losses) measured through five conditions: Regime Type, Magnitude of Fight, Per Capita Gross Domestic Product, Incompatibility, and Regional Instability.

These variables can be expressed as:

Domain of Losses → Increases Risk Acceptance → Increases likelihood of forming proxy relationship.

Domain of Gains → Increases Risk Aversion → Decreases likelihood of forming proxy relationship.

The substantial knowledge gleaned from the case studies, as addressed above in the case-by-case analysis of the armed groups domain/risk presented in Chapter 5, confirms the hypothesis. In each case, the armed group found itself in the domain of losses or in a state of status quo, which is akin to non-progression toward armed group objectives, and therefore was risk accepting. In each case the result was the formation of a proxy relationship with an external state power.

The confirmation of the hypothesis further cements the usefulness of prospect theory as a theoretical framework for assessing armed group decision making in general, and in forming proxy relationships specifically. This should inform future research programs on armed group decision making and be used as an alternative to outcome-based decision-making models such as expected utility theory.

The confirmation of the hypothesis, with the substantial knowledge gained, also finds that armed groups, though non-state actors, act as states would, as rational actors seeking their interests defined in terms of power. This expands the application of realist theory, typically reserved for sovereign states in international relations studies, to non-state armed groups seeking to overthrow a recognized sovereign state or create a new sovereign state within the territory of a recognized state. Finally, this study validated an initial set of five risk conditions used to determine the domain/risk of armed groups who entered proxy relationships.

In line with the hypothesis, each group sought a tipping point in their favor, and each turned to an external state to provide that tipping point. All of the armed groups were in a domain of risk acceptance. A proxy relationship with an external state power comes with risks. The armed group may lose autonomy as the external state tries to impose control to serve its own national interests. Armed groups could lose credibility with the citizens, as they forge a relationship with outsiders, trading one yoke for another. This was a common concern of the revolutionaries in America during the War of Independence, when contemplating an alliance with France. Another risk being, when the relationship is formed with a powerful external state, the objective of the proxy is not always achieved. Proxies are often unsuccessful and/or lose the support of the external state.

A central argument of this study is that armed groups, as non-state actors, wish to become state actors, and therefore act as states do. Thus, using realist theory as the foundation, armed groups seek their self-interest defined in terms of power. The added power provided by entering into a proxy relationship with a state power served this interest even if there are inherent risks. Each of the armed groups in this study acted accordingly, make decisions as sovereign states and rational actors would in the international system. This provides an extension of realist theory from the state actor domain to the non-state actor, even if states remain the central players in the international system.

Finally, this study sought to identify an initial set of risk conditions, or combination of conditions, which could be measured to assess their significance in affecting an armed group's risk reference point. In this endeavor, the study was

successful. Through a rigorous literature review and data collection effort, using the most reputable sources in the study of intrastate conflict, an initial set of risk conditions was identified. Through fsQCA testing, two standalone conditions and five separate condition recipes tested at a level of significance. Being the first of its kind in the study of proxy relationships, both in theory (prospect) and method (fsQCA), this research provides a solid initial foundation from which to build upon.

Shortcomings of the Research

While the intent of this dissertation was met, and the foundations are laid for future research, it has some shortcomings and limitations. First, this study only included cases with an outcome where an armed group formed a proxy relationship with an external state power. This leads to a situation in fsQCA where the consistency score is always 1.00 as the outcome in all cases is the same. This can influence overall scoring. Adding cases where an armed group “went in alone” will allow for a better understanding and distinction between cases where armed groups enter proxy relationships and when they do not. This compare and contrast approach will lead to a better understanding of the phenomena. However, this research also found that very few armed groups really “go in alone” completely. This calls for a more precise definition of proxy relationships in future studies.

Second, it is a difficult task to turn the concept of risk into an operationalized, measurable, and quantifiable variable. The calculation of risk by a person, state, or corporate entity is a subjective process. It differs in each case and many of the factors in a risk calculus are not seen, but rather simply the outcome of inner thought and debate by decision makers. Numerous attempts have been made by the United States military to

assign a numerical value to risk factors which, when tallied at the end of the risk calculation, in theory, informs leaders how risky an operation or mission is. For example, one risk point could be assigned to a day operation and two-points to a night operation. In practice, these metrics fall short and do not really capture the subjective nature of risk as weighed by those who are ultimately accountable. However, the author is confident that the risk conditions employed here do weigh on a decision makers risk calculus and, thus, are valid.

Third, the risk conditions employed in this study were indeed valid, but they were limited. Charles Ragin, the creator of the fsQCA methodology, makes it clear that the method is only useful given a limited set of conditions which could be casual on a particular outcome. Thus, the number of conditions employed here, five, can only be viewed as an important first step in this research program. New conditions will need to be identified, operationalized, and included in future research. For example, a new set of five conditions can be identified and tested in the same manner. Conditions or combinations of conditions testing at significant levels can then be merged with the significant risk conditions identified by this study for more testing. This would be a continuous refinement process until a set of conditions is identified which can lead to more precise generalizations of casual conditions of the phenomena.

Fourth, there is room for improvement on the operationalization of conditions. Database like the Correlates of War and Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) and Conflict Regions provide a great source of numerical data. This data can be, and in this case, was, further calibrated for optimal operationalization. However, the results of the condition regional stability, for example, show that more work needs to be done to

refine the calibration process. The numerical scale used by MEPV on regional stability was not easily calibrated into the four membership scores required for testing. This left many cases “mostly out” on the set condition “regional instability” when there were clear instances of regional instability. Certainly, cases such as Afghanistan and Sri Lanka, both “fully in” in the condition set regional instability, had higher scores than Guatemala or Mozambique, due to the nature of the violence and the players involved. This shows that data was calibrated in a manner which is credible. However, more work can be done, in the author's opinion to tighten the calibration process on risk conditions in future studies

Finally, the author's own experience with the methodology fsQCA was a limiting factor in this study. This was the first use of fsQCA by the author as a testing methodology and many lessons were learned along the way. With any methodology, the more one uses it, the more comfortable one becomes employing it sharply. The results of this study are valid and the fsQCA software performed its functions as advertised. However, there is more work to be done to refine the methods usage and employ all the features it offers to researchers. Being this is the first time, to the author's knowledge, the method has been used in the study of proxy wars, and this first step will serve as a valuable foundation for the author and fellow researchers alike.

Future Research Opportunities

The study of proxy wars has enjoyed a resurgence in the last decade. Proxy wars were of intense interest during the Cold War, but scholarship waned after the fall of the Soviet Union and continued to be of minimal interest during what became known as the United States' Global War on Terror. Terrorism studies have given way in the security studies realm to a renewed interest in great power competition. A rising China, a

declining America, and a stagnant Russia, coupled with host of regional balance of power issues, have resulted in what is becoming a multipolar international system. In this system, with multiple great powers, each nuclear armed, and a host of lesser powers having nuclear weapons or seeking nuclear weapons, the price of conventional war is high. Therefore, as was true during the Cold War, the prospect of a rise in wars by proxy is likely. Thus, the continued study of the phenomena will be imperative in the field of security studies.

This dissertation adds to the corpus of work on proxy wars. Its conclusions, however, are just as important as the questions that have emerged from it that require future research. First, another study should be conducted incorporating cases where a proxy relationship was not the outcome. This will allow researchers to identify differences in conditions and circumstances between armed groups involved in intrastate conflicts that do or do not enter a proxy relationship. This will further distinguish the phenomenon of proxy wars within the broader context of studies on civil war/intrastate conflict.

Research has shown, however, that intrastate conflicts rarely are isolated events. They seem to draw in outside interest as a rule. Thus, future research may be needed to further refine the definition of proxy wars. If most intrastate conflicts include meddling from outside interests, are all intrastate conflicts proxy wars in some sense? What is the threshold of support given, or the nature of support given, that makes third-party influence and participation a proxy war? There are many working definitions of proxy wars and, as this study has shown, there is not a consensus on what constitutes a proxy war or proxy force relationship. More work must be done on this shortfall. For a phenomenon to

constitute a distinct field of study, it needs a working foundational definition that researchers can use as a starting point.

Another interesting finding of this study which could benefit from future research is the difference between proxy relationships formed for a coup operation and those formed during a preexisting protracted fight involving a preexisting armed force. The Guatemala and Cuba cases demonstrate the nature of the proxy relationship and the means used to carry out a coup operation differs from the cases where external powers entered proxy relationships with armed groups already involved in a protracted struggle. In both coup cases, the armed groups had a small number of fighters, relying on heavy third-party support, to take a country in a surgical manner using speed and stealth. Studies of this kind may lead to a refined typology of proxy wars which would be beneficial to the field of study.

Within this possible typology could be studies on proxy forces that were created by foreign intelligence organizations. The cases of Guatemala, Cuba, Mozambique, and Sri Lanka showed that armed groups do not always organize organically. In each of these cases, foreign intelligence services are organized, trained, funded, and equipped their proxy force, with the explicit intent of using them as a means of carrying out the external state's interest. These types of proxy forces are used as a military instrument, like a strategically placed bomb would be, and therefore, are of a different nature than an organized armed group that is already engaged in an intrastate conflict. Studies of this nature could result in a further refined typology of proxy forces.

Finally, future studies, using fsQCA or other means of measurement and testing, must include new risk conditions and new risk condition recipes. This study employed

fsQCA, which limits the number of conditions to be tested. Therefore, this study is inherently limited. This study could be repeated, several times over, using different risk conditions in each case. Ultimately, researchers could find a set of risk conditions which provide better generalizations on phenomenon causation with regard to the formation of proxy relationships.

Contributions to the Field of Study

The introductory chapter explained the how this study, on a broad level, contributes to the field of study on the phenomenon of wars by proxy. Those broad contributions are worth revisiting here in the conclusion with more specifics based on the study's outcomes. First, this work provides a unique perspective to the field of study. The vast majority of academic work on proxy-external state relationships examine the phenomena from the external state perspective. These studies are tinted by Westphalian notions of international relations, where the state is the center and all else are the periphery. If the last few decades have taught humanity any lessons, it has been that armed groups can throw the international system into disarray, leaving states perplexed on how to respond. This study extended those Westphalian and realist understandings of behavior to non-state actors who wish to join the community of states. Thus, it was confirmed that classical realist theory has applications in the study of non-state actors.

Second, this study is a first. To the author's knowledge, this is the first use of prospect theory to examine the choice of an armed group to enter into a proxy relationship with an external state. To this author's knowledge, it is the first use of prospect theory in proxy war studies in general. Prospect theory is fitting and proper as political and military decision making is driven primarily by risk. More importantly,

prospect theory was found to have great explanatory value for the behavior of armed groups. Each case confirmed the armed groups were in a domain of losses, or at best, status quo. In this domain, the groups were risk accepting, and therefore, entered into a proxy relationship. The use of prospect theory will enrich future studies on proxy-external state relationships

Third, this study is timely. Studies on proxy war had decreased after the Cold War and scholarship shifted to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency after the attacks of September 11th. The international system is moving into multipolarity and focus is shifting to great power competition. It stands to reason that proxy wars will increase as a method for these states to impose costs on one another indirectly. Thus, it makes sense to reason that there will be a renewed interest in the study of war by proxy. This study will be useful in informing future studies, adding a new theoretical lens to the body of work, as well as specific risk conditions that drive the formation of proxy relationships from the perspective of the proxy.

Finally, this study is immediately applicable to the planning and conduct of American foreign policy. Entering into a relationship with an armed group has risks, especially for a state like the United States, which tries more than some to adhere to international norms and laws of armed conflict. To understand the risk reference point and domain of a prospective proxy will allow policymakers to make more informed decisions. This study has proven that an armed group's domain and risk reference can be located through controlled study and testing. Using this study as a model, policy experts can provide more informed recommendations to decision makers.

Policy Recommendations for the United States

It is the belief of the author that studies in the field of war and conflict should have some level of immediate usability for policymakers. Therefore, it is appropriate and necessary to provide a few recommendations to that end to conclude this study. This study will conclude with three policy recommendations for practitioners of American national security: Find partners now, know your partner(s), communicate strategic interests when off-ramping a partner.

First, find proxies. Policy practitioners must be continually searching for partners around the globe that can impose costs and dilemmas on our adversaries in the competition space. The Cold War provides many examples of how a proxy force can impose costs and dilemmas on an adversary while avoiding direct conflict. The United States supported the Mujahedeen and bled the Soviets for years without an American boot on the ground. Likewise, China and the Soviet Union supported communist guerillas in Vietnam and Laos to bleed America without a direct engagement. Proxy forces are an effective tool.

In this multipolar system, America's adversaries are active around the globe. China and Russia, for example, have military infrastructure, business interests, and influence in every corner of the world. In Africa, for example, China has its first overseas military base, while Russia has troops and government controlled private military security companies on the continent. Each has numerous government-controlled business interests on the continent. America does not have the means to be everywhere at once. In countries where the United States lacks a presence or a healthy relationship with the sitting government, proxy relationships can be formed with like-minded groups who view

Chinese and/or Russian influence in their country as a negative. These partners need not always be armed groups either. In today's security environment they could also be rival corporations or groups of hackers. Thinking outside of the box is imperative.

Second, know your proxy. This study has proven that potential proxy groups are rational actors, are driven by risk, and certain conditions have placed constraints on them. Other conditions give them opportunities. By better understanding a potential proxy's domain (gain/losses) and risk condition (adverse/accepting), policy practitioners can better determine the suitability of a potential proxy, how they can best serve the national interest, and understand their decision-making process. This will result in a more effective employment of the proxy.

Knowing the potential proxy force is important, but this process must be continual from relationship formation to proxy force off-ramping. Having a better understanding of the potential proxy will allow decision makers to make informed decisions on whether or not to enter into such a relationship in the first place. From there, those responsible for maintaining the proxy relationship must continuously update their knowledge, assumptions, and understanding of the proxy's domain/risk condition. This will allow them to create practical objectives and expectations for the proxy, and inform a set of warning indicators which could trigger corrections to the proxy's course or proxy off-ramping.

Finally, there must be a plan to effectively off-ramp the proxy. When the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the United States almost immediately withdrew from the proxy relationship. There was no plan to off-ramp. Many in the Mujahedeen, to include Osama bin Laden, went down the extremist path and formed

groups like Al Qaeda and the Taliban. A well-developed off-ramping plan, understanding the group's domain/risk and objectives, could have saved the United States a lot of trouble down the road.

There must also be strategic communication plan in the off-ramping process, especially when the proxy is popular within the government and in public opinion. For example, while not a complete off-ramping, the United States found itself in a bad position between a NATO ally, Turkey, and the Syrian Democratic Forces in Northwest Syria, who are foes. President Donald J. Trump ordered American troops to abandon key positions in Syria, opening the door for Turkey to invade. It is clear that the long-term strategic interests of the United States are better served preserving a relationship with Turkey. However, this interest was not clearly communicated in this case, and the result was a feeling within the government and without, that the United States had abandoned its partner. Sometimes, proxy forces need to be off-ramped, and how that is communicated is a key aspect of the process.

The use proxy forces will increase as the current security environment progresses into multipolarity. The dynamics and structure of the system will change, but the understanding that direct conflict between great powers will be catastrophic. From Washington to Beijing to Moscow, leaders understand that a general war between great powers is not desirable. Therefore, each state will look for ways to inflict damage and present dilemmas below the level of direct conflict. The use of proxies is one such method of achieving those objectives. This study has demonstrated that proxy forces are rational actors, make decisions based on conditions of risk, and act as states do. This must be understood by policy practitioners and decision makers if they are to advance the

national security interests of the United States, ensuring that conflict through indirect means does not progress to a disastrous direct great power war.

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