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IntraPartyComp: The study of personalization in 33 democracies since the 2000s

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INTRAPARTYCOMP

THE STUDY OF PERSONALIZATION IN 33 DEMOCRACIES SINCE THE 2000s

JÉRÉMY DODEIGNE, GERT-JAN PUT & JEAN-BENOIT PILET

PRESENTATION OUTLINE

- 1. General presentation of the project
- 2. Current status of data collection and ambition
- 3. Exploratory empirical results
- 4. Next steps: strategic priorities?

GENERAL PRESENTATION OF THE PROJECT



THE FOCUS OF INTRAPARTYCOMP

- A comprehensive study of electoral personalization and intraparty competition in global set of list PR systems (N=33)
- The degree of centralized versus decentralized personalization
- The role of institutional (i.e. electoral institutions, political system architecture, age of democracy), party-level (i.e. leadership, government status, candidate selection dynamics) and time as potential determinants
- Consequences of intraparty competition for party strategies, government stability, voter perceptions and behavior

THE EMPIRICAL STRATEGY OF INTRAPARTYCOMP

- A global data collection project
- Analyzing the distribution of preference votes over candidates on party lists using established indicators
- Systematic data collection since 2000: preference votes, list positions, parties, gender, age, incumbency status, district magnitude and party magnitude
- Open publication of dataset on project website as resource for political science scholars

EMPIRICAL SCOPE OF INTRAPARTYCOMP

Country	World	List PR type	N elections	Status
	region		since 2000	
			(first-last)	
Austria	Europe	Flexible	6 (2002-2019)	\checkmark
Belgium	Europe	Flexible	5 (2003-2019)	\checkmark
Netherlands	Europe	Flexible	6 (2002-2017)	\checkmark
Bulgaria	Europe	Flexible (since 2013)	3 (2013-2017)	
Croatia	Europe	Flexible (since 2015)	3 (2015-2020)	\checkmark
Czech Republic	Europe	Flexible	5 (2002-2017)	\checkmark
Denmark	Europe	Open	6 (2001-2019)	
Estonia	Europe	Flexible	5 (2003-2019)	\checkmark
Finland	Europe	Open	5 (2003-2019)	\checkmark
Greece	Europe	Open	7 (2004-2019)	\checkmark
Iceland	Europe	Flexible	6 (2003-2017)	
Kosovo	Europe	Open	4 (2010-2019)	
Latvia	Europe	Open	6 (2002-2018)	\checkmark
Lithuania	Europe	Mixed Member (open	5 (2000-2016)	\checkmark
		list component)		
Poland	Europe	Open	6 (2001-2019)	\checkmark
Slovakia	Europe	Flexible	6 (2002-2020)	\checkmark


Country	World region	List PR type	N elections	Status
			since 2000	
			(first-last)	
Sweden	Europe	Flexible	5 (2002-2018)	\checkmark
Chile	South America	Open	1 (2017)	\checkmark
Colombia	South America	Variable open/closed	4 (2006-2018)	\checkmark
		(since 2003)		
Ecuador	South America	Open	5 (2002-2017)	
Indonesia	Asia	Open (since 2009)	3 (2009-2019)	
Peru	South America	Open	5 (2001-2020)	\checkmark
Bosnia and	Europe	Open	5 (2002-2018)	\checkmark
Herzegovina				
Cyprus	Europe	Open	4 (2001-2016)	
Brazil	South America	Open	5 (2002-2018)	\checkmark
Lebanon	Asia	Open (since 2017)	1 (2018)	
Sri Lanka	Asia	Open	5 (2000-2015)	
Suriname	South America	Flexible	5 (2000-2020)	
Panama	North America	Mixed Member (open	4 (2004-2019)	
		list component)		
Luxembourg	Europe	Free	4 (2004-2018)	\checkmark
Switzerland	Europe	Free	5 (2003-2019)	
El Salvador	North America	Free	7 (2000-2018)	\checkmark
Honduras	North America	Free	5 (2001-2017)	

EMPIRICAL SCOPE OF INTRAPARTYCOMP

Countries	Nb. elections	Nb. candidates	Countries	Nb. elections	Nb. candidates
Austria	6	37 090	Finland	9	15038
Belgium	5	9 627	Greece	2	9 523
Bosnia and Herzegovina	5	3 1 3 9	Latvia	6	8 860
Brazil	5	32 302	Lithuania	5	6 356
Chile	1	960	Luxembourg	4	2341
Colombia	2	2714	Netherlands	7	8072
Croatia	3	7 401	Peru	3	6 200
Czech Republic	7	37 621	Poland	6	44 358
El Salvador	4	2416	Slovakia	6	6 1 2 2
Estonia	5	5 529	Sweden	2	15 402

FIRST EXPLORATORY EMPIRICAL RESULTS: TWO INDICATORS

Relative (0-100 percent)




(1) Scale independence(2) Population independence(3) Transfer principle

Absolute (0 to *n* candidates)


Effective Number of Candidates (ENC) = $\frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^2}$

(1) Intuitive and direct(2) Consistent with 'descriptive' reality(3) Sensitive to mechanical effects


FIRST EXPLORATORY EMPIRICAL RESULTS: GINI




FIRST EXPLORATORY EMPIRICAL RESULTS: ENC




FIRST EXPLORATORY EMPIRICAL RESULTS: GINI



FIRST EXPLORATORY EMPIRICAL RESULTS: GINI




Determinants of the Gini Index across 20 countries - Models 1-4				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ElectoralSystemsFree		31***	25**	13
		(.11)	(.11)	(.09)
ElectoralSystemsMixed	l	03	.02	06
		(.11)	(.11)	(.09)
ElectoralSystemsOpen		19***	14**	005
		(.07)	(.07)	(.06)
ParliamentaryParty1		.14***	.01	.09***
		(.003)	(.01)	(.01)
PartyMagnitude_0.3			.12***	04***
			(.01)	(.004)
NumberCandidates_0.3				.27***
				(.003)
Constant	.46***	.50***	.43***	14***
	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.04)
Observations	15,126	15,126	15,126	15,126
Log Likelihood	4,174.21	5,083.35	5,328.95	9,158.15
Akaike Inf. Crit.	-8,342.42	-10,152.71	-10,641.91	-18,298.30
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	-8,319.55	-10,099.34	-10,580.91	-18,229.68
Note:	.p<0.1; *p	<0.05; **p	<0.1; ***p<	<0.001




Determinants of the G	ini Index a	across 20 c	ountries - N	Models 1-4
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ElectoralSystemsFree		31***	25**	13
		(.11)	(.11)	(.09)
ElectoralSystemsMixed	l	03	.02	06
		(.11)	(.11)	(.09)
ElectoralSystemsOpen		19***	14**	005
		(.07)	(.07)	(.06)
ParliamentaryParty1		.14***	.01	.09***
		(.003)	(.01)	(.01)
PartyMagnitude_0.3			.12***	04***
			(.01)	(.004)
NumberCandidates_0.3				.27***
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Note:	.p<0.1; *p	<0.05; **p	<0.1; ***p<	<0.001

Model 4 - Effects of the type of electoral systems on the list's gini scores



Determinants of the Gini Index across 20 countries - Models 1-4					
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		
	31***	25**	13		
	(.11)	(.11)	(.09)		
l	03	.02	06		
	(.11)	(.11)	(.09)		
	19***	14**	005		
	(.07)	(.07)	(.06)		
	.14***	.01	.09***		
	(.003)	(.01)	(.01)		
		.12***	04***		
		(.01)	(.004)		
			.27***		
			(.003)		
.46***	.50***	.43***	14***		
(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.04)		
15,126	15,126	15,126	15,126		
4,174.21	5,083.35	5,328.95	9,158.15		
-8,342.42	-10,152.71	-10,641.91	-18,298.30		
-8,319.55	-10,099.34	-10,580.91	-18,229.68		
.p<0.1; *p	<0.05; **p	<0.1; ***p<	<0.001		
	(1) .46*** (.04) 15,126 4,174.21 -8,342.42 -8,319.55	$\begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	$\begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$		


Model 3 - Effects of the type of electoral systems on the list's gini scores



Determinants of the Cini Index across 20 countries - Models 1-4


Determinants of the G	ini Index	across 20 c	ountries - l	Models 1-4
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ElectoralSystemsFree		31***	25**	13
		(.11)	(.11)	(.09)
ElectoralSystemsMixed		03	.02	06
		(.11)	(.11)	(.09)
ElectoralSystemsOpen		19***	14**	005
		(.07)	(.07)	(.06)
ParliamentaryParty1		.14***	.01	.09***
		(.003)	(.01)	(.01)
PartyMagnitude_0.3			.12***	04***
			(.01)	(.004)
NumberCandidates_0.3				.27***
				(.003)
Constant	.46***	.50***	.43***	14***
	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.04)
Observations	15,126	15,126	15,126	15,126
Log Likelihood	4,174.21	5,083.35	5,328.95	9,158.15
Akaike Inf. Crit.	-8,342.42	-10,152.71	-10,641.91	-18,298.30
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	-8,319.55	-10,099.34	-10,580.91	-18,229.68
Note:	.p<0.1; *p	<0.05; **p	<0.1; ***p	<0.001

Model 2 - Effects of party magnitude on the list's gini scores




	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ElectoralSystemsFree		31***	25**	13
		(.11)	(.11)	(.09)
ElectoralSystemsMixed		03	.02	06
		(.11)	(.11)	(.09)
ElectoralSystemsOpen		19***	14**	005
		(.07)	(.07)	(.06)
ParliamentaryParty1		.14***	.01	.09***
		(.003)	(.01)	(.01)
PartyMagnitude_0.3			.12***	04***
			(.01)	(.004)
NumberCandidates_0.3				.27***
				(.003)
Constant	.46***	.50***	.43***	14***
	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.04)
Observations	15,126	15,126	15,126	15,126
Log Likelihood	4,174.21	5,083.35	5,328.95	9,158.15
Akaike Inf. Crit.	-8,342.42	-10,152.71	-10,641.91	-18,298.3
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	-8,319.55	-10,099.34	-10,580.91	-18,229.6
Note:	.p<0.1; *p	<0.05; **p	<0.1; ***p<	<0.001

Model 4 - Effects of nb. of candidates on the list's gini scores



Determinants of the Gini Index across 20 countries - Models 5-7				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	
ElectoralSystemsFree	13	.13	11	
	(.09)	(.08)	(.09)	
ElectoralSystemsOpen	.02	23***	.01	
	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	
ParliamentaryParty1	.08***	.06***	.07***	
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	
PartyMagnitude_0.3	04***	02***	04***	
	(.005)	(.005)	(.01)	
NumberCandidates_0.3	.25***	.19***	.25***	
	(.003)	(.005)	(.003)	
Incumbent_0.3	.01***	.01***	.01***	
	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	
ElectoralSystemsFree:NumberCandidates_0.3		17***		
•		(.02)		
ElectoralSystemsOpen:NumberCandidates_0.3		$.10^{***}$		
		(.01)		
ElectoralSystemsFree:PartyMagnitude_0.3			06***	
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,			(.01)	
ElectoralSystemsOpen:PartyMagnitude_0.3			.01***	
			(.01)	
Constant	- .11 ^{***}	.07*	10**	
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	
Observations	13,117	13,117	13,117	
Log Likelihood	7,995.02	8,266.40	8,025.33	
Akaike Inf. Crit.	-15,972.05	-16,510.79	-16,028.67	
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	-15,904.71	-16,428.49	-15,946.37	
Note:	.p<0.1; *p<0	.05; **p<0.1;	; ***p<0.001	



NEXT STEPS: STRATEGIC PRIORITIES?

- Deepening: Focus on integrating additional candidate-level (e.g. prior candidate experience and list positions, political career pattern), list-level (e.g. prior results and party strongholds), district-level (electoral fragmentation, urban-rural characteristics) variables for a fixed set of countries (N= ~ 25)
- Widening: Focus on expanding the set of included country cases to N = -35
- Journal publication to highlight first findings, scope of database, patterns by country and temporal comparisons
- Future efforts to include upcoming elections in list PR systems

NEXT STEPS (II): HOW TO INCORPORATE THE EFFECT OF LIST SYSTEMS?

- A crucial hypothesis: the electoral system, and especially the nature of the list system, would affect the nature of intraparty competition
 - Number of preferential that could be cast
 - Openess of the list (closed/flexible/open)
- But how the differentiate among flexible list systems (Shugart et al., 2005)?
 - 11 countries with flexible list systems in our project (especially in Europe)
- Two main approaches
 - Based upon past electoral results: what share of MPs were elected in past elections only based on their personal score (André, Depauw, Shugart & Chytilek, 2017)
 - Based upon the formal rules, and how hard it is to be elected irrespective of list position (Renwick and Pilet, 2016)

APPROACH 1: PAST ELECTION RESULTS

Two main indicators

- Share of MPs elected on basis of preference/personal votes only
- Share of MPs elected disturbing list order
- Some examples from our dataset
 - Belgium: 5% of MPs elected only on their preference votes; Slovakia: 0%, Croatia: 49%; Sweden: 60%; CZ: 69%

Difficulties

- It might reflect how good are parties at playing with the rules of the game (and how bad coordination is among voters to disturb list order).
- Should it be captured at country-level or at list-in-district level?

APPROACH 2: FORMAL RULES

- Main advantage: independent of parties' and voters' behaviors
- Rather easy for the 'threshold system' (candidates directly elected if reaching a % of all votes for the list
 - A specific percentage: 5% in CZ, 8% in Sweden, 9% in BG, 10% in Croatia, 50% in Slovakia
 - The Hare quota (or a share of it): Austria, NL, Suriname
- But more complex for other system
 - List votes transfer (Belgium)
 - Almost fully closed system like Estonia where list order prevails except in very rare cases
 - Almost fully open system like Iceland where personal votes prevails but non pre-printed ballot protect list order
- Other difficulties
 - How to cope with system combining several mechanisms (How to classify fully open (0% threshold) and fully closed systems (100% threshold)?
 - Should it be captured at country-level or at list-in-district level?