IntraPartyComp: The study of personalization in 33 democracies since the 2000s

Dodeigne, Jérémy; Pilet, Jean-Benoit; Put, Gert-Jan

Link to publication

INTRAPARTYCOMP

THE STUDY OF PERSONALIZATION IN 33 DEMOCRACIES SINCE THE 2000s

JÉRÉMY DODEIGNE, GERT-JAN PUT & JEAN-BENOIT PILET

PRESENTATION OUTLINE

1. General presentation of the project

2. Current status of data collection and ambition

3. Exploratory empirical results

4. Next steps: strategic priorities?

GENERAL PRESENTATION OF THE PROJECT

THE FOCUS OF INTRAPARTYCOMP

- A **comprehensive stud**y of electoral personalization and intraparty competition in global set of **list PR systems (N=33)**

- The degree of centralized versus decentralized personalization
- The role of **institutional** (i.e. electoral institutions, political system architecture, age of democracy), **party-level** (i.e. leadership, government status, candidate selection dynamics) and **time** as potential **determinants**

- **Consequences** of intraparty competition for party strategies, government stability, voter perceptions and behavior

THE EMPIRICAL STRATEGY OF INTRAPARTYCOMP

- A **global** data collection project

- Analyzing the **distribution of preference votes** over candidates on party lists using established indicators

- **Systematic data collection** since 2000: preference votes, list positions, parties, gender, age, incumbency status, district magnitude and party magnitude

- **Open publication** of dataset on project website as resource for political science scholars

EMPIRICAL SCOPE OF INTRAPARTYCOMP

| Country	World region	List PR type	N elections since 2000 (first-last)	Status
Austria	Europe	Flexible	6 (2002-2019)	✓
Belgium	Europe	Flexible	5 (2003-2019)	✓
Netherlands	Europe	Flexible	6 (2002-2017)	✓
Bulgaria	Europe	Flexible (since 2013)	3 (2013-2017)	
Croatia	Europe	Flexible (since 2015)	3 (2015-2020)	✓
Czech Republic	Europe	Flexible	5 (2002-2017)	✓
Denmark	Europe	Open	6 (2001-2019)	
Estonia	Europe	Flexible	5 (2003-2019)	✓
Finland	Europe	Open	5 (2003-2019)	✓
Greece	Europe	Open	7 (2004-2019)	✓
Iceland	Europe	Flexible	6 (2003-2017)	
Kosovo	Europe	Open	4 (2010-2019)	
Latvia	Europe	Open	6 (2002-2018)	✓
Lithuania	Europe	Mixed Member (open list component)	5 (2000-2016)	✓
Poland	Europe	Open	6 (2001-2019)	✓
Slovakia	Europe	Flexible	6 (2002-2020)	✓

Country	World region	List PR type	N elections since 2000 (first-last)	Status
Sweden	Europe	Flexible	5 (2002-2018)	✓
Chile	South America	Open	1 (2017)	✓
Colombia	South America	Variable open/closed (since 2003)	4 (2006-2018)	✓
Ecuador	South America	Open	5 (2002-2017)	
Indonesia	Asia	Open (since 2009)	3 (2009-2019)	
Peru	South America	Open	5 (2001-2020)	✓
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Europe	Open	5 (2002-2018)	✓
Cyprus	Europe	Open	4 (2001-2016)	
Brazil	South America	Open	5 (2002-2018)	✓
Lebanon	Asia	Open (since 2017)	1 (2018)	
Sri Lanka	Asia	Open	5 (2000-2015)	
Suriname	South America	Flexible	5 (2000-2020)	
Panama	North America	Mixed Member (open list component)	4 (2004-2019)	
Luxembourg	Europe	Free	4 (2004-2018)	✓
Switzerland	Europe	Free	5 (2003-2019)	
El Salvador	North America	Free	7 (2000-2018)	✓
Honduras	North America	Free	5 (2001-2017)	

EMPIRICAL SCOPE OF INTRAPARTYCOMP

Countries	Nb. elections	Nb. candidates	Countries	Nb. elections	Nb. candidates
Austria	6	37 090	Finland	9	15 038
Belgium	5	9 627	Greece	2	9 523
Bosnia and Herzegovina	5	3 139	Latvia	6	8 860
Brazil	5	32 302	Lithuania	5	6 356
Chile	1	960	Luxembourg	4	2 341
Colombia	2	2 714	Netherlands	7	8 072
Croatia	3	7 401	Peru	3	6 200
Czech Republic	7	37 621	Poland	6	44 358
El Salvador	4	2 416	Slovakia	6	6 122
Estonia	5	5 529	Sweden	2	15 402

FIRST EXPLORATORY EMPIRICAL RESULTS: TWO INDICATORS

Relative (0-100 percent)

Illustration. Lorenz curve and estimation of the Gini coefficient

$$\frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \beta}$$

(1) Scale independence

(2) Population independence

(3) Transfer principle

Absolute (0 to n candidates)

$$\text{Effective Number of Candidates (ENC)} = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^2}$$

(1) Intuitive and direct

(2) Consistent with 'descriptive' reality

(3) Sensitive to mechanical effects

FIRST EXPLORATORY EMPIRICAL RESULTS: GINI

FIRST EXPLORATORY EMPIRICAL RESULTS: ENC

FIRST EXPLORATORY EMPIRICAL RESULTS: GINI

FIRST EXPLORATORY EMPIRICAL RESULTS: GINI

$$Y = X^{0.3}$$

Determinants of the Gini Index across 20 countries - Models 1-4

|	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ElectoralSystemsFree		-.31***	-.25**	-.13
		(.11)	(.11)	(.09)
ElectoralSystemsMixed		-.03	.02	-.06
		(.11)	(.11)	(.09)
ElectoralSystemsOpen		-.19***	-.14**	-.005
		(.07)	(.07)	(.06)
ParliamentaryParty1		.14***	.01	.09***
		(.003)	(.01)	(.01)
PartyMagnitude_0.3			.12***	-.04***
			(.01)	(.004)
NumberCandidates_0.3				.27***
				(.003)
Constant	.46***	.50***	.43***	-.14***
	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.04)
Observations	15,126	15,126	15,126	15,126
Log Likelihood	4,174.21	5,083.35	5,328.95	9,158.15
Akaike Inf. Crit.	-8,342.42	-10,152.71	-10,641.91	-18,298.30
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	-8,319.55	-10,099.34	-10,580.91	-18,229.68

Note: .p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.1; ***p<0.001

Country

Determinants of the Gini Index across 20 countries - Models 1-4

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ElectoralSystemsFree		-.31***	-.25**	-.13
		(.11)	(.11)	(.09)
ElectoralSystemsMixed		-.03	.02	-.06
		(.11)	(.11)	(.09)
ElectoralSystemsOpen		-.19***	-.14**	-.005
		(.07)	(.07)	(.06)
ParliamentaryParty1		.14***	.01	.09***
		(.003)	(.01)	(.01)
PartyMagnitude_0.3			.12***	-.04***
			(.01)	(.004)
NumberCandidates_0.3				.27***
				(.003)
Constant	.46***	.50***	.43***	-.14***
	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.04)
Observations	15,126	15,126	15,126	15,126
Log Likelihood	4,174.21	5,083.35	5,328.95	9,158.15
Akaike Inf. Crit.	-8,342.42	-10,152.71	-10,641.91	-18,298.30
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	-8,319.55	-10,099.34	-10,580.91	-18,229.68

Note: .p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.1; ***p<0.001

Model 4 - Effects of the type of electoral systems on the list's gini scores

Determinants of the Gini Index across 20 countries - Models 1-4

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ElectoralSystemsFree		-.31***	-.25**	-.13
		(.11)	(.11)	(.09)
ElectoralSystemsMixed		-.03	.02	-.06
		(.11)	(.11)	(.09)
ElectoralSystemsOpen		-.19***	-.14**	-.005
		(.07)	(.07)	(.06)
ParliamentaryParty1		.14***	.01	.09***
		(.003)	(.01)	(.01)
PartyMagnitude_0.3			.12***	-.04***
			(.01)	(.004)
NumberCandidates_0.3				.27***
				(.003)
Constant	.46***	.50***	.43***	-.14***
	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.04)
Observations	15,126	15,126	15,126	15,126
Log Likelihood	4,174.21	5,083.35	5,328.95	9,158.15
Akaike Inf. Crit.	-8,342.42	-10,152.71	-10,641.91	-18,298.30
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	-8,319.55	-10,099.34	-10,580.91	-18,229.68

Note: .p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.1; ***p<0.001

Model 3 - Effects of the type of electoral systems on the list's gini scores

Determinants of the Gini Index across 20 countries - Models 1-4

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ElectoralSystemsFree		-.31***	-.25**	-.13
		(.11)	(.11)	(.09)
ElectoralSystemsMixed		-.03	.02	-.06
		(.11)	(.11)	(.09)
ElectoralSystemsOpen		-.19***	-.14**	-.005
		(.07)	(.07)	(.06)
ParliamentaryParty1		.14***	.01	.09***
		(.003)	(.01)	(.01)
PartyMagnitude_0.3			.12***	-.04***
			(.01)	(.004)
NumberCandidates_0.3				.27***
				(.003)
Constant	.46***	.50***	.43***	-.14***
	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.04)
Observations	15,126	15,126	15,126	15,126
Log Likelihood	4,174.21	5,083.35	5,328.95	9,158.15
Akaike Inf. Crit.	-8,342.42	-10,152.71	-10,641.91	-18,298.30
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	-8,319.55	-10,099.34	-10,580.91	-18,229.68

Note: .p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.1; ***p<0.001

Model 2 - Effects of party magnitude on the list's gini scores

Determinants of the Gini Index across 20 countries - Models 1-4

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ElectoralSystemsFree		-.31***	-.25**	-.13
		(.11)	(.11)	(.09)
ElectoralSystemsMixed		-.03	.02	-.06
		(.11)	(.11)	(.09)
ElectoralSystemsOpen		-.19***	-.14**	-.005
		(.07)	(.07)	(.06)
ParliamentaryParty1		.14***	.01	.09***
		(.003)	(.01)	(.01)
PartyMagnitude_0.3			.12***	-.04***
			(.01)	(.004)
NumberCandidates_0.3				.27***
				(.003)
Constant	.46***	.50***	.43***	-.14***
	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.04)
Observations	15,126	15,126	15,126	15,126
Log Likelihood	4,174.21	5,083.35	5,328.95	9,158.15
Akaike Inf. Crit.	-8,342.42	-10,152.71	-10,641.91	-18,298.30
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	-8,319.55	-10,099.34	-10,580.91	-18,229.68

Note: .p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.1; ***p<0.001

Model 4 - Effects of nb. of candidates on the list's gini scores

Determinants of the Gini Index across 20 countries - Models 5-7

	(1)	(2)	(3)
ElectoralSystemsFree	-.13	.13	-.11
	(.09)	(.08)	(.09)
ElectoralSystemsOpen	.02	-.23***	.01
	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)
ParliamentaryParty1	.08***	.06***	.07***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
PartyMagnitude_0.3	-.04***	-.02***	-.04***
	(.005)	(.005)	(.01)
NumberCandidates_0.3	.25***	.19***	.25***
	(.003)	(.005)	(.003)
Incumbent_0.3	.01***	.01***	.01***
	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)
ElectoralSystemsFree:NumberCandidates_0.3		-.17***	
		(.02)	
ElectoralSystemsOpen:NumberCandidates_0.3		.10***	
		(.01)	
ElectoralSystemsFree:PartyMagnitude_0.3			-.06***
			(.01)
ElectoralSystemsOpen:PartyMagnitude_0.3			.01***
			(.01)
Constant	-.11***	.07*	-.10**
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Observations	13,117	13,117	13,117
Log Likelihood	7,995.02	8,266.40	8,025.33
Akaike Inf. Crit.	-15,972.05	-16,510.79	-16,028.67
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	-15,904.71	-16,428.49	-15,946.37

Note: .p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.1; ***p<0.001

Model 6 - Effects of the type of electoral systems on the list's gini scores

NEXT STEPS: STRATEGIC PRIORITIES?

- Deepening: Focus on integrating additional candidate-level (e.g. prior candidate experience and list positions, political career pattern), list-level (e.g. prior results and party strongholds), district-level (electoral fragmentation, urban-rural characteristics) variables for a fixed set of countries (N= ~ 25)

- Widening: Focus on expanding the set of included country cases to N = ~ 35

- Journal publication to highlight first findings, scope of database, patterns by country and temporal comparisons

- Future efforts to include upcoming elections in list PR systems

NEXT STEPS (II): HOW TO INCORPORATE THE EFFECT OF LIST SYSTEMS?

- A crucial hypothesis: the electoral system, and especially the nature of the list system, would affect the nature of intraparty competition
  - Number of preferential that could be cast
  - Openess of the list (closed/flexible/open)

- But how the differentiate among flexible list systems (Shugart et al., 2005)?
  - 11 countries with flexible list systems in our project (especially in Europe)
- Two main approaches
  - Based upon past electoral results: what share of MPs were elected in past elections only based on their personal score (André, Depauw, Shugart & Chytilek, 2017)
  - Based upon the formal rules, and how hard it is to be elected irrespective of list position (Renwick and Pilet, 2016)

APPROACH 1: PAST ELECTION RESULTS

- Two main indicators
  - Share of MPs elected on basis of preference/personal votes only
  - Share of MPs elected disturbing list order
- Some examples from our dataset
  - Belgium: 5% of MPs elected only on their preference votes; Slovakia: 0%, Croatia: 49%; Sweden: 60%; CZ: 69%

- Difficulties
  - It might reflect how good are parties at playing with the rules of the game (and how bad coordination is among voters to disturb list order).
  - Should it be captured at country-level or at list-in-district level?

APPROACH 2: FORMAL RULES

- Main advantage: independent of parties' and voters' behaviors

- Rather easy for the 'threshold system' (candidates directly elected if reaching a % of all votes for the list
  - A specific percentage: 5% in CZ, 8% in Sweden, 9% in BG, 10% in Croatia, 50% in Slovakia
  - The Hare quota (or a share of it): Austria, NL, Suriname
- But more complex for other system
  - List votes transfer (Belgium)
  - Almost fully closed system like Estonia where list order prevails except in very rare cases
  - Almost fully open system like Iceland where personal votes prevails but non pre-printed ballot protect list order

- Other difficulties
  - How to cope with system combining several mechanisms (How to classify fully open (0% threshold) and fully closed systems (100% threshold)?
  - Should it be captured at country-level or at list-in-district level?