Conceptions of Chinese Democracy

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

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CONCEPTIONS *of* CHINESE DEMOCRACY

READING SUN YAT-SEN, CHIANG KAI-SHEK, AND CHIANG CHING-KUO

DAVID J. LORENZO

Conceptions of Chinese Democracy

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Conceptions of Chinese Democracy

Reading Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, and Chiang Ching-kuo

David J. Lorenzo

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Conceptions of Chinese Democracy

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Chapter One

Discussions of Democracy in the Work of Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, and Chiang Ching-kuo

> Even under the single-party authoritarianism of Taiwan's ruling Nationalist Party . . . , the ideological justification for the Republic of China was its aspiration to be—or become—democratic. . . . Thus, the KMT-led government that took control of Taiwan when the Japanese colonial government withdrew in 1945 based its legitimacy on its democratic aspirations.

On its surface, contemporary Taipei appears little different from Hong Kong, Shanghai, or Singapore. Strong reminders of traditional Chinese culture exist alongside skyscrapers and internationally famous shops. Sophisticated transportation networks, modern factories, and an affluent middle class are prominent. As in those other three cities, economic modernization and the wealth it brings appear to be the most important and generalizable characteristics of Taipei and Taiwan as a whole.

Below the surface are signs that Taiwan is different, including a lively political scene. Unlike those other locations, Taiwan (as the Republic of China, or ROC) is a democracy that draws many of the features of its political system from the West. Multiple parties contest elections for local and national offices. Political campaigns are spirited, politicians lionized and maligned. Political talk shows and comic political satires dot the airwaves. Political pollsters are active, and politicians run campaigns carefully calibrated to garner the largest possible number of votes. To a greater degree than in Western democracies, Taiwan's political discourse also emphasizes consensus.

What accounts for Taiwan's democracy? This question is the subject of both scholarly and popular interest. Taiwan feeds the hope that authoritarian regimes (such as the one that governed Taiwan until 1988) will transform themselves into free, open, and democratic governments and lays to rest the

The octagonal roof of Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall symbolizes eight traditional virtues and a revival of the Chinese people, while the three sets of stairs represent ruling the nation by the Three Principles of the People. The eighty-nine steps on the two sets of white stairs recall Chiang Kai-shek's age at death. Courtesy of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan)

canard that Chinese culture represents an insuperable obstacle to democratization.[1] One aspect of this question is whether discussions of democracy provided by leaders of the ROC who based the legitimacy of their government on the oft-repeated premise that they were building a democratic country, help account for the transition. Might those discussions have furnished important justifications of democracy and delegitimized other forms of government in the same way that similar materials contributed to democratic transitions in other countries? And how are those discussions connected with Taiwan's contemporary democracy?

A related question concerns the place of these discussions in the larger Chinese community. How do the conceptions of democracy these leaders expounded fit into historical understandings and contemporary discussions of democracy within that community, including those conversations now taking place on the Chinese mainland?

A Study of the ROC's Leaders' Discussions of Democracy

This book is a study of the discussions of democracy in the speeches and public writings of Sun Yat-sen (孫逸仙), Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石), and Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國). Its particular focus is on the conception of democracy found in Sun's *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* (Three Principles of the People, 三民主義) lectures, which were published in the mid-1920s, and the published speeches and pronouncements of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo during their time on Taiwan. Its purpose is fourfold. (1) It documents and arranges into themes the various conceptions and justifications of democracy promulgated by these three leaders. (2) It compares, contrasts, and traces influences among those discussions. (3) It critiques those discussions in light of recent democratic theory. (4) It places those discussions in the context of Taiwan's current democracy and the larger Chinese community's conversation regarding democracy.

There are several reasons for discussing the materials in this fashion. First, while analyses of Sun's arguments are available in both English and Chinese, no one has examined in depth, in English, and in light of new scholarship in democratic theory and practice, Chiang Kai-shek's or Chiang Ching-kuo's discussions of democracy in ROC Government Information Office (GIO, 中華民國行政院新聞局) publications.[2] Thus there has been no sustained contemporary discussion in English of their thoughts, or Sun's, in relation to Taiwan's current democracy. Nor has anyone examined these leaders simultaneously, extensively, and critically in terms of democracy. At least on the surface, they are all of a piece in being "Sunists." But within this tradition, there are important differences as well as continuities. Exploring these differences and continuities provides insight into the workings of a particular Chinese political tradition over time.[3]

Second, examining these pronouncements helps us assess explanations for Taiwan's democratization. Given that both Chiangs spoke extensively about democracy while holding important positions of power and continually invoked and disseminated Sun's writings on democracy, a full consideration of explanations for Taiwan's transition requires that we examine this evidence

to see what role these discussions may have played in popularizing and legitimating particular conceptions of democracy and in delegitimating nondemocratic forms of government. This evidence also provides us with material with which to think about explanations for the character of the ROC's current democratic regime.[4]

Finally, understanding these conceptions helps flesh out our understanding of Chinese conceptions of democracy. Scholars have explored such conceptions for the early Nationalist period and with regard to the Democracy Wall and Tiananmen Square democratization movements on the mainland.[5] But there has not been much work on the Chiangs' views on democracy in the context of the broader Chinese conversation on the subject, or on the possible contemporary uses of the particular models of democracy that Sun and the Chiangs, to greater and lesser degrees, drew upon. These leaders' discussions of democracy are inherently interesting as examples of twentieth-century, non-Western, Chinese contributions to democratic thought. Examining their discussions adds another facet to our understanding of the complex history of Chinese conceptions of democracy.[6]

Explanations for Taiwan's Democratization

If the larger Chinese community is the overarching context of this discussion of concepts of democracy, an important part of that context is the democratic transition on Taiwan. Taiwan is where two of the three figures we examine were active, and the fact that Taiwan experienced a democratic transition is part of what makes these figures important to the larger community.

No scholar now seriously questions the judgment that prior to the late 1980s Taiwan experienced something other than full democratic governance. It is also taken for granted that the ROC on Taiwan today is a democracy and that it is, for the most part, a liberal democracy. However, the causes of Taiwan's transition are still the subject of vigorous debate. An important point of departure is differing explanations of the impetus for that transition. Was the transition driven by internal, indigenous sources, or was the transition and its outcomes primarily influenced by global contexts? For example, some scholars argue that the Cold War (which forced Taiwan to become more liberal and democratic in order to retain Western and particularly American support) or its waning (with the accompanying declining of security concerns) is the primary factor.[7] For others, the broader Third Wave of democratization is the cause for the transition, infecting Taiwan with a democratic contagion

A political training course of the KMT in progress (1953). Courtesy of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan)

that came from the People Power movement in the Philippines and South Korea's democratic transition.[8] In these explanations, external factors play the primary role in both the transition to democracy and the type of democracy Taiwan now experiences.

Other explanations look to internal causes. Some scholars point directly to the central role of the ruling Kuomintang Party (KMT, 國民黨), arguing that it was the KMT's intention to democratize and that the transition was the fruit of that intention.[9] The predominant paradigm for internal explanations of Taiwan's transition, however, is the politically oriented framework derived from O'Donnell and Schmitter's work, which is predicated on understanding relationships among elites inside and outside of power in the predemocratic state.[10] Scholars refer to one or more variations of the political democratization paths Huntington built upon the O'Donnell and Schmitter framework to account for the transition. Some hold that it was the result of complex interactions between the KMT and opposition groups.[11] Others hold that interactions among factions within the KMT and opposition groups, coupled with leadership and political norms, account for the transition.[12] These scholars

generally label Taiwan's move to democracy a transformational and political event in which the ruling KMT elite, though under some pressure, remained in power and ushered in democratic reforms under circumstances in which it could have resisted reform. In this explanation, the sources for the transition were internal and dominated by the KMT's hold on power and, presumably, understanding of democracy.

In contrast, another group of scholars argue that while the sources of Taiwan's democratization are internal, those sources are most closely associated with the democratic opposition movement alone. In this understanding, it was not the KMT elites in power whose attitudes, divisions, or actions were crucial but those of democratic activists who kept democratic aspirations alive in the face of the KMT's authoritarianism, winning elections at the local level despite unfair KMT practices and, in the late 1980s, ultimately forcing the KMT to adopt democratic reforms or face the prospect of massive civil disturbances.[13] In this view, democratization was a process in which an opposition wrested democratic reforms from a recalcitrant government dominated by a nondemocratic KMT. This opposition, animated by the forces that coalesced to form the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民主進步黨), are generally said to be have been influenced by Western understandings of democracy.

Departing from these purely political explanations, support for the proposition that the KMT contributed to a culture of democratic learning that was important to the transition and its aftermath is found among another group of scholars, especially Gold and Nathan and Ho. Gold holds that the KMT made commitments to democracy that were later used by the opposition to oppose the system it created. Thus, even if the KMT as a party was not an important actor in the democratization process in this explanation, its public pronouncements were important to a process of democratic learning and conceptualization.[14] Nathan and Ho likewise argue that the KMT's "constitutionalist and prodemocratic ideology" was a factor in the democratization process, and they place Chiang Ching-kuo at the center of the transition, even though they argue that democratization for Chiang was instrumental to the goals of legitimizing his regime and reviving the KMT rather than an end in itself.[15] There is also a place here for democratic learning linked to the conceptualizations of democracy we examine, even if such learning is understood to have been an unintended consequence of the government's and the party's actions.

Examining the democratic discussions of KMT leaders can help us evaluate these various explanations. If the leadership of the KMT did not speak of democracy in meaningful ways, then the impetus for democratic reform may more plausibly be placed outside the KMT, the process itself confined to the 1980s and 1990s, and the factors influencing Taiwan's current democracy identified as either coming directly from the West, indirectly through other countries, or from the understandings of oppositional groups alone. If that leadership did contribute democratic concepts, then the view of Taiwan's democratization as an extended process is reinforced, an important role for the KMT in the process cannot be ruled out, and the role of previous conceptions of democracy in shaping Taiwan's current democratic regime would be in play.[16] An existing culture of democracy might also plausibly be referenced as an influence on the democratic opposition itself. It is the foundations for these latter explanations, particularly those put forward by Gold and by Nathan and Ho, that we seek to explore here by determining whether the KMT's leadership did contribute meaningful discussions of democracy.

Understanding, Recognizing, and Assessing Democratic Conceptions

Definitions of Democracy

Before considering the broader Chinese contexts of these discussions, we must first answer questions related to democratic theory and political thought in general. How do we recognize whether a political conception is "democratic"? How do we assess the justifications, conceptions, and overall quality of these leaders' contributions to discussions of democracy?

For such early systematic theorists of constitutions as Aristotle, democracy was a particular regime type that could emerge empirically in contextually different forms. Democracy generally entailed (1) the widespread granting of citizenship, (2) political equality among citizens, and (3) significant participation in the administration of political affairs by ordinary citizens. The way in which these features were embedded in a constitution importantly varied in different contexts. However, Aristotle also argued that the existence of such a regime inevitably meant that power would gravitate to the poor because they would be the most numerous portion of the citizenry and would therefore dictate terms to other groups by their ability to mobilize votes. In his understanding, democracy may involve different institutions and practices rooted in particular contexts, but it is ultimately and universally about numbers: is

citizenship extended widely (democracy) or more narrowly (other forms of government)?[17]

Later theorists in the civic republican tradition were less realist in their understanding of the internal components of communities, or perhaps they had a realist appreciation of particularistic interests and tried to find ways of avoiding what they saw as the deterioration of the community into rival factions. For Machiavelli and Rousseau, the formation of citizens into a unified demos was a crucial and necessary component. Through the actions of a founder and the embrace of civic virtues and a common culture, citizens would develop a common will and identify common interests and an overall common good that would be the objects of their political activities. Rousseau condemned intermediary groups that stand between the individual and the community as destructive of democracy because they distort the process of assessing the general will and shatter solidarity in the quest for the satisfaction of particularized interests. For these theorists, political pluralism within the demos is not desirable. Concomitantly, while neither Machiavelli nor Rousseau advocated the complete administration of political machinery by all ordinary citizens, both saw attention to political matters as a primary responsibility of citizens. For both, the essential marker of democracy is the responsiveness of the government to the will of the entire community. A government that is not responsive to the community as a whole, or is responsive to only a portion of the community, is not democratic because democracy is the means by which the community as a whole, and therefore each individual as part of the community, exercises autonomy.[18] Thus in their understanding, democracy is a universal conception that assumes a monist citizenry.

Modern theorists are split in their understandings of democracy. For those who seek to compare democracy across cultures and develop inventories of democracy, a simple, universal definition is adequate even if the particulars of democracy are different in different nations. A popular definition is Lipset's formulation that a regime is democratic if and only if it "supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials, and a social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for political office."[19] Note that this definition, while simple and allowing for variations, still argues for the universality in democracies of constitutionalism, indirect democracy, majoritarianism, downward accountability, and choice in the form of multiple candidates and, presumably, multiple parties.

Dahl, meanwhile, has put forward more extensive criteria that, while allowing for some latitude in the construction of a democratic regime, nonetheless narrowly prescribe the conditions necessary for a decision-making process to be deemed democratic in a modern setting. These criteria are effective participation by citizens, voting equality among citizens, enlightened understanding among citizens, control of the political agenda by citizens, and inclusion in the demos of all nontransient and mentally sound adults.[20] Within these criteria are such subsidiary elements as elections and the right to run for office, majority rule, liberal freedoms, access to information, and the right to form associations. These elements, which Dahl associates with a "second transformation" of democracy that took place in modern Europe, constitute what others identify as a liberal understanding of democracy and what Dahl terms "polyarchy."[21]

I do not accept that all of Dahl's criteria must be met for a conception to be deemed democratic. However, these criteria are useful in attempting to distinguish between democratic and nondemocratic elements. A theory that fails to meet these criteria must provide good reasons why it does not; failing to do so, the theory could be found deficient. Dahl, for example, provides a cogent overview of the problems associated with conceptualizing policy in terms of expressions of a common good rather than pluralism. Dahl's conception is also important because Taiwan's political system currently satisfies his criteria. I use this and other analyses to test, probe, and critique the conceptions of democracy we find in the examined discussions.

However, we need not adhere to such prescriptive definitions to think about democracy more generally in the context of democratic learning. Other theorists conceive of democracy somewhat more broadly and recognize that more than one type of democratic theory exists. Among these, Held's work is perhaps the most prominent. In constructing a typology of democratic theories, Held provides us with a way of understanding and classifying different types of democratic theory and a way of understanding theories that does not take for granted the liberal model usually associated with the West.

In Held's broader understanding, a theory is democratic if it maintains that state power can be exercised only with the consent (or voice) of citizens, who in turn must encompass a large majority of the state's inhabitants. The institutionalization of consent generally includes identification of the ways in which people acquire public power, as well as the creation and use of particular procedures by which decisions are made, policies approved, and power

exercised. While broad and simple, this definition provides clear markers that differentiate between democratic and nondemocratic conceptions. For example, a conception that allows an elite to hold power without the consent of citizens, even though it implements policies that favor the vast majority of ordinary citizens, is not democratic in this understanding. Likewise, no theory in this understanding can claim a government is democratic and not discuss some means by which the citizens' voice is concretely expressed and officials are held accountable by citizens. Absent such a procedure for downward accountability, a government could as easily be a paternalistic monarchy as a democracy. Consultation is not sufficient to constitute accountability or consent. To consult means to listen to the demos, thus constituting in part "voice," but the decision whether to heed that voice is still up to officials; this conception requires that mechanisms be in place to ensure that the citizens' voice is heeded for a government to be deemed democratic.

Held documents the fact that different conceptions of democracy disagree radically with regard to how voice, accountability, and consent are to be formulated and expressed. Some theories hold that only the direct exercise of policy-making power by citizens constitutes democratic practice. Others hold that election of officials, understood in the barest sense, is enough. Still others argue that elections alone are not sufficient, even when one accepts an indirect model of democracy. In these latter conceptions, democracy demands that there be guarantees of rights and freedoms necessary to run for office, organize parties, and criticize government, as well as constitutional guarantees that elections be truly competitive.[22] These understandings inject a liberal understanding of the importance of individuals, individual autonomy, and pluralism into democratic theory, requiring that some balance be struck between these elements and the emphasis on equality and collective autonomy that democratic understandings alone tend to favor.

Types of Democracies

For our purposes, three of Held's models are most important: those of liberal democracy, republican unitary democracy, and competitive elitism.[23] Though not included in Held's typology, a Chinese unitary conception also importantly informs the conceptions of democracy under study here. We will find that the constituent elements of the democratic conceptions of Sun and the Chiangs move among these various models.

For Held, the *republican unitary model* emphasizes civic virtue and a unified political community that generates a general will embodying the autonomous choice of the demos as a whole. Adherents of this model also argue that a common good exists that is more than just the simple aggregation of particular interests and that constitutes the subject of all politics. Rather, the common good is the good of the entire demos taken as a separate, living entity. These democrats are suspicious of parties and interests groups. They see politics as the way in which the community as a whole attains autonomy. They point to the need for the populace to be disciplined and exercise civic virtues. These virtues are particular kinds of moral excellences (public interest, dedication to the public good, rejection of particular interests). Government is to be administrative in nature, with ordinary citizens acting as the implementers of policies citizens as a whole approve. Republican unitary democrats are suspicious of too much wealth and are sometimes sympathetic to eliminating economic inequalities. They are also opposed to the presence of groups or organizations that mediate between individuals and the community as a whole (what liberal democrats call civil society). To be autonomous in their understanding is to participate in the governance of the community as a whole; it is through the shared control of the community that one is the author of one's own actions.[24]

Drawing upon the work of Weber and Schumpeter, Held argues that a *competitive elitist model* portrays democracy as a process by which citizens choose the people who are to exercise political power by means of voting among candidates representing different political parties. Thus, competitive elitism employs a concept of indirect democracy. An important justification for this position is not just the size of modern democracies (a point that Dahl emphasizes in conceptualizing democracy as polyarchy) but also the presumption of a significant gulf of political ability and interest between citizens and leaders. Politics is the realm of the professional politician, not regular citizens, because the latter are generally unable to make sense of and judge policies. Non-elites are capable of recognizing and voting out incompetent leaders, but not more. The demos is understood as diverse in its interests and desires, as are political elites. In this model, multiple political parties and other political groups are natural to democratic practice and understood as the vehicles by which leaders build political influence, and it is to parties and their interests rather than citizens as a whole that political leaders in practice owe their loyalty and whose

political values and interests they further. While governing is a technical business, it is also, as in the liberal model, a process of bargaining and compromise among political elites representing various interests and views, particularly in the form of the parliamentary democracy that Weber describes. A competitive elitist regime may contain checks and balances, rights and freedoms, and a developed system of law, as does Weber's version; however, in Weber's understanding these are not aimed at the state per se but at the bureaucracy that is the inevitable accompaniment of the modern state.[25]

The *liberal democratic model* limits government and privileges individuals in the context of an indirect democracy in which most of the important policy making is done by officials chosen through regularly scheduled elections. Autonomy in this understanding is both collective (in terms of participating in the shared making of general rules) and individual (in terms of the creation of unique and particular life plans). Liberal democracy incorporates constitutionalism that provides limits to and checks on government power in terms of rules, structures, and specific rights that protect individuals and political minorities. Liberal democracy assumes pluralism and the natural development of different interests, a variety of understandings of politics and the common good, and competition among multiple political parties. Adherents of this model emphasize the development of and participation in private organizations that form a free civil society. A liberal democracy, they hold, emphasizes the free and equal nature of all citizens, the openness of office to all citizens through elections, and the protection of individual rights. Liberal democrats also place great emphasis on the competitiveness and freedom of elections, competition among multiple political parties, and the important role political parties and political elites out of office play in holding officeholders accountable through criticism and the formulation of alternative policy proposals. While they are suspicious of state power and attempt to curtail the power of public officials, they are also dubious of ordinary citizens' willingness to respect the rights of all; therefore, liberal democrats seek to limit the powers of majorities by means of constitutions and checks and balances. These limits on power are meant to curb abuses of power, attempts to rule dictatorially, and particularly attempts by ordinary citizens or elites to use the state to impose a set of perfectionist life plans on individuals.[26]

Democratic Conceptions in the Chinese Context

As political figures exposed to Chinese philosophy and history, Sun and the two Chiangs both drew upon and participated in a Chinese conversation about the nature and attributes of democracy that extends back to the late nineteenth century and continues to this day. The nature of that participation as well as their possible influences on, or general relationship with, the current conversation in the Chinese community is of particular interest.

Just as in the more general literature on democracy, there are disagreements among scholars regarding conceptions of democracy in the Chinese community. Questions arise as to whether there is a unique understanding that Chinese discussions inevitably invoke. If so, what are the features of that conception? Is it democratic? What is the relationship of Chinese conceptions with Western understandings? For those who prescribe democracy as a normative matter, the questions are somewhat different. If a Chinese state is to embrace democracy, what does that mean? Should Chinese theorists and practitioners look to the West and adopt Western (and particularly liberal) models wholesale? Should existing models be adapted to Chinese conditions? Are Chinese contexts relevant? Should the concept of democracy itself be fundamentally rethought?

The recent debate begins more largely with the topic of "Asian" democracy. Some scholars and political figures accept (and sometimes promote) a conception of politics that includes what is said to be a distinctly Asian understanding of democratic practices, values, and leadership that they argue is different from Western understandings but is, nonetheless, democratic at its core. Most famously, Lee Kuan Yew has argued that Singapore embraces a democratic understanding influenced by the context of Asian culture and values that emphasizes discipline, authority, the family, and traditional Chinese culture. For Lee and others like him, this form of democracy is both best suited for countries with a Chinese heritage and normatively superior to other versions.[27] In a somewhat different vein, scholars such as Reilly have argued for the significance of a distinctive and common set of electoral rules that have recently been implemented in East Asian countries that emphasize the importance of a majoritarian conception of democracy. Here, the emphasis is on identifying and studying what appears to be a particular model of democracy that has emerged in a particular region of the world, a model that promotes solidarity and stability over the representation of pluralist interests, even while it otherwise shares important features with Western understandings of democracy.[28]

Both contentions are controversial and as such should initially be treated cautiously. A significant number of scholars argue that there is no conception of "Asian democracy." Rather, some hold that differences between the classical liberal versions of democracy and those labeled "Asian" conceptions are to be explained by the fact that the latter, while called democratic by politicians such as Lee, are really incomplete democratic conceptions.[29] Others argue that such differences are the result of universal factors, such as government manipulation, government control of the press, and a middle-class desire for stability, or politicians attempting to protect their interests. There is nothing Asian or distinctively democratic about such conceptions or practices.[30] They merely incorporate local manifestations of problems or features that can be found in any operational democracy.[31] Still others argue that such conceptions are merely relabeled normative constructions of developmental strategies.[32]

The Chinese Conversation on Democracy

General Discussions of Democracy

Like discussions of Asian values and experiences in the conversation about Asian democracy, discussions of democracy in the Chinese community form part of an ongoing and more general discussion of the role of Chinese values and contexts in the integration of China into the modern world. In the eyes of Yu Keping (俞可平), a contemporary commentator on democracy working on the Chinese mainland, the current discussion of globalization in mainland China is an extension of a conversation that began with the participants of the May Fourth Movement of 1919 and has since been taken up on various occasions. This discussion includes efforts to think through the possible differences among the concepts of globalization, modernization, and Westernization and subsequent attempts to identify the proper Chinese attitude toward science, technology, industrialization, culture, civil society, education, politics, and economics. As Yu and others also note, attitudes vary. Some participants in this discussion argue for the complete adoption of Western approaches and values, holding that these represent the core of modernity and globalization. The opposite view is held by more strongly nationalist groups, who maintain that China's response to globalization should be a revival of traditional values, either narrowly in the form of Confucianism or more broadly in terms of China's larger heritage of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism. Yu is typical of those who adopt a middling, syncretic position. In this understanding, globalization demands the adoption of certain universal values and

understandings, including democracy, freedom, and individualism. However, these need not come only in Western forms, and when they do, such understandings can and should be supplemented by the addition of Chinese understandings. Democracy in this conception encompasses local elements, even though it is a universally desirable form of government.[33]

Taking Yu's understanding of the Chinese conversation on modernization as a starting point, we see that this conversation contributes to an overlapping debate regarding democracy. Should China adopt a Western understanding or should it, to put it in modern parlance, adopt democracy "with Chinese characteristics"? There continue to be arguments on both sides of this question. The current leadership of the People's Republic of China (PRC), for example, claims not only to follow democratic norms in the form of a socialist understanding of democratic centralism but also to practice a form of democracy that takes into account the particularities of China's context as a developing country with a particular history.[34] This conception promotes the centrality of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and, while formally accepting some Western concepts such as the rule of law and a system of checks and balances within the CCP, conceives of accountability in terms of consultation rather than multiparty elections or nationwide elections for top government officials. Yu, among others, also appears to take this position in justifying intraparty democracy as at least a transitional form. Other researchers have identified alternative forms of what they hold to be particularly Chinese understandings of democracy.[35] Of these, one interesting group explores the possibilities for a specifically Confucian conception, or at least the prospect that Confucian values can support a form of democracy amenable to Chinese culture and history.[36]

On the descriptive side of the scholarship, a broad group of scholars argue that elements of practicality, elitism, syncretism, liberalism, and Confucian values can be found in the larger, historical stream of Chinese conceptions of democracy. In this understanding, the Chinese intellectual experience with democracy is best described as rich and varied. This descriptive view is illustrated most vividly in Fung's work, which argues for a nuanced understanding of this discussion, particularly for the periods encompassing the early republic, the May Fourth Movement, and the early Nationalist period.[37] For these scholars, there is no single conception of a "Chinese" democracy that is constrained by particular boundaries set by culture and history. There have been, instead, a variety of ways in which people have explored the idea of

democracy within the Chinese context; those who are interested in democracy sometimes adopt outside ideas wholesale, while others adopt and modify both outside and indigenous political concepts.

In surveying this evidence, there does not appear to be a single, unique understanding of Chinese democracy, much less a single Asian democratic model, which a critical mass of people in China, whether now or in the past, have accepted. Chinese discussions of democracy cover a wide range of understandings, and thinkers have put forward several different candidates for the title of "Chinese democracy." These findings are of importance to the project here, for they point to the complicated task of situating these leaders' democratic discussions within the larger Chinese conversation. I attempt to simplify this task by focusing on two questions: First, does the figure in question put forward an understanding of democracy that one might label a "Chinese" understanding in that it does not appear to follow a completely Western format but instead draws upon conceptions and views intimately associated with Chinese culture, philosophy, history, and conditions? That is, to what extent do they supply an understanding of democracy with specifically Chinese characteristics rather than importing a conception wholesale? And second, does the figure himself label what he discusses a universal conception, a "Chinese" conception, or some combination?

The Chinese Unitary Model of Democracy

In approaching the first question, we must decide how to operationalize a "Chinese" conception of democracy. One way of doing so is to check the conceptions we study here against a list of elements that come from the Chinese context, such as cultural values, philosophical precepts, and Chinese historical models. Such an exercise forms part of the analysis here. A second way is to compare the conception at hand to a popular existing conception of democracy that incorporates contextual Chinese elements. We know that such conceptions exist, for scholars have uncovered elements of continuity and commonality that mark some conceptions in ways that go beyond broad and indeterminate references to rulers making policies that benefit everyone.[38] For example, Peng identifies important continuities and similarities among various conceptions of democracy and good government held by Chinese commentators. Others go further to suggest the existence of Asian variations of Western democratic models.[39] Fung, for example, has argued for the existence of a Chinese version of democratic liberalism in the 1930s and 1940s, in

which a combination of liberalism, democracy, and traditional Chinese values created a conception in which democratic values placed limits on such liberal tenets as individuals and rights.[40] There also appear to be Asian versions of the republican unitary model of democracy, of which Lee's discussion is broadly representative.

Of particular importance here is the widespread presence in the Chinese experience of a different variation of the republican unitary model, one that I label the *Chinese unitary model*. Following Peng, I see the philosophical foundations of this model residing in two different but not incompatible justifications for democracy that extend back into Chinese history and culture. One justification is that democracy is a rendering of an understanding of good government found in traditional understandings of Chinese politics. The writings of Confucians in general and those of Mencius in particular have been used by Chinese intellectuals to argue for the existence of a historical, cultural conception of government that is operated "for the good of the people"—thus labeled by many a *mínběn* (民本), or people-based, form of government. In both the traditionalist and the later forms of this understanding, officials are elites who are chosen for office on the strength of their virtue and character. They are charged with using their power to further the interests of the people as a whole rather than those of officials or a narrow segment of the population. The people, in turn, are to defer to officials, obey laws, and develop their own virtue. Thus there are important elitist and moralist as well as unitary elements to this understanding.

Some Chinese intellectuals take this formulation by itself as a form of democracy, or at least the foundation for a Chinese conception of democracy. But when considered in relation to the definitions above, this understanding is not democratic even by Held's minimal standard. It importantly lacks institutions that require downward accountability. In barebones *mínběn* conceptions, accountability is either upward to a benevolent and wise ruling official or sideways to cultural norms stressing the need for "people-centered" policies or ethical standards in the Confucian canon. As Fukuyama has pointed out, such a conception may include a system of moral accountability and may also produce states that are capable of engaging in good governance (one example being Singapore) in that they can effectively deal with the tasks that states must carry out, but it does not meet the criteria of a democratic state. In addition to lacking the procedural, downward accountability that is a marker of democracy, this conception also does not provide the means for furnishing

officials with essential information regarding the common good, or institutions that forcibly restrain or remove rulers who refuse to follow ethical principles and abuse power.[41] Thus, something more than a *mínběn* understanding is necessary for the construction of a democratic concept.

The other justification that feeds into the Chinese unitary conception is contextual and pertains to function and purpose. This justification also has a history that extends back at least to the turn of the twentieth century. In the latter stages of the Chīng dynasty and early years of the republic, intellectuals referenced the ongoing struggles of China in a complex and dangerous world to justify democracy as a form of government that appeared to account for the success of the powerful (Western) nations. The need for China to unify, free itself of imperialist attacks, defend itself from powerful economies and military forces, and engage in the difficult but necessary tasks of economic development, industrialization, and modernization lent a pragmatic dimension to democracy as a system of government capable of creating a powerful state able to harness the energies and will of the entire nation.[42] Here, as Fung would argue, the inspiration and justification for democracy is national salvation, or *jiùwáng* (救亡). Democracy is a desirable form of government in this justification because it helps create a powerful and effective state that allows China to meet its challenges; thus conceptions of democracy justified by this understanding pragmatically emphasize the unity, will, and power necessary to save China, which, adherents argue, nondemocratic forms of government cannot supply. Consequently, this conception does not stress the rights of individuals in the way the liberal democratic model does. While it does favor the exercise of power by elites, it also does not recognize pluralism in the same way as the liberal democratic model or the competitive elitist model. To put this in the parlance of modern democratic theory, the *jiùwáng* justification paints democracy as desirable for reasons of good governance and policy performance, not for reasons of democratic process performance or in connection with any normative linkage to human nature.[43]

While strongly reminiscent of the republican unitary concept found in the general democracy literature, the Chinese unitary model differs from the latter in a number of important respects. First, as just noted, this model incorporates *mínběn* and/or *jiùwáng* justifications for democracy rather than anchoring justifications in some stable understanding of human nature. Democracy here is either culturally rooted or has strongly functional attractions that are often contextually conditioned. Second, while it shares with the republican

unitary model an emphasis on the importance of particular kinds of virtues that serve to discipline the public and turn its gaze to public rather than private interests, it does not necessarily emphasize the types of civic virtues associated with actively participating in political affairs that in the West are derived from Greek, Roman, and Renaissance philosophy. While Sun argues for the necessity of greater focus on public interest in democracy than it had historically been given in China, this model tends to emphasize more strongly the importance of traditional Chinese values that encourage harmony, cooperation, self-discipline, and hard work.[44]

Third, this variant differs from some understandings of republican unitary democracy in its emphasis on elitism. Whereas Rousseau's conception places at its center the arguments that humans must be seen both descriptively and normatively as equal and that government only implements and does not formulate policies, this conception holds the opposite: that a small group of people incontestably possess superior abilities and are best suited to hold and exercise most policy-making powers, subject to supervision by the people as a whole. The characteristics of these elites include higher intelligence and education levels, greater attainment of moral and ethical virtue, and more developed capacities for practical and technical work. Such was the Confucian understanding, which specified the active character of leaders and the passive role of ordinary citizens, which Guang argues was adopted by some of the early democracy enthusiasts in China and which others argue is a more general marker of Confucian political ideas.[45] Indeed, Peng has gone much further to argue that such elitism is to be found in all the main varieties of Chinese democracy.[46] In its elitist understanding, this model stands closer to the competitive elitist model and to Machiavelli's understanding of the importance of extraordinary leaders who create or reform a people by means of cultural activities, lawmaking, a constitution, and otherwise attempting to master *fortuna* than to Rousseau's understanding of equal and active citizenship.

The other aspects of this model mirror those of the republican unitary model in general. Its fourth element is the conceptualization of the demos in terms of unity rather than pluralism. It tends to be suspicious of the alternative, intermediary organizations (at least those not under the control of the government) that liberal theory privileges as a necessary part of civil society. People engage in self-governance collectively, not as individuals or as members of voluntary associations. "The people" (*mín*, 民) must be organized and disciplined and must speak with a single voice. If not, they must be encouraged to

do so, either through the forces of nationalism and civic virtue or through traditional values and culture.

A fifth characteristic is the understanding that if the demos is a united whole, it has one will that identifies a common good. Downward accountability is not about reflecting a diversity of opinions but about identifying the general will and furthering the common good. This is an antipluralist understanding, in which the existence of different or conflicting interests and opinions is discounted or ignored in favor of a conception in which expressions of a common will and a common good are understood as having objective existence.[47] As in the republican unitary model, the concept of downward accountability and understandings of good and interests are not connected here with individuals or political parties but with citizens conceptualized as a united and disciplined whole and often take the form of one-party rule and plebiscites.[48]

We will use this model as a resource when discussing the Chinese characteristics of the conceptions of democracy that Sun and the Chiangs put forward. We will also refer to it in conjunction with the republican unitary, democratic elitist, and liberal democratic models, as well as discussions by contemporary democracy scholars.

Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Ching-kuo, and Democracy

As we are examining anew the democratic conceptions of Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Ching-kuo by means of these models of democracy and the discussions of democratic theorists, the following reviews how these actors have previously been described.

Sun Yat-sen

Many of Western discussions of the substance of Sun's writings are old, clustering in the 1920s to1940s, when the doctrine of the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* was recognized as a key component of the KMT's philosophy of party and government. Of these early characterizations, some saw Sun as the originator of a line of philosophical thought. They took as the key part of the doctrine its emphasis on a developmental and elitist form of democracy in which political leaders exercise power while training regular citizens in the fundamentals of democratic citizenship to fit them to take on the full burdens of democratic responsibility.[49] Some later characterizations also make this the central part of their analyses.[50] Other early analysts, such as Linebarger, stress the impor-

tance of a strong state in Sun's discussion and the denigration of Western-style checks and balances in his theory.[51] This emphasis on a strong state is likewise echoed in some later analyses, which also tend to point to the importance of nationalism in Sun's understanding and the way in which this emphasis produced an instrumental justification of democracy.[52]

Some more recent scholars put Sun in the context of traditional Chinese understandings of democracy and therefore see him as departing fundamentally from a liberal understanding. Some scholars emphasize the role of *jiùwáng* justifications of democracy and the cultural and Confucian influences of *mínběn* understandings of good government in his conception. These scholars see Sun as typical of one brand of early twentieth-century promoters of democracy in his practical interests, his syncretic approach, his preoccupation with the challenges China faced, his unitary conception, and his elitism. These scholars, particularly Fung, portray Sun as differing importantly from those democratic thinkers in China who were more deeply influenced by Western liberals.[53] In contrast, while Wells also sees Sun as providing a nonliberal model by drawing importantly on traditional Chinese sources, he believes this to be a beneficial development and argues that Sun's conception would defend individual rights.[54] Other scholars (most of whom are writing on Taiwan after Taiwan's democratic transition) also have argued that Sun did emphasize the importance of individual rights, recognize pluralism and diversity, draw up a system that included checks and balances, and favor the rule of law and at least a two-party system.[55] Some of these studies trace those characteristics, particularly what they see as a liberal emphasis on checks and balances, back to Chinese origins; others do the same while simultaneously arguing that Chinese cultural concepts, including *mínběn* understandings, influenced Sun's conception of democracy.[56]

In general, the Chinese-language literature on Sun is divided among approaches that are ideological, expository, or practical. In both mainland China and Taiwan, discussions of Sun attempt to place him in the context of the rival Chinese regimes. Those on the mainland have both critically noted the bourgeois character of Sun's democratic understanding and sought to link Sun's Principle of the People's Welfare (which, along with his Principle of Democracy and Principle of Nationalism, forms his *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*) to the PRC's economic policies. A large literature on the mainland and Taiwan has also attempted to trace the historical and philosophical influences on Sun's thought.[57] The difference in these writings from most of the Western scholarship is the presence of an important line of publications (mostly on Taiwan) that attempt

to test and utilize Sun's understanding of democracy and democratic development in present contexts. These studies concentrate on Sun as a theorist rather than as a philosopher, assuming that the importance of Sun's work lies in his identification of a three-part democratizing process consisting of a preliminary period of military rule, a period of tutelage, and finally, the institution of constitutional democracy, rather than in his justifications of democracy or other philosophical aspects of his writing.[58]

Chiang Kai-shek

Chiang has been, and still is, widely criticized for his authoritarian thought and practice. Many critics emphasize his military training and outlook, as well as his traditional education.[59] However, Chiang is also sometimes portrayed as a contributor to democracy and democratic discussions in China and Taiwan. For many scholars sympathetic to his politics, Chiang was not only a systematic thinker with a coherent philosophy; he was also deeply committed constitutional democrat.[60] In his democratic musings, he is said to have been influenced by Confucius (孔子), Mencius (孟子), and Wang Yang-ming (王陽明) as well as the *mínběn* and Great Learning (大學) teachings in the Chinese tradition and Rousseau and Montesquieu from the West. These figures, the arguments go, contributed to his understandings of constitutionalism, rights and freedoms, checks and balances, and limited government. Cheng not only paints Chiang in a sympathetic democratic light but also underscores what he sees as Chiang's attempt to balance Western liberal values with Chinese and developmental values in a way that locates Chiang's conception of politics near the liberal model of democracy.[61]

In terms of concrete accomplishments, Chiang is credited with promulgating a constitution that, with its emergency provisions stripped away, serves as the basic law of the current democratic government.[62] More recently, Taylor has argued that Chiang was sincere in his attempt to move to a constitutional government in the aftermath of World War II.[63] Chiang portrayed himself as a democrat whose program and reputation for democratic change were thwarted by the need to centralize government power and mobilize the population in the face of a long series of threats.[64]

Chiang Ching-kuo

Chiang Ching-kuo's democratic character and his role in the democratization process are also disputed. Debates particularly swirl around his role as

president of the ROC in the run-up to the transition, with supporters emphasizing his positive contributions and detractors arguing that the transition occurred apart from any of his efforts and that he was, at best, a soft authoritarian and, at worst, a former secret policeman who had to be cornered into conceding democratic reforms.

Of importance here are the arguments that he was a committed democrat. Wang argues that Chiang Ching-kuo embraced Sun's understanding of constitutionalism and a general emphasis on the rule of law.[65] Heng argues that he took a populist approach to politics while simultaneously emphasizing the role of education and the training of citizens in law and order for a future democratic life.[66] Meanwhile, such current and former KMT members as Lien Chan (連戰) and James Soong (宋楚瑜) are the most adamant in stressing his importance to the actual democratization process. Chan argues for the importance and vitality of the historical commitment to a Confucian understanding of democracy on the part of both Chiang Ching-kuo and his father.[67] Soong emphasizes the centrality of Chiang Ching-kuo's actions and traces the democratization process to Sun's ideology and the efforts of the KMT to institute local and provincial elections, as well as to its success in the areas of mass education and economic development.[68]

Sources, Methodology, and Outline

Sources

For Sun Yat-sen, I rely mainly upon the official version of the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* lectures as prepared and published by official government sources. I also occasionally refer to the standard ROC version of Sun's *Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary* (孫文學說), which was also accessible to the general public. For both Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo, I look to their public writings and pronouncements while on Taiwan. I rely exclusively upon the materials published by the Government Information Office (GIO) in the *Free China Review* and in annual collections. Both provide reprints of speeches, declarations, pronouncements, and interviews that had been published previously in domestic outlets, both governmental and private.

Since 1949, these discussions of democracy have been deployed by government and party officials in the context of confronting and explaining political events and problems. For a period of approximately forty years before the ROC's democratic transition, they were an important and widely available part of the political vocabulary used on Taiwan, forming the officially accepted

view of legitimate government in general and of democracy in particular. The conceptions of democracy they contain have been used publicly and broadcast by means of newspapers, government documents, and other written materials. Some of them, such as Sun's *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* lectures and selections from Chiang Kai-shek's writings, were (and in some cases still are) part of the public school curriculum, military training materials, and KMT party reading materials.[69] They were prominent in the KMT regime's rhetoric and elaborated upon continually on the occasion of the annual National Day memorial (commemorating the start of the Xinhai Revolution [辛亥革命] on October 10, 1911, which ended the Chīng dynasty), Constitution Day addresses, and the opening and closing ceremonies of KMT party functions. These speeches, interviews, remarks, and other materials were originally disseminated through the president's office and were also circulated through bookstores, the Research and Development Council (for placement in libraries), and the offices of private organizations if the speeches were delivered to its members. All important speeches were contemporaneously carried in Chinese-language newspapers, and English translations appeared in *The China Post* and *China News*.[70]

In focusing on materials that the government disseminated and emphasized and were available publicly on Taiwan from 1949, I do not mine the entire corpus of the writings of Sun, Chiang Kai-shek, and Chiang Ching-kuo. For example, I do not examine most of the material Sun wrote before the lectures on the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* aside from *Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary*. I also do not discuss Chiang Kai-shek's speeches and addresses from his time on the mainland, with the exception of one address that was republished in the *Free China Review* in the 1950s. Nor do I discuss any of his writings that are not in the form of speeches, proclamations, or other public addresses. Taking into account these other materials might change the picture we have of the political philosophy of both, but I believe that while such materials would add to our appreciation of the complexity of their views, they would not fundamentally change our understanding of their conceptions of democracy. In any event, what we are concerned with here are the public pronouncements and writings that were most likely to have been read or heard by people on Taiwan and could thereby contribute to democratic learning.

Methodology

I refer to the understandings of democracy put forward by such theorists as David Held, Robert Dahl, Ian Shapiro, and Larry Diamond. All contribute

important parts of an understanding of what is and what is not a democratic conception. All help us understand how democratic regimes arise and how they practice democratic politics. Held also helps us understand the different types of democratic conceptions (and establishes that there is more than one type). I use several elements of Diamond's discussion of democracy to organize my analysis of these writings by breaking them down into discrete components (justifications of democracies, discussions of parties and elections, etc.) and Held's analysis of the different types of democratic conceptions to classify the understandings put forward. I also use the tools generally associated with the study of the history of political thought to explore how these conceptions of democracy are put together and to analyze justifications of democracy in particular. The goal is to uncover assumptions, explore concepts, grasp the explanations of the world put forward, and test the coherence and consistency of ideas.

In exploring the importance of these conceptions, both in terms of their survival through time and their use, I draw upon leadership theory as it has been developed in understanding Soviet and Russian politics in the work of George Breslauer and Lila Shevtsova.[71] This literature emphasizes the importance of elites framing issues and problems in distinctive ways within particular contexts, building on already accepted conceptions, and leaving behind their own conceptual legacies that become the norm for addressing those problems and thinking about politics in general. I also draw upon my own work on the perpetuation of traditions as accepted, even necessary, means for making political arguments in particular discourse communities.[72]

The general understanding of the role of ideas in democratic transitions I explore is derived from aspects of democratic learning theory and the literature on socialization in political culture. Bermeo and others have argued that one stage or element of democratic transitions involves citizens learning from various sources (indigenous elites, examples of other countries, democracy advocacy groups) a vocabulary of democratic concepts, acceptance of democratic tenets, and critiques of nondemocratic regimes and practices.[73] As Mattes and Bratton argue with regard to democratic learning in Africa, "Perhaps the most fundamental cognitive step in political learning about democracy is that people attain a basic awareness of democracy so that they can attach some kind of meaning to the concept."[74] Without such basic awareness, there is little reason for people to want democracy, reject nondemocratic governments, or understand what living in a democracy entails. Democratic learning is the means by

which the discussions of democracy studied here participated, if at all, in Taiwan's democratic transition. Likewise, if these democratic discussions have had a continuing effect on Taiwan's current political atmosphere, it is because of their role in political learning and socialization.[75]

Most generally, I approach this project from the methodological standpoint of constructivism. This position holds that concepts, descriptions, and understandings of politics are important for both elites and non-elites. Political actors require these intellectual resources in order to understand their interests and contexts and how the two are interrelated. Actors also require such resources so that they may understand, develop, assess, and put into practice strategies and tactics meant to further their interests. Interests are not brute facts, and strategies do not exist as some pragmatic form of natural law. We find the materials for such an approach in a variety of sources but particularly in the work of such scholars of political discourse as David Apter and of intellectual and cultural history as Christopher Hill.[76] To understand Taiwan's democracy and its transition process from a constructivist standpoint, we must understand what conceptions of democracy were available and how those conceptions made democracy itself appear a useful and desirable form of government.

Another important methodological point has to do with authorship. Not all the materials I discuss were written directly or completely by the persons to whom they are attributed. In particular, the speeches of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo bear the imprint of aides. There is probably some distance between these leaders and the ideas I discuss. This problem can be addressed in two ways.

First, we should note in each case the substantial participation by the leader in question. Sun himself wrote most of the materials associated with him that we examine here, probably with some secretarial, editorial, and research assistance. The elder Chiang relied upon more substantive assistance from aides. But as Fenby notes, he was deeply involved in the writing process, sometimes writing drafts of messages and speeches himself and supervising the work of others closely. It is relatively clear that the material that went out over Chiang Kai-shek's name was a transcription of his own views.[77] The degree to which the same is true of Chiang Ching-kuo, particularly during the time of his failing health in his later years, is unclear. The influence of Western-educated aides in formulating his policies and pronouncements (including the current president, Ma Ying-jeou, 馬英九) has been noted by Taylor in his study

of Chiang Ching-kuo, but Chiang Ching-kuo did spend a considerable amount of time reviewing the materials that went out over his name.

The second way of resolving this problem is to discard the notion that authorship must be attributed to a single person for a meaningful discussion of and comparison among these concepts to be possible. The most important feature of these discussions is the fact that conceptions were generated, publicly broadcast, established as authoritative, and passed down through time by the identification of the conceptions with a leader. Literal authorship is not crucial. This is true of many other types of analysis, such as those that examine different types of political, religious, and philosophical traditions. For example, one is able to discuss intelligently the ideas contained in *The Book of Lord Shang* (商君書) in terms of the conceptions contained within it and the influence of those conceptions over time, even though it is well understood that this work is not the product of a single author. The same is true of studies of the influence of the Bible. In this understanding, what is most important is that the writings under discussion here were disseminated over the name of one person who represented a generation of the "Sunist" tradition and that this person was politically important. In that sense, one can think of the entity signified by a name as either singular or plural.

Though for convenience sake I refer to a single person as the generator of these concepts, it may be useful to think of the authorship of these materials as becoming more plural as the generations proceed. The materials identified here with Sun are directly attributable to him. "Sun" is conceptually the person of Sun. The materials assigned to Chiang Kai-shek are, for the most part, attributable to him personally or to the ideas that he communicated to close aides. In that sense, "Chiang Kai-shek" is mostly a singular attribution. "Chiang Ching-kuo" must be understood as generally plural. The core of the ideas at any one time is Chiang Ching-kuo's, but their elaboration and probably some of their inspiration comes from those around him.[78] This may account for what we will find is the muddy and bifurcated understanding of democracy that went out over Chiang Ching-kuo's name.

Outline

In general, we assess whether the conception each leader put forward corresponds with generally accepted conceptions. Is the conception democratic according to accepted contemporary standards? If so, which model or models does the conception resemble?

I also analyze these discussions by reference to the various components of Diamond's democratic conceptions. I apply only a portion of the ten elements of a liberal democracy Diamond identifies,[79] but these are the most important because they address democracy per se.

The first element is the desirability and attainability of democracy. How does the leader justify democracy? What methods are used? Is democracy portrayed as natural, normatively good, instrumentally useful? What associations are drawn between democracy and Chinese history and culture and between democracy and human nature? Does the discussion portray democracy as compatible with people as they are, or does it hold that people would have to change to attain democracy? How are nondemocratic conceptions treated? Does the discussion delegitimize such conceptions, and if so, how, and how effectively?

The second component is the concept of democracy. Does the understanding put forward resemble any accepted conception? Are citizens allowed "voice" and if so, how? Are people, as Stepan puts it, "granted the right to advance their interest, both in civil society and in political society" through election and other mechanisms?[80] Are there mechanisms for effective downward accountability?

The third component is the role of constitutions, elections, and other means by which officials are controlled and held accountable. How do these discussions speak of constitutions? Do they emphasize checks and balances and other forms of horizontal limits and accountability? What is the role of elections? What is their nature? Are multiple parties allowed? Is the participation of parties controlled or free?

Finally, what are the roles of rights, freedoms, and other protections for individuals and private organizations that allow people to participate freely and hold government accountable? Is everyone under the rule of law? In practice, how important are these concepts in the understanding of democracy put forward, and are their role and substance compatible with accepted understandings of democracy? If, as Diamond and others argue, elections themselves are not always sufficient to ensure democracy, what else is allowed? Rights and constitutional protections? The rule of law? Equality before the law?[81]

I conclude each chapter by summarizing and assessing the leaders' contributions to democratic learning and locating their discussions in terms of whether the leader provides an understanding of democracy that draws significantly on Chinese sources and contexts.

Chapters 2 and 3 are organized more strictly along these lines than chapter 4. In the latter, I move more quickly to explore the overall characterizations of Chiang Ching-kuo's conceptualization of democracy. This is a useful departure not only because it was under his presidency that the beginnings of the democratic transition occurred but also because we find in Ching-kuo's statements several different conceptualizations of democracy that must be explored in depth.

Chapter 5 concludes the discussion by using the data collected to answer the questions posed at the beginning of this chapter. To what degree do these discussions fit the models of democracy we have at hand? How do they connect with current views of democracy on Taiwan? And how can we situate these discussions within the broader domain of Chinese discussions of democracy, particularly discussions now taking place on the mainland?

Sun Yat-sen

Democracy through Unity and Elitism

> A writer in the *China Critic* raises the following conundrum: "Another interesting point is that it is stated that Dr. Sun's teaching shall be the basic principles of our education, and it is also stated that the citizens shall have the freedom of conscience. Now if the conscience of some individual should revolt against Dr. Sun's teachings or some of them . . . what shall be done to him?"

Sun Yat-sen developed his understanding of democracy as part of a larger attempt to resolve the problems of a weak China. While Sun put his understanding in its final form in the 1920s, his inspiration was the condition of China in the late Chīng (大清帝國) era and the disappointing developments that followed the establishment of the republic in 1911. These developments reinforced his thinking that a popular regime was necessary for China's survival and success but also that unity and discipline were equally required.

Sun was a revolutionary opponent of the Chīng primarily for functional reasons. It is easy to see why he embraced a revolutionary stance on those grounds. China was losing control over its territories. Central control over the provinces was weakening, and outside powers were carving out economic zones of control. The Chinese population was increasingly impoverished, its traditional industries ravaged by imports. Between the late 1830s and the end of the nineteenth century, China had lost wars to England and Japan and had experienced a series of uprisings, the greatest of which, the struggle with the *Tàipíng* movement, had cost the state tens of millions in both money and lives. In an increasingly competitive world, China had fallen behind the great powers and was still losing ground. Its very existence as a political entity within the borders of the Chīng dynasty was in doubt. As Hunt usefully notes, an appreciation of this situation led to discussions among intellectuals around the turn of the century regarding the nature of patriotism, the importance of identifying a workable ideology, and schemes to revive the state, along with

conceptions of "the people," political leaders, and the relationship of both to the state—all topics to be found in Sun's treatment of democracy.[1]

For Sun, China's weakness stemmed from the state's inability to maintain geographical unity and marshal the nation's natural resources, especially its population. Sun conceptualized this situation in a contextual and evolutionary fashion. China was not congenitally weak and unable to hold its own among other nations, and it was not inevitable that China would be divided. China possessed the necessary resources of population, land, and culture. Yet China had lost its greatness and become prey to imperialist powers. The solution was to become modern. This position is not to be confused with later understandings of modernization, wherein nations were said to undergo a natural process of structural change. While he conceptualized modernity in mostly universalistic terms, Sun also portrays "becoming modern" as a series of choices. Nations, in his argument, consciously decide to change themselves (usually through revolutionary means) or to continue with the status quo. The first choice to be made on the road to modernization is to adopt the correct mindset. Once this first choice is made, subsequent choices become easier because the contexts they address are correctly understood, and the general nature of answers to problems is foreseen. As he would put in *Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary*, it is not action but attaining the correct understanding of things that is most difficult.

The *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* doctrine, which he began developing in the early 1900s, is the framework Sun put forward as this first step on China's road to modernization. That framework conceptualizes modernization in terms of political structures (democracy), national spirit (nationalism), and the development of human resources (people's welfare). This framework generally treats the population as a resource whose will and sense of determination supply national strength. It holds that the form of the state that will allow China most effectively to draw upon this will and determination must be based on two concepts. The first is contextual. To compete in the modern world and unite itself in the face of external threats and internal tensions, China's state must draw upon the active support of its entire population. Passive acquiescence is not enough, and resistance, intrigue, and rebellion are fatal. The only way of soliciting such support is to make the state a popular one; that is, China must create a state that draws its legitimacy from the fact that it is the instrument of the population as a whole.[2] The second concept is rooted in human nature. While sovereignty must be popular, administration cannot be,

A bronze statue of Sun Yat-sen resides in the anteroom of Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall. Courtesy of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan)

because ordinary people are not fit for the intellectual rigors of policy making. This differentiation characterizes all powerful and effective states, no matter their form or their temporal contexts. The right contemporary choice of constitutional forms and other large political structures must reserve administrative and policy-making powers to an educated elite.

Sun's conception of democracy is part of this larger intellectual framework. For Sun, conceiving of the state correctly allows one to adopt the choices that

must be made if China is to transform itself from a disorganized mass of people into a disciplined country, from a premodern entity into a modern state, from a victim into a great power.

Views of Sun

Much of the literature on Sun seeks to locate the sources of his thought rather than to explore his philosophical positions. Many scholars reject him as an original theorist, with most Western researchers painting him as a practical revolutionary whose writings were infused with the intellectual influences of his environment. While extreme, there is some truth in the observations of one reviewer of Linebarger's early discussion of Sun: "Actually, Sun was too much concerned with vital political problems to bother with logic, and when in the course of his wide reading he encountered ideas which he thought would contribute to the accomplishment of his ultimate aim . . . he did not hesitate to adopt them even though they might be mutually incompatible."[3] Others do not go as far but still argue that there is no consistent "Sunist" doctrine. In this view, Sun was governed by his environment, as we find in Wilbur's emphasis on Sun's intellectual wanderings. Support for privileging environmental influences on Sun can be found in the fact that he revised the theoretical content of the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* lectures up to the time of his death.[4]

Others see more consistent influences that contributed coherence to Sun's work but differ greatly in their attribution of inspiration. For Tan, Sun was primarily influenced by Western writings on politics and democracy; these writings lend his views consistency, even if he often did not completely understand them.[5] Shotwell saw Sun's democratic understandings as indebted to the West in ways that allowed Sun to harmonize the otherwise incompatible themes of nationalism, democracy, and socialism.[6] Linebarger also traces significant influences to Western sources.[7] Gordon and Chang do as well in terms of Sun's understanding of democracy, though they hold he was most generally influenced by both Western and traditional Chinese philosophical sources.[8]

In contrast are those who argue that the West had less to do with Sun's thought than his Chinese environment. For example, Gregor and Chang argue that persistent scholarly attempts to link Sun to Italian fascist influences are mistaken. More important in their view are the influences of Confucian and neo-Confucian thought.[9] Wang, in contrast, contends that Sun was not well versed in the Chinese classics. Instead, he holds that Sun borrowed from, was influenced by, and sometimes distorted or added to, fundamental

arguments first put forward by such popular contemporary intellectuals as Yan Fu (嚴復) and Liang Chi-chao (梁啟超). Thus, he holds that Sun's doctrine was often derivative of modern, contemporaneous, and widely circulated Chinese arguments and understandings.[10]

I see Sun drawing upon several sources in constructing his concept of democracy in ways that do not always contribute to coherence. As Wilbur notes in his biography, Sun was an eclectic thinker who attempted to synthesize ideas from a variety of traditions from both the East and West.[11] From Chinese philosophy, Sun drew important ideas that cut across several traditions. Like the Daoists and Confucians, he emphasized context. Identifying the correct course of action and doing the right thing in those traditions does not entail reverting to a rigid principle or identifying an objective reality. Rather, it means identifying what is correct given a set of circumstances. Reality is not fixed; it is fluid and, therefore, what is right and correct is also fluid.[12] Despite the translation of his *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* (三民主義) doctrine as the three "principles" of the people, Sun does not adopt the Western, Kantian understanding of the role of principles as strict decision rules. Rather, "*chǔ yì*" (主義) is more akin to "doctrine," the application of which should be contextually sensitive.

But Sun was also influenced by contemporary Western technocratic understandings of science and business. As had the Self-Strengtheners (洋務運動) before him, Sun importantly conceived of the modern era as dominated by science, technology, and industry. In this understanding, government is not a matter of setting correct examples, as the Confucians would have it, or of representation of interests (as in liberal theory), but of machinery. Sun argues that, just as the West has created machinery that increases the productivity of economic units, so China should construct a powerful, machinelike state. The institutions of government are portrayed as mechanical in his writings; that is, they are inanimate and impervious to context. It is the demos and the human elites who operate those institutions that inject subjectivity and sensitivity to context into them, and in this as well as other senses, there is a distance between the government as machinery and those who operate and control it. Sun's position here resembles that of the Legalists (法家), who also argued that government is a matter of laws and technical judgments.[13]

Sun also took from the West examples of the fundamental theory and historical practice of democracy. The experiences of France, England, and the United States are central to his understanding of the potential strength and

contemporary problems of democratic forms of government, and it is the West, not China, that gives him the material through which to reconceptualize and update democracy. Yet, while he was enamored of democracy as the new, modern, and potentially powerful way of running public affairs, he was not always captivated by the way democracies had been conceptualized or operated in the West. Earlier in his career, Sun was more willing to adopt Western concepts wholesale, but by the time of the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* lectures, he was distancing himself from the West and had become less liberal with regard to such topics as limitations on power and individual rights and freedoms, seeing those features as adaptations of democracy to the Western context rather than intrinsic aspects of democracy itself.[14]

Sun on Democracy

Is Democracy Good and Is It Attainable?

Contextual Justifications

Sun addresses the subject of the goodness and attainability of democracy in his first lecture on the Principle of Democracy (民權主義) in the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* lectures. For Sun, democracy is good, but not for the reasons many Western political theorists hold. Rather than describing it as intrinsically desirable or the political reflection of the innate equality of humans, Sun most importantly embraces democracy for contextual and instrumental reasons. Quite simply, democracy is in the spirit of modern times and, therefore, is the most effective way of transforming China from a disorganized and weak to a united and strong nation.

Sun argues that democracy is one of a series of types of government tied to the historical circumstances and development of humans. He denies that democracy is natural, explicitly rejecting Rousseau's position that it is.[15] In their natural state, he argues, humans are not equal, nor do they inevitably arrange themselves in an equal fashion once they leave the state of nature. This leads Sun to two conclusions. One is that democracy itself does not imply complete equality. In his understanding, humans are never equal in their abilities, and his conception of democracy does not attempt to level people in terms of control over policies. To do so would be an exceedingly dangerous way of constructing government in Sun's view. People can only be equal in terms of their abstract relationship to the state; not everyone has the same claim to policy-making power.[16]

The second conclusion is that democracy as a form of government that spreads political power in general beyond a small circle of elites is not suited to all humans at all times. It is not at one with their nature because that nature is not stable, and government is responsive primarily to the way contexts mold the human condition. Instead of postulating a static human nature amenable to democracy, Sun substitutes an understanding of humans that features a deep-seated plasticity of political desires and needs. "Democracy," he argues, "has not been Heaven-born but has been wrought out of the conditions of the times and the movement of events."[17] To put this in the context of classical Chinese philosophy, democracy for Sun does not participate in the natural, universal set of moral strictures that form The Way (*tào*, 道), though he sometimes mentions *tào* in terms of political progress. Democracy, like all forms of government, is simply a tool that fits the requirements of particular circumstances.

Sun amplifies his contextual and instrumental privileging of democracy by surveying political history in a fashion that emphasizes the variety and fit of different types of government to a succession of historical contexts.[18] A correct understanding of human history, he argues, demonstrates that governments vary in reflection of the needs of the time. Each type of government is functionally appropriate and therefore correct in its historical context.[19] It would be wrong to condemn the ancient Chinese for not embracing a democratic form of the state. Such thinking, Sun holds, is not only deeply anachronistic but also politically wrong-headed. It would have been just as harmful for the ancients to have embraced democracy as it is for contemporaries to embrace autocracy.[20] Now, things are different. Because democracy is currently the "tendency of the age," just as theocracy and autocracy were earlier, democracy is the best form of government for China.[21]

Democracy as the answer to contemporary problems. If there is a core to human nature in Sun's philosophy, it is that humans react to and are politically defined by their contexts. These contexts are not to be understood by reference to the development of human potentialities, the stages of economic development, or the clash of classes. Sun's understanding is more basic. Humans struggle to survive by overcoming increasingly sophisticated obstacles.[22] These obstacles call forth different aspects of human character and require that humans interact with one another in particular ways.

This minimalist understanding leads Sun to an equally minimalist depiction of the origins and types of government. For Sun, it is not the need to create

order among humans that spurs the development of government, as it is for Machiavelli, Locke, and Hobbes but, rather, as for Plato, it is a variety of functional needs, each of which stimulates a different organizational form, including different forms of the state. Initially, humans lived anarchically. No state was needed when humans' main problem was their competition with animals.[23] When the human struggle shifted to nature as an adversary, the state came into being, in the form of theocracy. When struggles among humans erupted, rule by military leaders or autocrats resulted. Democracy only comes late on the world stage when, during the age of "war within states, citizens do battle with monarchs and against one another."[24] The epic challenges of regions fighting for autonomy and people struggling for power within and against the state indicate that China has entered that latest stage. Thus, by means of this historical excursion, Sun utilizes and contextualizes the traditional *jiùwáng* justification of democracy for China by placing the types of problems China encountered within the broader currents of human history.

Sun pushes this contextualized *jiùwáng* discussion to eventually reach democracy's functions. He bluntly argues in his first democracy lecture that Chinese revolutionaries are "resolved that, if we wanted China to be strong and our revolution to be effective, we must espouse the cause of democracy."[25] Later, he argues that democracy is desirable "first, that we may be following the world current, and second, that we may reduce the period of civil war." Democracy addresses the latter because it removes the struggle for the throne among men, to "prevent rivalry for imperial power."[26] Here again, Sun argues that democracy is topical and historically right because China confronts problems arising from modern contexts (unification, modernization, defense against other modern states). Important to this analysis is the judgment that only a strong state can address these problems, and democracy is the basis for a strong state in the modern context.

Note that the desirability of democracy is set in terms of functionality and contexts that are external to both humans and the state itself. The rightness of democracy and even of autocracy in previous forms of government depends on factors outside the state's control and not tied to intrinsic human characteristics. Thus it is not that autocracy's internal processes are inherently undesirable from a normative point of view that leads Sun to reject that form of government, nor does he paint the internal processes of democracy as innately good or suitable for humans in general or the Chinese in particular. Rather, autocracy is to be discarded because the state it creates is not sufficiently

strong to address modern problems or even to exist in the modern context. Democracy can create a strong state and survive both internal and external challenges; therefore, it is the appropriate form of the state for the current context.

Thinking about this aspect of Sun's theory from a democratic-learning perspective yields the judgment that it is serviceable but weak. While such theorists as Smith argue that the least dangerous justifications of established liberal democracies are those that illustrate the practical benefits they bring,[27] pragmatic justifications like Sun's are open to a variety of damaging attacks. Simply put, if we posit a change in contexts, Sun's justification for democracy within his system of thought disappears. When different types of problems arise, they will call for the features of a different type of state (or possibly no state at all). Democracy in this understanding is ostensibly not the final and most desirable form of human organization. It is good only in the context of the need for a strong modern state. That is why Sun explicitly admits that China's former states were normatively good until the modern age arrived. They were fit for the times rather than normatively undesirable precursors to a timelessly good democratic entity.

An even more immediate and dangerous threat to the functional part of this justification comes in the form of a comparison of strength and effectiveness with other types of states. What if nondemocratic states provide evidence that they are strong and capable of good governance? If one were to show that democracies were less effective in dampening power struggles, unifying the nation, engaging in economic modernization, and overcoming external foes, then other forms of government that perform those function better must be judged more attractive.[28] This problem is deepened by the nature of democracy as a form of the state. Structurally, democracy does not always lend itself to the creation of a strong state for the same reason it does not always produce good governance: the requirement that government be downwardly accountable can create significant problems. Regions may not want a strong centralized state. Citizens may wish to limit the power of officials and the reach of state organs. The need to garner approval and consult citizens' voices may lead to slow decisions and ineffective policies. While arguments are made that, in the long run, the better information available to and self-correcting features of liberal democracies lead to better governance than nondemocracies, the evidence is not clear that such is the case in the short term. Authoritarian

governments have shown that they can create strong states and govern effectively despite their denial of popular sovereignty and incursions on individual freedoms. Singapore is a modern example.

While Sun's contextual justifications are tied to the *jiùwáng* mode of understanding China's political needs at the time, they are rather tepid when considered as materials for democratic learning both during Sun's life and when read by later generations. Sun expends much effort justifying democracy, and while in the abstract this defense of democracy is important for identifying democracy as a legitimate modern government, his contextual, *jiùwáng* justifications do not travel well and lack critical bite as foundations for democratic learning. They can too easily be nullified by assuming different contextual conditions or through comparison with other state forms.

Democracy is the government of cultural maturity. If contextualism is important to Sun's approval of democracy in that it presupposes conditions under which a strong state is necessary, that contextualism also plays itself out in Sun's discussions of Chinese culture. While Sun does not provide a justification of democracy tied to human completeness or potential, it initially appears that Sun does tie democracy to an understanding of cultural development in a way that founds a moral claim to democracy.

At one point in the democracy lectures, Sun argues that while the ancient sages had an understanding of democracy, the concept was "utopian" in the ancient Chinese context because democracy is only truly feasible in an advanced civilization and only necessary in the face of the kinds of problems that such a civilization creates.[29] Some of those problems are tied to cultural development. While Sun notes that the concept and practice of democracy originated in Greece, he holds that it had only become generally relevant within the preceding 150 years.[30] It was during this period that the human struggle for survival moved from a focus on external enemies to a resistance to autocracy and a growing consciousness of inequities of power within states. Thus the field of struggle shifted to the grounds of morality, of "struggles between good and evil, between might and right" rather than struggles against animals or nature.[31] This shift was created by the impact of higher culture on humans. The reason why there are struggles internal to states is that people are now "growing in intelligence and developing a new consciousness of self"; therefore, they are developmentally ready for democracy, just as humans as individuals are ready to "be independent when we grow up to manhood and seek

our own living."[32] One can read this discussion to mean that the people of a culturally mature modern state can be politically autonomous in the same way they can be economically or socially autonomous. These forms of autonomy and the conflicts they generate, in turn, provide moral reasons for adopting democracy. While the need to defend the nation against enemies and maintain order and stability among citizens requires a strong state made possible by universal support, democratic control by the populace is also necessary to prevent the strong state from oppressing the populace and to provide a means by which culturally mature citizens can work out their differences.

Taken this way, this position reads as a moral argument justifying democracy in general and a liberal democratic model in particular. If one assumes that humans who have reached a level of cultural sophistication that connotes "maturity" have claims to the kinds of political participation and structures that are bound up with democracy, then it appears that the political regime suited to such humans must respect individual autonomy in the form of popular control of the state, a competitive political system that reflects the pluralist nature of modern humans, and a strictly enforced list of rights and safeguards against the abuse of state powers. Control over political affairs must parallel the control over one's body that Sun appears to recognize as the moral right of modern adult individuals. This position would provide a strong lesson in favor of a constitutional liberal democracy as well as a general justification of democracy that is insulated from the weaknesses of Sun's *jiùwáng* argument. But Sun's reference to internal disorders and the need for unity in the face of external dangers aborts that line of thinking and short-circuits both the general democratic and the liberal democratic lesson. Individual autonomy is limited in Sun's understanding, necessarily giving way to the need for internal order and externally directed strength.[33] The analogy with individualism is misleading, for Sun is not a strong individualist or a subscriber to the concept of natural rights. There appears to be no moral claim on the part of citizens to enjoy liberal democracy or any type of democracy in his understanding. Rather, what he provides here is another contextual and functional argument in which he recognizes that popular sovereignty is the price to be paid for a culturally mature population's active support for a strong state.

It is therefore important to recognize that, contrary to his language in these passages, what is really primary in Sun's political understanding is not the individual but the nation and not morality but functionality. When he

describes democracy as a means of dealing with an environment characterized by struggle, the actors he conceives are collective. Democracy is the pragmatic means by which a *people* governs itself at a certain stage of development and by doing so achieves strength and unity. It is not necessarily a form of government that strongly protects *individuals* from the effects of collective decision-making or a morally mandatory arrangement that allows individuals to exercise political autonomy or to find room for pluralistic expression.[34]

Democracy Is Compatible with Chinese Culture

While Sun's contextual justifications reference the abstract confrontation of internal struggles within states and the more concrete plight of China that he believes is redeemable only with the powerful state democracy brings, he is unwilling to relinquish a traditional and uniquely Chinese contribution to democratic development. He therefore also provides a *mínběn* justification that references the criteria for judging government found in traditional sources. He does so, however, not as a primary justification or as a source of theoretical differentiation but as an argument that democracy is not alien to China.[35]

Sun argues that Confucius and Mencius both alluded approvingly to the principle that underlies democracy (people's rights and people's sovereignty) and commended the ancient emperors Yao and Shun because they "did not try to monopolize the empire. Although their government was autocratic in name, yet in reality they gave the people power."[36] Mencius, he further argues,

> already saw that kings were not absolutely necessary and would not last forever, so he called those who brought happiness to the people holy monarchs, but those who were cruel and unprincipled he called individualists whom all should oppose. Thus China more than two millenniums ago had already considered the idea of democracy, but at that time she could not put it into operation.[37]

This variation on the *mínběn* philosophy of government is meant to root democracy in Chinese culture and history despite the absence of what are recognizably democratic regimes in China's past. Its main focus, as with the *mínběn* understanding in general, is the notion that good government means looking out for the interests of ordinary people taken as a whole, and insofar as democracy performs that function, it is compatible with traditional conceptions of good government.[38]

These passages bring out several important and interrelated points that serve Sun as justifications for democracy in the Chinese context. The first is the role of an enlightened elite in democracy and democratic transitions. The Chinese were historically and culturally aware of democracy, Sun argues. They understood its potential but were equally cognizant of its contextual nature. If governments in China were historically autocratic, this was inevitable given the circumstances China faced. Chinese autocracy could be, and often was, a good autocracy given those contexts and the availability of an elite who looked out for the interests of the general population rather than their own. Thus Sun implies that Chinese elites generally understand government and appreciate the criteria that distinguish good government from bad. Second is the character of that elite. Given that they are already educated in *mínběn* philosophy, there is no need for changes in the general nature of the elite. Changing the form of government to give the populace sovereignty need not entail a wholesale purge of government officials or the mass reeducation of intellectuals. Also, given that they are unlike their Western counterparts in their dedication to the common good, the Chinese elite can be trusted with more power than the latter. Third, the presence of *mínběn* philosophy means there is no cultural obstacle to changing China's government to a democratic model because Chinese culture is not wedded to any particular type of government. There is no "Chinese" form of government or politics, only *mínběn* philosophy and criteria that identify good governance. In this understanding, legitimate Chinese *mínběn* government can be autocratic or democratic depending on the contexts. In the sense that *mínběn* defines goodness by reference to the general population, there is a substantive link to democracy if the latter is viewed, as Sun viewed it, as government "of the people, by the people, and for the people." Meanwhile, in a cultural sense, there is also no need for a *fundamental* reeducation of the population in preparation for democracy, though tutelage in the powers and responsibilities of democracy is required.

By establishing these three points of contact between China's historical philosophy and democracy, this justification dissolves the problem of China's nondemocratic past and overcomes the problem of origins. If China had no history that was relevant to democracy, then it would be difficult to find mechanisms by which China could become democratic other than by importing the concept wholesale. Not only is that solution not compatible with Sun's emphasis on nationalism; it is also weak in itself. How could an alien import be expected to flourish on Chinese soil? With a *mínběn* understanding, however,

democracy already has roots in China; it need not be imported and artificially planted. The transition need not be bloody or chaotic. Tutelage of ordinary citizens can take place easily with the same set of elites in charge. Democracy is not just a Western concept; it is a universal concept that China had already discovered.

Yet Sun's cultural justification is problematic for the very reasons it initially appears persuasive. If the universal concept of democracy is congenial to China's culture because *mínběn* criteria are agnostic regarding forms of the state, there is nothing special about democracy. There is no reason to favor it over other forms that equally meet the criteria of good governance and a strong state. Insofar as nondemocratic forms of government are congruent with contexts and challenges and conform to the *mínběn* criteria, they are equally legitimate. Thus, as material for democratic learning, Sun's cultural justification is powerful but limited. While it answers objections that democracy is alien and overcomes the problem with origins and transitions, it mirrors his contextual and *jiùwáng* justification by reinforcing their failure to delegitimize alternatives. In conceding the legitimacy of China's premodern autocracies by reference to *mínběn* criteria, he does not sufficiently differentiate democracy from those autocracies normatively or structurally. This is particularly important given his elitist conception of democracy. How are China's historical autocracies substantively different from democracy given (as we will see below) the ways Sun qualifies the latter's unique feature, government "by the people"? Not only are the former normatively equivalent to democracy in this analysis; they also appear to be quite similar.

Attaining Democracy

China's Suitability for Democracy

As we saw above, when Sun references the evolution of governmental forms, one of his conclusions is that democracy is government suited for humans who have reached their cultural maturity. For democracy to be suited for the Chinese context, China must have attained cultural maturity. But Sun does not consistently treat this criterion as a developmental necessity for democratization. It is a contextual argument, and context entails more than just cultural development. Equally important in his vocabulary is the Western and Chinese experience of revolution that is tied to his *jiùwáng* justification. Sun understands the struggle characteristic of the modern human experience as taking the form of revolution. Revolution, in turn, involves important nationalistic, economic,

and other dimensions that are tied to functionality in a wider world that is populated with other states and various types of domestic problems. Sun therefore moves back and forth between a purely developmental rooting of democracy and his revolutionary desire to adopt democracy for what he sees as its practical advantages in solving China's political, social, economic, diplomatic, and military problems. Democracy is necessary, he notes at one point, "if we expect our state to rule long and peacefully and our people to enjoy happiness."[39]

This ambivalence raises important questions about Sun's understanding of China's cultural progress and, therefore, China's fitness for democracy. His movement from philosophical to practical political analysis glosses over the important contextual points he spends so much time explicating elsewhere and leads him to overlook the deterministic position he otherwise adopts. That position holds that if humans are characterized by struggle and experience stages of struggle that are produced by a particular stage of culture and produce particular kinds of problems, then China's destiny is linked to this developmental model. Accordingly, if China is ripe for democracy, democracy will take hold. If China is not ripe, then the quest for democracy is utopian, practical and revolutionary considerations notwithstanding and decisions to adopt democracy aside. Democracy will be out of reach no matter his efforts and no matter what practical benefits democracy hypothetically might bring. Even if democracy could bring the strong state China needs, it will not come about if the relevant contexts are not present.

To accept this position, however, would turn Sun into a passive spectator of a deterministic history, a role he is unwilling to assume. Instead, he turns to various nuanced discussions of China's readiness for democracy. At some points in the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* lectures, Sun suggests that China is positioned for democracy. Relying upon his understanding of traditional Chinese culture and history, he argues that, both politically and culturally, China is older than Europe. It has developmentally reached the age of democracy. Therefore, when he poses the question of autocracy versus democracy in general, he opts for the latter:

> Which, autocracy or democracy, is really better suited to modern China? If we base our judgment upon the intelligence and the ability of the Chinese people, we come to the conclusion that the sovereignty of the people would be far more suitable for us.[40]

But Sun does not always provide support for the position that China should immediately adopt democracy. This, it appears, is a separate question. While China should not submit to an autocracy and is more suited for democracy in terms of the Chinese people's intelligence and ability, it is not clear that China is well prepared for democracy at the time, given the state of development of its citizens. That Sun doubts the cultural and political "maturity" of ordinary Chinese citizens is signaled in various other places. Previously, in *Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary*, he bluntly argued that the Chinese people in general were below the level of culture and cultivation that characterized America's former slaves, and the latter had to be denied the vote when, upon emancipation, they proved to be illiterate. Ordinary Chinese people, he concluded, were like children in their level of political understanding.[41] Though this was written some five years before the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* lectures, it is not likely, given Sun's other references in those lectures, that he had fundamentally changed his mind on this point.

Sun is thus ambivalent regarding the readiness for democracy of ordinary Chinese or their place in his anthropological understanding of political evolution. His conclusion, it appears, is that while they are not unfit for democracy, they are not fully prepared for it either and that the problems China is experiencing are congruent with the kinds of human conflicts that generate democratic states. Given this conclusion, he explicitly calls first for a period of military rule to unite the country, then a period of *xun zhèng mín zhǔ* (訓政民主), or "tutelary democracy," to inculcate the correct political values and habits in the people before a third stage of constitutional democracy is reached. In *Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary*, Sun justifies this position by making several observations. First, he argues that democracy requires certain types of citizens, and therefore tutelage is a stage both normal and necessary for countries adopting democracy without prior practical experience. He elsewhere points to revolutionary France as an illustration of the problems of jumping directly into a democracy. Next, he references the low level of cultural and political development among the Chinese people in general. Third, he argues that the government's actions during this period are not those of an autocratic government. Rather than seeking to perpetuate a situation in which the people do not exercise sovereignty, a tutelary democratic government trains the people in their duties as citizens, institutes local self-government, creates a provisional constitution, and, eventually, institutes full constitutional

government. All these activities, he argues, are necessary as interim steps that must be taken before China can enjoy a fully democratic government.[42]

In describing this transition period, Sun is at ease with the cultural materials with which the government is to work. Part of this attitude stems from the fact that he generally holds that the experience of living under a democracy or tutelary government will bring citizens together into a "people." But despite his stinging criticisms of Chīng autocracy, his disparagement of the cultural and political acumen of ordinary citizens, and his insistence on tutelage, he looks favorably upon Chinese history, traditions, and values as useful building blocks of, and precursors to, the attainment of democracy. In this, Sun retains a bit of Confucian orthodoxy in holding up as exemplars ancient sages and kings in ways that go beyond the *mínběn* understanding of good government (as will Chiang Kai-shek to a much greater degree). Some ancient emperors, he argues, had both ability and character in addition to the sovereignty they held. They were intellectually and morally fit to make public policy. Their exemplification of mercy, kindness, and love are important to the development of the virtues one demands of democratic leaders.[43]

He also argues that incompetent rulers who held the throne were savvy enough to cede power to subordinates who were very competent. Where the first set of characters demonstrates that Chinese history has individuals whom leaders should emulate, the second character demonstrates something different—that Chinese history has examples of rulers whom *the people* should emulate. Being incapable of making the correct policy decisions, they should retain their sovereignty (as did the incompetent emperors) but cede decision-making power to those more competent than themselves.[44] So even though China does not have the kind of democratic and individualistic cultural heritage that many liberal Westerners find crucial to the establishment of a democratic state, Sun is unmoved. Such a heritage is not necessary. China's different heritage in this respect (though not in others, such as the tendency to identify with their localities rather than the nation) is beneficial rather than harmful to the democratic project and enhances the prospects of implementing his conception of democracy in China. Chinese culture and history in Sun's understanding provide important lessons in democratic learning both for the adoption of important political virtues and for the correct understanding of the role of ordinary citizens. It is in part to administer and reinforce such democracy-friendly cultural lessons that a tutelary government should exist.

Sun's lectures on nationalism in the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* also appear to link existing Chinese culture favorably with democracy. He argues there that while Chinese culture is still in a period of transformation to a more advanced level, the immediate future will not see a break with traditional Chinese values, and this period of cultural transformation will last for a considerable period of time. The Confucian constellation of virtues, he argues, must play a role in China's way forward. China must throw away the bad in tradition but preserve the good.[45] As part of this argument, Sun praises traditional Chinese political philosophy in the "Great Learning" (大學) and the importance of "personal culture" based on ancient virtues.[46] While it is unclear whether his philosophical understanding of cultural evolution necessitates the complete eclipse of earlier cultural artifacts by later formulations, it is clear that Sun not only looks backward with approval but also believes that China can use its traditional values to build a mature political culture.[47]

If Sun is content that China should create first a military regime and then a tutelary government, all the while postponing full democratization for a decade or more because of problems of unity and the lack of political preparedness on the part of most ordinary citizens, he also wishes to limit the reach of this point lest it damage the more general justification that China has the human materials necessary for democracy. He does so by emphasizing the difficulties the West faced in developing and stabilizing democratic regimes. If the West is the cradle of modern democracy, Sun argues that one cannot smugly point to developments there to denigrate the Chinese experience. In tracing democracy in the West from the English Civil War through the American and French Revolutions, he underscores the ambivalence of modern Westerners initially in the face of the democratization process, pointing to repeated failures, resistance, turmoil, bloodshed, and gravitation back to autocracy. The West did not find the creation of democracy easy and should not blame or denigrate China if it also flounders initially in its attempt at that task. Nor should the Chinese themselves lose heart or reject the necessity of tutelage.[48]

We see from this discussion that there is some ambivalence in Sun's conception of China's culture and citizens with regard to their suitability for modern politics. Sun, I believe, is quite aware of this and attempts to paper over the inherent tensions in his use of democracy as a legitimating slogan. He attempts to finesse these difficulties by establishing the KMT as a revolutionary party whose *goal* is democracy and by pointing to the historical difficulties of attaining democracy, even while he simultaneously suggests that China

needs the powerful government democracy makes possible. Thus he argues that China needs democracy but must undergo tutelage before it can practice it and that only a powerful government can undertake the task of tutelage. Yet creating a powerful government capable of undertaking monumental tasks is one of Sun's main justifications for democracy. By speaking of a party-led government whose goal is democratization, he allows for strong nondemocratic government because "the people" wholeheartedly support the government's goal of democratization. If this is the case, why institute democracy at all?

As material for democratic learning, Sun's legacy with regard to China's readiness for democracy is mixed. His insistence that China can and should democratize is helpful. He removes arguments that there is something in China or Chinese culture that is innately hostile to democracy. He denies that "Asian values" make democracy impossible. He even paints traditional Chinese culture as important to the first stages of democratization, establishing again the compatibility of democracy with that culture. One can be a democrat and a good, faithful follower of Chinese cultural traditions.

Yet Sun's insistence that China requires "tutelage" before it can practice democracy potentially undercuts important parts of that lesson. Why is such tutelage really necessary? If the tenets of Chinese culture are compatible with a democratic culture, why is practicing the latter so difficult that people require training? Implicit is Sun's understanding of human plasticity. He appears to understand democracy as a modern form of government requiring a modern mentality. Traditional Chinese culture can participate in that mentality, but that culture cannot constitute the whole. It seems that something more—an active interest in politics and the capacity to oversee officials—is needed. These parts of a modern mentality must be artificially grafted onto people through training and practice, and it is ultimately the experience of democracy itself (in the form of local self-government) that will create the disciplined, nationalistic polis that will control his democratic government. Parts of this understanding, particularly the emphasis on the quick establishment of local self-government, are helpful to democratic learning. They reinforce the importance of democratic practice and the capacity of ordinary people to engage in democratic activities. And positing that people must be given training in democratic processes is not necessarily incompatible with other strains of democratic theory, one example being the inclusion of such provisions in discussions of deliberative democracy. Yet the general proposition of a state

devoted to tutelage as a consequence of a lack of preparedness on the part of the demos is otherwise problematic. It legitimizes the delegation to the state of large, unchecked powers to form individual character. Such powers are not congruent with the tenets of an understanding of democracy that sees the demos rather than the state as the source of subjective political understandings and leaves the way open to pseudodemocracy, authoritarianism, or worse.

Finding the Best Model of Democracy

Part of Sun's position on the attainability of democracy implicates the search for the best model. Absent such a model, the Chinese cannot successfully adopt and practice democracy, not just because they are different, but because they require the full capacity and power of the state that democracy can bring. Sun argues that the West has yet to develop the best model because it has not yet fully grasped democracy's theoretical nature and full potential. For example, he argues that while a model based on universal suffrage is good, the experiences of the United States show that "the common people did not possess the necessary intelligence and power to wield complete sovereignty."[49] It appears that he thinks the United States allows too many people to vote and run for office for the sake of good democratic governance. Even more telling for Sun are the lessons France provides. While he is favorably disposed to the American Revolution, he is scathing in his assessment of the immediate aftermath of the French Revolution. The problem, he argues, was the initial commitment of the French to a pure, or complete, democracy. This commitment, he holds, resulted in mob rule and, therefore, violence and disorder.[50]

In the course of this discussion, Sun appears to distinguish among several models of democracy. These distinctions initially lead him into pessimistic territory. "Complete" democracy in his terminology is one in which the populace holds both sovereignty and administrative power; that is, power over policy as well as institutions is completely in the hands of all citizens. This is the kind of direct democracy that was practiced in the golden age in Athens and, by his description, in Paris after the French Revolution. In his mind, this arrangement inevitably results in the events associated with the French Reign of Terror, complete with disorder and mass violence as well as mistaken policies. Direct democracy rejects "natural leaders" and leaves the population bereft of their "good eyes and ears" that "distinguish who was right and who was wrong on any issue that arose." Complete democracy is not the best model

because it does not contain the distributions of power necessary for the creation of correct policies and good governance. In other words, direct democracy is *too* democratic because, by providing everyone with policy-making and administrative power, it mistakenly levels the political field. The world, Sun holds, is not amenable to the understanding of all people either descriptively or morally. But this conception of the world is not readily apparent to the general population. They initially demand "complete democracy" and in the West only gradually realized its shortcomings.[51]

Sun notes that the West has since moved to the concept of representative (or indirect) democracy. In this model, the populace elects leaders who carry out administrative tasks and make policy decisions. This procedure provides more discretion in terms of who exercises policy-making power in particular. If intellectually gifted individuals are elected, then good governance will follow. Yet this model, in the form of the liberal model of indirect democracy, is also not sufficient to realize democracy fully. Earlier we saw that Sun suggests that the US system does not sufficiently restrict the pool of those who should vote and hold office. Here he makes additional objections. As currently practiced, indirect democracy is not democratic enough; it is too weak, and it is not functionally correct.[52] "The hope of foreigners that representative government will insure the stability and peace of the state is not to be trusted," he argues.[53] What is needed, he holds, is a model that empowers leaders to lead and to build a strong state but also allows people to hold sovereignty totally. In other words, what is needed is a strong, "responsible," indirect democracy. The West has not put such a model into practice. Therefore, it has not yet attained and practiced the most perfect form of democracy, and thus China should not adopt fully any of the variations currently in use by Western states.

This state of affairs disappoints Sun. It would be comforting to know that an advanced democratic model has been fully worked out, successfully implemented elsewhere, and is ready to be taken over and implemented in China. Yet Sun does not wish to draw too bleak a picture. The forces of political evolution are still at work and are operating globally, not just in the West.[54] Sun seeks to differentiate between the West's prowess in technical and scientific matters and its efforts in political matters. Even if Chinese Westernizers were right that China should adopt Western science and technology in place of its traditional Confucian understanding of the natural world, they went too far in arguing for the automatic adoption of Western political forms. If "Western

social customs and sentiments are different from ours in innumerable points," social differences are not the only reason for China to strike out on its own politically.[55] More problematically, "Western nations have not fundamentally solved the problem of administering democracy."[56]

The core issue, he notes, is the need to create a powerful and stable state. States in the West, he observes, are externally powerful, having largely subordinated China. Liberal democracy is the most modern form of the Western state. But such states, while capable of engaging in imperialist endeavors and winning great wars, are internally weak because of the popular fear that a powerful state cannot be controlled. In his understanding, states in the West are either strong and run wild, oppressing citizens, executing leaders, and exercising power unaccountably (direct democracies in contemporary times, feudal autocracies previously), or they are shackled with checks and balances, limits on power, and elaborate systems for safeguarding the rights of individuals that render the state internally weak (liberal democracies). Liberal democrats hobble the state internally and water down the power of a united citizenry, fearing the effect of both the state and the masses on individual citizens. This fear is attributable in part to a liberal democratic distrust of government left over from the era of autocracies and in part to early experiences with the direct democracies of the French type. But giving in to that fear would mean creating a state too weak to unite China and forgoing the possibility of using the strength of a united Chinese people to engage in the gigantic tasks of unification, modernization, economic development, and liberation from imperial encroachment. Such a move is not acceptable.

Fortunately, Sun argues, he has created a more advanced democratic model by synthesizing observations of democratic developments on the ground with his theoretical appreciation of the modern role of democracy. He points to the fact that Switzerland and California have granted citizens four important rights (or powers): suffrage, recall, initiative, and referendum, the last three of which go beyond the powers normally associated with indirect democracy.[57] These powers, he argues, are the key to keeping control over a powerful state. Combining political powers granted citizens by representative democracies with three additional powers should provide citizens the necessary leverage to keep control of a state that itself has more powers and fewer constitutional constraints and is more reliant upon the routine delegation of power to elites than the Western liberal model. This is the model of the democratic state China

should adopt, Sun argues, and it is derived by the logic of a Goldilocks argument: complete democracy is too democratic, and indirect democracy is not democratic enough; Western autocratic states and direct democracies are too strong internally, and Western liberal democracies and Chinese autocracies are too weak internally. But an indirect democracy that combines a strong state and an empowered class of officials with enhanced political powers in the possession of ordinary citizens, in the form of suffrage, initiative, referendum, and recall, is just right.

In putting forward this conception of democracy, Sun claims his place as a theorist in possession of important theoretical and practical insights into the nature of democracy. As material for democratic learning, this discussion is useful and interesting. While Sun does not put his support behind a liberal democratic model, he does legitimize democracy and delegitimize alternatives. His discussion of various forms of democracy is also useful as a model of critical thinking. Democratic citizens should reflect on various types of democracy rather than taking any particular form for granted. Whether his model would work or is coherent, however, is open to question.

Sun's Concept of Democracy: The Story of the Hired Car

As we have seen, Sun's preferred conception of democracy is a mixture of an indirect framework with important elements of direct and unitary understandings. Key to his approach to the problem of squaring good governance and a strong state with popular political control is a distinction between "sovereignty" and "administration." "Sovereignty," or political power (*zhuchuán*, 主權), is generally taken to mean that "the people" hold the ultimate power in the state. The state is their property. Their goals are to be the goals of the state. The state is to be run for their benefit. The people exercise the four important political powers identified above (suffrage [選舉], initiative [創制], referendum [複決], and recall [罷免]). These powers are to be used to force those who exercise administrative power to be responsible to citizens and to follow the will of the demos (i.e., downward responsibility). "Administration," or the powers of governance (*zhìchuán*, 治權), is taken as the routine exercise of executive, legislative, and judicial powers. While everyone holds sovereignty and exercises the powers or rights that come from sovereignty, only those who possess highly advanced knowledge and abilities are eligible to exercise the powers of administration. Here, Sun attempts to combine the populism of a "complete" democracy (with its attending energy and power provided by the population, as dis-

played in the French Revolution and its aftermath) with the advantages of an indirect democracy (in terms of the choice of qualified people as policy makers) and perhaps a traditional Chinese meritocratic autocracy (with its promises of good judgment and virtuous behavior).

This combination does not add up to a liberal indirect democracy. Instead, it resembles a combination of a competitive elitist model with a unitary model. To illustrate and explain his advanced model of democracy, Sun moves away from his previous historical discussion to the realm of storytelling in Democracy Lecture 5 of the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*. Sun relates that when living in Shanghai, he once had to travel quickly to a meeting at some distance across town. He hired a car to take him there and informed the driver that he was due at his destination shortly. When the driver took a roundabout way to the meeting place, Sun was worried and angry. He thought this course would take too much time and wanted to order the driver to take the most direct route. But he kept silent, deferring to the driver's expertise. In the end, everything turned out well, as Sun arrived in time for his appointment. Sun realized the driver was correct in his choice—the longer route had less traffic, so, as the driver explained, he was able to make better time than he would have if he had taken the more congested direct route. In this story, Sun was placed in a situation in which he had made a choice (to attend a meeting at a particular location) that implicated an activity (driving), the technical details of which were beyond his immediate understanding. In experiencing that activity, he came to realize that he needed to defer to and trust the expert in that activity (his driver) by giving the latter the freedom to take important technical decisions (the best route) as identified by the latter's expert judgment. With the driver in charge, Sun achieved his goal.[58]

In this story, Sun the passenger symbolizes the people (民), the demos. He chooses a goal (a meeting to attend) and also freely chooses the venue of that meeting and thus his destination. He alone has the right to exercise these choices. The means by which Sun reaches that destination is a machine, a car. He does not operate this machine. Rather, another person with an identifiable occupation and expertise drives it. The driver symbolizes government officials. They understand how the machine operates: they know how to drive and maintain the machine in good operating order so that it functions efficiently when the people want it to function. They also know the routes (the policies) that lead to an identified destination and are able to use their training, experience, and intellectual gifts to pick the best route according to the

criteria the passenger supplies. The car is the state. It is a machine. It does not have a will of its own. It is powerful. It is used by the passenger for his ends and can only function when operated by the driver.[59]

The Demos as Passenger

We start first with the character of the demos. In the story, the passenger is a single person. This characterization implies a cluster of characteristics: the demos is united and it has a single will, which, though subjective in origin, is expressed in a way that is understood objectively. Thus, Sun does not provide a pluralist theory of democracy. There is no allusion to interest groups or other manifestations of a population animated by a variety of motivations, desires, or goals that would be symbolized by a group of passengers debating their destination. Nor is there room for multiple political parties or for anyone who does not accept democracy and the republican revolution. As Sun puts it in a perhaps unconscious echo of Machiavelli and Rousseau, "Any unified and organized body of men is called a 'people.'"[60] In providing this description, he embraces an understanding of the general will that typifies the republican and Chinese unitary models of democracy. He also gestures toward the same understanding as did Machiavelli, Rousseau, and some of the American Founders who inclined toward civic republicanism: dissent from fundamental principles is treason, and interest groups and parties are to be treated as factions that weaken and distract from the common good and general will rather than as natural and acceptable entities.

Sun's understanding of such a demos, however, was more normative than descriptive at this time. The Chinese should act in this way, but his lamentations in his lectures on nationalism over the lack of unity demonstrate that he did not think the Chinese possessed such characteristics in the 1920s. They had not become a "people," a disciplined entity capable of exercising the ultimate powers of choosing collective goals.[61] Their lack of unity was due to cultural, geographical, and historical reasons. Thus unity must be artificially constructed through participation in a democracy as well as through political training by officials during the time of tutelage. This latter point represents the first of several complicating factors in understanding the conception of democracy Sun means to convey, because this interaction between officials and ordinary citizens implies a different relationship than is provided by the story. To become a "people" in the context of tutelage, the passenger must be

taken under the control of the driver; in this story, the driver is under the orders of an already fully mature passenger.

Passengers in this metaphor do not drive the machinery of state.[62] That task requires both specialized skill and intellectual gifts that are not available to all. A philosophical, political, and legal distinction must be made, Sun argues, between the demos and officials, which Sun claims is his crucial contribution to democratic theory. In making this distinction, he argues that democracy necessarily entails popular sovereignty. The state must be answerable and responsive to and ultimately controlled by the people. This is the essence of democracy for Sun: sovereignty possessed by the general populace and the state working for the "welfare and happiness" of the people, who in turn give the state their strength and energy.[63] Sovereignty carries with it the right and power of all citizens collectively to make ultimate choices and hold officials accountable. Yet, he argues, this precept does not and cannot assume that people are equal in ability or equally fit for administrative and policy work. For a democracy (or any type of regime, for he levels the same critique at incompetent autocracies) to function, people must recognize that they have different levels of ability and must cede immediate administrative and policy-making control to those within the demos who have the highest levels of intelligence and administrative talent.[64] Ordinary people must think of themselves in the same place and role as Ah Do (or Liu Shan, 劉禪), the incompetent ruler in *The Romance of the Three Kingdoms* (三國演義). While they possess sovereignty, they must willingly yield policy-making and administrative power to competent persons, just as Ah Do originally delegated power to the scholar and strategist Chu-ko Liang (諸葛亮) to run his kingdom.[65]

As the story of Ah Do illustrates, it is a mistake, Sun argues, to think that just anyone is administratively competent and should share direct administrative and policy-making powers. While Western democratic theory rightly recognizes the injustice and dysfunctionality of treating equals unequally and correctly condemns autocracies for the mistake of granting particular people political power on the basis only of their birth, he argues that Western democrats tend to make the mistake of insisting upon the equality of unequals in terms of administrative and policy-making talent, allowing incompetent people to wield administrative power either by permitting anyone who wishes to run for office in the case of indirect models or by granting everyone a role simultaneously through unconstrained direct democracy. Even though we should

recognize that everyone ought to have an equal share of sovereignty and all can equally employ the powers held generally by the demos, we must not allow those of lesser ability to engage in policy-making and executive work.

Sun is adamant that people are naturally unequal in terms of intellect and talent and that democratic theory must recognize this facet of human nature when it comes to political office. In Democracy Lecture 3, Sun provides us with a graph mapping the natural incremental gradation of people from "The Sage" to "The Inferior Man." While he rejects what he calls the excessive and artificial political inequality of autocracy in the modern context, he argues that to insist that one category of person is the same as another in terms of ability is not only inaccurate but also leads to politically dysfunction: "If we pay no attention to each man's intellectual endowments and capacities and push down those who rise to a high position in order to make all equal, the world will not progress and will retrocede."[66] This statement at first glance appears to be an unexceptional reiteration of the concept of equal opportunity.[67] Sun, it seems, is only arguing against a strict understanding of direct democracy and the institution of hereditary offices. This would not necessarily place him outside the liberal democratic model. But Sun in reality goes further. In rejecting direct democracy, he rejects not only Rousseau but also Jefferson. The latter, he argues, formed a party based on the proposition that

> people were endowed with natural rights and that if the people were given complete democratic power, they would be discriminating in the use of their freedom, would direct their power to the accomplishment of great tasks, and would make all the affairs of the nation progress to the fullest extent. Jefferson's theory assumed that human nature is naturally good.[68]

While Sun is setting Jefferson up as an exponent of populist democracy as opposed to a Hamiltonian emphasis on the power of experts and a strong central government, his position is more far reaching. Sun rejects not only direct democracy as a comprehensive model but also positions central to a liberal democratic theory that are necessary to the liberal notion of individuals as free and equal citizens. For Sun, humans are not endowed with natural rights—it is government rather than nature that defines and provides rights and freedoms. He also rejects the notion that the average citizen can use state power and individual freedom in a discriminating fashion. The average person is incapable of competently controlling governmental machinery. People

are not naturally good. In sum, Sun argues that most people are politically inept and when given administrative or policy-making power will abuse it. Popular influence on government must be limited to setting only the broadest of goals and exercising the broadest of supervisory powers over government officials and should not include the right to exercise power directly as individuals or the right of an average person to have access to government offices. As Sun puts it elsewhere, the correct democratic idea entails putting only persons of ability in offices with responsibility for policies. If they fail, then the people can take that power back by ejecting them and putting in others or by collectively exercising their powers of initiative and referendum.[69]

Sun's understanding here appears complex or, less charitably, to present serious tensions for democratic learning. He rejects autocracy in the modern context and insists that the people must now have control of the state. This is a useful exercise in delegitimization and extends beyond the traditional *mínběn* understanding of good government. As we have seen, he goes on to criticize the Western style of elective indirect democracy as *insufficiently* democratic and wishes at least to supplement it with the popular powers of initiative, recall, and referendum. However, he also uses his depiction of a natural human hierarchy to inject a stronger differentiation into the relationship between officials and ordinary people than does the usual understanding of indirect democracy or even an initial reading of the story of the car implies. His elitism here approaches that of autocratic theory.

To explore this tension, we first take up the additional powers Sun wishes people to exercise. The power of recall can be understood most generally as an additional aspect of representative democracy that participates in a delegative rather than trustee model of representation. Delegation assumes that representatives must automatically adopt the positions that ordinary voters take in the arenas of power. Officials do not take positions on any issue that is different from that held by the bulk of voters. This understanding does not accord well with Sun's antipopulist understanding of officials as highly educated experts choosing the best policies. His view is closer to Burke's conception of representatives as trustees—people who exercise their best judgment in public affairs no matter what the bulk of the population believes to be correct policies. In a trusteeship conception, recall would only be legitimate as a device for removing clearly incompetent officials. This represents a very low threshold of accountability. Yet Sun does not appear to furnish many grounds for

believing ordinary people even possess the ability to judge the competence of officials, much less to remove officials on other grounds.

Referendum and initiative are powers associated with direct democracy or with newer understandings of deliberative democracy. They presume the capacity of ordinary people collectively to make important judgments regarding policy either because policy matters are not so complex that they reside outside the competence of ordinary people exercising ordinary judgment (direct democracy models) or because ordinary people can be sufficiently trained to grasp enough normative and technical material that they can pass judgments on policy matters (deliberative democracy models). Sun clearly does not buy into the first scenario because he believes policy matters are complex.[70] Does he, then, assume aspects of a deliberative democracy model? His references to tutelage are intriguing in this respect. He clearly believes that democracy requires training and popular engagement. The question, however, is what type of training for what type of engagement? Discussions of deliberative democracy speak of training people in critical thinking, data analysis, and structured conversations. In contrast, Sun's discussion of training appears to entail making Chinese citizens "modern" both in a generic sense (i.e., comfortable with new ways of thinking, dedicated to the nation) and in a specific sense of accepting his understanding of correct politics. These are not sufficient for a deliberative model to function. Moreover, his understanding of the differences among humans appears essentialist, holding that the power to understand complex governmental matters is more innate than learned. Given therefore that Sun would accept justifications for these powers from neither direct nor deliberative democracy, and given that these powers are at the least associated with a delegative understanding of representation rather than the trusteeship conception he prefers, if not associated with direct democracy when Sun insists upon an elitist indirect conception, it appears that this aspect of Sun's understanding is not coherent.

Other problems also attend Sun's understanding of the place of ordinary citizens in his democratic conception. How is it that their voice will be heard in the corridors of power? Many of their claims, such as those associated with particular interests, would be disqualified in his understanding. Those claims associated with variant understandings of the popular will, in theory, would not be disqualified, but Sun seems to assume, as in his story of the car, that there would be agreement on the goals the state should pursue, including

among those with superior abilities. More complex would be a situation in which a more qualified person puts forward goals at odds with the will of the community, whereas an unqualified person embraces goals that the community approves. It is likely that Sun would dismiss these possibilities as purely theoretical or would argue that they would be rendered moot by holding that part of democratic tutelage would be training in identifying the most talented members of society, as well as the formation of the populace into a unified whole. Yet from a broader theoretical standpoint, such a possibility presents real problems for Sun's theory. What if the demos is split in its understanding of national goals? Would the government then be rendered powerless, or would it on the contrary be empowered to remove any manifestation of pluralism? If the latter, then downward accountability need not be sensitive to differences of interests and understandings, because there should be none, or respect individuals as free and equal citizens, because they do not hold distinct identities; they are merely members of a corporate entity.[71]

A related issue is the assumption that government officials work to realize a common good that the populace identifies through the exercise of a general will. In identifying a popularly defined general will and common good as the object of government action, Sun ostensibly pushes beyond the *mínběn* understanding of good government. It is not the driver but the passenger who sets the destination, and the passenger has certain broad veto powers over the actions of the driver. Yet thinking about democracy in these terms is beset with philosophical and practical problems. How do officials identify a general will or common good? Must agreement be unanimous, and if not, what is the threshold for deeming some degree of agreement as the general will?[72] Sun says little about such problems. Moreover, even if we allow that a general will can be satisfactorily identified, what of the means for acting on this will? In accordance with Sun's scheme of dividing sovereignty from administration, that task is delegated to officials, with the occasional intervention of the demos through the use of its powers. But, as Dahl notes, any particular conception of a common good or general will must be broad to command general assent. Such broadness also generates plural conceptions of how to implement any particular expression, conceptions that will often conflict to an extent that no specific policy can satisfy them all. Thus, to leave the choice of policy to officials is to delegate much more meaningful powers to them than is intimated by the story's analogy of a driver's choice of a route to a fixed destination. In

reality, the passenger can only identify a type of preferred destination, and the driver's choice of the route will influence at which particular destination the driver and passenger will eventually arrive. The populace, it seems, would not really choose the state's goals after all.[73]

These features turn the substance of this discussion into a mixed bag of materials for democratic learning. Sun's assumption that it is the popular will that is to guide government does go far in legitimizing democracy and delegitimizing autocracy. However, it is difficult to accept a concept of democracy in terms of popular sovereignty, popular accountability, and active citizenship when the nature of inequality between ordinary citizens and those eligible to hold office is so markedly emphasized. His account also incoherently mixes elements of elitist and direct democracy models. Why should the people's will control government if ordinary people lack comprehension? Why should ordinary citizens be allowed the rights of referendum and initiative when they are incompetent in policy making? Why should officials submit to downward accountability when citizens are incompetent and when a general will is necessarily broad?

Sun's distinction between sovereignty and administration does not reach the core problem generated by his extreme elitism because, for that distinction to work, it must lead to a complete break between leaders and ordinary citizens and thus undercut the justification for democracy itself. As noted above, the tensions that Sun creates by his view of humans as radically unequal in ability are both with the concept of free and equal citizens and with accountability. With regard to the first, if the bulk of citizens will never have even the chance of exercising policy-making power as individuals (by being eligible to run for office, or even to voice particularistic interests), it is not clear how they can be regarded as equal with those who can hold such power. There really is no equal citizenship here. There is also a problem with suffrage. While it appears that Sun keeps the basic tenet of indirect democracy in which citizens choose their policymakers, this does not seem to be fully the case. The demos cannot choose someone outside the intellectual elite. Such circumscription of choice considerably reduces the power ordinary citizens exercise, particularly if those eligible to hold office are associated with a single party.

Second, how is downward accountability to be conceptualized and enforced? If policy making and strategic vision are beyond the ability of most citizens, how can they evaluate their leaders' performance or articulate long-term goals with any kind of foresight or intelligence? If the gap between offi-

cials and citizens is as large as Sun paints it, why should the intellectual elite acquiesce to popular oversight and goal setting? If energy and manpower are the reason, these can be derived more easily by authoritarian mobilizational techniques than by ceding the four powers Sun grants ordinary citizens. Here again, the lack of more than instrumental justifications of democracy damages Sun's argument. There appears to be no good reason for him to award ordinary citizens the powers he outlines if he is unwilling to grant that they could grasp the fundamentals of policy making, have the capacity to set strategic goals, or have some moral or other claim to democracy based on an understanding of human nature.[74] Nor does he provide good reason for those who are intellectually or otherwise well equipped for power to accept such an arrangement when alternative forms of government are available. To articulate a coherent democratic conception, Sun must considerably lessen the distance between officials and ordinary citizens and blur the distinction between administration and sovereignty.

Government Officials as Drivers

In Sun's narrative, the metaphor of a driver representing officials likewise implies a variety of characteristics. In the story, there is only one driver, so there is no dispute as to how the task of driving is to be carried out. There is to be unity in officialdom, implying again the role of a single party or other type of unified group of political figures that dominates the political arena. The choices the driver is allowed to make appear to be limited, being bounded by the destination, or goal. He cannot change the goal by disputing the importance of the meeting, the desirability of its location, or the rationality of the passenger in deciding to attend meetings. He must choose the best route to that destination. Moreover, his choice is limited by an important aspect of the route, namely, *timeliness*. In the story, then, the driver has freedom only in how to drive the car and the route to take.

One may interpret this aspect of the story in several ways. In one interpretation, it appears the people are firmly in charge, with officials merely following their orders as technically skilled minions. Their technical volition does not add up to much freedom, as is the case in Rousseau's account of administrators. Sun glosses this argument when he asserts in Democracy Lecture 5, "We must not look upon these experts as stately and grand presidents and ministers, but simply as our chauffeurs, as guards at the gate, as cooks, physicians, carpenters, or tailors."[75] This reading is in keeping with Sun's criticism

of Western elective democracies as failures, in that the people are empowered only "to elect and be elected." They cannot affect policies directly, for "all measures of national importance must be passed upon by Parliament before they can be put into effect." He questions this arrangement: "But does this form of government insure the perfect development of democracy?" In Sun's analysis, the answer is no. He wants further popular control of government. Citizens should firmly direct the actions of officials, and officials should not filter the goals and desires of the people. Sun believes he makes such control possible by adding to suffrage the three additional political powers noted above.[76]

Yet the story of the car also invites alternate readings. Another interpretation holds that Sun is merely describing a Westminster-style parliamentary system in which governments are held to account by a national legislature and fall if they do not maintain majorities. Thus at another point Sun asserts:

> When democracy is highly developed and methods of controlling government are perfected, the government will have great power, but the people will only have to make their opinions known in their national congress; if they attack the government, they may overthrow it, or if they laud the government they may strengthen it.[77]

This description implies something different than a group officials operating in the fashion Rousseau approves; instead, it appears to describe a powerful cabinet government that is responsible to a national legislative body. Officials in this understanding could have a free hand to craft policies and otherwise enjoy wide discretion in administrative matters but could be defeated by losing a confidence vote. In this understanding, Sun is not going beyond indirect Western models in the constitution of government except to add the three additional powers of recall, initiative, and referendum. Indeed, this looks somewhat like Held's description of Weber's competitive elitist model.[78]

In a third reading, buttressed by Sun's insistence on inequalities of ability, what he is referring to is not a Westminster system but the empowerment of a much stronger set of officials who have the capacity to mold the nation and make strategic rather than tactical decisions and to make policies that shape the preferences and outlook of the population. In this reading, the equation of a government official with a chauffeur is not only inaccurate but misleading. The abilities of the "sage" and other higher-grade people significantly surpass

the technical skills of driving and maintaining a car and familiarizing oneself with traffic patterns. Hence, the reference to attacks and support in a national assembly must refer to much stronger manifestations of discontent than routine votes of no confidence. They suggest plebiscites, in the absence of which officials would continue to hold and exercise wide powers. Instead of showing the demos in charge, this description portrays citizens following in the wake of official expertise, intervening only in times of major discontent that would result from manifestations of gross incompetence. Given the wide differences of intelligence and ability in Sun's understanding of natural hierarchy, anything else would be beyond the powers of the demos.[79]

While this latter interpretation of Sun's understanding of government officials runs afoul of a surface reading of the passenger-driver relationship in his car story and of his criticism of Western elective democracies as insufficiently democratic, it appears to fit best his understanding of humans. Rather than reducing affairs of government to technical matters, this understanding *elevates* politics to the level of technical expertise. Supporting this reading are Sun's further references to human types. Refining his earlier discussion, Sun argues in Democracy Lecture 5 that a correct understanding of humans differentiates among three fundamental groups (where earlier he had given eight categories): (1) those who can see, perceive, and have insight into the future; (2) those who can understand by learning through imitation only after something has been discovered; and (3) those who cannot perceive or understand at all but can be depended upon to act. While all are necessary to progress and valuable to the nation, as a matter of functionality and good sense it is only the first group and some members of the second who should be entrusted with governmental power because they are extraordinary in both their competence and, as his rejection of the Jeffersonian view of human nature and his identification of "sages" suggests, moral character.[80] To create a workable democracy, people must recognize and accept these gradations just as they recognize differentiations, in another metaphor, in the building trade between those who plan the building, those who supervisor the workers, and those who do the actual construction work.[81]

There is also much additional support for this reading in Sun's discussion. He routinely argues that one must treat government officials like experts and defer to them, just as one defers to military or business experts, and that one should defer to them even if, or rather especially if, one does not understand

what the experts are doing.[82] At other times, he likens officials to the managers of companies in whom stockholders vest administrative responsibility. Thus Sun says of officials in Democracy Lecture 5 that "if they are able men and loyal to the nation, we should be willing to give the sovereignty of the state into their hands. We must not limit their movements but give them freedom of action; then the state can progress and progress with rapid strides."[83] Such passages put into question whether ordinary citizens should ever exercise their political powers in ways that would interfere with incumbent officials and suggest the possibility of a strong feedback loop, in which officials set forth goals that are ratified by the people; this, then, is conceptualized in terms of the demos setting forth the direction of the state. It would be as if, in the story, the driver were to set both the general and particular destination and, through his superior abilities, persuade the passenger that this action was really an exercise of the passenger's will. Sun might describe his position more benignly by arguing that those to whom he attributes foresight partake of the general spirit of the community, and if that foresight differs from the popular understanding, they would persuade the demos of the correctness of the alternative set of goals. The demos could be mistaken in its identification of the general will or of the common good. But in either version, it is not clear that the demos really is setting the direction of the state. Such a condition seems to require both the capacity for, and reality of, independence that the demos does not possess in Sun's depiction. It would appear to be dominated by its more intelligent members to the same degree as is the state, thus again problematizing officials' downward accountability.

The ramifications of this understanding are significant. Most important, Sun appears to identify knowledge as the marker of eligibility for office. As in the Confucian tradition, knowledge commands respect and power apart from the choice of the demos. To put it radically, the demos in Sun's understanding has a responsibility to recognize ability when putting officials into office. It appears that if a person not of higher intellectual rank were voted into office, he would not have a morally clear right to exercise power on democratic grounds. If the demos chooses an unqualified person, it has made a mistake in terms not just of functionality but also of democratic morality.[84] Only those with clearly superior capacities may rightfully hold office, no matter what the demos wants. This understanding acts as a limit to democratic choice in much the same way as would constitutional principles. Further, it would provide jus-

tifications for barring individuals from the ballot and monopolizing political power through the institution of single-party government. It could also give officials justification for canceling elections, limiting the scope and frequency of elections, or ignoring the results of elections on the premise that no one besides incumbent officials is competent to hold office.

It could be that some of these difficulties could be explained by again positing that Sun supplies a version of a competitive elitist model of democracy. In Weber's version of that model, there is in practice also a wide gulf between ordinary citizens and political leaders and the reservation to the latter of the power to formulate policy. Weber likewise argues that citizens are only capable of throwing out incompetent leaders through a plebiscitary process.[85] The difference is that Weber thought of political leaders as the heads of parties that competed with one another in the context of a pluralistic demos. Sun did not appear to embrace either this pluralism or the understanding of parties as the connectors of particular citizens with leaders. Nor did Weber embrace the powers of recall, initiative, and referendum.

There is also some difficulty in attempting to classify Sun's conception of the relationship between officials and citizens under some versions of the republican unitary model. Sun appears to occupy a position that is different from Rousseau's. For Rousseau, government officials are only supposed to implement the will of the people. They are purely administrators. They are not, in theory, to interject their understandings of policy preferences into the deliberations that inform the general will. In his formulation, citizens lay aside their role as administrators when deliberating with the rest of the community. Rousseau, however, is able to sustain this understanding because he assumes that government officials really are ordinary citizens with particular jobs and thus no different than any other random citizen. Sun's understanding of the difference between experts and others does not replicate this conception. It appears to recall instead Machiavelli's praise of founders as extraordinary people who can grapple with *fortuna*.

Another way of understanding Sun's conception of the role of officials, though it runs against his implication that natural human hierarchies involve moral knowledge, is through his analogy of policies as "routes." This understanding accords with his conceptualization of the state as a machine (discussed below) and his tendency to drain politics of partisanship and particular interests. It implies that politics and policies reduce to technical matters.

Policies, like routes, are both amoral and the subject of specialized knowledge that allows them to be apprehended objectively. Ostensibly, if goals are specified, all leaders need do is create policies that achieve those goals most effectively within constraints that the demos sets. The story of the car implies that choices among routes are differentiated only by such constraints (speed, scenery, distance, etc.) that are assessable by technical means rather than by moral or otherwise normative values. Officials' policy menus would be created by a technical understanding of the best ways of attaining the goals identified by the demos. Likewise, choices from those menus would be governed by technical and specialized knowledge.

However, insofar as we see Sun adopting this technical description of leaders and policies (and there is textual support for doing so), he not only continues to run into the problems of choice alluded to above in reference to Dahl's discussion, but he also departs from any realist appreciation of institutions and politics. Drivers and machines, leaders and governments are here conceptually, practically, and politically separate. In the car story, Sun depicts leaders as tending to the machinery of state in an impersonal way. Drivers drive cars; leaders lead states. They can be trusted because they possess ability, only employ technical knowledge, and if they lose the trust of the people, their freedom of action can be further curbed or they can be fired. There is nothing in this description suggesting that operating the machinery of state creates an interest in retaining control of the state or that operating parts of the state creates different interests among officials. Nor does Sun acknowledge that such operations permit leaders to use instruments of control and coercion to resist attempts to curb their discretion or to fire them. For Sun, possessing the wheel of the vehicle of state does not confer either interests or power to resist the people's sovereignty. Any thorough understanding of the nature of politics would make one skeptical of this picture. Leaders can burrow their way into states in ways that are not captured by the driver/car metaphor. Leaders also develop deep interests in maintaining the driver's seat that are similarly neglected by the car story. In the story, if Sun fires the driver, the latter will acquiesce. There is nothing that allows the latter to keep Sun as the passenger against his will. This is not the case in the actual world of politics.

Sun's lack of clarity and his refusal to recognize the dangers of state power weaken this discussion as a source of democratic learning. Sun's insistence that officials are placed in office by the people is democratically useful, but his

reservation of office for a particular set of extraordinary people who appear to exercise almost complete control over policy making (save for instances in which citizens inexplicably exercise referenda and initiative powers) mitigates that democratic lesson. More broadly, the vagueness of his story's depiction of the relationship between officials and the demos is also problematic. Who really sets goals? How much discretion should officials possess in interpreting their popular mandate to govern? How can the demos hold officials to account? Is this a Westminster system in which legislators routinely and regularly hold officials to account or something more like a plebiscitary democracy in which citizens hold occasional referenda on the government? Can and should officials attempt to mold the popular will? Are leaders of high moral standing or do they only possess superior technical knowledge? These ambiguities confuse the lesson Sun attempts to provide regarding the commanding position of the demos and weaken the proposition that democracy importantly entails popular sovereignty and downward accountability.

More fundamentally troubling is the fact that here and throughout his discussion of democracy, Sun embraces many of the arguments that Dahl has identified with the "guardianship" critique of democracy.[86] This critique argues that policy making requires special abilities and special knowledge that is beyond the reach of ordinary people. Politics should be reserved for the intellectually skilled element of the population. Plato is the most famous of those who use this theory to reserve power to the few. Sun likewise posits that humans are vastly unequal in their talents and depicts the world as complex and difficult to understand. Where Dahl argues that such arguments logically lead to justifications of authoritarianism, Sun attempts to sidestep this problem with his distinction between sovereignty and administration. Nevertheless, there will always be an elitist character to Sun's understanding that appears to go beyond the differentiation contained in various elitist democratic models and puts into question the very democratic nature of his scheme.

Given these criticisms, it is also important to note when Sun is writing. The early twentieth century was a time of fascination with experts, technology, and science (hence the May Fourth Movement's advocacy of "Mr. Science" along with "Mr. Democracy"). The idea of ceding government to an intelligentsia who could decide policies rationally in imitation of technical experts was an appealing response to the increasingly complex nature of politics. Moreover, thinking of democracy in terms of competitive elitism and arguments

regarding the inevitability of government by an elite was also popular in the West. Michels's skepticism regarding democracy, as well as Weber's conception of democracy, depicted ordinary citizens as necessarily taking a passive role in government, in large part because of their relative disadvantage in terms of knowledge and understanding. In this comparative and contextual perspective, Sun's views fare somewhat better.

The State as the Car

Sun's conception of the state in this story is that it is a mechanism, though he also appears to move away from that view at one point. If the state is a machine, it is not made up of individual humans with particular interests and desires. Rather, it appears to be a kind of inhuman construct. It is an object without realist attributes. It does not resist steering; it lacks interests and direction of its own. It does not fight modifications and reforms. As a mechanical servant, it is the perfect instrument for attaining goals identified outside its field of decision making.[87]

Sun uses this conceptualization of the state as a machine not only to deny that its citizens may possess separate interests and to emphasize its instrumentality but also to underline the importance of creating an increasingly powerful state in China. As noted above, Sun wishes to emphasize his disagreement with many contemporary Western understandings. The West, given its history of harsh autocracy and revolutionary direct democracies, has become distrustful of the state, Sun argues. Western theorists maintain that the state must be kept internally limited in order to protect the people. The rise in the West of checks and balances and the concept of natural, individual rights enforceable against the government through an independent judiciary and other tools to fight absolutism were spurred by the desire to weaken what was perceived to be a necessary but dangerous entity. China, he argues, both lacks that history and occupies a different international and domestic context. China's autocracy historically was more benign and its governments weaker, with less reach into the affairs of ordinary people, than were autocracies in the West. For Sun, what threatens the people in China is not a strong but a feeble state. China can settle for no less than the "best" state in terms of good governance, and the best state is powerful.[88] Indeed, Lei goes so far as to argue that Sun advocated the creation of an all-powerful state with no practical limits.[89] So in thinking of the state as a machine, Sun attempts to

link its dangers to contexts rather than inherent characteristics. As an inanimate object and a tool, it is only as dangerous as those who wield its power.

However, having emphatically made this point regarding the machinelike character of the state in several places, Sun proceeds to muddy the waters conceptually by arguing that one cannot apply social science in the same manner as natural science and technology when speaking of politics. This argument undercuts his understanding of government as a machine and officials as technical experts, which points explicitly *to* technology and something like the Western understanding of natural science as the correct sources of knowledge. If the distinction between sovereignty and administration is to work as part of a democratic conception (and above we saw that this distinction is otherwise problematic) and if he is to distance the state as an entity from dangerous propensities, he must see administration and the nature of politics as involving knowledge that partakes of the epistemological objectivity of Western natural science. Otherwise, he must concede that the state itself is not an inert object but has independent agency. Yet Sun provides a different and perhaps more troubling conception, arguing that what China needs with regard to the state is not a technical attitude on the part of officials but a change of attitude on the part of the people, from an emphasis on liberty and equality to a properly modulated adherence to those values plus democracy.[90] The result is a different attitude toward government—not of indifference (as in the past in China) or hostility (as in the West) but of acceptance and support.[91] The key in his mind to the construction of a powerful state therefore is not structure—the character of institutions, the addition of particular powers—but psychology. The state can be powerful and controllable at the same time because it is part of a larger psychic being—the people. This understanding serves to link officials to the demos not by ties of accountability but through the bonds of nationalistic fervor.

Sun's contribution to democratic learning here is hindered by significant normative and practical difficulties. Normatively, his understanding veers between attempting to make the government mechanical and attempting to make it an extension of the people. Insofar as his arguments favor government as machinery, they tend to shield it from the criticism of ordinary people. Policies are too technical for ordinary people to understand. Insofar as he paints the state as a nonmechanical extension of the people, he runs the risk of rendering such criticism illegitimate because treasonous and removing the

possibility that citizens can enjoy rights as limits on state power. As he sometimes notes, the people need no rights because they control the state. He runs the risk of justifying the type of revolutionary state that arose in the immediate aftermath of the French Revolution, a type of state he condemns because the identification of the populace with the state led to what he believed was a dangerous model of direct democracy. Practically, his understanding veers between a lack of a realist understanding of interests in his mechanical description of the state and a lack of appreciation of the structural inequalities of power that inevitably arise as a consequence of a state's existence. The nationalist states he admires may appear to be populist but are often under the command of officials who do more to manipulate citizens than citizens do to control them.

In all, this part of his discussion provides only generally useful materials in that they emphasize the argument that government machinery should be subordinate to the will of the demos. Otherwise, this contradiction in his discussion serves more to confuse than to educate. In terms of different models, Sun draws little on liberal democratic conceptions; instead, he uses arguments more congenial to unitary versions of democracy—with their emphasis on the people's will and neglect of the rights of minorities—and to elitist understandings.

Elections and Sources of Accountability

Sun's understanding of political participation and downward accountability is conditioned by his simultaneous acceptance of human inequality and his uneasiness with elections as the primary way of incorporating the will of the demos into the state. He rejects the usual machinery of direct democracy (the routine participation of ordinary people in the policy-making process through large assemblies of citizens) on the grounds that such arrangements will necessarily lead to disorder because ordinary people are incapable of discharging such duties. But he also rejects the Western conception of indirect democracy as inadequately democratic. Democratic participation must extend beyond "the right to elect and to hold office." This position leads Sun away from any emphasis on competitive, multiparty electoral systems. Downward accountability in the form of elections is not based on competition in which people compare policy platforms but on assessments of competency in which the demos passes judgment on officials in their pursuit of the goals upon which

the demos has internally agreed.[92] Only if the demos as a whole makes an adverse determination based on that criterion will elites be rotated out of office either by election or recall. Otherwise, citizens defer to officials or collectively intervene through referendum and initiatives rather than by joining together in parties or other groups to oppose the government. Political activity, in this sense, is not individual, nor is it to lead to divergences of opinion or policy, given that, at bottom, differences of understanding and of interest do not eclipse the common will of the people. Elites participate politically as "officials" who use their expertise and their knowledge, and ordinary people participate collectively as "the people," who set goals and assess whether officials are performing their jobs competently through the collective instruments of suffrage, recall, referendum, and initiative.

Several other pieces of evidence point to Sun's rejection of multiparty electoral democracy and the possibility that he was not in favor of the Westminster-style system explored above. First, as we have seen, he conceives of the demos and officials in the car analogy as unified and undifferentiated entities. No division of interest or goals is attributable to citizens as a whole, and no differential understandings of driving characterize officials. Second, he only appears to refer to the KMT when discussing political officials. Third is his discussion of Western democracy. In parts of that discussion, Sun appears to reject the notion that political and intellectual pluralism is desirable. The West, he argues, has not attained the best form of democracy because revolutionaries allowed the division of the people into multiple political parties. For Sun, the most important thing about this division is that they represent not merely different interests but different intellectual positions, which leads to a fragmented understanding of politics unable to produce and sustain a powerful, centralized government. He traces the origins of that fragmentation to different understandings of human nature and illustrates this conclusion by exploring early American political history. For example, he posits that Jefferson and the Democratic-Republicans were progressive exponents of populist democracy who favored the decentralization of power because they held an optimistic view of humans and wished to see them exercise their autonomy. In contrast, Hamilton and the Federalists saw humans as imperfect and thought that giving too much power to the populace was dangerous and could result in anarchy and the inability to attain justice, law, and order. Therefore, the Hamiltonians proposed a more centralized and powerful state structure.

While Sun definitely prefers the Hamiltonian Federalists to the Jeffersonian Republicans in terms of substantive politics, he more fundamentally regrets this division of thought into different camps. He strongly suggests that multiple political parties are dangerous to democracy because they espouse different understandings of the world, different policies, and different goals. They put forward competing understandings of the state, the people's will and common good, and of people themselves.[93]

This overall position again has important ramifications for understandings of accountability, in that it appears to emphasize democratic accountability mainly through referenda or plebiscites rather than the more generally accepted understanding of a choice among multiple candidates. For some democratic theorists, this shift is deeply problematic. For example, Shapiro notes that competition for office not only allows people with diverse interests to obtain power but acts as a mechanism for creating a watchful opposition that continually critiques governments and holds officials accountable in ways that are not available through other means.[94] Sun's account appears to remove this brand of oversight from his democratic conception. In Sun's postpartisan democracy, the opportunity for institutionalizing a watchful opposition does not exist, as it would be viewed as divisive and destabilizing.

As noted above, Sun's discussion here is often uneven with regard to democratic learning. From the viewpoint of liberal democratic theory, Sun's rejection of competition and pluralism makes this weak material for democratic learning. Yet this is to hold that only competition provides accountability. One might argue that a vigorous use of plebiscites might allow a populace to hold officials to account without the need to hold over their head the possibility that they may be replaced en masse by a different group and without the need for constant critiques based on alternative policy proposals. This appears to have been Rousseau's understanding of democratic accountability. Sun's acceptance of suffrage (despite his criticisms of the inadequacy of elections) as well as the other three powers is clearly useful. His discussions establish the need for the demos to hold governments accountable and provide it with tools by which to do so. However, he does not clarify why ordinary people should exercise any further powers beyond suffrage if, in fact, the basis for his understanding of democracy is that ordinary people should not exercise administrative or policy-making powers. Yet this is precisely what he proposes. Having condemned direct democracy, he seeks to inject important elements of that model into his preferred form. That Sun so strongly argues for democ-

racy and its further development is laudable and abstractly useful to later proponents of democracy, but the specifics of his discussion, besides their vagueness and paucity, are as likely to confuse as to inform.

Rights, the Rule of Law, and Checks and Balances

Sun appears to stray considerably from the Liberal democratic model when it comes to checks on official power. While he is described by many Taiwanese scholars as a supporter of constitutional democracy,[95] he was not a follower of the natural rights tradition and would look in askance upon Acton's distrust of power. Sun's justifications for this position were rooted in his contextualism and his confidence in perfecting the machinery of the democratic state. The result is an understanding of democracy that is not overtly friendly to the types of individual safeguards that characterize liberal democracy and are more congenial to the republican unitary and the Chinese unitary models of democracy.

First is the nature of Sun's abstract conceptualization of democracy. As do many modern democratic theorists, he separates democracy from the liberal tradition and from any necessary connection with individual rights and freedoms, and individualism per se. What is good about democracy is its capacity to meet the needs of a people as a collective at a certain time. It is a particular type of tool that is best suited to the struggle to overcome the obstacles that peoples face.[96] In this understanding, liberal democracy is not the most advanced form of democracy. The freedoms, checks, and safeguards that liberalism insists upon imposing on democratic structures results in a state that is not maximally strong and therefore does not push to its logical conclusion the concept of democracy as a powerful form of government meant to deal with conflicts among humans. Those features also create a community too loosely constructed to act as a unified whole and govern itself. Such a body cannot be autonomous because it cannot control itself sufficiently to generate a common will.

In thinking about the role and function of democracy contextually, Sun also situates China differently from Europe, identifying it as possessing a dissimilar political culture and a different political legacy. There was, he argues, much more equal opportunity in politics in traditional China than in autocratic Europe in the form of the examination system.[97] It was the extreme political and economic inequality in Europe, he argues, that created "cruel and iniquitous" government that spurred ordinary people to rebel and led thinkers to

speak of natural equality that founds equal rights as a way of eliminating the evils of autocracy.[98] While autocracy in the West took natural inequality and pushed it "to an extreme," Sun argues that this state of affairs should not mean that we construct an artificial political and legal rights regime in reaction. This is because Sun was not convinced that traditional Chinese government was characterized by abuses of power. In keeping with the antirealist, technical strand in his democratic conception, he sees the possession of power in China as historically benign. People were not arbitrarily imprisoned, enslaved, or killed by the government. What is most important in safeguarding and furthering the welfare of people as a demos and as individuals is that competent people occupy office and have ample power to set policies, while citizens in general exercise their four powers, and those in office are not burdened with other safeguards. Sun's quarrel with the takeover of power by aristocratic families during the Chīng dynasty is not any contention that those families extended the power of the state so as to oppress the populace. Rather, he decries their incompetency, their failure to defend China from external enemies, their neglect of popular welfare, and their inability to correct course when the state failed to engage in good governance.

There is some controversy regarding the institutional structures Sun envisioned in terms of their relationship to dividing and checking power. Sun wanted a government that would consist of the usual three branches (executive, legislative, and judicial) plus two more with roots in Chinese practice: the Examination Yuan (which would administer civil service examinations) and the Control Yuan (which would act as an inspectorate). Some scholars see Sun's creation of this "five-power" scheme as building on the Western, liberal example of dividing power and providing the basis for checks and balances. These scholars point not only to his adoption of the classical scheme outlined by Montesquieu, which serves to break up governmental power among competing groups, but also to the importance of the Examination Yuan and Control Yuan in their capacity to control the quality of officials, especially the powers of the Control Yuan to investigate and impeach.[99]

In contrast, others argue that Sun did not mean the five branches of government to be the foundation of a checks-and-balances system. In this understanding, the establishment of these institutions was not part of a project to divide, dilute, or regulate power. Rather, they were meant more as functional and administrative entities intended to better organize power.[100] Where the

former view is supported by references to Sun's earlier work, particularly his *Fundamentals of National Reconstruction* (建國方略, ca. 1919), the latter view is supported by Sun's discussions in the democracy lectures. There, Sun wants to entrust large powers to those who are competent.[101] He founds this prescription on yet another modern analogy—shareholders giving authority to managers to run a company.[102] Managers do not necessarily hold authority for fixed periods of time or divide it among themselves. They are given power over the whole enterprise and hold it as long as they effectively guide the enterprise. Sun also reverts here to his technical conceptualization, likening government officials to experts. We use experts in all other areas of life without demur, he argues, so we should be comfortable doing so with political affairs because political experts know things that ordinary people do not. Experts also do not differ in their understanding; therefore, there is no need to pit one against another.[103]

It is also the case that Sun does not dwell upon the importance of constitutionally embedded rights and freedoms or term limits in his later works. Popular sovereignty is sufficient protection for the people from abuse by government.[104] His preoccupation with who holds office rather than limits on the powers of office itself extends to his historical understanding of the broader effects of power on the population. He bases his position on two arguments that again relate to the Chinese context. He takes that context as more generalizable than the European experience. First, he argues that Chinese political history reveals that governors were concerned with the throne, not the affairs of the people. The Chinese state, in other words, generally was not internally oppressive in the sense that government did not seek to control people's everyday lives through regulations and coercion. This situation locates China differently in terms of politics and political culture than Europe, and he implies that Europe is the outlier rather than the norm in this regard. This judgment leads to his second argument, that the Chinese state historically did not spur the growth of a popular political consciousness that put liberty as central to human existence.[105] As opposed to the European autocracies, which "pressed directly down upon the shoulders of the common people," Sun argues that "the dynasties and governments which followed the Ch'in adopted a much more liberal policy towards the people; apart from paying the regular grain taxes the people had almost no relation with the officials."[106] This means that ordinary Chinese people are not very concerned with individual autonomy

and lack a theoretical understanding of liberty, having taken negative freedom for granted for so long. Consequently, they do not long for the enjoyment of the individual freedoms that Westerners crave or obsess over their protection through a regime of rights and systems of checks and balances. It is only when the Chinese have developed further under a democratic regime that they will embrace liberty as a good to be valued rather than one that is only naturally experienced under their typical state and possibly desire such features in the state. But in the past decades, the Chinese state erred not in being too strict but in doing too little to discipline citizens by making them focus on the general good and national unity.[107]

Thus, Sun displaces liberty by favoring unity. As a form of government responsive to context, Chinese democracy must put nationalist unity and a strong state at its center. This is because the tasks China faced in the 1920s were not those with which the West grappled (eliminating oppressive monarchs and aristocrats) but rather the geographical unification of the state and its defense against imperialist powers, as well as economic development.[108] For China, unity should come first both in government and the demos. Diversity is not desirable, even if some forms of pluralism are natural to China. To make the attainment of individual liberty that allows for the full expression of pluralism the primary goal in the Chinese context is to err in a variety of ways. It is to waste time and effort only to arrive at a problematic situation. It is to run the risk of recapitulating the abuses of liberty and equality manifested in the West.[109] And it is to neglect the development of another necessary good—social discipline. The latter neglect is particularly dangerous, he asserts, because it is imperative to habituate individuals to act collectively and pool their strength to attain good governance.[110] As even Lei (who argues that Sun does attend to individual rights and freedoms) argues, while Sun would grant citizens a full slate of political freedoms and rights, those would be limited by the needs of the nation for a disciplined citizenry.[111]

This analysis may be more benign than it first appears. What Sun seems to be arguing is that the national unity (geographical and social) that Western states began to enjoy at the beginning of the early modern period is absent in China after the fall of the Chīng, the debacle of Yuan Shih-kai's (袁世凱) betrayal of the republic, and the rise of the warlords. This unity must be achieved before other matters, including individual liberty, can be attended to. At other times, individual liberty appears peripheral to his vision, not because that

good is unimportant to him, but because he believes the Chinese already enjoy that good. However, at still other times he appears to dismiss individual liberty as an overrated good that is not necessary for human flourishing (he never argues that the desire for liberty is innate) and is even antithetical to good governance in a modern democracy.

Sun seeks to soften this latter conclusion (or perhaps misunderstands the Western theory to which he alludes) by arguing that his subordination of freedom to other values is not so different from the approach taken by Western political theorists who have taken up the topic. John Stuart Mill, he argues, also held that individual liberty must be limited by the like liberty of all. The advocacy of absolute freedom brings "constant disorders and strikes."[112] While it is true that Mill would agree that individuals, in exercising their autonomy within the sphere of freedom he designates through the Harm Principle and other means, should voluntarily refrain from abusing their freedoms and, in the spirit of both freedom and equality, find principled ways of adjudicating among competing freedom claims by means of the law, he was not speaking of the types of discipline needed to turn a nation of individuals into a disciplined demos with a unified will. Sun misunderstands (or misstates) Mill's position, twisting it so that it would be compatible with his argument that China as a nation demands the forfeiture of the individualism Mill champions. For it is not the Harm Principle to which Sun refers but rather the maxim "To make the nation free, we must each sacrifice his personal freedom."[113]

Given his distaste for pluralism in the demos as well as his emphasis on unifying China, it is no surprise that Sun also rejects the avenues for expressing political and geographical diversity that Madison championed. In his discussion of the American system, he holds that even though the Federalists won the contest with the Democratic-Republicans and injected their strong state ideas into the Constitution, they did not, or could not, move all the way toward a unified, powerful state. The Federalists accepted a multibranch government "which divides clearly the legislative, judicial and executive powers of the government so that they do not encroach upon each other."[114] This is not at all to Sun's liking, at least in this passage. He is not, as we saw above, averse to organizing power through branches but to their separation and to the way in which regions are able to have a say in the affairs of the national government. Nor does he accept federalism. The US Constitution was a matter

of compromise, and the division of power between central government and the states in that constitution was a particular result of compromise. This development, he argues, leads to an important deviation from his preferred form of democracy and thus to only limited popular sovereignty.[115]

While Sun regrets this democratic imperfection, he otherwise accepts that the form of government the United States adopted was practically fit to its context. It was not a naturally united country and required the artificial politics of the Constitution to make a big state from smaller states. Federalism is, so to speak, a feature of democracy with American characteristics. But American-style federalism, he holds, is neither an intrinsic part of democracy nor suitable for China. It presupposes legitimate, self-governing territories with separate constitutions uniting to become a nation. China does not have such territories. After going to so much trouble militarily wresting control from rebellious regional warlords, it would be a foolish mistake to then establish semiautonomous regional governments in order to create a federal state. The basis for such a scheme would be mere imitation of the American model, not a close understanding of China's context or an understanding of the core concept of democracy. China must not emphasize theory, mechanical imitation, or divisions; it must emphasize practicality, relevant contexts, and unity.[116]

If Sun rejects (as I argue he does in the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* lectures) the separation of powers, checks and balances, and federalist features of liberal democracy, the final feature that might have supplied some limits on government power and official discretion is the rule of law. It is true that Sun emphasized the importance of a constitution as setting out the form of government and the political powers that the people are to enjoy. In embracing constitutionalism, he set the stage for constitutional law. However, he does not mention such law in his lectures, and it is unclear what powers the Judicial Yuan is to have (there is nothing regarding a concept like judicial review in his lectures) or how the Control Yuan is to operate. Indeed, he rarely mentions law at all except in the context of providing limits to individual behaviors. It is important for him that ordinary people not abuse their freedoms; thus those freedoms are bounded by law. But he does not discuss the subordination of officials to laws and, therefore, appears to adopt what Yu argues is the traditional understanding of "rule by law" (in which the ruler is above the law) rather than the "rule of law."[117] Officials are not held accountable horizontally by the application of laws. Nor are there references to how, or if, official discretion is

to be limited by legal principles and enforceable boundaries on the exercise of power. He appears to treat such legal boundaries in the same way he treats the boundaries created by rights—they are superfluous as long as "the people" control the state.[118]

Therefore, while Sun is at pains to argue that his advanced form of democracy fits China's needs, he is equally frank in arguing that this advanced form departs from the liberal democratic model. His privileging of elites in office, discomfort with multiple political parties, and refusal to emphasize either institutional checks on power or the establishment of individual rights fits more comfortably with the republican unitary and Chinese unitary models. His emphasis on the relative liberties traditionally enjoyed by the Chinese is technically correct yet, again, puzzling, coming as it does from a grizzled revolutionary. Was the only reason he rebelled against the Chīng really their incompetence? Is there really no connection between rights and freedoms and the welfare of citizens? Sun appears especially obtuse on these points. That other understandings of freedoms were available to him is sufficiently evidenced by his reading, and rejection, of liberal arguments regarding democracy in the West. Nor, as the work of scholars of Chinese conceptions of freedom and democracy demonstrate, can we argue that Sun was following or was trapped by a single Chinese understanding of those concepts that privileged the community over the individual.[119] Sun consciously and comfortably discarded a liberal model that privileges rights and freedoms for individual citizens, as well as its emphasis on the rule of law and multiparty elections.

There are also problems in these discussions for democratic learning in general. As noted above, one understanding of his position is that Sun prefers to see political office as a technical position, to be filled by those with the requisite competence and knowledge. This understanding can elevate a political elite so far above ordinary people that it is unclear how the latter could practically exercise overall control over the state. But we can go further. First, to objectivize politics and policies in this manner is to delegitimize dissent and pluralism. If there is, objectively, one people's will, there is no need for freedoms of association, speech, press, or other expressive liberties beyond that necessary for the entire community to gather and deliver its will. While that will is generated subjectively, it is reached collectively and apprehended objectively. Individuals need not voice their opinions on that will in other ways. It need not be detected through various means or interpreted. Nor is there

any need for a diversity of ways of thinking about policy matters. There is one correct policy choice, arrived at through technical means. The state in its downward accountability need not be sensitive to differences of interests or opinions and in identifying a general will or good through its own devices may come to reject such accountability altogether.

Second, deference to specialists and experts is also troubling for understandings of rights, freedom, and pluralism. In Sun's time and in the Chinese context, such deference was seen as unproblematic. Not only did such deference follow in the path of the traditional Confucian elevation of knowledge; it was also rational to follow the lead of people whose technical expertise, derived from long hours of study and practice, allowed society to be more productive. But deference to experts has a long history of association with authoritarianism and suppressions of freedoms, not just in China but elsewhere, as Dahl argues in his discussion of the guardianship argument. Moreover, we lose important sources of autonomy when we cede policy-making power (or its equivalent) to experts. The type of reliance upon experts that Sun appears to advocate does not mean utilizing a technical tool that has no impact on the autonomy of the community that wields it; rather, it means turning over to that tool significant, perhaps even total, power over the community that thinks it wields the tool. As Foucault reminds us, the organization of knowledge is also a source of power.

Sun's Contributions to Democratic Learning and the Chinese Conversation on Democracy

It is clear that Sun created and disseminated a conception of democracy. He considered himself a democrat. He believed democracy was a good form of government. He held that democracy was compatible with Chinese culture and not just an alien Western conception. He strongly urged that China become a democratic nation. His writings became a focal point for later official efforts by the ROC to claim a democratic heritage.

More specifically, Sun provides a contextual and instrumental justification of democracy. This approach soothed contemporary anxieties and insecurities. Any proposed form of government had to be drawn as powerful if it were to appeal to activists who favored a united China free from imperialist impositions. To argue that a democratic state would be a strong state provided a quick and simple answer to people who wanted to know how a democracy, which appeared to be a messy form of government, could solve China's prob-

lems. Sun dealt with this issue by referring to the success of the Western democracies internationally while criticizing their domestic performance and arguing that his contributions would perfect democracy's conceptualization.

By using a contextual analysis and references to historical *mínběn* arguments, Sun was also able to finesse the problems of transitions and origins. How could China, with its history of authoritarianism and relative paucity of explicitly democratic thinking, move to a democratic government? By appealing to contexts, Sun could dismiss China's authoritarian past as irrelevant to the present even while providing implicit approval of previous governments in general. By referencing *mínběn* conceptions, Sun could argue that democratic expectations and conceptions, in the form of people-centered governments, were not alien to China. Despite his labeling it as revolutionary, the move to democracy in his conception was really a transition to a different form of traditional government rather than a radical break with the cultural and political past.[120]

However, Sun's reliance upon utility and context comes at a cost. The first victim is his ability to delegitimize nondemocratic alternatives. By placing primary justification on good governance by a powerful state rather than the performance and products of such democratic processes as voice, downward accountability, and robust political choice, Sun's justification can face stiff competition from authoritarian governmental forms. The second victim is his conception of democracy. That is, his *jiùwáng* justification mixed with contextual analysis significantly affects his understanding of democracy as a form of government. It is no mistake that he takes a car as his metaphor for democratic government. In his understanding, governments are tools to be used for various purposes, and like tools lack intrinsic human characteristics. The only intersections between human nature and democracy that he mentions are those aspects of humans that establish their inequality and their existential experiences of facing problems. From a larger philosophical viewpoint, such distance may be valuable. To regard government as a tool is potentially to create intellectual resources by which to resist the state's encroachment on the individual. But in terms of democratic learning, Sun's instrumental treatment of democracy makes that form of government disposable in the face of functionally superior alternatives, just as any government is disposable in Locke's understanding if it does not perform the functions that remove the inconveniences of the state of nature. The difference is that the problems Sun wants democratic government to address are not necessarily

connected to the welfare of the individual as are Lockean functions. Neither do those tasks necessarily stand close to democracy's inherent strengths.

In turn, Sun's resort to mechanical metaphors also reveals important aspects of his democratic conception that stem in part from his *jiùwáng* justification and his understanding of human nature. Sun takes no pains to hide the fact that his conception is elitist and collectivist. Aside from his allusion to the four powers citizens generally hold, he displays little interest in the course of the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* lectures in the creation of the types of procedural safeguards on official power that had become the focus of much contemporary Western work on democracy. Sun wants an effective and powerful state, and for that reason he does not wish to shackle the Chinese state with what he sees as needless impediments to action or with naive requirements that give everyone a routine share of policy-making power. He understands political office as rightfully belonging to experts exercising independent professional judgment in pursuit of broad populist goals. He does not see government itself as an arena of interests or fear that government officeholders will pursue their own interests by means of governmental power. He perceives the demos as standardized and homogeneous, and insofar as he considers pluralism, he generally associates it with national fragmentation and a lack of personal discipline.

In Sun's reasoning, it is the four political rights or powers with which he furnishes the demos that would effectively keep officials under control and would do so more efficiently than the Western systems of elections, strong rights, and checks and balances.[121] The problems with Sun's forays into these forms of accountability are threefold. First, his expert class of officials does not appear to be very amenable to downward accountability. His discussion of the power of experts leads to the real possibility that they would ignore the electorate or manipulate elections. Second, his unitary understanding of the demos can serve to delegitimize dissenting voices and even to the overturning of elections that are deemed not reflective of the people's will. Third, his general discussion of downward accountability does not square with his elitist assumptions. It is not clear that ordinary citizens, given Sun's account of humans, have the relevant knowledge and understanding to intervene fruitfully in the activities of officials through recall, initiative, and referendum. It is not even clear that they have the requisite abilities to pass judgment on government officials through elections.

To put his conception in the Western context, Sun promotes a governmental model that resembles neither the brash, egalitarian democracies that arose immediately after the American and French Revolutions nor the mature liberal democracies that had evolved in the West by the early twentieth century. Rather, he prefers the types of governments that sprang up as a result of reactions to the excesses of the eighteenth-century revolutions. These governments did not recapitulate the aristocratic pretensions of the ancien régime but combined the centralization of power to which those old forms of government pretended with the energy of the ordinary citizens who overthrew the old guard. Despite his differences with the former, it is Rousseau and Machiavelli, not Montesquieu or Madison, that Sun ultimately follows. What Sun really desires is not a version of the post-1787 American state, or the French First Republic but a modified form of the French Consulate—a populist, republican, unitary form of elitist democracy based on plebiscites plus recall, initiative, and referenda. That such a regime could be highly effective is supported by France's experience. But the French experience also demonstrated its shortcomings, including its degeneration into full-blown Bonapartism. This danger, however, did not appear to trouble Sun.

One can make the case that Sun put forward an understanding of democracy that approaches a uniquely Chinese conception. He adopted in large part the Chinese unitary model, added the examination and control branches from Chinese historical practice, and argued that the design of democracy must be adapted to important facets of the Chinese context, including its political history and its existential challenges. In particular, he appears to reject many features of Western liberal democracies, such as federalism and a system of checks and balances, based on his reading of the Chinese context. Yet he also drew extensively upon modern Western history and adopted Western democratic practices, including the four political powers of the people that form a central part of his understanding. It is also the case that while he speaks of the Chinese context, he really did not market himself as a theorist of Chinese democracy. First, while he argues that democracy was discovered by both the Chinese and the Greeks, he agrees that democracy per se was not always suitable for the Chinese and that a period of tutelage is necessary for the inculcation of the political virtues necessary to practice that particular type of politics. Second, it is clear that he justified his conception of democracy as the next logical step in the advancement of democracy itself, not as a

variant of democracy that was only suited to the Chinese. He would conceivably argue that, as a perfected conception of democracy, it was just as applicable to the West as to China should the West wish to adopt a more advanced form. Third, he described the direct democracy model as inherently flawed from a democratic (not Chinese) point of view and portrayed the American model as idiosyncratic to the United States. So while it is clear that he did not position himself as a Westernizer, it is safer to say that he portrayed himself as a democratic theorist whose more advanced, generic, democratic model was best suited for China than to say he projected the image of someone who created a uniquely Chinese democratic model.

Chapter Three

Chiang Kai-shek

Democracy and Chinese Tradition

> As Sun Yat-sen had noted, there are three groups of people in any given nation. . . . It should not take an extraordinary amount of imagination for Chiang to conclude that he, the heir to Sun's mantle of leadership and wisdom, is the discoverer, his loyal followers the promoters, and the general public the practical men.

What was Chiang Kai-shek's public position on democracy? Did he provide meaningful discussions of the topic? Did he put forward a recognizably Chinese conception of democracy? It is clear that both on the mainland and on Taiwan, Chiang headed a government that fell short of democracy as measured by most mainstream definitions.[1] Chiang and the KMT were dominant. The government controlled laws and interpretations of the laws. Access to power was largely controlled by a single party. Chiang held the presidency until his death by being repeatedly elected by a body (the National Assembly) permanently dominated by the KMT. While elections were held at the local level, only a limited number of parties were permitted to participate in them, and competitive national elections, as well as other forms of accountability necessary for a truly democratic regime, were lacking.[2]

Despite this situation, I argue that Chiang did publicize and legitimize important democratic concepts. This chapter documents and assesses Chiang's discussions of democracy during his residence on Taiwan, exploring thematically Chiang's treatment of democracy in his public pronouncements published by the ROC's GIO from 1949 to his death in 1975. In all, I argue that the conception of democracy Chiang provided was somewhat more liberal than Sun's and that he offered a stronger justification of democracy than did Sun, adopted many of the problematic features of Sun's model, and projected the image of someone who had created a Chinese conception of democracy.

US president Dwight D. Eisenhower and ROC president Chiang Kai-shek enter Taipei City in an open car and are welcomed by people lining the streets (1960). Courtesy of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan)

Chiang's Problems

It is important to understand that, in its historical context, the conception of democracy Chiang presented was responsive to several important problems he faced: the need to unify the populace on Taiwan, the need to identify himself as the leader of the Chinese nation, and the need to link the ROC with the West.

Like Sun, Chiang faced the problem of achieving unity. But unlike the difficulties he and Sun faced on the mainland, where vast spaces, warlords, and a historic lack of Chinese nationalism were the defining aspects of the problem, those Chiang faced on Taiwan presented a different set of challenges. First was the reality of the Communist domination of the mainland after the Nationalists lost the civil war in 1949. In terms of territory, population, and military might, Chiang was at a severe disadvantage not just with regard to his determination to retake the mainland but even in the more immediate problem of defending his stronghold on Taiwan. To survive, he argued, the Nation-

alists must be united in the face of their enemies. In promoting democracy, Chiang had to find ways of disciplining the general population as well as his own sometimes fractious followers. Thus we find Chiang's emphasis on a unitary demos, the common good, and discipline, characteristics that form important parts of both the republican unitary and Chinese unitary models.

Related to these problems was Chiang's need to reinforce the understanding that he was the rightful leader of the Chinese people as a whole. In this task, he had at his disposal the long history of rulers' strategies for attaining such an end. Successive dynasties, especially those originating outside the Han areas, had resolved this problem by emphasizing their support for traditional Chinese culture. They adopted Chinese customs and embraced Confucian and Daoist thought and practices. Chiang also had Sun's example at hand. As we have seen, Sun was careful to argue that there was a Chinese basis for the political positions he took and did not discard traditional Chinese culture and teachings from his revolutionary storehouse. For Chiang as well, conceptualizing democracy as an expression of Chinese culture and himself as a traditional Chinese leader met part of his need to establish his status as the true leader of the Chinese nation. Such characteristics are, again, part of the Chinese unitary model.

Finally, Chiang realized that he depended militarily, politically, and economically on the West. This dependence had characterized his regime on the mainland after 1941, when his government was supplied by the wartime allies. This support became more erratic after the war, and there was a decision to abandon him after he lost to the Communists. The Korean War and the Cold War came to his rescue. Washington's unhappiness over the PRC's intervention in Korea and its attempts to increase the strains between the PRC and the USSR led to a resumption of ties between Chiang and the United States.[3] While Chiang's support stemmed mostly from Taiwan's strategic location, he naturally needed to go further in his identification with the Western cause; speaking continuously of democracy as part of his identification with the "free world" served this purpose. Bare invocations of democracy were not enough. Chiang had to demonstrate more forcefully that he understood democracy in ways that differentiated him from those who labeled their regime a "people's democracy." This requirement helps in part to explain his gestures toward meaningful constitutionalism and references to individual rights and freedoms associated with the liberal model of democracy.

Sun and Chiang

Understanding Chiang's portrayal of democracy also requires examining the influence of Sun on his conceptions. We find invocation of Sun's philosophy throughout Chiang's public pronouncements. It is clear that Chiang publicly identified Sun's understanding as broadly normative of any legitimate Nationalist position on the future of a Chinese state.[4] That state must, at some point, become democratic. But as noted in chapter 2 with regard to Sun's understanding, the democratic Chinese state would not necessarily be realized in the immediate future, nor would it conform exactly to liberal standards. In particular, we find that Chiang adopted the most salient parts of Sun's conception of democracy: that "government" as policy making is for experts, the demos should be a unified body, and a period of tutelage is necessary before adoption of a fully democratic regime. Acting on and expressing a common good that is discoverable rather than revealed through electoral competition just as strongly marked Chiang's conception as Sun's assumption of a general will. Thus there are major differences between both Sun's and Chiang's conceptions and a liberal conception of democracy.

But there are also differences between Chiang's conception and Sun's. Chiang makes more references to individual rights and constitutionalism than does Sun, making him somewhat more liberal. They also differ on the sources of political solidarity. For Sun, a focus on the nation and national goals, as well as the teachings of Chinese philosophy, would provide the collective spirit necessary to mold a people's will and a common good. He seems primarily to have had in mind the displays of patriotism that marked the American and French Revolutions. Chiang differed. He much more strongly emphasized the role of traditional Chinese ethics in fostering social order and discipline and making a unified demos of Chinese citizens. This stance partly flowed from the fact that Chiang did not privilege, as did Sun, the place of Western history in democratic theory. Where Sun (at least in his *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* democracy lectures) took the West to be the locus of modernity and an important source of political wisdom in terms of both philosophical concepts and experiences, Chiang embraced a more skeptical understanding of the West in general[5] and looked more fundamentally to traditional Chinese sources. In particular, he turned to Confucian and neo-Confucian writers and values for ways to unify and discipline citizens. We find him touting with much greater frequency than did Sun such Confucian virtues as benevolence, self-control, and goodwill as the markers of good citizenship and the sources of

the political and social solidarity necessary to make a democracy feasible, rather than participation, critical assessment of leaders, and other markers of Western civic virtue. It is here that Chiang cleaves more closely to the Chinese unitary model than did Sun.

The Literature on Chiang

Discussions of Taiwan's democratic transition often portray the elder Chiang as at best a nonpolitical contributor.[6] Politically, he is not depicted as a democrat. Even more than Sun, Chiang has been the subject of wide debate over his alleged fascist influences and political practices.[7] He is often depicted from the left as the author of an "anti-democratic political and economic philosophy."[8] Liberals likewise cast doubt on his democratic credentials by emphasizing his leadership of a Leninist party.[9]

Alongside such depictions is a considerable body of scholarship that understands Chiang not as a fascist, a strongman, or a pale totalitarian but more as a Chinese traditionalist. Some attribute his emphasis on virtue, the community, and nationalism to the influence of late Chīng restorationists.[10] Others argue for his association with attempts to preserve a traditional Confucian culture and hold that he was ultimately a follower of "reform traditionalism."[11] These judgments would put him outside the historical Chinese conversation regarding democracy, though still within the *mínběn* tradition of discussions regarding the nature of enlightened rulers.

Somewhat more sympathetic are portraits of Chiang as a military figure who ran greater China, and later Taiwan, as an authoritarian leader but with democratic accomplishments to his credit. Such is the general portrait provided in the late 1950s by Walker, who joins with others in praising the KMT's achievements on the issues of land reform and local elections.[12] In other areas, particularly in discussions that address individual rights and freedoms, some scholars argue that Chiang put forward a more liberal understanding of democracy than did Sun with regard to ordinary citizens. Lei in particular holds that Chiang was more interested than Sun in placing limitations on the scope and reach of the state, holding with Cheng that Chiang displayed, at least theoretically and rhetorically, a commitment to ensuring that government officials do not encroach upon the sovereign powers exercised by ordinary citizens.[13] Chiang certainly mentions individual rights and freedoms more often than did Sun and was not as adamant in asserting that the Chinese, for cultural and historical reasons, need not pay much attention to such concepts.

He also does not employ Sun's *jiùwáng* argument that China's context requires good governance through a strong state. However, most scholars (even those who display considerable sympathy for his politics) agree in describing Chiang's conceptions of rights and freedoms as falling short of liberal standards, containing as they do important attempts to balance the concrete autonomy conferred by rights and freedoms with equally compelling political duties to be disciplined, to take up responsibilities and obligations to society and the state, to respect strictly the rule of law as handed down by officials, and to conform obediently to official definitions of order.[14] Markedly absent is a liberal skepticism regarding the power of the state and liberal democracy's overall privileging of rights and freedoms as fundamental.

As is the case with Sun, many commentators are unimpressed by Chiang's abilities as a democratic theorist. Writers sympathetic to the Democratic Progressive Party, even if they grudgingly concede Chiang Ching-kuo's contributions late in life, refuse his father any credit for helping develop Taiwan's democratic understandings. More generally, the views of critics are summed up by Loh, who not only remarks that Chiang's understanding of democracy was circumscribed by his commitment to Confucian values but more generally observes that "Chiang was ill-equipped and inept in matters of theory."[15] The analysis that follows partially disagrees, holding with other studies that this judgment is exaggerated. Chiang's speeches and pronouncements, despite many weaknesses, do provide important and systematic elements of a democratic conception.

The Democratic Content of Chiang Kai-shek's Writings

Justifications of Democracy

The largest contribution Chiang made to Taiwan's democratic discourse was his assertion that democracy is good and attainable. He made this argument in a variety of ways, including his ritual invocations of the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*. More specifically, he elevated democracy as an important goal by identifying it with Sun and the ends of the Chinese Revolution, by referencing democracy's roots in human nature and a universal moral order, and by emphasizing democracy's compatibility with Chinese culture.

Democracy as Sun's Revolutionary Legacy

To a considerable degree, Chiang based his claim to legitimacy on Sun.[16] His claim to leadership of "Free China" was based on the perception that he was

Sun's legitimate political heir. This was partly confirmed by his leadership of the KMT and solidified by his occupation of the presidency of the ROC. But more important was his claim to be the political and intellectual, and not just institutional, heir of the founder. To be the true leader of China meant to be a leader in Sun's mold: revolutionary, ascetic, transformational, jealous of China's place in the world, optimistic about China's future, and a democrat.

In the course of these arguments, Chiang made the point that democracy forms part of the Nationalists' revolutionary goals and particularly Sun's revolutionary legacy by conflating democracy with the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*. For Chiang to emphasize democracy as part of the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* is of considerable significance. By identifying Sun with democracy and himself with Sun, he established democracy as the ROC's only completely legitimate form of government. This is probably one reason Chiang was so insistent during the 1950s on labeling the ROC regime on Taiwan a democracy, even though he later acknowledged that it fell short by many democratic standards. For Chiang to be Sun's legitimate heir, he had to be a democrat and had to preside over a democratic, or at least democratizing, government.

In ritually invoking Sun, Chiang repeatedly stated that the goal of the Chinese Revolution was the implementation of the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*. He tirelessly cited Sun's formula that the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* doctrine entails Lincoln's maxim that government should be "of the people, by the people, and for the people" and that important elements of the revolution will be fulfilled once all of China is ruled by a government that follows that maxim.[17] He made sure to emphasize the democratic elements of the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*, not merely glossing over them in anticipation of nationalism and people's welfare, as we see in this typical passage from Chiang's New Year's message for 1961: "Only our Three Principles, which stand for national independence, democracy and social well-being, are in conformity with the natural law and enjoy the support of the people."[18] Note the connection Chiang draws among democracy, the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*, and the national will. If Sun's legacy had to be protected and carried on in accordance with both his and the people's will, democracy was an intrinsic part of that legacy. This is a formulation found in almost every one of Chiang's ritual messages, generally delivered on January 1, October 10 (National Day), and December 25 (Constitution Day) from the early 1950s until his death.

Democracy Is Natural

Having made the connection between democracy and the revolutionary heritage of Sun and the doctrine of the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*, Chiang sometimes referred to a second point—that democracy is good because it is natural. We see one formulation of this claim in the excerpt quoted above, as well as in his October 10 message of 1959. In the latter, he goes further to argue not only that there is a connection between the doctrine of the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* and the character of the universe (*tiān xìng*, 天性) but also that human problems can only be solved by implementing the principles constituting the doctrine of the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*. There is an association, Chiang asserts, between democracy and natural law. Contrary to Sun's assertion, democracy is not man-made or artificial. It is involved with something bigger than and antecedent to humans.

In these assertions Chiang appears to refer to at least two conceptions of "natural law." When he argues that democracy and the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* are involved with natural law as the character of the universe (天性), he appears to make a general reference to Confucian and Daoist philosophical tenets that speak of the need for humans to participate in something that is part of the larger structure of existence. Democracy here is part of The Way (*tào*, 道), the naturalistic set of ethics everyone must follow. It is always right and proper to support democracy because democracy reflects the permanent character of the universe.

In the same passages, however, Chiang also invokes a traditional understanding of the "mandate of heaven" (*tiān mìng*, 天命) in a claim to legitimacy for democracy and the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*. This formulation is also compatible with a generally Confucian or Daoist conception of a universal structure and order that establishes what is natural and good for humans, but in a different fashion. In this usage, it appears that democracy is the way of the universe in the sense that it has the approval of heaven. This understanding is not connected with political type but rather with political performance. Authoritarian states in the past, which were headed by an emperor, have also been described as enjoying the mandate of heaven based on their ability to rule well. Here, the claim to legitimacy does not appear to be that democracy and the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* are *part* of the permanent structure of the universe and participate substantively in The Way but rather that they are legitimate because they *follow* The Way as a separate and universal set of criteria by which good

government in general is measured. This is a more transient and contextual understanding of political obligation. The mandate of heaven could change to reflect different circumstances (such as failures of governance or failure to follow The Way). Citizens would then be forced to change their allegiance to particular governments or even forms of government in compliance with these changed circumstances given that heaven does not, in this instance, dictate a particular form of government but only standards by which to judge good governance.

While the terminology that Chiang employs suggests otherwise, we must consider the possibility of a third understanding of nature and natural law given the fact that, by the 1950s, Chiang was a practicing Methodist and may have also picked up and used the Christian conception of natural law.[19] In Christian belief, if democracy is in accordance with natural law, it is compatible with God's will. One should support democracy because God ordered the universe so as to make democracy morally mandatory. This understanding would work similarly to the first conception described above, in that natural law is permanent and its injunctions eternal, not transitory. It is also external to humans, requiring that they learn it in order to have knowledge of it. This location of moral knowledge outside humans in Christian theology is also generally accompanied by the argument that humans cannot automatically choose rightly or intuitively understand what is right. According to most mainstream Christian theological understandings, human nature is no longer "good" in the sense that humans can automatically participate in God's will. The freedom of humans to naturally choose rightly (*libertas*) has been lost. Because of the Fall, knowledge of God's will is not innate within humans or otherwise automatically available to them. One must force oneself to conform to God's will and natural law and thus force oneself to conform to the dictates of an externally located moral code.

Chiang's further justifications of the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* and democracy as natural lead us to reject the possibility of his use of a Christian or otherwise Western conception. These justifications came in the form of arguing that the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* and democracy are associated with human nature (*rén xìng*, 人性). In these arguments, the naturalness of democracy is located within humans themselves. Humans fulfill themselves and are true to themselves when they live in a democratic political system because doing so expresses, exercises, or is compatible with something innate within them. One way Chiang made this argument was by disputing the human character of the PRC by

contrasting the latter with the character of democracy and the Three Principles of the People. He characterized the regime on the mainland as alien to human characteristics. "Communism is inhuman, reactionary," Chiang argued.[20] At other times, he argues that the policies of the PRC stray from human nature (人性). These assertions were meant to draw a contrast between the PRC and the situation on Taiwan, where democracy was said to be the rule.[21] The *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* is unlike communist doctrine in that it is not alien to humans or an imposition of ideas from outside the human experience. The mainland's government is different. It cannot operate without attempting to change human nature by violence. "The Peiping regime," he argued, "must first resort to terrorism in order to destroy the human nature and the moral principles innate to youths so that it may insulate them from the influence of their historical and cultural tradition, that is, the ideology of San Min Chu I."[22] Chiang held more explicitly elsewhere that a party that is both revolutionary and democratic was necessary to "human nature and the times."[23] Democracy and the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* are congruent with human nature and the nature of the world and universe, in part because the desire for freedom is innate in humans, and in part because people are naturally good.[24] As "the eternal ideal and goal for all mankind," the fulfillment of the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* and democracy is attainable and represents a universal and necessary project.[25]

Chiang then completes this argument by asserting that the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* are a decisive contribution by China and Sun to democratic theory and thus represent the culmination of the democratic project that humans have labored over for centuries. To implement fully the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* is to fulfill human destiny and usher in "an era of mankind marked by freedom, equality and human compassion."[26] Democracy and the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* are not just good; they are *necessary* to the continued existence of humans. In Chiang's rhetoric, therefore, the doctrine of the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* and democracy are the highest achievements of humans and must be attained, expressing as they do the knowledge and standards that are both innate in humans and contained in natural law. All systems other than democracy necessarily fall short of what humans require and what they are capable of achieving. To be without democracy is to experience a degrading situation that robs humans of their humanity, while to live under a democracy is to be fully human.[27]

We see that Chiang's references to human nature generally rule out the Christian and Lockean conceptions of natural law. Human nature refers to something intrinsic in humans. To follow human nature is literally to do what

comes naturally. One does not need to learn something that is part of human nature. Thus when Chiang holds that democracy is at one with human nature and says that democracy coincides with the moral precepts contained in the natural law that orders the universe, he is locating the goodness of democracy in both places. Chiang probably is not drawing upon Christian doctrine here because he claims a connection between natural law and human nature that is absent in most mainstream Christian accounts. In those accounts, humans must learn or otherwise acquire knowledge of what is good, including the contents of natural law.[28]

He is also not invoking a Lockean conception of natural law.[29] In Locke's understanding, natural law is part of the natural, preexisting moral structure of the universe. It contains various types of general moral precepts (respect for the life and property of others, for example) that are relevant to humans given human nature. But there is no overlap between human nature and natural law. Humans must learn natural law because knowledge of it (or indeed any knowledge) is not innate to them. Humans are a blank slate when it comes to knowledge. Instead, what humans possess are faculties and characteristics—they are rational and self-interested. It is through the use of their faculties that humans acquire knowledge, including that of natural law (i.e., they grasp it with their rationality). Thus, while Locke holds that an acceptable state can be justified by reference to human characteristics, he argues that the state itself is artificial rather than natural or at one with human nature. In this judgment, he is arguing two things with regard to the state. First, natural law does not dictate a particular form of the state, and no particular form of the state is part of the structure of the universe because the concept of the state itself is not part of natural law. Rather, natural law informs us of the characteristics of what would be a good state by providing standards that define the meaning of justice in any situation, whether a state is present or not. Though Locke goes further by conceptualizing the state itself as artificial, his natural law in this regard acts much the same as does the *mínběn* conception of good government and the concept of *tiān mìng* (though the latter is more performance oriented than the former). Second, Locke is arguing that neither the state per se nor forms of the state flow automatically from human nature. Living under a state is not part of humans' natural condition, and no understanding of a good state is implanted in Lockean humans.[30] The identification and creation of the structures of a good state are, rather, the product of rational thinking and human effort, not introspection or the apprehension of a

preset political blueprint that is part of a universal order. Locke argues that experiences in the state of nature are such that a rational understanding of natural conditions leads humans to create states that meet the standards of natural law, in that such states are capable of performing the political and other tasks that are implicated in the substance of natural law and the needs generated by the stresses of humans living together. A good state is one that is rationally justifiable by reference to an external and eternal set of standards. Humans build a good state and know that a state is good only through the use of their rationality to apprehend and apply natural law and by reflecting on their experience, not by consulting their intuitions. Therefore, Locke would not argue that a good state, a liberal state, or a democratic state is in accordance with human nature or mandated by natural law. Rather, he would argue that a good state is one that humans construct in accordance with a judicious use of natural human faculties that process experience and apply the moral principles that are incorporated in natural law.

This understanding of the state puts Locke in the company of Sun in that both see the state as an artificial tool. Where they differ is in Locke's argument that a state that performs very specific functions in accordance with specific normative criteria is always rationally defensible (given his assumption of a stable, universal human nature as well as stable natural law) and is useful for enforcing the moral precepts of natural law. This type of normative argument is absent from Sun's account; Sun instead refers to contextual and functional criteria and a plastic understanding of human nature.

Thus, Chiang differs from Christianity, Locke, Sun, and traditional uses of *mínběn* and *tiān mìng* when he argues that democracy is in accordance with both human nature *and* natural law. His argument requires that there be substantive content directly addressing the specific form of a good state in both natural law and human nature that is missing from those accounts. A particular interpretation of Chiang's references to human nature and natural law helps us explain this facet of his discussion. This interpretation accepts the proposition that Chiang was influenced by Wang Yang-ming (王陽明). Tsui and Lokuang argue that Chiang crucially accepted Wang's moral epistemology, particularly his acceptance of and distinction between innate knowledge and "learned" knowledge.[31] If Chiang is speaking of what is "natural" through the lens of Wang's philosophy, he is referring to innate human knowledge and the structure of the universe, both of which originate from and are imparted by heaven (*tiān*, 天). Human nature in this scheme is moral knowledge that is

planted within humans, as we see in Chiang's reference to innate moral knowledge in the quotation above.[32] Natural law is the moral and physical order of the universe. What is natural in this understanding, therefore, exists both inside and outside of humans in the form of permanent knowledge and ethical understandings that one intuits from within and learns from the outside through observation of and experience with the workings of eternal laws and principles. While one gains these types of knowledge differently, both participate in the same stable body of knowledge and reinforce one another. Both are also politically substantive, in the sense that they consist not just of such capacities and characteristics as rationality and self-interest (human nature for Locke) and general moral principles (natural law for Locke) but of specific injunctions that dictate that one particular form of the state is morally correct. To follow these precepts is to follow one's own nature and the precepts contained in structure of the universe; to follow both is to follow The Way. In this understanding, the distinction between human nature and natural law that a Christian theorist or a Lockean would embrace does not exist, and there is no tension in asserting that democracy is in accordance with human nature and natural law.

Nature as a Justification of Democracy

If this account is correct, then Chiang located democracy within a Chinese understanding of ethics in which moral precepts are seen to permeate the universe and inform the daily and political life of every being who follows the true, heaven-sent set of morals. To participate in a democracy is to practice a moral life and to follow the moral path that is The Way spoken of and extolled throughout the history of Chinese philosophy. This is a strong defense of democracy that departs significantly and usefully from Sun's justification, as well as from some traditional accounts. By invoking it, Chiang is able to avoid many of the problems that we found in Sun's account. By identifying democracy with an eternal natural law and positing a fixed human nature consisting of innate and substantive moral knowledge, he can hold that a particular, universal, and timeless set of moral understandings and principles demand a democratic state. Democracy is good and right for all humans at all times. By avoiding the *jiùwáng* justification, Chiang also need not deal with contentions that authoritarian regimes are better placed to solve China's (or Taiwan's) problems because the justification is not instrumental but moral. While he invokes cultural arguments and a general *mínběn* approach, his rendering is

sufficiently different to render moot the argument that nondemocratic states are also compatible with Chinese culture. Finally, Chiang's justifications of democracy on these grounds generally serve to delegitimize competing conceptions of the state. It is clear that the state on the mainland is delegitimized because of its inability to practice democracy. Competing forms of governments in general, despite any merits they may possess, are also delegitimized by their failure to follow human nature (including the innate desire for freedom he identifies) and their residence outside the confines of natural law.

Yet there are a variety of other problems and tensions in these arguments from the viewpoint of promoting democracy and delegitimizing alternatives. The first problem is precisely the fact that in making these assertions, Chiang departed significantly from Sun's position. For Sun, there is no innate moral approval of democracy. Instead, akin to Han Fei (韓非), Sun implied a kind of plasticity to humanity's political nature, such that humans naturally gravitate to different forms of government in different eras for functional reasons. So where in other places Chiang rested a significant portion of his justification of democracy on Sun's democratic legacy, invoking Sun as an infallible guide, he departs here from that legacy and undercuts an important part of Sun's analysis of China's political history. This unacknowledged departure brings significant incoherence into Chiang's line of justification. People reading the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* alongside Chiang's pronouncements cannot but be confused, leading to a possible conclusion that democracy cannot be justified, that those who promote democracy lack clearheadedness, or that the promotion of democracy is a kind of trick.

Another tension resides in the conflict between this assertion of naturalness and Chiang's (and Sun's) simultaneous assertions that the Chinese must undergo a period of "tutelage" before they are able to practice and enjoy the fruits of democracy. If democracy is, in fact, natural and good for humans, why would Chinese citizens need to undergo tutelage? Does not such an assertion, particularly the argument that the desire for freedom and democracy is innate, necessarily imply that humans are also automatically suited for this type of political order? If people have to be trained and educated to practice democracy, does not this position imply that humans are being changed, artificially molded, in order to fit into the democratic paradigm?

A solution to this problem may lie in the substance of Chiang's understanding of tutelage. It appears he did not see it as the imposition of an artificial character onto citizens but as the refinement and development of their

existing character and increasing appreciation and reliance on their innate moral knowledge. The development of virtues and discipline is the encouragement of elements that are already in humans. Thus his acceptance of humans as good (another difference from Sun) is important, as is his assertion that moral knowledge is innate. In this understanding, "tutelage" entails government programs that encourage the development of particular types of behavior in people that merely assist in the maturing of citizens into fully developed humans. Supporting this interpretation is Chiang's argument that people on the mainland, despite their experiences and the current government they endure, are also capable of democracy because of what they are as humans: "Remember you are all citizens of the Republic of China. . . . You all are endowed with the sense of self-respect, independence and love of freedom. In you lives a spiritual force to save yourself and the nation."[33] Yet, while this argument allows us to smooth over contradictions in this part of Chiang's discussion, it again implies a different understanding of the relationships among human nature, democracy, and tutelage than Sun supplied. For Sun, while tutelage did not entail a wholesale makeover of humans, it did seem to mean making the Chinese people partly different from before by stripping out their traditional localist mentality (though not all their traditional culture) and engrafting on them through teaching and practice a modern nationalist mentality and interest in public affairs that is compatible with democracy. This is possible because humans can be trained to adopt whatever type of state best suits the spirit of the times. One simply takes out one type of mentality and substitutes another. For Chiang, political elements reside directly within humans as part of their innate moral knowledge, and instead of having to be transformed in order to practice democracy, they rather must be denatured in order to reside under a regime that does not practice democracy or at least have democracy as its goal. The preparation they need for democracy lies in their development of innate capacities, not the inculcation of attributes. Again, Chiang's contribution to democracy would appear to be weakened by this basic difference from Sun, particularly given that Chiang never openly acknowledged it.[34]

Democracy Is Compatible with Chinese Culture

Aside from their roots in human nature in general, Chiang also emphasized the compatibility of democracy and the doctrine of the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* with Chinese culture. He made references sometimes to Chinese culture alone and

sometimes to the synthetic character of the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*. We find an example of the first tactic in an address in 1966. Here he held that

> Dr Sun Yat-sen was born just in time. By originating the *San Min Chu I* . . . he made possible the restoration of China's cultural tradition. I firmly believe that the essence of *San Min Chu I* is to be found in ethics, democracy and science . . . and these are likewise the foundation stones on which the traditional culture of China is built.[35]

Chiang similarly argued on other occasions that the Chinese have developed unique understandings of democracy and "obtained enlightenment from its internal sources and trod its own road of development."[36] He also referenced the *mínběn* justification, holding that democratic concepts had been formulated and advanced by Chinese reformers and revolutionaries for several hundred years.[37] Chiang furthered this argument by identifying even deeper roots for democracy in traditional Chinese culture and holding that Sun based the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* on traditional elements and figures. He held, for example, that the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* doctrine is based not only on Chinese culture in general but more particularly on the teachings of pivotal historical and philosophical figures, including Confucius and the eight virtues associated with Confucianism.[38] The most important of the latter for Chiang is the virtue of benevolence, which he held was intrinsic to the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* and necessary for democracy and good government in general.[39]

This is a somewhat diluted form of the *mínběn* conceptualization and derivation of democracy, but it works here (as in Sun's account) more as an argument for the compatibility of democracy with the Chinese character than as a use of cultural materials to fashion an understanding of democracy. Democracy in this argument is a form of government that has roots in indigenous sources. It is not alien. The Chinese did not need Westerners or any other foreigners to introduce it to them. As a nonalien political philosophy, it is compatible with the rest of Chinese civilization. As Chiang tended to view Chinese culture as homogeneous, this would make sense. In his understanding, doctrines with shared national and cultural origins have constituent elements ("foundation stones") in common. The combination of Chinese culture with democracy is therefore not incoherent in his reading, including the joining of democratic theory and practice with Confucian and neo-Confucian values and educational systems. But Chiang also seems to go further by appearing to

argue that the pursuit of democracy is the only way of fulfilling the promise of traditional Chinese culture. In finding democracy at the root of the teachings of important Chinese figures, Chiang claims that democracy is an integral part of Chinese culture. Not only does China not need the West to teach it democracy, and not only is democracy not alien to China; by association with key cultural figures, democracy is at the core of being Chinese. To reject democracy is to reject classical Chinese teachings, Chinese culture, and the genius of Chinese civilization. To be Chinese is to be a democrat.

Note both the strength of this argument and its subtle differences with a more classically *mínběn* justification. In putting democracy at the heart of Chinese culture, Chiang not only legitimates it as a form of government; he also mobilizes the prestige of that culture against any other form of government, thus turning on its head the general argument that democracy is not Chinese. This argument also differs from other *mínběn* justifications in that Chiang is not arguing that democracy is necessary because it conforms to traditional understandings of good government. Rather, he identifies democracy as a form of government within those traditions, reading democracy as implicitly present in those philosophical principles rather than bringing those principles forward into modern times and using them as a checklist for approving (and possibly limiting) democracy as a conception of government. As noted above, this is another area in which he differs from Sun; unlike Sun's position, this line of argument would not accept that previous authoritarian governments were defensible because they conformed to populist *mínběn* standards of good government. For Chiang, *mínběn* is not agnostic regarding forms of government; only democracy meets the *mínběn* criteria in his formulation because democratic principles are the *mínběn* criteria.

Despite the number of these assertions, Chiang sometimes also provided a somewhat different understanding of the nature of democracy and the origins of the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* doctrine in relation to Chinese culture. Here, Chiang references the Western origins of democracy and asserts that, in the form of the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*, Sun consciously distilled Western borrowings and added them to Chinese culture. In this rhetoric, Sun played a role in revivifying Chinese culture by adding to it an important leavening of foreign ideas. "Dr. Sun," says Chiang, "carried the moral heritage of the sages. He skimmed the essence from both Chinese and foreign cultures . . . and brought together all the excelling points in the vital synthesis of *San Min Chu I* culture."[40] In

pursuing this line of argument, Chiang holds that the modern concept of democracy had its origins in the American and French Revolutions. He emphasizes that Sun was aware of both premodern and modern democratic concepts in the West and used them in constructing the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* but was a crucial filter in adding to the Chinese version only those Western concepts that were sound because compatible with the genius of Chinese civilization. In these arguments, the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* is described as based on unique features of Chinese civilization in representing a "philosophy of virtuous rule and world harmony" and "a Tao that combines internal uprightness with external justice," but on the whole the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* and its democratic conception are not completely Chinese.[41]

Here Chiang argues that Sun built his democratic conception out of compatible elements of Chinese and Western understandings. This is a much more constructivist understanding of Sun's conception and project than we have discussed so far, and it contrasts more sharply with Chiang's naturalistic justification of democracy than does his purely Chinese cultural explanation. The latter can be made consistent with his naturalistic explanation by positing that democracy's presence in Chinese culture is a manifestation of its presence in all cultures. But his constructivist argument, by imputing agency and a degree of originality to Sun in creating a cultural synthesis, strongly implies that Sun's conception of a democratic state is artificial and thus stands apart from any natural conception.

Despite these inconsistencies, Chiang was generally much closer to Sun on this topic than he was in his discussions of democracy and human nature. And yet there are still problems. When Chiang wavers in his basic understanding of the origins of the democratic concepts he claims to have inherited, he raises important questions. Is democracy indigenous to China or not? Is it essentially Chinese or not? Is to be Chinese to be a democrat, or can one embrace some parts of Chinese culture that are not democratic and still be authentically Chinese? Can one build an authentically Chinese, nondemocratic government out of Chinese culture? If important parts of modern democratic thought are imported from the West, which are they? And how are we to know that they are in fact compatible with Chinese culture? Equally important, if modern democracy originated in the West and must be "filtered" to operate in China so that it is compatible with Chinese culture, might that assertion imply that there are democratic elements that are *not* compatible with Chinese cul-

ture? If so, which parts are incompatible? And how are we to know that the "filtered" version remains recognizably democratic? Must democracy be "purified" of extraneous Western elements? Must it be otherwise modified to fit the Chinese context?

Chiang never fully answers these questions, though he, like Sun, hints that Chinese culture may have little affinity with untrammeled modern Western understandings of individualism that are part of the liberal conception of democracy. There are also moves on his part that suggest he believed democracy must be given Chinese characteristics. This stance, of course, posed problems for Taiwanese advocates of democracy who looked to Western, liberal understandings. His overall understanding in this second cultural conception of democracy, unlike the first, also incompletely delegitimizes nondemocratic governments in terms of Chinese culture. But despite these problems, it cannot be denied that Chiang does some important work on the larger task of legitimizing democracy to Chinese traditionalists through these attempts to link democracy to Chinese culture and supplies better justifications of this type than did Sun.

What Is Democracy?

Chiang's conception of democracy was based on Sun's writings and, therefore, privileged the decision-making authority of elites rather than popular participation and individual expression. It is emphatically an indirect model. But he does not construct his understanding of democracy on the argument that democracies allow for the creation of strong states that are capable of good governance in the context of large national tasks. Instead, he conceptualizes democracy in terms of constitutionalism. Democracies are regimes that institutionalize popular control by means of written rules and procedures.[42] However, while Chiang sometimes referenced the need for democratic leaders to attend directly to the opinions of citizens as a constitutional form of downward accountability, he often depicted citizens in these references as passive, obeying the orders of officials rather than participating in active forms of accountability. Chiang also moves beyond understandings of rules, procedures, and even the constitution by stressing the importance of traditional Chinese ethics as the means for guaranteeing good governance on the part of officials and disciplined unity on the part of the demos. Democracy, he argues, requires the practice of virtuous self-restraint on the part of both officials and citizens in

addition to constitutionalism. This leads to an emphasis at times on what Fukuyama labels "moral accountability" for officials rather than institutionalized downward accountability.

Democratic Constitutionalism

Chiang's rooting of democracy in Sun's doctrine meant that he accepted almost in toto the latter's understanding of constitutionalism. He argued that a constitution is essential to a mature democratic system, implying the subordination of official power to a fundamental and binding plan of government rather than allowing government officials to create their own policies and procedures at will. As part of this understanding, Chiang embraced Sun's "five-power" constitution. Such a constitution, as we have seen, spreads power among five separate branches, seemingly dividing official authority and potentially setting the stage for checks and balances.[43]

In Chiang's description, a constitution is essential to a democracy because it connects people to government and reflects the fact that the citizens are ultimately sovereign.[44] At times, his understanding of constitutionalism accords with the liberal democratic conception of limitations on power and the rule of (constitutional) law. To have a constitution is to place limits on officials' powers through explicit prohibitions and mandatory procedures. Chiang alluded to such a conception frequently when criticizing the Communists, particularly in referring to the "terrorism" of Mao.[45] An intrinsic part of Mao's tyrannical rule, Chiang charged, was his willingness arbitrarily to jettison political and judicial structures and procedures that the Communists themselves had created. In contrast, he held that on Taiwan the government and the people supported and followed the constitution.[46] Procedures and laws should be predictable and stable to be good. He argued elsewhere that "our democracy is the democracy of a government under the rule of law," an argument that emphasizes that officials are not just the creators of law but are under the rule of law, and thus indicating that he rejects the traditional concept of "rule by law."[47]

Building on these and similar references, scholars such as Cheng, Lei, and Tsao and Tang argue that Chiang took constitutionalism seriously and can be labeled a constitutional democrat. They hold that Chiang's embrace of Sun's five-branches system and agreement with Sun that political powers should be divided between the people (in the form of suffrage, recall, referendum, and initiative) and officials (legislation, administration, judging, examining, and

censoring) indicate that Chiang accepted a subordination of officials to a constitutional plan of government that embodied a liberal system in which the government's power is divided and limited, checked by the citizenry at large, and subordinate to and disciplined by constitutional rights of the people and the rule of law.[48]

However, Chiang also expressed understandings that throw doubt on the strength of the constitutionalism he advocated. In those references, the constitution is merely a mechanical way of legitimizing power in which Sun's division of administration from sovereignty is less a system for checking power and more a way of empowering officials. In this system, the act of governance is reserved for those who have the knowledge and talent for administrative affairs. He quotes with approval the principle "Political sovereignty to the people and administrative power to the government."[49] In this formulation, there appears to be little purchase for constitutional structures. Power is given to officials, period. There is no room for checks and balances, procedures that limit the power of officials or other impediments to official discretion.

This construction of Sun's doctrine makes sense in the context of the political environment Chiang believed he inhabited. Given the goals of the revolution and the problems presented by the Communist takeover of the mainland, not only was the exercise of power by elites justified in Chiang's constitutional understanding, but centralization within the government itself was paramount. Again, while Sun provided for a five-power constitution, he did not necessarily see those multiple institutions exercising strong checks on officials' powers.[50] Chiang, in practice, paid even less attention to nonexecutive branches than did Sun and largely emasculated the principle of horizontal institutional accountability. While Cheng holds that Chiang can be seen as conceptualizing the five branches as the means for checks and balances among officials, he argues that Chiang really conceptualized those branches as performing functions in a linear understanding of policy making (the legislative branch supplies the ideas, the Examination Yuen supplies the personnel, etc.); thus they are designed to be the locations of discrete tasks rather than the sites of competing centers of power and representation.[51] Constitutional rules and procedures here have to do mostly with describing and allocating functions rather than the means for defining and constraining power or mandating downward or horizontal accountability. We also find Chiang defending the blurring of lines between such functional divisions. As Halbeisen has noted, the emergency provisions Chiang added to the constitution and defended as a

necessary response to the Communist threat strengthened the powers of the president of the republic at the expense of the Legislative Yuan, the Control Yuan, and the premier.[52] While Chiang did argue that the rationale for this centralization of power would disappear once emergency conditions ceased,[53] he was never moved to make such a determination.

Even more disturbing, while Sun stressed the importance of the popular powers of referendum, initiative, and recall as ways the populace enforce downward accountability, Chiang rarely mentions them. When we consider this reticence along with his lack of enthusiasm for horizontal checks, Chiang sometimes seems to see the constitution more as the framework the population has agreed government officials should use to organize and utilize political power and solicit legitimacy and less as a set of laws and norms that limit, check, and define the powers of government officials. Indeed, Chiang was not overly concerned in everyday political life with the concepts of limitations, divisions of power, checks and balances, or any other understandings of procedural democracy except in their gross, outward forms. Constitutional government in his understanding, as in Sun's, was compatible with one-party government—both are primarily organizational instruments that allow for efficiency and legitimacy in his understanding.[54] Chiang therefore often spoke of constitutional democracy as a matter of administrative efficiency and practicality, buttressed by an amorphous understanding of "social control."[55]

Consequently, the democratic conception Chiang often expressed emphasized the concentration of power in a constitutional framework whose purpose is the realization of political goals. The source of the constitution is the people, and ostensibly power is exercised for the good of the people, but ordinary citizens do not exercise power. Thus Chiang's description of the ROC government:

> Our Constitution was enacted by the people of the whole country. Our government was elected by the people and since World War II has been entrusted with the responsibility of leading the nation in carrying out the ideals embodied in the Three Principles of the People and the duties of our National Revolution.[56]

Again, in an important speech he had given earlier but reprinted in 1955, he eschews the notion that constitutionalism necessarily means that power is dispersed, even if it does means that different responsibilities are formally ascribed to different branches. The entity that bridges the branches, undoing

their separation if not their differences, is the KMT as a party charged with democratizing the country:

> In the present Party reform we are melding political freedom and economic equality in one pot. In organization we should bring together democracy and concentration of power so that the Kuomintang may become the revolutionary democratic political Party to carry out its mission of fighting Communism.[57]

At best, this is a version of the competitive elitist model of democracy without the prospect for much competition. The most disturbing element of this part of Chiang's conception of constitutional democracy is the notion that the KMT is above the constitution. Chiang never seems to have discarded this concept (as the reprinting of this speech suggests). The KMT was the entity empowered to run the government; to hold or not hold elections; and to create, amend, or abrogate constitutions. So while he held that democracy implies constitutionalism, it is not clear how much real bite constitutions in his scheme should have on nongovernmental bodies whose members believed themselves charged with implementing and defending democracy, or on officials themselves.[58]

As we see, Chiang does defend the general concept of constitutional democracy, but his practical understanding and depiction of constitutionalism is mixed. He specifically defends proceduralism and limits on power when discrediting his PRC rivals, but he does little to further that conception as an intrinsic part of a move toward full democratization on Taiwan and, indeed, tends to hollow out that conception the more he discusses it. His contribution to the public's understanding or expectations of how a constitution should operate in a democracy is limited by his refusal to outline a full theory of constitutionalism in the context of Taiwan's government, his blurring of the lines between branches of government, his views of constitutionalism as empowering officials, and his privileging of the KMT.

Traditional Chinese Values and the "Democratic Way of Life"

Chiang contrasted good governance with anarchy and argued that democracy does not allow everyone to do anything he or she wishes. In making this comparison, Chiang displayed some anxiety regarding the strength of Western liberal democracies to maintain order and social discipline.[59] Democracy in his understanding must be constructed as a purpose-driven form of government

that both expresses and forms the popular will.[60] In following this path, Chiang again leans toward the republican unitary and Chinese unitary models.

The reason morality and virtue are needed in Chiang's understanding of democracy is that he assumes that the diversity we find among people is the result of indiscipline. Both are problematic. Diversity leads to a weakening of the country and a lack of political focus. A lack of discipline leads to a breakdown of law and order. As noted earlier, Sun had turned to modern nationalism and the experience of democratic government as the glue that would overcome China's pluralism and form "the people" into a united entity. The Chinese would unite in a burst of nationalistic fervor in the same way that the French and Americans did in the aftermath of their revolutions. Chiang, having witnessed the weakness of Chinese nationalism both before and during World War II, is skeptical of this proposition. Not only the war but the social disorders and factionalism of the prewar and postwar periods seem to have influenced him on this score. This skepticism was probably reinforced by his training in classical Chinese philosophy. Moreover, he is generally more dubious than Sun of the ability of humans to unite themselves spontaneously and of the capacity of democracy alone to produce unity. People must be trained and educated in social mores and social discipline. While the potential for those attributes is inside them, they will not be developed if people are left to their own devices through the unfettered enjoyment of rights and freedoms. Their innate desire for democracy and freedom leads to dangerous possibilities if not balanced by disciplinary practices that originate both inside and outside themselves. To rule themselves collectively and defend themselves against such enemies as the Communists, citizens must participate in political and cultural systems that will provide them with discipline and virtue, he argues. Therefore, while he conceptualized democracy as part of a revolutionary agenda, Chiang emphasizes that the moral principles and virtues the demos and leaders are to cultivate should be drawn from traditional Chinese culture because of their content as well as their participation in China's heritage.

Chiang was always predisposed to the resurrection of traditional Chinese morality in politics, but he was especially assiduous in making this argument during and after the Cultural Revolution on the mainland. He interpreted this event and its disastrous aftermath as a vindication of his long-standing argument that the Chinese Communists were not only lackeys of the imperialist Russians but also people whose lawlessness resulted from their rejection

of Chinese tradition. Indeed, as he argued on numerous occasions, the correct interpretation of the Cultural Revolution was that the Communists were attempting to destroy Chinese democracy by eliminating the traditional Chinese "ethical philosophy" and "moral code" that provide the necessary cultural roots of democracy.[61] Or, as he put in on another occasion, freedom and democracy necessarily entail "the rule of virtue and benevolence" that the Communists lacked and the ROC possessed by reason of its attachment to traditional Chinese culture.[62]

Chiang also referenced lessons from Europe's immediate past to emphasize the need for Chinese values to help citizens attain the unity, discipline, and virtues that allow a democracy to operate and to mark the problems presented by an undue emphasis on rights and freedoms. "The Three People's Principles," he argues, are "based on our traditional morality as summed up on the eight virtues of loyalty, filial piety, justice, harmony and peace, benevolence, fraternity, faithfulness. If democracy is not founded on the eight virtues . . . it will be seized by political demagogues and turned into mob rule or totalitarianism."[63] This emphasis on traditional virtues appears in tandem with the theme of social discipline that forms the substance of Chiang's hectoring that often took place in the early and mid-1950s. Typical are remarks from 1953 that indicate that while democratic practice is important, something more than just political processes is needed, given that "no marked improvement has been made in the field of social and cultural reforms. The habit of extravagance and lavishness is still prevalent. Looseness in organization and moral turpitude has not been corrected."[64] As Lei, Cheng, and Tsao and Tang argue, Chiang wanted to create a "democratic way of life" that embodies the combination of rights and responsibilities, freedom and discipline, respect for other individuals and society, and unquestioning obedience to laws and the forces of order.[65] To enable "the people" to practice democracy successfully, the government must prioritize the teaching and practice of traditional Chinese values as a coequal goal with political democratization. The two must go together if the latter is to be worth pursuing.

Chiang developed more thoroughly the connection among the themes of traditional virtue, democratic realization, and the active role of officials in his Constitution Day address in 1968 in a way that emphasizes the importance of traditional values. Democracy, he holds, "is possible only in a framework of ethical government." It has to do with ruling and being ruled in a particular ways: "The ideal of democracy to be found in Chinese culture is to

'guide by virtue and regulate with decorum.'" This formula entails a strict separation of responsibilities between officials and ordinary people. Both must be virtuous, but their virtue consists of different things:

> As the ancients put it, "When the people are created, the Lord makes rules for them to follow; so long as they obey, they are possessed of virtue." Another old saying maintains that "Government prospers when it keeps pace with the aspirations of the governed and declines when it breaks faith with the people."

In this understanding, the virtue of government officials provides them with an active role, while that of the populace relegates them to a passive position. Government rules, and its officials ensure that its rule is democratic by "keeping pace with" and "keeping faith with" the populace.[66] This is reminiscent of Sun's argument regarding the correct understanding of officials' and citizens' roles and responsibilities. But Chiang goes further. In his description, the most important day-to-day responsibility of the ordinary citizen is to be autonomous (self-ruling) by following the traditional laws of morality. While external laws are necessary, they are not sufficient in a democracy. Thus, Chiang emphasizes that "it is up to each person to fulfill his responsibility as a man and to live up to the criteria set for humankind. . . . Only such a democracy can be regarded as sufficiently sound to avoid the discrepancies and shortcomings of run-of-the mill democratic systems."[67] This invocation of *rén* (仁) in terms of the responsibility of citizens to cultivate their humanness and follow The Way stands opposed to Western liberal democratic systems that lack an emphasis on morality, particularly the traditional Chinese moral values that stress solidarity over individuality. Those other systems, he argues, are not fully developed, not because they are institutionally lacking but because they are culturally and ethically immature. In such systems, citizens, by "abusing their freedom . . . have moved toward an iconoclastic negation of all their conscious values. Morals of day-to-day life have deteriorated into profligacy. Pseudo-democracy and social conflict have emerged in the political sphere."[68]

Because morality is important for rulers and people in Chiang's conception, there is room for the government to play the role of moral tutor. At his harshest Chiang argues that "the power of social control and mutual assistance should be employed to convert even the lazy to be diligent and the weak to be strong, thus strengthening general mobilization."[69] In his more temperate moments, he speaks of the need for further "accustoming our people to de-

mocracy, the rule of law, and the observance of law."[70] Overall, he argues, the key problem of democracy is discovering how to extend education to all citizens in such a way as to "promote higher moral concepts and spread knowledge among more people, thereby strengthening the foundation of democracy."[71]

Yet, while Chiang's dependence on traditional values to teach people morality and virtue points to an activist state, it also implies definite limits on public officials that were absent in much of his discussion of constitutionalism. If implementing the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* entails applying the eight traditional virtues of Confucianism to government officials, then the untrammeled will of those officials cannot be the source of public policy. Officials, too, must be disciplined, other-centered, mild, compassionate, honest, and competent.[72] As Chaibong has argued, these moral virtues, at least theoretically, present important checks on arbitrariness and "excesses" not just in their workings but also in the standards to which those officials may be held.[73] Such "moral accountability,"[74] when coupled with the institutional means of accountability in the form of elections, provides the demos with important tools for measuring the government's performance and underscores the proposition that officials are accountable to the population as a whole. Unlike the technical details of policy making and administration, which are beyond the reach of ordinary people in Sun's conception, the content of Confucian morality is accessible to all. This system of moral accountability also goes beyond the traditional *mínběn* criteria of good government. The basis for assessment is not only the implementation of policies that benefit the general public but also adherence to a particular set of ethical standards that limit the exercise of power. This understanding of the moral foundations of democracy makes possible a reciprocal relationship between officials and the demos that is absent in Sun's conception or in the traditional *mínběn* understanding. Both official and citizen, at least theoretically, can use traditional Confucian morality as a standard for substantive critique of behavior and possibly of policies.

Chiang did, on occasion, defer to this standard by admitting to his failings and retreating from claims to an infallible knowledge of political or moral affairs. Even if such confessions were a standard part of both Chiang's political strategy and his personal neo-Confucian practice,[75] they could be important for the development of a kind democratic ethos based on moral virtues because they discard the conception of an infallible leadership and emphasize a kind of popular accountability. Chiang admitted at various times that his "leadership has been at fault" with regard to various human right violations

and admitted that he had "brought more stains to the revolutionary history and have failed to live up to the expectations of all [his] compatriots."[76] This recognition of fallibility also spilled over into policy decisions, as Chiang admitted to a "dereliction of duty and failure of mission."[77]

Therefore, it appears that Chiang at least occasionally acted on and publicized this understanding of reciprocal accountability between political leaders and the demos and in doing so demonstrated a rhetorical commitment to the concept of responsible government and to the core democratic assumption that governments are inevitably fallible. In these references, he contributed to democratic learning with regard to accountability in general. But in substance, Chiang's invocation of a system of moral accountability did little to remedy his neglect of institutional and political downward responsibility. Equally problematic is the fact that Chiang's understanding of a democratic way of life depends upon the government's promotion of a comprehensive and perfectionist account of the good life based on a common acceptance of Confucian ethics.[78] The grounds for the possible critical assessment of government by citizens are those the government sets, not those the citizens themselves choose. Thus his understanding of democracy is not of the liberal variety but one with (traditional Confucian) Chinese characteristics.

The Nature and Role of Officials and the Demos

Even though democracy entails embracing traditional Chinese understandings of morality and virtue available to everyone, Chiang followed Sun in holding that administrative talents are not equally distributed. While few mainstream Western democratic theories support a completely equal distribution of power in the form of a direct democracy, only the most elitist vest as much responsibility in officials as Chiang often did. However, he was not consistent in this view; on some occasions he gestured toward a more robust role for citizens that entailed their guidance on public policy. Even more than in his discussions of aspects of democracy, Chiang puts forward inconsistent conceptions of this very important part of democratic theory. In wavering among different democratic models, though generally embracing the elitist understandings of competitive elitism and the Chinese unitary model, he provides rather weak lessons in the responsibilities and roles of ordinary citizens in a democracy.

Usually for Chiang, democracy entails "the people" electing officials who then exercise power on behalf of the demos.[79] Like Sun's conception, this

understanding implies a trusteeship rather than a delegative function for officials and thus invokes a conception of democracy in which the demos's role is mainly confined and subordinate.[80] This understanding also implies that officials are not to weigh the importance of various interests, compromise and bargain, or engage in other attempts to find common ground among a variety of viewpoints, because it assumes that there is a single, identifiable set of correct policies that the superior talents of officials recognize and act upon. This understanding is spun out in Sun's conception as the "people" articulating a general will that officials then actualize in terms of correct policies; Chiang, however, does not emphasize the subjective will of the people but rather the existence of a common good arising from objective circumstances. Voters need not choose among candidates using criteria based on different interests or various intellectual constructions of the world. Rather, it is the job of officials, with their administrative and intellectual gifts, to understand the common good and implement policies compatible with it. Choice among candidates per se is not as important as empowering those who understand the common good. Nor is choice among policy options important. There is only one "good" set of policies, and if candidates from a single party have a sufficient grasp of the common good and requisite policies, there is no need to have multiple parties putting forward different candidates and contrasting platforms.

In this construction, the absence of choice reflected by a refusal to recognize pluralism largely transforms voting by the demos from an exercise of sovereignty to a ratification of unequal power relations. While Chiang does not dwell at any length on the gulf between ordinary citizens and leaders, he often conveyed this understanding when discussing his expectations of ordinary citizens by describing popular participation in a fashion that limits its scope. For example, he held in an early New Year's Day message that the populace should "support and supervise the government . . . work harder and make Taiwan a model province based on the Three Principles. . . . I urge all our countrymen to review and promote the Four Reformation Movements."[81] The role ascribed to citizens here is passive and reactive. They are only weakly encouraged to criticize, assess, or even suggest measures but are exhorted more strongly to "support," "review," and engage in "promotion" because the "Four Reformation Movements" embody the correct policy. There are no other "correct" alternatives. The government having identified the correct policies, the task of citizens is to support the government and only "review" how

policies are implemented. Indeed, Chiang often described the correct role of citizens as "supporting" and "carr[ying] out all Governmental orders."[82] The assumption of such statements is that the government knows what is best and that citizens should subordinate themselves to that understanding and to the power of officials in general.

Chiang sometimes did embrace a more subjective account of the demos in his discussion of how the government operates in a democracy, though like Sun he still spoke of a singular will emanating from it. For example, in an address from 1964 he implies that government policy reflects the wishes of a demos that expresses a single will that the government apprehends and implements as part of its democratic duty:

> Of special importance is the necessity of observing and implementing the axioms that "national affairs are to be decided by popular will" and that "political power lies in the hands of the entire people." This has always been our attitude and a foremost requirement that we must fulfill without fail.[83]

Here, while it is public opinion that is ultimately said to control the direction of government, it is the government that interprets the substance and meaning of that opinion, and it is taken as existing in a singular form. On still rarer occasions, Chiang holds that it is public opinion that checks government power. He argued in 1972, for example, that delegates to the National Assembly should "abide by the wishes of your electorate . . . and uphold principle."[84] The public seems to be playing an active role in this statement by impelling government officials to follow their guidance and understanding. However, the public's input is not in the form of arguments for this or that policy or the expression of particular interests. Such a multiplicity of voices is not seen as helpful. Rather, as Chiang put it on an earlier occasion, it is the input of "responsible persons" that will lead to "improvements in public affairs," implying that there is an objectively correct set of policies that particular members of the populace may help government officials discover and correctly implement if the latter lose their way.[85]

Even when the goal is democratization, Chiang's emphasis was often on the role of the government, not the role of the populace, in identifying correct policies, implementing reforms, and creating structures. In discussing ongoing efforts to implement his early, much-trumpeted scheme of local self-government, for example, Chiang commented that the burden of action fell on the government, which should emphasize efficiency and education. "From

now on," he held in 1960, "we should further raise our administrative efficiency, increase the functions of local self-government. We should take another step forward in accustoming our people to democracy, the rule of law, and the observance of law."[86] The initiative always resides with the government in this view, with the populace expected to trail obediently behind. Chiang did sometimes refer to what initially appear to be more vigorous types of participation as part of his usual appeals for support from ordinary citizens on the mainland. Of the many promises he made should his regime regain control of greater China, one was that not only would "democracy . . . dawn once more on the mainland," but "we shall then undertake to initiate political consultations, amend the Constitution and hold nationwide elections so as to enable the people to make the supreme decision on national policy and steer the government in accord with public opinion."[87] These references to decision making and steering imply a role for citizens that extends beyond the passivity emphasized earlier. However, public opinion is still taken to be singular, it is the government that decides whether or not to grant elections, and public input is only of the most general kind. Chiang does not appear to be referring to officials being elected on the basis of competing platforms with different policy proposals and arguments. Rather, he seems to have in mind the holding of plebiscitory elections in which the approval of citizens is solicited for a group of sitting officials.

It is difficult to make sense of these differing positions. In part, they capture the inconsistencies of Sun's vision. But Chiang does not completely duplicate Sun's extensive arguments regarding the immense differences among people as a means of justifying his acceptance of Sun's position on the differentiation between the powers of sovereignty and the powers of officeholders. He assumes such a differentiation, as well as a unitary demos without much discussion. His elitism and antipluralism are implied rather than elaborately rehearsed. Again, he follows the republican unitary and Chinese unitary models of democracy in preference to the liberal emphasis on downward accountability and pluralism. Substantively, he provides useful accounts for democratic learning with regard to democratic citizenship only in the context of those models.

Elections and Limits on Tenure in Office

Consideration of the role of the demos leads directly to an understanding of the role, nature, and importance of elections in Chiang's public discussion.

Does his understanding lend itself to a conception of elections that includes broad eligibility for office and choice among candidates and policies? Do his discussions provide the basis for thinking that elections ought to be meaningful exercises in downward accountability? We know that, in practice, Chiang only moved in small steps toward implementing such a conception. While the government did allow multiple candidates to run for local positions, none but the officially sanctioned parties could organize electoral campaigns. Candidates who were not members of the KMT or the tiny officially sanctioned alternate parties had to run as independents (though a surprising number won). We also know that a full range of policy options was not on the table come election time because, for example, expressions of pro-independence and pro-Communist views were harshly penalized, as were, retroactively, criticisms of government policies uttered during election campaigns.[88]

Chiang did discuss elections with some frequency, approved of them, and described them as important exercises of popular will. But that does not mean that he approved of all calls for elections. He stubbornly clung to the argument that his government on Taiwan was the legitimate government of all of China and therefore must be kept intact until the mainland was retaken. This meant that the National Assembly, which controlled the election of the president, as well as the Legislative Yuan, must keep their membership without new elections on Taiwan because "the electorate [on the mainland] were no longer free to exercise their constitutional right [to vote]," and changing the composition of those bodies with only votes from Taiwan would be unconstitutional.[89] This position, of course, served Chiang well, for it is unclear that if completely free elections were held early in his tenure on Taiwan the KMT would have emerged victorious. He did, however, eventually change his mind on this question (allegedly at Ching-kuo's urging) and sanctioned elections to the Legislative Yuan to fill various vacancies.

Many of his statements reflected a narrow understanding of elections as opportunities for choice. In discussions of one set of elections in the 1960s, for example, Chiang argued that such exercises were mechanisms for picking the "right" persons to hold office and manage government on behalf of people. Elections in this sense were depicted more as a part of a broader, state-initiated program of government reform, renewal, and co-optation than as an exercise of sovereign choice and popular representation. This conception is reflected in a variety of ways: in the reason for holding elections ("We have decided to hold elections this year to choose additional representatives and to

fill vacancies in representative organs on the central level"); in describing the purpose of the election as being to "broaden and enlighten the function of our democracy by electing intelligent, competent persons to public office"; and in describing the desired result of the election as the capacity to "strengthen our program of self-government, enhance our system of responsibility in the source of the people, rid ourselves of bureaucratic abuses, and thereby reinforce the foundations of efficient, honest government."[90] In all these statements, it is the government that is in charge and that benefits from elections. Chiang does nothing to stress that elections are necessary and should be regularly scheduled. He similarly described an earlier set of elections as facilitating "mobilization for the suppression of the Communist rebellion" as well as "implement[ing] the ideal of 'letting all the people share political powers' and giv[ing] an opportunity to the young people to serve their country through periodic elections."[91] There is little in any of these descriptions about representing interests, debating policy options, choosing among different parties with competing policy positions, or the role of elections as important means of downward accountability.[92] Elections generally appear to have other purposes connected with strengthening the government or helping it conduct its business rather than with allowing the population to exercise sovereignty and hold officials accountable.

Chiang did, however, argue for a more expansive conception of participation in other discussions of elections. He held, for example, that if the ROC took back the mainland, a political program would be initiated to implement the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* doctrine, with the result that "every Chinese citizen is entitled to vote and/or to be voted into office irrespective of his class or party affiliation."[93] He also referred to elections as exercises of popular sovereignty.[94] These discussions do recognize choice as a sovereign and meaningful act, recognize equal citizenship, and gesture toward some understanding that different parties may develop different policy agendas and that elections are more than tools by which government makes its life easier.

Perhaps more important for promoting an expansive and meaningful view of elections is the fact that Chiang at times acknowledged the democratic shortcomings of the ROC in the area of elections. While he did often argue that the ROC was a full democracy and had progressed past the periods of military rule and political tutelage and reached the era of full constitutional government,[95] at other times he backed away from such claims. For example, early on he held that local elections were indications that Taiwan was "on the

road to democracy."[96] Later, he explicitly cited the need for more progress in democracy and referred to elections of municipal and *hsien* councilors as indications of "marked improvements" in "political democratization."[97] He likewise argued that movements toward "local self-government" and local elections indicated that "progress" was being made in implementing the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*.[98]

Again, we find a dichotomy in Chiang's discussion. Many of his descriptions of elections depict them as merely devices that those who hold government power use to legitimate themselves and co-opt talent.[99] At best, this reflects the elite-driven understanding of democracy he inherited from Sun. Government and party officials have superior knowledge and are rightfully ratified in their positions of power. His emphasis on having the "right" kinds of people in office also tells us that Chiang depicted elections on these occasions as, again at best, expressive of broad mandates ratifying the power of officials rather than the means by which ordinary citizens make fundamental choices about who should hold power and which policies the government should implement. Yet when it came to local elections, Chiang seemed willing to say that ordinary citizens should control and hold accountable government officials and government policy by means of elections. In this view, Chiang seems to argue not only for the possibility of real choice but also for the prospect that favored KMT candidates could legitimately be voted out of office as unsatisfactory, as inferior in ability to other candidates, or as proponents of policy positions the majority of the public rejects. This provides the basis, however tentative, for a stronger democratic conception in the vein of either a fully competitive elitist model or possibly the liberal democratic model. It also more generally provides an understanding, useful for democratic learning, of what citizens should expect from truly democratic elections.

Rights and Freedoms

Chiang's discussion of rights and freedoms, like other aspects of his discussion of democracy, is fragmented into several pieces that fit oddly together. He argued that the desire for freedom is innate, thus abandoning Sun's argument that freedom was not something in which the Chinese had interest. However, he also went out of his way on many occasions to argue for restrictions on rights and freedoms. We can see the outlines of this complicated stance by taking as an example a major speech on the subject in 1955. In this speech Chiang clearly articulated one of the fundamental tensions in his pronounce-

ments: the contradiction between his claims to be the head of a free democracy that recognizes a full range of rights for its citizens and what he argues are necessary actions government must take to safeguard those citizens against external and internal threats to their safety, security, and freedom.[100]

In the course of this address, Chiang argues that the foundation of democracy is in law, order, and national security. While rights are necessary, they must be built on law, while order and national security take precedence over them. So while he argues that democracy "must protect people's rights, and in order to obtain freedom, we must first have freedom of speech," he qualifies this assertion with an argument that depicts aims other than rights as primary: "As Taiwan is today the bastion for the Anti-Communist and Resist-Russia struggle, there must first be peace and order before we can have security." Decisions must be made "in accordance with laws and regulations and without favoritism or prejudice." This assertion sets the stage for his justification of limitations on a whole range of freedoms that he nonetheless argues are compatible with democracy and individual rights. Despite the fact that the government limited publications by rationing paper and punished some authors and publishers for articles that criticized the government or its policies, there was "no censorship," he insists. There is freedom of speech, he argues, as evidenced by the fact that "there have been published many suggestions, criticisms and even attacks on the government." But government tolerance should not and did not extend to allowing the public airing of views hostile to established policies, particularly those that have to do with mainland Communists and Russia. To do so, he implies here and elsewhere, is to contribute to public confusion and to the weakening of the nation.[101]

The sanctity of established policy, particularly in the form of national goals, represented one limit to speech and publication in this understanding. "Crisis" represented another. Speech could be limited because of the circumstances the nation faced. The greater the crisis, the more authority the government should have to limit expression in order to protect national security and preserve national solidarity. The fact that the "crisis" is ongoing gives the government reason continually to suspend rights. But Chiang goes even further, suggesting at times that any rationale will do, so long as provisions for limiting rights are enshrined in law:

> Freedom should be confined to the limits of law. Freedom of speech should not be otherwise. . . . There would be serious consequences on national morale

> and peace and order if we allow the publication of articles encouraging moral depravity or endangering national security. . . . [The press law that provides for suspensions] is not intended to gag, but to protect, lawful freedom of speech.[102]

This formalistic understanding of the limits of freedoms and rights has important implications. It implies that rights have no substance other than that which government decides to accord them. It could shrink them in any way it chooses as part of its power to keep order and secure the nation. There are no principles, no decision rules, no constitutional provisions, no precedents that must be consulted or invoked. This implication includes the law itself, in that Chiang's formulation suggests a plasticity to it—no citizen could have knowledge or insight into whether a particular expression or publication would run afoul of the statutes Chiang references. That determination would be entirely in the hands of government officials, who would make decisions ad hoc based on their understanding of relevant conditions.

These positions are fundamentally illiberal. They do not conceptualize rights and freedoms as fundamental, to be limited only to prevent actual disorder or when they conflict with one another. Here, governmental authority in the pursuit of order and security, as well as its own policy preferences, is fundamental, subordinating rights and freedoms. Earlier, we saw that Chiang embraced the notion that traditional ethics should be deployed to limit and balance the exercise of rights and freedoms. There, rights and freedoms are placed on equal footing with a set of moral principles supported by the government. In these statements we see a different picture of how Chiang sometimes conceptualized rights and freedoms as secondary to officials' preferences and their efforts to foster order and security.

In contrast, Chiang (in addition to the arguments from human nature previously discussed) did on occasion argue that rights and freedoms are necessary and in so doing implicitly endorsed the understanding that democracy is fundamentally connected with a strong set of rights and freedoms:

> We are all human beings; we are not machines. As human beings, we should have human rights, human freedoms, a human way of thinking and human dignity. If everyone is condemned to never-ending struggle in Peiping's "revolution," then for whose sake is the "revolution" fought?[103]

At various times, Chiang listed freedom of speech, publication, religion, and travel as necessary for a democratic regime. He argues that *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*

democracy entails a mixture of fixed revolutionary and national goals and negative freedoms for people. When fully instituted, democracy would mean there would be no more class struggle, despotism and violence, political chicanery, intimidation and war, no tampering with history and culture, no persecution of minorities or families. On the positive side, "everyone will be free to enjoy his freedom and to possess his own property."[104]

Yet Chiang was often more adamant in discussing the denial of such negative freedoms to mainlanders under the PRC than in defending their necessity for those who endured the rigors of his own government. For the latter, freedom must be balanced against the problems individual contingency brings. This meant that freedom for young people sometimes reduced in his discussions to the opportunity to become to ethical beings and patriots as produced by "*San Min Chu I* education."[105] Or it could mean that "disciplined freedom" was needed in the face of the dangers of hedonism, debauchery, degeneration, and the loss of moral courage that comes from modern prosperity.[106] Tsao and Tang emphasize this aspect of Chiang's democratic understanding, arguing that he was consistent in his conception of the relationship between citizens and the state. They argue that Chiang created a particular conception of democracy that builds on Sun's belief in the need for a disciplined demos. In this conception, citizens are expected to respect and contribute to society while living an individual life. In this democratic way of life, not only are individualism and social awareness balanced, so also are the importance of citizens embracing both rights and obligations and in placing equal importance on freedom and public order. All this is founded on a fundamental emphasis on the rule of law. Thus they argue that Chiang did not favor an authoritarian or illiberal state, even if he moved away from a strongly Western liberal model. He strove instead for a hybrid understanding that he thought best fit the need for individual autonomy and social discipline in the Chinese context.

This interpretation appears to give Chiang more credit for a systematic view than is really the case and to overstate his acceptance of individual rights and freedoms. It also appears to misunderstand the liberal placement of rights and freedoms and its resistance to government sponsorship of perfectionist life plans. But even in this sympathetic treatment, the picture we have of Chiang's conception emphasizes the fact that he partly followed in the footsteps of Sun on this question. For the latter, China, unlike Europe, historically had problems not with the absence of freedom but with too much

freedom. Revolution for him primarily had the goal of strengthening the nation through unity rather than pursuing the glamour of liberty. If this meant taking away some individual freedoms, Sun was untroubled by the prospect. Chiang seems to have partially picked up and perpetuated this attitude, though in his references to negative liberty he appears, at least rhetorically, to have linked liberty more closely to democracy than did Sun. He had absorbed from other sources, possibly Western, a partly liberal vocabulary on rights and freedoms that he liked to deploy when speaking of the mainland. But that liberal vocabulary sat rather incongruously alongside his other uses of republican and Chinese unitary vocabularies that stressed discipline and unity above individual autonomy.

As in many other areas, Chiang's contribution to democratic learning in this area is mixed. He does defend rights and freedoms in the abstract. He does list a number of rights as important. He denounces the PRC for refusing to respect individual rights. A regime that totally denies rights is, in this portrayal, not legitimate. But he does not provide a defense of a rigorous system of rights. He legitimizes the limitation of rights and their subordination to

President Chiang Kai-shek, in full military dress, delivers a speech during the 1966 National Day celebration. Courtesy of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan)

projects important to the government. He attempts to balance freedom with state-sponsored traditional ethics. He does not mention the need for an independent judiciary to defend rights. In all, he does not provide a very full or detailed understanding of what a democratic government characterized by a full respect for individual rights would entail.

Chiang Kai-shek's Contributions to Democratic Learning and to Discussions of Democracy in the Chinese Community

It is clear that, in practice, Chiang presided over a regime on Taiwan whose use of elections and constitutional precepts amount to something more than a "pseudo-democracy" in Diamond's terms and less than a democracy in Lipset's minimal definition. At issue here, however, is the democratic understanding Chiang contributed in his public statements and their possible influence on democratic learning and socialization. I argue that his rhetorical contribution was significantly greater than his practice. It falls somewhere between Lipset's standard and Diamond's conception of a liberal democracy, settling in a description that mixes the republican unitary, competitive elitist, and Chinese unitary models with liberal elements.

In contrast to Sun, Chiang provides a very strong justification of democracy that sidesteps many of the contextual and pragmatic pitfalls of his predecessor's defenses. For Chiang, it is not just modern humans (or Western citizens) who desire democracy. Neither is democracy the product of higher civilization or topical only because of the need for powerful states to accomplish historic tasks. Democracy is necessary because it corresponds to the natural order of things, is responsive to an innate human desire for freedom, and is identifiable with the substance of both an innate and an external understanding of morality and ethics. These justifications are intellectually congenial to citizens trained in China's traditional philosophical and religious systems and serve to delegitimize authoritarian alternatives.

More complex are Chiang's discussions of democracy in relation to the authority of Sun, Chinese culture, and tutelage. Chiang expends an inordinate amount of energy linking democracy with Sun. The ROC should be a democracy because that is what Sun desired. This justification is problematic from a democratic point of view, as we shall discuss more fully below. His rooting of democracy in Chinese culture, which mirrors aspects of the cultural *mínběn* justification, as well as his references to human nature, are also complicated by his insistence on tutelage. Part of this complication can be explained by his

belief that training in traditional virtues is important to democratic discipline and his probable assumption that tutelage brings out human potential. Nonetheless, to hold that the Chinese require tutelage before they can practice democracy puts the entire project of democracy in question as a potentially alien, artificial, or paternalistic construct that sits uneasily alongside his rooting of democracy in human nature and Chinese culture.

While he does not push a *jiùwáng* justification of democracy, Chiang's focus on nationalism and unification does affect his understanding of democracy in a parallel fashion. He suggests that, given the challenge of unification and later of the Communist enemy, a viable China can only be democratic if it stresses unity. Where Sun sees democracy as a valuable contextual variation of government that provides a nation with a powerful tool for solving problems, Chiang sees democracy as responsive to a facet of human nature that must be accounted for but that in operation can encourage fragmentation. Thus while he argues that democracy is anthropologically necessary, he speaks as if it is not always instrumentally helpful. Given that understanding, Chiang discusses democracy in ways that imply that officials must constantly pay attention to and guard against the dangers democracy poses, which come in the form of excessive individualism and social indiscipline. This is why important democratic rights and powers were suspended under the "Emergency Provisions"; as later justifications put it, the government could not allow citizens to exercise their rights in full or allow the participation of multiple parties whose "politicking . . . could divide a nation's strength" in the face of the Communist challenge.[107] Thus we find Chiang's emphasis on the unificatory and disciplinary benefits of traditional Chinese culture, benefits that he attempts to incorporate into democratic practice through the joining of rights and freedom with the civic virtues of responsibilities, discipline, and a rigid respect for law and order.

This last point leads to the observation that, in its contours, Chiang's conception of democracy follows Sun's in its elitist and unitary characteristics and shares the problems of downward accountability we identified in Sun's discussion. Like Sun, Chiang assumes that the KMT can represent the entire demos and does little to recognize the legitimacy of pluralism. This makes his state resistant to expressions of downward accountability. But there is a difference here between Sun and Chiang in their understandings of democracy's relationship to unity, with Sun relying upon the practice of democracy and Chiang relying upon on Chinese culture. Chiang also depends on tradi-

tional ethics for a form of moral accountability. Sun is closer in this sense to the republican unitary model than Chiang, while Chiang is closer to the Chinese unitary variant of democracy than Sun. Yet Chiang also goes further than Sun to incorporate aspects of liberal democracy into his discussions, particularly in the areas of constitutionalism and individual rights.

Chiang is a complex figure in the general Chinese conversation on democracy. When he emphasizes liberal understandings (constitutional forms, the role of the public, gestures toward rights and freedoms), he appears to draw more substantively from the West than did Sun. However, Chiang's rhetorical resistance to seeing democracy as only a Western concept, his insistence that it is a concept that must be adapted to Chinese contexts, his repeated references to Chinese cultural figures, and his employment of traditional Chinese ethics as the means by which to solidify the demos and balance individualism add important elements to his understanding that are clearly absent from Western models. Likewise, his justifications of democracy by reference to a Chinese understanding of natural law, the nature of the universe, and The Way produce a discussion that marks this version of democracy as different from Western models and distinct from the universal, advanced model that Sun put forward. Substantively, he mixes both sources more thoroughly than did Sun. Where Sun portrayed himself as a democratic theorist advancing our understanding of democracy while working in the Chinese context, the bulk of evidence points to Chiang presenting himself as a proponent of a Chinese variant of democracy.

Chapter Four

Chiang Ching-kuo

Democracy in the Context of Transition

> Under its ideology, Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People, the KMT did not define its role in terms of the struggle between progressive and reactionary classes. Instead, it justified itself as a moral and technocratic vanguard capable of guiding national construction and gradually introducing full constitutional democracy.

Can we find substantive discussions of democracy in Chiang Ching-kuo's public pronouncements, or were his references only cosmetic? If he did discuss democracy substantively, did he provide a vocabulary that reformers could use to demand democratic changes of the government? Does he provide materials for democratic learning and socialization? Did his discussion differ from Sun's and his father's understandings? Did he provide, and see himself as providing, a Chinese version of democracy?

Chiang Ching-kuo's Context and Problems

Like Chiang Kai-shek's, Chiang Ching-kuo's discussions of democracy must be understood against the background of the context of his situation and the problems he faced. As premier and later president, Chiang faced a political situation that had begun to change in the later years of his father's life. The PRC and the ROC were still in conflict. The public aspiration of the regime was still to retake the mainland, and Chiang spent a considerable amount of time comparing the sins of the mainland with the virtues of the ROC on Taiwan.[1] The ROC still identified itself with the West. But internationally, the position of the ROC was deteriorating. An increasing number of nations were moving formal recognition to the PRC. The most important blows were dealt by the United States, first with the understanding reached by Nixon with the PRC in 1972 and later with Carter's switch of formal recognition to the PRC and his abrogation of the mutual defense treaty between the United

States and Taiwan. Thus Chiang could not automatically count on the support of the United States in either domestic or international affairs. More particularly, any support the ROC did receive from the mid-1970s onward depended upon demonstration that it fit with the Western powers as a democratic nation and was different from the authoritarian PRC.[2] While support for the ROC always depended to some degree on acceptance of its democratic claims, from the late 1970s the practical value of Taiwan in the Cold War had diminished dramatically, making its claims to democracy increasingly important.

Coupled with these external factors were internal developments. As a leading "Asian Tiger," Taiwan experienced rapid economic growth from the 1960s through the 1980s, generating a large, educated middle class and rising levels of prosperity and sophistication. An increasing number of young people had also returned from schooling abroad during this period, bringing with them ideas about political and social reforms. These developments culminated in the formation of a series of opposition groups that demanded liberal and democratic reforms, including greater freedom of expression, the right to form new political parties and campaign freely for office, and the repeal of the emergency provisions that served to override or suspend important parts of the constitution. Clashes between the government and reformers occurred throughout the 1970s, culminating in the suppression of *Formosa Magazine* and the Kaohsiung Incident in 1979. Reformers experienced a period of repression throughout the early 1980s, recovering only later with the technically illegal establishment of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 1986. These demands for democracy, as the literature on Taiwan's transition demonstrate, placed pressure on Chiang to make good on the KMT's democratic promises.

Views of Chiang Ching-kuo

Views are quite mixed with regard to Chiang's relationship to the democratic transition that began, on the government's part, with the lifting of the "Emergency Provisions" in 1987 and the move to recognize the legality of the DPP. Scholars such as Ge and Hui emphasize Chiang's leadership in this process, with Ge identifying him as a key player in the transformation and Hui emphasizing the independence of his eventual decision to liberalize.[3] Huang and Wu attribute democratization to Chiang's economic development efforts and success in promoting a generation of Taiwanese leaders in the KMT.[4] More succinctly, a recent editorial in the *United Daily News* memorialized his

President Chiang Ching-kuo (glasses), seen here enjoying fishing with local villagers while on an inspection tour in 1979. Courtesy of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan)

one hundredth birthday by praising his leadership abilities and arguing that "every step [Ching-kuo] took advanced democracy."[5]

Others see Chiang favorably but are less laudatory of his democratic accomplishments. Some on the mainland see him as a Gorbachev-like figure who imposed a democratization process from above rather than allowing it to come from below.[6] Harrison portrays Chiang as a liberalizer but emphasizes that he did not push conservatives hard and died before accomplishing a complete transformation of the political system.[7] Jacobs likewise argued early in the 1970s that the KMT and its leadership pursued a contradictory course: it wanted democracy but was unwilling to share power with non-KMT leaders, resulting in a situation in which the KMT ran Taiwan in the same manner as an American political machine.[8] However, Jacobs also believed it significant that when on one occasion in the late 1970s "K'ang Ning-hsiang made

an outspoken call for political democracy . . . Premier Chiang Ching-kuo's reply showed considerable sympathy for democracy as did his other statements to the Legislative Branch."[9]

On the other side of the argument are scholars who downplay Chiang as a factor in the democratic transition. Hsu stresses the role Chiang played in creating an internal intelligence network and his skill in gathering a political clique around himself, arguing that his "tolerance of Taiwan's democratization was a shrewd recognition of the inevitable rather than a promotion of the cause of democracy as an ideal."[10] Likewise, Winkler holds that at the beginning of the democratic transition Chiang was probably headed to no more than a change to "soft authoritarianism" and operated mostly as a defuser of tensions between KMT and non-KMT elites.[11] Wachman also argues that Chiang was at best a reluctant reformer; he does not mention the KMT's previous arguments regarding democracy, and he highlights the importance of opposition to the democratic transition. In general, he holds that "although Chiang must be credited for seizing the opportunity to initiate reform, if he felt he could have continued to suppress the opposition, he probably would have done so."[12]

Others have specifically portrayed the democratic conceptions of the KMT in general and of Chiang in particular during the 1970s and 1980s as falling significantly short of the democratic practices that were later instituted. Nathan and Ho endorse Lerman's argument that, while it discussed democracy as a goal, the KMT leadership even in the late 1970s saw democracy in purely mobilizational terms, that is, as "liberating the energies of the people and channeling them into public affairs; disciplining the energies of the people; orderly discussion in search of a unified general will."[13] Taylor, meanwhile, takes a middling position. He argues that while in the 1950s Chiang was cool to the idea of democracy and rights, he became interested in political reform from the late 1960s and increasingly so in the 1980s. The democratic breakthrough of the late 1980s, in Taylor's opinion, was a joint product of the opposition's and Chiang's deliberate attempts to guide conservative elements in the government and the KMT toward democratic reform.[14]

Despite the harsher views of those associated with the DPP, the general population today tends to see Chiang Ching-kuo as more approachable and more democratic in his manner than his father. I agree that the evidence shows that he was ambivalent toward liberal democracy, particularly in the years immediately following his father's death in 1975. There is evidence of this coolness

throughout the 1980s. Nathan, Ho, and Lerman, in their critical descriptions of his theoretical statements and political practices, are correct in their portrayal of one conception of democracy that Chiang Ching-kuo put forward publicly. However, I argue that these assessments do not do justice to the totality of the conceptions of democracy he popularized. They miss parts of Chiang Ching-kuo's discussion that gesture toward the liberal democratic model and buttress Taylor's more sympathetic understanding of his political views. This makes his democratic conception appear even more mixed than those of Chiang Kai-shek and Sun Yat-sen.

The Democratic Content of Chiang Ching-kuo's Speeches

The Goodness and Possibility of Democracy

Democracy, the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*, and Sun

Continuing the line of argument Chiang Kai-shek initiated, Chiang Ching-kuo legitimized democracy by associating it with the goals and ideology of the Chinese Revolution and with the thought of Sun. Sun is often mentioned by name, and almost every speech by Chiang mentions the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* in association with democratic and constitutional government. For Chiang, Sun's understanding of democracy in the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* was often sufficient for his needs, and references to the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* were adequate to establish the necessity of attaining democracy as a goal. However, by establishing a commitment to Sun's thought and coupling that thought with democracy, Chiang did go further than his father in identifying democracy as the ultimate goal and defining characteristic of the nation. Democracy, in Chiang Ching-kuo's utterances, is located at the heart of what the ROC is all about. Typical of his discussion is the following, from a speech in 1979:

> We know that since the day the *Tsungli* [Sun] created the Three Principles of the People, the long-range goal of the National Revolution has never been changed and that since the establishment of the Republic of China, the nation has never budged from the long-range goal of "vesting sovereignty in the people."[15]

This passage touches on important themes that we find in many of Chiang's justifications of democracy. Three concepts are key: the centrality of "vesting sovereignty with the people" as democracy, the invocation of Sun's authority, and the placement of democracy among the paramount goals of the state. Popular sovereignty could, to a limited degree, be a substantive concept, as it is not merely the invocation of democracy as a label to be applied to any prac-

tice but one that appears to entail a specific practice and thus a specific standard. Democracy as popular sovereignty means that the state is responsible to and should be guided by the will of its citizenry rather than the will and interests of a ruling group. It implies a notion of responsible government and accountability.

To reference Sun, meanwhile, is to invoke the person the KMT leaders and others had for decades argued was the father of their country. But Chiang's references to Sun are more deferential and more numerous than those of previous leaders.[16] His invocation of Sun was akin to invoking George Washington in America in the nineteenth century—it was to associate a concept with someone whose judgments, character, and seminal importance have been established over time as unquestioned and unquestionably good.[17] Here, Chiang extends his father's argument. Sun is a person not just to be admired, not just to be followed, but to be obeyed and imitated politically. To say that he was in favor of democracy is to say that everyone in the ROC should similarly favor that form of government.

Finally, to identify democracy with the state in this way is to say that democracy is the defining feature of the state and the most important measure of the legitimacy of its government. Democracy is central to Chiang's claim to legitimacy, his claim to leadership, and his claim to act correctly. He implies that to be a good and effective leader, one must be a democrat. The same is also implied of ordinary people. To be a good and loyal citizen, one must embrace democracy.[18] As he put it in 1987, "Constitutional democracy has been the Republic of China's major national goal since its founding."[19] No other form of government is legitimate; thus all other forms are illegitimate.

Stepping back from these observations, one can see that there are several things at work, not all of them consistent or compelling with regard to democratic learning. First is the invocation of popular sovereignty. While potentially of some value, it is also rather empty. There is nothing in the reference that specifies how democracy operates. It gestures toward significant concepts, and people who internalize it will probably embrace important democratic expectations. But more is needed if robust democratic learning is to take place. Second is the continuation of the rhetoric that painted Sun as the all-knowing, benevolent founder of the Chinese nation. This was a conscious effort to cloak the ROC and the KMT's regime on Taiwan with Sun's legitimacy. Chiang thoroughly identifies Sun with China and the government on Taiwan and in turn uses Sun's ideology to establish the normative contours of the nation. Sun,

in this sense, is not just a KMT leader. He is the founder of the country, the one who managed the transition from premodern to modern China. He therefore establishes the necessity of democracy for everyone who is Chinese. To be for Sun is to be for democracy; to oppose democracy is to reject Sun and the modernity of the Chinese nation.

The latter claim is, to a degree, effective and powerful. Such assertions serve to delegitimize nondemocratic forms of government so long as one accepts Sun's position as decisive. References to Sun connect democracy with a rhetorical strategy common to many discourse communities, in that they often root both legitimacy and an understanding of the solutions to ongoing problems in the teachings of a founding figure.[20] This strategy is probably no less effective than justifying democracy by reference to stories of a state of nature or accounts of natural law. Yet the problem with this strategy lies in the proposition that people should and would accept Sun. Normatively, the problem is with the invocation of Sun's authority in terms of a democratic understanding of consent and free and equal citizenship. This problem is shared by the invocation of any authority figure. There was no poll that established Sun as the father of the nation. No one elected him the font of all that is right with Chinese politics. Moreover, automatically deferring to his program and his principles leaves ordinary citizens outside the circle of fundamental decision making, thus reinforcing nondemocratic lessons about the accountability and power of government officials. Such deference calls to mind the obedience that Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Ching-kuo, and other government officials routinely demanded of citizens in determining a whole raft of policies. Why should the people of Taiwan defer to the wishes and philosophy of a long-dead mainlander if Taiwan is to be a democracy? Why should they accede to the normative rules he set down? Why should they be subjected to his understanding of democracy rather than another? Even if effective, this justification is itself philosophically undemocratic.

There are also problems with the efficacy of such references as material for legitimizing democracy. This justification depends upon the continued exaltation of Sun and his *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* doctrine.[21] But as time passed and the events of Xinhai Revolution of 1911 became more distant and less relevant as a "mainland" event and Sun himself passed from people's memories, how many people continued to revere him as a founder? To tie democracy to Sun in this fashion is to risk its legitimacy in the long term. By the early 1980s, opposition groups began to turn to narratives of Taiwan's story as ways of thinking

about politics in general and democracy in particular, dwelling at length on the martyrs of the 2/28 Incident[22] and the participants in the events of the late 1970s rather than on the efforts leading up to the Xinhai Revolution on the mainland. Thus, while this mode of legitimizing democracy continues to this day, there is doubt as to its prior and continuing efficacy.

Democracy Is Natural

If Chiang held that democracy is good because associated with Sun, he also followed in the footsteps of his father in arguing (against Sun) that democracy and the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* participate in some natural set of moral principles.[23] One way he makes this argument is by comparing the effects of the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* on Taiwan with conditions on the Communist mainland. Mainland conditions, he argues, are unnatural, leading inevitably to popular resistance against the government of the PRC. Like all people, those on the mainland want freedom and democracy. They have, in Chiang's words, "undertaken struggle for freedom, democracy and survival. They want to live as men and not as animals."[24] There is, he argues on a later occasion, a "natural inclination of human beings to win their freedom as demonstrated in the natural course of history itself."[25] Likewise, in denouncing the PRC as "despotic and perverse," Chiang extolled the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* as humane (*rén*, 仁), particularly in their responsiveness to citizens and their closeness to what humans want. The *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* and the constituent goals of freedom and democracy are natural. They "have followed the course of nature and accommodated themselves to the needs of human kind."[26]

Here we have Chiang Ching-kuo rehearsing some of the arguments Chiang Kai-shek put forward. While he does not speak at length about innate knowledge and makes more references to history, he does locate democracy and *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* in human nature and makes the connection with heaven (*tiān*, 天) in arguing that they are part of the "course of nature" (*tào*, 道). Prominently displayed in this argument is the assertion that nondemocratic governments are not natural, are not humane, are not close to the people, and do not accommodate human needs. They depart from The Way. People on Taiwan have a moral obligation to strive for democracy because democracy is intimately tied to being human. All other forms of government, being unnatural and out of step with human nature, are therefore illegitimate.

Yet it is telling that Chiang did not refer to the natural character of democracy as frequently as his father did. He was less inclined to philosophize in

public, perhaps believing that the foundation of democracy in human nature had been sufficiently established by his father or that such a congruence was self-evident, necessitating no further elaboration. In any case, he reinforced the type of democratic learning his father promoted but made such arguments appreciably less often.

Democracy Flows from Traditional Chinese Culture

Chiang Ching-kuo is much more consistent than his father in identifying democracy with traditional Chinese and Confucian culture. He rejects the proposition that Asians are culturally incapable of embracing and practicing democracy. The Chinese are not “backward” in relation to the West. The Chinese do not have to undergo a process of cultural modernization in order to embrace democracy. They do not have to discard their traditional heritage or adopt an alien concept. Being compatible with, and indeed even part of, Chinese culture, democracy is congenial to the Chinese experience.[27]

In portraying democracy as something not alien to the Chinese, Chiang explicitly links it with Chinese cultural tradition. Such linkages come in a variety of forms. In one way, the connection between democracy and Chinese culture is elective. They are compatible not only because democracy represents an extension of that culture but also because the Chinese people, being deeply immersed in that culture, have recognized democracy as part of that culture and embraced it. Here the Chinese are not unthinking beings automatically following what is culturally compelling but discerning entities who can recognize and anticipate where culture is leading and help shape their own futures. In living under the doctrine of the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*, they have given their consent to the ROC’s correct cultural interpretation of government and democracy. Thus Chiang remarks that “the Chinese people have long since chosen to live under the Three Principles of the People, which are the fruits of our heritage of Chinese culture, so that the government of the people, by the people and for the people may become a reality for all China.”[28] At other times, Chiang emphasizes the direct connection between democracy and Chinese culture. Here he echoes his father in holding that democracy and the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* constitute an essential element of a living Chinese tradition. It represents a core part of the tradition, and the logic of that tradition *automatically* leads one to democratic understandings. The emphasis is not on consent but on being authentically Chinese. To reject democracy is to be obtuse regarding one’s cultural heritage.[29] Here, in arguing that the essence

of democracy is familiar and flows from the principles that the Chinese historically have embraced, Chiang accepts the *mínběn* argument that democracy was a political concept discovered by Chinese sages in their attempts to define good government. Likewise, Chiang argues that, insofar as democracy is a part of traditional Chinese culture, it is Sun's and the KMT's formulation that best exemplifies democracy and makes Chinese culture complete. There is no modern Chinese democracy without the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* doctrine, and Chinese culture is not whole without democracy. But implicit in this argument is also the contention that there is no need for Western acculturation or a Western conceptualization for democracy to flourish in the ROC. Ching-kuo stands with Kai-shek at least partly against Sun here, for the latter seemed to argue that "tutelage" would lean on more than just lashings of traditional Chinese culture.

Related arguments allowed Chiang to link the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* doctrine with the exemplars of Confucianism that form the backbone of what he regarded as traditional Chinese culture. These include the familiar historical figures Sun and his father cited.[30] To be democratic in this sense is to be a good Chinese not only in a broadly traditional sense but also more narrowly in the Confucian tradition. This argument also provided Chiang Ching-kuo with a way of conceptualizing the democratic connection between leaders with ordinary citizens. In Chiang Kai-shek's formulation, democracy as a traditional Chinese concept informed by Confucian principles creates a set of responsibilities linked with actions that are assessable on the part of the population in ways that policy decisions are not. Chiang Ching-kuo follows this lead by arguing that standards identifying what is good and harmful are embedded in traditional Chinese culture in general and specifically in such well-known artifacts as the *Spring and Autumn Annals* (春秋). In turn, he argues that those standards have been transferred textually to the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*, spiritually to the revolution, and politically to the ROC. Democracy as understood through the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* thus participates in the "cultural tradition" that the Chinese accept exclusively, which is based on traditional virtues.[31] Again, the implication is that to be faithful to one's heritage, one must embrace democracy because that heritage includes and informs democratic understandings of public affairs.

Chiang Ching-kuo's related arguments are consequentialist as well as essentialist. They hold that because democracy and the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* participate in traditional Chinese culture and because the developments on Taiwan since 1949 are grounded in traditional Chinese culture, the former are re-

sponsible for the economic and social progress on Taiwan that occurred since the removal of the Nationalist government to the island. Yet culture is not the only responsible or active agent here. Democracy, he argues on these occasions, was a process that began on Taiwan with his father's arrival, and its pursuit by the KMT led to the good things that have happened since. This argument seems to form a defense of the KMT's modernization plans, including its policies on political developments that implemented Chiang Kai-shek's understanding of tutelage. Where previously he had argued that no change was necessary for the Chinese to embrace democracy because their culture incorporated that form of government, here he argues that the KMT successfully met the challenge of preparing the Chinese society on Taiwan for democracy by both preserving and building upon Chinese tradition. Taiwan's society had to be modernized for it to be capable of supporting a constitutional government, even if that modernization only entailed pushing Chinese culture forward to its evolutionary ends: "When the Central Government moved to Taiwan 30 years ago, the overall situation was chaotic. But in that first year Taiwan began to implement local self-government," Chiang argues.

> Thanks to the dedication and diligence of all our compatriots, we have followed the blueprint established in the Three Principles of the People and built a solid foundation for constitutional and democratic rule, a prosperous and equalitarian economic system, and a peaceful and happy society. . . . These creations are unquestionably consistent with the thought, culture and way of life of the Chinese people and can meet the needs of future social development in China.[32]

This argument deepens those above by claiming that the KMT has established democracy, that creating a democratic regime was a conscious decision on the part of the party, that the actions of the KMT were in keeping with the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*, and that all are deeply compatible with traditional Chinese culture. Because of that compatibility and success, the party is justified in pursuing democracy as a political goal. Such action requires "dedication and diligence," not merely a perfunctory reference to tradition. The KMT is an active agent in bringing democracy out of Chinese culture and preparing Taiwanese citizens for it, not just a passive receiver and transmitter of tradition.

In general, these attempts to link democracy to Chinese culture are useful in promoting democracy. They provide a necessary amplification of the *mínběn* justification for democratic purposes and serve to legitimate democracy for culturally conservative citizens. They also provide possibly compelling justifi-

cations for ordinary citizens to embrace democracy while retaining their self-identification as Chinese in culture and national identification. To be a democrat does not entail embracing an alien ideology. Indeed, to be true to one's Chinese cultural and political heritage, one ought to embrace democracy. In discussing the KMT's role in using economic development to prepare the ground for democracy, these remarks also reflect an important scholarly understanding of events.

In examining these pronouncements critically, we also see several potential problems. First is the tension among the different ways in which democracy is associated with Chinese culture. At times, it is merely asserted that it is compatible. At other times, the argument is that democracy is intrinsic to that culture or that it represents the completion of that culture. At still other times, the argument is that democracy is associated with that culture but that some outside agent (the KMT) must necessarily intervene to put the two together on Taiwan through the process of tutelage. Not only is this potentially confusing; it also raises suspicion that this linkage is tactical and its purpose is to cloak the KMT's activities with the mantle of Chinese culture. Such confusion tends to lessen these arguments' utility for democratic learning. Second is the rather arid nature of these pronouncements. They achieve their aim more by forceful delivery and repetition than by conceptual power. It is not clear from these assertions what it is about democracy that makes it compatible with traditional Chinese culture other than popular "roots" that hold that the "people" should be sovereign. There is no acknowledgment on Chiang Ching-kuo's part, as there was on Sun's, that traditional Chinese government was autocratic, that democracy in its current form had its origins in modern times, or that important aspects of democracy (such as constitutionalism) came from the West. These arguments also do nothing to establish substantively how democratic concepts and forms align with specific parts of traditional culture. This task is left to other descriptions of democracy.

There are also tensions with democratic concepts that accompany the conflation of democracy with cultural identification. If to be Chinese is to be democratic, the corollary may require that to be a democrat on Taiwan one must be "Chinese" (as opposed to "Taiwanese"). To locate the roots of Taiwan's democracy on the mainland, in mainland culture, could not but alienate many of those who embraced a Taiwanese identity by resurrecting for them the programs of cultural homogenization that had taken place earlier in the KMT's rule on the island. That project also gestures toward the unitarian concepts

of the demos contained in the republican unitary and Chinese unitary models, concepts that could slide into culturally aggressive, essentialist, and exclusivist policies that reinforce moves to deny people on Taiwan cultural choice and agency.

What Is Democracy?

For Chiang, the fact that that the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* were based on traditional Chinese and Confucian culture distinguishes them in the understanding of democracy they provide. He argues that the ROC "has been an *independent* country standing for the traditional Confucian doctrine of humanity and practicing Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People, which stresses ethics, democracy and science."[33] Understandings and types of democracy, he implied, are tied to contexts: democracy arises and flourishes differently in different countries and different cultures and possibly at different times. Thus, he insisted, to be successful in understanding and implanting democracy, "democracy must be cultivated and not transplanted and . . . must be adapted to our own national environment so it can strike root in our own soil."[34] This assertion in part recapitulates Sun's argument that thinking about democracy as a form of government must take context into account, but here the thrust is more substantive. It implies that Chiang adheres to a version of "Chinese democracy" rather than merely democracy instituted in a Chinese context—that is, a version compatible with the aspirations and beliefs of the general Chinese public and its culture that may lead to important differences with Western understandings. "Chinese" democracy in this view cannot be compared with other versions or measured by any universal standard of democratic definition or practice. What this position means in practice, however, is uncertain because Chiang provided several different conceptions.

A Liberal, Pluralist Conception?

Chiang's statements on some occasions suggest he promoted a liberal and pluralist understanding of democracy. One early conception holds that democracy entails the government's carrying out the people's wishes. In this conception, government appears responsive to the populace, and the views of ordinary citizens are given prominence in ways that appear to modify Sun's stricture that administration be separated from sovereignty. The directions that the government takes from the people are portrayed as extending to the

setting of policy and to the administrative realm.[35] Chiang also went further in this direction in other declarations. In a set of pronouncements from the late 1970s, democracy is said to equal elections and the exercise of "democratic civil rights," protection of rights in a constitution, and an independent judiciary.[36] Similarly, he elsewhere associates democracy with constitutionalism, freedom, and individual rights, benefits that those on the mainland lacked.[37] Thus, like Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Ching-kuo argues that if the Nationalists were successful in reunifying China, they would create a full-fledged democratic state that would follow the practices pioneered on Taiwan, including "the institution of constitutional democracy, elimination of totalitarianism and class struggles, the responsiveness of government policy and programs to the will of the people, and equality of political power for all Chinese citizens, and assurances of equal rights for all before the law."[38] These statements refer to many features of the liberal democratic model. Responsiveness to the public, political equality, an independent judiciary, constitutionalism, and equal rights are all vital to such an understanding of democracy. This position stands in contrast to some of Chiang Kai-shek's arguments that nothing in addition to the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* is necessary for democracy. It also lacks the mobilizational elements that are often noted as characterizing Chiang Ching-kuo's predecessors' understandings of democracy.

But we need to know more specifically what stands behind these pronouncements and whether the enumeration of such features of democracy is consistent with the broader understandings of democracy Chiang referenced elsewhere, particularly given the fact that, even in the above description, he continues to talk of democracy in terms of government implementing the "people's will," a concept associated with unitary models. Did he ever follow up on these liberal references?

Chiang did fill in some of these details later in the 1980s. Important to these pronouncements is Chiang's recognition of the centrality of rights and of the existence of plural views and interests. In 1987, after the formation of the DPP, he made a point of holding that democracy entails "political freedom," the enjoyment of a "free life," and "rights guaranteed . . . under the Constitution."[39] Other details are found in Chiang's speeches delivered in 1984. In his inaugural address of that year, he characterizes democracy as a matter of making policies in a particular fashion—by open discussion among plural views.[40] He reiterates this position a few months later in his Constitution

Day address, where he argues that democracy entails constitutionalism, repeating that "there are no major issues of our country . . . that cannot be openly discussed for the purposes of reaching general consensus." The necessity of open process, close government attention to popular opinion, and finding rather than assuming consensus, he argues, is not attributable to a problematic condition that requires the addition of an external disciplinary body. Rather, it is due to inevitable, natural, and benign differences of understanding:

> We must all understand that in a pluralistic, open society, developments in each and every activity phenomenon are naturally complex. Because of differences among individuals' interests, always, views will differ on national and social affairs. In the same way, people will have different opinions concerning the various advocacies of government administration, themselves derived from different viewpoints. These are but normal aspects of modern societies based on freedom and democracy, and all are open to debate.[41]

This view describes democracy in a way that coincides largely with the liberal democratic model. First, it holds that decision making is an open rather than hidden and closed process. This could include all types of decisions and all possible options and, ostensibly, the participation of various types of people rather than only members of a single party. Second, it holds specifically that views are legitimately plural. This position excludes the argument that there is a single, objective understanding of correct policies that already exists, thus differentiating it from Sun's and Chiang Kai-shek's understandings that appear to brand dissent as dangerous and unpatriotic because they detract from or confuse a general will or the detection of a common good. It could also imply an acknowledgment of plural views on what constitutes the common good. It recognizes that plural views stem from different interests. There is therefore no predetermined or objective common good that it is the duty of the government to discover. In this understanding, to establish that a policy furthers the national interest entails a process in which everyone participates and all interests are included. The general interest is the amalgamation of particular interests, not something apart from and higher than those interests that is discoverable only by guardian-like elites.

This description, while underdeveloped and falling short of a full conception of democracy, provide evidence that Chiang did sometimes promote a relatively liberal conception of democracy. Government is portrayed as operating in a delegative rather than trusteeship mode and recognizing that the

common interest is synthetic and constructed from below through compromise among different interests and understandings rather than unitary and natural or orchestrated from above by the application of rules and laws. This description also acknowledges the natural and benign character of pluralism and a diversity of political views and does not assign to government any role in molding public opinion, reducing the scope of political diversity, or imposing any particular conception of the common good on citizens. The people here are active rather than passive. This portrayal departs fundamentally from Sun's story of the car as the paradigm through which to understand democracy and is different from the latter's arguments for an elite that is based on a natural hierarchy of intelligence and steers the machinery of state by reference to its own superior understanding of politics and policy.

These materials are useful for democratic learning, and liberal democratic learning in particular. They outline a conception of democracy that leads to expectations of participation, political freedom, and the acceptance of a diversity of views and interests. In this respect they point to important aspects of what will be Taiwan's democratic future, though they are sporadic and indeterminate.

Democracy as a Unitary Conception

In contrast, we find in other pronouncements by Chiang Ching-kuo a more consciously elitist and unitary understanding of democracy that is at odds with such concepts as pluralism, equal citizenship, and downward accountability. It is not just his tendency to identify a particular brand of democracy with a monolithic Chinese culture that is the problem here. He sometimes conceptualizes "public interest," for example, as something apart from and probably beyond the reach of general public understanding.[42] This position echoes the views held by his father, by Sun, and by the unitary models, all of which paint the general will and common good as entities that are objectively identifiable, more than the sum of particular opinions and interests, and understood only by elites. Leaders and the ruling party are key in this understanding of democracy. They are more than first among equals and act as trustees rather than delegates, for while they are said to embody and reflect popular aspirations, these aspirations and the understandings from which they flow are actually molded by the state or by a party that controls the state in this conception.

This understanding of democracy contrasts with the conception described above and is reflected in the ambivalent views on political pluralism Chiang

articulated in response to political unrest in the late 1970s. In contrast to his other comments on differences, he sometimes argued at this time that while pluralism is natural, it is at best regrettable and at worst the result of the failure of the population to discipline itself. It arises because "individuals cannot always harmonize themselves with the whole picture, and conflict between public and private interests cannot always be avoided." The government's task is to navigate among these views, while simultaneously limiting them to types that are compatible "with assur[ing] the public good and maintain[ing] social order."[43] Here differences of views, while again seen as natural, are conceptualized as the products of popular incapacities and the perniciousness of private interests. This understanding condemns any refusal to align oneself with an official policy as dangerous and disorderly and emphasizes the role of government in forcefully dealing with such recalcitrance on the part of innately troublesome citizens. The inability of ordinary citizens spontaneously to reach agreement on policies (particularly those the government thinks best) does not, in this account, spur recognition of the need for an open decision-making process in which the political system provides a way for ordinary actors to compete for the free allegiance of a majority but empowers governmental and party elites to overcome that deficiency in the interest of good governance both by identifying independently the nature of the "public interest" to be furthered and by passing judgments on the legitimacy of the views that citizens hold. In other words, one does not change the goal of acting on a consensus in the face of demonstrated pluralism; one changes the agent that pursues the goal. Pluralism is not the bedrock of or motivation for adopting democratic procedures; it is an obstacle to democracy for the same reason Sun bemoaned the lack of nationalistic solidarity among the Chinese. Democracy is understood in the same way Sun conceptualized it: as political elites implementing (and perhaps molding) the wishes of a potentially united, undifferentiated, and unperceptive demos. Absent a natural unity, it must be constructed from above with a predetermined understanding of what the consensus will entail.

These assertions are preceded in this particular discussion by an elaboration of democracy that underscores the proposition that, in the ROC's democratic system, the government and the KMT should be much more than active; they should be dominant in their relationship with ordinary citizens given the latter's shortcomings. Chiang here argues that democracy is a way of creating an understanding of the general will and accommodating political

conflicts within a predetermined structure of what is on the table for discussion and what is not, with the government playing the deciding role. He argues that this version of democracy is how government attempts to "harmoniously rectify extreme tendencies and accommodate conflicting views." Thus democracy is not so much about competition among competing visions and the determination of majority opinion but the attempt to create a consensus from above in the face of citizens' inability to do so for themselves.[44] This requires that differences be narrow and their expression muted and that the government be active and powerful. What is primary is not individual rights but the government's "establishment of the rule of law" as the framework in which "harmonization" is achieved.[45] This discussion, unlike those referenced previously, is compatible with the Chinese unitary model of democracy.

We shall return to the concept of the rule of law when we discuss constitutionalism. For now, it is sufficient to note that Chiang's concept of law involves the establishment of rules for dealing with diverse political understandings. For Chiang Ching-kuo in this iteration of the concept, democracy is a rule-based regime type. For him, as for Chiang Kai-shek, such rules are not limited to the external. Both argue that democracy requires discipline on the part of the people and on the part of government officials that places limits on both and internalizes the rules that flow from political and ethical conceptions. This allows the state to identify and promote a unified will that provides directions to the state and creates officials who are able, selflessly and faithfully, to identify and mold that will and to steer the state well. Here again, pluralism is not benign. It is a manifestation of a lack of discipline and an inability to follow rules. In this view, as in that discussed above, pluralism must be eliminated. But in the course of eliminating pluralism with the intention of making clear a general will, the government actually defines the nature of that will. As we saw in similar provisions in Sun's conception, the driver of the car of state imposes conditions on the passenger citizens and thus dictates their destination as well as the route taken.[46]

Because Chiang claims to put forward a Chinese understanding of democracy, he naturally argues that discipline is created by the leadership and the people exercising virtues associated with Confucian ethics and the good things those virtues bring. The association of culture with democracy points not to the importance of democracy but to the necessity of culturally generated values and discipline that mark democratic society with uniformity and orthodoxy.[47]

References to the party practicing virtue while exercising power on behalf of demos inform other parts of Chiang's discussion as well, such as his understanding of the ways in which governmental structures remain in contact with the populace in terms of accountability, responsiveness, and "honesty and efficiency." If these are to be attained primarily through the cultivation of virtues, then the expression of contrary views and the rotation of people in office are not necessary because the most important characteristics of government officials are not those that are generally considered when elections are the means by which people are placed in office. Such attributes are the products of training rather than attendance to popular views. Where Chiang understood virtues to be insufficient or officialdom in need of renewal, he supplemented political elites in this conception with the recruitment of citizens into the government and into the ruling party. Participation and contact between government and citizens takes the form of co-optation rather than independent activity on the part of citizens. Citizens are dominated by the state because they are not viewed as gaining access to political power through their own efforts and the support of their fellow citizens who agree with their policy views but rather by being "cultivated and promoted" into political affairs after first being subject to the "social education" everyone is to undergo "so as to improve social customs and make sure of political renovation to assure a high level of constructive political morale."[48]

Note the difference between this conception and, for example, the liberal understanding Madison put forward in *Federalist* 10. Madison also argues that the existence of factions (in the form of political parties and interest groups) and their association with political officials was unfortunate, but he rejected the notion that governments should control them or attempt to unify diverse interests. Free governments must put up with factions because to get rid of them is to deprive citizens of important freedoms and their natural diversity. Because it entails the removal of liberty and the attempt to mold people artificially, the cure for factions is worse than the problems they bring. In contrast, Chiang appears to invoke the concept that people can be active and united at the same time only if they adopt the appropriate, government-approved set of ethics and policies and are recruited for political activity by the state. This view does not leave room for organized political parties or interest groups; indeed, it views such organizations and their independent political platforms as dangerous to the web of relationships that form the foundation of social

order and solidarity. In the absence of such solidarity, governments should not give way to the desire for such groups; rather, they must actively seek their elimination.

Here, in failing to provide defenses of rights and pluralism and undermining arguments favoring limitations on government power, Chiang favors the Chinese unitary model. His conception of democracy in these remarks is incompatible with the liberal democratic model because of its hostility to pluralism. It is also problematic in terms of the republican unitary model because it gives too much power to the state and elites to form opinion. The power structure Chiang outlines does not meet the criteria of Rousseau's definition of democracy. In all, his discussion provides only weak stuff for democratic learning in general. He largely limits accountability to consultation and co-optation, while setting up the government as arbitrator as to what is and what is not an acceptable political view. More broadly, rather than emphasizing the importance of citizens' control over the government, their active role in government, and their participation in choosing leaders and providing independent opinions regarding issues and policies, he instead promotes expectations of passivity, obedience, and uniformity on the part of citizens.

Views on an Enlarged Party System

Given both the more liberal and pluralist understanding of democracy described previously and this alternative conception with its emphasis on creating consensus from above through rules, virtues, and discipline, it is no surprise that Chiang displayed considerable ambivalence regarding the utility of an enlarged party system as a means of putting officials into policy-making positions and generating downward accountability. Before 1987, he often appeared not just practically but philosophically opposed to such a system. While he noted in 1984 that "a politically pluralistic society already exists on Taiwan," he did not see this as reason to allow the formation of new political parties. Indeed, he pointed to that pluralism as proof that the KMT's predominant position and the existence of the "emergency chieh-yen" laws "have in no way restrained the normal free activities and welfare of the people."[49] This statement echoed the position he had taken earlier, in a similar setting, in which he held that the correct conception of democracy was fully compatible with one or only a few parties. This is because democracy is not about the representation of particular interests in government but about the general control

of government by the people as a whole and the government's responsiveness to the general public:

> The essence of democracy is to make, through the people's participation in politics, the government responsible for the well-being of the people and responsive to their aspirations. Democracy has no absolute connection with the number of political parties. . . . The absence of new political parties has not impeded the functioning of parliamentary politics.[50]

This position is likewise a reformulation of an earlier position Chiang held that defended the capacity of a single party—the KMT—to embody the general will and common interests of citizens without competition. To argue otherwise, he held, is to attempt to drive a wedge between the government and citizens. Such attempts are misguided and misleading because there is an inherent unity between the government and citizens. Significantly, Chiang assumes on this occasion the identification of the government with not only the people but the KMT. He rejects the notion that the government or the KMT could have interests particular to themselves and separate from the population as a whole. He also implicitly rejects the notion that the common will could be in dispute or is constituted by the sum of particular interests that must be expressed to be taken into account.

In this understanding, there is no need for multiple parties to provide choice, to furnish a check on the government and the KMT, to hold the government accountable on a day-to-day basis, to allow for the expression of diverse views or interests, or to allow majorities to institute their understandings of the common will that may differ from the understandings held by the KMT. Neither did Chiang concede that the government or the KMT might systematically abuse power, because he viewed both as nothing more than extensions of the people. In such circumstances, multiple parties are not needed and only serve to break the population into self-interested factions. In this view, the existence of dissent should not be treated as a reason for creating new parties but as evidence of the difficulties the government faces in creating a consensus from above. All that is needed, in Chiang's view, is virtue and goodwill on the part of the government and the people.[51]

Even in 1986, just months before conceding the necessity of expanding the party system, Chiang did not publicly discard his philosophical objections to adding more political parties.[52] Instead, he again downplayed the importance of political choice, preferring a conception of democracy that privileges gov-

ernmental sincerity in its attempts to remain close to the population, the need to forge consensus from above, and the centrality of the rule of law. Indeed, it was this conception that allowed him to argue at that time that the creation of multiple parties and the demand for constitutional democracy itself must be balanced against the requirements of national security.[53]

Chiang did, on occasion, publicly back away from an absolutist adherence to this conception and return to a more liberal understanding of democracy. In these interludes, he sometimes argued that it was not philosophical reasons that prevented the government from agreeing to the formation of new parties but that the time was not ripe, because of security concerns, to allow more parties. He implied that political choice is acceptable, even good, but stressed that what was most important at the time was "our freedom and stability, which are the keys to our political, economic and social progress."[54] At other times, Chiang also appeared to acknowledge publicly the need for multiple avenues of political participation and, therefore, the need for multiple parties. But he held in these statements that the existence of the Young China Party and the China Socialist Democratic Party (small parties whose leadership had accompanied Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan after the civil war) in addition to the KMT, along with the opportunity for a citizen to run for office as an unaffiliated candidate, provides sufficient choice. As he put it in 1982, "Kuomintang members and non-Kuomintang personages enjoy equal opportunities for political participation," and, therefore, "the channel of political participation is not clogged" by the absence of additional parties and the dominance of the KMT.[55]

The position Chiang ultimately took in 1987 in discussing the government's decision to allow formation of new political parties is consistent with the more liberal understanding of democracy and was therefore quite different from what we might expect from someone who also advocated "consensus from above." He argued that it was the government's goal all along to institute an expansive party system, thus implying that he had always embraced a conception of democracy that viewed political choice and multiple political parties as intrinsically important. He held that it was not philosophical opposition but security issues, the lack of sufficient economic and social development, educational shortcomings, and the problems of political stability that had delayed implementation of this democratic vision. There is no mention here of his earlier opposition to the concept of multiple parties and the philosophical shift that accompanied this move on the part of the KMT and Chiang

himself. Instead, he paints the KMT as having followed with ultimately liberal intentions Sun's developmental path to democracy, with the preceding few years representing the culmination of the tutelary effort.[56]

These materials again contribute unevenly to democratic learning. While Chiang reinforces the conception that government should be responsive to and take general direction from citizens rather than the interests of officials, his description of how such a democratic system should work fails sufficiently to differentiate a democratic electoral system from the manipulated elections that serve to legitimize pseudodemocratic regimes. There is little support for downward accountability here even when Chiang speaks in the language of the republican unitary and Chinese unitary models, and he sometimes runs afoul of the former. When he does reinforce expectations that citizens may organize themselves in political organizations free from government interference that would legitimize political pluralism, he sometimes undercuts democratic learning by elevating the importance of security. Free and plural political participation must take a backseat to government judgments regarding the suitability of the political environment in his view. People do not have the general right to participate freely; they only enjoy that privilege if and when government decides to grant it to them. This is, at best, a weak democratic lesson.

The Role of Leaders

A unitary and elitist understanding. We also see signs of Chiang's inconsistent views on the nature of democracy in his discussions of the role of political leaders. The less liberal and elitist conception comes across in defenses of the KMT and the government against criticisms of their policies, particularly allegations that the government violated democratic principles and individual rights. In response, Chiang often argues that it is the responsibility of leaders to use their power to "instill" beliefs in people. In doing so, he again often conflates the KMT with national government and with the popular will and attributes opposition and criticism of leaders to the KMT's "failures to exercise its influence and power of conviction in cultural and press activities."[57] Here leaders are not portrayed as constrained by public opinion, much less expected to respect and take into account understandings that differ from those the government favors. There is one general will; it is what the government says it is, and if people do not accept the government's definition, the government must try harder to make them accept it, and citizens must pay

closer attention to what the government says. This understanding runs afoul of both the republican unitary model (in its elitism) and the competitive elitist model (in its disregard for pluralism) as well as the liberal democratic model.

Even stronger terms are found in other remarks. Nations make decisions, Chiang once held, and while people have the right to speak, the assumption is that citizens will follow the government and the government is authoritative in its direction of the nation based on its interpretation of the interests of the nation. Expressions of opposition to the government's choice of strategies and goals, particularly its goal of retaking the mainland, are not tolerated. While he argues that identification between the government and the people is necessary, it is incumbent upon the government to make this connection through communication and other means, not by way of downward accountability. The government and leaders are the only real actors in this conception of a democratic political system. Thus, "The *government* considers the people's interests its interests and secures its rights from the people's rights" (emphasis added). Its strategy is to communicate its actions and policies to the people "so they will understand the position of the country and the actions of the government." This position goes beyond the usual understanding that the state must act authoritatively and laws must be obeyed if order and stability are to be maintained. It implies that all opposition to the government's actions, including policy differences, stems from either citizens' failure to understand (revealing a deficit of intelligence or inadequate government communication strategies) or from a failure of critics to acknowledge the interests of the people as correctly identified by the government (revealing a lack of good faith). Thus Chiang concludes, "If the government always keeps the people in mind and conducts itself in accord with their interests, the people will not withhold their support."[58] There is no room here for the possibility that a majority of citizens may completely understand the government's position and still not support the government's policies or administrative tactics or that they may be divided among themselves in their interests or may hold that the government, no matter what its policies, is incompetent. In a simple if-then proposition, Chiang assumes that citizens will agree with the government's policies if the government tries hard enough to communicate or, at best, consult with them.

Inherent in this last statement, however, is an intriguing strand. It gestures toward a deeper understanding of democratic accountability that is difficult to operationalize given the way Chiang formulates the general powers of leaders. What he implies in this conditional proposition is that a demonstrated loss of

support for the government may signal that leaders are not "keeping the people in mind" or "conducting themselves in accord with the people's interests." Differences between citizens' and leaders' understandings of correct policies and strategies may in fact indicate a democratic deficiency, the failure of leadership, and an illegitimate government. This is masked, however, by Chiang's insistence that leaders should help mold the people's understanding of their interests and that separation between leaders and people usually indicates failure of communication or, worse, treachery on the part of unfaithful citizens, rather than failure on the part of leaders to craft truly popular and effective policies. To put some muscle into this implicit leadership standard, Chiang would have to supply an understanding of the right of citizens to formulate an understanding of the general will and favored policy approaches for themselves. In other discussions addressing the role of leaders and the people, Chiang exhibits a profound ambivalence regarding the capacity of people by themselves to develop acceptable opinions, understand the common will, or hold views that the government should take seriously. Often he employs the tutelary conception he inherited from his predecessors that stresses leaders' responsibility to pay attention to the opinions of ordinary citizens but also to instruct people in how they should understand their interests and discipline those who would agitate against the government's understanding of what the people want and need, despite the fact that he argued that the state was now a constitutional democracy. He argues in one speech that it is the government's responsibility

> to uphold democracy and the constitutional government that enables the people to enjoy a life of liberty and equality, and to teach the people to perceive and experience the true meaning of democratic government so we can march along the right political road and ensure the opinions of the people are truly respected. I am convinced that in these times no one should undermine our constitutional foundations by spurning public opinion and giving false accounts of the facts.[59]

In these remarks, Chiang does not concede that ordinary citizens have the right to espouse understandings critical of the government, including advocacy of alternative policy approaches, without the threat of political leaders using state structures to punish them. Alternative readings of policies, motivations, and facts are subject to an official construction that could label them "false" and "contrary to the facts" and, therefore, fundamentally dangerous

to the public weal. Backing this reading is his emphasis on the government's duty to teach people the correct way of thinking and acting. He argues that it is incumbent on the government to team up with media in teaching people frugality, hard work, and national consciousness as well as "correcting decadent social morality."[60] Earlier, as premier, he had been even more specific in discussing what constituted the orthodoxy the government would promote.[61]

On the other side of this relationship, Chiang often refers to the need for leaders to exercise self-discipline based on ethical virtues and a devotion to some understanding of the common good. Chiang resorted to alternative methods of disciplining government officials in the absence of the checks provided by a completely free press and open political system. Inherent in such an approach is the danger that discipline and virtue will be directed toward ensuring that lower-level government officials keep the most powerful leaders happy rather than forcing them to be responsive to the populace and the common good. In other words, this is a recipe for upward rather than downward accountability.

One important virtue that Chiang extols is "benevolence." In one reading, the centrality of this virtue is troubling. It assumes not only an inherent and probably unbridgeable difference of power but also that the treatment of citizens in such fundamental matters as rights depends upon the indulgence of leaders to follow the wishes of the population rather than an inescapable requirement set by laws, the constitution, and institutionalized elections.[62] A benevolent leader, in this understanding, is one who rules benignly and tolerantly of his own account and without compulsion rather than one who is held to strict account by a populace that ultimately controls government. Benevolence implies a free gift of patience and charity given by the rulers to the ruled. A different reading, however, which sets benevolence more firmly in the context of *mínběn* democracy and traditional Confucianism as generally human qualities (*rén*, 仁), construes the centrality of this virtue as less disturbing. In this understanding, officials are expected to be benevolent because such an attitude is part of what it means to live a moral life, to participate in The Way. In this view, the government's treatment of citizens is not a matter of whim or indulgence but a natural expression of an ethical attitude that takes the interests of all into account. It is part of a fundamental and natural ethic, comprising those things that any decent human is expected to do no matter the source of his or her power or authority. To be benevolent is to do what is expected of anyone. Yet even in this reading, there is no role for structures,

laws, or instruments of political responsibility to discipline or change officials' behavior. As in all systems of moral accountability, it is up to the individual herself to develop the requisite virtues, and if leaders do not develop the virtues that constitute *rén*, citizens have no recourse to laws or politics to force them to act differently. Accountability is sideways to a moral ethic rather than downward to citizens.

In both these readings, initiative and action are imputed to the government and passivity to ordinary citizens. Citizens are not expected to understand government policies on their own, to make independent political decisions, or, more generally, to hold government and government officials accountable. The government and officials act benevolently. Thus, Chiang argues that it is the responsibility of leaders to keep people informed of its decisions and to govern selflessly while it seeks to regenerate itself from internal resources:

> The government should improve itself from time to time and keep our people informed so that they can always understand what is going on. I hope that in the end each of us will cast out our private interests and prejudices while keeping in mind the interests of the nation and the people as a whole.[63]

Connection here with the populace, as we shall also see later in some of the official PRC versions of democracy, is mainly through the mechanism of consultation. The government consults with the populace regarding its wishes and understandings, but there is nothing binding in that process. Consultation does not equal the acceptance of any popular program of policies and priorities. The government, not the populace, sets the agenda. Note also the linkage here between an active government, a condemnation of different interests, and the attempt to identify a singular public good and general will. There is no need for people to inform government of their interests because the public good and general will are things apart from and beyond those particular interests. Rather than being defended, particular interests should be cast aside and suppressed as unworthy of citizens in order for leaders, through the lens of their benevolence, to understand and act on the unitary common good.

At best, these pronouncements support democratic learning in terms of the Chinese unitary model, but even that judgment is questionable. One could argue that these lessons fall short of any truly democratic conception, lacking as they do any robust depiction of downward accountability. These views are too unitary for the competitive elitist model, too elitist for the republican

unitary model, and too unitary and elitist for the liberal democratic model. They appear, in all, to be pseudodemocratic.

A more liberal understanding. In contrast to these public assertions, Chiang on other occasions expanded on this understanding of selfless leaders governing in accordance with the common good in ways that go beyond the Chinese unitary model and pseudodemocracy. In these comments, he provides criteria by which leaders are to be measured in terms of the concrete, democratic accomplishments they are expected to attain. These include creating "the foundation of a democratic and constitutional government" as well as encouraging the creation of "a sound, prosperous and equalitarian economic system." He further holds that leaders are to abide by norms that accord well with liberal democracy. These include "respect for the people's judgment in ascertaining right and wrong in keeping with normality and rationality." This criterion, despite its qualification by the final clause, shifts the burden of judgment from leaders back to ordinary citizens, who are actively to use their judgment to hold officials to account.[64]

The norms that are to form the basis of that judgment include those of "legality." Chiang alludes to two norms important to democracy in this respect. First, he holds that "everyone should strictly abide by the laws and respect the rule of law." Because he is speaking here of government officials and leaders, he is arguing that those groups are under the rule of law, not above it. This position echoes earlier assertions on the part of Chiang Kai-shek that also indicated a liberalization of the latter's views and a basic recognition that laws and constitutional norms, not officials, are supreme. Thus he embraces here the rule of law, not merely rule through law. Second, Chiang Ching-kuo asserts that "our goal is to see that everyone is equal before the law and to respect his legal rights and interests."[65] This statement not only conceptually levels the field in terms of power between leaders and ordinary citizens but would provide citizens a vocabulary for demanding the construction of a legal foundation legitimizing challenges to the government over its strategic goals and policy decisions, a foundation that would allow citizens to control government rather than being subject to attempts to formulate a consensus from above. This formulation also recognizes the centrality of equal citizenship as the basis for democratic government.

In sum, we are again presented with materials that are mixed in their potential to contribute to democratic learning. Most of these materials privilege

leaders and government powers too emphatically to impart to citizens important lessons regarding requirements for strong systems of accountability and the need for citizens actively to participate in accountability processes. It is not accountability but consultation and communication that are called for. Many comments that do provide for accountability point upward or sideways rather than downward to citizens. Given that Chiang orchestrated a crackdown on dissent and began articulating the position that discussions must take place within the confines of a government-sanctioned agenda in the years following some of his more liberal remarks, these comments take on added weight. At best they serve to train citizens in the strictures of a Chinese unitary democracy. However, it is also important to note that by alluding to additional features, particularly by discussing the importance of public officials being under the rule of law and referring to equal citizenship, Chiang did provide a vocabulary useful to some aspects of more liberal democratic learning.

Constitutional and Administrative Machinery

Like Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Ching-kuo emphasized the importance of the ROC's constitution. Like Kai-shek, Ching-kuo did not dwell at length on the importance of procedures. But he did put more emphasis on rights, the rule of law, and equality before the law than did his predecessors.

In his public discussions, Chiang depicted the constitution as an important, if not the key legitimator of the ROC. He emphasized on these occasions his understanding that the people of the ROC had accepted the constitution, as it "is the consensus of all the people," and he held that the government had been faithful to that document's democratic "principles" and "spirit."[66] This position implies that if the constitution did not represent such a consensus, it would be inapplicable, and that should the government stray from it (if we assume the constitution does represent such a consensus), then the government would be illegitimate. Chiang at least gestures to the concept of consent here.

Chiang was careful to portray the constitution as both democratic and Chinese, praising it as the correct blend of political principles and respect for tradition. In mixing his description of the constitution as democratic in form with references to Chinese culture, he continued with the assertions he made elsewhere that democracy was good, that the type of democracy practiced in the ROC was congruent with Chinese culture, and that the realization of a Chinese brand of democracy was therefore desirable.[67] He once described the constitution as "the treasured book of nation-ruling through which Dr. Sun

Yat-sen's teaching is implemented, Chinese culture is carried on and national virtues are enhanced." It is also, he argues, "the symbol of democracy, freedom and justice."[68]

As the expression of Chinese democracy, what does the constitution do politically? In Chiang's argument, a constitution is a plan or rulebook necessary for democracy. Democracy is not merely the untrammeled expression of the people's will in policies and practices. It is the expression of the people's will as filtered through that permanent plan for distributing power and responsibility within government and between the government and ordinary citizens. Thus for Chiang the constitution provides several goods necessary for stability and democracy that the ROC by the late 1970s had not yet fully obtained. These included provisions that "enlarge political participation, safeguard freedom and human rights and assure that democracy and freedom are based on the will of all the people and can be advanced in accordance with moral rationality, dignity of the law, common harmony and sincere solidarity."[69] He further held that the constitution is "the fundamental law consolidating the nation, protecting the rights of the people, ensuring social stability, and promoting the people's welfare," as well the framework for a government whose main task was "strictly enforcing the rule of law."[70]

Chiang references several features of a substantive democratic regime here. The constitution provides the state with a fundamental law that must be obeyed. Rule by decree is not legitimate, nor are any actions or laws that do not accord with that law. The constitution as fundamental law also contains an authoritative description of citizens' rights that cannot legitimately be abrogated. The constitution provides stability. Democracy is not an unregulated market of ideas, policies, and preferences. It is a stable regime that works on the basis of consensus on rules rather than ad hoc arrangements. Finally, the constitution institutionalizes particular goals, namely, those that are outlined in the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*. This marks Taiwan's democracy as a *Chinese* product.

Chiang expands on the topic of constitutional rights both to contrast the ROC with the PRC and to expound his understanding of the limits on the rights the constitution confers. In so doing, he legitimates a vocabulary of rights as both rooted in the constitution and definitive of the ROC itself. But he also weakens that vocabulary by interpreting flexibly the powers of the government over the rights people may exercise in pursuit of political goals. The constitution may secure political rights of all kinds and particularly a right of expression in that vocabulary, but the government may also, in his view,

rightfully exclude particular beliefs and activities. Constitutional guarantees of particular rights in these pronouncements are not only conditional rather than absolute or expansive; they are, from the viewpoint of a liberal respect for individual freedoms, excessively limited. Thus for Chiang if "respect for human rights is a moral principle this government fully supports, and an important aspect of our anti-Communist struggle," that respect is not applicable to those who are "working for the Communists against our anti-Communist policy of safeguarding human rights and people's freedom."[71] As he emphasized in 1980, while the constitution provides for individual rights, "the exercise of civil rights cannot deviate from the course prescribed by law and cannot step outside the bounds of the rule of law" as interpreted by the government in its understanding of the needs and interests of the nation.[72] Again, as in Chiang Kai-shek's discussion of constitutional rights, there is no reference to specific principles or decision rules that would allow for the neutral enforcement of these strictures. The concept of rights as completely subordinate to any laws the government passes is both illiberal and highly formalistic.

This ambivalent attitude toward the security of rights within the constitution extends more generally to the changes in the constitution wrought by the "Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion." Even though these measures gave the government sweeping powers over citizens and did much to consolidate the power of the presidency, Chiang argues that they were not as harsh as outsiders perceive. He apologizes for them but does not paint them as inimical to democracy, or even to a democracy that promotes individual freedom. "In the face of the Chinese Communist threat," he argues,

> this measure is unavoidable. But its application is very limited in scope. Instead of impeding the people's freedoms and well-being, and disrupting social stability and prosperity, the "state of serious alert" has actually safeguarded all these. Therefore, the "state of serious alert" is a far cry from the military control envisioned by Westerners in a martial law situation.[73]

While Chiang is at pains to argue that the effects of the "Temporary Provisions" are much milder than portrayed, he is also arguing that the abrogation of constitutional rights is a defensible action. He is by no means advocating constitutional absolutism or posing as a strong civil libertarian in arguing that such infringements on rights, structures, and procedures do not threaten freedom. His argument on this topic slides close to a manipulation of a con-

stitutional and democratic vocabulary and therefore to a weakening of that vocabulary as material for democratic learning.

In contrast, at other times Chiang's emphasis on the rule of law and equality before the law contributes positively to the vocabulary of democracy he provided. Beginning when he was premier in the late 1960s, his references to the rule of law are often couched in terms of the necessity of ordinary citizens obeying the law, but they also point to the need for government officials to operate within the boundaries of law. He argues that "to abide by the rule of law means that our fundamental principles, system and specific policies must be consistent with the provisions of the Constitution. This is what we mean by constitutional rule."[74] This implies that commitments to abide by those provisions must be permanent rather than contingent and that government officials can be held to account at any time for their failure to abide by laws or to grant equality before the law. Crucial as well to these discussions is Chiang's accompanying acknowledgment that equality before the law is likewise important.[75] This acknowledgment, contrary to his other discussions of the role of leaders, points to an equalization of power between officials and citizens in terms of equal citizenship such that officials do not dictate to citizens the terms of their political existence.[76] For Chiang, the rule of law importantly means that "everyone is free within the bounds of the law."[77] In these arguments, the rule of law, the concept of equality before the law, and negative freedoms are linked with democracy and with the constitution. This linkage expands Chiang's language of democracy in ways important for liberal democratic learning. First, it moves his discussion away from the notion that democracy is the attempt to harmonize public policy with the government's understanding of the state's interests and thus away from the "consensus from above" description that draws, at best, on the republican unitary and Chinese unitary models. Second, it provides a sense of permanence and necessity to privileging the rule of law, equality before the law, and negative freedoms. If all of these are intrinsic to a democratic constitution, they are not merely ephemeral policies. Third, in speaking of people as being free "within the bounds of the law" and thus enjoying negative liberties, he points to citizens living without the possibility of government dictating their movements and actions through mobilizational techniques.

Like much of the material discussed above, Chiang's discussions of constitutionalism contribute unevenly to democratic learning. His insistence on defining rights by government fiat and excluding from protection particular

subjects of speech and expression are destructive to lessons in liberal democracy and come close to teaching nondemocratic lessons. If the government can control the ways in which the demos considers political affairs, then the lesson is that it is the government, not the demos, that is ultimately in charge. These problems are balanced by Chiang's support for the important concepts of the rule of law and equality before the law, as well as his other discussions of the central place of rights and freedoms in a democratic constitution. These discussions do reinforce important aspects of democratic learning.

Elections

As we have seen, Chiang contributed a number of ideas to a democratic vocabulary that envisions the constitution as serving to check government. There seems to be a role for the demos in this conception. Add to those references the powers of initiative, recall, and referendum embedded in the ROC's constitution that he supported, and one would expect that Chiang would provide a rich source of democratic and liberal democratic material in this area. His contributions, however, are limited. While they follow the same bifurcation between elements that are found in the republican unitary and Chinese unitary models as well as the liberal democratic model, Chiang Ching-kuo's contributions here tend not to be liberal. Though he argues consistently that elections are an important part of democracy, he describes elections and participants in elections inconsistently.

Chiang was most vocal about the goodness of elections during the 1970s and early 1980s. As premier, he argued forcefully that elections are an essential aspect of democracy and self-government. Therefore, the number and types of elections must be expanded.[78] In 1980, after the turmoil of 1979 and the postponement of scheduled elections,[79] Chiang further reinforced the view that elections are important. In these remarks he argues that "elections provide a yardstick for democracy" and that "voting is a civil right and also an obligation."[80]

Yet his description of the role of elections within a democracy is sometimes at odds with a democratic conception. In both the aforementioned discussion and in an earlier address to the National Assembly, he describes the purpose of elections as the identification of "wise and able people to serve the country." While perhaps unexceptional by themselves, these pronouncements take on importance when considered in the context of other remarks. First, in emphasizing wisdom and service rather than representation, this description fits

with the understanding of a single, objectively identifiable common good, a single general will identified by the government, and the republican unitary and Chinese unitary models of democracy. Second, Chiang often portrayed elections as exercises not of accountability and choice but of mobilization. Elections, he argues in 1979, are held "to assure solidarity and harmony." They are not vehicles for particular groups or for the expression of particular interests. Third, other remarks make clear that Chiang almost exclusively identified wisdom and ability with the existing government and with membership in the KMT. He argues that an important reason for holding elections is to legitimize government by "lay[ing] the foundation for the government's permanent success and enduring stability."[81] In other words, elections are held for the convenience of, and to increase the utility of, the government, not to give people a say in political affairs, hold officials accountable, or test and submit alternative governing parties and their platforms to citizens. He fully expects the KMT to win and depicts elections as tools for legitimizing its inevitable rule. This is not a democratic argument, as it undercuts elections as tools for downward accountability.

Given this understanding of the role and nature of elections, Chiang felt able in 1986, before his decision to acknowledge the existence of the DPP, to argue that there was no problem in the ROC with elections. They have already been held and they are free:

> Politically, we have remained a firm member of the democratic community, and regularly held fair, open, and impartial elections at different levels to facilitate the smooth operation of a constitutional democracy and assure our great goal of "the people with sovereignty, the government with ability." This is surely the foundation of our country's unity and stability.[82]

Here he argues that the ROC's elections are completely open, free, and democratic despite limitations on speech and on the organization of parties and that elections serve a functional role that benefits the government rather than providing representation to citizens. Indeed, he here replicates Sun's understanding of democracy as incorporating popular sovereignty with officeholding by experts.

Even given this argument that the ROC had held free elections and was therefore a democracy, Chiang earlier had no trouble in providing reasons for postponing elections or avoiding an expansion of the scope of elections to the Legislative Yuan. In the first instance, he argued that in the wake of the nor-

malization agreement between the United States and the PRC in 1979, elections would create a situation in which "many differences of opinion aired." This would create instability that the government "could not control."[83] Here elections are deemed less important than a perceived threat to stability. Indeed, elections themselves are seen as inherently destabilizing because they potentially bring to the surface different understandings of interest, the common good, and the general will. In the second instance, Chiang argued in 1983 that the ongoing state of tension with the PRC created special circumstances that, along with the need to protect the constitution, served as his excuse not to expand the scope of elections. Yet even given this decision, he argues that the "legitimacy" of the country possessing a "multi-party, democratic constitution for all the people" was not at all in question.[84]

Here we see profound ambivalence in Chiang's contributions to Taiwan's understanding of elections. His generally approving attitude toward them and his linkage of them to democracy as an abstract concept are useful materials for democratic learning. Democracy implies the existence of elections. Yet the way he describes elections, the functions he assigns to them, his concern with the fact that they would reveal pluralism, and his willingness to cancel or postpone them is not helpful to building a democratic heritage. He does not portray them as the means by which the government is held accountable. Nor does he concede that open and free elections serve as the means by which people may be rotated into and out of office or rival policy options be put before the electorate. Collectively, these descriptions paint elections as tools of state officials, to be held or not held according to their schedule and judgments. These descriptions, at best, provide training in republican unitary and Chinese unitary democracy; at worst, they again gesture toward pseudodemocracy.

Chiang Ching-kuo's Contributions to Democratic Learning

Chiang Ching-kuo continued and expanded upon Chiang Kai-shek's justification for democracy based on reverence for founding figures. In his dependence on such justifications, he spent less time rooting democracy in human nature and natural law. This approach creates rhetorically and culturally powerful justifications that are, nonetheless, philosophically weak and temporally confined. So long as the populace continues to accept the proposition that Sun and Chiang Kai-shek are important figures to be emulated, this proposition works. But it works through problematic invocations of authority and tradition.

Chiang is ambivalent with regard to the type of democracy he advocates. At times he recapitulates many elements of the republican and Chinese unitary models. At other times, he emphasizes many facets of the liberal democratic model. At still others, he falls short of democratic concepts in his discussions of democracy. This ambivalence is expressed not in attempts to meld or otherwise join those models but in conflicting comments made at different times. This characteristic is probably the result of tactical needs of the moment and the influence of various aides on this thought. His lack of consistency can lead to confusion, particularly with regard to his conception of pluralism. While he generally holds that pluralism is natural, he provides varying assessments of its desirability. At times it is the result of indiscipline. At other times it is an unfortunate but remediable condition. At still others it is a result of differing understandings and interests that should be accepted instead of treated as a disease of the body politic. Which is the case? What is the government's attitude toward policy differences? May they be legally expressed? Does the government take them seriously? Is democracy compatible with different understandings and views or must they be subordinated and eliminated, as Sun and Chiang Kai-shek would hold? Are differences one reason for holding elections, or do differences make elections too dangerous? Citizens never know what is allowable and what is not. Ultimately, therefore, this problem weakens the emphasis on constitutionalism and the rule of law that Chiang Ching-kuo also champions.

On the whole, Chiang Ching-kuo's discussions of democracy focus less on unity and general will and more on recognition of the reality and legitimacy of pluralism than did his predecessors. His discussions of pluralism, uneven and only hesitantly related to multiple parties and competitive elections in his rhetoric as they may be, are his most important contribution to the discussion of Chinese democracy. As we shall see, his attempt to meld pluralism with a unitary understanding through a "consensus from above" approach may have anticipated parallel conceptions on the mainland. Otherwise, though he did less to justify democracy philosophically than did his father, he did do more to introduce particular liberal democratic conceptions into the ROC's political dialogue even if those contributions were sometimes weakened or offset by contradictory statements.

This invocation of different conceptions also carries implications for understanding these conversations in the context of the Chinese community. In one sense, Chiang expands the breadth of that discussion, moving as he does

from rather empty gestures toward democracy through traditional and unitary conceptions and on to liberal conceptions. Even as he moved, however unevenly and hesitantly, to incorporate more aspects of the liberal democratic model into his discussions of democracy and ultimately embraced that model before his death, Chiang Ching-kuo furthered and deepened his father's attempt to root democracy in Chinese culture and traditions. This association of more liberal aspects with a greater identification of democracy with China and assertions that the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* outline a Chinese understanding of democracy is surprising, given that in other hands an emphasis on Chinese and Asian characteristics generally leads the discussion away from the liberal model on the grounds that the latter is an essentially Western understanding of democracy. One could argue that Chiang's different approach to this question was important to the liberal democratic transition on Taiwan and perhaps something similar must happen on the mainland for a parallel transition to occur there.

Chapter Five

Taiwanese and Mainland Chinese Democratic Thought

The Implications for Taiwan's and Mainland China's Politics

> Dr. Sun Yat-sen's dream for a constitutional democracy was not realized on the Chinese mainland, but today it has taken root, blossomed and borne fruit in Taiwan.

As we have seen, Sun and the two Chiangs discussed democracy extensively, if unevenly and not necessarily always in a liberal fashion. To think about the broader impact and place of these discussions, we look to current understandings of democracy in the larger Chinese community. To do so, we first explore how they relate to political elites' understanding of democracy in Taiwan today. Second, we situate them in the larger history of Chinese discussions of democracy, including discussions currently ongoing on the Chinese mainland.

Conceptions of Democracy in Contemporary Taiwan

What impact did these discussions have on Taiwan's current understandings of democracy? While the question is complex and any analysis incomplete, we approach it in three ways. First, we examine the conceptualizations of democracy held by members of the two major parties. Second, we explore the contemporary privileging of consensus in Taiwan's political community as evidence of influence of the unitary models of democracy Sun and the two Chiangs employed. Third, we look for the influence of these discussions on justifications for some recent electoral changes in Taiwan.

Current Understandings of Democracy in Taiwan

I had the opportunity during a trip to Taipei in the spring of 2008 to interview a variety of elites regarding their views of Taiwan's democracy and to

The closing ceremony of a conference, held on July 5, 1990 (President Lee Teng-hui, with portrait of Sun Yat-sen in the background). Courtesy of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan)

attend several events at which democracy was discussed. I also gathered campaign and other literature from the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections to create contemporary benchmarks against which to compare the previous conceptions of democracy under study here.

I found a number of interesting parallels and continuities as well as differences with those conceptions in the course of this investigation. This finding could very well represent the continued influence of those previous conceptions and discussions. Prior conceptions, unsurprisingly, are most credible in the eyes of KMT elites, though there are echoes in the discussions of people affiliated with the DPP. These similarities point to the role of those discussions in reinforcing particular attitudes toward democracy that have developed from a variety of sources in the thinking of Taiwanese political elites.

Views of the Origins and Nature of Taiwan's Democracy

Contemporary justifications of democracy on Taiwan sometimes follow the content of prior discussions. In general, people take for granted democracy as the modern form of government and the means by which modernity is attained,

thereby replicating Sun's contextual and pragmatic *jiùwáng* justifications.[1] Occasionally, democracy is linked with human nature. In one recent speech, for example, DPP chairperson Su Tseng-chang (蘇貞昌) reiterated Chiang Kai-shek's connection between the incompatibility of human nature with the characteristics of the PRC's government and further gestured towards the compatibility of that nature with democracy.[2] In addition, some KMT elites accept the *mínběn* rooting of democracy in Chinese history. For example, in conversations with me several KMT members referred both to historical examples of dynasties toppled by popular unrest and to the teachings of Confucius and Mencius as illustrations of the existence of democratic concepts in Chinese culture, illustrations that are strongly reminiscent of the understandings of Sun and Chinese *mínběn* democracy theorists in general. These KMT members discarded the proposition that democracy is essentially Western or that its presence on Taiwan is due mainly to Western influences and accepted democracy on the grounds that it is a concept located in traditional Chinese culture.

DPP leaders, in contrast, tend to argue that Taiwan's democracy is not rooted in Chinese culture. Many reject the *mínběn* argument that democracy is something familiar to the Chinese and argue that democracy is predominantly a Western concept. They trace Taiwan's understanding of democracy to Western influences, either directly from the United States and Europe or indirectly through Japan, and are optimistic that Taiwan can deepen its democracy by drawing upon the practices of established democracies. These leaders, however, do not necessarily point to Chinese culture as fundamentally problematic for Taiwan's democratic future. Some I spoke with did reference the authoritarianism that was the hallmark of classical Chinese government and the fact that ordinary citizens in China did not historically participate meaningfully in politics at the national level as obstacles to be overcome. But they also generally rejected the proposition that a lack of strong democratic roots in Chinese culture represents an insuperable problem. The assumption is that although democracy is a political concept that has been imported into Taiwan, it is a universally desired form of government that can flourish anywhere given time, patience, and the commitment of democratic activists to see democratization through.

Despite these differences, many (though not all) KMT and DPP partisans tend to agree on the main outlines of a definition of democracy, at least in the current circumstances. Both hold that Taiwan's democracy is of the indirect

and possibly elitist variety, entailing the election of leaders who then make policy decisions. Leaders are held accountable for their failures—voted out of office by the public if voters are not satisfied, reelected if the populace is satisfied. Ordinary citizens in this conception are generally viewed as exercising choice based on the selection of leaders rather than of policies and in general are not expected to understand policies or the policy-making process in depth.

KMT elites tend to adopt this position not out of any pragmatic understanding of the impossibility of engaging in direct democracy given the large size of contemporary nations but rather out of a lingering belief, traceable to Sun's emphasis on the division of sovereignty from administration, that ordinary people are not intellectually ready to engage deeply in the nuts and bolts of policy making. One in particular argued that a truly grassroots democracy was still hundreds of years away because such democratic practice requires a much higher level of education on the part of ordinary people than now exists. But in the meantime, the existing model of electing people who then make key policy decisions is a workable and adequate model of democracy in his view.

There is an analogous conception of democracy in the DPP camp, but it appears less indebted to traditional political philosophy than to modern sociology. This view holds that ordinary people, while capable of political understanding, do not think very deeply about policies because they have other things that occupy their time and energies. The DPP officially argues that ordinary people should be involved in some decision making through the referenda process (a legacy of Sun, though other influences may also be in play), and its leaders generally have argued when in power that "the government's administrative measures and policies are formulated based on public opinion."[3] But the DPP position interprets that dictum loosely and accepts the notion that ordinary people are by themselves not always inclined to engage in the political process and must therefore be mobilized by parties and their leadership.

Thus both the KMT and DPP elites I spoke with agree in descriptions of contemporary practice that locate Taiwan's democracy as a combination of unitary, competitive elitist, and liberal democratic models. That is, the outline they provide combines Sun's understanding of democracy with a recognition of pluralism, multiparty elections, a raft of individual rights and freedoms, and procedural justice. Citizens vote for leaders who run as heads of different parties; elected officials are then expected to formulate policies that will protect and further the interests of Taiwan taken as a whole, follow a general consen-

sus on policies, and operate within a constitutional system of protected rights.[4] In this view, leaders generally agree that Taiwan now meets the criteria for being a democracy, though its democratic practice still has room to deepen. Regarding this latter point, the KMT supporters I spoke with agreed with the DPP that not much has been done in terms of developing a sense of democratic responsibility since the transition in the early 1990s. While they tend to see Taiwan's democracy as institutionally and procedurally mature, they share a sense of frustration in their perception that Taiwanese politics on both the elite and popular levels has not risen above the exploration of scandals, the elevation of minor events into major issues, the use of cynical political tactics, and a superficial politics of celebrity. In this assessment both sides share, to a degree, views consistent with the republican unitary and Chinese unitary democracy models, as well as some critiques of liberal democracy that we shall later encounter in discussions of democracy on the Chinese mainland.

Understandings of Elections and Accountability

An important difference between the two parties' practical understanding of politics is their expectations of citizens when choosing leaders. This difference feeds their differing criticisms of contemporary politics in Taiwan. While both accept the current liberal and pluralist structure of the state, including a multiparty system, the KMT and DPP see the purpose of elections and the way in which people should hold leaders accountable in somewhat different ways. The DPP members I spoke with believe that *issues* should play the predominant role in elections. Voters should choose leaders on the basis of their positions or records on issues, even if ordinary citizens should not always participate in choosing policies. In this view, citizens must hold leaders accountable for what they do in office through a clear understanding of what is happening on and to Taiwan. Many in the DPP believe that leaders are not being held to account in part because of media's irresponsible attitude toward politics and the population's parallel quest for entertainment. Reflecting a deep belief that ordinary people ought to have the opportunity to participate meaningfully in the policy realm, one person identified with the DPP with whom I spoke even deplored the fact that, in his perception, his own party tended to avoid policy debates and discussions of issues. Such debates and discussions, it appears, are important to his conception of the process by which ordinary people should judge and select the leaders who formulate

policies.[5] This position probably reflects a more deliberative form of democratic participation than Sun or Chiang Kai-shek advocated.

Others in the DPP more generally blame the KMT for the current reluctance to discuss issues and the preference for focusing superficially on candidates' personalities and biographies. These developments, they argue, are a legacy of the KMT's previous authoritarian rule. Under that rule, the argument goes, the only safe way of evaluating candidates was through a focus on personal details, because criticism of government policy could bring harsh government sanctions. This history of denying political freedoms, particularly freedom to engage in policy discussions, has had a lingering effect, making the population hesitant to talk about issues for fear that a KMT government would even now punish them for taking the wrong position.

Many DPP elites also identify as problematic a lack of popular mobilization in political affairs. These elites, in a perhaps unwitting echo of Sun, see popular participation channeled solely through representative democracy as inadequate. What they want is a continuation of the political mobilization that marked the democratization process.[6] For example, the DPP's international press conference before the 2008 election featured the video "March against the Wind," which consisted of scenes of mobilization (particularly young people marching and walking) as well as invocations of particular events and entities important to the DPP—the 2/28 Memorial, *Formosa Magazine*, and protests that took place after the founding of the DPP. In doing so, the video conceptualized democracy as importantly implicating direct citizen involvement in politics, usually by working informally outside of institutions.[7] While the DPP may have found this conception elsewhere than in KMT doctrine (in the American civil rights movement, the New Left, or the People Power movement in the Philippines, for example), it is also plausible to conjecture that the predisposition to adopt those views stems from exposure to Sun's writings, which were ubiquitous in both the political and educational arenas. The parallels between the positions are too close to be coincidental, even given the presence of alternative sources of influence.

In contrast, the KMT elites with whom I spoke appeared more comfortable with encouraging voters to focus on candidates' character and life history and expressed unease with mobilization. To evaluate candidates based on their ethics and morals, they argue, is an acceptable way for people to choose and hold public officials accountable. This outlook was evident during the 2012 presidential campaign when Ma Ying-jeou continually questioned the

ethical conduct of his DPP opponent and the DPP's overall commitment to ethics. His general stance emphasized ethical scrutiny as an important way of determining a candidate's fitness for office.[8] Like the DPP camp, KMT elites attribute some of the shortcomings of Taiwan's political system, including the fact that people are not engaging seriously in the ethical scrutiny of candidates, in part to the sensationalist press and the quest for entertainment. But they also blame the DPP's mobilizational focus, or what they term its "street mentality." They argue that the DPP prefers to take politics out of normal channels and institutions, stir up the population, and place popular pressure on political leaders to adopt the positions the DPP elites favor. The DPP does this, KMT elites argue, not through reasoned argument, but by lurid appeals to emotion, such as linking policy positions to the threat from the mainland or by recasting current events in the context of the past. Such practices, they argue, serve to debase politics and divert citizens from serious consideration of candidates' qualifications and character, and thus they see the DPP's focus on policies and issues as divisive, destabilizing, and an obstacle to good governance. Here we see a continuation of one conception of accountability that was central to Chiang Kai-shek's discussion of democracy coupled, ironically, with a repudiation of Sun's mobilizational emphasis.

To summarize, where the DPP tends to see the shallowness of popular engagement with politics largely in terms of an illiberal and antidemocratic KMT history, KMT elites see it as a product of elite manipulation of divisive issues that fractures the public and leads it to focus on superficial qualities and emotional response. Both groups of elites deplore what they consider the failure of citizens to discharge their responsibility to hold government to account, but the KMT appears to follow in part Chiang Kai-shek's conception of a system of democratic accountability based on ethical evaluations of leaders rather than policy positions. The DPP, in contrast, expects the populace to focus solely on how leaders deal with issues of interest, a position that appears both to repudiate the elitist division of people and to encroach upon the strict division between sovereignty and administration that Sun championed.

Consensus and Majoritarianism in Taiwan's Democratic Landscape

Emphases on Consensus

As we have seen, Sun and the two Chiangs each emphasized, to varying degrees, the importance of a united demos. Sun argued that democracy is the

form by which a united people solves large problems. Chiang Kai-shek spoke of the need for a united polity disciplined through the use of traditional Chinese ethics. Chiang Ching-kuo often alluded to a consensus that owes its existence to political orchestration. Such positions appear to align with the Chinese unitary model of democracy and, at times, the broader republican unitary model, both of which understand government as implementing a general will and furthering a general good with regard to public goals and issue positions.

We find a continuation of related discussions in contemporary Taiwanese politics, the difference being that these conversations often assume more pluralism than Sun or Chiang Kai-shek recognized and a consensus or general will that is more prescriptive in terms of policy than Sun's discussion of sovereignty assumes. Any survey of political argument in Taiwan would find that an important part of the conception of democracy that is continually referenced is the premise that political activity entails the attempt to find or forge consensus. While political figures, members of the media, and ordinary citizens now explicitly embrace the legitimacy of multiple parties and different policy positions, they appear uncomfortable with conflict.[9] Therefore, the acceptance of multiple parties is tempered by a demand, honored more in the breach than in practice, that leaders cooperate, that agreement be the aim of all politicians despite the existence of differences and pluralism, and that the best situation is when agreement extends throughout society.

This orientation was recapitulated in the spring of 2008 in Ma Ying-jeou's inauguration speech alongside references to pluralism and competition: "We will endeavor to create an environment that is humane, rational and pluralistic—one that fosters political reconciliation and coexistence. We will promote harmony among sub-ethnic groups and between the old and new immigrants." Both major parties engage in this type of rhetoric. Invocations of this type have in common not only the tropes of consensus, reconciliation, and harmony but also the "harder" analogs of the people's will (國民意志). The latter can be found in this defense of the Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) administration's 2004 referendum condemning China's missiles:

> A referendum allows for the proper expression of the will of the people. . . . The referendum will also serve to galvanize the will of the people. . . . Through the referendum, we may reconcile divergent views and forge a consensus in order to demonstrate the will and resolve of the people of Taiwan to strengthen national defense and pursue peace.[10]

This defense is based on an earlier press conference in which Chen argued that it was his constitutional duty to hold the referendum in order to "establish a consensus" (建立 . . . 共識), "consolidate the will of the people" (凝聚國民意志), and "voice the collective will" of the people of Taiwan (能展現出台灣人民的集體意志).[11] Note that while the first quotation speaks of the need to "reconcile" views, there really is no room in either discussion for dissent. There is either a preexisting will that is expressed or a consensus to be created by means of the referendum. Consensus is not an accommodation to opponents or critics. It is a show of strength and unity, a mobilization of the population that in ostensibly reaching agreement marginalizes opponents of the government's policies.[12] This stance, aside from its focus on particular policy positions, echoes arguments that both Chiangs used and is in accordance with the understanding Sun espoused.

These examples are not isolated; they are continually and broadly replicated in media reports, editorials, and the speeches of political elites. We find variants of the themes of consensus (共識), reconciliation (和解), and harmony (和諧) invoked in a wide variety of political contexts, from arguments over casinos and considerations of economic policy to discussions of the placement of constitutional amendments on the ballot and issues regarding cross-strait relations.[13] One would expect that with the growing appreciation of pluralism, much more would be made of the need to recognize differences, respect minorities, and abide by the preferences of majorities that fall short of broad agreement. Yet that is not generally the case. Consensus and unity continue to be part of a generally accepted, politically correct vocabulary.[14] So while for the most part elites from both parties with whom I spoke conceded that there is considerable pluralism in Taiwan's politics, their appreciation of the durability and variance of such differences is often not strong. They do note that there are large differences in terms of attitudes toward economic policies, mainland China, Taiwan's relationship with mainland China, and constitutional issues. They also acknowledge that such differences are often rooted in characteristics that make Taiwan's population diverse. They recognize the existence and importance of different economic and other interests, variations in educational levels, and the multiethnic makeup of the population. Yet almost every political figure speaks of the need to find or construct, respect, and act on consensus. Some do so because they take differences as either artificial in origin or as having been given an artificial importance.[15] Such understandings may in part account for the intolerance others have

noted among the population for differing political positions.[16] But even when political leaders do not see differences as artificially created, they still seek out consensus as the right approach to democratic political activity. So, for example, for party spokesperson Hsiao Bi-khim (蕭美琴), whose DPP emphasizes the importance of pluralism in Taiwan's electorate, elections are still the means by which consensus is translated into policy.[17]

Given this simultaneous recognition of pluralism and insistence on consensus, democracy is not conceived of as merely the rule of majorities, with elections giving a political party the power to put its own carefully differentiated policy proposals into practice in the face of disagreement by others, but is seen as being more about discovering the basis for or orchestrating broad agreement on the direction the nation should take and the policies that should be implemented. As another example, during the 2012 presidential campaign both the DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) and the People First Party candidate James Soong promised if elected to seek consensus on important foreign policy questions, such as those implicated in relations with the PRC.[18] Tsai even went further to argue that she would form a "grand coalition" of all parties based on the "mainstream" policy views they all share. This coalition would work to refine shared views and jointly exercise power in putting those views into concrete policies. Indeed, her campaign repeatedly criticized Ma's administration for not reaching out to other parties to find or construct a consensus on cross-strait relations.[19]

There is no agreement, however, on the mechanism by which consensus is to be reached. Tsai's and Soong's consensuses would be forged by a meeting of minds among party leaders. But consensus is also sometimes described as the invocation of a general will involving the entire population, as Chen Ming-tang of the Mainland Affairs Council once asserted regarding Taiwan's desire for a seat in the United Nations, as Chen Shui-bian argued in conceiving of democracy as the government following the people's will, as Ma held in putting forward his understanding of possible KMT control of the executive and legislature as expressing the outcome of the popular will, and as Ma again stated in arguing that Taiwan's sovereignty "transcends political affiliations and is something that everyone should work together to defend and protect."[20] Yet another understanding is the conception of the general will as a combination of common interests and common identity, both of which must be constructed. For example, Frank Hsieh's (謝長廷) 2008 campaign literature called for an end to the "politicization of culture and identity issues" that he

laid at the feet of the KMT. What is needed, he argued, is a project to "develop a national identity that celebrates the rich multicultural diversity of Taiwan."[21] During that process, it appears, consensus must be orchestrated, which is a point quite congenial to Chiang Ching-kuo's views.[22]

Thus consensus as an understanding of general agreement or a general will continues to play an important role in the way political leaders think about democracy in Taiwan. Discussions go beyond the familiar calls for bipartisanship in the United States, which usually are confined to particular and narrow issues having to do with national security or with pressing emergencies. In Taiwan, the preferred mode of operation for addressing all policy issues is consensus. This emphasis points to the continued influence on Taiwan's democratic practice of the unitary models of democracy that Sun and the Chiangs previously invoked. But understandings of unity, now conceived mostly in the form of consensus, have changed and continue to diverge over time, possibly in response to the attempt to square unitary desires with the recognition of pluralism. Understandings of the basis of consensus can be wide or narrow and its character viewed as natural or constructed, confined to elites or encompassing all citizens, and acted on by one party or the result of power sharing.

Electoral Law Reforms and Majoritarianism in Taiwan

These contemporary Taiwanese views on consensus suggest that portions of the conceptions of democracy Sun and the Chiangs referenced have become a source for arguments that assume the derivation of consensus out of an initial condition of pluralism. Such conceptions might also be linked to important changes to Taiwan's electoral system that have moved its democracy in a majoritarian direction.

Prior to 2005, elections for seats in Taiwan's national legislature, the Legislative Yuan, predominantly used the single nontransferable vote (SNTV) system in the context of multimember constituencies, supplemented by a small number of seats filled by a party-list proportional representation method. This type of system encourages the creation of small parasitic parties and the weakening of major parties because members of the same parties can run against one another in multimember constituencies. Elections to the Legislative Yuan, therefore, predictably produced ill-disciplined representatives from a variety of parties who focused more on publicity, procedural battles, and delay than on passing important legislation. These problems exacerbated

existing constitutional ambiguities in the relationships among the Legislative Yuan, the premier, and the president.

In 2005, article 4 of the constitution (which governs the Legislative Yuan) was amended with the support of both major parties. The changes reduced the number of seats in the Legislative Yuan from 225 to 113. They further mandated that 73 of these seats would be filled by elections from single-member constituencies and 34 would be filled through a party-list proportional representation method (the other 6 seats would be filled by elected representatives of aboriginal groups). The result of this electoral change in the 2008 legislative election was a dramatic transformation in the composition of the Legislative Yuan. Rather than the distribution of significant number of seats among a plethora of parties and a situation in which the DPP and KMT were roughly even in strength, the elections resulted in the KMT winning 81 seats to the DPP's 27, with minor parties gaining only 5.[23] This result, in tandem with Ma's victory in the presidential election, gave the KMT an overwhelming position in the national government.

Reilly argues that such electoral changes and outcomes, having been instituted not only in Taiwan but also in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, are symptomatic of a broader Asian model of democracy that emphasizes electoral majoritarianism. There are two aspects of Reilly's contention that are important for us to explore. The first is whether the majoritarianism that Reilly identifies is part of the conceptions of democracy that Sun, Chiang Kai-shek, and Chiang Ching-kuo put forward. The second is whether Taiwan's electoral reforms were justified by concepts put forward by Sun and the Chiangs, those put forward by Reilly, or in other terms.

Reilly holds that these types of majoritarian systems are "motivated by common aims of promoting government stability, reducing political fragmentation, and limiting the potential for new entrants to the party system."[24] This motivation stands in contrast with alternative attempts (found in some European parliamentary systems) to engineer electoral outcomes so that the body of the national legislature broadly and comprehensively mirrors the different views and interests that exist in the demos. Those efforts result in a multiplicity of parties that fragment those legislatures. In contrast, the Asian effort at electoral reform (through discarding the SNTV and eliminating multimember constituency systems in favor of single-member constituencies) results in movement toward two-party systems and election results that give decided legislative majorities to one party. In their emphasis on majoritarianism, Reilly

argues, these electoral reforms not only make this group of Asian democracies different from many of their European counterparts; their existence may signal a return to authoritarian attitudes.[25]

The first question we must ask is whether Sun's and the Chiangs' conceptions of democracy are reflected in the philosophical background implied by Reilly's hypothesis. The answer is a qualified yes. The impatience with pluralism and fragmentation that we find in all three and their focus on stability and unity are consistent with the motivations Reilly identifies. The implied elitism of the desire to restrict access to positions of power that Reilly also references likewise accords in general with their views. However, that elitist tendency does not go as far as Sun's differentiation between administration and sovereignty. Likewise, the majoritarianism Reilly identifies does not fully replicate Sun's and Chiang Kai-shek's unitary preferences. While electoral majoritarianism in Reilly's description implies a desire for undivided government and clear outcomes for elections, such majoritarianism falls short of the indifference toward or impatience with pluralism per se and emphasis on the general will that we find in many of the democratic discussions under study here. Electoral majoritarianism still implies multiparty electoral systems and true party competition, elements that are not stressed in Sun's and Chiang Kai-shek's discussions. It may, however, be related to Chiang Ching-kuo's discussion of consensus orchestrated from above.

The second question is whether Taiwan's electoral reforms were justified by arguments that conform to Reilly's concept of majoritarianism or Sun's and the Chiangs' conceptions of democracy or by other rationales. There are a number of reasons a nation might wish to move away from the SNTV system that Taiwan had previously utilized to a system in which most seats are filled by votes in single-member constituencies. Hsieh provides a useful list: a desire to reduce the number of parties, a desire to reduce the number of candidates running in a district, a desire to increase the internal discipline of parties, a desire to address problems of corruption, and a desire to make parties moderate their positions so that they appeal to the median voter rather than to outliers.[26] These reasons may coincide with the push for stability, defragmentation, and restriction of participants in the political arena that Reilly observes or with other motivations. The first two reasons may have to do with the desire to make electoral choices easier or to reduce the number of frivolous candidates. Party discipline can be associated with a desire to reform the workings of the legislative chamber as well as with majoritarianism. It is really only

the desire to have parties appeal to the median voter rather than to more radical elements that fits without question the goals Reilly has in mind; it also fits with conceptions of consensus that we find particularly in Chiang Ching-kuo's discussions of democracy.

What were the reasons put forward for election reform in Taiwan? Impressionistic evidence suggests that some elites did put forward reasons that coincide with the goals Reilly discusses. We also find other reasons, some of which implicate the views of Sun and the Chiangs. One example is this passage from an article in the *Taipei Times* that advocated adoption of the reform proposals:

> Legislators . . . have shown a lack of interest in actually reviewing legislative bills. This state of affairs must be improved. Another example is the many legislators with a preference for participating in call-in TV shows . . . [who] promote ethnic division and trample on democracy and reason. These legislators should improve their self-discipline. Furthermore, legislators reveling in press conferences to reveal misconduct are simply pandering to the masses under the protection of legislative immunity.[27]

Here we find a variety of justifications. Some have to do with legislative discipline in following procedure and accomplishing standard legislative tasks. These are general justifications. Other arguments speak of discipline more broadly and in ways reminiscent of the Chiangs. Legislators are dividing the populace and pandering to certain groups rather than providing guidance and wisdom.

A second article speaks approvingly of the changes' likely creation of a two-party system.[28] This position appears to fall into the political and electoral conception that Reilly describes, as do references in the same article to popular perceptions of instability. The piece also speaks of the reforms' salutary effects on corruption and legislative discipline, complaining of "clowns" in the legislature. These are standard arguments not necessarily connected with the concepts of democracy discussed here. But the author does go on to speak of the current system's encouragement of the media's involvement in politics, particularly its role in playing up conflicts between the major parties. This looks much more like the understandings of Sun and the Chiangs.

A final article also provides a mixture of justifications.[29] This article argues that the reforms will bring a host of improvements: better politicians, better legislatures, a two-party system rather than the current multiparty system, and increased momentum toward transformation into a presidential system

with a strong referendum mechanism. This list of benefits looks very similar to Reilly's conception of majoritarianism, particularly in the expressed desire for a two-party system and a general consolidation of power signaled by the desire to move to a presidential system. However, the piece also goes further toward the understanding Sun and the Chiangs promote, advocating a referendum mechanism by which a unified demos can register the general will. Not only does the author of the piece see the aim of the reform as making sure political figures "keep faith with the people"; the process itself is one in which success has been predicated on "the will of the people to overcome powerful political interest groups through the mobilization of public opinion and making use of democratic procedures." The echoes of Sun and the Chiangs are unmistakable.

Thus we see a variety of arguments for the recent electoral reform. Language associated with Sun and the Chiangs is present even if it is not dominant. It appears that people reflexively use such justifications but do not feel compelled to make only such arguments. If we trust these arguments, political motivations for these electoral changes appear to be a mixture of general desires to clean up the legislature, the political motivations that Reilly describes, and the belief that such understandings will build a political system that would share features of the unitary democracies that Sun, Chiang Kai-shek, and Chiang Ching-kuo drew upon.

Recent developments, however, have also revealed a complication in any easy equation of majoritarianism with consensus in Taiwan's context. As noted above, DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen called for the creation of a "grand coalition" during the 2012 presidential campaign. Such a coalition would entail the creation of a consensus-building and power-sharing mechanism involving all political parties. We noted that Tsai's position represents another piece of evidence supporting the continued persistence of the trope of consensus in discussions of democracy on Taiwan; thus one might expect Tsai to voice support for the 2005 amendments. But the reason for Tsai's call for a grand coalition, according to Tsai's campaign, was dissatisfaction with the majoritarian outcome of the 2008 election, which put in power one party (the KMT) that, in turn, refused to share any policy-making power with other parties despite the presence of substantive agreement on particular policies and issues. Tsai's camp is therefore not satisfied with the 2005 constitutional changes and during the 2012 presidential campaign hinted at the possibility of future reform proposals.[30] Consensus does not equal majoritarianism in their view; consequently,

they see the 2005 majoritarian reforms as mistakenly encouraging the party that wins an election to claim that its policies are supported by a general will and that it is empowered to act alone on the basis of that will. In other words, the Tsai camp now views the 2005 reforms as supporting the practice of unitary democracy, a development that it did not foresee and that it rejects. In contrast, Tsai's group grounds its preferred understanding of consensus on a Rawlsian conception of political liberalism, in which democratic consensus is defined as a situation in which pluralist groups find agreement on some but not all issues through an overlapping of views and proceed to share policy-making power on those issues. This definition of an "overlapping consensus" in Rawls's terms[31] at once assumes an additional facet of cooperation (power sharing) and a less extensive scope of agreement than do other conceptions we have seen. This understanding, therefore, pulls in a different direction from the impulses Reilly assigns the supporters of majoritarian regimes and diverges significantly from the more strongly unitary understandings of democracy Sun, Chiang Kai-shek, and Chiang Ching-kuo held.

Democratic Conceptions and the Chinese Conversation on Democracy

We have seen that the democratic discussions of Sun and the Chiangs have at times been echoed in Taiwan's contemporary democratic landscape and that there has in some cases been a merger of unitary democratic elements with the liberal democratic model in discussions of democracy even if such language is not dominant. Of equal interest is the relationship of these discussions to democratic understandings in the broader Chinese community. Where do the contributions of these three leaders fit in the Chinese encounter with democracy and current attempts by various people on the Chinese mainland to grapple with the concept of democracy? I first discuss broadly how these leaders' conceptions fit into the Chinese conversation by examining justifications of democracy. I then examine invocations of the Chinese unitary and liberal democratic models.

Justifications of Democracy

We concentrate here mostly on *jiùwáng* justifications, given their number and interesting characteristics. From the evidence we have at hand, it seems that Sun was typical of his time in putting forward *jiùwáng* and contextual arguments in favor of democracy.[32] He was not alone in desiring democracy

because it would support a strong state that would provide good governance in the form of a heightened capacity for policy performance. Where he, perhaps, goes farther than his contemporaries is in linking *jiùwáng* to a larger discussion of history in which humans, when facing particular kinds of challenges, generate particular forms of government. This understanding situates China's encounter with democracy within a larger context that transforms China's predicament from a purely parochial matter into an episode in an interconnected human narrative.

While we have noted that Sun's use of a *jiùwáng* justification helped push his democratic conception in a nonliberal direction, Fung has differentiated the use of that justification historically from an automatic rejection of liberal democracy in the Chinese community.[33] We also find this to be the case in later discussions. Late twentieth- and twenty-first-century *jiùwáng* justifications of liberal democracy on the Chinese mainland have arisen among critics of the government who see in democracy a tool for attaining modernization, social justice, and social cohesion as well as a method for holding government agencies and officials accountable for corruption and abuses of authority.[34] Guang argues that the democracy activists of both the Democracy Wall and the Tiananmen Square eras promoted democracy as a more effective way of engaging in modernization and economic development, holding that these processes are inextricably linked with political democracy. But an examination of documents from that period and later reveal that in doing so, these activists often have linked liberal democracy with solutions to mundane problems, such as corruption, incompetence, waste, failure to deal with natural and man-made disasters, and the need to restrain officials, problems that contrast with Sun's linkages of democracy with much larger processes and tasks.[35]

Jiùwáng justifications of liberal democracy have also arisen more recently in response to officials who refuse to countenance further political reforms and argue that liberal democracy will weaken the state, thus inviting disorder and national fragmentation. So, for example, the authors of Charter 08 (a document calling for the institution of liberal democracy in the PRC) argue that democracy is needed on the mainland in part because the current authoritarian government has created a rift between the state and ordinary people that has led to popular unrest and an increase in disorderliness that display the population's dissatisfaction with policies, economic inequality, and the government's lack of respect for private citizens. Here, democracy is presented as the answer to the problems of disorder and instability because it addresses

two root problems—disenfranchisement and popular resistance to government policies. Democratic procedures and human rights allow ordinary people to hold government accountable, thus creating in them satisfaction and removing these causes of disorder.

Like earlier *jiùwáng* justifications, these later justifications invoke democracy as the answer to the failings of the state. Their main difference from Sun's justification is the complaint that the state is too strong rather than too weak and that the problems being experienced are the direct result of the state's actions rather than those presented by modern contexts alone. While Sun hints that democracy is necessary because a mature people will demand control of a strong state, his ultimate pragmatic argument for democracy is that it makes the state strong and capable of tackling monumental tasks by harnessing popular energy and will; for many contemporary activists, the processes of a liberal democratic state make it sensitive to and accepting of the pluralism of popular interests, accountability by ordinary citizens, the sanctity of individuals, and the importance of grassroots views. Democracy is good because properly functioning liberal democratic features (process performance) provide the popular voice, accountability, rights, and transparency that make government suited to tackle to the tasks (the achievement of orderliness, social justice, and economic development) associated with good governance. Not only is sensitivity to pluralism and individuals important here in ways Sun did not embrace; the assumption also is that ordinary people are in closer touch with the problems that are the object of policy-making processes than are officials and political elites, and thus accountability to citizens in general is paramount to good governance. In this updated version of the *jiùwáng* justification, the features of liberal democracy remedy the intrinsic inability of current authoritarian structures to obtain the information necessary for providing for the common good and for modulating policies to fit particular contexts and the needs of ordinary people. This version, therefore, has a strongly anti-elitist character that contrasts with Sun's views.

Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo are mostly outside this pragmatic conversation. They are in closer company with those on the mainland who refer to democracy as the form of government most deeply compatible with human nature. We see scattered references to the relationship of democracy to human nature in the contributions by some of the early liberals that Fung described and the Tiananmen Square activists that Guang and Nathan document. We also find in the text of Charter 08 passages that resemble Chiang

Kai-shek's justification of democracy, particularly the argument that the absence of democracy "rots away [people's] humanity" (腐蝕人性).[36]

Less relevant and powerful are Chiang Kai-shek's and Chiang Ching-kuo's justifications of democracy by reference to authority figures. Sun is still lionized on the mainland, and while Nathan documents approving references to Sun on the subject of democracy among the Democracy Wall activists, Sun's image has been importantly linked with the CCP's appropriation of his legacy. For the Communists, his political understanding of democracy is typical of a necessary but inevitably outmoded era of bourgeois understanding. However, some commentators on the mainland (and on Taiwan) do take Sun seriously as a democratic theorist. Attention is paid to his understanding of the democratization process, as well as to his five-power constitution. For those who see democracy as a process that must be engaged in slowly, or who take tutelage seriously, Sun is an important visionary.[37] Others have also referred to the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* as containing important democratic principles that contemporary China would do well to follow.[38] But such references appear rarely on the mainland.

While Chiang Kai-shek is not seen as a democratic theorist, he is appreciated as a figure central to China's reunification after the warlord period and as an opponent of Japanese aggression. When he is officially mentioned with regard to democracy, it is often as someone who spoke of democracy but did not understand it.[39] Chiang Ching-kuo, on the other hand, is seen by some as a pioneer of modernization,[40] as well as a Chinese version of Gorbachev who helped initiate democracy from above. However, these depictions are not employed as justifications of democracy but (in the case of the latter) as a model of democratization to be rejected in favor of a bottom-up process.

The Chinese Unitary Model

Sun, Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Ching-kuo, and the Chinese Unitary Model

Throughout our discussion, we have referenced a Chinese unitary model that appears to have been embraced, to varying degrees, by Chinese theorists of democracy throughout the twentieth century. Many of those whom Nathan and Chao identify as following a *mínběn* understanding of democracy adhere to most aspects of this model. In particular, Liang Chichao (梁啟超), in Nathan's description, anticipates many of the features of democracy that Sun put forward, as did Hua Guofeng.[41] Many of the democratic discourses Peng documents on the Chinese mainland also partake of this model.

Table 1 provides an overview of the relationship of Sun and the Chiangs to this model. We see from this table that Sun generally embraces all the elements of the Chinese unitary model. He is less emphatic in emphasizing traditional Chinese values for purposes of unity than Chiang Kai-shek and is somewhat closer to the republican unitary model in his belief that participation in democratic politics will unite the nation. Sun transparently assumes the unity of the demos and relies upon the generation and expression of a subjective general will that can be objectively identified. His elitism is both central and robust. Though he is sometimes credited with a strict regard for individual rights, his discussions of democracy in the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* lectures display impatience with the Western obsession with those rights, preferring instead the four political powers he allocates citizens as the more useful safeguards of the popular interest.

Chiang Kai-shek is also at home with this model, but in somewhat different ways than Sun. In contrast to Sun, he does not rely heavily on its favored justifications. Instead, he locates democracy in human attributes and transcendent values. He emphasizes the substance of traditional cultural values to provide unity and discipline to the demos. His elitism is as strong as Sun's, but who constitutes this elite is somewhat different. Chiang Kai-shek prefers that his intellectual elite possess not only technical ability but also the virtues of traditional Chinese scholar-administrators. He speaks somewhat less of a general will, opting instead to identify a common interest that is more visible to government officials than to ordinary citizens. Finally, he is more vocal and more insistent on social and political discipline than Sun and somewhat

Table 1 Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, and Chiang Ching-kuo in relation to Chinese unitary democracy

	Emphasis on traditional Chinese values	Emphasis on *jiùwáng* and *mínběn* justifications	Emphasis on a general will	Emphasis on elitism	Emphasis on discipline and mobilization
SYS	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
CKS	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓
CCK	✗	—	✗	✗	✗

✓ = Fully contains element
✗ = Partially contains element
— = Only minimally contains element

more willing to make at least rhetorical room for individual rights. In sum, Chiang Kai-shek is substantively more in tune with some aspects of this model than Sun but also hints at departures from the model that Chiang Ching-kuo would take up more fully.

Chiang Ching-kuo is much more ambivalent regarding this model. He barely mentions its justifications of democracy. His strongest endorsement comes in the form of his continued emphasis on elitism and his discussion of elections. Even when speaking of elections as matters of choice, he is often careful to argue that the point of such exercises is not representation but the recruitment of talent into the government. Otherwise, his discussions of the core elements of the model are generally offset by allusions elsewhere to more liberal tenets. He often portrays differences of opinion over policies and goals as natural and sees the unifying concept of consensus as artificially orchestrated from above rather than flowing from democratic practice or the substance of traditional values. While he sets up Sun and Chiang Kai-shek as authority figures whose preference for democracy should guide the ROC in its political aspirations, his public discussions deviate significantly from the closer attachment of both his predecessors to this model.

The Chinese Unitary Model in the Chinese Community

Democracy has been conceptualized in various ways in the Chinese community. As a political and cultural construct, the Chinese unitary model and its constituent *mínběn* arguments importantly put forward as standards of good government the view that those who exercise policy-making power are elites who must govern for the good of all and the understanding that the demos is united and in possession of a specific will. I explore here some conceptions of democracy in general as they are found in the Chinese discussion in relation to these two important elements.

The people as a unitary entity. We have seen that Sun and Chiang Kai-shek consistently invoked the conception of "the people" as a cohesive organism that holds sovereignty, while Chiang Ching-kuo often suggested that diversity is, nonetheless, natural. In this, all three deliberately and starkly differentiated "the people" from experts and other knowledgeable officials who hold public office. However, if we look closely, we see that they understood the grounds for the unity of "the people" in somewhat different terms. We alluded earlier to the differences between Sun and Chiang Kai-shek on this topic. Sun, seeing that a common culture, race, and history were unable alone to unify China,

wanted additional fundamental materials in the form of the common political experience of living under a democratic government to provide the unifying impetus. "The people" for him is not just a cultural but also a political construct. That is one reason he would exclude from the polity those who did not accept the republican and democratic revolution. Chiang Kai-shek, in contrast, did not see democracy as the primary factor generating the united entity of a democratic "people." Rather, "the people" was formed importantly by exposure to the substance of traditional Chinese values. "The people" for him is, therefore, fundamentally a cultural entity, shaped by the particular content of China's history of philosophical and cultural ethics. That is why he is unsatisfied with the bare attainment of democratic political structures. They were not sufficient to provide the unity that was needed to make a democracy work.

Some portions of Chiang Ching-kuo's understanding present a third type of construction. He alludes at various times to the proposition that "the people" should be united but are not, mostly because of natural factors. These factors must be overcome by the working of political institutions, either by imposing a view on the demos or by elites orchestrating a consensus from above by weaving together the various views and interests present in the population. However, even this process must have a political bedrock of belief, as was the case with important parts of Sun's conception. But for Chiang Ching-kuo, that common understanding was not just belief in the republic but also acceptance of particular core policies, including anti-Communism and the necessity of taking back the mainland. Views that do not accord with such policies and the people who hold such views are not tolerated and are to be excluded from "the people."

These understandings of "the people" are, in their unitary contours, typical of discussions of *mínběn* concepts in the Chinese community throughout the past century. For example, Nathan illustrates the adoption of the assumption of unity by democracy theorists from Liang Chichao to the Democracy Wall activists of 1979.[42] Guang also documents continuities between the Democracy Wall and Tiananmen Square activists in their assumptions of a unitary conception of the demos.[43] Understandings on the mainland of what provides unity to "the people" have varied over time. Sometimes, as Peng has documented, conceptions are confined to particular groups (those who accept a particular ideology or viewpoint) or classes (the toilers, the working classes, etc.) that are defined by their economic circumstances and interests. At other

times, the designation is based on a broader distinction between bureaucrats or government officials and ordinary people. Here, the assumption is that either common understandings (ideology) or common interests and experiences (of a class or of ordinary citizens) will serve to unite the demos into "a people."[44] This conception appears to be the source of various current arguments, including appeals for citizens to vote.[45] Government officials also sometimes make a distinction by marking ordinary citizens (who enjoy freedoms and a variety of political rights) as "the people" and differentiating them from "antagonistic forces" who do not support the present regime.[46] These conceptions are probably comparable to those that Sun and Chiang Kai-shek discussed.

Yang Hengjun sums up what he believes is the dominant contemporary attitude on the Chinese mainland regarding the place of a unitary demos by referring to a skeptical stance toward elections. In this conception, the government represents everyone because of its monopolistic position that confines competition within a single party (the CCP). This position accepts the proposition that in a competitive party system, those who vote for losing candidates are not represented, and their resentment must disturb peace and stability:

> In China, where people have never experienced democratic elections, it's impossible to imagine how social harmony can result when close to half of the voters in any election back candidates who "lose." How much better it is, many Chinese imagine, to have instead of an elected government one that represents the interests of *all* people—where there is no need for elections, and everyone wins, even if decisions are made in secret.[47]

In this analysis, the government provides unity by somehow discovering and embracing a common interest while avoiding the use of political mechanisms (in the form of competitive elections) that would create divisions. In its anti-pluralistic stance and reference to a common interest or common good, this understanding of consensus is reminiscent of that which Chiang Kai-shek accepted but is a step beyond the attitude found currently in Taiwan, which embraces the importance of multiparty, competitive elections.

Officials as elites. In Sun's understanding, officials stand as highly educated technical experts who run the machinery of the state in the name of the ordinary people who possess various inferior levels of intelligence. These experts are expected to execute the will of the people in their collective, subjective, autonomous choice as to the goals the state should follow, though there are hints that perhaps officials should do more than passively carry out the wishes

of the demos. Official autonomy is curbed by the popular powers of voting, recall, initiative, and referendum. But even in the most restricted reading of their autonomy, there is considerable scope for officials to exercise their own understandings in the formulation and execution of policies. The same holds for Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo, though with some differences. For Chiang Kai-shek, officials are characterized not only by their intelligence, but also by their high moral and ethical standards. This characteristic strengthens their relationship with the demos, allowing them to push more firmly to inculcate the traditional teachings that will serve to unify and discipline the people. For Chiang Ching-kuo, at least in some of his utterances, officials are administrative experts trained in Confucian ethics, but perhaps more important than their ethics are their political talents in helping harmonize conflicting interests within the demos. Where Chiang Kai-shek's officials promote unity through teaching, with officials helping guide "the people" in terms of goals, Chiang Ching-kuo's officials promote harmony through their astute understanding of different political positions and help establish national goals through their harmonization of different subjective understandings of national aspirations.

Contemporary discussions on the mainland that address conceptions of government officials and the nature of the government services that benefit "the people" are complex. For those who hold to a general *mínběn* understanding rather than a Western conception, the definition of who decides what is best for the people has strong continuities that encompass the elitist position that Sun and Chiang Kai-shek held. Many tend to hold that "the people" do not have sufficient wisdom, technical expertise, or sometimes the requisite objective spirit to decide what is best for the demos as a whole. It is better that the stratum of highly educated people holds administrative and policy-making powers and uses its innate talents to discover what is best for the nation. Nathan documents this tendency in his discussion of Chinese democracy, as does Peng's discussion of the history of twentieth-century *mínběn* thinking.[48]

Differences on this topic also exist among those who have discussed democracy on the mainland during the past few decades. Guang, in particular, holds that the Democracy Wall and Tiananmen Square activists embraced different views. While the Democracy Wall activists were more traditional in conceiving of the demos as a united entity, they also tended to adopt a more populist conception, contrasting the uprightness of ordinary citizens with the corruption of officials. They sought much greater substantive input on the part

of ordinary citizens into policy making and administrative processes. This populist attitude anticipates some of the justifications of liberal democracy we find in contemporary activists. In contrast, the otherwise more liberal and Western-influenced Tiananmen Square activists, while acknowledging the importance and naturalness of pluralism, tended to adopt an elitist stance, questioning whether important segments of the population understand and can act intelligently upon their interests. They were content with broadening the scope of officials to include more than the narrow cadres then in power but did not rush to include populist mechanisms of input or the tools of liberal or deliberative democracy in their demands.[49] Ironically, these more liberal activists anticipate the positions of such contemporary theorists as Liu, who is reluctant to move beyond intraparty democracy despite other liberal tendencies.

Hu Wei, Guang, and Nathan also note the presence of strains of participatory and deliberative democracy in contemporary discussions on the mainland. These include calls for mass participation in the style of the Paris Commune, more modern attempts to involve ordinary citizens in administrative systems at the local level, and public hearings and cyberdemocracy at higher levels of government. Wei also notes that references to deliberative democracy have been merged with understandings of more traditional forms of consultation between government bodies and ordinary citizens.[50]

Recent discussions on the mainland regarding the nature of officials and what policies they implement tend to reference substantive and concrete outcomes closely connected to everyday policy goals, while conceptions of officials vary. For leftists and CCP officials who speak of democracy, democratic outcomes are conceptualized in the form of welfarist and social democratic policies that are put forward by officials characterized by their understandings of economics and their status as occupiers of positions in the system of democratic centralism. These policy outcomes are said to emanate from the people only in the objective sense identified by orthodox Marxism.[51] For traditionalists, it is a paternalist regard for the general welfare that officials, chosen for their knowledge and morality, provide.[52] Newer conceptions include thinking of government officials as constituting a neutral, meritocratic governing group promoting harmony in general and as sophisticated employers of social scientific principles chosen for their talents who operate powerful institutions to promote modernization, economic development, and social harmony while also protecting individual freedoms.[53] Of these, those

who connect democracy with harmonization are perhaps closest to Chiang Ching-kuo, in that they tend to see officials actively integrating pluralist positions rather than acting on an already unified general will or primarily pursuing other types of goals.

A final conception sees officials as standing apart from the demos because of their education and selection into the CCP but not necessarily representing a unitary group in themselves. Some party reformers argue that the dominance of the CCP is necessary but can be refined and reshaped. In this conception, the tools of oversight, competition, balance of power, and checks can be incorporated into the current system by introducing key elements of intraparty democracy. Here, the argument is that elections for higher-level positions could be spread to the entire party and open to multiple candidates, and different groups within the party could provide different policy proposals, compete for support, and provide checks on and oversight of members who wield policy-making powers.[54] This conception harkens back to Sun's idea of groups of officials either being confirmed in office by a national legislative body or swept away and replaced by an alternative group.

The CCP white paper on democracy. One partial contemporary expression of the Chinese unitary model is contained in the white paper on democracy the CCP issued in 2005, entitled "Building of Political Democracy in China."[55] Besides elaborating on an understanding of democracy, this paper serves several purposes. It surveys the history of the CCP's democratic efforts, justifies the party's understanding of democracy, and lays out avenues for what the party regards as the furthering and deepening of democracy.

It is useful initially to mark the points of departure between the understanding of democracy contained in this paper and those put forward by Sun and the two Chiangs. First, while the document explicitly notes that Sun and others took up democracy as a way of strengthening China, it does not deploy a *jiùwáng* justification of democracy. It instead associates modernization, unification, and other achievements with the CCP itself. It is not democracy per se but the leadership of the party that is essential. Second, unlike Sun or the two Chiangs, the paper does not locate democracy in Chinese history and culture through the *mínběn* conception, nor does it associate democracy with human nature, as did Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo. Third, it embraces a consciously Marxist-Leninist orientation, continuing to identify China as a socialist country and labeling any democratic concept that does not include socialism as a bourgeois conception that is not suited to China.

There are, however, important parallels at work. Like Sun, the white paper justifies democracy by reference to the spirit of the times, referring to the "outcome of historical development and political civilization." While it puts the conception in terms of "people's democratic dictatorship," the paper attempts to distinguish a disciplined democracy from democracy in general. The type of democracy China requires, the authors hold, does not tolerate the attempt by persons to put their "will above that of the collective," thus transparently locating the unity of the demos in the coercive instruments of the state. Related to this point is an emphasis on harmony, unity, and stability that we also find in Sun, the two Chiangs, and contemporary Taiwan. There is some limited acknowledgment of pluralism in this conception, particularly with regard to the recognition of the special status of ethnic minorities and historically disadvantaged groups, but there is more stress placed on the demos as "the people" when it comes to accountability and the steering of the state. It is "the people" in an undifferentiated sense whose wishes and views are consulted, and it is "correct opinions" that are harvested from consultation.

Likewise, while the paper emphasizes that there are multiple parties in the PRC, the system in which they operate is characterized as a "multi-party cooperative and consultative" system in which non-CCP parties are viewed as "friends" by the CCP, are consulted, and their members given government roles rather than being institutionally placed as oppositional parties that act as checks on officeholders and sources of policy alternatives. Of more importance to the authors of the paper is the participation of these parties in cooperation with the CCP and the introduction of reforms within the CCP that promote intraparty democracy. One suspects that the unitary conception implied by the central role the CCP plays and by the emphasis on cooperation among parties would be more to Sun's (as well as Chiang Kai-shek's and at times Chiang Ching-kuo's) liking than the "multi-party competitive" system that the paper rejects.

Like other variations on the Chinese unitary model, this paper conceives of democracy as importantly centered on a connection between the demos as a whole and the government in the sense that the government and leaders are accountable to "the people" and carry out its wishes. It is not constitutionalism or rights or other parts of liberal or other conceptions of democracy that are important, but rather this claim to ultimately populist identification.[56] Finally, like Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo, the paper rejects the notion that democratic systems must conform to a universal and particularly Western set of standards. Democracy must be fit to the Chinese context,

and while the authors hold that China can and does borrow freely from the West by incorporating such features as the embedding of human rights into a constitution and the notion of a constitution itself, they nevertheless affirm that "there is no one single and absolute democratic model in the world that is universally applicable."

The Liberal Democratic Model

Sun, Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Ching-kuo, and the Liberal Democratic Model

Adherence to portions of the Chinese unitary model does not preclude inclusion of elements from the liberal democratic model. As shown in table 2, Sun and the Chiangs all incorporate at least some elements that fit into the latter.

Sun is the least liberal of the three, at least in the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* lectures. This is due in part to his refusal to adopt any Western model and possibly also, as Chang and Gordon note, to his impatience with younger, less disciplined revolutionaries. He is at his most liberal in speaking of the importance of constitutionalism and equality before the law. However, his insistence on constitutionalism is never pushed in a substantive direction other than his devising of the five branches of government. His insistence that everyone is equal in terms of their relationship to the state is hedged considerably by his elitist division of administration from sovereignty and his even more vehement argument that people are radically unequal in their abilities. There is some controversy regarding support for individual rights and freedoms and the liberal character of his proposals for initiative, referendum, and recall,

Table 2 Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, and Chiang Ching-kuo in relation to liberal democracy

	SYS	CKS	CCK
Emphasis on democratic government	✓	✓	✓
Emphasis on constitutionalism	✗	✓	✓
Emphasis on pluralism	—	—	✗
Elections open to multiple parties	—	✗	✗
Elections open to individuals	✗	✓	✓
Emphasis on rights for individuals	—	✗	✗
Emphasis on political equality	—	—	✗

✓ = Fully contains element
✗ = Partially contains element
— = Only minimally contains element

but overall he says little in the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* lectures about the protection of individuals but instead argues that such protection is neither needed nor popularly appreciated in the China of his day. He also says little about pluralism and does not emphasize the importance of competitive multiparty elections or an independent civil society. His suspicion of uneducated citizens that drove his proposal for tutelage is also at odds with a liberal orientation, but it is important to note that it was shared by others at the time.[57]

Chiang Kai-shek mirrors Sun's position on most elements but improves on Sun with regard to the presence of multiple parties (even if these were minor) and the importance of individual rights and freedoms. His argument that the desire for freedom is innate can also be interpreted as a liberal tenet. He does, however, continue Sun's intolerance for plural views and is explicit in stating that particular policy positions are not to be allowed in the political arena. He also perpetuates Sun's general view of elections as plebiscites and his formalistic understanding of constitutionalism, though he speaks of constitutions more often than did Sun and speaks of officials falling under the law. He does little to improve on Sun's position with regard to political equality, continuing to distinguish between the abilities of government officials and the lack of understanding on the part of the majority of ordinary citizens. Where in taking his positions Sun was probably in step with his peers in China and even in the West (where fascination with elitist conceptions and eventually fascism would take hold among some), Chiang Kai-shek in his later years was out of step with his contemporaries in the West, particularly in his insistence on the government's imposition of a perfectionist set of Confucian life plans on citizens.

In his bifurcated discussions of democracy, Chiang Ching-kuo displays by far the most liberal characteristics of the three. He recognizes the pluralistic character of the citizenry and speaks more often about individual rights and freedoms. He is also somewhat less likely to speak about great distances between officials and ordinary citizens. He still speaks of consensus but often sees it more as a political creation than something natural or cultural. The increased presence of liberal elements in his conception makes him different from his predecessors, but as noted above, he does little to combine the various liberal and nonliberal aspects of that conception.

Discussions of Liberal Democracy in the Chinese Community

Fung notes the long history of references to liberal democracy in twentieth-century China, even if that conception was not the dominant understanding

early in the conversation. In particular, he and others document early attempts by participants in the May Fourth Movement to understand democracy through the constructs of human rights, constitutionalism, and the rule of law. On Taiwan, some factions of the democratic opposition before the transition were known for promoting liberal democracy alongside others who drew upon more traditional concepts, Taiwanese nationalism, and social democracy. Now, the predominant image of that opposition, particularly with regard to the oppositional *Formosa Magazine*, is generally that of Western-educated young people who both theoretically and practically opposed the government by putting forward liberal democratic demands regarding the protection of rights, procedural justice, and competitive multiparty elections.[58]

While on the mainland liberal positions generally yielded during the mid-twentieth century to *mínběn* and Marxist conceptions of democracy, since the late 1970s both traditional and newer Western understandings of democracy (such as those associated with the direct democracy of the Paris Commune of 1848) have gained currency. References to individual rights and freedoms in the form of human rights (人權) have been especially numerous. As Goldman and Nathan note, these conceptions of democracy often contain references to rights, the need for accountability through competitive multiparty elections, an independent judiciary, and checks and balances.[59] Examples are scattered throughout the documents associated with Tiananmen Square protests.[60] Hu Wei also documents the numerous references to liberal democracy in contemporary China.[61] Indeed, some contemporary writers have gone so far as to argue that cultural *mínběn* contains not just democratic but liberal democratic concepts said to be found in the writings of China's most famous philosophical figures.[62]

In the most recent discussions of democracy on the mainland, many participants have rejected the elitism and faith in an educated set of officials that marked earlier democracy activists, the CCP's approach, and the positions of Sun and the Chiangs in favor of more liberal understandings. Mao Yushi (茅于軾), for example, argues in his blog that governments that do not respect human rights are bound to fall (蔑視人權的政府最後是長不了的) and labels China's ongoing economic backwardness a symptom of its refusal to adopt liberal democratic concepts and values and instead rely upon an authoritarian elite.[63] Others also use elements of the liberal democratic model to critique both current official claims that China is practicing democracy and traditional *mínběn* arguments that so long as the government favors policies that benefit

"the people," it is democratic. For example, Qian Gang (錢鋼) has put forward liberal, pluralist understandings of democracy as a means of critiquing a history of failed attempts by China to create a constitutional and democratic form of government. It is only by introducing political, cultural, ideational, and other forms of competition into the political system, Qian argues, that China will realize its potential for democracy.[64] Likewise, Yang Hengjun (楊恒均) objects to the CCP's rejection of Western democracy, arguing that there need not be a complete bifurcation between "Western democracy" and a "Chinese democracy." Yang contends that any true understanding of democracy must contain important elements of the Western liberal model, even if it need not adopt that conception as a whole. He explicitly criticizes what he decries as the manipulative *mínběn* understandings of "the people" in whose name the CCP claims to govern.[65]

Yang Jisheng (楊繼繩) also endorses the liberal model by dismissing Western praise for the "China model" of governance. Emphasizing the tendency of authoritarian rulers in China to turn to tradition and exceptionalism to validate their antidemocratic practices, he takes to task both domestic and foreign admirers of the current system who wish to paint it as a new and unique form of democracy. In doing so, he references important elements of the liberal democratic model as normative for any understanding of democracy:

> China presently stands a great distance from democratic politics. The level of public participation in national affairs is low; channels for expression are far from open; forces checking political power are weak; government power is overstretched; the party and government are not separate, and the party is still substituted for the government; the court system cannot gain independence [from the party]; there is no freedom of speech. China is still an authoritarian political system.[66]

Charter 08 pushes these positions further, and in so doing epitomizes the liberal faction on the Chinese mainland and stands as the culmination of several decades of invocations of liberal democratic elements there.[67] In its specifics, its tone, its references, and its overall vision, it is a liberal document that depicts democracy as the antidote to the failures generated by the CCP's monopoly on power. It assumes individuals rather than "the people". It posits a nation of pluralist interests and views and demands toleration for them. It designates multiparty elections as the main instrument of accountability and advocates other liberal tenets such as the subordination of the military to ci-

vilians and the constitution and the sanctity of private property. It argues for majority rule and the protection of political minorities. It invokes the need for a comprehensive range of individual rights along with an independent judiciary to enforce them. And it promotes the adoption of such liberal structural features as separation of powers and checks and balances.[68] This scheme extends much further in a liberal direction than any programmatic statement by Sun or either of the Chiangs.

Other contemporary uses of the liberal democratic model on the Chinese mainland. One high-profile person who has incorporated parts of the liberal democratic model (as well as traditional justifications) into his discussions of democracy is PRC premier Wen Jiabao (溫家寶). Wen has garnered much attention over the past few years with speeches praising democracy and promising further and immediate political reforms.[69] He has become a polarizing figure. Some have likened him to a Chinese Gorbachev struggling against more conservative members of the CCP leadership to liberalize the political system. Others argue that he is merely a token of reform who is powerless in the face of more unscrupulous and authoritarian party leaders.[70]

In his speech to the Royal Society in London in 2011, Wen justifies democracy in several ways.[71] One is by painting democracy as a reaction against feudalism that serves to emancipate people politically and intellectually from an oppressive system. This appears to be a form of the *jiùwáng* justification, perhaps with a Marxian flavor. The second justification is his argument that an open political process contributes to the state's ability to accomplish important policy goals. These goals include the equalization of incomes and the attainment of justice. While this additional *jiùwáng* justification links democracy to state capacity, it points more to the state's operational efficiency and efficacy than the strength and power to which Sun alluded. It does appear on the basis of these justifications that Wen, as did Sun, thinks of democracy as unconnected with human nature. It is a concept or idea that has arisen and been embraced because of its impact on humans materially and intellectually. Therefore, democracy appears to be a useful political tool, but no more than a tool, for Wen as well as for Sun.

Wen lists various features of democracy without providing a comprehensive description. This list includes important liberal features along with other characteristics. Democracy, Wen holds, involves the rule of law, transparency, the guarantee of economic and political rights, the attainment of justice, oversight of officials and systems for the checking of officials' power, and

equal opportunity for participation.[72] Wen's understanding of democracy focuses more on the ways by which the power officials wield is checked, supervised, and informed than on the means by which citizens exercise control of policy-making or electoral power. Indeed, one might argue that this understanding is more liberal than it is democratic. His emphasis on the freedom to conduct scientific research and pursue other academic interests (probably influenced by the venue of this particular speech) is especially conducive to such attribution.

Absent from this description, however, are other liberal features. There is no discussion of multiple parties or competitive elections. There is little discussion of pluralism aside from references to multiculturalism. Rather than voting, Wen refers to consultation between officials and citizens. Wen also does not mention a constitution. Yet it is also significant that Wen avoids any discussion of problems with democracy in the Chinese context. He does not caution against too rapid political reforms or express worries over the looming dangers of anarchy, lawlessness, or political splintering if democracy were introduced. This is one of the reasons some reformers look to him with some degree of hope.

Like the official CCP white paper, Wen sees democracy as a concept with plural operational forms. He holds that China will learn lessons about political reform from other countries, though he is not specific about what lessons China will embrace in that learning process. He more emphatically holds that while democracy is a standard reaction to the experience of feudalism, it "may be achieved in different ways and forms in different societies and countries." Democracy may be a universal idea, but there is no standard model, and no country has a monopoly on its operational definition.

Another CCP official who has included liberal elements in his discussion of democracy is Yu Keping (俞可平). Yu has emerged as a prominent democracy theorist who, while acting as deputy director of the Compilation and Translation Committee of the CCP, nonetheless does not always echo the party line on political matters.

Yu's provocative 2006 essay "Democracy Is a Good Thing" (民主是個好東西) and the subsequent book of the same title[73] offer a version of democracy that contains several parallels with as well as differences from the conceptions under discussion here. Yu's essay provides a list of caveats regarding democracy. His treatment takes the form of a back-and-forth discussion in which the phrase "democracy is a good thing" and a list of democracy's virtues is offset by the

problems democracy is said to create (instability and disorder, trivialization of important issues, empowerment of dictators, government delays and inefficiencies) and the problems democracy is unable to solve. The purpose of this rhetorical tactic is to acknowledge democracy as a normatively good, useful, and probably necessary but by no means an unproblematic way of organizing the state and to demonstrate that democracy is a worthwhile goal for which the country must be willing to pay a reasonable but not excessive price.

On one level, this ambivalence as a whole is not in keeping with Sun's understanding of democracy. For the latter, democracy rightly understood would pose no problem in terms of unity, discipline, corruption, or dictatorship. Democracy provides the solution to all these problems by putting the people themselves ultimately in control of the state. Yu's conception is perhaps closer to Chiang Kai-shek's understanding of the problems of individualism and potential chaos in Western democracies, though Yu does not copy Chiang's insistence that traditional moral and ethical values are the answer to such problems. However, on another level this view is in keeping with Sun's understanding, in that Yu tends to see democracy as a political tool that has its uses and drawbacks. While Yu provides a justification of democracy based on human nature, as we shall see below, it does not appear he thinks democracy is the only form of government compatible with human thriving.

Yu provides several justifications for democracy. One is the familiar affirmation of democracy on *jiùwáng* grounds. Democracy can push forward the modernization process and assist in solving the problems of the people's livelihood. Here he is on familiar turf with Sun and many others in the broader Chinese conversation on democracy, but he is closer to his contemporary democracy activists than to Sun in pointing toward democratic processes and the importance of good governance rather than to state power as the useful products of democratization. Yu also follows Sun in arguing that democracy is congruent with a particular stage of development. For Yu as well as Sun, democracy is part of the trend of the times. However, Yu refers to cultural, social, and economic development as well as political development and like many Western scholars sees China's recent economic growth as a precondition for democracy rather than an outcome of democracy. While Yu explicitly argues that democracy is justifiable because it is temporally topical, he also holds that the premature or too rapid introduction of democracy and the potential for populist misuse of democracy by leaders can lead to internal and external violence, anarchy, or dictatorship. Such a position was implicit in Sun's argument

for political tutelage, though one might argue that in contrast with Yu's sober-minded assessment of China's readiness for democracy (on the part of both the populace and officials), Sun was more vehement in his argument that the process of democratization must proceed immediately.

Another of his justifications for democracy puts Yu in the company of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo but not Sun. That is his judgment, alluded to above, that democracy is "in accord with human nature" (標的工具，更契合人類自身固有的本性) in that, even with their material necessities provided for, humans would still be incomplete without the rights that are inextricably linked with democracy (即使有最好的衣食住行，如果沒有民主的權利， 人類的人格就是不完整的). Note several features of this justification. First, it is the association of rights with democracy that is in turn linked with human nature, not democracy as a political form. Thus, if democracy is correct and proper because of its connection with rights despite the problems it creates, other forms of the state theoretically might be accorded this status if they, too, embraced similar types of rights. Second, note that this justification is not quite the same as Chiang Kai-shek's. It does not point to human nature as innate knowledge, nor does Yu invoke traditional philosophical references to The Way or the "mandate of heaven." This is not a justification rooted in traditional Chinese philosophy and ethics. Rather, Yu employs a substantive understanding of human nature that establishes the compatibility of democracy and associated political rights with the potentialities and characteristics of humans, not their innate incorporation of particular ethical values.

What is democracy for Yu? Like Wen, Yu never provides a comprehensive discussion that would allow us to reconstruct his conception fully. We do know it consists of an incremental process in which the first steps are those associated with good governance: the development of intraparty democracy within the CCP, implementation of local and grassroots democracy, and further development of oversight and consultation mechanisms. However, beyond discussing these elements, Yu is vague. He alludes to the importance of political choice on the part of the populace, the rule of law, downward accountability, equal opportunity, a set of basic rights, checks and balances, and constitutionalism, but he does not provide much in the way of how these features are to be institutionalized.[74] Much of this list, of course, draws upon the liberal democratic model.

Of related interest is the fact that Yu's understanding is more pluralist than those of Sun and the Chiangs in its emphasis on civil society. The bulk of the

essays that make up *Democracy Is a Good Thing* is taken up by discussions of the problems, accomplishments, and promise of civil society on the mainland. Yu believes private organizations form an important part of the current functioning of democracy on the mainland and will play even more important roles in future democratic developments. Here, of course, he moves against the unitary impulses of Sun and the Chiangs. However, his analysis suggests that cooperation between civil society organizations and the government is a high priority and that at least some of the problems such organizations experience are the result of an oppositional stance on their part against the government, a stance that is "harmful to unity and stability."[75]

Finally, Yu sees himself as a syncretic theorist of democracy. For Yu, democracy as a form of government is a universal concept, both part of a contemporary process of globalization and associated with human nature. But democratic practice is also contextually conditioned. China need not and should not import all features of its democratic conception from the outside. Yu is most comfortable in thinking about universal standards associated with transparency and the rule of law, particularly as they pertain to civil society. He is more reluctant to embrace a multiparty system, in part because it appears he believes such a system would adversely affect the attempt to build and promote a "harmonious society" in China. So while he agrees that pluralism in the form of a lively arena of nongovernmental organizations that work at the grassroots level to supply services and help with oversight activities is good, his endorsement of pluralism and competition at the national level and in the policy realm is much weaker. The same is true of his treatment of federalism. As a feature in the distribution of power, he argues, federalism is not essential to the concept of democracy, nor is it compatible with mainstream Chinese political traditions, which emphasize a unitary state. This last point is of particular interest because Sun, by means of strikingly similar arguments, also dismissed the idea of introducing federalism into China.

The final figure we discuss here is Liu Xiaobo (劉曉波). Liu has been a prominent dissident, critic, and democracy activist for more than two decades. A participant in the Tiananmen Square movement, he has been jailed several times for antistate activities and in 2010 won the Nobel Peace Prize. He was a key player in the group that created Charter 08 and, as such, is associated through that document with the concept of a liberal democracy.

We see Liu's liberal analysis at work in several venues. One is in his attack on the CCP's white paper on democracy.[76] Here, Liu discards faith in an

enlightened elite as a throwback to the figure of the good and benevolent emperor and puts in its place the concepts of human rights, procedural justice, and multiparty elections as the correct ways of safeguarding citizens' well-being. In these contentions, he is typical of others who see in liberal democracy important pragmatic tools for fixing the political, social and economic problems of modern China that political elites have failed to solve. Thus, like many of his fellow democracy activists, Liu depends upon a modern version of the *jiùwáng* justification that emphasizes the shortcomings of the current regime and the connection between good governance and liberal democratic processes. Democracy for him has external utility rather than being expressive of innate human tendencies or in accordance with moral criteria.

In the collection of essays published in the West entitled *No Enemies, No Hatred*, Liu expands on this justification by further cataloging the abuses and general problems the power-seeking officials of the ruling CCP have generated, which he looks to democracy to solve. He points to unregulated sweatshops, land grabs, the privatization of public wealth, slavery, the denial of civil rights to citizens, social injustices, and the vastly unequal distribution of wealth. These ills, he argues, are directly attributable to the fact that the higher CCP leaders' primary aim is to retain power and the fact that the state is constructed so that lower-level officials are only accountable to higher officials and not to ordinary people. Ultimately, he argues, the prosperity, stability, and social solidarity between government and the people that CCP officials trumpet are illusory, as they are not available under authoritarianism, given the social, political, and economic inequalities and abuses and dysfunction such government creates. Only a "free government," with openness to criticism, freedom of information, and popular accountability can supply those goods.[77] In making this argument, Liu (like other contemporary democracy activists) associates liberal democracy with the very attributes (stability, solidarity, unity) that Chinese critics of liberal democracy accuse it of undermining, thus following Sun in linking democracy generally with those attributes. However, it is the process performance he associates with liberal democracy that generates these goods in Liu's understanding, not the solidarity of the demos or Sun's strong state.

Liu's second justification of democracy in *No Enemies* is the rights and freedoms he links with that form of government. For Liu, the key to China's (and the world's) advancement is the continued evolution of culture and morality.

Once obsessed by the possibility that Western culture could transform China, Liu now sees a truly human culture as transcending both East and West. Here he resembles Sun in the latter's search for an advanced theory of democracy that is neither Eastern nor Western and Chiang Kai-shek in his emphasis on culture and morality (though not the traditional Chinese versions). A key to the development of a new culture and morality in Liu's mind is the capacity for the deployment of reason, aesthetic appreciation, and critical self-reflection on the part of China's population. It is only under a democracy, he urges, that these tools can be used fruitfully, given that only a democracy takes constitutional rights seriously, and only a democracy allows its citizens to hold officials accountable for respecting those rights. In the absence of democracy, culture becomes a manipulated commodity in the hands of authoritarian rulers, and freedom of thought shrinks and becomes fugitive. Liu points to erotic literature and patriotism in particular as cultural resources that officials currently manipulate to mobilize citizens behind the government and to divert them from thinking about the character and nature of the country. Once the foundations for subverting smug and unrepresentative orthodoxy, discussions of sex and nationalism have been vulgarized, commercialized, and attached to the state as forms of propaganda and fantasy.[78]

Like Yu, Liu sometimes emphasizes the liberal part of liberal democracy more than the nuts and bolts of democratic structure. He also hints at a universalist definition, eschewing a purely Chinese position while rejecting the concept that "universal" equals "Western." He esteems Russian and eastern European opponents of authoritarianism, referencing in particular the Czech authors of the anticommunist Charter 77 as inspirational in their democratic ambitions and willingness to take on state authorities. While admiring Taiwan and its democratic system, seeing it as a demonstration of the capacity of the Chinese to build and practice democracy and viewing Chiang Ching-kuo as a key player in Taiwan's democratization, he likewise understands the latter as a Gorbachev figure who initiated a "top-down" process of democratization and on several occasions notes that this avenue of change is not available on the Chinese mainland. If China is to become like Taiwan, it must undergo a different, bottom-up process of democratization, he argues.

The place of the liberal model in Chinese discussions of democracy. We see that contemporary liberal discussions of democracy in the Chinese community generally leave behind the assumptions and goals that animated Sun and his successors when they spoke of democracy. Modern Chinese proponents of

liberal democracy on the mainland either are less likely to be afraid of fragmentation and social indiscipline on the part of ordinary citizens than were Sun and the Chiangs or they attribute those problems to current authoritarianism rather than to liberal freedoms and democratic political activities. They see an effective government as one that is responsive to the nuances of and differences within public opinion, as well as to the interests of each citizen, holding that only this type of government will discern and address the social and economic problems that afflict China. Liberal democratic activists invoke the individually expressed and diverse manifestations of wisdom on the part of ordinary citizens operating in a pluralistic world, not the technical skills of an elite identifying objectively good policies in a monolithic universe. In doing so, they sometimes emphasize liberal tenets more than democratic values.

There is understandably greater suspicion of, even cynicism regarding, the benevolence and disinterestedness of government officials among these contemporary commentators than we find in Sun, Chiang Kai-shek, and Chiang Ching-kuo. Accusations of official corruption and the use of state power to protect political ambitions signal that many modern democratic enthusiasts on the mainland reject Sun's assumption that the state is a mechanical tool with no interests of its own and of no use to officials seeking to further their individual interests. While some references to recall and referendum are reminiscent of Sun's thinking, the more routine and exacting means of holding officials accountable through competitive multiparty elections, checks and balances, and judicial enforcement of rights are the favored form of popular control of government and protectors of citizens' interests. Unlike Sun and the Chiangs, these democratic activists are just as interested in how power is structured as they are in the goals the state pursues and the policies it crafts, and they are more interested in the fate and freedoms of individuals.

Criticisms of Western liberal democracy, particularly from official sources, have also not been in short supply recently on the mainland. These often follow in the footsteps of Deng Xio-peng's (鄧小平) speech in January 1980, in which he argued, "'A multiparty system which some democrats had suggested, would sap the nation's unity" and prevent the government from undertaking a succesful program of modernization.[79] The nationalist editor Hu Xijin (胡錫進) has recently argued that a Western-style democracy would lead to widespread social disorder, civil war, and the breakup of the country.[80] Others who support democratic reforms link a defense of their proposed

changes (which include more citizen input in the form of consultation and citizen supervision of officials) with a rejection of calls for importing a Westernized, liberal, multiparty democracy. While reforms are said to be needed to fight corruption and focus policy more closely on popular needs, the wholesale implementation of a Western "process" democracy is undesirable because of its looseness, its divisiveness, the probability of reintroducing large gaps between the rich and poor, and the power that elites wield in controlling Western-style elections and shutting out the voices of common people.[81] Zheng Ruolin (鄭若麟) has also recently attacked both the pragmatic justifications for introducing Western liberal democracy and rejected Western definitions of democracy. Elections, he holds, do not necessarily lead to empowerment of good leaders, nor do they automatically lead to good governance. Elections also do not contain the essence of democracy, but rather only one facet of a Western conception. Rather than elections, he argues, it is the delinking of political power from the right to inherit and hold it indefinitely that encompasses the true understanding of democracy. "Once a country's leaders do not come to power by hereditary right, and once they must [as in the case of China] leave office after a set term, then this country is not only already a republic, it has entered the orbit of democratic systems." In this understanding, China's method of having a single party select leaders from a pool of technocrats and subject them to term limits is a superior form of democratic practice to the liberal, multiparty competitive model.[82]

Closing Thoughts

Their massive statutes seated within their respective monuments in Taipei, Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek are officially designated by KMT governments as the fathers of Taiwan's democracy. Chiang Ching-kuo, though bereft of monumental commemoration, is likewise credited in many circles with initiating the actual democratic transition. To sum up what we have learned about their discussions of democracy, what can we say about their contributions?

We have seen that all three made strong statements justifying democracy as a desirable form of government. While Sun did not make statements that strongly delegitimized authoritarian governments, Chiang Kai-shek did. All three also argued that democracy is compatible with Chinese culture. All three sometimes discussed democracy in problematic and illiberal ways, generally combining the elitist, unitary, and liberal models. We find elements of these in Taiwan's current democratic ethos, though its democratic institutions fol-

low the liberal model. On balance, this analysis lends support to contentions, such as those of Rigger, Gold, and Nathan and Ho, that these leaders' discussions of democracy played a role in Taiwan's democratic transition. This judgment is fortified by the fact that Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), who followed Chiang Ching-kuo as president, echoed Sun's and the Chiangs' justifications and conceptualizations of democracy during the actual democratic transition.[83] This points to the conclusion that any explanation of Taiwan's transition to democracy should consider its connection with these leaders' pronouncements and the opportunities for democratic learning they provided. However, it also points to the danger of relying heavily on those discussions to account for Taiwan's transition given the problems we found with regard to democratic learning and the predominantly liberal democratic characteristics of Taiwan's current political system.

What of the place of these conceptions in the discussion of democracy within the larger Chinese community? In the course of this analysis, we have seen an important intellectual trend played out—the gradual acceptance of liberal democratic concepts within the vocabularies of the leaders under study, as well as in the discourse of mainstream politicians on Taiwan and democratic dissidents on the mainland. Important figures no longer cleave as closely to the Chinese unitary model as did Sun. The attachment to a conception of a united demos has loosened, as has plebiscitory understandings of elections. What has been added is additional recognition of pluralism, multiparty elections, individual rights, and the rule of law. Also of particular interest is the fact that many mainland activists have adopted liberal democratic process values as important for good governance and justify democracy by reference to a list of pragmatic benefits that liberal democracy would bring. Justifications of democracy no longer generally link it with a powerful state or a monolithic demos; instead, supporters of democracy often associate it with important limitations on state power that serve to protect a pluralist citizenry.

However, we have also seen that elements of the Chinese unitary model that were important to the conceptions of Sun and the two Chiangs have not disappeared from the way political figures on Taiwan conceptualize democracy. Nor have they departed from mainland discourse on democracy. In particular, not only is the concept of consensus still important in Taiwan; some of Taiwan's elites are dismayed that Taiwan has moved so rapidly to adopt the trappings of contemporary Western democracy. In holding this view, they follow in the footsteps of their predecessors and some contemporaries on the

mainland who argue that Chinese democracy need not and should not be Western because the West overemphasizes individual interests and volitions. This position puts these elites in something of a quandary. They continue to argue that Taiwan's democracy is about choosing elites who make policy and, therefore, hold that ordinary people do not know much about issues or policies. They use Western techniques as ways of working out that conception through the instrument of elections. But they also see the adoption of contemporary Western political practices as contributing to a trivialization of politics. They want both candidates and the general population to be more serious in their political activities. In some ways, they yearn for the united demos and the disciplined leaders that Sun and the Chiangs depicted so frequently and are frustrated that these cannot exist as long as Taiwan's elections look like those in the West. Having experienced Western-style democracy, they are perhaps more sympathetic to arguments that liberal democracy creates political problems than are many of the mainland's democracy activists.

The same is also true of some on the mainland. Some advocates of democracy there go even farther to reject multiparty democracy in favor of intraparty democracy and increased consultation and popular oversight of the CCP on the grounds that too much competition and encouragement of diverse views will lead to China's physical breakup. Where supporters of liberal democracy point to the success of Taiwan and other Asian democracies, these commentators sometimes gesture more fearfully to the fate of the Soviet Union after democratization.[84]

The result, as the justifications we found in arguments supporting the majoritarian electoral law changes in Taiwan suggest, may be further intellectual developments in Taiwan and on the mainland in which a new conception of democracy combining the liberal and Chinese unitary models is hammered out. This model, as Reilly suggests, would accept pluralism and a multiparty system, along with rights and constitutionalism, but seek to limit the expression of pluralism in the interests of unity and stability. Thus, for example, the emphasis on consensus could be retained and further theorized to accord with understandings of an initial and natural pluralism. Chiang Ching-kuo's understanding of consensus orchestrated from above may be part of such a new theory, which might also include emphases on new practices and norms that discipline elites so that they reach policy agreement and engage voters on serious political issues.

Another possibility is that democracy on the mainland will remain at the stage that Yu thinks of as transitional and that the CCP believes constitutes true democracy. That is, the mainland could, despite the arguments of many of democracy activists, embrace a conception that looks much like the Chinese unitary model, constituted by elements of intraparty democracy in the CCP, a more substantive emphasis on rights, and stronger mechanisms for popular oversight and consultation. Such a situation may incorporate the type of responsive and informal institutional behavior that Tsai argues China's businessmen have successfully wrested from the government. This model, Tsai suggests, has led China's entrepreneurs to remain supportive of the status quo rather than risk destabilization by demanding formal and routine institutional accountability to citizens as a whole.[85] One of the dangers of China moving to such a model, some argue, is that it could lead to an aggressive rather than peaceful democratic mainland because of its emphasis on unity and democracy for purposes of nationalistic *jiùwáng* rather than for accountability and democratic process performance.[86] Whether such developments would also represent a step backward toward authoritarianism, as Reilly suggests, would depend on the character of the new model. It would definitely be a move away from a full embrace of liberal democracy. As such, it would represent yet another chapter in the ongoing Chinese conversation about democracy that could return to important parts of the understandings that Sun and the Chiangs embraced.

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Glossary

Chinese unitary model: A model of democracy advocated by some in the Chinese community that emphasizes elitism and a unified demos, often using *jiùwáng* and *mínběn* justifications.

Chīng dynasty (大清帝國): Last of the imperial dynasties in China, which was overthrown in 1911 and replaced by the ROC.

Competitive elitism: A model of democracy that emphasizes decision making by elites. Accountability is through competition among elites within a multiparty system.

Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) (民主進步黨): Political party created in 1986 in opposition to the ruling KMT party on Taiwan.

Demos: The collective body of citizens.

Jiùwáng (救亡): A popular traditional Chinese justification of government based on the usefulness of creating a powerful state capable of discharging tasks necessary for saving the country from existential crises.

Kuomintang Party (KMT) (國民黨): Political party founded by Sun Yat-sen in 1912 as the vehicle for carrying out the revolutionary task of transforming China into a strong, modern, democratic state.

Legalists (法家): Chinese philosophical school that emphasizes the importance of pragmatic policy making, rewards and punishment, the state, and rules and laws as the foundation for keeping order. Shang Yang (商鞅) (390–338 BCE) and Han Fei (韓非) (280–233 BCE) were two of the principal figures in this school.

Liberal democratic model: A model of democracy that emphasizes the importance of constitutionalism, individual rights and freedoms, and checks and balances.

May Fourth Movement (五四運動): A nationalist and populist intellectual movement in mainland China that began in 1919 as a result of student protest of the government's general failures at the peace conference in Versailles and the awarding of the German possessions in Shandong to Japan in the Treaty of Versailles. The anticolonialist movement emphasized the importance of science

and the strengthening of China in the world arena and took up the question of the place of the West, Western intellectual trends, and Western understandings of politics with regard to China's path to modernization.

Mín (民): The people.

Mínběn (民本): A traditional Chinese conception of government that links legitimacy to the promulgation of policies that promote the general interests of ordinary people. It also incorporates an elitist understanding of decision makers that emphasizes the necessity of leaders exercising traditional virtues.

People's Republic of China (PRC) (中華人民共和國): The Communist state created in 1949 as a result of the Communist triumph in the Chinese Civil War. The PRC governs mainland China and claims sovereignty over Taiwan.

***Rén* (humaneness)** (仁): The characteristic of being in accord with a fundamental and natural ethics that should govern the behavior of all humans.

Republican unitary model: A model of democracy that emphasizes the unity of the demos, citizen participation in political affairs, and the importance of civic virtues.

Republic of China (ROC) (中華民國): The Chinese state created to replace the Ching dynasty on the Chinese mainland. It was displaced on the mainland by the PRC in 1949 but continues to govern Taiwan.

***Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* (Three Principles of the People)** (三民主義): The principles of democracy, nationalism, and people's welfare promulgated by Sun Yat-sen as the fundamental principles for the modernization and governing of China.

Self-Strengtheners (自強運動): The group of Chinese officials and intellectuals who, in the second half of the nineteenth century in the aftermath of repeated Chinese humiliations at the hands of the West and Japan, proposed that China modernize and strengthen itself militarily by adopting Western understandings of science, technology, industry, and weaponry while retaining traditional Chinese culture and values.

***Tào* (The Way)** (道): The path of virtue and right living that is embedded in the structure of the universe. It is referred to by most traditional Chinese philosophical schools, though each school provides a different interpretation of the virtues that make up that path and how one discovers and retains those virtues.

Tiān (天): Heaven, the universe, all that exists.

***Tiān mìng* (mandate of heaven)** (天命): The legitimization of government by the natural order of things, generally thought to be expressed by the absence of social and political turmoil and of natural disasters (droughts, floods, earthquakes, famines, epidemics).

***Xunzhèng mínzhǔ* (tutelary democracy)** (訓政民主): The second stage of political development Sun Yat-sen outlined in China's road to modernization and democracy. In this stage, a KMT-controlled government would prepare citizens for the responsibilities of democracy through training and the institution of local self-government. The first stage would be a military government that would forcibly carry out the unification of China by eliminating warlords and other threats to geographical unity and political order, while the third stage would be reached when of a full-scale constitutional democracy was implemented.

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Key Dates

1866: Sun Yat-sen is born in Guongdong Province in China

1886: Chiang Kai-shek is born in Zhejiang Province in China

1910: Chiang Ching-kuo is born in Zhejiang Province in China

1911: Chīng dynasty is overthrown

1912: Sun serves as provisional president of the new Republic of China (ROC)

1924: Sun delivers the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* lectures in Guangzhou

1925: Sun passes away in Peking

1928: Chiang Kai-shek assumes the presidency of the ROC for the first time

1946: New ROC constitution promulgated in Nanjing meant to mark the transition to democracy

1948: The "Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion" added to the ROC constitution, strengthening the power of the executive branch

1948: Martial law declared on Taiwan in response to the 2/28 Incident, in which antigovernment protests were forcefully suppressed

1949: Chinese Communists win Chinese civil war; Nationalist government retreats to Taiwan

1971: Richard Nixon visits mainland China to open negotiations for normalizing relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC)

1975: Chiang Kai-shek passes away in Taipei

1978: Chiang Ching-kuo assumes presidency of the ROC

1978: United States normalizes relations with the PRC and breaks ties with the ROC

1986: Democratic Progressive Party founded in Taipei

1987: Martial law lifted on Taiwan

1988: Chiang Ching-kuo passes away in Taipei

1990–1993: The “Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion” removed from the constitution and further democratic reforms implemented, including direct popular presidential elections

1996: Lee Teng-hui elected president in the first direct, popular presidential election in the ROC

Notes

Abbreviations

FCR	*Free China Review*
Perspectives	*Perspectives: President Chiang Ching-kuo's Selected Addresses and Messages, 1978–1983*
SAM 1958	*Selected Addresses and Messages of President Chiang Kai-shek in 1958*
SAM 1959	*Selected Addresses and Messages of President Chiang Kai-shek in 1959*
SAM 1972	*President Chiang Kai-shek's Selected Addresses and Messages in 1972*
SAM 1982	*President Chiang Ching-kuo's Selected Addresses and Messages in 1982*
SAM 1983	*President Chiang Ching-kuo's Selected Addresses and Messages in 1983*
SAM 1984	*President Chiang Ching-kuo's Selected Addresses and Messages in 1984*
SAM 1985	*President Chiang Ching-kuo's Selected Addresses and Messages in 1985*
SAM 1986	*President Chiang Ching-kuo's Selected Addresses and Messages in 1986*
SAM 1987	*President Chiang Ching-kuo's Selected Addresses and Messages in 1987*
SAM 1988	*President Chiang Ching-kuo's Selected Addresses and Messages in 1988*
SAM 1991	*President Lee Teng-hui's Selected Addresses and Messages in 1991*
SAM 1993	*President Lee Teng-hui's Selected Addresses and Messages in 1993*
SAM 1995	*President Lee Teng-hui's Selected Addresses and Messages in 1995*

CHAPTER 1: **Discussions of Democracy in the Work of Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, and Chiang Ching-kuo**

Epigraph. Rigger, "Taiwan's Best-Case Democratization," 286.

1. For a recent invocation of this theme, see the news story "Activist Touts Taiwan Democracy."

2. The most recent works on the Chiangs are Taylor's biographies, *The Generalissimo* and *The Generalissimo's Son*, and Fenby's *Chiang Kai-shek*.

3. Wells, *Political Thought of Sun Yat-sen*; Chang and Gordon, *All under Heaven*; and Fung, *In Search of Chinese Democracy*, discuss Sun's place in contemporary discussions of democracy, but they do not address these themes.

4. Chang and Holt, "Naming China," have used these sources to trace the various ways in which ROC leaders have been referred to on the mainland since 1949 but do not explore their political content.

5. See, for example, Fung, *In Search of Chinese Democracy*; Nathan, *Chinese Democracy*; and Guang, "Elusive Democracy."

6. For recent work, see Wells, *Political Thought of Sun-Yat-sen*; Chang and Gordon, *All under Heaven*; and Fung, *In Search of Chinese Democracy*.

7. Among those arguing that the transition to democracy has been driven by the Cold War are Tien, "Taiwan's Transformation"; Hansson, "Chiang Ching-kuo: A Motive Analysis," Ko, "Cold War Triumph?"; and C. Hu, "Taiwan's Geopolitics."

8. For examples of the general identification of Taiwan's transition with the Third Wave, see Tien, *Taiwan's Electoral Politics*; Diamond et al., *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies*; and Rigger, "Taiwan's Best-Case Democratization."

9. Soong, "Explaining Taiwan's Transition"; King, "A Nonparadigmatic Search"; and Chu, "Taiwan and Mainland China's Democratic Future."

10. O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*. For one overview of various explanations of Taiwan's democratization process, see Tien, "Dynamics of Taiwan's Democratic Transition."

11. Halbeisen, "In Search of a New Political Order?"

12. Chao and Myers, "The First Chinese Democracy," 213–30.

13. Tien, "Taiwan's Transformation."

14. Gold, "Taiwan: Still Defying the Odds," 169.

15. Nathan and Ho, "Chiang Ching-kuo's Decisions," 33, 50. See also Tien, *The Great Transition*, 251, passim.

16. Hood, *Kuomintang and the Democratization of Taiwan*.

17. Aristotle, *The Politics*, bks. 3 and 4.

18. See Rousseau, *The Social Contract*; and Machiavelli, *Discourses*.

19. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," 71. For an example of an empirical study that explicitly uses this definition, see Vanhanen, "New Dataset for Measuring Democracy."

20. Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics*, chap. 8.

21. Ibid., 220–24.

22. For a discussion of electoral regimes that fall short of democracy in the understanding of many theorists, see Diamond, *Developing Democracy*, 15–16.

23. Held, *Models of Democracy*.

24. See ibid., chap. 2.

25. Diamond argues that this type of system represents a minimal model of democracy. *Developing Democracy*, 9–10. For a full discussion, see Held, *Models of Democracy*, chap. 5.

26. For representative and generally accepted descriptions of liberal democracy, see Held, *Models of Democracy*, chap. 3; and Diamond, *Developing Democracy*, 11–12.

27. See Lee, "Culture Is Destiny." See also the descriptions of pro-Asian democracy elites in Hong Kong in Beatty, *Democracy, Asian Values, and Hong Kong*, 52–57. For a useful overview of the Asian democracy debate, see Mauzy, "The Challenge to Democracy."

28. See Reilly, "Democratization and Electoral Reform."

29. Hood, "Myth of Asian Democracy."

30. Mauzy, "The Challenge to Democracy." See also the views of the Hong Kong elite who are skeptical of Asian democracy in Beatty, *Democracy, Asian Values, and Hong Kong*, esp. 48–52.

31. Mukherjee, "Is There a Distinct Style of Asian Democracy?"

32. Cho, "Democracy with Chinese Characteristics?"

33. Yu K., *Democracy Is a Good Thing*, chaps. 7, 8.

34. Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, "Building of Political Democracy in China." A more recent example can be found in Dong, "China Fully Committed to Democracy." For a Western view of a possible Chinese version of democracy, see Bell, "Democracy with Chinese Characteristics."

35. Nathan, *Chinese Democracy*.

36. See, for example, Bai, "Mencian Version of Limited Democracy"; A. Chen, "Is Confucianism Compatible?"; and Fetzer and Soper, "Effect of Confucian Values."

37. Fung, *In Search of Chinese Democracy*.

38. See, for example, Peng, "Democracy and Chinese Political Discourses"; Guang, "Elusive Democracy"; and Wei, "Understanding Democracy."

39. Peng, "Democracy and Chinese Political Discourses." While one could make the argument that Chiang Kai-shek's conception fits this description, I argue for a different understanding.

40. Fung, *In Search of Chinese Democracy*, 15.

41. Fukuyama, "Historical Pattern."

42. For several examples of the many early justifications in this vein, see Price, "Revolution of 1911," 224; see also Fung, *In Search of Chinese Democracy*, 10–12; and Hunt, *The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy*, chap. 2.

43. For this distinction, see Norris, "Does Democratic Satisfaction Reflect?" For the concept of *jiùwáng*, see Fung, *In Search of Chinese Democracy*.

44. For an overview of different understandings of the compatibility of such values with democracy in general and liberal democracy in particular, see Spina, Shin, and Cha, "Confucianism and Democracy"; and A. Chen, "Is Confucianism Compatible?"

45. Guang, "Elusive Democracy"; Fung, *Search of Chinese Democracy*, 18–19; and Spina, Shin, and Cha, "Confucianism and Democracy." For a skeptical view, see Elstein, "Why Early Confucianism Cannot Generate Democracy."

46. Peng, "Democracy and Chinese Political Discourses," 433–34.

47. Some scholars hold that the attribution of this feature to democracy stood in contrast intellectually with the early twentieth-century Chinese republican (*gongzhe*, 共和) understandings of democracy (in which virtue, structure, constitutionalism, and the separation of the public from the private featured) that were espoused by some participants in the May Fourth and New Culture Movements. See Jin, Liu, and Lam, "From 'Republicanism' to 'Democracy.'" The identification of an objective common will and common good has been associated with some of the leaders of the democracy movement in the 1980s. See Guang, "Elusive Democracy," 428–29.

48. See Price, "Revolution of 1911," 227–28.

49. Chao and Ho, "Philosophical Background of the Chinese Revolution," 306–12.

50. G. Yu, "The 1911 Revolution," 895–904; Y. Lee, "Analysis of Democratic Transition."

51. Linebarger, *Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen*.

52. Bedeski, "Concept of the State," 338–54.

53. For example, Zhao, "A Tragedy of History"; and Fung, *In Search of Chinese Democracy.*

54. Wells, *Political Thought of Sun Yat-sen.*

55. For an early view that paints Sun in liberal terms, see S. Chung, "Sun Yat-sen's Revolutionary Principles." For later discussions, see Chaung, "Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Social Development Concept"; C. Chung, *Sun's Thought and Political Guidelines*; and Y. Cheng, *Chiang Kai-shek's Thought*.

56. Y. Hu, *Sunology and Its Origins*; Y. Cheng, *Chiang Kai-shek's Thought*, 2, notes both *mínběn* and modern democratic influences.

57. See Shang, "Studies on Sun Yat-sen"; and Wells, *Political Thought of Sun Yat-sen* for overviews of the literature on Sun in the PRC. Both note the different ways in which scholars sought to explicate Sun's thought in the context of prevailing ideological views from the 1950s through the 1970s. For examples of expository studies on Taiwan, see Y. Hu, *Sunology and Its Origin*; and Huang C., "Chinese Intellectuals' Attitudes toward Socialism."

58. See Y. Lee, "Analysis of Democratic Transition"; Hui, "Analyzing the Political and Economic Transition"; Lai, "On the System of 'Sunology,' "; Y. Chen, "Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Thought on Party Politics"; Chaung, "Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Social Development Concept"; Vhiang, "Sunism in Post-Socialist China"; C. Chung, *Sun's Thought and Political Guidelines*; and Huei, "On Cross-Strait Democratic Development."

59. For example, Fenby, *Chiang Kai-shek*.

60. Sympathetic treatments of Chiang include Lokuang, *Chiang Kai-shek's Interpretation*; Tsui, *Explication of Chiang Kai-shek's Philosophical Thinking*; and Chien, *Chiang Kai-shek*. On Chiang's commitment to constitutional democracy, see Tsao and Tang, *Chiang Kai-shek*; and Lei, *Chiang Kai-shek's Democratic Thought*.

61. Y. Cheng, *Chiang Kai-shek's Thought*; Ho, *Political Philosophy of Chiang Kai-shek*; Lei, *Chiang Kai-shek's Democratic Thought*; Tsao and Tan, *Chiang Kai-shek*.

62. Chiu, "Constitutional Development."

63. See Taylor, *The Generalissimo*, 343–44, 442–43.

64. Chiang Kai-shek, "Speech to KMT in Chungking, Sept. 20, 1949," *FCR*, Jan. 1955. Tong's sympathetic biography, *Chiang Kai-shek*, generally makes the same argument, as does Price, *China: Dawn or Dusk?*, 84.

65. Ts. Wang, "One Who Lays the Foundation."

66. Heng, "Former President Jiang's Deeds."

67. Chan, "Common Commitment to Democracy," 198–99.

68. Soong, "Explaining Taiwan's Transition," 202–6. See also Rigger, "Taiwan's Best-Case Democratization"; and G. Yu, "The 1911 Revolution."

69. For a discussion of moral education on Taiwan, see Meyer, "Teaching Morality"; and Lin, "Political Indoctrination," 134–38. For an example of the use of the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* lectures in military training, see Zhu, "Constitution of the Republic of China" [中華民國憲法與孫中山思想].

70. Interview with Vance Chang, director of the Department of Compilation and Translation, GIO, and Virginia Sheng, editor, *Taiwan Journal*, March 2008.

71. See Breslauer, *Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders*; and Brown and Shevtsova, *Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Putin*.

72. See Lorenzo, *Tradition and the Rhetoric of Right*, esp. chap. 2.

73. Bermeo, "Democracy and the Lessons." See also Diamond, *Developing Democracy*, 65, Diamond, "Promoting Democracy," 23; and Corothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad*, chap. 5.

74. Mattes and Bratton, "Learning about Democracy in Africa,"199.

75. For an overview and empirical test of various types of learning and socialization theory associated with posttransition politics, see Mishler and Rose, "Generation, Age, and Time."

76. Apter and Sawa, *Against the State*; Apter and Saich, *Revolutionary Discourse*. Of the many works by Hill and those who follow him, see Hill, *World Turned Upside Down*; Hill, *English Bible and the Seventeenth-Century Revolution*; and Underdown, *Fire from Heaven*.

77. See Fenby, *Chiang Kai-shek*.

78. The issue of translations is also important. All material comes from the official government translations, whether the source is a book or a government publication such as the *Free China Review*. As it was explained to me, the process for translating official speeches and messages starts with local staff initiating the translation after conferring with other government bodies regarding important concepts and terms. The copy is then sent to the foreign editors (GIO editors who are native speakers of non-Chinese languages) for polishing. There is an emphasis throughout the entire process on the creation of consistent translations for important terms. During the KMT era, the approach was even more literal and rigid, with little leeway for loose or free translations. Interview with Vance Chang and Virginia Sheng, March 2008. I also reviewed important portions of the original Chinese text with native speakers to check the GIO translations, including Vance Chang, who has been involved with the GIO translation process for many years.

79. Diamond, "Defining and Developing Democracy," 35.

80. Stepan, "Religion, Democracy," 5.

81. Diamond, "Defining and Developing Democracy," 34.

CHAPTER 2: **Sun Yat-sen**

Epigraph. Hsia, "China's People's Convention," 789.

1. See Hunt, *Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy*, chap. 2.

2. For a useful discussion of the larger conversation on the need to tie the population to the state during the late Chīng era, see ibid., 56–60.

3. Biggerstaff, review of *The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen*, 188–89.

4. See Wilbur, *Sun Yat-sen*.

5. Tan, *Chinese Political Thought*, 147–56.

6. Shotwell, "Sun Yat-Sen and Maurice William," 19–26.

7. Linebarger, *Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen*.

8. Chang and Gordon, *All under Heaven*, 107–13.

9. Gregor and Chang, "Nazionalfascismo," 23; Gregor and Chang, "Wang Yang-ming," 388–404; and Gregor, "Confucianism," 55–70.

10. Y. Wang, "Influence of Yen Fu and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao," 163–84. See also Gu, "Who Was Mr. Democracy?," 589–621. In contrast, Chang and Gordon, *All under Heaven*, emphasize Sun's political and philosophical disagreements with Liang.

11. Wilbur, *Sun Yat-sen*.

12. See Ames, *Anticipating China*.

13. See, for example, *The Book of Lord Shang*.

14. Chang and Gordon attribute this development to Sun's increasing political estrangement from the West, his negative perceptions of the May Fourth Movement, and his general disappointment at the lack of progress since 1911. However, they also argue that his theoretical understanding of democracy incorporates a Montesquieu-like conception of the separation of powers. *All under Heaven*, 57–63, 107–13.

15. Sun, *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*, Dem. Lect. 1, 61–62.

16. Ibid., Dem. Lect. 3, 81–82.

17. Ibid., Dem. Lect. 1, 61.

18. Sun explicitly emphasizes this orientation by referring to the epistemological primacy of the "evolution of history." Ibid., 61–62.

19. Ibid., 62.

20. Ibid., 57–58.

21. Ibid., 62–63.

22. Ibid., 52.

23. For a fuller discussion of natural cooperation and human nature in Sun's thought, see Jiang, *Sun Yat-sen's Philosophy*, chap. 7.

24. Sun, *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*, Dem. Lect. 1, 55–57.

25. Ibid., 63.

26. Ibid., 64–65.

27. See Smith, *Civic Ideals*, epilogue.

28. Fung, *In Search of Chinese Democracy*, makes parallel criticisms of Sun's justification of democracy.

29. Sun, *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*, Dem. Lect. 1, 62.

30. Ibid., 53.

31. Ibid., 56–57.

32. Ibid., 57–58.

33. See Lei, *Chiang Kai-shek's Democratic Thought*, 12.

34. This point is emphasized by Fung, *In Search of Chinese Democracy*, 37. See also Chang and Gordon, *All under Heaven*, 109–11.

35. Y. Cheng, *Chiang Kai-shek's Thought*, goes further to argue that Sun's overall understanding of democratic conception was influenced by traditional "people-oriented" thought.

36. Sun, *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*, Dem. Lect. 1, 58.

37. Ibid., 59.

38. Peng, "Democracy and Chinese Political Discourses"; Fung, *In Search of Chinese Democracy*, 22. In this judgment, Sun is close to contemporary scholars who argue that Confucian and *mínběn* values are compatible with democracy. See Spina, Shin, and Cha, "Confucianism and Democracy."

39. Sun, *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*, Dem. Lect. 1, 59.

40. Ibid., 58. This discussion may in part be a response to the work of Frank Goodnow, an aide to Yuan Shih-kai, who argued that China was not suited for democracy. See Chang and Gordon, *All under Heaven*, 55–56.

41. Sun, *Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary*, 131–36.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid., 118.

44. Ibid., 119.

45. Sun, *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*, Nationalism Lect. 6, 37–38.

46. Ibid., 41–42, 43–44.

47. Sun's embrace of traditional Chinese values is heavily emphasized in Wang S., *The Thought of Dr. Sun Yat-sen*, 43.

48. Sun, *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*, Dem. Lect. 1, 60–61, 63.

49. Ibid., Dem. Lect. 4, 99–100.

50. Ibid., 100–101.

51. Ibid., 100–101.

52. Ibid., 107.

53. Ibid., 105.

54. Ibid., Dem. Lect. 5, 106–7, 110.

55. Ibid., 111.

56. Ibid., 110.

57. Ibid., Dem. Lect. 4, 106.

58. Ibid., Dem. Lect. 5, 125–28.

59. Ibid., 126.

60. Ibid., Dem. Lect. 1, 51. This is one of several places where Sun appears to echo Rousseau despite Sun's rejection of the anthropological basis of Rousseau's understanding and his probable rejection of the parallel as a whole.

61. In this, Sun's insistence on both the necessity of unity and its absence is possibly a manifestation of what Lucian Pye argues was a contemporary Chinese legitimacy crisis. See *Spirit of Chinese Politics*, 7–10.

62. In Dem. Lect. 6, 133–34, Sun confuses this point by using the metaphor of a train and its conductor.

63. Sun, *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*, Dem. Lect. 5, 118; Dem. Lect. 1, 52.

64. Ibid., Dem. Lect. 5, 115–17.

65. Ibid., 119–20.

66. Ibid., Dem. Lect. 3, 81, quotation on 82.

67. Chang and Gordon take the position that it is a reference to equal opportunity. *All under Heaven*, 110.

68. Sun, *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*, Dem. Lect. 4, 93.

69. Ibid., Dem. Lect. 5, 114, 123–24.

70. Lei differs here, arguing that Sun, unlike Chiang Kai-shek, embraced a model of direct democracy. See *Chiang Kai-shek's Democratic Thought*, 20.

71. Wang S., *Thought of Dr. Sun Yat-sen*, 238–44, puts a somewhat different spin on this, holding that Sun's contextualism would lead him to different, more liberal understandings in different circumstances. For a harsher view, see Fung, *In Search of Chinese Democracy*, 34–38.

72. For a survey of these difficulties, see Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics*, chap. 20.

73. Ibid., 283–89.

74. Held subjects Weber's similar proposition to the same criticism. See *Models of Democracy*, 175.

75. Sun, *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*, Dem. Lect. 5, 129.

76. Ibid., Dem. Lect. 4, 107. Thus he also approves of the saying "The skillful the slaves of the stupid." Ibid., Dem. Lect. 3, 90.

77. Ibid., Dem. Lect. 6, 134.

78. See Held, *Models of Democracy*, 162–74.

79. See Fung, *In Search of Chinese Democracy*, for a similar analysis. Chang and Gordon cite Sun's criticisms of the British style "parliamentary dictatorship" that appear to make such an understanding unlikely. Yet Sun's theoretical understandings were often at odds with his practical discussions. See *All under Heaven*, 112.

80. Sun, *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*, Dem. Lect. 5, 115.

81. Ibid., 116.

82. Ibid., 124–25.

83. Ibid., 126.

84. Even though Sun would again probably reject the comparison, this judgment parallels Rousseau's understanding that the population's conception of the general will (as opposed to the general will itself) is inerrant.

85. Held, *Models of Democracy*, 172–75.

86. See Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics*, chap. 1.

87. Sun, *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*, Dem. Lect. 6, 130.

88. Ibid., Dem. Lect. 5, 111.

89. Lei, *Chiang Kai-shek's Democratic Thought*, 20.

90. Sun, *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*, Dem. Lect. 5, 113.

91. Ibid., 113–14.

92. Wells, *Political Thought of Sun Yat-sen*, argues that Sun would see his democratic state as embracing at least a two-party system, as does Lee Y., "Sun Yat-sen's Democratic Thought."

93. Sun, *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*, Dem. Lect. 4, 93–94.

94. Shapiro, *The State of Democratic Theory*, 75.

95. See, for example, Lei, *Chiang Kai-shek's Democratic Thought*; and Y. Cheng, *Chiang Kai-shek's Thought*.

96. On this point see Tan, *Chinese Political Thought*, 126.

97. Sun, *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*, Dem. Lect. 3, 82–83.

98. Ibid., 79–80.

99. See, for example, Wells, *Political Thought of Sun Yat-sen*, 82–83; and Chang and Gordon, *All under Heaven*, 111–12.

100. Sun, *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*, Dem. Lect. 6, 147–49. For this interpretation, see Ling, "Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Doctrine," 6.

101. Sun, *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*, Dem. Lect. 5, 120–24.

102. Ibid., 124–25.

103. Ibid., 126–28.

104. Ibid., 6, 133–34. While Sun speaks of the demos controlling government, some recent discussions read liberal tenets into his understanding. See, for example, Y. Hu, *Sunology and Its Origins*, a college-level Taiwanese textbook published in 2003; and Wells, *Political Thought of Sun Yat-sen*, 83.

105. Sun, *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*, Dem. Lect. 2, 70–71.

106. Ibid., 70. As noted above, some commentators, drawing upon materials previous to the *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì* lectures, argue that Sun was interested in individual rights. See C. Chung, *Sun's Thoughts and Political Guidelines*; for an earlier discussion in a government publication, see S. Chung, "Sun Yat-sen's Revolutionary Principles."

107. Sun, *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*, Dem. Lect. 2, 69–71; ibid., Dem. Lect. 3, 88.

108. Ibid., Dem. Lect. 2, 72–73.

109. Ibid., Dem. Lect. 3, 89.

110. Ibid., Dem. Lect. 2, 76; ibid., Dem. Lect. 3, 84, 88–89.

111. Lei, *Chiang Kai-shek's Democratic Thought*, 12. Chang and Gordon, *All under Heaven*, also take this line while arguing that Sun adopted a generally liberal structure of government. For an opposing view, see Bergère, *Sun Yat-sen*, 353.

112. Sun, *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*, Dem. Lect. 2, 73–74.

113. Ibid., 76. Chang and Gordon, *All under Heaven*, argue that this position represented a shift from Sun's earlier conception and was a reaction to the May Fourth Movement.

114. Sun, *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*, Dem. Lect. 4, 95.

115. Ibid., 98–99.

116. Ibid., 97.

117. Yu K., *Democracy Is a Good Thing*, 116.

118. Chung, *Sun's Thoughts and Political Guidelines*, differs in holding that Sun does emphasize the rule of law.

119. See Fung, "Idea of Freedom," 453–82; and Fung, *In Search of Chinese Democracy*.

120. In employing this intellectual strategy, Sun participated in what Yu argues was at the time one of two often-used intellectual strategies for incorporating Western ideas into the Chinese context. See Y. Yu, "Radicalization of China."

121. This assertion appears to have also been important to Chiang's government on Taiwan, as it appears in at least one article in the government-sponsored *Free China Review*. See S. Chung, "Sun Yat-sen's Revolutionary Principles."

CHAPTER 3: **Chiang Kai-shek**

Epigraph. Loh, "Politics of Chiang Kai-shek," 468.

1. Official sources in the PRC praise Chiang for his leadership in the war against Japan and in his efforts to tamp down Taiwanese independence groups. See, for example, Segura, "Cross-Straits Tourists See Double."

2. For a useful and informative discussion of the democratic shortcomings of the early Nationalist regime, see Fung, *In Search of Chinese Democracy*.

3. See Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 68–69, 192–93. Gaddis documents Dulles's reasoning that supporting the Nationalists on Taiwan would lead the PRC to make demands

on the USSR that could not be met, thus straining relations between the two Communist regimes.

4. Sun's influences on Chiang's democratic conceptions are emphasized, for example, in Y. Cheng, *Chiang Kai-shek's Thought*, 4; Tsu, *Influence of Wang Yang-ming's Philosophy*, 1; Chien, *Chiang Kai-shek*; and Tsui, *Explication of Chiang Kai-shek's Philosophical Thinking*.

5. Even Cheng, who argues that Chiang was influenced by Rousseau and Montesquieu, holds that Chiang refused to blindly follow Western democratic models. See *Chiang Kai-shek's Thought*, 4. Ho also argues that Chiang departed fundamentally from the West's "Machiavellian effort" to separate power from morality. *Political Philosophy of Chiang Kai-shek*, 19.

6. See Lipset, "Some Social Requisites for Democracy," for a general discussion of this topic and Soong, "Explaining Taiwan's Transition" for Taiwan's case.

7. See in particular Chang, "'Fascism' and Modern China," 553–67; and Wakeman, "A Revisionist View," 395–432.

8. Jaffe, "Secret of China's Destiny."

9. For example, Dickson, *Democratization in China and Taiwan*; and Wakeman, "Revolutionary Rites."

10. Wright, "From Revolution to Restoration."

11. Loh, "Politics of Chiang Kai-shek"; Tsu, *Influence of Yang Wang-ming's Philosophy*; Chien, *Chiang Kai-shek*.

12. Walker, "Taiwan's Development," 395–432; Chao and Myers, "How Elections Promoted Democracy"; Tsao and Tang, "*Chiang Kai-shek*. For a later rendition of this argument in a government publication, see Ger, *The Story of Taiwan*, 7–13.

13. Lei, *Chiang Kai-shek's Democratic Thought*, 20; Y. Cheng, *Chiang Kai-shek's Thought*, 4.

14. In addition to Lei and Cheng, see also Tsao and Tang, *Chiang Kai-shek*; and Ho, *Political Philosophy of Chiang Kai-shek*.

15. Loh, "Ideological Persuasion of Chiang Kai-shek," 211–12.

16. See Lei, *Chiang Kai-shek's Democratic Thought*; Y. Cheng, *Chiang Kai-shek's Thought*; Tsu, *Influence of Wang Yang-ming's Philosophy*; Chien, *Chiang Kai-shek*; and Tsui, *Explication of Chiang Kai-shek's Philosophical Thinking*.

17. For example, "Youth's Day Message," *FCR*, Apr. 1957, 10; "Message to the Nation by President Chiang Kai-shek, Oct. 10, 1960," *FCR*, Nov. 1960, 55; and "Message to the Nation by President Chiang Kai-shek, Oct. 10, 1956," *FCR*, Oct. 1956, 44.

18. "President Chiang's New Year's Message 1961," *FCR*, Jan. 1961, 55–56. See also "Message to the Nation by President Chiang Kai-shek, Oct. 10, 1959," *SAM 1959*, 36–37.

19. For Chiang's religious practices while on Taiwan, see Taylor, *The Generalissimo*, 390, 432. Also see "Testimony on Good Friday," Mar. 27, 1959, *SAM 1959*, 23–25, in which he argues that freedom comes only through God's truth and Christ.

20. "Answers to Questions Submitted by Albert Kaff, Manager of UPI Taipei Bureau, Oct. 22, 1959," *SAM 1959*, 46.

21. "New Year's Message for 1963," *FCR*, Feb. 1963, 103–4.

22. "*San Min Chu I* and Communism," *FCR*, July 1966, 13.

23. "Message of the Tsungtsai," *FCR*, Jan. 1975, 52.

24. "Message to the Nation by President Chiang Kai-shek, Oct. 10, 1959," *SAM 1959*, 36–37; "New Year's Message," *FCR*, Jan. 1961, 55–56; "Address at the Opening Ceremony of the First Conference of the World Anti-Communist League, Sept. 25, 1967," *FCR*, Oct. 1967, 89; "Message to the Nation by President Chiang Kai-shek, Oct. 10, 1966," *FCR*, Nov. 1966, 82.

25. "Youth Day Message, March 29, 1963," *FCR*, May 1963, 95.

26. Ibid.

27. "Message to the Nation by President Chiang Kai-shek, Oct. 10, 1968," *FCR*, Nov. 1968, 75; "Message to the Nation by President Chiang Kai-shek, Oct. 10, 1971," *FCR*, Oct. 1971, 67.

28. Interestingly, the *Free China Review* in the late 1950s published an essay that connected natural law with democracy in a way that moved away from Western understandings. See Wu, "Natural Law and Democracy." See also Pan, "Role of Confucianism," in which Pan also identifies elements of natural law and democracy in Confucianism, particularly in the concept of *rén* (仁).

29. See specifically Locke, *Second Treatise on Government*.

30. This position is laid out most explicitly in Locke's *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*.

31. Tsui, *Explication of Chiang Kai-shek's Philosophical Thinking*; Lokuang, *Chiang Kai-shek's Interpretation*.

32. Lokuang, *Chiang Kai-shek's Interpretation*, 5.

33. "President Chiang Kai-shek's Message to the Nation, New Year's Day, 1958," *FCR*, Jan. 1958, 9.

34. He did elsewhere document his struggle to resolve the differences between Sun's and Wang's epistemological positions. For one account, see Tsu, *Influence of Wang Yang-ming*.

35. "Opening of the Chinese Cultural Hall of Chung-Shan Building on the 101st Anniversary of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Birthday, Nov. 12, 1966," *FCR*, Dec. 1966, 87. See also "*San Min Chu I* and Communism," *FCR*, July 1966, 13.

36. "Constitution Day Address, Dec. 25, 1968," *FCR*, Jan. 1969, 80.

37. "Address to Youth Representatives, March 29, 1968," *FCR*, May 1968, 79. See also Pan, "The Role of Confucianism in the Democratization of China" and Wu, "Natural Law and Democracy."

38. "New Year's Day Message," *FCR*, Jan. 1967, 85; "Youth Day Message, March 29, 1967," *FCR*, May 1967, 88; "Inaugural Speech, May 20, 1966," *FCR*, June 1966, 98; "New Year's Message," *FCR*, Jan. 1970. Pye, *Spirit of Chinese Politics*, 55–60, provides other explanations for this stance.

39. "National Day Message," *FCR*, Nov. 1967, 87; "Message to the Nation by President Chiang Kai-shek, Oct. 10, 1966," *FCR*, Nov. 1966, 82; "Constitution Day Message," *FCR*, Jan. 1970, 75.

40. "Address at a Meeting Commemorating the Birth of Sun Yat-sen and Chinese Cultural Renaissance Day, Nov. 12, 1970," *FCR*, Dec. 1970, 75. See also "New Year's Message," *FCR*, Jan. 1957, 11; "Inaugural Address, May 20, 1966," *FCR*, June 1966, 98; "Address to

Youth Representatives, March 29, 1968," *FCR*, May 1968, 79; "Answers to Questions Submitted by Albert Kaff, Manager of UPI Taipei Bureau, Oct. 22, 1959," *SAM 1959*, 46.

41. Note that Chiang did not go quite as far as those quoted in Stepan, "Religion, Democracy," 1, 3, 34. Stepan interprets Confucian texts as explicitly supporting democratic principles. A contrary view is held by Chaibong, "Ironies of Confucianism."

42. Ho, *Political Philosophy of Chiang Kai-shek*, 12, emphasizes Chiang's argument that "public opinion and public sentiment are the basis of the government's policy-making."

43. "New Year's Day Message," *FCR*, Feb. 1971, 75; "Constitution Day Address, Dec. 25, 1968," *FCR*, Jan. 1969, 79.

44. "Constitution Day Address, Dec. 25, 1968," *FCR*, Jan. 1969, 79.

45. "*San Min Chu I* and Communism," *FCR*, July 1966, 13.

46. "Constitution Day Address, Dec. 25, 1968," *FCR*, Jan. 1969, 79; "Double Tenth Day National Message," *FCR*, Nov. 1970, 76; "Address to the Fifth Session of the National Assembly, Feb. 20, 1972," *SAM 1972*, 12.

47. "New Year's Message," *FCR*, Jan. 1956, 47; Y. Cheng, *Chiang Kai-shek's Thought*, emphasizes this point.

48. Y. Cheng, *Chiang Kai-shek's Thought*; Lei, *Chiang Kai-shek's Democratic Thought*; Tsao and Tang, *Chiang Kai-shek*.

49. "Address to the Fifth Session of the National Assembly, Feb. 20, 1972," *SAM 1972*, 10.

50. Sun, *Sān Mín Chǔ Yì*, Dem. Lect. 6, 130–31.

51. Y. Cheng, *Chiang Kai-shek's Thought*, 1–12.

52. Halbeisen, "In Search of a New Political Order?"

53. "Address to the National Assembly at the Closing of Its Fourth Plenary Session, March 25, 1966," *FCR*, May 1966, 84.

54. "Speech to KMT in Chungking, Sept. 20, 1949," *FCR*, Jan. 1955, 65.

55. "New Year's Message," *FCR*, Mar. 1952.

56. "Message to the Nation by President Chiang Kai-shek, Oct. 10, 1961," *FCR*, Oct. 1961, 77; "Message to the Fourth Session of the National Assembly, Feb. 9, 1966," *FCR*, Mar. 1966, 81.

57. "Speech to KMT on Sept. 20, 1949, in Chungking," *FCR*, Jan. 1955.

58. Note that Chiang was quick to have the constitution changed to permit him to seek a third, fourth, and ultimately fifth term as president.

59. "Address to the Fifth Session of the National Assembly, Feb. 20, 1972," *SAM 1972*.

60. "New Year's Message," *FCR*, Feb. 1955, 53; "New Year's Message," *FCR*, Jan. 1953, 39–40; Wright, "From Revolution to Restoration."

61. "Message to the Nation by President Chiang Kai-shek, Oct. 10, 1966," *FCR*, Nov. 1966, 83; "Address to Youth Representatives, March 29, 1968," *FCR*, May 1968, 79; "Constitution Day Address, Dec. 25, 1968," *FCR*, Jan. 1969, 79; "Address at Meeting Commemorating the Birth of Sun Yat-sen and Chinese Cultural Renaissance Day, Nov. 12, 1970," *FCR*, Dec.1970, 76; "New Year's Day Message," *FCR*, Jan. 1974, 57.

62. "Youth Day Message, March 29, 1974," *FCR*, Apr. 1974, 53.

63. "Report to the National Assembly, Feb. 20, 1960," *FCR*, Mar. 1960, 11. Ho, *Political Philosophy of Chiang Kai-shek*, 19, emphasizes Chiang's contention that Western understandings must be supplemented by Confucian values.

64. "President Chiang Kai-shek's Message to the Nation on New Year's Day, 1953," *FCR*, Jan. 1953, 38.

65. Lei, *Chiang Kai-shek's Democratic Thought*; Tsao and Tang, *Chiang Kai-shek*; Y. Cheng, *Chiang Kai-shek's Thought*.

66. "Constitution Day Address, Dec. 25, 1968," *FCR*, Jan. 1969, 79–80.

67. Ibid., 80.

68. Ibid.

69. "New Year's Day Message," *FCR*, Mar. 1952, 55.

70. "Inaugural Address, May 20, 1960," *FCR*, June 1960, 43.

71. "Answers to Questions Submitted by Albert Kaff," *SAM 1959*, 44; "Birthday Centennial of Sun Yat-sen," *FCR*, Dec. 1965, 10.

72. "Constitution Day Address, Dec. 25, 1968," *FCR*, Jan. 1969, 80.

73. Chaibong, "Ironies of Confucianism," 38.

74. Fukuyama, "Historical Pattern."

75. See Taylor, *The Generalissimo*.

76. "Message to the Nation on the May 24 Incident," *FCR*, June 1957, 8; "Report to the National Assembly, Feb. 20, 1960," *FCR*, Mar. 1960, 12.

77. "Report to the National Assembly, Feb. 20, 1960," *FCR*, March 1960, 8.

78. Bai, however, might label Chiang's use of Confucian ethics, as well as his understanding of moral accountability, as compatible with a "thin" liberal conception of democracy. See "Mencian Version of Limited Democracy."

79. "Message to the Fourth Session of the National Assembly, Feb. 9, 1966," *FCR*, Mar. 1966, 80.

80. Chiang shared this view with some Western thinkers whom we regard as democrats. See for example Jefferson, "Letter to the Abbé Arnaux, July 1789."

81. "New Year's Day Message," *FCR*, Jan. 1958, 8–9.

82. "Message to the Nation by President Chiang Kai-shek, Oct. 10, 1953," *FCR*, Nov. 1953, 52.

83. "New Year's Day Message," *FCR*, Feb. 1964, 86

84. "Address to the Fifth Session of the National Assembly, Feb. 20, 1972," *FCR*, Mar. 1972, 13–14.

85. "New Year's Day Message," *FCR*, Feb. 1964, 86.

86. "Inaugural Address, May 20, 1960," *FCR*, June 1960, 43.

87. "New Year's Day Message," *FCR*, Jan. 1967, 86.

88. Chiang rejected the description of Taiwan as a one-party state, asserting that the two other small constitutional parties were important and stressing that independent candidates could run for office.

89. "Speech to National Assemblymen's Club, Dec. 25, 1959," *FCR*, Jan. 1960, 48; "Address to the Fifth Session of the National Assembly, Feb. 20, 1972," *FCR*, Mar. 1972, 9.

90. "New Year's Day Message," *FCR*, Feb. 1969, 73.

91. "Address to the National Assembly at the Closing of Its Fourth Plenary Session March 25, 1966," *FCR*, May 1966, 84.

92. For a discussion of the restrictions on candidates' speech and policy positions during this time, see Jacobs, "Recent Leadership," esp. 152.

93. "Message to Chinese Communist Party Personnel, Oct. 9, 1966," *FCR*, Nov. 1966, 89.

94. "New Year's Day Message," *SAM 1958*, 7–8.

95. "Message to the Nation by President Chiang Kai-shek, Oct. 10, 1951," *FCR*, Oct. 1951, 4; "New Year's Day Message," *FCR*, Feb. 1971, 75; "Message to the Nation by President Chiang Kai-shek, Oct. 10, 1971," *FCR*, Oct. 1971, 67.

96. "Message to the Nation by President Chiang Kai-shek, Oct. 10, 1952," *FCR*, Oct. 1952, 43.

97. "Inaugural Speech, May 20, 1966," *FCR*, June 1966, 97; "New Year's Day Message," *FCR*, Mar. 1952; "New Year's Day Message," *FCR*, Jan. 1953, 38.

98. "Message to the Nation by President Chiang Kai-shek, Oct. 10, 1952," *FCR*, Oct. 1952, 43. Israel, "Politics on Formosa," 4, described KMT practice as "rule by martial law under a democratic constitution while practicing political tutelage."

99. See also Jacobs, "Taiwan 1972: Political Season," 103–4.

100. See "Speech on the Protection of People's Rights and Freedoms, April 5, 1955," *FCR*, May 1955, 45–48.

101. Chin, *Preliminary Commentary*, emphasizes Chiang's arguments that national goals require the limitation of freedoms, resulting in a situation in which citizens possess "disciplined freedoms" and government officials enjoy "functional powers."

102. "Speech on the Protection of People's Rights and Freedoms, April 5, 1955," *FCR*, May 1955, 46.

103. "National Day Address, 1965," *FCR*, Nov. 1965, 87.

104. "Youth Day Message, March 29, 1970," *FCR*, Apr. 1970, 80.

105. "Youth Day Message, March 29, 1969," *FCR*, May 1969, 83.

106. "Constitution Day Message, Dec. 25, 1969," *FCR*, Jan. 1970, 75.

107. This quite typical justification was provided by a government publication *after* the transition. See Ger, *The Story of Taiwan: Politics*, 7.

CHAPTER 4: **Chiang Ching-kuo**

Epigraph. Chou and Nathan, "Democratizing Transition in Taiwan," 278.

1. See, for example, "Address to the Fifth Journalists' Conference, November 18, 1978," *Perspectives*, 10; and "Address to the Annual Constitution Day Meeting of the National Assembly, November 25, 1978," *Perspectives*, 16.

2. For a full discussion of the political contexts, see Nathan and Ho, "Chiang Ching-kuo's Decisions."

3. Ge, "Chiang's Transitional Leadership Style"; Hui, "Chiang's Contribution."

4. Huang and Wu, "Chiang's Rule in Taiwan: The Localization Policy."

5. "Remembering Chiang Ching-kuo."

6. Nathan, *Chinese Democracy*.

7. Harrison, "Taiwan after Chiang Ching-kuo," 790–808.

8. Jacobs, "Taiwan 1972," 22–29.

9. Jacobs, "Taiwan 1978," 26.

10. Hsu, "Historical Setting," 12, 19.

11. Winkler, “Institutionalization and Participation on Taiwan,” 481–99. See also Nathan and Ho, “Chiang Ching-kuo’s Decisions for Political Reform.”

12. Wachman, *Taiwan in the Modern World*, 140–43.

13. Nathan and Ho, “Chiang Ching-kuo’s Decisions,” 51.

14. Taylor, *The Generalissimo’s Son*. For Ching-kuo’s ambivalence regarding liberal democracy, see Taylor’s description of his reaction to US culture and comparison of it to Taiwan, 221, 224.

15. “Prospects for the National Revolution as Seen in the Perspective of the History of the Kuomintang of China, November 24, 1979,” *Perspectives*, 252.

16. See Chang and Holt, “Naming China.”

17. On the function and rhetorical power of references to founders, see Lorenzo, *Tradition and the Rhetoric of Right*, chap. 3.

18. See “Address to the Constitution Day Ceremony, December 25, 1985,” *SAM 1985*, 25; “Congratulatory Message on New Years Day of the 74th Year of the Republic of China, Jan. 1, 1986,” *SAM 1986*, 1.

19. “Answers to Questions Raised by a Group of Journalists of Hongkong English-Language Newspapers & Magazines,” *SAM 1988*, 8.

20. For a discussion of this feature of discourse communities, see Lorenzo, *Tradition and the Rhetoric of Right*, chap. 3.

21. Indeed, many of the government officials and academics on Taiwan with whom I have spoken, in both parties, see Sun and his ideas as old and of only historical interest.

22. The “2/28 Incident” refers to the events surrounding the ROC’s takeover of Taiwan from Japan at the end of World War II, which resulted in riots and the use of military force against protestors who demonstrated in response to a long list of grievances, including official corruption and the importation of mainland officials.

23. See, for example, “Double Tenth Message, 1966,” *FCR*, Nov. 1966, 82.

24. “Opening Address to the 12th National Congress of the Kuomintang of China, March 29, 1981,” *Perspectives*, 39.

25. “National Day Message, October 10, 1985,” *SAM 1985*, 14.

26. “Congratulatory Message on the 1983 National Day, October 10, 1983,” *SAM 1983*, 21.

27. “Answers to Questions Raised by Wulf Kuster of *Der Speigel*, May 16, 1983,” *Perspectives*, 234–35; “Address at the Opening Ceremony of the Seventh Session of the National Assembly, Feb. 20, 1984,” *SAM 1984*, 10.

28. “National Day Message, October 10, 1985,” *SAM 1985*, 14.

29. “Address to the Constitution Day Rally of the National Assembly, December 25, 1979,” *Perspectives*, 26–27.

30. “Looking Back on the Past Five Hard but Hopeful Years, April 3, 1980,” *Perspectives*, 268–69. See also “National Day Message, October 10, 1985,” *SAM 1985*, 14; “Address to the 1985 Constitution Day Ceremony, December 25, 1985,” *SAM 1985*, 26–27; “China’s Reunification & World Peace: An Address at the Opening of the Third Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee of the Kuomintang Party, March 29, 1986,” *SAM 1986*, 9; “National Day Message, October 10, 1984,” *SAM 1984*, 28; “Congratulatory Message on New Years Day of the 74th Year,” *SAM 1985*, 2.

31. "Prospects for the National Revolution," Nov. 24, 1979, *Perspectives*, 260–61, 264.

32. "The Fundamental Position and Spirit of the Nation, June 9, 1980," *Perspectives*, 82–83.

33. "Interview with Renzo Trionfera, Correspondent, *Il Giornale Nuovo*, Milan, January 23, 1980," *Perspectives*, 195. Emphasis added.

34. "Address to the Constitution Day Rally of the National Assembly, December 25, 1979," *Perspectives*, 28. See also "Address at the Closing Ceremony of the 12th National Congress of the Kuomintang of China, April 5, 1981," *SAM 1982*.

35. "Message to the National Administrative Meeting, July 4, 1980," in *Perspectives*, 62.

36. "Dialogue with Renzo Trionfera," *Perspectives*, 153.

37. "Address to the Annual Constitution Day Meeting of the National Assembly, December 25, 1978," *Perspectives*, 19.

38. "China's Reunification & World Peace," Mar. 29, 1986, *SAM 1986*, 18.

39. "Responses to Questions posed by Ms. Claudia Rosett, Editorial Page Editor, *The Asian Wall Street Journal*, Oct. 22, 1987," *SAM 1987*, 19–20.

40. Inaugural address, May 20, 1984, *SAM 1984*, 22.

41. "Address to the 1984 Constitution Day Ceremony of the National Assembly," *SAM 1984*, 32.

42. "Address to the Kuomintang Work Conference, August 1, 1980," *Perspectives*, 30–31.

43. "The Fundamental Position and Spirit of the Nation, June 9, 1980," *Perspectives*, 84.

44. This resembles the understanding of a Confucian, *mínběn* democracy put forward by Ling and Shih, in which "ruling elites would fulfill the people's wishes by deciding what is best for them rather than consulting their needs, desires, ambitions, or aspirations. Accordingly, *mínběn* governance continues to cast the people as *objects* of elite rule." "Confucianism with a Liberal Face," 62.

45. "The Fundamental Position and Spirit of the Nation, June 9, 1980," *Perspectives*, 88.

46. "Remarks at the Central Government Ceremony Marking New Year's Day and the Founding of the Republic of China, January 1, 1983," *SAM 1983*, 5.

47. "Address at the Opening of the Second Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee of the Kuomintang, February 14, 1984," *SAM 1984*, 5–6.

48. "Inauguration Address, May 20, 1978," *Perspectives*, 6.

49. "Answers to Questions in an Interview with Jonathan Broader of *Chicago Tribune*, May 10, 1984," *SAM 1984*, 19. It is interesting to note that Hsu argues that the pluralization of Taiwan had begun in the 1970s, particularly with return of overseas students. Hsu, "Historical Setting for the Rise of Chiang Ching-kuo," 15.

50. "Answers to Questions Raised by Wulf Kuster," *Perspectives*, 235.

51. "Looking Back on the Past Five Years," *Perspectives*, 270.

52. Taylor argues that Chiang was deeply committed to creating a multiparty system at this time and that the small reform groups he formed had this as their agenda. See *The Generalissimo's Son*, chap. 25.

53. In response to a question about new parties Chiang concluded, "In the future, leaving in mind the due balance between national security and constitutional democracy, we will carefully and actually study the issues relating to the formation of new parties and the termination of Chieh-yen." "Answers to Questions Raised by a Visiting Group From the *Washington Post*, Oct. 7, 1986," *SAM 1986*, 27.

54. "Answer to Questions Raised by Smith Hempstone, Editor in Chief of *Washington Times*, Feb. 25, 1984," *SAM 1984*, 14.

55. "Answers to Questions asked by William Lawrence Rother, Regional Editor and Peking Hong Kong Bureau Chief of *Newsweek*, November 1, 1982," *Perspectives*, 216.

56. "Answers to Questions Raised by a Group of Journalists of Hongkong," *SAM 1987*, 8–9.

57. "Address to the Fifth Journalists' Conference, November 18, 1978," *Perspectives*, 10.

58. "The Fundamental Position and Spirit of the Nation, June 9, 1980," *Perspectives*, 86. Emphasis added.

59. "Address to the Fifth Journalists' Conference, November 18, 1978," *Perspectives*, 12–13.

60. "Unity for a Bright Future, June 2, 1982," *Perspectives*, 120.

61. "Premier Chiang Ching-kuo's Oral Administrative Report to the First Meeting of the 54th Session of the Legislative Yuan, September 17, 1974," *FCR*, Oct. 1974, 56.

62. See in particular "The Fundamental Position and Spirit of the Nation, June 9, 1980," *Perspectives*, 92, for a discussion of the importance of benevolence.

63. "Unity for a Bright Future, June 2, 1982," *Perspectives*, 119.

64. "The Fundamental Position and Spirit of the Nation, June 9, 1980," *Perspectives*, 92

65. Ibid., 92.

66. "Address at the Opening Ceremony of the Seventh Session of the National Assembly, Feb. 20, 1984," *SAM 1984*, 9; "Address to the Annual Constitution Day Meeting of the National Assembly, December 25, 1983," *Perspectives*, 54.

67. "Address at the Opening Ceremony of the Seventh Session of the National Assembly, Feb. 20, 1984," *SAM 1984*, 9. See also "Address to the Annual Constitution Day Meeting of the National Assembly, December 25, 1978," *Perspectives*, 16.

68. "Address to the Annual Constitution Day Meeting of the National Assembly, December 25, 1983," *Perspectives*, 54.

69. "Inauguration Address, May 20, 1978," *Perspectives*, 5–6.

70. "Address to the Annual Constitution Day Meeting of the National Assembly, December 25, 1983," *Perspectives*, 54; "Congratulatory Message on New Year's Day of the 76th Year of the Republic of China, January 1, 1987," *SAM 1987*, 3–4.

71. "Dialogue with David Reed, Editor of *Reader's Digest*, May 30, 1978," *Perspectives*, 142.

72. "The Fundamental Position and Spirit of the Nation, June 9, 1980," *Perspectives*, 88.

73. "Answers to Questions Raised by Wulf Kuster," May 16, 1983, *Perspectives*, 234.

74. "Address to the Constitution Day Rally of the National Assembly, December 25, 1979," *Perspectives*, 27.

75. "Premier Chiang Ching-kuo's Oral Administrative Report to the First Meeting of the 52nd Session of the Legislative Yuan, September 23, 1973," *FCR*, Oct. 1973, 62.

76. Chiang's emphasis on the responsibilities of government to ordinary citizens in this regard may have sprung from his experiences in Kiangsi Province during World War II. See Hsu, "Historical Setting," 6.

77. "Premier Chiang Ching-kuo's Oral Administrative Report to the First Meeting of the 53rd Session of the Legislative Yuan, February 26, 1974," *FCR*, Mar. 1974, 58.

78. "Premier Chiang Ching-kuo's Oral Administrative Report to the First Meeting of the 51st Session of the Legislative Yuan, February 23, 1973," *FCR*, Mar. 1973, 77.

79. In 1979, demonstrations in favor of human rights and democracy led to government arrests and sentencing of major opposition leaders.

80. "The Fundamental Position and Spirit of the Nation, June 9, 1980," *Perspectives*, 88.

81. "Address to the Constitution Day Rally of the National Assembly, December 25, 1979," *Perspectives*, 26–27.

82. "China's Reunification & World Peace," *SAM 1986*, 11.

83. "Dialogue with Marsha Clark, Southeast Asia Bureau Chief, *Time* Magazine, May 3, 1979," *Perspectives*, 182.

84. "Address to the Annual Constitution Day Meeting of the National Assembly, December 25, 1983," *Perspectives*, 56.

CHAPTER 5: **Taiwanese or Mainland Chinese Democratic Thought?**

Epigraph. Ma Ying-jeou, "Inaugural Address," May 20, 2008, which can be found at USC US-China Institute, http://china.usc.edu/.

1. Thus one columnist on Taiwan argues that "China's leaders should realize that without democracy, the country cannot be culturally advanced; without democracy, it cannot really be modern, and without democracy, the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation will be incomplete." Ching, "Beijing's Democratic Vision Falls Short."

2. "DPP Will Not Make Pro-China Policies."

3. "Public Opinion in Taiwan and Taiwan's Bid to Join the United Nations," photocopy handout, Public Affairs Council, Sept. 7, 2007.

4. For example, Wang, "Chairman Wang Jin-ping's Remarks," 9.

5. The press has also echoed this view. One editorial in a paper generally favorable to the KMT condemned that party for not fully disclosing its policy positions in the 2012 presidential campaign. All parties, the article argues, sidestep unpopular yet essential policy issues and instead use electoral tactics "focused mainly on mudslinging and party ideology" rather than issues. "Unhealthy Democracy."

6. For a defense of the DPP's use of mobilizational tactics as a routine matter in the face of perceived KMT domination of state institutions, see P. Lin, "Hong Kong Leading the Resistance."

7. This theme was repeated, though in more muted form, by Tsai campaign's emphasis on the significance of the spontaneous "piggy bank" phenomenon that occurred during the 2012 campaign. A video on the phenomenon at the International Press Conference played the same role as did the "March against the Wind" video during the 2008 press conference.

8. "2012 Elections: Clean Officials Wanted." The essay alluded to (找回台灣失去的清廉) was posted on Ma's Facebook site (www.facebook.com/MaYingjeou?sk=wall) on Jan. 10, 2012.

9. Fukuyama, "Confucianism and Democracy," points to the importance of national unity for this aspect of Chinese political thought. Ling and Shih, in contrast, argue that references to harmony and unity are more rhetorical than substantive. See "Confucianism with a Liberal Face," 79.

10. "Questions and Answers about Taiwan's Referendum," GIO 2004. For similar statements from both Green and Blue camps, see also "Ma must Affirm Taiwan's Sovereignty, Says DPP's Tsai," 2; and "Taiwan's Opposition's Anti-Chen Drive Gathers Steam," *Asian Political News*.

11. Chen C., "Writing History with Democracy"; and www.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=131&itemid=9185&rmid=514&sd=2004/02/01&ed=2004/02/14.

12. This reading is also consistent with interpretations that argue that Chen used referenda in part to bypass the deadlocked Legislative Yuan as well as to demonstrate a consensus on Taiwan's status. See Kao, "Referendum Phenomenon in Taiwan."

13. For more examples, see "No Casinos Allowed before Consensus Reached"; "Chen Seeks Consensus on Future Amendments"; "Consensus Called For on Economics"; "DPP Urges Consensus before CECA Is Signed"; "Ma Restores 2/28 Foundation Budget"; "DPP Resolution on Taiwan's Future"; *The Significance of Taiwan's Constitutional Reforms*, 1; Hsieh, *Cooperation and Symbiosis*; Lin, "Taiwanese Must Find Common Interests," 8; "Preserving Harmony as Important as Democracy"; "President Chen Shui-bian's Remarks to the Opening Ceremony"; and "Shih Confident in Taiwan's Democracy."

14. For contemporary emphases on consensus alongside pluralism, see "DPP Resolution on Taiwan's Future"; *The Significance of Taiwan's Constitutional Reforms*, 1; Hsieh, *Cooperation and Symbiosis*; Lin, "Taiwanese Must Find Common Interests," 8; "Preserving Harmony as Important as Democracy"; "President Chen Shui-bian's Remarks to the Opening Ceremony"; "Shih Confident in Taiwan's Democracy"; Mainland Affairs Council, "Public Opinion in Taiwan"; and Chen S., "President Chen Shui-bian's Speech," 4.

15. For example, some members of the KMT argue that ethnic differences would not be important were it not for the politicization of those differences by elites seeking political office.

16. See Wang and Chang, "External Threats."

17. Remarks during the DPP International Press Conference, Jan. 12, 2012, Taipei.

18. Democratic Progressive Party, "National Security Strategy," 4; Remarks at People First Party International Press Conference, Jan. 11, 2012, Taipei.

19. Hsiao Bi-khim, DPP International Press Conference, Jan. 12, 2012. For an example of news reports of Tsai's discussion of the concept, see "2012 Elections: Clean Officials Wanted."

20. Remarks at Mainland Affairs Council Roundtable, Mar. 20, 2008; Chen S., "President Chen Shui-bian's Speech," 4; remarks at KMT Press Conference, Mar. 21, 2008, Taipei; Ma, "Transgenerational Justice: Sovereignty, Human Rights and Environmental Rights, May 19, 2010," in Mainland Affairs Council, *Important Documents on the Government's Mainland Policy*, 21.

21. F. Hsieh, "Bringing Progress and Hope," 16.

22. I describe alternative explanations for this consensus rhetoric in Lorenzo, "Democracy and the Roots."

23. Stockton, "How Rules Matter," explores the role changes in electoral laws played in this election.

24. Reilly, "Democratization and Electoral Reform," 1350.

25. Reilly, "Political Engineering in the Asia-Pacific."

26. See J. Hsieh, "Origins and Consequences."

27. “Reforms Fixed, and Created, Flaws,” editorial, *Taipei Times*, Aug. 29, 2004.

28. Liu K., “Reform of Legislative Yuan.”

29. “Editorial: Reforms Herald New Democratic Era.”

30. Hsiao Bi-khim, response to author’s question, DPP International Press Conference, Jan. 12, 2012. Tsai at times defined her democratic understanding of “grand coalition” politics as “consociational” (協商式民主). See “2012 Elections: Tsai Planning Grand Coalition to End Divisions”; and “2012 Elections—Super Sunday: Tsai Confident DPP Heading for Victory.”

31. It is important to note, however, that Rawls sees the achievement of such consensus as important for such fundamental political principles as toleration rather than as a routine political activity concerning policy matters.

32. Zhao, “A Tragedy of History,” argues that advocates of dictatorship in the 1930s used the same *jiùwáng* justification. See also Fung, *In Search of Chinese Democracy*, 16, as well as his discussion of Zhang Zunmai, Luo Longji, and Hu Shi, 138–40.

33. One example is the group of liberal democracy advocates whom Fung documents as arguing that a democracy marked by significant rights and freedoms was necessary for the successful prosecution of the war against Japan. Fung, *In Search of Chinese Democracy*, 195–97. See also his discussion of Ip Hung-yok’s argument regarding the ability of Chinese intellectuals to justify democracy on instrumental and other grounds, 213–18.

34. For example, Guang, “Elusive Democracy,” 426; Goldman, *Sowing the Seeds of Democracy*, 41; and Wen zhi bu bin’s (文質不彬) response to Charter 08 in “Either Democratize or Don’t.”

35. Guang, “Elusive Democracy”; XXX, “Why Does China Need Democracy”; Ye XX, “It’s About Time”; “Awakening of People’s Consciousness”; Professors in the Physics and Mathematics Departments, Beijing Normal University, “Our Views”; and Two Hundred Intellectuals, “Open Letter to the Party Central Committee”; and *Zhai*, “You Have Failed Us, Mr. Wen.”

36. See Guang, “Elusive Democracy”; and Charter 08.

37. Shang, “Studies on Sun Yat-sen”; Wells, *Political Thought of Sun Yat-sen*; Y. Lee, “Analysis of Democratic Transition”; Hui, “Analyzing the Political and Economic Transition”; Lai, “On the System of ‘Sunology’ ”; Chen Y., “The Thought of Party-Politics”; Chaung, “Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s Social Development Concept”; Vhiang, “Sunism in Post-Socialist China”; C. Chung, *Sun’s Thought and Political Guidelines*; and Huei, “On Cross-Strait Democratic Development.”

38. “Du Daozheng: I’m Optimistic about the China’s Prospects.”

39. Yang T., “Lecture: Something You Do Not Know” [楊天石, 文史大講堂第一講：告訴你所不知道的蔣介石].

40. See Cao, *Jiang Jingguo*.

41. Nathan, *Chinese Democracy*, 48–62, 128.

42. Ibid., passim.

43. Guang, “Elusive Democracy.” For a contemporary discussion that emphasizes harmony and unity, see Peng, Ma, and Xu, “Cooperative-Harmonious Democracy.”

44. Peng, “Democracy and Chinese Political Discourses.”

45. For one such appeal in Wuxue City, Hubei Province, see www.wxycz.cn/Board_news.asp?ID=20.

46. Hu W., "Understanding Democracy in China."

47. Yang H., "How Chinese View Foreign Elections."

48. Nathan, *Chinese Democracy*; Peng, "Democracy and Chinese Political Discourses."

49. Peng, "Democracy and Chinese Political Discourses"; Guang, "Elusive Democracy."

50. Hu W., "Understanding Democracy in China"; Nathan, *Chinese Democracy*; Guang, "Elusive Democracy." For various discussions of deliberative democracy in China, see Lieb and He, *Search for Deliberative Democracy in China*. For an explicit rejection of the notion of the elitist "good" official or emperor model that also criticizes other democracy activists' infatuation with Zhou Enlai as the embodiment of consultation, see "The Awakening of People's Consciousness Is a Prerequisite for Democracy," in Minchu, *Cries for Democracy*.

51. See, for example, the summary issued by the PRC Information Office, "China Issues 1st White Paper on Democracy," Oct. 19, 2005.

52. Pan, "Chinese Model of Development."

53. Peng, Ma, and Xu, "Cooperative-Harmonious Democracy."

54. See, for example, Zhang M., "Zhang Musheng Discusses New Democracy." For a general discussion of the concept, see Cheng L., "Intra-Party Democracy in China."

55. Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, "Building of Political Democracy in China."

56. This conception and the claim that it has been successfully implemented have both been echoed in recent official statements that contrast the events of the Arab Spring with China's situation. See, for example, Lai, "China's Political and Social Stability."

57. See Fung's discussions of Huang Yanpei, Zhang Zunmai, Luo Longji, and Hu Shi, *In Search of Chinese Democracy*, 16, 138–40, 154.

58. "What 'Formosa' Means for Today's Taiwan"; Arrigo, "Social Origins of the Taiwan Democratic Movement"; "A Loudspeaker for Democracy."

59. Goldman, *Sowing the Seeds of Democracy*, 62–78; Nathan, *Chinese Democracy*.

60. For example, XXX, "Why Does China Need Democracy"; Ye XX, "It's About Time"; "The Awakening of People's"; Professors in the Physics and Mathematics Departments, Beijing Normal University, "Our Views"; and Two Hundred Intellectuals, "Open Letter to the Party Central Committee."

61. Hu W., "Understanding Democracy in China."

62. Liu J., "Don't Discount Chinese Liberalism."

63. Mao, "Without Human Rights."

64. Qian, "How the Next Ten Years."

65. Yang H., "That Old Pair of Shoes"; Yang H., "Promoting Democracy Means More."

66. Yang J. "How I See the 'China Model.'"

67. Feng, "Charter 08 Framer Liu Xiaobo Awarded Nobel."

68. A translation of Charter 08 by Perry Link can be found at www.charter08.eu/2.html.

69. The material discussed here is taken from his recent speech to the Royal Society in London on June 27, 2011. For the text, see www.gov.cn/english/2011-06/28/content_1894676.htm. Other important statements include his speech at Shenzehn on August 21, 2010, entitled "Only by Adhering to Reform and Opening Does Our Country Have a Bright Future" [只有堅持改革開放，國家才有光明前途], and his interview with Fareed Zakaria on September 23, 2010, on CNN, http://articles.cnn.com/2008-09-29/world/chinese.premier.transcript_1_financial-crisis-interview-vice-premier?_s=PM:WORLD.

70. For discussions that reject Wen as a serious reformer, see Qian, "How the Next Ten Years"; and *Zhai*, "You Have Failed Us, Mr. Wen."

71. For the text of this speech, see www.gov.cn/english/2011-06/28/content_1894676.htm. Other important statements include his speech at Shenzehn on August 21, 2010, entitled "Only by Adhering to Reform and Opening Does Our Country Have a Bright Future" [只有堅持改革開放，國家才有光明前途], and his interview with Fareed Zakaria of CNN broadcast on September 28, 2008, http://articles.cnn.com/2008-09-29/world/chinese.premier.transcript_1_financial-crisis-interview-vice-premier?_s=PM:WORLD.

72. Wen also mentions transparency and oversight of officials by the public in his interview with Zakaria (see preceding note).

73. Yu K., *Democracy Is a Good Thing*. A translation of the essay "Democracy Is a Good Thing" is provided by Roland Soong at *My Opera*, http://my.opera.com/PRC/blog/democracy-is-a-good-thing-3.

74. For a discussion of Yu's conception, see C. Li, introduction to *Democracy Is a Good Thing*, xxi.

75. Yu K., *Democracy Is a Good Thing*, 79.

76. Liu X., "Can It Be?"

77. See, for example, "The Erotic Carnival in Recent Chinese History," "Behind the Rise of the Great Powers," "Why Child Slavery in China's 'Black Kilns' Could Happen," and "The Significance of the 'Weng'an Incident' " in *No Enemies*.

78. See "Chinese Politics and China's Modern Intellectuals," "Ba Jin," "The Erotic Carnival in Recent Chinese History," and "Political Humor in a Post-Totalitarian Wasteland" in *No Enemies*.

79. Quoted in Nathan, *Chinese Democracy*, 36–37.

80. Wén, "Either Democratize or Don't."

81. Han, "Democracy: The Program or Essence?" www.governance.cn/browarticle.php?wz_id=224.

82. See Zheng, "China Long Ago Entered."

83. See "First International News Conference, Feb. 22, 1988," *SAM 1988*, 4; "Taiwan's Experience and China's Future, July 6, 1991," *SAM 1991*, 73; "10/10 Address 1991," *SAM 1991*, 119; "Report on the State of the Nation," Jan. 4, 1993, *SAM 1993*, 4–5; "National Day Message, Oct. 10, 1995," *SAM 1995*, 98–99; "Building a Democracy for Unification," *SAM 1991*, 59; "Responses to Written Questions Submitted by France's *Politique Internationale Quarterly*," July 1, 1991, *SAM 1991*, 65; "Message to the Closing Ceremony of the Second Extraordinary Session of the First National Assembly, April 24, 1991," *SAM 1991*, 20; "International News Conference, April 30, 1991," *SAM 1991*; "Speech at Europe Day Gala

Dinner," May 9, 1991, *SAM 1991*; "Response to the World Peace Day Message of Pope John Paul II," Jan. 2, 1991, *SAM 1991*, 6.

84. For example, see Zhao [趙強], "*Seeking Truth*" [求是].

85. For an overview of this argument, see Tsai, *Capitalism without Democracy*, chap. 1.

86. For one such discussion, see Friedberg, "US-China Relations," 30–33.

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