

**Moving Moments:  
Uses of European Pasts in Heritage and Political Discourse**

David Farrell-Banks

Department of Media, Culture, Heritage  
School of Arts and Cultures  
Newcastle University

Submitted in fulfilment of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
September 2020



## Abstract

References to particular historical moments can be a powerful tool of persuasion in political discourse. This project interrogates the uses of two historical moments in heritage sites and political discourse: the 1215 first writing of Magna Carta and the 1683 breaking of the Siege of Vienna.

The thesis explores how Magna Carta is used as a means of asserting British (or, more precisely, English) national identity against a European other, particularly in the context of the Brexit referendum. The breaking of the Ottoman siege of Vienna in 1683, meanwhile, is used by right-wing populist and extremist European groups to assert a notional 'European' identity against a migrant and Muslim other.

I follow the use of these moments across heritage sites, political discourse in legacy media, and through their use on Twitter. In doing so, I focus on constructions of British, Western and European shared identity and history in right-wing populist and extremist discourse.

The thesis proposes the concept of the *moving moment*. This views historical moments as constantly in movement, temporally and spatially. In political discourse, particular actors 'pull' these moments into the present, giving them new relevance for their political purposes. These historical moments are also viewed as having the power to *move* us emotionally. This emotional movement is key to the successful use of these pasts by political groups.

Through developing an understanding of how right-wing groups use historical moments to foster a politics of division, this thesis seeks to contribute to decision-making among other political activists and heritage organisations. It argues that heritage sites and museums need to acknowledge, if not interact with, the divisive uses of the pasts in question. In doing so, such sites can better engage actively in a politics of inclusion.



*“While I’m alive, I’ll make tiny changes to earth.”*

**Scott Hutchison**

**Dedicated to the memory of Donald M, Donald T, Martin, Jason & Rea, for  
the tiny changes they made to earth.**



## Acknowledgements

I am indebted to the support of a number of organisations and individuals for the completion of this research. Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisors, Professor Chris Whitehead, Dr Areti Galani & Dr Darren Kelsey (despite his questionable taste in football clubs). You have provided support, encouragement, and a push beyond my comfort zone when needed. The research would not have been possible without your guidance.

Thank you to Newcastle University's Research Excellence Academy for providing funding for this research. Thanks to the School of Arts and Cultures for additional financial support during the course of the doctorate. I am grateful to staff at Lincoln Castle, Salisbury Cathedral, Wien Museum – Karlsplatz, the Deutsches Historisches Museum, and the National Museum of Hungary – Budapest for accommodating me during my visits.

I am extremely grateful to the support of colleagues, at Newcastle and beyond, at various points over the research process. Special thanks go to colleagues in the Cultures of Memory research group and the numerous friends from the University and College Union. My thanks go to everyone in the department of Media, Culture, Heritage, for being part of such a supportive and positive working environment. In addition to my supervisory team, particular thanks go to Dr Joanne Sayner for her encouragement and support in my teaching duties.

To all my colleagues in room 2.69 thank you for the perhaps-too-regular tea breaks and definitely-too-regular pints that have provided necessary respite from the PhD. Special thanks to Erica, Megan and Phil for their friendship and support. To Emilio, thanks for providing occasional support at tough times in the PhD, and frequent support in tough times supporting Newcastle United. To everyone at Wor Flags, thanks for the reminder that this research could never be as important as football.

Last, and very much not least, thanks go to my family for their love, support and encouragement at every stage. Thanks to my Mum and Dad for supporting with inimitable Hebridean spirit and frequent deliveries of strong Hebridean spirits. I am ever grateful to the support of the Farrell and Robson families, not least for their welcoming me into the local fold. Special thanks to Lynn and Andy for all food and pontificating, and to Tom for having me in the family. Mostly, thanks go to Charlotte, without whose support I would never have returned to education a decade ago and embarked upon this ever challenging, often exhausting and constantly surprising journey.





# Table of Contents

Abstract.....	iii
Acknowledgements.....	vii
Table of Contents.....	ix
List of Figures & List of Tables.....	xiii
List of Abbreviations.....	xiv
<b>1. Introduction.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>1.1 Research Outline.....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>1.2 Theoretical Background.....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>1.3 The Politics of the 2010s: Right-Wing Populism and Fake News.....</b>	<b>7</b>
1.3.1 Defining Populism.....	9
1.3.2 Right-Wing Populism.....	11
1.3.3 Digital Technology and Populism.....	12
<b>1.4 Affect, Memory and Digital Media.....</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>1.5 <i>Moving Moments</i>: A Brief Introduction.....</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>1.6 A Note on Agency.....</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>1.7 Activist Writing.....</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>1.8 Thesis Outline.....</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>2. The Affect, Memory and Ambiguous History of <i>Moving Moments</i>.....</b>	<b>27</b>
<b>2.1 Ambiguous History: Events and Moments.....</b>	<b>28</b>
2.1.1 Historical Events.....	29
2.1.2 Historical Moments.....	31
<b>2.2 Affect and Movement.....</b>	<b>33</b>
<b>2.3 Affect and Discourse.....</b>	<b>38</b>
<b>2.4 Cultural Memory and Interaction with the Past.....</b>	<b>43</b>
<b>2.5 Identity, History and Memory.....</b>	<b>47</b>
<b>2.6 Museums, Memory and Affect.....</b>	<b>50</b>
<b>2.7 Affect, Memory, History and Heritage: An Assemblage.....</b>	<b>57</b>
<b>3 Analysing <i>Moving Moments</i>: Assemblage and the Public Sphere.....</b>	<b>59</b>
<b>3.1 <i>Moving Moments</i> as Assemblage.....</b>	<b>60</b>

3.2	The Democratic Public Sphere.....	63
3.3	Assemblage and the Digitally-Integrated Public Sphere.....	68
3.4	Methods of Tracking <i>Moving Moments</i> .....	69
3.5	Data Gathering.....	74
3.5.1	‘Official’ Political Content.....	75
3.5.2	Digital Content.....	76
3.5.3	Ethics and Social Media Content.....	83
3.5.4	Museums and Heritage Sites.....	84
3.6	Conclusion.....	91
4	Magna Carta from 1215 to 2020: Official History to Political Discourse.....	92
4.1	26 June 2018, Somewhere on the A1.....	92
4.2	15 June 1215, Somewhere Near Runnymede.....	94
4.3	After 1297: The Myth of Magna Carta.....	97
4.3.1	Revolution and Magna Carta.....	98
4.4	Recent Political Use of Magna Carta.....	99
4.4.1	Magna Carta and Englishness.....	101
4.4.2	Magna Carta and Populist Discourse.....	105
4.5	Nationalism and Populism.....	110
4.5.1	Nation(s) and Nationalism(s).....	110
4.6	Brexit, Magna Carta and Populist-Nationalism.....	115
4.7	Affective Populism in Magna Carta Discourse.....	119
4.8	Moving Discourse: Chapter Summary.....	123
5	Magna Carta in the Digitally-Integrated Public Sphere.....	126
5.1	Magna Carta Online.....	127
5.1.1	The Form of Digital Discourse.....	128
5.1.2	Magna Carta in 280 Characters.....	131
5.1.3	The Extreme Right and Magna Carta.....	136
5.2	Internationalist Populism.....	140
5.3	Magna Carta in Heritage Discourse.....	141
5.4	Chapter Summary.....	151
6	The Siege of Vienna and European Populism.....	154
6.1	The 1683 Ottoman Siege of Vienna.....	154
6.2	Post-1683 Liberation Mythology.....	156
6.2.1	Anniversaries of 1683: Poland.....	157
6.2.2	Anniversaries of 1683: Vienna.....	158

6.3	1683 in the Vienna Landscape.....	161
6.3.1	Urban Traces of 1683.....	161
6.3.2	1683 in the Museum.....	161
6.4	1683 in Political Discourse.....	164
6.5	1683 in Transnational Right Wing Populist Discourse.....	168
6.5.1	Viktor Orbán.....	168
6.5.2	The Law and Justice Party: Poland.....	171
6.6	Uses of 1683: Chapter Summary.....	173
7	1683 in Online Discourse: Far-Right Terrorism and the Identitarian Movement.....	175
7.1	The Gates of Vienna and the Origins of the Great Replacement Theory....	177
7.2	Cultural Identity and the Politics of Gender.....	181
7.3	The Identitarian Movement and 1683.....	183
7.3.1	<i>Identitäre Bewegung Österreich</i> .....	183
7.3.2	Fearless Debate.....	187
7.3.3	Remigration and the Dominant Culture.....	188
7.3.4	Family-Friendly Policies.....	188
7.3.5	Promoting Traditions.....	189
7.4	<i>Gedenken 1683</i> Commemorative Actions.....	190
7.4.1	Gender and <i>Gedenken 1683</i> .....	191
7.4.2	Traditional Culture and Heimat.....	192
7.4.3	Far-Right Procession Imagery.....	193
7.5	<i>Gedenken 1683</i> and Connective Memory.....	194
7.6	1683 and Affective Action.....	198
7.7	Chapter Summary.....	200
8	<i>Moving Moments: The Affective Persistence of Populism and the Past</i> .....	203
8.1	Ambiguous History.....	205
8.2	<i>Moving Moments</i> as National and Transnational.....	212
8.3	The Persistence of Populism.....	215
8.4	Unfixing the Unthought.....	218
8.5	<i>Moving Moments</i> and the Right Wing Populist Threat.....	222
8.6	<i>Moving Moments</i> and Heritage Discourse.....	226
8.7	Future Work: What Isn't a <i>Moving Moment</i> ?.....	227

<b>9 Conclusion.....</b>	<b>232</b>
<b>9.1 <i>Moving Moments</i> and Memory Studies.....</b>	<b>232</b>
<b>9.2 Hope and the <i>Moving Moment</i>.....</b>	<b>234</b>
<b>9.3 Responsibility and the Future.....</b>	<b>237</b>
<b>Appendix A.....</b>	<b>240</b>
<b>Bibliography.....</b>	<b>242</b>

## List of Figures

<b>Figure 3.1</b> Sample of Tweets mentioning ‘Magna Carta’ .....	79
<b>Figure 4.1</b> Frequency of references to Magna Carta in Parliament.....	100
<b>Figure 5.1</b> The Magna Carta Memorial, Runnymede.....	143
<b>Figure 5.2</b> The Jurors, Runnymede.....	146
<b>Figure 5.3</b> Protest material from the ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings in Egypt. Salisbury Cathedral.....	148
<b>Figure 6.1</b> St Josefskirche, Kahlenberg.....	160

## List of Tables

<b>Table 1.1</b> Provisional Characteristics of <i>Moving Moments</i> .....	17
<b>Table 2.1</b> Five Elements of Belonging.....	54
<b>Table 3.1</b> Medium and situation factors in CDA and social media.....	80
<b>Table 3.2</b> List of museums and heritage sites visited.....	88
<b>Table 4.1</b> Magna Carta as <i>Moving Moment</i> : Chapter Summary.....	124
<b>Table 5.1</b> Movements of Magna Carta: Chapter Summary.....	151
<b>Table 6.1</b> Movement of 1683: Chapter Summary.....	173
<b>Table 7.1</b> Movements of 1683: Chapter Summary.....	200
<b>Table 8.1</b> Memory ‘of...’ and ‘with a cause’ in 1215 and 1683.....	205
<b>Table 8.2</b> National and Transnational Uses of 1215 and 1683.....	213
<b>Table 8.3</b> Potential <i>Moving Moments</i> .....	229

## List of Abbreviations

ABA	American Bar Association
AfD	Alternative for Germany (Alternativ für Deutschland)
AHD	Authorised heritage discourse
API	Application Programming Interface
BNP	British National Party
CDA	Critical discourse analysis
CDU	Christian Democratic Union of Germany (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands)
DCMS	Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport
DHA	Discourse Historical Approach
DHM	German Historical Museum (Deutsches Historisches Museum)
DMA	Discourse-Mythological Approach
DRA	Dialectical-Relational Approach
EDL	English Defence League
EU	European Union
FPÖ	Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs)
IBÖ	Generation Identity Austria (Identitäre Bewegung Österreich)
MP	Member of Parliament
NRT	Non-representational theory
OAW	Austrian Academy of Sciences (Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften)
ÖVP	Austrian People's Party (Österreichische Volkspartei)
Pegida	Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident (German: Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes)
PiS	Law and Justice Party, Poland (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość)
RT	Retweet
RWP	Right-Wing Populism
SPD	Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands)
SOUV	Statement of Outstanding Universal Value
UK	United Kingdom

UKIP	United Kingdom Independence Party
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
USA	United States of America
WHS	World Heritage Site





# Chapter 1

## Introduction

*'Here where we're starting; here where we're picking up our story precisely because it was like the start and end of something, a time when everyone knew exactly where they were'*

*(Dead Air, Iain Banks)*

On the afternoon of 23 June 2016, having come home from a work placement at Durham World Heritage Site (WHS), I found myself sat outside a bar in the sunshine with my wife and some friends sharing in a tentative sense of relief. We had just voted in the United Kingdom-European Union membership referendum (henceforth UK-EU referendum<sup>1</sup>). The latest polls suggested that the United Kingdom (UK) was going to vote, albeit quite marginally, to remain in the European Union (EU). As we are all aware now, our relief was short-lived.

I begin here not because the referendum result is the definitive origin point for all of the discussion that will follow, nor does it mark the emergence of the populist politics that represent the most significant political movements discussed in this thesis. What it does represent is a clear point of change. It is the point at which the reality of the influence of populist movements, growing globally, became keenly felt in the UK. It is equally a point upon which I hook this thesis to provide a distinct and recognisable context. I began working on this PhD the following January. Brexit has provided a dominant political backdrop to the entirety of this research.

There is a broader political setting, one that stretches beyond the borders of the UK or the edges of Europe, wherever we might consider those to be. For many across Europe, this moment could be considered a 'moment of danger' (Levi & Rothberg 2018). Taking inspiration from Walter Benjamin's 1940 essay on the rise of fascism in Europe, Levi and Rothberg (2018: 356) see a present danger represented by 'Trump and Brexit, Jobbik and Golden Dawn, Putin, Erdogan [sic], Modi, Le Pen, and el-Sisi' which they see as sparking a memory of fascism itself. This thesis has been written in the shadow of these dangers,

---

<sup>1</sup> The referendum is commonly termed the 'Brexit' referendum.

and more besides. I might add Bolsonaro and Netanyahu, Strache and Salvini, Lega, Vox, and the rising influence of the Identitarian Movement to the list. That memory of fascism merges in the present with these right-wing populist and nationalist realities.

## 1.1 Research Outline

This thesis examines the reference to two particular historical moments in heritage and political discourse. I use ‘political’ here in broad terms, to encompass any actions, or engagement with actions, that aim to impact social structures, from the international level to individual action. I first explore the use of reference to the 1215 first issuing of Magna Carta to assert British, or English, national identity against a European other. This focuses heavily on the use of such references in political discourse surrounding the EU-UK referendum in 2016. Secondly, the breaking of the Ottoman siege of Vienna in 1683 is examined primarily with regard to its use as a means of asserting a national or transnational European identity against a Muslim or non-white migrant other. The analysis of the use of 1683 draws upon discourse from right-wing populist and extremist groups, in addition to mainstream political parties. I seek to analyse the respective uses of these historical moments in heritage sites (or official heritage discourse), established political discourse (i.e. political manifesto, speeches, or content in legacy media) and in digital media (including social media platforms such as Twitter, campaign group websites, and niche political blogging sites).

As a framework for understanding the relationship between these respective uses of the past, and their connection to political action, I propose the concept of the *moving moment*. This views historical moments as perpetually shifting, both spatially and temporally. Spatial movements include the physical movement of objects to certain heritage sites, or indeed the global movement of visitors to and from heritage sites. It also extends to the spatial transmission of uses of the past via political discourse and digital media. Temporally, this refers to the ‘past-presencing’ (Macdonald 2013) of historical moments taking place within written histories and heritage discourse. I also refer to the manner in which particular actors, through the use of political discourse, seek to pull moments into the present, giving them new relevance for political purposes. The *moving moment* also refers to the ability of such moments to *move* us emotionally. They are viewed as holding the capacity to affect. This capacity to affect is argued to be central to successful uses of

the past in political discourse. This leads to the final dimension of the *moving moment*: the ability to be used to move people to political action. That is, the uses of these pasts will be shown to influence political actions, be that through voting patterns (see Chapter 4), protest action (Chapter 6) or violent extremism (Chapter 7).

In developing the *moving moment*, this thesis analyses the relationship between different forms of uses of the past. I question the role of digital media in shifting political uses of the past, in particular through the development of a digitally-integrated public sphere (Chapter 3). Through focusing upon the affective use of the past within right-wing nationalist, extremist and populist discourse, I question the importance of this to recent rises in a politics of division. I use this discussion to question the responsibility that heritage sites and museums have in acknowledging such divisive uses of these pasts. Finally, I offer an encouragement for other political activists to recognise the potency of the *moving moment*, and to consider how such moments can be used for a politics of inclusivity rather than division.

This work intends to develop our understanding of right-wing uses of the past but seeks to do so through the development of a framework that might be applied to political uses of the past more broadly. This is most significantly the case with regard to the right-wing uses of 1215 and 1683, but it is hoped that the knowledge developed on these two case studies can find wider applicability. The work will also provide a focused study of the rhetorical and discursive tactics that right-wing groups adopt in their uses of the past. In analysing uses of the past across traditional political discourse, online discourse (including blogs and social media platforms such as Twitter), and in heritage sites and museum displays I also develop methodological approaches that facilitate research across these fields. By introducing and developing the idea of the *moving moment* I seek to present a framework through which certain political uses of the past can be approached. This notion is developed through each chapter, before being discussed in detail in Chapter 8.

The remainder of this chapter introduces the notion of the *moving moment*. Firstly, I briefly discuss the theoretical background to the research, in particular by introducing cultural memory studies and the role of affect. Secondly, I discuss the current political context. This is focused upon the re-emergence of right-wing populist and nationalist movements in recent years. I introduce definitions of populism and consider the role of digital technologies on recent political trends. I then discuss some areas where affect,

memory and digital technologies are seen to intersect. This sets the ground to provide a brief introduction to the notion of the *moving moment* as the central concept examined throughout this thesis. I then focus on the role of this research as activist work, including a concern with undertaking activist writing. Finally, I introduce the structure of the thesis.

## **1.2 Theoretical Background**

I focus in this thesis on intersections between past, present and future, drawing initially upon cultural memory studies (see Assmann 2011; Erll 2011; Olick 2007) to traverse that territory. When Benjamin or Levi and Rothberg talk of a ‘moment of danger’, they do so with reference to the past, but the sense of danger is rooted in a fear for the future.

Temporalities are collapsed as past, present and future coalesce in that feeling of existing within a moment of danger. Equally, one might respond to this sense of danger by turning towards what Rigney (2018) has described as a need for acts of ‘remembering hope’. Hope becomes an act of resistance, recognising the moment of danger but responding to it through seeking positive pasts to draw upon. It too is an act that collapses temporalities, as past successes become present as a means of providing hope for the future. These works encourage us to consider how the pasts that are made relevant in the present impact upon our conception of possible futures.

Danger, hope, fear. These terms carry with them a heavy emotional weight. They are terms that undoubtedly engage with each of us in an intensely individualised way. We know what these terms mean, but the feelings that they instil are not so easy to communicate. This offers us a brief glimpse into the affective capacity of memory and the past. When Lowenthal (2015) talks of the weight of nostalgia, or when Nora (1989: 8) proclaims that ‘memory is life’ they too allude to that affectivity and emotion that comes with our interaction with the past. They recognise that the past has the potential to affect us in the present. ‘Affect’ refers to the capacity for something to affect others or be affected itself, in other words the capacity to impact, often by way of a felt emotional response, others and be impacted by others. As the capacity to affect entails objects (or bodies) influencing each other, this is frequently theorised in terms of trajectories of influence from one object to another. Theresa Brennan (2004), for example, asked why we might be able to feel the atmosphere in a room, alluding to the ways in which we might internalise our responses to external emotional influences. This is a concern with the flow of emotional reactions from

object to object. These flows are variously considered as affective atmospheres (Anderson 2009; 2014) of the past (the degree to which affect spreads across a collective, akin to changes in atmosphere), the affective potency of discourse (the ability of discourse, spoken, written or other, to illicit an affective response; Wetherell 2012), or the affective power of the past upon national identities (the role of emotion and affect on generating collective belonging in a nation state; Closs Stephens 2016; Guibernau 2013). As discussed in detail below (sections 2.2 and 2.3), there is a recognition that we affectively interact with the past through our mnemonic experiences. Memory and affect, therefore, operate relationally.

In questioning the affective capacities of these pasts at the points where they emerge, I do not view affect and memory in abstract, instead following the emergences of the past in the present at particular points and through particular media. Attention is given to museums and heritage sites as realms of ‘official’ heritage discourse, political speeches or manifestos as sites of ‘official’ political discourse, and political content produced via social media. These are spaces where memory and affect intersect and become more than themselves. The role of affect and emotion in museums has garnered greater attention recently (Bozoğlu 2019; Tolia-Kelly, Waterton and Watson 2017; Smith, Wetherell and Campbell 2018). Experiential approaches to emotion and affect within heritage sites have also developed (Drozdowski, Waterton and Sumartojo 2019; Sumartojo 2019; Sumartojo and Pink 2018; Dittmer and Waterton 2016). Following Wetherell’s (2012) claim that affect studies had been involved in a ‘rubbishing’ of discourse, a return to focus on affect in critical discourse studies has also taken place (Kelsey 2017; Glapka 2019).

While crossing disciplinary boundaries between museum studies, heritage studies and critical discourse, affect and memory are kept to the fore. These foundational concepts can traverse these disciplinary grounds as they are, to borrow from Mieke Bal (2002), ‘travelling concepts.’ Both memory and affect are concepts which are not confinable within disciplinary boundaries. Rather, they both draw upon and contribute to inter-, cross- or trans-disciplinary work. As these terms travel, they come into interaction with each other in different forms. One point of intersection between affect and memory, and one that is relevant to each of the disciplines discussed above, is in the shaping of individual and collective (in a broad sense but including national) identity.

In her work on belonging, Montserrat Guibernau (2013) offers a route to understanding the role of memory and affect in that construction of collective identity. While dealing primarily with collective national identity, Guibernau puts together a framework for collective identity that is applicable to group belonging more broadly. She notes that ‘the selective use of history provides members of a nation with a collective memory’ (Guibernau 2013: 126). This collective memory allows for the evocation of a sense of ‘superiority’ for those who belong to that nation. That necessity of a collective memory, the sense of a shared past, is viewed by Guibernau as a central component of collective identity more broadly. That is, any group belonging requires a sense of historical commonality that emerges from the social structures a group exists within (akin to Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of habitus, see Chapter 2). Groups require, as Hobsbawm and Ranger argued with reference to nations, ‘invented traditions’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). In the discussion below, we see where the power of ‘invented traditions’ feeds into present political discourse, for example in the use of actions commemorating Magna Carta and the 1683 Siege of Vienna being used to encourage a vote to leave the European Union or an engagement in far-right protest action, respectively.

Guibernau takes these ideas further, considering not only the manner in which collective identities are formed, but also the political action that can be built from these groups. It is here that Guibernau provides a link to considering affect. As we have seen above, in discussing collective memory Guibernau alludes to affect tangentially in her reference to the power of the past to evoke a sense of superiority. There is an emotional, if not affective, process taking place. Turning her focus to ‘emotion and political mobilization’, Guibernau details emotions that she considers necessary to members of a group engaging in political action, these being vengeance, *ressentiment*, fear and confidence (Guibernau 2013: 164). Where Guibernau details the role of specific emotions, I look instead towards the affective *movement* of these emotions within and beyond the borders of particular groups. The continuing importance of belonging is foundational here. The role of museums, heritage sites, and the political discursive use of historical moments in facilitating such belonging is then focused on.

Through Guibernau’s recognition of the role of both history (or the past more broadly) and emotion on the development of collective identity and belonging, a route is opened up to considering not only the emotionality of the past, but the affective, political potential of the past. The two case studies focused upon in Chapters 4 through 7 examine this potential

through the unique contexts of the two cases. The 1215 first drafting of Magna Carta is discussed primarily within the context of its use in the UK-EU referendum of 2016. It is considered initially in nationalistic terms, with use of 1215 as a means of championing British exceptionalism against a European other. The 1683 breaking of the Ottoman Siege of Vienna is then viewed in terms of transnational networks of nationalism(s), where 1683 becomes a means of championing a western European identity against a non-White European, predominantly Muslim, other.

### **1.3 The Politics of the 2010s: Right-Wing Populism and ‘Fake News’**

In 2015, a year before the UK-EU referendum, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) explicitly attached their election manifesto to the 800th anniversary of Magna Carta. In the opening remarks of this manifesto, then leader Nigel Farage wrote the following:

If you believe in these things and that in this year, the 800th anniversary of Magna Carta, you believe we should seize the opportunity for real change in our politics; rebalance power from large corporations and big government institutions and put it back into the hands of the people of this country, then there really is only one choice.

(UKIP 2015: 3)

The manifesto suggested that if you acknowledged the role of Magna Carta then you should vote for UKIP, and against the EU. UKIP won a single seat in the 2015 election. However, the Conservative party, under the leadership of Prime Minister David Cameron, committed to holding the UK-EU referendum. For many this was merely a cynical attempt to appease voters potentially swaying towards UKIP. The influence of UKIP on both the Conservative party rhetoric and upon the Brexit vote has been shown elsewhere (Cap 2017; Taylor 2017). These writers demonstrate that the Conservative party policy often sought to win back voters being lost to UKIP and in doing so brought the party further to the right in their position on the EU. The Brexit vote is frequently viewed as a part of the global rise in right-wing populism (RWP) or far-right politics (Moffit 2020; Mondon and Winter 2020).

In December 2017, Austria's new coalition government, an alliance between the centre-right (historically conservative) Austrian People's Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, ÖVP) and far-right Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ), announced the formation of their partnership at Kahlenberg, on the outskirts of Vienna. Kahlenberg, in the 19th District of Vienna, is the hilltop area from which an allied Holy Roman Empire force, led by Polish King Jan III Sobieski, repelled the Ottoman forces who had besieged Vienna in 1683. This is often viewed as the furthest Western limit reached by the Ottoman Empire – although this relates to a cultural as well as geographical notion of 'west', where a further geographically western reach in Africa is ignored as Africa is not culturally a part of the West. In opting for this location, the coalition sought to physically express a sense that this coalition would offer protection to an Austria once again threatened by an influx from the East. Where in the past this was the threat from the Ottoman Empire, in the present this is a threat from migration from the Middle East<sup>2</sup> and North Africa.

In Poland, Members of Parliament for the ruling Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) take such a narrative further. Speaking against the refusal in Vienna to erect a new statue to Sobieski, MP Dominik Tarczynski argued that 'if not for Sobieski all Europe would be speaking Arabic – and if the Viennese want to speak in Arabic now, they are welcome.' (Tomlinson 2018). He went on to suggest that a trend of political correctness threatened future generations in Europe with a life under 'an Islamic caliphate' and praised the Polish forces in 1683 for stopping a 'Muslim army which was about to invade and take over in Europe'. For Tarczynski, the relevance of the breaking of the Siege of Vienna in 1683 is clear. Once again, Europe is under threat from a Muslim force.

While both 1215 and 1683 have found use among right-wing (if not always populist, see below) political groups, there are notable differences in their usage. Firstly, Magna Carta has been mobilised for the promotion of a national (English or British) group against the European other, while Siege of Vienna has been adopted to promote a national and European identity threatened by the Muslim other. The degree to which these moments also exist within a national consciousness also differs, as we shall see in more detail below. While Magna Carta is stereotypically linked to English or British identity, the Siege of Vienna is distributed more loosely across Europe. While heritage sites discussed with

---

<sup>2</sup> The 'Middle East' itself being a notion that only comes into being following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (see Davison 1960).



regard to Magna Carta are often very specific locations with a long attachment to Magna Carta, in the case of Siege of Vienna a more dispersed presence of this historic moment exists, particularly across the Viennese cityscape. The potential commonalities within their usage can be seen when taking a broader view.

### **1.3.1 *Defining Populism***

Populism is, at the time of writing, one of the distinct features of global politics. To understand uses of 1215 and 1683 by RWP groups, we need to first question what is meant by populism as a term. The increasing electoral influence of populist groups is reflected in the attention paid to populism across disciplines. The last five years have seen contributions such as: broad introductions to populism as a concept (Moffitt 2020; Müller 2016), studies on populism as political movement (Cossarini & Vallespín 2019), on the far-right and populism (Mondon & Winter 2020; Mudde 2019; Lazaridis, Campani & Benveniste 2016), on left-wing populism (Mouffe 2018; Agustín & Briziarelli 2018), heritage and populism (Kaya 2019; González-Ruibal, González & Criado-Boado 2018), and cultural memory and populism (De Cesari & Kaya 2020; Levi & Rothberg 2018; Rigney 2018).

Across these works, a variety of definitions of populism are presented. Pelinka (2013: 3) argues that ‘populism is a general protest against the checks and balances introduced to prevent ‘the peoples’ direct rule.’ Populism, here, is a conception of democracy that focuses upon a notion of direct democracy, rather than the more common forms of representative democracy. However, who ‘the people’ are for these populist groups is often, and perhaps integrally, unclear. This lack of clarity – who are the ‘people’ that a populist might speak for – allows for the development of a rhetoric that is both loose in its meaning, yet at the same time contains potent meaning for those who it might target.

This entails the construction of an ‘in-group’. That is a group of people sharing certain characteristics which allow them to claim shared membership of a group against the exclusion of others. In this case the in-group construction of the ‘people’ necessitates the equal construction of an oppositional, excluded other. This is an exclusion which is often constructed and reinforced discursively (Wodak 2015: 50; KhosraviNik and Unger 2016). These central features of populist discourse allow for a closer defining of what RWP is, specifically based upon what it is against, rather than what it is for. These oppositions can include: ‘anti-elitism, anti-intellectualism, [...] racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, anti-

Islam, anti-immigration’ (Kaya 2016: 4). These elements are united in their setting against the other. The success of a brand of politics that stands for ‘the people’ is built upon these oppositions. The other is constructed as a force which ignores the will of ‘the people’, a force against the populist notion of democracy.

However, populism extends beyond a set of political beliefs. Kaya (2016) and Moffitt (2016) have suggested that populism can be additionally considered a political *style*. The populist style reinforces the in/out-group divisions discussed above, particularly with regard to creating a ‘people’ as the opposition to an untrustworthy or corrupt ‘elite’. Moffitt (2020) suggests that this style can be focused on the adoption of ‘bad manners.’ ‘Slang, swearing, political incorrectness’ are adopted to appear as opposite to the ‘rigid, rational, technocratic, intellectual’ stereotypical politician (Kaya 2016: 11). Trump, despite being a multi-billionaire and arguably part of an establishment elite to which RWP might be opposed, can be seen to use such tactics – perhaps not consciously – in his unapologetic attitude to overtly sexist language and behaviour in his past. Kelsey (2016) has noted that former investment banker Nigel Farage has cultivated an image of himself as a man of the people. The clear trend towards a focus on populism may lead to a bias in defining too broad a range of actors within this framework, to the point where any definitions of groups as populist may become meaningless (Moffitt 2020: 10).

Despite concerns regarding an overuse of the term ‘populism’, Moffitt (2020: 10) does demonstrate that there is broad agreement on certain traits that are found in populist politics. Central to populism is a division between ‘the people’ and an ‘elite’. Where we might consider nationalism to be constructed on horizontal divisions based on territory or culturally constructed divisions, populism operates on a vertical axis between elite and other (see Chapter 4 for more detail). Both ‘the people’ and the ‘elite’ can be constructed to suit a particular populist actor’s need. For example, when discussing Magna Carta and Brexit in Chapters 4 and 5, we witness the construction of the ‘people’ as British citizens, acting against a secretive European elite. That elite is presented as a threat to legal rights of ‘the people’ of Britain. In Chapters 6 and 7, populist actors frame the ‘elite’ in terms of those acting, by way of conspiracy, to threaten the cultural autonomy of Europe. When considering the influence of RWP actors upon uses of 1683 and 1215, these defining features of populism are foregrounded. This ensures that there is no misrepresentation of nationalistic, extremist or other political groups within an incorrect frame of populism.

### **1.3.2 *Right-Wing Populism***

Ruth Wodak, writing in 2015, noted that European elections were showing the increasing influence of RWP parties (Wodak 2015: 30). In the years since, it has been argued that an extremist, populist far right has become ‘mainstream’ (Mondon & Winter 2020). On an electoral level, the continuing influence of a right wing form of populism has been borne in recent populist electoral successes across Europe. The 2017 German elections saw large losses among the centre-right Christian Democratic Union of Germany (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, CDU) and centre-left Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD), with the RWP Alternative for Germany (Alternativ für Deutschland, AfD) seeing the greatest increase in success, becoming the third largest party in Germany and entering the Bundestag for the first time. The 2018 Swedish general election saw the RWP Sweden Democrats consolidate their place as the third largest party in the country. The 2017 Dutch general election returned the RWP Party for Freedom as the second largest party. In Spain, the far-right party Vox, itself only founded in 2013, became the third largest party in government in the November 2019 general election.

These electoral trends have been reflected in those places where the memory of 1215 and 1683 have been mobilised. As mentioned already, the successful 2016 campaign for a vote to leave the EU, one with which references to Magna Carta emerged frequently, has been seen as utilising populist politics and trends (Fuchs 2018a; Clarke and Newman 2017; Taylor 2017). It has been argued that Boris Johnson’s successful electoral campaign as Conservative Party leader in 2019 is in part attributable to that same use of RWP tactics (Barber 2020; Grice 2019). In Austria, the 2017 elections returned a coalition government between the centre-right Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and far-right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ). This is particularly relevant to the memory of 1683 as the FPÖ leader, Heinz-Christian Strache, had in the past produced campaign material specifically connecting himself to the liberation of Vienna in 1683 (Wodak and Forchtner 2014). In Poland, PiS, one of the most successful RWP parties in Europe, have offered vocal support for the erection of a statue to Jan III Sobieski, a leader of forces who broke the siege, in Vienna. In response to Vienna refusing to support such a statue, PiS have supported its placing in Kraków (Dowell 2019).

The success of RWP over the last decade is also deeply tied to the financial crash of 2008, and the politics of austerity which have followed. Quantitative studies of voting patterns across 800 European elections between 1850 and 2014 showing a 30% increase in votes for far-right parties following a deep financial crisis (Funke, Schularick and Trebesch 2015). In part, this confirms Greskovits' (1998) assertion that populist successes often follow such crises, but only at such a point as these crises have been brought under some control. The continuing trend towards RWP successes more than a decade after the financial crisis of 2008 fits within these timeframes. Whether the financial crisis has been brought under control in the United Kingdom is open to debate. The political narrative in the United Kingdom has moved to one of 'post-austerity' (Eaton 2019). However, for many the reality of a decade of austerity continues to impact their lives, as made clear by the United Nations (UN) special report on poverty (Alston 2018). The economic impact of, and response to, the current Covid-19 pandemic remains to be seen. The potential for a populist use of this new crisis is already being discussed (Mudde 2020), and it seems likely that RWP influence on mainstream politics will continue for the foreseeable future.

It is important to note that although I focus here on RWP, as the elite vs the people characteristic of populism is constructed it is not the case that populism is solely found in right-wing politics. Left-wing political parties such as Podemos in Spain, or Syriza in Greece have been presented as left-wing populists, where 'the people' are viewed as a working-class oppressed, acting against 'the elite' in the form of big business, the mega-rich, and governments whose policies are seen to support that elite above the rights of the people. Mouffe (2018) has recently argued that a left-wing populism is necessary to combat the successes of RWP actors and neoliberal elites that, in her view, have allowed for that rise in RWP success.

### ***1.3.3 Digital Technology and Populism***

This recognition of certain RWP traits also acts as a reminder that such forms of populism are not new, but rather have a long history (Moffitt 2020; Judis 2016). Similarly, other forms of right-wing authoritarianism or fascism have had repeated periods of electoral success and political influence (Fuchs 2018a). The current political context is, however, distinguished by the changing forms of political media over the past decade. The prevalence of digital media has brought with it references to 'post-truth' or 'fake news'. In

2019 the phrase ‘fake news’ was added to the Oxford English Dictionary, such was its ubiquity. These terms have become associated with changes in media, and the developing influence of social media on the distribution and creation of political knowledges. That digital landscape is an inescapable feature of current political contexts.

Christian Fuchs (2018a) has presented Donald Trump as a ‘digital demagogue’, writing of ‘the age of Trump and Twitter’. This sense of an era evoked in Fuchs’ reference to the ‘age of...’ presents two key facets of the current political context. Trump represents re-emergent populism (in addition to the continued overriding success of neoliberal capitalism), while Twitter represents the changing media landscape where social media has become a key form of political communication. It is a platform which allows for an emotional (and, as we shall see below, affective) form of communication. Fuchs (2018a: 198) suggests that Trump’s followers have an emotional rather than rational relationship with him, a relationship that is facilitated by Twitter. This recognition of an emotional connection again draws us to the importance of affective political communication in this context.

With this emotional connection comes the potential to use that relationship for particular political means. Hands (2019: 112) notes that fake Twitter accounts or manufactured ‘bots’ (automated Twitter profiles that are programmed to post or respond in a particular way, with no need for human action) can be used to create ‘false outrage’ around particular networks or voices. Simultaneously, Hands recognises that the high-speed connectivity of platforms such as Twitter offer a route to the vast spreading of discourse, potentially undermining existing governance structures. Trump argued that continuing to Tweet as president allowed him to ‘bypass dishonest media’ (Trump 2016, cited by Fuchs 2018a). This bypassing of governance structures or existing media platforms relates back to a previous view that social media could be a ‘liberation technology’ (Diamond 2010). The successful use of social media by political actors such as Trump, might also suggest that these affordances of social media reinforce certain existing structures. It becomes a liberation technology, potentially, for those already in positions of wealth and power, liberating them from some of the restrictions inherent to democratic governance.

In March 2018 it was revealed by multiple news outlets, including the *Guardian* and the *Observer* in the UK and the *New York Times* in the United States of America (USA), that a consulting company known as Cambridge Analytica had been harvesting private data from

over 50 million Facebook profiles. Data gathered were then offered to political campaigns, including the Trump presidential campaign, as a means of creating personalised political advertising (Manokha 2018). Such advertising targeted, according to a whistle-blower, people's 'inner demons' (Cadwalladr & Graham-Harrison 2018). The emotional connections facilitated by social media become a route for targeted political advertising. These same networks have been implicated in both the unofficial Leave.EU campaign and the official Vote Leave campaign (Cadwalladr 2017) during the UK-EU Referendum. The successful 2019 conservative election campaign was largely organised by Dominic Cummings, a figurehead of the Vote Leave campaign. At the time of writing, Cummings acts as an advisor to the UK Prime Minister, Boris Johnson.

Globally, social media advisors have become key to political campaigning. Following their success in running the re-election campaign for Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, the media agency Topham Guerin were employed to advise on Boris Johnson's successful Conservative Party leadership campaign and 2019 Conservative general election campaign. The tactics employed by Cambridge Analytica, Trump and Vote Leave, have had significant influence not only on electoral successes, but also on political communication more widely. The communication tactics adopted by companies such as Topham Guerin are becoming more widely adopted, perhaps epitomised by their hiring to manage UK government public communication during the Covid-19 pandemic (Waterson 2020). The examination of political discourse on social media which follows, particularly in Chapters 5 and 7, is undertaken within the wider context of this significant shift in official political campaigning. This calls for a greater focus upon the affective political power of discourse produced on social media.

#### **1.4 Affect, Memory and Digital Media**

As the political context of the rise in RWP is an important foundation, so too is the integrated role of digital technologies on our everyday lives. The approaches to memory and affect discussed briefly above, and introduced further in Chapter 2, are subject to influence from the development of digital media. For example, in discussing affect I consider the role of human actors within a broader assemblage (see Chapter 3). Our interaction with various forms of digital media will impact upon the operation of that assemblage as a whole, and the individual components – including human actors. Hands

(2019) presents the idea of a ‘gadget consciousness’, where our interaction with new technologies, from physical gadgets to social media, can impact upon our individual and collective (or, in his formulation, class) consciousness. The increasing influence of flat ontologies (Ash 2020) provides further ground for considering entities including digital technologies in terms of their relational interaction with other objects. Each digital platform or technological development discussed here – predominantly, but not exclusively, social media platforms – exists in a relationship with other items of focus, including political marches (Chapter 7) and museum displays (Chapters 5 and 6).

With influence from N. Katherine Hayles’ (2017) work on ‘nonconscious cognition’ and Tony Sampson’s notion of virality (2012), I adopt an approach that recognises the impact of digital technologies upon our modes of thinking, while taking care to not lose sight of human agency. This is akin to a ‘flat ontological’ approach (Ash 2020) that views ‘human’ and ‘nonhuman’ as equal components of a relational network, or assemblage (see Chapter 3). Influenced by Karen Barad’s ‘agential realism’ (Barad 2006) this indicates a desire to avoid assuming a clear distinction between human and non-human. However, unlike Barad I do not approach this from an avowedly posthuman perspective. My discussion is primarily concerned with human political action and, therefore, human actors are often brought to the fore.

Both Hayles (2017) and Hands (2019) use their discussions of cognition to consider the utopian potentials of nonconscious cognition and gadget consciousness respectively. These works, both of which develop understandings of the relationship between affect, cognition, experience and digital technologies, recognise the political salience of such discussions, and the political potential of the knowledge developed. The potential political impact of their work is then openly acknowledged. An approach that views political action as relational and shifting prevents content produced on social media, for example, from being reduced to an unavoidable consequence of discourse on a specific platform. Instead, space is retained for political change through human action and activism. Action here refers to the full breadth of human activity discussed including, but not limited to, the production of museum exhibitions and heritage discourse, news production, and the production of social media content. Activism is action that is specifically concerned with influencing discourse in the digitally-integrated public sphere and concerned with the influencing and changing of political policy.

I take a similar approach to the impact of the digital upon memory. Hoskins (2011) has suggested that a ‘connective turn’, the increasing ubiquity of digital media and communication networks in our lives, has altered the way memory studies is approached. He suggests that this development of digital media has ‘re-engineered memory, liberating it from the traditional bounds of the spatial archive, the organization, the institution, and distributed it on a continuous basis via connectivity between brains, bodies, and personal and public lives’ (Hoskins 2018: 1). Memory here is also taken as relational, acting between brains and bodies, between the individual and the collective, and between the human and the digital. Hoskins argues that ‘there is a new cultural and political force of digitally fostered values of unbridled commentary, open access, freedom of information, the ‘right to know’, the immediacy of instant search’ which ‘feed[s] on and provoke[s] the restless past’ (Hoskins 2018: 3). This provides key contextual grounding to the consideration of the impact of digital media upon uses of the past. Through tracking the use of 1215 and 1683 in digital spaces, these ‘new’ cultural and political forces are drawn into the analysis of the broader political use of these historical moments. This allows for a questioning of whether these can be considered a ‘new cultural and political force’, as Hoskins does, or whether we might more productively consider persistent, already existent cultural and political forms that are simply finding new shape through the influence of digital media.

Current trends in RWP politics provide a useful lens through which to consider the relationship between changing digital media or technologies, affect, memory and political discourse. RWP is recurrent and persistent in part due to the ability of RWP actors, such as those discussed briefly above, to create in/out groups that are relevant at a particular point in time. They must also communicate effectively with a significant portion of a politically engaged population in order to gain influence and power. Currently, this means communicating through digital media, whether that is in the form of Trump’s tweets, Stephen Yaxley-Lennon’s online news fora (Chapter 4 and 5), far-right blogs or Identitarian Movement websites (Chapter 7). The political and technological contexts are approached in tandem here, with the analysis of each individually offering a route to a deeper analysis of the role of the other. Where RWP offers a chance to view forms of digital political discourse and campaigning, access to digital media allows for a consideration of the degree to which RWP is persistent or challengeable. Below, I offer a



working concept for considering political uses of the past that opens routes to these spaces of research.

### 1.5 *Moving Moments*: A Brief Introduction

This work develops the concept of the *moving moment* as a means of capturing mnemonic, affective, discursive and political uses of the past across spaces including political discourse, heritage sites, museums and social media platforms. The *moving moment* refers to the memory of an historical moment (rather than event, as discussed in Chapter 2) as used across different physical and temporal spaces. Table 1.1 sets out the four forms of movement proposed to comprise the *moving moment*.

<b>Movement</b>	<b>Form</b>	<b>Example</b>
<b>Spatial</b>	The emergence of discursive uses of particular historical moments across broad geographical ground. Additionally, the emergence of these uses of the past across different forms of media, both legacy and digital.	The emergence of Magna Carta as important to the cultural heritage of the development of the US constitution (see Chapter 4).  The development of transnational right-wing online networks built upon references to 1683 (Chapter 7)
<b>Temporal</b>	The continued reference to a particular historical moment over a long period of time, resulting in continued acts of ‘past-presencing’ (Macdonald 2013).	Written histories of historical moments (i.e. Holt’s account of Magna Carta (Chapter 4) or Shaw’s account of the 1683 Siege of Vienna (Chapter 6)).  Heritage and museum site

		<p>representations of historical moments.</p> <p>Political references to historical moments, making them relevant in the present.</p>
<b>Affective</b>	Discursive uses of the past which encourage an emotional response.	<p>The use of Magna Carta to encourage feelings of national pride and a sense of British/English exceptionalism.</p> <p>The use of references to 1683 to encourage anger at a perceived cultural threat from immigration.</p>
<b>Political</b>	Uses of the past to encourage a target audience to engage in particular political action (taken as action which seeks to influence social structures or public policy).	<p>The use of references to Magna Carta to encourage a vote for Britain to leave the EU (Chapters 5-6).</p> <p>The use of references to 1683 to encourage people to participate in right-wing political protest action (Chapters 6-7).</p>
<b>Table 1.1: Provisional Characteristics of <i>Moving Moments</i></b>		

Firstly, there is spatial movement as memories or knowledges of them are presented or remerge in different physical spaces, including but not limited to museums and heritage sites. Secondly, temporal movement is suggested to refer to each act of engagement with these pasts which draws them anew into the present. Similarly, a multitude of past acts of remembering of these moments (for example anniversary commemorations) add to or shift

perceptions and knowledge of these moments across time. Thirdly, there is the component of affective movement, referring to the capacity for these moments to affect others and be affected themselves. In other words, they are historical moments which, in their uses, can *move us*, emotionally. Finally, through fostering these responses, the moments are shown to move people to political action, this being action designed to impact change in social structure or political policy. This takes a variety of forms ranging from voting in a particular manner through to violent extremism. Throughout, these moments move in and between groups and individuals, emerging within individual and collective memory, exerting an impact upon individuals and collectives as they re-emerge.

This notion of the *moving moment* is a conceptual proposal which has developed through the experimental research undertaken for this thesis. Although foregrounded here in writing, this is not a framework which arrives ready-formed at the outset of the research. As such, each chapter should be viewed as an exploration of the ontological potential of the concept. The final two chapters of the thesis will offer a reflection on the development of the *moving moment* and its potential continued usage.

## **1.6 A Note on Agency**

Through a focus on processes of movement, this concept encourages a questioning of the layers of agency involved in uses of the past. That is, who or what is moving the past into the present? Who or what is acting to move a group of people emotionally? Who or what is involved in a movement towards political action? In considering these uses of the past in terms of an assemblage (see Chapter 3), I consider movements as involving both human and non-human components of an assemblage. I can illustrate this with a pre-emptive consideration of the uses of Magna Carta, discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 5.

In these chapters, references to the 1215 first sealing of Magna Carta in the 2015 UKIP manifesto are used as the starting point to consider the use of Magna Carta within UK-EU referendum discourse. Within this discourse, Nigel Farage actively seeks to use Magna Carta to move people to a particular political action – a vote for UKIP and, later, a vote to leave the European Union. However, Farage’s ability to use this historical moment does not appear in isolation. Written histories and a presence in prominent museums have given Magna Carta a place in a public consciousness, which has already moved them into a position where their political use is made possible. Prior to this, their storage in cathedrals aided their long preservation, making those museum displays possible. The past emergence

of Magna Carta in association with a variety of political movements (the Levellers, the drafting of the American Bill of Rights) aided a continued presence of the document over a deep history. More recently, the development of digital technologies allows for a different form of distribution of the past, or uses of these pasts, through blogs, or social media platforms such as Twitter. Here, the past moves through telephone and fibre-optic cables. The emergence of a reference to the past on a device such as a smart phone or laptop involves the diffuse movement of wireless internet signals through the air. The movement of the past takes multiple forms and is facilitated by a multitude of human and non-human actors. Human actors range from historians and politicians to conservators and the general public, whilst non-human actors include the bricks and mortar of cathedrals, the metals that form digital communications infrastructure. These are multiple bodies ‘working in concert and conflict with each other’ (Chidgey 2018: 42) to form an assemblage. The *moving moment*, then, is suggested to be a particular form of assemblage, where these bodies come together at a particular point in such a manner that they precipitate political action.

### **1.7 Activist Writing**

The political context discussed, whether we consider a ‘moment of danger’ or otherwise, is one where a right-wing politics of racial and nationalistic division has come to the fore. I approach the writing within this context with an acknowledgement of my own desire to oppose such politics. This is not explicitly through a call for consensus politics, since like Chantal Mouffe (2005) I do not view this as an achievable outcome. Rather, I seek to contribute to understandings of RWP and extremist politics with the express belief that this can contribute to considering how such politics might be opposed. Therefore, I consider this writing to represent a form of activism. I make no claims to political neutrality.

Proponents of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA, e.g. Wodak and Meyer 2015; Fairclough 2003; 2001) have recognised that the political position of the researcher is central to the analysis undertaken. I draw influence from recent expressly activist works, including Altinay et al’s *Women Mobilizing Memory* (2019), Chidgey’s *Feminist Afterlives* (2018), and Fuchs’ *Digital Demagogue* (2018a), in addition to activist-focused research projects including *Remembering Activism: The Cultural Memory of Protest* (ReAct 2020) and *The Afterlives of Protest* (Protest Memory 2019).

This note on activist writing is offered as a written commitment to political and personal reflexivity in my research practices. I acknowledge the political positions that I have carried into this research. However, in drawing upon activist works I seek to go beyond solely referring to reflexivity. There is danger that noting that one has sought to be reflexive in considering their own positionality as a researcher can act as a covering statement, one that seeks to pre-empt criticism of research practices. This could be considered as ‘research parsley’ (Williams 2020) – a garnish sprinkled on top of the writing, with little consideration of its purpose. In taking influence from activist practice and activist writing, I seek to consider my own positionality not only as a garnish, but as a key ingredient to the research and writing process. I consider it necessary to oppose right-wing politics, in particular that of the extremist and populist variety. This work seeks to develop our knowledge of these politics further as a means of facilitating opposition to their emergence. Impartiality is not attempted within the writing, as a politics of anti-racism is cooked through the research. In acknowledging this, I deliberately open the door to a critique of this work from an activist perspective.

### **1.8 Thesis Outline**

The central research question here is: How and why are particular historical moments used for symbolic effect in heritage and political discourse? As seen above, there is a particular focus on the mnemonic and affective uses of these historical moments. The role of shifting digital media, and the integration of that digital content into the public sphere, is examined. From these foundations, I seek to contribute to understandings of the operation of belonging and collective memory through digital means. I examine the different manner with which these historical moments are used politically across different platforms, from traditional news media, museum and heritage exhibitions, and social media. Common features of this discourse are identified, and the political role of producers of ‘official’ heritage and museum discourse is questioned. Through the frame of the *moving moment*, the consistently affective interaction with both the past and the political is foregrounded as a means of suggesting how a politics of hope can be retained against a backdrop of increasing authoritarianism and division.

Chapter 2 looks in depth at affect, memory and the ambiguity of history. The chapter firstly introduces the notion of the historical *moment* as a constituent part of the *moving moment*. It does so as a means of unfixing histories. Initially, the ambiguity and

malleability of history is brought to the fore. The historic moment is presented as distinct from a historic event, where the ‘event’ is seen to carry notions of fixed meaning, or of a certain level of importance. Where events have been seen variously as ‘what actually happened’ (Ricoeur 1990) or changing the ‘course’ of history (Sewell 1996), others have noted the impossibility of placing boundaries on the event (Wagner-Pacifici 2010). The moment, in comparison to the event, is introduced as inherently malleable, indistinct in length or boundary. Historical moments are shown to be finite and infinite, both already having occurred but also reoccurring (Koselleck 1984). This malleability of historical moments also recognises the connection between the historical and present affective experiences (Berlant 2008).

The remainder of the chapter begins to consider how moments ‘move’. Firstly, focus is given to the act of being moved emotionally. This introduces the affective potentials of our interaction with the past. An initial discussion builds upon non-representational theory (NRT) and the non-, pre- or more-than-bodily experience of the affective. Notions of affective atmospheres or affect as contagion are introduced, illustrating a longstanding focus upon the manner with which affect travels. The chapter then presents *discourse* as a range of media through which affects are moved. I view *discourse*, following Wetherell, as ‘the practical (formal and informal) realm of language in action – talk and texts, words, utterances, conversations, stories, speeches, lectures, television programmes, web pages, messages on message boards, books etc., patterned within the everyday activities of social life’ (Wetherell 2012: 52). In this instance I expand these examples to include social media platforms, such as Twitter. Additionally, these examples are not each mutually exclusive – discourse may appear as a Twitter dialogue or conversation, for example. Additionally, where Wetherell considers that which is ‘patterned within the everyday activities of social life’, I am more directly concerned with discourse as it emerges within a digitally-integrated public sphere of social and political life. Discourse here is a shifting collection of media through which understandings of the past can be used to move individuals emotionally through the instigation of affective responses. This affective interaction with the past is viewed as deeply connected to our mnemonic experiences, as shown through an exploration of cultural memory studies. Finally, museums or heritage sites are then shown to be sites where that affective movement of the past takes place, particularly through a discursive interaction with past and individual and collective memory.

Where Chapter 2 foregrounds ambiguity, Chapter 3 focuses instead upon spaces through which the movement of these historical moments might be followed. This includes detailing their emergence in political discourse, including through legacy and social media, and in museum and heritage sites. Firstly, each of these spaces is presented as a component of a digitally integrated public sphere. This opposes the notion of a split between a digital and ‘real’ world, with the digital rather seen as a component of a changing public sphere. The dissemination and development of political ideas is seen as taking place within this digitally extended public sphere. However, in response to significant critique of the hierarchical nature of formulations of the public sphere, I adopt an assemblage influenced methodological approach to the analysis of the *moving moment*, reflecting the flat ontologies discussed above. Each item of political discourse encountered, each heritage site display, each item within a display case, each Tweet is viewed as a potentially equal. Each influencing part of an assemblage is approached as holding the capacity to have political and social effect and affect. There are limits to this approach, with the researcher required to identify what becomes a part of this assemblage. Viewing impact of each part of the assemblage upon human political action also inherently places human actors within the assemblage to the fore. Therefore, whilst I take influence from flat ontologies in seeking to acknowledge agency of nonhuman components of the assemblage, the outcome does not claim to be strictly ontologically flat. I have given greater focus to certain museums, heritage sites and political actors over others. This is in part due to physical limits of the research, locations visited, and other conscious choices or chances of the research process. I strive to be as open as possible throughout on the decisions that have defined the boundaries of the assemblage.

Having set this framework, I then discuss some specific methodological approaches. This includes detailing a critical discourse analysis (CDA) analytical framework for the interrogation of political discourse. As with the broader assemblage methodology, CDA allows for an active recognition of my own political position, thus allowing for acknowledged activist positions to be taken in the course of the research. The chapter then covers the specifics of data gathering, including the use of statistical programming software R for the gathering and analysis of Twitter content. Finally, the chapter discusses the ethics of engaging in this research. This extends to researcher safety and positionality when engaging with extremist content and the ethics of gathering social media content where understandings of the publicness of posts will vary. Where ethical approaches to

digital content gathering are still developing (see Richardson 2018; Colley 2015), this discussion offers further input into these debates.

The thesis then progresses into the analytical chapters. Firstly, Chapters 4 and 5 focus upon the use of Magna Carta in heritage and political discourse. Chapter 4 offers a brief history of the development of Magna Carta, including its repeated use as a reference point in key political fights in the centuries since the first drafting in 1215. The chapter discusses a spike in references to Magna Carta in the last two decades, pre-empting its use in the UK-EU referendum campaign. The period of data gathering also drew the research analysis towards the role of Magna Carta in discourse surrounding the arrest of English right-wing figurehead Stephen Yaxley-Lennon (commonly known as Tommy Robinson). Chapter 5 tracks this use of Magna Carta in online discourse, before returning to the representation of the same history within heritage and museum sites. In foregrounding the political discourse, before moving to what Laurajane Smith would term the Authorised Heritage Discourse (AHD) surrounding the display of Magna Carta in official sites, the chapters are used to question the political role of these sites. The potential for museums and heritage sites to offer discourses of inclusivity against division is considered.

Chapters 6 and 7 then move to the analysis of the use of the 1683 *Siege of Vienna* across a similar range of spaces. These chapters begin with a brief introduction to the importance of the 1683 siege in the broader history of the Ottoman Empire, and a brief history of what occurred around the Siege from June to September 1683. The development since 1683 of a liberation mythology around this moment is discussed. A discussion of the commemoration of 1683 across time in Poland and Vienna shows part of the development of this mythology. Chapter 6 then turns to discussing the presence of 1683 in museums, in political discourse, and across the Viennese landscape. The role of the urban landscape becomes a focal point. As with the discussion of 1215, the role of 1683 in transnational political discourse emerges. The use of 1683 by Viktor Orbán in Hungary and the Law and Justice Party (PiS) in Poland, both arguably considered RWP groups, is considered.

Chapter 7 tracks the use of 1683 beyond this 'official' party political discourse, across to its use by right-wing extremists. The references to 1683 made by terrorists including the 2011 Oslo and Utøya attacker and the 2019 Christchurch attacker is demonstrative of the most extreme usage of this historical moment. The chapter focuses significantly on online content, both from blog sites and from social media, to develop this analysis. Where the



discussion of 1215 made use of a broad capture of Twitter content, the analysis of 1683 focuses on key actors in the use of 1683 in RWP and extremist circles. This begins with a discussion of the far-right blog site *Gates of Vienna*. The analysis of content from this site opens up space for a discussion of the development of the ‘great replacement’ conspiracy theory and its continued relevance. The relevance of gender and notions of ‘family values’ also comes to the fore. These trends are continued, with direct relevance to the mobilisation of the memory of 1683, by the Identitarian Movement. The role of Identitarian groups in Austria is discussed, alongside their beliefs, and their performative commemorations of 1683. The chapter concludes by discussing the relationship between online and offline use of 1683.

Chapter 8 draws together key themes from the four analytical chapters. These include the role of RWP and nationalist ideologies, the relationship between online and offline memory activism, and the relationship between this use of the past and its display in heritage sites and museums. The chapter ties the discussion back to a focus upon the ambiguity of the past and the role of affect in developing political uses of the past. This allows for a closer focus on the role of *moving moments* in practice. The chapter suggests that the persistence of right-wing nationalism and populism can be tied to the affective strength and sense of collective belonging cultivated by these political ideologies. The historical moments I focus upon here are used in a range of political discourse, but I suggest that they have been most successfully used in right-wing discourse in part as a result of this additional affective strength. The impact of the development of digital technologies is, therefore, one feature of the changing public sphere through which such discourses emerge, not a defining feature of the persistence of right-wing ideologies. Taking this stance allows for a discussion of digital platforms as component of the digitally-integrated public sphere through which political knowledge and uses of the past can be mobilised. The roles of museums and heritage sites are discussed as not separate from this discourse but as related components of this public sphere.

Chapter 9, by way of conclusion, returns to the initial framing of this work as an item of memory activism itself. Suggestions are made for how this work can contribute to countering divisive ideologies in the moment of danger discussed above. The conclusion also responds further to Rigney’s (2018) suggestion that where memory studies has long focused on the negative, positive acts of ‘remembering hope’ should also be foregrounded. It is suggested that such acts of ‘remembering hope’ can counter persistent, divisive

ideologies on an affective level by similarly seeking to engage in developing a sense of belonging, both within and across national boundaries. Finally, I suggest that the potential for such discourse offers a route for museums and heritage sites to consider their role in opposing divisive and extremist uses of these historical moments.

## Chapter 2

### The Affect, Memory and Ambiguous History of *Moving Moments*

A reference to Magna Carta has the power to convince people to vote to leave the European Union. References to the 1683 Siege of Vienna have the power to deepen racist and xenophobic viewpoints. They each have the power to move people to political action. Across Chapters 4 – 7, I demonstrate the manner in which these pasts move temporally, spatially, affectively and politically. But what does it mean to talk about the past as moving? This chapter details the manner in which historic moments might be considered mobile and the central roles of affect and memory in this mobility.

The ambiguity of historic moments imbues them with a potentiality, a mobility and an unboundedness that allows them to be moved into political discourse. For all of this unboundedness, these moments are also, to borrow from Sara Ahmed, ‘sticky’. Ahmed suggests that ‘anxiety is sticky’ (2007/8: 125). Anxiety is a feeling that ‘tends to pick up whatever comes near’ – anxiety has the capacity to stick to and affect other bodies. However, Ahmed also suggests that ‘objects become sticky, saturated with affects’ (2007/8: 126). Objects or bodies do not, according to Ahmed, arrive at a point devoid of existing affective potential. Historical moments, I suggest, also arrive with that capacity to affect. This capacity is influenced by the past of that historical moment and by the circumstances of the moment at which they arrive. These moments contain the ability to ‘stick’ in certain spaces and times when they are given a role in political discourse. Certain moments, those that hold a dominant position in the consciousness of a group, will arrive already saturated with affects, to borrow Ahmed’s language. These affects relate to the potential for these moments to be used in political discourse. As Wodak (2013) shows, for example, the demonisation of a threat from an ‘other’ allows for the spread of a ‘politics of fear’. Linking this to Ahmed, it can be argued that political conditions allow an affect of fear to ‘stick’. This chapter approaches the mobility and ambiguity of historical moments. The chapter firstly considers what we understand by reference to the *event* or *moment*. This discussion emphasises the ambiguity of history. The chapter then draws upon understandings of affect to consider how we interact with the past as a component of the world around us. This is closely tied to constructions of personal identity. I view affect on

an individual and collective level, where the collective and individual consistently operate in tandem.

Having expanded upon the ambiguity and malleability of both history and our interaction with the past, the chapter then focuses on the role of cultural memory and of museum and heritage sites as spaces that reaffix our interaction with the past. Cultural memory studies offer an understanding of how the past not only shapes our individual identity, but also impacts upon our sense of belonging through expanding our sense of collective identity. Experiences of individual and collective memory are argued to be filled with affective capacity. Similarly, understandings of the past, as communicated through museums and heritage sites, are argued to be sites which communicate power and dominance, with this communicative practice made more powerful through the affective potential of those presentations of the past.

## **2.1 Ambiguous History: Events and Moments**

While discussions have taken place regarding the working definition of the historical *event*<sup>3</sup> (Wagner-Pacifci 2010; Sewell 1996; Ricœur 1990), consideration of what constitutes an historical *moment* is less frequent. This is not to say that the term *moment* does not appear with frequency, but rather that it is given less analytic focus than the *event*. Koselleck (1985: 14), for example, refers to a ‘conscious element (*Moment*) of political action’, but does not seek to define the term itself, instead using it to refer to an unspecified temporal occurrence. The term ‘historical moments’ has been defined previously as a period in time longer than an event, ranging from five to fifty years in length (Denzin and Lincoln 2011: 3). This, however, has the issue of suggesting that events are always short, with set boundaries. There is a further ambiguity in the *moment* as a term which is reflected in its everyday use. We might take a moment of our friend’s time, or join them in a moment, ask someone to wait a moment. Paul du Gay, Stuart Hall and others adopted the term ‘moment’ to refer to the points of their circuit of culture, such as the ‘moment of ‘representation’’ or the ‘moment of ‘production’’ (du Gay et al. 2013). There is a shared understanding in these phrases, but the exact meaning is more difficult to pin down.

---

<sup>3</sup> This discussion stands apart from ontological debates regarding the event, rather than the historical event, as found in Deleuze or Heidegger (see Zourabichvili 2012).

The ambiguity of the *moment* extends to its wider use by Koselleck, who talks of a ‘moment of our history’, a ‘moment of experience’ (1985: 55-56). This ambiguity, however, has its uses. Koselleck’s ‘moment of experience’ makes use of this ambiguity to recognise the non-uniform manner with which contemporaneous occurrences become a part of this unified moment (Tribe 1985: xiv). The ambiguity of the *moment* becomes a tool through which we can look at the inherent ambiguity of history. This ambiguity is a key element of that which allows history to move, to find new meaning. It is an ambiguity that, I suggest, contributes to moments such as 1215 and 1683 to finding continued, changed relevance through political discourse. Before going into this ambiguity in depth, I will first consider the concept of the historical *event* further.

### **2.1.1 Historical Events**

Paul Ricœur suggests that ‘in an ontological sense, we mean by historical event what actually happened in the past’ (1990: 96). The event is based on attempts to develop an absolute understanding of things that ‘active beings [...] make happen’ (ibid.). This, as Ricœur recognises, is an unachievable goal. The act of writing history shapes the understanding of what has taken place, undermining any possibility of absolute accuracy. Similarly, the images or stories captured will be selective, with some actions brought to the fore, others pushed to the rear, and others lost beyond the frame of capture completely. Pieter Bruegel the Elder’s painting *The Procession to Calvary* (1564) shows the operation of this documentation of history. One’s eye is not necessarily drawn straight to the image of Christ, with a cross on his back, towards the centre of the painting. The title, however, suggests to the observer what the focal point of the painting is. This is the part of the scene that is of greatest importance. Allowing the eye to drift away from this scene, however, we see the painting is populated by groups of people, some praying, others following Christ, others seemingly disconnected from this scene entirely. In a 1559 work by Bruegel the Elder, *The Fight between Carnival and Lent*, figures are seen leaving the frame, disappearing around corners behind buildings. What we see, it is made abundantly clear, is a fragment of a wider scene. Life continues beyond these images. What is given focus is a choice of the painter. So too, what is given focus in history is at the will of the writer. The historical event is something which is constructed. It is always narrated, becoming known in written or spoken accounts and is constantly reconstructed in each reference given to that history (Ricœur 1990: 169-70).

William Sewell takes a similar approach, defining historical events as actions that are commented on by contemporaries (1996: 841-42). It is the act of commenting, or of writing an account of an occurrence, that results in these actions becoming an event. Not only this, these actions must be commented upon ‘widely’ by those contemporaries (ibid.). This, for Sewell, draws historians towards focusing upon acts which they believe somehow ‘change the course of history’ (Sewell 1996: 842). The historical event, therefore, is ascribed with a level of importance in its power to alter the very course of history. This understanding becomes problematic when taken in conjunction with the assertion that the act of writing history has an impact on the subject being written about. In the repeated act of writing about a particular event, based upon a belief that whatever occurred had a greater than average impact on the course of human history, the historian will immediately add to that view simply by engaging in the act of writing. Assertions that certain actions changed the course of history are uncritically furthered purely through the act of writing.

Sewell deals with this issue through introducing structure, as defined by Giddens (1981), to this definition. In agreement with Giddens, Sewell notes that it is the structures which govern society that act as both the medium and the outcome in any social systems. Society acts within the constraints of a structure developed over time, while also acting in a manner which develops and alters those structures to fit contemporary needs (Sewell 1996: 842). This allows Sewell to further define what might be considered as ‘changing the course of history’ in terms of the transformation of structure. Historical events are then defined as: ‘(1) a ramified sequence of occurrences that (2) is recognized as notable by contemporaries, and that (3) results in a durable transformation of structures.’ (Sewell 1996: 844). By this definition the representation of an event is not in itself enough; it must also be possible to trace the impact of actions in terms of discernible changes to social structure. While this gives more rigidity to the notion of the historical event, it still foregrounds the history-altering aspect of actions discussed. It also foregrounds direct human observation of occurrences that become considered an event after the fact. This results in human agency taking a central role at the point of definition. This could facilitate an uncritical foregrounding of human action, something I seek to avoid here in taking influence from flat-ontological approaches.

A further element of subjectivity is the definition of the boundaries of the event. Structures, in Sewell’s definition, are considered to be ‘multiple and overlapping’ (1996: 871). Events, too, are multiple and overlapping. They impact on, create and reorganise

other events, an impact that is furthered by the blurred and subjective boundaries of the event. Taking the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 as an example, Wagner-Pacifci (2010) articulates a picture of historical events as difficult or even impossible to define in terms of a beginning and end. Does one refer only to the events involving the hijacked planes on that specific date? Or does an account also include the following conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan as a part of the same event? Does one consider preceding years of American involvement in the Middle East? Defining the actions which constitute part of an event, much like the act of defining the temporality of an event, is a judgement imposed upon it by the writer. The difficulty is summed up by Wagner-Pacifci in the following paradox: ‘you cannot have an event without boundaries, and you cannot definitively bind an event.’ (Wagner-Pacifci 2010: 1356). Historical events are ‘restless’ (ibid.), and yet in the writing of them attempts are made to fix them. I suggest that dismissing this notion of the event in favour of the historical moment allows one to navigate this paradox. I argue that this facilitates our recognition of a further paradox – that our experience of history or the past is always in part unfixed, despite the fact that discourses we interact with are based upon attempts to fix that past to a set meaning.

### **2.1.2 Historical Moments**

When we talk of a moment, we talk of an indistinct period of time. The boundaries of a moment are already ambiguous and blurred. We know they are there, but they do not merit absolute definition. This was not always the case. The etymology of ‘moment’ suggests a short period of time. Similarly, the minute, of which there were once forty in an hour, was built of forty moments. A google search even suggests that a moment could be quantified as 2.25 seconds long. In practice, however, it is knowingly ambiguous. Where the second or minute might be used indistinctly, there is a deeper ambiguity to the moment. The roots of the term alongside notions of movement (e.g. the Latin *momentum*, and associations with the Spanish term *mover*) suggest an unfixing of the term. It might suggest a certain period of time, but it is time in movement, time as unfixed. If we accept that it is impossible to put boundaries on an historical *event*, but also accept that an event must have an imposed start and end point, then it becomes clear that we should adopt terminology that recognises this paradox more clearly. The solution comes in referring to the already-ambiguous historical *moment*. In the historical moment one finds reference to past

occurrences but acknowledges that these occurrences cannot be fixed. They are characterised by the manner in which they move.

The linguistic choice made here is not a unique one. References to the historical moment(s) are commonplace. However, the use of this linguistic choice as a means of acknowledging the malleability and ambiguity of history is less explicitly discussed. Its use is left more open and ambiguous than reference to an event. When Berlant (2008: 846) discusses the ‘conditions of an historical moment’s production as a visceral moment’, the temporal fluidity (and therefore potential temporal movement required of a *moving moment*) that is encapsulated within this term allows for the affective capacities of the past to be brought to the fore. No longer is the past closed off within narrow, methodologically convenient conceptions of historical events or a series of definable actions. Here the “‘knowledge’ of a contemporary historical moment’, such as 9/11, is tied to an ‘aesthetic rendition of [an] emotionally complex sensual experience’ (ibid.). The sensuality of this experience reminds us that moments can arrive ‘saturated’ in affect, in the potential to move us emotionally. The experience of the past within the present is not separable from the fluidity of past actions and our development of a “knowledge” of them.

Historical moments might stick, but they cannot be permanently fixed. Taking influence from a study of the historical novel, Berlant finds that the historical moment is ‘a moment in transition’ (Berlant 2008: 847). Taking historical moments as points of transition, rather than fixed occurrences, prompts us to think of our perception of time. Indeed, how can we talk of the past without considering our understanding of time? Most commonly, we conceive of time as linear, a ‘continuous line moving from the past towards the future’ (Arienzo 2016: 96). However, this view has been heavily critiqued, particularly over the last century, by thinkers such as Bergson, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty (Santojanni 2016). Influenced by Bergson’s distinction between lived time (that of conscious thought) and spatialised time as understood scientifically (Di Bernardo 2016), Koselleck suggests that ‘temporal determinations of historical occurrences ... can be as numerous as all the individual “events”’ (1984: 95). Temporal experience of histories cannot be considered to follow any sequence in the manner that ‘temporal rhythms given in nature’ might (ibid.). Histories, or historical moments in this instance, are considered to be both finite and infinite (Koselleck 1984: 104). He argues, therefore, that actions have already occurred; but that does not prevent their reoccurrence, particularly as they are brought into the present discursively, mnemonically or through museum and heritage site representations.



Before considering these acts of ‘past-presencing’ (Macdonald 2013, see below), or what we might consider to be social and collective interactions with the past, I wish to consider the impact of this non-linear view of temporality on an individual and affective level.

## **2.2 Affect and Movement**

When we unfix historical moments, ‘historical narrative’ becomes embedded ‘in the intensities of affective life’ (Berlant 2008: 847). Berlant draws a link here between historical moments, the narratives that are produced around them, in our affective experiences of and with them in the present. This draws us to the necessity of a focus upon collective and affective interactions with the past. In the following sections I continue to unfix historical moments through considering the broad role of affect. Having done so, I return to cultural memory as a mode through which affective interactions allow the past to ‘stick’ as part of our personal and political interactions with the past in the present.

The terms *affect* and *emotion* are, problematically, often considered to be synonymous (Anderson 2014: 11). Geographer Ben Anderson suggests that emotion deals primarily with the personal. Affect, on the other hand, is positioned as the impersonal and objective. This distinction, for Anderson, also suggests that it is emotion that impacts on identity, while affect becomes the consideration of the ‘non-conscious or not-yet-conscious dimensions of bodily experience’ (ibid.). Anderson builds on a Spinozan concept of affect as, according to Deleuze and Guattari, ‘the capacity to affect or be affected’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1980: xvi). For Spinoza, affect referred to that which increased or decreased the body’s capacity to act, where ‘body’ refers specifically to the human body. For Deleuze and Guattari this notion is extended, according to Brian Massumi’s translator’s note, ‘to include “mental” or ideal bodies’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1980: xvi). More recently, Blackman has noted that the human body has become increasingly ‘displaced’ as understandings of the affective body have expanded to include ‘species bodies, psychic bodies, machinic bodies and other-worldly bodies’ (2012: 1). Understandings of the body show a post-human influence, as ‘boundaries between the psychological, social, biological, ideological, economic and technical’ (ibid.) are broken down. In opening up the notion of the body to the non-human, we also open up to the notion that those non-human bodies also have the capacity to affect and be affected.

In considering a body's 'capacity to affect or be affected', Deleuze and Guattari open up affect to collective consideration. Affect becomes not simply that which impacts an individual body's own ability to act, either positively or negatively, but that body itself exerts affective influence on others. It is a definition which Massumi suggests is deeply relational (Massumi 2015: 91), it places affect as something that can work *between* bodies. To pre-empt further discussion below and in Chapter 3, it allows for a consideration of affect within relational assemblages. Blackman (2012) concurs, noting that moving away from focusing purely on the human body allows us to consider 'bodies as assemblages of human and non-human processes.' I outline my use of the assemblage further in Chapter 3, but note here that assemblages are considered to be bodies themselves, as well as a total of individual bodies, all with the individual and collective capacity to affect and be affected.

Returning to the distinction between affect and emotion, emotion can be considered to be the internalised, embodied element of feeling. It is the experience of a feeling at the personal level, or the experience of feeling love, hate, anger that we consciously experience. Affect, on the other hand, refers to feeling in movement. That is both movement between bodies and movement of bodies. Movement between bodies as the affective capacity of one body influences the capacity of another body to affect and be affected, and the movement of bodies in that in holding a capacity to be affected, an individual body can be *moved* to emotional responses. While acknowledging that this does involve considering the more-than-bodily aspect of emotions, the complete removal of human agency is problematic, particularly on two fronts. Firstly, it removes an element of responsibility from those who may wish to have an affective impact on others, and secondly it may result in too great a focus on how affects are understood to move, rather than their impact.

For some, the relationality of affect has been extended to consider the more-than-bodily, or pre-cognitive. This is most notably the case among proponents of NRT (Thrift 2007; 1996). NRT is built upon the premise that active consciousness is weak, only ever holds for a short period of time and only allows us to deal with a small number of items at a given time (Thrift 2007: 6). Beyond a short (apparently no more than 15-second) period, individuals rely on memory of something that has passed. NRT further argues for the role of the pre-conscious, or pre-cognitive, in our understanding of the world. Thrift suggests that a 'roiling mass of nerve volleys prepare the body for action in such a way that intentions or decisions are made before the conscious self is even aware of them' (Thrift

2007: 7). Thrift applies this to the issue of affect by taking Spinoza's suggestion that the world within which we live contains 'dynamic affective charges' (Spinoza, cited in Thrift 2007: 13), and our perception of the world, including our affective response to it, will be imposed rather than consciously constructed. Our ability to act in a particular manner is always augmented or diminished by 'pre-individual bodily forces' of affect (Clough 2008: 1). While Thrift (2007) does suggest an attempt to maintain at least some element of conscious human agency, this remains limited in NRT, subsumed by the pre-individual, the disembodied.

Through the development of NRT, the conception of affect in terms of *atmosphere* also emerges. Teresa Brennan (2004: 1) asked 'is there anyone who has not, at least once, walked into a room and "felt the atmosphere"?' Through that notion of an atmosphere in a room, affect becomes not only removed from the cognitive, but there emerges a danger of affect becoming disembodied. Affects can move within a room, between bodies, without the agency of those bodies. Brennan pulls back from this notion, suggesting that this calls for the development of a means of understanding how the 'emotions or affects of one person ... can enter into another' (Brennan 2004: 3). Brennan, therefore, becomes concerned not only with the pre-cognitive dimensions of affect, but more pertinently with the transmission of affect. For this purpose, Brennan considers affect as distinct objects moving between bodies, but completely separable from those bodies. Affect exists within and as non-human independent objects. For proponents of NRT, this formulation of affect helps challenge 'the epistemological priority of representations as the grounds of sense-making' (McCormack 2003, cited in Wetherell 2012: 58). For Wetherell, however, this goes too far in losing focus upon the representational. She suggests that Brennan's work in particular suggests a 'self-contained packet' of affect that is 'transferred wholesale' (Wetherell 2012: 141). The bodies become unknowing bystanders.

An example discussed in detail below demonstrates the applicability but also the limitations of this conception of affect. Chapter 7 gives some focus to a right-wing 'commemorative procession' held in September each year in Vienna marking the anniversary of the breaking of the Ottoman Siege of Vienna in 1683. It is certainly the case that an atmosphere is constructed at this event, through the use of militaristic banners, flaming torches, and chants during the procession. There is a desire for this march to have affective potency. If we were to consider affect as 'self-contained packets' that move without agency of those impacted by them, then any actions by, or participation in, this

procession could be excused as outside an individual's agency. They could have been carried by the atmosphere of the occasion. I seek to avoid notions that might remove responsibility for individual actions. However, this does not entail casting NRT aside completely.

Theresa Brennan develops notions of transmission of affect through theorising affect as *contagion* (Brennan 2004: 68). This again presents the danger of affect becoming completely removed from human agency, removing this from each individual capacity to act. Blackman (2007), however, suggests that the view of affect as a contagion may merely recognise that affect can be distributed. Considering affect as a contagion that one might be 'caught up in' (Blackman 2007: 29) merely foregrounds the capacity to be affected, to be influenced by items external to our own bodies. Here, our understanding of the spread of affect at the commemorative march would read differently. For those taking part in the procession, or indeed those taking part in an anti-fascist counter protest, or those merely viewing the events, it is easy to see how one might become 'caught up in' the drama and atmosphere of the events. Here, the role of our felt reactions to affect as a contagion is kept to the fore. The notion, however, does retain some sense of affect as a separable entity, with a life of its own. If we are to be 'caught up in' an event, where do the boundaries fall between our own decision making and that which is simply the impact of those around us?

In part as a reaction to concerns regarding considerations of affect as contagion, others have written in detail on understanding affect as an atmosphere (McCormack 2008; Anderson 2009; Michels 2015; Closs Stephens 2016). McCormack (2008: 418) suggests that unlike transmission or contagion, 'atmosphere is instead a set of dynamic and kinetic affects.' This is intended to build a recognition of affect as both 'more-than-human' but also sensed within bodies as 'intensities of feeling' (McCormack 2008: 414). Closs Stephens (2016) takes McCormack's suggestion of affective atmospheres as immersive, something that we can sense while still not being part of us. She applies this to understanding how nationalist feelings might become more noticeable at particular times, such as around the 2012 London Olympics. Affect is again something that is largely outside human agency. It is experienced, but as a separate entity.

In Closs Stephens' work, affective atmospheres are untraceable to any individual or group action (2016: 185). The definition of atmosphere presented by Ben Anderson (2009) is useful in applying a level of bodily agency to affect that is missing from the above. Taking

influence from Deleuze and Guattari, Anderson (2009: 78) suggests that affective atmospheres are both determinate and indeterminate. These atmospheres are produced by bodies, in this context referring to any human or non-human object acting within a relational structure, and continually form and deform as they engage with each other relationally. Anderson's definition moves to recognise the agency of bodies, an agency of human action, while also recognising the strongly relational element of affect. This has the benefit of allowing for a recognition of the personal and historical context of the bodies acting within any relationship. Put bluntly by Michels (2015: 258), 'what an individual can or cannot do always depends on the situation it becomes part of', and on the personal history of that individual. Anderson, building nuance in to the Deleuzian notion of 'becoming', later suggests that 'affects are made and remade' continually, and this process is structured by the personal context of those bodies involved in the making and remaking of an affect (2014: 101). However, there remains a lack of clarity on the precedence of affect. That is, how do we understand the manner in which affects might arrive at a body or be communicated between bodies.

Wetherell offers a route through this concern as she explicitly considers affect displays 'strong pushes for pattern' as well as showing 'disturbance in existing patterns' (2012: 13). She places this focus upon pattern in opposition to those who, in her view, approach affect as a purely disruptive or 'dangerous' (Lingis 2000, cited in Wetherell 2012: 13) force. Affect, for Wetherell, is not chaotic but rather is 'practical, communicative and organised' (2012: 13). I adopt this notion in considering discursive uses of the past, with the role of affect not viewed as a chaotic element within the framework of the '*moving moment*'. Rather, it is another feature of representational patterns which give insight into the role of the past in political discursive structures in the present. This tendency towards pattern also allows for a drawing of focus away from a concern over the origin of affective responses. In discussions above, I outlined my adoption of the term 'moment' over 'event' as a means of recognising historical ambiguity. This also recognised the difficulty in presenting boundaries upon histories or defining when an event might start or end. There is a similar difficulty in defining the origin or end point of an affective movement. For the *moving moment*, however, these origins take a lower priority than a consideration of particular emergences of affect. For example, in Chapters 4 & 5 I am concerned with the affective impact of references to Magna Carta when they are used to communicate a notion of British/English exceptionalism. In Chapter 7, I focus on the affective role of discourse

which inspires acts of extremism. This is a concern, as Wetherell notes, with spaces where affect shows pattern or structure. It is at these points that I seek to view the role of affect in the discursive-mnemonic uses of the past.

This focus upon pattern, however, does not absolve affect of a degree of the chaotic. To echo the discussion of historical moments, it does not absolve affect of an ambiguity. While I take influence from Wetherell's focus upon the pattern and structure of affect, I diverge from her work in suggesting that this does not lessen the pertinence of the non-representational, or the more-than-representational. These works act as a reminder that, beyond the points at which affect might emerge in a museum display, a political speech, or a protest action, affect will continue, dissipating among a range of bodies and being carried to re-emerge at further points of representation. As bodies have the capacity to affect and be affected, and as affects are constantly made and remade by these bodies, this suggests that bodies can act to mediate affects. If we are to consider the mediation of affects, then it also encourages a turn towards the means through which affects might be communicated or spread. Rather than considering the manner by which affect transmits, this instead necessitates a focus upon the media through which affect can be transmitted. This is equally a focus upon the agency of non-human bodies that facilitate the mobilisation of the past.

### **2.3 Affect and Discourse**

*Letters are symbols. They are building blocks of words, which form our language. Languages help us communicate. Even with complicated languages used by intelligent people, misunderstanding is a common occurrence. We write things down sometimes – letters, words – hoping they will serve us and those with whom we wish to communicate. Letters and words, calling out for understanding.*

*Miscommunication sometimes leads to arguments, and arguments sometimes lead to fights. Anger is usually present in arguments and fights. Anger is an emotion, usually classified as a negative emotion. Negative emotions can cause severe problems in our environment and to the health of our body.*

(Catherine Coulson as the Log Lady, *Twin Peaks*, 1993)

David Lynch, through the voice of *The Log Lady*, not only recognises the role of text as symbols, he also recognises the affective power of those symbols. In the world of *Twin Peaks*, the focus is upon miscommunication and misinterpretation, with crossed signals dramatically impacting upon the trajectory of the characters. These excerpts also draw attention to the broader affective power of discourse, both written and spoken. The words communicated impact our environment and the health of our bodies. We feel the impact of words. In considering the impact of language upon our environment, Lynch also extends this idea beyond the bodily. Where the works discussed above consider the affective atmosphere, Lynch considers the impact of language upon our emotional environment. Acts of communication, for Lynch, impact us emotionally through impacting the environment around us. In doing so, Lynch recognises the capacity of language to affectively impact us not only individually, but also collectively. He recognises, albeit not in such terms, the movement capacity of language to affect and be affected. I suggest that *moving moments* act as symbols, much as language might act as symbols for Lynch.

Wetherell (2012) has drawn attention to the apparent ‘rubbishing of discourse’ in works on affect, particularly focusing upon proponents of NRT. Wetherell suggests that those who rubbish discourse do so ‘in contestation with post-structuralist discourse theory’ (2012: 54). This post-structuralist approach views discourse to be an historically dependent social system producing knowledge (Foucault 1969). Here, discourse serves to organise knowledge in a manner which can influence and, often, uphold dominant social structures. The power structures that are already in place will condition the form of discourse produced. Centrally, this ensures that discourse is not considered as outside of the historical context within which it arises. Discourse, then, arrives with rules in place. That does not mean that political discourse cannot influence and change social structures, but it does so from a starting point that it is by necessity acting within structures influenced by dominant powers.

Wetherell does, however, note that post-structuralist approaches rarely explicitly define discourse itself. Therefore, I take as a grounding point Wetherell’s definition of discourse as ‘the practical (formal and informal) realm of language in action – talk and texts, words, utterances, conversations, stories, speeches, lectures, television programmes, web pages, messages on message boards, books etc.’ (Wetherell 2012: 52). This does not supersede Foucault, but rather provides a route to the practical application of Foucault’s understanding of discourse. However, I disagree with Wetherell in her suggestion that

those who follow a NRT view of affect are guilty of ‘rubbishing discourse’. Within works of key theorists of NRT, distinct references to the role of the discursive can be found. These works provide a pivot between the discursive, mnemonic and the more-than-human.

Wetherell suggests that for proponents of NRT it is the fact that affect is ‘not discourse’ which makes it an exciting field of study. This implies a conscious decision to remove any focus upon discourse, therefore apparently ‘rubbishing’ any role that discourse might play in the mobilisation of affects. I diverge from Wetherell here, instead considering NRT approaches to the discursive to offer valuable contributions to understandings of affect. While NRT, to varying degrees among different theorists, distances affect from being solely found in realm of conscious decision-making, this often does not preclude those who adopt NRT from also seeing a role of affect in discourse. Nigel Thrift (2007), for example, views affect as an integral part of political campaigning, with political discourse a central component of this affective experience.

The recognition of affect as a component of political campaigning and political discourse, even when not directly discussing discourse itself, is echoed by other theorists within the field of NRT (Clough 2008; Massumi 2015). McCormack (2008), in his theory of affective atmosphere, makes use of discourse in the form of diaries and media accounts to detail how an affective response to the balloon expedition was built among the public. Anderson, following on from McCormack’s work, uses Barack Obama’s 2009 inauguration speech as a means of noting the affective atmosphere created in the USA at that moment. He recognises that ‘images, words, reports and texts’ will act upon affective life (Anderson 2014: 60). This does not speak to a ‘rubbishing’ of discourse, but rather indicates approaches that may have a lesser focus upon the discursive. These retain a strong presence for the discursive within their work. Attention to the discursive is not beyond the realm of NRT, nor does a primary focus on discourse require a rubbishing of the non-representational or more-than-representational.

This is made clear in recent work, where the role of the non- or more-than-representational and the discursive find closer alignment. Ahmed (2007/8) uses the discursive example of the film *Bend it Like Beckham* to demonstrate that pre-existing affective roles, particularly those placed upon particular bodies through racially prejudiced social practices, are reflected and revealed through the discursive. In previous work, Ahmed noted that collective affective responses may also be built from discourse, using examples ranging



from white-nationalist Aryan Nations web content, to a Christian Aid letter (Ahmed 2004). Discourse is recognised here as both responding to existing affects while also having the power to create new ones. The discursive becomes, in the Deleuzian sense, a body with the capacity to affect and be affected.

In Chapter 4, for example, we see the discursive use of references to Magna Carta as a tool for engaging an audience in political action. Reference to Magna Carta is shown as communicating a sense of English/British exceptionalism, such that it instils a feeling of nationalistic pride and belonging which could give confidence in voting to support Brexit. However, in acting as a piece of affective discourse, these references to Magna Carta are themselves affected, as some of that nationalist sentiment which has been encouraged sticks back to Magna Carta, at least for those who are encouraged to those political actions. Future interactions with Magna Carta are then charged with affects that have stuck in previous interactions. This ties together the discursive, affective and mnemonic. Such discourse has the capacity to affect whilst simultaneously contributing to our mnemonic understandings of the past. These themselves, as is shown in more detail below, also shift and change through repeated interaction with discourse regarding the past.

A degree of focus upon the more-than-representational does not limit the importance of discourse nor does it inherently remove any role of human agency and choice. N. Katherine Hayles' concept of the 'unthought' (Hayles 2017) has provided new space for considering the cognitive and the discursive facets of affect in tandem. In building on the notion of the 'cognitive nonconscious', itself a development of Damasio's 'protoself' (Damasio 2012, cited in Hayles 2017: 10), Hayles presents a model of the development of seemingly ingrained affective responses. The 'unthought' allows for certain key tenets of NRT to maintain relevance, while also ensuring that there is a powerfully influential role for conscious lived experience and, therefore, the influence of discourse. Hayles, as I discuss further in the Chapter 9, makes use of a posthuman approach to assemblages, but does so in a manner that retains an active element of human agency and, therefore, the ability of humans to exert political impact upon their futures.

For Hayles, 'nonconscious cognition' acts as 'a faithful advisor supporting and influencing consciousness but not initiating whole-body action on its own' (Hayles 2017: 55).

Adopting a political metaphor, Hayles suggests that nonconscious cognition is more akin to 'Joe Biden than Dick Cheney' (ibid.). That is, more of a passive actor rather than a

leader pulling all the strings from the background. If we extend this metaphor further, Hayles notes that the consciousness is limited in the amount of information it can process. Like any senior politician will rely on advisors and researchers to gather pertinent information, discarding that which is considered to be irrelevant and passing key points forward, the consciousness relies upon nonconscious cognition to filter responses, passing important information forward. The information that is passed forward is not arbitrary, but rather learned over time. So, decisions we make might come predominantly from our nonconscious, but that does not mean that these decisions are completely beyond our agency. We may react to particular discourse in a manner which has been learned over time, to the point where our nonconscious cognition engages an emotional or affective response without full conscious awareness, but we have the ability to change these behaviours over time as we learn new responses and gain new information.

Hayles' posthuman approach to cognition presents a link to Pierre Bourdieu's concept of 'habitus' (1977). This concept suggested that 'past practice becomes embodied in social actors' (Wetherell 2013: 105) to such a degree that they will be disposed towards certain actions, viewpoints and preferences. Any future actions are, therefore, guided to some degree by the personal and social history that an actor carries with them. However, this does not entirely limit possible future actions. Although some 'lines of action and reaction that are not totally supported or resourced recede' (ibid.) or even become unimaginable, a degree of choice and human agency remains present. The concept of 'habitus', according to Wetherell, allowed Bourdieu to understand the paradoxical relationship between 'openness and structure' (ibid.). Where nonconscious cognition, for Hayles, allows for a resolution between nonconscious influence on actions and our ability to develop and change our responses, habitus allows for a similar resolution between the learned experiences that shape our actions and an ability to continue to make active choices. Similarly, our responses to discourse we interact with and our actions in creating discourse ourselves will be influenced by our past and our nonconscious, but not entirely constrained by them to the point of removing our agency.

Discourse has the potential to affect us and the discourse we produce can instil an affective response in others. That these affective responses may take place within the realm of the nonconscious, or in the precognitive for proponents of NRT, does not 'rubbish' the power of discourse, nor does it remove individual agency from this relationship. Discourse becomes a tool that can be used actively as a means of instigating certain responses, or

reflecting certain affective positions. Concurrently, once created, discourse exists as a separate body from that which created it. Discourse takes on affective capacities which exist and spread beyond the control or influence of the originator of that discourse. For example, the original drafters of Magna Carta could of course not foresee it being used on social media by supporters of right-wing activists such as Steven Yaxley-Lennon, as we see in Chapters 4 and 5. Similarly, curatorial staff at sites such as Salisbury Cathedral (see Chapter 5) may not be expected to account for right-wing readings of their exhibition content. In the analysis below, however, I question the degree to which museums and heritage sites should engage with potential political uses of the pasts they represent.

When we consider political discourse, or indeed any discursive body which may instigate a political response, we must consider this affective dimension. Guibernau has shown that emotions are key drivers of political action. Chantal Mouffe (2005a; 2005b; 2013; 2018), influentially, has argued that ‘passions’ are an integral part of democratic politics. Here I recognise that this can be extended to consider the affective potentials of discourse to engage a capacity to act politically. This includes the affective potential of discourse that makes use of the past through engaging our individual and collective memories.

## **2.4 Cultural Memory and Interaction with the Past**

Within NRT, as discussed above, there is some allusion to the interaction between memory and consciousness. It was suggested that if we are responding to any action beyond a period of around 15 seconds, we rely on some form of memory to facilitate our response. Similarly, if we are to view the ‘unthought’, that nonconscious part of our cognition, as developing and changing across time, then we acknowledge that both our conscious and nonconscious are influenced by our individual pasts. What does this mean when we are interacting with the deeper past? How does this become relevant to our interaction with historical moments such as the 1215 sealing of Magna Carta or the 1683 breaking of the Siege of Vienna? In the remainder of this chapter I first develop a view of the role of cultural memory. Following this, I place heritage sites and museums as public sites for the discursive communication of understandings of a deep past. In doing so, the joint role of affect, discourse, and memory are drawn together.

‘Acts of cultural remembering’, according to Erll (2011: 13), ‘seem to be an element of humans’ fundamental anthropological make-up, and the history of creating shared heritage

and thinking about memory can be traced all the way back to antiquity'. Where Erll illustrates this through reference to Homer, Plato and Aristotle, this can be taken back further. Let us consider, for example, the megalithic temple structures of Neolithic Malta. These structures, completely unique in form from any contemporary culture, develop in their size, intricacy and shape as they are gradually constructed over a period of more than a millennium. In addition, the unique architecture of the temples is mirrored in subterranean burial chambers, themselves seemingly used for hundreds of years. The relevance of this brief aside is in the transgenerational transmission of cultural practices necessary for this long development of unique cultural forms. The construction of these temples, particularly those that show multiple phases of construction, would have lasted far beyond individual life expectancy. The continuity implies a degree of transgenerational communication of practice in a way that fosters a continuity of use and a continuity of collective identity. It implies a collective understanding of and reference to past actions, in a manner which makes sense of actions taken in the present and provides a vision for the future. We build these temples because our predecessors began building them, and we shall continue to build them because we have a vision of their completion. This does not, however, imply static, homogenous cultural transmission. Those same temples show a gradual altering of design practices across centuries. Such transmission of cultural memory does not negate new generations adapting those memories and practices for their own purposes.

The origins of cultural memory studies come in a similar desire to research and develop a knowledge of collective reference to the past. The field is seen as emerging initially in the 1920s, particularly through Maurice Halbwachs' work on *mémoire collective*. Halbwachs' work served to expand our conception of memory beyond the realm of the individual. He concluded that 'we should hence renounce the idea that the past is itself preserved within individual memories as if from these memories there had been gathered as many distinct proofs as there are individuals' (Halbwachs 1992: 173). The past, and our collective, social understanding of the past exists not within each individual memory, but rather in the communication and dissemination of those memories. 'Social thought', he goes on to say, 'is essentially a memory and [...] its entire content consists only of collective recollections or remembrances' (Halbwachs 1992: 189). The past permeates into memory, and is 'transported into a teaching, a notion, or a symbol and takes on a meaning. It becomes an element of the society's system of ideas.' (Halbwachs 1992: 188). The permeation of the

past into social collective memory, for Halbwachs, comes through communication and language. 'It is language, and the whole system of social conventions attached to it, that allows us at every moment to reconstruct our past.' (Halbwachs 1992: 173). Here, Halbwachs not only draws connection between the individual and collective memory, but also draws attention to the central role of communicative practice as a route by which memory can move from the individual to the collective.

Although finding a limited audience at the time, Halbwachs work proved influential on the further development of cultural memory studies from the 1980s (Erll 2011: 22-3), and from upon the 'memory boom' (Huysen 1995) that followed. This renewal of a focus upon collective, social or cultural memory came initially through Pierre Nora's vast, seven-volume work *Les Lieux de Mémoire* (English translations Nora 1996-98, Nora 2001-10). Nora, like Halbwachs before him, took a clear delineation between *history* and *memory* as a foundational point. For Halbwachs, this was a divide between objective, neutral, 'written' history and the 'evaluative and hierarchical' aspects of 'lived' memory (Erll 2011: 17-18). Nora went further, suggesting that history and memory exist in 'fundamental opposition', 'stretched to [a] convulsive limit' (Nora 1989: 8). Nora argues that 'history is perpetually suspicious of memory, and its true mission is to suppress and destroy it' (Nora 1989: 9). Because history stands in opposition to memory, the development of a 'fundamentally historical sensibility' – that is the expansion of our use of history, as understood by Nora – results in the loss of memory. As a result, we begin to give greater focus to memory precisely 'because there is so little of it left' (Nora 1989: 7).

Consequently, Nora introduces his notion of *lieux de mémoire*, sites of memory, in place of '*milieux de mémoire*, real environments of memory' (ibid.). Memory is found within memorials, specific sites, and places of commemoration, rather than as something lived and living. So, for example, memory for Nora would be found at the Magna Carta memorial (Chapter 5), or at the commemorative procession to 1683 at Kahlenberg, Vienna (Chapter 7). Across the seven volumes, Nora asserts that everything from food culture to language, Joan of Arc to street names, can be considered as *lieux de mémoire* in France (Nora 1996; 1997, see also Olick 2007; Erll 2011). For Olick, this raises a question on what is *not a lieu de mémoire*. Nora's work has acted as a stepping point from which cultural memory studies scholars have developed the field further (see Erll 2011, Assmann 2011, Olick 2007, Huysen 1995). However, the split between history and memory that he proposes has been heavily critiqued. Astrid Erll (2011: 25) in particular notes that the

assertion of such a split between memory and history is expressed almost concurrently with discussions of the mnemonic processes involved in writing history. What Erll recognises, in a manner which is given little attention by Nora, is the ambiguity of history. The writing of history will be influenced by the personal and historical context of those who write it, and the memories that any writer or historian experiences will impact upon the account they choose to give. Memory is always a part of the construction of history.

In taking memory and history as interwoven, the view of our perception of time, and by association history, as non-linear is strengthened. Samuel (2012: 29) writes that memory may be viewed as ‘the very antithesis of written history’, in part as it ‘has no developmental sense of time’. However, rather than suggesting that this places memory in opposition to history, Samuel instead argues that history itself is a ‘social form of knowledge’ (2012: 30). For Samuel, to study history is to focus upon the full breadth of ‘activities and practices’ within which history emerges. It is a concern with ‘past-present relations’, through which popular memory plays a central role. Popular memory, then, is found in the landscape, in myth and legend, folklore and music. It is littered throughout the world we interact with in everyday lives. These interactions with popular memory contribute to our understanding of the past and to that social knowledge of history.

Whilst Samuel articulates his view of history in opposition to the close reading of select texts that he argues characterises the work of historiographers such as Hayden White, I do not cast aside White’s consideration of historical narratives (i.e. White 1987). Taking history as a social construction, or social form of knowledge, continues to view history in terms of a story of the past, whilst refuting a linear developmental perception of history. While I talk of narrative, I do not necessarily talk in terms of linearity. If we consider, for example, David Mitchell’s *Cloud Atlas*, we can see where narrative forms can be broken apart and reshaped in forms that do not subscribe to the linearity of a start, middle and end. In *Cloud Atlas*, a series of interconnected stories seem to be taking us from past, through present, to future. The story, however, turns on a central pivot, before moving backwards through time as the story continues to develop. Alternatively, Iain Banks’ *The Bridge* follows a narrative structure inspired by the physical structure of the Forth Rail Bridge. Neither *The Bridge* nor *Cloud Atlas* provide what might be considered a clear start and end point. Their stories shift, wrap around and fold in on themselves. They do, however, provide a narrative for the reader to hook in to, simply a narrative that is not linear.

Histories, too, may provide us with narratives that are not linear, but are nonetheless narratives through which we can find meaning and relevance.

Returning to Halbwachs' definitions of history, autobiographical memory, historical memory, and collective memory, Olick (2007) and Erll (2011) find further cause to understanding collective memory in a manner which allows for the closer entanglement of memory and history. Within this framework, autobiographical memory refers to events that have been experienced by the individual in question, while historical memory is that which we know of through the historical record. History is the past to which there is no living connection, and collective memory is the aspects of the past that influence our identity (Olick 2007: 20). As Olick recognises, these aspects of history and memory are not entirely separable but will overlap with each other. It also seems to become apparent that, despite his assertion of a divide between history and memory, Halbwachs does recognise that aspects of each of these forms of memory and history serve to play a role in the construction of identities, a connection that is somewhat lost within Nora's work (Erll 2011: 23). Indeed, through this overlap between history and memory we can begin to examine the role that each play on the development of personal and collective identity.

## **2.5 Identity, History and Memory**

When viewing history and memory as in a constant relationship with each other, one where both act upon each other in a continuous cycle of reconstruction, the relationship between both and the formation of identities becomes clearer. Geoffrey Cubitt (2007) introduces the concept of *scaffolding* when discussing the role of elders in passing on memories to younger generations. Parents and grandparents, he suggests, provide a knowledge of the child's younger years, and indeed of their family prior to their birth, that helps to build a framework within which the child's identity can form. History and memory can offer such scaffolding not only for our individual identity, but also the development of a form of social identity. In our brief example of the Maltese temples earlier, this scaffolding is illustrated through the continuing construction of grand structures of a similar form over numerous generations. In the analysis to follow, learned memories of 1215 and 1683 act as scaffolding for new political uses of these pasts. Each new generation does not simply act in isolation, but rather is constrained by the affordances of the society and the environment (Gibson 1966) within which they exist. For

Gibson, these affordances are aspects of an environment ‘perceived by an individual and yet independent of the individual’s experience’ (Heft 2017: 136). Affordances of an environment are what they ‘offer’ animals, including humans (Gibson 1977: 68), further arguing that these affordances are static: they do not change as the needs of an observer change (Gibson 1979, cited in Heft 2017). However, in considering affordances of society and environment in combination, I recognise that through technological developments or changes in the environment, new affordances develop, or affordances shift. We can see this in Gibson’s own example, where the post-box is taken as an example of an item whose affordance does not change: it affords the act of posting a letter. Gibson suggests that ‘everyone above the age of six knows what it is for and where the nearest one is’ (Gibson 1979, cited in Heft 2017: 136). But the affordance of posting a letter is the result of the development of an integrated mailing network, and we might ask whether with the advent of digital technologies children will indeed all know where their nearest post-box is. It is also the case that these affordances themselves exist through some understanding of the past, developed and experienced through history and memory. For members of a given society, the affordances that they place upon certain objects will be shaped not only by the physical attributes of that object, those static features articulated by Gibson, but also by what is perceived to be the affordances of those objects. The limits of these perceptions echo the learned limitations of one’s habitus, as discussed above.

This relationship between history and memory contributes to the inherent ambiguity of history. That ambiguity is compounded by our malleable and changeable interaction with memory. It is tempting, and perhaps even essential for our mental wellbeing, to place trust in our own memories. Indeed, the weight that we attach to our own memories is revealed in stark fashion when it fails us. Illnesses such as Alzheimer’s disease are thought of with a fear as they are seen to entail a loss of self. This fear of memory loss is compellingly articulated in Kazuo Ishiguro’s 2015 novel *The Buried Giant*. The novel walks the borders between historical fiction and fantasy, following the story of elderly couple Axl and Beatrice on a journey in search of their son, but drawing upon Arthurian myth (through the appearance of the now elderly knight of King Arthur, Sir Gawain) and fantasy figures of ogres and dragons. The core of the novel, however, is one of fear of memory loss. Amnesia exists not on an individual level, but seemingly as a fog which has covered Britain. Axl and Beatrice appear to be in search of a son they had forgotten. Even God, it is suggested, seems to have amnesia. The loss of memory, particularly the potential loss of



memories of love for Axl and Beatrice, pervades the novel with a foreboding and fear, a sense of the unknown. There is a fear of separation as Axl and Beatrice approach death, illustrated through the figure of a boatman transporting people to an island of death. To travel together, a couple must convince the boatman of their devotion. Failure risks separation, with one half of the couple left on the shore. How can one make sense of a life of love and devotion if those memories are shrouded in fog? The darkness that Ishiguro draws upon is founded in our fear of a loss of memory and, therefore, a loss of ourselves and the connections by which we identify ourselves. Ishiguro articulates this fear not through explicit language, but through the development of an atmosphere of amnesia. The fog over Britain is not individualised, it is discussed as something which encompasses the entire world of the two central characters. The anxiety and fear that are carried in this fog are therefore not individualised but seen as something at least in part external to these characters. Physical injuries that the couple incur are personal, but this amnesia is collective. Ishiguro constructs an affective atmosphere, where the loss of memory moves beyond the individual body.

That fear reinforces the weight which we give to our own memory, despite memory constantly adapting and changing over time (Lowenthal 2015: 304-5). We will constantly, subconsciously reshape those memories to fit the narrative that makes most sense at the time of recall. The memories of our peers and elders will similarly be constantly reshaped. Such memories are not objective and do not recall a previous reality, but instead are heavily influenced by the cultural context within which the remembering is taking place (Erlil 2011: 7). Therefore, the scaffold upon which we construct our personal identity from a young age is itself constructed from memories that are inherently inaccurate. This does not make our identity feel any less legitimate or real. It simply reflects how our identities are shaped and how they change through time. Our identities, like our memories, will constantly shift to best fit current circumstances and will be influenced by relationships with others and with the past (Booth 2006). This does not negate the fact that memory is essential to our formation of identity. Memory, like history, exists with ambiguity. It too impacts us on an affective level.

While the role of social and cultural memory has been foregrounded here, the role of the individual should not be taken as entirely subsumed within collective mnemonic processes. Individual agency remains at the core of the distribution of collective memory and societal understandings of the past. This link between the collective and the individual draws us

back to discussions of discourse as an historically dependent social structure and to Bourdieu's habitus. Bourdieu argued that actions were influenced by certain predispositions learned over time. The memories that are developed, both on an individual and societal level, can be viewed as a part of this habitus. These memories will shape the choices that we make, or even the choices that we can imagine are possible to make. However, as with habitus, this does not mean that we do not retain some agency over our use of these memories. The same paradox that exists in habitus, between socially ingrained constraints and individual agency, exists in the ambiguity of our interaction with memory. Memories contribute to the construction of our identity, but are concurrently shifting, constantly being recreated to suit our present narrative. Discourse that engages with or uses memories or the past is itself historically dependent and exists as the outcome of historical social conditions. However, counter-discourses remain possible (Moussa and Scapp 1996). These counter discourses can reshape understandings of the past, and in doing so shape discursive possibilities in the present.

In the shaping and reshaping of memories, the role of the collective and individual memory combine. These different levels of mnemonic practice remain intertwined. There is a circular theoretical issue with our understanding of memory, as Jeffrey Olick identifies, in that 'there is no individual memory without societal experience, nor is there any collective memory without individuals participating in communal life.' (2007: 34). When focusing upon the role of historical moments from a deeper past, such as 1215 or 1683, on society in the present, the role of memory on both an individual and collective level comes in to play. Individual and collective understandings continue to act in tandem. The mnemonic practices and processes discussed here are not reducible to the individual, but nor should a collective be considered without a consideration of its individual components. As we shall see in Chapter 3, this is mirrored in the analytical framework of the assemblage. Key to this relational network of mnemonic practices is the role of the heritage site and museum. These are sites where cultural memory and affect emerge in combination.

## **2.6 Museums, Memory and Affect**

That fear of the loss of memory is reflected in a fear that the deeper past might somehow be lost. Lowenthal (2015: 55) believes that 'we crave its recovery'. He asks 'is there no

way to recapture, re-experience, relive it? Some agency, some mechanism, some faith must let us know, see, sense the past.’ (ibid.) This desire to know the past, to sense it in a manner that museums and heritage sites cannot reach (Lowenthal 2015: 63), is at the heart of our creative obsession with time travel. Museums and heritage sites will provide us with the content through which to construct ‘hallucinations’ (Nora 1989: 17) of the past. Nora argues that these hallucinations are only made possible by the impossibility of the task of recapturing the past. We long to travel back in time through gaining a real understanding of the past, even though this is not possible. Nora’s choice of language draws attention to the power of this desire. It is beyond a daydream or longing, in ‘hallucinating’ it seems to be an impact that is beyond our control. This reinforces the power of discourse in heritage sites and museums. That they will always fall short of fulfilling our desire to fully experience the past does not lessen their impact, as the narratives they present allow us to hallucinate. Lowenthal touches here upon the authority and affective power with which the museum or heritage site, as a place that seeks to offer us some mechanism to know or sense the past, is imparted.

In relics of the past, Lowenthal finds the connection between memory and history (Lowenthal 2015: 401). ‘As the past recedes from us’, he argues, ‘we re-voke it by multiplying paraphernalia *about* it [...] and by preserving and rehabilitating its relics’ (Lowenthal 2015: 410). The development of the museum from the 17<sup>th</sup> century (see Bennett 1995) is an expression of this desire to preserve relics of the past. However, history and memory are, as we have seen above, ambiguous and constantly shifting, they are not fixed. Drawing history and memory together within the heritage site or museum does not halt this movement, but rather adds another layer of movement and change to them. Each interaction with the past, each time our knowledge of the past is remediated, that past is altered, either consciously or unconsciously (Lowenthal 2015: 411). With this in mind, the late twentieth-century ‘heritage boom’ (Harrison 2013) can be considered to represent an increase in that remediation and further movement of the past. Harrison views this ‘heritage-boom’ as being concurrent to the growth of memory studies, particularly in Europe (2013: 167-169). This ‘memory boom’ (Huyssen 1995; 2003; Rossington and Whitehead 2007) is viewed by Harrison as emerging from the post-war compulsion to not forget the past atrocities of the Holocaust and World War II. Huyssen (2003, cited by Harrison 2013: 198) suggests that the ‘obsession’ with forgetfulness is the result of the Holocaust indicating the ‘failure of the enlightenment project’, a disillusionment that broke

down a sense of human progress. The heritage and memory boom and the associated expansion of collective nostalgia (Lowenthal 2015) is an affective response to the trauma of the Holocaust. A collective emotional response to that trauma leads to a compulsion to remember the past. This is shown most visibly in the use of the statement ‘Never Again’ in Holocaust remembrance. Remembering supposedly ensures that past traumas are not repeated. More broadly, this reminds us that museums and heritage sites can act as affective communicators of, and responders to, public understandings of the past.

To view museums and heritage sites as unconscious remediators of the past would be inaccurate. Museums have long been conceptualised as institutions, either directly run by the government or enlisted by governments at arm’s length, which have the power to not only inform but also to discipline a populace, in a Foucauldian sense. Tony Bennett has argued this case in detail in *The Birth of the Museum* (1995), suggesting that museums were institutions that had the power to ‘discipline’ individuals towards acting in concordance with an established elite’s’ vision of society. The museum here is not a unique development, a discrete technology of control – indeed Foucault did not offer any significant analysis of the museum institution himself (Hetherington 2013: 21). Rather, Bennett suggests that museums should be ‘envisaged as functioning alongside a veritable battery of new cultural technologies for this purpose’ (Bennett 1995: 21). In Foucault’s work these technologies of discipline would be taken to include the factory, school, hospital and modern prison (Foucault 1977). Articulating the circular and all-encompassing nature of his notion of discipline in modern societies, Foucault asks: ‘is it surprising that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons?’ (Foucault 1977: 228). Foucault is not speaking purely of architecture here, but rather of the functioning of these institutions as places of surveillance and judgement. These institutions are ‘apparatus’ of the state, in terminology borrowed from Louis Althusser (1971), where individuals’ behaviour and actions are moderated through the potential of negative judgement. As discussed above, they are institutions which exert a power which makes subjects and subjugates them.

This notion is developed through the metaphor of Bentham’s panopticon – a prison complex where an outer circle of prison cells can each be viewed from a central tower<sup>4</sup>. In

---

<sup>4</sup> While a prison complex with a design very close to Bentham’s was built in the 1920s – the Presidio Modelo in Cuba – Foucault refers only to the Bentham design in a conceptual sense rather than any existing buildings.

such a complex a large number of prisoners could be kept under surveillance by a minimal number of guards, as for each prisoner there would exist the possibility of being watched at any given time, even if this could not be verified. For Foucault, there exists a related sense of the possibility of being observed in other state institutions, the potential that we are being observed by ‘the teacher-judge, the doctor-judge, the educator-judge, the ‘social worker’-judge’ (Foucault 1977: 304) serves to modify our behaviour in these institutions. For Bennett, this process also occurs within the development of the modern museum – a development which occurs broadly at the same time, in the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth century, as the development of the institutions Foucault focuses upon. The museum becomes an institution that, depending on the viewpoint taken, acts to ‘lift the level of popular taste’ and encourage an industrious society, or simply to display power to the general populace (Bennett 1995: 23-24). In each instance the museum becomes an institution where ‘civilized forms of behaviour might be learnt’ (Bennett 1995: 24) and spread among the wider society (see also Duncan and Wallach 1980; Hooper-Greenhill 1992).

More recently, Macdonald (2013) has developed this notion with regard to the influence that museums might play in creating an imagined sense of belonging to a nation state. For Macdonald, the narratives presented in the museum are key to the development of an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1983). While Macdonald often gives reference to a localised imagined community – such as that present in the Hebridean rural communities of the Isle of Skye (Macdonald 2013: 155) or the Basque regions of northern Spain and south western France (Macdonald 2013: 134) – the sense of belonging that is created in these cases is applicable to the imagined community of the nation state conceptualised by Anderson (1983). This belonging is built upon notions of and acts to reassert ‘difference and independence’ (Macdonald 2013: 155). I contend that the construction of this sense of belonging must also be built upon the five elements of belonging detailed by Guibernau (2013, Table 2.1). This is a belonging built upon psychological, historical, cultural, territorial and political means, with each element adding to the sense of a shared group identity. Additionally, this belonging is a mnemonic and affective experience. The mnemonic role of the museum, as an institution which deals with the past, is clear. So too is the role of the museum as a mediator and communicator of historical knowledge. The affective role of museums, less so.

<b>Psychological</b>	Belonging, closeness, particularly important when presented against a common enemy, or at times of conflict.
<b>Historical</b>	Selective use of history to build collective memory, connecting to an ‘extended family’ of ancestors, evoking a past which makes citizens of this nation ‘superior’.
<b>Cultural</b>	A recognition of symbols, such as rituals, flags, particular imagery.
<b>Territorial</b>	Shared spaces, often perceived as providing nourishment to citizens.
<b>Political</b>	Common values, or at least a sense of common values.
<b>Table 2.1 Five Elements of Belonging (from Guibernau 2013: 125 – 128)</b>	

Viewing museums and heritage sites as ‘sites of and for emotion’ (Bozoğlu 2020) and sites of affect and emotion (Tolia-Kelly, Waterton & Watson 2017) has become more frequent in recent years. This ‘groundswell’ (Tolia-Kelly, Waterton & Watson 2017: 1) follows an earlier ‘affective turn’ in the wider humanities (Clough 2008; Clough and Halley 2007). Intersections between affect and heritage have been found within historical re-enactment (McCalman and Pickering 2010), in archaeological studies of senses (Hamilakis 2014; Skeates 2010) and in work on memory and place (De Nardi et al. 2019). Bozoğlu’s (2020) work takes a lead, as I have done above, from Wetherell’s construction of affect and emotion. Where Bozoğlu builds upon Wetherell to focus upon visitors’ emotions within museums, here I focus on the role of these affective interactions with pasts beyond museums. Bozoğlu’s work compellingly demonstrates that visitors will interact affectively with information presented in museums. In the analysis below, I consider then how such interactions with particular heritage discourses contributes to continued affective interactions with pasts.

As we shall see in Chapter 3, this is intimately connected to my view of the *moving moment* through an assemblage lens. Bozoğlu takes care to ensure that emotion is not reduced solely to individual experience. In referring to the ‘affective atmosphere’ of museums, she shows that the affective role of the museum is constructed from both the ‘emotive nature and prompts’ of exhibits and the manner in which visitors engage with those prompts emotionally by way of past ‘emotional regimes’ (2020: 5). Individual experiences of emotion, therefore, become more than individual as they engage with the discursive prompts in the museum. Individual experiences feed into the collective affective atmosphere of these spaces. Visitors to museums and the museums themselves emerge as

bodies with the capacity to affect and be affected. Each piece of information displayed, communicative text presented, heritage site visited, and individual interacting with these sites is viewed as having affective capacity, each offering the potential to impact the other affectively.

The affective potential of museum and heritage sites is further illuminated by a consideration of the processes by which the past is communicated through such sites. Macdonald (2012; 2013) views the act of giving the past relevance in the present as a process of ‘past-presencing’. This is a process that could be deliberate, as we see in some political discourse below, or habitual, as we might consider to be the case when we interact with discourse which relates to the past. A political speech which refers to Magna Carta, for example, might be viewed as a deliberate act of past-presencing, with explicit political goals. The reference to the same historical moment by a supporter of the RWP party Lega in Italy, conversely, might be viewed as more habitual (see section 5.2). When we interact with pasts in museums or heritage sites we are being asked by these displays to make those pasts alive in the present through giving them relevance to our experience of the present. Relevance that we attach to pasts as we interact with them in the present will always be informed by the context within which we engage in this interaction. Our understandings within the present impact upon how we interact with these pasts while concurrently those pasts will shift our understandings of ourselves in the present. Macdonald (2012) recognises that these processes are themselves heavily affective.

She also acknowledges that these processes of past-presencing are not always equal in labour. Some histories may be a part of our historical consciousness to the degree that the act of past-presencing can be a process of habit, ingrained in our habitus to return to Bourdieu’s language. However, other moments, or parts of histories, will be hidden and require greater labour to bring to the present. Macdonald (2013: 33), for example, notes that her own experience of reading primary sources and other historical materials has given her a greater understanding of the selective presentation of the past in accounts of Scottish Highland history. This knowledge allowed her to see subtleties in these historical accounts, or to see what was being omitted, silenced in a museum display (see Mason and Sayner 2019). There is extensive labour involved in MacDonald’s viewing of these less visible parts of history, including but not limited to academic training and access to primary sources. This is not a level of labour that museums might ask of visitors. The knowledge of pasts that, therefore, might become most easily ‘past-presented’ for a visitor might be that

which is already a part of our historical consciousness, or that which can be more easily connected to issues in the present.

In Chapters 4 and 5 we can see how this might operate in the example of the presentation of Magna Carta at museums and heritage sites. There is an extensive foregrounding of the idea of Magna Carta as a symbol of fairness and equality under law. It is often presented as a foundational document for international ideas of justice and human rights. At Salisbury Cathedral we see these ideas connected to global fights for justice, in particular protests during the Arab Spring uprising in 2011. At Runnymede, this symbolic notion of justice is linked by way of a physical memorial to the values of the American Bar Association. Lincoln Castle references the clauses that are still in law today. Less present are discussions of the failures of the document, or disputes over its relevance. Hidden entirely might be the role of Magna Carta's clauses on Jewish people and the role that they played in a long increase in anti-Semitism in the United Kingdom (Roman 2014). These nuances, or omitted histories, will only feature in any action of past-presencing for those who have undertaken previous labour to gain this knowledge. For most, past-presencing that takes place will be focused upon central themes of justice and fairness.

In addition, knowledge of the past as presented in museums is done so with a degree of authority. Bennett (1995) and Lowenthal (2015) recognise the political power contained within the museum, the power to influence or discipline the public. This influence on the public is further mediated by what Laurajane Smith (2006) describes as museum and heritage sites' tendency to present an AHD. Through the presentation of an AHD, museums and heritage sites can be seen to uphold dominant understandings of national pasts and identities. The mass expansion of heritage sites and museums in the 'heritage boom' is seen through Smith's work as emerging in tandem with a formalisation of heritage processes through charters such as the 1972 United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) World Heritage Convention (Smith 2006: 95). The belonging that is presented to us in these sites is viewed as reconfirming existing dominant structures. The political implications of this are made more tangible through our interaction with the affective communication of a sense of belonging. In communicating the past affectively, museums and heritage sites do not only communicate an historical or cultural sense of belonging, but they add to the psychological aspect of belonging through communicating a sense of shared identity.



We may wish to question the importance of an AHD to the development of political viewpoints. For example, will supporters of Stephen Yaxley-Lennon (see Chapter 5) be likely to visit the heritage sites discussed in the same chapter? Will the far-right bloggers who discuss the 1683 Siege of Vienna be likely to visit the Wien Museum, Karlsplatz (see Chapters 6 & 7)? These are not questions that I seek to explicitly answer. I focus instead upon the presence of a dominant understanding of the past within political discourse that echoes what might be found in an AHD. These are instances where an AHD is not contained within official heritage settings, but has a presence within a wider digitally-integrated public sphere (see Chapter 3). When such an understanding of the past has a ubiquity within this public sphere, these pasts may be more easily mobilised affectively in the construction of group belonging and a confidence in engaging in political action.

The role of the museum in communicating a sense of belonging to an imagined community (see above) should be viewed with affective capacities in mind. Guibernau (2013) recognises that a sense of belonging is a key driver of a confidence to engage in political action. In presenting knowledge of the past in a manner which can engage visitors in some sense of belonging, museums and heritage sites are – whether consciously or not – engaging in work that can add to those visitors’ confidence to engage in political action. Bennett, Lowenthal, Smith and others recognise this political role of the museum. The strength of that political role of the museum is such that Lowenthal views all efforts to preserve the past as ‘suffused with other purposes, openly avowed or subconsciously held, but usually passionately denied’ (Lowenthal 2015: 496). This denial could allow museum or heritage site personnel to absolve themselves of responsibility for political uses of the pasts they display. However, it is my contention here that such use of the past is inescapable. In addition, the affective and authoritative power of knowledge communicated through museums or heritage sites gives greater responsibility to such sites to acknowledge such uses of the past. The extent to which this is the case, and the continuing role of the museum and heritage site, is questioned through the case studies below.

## **2.7 Affect, Memory, History and Heritage: An Assemblage**

This chapter has outlined a conception of the past as mobile. History is viewed as ambiguous, memory as subjective and shifting, heritage discourse as remediating pasts,

and affect as an ever-present feature of each of the above. In the following chapter, these elements of uses of the past are brought together within the notion of the assemblage. That is, a conglomeration of bodies (in a broad view taken to include a range of media, individuals, collectives, texts, heritage sites, objects and more) each with a capacity to exert an influence upon each other. In doing so, these constantly mobile and affecting pasts are placed within a framework that allows us to engage critically with their use in the present.

Lowenthal (2015: 411) asks if we can ‘trust a past in constant flux, alterable by accident or evolution or at will?’ This question is, as Lowenthal realises, largely arbitrary, as whether we can or cannot trust the past is secondary to the fact that we instinctively attach ideas of our identity, personal or collective, to that past. The *trustworthiness* of the past does not enter that equation. Through the course of this work I instead ask: what are the lived political outcomes of the trust we place in an ambiguous past? What does the weight we give to these moving pasts mean in the present? How does that impact on personal and collective political action? This chapter has outlined the manner with which these pasts arrive in the present. In the next chapter I set out the analytical and methodological toolkit used to answer these questions.

## Chapter 3

### **Analysing *Moving Moments*: Assemblage and the Public Sphere**

Historical moments like the 1215 sealing of Magna Carta and the 1683 breaking of the Siege of Vienna emerge across a plurality of spaces. In the coming chapters I discuss their presence within museums, within urban and rural landscapes, on smart phones, in newspapers, political manifesto, and in the murky world of far-right blogs. Despite the ambiguity of historical moments, an ambiguity which imbues them with a mobility and allows them to be used in political discourse, these moments emerge in tangible forms. The moments find meaning at particular times, through particular media, and in particular spaces. The notion of the *moving moment* presents a methodological challenge as it requires a tracking of inherently ambiguous histories as they move. These movements are plural. It is a temporal movement, as historic moments are activated in the present. There is spatial movement, as moments are given grounding in particular spaces, both physical and digital. There is affective movement, where moments, by design or otherwise, instigate an emotional response, and there is the movement to political action that this affective quality facilitates.

This chapter sets out the methodological approaches that I use as a means of engaging with the two case study movements as they move. I do so by developing the epistemological approach I take to understanding the social framework within which these moments move. Firstly, I offer a deeper focus upon *moving moments* as relational. I do so by considering these moments as part of an assemblage (Chidgey 2018; Reading 2016). Reading (2016: 9) recognises that viewing memory as assemblage allows for a tracking of ‘complex [...] characteristics’ that arise from ‘the fusion of digitisation and globalisation’. In this instance, viewing *moving moments* as assemblage reveals complex characteristics that come from a fusion of the digital and analogue, political discourse and heritage discourse, the ambiguous and the affective, within a globalised, digitally-integrated public sphere.

The chapter is built upon a discussion of the assemblage, and the public sphere, to provide a working definition of the digitally-integrated public sphere, and the *moving moment*. As this position is developed, I detail elements of a methodological toolkit used through the course of the research. I adopt a position common to proponents of CDA, such as Ruth Wodak, Teun Van Dijk and Norman Fairclough, that takes theory as determined by the

practicalities of research (Weiss and Wodak 2007: 2). The methodology is intimately linked to theory. Therefore, while this chapter does introduce the methodological toolkit it is not solely a discussion of methodology. Rather, it refers to how we might theorise the social spaces across which these moments traverse and how we can study them at the points where, to borrow again from Sara Ahmed (2004), they stick.

### **3.1 *Moving Moments* as Assemblage**

What is to be gained by viewing *moving moments* as constituent parts of complex assemblages? Both Reading (2016) and Chidgey (2018) have applied assemblage methodologies to memory and gender, and feminist memory, respectively. Chidgey suggests that the use of an assemblage framework ‘decentres the privileged focus on narrative and identity which organises wider social movement treatments of collective memory’ (2018: 41). This methodological approach encourages the movement of focus away from centres of power and privilege, allowing for an equal focus upon potentially marginalised aspects of collective memory cultures.

This work, however, is not about gender. Nor is it a thesis that is directly about race, class, sexuality, or dis/ability. Indeed, as the first two chapters have shown, this thesis uses narrative approaches to memory. It focuses on questions of British and European identity and does not deal explicitly with marginalised voices. However, the assemblage approach facilitates integrating an activist perspective into the research methodologies. Doing so opens the analysis to discussions of issues such as racism and the performative use of gender. This builds upon Rigney’s (2018) model of memory activism, but also incorporates an acknowledgement of my own political standpoint within the methodological approach. In Chidgey’s work, her ‘toolkit for Assemblage Memory’ allows for a movement of ‘the discussion of feminist activist memory away from the bounded page or screen, and out of the archive, and put in messy collision with the social world’ (Chidgey 2018: 41). The methods adopted here are designed to allow activist uses of the past to similarly be moved away from the constraints of the museum, archive, heritage site, or page, and similarly placed into a messy, complex relationship with the social world.

The assemblage, as it is seen in Deleuze and Guattari’s *A Thousand Plateaus* (1980), is a connected system of bodies existing in relation to each other, effecting and affecting each

other to varying degrees. In Chidgey's toolkit, the assemblage is seen as consisting 'of expressive content (signs and signifying systems) and materiality (affects, technologies, objects and embodiments), which move through different thresholds and shifting relations to each other' (2018: 42). The assemblage brings together the affective, mnemonic and discursive (see Chapter 2), as the materiality of each element is recognised. In the analysis of uses of Magna Carta, for example, this encourages mnemonic uses of Magna Carta, discursive representations of the historical moment, and affective responses to its usage to each be considered as acting relationally upon each other. It also draws in the discursive systems, those signs and signifying systems, to which CDA (see below) gives a greater focus. It does so in a manner which does not by necessity place any part of the assemblage above another, but rather sees them by way of their interactions with each other. Assemblages equally are not static but open themselves to transformation (Deleuze and Guattari 1980). The assemblage, then, is open to movement and change.

Bodies within an assemblage – as we shall see through the course of this thesis – move spatially and temporally. Assemblages themselves are also 'mobilised' by memory agents' (Reading 2016: 48), where those agents can be individual actors (such as an individual blogger using references to Siege of Vienna to promote Islamophobic views, as we see in Chapter 7), through to larger collectives (i.e. a political group taking part in a commemorative march for the Siege of Vienna). These assemblages also include non-human actors, which in the cases below include, but are my no means limited to, the cathedrals and museums that hold copies of Magna Carta, the copies of Magna Carta themselves, technological components which allow for online communication, blogging platforms, items of Ottoman loot, Viennese coffee shops, and the physical properties of Kahlenberg (outside Vienna) as a landscape. This reasserts that the agency that allows a *moving moment* to develop is diffused throughout an assemblage, where components act in 'concert' (Chidgey 2018: 42), with different components rising to the fore or diffusing into the background at different points in time. Human action, here, is not the sole driver of the assemblage. The assemblage, as Chidgey recognises above, also recognises the role of bodies that move us emotionally, that engage in affect. Importantly, the assemblage toolkit also gives focus to the capacity of an assemblage, or bodies within an assemblage, to precipitate an action within other bodies. So, when considering activist uses of the past, or mnemonic activist practices, the assemblage toolkit recognises that the bodies we give focus to within a given assemblage have an inherent capacity to impact other bodies and

instigate action in other bodies. Therefore, each of the uses of the past discussed through this work is viewed as containing the capacity to instigate some sort of political action.

My reference to the assemblage substantially echoes that of Macdonald (2013), who notes that her conception of the European Memory Complex shows distinct similarities to the assemblage. The memory complex is viewed as ‘an assemblage of practices, affects and physical things, which includes such parts as memorial services, nostalgia and historical artefacts.’ (2013: 6). Macdonald suggests that this allows for a better understanding of individual components of the memory complex or assemblage, and also the processes that make certain practices ‘durable’. However, Macdonald moves away from referring specifically to the assemblage, in favour of the memory complex. This, she notes, is as she is concerned with ‘the specific constellation of the memory phenomenon in Europe’, rather than what she suggests are the ‘more general characterisations’ to which assemblage theory is often concerned, primarily focused upon grander ontological questions of complexity, as shown for example in posthuman theory.

*Moving moments* fall between the two points of complex and assemblage theory. The focus here is on the political use of European pasts and upon spaces where the past and the political collide. However, my concern extends beyond viewing this purely in terms of a European memory phenomenon and seeks to engage with broader concerns regarding political uses of the past, such as the impact of technological change and the role of affective interactions with historical moments. The possibilities of assemblage methodologies are used to allow for the notion of the *moving moment*, with each of its constituent components, to be examined in detail. This approach also allows for an openness to adaptation. The criteria developed for *moving moments* across Chapters 4 – 7, and then detailed in Chapter 8, will emerge from the nuances of the particular assemblages surrounding Magna Carta and the Siege of Vienna. The veracity of these criteria will be furthered by their application to different assemblages.

The assemblage, as a methodological framework, is also one that is open to adapting to the needs of a particular project. This methodological flexibility is essential in work that must react to developing understandings of the *moving moment* as these emerge through the research process. This work not only questions the manner in which the past is being used, but also the influence of digital technologies upon that use of the past, and impact of that technological change upon the capacities of particular actors to instigate political action.

This necessitates consideration of the manner in which digital technologies impact the political landscape within which the *moving moment* exists. The coming section makes use of Habermas' democratic public sphere for this purpose, before suggesting the notion of the digitally integrated public sphere as a means of better understanding political discourse in a technologically connected society.

### **3.2 The Democratic Public Sphere**

Habermas defined the public sphere as 'a realm of our social life in which such a thing as a public opinion can be formed' (Habermas, Lennox and Lennox 1974: 49). He details the emergence of this space, as opposed to a private sphere, in post-enlightenment Western Europe, particularly France, Germany and Britain, with the development of mass media and the increasing access to political life among the public as integral to this emergence. The formation of the Public Sphere was, for Habermas, facilitated in England, not only through the emergence of a political journalism (something he identifies as less present in France prior to the French revolution), but specifically through a political journalism that was facilitated by the presence of England's parliament (Habermas 1962: 67). This is a parliament which is the figurehead institution of a democracy that is often seen as rooted in the Magna Carta in 1215. There exists, therefore, a trace of the development of the public sphere in certain understandings of Magna Carta. The mythical ties between Magna Carta and trial by jury, for example, give Magna Carta a place in the development of a public role in the judiciary. This could be seen as the beginnings of the role of the public sphere and is an association with Magna Carta, which is echoed in the heritage landscape at Runnymede, the location of the apparent first sealing of the document. Here, as we shall see in Chapter 5, one can find a sculpture of twelve chairs, signifying the right to trial by a jury of twelve peers. The histories of the public sphere and Magna Carta can be seen to be intertwined.

The period through which Habermas details the emergence of this public sphere is defined in part by the emergence of 'voices that had hitherto gone unheard' (MacIntyre 2016: 99) and progress towards universal suffrage in the countries in question. The emergence of a political press is explicitly linked to the development of political activism, protest, union movements and suffrage. Even where the political press was slower to emerge, as Habermas suggests was the case in pre-revolutionary France, he still links the use of public

news-sheets by royal officials as a process which ‘unwittingly’ instigated the development of a space for public discourse (Cowans 1999: 136). From its initial place of emergence then, the public sphere is intimately entwined with public political discourse.

This is a feature of the public sphere recognised by critical discourse scholars. Much of the content used within CDA (political speeches, manifestos, news articles, public statements) are themselves foundational media within Habermas’ public sphere. That very lack of a consistent theoretical standpoint itself gives freedom for those who make use of CDA methodologies and apply them to research from a wide range of theoretical perspectives. I view each component of the *moving moment* relationally, as constituent parts of an assemblage. CDA, similarly, seeks to bring a range of theoretical standpoints into a relational dialogue with each other (Fairclough 2005). In this instance theory becomes a practical, relational component of methodological approaches taken, rather than being distinct from research goals. Thus, the application of CDA can itself contribute to the assessment of the changing construction and operation of the public sphere. The focus on the discursive is not separated, for example, from a broader theoretical concern with the impact of digital technologies on political uses of the past.

In focusing upon the role of political discourse, I build upon two further theoretical standpoints. Firstly, I recognise that discursive practices operate within a social system not by being necessarily already a part of that system, but rather by serving to constantly symbolically reproduce that system (Weiss and Wodak 2007: 10). Through the action of producing a piece of discourse, the social conditions which made that position possible are remade. This approach to discourse echoes Bourdieu’s habitus (see Chapter 2), where discursive possibilities are defined by historically (re)produced structures. Secondly, through recognising that discourse is both a production of, and reproducer of, dominant social structures, it follows that CDA is inherently a study of the links between discourse and issues of ideology and power.

As CDA is at its core concerned with linkages between language and power, the approach that I take to textual analysis must be focused upon questioning how a piece of discourse might operate and exert influence in addition to revealing why this may be of interest to those who have produced such discourse. That is, how do these texts reproduce certain power structures or ideological viewpoints and who does that serve? It is a discipline that is, in these terms, concerned with issues of gender (e.g. Wodak 1997), race and national



identity (see below), among others. The analysis of both historical moments below draws a focus to discourses of nationalism and racial power structures. That is, how is Magna Carta used to reassert a national dominance of England or Great Britain and how is the Siege of Vienna used discursively to assert a (white-) Christian dominance within Europe.

This focus upon nationalistic power structures leads to a significant critique of Habermas' conception of the public sphere. Habermas builds a concept of the structure of a politically engaged society upon developments within a limited geographical area (predominantly Germany, France and England). It is a Euro-centric approach which remains evident in his later writing, particularly in his 2003 discussion of a 'European public sphere' (Habermas and Derrida 2003). Habermas sees the emergence of a European identity where citizens of one European nation would regard those from others as 'fundamentally 'one of us'' (Habermas and Derrida 2003: 293). However, the character of that 'us' is unarticulated. This is particularly relevant at this stage as for those who use CDA to delve into the world of nationalistic or racist political discourse (see Wodak 2015; Wodak and Pelinka 2002; Reisigl and Wodak 2005; Van Dijk 1991). Such discourse is frequently characterised by a polarisation of an 'us' in-group against an outside 'other'. Therefore, when Habermas suggests the need to develop a sense of identity based upon being one of us, he implicitly adopts the linguistic tools of nationalist or populist politics.

While Habermas strives to be critical of any ethnocentric biases in his work, particularly in his *Theory of Communicative Action* (Habermas 1984), Delanty notes that a 'residual Eurocentrism still pervades it.' (Delanty 1997: 30). As I seek to critique Anglo- and Euro-centrism in later chapters, it is necessary to recognise these limitations within the work's theoretical underpinnings. Further criticism of Habermas focuses upon his idea that society is governed by a desire for consensus (Markell 1997: 379; also Lyotard 1984; Villa 1992). Discussion and consensus are foregrounded to the exclusion of issues of power (Roberts and Crossley 2004: 11). For some, Habermas work is seen as masculinist and 'constituted on the basis of dominance and exclusion' (Hill and Montag 2000: 10). Aspects of such critique are grounded on a view that Habermas sees progression towards consensus as a 'strong normative claim with respect to the procedures that make agreement possible', rather than 'a weak phenomenological claim with respect to the condition of agreement itself' (Markell 1997: 391). In other words, it is the process of seeking consensus that is key, rather than reaching consensus.

Seeking to overcome legitimate criticism of Habermas' work as Euro-centric and masculinist, the conception of the public sphere used here is further influenced by Hannah Arendt's work on public and private realms. Arendt sees such a division between the private and public realms as a development of the Greek *polis* and the city-state (Arendt 1998: 24), where the political organisation that occurs within the public realm exists in opposition to the realm of home and family. She argues that modern political developments mean that the dividing lines between these spaces are 'entirely blurred' (Arendt 1998: 28). That which was once private seeps into public life, and vice versa. Arendt also offers a link to a consideration of the role of affect. While suggesting that discussing that which can only be experienced privately in public gives those experiences 'a kind of reality which [...] they could never have had before' (Arendt 1998: 50), she also argues that intense feelings such as those of love or pain may lose some of their intensity as they become public. Importantly, Arendt allows for an acknowledgement that emotion, or more pertinently here affect, could traverse those blurred lines between private and public.

Arendt offers a further definition of what constitutes a *public* space. She suggests that a public space is one where 'everything that appears [in this space] can be seen and heard by everybody' (Arendt 1998: 50). This is, as with Habermas notion of consensus, a theoretical absolute rather than something which is expected in practice. It is not the case that every public utterance can be heard by everybody else, but this remains the absolute potential of a public space. Taking the work of Arendt and Habermas in tandem, a working definition of the public sphere can be constructed. The public sphere is a space where communication has the *always* unfulfilled potential to be seen by everybody. It is a space where there is the *often but not always* unfulfilled potential for communication and dialogue which can lead to consensus. It does not exist as separate from private spaces, but rather these spaces exist in relation to each other. As a result of that relationship, that which might be felt most intensely privately can be communicated within the public sphere. Therefore, the role of affect is not held within the private but is involved in communication within the public sphere. Finally, the public sphere itself is impacted by technological developments. This necessitates some focus upon the impact of digital technologies upon the public sphere.

For this purpose, I propose the notion of the *digitally-integrated* public sphere. At the foreground of the notion of digital integration here, rather than a separate 'digital public sphere' or an 'extended' public sphere, is an understanding that digital technologies do not

exist in separation from the analogue. Our actions as mediated by digital platforms are not separate from our actions within something that might be called the 'real' world. Joss Hands powerfully demonstrates the interconnectedness of the digital and the public sphere. He states that:

The intimate relations we have with our gadgets means that personal perspectives can be quantified and turned into data sets of political views, opinions and beliefs, which can be modulated by false or manipulative information introduced into the public sphere. (Hands 2019: 35)

What this illustrates is the level to which the public, private and political become ever more blurred through digital mediation. Those personal perspectives that we make public through these technologies return to us by way of political propaganda within a public sphere. The ever-present nature of these 'gadgets' (Hands 2019) in the lives of a significant portion of people exacerbates this trend. The access we have to publicising those personal viewpoints from anywhere, at any time of day acts in combination with our access to other content, overtly political or otherwise, at any time of day.

This further blurring of boundaries between public and private offers further concurrence with Arendt, as seen above. Arendt goes further in articulating the manner in which the public and private act upon each other. She argues evocatively that 'even the twilight which illuminates our private and intimate lives is ultimately derived from the much harsher light of the public realm' (1998: 51). Through the medium of social media and gadgets such as smart phones, as articulated by Hands, the level to which that harsh light of the public realm illuminates the private seems to have increased significantly. Indeed, we could extend Arendt's analogy, and consider the harsh light of the smartphone. Picture someone waking up in the night, instinctively checking their phone for any messages, or perhaps to have a quick look on Twitter. Within this scene we can imagine the harsh light of the smartphone illuminating the private space. The public bursts into private spaces ever more intensely. Within this scene, the smart phone, the individual, the content they interact with, other producers of that content, each of these becomes a part of an assemblage, acting upon each other, exerting an influence upon each other. The private and the public sphere come together within these assemblages.

### 3.3 Assemblage and the Digitally Integrated Public Sphere

Having set out a desire to consider the *moving moment* as an assemblage, while also considering political discourse within the framework of the digitally integrated public sphere, these two theoretical standpoints must now be brought into cooperation. Chidgey (2018) views the assemblage toolkit as reconstituted for the purposes of each research project which uses it. Similarly, proponents of CDA see their work as being based upon methodological tools which allow a range of theoretical backgrounds to be brought into dialogue (Fairclough 2010). In this instance, the assemblage toolkit is adapted to bring Habermas and Arendt into that dialogue. Doing so allows for characteristics of the assemblage to be brought to the fore, creating a relational approach which seeks to counter tendencies to place dominant voices to the fore. Concurrently, it places those actions within a framework of political discussion and interaction – the digitally integrated public sphere.

For Chidgey (2018: 47) the ‘assemblage perspective is concerned with the conditions, trajectories and forces that bring heterogeneous elements together – questioning how they come to collide, stick and potentially rearrange each other’. The digitally-integrated public sphere does not necessarily highlight the forces and trajectories that bring these elements together, but does provide a conception of the spaces within which elements come together. There is theoretical basis for engagement in political discourse. The assemblage then allows us to expand upon our notion of the elements involved in these interactions within the digitally-integrated public sphere.

Returning to cultural memory, as discussed in Chapter 2, the assemblage provides a bridge between the individual and collective. While I focus upon two specific historical moments, Chidgey (2018: 49) recognises that ‘memory is not held in an object or site’ but rather is produced through time, by a variety of actors. Each museum display, political speech, monument, or tweet discussed later in this thesis itself draws in a range of actors and mnemonic practices, each of which is a component of the assemblage. In the same manner that an assemblage is constantly in transformation, so too are cultural memories constantly remediated (Basu and Bijl 2009). Where Reading (2016) made use of assemblage approaches to reveal ‘complex gendered characteristics arising from the fusion of digitisation and globalisation’, the assemblage here reveals elements of the operation of *moving moments*. Tracing these assemblages as composed of related elements that impact

upon each other is intended to reveal particular characteristics of the manner with which nationalistic discourse and historical moments coalesce and diverge through traditional and digital media. Through this analytical process, particular temporal, spatial, affective and political movements of the two historical moments studied are illuminated.

Following potential *moving moments* as complex assemblages of individual components allows for a multi-layered analysis of the numerous movements present. As discussed in the introduction, these movements are considered to be temporal, spatial, political and affective. Viewing the historical moments analysed as assemblages entails approaching both the constituent components of that assemblage, whether that is a museum display, a protest march, or a political speech, as well as considering the moment-as-assemblage as an entity itself. The movement of each component of the assemblage can be viewed individually, in addition to considering the overall movement of the historical moment. This adds weight to the conception of the *moving moment*, as to consider an historical moment as a *moving moment* it is necessary to show a depth of movement on all four dimensions.

### **3.4 Methods of Tracking *Moving Moments***

How does one track these moments across a diversity of fields, whilst retaining focus on their relationality? This is a key methodological challenge of this research, but one that provides an opportunity for methodological creativity. Whilst this work began as rooted in museology and heritage studies, the research also takes in far-right comics, websites, processions and political speeches. In following the same historical moments across these different points of emergence, each point is seen as a related part of an assemblage. These relationships, however, may not be immediately visible. It is not expected that museums will adopt an openly partisan political stance<sup>5</sup>. It is also not expected that right-wing extremists will necessarily discuss the representation of pasts that they use in museum settings. This does not preclude these from impacting upon each other in a less immediately visible manner. Following the manner in which these relationships can be made visible is key to the analysis in Chapters 4 – 7.

---

<sup>5</sup> With notable exceptions, such as museums openly supported by the AKP in Turkey (see Bozoğlu 2020)

Following the political use of these *moving moments* entails a focus upon the discursive. Each discursive item is viewed as a body existing within an assemblage. These discursive items carry with them the capacity to remediate understandings of the past, to influence our individual and collective memory of these historical moments. They also carry with them the capacity to communicate affectively, as indeed does each part of an assemblage. The affective capacity of discourse, however, does not remove the primary need to engage with each item on its own terms. For this purpose, I turn to CDA in more detail to outline the approach taken to analysing these discursive items.

As with any field of analysis, different scholars have suggested a range of specific methodological approaches that fall within the wider scope of CDA. These include the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA; Resigl and Wodak 2016; Weiss and Wodak 2007), the Dialectical-Relational Approach (DRA; Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999; Fairclough 2001; 2010) a multimodal approach (Kress and van Leeuwen 2001) and, more recently, the Discourse-Mythological Approach (DMA; Kelsey 2015; 2017). I adopt an approach that while closest to the DHA also takes influence from other aspects of CDA.

It is also the case that these methodologies are being called into intersection with new areas of research. It is largely not the case, for example, that cultural studies scholars engage in the study of museums (with notable exceptions such as Tony Bennett (1995)). Nor is it the case that museologists are often concerned with political speeches and far-right social media content. In drawing upon a range of CDA methodologies, I seek to construct a methodology that navigates these divergent fields and, ideally, draws them together. This methodological divergence equally draws attention to the potential limitations of individual components of data. As it is not expected that far-right commentators will necessarily refer to museums, nor that museum discourse will engage with right-wing politics, these focal points of research are apparently quite distant from each other. The approach taken intends to reveal points of connection between seemingly distant data.

In proposing the adoption of the DRA, Fairclough first deems it necessary to distinguish between the different meanings communicated by the term *discourse*. In particular, he notes that discourse can refer, in different contexts, to:

- (a) meaning-making as an element of the social process, (b) the language associated with a particular social field or practice (e.g. ‘political discourse’),

(c) a way of construing aspects of the world associated with a particular social perspective (e.g., a ‘neo-liberal discourse of globalization’). (Fairclough 2016: 87)

Fairclough does not provide this as an exhaustive list, but rather to illustrate the potential messiness of *discourse* as a term, with these conceptually distinct yet related meanings potentially leading to confusion. In part, he deals with this by referring to the first of these definitions – the act of meaning-making within the social process – as semiosis. Semiosis is itself then further considered to be ‘an element of the social process which is *dialectically* related to others’ (*ibid.*), ergo the dialectical relational approach to CDA. Semiosis is dialectical here in the sense that other elements of the social process are separable but not completely distinct from semiosis. While Fairclough specifically refers to ‘social relations, power, institutions, belief and cultural values’ as elements of the social process which ‘internalize semiosis’ (*ibid.*) while not being entirely distilled to it, we could equally refer to memory (or remembrance), belonging and identity as elements of this broad social process which are equally related to these acts of meaning-making, but not entirely reducible to this.

CDA is, therefore, relational. It focuses not solely on these semiotic processes, but also on the relationships between those and broader social processes. In constructing a methodology that is influenced by flat ontological approaches and the assemblage, these social processes are taken to include human and non-human actors. Fairclough’s approach also recognises that discourse is not fixed within particular parts of a public sphere. This movement is seen primarily through the ‘recontextualization of discourses’ (Fairclough 2016: 89). Here, something that originates in one field (neo-liberal economics in his example) can be adopted and given new context within a different field (i.e. when that moves from economic discourse to political). I note this to pre-empt the recontextualisation of historical discourse into the political field that we see in later chapters.

The DRA, then, provides key methodological elements which are applicable here. Firstly, it provides a delineation between discourse as the mode of expression through which the social world is constructed, and semiosis as the process of meaning making. Secondly, it provides the linguistic tools through which to more accurately discuss the movement of discourses from one field to another (by recontextualisation or operationalisation), and

thirdly it articulates the necessity for CDA to adopt a transdisciplinary approach. It is also explicitly political. Fairclough suggests that the approach seeks to identify a ‘social wrong’, its semiotic aspects, and then asks how we might address this wrong (Fairclough 2016). Where the activist stance taken here differs is in the concern with influencing or undermining divisive nationalistic uses of the past, rather than the specific identification of such use of the past as a ‘social wrong’.

It is here that the DHA emerges as more applicable. This approach, in particular put forward by Ruth Wodak (Reisigl and Wodak 2016; Weiss and Wodak 2007), shows similarities to the DRA. Wodak, however, does not talk about the political duty in such explicit terms as Fairclough (she does not refer to ‘social wrongs’). What is evident in Wodak’s work is a desire to have discernible political impact. While Wodak does provide a detailed step-by-step methodological outline that forms the DHA, the method still retains an openness that allows for its political applicability to a wide range of issues. In part this is achieved by the foregrounding of issues of ideology and power rather than the much muddier and subjective ‘social wrong’. In beginning with a discussion of ideology and power, the DHA more effectively allows for a picture of a current social context to be constructed first, upon which a powerful and politically active research can be built. Taken in the purest Habermasian sense, this method begins at a point which potentially encourages dialogue, rather than a point which could be seen as (however legitimately) exclusionary. Discussing the DHA also allows for a short divergence into defining understandings of ideology and power.

Ideology, firstly, is taken in DHA to refer to a usually one-sided perspective or worldview. In more detail, for DHA ideology is seen as a system which is:

composed of related mental representations, convictions, opinions, attitudes, values and evaluations, which is shared by members of a specific social group. Fully developed ideologies such as communism, socialism, conservatism or liberalism, include three inter-related imaginaries: (1) a representational model of what society looks like ... (2) a visionary model of what society should look like in the future ... and (3) a programmatic model of how the envisioned society could be achieved ‘on the path’ for the present to the future. (Reisigl and Wodak 2016: 25)



We can see connections here between ideology, as defined by Wodak, and the construction of collective memory and identity. In particular, the notion that ideology (itself linked to a group belonging) is predicated on a sense of the past (what grounds this group idea is built upon) a present (what society now looks like) and a future (what it could or should look like) is strikingly similar to conceptions of collective identity (a shared notion of a past gives a sense of connectedness in the present) and of collective memory (a shared past allows for the imagining of a shared future).

Returning to the DHA, this method also pays close attention to issues and relations of scale. The approach systematically moves from the macro- or meso- level discussions of contexts down to the micro-level analysis of specific texts, where *texts* are a smaller constituent part of a wider discourse (Resigl and Wodak 2016: 27). Built into this approach, therefore, is an understanding that discursive actions such as the production of texts cannot be viewed as beyond or separate to the wider contexts within which this has been produced. These texts are, viewed in another manner, components of an assemblage. Whilst they are analysed in part as discrete entities, they are viewed also as not separable from that assemblage or entirely reducible to the text in isolation. At the macro- and meso-level of context the DHA calls for a focus upon the socio-political and historical context of the topic covered and the current context within which the study is taking place. At the micro-level there is what Wodak terms the ‘text-internal co-text’, that is the specifics of a text analysed, and finally the relation between the specific text and other discourses, texts, actions or events, termed as the context of the intertextual and interdiscursive relations (Wodak 2015: 51). In the cases discussed here, each of these relationships is viewed additionally as a feature of the *moving moment* as an assemblage.

Finally, as mentioned briefly above in the context of Habermas, the DHA gives frequent focus to the construction of certain groups – in terms, as we have seen, developed from a common ideological viewpoint – against others, that ‘us’ vs ‘them/other’ dichotomy. This is a construction that is similarly referenced, albeit not in this linguistic frame, by Guibernau in her discussion of belonging and the development of group identity, where the sense of a common oppositional other is seen as an extremely strong unifying force. Within the DHA these expressions are seen in the presence of common *topoi* (discursive thematic tools) which relate to an associated argumentation scheme. For example, Wodak (2015: 52-3) discusses the *topos of threat* where an argument would suggest that because of a particular threat, such as that said to be posed by immigration, certain actions are

necessary, such as closing borders. The political use of the *topos of threat* has been seen in Donald Trump's call for the construction of a border wall on the USA's border with Mexico. Trump launched his presidential campaign with a speech which included the following quotation:

The US has become a dumping ground for everybody else's problems. Thank you. It's true, and these are the best and the finest. When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best. They're not sending you. They're not sending you. They're sending people that have lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems with us. They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists. And some, I assume, are good people. (Trump speaking in 2015, cited by *The Washington Post* 2015)

The threats articulated here are numerous, but the solution is clear to Trump: immigration from certain countries has 'got to stop and it's got to stop fast' (ibid.). The articulated threat leads to a specific necessary action. The identification of such *topoi* is a feature of the DHA that will be applied to the analysis in the following chapters.

In addition to the DHA, I further adopt elements from Kelsey's (2015; 2017) Discourse-Mythological Approach (DMA). This approach gives a route towards dealing with the uses of the past discussed here not solely in terms of discursive features or *topoi* (as per the DHA) but also in terms of the construction of myth. This is particularly relevant to both Magna Carta and Siege of Vienna as the meanings communicated through them, as we shall see later, often bear a relation not necessarily to the specifics of the moments themselves, i.e. what our best knowledge suggests about these moments, but rather on a collective meaning inherited over time since these events took place. They are moments whose communication is frequently based upon a mythological understanding of these historical moments. Reflecting the diversity of content analysed, nuances of each of these approaches are brought to the fore where they are appropriate to the content and moment analysed.

### **3.5 Data Gathering**

The concept of the *moving moment* is one developed through a research process undertaken over a number of years. Data gathering processes have not solely been a means

to an end, but an additional element of experimentation. This process of trial and error has opened the research to routes that may not have been immediately clear, giving depth to the data and analysis. This process of experimentation also allowed for an openness to a wide variety of components that might be considered a part of each *moving moment* as an assemblage. This process, therefore, might not be repeatable, but should offer a range of data gathering approaches that can be refined and applied as is fit to future research. As the content gathered is diverse, a range of data gathering practices have been engaged with. I detail each in turn below. Content has also been gathered from a mix of English and German language sources. All content gathered for the Magna Carta analysis is in English and only English interpretive text has been analysed from all museum and heritage site sources. All legacy media content has also been gathered solely in English. Content relating to the 1683 Siege of Vienna sourced from IBÖ and *Gedenken 1683* websites and social media accounts has been captured in German and translated by the author, who has proficiency in reading German texts. These translations have been proofread by a professional translator to ensure their accuracy.

### ***3.5.1 'Official' political content***

I have gathered 'official' political content through a focus upon news sources at key points of political action. For example, a number of items are analysed that were produced in the years preceding the commencement of this project. Some of these were known to the researcher from the outset of the project, as they had been included in the project advertisement. These include the UKIP manifesto from 2015 and a speech from Nigel Farage in the early part of the same year. Additional political addresses were sourced through a targeted search of key speeches delivered by prominent political actors, for example speeches from then Prime Minister David Cameron delivered in January 2013 and November 2015 in relation to the EU referendum. This was supplemented by broad google searches partnering key figures and terms (i.e. 'David Cameron'/'Nigel Farage' and 'Brexit'/'Magna Carta') to uncover content missed through targeted data gathering. Each of these speeches is important in understanding the context of the UK-EU referendum of 2016. Similarly, speeches from politicians including the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, which give reference to the Siege of

Vienna are included as a means of illustrating the diverse political contexts with which the 1683 Siege have been used in recent years.

A range of news articles produced in the period around the 2016 referendum are also included in the interests of illustrating the frequency with which Magna Carta was used as a discursive tool in the period surrounding the referendum. Articles were gathered using a Lexis search of national newspapers for the term 'Magna Carta' from May to July 2016. Again, this was supplemented by broad searches for 'Magna Carta' and 'Brexit' via a Google news search. As news articles referencing the 1683 Siege of Vienna were significantly less frequent, regular Google news searches were used in this instance, resulting in the targeted gathering of articles predominantly in right-wing news sites such as Breitbart. Additional searches were made for references to 'Kahlenberg', the location of commemoration marches for the Siege each September, during September 2017 and 2018.

Reference is made throughout the analysis to this wide range of speeches, news articles and manifestos, and a handful of these are covered in greater detail, following the CDA frameworks as discussed above. The selection of certain elements of text should be taken as the result of characteristics which reveal themselves as key to the operation of the assemblage. This does not itself mean that these elements should be taken as hierarchically above others, but rather as a feature of the particular focus of this research.

### **3.5.2 Digital Content**

I begin here from the standpoint that events that occur within digital networks are always inescapably intertwined with the world beyond that network (Hands 2019: 8). Our emotional engagement with digital media intersects with mnemonic practices and our experiences of everyday life (Bareither 2017; 2019). The notion of a division between a 'digital' and 'real' world is opposed, instead viewing these as part of the same lived experience, within a digitally-integrated public sphere. While the 'digital' is itself an extremely wide and varied sphere, here I focus predominantly upon the role of social media. Within the space of the last decade we have seen social media platforms move from being considered a potentially powerful tool for the expansion of democracy, a 'liberation technology' (Diamond 2010) towards being framed as endangering democracy itself (Tucker et al. 2018: 3). While some writers (see KhosraviNik and Unger 2015) retain Axel Bruns' (2006) notion of the '*produser*', where those who use social media are also the

producers of the content they consume, there has been an increasing progression away from the notion that social media acts in a democratising fashion.

Certain features of social media are taken into account throughout the analysis. As Marwick and boyd (2010: 117) made clear, there is often a significant imbalance on Twitter between the number of ‘followed’ and ‘followers’ among public figures. For example, Jeremy Corbyn, former UK Labour Party leader, has 1.85 million followers, but follows just 2,500 himself at the time of writing. Figures who are already in the public eye will, in general, receive more attention to their content than those who are not. Established political voices continue to be raised above those at the fringes. Additionally, while the notion of the ‘produser’ remains accurate in a technical sense – those who interact with social media are also the producers of that content – we can no longer consider this content as working on an equal footing. It is, in reality, heavily curated. Indeed, this has led to a British governmental committee recommending the creation of a new category of company which specifically frames certain social media entities as neither ‘platform’ or ‘publisher’ but rather something hybrid (Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) 2019: 10).

Recent elections, particularly the UK-EU referendum and the US presidential election of 2016, have brought into sharp focus the possibly manipulative role of social media within politics. In the aftermath of the UK-EU referendum elements of the successful leave campaign have credited a part of their success to an ability to heavily target specific demographic groups. The fine detail of how these groups operated continues to emerge, with Facebook (as a multi-billion-dollar global company) seeming to play an active role in facilitating such campaigning. Their reluctance to give evidence to the UK Parliament on this issue has resulted in that parliament describing the company as acting ‘like ‘digital gangsters’ operating above the law’ (DCMS 2019: 42). And so, when I describe social media content as being ‘heavily curated’ I refer not only to the disparity between individual reach, but also to the active role that the companies in charge of these platforms now play in deciding what we see and when. Content viewed on social media is not providing us a window onto a democratic process; rather it is algorithmically curated and carefully selected to serve a customer base. Those ‘produsers’ remain customers of an economic behemoth.

As with the study of any organisation, the manner in which these platforms operate is integral to the formation of an adequate methodological approach to their study. As Bonacchi and Krzyzanska (2019: 1236) ask, how can we ‘grasp the impact of social media platforms for digital cultural engagement without knowing how networking sites are collecting information? How can we critique these practices if we do not have an in-depth and first-hand understanding of how they function?’ The gathering of data using the statistical analysis programming language R also creates an increased knowledge of the manner with which Twitter operates. While I do not make use of complex code, the process of working with a programming language itself has provided me with an insight into the functioning of the digital platforms. Again, the specifics of this functionality are viewed as components of the assemblage, altering the capacity of particular content to impact upon other bodies within that assemblage and within the digitally integrated public sphere.

The practicalities of gathering digital content required me to gain knowledge of programme languages. For the purposes of this research, I have made use of the statistical programming language R. Bonacchi and Krzyzanska (2019) argue that with the expanding influence of the digital content, heritage researchers should be actively encouraged to develop their digital literacy. Such literacy can aid in the gathering and analysing of data in projects such as this while also developing understandings of long-term collection, storage and preservation of digital ‘heritage’, that is the remnants of digital content. Programming languages such as R have the advantage of being open source. They are freely downloadable and exist within an open-source programming community globally. Therefore, with fairly limited introduction to the language it is possible to develop these skills on a predominantly self-taught basis. The main code I use below was initially sourced verbatim from an existing template, with additional sections added on a task-specific basis. Coming from a starting point of little to no programming skillset, templates such as these – a feature of the open-source community – allow for the easier development of digital literacy.

Key aspects of the code used are available in Appendix A. The process used for gathering Twitter content has been as follows: Firstly, to access the Twitter stream (essentially the live search function) researchers must create a Twitter developers account, although this can be created through any existing personal Twitter account. Through a developer’s account, users can access items known as Consumer API (Application Programming

Interface) keys and access tokens. These items, which exist in the form of strings of alpha-numerical characters, must be placed into R to create an authorising key which allows access to Twitter data. This item, usually titled an “OAuth” or similar, can be created once and then used in repeated programmes through a particular R package.

Upon running the data gathering code (See Appendix A), the process should continue until such a point that the user decides to stop the code running. Following this, the function will provide a .json file which can be easily converted into a dataframe, a spreadsheet ready for analysis (see Figure 3.1).

The screenshot shows a RStudio window with a dataframe titled 'june8to13.df'. The dataframe has 43 columns and 27 rows of data. The columns are: text, retweet\_count, favorited, truncated, id\_str, in\_reply\_to\_screen\_name, and source. The rows contain tweet data, including text, retweet counts, and user information.

	text	retweet_count	favorited	truncated	id_str	in_reply_to_screen_name	source
1	@edmozley @wolf665 @MichelBarnier That's totally ...	0	FALSE	TRUE	1005117220249272320	edmozley	<a href="http://twitter.com/edmozley" data-bbox="845 325 860 335">
2	RT @smartnotstupid: Who described the Magna Carta...	3	FALSE	FALSE	1005118223363211265	NA	<a href="http://twitter.com/smartnotstupid" data-bbox="845 335 860 345">
3	RT @smartnotstupid: Who described the Magna Carta...	5	FALSE	FALSE	1005120777644052481	NA	<a href="http://twitter.com/smartnotstupid" data-bbox="845 345 860 355">
4	@Gleann_Lucha @TonyIng82432643 Kidnapping sol...	0	FALSE	TRUE	1005121290817232896	Gleann_Lucha	<a href="http://twitter.com/Gleann_Lucha" data-bbox="845 355 860 365">
5	RT @smartnotstupid: Who described the Magna Carta...	7	FALSE	FALSE	1005121306692673537	NA	<a href="http://twitter.com/smartnotstupid" data-bbox="845 365 860 375">
6	Magna Carta & nappies DEPENDS WE GOT IT ESKI...	0	FALSE	FALSE	1005122027190009856	NA	<a href="https://mobile.twitter.com/smartnotstupid" data-bbox="845 375 860 385">
7	RT @smartnotstupid: Who described the Magna Carta...	8	FALSE	FALSE	1005123365215105026	NA	<a href="http://twitter.com/smartnotstupid" data-bbox="845 385 860 395">
8	RT @WorldRights1: @GrahamHmoore @walford_danie...	10	FALSE	FALSE	1005123919471370240	NA	<a href="http://twitter.com/WorldRights1" data-bbox="845 395 860 405">
9	RT @RuthPtn: Italy gets the world's first minister for d...	3	FALSE	FALSE	1005124377606787072	NA	<a href="http://twitter.com/RuthPtn" data-bbox="845 405 860 415">
10	RT @kaufmannbruno: Bella Italia! A national #directde...	9	FALSE	FALSE	1005124478634950656	NA	<a href="http://twitter.com/kaufmannbruno" data-bbox="845 415 860 425">
11	RT @smartnotstupid: Who described the Magna Carta...	8	FALSE	FALSE	1005124570112839680	NA	<a href="http://twitter.com/smartnotstupid" data-bbox="845 425 860 435">
12	RT @smartnotstupid: Who described the Magna Carta...	8	FALSE	FALSE	1005125360126693382	NA	<a href="http://twitter.com/smartnotstupid" data-bbox="845 435 860 445">
13	RT @KatTheHammer1: From the Magna Carta to this. ....	3928	FALSE	FALSE	1005125548329316358	NA	<a href="http://twitter.com/KatTheHammer1" data-bbox="845 445 860 455">
14	England, the nation that inspired our Founding Father...	0	FALSE	TRUE	1005128330952130562	NA	<a href="http://twitter.com/England" data-bbox="845 455 860 465">
15	RT @smartnotstupid: Who described the Magna Carta...	9	FALSE	FALSE	1005128838278459392	NA	<a href="http://twitter.com/smartnotstupid" data-bbox="845 465 860 475">
16	RT @TrumpChatting: No man is above the law. Not ki...	18	FALSE	FALSE	1005128958957015040	NA	<a href="http://twitter.com/TrumpChatting" data-bbox="845 475 860 485">
17	#AQAHistory #GCSEs2018 me searching for the suffr...	0	FALSE	TRUE	1005130235963170817	NA	<a href="http://twitter.com/AQAHistory" data-bbox="845 485 860 495">
18	RT @TrumpChatting: No man is above the law. Not ki...	19	FALSE	FALSE	1005130735055921154	NA	<a href="http://twitter.com/TrumpChatting" data-bbox="845 495 860 505">
19	RT @smartnotstupid: Who described the Magna Carta...	11	FALSE	FALSE	1005132084866936834	NA	<a href="http://twitter.com/smartnotstupid" data-bbox="845 505 860 515">
20	RT @smartnotstupid: Who described the Magna Carta...	11	FALSE	FALSE	1005136205321785344	NA	<a href="http://twitter.com/smartnotstupid" data-bbox="845 515 860 525">
21	RT @smartnotstupid: Who described the Magna Carta...	13	FALSE	FALSE	1005138706372677632	NA	<a href="http://twitter.com/smartnotstupid" data-bbox="845 525 860 535">
22	How bloody sad is that? It's fast becoming a nation w...	0	FALSE	TRUE	1005139989972254720	NA	<a href="http://twitter.com/HowBloodySad" data-bbox="845 535 860 545">
23	Magna Carta Holy Grail https://t.co/blwa0MM2VA	0	FALSE	FALSE	1005140625015132164	NA	<a href="http://twitter.com/MagnaCartaHolyGrail" data-bbox="845 545 860 555">
24	RT @smartnotstupid: Who described the Magna Carta...	14	FALSE	FALSE	1005141867789696000	NA	<a href="http://twitter.com/smartnotstupid" data-bbox="845 555 860 565">
25	RT @TrumpChatting: No man is above the law. Not ki...	20	FALSE	FALSE	1005142315864920064	NA	<a href="http://twitter.com/TrumpChatting" data-bbox="845 565 860 575">
26	RT @TrumpChatting: No man is above the law. Not ki...	21	FALSE	FALSE	1005142557494476801	NA	<a href="http://twitter.com/TrumpChatting" data-bbox="845 575 860 585">
27	RT @whitehalleng: Supposedly discovered in a Lond...	57	FALSE	FALSE	1005142767842161856	NA	<a href="http://twitter.com/whitehalleng" data-bbox="845 585 860 595">

Figure 3.1: Sample of Tweets mentioning ‘Magna Carta’, captured during the data gathering process.

This dataframe contains 43 columns, including details of the text itself, the users, the retweet/favourited counts, and retweet information, among other points. This itself is a more limited version than the 150+ variables initially contained within the .json file. In total, 9,816 Tweets were gathered through this process, and it is this data that constitutes the key social media content discussed in Chapter 5.

In the interest of adding depth to the discussion of this content in later chapters, some quantitative analysis has been undertaken. This is used to give context to the closer analysis of given pieces of text using a CDA approach. The potential meanings and ideologies being communicated, and how they might be received, are my primary concern. Some statistical analysis facilities developing our understanding of the use of particular terms on a platform such as Twitter. This feeds into the analysis of particular Tweets

through a CDA lens. As this does not entail the collection of big data, the Twitter content gathered should be viewed as a snapshot from a particular time period. On viewing each *moving moment* as an assemblage, the method taken to the capture of data regarding each moment is led by the emergence of prominent components of that assemblage. An alternate approach has been taken, therefore, to the study of 1683 and 1215.

As KhosraviNik and Unger (2016) rightly note, in constructing a CDA approach to the study of social media content, the specific context of particular platforms and the wider context of the issues being analysed must be taken into account. The two historic moments covered in the upcoming chapters represent unique contexts and, therefore, necessitate different approaches to the study of online content. In testing various data-gathering software, it was clear that the frequency of Tweets being produced relating to the Siege of Vienna was significantly more limited than for Magna Carta. This will in part be attributable to content in a range of other languages – Polish, Hungarian and Turkish among others – being filtered out. Taking this into account, a decision was made to focus upon content being produced by some key Twitter accounts and around a key event – the now annual commemoration of 1683 by right-wing activists in Vienna. This includes content produced by Identitäre Bewegung Österreich (Austrian Identitarian Movement, IBÖ) and an associated ‘*Gedenken 1683*’ (Remember 1683) Twitter account and the IBÖ leader Martin Sellner.

In taking CDA methods and applying them to social media content, there are a range of ‘medium and situation factors’ (Herring 2007, quoted in KhosraviNik and Unger 2016: 214) that must be considered within the analytical process. In practice, the detail that these factors (see Table 3.1) provide can be applicable to the analysis of more traditional political texts. The relevance of each of these factors will vary depending on the analytical goals of a project and the specific social media platform being researched.

<b>Medium Factors</b>	Synchronicity	Asynchronous-synchronous
	Message transmission	One-to-one; one-to-many; many-to-many
	Persistence of the transcript	Ephemeral – archived
	Size of message	Amount of text conveyed



	Channels of communication	Words, image, sound, video
	Privacy settings	Public, semi-public, semi-private, private contexts
	Anonymous	Extent to which the participants' identities are represented within a site
	Message format	Architectures for displaying interactions
<b>Situation Factors</b>	Participation structure	Number of participants involved
	Participant characteristics	Stated or assumed demographic and ideological characteristics
	Purpose	Goals of interaction (either at individual or group level)
	Topic	Subject matter
	Tone	Formal or informal
	Norms	Accepted practices established by the group
	Code	Language variety and choice of script
<b>Table 3.1:</b> Medium and Situation factors in CDA and social media. (Source: Herring (2007) quoted in KhosraviNik and Unger (2016))		

While there are certain commonalities to the analysis of an item of text from social media in comparison to that from traditional media sources, as can be seen clearly in the similar approach taken to the analysis of news content, far-right blogs, and right-wing Twitter

profiles in Chapter 7, there are a number of logistical challenges that are unique to the analysis of social media content. As identified by KhosraviNik and Unger, these are:

1. How to collect and select data from the vast amounts available on some social media platforms.
2. How to deal with the inherent non-linearity of text-production and consumption processes.
3. How to define context vis-à-vis social media.
4. How to deal with the fleeting nature of data and the constant changes in format and functions of platforms.
5. How to incorporate systematic observations to account for media and genre-specific contexts of communication.
6. How to decide on an ethical framework that respects individuals' rights and their understanding of how public their data should be.

(KhosraviNik and Unger 2016: 214-215).

I will deal with these challenges in order. Firstly, the data collection and selection issue is solved through the use of R and through the selection of a specific timeframe for the collection of data. This returns an amount of data that is larger than would be used in more traditional CDA projects but does not reach the “big data” levels of specifically digital projects. Secondly, with regard to the non-linearity in the production and consumption of text, I will consider the dialogic potential of Twitter as a means of offering insight into this aspect of the genre. That is, does the non-linearity of this content, the lack of a specific face-to-face dialogic event (see Farrell-Banks 2020), prevent the interactions from having dialogic potential?

Thirdly, defining the context vis-à-vis social media is a more significant challenge.

However, in each instance I seek to tackle this by providing as much detail as is possible regarding the individuals producing specific content, the political context it refers to and was produced within, and other pertinent information as much as possible. In practice, this logistical difficulty is intimately connected to the ‘fleeting nature’ of social media content. However, as far as possible I attempt to fix content into a temporal and spatial context.

Fourthly, in capturing and storing this data it ceases to be entirely fleeting, as it is

preserved. The moment of posting might still be fleeting, as are interactions with this content, but in a manner which can also be seen as a feature of our messy interaction with ambiguous histories. Interactions with political speeches, or heritage sites, are also necessarily fleeting. We are dealing here with a question of temporality, rather than an entirely new feature of social media content. Additionally, the functions of a platform at the point of capture can be noted. Much as any other forms of media change through time in their delivery, content, layout, so does social media.

### ***3.5.3 Ethics and Social Media Content***

The sixth logistical issue detailed by KhosraviNik and Unger (2016), that of an ethical framework for the analysis of this data, merits more detailed discussion at this stage. This reflects the ongoing debate regarding ethical approaches to the gathering and publication of data from social media. At the core of this debate is the level to which we consider this content to be public. While all of the content gathered for this PhD is publicly accessible, there is a debate regarding whether or how such content should be reproduced. This is related to giving due attention to what audience a Twitter user might consider their Tweets to be for when they produced them. This is an individual's 'imagined audience' (Marwick and boyd 2011). While individuals in the public eye will share content with the assumption that it will draw significant attention, for the average user that imagined audience will be significantly smaller, perhaps really only considering it relevant to their own handful of followers.

This draws us back to the very notion of what it means to be 'public'. Arendt posits that the term suggests a space where 'everything that appears [in that space] can be seen and heard by everybody' (1998: 50). This is, of course, a reference to the *potential* for something to be seen and heard by 'everybody' rather than the unlikely eventuality of this. However, if 'imagined audiences' do indeed differ from one person to the next, the *potential* to be seen by 'everybody' is not always equally considered. A public figure would expect their posts to reach a vast audience, and so posts will often be shared with this potential in mind. For many other Twitter users, even if the post is public the expectation may be for the post to be seen by no more than a handful of friends and colleagues. This reiterates the blurriness of the boundaries between the public, social and private. If the publicness of this content is contentious, then so too are its reproduction and

preservation. This is in part the reproduction and preservation of statements in a manner that is completely outwith the control of the individual user. It is additionally transferring the content and reproducing it in a new context, with new interpretation, and read by a different audience that would not have been considered by the user. Therefore, there is an ethical duty to consider the implications of the researcher's actions here.

I take the maintenance of anonymity as the basic ethical starting point, even in the production of public Twitter content. This anonymity includes the removal of the Twitter 'handle' (the @name that indicates the individual's Twitter account). This goes some way to ensuring that any individuals have the option to remove content in the future and not have it remain linked to their name within this work. The removal of anonymity then must be justified, rather than vice-versa. I opt to only remove the anonymity of individuals where the content is produced by those who have a definitively public role beyond the 'Twittersphere'. With regard to Twitter this is taken as evidenced by the presence of a "blue-tick" account. These are accounts where the validity of the account – i.e. that it belongs to who it says it belongs to – is confirmed by the presence of a blue tick next to their profile name. The presence of a blue tick indicates that the individual is so present in the public eye that they are at risk of impersonation. For these individuals it is more evident that they will acknowledge the incredibly public nature of a Tweet. They will be aware that their "imagined audience" is extremely vast.

Similarly, if a certain tweet is produced by a political commentator who maintains a public presence for their political views beyond Twitter then the identity is acknowledged. The identity of the individuals is important in these instances as it provides further contextual information that informs the analysis of the content. For example, if an individual has in the past worked as an advisor to the democratic government in USA (as is the case with one Tweet) then their political leanings are an important piece of contextual information. Similarly, if the producer of a tweet has a wider track record of producing right-wing content on a public forum then this is integral to understanding their social media content.

### ***3.5.4 Museums and Heritage Sites***

Chapter 2 discussed the role of museums and heritage sites as places which communicate a sense of belonging and a sense of both collective and national identity. These sites have been framed as locations which can exert power on a visiting populace (Bennett 1995), or

as communicators of dominant discourses (Smith 2006). As sites which give the past relevance in the present (Macdonald 2013; Lowenthal 2015) and play an active role in the remediation of the past, they also interact with people on an affective level. The content interacted with at sites visited for this thesis are considered as equal constituent parts of the assemblage. They are not taken as necessarily above other elements in a hierarchy, and the focus given to parts here should be taken as a result of the particular research questions and analytical focus of this work. Equally, items that are given greater focus from within these sites are those that emerged in response to the research questions being interrogated.

It is also the case that while an analytical focus upon power has resulted in museum studies inspired by Foucault (see Bennett 1995; Duncan and Wallach 1980; Hooper-Greenhill 1992), the connection between Habermas' conception of the public sphere and the museum has also been identified (Barrett 2012). Indeed, the period across which Habermas (1962) identifies the emergence of the public sphere is broadly concurrent to the emergence of the museum across the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Bennett 1995). While Habermas does not himself discuss museums in detail, Barrett (2012: 20) builds upon Fraser's (1992) critique of Habermas to argue for an analysis of Habermas' public sphere in a manner built upon 'the centrality of the cultural space'. Fraser argued that Habermas did not distinguish between 'strong' and 'weak' publics, where strong publics are those where participants can influence decision making, and weak publics are those confined to the formation of opinion. Barrett rightly points out that any instinct to place museums – or cultural sites more broadly – within the realm of the weak public undermines the strength of these spaces as sites of influence (Barrett 2012: 20).

Barrett (2012: 114) views cultural spaces as sites where individuals might learn 'how to be in public'. Democracy, she argues, is performed in these spaces, such that it informs understandings of what it means to be an active participant in the public sphere. That understanding can be extended through reiterating the power and influence that the past has upon our understandings of our identity, individual and collective, in the present. There is concurrence here with the earlier articulated view of museums as sites of power. Museums and heritage sites are not removed from the influence of digital technologies. Each of the sites discussed below has an online presence, and for the majority this includes social media sites. Equally, visitors to these sites will engage in digitally mediated practices, using smartphones, or other technologies to interact with these spaces. Responses to visits, or to ideas communicated about the pasts presented, may be shared on

platforms such as Twitter. These sites are not removed from the influence that the digital exerts on people's everyday lives. As components of the public sphere, therefore, they are already actors in a digitally-integrated public sphere. In this regard the analytical framework offered by the assemblage toolkit outlined above is equally applicable to these sites. Methods of data gathering, however, are specific to the study of museums and heritage sites.

I visited a range of sites of the 'official' heritage representation of these two *moving moments* (see Table 3.2). These sites have been approached as a 'critical museum visitor' (Lindauer 2006) and extensive fieldnotes have been taken during visits to each site. Much as CDA seeks to look at the unstated ideology behind the stated intentions of a piece of political discourse, this approach seeks to give weight to our inferences regarding the 'museal silences' (Mason and Sayner 2019) present. That is, it allows us to illuminate that which is left unsaid in a museum but is, regardless, still present. The critical museum visitor 'explores what is left unspoken or kept off display. [They ask] who has the most to gain or the most to lose from having this information, collection, or interpretation publicly presented?' As Lindauer states, this approach is not concerned with assessing audience interaction with a display, but rather seeks to encourage a critical viewing of: 'what objects are presented, in what ways, and for what purposes' (Lindauer 2006: 204).

However, the critical museum visitor approach does not directly discuss the affective potential of museum spaces. Andrea Witcomb's 'pedagogy of feeling' (2015) offers a path to drawing a focus upon the affective and emotional into the critical museum visit. A 'pedagogy of feeling' describes the manner in which exhibitions may be designed to 'stage affective encounters between viewer and viewed' through instigating particular sensory experiences which 'encourage introspective reflection' by visitors (2015: 322). In considering pedagogies of feeling, we are asked to consider where exhibition design might ask visitors to feel something in response to the exhibit they are interacting with. In discussing an exhibition which deals with emotive histories of trauma, oppression and colonisation, Witcomb demonstrates occasions where the importance of engaging an emotional response is foregrounded. This foregrounding of emotion and feeling echoes Guibernau's assertion that emotional responses are key to political action. Here, exhibitions make use of a 'pedagogy of feeling' to encourage an engagement with ethical responses amongst visitors. We might suggest that such responses will be of less relevance to exhibitions relating to 1215 and 1683, as discussed below. These are deeper histories,

which are unarguably less presently contested and active as exhibits which inform us of ongoing global oppression. However, I will argue that affective communication of the past is present in both cases, albeit not necessarily as an active intention on the part of the exhibition. Engaging with pedagogies of feeling, therefore, allows for the expansion of a critical museum methodology to incorporate attention being given to affective discursive practices.

<b>Historical Moment</b>	<b>Site Visited</b>	<b>Details</b>
<b>1215 – Magna Carta</b>	Runnymede & Ankerwycke	National trust property on the location where Magna Carta was supposedly first sealed
	Lincoln Cathedral	Home to a surviving copy of the original 1215 Magna Carta
	Salisbury Cathedral	Home to a surviving copy of the original 1215 Magna Carta
	British Library, London	Home to two originals of the 1215 Magna Carta, in addition to later issues and copies of the <i>Charter of the Forest</i>
<b>1683 - Siege of Vienna</b>	Wien Museum – Karlsplatz, Vienna	Museum of Viennese history featuring a display focused upon the 1683 siege.
	Deutsches Historisches Museum – Berlin	National museum in Berlin, containing a display of a captured Ottoman tent from the 1683 siege.
	National Museum of Hungary – Budapest	National museum of Hungarian history,

		including displays on Ottoman history in Hungary, with items associated with the 1683 siege.
	Vienna Military Museum	Museum of Austrian military history, including Ottoman and Holy Roman Empire artefacts from the 1683 Siege.
	Kahlenberg – Vienna	Viennese hilltop suburb including monuments to the 1683 Siege.

**Table 3.2: List of museums and heritage sites visited.**

Lindauer encourages the critical museum visitor to consider their visit in stages. It is worth covering each of these stages in turn, as in some instances the approach suggested by Lindauer has been developed for my purposes through drawing on a range of other methodological approaches.

1. **The Pre-Visit.** That is, observations regarding why one might be visiting a museum, what expectations might be carried prior to even engaging with a site. It is inevitable that as a museum and heritage scholar I am approaching these visits with different expectations than a visitor who is there purely for leisure purposes.
2. **Museum Architecture.** Here Lindauer asks for a consideration of ‘the building itself and its location within a community or region’ (Lindauer 2008: 206). The style of architecture, the state of repair, the presence of any additional works that may impact on visitors’ experience should be taken into account. When approaching open air heritage sites, I have adapted this to refer to the architecture surrounding a site as well as the buildings or constructions upon which certain memorials may be placed.
3. **Display Style.** Does the display follow a particular style? Is this in the form of a series of display cases? Does the display show closer resemblance to a traditional art exhibition – the white walled, spatially separated selection of individual



objects? Are there dioramic reconstructions? Is technology incorporated? If so, in what form? What other aspects of design – such as colour schemes, lighting, fonts used, the relationship between objects – influence the interaction with the display? While Lindauer does not specifically reference ‘narrative’ within this section<sup>6</sup>, following Mieke Bal’s (1999) conceptualisation of exhibitions, as a whole rather than in part, as a form of narrative, I additionally consider the impact of the display style and layout as a feature of the narrative. These are constituent parts that influence the narrative that the museum wishes to communicate, and therefore the ideological standpoints communicated. Narrative is taken in a broad sense, as discussed in Chapter 2, and should not be taken to necessarily denote a ‘top-down’ approach to museum curation (see Hourston Hanks, Hale and MacLeod 2012). As the DHA (see above) recognises that texts are but a constituent part of a wider social and political context, so each element of the museum visit is part of a wider overall narrative.

4. **Written Text and Unspoken Messages.** This entails more than simply the analysis of the text itself. It calls for the visitor to ask: ‘Whose knowledge is presented? What is explicitly asserted and what is implied or unspoken? Does the text invoke an anonymous expert’s voice? To whom does it speak and for what purpose?’ (Lindauer 2006: 213). This approach acknowledges that, as discussed above with reference to Habermas, Foucault and the origins of the modern museum, museums are institutions which are in a position of power and therefore will often communicate power in some manner. In seeking to unpick the type of knowledge being communicated in museum displays, and where power is being expressed, it is valuable to draw upon the CDA tools discussed above. In addition to looking at the text from a museum perspective, this entails looking for any distinct *topoi* within the text of the exhibits. Are there *topoi* which are evident from a display? If so, do they bear similarity to *topoi* seen in other discursive spaces? Who might these *topoi* serve? I also note here that the presence of such *topoi* should not be seen as a necessarily deliberate act of a museum curator or exhibition designer, but rather as possibly evidencing broader, unquestioned assumptions that may become tied to the historic moments represented. Here, the approach taken

---

<sup>6</sup> ‘Narrative’ is discussed by Lindauer only in specific relation to the written text which represents the following stage of analysis.

owes something to Louise Ravelli's socio-semiotic approach to museum text analysis (2006), where the wider social context within which a text is produced is inseparable from the analysis. This ensures that 'issues of ideology are clearly foregrounded' (Ravelli 2006: 117), recognising that texts are produced within an institutional context which will impact on the ideologies communicated. Again, the commonalities between these approaches and the importance of social context in the DHA above should be noted. While there are distinctive traits to the methodological approaches to different aspects of this work, these approaches share significant common ground.

5. **Beyond the display.** This focuses upon the marginalia of an exhibition. This can include, but not be limited to, what is communicated in an exhibition booklet or on the museum website. It also suggests that further attention be given to the organisational context, although I have viewed this as a thread to be attended to at every stage of the analysis. Other exhibitions within a museum, or indeed other aspects of a heritage site, should be considered. How do these aspects of the museum influence your interaction with a display? In taking Bal's notion of the display as a narrative, these aspects could be considered as the scene setting aspects of that narrative. They may not move the story on, but nevertheless they are an integral part of the readers' experience.
6. **The Post-Visit.** Lindauer terms this section as 'From Observation to Critique' (Lindauer 2006: 221). In essence, this is the process seen in the coming chapters, where the theoretical standpoints I have developed are put in to practice through the analysis of the two different *moving moments*. That is, what themes emerge through the displays and how do they relate to the theoretical perspective taken? While Lindauer refers to the connection specifically to new museum theory, in this instance the theoretical connections are seen to be broader, encompassing notions of the manner in which the socio-public sphere is operating in relation to the studied historical moments.

Fieldnotes were taken following the structure of this framework, but these were extended to include personal reflections. This includes notes on reactions to the landscape and environment surrounding heritage sites, or to include my emotional responses to interaction with these sites. This allows for the visits to be placed in a context which recognises my own affective interaction with these sites. While I take the above as the

foundation of the approach followed, in each of the case studies a mix of museums and heritage sites have been visited, adding an additional layer of complexity to the approach required. The manner in which sites that are incorporated into the surrounding landscape – e.g. the Magna Carta Memorial at Runnymede and the Siege of Vienna memorial at Kahlenberg – are interacted with will differ from the more official museum displays. Where the analysis has involved an unexpected tangent – as was the case, in particular, in the analysis of sites with a connection to the 1683 Siege of Vienna – this will be detailed in the coming chapters.

### **3.6 Conclusion**

This chapter has outlined an analytical framework for the study of the *moving moment*. The assemblage toolkit (Chidgey 2018) has been used and adapted as a means of interrogating political uses of these pasts. The mnemonic, historical, heritage and affective elements of the *moving moment* are all given equal analytical focus in this framework. This includes opening the analysis to the non-human components of the assemblage (including objects in museums and communications infrastructure) which facilitate forms of mobilisation of the past. Additionally, Chidgey's toolkit is by design open to adaptation for the requirements of a particular research project. In this chapter I expanded upon the role of the assemblage to incorporate the *digitally-integrated public sphere* as spaces of political discourse and debate. Key components of the assemblage analysed have also been detailed in terms of the specific methodological approach being applied to each. This included a discussion of the role of CDA, in particular Wodak's Discourse Historical Approach, to the study of political discourse. The particular nuances of gathering and analysing social media content were covered, giving detail of some genre specific components of this work which will feature in the coming analytical chapters. Finally, methods of analysing museums and heritage sites were covered.

In the coming chapters it will become clear that these methodologies act almost as an assemblage of their own. Each of the approaches taken will exert an influence on the other, informing the approach taken to the analysis of each piece of content. That data gathering processes took place concurrently will have increased the extent to which this has occurred, as there was little space to allow myself to separate every piece of data gathering from each other. The second section of this thesis will apply this toolkit and these methodological approaches to analysing uses of 1683 and 1215 in the present.

## Chapter 4

### **Magna Carta from 1215 to 2020: Official history to political discourse**

*In many ways, this is where UKIP came from: a feeling that successive governments were no longer representing the will of the British people. Now, there is something to vote for, if you believe in Britain.*

*If you believe that we are big enough to make our own laws, in our own parliament; if you believe we should have the sovereign right to control our own borders; if you believe that we should be fiscally responsible, and stop adding to our national debts and expecting our children and grandchildren to pay the bill, then we are the party for you.*

*If you believe in these things and that in this year, the 800th anniversary of Magna Carta, you believe we should seize the opportunity for real change in our politics; rebalance power from large corporations and big government institutions and put it back into the hands of the people of this country, then there really is only one choice.*

Nigel Farage, 2015 UKIP Manifesto (UKIP 2015: 3)

#### **4.1 26 June 2018, somewhere on the A1**

It is mid-morning, 26 June 2018. I am driving southwards on the A1 from Newcastle with my wife, heading towards Lincoln. Over the coming two weeks we will also be making visits to Runnymede, Salisbury and Hereford, alongside a few other destinations. We have never visited any of these locations before and have few expectations. They probably wouldn't be our first choices. So, it is reasonable to ask, why are we doing this? This is what has become known as our 'Nationalist Road Trip'. We are visiting these places because of their connection to the original sealing of the first iteration of Magna Carta in 1215.

Lincoln Castle and Salisbury Cathedral both host one of the few surviving original copies of Magna Carta. Hereford Cathedral is the site of a permanent Magna Carta display, in addition to possessing an early issue of the document, although this does not feature on

permanent display. Runnymede stands apart from these institutions, as this is a heritage site at the location of the apparent first sealing of Magna Carta. The site, a National Trust property now, includes the ‘Magna Carta Memorial’, but also plays host to the John F Kennedy Memorial.

I begin this chapter with this short anecdote because it illuminates our always politically influenced interaction with history. We do not separate ourselves from our social and political positions when we go to a heritage site. We carry them with us as part of our ‘entrance narratives’ – the knowledge and beliefs that visitors bring with them into a museum (Doering and Pekarik 1996; Falk and Dierking 2013). These entrance narratives will be shaped by socio-cultural background (their ‘habitus’) and the visitors’ individual identities (Savenije and de Bruijn 2017). Any sense of group belonging, as articulated by Guibernau (2013), will contribute to this entrance narrative. Seeking to engage with the subject as a critical museum visitor does not remove the biases or tendencies of my own entrance narrative. In this instance, we carried the political baggage of the first 18 months of this PhD with us when we embarked on the journey. Having spent a significant portion of those months looking at right-wing nationalist usage of Magna Carta, embarking on such a trip took on an unusual character.

Being a critical museum visitor (Lindauer 2006) or being a proponent of CDA (e.g. Fairclough 2013; Wodak 2013; Wodak and Meyer 2009; Wodak and Reisigl 2000) asks us to acknowledge our own social and political positions. It recognises that inability to separate ourselves from our backgrounds. Recognising these positions adds to the integrity of research. In recognising our backgrounds and acknowledging the influence we take into our work we allow ourselves to deal with those assumptions with openness. While this research trip was dubbed the ‘Nationalist Road Trip’ rather jokingly, it revealed something about the position that had developed through the early parts of this research. The prevalence of right-wing populist and nationalist content gathered from Twitter had become ingrained in my thoughts.

In part, this is a trait that seemed to be reflected in wider political discourse. The explicit tying of UKIP’s 2015 election manifesto to the 800<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the sealing of Magna Carta (see above) is telling. There is an assumption that this historical moment connects to a nationalist-patriotic sense of what it means to be British, a trait that would appeal to potential UKIP voters. This is important in two senses. Firstly, in recognising the impact

this had on my own assumptions and positioning, I seek to ensure that I view museum exhibitions as fairly as possible. Secondly, however, the prevalence of such uses of Magna Carta represents the political background with which many visitors would be engaging with these exhibitions at this time, no matter how consciously.

#### **4.2 15 June 1215, Somewhere Near Runnymede**

In 1215 Magna Carta was a failure. It was intended as a peace and it provoked war. It pretended to state customary law and it promoted disagreement and contention. It was legally valid for no more than three months, and even within that period its terms were never properly executed. (Holt 1992: 1).

As a 13th-century peace treaty, Magna Carta was a failure. Just 10 weeks after its creation, it was annulled by the Pope and the country was plunged into civil war. (Carpenter 2015)

How, we might ask, has a failed endeavour become such an ever-present symbol in the English, or British, history? Why is it seen to be so important if it was such a failure? To answer this, we must turn to a brief history of the development of Magna Carta, from the political chaos of the years that preceded its drafting to its final reissuing nearly a century later and on to its re-emergence in political discourse in the centuries that followed.

King John's reign as King of England began in 1199. By the year 1213 he was beginning to see his grip on power dramatically recede, challenged at the time by a group of rebel barons. In part, this was a question of sovereignty, much as the UK-EU referendum has been framed by politicians such as Nigel Farage in recent years. In 1213, John had given significant power over his kingdom to Pope Innocent III in a settlement of convenience for both sides. The settlement made between John and the Vatican precipitated Innocent's removal of support to King Philip of France's plans to invade England. For John, this allowed him to make his own movements towards attacking France the following year in an attempt to reclaim Normandy from King Philip. The campaign in France ended in heavy defeat for King John at the Battle of Bouvines (Arlidge and Judge 2014). The cost of this defeat, coupled with a sense that King John was giving undue favour and positions of power to those with close ties to the Vatican, was that tensions rose domestically. With

the King's treasury depleted and his authority severely diminished, the rebel barons renounced their allegiance to King John in May 1215.

With his power almost lost, John met the rebel barons at Runnymede, a few miles away from Windsor to the west of London, to present a 'charter of liberties'<sup>7</sup> (Garnett 2015) that would take certain powers away from the king and return it to the barons. Clause 61 of the original charter is most notable here as it gave power to twenty-five barons to act as guardians of the law, stripping the King of sole ruling power. The king was now to be kept in check by the rule of law (Warren 1997: 239). However, as Holt notes, this document was a failure. On the side of the barons there was a belief that King John was already renegeing on commitments given in the charter. This belief was substantiated by King John's actions. No more than three months after the sealing of the charter it was annulled by Pope Innocent III, at this point an ally of King John. With this action, civil war broke out. It was because of the short-lived impact of the 1215 Magna Carta, prior to the outbreak of civil war, that the document is considered to be a 'failure'.

This is perhaps unsurprising considering the hastily botched-together nature of a charter described by Warren (1997: 240) as a 'medley of provisions, some just and reasonable, some salutary and convenient, some unfair and impracticable, and some vindictive.' At this point it is reasonable to question how this document has taken on such importance. Holt alludes to this in the title of the closing chapter of his history of Magna Carta – 'the re-issues and the beginning of the myth' (Holt 1992: 378-405). This points to the complexity of our interaction with Magna Carta, and to its place as an historical moment instilled with all the historical ambiguity discussed in Chapter 2. What Holt acknowledges above is that, while there may be a tendency to commemorate the first issuing of Magna Carta in 1215, as UKIP did in their 2015 manifesto, the strength of the Magna Carta 'myth' comes from its reissuing in the years following 1215, and in its use in the centuries that followed. It is a document that becomes, in Holt's words, 'distorted'. He states, however, 'that the problem posed by the history of the Charter is not why and how it came to be 'distorted', but why it, rather than any other document, came to play the role it did' (Holt 1991: 21). This development is tied not only to the later reissues of the charter, but also to the development of the *Charter of the Forest*, alongside which Magna Carta was

---

<sup>7</sup> Note that at the time the document was not entitled Magna Carta. This terminology was only adopted when it became necessary to differentiate between this charter, henceforth 'the great charter' or Magna Carta, and the associated *Charter of the Forest*.

reissued in its later forms. It is the association with the smaller *Charter of the Forest* that gives Magna Carta its title: ‘Great Charter’ meaning larger in size than the charter it accompanied, rather than to denote a particular importance.

Turner (1994: 238) concurs that it is only with the reissues in 1216, 1217 and 1225 that Magna Carta becomes ‘perpetual, the first of England’s statutes and a cornerstone of the British constitution.’ Once again, however, the role of Magna Carta in at least the first reissuing bears little resemblance to its use today. The priority was to tempt supporters of Prince Louis, the eldest son of King Philip of France, back on to Henry’s side (Carpenter 2015). Following the death of King John in 1216, Louis was in control of over half of England. Nine-year-old Henry, now King Henry III, took to the throne in the context of rebellion and loss of power. The 1216 Magna Carta, issued in Henry’s name<sup>8</sup> at Bristol in November of that year, served to quell this rebellion. Carpenter (2015) explicitly links the reissuing of the charter to the decision of barons loyal to Prince Louis to surrender to Henry’s forces at the battle of Lincoln in 1217. Even if this was so, it remained the case that the relatively hastily reissued charter of 1216 did not quell all opposition to the king. For this to take place we need to look forward to the 1217 and 1225 reissues and the role of the *Charter of the Forest*.

To appreciate the scope of the *Charter of the Forest* it is important to distinguish between what constituted ‘forest’ in this context from our current understanding of the term. The royal forest is defined by usage rather than specific characteristics. Areas declared royal forest were considered under different jurisdiction, with the resources – both flora and fauna – usually considered to be for the use of royalty. Specific regulations would then govern the animals that could be hunted and the use of other raw materials, among other conditions. The penalties for breaching these conditions could be as severe as death. The impact of this in the years preceding the development of Magna Carta was heightened by the allocation of up to a third of England as royal forest. Magna Carta was not effective in quelling this anger. As Holt (1992: 113-114) notes in an earlier account, a previous ‘unknown charter’ contained provision for the return of much of the royal forest to common law. By the time of Magna Carta this was not present. With the combination of Magna Carta with the *Charter of the Forest* in 1217, however, a concession to ‘freemen’ living in these areas was given, setting the path for the charter to become the ‘myth’

---

<sup>8</sup> Due to Henry’s young age the document was issued in his name but would have been the work of his advisors.



referenced today. Indeed, the success of this is reflected in the minor changes which take place in the 1225 and 1297 issues of Magna Carta. Magna Carta finds its success only in combination with *Charter of the Forest*.

### 4.3 After 1297: The Myth of Magna Carta

The myth of Magna Carta relates less to the specificities of the charter, but rather to what the charter came to stand for. Since 1215, ‘in nearly all ages’ those ‘who knew little and cared less for the contents of the charter’ (Warren 1997: 240) have called upon it for their own means. This longevity, for Warren, relates not to the contents of the charter, but what it *meant*. While the charter of 1215 shifted significantly before the final issuing in 1297, and despite the necessity of the *Charter of the Forest*, Magna Carta became ‘a shorthand way of proclaiming the rule of law’ (Warren 1997: 240)<sup>9</sup> against any individual attempt to subvert that, up to and including the monarch.

Central to the development of the myth of Magna Carta is the redeployment of the document among 17<sup>th</sup> century radicals and lawmakers alike. Regardless of a specific knowledge of the original charter – the charter most often referred to in the 17<sup>th</sup> century is the 1225 issue – Warren suggests that the ‘spirit’ of the charter was reflected in its use at this time (*ibid.*). This suggests that even from the perspective of a detailed historical account, the assumed meaning of the charter was at times more important than the contents themselves.

The placing of myth above detail is clear in the most detailed mobilisation of Magna Carta in 17<sup>th</sup> century politics, Edward Coke’s *Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England* (Coke 1797[1642]; henceforth the *Institutes*). This document opens with the following statement:

It is called Magna Carta, not that it is great in quantity, for there be many voluminous Charters commonly passed [...], nor comparatively in respect that it is greater than [*The Charter of the Forest*], but in the great importance, and weightiness of the matter. [...] King Alexander was called *Alexander Magnus* (Alexander the Great), not in respect of the largeness of his body, for he was a

---

<sup>9</sup> For a detailed account of the role of Magna Carta in legal disputes around the era of its adoption see the opening chapter of Holt’s (1992) history of Magna Carta.

little man, but in respect of the greatness of his heroical spirit (Coke 1797: prelim).

As is clear from the accounts above, this statement is inaccurate. However, what emerges through the *Institutes* and subsequent developments is a sense that Magna Carta is used as a shorthand reference to a significant expansion of liberties for certain British citizens, at this point wealthy men. Following the writings of Coke, and later developments precipitated by William Blackstone's *Commentaries on the Laws of England* (1768), Magna Carta became associated with the development of the *Habeas Corpus Act of 1679*, what Blackstone referred to as 'that second Magna Carta' (Wert 2010: 476). Magna Carta becomes not only a shorthand for the proclamation of no individual being above the rule of law, as Warren articulated, but is also associated with the right of individuals to a trial by jury of their peers, as delegated by the *Habeas Corpus Act*. In these instances, new memory traces were added, to use Jay Winter's (2001) terminology, to collective understandings of Magna Carta. Broadly concurrently, traces were also being added from those of a more revolutionary perspective – on both sides of the Atlantic.

#### **4.3.1 Revolution and Magna Carta**

In 1645 John Lilburne, the leader of the radical reformist movement the Levellers, was imprisoned for apparent disloyalty to the Speaker of the House of Commons. Lilburne argued that to be questioned on such disloyalty, without a charge being brought, was an act that was contrary to rights guaranteed by Magna Carta (De Krey 2018: 64). This appeal to Magna Carta by Lilburne is notable considering his own heavy critique of the charter. Writing in *The Just Man's Justification*, Lilburne suggests that '*Magna Charta* [falls] far short, in sufficiently providing for ... the safety and weal of the people' (Lilburne 1646, cited in De Krey 2018: 64). For Lilburne, Magna Carta was a useful reference to argue against an overreaching authority of either the House of Commons or House of Lords, despite his own sense that Magna Carta had a limited role in protecting the rights of individual citizens. For his fellow Leveller, William Walwyn, Magna Carta was a 'mess', or only a small and hard-won 'part of the people's rights and liberties', a criticism which led Walwyn to express doubts over Lilburne's inclination towards using Magna Carta as a rhetorical device (De Krey 2018: 11, 83; Spicer 2004: 577).

In the years following Coke's *Institutes* the mobilisation of Magna Carta within more revolutionary circles also emerged. The shorthand use of Magna Carta was a touchstone in the struggle for the expansion of the rights of British citizens. The revolutionary potential of the work of the Levellers, Magna Carta and the conflation of *Habeas Corpus* and Magna Carta become further fused with the development of the burgeoning American colonies (Wert 2010: 476; Spicer 2004). Again, this was due to the perception of what Magna Carta meant rather than specific contents. In the development of an American constitution and bill of rights, reference to Magna Carta allowed the asserting of people's rights against a ruler acting above the law. It is a touchstone for those who argued for the expansion of certain rights, in this instance the right of independent governance for American colonists. Spicer (2004) suggests that the influence of the Levellers on the American colonies can be further felt in ideas of individual freedom and the notion of being actively distrustful or critical of governing institutions. In the emergent independent America, Magna Carta becomes closely linked with a sense of individual freedom, in addition to being mobilised to criticise the overreaching power of any single person or institution. In tweets discussed below, it is this theme of individual freedom and links to Magna Carta that comes to the fore.

In this potted account of the development of Magna Carta itself, and of the "myth" of Magna Carta, I have focused on two key points. Firstly, the emergence of a sense that Magna Carta is tied specifically to notions of individual rights to justice and equality under law and, secondly, the intimate links between Magna Carta and the development of the American constitution. This illustrates that recent political discursive use of Magna Carta cannot be viewed as an entirely modern development. The political use of Magna Carta has occurred since its first drafting. The traces that we experience when we interact with Magna Carta have been developed over the past eight centuries.

#### **4.4 Recent Political use of Magna Carta**

In the centuries following the first sealing of Magna Carta it has 'come to symbolise the rule of law and its guarantee of freedom' (Magna Carta 800<sup>th</sup>, cited in Atkins 2016: 603). The shifting interpretations and uses of the document contribute to that symbolism. Over the past two decades the use of Magna Carta as a political reference point has seemingly grown. In this section I detail this growth and demonstrate that the use of references to

Magna Carta in the build up to the EU referendum can be seen as part of a longer-term trend.

From the beginning of Hansard records – the official record of proceedings from the Houses of Parliament – in 1800 through to the end of the First World War there were only two recorded mentions of Magna Carta, both as passing comments. However, as we can see below (Figure 4.1), following the Second World War there has been a steady increase in reference to Magna Carta in parliament. Within that period, there has been a further increase in the years since the turn of the millennium, largely related to the 800<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the first sealing of Magna Carta in 2015. However, such a commemorative spike in references is a new feature, with no such feature appearing in either 1815 or 1915.




Figure 4.1: Frequency of references to Magna Carta in Parliament since 1800, based on data retrieved from Hansard.

A closer look at some individual spikes in reference are illuminating. For example, a spike in 1975 relates to a proposal to loan an original copy of Magna Carta to the United States to mark the bicentenary of American independence, drawing our attention to a transatlanticism of the political use of Magna Carta which will emerge as a recurring theme. The bicentenary of American independence emerges as more distinctly here than the 600<sup>th</sup> and 700<sup>th</sup> anniversaries of Magna Carta itself. A spike in 1946 similarly relates to a debate regarding the loan of a British Museum owned copy of Magna Carta to the USA. The transatlanticism of the charter, as developed through the formation of the American declaration of independence, is reconfirmed through these parliamentary records. This transatlanticism is also seen in the use of Magna Carta in political discourse on Twitter, in particular in the use of Magna Carta by right-wing American commentators (see below).

None of this, however, accounts for the distinct increase in frequency of reference to Magna Carta since the turn of the century. In these years, the transatlanticism of Magna Carta gives way to a closer linking of Magna Carta to a sense of British, or more specifically English, identity. It is English identity as a counter to European identity, often in opposition to immigration. It is here that the type of discourse used by Nigel Farage in the 2015 UKIP manifesto begins to emerge.

#### ***4.4.1 Magna Carta and Englishness***

Judi Atkins' (2016) analysis of 'myth, metaphor and the Rhetoric of Britishness' in political use of Magna Carta draws attention to the connecting of Magna Carta to a 'founding myth' that articulates, for some, what it means to be British. Atkins focuses upon speeches by two prominent British politicians, Gordon Brown and David Cameron, as a means of drawing attention to the changing 'rhetorical culture' in Britain. There are, however, distinct differences identified in the use of Magna Carta by these two politicians.

Brown, in speeches given from 2006-07, a period in which he transitioned from being the Chancellor to Prime Minister in a Labour Party government, opts for a predominantly 'inward-looking' rhetoric. For example, Atkins notes that Brown (2006, cited by Atkins 2016) 'identifies liberty as a 'founding value of our country' and argues that it runs throughout British history like a 'golden thread'' (Atkins 2016: 607). Brown places his Labour government in the context of a continual development of liberty and 'fairness to all' (Brown 2006, cited by Atkins 2016) that is conceived as integral to Britain as a nation.

In further speeches, Brown links such notions of Magna Carta and liberty as foundational to Britain, and beyond this to ‘the myth of British exceptionalism’ (Atkins 2016: 608).

Brown states that:

first with the Magna Carta and then through Milton and Locke to more recent writers as diverse as Orwell and Churchill, philosophers and politicians have extolled the virtues of a Britain that, in the words of the American revolutionary Patrick Henry, ‘made liberty the foundation of everything’, and ‘became a great, mighty and splendid nation because liberty is its direct end and foundation’. (Brown 2007, cited by Atkins 2016).

Magna Carta does not stand alone as a representation of British identity but is drawn into a broader notion of a long history of British exceptionalism – although the extent to which Orwell could be said to extol the virtues of Britain is questionable. Through further speeches discussed by Atkins, Brown connects Magna Carta to British exceptionalism in the Second World War. In doing so, Brown draws upon rhetorical techniques such as creating the conceptual metaphor that ‘the nation is a person’, a process which facilitates the ‘actions of nations to be represented as if they were either the actions of heroes or villains’ (Charteris-Black 2005: 43, cited by Atkins 2016). The abstract notion of the nation becomes personified, allowing for the further mobilisation of ‘the myth of BRITAIN IS A HERO’ (Atkins 2016: 610, original capitalisation).

Atkins characterises Brown’s speeches as inward-looking, focusing on what it means to be British in reference to actions and events in Britain. However, Atkins also notes that the events that Brown refers to are examples from English history rather than British history (Atkins 2016: 611). Events that might be considered an integral part of Scottish, Welsh or indeed Northern Irish mythology are not included. Therefore, while the rhetorical tools used by Brown do not pit Britain against a countering other, there is an unspoken othering of the smaller nations that make up Britain or the United Kingdom, the nation for and to which he speaks as Chancellor or Prime Minister. Additionally, Hassan (2007, cited by Atkins 2016) notes that English collective identity is also subsumed here as English history becomes a part that acts as speaking for Britain as a whole. The tensions that emerge in this political use of history are present in Brown’s speeches, beneath the surface.

David Cameron, in speeches given during his Prime Ministership, more explicitly places Magna Carta in an outward-facing conception of Britishness that ‘is defined against the

European ‘Other’ (Atkins 2016: 612). For Cameron, that same notion of Magna Carta as situated within a long British history of liberty is used in relation to British leadership in human rights. Cameron, as detailed by Atkins, variously refers to the abolition of slavery, the English Civil War, the Chartists movement, the Suffragette movement, and British action in the two World Wars. Again, it is a predominantly English history which stands in for British identity. Further, Cameron draws upon metaphors of natural phenomena – including notions of liberty ‘rooted in our very soil’ or rights that ‘took root’ with the drafting of Magna Carta (Atkins 2016: 612) – to create a sense of these as an organic part of Britishness, something that is more than simply human-made.

Cameron also began making use of Magna Carta to explicitly place Britain against Europe. In his 2014 Conservative Party conference speech, Cameron invoked a sense of British exceptionalism (Atkins 2016: 613), simultaneously denigrating the influence of European lawmakers:

This is the country that wrote Magna Carta...the country that time and again has stood up for human rights...whether liberating Europe from fascism or leading the charge today against sexual violence in war. Let me put this very clearly: We do not require instruction on this from judges in Strasbourg.

(Cameron 2014)

European influence on British politics is, according to this quotation, not needed. Britain is a nation which has been at the forefront of the advancement of liberties and human rights, and therefore does not need guidance from European neighbours or EU governmental apparatus. This speech was made in September 2014, at a point when Cameron had announced the intentions for an EU membership referendum. Atkins’ work articulates the form of discursive use of Magna Carta across the period highlighted above (Figure 4.1) Magna Carta moves from being something rarely discussed in British politics, to becoming a direct link to the development of liberty and fairness as inherently British under Gordon Brown’s leadership, and then, under David Cameron’s leadership, on to being used not only as a message of British identity but one that stands in opposition to a European other. In a much longer sense, the history of Magna Carta has been one of selective use, mythology-building and manipulation.

This changing ‘rhetorical culture’ described by Atkins comes at a time when Magna Carta seems to become ever more prominent in parliamentary discourse. One indicator of why

this might be the case is in the 2005 republication of H.E. Marshall's *Our Island Story: A History of Britain for Boys and Girls from the Romans to Queen Victoria* by the right-wing think tank, Institute for the Study of Civil Society, or CIVITAS (Smith and Green 2017: 389). Smith and Green note that this work, which they describe as 'a series of ripping yarns primarily derived from the insular English Protestant historical tradition', saw Magna Carta as foundational to 'all our laws and liberty' (Smith and Green 2017: 389). This was followed in 2006 by the creation of a 'Magna Carta Day' on 15 June to act as a celebration of national identity. Again, English history stands in place of British history and identity (Smith and Green 2017: 389-90). The impact of *Our Island Story* on political discourse is clear. In 2014 – on 15 June, appropriately – David Cameron used a *Daily Mail* comment piece to celebrate Magna Carta and state that: 'it's a great document in our history – what my favourite book, *Our Island Story*, describes as the 'foundation of all our laws and liberties'' (Cameron 2014). The reassertion of the relevance of this document is a concerted political act, a controlled changing of that 'rhetorical culture'.

It must be noted that these notions of liberty and justice do not solely set the ground for the discursive use of Magna Carta in party political discourse. The Runnymede Trust, one of the most prominent racial equality think tanks and charities in the United Kingdom, also make use of Magna Carta to give their work authority and legitimacy. The organisation justifies their choice of name as follows:

Extending well beyond its original purpose as a definition of the limitations of royal power, the Magna Carta is the cornerstone of many ensuing historic legal documents, such as the Human Rights Act. In fact, with the Royal Assent of the Magna Carta, human rights and equality were granted official legal protection in Britain for the first time.

A right to equality in law and under public policy has, since that day, become an intrinsic part of what it means to be British.

This premise - that we are all equal and deserve equal opportunities - is the one on which our organisation was founded and continues to operate today.

(Runnymede Trust 2019)

The reasons for the use of Magna Carta are familiar. The rights developed since Magna Carta are an '*intrinsic* part of what it means to be *British*'. This moment is used because of what it tells us about British identity. There remains a sense of British exceptionalism here.



British identity is tied to a recognition of human rights and equality in law. In this instance, however, this British exceptionalism is mobilised for explicitly anti-racist purposes. The work of the Runnymede Trust, seeking to tackle issues such as Islamophobia and promote racial equality, is given added legitimacy because of the discursive ties the trust makes to Magna Carta. This reminds us that the use of Magna Carta seen in the sections that follow represent the choice to use the moment for particular political motives. These are by no means the only possible uses of Magna Carta. Indeed, museum and heritage site displays, such as those at Salisbury Cathedral and Runnymede (see Chapter 5 below), echo this use of Magna Carta as a symbol of global human rights and the desire for equality.

Both the recent history and long history of its use are included here in the interests of demonstrating one thing: when Farage invoked Magna Carta in the UKIP manifesto, it was the latest action in a long history of political use. In the following section I focus upon this use of Magna Carta in traditional political discourse – e.g. newspaper articles and political speeches – before moving on to discussing the movement of this discourse through digital spaces, particularly facilitated by social media platforms such as Twitter.

#### ***4.4.2 Magna Carta and Populist Discourse***

In the weeks surrounding the UK-EU referendum, a range of news articles drew Magna Carta into a discursive relationship with a ‘leave’ vote; a vote for Brexit. For example, in the right-wing tabloid *Daily Express*, an article appeared a few weeks prior to the vote: ‘EU superstate laws strip Britain of its Magna Carta rights, writes [Conservative MP and leading Brexit campaigner] Jacob Rees-Mogg’ (30 May 2016). Similarly, three weeks after the vote (13 July 2016), the left-leaning broadsheet *The Guardian* ran the following headline: ‘Wetherspoon [UK pub chain] chairman Tim Martin [a prominent Brexit supporter] says Brexit is a “modern Magna Carta”’. In these instances, there is, as identified by Atkins above, a notion of British exceptionalism being pushed forward, in an inward- and outward-looking fashion. Firstly, in the case of the *Daily Express* headline, Rees-Mogg follows David Cameron’s lead, placing Magna Carta in opposition to a European other. If Magna Carta is an integral part of what it means to be British, then in stripping ‘Britain of its Magna Carta rights’ the EU is framed as being distinctly anti-British and therefore implicitly against fairness and liberty.

This notion becomes more explicit through the body of Rees-Mogg's comment piece, with EU nations being presented as places of unequal access to a fair legal system:

A further principle [of extradition] is the justice available in the [foreign] country is of similar quality to at home. This is simply not true across the EU. The individual members have different legal systems and abilities to hold people without trial. (Rees-Mogg 2016)

There is an implication here that countries across the EU do not uphold the same legal values as the UK, and that in other member states individuals may be held without trial. This creates a sense of unfair detention of individuals for indeterminate periods of time. However, the example is notable for its lack of specifics. It is used despite the fact that under the UK *Terrorism Act 2000* (UK Government 2000) individuals may be held for up to fourteen days without charge<sup>10</sup>. The human rights campaign organisation Liberty notes that this pre-charge detention period 'far exceeds equivalent limits in other comparable democracies' (Russell 2007). While Rees-Mogg is correct in his assessment that rights differ from country to country, there is a wilful deflection from issues in UK legal provision. While the above quotation is not linked directly to Magna Carta, the reference to Magna Carta in the headline gives the article a consistent intertextual (see Kelsey 2015: 45) connection with Magna Carta. Rees-Mogg further relates these rights to 'Habeas Corpus [...] a right of great antiquity' and suggests that the 'Magna Carta right to trial by peers is removed' (Rees-Mogg 2016). Here, as we saw in the 17<sup>th</sup> century examples above, Magna Carta and the later provision of Habeas Corpus are brought together, serving to again further a sense of British exceptionalism.

While Tim Martin takes a more inward-looking perspective, the implications at the heart of his message are the same. Speaking while providing a trading update in the weeks following Brexit, Martin stated that 'Brexit is a modern Magna Carta, reasserting democratic control in the UK' (Martin 2016). Again, there is a suggestion that control has been lost to a European other that does not uphold the same legal protections that we have maintained since Magna Carta was first introduced. This becomes even more explicit when viewing the paragraph from which the above quotation is taken:

---

<sup>10</sup> This itself is a lowering of the previous 28-day pre-charge period originally specified in the *Terrorism Act*. The *Protection of Freedoms Act 2012* (UK Government 2012) amended the act to specify a 14-day pre-charge detention limit.

Democracy, prosperity and freedom are inextricably linked. The EU is heading down an increasingly autocratic path, which has already caused severe economic problems in most of southern Europe, and risks further contagion on the continent. Brexit is a modern Magna Carta, reasserting democratic control in the UK. It is up to UK citizens now to participate in formulating policies based on free trade with Europe and the world, an enterprise economy and sensible immigration policies, with parliamentary control. As one US president said, we have nothing to fear but fear itself. But Big Brother in Brussels is no longer in charge. The world is our oyster, provided we think clearly, debate strongly and prevent the paranoia and hyperbole of the referendum process from clouding our judgement. (Martin 2016)

The EU is presented as ‘autocratic’, in opposition to the liberties that are retained in the UK. While Martin’s comments do not come from a traditional political forum – a trading update for a pub chain would not usually be a space for political grandstanding – Martin has long placed himself as one of the figureheads of the Brexit campaign. The free magazine produced for his pub chain has frequently featured pro-Brexit commentary, with copies being distributed countrywide in a mass mailing prior to the referendum. Patrons of Wetherspoon’s were also able to rest their drinks on a series of pro-Brexit beer mats.

The use of Magna Carta to extoll British exceptionalism, Britain as a place of liberty and freedom, against an oppressive EU has also been a feature of political debate within Westminster. In January 2016, in a debate regarding the European Convention on Human Rights, the then Conservative government’s Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice, Dominic Raab, contributed to the following exchange with Conservative MP Victoria Prentis:

**VP:** Will the Minister confirm that human rights have been part of our law in this country under the common law for many years, and that they will continue to be so after the repeal of the Human Rights Act, perhaps in a more modern and codified way?

**DR:** My hon. Friend is absolutely right. We have a long tradition and pedigree of respecting human rights, dating back to Magna Carta and before that. We protected human rights in this country before the European convention, and

certainly before Labour's Human Rights Act. We shall continue to do so proudly in the years ahead.

While the substance of the comments themselves are inward-looking in their reference to British traditions of respecting human rights, there is a repetition of the implicit linkage of Magna Carta to an anti-EU stance. The involvement of European conventions, such as that on human rights, is not necessary, since Britain has long been a leader in the provision of human rights, a bastion of liberty and fairness.

This theme continues in later debates regarding the reformation of the Human Rights Act 1998 and potential removal of the UK from the European Convention on Human Rights. In September 2016, the Conservative government's Secretary of State for Justice, Elizabeth Truss, responded to a question by the Conservative MP Julian Brazier:

**ET:** My hon. Friend is absolutely right: human rights were not invented in 1998 with the Human Rights Act. We have a strong record, as a country, of human rights, dating back to Magna Carta, and the British Bill of Rights is going to be the next step in enshrining those rights in our laws.

The similarity of this response to that of Dominic Raab some nine months earlier is striking:

**DR** (January 2016): We have a long tradition and pedigree of respecting human rights, dating back to Magna Carta and before that.

**ET** (September 2016): We have a strong record, as a country, of human rights, dating back to Magna Carta.

This demonstrates the continuing use of Magna Carta as a useful rhetoric tool for the continuing promotion of British exceptionalism, and further suggests that this has become an ingrained governmental line. Referencing Magna Carta is recognised as an effective means of arguing for the Conservative government's ability to act as custodians of human rights in the UK. The reference could show deference to traditions which date back to Magna Carta and therefore the Conservative government can be trusted to act in a manner which respects these traditions.

The manner with which this notion of British exceptionalism operates is further illuminated if we consider parts of this discourse through a DHA lens. Wodak (2015)

draws our attention to a variety of *topoi*, or argumentation schemes, through which certain aspects of political discourse operate. Wodak distinguishes between formal and content-related *topoi*. Formal *topoi* are those based upon explicit rules, where the content is abstracted from the rule. For example, in the *topos of authority*, the rule works as follows: ‘if authority X says that A is true, then A is true’ (Wodak 2015: 52). Content-related *topoi*, on the other hand, foreground content and context, allowing for the deconstruction of ‘presupposed and frequently fallacious prejudices embedded in everyday common-sense conversations about specific topics’ (ibid.). While Wodak is clear to specify that the *topoi* suggested are not in themselves necessarily fallacious, the *topoi* can act as rhetorical shortcuts which, when connected to particular topics and contexts and when connected to existing knowledge, can create a discourse that is fallacious and/or manipulative. Content-related *topoi* can include the *topos of threat* (if there exists a specific threat, then certain actions must be taken), *topos of burden* (if an individual, nation or organisation is burdened by a defined problem, then actions should take place to alleviate those burdens) or the *topos of history* (if history suggests that certain actions have had particular consequences in the past, then actions should either be taken or avoided in a new and comparable situation).

In the DHA then such *topoi* are often discussed with reference to particular power dynamics, most notably regarding notions of positive self and negative other presentations (ibid.). In the excerpts of debate taken from Hansard above, government officials readily adopt a *topos of history* as a means of justifying both their own sense of British exceptionalism and, additionally, their ability to act as trustworthy governmental officials. The above quotation from Dominic Raab demonstrates the use of such discursive tactics:

We have a long tradition and pedigree of respecting human rights, dating back to Magna Carta and before that.

Raab tells us that Britain has a long history of respecting human rights, and therefore can be trusted to uphold human rights in the future. In addition to this, Raab constructs an in-group of which he is a part. In noting that ‘we have a long tradition...’ (emphasis added), Raab reasserts his British credentials while also ensuring that the message targets a chosen in-group (the ‘we’ in the above quotation). This message is of relevance to those who are British. It is a positive self-presentation of British credentials which stand in opposition to both a European other – in the form of those that suggest that the European Convention on

Human Rights must be retained – or the Labour party as a political opposition. *We* can be seen to be a British and a Conservative *we*.

A distinctive feature of this argument, and of the use of Magna Carta by Cameron and Brown above, is the mobilisation of the moment within a nationalistic framework. This content does not, at this stage, demonstrate any elements of populism. To demonstrate the importance of this distinction, I will discuss how we conceptualise populism and nationalism as distinct political systems.

#### **4.5 Nationalism and Populism**

Where nationalism often emerges as a set of political beliefs, populism emerges more often as a style (Moffitt 2016; Kaya 2019). Being a nationalist does not equate to being a populist, nor vice versa. However, one may be a populist-nationalist, or a populist-internationalist. This is the case as nationalism and populism operate on different axes. While each are dependent on the notion of an ‘us’ vs ‘them’ discourse, an accepted in-group vs an oppositional other, the formation of this in-group and oppositional other differs. Nationalism is constructed upon a horizontal territorial axis, where an in-group is built around notions of shared territory, culture and, at times but not always, ethnicity. Populism, conversely, operates on a vertical axis, where the in-group of “the people” are pitted against an often ‘elite’ other. I contend below that the discursive use of Magna Carta around the period of the UK-EU referendum constitutes a case of populist-nationalist discourse.

##### ***4.5.1 Nation(s) and Nationalism(s)***

Benedict Anderson (1983) suggested that nations are an ‘imagined community’. Nations are ‘imagined’ in the sense that the members of a nation ‘will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion’ (Anderson 1983:6). That is, nations are not a static and inescapable part of society, but rather nations are constructed within the minds of its citizens. Following Guibernau’s work, nations are built upon a collective sense of ‘belonging’, where the notion of group identity is constructed. Anderson recognises that this notion of belonging to a community exists on the horizontal axis introduced above, where ‘the

nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship' (Anderson 1983:7). The constructed nature of the nation does not dilute its power. Where Guibernau suggests that the notion of belonging to a national group identity can act as one of the most powerful articulations of group belonging, one that can motivate individuals towards certain actions, Anderson goes further. He suggests that the comradeship that comes from the imagined community of the nation is so strong as to 'make it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings.' (Anderson 1983:7). Anderson recognises, tangentially, the affective power of national belonging. When moments such as Magna Carta are used to construct a national belonging built upon a sense of exceptionalism, as already discussed above, Anderson reminds us that this construction can have significant, tangible outcomes in political action. In the case of Magna Carta this is primarily focused upon electoral politics but, as we see in Chapters 6 and 7, this constructed belonging can indeed create situations where people are willing to kill for an imagined community.

Weber, writing before Anderson, noted this affective element of national belonging. He considered a nation to be 'a community of sentiment' (Weber 1966: 179). However, in linking a sense of kinship that constructs nations, whether we consider that to be imagined, sentimental or something else, to a necessary desire for statehood, Weber creates a definition that is inexorably linked to the modern era. Angharad Closs Stephens counters this, suggesting that there is:

a contradiction in the established literatures on nations and nationalism which dictates that, even when we begin from an understanding that nations are historical constructions, we are nevertheless led to the conclusion that this was either historically inevitable, politically necessary or something that, today, we can't risk dispensing with. (Closs Stephens 2013: 16)

In *The Persistence of Nationalism*, Closs Stephens strongly critiques this sense of the nation, in terms of the nation-state, as a modern inevitability. She suggests that in part this is due to a consistent view of time, at least in literatures of nationalism, as linear. This leads to a paradox in many works on nations and nationalism, where nations are recognised as constructed, but simultaneously imbued with a deep historical inevitability (Closs Stephens 2013: 16-17).

This inevitability of the nation or nation-state is countered in part in the work of Ernest Gellner. Writing in *Nations and Nationalism*, Gellner argues that:

Nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as inherent though long-delayed political destiny, are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures: *that* is a reality, for better or worse, and in general an inescapable one. (Gellner 1983: 48)

This is an important progression as we can see the movement towards the stronger recognition of nations as culturally constructed. Gellner suggests that it is nationalism which defines nations, rather than vice versa. This reminds us that nations, like historical moments, are inherently ambiguous unless discursively continually (re)constructed. Reference to moments such as Magna Carta, then, can provide a sense of longevity and deep historical legitimacy to this constructed nation. Through this process, such histories become powerful discursive tools for nationalist or populist politicians who wish to convey a deep sense of group belonging.

This is supported by Hobsbawm and Ranger, who viewed nation-states as built upon ‘invented tradition’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983), rather than explicitly upon nationalism. These are, however, intersecting notions. These invented traditions are acts which provide a sense of group belonging, as discussed by Guibernau (2013), through the creation of both a shared history and present. Hobsbawm and Ranger viewed the development of public ceremonies and the mass production of public monuments as actions which serve to consolidate an accepted notion of a commonly shared past. These monuments and ceremonies simultaneously create new sites for the public expression of nation state identity. They become *Lieux de Mémoire* (Nora 1989) – sites of memory which stand as symbols of that constructed national identity. In aiding the construction of a collective national identity, these ceremonies and monuments contribute to the sense of a shared history that Guibernau shows as integral to the developing of a sense of group belonging. I will return to these notions below as the focus moves towards the representation of Magna Carta and the Siege of Vienna in official heritage sites and through commemorations. At this stage, it is sufficient to further illustrate the fact that the nation-state is a recent construction, rather than an historical inevitability (see also Smith 2001; Breuilly 1982).



Recognising the nation-state as constructed reveals key tensions in the nationalistic discursive uses of Magna Carta. These uses, as we have seen above, often communicate a sense of British exceptionalism through a focus on English history and collective identity. Within the British nation-state we might consider Scottish, Welsh and English forms of nationalism as expressions of their own individual, imagined sense of nationhood. Acknowledging this division in British identity, Smith (2001: 16) also notes that similar divisions might be seen in France, where ‘Bretons, Basques, Alsatians and even Corsicans’ will have their own notion of a national-identity, even if they are not themselves seeking statehood. In Spain we might say the same of Galicians, Valencians, Catalans and Basques, some of whom will use their sense of a nation to argue for independent statehood. These separations of the concept of statehood from the imagined sense of the nation prevent a limiting notion of where and how nationalism might operate. The definition of nationalism and therefore nationalistic discourse can be separated from specific notions of the nation-state.

In following this separation, we are in a position to not only consider the presence of separable imagined nations within a nation-state, but also to consider the presence of an international nationalism. This international nationalism adopts all of the features of nationalism while creating an imagined community across existing nation-state borders. This is integral to the case studies discussed here as they will each draw attention to these different forms and expressions of nationalism. In the case of Magna Carta we will see a British opposition to a European other that is, as seen above, often distinctly English in its articulation. There is also the presence of a transatlantic nationalism where connections emerge between English and American nationalist sentiments. In the case of the Siege of Vienna case study, a form of transnational nationalism emerges across Europe. A singular notion of European cultural identity as white and Christian is used to assert a nationalism based upon these same characteristics, constructing them in opposition to a territorial and racial near- and middle-eastern other. For example, when Viktor Orbán talks of a threat to a European culture from migration, he does so as a means of asserting his Hungarian nationalist credentials (Whitehead et al. 2019: 5).

In addition to discourses of nationalism, the following sections deal with populism as a significant feature of current political discourse. Populism here is taken to refer to a political style rather than distinct set of views (Moffitt 2016; Kaya 2019, see Chapter 1). In this it is immediately distinguishable from nationalism. Where nationalism projects a

specific viewpoint for a set group of people, the lines that emerge within populism are more abstract. While nationalism constructs its other on apparently immovable territorial boundaries, populism creates groups that are by their nature fluid. It is the development of an opposition between '*the people*' and a constructed other. Neither the constructed 'in' group of 'the people' or the equally constructed oppositional 'other' are closed in their definition. Who might be seen as one of '*the people*' and who this group is in opposition to can shift to meet the political needs and desires of the populist politician at a given time. For the Levellers, for example, reference to Magna Carta can be used to oppose an English governmental parliamentary elite that is ignoring the democratic rights of the people, here these being the non-land owning classes of England. Recently, reference to Magna Carta is used to construct a British in-group as opposed to a European bureaucratic elite.

Where a stylistic commonality does emerge across both nationalism and populism is in the construction of a shared past. Where we see the invention of traditions (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) or the use of symbols and myths in the production of a banal, ever-present nationalism (Billig 1995) in the production of nationalisms, populism similarly mobilises history for the creation of a sense of shared identity. This common use of the past for both nationalist and populist groups is not necessarily evidence that these are inherently interlinking political ideologies, but rather suggests the need for a sense of shared history to form any sense of group belonging, as argued by Guibernau (2013). Populism, like nationalism, seeks to construct a 'common "we"' (Engel 2016). Group belonging as constructed in populist politics is, as with the national belonging discussed by Guibernau, developed through emotional communication (Demertzis 2006). It is a form of political belonging built on a shared affective connection. Linguistic differences between populist and nationalist rhetoric emerge in the form of different in/out group identities that are developed through a use of the past. For example, Cameron or Brown were often shown to use reference to Magna Carta in nationalistic terms, as a means of communicating a sense of British/English exceptionalism. Farage and, to a lesser degree, Cameron in his speech calling for an EU membership referendum take that exceptionalism and add in an element of populist rhetoric in opposing unseen elites, represented by the EU. Here, discourse from different political actors, or discourse produced for different purposes, emerges as changeably populist, nationalist or an amalgamation of the two.

From the above we can take the following elements as key. Firstly, nationalism is viewed as the development of a sense of autonomy, unity and identity that invokes the idea of

belonging to an imaged “nation”. This sense of belonging is constructed discursively and affectively. The discursive and the affective here are inseparable, as it is through the discursive that affect is mobilised. Secondly, the imagined “nation” is not equal to a “nation-state” as we often perceive them. Thirdly, such nationalism is most commonly mobilised through the creation of a territorial, ethnic, or racial other. Finally, populism is not inherently nationalistic, nor is nationalism inherently populist. Rather, these two individual political styles can intersect when opposition to the territorial other is combined with an opposition to an unseen elite other.

#### **4.6 Brexit, Magna Carta and Populist-Nationalism**

In the coming sections I will focus upon the discursive use of Magna Carta in what might be considered to be ‘traditional’ political discourse in the time surrounding the UK-EU referendum. This includes speeches from key politicians around the campaign, in addition to a small selection of news articles, comment pieces (broadly material in legacy media) and party manifestos. I refer to this as ‘traditional’ political discourse specifically to delineate this from the use of Magna Carta through digital platforms, most notably Twitter. This delineation is purely one of form, rather than of use. Within a digitally-integrated public sphere, speeches, manifestos and content within legacy media will feed into discussion on a wide range of digital media platforms. The discussion of the use of Magna Carta on Twitter will follow in the next chapter. This will be followed by discussion of the representation of Magna Carta at official heritage sites in the UK. The content discussed here focuses on the nationalistic or populist nature of discursive uses of Magna Carta. Where the discourse discussed above was broad in its focus, here I wish to focus more distinctly on discourse that relates to the UK-EU referendum campaign.

In the content above the discourse produced can seem distinctly nationalistic in its formation. The various figures discussed – David Cameron, Dominic Raab, Elizabeth Truss – made use of Magna Carta to place the UK in opposition to a territorial other in the European Union. The framing of that European other, however, is not always so clear. For example, in David Cameron’s reference to Magna Carta in his 2014 party conference leaders’ speech, the embodiment of the European other is not territorial but rather personified in the distant and bureaucratic form of ‘judges in Strasbourg’. These institutions are presented as not necessary, or as in opposition to a long, exceptional British

track record on human rights as summed up by Magna Carta. This use of Magna Carta can be viewed as the use of the *topos of history* (see above), with Magna Carta acting as a synecdoche for Britain, the country that defeated fascism and led the way on universal principles of justice. Britain as an imagined nation is Magna Carta writ large, and so can be trusted without interference from Europe.

There is, however, an additional layer of the *topos of threat* in addition to this quotation. The *topos of threat* operates as follows: ‘if there are specific dangers or threats, one should do something against them’ (Wodak 2015: 53). For example, if we think of the stereotypical and contested notion that immigration risks loss of jobs, then the *topos of threat* works as follows: there is a threat to your (individualised) job from immigrants (usually embodied in images of particular immigrants from a specific location), ergo you should support tighter controls on immigration. To see how the *topos of threat* appears in the text above we must look to the preceding section of the speech:

Of course, it’s not just the European Union that needs sorting out – it’s the European Court of Human Rights. When that charter was written, in the aftermath of the Second World War, it set out the basic rights we should respect. But since then, interpretations of that charter have led to a whole lot of things that are frankly wrong. Rulings to stop us deporting suspected terrorists. The suggestion that you’ve got to apply the human rights convention even on the battle-fields of Helmand. And now – they want to give prisoners the vote. I’m sorry, I just don’t agree.

Our Parliament – the British Parliament – decided they shouldn’t have that right. This is the country that wrote Magna Carta... (David Cameron 2014)

The threats here are numerous, but each can be mitigated by political support for the Conservative party. There is a threat that the UK can no longer deal with terrorists, that their armed forces might be threatened with prosecutions for fighting terrorism in the overseas warzone (Helmand, in Afghanistan, was one of the frontlines of the so-called ‘War on Terror’) and, in the threat to give prisoners the right to vote, there is a threat to the sovereignty of the British parliament, who voted to deny them that vote. This threat is, of course, used to argue for a particular action. In this instance the action argued for by Cameron is to vote Conservative at the following year’s election. However, there is an additional action that could be taken from this text – to act against the European Union.

The language used by Cameron is not populist in style. There is no formulation of a ‘people’ as an in-group, for example. However, the rhetoric that emerges here is one that could easily be adopted by populist protagonists. There is a threat to British sovereignty that comes from three interconnected groups: the European Union, the European Court of Human Rights, and Strasbourg judges. In stating that ‘it’s not just the European Union that needs sorting out’, Cameron is presenting an argument that can easily be taken as one that supports leaving the European Union, a position that Cameron campaigned against in the UK-EU referendum.

To look at how such language is reflected in populist discourse, I focus upon the rhetoric of UKIP or, more specifically, the rhetoric of the ex-party leader, now Brexit Party leader, Nigel Farage. The quotation presented at the opening of this chapter is taken from the UKIP 2015 election manifesto. This document opens with a discourse that appears nationalistic in its language. UKIP tie their manifesto to the 800<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Magna Carta again as a means of calling upon a sense of British exceptionalism. ‘Now, there is something to vote for’, the document argues, ‘if you believe in Britain.’ (UKIP 2015). British exceptionalism – that confidence that comes from a sense of a deep history – is once more linked to a threat to British sovereignty. The following section argues: ‘If you believe that we are big enough to make our own laws, in our own parliament; if you believe we should have the sovereign right to control our borders ... then we are the party for you.’ (UKIP 2015). The threat in this instance is, however, turned into an argument similar to what Wodak has termed the *topos of saviour* (Wodak 2015: 53).

Where the *topos of threat* suggests a counter action against that danger or threat, the *topos of saviour* argues that ‘if a danger is to be expected because of X and if A has saved in the past, then A will be able to save us again.’ (Wodak 2015: 53) Where, in the text above from Cameron, there was a threat on British sovereignty from the European Union, in the words of Farage that threat has been realised. In asking ‘if you believe we should have the sovereign right to control our own borders’ there is a suggestion that this control and sovereignty has already been lost. Therefore, the action needed is to vote for someone who can act as a saviour, coming to regain those rights that have been lost. Farage cannot claim to have ‘saved’ Britain from such a threat in the past and so he does not necessarily fit the specific terms of the *topos of saviour* as suggested by Wodak, but the notion of the *need* for a saviour is retained. The saviour, in this instance, is invoked through that historical British exceptionalism, where Britain, as an ambiguous symbol for collective belonging

(Guibernau 2013), can act as saviour. Farage then adopts that role by creating a discursive synecdoche where he stands in place of Britain, as the individual who acts for Britain. He does this by adopting a more populist language in the passages that follow.

The next passage, where Magna Carta is directly invoked, follows the same basic structure. It calls on what the reader *might* believe as a form of interpellation. It then moves on to the adoption of a notion of the people as acting against an economic elite:

If you believe in these things and that in this year, the 800th anniversary of Magna Carta, you believe we should seize the opportunity for real change in our politics; rebalance power from large corporations and big government institutions and put it back into the hands of the people of this country, then there really is only one choice. (UKIP 2015)

Here, the populist-nationalism discussed above comes to the fore. A territorial, nationalistic thread is retained. In creating an in-group of the people, Farage specifically frames this as ‘the people of this country’, building upon an earlier reference to ‘the will of the British people’. The in-group is asked to continue to define themselves by the territorial boundaries of the nation-state. This territorial in-group is set in opposition, however, to an elite-other. The opposition here is ‘large corporations’ and ‘big government institutions’, rather than a specific territorial other. The threat that is utilised is a threat from these corporations and institutions, from financial and governmental elites. It is a vertical axis of opposition between the people and the elite, as is common to populist politics. The territorial other in this instance does not need to be explicitly referred to, as the elite-other of the European Union provides an implicit territorial other, Europeans from outside the United Kingdom – in particular Eastern European economic migrants.

Further to the specifics of the text itself, the populist features of this language are reinforced by the self-characterisation that Farage has created for himself. It is a presentation of himself as a ‘man of the people’ (Kelsey 2016) which is seen to legitimise his comments. As a ‘man of the people’ he can position himself as a distinct part of that ‘British people’ in-group, against those governmental and economic elites. The success of such a positioning is all the more notable when taken in comparison with the reality of Farage’s private-school education, his background as a London Stock Exchange broker and a twenty-year career as a politician. In understanding how such an image might be

created and maintained the affective nature of the populist style – that emotionally moving element of the *moving moment* – must be discussed.

#### 4.7 Affective Populism in Magna Carta Discourse

Returning briefly to Guibernau's key elements of 'belonging' through the development of a sense of national identity, in the following section I will look at the manner with which the discourse discussed might operate on an affective discursive level. The effectiveness of the various discursive *topoi* emergent in the texts discussed (e.g. *topos of threat*, *topos of saviour*) becomes clearer when we see that these discursive tools fit the dimensions of national identity suggested by Guibernau. These elements of national identity are:

- Psychological - Belonging, closeness, particularly important when presented against a common enemy, or at times of conflict.
- Historical - Selective use of history to build collective memory, connecting to an 'extended family' of ancestors, evoking a past which makes citizens of this nation 'superior'.
- Cultural - A recognition of symbols, such as rituals, flags, particular imagery.
- Territorial - Shared spaces, often perceived as providing nourishment to citizens.
- Political - Common values, or at least a sense of common values.

If we return to the Farage text in the UKIP manifesto, each of the above dimensions of national identity are present.

Firstly, the psychological dimension of national identity can be seen as aligning closely to the *topos of threat*. Psychological, national belonging here is a closeness which becomes particularly strong when presented against a common enemy. In the text discussed a common enemy is created through the deployment of the *topos of threat* in combination with the defining of a distinct in-group. In texts above (that from Cameron or Raab), the in-group is constructed on (usually English) nationalistic terms. However, in the case of the text from Farage there is the addition of the populist element. The psychological belonging is that of belonging to the 'people of this country' or the 'British people' against a European, financial and political enemy. This belonging is constructed upon nationalist and populist lines.

Secondly, the historical element is clear. Through the invocation of the Magna Carta there is both a deep history and a sense of British exceptionalism created. This aligns closely with Guibernau's notion that historical belonging not only requires the sense of a shared past, but must include the notion that this shared past makes the group superior. Thirdly, there is a cultural element of belonging that is built upon the recognition of shared symbols. The term 'symbols' here can be considered in the sense used by Michael Billig in *Banal Nationalism* (1995), where certain rituals, or imagery such as flags, serve to consistently reassert the sense of national belonging in a routine, everyday manner. Magna Carta acts as a symbol in these terms (a notion which will be explored further when considering the role Magna Carta plays in online political discourse), where talking of Magna Carta acts to reassert the speaker's membership of the in-group through the use of a piece of history which has become an ambiguous symbol for all that is exceptional about British national identity.

The fourth element, of territorial belonging, is the most distinctly and purely nationalistic element of these dimensions, although that imagined national territory does not have to match to the national territory as defined in nation-state terms. Magna Carta is used to call for the sovereignty of the Britain as a shared space for the defined in-group. When a *topos of threat* is put to use it often acts through suggesting a threat to the *sovereignty* of that territory, if not a distinct threat to the existence of the territory itself. This is particularly useful when considering how such an argumentation scheme might be used in populist terms, where the threat to the territory comes not from a clear opposing national opposition, but rather in the less easily visible or definable 'big corporations' and government officials. Finally, the sense of shared political values is twofold. Magna Carta is used, through a means of arguing for British exceptionalism, to demonstrate that the country is home to all that is good about democracy, equal rights to all citizens in a fair legal system, where the sovereignty of the country is paramount. This political dimension is given further clarity through the presentation of certain figures or parties as the best hope for that national in-group, through the *topos of saviour*. A recognition of the rights present since Magna Carta are used to give confidence in the potential political actions of people like Farage, if voted in.

For Guibernau, these elements of national identity are at their most potent when they foster an emotional attachment to a group. It is only through this development of an emotional attachment that political action is mobilised. Four emotions are seen as key to action:



vengeance (a desire for retributive justice); *ressentiment* (anger that is not expressible often against something that one cannot have, or at a sacrifice gone unrecognised, (Demertzis 2006; see also Bozoğlu 2020: 101 on ‘resentment’)); fear (at a lack of power, or perceived threat); and confidence (to take action towards a desired future that can be made present). Of these, confidence is seen as being the most essential for action to take place. These elements of group action can be viewed in alignment with the various discursive argumentation schemes present in the texts above.

In each of the texts discussed so far, the use of Magna Carta could be framed as always seeking to instil confidence. In the instances of Dominic Raab and Elizabeth Truss this is a simple case of seeking to instil confidence in the United Kingdom’s ability to be a human rights leader even if not subscribing to the European Court of Human Rights:

**DR** (January 2016): We have a long tradition and pedigree of respecting human rights, dating back to Magna Carta and before that.

**ET** (September 2016): We have a strong record, as a country, of human rights, dating back to Magna Carta.

The deep history of acting as a leader in this regard, dating all the way back to Magna Carta, should give British politicians confidence to remove themselves from the European Court of Human Rights. In these instances, however, the confidence that is being built always remains within the realms of what might be considered everyday political practice. They wish to use this to argue a point within a House of Commons debate. When Cameron draws upon Magna Carta the intention is broadly the same – to give confidence to members of the Conservative party in their leader and simultaneously give confidence to the public in voting for the Conservative party. The distinction in the more populist rhetoric of Farage is in a more explicit confidence of the people being called for – a personalised confidence.

Farage repeatedly calls directly to an individual, asking ‘if you believe...’ in X, then ‘we’ can do Y. The text not only asks for a group to have confidence in a particular group or individual, but encourages that group to have confidence in themselves, both individually and collectively. Having already called to the ‘will of the British people’, Farage then seeks to give that group confidence in a personalised manner. Farage asks ‘if you believe in these things’ and whether ‘you believe we should seize the opportunity for real change in our politics’. If this belief is held, the power can be put in

the hands ‘of the people’. These beliefs are not set as abstract notions, but rather they are beliefs in something that is set as being integral to British (again, read: English) national identity.

Confidence in these notions should come from the readers’ sense of the previous 800 years of development, from being a part of ‘the people’ who created Magna Carta. The confidence on this occasion, however, is with ‘the people’. Farage presents himself not as an unreachable leader of this group, but rather as an equal member of the group. He is the man who would share a beer with other members of this group (see Kelsey 2017: 56). Beyond this, each of the four emotional drivers for political action, not simply confidence, emerge in these texts. Fear of a perceived threat, or lack of power, we have seen before – the lack of sovereignty and the threat from a European or elitist other. *Ressentiment* develops from this anger. The sense that ‘the people’ have been cast aside, left without a voice as power rests with ‘large corporations and big government institutions’, is used to build that anger at the power which cannot be attained. In offering an action, a solution, a sense of vengeance can be developed. The people here, the collective ‘you’ addressed, are encouraged to ‘seize the opportunity’ for a ‘rebalance of power’ that puts that power ‘back into the hands of the people’. These are built upon the notion of British exceptionalism which gives confidence.

The emotional prompts within these texts appeal to a particular, already-constructed in-group, making use of the communication of affect to build upon a ‘topos of people’ (Wodak 2015: 53). That is, because the ‘people’ favour a particular action (the returning of power from the European Union), a particular action should be taken (or, in more affective language above, opportunity should be ‘seized’). While UKIP only gained a single seat in this election, the party did take a 12.6% share of the vote. Their subsequent collapse following the departure of Farage from the party serves to reiterate the fact that this was a populist vote, largely in support of Farage as a figure. The subsequent success of the Leave vote campaign can be seen to have significantly influenced by this development of Farage as such a figure, and the success of his call for ‘the people’ to act. His recent return with the new Brexit Party, and the associated electoral success of this party in recent European Elections, gives further weight to this. I suggest here that while this electoral success has numerous factors, the *affective* language used by Farage is significant in this.

#### 4.8 Moving Discourse: Chapter Summary

In this chapter I have sought to set Magna Carta in its historical context, offering this as the basis for understanding its use in contemporary political discourse. This allows for certain parts of the myth of Magna Carta to be questioned. One of these is the notion that the Magna Carta has been an ever-present guiding document in the political history of the United Kingdom. Rather, there are political peaks and troughs in the use of Magna Carta across the past 800 years. The years following the Second World War represent a slow move towards a current peak in its usage, while in preceding centuries little attention was given to Magna Carta in official political discourse.

The recent usage of Magna Carta is seen as emerging firstly through a desire among leading politicians – notably Gordon Brown and David Cameron – to give credence to a notion of British exceptionalism. Despite being a document that is central to English rather than British history, it becomes used as representative of Britain, or indeed of the United Kingdom. Magna Carta is taken as a starting point in a long history of British leadership in issues of fairness and equality, a global leader in the provision of human rights. While this discursive redeployment of Magna Carta can initially be considered in nationalistic terms, where British exceptionalism allows for a framing of the Britain as either a leader within Europe (in the case of Brown) or as a leader that does not require Europe, it is a rhetoric that has since been adopted for nationalist and populist usage, sometimes concurrently. The focus upon the Nigel Farage text has sought to demonstrate in detail the manner in which this discourse has emerged. In addition, I have introduced the notion that this nationalist-populist discourse is particularly effective because it creates a strong sense of in-group belonging and acts affectively through the use of emotional prompts. These prompts give depth to the discursive *topoi* used, connecting particular arguments to an affective communication of group belonging. This belonging serves to give confidence for political action, for example a confidence in vocally supporting politics of anti-immigration (as encapsulated in the Brexit campaign) or, as we see in the discussion of Siege of Vienna below, confidence in supporting right-wing extremism.

**Table 4.1:** Magna Carta as a *Moving Moment* – Chapter Summary

<p><b>Spatial Movement</b></p> <p>Spread of <i>MC</i> as something which represents Britain, not solely England.</p> <p>Emergence of Magna Carta in American constitutional discourse.</p>	<p><b>Temporal Movement</b></p> <p>Written histories, such as those from Holt or Carpenter discussed at the top of the chapter.</p> <p>Reference to MC by political groups such as the Levellers centuries after its drafting. Later use by David Cameron, Gordon Brown, or Nigel Farage.</p>
<p><b>Affective Movement</b></p> <p>The creation of the <i>MC</i> myth – associated use to communicate a sense of English (or British/American) exceptionalism.</p> <p>The role of <i>MC</i> in communicating belonging to a national community.</p> <p>Discursively communicating the sense of a deep historical connection.</p>	<p><b>Political Movement</b></p> <p>The Levellers demands for constitutional rights.</p> <p>The drafting of the American constitution.</p> <p>Encouragement to vote to leave the European Union.</p> <p>Justification for opposition to the European Human Rights Act.</p> <p>Rarely, to make the case for anti-racist politics (Runnymede Trust).</p>

Table 4.1 summarises points where this chapter can show Magna Carta acting as a *moving moment*. The chapter has engaged primarily with the temporal movement of Magna Carta. This includes the temporal labour of historical accounts, such as those of Holt and

Carpenter, which bring a more detailed knowledge of these moments into the present. This temporal labour is aided by the intermittent political use of Magna Carta, such that it retains a place in a collective consciousness across a long period of time. These political uses extend back to groups such as the Levellers and the influence of Magna Carta upon the US constitution and bill of rights. Exerted over a long period of time and by a variety of actors, this temporal labour has allowed for the easy use of Magna Carta as a reference point in the present, as some understanding of its relevance is already present for the target audiences for political discourse. For example, in using reference to Magna Carta as a means of arguing for a Brexit vote, a connection was made to an already constructed attachment of Magna Carta to a sense of British, or English, exceptionalism.

This begins to draw attention to the affective movement of these pasts. In using reference to moments with a clear narrative and an established association with national identity, political discourse can focus upon engaging audiences in the affective labour required for political action. When Nigel Farage discusses Magna Carta, he does not ask his audience to engage in a deep historical engagement with this moment. His discourse is effective as that historical labour has already taken place. The audience are simply asked to associate the narrative of Magna Carta as a symbol of British leadership in justice, to a constructed threat represented by the European Union. The lesser labour asked of audiences in making this connection allows for a focusing of energies upon using these pasts to affect. In this instance it is a use of the past to engage in an anger towards the actions of the EU, and therefore a desire to vote to leave.

The following chapter will look at the potential impact of this discourse in the digitally extended public sphere, through an analysis of the discursive use of Magna Carta on Twitter. In doing so, I examine the extent to which the digital movement of historical moments follows the same discursive criteria of *moving moments* introduced above. That is, what labour is being asked of readers of certain political discourse. These different elements of discourse will then be placed in comparison with the representation of Magna Carta at official heritage sites.

## Chapter 5

### Magna Carta in the Digitally-Integrated Public Sphere

Where Habermas' theory of modernity has been questioned for its lack of focus upon nationalism (Delanty and O'Mahony 2002), the impact of the expansion of digital technologies similarly provokes a questioning of the formation of the public sphere. While references to the 'digital public sphere' are frequent (e.g. De Cock and Arias 2018; Duthely 2017; Sullivan 2018) what that extension of the public sphere means is often unarticulated. This is, in part, a reflection of the use of 'public sphere' as a generalising term with, at times, little critical reflection on what is communicated by this term. As discussed in Chapter 3, here I consider what the digital extension of that public sphere means in practice through discussing the digitally-integrated public sphere. Twitter represents one element of that public sphere. A similar approach can and indeed has been taken with other platforms including Facebook (Bonacchi, Altaweel and Krzyzanska 2018) Flickr (Arrigoni and Galani 2019), Instagram and Pinterest (Guidry et al. 2018).

In taking digital platforms as a part of this extended public sphere, I deliberately retain the centrality of human agency. This recognises that purely digitally focused analyses 'can only partially explain social effects' (Pond and Lewis 2019). Actions within digital networks, discourses that spread across those networks and emerge through digital platforms and on digital devices, are always linked to and a part of the world beyond those networks, platforms and devices (Hands 2019). Therefore, it is important to reiterate that the discourse discussed below is not taken as part of a digital world that is separable from a real or analogue world, but rather as simply a different part of it. The digital and analogue both form a part of the digitally-integrated public sphere. Neither digital nor analogue content are taken as hierarchically above the other, but rather are all related components of that public sphere.

In the case of Twitter discourse, this means that factors unique to the platform, the idiosyncrasies of the Twitter genre are considered, as are the nuances of digital platforms. These are taken alongside issues unique to the platforms as a means of considering how the discourse discussed moves. Again, this movement is taken to mean the movement through spaces (digital and physical) and also as a reference to the affective capacity of discourse to *move* people, and finally the moving of people to political action.

## 5.1 Magna Carta Online

Much as the use of Magna Carta in political discourse represents only one route through which the document enters public knowledge in the non-digital world, so too the use of Magna Carta for online political discourse is only one route through which a knowledge of Magna Carta is distributed digitally. One might use Google, Wikipedia, the websites of institutions such as British Library, the National Archives, the National Trust, the UK Parliament and a BBC education page in exploring meanings of Magna Carta. Across these platforms the information conveyed is repetitive. In addition to a frequent potted history of the origins of Magna Carta – the narrative of rebellion, necessity, failures and reissuing presented in Chapter 4 – a number of themes consistently appear across these sites.

On the National Trust website, in a page entitled ‘What is Magna Carta?’, a subheading asks, ‘How important is Magna Carta?’. The answer comes in the fact that it has acted as a ‘milestone of individual rights and freedoms’ and has inspired documents including the ‘1791 United States Bill of Rights [and] the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)’ (National Trust 2020). The UK Parliament website draws connections between Magna Carta and notions of connected freedoms that retain a ‘universal quality’ (UK Parliament 2020) linking the 800<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Magna Carta in 2015 to the development of parliament and freedoms in the United Kingdom. The British Library website focuses upon similar themes. Prominent sub-sections on their Magna Carta landing page link to subjects such as ‘Magna Carta and human rights’, ‘Modern America and Magna Carta’ and ‘Why Magna Carta still matters today’ (British Library 2019). Following through to the ‘Why Magna Carta still matters today’ article, one will find images of related documents inlaid into the article. These include the 1689 Bill of Rights, the 1790 Delaware copy of the United States Bill of Rights, the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1953 European Convention on Human Rights, and the United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act 1998. Common themes of human rights, equality, fairness and of a connection to the emergence of democracy in the United States are present across these platforms.

There is a sense of an accepted, official history of Magna Carta which leads to an accepted, official notion of what relevance the document has today. There appears to be a relatively closed conception of the AHD (Smith 2006) of this document. In considering the

role of digital media in changing the nature of discourse, either as a democratising tool (Diamond 2010) or as a danger to accepted notions of democratic debate (Tucker et al. 2018), the degree to which the discourse might be seen to retain, dispute, subvert or simply ignore this AHD - this accepted notion of what Magna Carta means - will be central to developing an understanding of how much discourse in the digitally extended public sphere is impacting our understandings and uses of the past.

### ***5.1.1 The Form of Digital Discourse***

The manner with which social media platforms, in particular, have moved so dramatically from being considered as democratising tools through to being viewed as a danger and a concern within the space of less than a decade is illustrative of the rapid changes precipitated by such technological developments. Digital discursive practice continues to strive to keep pace with these technological developments. The continuing ethical debate (see Chapter 3) and the associated lack of a distinct set of ethical guidelines for the digital researcher, are a further reflection of this pace of change. That said, there are a number of features of digital discourse that can be articulated. These must be taken as features of the digital discursive landscape at the time of writing. Much as the political context of this research is set within the constraints of the timing of the research, so too the technological context is temporally specific and therefore limited.

While the use of the internet as a space for activism and protest has been recognised since the 1990s (Pickerill 2003), the period around 2007/8 has been characterised by the spread of digital activism (Karatzogianni 2015). For some, this is a period of activism precipitated by the global financial crisis of 2008 (Bennett and Segerberg 2013). The expansion of online political action has coincided with the re-emergence of right-wing populism over the past decade, rather than having precipitated this rise itself. There is a potency to this combination. The movement towards more extreme right-wing politics in the years following a financial crisis could be viewed as expected<sup>11</sup>, following a pattern seen across the past 140 years (Funke, Schularick and Trebesch 2015). The rise in right-wing populism currently does not result entirely from the influence of digital platforms. At least in part, it must be attributed to the 2008 financial crash and economic policies of austerity which

---

<sup>11</sup> The repetition of this trend does not mean that the rise in extreme right-wing politics should be accepted as inevitable.



followed. Additionally, the expansion of political action onto digital platforms is by no means confined to right-wing activism. This expansion has also been discussed in relation to the Occupy Wall Street movement (Karatzogianni 2015; Bennett and Segerberg 2013) the Arab Spring protests (Karatzogianni 2015; Hänska Ahy 2016; Howard and Parks 2012) and the recently increasing environmental protest movement (Brunner 2017). This analysis focuses on the presence of right-wing populist activism online, but this is informed by understandings of online activism as a wider phenomenon.

Bennett and Segerberg (2013) have coined the term ‘connective action’ to conceptualise this online activism. This term echoes Hoskins’ discussion of ‘connective *memory*’ (Hoskins 2011, emphasis added), and can be considered within what Hoskins describes as the connective turn. This turn is considered to be ‘the massively increased abundance, pervasiveness and accessibility of digital technologies, devices and media, shaping an ongoing re-calibration of time, space (and place) and memory by people as they connect with, inhabit and constitute increasingly both dense and diffused social networks.’ (Hoskins 2011: 271) This ever-presence of digital technologies, the manner with which they intersect with the lives and actions of individuals and collectives, makes these networks more visible.

The notion of connective action is conceived differently. It is taken as emerging in the form of ‘digitally networked *connective action* that uses broadly inclusive, easily personalised action frames as a basis for technology-assisted networking’ (Bennett and Segerberg 2013: 2). The technological component, in this instance, does not individualise political action, but rather assists networks forming. This alludes to something of the affective nature of political action. While connective action involves a personalisation of politics, the necessity of feeling as if one is acting within a group or network is retained. The importance of belonging is retained. For example, Bennett and Segerberg (2013: 8) view Twitter as a particularly effective platform as it ‘enables people in the midst of crowded protests, as well as bystanders from afar’ to organise and coordinate the ongoing protest. It draws people together, through the means of the platform, in a manner which gives a sense of participation in collective action. Here, the notion of connective action can be viewed within the broader connective turn. The visibility of networks, that characteristic of the connective turn, allows for the emergence of activist and protest communities that can be both present and distant. Returning to Hoskins’ terms (2011: 271), they could be considered ‘both dense and diffuse’.

In proposing ‘connective action’, the authors also draw attention to frequent discursive calls towards inclusivity and belonging, terming these ‘symbolic inclusiveness’ (Bennett and Segerberg 2013: 37). This is seen in the use of terms such as ‘We Are the 99%’ by the Occupy movements, where people from different backgrounds are encouraged to feel included within a particular protest movement. This ‘symbolic inclusiveness’ shows echoes of the populist ‘people’ as an in-group, which could similarly be suggested to be built upon a notion of symbolic inclusiveness. Bennett and Segerberg see the same inclusivity in action at the ‘put people first’ protest against the G20 meeting in London in 2009. While each of these cases are rooted in a physical space – the Occupy movement in New York, the ‘Put People First’ march in central London – this symbolic inclusiveness allows digital participation, an extended belonging, for those who cannot be physically present.

This breaks down notions of a hard split between the online and offline (see also Bareither 2019; 2017), moving instead towards a notion of a changed political landscape where the online and offline interact with each other and influence each other relationally. While discussing symbolic inclusivity, however, the authors do not discuss what is understood by ‘symbolic’ in this context. This power of symbols in collective action and the propagation of a sense of national identity, as discussed in the previous chapter, is not considered. For Bennett and Segerberg such symbols might emerge in the form of memes or other online content, where actors across vast distances can act to contribute to the collective. They draw us towards the notion of new digitally mediated *lieux de mémoire*, where symbols convey a meaning that can further instil a sense of belonging. Connective action and connective memory become combined in the communication of belonging and inclusivity. They also note that the actions, both personal and collective, developed are often ‘emotionally compelling’ (Bennett and Segerberg 2013: 40). In doing so the authors bring attention to three key points. Firstly, the inseparability of online and offline action. Secondly, they allude to the power of symbols in drawing a sense of inclusivity. Thirdly, the affective operation of this inclusivity is covered. Therefore, while not discussing nationalism or populism explicitly, the authors create a strikingly similar concept of collective belonging to that discussed by Guibernau. In the below sections, the inseparability of online and offline action, and an associated discursive-mnemonic construction of collective belonging, is seen through uses of Magna Carta on Twitter. The key elements of the *moving moment* (temporal and spatial movement, affective capacity,

and instigation of political action) are explored in these uses of the memory of 1215 in online discourse.

### ***5.1.2 Magna Carta in 280 Characters***

In this section I discuss a set of Tweets gathered between 8 and 25 June 2018. This is a period which covered both the apparent anniversary of the first sealing of Magna Carta (15 June) and the second anniversary of the UK-EU Referendum (23 June). This period was chosen as a means of covering both an historical anniversary that might be expected to increase discussion of Magna Carta as a piece of heritage and an instance where it might be expected that there would be an increase in its use in political discussion. While I predominantly adopt a CDA methodology here, particularly that of the DHA (Wodak 2015; Reisgl and Wodak 2016), some statistical analysis of the content has also been undertaken. This itself can be seen as a further reflection of the relational interaction between online and offline political content. Where the DHA looks at individual Tweets in detail, the ability to capture relatively large amount of content with ease allows for the viewing of some trends in the content.

Firstly, of the Tweets gathered in June 2018, just under two-thirds (6,058 out of 9,816) have received ten or fewer retweets (the *verbatim* sharing of a post). The average retweet count, however, is 48. This, in rather simple terms, illustrates the fact that the data is skewed by a minority of posts that receive high levels of interaction. Contrary to the suggestion that social media can act as a democratising tool, this suggests that imbalances of power and influence are retained in social media. As we shall see in the first examples below, a number of these most-interacted-with posts come from individuals who already occupy positions of public influence. In this initial set of Tweets, I focus the analysis upon tweets that have received the most interaction in terms of retweets and, therefore, have been shared most widely on Twitter. While other forms of interaction are possible (such as commenting on or liking a tweet), here I use retweet counts as an indicator of a significant interaction and indicator of the reach of a post. It should be noted that retweets can be used as a means of quoting and disagreeing with the content included. However, it is the case that the most common use of the retweet is to simply distribute the post to the user's own followers, and therefore is usually an act of agreement with the content in the original tweet.

In this set of data, the most extensive interaction is found among users/account holders with traditionally public political roles. Additionally, two of the most prominent political tweets both relate not to British politics, but to issues in the United States and Canada. The transatlanticism of Magna Carta is reinforced. Firstly, this Tweet from the former White House Ethics lawyer – a post held during the George W Bush presidency – and active political commentator Richard Painter:

Tweet 1 [3,716 Retweets (RTs)]: The President can't obstruct justice because he is the top law enforcement officer. The President can't have a conflict of interest. Like a king before Magna Carta the President IS the law. And congress is too busy with its own corruption to care.

And secondly, from the deputy leader of the Canadian Conservative Party (and so at the time of writing the deputy leader of the opposition) Lisa Raitt:

Tweet 2 [603 RTs]: Fantastic point of order by @AndrewScheer. He reminded the House that today in history the Magna Carta was signed giving people fundamental rights and privileges. The King could no longer impose taxes without approval of the ppl. We deserve to know the cost of the carbon tax.

In these instances, Magna Carta is called up as a means of calling attention to an apparent abuse of power. In the first instance, Painter portrays President Trump as being like a king ruling above the law. Like a pre-Magna Carta king, the President is the ultimate arbiter of what is legal. In referencing congress dealing with 'its own corruption', Painter tacitly suggests that Trump is himself engaged in corrupt activity. The specific reference to Magna Carta here shows both similar and distinct traits in comparison to the British political discourse discussed in the previous chapter. Magna Carta is again mobilised as a means of referring to issues of fairness and justice. In this instance, attention is drawn to a lack of fairness and the potential inability to call Presidents to justice in the American political system. Secondly, Magna Carta is mobilised in oppositional terms. While in texts discussed previously this emerged specifically along party political lines, here the opposition emerges in a different form. Although ostensibly a Republican, having served in the George W Bush government, Painter has more recently become known for a strong anti-Trump position. This opposition is present in this Tweet, but so too is a broader opposition to the current political establishment, in the form of Congress.

It is in this opposition that something of a difference in the use of Magna Carta appears. Where in British politics the moment was often used to project a notion of British exceptionalism, here Painter uses the Tweet in almost the opposite fashion. In calling on the long history of Magna Carta, and the notion that the President can act like a pre-Magna Carta King, Painter presents American politics as a focus of ridicule. How might it be that this system allows a president to act like a king prior to Magna Carta?

The second Tweet, from Lisa Raitt, makes use of Magna Carta in clearer, party-politically oppositional terms. Also, in something of a rarity for the content gathered from Twitter, this Tweet seeks very specifically to draw upon Magna Carta as a piece of heritage and a political discursive tool. The Tweet also blurs the boundary between online and offline political discourse. Firstly, the moment is appealed to purely in reference to the commemoration of a piece of history. Andrew Sheer, the leader of the Canadian Conservative Party, ‘reminded’ the Canadian parliament that ‘today in history the Magna Carta was signed giving people fundamental rights and privileges.’ The central theme is Magna Carta as a turning point in the developing of equal rights and fair access to justice. This is then attached to a current political issue – the potential introduction of a carbon tax in Canada. The suggestion is that the government in power in Canada is introducing a tax that is unfair and unjust. The implication is of a government acting against the will of the people (or, in Twitter parlance, ‘ppl’). The Tweet also refers to a statement made in Parliament but one which, through the affordances of Twitter and social media, is immediately then made public far beyond the walls of this Parliament.

There is a symbiotic relationship between online and offline political discourse and action. This can also be seen in the use of social media by Jeremy Corbyn and the Labour Party. While the impact of social media by Corbyn in the 2017 General Election has already been noted (Dorey 2017), the Labour Party have continued to make use of such platforms in tandem with existing political platforms. It was often the case that clips of a particular statement made by Corbyn during the weekly Prime Minister’s Questions (PMQs) session would appear rapidly on social media. As such clips reach a significant audience, although not quite as substantial as PMQs itself<sup>12</sup>, this can lead to a position where questions are written for politicians such as Corbyn with their social media impact, in addition to their

---

<sup>12</sup> One recent video on Jeremy Corbyn’s official Facebook page had 199,000 views at the time of writing (Available at: <https://www.facebook.com/JeremyCorbynMP/videos/449714615591300/UzpfSTI1NzQ5NjQ3NDEwOjEwMTU2NDc4NzkzMjU3NDEx/>)

effectiveness in parliament, in mind. There is a ‘hybrid media system’ (Chadwick 2017) in operation here, where traditional means of communication work in relation to more recently emergent digital media.

This hybrid media system allows particular issues to be rapidly reframed for a global audience. In the Tweets above, Magna Carta discursively ties a particular political issue to transnational issues of equality and fairness. The transatlanticism of Magna Carta is reinforced. It acts as a reference point not only for those commenting on British politics, but rather as a reference point for the English-speaking west. There is also a continuing use of Magna Carta as a shorthand reference to issues of rights, fairness and justice. Thirdly, this is often used in an oppositional manner, calling for a specific action to be taken. The various *topoi* suggested by Wodak, such as the *topos of threat* or *topos of history*, do not sum up the manner in which Magna Carta is used here. In this instance I suggest that we see the emergence of a *topos of justice*. This is a piece of discourse that focuses upon issues of justice, freedom and individual rights. While often intersecting with the *topoi of threat/history*, the central argument is built upon these notions of justice. The argumentation scheme in this instance acts as follows: if there is a denial, or threat of denial, of justice or individual rights, then actions must be taken in order to return that fairness and justice. The argumentation scheme therefore suggests the presence of three constituent parts of a piece of discourse. Firstly, a reference must be made to notions of justice, legality, human rights and fairness. While this could be made explicitly, as we shall see here Magna Carta acts as a symbol or synecdoche for these notions. Secondly, there must be a threat to these rights. Finally, there must be a correctional action to be made in response to this.

Each of these elements is present in the Lisa Raitt tweet:

Tweet 2 [603 RTs]: Fantastic point of order by @AndrewScheer[3]. He reminded the House that today in history the Magna Carta [1] was signed giving people fundamental rights and privileges. The King could no longer impose taxes without approval of the ppl. We deserve to know the cost of the carbon tax [2].

At point [1] we see Magna Carta brought in as a shorthand reference to the development of rights, fairness and equal access to justice. At point [2] we see this under threat from the introduction of a tax about which people have not, supposedly, been given adequate

information. Thirdly, at point [3] we see the action that must be taken. As this statement was made by Andrew Sheer, leader of the opposition, the action that must be taken is suggested to be to give one's support to the Canadian Conservative Party. They are the party who will respect these long existing rights and privileges.

The potential for using moments such as Magna Carta on Twitter is evidenced in this Tweet. When one is restricted to 280 characters, the careful use of symbols or metaphors can become a potent political tool. There is a significant amount of knowledge and rhetoric which can be communicated in two words - in eleven characters.

These traits seem to equally be recognised by RWPs and are borne out by their use of Magna Carta on Twitter. Take the following Tweet:

Tweet 3 [986 RTs]: **Britgov to citizens[2]:** We will shut you up and lock you up if you don't like how we are dealing with a plague of child sexual abuse. We will shred every document of freedom from the **Magna Carta to the UN Declaration on Human Rights[1]** to protect **our privileges[2]**. [This post links to a news article regarding the **arrest of British right-wing activist Stephen Yaxley-Lennon[3]** (more commonly known as Tommy Robinson)].

The language used in this tweet is strikingly similar to those in the Tweet from Lisa Raitt above. Magna Carta is explicitly related to the protection of privileges, to human rights.

The purpose of the tweet, however, differs significantly. Tweets 1 and 2 could be viewed in terms of established and expected political discourse in their respective countries. In the Tweet 1 it is criticism at the power of the presidency. In Tweet 2 the argument presented is typically party-political, where the incumbent government are targeted as a means of encouraging the vote for the main opposition. In Tweet 3 the argument works as follows. Magna Carta, alongside the UN Declaration on Human rights in this instance, are used as a shorthand reference to issues of equal rights and freedom [1]. In this instance, however, the threat to these freedoms and rights comes not from specific individuals but rather from the broader notion of the British Government [2]. This is framed as a message from 'Britgov to citizens'. To unpick the discourse further, however, we must turn briefly to some background regarding a champion of RWP in the United Kingdom.

### ***5.1.3 The Extreme Right and Magna Carta***

Stephen Yaxley-Lennon, more commonly known by his adopted moniker Tommy Robinson, has been a prominent, chameleonic figure in the British far-right for the past decade. Previously a member of the far-right British National Party (BNP), Yaxley-Lennon rose to particular prominence from 2009 onwards as the leader of the English Defence League (EDL). The EDL formed from the football ‘casuals’ scene – groups of fans connected to particular football clubs who are often known for their hooliganism and violence – and presented themselves as standing against militant Islam. While they publicly stated that they were open to members from various religious, ethnic and sexual minorities, in practice EDL protests were predominantly populated by white males. In addition to a predilection for adopting a range of monikers (he has also adopted the names Paul Harris and Andrew McMaster at various points (see Rampen 2018)), Yaxley-Lennon has also repeatedly moved between or founded new groups as previous platforms have become less useful, or clouded by accusations of extremism. He left the EDL in 2013, supposedly in opposition to the ‘far-right extremism’ (Rampen 2009: 18) of the organisation. In 2014, Yaxley-Lennon became associated with the German anti-Islam group Pegida (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident (German: Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes)) and began to manoeuvre himself into the circles of the emerging ‘alt-right’ movement globally.

Yaxley-Lennon also developed his online presence. He began writing a column for the far-right Canadian website *Rebel Media*, in addition to increasing a presence on platforms such as YouTube and Twitter. Having reached 413,000 followers on Twitter, his account was banned for breaching the platform’s policies in March 2018. A YouTube account, with 390,178 subscribers at the time of writing, continues to exist. Where in the past Yaxley-Lennon has been the leader of particular far-right groups, this re-emergence has been entirely focused on his own personal image. Through the YouTube channel, his website TR News, and Facebook, alongside other smaller platforms, Yaxley-Lennon has cultivated an image of himself as a self-proclaimed ‘enemy of the state’, speaking up for ‘the forgotten people of the UK’. His targets are often of Muslim descent.

On 25 May 2018, Yaxley-Lennon was arrested outside Leeds crown court for broadcasting a “news report” on Facebook regarding an ongoing trial. He was then charged with contempt of court – relating to potentially risking the veracity of the ongoing trial – and



sentenced to 13 months imprisonment. He was released in August 2018 on appeal before being sentenced once more at a retrial in July 2019. This arrest and imprisonment have become a part of the Tommy Robinson myth and brand. His arrest precipitated outspoken support from RWP figures globally, including Dutch far-right politician Geert Wilders and Donald Trump Jr (Perraudin 2018). While Yaxley-Lennon had been convicted of contempt of court a year previously, receiving a suspended sentence, this conviction brought his output to a global audience (Serhan 2018). The arrest was presented globally not in terms of legal procedure, but as ‘politically motivated imprisonment’ (Ford 2018, cited in Serhan 2018). The fact that Yaxley-Lennon was broadcasting from outside the trial of a gang accused of sexual abuse, who Yaxley-Lennon called ‘Muslim child rapists’ (Serhan 2018), set him up as the martyr of the new far-right.

It is in this context that Tweet 3 appears, at the time of the prominence of the ‘#freetommy’ movement across Twitter. Magna Carta is used as shorthand reference to justice and freedom. This freedom is threatened by the British Government. They have turned their back on those freedoms to target that self-described ‘enemy of the state’, Tommy Robinson. The discursive argument is, therefore, that one should support Yaxley-Lennon in his fight against these injustices. Wrapped within this argument for the support of Yaxley-Lennon is the argument that Yaxley-Lennon is exposing something hidden – abuses perpetrated by Muslim individuals – but that the government itself is a part of this cover up. If you don’t like that, the Tweet argues, then the government will arrest you too. That threat to freedom is personalised – you could be the next one to be arrested, unless you act.

This discursive use of Magna Carta continues in two further, heavily retweeted posts. Firstly, in the most retweeted post from this data collection:

Tweet 4 [3,928 RTs]: From the Magna Carta to this. How far our cousins across the pond have fallen. #FreeTommyRobinson. [Alongside a photo of Yaxley-Lennon’s arrest].

The argumentation scheme is again one of the denial of justice by those in a position of power. In Tweet 3 there was a notion that the British Government might ‘shred’ Magna Carta. In Tweet 4 this has already happened. Britain has ‘fallen’ from the standards set in Magna Carta. The evidence presented for this is the arrest of Yaxley-Lennon. This arrest and conviction stand as evidence that the rights and freedoms present since Magna Carta

was first sealed have been lost. Additionally, this is again presented for transatlantic political purposes. Britain has fallen. What are the implications for the United States? The action potentially suggested in this Tweet is revealed by looking at some of the associated discursive features of Twitter.

As suggested by KhosraviNik and Unger (2016), taking a CDA approach to social media entails looking not only at the central piece of text, but also associated discursive features. These can include the username (anonymised here), images used and profile descriptions. The user posting Tweet 4 describes themselves as ‘conservative’ and ‘constitutionalist’. They identify themselves with three hashtags in their profile, including: ‘#TrumpSupporter’ and ‘#BackTheBlue’. The second of these relates to support for the police forces in America and has emerged largely in response to the prominence of the Black Lives Matter movement. Once again, the notion of being supportive of Yaxley-Lennon is connected to support for Trump. Trump is, for some, the figurehead of the success of the alt-right movement of RWPs (Fuchs 2018a).

The international populist adoption of Magna Carta and the connection to Yaxley-Lennon continues in the following Tweet from Ezra Levant, the co-founder of Rebel Media:

Tweet 5 [481 RTs]: A final thought. When I first visited Tommy, I was excited to be in the UK, a land I associated with Shakepeare [sic], Churchill, Magna Carta, etc. I soon learned that Britain is gone; it's in a museum. I am disillusioned. And the cheering from the left confirms I am not wrong.

We come full circle with this Tweet, returning to ideas of British (for which read: English) exceptionalism. Britain is framed as the land of ‘Shake[s]peare, Churchill, Magna Carta’. Magna Carta is almost anthropomorphised here, placing it as a figure like Shakespeare and Churchill which stands as a symbol of the best of Britain. But, as with Tweet 4, that has been lost, ‘it’s in a museum’.

Where Tweets 3 and 4 appear to be from citizen commentators<sup>13</sup>, that is individuals who would not usually be in positions of media prominence, Tweet 5 is a part of a deliberate populist discourse. The thread of tweets within which Tweet 5 is contained includes references to UK prisons ‘dominated by Muslim gangs’ and the need to separate ‘mosque and state’. These points return to nationalist-populist tropes – the creation of an in-group

---

<sup>13</sup> It is possible that such Tweets may be from bots or other state operated propaganda accounts. There was no initial suggestion from the content of accounts that indicated that this would be the case.

which stands against common enemies, in this instance Muslims and the ‘left’ or the elites in the form of the incumbent government.

The in-group is presented in terms lifted directly from Yaxley-Lennon’s own works. Levant praises Yaxley-Lennon for speaking up for the ‘forgotten people’, standing up for those who will feel angry at this loss of all that has made Britain exceptional. As we saw above, spokesperson for the ‘forgotten people’ is how Yaxley-Lennon describes himself on his YouTube channel and TR News website. In this instance, therefore, there is a deliberate mobilisation of Magna Carta for the transatlantic, transnational promotion of RWP views.

In these posts from RWPs, the topos of justice becomes more specific. In the first two examples discussed above, the narrative could be directed towards a wide range of people. Anyone who supports the opposition party in Canada, or who disagrees with Trump in the USA, could be a target of this discourse. In the case of the RWPs, the argument only applies to a particular group of ‘citizens’, ‘cousins’, or ‘people’. It is a topos of justice for those who belong. There are distinctive ‘positive self- and negative other-presentations’ (Wodak 2015: 52) present here. Magna Carta means justice for those who are legitimately British, or at least white and western. According to the tweets above, this is being endangered by the outsider group – the non-white, frequently Muslim, populace. The ambiguity of the historical moment allows for Magna Carta to become a potent tool within these arguments. The detail of what Magna Carta means, its legal application and relevance today, are subsumed by the vague meaning as a bastion for fairness and justice, for the giving of power to ‘the people’. Here the particular affordances and limitations of Twitter, the necessity of short statements giving little room for nuance, emerge.

These affordances and limitations are inseparable. The limited length of statements favour a use of the past where the suggested understanding equates to an AHD, or common understanding of the particular historical moment. In using Magna Carta to refer to central themes of fairness and justice, there is no need for lengthy historical contextualisation or explanation. The discursive labour, therefore, is focused upon attaching this historical legitimacy to an intended current political meaning, such as to view the treatment of Yaxley-Lennon as unfair. Such limitations have led to Twitter being characterised as a space of dissonance and antagonistic public discourse (Pfetsch 2018). Certainly, the effective RWP and extremist use of social media suggests a recognition of the potential for

these platforms to facilitate the spread of dissonant and antagonistic *ideologies*. However, the form of the use of the past here does not necessarily inherently favour discourse of division. There remains a dialogic potential in social media discourse, although this can be limited in scope (Farrell-Banks 2020). While the development of the *moving moment* here is seen amongst RWP/extremist political actors, this does not mean that *moving moments* and the same form of use of the past online cannot mobilise other forms of political discourse.

## 5.2 Internationalist Populism

In the Tweets discussed above, the internationalist development of the new RWP discourse is key. While the ‘FreeTommy’ campaign relates to a British right-wing political actor and to distinctly British legal issues, in regard to the legalities of reporting on ongoing trials, it was mobilised internationally. Similarly, while Magna Carta has been presented as a moment tied to notions of English exceptionalism in traditional political discourse, here it is mobilised to facilitate the spread of RWP support internationally. In doing so, Magna Carta itself becomes something which gains meaning internationally. In an interview with supporters of the populist Italian (then-) Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini, of the RWP Lega party, Channel 4 correspondent Paraic O’Brien describes young supporters of Salvini as spreading the ‘internationalism of the new nationalism’ (O’Brien 2018).

One young-adult Salvini supporter says that he is against ‘the Islamisation of Europe and the Islamisation of the UK’. He goes on to say that ‘London is London, not Londonistan. London is London. The London of Churchill’. When O’Brien questions this point, suggesting that what the interviewee means is that London is a place only for people who are white and Christian, the Salvini supporter responds: ‘The London of Magna Carta. Not the London of Islamisation and sharia’. Where the transatlantic use of Magna Carta could be attributed in part to the influence of Magna Carta on the US Bill of Rights, and the long-standing use of Magna Carta in American politics can be seen elsewhere (see below), this use of Magna Carta as a reference point by a young RWP activist in Italy stands apart. Notably, the reference points for this activist are the same as those called upon by Ezra Levant. Churchill and Magna Carta are the figures and characteristics threatened by Muslim populations in Britain.

In the recent European Parliament elections, Yaxley-Lennon stood as a candidate for the North-West of England. He received only 2.24% of the vote. While this could be seen as a sign that his rhetoric has had little impact, I suggest that through the affordances offered by social media, ‘Tommy Robinson’ has been allowed to influence political discourse internationally. He exists within this new internationalist nationalism and populism. Discursively, historic moments such as Magna Carta become a part of this internationalist network. They become moments which are easily moved within these right-wing populist discursive spaces.

The internationalism of the far right is not a recent trait. Rather, transnational networks of far-right groups and fascist groups have a long history (see Macklin 2013; Bar-On 2013; Alcalde 2016). Therefore, it has rightly been seen as misguided to consider an international right-wing movement as a new development. Equally, it is the case that the development of new technologies and particularly the connectivity of social media has changed the way in which these groups interact (Fuchs 2018a; 2018b; Gounari 2018; Caiani and Parenti 2016). The changing exchanges and development of collective memories through digital media is an integral part of this mode of far-right operation.

### **5.3 Magna Carta in Heritage Discourse**

When Ezra Levant bemoans the loss of Magna Carta and Churchill to a museum, he communicates the sentiment that the museum is for things lost, things past. It suggests that the museum is somehow separable from our present day lives. For Levant, the sense that influential figures such as Magna Carta, Shakespeare and Churchill can only be found in the museum speaks to an apparent loss of British exceptionalism in the present day. The museum, in these conceptions becomes a place for that which has been lost, a site of relics to a superiority that is being threatened or has disappeared. In presenting the past in these terms, the role of the museum in influencing our collective perceptions of the world is denigrated. In earlier sections I have sought to move against the notion of digital platforms as somehow separable from the ‘real world’. Similarly, the role of the museum as a place for the sharing of knowledge and understanding should not be seen as separable from lived cultural experiences. Separating these not only undermines the role of the museum, but also serves to absolve the museum of a political responsibility for the knowledge they share.

The AHD of Magna Carta facilitates its easy political use as a *moving moment*. In previous sections this focused upon understandings of Magna Carta as built through historical accounts, and the degree to which a dominant meaning of Magna Carta has developed over a long period. This dominant understanding of Magna Carta allows for its easy use in political discourse, as little historical labour is asked of political audiences. Their understanding of these pasts is not challenged. Magna Carta refers to British exceptionalism and leadership in fairness and justice. The discourse is, therefore, allowed to focus upon using this past to instil legitimacy, while the audience is encouraged to focus on political issues – such as the need to leave the EU. This is particularly useful in Twitter discourse where there it is necessary to communicate a call for political action in limited characters. Magna Carta, I argue, is potent as it allows for a communication of a sense of exceptionalism in eleven characters. It is a historic moment that has found use in promoting nationalist and, more recently, populist-nationalist discourses (Chapter 4), where that exceptionalism is used in promoting the rights of white Western citizens against perceived threats, predominantly from Muslim populations. In the next sections I look at whether this use of Magna Carta finds commonality in the representation of this moment in official heritage discourse.

Runnymede, the apparent location of the first sealing of Magna Carta, is a heritage landscape with traces of Magna Carta distributed across the space. The story written in that landscape now is, much as with the discussion of Magna Carta in Parliament, a gradual redeployment of Magna Carta in the past sixty years. The transatlanticism of Magna Carta comes to the fore at Runnymede. The first memorial built at this heritage site is the ‘American Bar Association (ABA) Memorial to Magna Carta’. Constructed in 1957, an inscription upon the memorial states that its purpose is ‘to commemorate Magna Carta, symbol of freedom under law’ (Figure 5.1). In traditional political discourse, and in the expansion to online discourse, Magna Carta was used discursively as a reference point for freedom under law. On the Memorial this notion of what Magna Carta means is written in stone.

In the decades since the first erection of the memorial, the ties between Magna Carta and the American political and legal system have been reinforced. Inscribed paving stones surrounding the memorial, from 18 July 1971 and 13 July 1985, state that ‘The ABA again came here and pledged adherence to the principles of the Great Charter’ or ‘returned to this place to renew its pledge of adherence to the principles of the Great Charter’. Further

inscriptions come on 15 July 2000 ('to celebrate Magna Carta, foundation of the rule of law for ages past and for the new millennium'), and 15 June 2015 ('The ABA rededicated this memorial in commemoration of the 800<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Magna Carta, foundation of the rule of law, and reaffirmed its commitment to the principles of the Great Charter').



*Figure 5.1 The Magna Carta Memorial, Runnymede (Author's Image)*

The landscape at Runnymede is further tied to American history and heritage by the presence of a memorial to President John F Kennedy set into the same landscape, on land gifted to the USA by the UK for this purpose. The landscape, at a site apparently focused upon a defining piece of British heritage, is dominated by links to the USA. This is a further reflection of the foundational influence that Magna Carta is said to have had on American politics (see Warren 1997). As with the commentators in posts discussed above (Tweets 1 and 2) the veneration of Magna Carta is seen as giving legitimacy to legal and

political actors in the present<sup>14</sup>. The ABA, and politicians who have taken part in ceremonies at the site, recognise individual rights and freedom under law as symbolised by Magna Carta, ergo they can be trusted to uphold these principles today. This is a heavily contained and managed form of ‘past-presencing’ (Macdonald 2013), where these past moments are made relevant to the dominant political movements of the present. Magna Carta is moved into the present with very specific political connections in mind, in particular the upholding of values of justice, freedom and democracy that are placed as being Western (in particular British and American) in origin.

At Runnymede, the memorials also sit within a particular type of English landscape. The site is a short drive from London. It sits within the southern edges of an area of parkland, the greenspace providing some escape from the suburban sprawl. Heathrow is located just across the nearby M25, and the sound of planes acts as a reminder of the globalised urban environment surrounding the site. On arriving at the site on a sunny June day in 2018, the first sight was of small groups of people sitting out on the riverside as row boats passed by. A small number of house boats are moored in the area. It is an almost stereotypical view of what wealthy middle England should look like. That the memorial site is owned and maintained by the National Trust merely adds to this image. The National Trust as an organisation has been accused of promoting ‘a country-house version of ‘Englishness’’ (Samuel 2012: 160), creating a particular, marketable sense of English heritage. Whilst the variety of sites included in their purview has shifted in the years since Samuel’s (first published in 1994) critique<sup>15</sup>, the landscape around Runnymede can be viewed within this framing. The site includes a tearoom, housed in one of the Fairhaven Memorial Lodge – houses commissioned by Lady Fairhaven, the landowner who donated the site to the National Trust, in memory of her husband Sir Urban Broughton MP. This rural Englishness and the authority given to the site as a National Trust property gives further weight to the importance of Magna Carta as an elemental piece of British history. There is a depth of history, one that is made use of in political discourse, that is given added legitimacy through the National Trust ownership.

---

<sup>14</sup> This veneration of certain British political figures in American politics has been echoed in recent years by the placing of a bust of Churchill in the Oval Office of the White House. Initially given as a gift by Tony Blair to George W Bush, the bust was returned at the end of Bush’s presidency. In 2017, it reappeared as Donald Trump took residency in the White House. (see *The Guardian* 2017).

<sup>15</sup> In 2015, for example, the National Trust launched ‘Brutal Utopias’, marked as a ‘celebration of brutalist architecture’.



The presentation of Magna Carta at Runnymede encourages a deeper consideration of an AHD relation to Magna Carta. Laurajane Smith's concept of the AHD refers to the expert- and institutionally proscribed narratives which are attached to a piece of heritage, while also recognising power dynamics that contribute to defining what might be considered 'heritage' at all. A piece of heritage is given an official interpretation, which can be considered to be the AHD. Smith suggests that in recognising that there is an AHD, one might also draw attention to alternative interpretations or discourses relating to heritage that may be excluded as they do not subscribe to the AHD. The official AHD will often tend towards a reflection of dominant groups, both politically and professionally (Henson 2016), meaning that minority groups, whose views may find less representation in society, will also find less representation at heritage sites. This AHD is often Western-centric globally, with the meaning of heritage on a broad level often built around the historically Western focused organisations. Certain practices are privileged, 'especially those of heritage professionals and the state' while 'a whole range of popular ideas and practices relating to heritage are excluded.' (Harrison 2013: 111). These practices will impact upon the strength of a *moving moment*. A use of the past within political discourse that echoes the hegemonic AHD of that same past will be more effective as, once again, the labour required from the audience is diminished. Where an AHD has a place in a collective consciousness, national or otherwise, there is less work required of an audience when that piece of the past appears in non-heritage discourse, including political discourse. If the political statement does not seek to challenge the understanding developed by an AHD, then a confidence can be built into the political statement, as the understanding of the past is taken to be truthful. As seen in Twitter usage of Magna Carta, this communication of the past can be limited to a very simple statement, such as the fact that Britain is 'the country of Magna Carta'. This statement does not challenge understandings of Magna Carta, it asks an audience to bring to mind their understanding of this past. For most, this will be an understanding which echoes an AHD. The rest of the political statement can then be focused upon the work of moving this audience to political action.

However, while the history of the site for a long time was focused upon the American ties to Magna Carta, in recent years a reinvigoration of Magna Carta and its relevance seems to have taken place. This mirrors the increasing reference to Magna Carta in the UK parliament and British political discourse. The trend is characterised by a number of new inclusions to the Runnymede site developed as a part of the commemorations of the 800<sup>th</sup>

anniversary of Magna Carta. The centrepiece of the 800<sup>th</sup> anniversary was the installation of a new artwork at Runnymede, a piece entitled *The Jurors* by Hew Locke (2015). This is a piece which draws on common myths relating to Magna Carta, while also placing the events of 1215 within a broader, global narrative of freedom.



*Figure 5.2: The Jurors, Runnymede (Author's Image)*

*The Jurors* (Figure 5.2) is a set of twelve chairs placed in the field at Runnymede, below the hillside upon which the ABA Magna Carta memorial sits. These twelve seats represent the twelve members of a jury in the UK legal system. Immediately the piece connects to the myth of Magna Carta as directly linked to *Habeas Corpus* and the right to trial by jury. Each of the wooden chairs is decorated with carvings on the front and rear relating to stories of justice or human rights across the globe. The historic stories, figures and moments alluded to are diverse and global, including: a spinning wheel designed by Mahatma Gandhi as a political symbol of resistance; a portrait of Phillis Wheatley, the first African-American woman to be published; an image of the Exxon Valdez tanker, which spilled 11 million gallons of oil into the Gulf of Alaska in a 1989 environmental disaster; a commemoration of the 1920 marches of blind trade-unionists in the UK to Trafalgar

Square; a memorial to ‘The Disappeared’, the collective title for those who have been taken away and often murdered at the will of a political organisation or state; a small boat carrying refugees inscribed with the responsibilities of nations to protect refugees; an inscription, in Chinese script, which details the Confucian principles of humanness, ritual and justice, originally written in 206 BCE; and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.

The placing of Magna Carta in an international context is a concept which appears repeatedly in political discourse. In this instance, however, the place of Magna Carta is not the sole starting point of the development of human rights and equality under law, but rather as a moment within a longer history of such developments. It is placed within a global narrative of the development of equal human rights, not simply the Western development of these ideals. Actions of western governments and organisations – on the environment, the protection of refugees, on racial segregation – could be seen as being condemned in the artwork. While some sense of British exceptionalism remains, with Magna Carta seen as a cornerstone of the development of human rights, this is used here as a means of encouraging the viewer to consider this in an international context.

At Salisbury Cathedral, a similar narrative stance is taken. On entering Salisbury Cathedral, a sign directs visitors towards the ‘Magna Carta: Spirit of Justice – Power of Words’ exhibit in the Chapter House. The affective potential of histories such as Magna Carta is immediately recognised. The document carries the ‘Spirit of Justice’, not as anything physical but in the communication of ideas. There is a recognition of affect as discursive, as this spirit is carried in the ‘power of words’. Displays at Salisbury actively seek to refute inaccuracies in a Magna Carta myth, for example by offering depictions of King John signing Magna Carta and asking visitors to ‘explore the exhibition to find out what [the errors in this image] are’. This desire to recognise past false depictions can give added authority to the narrative of Magna Carta presented.

The display also engages in explicit acts of ‘past-presencing’ (MacDonald 2013). It asks what relevance the document holds for us today (‘Magna Carta Now – So What?’), answering this with a focus upon rights of freedom and justice. As with the installations at Runnymede, Salisbury Cathedral focuses upon international fights for human rights and justice to foreground the relevance of Magna Carta. Visitors are told that rights such as the trial by a jury of one’s peers, or the ability to challenge your government in court, are the

continued tangible results of processes started by Magna Carta. Having offered a sense of what Magna Carta has achieved, the display then introduces the visitor to those places where such freedoms have not been achieved. ‘In many countries’, the display tells us, ‘there are lapses in the application of justice’. These display boards use images from the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings in Egypt to illustrate this point (Figure 5.3).



*Figure 5.3: Protest material from the 'Arab Spring' uprisings in Egypt. Salisbury Cathedral (Author's Image).*

This focus upon the Arab Spring, and particularly protests in Egypt, is partly a reflection of the designing of the exhibition in 2015 (to mark the 800<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the first sealing of Magna Carta). Temporal distance from these protests (although not from the resulting ongoing war in Syria) can moderate the impact of these displays. However, there remains a potential narrative of British exceptionalism. The development of human rights and equality in justice as the result of Magna Carta can be seen as a narrative rooted in England. Ongoing global injustices are conversely communicated through discussion of foreign, predominantly Middle Eastern, protest movements. The goal of the exhibition, and the Cathedral more widely, is to use their exhibition spaces to encourage visitors to consider ongoing fights for human rights and justice. There is a desire to present Magna

Carta as active and relevant to our political lives in the present. However, there is the potential of a dangerous reading of these displays.

As we have seen above, Magna Carta has been frequently mobilised as a shorthand reference for English or Western superiority against a false and divisive notion of Middle Eastern, migrant or Muslim inferiority. For visitors who are already inclined towards these viewpoints, a possible reading of these displays could act to reinforce such views. This does not equate to the display endorsing such views – indeed it is most likely the case that this is the opposite of the intended reading of the display. However, when considering the political context of the last decade – one of rising Islamophobia and increasing public proclamations of English superiority many of which have been pinned to references to Magna Carta – one can begin to consider the danger of these potential readings. Where the AHD around Magna Carta is one of English exceptionalism, a shorthand reference to this moment can facilitate a right-wing construction of that exceptionalism against a less desirable other. For the supporters of the ‘FreeTommy’ hashtag, this allows for an easy construction of English exceptionalism as founders of freedom under Magna Carta, an exceptionalism now threatened by a Muslim and migrant other. For supporters of Brexit, the exceptionalism symbolised by Magna Carta is threatened by a bureaucratic European other. In each instance, the understanding of Magna Carta required of the political audience does not differ to any significant degree from that presented in heritage discourse. A recognition of these uses of the past could encourage heritage sites to offer a more challenging discourse within their exhibition spaces.

This presents a challenge to institutions who may not have the financial ability to respond to changing political contexts. Signage at Salisbury Cathedral informs visitors that it costs £14,000 per day to run the Cathedral. Engagement with visitors is often undertaken by volunteers, and frequent updates of exhibition material may not be a priority. To suggest that heritage sites such as these should be more proactive politically can easily be written off as impractical, time-intensive and expensive. However, the changing political landscape and the insight into wider public use of Magna Carta in political discourse does allow for a reflection on the process of presenting histories that could be seen as *moving moments* – i.e. histories with a strong potential for use in political discourse. Salisbury Cathedral and Runnymede both acknowledge that the history of Magna Carta is political, and that the presentation of Magna Carta continues to have political impact in the present. Having recognised the politicised nature of such histories, such heritage sites are taking on



an additional responsibility to consider the political impact of their use of these historical moments.

If we are to consider these *moving moments* as carrying additional political power when communicated affectively, as is frequently the case in social media or traditional political discourse, then the potential affective capacity of heritage and museum discourse must also be considered. The producers of the exhibition at Salisbury Cathedral consider the ‘spirit’ of Magna Carta to carry a certain power. The political and emotional relevance of Magna Carta is communicated in these displays. However, how visitors might use this ‘spirit’ or knowledge is not articulated. This is an openness to individual interpretation that can be extremely positive in allowing for the communication of this very specific historical moment to a diverse global audience – one that is actively sought and welcomed at Salisbury Cathedral. However, in leaving the divisive use of these pasts unchallenged, the legitimacy of the use of Magna Carta by right-wing groups is equally unchallenged.

There are essential caveats here. While it may be tempting to place a heavy level of responsibility on heritage sites to present stronger narratives of inclusivity, and to push back against divisive ideologies more actively, this can also absolve political activists of a responsibility to shape such discourse. Many potential readings of the display at Salisbury can also be seen as championing the rights of the oppressed. One might then consider how and why a RWP use of Magna Carta seems to be most pervasive in political discourse. I suggest that these actors have made stronger affective use of the ambiguity of Magna Carta. Magna Carta for these groups is used as a means of taking the anger or fear that they cultivate and giving a confidence to act. This confidence is provided by the sense of English exceptionalism that can be found in Magna Carta as the origins of human rights and justice, alongside the deep historical legitimacy that comes from the use of a distant past. England, or Western societies, have been leaders in human rights and justice for centuries, ergo it must be right to continue to consider ourselves in these terms. Complex histories and actions are swept aside by this simple, confidence breeding narrative.

## 5.4 Chapter Summary

**Table 5.1:** Magna Carta as a *Moving Moment* – Chapter Summary

<p><b>Spatial Movement</b></p> <p>Digitally facilitated global movement of political uses of the past – Magna Carta appearing in political discourse in Italy, America, and Canada.</p> <p>Movement across heritage sites. Magna Carta present in different landscapes and settings, accompanied by movement of people to these sites.</p> <p>Transatlantic movement of Magna Carta, both digitally (Tweets from American and Canadian commentators) and in heritage sites (JFK memorial and American Bar Association link at Runnymede).</p>	<p><b>Temporal Movement</b></p> <p>Past-presencing in political and heritage discourse.</p> <p>A mix of deliberate (i.e. Farage) and habitual (i.e. Salvini supporter) acts in political discourse. Low temporal labour in political discourse, as heavy past-presencing has taken place elsewhere.</p> <p>More consistent past-presencing, and therefore heavier temporal labour, in heritage sites, which seek to communicate the deep history of the moment. Particularly true of cathedral sites which act as continued holders of issues of Magna Carta.</p>
<p><b>Affective Movement</b></p> <p>Continued communication of a sense of exceptionalism and common identity, particularly for English and American audiences.</p> <p>Historical sense of fairness and equality linked to perceived inequalities (therefore threats) in the present – such as the threat from Muslim migration or the threat to individual liberties (Yaxley-Lennon supporters).</p>	<p><b>Political Movement</b></p> <p>To support particular political actors or groups, such as the opposition in Canada (Twitter discourse), or to support Stephen Yaxley-Lennon (#FreeTommy discourse).</p> <p>The shorthand use of Magna Carta to produce an affective response is shown to facilitate political discourse, where a focus can be placed upon encouraging particular</p>

<p>Affective responses built upon use of references to the past that echo an AHD – i.e. Magna Carta as a symbol of justice, fairness, and exceptionalism.</p> <p>Communication of a particular affective response facilitated by the adherence to an AHD.</p>	<p>actions, such as supporting Yaxley-Lennon.</p>
---	---

Table 5.1 outlines the dimensions of movement seen in uses of Magna Carta detailed in this chapter. Firstly, the spatial movement of uses of this past has expanded to include digitally facilitated ‘connective action’ associated with references to Magna Carta. Secondly, the temporal movement – the past-presencing of Magna Carta – can be seen in heritage and political discourse. However, where heritage discourse, like the historical accounts detailed in Chapter 4, requires a heavier temporal labour in providing a sense of deep history, political discourse often only requires the audience to call upon a base knowledge of these historical moments. The temporal movement presented in heritage sites also builds upon an AHD, where a thematic focus remains upon notions of fairness, justice and British exceptionalism. This facilitates, on the third part, a clear affective communication through reference to *MC*. In this chapter we saw how this communication of affect could facilitate the constructing of a perceived threat to justice and liberty, either from Muslim migrants or from prominent political actors. This, fourthly, allows for the stronger communication of a need for political action. References to Magna Carta, which only ask audiences to concur with an AHD understanding of this historical moment, can instil a deep sense of group belonging through the construction of a shared history. In suggesting that the values symbolised by this shared history might be under threat, political actions – ranging from supporting a political party to protesting in support of Stephen Yaxley-Lennon – are encouraged.

The relevance of the strength of this use of the past by right-wing actors is shown in clearer terms in the following chapters. The use of Magna Carta by the groups discussed above has cultivated divisive political action, such as the positioning of the United Kingdom as opposed to a European other, or the spread of a certain level of Islamophobic viewpoints through the support for Stephen Yaxley-Lennon. The following two chapters apply some of the same methodologies to a discussion of the use of the 1683 breaking of



the Siege of Vienna in right-wing political discourse. Unlike the use of Magna Carta, the use of the memory of 1683 has provided inspiration for a politics of division that has crossed into violent expressions of right-wing extremism. In moving to discuss greater levels of extremism, the necessity to find means of countering such division becomes even more pressing.

## Chapter 6

### 1683: The Siege of Vienna and European Populism

In September 1683, allied western European forces attacked Ottoman forces who had besieged Vienna since July. Advancing down from the hills of Kahlenberg, on the outskirts of the city, the Ottoman armies were repelled, and Vienna was liberated.

This is the straightforward narrative of the breaking of the 1683 Siege of Vienna. It is one of West vs East, of Christians vs Muslims, and of the protection and liberation of Europe from the Ottomans. As with Magna Carta, however, this is an historic moment where a mythical simplicity of narrative exists. It is another potentially ‘restless’ (Chidgey 2018), messy and ambiguous historic moment. Much as the assemblages of memory practices, discursive or otherwise, around Magna Carta are numerous and shifting, so too are the assemblages of memory practices surrounding the 1683 Siege of Vienna. This chapter begins with a brief history of the Siege of Vienna, followed by a discussion of the moving of this piece of history into recent political discourse. In tracking the use of the 1683 Siege across heritage sites, urban landscapes, and through political discourse, the following two chapters show how this ‘restlessness’ might become a characteristic of an historical moment through its continued use in political discourse over a long period of time. However, this restlessness then paradoxically allows for the deliberate use of these pasts towards specifically targeted political action such as, we shall see below, extremist right-wing actions.

#### 6.1 The 1683 Ottoman Siege of Vienna

The second Volume of Shaw & Shaw’s *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey* (1977) is prefaced by two maps. The first details ‘the Growth of the Ottoman Empire, 1280-1683’. The second covers the decline from 1683-1975 (Shaw & Shaw 1977: xxii-xxiv). While the intricacies of the expansion and decline of the Ottoman Empire might make this a simplified viewpoint, this alludes to the sense that from 1683, and particularly following the defeat of the Ottoman forces at the Siege of Vienna, the Ottoman Empire begins a long decline. 1683 is a pivotal moment in Ottoman history.

The reality is slightly more complex and draws us towards a history of shifting powers and the emergence of the nation-state. Shaw and Shaw (1977: 169) recognise this, noting that the increasing power of emerging European nation-states provided stronger opposition to the Ottomans than had been faced in preceding centuries. Concurrently, instability and corruption spread through the Ottoman political system. Turmoil within the closed Ottoman economic system, precipitated by growing trading wealth in Western Europe, resulted in inflation, the decline of traditional craft industries, and a decline in the influence of centralised power structures in Istanbul (Shaw & Shaw 1977: 172-4). The empire was becoming destabilised from within.

The century preceding the 1683 was also one of frequent conflict, including wars not only with the Habsburgs but also with Venice, Poland and Iran, alongside conflicts and uprisings in Baghdad and the Crimea. The Ottoman Empire also gave support to anti-Habsburg forces in the Thirty Years War. In the 1660s, war with the Habsburgs broke out around the Austrian border in response to Habsburg raids into Ottoman Transylvania. Shaw and Shaw discuss key battles near the banks of the river Raab, at which ‘neither side was in fact victorious [but] the Ottomans were prevented from advancing across the river. Europe, therefore, considered it a spectacular success.’ (Shaw and Shaw 1977: 212). Territory was lost and won, as the ongoing shifts in power across Europe and beyond played out.

In 1681, two years prior to the Ottoman advance upon Vienna, failed campaigns against Russian forces led the Ottoman Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa to accept an apparently ‘unfavourable’ peace treaty, including the loss of Ottoman territory. The willingness to accept such a peace treaty was likely influenced by increasing tensions in Hungary and impending war with the Habsburgs. With the Habsburg forces equally occupied with war with the French to the west, Mustafa was able to support the taking of all of upper Hungary in 1682. Kara Mustafa was seemingly convinced at this point that there was an opportunity to seize Vienna (Shaw 1976: 214). The Ottoman forces advanced to Vienna and besieged the capital of the Habsburg Empire in July of 1683. The city was able to hold out, thanks to the strength of the fortifications, until the arrival of Holy Empire forces led by Jan Sobieski in September 1683. Mustafa and the Ottoman forces were forced into a retreat and on 1 November were once again heavily defeated by Sobieski’s forces in a conflict at the town of Gran. Mustafa was held responsible for the failed attempt to capture Vienna and was executed in Belgrade in December 1683.

The Ottoman armies then lost control of most of northern Hungary, before fleeing Belgrade before the end of the decade. In 1699, the treaty of Karlowitz was signed, formally giving Hungary and Transylvania to Austria, Ukraine to Poland, and a number of islands in the Aegean and on the Dalmatian Coast to the Venetians (McCarthy 1997: 183). The years of decline had begun. This history is complex. In the years that preceded the Siege of Vienna, the Ottoman Empire was one of many players in the fight for territory across modern Europe. To the north they tangled with Russian forces. To the west they were in competition with the Habsburgs and Venetians. The Habsburgs themselves were caught in battles with France and the Dutch Republic, among others. Additionally, the years following 1683 are not simply ones of abject retreat and the decline of the empire. The Ottoman Empire remained in existence for centuries following the defeat at Vienna in 1683, only coming to an end in 1923. As McCarthy (1997: 190) asserts, there is a tendency to focus histories upon ‘what was wrong with the Ottoman Empire’, in a manner that forgets that by 1683 ‘the Ottoman sultans had already ruled for 400 years, and that more than 200 more years would pass before the Empire ceased to exist. Few states could claim such longevity’. The majority of the following century was one of peace, minimal political upheaval and the redevelopment of Istanbul into a ‘city of fountains and pleasure palaces’ (Greene 2015). What has previously been viewed as a story of decline, could equally be viewed as one of progression towards a relatively peaceful century (Greene 2015; Tezcan 2012).

1683 is often presented as the moment in history where Europe was saved from invasion. In practice, however, factions within Europe continued to battle internally, territory continued to be disputed. For some it may be easiest to take a view of the saving of Europe. For others this same history could be seen as a turning point in the advancement of European imperialism. McCarthy (1997: 191) suggests that ‘of all the non-Western countries, only Japan can be said to have withstood the force of Europe’. 1683 could be taken as a starting point for European oppression of others, rather than a moment of liberation. It is, like Magna Carta, a mobile, messy historical moment.

## **6.2 Post-1683 Liberation Mythology**

A clear difference in the movement of 1683, in comparison to discussions of Magna Carta, is in the emergence of a clear mythology on the meaning of the breaking of the Siege of

Vienna from 1683 onwards. This is not a mythology of Europe vs the Ottomans. It is a narrative of Christians/Christianity vs the Ottomans/Islam. In the seventeenth century the predominant image of Turkish people was ‘first that of the infidel and second that of the alien savage: at once the enemy of faith and culture’ (Yapp 1992: 142). Victories, not only in Vienna but also at Lepanto and Malta, were characterised as Christian victories. Pamphlets published at the time of the siege focused upon the defence of Christian territory. Yapp notes that ‘Christian heroes such as [...] John Sobieski were celebrated’ (ibid.). The heroic status of Sobieski was being written right from the moment of the breaking of the Siege. The relevance of 1683 was also already being drawn on religious lines.

The relevance of this to the contemporary use of 1683 is furthered by the development, after 1683, of a more secularised view of Europe. Yapp notes that the 1714 Treaty of Utrecht is the last to refer to the ‘*res publica Christiana*’ (Yapp 1992: 142), representing the end of a shift towards a focus on territorial Europe in place of the lands of Christianity. The events of the breaking of the 1683 Siege are situated not only at a pivotal moment in the long history of the Ottoman Empire, but in the development of a notion of collective European identity.

### ***6.2.1 Anniversaries of 1683: Poland***

Events in Vienna had particular relevance in Poland thanks to the leading role of Jan III Sobieski, the King of Poland and Grand Duke of Lithuania. In 1683 and 1684, the breaking of the Siege was commemorated through the display of war trophies in Kraków, Warsaw and Zhovkva (Sobieski’s hometown). Such displays included the erecting of the defeated Vizier’s tent on the outskirts of Kraków and Zhovkva (Demski 2014). Demski views this as the point at which a leader myth forms around Sobieski. In detailing the 100<sup>th</sup>, 200<sup>th</sup>, 250<sup>th</sup> and 300<sup>th</sup> anniversaries of the breaking of the Siege, Demski constructs a narrative of the increasing valorisation of Sobieski as a symbol of former Polish power and strength. This occurs alongside the development of an increasingly official form of commemoration. Initially, events were marked only in Zhovkva, Warsaw and Kraków. By 1883 commemorations had spread to Polish cities such as Poznan and as widely as Lviv and Kalush in modern Ukraine.

The presence of a Sobieski myth in Poland is echoed in the transnationality of the 1683 memory landscape. For example, a statue of Sobieski originally intended for Vienna has recently been erected in Kraków after the Viennese authorities refused to house it at Kahlenberg (see more detail below). As is seen across the next two chapters, the 1683 siege emerges in right-wing discourse across Europe and, in the instance of the 2019 shooting at mosques in Christchurch, in violent political action as distant as New Zealand. The events of 1683 are not confinable to a particular modern nation state. Even in the simplistic association of the breaking of the Siege with the formation of modern Europe there is a narrative that crosses nation-state borders. Commemorations of 1683 are locally nuanced but occur across nation-states.

### ***6.2.2 Anniversaries of 1683: Vienna***

In Vienna, commemorations of 1683 were shaped by the political situation at the time of the celebrations. There is a common use of the memory of 1683 as a means of unifying against perceived threats at the time of each anniversary. The *Türkengedächtnis* project, hosted by the Austrian Academy of Sciences, has meticulously detailed 1683 anniversary celebrations in Vienna from 1883 to the present. The project suggests that ‘the memory of the Siege of Vienna in 1683 was periodically refreshed or deliberately used for the construction of contemporary enemy stereotypes and threats’ (The Austrian Academy of Sciences (Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, OAW) 2010). The apparent ‘Turks of today’ varied between liberals, conservatives, social democrats or Bolsheviks depending on the political circumstances at the time. At present, the “Turks of today” are most often immigrants, particularly those from the Middle East or North Africa, or more broadly any Muslim populations. The use of 1683 for the construction of a common enemy is not a recent development, but rather one that has been a continuous trend since the earliest commemorations of the siege.

In 1883, a mix of secular and religious events marked the 200<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Siege. Three days of festivities took place at St Stephen’s Cathedral, led by the Archbishop of Vienna and given approval by Pope Leo XIII. Meanwhile, secular events included the ceremonial laying of a keystone at the new Vienna Rathaus (City Hall), the installation of a new commemorative plaque at St. Josefskirche on Kahlenberg, and a firework display from Kahlenberg hill. The placing of the keystone symbolically put the breaking of the

1683 Siege in a foundational position at the heart of modern Vienna. The new Rathaus, the centre of the city, was permanently tied to the events of 1683. Concurrently, the construction of the St. Josef-Weinhaus Church in the Weinhaus district of Vienna was designed to coincide with the 200<sup>th</sup> anniversary celebrations. The construction of this church made more overtly divisive political use of 1683. The parish priest, Joseph Deckert, was renowned for his Islamophobic and anti-Semitic views and preaching (Adler 2016). The decision to focus the consecration of the new church on this anniversary was a means of further reflecting these views, while venerating the apparently Christian liberation of Vienna.

The combination of Islamophobic and anti-Semitic viewpoints were also present in the political discourse of the period. In 1895, Karl Lueger launched his successful mayoral election campaign ‘by noting that “today we remember Vienna’s liberation from the Turks, and let’s hope that we’ll be able to ward off a woe that is even greater than the Turkish danger, namely the woe of Jews”’ (Fredriksson 2014). The malleability of the use of 1683 allowed for its mobilisation against a variety of ‘others’, with little relation to the events of 1683 itself.

The 1933 celebrations took place against the backdrop of the rise of the Nazi parties in Germany and Austria. Events took place in May of 1933 rather than September for no clear reason beyond concern over increasing political tensions (Dallinger 2010). The ‘Turkish Liberation Celebration’ in May of 1933 served to legitimise the authoritarian leadership of Engelbert Dolfuss, who had recently dissolved the Austrian parliament. While the authoritarian government had banned public assembly, a special permit was given for ‘particularly patriotic state-supporting events’ (Wiener Zeitung 1933, cited by Dallinger 2010). The in-group in 1933 were those who were viewed to be adequately patriotic and in support of the governing regime, with the Social Democrats – who traditionally marched on 1 May in Vienna – set as the main opposition. The political turmoil in 1933 appears to have taken precedence over any religious celebrations at this time.

The 300<sup>th</sup> anniversary brought religion back to the fore. A planned visit of Pope John Paul II in 1981 had been cancelled following the assassination attempt on the Pope. The rescheduling of the visit in 1983 allowed for the visit to be closely linked to the 300<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the breaking of the siege. While nominally focused upon the celebration of

Katholikentag (Catholic Day) – a semi-regular celebration of Catholicism in Austria, Germany and Switzerland – events during the Pope’s visit focused almost entirely upon the 1683 siege. This was most evident in the Pope’s visit to Kahlenberg on 13 September. This was widely seen as deliberately designed by the local Catholic organisers of the visit to Vienna (Loffler 1983, cited by Dallinger and Gollner 2010). During his visit to Kahlenberg, the Pope unveiled a memorial plaque to Jan III. Sobieski – notionally a countryman of the Polish Pope. This commemorative plaque is located on the front of St Josefskirche, across from a similar plaque marking John Paul’s visit to the church (Figure 6.1). While the Pope foregrounded messages of peace and unity between nations in his speeches, for many the timing of the visit and the national link to Sobieski furthered the myth of Sobieski as the ‘saviour of Christendom’ (Dallinger and Gollner 2010). The common narrative of 1683 as the saving of Christian Europe against an Ottoman or Muslim other continues in these commemorations. It is this use of 1683 that has been brought to the fore by political groups over the last decade.



*Figure 6.1: Front of St Josefskirche, Kahlenberg. Inscription above the doorway commemorates the role of King Leopold I in the 1683 Siege. To the left of the doorway a plaque commemorates Jan III. Sobieski, whilst the plaque on the right-hand side marks the visit of Pope John Paul II on the 300<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the breaking of the siege (Author’s Image).*



## **6.3 1683 in the Vienna Landscape**

### ***6.3.1 Urban Traces of 1683***

The memory of 1683 is also distributed across the Viennese urban landscape. The traces of the moment permeate throughout the city alongside other similar moments and narratives from the city's history. For example, at the central site of St Stephen's Cathedral, the anti-Ottoman sentiment is present. On the site of the Cathedral, away from the direct attention of the thousands of tourists who flock around the building every day, is a statue to St John of Capistrano. The figure depicts St John in a violent scene, with a spear piercing the flesh of figures at his feet. The reference here is to St John of Capistrano's legend as the warrior Priest, who led forces against the Ottoman armies in the 15<sup>th</sup>-century Battle of Belgrade. The statue depicts this Priest in the act of slaughtering Ottoman enemies, and it stands in pride of place in the centre of Vienna.

Elsewhere, items which relate more directly to 1683 are present. In the proximity of the St. Josef-Weinhaus church (see above) is a bakery which features a large mural of the scene of the 1683 siege on its side wall. This itself stands a short walk from Turkschanzenpark, a city park created around some of the trenches from the 1683 siege. The area around Kahlenberg is filled with memorials to the breaking of the siege or memorials to commemorations of the siege, in a layering of the mnemonic narrative of the locale. The influence of the Ottoman Empire on Vienna also exists in the everyday and banal. The logo of Meisl Coffee, the figure of a boy in a fez (the logo originally depicted a dark-skinned boy but has since been redesigned to be a single colour so as to mimic a silhouette) is a reference to the Turkish origins of the coffee that has become a staple of Vienna life. The influence of the Ottoman Empire is present throughout Vienna. The depictions, however, are often focused not upon the integration that took place, but rather upon defeats of Ottoman forces. It is a narrative of opposition, of triumph of Western Europe over the East.

### ***6.3.2 1683 in the Museum***

The same can be said of the narrative presented in Viennese museums. Both the Wien Museum – Karlsplatz, and the Military History Museum of Vienna present a simple, linear narrative of the events of 1683. The Wien Museum – Karlsplatz is the central building of

Vienna's main city history museum conglomerate. Karlsplatz itself is a short walk from the city's Museums Quarter – home to the MUMOK contemporary art gallery and Leopold Museum of Modern Art – and the adjacent Museum of Natural History and Kunsthistorisches (Art History) Museum. The grand 19<sup>th</sup>-century architecture of the Natural History and Kunsthistorisches museums and the striking modern architecture of the Museums Quarter makes the Wien Museum – Karlsplatz somewhat underwhelming. The more brutalist, post-Second World War structure is certainly less conventionally aesthetic.

Entering the building itself, you are welcomed into a bright, open space that bears little resemblance to the look of the building from the outside. The displays on the Siege of Vienna are housed in a small room to the right of the main entrance. The museum used to house a larger display to this period of history, but this has since been downscaled to allow further room for temporary exhibitions. This results in 250 years of Vienna's history being told within an extremely small space. The influence of the Ottoman Empire on the city is distilled to a story of the Ottomans reaching Vienna before being repelled, following which Vienna progresses into the enlightenment and takes a role as a prominent cultural centre for Europe. This is reiterated in the exhibition architecture, as the rear section of the room in question moves the narrative on to the Baroque and the Enlightenment.

Taking pride of place in the first part of the room is a painting of the Siege, as depicted from Kahlenberg. In addition to the painting, the narrative of the events of 1683 is primarily told through war booty. A selection of Ottoman items taken after the battle are used as the primary route for giving any information on Ottoman influence. As one moves beyond these objects, the story told in the room moves to the dawning of modernity in Vienna. The repelling of the Ottoman Empire is presented as the moment at which Vienna (and Europe more widely) moves towards modernity and enlightenment.

The Military History Museum in Vienna tells a similar story, again in a relatively short space. This building, constructed in the 1850s as an architectural memorial to the Austrian Imperial Army, was originally a central part of the Vienna Arsenal, a military site consisting of over 70 individual buildings. The museum is now one of the few parts of this complex that remains. The building, built to a mid-19<sup>th</sup>-century Venetian Renaissance style, features an imposing frontage and lavish interior. The 'memorial' aspect of the architecture is clear. Displays continue in this vein, foregrounding sizable paintings to past

military leaders on the walls of the great halls which make up the museum. References to 1683 within the gallery 'From the Thirty Years' War to Prince Eugene (16th century–1700)' are primarily through the means of paintings of the Siege and of Jan III. Sobieski. The role of the Ottoman Empire is again told through war loot. Items include a Turkish guidon (heraldic flag) and decorative horsetails for spears (Turkish: *tuğlar*) from the 1683 siege, in addition to the seal of Sultan Mustafa II, captured after the 1697 battle of Zenta. A captured Ottoman tent sits at the end of the hall, a further signal of Austrian or Habsburg victories over the Ottoman empires. It is a story of the defeat of Ottoman forces, with little room given to discussion of influences from one empire to the other.

The display of an Ottoman military tent is echoed at the German Historical Museum (Deutsches Historisches Museum (DHM)) in Berlin, where a small display focusing on the 1683 Siege includes the tent of Sultan Mustafa I as its centrepiece (see also Whitehead & Bozoğlu 2015). The use of war loot as a means of communicating the story of the 1683 siege resembles early commemorative events, particularly those which took place in Poland. The victory for Christian Europe against the Ottoman threat, as it was portrayed in some of these commemorative events, was summed up in the display of these items captured following battle. The lack of any significant interpretative text at museums such as the Wien Museum – Karlsplatz or the DHM allows for that same simplistic narrative to be continued. The captured items are displayed as trophies, implying that they are the result of a rightful victory. The ethics of displaying stolen war loot are not discussed.

At the National Museum of Hungary, Budapest, the events of 1683 are told in relation to an ebb and flow of the influence of the Ottoman Empire on the Balkans and into Western Europe. This allows for some additional degree of nuance in the narrative when compared to the DHM or Wien Museum. The Siege is a part of this story, rather than the focal point. The militaristic aspect of the story is told as a part of a wider narrative, where the influences of trade and migration on cultures of the region are given equal or greater space. This can be in part attributed to the longer-term history of Budapest as a part of the Ottoman Empire, with architectural elements of the city – such as the importance of Turkish bathhouses as a tourist attraction - a testament to this. That the urban landscape is one of cohabitation more than one of war (as is the case with traces of 1683 in Vienna) is reflected in the heritage discourse within the museum.

This does not preclude the museum from some West vs East, European ‘in’ group vs Turkish ‘other’, elements in their interpretative text. For example, reference is made to attempts to unify ‘European powers’ against ‘the Ottoman danger’ in the late 15<sup>th</sup> Century. Years of Ottoman rule over modern Hungary are also referred to as a period of ‘occupation’, discursively undermining the legitimacy of Ottoman influence on the region. Most notably, one piece of text refers to a ‘Turkish wedge’ being ‘driven into the body of the country’ in 1566. Placing the nation as a physical body is a discursive trait common to right-wing discourse (Wodak 2015: 75-77). The years following the breaking of the 1683 siege are then presented as a narrative of the ‘expulsion’ of the Turks and of the ‘liberation’ of Buda. Here, whilst the material on display in the National Museum of Hungary give space to a broader narrative that could counter the militaristic displays at the DHM and the two Vienna museums, including reference to trade, craft, and Ottoman arts, the AHD remains one of a European superiority founded upon the resistance to a Turkish other. Europe is constructed in opposition to the Oriental other (see Said 1978).

These displays prompt a further questioning of the role of museums within the public sphere. As institutions with an authoritative voice, there is a responsibility that comes with considering how certain histories are displayed. This responsibility is heightened when the particular historic moments are often used in a divisive manner. This is certainly the case with regard to 1683. Past commemorations mobilised the memory of 1683 as a tool for the demonisation of contemporary enemies. In present day political discourse 1683 continues to be a tool for the demonisation of certain chosen enemies.

#### **6.4 1683 in Political Discourse**

We have already seen allusions to the manner in which certain groups have been othered through the use of the collective memory of 1683 in past celebrations. In recent years, the prominent target for these attacks has been immigrant and/or Muslim populations. This is most evident in the rhetoric of Heinz-Christian Strache, until early 2019<sup>16</sup> the leader of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ). In his leadership of the FPÖ, from 2005 to 2019, Strache

---

<sup>16</sup> On 17 May 2019 a video, recorded on the Mediterranean island of Ibiza prior to the 2017 Austrian elections, was released to the press. The video showed Strache and Johann Gudenus, deputy leader of the FPÖ, discussing electoral tactics with a woman posing as the daughter of a Russian billionaire. Strache and Gudenus agree to the awarding of government contracts in return for positive news coverage. The so called “Ibiza affair” resulted in Strache resigning as vice-chancellor of Austria and as chairman of the FPÖ. Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz lost a vote of no-confidence as a result of the same scandal.

has made frequent use of xenophobic arguments in election campaigns. Slogans used during Strache's leadership included: *Daham statt Islam* (Austrian natives instead of Islam), *Mehr Mut für unser Wiener Blut* (More courage for our Viennese blood), and *Zu viel Fremdes tut niemandem gut* (Too many foreigners [or too much foreign] does nobody good.) The success of Strache's FPÖ came alongside the increasing success of this rhetoric. It is frequently a strongly Christian imagery and emerges as part of the wider surge in RWP in Europe.

Strache's tactics saw the party increase their vote share in Viennese municipal elections in 2010 and allowed the party to take third place in the 2017 Austrian legislative elections, less than one percentage point behind the centre-left Social Democrats. The centre-right Austrian People's Party (ÖVP), led by Sebastian Kurz, finished as the largest party. Having also led a campaign that sought to appeal to the right-leaning nationalist vote through promises to enact strong anti-immigration policies, the coalition government formed between Kurz's ÖVP and Strache's FPÖ was unsurprising. The presence of a far-right party in coalition government can be ascribed partly to the increasing influence of RWP globally. However, in Austria the same two parties formed a coalition government between 1999 and 2005. Indeed, in the 1999 legislative elections the FPÖ had finished second, with a higher percentage of the vote than they achieved in 2017. The difference, however, is in the response to the electoral success of the coalition rather than the form of the coalition itself. It is in responses, both nationally and across Europe, that the increasing influence of RWP comes to the fore.

Following the 1999 elections, despite the FPÖ taking a higher vote share, the Austrian chancellorship went to Wolfgang Schüssel of the ÖVP. Jörg Haider, then leader of the FPÖ, was not given any role in the government. This appeased tensions with the European allies, who were fearful of the impact of a far-right government. The fears of FPÖ influence on the Austrian government led other European leaders to impose sanctions on Austria, until they were convinced of the limited influence of the FPÖ in government (Nohlen and Stover 2010). In Vienna, an initial protest against the formation of the coalition government attracted between 150,000-250,000 people. In the years that followed, weekly Thursday night protests continued in Vienna against the coalition. Following the 2017 elections, a protest in Vienna drew a crowd of roughly 20,000. Until late 2018, there was no discernible, coordinated protest movement against the presence of the FPÖ in government. This only began with the Ibiza scandal. On a European level, there

was no outcry and no threat of sanctions despite the fact that on this occasion the FPÖ leader, Strache, took the position of vice-chancellor. While the formation of this coalition is not new in Austrian terms, the reaction suggests a change in European politics.

In 2000, Haider and the FPÖ were an isolated entity. This is no longer the case. An increase in European Parliamentary numbers for Eurosceptic alliance Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy, led by UKIP's Nigel Farage and David Borelli of Italy's populist Five Star Movement, changed the outlook of the European Parliament. A greater number of European leaders were friendly to Strache, notably Viktor Orbán in Hungary. An increase in voting for anti-immigrant or RWP parties since 2010 (Wodak 2015) meant that the success of the FPÖ was no longer extraordinary. This is relevant to the use of 1683 as Strache has repeatedly drawn upon references to 1683, not only to increase the success of his party, but also as a means of developing his own image as a strong leader.

The development of a sense of myth surrounding RWP leaders has been articulated by Kelsey (2016) with regard to Nigel Farage's political success. Kelsey suggests that Farage has developed an image that is simultaneously one of a man of the people – the pint-drinking, chain-smoking 'bloke down the pub' look – while also fitting into the myth of a 'hero's journey'. He places himself as the underdog, on a mission to defeat the powerful enemies in Brussels. While Farage has never specifically vocalised this position, the development of such a public profile allows him to attract support to his cause, rather than the cause of a particular party. Strache, conversely, has made very deliberate efforts to mythologise his own position as the defender of Austria and Vienna, particularly through his references to 1683.

In his first campaign as leader of the FPÖ, Strache adopted the slogan *Wien darf nicht Istanbul werden* – Vienna must not become Istanbul. This itself was a play on a previous FPÖ slogan, *Wien darf nicht Chicago werden* – Vienna must not become Chicago. Chicago represented a clichéd image of a city overrun by crime, often perpetrated by black gangs. It was a law and order slogan with racial undertones. Strache adopted the new slogan following the installation of Feridun Zaimoğlu's art piece *Kanak Attack: Die dritte Türkenbelagerung?* (Kanak Attack: The Third Siege of Vienna?) at the Wien Kunsthalle. *Kanak* references the derogatory German term (often *Kanake*) for people in German-speaking countries who have roots in Turkish, Middle Eastern or Southern European countries. The piece involved the covering of the Kunsthalle with 420 Turkish flags.

Strong reactions to the piece followed. *Berliner Zeitung* reported that the Viennese were ‘deeply traumatized since 1683’ (Fredriksson 2014). Strache spoke out against the installation, promoting the slogan ‘Vienna must not become Istanbul’ in the process. The notion of the ‘third Turkish siege’ had been brought into public discourse three years previously, when the Bishop of St. Pölten stated that the country was experiencing a third Siege, one more dangerous as it came from within. The intervention of a clergyman gives focus to the continued religious rhetoric at work in this political discourse. Religious sites, much like the church in Weinhaus, take on an active role in the memorialisation and continued use of 1683.

Strache and the FPÖ showed an awareness of this when, in the same 2010 election campaign, they adopted the further slogan *Pummerin statt Muezzin* – Pummerin instead of Muezzin. Pummerin is the main bell in St. Stephens Cathedral, and so symbolic of the Christian identity of Vienna. The FPÖ, and Strache, present themselves as defenders of that Christian identity, against the supposed threat posed by those of Muslim identity, or from countries that are predominantly Muslim<sup>17</sup>. Through the provocation of the Zaimoğlu piece, Strache and others were able to mobilise the collective memory of 1683 as a means of othering certain groups, predominantly those of Turkish origin. The success of this strategy was built upon by Strache in elections that followed.

In 2010, in the build-up to the Vienna local elections, a propaganda comic book entitled *Sagas From Vienna*, written and produced by the FPÖ, again sought to mobilise the memory of 1683, this time by including a caricature of Strache taking on the imagery of Jan III. Sobieski (see Wodak and Forchtner 2014). Strache was the liberator of Vienna – his social democratic opponents were depicted as overweight, corrupt figures who were allowing too much immigration into Austria. Strache stood as the figure who could lead the opposition to this immigration, and to the presence of Islam in Vienna. Moving beyond the use of metaphor, the comic book visually places Strache as the direct ideological descendent of Sobieski. In placing himself in Sobieski’s position, Strache becomes not only the liberator and protector of Vienna but also the defender of modern Europe, through the common understanding of 1683 as the defence of Europe against Ottoman threats.

---

<sup>17</sup> In practice these slogans, while focus on an anti-Islam viewpoint, serve to bolster a broader anti-immigrant stance.

This place as the defender of Europe is built upon an amalgamation of various *topoi*. There is the *topos of threat*, with that threat posed by immigrants, those of Turkish descent, or anyone of Muslim identity. The action that can be taken to alleviate that threat is to support the FPÖ and enact policies to prevent immigration into Austria. There is the *topos of history*, with the common narrative of events in 1683 acts as a reference to the apparent repelling of Muslims from Europe in the past, *ergo* an action that can be repeated. Finally, there is the *topos of saviour*, with Strache standing in for Sobieski to appear as the individual who can save Vienna and *ergo* Europe. Europe is built up as specifically Christian, with any kind of Muslim identity not just unwelcome but an active threat to Europe. Strache uses the collective understanding of 1683 to give weight to this notion. In recent years, this use of 1683 has been adopted beyond Austria for the same purposes.

## **6.5 1683 in Transnational Right-Wing Populist Discourse**

The recent discursive use of 1683 in political discourse can also be seen in Hungary, Poland and Germany. In these instances, the producers of such rhetoric are leaders who have embraced populist politics as a means of bolstering their own positions of power. As we shall see in Chapter 7, the manner in which 1683 is mobilised shows a similarity not only to the discourse of the FPÖ, but also to extreme-right wing groups operating online. The introduction of references to 1683 in Poland and Hungary are both linked to historical ties to the event. For Poland, it is the link to their countryman Jan III. Sobieski. For Hungary, it is connected to their longer history as a part of the Ottoman Empire, one that began to end following the breaking of the 1683 siege. For both nations the pertinence of the moment currently is to demonise immigrants and Muslims.

### **6.5.1 Viktor Orbán**

Viktor Orbán has been Hungarian president since 2010 as leader of the increasingly right-wing conservative Fidesz party, a party he has led since 1993 (excepting a short gap from 2000-2003). While Fidesz had its origins as a centre-right party advocating a position of European integration, under Orbán's leadership the party has shifted further to the right, embracing an increasingly Eurosceptic viewpoint. This shift in views has come alongside an increasingly anti-immigration stance. Orbán's government has become more



authoritarian and anti-democratic during this period (Kelemen 2017). The stifling of freedom of the press in Hungary (Wodak 2015: 180) shows not only a disregard for democratic principles, but also a disregard for human rights treaties that are intended to be a significant part of EU membership<sup>18</sup>.

As a means of bolstering his legitimacy as leader of Hungary, Orbán has turned frequently to references to past defeats of Ottoman forces. He has described himself as ‘the János Hunyadi of our time’ (Balogh 2015), in reference to the 15<sup>th</sup>-century nobleman and military leader who fought at the 1456 Battle of Belgrade<sup>19</sup>. The events of 1456 can be viewed in a similar light to references to 1683. In defeating Ottoman forces who had besieged Belgrade, the southern Hungarian borders were solidified for half a century. While this is not viewed as a defining point in the decline of the Ottoman Empire in the manner of the 1683 breaking of the siege, it was a military victory that had a long impact on the region. Orbán, like Strache placing himself as the modern Sobieski, puts himself in the position of the protector of Hungarian borders<sup>20</sup> against Turkish or Muslim immigrants. In this instance the threat to the border is from refugees travelling the “Balkan route” through Hungary to western Europe.

In further speeches, Orbán expands upon this rhetoric. He argues that Hungary has a particular authority on this matter as ‘when it comes to living together with Muslim communities, we are the only ones who have experience because we had the possibility to go through that experience for 150 years’ (Orbán 2015, cited in Tharoor 2015). The years of Ottoman rule of the region are presented as a dark part of history, an experience which must not be repeated. Much like claiming that the scars of 1683 still impact the people of Vienna, Orbán seems to suggest that the events of the 14<sup>th</sup> to 17<sup>th</sup> centuries, where Ottoman control of the region was at its greatest, continue to impact upon the collective memory of Hungary as a modern nation. This notion sits in opposition to aspects of the experience of visiting Budapest, with Ottoman architecture, and the Turkish baths in particular, a key feature of the city. It is notable, however, that the statement of outstanding universal value (SOUV) for the Budapest WHS designation largely ignores the Turkish

---

<sup>18</sup> In September 2018 the EU opted to impose sanctions on Hungary for its ‘flouting of EU rules on democracy, civil rights and corruption’. (MacDonald 2018)

<sup>19</sup> Note that in this battle Hunyadi fought alongside John of Capistrano, the figure immortalised on the side of St Stephen’s Cathedral in Vienna.

<sup>20</sup> The Hungarian borders which are themselves the result of the conditions of the post-World War I Treaty of Trianon, were imposed upon Hungary unwillingly. Orbán leaves this unsaid. He avoids connecting the protection of these borders to a national memory of defeat.

influence, save for one reference to ‘recovery’ following the end of Turkish ‘occupation’ (UNESCO 2020). The Ottoman influence on Budapest across a number of centuries is reduced to one of an occupation, the term denoting an illegal claim on the land of Hungary. In Orbán’s speech, the *topoi* of history, threat and the saviour are again combined within this discourse. The history of Ottoman occupation is one that must not be repeated. There is a threat to the stability of the nation posed by immigration through Hungary.<sup>21</sup> Orbán, as the modern-day Hunyadi, can be the saviour of Hungary. The layering of common populist *topoi* gives weight to Orbán’s position as an authoritarian leader of the nation. He is positioned as doing what is necessary at the time.

In the same speeches, Orbán also references clichéd notions of what it means to be European. Europeanness is constructed as specifically Christian:

We shouldn’t forget that the people who are coming here grew up in a different religion and represent a completely different culture. Most are not Christian, but Muslim [...] That is an important question, because Europe and European culture have Christian roots. (Orbán 2015, cited by Tharoor 2015)

The dividing lines are created not only on a territorial basis, but also on the basis of differences in culture and religion. It is another instance of a right-wing populist-nationalism in action, where the discursive *topoi* common to RWP, as detailed by Wodak (2015), are used in tandem with typically right-wing nationalist discourse. In this instance, it is the use of metaphors of the physical land. ‘Europe and European culture have Christian roots.’ The Christian identity of Europe is not simply a cultural being, but something that is deeply connected to the physical land of Europe. Christian identity is presented as being as real as the land itself and therefore immovable.

The linking of territorial and cultural identity, particularly with regard to the apparently specifically Christian identity of Europe, has been adopted significantly by RWP groups operating online (see Chapter 7). It is also a discursive tactic that has been adopted by allies of Orbán.

---

<sup>21</sup> It is important to note that the majority of refugees on the Hungarian border wish to travel through Hungary and not to remain in the country.

### 6.5.2 *The Law and Justice Party: Poland*

In 2011 Jaroslaw Kaczynski, leader of Poland's Law and Justice party (PiS), said he was 'convinced that the day will come when we will have Budapest in Warsaw' (Kaczynski 2011, cited by The Economist 2018). His desire was to emulate the path taken by Orbán and Fidesz, in bringing a populist, authoritarian regime to Poland. In the 2015 elections, PiS became the first party in post-communist Poland to win an outright parliamentary majority. After taking office, PiS began to follow the path suggested by Kaczynski. Since 2015, legislation passed by PiS has undermined democratic checks and balances in Poland (Marcinkiewicz and Stegmaier 2017). In 2017, the government sought to pass legislation that would strip the judiciary of its independent power, bringing powers previously held by non-governmental representatives into governmental control. It was seen as a move by Kaczynski to increase his own individual power, mirroring the authoritarian stance of his Hungarian allies.

Such authoritarian policies have widened to include the cultural sector, particularly museums. The Museum of the Second World War in Gdansk (*Muzeum II Wojny Światowej*) has become a target for PiS. Following the museum's opening in 2017, all curatorial staff were sacked. The museum was targeted for its positioning of Poland as not simply a victim of Nazi Germany in the Second World War, choosing to present a more complex history of occupation, collaboration and aggression (Machcewicz 2019). This intervention in the presentation of history in the museum setting is just one area where PiS have sought to make use of history for their own means. The use of memories of 1683 also serves this purpose. The figure of Sobieski has become an icon for the protection of a Christian European identity in Poland.

On the 12 September 2018, the anniversary of the breaking of the Siege was intended to be marked by the unveiling of a statue to Jan III Sobieski at Kahlenberg. However, in August 2018 Ernst Woller, president of the Vienna Landtag (regional government), announced that approval had not been given for the installation of the statue<sup>22</sup>. This decision came despite a plinth having been installed at Kahlenberg. The statue had already been cast in preparation for the installation and unveiling. The decision has been presented by right-wing online news sources, including Defend Europa and Breitbart, as having been taken

---

<sup>22</sup> Far-right blogs and news sources state that this decision was officially made as the statue was viewed as 'archaic' and not meeting required standards of 'artistic values'. However, they also present the decision as an attack on Austrian heritage.

over concerns for an anti-Turkish sentiment presented by the statue. Following this decision, a deal was made for the statue to instead be placed in Kraków.

PiS politicians had initially expressed anger at the refusal to erect the statue at Kahlenberg. Polish MP Dominik Tarczyński responded in an interview with Breitbart by engaging in a strong defence of Sobieski's importance:

What King Sobieski did was an act of defence; if not for Sobieski all Europe would be speaking Arabic — and if the Viennese want to speak in Arabic now, they are very welcome, but it's not going to change history. So please wake up, Austria, because history will not be changed. (Tarczyński 2018, cited by Tomlinson 2018)

The invocation of the potential loss of a language to stand in for the threat to a nation's identity is frequent in right-wing political discourse. It is a much-used phrase in the United Kingdom, where if it wasn't for victory in the Second World War "we would all be speaking German" today. For Tarczyński, the threat is from the Arabic speaking world. This ties national identity – be that Polish, Austrian or other – to a monolingualism and an unchanging monocultural identity. 'History will not be changed', and so neither should the cultural identity of a nation.

Tarczyński continued:

You will not be free men; you will spend all of your lives — and your wives and your daughters will spend all of their lives — under an Islamic caliphate. Is this what you want?

If you do want it, go ahead — Poland will not allow you to falsify history. Our brave hussars stopped the Muslim army which was about to invade and take over in Europe; please remember that, and be thankful for that. (Tarczyński 2018, cited by Tomlinson 2018).

European cultures are placed as the pinnacle of freedom. The threat from immigration from middle eastern countries is in the imposition of a 'caliphate' where freedoms – particularly for women<sup>23</sup> – will be lost. The accounts rely upon a singular notion of what

---

<sup>23</sup> The gendering of the threat from immigration is frequent, with immigrants placed as particular threats to the safety of women. There are links here to the long history of racist tropes of the foreign beast. See chapter 7 for more detail.

the events of 1683 meant. It is, again, the linear, simplistic narrative of the saving of Europe from a Muslim invader. The reality, that this was a war of empires rather than a war between religions or cultures, is cast aside.

### 6.6 Uses of 1683: Chapter Summary

As Dag Herbjørnsrud (2018) has covered in detail, the Siege of Vienna did not represent a battle between Islam and Christianity. Rather, it was a battle for territory. Muslim brigades fought alongside Sobieski’s forces. Many western Protestant Christian groups and nations were broadly supportive of the Ottomans. For those Protestant groups, the longer the Habsburg Empire was occupied to the East, the easier it was to solidify or gain ground at the Western edge of the Habsburg Empire. The history of the Siege of Vienna is not a simple narrative of an aggressor, a victim and a liberator. It is a messy, dynamic history where the relationships both in 1683, and between 1683 and the present, are complex, moving – in a physical, temporal and emotional sense of the word – and full of ambiguity.

1683 as a historic moment is not inherently right-wing, but it has found easy use and adoption by right-wing groups. It has become an ideological battleground. The plinth for the never-to-be-erected statue was vandalised in 2017; the inscription of the year 1683 was crossed out and “no Nazi” was daubed across the stone. In being adopted as a touchstone moment for right-wing groups, the memorialisation of 1683 becomes a target for left-wing protest. The memory of 1683 takes on multidirectional tendencies (Rothberg 2009), as competing framings of this past emerge in relation to and in competition with each other.

<b>Table 6.1: Movement of 1683 – Chapter Summary</b>	
<p><b>Spatial Movement</b></p> <p>Movement in the expansion and recession of Ottoman territory.</p> <p>Commemorations to the breaking of the siege in Poland and Austria.</p>	<p><b>Temporal Movement</b></p> <p>The heavy temporal labour of written histories, ensuring continued knowledge of these pasts in the present.</p> <p>The role of continued commemorative events – unlike with MC these are present from immediately after 1683.</p>

<p>The movement of this past into museum and heritage settings.</p> <p>Spread of references to 1683 across the Vienna landscape.</p> <p>Spread of recent political discourse transnationally – particularly in Hungary and Poland.</p>	<p>Past-presencing in museum and heritage settings. This is a past-presencing which builds an AHD (liberation or saving of Western Europe from an Ottoman threat or occupation).</p> <p>Past-presencing in political discourse – most deliberately seen by HC Strache in Austria.</p>
<p><b>Affective Movement</b></p> <p>Facilitated by the development of a liberation mythology, echoed in the AHD.</p> <p>Use of 1683 to create opposition to the ‘enemies of the day’, creating a sense of superiority and of continued victories over perceived threats.</p> <p>Sense of fear built into the continued threat from a Muslim or ‘migrant’ other.</p> <p>Confidence given to support political action.</p>	<p><b>Political Movement</b></p> <p>Long history of use of 1683 to call for political support (by opposing a constructed threat).</p> <p>Almost exclusively used in present discourse to encourage support for RWP parties – FPÖ in Austria, PiS in Poland, Orbán’s Fidesz in Hungary.</p>

In this chapter I have detailed the manner in which the historical moment of 1683 has moved into political discourse. The aspects of this moment are detailed in Table 6.1. The representations of 1683 in museum displays are shown as frequently following a linear narrative that can allow for the easy adoption of the history by divisive right-wing groups. In recent years this has been exercised most vehemently by extreme right-wing populist groups such as Generation Identity. In the following chapter I will look at the manner in which 1683 has been mobilised online as a galvanising historical reference point. In these cases, the use of the moment in discourse moves from legitimising authoritarian political policies, towards providing a reference for those engaging in violent acts of terrorism.

## Chapter 7

### 1683 in Online Discourse: Far-right Terrorism and the Identitarian Movement

*We want to build a bridge to the present, because the memory of 1683 is both our heritage and our mission.*

*(Gedenken 1683)*<sup>24</sup>

In 2011, an attacker detonated a bomb in the government quarter of Oslo, Norway. The attack killed eight and injured over 200 people. Soon after this attack the attacker, dressed in a homemade police uniform and carrying false identification, travelled to the island of Utøya, where a gathering of the Norwegian Labour Party's (the ruling party at the time) youth division was taking place. The attacker shot and killed 69 people on the island, many of them minors. Prior to the detonating of the Oslo bomb, the attacker posted a document online entitled *2083: A European Declaration of Independence*<sup>25</sup>. The chosen date, 2083, marks the 400<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the breaking of the Siege of Vienna.

On 15 March 2019, an attacker live streaming his actions on Facebook attacked a mosque in the suburbs of Christchurch, New Zealand. Fifty-one people were killed, the deadliest mass shooting in New Zealand's history. For some newspapers, the attack was viewed as a sign of the increasing reach and violence of far-right extremism globally (see Kingsley 2019; *The Observer* 2019). The Christchurch attacker made use of weaponry upon which he had written a range of dates, names and slogans. Slogans referenced included a reference to the "14 words", a far-right phrase influenced by a passage in Adolf Hitler's *Mein Kampf*. Names written on the weaponry included those of historical figures such as John Hunyadi (a figure also referenced in speeches by Viktor Orbán, see Chapter 6) and Iosif Gurko (a Russian marshall who fought against the Ottomans in the 1877-78 Battle of Shipka Pass, where the Ottomans were forced out of Bulgaria). Alongside these historical figures the attacker also wrote the names of fellow right-wing extremist terrorists including

---

<sup>24</sup> Quotations from *Gedenken 1683* and *Identitäre Bewegung Österreich* sources in this chapter have been translated from the original German by the author.

<sup>25</sup> Direct references are not provided to this material, as I do not believe that access to such documents should be encouraged. For similar reasons, the names of the perpetrator of this and other terrorist attacks are not given.

the attacker from the January 2017 attack on a Quebec City Mosque, an Italian extremist who attacked black migrants in 2018, and a Spanish neo-Nazi who stabbed a young anti-fascist protester in 2007. In addition to these names, the attacker had also written ‘for Rotherham’ on to one piece of equipment, a reference to the arrest of a grooming gang in the British town. Here, the attacker echoes the Islamophobic connections made by the supporters of Stephen Yaxley-Lennon, seen in Chapter 5, and also feeds into a gendered rhetoric that has become common amongst far-right groups (see more below). The recent and the historic share a discursive space on the weaponry of the attacker. On one rifle cartridge the text read ‘Vienna 1683’. The attacker’s ‘manifesto’, posted online prior to the attack in the same manner as the Oslo terrorist manifesto, was entitled ‘The Great Replacement’, a reference to an ideology heavily promoted by new right-wing populist and extremist groups in Europe. The Christchurch attacker has since potentially become an inspiration for another attempted attack in Norway, this time upon a Mosque<sup>26</sup>.

On Saturday 3 August 2019, a gunman opened fire in a Walmart store in the Texas city of El Paso. At least twenty people were killed in the attack. Prior to the attack, the gunman posted a document on to the online forum 8chan claiming the shooting was in response to ‘the Hispanic invasion of Texas’ (Beckett and Wilson 2019). The fear of an ‘invasion’ from a foreign other, at the expense of the existing predominantly white population, is an echo of the great replacement ideologies of the populist far-right movements in Europe.

In the past decade the memory of 1683 has been used as an inspirational moment for those inflicting some of the worst terrorist attacks in recent memory. Through the emergence of digitally connected far-right movements globally, an historical moment that has previously been mobilised politically within Central and Eastern Europe has become an international reference point. In this chapter I analyse the development of 1683 in online political discourse, from the emergence of the far-right *Gates of Vienna* blog site, through to the use of 1683 by the Identitarian Movement in recent years. In doing so, the role of connective action in these political movements and the affective dimension of collective memory and belonging is investigated.

---

<sup>26</sup> Online posts attributed to the attacker in this instance praised the Christchurch attack. However, at the time of writing the legitimacy of the posts remains unverified.



## 7.1 The Gates of Vienna and the Origins of the Great Replacement Theory

The *Gates of Vienna* blog site is an Islamophobic platform formed in 2004, initially through platforms such as BlogSpot but self-hosted since 2013<sup>27</sup>. While the blog is based in the United States, it has served as a hub for an international Islamophobic blogging network. In its early years, bloggers had close ties to the Center for Vigilant Freedom (now rebranded as the International Civil Liberties Alliance) and the associated CounterJihad Europa website. *Gates of Vienna* is now part of a network alongside sites such as Jihad Watch and the right-wing think tank Middle East Forum. One prominent contributor in the early years of *Gates of Vienna* was an author known only through the pseudonym “Fjordman”. This work was cited by the Utøya attacker as his main inspiration. The attacker cited Fjordman 111 times in his manifesto (Vikås et al. 2011). While the platforms and connections among these key actors in the global Islamophobic far-right are often shifting, think tanks or similar organisations frequently act as the more public face of the movements. In recent years the International Free Press Society has acted as an umbrella organisation for this particular right-wing movement, with bloggers from *Gates of Vienna* present as board members (Lazaridis, Polymeropoulou and Tsagkroni 2016).

From the outset, *Gates of Vienna* has made use of the collective memory of 1683 to suggest the notion of an ongoing ‘war’ between white, Christian Europe (and, connectedly, America) and a hostile Islamic force. The inaugural blog post cites ‘The Newest Phase of a Very Old War’. The opening paragraph states:

Some people refer to the current war as the GWOt (Global War on Terror). Others call it WWIV (Norman Podhoretz). We at Gates of Vienna prefer to call it GIJ3W: The Great Islamic Jihad, Third Wave.

The second wave of this ‘war’ ended, according to the blog, after the breaking of the Siege of Vienna in 1683. The heading banner of the site states: ‘At the siege of Vienna in 1683 Islam seemed poised to overrun Christian Europe. We are in a new phase of a very old war.’ The point at which this ‘third wave’ began is put up for debate, but the meaning is made clear to the reader. The purpose of *Gates of Vienna* is surmised as follows: ‘The thesis of this blog is that, like it or not, we are in a religious war’. It goes on to state that

---

<sup>27</sup> It seems that prior to the move to self-hosting, the previous platform had been removed on at least two occasions due to the racist content of the site. Citations for the exact history of the site are difficult to source, and the site’s own archives are not always in a clear chronological order.

‘our survival depends on our capacity to unite in a common cause against physical and cultural destruction.’

The fears of an invading force, notions that have been further mobilised in the ideology of the great replacement, come to the fore in content produced by *Gates of Vienna*. This rhetoric makes use of the common right-wing populist argumentation scheme, the *topos of threat*. In this instance, life in Western Europe is threatened by a supposed Islamic ‘invasion’. The threat is framed not only as physical, but also in terms of the threat of a cultural loss. If we look in more detail at the *topos of threat* as used in the above statements, there is a threat posed by Islam (and therefore anyone from any majority Muslim nations) not only physically to inhabitants of Europe, but also to the cultural identity of Europe and/or the West. According to the bloggers, the action that must be taken against that threat begins in recognising that this constitutes a war. Actions that came later, as we saw detailed at the opening of this chapter, were extreme in nature. The first step, however, was in building the idea of the ongoing religious war.

Issues of collective cultural identity are central themes in *Gates of Vienna* content. The second post on the site responds to the work of oriental historian Bernard Lewis, a scholar himself accused of holding a racist and colonialist view of Islam, notably by Edward Said. Said suggested that Lewis’s (1982) critique of *Orientalism* (Said 1978) contained ‘not history, not scholarship, but direct political violence substituting for reasoned judgement’ (Said & Grabar 1982). Later, Said targeted Lewis’s 1990 work *The Roots of Muslim Rage* for its ‘reckless’ construction of ‘entities called “the West” and “Islam”, which Said suggests reduces complex matters to a ‘cartoonlike world’ (Said 2001). As Said notes, the ideological underpinnings of Lewis’ work are clearly articulated in the title of this work. For the *Gates of Vienna* bloggers, however, Lewis does not go far enough in his critique of ‘the Muslim world’. He fails to recognise ‘a central feature of Muslim culture, its tribal identity’. The blog continues, ‘Unlike the West’s Judaeo-Christian elevation of individual liberty and responsibility, Islamic identity begins and ends with the tribe.’ In such passages, the idea of a unified cultural identity in the West is formed. This sense of Western cultural identity mixes ideas from American libertarianism with religious imagery (the Libertarian Party place individual liberty or sovereignty at the centre of their ideology (Libertarian Party 2018)). Judeo-Christian culture is intertwined with libertarian capitalism. What is meant by the conception of Islamic culture as fundamentally ‘tribal’ is not discussed in detail, although there are echoes of past constructions of the ‘savage’

foreigner (see Fanon 1963). The purpose is to place Islamic culture in absolute opposition with a supposedly more advanced Western culture. The culture of ‘the Muslim world’ is one that is presented as restricted to ‘scavengers’, a cultural identity that ‘cannot survive’.

These early posts on *Gates of Vienna* construct divisions along lines of Orient vs Occident. For Said the idea of the Orient is ‘an integral part of European material civilization and culture’ (Said 1978: 19). The dividing lines that *Gates of Vienna* draw are, therefore, ones that exist, to differing extents, within the conception of what it means to be European or Western. Fjordman’s blog posts use these existing divisions as a gateway through which to develop their conception of ‘The Great Replacement’. Posts from between 2007 and 2009 cover topics such as ‘Why Did Europeans Create the Modern World?’, ‘Why Transnational Multiculturalism is a Totalitarian Ideology’ and, most pertinently, ‘Defeating Eurabia’. The concept of ‘Eurabia’, popularised by the author Bat Ye’or (pseudonym of Gisèle Littman) is a precursor to the adoption of ‘The Great Replacement’. In the 2005 book *Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis*, Ye’or portrays Europe as becoming ‘subjugated’ by the ‘ideology of jihad’, thanks in part to the loss of the distinct Judeo-Christian culture. In this instance, European governments are taken as complicit in this threat, as in their ‘subjugation’ they do little to protect the supposed rightful European population or Western culture.

The loss of European identity is threatened, according to Ye’or, not only by immigration but by high birth rates among Muslim families. Ye’or ties her notion of ‘Eurabia’ to a long history of embodied racism. Physical attributes and the threat from birth rates are used to stoke fears of the ‘other’. Early 20<sup>th</sup> century theories of eugenics, particularly those popularised by Madison Grant’s *The Passing of the Great Race* (1916), sought to offer a scientific justification for the superiority of a white ‘Nordic race’. Support for such theories of eugenics, particularly in the interwar period, could be found in Britain (Stone 2002), Canada (McLaren 2016) and America (Kline 2001). This ‘scientific racism’ (Kuhl 1994) acted as an inspiration for the Nazi movement in Germany, with Adolf Hitler praising Grant’s work as ‘his Bible’ (Kuhl 1994: 85).

In seeking to provide a scientific legitimacy to the conspiracist theories of a racial or cultural threat, the supporters of the ‘Eurabia’ follow an approach that has characterised racist propaganda for much of the last century. From the 1980s and 1990s, attempts to reassert the legitimacy of studies that relate to race and intelligence emerge, in what Kuhl

terms a return of ‘scientific racism’ (Kuhl 1994). Kuhl points to Roger Pearson’s *Race, Intelligence and Bias in Academe* (1991) as an exemplar of this trend. Pearson, according to Kuhl, makes efforts to distance eugenics as a discipline from associations with Nazism (Kuhl 1994: 5). However, Pearson’s work was primarily funded by the Pioneer Fund, which was founded in 1937 by supporters of Nazism (*ibid.*, see also Southern Poverty Law Centre (SPLC) 2019).

The Pioneer Fund also contributed to a work that has prompted significant debate regarding potentially racist scientific research output. Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray’s work *The Bell Curve* (1996) has been accused of using poorly justified statistical methods (Fischer et al. 1996) as a means of suggesting a link between IQ and race. *The Bell Curve* suggested that higher birth rates among those with a lower IQ might be impacting cognitive ability levels nationally. The attempts to tie IQ to racial heritage within *The Bell Curve* have been heavily criticised (see Freeman and Herron 2015; Chomsky 1995; Graves 2001). For some, the lack of a justification for the approach taken by the authors of *The Bell Curve* leaves the work open to use by those who wish to advocate a judgement of people based upon their race. Therefore, the work contributes to racist agendas irrespective of whether this was its intention (Siegel 2017).

*The Bell Curve* can be seen as a single element which contributes to a wider assemblage of material used as justification for racial superiority. It operates relationally with the works of Bernard Lewis (e.g. 1990; 1993) and Bat Ye’or (1985; 2005). Where some delineation does exist, it is in the more explicit viewpoints put forward by authors of such works. While Herrnstein and Murray have attempted to distance themselves from any racist use of *The Bell Curve* (1994), Ye’or has moved from the less polemical, although still problematic<sup>28</sup>, scholarship of *The Dhimmi* (1985), towards the conspiracist writings of *Eurabia* (2005). In 2007, Bernard Lewis went beyond his earlier work and commented, in a briefing to *Jerusalem Post* editorial staff, that Muslims ‘seem to be about to take over Europe’ (Machlis and Lazaroff 2007).

---

<sup>28</sup> Jacques Ellul’s preface to the 6<sup>th</sup> printing of *The Dhimmi* is illustrative of issues with the work. Ellul concludes his defence of the book as legitimate scholarly work by stating that ‘The Muslim world has not evolved in its manner of considering the non-Muslim, which is a reminder of the fate in store for those who may one day be submerged within it.’ (Ye’or 2010) The echoes of the *Gates of Vienna* blog posts should be clear. Much as representations of 1683 have been accused of representing a territorial battle in purely religious terms (see above), so too does *The Dhimmi* conflate primarily territorial or economically precipitated conflicts, such as Israel/Palestine, or Libya, with a purely religiously precipitated aggression.

In the above sections I have illustrated how a return to the ‘scientific racism’ described by Kuhl has added credence to an ever more extreme form of racism. While parallels to pre-WW2 years should be used sparingly, in this instance a similar trend towards the use of that scientific racism is notable. The themes that have developed in those works, themes of replacement through immigration or high birth rates, of the loss of a specific European culture, and of the division between West and East, have become commonplace in the rhetoric of right-wing populist parties.

## 7.2 Cultural Identity and Politics of Gender

The above section details the manner in which right-wing rhetoric has been given scholarly backing, both deliberately and tangentially. Extreme right-wing commentators who make use of the memory of 1683 do so in relation to that scholarly work. The building-up of the notion of a defined Western or European culture, one that is distinctly white and Judeo-Christian, is given weight through references to seemingly scholarly sources. The threat that is constructed as a means of fostering political anger and action is then given added legitimacy. In recent years, with the increasing success of right-wing populist parties across Europe, these same themes have emerged in official political campaigning.

In April 2019, AfD produced a billboard with the slogan ‘*Damit aus Europa kein “Eurabian” wird! Europäer wählen AfD!*’ (So that Europe does not become ‘Eurabia’ Europeans vote for the AfD!). The myth perpetuated by Bat Ye’or here filters through into official political campaigning. The argumentation scheme in these adverts is similar to that made upon the *Gates of Vienna* blog, primarily in their use of the *topos of threat*. The threat posed is in the loss of European identity to an apparent threat from the Muslim other. The action to be taken is to support the AfD in upcoming European elections. Further layers to the argumentation scheme come into play if we look at the advert from a multimodal perspective (Kress and Van Leeuwen 2001), where the text is viewed in relation to the associated imagery. The poster makes use of the 1866 Jean-Leon Gerome painting *Slave Market*, a painting which depicts a dark-skinned, seemingly Muslim slave trader presenting a nude, lighter-skinned young woman for examination by a group of men. The choice of image – one that resulted in a legal challenge from the owners of the painting, the Clark Art Institute in Massachusetts (CBS News 2019) – works by presenting embodied, gendered racism that has been a common feature of the scientific racism

discussed above. The threat that is posed to European culture is given the additional layer of being a particular threat to the freedom of women in Europe.

The AfD have frequently gendered their campaigns in this manner. Additional campaign posters have made use of slogans such as ‘Burkas? We prefer bikinis’ (upon an image of two bikini clad women) or “‘New Germans?’ We’ll make them ourselves’ (with the image of a pregnant white woman). Even slogans which are not themselves specifically gendered, such as a poster championing ‘Islam-free Schools’ placed on an image of five white school children, show a degree of gendering, with a young blonde woman placed to the front of the poster. Another poster depicts Frauke Petry, then the co-leader of the AfD, holding her young child with the slogan ‘What is your reason for fighting for Germany?’ The implication here is that Frauke Petry, and therefore the AfD, are more concerned for the future of Germany than the childless Angela Merkel. These slogans play upon the fears of the threat to a culture that comes from the higher birth rate of the ‘other’.

The fear of the foreigner as savage also emerges in political discourse from AfD members. In January 2018, two prominent AfD figures used posts on Twitter and Facebook to target Muslims in Germany. Beatrix von Storch, then deputy leader of the party, accused police in the German city of Cologne of appeasing ‘barbaric, gang-raping Muslim hordes of men’, while Alice Weidel, at that point one of the party leaders, suggested that the same authorities were giving way to ‘important, marauding, groping, abusive, knife-stabbing migrant mobs’ (BBC 2018). There are echoes in this content of Donald Trump’s now infamous speech characterising Mexican immigrants to the United States as ‘rapists’ and criminals trafficking drugs across the border. The cultural threat posed by the Muslim other follows the themes expressed by authors such as Bat Ye’or, Bernard Lewis and Roger Pearson, but mobilising them instead in activist terms, seeking to encourage particular political action.

An internal hypocrisy is often present in the gendered Islamophobia of groups such as the AfD, where the freedom and protection of women is used as a campaigning tool, while the rights for women are simultaneously not upheld. In the above posters, women are sexualised (e.g. bikini poster), or given legitimacy solely based on their ability to reproduce. Women’s freedom of choice is also tacitly criticised, with the legitimacy of politicians such as Merkel questioned due to her lack of a child. The role of women is reduced to the ability to produce the offspring that will ensure a strong future for Germany.

Similar attacks on women's rights by populist parties who simultaneously criticise the apparent lack of Muslim women's freedom are seen across Europe. PiS in Poland sought to enact a complete abortion ban and have overseen the rise of a culture of intimidation against women's groups (Margolis 2018). Viktor Orbán's Fidesz party in Hungary have pushed for an almost complete ban in teaching of gender studies in Hungary, with the Central European University the main target of the ban. Similar backlashes against women's rights and gender equality have been detailed, to differing degrees, across Europe (Juhász and Pap 2018).

The relevance of gender equality policy to the cultural memory of 1683 is seen in a similar backlash against gender equality in Austria. Juhász and Pap (2018) point to the interaction between this reaction to gender equality and other seemingly culturally rooted concerns. Gender equality is framed alongside concern for family values, and the targeting of a broadening of sex education policies (Juhász and Pap 2018: 20). Groups and campaigners that focus upon these topics include right-wing conservatives, particularly Catholic groups in Austria, men's rights groups, and groups referred to as 'conscious parents' (Mayer & Sauer 2017: 23). In addition to this, the gender rights backlash has been taken on by right-wing extremists and populists. In Austria, at the forefront of the right-wing extremist rise are Identitäre Bewegung, while the RWP success has been led by the FPÖ. In both cases, these are the groups that also make frequent use of the memory of 1683. The memory of 1683 is used as a means of increasing the sense of a threat to a common culture from the Muslim other. Movements against gender equality policies are also based upon the construction of that same threat to a common culture. These targets operate relationally, each one helping facilitate the construction of the in-group as based entirely on what they stand against.

### **7.3 The Identitarian Movement and 1683**

The in-group, constructed by those right-wing groups who make use of the cultural memory of 1683, features certain key elements, each of which is constructed based on the 'other' it stands opposed to. It is a collective identity that is framed as distinctly European – although that can be extended to include North America and Australia through European colonial identity. That Europeanness is taken as white and Judeo-Christian, in opposition to the Muslim 'other'. This is identity as constructed on orientalist divisions (Said 1978).

Secondly, it is a European identity which is constructed as being enlightened, as built upon a scientific racism, standing in opposition to the ‘savage’ other. This is expressed most keenly in the use of representations of women, where the apparent freedoms for women in Europe/the West are foregrounded against the stereotype of the niqab-wearing Muslim woman. Those freedoms are also threatened by the out-of-control, othered violent male incomer. Thirdly, and connected to the second feature, there is the construction of an adherence to ‘traditional’ family values, as threatened by liberal gender-equality movements. The groups that place themselves at the forefront of the commemorations of 1683 push these three features of European identity through their actions. In addition, they mobilise this idea of collective belonging affectively, creating a confidence for their supporters to engage in political action.

### ***7.3.1 Identitäre Bewegung Österreich***

The Identitarian Movement emerged within French politics, consolidating initially in 2003 with the formation of *Les Identitaires* (formerly *Bloc Identitaire*). The group brought together former members of a range of right-wing groups, most notably the French National Front. The group was characterised by its use of ‘majority Identitarian populism’, an ideology which ‘focuses on the concept of identity as a tool for determining who belongs’ to a majority in-group (Lazaridis and Tsagrkoni 2016: 242). In the same vein as the ‘Eurabia’ theories, these groups combine their anti-immigrant and Islamophobic viewpoints with the targeting of a shadowy, out-of-touch elite that no longer cares for the majority population. The mobilisation of this ideology beyond forums such as DefendEuropa and *Gates of Vienna* (see above) was minimal prior to the formation of the *Bloc Identitaire* youth wing in 2012.<sup>29</sup> The youth wing, calling themselves *Génération Identitaire* (Generation Identity) fairly rapidly expanded across Europe, most notably with *Generazione Identitaria* in Italy and *Identitäre Bewegung* in Austria and Germany. The UK branch of Generation Identity launched in July 2017. What formed as a youth wing has swiftly become one of the most visible groups in right-wing populism and extremism across Europe.

---

<sup>29</sup> Although that is not to say that such ideologies were not of significant impact, in particular in inspiring the 2011 Oslo and Utøya terrorist attack. At this point, however, these ideologies were less visible in “on the ground” activist movements.



Generation Identity groups across Europe have focused on creating a strong, unified image. The yellow lambda symbol upon a black background has become increasingly visible at right-wing protests. In the following section I focus upon the ideology presented by Generation Identity Austria (Identitäre Bewegung Österreich (IBÖ)). The message presented by Generation Identity groups elsewhere is broadly similar to that discussed here, simply with a localisation of historical references and targets for actions. Central to this ideology is a championing of an ethnopluralism, with the rights to expression of individual cultural identity foregrounded. This ethnopluralism is held up as the alternative to globalisation and is used as a means of arguing against immigration, particularly from the Middle East or Africa. These forms of immigration are presented as threatening the cultural individuality of Europe. It is a viewpoint which is claimed by its proponents to be anti-racist, as it views the ‘complete separation between people of different origin in different territories’ as the only means of preventing racial violence (Fleischer 2014). Europe, therefore, is to be preserved for those who fit the conception of European identity discussed above.

The IBÖ describe themselves in the opening paragraph of their ‘Vision’ as the ‘main patriot and activist NGO’ in Austria. Acting independently from political parties, they are ‘committed to the preservation of our cultural heritage in all states’ (IBÖ 2019). The ethnopluralist ideology is pushed to the fore, with a concern for the preservation of cultural heritage specified ‘in all states’ – that is, cultures should remain within the states of their origin. ‘The identity of Europe’ they go on to say, ‘is worth passing from generation to generation’ (ibid.). This European identity is presented as diverse across regions and nations, again focusing on the preservation of those specific identities within nations or regions. While they present themselves as acting independently from political parties their ‘vision’ includes the demand for ‘patriotic politics from our politicians’ (ibid.), suggesting that they are encouraging their supporters to vote for particular parties, usually those on the right.

Across the IBÖ website references are made to the homeland or, in the original German, to *Heimat*. *Heimat* goes beyond homeland. It is a term tied deeply to German cultural history (Eigler and Kugele 2012). It is a term that refers not just to a homeland, but a home ‘imbued with a deep sense of belonging’ (Nielsen 2019: 2). It invokes a cultural memory of German nation building and deep history (Eigler and Kugele 2012: 1). In the 1930s, *Heimat* became mobilised as a part of the Nazi “Blood and Soil” propaganda programme,

the term used in that instance to foster an apparently patriotic sense of belonging and responsibility to the German nation. *Heimat*, then, is a loaded term. Where the IBÖ pages on ‘vision’ and ‘demands’ refer to *Heimat*, the equivalent sections on the Generation Identity UK website interchange between homeland, or ‘love of one’s own country’ (Generation Identity 2019). *Heimat* is discursively tied to images and concepts of Austrian culture by the IBÖ, further layering an already culturally loaded term with ties to concepts of a notion of a particular Austrian identity. For example, under a subheading on the ‘local’ vision of IBÖ, they state that:

being rooted means that the mountains, forests and seas of our *Heimat* [which] are as much a part of us as the Sunday ringing of the church bells, traditional processions with their music, unique dialects, beautiful costumes and traditional customs. To give up our *Heimat* would be to give up ourselves.  
(IBÖ 2019)

What *Heimat* means in Austrian terms is a recognition of both the physical lands that make the nation remarkable and cultural traditions such as processions and traditional costumes. The IBÖ here make use of common right-wing discursive tools. There is a connection to the physical lands of Austria. It is not the case that one lives in an area, but rather is rooted to the land itself. The cultural touchpoints, in particular the ‘Sunday ringing of the church bells’, immediately evokes a Christian identity<sup>30</sup>. In connecting *Heimat* to physical territory and to Christian cultural identity, the physical land of Austria is given a deep Christian identity.

The IBÖ reject the notion that this glorification of an indigenous culture could slip into racist behaviour. They specifically state that they ‘reject any form of racism. We recognise other cultures as different and see the value in human diversity’ (ibid.). Recognising that diversity, in a clear representation of the ethnopluralist ideology, means the preservation of those diverse cultures within their own regions and/or nations. They are clear that they ‘want no globalisation of cultures and no world states’ (ibid.). Globalisation is rejected as endangering that cultural diversity, threatening a society where ‘all people think and live the same’ in place of ‘genuine originality’ (ibid.). Having set out this political vision, the

---

<sup>30</sup> This is echoed in the use of the ringing of church bells to mark the UN instigated International Day of Peace in Europe (see McDonald et al. 2019)

IBÖ list a series of demands. These demands reveal roots of the Identitarian Movement in broader right-wing theories, including eugenics and political correctness.

The IBÖ's demands are as follows:

- 'Fearless Debate – enough of people losing their job or being threatened for voicing their opinions. We demand the right to debate without fear in the future, for our *Heimat*'
- Remigration and the Dominant Culture – Austria is the land of the Austrians. Migration has always existed and can be enriching. The mass migration of today, however, is not enriching, but leads to the loss of our identity.
- Family Friendly Policies – We Austrians will die out, as we do not have enough children. We demand child and family-friendly politics, so our people will continue to exist in the future.
- Promoting Traditions – while foreign cultures are given significant promotion, domestic customs and traditions fall to the side. We demand that we first give attention to the future of our identity.' (IBÖ 2019b)

These demands are summed up as a demand for 'the love of one's own' (IBÖ 2019c).

Through looking at each of these four demands in more detail, the shape of the Identitarian ideology, and its historical roots, becomes clearer.

### **7.3.2 Fearless Debate**

The suggestion that freedom of speech, or the right to fair debate, is under threat has long been a tool used by right-wing groups to attack their opponents. This is frequently combined with attacks on a society too concerned with 'political correctness' (Tufail 2018; Lentin 2014). Excessive concern for political correctness is framed as preventing politicians or other authorities from tackling problems inherent, according to groups like the IBÖ, with multiculturalism (Tufail 2018; Moore and Greenland 2018). Strategically framing<sup>31</sup> the debate in such a way allows groups such as the IBÖ to position their opposition to immigration and cultural diversity as 'a common-sense questioning of 'political correctness gone mad'' (Lentin 2014: 1276). For these groups the use of this rhetoric serves two purposes. Firstly, it legitimises their racist language as a non-racist,

---

<sup>31</sup> See Hänggli (2020) for a detailed discussion on strategic framing of political discourse.

acceptable criticism of modern politics. To criticise these proclamations can be framed as attacking freedom of speech and the right to open debate. Secondly, this demand allows the IBÖ to attack their left-wing critics as placing the feelings of minority groups over the rights of the majority. Criticism that is labelled as an attack on free speech is further criticised as specifically demonising the majority view. This rhetoric allows those who use it to present themselves as in touch with a majority view that unseen elites try to stop being aired.

This form of argumentation echoes populist styles. Through constructing an unseen elite who are apparently shutting down legitimate debate, groups such as the IBÖ are able to combine their nationalist or ethnopluralist ideology (racial or territorial in/out groups) with the populist notion of an elite that operates against the people (in/out groups presented on a vertical axis).

### ***7.3.3 Remigration and the Dominant Culture***

‘Remigration’ is at the heart of the Identitarian ethnopluralist ideology. It acts as a response to the ‘Eurabia’ or ‘Great Replacement’ conspiracy theories (see above) which suggest that European culture is slowly being replaced by an Islamic culture imposed through mass migration. Remigration calls for the supporting of policies that encourage migrants to return to their place of origin. This, according to the UK branch of Generation Identity, is a requirement because of ‘The Great Replacement’ (Generation Identity 2019). This suggests that a remigration policy is a necessity as a result of other politicians’ decisions – rather than an ideological choice of the group itself. For the IBÖ the policy of remigration is similarly framed in terms of a necessity to protect Austrian culture (as defined above). Migration is not, they claim, an inherently bad thing, but mass migration ‘is not enriching, but leads to the loss of our identity’ (IBÖ 2019b). They make use of the *topos of threat* once more to suggest that because of the threat to the preservation of Austrian identity, action must be taken to remove migrants from Austria.

### ***7.3.4 Family-Friendly Policies***

The ‘scientific-racism’ of both the pre-WW2 eugenics movement and more recent works on IQ and race featured characterisations of certain othered groups as both a less desirable

group of humans and as prone to higher birth rates. These fears are again brought to the fore in recent right-wing Islamophobic views. Birth rates among these communities are presented as a threat to the cultural identity of a nation. These ideas act as the foundation for the IBÖ's reference to 'family friendly policies.' They are combined with a conservative view on the role of women.

The IBÖ, in response to their depiction of a Muslim other, where women are subjugated by men, seek to profess their credentials as champions of women's freedom. Simultaneously, the role of women is centred in reproduction. There is a duty placed on patriotic Austrians to increase the birth rate, with women expected to give birth to more children as a means of ensuring that 'our people will continue to exist in the future' (IBÖ 2019c). 'Family Friendly Policies' in this instance allow for the IBÖ to create a sense of nostalgia, where traditional family values are connected to a culture now under threat. Women's freedoms are, therefore, limited. As with the gender subjugation of the eugenics movement, control over reproductive rights for the good of the population is central to these policies. Echoes also emerge of the call for women in Nazi Germany to reproduce for the good of the Aryan race (Kline 2001: 142). The IBÖ presents the (supposed) high birth-rates among Muslim or immigrant populations as a threat and as evidence of their savagery, while simultaneously presenting an increase in birth rates among Austrian populations as a goal for a patriotic society.

### ***7.3.5 Promoting Traditions***

In their references to *Heimat*, the IBÖ evoke a deep sense of the Austria not only as a physical nation, but also as a place where the culture creates a sense of home. The preservation of traditions and cultural heritage are presented as central to the vision of the IBÖ in a positive manner. In the demands, that vision is once again connected to the demonisation of the Muslim or migrant 'other'. 'Foreign cultures are given significant promotion', the IBÖ claim, at the expense of 'domestic customs and traditions'. This claim does not stand up to scrutiny. A 2016 report on changing cultural spending in Austria noted that recent increases in spending had particularly benefitted renowned Austrian institutions such as the Salzburg Festival, federal theatres and the State Opera (Compendium 2016). Suggestions that domestic traditions will 'fall to the side' are clearly unfounded, as Austrian cultural institutions still draw significant funding.

The demand, therefore, to ‘give attention to the future of our own identity’ is, on face value, met by policies already in place. This exposes the IBÖ agenda, where demands for the preservation of Austrian cultural heritage are wrapped up in a fear of an incoming migrant culture. This relies on the notion of a set, indigenous culture, one that has not been influenced by migration until recent years. The lens of the memory of 1683 and Ottoman influence on Vienna is a useful means of dispelling this myth. As discussed in Chapter 6 (see above), traces of Ottoman influence on Vienna exist across the city, not just in museums but in the Vienna cityscape. From the Ottoman figure on the Meisl coffee logo, found at so many of Vienna’s famous coffee houses, to sites such as the Turkschanzenpark, the myth of a pure, indigenous Austrian culture allows groups such as the IBÖ to wrap their Islamophobia and racism within a cloak of concern for equality and cultural heritage.

Each of these demands illustrates the manner in which the IBÖ operate. On an annual basis, the IBÖ organise a commemorative march to mark the breaking of the Siege of Vienna in 1683. Through this march, entitled *Gedenken 1683*, a physical mobilisation of the ideas presented by the IBÖ takes place. The memory of 1683 becomes a conduit for the projection of the demands of the IBÖ and, by extension, associated right-wing populist groups across Europe.

#### **7.4 *Gedenken 1683* Commemorative Actions**

‘We want to build a bridge from past to present, because the memory of 1683 is our heritage and our mission’. This is the slogan for the *Gedenken 1683* group in Austria. For the past four years, this group – a branch of IBÖ – have held a procession at Kahlenberg on the weekend closest to 12 September to mark the anniversary of the breaking of the siege. The imagery of this march, and the use of that imagery on social media, have been constructed in a way that the demands of the IBÖ detailed above become embodied in the practices of the march. The following section details the manner in which the procession constructs ideas of gender equality, traditional culture, evokes ideas of the Austrian *Heimat*, and mirrors imagery from right-wing marches globally.

### ***7.4.1 Gender and Gedenken 1683***

Images from the *Gedenken 1683* processions from recent years include the deliberate placing of women to the front of the procession. The placement creates a false impression of the gender split at such marches, which continue to be heavily male-dominated. The placement of women to the front of the march serves two purposes. Firstly, the *Gedenken 1683* group – and by association the IBÖ – are seen as an open space for women. This is a part of the culture that the group claims to protect and can be seen in opposition to their view of the threat from the ‘other’, an immigrant/Muslim culture which is presented as oppressive to women. As with the IBÖ demands for family values, which places women in a particular set role and seems to stand in opposition to their own claims as champions of gender equality, the placing of women to the front of the march can be seen as the placing of women into a specific role, as opposed to women necessarily being a part of the Identitarian Movement more broadly.

This presentation of marches also contributes to a wider global attempt by right-wing extremist and populist groups to broaden their appeal to women. Through this broadening of appeal, and through the prominent position of some women in key right-wing parties in Europe, such groups are able to act against two opponents simultaneously. The groups, as discussed above, can be seen as opposed to the Muslim other. Secondly, they are able to claim opposition to a cultural ‘elite’, particularly those who push forward feminist and gender equality policies. This is an essential part of the RWP axis, where the opposition to that unseen elite is an essential part of being able to present themselves as speaking for the will of ‘the people’. Political recognition of gender fluidity in recent years can be set as opposed to the ‘traditional family values’ championed by the IBÖ. Through increasing the visual presence of women at the front of these RWP movements, these groups can push against these policies while claiming a feminist perspective themselves. This can be seen as a part of a trend shift described by Feyda Sayan-Cengiz and Caner Tekin (2019) as a ‘gender turn’ amongst the radical right. This can refer to both the rise in support for radical right-wing parties and the adoption of gendered rhetoric by right-wing parties and groups. In terms of political party support, this is seen most distinctly in the rise in support for Marine Le Pen’s Front National amongst women in France (Mayer 2015). Equally, right-wing groups have been shown to adopt a rhetorical strategy of support for gender equality

and LGBT<sup>32</sup> rights as a means of denigrating a Muslim other (Köttig and Blum 2017; Mayer, Ajonovic and Sauer 2014). As is shown below, it is the latter aspect of a ‘gender turn’ that is seen most prominently amongst the extreme right in Austria.

#### ***7.4.2 Traditional Culture and Heimat***

Throughout the *Gedenken 1683* website, the events of 1683 are presented as a part of the cultural heritage of the ‘young Austrian patriots’ who form the group, and by extension the cultural heritage of anyone who might consider themselves to be an Austrian patriot. Building the importance of 1683 as a part of this cultural heritage involves *Gedenken 1683* making use of language that echoes that found in cultural memory studies. They state that: ‘This history is for us not merely something for the past, but rather is an elemental component of our identity and therefore essential for our present and future’. This sentence taken in isolation could easily concur with my own framing of the importance of cultural memory as integral to the construction of identity in the present. The sentence communicates much of what might be considered essential to our understanding of the need for protection of cultural heritage. However, the divisive ideological underpinnings of *Gedenken 1683* emerge in the sentence which follows.

The group use this memory to ‘express our explicit commitment to a positive and identity-creating approach to this memory and associate our work with an explicitly patriotic agreement.’ (ibid.) This cultural memory is designed to be explicitly used as a means of expressing a patriotic identity. The direct connections between IBÖ and *Gedenken 1683* mean that this patriotic identity is linked to that suggested by the IBÖ. It is a patriotism based upon care for traditional culture, family values and the Austrian *Heimat*. Taking part in the commemoration event is, therefore, presented as a chance to show deference to this cultural heritage. Through the use of the cultural memory of this historical event, a march that is distinctly political in its intentions can be presented by the organisers as an expression of care for the cultural heritage of Austria. Opponents of the march – of which there have been an equal number at Kahlenberg in recent years – can therefore be depicted

---

<sup>32</sup> This support exists in a state of tension, where the support for LGBT rights might be used to allow for opposition to a Muslim Other, whilst an opposition to threats to ‘traditional family values’ may require the same groups to oppose aspects of LGBT struggles for equality. This is most keenly seen in the opposition to trans rights and to critical gender studies more broadly, for example in Viktor Orbán’s demonising of gender studies at the Central European University in Budapest.



as trying to suppress legitimate commemoration of national cultural heritage, rather than opponents of the right-wing ideologies that underpin the march. Once again this facilitates groups supporting the march in developing their right-wing populist stance. The memory of 1683 is mobilised to present Austria as white and Christian, having defeated the Ottoman armies and therefore protecting that cultural identity. The threat from immigration is conflated with the threat from the Ottoman forces in 1683. Secondly, by presenting themselves as the protectors of cultural heritage, the IBÖ and *Gedenken 1683* groups can again place themselves as opposed to an unseen elite who are too concerned with “political correctness” to give due credence to this part of Austrian heritage. Again, the group create opposition on horizontal (territorial) and vertical (elite vs people) lines.

#### ***7.4.3 Far-right Procession Imagery***

One of the most striking features of the *Gedenken 1683* march is the familiarity of the image: the procession, complete with flaming torches and banners. The banners are designed to replicate war standards and battle banners, seeking to deepen the sense of connection to Sobieski’s forces and their arrival at Kahlenberg in 1683. While the banners are specific to this march, the collective image created is strikingly similar to far-right marches globally in recent years. The ‘Unite the Right’ rally in Charlottesville in 2018, for example, featured scores of right-wing activists from across America, particularly those associated with the alt-right movement<sup>33</sup>, taking part in a procession through the city with flaming torches in hand. Those in the procession chanted slogans like ‘blood and soil’, and ‘Jews will not replace us’. Such slogans have been common to far-right discourse for a number of years, but their use in such a public march marked an increase in confidence of those present.

The torches also become a part of *Gedenken 1683*’s online discourse. In advertising the 2019 procession on Twitter, the group ask supporters to ‘carry on the torch of remembrance with us, make a clear sign for our shared identity’. The torches and banners are a connection not only to the forces in 1683 then, but also to that physical belonging to the constructed group of Austrian patriots. The internationalism of these far-right networks

---

<sup>33</sup> The alt-right in America has splintered in recent years. Ties between the alt-right and Generation Identity in Europe have been evident, both in terms of sharing content online but also in terms of adopting similar tactical and visual approaches.

is illuminated once more in these actions. The choice of clothing, colour schemes of banners and use of flaming torches have become signifiers of the politics of marches such as these<sup>34</sup>.

## 7.5 *Gedenken 1683* and Connective Memory

Social media platforms, including Twitter, are an essential part of the *Gedenken 1683* activist network. The official commemoration account received limited interaction in the last two years, appearing to be rarely used outside of the period immediately surrounding September's commemorative action. Posts from the account garnered some attention from directly associated groups, but did not reach a significant audience, save for a peak of 244 likes and 63 RTs for a post on the day of their September 2018 march (notably lower than Tweets discussed in relation to Magna Carta in Chapter 4). The account itself only has 410 followers at the time of writing in May 2020. This is in contrast to the much wider interaction found with broader Generation Identity accounts (29.3k followers for Identitäre Bewegung's German account and 39.7k followers for Martin Sellner, the leader of IBÖ.) However, the *G1683* account offers a productive insight into the role of uses of the past in the public face of the IBÖ, and the role played by the commemoration of 1683. This is particularly evident in increased activity in the months preceding the 2019 march. Firstly, *Gedenken 1683* have developed a consistent imagery for the annual march, including a specific logo for the occasion. This echoes similar attention to brand detail shown by the IBÖ and associated groups. Secondly, the group gave greater focus to the construction of a clear historical narrative to accompany their commemorative actions.

In advance of the *Gedenken 1683* march in September 2019, the group's Twitter pages shared a series of biographies of figures central to the breaking of the siege. In addition to Jan III Sobieski, profiles were posted of Karl V. Von Lothringen (Charles V, Duke of Lorraine, commander of the Imperial Army during the breaking of the 1683 siege), Marco d'Aviano (a Catholic Capuchin friar who through his support for the mobilising forces against the Ottoman armies is referred to as the 'Saviour of Vienna') and Johann Andreas Von Liebenberg (Mayor of Vienna in 1683). Each profile is accompanied by an image of

---

<sup>34</sup> The international links that characterise the current extreme far-right were illuminated by the ties between Martin Sellner, of *Gedenken 1683* and the IBÖ, and the Christchurch attacker. See the following for more information: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/16/christchurch-shooters-links-to-austrian-far-right-more-extensive-than-thought> [Accessed 11 September 2019]

the individual, their date and place of birth and death, and a link to the *Gedenken 1683* website, all placed above a shadow of the *Gedenken 1683* logo. Alongside the careful attention to maintain a brand imagery, this is an attempt to place the historical narrative at the front of this campaign.

*Gedenken 1683* present their actions as a march of commemoration. The foregrounding of a connection with these histories allows the group to claim some continuity with the past. This is an effective strategy on two fronts. Firstly, these acts operate at an intersection between history and memory (for a detailed discussion of the connection or divisions between history and memory see Cubitt (2007: 30-39)). Similar to the political use of Magna Carta, the heavy historical labour has taken place over a long period since 1683. Through commemorative events, written histories, and the interpretation of the 1683 siege in museum settings, a straightforward narrative of the moment has a place in a collective consciousness. This is the AHD of 1683. It is a narrative of Ottoman expansion until 1683, followed by a decline and the solidification of Europe as a Christian continent following the breaking of the siege. The actions of *Gedenken 1683* do not dispute this narrative, rather they promote it further. The long historical labour allows for the use of this moment in a manner that suggests a legitimate understanding of the past. As the AHD of 1683 is not challenged, there is little labour asked of the prospective target audience for these political actions. This allows for a focusing upon the affective and political labour called for by 1683 as a *moving moment*, facilitated by the mobilisation of a collective memory and the construction of a sense of belonging. The procession acts to construct a shared memory, based upon a shared Austrian, European and white Christian identity. A continuity between those taking part in the procession and Sobieski's forces in 1683 is suggested. The procession itself, complete with banners and flaming torches, is a shared experience which encourages passionate responses akin to the collective identity constructed amongst football 'ultras.'<sup>35</sup>

The continuity between the *Gedenken 1683* march and perceived ancestors echoes a central element of Connerton's (1989) framework of commemorative practices. In adopting certain elements of a formal ritual language (Connerton 1989: 59), the group can give an additional level of legitimacy to their actions. This is a continuity that is substantiated by a claim to historical accuracy and a professed desire to preserve a national

---

<sup>35</sup> Superfans of football clubs who often use pyrotechnics, flags and chants to create a collective display of support for that club (see Doidge, Kassakowski & Mintert 2020).

cultural heritage. It allows the group to falsely claim a degree of political neutrality, where their actions are concerned primarily with the commemoration of an historical moment that they see as central to the identity of Vienna and Austria. When these marches are then opposed by anti-racist and anti-fascist campaigners, the organisers of the march can further demonise these political opponents through a claim that they are challenging a peaceful march of historical commemoration.

However, the political action that is associated with this use of the past is made clear in the associated text. Firstly, each of the four profiles presented concludes with the slogan of *Gedenken 1683* – ‘Ihr/Sein Erbe ist unser Auftrag!’ (Your/His legacy is our mission). There is a deliberate past-presencing of these individuals, as they are consciously connected to actions in the present. The profile of Marco d’Aviano argues that he is ‘often called the “saviour of Vienna” [...] thanks to his efforts to ensure that the [allied Holy Roman Empire] army was quickly mobilised and deployed’. They argue that these actions are a reminder that ‘in the face of imminent danger’ it is important to ‘pull together’. The profile does not detail what the current ‘imminent danger’ might be, but the association between *Gedenken 1683* and the IBÖ creates an intertextual link between this discourse and the wider manifesto of these groups. It is clear that the imminent danger is immigration and Islam.

The historical accounts also make use of martyr narratives, a style that echoes the *topos of saviour* seen in populist political discourse. Johann Andreas von Liebenberg is praised for his role as Mayor of Vienna in leading the resistance to the siege among residents of the city. He is presented as a Mayor who led by example, foregoing ‘supposed differences of status’ to lead by actions rather than words. The *Gedenken 1683* profile states that he ‘was not allowed to live to see the liberation of his hometown’. Therefore, the memory of this man who ‘had inspired thousands to defend the city, will remain alive in the future and serve as a model for us’. The representation of von Liebenberg as a martyr allows *Gedenken 1683* to present him as an Austrian hero, someone who died while inspiring thousands in the protection of Vienna. These historical narratives of heroism combine with historical myth to give meaning to events in the present (see Kelsey 2015: 179). The ‘legacy’ of van Liebenberg is presented as the ‘mission’ of *Gedenken 1683*, creating a discursive call for those who follow *Gedenken 1683* to become leaders in the defence of Vienna in the present.

Where von Liebenberg and d'Aviano are described in evocative terms, the account given to Jan III Sobieski is a more formulaic account of his role in organising the armed forces. Detail is given on the negotiations that led to Sobieski's involvement in the battle, and the route that the armies took to Kahlenberg and through the Vienna woods when engaging with Ottoman forces. However, the profile does place Sobieski as the primary liberator of the city. 'Thanks to Jan Sobieski III and his 27,000 Polish troops', it argues, 'the Ottomans were defeated and the city was liberated'. It is only at the end of the profile that the links between past and present once again become explicit and emotive. The closing statement suggests that Sobieski's 'commitment stands for the fact that it is possible to ward off the greatest dangers as long as the European peoples stand together. His legacy is our mission!' The account of Marco d'Aviano was used to call for supporters to 'pull together'. Here, the in-group that is being called together is made more explicit. It is not just Austrians, but 'European peoples' who must stand together against any dangers or threats that might exist. We can see the *topos of threat* (Wodak 2015: 53) emerge explicitly here. There is a danger, that one can read through knowledge of the group's ideology as coming from Muslims or migrants, that must be opposed by European peoples coming together in action.

It is in this call for action that the influence of the discursive use of the Siege of Vienna becomes clearer. When considering the use of Magna Carta, a focus was given to a notion of British/English or Western exceptionalism as attached to a development of justice and human rights. This is a form of exceptionalism that has been mobilised by right-wing groups to foster division, but often within those frames of access to, or denial of, justice and fairness under law. With the Siege of Vienna, the associations with military action and the physical repelling of Ottoman forces connects this to an immediately more aggressive form of action. *Gedenken 1683* and the IBÖ make clear who their in-group is – Austrian and European 'patriots'. They are often less explicit in the action that they call for. However, in connecting their actions to memories of war, there is an implicit link to violent action. Where the *Gates of Vienna* blog is open in talking of a new phase of an old war between Christianity and Islam, *Gedenken 1683* and the IBÖ simply talk of certain threats or dangers to a way of life. The discursive links that each of these groups make are, however, the same. Supporters of *Gedenken 1683* are encouraged to emulate heroes such as von Liebenberg and Sobieski, suggesting that they should view themselves as the leaders of forces in an ongoing battle to protect the city.

These accounts of chosen individuals also continue to present a simple linear narrative of a white, Christian, Western European force defeating the threat from a Muslim, Eastern, and Ottoman other. This exacerbates the false sense of a simplistic narrative regarding the events of 1683. The most detailed accounts of the events of 1683 detail a conflict between two unstable empires, each seeking to solidify or expand their territory. In addition, other parties beyond the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, including the powers of Venice and France, had a vested interest in the tensions on the Eastern border of the Habsburg Empire. Leaders in France and Venice would have been supportive of the Ottoman Empire, as continuing tensions on the East could have presented an opportunity for expansion into Habsburg territory on the West. Within the allied forces who arrived at Vienna to break the Ottoman siege were Muslim regiments from Poland and Lithuania. The battle was one of territory rather than religion, of resources and power rather than one of cultural dominance (Herbjørnsrud 2018). The simplistic narrative presented by *Gedenken 1683* and the IBÖ pushes these nuances to the side in the interests of building the collective memory of 1683 around the idea of a European culture under threat. While their tactics differ, the outcomes they seek are the same as those shown by blogs like *Gates of Vienna*.

## **7.6 1683 and Affective Action**

Whether distributing content through online blogs, via Twitter, or mobilising people at a physical march, the success of these groups rests upon their ability to foster a sense of in-group belonging. For right-wing extremist groups and blogs such as those who contribute to *Gates of Vienna*, belonging to that in-group is founded upon an acknowledgement of the superiority of a Western and European culture in opposition to an Eastern Muslim other. For groups such as the IBÖ, *Gedenken 1683*, and right-wing populist political parties, the belonging is founded on that same right-wing in-group, with the addition of the opposition to an 'elite', represented by liberal governments or left-wing organisations. This delineation of a group identity is, however, only mobilised to action when – as we have previously discussed in the context of Guibernau's (2013) work on belonging – an emotional response is elicited. It is this emotional response that instils a confidence to act.

As Guibernau (2013) notes, this confidence can often be built from a position of fear. Fear without confidence, however, cannot facilitate action, they must come together. In looking at the use of 1683 by right-wing extremist and populist groups, the discourse and actions

produced seek to mobilise people in this manner. The discourse used can frequently be placed into the framework of a *topos of threat*, following Wodak's (2015) approach. The manner in which the *topos of threat* operates in this instance can be mapped against Guibernau's notion of belonging and political action. The *topos of threat* operates by discursively presenting a target audience with a threat that should be responded to. Those using this tactic can then provide the route to act against this threat. Throughout the political use of 1683 in all its forms, there is the construction of a sense of an ongoing threat from a Muslim, Eastern other. Political parties, bloggers and groups such as *Gates of Vienna*, the IBÖ, the FPÖ, Fidesz and PiS present themselves as the groups with the answers to these threats. Wodak notes that this use of the *topos of threat* is an operative part of the development of populist 'politics of fear' (Wodak 2015).

The above statements can be reframed in terms of this construction of a politics of fear. The threat that is presented from the Muslim other is framed in terms of a threat of invasion, loss of a culture and, in the Austrian example, the loss of *Heimat*. Right-wing parties are noted as particularly successful in creating this fear as a means of legitimising their policies (Wodak 2015: 5). This success rests upon not only constructing this fear of a particular threat, but also in projecting a sense of confidence in the policies and actions to be taken. While building an in-depth conception of the manner in which this politics of fear operates and the workings of such discourse, Wodak does not give significant attention to the affective and emotional element of the success of the discourse and the RWP or extremist groups who make use of it.

## 7.7 Chapter Summary

**Table 7.1:** Movements of 1683 – Chapter Summary

<b>Spatial Movement</b>	<b>Temporal Movement</b>
<p>Digitally facilitated communication of understandings of 1683 across transnational right-wing networks (i.e. through blogs such as <i>Gates of Vienna</i>).</p> <p>Movement through the landscape in the case of the <i>Gedenken 1683</i> march.</p> <p>Movement of terrorist actions, in particular in New Zealand and Norway.</p>	<p>Active past-presencing in discourse suggesting a continued threat. References to a continued war, the fight against a consistent enemy.</p> <p>Temporal continuity (and therefore a sense of historical belonging) communicated through the <i>Gedenken 1683</i> march, and the histories they present on Twitter.</p>
<b>Affective Movement</b>	<b>Political Movement</b>
<p>Repeated construction of the sense of a threat from a Muslim ‘other’.</p> <p>Reinforcement of white-Western superiority, supported by reference to scientific racism.</p> <p>Gendered construction of a threat to women’s rights (built upon the notion of a foreign savage).</p> <p>Fear of ‘replacement’ and the loss of traditions, heritage and a European (i.e. superior) culture.</p> <p>Belonging communicated through the visual aspects of the commemorative march.</p> <p>The discursive presentation of a ‘mission’, or a ‘war’.</p>	<p>Act to support the Identitarian Movement – either in person or online.</p> <p>Encouragement to take action against the ‘great replacement’ and to defend Europe, potentially through supporting anti-immigration political policies.</p> <p>Encouragement to join protest actions such as the <i>Gedenken 1683</i> march.</p> <p>At the most extreme, encouragement to act to protect your in-group against a threat by engaging in violent actions (Anderson’s notion that any members of an imagined community may be willing to kill others to protect their community).</p>



Confidence given by the deep historical continuity – again facilitated by subscribing to a narrative echoing the AHD.

This chapter has detailed occasions where uses of the past can encourage political action which goes beyond support for particular political parties and extends to encouraging acts of violent extremism. The dimensions of movement of 1683 discussed in this chapter are outlined in Table 7.1. The spatial and temporal movements of the past here echo those discussed in previous chapters. These are national and transnational movements of references to the past, facilitated recently by digital technologies. Here, however, we saw the construction of a more extreme sense of threat from an out-group. The affective movement of 1683 was seen to communicate the notion of a European identity under threat of ‘replacement’ and, therefore, the need to take action against this threat. Anderson (1983) noted that members of an imagined community, in his conception that of the nation-state, develop such a strong sense of collective belonging that they are willing to kill or be killed in service of this community. The actions of right-wing extremists, frequently using references to 1683 to justify their actions, demonstrate the depth of belonging felt towards an imagined white-Western, international community. As with political uses of Magna Carta, references to 1683 in political discourse again do not diverge significantly from an AHD in the understandings they ask of their audiences. These uses of the past do not sit in complete isolation, but rather exist in relation to each other. In recognising this relationality, an additional responsibility for considering political uses of pasts presented in heritage discourse is generated.

In *The Persistence of Nationalism*, Closs Stephens (2013) draws our attention to the consistent importance of an imagined community to the construction of a national identity. Similarly, Guibernau (2013) gives strength to the importance of collective belonging as built on key emotional connections. The re-emergent RWP success is similarly built upon a construction of an imagined belonging that is both nationalist and ethno-cultural. The fear of a threat is mobilised effectively as it operates affectively. This affective communication of a sense of belonging is created whether the memory of 1683 is being mobilised physically, in the form of a march, or connectively through social media or

right-wing blogs. In the following chapter I look in detail at the manner in which this affective communication of culture operates. In doing so, I will develop the concept of the *moving moment* in depth, as a means of furthering our understanding of these uses of the past. In adopting this concept, I also seek to offer routes through which this understanding of the use of the past by right-wing groups can inform our response to the populist politics of fear and division.

## Chapter 8

### ***Moving Moments: The Affective Persistence of the Past***

The previous four chapters detail the movement of two historic moments in and through heritage and political discourse. In following this movement, the chapters drew attention to the re-emergence of right-wing populism, the continued impact of nationalist ideologies, the ambiguity of history, the impact of digital ecologies in political discourse, and the role of affect in creating a politically potent use of the past. This chapter looks at these topics in more detail. In doing so, the broader relevance of *moving moments* to the study of uses of the past in heritage and political discourse is outlined. As a reminder, *moving moments* are taken to encapsulate the following aspects of uses of the past:

- Historic moments are ambiguous and malleable, with meanings and understandings of a given moment never fixed but rather constantly shifting. These meanings shift as historical accounts change over time and they shift as the historical moments are made relevant to changed circumstances in the present. For example, the relevance of Magna Carta to the American constitution will differ from understandings required for a relevance to the far-right discourse of Stephen Yaxley-Lennon. Similarly, the understandings of the relevance of the *Siege of Vienna* shift to focus upon the ‘enemy of the day’, whether those were socialists, Jewish people or, as is now the case, Muslims and migrants. However, in each case a dominant AHD and a common narrative for these moments facilitated them being made relevant to changing political needs.
- These historical moments are moved, through heritage and political discourse, in the following ways:
  - Temporally – as these pasts are remediated in the present through media representations, heritage and museum displays, or through acts of individual recollection (often but not always precipitated by media representations)
  - Spatially – as knowledge of these pasts is communicated through different museums, memorials and through individual acts of communication.
- These historical moments have affective potential – the capacity to *emotionally move people*. This capacity is one that is made present through discourse, be that in heritage or political settings, which seeks an emotional response from its audience.

This is not a capacity that will be present in any historical moment, it is a capacity built by long historical labour. These are not, therefore, moments that come already-imbued with specific impact prior to any social interaction, but rather develop an affective capacity through their continued discursive-mnemonic uses.

This results in *moving moments* which have:

- A simple narrative of meaning (i.e. justice, fairness and British exceptionalism with Magna Carta, and defence of European culture represented by the 1683 *Siege of Vienna*.)
- An already existing place for that narrative in the consciousness of target audiences for political discourse (a long discourse of the importance to British and American national history in the case of Magna Carta, the repeated relating of the *Siege of Vienna* to contemporary political issues in regard to 1683).
- *Moving moments* have the capacity to move people to political action. This emerges through the combination of all of the above features of the *moving moment*, where the temporal and spatial movement of these moments and the relevance they find in the present, allow for them to be easily connected to contemporary political issues. Political action emerges when an affective response is fostered, one which provides a target group with confidence to act in a particular manner. This might be the confidence to vote for Brexit, or support Stephen Yaxley-Lennon (in relation to Magna Carta), or a confidence to engage in public, anti-immigrant protests or to engage in acts of extreme violence (as is the case with the *Siege of Vienna*).

Viewing each of the analysed historical moments as assemblages has also drawn attention to the multitude of components which facilitate the emergence of a *moving moment*. Affective and political movements, founded on particular uses of the past in political discourse, are made possible by the varying, but all agential, role of non-human bodies within the assemblages. These include, but are not limited to, churches, documents, popular histories (in the case of Magna Carta); war loot, landscapes, murals, statues (in the case of the 1683 siege) and online platforms, social media profiles, museum displays and communications infrastructure (in both cases). The elements of the assemblages that are drawn to the fore here are necessarily selective, as the research process illuminated certain components. Repeating the research would likely illuminate different items. Despite the

limitations of this inherently selective process, it is clear that these particular moments have emerged as particularly potent pasts to use in political discourse. Here, human agency is once again foregrounded. While each component of an assemblage, human and non-human, acts in sum to create the potential for the *moving moment*, clear acts of affective and political movement precipitated by uses of these pasts are the result of a human-led action.

The two case studies presented offer a window into how this has taken place in specific contexts, particularly in the United Kingdom and Austria. However, these characteristics and tactics are globally relevant. In looking in more detail at the characteristics of the *moving moment*, this chapter offers insight in to the discursive operation of global memory politics, the impact of the digital upon the circulation of political discourse and, importantly, seeks to build an understanding of what this means to those wishing to oppose the politics of division of the RWP and extremist groups mentioned. The following sections approach the discussed themes individually, drawing together threads that emerged in the analysis of the respective case studies.

### 8.1 Ambiguous History

	<b>‘Memory of a cause’</b>	<b>‘Memory with a cause’</b>
<b>1215 – Magna Carta</b>	The introduction of Magna Carta as a fight for equal rights to justice and fairness under law.	Magna Carta used to suggest a current struggle for rights, fairness and justice, often for those of a particular in-group.
<b>1683 – <i>Siege of Vienna</i></b>	The memory of the fight to “liberate” Vienna from the Siege in 1683.	The use of that memory to suggest a fight against a new threat to Austria (or Europe more broadly) is necessary.
<b>Table 8.1</b> Memory ‘of...’ and ‘with a cause’ in 1215 and 1683.		

This thesis has approached the concept of time as non-linear (see Chapter 2), allowing for the collapsing of temporalities such that past, present and future interact with each other simultaneously. As Rigney (2018) identifies, this is a characteristic that is particularly present when the past is used within political activism. In talking of memory activism, Rigney states that ‘the memory of a cause plays into memory with a cause’ yielding ‘a complex temporal overlay rather than a linear progression from past to present to future’ (2018: 372). In the cases of both 1215 and 1683 individual and group actors have invoked the memory of a cause (the introduction of Magna Carta, or the battle to break the Siege of Vienna) as a means of creating a memory with a cause (see Table 8.1).

Deep histories of 1683 and 1215 are flattened, creating the sense of a continued cause that connects political actors in the present to a constructed common ancestor, building belonging in the process (Guibernau 2013). This allows these histories to be effectively mobilised for a new cause in the present. This flattening of the past also allows for the creation of an imagined future, based on past successes. The collective memory of both 1683 and 1215, as built up not only through political discourse but equally through a dominant AHD present in museums and heritage sites, is one of valorisation of past success. This reminds us that the AHD is not a concept which relates solely to the representations of the past in official heritage settings, such as heritage sites and museums. Rather, the AHD becomes an understanding of the past that has an ubiquity within broader public understandings of a shared past. It is a discourse which is present within official heritage settings, but also permeates significant portions of the (digitally-integrated) public sphere. In both cases discussed here, an AHD is echoed in a broader understanding of these same pasts, creating a fertile ground for their political mobilisation.

The valorisation of Magna Carta allows for the placing of England, and therefore English identity, as leaders in justice and fairness. The role of the Magna Carta in the foundation myth of the USA allows for an adoption of that same sense of national exceptionalism transnationally. The memory of 1683 similarly creates a sense of national and transnational exceptionalism. The breaking of the siege in 1683 stands in for the superiority of a particular notion of western European identity – a white, Christian identity. Through the collapsing of temporalities, evoking 1683 in political discourse by making it active in the present, allows those who identify with that form of European identity to consider themselves as continuingly the only rightful residents of Western Europe. Through this ‘temporal overlay’, victories of the past become felt as real in the present. Therefore, the

notion of potential future victories – in response to threats constructed by RWP groups – becomes tangible.

This adds a layer of complexity to the notion of historical ambiguity – the ambiguity of imagined futures. Rodney Harrison has argued that ‘heritage actually has very little to do with the past’ but rather is concerned with how the past/present relationship acts as ‘a reflection on the future’ (Harrison 2013: 228). The World Heritage Convention (UNESCO 1972) is itself concerned with the protection of heritage for ‘transmission to future generations.’ A preoccupation with the future was viewed by Ulrich Beck as a consequence of modernity and an increasing recognition of future risk (Beck 1992: 21, cited by Harrison 2013). The view of current circumstances as a moment of danger (Levi and Rothberg 2018) supports an increasing concern for our collective future. This is reflected in part by the development of a ‘Heritage Futures’ research group at University College London, and the ‘futures’ theme of the 2020 biennial Association of Critical Heritage Studies conference. This focus upon futures reiterates a sense that understandings of the past are always concerned with perceptions of future societies. The connecting of understandings of the past to visions of the future is central to the political uses of the past.

Much of the RWP discourse detailed so far has focused upon the construction of a threat from a distinct ‘other’ and, importantly, an anger over what that threat might mean to the in-group. This concurs with others who view anger as a primary emotion for populist politics (Rico, Guinjoan and Anduiza 2017). However, I argue that such anger is politically impotent unless combined with a sense of confidence, as suggested by Guibernau. In developing a sense of confidence, the interaction between past, present and future becomes integral. The political discourse discussed here is not solely built upon a view of the past, but also on the conception of an imagined future. In focusing on the development of a sense of nostalgia – particularly as seen in the use of 1683 and the notion of *Heimat* (see Chapter 7) – the issue of futurity has been left absent. However, in collapsing temporalities into a lived experience in the present, the ambiguity of the past and a sense of the future become entwined. This is the case for the use of the past by RWP groups as much as it is for any other political use of the past.

In discussing the potential for ‘remembering hope’ Rigney (2018) seeks to offer a route towards creating an activist memory culture that focuses on human achievements, rather than upon loss and trauma as is often the case. When delivering a conference paper

alluding to the concept of ‘remembering hope’, it was suggested to me in post-paper discussion that RWP do not build their politics on hope (see also Lindroth and Sinevaara-Niskanen 2019), but rather on loss – referring, in general, to the sense of a lost mythical past. While the latter part of this statement is true, this sense of loss cannot precipitate action unless it acts in combination with a sense of what might be achieved. While the focus of that RWP discourse might be upon a nostalgic, mythical past, in constructing this myth of the past they seek to give their supporters hope that this image of the past can be recreated in the future. The affective potential of nostalgia (Wetherell 2012) supports this collapsing of temporalities as it encourages the imagining of a positive future. It allows for what Smith and Campbell describe as ‘inspiring thinking and imagining that is oriented to the future’ (Smith and Campbell 2017: 612). This is a form of thinking that allows for nostalgia to be mobilised towards the construction of progressive futures, based upon a nuanced understanding of messy pasts (Veale 2017). The same affect of nostalgia, however, can be used to imagine what I would consider to be regressive futures based upon politics of division. The successes of right-wing political discourse, in particular in their use of *moving moments*, requires the building of confidence to act. In other words, it requires that ‘inspiring thinking’ in the interaction with their target audiences, their constructed in-group. As imagined, lost pasts and potential futures coalesce in the present, this confidence and inspiration is built.

This coalescing of lost pasts and imagined futures is clearly present in political discourse. Perhaps the most infamous of populist slogans of recent years, Trump’s ‘Make America Great Again’ (conveniently hashtagable as #MAGA, equally important for the reach and impact of a campaign slogan in a digitally integrated society), works through a simultaneous duality of nostalgia and hope. It recalls the electoral successes of Ronald Reagan, who made use of the slogan in his 1980 campaign. In recalling past Republican successes, Trump instils confidence in Republican voters in the present. A nostalgia is created for a mythical past. The point at which America was great, or the point at which that was lost, is never articulated. While the slogan borrows from Reagan, Trump does not otherwise pin his campaign on memories of the 1980s more broadly. Trump places himself as the figure who can make that mythical past a future reality. Similarly, the use of Magna Carta in the context of ongoing Brexit debates allows for the creation of a mythical nostalgia for an English past where every person was equal. The implication in the political discourse discussed above is that this mythical version of the past has been broken



by way of mass immigration. Supporting Brexit, or more extreme groups or figureheads such as Stephen Yaxley-Lennon and acting against migrants, is not simply taken as an act of preservation, but rather a hopeful reclamation of lost past glories. In invoking the successful breaking of the Siege of Vienna in 1683, political protagonists are not simply creating a nostalgia for an apparently lost, or disappearing, *Heimat*, but also providing a hope, via past glories, of the reclamation of that imagined and fictitious *Heimat*.

While the operative functions of this form of mobilising memory does not constitute specifically an act of ‘remembering hope’, it is always remembering *for* hope. When Guibernau (2013) points to the requirement of confidence for political action to take place, she identifies the requirement of an imagined positive, achievable future for political action to take place. If the political discursive use of 1215 and 1683 did not include a future-oriented component, a confidence for political action is less feasible. While these discourses construct themselves primarily on a mythical nostalgia, through the collapsed temporalities instigated by acts of remembering, that nostalgia occurs simultaneously to an imagined future. Past, present and future become entangled, with past successes and possible futures appearing as concurrent, approaching one and the same.

The potency of this connection between past and future is further illuminated by research in neuroscience, where acts of remembering the past and imagining futures have been shown to engage similar – although not identical – neural processes (Schacter and Madore 2016; Hassabis and Maguire 2007). This is often said to be rooted in the operation of *episodic memory* – memory processes that engage the recollection of personal experiences. It is suggested that such acts of recollection engage similar neurological processes to acts of imagining possible futures. This is attributed to a common need for ‘scene construction’ in both actions (Schacter and Madore 2016: 250). For Hassabis and Maguire (2007) this process of scene construction is the same as that which we engage in imagining fictitious events, or even picturing navigation. The common processes that allow us to imagine futures and remember the past also act circularly upon each other, allowing us to produce ‘memories of the future’ (Spzunar et al. 2013). This brief consideration of memory processes gives weight to the potency of discourse that triggers both an apparent memory of a lost past and the hope for a reclaiming of this in an imagined future.

Whilst the input from neuroscience is concerned with our individual experiences of memory or scene construction, the social sciences can offer an understanding of how these

individual processes might influence political action. The common understandings of both 1215 and 1683, often reflected in their AHD, link these moments to a period of superiority or exceptionalism. That can be viewed through the superiority of a white, Western European identity as encapsulated in the narrative of a victory over an Ottoman/Muslim threat in 1683, or in the sense of British/English exceptionalism as leaders of freedom and justice encapsulated by discourse around 1215 and Magna Carta. In each instance, certain audiences will be encouraged in their interactions with these historical moments to imagine a past where their in-group demonstrates superiority. The political use of these moments attaches those imagined pasts to a similar sense of an imagined future. For their target audiences, these will be positive visions of the future, where the historical underpinnings provide confidence that these futures can be achieved. For those marching to commemorate 1683, for example, the historical confidence that is given from the repelling of Ottoman forces facilitates an imagined future where Vienna, and Europe more widely, is a society without Muslim or migrant populations. For those being asked to support UKIP, encouraged by the history of Magna Carta, there is an imagined future where the UK/England is again a nation in a position of global superiority. That future is presented as being held back by EU membership. In each instance a constructed memory of the past combines with a positive imagined future for a target audience, not solely on an individual level but collectively through political discourse.

In suggesting that there is particular power in *moving moments*, I have argued that political discourse must engage audiences emotionally. A collective, affective response to these pasts is an integral component of the successful political use of these pasts. This suggests that there is a certain amount of affective labour required of their target audiences.

Through the use of *Moving moments*, however, there is an easier form of labour required from the audience. It is a labour of reaffirmation of existing knowledge, rather than one that seeks to challenge assumptions to any significant degree. For example, it asks audiences to reaffirm ideas of Magna Carta representing British/English exceptionalism, or it asks an audience to reaffirm existing ideas of a singular European cultural identity as protected in 1683. If we take the examples discussed above, an anger at the sense of a greater, mythical lost past and the confidence that comes through the hope for a reclamation of that greatness in the future are built in similar mental actions. This echoes views of an affective engagement of nostalgia as a powerful tool for inspiring political action in the present (Smith and Campbell 2017; Campbell, Smith and Wetherell 2017;

Veale 2017). A single act of scene construction engages a nostalgia for the past and a hope for the future.

This aspect of recalling the past and imagining the future also opens connections to the ‘persistence of nationalism’ as described by Closs Stephens (2013). As discussed in previous chapters, nationalism is seen as a concept built on some form of scene construction. This is most clearly the case in Anderson’s (1983) description of the ‘imagined community’. The sense of belonging to a national community is not based upon a real connection to each other member of this community, but rather comes from an act of imagination that is itself a form of scene construction. Similarly, when we encounter those elements of ‘banal nationalism’ (Billig 1995) through symbols such as flags, we too are encouraged to engage both our memory and imagination. Our memory is engaged as these symbols remind us of past encounters with the ‘nation’. Our imagination is engaged as we respond to these symbols in the present.

*Moving moments* such as 1215 or 1683 similarly engage these processes. Memories of past engagements with these historical moments are mobilised, particularly in the use of these pasts within political discourse, and our imagination of what this can mean for a possible future is sparked. The moments become connected to our hopes for the future. Through that connection, they become intensely affective. The historical moments which become of greatest importance to us, then, are those that affectively and emotionally ‘stick’ (Ahmed 2007/8). Nationalism and populism are persistent in part because they produce discourse that sticks.

For those that have made use of 1215, this is often a future that seeks to reclaim a threatened or lost British/English or Western exceptionalism and greatness. The sense of a deep history of leadership in equality, justice, fairness, freedom and human rights provokes a sense that such leadership can be found again in the future. In the specific context of opposition to the European Union this use of 1215 emerges as it provides a discourse where European involvement is undermining English (or now British) ability to continue to be rightful global leaders in issues of justice. This creates confidence in a vision of a future that is based upon that sense of a deep past. In the use of 1683, the association of a deep historical narrative of Europe as necessarily white and Christian, and of the notion of a European way of life being based upon these characteristics and incompatible with non-white immigrant or Muslim cultures, creates a confidence that it is not only possible to

argue for the protection of that false notion of a white, Christian Europe, but in fact it is necessary to take action to provide a future which protects a positive way of life.

It is the very ambiguity of the past that allows them to move in such a manner, sticking to finding new meanings in present events. As historical moments retain an ambiguity, this allows for a continued movement of the past to serve the needs of a national identity in the present. The past becomes the nation and the nation becomes the past. That is, a notion of historical continuity becomes a defining feature of the nation in the present, and that sense of past identity and/or exceptionalism becomes a shorthand for how the nation can be in the future. References to the past stand as symbols of what a nation is or, in some cases, should aspire to be. The sense of what the nation is simultaneously becomes affixed to these notions of the past, at least in how we experience them in the present. Where the nation is an imagined community, a result of invented traditions, the past acts as an imagined nation, where traditions and a sense of identity are forged. Nationalism persists through a belonging that comes from a sense of a deep shared history, a constant reminder of a shared past across this imagined community. Right-wing populist groups make easy use of this as they build their own particular sense of group belonging upon a nationalistic sense of a shared past, that is then mobilised against ‘others’ of their own construction. A nationalistic hope for a future is built upon a mythical past, and upon a constructed ‘other’.

## **8.2 *Moving Moments* as National and Transnational**

Both 1215 and 1683 move across multiple spaces, both physical and digital. These pasts form part of the foundation myth of multiple nations and have shifting relevance in different spaces. They act as global signifiers of something loosely connected to Western or European identity (see Table 8.2). The 1215 first sealing of Magna Carta stands as a signifier of British/English identity and a deep historical superiority of Britain/England as a nation. Simultaneously, it stands as a central feature of the foundation story of the United States. In museums and heritage sites it is connected to the development of legal systems in countries such as Australia, and the development of universal legal declarations such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Magna Carta has also taken on a new role as a signifier of Western superiority in recent anti-immigrant and Islamophobic actions, as demonstrated by both the supporters of Stephen Yaxley-Lennon and Matteo Salvini. The meaning that is attached to these histories itself moves as the knowledge or uses of the

historical moment emerges in different spaces. The ambiguity of these moments allows for them to become attached to a range of issues in different spaces or media.

For those who invoke the memory of 1683, it stands as a liberation story for Austria, an assertion of the nation as one which holds a white, Christian identity. It is also a liberation story, to a lesser extent, to be used by the current Hungarian regime for the same purpose. For Poland it is a story of military strength and victory more than liberation, focused upon the figure of Jan III Sobieski. In combination, the ties across these nations allow 1683 to also stand as a point at which European identity is collectively solidified as white and Christian. In each case, features that are central to a nationalist use of these pasts are adopted to equally allow for the development of a transnational memory culture based upon the same pasts. The form of that transnational memory culture is also constantly in movement. For certain actors, such as the national politicians and political parties, it is a memory culture that is mobilised as a means of asserting political authority. For others, particularly those interacting with *Gates of Vienna* or the IBÖ, it is a transnational memory culture constructing upon developing an aggressive opposition to Muslims and/or migrants. In the case of the latter we have seen how this movement of the past can emerge in extreme and violent forms. However, in considering these uses of the past as part of an assemblage, these two different transnational uses of the past are taken as acting in relation to each other. The use of 1683 as a signifier of European culture within official political discourse can be seen to give additional confidence to those who use the same past in the advancement of more extreme viewpoints.

	<b>Nationalist</b>	<b>Transnational</b>
<b>1215</b>	English (or British) superiority as leaders in justice and fairness.	Magna Carta as a foundational document for Western identity, as built upon fairness and justice. This is presented against an immigrant or Muslim threat to these principles, with Muslims/immigrant culture represented as being opposed to these principles.
	American identity as founded upon rights enshrined in Magna Carta. America therefore is founded upon fairness and equality under law.	

<b>1683</b>	Austrian liberation story – the point at which Austria is freed from Ottoman threat for good, and therefore is solidified as a Christian nation.	European liberation from the Ottoman empire, and therefore Europe becomes a white, Christian continent. White European-colonised nations, such as the United States or New Zealand, take on these same qualities as cultural extensions of Europe.
	Hungarian liberation story – as above, but part of a continued longer narrative of Ottoman decline and the end of Ottoman control of Hungary.	This extends beyond the geographical boundaries of Europe, where ‘Europe’ and the more ambiguous idea of the ‘West’ become intertwined. This is most keenly seen in the actions of the Christchurch attacker and the frequent references he made to past battles that were viewed as defending Europe.
	Polish victory story – Jan III Sobieski as a mythical hero for the Polish nation, a figure who fought for Christian people against Muslims and won.	

**Table 8.2: National and Transnational Uses of 1215 and 1683**

While these globalised memory cultures are not themselves a new occurrence (see Appadurai 2013 on global circulations), through the emergence of a digitally-integrated public sphere the potential for these globalised memory cultures to emerge and instigate actions at a more rapid pace has undoubtedly increased. Returning to the ability of *moving moments* to mobilise individuals or groups to political action, the necessity of a confidence to act politically once again comes to the fore. The pace of circulation of a politicised collective memory is arbitrary if it does not form a discourse that constructs a collective belonging and a confidence to act. Where Guibernau (2013) focuses upon national belonging in demonstrating the role of confidence, I extend this by making a link between

that national identity and transnational collectives. In each instance a collective transnational identity is built, and confidence to act is instilled. This is central to the success of the *moving moment*, where particular historical moments are given relevance beyond their initial geographical limits.

This globalised use of the past to produce engagement in political action was seen most visibly in instances of extremist terrorist activity. The terrorist attacks in Oslo/Utøya and Christchurch emerge from a globalised, digitally integrated network of extremist ideologies. Their focus, however, remained staunchly national. The Oslo/Utøya attacker opted to target a national government building and the youth supporters of a national political party. The sense of a global threat, developed through the mobilising of a right-wing memory culture around 1683, among other moments, is localised as a threat to individual nations. For these attackers, their actions focus upon the threat that they believe Islam and immigration posed to Norway and New Zealand. The protection of a Western way of life, characterised by justice and fairness as symbolised by Magna Carta, is in practice mobilised in terms of the protection of something distinctly British/English or American. The protection of European identity, characterised as white and Christian and symbolised by the breaking of the Siege of Vienna, is in practice mobilised to call for the protection of nationalist identities of Austria, Poland, Hungary, or others. Against increasingly transnational uses of the past there is a clear ‘persistence of nationalism’ (Closs Stephens 2013). The rooting of the past, and an associated sense of group belonging, remains territorial. Nationalism persists through its powerful, affective potential, as often defined through references to cultural preservation within set borders or territories.

### **8.3 The Persistence of Populism**

Where Closs Stephens talks of the ‘persistence of nationalism’ (2013), here I have articulated a persistence of populism. Where Closs Stephens recognises the affective power of nationalism, the uses of *moving moments* by RWP actors alludes to a persistence of populism. Where Betz (1993) saw an instrumentalisation of envy, disenchantment, resentment, and anxiety in the RWP parties of the late 1980s, the analysis here has drawn attention to the foregrounding of similar emotions in the recent re-emergence of RWP parties. We have seen a disenchantment with mainstream politics (as represented by the

British parliament, the EU, and both centre-left and centre-right parties across Europe), a resentment targeted towards Muslim and/or immigrant populations, and an anxiety about the loss of a national or transnational culture.

However, the discursive use of *moving moments* does not suggest that the persistence of populism can be viewed purely through the lens of supposedly negative emotions (anger, resentment, anxiety). Guibernau (2013) recognises that these emotions are most potent when combined with the creation of a feeling of confidence. Collective political action, therefore, requires a positive affective experience. *Moving moments*, like 1215 and 1683, act as a discursive bridge, allowing for those negative emotions to be turned to a collective, positive, hopeful affective experience which encourages political action. When those advocating for Brexit sought to make discursive use of Magna Carta, they did so to move people to political action. The sense of a deep historical exceptionalism, targeted towards a white, British/English in-group, allowed those who made such a use of Magna Carta to take a constructed disenchantment with the European Union, resentment towards migrants and Muslims, anxiety and fear of a the loss of a mythical cultural homogeneity, and connect it to the hope of something that can be achieved through clearly defined political action.

The same can be seen among groups who make political use of 1683. Anger and disenchantment towards the EU and national parties is built around their supposed lack of action against immigration; that same resentment mentioned above is targeted towards migrants and Muslims, and anxiety is constructed around the loss of a Christian culture, or an Austro-Germanic *Heimat*. Through invoking the memory of 1683, and of the supposed successful past preservation of a Christian Europe against an external force, those emotions are channelled towards a confidence in the vision of their own identities (as white and Christian) as the only legitimate form of national identity. The political action that should be taken on this occasion ranges from voting for a RWP party, to marching against immigration and in support of groups such as IBÖ or Pegida. At most extreme ends it has encouraged some figures to engage in violent and/or terrorist actions. The foundation of these actions is the development of a long-term affective response to this political discourse. This presents significant challenges for those who wish to enact political change against RWP trends.



At the outset, I questioned whether it was useful to consider the recent successes of right-wing populism as closely related to the development of digital media and the associated increase in the rapid spread of information. However, I suggest that this offers an oversimplistic account of recent populist successes. Through following the two *moving moments* this emerged in a number of ways. Firstly, if we are to consider the use of Magna Carta, we not only have a deep history of the political use of this moment but also a recent rearticulating of its relevance that began to emerge prior to the advancement of significant social media usage. Similarly, the use of 1683 across the subsequent centuries suggested a continued association of this past with the ‘enemies of the day’. We can also see a consistency in the affective use of these pasts. Politicians such as Gordon Brown sought to use Magna Carta to champion a notion of British unity, connecting this history to personal and collective feelings of belonging and national identity. The construction of churches or the invitation of the Pope to ceremonies commemorating the events of 1683 indicated an attempt to link this moment to a religious or spiritual sense of belonging. At Salisbury Cathedral an interpretive panel suggests that there is a ‘spirit of justice’ in Magna Carta. The linking of Magna Carta to Christian identity is physically reproduced, with many surviving copies of the document and its later issues owned by cathedrals. The religious belonging communicated in uses of 1683, conversely, is a more recent and deliberately culturally constructive act. Through the building of churches, or the use of Christian imagery, 1683 becomes tied to a Western European expression of Christian continuity.

These same connections are made in the digital use of both 1683 and 1215. Discussions of Magna Carta on Twitter often relate to a sense of national identity and exceptionalism. There are allusions to the loss of a particular British or English identity, a loss that certain commentators argue must be challenged. Magna Carta then continues to not simply be about rights and justice, but also about what it means to belong to a particular national identity. It continues to be mobilised to create an in-group through social media discourse, echoing the non-digital discourse. The belonging that is being created may be of a differing form, but the processes are the same. 1683 continues to represent European Christian ideals for those creating content on *Gates of Vienna* or through IBÖ and *Gedenken 1683* websites and social media spaces. The mode of communication has shifted, but the purpose of using these pasts shows continuity. The *moving moment* is not inherently reliant on digital mediation, but rather is centred upon the successful construction of a confidence in political ideals.

## 8.4 Unfixing the Unthought

The analysis above has suggested that the persistence of populism is built upon the ability of these parties to use political discourse, such as that constructed around 1215 and 1683, to affect people, or to *move* them emotionally. This capacity to affect is tied to a potential for such discourse to move people to political action. The range of political action that can be seen in relation to the use of both 1215 and 1683 supports this suggestion. In offering some focus on the strength of affective communication in such political discourse, I do not seek to merely develop our means of understanding how such discourse operates, but also to offer a route to considering the manner in which divisive discourse can be more effectively challenged. In this sense, the developing of understandings of the use of affective communication in political discourse can contribute to activist uses of this work.

In building on the notion of the ‘cognitive nonconscious’, itself a development of Damasio’s protoself (Damasio 2012, cited in Hayles 2017: 10), N. Katherine Hayles gives us a model of the development of seemingly ingrained affective responses that allows for the unknown elements of neuroscience and the suggestions of non-representational theory, while maintaining a powerfully influential role for conscious lived experience and, therefore, the influence of discourse. This allows for a movement away from the ‘rubbishing of discourse’ (Wetherell 2012, see Chapter 2) while recognising that the non-representational, or not-quite-representational, can act as an influence on, and be influenced by, discourse. Hayles articulates this through the concept of the ‘cognitive assemblage’, where Latour’s (2005) ideas of the assemblage in actor-network theory is modified to focus upon the role of ‘cognizers’ (Hayles 2017) in any given assemblage. This applies equally to the assemblages that exist around 1215 and 1683.

Cognizers, for Hayles, are central to any assemblage or network as these are the components who instigate action. Hayles is primarily concerned here with foregrounding an element of individual agency – although this is not taken to be at the expense of the influential role of any other constituent part of an assemblage. This concept is applied to the development of digital technologies. Hayles covers a range of technological developments, including automated traffic control systems, artificial intelligence personal assistants (i.e. developments of Apple’s Siri or Amazon Alexa), and automated and piloted drone technology. Hayles concludes that in taking these developments as part of a cognitive assemblage, the role of human decision making is foregrounded while also

recognising that there is a constant feedback upon that decision making. ‘We need to recognise’, she states, ‘that when we design, implement and extend technical cognitive systems, we are partially designing ourselves as well as affecting the planetary cognitive ecology’ (Hayles 2017: 14). In other words, any technological system that impacts upon our decision making and behaviours is both human-designed and exerts a designing influence upon our behaviour.

This informs an understanding of the affective impact of discourse propagated predominantly through digital technologies. The affordances of social media platforms, as discussed above, while themselves the result of a human decision-making process, have the potential to actively ‘design’ our future behaviour. In contributing to a digitally-integrated public sphere we are open to a constant system of behaviour modification. This could be viewed as asserting that some viewpoints can become so ingrained that efforts to change them can be futile, and influences that ‘design’ our behaviour are beyond our control. Conversely, we can view the possibility of influencing these decisions and systems by recognising the foregrounded role of human decision making.

Incorporating an activist approach into the consideration of affect pushes one towards the latter option. In the introduction I acknowledged that the work of Hayles and others (e.g. Hands 2019) allows for the retention of a component of human agency even within a posthumanist perspective. In suggesting that there is a persistence in both populist and nationalist discourses, I separate this debate from a notion of technological determinism. It is not the case that digital media have brought a new form of RWP to the fore, but rather that digital media as a predominant form of communication have allowed for the mass communication between and mobilisation of people who subscribe to a form of RWP, or other divisive ideologies, that themselves bear resemblance to political trends seen in the past.

The question, then, is how and why these forms of discourse might have gained traction, and why historical moments such as 1215 and 1683 are so potent. It is here that two of the criteria for political action noted by Guibernau (2013) are again pertinent. She recognises that strong group belonging necessitates the sense of a history of that group’s shared identity, and secondly, she recognises that a confidence to act is something that is communicated emotionally. In addition to the negative affect of much RWP discourse, such as a spreading of fear and anger (often seen through discourse adopting the *topos of*

*threat* or *topos of danger*, as discussed in Chapters 4 through 7), there must also be the capacity for a positive affective reaction. Many of the uses of 1215 and 1683 discussed here seemed to provoke a sense of fear of loss. That may be a fear of the loss of exceptionalism, loss of a sense of home culture (or *Heimat*), the loss of certain rights. There also exists a surface-level anger. That can emerge as an anger that rights have supposedly been taken away or unfairly given to favour other, ‘out-group’ people. It may be an anger based upon a sense that national politicians are not listening to one’s concerns. These concerns are reinforced as both legitimate and shared among a particular in-group. However, as shown by Guibernau, the communication of these collective feelings cannot in themselves bring about strong political action.

In the case of both 1683 and 1215, the development of a sense of transnational belonging, facilitated by digital media, has also fostered a transnational confidence in taking political action. This is seen at its starkest in relation to 1683. The emergence of references to 1683, or conspiracy theories that have been associated with the right-wing use of 1683, in relation to some of the most extreme white nationalist terrorist attacks of recent years, clearly demonstrates that these uses of the past can be a part of a discourse which gives confidence to act in an extreme manner. The positive framing of violent actions in the past can give license to extremists to engage in violent actions in the present. As discussed in Chapter 7, this confidence to act as channelled through the discursive use of 1683 is often related to a narrative of military action. ‘Liberators’ and ‘defenders’ of Vienna, and ergo Europe, are lauded as figures to be emulated. *Gates of Vienna* presents this emulation in terms of a new phase of a long-lasting war. The IBÖ and *Gedenken 1683* focus on commemoration as a route for calling on people to take the approach of figures like Jan III Sobieski in the battles they face today. The confidence to act comes through a sense that one is not an individual, but rather one of many who are acting collectively. Those actions are also seen as the continuation of a long history of such actions, and so one should be confident that such actions are not only right but have precedent.

This collective call to action may be less extreme when looking at the use of 1215, however it is presented. The very ambiguity that is central to the use of these historical moments becomes central to this call for action. The strength in use of Magna Carta is seen in its power as a shorthand reference that has a shifting meaning for different groups. Whether those are supporters of Andrew Scheer’s opposition party in Canada, or supporters of Stephen Yaxley-Lennon in the United Kingdom, Magna Carta allows for a

rapid reference to the potential loss of, or threat to, long standing rights. Tweets discussed in Chapter 5 focus upon issues such as a carbon tax. In referencing Magna Carta, these potentially dry topics become attached to notions of human rights and fairness. The reference to Magna Carta carries the affective potential within such political discourse. The frequency of the use of Magna Carta in the period surrounding the UK-EU referendum suggests an understanding that it carries a power of persuasion.

The ‘spirit of justice’ that Salisbury Cathedral suggests is carried by Magna Carta is also carried in its discursive use in political discourse. That spirit of justice can provide a particularly powerful call for action when it is presented as being the unique right of a constructed in-group. In broad terms we saw in Chapters 4 and 5 how this is presented to British or Western nations as in-groups, but in the UK-EU Referendum campaign this becomes specific to a British or English in-group. The EU is presented as a threat to fairness and justice that are the deserved rights of that specific in-group. This threat is countered by a confidence that these rights are deserved, specific to this in-group, and can be protected by the undertaking of a specific action – a vote to leave the EU. The in-group becomes even more limited in discourse relating to the arrest of Stephen Yaxley-Lennon. The English in-group is limited further to white-English citizens, presented as opposed to migrant or Muslim groups. The arrest of Yaxley-Lennon, through reference to Magna Carta, becomes not an issue of undermining an ongoing trial, but rather a battle for free speech and again a threat to the certain rights that must be protected for this in-group. A confidence to take action, such as through supporting Yaxley-Lennon’s campaigns and beliefs, is then built around the need to protect the rights of this in group.

These historical moments, as *moving moments*, carry a capacity to affect that is recognised in their political use. The same connection that visitors to heritage sites, museums (or indeed those who may seek to engage with their ancestry or spend money on a DNA profile) seek to find with the past is carried into political discourse. This is carried through entirely because that connection with the past carries an intense capacity to affect. Political issues that can seem disconnected from everyday experiences, reach an audience through that capacity to affect. For those who adopt a form of RWP politics, or nationalistic politics, there is a need to connect with ‘the people’, the in-group, which is made easier through this use of the past. The *moving moment* is a potent political tool in part due to the ability for these moments to be used in political discourse to affectively *move* those who may otherwise be disinclined to political action.

These acts of movement are facilitated by human and non-human bodies, within a particular assemblage, working in ‘concert’ (Chidgey 2018: 42). When a political actor makes reference to these pasts, they are responding to processes which have given these pasts a presence within a public consciousness. The bricks and mortar of cathedrals, written accounts of these histories, the objects that are stored within museums, the traces of these pasts on particular landscapes all contribute to the movement of these pasts over time. In the present, internet, smartphones and other communication technologies allow for the rapid movement of political discourse which references these pasts. These acts of movement are made possible by the affordances of numerous bodies. However, this does not absolve human actors of a primary responsibility for how they use these pasts in the present. The assemblage does not absolve the *Gates of Vienna* bloggers of their role in inspiring two recent horrific acts of terrorism. The potential to use these pasts politically is built collectively by human and non-human bodies, but the manner in which they are used remains a necessarily human act, with an associated responsibility for the effects of these acts.

### **8.5 Moving Moments and the Right-Wing Populist Threat**

‘If you believe you’re a citizen of the world, you’re a citizen of nowhere.’ These words were spoken by then UK Prime Minister Theresa May at the 2016 Conservative Party conference. In doing so, she drew attention to a tension at the heart of modern conservatism. Free movement of money and goods are to be celebrated in a globalised world, but the free movement of people is to be condemned. Despite the impacts of globalisation, the nation-state remains the key political and territorial reference point. According to Theresa May, it is paramount that individuals retain a sense of a distinct national identity. The timing of the comments, in the months following the EU Referendum, gave the comments a greater weight. At this point, pro-EU (or at least pro-remain) commentators spoke frequently of their global citizenship, in part reflected in the freedom of movement that EU membership afforded. The implication here was simple – if you were to put forward views of global citizenship, you were denouncing British citizenship. In Theresa May’s discourse, these two understandings of identity were not compatible.

For many, experiences of ‘‘banal’ cosmopolitization’ (Beck 2016: 260) are now a part of our everyday lives. Beck points out that the way we work, the food we eat, and the people we meet and fall in love with, have been altered through a process of cosmopolitization. He refers to cosmopolitization rather than cosmopolitanism as a means of distinguishing between a ‘top-down’ or ‘elite’ choice or action and, conversely, a process that ‘unfolds unwanted, unseen [...]. It extends from the top of society down to everyday life.’ (ibid.) This globalised experience is, therefore, not an active choice, but rather an unavoidable feature of our everyday lives. This is the case, according to Beck, ‘even as national flags continue to be raised and even if national attitudes, identities and consciousness are strongly being reaffirmed’ (ibid.). Globalisation has brought a cosmopolitization of our everyday experiences, but national identities continue to retain a central role in our lives.

National identities, attitudes and consciousness continue to be strongly reaffirmed – even as our everyday lives become ever more impacted by processes of banal cosmopolitization. We might go further and suggest that in the current ‘moment of danger’ (Levi and Rothberg 2018) that is presented by the rise of RWP and extremism, those national identities and attitudes are affirmed with greater strength. Indeed, at times those very everyday experiences of cosmopolitization have become a point from which those national identities and attitudes can be reaffirmed, as we have seen in the discussion of both 1215 and 1683 in political discourse. Beck has viewed isolationist efforts to counter the process of cosmopolitization as ‘subjected to international *moral* condemnations’. Not only that, the process itself had become inevitable and ‘beyond wilful political or social choices’ as global forces ensure the process continues (Beck 2016: 261). In the decade since, however, isolationist proclamations have become more frequent, with condemnation of them less present.

When the FPÖ returned to coalition power in Austria in 2017, the condemnation and threats of sanctions from the EU, or other national governments, that had been present when they previously entered coalition government in 1999 were no longer present. In 2017, the FPÖ simply became a more prominent example of a rise in RWP support that exists across Europe (see Chapter 6). Nigel Farage, for example, is no longer a figure at the fringes of UK and international politics, but rather a figure publicly endorsed by the President of the USA (Smith 2019). Those pushing the most right-wing vision of Brexit can find support in governments globally, as can RWP parties finding themselves in positions of influence or power. In Austria and the United Kingdom these right-wing

political actors have found success in their political uses of certain pasts – pasts which I have termed *moving moments*. The broader relevance of *moving moments* as a framework for considering political uses of the past may be found in researching the use of *moving moments* by prominent right-wing politicians globally.

*Moving moments* take on potency at a national level despite their ability to be moved both temporally and spatially. The operative properties of *moving moments* are in part a product of the cosmopolitization described by Beck. References to historical moments from other nations can become a part of the banal cosmopolitization of everyday life. That ability for political discourse to move across vast spaces across such short timeframes is a product of this process. However, for the most potent *moving moments*, symbols of national identity and attitude are pushed to the fore. The continuing relevance of national identities is not, therefore, to be seen as a qualifier to that process of cosmopolitization, but rather an addition to it. These national identities persist and take on new strength as they make effective use of the global networks scaffolded by globalisation and the familiarity of global interactions in our everyday lives, to push a distinctly nationalist and populist discourse.

The very existence of a cosmopolitized world around us facilitates this process for RWP groups. If we are to return to the formulation of RWP groups as creating an in/out group identities on both a horizontal and vertical axis, we can see how the processes described above facilitate an international spread of RWP ideas. That very process of ‘banal cosmopolitization’, while making our everyday lives ever more globally connected, also allows for the spread of common negative reference points for RWP groups. They seek to reiterate the importance of a horizontal in/out group belonging on nationalist lines, despite the continuing influence of migration on societies. Through a familiarisation of experience that comes from cosmopolitization, the targeting of a common familiar ‘other’ becomes easier. This is currently expressed in framing Muslims and/or non-white migrants as the other, the threat to this in-group. The same symbols of the incoming threat of this other – such as the building of mosques, or the presence of people in Islamic clothing – can be used across international borders.

At the same time as these groups make use of their own international networks, the globalisation of political elites becomes the vertical target for RWP groups. On a horizontal axis, it is Muslims and migrants that are targeted. On a vertical axis, it is unseen



elites that are facilitating a mass migration that is said to threaten indigenous cultures. These elites will be represented by multinational political organisations such as the EU, or by national political parties. For example, the uses of 1683 discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 saw the uses of this particular *moving moment* to build opposition to Muslim or migrant others. Despite superficially holding less connection to Islamophobic viewpoints, the analysis of uses of Magna Carta in Twitter discourse found a similar use of the past to communicate support for a white in-group against a Muslim or migrant other, discursively carried in statements of support for Stephen Yaxley-Lennon. Donald Trump's imposition of a travel ban against a number of predominantly Muslim nations indicates the demonisation of the same 'other', as does Modi's brand of Hindu nationalism in India. In developing the notion of *moving moments*, this thesis has developed a framework that could be applied to wider global political trends.

RWP use of *moving moments* then makes use of the affordances of a cosmopolitization of society to develop their success across international networks. The need for a sense of shared identity and a shared past across these networks remains. *Moving moments* become an integral part of this process. Their ambiguity allows for a relevance to be found across international networks. Importantly, they are mobilised with reference to common experiences across these international boundaries. The notion of fairness and justice that is evoked by references to 1215 and Magna Carta can find relevance in a range of political spaces. Notions of justice will be understood differently in Italy, the USA and the UK, but Magna Carta can stand in for these in each instance. When the in-group is said to stand for justice and fairness, it facilitates a message that the 'othered' group (Muslims and non-white migrants) are somehow opposed to these values, and therefore are a threat. When the memory of 1683 is used to tie European identity to a white and Christian identity, again it facilitates a message of that same othered group constituting a threat.

Cosmopolitanism seeks to respond to a process of cosmopolitization by arguing for a need to move beyond notions of national identity and nationalist attitudes. When adherence to nation-states remains so strong, this is a significant task. For RWP, however, the process of cosmopolitization simply presents an opportunity to reinforce those national identities by arguing that they are being threatened. Uses of certain pasts, such as 1215 and 1683, is an integral part of this political discourse. Without a shared past, a collective identity is less present and, therefore, collective political action is less likely. *Moving moments* allow for the development of this shared identity and, importantly, the mobilisation of a

collective affective response. Fear of a threat, and confidence to act become communicated politically and affectively by reference to these pasts. When this use of the past becomes so present in political discourse, the role of museums and heritage sites becomes challenged. In the closing section of this chapter, I wish to reflect on what the political adoption of *moving moments* means for museums and heritage sites.

## **8.6 *Moving Moments* and Heritage Discourse**

Museums and heritage sites continue to hold a place as authoritative communicators of knowledge of the past. This is true for both 1683 and 1215. Visitors to sites discussed in the chapters above will take information from these sites with a certain weight. Despite this, political usage of both moments is often connected to ideals that seem opposed to the stance taken in these heritage sites – where one is taken. Museum displays and heritage sites for Magna Carta frequently reference the development of a universal notion on human rights (Runnymede, Salisbury and Lincoln). They refer to cross-border collaboration in issues of justice and human rights (Salisbury and, to a lesser extent, Runnymede). Despite this, recent political use of the moment has tended towards the nationalistic. Displays detailing 1683 focus on historicising the events, placing them in the context of a long history of conflict. In some cases, the interaction between Western Europe and the Ottoman Empire occasionally comes to the fore (aspects of the National Museum of Hungary, Budapest). Again, this is at odds with the political use of the moment, where a continuing opposition between West and East dominates.

However, in the case of both Magna Carta and the 1683 Siege of Vienna, a dominant AHD was evident. Throughout this thesis I have argued that to consider an historical moment to be a *moving moment* there was a need for affective movement and a movement to political action. These features of the *moving moment* may seem to be less relevant to the presentation of these moments in museum or heritage settings. However, the analysis of both moments demonstrated that the impact of a reference to particular past in political discourse is aided by a dominant understanding of the historical moment that is present in the consciousness of a particular target group. For Magna Carta this is a discourse of British/English exceptionalism and principles of fairness and justice. For 1683, it is a discourse of European cultural and militaristic dominance against a Turkish (or Muslim, or non-White) other. The presence of these dominant understandings of the past, facilitated

by an AHD in both instances, allows for a limited degree of historical labour to be undertaken by audiences of political discourse. This is the relational role of museums and heritage sites in the context of a *moving moment*.

Where historical accounts are shown to undertake the long temporal labour of ‘past-presencing’ particular historical moments (Macdonald 2013), museums and heritage sites act to provide a continuity of past-presencing. That is, they play a role in ensuring that particular moments they represent have a consistent presence within the heritage and collective memory of a nation. This presence in a national consciousness facilitates the easier use of these moments in political discourse, where labour is focused upon drawing people towards particular political actions – i.e. voting to leave the EU, or join in actions with racist, right-wing political groups (even to the point of engaging in extremist terrorist actions). This role of heritage discourse in the success of *moving moments* does not suggest that heritage sites or museums are responsible for each political use of the past, or the outcomes of those uses of the pasts they represent. It does, however, act as a reminder that in adopting a dominant narrative in the representation of any historical moment, museums and heritage sites are playing a role in maintaining a broad public understanding of this past. Much as the entrance narratives that visitors might bring to a museum will influence their interaction with histories presented, the exit narratives that these sites give to their audiences will impact their interaction with the world beyond the boundaries of the institution.

### **8.7 Future Work: What Isn’t a *Moving Moment*?**

The concept of the *moving moment* developed through a recognition of similar processes taking places in the respective uses of both 1215 and 1683. In each instance, across broad political spectra, the elements of spatial, temporal, affective and political movement emerged as central components of these uses of the past. In addition, the analysis of these two moments has revealed the importance of an easily-communicable and understood AHD in propping up political discourse. Additionally, in each instance these *moving moments* have developed across transnational political networks. This might be considered to be spatial movement on the macro level, as distinct from local interactions with the past. It would be reasonable to ask, however, what might prevent an historical moment being considered a *moving moment*. At a time when we might see people wearing t-shirts with

the slogan ‘MUSEUMS ARE NOT NEUTRAL’, we might suggest that surely all pasts are political and, therefore, potentially *moving moments*. The veracity of the concept will only be verified through future work which adopts the *moving moment* as a framework for research. However, here I wish to consider some recent events or commemorations and consider their potential for being considered a *moving moment*. Table 8. 3 presents these suggested moments and the degree to which they meet the criteria to be considered a *moving moment*.

The final months of this writing process have been undertaken during the Covid-19 pandemic. The spread of the virus globally, and the lockdown measures which followed in its wake, have impacted our working environment in a manner which most could not have foreseen even in the early months of 2020. In the UK, on the 8 May 2020, numerous parties took place across the nation to mark the 75<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Victory in Europe (VE) day, the day on which the allies accepted Germany’s surrender at the end of WWII. In recent years this has not been a day of mass celebration. But, against a backdrop of six weeks in lockdown, suddenly a desire to mark this event emerged nationwide (or across England and Wales, at least). For some, these events represented a cavalier attitude to the danger posed by Covid. For others, this was an opportunity to celebrate British success (or, perhaps, British exceptionalism) in overcoming an enemy. The commemorations of this event certainly captured the spatial and temporal dimensions of the *moving moment* – collective memories of past-events brought into the present in streets and gardens across the country. I would also suggest a strong degree of affective movement here, where the collective memory of a wonderful victory over an enemy was brought into the present to provide a sense of hope at the ability to overcome the threat from Covid-19 (although we might point out here that a virus is not an enemy which can be defeated in the same manner as Nazi Germany). Despite these features of this commemorative act, I would not consider this to be a *moving moment*, or at least not at present. There was little evidence of the use of this past as a means of encouraging distinct political action – no calls were given to vote for a particular party or support a particular political ideology. It is also notable that discussion of these celebrations has dissipated quite rapidly after the commemorations themselves. The use of WWII more broadly would perhaps be more likely to meet the requirements of the *moving moment* (for example see Kelsey 2014).

I was also drawn to consider the commemorations to the 21 June 1919 scuttling of a fleet of German ships within Scapa Flow, a sheltered body of water within the Orkney Islands, Scotland. Fearing that these ships would be sold off to allied forces, the German commander of the fleet – following months in captivity in Scapa Flow – made the decision to scuttle his own ships. In the collective memory of Orkney this is an evocative piece of history, one recently commemorated in song by Orcadian singer Kris Drever. There is consistent temporal movement of this past, in monuments to the event on the islands, heritage discourse in local museums, and in commemorations of the event. I would also argue that there is affective movement here. Sailors who died in the event are listed as the last casualties of WWI, with the event coming to represent the futility of that conflict. Drever sums up this notion in singing ‘millions dead but no one knows what the dying was all for’ (Drever 2019). However, once again there is limited use of this moment as a means of calling for political action. Additionally, there is limited spatial movement of this moment. Its presence in the collective memory of Orkney is not echoed in a broader collective consciousness. This questions what degree of spatial movement is required of a *moving moment*. Is it possible to have a deeply localised *moving moment*? This question can only be answered through future research.

Discussions on the merits of the concept have raised numerous further potential *moving*

	<b>Spatial Movement</b>	<b>Temporal Movement</b>	<b>Affective Movement</b>	<b>Political Movement</b>
<b>VE Day</b>	✓	✓	✓	✗
<b>1919 Scapa Flow Scuttling</b>	?	✓	✓ (but only for a very specific community)	✗
<b>Peterloo Massacre</b>	✓	✓	✓	?
<b>1453 Fall of Constantinople</b>	✓	✓	✓	✓

**Table 8.3: Potential *Moving Moments***

*moments*. We might consider recent increased attention to the Peterloo Massacre, again aided by film representation of the event, this time in 2018. There have certainly been attempts to connect the memory of the Peterloo massacre to calls for support for socialist

policies, against a governing elite, in the present. If these connections could be shown to result in political action, then this would certainly fit the *moving moment* framework.

Perhaps the most telling recent moment to fulfil each requirement would be the anniversary of the Fall of Constantinople on 29 May 1453, the capture of the Byzantine capital by the Ottoman Empire. A video shared on The Greek Reporter's Facebook page describes this as 'the darkest day in Greek History' (Greek Reporter 2020). Popular comments on the post describe it as a dark day for 'Christendom'. There is certainly the spatial movement of this historic moment globally, supported by a digitally-integrated public sphere. There is deliberate past-presencing, moving the moment temporally into present day discourse. Evocative language, referencing darkness, might indicate a level of affective communication. The political uses of this in the present would certainly merit further research. Most notably, this may also be taken as a *moving moment* in conflict, where the same moment communicates a different affective and political movement in different audiences. For, whilst the Greek Reporter might describe this as a history of darkness and loss, for Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan the same moment is taken as an opportunity to communicate a Turkish (Ottoman) superiority. In addition to the temporal and spatial movements involved in Erdoğan's acts of deliberate past-presencing, he may use this moment to communicate an affective response which encourages confidence in Turkish actions. There was clear politicisation of the moment this year as he announced the reopening of mosques, following Covid-19 restrictions, on the 29 May. This then contributed to his calls for an Islamic prayer to take place in the Hagia Sofia (previously a church, then a mosque, more recently governed as a secular museum and, in 2020, once again becoming an active mosque).

These brief examples (one might also use this model to study discursive uses of pasts such as the Korean War, Gallipoli, The Boston Tea Party, the Mayflower, Dunkirk, the Russian Revolution, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Easter Rising in Dublin, to name only a handful) act as provocations, illuminating potential limitations of this research and areas for future study. In the case studies of 1215 and 1683 the focus was drawn towards uses of these pasts from particular right-wing viewpoints. This was the form of discourse which emerged as most prominent at the point of study. This does not mean that these moments inherently tend towards this form of discourse. The references to Magna Carta by the Runnymede Trust, for example, give some insight into the use of the same past for an alternative political outcome (delivering anti-racist policy action in Government). With

regard to 1683, someone also analysing Turkish language data and the role of the Ottoman memory in Erdoğan's (or his supporters') political discourse may find a differing use of this same past. This is a reminder that *moving moments*, like any historical moments, are not fixed in their meaning. The same traits that emerged in the uses discussed here could equally allow for their use in a wide range of political discourse. The degree to which this is the case merits further research.

This research has also not considered the question of scale. The two case studies drew the analysis towards transnational assemblages. In each case, political discourse was mobilised across multiple nations through a variety of media. My brief consideration of Scapa Flow 1919 encourages a questioning of the applicability of the *moving moment* to a more localised politics. To a certain degree, the research was drawn towards a focus upon the urban, particularly in the case of the movement of 1683. Again, one might question the applicability of this concept to politics in rural communities. The role that technologies play within a digitally-integrated public sphere may also differ between settings. These are questions which indicate a path towards the afterlife of this thesis. I believe that the *moving moment*, as a concept, provides a clear framework for better understanding effective and affective uses of the past in political discourse. The veracity of this claim is a question for further research.

## Chapter 9

### Conclusion

In detailing some of the characteristics of the *moving moment*, attention has turned to familiar territory. The persistence of nationalism, the presence of globalised networks of far-right actors, and the characteristics of populist politics have all been seen before and, as such, often much discussed. I have also suggested that while the digital ecologies which characterise these networks are a relatively recent developments, these represent a reshaping of the public sphere rather than a complete altering of the character of political discourse. These new genres of discourse have their own affordances and potentials, but the type of discourse perpetuated is not new. This raises a legitimate question regarding the relevance of the *moving moment* in offering a new perspective on political discourse and uses of the past. I conclude here by reflecting upon the role of the *moving moment* in responding to Levi and Rothberg's call for reflections in memory studies on far-right politics.

#### 9.1 *Moving Moments* and Memory Studies

Levi and Rothberg (2018) have already alluded to the role that memory studies might play in this 'moment of danger', where fascism and right-wing populism are globally influential once more. The authors argue that 'transnational memory studies needs to think more about the historical consciousness that buttresses contemporary far-right politics and about the potential memory politics that might oppose it' (Levi and Rothberg 2018: 355). While the work that forms this thesis began prior to Levi and Rothberg's intervention, it is the case that this work responds to this call. The memory cultures that are developed or mobilised by right-wing groups do not emerge from the ether. They are scaffolded by understandings of the past built up over long periods, in both 'official' and 'unofficial' forms of heritage and political discourse. The 'historical consciousness' mentioned by Levi and Rothberg is evident in both of the case studies discussed here. It is, however, not the case that the presence of such a historical consciousness is necessarily right-wing.

In looking at broader uses of Magna Carta, the race equality think tank The Runnymede Trust is evidence of the presence of a liberal-progressive historical consciousness associated with this historical moment. The Runnymede Trust make use of the same deep



connection and ‘spirit of justice’ that is represented by Magna Carta in actively moving against a politics of division or fear. They state their mission is ‘to build a Britain in which all citizens and communities feel valued, enjoy equal opportunities, lead fulfilling lives, and share a common sense of belonging’ (Runnymede Trust 2019). Where discourse discussed through this thesis seeks to create an in-group on the basis of the exclusion of others, here we see links to Magna Carta used to suggest an in-group that is open to ‘all citizens.’ They refer to a ‘sense of belonging’ that is not built upon a notion of an in/out group dichotomy, but rather an openness to all. For the Runnymede Trust this is a mission statement that informs their valuable work in seeking to influence government policy. While they are not engaged so heavily in the public political discourse of the groups discussed throughout this thesis, their use of the same past offers some indication of areas where the same affective use of these historical moments can be turned towards work that seeks to foster dialogue and inclusivity.

This does, however, draw our attention to the more successful political creation of group belonging in recent years by right-wing political actors. These right-wing actors construct a belonging that successfully leads to a confidence in political action. It is this development of an increased confidence in political action that best characterises the re-emergences of extreme right-wing and RWP groups in recent years. These developments are deeply affective in character. These groups, due to their use of a strongly affective political discourse, have found themselves in a position to capitalise on changes precipitated by the expansion of the influence of social media within a digitally integrated public sphere. They can capitalise on the impacts of a ‘post-scarcity culture’ (Hoskins 2018: 21). This post-scarcity culture, Hoskins argues, ‘seduces self and society to turn on the restless past, opening it up anew, paradoxically in the name of closure, but rather as an attempt to deal with or distract from the complexities of the present’ (ibid.). The connection with the past and group belonging that is fostered through the use of these *moving moments* shows significant success in distracting from the complexities of the present, instead offering straightforward political solutions.

The groups detailed within this thesis certainly make use of this ability to seduce society if not to turn on a restless past, at least to turn *to* the past as a means of giving clarity to an uncertain present and future. In discussing ‘post-scarcity culture’, Hoskins focuses upon our ability to post, share, publish and preserve comments, or access information at a vastly increased rate. If a shift-change has occurred in the development of the digitally integrated

public sphere, it is in this change in accessibility of/to the public sphere. It is not the case, however, that this access to the public sphere impacts necessarily upon the forms of political discourse that find influence. Notions of group belonging, collective identity, the connection to a shared past and the confidence to engage in political action can be understood as long-standing features of political discourse. Where there is a shift is in the style of such political discourse. Social media platforms push one towards short but powerful messages, a trend that has been used particularly successfully by social media campaigners Topham Guerin in their work with Scott Morrison and Boris Johnson in the recent Australian and UK elections (Swinford & Wright 2019). *Moving moments* discursively allow for the carrying of notions of belonging, collective identity, historical legitimacy and calls for political action within a small number of characters. In their use by right-wing groups, including RWP parties, those groups have found powerful discursive strategies that operate effectively within the digitally integrated public sphere.

However, the persistence of nationalism and populism does not suggest that they always carry the same influence and presence in political discourse. Rather, it acknowledges that they have been pushed to the fringes in the past but have always found means of re-emergence. The persistence of such politics does not necessarily mean that the success of such politics is inevitable. The discursive tactics of these groups follows previously identified common features of right-wing political discourse, such as the *topoi* of threat, saviour or history. Nevertheless, certain right-wing groups have found a particular success in adapting to the use of such discourse within a digitally integrated public sphere recently. If the analysis of the *moving moment* as a concept is to prove useful in informing political activism, we must consider the potential for those who oppose RWP or far-right extremism to make use of *moving moments* in their own political discourse.

## **9.2 Hope and the *Moving Moment***

I suggest that the activist element of this work comes through a reference to positive futures. Here, I return to the powerful political notion of ‘remembering hope’ (Rigney 2018). In comparison to Levi and Rothberg’s negative, although by no means not legitimate, notion of memory studies in a ‘moment of danger’, Rigney’s formulation of ‘remembering hope’ calls for a use of the past that engages us in a hope for a better future. The call to foster acts of ‘remembering hope’ is, I argue, furthered by an understanding of

the use of *moving moments*. The political potential of *moving moments* is in part the result of the ambiguity of histories and their ability to communicate a connection with a deep past. It is additionally built upon the potential for discourse to bridge this ambiguity, giving a narrative clarity to complex histories. The *moving moments* discussed found clarity in a clear AHD, with this reflected in political discourse. This, I argued, allowed discourse to focus on the affective and political movement of a target audience, as historical knowledges were reinforced through a concurrence to a clear narrative. This form of political use of the past does not suggest an inherent favouring of particular political viewpoints.

Rigney's call towards 'remembering hope' is particularly powerful in this regard. Remembering hope acknowledges that there is an affective power that can be communicated in focusing upon acts of hope. Importantly, remembering hope does not solely refer to recalling hope in the past, but explicitly considers hope as an act which allows us to focus upon the potential for positive futures. Central to the analysis of the political uses of 1215 and 1683 has been the notion of using affective communication of these pasts to create a sense of confidence in engaging in political action that contributes to an imagined future. Without confidence to act, feelings of fear or anger are less likely to have tangible impact beyond the private. Rigney recognises this need for confidence to engage in political action and finds a route to that confidence to act by focusing upon the communication of hope. Rigney, then, is looking towards pasts that have an ability to affect, that ability to move us emotionally.

If hope can foster confidence to engage in political action, this offers a route to countering the divisive use of *moving moments* in RWP and extremist political discourse. I suggest that this comes not in seeking to counter emotionally charged, affective and divisive uses of the past through calls for rationality, or through a focus on notions of historical fact, but rather through finding routes to an affective use of the past that foregrounds hope in the vision that we suggest for the future. Certain uses of 1215 and 1683 already indicate that there is recognition of some spaces where both these moments can be used in the presentation of a politics of openness and unity.

We saw in Chapter 5 that heritage site and museum representations of 1215 often foreground the role of Magna Carta in the development of international recognition of human rights. Salisbury Cathedral takes this further and considers the role of Magna Carta

in inspiring protest movements that might continue to fight for the provision of human rights globally. The Runnymede Trust similarly view Magna Carta as providing a foundation for lobbying for inclusive social policies in the United Kingdom. However, each of these representations of the past are confined within the limits of their particular genre. Even though the Runnymede Trust is seeking to influence political policy, they do so as a think tank, rather than through explicitly public-facing political activism of the likes we saw from UKIP or Stephen Yaxley-Lennon. There is a discursive space, therefore, that is currently empty. This is a discursive space that uses those elements of the inclusivity, or a focus upon human rights, to engage 1215 as a *moving moment* which can foster hope in a politics of inclusivity. Influential political discourse which makes use of 1215 then might currently tend towards right-wing uses, due largely to the greater right-wing success in giving confidence to political action. The challenge then is for that inclusive use of 1215 to communicate affectively, through engaging in remembering hope, in a manner which can give confidence to a less divisive form of political action.

We might suspect that the more violent, militaristic memory of 1683, a moment that we have seen described as used to create opposition to the ‘enemies of the day’ continuously over decades and centuries, has less scope for a use in countering right-wing political discourse. However, in the Turkenschanzpark, Vienna, one can find a fountain with text from the Koran in both German and Turkish, a collaborative project of the district council and the Turkish Ministry for Culture. This offers a reminder that even histories that seem divisive can be used to foster an opposing view of the future. The role of commemorations of Gallipoli as a marker of peace between former enemies could similarly act as such a reminder. Here, the act of remembering hope emerges in the fostering of a hope that conflicts such as that in 1683 are exclusively past events. Where *Gates of Vienna*, *Gedenken 1683* or IBÖ like to talk of an ongoing war, here we are explicitly asked to consider the ending of conflict. We are asked to consider a future without such conflict, where an integration between people of different backgrounds and religions can be engaged through the remembering of a time when this may not have been possible.

Instances where 1683 might be used to communicate a politics of peace and collaboration are, however, hindered by their lack of adherence to an AHD for this past. For example, when the *Gedenken 1683* march takes place in Kahlenberg, anti-fascist protestors gather to oppose their presence. However, this opposition is focused upon the broad political goals being called for by *Gedenken 1683*. They do not offer opposition to the particular use of

the past. This may be a reflection of the fact that the *Gedenken 1683* protestors are seen to use a common narrative of this historic moment and, therefore, it is not productive to challenge their use of the past. There is little political use, perhaps, in challenging a narrative which concurs with an AHD. This is also the case at the St. Josef-Weinhaus church. Here, the fact that the church was built for the advancement of anti-Semitic beliefs has been used to create space for dialogue and inclusivity in the present. However, the use of the memory of 1683 as a marker of Western superiority over a constructed ‘other’ is not challenged. A space is found to use this past to challenge divisive politics, but this is not achieved through a challenging of an AHD of these pasts. It is perhaps in this concurrence with an AHD that right-wing uses of *moving moments* have proved effective and it is this aspect of *moving moments* which presents a challenge to those who oppose such a politics of exclusion.

### **9.3 Responsibility and the Future**

I have sought here to find use for this work not only in terms of knowledge produced, but also as a means of considering how divisive political discourse can be countered.

Elsewhere (Farrell-Banks 2020) I have used this research to question the responsibility that lies in museums and heritage sites in acknowledging where the pasts they present might be used to foster division. In the previous chapter I argued that recognising the important role of non-human bodies in allowing for the mobilisation of particular pasts does not absolve human actors of their responsibility for the manner in which they then make use of these *moving moments*. The affordances of digital technologies, for example, are not responsible themselves for the spread of far-right discourse. In addition to this, I suggest in conclusion here that an additional responsibility lies with political activists.

I have made use of the notion of the *moving moment* to detail the manner in which right-wing groups have made successful use of contested pasts to further the reach of their own ideology. If these pasts are to be used to focus upon positive, inclusive futures it is essential that a recognition is given to the need to communicate these pasts in an affective manner. There is a responsibility to consider how these pasts are used to create the sense of a hope for the future. This hope must be tangible enough to foster a confidence in engaging in political action. In this regard, there is a limit to the reach of heritage sites or museums. This is not to state that such sites do not carry political weight, particularly in reinforcing

an AHD. However, the sites discussed have frequently been religious buildings or national museums where the scope of their political action may be limited, or at least mediated by the role that they carry as institutions. It is not necessarily to be expected that these sites act as political activists<sup>36</sup>. This is where responsibility falls again to those who are expressly concerned with calling for political action.

The future of this work, and the success of the conception of the *moving moment*, can therefore in part be judged by the extent to which this knowledge allows for a more effective use of these pasts by political activists who seek to further a politics of inclusion, those who seek to create a society based upon a celebration of diversity, rather than a protection of indigeneity. It is not the case that this can be achieved solely through the communication of these values in connection to a use of pasts such as 1215 and 1683. This cannot and will not in itself challenge the financial insecurity, increasing wealth inequality and very present feelings of disenfranchisement that RWP and extremist groups make such potent use of. However, the sense of belonging that the affective use of the past can foster can facilitate the challenging not only of the most overt forms of divisive politics, but also give strength to those who wish to challenge the systemic issues that have allowed the recent rise in RWP and extremist politics to take place.

I wish to close on a note of personal reflection. With unnerving frequency throughout the years of working on this research, colleagues have commented on how difficult it must be to spend time engaging with right-wing groups. This has often been framed as a ‘we’re glad someone’s doing it’ response to this work. It is right to acknowledge that any work which touches upon acts of violent extremism carries with it a heavy emotional burden. However, this too is countered by keeping some focus upon acts of remembering hope. Right-wing populism, nationalism and extremism may well be heavily present in our political sphere at the moment, but this should not be taken as inevitable. It is also the case that we should avoid considering this an outcome in changes in forms of communication and the advancement of digital media. Doing so would lead us towards a pessimistic view, not only of the present but also the future, undermining any ability that we might have to find confidence to engage in political action. The digitally integrated public sphere remains a public sphere where political views and the prevailing political ideology of the time can

---

<sup>36</sup> Although some sites will view their role as clearly activist (see Janes and Sandell 2019; Message 2014).

be changed. The responsibility in using contested pasts to engage in a politics of inclusion is itself a recognition of the fact that a hopeful future of inclusion is possible.

## Appendix A

### Digital Content Data-Gathering Code

The following is an example of the code use in gathering Twitter data relating to Magna Carta through the statistical programming software package R. For more detail on the use of this code please contact the author.

#### Code

```
1 ```{r}
2 install.packages("pacman")
3 library(pacman)
4 p_load("streamR")
5 p_load(ROAuth)
6 load("my_oauth.Rdata")
7 file <- "magnacartajune8.json"
8 filterStream(file.name = file,
9 track = c("magna carta", "Magna Carta", "magnacarta", "MagnaCarta"),
10 language = "en",
11 oauth = my_oauth,
12 verbose = TRUE)
13 ```
```

In the interests of openness to those without programming experience, I detail each line of code in turn. Firstly, a new coding ‘chunk’ is indicated by the following line: ````{r}`. This applies when working with an R Markdown project – a project format that allows for the



easy annotation of work as you produce it, in addition to the option to easily export the code and annotations into a word document. Following this, it is necessary to install relevant packages for the work you are undertaking. R operates as the base software, onto which various add-ons can be installed. In this instance I first installed a package called “pacman” (using the “install.packages” function) and then loaded it into the project (using the “library” function). Pacman is a package of convenience rather than necessity as it allows you to install and immediately load any further add-ons necessary using solely the “p\_load” function, a process I use in lines 4 and 5. These two packages are those that allow for the collection of Twitter data (other packages such as `twitteR` are available). `Streamr` allows for the as-live access to the Twitter stream (essentially what you would see if you searched a term on Twitter and continually updated the “latest” page). The programme `ROAuth` then allows the access tokens, as discussed above, to operate correctly. The code in line 6 then uses this package to load my pre-existing authorisation key. At this stage, these are the only programmes required for the collection of Twitter data.

Line 7 then allocates a new file location, within which all of the Tweets and metadata will be stored in `.json` (JavaScript Object Notation) format. These files can be converted into readable spreadsheet format through a variety of software, including R.

Lines 8 to 12 then enact the data gathering itself. The “`filterStream`” function asks the programme to start searching the active Twitter API (rather than the REST API, a function which would return already existing results rather than content as it is produced). What follows is then the specifics of the search. Here I specify that the returned file is that already specified in line 7 (`file.name = file`). I then ask the search to gather four different iterations of the term `Magna Carta`, allowing for the lack of a space and for different usage of upper/lowercase. I then specify that I only wish to gather English language tweets in line 10, before relating the search to my authorisation key in line 11. Line 12 (`Verbose = TRUE`) is a default position for the `StreamR` function. This gathers additional information on the process for R but is of no relevance to the data itself. Line 13 then closes this chunk of code.

## Bibliography

- Adler, T. (2016) 'Why I Started Visiting a Church Regularly', in Milevska, S. (ed.) *On Productive Shame, Reconciliation and Agency*. Berlin: Sternberg Press.
- Agustín, O.G. & Briziarelli, M. (2018) *Podemos and the New Political Cycle: Left-wing populism and anti-establishment politics*. Cham: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Ahmed, S. (2007/8). 'Multiculturalism and the promise of happiness.' *New Formations*, 63, pp. 121-137.
- Ahmed, S. (2004). 'Collective Feelings: Or, The Impressions Left by Others.' *Theory, Culture and Society*, 21(2), pp. 25-42.
- Alcalde, Á. (2016) 'War veterans and the transnational origins of Italian Fascism (1917–1919)', *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 21(4), pp. 565-583.
- Alston, P. (2019) 'Visit to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights', *United Nations Human Rights Council*. Available at: <https://undocs.org/A/HRC/41/39/Add.1> (Accessed: 24 June 2020).
- Althusser, L. (1971) *Lenin and philosophy, and other essays*. London: New Left Books.
- Altnay, A. G., Contreras, M. J., Hirsch, M., Howard, J., Karaca, B. & Solomon, A. (Eds.) (2019) *Women Mobilizing Memory*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Anderson, B. (1983) *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. London: Verso.
- Anderson, B. (2014) *Encountering Affect: Capacities, Apparatuses, Conditions*. Farnham: Ashgate.
- Anderson, B. (2009) 'Affective Atmospheres', *Emotion, space and society*, 2(2), pp. 77-81.
- Arendt, H. (1998) *The Human Condition*. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Arienzo, A. (2016) 'Time Out of Joint: Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari on Time and Capitalism', in Santoianni, F. (Ed.) *The Concept of Time in Early Twentieth-Century Philosophy: A Philosophical Thematic Atlas*. Cham: Springer, pp. 77-84.

- Arlidge, A. & Judge, I. (2014) *Magna Carta Uncovered*. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
- Arrigoni, G. & Galani, A. (2019) 'From place-memories to active citizenship: the potential of geotagged user-generated visual content for memory scholarship.' In: Drozdowski, D; Birdsall, C, (eds.) *Doing Memory Research: New Methods and Approaches*. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.145-167.
- Ash, J. (2020) 'Flat Ontology and Geography', *Dialogues in Human Geography*, pp. 1-17, doi: 10.1177/2043820620940052.
- Assmann, A. (2011) *Cultural memory and western civilization: Functions, media, archives*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Atkins, J. (2016) '(Re)imagining Magna Carta: Myth, Metaphor and the Rhetoric of Britishness.' *Parliamentary affairs*. 69(3), pp. 603–620.
- Baele, S. J., Sterck, O. C. & Meur, E. (2016) 'Theorizing and measuring emotions in conflict: The case of the 2011 Palestinian statehood bid.' *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 60(4), pp. 718-747.
- Bal, M. (2007) 'Exhibition as Film.' In Macdonald, S. & Basu, P. (eds.) *Exhibition Experiments*, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 71–93.
- Bal, M. (2002) *Travelling Concepts in the Humanities: A Rough Guide*. Toronto: Toronto University Press.
- Bal, M. (1999) 'Narrative Inside Out: Louise Bourgeois' "Spider" as Theoretical Object', *Oxford art journal*. 22(2), pp. 101–126.
- Balogh, E. (2015) 'Orbán's Claims of Historical Antecedents', *Hungarian Spectrum*, Available at: <https://hungarianspectrum.org/2015/09/27/viktor-orbans-claims-of-historical-antecedents/> (Accessed: 11 September 2019).
- Bar-On, T. (2013) *Rethinking the French New Right: Alternatives to modernity*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Barad, K. (2006) *Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

- Barber, T. (2020) 'Boris Johnson, Hungary and rightwing European populism', *Financial Times*, 7 January, available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/d132e700-3142-11ea-9703-eea0cae3f0de> (Accessed: 2 August 2020).
- Bareither, C. (2019) 'Doing Emotion through Digital Media: An Ethnographic Perspective on Media Practices and Emotional Affordances', *Ethnologia Europaea*, 49(1), pp. 7-23.
- Bareither, C. (2017) "'That was so mean :D' – Playful virtual violence and the pleasure of transgressing intersecting emotional spaces', *Emotion, Space and Society*, 25, pp. 111-118.
- Barrett, J. (2012) *Museums and the Public Sphere*. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Basu, L., & Bijl, P. (2009) *Mediation, Remediation, and the Dynamics of Cultural Memory*. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter.
- BBC News (2018) *German AfD MPs under fire for anti-muslim New Year's Eve messages*. Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-42537656> (Accessed: 11 September 2019).
- Beck, U. (2016) 'Varieties of Second Modernity and the Cosmopolitan Vision', *Theory, Culture & Society*. 33(7-8), pp. 257–270.
- Beckett, L. & Wilson, J. (2019) 'White power ideology': why El Paso is part of a growing global threat', *The Guardian*, 5 August. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/aug/04/el-paso-shooting-white-nationalist-supremacy-violence-christchurch> (Accessed: 11 September 2019).
- Bennett, T. (1995) *The birth of the museum: History, theory, politics*. London: Routledge.
- Bennett, W. L. & Segerberg, A. (2013). *The logic of connective action: Digital media and the personalization of contentious politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Berlant, L. (2008) 'History and the Affective Event', *American Literary History*, 20(4), pp. 845-860.
- Betz, H. G. (1993) 'The two faces of radical right-wing populism in Western Europe.' *The Review of Politics*, pp. 663-685.
- Billig, M. (1995) *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage.
- Blackman, L. (2012). *Immaterial bodies: Affect, embodiment, mediation*. London: Sage.

- Blackman, L. (2007). 'Is Happiness Contagious?' *New Formations*, 63. pp. 15-32.
- Blackstone, W. (1768) *Commentaries on the laws of England*. 3rd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Bonacchi, C., Altaweel, M. and Krzyzanska, M. (2018) 'The heritage of Brexit: Roles of the past in the construction of political identities through social media', *Journal of Social Archaeology*, 18(2), pp. 174–192.
- Bonacchi, C & Krzyzanska, M. (2019) 'Digital Heritage Research Re-Theorised: Ontologies and Epistemologies in a World of Big Data.' *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 25 (12), pp. 1235–1247.
- Booth, W.J. (2006) *Communities of Memory: On witness, Identity and Justice*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Bourdieu, P. (1977) *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bozoğlu, G. (2020) "A great bliss to keep the sensation of conquest alive!": the emotional politics of the Panorama 1453 Museum in Istanbul', in De Cesari, C. & Kaya, A. (Eds.) *European Memory in Populism: Representations of Self and Other*. Oxon: Routledge, pp. 91-111.
- Bozoğlu, G. (2019) *Museums, Emotion and Memory Culture: The Politics of the Past in Turkey*. London: Routledge.
- Brennan, T. (2004). *The Transmission of Affect*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Breuilly, J. (1982) *Nationalism and the State*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- British Library (2019) *Magna Carta*. Available at: <https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta> (Accessed: 14 July 2020).
- Brunner, E. (2017) 'Wild Public Networks and Affective Movements in China: Environmental Activism, Social Media, and Protest in Maoming', *Journal of communication*. 67(5), pp. 665–677.
- Bruns, A. (2006) 'Towards produsage: Futures for user-led content production', in Sudweeks, F., Hrachovec, H. and Ess, C. (eds.), *Proceedings: Cultural attitudes towards communication and technology 2006*, Perth: Murdoch University, pp. 275–284.

- Cadwalladr, C. (2017) 'The great British Brexit robbery: how our democracy was hijacked', *The Guardian*, 7 May, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/07/the-great-british-brexit-robbery-hijacked-democracy> (Accessed: 2 August 2020).
- Cadwalladr, C. & Graham-Harrison, E. (2018) 'Revealed: 50 million Facebook profiles harvested for Cambridge Analytica in major data breach', *The Guardian*, 17 March. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-influence-us-election> (Accessed: 24 June 2020).
- Caiani, M. & Parenti, L. (2016) *European and American Extreme Right Groups and the Internet*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Cameron, D. (2014) *Speech to the Conservative Party conference, 1 October 2014*. Available at: <https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/david-cameron-s-speech-to-the-conservative-conference-full-text-and-audio> (Accessed: 20 June 2020).
- Campbell, G., Smith, L. & Wetherell, M. (2017) 'Nostalgia and heritage: potentials, mobilisations and effects.', *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 23(7), pp. 609-611.
- Cap, P. (2017) *The language of fear: Communicating threat in public discourse*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Carpenter, D. (2015) *Revival and Survival: reissuing Magna Carta*. Available at: <https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/revival-and-survival-reissuing-magna-carta> (Accessed: 15 July 2020).
- CBS News (2019) 'U.S. museum demands German anti-Islam party stop using 19th-century "Slave Market" painting', *CBS News*, 30 April. Available at: <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-museum-germany-far-right-afd-anti-islam-party-slave-market-painting/> (Accessed: 11 September 2019).
- Chidgey, R. (2018) *Feminist afterlives: Assemblage memory in activist times*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Clarke, J. & Newman, J. (2017) '“People in this country have had enough of experts”: Brexit and the paradoxes of populism', *Critical Policy Studies*, 11(1), pp. 101-116.
- Closs Stephens, A. (2016) 'The affective atmospheres of nationalism', *Cultural Geographies*, 23(2), pp. 181-198.

- Closs Stephens, A. (2013) *The Persistence of Nationalism*. London: Routledge.
- Clough, P.T (2008). 'The Affective Turn', *Theory, Culture & Society*, 25 (1). pp. 1-22.
- Clough, P.T. & Halley, J. (eds.)(2007) *The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Chomsky, N. (1995) 'Rollback', *Z Magazine*, January-May, 1995. Available at: <https://chomsky.info/199505/#TXT2.23> (Accessed: 11 September 2019).
- Chouliaraki, L. & Fairclough, N. (1999) *Discourse in Late Modernity: Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Coke, E. (1797) *Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England. Containing the Exposition of Many Ancient and Other Statutes*. London: Printed for E. and R. Brooke.
- Colley, S. (2015) 'Ethics and Digital Heritage', in Ireland, T. & Schofield, J. (Eds.) *The Ethics of Cultural Heritage*. New York, NY: Springer, pp. 13-32.
- Compendium (2016) *Austria: Financing of Culture*. Available at: <https://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/austria.php?aid=61> (Accessed: 11 September 2019).
- Connerton, P. (1989) *How societies remember*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cossarini, P. and Vallespín, F. (eds.) (2019) *Populism and Passions: Democratic Legitimacy After Austerity*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Cowans, J. (1999) 'Habermas and French History: The Public Sphere and the Problem of Political Legitimacy', *French History*, 13(2), pp. 134-160.
- Crossley, N. & Roberts, J.M. (2004) *After Habermas: New Perspectives on the Public Sphere*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Cubitt, G. (2007). *History and Memory*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Dallinger, S. (2010) 'Türkenbefreiungsfeiern' der Parteien 1933 – Überblick. Available at: <https://www.tuerkengedaechtnis.oeaw.ac.at/feierlichkeit/,turkenbefreiungsfeiern'-1933-uberblick/> (Accessed: 11 September 2019).
- Dallinger, S. & Gollner, M. (2010) *Papst Johannes Paul II. in Österreich (10.–13. September 1983)*. Available at:

<https://www.tuerkengedaechtnis.oeaw.ac.at/feierlichkeit/papst-johannes-paul-ii-in-wien-10-13-september-1983/> (Accessed: 11 September 2019).

Davison, R. H. (1960) 'Where Is the Middle East?', *Foreign Affairs*. Available at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/1960-07-01/where-middle-east> (Accessed: 24 June 2020).

De Cesari, C. & Kaya, A. (2020) *European Memory in Populism: Representations of Self and Other*. Oxon: Routledge.

De Cock, B. & Arias, C. G. (2018) 'Reference to Self and Other in the Digital Public Sphere: The Case of Political Blogs.' *Journal of psycholinguistic research*, 47(2), pp. 343-354.

De Krey, G.S. (2018) *Following the Levellers, Volume Two English Political and Religious Radicals from the Commonwealth to the Glorious Revolution, 1649–1688*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

De Nardi, S., Orange, H., High, S. & Koskinen-Koivisto, E. (Eds.). (2019) *The Routledge Handbook of Memory and Place*. Oxon: Routledge.

Delanty, G. (1997) 'Habermas and Occidental Rationalism: The Politics of Identity, Social Learning, and the Cultural Limits of Moral Universalism', *Sociological Theory*, 15 (1), pp. 30–59.

Delanty, G. & O'Mahony, P. (2002) *Nationalism and social theory: modernity and the recalcitrance of the nation*. London: Sage.

Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. (1980) *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Demertzis, N. (2006) 'Emotions and Populism', in Clarke, S., Hoggett, P. & Thompson, S. (Eds.) *Emotion, Politics and Society*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 103-122.

Demski, D. (2014) 'Jan Sobieski: Anniversaries of the 1683 Battle of Vienna (from 1783 to 1983) and its historical imagination.' *Traditiones*. 43(1), 13–28.

Denzin, N.K. & Lincoln, Y.S. (2011). 'Introduction: The Discipline and Practice of Qualitative Research', in N.L. Denzin & Y.S. Lincoln (Eds.), *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research*, 4th Edition. London: Sage.



Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee (2019) *Disinformation and 'Fake News': Final Report*. Available at:

<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcmmeds/1791/1791.pdf>

(Accessed: 15 July 2020).

Di Bernardo, M. (2016) 'Time and Reality in the Thought of Henri Bergson', in Santoianni, F. (Ed.) *The Concept of Time in Early Twentieth-Century Philosophy: A Philosophical Thematic Atlas*. Cham: Springer, pp. 39-57.

Diamond, L. (2010) 'Liberation technology', *Journal of Democracy*, 21(3), pp. 69–83.

Dittmer, J. & Waterton, E. (2016) 'Embodied memory at the Australian War Memorial', in Drozdowski, D., De Nardi, S. & Waterton, E. (eds.) *Memory, Place and Identity: Commemoration and Remembrance of War and Conflict*. Oxon: Routledge, pp. 170-187

Doering, Z.D. and Pekarik, A.J. (1996) 'Questioning the entrance narrative.' *Journal of Museum Education*, 21(3), pp. 20-23.

Doidge, M., Kossakowski, R. & Mintert, S. (2020) *Ultras: The passion and performance of contemporary football fandom*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Dowell, S. (2019) 'King Sobieski monument erected in Kraków after Vienna says it's too controversial', *The First News*, 19 November. Available at:

<https://www.thefirstnews.com/article/king-sobieski-monument-erected-in-krakow-after-vienna-says-its-too-controversial-8780> (Accessed: 24 June 2020).

Drever, K. (2019) *Scapa Flow 1919*. [Digital]. Derby: Reveal Records.

Drozdowski, D., Waterton, E. & Sumartojo, S. (2019) 'Cultural memory and identity in the context of war: Experiential, place-based and political concerns', *International Review of the Red Cross*, 101(910), pp. 251-272.

Du Gay, P., Hall, S., Janes, L., Madsen, A.K., Mackay, H. & Negus, K. (2013) *Doing Cultural Studies: The Story of the Sony Walkman*. Second edition. London: Sage.

Duncan, C., & Wallach, A. (1980). 'The universal survey museum', *Ariel*, 137, pp. 212-199.

Duthely, R. (2017) 'Black feminist hip-hop rhetorics and the digital public sphere.' *Changing English*, 24(2), pp. 202-212.

Eaton, G. (2019) 'The age of post-austerity: why Labour and the Tories have embraced big government', *New Statesman*, 4 November. Available at:

<https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/economy/2019/11/age-post-austerity-why-labour-and-tories-have-embraced-big-government> (Accessed: 24 June 2020).

The Economist (2018) 'Drinking from the Same Glass', *The Economist*, 17 May.

Available at: <https://www.economist.com/europe/2018/05/17/viktor-orbans-visit-to-warsaw-showcased-an-illiberal-alliance> (Accessed: 11 September 2019).

Eigler, F. & Kugele, J. (2012) *'Heimat': At the Intersection of Memory and Space*. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Engel, L.C. (2016) 'Defining and Debating the Common "We": Analyses of Citizen Formation beyond the Nation-State Mold', in Williams, J.H. & Bokhorst-Heng, W. (eds.), *(Re)Constructing Memory: Textbooks, Identity, Nation, and State*. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, pp. 345-354.

Erll, A. (2011) *Memory in Culture*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Fairclough, N. (2016) 'A dialectical-relational approach to critical discourse analysis in social research', in Wodak, R. & Meyer, M. (eds.), *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. London: Sage, pp. 86-108.

Fairclough, N. (2010) *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language*. 2nd ed. New York: Longman.

Fairclough, N. (2005) 'Critical discourse analysis in transdisciplinary research', in Wodak, R. & Chilton, P. (eds.) *A New Agenda in (Critical) Discourse Analysis*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Co., pp. 53-70.

Fairclough, N. (2001) *Language and Power*. 2nd ed. New York: Longman.

Falk, J.H. & Dierking, L.D. (2013) *The Museum Experience Revisited*. Walnut Creek: Left Coast Press.

Fanon, F. (1963) *The Wretched of the Earth*. New York, NY: Grove.

Farrell-Banks, D. (2020) '1215 in 280 characters: Talking about *Magna Carta* on Twitter', in Galani, A., Mason, R. & Arrigoni, G. (eds.), *European Heritage, Dialogue and Digital Practices*. London: Routledge, pp. 86-103.

- Fleischer, R. (2014) 'Two Fascisms in Contemporary Europe? Understanding the Ideological Split of the Radical Right', in Deland, M., Minkenberg, M. & Mays, C. (eds.) *In the Tracks of Breivik: Far Right Networks in Northern and Eastern Europe*. Vienna: Lit Verlag.
- Foucault, M. (1977) *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. New York, NY: Pantheon.
- Foucault, M. (1969) *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. London: Routledge.
- Fraser, N. (1992) 'Rethinking the Public Sphere', in Calhoun, C. (ed.) *Habermas and the Public Sphere*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 109-142.
- Fredriksson, C.H. (2014) 'Vienna has fallen! The challenges of a European public sphere', *Eurozine*. Available at: <https://www.eurozine.com/vienna-has-fallen/> (Accessed: 11 September 2019).
- Freeman, S. & Herron, J.C. (2015) *Evolutionary analysis*. Fifth edition. Harlow: Pearson.
- Fuchs, C. (2018a) *Digital Demagogue: Authoritarian Capitalism in the Age of Trump and Twitter*. London: Pluto.
- Fuchs, C. (2018b) 'Racism, Nationalism and Right-Wing Extremism Online: The Austrian Presidential Election 2016 on Facebook', in Morelock, J. (ed.) *Critical Theory and Authoritarian Populism*. London: University of Westminster Press, pp. 157-206.
- Funke, M., Schularick, M. & Trebesch, C. (2016) 'Going to extremes: Politics after financial crises, 1870–2014', *European Economic Review*, 88, pp. 227-260.
- Garnett, G. (2015) 'Magna Carta Through Eight Centuries', In *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*. (Online only). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gellner, E. (1983) *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Gibson, J.J. (1977) 'The Theory of Affordances', in Shaw, R. & Bransford, J. (Eds.) *Perceiving, Acting and Knowing: Toward an Ecological Psychology*. Oxon: Routledge, pp. 67-82.
- Gibson, J. J. (1966) *The senses considered as perceptual systems*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.

- Giddens, A. (1987) *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, Volume 2: The Nation-State And Violence*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Giddens, A. (1981) *The Class Structure of Advanced Societies*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition. London: Hutchinson.
- Glapka, E. (2019) 'Critical affect studies: On applying discourse analysis in research on affect, body and power', *Discourse & Society*, 30(6), pp. 600-621.
- González-Ruibal, A., González, A. P. & Criado-Boado, F. (2018) 'Against reactionary populism: Towards a new public archaeology', *Antiquity*, 92(362), pp. 507-515.
- Gounari, P. (2018) 'Authoritarianism, Discourse and Social Media: Trump as the 'American Agitator'', in Morelock, J. (ed.) *Critical Theory and Authoritarian Populism*. London: University of Westminster Press, pp. 207-228.
- Grant, M. (1916) *The Passing of the Great Race*. New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Graves, J. (2001) *The Emperor's New Clothes: Biological Theories of Race at the Millennium*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Greek Reporter (2020) *The Fall of Constantinople: May 29, 1453* [Facebook] 29 May. Available at: <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=579975626269307> (Accessed: 30 May 2020).
- Greene, M. (2015) *The Edinburgh history of the Greeks, 1453 to 1768: The Ottoman Empire*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Grice, A. (2019) 'Boris Johnson's triumph of populism comes straight from the Trump playbook', *Independent*, 13 December. Available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/boris-johnson-general-election-december-2019-a9244811.html> (Accessed: 2 August 2020).
- Guibernau, M. (2013) *Belonging: Solidarity and Division in Modern Societies*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Guidry, J. P., Jin, Y., Orr, C. A., Messner, M. & Meganck, S. (2017) 'Ebola on Instagram and Twitter: How health organizations address the health crisis in their social media engagement.' *Public relations review*, 43(3), pp. 477-486.
- Habermas, J. (1984) *The Theory of Communicative Action*. London: Heinemann.

- Habermas, J. (1962) *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Habermas, J. & Derrida, J. (2003) 'February 15, or What Binds Europeans Together: A Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe', *Constellations*, 10(3), pp. 291-297.
- Habermas, J., Lennox, S., & Lennox, F. (1974) 'The public sphere: An encyclopaedia article (1964)', *New German Critique*, 3, pp. 49-55.
- Halbwachs, M. (1992[1925]) *On Collective Memory*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Hamilakis, Y. (2014) *Archaeology and the Senses: Human Experience, Memory, and Affect*. Cambridge University Press.
- Hands, J. (2019) *Gadget Consciousness: Collective Thought, Will and Action in the Age of Social Media*. London: Pluto.
- Hänggli, R. (2020). *The Origin of Dialogue in the News Media*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hänska Ahy, M. (2016) 'Networked communication and the Arab Spring: Linking broadcast and social media.' *New Media & Society*, 18(1), pp. 99-116.
- Harrison, R. (2013) *Heritage: Critical Approaches*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Hassabis, D. & Maguire, E. A. (2007) 'Deconstructing episodic memory with construction.; *Trends in cognitive sciences*, 11(7), pp. 299-306.
- Hayles, N.K. (2017) *Unthought: The Power of the Cognitive Nonconscious*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
- Heft, H. (2017) 'Perceptual Information of "An Entirely Different Order": The "Cultural Environment" in *The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems*', *Ecological Psychology*, 29(2), pp. 122-145.
- Henson, D. (2016) 'Finding People in the Heritage of Bankside, Southwark', in Schofield, J. (ed.) *Who needs experts?: counter-mapping cultural heritage*. Oxon: Routledge, pp. 147-164.

- Herbjørnsrud, D. (2018) 'The Real Battle of Vienna', *Aeon*. Available at: <https://aeon.co/essays/the-battle-of-vienna-was-not-a-fight-between-cross-and-crescent> (Accessed: 13 December 2019).
- Herrnstein, R.J. & Murray, C.A. (1996) *The bell curve: intelligence and class structure in American life*. New York: Free Press Paperbacks.
- Hetherington, K. (2013) 'Foucault and the Museum', *The International Handbook of Museum Studies*, pp. 21 – 40.
- Hill, M. & Montag, W. (2000) *Masses, Classes and the Public Sphere*. London: Verso.
- Hobsbawm, E. & Ranger, T. (eds.) (1983) *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Holt, J. C. (1992) *Magna Carta*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hooper-Greenhil, E. (1992) *Museums and the Shaping of Knowledge*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Hoskins, A. (2018) 'The restless past: an introduction to digital memory and the media', in Hoskins, A. (ed.) *Digital Memory Studies: Media Pasts in Transition*. Oxon: Routledge, pp. 1 – 24.
- Hoskins, A. (2011) 'Media, Memory, Metaphor: Remembering and the Connective Turn', *Parallax*, 17(4), pp. 19-31.
- Howard, P.N. & Parks, M.R. (2012) 'Social Media and Political Change', *Journal of Communication*, 62, pp. 359-362.
- Huyssen, A. (2003) *Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Huyssen, A. (1995) *Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia*. London: Routledge.
- Janes, R.R. & Sandell, R. (2019) *Museum Activism*. London: Routledge.
- Judis, J.B. (2016) *The Populist Explosion: How the great recession transformed American and European politics*. New York, NY: Columbia Global Reports.
- Juhász, B. & Pap, E. (2018) *Backlash in Gender Equality and Women's and Girl's Rights*. Policy Department for Citizens Rights and Constitutional Affairs, European Union.

- Karatzogianni, A. (2015) *Firebrand waves of digital activism 1994-2014: the rise and spread of hacktivism and cyberconflict*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kaya, A. (2019) *Populism and Heritage in Europe: Lost in Diversity and Unity*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Kaya, A. (2016) 'The rise of populist extremism in Europe: Theoretical tools for comparison', *CoHERE Critical Archive*. Available at: <https://cohere-ca.ncl.ac.uk/#/grid/125> (Accessed: 24 June 2020).
- Kelemen, R. (2017) 'Europe's Other Democratic Deficit: National Authoritarianism in Europe's Democratic Union.' *Government and Opposition*. 52 (2), 211–238.
- Kelsey, D. (2017) *Media and Affective Mythologies: Discourse, Archetypes and Ideology in Contemporary Politics*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan
- Kelsey, D. (2016) 'Hero Mythology and Right-Wing Populism: A discourse-mythological case study of Nigel Farage in the *Mail Online*', *Journalism Studies*, 17(8), pp. 971-88.
- Kelsey, D. (2015) *Media, Myth and Terrorism: A Discourse-Mythological Analysis of the 'Blitz Spirit' in British Newspaper Responses to the July 7th Bombings*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- KhosraviNik, M. and Unger, J. W. (2016) 'Critical discourse studies and social media: Power, resistance and critique in changing media ecologies', in Wodak, R. & Meyer, M. (eds.), *Methods of critical discourse studies*. London: Sage, pp. 205–233.
- Kline, W. (2001) *Building a better race: gender, sexuality, and eugenics from the turn of the century to the baby boom*. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press.
- Koselleck, R. (1985) *Futures past: On the semantics of historical time*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Köttig, M. & Blum, A. (2017) 'Introduction', in Köttig, M., Bitzan, R. & Petö, A. (eds.) *Gender and Far Right Politics in Europe*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1-10.
- Kress, G.R. & Van Leeuwen, T. (2001) *Multimodal Discourse: The Modes and Media of Contemporary Communication*. London: Hodder Education.
- Kühl, S. (1994) *The Nazi connection: eugenics, American racism, and German national socialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Latour, B. (2005) *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lazaridis, G., Campani, G. and Benveniste, A. (2016) *The Rise of the Far Right in Europe: Populist Shifts and 'Othering'*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Lazaridis, G., Polymeropoulou, M. & Tsagkroni, V. (2016) 'Networks and alliances against the Islamisation of Europe: The case of the Counter-Jihad Movement', in Lazaridis, G. & Campani, G. (eds.) *Understanding the Populist Shift: Othering a Europe in crisis*. Oxon: Routledge, pp. 70-103.
- Lazaridis, G., & Tsagkroni, V. (2016) 'Majority Identitarian Populism in Britain', in Lazaridis, G, Campani, G. & Benveniste, A. (eds.), *The Rise of the Far Right in Europe*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 239-272.
- Lentin, A. (2014) 'Post-race, post politics: the paradoxical rise of culture after multiculturalism.' *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. 37(8), 1268–1285.
- Levi, N. & Rothberg, M. (2018) 'Memory studies in a moment of danger: Fascism, postfascism and the contemporary political imaginary', *Memory Studies*, 11(3), pp. 355-367.
- Lewis, B. (1982) 'The Question of Orientalism', *The New York Review of Books*, 24 June. Available at: <https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1982/06/24/the-question-of-orientalism/> (Accessed: 11 September 2019).
- Lewis, B. (1990) 'The Roots of Muslim Rage', *The Atlantic*, September 1990. Available at: <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1990/09/the-roots-of-muslim-rage/304643/> (Accessed: 11 September 2019).
- Lewis, B. (1993) *Islam and the West*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Libertarian Party (2018) *Libertarian Party Platform*. Available at: <https://www.lp.org/platform> (Accessed: 11 September 2019).
- Lindauer, M. (2006) 'The critical museum visitor', in Marstine, J. (ed.), *New Museum Theory and Practice: An Introduction*. Malden: Blackwell, pp. 203–225.
- Lindroth, M. & Sinevaara-Niskanen, H. (2019) 'Politics of hope.' *Globalizations*, 16(5), pp. 644-648.



- Lowenthal, D. (2015) *The Past is a Foreign Country – revisited*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lyotard, J.-F. (1984) *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Macdonald, S. (2013) *Memorylands: Heritage and identity in Europe today*. London: Routledge.
- Machcewicz, P. (2019) *The War That Never Ends: The Museum of the Second World War in Gdańsk*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter GmbH.
- Machlis, D. & Lazaroff, T. (2007) ‘Muslims ‘About to Take Over Europe’’, *Jerusalem Post*, 29 January. Available at: <https://www.jpost.com/International/Muslims-about-to-take-over-Europe> (Accessed: 11 September 2019).
- MacIntyre, A. (2016) ‘Writing as Social Disclosure: A Hundred Years Ago and Now’, in Fives, A. & Breen, K. (eds.) *Philosophy and Political Engagement: Reflection in the Public Sphere*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 99-115.
- Macklin, G. (2013) ‘Transnational networking on the far right: The case of Britain and Germany’, *West European Politics*, 36(1), pp. 176-198.
- Macklin, G. (2012) ‘Transatlantic Connections and Conspiracies: AK Chesterton and The New Unhappy Lords.’ *Journal of Contemporary History*, 47(2), pp. 270-290.
- Manokha, I. (2018) ‘Cambridge Analytica’s closure is a pyrrhic victory for data privacy’, *The Conversation*, 3 May, available at: <https://theconversation.com/cambridge-analyticas-closure-is-a-pyrrhic-victory-for-data-privacy-96034> (Accessed: 2 August 2020).
- Marcinkiewicz, K. & Stegmaier, M. (2017) ‘Poland appears to be dismantling its own hard-won democracy’, *Washington Post*, 21 June. Available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/07/21/poland-appears-to-be-dismantling-its-own-hard-won-democracy/> (Accessed: 11 September 2019).
- Margolis, H. (2018) ‘Once Optimistic, Poland’s Women’s Rights Activists Live in Climate of Fear’, *Human Rights Watch*. Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/10/03/once-optimistic-polands-womens-rights-activists-live-climate-fear> (Accessed: 11 September 2019).

- Markell, P. (1997) 'Contesting Consensus: Rereading Habermas on the Public Sphere', *Constellations*, 3(3), pp. 377–400.
- Martin, T. (2016) 'Tim Martin reflects on Brexit: "Democracy is economic steroids"', *Morning Advertiser*, 26 June. Available at: <https://www.morningadvertiser.co.uk/Article/2016/06/27/Tim-Martin-reflects-on-Brexit-Democracy-is-economic-steroids> (Accessed: 23 June 2020)
- Marwick, A. E. and boyd, d. (2011) 'I tweet honestly, I tweet passionately: Twitter users, context collapse, and the imagined audience', *New Media and Society*, 13(1), pp. 114–133.
- Mason, R., & Sayner, J. (2019) 'Bringing museal silence into focus: eight ways of thinking about silence in museums', *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 25(1), pp. 5-20.
- Massumi, B. (2015). *The Politics of Affect*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Mayer, N. (2015) 'The Closing of the Radical Right Gender Gap in France?' *French Politics*, 13(4), pp. 391–414.
- Mayer, S. & Sauer, B. (2017) "'Gender ideology" in Austria: Coalitions around an empty signifier', in Kuhar, R. & Paternotte, D. (eds.) *Anti-Gender Campaigns in Europe. Mobilizing against Equality*. London: Roman and Littlefield. pp. 23-40.
- Mayer, S., Ajanovic, E. & Sauer, B. (2014) 'Intersections and Inconsistencies. Framing Gender in Right-Wing Populist Discourses in Austria', *NORA: Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender Research*, 22, pp. 250-266.
- McCalman, I. & Pickering, P.A. (2010) *Historical Reenactment: From Realism to the Affective Turn*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- McCarthy, J. (1997) *The Ottoman Turks: An Introductory History to 1923*. New York: Addison Wesley Longman.
- McLaren, A. (2016) *Our Own Master Race: Eugenics in Canada, 1885-1945*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- McCormack, D.P. (2008). 'Engineering affective atmospheres on the moving geographies of the 1897 Andree expedition.' *Cultural Geographies*, 15(4), pp. 413-430.
- Message, K. (2014) *Museums and Social Activism: Engaged Protest*. London: Routledge.

- Michels, C. (2015). 'Researching affective atmospheres.', *Geographica Helvetica*, 70(4), 255-263.
- Moffitt, B. (2020) *Populism*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Moffitt, B. (2016) *The Global rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style, and Representation*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Mondon, A. & Winter, A. (2020) *Reactionary Democracy: How Racism and the Populist Far Right Became Mainstream*. London: Verso.
- Moore, K. & Greenland, K. (2018) 'Racism as a Crime in Britain's Right-Wing Press', in Bhatia, M., Poynting, S. & Tufail, W. (eds.) *Media, Crime and Racism*. Cham: Springer International. 213-233.
- Mouffe, C. (2018) *For a Left Populism*. London: Verso.
- Mouffe, C. (2013) *Agonistics: Thinking the world politically*. London: Verso.
- Mouffe, C. (2005a) *The Return of the Political*. London: Verso.
- Mouffe, C. (2005b) *On the Political*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Moussa, M., & Scapp, R. (1996) 'The practical theorizing of Michel Foucault: Politics and counter-discourse', *Cultural Critique*, 33, pp. 87-112.
- Mudde, C. (2020) 'Will the coronavirus 'kill populism'? Don't count on it', *The Guardian*, 27 March. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/mar/27/coronavirus-populism-trump-politics-response> (Accessed: 24 June 2020)
- Mudde, C. (2019) *The Far Right Today*. London: Polity.
- Müller, J. (2016) *What Is Populism?* Philadelphia: Philadelphia University Press.
- Nairn, T. (2003) *The break-up of Britain: crisis and neo-nationalism*. 3rd. ed. Altona, Vic.: Common Ground.
- National Trust (2020) *What is Magna Carta?* Available at: <https://www.nationaltrust.org.uk/runnymede/features/what-is-the-magna-carta> (Accessed: 23 June 2020).

- Nielsen, P. (2019) *Between heimat and hatred: Jews and the right in Germany, 1871-1935*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Nohlen, D. & Stöver, P. (2010) *Elections in Europe: A Data Handbook*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Nora, P. (1999-2010) *Rethinking France: Les Lieux de mémoire*, volumes 1 – 4. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
- Nora, P. (1996-98) *Realms of Memory*, abridged translation. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Nora, P. (1989) ‘Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire’, *Representations*, 26, pp. 7-24.
- OAW (2010) *Feirn*. Available at: <https://www.tuerkengedaechtnis.oeaw.ac.at/feirn/> (Accessed: 11 September 2019).
- O’Brien, P. (2018) ‘Face to face with Matteo Salvini, Italy’s far-right Deputy PM’, *Channel 4*, 2 August. Available at: <https://www.channel4.com/news/face-to-face-with-matteo-salvini-italys-far-right-deputy-pm> (Accessed: 27 June 2020)
- Olick, J. K. (2007) *The Politics of Regret: On collective memory and historical responsibility*. London: Routledge.
- Pearson, R. & Eysenck, H.J. (1991) *Race, intelligence and bias in academe*. Washington, D.C.: Scott-Townsend Publishers.
- Pelinka, A. (2013) ‘Right-Wing Populism: Concept and Typology’, in Wodak, R., Mral, B. & KhosraviNik, M. (eds.) *Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse*. London: Bloomsbury, pp. 3-23.
- Perraudin, F. (2018) ‘EDL founder Tommy Robinson jailed for contempt of court’, *The Guardian*, 29 May. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/may/29/edl-founder-tommy-robinson-jailed-13-months> (Accessed: 4 June 2020).
- Pfetsch, B. (2018) ‘Dissonant and disconnected public spheres as challenge for political communication research’, *Javnost: The Public*, 25(1–2), pp. 59–65.
- Pickerill, J. (2003) *Cyberprotest: Environmental activism online*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Pond, P. & Lewis, J. (2019). 'Riots and Twitter: connective politics, social media and framing discourses in the digital public sphere.' *Information, Communication & Society*, 22(2), pp. 213-231.

Protest Memory (2019) *The Afterlives of Protest*. Available at: <https://protestmemory.wordpress.com/> (Accessed: 26 June 2020).

Rampen, J. 'How Tommy Robinson became a folk hero for the global alt-right', *New Statesman*, 27 June, Available at: <https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2018/06/how-tommy-robinson-became-folk-hero-global-alt-right> (Accessed 13 May 2020).

Ravelli, L. (2006) *Museum Texts: Communication Frameworks*. New York, NY: Routledge.

ReAct (2020) *Remembering Activism: The Cultural Memory of Protest in Europe*. Available at: <https://rememberingactivism.eu/> (Accessed: 26 June 2020).

Reading, A. (2016) *Gender and memory in the global age*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Rees-Mogg, J. (2016) 'EU superstate laws strip Britain of its Magna Carta rights', *Daily Express*, 30 May, available at: <https://www.express.co.uk/comment/expresscomment/674777/Jacob-Rees-Mogg-EU-superstate-laws-Magna-Carta-rights-Britain> (Accessed: 23 June 2020).

Reisigl, M. & Wodak, R. (2016) 'The discourse-historical approach (DHA)', in Wodak, R. & Meyer, M. (eds.), *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. London: Sage, pp. 23-61.

Reisigl, M. & Wodak, R. (2005) *Discourse and Discrimination: Rhetorics of Racism and Antisemitism*, Oxon: Routledge.

Richardson, L. (2018) 'Ethical Challenges in Digital Public Archaeology', *Journal of Computer Applications in Archaeology*, 1(1), pp 64-73.

Rico, G., Guinjoan, M. & Anduiza, E. (2017) 'The emotional underpinnings of populism: How anger and fear affect populist attitudes.' *Swiss Political Science Review*, 23(4), pp. 444-461.

- Ricœur, P. (1990) *Time and narrative Vol. 1*. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
- Rigney, A. (2018) 'Remembering Hope: Transnational activism beyond the traumatic', *Memory Studies*, 11(3), pp. 368-380.
- Romaln, J. (2014) 'Magna Carta's here Jewish clauses', *The Jewish Chronicle*, September 4. Available at: <https://www.thejc.com/magna-carta-s-three-jewish-clauses-1.56652> (Accessed: 26 June 2020).
- Rossington, M. & Whitehead, A. (2007) *Theories of Memory: A Reader*. Perth: University of Western Australia Press.
- Rothberg, M. (2009) *Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
- Runnymede Trust (2019) *What's in a name?* Available at: <https://www.runnymedetrust.org/about/what-s-in-a-name.html> (Accessed: 13 June 2020).
- Russell, J. (2007) *Terrorism Pre-Charge Detention: Comparative Law Study*. London: Liberty.
- Said, E. (1978) *Orientalism*. London: Penguin Books.
- Said, E. & Grabar, O. (1982) 'Orientalism: An Exchange', *The New York Review of Books*. 12 August. Available at: <https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1982/08/12/orientalism-an-exchange/> (Accessed: 11 September 2019).
- Said, E. (2001) 'The Clash of Ignorance', *The Nation*. Available at: <https://www.thenation.com/article/clash-ignorance/> (Accessed: 11 September 2019).
- Samuel, R. (2012) *Theatres of memory: Past and present in contemporary culture*. London: Verso.
- Santoian, F. (2016) 'Phenomenology and Perception of Time Maps', in Santoian, F. (ed.) *The Concept of Time in Early Twentieth-Century Philosophy: A Philosophical Thematic Atlas*. Cham: Springer, pp. 35-38.
- Savenije, G. M., & De Bruijn, P. (2017). 'Historical empathy in a museum: uniting contextualisation and emotional engagement.' *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 23(9), pp. 832-845.

- Sayan-Cengiz, F. & Tekin, C. (2019) 'The 'gender turn' of the populist radical right', *Open Democracy*. Available at: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/rethinking-populism/the-gender-turn-of-the-populist-radical-right/> (Accessed: 16 July 2020).
- Schacter, D. L. & Madore, K. P. (2016) 'Remembering the past and imagining the future: Identifying and enhancing the contribution of episodic memory.' *Memory Studies*, 9(3), pp. 245-255.
- Serhan, Y. (2018) 'The British Trial That Became a Free-Speech Crusade for the Right', *The Atlantic*, 2 August. Available at: <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/08/tommy-robinson-wins-appeal/566549/> (Accessed: 3 June 2020).
- Sewell, W. H. (1996). 'Historical Events as Transformations of Structures: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille', *Theory and Society*, 25 (6). pp. 841-881.
- Shaw, S.J. (1976) *History of the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey. Volume 1, Empire of the Gazis: the rise and decline of the Ottoman Empire 1280-1808*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Shaw, S.J. & Shaw, E.K. (1977) *History of the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey. Volume 2, Reform, revolution, and republic: the rise of modern Turkey, 1808-1975*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Siegel, E. (2017) 'The Real Problem with Charles Murray and "The Bell Curve"', *Scientific American*. Available at: <https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/voices/the-real-problem-with-charles-murray-and-the-bell-curve/> (Accessed: 11 September 2019).
- Skeates, R. (2010) *An Archaeology of the Senses: Prehistoric Malta*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Smith, A.D. (2001) *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History*. Malden, Mass.: Polity Press.
- Smith, G. & Green, A. (2017) 'The Magna Carta: 800 Years of Public History', in Gardner, J.B. & Hamilton, P. (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Public History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 387-402.
- Smith, L., Wetherell, M. & Campbell, G. (2018) *Emotion, affective practices, and the past in the present*. London: Routledge.



- Smith, L. & Campbell, G. (2017) ‘‘Nostalgia for the future’’: memory, nostalgia and the politics of class.’ *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 23(7), pp. 612-627.
- Smith, L. (2006) *Uses of Heritage*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Spicer, M.W. (2004) ‘The English Levellers and American Public Administration.’ *Administrative Theory & Praxis*. 26 (4), pp. 566–587.
- SPLC (2019) *Pioneer Fund*. Available at: <https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/pioneer-fund> (Accessed: 11 September 2019).
- Szpunar, K. K., Addis, D. R., McLelland, V. C. & Schacter, D. L. (2013) ‘Memories of the future: New insights into the adaptive value of episodic memory.’ *Frontiers in behavioral neuroscience*, 7, 47.
- Stone, D. (2002) *Breeding superman: Nietzsche, race and eugenics in Edwardian and interwar Britain*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
- Sullivan, E. (2018) ‘Shakespeare, Social Media, and the Digital Public Sphere: Such Tweet Sorrow and A Midsummer Night's Dreaming.’ *Shakespeare*, 14(1), pp. 64-79.
- Sumartojo, S. (2019) ‘Sensory Impact: Memory, Affect and Sensory Ethnography at Official Memory Sites’, in Drozdowski, D. & Birdsall, C. (eds.) *Doing Memory Research: New Methods and Approaches*. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 21-37.
- Sumartojo, S. & Pink, S. (2018) *Atmospheres and the Experiential World: Theory and Methods*. London: Routledge.
- Taylor, G. (2017) *Understanding Brexit: Why Britain voted to leave the European Union*. Bingley: Emerald Publishing Limited.
- Tezcan, B. (2012) *The second Ottoman Empire: political and social transformation in the early modern world*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tharoor, I. (2015) ‘Hungary’s Orbán invokes Ottoman invasion to justify keeping refugees out’, *Washington Post*, 4 September. Available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/09/04/hungarys-orban-invokes-ottoman-invasion-to-justify-keeping-refugees-out/> (Accessed: 11 September 2019).



Thrift, N.J. (2007). *Non-representational Theory: Space, politics, affect*. Hoboken: Taylor & Francis.

Thrift, N.J. (1996). *Spatial Formations*. London: Sage.

Tolia-Kelly, D., Waterton, E. & Watson, S. (eds.) (2017) *Heritage, affect and emotion: Politics, practices and infrastructures*. London: Routledge.

Tomlinson, C. (2018) 'Exclusive: Polish MP Slams Vienna Govt for Rejecting Statue of Polish King who Rescued City from Turkish Siege', *Breitbart News*, 1 September.

Available at <https://www.breitbart.com/europe/2018/09/01/exclusive-polish-mp-slams-vienna-govt-for-rejecting-statue-of-polish-king-who-rescued-city-from-turkish-siege/>

(Accessed: 24 June 2020).

Tucker, J. A., Guess, A., Barbera, P., Vaccari, C., Sigel, A., Sanovich, S., Stukal, D. & Nyhan, B. (2018) *Social media, political polarization, and political disinformation: A review of the scientific literature*. Menlo Park: Hewlett Foundation.

Tufail, W. (2018) 'Media, State and 'Political Correctness': The Racialisation of the Rotherham Child Sexual Abuse Scandal', in Bhatia, M., Poynting, S. & Tufail, W. (eds.) *Media, Crime and Racism*. Cham: Springer International. 49-71.

Turner, R.V. (1994) *King John*. London: Longman.

UK Government (2000) *Terrorism Act 2000*. Available at:

<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/contents> (Accessed: 20 June 2020).

UK Parliament (2020) *The Legacy of Magna Carta*, Available at:

<https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/evolutionofparliament/originsofparliament/birthofparliament/overview/magnacarta/magnacartalegacy/> (Accessed: 20 June 2020).

UKIP (2015) *Believe in Britain: UKIP Manifesto 2015*. Newton Abbott: UKIP.

UNESCO (2020) *Budapest, including the Banks of the Danube, the Buda Castle Quarter and Andrásy Avenue*. Available at: <https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/400/> (Accessed: 13 May 2020).

Van Dijk, T.A. (1991) *Racism and the press*. London: Routledge.

Veale, K. (2017) 'Gone Home, and the power of affective nostalgia.' *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 23(7), pp. 654-666.

Vikås, M., Widerøe, R.J., Ravndal, D., Torgensen, H.H., Brenna, J.G., Andersen, G. & Hopperstad, M.S. (2011) 'Breivik's political idol "Fjordman" emerges from anonymity', VG. Available at: <https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/2Q5d4/breiviks-political-idol-fjordman-emerges-from-anonymity> (Accessed: 11 September 2019).

Villa, D.R. (1992) 'Postmodernism and the Public Sphere', *American Political Science Review*, 86(3), pp. 712-722.

Wagner-Pacifici, R. (2010) 'Theorizing the restlessness of events', *American Journal of Sociology*, 115(5), pp. 1351–1386.

Warren, W. L. (1997) *King John*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press

Washington Post (2015) *Full Text: Donald Trump announces a presidential bid*. Available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/06/16/full-text-donald-trump-announces-a-presidential-bid/> (Accessed: 14 July 2020).

Waterson, J. (2020) 'Stark warnings part of government's new coronavirus messaging', *The Guardian*, 1 April. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/01/stark-warnings-part-of-governments-new-coronavirus-messaging> (Accessed: 26 June 2020).

Weiss, G., & Wodak, R. (Eds.). (2007) *Critical discourse analysis*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Wert, J.J. (2010) 'With a Little Help from a Friend: Habeas Corpus and the Magna Carta after Runnymede.' *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 43(3), pp. 475-478.

Wetherell, M. (2012) *Affect and emotion: A new social science understanding*. London: Sage.

White, H. (1987) *The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation*. Baltimore, ML: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Whitehead, C., Daugbjerg, M., Eckersley, S. & Bozoğlu, G. (2019) 'Dimensions of European heritage and memory: A framework introduction', in Whitehead, C., Daugbjerg,

M., Eckersley, S. & Bozoğlu, G. (eds.) *Dimensions of Heritage and Memory: Multiple Europes and the Politics of Crisis*. London: Routledge, pp. 1-25.

Whitehead, C. & Bozoğlu, G. (2015) 'Constitutive Others and the Management of Difference: Museum Representations of Turkish Identities', in Whitehead, C., Lloyd, K., Eckersley, S. & Mason, R. (eds.) *Museums, Migration and Identity in Europe: Peoples, Places and Identities*. Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 253-284.

Williams, B.M. [@DrBritWilliams](2020) 'Y'all use Intersectionality as research parsley. Don't even know what it means, just throwing it on.' [Twitter] 7 May. Available at: <https://twitter.com/drbritwilliams/status/1258493583658754050> (Accessed: 2 August 2020).

Winter, J. (2001) 'The generation of memory: reflections on the "memory boom" in contemporary historical studies.' *Canadian Military History*, 10(3), pp. 57-66.

Witcomb, A. (2015) 'Toward a Pedagogy of Feeling: Understanding How Museums Create a Space for Cross-Cultural Encounters', in Witcomb, A. & Message, K. (eds.) *The International Handbook of Museum Studies: Museum Theory*, pp. 321-344.

Wodak, R. (2015) *The Politics of Fear: What right-wing populist discourses mean*. London: Sage.

Wodak, R. (1997) *Gender and Discourse*. London: Sage.

Wodak, R. & Forchtner, B. (2014) 'Embattled Vienna 1683/2010: Right-wing populism, collective memory and the fictionalisation of politics.', *Communication*, 13(2), pp. 231-255.

Wodak, R. & Meyer, M. (2001) *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. London: Sage.

Wodak, R. & Pelinka, A. (2002) *The Haider phenomenon in Austria*. London: Transaction Publishers.

Yapp, M.E. (1992) 'Europe in the Turkish Mirror', *Past & Present*, 137, 134-155.

Ye'or, B. (1985) *The dhimmi: Jews and Christians under Islam*. London: Associated University Presses.

Ye'or, B. (2005) *Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis*. New Jersey: Farleigh Dickinson University Press.

Zemblyas, M. (2015). 'Rethinking race and racism as technologies of affect: theorizing the implications for anti-racist politics and practice in *Race, Ethnicity and Education*, education.' 18(2), pp. 145-162.

Zourabichvili, F. (2012). *Deleuze: A philosophy of the event: Together with the vocabulary of Deleuze*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.