

The Legacy of a War
How the Legacy of the Russo-Japanese War Affected the US-Japan Relations

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The Russo-Japanese War—fought between the Russian Empire and the Empire of Japan from 1904 until 1905—was undoubtedly among the most significant wars in world history. Not only did it define the future of imperialism adopted by the Russian Empire, but it also shaped the future of world politics. Some scholars even refer to the Russo-Japanese War as ‘World War Zero’ (Steinberg 2007), given its profound and long-lasting impacts. This paper will elucidate the Russo-Japanese War, elaborate on the events and battles that took place during the war chronologically, analyze the consequences of the Russo-Japanese War, and draw a conclusion elucidating how the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War affected US-Japan relations.



Figure 1: Asia in the late 19th century & early 20th century.

It is plausible to commence with the background of the Russo-Japanese War and what led the Russian Empire and the Empire of Japan to wage war one another. Both the Russian Empire and the Empire of Japan, as is evident from their official titles, were two of the greatest empires in the early twentieth century, both having carried out imperialist and expansionist policies in the Asian continent and having a global claim to Asia. In the case of the Empire of Japan, it is plausible to state that the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 fought over Korea's independence allowed the Empire of Japan to acquire Taiwan, granting the empire extraterritoriality privileges. Followed by the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Li Hung-chang and Ito Hirobumi negotiated, and the Empire of Japan was given plenty of territories, further allowing her to expand its territorial borders. The terms of the treaty obliged China to recognize the independence of Korea, over which it had traditionally held suzerainty; to cede Taiwan, the Pescadores Islands, and the Liaodong (south Manchurian) Peninsula to Japan; to pay an indemnity of 200,000,000 taels¹ to Japan²; and to open the ports of Shashi, Chongqing, Suzhou, and Hangzhou to Japanese trade³ (Paine 2005). However, The Triple Intervention of 1895, secured by Russia, France, and

¹ Any of various Chinese units of value based on the value of a tael weight of silver; any of various units of weight of eastern Asia.

² This indemnity was increased to 230 million upon Japan's agreement to withdrawal from Fengtien.

³ This treaty of commerce and navigation was agreed upon July 21, 1896.

Germany, subsequently required Japan to retrocede the Liaodong Peninsula to China in return for an additional indemnity of 30,000,000 taels.⁴ Therefore, with the Triple Intervention of Germany, Russia, France in 1895, the Empire of Japan was forced to return the Liaotung Peninsula and Port Arthur to China, which would, later on, signify one of the *casus belli* for the Empire of Japan.

Having given the background knowledge as to the Japanese Imperialism, it is of utmost significance to state the geopolitical and geographical importance of the Lüshunkou District—which is a district of Dalian, in Liaoning province, China. Also previously pronounced Lüshun City or Lüshun Port, the Russian Empire formerly named as both Port Arthur and Ryojun (Japanese: 旅順). The present research mentions Lüshunkou District as Port Arthur, for it was the name of the district during the Russo-Japanese War. The location of the Port Arthur is at the extreme southern tip of the Liaodong Peninsula. In geopolitical and military terms, Port Arthur was of surpassing significance both for the Russian Empire and the Empire of Japan in the early twentieth century.




Figure 2: Port Arthur city plan Lüshunkou/Lvshunkou District (Ryojun), China.

A crucial access spot for both empires, the port harbored pre-eminent geopolitical value, especially for the Russian Empire due for various purposes. To put the reasons more explicitly, it is manifest that the Russian Empire was looking forward to a warm port for the transportation of its products for a considerable period. The Suez Canal was an opportunity; however, as the British Empire had the dominance over the Suez Canal and she also refused access to the Suez Canal for the Russian Empire—the Russians obliged a port that would ease its way to the Indian subcontinent to conduct trade in India. Without any other options to access to the Indian subcontinent, the Russian Empire had to sail

⁴ Shimonoseki, Treaty of. Shunpanrou Hall, Shimonoseki, Yamaguchi Prefecture, Honshu, Japan, where the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed in 1895. Ian Ruxton. <https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-of-Shimonoseki>

⁵ An event or action that justifies or allegedly justifies a war or conflict.

along the Indian ocean. Since the Suez Canal opened, the Russian Empire had been using the Cape Route when the British Empire refused passage through the Suez Canal. In the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War, the Dogger Bank incident (Jackson 1974) forced the Russian fleet to sail around Africa as well, which was not a convenient route for the Russian Empire. Another remarkable fact is that in the early twentieth century, all the ports of the Russian Empire at the time were in cold spots, which used to hinder the mobility of the boats and ships to a substantial degree. Geographically fit, Port Arthur became a prominent spot to start and reshape the Russian Empire's projects. As the construction of the railway tracks set out—dealt with in more extra detail in the following section, the Russian Empire employed too many soldiers at the Port (Arthur). The deployment of soldiers served a beneficial purpose of intimidating the Japanese regime—as the Japanese at the time were attempting to establish their domination in the Korean Peninsula. What is striking is that when the Empire of Japan tried to oppose the deployment of the Russian soldiers, the Russian Empire merely shrugged them off and did not pay much heed to the opposition, which would be another triggering detail that would lead up to the Russo-Japanese War. Therefore, as its location signifies, Port Arthur is an excellent natural harbor, the possession, and control of which became a casus belli of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905).



Figure 3: China – Dalian / Ottoman Map / Siege of Port Arthur (1904-5): [پور ارتور... باشلا حرب] Map of the Russian-Japanese War]. Author: Ottoman Military Press (Matbaa-i Askeriye). Place and Year: [Constantinople: Matbaa-i Askeriye, 1905].

The Russo-Japanese War would take place due to various reasons, all of which stem from the imperialist and expansionist policies of both the Russian Empire and the Empire of Japan. Another reason was also their contestation for dominance over the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, another substantial determinant of the eruption of the Russo-Japanese War is “railways/railroads”—which are of profound history and provide a comprehensive example in terms of elucidating imperialist and expansionist policies of both the Russian Empire and the Empire of Japan. The present research explains both Trans-Siberian and South Manchurian railways and their routes in detail from the perspectives of the two empires to layout their expansionist policies more elaborately. In his pivotal work entitled *Rethinking the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5 Volume I: Centennial Perspectives*, Rotem Kowner elucidates the Trans-Siberian Railway connecting European Russia with the Russian Far East provinces

on the Sea of Japan—built between 1891 and 1916 (Kowner 2007, 49). The Russian-built system included the Chinese Eastern Railway, short-cutting across China’s Manchuria; later on, its southern branch was connected with other Chinese railways. The construction of the railways along with their short-cuttings, as Kowner states, underlined the Russian Empire’s imperialist policy by building a network not only to carry the goods that she produced but also to expand its already-existing vast territories and boost its global claim to Asia (Kowner 2007).



Figure 4: The Russo-Japanese War took place neither in Japan nor Russia, but chiefly in Manchuria—the substantial part of China that lay north of the Great Wall. Most of the fighting concentrated on control of Port Arthur, where the Japanese had bottled up the Russian Far Eastern Fleet at the outset of the war in February 1904. The most prominent land battle took place at Mukden in March 1905. The most renowned naval combat was Admiral Tōgō’s devastating May 1905 victory at Tsushima, where he defeated a large Russian fleet that had sailed around the world from the Baltic. The astronomical distance that Russian troops and supplies had to travel to get to the front posed immense challenges. The Trans-Siberian Railway and connecting railroad lines were the keys to this challenging logistics. (Source: *Asia Rising: Japanese Postcards of the Russo-Japanese War*, John W. Dower, Massachusetts Institute of Technology © 2005 Visualizing Cultures, Images from the Leonard A. Lauder Collection of Japanese Postcards at the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston.)

The Russian Empire, as mentioned above, implemented her expansionist policies through the construction of railroads by establishing new networks all around her colonial domains. Aside from the Trans-Siberian Railway, another truly remarkable railway is the South Manchurian Railway. The mainline from Changchun to Port Arthur—as called Luishun under the Russian rule—was built between 1898 and 1903 by the Russians as the southern branch of their Chinese Eastern Railway. The Russian Empire established the railway according to the 1896 secret treaty and the 1898 lease convention between Qing China and Imperial Russia in the aftermath of the First Sino-Japanese War (Maruya 2012). However, although built by Russians in 1905 after Russia’s defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, this area would be taken over by Japan under the name of the South Manchuria Railway Zone. The line had been a source of friction between the Chinese, Japanese, and Russians throughout the first half of the twentieth century. However, the Russian Empire built the railway line to connect what were then the South Manchurian sea towns of Lüshun (Port Arthur) and Dalian (Dairen) on the Liaodong Peninsula (now combined as the city of Dalian)—with the Chinese Eastern Railway running across Manchuria (now Northeast China) from Chita in Siberia to the Russian seaport of Vladivostok (Britannica 2011). The areas mentioned above—namely Port Arthur and Liaodong Peninsula—were the regions to which both the Russian Empire and the Empire of Japan had claim, which made the South Manchurian Railway another *casus belli* for the Russo-Japanese War (Felix Patrikeeff 2007) given that

it created turmoil in terms of the imperial rivalry between the Russian Empire and the Empire of Japan early in the twentieth century.

One of the primary factors resulting from both empires' imperialist policies was also the ceaseless competition for dominance over the Korean Peninsula, which signifies the last one of the *casus belli* for the Russo-Japanese War for this paper. In this view, it is incontrovertible that the Russian Empire—both to acquire Port Arthur as an access point to warm water ports and to utilize the Korean peninsula as a buffer zone—had long yearned to conquer or annex the region (Lukin, *Russia's Game on the Korean Peninsula: Accepting China's Rise to Regional Hegemony?* 2019) until her humiliating defeat to Japan in 1905. Those grand designs abruptly ended with the empire's defeat; nevertheless, the military and political dispute over the Korean peninsula as to its use as a buffer zone had not ceased for years before the eruption of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. The Empire of Japan had obtained dominance over the Korean peninsula and had control of the area. Moreover, the Empire of Japan would have maintained influence over Korea, whereas the Russian Empire kept insisting on 'Korea's Neutrality Policy.' From this conflict emerged a latent hostility between the Russian Empire and the Empire. In his article entitled *Korea's Neutrality Policy and The Russo-Japanese War*, Lee Sung-Hwan (2007) elucidates the idea

The mutual border between Korea and Russia came into existence as a result of the Treaty of Aigun in 1858 and the Treaty of Peking in 1860 when the coastal province became Russian territory. [...] A major reason for the fear of a Russian menace was the racism that had formed in Japan and the wholesale transmission of this image of Russia to Korea. (Sung-Hwan 2007, 105-106)

In the 1890s, the Empire of Japan outraged at Russian encroachment on its plans to create a sphere of influence in Korea and Manchuria. Therefore, she offered to recognize Russian dominance in Manchuria in exchange for recognition of Korea as being within the Japanese sphere of influence. The Russian Empire refused and “demanded Korea north of the 39th parallel to be a neutral buffer zone between Russia and Japan,” (Nish 1985). The Japanese government decided on war to stop the perceived Russian threat to its plans for expansion into Asia, which became the turning point in the eruption of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. The Russian Empire's refusal, despite the demand by the Empire of Japan, would prolong the rivalry between the two great empires for the dominance over the Liaodong Peninsula and Lüshunkou (Port Arthur). Besides, it would also spark the Russo-Japanese War.



Figure 5: Greater Manchuria. Russian (outer) Manchuria is the lighter red region to the upper right.

When the Russo-Japanese War terminated, the naval forces of the Empire of Japan under the commandment of Tōgō Heihachirō Saneyoshi⁶ won remarkable victories on land and at sea over the Russian Empire. However, the war—harbinger of World War I—concluded with grand casualties. The battles of the Russo-Japanese War are namely Battle of Hsimucheng, Battle of Liaoyang, Battle of Motien Pass, Battle of Mukden, Battle of Nanshan, Siege of Port Arthur, Invasion of Sakhalin, Battle of Sandepu, Battle of Shaho, Battle of Tashihchiao, Battle of Te-li-Ssu and Battle of the Yalu River. In the aftermath of all the encounters of the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian Empire confronted nothing but a humiliating defeat—which would prevent the Russian Empire from having a global claim to Asia. Lukin asserts the stance of the Russian Empire at the end of the Russo-Japanese war by stating that “After the Russo-Japanese War, Russia has never again attempted to play a leading role in East Asia, saving strategic resources for other regions it deemed of higher importance, such as Europe and the Middle East,” (Lukin, *Russia’s Game on the Korean Peninsula: Accepting China’s Rise to Regional Hegemony?* 2019).

The sources do not agree on a precise number of deaths from the war because there is a lack of body counts for confirmation. However, estimations state that “the number of Japanese Army dead in combat or died of wounds is at around 59,000 with around 27,000 additional casualties from disease, and between 6,000 and 12,000 wounded. Measures of Russian Army dead range from around 34,000 to around 53,000 men with a further 9,000-19,000 dying of disease and around 75,000 captured. The sources also assert that the total number of dead for both sides commonly, as around 130,000 to 170,000,” (Samuel Dumas 1923). In this view—both parties sustained casualties amounting to more than 150,000 combined—and that some 20,000 Chinese civilians got killed (Editors 2018). Mostly in favor of the Empire of Japan, the consequences of the war were ample. In the aftermath of the takeover of Port Arthur with the sinking of the Russian Baltic Fleet in Battle of Tsushima—under the leadership of Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō Saneyoshi—the global celebration of the triumph of the Empire of Japan became one of the repercussions of the war. The Empire of Japan achieved such primary supremacy over the Russian Empire that it even made the headlines. In his pivotal work entitled *The Making of Modern Japan*, Marius B. Jansen states, “Japan also enjoyed international approval and even acclaim. The opening assault on the Russian navy, which came before a declaration of war, was described by the *London Times* as “an act of daring which is destined to take a place of honor in naval annals,” (Jansen 2002).

The Russo-Japanese War was likewise officially concluded by a treaty with conditions and demarcations circumscribed by its articles—as is indisputable in the aftereffect of wars in world history. Concerning this detail, the Portsmouth Treaty of Peace terminated the Russo-Japanese War, and according to the terms of the treaty, the Empire of Japan arose as a further unity to the Five Major World powers.⁷ Supremacy in the Russo-Japanese War empowered the status of the Empire of Japan as an upcoming glorious power—especially since it came on the heels of Japan’s triumph in the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. In the process of signing the Portsmouth Treaty of Peace, the former US President, Kaneko Kentarō—one of his fellow Harvard classmates—asked Theodore Roosevelt to assist in mediating a treaty between Japan and Russia to end the Russo-Japanese War. Roosevelt agreed to do so (Katz 2019, 243). The Russian Empire and the Empire of Japan met in Portsmouth/New Hampshire to resolve the final conflict over the division of Sakhalin. Under the treaty clauses of the Portsmouth Treaty of Peace, Russia took the northern half of the Sakhalin Island, and Japan the south; Japan also dropped its demand for an indemnity (Brands 1997, 530-39). The negotiations and the signing of the peace treaty were so successful that Theodore Roosevelt won the Nobel Peace Prize for his successful efforts in bringing about the Portsmouth Treaty of Peace. Jansen (202) summarizes the political overview in the aftermath of the signing of the Portsmouth Treaty of Peace as follows

⁶ Japanese: 東郷 平八郎.

⁷ The Europe of 1871 was a continent of five great powers divided into two categories. The first grouping were the three most powerful states—Great Britain, Germany, and France. The second grouping was lesser in rank but remained significant for the period—Austria-Hungary and Russia.

The Portsmouth Treaty of Peace transferred to Japan the Russian lease of the Liaotung Peninsula and the South Manchurian Railroad rights in Manchuria. The southern half of the island of Sakhalin became Japanese territory. Perhaps most important of all, Russia was forced to recognize Japan's paramount interest in Korea. Not only was Japan now a major world power, but its performance had excited the admiration of the world. (Jansen 2002, 440)

Signed on September 5, 1905 ("Text of Treaty; Signed by the Emperor of Japan and Czar of Russia" 1905), after negotiations lasting from August 6 to August 30, at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, Maine, United States (Location of shipyard in Maine: "York, ME-NH" 2019), the Portsmouth Treaty of Peace contributed to the rise of the Empire of Japan and its dominance over the Korean Peninsula. On the other hand, the Russian Empire, once again, was forced to renounce her quest for warm water ports. The Treaty was in favor of the Empire of Japan, for she was prominently the victorious side. Henceforth, the Empire of Japan was able to acquire control of Korea and much of South Manchuria. She also gained Port Arthur along with the railway, which connected the port to the rest of the region. Moreover, the treaty divided Sakhalin Island into two; the Empire of Japan would acquire the southern half, whereas the Russian Empire would dominate the northern half. The territorial demarcations, combined, resulted in a Russian Empire left with curtailed power in the region. The treaty, however, did not require the Russian Empire to pay Japan's war costs, for neither nation was in a stable financial position to resume the battles effortlessly. In this view, the treaty forced both the Russian Empire and the Empire of Japan to compromise in terms of peace, which was of tremendous significance given that it would be the offset of tensions in the relations between Japan and the United States. The aforementioned tension between the two countries would accumulate commencing from 1905, would lead to World War I, and consequently World War II, ultimately reaching its climax when the United States denoted two nuclear weapons over the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, 1945.



Figure 6: Russo-Japanese War and peace map.

Figure 6 (see page 7) reveals that the Portsmouth Treaty of Peace forced both empires to compromise in terms of the Empire of Japan's receiving war indemnities. However, as is evident in Jansen's reference above, the Japanese public was well aware that they had won the war, and they

considered the lack of an indemnity to be an affront (The Treaty of Portsmouth and the Russo-Japanese War, 1904–1905 n.d.). Neither party was satisfied; the Russian Empire due to her leasing of the southern half of Sakhalin. The Empire of Japan, on the other hand, did not receive the post-war indemnities under the pretext of “post-war exhaustion” of both parties. In other words, “the Portsmouth Treaty of Peace did not grant Japan the monetary reparations that the Japanese people expected after their significant investment of energy and blood in the war,” (Szczepanski 2018).

Jansen (2002) elaborately explains the spark of the tensions between the Empire of Japan and the United States as follows

Poorly informed by a government that had not bothered to keep them posted, confident that further struggle would bring the Russians abjectly to heel, and determined that their hardships would be rewarded, Japanese were indignant when they discovered that the Portsmouth treaty had no provisions for indemnification. (Jansen 2002, 448)

Another scholar, Minohara, also states that the United States— especially by Roosevelt— betrayed the Empire of Japan. He says, “[...] Roosevelt was no Japanophile; his policy was firmly grounded on pragmatism and the preservation of American national interests,” (Minohara 2016, 55). In this view, it is incontrovertible that the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War put into jeopardy the relations between the Empire of Japan and the United States. In terms of the Empire of Japan, it is possible to state that the Japanese victory over the Russian Empire was the first major military victory in the modern era of an Asian power over a European nation. The Empire of Japan forced the Russian Empire to abandon its expansionist policy in the Far East, becoming the first Asian power in modern times to defeat a European power. Furthermore, marking a significant turning point in terms of the 20th-century world politics, the Russo-Japanese War and its aftermath have been considered as the leading factor for both world wars, namely World War I and World War II. Besides, as mentioned in the introduction part, some scholars even regard the Russo-Japanese War as World War Zero (Steinberg 2007), given that it sparked the events that would climb up to World War II. Therefore, the Russo-Japanese War is of surpassing significance in terms of the US-Japan international relations and Japan’s foreign policy towards the United States of America. It is incontestable that the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 brought about the transformation that took place in US-Japan relations. This alteration is what led to the worsening of relations between two countries, ultimately reaching its peak with the atomic bombings. Jansen (2002) elucidates the final order as well as the rising of the Empire of Japan after the Russo-Japanese War stating that “After the Russo-Japanese War, Japan was the strongest power in Asia. In the next two decades, it increased its stature and emerged as one of the five Great Powers, with a permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations,” (Jansen 2002, 511).

Despite Jansen’s description of the Empire of Japan right after the Russo-Japanese War, it is inevitable that due to the number of casualties as well as military and financial exhaustion of the Empire of Japan, “the nation’s ability to sustain the conflict was seriously crippled. Despite a string of key victories, and while hidden from the public, Japan was near exhaustion in terms of both material and financial resources,” (Minohara 2016). Moreover, the profoundly restrained peace articles—negotiated at the end of the war—affronted the Japanese public opinion even though the Russo-Japanese War had terminated in supremacy for Japan (“Japan’s Present Crisis and Her Constitution” 1905). The post-war exhaustion, financial and military tiredness, as well as the scarcity of sources, caused widespread discontent through the populace in the Empire of Japan upon the announcement of the treaty terms. Riots erupted in major cities in Japan. Besides, the Empire of Japan, has come out as the most prominent power in the Asian continent, started to become a principal threat to the United States, as well as it was to Korea, and most notably, China. Furthermore, the Russian Empire and the Empire of Japan contrived to stabilize their imperial relations, with the Empire of Japan emerging more prominent than ever, and the Russian Empire never having an imperialist claim to Asia. However, this time, Japanese imperialism came into friction with the United States, which was building its empire in the Pacific. In this view, both domestically and internationally, it is not possible to address a ‘political stability’ in the Asian context in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War. Moreover, the crisis across the Pacific between the United States and Japan strained also Anglo-Japanese relations (Akira 2007), forcing Britain ultimately to choose between the Empire of Japan and the United States as its primary imperial partner.

In East Asian regional scheme without U.S. participation would have been impossible to develop, but some system of trans-Pacific order could have developed only if the United States and Japan had pursued parallel policies on the Asian continent. In such a perspective, the Russo-Japanese war and the subsequent crisis across the Pacific may be seen as developments antithetical to the growth of Asian-Pacific regionalism. (Akira 2007)

Akira's statement explicates the lack of parallel relations between the United States and the Empire of Japan in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, which prevented Asia from becoming a politically stable zone. However, for the present research, a more crucial detail is the increasing tension in the relations between the United States and the Empire of Japan in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War. It is plausible to restate that the rising of the Empire of Japan as a grand imperial power in Asia-Pacific was a threatening element for the United States, which aimed at preventing the Empire of Japan from expanding all over the Asian continent and becoming a colonial threat to her.

At no time since 1905 have relations between the United States and Japan attained that degree of cordiality which prevailed in the earlier years. The growth of American interests in the Pacific and the emergence of Japan as a great power with aspirations on the continent of Asia proved a source of friction, while the question of Japanese immigration into the United States gave repeated cause for ill feeling. (Patch 1932)

It is incontrovertible that "Securing peace at Portsmouth allowed Japan to shift its attention toward its postwar diplomacy. The decisive outcome of the Russo-Japanese War enabled Japan to vastly strengthen and expand its sphere of influence in both Northeast China and Korea," (Minohara 2016, 59). The Empire of Japan, therefore, had become a threatening factor for the American national interests by the time the Russo-Japanese War ended. Such a drastic change became readily apparent in the eyes of other world powers and the transformation that the Empire of Japan underwent brought along many agreements, treaties, and conventions on its way. The agreements are namely the Taft-Katsura memorandum of July 1905, the Second Anglo-Japanese Alliance of August 1905, the Franco-Japanese Convention of June 1907, the Root-Takahira agreement of November 1908, and the Russo-Japanese Convention of July 1907 (Minohara 2016, 60). The arrangements in the previous sentence were just a string of international agreements that were signed to recognize the Empire of Japan as a preeminent global power even though she had evolved into such a colossal empire at the expense of the Russian Empire.

In conclusion, the termination of the war through the Portsmouth Treaty of Peace did not constitute a stable environment in Asia, although there was an unmistakable victory in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War. It precipitated the rise of the Empire of Japan; however, this development did not solve the predicaments given that the Empire of Japan became so compelling that it resulted in an increased tension with the United States. Therefore, it is possible to deduce that the rising of the Empire of Japan after the Russo-Japanese War and American national interest clashed with one another—causing an on-going tension that would remain for decades until Japan's defeat in 1945, which marked the end of the World War II. Moreover, Roosevelt disregarded the war indemnities that were the right of the Empire of Japan but handled her the same way as he did to the Russian Empire despite the Empire of Japan was the victorious party, which contributed to the clash between the countries to a further extent.

The Russo-Japanese War—in this view—has always been considered a world-changing war even though it was not a 'world war.' However, the war was referred to as 'World War Zero' despite not being a world war given that it changed the flow of the regional stability in the Asian continent. This change in the Asian continent brought about a variety of developments that would trigger World War I and ultimately World War II and would cause the Empire of Japan's ultimate defeat right in the aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bomb denotations. Even though the United States-Japan relations are of tremendous significance both for the United States and especially for Japan today, it is an incontestable fact that both countries have survived a long, bitter past.

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