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U.S.-Soviet Competitive
Intervention: Retrospect and Prospect

by

Frederic S. Pearson

U.S. - SOVIET COMPETITIVE INTERVENTION:

RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

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U.S.- SOVIET COMPETITIVE INTERVENTION: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

INTRODUCTION

Scholars have disagreed about the nature of the international system since the second world war. The initial post-war period has been characterized as "bipolar," with the Soviet Union and the United States as the major powers. Some analysts detected a loosening of this bipolarity and the emergence of "multipolar" tendencies, beginning roughly in 1958 with vehement French and Chinese criticism of their respective alliance leaders (such criticism had begun long before, as we now know). At least one recent behavioral study, measuring the degree of global system bipolarity, has highlighted a slow and relatively steady decline of economic, diplomatic, and military bipolarity and bipolar dependency relations after a peak in the mid-1950's. By criteria such as military spending, the US and USSR jointly accounted for more than 50% of world "power" until 1979. In some years during this "bipolar" era the US had nearly a 2 to 1 lead over the Soviets. Detente in the 1970s seemed to lower bipolarity and bipolar dependencies markedly, and also to equalize US and Soviet military power.(1)

By certain interpretations then, the post-war international system was "unipolar" at least through the 1960s, with the United States as the dominant world military and economic power, and the Soviet Union as an aspiring competitor. (2) The Chinese and Europeans were extremely inferior in military capability throughout most of the period (though China made very good use of its forces in the Korean War). While Europe and Japan made rapid economic strides, they lagged considerably behind the Americans through the mid-sixties. Thus, there were few effective rivals to American world economic and military power prior to 1970.

The last fifteen years, however, have witnessed the first transformation in this American-dominated era. Though still trailing in economic efficiency/productivity and high technology, the Soviet Union, spurred by the humiliation of the Cuban missile crisis and by Chinese competition, made important and clear progress in both conventional and nuclear military capability. By most calculations--including those of the International Institute for Strategic Studies--rough military parity prevails between the superpowers, albeit at levels somewhat less dominant over the rest of the world than before. With its first trade imbalances of the early 1970's, Washington also experienced a genuine economic challenge from, and in some products, clear inferiority to European Community members and Japan. For the first time since World War II, American decision-makers faced an environment with serious and equally potent rivals.

This study focuses on the ways in which U.S. and Soviet "security managers" dealt militarily with the unipolar or nearly bipolar system before 1970 and the more competitive, some might even say "bimultipolar" (3) system since that time. The historical record could provide clues as to whether they have adjusted sufficiently to the new demands of a more complicated international system to avoid superpower war. The stakes in such an adjustment are, of course, monumental, and include the survival of this planet.

In a geo-political system in which one power dominates, it is likely that the other power will learn when to give way, and when to assume it is safe to

be assertive. Since the days of Kennan and Acheson, American policy-makers anticipated a global reach of Soviet influence, and sought to contain or diminish this reach. Eastern Europe became a relatively exclusive Soviet sphere of influence, and American leaders had to worry about stepping too close to vital U.S.S.R. interests in North Korea and later in North Vietnam. The fact that Soviet forces could hit U.S. Asian and European allies also gave Washington pause, even if Moscow could not reach the U.S. mainland. But most of the time, U.S. leaders were relatively free to intervene and extend American power without much fear of Soviet counter-measures.

Moscow, on the other hand, had to be acutely conscious of American or American allies' dominance in most regions. Soviet leaders mainly relied on political and aid ties to states outside their immediate geographical neighborhood; they were not equipped for military involvements and for the possibility of direct confrontation with the West in distant regions.

For American leaders those relatively secure and self-assured days are gone now. Although the Soviet Union may still be quite reticent about direct confrontation, the Soviet navy is much more formidable than in the days of the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet nuclear arsenal is larger and much more diverse than in the days of Suez (when the West could largely ignore Khrushchev's nuclear threats), and Soviet tank forces are much larger than in the days of the Berlin crises. Washington security managers now drive on uncharted roads, with a seemingly greater prospect of meeting dangerous oncoming traffic.

Moscow's security managers have, of course, had less experience than their U.S. counterparts in handling their own major power status and avoiding over-commitments. (4) Even as late as in Brezhnev's era, Moscow basically ignored the deaths of Soviet personnel in U.S. saturation bombings of Vietnam; it has been argued that the U.S.S.R. will not risk world war to defend Third World clients such as Syria. Yet can one be sure that Soviet leaders will continue to step back from military confrontation with the other superpower when they have the means to engage in such confrontations? What is the value of Moscow's friendship and security treaties in such circumstances?

Furthermore, decision-making pressures are mounting in both Washington and Moscow, with rapidly advancing and threatening nuclear technologies, the potential spread of nuclear weapons in Asia and Latin America, and newly revived mutual political hostility. Soviet leaders have been faced with exceedingly accurate American missiles able to reach the Soviet heartland from submarines and from Europe. Even if the Reagan Administration is replaced by one less stridently hostile to the Soviet political system, the U.S.S.R. will be on notice as to the fragility of detentes. If trust is an important element in regulating a bimultipolar world, it is also likely to be scarce in the last years of the century.

CAPABILITIES, HOSTILITIES AND SUPERPOWER INTERVENTION

Superpower confrontation and the danger of major war in the coming years seem most likely to stem from simultaneous foreign interventions. While World War III or a severe crisis such as those in Cuba or Berlin could erupt merely from political disputes, the physical presence of one superpower's forces or advisors in or near countries considered strategically important to the other could set off chain reactions of dangerous combat.

Intervention depends in part on the threats parties perceive in foreign disputes, on their capabilities to project military power or assistance across borders or overseas, on their political will to do so, and on their general economic and political expansiveness. Expansiveness here entails not merely conquering foreign territory, but developing interests in foreign events, and needs for foreign contacts during periods of internal growth and/or perceived external threat. (5) Economic growth increases demands for foreign goods and services, and affords a state more capabilities with which to intervene militarily abroad. Expansive states are more likely to encounter foreign hostilities as their spheres of interest and influence intersect those of other expansive states. Occasions for competitive intervention, therefore, increase. The will to intervene also depends on such factors as capability and threat perception, and on success or failure in prior interventions.

In past studies it has been determined that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. seldom have intervened with troops in the same place at the same time. (6) However, little is known about the pattern of action and reaction once intervention by one party has taken place, action and reaction involving forms of intervention short of, as well as including troop movements. In the years to come, such action-reaction patterns will determine whether superpower confrontations escalate to dangerous levels. It is important, therefore, to chart the patterns of U.S. - Soviet involvements in unfolding foreign disputes: during periods of U.S. dominance vs. relative equality; during periods of U.S. or Soviet expansiveness; and during periods of great mutual hostility and perceived threat vs. periods of detente.

A series of hypotheses concerning mutual superpower interventions can be derived from the observation that the Soviets and Americans have been extremely reluctant to escalate involvements in the face of probable confrontation with the other side.

"It would not be incorrect to contend that military conflicts occur only in situations where the superpowers are not directly confronting each other, or over which both of them do not feel an equally deep and intimate commitment so as to get directly involved at the same time and to the same extent." (7)

The trend throughout the "cold war" period has been to cooperate by conceding areas of greater interest to the superpower most concerned, not to confront the other superpower with major military forces, and to shy away even from joint "peacekeeping" offers, as in Suez (1956) or the Congo (1960).

Therefore, the following hypotheses seem plausible: and will be tested in this analysis for the years 1945-1975:

Hypothesis 1-- we would expect that when levels of superpower military involvement in a foreign dispute escalate and become more nearly equal, the tendency will be for one or the other superpower to retire from the fray and decrease its level of involvement significantly;

Hypothesis 2-- in periods when one superpower is clearly predominant in military capability, we would expect the inferior power consistently to back down in the face of mutual involvement, while in periods of rough superpower equality, we would expect the power with the least traditional involvement in the disputed area to give way;

Hypothesis 3-- if a superpower is undergoing a period of marked foreign expansiveness (in terms of foreign contacts, commitments, and the development of military forces capable of distant deployment) and internal industrial growth, we would expect it to challenge superpower opponents at higher levels of mutual intervention than during less expansive periods; however, ultimately it may still back down if confronted by superior military power or its opponent's strong traditional interest in the area; and

Hypothesis 4-- during periods of high mutual hostility and tension, we would expect superpowers to compete at much higher levels of mutual intervention, and to give way less frequently to opponents than during periods of relative detente. (8)

Operationalization of Key Concepts

The concept of intervention employed in this study encompasses the array of means by which a superpower can influence a target nation's policies. Thus, intervention will be broken down into various levels; conservatively, these levels will be interpreted as a nominal scale, although there is a general ordinal development from non-involvement to full scale military operations. Covert and overt intervention also will be distinguished for each level of involvement. Only US and Soviet governmental (as opposed to mercenary or private) interventions in the "Third World" will be considered. The intervention levels chosen for this analysis are as follows (9):

LEVEL NUMBER	INVOLVEMENT
0	Uninvolved
1	Diplomatic methods, including embassy activities
2	Propaganda and generalized threats
3	Planning or advisory participa- tion (including organized subversion)
4	Materials (including financial support)
5	Passive military support (over- flight rights, explicit threats, etc.)
6	Limited military support
7	Large scale military support
8	War

It will be assumed that interventions prior to 1965 occurred in a period of marked U.S. military superiority; that interventions between 1966 and 1970 occurred in a transitional period, with the U.S.S.R. gaining rapidly in projectable military power; and that interventions since 1971 have occurred in

a period of rough and developing equality. Periods of great U.S. - Soviet hostility and tension will be identified in conjunction with major crises, such as Korea, Berlin, and Cuba, and according to historical accounts of detentes.

Two measures of international expansiveness will be used: percentage of yearly growth in foreign trade and in military expenditure. (10) Trade represents expanded industrial, agricultural, or raw material production, leading to foreign sales and purchases-- an outreach to the external world. Military expenditures generally indicate that a government intends to prepare for conflictual encounters with other nations. (11)

Expansiveness measures, as well as measures of the intensity of U.S. - Soviet rivalry, can also be used to demarcate periods during the "cold war." For instance, Gamson and Modigliani have identified several phases according to major Soviet or American hostile or conciliatory actions; these will be used to measure superpower hostility and threat perception.

"The first short phase runs from the beginning of the Cold War to the announcement of the Truman Doctrine in March, 1947. This phase is characterized by relatively belligerent Western behavior and varied or erratic Soviet behavior. . .The second phase begins in 1947 and lasts until the beginning of the stalemate in Korea following full-scale Chinese entry into the war. It is characterized by relatively belligerent behavior and refractory responses by both coalitions. . .the Korean stalemate begins the third phase, which ends with the almost simultaneous interventions in the Suez and Hungary in October and November, 1956. It is characterized by relatively accommodative behavior and an unusually high percentage of conciliatory responses by both sides. . .The fourth phase begins with Suez-Hungary and ends with the Cuban missile crisis in October, 1962. . .Both sides tended to respond in a refractory fashion to a range of patterns; however the Soviet coalition also responded to Western belligerence in a conciliatory fashion on a number of occasions. . .The final phase runs from the Cuban missile crisis to the end of our analysis in November, 1963. The few interaction units here, like those of the third phase, reflect mutual accommodation." (12)

Expansiveness data also can be broken down by periods during the cold war, to compare to the Gamson-Modigliani periodization. Five major cold war phases can be identified in the trade and military expenditure figures. (13) The first phase, 1946-49, saw initially increased but then declining trade growth (military figures unavailable) for both countries. This trend was sharply, though only briefly broken from 1950 to 1955 by the Korean conflict. There followed relatively parallel U.S. - U.S.S.R. trade growth fluctuations from 1956-62, along with the beginnings of military build-ups by both countries in 1960. The 1963-69 period saw a levelling off of both countries' trade growth at roughly 10%, while military expenditure growth increased sharply, though not uniformly, in the Vietnam and post-Cuban missile crisis era. The final period saw a remarkably similar pattern in U.S. and Soviet trade growth, though with some divergence at the end, and a decline in rates of military growth to near zero percent-- this despite periodic scare headlines in both countries about the other's buildups.

Differences between expansiveness periods and periods identified

according to hostility levels by Gamson and Modigliani are noteworthy. The latter's first phase of marked hostility and political competition was not, on the whole, characterized by mutual expansiveness. Trade and military dislocations caused by the Korean War seemed to increase superpower expansiveness, but in Gamson/Modigliani's behavioral analysis, greater mutual conciliation prevailed. The post-Suez pattern was mixed in both analyses, with somewhat greater but fluctuating expansiveness and a breakdown of the brief "spirit of Camp David" detente. Detente returned in the 1960's following the missile crisis, but trade and military spending grew markedly at the same time. Any relationship would seem to be inverse, i.e., the greater the expansive pressure, the more general mutual conciliation and wariness in the two superpowers' behavior.

Finally, it appears unlikely that an expansive U.S. would have encountered a simultaneously expansive U.S.S.R. during these cold war periods. As reflected in the trade and military expenditure data from 1946-73, measures of U.S. and Soviet expansionist pressures were only moderately correlated (product moment correlations: .52 for yearly trade growth, and .42 for military expenditure growth). Furthermore, negligible correlation was observed between economic and strategic expansiveness, as reflected in low correlations between the trade of one power and the military expenditures of the other.

A full test of the four hypotheses listed above would require a large sampling of U.S. and Soviet interventions from each period since World War II. Because the action-reaction sequences in such intervention cases are complex and require detailed investigation, only a small sampling of selected cases from each period will be presented here. The cases were all selected from the Middle East, in order to provide some continuity of context. They include: the Turkish Straits conflict (1945-46); the Turkish-Syrian border dispute (1955-57); the Arab-Isaeli Six Day War (1967); and the Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War (1973).

COMPETITIVE INTERVENTION CASES

Turkish Straits Confrontation

The first case considered, and outlined in Table 1, concerns the "Turkish Straits" conflict of 1945-46. This case occurred during a period of unquestioned U.S. military superiority and atomic monopoly, though in a location which favored Soviet forces logistically. The new Truman Administration was, furthermore, engaged increasingly in a test of wills with Moscow regarding post-war relations in the Balkans and Asia Minor, including Iran. While the Soviet Union still reeled economically and militarily from the effects of war and disrupted international trade channels, both countries were, at least for a short post-war period, quite expansive. U.S. trade grew by 45%, for example, between 1946 and '47, with Soviet trade growth following at 34%.

We look for trends in mutual superpower intervention escalation or deescalation. Basically, in March 1945 the Soviet Union notified Turkey that it was dissatisfied with the arrangements of the Montreux Convention of 1939. Moscow feared that Turkey conceivably could seal off the straits leading to the Mediterranean, blocking Soviet vessels while permitting free wartime passage to nations hostile to Soviet interests. Stalin considered the Convention a "scrap of paper" which should be supplemented with "effective

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guarantees," conceivably such as stationing Soviet forces within range of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles under the type of long-term lease proposed during negotiations with Nazi Germany in 1940. Stalin's views on Montreux inadequacies had received relatively favorable hearings from Churchill and Roosevelt during the Moscow and Yalta conferences of 1944 and '45. (14)

In June 1945, the Soviet Union further demanded cession of Kars and Ardahan provinces, acquired by Turkey from the fledgling U.S.S.R. in 1918. The major Soviet oil port, Batum, was just beyond the border at Ardahan, and the Americans and British had been interested in the area during the war. While Britain reportedly urged Turkey to resist Soviet demands, the U.S., still reflecting Roosevelt's precepts and hopes for post-war Big Three cooperation, refused to become directly involved in the matter. The Straits issue had come to a standstill at the Potsdam Conference in June, although the powers generally followed the Yalta guidelines that the Montreux Convention needed revision and that the three powers would each conduct direct negotiations with Turkey. (15)

Thus, the initial U.S.S.R. post-war involvement in Turkey was on overt levels one and two (see levels outlined above). Indeed, Moscow evidently was proceeding along what it assumed to be a path approved at wartime summits to secure its age old interests in the Straits. It waited until August of 1946 formally to request revision of the Convention by Turkey. By that time, however, Soviet moves were no longer being interpreted in Washington as fulfilling wartime agreements, but rather as challenging those agreements and seeking control of such regions as the Middle East. (16).

Initial demonstrable U.S. involvement occurred on levels one, two, and three, in conjunction with Great Britain. President Truman wrote the Turkish government in August 1945 suggesting that an international conference be convened. Truman did not volunteer U.S. participation at the conference, but made clear that any agreement reached by the Black Sea powers would have to guarantee Turkey's sovereignty and independence.

The Soviet reply of August 7 maintained that the Straits' regulation was solely a matter for the Black Sea powers, and suggested that the U.S.S.R. and Turkey jointly organize the Straits' defenses. (17) Large scale Soviet troop mobilizations along the Bulgarian-Turkish border in October and November punctuated these suggestions. Turkey responded by escalating its own military build-up, further straining the post-war Turkish economy. However, even in the midst of these tensions, the U.S.S.R. also assured the Western powers, and hence the Turks, that no invasion was planned. (18)

Determined to prevent Soviet expansion, the U.S. moved both diplomatically and militarily in 1946, reiterating its support for a U.N. negotiated solution, but ultimately strengthening its rejection of Soviet terms by dispatching a task force into the Mediterranean as well. In so doing, Truman made his famous remark that, "We might as well find out whether the Russians are bent on world conquest now as in five or ten years." (19) In September the U.S. Navy announced the permanent stationing of what later became the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean (as early as February, naval "courtesy calls" had begun).

Soviet demands were largely dropped at this point in the face of diplomatic and passive U.S. military support for Turkey. Even in formally requesting revision of the Straits regime, the Soviets had not applied all

procedures for withdrawing from that regime. However, the Truman administration went on with the Truman Doctrine in 1947. Thus, a temporary show of support for Turkey was replaced by long-term economic and military commitments with which the Soviets could not compete. One consequence of these commitments, however, was that Moscow came to view Turkey not merely as a British client and potential impediment to the Straits, but as a U.S. outpost near the Soviet heartland. (20)

The initial U.S.S.R. intervention on overt level two was countered by American involvement on overt levels two and three. Moscow probed U.K., U.S., and Turkish reactions further by massing troops on the Turkish border, overt level five, as well as by reportedly seeking influence on the Turkish elections. Moving rapidly up the scale, Washington countered with interventions on overt levels two, three, four, and five. It was an expansive moment for American foreign policy as President Truman and the State Department perceived and portrayed a global Soviet threat rather than simply a regional conflict in which Britain could no longer prevail.

Several other major disputes complicated the decision-making in the Turkish confrontation. U.S. Middle Eastern involvement during the same period included interventions in Iran and Greece, and events in Turkey coincided with a Yugoslavian attack on two American aircraft. Modes of U.S. and Soviet interaction in Turkey and Iran were somewhat similar. The Soviets were in a stronger military position in Iran, with troops still stationed in the North in support of breakaway provinces. Yet the Iran crisis was settled largely through relatively adroit Iranian negotiations in Moscow concerning oil concessions and security issues. In both cases the Soviets applied political and military pressure as 1946 deadlines approached-- either for filing protests to the Montreux Convention (August) or for withdrawal from Iran (March) under wartime agreements. When the pressure was resisted, or even slightly and temporarily accommodated by local authorities as in Iran, the U.S.S.R. conveniently dropped the claims. (21)

Power was a crucial variable in the types of intervention employed. The U.S.S.R. was unable to compete with Americans in mobilizing economic or military supplies, and had to rely on rather crude threats of a large standing army. The mobility of the American navy proved a great advantage, but a naval strategy was also dictated by the rapid demobilization of American forces; the U.S. posture consisted mainly of symbolic military presence backed by huge financial resources.

The fact that military conflict did not result from the interventions indicates that the U.S.S.R., at least, did not regard the Turkish issue as worthy of the political, let alone the military risks involved. The Truman Doctrine had not yet been enunciated, and the Soviets evidently still valued and hoped for cooperation on spheres of influence in central Europe, a far more crucial area than either Turkey or Iran. (22)

Turkish -Syrian Border Dispute, 1955-57

Aside from the Korean war, which even included a brief hostile encounter as the U.S. bombed Soviet territory, there were relatively few competitive Soviet - American interventions outside Europe between 1942 and 1955, and certainly few in the Middle East. Gamson and Modigliani's description of developing tacit accommodation and conciliation, even in the midst of bitter propaganda, seems generally accurate. For example, the U.S.S.R. stayed mainly

on the sidelines, applauding but not intervening, during the British-American-Iranian oil nationalization crisis of 1952-53. Even when the Iranian army, with C.I.A. support, displaced Premier Mossadeq and reinstated the Shah, Moscow remained uninvolved, and relatively unconcerned during a subsequent crackdown on the Tudeh Party. (23)

The U.S. and U.S.S.R. were, at least in 1951, quite expansive in trade and military preparation, but the Americans were still afforded relatively wide latitude for intervention and even alliance building (the Baghdad Pact) near the Soviet border. The Soviets evidently merely tried to maintain businesslike relations with states penetrated by American influence, and to convince those states' leaders not to allow offensive operations against Soviet territory.

After 1955, however, Moscow leaders began to see more value in closer relations with Third World states. Their dealings with Egyptian President Nasser, and his successful offensive against the Baghdad Pact, convinced them that the Middle East was not simply a British-American stronghold. Moscow's more active and ardent support of non-aligned leaders resulted in new confrontations with the United States.

There was little growth in expansive pressure--trade or military spending-- in the first part of the 1956-62 period. Nevertheless, the cold war heated up again from Suez to Hungary, including the Turkish - Syrian border. As revealed in the Eisenhower Doctrine of January 1957, American policy had become highly responsive to any perceived Soviet Middle Eastern incursions. Already stung by Nasser's assertiveness, American leaders were alarmed at the prospect of Syria becoming a Soviet "satellite" which might further disrupt the Middle Eastern status-quo.

The gradual warming of Soviet - Syrian relations culminated in a Syrian delegation's visit to Moscow in July 1957, and a long term Soviet economic and military loan agreement for \$500-million. Syria turned to the Soviets for aid after U.S. offers-- for less money and at over twice the interest rate-- had proved unacceptable. Nevertheless, the Soviet agreement was controversial in Damascus, and touched off political upheaval among nationalist and pro-Soviet parties. (24)

American involvement developed one week after the Syrian - Soviet agreement, on August 13, as three U.S. diplomats were expelled from Syria. The evidence indicates that, as Damascus maintained, the three were trying to foment at least a change in Syria's military leadership, if not an outright regime overthrow. (25) The American diplomatic plot had undesired consequences, as President Quwatli conducted an extensive purge of government and military personnel. Pro-Soviet officials and officers took over vacated posts.

Perhaps in response to these moves, the U.S. dispatched Loy Henderson from the State Department to "assess" the Middle Eastern situation. The truth of Soviet claims that Henderson was sent to "organize an attack by Arab countries against Syria" is still open to conjecture, but clearly part of his mission was to align Turkey as an instrument for further U.S. intervention in the area. (26) Ankara had been warning of increased Soviet military aid to Syria since late 1956, had concentrated troops on its southern border in the spring of 1957, and played host to dissident Syrian exiles during the summer. (27)

Increased Soviet influence in Syria and Henderson's presence prompted Moscow's proposal to Britain, France, and the U.S. for a mutual agreement not to use force in the Middle East. The West had twice previously rejected the same offer. (28) Washington again brushed aside such proposals, this time with a military flourish. On September 5, Washington announced that military supplies would be airlifted to Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq. Eisenhower warned that Syria was in danger of violating the Eisenhower Doctrine, and positioned the Sixth Fleet off the Syrian coast. At the same time, Turkey began military maneuvers along the Syrian border, a traditional Turkish method of influencing Syria, employed already with success in April and May 1957 to discourage Syrian support to revolutionary elements in Jordan. (29)

Tension remained high throughout September. Soviet propaganda denunciations began on the 10th, and on the 13th the Kremlin issued a warning letter to Ankara. For maximal effect, Soviet forces along the Turkish border were mobilized, and on the 19th a naval squadron arrived on "courtesy call" at the Syrian port of Latakia. The U.S. responded with a series of objections to Soviet "intimidation" of the Turks. (30) Reports from Damascus indicated that Syria was preparing for immediate military action, with cancelled leaves, closed roads, and defense committee meetings.

Tension dissipated quickly in October as various parties seemed to tire of or see no further benefit in the confrontation. Khrushchev, perhaps in an effort to keep the issue alive or to stave off a Turkish attack, appealed to West European Socialist parties to help prevent aggression. (31) The Soviet leader was under considerable domestic pressure to consolidate control, and may have used the crisis to improve his image. Turkish Premier Menderes could have had similar domestic goals. (32) As late as October 16, perhaps emboldened by impending settlement, Secretary Dulles warned that in resisting a Soviet attack on Turkey, the U.S. would not consider U.S.S.R. territory a privileged sanctuary. (33)

Syrian leaders, by now uncomfortable with their role center stage in a Soviet - American confrontation, quietly began to negotiate a number of agreements eventually uniting their country with Egypt. This unification in 1958, and the arrival in Syria of Egyptian troops went far to reassure all sides that there was no need for further superpower involvement, and to diminish the role of Communists in the Syrian government.

Thus, again the superpowers escalated their confrontation only to overt level 5. The U.S. reached that level on September 7, and the Soviets on September 19, 1957. Unsuccessful in its initial intervention on covert level 3, the United States moved to overt levels 3, 4, and 5. In response, the U.S.S.R. moved from overt levels 4 to levels 5 and 2; explicit threats, passive military support, and propaganda campaigns were mounted in defense of the Syrians. The crisis moderated to level 1, with Soviet appeals to European Socialists; the U.S. countered with level 2 threats. Tensions abated amidst toasts, as Khrushchev announced the removal of Marshal Zhukov at a Turkish embassy reception in Moscow on October 29.

The United States seemed anxious to weaken Soviet influence in the area, and attempted to do so with a wide variety of diplomatic and military moves. The Soviet Union, wishing to enhance its Third World image and in the midst of a domestic power struggle, took up the challenge, but was somewhat more confined in its choice of options. Again, Moscow reverted to traditional

forms of pressure on Turkey. Khrushchev spoke of missiles flying and the situation getting out of control, but his behavior indicated a desire to defuse confrontations with a relatively militant Eisenhower Administration. Finally, it took an Arab initiative to break the deadlock.

Levels of involvement in the Syrian crisis were roughly comparable to those in other Middle Eastern crises in the same period. In Suez, both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. reached level 5 toward the end, with obliquely worded Soviet threats against Britain and France, U.S. counter-threats against the Soviets, and Washington's strong pressure on Britain and France. Far from materially aiding Egypt in the fighting, the Soviets reportedly removed many of their technical advisors and much military hardware once the Suez invasion began. (34)

Direct U.S. military intervention was mounted in Lebanon (and British intervention in Jordan) for a short period in 1958 (overt level 7) after the demise of the Iraqi regime, the cornerstone of the Baghdad Pact. The Soviet Union stood mainly on the sideline throughout, issuing veiled warnings to Turkey not to interfere with the Iraqi revolution, and calling for a five power summit and for U.N. debates on the Middle East (possibly leading to regional neutralization and arms control). (35) With significant Arab powers, such as Egypt, able to exert influence in the region, the main crises during this period, excepting Suez, were settled largely through inter-Arab or regional compromise, even in the midst of major power intervention.

Arab - Israeli War, 1967

The first portion of the 1963-68 period was relatively free of superpower confrontation in the Middle East. The region saw disputes among "radical" states, and between radical and conservative Arab states in such places as Yemen; Egypt went deeply in debt to the U.S.S.R. for military hardware, and a U.S. - Saudi military aid relationship was established. Both the superpowers were undergoing moderate expansionist growth; trade figures increased generally at between five and ten percent, and military expenditures grew rapidly after 1965. Military and advisory aid to their respective clients placed the superpowers as high as overt levels 3 and 4 even without face-to-face intervention in specific disputes. In the wake of the Cuban missile crisis, the powers were moving hesitantly toward stabilization of strategic relations and the beginnings of detente. Increasingly, the U.S. government became enmeshed in and preoccupied with Vietnam dilemmas.

The major powers were implicated directly as continuing Arab - Israeli disputes erupted into another international crisis in mid-1967. Guerrilla raids, conducted from strongholds in Syrian territory, prompted numerous Israeli retaliatory airstrikes in 1966 and early 1967. Israel's massive retaliation policy, aided by liberal doses of American military supplies, further isolated Tel Aviv from its Arab neighbors and precipitated a Syrian - Egyptian mutual assistance pact in November 1966.

On May 13, 1967, the Soviet Union evidently to solidify that pact and protect Syria, intervened at covert level 2, inaccurately informing President Nasser that Israel had concentrated 11 to 13 brigades on the border preparing for a massive attack against Syria. (36) Acting on this information, Nasser put Egyptian troops on maximum alert the next day, and the Cairo press warned that the defense pact would be honored if Syria were attacked. Moving troops toward the Sinai front, Nasser went on to demand the removal of U.N. troops

which had been stationed along the Sinai border since 1956.

The crisis intensified further on May 22, with an Egyptian blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba, a move met by a violent reaction in Tel Aviv, and implicating the United States which had reportedly promised Israel in 1956 that the Gulf would be kept open. President Johnson asked the Israelis not to take action against the blockade for 48 hours on the 23rd, and he warned Egypt that the blockade was illegal and dangerous. (37) U.S. ambassadors immediately undertook initiatives to settle the issue through U.N. and international negotiations.

The Soviets responded with warnings similar to Johnson's. The seriousness of the situation appeared to unite the Russians and Americans in an effort, including use of the newly established "hot line," to dissuade their respective clients from taking further action. In conversation with Premier Kosygin on May 22, President Johnson said:

"Your and our ties to nations of the area could bring us into difficulties which I am confident neither of us seeks. It would appear a time for each of us to use our influence to the full in the cause of moderation, including our influence over actions by the United Nations."

In joint consultation, the Israelis and Americans reportedly reached an understanding that the former would refrain from military action until all diplomatic channels had been exhausted; the President warned that support for Israel could be guaranteed only if no conflict were initiated: "Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go alone." (38) Diplomatic pressure by the U.N. Secretary General and others also produced an Egyptian promise on May 25 not to attack Israel. But additional Egyptian troops moving toward the Sinai front and increasing Egyptian boasts and demands intensified the crisis.

The Soviets and Arab states rejected U.S. proposals for a "cooling off" period, since it would entail opening the Gulf of Aqaba. As several Arab states pledged support to Egypt and placed military units under Egyptian command, Israeli leaders began to give up hope of peaceful settlement. U.S. leaders were aware of the mood in Tel Aviv, and sent the Sixth Fleet to monitor events. However, as Walter Lacqueur observed;

"On the eve of the war, Russia's hands were as much tied as America's. But there was also the understanding with America about non-interference by the super-powers. . .Moscow (like America) would envisage military action only if major, direct interests of the Soviet Union were concerned." (39)

On June 5, Israeli planes attacked and virtually destroyed the Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian air forces; the Six Day War was on. Moscow responded with a Security Council resolution proposing a ceasefire, but despite official agreement, fighting continued. Accusing Israel of ignoring the ceasefire agreement, Premier Kosygin, in a "hot line" message to President Johnson, warned of a possible independent Soviet decision to use military force if hostilities did not cease.

As in the Suez case and in subsequent Middle East wars, the Soviet Union issued relatively high level threats at the end of the 1967 crisis, especially when Syria seemed threatened with Israeli occupation. Unlike 1956, however,

there were no nuclear threats; the missile crisis experience seemed to heighten awareness of nuclear weapons' extreme dangers. In response to Soviet threats, the U.S. moved the Sixth Fleet to within 50 miles of the Syrian coast. (40) U.S. - Soviet tension eased, however, on June 10 as Israel honored the cease-fire under pressure from Washington.

Throughout the crisis and war period, the U.S. maintained overt intervention levels 1, 2, and 3, initially seeking diplomatic solutions and warning against aggressive action. As in prior Middle Eastern confrontations, the U.S. ultimately reached level 5, with deployment of the Sixth Fleet both to observe the Israelis (resulting in the sinking of a U.S. warship) and warn the Soviets. The Soviets also had moved to level 5, though with explicit military threats rather than deployments. Soviet moves evidently were more designed to pressure the Americans to restrain Israel than to confront U.S. forces. Moscow watched while vast quantities of its equipment were destroyed in the desert, and significantly, did not offer resupply of vital weapons such as planes until after the war was over. (41) The superpower game in the Middle East remained more political than military; the superpowers had established limits to their competition and clear mutual interest in restraining clients. However, neither proved capable of preventing clients from going over the brink of war. Finally, Soviet presence in Egypt and Syria was even greater after the disastrous war experience than in the pre-war period.

Arab - Israeli War, 1973

The most recent superpower political detente, from 1969-75, saw both powers averaging nearly 20% annual trade increases and neither power materially increasing its real defense spending. Thus, it was a period of commercial expansion, at least until the effects of petroleum price increases were felt, but also one of relatively equal military capability and generally declining tensions and stable military competition. In the midst of this detente, symbolized by the Helsinki Accords, came another major Middle Eastern war.

Prior to that October 1973 conflagration, both superpowers had continued to support their respective Middle Eastern clients with arms while attempting to facilitate negotiations. The Soviet Union became intricately involved in its first direct military intervention outside Eastern Europe in 1970, during the Israeli - Egyptian "war of attrition" along the Suez Canal. Soviet pilots reportedly flew missions in support of the Egyptian airforce, helping defend canal cities and strategic targets against Israeli bombing. (42) The close encounters of Israeli and Soviet forces seemed to chasten both sides, and led to more serious disengagement negotiations and a three year ceasefire.

This Soviet intervention at level 7 constituted a signal both that Moscow was serious about preventing the collapse of Arab clients, and that Soviet forces could now be more effectively deployed abroad at greater distances (indeed had to be so deployed in part to protect the more extensive Soviet naval fleet which lacked aircraft carriers). (43) This capability would be displayed further in logistical support of Cuban and East German interventions in Africa during the 1970's. The age of rough superpower military parity had dawned.

Moscow - Cairo relations were far cooler and more suspicious in 1973 than in 1970, however, as Sadat had swept aside a number of the pro-Soviet

advisors. While Soviet weapons, tactical support, and training were still needed, Soviet demands, restrictions, and counselling against war with Israel were not appreciated. The level of desired or permitted Soviet involvement in future disputes was uncertain, and the Egyptians made much of detente's potentially harmful effects on Arab interests. (44)

As with threats to Syria in prior crises, fighting between Israel and Syria in September 1973 engaged Soviet concerns and interests. Moscow finally agreed to Egypt's war plans, and somewhat stepped up its arms shipments (though still at levels thought not to threaten Israel strategically). Evidently the Soviets hoped that Vietnam, Watergate, and commitments to detente would keep America from intervening. (45)

However, the cautious Kremlin rulers did not embrace the idea of war with much enthusiasm until it became apparent that the Arabs stood a reasonable chance of success. After a successful initial attack on October 5, President Sadat later reported, the Soviets encouraged Egypt to accept a cease-fire after only six hours of fighting. On the war's third day, large quantities of weapons were finally dispatched to Egypt and Syria by air and sea, "the first time in an Arab-Israeli conflict that the USSR had aided the Arabs during the actual fighting." (46)

The U.S. reacted to war's outbreak by seeking immediate diplomatic solutions through the U.N. Nixon and Brezhnev exchanged communications on October 7 and 8, leading to the decision to ask for an immediate Security Council session. (47) When Soviet clients seemed to be losing badly in the 1967 fighting, Moscow had initiated ceasefire proposals; American leaders did the same while Israel reeled in the early fighting of 1973. Meanwhile, the U.S.S.R. opposed a ceasefire until Israel withdrew to pre-June 1967 borders, but quickly reversed itself when Israeli forces crossed the Canal into western Egyptian territory on October 16.

It is now well known that while attempting a diplomatic solution to the war and a territorial settlement, the U.S., with Henry Kissinger largely instrumental, held up resupply of Israeli forces. (48) Heavy domestic and Israeli pressure, and Egypt's unwillingness to embrace the ceasefire that Israel supported on October 12 finally convinced Nixon and Kissinger to authorize a massive airlift for Israel. (49) In addition to \$825-million in military assistance, and a Congressional request for an additional \$2.2-billion for Israel, the Sixth Fleet was suddenly noticeable in the conflict area, thus moving the U.S. once again to level 5.

While the stepped-up U.S. involvement brought on at least a nominal OAPEC oil embargo on October 17, it, along with a string of Israeli battlefield successes, also began almost immediately to have effects in Cairo and Moscow. On the 16th, Premier Kosygin arrived in Cairo evidently to urge a ceasefire; Egypt accepted on the 19th, convinced that the U.S. involvement doomed any further campaigns against Israel. (50) With the Egyptian army in imminent jeopardy, Kissinger was urgently invited to Moscow on the 20th and the two powers agreed on a ceasefire. Their clients fought on, however, with Israel nearly surrounding the Egyptian Third Army on the 24th. Cairo appealed to the superpowers jointly to send peacekeeping troops, a request promptly refused by Washington.

Apparently interpreting the U.S. refusal as designed to allow Israel greater strategic advantage, the Soviets raised the pressure on Washington and

Tel Aviv by dispatching transport planes to southern Soviet bases and by alerting and concentrating unusually large military forces in southern Soviet republics. The Soviet Mediterranean fleet also evidently was expanded. Shortly after the White House received intelligence reports of this military activity on the 24th, Brezhnev contacted Nixon with following message:

"I will say it straight that if you find it impossible to act together with us in this matter, we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally." (51)

It now appears that unilateral Soviet actions would have involved resupply efforts for the Third Army, rather than a combat military intervention, but responding to the uncertainties of the moment, Kissinger on behalf of Nixon, on the one hand placed American military forces on a world-wide high status alert, and on the other applied renewed pressure on Israel to halt their advances. As a diplomatic cover for the pressure on Israel, the nuclear alert was a grander move than Eisenhower's and Johnson's quiet use of the Sixth Fleet in similar circumstances. On October 25, the U.S.S.R. softened its position and agreed to support a U.N. resolution calling for a peacekeeping force composed of non-superpower troops. The proposal was subsequently adopted, and with Israeli forces finally stopped, the crisis ended in yet another military deadlock.

The Soviet Union was initially involved in this crisis at considerably higher levels than the U.S. (see Table 4), but with changing battlefield conditions and relatively uncontrollable clients, U.S. involvements escalated to overt level 5. A seemingly panicky Soviet move to level 5 brought about another American move at this level as well, along with serious diplomatic pressure for a settlement.

Conclusions

Perhaps because of the Middle East's peculiar geo-political characteristics and repeated conflicts, patterns of simultaneous superpower intervention have been remarkably stable over the years. During periods of hostility and detente, with U.S. military dominance or relative parity, in the midst of superpower expansiveness or retrenchment, the superpowers generally employed some form of overt threatening military move (at level 5) in each post-war crisis in the region. Only twice, in Lebanon, 1958, and during Soviet combat intervention in the 1970 war of attrition, did they venture beyond such tactics through 1975 (later the U.S. was to intervene again rather disastrously in Lebanon during the Reagan administration). Passive military involvements at level 5 generally were employed near the end of crises to reinforce diplomatic demands, often demands on clients, and the powers generally climbed down quite quickly.

While the overall patterns were fairly stable, competitive interventions varied enough among crises to lend credence to certain of the hypotheses under study. There was evidence that, as predicted in hypothesis 1, when level of superpower interventions became nearly equal, especially at high levels, one or the other power tended to withdraw or decrease involvements significantly. The Soviets tended to back away, albeit with some military flourish, in both Turkish crises when U.S. intervention reached level 5. Note that in the 1957 case, however, the U.S.S.R. escalated to that level after the U.S., and then eased back. In the two Arab - Israeli wars (1967 and 73), the U.S. seemed to

pull back somewhat in the face of stern Soviet warnings. Although both wars ended with each superpower at level 5, Washington also applied significant pacification pressures on its Israeli clients.

In a sense these findings also substantiate predictions in hypothesis 2, in that the militarily subordinate or less traditionally interested superpower tended to give way first. Prior to the mid-1960's, the U.S. tended to hold sway in confrontations, with Moscow probing and testing the crisis waters but dropping claims in the face of heavy resistance. Moscow was more traditionally interested in the area than Washington (though not necessarily than London), but faced unfavorable military odds. Washington had, of course, done its share of probing and provoking in the 1957 dispute by bringing heavy subversive pressure on Syria.

In the power transition and parity periods, however, both superpowers calculated the limits of confrontation carefully, and took the opponent's signals that these limits were being breached quite seriously. Crisis hot-line communications helped in this signalling. Note, however, that the stakes were higher in these last two crises than in those on the Turkish border since actual warfare had broken out. It was also politically easier for the U.S. than the U.S.S.R. to give way in 1967 and 1973, since its client ultimately was winning. Finally, it had also dawned on all parties that the Middle East was an especially dangerous region, with important interests of a number of major powers--including Europe and Japan--at stake. The superpowers were aware that disastrous escalation could result more easily in such a region than in places such as Africa, where more tangential interests and less superpower competition prevailed.

However, the conflict resolution impact of superpower fencing at level 5 in the Middle East must not be exaggerated, since in the Turkish Straits, Iranian, and Turkish border disputes the local participants themselves dampened the crises through shrewd diplomatic maneuvers. Pressures to find such solutions may have been heightened by superpower intervention, and major power diplomats coached their clients in ways to respond to outside pressures. Superpowers' presence also raised the dangers of Middle Eastern fighting and prevented clear-cut victories.

The Soviet Union indeed seemed somewhat bolder in its Middle East commitments and more credible in its threats once it had become a mature power in the mid-sixties. The dispatch of Soviet pilots in 1970 testifies to this new activism. However, the predictions of hypothesis 3, that powers would be willing to challenge at higher intervention levels during especially expansive periods, are only sporadically supported. The U.S. was relatively bold in establishing permanent naval commitments in the Mediterranean during crises in the 1940s, but the U.S.S.R., also undergoing expansion, was more reticent. The mid-fifties were not an especially expansive period for either power, yet the U.S. articulated and sought to apply the Eisenhower Doctrine in Syria and Lebanon. The superpowers were again rather expansive in the sixties, but while assertive in the 1967 crisis, shadowed each other cautiously, mindful of nuclear dangers, other commitments (Vietnam), and a nascent detente. Commitment levels were still limited to passive military support in 1973, a time of commercial if not military expansion (higher level Soviet intervention in 1970 had come during a far less expansive period). Thus, expansiveness seems to have little overall impact on intervention levels.

It was also hypothesized (#4) that periods of high tensions and

superpower hostilities would see the highest intervention levels and the least willingness to give way. This was clearly not the case regarding intervention levels, since all disputes saw level 5 involvements, regardless of tension levels; both the cold war era of 1958 and the detente of 1970 also saw level 7 interventions.

During the first detente era, shortly after the Korean War, there were no competitive Middle Eastern Interventions, but also few regional disputes to stimulate interventions. This may have been due partly to a rather effective arms supply limitation imposed on the region by the Western powers in the 1950 Tripartite Declaration, a limitation finally broken in the 1955 Czech - Egyptian arms deal. While the U.S. called for similar arms supply restraint in the 1960's (as Soviet commitments to Egypt soared), and the U.S.S.R. called for them in the 70's (as U.S. supplies soared), no agreement was reached, and the second detente period saw two bloody regional wars tempting superpower interveners. These wars' seriousness, and a changed superpower military balance, made the powers slightly less willing to give way during detente than predicted in hypothesis 4; yet understandings facilitated by detente and a new ease of crisis communication did temper their responses.

Thus, it appears that the level of mutual intervention and the prevailing superpower military balance have the greatest impact on willingness to escalate competitive interventions in crisis. Degree of conciliation in superpower relations also works marginally to dampen escalation. Degree of superpower commercial or military expansiveness and rate of growth appear to have little impact on crisis intervention. Clients' diplomatic inventiveness and sensitivity to superpower demands and overcommitment are also important components in ending crises before the powers become fatally entangled. Sometimes the powers will aim the bulk of their intervening weight against those very clients to restrain them and placate the opposing power.

Interpolating from these findings to the future is extremely problematic, but it appears (admittedly from a limited sample of cases in one region of the world) that the age of superpower parity has not fundamentally altered modes of superpower crisis intervention. It has, however, slightly emboldened the Soviets and made Washington somewhat more conscious of the need to back away from confrontation. The U.S. again reached levels 6 and 7 in its Beirut intervention of 1983, and the Soviets remained at level 4 in support of Syria. But even in defending his commitment of marines to support the Lebanese government and pave the way for peace talks with Jordan, President Reagan spoke of the proximity of the U.S.S.R. and the danger of confrontation if the marines' mission were widened. Washington also bombed Libya (level 7) in 1986 and Soviet advisors evidently remained in their barracks (probably after prior U.S. warning).

In this and other regions of the world (notably Grenada, Nicaragua, and Angola), the President may have hoped to embarrass the U.S.S.R. and its clients. However, by moving marines less than 30 miles from Soviet military personnel in Syria he increased the danger of confrontation. Yet even in the the 1980s, in the midst of the bitterest U.S. - Soviet relations since the early 1960's, and unprecedentedly large military buildups (expansiveness), at least some of the mutual restraint born of the nuclear parity period, if not earlier, is still in evidence.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Roger Wall, "Bipolarity, Bipolarization, and War: An Exploratory Study," paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association Midwest (Urbana, IL: November 1984).
2. See A.F.K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Knopf, 1968), chs. 8, 9, 13, and 14.
3. Richard Rosecrance coined the term "bimultipolarity" in 1966, and his description of a bimultipolar system, with remarkable prescience, described the detente era of the 1970's. He believed that the world still had not reached bimultipolarity in 1966, but was in a period of possible transformation. See Richard N. Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Future," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 10 (September 1966), pp. 314-27.
4. Studies have revealed that from 1948-67, the U.S. led the world in total foreign military interventions, with Britain second, Israel third, and the U.S.S.R. tied for seventh. But controlling for wealth, population, size, and geographic opportunity, the U.S. ranked from third (geographic opportunity) to 33rd (wealth) in interventions, and the U.S.S.R. roughly 33rd and 34th. See Frederic S. Pearson, "Geographic Proximity and Foreign Military Intervention," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 18 (Fall 1974), p. 444.
5. Choucri and North maintain that nations' population and industrial growth combine to create consumption demands that often cannot be met within internal boundaries. See Nazli Choucri and Robert C. North, Nations in Conflict (San Francisco: Freeman, 1975), p. 14. This "lateral pressure" conception is related to Organski's power theory, in that power for Organski is also a matter of size and population and industrial growth. In a personal communication to the author in October 1978, North maintained that since indicators of lateral pressure are so elusive and interrelated, it might be best to put the term aside for a while and concentrate on indicators of demands, capabilities, and external expansion. Prior efforts to measure and determine the effects of lateral pressure have, for example, shown that power variables in lateral pressure calculations had the greatest predictive effect on conflict behavior in Asia. See Frederic S. Pearson, Kenneth E. Rudd, and Robert A. Baumann, "Critical Analysis of Two System-Level Approaches to the Study of War," Papers: Peace Science Society (International), 27 (1977), pp. 59-66.
6. See for example, Frederic S. Pearson, "Trends in U.S. Military and Non-Military Intervention," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Section on Military Studies, International Studies Association, Carlisle, PA, 1974; Erich Weede, "U.S. Support for Foreign Government or Domestic Disorder in Imperial Intervention, 1958-1965," Comparative Political Studies, 10 (January 1978), pp. 497-527; and Bertil Duner, "The Many-Pronged Spear: External Military Intervention in Civil Wars in the 1970's," Journal of Peace Research, 20 (April 1983), pp. 59-72; and "Military Involvement: The Escalation of Internal Conflicts," Research Report 5 (Stockholm: Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 1980).
7. M. V. Naidu, Alliances and Balance of Power (New York: St. Martins,

- 1975), p. 146.
8. Assumptions developed from Choucri and North, op. cit., p. 20.
 9. Richard Cady and William Prince, Political Conflicts 1944-1966 (Ann Arbor: Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, 1974). Intervention levels have been modified, with some deletions.
 10. Data compiled for military expenditures include only the years 1949-1974; constant U.S. dollar figures were unavailable for 1946-48.
 11. Choucri and North dealt mainly with colonial expansion, since that was a prevalent form of control during the World War I era they examined. The expansiveness notion has been broadened to include superpower competition in the post-colonial era. In this connection, Midlarsky has argued that much foreign conflict can be explained as a desire to control events abroad and prevent the unexpected. As a state grows in power, interests in control grow apace. See Manus I. Midlarsky, On War (New York; Free Press, 1975).
 12. William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani, Untangling the Cold War. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), Ch. 7.
 13. Owing to space limitations, figures on trade and military expenditure have not been included in the paper. The figures are available by writing the author: Center for International Studies; University of Missouri-St. Louis; St. Louis, Missouri 63121-4499; U.S.A.
 14. See Ellis M. Zacharias, Behind Closed Doors (New York: Putnam's, 1950), pp. 122-23; James Beddie and Raymond Sontag, eds., Nazi - Soviet Relations (Washington: U.S. Department of State, 1948), pp. 256-68; and Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), p. 234.
 15. The Conference of Berlin (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), pp. 1496-97; Yergin, op. cit.; R. Daniell, "Turkey, Uneasy Buffer Between East and West," New York Times Magazine (April 27, 1947); and Herbert Druks, Harry S. Truman and the Russians, 1945-53 (New York: Speller, 1966), p. 116.
 16. Yergin, op. cit., p. 234.
 17. Yaacov Ro'i, From Encroachment to Involvement (New York: Wiley, 1974), pp. 35-36.
 18. George Harris, "The Soviet Union and Turkey," in The Soviet Union and the Middle East: The Post-World War II Era, ed. by Ivo Lederer and Wayne S. Vucinich (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1974), p. 27.
 19. Richard J. Barnet, Intervention and Revolution (New York: World, 1968), p. 103.
 20. Harris, op. cit., pp. 28-31.
 21. See Firuz Kazemzadeh, "Soviet-Iranian Relations: A Quarter-Century of Freeze and Thaw," The Soviet Union, ed. by Lederer and Vucinich, op. cit.,

- pp. 55-67; and Yergin, op. cit., pp. 179-92.
22. Harris, op. cit., pp. 28-31; and Robert G. Kaiser, Cold Winter, Cold War (New York: Stein and Day, 1974), pp. 42-43.
 23. Kazemzadeh, op. cit., pp. 67-71.
 24. See D. F. Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins, vol. II (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1961), pp. 888-89.
 25. Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 293-94.
 26. See The New York Times (October 10, 1957); and Seale, op. cit., pp. 298-301.
 27. Harris, op. cit., pp. 39-41.
 28. See The New York Times (September 5, 1957).
 29. See The New York Times (September 5 and 6, 1957); and Seale, op. cit., pp. 286 and 300.
 30. Fleming, op. cit., p. 889.
 31. Harris, op. cit., pp. 40-41.
 32. See Anwar Sadat, In Search of Identity (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p. 149; and Fleming, op. cit., p. 891.
 33. Harry N. Howard, "The Soviet Union in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan," in The Soviet Union, ed. by Lederer and Vucinich, op. cit., p. 145.
 34. Mohamed H. Heikal, The Cairo Documents (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1973), pp. 147-48.
 35. Harris, op. cit., p. 42; and Howard, op. cit., pp. 142 and 146-49.
 36. The New York Times (May 26, 1967).
 37. Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point (New York: Popular Library, 1971), p. 291.
 38. Ibid., p. 293.
 39. Walter Laqueur, The Road to Jerusalem (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 181.
 40. Johnson, op. cit., pp. 301-02; and Dan Caldwell, American-Soviet Relations From 1947 to the Nixon-Kissinger Grand Design (Westport, CN: Greenwood, 1981), pp. 66-67.
 41. Ibid., p. 68.
 42. Robert O. Freedman, Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970, 3rd ed. (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp. 40-41.

43. Ibid., pp. 32 and 40.
44. Ibid., pp. 134-35.
45. Ibid., p. 137.
46. Ibid., p. 146; see also, Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 251-53.
47. The New York Times (October 9, 1973).
48. Edward R. F. Sheehan, The Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger (New York: Crowell, 1976), pp. 33-34.
49. Insight Team of the Sunday Times, Insight on the Middle East War (London: Andre Deutsch, 1974), pp. 134-37; and Walter Laqueur, Confrontation (New York: Quadrangle, 1974), pp. 170-71.
50. Sadat, op. cit., p. 261.
51. Rubinstein, op. cit., p. 275.

Table 1

Turkish Straits

DATE	EVENT	LEVEL
March 1945	U.S.S.R. notifies Turkish Ambassador that Soviet - Turkish Friendship treaty will not be renewed without prior revision of Montreux Convention.	overt,1
June 1945	U.S.S.R. demands return of Turkish provinces of Kars and Ardahan.	overt,2
June 1945	Soviet propaganda campaign initiated against Turkish government, including unofficial territorial demands.	overt,2
July 1945	U.S. and Britain inform U.S.S.R. that the Straits issue is of international importance and should be decided by the U.N.	overt,1
August 1945	Truman advises Soviets that the U.S. will guarantee Turkey's sovereignty, and instructs Istanbul to ask for an international conference on Straits.	overt 2,3
Oct.-Nov. 1945	Soviets mobilize forces on the Turkish - Bulgarian border.	overt, 5
Feb. 1946	U.S. begins naval courtesy calls to Turkey. U.S. and U.K. help Turkey draft responses to U.S.S.R., and U.K. renews Anglo-Turkish security treaty.	overt,5 covert,3 overt,5
April 1946	U.S.S. Missouri returns Turkish Ambassador's remains from Washington; U.S. issues statement of support.	overt,2,5
June-July 1946	Soviets spend \$150,000 for propaganda efforts in Turkish elections.	covert,2,4
August 1946	Deadline for Montreux Convention revision; U.S.S.R. files formal request, mobilizes forces on Bulgarian border, and moves Black Sea Fleet.	overt,1,5
Sept. 1946	Major U.S. naval exercises and pledge to keep 6th Fleet on station.	overt,5
Mar. 1947	Truman Doctrine announced.	(overt,4)

Table 2.
Turkish-syrian Border

DATE	EVENT	LEVEL
July-Aug., 1957	U.S.S.R. loans Syria economic and military supplies.	overt,4
Aug. 13, 1957	U.S. diplomats expelled from Syria for subversive activities.	covert,3
Aug. 20, 1957	Loy Henderson dispatched to Middle East to assess Syrian situation.	overt,1 (and covert?),3
Sept. 5, 1957	U.S.S.R. proposes major power intervention pact. U.S. airlifts military supplies to Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq.	overt,1 overt,4
Sept. 7, 1957	U.S. threatens to implement Eisenhower Doctrine in Syria; moves Sixth Fleet off Syrian coast.	overt,5
Sept. 13, 1957	Bulganin sends letter warning Turkish Prime Minister not to interfere in Syria.	overt,5
Sept. 19, 1957	Soviet naval squadron arrives in Latakia, Syria.	overt,5
Sept. 20, 1957	Soviet Minister Gromyko warns U.S. not to use force in Syria.	overt,5
Oct. 7, 1957	Khrushchev warns U.S. not to interfere in Syria.	overt,5
Oct. 11, 1957	Khrushchev appeals to European Socialist parties to help prevent aggression in the Middle East.	overt,1
Oct. 16, 1957	U.S. warns of counter-attack if Soviets attack Turkey.	overt,2

Table 3
Six Day War

DATE	EVENT	LEVEL
May 13, 1967	U.S.S.R. sends Egypt false information on Israeli military build-up on Syrian border.	covert,2
May 23, 1967	U.S. advises Israel not to act militarily against Egyptian blockade for at least 48 hours, and warns Egypt of seriousness.	overt,3 overt,2
May 26, 1967	U.S. receives Minister Eban in Washington and convinces him to withhold military until diplomatic channels exhausted. U.S.S.R. advises Egyptian delegation in Moscow not to initiate military clash.	overt,3 overt,3
June 7, 1967	U.S.S.R. and U.S. draft cease-fire resolution in U.N., and apply diplomatic pressure on clients. U.S.S. Liberty attacked by Israeli torpedoes while monitoring war.	overt,3 covert,5
June 10, 1967	U.S.S.R. explicitly threatens Israel on disregard of cease-fire agreement. U.S. repositions Sixth Fleet off Syrian coast.	overt,5 overt,5

Table 4
1973 Arab - Israeli War

DATE	EVENT	LEVEL
Sept.-Oct., 1973	U.S.S.R. sends military supplies and technicians to Egypt in preparation for coming war.	covert/overt,3,4
Oct. 7, 1973	U.S.S.R. launches Middle East propaganda attack, and issues generalized threat to Israel.	overt, 2
Oct. 7-8, 1973	U.S. seeks diplomatic solution to Middle East conflict in U.N.	overt,1
Oct. 8, 1973	U.S.S.R. appeals to Arab states to support Egypt and Syria; U.S.S.R. begins airlift of additional military supplies to Egypt.	overt,1 overt,4
Oct. 12, 1973	U.S. advises Israel to accept cease-fire proposals in U.N.	overt,3
Oct. 13, 1973	U.S. begins massive airlift of military supplies to Israel; Sixth Fleet located within striking distance of Egypt.	overt,4 overt,5
Oct. 16, 1973	Kosygin arrives in Egypt to negotiate with Sadat.	overt,3
Oct. 22, 1973	U.S. and U.S.S.R. submit cease-fire proposal in Security Council.	overt,1
Oct. 23, 1973	U.S. and U.S.S.R. present second cease-fire resolution in Council.	overt,1
Oct. 24, 1973	U.S.S.R. moves forces and threatens unspecified unilateral action. U.S. places forces on world-wide alert and applies diplomatic pressure on Israel.	overt,5 overt/covert,3