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in Sub-Saharan African Subsystems

by

Frederic S. Pearson

and

Robert A. Baumann

ABSTRACT

While the search for the causes of international violence and war has generally been pursued globally, this study is based on analysis of regional political subsystems and the linkages between subsystem politics and the use of force. In this analysis, African military interventions are related to data on African regional conflicts, power balances, outside major power penetration, resource distribution, geography, and sub-system interaction. A list of more than one hundred cases of intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1960-84, by both regional powers and extra-regional powers, is included in an appendix.

DRAFT
NOT FOR QUOTATION

International Military Intervention in Sub-Saharan African Subsystems*

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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY INTERVENTION IN
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN SUBSYSTEMS

INTRODUCTION

The search for the causes of international violence and war generally has been pursued globally, with assumptions that general causes can be identified across time periods and the universe of countries in the world. Few researchers have distinguished among regional patterns of conflict or compared regions as to conflict potential. Yet there is good reason to assume that regional customs, ethnic and political disputes, norms, geography, and power balance profoundly affect occasions and decisions to use force.

Foreign policy analyses generally have shown that governments are most sensitive to perceived threats or interests close to home, especially if they lack -- as do most states -- the military power to project force to other regions. Research over the past 20 years indicates the importance of interactive regional/local subsystems in relation to the global system of competition among major powers.¹ Regional pressures can be expected strongly to condition security policy.

In a prior analysis, the authors have moved toward development of a regional model of international military intervention.² Such a model would predict interventions on the basis of regional characteristics such as power balances and geography. The regional model approach is based on analysis of regional political subsystems, and the linkages between subsystem politics and the use of force. Regional systems and subsystems are groups of intensely interacting states, largely preoccupied with each other in economic, political, or military exchanges (e.g., trade, diplomacy, or combat).³ States from outside the region or subregion can belong to such systems, but generally the interacting core is composed of neighboring states. In addition to power balances and geographic peculiarities, such features as level of

major power penetration, distribution of wealth and natural resources, development of norms and consultative or regulatory organizations, dominant conflicts and traditional rivalries can be seen as independent variables affecting the extent and types of military interventions in the region.

One of the most important and widespread forms of localized or regional international conflict, especially in the Third World, is international military intervention. Military intervention, i.e., the interposition of forces by one country inside another in the context of some political dispute, has taken on new importance as a conflict category in an era in which formal war declarations have become rare, in which domestic instabilities in many parts of the Third World constitute temptations for foreign powers to interfere, and in which the resources for prolonged international warfare may be scarce in various regions. Interveners generally seek to affect or control political outcomes inside the target state. Thus, intervention is in a sense a narrower concept than war, since it entails less sustained bilateral or multilateral combat. In a sense it is also a broader concept than war, since analytically interventions precede wars, but not all interventions become wars.

Among the hypotheses tested in the prior study of Middle Eastern interventions from 1948-80 were assumptions that: (1) intervention by major powers would be infrequent and by smaller regional powers frequent in regions subject to major power competition; (2) that regions dominated militarily by a single regional power would witness numerous interventions by that power, while bipolar regions would experience few interventions, and multipolar regions would experience many interventions from diverse sources; (3) that multipolar regions would have more friendly (prop-up the target government) than hostile interventions; (4) that regions with large deposits of natural

resources would experience great penetration and competition by major powers, but more regional power than major power interventions; (5) that uneven distributions of regional wealth would lead to friendly interventions to shield the richer states; (6) that clear major power commitments to regional clients tend to shield such clients from interventions; (7) that high rates of arms transfers to the region lead to high levels of regional intervention; and (8) that severe regional conflicts lead to more interventions by major and regional powers.

It was found that Middle Eastern military interventions were most strongly conditioned by prevailing regional disputes and by the pattern of major power competition in the region. Arms supplies also facilitated more interventions by certain regional powers. However, regional power balances did not appear to have consistent impacts on overall intervention patterns, and natural resources seldom appeared the major reason for intervention. Major powers intervened in the region primarily in periods of less intense major power competition; bipolarity among regional powers (as between Egypt and Israel) generally did not deter interventions by major or by regional powers if the stakes were perceived as high. During periods of regional multipolarity, friendly interventions seemed to predominate over hostile ones. Finally, major power base commitments had some, though not invariable, deterrent effects on potential interveners.

Some hypotheses were supported and others contradicted by the Middle Eastern experience. Analyses must be extended to other regions for comparison, and to identify regional characteristics bearing on intervention which might have been overlooked. Africa differs from the Middle East in a number of important respects. First it is a continental region, with wide geographical, ethnic, cultural, and political diversity -- in other words a

much larger system which must be divided into several regional subsystems (Western, Central, Eastern, Southern, regions below the Sahara). Africa also is composed mainly of new nation-states, emerging from a long colonial history (as did most of the Middle East) and a rich tradition of local kingdoms and empires which for much of this millenium have been suppressed and placed outside the "mainstream" of Euro-Asian centered international politics. In other words, "modern" African political traditions are only just emerging, while Middle Eastern political cultures evolved, partly through nearly continuous foreign contact and imperial rivalries, for centuries. If African nation-states and political cultures themselves are new, their approaches to the use of force internationally cannot yet have been fully formed. Africa's strategic thinking has been affected by other regions, but will continue to reflect significant local adaptations.⁴

AFRICAN SUBSYSTEMS

Military intervention by one African state in the affairs of another is itself only a very recent phenomenon, originating mainly in the mid to late-1970s. Prior to that time, major powers had intervened in the region, but African leaders had been very reluctant to violate a norm of non-intervention established in the early 1960s to safeguard hard-won sovereignty. Even in the 1980s, the non-intervention norm persists, although in an evidently weakened form.⁵ Changes in African political and economic subsystems across the two decades may account for this pattern of slowly increasing intervention.

Many aspects of the African international system, or systems, have endured, while some have been significantly modified across the three post-independence decades. In the mid-seventies, Zartman listed several system characteristics: (1) lack of a "core" or overwhelmingly powerful state

or group of states to hold the regional system together (in contrast to Brazil and Argentina, for example, in Latin America); (2) growing inter-African, and especially subregional interaction -- with very important interactions still taking place outside the region; (3) abortive subregional organizations and integration, due to insufficient commerce, communications, transportation, and technology; (4) only rare intervention by one subregion or subregional leader in the politics of another sub-region; (5) coalitions dominated by former colonial ties and ethnic affinities; (6) ideological political coalitions, but with ideologies subject to change by personalist leaders, and with no inflexibly binding alliances or blocs; (7) a balance of power structure until 1963, giving way to a concert system, with the promotion of conflict settlement through mediation and diplomatic intervention by notable leaders through the OAU when consensus can be achieved; (8) nation-states severely underdeveloped and developing less rapidly than those in other regions, with a growing gap between richer and poorer African states; (9) states subject to political disintegration, and characterized by ethnic, linguistic, and cultural pluralism; (10) struggles against heavy odds for independence and dignity by dominated populations in the southern portion of the continent; (11) severe natural hardships, including draught and famine; (12) only peripheral roles and interests for actors outside the system, including the major powers.⁶ In a prior study Zartman had listed several norms which also characterized the system: (1) "intra-system solutions [are] preferable over extra-system solutions;" (2) wars of conquest are not acceptable alternatives; (3) states shall not interfere in each other's internal affairs.⁷

Among the systemic changes which must be noted over the last decade are the gradual emergence of certain subregional power centers. Although Zartman remains essentially correct that despite size differentials, no African states

(except South Africa) are able to dominate their neighbors militarily and politically, Nigeria, Zaire, and South Africa, among sub-Saharan states, represent substantial centers of commerce, military potential, and resource abundance. The former two have not exceeded the latter in wealth, as Zartman predicted they might by the 1980s, but have the population size and resource base to play the Brazilian/Argentinian role in the future. In addition, certain other states have accumulated locally significant economic (Ivory Coast, Zimbabwe, Gabon, Cameroon, Kenya) or military power (Ethiopia, Somalia, Tanzania, Angola). However, East Africa, the Horn, and Central Africa (despite Zaire's and Ethiopia's potential) remain regional subsystems without a single core or polar power.⁸

Furthermore, beginning with the Angolan revolution, the US and USSR increasingly have brought the cold war to the continent as well. Powers such as Britain, Portugal, Spain, and China appear largely to have bowed out of all but economic and diplomatic contacts, but France and Belgium have remained militarily active, and the US, USSR, East Germany, Cuba, and North Korea have become increasingly active. Also as noted earlier, ethnic, linguistic, ex-colonial, and ideological ties no longer characterize African coalitions as much as in earlier decades.

One of the major systemic changes has been the decline of continentalism as a political watchword, and the increasing importance and preoccupations of geographic subsystems. During the first post-independence decade in the 1960s, two large blocs of states -- frequently styled as radical vs. moderate, the Casablanca and Monrovia or Brazzaville groups, coalesced in the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU -- formed in 1963). This organization institutionalized recognition of existing national borders and a non-intervention imperative for both African states and outside powers. OAU

mediation and diplomatic pressure helped dampen and/or resolve boundary disputes between Algeria and Morocco and among Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia. Kwame Nkrumah's interventionist threats in West Africa also met stiff OAU diplomatic opposition and were dropped; despite temptations, no external military intervention -- disregarding aid -- took place in Nigeria's civil war. This was the heyday of African continental unity and consensus.

However, the vast increase of independent African states, together with severe world economic pressures (oil prices, saturated markets, "stag-flation," etc.), and varying impacts of regional conflicts and extra-regional actors seemed to erode continentalism and unity in the 1970s.⁹ Particularly, severe political and military disputes in the Horn and Southern Africa drew foreign interveners, produced scores of destitute refugees, and proved relatively intractable for OAU settlement, although the Organization continued to promote accommodations in less severe disputes and to pressure for limits to larger ones. African states seemed to move in various directions to establish relations with non-African patrons. Some suffered major regime changes; gaps between "have" and "have-not" states widened. Leaders such as Siad Barre of Somalia, and even Tanzania's venerable Julius Nyerere found the OAU a continuing barrier to foreign intervention, but in spite of pan-African ideals, many leaders concentrated on survival in increasingly violent local disputes and accommodated various foreign interests for aid.

In comparison to the Middle East and pan-Arabism, then, pan-Africanism led to a more assertive and egalitarian political institution, (the OAU compared to the Arab League), but proved to have less profound impact on governments' security calculations. Arab states cannot long ignore their unity myth, even in light of severe disunity, since the myth has long fostered

interference and even intervention in neighboring states' affairs. The pan-African myth tended to foster non-interference.

Although subsystem preoccupations emerged, the coherence and stability of subsystems may have diminished in the 1970s. Institutions such as the East African Common Market and the African and Malagasy Common Organization (OCAM) were perpetuated with relatively high hopes during the 1960s, but disillusionment subsequently set in. Partly this was due to poor economic performance and prospects, partly to ideological and political disputes, as between Uganda and Tanzania, and partly perhaps to the declining importance of ex-colonial "club" ties. Although OCAM states continue to maintain close ties to the former metropole in France, a number of former French and British territories began to break down cultural and linguistic barriers, and to establish dialogue based on geographic proximity, shared problems, and needs.

New organizations again were formed in the mid-1970s, when the oil price revolution created richer core states, such as Nigeria, around which smaller neighbors could gravitate regardless of former colonial ties, as in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). However, such coalitions' underpinnings have proved as flimsy as their predecessors, as the sharp economic downturns of the 1980s already have brought about growing acrimony over such issues as foreign labor. South Africa's racial and interventionist policies also seemed to spur the formation in 1980 of the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC), to provide alternate economic and technological options for the nine black African member states. Intricate intervention patterns in Southern Africa make it perhaps the most focussed of the regional subsystems. But the success of organizational efforts there also remain to be seen.¹⁰

Another of the OAU's original missions was to prevent renewed colonial

interventions in Africa, and preclude the need for the type of dangerous and embarrassing rescue operations undertaken by major powers and multilateral organizations in the Congo during the 1960s. The weakness of African regimes provides temptation and demands for intervention to topple or bolster the incumbents. Obviously, intervention by non-African states continues into the 1980s. Africans often defend such interventions as not violating the OAU ethic, since interveners generally have come at the request and in defense of incumbent regimes facing severe threats. However, multipartite interventions in Angola and Zaire since 1978 have strained these rationalizations, as have some French interventions, as in Gabon, 1964 and the Central African Empire, 1979.¹¹

Zartman has argued that the African regional system has become somewhat more "autonomous," i.e., resistant to major power military intervention, throughout the 1970s; African states themselves had begun to intervene more in security disputes. But the region has been subject to growing economic penetration, and Soviet-Cuban interventions toward the end of the decade reversed the autonomy trend somewhat. Economically, while the region is highly dependent on "Northern" industrialized markets and suppliers, classic "dependencia" theory does not quite apply because African states tend to rely increasingly on multiple contacts rather than on single economic patrons - even ex-metropoles. African trade levels, both intra- and extra-regional, remain disturbingly low, and states increasingly have sought--though often in vain--external foreign aid and trade from multiple sources.¹²

The persistence and evolution of subsystem characteristics, some of them entailing extremely harsh living conditions and political insecurity, have increased the region's conflict potential and put severe pressure on non-intervention norms. With domestic conditions deteriorating in most

African states, the frequency of military coups d'etat has increased, and the occasions for political interference, harboring of dissidents, irredentism, counter-coups, and intervention have increased as well. Additionally, the Angolan, Mozambiqan, and Zimbabwean revolutions, along with Namibian insurgency and domestic unrest have compounded South Africa's insecurities, while presenting new states and coalitions which South African strategists seek to manipulate.¹³ Zartman also notes that in addition to intervention as a newly emerging response to African state collapse, absorption of territory now has precedent (eg., by Libya from Chad). This means that although there is still consensus on the preferability of intra-system solutions to African problems, on the importance of sovereignty, on the illegitimacy of South Africa, and on the undesirability of war, existing systemic norms, including respect for boundaries and unwillingness to negotiate with South Africa, may be losing sway.¹⁴

REVISED HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY

In this study, the major hypotheses tested in the Middle Eastern system and listed above will be reexamined in the African context. In addition, some of the assumptions and assertions in the African politics literature will be formalized and evaluated as hypotheses relating to intervention: (1) since political and social instability leads to outside intervention, most African interventions take place in states suffering from the most disintegration and domestic disruption; (2) since economic dislocation leads to political instability and conflict, most African interventions also take place in states with the worst economic performance, highest indebtedness, and least adequate food production; (3) states suffering high degrees of domestic instability will also be among the region's most frequent foreign interveners, partly to compensate for these instabilities; (4) intervention will most frequently be

undertaken by the region's most militarily powerful states, or those with clear major power backing; (5) most superpower military interventions will be related to the proximate presence of the other superpower, while most interventions by mid-sized non-African powers (such as those in Europe) will be related to threats to traditionally dependent African regimes.¹⁵

To test these hypotheses, a list of interventions in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1960-84, by both regional and extra-regional powers, has been developed (see Appendix A). Military interventions are defined operationally as the movement of troops or forces of one government across an international boundary, in the context of some political dispute.¹⁶ Intervention incidents and trends will be related to data on African regional conflicts (domestic and international); power balances; outside major power penetration, commitment, and competition; resource distribution; geography and subsystem interaction. Trends will be contrasted for: (1) the early post-independence period up to the Nigerian civil war (a conflict which resulted in the reinforcement of the state sovereignty principle in 1970); (2) the economic and political disillusionment period of the 1970s, including the era of higher oil prices and growing sub-regionalism, and ending with Angolan and Zimbabwean revolutions; and (3) the contemporary period (1980-84) of environmental/economic crises and South African upheaval and offensives. Among a variety of indicators, military expenditures will be taken as one measure of power balances; military bases, arms transfers, and security agreements will indicate major power penetration and commitment; "strategic minerals" lists will be used to measure resource distribution; armed attacks and coups will indicate domestic disruption; literacy, health, nutritional and GNP levels will indicate economic well-being; and diplomatic exchanges and trade will indicate subregional interaction.

Findings

As seen in Table 1 and Appendix A, the pattern of African interventions changed markedly across the three time periods. In the 1960s, interventions were concentrated almost exclusively in Central Africa, and especially in Zaire (then the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Congo Kinshasa). Most of the 28 interventions were carried out by outside major powers or by colonial powers (interventions by UN peacekeeping forces are not included) trying to hang onto territories by attacking neighboring hostile states. All of the former, major power interventions were meant to prop-up the target government, except when France reversed a Gabonese coup d'etat in 1964. All of the colonial interventions were hostile to the target.

During the decade of the OAU's formation, therefore, Sub-Saharan African states themselves undertook only seven interventions -- two by Ghana, two by South Africa, and one each by Nigeria, Ethiopia and Somalia -- indicating, though, that Zartman's dating the dawn of African state intervention as the 1970s is a bit late. Most of these were "friendly" to the target government, except for Ghana's incursion into Upper Volta in 1963, and Somalia's into Ethiopia in 1964 to press territorial claims. Only the most established -- i.e., oldest, largest, and/or governmentally best organized independent African states undertook interventions in the 1960s, as they alone had the requisite organized forces and foreign policy ambitions.¹⁷ Finally in only three interventions during this period were independent intervener and target in the same subregion, although several of the colonial interventions were among neighboring states. In general, long range intervention predominated, with twenty mounted by non-African (non-continental) states.

During the 1970s the intervention total swelled to 65 (with 57 in independent states), of which over half (36) were undertaken by Sub-Saharan

states themselves. This growth rate of 500% in regional interventions far exceeds the growth in the number of independent African states, from 27 in 1960 to 48 in 1975.¹⁸ Extra-African interventions, still numbering 18, did not die out as much as regional interventions increased. Furthermore, the growth of subregionalism is reflected in interventions within the same subregion. As in the 1960s, Central Africa led the way with about a third of the interventions, but the geographic spread was much broader, with each subregion the site of at least nine interventions. West and Southern Africa had the most active interveners, but East and Central Africa were not far behind. While most interventions in the 60s had been friendly to the target, 45% were hostile during the 70s. Altogether, this indicates greater African military preparation and willingness to risk opposing or even trying to bring down (e.g., Tanzania into Uganda) neighboring states.¹⁹

Territorially vast and resource rich Zaire continued, as in the 60s, as the most intervention prone target, with a variety of multilateral efforts to prevent secession. The end of Portuguese colonialism in Angola, and ravaging Ethiopian wars sparked the other major intervention hot-spots. In the process, the USSR and Cuba undertook their first major Sub-Saharan interventions, the U.S. and Belgium maintained an interventionist tradition in Zaire, and France remained the leading major power intervener. South Africa remained the most interventionist African state, but numerous other active interveners emerged, including Guinea, Uganda, Zaire, Gabon, and Rhodesia (in its last throes), all with two or more interventions. From North Africa, Morocco and Libya emerged as major interveners as well.

The fast pace of African interventions has slowed slightly during the first half-decade of the 80s, with 17 interventions through 1984 (and South African moves into Botswana and Angola in 1985).²⁰ In addition, 70% of these

have been undertaken by Sub-Saharan states, and in 65% intervener and target were in the same subregion. Southern Africa remains the most self-contained subregion of intervention, as nearly 80% of interveners and targets there since 1970 both have been inside the subregion. In general, intervention by non-African states has died off dramatically, although two North African states continue to intervene below the Sahara. The riddled polity of Chad attracted 7 of the 17 incursions in the early 1980s (as well as a tripartite OAU peacekeeping force), displacing Zaire as the most intervention-prone state. As in Zaire, most were attempts to bolster the existing government or expel hostile (Libyan) forces. Therefore, Central Africa remains the primary intervention venue, closely followed by West and Southern Africa, the latter subregions also producing the most active interveners.

Hypotheses Testing

Turning first to hypotheses relating to system structure, it was predicted that as major power political and strategic competition in the region increased, direct major power intervention would decrease due to deterrence, to be replaced by regional power intervention. If, despite the difficulties of estimating the value of regional arms agreements,²¹ arms supplies are taken as an indicator of major power interest and competition, the findings in Table 2 would at least cast doubt on the hypothesis for Africa. During the period of highest arms supply competition -- the 1960s -- major power intervention was most frequent. Major power intervention diminished in the 1970s as the USSR came to dominate African arms supplies, at least according to ACDA estimates. Much of the Soviet increase was accounted for by the Ethiopian and Angolan wars, which also brought direct Soviet and Cuban intervention.

If viewed according to supply patterns with individual states rather than

total value of deliveries, however, the region appeared less dominated and more competitive in arms supply during the 70s than the 60s. Twenty-one (out of 37) states were in sole or dominant supply (over 60%) relations with a single arms supplier in the 1960s, but only 16 (of 42) were as dependent in the 70s. Twenty-one sub-Saharan states had established multiple supply relations. Hence, the reduced overall level of major power intervention would appear to fit this increased arms supplier competition pattern, but the possibility of mere coincidence in these findings cannot be ruled out. The Soviets were willing to intervene militarily in the 70s, but the level of US as opposed to European arms competition had diminished markedly. Therefore, Moscow may have perceived less danger of direct US-Soviet confrontation than in the 60s. As seen below, however, the growth of intra-African interventionism was probably spurred more by the overall increase of arms suppliers and supplies than superpower interventionism was decreased by them.

The second systemic hypothesis related to the deterrent effect of regional power competition, and particularly the likelihood of interventions by a dominant regional military power or in the midst of a multi-polar regional system. Data on size of African armed forces and military expenditures, two measures of military power, indicate that Sub-Saharan Africa was basically tripolar in the 1960s, multi-polar in the 70s, and tripolar in the 80s. South Africa and Nigeria each spent more than \$100-million on the military in 1965, and Ethiopia and South Africa each had more than 50,000 men under arms.²² It was predicted that in bipolar systems, few interventions would be risked by regional powers, i.e., deterrence would prevail. Indeed, the 60s witnessed very few African interventions. However the two or three dominant powers of that period were geographically very far apart, and although Nigeria helped in Tanzania, and Ghana in Zaire, they were unlikely to

send troops great distances to stop each other from intervening. Other African states were too weak to help much in multilateral or collective security; non-African states were imported through the U.N. for that duty (as in Zaire). Therefore, it seems unlikely that regional deterrence limited the number of regional interventions. In fact, regional states undertaking intervention (Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, Ethiopia) were among the states with the largest armies or defense budgets in 1965 (only Somalia did not fit the pattern).

In the 1970s (1975), Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa, and Zaire all had over 50,000 troops. South Africa and Nigeria stepped up military spending to over \$1-billion, and Angola, Ethiopia, Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire -- all involved in hot local conflicts -- each spent in excess of \$100-million. As predicted for multipolar systems, the number of interventions by local powers mushroomed, and outside powers continued their pace. Any deterrence between Nigeria and South Africa did not prevent the latter from undertaking six interventions, nor even small regional powers like Burundi, Mali, Upper Volta, and Gabon from undertaking hostile interventions.

The system reverted again toward tripolarity (Nigeria, South Africa, Ethiopia) in the 80s (1979 measurement), although Tanzania and Somalia remained highly mobilized and the Ivory Coast and Kenya at least temporarily joined the ranks of big military spenders (over \$200-million). None of this seems to have had much deterrent effect on the emerging trend of regional and subregional intervention, which has seen only two new interventions by powers not on the African continent. Therefore, the hypothesis is not clearly supported.

The evidence also does not support the prediction that multipolar systems will yield the most friendly (i.e., bolster the target government)

interventions. While the 1970s saw 29 such interventions, compared to 16 in the tripolar 60s and 6 in the tripolar 80s, the proportion dropped from 57% of all interventions in the 60s to 45% in the 70s and 35% in the 80s. The trend is toward greater hostility to intervention targets regardless of the system structure.

Africa is a region rich in natural resources, and it has been predicted that as outside powers become interested in and compete for such resources, they will deter each other, leave interventions mainly to regional powers, and intervene mainly in a protective ("friendly") role for the best endowed or wealthiest regional states. In general "strategic resources" seemed highly relevant in only a few African interventions (Table 3), clearly in Zaire and possibly in Zambia, Upper Volta, Angola, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Kenya, Ethiopia and Chad, where Nigeria was rumored to be interested in Lake Chad oil deposits in 1983.

Twenty-seven of the 48 independent Sub-Saharan states have, or are thought to have more than negligible deposits of at least one category of highly valued natural resources. Of these 21 have sustained interventions, with 36 friendly and 33 hostile (of the regional total of 51 friendly and 45 hostile). Therefore, a bare majority of interventions in resource rich states were friendly to the government, and the bulk of friendly interventions were in well endowed states. But an even higher percentage of hostile interventions also had such targets. The 73 total interventions (including neutral affect) in such states represented 66% of all post-war African interventions (a proportion higher than the 56% share of such states among independent African states). Non-African powers undertook 31 of these interventions, but this was less than half of the total; the majority of such interventions were by regional powers as predicted. Still, nearly 80% of

non-African powers' (and over 75% of Sub-Saharan states') interventions in the region were in states (regional powers' interventions in phosphate rich Spanish Sahara are not counted here) with important resources. Two-thirds of these non-African powers' interventions in states with important resources were friendly to the target. Therefore, the hypothesis has mixed evidentiary support.

The friendly or neutral interventions in Zaire generally fit the hypothesis, though eight were by major non-African powers, four of them even in the period of major power arms competition in the 60s. British and French moves into Uganda, Zambia, Gabon, Chad and the Central African Republic in the 1960s also contradicted predicted major power restraint, but few regional powers were strong enough to substitute for majors in "protecting" African resources in those years. As the Soviets gained arms predominance in the 70s, Angola's oil resources (and their American extractors) came under Cuban protection -- though the Soviet bloc did not directly benefit from such resources nor try to deny them to the West. Western powers also ventured four more Zairian interventions, and France remained active in the C.A.R. and Chad.

Therefore, the level of major power arms competition did not have much effect on major power resource interests and protective interventions; political competition more than resource endowments probably conditioned Soviet intervention in Ethiopia as well as Angola. France maintained a relatively constant interest in African resources such as uranium, regardless of Soviet or U.S. competition. South Africa, among the best endowed in natural resources, required no protective interventions, and indeed went on a security intervention binge of its own in the 70s and 80s, perhaps filling in at times for more reluctant Western powers as the hypothesis might imply. Other well endowed states - Zaire, Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, Uganda, Nigeria, Guinea

(Morocco and Libya if we extend discussion to North Africa) also proved to be as much interventionist as intervention-prone. Perhaps this is in part an anticipatory interventionism designed to stave off future threats to the homeland's resources.

On the question of the intervention immunity offered by major power commitments to regional clients, Table 4 shows that in countries with major military power bases only two hostile interventions by major powers other than the base owner took place -- both due to colonial conflicts: Portugal in Senegal and France into Somalia, despite the respective French and Soviet bases. Two more major power hostile interventions took place in states granting military transit or visitation rights to a major power -- again both related to colonial uprisings (Spain into Equatorial Guinea, and Portugal into Guinea, both Soviet clients). Israel raided Uganda in 1976 despite Sudanese and USSR aid agreements. Three Portuguese colonial interventions into Zambia and Malawi, states with no bases or commitments, rounded out the total of 10 hostile non-African power interventions. Fifty percent of these occurred in states with at least some military commitments by other major powers, and last ditch colonial interests or risks to hostages seemed to be the factors negating deterrence.

Major power commitments seemed to work somewhat less well in deterring regional power intervention. Twelve hostile interventions by regional powers took place in states granting major power bases or military visitation, while 21 took place in states with no such commitments. Of the latter, four targets had at least some military agreements with major powers (for example Mali intervened in Upper Volta despite that state's long standing cooperation and defense treaty with France). Thus, over 50% of hostile regional interveners ignored at least some major power ties to the target, and about one-third

ignored actual physical presence of major power forces. Aside from Chad, Upper Volta, and briefly Senegal during Portuguese colonial days, French clients seemed somewhat more immune to hostile intervention than Soviet and Cuban clients; the few states with U.S. commitments generally had few hostile interventions but plenty of domestic warfare.

Regional defense, security, or friendship pacts also provided only limited protection from hostile intervention. Of the 18 states entering such pacts since 1960, seven (39%) still suffered at least one hostile intervention during the term of the agreement. By contrast, nearly the same proportion (36%) of states without regional pacts also suffered hostile interventions. South Africa ignored the deterrent signals of its five "frontline" African neighbors to mount frequent raids in the 70s and 80s, and Nigeria's agreements with Benin did not prevent that very country from forcefully pursuing its border dispute with Lagos.

In order to explain the patterns of African intervention and non-intervention, MacFarlane and Zartman referred to political disruption, economic dislocation, military power imbalances, subregional interaction, and major power competition. While each of these seem relevant to troop movement, closer analysis shows support for only certain hypotheses.

Looking first at political disruption and fragmentation, it seems that domestic armed attacks and insurgencies (through the 1970s, as measured in the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators) frequently (26% of the time) led to outside military intervention (see Table 5). Looked at another way, over 50% of the years in which African interventions took place followed years of high civil disruption in the target state -- so that most African interventions related to such disruption (although the majority of disruption did not lead to intervention). This fits patterns discovered by the authors

for worldwide interventions from the 1940s to the 1960s.²³

According to MacFarlane, states also are likely to compensate for high levels of domestic disruption by undertaking foreign intervention. This does not appear to happen very frequently, however; in only 16% of high domestic disturbance years did the disrupted state subsequently undertake an intervention abroad. Finally, there is also little evidence that African interventions exacerbate domestic disturbances in the target state (as interventions appear to do in other regions); only 10% of high domestic disturbance years followed interventions, and 30% of intervention years preceded high levels of domestic disturbances in the target state.

MacFarlane pointed to ethnic rivalries as the strongest correlate of intervention in 1970s.²⁴ The expanded data in this study do not contradict that finding. In general, most African international disputes since 1960 have not resulted in intervention among the disputants, but approximately 40% have. Of these, ethnic and political insurgencies were present in almost one-half the cases (see Table 6), and 57% of such insurgencies spawned intervention. By contrast, only 23% of border and territorial disputes sparked intervention. Colonial disputes, which themselves often involved ongoing insurgent liberation movements, also were prime issues for intervention.

While armed anti-government attacks by organized groups distinctly related to receipt of foreign intervention, other forms of political upheaval, such as coups d'etat or government takeovers, did not. The product moment correlation between coups and receipt of foreign intervention for the 1960-84 period was .18, and that between coups and initiation of intervention was -.01. This is not to say, of course, that individual takeovers -- such as the deposition of Ugandan President Idi Amin -- have not been highly dependent on external interventions (in this case, by Tanzania).

MacFarlane rightly points out that political fragmentation in Africa is exacerbated by "catastrophic" economic conditions. One would expect, therefore, that states with the poorest economic conditions also suffer the most foreign intervention. However, the actual correlations (Table 7) are weak at best, though generally in the predicted direction. African countries' Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI), debt interest load, and food production indices for the 1970s all account for only between two and five percent of the variance in interventions received or initiated.

Military power is perhaps the best predictor of intervention initiation. There is a clear and strong correlation (.72) between arms imports (1975) and number of interventions initiated between 1960 and 84, and (.71) between military expenditures and such initiatives. Size of armed forces correlates more modestly at .33. Obviously, the activities of a state such as South Africa condition these findings, but other big arms spenders such as Somalia, Nigeria, Uganda and Zaire also were active interveners. While certain notorious intervention targets, such as Ethiopia, Angola, and Zaire also spent heavily on arms to stave off threats, there was no overall tendency for military preparation to attract or evidently to repel foreign intervention (see Table 7).

The influx of arms into Africa during the 1970s, therefore, is highly associated with the expansion of regional intervention, though it was also in part caused by that expansion as states sought to bolster their defenses. The increase of African insurgencies, attracting so many interventions, probably also contributed to the demand for arms, in a complex cause and effect sequence accounting for intervention.

Major powers have supplied arms to Africa for a variety of reasons, including both economic and strategic interests (for the US and USSR, as

opposed to France or Germany, probably more the latter). Sometimes arms supplies to favored clients serve as a substitute for direct major power involvement; in other instances (eg., Ethiopia and Angola) such supplies are concomitant with direct intervention.

Legum accurately distinguishes among the situations likely to spark regional or major power intervention in Africa: (1) regional violence -- which spills across state boundaries when: (a) one state fears that its security would be jeopardized by domestic conflicts in nearby states; (b) when strong neighbors seek to subvert each other by supporting clandestinely insurgencies or communal dissidents; (c) when a state tries to exert leverage on another by supporting anti-government groups abroad; or (rarely) (d) for issues of principle (as perhaps in the overthrow of Amin); and (2) major power intervention directly to confront other major powers as opposed to attempts to control or manipulate regional violence or protect favored clients.²⁵

It appears that major (mainly Western) power interventions of the 60s still aimed to produce friendly regimes, or hang onto disputed territory. Major powers shied away from direct confrontation (as in sending UN forces to the Congo), and the USSR was in no position to intervene vigorously. With increased African autonomy, arms, and international violence in the 70s, major powers appear to be playing a more reactive game, shoring up existing regimes not so much to preserve strongholds as to preclude other major powers or ambitious hostile regional powers from gaining footholds. Hence a more powerful USSR chose to relinquish ties to Somalia in order to complete the ouster of the U.S. from Ethiopia, and moved to aid MPLA in Angola when the Zairian-South Africa-PRC interest in UNITA/FNLA emerged.²⁶ France moved to preserve the territorial integrity of Zaire and Chad, but probably without much hope that either would become an exclusive French preserve -- rather more

to stave off a chaotic fall of these territories into potentially hostile hands.

Africa is still no one major power's preserve, and not yet of primary major power concern. While Angola brought Washington, Moscow, and Peking dangerously close to direct competitive intervention, restraints held, and other less overt forms of confrontation were devised. It is difficult, though possible, to envision a direct confrontation over a crumbling South African regime as well. The powers shadow each other in Africa, indeed staying in close proximity, but so far not with simultaneous troop commitments. In this, the French are somewhat less evidently preoccupied with Cuba and the USSR than with local and Libyan threats to French interests. All non-African powers still seek local leaders and factions to back rather than warring with other non-African powers.

It was also predicted that the most intensively intra-active subregions would also produce or attract the most interventions. We have seen a growing inwardness about African subregional intervention, a tendency for increased intervention within subregions. This corresponds to Zartman's findings about progressively increasing subregional trade and diplomatic visits. Looking in more detail at the most recent trends, during the 1980s West Africa has emerged as the most intra-active and interlinked area, for instance with 57% of Africa's within-subregion diplomatic visits (26% of all African visits), and 59% of Africa's pairs of state's trading over one percent of one state's total trade (76% of such pairs trading within the same subregion).²⁷ However, during this period Southern Africa led the continent in subregional interventions with five, with West Africa next with four (Central Africa led in total interventions). Central and East Africa had two and one within subregion intervention respectively -- yet East Africa had more diplomatic and

trade exchange than Southern Africa (the trade data excluded a number of Southern states). These rough indicators imply that diplomatic and trade exchange, i.e., the development of more coherent interactive subsystems, neither shields states from nor exposes them especially to local intervention. Again, military power levels and political grievances would seem to weigh heavier than these structural factors.

Conclusion

In Africa, a region of severely disrupted polities and economies, military interventions are undertaken mainly and increasingly by the militarily strongest, though not often the economically soundest states. Targets are frequently poor, in political turmoil, and comparatively resource rich. Non-African states continue to intervene in the region, and maintain a limited competition for influence. African interventions have become more frequently hostile to the target government, with fully half of these hostile actions concerning on-going insurgencies and domestic disputes. African states frequently and increasingly strike against those perceived to be harboring dissidents or supporting subversion. Territorial disputes linger, and have been involved in 39% of the hostile interventions as well.

Therefore, if one wishes to strengthen African organizational or political machinery to reduce the level of armed international intervention and violence, it would be well to concentrate on arms control, on either strengthening existing regimes or increasing dialogue and compromise among regimes and their opponents, and on resolving border issues through third party mediation.

The African system structure is becoming increasingly segmented, with West Africa emerging as the most coherent subsystem gravitating around the Nigerian and Ivorian core states. Yet economic downturns, unless reversed,

could abort this process within the decade. Interventions too are more prevalent within subregions -- especially Southern and Western Africa. However, other aspects of system structure, including major power competition and regional pact building seem less related to intervention. Major power commitments to regional clients do appear to deter other major powers from hostile interventions in those client states, though.

Whether by design or accident, both major and regional powers confine over 70% of their African interventions to relatively resource rich states. The economic and resource potential of states such as Chad, Ethiopia, or Zaire might help explain why so many African interventions have had such pitifully poor targets. Direct control of the wealth or resources is a less conspicuous intervention motive than efforts to prevent disintegration of states which could afford advantages to other interveners.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Michael Banks, "Systems Analysis and the Study of Regions," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 12 (1968), pp. 335-60; Larry W. Bowman, "The Subordinate State System of Southern Africa," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 12 (1968), pp. 231-61; Leonard Binder, "The Middle East as a Subordinate International System," World Politics, Vol. 10 (1958), pp. 408-29; and Michael Brecher, "International Relations and Asian Studies: The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia," World Politics, Vol. 15 (1963), pp. 213-35.
2. Frederic S. Pearson and Robert A. Baumann. "Toward A Regional Model of International Military Intervention: The Middle Eastern Experience." Arms Control, Vol. 4, No. 3. (Spring 1984), pp. 187-222.
3. See Pearson, "The Dynamics of 'Middle Eastern' Conflict," General Systems Yearbook, Vol. 19(1974), pp. 103-115.
4. It has been argued that African elite perception and orientation on such dimensions as national identity, economic development strategies, international affect, global and regional alignment will determine the overall foreign policy orientation of the states. See W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, "A Theoretical Framework for the Research and Analysis of the Foreign Policies of African Countries," paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Los Angeles, March 1980.
5. Zartman argues that the norm remains very significant, while MacFarlane points to its continuing erosion. See I. William Zartman, "Issues of African Diplomacy in the 1980s," in Africa in the Post-Decolonization Era, ed. by Richard E. Bissell and Michael S. Radu (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1984), pp. 137-55; and S. Neil MacFarlane, "Africa's Decaying Security System and the Rise of Intervention," International

- Security, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Spring 1984), pp. 127-51.
6. Zartman, "African Regional and Subregional Systems," unpublished version and as "Africa," in World Politics: An Introduction, ed. by James N. Rosenau, Kenneth W. Thompson, and Gavin Boyd (New York: The Free Press, 1976), pp. 569-94; and "Social and Political Trends in Africa in the 1980s," in Africa in the 1980s: A Continent in Crisis, ed. by Colin Legum, I. William Zartman, Steven Langdon, and Lynn K. Mytelka (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), pp. 69-119.
 7. Zartman, "Africa as a Subordinate State System in International Relations," International Organization, Vol 21 (1967), pp. 559-61; and International Relations in New Africa (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966); for commentary see S. Neil MacFarlane, "Intervention and Security in Africa," International Affairs, Vol. 60 (Winter 1983/84), pp. 53-56.
 8. Zartman, "Social and Political Trends," op. cit., pp. 96-100; and "The OAU in the African State System: Interaction and Evaluation," in The OAU After 20 Years, ed. by Yassin El-Ayouti and I. William Zartman, (New York: Praeger, 1984), pp. 25-27.
 9. Though Zartman argues it would be a mistake to consider Africa as a whole no longer a coherent political region. See Zartman "The OAU in the African State System," Ibid., pp. 13-14.
 10. Zartman, "Issues of African Diplomacy . . .," op. cit., pp. 144-49.
 11. Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "Pax Africana and its Problems," in Africa, ed. by Bissell and Radu, op. cit., pp. 174-75; and Pearson, Robert A. Baumann, and Gordon Bardos, "Arms Transfers: Effects on African Interstate Wars and Interventions," paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Il., September

1987.

12. Zartman, "The OAU," op. cit., pp. 14-19.
13. See MacFarlane, "Decaying," op. cit., pp. 129-35.
14. Zartman "Issues," op. cit., 143-44; and "The OAU," op. cit., pp. 28-29.
15. See MacFarlane, "Decaying," op. cit., pp. 127-35.
16. This definition includes both the movement of troops across a border as well as actions by troops already stationed in the target country. Covert military or para-military aid or operations are excluded. If initiated in the context of some dispute (and performed by regular military personnel, aircraft, or vessels), small arms fire, shelling, bombing, or strafing across borders is counted as military intervention. The provision of military transports is counted as intervention if the transports are flown by regular military personnel and are being used to transport troops. The transport of material alone is excluded. Unless there is some dispute, random unexplained fire across borders, or minor border incursions are considered accidental and excluded from the data set.
17. These findings, and the changes in subsequent decades, fit patterns discovered for the Third World in general by Istvan Kende and for Africa by Henry Bienen. See Harvey Starr and Benjamin A. Most, "Patterns of Conflict: Quantitative Analysis and Comparative Lessons of Third World Wars," in The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World, Vol. I, ed. by Robert E. Harkavy and Stephanie G. Neuman (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1985), p. 40.
18. As one measure of the growth of interaction opportunities over this period, Starr and Most reported that total borders between African states increased from 163 in 1960 to 276 in 1975. Again, though, the percentage of growth would not appear to account fully for the intervention growth

- rate. See Harvey Starr and Benjamin A. Most, "Contagion and Border Effects on Contemporary African Conflict." Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1 (April, 1983), p. 103.
19. Military preparedness evidently plays a crucial role. MacFarlane has noted that Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for only 3.5% of Third World arms imports in 1968, but rose to 32%, according to ACDA figures, in 1978. See MacFarlane, "Intervention and Security . . .," pp. 62-63.
 20. The trend of findings, including the increase of inter-African intervention, agrees with those of MacFarlane, though evidently because of definitional differences, approximately 40 more interventions were recorded here since 1975 than in MacFarlane's data. See "Decaying Security System," pp. 146-47.
 21. On difficulties involved in such calculations, see Bruce E. Arlinghaus, Arms for Africa: Military Assistance and Foreign Policy in the Developing World, especially Joseph P. Smaldone, "U.S. Arms Transfers and Security-Assistance Programs in Africa: A Review and Policy Perspective," (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1983), pp. 179-220.
 22. MacFarlane, "Intervention and Security . . .," pp. 70-73 and U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade 1963-1973, Washington, D.C.: 1975.
 23. Frederic S. Pearson, "Foreign Military Interventions and Domestic Disputes," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1974), pp. 259-90.
 24. MacFarlane, "Security System," op. cit., p. 133.
 25. Legum, et.al., eds., Africa in the 1980s, op.cit.
 26. Ibid., pp. 46 and 48.
 27. Trade data derived from International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade

Statistics (Washington, DC: May 1985) for only those African states for which yearly trade figures were available from 1979-84; diplomatic data derived from Africa Contemporary Record Annual Survey and Documents, 1981-82; Africa Research Bulletin, 1981-84; and Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1981-84.

APPENDIX A
MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN AFRICA,^A
1960 - 1984

Period I (1960s)^B

<u>Start Date</u>	<u>Intervener</u>	<u>Target</u>	<u>End Date</u>	<u>Affect</u>
1/60	France	Cameroon		F
11/67	France	Central African Republic		F
8/68	France	Chad		F
8/63	France	Congo (B)		F
3/69	Spain	Equatorial Guinea		H
2/64	Somalia	Ethiopia		H
2/64	France	Gabon		H
4/64	US	Gabon	4/64	N
1/64	UK	Kenya		F
X/66	S. Africa	Portugal (Angola)		F
X/67	S. Africa	Rhodesia	12/79	F
4/63	Portugal (from Portuguese Guinea)	Senegal	X/73	H
1/64	UK	Tanganyika		F
3/64	Nigeria	Tanganyika		F
1/64	UK	Uganda		F
5/69	Sudan	Uganda	X/69	N
4/63	Ghana	Upper Volta	X/65	H
7/60	Belgium	Zaire		N
11/64	US	Zaire		F
11/64	Belgium	Zaire		F
7/67	Ghana	Zaire		F
7/67	US	Zaire		F
7/67	Ethiopia	Zaire		F
1/64	US	Zanzibar		N
1/64	UK	Zanzibar		N
12/65	UK	Zambia		F
7/66	Portugal	Zambia	12/66	H
3/68	Portugal	Zambia	70	H

Period II (1970s)

<u>Start Date</u>	<u>Intervener</u>	<u>Target</u>	<u>End Date</u>	<u>Affect</u>
3/75	Zaire	Portugal (Angola)	X/76	N
8/75	S. Africa	Portugal (Angola)	11/75	N
10/75	Cuba	Portugal (Angola)	11/75	N
11/75	Cuba	Angola		F
11/75	USSR	Angola		F
11/75	S. Africa	Angola	3/76	H
11/75	Zaire	Angola	X/76	H
7/76	S. Africa	Angola	X/81	H

Period II (1970s) cont'd.

<u>Start Date</u>	<u>Intervener</u>	<u>Target</u>	<u>End Date</u>	<u>Affect</u>
X/77	Guinea	Benin		F
X/75	Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)	Botswana	X/76	H
X/79	S. Africa	Botswana		H
5/72	Zaire	Burundi	5/72	F
1/79	Zaire	Central African Republic		F
9/79	France	Central African Republic		H
6/73	Libya	Chad		H
7/77	France	Chad		F
4/78	France	Chad		F
3/79	Nigeria	Chad	5/79	N
4/79	Libya	Chad		H
8/79	Morocco	Equatorial Guinea		F
4/72	Gabon	Equatorial Guinea	11/72	H
7/77	Somalia	Ethiopia		H
12/77	Cuba	Ethiopia		F
12/77	USSR	Ethiopia		F
3/78	Cuba	Ethiopia		F
11/70	Portugal (from Portuguese Guinea)	Guinea		H
X/79	Guinea	Liberia		F
5/73	Portugal (from Mozambique)	Malawi		H
12/74	Upper Volta	Mali	7/75	H
7/77	Morocco	Mauritania	X/78	F
X/77	France	Mauritania	X/78	F
6/76	Rhodesia	Mozambique	10/79	H
X/71	Guinea	Sierra Leone	6/73	F
X/79	Guinea	Sierra Leone		F
2/76	France	Somalia		H
2/78	Ethiopia	Somalia		H
11/75	Morocco	Spain (Spanish Sahara)	2/76	N
1/76	Mauritania	Spain (Spanish Sahara)	2/76	N
2/76	Algeria	Spain Spanish Sahara)	2/76	N
8/71	Uganda	Tanzania	X/71	H
9/72	Uganda	Tanzania	X/72	H
6/73	Burundi	Tanzania	X/73	H
X/78	Uganda	Tanzania	X/78	H
2/76	Somalia	France (Territory of the Afars and Issas)		H
12/71	Sudan	Uganda	12/71	H
7/76	Israel	Uganda	7/76	H
10/78	Tanzania	Uganda		H
3/79	Libya	Uganda		F
12/74	Mali	Upper Volta	7/75	H

Period II (1970s) cont'd.

<u>Start Date</u>	<u>Intervener</u>	<u>Target</u>	<u>End Date</u>	<u>Affect</u>
X/77	Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)	Zambia	2/78	H
X/78	Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)	Zambia		H
X/79	S. Africa	Zambia		H
4/77	Morocco	Zaire	4/77	F
4/77	France	Zaire		F
4/77	Uganda	Zaire		F
5/77	Egypt	Zaire	5/77	F
5/78	Belgium	Zaire	7/78	F
5/78	France	Zaire	6/78	F
5/78	US	Zaire		F
6/78	Morocco	Zaire	8/79	F
6/78	Senegal	Zaire	7/79	F
X/78	Togo	Zaire	7/79	F
6/78	Gabon	Zaire	7/79	F
4/77	Zambia	Rhodesia		H
12/79	S. Africa	U.K. (Zimbabwe)	3/80	F

Period III (1980s)^C

<u>Start Date</u>	<u>Intervener</u>	<u>Target</u>	<u>End Date</u>	<u>Affect</u>
7/81	S. Africa	Angola	4/84	H
12/84	S. Africa	Angola		H
1/80	Congo (B)	Chad	3/80	N
3/80	France	Chad	5/80	N
11/80	Libya	Chad	11/81	F
4/83	Nigeria	Chad	6/83	H
6/83	Libya	Chad		H
7/83	France	Chad	X/84	F
7/83	Zaire	Chad		F
10/80	Senegal	Gambia	11/80	F
X/81	Senegal	Gambia		F
12/82	S. Africa	Lesotho	12/82	H
10/81	Morocco	Mauritania		F
1/81	S. Africa	Mozambique	12/83	H
X/81	Benin	Nigeria		H
6/82	Ethiopia	Somalia		H
4/82	S. Africa	Zimbabwe	4/82	H

- A. Does not include interventions in North Africa, i.e. Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and United Arab Republic.
- B. The U.N. joint peacekeeping force in the Congo, 1960-64 was not included. Countries sending troops as part of that force include: Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Ireland, Liberia, Mali, Morocco, Sweden, Tunisia, and United Arab Republic.
- C. The OAU joint peacekeeping force in Chad, December 1981 - June 1982 was not included. Troops from Nigeria, Senegal, and Zaire took part under OAU Command.

TABLE 1
AFRICAN SUBREGIONS^A AND INTERVENTION^B

1960s

	West	Central	Southern	East	Total
Targets	2	13	4	8	27
Interveners	3	0	2	2	7
Target and Intervener in same subregion	1	0	1	1	3

Totals for 1960s: 28 interventions^C
20 interventions by non-African states

1970s

	West	Central	Southern	East	Total
Targets	9	21	13	14	57
Interveners	10	7	11	8	36
Target and Intervener in same subregion	6	4	9	6	25

Totals for 1970s: 65 interventions^C
18 interventions by non-African states

1980s

	West	Central	Southern	East	Total
Targets	4	7	5	1	17
Interveners	4	2	5	1	12
Target and Intervener in same subregion	3	2	5	1	11

Totals for 1980s: 17 interventions^C
2 interventions by non-African states

A. Subregions:

West: Benin, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Spanish Sahara, Togo, Upper Volta.

Central: Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Zaire.

Southern: Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Reunion, South Africa/Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

East: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda.

B. Includes only interventions into or by independent countries.

C. This total includes non-independent targets.

TABLE 2

i. Arms Transfers to Sub-Saharan Africa
(in millions of U.S. \$s, current)

	<u>1964-1973</u>	<u>1976-1980</u>
Supplier:		
U.S.	226	245
U.S.S.R.	205	3985
France	300	875
U.K.	173	275
PRC	74	NR
FRG	42	140
Canada	17	NR
Czechoslovakia	14	60
Italy	NR ¹	525
Poland	NR	60
Switzerland	NR	60
Yugoslavia	NR	85

ii. Relationship of Arms Recipient Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa To Arms Suppliers²

Number of Arms Recipient Countries with:

	<u>1963-1973</u>	<u>1976-1980</u>
1. Multiple Suppliers	8	21
2. Dominant Supplier:		
U.S.	1	1
U.S.S.R.	4	9
France	7	2
U.K.	0	0
PRC	1	0
FRG	0	0
3. Sole Supplier:		
U.S.	1	0
U.S.S.R.	1	3
France	3	0
U.K.	1	1
PRC	1	0
FRG	1	0

SOURCES: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade 1963-1973 (Washington, D.C.: 1975) and U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1971-1980 (Washington, D. C.: 1983).

1. NR-not reported.

2. These categories of supplier relationships are from Robert E. Harkavy, The Arms Trade and International Systems (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1975), pp. 104-105. Harkavy defines the categories as follows:
 "1. Sole supplier relationship--where a single donor has supplied all of the weapons received by a given recipient. 2. Principal or dominant supplier relationship--where a single donor has supplied 60 percent or more, on the average, of all weapons systems or is the primary supplier of most all of them. 3. Multiple supplier relationship--where no one supplier has transferred over 59 percent of the weapons acquired by a given recipient nation."

TABLE 3
STRATEGIC MATERIALS^A

	Number of Strategic Materials	No. of Times Target, 1960-84:			By Non-African Powers	No. of Times Intervener, 1960-84
		Friendly	Neutral	Hostile		
South Africa & Namibia	21	0	0	0	0	13
Zaire	16	16	1	0	8	5
Rhodesia-Zimbabwe	16	1	0	2	0	4
Zambia	10	1	0	5	3	1
Madagascar	8	0	0	0	0	0
Nigeria	8	0	0	1	0	3
Ghana	5	0	0	0	0	2
Ethiopia	4	3	0	2	3	3
Ivory Coast	4	0	0	0	0	0
Kenya	4	1	0	0	1	0
Mozambique	4	0	0	2	0	0
Sierra Leone	4	2	0	0	0	0
Gabon	3	0	1	1	2	2
Guinea	3	0	0	1	1	4
Uganda	3	2	1	3	2	4
Cameroon	2	1	0	0	1	0
Central Africa Republic	2	2	0	1	2	0
Congo, People's Rep. (Brazzaville)	2	1	0	0	1	1
Niger	2	0	0	0	0	0
Rwanda	2	0	0	0	0	0
Angola	1	2	0	5	2	0
Botswana	1	0	0	2	0	0
Burundi	1	1	0	0	0	1
Chad	1	3	1	4	5	0
Lesotho	1	0	0	1	0	0
Mali	1	0	0	1	0	1
Upper Volta	1	0	0	2	0	1
Totals		36	4	33	31	45

A. Includes the following strategic materials: Antimony, Beryllium, Cadmium, Chromite, Cobalt, Columbium, Germanium, Hafnium, Indium, Lithium, Manganese, Mercury, Molybdenum, Nickel, Platinum group metals (platinum, palladium, rhodium, iridium, ruthenium, osmium), Rhenium, Selenium, Tantalum, Tellurium, Titanium, Tungsten, Vanadium, Zirconium, plus the following other minerals: Aluminum metal or ore (bauxite), Petroleum (crude) and/or natural gas, Gold, Diamonds, Silver, Copper, Tin, Zinc, Ruby, Uranium, and Sulfur.

SOURCES: Rae Weston, Strategic Materials: A World Survey. London: Croom Helm, 1984 and U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, various annual volumes.

TABLE 4

Military Commitments by Major and Regional Powers in Sub-Saharan Africa

	Bases	Overflight or Transit Rights	Military or Friendship Pacts (Date)	No. of military interventions by outside powers and (no. hostile)	No. of military interventions by regional powers and (no. hostile)
Angola	0	0	USSR (1976-) Cuba (1976-) Zambia, Botswana Mozambique, Tanzania (1978)	2 (0)	5 (5) 1970s-80s
Benin	0	USSR (1977)	France (pre-1975) Nigeria (1978)	0	1 (0) 1970s
Botswana	0	0	Zambia, Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania (1978)	0	2 (2) 1970s
Burundi	0	0	France (1980-)	0	1 (0) 1970s
Cameroon	0	0	France (1960s-)	1 (0) 1960	0
Central Africa Rep.	France (1979-)	-	France (1960s-)	2 (1) 1967 & 1979	1 (0) 1960s
Chad	France (1979)	0	France (1960s-)	5 (0) 1 in 1960s	8 (4) 1970s-80s
Comoros	France (1974-)	0	0	0	0
Congo, People's Republic	0	USSR (1977)	France (1960s-)	1 (0) 1963	0
Equatorial Guinea	0	USSR	USSR (pre-1979) PRC (pre-1979)	1 (1) 1969	2 (1) 1970s
Ethiopia	Cuba (1976-)	US (pre-1976)	USSR (1978-) Cuba & DDR (1978-) Kenya (1963 & 1979-) Libya, S. Yemen (1981-)	3 (0) 1970s	2 (2) 1 in 1960s 1 in 1970s
Gabon	France (1960s)	-	France (1960s-) Ivory Coast, Senegal, Guinea, Upper Volta, Mali (1977)	2 (1)	0
Gambia	0	0	Senegal (1964-)	0	2 (0) 1980s
Ghana	0	0	US (security assistance)	0	0
Guinea	0	USSR (pre-1977)	USSR (military aid, 1960-) PRC, Cuba (instructors). Ivory Coast, Senegal, Upper Volta, Mali, Gabon (1977) Liberia (1979-)	1 (1) 1970	0
Guinea-Bissau	0	USSR (1977-)	USSR (technical assistance)	0	0
Ivory Coast	France (1960s)	-	France (1960s-) Gabon, Senegal, Guinea, Upper Volta, Mali (1977)	0	0
Kenya	0	US (1980-)	U.K. Ethiopia (1963- & 1979-)	1 (0) 1964	0
Lesotho	0	0	0	0	1 (1) 1982
Liberia	0	0	Guinea (1979-) U.S. (technical assistance; 1960s-)	0	1 (0) 1979
Madagascar	0	0	France	0	0
Malawi	-	-	-	1 (1) 1973	0
Mali	0	USSR (1977)	PRC Ivory Coast, Guinea, Upper Volta, Gabon, Senegal (1977)	0	1 (1) 1974
Mauritania	Morocco (1978)	0	Morocco (1977) France (military aid)	1 (0) 1977	2 (0) 1970s & 80s

Haiti	0	USSR	0	0	0
Mozambique	0	USSR (1975-)	USSR (1977-) DDR (1979-) PRC (military aid) Angola, Zambia, Tanzania (1978) Zimbabwe (1981) South Africa, (non-aggression, 1984)	0	2 (2) 1970s & 80s
Niger	0	0	France FRG	0	0
Nigeria	0	USSR	Benin (1978)	0	1 (1) 1981
Rwanda	0	0	0	0	0
Senegal	France (1960s-)	France	France (1965-) Gambia (1964-) Ivory Coast, Guinea, Mali, Upper Volta, Gabon (1977)	1 (1) 1963	0
Sierra Leone	0	0	0	0	2 (0) 1970s
Somalia	USSR (pre-1978)	US (1980-)	Egypt (1977-) USSR (active 1974-77)	1 1976	1 (1) 1982
South Africa			Israel (1970s-80s) Rhodesia (pre-1980) Mozambique (non-aggression, 1984-)	0	0
Swaziland	0	0		0	0
Tanzania	0	0	PRC (military assistance, 1960s-1970s) USSR (military aid, 1980s)	1 (0) 1964	5 (4) 4 in 1970s
Togo	0	0	France (1960s-70s, revised 1980s)	0	0
Zaire	0	0	US (security assistance, 1960s) Belgium, France, Egypt, PRC (military assistance)	8 (0) 4 in 1960s	9 (0) 2 in 1960s
Zambia	0	0	Botswana, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Tanganyika (1978)	3 (2) 1960s	3 (3) 1970s
Zimbabwe	0	0	S. Africa (pre-1980) Botswana, Angola, Tanzania (1978) Mozambique (1979 & 1981)	0	3 (2) 1 in 1960s 1 in 1970s 1 in 1980s
Uganda	0	0	Israel (pre-1972) USSR (aid, pre-1979) Sudan (1972) UK (pre-1972)	2 (1) 1 in 1960s	4 (2) 1 neutral in 1960s 3 in 1970s
Upper Volta	0	0	France (1960s-) Ivory Coast, Senegal, Guinea, Mali, Gabon (1977)	0	2 (2) 1 in 1960s

SOURCES:

Bases:

Annuaire De L'Afrique Et Du Moyen-Orient 1980: Les Armees Et La Defense. (Supplement Annual A Jeune Afrique). Paris, 1980, and Robert E. Harkavy and Stephanie G. Neuman, (eds), The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World, Volume I. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1985.

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Annuaire De L'Afrique Et Du Moyen-Orient 1980: Les Armees Et La Defense. (Supplement Annual A Jeune Afrique). Paris, 1980;

Olaide Aluko, "African Response to External Intervention in Africa Since Angola," African Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 319 (April, 1981), pp. 159-179;

Robert E. Harkavy, The Arms Trade and International Systems. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1975;

Stephanie G. Neuman and Robert E. Harkavy, (eds), Arms Transfers in The Modern World. New York: Praeger, 1979;

I. William Zartman, "Issues in African Diplomacy in the 1980s," p. 154. In Africa in the Post-Decolonization Era, edited by Richard E. Bissell and Michael S. Radu. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1984; and

I. William Zartman, "The OAU in the African State System: Interaction and Evaluation," p. 27 in The OAU After Twenty Years, edited by Yassin El-Ayouty and I. William Zartman. New York: Praeger, 1984.

TABLE 5

DOMESTIC ARMED ATTACKS AND OUTSIDE INTERVENTION,
1960s and 1970s^A

	Followed (Same Year or Next)	Not Followed
I.		
#High Domestic Armed Attack Years ^B Followed by Receipt of Intervention ^C	26 (26%)	73 (74%)
#High Domestic Armed Attack Years Followed by Initiation of Intervention	16 (16%)	83 (84%)
II.	Following (Next Year)	Not Following Interventions
#High Domestic Armed Attack Years Following Interventions	10 (10%)	89 (90%)
III.	Following (Same Year or Next)	Not Following
#of Intervention Years Following High Domestic Armed Attack Levels in Target	26 (53%)	23 (47%)
IV.	Preceding (by one Year)	Not Preceding
#of Intervention Years Preceding High Domestic Armed Attack Levels in Target	10 (30%)	23 (70%)

A. For thirty-seven independent states.

B. Calculated on the basis of that country's quarterly conflict profile as reported in Charles Lewis Taylor and David A. Jodice, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, Third Edition, Volume 2: Political Protest and Government Change. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983. High level is judged separately for each country.

C. Sixty-one percent of the interventions in those years were friendly to the target.

TABLE 6

AFRICAN INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES AND
INTERVENTIONS AMONG DISPUTANTS

I. Disputes and Intervention

Disputes with Intervention	27	(42%)
Disputes without Intervention	37	(58%)
	<u>64</u>	

II. Number of Disputes and Intervention

	With Intervention	No Intervention
#Border/Territorial	7	23
#Insurgency	12	9
#Political	5	4
#Colonial	7	2
#Tribal/Other	0	2

III. Type of Dispute and Number of Hostile Interventions

Type of Dispute:	# of hostile interventions.
Border/Territorial	12
Insurgency/Domestic Dispute	24
Political	18
Colonial	8
Evacuations/Other	1
Total # of Hostile Interventions	45 ^A

A. This column does not add up to 45 because a given intervention may be classified as related to more than one issue or type of dispute.

SOURCES:

Disputes:

Annuaire De L'Afrique Et Du Moyen-Orient 1980: Les Armees Et La Defense. (Supplement Annuel A Jeune Afrique). Paris, 1980; Annex 6, pp. 379-383, in The OAU After Twenty Years, edited by Yassin El-Ayouty and I. William Zartman, New York: Praeger, 1984; I. William Zartman, "The OAU in the African State System: Interaction and Evaluation," p. 25 in El-Ayouty and Zartman, op. cit.; Raymond W. Copson, "African Flashpoints: Prospects for Armed International Conflict," pp. 183-203 in Africa In The Post-Decolonization Era, edited by Richard E. Bissell and Michael S. Radu, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1984; Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "Pax Africana and Its Problems," pp. 167-168 and 175 in Bissell and Radu, op. cit.; and I. William Zartman, "Issues of African Diplomacy in the 1980s," p. 144 in Bissell and Radu, op. cit.; and Victor T. LeVine, List of Border Conflicts, Unpublished, Washington University, St. Louis.

• TABLE 7

Correlates of Sub-Saharan Intervention, 1960-84^A

	Targets of Intervention	Initiators of Intervention
Coups (1960-84)	.19	.00
Arms Imports (1975)	.18	.71
Armed Forces Size (1975)	.11	.33
Military Expenditures (1975; 1978 Dollars)	-.03	.70
PQLI (Mid-'70s)	-.15	.19
Debt Interest (1970) ^B	.20	.22
Food Index (1977-79; 1969-71 base)	-.14	-.22
GNP/Capita (1979)	-.13	.06

A. Pearson product-moment correlation.

B. Debt interest correlation for 1960s and 70s only. Fractions of \$1 million were taken as \$.5 million.

SOURCES:

Coups: Compilation by Thomas Ernst, St. Louis.

Arms Imports: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (USACDA), World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT) 1967-76.

Armed Forces Size and Military Expenditures: S. Neil MacFarlane, "Intervention and Security in Africa." International Affairs, vol. 60, No. 1, (19--), pp. 53-73, and augmented by USACDA, WMEAT 1967-76.

PQLI: Florizelle B. Liser, "A Basic Needs Strategy and the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI): Africa's Development Prospects," in Alternative Futures for Africa, edited by Timothy M. Shaw. Boulder: Westview Press, 1981.

Debt Interest, Food Index, and GNP/C: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1982.