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German Liberalism As Liberal Germanism

Frank F. Mathias

Modern science and technology have almost rid men's minds of a revered concept—the idea of “natural barriers.” The earth today may be thought of as a sphere as smooth as the charts used to plot the trajectory of missiles. The idea of distance lapses into insignificance when measured against projectiles capable of traveling 9,000 miles in fifteen minutes. Barriers do exist, but they are mental rather than physical barriers, and their existence is nourished by the past more than by the present. In other words, mental barriers are usually inherited, imitated, and then passed on to the next generation with but few increments.

Historians have often contributed mightily to this process, but the recent elimination of the idea of “natural barriers” might well force a re-examination of much historical theory since 1800. It has already forced “agonizing reappraisals” of ancient ideas of military strategy and geopolitics. The mental barrier inherent to many historians might be described as “lumping.” Germans have been “lumped” in one group, Africans in another, and Confederates in still another. Heretofore this process probably seemed to be an orderly manner to effect a horizontal division of history. Dates—1492, 1789, 1865—were used to effect a vertical division. Owing to reasons listed above, time and space have lost much of the meaning formerly assigned them by earlier generations. Is it unreasonable to assume that new concepts of time and space will not demand equally new concepts of history? Are not space and time history's body and soul?

The “lumpers” have placed history in a strait-jacket by eagerly sacrificing principle to gain form. Forms are always changing, but principles never change. A basic principle of Christianity, and later of liberalism, is the essential sameness of people. Shakespeare used this principle to good effect in Shylock, *The Merchant of Venice*. The “lumpers,” however, have written history as if they intended to make this principle change its course and declare itself in favor of the essential differences of people. Karl Marx tried to do this. The “lumpers” do it every time they set out to “prove” that a certain group of people is naturally militaristic, naturally democratic, naturally schizophrenic, or naturally problematic. Such “togetherness” has no place in history, nor do the stereotypes thereby created. In short, it may be much easier for a historian to “prove” his argument within a rigid form of his own making than to dig for disconnected facts, but the corroding effects of time and space will eventually expose his argument as one lacking in truth. Principle will not long remain enclosed within an arbitrary framework of latitude and longitude, or behind *convenient* natural barriers. Only when form follows principle, as is the case in the great interpretations of history, will truth emerge.

Certain questions raised by the preceding paragraphs remain to be answered,

but the purpose of this paper has been partially revealed: the intellectual historian cannot fully and accurately interpret his chosen subject within the changing framework of time and space unless he relies on unchanging principles. If he does not rely on such principles, inherited mental barriers will force him into errors that could have been avoided but which will, at a later date, nullify his interpretation of history. It must be stressed that this paper will not challenge the facts gathered by such a historian, but it will challenge the interpretation read into those facts.

Before relating the purpose of this paper to various histories and historians of German liberalism, objections and questions raised by the preceding paragraphs must be answered. How can "lumping" be defined as a mental barrier? Can it not be admitted that there is an essential sameness of people, yet differences of race, creed, and language that create division in thought as well as in practice? Do not many modern nations exist along those very lines? Yes, these things can readily be admitted, but the "lumper" does not start with these basic divisions. He cannot, for these divisions, stubborn though they may be, are being overcome in most of the older nations and in many of the newer ones, a demonstration of the sameness of the human race. Rather, he glorifies in the belief that "fences make friends." He uses history to build "fences" or create divisions where actual divisions never have and never will exist—this, in spite of his efforts. In short, he interprets history so that his facts will fit into a preconceived form. But history is written about human beings, and their unpredictability in groups or individually is a lesson of history not to be taken lightly. History's people cannot be crammed into a strait-jacket of form unless principle has been violated. Bias and the creation of stereotypes result from such a violation. Various reasons may be called forth to explain why some historians have placed form before principle. The exigencies of war may demand the creation of bias, and stereotypes of the "Hun" or "Jap." Personal bias may have guided the vitriolic pens of certain historians.

Apart from these obvious explanations, it is the contention of this paper that some intellectual historians have inherited a distinctive mental barrier that causes them to divide the fruits of Western civilization unequally among the shareholders. England is given an "apple," France, a "peach," Italy, a "banana," Spain, a "prune," and Germany, the prodigal son, a "peanut." The fruits—art, law, religion—were meant for and evolved out of the continent as a historical whole. Artists, lawyers, Christians—the people—are basically the same throughout this whole. Murder, for example, elicits the same responses and remedies from Italians as it does from Germans. Yet, there are historians, as will be shown in this paper, who would maintain that the German response would depend on whether their barbaric or their Western "soul" was functioning at the time of the murder! Such extreme interpretations may primarily be attributed to bias, but they are also caused when a historian disregards the whole and thus blinds himself to extended truths found in the part. One reason he refuses to see the part in full relation to the whole is owing to an inherited mental barrier.

The historian who has been conditioned to believe that natural barriers can

enclose ideas has inherited a mental barrier. Natural barriers have stopped armies and highways, but they have never stopped ideas. The historian in question may be said to be carrying a geographical imprint on his mind. In dealing with the various people of the earth, he obediently stops at rivers, channels, mountains, and lines of latitude and longitude. He does this consistently, whether his subject demands it or not. In doing so, he translates physical barriers into the realm of ideas which make up intellectual history. He does this because he has unconsciously accepted a tenet of Nationalism.¹ Borders were sacred to the Nationalist. He declared for national autonomy and grew furious at the thought of foreign interference within the borders of his country. A historian, however, need not fear frontiers, especially when dealing with ideas; but if he has inherited this tenet of Nationalism he will find it easy to interpret history in reference to lines of latitude. The part will be made to answer to the whole, and form will precede principle. Entire nations will be severed from Western Civilization at the stroke of his pen. People on one side of a river will be stereotyped as brutes, while 200 yards away, on the other side, people will emerge from his pen as being among the most civilized on Earth. Truth suffers, for this historian will never expose his carefully collected facts to the light of Western Civilization as a whole. Like film in a camera, he fears the light necessary to the securing of a complete picture.

History will profit from the fall of natural barriers and, it is hoped, the resultant fall of mental barriers. Men are viewing the physical world from a new position—outer space. Others share this view through the use of film or television. For the first time in history, men know emotionally and intellectually that the world is a whole, not a patchwork of parts. Neither space nor time can retain their former significance. This compression of time and space may also elicit a demand for a similar compression of the world's history, an interpretation based much more on the rocks of principle than on the shifting sands of form. There may occur the idea of a great synthesis of national histories instead of the present rather separate and divisive Nationalist histories. In any event, the idea of borders as barriers will fall. It is an idea that is disintegrating in Europe today, the Common Market being the one best example of this. When historians free themselves of their mental barriers they may take this economic lesson to heart, and doing so, produce a common history of Europe. If this is done, truth will finally be freed from the national barriers which have held it for so long, and, judging from rather recent histories of German liberalism and related ideologies, still hold it.²

The writing of this paper, both in its preceding and in its following pages, has been and will be guided by one major purpose: an exposure of some of the inconsistencies evident in recent intellectual histories which have used certain negative aspects of German, and only German, history in an attempt to answer the positive questions posed by German involvement in the several European wars. It is felt that guilt for these wars has erroneously been assigned to nations instead of individuals, and that historians who have done so have fallen victim to the same type of Nationalism they pretend to see and deplore in German historical development. Some of the reasons for this boxed-in approach to history have been

given in the preceding pages; others will be dealt with in the remainder of the paper.

Recent histories of German liberalism have usually been tailored to the purpose of providing an answer to the questions posed by German militarism. Without exception, the historians referred to in the preparation of this paper agree that the failure of the German liberal movement may be held responsible for the success of German militarism.³ Again, without exception, the ideology of liberalism—the full meaning of the term itself—is left undefined. This is unfortunate, for “isms” were a characteristic of the nineteenth century, a century of revolution and emancipation, a century that could boast of Nationalism, Liberalism, Materialism, Individualism, Rationalism, Naturalism, Indifferentism, Relativism, Subjectivism, Agnosticism, Anti-clericalism, Positivism, Pragmatism, Secularism, Utilitarianism, Darwinism, Socialism, Communism, Anarchism, Pantheism, Modernism. Leonard Krieger, however, warns the reader that he treats only of “the individual secular liberty familiar to the western political tradition.”⁴ Reinhold Aris’ definition perhaps sums up those provided by the other historians: “While the conservative and socialist thinker proceeds from the concept of authority, the liberal thinker proceeds from the concept of autonomy.”⁵ This tendency, asserts Aris, derives from the common liberal characteristic of pushing back the authority of the state for the sake of individual liberty.

While agreeing with Aris’ conception of liberalism, Peter Viereck shows that not everyone in Germany who has been called a liberal was actually a liberal. According to Viereck, there were two groups of rebels in the 1806-15 period who saw the possibility of reorganizing Germany on nationalist lines for the first time. Both groups have been mistakenly united under the liberal banner by historians, because both groups overlapped in their opposition to the conservative nationalism of Metternich. The first group, composed of rationalists, individualists, and constitutionalists, were, says Viereck, possibly liberals. The second group revolted against the international Habsburg rule only because they preferred a nationalism that would eventually turn out to be many times as oppressive. To Viereck, this group represents the early-day “Nazis,” and he maintains that by 1848 the second group had converted the first group to “organic nationalism. The time has come,” declares Viereck, “to revise those history books which call 1848 the ‘international liberal revolution.’ That is only true of France.”⁶ Viereck would have to revise every book under discussion in this paper except that of Aris, who wrote of an earlier period.⁷ The point is not that of proving one man right and another wrong, but rather to show the confusion of historians—in this instance, Viereck—who believe they can enclose either ideas or ideology within the boundaries of one nation. In short, Viereck has a mental barrier.

What has been said of Viereck can also be said of certain other historians. Hans Kohn, whose purpose in writing *The Mind of Germany* was to show “how the alienation of Germany from the West came about,” admits, with Jacob Burckhardt, that any study of complex ideas “must be broken up into single, and often what seems arbitrary (categories and divisions) in order to be in anyway intelligible.”⁸ Thus, in order to justify his pre-conceived premise that Germany was alienated

from the West, Kohn is forced to admit that though it is contrary to intelligence to twist ideas out of their context it “must” be done, or history will not possess clarity. The opposite is true, for the human mind is the only context from which ideas can be twisted. It can either give or receive ideas, but it resents being isolated or twisted from its source—itsself. To attempt this is to create confusion, in society as well as in history. Kohn is, therefore, setting out to create social, cultural, and historical schizophrenia by pulling an entire group of people out of Western Civilization, the one source of its ideas. If this can be done to Germany—and herein lies the danger—it can be done to any nation in the West. The only thing needed is a premise. If Christ had started from such a floating premise, Christianity would never have spread out of Jerusalem, for He would have treated the idea of sin as something detained by national borders. Germany may have sinned against the Western Civilization of which she is a part, but she sinned after, not before she was a part of the West. She sinned in, not apart from the West. If not, why regard her as a “problem”? Why not “alienate” Japan by use of the same premise? Either Germany is or is not Western—she cannot be both. People cannot accept Christ without accepting Satan, nor can historians accept Beethoven without accepting Hitler. Kohn, too, has a mental barrier.

So has Anreas Dorpalen. He believes that “it is undeniable that [Heinrich von Treitschke] helped to precondition his countrymen for their reception of Nazism.” This happened, contends Dorpalen, through Treitschke’s consistent teaching that Germans were “too ignorant and too selfish to govern themselves.”⁹ This proves nothing, except perhaps Dorpalen’s wish that the nature of man might change. Insofar as Dorpalen’s argument goes, James Madison and John Adams also believed that men were too selfish and too ignorant to govern themselves: “A properly designed state, the Fathers believed, would check interest with interest, class with class, faction with faction, and one branch of government with another in a harmonious system of mutual frustration.”¹⁰ This system became so mutually frustrating that it finally took four years—1861-1865—to restore a semblance of harmony. Germany’s problem was to achieve union, while America’s was to prevent disunion. Although the physical conflict was roughly confined to borders in both nations, the conflict of ideas involved many of the basic concepts of Western Civilization. The ideas of individual and state rights cannot be assigned to America, and withheld from Germany. But this is seldom done anyway, for at first glance such ideas are seen as pleasant proof that all is right in the world. They are accepted as being good until they (of themselves?) turn bad. When this happens historians are all too anxious to “throw the baby out with the washwater.” Slavery existed in the United States. Nazism existed in Germany. Both were bad. Which nation is to be thrown out to “save” Western Civilization the responsibility of answering for itself? Viereck, Kohn, and Dorpalen—the latter over-confident of Treitschke’s importance—choose Germany.

Nineteenth century liberalism has been taken at “face value” by most of the historians treated in this paper. Actually, liberalism presented two “faces” to the people of this self-confident century. On one side stood the political liberal, whose

program, besides constitutional, representative forms in government, called for a minimum of authority in his sovereign. The state was to use police only for the necessary preservation of order and property. With him stood the economic individualist, who wanted the government to keep out of business altogether. On the other side, but often overlapping, stood another form of liberal, an intellectual liberal advocating absolute freedom of conscience, religion, thought, speech, the press and politics. In his self-contained world of anarchy, authority derived neither from the state, nor from God. John Henry Cardinal Newman, who long fought this type of liberalism, clearly defined it:

Now by Liberalism I mean false liberty of thought, or the exercise of thought upon matters, in which, from the constitution of the human mind, thought cannot be brought to any successful issue, and therefore is out of place. Among such matters are first principles of whatever kind; and of these the most sacred and momentous are especially to be reckoned the truths of Revelation. Liberalism then is the mistake of subjecting to human judgement those revealed doctrines which are in their nature beyond and independent of it, and of claiming to determine on intrinsic grounds the truth and value of propositions which rest for their reception on the external authority of the Divine Word.¹¹

It may be argued that Newman's treatise, which appeared the same year (1864) that Pius IX condemned religious liberalism in parts of his "Syllabus," was intended only for Roman Catholics. The point is missed if this view is taken, for the point is that the major segment of the people of Europe were confronted with a new idea—that religious liberalism was sinful. This concept, outlined in black and white by Pius IX, presumably traveled through the hierarchy to every village priest and his parishioners on the continent. Good German Catholics must have reacted in the same way as did their counterparts in each nation of Europe. In any event, the negative side of liberalism was laid before the masses, and in language that all could understand. If a man could not read, the priest could read it for him. Germany was one-third Roman Catholic. Yet, none of the historians consulted for this paper define liberalism in this light, nor do they consider it as a potent conservative weapon! Eugene Anderson, in writing of the 1860's, concludes that the liberal's main error lay in their failure to be liberal enough. This, he asserts, prevented them from building up mass support through organizations on the local level.¹² Krieger states that the liberal leaders of the 1860's became more and more dependent on the economic bourgeoisie, finally to the point that the destiny of the movement was decided here.¹³ Kohn maintains that the main element in the failure of liberalism was the self-abasing surrender of the idea that the educated middle-classes were able to govern.¹⁴ In short, most historians agree that liberalism was a small middle-class movement in Germany, and that the lack of mass support probably sealed its doom.

Various reasons for the lack of mass support are given in each of the histories here under discussion, but most, with the liberals of the day, believe that the

main reason lay in the lack of education of the masses. In other words, the peasants, workers, and poor should be educated so that they might “understand” liberalism. Only Anderson, who excellently interprets the religious issues present in 1858-1864, underscores this liberal paternalism: “The Liberals . . . remained bound by a class prejudice of superiority over the masses and did not perceive the possibility of the peaceful organization of the population against the government.”¹⁵ This sense of superiority must have made any attempts at mass education an irksome thing, both for the masses and for the liberals. Yet, if the contentions of these past few paragraphs are true, a very large minority of the German masses *already* understood the negative aspects of liberalism as taught them by their parish priests. This possibility is entirely ignored or unknown in the histories here discussed. It should be investigated, for it may be found that the unlettered masses were more truly liberal than the liberals who set out to “educate” them. Above all, investigation might well undermine the generally held theory that German liberalism and opposition to it differed from that of other nations, for the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church knew no national boundaries.¹⁶

It would be beyond the scope of this paper to narrate the tortuous twistings of liberalism through the fabric of nineteenth century life in Europe. In one way or another, it became entwined and tangled with most of the other “isms” mentioned elsewhere in this paper. It may be compared to a man having limbs of unequal length—it limped when it tried to walk, and fell when it tried to run. The long and strong limb may be identified as the political side of liberalism; the short and weak limb may be seen as the “philosophy of life” side of liberalism, a side tarred with the same materialistic stick as Communism, Socialism, and, for that matter, even Fascism. In this respect the “weak” limb proved to be the “strongest,” for recent generations have seen many of the ideas common to these “isms” translated into action, or, as Peter Viereck says, transformed from “books into bullets.”¹⁷ In short, generalizations can and should be constructed in an effort to arrive at the sources of twentieth century bloodshed. It is only when historians such as Viereck, Kohn, and Dorpalen, by “scientifically” interpreting generalizations instead of facts, arrive at the conclusion that Germany is guilty of all error—that is the precise point when truth begins to suffer.¹⁸ At that point natural barriers have been translated into the realm of ideas, and principle is made to serve pre-conceived form.

The essential sameness of people is ignored for a purpose. Germany must be proven guilty—the masses as well as their leaders. Viereck and Kohn resort to a “psychoanalysis” of the German masses (tribe) by use of their traditional fairy-tales. These tales are said to have been vulcanized by Romanticism into a mental aberration called “*Volk*.” In English the word means “folk.” But to Kohn and Viereck its presence in German folklore is of ominous portent. On this presence is constructed the theory that Germans have a tribal anti-Western “*Volk-soul*” as well as a Western (Christian) soul. Simply stated, this means that if the barbarian side of German nature is allowed to emerge, there will occur an uncontrollable urge in the German breast to overthrow Western Civilization. Viereck traces this

“urge” from “Fichte to Hitler,” thereby fitting Germany into Western Civilization only at such times as the “spirit” hit him. Kohn, however, reveals that this dual-nature led the Germans to the conclusion that they were the “chosen people” of the nineteenth century.¹⁹ This belief led them to desire separation from the West. Both of these historians might have profited through a reading of “Clio Rediscovered,” an essay first published in 1903 by George Macaulay Trevelyan:

How indeed could history be a ‘science’? . . . You cannot dissect a mind; and if you could, you could not argue thence about other minds. You can know nothing scientifically of the twenty million minds of a nation . . .

There is no utilitarian value in knowledge of the past, and there is no way of scientifically deducing causal laws about the action of human beings in the mass.²⁰

It might be appropriate to say in summary that Kohn and Viereck, perhaps in imitation of the brothers Grimm, sprinkled crumbs of fact throughout a historiopsychological forest in hopes that their readers would be led to a fairy-tale witch—the “Volk”! In doing so, they actually transferred the Barbarossa or “hidden savior” role to themselves. They tried to “save” Western Civilization by “exposing” Germany. Theirs is a nationalism with the “insides out,” but it differs only superficially from the nationalism they so intensely deplore in Germany.

All of the authors consulted for this paper maintain or imply: first, that liberalism produced only good results, and second, that the failure of liberalism produced, therefore, bad results—militarism. This assumption, that liberalism was capable of controlling the nature of man through constitutional law, cannot be debated. Yet, none of these historians undertakes an explanation of why the individual German was unwilling to fight physically for his liberty. It may have been that his understanding of the negative facets of liberalism in some way balanced his dislike for conservative militarism. This balance between two evils may have dimmed his understanding of the bright aspects of political liberalism. This confusion, a result of overlapping in the liberal forces, was enough to deny him the vision of an attainable goal. In short, he, unlike the historians who interpreted him, was not at all sure that integral liberalism produced only good results.

It can be assumed that the historians consulted in this paper are liberals. Throughout their volumes they analyze the German “problem” from a liberal bias. They do not at any time give a thorough definition of anything but political liberalism. With no real proof—and fairy-tales are dismissed here—they start and end with the premise that the failure of German liberalism led to the acceptance of German militarism, which, in its turn, led to war in 1870, 1914, and 1939. Each of the books, in its own way, falls into a monotonous circle of cause and effect: Liberalism is good, therefore a nation rejecting liberalism is bad, a “problem.” Why is Germany bad: Germany rejected liberalism. Yet they contradict themselves by often wondering why Germany could not have been like France, which is good. Why is France good? France did not reject liberalism. But with such wishes for Germany, are they not admitting that the principles of integral liberalism will not function everywhere? This paper does not admit this, but if the historians under discussion

can be held to admit this illiberal principle, they can also be accused of placing Germany in a preconceived form, and then wondering why it does not fit. They are nationalists at heart. From outerspace their minds would fill in a map of European boundaries that their eyes could never see, for the form would be held more important than the principle of unity. Thus, they ignore the great similarities between France and Germany and lose insights that such a study would provide.

Either a fear of neighbors or a fear of civil war has dictated the necessity of maintaining armies. Fear is an emotion common to all mankind, and it has ever overcome other equally common emotions that might lead to disarmament. The compression of time and space may lead to truer interpretations of this fear on the part of historians reared in America. It may not be quite so easy to "lump" all Germans into a framework of anti-Western militarism when the fearful killing power of Russian army missiles is realized to be only fifteen minutes in "distance" from the library where the "lumping" is taking place! This is actually "closer" than any Russian army ever came to Germany in peacetime, for it would take longer than that for an army to cross the flat German borders. It is hoped, then, that American historians will place fear in its proper perspective as a cause of German militarism. Without fear, armies soon cease to exist, for they are very expensive. Statesmen fear the future power of a neighbor's army and take steps to keep abreast, for they too, have a fear of being killed. Their people support their plans, for they share the fears of their statesmen. Whether such fears are real or imaginary in any given period is of little importance. The important consideration is that an army launched by imaginary fears is just as deadly as one launched through genuine alarm. Fear unites or divides men, but it cannot be taken from them. It underscores the sameness of people—in black. It forms armies and holds society together. It makes history both active and passive. Yet, seven historians ignore it entirely! Without it, there would have been no German army or German militarism to step across the dead body of German liberalism.

In conclusion, it can almost invariably be said that the inconsistencies noticed in the books listed in this paper originated in an adherence to form instead of to certain basic principles. Yet, this has not been an argument against form except when form is preconceived to serve a purpose. History is no field for such preconceptions, for new ideas grow out of basic and living principles where they can breathe and expand into interpretations. Only then are they suitable for "framing."

Much work remains to be done in German history. Though difficult in style, Leonard Krieger's work was undoubtedly the finest volume consulted for use in this paper. Still, a volume is needed that will place the liberal movement into the main currents of German and European history. Too often, the student of this subject labors under the impression that both he and the entire liberal movement have been set adrift on an unnamed river. He wonderingly floats over water of unknown depths. Bias and prejudice drift by on one side and undefined terms on the other. Eventually, historians may produce volumes that will strip the aura of mystery from Germans and their "legendary" militarism; that will admit that wars are caused by a breach in vital interests rather than by collected fairy-tales; that will

assess a movement such as liberalism on carefully defined points of what it was instead of what it should have been; that will permit pertinent ideas to penetrate barriers—whether natural or acquired. Time and space are undergoing a compression which will, paradoxically, unleash a vast expansion in historical thought and theory. Truth is going to be freed of many shackles, for this compression will demand that historians attach man and his ideas to something more permanent and less negative than barriers. In doing so, historians may find themselves free of much of the fearsome mass of past and present source material. Much of this material will collapse of its own weight when historians admit, with John Donne, that: "No man [or nation] is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main."²¹

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NOTES

¹ Nationalism is not to be confused with patriotism, a genuine love of country. It is used here to mean a false love which *excludes* every other nation from any share in the imagined superiority which the Nationalist attributes to his own nation.

² Of the volumes used in preparing this paper, I think this to be generally true of: Peter Viereck, *Metapolitics: From the Romantics to Hitler* (New York, 1941); Andreas Dorpalen, *Heinrich von Treitschke* (New Haven, 1957); and Hans Kohn, *The Mind of Modern Germany: The Education of a Nation* (New York, 1960). It is partially true of: Leonard Krieger, *The German Idea of Freedom* (Boston, 1957); Reinhold Aris, *History of Political Thought in Germany from 1789 to 1815* (London, 1936); Eugene Anderson, *The Social and Political Conflict in Prussia, 1858-1864* (Lincoln, Nebr., 1954); and Koppel S. Pinson, *Modern Germany, its History and its Civilization* (New York, 1953). (Hereinafter last names only are cited.)

³ See: Anderson, 441; Viereck, 92; Kohn, 128; Dorpalen, 251; Krieger, 469; Pinson, 106; Aris, implied on p. 371.

⁴ Krieger, ix.

⁵ Aris, 156.

⁶ Viereck, 58-62.

⁷ In one way or another, all conclude that 1848 was a year of liberal revolution in Germany: Krieger, 340; Dorpalen, 15; Kohn, 138; Anderson, 308; Pinson, 106. In fact, *passim* would serve better than pagination for each of these histories.

⁸ Kohn, ix.

⁹ Dorpalen, 302.

¹⁰ Richard Hofstadter, *The American Political Tradition* (New York, 1948), 8-9.

¹¹ *Apologia pro Vita sua*, Appendix A (Oxford edition, 1913), 493. Originally printed in the edition of 1865. See also, Anton C. Pegis (ed.), *The Wisdom of Catholicism* (New York, 1949), 647.

¹² Anderson, 439-443.

¹³ Krieger, 402.

¹⁴ Kohn, 157-159.

¹⁵ Anderson, 440.

¹⁶ See n. 6.

¹⁷ Viereck, 145.

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- ¹⁸ Viereck blandly asserts that his book “is a psychoanalysis of Germany.” (p. x.) Dorpalen implies the same by translating his studies of Treitschke’s personality to the national level, and holding this as a cause for the rise of Nazism. (pp. 116-17, 188, 274, 302.) Kohn assigns Germany a national nuerosis he defines as “the longing for the hidden savior.” (p. 14 f.) Both Kohn and Viereck make extensive use of Romanticism (as they interpret it) to back their assertions. Kohn, e.g., opines that Romanticism gave Germany an irrational “national individuality.” The reader is left with the assumption that irrationality was magically halted on the shores of the Atlantic, Baltic, and Rhine. (p. 51.)
- ¹⁹ Kohn, 300, *et passim*. Viereck, 189-198, *et passim*.
- ²⁰ Included in *The Varieties of History: From Voltaire to the Present*, ed. Fritz Stern (New York, 1956), 232-33. Though imaginative, neither Viereck nor Kohn are psychiatrists. They establish a false analogy in trying to apply scientific techniques meant for individuals to the masses.
- ²¹ Quoted by Thomas Merton, *No Man is an Island* (New York, 1955), 21.

