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Benjamin Disraeli And The Foundations Of Western Posture In The Middle East

R. J. Maras

To understand the appearance of Great Britain in the Middle East as well as the resurgence of Egyptian nationalism requires an understanding of the political development and role of Benjamin Disraeli (1804-81), a key figure in forty-five years (1830-75) in British politics and Anglo-French relations. His activities appear indispensably germane to the subject. Thus the political roots of Egypt's nationalistic outburst in 1956 and after that brought it more self-determination and aggressive leadership contain a pattern of growth that may be traced back 125 years amidst the continuity of Franco-British relations. Thereupon it is concluded that the irony—for example, the events of October, 1956—that oftentimes results from a policy of self-interest was already inherent in the Egyptian situation of 1875 when England and France became the Western partners in the management of the Suez Canal Company.¹

Disraeli returned to England from a grand tour of the eastern Mediterranean region in 1831, the heyday of Romanticism.² Such a journey to a distant and exotic land left permanent impressions upon the young man of twenty-seven, stirring his imagination and whetting a hunger for politics. Well do his biographers describe the travel:

It not only enlarged his experience beyond that of most young Englishmen of his day, but, what was even more important to one of his peculiar temperament, it helped to give definite purpose and significance to the Oriental tendency in his nature, which, vaguely present before, was henceforth to dominate his imagination and show itself in nearly all his achievements . . . but we can see it not less clearly in the bold stroke of policy which laid the foundations of English ascendancy in Egypt, in the act which gave explicit form to the conception of an Indian Empire with the Sovereign of Great Britain at its head, and in the settlement imposed on Europe at the Berlin Congress.³

While politically a novice, Disraeli already considered the serious nature of foreign policy in his novel, *Gallomania* (1832):

There is no subject on which, as a society, we are so misinformed as our foreign policy . . . To my mind it is of primary, of paramount importance: upon our foreign policy the safety as well as the glory of this country as a great Empire depends.⁴

His early political views were neither Whig nor Tory, even though he resided in Edmund Burke's old locality of Beaconsfield and eventually rejuvenated the

decadent Conservative Party. During this period of surging nationalism it was natural for Disraeli to claim that his politics could be described by one word: England. As a candidate of the English Radicals, he stumped for election to Parliament, October, 1832. One of his addresses irritated both major political parties, but it was ineptitude of Whig foreign policy that he deplored because it might have led to the loss of British supremacy on the seas.⁵ Disraeli cherished the cardinal point of British politics that domestic and foreign policy cannot be dissociated.

The first thorny problem with which Disraeli grappled was the age-old Near Eastern Question, a problem for which his visit to the Levant and meeting with Pasha Mehemet Ali prepared him to speak with conviction and understanding. On May 25, 1838, Ali renewed his bold actions to free himself and Egypt from the Ottoman yoke, but the occasion almost precipitated hostilities between France, supporting Ali, and England, Austria, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire, the suzerain State. Actually, Palmerston and Thiers, the foreign ministers, were forced to resign and Aberdeen and Guizot, who sought to restore amity, replaced them in 1841. Disraeli appeared very eager to encourage goodwill;⁶ but he reserved judgment on the issue, being divided in sentiment between a friend, King Louis Philippe, and his homeland, England.⁷ The crisis expired when France withdrew her support of Ali, who, while surrendering Syria, became practically independent of the Ottoman Empire as "hereditary governor" of Egypt.⁸ The Great Powers in signing the Straits Convention of July 13, 1841, ushered in an era of peace.

Contemporaneously in England, Sir Robert Peel was elected to his second prime ministry (September, 1841-June, 1846) with a conservative majority of ninety members in the House of Commons. Disraeli believed that a political party could "dictate the character of his (Peel's) foreign policy." He declared—rather prophetically in the light of the events of October, 1956—that "in the international union of France and England depend not merely the material prosperity but ultimately their existence as powers of the first class." To support an Anglo-French alliance, Disraeli planned to found a press organization.⁹ In December, 1845, on a visit to Paris, he observed that King Louis Philippe and Guizot, his chief minister, were perplexed by the change (perhaps in regard to the issue of the Spanish marriages) in the English government. With Palmerston's return highly probable, Disraeli strove to assure them that Palmerston was the first British foreign minister who had taken the friendship of France, as "an avowed element of our national policy." But Louis Philippe and Guizot remained skeptical. Upon his return to England, Disraeli urged Palmerston to visit France and the following year, during the Easter holidays, Palmerston arrived in Paris. Before departure, "ce terrible Lord Palmerston" became "ce cher Lord Palmerston."¹⁰ However, the apparent reconciliation was short-lived since the untoward incident of the Spanish marriages emerged and betrayed the hope of all concerned.¹¹

At this juncture of circumstances, an event occurred that went far to cement friendly relations between England and France. In March, 1848, the Federal Diet

of the German Confederation “called upon the German Governments” to prevent Denmark from possessing the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein.¹² Under the guise of the principle of nationality, Prussia eventually (1864-66) aggrandized itself there, but in 1848, despite hostilities, the Prussians were unable to acquire the territory because of the warning from Great Britain, France, and Russia. Keenly aware of the strategic value of the Danish sounds and Lowlands, Disraeli remarked that if Prussia had obtained harbors to the north, the threat to England and to the maintenance of peace would be serious; moreover, he hoped that Prussian aims in the strategic region would not go unnoticed and “uncensored.”¹³ Thus the German provocation so strengthened the bond of mutual regard between England and France, that even the revolutionary events from November, 1848, in France could not divide the two powers.

The Revolution of February, 1848, liquidated the parliamentary monarchy of Louis Philippe, forced him into exile in England, and the succeeding provisional government called for national elections (Autumn, 1848) based on universal suffrage. Louis Napoleon won an overwhelming victory in that election to become President of the Second French Republic. British official circles received this news favorably but, on the other hand, the British press, remembering the struggle for survival with Napoleon Bonaparte a generation ago, opposed the political upheaval and the change of government.¹⁴ From Paris, Lord Stanley dispatched a letter to Disraeli stating that Louis Napoleon received him very kindly as the British ambassador.¹⁵ Disraeli, the Conservative leader in the House of Commons, continued to regard Louis Philippe as the King of France even after his overthrow and the establishment of residence in England.¹⁶

Three years later, December 2, 1851, when Louis Napoleon extended unilaterally his presidential term from four to ten years, Palmerston quickly approved the coup, but Lord John Russell, the prime minister, disliked the foreign minister's sanction and dismissed him. A month elapsed when another cabinet crisis ensued. In the upshot, the Conservative Party attained political leadership. Lord Stanley (14th Earl of Derby) became prime minister (Feb. 27-Dec. 18) and Disraeli accepted his first cabinet post, that of chancellor of the exchequer while retaining his role of Conservative leader in the House of Commons.¹⁷ It was this British government that quickly recognized the new imperial regime in France. Louis Napoleon was convinced that uncle Bonaparte's deadly mistake was his deeply engrained hatred of the British, and to obtain diplomatic recognition from Great Britain, Louis promised not to change the European balance of power—a *quid pro quo* arrangement. England was the first state to recognize him.¹⁸ For his part, Disraeli desired a commercial treaty with France to popularize his budget statement, as well as to strengthen the bonds of Anglo-French amity. Attainment of these objectives seemed likely for reasons previously stated as well as the fact that Lord Malmesbury, the British ambassador to the Quai d'Orsay, was a confidant of Louis Napoleon.¹⁹

Shortly after and despite the proclamation of the Second French Empire on December 2, 1852, which restored the persistent memory of Bonaparte and implied

an aggressive foreign policy, Disraeli strove for a resumption of close association with France. On February 18, 1853, while clarifying his position and impugning the foreign policy of Lord Aberdeen, Disraeli declared that cordial relations should be the keynote of British foreign policy.²⁰ From France, (March, 1853), Malmesbury, whose confidence in the peaceful intentions of the emperor remained steadfast, informed Disraeli that Napoleon III desired an English alliance and the consolidation of "his position with the Great Powers by a pacific policy." Nevertheless, Queen Victoria deemed it necessary to look after the country's defenses even though no serious French threat seemed near.²¹ Instead, the Near Eastern question erupted once more.

A serious rupture in the European Concert of 1815 emerged from the religious discord between the Orthodox Christians and those subject to Roman authority in the Ottoman Empire. The Russians, long regarding themselves as overseers of the "Christian religion and churches" since the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji, (July 26, 1774), demonstrated the will to protect their co-religionists.²² France showed interest because of its traditional protection of Christians in the Near East since the Capitulations Agreement of 1535. In England, Disraeli led a policy of opposition to Russia, for if she acquired Constantinople Russian influence would overthrow European civilization and undermine the interests of England.²³ As early as 1844 both Russia and England may have come to a "verbal", secret understanding about the possibility of a partition of the Ottoman territory, and in 1853 the Tsar, having been denied what seemed to him a foregone conclusion, unilaterally ordered his armies across the River Pruth.²⁴ On March 28, 1854, England and France declared war on Russia.

The Crimean war years confused political and diplomatic affairs in England. Lord Aberdeen's coalition government, (1852-55), negotiated a military convention with Austria on December 2, 1854. But Disraeli showed little faith in the Austrian alliance which vaguely bound Austria to oppose Russia "in certain eventualities in the future." Subsequently, because of public opinion and the motion of the radical Roebuck for an investigation of the war, an action which Disraeli also approved, the Aberdeen government fell and Palmerston accepted the prime ministry.²⁵ In the successive weeks of March, 1855, Disraeli launched a peace offensive in his weekly newspaper, the *Press*. Tsar Nicholas I died on March 2, 1855, and his son and successor, Alexander II, was disposed to peace negotiations. In mid-April, Napoleon III's state visit to England buoyed Disraeli's hopes for peace.

In the deliberations as to a basis of peace at the Vienna conference, Russia recoiled from the crucial third point, regarding naval bases on the Black Sea. On May 26, Disraeli's *volte face* demanded prosecution of the war for the peace negotiations had become a farce: 'Our part is taken, our terms are known, we have confidence in the justice of our cause and the might of our arms, and we dare the last dread issue . . . the appeal to battle.'²⁶ Thus fighting continued.

On September 8 Sebastopol, the Crimean fortress, fell to the western powers

and the time was opportune for Disraeli to launch a second peace offensive—for he believed that the objective of war, the defense of the existing Ottoman Empire, had been secured. He received support from Napoleon III while Palmerston's "war party" clamored for continuation of the war.²⁷ On February 1, 1856, after the modification of Point Three regarding the Black Sea in the protocol of the peace of Vienna, Russia acceded to the terms which neutralized the Black Sea area. The resolution was incorporated in the definitive Treaty of Paris, March 30, 1856.²⁸

The following fifteen years, 1856-71, were crucial for Great Britain. Pursuing a policy of splendid isolation which aimed at the preservation of peace and the balance of power in Europe, England actually was short-sighted as the rise of Italy and of Germany to statehood upset the old structure of the European nation-states system. At the opening of the Italian Wars of Liberation, Disraeli advocated peace. In the Polish Revolution of 1863 he urged non-intervention for no "sufficient interests" were involved.²⁹ Later Disraeli recalled: "I think the climax of mismanagement was reached in the conduct of the Government with respect to the Polish insurrection and its diplomatic communications on that subject, both with France and Russia."³⁰ At the time of the Schleswig-Holstein aggrandizement by Prussia and Austria in 1864, he opposed the war, but supported England's presence in Europe "in accordance with the laws of nations and with the stipulations of treaties."³¹ Twelve years earlier the Derby-Disraeli government had negotiated the London agreement which ratified but did not guarantee the duchies to the Danish king. When Napoleon III declined to intervene in behalf of Denmark and the duchies fell to Austria and Prussia, Disraeli's distrust of him naturally arose. Campaigning for reelection in 1866, Disraeli reinterpreted England's position as no longer just another European power, but the heart of "a great maritime empire."³² Finally, the revolutionary consequences of the Austro-Prussian war (1866) were not at once understood by Disraeli, even though the turn of events shifted the strength in west-central Europe in favor of the North German (Prussian) Confederation. A letter of July 31, 1867, to General Grey, Queen Victoria's private secretary, presents Disraeli's views on Prussia and, indirectly, France: "I think the general bias of Lord Stanley's mind is to lean toward Prussia, and I have always encouraged and enforced that tendency."³³

When Lord Stanley resigned as prime minister in 1868, Disraeli succeeded to that office from March to November. His policy, he declared, would be the pursuit of peace without selfish isolation. Several months later, (June, 1868), in an address at Merchant Taylors' Hall Disraeli praised his success: ". . . there never existed between England and foreign powers a feeling of greater cordiality and confidence than now prevails." At the time of the Franco-Prussian war in 1870-71, Disraeli joined with English public opinion to blame Louis Napoleon III and French impetuosity for the war. He also sensed that there had been a greater "natural affinity" between Great Britain and Germany; the events of July, he added, confirmed his view. He advocated a neutral course—an "armed neutrality," perhaps with Russia's

cooperation. After the “blitz”-like war, Disraeli recoiled. He was apprehensive for the new German Empire appeared to have definitely upset the old balance of power system.³⁴ In this sense the war of 1870-71 was a major turning point.

Disraeli's election as prime minister, 1874-80, marks the end of an isolationist era for Britain—an era wherein the rise of Germany and Italy necessitated a reorientation of British foreign policy. In an address to his electors, Disraeli censured the old government “for showing too little energy in Foreign Affairs, and too much in domestic legislation. That order of things it was his intention to revise.” Anxious that Great Britain's influence should again be significant in Europe, “he was determined to win for his country the place in continental politics which Germany under Bismark was usurping.”³⁵ Upset by the political and territorial changes in central Europe, Disraeli could state: “. . . It is curious, but since the fall of France who used to give us so much trouble, the conduct of foreign affairs for England has become infinitely more difficult . . .”.³⁶ Again, in a pessimistic letter to Lord Derby, he wrote that England “. . . shall be kept in a state of unrest for a long time; probably until the beginning of the next Thirty Years' War.”³⁷ While Disraeli's alarms increased during the War Scare of March, 13-May 10, 1875, he helped to preserve peace through Lord Lyons, the British ambassador to France.³⁸ Everyone desired peace, but the real significance of this event lay in England's departure from isolation, a move substantiated by the purchase of stock in the Suez Canal Company.

In the diplomatic history of the late nineteenth century, Disraeli's acquisition of the Suez Stock rivals in diplomatic dexterity such *faits accomplis* as the Ems telegram of 1870 and Austria's possession of Bosnia-Herzegovia in 1908. It seems that the diplomats of the nineteenth century improved on the predecessors of the eighteenth century in the matter of calculation, swiftness, finality and hardness of conscience. Of these countries, only Britain retained her prize beyond 1918. In the pre-Canal era, Palmerston balked at British participation in the canal project, and Disraeli disliked Ferdinand de Lesseps' undertaking because of its “engineering impracticability.”³⁹

From 1869-74 Lesseps, the engineer of the Suez Canal, was unable to show a profit from its business activity. After the opening of the Canal to traffic, more than three-fourths of the shipping that passed through it was British. The Canal shortened the previous journey from London to Bombay, India—where British investments were heavy—by approximately 4400 miles.⁴⁰ To offset financial difficulties, Lesseps raised the tonnage duties but Ismail Pasha, the impecunious Egyptian khedive, thwarted this policy. Neither was to have complete control. As early as April, 1874, Lord Derby knew of Lesseps' embarrassment and the Canal's condition. Thereupon he wrote to Disraeli: ‘We cannot let the Canal go to ruin; it is too useful for us.’⁴¹ Taking advantage of this “golden opportunity” Disraeli, with vigorous persistence, acquired the Canal stock.⁴² Queen Victoria approved the action and the cabinet presented him a *carte blanche*. On the other hand, Louis Charles Elie Decazes (1819-86), foreign minister of the Third French

Republic, was not too anxious to estrange a British government which supported France during the recent War Scare (1875) with Germany. Decazes instructed Gavard, chargé d'affaires in London, to discuss the Canal situation with Lord Derby. Suddenly, French attempts to acquire the stock halted, French financiers were unable to raise the necessary money, and the bankrupt khedive offered the stock to the British government (i.e. Disraeli).⁴³

The reactions to Disraeli's diplomatic success were mixed. He, himself, championed a "Dual Control" policy in Egypt and resisted all suggestions of eliminating France from the Suez. France had to be respected.⁴⁴ Queen Victoria, whose support had been of great help, greeted the event as "a blow at Bismark." Yet no one gloated more than the Iron Chancellor, for his European policy remained intact and there loomed a likelihood of Anglo-French friction in Egypt.⁴⁵ Disraeli sent word to Lady Bradford (November 25, 1875): "The Fairy (Queen Victoria) is in ecstasies about 'this great and important event'—wants 'to know all about it when Mr. D. (Disraeli) comes down today.' The following day Queen Victoria wrote to Mr. Theodore Martin: "It is entirely the doing of Mr. Disraeli who has very large ideas and very lofty views (sic) of the position this country should have."⁴⁶ Britain's success in the Suez region was a turning point in universal history.

For more than four centuries, or since the days of Cardinal Wolsey, England has pursued a policy of balance of power in European politics. Disraeli added an indispensable corollary when the Suez Canal became the strategic link in the economic life-line stretching from London to India and the Far East. This corollary or principle can aptly be described by the phrase "hegemony in the eastern Mediterranean." Previously, between 1866-70, Germany and Italy overturned the traditional balance of nations on the European continent. This fact England failed to realize in its importance and implications until the defeat of France in 1870-71. Yet, by a sudden and phenomenal rise to power, the German empire unwittingly assisted the *rapprochement* of France and England, and this mutual attraction was confirmed by the events of 1875, the Congress of Berlin in 1878, and definitively by the *entente cordiale* of 1904. After 1875 the Ottoman empire (later Turkey), bordering Russia, received unprecedented strategic significance as a bulwark confronting Russia. So long as her political integrity remained, English interests were secure in the eastern Mediterranean. Additional protection Disraeli provided in 1878 by acquiring Cyprus.⁴⁷ However, in 1956-57, the position of Egypt—*mutatis mutandi* and no longer under the Turkish or British yoke and having nationalized the Canal—posed a grave problem and serious threat to Western hegemony there.⁴⁸ The concerted attack on Egypt by France and England in October, 1956—coming on the heels of nationalization and the Israeli-Egyptian War—whatever the avowed motivations for their action, was a logical, historical development in Franco-British relations since 1830.⁴⁹ Bitter irony appears in their ouster from Egypt at the insistence of the United Nations, including the United States.

It is not by singular reference to the events since World War II that one can fully understand the contemporary events in the Middle East. Actually that is only

one part, albeit a large one, of the history. Whereas an analysis of the immediate causes leading to the Egyptian problems leaves many questions unanswered, a study of the historical background from 1830-75 and after clarifies the positions of France and England to date; it likewise clarifies the position taken in recent years by Egypt, the Soviet Union, and certainly the United States which has replaced Great Britain as a principal guarantor of peace there. Strategic reasons as well as considerations of oil, nationalism, and history have contributed to the tensions and periodic crises. It was Disraeli who welded Great Britain into the living mosaic. With the decline of British power, the United States has stepped into the breach to uphold Western posture in the Middle East (and Europe).

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NOTES

- ¹ U. S. Department of State, *The Suez Canal Problem: July 26-September 22, 1956*. A Documentary Publication (6392), (Washington, D. C., 1956), p. 370.
- ² Disraeli (1804-81) spent four months in Egypt, met Pasha Mehemet Ali, and as a Christian—baptised in 1817 at the age of thirteen—he visited the Holy Lands. The word “Levant” has its etymological roots in the French infinitive “lever,” meaning “to rise” (appropriately the sun “rises” in the East); a similar play can be worked for the word “orient,” meaning “to arrange.” See Andre Berthelot, *et al.*, eds., *La Grande Encyclopedie*, 31 vols. (Paris: 1886-1902), XXII, 130.
- ³ William F. Monypenny and George E. Buckle, eds., *The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield*, 6 vols (London: 1910-20), I, 136, hereafter abbreviated simply as *Disraeli*. See also the new and revised edition by Mr. Buckle, (New York, 1929), 2 vols. Robert Blake’s *Disraeli* (New York, 1966), chapter III.
- ⁴ Monypenny and Buckle, *Disraeli*, I, 208.
- ⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 210, 228.
- ⁶ Monypenny and Buckle, *Disraeli*, II, 150-51. Philip E. Moseley, *Russian Diplomacy and the Opening of the Eastern Question in 1838 and 1839*, (Cambridge, Mass., 1934), pp. 3-6.
- ⁷ George E. Buckle, ed., *The Letters of Queen Victoria*, (2nd series, 1862-85; 3 vols. London: 1926-28), II, 391.
- ⁸ Carlton J. H. Hayes, *Modern Europe to 1870*, (New York, 1953), p. 656. Charles Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, 1830-41*, (London, 1951). 2 vols; The work is devoted entirely to Europe and the Near Eastern Question.
- ⁹ Monypenny and Buckle, *Disraeli*, II, 411-13.
- ¹⁰ Adolphus Ward and George P. Gooch, eds. *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1783-1919*, 3 vols. (Cambridge, England: 1922-23), II, 292-93. The allusion might be to the era of the 1830’s. Palmerston headed the Foreign Ministry from July 6, 1846 to February 23, 1852. See footnote 11.
- ¹¹ Adolphus Ward, et al., eds., *The Growth of Nationalities in the Cambridge Modern History* 13 vols. (London, 1903-11) XI, 17. Guizot arranged marriages for Queen Isabella of Spain and her sister (to the Duke of Montpensier, son Louis Philippe) in August, 1846, despite

- Palmerston's opposition. England was of course infuriated. J. H. Clapham wrote the relevant chapter for this information.
- ¹² William L. Langer, *Political and Social Upheaval: 1832-1852*. (in *Rise of Modern Europe* series edited by the author) New York, 1969 (Paperback), p. 404.
- ¹³ Monypenny and Buckle, *Disraeli*, III, 184-85; See also I, 218-19. Ostensibly Disraeli expressed this opinion for political reasons, as no grave threat to Britain existed at the moment from Russia.
- ¹⁴ Franklin C. Palm, *England and Napoleon III: A Study of the Rise of a Utopian Dictator*, (Durham, N.C., 1948), pp. 19-26. In 1848 the British mercantile class desired a strong French government, which would partly eliminate the economic chaos prevalent on both sides.
- ¹⁵ Benjamin Disraeli, *Home Letters: 1830-52*, ed. by Ralph Disraeli—a reprint (London: 1928), p. 300. Stanley mentioned the fact that Louis Napoleon had “been a brother special constable with him on the famous 10 of April (at the time of the threatening Chartist riot, 1848) when they traversed the Haymarket together for a couple of hours.”
- ¹⁶ Marchioness of Londonderry, ed. *Letters from Benjamin Disraeli to Frances Anne, Marchioness of Londonderry: 1837-1861* (London, 1938), pp. 49-50.
- ¹⁷ Disraeli, *Home Letters*, p. 311; see Londonderry, Letters, p. 109.
- ¹⁸ Palm, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-7.
- ¹⁹ Monypenny and Buckle, *Disraeli*, III, 395-96. Malmesbury was the foreign minister, Feb. 22—Dec. 20, 1852. See Lloyd Charles Sanders, “James Howard Harris, 1807-89,” *Dictionary of National Biography* edited by Leslie Stephen and Sidney Lee (Oxford: 1917), IX, 9-13.
- ²⁰ Thomas E. Kebbel, ed. *Selected Speeches of the Late Right Honourable, the Earl of Beaconsfield*, 2 vols (London: 1882), II, 3-41. Palm, *op. cit.*, p. 95. The French elections of November 22, 1852, registered an overwhelming victory for Louis Napoleon. In England, Lord Aberdeen, was Prime Minister of a Conservative-Liberal Coalition, Dec. 28, 1852-Jan. 20, 1855.
- ²¹ Monypenny and Buckle, *Disraeli*, III, 404.
- ²² Georg Fred. de Martens, ed., *Recueil de Traités d'alliance, de paix. depuis 1761 jusqu'à présent*, 4 vols. (2nd ed. rev., and aug. Gottingen: 1817-18), II, 297, Art. VII.
- ²³ Monypenny and Buckle, *Disraeli*, III, 521-22, 538-40. Hence it was impolitic to propose a peace budget on the eve of war. Leonid F. Strakhovsky, ed., *A Handbook of Slavic Studies*, (Cambridge, Mass., 1949), p. 302.
- ²⁴ Vernon J. Puryear, *International Economics and Diplomacy in the Near East* (Palo Alto, 1935), pp. 264. See the author's article “New Light on the Origins of the Crimean War” *Journal of Modern History*, III (1931), 219-34; also his *England, Russia and the Straits Question, 1844-56*, (Berkeley: 1931), pp. 481. For a brief economic interpretation of the background of the two decades preceding the war, see Valentin Giterman, *Geschichte Russlands*, 3 vols. (Zurich, 1944-49), III, 66-67.
- ²⁵ Monypenny and Buckle, *Disraeli*, III, 554, 566-572. Jacques Droz, *et al. L'Epoque Contemporaine*, Vol. I, *Restaurations et Révolutions (1815-1871)* or Vol. XII of *Clio: Introduction Aux Etudes Historiques* (Paris, France, 1953), 165-66; 189; 606-08. Robert W. Seton-Watson, *Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question, a study in diplomacy and party politics*, (New York, 1935), p. 2.
- ²⁶ Monypenny and Buckle, *Disraeli*, IV, 2-10, 48-49. Robert C. Binkley, *Realism and Nationalism, 1852-1871* (in *The Rise of Modern Europe* a series edited by William L. Langer) (New York, 1935) p. 175.

- ²⁷ Monypenny and Buckle, *Disraeli*, IV, 17-23; Binkley, *op. cit.*, p. 176.
- ²⁸ Georg F. R. Martens and continued by Charles Samwer, eds., *Nouveau Recueil Général de Traités, Convention . . .*, 20 vols (Gottingen: 1843-75), XV, 702-04, 770-88. Droz, *op. cit.*, XII, 607-08.
- ²⁹ Monypenny and Buckle, *op. cit.*, IV, 347, 317.
- ³⁰ T. C. Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates*, 3rd series, CLXXIV, 1360 ff.
- ³¹ Monypenny and Buckle, *op. cit.* III, 262-64; IV, 341-48. Lawrence D. Steefel, *The Schleswig-Holstein Question*, (Cambridge, Mass., 1932), pp. 400.
- ³² Monypenny and Buckle, *op. cit.*, IV, 341-48; 465-67, V, 125-27. Disraeli also stated that England was ready to interfere in European affairs if necessary; see Ward and Gooch, *op. cit.*, III, 9-10. Keibel, *op. cit.*, II, 80.
- ³³ Buckle, *The Letters of Queen Victoria*, I, 455-56. Lord Stanley became the 14th Earl of Derby; this citation is to avoid confusion of names.
- ³⁴ Monypenny and Buckle, *Disraeli*, IV, 598-99; V, 80, 125-34. One of the indirect results of the French catastrophe of 1870 was Russia's repudiation of several clauses regarding the Black Sea area in the Treaty of Paris, 1856.
- ³⁵ Ward and Gooch, *op. cit.*, III, 77-78. D. C. Somervell, *English Thought in the Nineteenth Century* (New York, 1927), pp. 173-74; the speech at the Crystal Palace, 1872, affirmed British imperialism.
- ³⁶ Marquis of Zetland, ed., *The Letters of Disraeli to Lady Chesterfield and Lady Bradford*, 2 vols (London: 1929), I, 363-64, the letter of September 6, 1875.
- ³⁷ Monypenny and Buckle, *Disraeli*, V, 420-27. This prophecy was vindicated by the two World Wars, 1914-18, 1939-45.
- ³⁸ Marquis of Zetland, *op. cit.*, I, 240.
- ³⁹ Monypenny and Buckle, *Disraeli*, V, 407-12. For a contrary view see Herbert Heaton, *Economic History of Europe* (New York, 1936), p. 568.
- ⁴⁰ E. A. J. Johnson, *Some Origins of the Modern Economic World* (New York, 1936), pp. 148-51; see Herbert Feis, *Europe the World's Banker, 1870-1914* (New Haven: 1930) pp. 382-97; 463-69. U.S. Department of State, *The Suez Canal Problem . . .*, pp. 1-20.
- ⁴¹ Monypenny and Buckle, *Disraeli*, V, 412-13. Lord Derby's letter to Disraeli, April 24, 1874. Ministère des Affaires étrangères, *Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1871-1914*, 1st series, 12 vols (1871-1900), (Paris, 1929-), II, 19-20; 20-32.
- ⁴² André Maurois, *Disraeli, A Picture of the Victorian Age*, trans. from the French by Hamish Miles. (New York, 1925), p. 379. Maurois, Disraeli's French biographer, stressed his courage. Charles Whibley, *Lord John Manners and His Friends*, 2 vols. (London, 1925), II, 178-79. Blake, *Disraeli*, pp. 581-87.
- ⁴³ Monypenny and Buckle, *Disraeli*, V, 442-48. Seton-Watson, *Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question*, pp. 25-27. With Parliament in recess and money urgent, Disraeli appealed to his friends, the Rothschilds, in lieu of the Bank of England. See Carlton J. H. Hayes, *A Generation of Materialism 1871-1900*, in the series "The Rise of Modern Europe" edited by William F. Langer, (New York, 1941), pp. 227,230,373. By 1882 Egypt, still under Ottoman Suzerainty, became in its lower region a virtual satellite state of Great Britain alone.
- ⁴⁴ Monypenny and Buckle, *Disraeli*, V, 453.
- ⁴⁵ Zetland, *op. cit.*, I, 306-08; see the letter of November 26, 1875. Sidney B. Fay, *The Origins of the World War* (2nd ed. rev.; New York, 1930; reprint 1947), p. 97.

- ⁴⁶ Zetland, *op. cit.*, I, 305-06; see Algernon Cecil, *British Foreign Secretaries* (New York: 1927), p. 201.
- ⁴⁷ Harold W. V. Temperley, "Disraeli and Cyprus," *English Historical Review* 46 (April-July, 1931), 274-79; 457-60. Disraeli suggested the acquisition of Cyprus in 1847. Pierre Renouvin, *et al*, *L'Epoque Contemporaine*, Vol. II, *La Paix Armée et la Grande Guerre, 1871-1919* of Vol. IX or *Clio: Introduction aux Etudes Historiques* (Paris, 1947), pp. 395 & 406. Blake, *Disraeli*, pp. 652-54, 760.
- ⁴⁸ George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1956), pp. 399-430; 487-500; 535-36. David Lawrence, "Suez Issue Really Matter of Honoring Treaties," *South Bend Tribune* (Monday, October 15, 1956), Editorial Page, p. 8. In the light of this article, Lawrence's claims that the Suez is "merely" a matter of honoring treaties brings out only a part of the truth. The forces of nationalism and anti-colonialism, the passage of time, and the new circumstances all cried out for equity in Egypt.
- ⁴⁹ Raymond James Sontag, *Germany and England, Background of Conflict, 1848-1894*, (New York, 1938), pp. 122-24.

