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The Germanies: United or Divided?¹

by Raymond J. Maras, Ph.D.

As everyone knows the present existence of two Germanies is a stark historical fact, the by-product of man's military activity in recent history. As a problem its solution is a crying imperative challenge to man's consummate statecraft or diplomacy. In our nuclear age the very peace of the world rests perhaps solely on what may happen to the German people. For that most grave reason, and since the problem will not disappear or solve itself, the subject warrants most serious attention.

Let us first analyze how it happened that the divided Germanies arose. It is a well-known fact that the totalitarian states of Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia and Fascist Italy attempted to build a "new order" in Europe during the generation following the first World War. Their plans led to the second World War involving, among other nations, the United States. After the Normandy Invasion the Americans marched eastward; however, the Russians had already thundered forward into the west — after the turn of the tide at Stalingrad. The resultant well-organized and coordinated attack upon the enemy in Europe ended in the unconditional surrender, division, and occupation of all of Germany by Spring, 1945. For the first time in their short history as an independent nation, the Germans were overrun, divided, and occupied. (In part history was repeated. Two centuries ago Russian troops occupied Berlin.) No more grievous humiliation can a nation suffer unless it be extinction as a people.

Meanwhile diplomats at the Yalta conference and the subsequent one at Potsdam in July, 1945, discussed the problem of "Germany." Their solution called principally for a temporary but indefinite (in time) occupation, the promotion of economic unity, and eventually free elections among the German people concerning their political unity.² Since 1945 only the first has been fulfilled — temporary military occupation — but twenty years later there is still no terminal date in sight, nor any hint of withdrawal of the "occupying" armies. What is really in store for the German people? History informs us that the ancient Romans occupied Britain for well-nigh four centuries. It also tells us that after World War I the occupation of certain parts of Germany was quite short. Both occupations, the long and the short, were temporary. Neither example may apply to the Germans today. Actually, the solution depends on the carrying out of the *final purpose* or *end* which anyone has in mind for the German people. After all, it is the goal one has in mind that provides the necessary dynamism and direction.

Before discussing the complex implications of division and unification, let us survey the historical record of German political unity and disunity down to the present time. Undoubtedly we will derive a better appreciation of one of mankind's most difficult political problems and perhaps extract some insight into its solution. One

should consider that the German solution involves Europe as well as world civilization, hence the problem is more than an ordinary one. Marx, Trotsky, and others realized the importance of a Communist dominated Germany. For them a Communist Germany undoubtedly would make more probable the Communist world revolution and world domination, and certainly Communist hegemony in, perhaps control of, Europe on the continent.³ Let us review the record concerning German unification.

While such nation-states as Spain, Portugal, France, England, Poland, and others were arising during the Middle Ages, thanks to the historical development of Europe, the German people became part of the medieval "Roman" Empire. For imperial and feudal reasons political unity, constituted predominantly of German peoples, failed in the thirteenth century. The spirit of particularism as well as that of imperial "universalism" prevented national roots from shooting deeply and fruitfully into the soil. That condition continued during the decline of the Middle Ages and into early Modern Times. The religious upheavals of the sixteenth century compounded problems of solidarity.^{3a}

The pattern just sketched persisted until the seventeenth century. In this epoch a vigorous and strident force arose in the form of an institution that became the chrysalis from which German unification emerged. I refer here to the Hohenzollern dynasty, a legitimate kingly house only as of 1701. At this time conditions appeared optimum for the eventual fashioning of a nation-state in central Europe under the aegis of Prussia. Unfortunately the failure of Frederick II and the presence of a sufficiently strong Holy Roman Empire thwarted Prussia's realization of a nation-state and great-power status. As a result Germans remained divided, a condition attested by the fact that in 1800 there were approximately 300 petty German states on the European political checkerboard. It took the combined triple torches of the French Revolution, the Prussian defeat at Jena, 1806, and the resurgence of nationalism to ignite the "spirit" seeking nation-statehood in the classic age of European self-determination and national pride. It required well-nigh three-quarters of a century, several successful wars, and great individual and national effort to achieve political unification by 1870-71.

It is true that the German peoples missed a golden opportunity in 1848 during the liberally-minded Frankfurt Assembly to form a unified state. However, because the movement was liberal, it lacked the blessing of the crown and the support of the conservative elements among the people. Moreover, provincial revolutions alarmed Frederick William IV, the Prussian king, who also feared the revolutionary spirit at Frankfurt. The result was that 1848 failed to turn the German people in the right direction. Once again Prussia submitted to Austrian power.

Although idealistic aspirations to unity failed fulfillment, there were men of realism just yearning for opportunity to implement their ideas. Such a one was the Prussian Prince Otto von Bismarck, advocate of a "blood and iron" policy, who, with the Prussian army, hammered out German unification in the decade after 1861. In

retrospect Bismarck's psychic qualifications for unifying the German people make him the right man with the right methods at the right place at the right moment. Bismarck's prepossessing inspiration was German unification; he relied on Prussian leadership and nationalism; and his central purpose was the defeat of Austria and France to effect the unprecedented unification of a new Germany. Bismarck's successes in the three successive military conflicts against Denmark, Austria, and France awakened the "British lion" and frightened Europe. Bismarck's furthering of German development by defeating other nations followed the political fashion of the times. The United States, Japan, even Italy were also united in the modern manner, i.e., in the crucible of war or revolution. The nation-state philosophy reigned triumphant. The world by 1870 had entered a new era of *machtpolitik*, keeping in step with the vertiginous achievements of science and technology.⁴ So under Bismarck, for the first time in their history the German people were unified under their own sovereign state. As a consequence the course of history would be much different than it had been. Liberalism had failed to achieve unity in 1848.

Bismarck's "mailed fist" fashioned unity and a second Reich but at an unbelievable price. Alan J. P. Taylor and Erich Eyck, controversial historians, evaluated the price which the German people paid for unity. The price was a monarchical, albeit benevolent, despotism in lieu of a democracy springing from parliamentary monarchy. Social and economic paternalism, militarism, the general staff, and *realpolitik* were the ogres emerging from Pandora's box of evils.⁵ The mighty torrent of history could not be reversed. The die had been cast. The course of future German history had been shaped although the details and vicissitudes remained unknown. It appears that enthusiasm of successive victories, both military and domestic, and the pride of superiority and potential, fostered in the new German nation an overconfidence that would prove disastrous.

This supreme overconfidence proved fateful for Germany in the recent era of the two world wars. It explains the tragic insouciance both of the Kaiser in June and early July, 1914, in his rapport with Austria-Hungary as well as that of General Moltke in August, 1914, when he sent his naive telegram, though failing to carry out the classic Schlieffen strategy. As a result of this blunder, Allied doggedness and America's entry in 1917, Germany lost the war and once again became disunited, partly occupied, and anarchic. Afterwards as an untried republic, it existed as a feeble nation until the appearance of demonic Nazism and Hitler's fantastic dream for a Third Reich or New Order. After many amazing internal and foreign successes, Hitler's mad schemes and deeds precipitated a second world war in Europe that terminated in unconditional surrender, dismemberment, and total occupation of Germany. After twenty years, this condition, although somewhat modified, still persists into our times. Thus as an induction from the above data, one may state that historically, especially in modern times, Germany has not been a united nation-state for any extended period of time—the longest was from 1870-1918, a period of forty-eight years, or less than a western man's average life span today. Although such is

the verdict of history, disunion is not an ineluctable fate as historicism would have us conclude, and union the exception.

This juncture of German history brings us to a necessary and urgent consideration and question. According to the postulates of nationality and of self-determination, principles accepted by all peoples today, one may ask the question whether or not the German people are entitled to a national unity that is being obviously withheld? *Prima facie* consideration would certainly reply in the affirmative, that since nationhood is acceptable and the trend current throughout the world today, unity and self-determination are proper and entirely in order. An interesting insight on this matter is provided by Boyd C. Shafer.⁶ He holds that natural and national boundaries are a product of historical circumstances and man's activity, that boundaries constantly shift, and that there are no permanent national boundaries. This view is further abetted by the fact that ten million German people have returned to "Germany" proper from areas no longer under German control—e.g., western Poland, the Czech Sudetenland, and so on. In other words there is no unredeemed segment of German people. Moreover, the presence of N.A.T.O. and the United Nations further buttresses the argument for the safety of Europe, given German unification. Also, the Potsdam agreement postulated that political unity should be preceded by economic unity and cooperation. In his inaugural address of January 4, 1965, President Johnson advocated German unity and self-determination.

The question thus arises as to why there has been no unification and why there remains a divided Germany. Is Germany a threat to the peace? To the established status-quo? According to Mr. Taylor there are basically two sides to the German question: 1) How can the peoples of Europe be secured against German aggression? 2) How can the Germans discover a settled, peaceful form of political existence?⁷ For other observers there is also the problem of integrating the entire land into the comity of nations, a point which may be part of the second question.⁸ Another but divergent aspect of the entire problem has been put in this way: How can we (the Western Powers) build up Germany as a Great Power and use her as an ally against the Soviet Union without risk of her turning against us? Against Europe? Mr. Taylor believes that such a *tour de force* is impossible since a great and independent Germany would have full freedom of action.⁹

Various Great Powers occupying the Germanies are vitally concerned with the German problem. So are the European powers of the second degree, such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and the others. Moreover, the status quo arrangements established at Yalta, Rheims (May, 1945), and at Potsdam have prevailed up to the present time. "The decision to create occupation zones was a political one, over which Supreme Commander Eisenhower had little control. In September, 1944 the European Advisory Commission . . . signed a protocol that laid out three (a fourth for the French was added at Yalta) separate occupation zones for postwar Germany, plus a special Allied joint authority for greater Berlin."¹⁰

At the Yalta meeting of February, 1945, a time when American troops recovered

from the “Battle of the Bulge,” the Soviet armies were pushing close to Germany proper — Soviet troops had arrived on the edge of the Danube and Oder Rivers, and had penetrated into Bulgaria and even Yugoslavia — the U.S.S.R., taking advantage of its bargaining position, pressed for and obtained the division of Germany as well as territorial concessions. In other words much in the Yalta agreement concerning Central and East Europe was the Soviet price for military assistance in the Far East. As a result, with the Pacific war still going on in mounting intensity and success costly for the United States, the balance of power, certainly in Europe, had swung for the moment in favor of the U.S.S.R. The conference at Potsdam of July-August, 1945 ratified the arrangements concerning the German nation, although the United States went on record that it did not regard them as final.¹¹

By 1947 with the failure of the London conference of foreign ministers primarily the responsibility of the U.S.S.R., it was already tacitly understood that the wartime allies would be unable to unify the occupied zones into a single Germany.¹² In fact there was a failure in economic cooperation. As a result, in the following decade two Germanies were created and these have survived to the present time. In addition to the real division, many verbal proposals concerning a united or divided Germany have been submitted and discussed; these may best be subsumed under three categories: 1) realistic, 2) idealistic, and 3) the particular proposals of individuals.

It is true that we are continuing to live in an era of intense or exaggerated nationalism, marked by an acceptance of sovereignty and self-determination. These principles have been recognized in the Charter of the United Nations. Thus by the mere formal recognition of these principles it would appear that the German people have an imprescriptible right to national unity. So far the logic appears incontrovertible. But there can be no doubt that the German problem is more complicated than the accomplishment of the desired unity — ergo the present division and tension.

The ultimate consideration at this juncture of events is undoubtedly the preservation of peace as well as the fostering of conditions for a lasting peace with freedom and prosperity. Germans and other Europeans, all Americans as well, must assume that peace, freedom and prosperity are the basic aspirations of the peoples of Europe and the world. Herbert Hoover’s prerequisite for peace is mankind’s strong will and desire for peace.¹³ Hence one should consider which conditions would best promote the well-being of all Europeans. Presently, a divided Germany, the result of World War II, and arrangements among the wartime allies, seems to be the only viable, *realistic* type of *modus vivendi* possible — in all respects a procrustean solution in contrast to the situation of 1939 or 1871. Unfortunately, the arrangement has necessitated the presence of scores of generals, an “overkill” quantity of nuclear arms, and the constant alert of hundreds of thousands of occupation troops backed by civilian economies heavily geared to war. Nevertheless, since unity has not been attained, the German people remain dissatisfied.¹⁴ Justification of the division comes from the resultant peace even though qualified by the “cold war” atmosphere of international relations.

The *idealistic*, really a neutral, solution may be set forth as follows. Since the indispensable pre-conditions for the tranquillity of Europe must be peace, freedom and prosperity, some solution making possible a united Germany has to be found to incorporate these desiderata. Do the German people themselves believe that their unity would best foster these objectives? Let us be historically minded and suppose hypothetically that Germany were united as it had been before the outbreak of war in 1937. For a time peace, freedom and prosperity would be undoubtedly cultivated. As a result confidence would mount, and energetic nationalists would proclaim once again this time perhaps not for *drang nach osten*, but for *terra irredenta*. It seems likely that territorial revisionism would once again rise to the fore. It appears unlikely that a vigorous, dynamic Germany, enmeshed in present political and economic circumstances, would not be apt to pursue the path sketched above.

From what has just been postulated, does this mean that Germany should remain divided and the hopes of the people unfulfilled? Not at all. The *idealistic* solution embraces and claims to satisfy German hopes. It is contended that the national ambitions of a united Germany may best be fulfilled in a political orientation larger than the increasingly antiquated nation-state system, despite the paradox of contemporary nationalistic fever. In fact, this appears to be the development today in the Common Market and N.A.T.O. Although Europeans fear that a united Germany would dominate the re-alignment of states, such a resolution need not be ideal for the German people only, because they as well as the others would belong to a larger political configuration. Such a solution, either a confederation or federation, would have the natural and spiritual requisites to be independent, free, prosperous, and peaceful. On the other hand, *prima facie* it appears, this resolution would give up all hope of restoring the eastern European countries to a non-Communist orientation. This, however, need not be necessarily so, for in time these east European countries could be included in a dynamic, developing Europe. And if Soviet Russia's ideological stand continues to be modified under the exigencies of reality, a truly united Europe, in adaptation to evolving historical forces, would conceivably be the end result and desirably so.¹⁵ By sublimating national pride in this larger scheme of historic reality German hopes may be satisfied and the peace and prosperity of Europe obtained and guaranteed. Practical and moral consideration would loom foremost in German and other European minds. Individual national interests would be subordinated to regional, even to world stability, all a prelude to a "golden age" of unprecedented magnitude and scope.¹⁶

The most obdurate factor complicating, and hindering, the solution of the German problem appears to be the U.S.S.R. and Communist ideology. How can one resolve the question of unification, European security, and opposing ideologies? Pitirim A. Sorodin, the eminent sociologist, has set forth the theory that as a rule war breaks out between two societies with mutually incompatible systems of value.¹⁷ For a moment let us consider several other specific proposals concerning the German predicament that have been put forth in the recent past. What have the French pro-

posed for a solution of the problem? This is an important question because of France's legitimate fears for her own security in the wake of three conquests since 1870. Jacques Soustelle, former secretary of the Gaullist party, has advocated a Franco-German agreement as the basis of a confederated Europe.¹⁸ Although the confederation has not fructified, a Franco-German partnership was negotiated in January, 1963. Its triple significance may comprise: 1) the ending of hereditary hostility between the two peoples; 2) eliminating the German "threat" to European and world peace; 3) fashioning a western solidarity (aided by the United States) strong enough to contain the U.S.S.R.¹⁹ The partnership may contain an element of negation because two virile states might find it a blow to national pride to have one or the other subordinate itself to the other's leadership.²⁰ From an altruistic point of view, Jean Monnet, chief author of the European Common Market, has held that the solution to Europe's largest problem — German division — "lies in the melding of all the nations of Europe." Also, Paul Henri Spaak, Belgium's statesman, has stated that the time has come for the Common Market nations to create new political institutions of cooperation, and suggested "that although a supranational federal United States of Europe remained the ultimate goal, his plan presented a lesser aim: a confederal unity leaving each of the Six a nation sovereign and intact."²¹ Spaak's position like the others implies a divided Germany for the present.

Konrad Adenauer, until recently head of the West German government and advocate of western orientation of West Germany, has claimed that the U.S.S.R. desires a disunited Europe and that it would control Europe unless the United States remains on watch in Europe. Moreover, and despite the partnership with France, Adenauer regarded a united Germany as having a vital role in a European federation which would include a role for England as well.²² One may recall that in 1951 the Western Powers proclaimed an end to the state of war with Germany; four years later West Germany was recognized as a sovereign state with admittance to N.A.T.O. and the West European Union.

In 1952 Dean Acheson, then Secretary of State of the United States, favored a policy of containment of Communism by establishing a partially unified Germany, simultaneously incorporated into a European Defense Community, in liaison with N.A.T.O., thereby channeling aggressive German militaristic tendencies into a constructive and positive form.²³ The immediate American goal appears to be the prevention of any drastic change in the present equilibrium of total power, especially "through an Eastern orientation of a united Germany. It has made common cause with Germany in maintaining the illusion that Germany's Western orientation will be the instrument for the realization of its national aims. This illusion has created schizophrenia in the German mind: it has set itself objectives which cannot be achieved by the means chosen."²⁴

Besides maintaining the existing division of Germany, ostensibly unsatisfactory to no one, the Soviet government has offered the goal of unification to the Germans. The Soviet note of March 10, 1952, "held out the bait of reunification to the Ger-

man people in return for a commitment on the part of Germany, to neutrality and isolation.”²⁵ During the Khrushchev era, the Soviet desire was directed toward “an eastern orientation of a united Germany,” perhaps through a kind of “Rapallo” agreement. Also, Soviet Russia time and again had threatened to recognize an independent East Germany; hence, the Soviet government has offered a solution to Berlin “as a bargaining counterweight to the recognition of the East German regime, which in turn implies a complete change in the present balance of power.”²⁶

Mr. Morgenthau, the American scientist, regards West Germany’s power as of supreme importance in the positioning of the United States and the U.S.S.R. This power, he stated — excessively — stems from two principal sources: 1) there are the circumstances that have prevailed in Europe since the attainment of unity in 1870-71; her industrial and scientific “know-how” and capability have made West Germany the “most productive industrial plant on the continent.” Thus West Germany seemingly could make herself the master of Europe. But it is this mastery which the other peoples of Europe have refused to accept and which they have fought two world wars in this century to prevent.²⁷ For this same reason the United States and de Gaulle “have endeavored to integrate Germany into a larger whole, be it an Atlantic Community, a federated Europe, or a Europe dominated by a Franco-German combination.”²⁸ 2) The other source of power paradoxically is Germany’s division since 1945. The recovery of lost provinces and unification “are the two national objectives to which repeated official declarations and public opinion polls assign the highest priority. When Germany joined N.A.T.O. in 1954 she did so with the understanding that her allies would support these aspirations, and the United States has consistently done so.”²⁹ But, Morgenthau wrote: “there is in the foreseeable future no chance for the recovery of the eastern provinces and the unification of the country as long as the Soviet Union is opposed to this and has the power to prevent it.” Consequently the road to realizing German objectives “leads through a German understanding with the Soviet Union.” Moreover, Mr. Morgenthau believes that the governments of Bonn and Washington “are verbally committed to the illusory proposition that their military alliance is the instrument for unification and the recovery of the eastern provinces.”³⁰ Actually he understood the commitment as no more than verbal; whereas in fact it is part of a N.A.T.O. resolution, which included the United Kingdom, France and the United States, stating: “A peace settlement for the whole of Germany, freely negotiated between Germany and her former enemies, which should lay the foundation of a lasting peace, remains an essential aim of their policy.”³¹ For some time the Bonn government has known that the United States cannot weaken the alliance for fear of weakening its own strength. This consideration, added Morgenthau, has given West Germany a veto over the European policies of the United States. Hence any accommodation between the latter and the U.S.S.R. on the basis of the *status quo* is usually of concern to West Germany, which regards such an action as incompatible with its aspirations.³² Here one may apply Churchill’s paradigm concerning the Soviet Union: the German problem remains “a riddle

wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.”

It seems, moreover, that the Russians and their satellites fear a war of revenge as evidenced by the agitation in West Germany for unification and recovery of lost provinces.³³ On the other hand, it has been pointed out that the Germans themselves may perhaps regard such aspirations for unity as merely sentiment and a moral commitment. But Morgenthau regards the condition as “inherently an unhealthy state of affairs for a political elite to commit itself in public to objectives which it admits in private cannot be realized in the foreseeable future. The moment of truth is bound to come. When it comes, will the leaders be capable of trimming the professed objectives down to the level of the means safely available, or will they embark upon risky policies in order to keep popular favor?” In other words, is traditional German expansionist ambition a thing of the past? This is the bold question that has been posed and it has been remarked that only an ambiguous answer can be given: there is a revulsion and there is “a new national assertiveness.”³⁴ Thus real ambivalence colors the resolution of the German problem.

So in summary two general theoretical solutions, idealistic and realistic, appear to contain the answers to the German problem. Neither procedure will expunge every danger from the scene. Idealism promises German unity in a European confederation (or federation at most), but lurking in the background is the possible remote threat that revisionism may once again be repeated in history. Realism would retain the situation divided as it exists for fear that something worse would be substituted issuing in a new Pandora’s box of evils. In addition, the individual proposals for the greater part have the common deficiency of failing to comprehend what Europe really is or refuse to consider the historic and geographical oneness of Europe. Also, most of the proposals suffer from incompleteness — disregarding either part of Germany, or eastern Europe; in consequence the proposals set forth thus far have been at best only “remedial.” As such any of them undoubtedly might, if implemented, sow the seeds of another war.³⁵ Great things are expected of the present generation of leaders. The challenge is indeed titanic. The response must be commensurate if mankind is to move on to a better world. It is worthwhile trying — for our sake as well as for the sake of those who will come after us. The peoples of Europe must solve their own problems. The United Nations should encourage any development toward peace, and prosperity.³⁶ Is not the idealism sketched above the true realism? Surely, old-fashioned realism in Europe or Asia is out-of-date; both it and the mentality which gives it birth must be consigned to the garbage can. Only then will mankind be able to live in peace, freedom and dignity.

FOOTNOTES

I have benefited from the combined suggestions of Jozef Patyk, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, and of John Kutolowski, Assistant Professor, Department of History.

1 An excellent brief discussion of the German problem since the second World War is contained in the following reference: Foreign Policy Association, *Great Decisions . . . 1965* (New York: Foreign Policy Associ-

ation, Inc., 1965), pp. 16-26. My presentation is radically different, more historical, and covers a longer time-span.

2 Walter C. Langsam, *Historic Documents of World War II* (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1958), pp. 104, 115-16.

3 Karl Marx or Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto in Capital, The Communist Manifesto and Other Writings (with an essay on Marxism by V. I. Lenin)*, ed. by Max Eastman, (New York: Modern Library, 1932), p. 355, 367.

3a Professor Patyk claims that the Empire provided the German people with a sense of unity.

4 Friedrich Meinecke, *Machiavellianism. The Doctrine of Raison d'Etat and Its Place in Modern History* trans. by Douglas Scott from the German (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), p. 396.

5 Erich Eyck, *Bismarck and The Second Empire* (1st ed. 1950 and 2nd ed.; London: Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1951). Alan J. P. Taylor, *The Course of German History* (London: Coward-McCann, 1945).

Otto Pflanze upheld the same conclusion in his *Bismarck and the Development of Germany: The Period of Unification, 1815-1871* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963).

6 Boyd C. Shafer *Nationalism: Interpreters and Interpretations* (2nd ed.; New York: Macmillan, 1963), p. 6.

7 Taylor, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

8 Kenneth M. Setton and Henry R. Winkler, eds., *Great Problems in Western Civilization* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1954), pp. 628-35.

9 Taylor, *loc. cit.*

10 *Time*, (September 29, 1961), p. 19.

11 John L. Snell, *Wartime Origins of The East-West Dilemma Over Germany* (New Orleans: Hauser, 1959). Also his *Illusion and Necessity: The Diplomacy of Global War, 1939-1945* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), pp. 178, 190-91. Langsam, *loc. cit.*

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., *Roosevelt and the Russians. The Yalta Conference* ed. by Walter Johnson (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1949), p. ix; the former Secretary of State stated that Yalta was not appeasement; also see pp. 295-307, 338, 346-47.

12 Setton and Winkler, *op. cit.*, p. 628. Professor Patyk believes that in 1945 and shortly thereafter, the Soviet Union purported to support German unification expecting such a position to appeal to the German people. When the Soviet Union discovered that it had no great following in the Germanies, it retreated from its indirect policy.

13 Herbert C. Hoover and Hugh Gibson, *The Problems of Lasting Peace* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1942).

14 David S. Collier and Kurt Glaser, eds., *Berlin and The Future of Europe* (Chicago: Regnery, 1963), pp. 124-5; see p. 188 for a listing of five general alternative policies toward Germany.

15 A united Europe would not necessarily make for a "smaller" version of the nation-state system in the world. It could make the United Nations more effective thereby minimizing, if not eradicating, even the "balance of power" mentality that has been an obsession of the Western mind since the fifteenth century.

16 For a similar and optimistic appreciation and resolution of the problem see Zbigniew Brzezinski's "Russia and Europe," *Foreign Affairs* XLII (Oct.-July, 1963-64), 434-37, 443-44. Also in the same spirit, see Walter Hallstein, *United Europe — Challenge and Opportunity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. ix-x, 59, 70, 90, 95. However, Hallstein failed to envision a real United Europe that would include eastern Europe, hence it is really a divided Europe.

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17 Pitirim A. Sorokin, "The Cause and Factors of War and Peace" in *The Quest for Political Unity in World History* edited by Stanley Pargellis, *Annual Report of the American Historical Association*, III, (1942), pp. 628-30.

18 Jacques Soustelle, "France and Europe: A Gaullist View," *Foreign Affairs* XXX (1951-52), pp. 546-48, cited in Setton and Winkler, *op. cit.*, pp. 628-30.

19 *Dayton Daily News* (January 20, 1963), p. 3, Section 3. For text of the treaty see *New York Times* (January 23, 1963), pp. 2, 8.

20 *Cleveland Plain Dealer* (December 27, 1964), p. 21.

21 *Time* (September 18, 1964), pp. 39-40.

22 Extract in Setton and Winkler, *op. cit.*, pp. 631-32.

23 *Ibid.*, pp. 632-33. Presently, Senator James William Fulbright of Arkansas reposes great faith in a "unified" Atlantic Community as the "model and magnet for the entire world . . ." See his *Projects for the West*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 63. Also Karl E. Meyer, ed., *Fulbright of Arkansas*, (Washington, D.C.: Luce, 1963), pp. 155-59.

24 Hans J. Morgenthau, "Germany Gives Rise to Vast Uncertainties," *The New York Times Magazine* (September 8, 1963), p. 119. Brzezinski, *op. cit.*, *passim*. The American Policy appears to be restricted to maintenance of the status-quo on the Elbe river; also in principle the United States advocates reunification. Consequently, the author warns that the maintenance of a divided Europe (and Germany) by the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. would be "dangerous," and make possible a "European collaboration with Russia against America."

An interesting co-relation between the American mentality and American action was provided by Michael Haney's "Communication Gap," *The Denver Post* (August 17, 1964), editorial page. Haney wrote about the phenomena of "doublethink," i.e. ". . . the ability to hold two contradictory beliefs in one's mind simultaneously and to accept both of them. Americans use doublethink more often than they realize it at all. An example will illustrate this:

"We speak frequently of the 'free world.' In it we include not only democracies and republics based on free elections and freedom of expression but also all the various dictatorships not under Communist control. 'Free world' does not mean, as the words seem to indicate, states which have political freedom.

"This lack of communication and the characteristic doublethink result in grave consequences both at home and abroad." Haney derived his idea from George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four*.

25 (None), *Berlin: Crisis and Challenge*, (New York: German Information Center, 19 - -), p. 35.

26 *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2. Morgenthau, *The New York Times Magazine*, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

27 Morgenthau, *New York Times Magazine*, *op. cit.*, p. 117. In reality Germany's political unification should be rated as the supreme fact in the history of Europe of the nineteenth Century.

28 *Ibid.*, p. 21.

29 *Ibid.*

30 *Ibid.*, p. 117.

31 *Berlin: Crisis and Challenge*, p. 65.

32 Morgenthau, *loc. cit.*

33 Senator Fulbright wrote recently that "Soviet policy toward Germany cannot be understood entirely, or

even predominantly, in terms of the expansionist ambitions of the Soviet Union. It stems at least as much from Russia's historic fear of and admiration for German power." From *Prospects for the West*, p. 28.

34 Morgenthau, *New York Times Magazine*, *op. cit.*, pp. 117-18. Also see Hugh Seton-Watson, *Neither Peace Nor War: The Struggle for Power in the Post-War World* (New York: Praeger, 1960), p. 349, on the indifference of the Germans concerning their "abandoned" homelands.

35 Fulbright, *Prospects for the West*, p. 41. The central question facing the West is therefore: "What is to replace the classical 'European age'. . . On it the future evolution of the United States depends."

36 On a different approach to peace than that espoused by the United States and Soviet Russia, see Leslie Dewart, "Soviet-American Diplomacy and *Pacem in Terris*," in *Cross Currents* (Summer, 1964), pp. 287, 299, 309-11. See Quincy Wright, "The Historic Circumstances of Enduring Peace," *Annual Report of the American Historical Association*, III (1942), pp. 370-73. Also *Saturday Review* (August 29, 1964), p. 193.