

ETHICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: A NORMATIVE ACCOUNT

BY

ABIODUN PAUL AFOLABI

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Supervisor: Prof. Uchenna Okeja

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Abstract

Consider, for instance, you and your family have lived around a place where you enjoyed the flora and fauna of the land as well as the natural environment. Fishing and farming were pleasant activities for your family, and anyone in the community not only to survive but thrive. Your neighbours and the people in the community pride themselves so much in their farming abilities and fishing techniques. Suddenly things start taking a different turn because of rising sea level and changing weather pattern. First, your land began to give way because of sweeping erosion, and later the riverbank serving the community starts drying up. Your neighbour could not hold their own in this grim condition as they started relocating. You even witnessed some of your family and friends leaving the community and you later heard that they have become climate refugees. To put it all together, you were told that what you are experiencing is one of climate change effects. You were told that the loss of the place that you once cherished is not an act of God but the result of the reckless flaring of greenhouse gasses harmful to the environment by some powerful but polluting nations. What will you do?

This might sound like a fairy tale. In reality, this is the story of the people of Saint Louis Atlantic Coasts in Senegal, captured by the *Global Climate Change Alliance Plus Initiative*.¹ Their situation has been described as ‘living on the edge’ because for centuries, Saint Louis Atlantic Coasts, home to around 230,000 inhabitants, also known as the ‘Venice of Africa’ has been protected from the pounding Atlantic waves by the ‘Lingue de Barbarie,’ a narrow, 30 km peninsula at the mouth of the Senegal river. However, the low-lying sandy spit of land along this World Heritage site is itself rapidly disappearing in the present. This is the consequence of a changing climate and other man-made problems such as illegal sand-mining and over-development. Today, the southern part of the Lingue de Barbarie is an island, and the village of Doune Baba Dieye is under more than a metre of water. The villagers have become climate refugees, forced to live in temporary camps on the mainland. Not only have they lost their homes, but they have also lost significant cultural heritage like the farming and fishing culture tied to this place.

The ethical considerations that emerge from climate change impacts on the world’s cultural heritage are varied. However, it seems not as self-evident in the way that research on climate change ethics has been framed around economic interest and direct threats to human life and other species. Even when they mention climate impacts on heritage sites around the world, those of Africans have been side-lined. For instance, the impact of climate change on small island nations like Tuvalu, Kiribati² have gained much traction in climate change discourse, but we do not get to see stories of Africans whose cherished cultural heritage are affected by climate despoliation. How do we respond to this intractable challenge? This is a question of justice and, to be more precise, climate justice.

¹ This story was adapted from the publication of *The Global Climate Change Alliance Plus Initiative*. The title of the story is “The Climate Refugees from the Venice of Africa” see <https://www.gcca.eu/stories/climate-refugees-venice-africa>. Accessed, January, 2021.

² For a detailed discussion on the Impacts of Climate Change in *Tuvalu* Island, see Farbotko, C. (2011).

Many principles and proposals for climate justice have been put forward, but the insufficient attention to the vulnerabilities or loss of cultural heritage values of Africans, which is a critical aspect of their social realities, make these theories less persuasive on a global level. This thesis, then, fills this gap in the literature by suggesting that the failure to take cognizance of the injustice in neglecting cultural heritage values when dealing with the burden of climate change is the effect of three problems. One, the value of culture is less understood in this environmental age. Hence, cultural values are excluded or made to be secondary in consideration of principles of climate justice. Second, the idea of Personhood has been neglected in climate ethics and climate justice discourse. Yet, this idea of Personhood can be an enabler of climate justice in that a realization of the significance of cultural heritage to the wellness of the human persons in Africa, makes its loss morally reprehensible. Third, those whose cultural heritage is significantly affected do not get represented in the debate about sharing the burden of climate change.

This dissertation thereby builds upon the general findings of the past about anthropogenic climate change, its causes and consequences. Adopting a discursive normative framework, I also address the significance of cultural heritage in this contemporary environmental age and discuss the global justice implications of cultural heritage loss to climate change. This dissertation further provides a critique of mainstream climate justice theories, especially their marginalization of the cultural dimension of climate change. In this regard, the metaphor - 'cultural storm' was deployed to argue that climate justice discourses have neither factored the deep socio-cultural impact of climate change nor do they draw on the cultural understanding of justice in putting forward their theories. Given the nature of the indirect, cumulative, and interconnected invisible losses to cultural heritage from climate change, it seems unlikely that they can be addressed by simple tweaks of the climate justice status quo.

This dissertation proposes that the idea of personhood in African philosophy, can be conceived to ensure climate justice live up to its expectations in a world of diverse persons dealing with a complex phenomenon like climate change. It argues that a cultural dimension of climate ethics has implications for how mitigation, adaptation and compensation plans should be furthered for global climate justice. At the foundation of my argument, I suggest that what is needed in climate justice discourse is a commitment to explore new and innovative alternatives that will produce an inclusive global climate treaty that is sensitive to the cultural heritage assets that is destroyed by climate change in Africa. This will require a multi-dimensional framework that allows fundamentally different kinds of values and benefits to be given equal visibility and standing in global climate negotiations.

The dissertation proceeds in six chapters. In the first chapter, I discuss how climate change denies, damage and destroys cultural heritage values in Africa and argue that it is unjust to ignore this dimension of climate change impact, particularly on the African continent. In the second chapter, I critically discuss the normative value of cultural heritage in an environmentally sustainable and morally appropriate way for this global age. I argue that what is lost when climate change affects cultural heritage is a significant cultural asset that ought to be seriously considered in climate ethics. The third chapter addresses the global

justice implications of the destruction of Africa's cultural heritage by climate change that must be paid attention to. In chapter four, I evaluate the plausibility of some of the mainstream climate justice proposals. I offered a different possible critique of current approaches to climate justice to show how they have furthered cultural injustice. The critique of current climate justice theories that I offer, stems from an uninspiring approach that belies logic permitting the sacrificing of that which is connected to others wellbeing as well as the implicit assumptions and the limitation of the idea of justice that undergird these climate justice theories. I offer, in chapter five, a plausible climate ethics theory that recognizes culturally embedded ideas of justice and empower all stakeholders to build by themselves, lives that are, in the light of these ideas, deemed to be adversely impacted by climate change. This theory advances a socio-cultural perspective to climate change which could provide a nuanced basis for understanding and addressing global climate duties that will be sensitive to the loss of cultural heritage. Specifically, I apply the African conception of personhood, to provide a normative basis for a different but intuitive understanding of the cultural dimension of climate ethics. In the final chapter, I discuss how this theory can be applied to rethink current global responses in the form of mitigation, adaptation and compensation in such a way that it takes seriously the impacts of climate change on Africa's cultural heritage and values.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

IPCC	-	The Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change
UNFCCC	-	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
GDP	-	Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
WHC	-	World Heritage Convention
SIDs	-	Small Island Developing States
OUV	-	Outstanding universal value (OUV)
UNESCO	-	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
CSICH	-	Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage
GHG	-	Greenhouse Gasses
COMEST	-	Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology
SDGs	-	Sustainable Development Goals
LDCs	-	Least Developing Countries
UN	-	United Nations
GNP	-	Gross National Product
UDHR	-	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UNECA	-	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
APP	-	Ability to Pay principle
BPP	-	Beneficiary Pays principle
OECD	-	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PPP	-	Polluter Pays Principle
ICC	-	International Criminal Court
CBDR	-	Common but Differentiated Responsibility
UNCCC	-	United Nations Climate Change Conference
COP	-	Conference of the Parties

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INTRODUCTION

The aim of climate justice, according to Edward Page, has always been to explain "how the burdens associated with climate change and policies should be allotted amongst agents with competing interests, entitlements, resources and responsibilities" in order to respond and adapt to climate change (Page, 2011: 412). However, we need to address three fundamental questions to properly understand the complex issues surrounding climate justice. First, what is the nature of climate change problem? Second, what is the nature of the burden that the problem imposes and third, what principles should be adopted for the distribution of these burdens? This dissertation addresses these questions through normative analysis of ideas, to show how climate change has affected cultural heritage and the insufficient attention it has received in climate justice discourse.

This dissertation addresses the impact of climate change on cultural heritage. Culture is an important facet of human life. As Kwame Gyekye posits, culture is a representation of a "community of people, created and fashioned in response to the whole gamut of problems" (Gyekye, 2004: 11). The effects of climate change seen in rising sea levels, changing rainfall patterns and higher temperatures have challenged the sustenance of tangible and intangible cultural heritage and values. This cultural heritage and values include monuments, buildings, shared myths, farming and food preservation methods, and the homelands that people reside. The effect of climate change on these heritage values is a threat to the present sustenance and long-term survival of human beings living in the affected communities. The prime focus of ethical discourse on climate change has been on how to remedy the direct consequences of greenhouse gas emissions, leaving the losses to cultural values on the side-lines.

The marginalization of cultural heritage in current climate ethics discourse and policy-making has been captured by some scholars. In different senses (Kim Hee-Eun, 2011; Adger *et al.*; 2009) and N.J Turner *et al.*; 2008) have argued that climate change destroys cultural values. For instance, Hee-Eun Kim suggests that "the impact of climate change on cultural heritage hardly figures in current climate change policy-making" (Kim 2011: 259). The dominant focus of climate ethics has been direct consequences of greenhouse gas emissions. Despite the fact that the Fifth Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) assessment report stated with "high confidence that climate change will compromise culture and identity" (IPCC, 2014: 12.3.1), critical attention has not been given to this issue in

climate ethics. This dissertation seriously considers Africa's culture heritage loss to climate change and addresses it as a normatively important issue.

There is a great deal of popular, scholarly and policy interest on the inequity in climate burden-sharing at the international level. The impact of climate change on cultural values is often subsumed or simplified in scientific, economic, and political debates. The insufficient treatment of the vulnerability and loss of cultural values in the event of climate change requires first, a conceptual critique of culture. This is because culture is both the means and consequence of human's actions changing the world, such as in climate change. This dissertation contends that neglecting or not treating the impact of climate change on cultural heritage insufficiently will amount to cultural injustice. The injustice here arises due to the fact that people living in local communities who contribute little to the emission responsible for climate change will suffer the displacement of cultural values that are critical to their existence with little or no reparation.

In literature, current climate justice debate seems to focus more on issues like economic development, human rights and future generations (Gardiner *et al.* 2010; Caney, 2010; Page, 2006). Although these perspectives and the principles proposed, which include 'causal responsibility', 'historical responsibility', 'intergenerational justice', and 'procedural justice' are important (Klinsky and Dowlatabadi, 2009: 88-108),¹ surprisingly lacking is the consideration of how to address the loss of cultural heritage and values that climate change exacerbates. This dissertation contends that there is the need to clarify the real nature of that which is lost when climate change affects cultural heritage. Thus, it suggests the need to re-evaluate the conception of culture and its simplistic characterization as that which must continually undergo changes, without considering the effects of these changes on lived experiences tied to long term sustainability.

This dissertation further investigates the impacts of climate on cultural heritage from a normative perspective. By normative account, I mean undertaking a conceptual analysis of culture and the values associated with it to determine how environmental threats to cultural values in climate change should be perceived and dealt with. This dissertation, drawing insight from the literature on climate change impacts, show that climate change will significantly impact the cultural values and heritage of developing countries.

¹ I explained some of these principles in chapter four.

To address the impacts of climate change on cultural heritage, I propose that cultural heritage is an essential 'community good.' Community here is broadly defined as a group of people living in a geographical location. The value that cultural heritage signifies makes its loss grievous, which, if ignored by climate ethics, would make the discourse questionable. Thus, the moral evaluation of the cultural impacts of climate change that I articulate in this dissertation provides normative background to offer a climate ethics theory that represents global realities. The climate ethics theory that I offer takes into consideration the often neglected but real vulnerabilities of people's cultural heritage alongside other easily perceived consequences in the event of climate change. Doing this makes a case for evaluating how we should think about the costs of mitigation and adaptation to climate change that have been contentious in climate justice discourse.

This dissertation fills a gap in the literature by concentrating on the impact of climate change on cultural heritage. As already noted, this perspective has not been seriously engaged in climate ethics discourse. Thus, by focusing on this important feature of climate change, this dissertation tackles this issue and advances the argument that culture might be dynamic, but when it comes to threats to cultural values resulting from climate change, the conception of culture should be evaluated in a manner that is environmentally sustainable and morally appropriate. This is because a proper view of culture and its importance in fostering meaningful life shows that cultural heritage is a critical asset for human beings everywhere. For this reason, the loss of it as a result of actions adversely affecting the climate should not be dismissed. This dissertation's main contribution is to the subject matter of cultural heritage in the era of climate change. Through the ideas in this dissertation, it will become clearer that the loss of cultural heritage to climate change will be a major challenge for climate policy-making, yet in political philosophy, climate justice is discussed with little attention to the impact of climate change on cultural heritage and values.

Let me show how works on climate ethics have paid insufficient attention to impact of climate change on cultural heritage. Prominent works on climate ethics by Stephen Gardiner (2004, 2010 and 2011), Peter Singer (2002, 2006), James Garvey (2008), Simon Caney (2009, 2010 and 2012) and Henry Shue (1992, 2010 and 2016) have not taken the impacts of climate change on cultural values seriously. For example, in Stephen Gardiner's book,² Gardiner's claim to have identified the complexity of the problem upon which proposals for

² Gardiner, S.M. 2011. *The Perfect Moral Storm*.

solutions can be mounted seems to be narrow. Examining his claims closely, one will find out that the obvious disregard to the vulnerabilities or loss of prized cultures which is an important aspect of the social realities in affected communities makes his theory less persuasive on a global level.

In a similar vein, James Garvey, despite observing that our inability to deal with the problem is partly because we are "embedded in a culture" given to the burning of fossil fuels (Garvey, 2008: 114), neither gave credence to the place of culture in exacerbating this problem nor identify ways in which the important cultural values that are destroyed are rectified. This is the case in his proposal of principles like "historical responsibility, present capacity, sustainability and procedural fairness" for an acceptable climate justice policy (Garvey, 2008: 114). Dale Jamieson as well did not consider climate impacts broadly when he criticized "management approaches that seek to redress climate change by manipulating behaviour through the control of economic incentives" (Jamieson, 2010:79-80). Although he rightly noted that assigning economic values to an alternative course of actions will not accurately picture the vast impacts of climate change, he failed to go further to proffer cultural values as an important value that should be considered.

I noted earlier that these principles that have been offered are essential. However, addressing the economic development of the poor countries affected by the wealthy nations' actions does not tell the whole story. The poor countries could get adaptation benefits, but what about the cultural values that are displaced which are not factored in the benefits offered? Henry Shue distinguished between 'subsistence emissions' and 'luxury emissions' to determine a fair distribution of emission rights. He also proposes three principles of fairness. They are 'unequal burdens,' 'ability to pay' and 'guaranteed minimum.' These principles point to the conclusion that based on their historical responsibility for climate change and superior economic capacity, the wealthy nations have the responsibility to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and support developing countries by paying for the cost of adaptation (Shue, 2010: 101-121). In this dissertation, I interrogate the prominent view in climate ethics where distributive justice principles only cover how to distribute the burdens of direct harmful emissions. I contend that not addressing the indirect consequences of these emissions on people's cultural heritage is akin to playing down the criticality of culture to people's survival. The consequence is the possibility of dissension about proposed policies by affected communities.

Another area of contention in climate justice is the application of historical principles that take past emissions into account. Accordingly, the argument here is that the developed countries that have contributed more to the problem have the historical responsibility to pay. Although this may sound straightforward, there are Scholars that are opposed to the historical principles of justice. One of them, Simon Caney argues that it would be unfair and inadequate to apply the historical principle or the "Polluter Pays Principle" to climate justice. Some actual individual polluters are dead and cannot pay (Caney, 2010: 122-145). Caney avers that "climate change jeopardizes fundamental human rights to life, health and subsistence" (Caney, 2010:166-169). This position is very instructive because it demands that we go beyond the easily observed and measured impacts to determine the harms that are suffered, thus making an important claim that mitigation and adaptation are not enough to redress harms to fundamental human rights (Caney, 2010: 163-173). However, a complement to this theoretical analysis would have been to address how cultural rights are affected by climate change. In addition, it might be necessary to understand how climate change has been propelled by rights to freedom and property acquisition supported by libertarian culture and also how this libertarian disposition affects group rights.

Peter Singer assumes that the loss of critical cultural capital can be made up with economic gains. This is evident in his argument that "a system of 'per capita' entitlements combined with global emissions trading will bring about a climate justice policy that is fair and efficient" (Singer, 2010: 197). His suggestion that developing countries that cannot reach their emission targets can decide to sell off to developed countries for economic gains is a utilitarian solution. This sort of proposal will have dire consequences for communities dependent on cultural values that cannot be substituted for monetary gains. This is an indication that climate change requires an interdisciplinary approach. Adger *et al.* from the perspective of environmental science, claim that the consideration of wider values in adaptation is important. They submit that:

If we hold a lens to the adaptation process and analyze it further in detail, it becomes clear that environmental and social change does not affect everyone equally. Less resilient communities – and more vulnerable individuals – can be severely affected by change, thus limiting their opportunities for adaptation (Adger *et al.*, 2009: 10).

While their analysis is important for this dissertation, I further show the difficulties with the characterizations of culture that have given rise to such a narrow view of the cultural values destroyed by environmental disaster. Thus, to provide a plausible climate justice theory, this

dissertation first, challenges the conceptual characterization of culture as an instrumental 'good' or 'resource' which must continually undergo change(s). The description of cultural heritage that I provide makes it difficult to push aside when considering the burdens of climate change.

This dissertation will therefore suggest that the normative foundation of the disregard for losses to cultures in the event of climate change begins with the exploration of the conception and characterization of culture, especially that which concerns its susceptibility to change without considering how it affects human wellbeing. From this understanding, this dissertation develops an ethical theory of climate change that is culturally sensitive in the face of potential irreparable loss. This is done through the application of personhood as a way to conceive a normative basis for a different understanding of climate justice.

Like any other research, I do not cover all aspects of climate change ethics. This dissertation is a philosophical research specifically in the area of political philosophy where ideal theorization has been the popular approach to reflection. This, of course, does not ignore the fact that recently, scholars are adopting a non-ideal pattern of theorizing.³ From the onset, the approach I adopt for the most part of this dissertation relies on non-ideal theorists,⁴ but the climate ethics theory that I advance stems from ideal theory. This suggests that I adopt a conciliatory approach that leans on ideal theorizing but still allows for the plurality of ideal theories, each with its distinct non-ideal auxiliaries on global issues like climate change. Since my dissertation aims to address a specific real-world phenomenon, namely, climate change, the analysis I undertake is not removed from the experiences in the world we live in. This dissertation engages in conceptual analysis of some normative concepts pertinent to the climate change issues that I address. They include justice, culture, and heritage. In providing conceptual clarifications of these concepts, I do not start by providing grand theories on which to build my arguments. Rather, I employ an interpretive approach for these concepts of culture and heritage. This is only done to provide the basis for the arguments that I intend to put forward.

³ I have the impression that at this stage of the debate between ideal and non-ideal theorists that is should be more conciliatory than when it started. Some scholars suggest that each of them has different roles to play. See Swift and White 2008, pp. 59-60. Thus, my dissertation does not deny in any way, the viability and place of ideal-theory in the field of political philosophy.

⁴ Non-ideal theorists to provide a more realistic normative theory. That is, they include in their analysis, question about various feasibility constraints or facts should be considered in normative theorising. Heyward, Clare and Roser Dominic (eds) 2016; Shue, Henry (2014) and Roser, Dominic and Seidel (2017) are some of the notable works that approach climate ethics through the method of non-ideal theory.

The theory of climate ethics that I develop does not neatly fall into non-ideal theory. I employ the normative conception of personhood as the basis for critical intervention for climate justice theorization. It is important to note that the reality of climate change and the normative questions we face, are in part, the result of a failure on the part of agents to uphold their moral obligations. In an ideal world, we would not have to face the challenges and difficult decisions we have to tackle today, and so my normative theory is for the here and now because we already operate in circumstances inviting non-ideal theorizing. At the same time, the non-ideal scenarios we face need a higher level of abstraction to draw ideas for criticizing 'the world as it is'. However, insights from higher levels of abstraction should not be incorporated carelessly. The principles and concepts should be suitable to the subject under investigation. In the end, the conclusions should aim to circle back to the real world where solutions are sought. This dissertation is not a briefing for policy-makers, where researchers explain an issue and make policy recommendations. Although its suggestions could be useful for public policy, at its core, it is a piece of research in normative philosophy and not public policy.

In Chapter One, I situate the context of my engagement with climate change. I will discuss the impact of climate change on cultural heritage. Specifically, I address this dimension of impact to demonstrate how climate change impacts negatively, tangible and intangible cultural heritage and values of developing countries. I analyze how anthropogenic climate change affects their cultural heritage values through forced-migration and by limiting their opportunities to express themselves through the significant cultural heritage that give meaning to their existence.

In chapter two, I proceed to underscore the value of what is lost when climate change destroys cultural heritage. In this connection, I discuss, first, the normative challenges to the present understanding of culture and heritage. I provide a normative understanding of culture and heritage in environmentally sustainable and morally appropriate ways. I argue that what is lost when climate change destroys cultural heritage is not an inconsequential commodity but that which is connected to the long-term survival and sustenance of local people of developing countries. From this understanding, I show why this dimension of impact should be seriously considered in climate ethics and policy discourse.

In the third chapter, I address the global justice implications of the destruction of Africa's cultural heritage by climate change. I start the chapter by discussing some of the global

justice concerns notably, distributive justice, compensatory justice, intergenerational justice and procedural justice that have been contentious in climate justice literature. I proceed to raise concerns about the methodology of global justice theorists that leaves out cultural (in) justice in the area of global climate change. I show that the destruction of Africa's cultural heritage by the incidence of climate change is a matter of justice and cannot be dismissed with a wave of the hand. For instance, Africa's contribution to climate change is minimal, yet these people are worst hit by the impacts of climate change. The effects of climate change on their heritage contributes to the already known poverty of the continent and also affect their development prospects. At the individual level, I argue that the experience of climate change will contribute to forced migration and could mean more refugees from the African continent. I submit in the chapter that the destruction of Africa's cultural heritage is a global justice issue and must be addressed.

In chapter four, I evaluate some of the mainstream climate justice theories with a view to pointing out their limitations. In this regard, I raise objections to current climate justice theories especially their insufficient attention to the destruction of cultural heritage by climate change. Before then, I describe the concerns of climate justice and acknowledge the complexity of the normative concerns of climate change, that makes it difficult for a plausible climate justice theory. I also discuss some of the thematic concerns of climate justice. Specifically, I focus on four thematic issues connected to (a) responsibility for causing climate change, (b) The ability to do something about the problem, (c) the degree to which one benefitted from GHG emissions and (d) the scope of justice consideration. I discuss some of the reigning responses to these issues in the context of climate justice. At the end of the chapter, I put forward objections to current climate justice theories. I raise two important objections. First, I contend that climate justice scholars have assumed positions that have not sufficiently engaged the impact of climate change on cultural heritage. Second, I show why the understanding of justice undergirds most climate justice theories poses challenges for developing a plausible climate justice theory that is sensitive to the destruction of cultural heritage. From these objections, I show why most of the climate justice theories show no sense of urgency to the destruction of critical heritage assets, particularly for countries of the Global South. That is why, I contend that climate justice principles that address the loss of cultural heritage is yet to be fully developed.

In the fifth chapter, I respond to the need for a plausible climate ethics theory that addresses the destruction of cultural heritage. In this regard, I offer a plausible climate ethics theory that addresses the vulnerability of those whose cultural heritage is affected by climate change. I submit that such theory must recognize culturally embedded ideas of justice and empower all stakeholders to build by themselves lives that are, in the light of these ideas, deemed to be adversely impacted by climate change. I explicate the relationship between climate ethics and the African concept of personhood. Through the normative understanding of this African concept of personhood, I proffer four principles of justice that is relevant to climate justice. They include mutual recognition, inclusive deliberations (and relational entitlement), responsive action and intergenerational justice. I argue that these three notions will provide a new understanding of climate justice. I argue that these four principles provide a new understanding of climate justice by suggesting the need to prioritize considerations of climate impacts on the significant values that human beings hold, one of which is cultural heritage value.

In the sixth chapter of this dissertation, I apply the climate ethics theory that I developed to current global responses, in the form of mitigation, adaptation, and compensation. The aim is to ensure that the impacts of climate change on Africa's cultural heritage and values will be taken seriously. I discuss the implication of a climate ethics theory that is sensitive to climate change's impact on cultural heritage values, especially for mitigation, adaptation, and compensation for climate justice. Furthermore, the chapter addresses the kind of rebuttals that can be raised against the climate change ethics theory that I propose. The later part of the chapter explains the nature of future responses to global climate change, especially for Africa.

CHAPTER ONE

CLIMATE CHANGE, AFRICA, AND CULTURAL INJUSTICE

1.1: Introduction

Recent events in our world suggest that many stakeholders are interested in tackling the problem of climate change. While scientists, economists and politicians seemed to be the most interested from the outset, further examination of the nature of the problem by scholars has shown that, dealing with the effects of climate change demands an interdisciplinary approach. Although there is the perception that climate change is a global phenomenon, it remains to be seen how this environmental threat is understood and dealt with in different parts of the world. Any sort of generalisations in climate studies, either in its science, politics or economics, could be limiting because of the variability that comes with the effects of climate change.

In this chapter, I intend to situate the context of my engagement with climate change. My focus is on the socio-cultural dimension of climate change in Africa. Specifically, this chapter highlights the impacts of climate change on cultural heritage and values in Africa. The dimension of climate impact on Africa's cultural heritage has not been sufficiently addressed in global climate ethics discourse. Despite the high-level scholarly interest in climate change impact on natural and socio-economic systems, a comprehensive understanding of the ethical implications of the impacts of climate change on cultural heritage values in Africa is noticeably absent from climate ethics literature. Alexa Zellentin (2010; 2015: 491-498) and Clare Heyward (2014: 149-169) have explored the cultural losses that climate change exacerbates, while Maus Sylvia (2014: 699 – 715) takes a human-rights based approach to tackle climate change. In a similar manner, Kim Hee-Eun (2011: 259-290) explores the relationship between climate change and intangible cultural heritage in international legal framework. These studies have drawn attention to some of the cultural impact of climate change. The issue however is that an ethical study of the vulnerability of Africa's cultural heritage to climate change, have not been addressed in a way that these values are seen as important for climate justice. Hence, to ask how climate change affects tangible and intangible cultural heritage values in Africa is a question about value pluralism in climate ethics discourse. If there is reason to be concerned about the loss of cultural heritage values, which I think there is, then the impact of climate change on cultural heritage values in African should be taken seriously in climate ethics and political discourse.

Structurally, this chapter is divided into six sections. I begin by examining the trajectory of the concept 'climate change' after which, I discuss the impact of climate change, particularly, on human beings. Section three examines the spatial and temporal features of climate change that makes this phenomenon difficult to deal with. In section four and five, I discuss the socio-cultural impact of climate change on the African continent. Precisely, I analyse the vulnerability of cultural heritage values to climate change in three different senses. That is, I show how climate change damages, destroys and strangely denies the use of cultural heritage in Africa. I discuss how climate change causes cultural heritage loss even when it does not displace the people from their cultural space.

In the sixth section, I show that climate ethics and climate justice discourse have paid insufficient attention to the impact of climate change on cultural values and heritage in Africa. I argue that it is unjust to ignore this important dimension of climate change impact, particularly on the African continent. I conclude that the failure to take cognisance of the cultural injustice in neglecting cultural heritage and values when dealing with the burden of climate change leads to two problems – First, the value of what is lost in cultural heritage is undermined. Second, those whose cultural heritage is significantly affected by climate change do not get represented in the debate about how to determine the impacts of climate change.

1.2: Climate Change: the beginning of its Complex Coinage

How did climate change start? From the account of Spencer Weart, he proposes that climate change became a matter of broad public concern in the early 1970s when savage droughts afflicted the American Midwest, devastated the Russian wheat crop, and brought starvation upon millions in Africa (Spencer Weart, 2012:3).

Climate change did not just become the name of the atmospheric crisis that the world is currently grappling with. The name went through some modifications to reflect the nature of its experience per time. Given the 'slippery' nature of the changes in the atmosphere, there were modifications to the terms used to describe this experience. The concept, 'climate change', was preceded by the terminologies of 'greenhouse effect' and 'global warming' (Gardiner, 2004:557). The term 'greenhouse effect' refers to the basic physical mechanism behind projected changes in climate system" (Gardiner, 2004:557). This phrase suggests that

some atmospheric gasses called 'greenhouse gases'⁵ interact with the earth's surface to cause the earth's temperature to be higher than would otherwise be the case. After the commonplace use of 'greenhouse gas effect', the term 'global warming' became popular. The idea of global warming captures the fact that greenhouse gases, are not in themselves a problem to the atmosphere, for without them, the earth will be less hospitable. Calling this atmospheric changes 'global warming' however makes it clear, that it is the increased levels of greenhouse gases from human-induced activities that affect the climate negatively. How then, has greenhouse gases become part of our atmosphere to the point of exerting atmospheric temperature beyond normal proportions? The Intergovernmental Panel for Climate change (IPCC) has responded to the question. The IPCC's findings made it clear that human beings are increasing the atmospheric concentrations of these gases through industrialisation by using fossil fuels for industrial activities (IPCC, 2007: 1-9 and 2014: 4-6).⁶ This atmospheric gaseous concentration, other things being equal, is expected to result in an overall warming effect of the earth. It is on the strength of these findings that the phrase 'climate change' became the main reference point for describing the warming effects that human beings are causing to the atmosphere. Hence, the issue of climate change became popular because scientists were able to discover that human beings were mostly responsible for the adverse effects of our climate. On this discovery, Stephen Gardiner posits that:

The fundamental problem in climate change is that it is now possible for humans to alter the underlying dynamics of the planet's climate and so the basic life-support both for themselves and all other forms of life on earth (Gardiner, 2004:559).

The recognition that human beings are adversely affecting the climate led some scholars to posit that we are now living in an era of the 'anthropocene' (Heather Davis and Etienne Turpin, 2013).⁷ This is to buttress the view that human beings are causing the unpleasant

⁵Other greenhouse gases like water vapor, methane and ozone have similar effects on the climate. See Garvey, (2008). pp. 19-20. Thus, with the common "greenhouse" prefix, I do not differentiate between these gases throughout this dissertation.

⁶The IPCC was established in 1988 by the United Nations Environment Programme and the World Meteorological Organization, and thousands of scientists and experts worldwide contribute to its work. Based on the reviews, the IPCC summarizes the current state of knowledge about the causes and potential impacts of climate change. See IPCC 2007:1

⁷ The Anthropocene is a term that beckons environmental justice thinking, asking what worlds we are intentionally and inadvertently creating, and what worlds we are foreclosing while living within an increasingly diminished present. It has become a concept that speaks not just to the hallmarks of our time, such as climate change and the so-called Sixth Extinction, but creates a need to think through the interconnections and interactions of these events in conjunction with political economic logics and their attendant debts to the future.

changes to the environment that we are presently witnessing. Therefore, the effects of anthropogenic climate change, became a problem threatening not only human beings but every life-given organism. For this dissertation, I adopt the phrase 'global warming' or 'climate change' in the same sense. In the next section, I examine the effects of climate change on human beings.

1.3: Prospects on the Effects of Climate Change on Human Beings

In this section, I discuss the debilitating effects of climate change on human beings to show why we need to find a solution. Given the facts of climate change, what are its effects on our planet? The IPCC report states that "in recent decades, climate changes have caused impacts on natural and human systems on all continents and across the oceans (IPCC 2014: 6)." The IPCC made a stark prediction that "continued emission of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and long-lasting changes in all components of the climate system, increasing the likelihood of severe, pervasive and irreversible impacts for people and ecosystems" is frightening (IPCC, 2014: 8). The changes to the atmosphere because of human-induced emissions, if unchecked, will remain a continuous process that will leave the planet devastatingly hotter or colder as the case may be.

Among other things, scientists might not be sure of the magnitude, timing, and the regional variability of the effects of climate change. However, the justification of inaction to climate change on the grounds of scientific uncertainty is untenable (Oreskes and Conway; 2010). We are already feeling the effects of these changes to the atmosphere. Tolba Mostafa (2005) argues that making scientific uncertainty an excuse for not dealing with a potential catastrophe like climate change is unscientific. According to him, "there has never been any scientific subject where scientists agreed on all its aspects one hundred per cent. They go by the majority and not just simple majority, but a real, solid majority." He concludes that that is what we have in the case of climate change (Mostafa, c.f Low, 2005: xxv).

The impacts of climate change on human beings can be discussed in two ways. There are direct impacts of climate change on human beings on the one hand, and there are indirect impacts on the other hand. While the direct impacts are the physical effects of climate change are well known, the indirect effects on socio-economic and political life are yet to be fully

See Heather Davis and Etienne Turpin (ed.) (2013). *Art in the Anthropocene* London: Open Humanities Press. See also Crutzen, P., Stoermer, E. F. (2000). "The Anthropocene" *Global Change Newsletter* 41: 17–18.

captured because this dimension of impact is still evolving, particularly in developing countries. For example, the impact of climate change on refugees in Africa is an issue that is yet to be fully understood. To understand the full extent of damage that climate change is causing, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) established a group to look into the intricate nature of the kind of 'loss and damage' that has been suffered from climate change.⁸

The changes to the weather and the planet's surface will undoubtedly be accompanied by changes in the lives of many plants and animals which could result in the extinction of some of them like the polar bear. Temperature changes will make some places more habitable while places which are already habitable could be densely populated because of migration, or sparsely occupied because of emigration.

James Garvey (2008) explains that the immediate and direct effect of climate change is that there will be higher maximum temperatures likely to result into more hot days and more heatwaves all over the planet. Conversely, there will be higher minimum temperatures and fewer cold days. More extreme weather events will characterise the future of our planet. As our planet gets warmer, evaporation will increase, more water vapour will find its way into the air, and some parts of the world will experience much more or much less precipitation. It is not going to be an even spread of extra rain (Garvey, 2008: 24). Besides this, the frequency and intensity of heavy showers, thunderstorms and flooding will increase in some places, as will the frequency of landslides and mudslides.

In other areas, the frequency and intensity of droughts or general drops in levels of precipitation will increase. In such places, crops will be damaged or fail to grow, water for both agriculture and human consumption will become scarce or disappear altogether, and the number of forest and bushfires will increase. There is a solid chance that hurricanes will become more frequent and more powerful; the monsoon cycle will be disrupted and, in general, the world's weather will become increasingly dramatic (Garvey, 2008: 25).

Changes in sea-level rise will have severe implications for coastal regions. This will also affect agriculture on the planet. Access to food and water will be thereby jeopardised.

⁸ 'Loss and damage' is defined as 'the actual and/or potential manifestation of impacts associated with climate change in developing countries that negatively affect human and natural systems' See (UNFCCC, 2012, para. 2). See *Report of the Conference of the Parties on its eighteenth session*, held in Doha from 26 November to 8 December 2012 (UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.1)

Flooding, illness and diseases because of extreme weather events could become commonplace (United Nations Human Development Report 2007:17). Increasing temperatures will affect what can be grown and where it can be grown. Life expectancy will be shortened because of the harsh conditions of people in regions where the heat is most felt. Diseases, hunger, thirst, violence, and the like will become their lived experiences. All sorts of habitats and human lives will be altered because of the changes in heatwaves. It could lead to abrupt breakdowns in ecosystems where there is a permanent altering of the connections between the ecosystem and the people.

Climate change has also caused or contribute to conflict (Nordas and Gleditsch, 2007: 627-638). That the effects of climate change will cause, the shrinking and shifting of the planet's resources can explain this. Once resources are scarce, we can expect a future with hundreds of millions, even billions of displaced, hungry, thirsty people in it. These people will strive to escape not just sea-level rises, they will also struggle to move away from scorched croplands and empty wells. It does not take much to imagine conflicts happening in many places because of diminishing or shifting resources (Garvey, 2008: 28).

In this regard, the world's poorest will be the ones most adversely affected, as well as the ones with the least resources for adaptation. Africa, for example, a continent already struggling with the grip of drought, crop-failures, regional conflict, water shortages, and disease can expect to be made much worse off by climate change (Buwani and Dolamo, 2019: 2). The mere description of the consequences of climate change cannot explain the intricate nature of this phenomenon. In the next section, I will discuss the complex nature of the climate change phenomenon. In this connection, I will point out the issues that make it difficult to deal with. Next, I address the question why dealing with climate change phenomenon is a complex issue.

1.4: Why Dealing with Climate Change is Complex?

Having discussed the effects of climate change, I now turn to analysis of some of the complicated issues that made Will Steffen describe climate change as "a complex and diabolical policy problem" (Will Steffen, 2012: 27). Climate change remains a complex phenomenon to grapple with. Its subtle character in terms of cause and effects, as well as the policy considerations to guide action requires "crossing boundaries between science,

economics, law and international relations" (Gardiner, 2004:556). The interdisciplinary and cross-disciplinary demand of any climate change solution makes it a burgeoning issue.

Stephen Gardiner (2011) pays close attention to the fundamental problem of climate change. He describes its nature through the metaphor of "*a Perfect Moral Storm*." He argues that climate change problem is like a convergence of three smaller "storms" which he calls the 'global storm,' 'intergeneration storm,' and 'theoretical storm,' with each of them comprising difficult moral issues, and each interacting and reinforcing one another to produce an incentive structure that discourages actors from addressing climate change (Gardiner, 2011:22).

Climate change is a hydra-headed problem. According to him, climate change "is truly a global phenomenon." According to him, the causes and effects of climate change are not readily grasped because, causal agents are dispersed all over the globe. This is because the emissions of greenhouse gases from any geographical location on the earth's surface enter the atmosphere and then play a role in affecting climate globally. What makes it more complicated is that "the impact of any particular emission of greenhouse gases is not realised solely at its source instead, impacts are dispersed to other actors and regions of the earth" (Gardiner, 2011: 24).

Another feature that makes climate change difficult to deal with is the fragmentation of its causal agency. Climate change is not caused by a single agent, but by a vast number of individuals and institutions that are not unified by any comprehensive structure of agency. This feature of climate change makes it challenging to coordinate an effective global response to deal climate change. This character of climate change is important because it poses a challenge to humanity's ability to respond (Gardiner, 2011: 24-25).

The challenges regarding the spatial features of climate change might seem problematic, but much more is the one brought about by temporal dispersion of the effects of climate change. Steffen posits that "human-driven climate change operates on a time scale that is beyond the experience of decision-makers today" (Will Steffen, 2012: 27). Scientists have proven that it takes a very long time for the harmful effects of greenhouse gas to be manifested thereby making climate change a resilient phenomenon.⁹ This implies that the effect we are witnessing in the present is because of past emissions, rather than current emissions. Two

⁹ For more explanation on this claim, see IPCC 2001, pp. 16 –17

issues arise from this grim fact. First, it is of utmost importance to trace the cause and effects of not only current climate actions but also the historical emissions that has stretched our climate. Second, there is the need to organise sustained actions that will recover the present and at the same time prevent a future catastrophe. One complication here is that not acting in the present increases the magnitude of future climate change and procrastinating sustainable actions by current generation increases the cost of coping with climate change in the future (Gardiner, 2011: 39).

More so, our institutional inadequacy has rendered climate change a complicated problem. At present, we are living in a world in which our actions are interconnected. However, there is no structure or system of global governance to tackle harms from such interconnected actions. Addressing global climate change appears to require global negotiations on the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions, where this includes establishing a reliable enforcement mechanism. However, the current global system or perhaps, the lack of it, makes a global consensus climate agreement difficult, if not impossible. Hence, attempts to combat it will have substantial ramifications for social life, especially in our socio-economic organisation.

Another vital feature of climate change is the possibility and even the reality of skewed vulnerabilities. Countries inhabited by poor people will be badly affected by climate change, even though they have contributed little to the problem. Gardiner makes this point when he writes:

For one thing, the responsibility for historical and current emissions lies predominantly with the richer, more powerful nations, and the poor nations are badly situated to hold them accountable. For another, the limited evidence on regional impacts suggests that it is the poorer nations that are most vulnerable to the worst impacts of climate change, at least in the short- to medium-term (Gardiner, 2011: 31).

Furthermore, climate change opens the cankerworms of global issues. Organisations like the United Nations saddled with the responsibility of ensuring cooperation among nations has so much to deal with in redressing our failing climate. To bring about international cooperation, there is moral pressure on its leadership to ensure equity and justice in the relationship among nations. The problem of climate change opens the moral defects of the current global system on issues such as global poverty and inequality, human rights violation, open borders - all combining to exacerbate the clamour for global justice. To act on climate change requires

that developed nations first address those issues and if some of these developed nations do not wish to engage in such issues, it lessens the general motivation to cooperate as regards creating a binding agreement on climate regime.

Our current climate situation has put humanity into a strange paradox of development. That is, do we continue with the habit of emitting greenhouse gases especially at the industrial level, giving its critical importance to development or do we abate these emissions, knowing very well that except there is a ready substitute, actions of abating it will have profound impacts on human lives and how societies evolve. To abate emission is to shun development, but to continue emitting these harmful gases in this present proportion, even for the sake of development, is to cast aspersion on the impending catastrophe. Hence, Gardiner decries that "action on climate change is likely to raise serious and perhaps uncomfortable questions about who we are and what we want to be" (Gardiner, 2011: 31).

Having discussed the complex issues that need to be dealt with if we must redress our failing climate, I will, in the next section, narrow my focus to the regional impacts of climate change. This is important to set the tenor of this dissertation. Hence, I will discuss the socio-cultural impacts of climate change, particularly the vulnerability of cultural heritage values in Africa.

1.5: The Vulnerability of Cultural Heritage Values to Climate Change in Africa

As I have discussed earlier, climate change will have a devastating consequence for human beings. These deleterious effects will also be felt in the "products of human creativity" everywhere (Chechi, 2015: 163). Besides the well documented direct impacts of climate change on human beings (Low, 2005; Toulmin, 2009),¹⁰ climate change will continue to have an immense impact on cultural heritage values of people. Sea-level rise, higher temperatures, increasingly frequent extreme weather events such as floods and droughts, will all threaten to degrade rapidly, the natural and cultural heritage of human beings. Therefore, the harms done by climate change to human beings should not only be examined at the level of physical and socio-economic wellbeing as it has mostly been done in climate ethics (Gardiner *et al.*, 2010; Garvey, 2008). These impacts should also be considered from the angle of socio-cultural wellbeing of human beings. That is, we need to reflect on how climate change affects the

¹⁰ Camila Toulmin discussed the impacts of climate change in the fields of water, food production, forests and cities, as well as the risks that climate change will bring in terms of generating conflict over scarce resources. See Toulmin, C. 2009.

cultural lifeways of human beings. Despite the high level of scholarly interest in climate change impacts on natural and socio-economic systems, a comprehensive understanding of the impact of climate change on Africa's cultural heritage values have not been given sufficient attention in climate ethics and climate justice literature.

Climate change, indeed, is a global phenomenon. However, I have decided to examine its impacts on cultural heritage values in the African continent for three fundamental reasons. First, Africa as a continent contributes little to climate change, but it is the worst hit in terms of the effects. Many climate change scholars have advanced this position (Toulmin, 2009:1; Low, 2005: xv). When we view nation-states as climate change actors, it is evident that rich countries of the global North disproportionately emit greenhouse gases while the developing countries of the global South, to which Africa belongs disproportionately suffer the damages (Arnold, 2011: 32). Second, Africa's population is made up of many indigenous and local people. The number of indigenous people in Africa is estimated to be around 50 million. Most of these indigenous people are nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoralists and subsistence farmers. Many of them are faced with multiple challenges, including the dispossession of their lands, territories, and resources, forced assimilation into the way of life of the dominant groups, marginalisation, poverty and illiteracy (United Nations Forum, 2013). Indigenous people are especially vulnerable to the adverse consequences of climate change because their lives are closely tied to the natural environment (Barry *et al.*, 2015:314; Baird Richard, 2008:2-3). The consequences of climate change on the environment can affect the physical wellbeing of indigenous people, such as their ability to obtain adequate food, water, and shelter.¹¹ Africa's dependence on natural and cultural resources makes them adversely affected by climate change (Peach Brown, 2011: 164).

Third, which seems to be most important, is that the dimension of the impact of climate on cultural heritage values in Africa is neglected in climate ethics, yet it is very important. Even in the findings of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, the attention given to the impact of climate change on cultural resources is little and biased towards the continent of Europe (Fatoric and Seekamp, 2017:234). Africa's sensitivity to the loss of cultural heritage is

¹¹ For instance, it was reported that the Indigenous peoples in Africa's Kalahari Desert are forced to live around government drilled bores for water and depend on government support for their survival due to rising temperatures, dune expansion and increased wind speeds which have resulted in a loss of vegetation, and negatively impacted traditional cattle and goat farming practices. See "Climate Change" in United Nations Website www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/climate-change.html Accessed on August, 20th, 2020.

connected to its dependence upon the natural environment (Andre Lalonde, 1991: 3). However, a recent study of the impacts of climate change estimates that only 1% of research on the impacts of climate change on heritage is related to Africa (Fatoric and Seekamp, 2017: 234). Africa has long been a land of numerous cultures, with peoples of many origins mingling together and using the natural resources in different ways (Berre and Messan, 1995: 66). Cultural heritage seems to be more cherished in Africa than other climes because her cultures have evolved out of nature and still draw their authority from it.

Before moving ahead, let me provide concise analysis of what I mean by cultural heritage. Culture, as Kwame Gyekye posits "is an enactment of a community of people, created and fashioned in response to the whole gamut of problems or questions that arise in the context of a people's particular situation (Gyekye, 2004: 11). On the meaning of 'heritage,' I agree with Littler Jop when he suggests that 'what is circumscribed by heritage is historically specific, culturally contingent, and historically debatable.' (Littler Jop, 2005: 2) However, at its very core, the concept of heritage is something in the form of property that is inherited and passed down from previous generations (Harrison 2009: 9). This does not in any way suggest that heritage is only connected to the past and has no relevance in the present. There are two kinds of heritage in this sense - natural and cultural heritage. Natural heritage is the environmental natural resources like gold, water, crude oil that are found in a particular site. This also include sites where certain species of plants and animals can be located. In the case of cultural heritage, such heritage is bonded to the cherished ways of life of group of people. That is, the people have interacted with certain natural heritage sites in established ways to the point of deriving a significant pattern of living that is tied to their identity as human beings.

According to 2007 UNESCO *World Heritage Report*, cultural heritage is defined very widely to include "individual sites, buildings or structures as well as rural landscape" (UNESCO World Heritage Report, 2007: 24). This definition seems limiting in the range of things that constitute cultural heritage. Cultural heritage goes beyond tangible or physical cultural properties such as cultural landscapes, historical sites, and monuments in the form of art representations. It also includes non-tangible properties such as language, traditions, rituals, myths, and ancient memoirs in the form of art works. Also, cultural heritage is not limited to the tangible and intangible properties of the past. It also comprises contemporary rural and urban practices in which diverse cultural groups take part (UNESCO, 2007: 4). Cultural heritage refers to those things that contribute to the sense of identity of a particular population

or community of people. These can be special monuments, like a building, sculpture, painting, a cave dwelling, or anything important because of its historic, artistic, or scientific value. Cultural heritage, therefore is a valuable possession of people. According to Kersel and Luke (2015), cultural heritage is “something that someone or a collective considers to be worthy of being valued, preserved, catalogued, exhibited, restored, admired” (Kersel and Luke 2015: 71).

Cultural heritage and natural heritage intersect in some cases. For instance, a river or lake could be a natural heritage site, but it could also become a source of cultural heritage when it serves the purpose of fishing and farming, known to be the peculiar way of life of the people inhabiting its environs. Natural heritage and cultural heritage are both important in every society. However, the value of natural heritage seems to be given credence compared to cultural heritage. That is why natural heritage sites, having national status are respected and protected against harms, for the benefit of current and future generations through a substantial body of legislation, policy and planning processes.¹² The preservation of cultural heritage against human-made actions because of its significant values deserves greater attention in terms of its preservation. Anderson Shakanga argues that in Africa, the two (natural and cultural heritage) are not isolated from each other, but on the contrary, are interwoven with extremely rich links (Shakanga, 1995: 9).

Africa’s cultural heritage is vulnerable to climate change. Besides the vulnerability of African cultural heritage to climate change, Africa has been vulnerable to climate change in three principal ways - physically, economically, and technologically. Their physical vulnerability consists in the fact of its geographical makeup. The literature on climate change in Africa routinely submits that much of the continent (even beyond the Sahara Desert) consists of drylands (Metz, 2016: 89). The land in Africa is suitable for agriculture, but in recent times, it has been blighted by drought on the one hand and floods on the other hand. With the bulk population living in rural areas and dependent upon the environment for their sustenance, Africa is on the wrong side of those who will bear much of the effects of climate change. Africa is economically vulnerable to climate change in that the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) realised by most African countries comes mostly from its agriculture and the

¹² For example, the UNESCO World Heritage Convention. The World Heritage Convention, whose full title is "The Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage," was adopted by UNESCO in 1972. The Convention today has 131 countries that are party to it. Through this instrument nations of the world have agreed to inventory, recognize and protect unique and irreplaceable properties of universal value.

extraction of natural resources. These activities are highly susceptible to weather variations (Toulmin, 2009: 50). Compared to other continents, the meagre GDP realised by countries in Africa can hardly sustain the basic needs of food, security and shelter of its population. How then will the continent financially contend with the menace of climate change when they have more pressing developmental challenges? Talking about her technological vulnerability, Africa lacks the means and the method to adjust from using fossil fuels as the power source in the industrial arenas. If countries in developed nations succeed in finding a substitute to fossil fuels because of their technological advancement, Africa will struggle to abandon fossil fuel usage because they are in a dire developmental stage where fossil fuel is needed to grow her economy.

The socio-economic impact of climate change on Africa's cultural heritage has worsen her vulnerability. To examine the social vulnerability of the cultural heritage of the people of Africa to climate change is to discuss how climate change has hampered their lives and wellbeing by limiting their opportunities to express their significant cultural traits and beliefs that give meaning to their existence. The concept of vulnerability as put forward by the 2014 IPCC means the "propensity to be negatively affected." The report further posits that "vulnerability encompasses a variety of concepts including sensitivity and lack of capacity to cope and adapt" (IPCC, 2014a). The concept of vulnerability could, therefore, be applied in varying contexts. However, my use of the concept – vulnerability - is restricted to the socio-cultural context. Kelly and Adger define social vulnerability as "the capacity of individuals and social groups to respond to, that is, to cope with, recover from or adapt to - any external stress placed on their livelihoods and wellbeing" (Kelly and Adger, 2000: 347-348).

In an esoteric manner, the 2014 IPCC Report states with 'high confidence' that "some ecosystems and cultures are already at risk from climate change" (IPCC, 2014: 72). These ecosystems and cultures are not just things without significance. They are valuable possessions of these societies. Indeed, everyone and every society possess culture, but the influence of cultures on human beings differs from society to society. That is why I will not tally with Sarah Straus claim that "every human society has culture in the same measure." From this position, she argues that since climate change is a global phenomenon, all cultures will be affected (Straus, 2012: 374-377). While she is partly correct, she failed to underscore the proportion to which each society engages with and benefits from the cultures that are affected by climate change. The expression of culture can, of course, be radically different from place to place.

The complexity of culture and cultural heritage in this environmental age is one of the difficulties to be addressed in this dissertation. However, in this present chapter, I do not need to be too precise about which characteristics are part of culture and cultural heritage and which are not. I will make that clarification in the next chapter where I will be dealing with normative challenges of dealing with the state of cultural injustice that climate change exacerbates. In the meantime, let me focus on the practical ways in which cultural heritage values are impacted by climate change in Africa. African heritage is predominantly lived heritage. It implies that such heritage is connected to the lives of the people and thus presents unique opportunities for drawing materials and inspiration (Berre and Messan, 1995: 79). The vulnerability of cultural heritage in Africa is a function of their exposure, natural sensitivity, and low adaptive capacity to the present and potential impacts of climate change (Buwani and Dolamo, 2019:4).

Before addressing the practical ways in which climate change affects Africa's cultural heritage values, it is apposite to explain the interconnection between the physical and social impacts of climate change as it relates to the vulnerability of cultural heritage. The consequences of climate change could be felt on cultural heritage values in two principal ways - directly or indirectly. The direct effects can be seen on structures and buildings that have been a source of identity and inspiration to the people. These effects on tangible heritage could lead to further indirect impacts like change in the kind of social and economic activities the people connected to these heritage sites will engage in.¹³ For example, the effects of climate change on the Chinguetti mosque in Mauritania is an example of the effects I am describing here (UNESCO World Heritage Report, 2007: 24). This heritage site is situated on the edge of the Sahara Desert, and it is home to a remarkable collection of Islamic manuscripts. The presence of this mosque has influenced the town by providing a trading post for travellers on routes from the east carrying cargoes of gold and ivory. This has brought great wealth to the community, and with this wealth, they have been able to maintain this building. Now, the threat from the encroaching desert because of weather variation is constantly threatening the town's building, especially this mosque. Chinguetti's building has

¹³ See UNESCO, 'Case Studies on Climate Change and World Heritage' (World Heritage Centre 2007) whc.unesco.org/en/activities/473. This publication presents 26 case studies from selected natural and cultural WHC sites to illustrate the observed and expected impacts of climate change. The World Heritage Centre was established in 1992 and is tasked with managing the day-to-day affairs of the WHC. Accessed 27 July 2020.

also been reported to be regularly subjected to seasonal flooding with subsequent erosion (UNESCO World Heritage Report, 24).

This situation has affected trading in that environment. Besides this, human traffic has greatly reduced, and the mosque is in danger of being affected by the encroaching desert. The potential impact of climate change here is not only in the loss of the mosque and the source of income from trading around this area. It is expected that the people around this area will need to adapt to specific lifestyle changes that can alter their long-term identity even if they are not displaced from their present location (Berenfeld, 2008:70).

Indeed, climate change will affect all cultures, many in severe and dramatic ways and there is no question about the truth of this statement, nor lack of evidence that these impacts are already well underway (Strauss, 2012: 374). My focus on the vulnerability of cultural heritage here is not just the loss of cultural heritage values because of the climate-induced displacement of people. While this is important, I will also explain the vulnerability of cultural heritage, even when climate change does not affect the temporal base of the people. This extended focus is incredibly important. This is because the underlying empirical assumption is that cultural heritage value is only lost when people are forced to leave their long-term abode because of climate change (Zellentin, 2010; Kim, 2011: 262-265; McNamara *et al.*, 2018).

Although explaining culture loss is important at least in the case of the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) that these scholars focus on,¹⁴ especially because the people have a close relationship to these places and such place bestows to them political sovereignty and environmental identity,¹⁵ which is essential for self-determination. However, I argue that of equal, and even more deserving is to consider the negative impacts of climate change on cultural heritage values of people in Africa, even when it does not distort the spatial location of people. This can be in two senses. One climate change could cause damages to cultural heritage values on the one hand and second, it could lead to the denial of cultural heritage practices on the other hand. I will explain these peculiar effects of climate change on Africa's cultural heritage in the next section.

¹⁴ One popular SIDS that have been discussed is Tuvalu. See Paton, K. and Fairbairn-Dunlop, P. (2010) 'Listening to local voices: Tuvaluans respond to climate change' *Local Environment* 15(7):687-698. See also Farbtoko, C. "Tuvalu, Climate Change and Culture" *A Discussion Paper, April 2011*. www.erc.org.au/pcp

¹⁵By environmental identity, I mean the amalgamation of cultural identities, ways of life, and self-perceptions that are connected to a given group's physical environment. See Figueroa, "Indigenous Peoples and Cultural Losses

1.6: The Context of Cultural Heritage Loss to Climate Change in Africa

No doubt, climate change will lead to the loss of cultural heritage values when people are displaced from their permanent place. Nevertheless, it is essential to underscore how climate change can cause cultural heritage values to be damaged and denied even when it does not lead to displacement in the form of migration. For climate change to cause damages to cultural heritage values, it must be the case that the impacts of climate change have blighted the cultural heritage value of a particular group of people.

Climate change can cause damage to cultural heritage values without affecting the present location of people for some apparent reasons. There are cases where climate change affects the way people benefit from engaging with their environment. This can be seen when they are forced to consider doing things of significant cultural interest in far less-appealing ways, such as celebrating yam festival without having the flurry of fertile yams because of the climate variability that has affected farm proceeds. Terje Oestigaard observes that "in Tanzania, rain-making rituals has been an intrinsic part of the culture" that is affected by climate change. (Oestigaard, 2010)." Among the Zimbabweans, it has been posited that the performance of rain-making ceremonies in a season of drought is a disrespect to the traditional cultural values (Brown *et al.*, 2012). Even with certain adaptation measures being put in place, there is, at present, a struggle to sustain these popular traditions because of climate variability. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, adaptation is an adjustment to "... human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderate harm or exploits beneficial opportunities" (IPCC, 2007: 1). However, when there are inappropriate adaptation measures, such that it causes the adjustment of long-term cultural patterns or hinders the use of cultural heritage sites, this could spell harm for such cultural practice.

Also, when climate change makes it challenging to practice a cultural belief in its popular and distinctive manner, this could leave the people with no other choice than to misrepresent their culture and cultural heritage. This can be harmful in a variety of ways. Most visibly, the creation of harmful stereotypes can hurt members of a culture especially when they are portrayed viciously by outsiders. For example, climate change has been linked to some sort of violent conflict among herder territories in Africa even if in "indirect ways" (Madu, A, Nwankwo, 2020: 8-20; Cabot C. 2017). There is now an odious representation of herding groups as 'inherently violent' people (Surulola Eke, 2020:753). While there is no doubt about

the report of herder-farmer conflict, forgetting the struggle for resources that incited these conflicts to claim that herders are violent people will not only be too forward but harsh. In this way, the community that prides in this herder culture have lost a significant face value. This could lead to a situation where this kind of people start seeing themselves as others see them, giving way for this culture to be perpetually distorted, and its distinctness eroded. In this sense, the herder cultural heritage, although not displaced by the effects of climate change, it has been devoid of its original representation because of the paucity of resources caused by climate change. Therefore, we can say that such cultural heritage has been damaged. Hence, when climate change distorts lifelong meanings of cultural practices and changes the fitness of purpose of cultural sites, then such effects should be deemed harmful.

In the second instance, where climate change denies people, access to their cultural heritage even when they retain their cultural space. The harms often invoked by climate change in this situation is the harm of depriving people the opportunities and platforms for cultural expression. People living on traditional land in Africa rely heavily on the bounty of their natural environment both for sustenance and to maintain a vibrant culture. In this era of climate change, it has become increasingly difficult for people in the region of Africa to distinguish between what is seasonal and what is 'abnormal' in their climatic experience. It has become steadily tough to guarantee the sustenance and the precision of some cultural practice because of the heightened variability that has come with the climate (Gumo, 2017:391). More so, most of these people have the indigenous knowledge to know what is strange about climate variability but lack the expertise on how to cope with the uncertainty that comes with it. Hence, they are forced to abandon religious festivals and ceremonies because their initial knowledge of the operations of the weather is becoming obsolete and non-functional in the light of new climatic realities (Gumo, 392). The unpredictability of how the climate will affect such practice has, therefore denied a group of people cultural practices like rituals, festivals, and games that are a significant part of their cultural life.

There is also another sense in which climate change denies people of their cultural heritage. The unsuitability of the environment because of the negative effects of climate change could deprive members of showcasing their ownership and expertise of a particular cultural trait. For instance, if the cultural traits that have become popular among cultural group A are affected by climate change. When this cultural trait is showcased in another group, say B and this group B goes on to claim ownership of such culture, this would mean that the original owners of this cultural property, because of the impacts of climate change, have been denied

a worthy and significant thing. This denial must not be dismissed by a wave of the hand. In addition, certain cultural products are becoming scarce or extinct because of climate change exertion on the land where these products are cultivated. Nche Cristian explains that it is becoming glaring that in Africa, the traditional drums which are made from unique species of trees and animal skins; the flute which is also made from special woods have all had their materials in short supplies. Some of these special trees and animals that provide the raw materials for producing some of these traditional musical instruments have become scarce or absconded from forests (especially in the case of animals) as deforestation and desert encroachment continue (Nche Christian, 2014:4).

To deprive people in accessing properties and engaging with activities that are rightfully theirs is to harm them by hindering them in the pursuit of their ends. Environmental degradation caused by climate change will lead to conditions for the recrudescence of thefts, illicit excavations, and exportations of cultural objects (Chechi, 167). In effect, just as in times of war and of political disorder, the opportunity for illicit trafficking of cultural artefacts increases with the impoverishment of the local population because of the devastating effects of climate change on their land.

More so, the impacts of climate change will cause changes in the value of some of the cultural heritage sites in Africa, and this will affect their popularity and tourism potentials. Let me try to make this point clearer. Natural heritage sites of different places have struggled for recognition in the list of World Heritage sites. This is because the key test for the inclusion of cultural heritage site on World Heritage List is that of meeting the criteria of outstanding universal value (OUV),¹⁶ which are accessed through a rigorous evaluation process by the Advisory Bodies of the World Heritage Convention (UNESCO, 2007: 27).

Thus, any site that happens to be listed in the World Heritage map has gained a special status and could benefit from international cooperation. The nations of the world strive to have their properties inscribed on the UNESCO World Heritage List, especially for international cooperation and tourism business. The World Heritage Convention has therefore noted that if one of its listed heritage sites loses the characteristics which warranted its inclusion on the World Heritage list, it can be deleted from the list (Operational Guidelines 192a-b, 55). If a

¹⁶ Outstanding Universal Value means cultural and/or natural significance which is exceptional as to transcend national boundaries and to be of common importance for present and future generations of all humanity. As such, the permanent protection of this heritage is of the highest importance to the international community. See UNESCO Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention, 2019. pp. 20

place has been adorned as a World Heritage site because of the presence of glaciers or coastal ecosystem, the impacts of climate change on these sites have caused their OUV to be diminished and the likely implication being that it can be stripped off its status as a World Heritage site.

The main problem here is not removing the heritage site from world Heritage List because a heritage site has lost its OUV. Instead, for heritage sites located in Africa, why should the owners (Africans) be responsible for the destruction of their OUV by the actions of others? The Lake Chad, centred in Western Chad and straddling the Niger, Nigeria and Cameroon borders was once regarded as one of the largest lakes. This lake was reported to have shrunk from 25,000 sq. km in 1963 to around 1,000 sq. km in 2008 because of climate variability (UNEP Report, 2008). The value accorded to this heritage site has reduced because the strong traditional culture of fishing and farming supported by the presence of this lake has diminished thereby leading to the emigration of farmers and pastoralists from its boundaries (Salkida, 2012).

In a similar vein, the Djenne in Mali, a town composed of earthen buildings has unique architectural features including an iconic mosque that was inscribed on the World Heritage List in 1988. There has been a severe degradation of its mud architecture because of the influence of climate change. High-quality mud must be used to repair this damage, but this resource has become scarce because of the lowering of the high water stand of the Inland Niger Delta. This implies that quality mud bricks must be sourced further afield at a greater cost, which locals can simply not afford. The result means that such building can only be repaired with cheaper materials such as concrete and fired clay bricks which portends less capacity to prevent the corrosive effects of climate change.¹⁷

That climate change will cause the displacement of people within and across African borders has been well demonstrated in the literature (Marchiori *et al.*, 2012). Displacements because of climate change linked to sea-level rise is predicted to grow exponentially, particularly in low-lying islands, with some of them in Africa (Kim, 2012). In the absence of any protective barriers, the estimation is that 1-metre sea-level rise will lead to the displacement of the entire population of Alexandria, 4 million people in the Nile Delta, 3.7 million in Nigeria and up to

¹⁷ See Clarke, J., Wangui, E.E., Ngarruiya, G. Brooks, N. 2019 “These African Heritage Sites are under threat from climate change” In: The Conversation Newsletter. <https://theconversation.com/these-african-world-heritage-sites-are-under-threat-from-climate-change-144140>

180,000 people in Senegal (Obasi, G in Low, 20005 p. xxix). While in many cases, climate change-displaced persons remain within their country, some may cross borders, thereby abandoning everything that could link them to their foundational base. In both scenarios, it is unlikely that these people will not forgo certain cherished beliefs and traditions that are fundamental to their cultural being. When climate change affects traditional knowledge and ways of life, indeed, maintaining in the long term, cultural values and traditions, after being displaced from the former location poses a significant challenge.

The geographical changes resulting from climate change have been linked to future armed conflicts (Nordas and Gleditsch, 2007: 627-638), which in turn might impact cultural sites and properties. Once climate change force people to leave their cherished places, there is always the breakup of the social relations and cultural structures. This will definitely incite the feeling of 'profound loss and alienation' wherever they emigrate, given that they are faced with an entirely different culture (Turner *et al.*, 2008:3). When climate change causes the displacement of people to the point where the local language is lost or distorted, this is a 'threat to cultural sustainability and an indication towards forced cultural assimilation' (Figuroa, 2012: 197). For instance, where a particular language no longer refers to an existing physical manifestation, the available cultural option is limited. To sustain cultural imagery, readapting to such site in the cultural memory and imagination will lead to a significant loss of history (Figuroa, 2012: 197). If this restricted access to former territories becomes permanent, it results in disorientation and the prohibition of intergenerational knowledge transmission. This will eventually result in the loss of cultural memory – a loss that can be characterised as overwhelming, but not visibly recognised in climate ethics discourse.

1.7: Climate Ethics without Cultural Justice

Seeing the vulnerability of Africa's cultural heritage to climate change as discussed above, it is worrisome that mainstream discourse on climate ethics and climate justice have not seriously considered this dimension of climate change. Even though the Fifth Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) Assessment Report stated with "high confidence that climate change will compromise culture and identity" (IPCC, 2014: 12.3.1), the impact of climate change on Africa's heritage and values is yet to be described and vividly considered by climate ethicists especially in the framing of distributive justice policies. These mainstream discourses seem to focus more on the direct impact of climate

change on values like economic development, human rights, and future generations (Garvey, 2008; Gardiner *et al.*, 2010; Posner and Weisbach, 2010). Although these perspectives and the principles proposed are important,¹⁸ surprisingly lacking is the consideration of how to address the loss of cherished cultural heritage values that climate change exacerbates. There is a great deal of popular, scholarly and policy interest on the inequity in climate burden-sharing at the international level, however, the impact of climate change on cultural heritage values is often subsumed or simplified in scientific, economic, and political debates.

Let me discuss some of the insufficient approaches in climate ethics and climate justice discourse. We must bear in mind that providing a comprehensive account of the climate justice concerns requires that we first outline the features of climate change impacts that are normatively significant based on common but 'differential vulnerability.' Most works on climate ethics and climate justice have been limited in the range of things they consider vulnerable to climate change impacts. For example, in Stephen Gardiner's book, that deals with the ethics of climate change, Gardiner's claim to have identified the complexity of the problem upon which proposals for assessing potential solution is narrow (Gardiner, 2011:4). This is because of his apparent disregard to the vulnerabilities or loss of cultural heritage values, a critical aspect of the social realities in affected communities. This makes his theory less persuasive on a global level. Similarly, James Garvey observes that our inability to deal with the problem is partly because we are "embedded in a culture" given to the burning of fossil fuels (Garvey, 2008: 114). However, he neither gave credence to the place of culture in exacerbating this problem nor identified ways in which critical cultural values are affected by climate impacts when he proposed principles of 'historical responsibility', 'present capacity', 'sustainability' and 'procedural fairness' for an acceptable climate justice policy (Garvey, 2008: 114-135).

Even when some climate ethics theorists address the impacts of climate change on critical human values like human rights, development, and security, they do not give attention to cultural rights.¹⁹ With respect to climate change, the field of cultural rights appears secondary

¹⁸ These principles include 'causal responsibility', 'historical responsibility', 'intergenerational justice', 'equal burdens', and 'procedural justice' (See Klinsky and Dowlatabadi, 2009, 88-108). I discuss these principles in chapter four.

¹⁹ Stamatopoulou 2008 suggests that five human rights are commonly understood as cultural rights under international law, namely (1) the right to education, (2) the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications, (3) the right to benefit from the protection of moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which the person is the author, (4) freedom for scientific research and creative activity and (5) the right to participate in cultural life. See Stamatopoulou 2008, p. 3.

to more tangible challenges (Maus, 2014: 707). For example, Simon Caney's normative theory which claims that "climate change jeopardises fundamental human rights to life, health and subsistence" is very instructive. He demands that we go beyond the easily observed and measured climate impacts to determine the harms that are suffered. He therefore makes the important claim that mitigation and adaptation as proposed by current climate policies are not enough to redress harms to fundamental human rights (Caney, 2010: 163-173). The problem with his theory is that he did not question how climate change has been propelled by rights to freedom and property acquisition, supported by the libertarian view of rights. The disregard for group rights in any human rights perspective of climate justice discourse is dire. A necessary feature of Caney's theoretical analysis would have been to at least mention, (if not address) the full range of the important human rights that are affected by climate change. This will include cultural rights (Eide *et al.*, 2001: 4). Therefore, respect for and the protection and conservation of cultural heritage are of importance most notably in times of change and potential disruption, such as that caused by climate change. Cultural rights play an important role in the context of indigenous peoples (Watt-Cloutier 2005; Wiessner 2011), who often are more susceptible to the negative consequences of climate change (Watt-Cloutier 2005). Cultural heritage right is an important human right when examined from the prism of property rights, access rights and the right to self-determination or right to development (Francioni Francesco, 2008: 6-7). Hence, it cannot be exonerated from league of fundamental human rights.

In climate justice, principles focusing on the just distribution of emission rights have occupied a central place in their debates (Singer, 2010; Caney, 2009; 2010, defend different versions of this view). For me, these are utilitarian approaches to climate justice. This is because they focus on how to maximise the happiness of present generation and perhaps future generation in such a way that life will not be uninhabitable. This is done by trying to adapt to the impacts of climate change. However, this approach only guarantees the priorities and interests of developed countries whose marketable emission targets need to be secured. The most critical challenge that has been raised against the conventional economic analysis of climate change is that it is 'biased downward' in that it fails to capture all the relevant impacts of climate change to those who are much concerned (Shogren and Toman, 2000: 15).

The poor developing countries that are much affected by climate change, because of their inequitable development position. These poor countries cannot match the developed countries on the debate on emission rights much as to describe how climate change is affecting their

socio-cultural lives. In line with this argument, economic analysis cannot adequately take account of some of the non-economic aspects of the impacts of climate change. Impacts on distinct human values like cultural heritage are not considered. Most times, the impacts of climate change on these values are 'irreversible' and non-substitutable (Shogren and Toman, 2000: 15). This is the more reason why it should be given priority in distributive justice.

Dale Jamieson criticised "management approaches that seek to redress climate change by manipulating behaviour through the control of economic incentives" (Jamieson, 2010:79-80). He rightly noted that assigning economic values to an alternative course of actions will not provide an accurate picture of the vast impacts of climate change (Jamieson, 2010: 80). However, he did not go further to proffer cultural heritage values as an important value that should be considered.

The problem of addressing climate change is simply a question of what we value, and values are most times determined by the aggregate of our evolving beliefs overtime. Hence, Jamieson is right by suggesting that climate change has radically shoved on our faces that the existing values we subscribe to are insufficient to deal with the burden it imposes (Jamieson 2010: 82-83). He takes the issue of values in climate ethics seriously. Jamieson offers the following argument. First, he asserts that our present values evolved relatively from "low populated and less technical societies with seemingly unlimited access to land and other resources." Resources in this sense involve all kinds, including material and immaterial. He moved further to claim that these values include, as a central component, an account of responsibility that "presupposes that harms and their causes are individual, and are local in time and space." This suggests that we tend to evaluate actions in terms of how it harms individual human beings in a limited sphere, without considering the nature of these harms, which could be to a group of people. He posits that the problem of climate change does not fit the criteria we have set for identifying and recognising harms and wrongdoings (Jamieson, 2010: 84). He, therefore, concludes that if we must deal with climate change in all of its complexities, we must move away from approaches that concentrate on "calculating probable outcomes" and focus on developing new ethos and culture (Jamieson, 2010:84).

The failure to take cognisance of the injustice in neglecting cultural heritage values when dealing with the burden of climate change is in the effect of two problems. One, the value of cultural heritage is less considered in this environmental age. Second, those whose cultural heritage is significantly affected do not get represented in the debate about sharing the burden

of climate change. Hence, there is no way to articulate the moral implication of the kind of loss suffered when climate change affects cultural heritage. To address the impacts of global climate change on cultural heritage, we need to reimagine the value of what is damaged, denied and displaced when climate change affects cultural heritage.

1.8. Conclusion

This chapter introduced the relations between climate change and cultural heritage with a focus on the continent of Africa. The discussion explicates how important cultural heritage values in the African continent are affected by climate change. To make clear the vulnerability of the cultural heritage of the people of Africa to climate change, I discussed how climate change has hampered their socio-cultural lives and wellbeing. I argue that climate impact affects their cultural heritage values not only through displacement but also by limiting their opportunities to express their significant cultural traits and beliefs that give meaning to their existence. I also discussed how climate change has damaged and displaced Africa's cultural heritage values. Furthermore, I contested the disturbing lack of engagement with this dimension of impacts in climate ethics discourse. To me, it seems evident that well-meaning climate ethics scholars perceive cultural heritage values, as being of little worth in the reckoning of an endangered global ecological heritage. Irrespective of the focus of scholars on other concrete impacts of climate change, the misplaced complacency about the extent and value of what is lost when climate change damages, denies and ultimately destroys cultural heritage value is objectionable. While I submit that there is a significant importance in addressing the impacts of climate change on cultural heritage values, what is missing is an understanding of the value of culture and cultural heritage that will accommodate the damage, denial and displacement in this environmental age. This will be my focus in the next chapter.

CHAPTER TWO

CLIMATE CHANGE AND CULTURAL HERITAGE LOSS: A NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF CULTURAL HERITAGE

2.1: Introduction

Climate change unearths many normative concerns. However, not all of these concerns have been sufficiently addressed in climate ethics. One of such normative concern is how to evaluate the impact of climate change on human beings. When considering climate impact on human beings, there are different ethical criteria one might appeal to. Several climate ethicists have examined the moral implications of climate change on economic development (Nicholas Stern, 2007; Mark Sagoff, 2011). Others like Simon Caney and Tracy Skillington examine its effects on the ideal of human rights (Caney, 2010; Skillington, 2017). Yet some others examine the impact of climate change on security (Christian Webersik, 2010) and future generations (Edward Page, 2006). Yet, a comprehensive normative appraisal of how to respond to the impact of a complex problem like climate change, requires more than these perspectives. Dale Jamieson rightly posits that we cannot tell the 'full extent of the risks and damages' posed by climate change, most especially in practice (Jamiesson, 2015: 24). His opinion suggests that the normative concerns that climate change exacerbates will keep multiplying as long as human beings continue to experience and exercise normative control over the actions to be taken. This means that the exercise of normatively controlling necessary actions needed to address climate change would be evolving rather than static.

Having impressed my concern for the impact of climate change on Africa's cultural heritage values and the disturbing lack of engagement with this dimension of impact in climate ethics in the last chapter, I need to be forthright about what is lost when climate change affects Africa's cultural heritage. This requires that I explicate the intricate nature of the problem. Thus, in this chapter, I engage the idea of cultural heritage to unravel how the neglect of critical cultural heritage values in this global environmental age stems from a normative paralysis of culture on the one hand and heritage on the other hand.

The objective of the chapter is to discuss the normative contours of the present understanding of culture and heritage that should be dealt with, for climate ethics to effectively address the impacts of climate change on cultural heritage values. Hence, I address three vital questions. First, what does the concept 'culture' and 'heritage' mean in this global environmental age? Second, what is the value of what is lost when cultural heritage is denied, damaged, or displaced by climate change? Third, if change is a pervasive part of culture, should we be

neutral about the changes to cultural heritage values, especially when external forces like climate change is responsible?

Proceeding in the mode of critical theory, I provide a reflective analysis of culture that clarifies its deeper meaning and significance. I also provide a description of culture and allows us to recognise cultural change while simultaneously acknowledging the weight of losses to cultural assets when redressing the burdens of climate change. Broadly construed, Franklin Todd describes critical theory as "a philosophical enterprise, aimed at combating ideological inculcation of systemic forms of domination and oppression by identifying ways in which the political significance of the concrete specificity of human subjectivity and a host of other contextual determinants of social relations and political structures are routinely unrecognised, unacknowledged and unappreciated" (Todd, 2002: 273).

The chapter is divided into five sections. In section one, I address the ambiguities that arise when dealing with the issues of cultural rights and recognition that has been a persistent part of our contemporary world. This is important for illuminating and giving guidance to the culturally sensitive climate justice principle that I have in mind. The second and third section proposes an ambitious but important perspective of culture and heritage that will guide the discourse. This section draws inspiration from the ideas of Kwame Gyekye (2004), Will Kymlicka (1995), Kwame Appiah (2005), James Young (2008) and Rodney Harrison (2012 and 2013). I define cultural heritage as the tangible and intangible properties that are connected to the people's cherished ways of life, whose meaning and significance can only be recognised through collaborative, dialogical and interactive processes, involving owners of this cultural heritage.

In the fourth section, I analyse the besieged notion of seeing culture as ubiquitous to change. I put forward three important normative challenges springing from this perception of culture in this global environmental age. One, I argue that this view of culture erases the logical and ontological continuity, that is involved in people's claim of cultural identity. Second, such characterisation of culture obscures the nature of what is denied, damaged and ultimately lost as a result of anthropogenic climate change. Three, if change is deemed as a natural character of culture, and we remain neutral about it in the context of a global challenge like climate change, we risk ignoring people's agency in their ability to act or even demand the kind of mitigation and adaptation plans that should be put forward, by those who undermine what is lost in the first place. In the final section, I analyse culture in an environmentally sustainable

and morally appropriate way for this global age. That is, I provide arguments for the normative value of culture that needs to be paid attention to when dealing with environmental challenges like climate change.

Admittedly, it is quite impossible to deny the universalistic tendency of my analysis. However, the scope of my analysis is restricted to the salient cultural heritage values of maligned cultural groups in Africa. While my focus is on Africa, the analysis can be applied in an objective sense because culture is a global normative value.

2.2: Culture and Heritage in this Global Ecological Age: Ambiguities and Ambitions

The popularity of culture in virtually every discourse has obscured the real nature of culture. The demand to put forward an all-inclusive view of culture has never been challenging for culture theorists than in this contemporary time. A good number of them are beginning to caution the extremism in the liberal characterisation of culture that has enhanced the domination and subjugation of others. What culture is, and what it represents for people have become keenly contested. Are all cultures the same? Why are some cultures marginalised in a liberal democratic society? These questions have ignited passionate responses from cultural theorists of notable repute.

Charles Taylor took up the task of explaining the circumstances necessitating the equality of cultures. He argued for a 'politics of recognition' where "everyone and by extension, every culture should be recognised for their unique identity." "Non-recognition or misrecognition of this uniqueness," he says, can cause "a person or group of people to suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves" (Taylor, 1994: 25-27). In a similar vein, Kymlicka in his notable work *Multicultural Citizenship* proffer arguments tending towards placing a high premium on cultural minorities. He utterly avows that the cultural rights of minority groups must be affirmed and recognised in every society (Kymlicka, 2005). Iris Young examines the 'politics of difference' to explicate the implications of group differences for values of freedom, equality and justice. In his two versions of politics of difference which are 'politics of positional difference' and 'politics of cultural difference', he argues that "the commitment to justice sometimes requires noticing social or cultural differences and sometimes treating individuals and groups differently (Young, 2005: 5-31)." Each of this theory is not without

objections.²⁰ However, what is familiar with all of them is that they signal a new political imagery for culture.

Therefore, in what follows in the rest of the section, I will address the normative challenges to the understanding of culture and cultural heritage values in this global environmental age. My analysis will illuminate and give guidance to a culturally sensitive climate justice principle that I have in mind. The analysis here has been stimulated by Appiah's diagnosis of "the trouble with culture." In his book, *The Ethics of Identity*, he posits that the concept of culture has been "historicised and anatomised" to the point of allowing its imperialistic tendencies to become a pervasive part of nations (Appiah, 2005: 114-154). These challenges need to be brought closer in the context of climate ethics. I ventured into this task by discussing thematically, seven problems with the idea of culture in this contemporary period.

Conceptual Inadequacy: The index of the present clashes of culture buttresses the fact that this dispassionate opinion requires straitening the contours of the concept of culture to accommodate the nuances of this age. Before now, Raymond Williams calls culture "one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language" (Williams, 1983: 87). Tim Ingold's also suggests that "scholars have adapted their notions of culture to suit the dominant concerns of the day" (Ingold, 2002: 329). In some quarters, there have been contentions about the misconception of culture related to ethnocentrism (Idiong, 1994: 46). The concept of culture has been popularly described and represented in the form of wholes – say an American culture, a Nigerian culture. This method of describing culture has been described by Benhabib, as 'normative universalism' (Benhabib, 2002). Normative universalism, according to Benhabib is the "principle that all human beings, regardless of race, gender, sexual preference, ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious background, are to be considered moral equals and are therefore to be treated as equally entitled to moral respect" (Benhabib, 2002: 27).²¹ The idea of viewing 'culture as a whole', Benhabib says is "an analytical error" of substituting the part for the whole (Benhabib, 2002:58). Maintaining a universal understanding of the significance of culture is controversial and untenable in this global ecological age.

²⁰For the critique of Kymlicka's theory, see- Carens, J. "Liberalism and culture," in Joseph Carens, *Culture, Citizenship and Community: A Contextual Explication of Justice as Evenhandedness* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 52-87.

²¹ For more variant conceptions of normative universalism, see Benhabib, 2002 "Universalism in Contemporary Philosophical Debate" in p. 26-29.

The problem with normative universalism in contemporary politics is complicated in that it allows a straitjacket view of sensitive issues. For instance, when climate change affects cultural heritage values, it is essential to put forward the normative peculiarity of such cultural heritage and the values associated, so that we can justly consider the significance of what is lost when climate change impacts such cultural heritage. What culture signifies for different people need to be closely examined rather than objectively determined. Hence, the meaning of culture and heritage needs contextualisation.

Crass Globalisation: The era of globalisation has engendered new forms of social integration which is proceeding alongside socio-cultural disintegration. This situation has undoubtedly raised fears of increasing homogenisation of cultures on the one hand, and the marginalisation of identities and ways of being that do not belong to the dominant western civilisation on the other hand. In this global environmental age, socio-cultural and economic homogenisation are meeting resistance and subversion by those concerned to guard the autonomy of their ways of life and value system that is determined by the impacts of climate change. Globalisation has made it important for every culture to be represented. The marginalisation of cultures by supererogatory ones will not be merely taken as cultural change and cultural assimilation. As globalisation and cultural pluralisation of societies are proceeding apace, culture in its classical but restrictive form is undermined and needs to be enhanced.

Cultural Essentialism: The purity and the distinctiveness of culture is under attack from contemporary theorists who think cultural essentialism is a clog in the wheel of progress of contemporary society. The idea of culture as 'meaningful discrete wholes' has been critiqued for different reasons (Parekh, 2000:77-80; Carens 2000: 52; Benhabib, 2002). Some have argued that there is a need for the purging of cultures 'through complex dialogues with other cultures' (Benhabib, ix: 2002). Hence, the preservationist thesis²² has been continuously attacked in the bid to allow for cultural equality and democratic inclusion. In most instances,

²² The idea in the preservationist thesis is that "conservatives argue that cultures should be preserved in order to keep groups separate, because cultural hybridity generates conflict and instability: they hope to avoid the "clash of civilizations" by reinforcing political alliances that closely follow cultural-identity rifts (See Huntington 1996). The premise of the preservationist thesis was put forward by Benhabib (2002: 5). (1) that cultures are clearly delineable wholes; (2) that cultures are congruent with population groups and that a noncontroversial description of the culture of a human group is possible; and (3) that even if cultures and groups do not stand in one-to-one correspondence, even if there is more than one culture within a human group and more than one group that may possess the same cultural traits, this poses no important problems for politics or policy.

the attractiveness of yielding to change is often mediated and conditioned by the compatibility of the expected change with the existing culture.

Applied to climate justice, the notion that culture must be described according to characteristics that apply to the majority within the society is questionable. There are other groups, although in the minority that maintain different ways of life that do not align with the majority. These group of people also deserve recognition when dealing with the burden of climate change. Therefore, a change (such as in climate change displacement) which calls for the replacement or total abandonment of pre-established and originally preferred modes of behaviour is less likely to be accepted, if it generalises the kind of behaviour, peculiar to everyone in such society. The best kind of cultural change will be one which either provides other alternatives to people and or extends the culture by merely adding new things to it (Idang, 2005: 107). It is not difficult to see here that the essentialists' argument for cultural preservation is insufficient in this global environmental age.

The fusion between individual and community cultures: I have noted this concern earlier. Let me dwell more on it. Among cultural theorists, the question - is culture a property of individuals or group of people is yet to be settled. Masolo posits that 'culture' is among other contestable concepts that have engendered strivings for individual and group identities (Masolo, 2002: 25). He posits that cultural communities are now viewed as "separate interest groups in which individuals can participate, simultaneously or in sequence with different other people in each case without abandoning any" (Masolo, 26). In other words, he says, "communities are no longer viewed as fixed entities, but rather as open-ended and amorphous groupings definable more by organising beliefs, principles and practices than by the bodies which inhabit them" (Masolo, 26). Some have argued that "the notion of culture is related to the concept of community and social groups" (Oksanen, 2014:550). As such, there is an identity that is conferred on such community based on their culture. Such identity demands not only cultural recognition but also political citizenship (Benhabib, 2002: 19). These two intersecting ideas have moral and political implications in this climate age.

Consumerist/economic reductionism: The value that culture signifies in this environmental age needs clarification. McCarthy *et al.* (2004), identifies two types of cultural value. First, the intrinsic value which has a direct relationship on the importance of culture-in-itself. The second, which is, instrumental value, is the practical importance of culture. That is, instrumental value responds to the question what is culture useful for? The culture wars that

we have seen were necessitated because of the increased focus on the latter kind of value - instrumental values. This is because they are easily measured than the intrinsic benefits (McCarthy *et al.*, 2004). The difficulty in ascertaining the intrinsic worth of culture has made culture to be reduced to the Rawlsian notion of 'primary goods'²³ (Appiah, 121-127). This view is, therefore, negligent of the intrinsic worth of culture, especially to those who own or practice the culture. The point here is that recognizing the value of culture is a task that keeps cultural theorists awake even in this contemporary period.

Value neutrality: The values associated with culture are increasingly becoming something that must be discursively studied rather than objectively deployed. We cannot expect culture to serve every individual or society the same way. For instance, climate change is affecting everyone, but the dimension of the impact is not the same. Countries in the Global South, because of their economic and political standing are devastatingly pummelled by climate change, unlike countries in the Global North, even though countries of the later have caused climate change.

Due to unrestrained inter-play of interests, passions and instincts, the considerations for the kind of measures to redress climate change have focused on specific values to the neglect of others. The consideration of economic, political, and technological values has been foremost in climate ethics and climate justice. Cultural values have been of less reckoning in global climate justice. This is to the dismay of countries whose mainstay include their cultural viability rather than economic or technological. Hence, we can no longer be neutral about this dimension of impact in this global environmental age. P.C. Joshi's remarks on the relationship of value between culture and the environment is worth considering. He says, "there is an age-long connection between culture and the environment that find expression in the tensions and turmoil, anxieties and agitation, conflict and violence which are the hallmark of all unguided social transitions" (Joshi, 1986:1225-1226). The vast cultural values of centuries are in the process of transition and indeed disintegration as a result of disruption of age-old mechanisms of conserving, recreating and revitalising culture in each society. Silence in the face of this cultural disruption is detrimental to the future of societies that suffer culture loss.

²³ On primary goods, Rawls posits that "with more of these goods men can generally be assured of greater success in carrying out their intentions and in advancing their ends, whatever these ends may be." Thus, people in the original position know they want more rather than less of the primary goods. Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 92-93

Challenges in Adjudication in this global and ecological age: The faulty normative contemplation of culture has grave normative political consequences both for how we think justice/injustice should be addressed and how we think human diversity and pluralism should be furthered. Culture has been a difference-maker in the sense that it has bestowed identity on groups and has accorded them recognition and social distinction. What is novel is that in the context of environmental disasters faced by the society, groups now cluster around such identity markers to demand legal recognition and resource allocations to preserve and protect their cultural values. Frequent 'cultural wars' have emerged because of the significance that certain cultural traits have taken in our environmental age. Several adjudicatory challenges have arisen, suggesting that the present conception of culture needs to be enhanced. Cultural values have been marked in places and sites that are uprooted by the ravaging effects of anthropogenic climate change. The inhabitants of these places are also demanding justice and fair representation in climate policy discourse. For justice to be served in the context of culture loss to climate change, there is the need to have a clear understanding of what is lost. Hence, I turn to the normative understanding of culture and heritage in this global environmental age.

2.3: Understanding Culture in a Global Environmental Age

The importance of employing 'interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary and even transdisciplinary approaches' in assessing cultural heritage resources cannot be doubted. Up till now, most of the disciplines that have engaged the impacts of climate on cultural heritage only give a descriptive account without any normative wedge.²⁴ In this section, I propose an ambitious but important understanding of the concept of culture and heritage. I recognise that culture is a pervasive part of our human life. However, there is a need to provide a normative understanding of culture and heritage that will illuminate their significance and give guidance to climate justice. In other words, cultural heritage values must be described, developed and deployed in an environmentally compelling and morally appropriate ways.

The concept of culture derives from the Latin root *colere* or *culturare*, which means 'to till' or 'cultivate the ground' (Baldwin *et al.*, 2006: 6; Mathews, 2005:21). These words are associated with activities of 'tending to,' 'caring for' and 'to preserve' (Mathews, 2005: 21).

²⁴ Here, I refer to disciplines like Archaeology, Anthropology, Geology, Tourism, Environmental and Biodiversity studies. Scholars in these disciplines have engaged the impact of climate change on cultural heritage. See a compendium in Seekamp, E. "Securing the Future of Cultural Heritage by Identifying Barriers to and Strategizing Solutions for Preservation under Changing Climate Conditions" in *Sustainability*, 9, 2143.

From this point of view, the root meaning of culture compels that its conceptualisation must not abandon the fundamental understanding of caring and cherishing, despite the noticeable changes in society. In the classical times, Edward Tylor defines culture "as a complex whole which encompasses knowledge, belief, customs, values, interests, arts, morals, law and any other capabilities and habits acquired or exhibited by man as a member of society" (Tylor, 1958:1). This description of culture seems to be the historical or time-praised design for portraying human conditioning. This definition, no doubt, laid a solid groundwork for an understanding of culture. It also serves as the potential guide for the description of human behaviour in any given society. However, Tylor's definition of culture might have stood for a long time as all-encompassing description of culture but this view of culture cannot necessarily become univocal.

Before showing why Tylor's definition cannot be univocal, let me quickly point out that the idea of culture embraces a wide range of human phenomena. These phenomenon include material achievements and norms, beliefs, feelings, manners, morals etc (Idang, 2015: 98). Culture can therefore be classified into two distinct parts – material or tangible and non-material or intangible. Gabriel Idang explains the distinction between these two dimensions of culture when he writes:

While material culture refers to the visible, tactile objects which man is able to manufacture for the purposes of human survival; non-material culture comprises of the norms and mores of the people. While material culture is concrete and takes the form of artefacts and crafts, non-material culture is abstract but has a very pervasive influence on the lives of the people of a particular culture (Idang, 100).

It is pertinent to underscore that the immaterial or intangible include the institutional, philosophical, and creative aspects of culture. While the institutional is about the political, social, religious, legal and economic structure, the philosophical is about the ideas, beliefs, and values of the people. The creative relates to the people's literature - oral and written, their visual and performative arts.

The terrain of describing culture has expanded far more than what is captured in Tylor's definition. Its original power is commendable, but it seems that in this global environmental age, we have reached the point where it obscures a good deal more than it reveals. Thus, to admit like Markku Oknanen that "culture is a notoriously elusive concept that denotes a complex aspect of the spatio-temporal existence of the human species" puts us on alert to better position ourselves, trying to deal with the normative contours in the usage of the word

(Oknanen, 2014:542). Scholars from different disciplines like sociology, psychology, and political science, have since defined culture to capture the nuances in their disciplines. Faulkner *et al.* (2006) did an exhaustive work by analysing many definitions of culture from diverse perspectives that have emerged from Kroeber and Kluckhohn's 1952 book *Culture: A Critical Review of concepts and definitions*. They were able to identify seven themes of definitions of culture. These include definitions according to structure, function, process, product, refinement, group membership and ideology (Faulkner *et al.*, 2006: 27-52). They argue that the terrain of culture studies has expanded far beyond what was analysed by Kroeber and Kluckhohn's book (Faulkner *et al.* 2006: 27).

The definitions of culture are manifold. However, for my analysis, I am interested in the notion of culture within the context of a community. In this connection, the definition of culture by Kwame Gyekye as "an enactment of a community of people, created and fashioned in response to the whole gamut of problems or questions that arise in the context of a people's particular situation" is a perfect starting point (Gyekye, 2004: 11). I take culture to imply the ways of life that are peculiar to the community without any community in mind. The idea of culture here, supposes that the inhabitants of a community share social space, engage in mutual interaction, and most importantly share a way of life. This same idea of culture was expressed in what Kymlicka calls 'societal culture.' A societal culture he says.

...is the kind of culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres (Kymlicka, 1995: 76).

Thus, the notion of 'community culture' or 'societal culture' implies that there are systems and structures woven in the fabric of a culture that help shape the lives of people. The understanding of a community or societal culture also aligns with the profound position of James Young (2008) that "group of people not only share some traits in culture, but they are also culture" (Young, 2008: 10). In conceiving culture this way, we cannot deny that culture is a system of meaning as well as social relations. A cultural community is, therefore, a distinguishable group of people, the members of which share certain features such as language, religion, institutions and practices, art, behaviour, and rhythms of life. These features in a 'community culture' constitute and enable a collective way of life.

2.4: Understanding Cultural Heritage in a Global Environmental Age

Cultural heritage comprises both tangible (natural and cultural) heritage as well as intangible heritage. The former is the subject of the main legal instrument for the protection of cultural heritage, namely the 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage (WHC), adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Intangible heritage, meanwhile, was acknowledged in UNESCO's 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage (CSICH) and includes practices, representations, expressions, knowledge and skills recognized as cultural heritage²⁵ (Sylvia Maus, 2014: 700).

The conventional understanding of heritage as something connected only to the past is crude and cruel for our environmental age. Heritage has very little to do with the past. Similarly, the separation between natural and cultural heritage is common but fussy. Culture reverberates in every aspect of people's lives including their environment. To maintain a distinct relationship between these two is untenable. Also, the dichotomy between the tangible and intangible is critical to how we determine heritage values. Most times, the description of tangible heritage as distinct from the intangible do not take along the notion that "a tangible matter is thought to be made meaningful by being brought into a world of intangible meanings, which are the property of human culture and experience" (Harrison, 2015: 30).

The concept of heritage needs to be critically reimagined. Harrison suggests that there is the need to creatively and entrepreneurially re-imagine heritage values to show its fundamental concerns 'with assembling and designing the future' (Harrison, 2013: 35). Through the framework of 'connectivity ontologies,' he objected to the social constructivist account of heritage value as universal and inherent. He proposes a different understanding of heritage as 'collaborative, dialogical and interactive' (Harrison, 2015: 27). While heritage is produced as part of a conversation about what is valuable from the past, it can only ever be meaningfully assembled in the present, in a state of looking toward, and an act of taking responsibility for the future (Harrison, 2015: 35). Harrison explains that heritage involves 'working with the tangible and intangible traces of the past to both materially and discursively remake both we and the world in the present, in anticipation of an outcome that will help constitute a specific (social, economic or ecological) resource *in and for* the future' (Harrison, 2013: 35). He argues further that heritage must be derived from a material-discursive process, in which the

²⁵ See Article 2.1 of the CSICH 2003 Declaration.

past and the future arise out of dialogue and encounter between multiple embodied subjects in (and with) the present (Harrison, 2015:27). According to Harrison, heritage is defined as "a series of diplomatic properties that emerge in the dialogue of heterogeneous human and non-human actors who are engaged in keeping pasts alive in the present, which function toward assembling futures" (Harrison, 2015:28). Harrison says, 'culture is everywhere' and thus there can be 'no boundary between nature and culture' in the manner of 'mind-matter binary' (Harrison, 2015: 29).

From my explanations thus far, cultural heritage is the tangible and intangible properties that are connected to the peoples cherished ways of life whose meaning, and significance can only be recognised through collaborative, dialogical and interactive processes, involving owners of this cultural heritage. Describing cultural heritage in this manner will encourage sensitivity to how different domains of heritage practice relate to different modes of existence, thus providing a specific understanding of the pasts, presents and futures. Also, a dialogical understanding of cultural heritage pushes us to consider the fundamental but complicated relationship between cultural heritage and other social, political, and environmental issues. This notion of cultural heritage is important, not only for the conceptual clarity it has brought but also because culture's influence is often manifested through group membership and the ways that people identify with social groups. Over the past few years, many things, including cultural heritage values, have been susceptible to change. Maintaining a dialogical notion of cultural heritage requires the considerations of the questions of ethics that is invoked from this view. I take up this task in the next section.

2.5: A Normative Analysis of Cultural Change

In this section, I will show how the notion of cultural change is besieged in this environmental age. As such, it breeds moral questions needing an urgent response. If change is a pervasive part of a culture, should we be neutral about the changes to cultural heritage values, especially when external forces are responsible? Put differently, how do we address cultural change and at the same time, recognise the loss of culture in the context of externally caused changes? I will address these questions by evaluating the nature of change that applies to culture, in the context of anthropogenic climate change. Cultural change has been taken for granted by cultural theorists. However, there are pressing moral issues that lurks behind the idea of cultural change. These issues cannot be resolved without the contribution of normative analysts and philosophers. This is because they have the "requisite knowledge of

normative questions" that will unravel the ethical blinders in the ordinary view of cultural change (Young, 2008:2).

Cultures are not eternal canons. They have been responsive to change from time immemorial. Indeed, change has been a persistent trend, and it is expected to be constant in every culture from time to time. Wars, plagues, new inventions have made societal cultures to be calibrated in varied dimensions. Every society must have experienced cultural change at one time or the other in the course of its history. Cultural changes happen all the time, and mere changes are not sufficient to constitute a threat to an individual's identity even if that individual might feel uncomfortable about them. However, the contemporary predicament of cultural dislocation in the event of anthropogenic climate change has provided the impetus for the theoretical challenges associated with merely describing the idea of cultural change. The forces behind cultural change must be scrutinize before such change can be admitted as normal. The current experience of climate change has made this scrutiny very important. This is because the effects of climate change have affected cultural values in devastating ways that cannot be overlooked. In the event of the cultural devastations caused by climate change, to see culture as a phenomenon that continually undergoes change, rather than something which can be denied, damaged or displaced portends grave normative implications for the way we think about how climate justice should be furthered. There are, at least, three important normative challenges springing from this perception of culture in this era of climate change.

One, the view of culture as that which must continually change erases the logical and ontological continuity that is involved in people's claim of cultural identity. In this sense, if culture must necessarily be conceived as having a fluid character and always changing, there can be no such thing as continuity *let alone* identity by people whose culture and ways of life have been disrupted by climate change. Second, such characterisation of culture obscures the nature of what is denied, damaged and ultimately lost as a result of anthropogenic climate change. By subsuming the alteration of cherished ways of life as a natural character of culture, we regard culture as an inconsequential good or resources. Three, if change is deemed as a natural character of culture and we remain neutral about it in the context of a global challenge like climate change, we risk ignoring people's agency in their ability to act, or even demand the kind of mitigation and adaptation plans that should be put forward, by those who undermine what is lost in the first place. I do not aim to disregard change as a necessary feature of culture. However, my concern is that to completely naturalise change as

a character of culture in the context of climate change will be unjust on the path of those whose cherished cultural heritage assets are destroyed. I will discuss further these three pertinent reasons why cultural change cannot be neutralised when describing the effects of climate change.

First, to see culture as a phenomenon that continually changes, erases the logical and ontological character of recognition and continuity that is involved in people's claim to cultural identity. Marshall Sahlins was first to raise this sort of argument against Western intellectuals that dismiss the idea of the cultural identity and continuity (Sahlins, 1976). He suggests that the definition of culture in terms of its ecological functionality undervalues the meaning of culture. He makes this clear in his cryptic summation that:

The ecological functionalism puts culture in double jeopardy. It (culture) is threatened with liquidation because it cannot be specified as such by natural reasons, and because consideration of its specific quality would invite in a reason of another nature. The crisis then becomes ontological in its proportions. Culture is exchanged for "behavior." Its concrete qualities are only the appearance of "bodily movements" whose wisdom is their biological effect. Ontology thus recapitulates methodology (Sahlins, 1976: 89).

He argues further that characterising culture this way has the effect of erasing the logical and "ontological" continuities involved in the different ways that societies interpret and respond to the imperialists' conjecture. He submits that "if culture must be conceived as always and only changing, lest one commit the mortal sin of essentialism, there can be no such thing as identity" (Sahlins, 1976: 88-90).

The above argument is much more important in our climate age. To describe culture only by what culture does, that is, its functions will be grossly insufficient in attenuating the significant normative value of culture in this global environmental age. There is an invisible but important part of culture that is neglected, when we describe culture, only in terms of the needs it serves. We must see culture not only in its functionality because such perception tends to look away from the structural roots that culture stems from. The structural root of culture is described as what culture is, regardless of its functions and this can be likened to Theodor Adorno's claim when he argues that culture "is the manifestation of pure humanity without regard for its functional relationships within society" (Adorno, 1992: 93).

In the event of cultural heritage loss due to climate change, we cannot ascribe what is lost only in terms of the functions that cannot be performed by those who possess such cultural values. Doing otherwise could be first commendable. However, on closer scrutiny, we will discover that such supposition neglects the symbolic significance of culture to the people. This apparent misnomer in climate ethics requires that we question the attention given to culture loss, especially when the change that brought about the loss is involuntary and external. Externally wrought changes are more alienating, due to being entirely outside of the group members' control and thus more detrimental to individuals' wellbeing and self-respect (Heyward, 2014: 153). That is why Adger *et al.* suggests that climate change adaptations strategies must be considerate of the significant but subjective values that are attached to the "loss of place and cultures" (Adger *et al.*, 2009: 347-349).

More so, it is important to underscore that the significance of cultural heritage will never be the same in every society. There is a normative peculiarity in the functions that cultural heritage performs in each society. For some, this heritage is akin to their identity while for others, they are attached to their long-term survival and sustenance. Therefore, any discussion of cultural change resulting from climate change must consider the impacts of such change on self-identity and self-determination of the people. Self-identity and self-determination are part of what Kymlicka describes as the structure of culture. Kymlicka makes the distinction between 'cultural character' and 'cultural structure.' He argues that while the character of culture changes, the structure of culture persists. If there is any permissible change that possessors of a heritage culture can allow, it must be for its character but not its structure (Kymlicka, 1995: 104-105).

Thus, the effects of climate change seen in rising sea levels, changing rainfall patterns and higher temperatures have challenged the sustenance of prized cultural heritage values like shared myths, farming, and food preservation methods. The consequence, sometimes being the displacement of people from their territoriality, thereby making them environmental refugees. For these people, these cultural heritage values have moved from being a possession to become almost an inalienable part of their lives. These values have given them responsive tools to the problems that confront them. These cultural heritage values are not just properties that is possessed, but who these people really are. That is, these cultural heritage values are rooted in their identity. Hence, any threat to the continuity and sustenance of these values cannot be merely treated as cultural change.

The experience of cultural change that threatens the survival of individuals or group of people cannot be gullibly passed for cultural change. To then treat culture as fluid in this kind of situation gives a clue of the value that is placed on the ontological elements of people's culture that pertain to their long-term sustenance and wellbeing. I am not building up preservationists' arguments. Instead, my point here is to caution the notion of cultural change that erases the ground of change by neglecting human wellbeing. The displacement of significant cultural heritage properties by climate change cannot be grouped in the ambits of cultural change because it uproots the ground of change with it. Doing otherwise will imply that we are still holding unto a parochial idea of culture. This idea of culture is what Appiah calls 'culture *simpliciter*'- where culture has no belonging attached to it. In this sense, we talk of culture as something that just "provides a framework of concept and values" without any attachment to a group of people (Appiah, 2005: 125).

The second normative implication of being neutral about cultural change is not as difficult to understand as the first. Neutralising or naturalising change as the character of culture in this climate change era obscures the nature of what is damaged and lost. Climate change has brought about skewed changes that require our reflexive and affective lives, to caution the way such changes have bedevilled us. Culture is an important facet of every human being, but to those living in indigenous communities, culture reverberates in their existence. For example, the traditional source of food, drinking water, and of living has been affected due to increasing salinity. These environmental conditions challenge the knowledge and values associated with subsistence-based practices as well as the utility they derive from their ecological space. The traditional ecological knowledge of indigenous peoples is generally transmitted orally and through cultural processes that include observation, demonstration, participation, ceremonies, and teachings at particular times of one's life or during special occasions, such as feasts and potlatches (Turner *et al.* 2007: 4). Collectively, the cascading effects of climate change have eroded traditional knowledge of environmental and economic survival in overwhelming circumstances (Turner *et al.*, 2008). The kind of pathetic change caused by climate perturbation to cultural heritage affects a significant part of people's lives. When externally imposed forces or decisions negatively impact or threatens the sustainability of cultural heritage values and prohibits a particular way of life and practices that go with it, this may threaten the viability of these people's socio-cultural lives, thereby making them feel a sense of profound loss and alienation.

Candidly, it is natural and desirable for cultures to change because of the choice of their members. People should be able to decide what is best from within their culture and integrate into their culture whatever they find admirable in other cultures. However, the emission of harmful greenhouse gas that is causing climate change has been traced to the industrialised and developed societies, devoid of the choices of the people in developing countries who currently bear the brunt of climate change. The socio-cultural consequences of these harmful emissions have weighed differently on human societies everywhere. The developed countries in the Global North have fared well in coping with such changes while developing nations, particularly those inhabiting indigenous people in the Global South have struggled to cope with the impacts of climate change. The cry of culture loss has been a diagnostic feature among indigenous societies but tacitly ignored in climate ethics discourse simply because it is not yet clear to the parties involved how cultural change can turn out to be culture loss. Climate change that causes culture loss prevents the flourishing of cultural diversity. The lamentation of culture loss is therefore valid and must not be merely treated as cultural change.

The third normative implication that the fluid conception of cultural change portends lays in the fact that it tacitly ignores people's agency to react to the sort of injustice that is embedded in the actions that cause these objectionable cultural changes. The idea lurking in this argument is that to be passive about cultural change on the premise of its natural character undercuts the potency to speak about the effects of such change. The fact that climate change affects culture in a way that choice is taken from these indigenous dwellers is objectionable. Climate change affects indigenous people in a way that it gives little or no choice to determine the prospects of their wellbeing. These poor indigenous people have no contribution to the harmful emissions that caused climate change, yet, if they are made to accept the coda that cultural change is natural, then they will be expected to accept the gruelling experience of culture loss due to climate change as their fate. Climate change cannot be caused by rich emitting nations and also deny the poor countries that are mostly affected the opportunity for self-determination. This will be highly unjust. Kymlicka's position on this injustice is clear when he avows that:

While indigenous peoples do not want modernisation forced upon them, they demand the right to decide for themselves what aspects of the outside world they will incorporate into their cultures, and many indigenous peoples have moved toward a more urbanised and agricultural lifestyle. And they

demand the right to use their traditional resources in the process
(Kymlicka, 1995: 104).

Forceful adaptation to climate change on anyone is unjust. Speaking of indigenous people's challenge of forced adaptational change, Tom Goldtooth, Executive Director of the Indigenous Environmental Network, states, "We have certain knowledge that we're able to adapt, but we should not be put into a position of *forced* adaptation or *forced* change....Our forecast as indigenous people is that, yes, we will survive, but we shouldn't have to go through all these difficulties...we should not be put in that position."²⁶ This opinion suggests that climate change enforces on indigenous people, the burden of preserving their culture, which was never envisaged by these people. Serious questions, therefore, arise about how and whether, in the case of mass displacement, relocation, or drastic loss of cultural heritage to environmental disasters from climate change, the integrity of cultural change can be maintained.

Maintaining a thoughtless view about cultural change in this era of climate change leaves those who are badly affected in a position where they can neither react nor complain about the injustice meted out on them whenever a discussion on how to remedy the burden of climate change is taking place. Given the normative challenges that blight a simplistic understanding of cultural change, we cannot admit less that the 'spirit' and 'substance' of culture needs enhancement in this global environmental age. I think this is not only possible but also desirable.

2.6: The Normative Value of Cultural Heritage in this Global Environmental Age

Before this period, anthropologists have been the frontrunner in the race to describe what culture signify (Idang, 2015: 97). Some Anthropologists have churned out forthright interpretative theories of culture that have helped shaped our understanding over the years (Geertz, 1973; Barker 2003). In this twenty-first century, the concept of culture is fast garnering scholars from other disciplines. Though, I doubt if anyone can dismiss the anthropologists as specialists in the study of culture, however, one can challenge what Terence Turner calls their 'market share' in the ascription of values associated with culture, especially in this global environmental age (c.f. Kuper, 2000: 228). Challenging this 'market

²⁶See Tom Goodtooth, "What does climate change mean for indigenous communities?" YouTube video, 7:03, uploaded December 27, 2011, by "One World TV" <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PFRxJFUefw8>. Accessed September 2020.

share' is particularly important for articulating a climate ethics theory that is culturally sensitive to the plight of individuals and communities.

The loss of cultural assets and the varied dimension to which different cultures have responded to the challenge of environmental problems has jolted the interests of environmental philosophers as well as political commentators in matters concerning the normative value of culture. Clare Heyward argued that global climate change "threatens cultural identity and thus raises questions of cultural justice" (Heyward, 201: 151). The problem of addressing cultural injustice, I think, requires exploring how to describe culture in a way that does not privilege some groups while marginalising others in the face of cultural loss. Taking seriously cultural justice requires expanding our ideas about what culture signifies and how it should be treated in this global environmental age. Give this reality, they (anthropologists) must accept that they no longer enjoy a privileged position in the packed and diverse gallery of experts in cultural studies.

The concept of 'culture' is rooted in the fibre of society, and its significance cannot be denied in present-day society. Lawuyi posits that "culture is a voice that has deep roots in the past...but it equally springs from a lively present. However, contrary to Lawuyi's perception that philosophers are "skirting around issues and concepts that anthropologists are at home with" (Lawuyi, 2017: 351)," it is worth mentioning that the interest of philosophers, particularly those engaged in normative studies, goes beyond merely describing what culture is. They try to examine, seeing the present realities, what culture *ought* to signify. It is the present connotation of culture in the face of environmental challenges, and how it relates to normative values like identity, race, and socio-economic justice, which makes the enhancement of its classical formulation more desirable.

Climate change increases not only the vulnerability of cultural resources but also the cultural values that are deeply embedded in cultural resources (Henderson and Seekamp, 2018: 220). This presents a challenge to our conceptual space especially what can rightly be described as culture and cultural heritage. In what follows in this section, I will provide arguments for the normative value of culture that must (and must not) be considered when dealing with environmental challenges like climate change. I argue that merely describing culture as a way of life tacitly undervalues the numerous sentiments in such a view. I agree with Homi Bhabha that "the borderline work of culture demands an encounter with 'newness' that is not part of a continuum of past and present." (Bhabha, 1994: 70). The newness here I think, should be the

moral considerations for culture when affected in the form of denial, damage, or outright loss by environmental disasters such as climate change. I shall underscore in two senses, (a) the ecological character and (b) the moral character of culture that are obscured in the classical understanding of culture. These characters of cultures need attention and recognition in this environmental age.

The moral and ecological character of culture has been overlooked long enough, but the index of our global age is prompting us to revisit these critical facets of culture. It strikes me that these characteristics of culture have been there, but never paid attention to. To imagine that Emile Durkheim has provided a clue about these characters beckons our attention. He argues that culture has an intrinsic character, and its survival is dependent on the environmental milieu of its time. He underscores this nature of culture when he posits:

...culture exists in and for itself: Its principles and goals are carried by powerful institutions and structures and are not necessarily beneficial or pleasant for its members. It is at base a complex system that has as its first task survival. To accomplish this task, it must cope with ecological, political, economic, structural, and technical constraints and pressures (cf. Lindholm, 2007: 194).

The later part of his summation shows that culture must learn to cope with ecological, economic, structural and technical constraints. These are some of the important features of culture that must be taken into consideration when dealing with its intricacies. Among the values suggested by Durkheim, the significance of culture to the environment that people inhabit is less considered. That is why it is easy to make plans towards redeeming the physical and economic effects of climate change without considering the significance of other physical structures that are the assemblage of veritable heritage cultures for some people. Culture provides its members with a lens, to both gaze their environment, and also determine their place in such environment. Charles Lindholm echoes this point when he posits that "it is more realistic to see that culture is not only a mirror of human hopes and fears, but also an objective reality, an evolving collective entity enduring over eons of time, providing its members with roles, identities, and morals that further the viability of the group as a whole" (Lindholm, 2007: 194). The important but complex connection between culture and environment seem unnerving, but we are pressed in this environmental age to revisit such connections.

Before now, there is a distant connection between culture and environment. Julian Steward points out that "in cultural-historical explanations, the environment was relegated to a secondary role in explaining cultural differences" (Steward, 2009: 199). Thus, we find less exploration of the impacts of people's environment on their culture. If this has been a persistent feature of the previous era, it cannot be the norm in this global environmental age. What is at stake here is to seek to make culture relevant in the ambits of environmental and social justice that have become a pervasive part of our contemporary existence.

While the socio-economic and socio-cultural connections of people are well known, the culture-environment relationship of human beings is not firmly rooted in consideration of environmental impacts on human beings. The connection between culture and the environment has been explored by some social scientists. For instance, Mike Hulme says "humans have no option to live climatically, just as they have no option but to live culturally (Hulme, 2015: 7). Chris Barker argues that "the analysis of economic determinants may be necessary to the understanding of culture. However, it is not and cannot be self-sufficient. He posits that we need to examine cultural phenomenon in terms of their own rules, logic, development, and effectivity" (Barker, 2003: 72). This argument points to the desirability of a multi-dimensional and multi-perspectival approach to the understanding of culture. This approach would seek to grasp the connections that culture has with economic, political and more importantly, the social life of people without reducing cultural phenomena to any specific level.

The inter-subjective nature of culture is also important for our global ecological age. The essence of culture is not limited to a particular group, but also useful for other people who neither belongs to the group nor practice such culture. For instance, the agricultural system that is affected by climate change in Africa does not only affect the people of Africa. The proceeds from their engagement in agriculture must have been useful (if not as finished products), as raw materials to other continents. In essence, this way of life is not only important to the people of Africa but also to the socio-economic existence of others. Seyla Benhabib makes a similar claim when he argues that the validity of cultural claims about the external world must be established both in a subjective and inter-subjective manner (Benhabib, 58). Thus, culture bestows an inter-subjective normative value that should be carefully considered in determining the burdens of climate change as well as how to share the following responsibility. The knowledge of these inter-subjective norms facilitates the methods in which socially competent mitigation, and adaptation benefits can be prescribed.

Another dimension of the inter-subjective importance of culture is its inter-generational importance. Culture connects present generation to future generation. The inter-generational value of culture has been decried by Jean-Christophe Merle when he argues that:

The culture handed down from earlier generations is our common heritage which we enjoy together. It is almost a natural resource and, therefore, can be treated in the same way as the environment. Fairness demands that we bequeath our common culture and the environment in an acceptable condition for all future generations (Merle, 1998: 262).

The representations of every culture in multicultural dialogues is important and in the case of climate change negotiations, cultural representation is very needful. The emphasis on the participation of all, in the development landscape, has created new demands for indigenous knowledge, especially in relation to the environment. Inter-cultural dialogues now seem to be a necessity to facilitate this transition thus bringing to the fore the value of culture.

The normative elements of a culture also determine human relations (Markku, 2014: 543). There are conceptions of right and wrong in every culture, and this can be traced to the moral formation of the individual inhabiting these societies. The social realities of our global age include many elements that regulate individual and collective behaviour. These elements are linked to the cultural rather than formal laws and decisions. Hence, there is the need to examine the actions that are tied to cultural beliefs and how these actions impact upon the climate. Markku critiqued actions like gift exchange, human mobility and ritual purification that have been part of human societies but needs to be revised if we are to mitigate the destructive effects of emitting carbon into the atmosphere (Oksanen, 548-555). These actions are rooted in cultural lifeways and cannot be cautioned by the application of formal laws; else, such laws will be crossing the threshold of permitting fundamental human rights. The point I am making here is that the cultural change needed for curtailing global climate change might not be feasible if the cultural values that impact climate change are not examined and analysed.

Broadening the horizon of the normative value of culture, we need to examine its connection with the moral values of people. On the moral character of culture, Tangwa explains the relationship between culture and morality. He says, "although moral imperatives are universal," nevertheless "moral thinking and practices may differ from culture to culture and even from person to person even within the same culture" (Tangwa, 2005, 17). Cultural practices are the by-product of moral rules, and this is generally the case in most African

societies. Having settled for the fact that culture is a necessary tool for accelerating anthropogenic climate change, we need to examine the impacts of each cultural beliefs, and at the same time, what effort can be made through cultural transformation of the beliefs that have caused climate change.

We cannot defer examining the agency responsible for cultural change when there is a compromise to the wellbeing of a group that is not catered for, in the event of an environmental disaster as in climate change. According to Kwame Gyekye, the values and practices of human cultures are created with a view, originally, for enhancing human wellbeing *generally*. He argues that the validity of any cultural practice is dependent on its consequences on the wellbeing of its people. He writes:

Culture...is created by human beings to serve the purposes and interests of human beings. For this reason, the basic or ultimate criterion for evaluating cultures is *human wellbeing*, the extent to which a particular culture is set to fulfil the conditions that make for human wellbeing (Gyekye, 2004: 17).

The normative value of culture in this environmental age, makes it important to consider the impacts of climate change on cultural values. The position of Adger *et al.* that "culture, and its analysis, is central to understanding the causes and meaning of, and human responses to climate change" presses home the point (Adger *et al.*, 2013: 112)." They submit that:

Climate change is often portrayed as a global-scale problem: it often does not resonate with the values associated with many traditional, ethnocentric worldviews, and may contribute to antagonism or cognitive dissonance. Yet in revealing linkages and connections that are not readily perceived or visible, climate change can also promote humanist values that counter exclusive and conformist values (Adger *et al.*, 2013: 114).

This is to say that the moral character of culture is central to understanding and implementing adaptation, mitigation and compensation for climate change.

Finally, exploring the normative character of culture in this global environmental age has paradoxical insights. While on the one hand, it opens us to the significant risks that culture faces in the event of climate change, on the other hand, a focus on the normative character of culture unlocks cultural practices by individuals and groups that have affected (and still affecting) the concentration of harmful greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere.

2.7: Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that although culture has been keenly contested in contemporary times, its significance in this global environmental age needs further theorising. I engaged the idea of culture and heritage in morally appropriate ways. I argue that cultural heritage is not simply an incidental fact of one's life; it is a significant feature of our modern moral identity. This understanding provided the motivation to caution the extreme fluidity in the classical understanding of culture. Through normative analysis, I punctuated the notion of cultural change that legislates the loss of cultural values in this global environmental age. In addressing the significant nature of what is lost when climate change affects cultural heritage values, I argue that although culture is a pervasive part of human life that cannot be ignored in this global environmental age yet its values need to be developed and deployed in an environmentally compelling and morally appropriate ways. Making culture the target of criticism and the focus of concern in this chapter is important. The normative understanding of culture and heritage that I have provided will give guidance on how climate justice should be furthered. But before then, it is important to set the tenor of the global justice implications of the loss of cultural heritage values to Africa. This will be my focus in the next chapter.

CHAPTER THREE

CLIMATE CHANGE AND AFRICA'S CULTURAL HERITAGE LOSS: THE GLOBAL JUSTICE ACCOUNT

3.1: Introduction

In line with the focus of this dissertation, this chapter addresses the significant denial, damage, and ultimate displacement of Africa's cultural heritage, resulting from the impacts of climate change as a problem of justice to which global justice scholars must pay attention to. Climate change associated with anthropogenic global warming represents an additional and potentially profound threat to African heritage. The loss of Africa's cultural heritage to climate change stirs important ethical questions. These questions include what responsibilities do the developed countries that caused climate change, have towards mitigation and adaptation for the sake of Africa's cultural heritage values that are destroyed? Should the existing heritage assets in Africa be preserved from destruction by climate change, at a cost within the budget of Africa's government? Answering the above questions puts justice in the front desk.

Our global age has prompted the need to explicate justice in ways that speak to the fluidity of our interactions and interconnectedness. This is because we now understand that the ramifications of our actions have both local and global consequences. This strikingly unusual situation by historical standard has generated important debates on global justice. Hence, questions that have been discussed by global justice scholars include - do robust duties of justice exist between people that do not live in the same country? In virtue of what (if any) are there such duties and most importantly, which principles best characterise those duties? These questions have provoked a response from the camps of cosmopolitan and non-cosmopolitan theorists of justice, but I do not intend to broach over the discourse to avoid distractions.²⁷

The concern for global justice has also been framed in the language of 'equity,' 'fairness' (Vanderheiden 2008: 54) and 'responsibility' (Jamiesson, 2015: 23-42) by some climate ethicists. It is also important to stress that the kind of justice relevant here is social justice at all levels, from the global to the local because the causes and consequences of climate change are intertwined deeply with global patterns of inequality. Mearns and Norton (2010:2) opine

²⁷For detailed discussion of cosmopolitan and non-cosmopolitan theories of global justice as well as their critique, See Kukathas, C. 2006. "The Mirage of Global Justice" *Social Philosophy & Policy Foundation*. Printed in the USA.

this when they posit that "the global injustice of a world in which responsibility for the causes of climate change is inversely proportional to the degree of vulnerability to its consequences calls for equity and social justice to be placed at the heart of a responsive agenda on climate policy and action" (Mearns and Norton, 2010:2). My approach in this chapter is a response to calls from Scholars to see climate change as a global justice challenge. One of such Scholar - Simon Caney challenges the institutional isolation of climate change policy within the international regime. He advocates what he calls an 'integrationist' approach that considers climate change 'in the light of general account of global justice' (Caney, 2012: 255 -300). By advocating an 'integrationist' approach, Caney provides a theoretical perspective that echoes call from developing countries that climate change is inherently tied to other challenges such as poverty and health that are connected to global justice.

In this chapter, I address how the impacts of climate change on African cultural heritage is intrinsically linked to the concepts of global climate justice, to which global justice theorists have been unmindful of.²⁸ Climate justice relates to people's ability to respond and adapt to climate change. How this ability affects and is affected by cultural heritage and how it is dealt with is very crucial. Following the discursive nature of heritage that I presented in chapter two, this chapter portrays heritage as a cultural product, knowledge base and political resources for Africans. Heritage contributes to our understanding of who they are, but, more importantly, whom they want to become because of its potentials for self-determination. Without heritage, people's connection to places, to the past and to the future can become untethered. This makes it important to consider the vulnerability of this critical asset to climate change as an issue in global justice.

The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section addresses climate change as a global justice concern. Here, I discuss some of the global justice concerns notably, distributive justice, compensatory justice, intergenerational justice and procedural justice that have been debated in climate justice literature. In the second section, I raise concerns about the methodology of global justice theorists that leaves out the issue of cultural (in)justice unattended. I contend that this neglect is dire and thereby makes global justice discourse less persuasive on a global scale. In dealing with these concerns, I suggest strategies that should be adopted by global justice scholars for a rich, comprehensive, and compelling global

²⁸A survey of canonical climate justice literatures like Gardiner, 2010; Garvey, 2008, Page, 2006 have not discussed the global justice implications of the vulnerability of cultural heritage to climate change.

justice. In the third section, I situate the destruction of Africa's cultural heritage values by climate change as a concern for global (in)justice. I argue that the climate impact on Africa's cultural heritage raises questions of 'climate justice' that cannot be dismissed as irrelevant or insignificant. The last section explores the global justice concern that the loss of cultural heritage from climate change might bring for climate refugees in Africa. It submits that climate refugees from the African continent, in addition to their loss of identities, struggle with the burden of sustaining both biological and cultural diversities. I argue that the critical concern of climate migration scholars should be to treat the loss of cultural heritage as a significant existential threat that must be seriously considered in global justice discourse.

3.2: Climate Change and Global Justice

The devastating effects of climate change on humans has now made it clear that the scarcest resource is the capacity of our atmosphere to continue to absorb the growing volume of harmful greenhouse gasses that we generate (Toulmin, 2009:9). Before discussing issues of justice that global climate change exacerbates, let me first address the question of how the atmosphere is now a finite resource that must be carefully tended. Okereke makes this point when he avers that the notion of 'biophysical limits of our ecological space' occupies a central position in global environmental justice (Okereke, 2011:119). This is because we once used to think that the atmosphere has an infinite capacity to absorb our waste gases without harmful consequences. However, this is no longer the case because the warming effects being felt at present shows that we might have used up the capacity of the atmosphere that helped retained emission in the normal sense. The atmosphere's capacity to absorb our gases has therefore become a finite resource to which various parties have competing claims (Singer, 2002:29). The arising claims and interest on how to ensure fair use of the limited atmospheric resources available demands a conscientious awareness of climate justice deliberations.

Interesting but complicated questions arising from this grim fact are - how do we allocate this scarce resource? Who should be held responsible for the harmful emissions causing climate change? How do we even determine those that will suffer from the consequence of harmful emissions? Should we narrow our scope to the past and the present or we need to include future generations? Put differently, the projected impacts of climate change raise serious questions of global justice and intergenerational justice (Heyward, 2014:149). The perplexing questions also reverberates around who should reduce GHG emissions, by how much, and when? What would a fair, equitable deal look like?

We now live, in what Peter Singer calls "One World" (Singer, 2002) because we share certain peculiar resources through interactions from our interconnectedness. The fate of humanity is believed to be intertwined, seeing that actions in a particular location now have consequences in global proportions. The action of burning fossil fuels which have resulted into, and is still causing climate change, is in the bracket of such actions. Therefore, we humans must learn to deal with the fall-out from the global dimension of our actions. Barbara Ward earlier warned of this imploding problem when she suggests that "our continued existence on this planet depends on our understanding of what our global interconnectedness means, and the need to adjust our behaviour towards a more sustainable use of the earth's finite resources" (Ward, 1972). The problem of climate change is now the ultimate 'global tragedy of the commons problem' that must be dealt with very urgently (Gardiner, 2011:26-29).

The political philosopher John Rawls outlined a theory of justice, which sought to promote "justice as fairness". He described justice as "the first virtue of social institutions" (Rawls, 2002: 3). He argues that the principles of justice are fairest when it emanates from what he calls 'original position,' a situation where people discard present rules and opinions in order to put forward ideal rules or principles of justice. He went further to posit that the rules will be fairest if they are drafted by people acting as though they are 'behind a veil of ignorance' and do not yet know where they will be, in the future economic and political hierarchy (Rawls, 2002: 118-136). Rawl's hypothesis, by extension to the problem of climate change, requires that the proposal for climate justice must be fair enough to deliver the best possible outcome for everyone. But this is difficult to theorise *let alone* bring into practice. Since climate change is primarily caused by some parts of humanity rather than being acts of God, its consequences will be largely suffered by others who contribute little or nothing to the problem. This is one clear reason why climate change has now become a significant concern of global justice (Moellendorf, 2012: 132-133).

Climate change will alter the distribution of benefits and burdens both across space and time. It will further extend inequalities between developed and developing countries, and it will undermine the well-being of many who belong to future generations. To determine a fair and just approach to deal with these challenges become not only important but also urgent. Indeed, most climate ethics and political theorists who write about climate change do so in the language of justice (Edward Page 2006; Stephen Vanderheiden 2008; Stephen Gardiner 2011; James Garvey, 2008; Simon Caney 2014; Henry Shue, 2014). They address several domains of justice, but the ones that are salient are distributive justice, intergenerational

justice, compensatory justice, and procedural justice all combining under the umbrella of global justice. However, the canon of discourse has favoured distributive justice as the paradigm to analyse global justice.

According to Page (2006), distributive justice theories focus on three important issues which are the scope, shape, and currency of justice (Page, 2006: 50). He explains that the scope of justice concerns the identifiable entities who are the legitimate recipients of benefits and burdens in the society (Page, 2006: 50). The scope of the theory of distribution could be applied only to human beings; to human beings and non-human animals; to all living creatures; or to all living creatures as well as certain physical structures or processes (Page, 2006: 50). Even within a strictly humanist paradigm, to which I am much concerned in this dissertation, there are a number of additional issues of scope to be addressed, notably those that turn on the spatial and temporal limits of justice. That is, whether only some compatriots living at the same or all persons living at all times have distributive claims against others.

Concerning the *shape* of justice, Page explains that it concerns the pattern of benefits that a theory of distribution recommends. That is, how much of a given measure of advantage (or benefit) people should receive. Popular answers to this question have been offered in terms of efficiency, equality, priority, and sufficiency. That is, it has been suggested that benefits and burdens must be distributed so that human (or possibly animal) well-being is thereby maximised, or so that all are equal, or so that the worst-off group in society is as well-off as possible, or so that as many people as possible have enough to lead a good life (Page, 2006: 51). The third, which is the *currency* of justice, concerns the aspect of well-being, or unit of benefit or advantage, on which our distributive concerns should focus. The idea is that a clear account of the entities that count for a theory of justice, as well as what the profile of benefits should be across these entities, must be attached to some further account of what it is that is shared between these entities (Page, 2006: 51). Insofar as the problem of anthropogenic climate change is a problem of global justice/injustice, that problem cannot be meaningfully addressed without taking the promotion of justice as a central aim of global climate policy efforts (Vanderheiden 2008: xiv).

Therefore, there has been notable progress in the discourse about global climate change and justice. Like I have earlier mentioned, distributive justice, intergenerational justice, compensatory justice, and procedural justice seem to be the most common themes of justice in the discourse of global climate change justice. For distributive justice, the ethical difficulty

lies in determining what is unfair and unjust in the distribution of the negative consequences as well as the benefits of actions that cause climate change. (Posner and Weisbach, 2010). Intergenerational justice proponents argue that the present generation should protect the environment that our successors will inherit, where these successors are people who are not-yet-born (Page, 2006:14). Proponents of compensatory justice argue that if people who suffer the consequences of climate change are not those who caused it, can they legitimately claim compensation from those who did cause it? While a general ethical principle exists that those who have caused harm to others should be held accountable for it and even compensate those that have been harmed, it is not exactly clear within the context of global climate change how to determine historical and current responsibility. The issue of procedural justice concerns who should participate in which processes of decision-making about measures to prevent, mitigate or adapt to climate change? (Grasso and Sacchi, 2011; UNESCO COMEST, 2010: p. 14-15).²⁹

Within the context of global climate change, these issues of global justice have been unnerving and very difficult to settle. However, there remain grey areas of concerns that are yet to be brought to bear in climate justice discourse. That is, the global justice implications of the impact of climate change on cultural heritage values have been side-lined for seemingly more important ones. This has fostered cultural injustice but yet to be recognised in current global justice. This neglect opens a significant concern for the pattern in which global justice theories have been furthered. I explore some of those concerns and provide suggestions for a global justice that will be sensitive to cultural injustice in the next section.

3.3: Global Justice: Suspicions and Strategies for Global Climate Justice

Before magnifying the global justice challenge in connection with the loss of cultural heritage values because of climate change, it is pertinent to clarify the theme of global justice. This clarity is needed to understand the objective of global justice theorists and how their focus falls short of their objective. What is the focus of global justice? The issues that global justice scholars have focused on are quite many. The common thread in their focus is the resistance to unjust treatment, whether from globalisation or industrialisation. They also challenge the devastation of local economies, intensified destruction of the environment, deepening

²⁹ The Ethical Implication of Climate change in UNESCO World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology (COMEST)

exploitation of the global poor, the withering away of local cultures, and the apparent unconcern with the most vulnerable and marginalised (Brock and Moellendorf, 2005).³⁰

Hence, the discourse on global justice is gaining decent attention as moral and political philosophers see the need for justice beyond nations. One will think that scholars that are vociferous about global justice have done well by bringing to light these concerns. However, they have erred on several counts in their favoured approach to global justice.

The notion that there is a prejudice in the assumptions of global justice theories is gaining weight among African philosophers (Bekele Gutema, 2013: 12-30; Uchenna Okeja 2017a:1-11; Menkiti, 2017: 13-32; Katrin Flikschuh, 2017; Anke Granes 2015: 126-140). That is why scholars like Okeja question the 'official narrative' regarding the idea of global justice (Okeja, 2017a:2). Okeja argues that global justice discourse has been framed in the voice of few (mostly from the West) who occupy the position of the oppressor rather than the oppressed, and they make their narrative represent the supererogatory view on the matters of global justice. Okeja argues further that “people culturally and physically outside the context of this 'settled' narrative...will have a hard time making sense of the parochial universalism of this 'official' narrative” (Okeja, 2017a: 2).

When addressing global problems, the dialogic nature that is expected from scholars is lacking. The present discourse of global justice fails to allow the marginalised people to speak about their challenges in their own language. One will expect just like Bekele Gutema suggests "that issues that are global obviously concerns all, affects all and therefore all who are concerned about it need to express their ideas on it" (Gutema, 2013:13). However, this is far from the norm. The discourse on issues bordering on global justice that we very often come across in political and moral philosophy is limited to the experience of the West. They very much address sensitive issues of global justice from their own concave lenses.

We therefore need to intervene because justice does not wear a sentimental glass, and so it must be utterly transparent. Transparency demands a rich dialogue among various stakeholders. Hence to achieve the goals of global justice, an open-ended, pluralistic dialogue among nation-states and cultural community must be actively embarked upon. Although the pluralistic dialogue is a necessity, the purpose is not for some dominant groups to exert

³⁰ For a detailed discussion of some of these issues in global justice, see Brock, G. and Moellendorf, D. 2005. *Current debates in Global Justice* Netherlands: Springer; Also see Samuel Scheffler, 'The Idea of Global Justice—A Progress Report', *The Harvard Review of Philosophy* XX (2014), 17-35

control and dominate the dialogue. So many times, global justice engenders the view of universality, thought to be embracing of all regions, but the narrow-minded ideals that global justice scholars defend overtime, has shown that the discourse has been deployed to be an instrument of dominant groups. This suspicion is important. This is because the agreement from such dialogue will be made to represent a global agreement, but in reality, it has been tacitly determined by the overriding influence of some powerful groups.

The language of global dialogue must be cautious of what Paul Knitter calls "the political or ideological nature and intent of all language" (Knitter, 1995: 222). He argues that "our language and our truth claims are not only culturally conditioned, but they are also economically and politically conditioned. They are rooted in our political or economic position in society and in our desire either to maintain that position or to better it. Our interpretations and our language, therefore, do not simply limit our own grasp of truth; they can also oppress the ability of others to assert and live their own truths" (Knitter, 1995: 222). The oppressive tendency of the present global justice discourse is objectionable. That is, by operating under certain assumptions of knowledge claims, it necessarily excludes other assumptions. Even when the opportunity to consider other assumptions presents itself, some of these scholars are suspicious of the disruption that might come from assumptions to the prevailing hierarchical and hegemonic narratives. However, when addressing global problems, it is valuable to consider other assumptions because it gives clarity to our own assumptions and "sharpen the inter-contextual validity" of the claims that we make (Okeja, 2017a:3). To understand the words that others or we, are using, we must ask questions not only about the ideologies that lurk within our language but also the ideologies that are rooted in the socio-political standing of 'others' especially when the present issue concerns all. The present discourse of global justice fails to allow these marginalised people to speak about their challenges, and when they seldom do, they can only speak in a predetermined language other than their own language.

The culpability of current global justice discourse does not only show in their lack of consideration of other assumptions, even when they decide to allow an all-inclusive dialogue, they do so by imposing a consensus frame of discussion that serves the interests of the powerful few, to the dismay of those who are significantly distressed. This is what Fricker calls 'hermeneutic injustice' – the notion that the powerful nations have an unfair advantage in structuring collective understanding and creating collective social meanings (Fricker, 2007:169). The issue of global climate change is the case at hand. A global discussion on

climate change and climate ethics must not impose for instance, the language of 'vulnerability,' 'responsibility,' 'loss and damage' and 'cultural heritage' as we have seen among dialoguing parties. This is important so as to prevent the potential agreement from being 'managerial', such that what will be discussed, the method for discussion and the goals of the discussion have been predetermined from the onset. Raymond Williams sounds a warning that should be announced before every dialogue towards global justice. He says, "a primary means by which privileged groups mask their hegemony is via a language of common contribution and co-operative shaping, to the extent that such groups can convince all partners in public dialogue that each voice contributes equally - to that extent does the conversation deflect attention from the unequal distribution of power underlying it" (Williams 1977: 112).

When scholars discuss global justice in all their glowing language about cooperation and general human well-being, it has been discovered, that the inequalities among nations that are responsible for the problem are not often put into consideration, even the significant concerns about the well-being of some people are less considered (Gutema, 2013:14). For instance, climate justice focuses more on the reduction of emissions, geoengineering, all in the bid to combat climate change but neglect the socio-cultural values that are of paramount significance to some other regions, especially Africa.

Having raised the germane concerns about global justice, what strategies can be put in place if we must realise a global justice discourse that will be persuasive on a global scale? First, justice which is the goal must be made to stand its proper ground everywhere rather than conditioning it according to the mould and pattern of a particular region. Justice, which is about the notion of moral rightness, needs not to be superimposed by anyone. There are other contingent markers of justice that must be considered. Bekele Gutema suggests some of these markers when he argues that "justice can be based on culture, rationality, and law" and neither one of them should be the sole yardstick for determining just actions (Gutema, 2013:13). I will explore the cultural dimension of justice in chapter five. In the meantime, the goal of global justice, I think, should be to treat all citizens in accordance with the inalienable rights that humans have by nature of being humans, taking other factors such as gender, culture and other traits as contingent matters.

For us to achieve the objective of global justice, there must be an allowance for what John O'Brien calls the 'hermeneutical privilege of the oppressed' for the realisation of persuasive

interreligious dialogue.³¹ In the context of global justice, this privilege gives the oppressed - that is, those who suffer most from the past inequalities and the current actions of the rich, the opportunity to speak about their experience. In other words, global justice must recognise and insist, not simply that everyone contributes equally but that some people have more urgent and more helpful word based on their 'unmade' status. These people have been unable to speak in the past and are presently helpless victims. If the dialogue that births global justice will engender the participation of all, it must also recognise that there are also those who are *primi inter pares* - first among equals, (Knitter, 1995: 227), not because of their *ab initio* recognition but based on their unpalatable experience because of a problem they know little or nothing about.

This 'hermeneutic privilege' is important for two reasons that I will explain shortly. One, it gives these people the opportunity, not to claim any kind of moral superiority or an exclusive grasp of reality. Rather, their privilege is therapeutic – necessary to diagnose and remedy the ideological distortions about the issue at hand. That is, the opportunity to speak about their experience creates the conditions to come to an awareness of the practical roots of the experience that should guide the discourse. Second, such privilege is invaluable and irreplaceable for the methodological purification needed to remedy epistemic injustice in global discourse. This is expected to be at the foundation of a global discourse like climate ethics, to which Western scholars have been unmindful of.

As put forward by Paul Knitter, equally important is that what is meant by this 'hermeneutic privilege' for the oppressed is not an exclusive suggestion that the voices of the oppressed are the only voices to be heard. The central concern for overcoming the oppressive tendency of current global justice discourse, as a matter of fact, does not deny, it indeed demands that our conversations and efforts, remain one that allows every party to contribute (Knitter, 1995: 227). In matters like global climate change, the voices of the affluent, middle class, artists must all be heard together with the voices of the oppressed slum dwellers, herders, farmers, and forest peoples without any gender bias. Also, the priority and privilege given to these victims do not mean that their views or claims are simply and always normative. These

³¹John O'Brien first used the phrase, but he calls it the 'hermeneutic privilege of the oppressed' see O'Brien, John. 1992. "Theology and the Option for the Poor" in *Theology and Life Series*, vol. 22. Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press. Paul F, Knitter applied it to the context of global Ethic- see Knitter, P.F. "Pitfalls and Promises for a Global Ethics" in *Buddhist-Christian Studies*, Vol. 15 (1995), pp. 221-229 University of Hawai'i Press

victims can also have distorted interpretations of their reality and dangerous plans to remedy it. In this sense, there are no absolute privileged seats, no final gavels, around the table of dialogue. Rather, what is suggested is that to assign a privileged place to the victim means, that no conversation can be considered complete or finished unless the voices of the suffering have been heard. More so, these voices must be heard, not only first, but also seriously and unceasingly. To be able really to listen to them and take them seriously, we will have to recognise that it will often be difficult to hear and to understand them and that we will have to overcome initial reactions of mistrust and avoidance. David Tracy envisages this need for resolving dialogues. He writes:

All the victims of our discourses and our history have begun to discover their own discourses in ways that our discourse finds it difficult to hear, much less listen to. Their voices can seem strident and uncivil-in a word, other. And they are. We have all begun to sense the terror of that otherness. But only by beginning to listen to those other voices may we also begin to hear the otherness within our own discourse and within ourselves. What we might then begin to hear above our own chatter, are possibilities we have never dared to dream. (Tracy, 1987: 79).

Furthermore, if the suffering and the victimised are to truly exercise a hermeneutical privilege in our dialogues, it will not be sufficient for the oppressor and those who have the power not only to listen to them, but will also have to act with, and for them. Understanding what the victimised is saying, grasping the structures of oppression that keep them in bondage and that afflict our planet, is not simply a matter of theory. It can come only from praxis.

Such a new strategy is also an indispensable dimension for anyone engaged in a dialogue toward global justice. It is not sufficient to invoke only the experts. It is not sufficient to call for working groups of scholars as it is often done. It is also essential for each First World participants to be engaged, somehow and in some degree, in actively listening to, working for, struggling and suffering with, those who have been the victims of oppression as they seek to understand and transform the political, economic, and cultural structures that have dehumanised their life. Without such real-life communicative praxis, the proponents of global ethics and global justice will not be able to protect their projects from becoming a hidden weapon of domination.

The task of aligning the goal of global justice to climate justice debate becomes necessary "not just on the basis of being citizens of the globe but also on the basis of the long-standing

relations that have existed and continue to exist among countries of the world" (Bekele Gutema, 2013: 14). Global justice will be much compelling if this above strategy is adopted. In what follows in the next section, I put into practice a global justice that reflects the hermeneutic privilege of the oppressed. I will discuss the implications of the destruction of cultural heritage values by climate change to which little has been said in current climate justice discourse.

3.4: Climate Change and Cultural Heritage Loss in Africa: Global Justice Concerns

I have noted in the previous chapter that global climate justice discourse as it is, has furthered cultural injustice by not considering the question of cultural heritage values that are destroyed by climate change. In this section, I aim to discuss the African continent as a suppressed victim of climate change. This is the case because that which is peculiar and significant to them is being affected by climate change without any advocate representative in climate justice. In this regard, I address how the loss of significant cultural heritage values to climate change in Africa, exacerbate justice concerns to which global climate justice scholars must pay attention. The present experience of global climate change and the policy considerations³² have not effectively reflected this specific vulnerability of the African continent. Climate change poses a range of direct and indirect threats to heritage in Africa and interacts with other factors like poverty and insecurity to act as a threat multiplier. The climate impact on Africa's cultural heritage raises questions of 'climate justice'- "a concept that recognises that those least responsible for anthropogenic climate change are often those most affected by its impacts, possess the least capacity to adapt and have the weakest voices in global climate change negotiations and discussions" (Schlosberg and Collins 2014:359).

The loss of Africa's cultural heritage to climate change stirs important ethical questions. These questions include what responsibilities do the developed countries that caused climate change, have towards mitigating climate change for the sake of Africa's cultural heritage values that are destroyed? Should the existing heritage assets in Africa be preserved from destruction by climate change, at a cost within the budget of Africa's government? The default approach to the loss of cultural heritage may be to assume that this loss is inevitable, thereby responding with resigned complacency and doing nothing to redress this loss. However, we need to ask who stands to lose the most from this approach and what are the consequences of this essentially 'do nothing approach'? For the response to these questions to

³² I will discuss the problem of current climate policies and proposal in the next chapter.

be fair, it must be culturally appropriate and made with free, prior, and informed consent of those who are in the frontline of the experience of losing their cultural heritage to climate change.

Predicting climate change for many African regions is particularly complex, because of the limited data available from the past and present, and also the poor understanding of how changes in the characteristics of land, sea and atmosphere interact (Toulmin, 2009: 23). Nevertheless, all models show that Africa will warm during this century, with the drier subtropical regions warming more than, the moister tropics. For instance, the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) Assessment Report submits that annual rainfall is likely to decrease in much of Mediterranean Africa and the Northern Sahara, with the decline being more marked towards the Mediterranean coast. Rainfall in southern Africa is also likely to decrease while an increase in average rainfall is expected in East Africa (IPCC, 2014; Camila Toulmin, 2009: 23). It is facts such as these that forces one to see climate change as posing problems of global justice because those who suffer most from its devastating effects have contributed little to the problem.

The present and potential impacts of climate change in Africa are large and wide-ranging, affecting many aspects of people's everyday lives. Kofi Anan in his address to the participants of climate change conference in Nairobi, Kenya in 2006 puts it forward that "the impact of climate change will fall disproportionately on the world's poorest countries, many of them here in Africa." He further posits that these poor people already live on the front lines of pollution, disaster and degradation of resources and land (Kofi Anan, 2006). Thirteen years after his remarks, the situation has taken heightened proportions. Africa, ironically the smallest offender in terms of harmful emissions, has been predicted to be the region that will be worst affected by global warming. Another unfortunate thing from this situation is that unlike some other regions whose concern about global warming is in the distant future, Africa is currently experiencing the detrimental effects of climate change and therefore needs urgent actions. The devastating flooding - *Cyclone Idai* that destroyed lives and cultural properties in Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe in 2019 is one of such unfortunate incidents. Such occurrences can only be expected to increase, both in frequency and in intensity, as there are, (at least as of today) no real signs of slowing down the rate at which industrialised nations emit harmful greenhouse gases, even though they give the facile impression that they are trying to curtail emissions.

The 'disposable approach' of climate ethics theorists to the impact of climate change on cultural heritage values is obvious. This has led to the passive treatment it has received in climate negotiations. Perhaps, I need to restate the significance of tangible and intangible heritage to Africans to underscore the importance of considering them for a just climate response.

African heritage sites have been linked to the concepts of sustainability and social well-being (Nick Brooks *et al.* 2020: 316). Heritage contributes to our understanding of who we are, but, more importantly, who we want to become because of the potential for self-determination it bemoans. Without heritage, our connection to places, to the past and to the future can become untethered. This can have a long-term deleterious impact on social identity. Hence, the idea of heritage runs concurrently as knowledge, a cultural product, and a political resource for Africans.

The loss of cultural heritage sites might become the most substantial loss that Africans have ever faced because it will hinder the growth of future generations. How is this possible? The capacity to sustain and pass on diverse human cultures currently hampered by global warming will deprive the future generation access to their environmental and cultural heritage. There is a false consciousness in assuming that cultural heritage is ancient relics and must only be connected to the past. History and heritage are not one and the same and must not be seen in the same light. Logan (2007) suggest that heritage usually comprises those things in the natural and cultural environment around us, that we have inherited from previous generations – or was sometimes created by the current generation – and that we, as communities and societies think, are so important that we want to pass them on to the generations to come (Logan, 2007:34). The instinct to preserve tangible and intangible heritage runs deeper in African communities. Robert Hewison describes better this motivation to pass on heritage values in Africa. He argues that "the impulse to preserve the past is part of the impulse to preserve the self...the past is the foundation of individual and collective identity, objects from the past are the source of significance as cultural symbols." (Hewison, 1987: 46) He explains further that,

continuity between past and present creates a sense of sequence out of aleatory chaos and, since change is inevitable, a stable system of ordered meanings enables us to cope with both innovation and decay. The nostalgic impulse is an important agency in adjustment to the crisis; it is a social emollient and

reinforces national identity when confidence is weakened or threatened." (Hewison, 1987: 47).

Lynn Meskell writes more forcefully on the significance of heritage when she argues that "the loss of heritage can easily be described as a crime that affects multiple generations, erasing cultural memory and severing links with the past that are integral to forging and maintaining modern identities" (Meskell 2002: 564).

The loss of cultural heritage is dire to Africans who are particularly vulnerable to climate change. Retorting some of the gnashing stories of the effects of climate perturbations on African farmers and pastoralists, John Magrath posits that the great global injustice is that Africa's contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions is merely 3%. For instance, it has been reported that Sub-Saharan Africa produces less than one metric tonne of carbon dioxide per person per year – compared with nearly 20 tonnes per person in North America. Yet, it is likely to be the continent hit hardest by climate change because potentially millions of people suffer additional hardship and misery from the impacts of climate change (Magrath, 2010: 891-901).³³ The cumulative effect of these challenges will increase poverty in the states where governments are already struggling to provide adequate services to their citizens. As such, the effects of global warming or climate change will be more catastrophic on Africa than any other continent in the world, as they are exacerbated by 'widespread poverty and governance' (Manfred, 2011:22-23).

Another important global justice concern from the threat of Africa's cultural heritage by climate change is its effects on indigenous people. Africa is filled with lots of indigenous communities, densely populated with indigenous peoples. Indigenous peoples are among the first to face the direct consequences of climate change, owing to their dependence upon, and close relationship with the environment and its resources. Climate change will magnify the difficulties already faced by vulnerable indigenous communities which include political and economic marginalisation, loss of land and resources, human rights violations, discrimination, and unemployment, among others.³⁴ In addition, indigenous peoples interpret

³³For a compendium of first-hand stories of Africans whose lives have been blighted by the impact of climate change, see- Magrath, J. (2010) "The injustice of climate change: voices from Africa" *Local Environment*, 15:9-10, 891-901

³⁴As the plight of indigenous peoples and the role they may play in combating climate change are rarely considered in public discourses on climate change, the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, through its Secretariat and its upcoming seventh session, is well placed to support indigenous peoples in putting a 'human face' on the issue.

See www.un.org/en/events/indigenousday/pdf/Backgrounder_ClimateChange_FINAL.pdf

and react to the impacts of climate change in creative ways, drawing on traditional knowledge from their heritage to find solutions which may help society at large to cope with impending changes. Indigenous peoples are vital to and active in, the many ecosystems that inhabit their land and territories, and many of these people also help to enhance the resilience of these ecosystems through their activities. Hence, giving priority to technical and economic impacts over and above the social considerations of indigenous people as a matter of global justice is untenable. Excluding these teeming indigenous people from negotiating treaties and policies that affects their long-term survival and sustainability is unfair.

Kyle Whyte (2017) notes three important reasons why the impacts of climate change on indigenous people should be given due attention. One, he posits that anthropogenic climate change is an intensification of environmental change imposed on indigenous people by colonialism. Two, he advises that renewing indigenous knowledge, such as traditional ecological knowledge, can bring together indigenous communities to strengthen their own self-determined planning and preparation for climate change. Three, he explained that Indigenous people often imagine climate change from their perspectives first, as societies with deep collective histories and second, as societies who must reckon with the disruptions of historic and ongoing practices of colonialism, capitalism and industrialisation (Kyle Whyte, 2017: 100). What Kyle is saying, in essence, is that the triple effects of colonialism, capitalism and industrialisation all combined "to intensify the carbon-intensive economic activities" that has altered the ecosystem of indigenous people, thereby threatening their collective heritage and destiny. Arguably, this situation is true with the African continent, and climate change will accelerate these destructive tendencies, if something urgent is not done.

The devastating effects of climate change on Africa's cultural heritage and the proposed technological solutions have pushed the development potential of the continent on the abyss. Cultural heritage can be used to shape and secure a sustainable future for the continent of Africa. The conservation and development of tangible cultural heritage sites are important for sustainable growth as I will point out shortly. The traditional coastal economies are part of Africa's heritage that is presently threatened by anthropogenic activity linked to climate change.³⁵ However, the threat to the heritage sites in Africa by climate change is worrisome for the prospects of achieving the project of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

³⁵ For a discussion of some of the African coastal heritage that are destroyed by climate change, See Brooks, N. *et al*, 2020.

Helena Wright *et al.* (2015), discuss the impacts of climate change on Least Developing Countries (LDCs) and the possibility of achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). They argue that "unless the current level of ambition in development and climate action is urgently increased, the reality of climate change impacts will render the aspirational goals of SDGs almost impossibly challenging for the Least Developed Countries (LDC)" (Helena *et al.* 2015). This situation is unjust when we consider that Africa's coastal regions that are vulnerable to sea-level rise with potentially catastrophic impacts on the economy, are important for achieving these SDGs. These coastal heritages can contribute to Africa's development strategy of building productive capacity, adding value in natural resource sectors and achieving sustainable structural transformations. However, the deplorable effects of climate change have blighted these prospects.

The development potential in Africa's heritage sites cuts across the area of tourism. Heritage sites have immense tourist potentials (Graham, 2001: 1007; Logan, 2007:35), and the ones in Africa are not exempted. Heritage do not only represent mechanisms of social cohesion and identity, they also in many cases, represent the principal earning potential for small communities, through tourism, craftsmanship and traditional trade practices. Heritage scholars have been quick to amplify the significance of heritage sites for tourism. Harrison posits that heritage sites "create destinations out of what would otherwise simply be considered 'places'" (Harrison, 2013: 107). The tourist potentials of heritage sites serve as a means to showcase the cultural aesthetics of the community and to give what Kirshenblatt-Gimblett describes as "a second life" to objects, places and practices that were no longer profitable due to the late-modern reorganisation of global economies (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett,1998: 7). The culture of heritage sites being used for tourism contributes to enhancing place identity to the global world. Bella Dicks termed this process the production of 'visitability' and saw it at work in a wide variety of settings in which 'place-identity' was produced, and culture was increasingly staged and exhibited for consumption (Bella Dicks, 2004: 3). Amusan and Olutola (2017) identify some South African cultural heritage that has served as tourist sites. These include winery tours in Stellenbosch, Western Cape and the game farms in Limpopo that are increasingly exposed to extreme climate-induced events like erosion and drought. They argue that the capacity of South Africa's tourism sector as a growth and development sustainability enabler is dearly threatened by climate change (Amusan and Olutola, 2017:10). For this reason, Africa's tangible cultural heritage cannot be considered expendable to climate change without raising eyebrows from Africans.

Global justice is huge and fraught with ambitious goals that put human rights in the spotlight. The vagaries of human rights must be connected to cultural heritage. This is because there is a direct link between human rights and cultural heritage at the local scale which in turn, ultimately contributes, in the aggregate, to the fulfilment of the global goal of achieving global justice (Silverman and Ruggles 2007:17). The UNESCO's General Conference in 1966, first adopted a *Declaration on the Principles of International Cultural Cooperation* in 1966. In Article 1 of the Declaration, it posits that "each culture has a dignity and value which must be respected and preserved," and that "every people has the right and duty to develop its culture in their wide variety and diversity, and in the reciprocal influences they exert on one another, all cultures form part of the common heritage belonging to all mankind" (UNESCO Declaration, 1966: 87). In a similar manner, Article 27 of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* specifically notes that "everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancements and its benefits" (UDHR paper, 56).³⁶ This article, in particular, introduced the idea that culture was an aspect of human rights, although it did not elucidate the specific relationship it has with individuals, communities and nations, and also did not clarify how conflicts among these three entities could or should be resolved.

Worldwide, the idea of cultural heritage rights does not figure prominently in the extensive literature on fundamental human rights, and we have seen this trend imported into climate justice. This neglect does not mean that cultural heritage right is an issue of minor importance or without significant social impact. Simon Caney contends that climate change affects rights to life, health, and subsistence (Caney, 2010: 163-179). While these are human rights of paramount importance and correctly deserving of protection from climate change devastation, cultural heritage ought to rank with these rights as an essential component of human rights. This is because the very concept of heritage insists on the recognition of a person or community's essential worth and as well demands that individual and group identities be respected and protected. If cultural heritage values would not be included in the list of valuable things that are destroyed by climate change, one should be suspicious of the global commitment to diversity that was enshrined in the UNESCO declaration.

³⁶Article 27, Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Adopted and proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III) of 10th December 1948.

The question of who determines cultural heritage and who should control the stewardship and benefits of cultural heritage is a matter that cannot be taken lightly. While heritage can unite, it also has the potential to divide. This is to suggest as Silverman and Ruggles that heritage is by no means a 'neutral category of self-definition nor an inherently positive thing'. It is a concept that has the potential to "promote self-knowledge, facilitate communication and learning, and guide the stewardship of the present culture and its historical past" (Silverman and Ruggles, 2007: 3). For instance, the West has placed emphasis on tangible physical heritage like buildings and monuments and downplayed the significance of intangible heritage values like language, songs ceremonies. The *World Heritage Convention* did not include intangible heritage as an important heritage until three decades after its inception. That is why scholars have levied criticisms against UNESCO's claims to universality (Logan, 2007: 5). This agency has been faulted for paying insufficient attention to the realm of culture and arts as significant heritage values. The objective of "World cultural heritage" might have been to promote tolerance, but the repression of the cultural expressions of the minorities would militate against the realisation of this objective. This repression has taken the form of suppression of intangible manifestations of culture among Africans such as language, music, dress and ritual or the outright physical destruction of material objects and buildings.

Bewilderingly, there is a blaring bias towards the West in the World Heritage Listings of sites and now on the World Heritage sites, that are affected by climate change. The African cultural heritage that is non-monumental is excluded from the list. An explicit statement on this bias was put forward by Harrison Rodney. He writes,

The particular biases in the World Heritage List that were identified in the report included a geographical bias towards Europe; a typological bias towards historic towns and religious buildings in preference to other forms of historic property; a religious bias in the overrepresentation of Christianity in relation to other religions; a chronological bias in the emphasis on historical periods over prehistory and the twentieth century; and a class bias towards 'elitist' forms of architecture in relation to vernacular forms (Harrison, 2013:128).

In addition to the above, there is also the accounting bias towards tangible heritage and a threshold bias whereby there is an overemphasis on high-impact events over slow-onset incremental changes that, nevertheless, have potentially large ripple effects on cultural heritage sites. Let me explain this. Damages and losses resulting from climate change may unfold sequentially, or all at once. For instance, losses in food production may affect

incomes, then nutrition, then cause forced migration, leading to adverse health impacts, community dislocation, erosion of identity, and loss of place. Thus, such gradual losses tend to accumulate, with profound impacts on individuals and communities, sometimes over generations. In contrast to slow emergencies and sequential loss, impacts from rapid-onset events such as floods or hurricanes although bring about overwhelming losses and poses existential threats, it should not be solely considered as the threshold for the indicators of threats to heritage values. In short, World Heritage Listing must incorporate non-monumental traditions, living expressions of human cultures, and heritage forms that represent humanity in its diversity.

Clearly, the implicit reason for the commitment of UNESCO to diversity is that it recognises the fact that it is impossible to impose norms in a culturally diverse world. In general terms, this has meant an acknowledgement that, in a culturally diverse world, it is incredible to attribute a single set of positive values to a single standard of heritage, and the recognition that different groups in society wish to see themselves, their values and their histories represented in the 'national story' of heritage (Harrison, 2013: 87). However, what is largely missing in the analysis of the so-called World Heritage Convention, then, is a perspective that focuses on the dynamic, multidirectional, and often contradictory values that people hold concerning their relationship with the people and places they reside, and the meaning they derive from these relationships, even if the places people value are not always local. The binary between intrinsic and instrumental value cannot be achieved by the science-driven, top-down, end-to-end approaches on climate change assessments because they tend to overlook place-specific and culturally subjective drivers of vulnerability and lived experiences on the ground.

More so, the question of who determines Outstanding Universal Value (OUV) of heritage and in fact, what criteria should be considered in determining the OUV is a matter of contention? Should it be allowed that a site is inscribed on the List of World Heritage or perhaps deleted from the World Heritage List due to the influence of impacts of climate change that are beyond the control of the concerned state or region? In recent times, what constitutes the OUV of heritage has been determined by the elite group in an elitist manner, devoid of the input of poor minorities, who find heritage a much pervasive part of their lives. This epistemic injustice is untenable (Graham, 2001: 1007). Laurajane Smith (2006) and Dicks (2003) criticised UNESCO's definition of heritage as residing in monumental, tangible 'things', suggesting that heritage should be understood as a process or series of discursive

practices. The listings of OUV that is acceptable, and fair can only be understood through dialogue within the "place and culture-specific contexts, taking into account various levels of power, rather than according to a universal metric of value, especially when threatened values are incommensurable" (Tschakert *et al.*, 2017: 3).

The *World Heritage Convention* – and its associated *Operational Guidelines* must seriously consider the diverse impacts of climate change and the fact that for some natural heritage properties, it will be impossible to maintain the 'original' OUV that allowed them to be originally inscribed on the World Heritage List. For an effective adaptation and mitigation strategies to be fairly applied; there is the need for an 'evolving' assessment of OUV values.

Heritage is not only important for conservation but also the politics of knowledge and representation. Laurajane Smith avers that the official representation and interpretation of heritage have a variety of characteristics that serve to exclude the general public from having a role in heritage, and its bureaucratisation and professionalisation have produced an industry in which heritage is perceived as something with which laypersons can engage only passively (Smith, 2004:91). While they may view heritage at historic houses or in museums, decisions about what constitutes heritage (and, perhaps equally importantly, what does not) are made by 'experts', and the representations that are produced from their selected canon of heritage are thus exclusive of minorities, and subaltern groups (Smith, 2004:195-201). A recognition that the ownership of heritage confers not only rights to control access to cultural objects, but also the power to control the production of knowledge about the past, lay behind a series of increasingly vocal calls for the return or 'repatriation' of cultural objects to indigenous people and other source communities and states over the last few decades of the twentieth century (Fforde *et al.* 2002; Kramer 2006).

Conventionally, responses to climate change have been divided into two categories: mitigation and adaptation. Whereas mitigation addresses the root cause of climate change, adaptation is intended to deal with its effects: to moderate the amount of harm caused (Parry *et al.* 2007, 869). Put simply, in climate policy, the aim of adaptation is to ensure that key human interests can continue to be met despite environmental changes. Adaptation to climate change must be concerned about reducing climate-related risks to protect the things that we value or to keep risks to valued objectives at a tolerable level.

However, when adaptation plans fail to protect the thing that stake-holders value like cultural heritage, such adaptation is limiting. Tschakert *et al.* (2017) suggest that the limits of climate

adaptation "are transcended when there are losses of things that people value and which have meaning to individuals, communities and entire societies" (Tschakert *et al.*, 2017:2). For example, adapting to rising sea levels involves measures such as building sea defences. However, in the context of climate effects on cultural heritage sites, adaptation cannot be in the form of relocation. While it may be deemed possible, to adapt to climate change by moving moveable cultural heritage away from a site, adopting relocation as an adaptation plan could have an overall negative effect on the value of such site. Despite the fact that tangible heritage sites in Africa may be subject to more severe changes, the fact that they are by their nature immovable means therefore suggests that adaptation has to take place on-site and must be carefully restored rather than replaced through reconstruction, so as to retain its meaning and significance.³⁷

3.5: Cultural Heritage Loss and Climate Refugees in Africa: Challenge for Global Justice

Some scholars have identified human migration as possibly "the greatest single impact" of climate change (Brown 2007: 4). This is rightly so when considering the population of migrants in this global climate era. With the continued emission of harmful greenhouse gases to the atmosphere and the lack of international consensus on how to approach and handle climate change on a global scale, the problem of climate change-induced displacement will only continue and worsen. These effects can compromise food and water security, change agricultural mechanisms, and radically alter means of livelihood in affected communities, thereby translating into poverty and hardship that makes domestic or international relocation to metropolitan areas inevitable. According to the publication *Governance in an Emerging New World*, "the largest climate-related migration pressures will likely result from diminishing agricultural opportunities, adding to the inexorable move of people from rural to urban areas already underway and, to a lesser extent to movement across national boundaries" (Giordano and Bassini, 2019). By 2050, it has been estimated globally that between 250 million and 1 billion people will be displaced for environmental reasons (IPCC, 2007; Tacoli 2009: 516). Droughts and rising temperatures that reduce land productivity have already been shown to be affecting migration trends in rural parts of African countries like,

³⁷In restoration of cultural heritage, there will be a genuine aesthetic encounter with the past unlike replacement through reconstruction that will be a mere replica of the original. Although reconstruction is likely to be easier than restoration, it will not be the same objects and may lack some of the value that the originals had qua being the originals. See Thomas, J.L. Bulow, W. 2020. "On the Ethics of reconstructing destroyed Cultural Heritage Monuments" in *Journal of American Philosophical Association* (In Press)

Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria (Morrissey 2008). The current impact and future predictions emphasise the severity of future climate change, one in which catastrophic climate disasters may be commonplace and severely impact social order, security and migration. These environmental changes will directly affect the ability of humans and other living creatures to survive in certain places.

The concerns over the negative impact of climate change have heightened fears that environmental degradation and demographic pressures will displace millions of people in Africa and create serious upheaval (Tacoli, 2009:516). The risks of violent conflict in African countries, where most of its populations live in fragile and unstable conditions make their vulnerable to climate change effects real (Hoste and Vlassenroot, 2009). Some scholars studying the potential impact of climate change have predicted that Africa is likely to experience higher temperatures, rising sea levels, changing rainfall patterns and increased climate variability, all of which will make Africa a climate-induced migration hotspot. (Nhamo *et al.*, 2020:2; Future Climate Report for Africa, 2006).

Migration studies have been attracting much attention in this environmental age because there seems to be a linear relationship between environmental change, conflict and migration (Laura Freeman, 2017:351). This is a welcome development to theorising the ethical implications of our insipid environmental culture that is affecting the safe habitat of thousands of people. The connection between climate change and environmental degradation, and how it drives migration has not only been a substantial challenge but also a critical area for research and policy response. However, the critical concern in the discourse around the issue of migration, ought not only to be the agitation whether migration is the singular product of climate change (Fartkobo, 2012; Doevenspeck, 2011; Piguet, 2008) nor the challenge of brain drain and the responsibilities of migrants' nations in the context of international migration (Brock and Blake, 2015; Okeja, 2017b). Of equal importance is that scholars should treat this subject in a manner that does not divest the loss of heritage - a significant part of people's lives especially those whose contribution to climate change is insignificant to the existential quagmire they are facing.

Indeed, the effects of climate change are not the only reasons why people decide to migrate. Nonetheless, if such adverse effects are part of the reasons driving people to move, then there is sufficient reason to explore its moral and ethical implications. For me, migration scholars have been seeking far more superior recognition of migrants in a far less moral way because they consider less significant the ground of their existence which inhabits their heritage. They

are also guilty of what I call the 'disposable approach syndrome' to cultural heritage. Disposable approach syndrome is a situation whereby cultural heritage and the values associated are considered expendable to environmental problems. That is, by not giving them credence in the discourse of migration and environmental change, they consider them less in priority of valuable things that is damaged by climate change.

The importance of the land or place that people live is a valuable heritage for apparent reasons. The land connects people with cultural ways of life and traditions. Therefore, they cannot be considered 'throwaways' because of their present and potential significance in enriching the well-being of the people. Deborah Rose describes the land that people live as a "nourishing terrain," a 'living entity' with a yesterday, today, and tomorrow, with a consciousness and a will toward life (Rose, 1996:7). Hence, we cannot talk about migrants without the loss of the land that inhabits them. That is why some climate migration scholars have rightly argued that much of the language used in the discourse on the relationship between climate and mobility, particularly in Africa is broad, abstract, and simplistic (Romankiewicz and Doevenspeck, 2015:79). Climate-induced migration has an adverse effect on pride of place, self-respect and the peaceful and productive lives for populations.

Many inquiries, (both empirical and normative) about how climate change impact on individuals' livelihoods and its possibility for migration, demonstrates that the 'climate change refugee' discourse may be ignoring the larger picture in which migration occurs. Farbotko asserts that the climate refugee narrative is perpetuated despite the "invisibility of much climate change phenomena to the naked eye or layperson's perspective" (Farbotko and Lazrus, 2012:8). It is therefore vital to separate shadows from substance and put forward, in clear moral terms, what is truly happening in diverse areas of the world because of climate change. What I mean is that, if we are always examining migration discourse with an embellished bird's eye view, we might have a deficient and distorted view of the realities of migrants, particularly those emanating from the Global South.

Most discourse on migration do not consider the varied, complex conditions in which such migration occurs and the more severe effects upon such migrants. Hence, the nature of climate-induced migration is subtly hidden in climate ethics discourse. I approach this issue keenly, to unravel the undeniable realities of climate migrants whose lives are decimated on the altar of a liberalist understanding of that which is of great significance to their existence. I have decided to adopt the concept of 'climate refugee' in this section, not because it is the

most appropriate way to describe climate-induced migrants as I will point out later. However, my reason for adopting this concept is to solidarize with these people. Climate migrants have lost so much, not only in being demoralized by the restriction of their cultural practices but also in been de-legitimized from claiming an identity as a climate-induced migrant.

The numbers of climate migrants spread across every part of the world; however, the most affected are countries of the Global South. The Global South mainly comprise of developing and underdeveloped countries with low Gross National Product (GNP).³⁸ These countries are populated with indigenous communities who have agriculture as the mainstay of most economies. They experience much of the adverse effects of climate change largely because of their 'unmade position' in terms of economic standing, thereby making them look like a helpless victim with regards to the cataclysmic experience of climate change. The local communities' experience of migration is quite different from what most literature depicts. They mask the intriguing pains, agonies and anxieties of these people, whose homelands and habitable environs are destroyed by climate-related disasters. The real vulnerabilities that ought to be highlighted are side-lined. This leaves one to question if we can achieve a just and equitable climate agreement.

Climate refugees from the African continent in addition to their loss of identities, struggle with the burden of sustaining both biological and cultural diversities. These indigenous climate refugees are much more likely to lose cultural sustainability than non-indigenous climate refugees who, though severely impacted in many similar ways, are often relocated within the dominant culture in which they originated. For example, while significant losses and inhumane conditions severely impacted climate refugees of Hurricane Katrina in the United States, many residents of the area were relocated to neighbouring states in which the dominant culture remained intact (Figuroa, 2012: 6). On the other hand, indigenous environmental refugees from most African countries, most times, seek relocation at best in already populated urban cities while few seek greener pasture outside their countries. Whichever case, these indigenous migrants face cultural alienation, thus finding it difficult to settle in their new environment with their cultural identity intact.

³⁸Gross National Product (GNP) is Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in other climes. One way that economies get characterized as “developed” or not is through the metric of gross national product (GNP), a measure of aggregate market transactions. A less developed economy with a low GNP has less goods moving through the market. This makes it likely that a larger portion of the goods necessary for a secure and rewarding life in those countries will be non-market or non-economic goods. See Preston, N.J (2017).

Climate migrants from Africa contend with the alienation of their cultural heritage in their new place. As such, arrogating to climate-induced migrants, the status of 'climate refugees' is just a contemptuous move to garner public sentiments. The use of the title 'refugees' to describe migration, or better said displacement, driven by environmental factors is still ubiquitous in political discourse. In the media, there is a more cautious and sceptical approach towards the use of the term which is still predominant within the academic literature (Morrisey, 2009).³⁹ Farbotko and Lazarus aver that the usage of the word 'refugee' is "politically and socially charged" (Farbotko and Lazarus, 2012: 16). Although I agree with Farbotko and Lazarus that the ascription of 'climate refugee' to climate migrants remove agency and power from vulnerable communities, thereby "redirecting their fate from their hands" (Farbotko and Lazarus, 2012: 1). However, such accusation should also underline that the term 'climate refugee' is prejudiced to the causal agency of climate migration, the effects of climate change on their socio-cultural heritage and the ensuing responsibilities of international governments.

Migration in every form including those connected to environmental devastation have stirred up theorizations about the issue of borders. Border closures to migrants from Global South is gaining traction among developed countries, leaving one to question the responsibility of developed nations for the part they have played in causing climate change. Rather than confronting the fundamental issue of climate-induced migration, developed nations are seeking ways to evade their responsibilities by failing to agree on who a climate refugee is and the responsibilities of nations to climate migrants. I do not have issues with recognising climate refugees as a group. However, validating a term like 'climate change refugee' can impact the sense of identity, culture and belonging of people. It can uproot cultures and identities strongly tied to specific regions of the world and force migrants to adopt a status that emphasises their non-belonging to any state in the world. Betsy Hartmann's contention that 'raising the spectre of climate refugees and climate conflict obscures the real battle lines' amplifies this point (Hartmann, 2010:242). We must take seriously the current experience of 'climate change refugee' because of its propensity to reignite racist fears of massive flows of poor migrants from the Global South and also the proclivity to contribute to imageries of migrants as inherent security threats to their destination.

³⁹ Morrisey discussed extensively the evolution of the related debates on environmental change and migration and environmental refugees in terms of the changing political context.

More so, if equity, identity and human rights, are central to climate change migration, with regards to vulnerable communities' perceptions of climate change, developed countries must show more commitment and responsibility to climate migrants from the Global South. The nations that continue to contribute to climate change through large levels of harmful greenhouse gas emissions, infringe on the basic rights of those affected which are outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). There is, therefore, the need to reassert these rights and call for accountability and protection on the part of responsible nations and humanitarian organisations, whose duty lies to aid global sufferers.

Since the causes of climate change, in many cases, lie beyond borders, global initiatives should be adopted to proactively protect the rights of people affected by climate change. Even if displacement is internal, that is, within a nation, all emitting nations have contributed to the human rights violations that caused it. Byravan and Rajan thus argue that "emitting states ought to take in refugees in proportion to their GHGs emission level" (Byravan and Rajan 2006; 2010). These climate migrants should not be considered as individuals fleeing political oppression or running away from the *facticity* of their existence. Instead, they should be considered as those whose ground has been cut off and the means for survival limited. They should be seen as people seeking better economic prospects and better lives because the mechanisms to afford such lives have been displaced in their former habitation.

While climate change is a significant factor in migration decisions, it remains unrecognised by most international and regional governing bodies. The global responsibility to those impacted by climate change is unaccounted for, leaving certain migrants in vulnerable conditions. Those inhabiting low-lying Small Island Developing States (SIDS) under the rising oceans are particularly affected. *Tuvalu*⁴⁰ is often mentioned as one of the first to be affected, as its average elevation is about one meter above sea level (Farbotko, 2011). Also, there are SIDS in Africa that are vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.⁴¹ They are uniquely vulnerable to climate change because they are already densely populated, and there are not many land reserves to accommodate prospective future internal migration, due to coastal erosion and inundation. Under various future scenarios, international migration seems

⁴⁰ For a detailed discuss on the Impacts of Climate Change in *Tuvalu* Island, See Farbotko, C. (2011).

⁴¹There are six African SIDS: Cabo Verde, the Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritius, Sao Tome and Principe, and Seychelles. For a Small Island Developing State, its surrounding ocean or sea is both an asset and a liability. For a detail analysis of the key climate and development challenges faced by African SIDS, See United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) *Climate Change in the African Small Island Developing States: From Vulnerability to resilience- The Paradox of the Small*

unavoidable, and if the worst of the future trajectories comes to pass, many of the territory of these SIDS in Africa will be inundated to render it uninhabitable. If most of these SIDS becomes uninhabitable, most of its inhabitants will be forced to leave. The need for permanent relocation of entire populations due to expected climatic effects might be the grim future of other locations as well. When these categories of climate migrants lose their territory to climate change, they will suffer some losses at the collective level as well. The peoples of SIDS in Africa, for example, may lose their homelands, national self-determination together with their cultural values embedded in the sunken land.

The malignant view, that migration is an adaptation strategy for these teeming migrants is contestable. Although the IPCC's fourth Assessments report emphasises the importance of migration as one of the key options for adaptation to climate stress (IPCC 2014 Report), nations responsible for these harmful emissions should not take the damage and displacement of people's cherished homelands for granted, thinking that migration is a settled and acceptable adaptation option.

Taking migration as an adaptation pathway to reduce vulnerability to climate hazards and alleviate the potential damage is laudable. That is, when people are faced with increasing stress on their livelihoods and reduced safe options where they reside, they may decide to relocate elsewhere to avoid the foreseeable deprivation that will result if they stay. In this way, relocation brings down the level of risk for the valuable aspects of their life that have been made less safe. Thus, if migration can be an effective way to reduce risk levels, then enabling and supporting it could be a good way to intervene, in order to alleviate the pains of affected people.

However, let us consider a case where a policy embraces the 'positive' view of migration as an adaptation strategy but takes it to its extreme. Imagine that an entire region of Akoko in Nigeria is highly vulnerable to climate change effects and the offer on the table is relocation as a replacement for lost safe options. This option, which is open and accessible to every risked individual in Akoko, substitutes the safe options they no longer have where they have resided. The problem seems to be solved, but maybe not entirely, on closer scrutiny. This is because all climate change harms to the people of Akoko cannot be obviated in this way. There are significant losses involved in relocation. Redressing the risk-harms created by climate change through relocating people from affected locations does not address their vulnerability in full. Part of their vulnerability is that they will have to leave their cherished

homes because of climate change effects. Relocation as an adaptation strategy is an auxiliary option that leaves behind residual losses (Kovner, 2017: 152). Contending the view of migration as an adaptation option, Oliviero Angeli writes:

Migration...is an adaptation option that can to some extent replace the safe options removed from an agent's set of options, but because it is not a close substitute the individual will have to sacrifice many things she values. Emigration involves such a loss because people are attached to their homeland and to the community or society they live in, and they value these ties and relations. This does not mean that all people have such strong attachments, or that they ignore the positive sides of relocation. However, accepting that people do have such attachments and their life plans are based on and intertwined with them, they should not be forced to break these ties and relocate (Angeli, 2016; 271-4).

When an entire community relocates, there will be some additional losses. Imagine that everyone in Akoko region has decided to pursue the new adaptation option and relocate, but to different states. In this case, immigrating to other states will restore the safe option for each individual, but at the same time, they will lose their connection to their homeland, risk losing the integrity of their community, and the chances of returning to rebuild their society become slim. Putting all our eggs in the basket of the 'migration-as-adaptation perspective' may lead to big losses for affected individuals, losses that should be avoided when possible (Kovner, 2017: 152). Admittedly, migration, in general, has potential impacts on human and economic development, security and environment, but to see migration as an effective adaptation strategy that serves to overcome the onslaught of climate change is wrong in itself.

Furthermore, climate change impacts are place-specific and path-dependent. Accordingly, location is an important determinant of hazardous exposure, and certain places will bear more risk than others. Climate change will disrupt ecologic, cultural, and economic relationships as well as nested conceptions of place. Disruption of place attachment and identity are traumatic for the individual and collective psyche. The rupture of the strong bond human beings have with 'place' have detrimental health effects at the individual and community levels (Hess and Malilay, 2008). In addition, disasters and other events that fundamentally alter the ecology of a given place disrupt people's attachment to place and identity, precipitating culture loss, even if inhabitants are not physically displaced. More subtly, and on a collective level, displacement undermines a community's capacity to engage various threats.

Overall, migration is a significant social occurrence that has substantial effects not only on history and culture of societies but also the well-being, mental, psychological, and physical

state, as well as the psyche of migrants themselves (Chari *et al.*, 2003). Thus, to avoid simplistic analysis of the causal relationship between climate, environment, and migration studies, Romankiewicz and Doevenspeck (2015) argue that we should focus on local people's representation, perception and interpretation of climate and environmental changes. Given the complex nature of climate change, it is important to develop a deeper understanding of local meanings of environmental change and migration in the context of multiple social, political, and economic processes of change in order to understand if, how and to what extent certain climate and cultural attitudes play a role in climate-induced kind of migration.

The inequality and the unbalanced nature of the global economy mean that the challenges of climate change in Africa needs a different yardstick of justice. Describing climate change as a symptom of unequal and unbalanced development, Michal Z. Cutajar retorts that:

Global climate change is not just our greatest environmental challenge. It is also a symptom of the unequal and unbalanced development of the global economy. Generated by the consumption pattern of the rich, it places an additional handicap on the survival of the poor. The 'creeping catastrophe' of climate change is thus an additional factor of inequity and stress in our global and globalising community. Nowhere does this burden weigh more heavily than an Africa's fragile states and ecosystems, already under pressure from internal forces and from external shocks (Michael Z. Cutajar c.f Low, 2005).

Thus, when considering Africa's experience of climate change, distributive justice, therefore, needs to go beyond mitigation and adaptation benefits. Some scholars have argued that compensatory justice and restorative justice should also be administered to developing countries (Figueroa, 2012:10-12). Thus, climate justice discourse needs to be more nuanced by considering the differential vulnerabilities to climate change, especially those of the Global South whose contribution to climate change is meagre.

3.6: Conclusion

From the above discussion, I have situated the impact of climate change on Africa's cultural heritage as a global justice concern that must be seriously considered. African heritage is under threat from climate change. I have discussed what the significance of cultural heritage is. I have also argued that there is an urgent need for cultural heritage loss to climate change, because of its significance, must be included in global justice discourse. The loss of heritage may not be felt by developing countries in Africa, especially in the short term, but the incremental loss of this critical cultural asset for Africa suggests that we sleepwalk into a

world where the valuable asset of some regions is left out of climate justice negotiations. This has often been the case in global climate justice as I will discuss in the next chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

CRITICAL EVALUATION OF CLIMATE JUSTICE – THE *CULTURAL STORM*

4.1: Introduction

From my conclusion in the last chapter, it is not difficult to see that climate justice theorists have side-lined the impact of climate change on cultural heritage values. Specifically, they have considered less the climate dividends for those, whose significant cultural heritage is destroyed by climate change. This is a real challenge for global justice. However, to make this claim more vivid, it is visceral to examine some of the canonical climate justice proposals that have been put forward to redress climate change.

My aim in this chapter is to evaluate some of the mainstream climate justice proposals⁴² and, in that process, examine the plausibility of these reigning responses to climate change. Whilst taking a critical approach that stems from rationality, unforced reflection, and openness rather than emotion based, I raise objections to current climate justice especially their insufficient attention to the destruction of cultural heritage by climate change. However, it is important to say from the onset that there is a lack of consensus in the theorization and curation of climate justice proposal. This chapter intends to provide a different possible critique of current approaches to climate justice by showing how these climate justice theories have not addressed the spate of cultural injustice exacerbated by climate change. It also contributes to the literature on climate justice and climate change politics in several ways. First, it posits that climate justice is broad in focus and must be treated with ethical sensitivity to the diverse normative concerns. In so doing, I acknowledge the complexity of the ranging issues and the flexibility with which different scholars have approached the subject. Second, it provides condensed discussion of some of the major themes in climate ethics and provide an analysis of the contestations that they entail. The normative critique of current climate justice discourse in this chapter provides a culturally driven critique that is needed for a critical theory of climate change ethics.

Before moving ahead, let me address why I have used the metaphor, ‘cultural storm’, to describe the kind of critique I put forward. First, the idea of culture in this chapter is connected to what I have earlier explained in chapter two. That is, culture is an enactment of

⁴² In this chapter, my reference to mainstream climate ethicists are scholars whose works on climate ethics and climate justice are often cited as landmark works on ethics of climate change. They include Henry Shue, Stephen Gardiner, Darrel Moellendorf, James Garvey, Dale Jamieson, Simon Caney etc.

a community of people, created and fashioned in response to the whole gamut of problems or questions that arise, in the context of a people's particular situation. Culture, in this context is different from tradition. The main difference between culture and tradition is that while culture describes the shared characteristics of a people, that is, a core part of their historical existence, traditions are passed down from one generation to the other. More so, while culture acts as the underlying thread that connects one person to everyone else in the community, traditions are the series of events and customs that preserves these connections. Traditions are often the most externally facing parts of a culture. Literarily, storms are of varying degrees and their sounds generally jolts our attention. Partly motivated by Stephen Gardiner's 2011 book – *The Perfect Moral Storm*, I see culture as an important facet of the 'moral storm' that needs to be addressed when dealing with climate change. However, if this aspect of climate change is brought to light as part of the critical issues that climate ethicists need to address, it will create another 'big storm' because of its fluid and controversial nature. Yet, we cannot dismiss this 'storm' with a wave of hand because of its significance to the lives of people, particularly in the global south.

Let me make a quick distinction between climate ethics and climate justice. The inquiry into climate justice stems from the broader discourse on climate ethics.⁴³ The terms "climate ethics" and "climate justice" are frequently used interchangeably as a distinctive feature of this field of inquiry. Ethics is the umbrella discipline that addresses moral issues - to which issues of justice are included. Climate ethics, in essence seeks to bring in contention, values like empathy, compassion and respect for human rights, while negotiating issues exacerbated by climate change. These values are also used to express the concerns of subjugation and marginalization that requires the determination of duties of justice when addressing climate change. However, one clear difference is that while the agitations of climate justice, most times examine the actions of the past that has caused climate change. The advocates of climate justice call for duties and obligations to those who have been adversely affected by actions that have contributed to climate change. Climate Ethics on the other hand has both the past and the future in perspective. That is, by examining the prevailing moral issues in this climate change era, it seeks to examine the past actions or inactions that has caused climate change to prescribe guiding actions and behaviours that could make for a better humane dealing with our climate. Unlike climate justice, climate ethics provides a broader

⁴³Most literature on climate ethics have climate justice as the central issue.

engagement with climate change. Since climate justice and climate ethics, in recent years, has become a very active field of research in applied philosophy and political theory, I will still use the two interchangeably in this dissertation.

Climate ethics and climate justice discourse have provided nuanced ways of evaluating the problem of climate change. However, some have argued that shifting the discursive framework of climate change away from the scientific-technological to one based on ethics, human rights, and social justice has "stymied productive global warming discussions" about how to share the burdens of the environmental despoliation (Agyeman *et al.*, 2008:121). This position is understandable if we do not want to painstakingly evaluate the full range of climate change impacts and policy proposals. However, if we carefully pace through the trajectory of the impacts of climate change and the kind of actions that have been taken to ameliorate these impacts, one will discover that putting aside a moral framework would jeopardize the actions taken and the prospects of a just and equitable global agreement on the future pathways to engaging climate change. The necessity and vitality of ethics in climate change debate cannot be overemphasized.

The chapter proceeds in four sections. In the first section, I articulate the meaning of climate justice, noting that the terrain of climate justice is quite volatile because of the intricate nature of climate change. I discuss climate justice as an ethical endeavour that is concerned with the moral issues relating to the cause of climate change and the ensuing responsibilities for redressing the climate. Section two provides an overview of some of the canonical issues that have been discussed in climate ethics. Although many issues have jolted climate ethicists, I focus on four issues connected to (a) responsibility for causing climate change (b) The ability to do something about the problem (c) the degree to which one benefitted from GHG emissions and (d) the scope of justice consideration. I discuss some of the reigning responses to these issues in the context of climate justice. It is quite necessary to state from the onset that the goal of this chapter is not to argue for a particular theory in normative climate ethics, but first to persuade us to appreciate the fundamental role that ethics play in climate change discourse, and also to give a perspicuous way of engaging with some of the most important issues in climate ethics. In the last section, I evaluate the plausibility of mainstream discourse on climate justice in a manner different from what has been obtainable in current literature.

The critique of current climate justice theories that I offer stems from an uninspiring approach that belies the logic permitting the sacrificing of that which is connected to others

wellbeing – cultural heritage - in the discourse of climate justice. Drawing inspiration from Gardiner’s (2011) metaphor of "The Perfect moral Storm,"⁴⁴ I used the metaphor ‘cultural storm’ to raise two main objections against current climate justice theories. I demonstrate (a) how current climate justice theories and their critiques have assumed positions that have unreflexively engaged the impact of climate change on cultural heritage and (b) Why the understanding of justice that undergird most climate justice theories pose challenges for developing a feasible climate justice that is sensitive to the destruction of cultural heritage. In the end, I argue that most of the mainstream climate justice theories that I evaluate show no sense of urgency to the destruction of critical heritage assets, particularly for countries of the Global South. The implicit assumptions and the limitation of the idea of justice that undergird their proposals have warranted their inability to attend to the spate of cultural injustice in climate ethics.

4.2: Understanding Climate Ethics and Climate Justice

Since all and sundry have not caused anthropogenic climate change in an equal manner, its impacts will not be felt across the planet uniformly. Hence, resolving this impasse has given rise to the highly diverse field of climate ethics and climate justice. The normative inquiry into climate ethics and climate justice are gradually building up but not exhaustible (Gardiner *et al.* 2010; Gardiner, 2011; Shue, 2014; James Garvey, 2008; Vanderheiden, 2008; Teresa Thorp 2014; Gardiner and Weisbach, 2016).

In the present, the lack of motivation to respond to climate change has provoked moral and political analysts to theorize on further pathways to a just response to global anthropogenic climate change. But before then, they had to first agree that the challenge that climate change poses is fundamentally ethical. Stephen Gardiner makes this point, (Gardiner, 2004: 555; 2010: 3) thus setting the tone for subsequent works on climate ethics and climate justice (see Vanderheiden, 2008; Garvey, 2008; Irwin, 2010; Shue, 2014; Gardiner and Weisbach, 2016; Moellendorf, 2014). Thus, climate ethics has become an area of inquiry in environmental philosophy. However, by focusing on climate change's moral challenge, climate ethics theorists do not merely retort that climate change is a moral problem. To my mind, they also imply (overtly and covertly) that in most policy discussions, the moral challenge of climate change is not sufficiently recognized. In other words, just as Idil Boran suggests, “they

⁴⁴ “The Perfect Moral Storm” is the title of Stephen M. Gardiner’s book. See Gardiner, 2011.

register their discontent with the public debates and insist that climate change is treated all too frequently merely as a technical problem” (Boran, 2018: 28).

So, how do we neatly explain the field of climate ethics and climate justice without conflating both areas of inquiry? The best way to describe them, I think, is to state that these areas of inquiries have the same focus although the inquiry into climate justice stems from the broader discourse on climate ethics. The terms ‘climate ethics’ and ‘climate justice’ are frequently used interchangeably as a distinctive feature of this field of inquiry, and I do not intend, in this chapter, to deviate from that norm.⁴⁵ However, in any of both inquiries, the central concern of scholars, have been to provide rational justification of moral duties in the face of climate change. For instance, Stephen Gardiner submits that disregarding climate justice amounts to a violation of ethical norms. He specifies that the concepts of ethics, such as respect and fairness, are “strongly related to the more general notion of justice” (Gardiner, 2016: 99).

From this point, I will try to focus more on climate justice, but my discussion has ethics of climate change as the broad focus. Addressing climate change has been a global concern, but of much importance is addressing this human-induced environmental problem in a just manner. But before seeking ways of redressing the climate in a just manner, there must be an agreement on what a just climate looks like. This leads me to address the important question, what is climate justice?

Candidly, climate justice means different things for different people and, to complicate matters further, Teresa Thorp suggests that it could also “mean different things to the same people depending on a particular time and space” (Thorp, 2014: 127). This is because there are many moral wrongs associated with global climate change. Hence, all proposals seeking climate justice have different missions, but there is a consensus that “climate inequalities” exist and need to be confronted (Robert and Parks, 2006: 11; Shue, 2014: 5; Meikle *et al.* 2016). Therefore, Evan Gach submits that climate change has evolved to be much of a problem that is “more congruent with the principles of climate justice” (Evan Gach, 2019:14).

⁴⁵ What I mean here is that most of the literature on climate ethics cannot do without discussing climate justice issues. This literature seems to maintain a narrow focus on climate justice takes the approach of ethics (although some pretend to approach climate justice from the perspective of politics see Cerrutti, F. 2016. “Climate Ethics and the Failures of Normative Political Philosophy” in *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, Vol. 42 (7), 707-726.

Given the complex and diverse nature of climate change as well as its justice components, Meikle *et al.* (2016) suggests that “the identification of injustices around the impacts of, and responses to climate change does not necessarily make it straightforward to state what “climate

Justice” is (Meikle *et al.*, 2016: 497). Similarly, Jafry *et al.* (2019) posit that “it would indeed be somewhat contradictory to expect rigid conceptual compliance to climate justice - a term rooted in equity, fairness and political emancipation” (Jafry *et al.*, 2019: 8). The different suggestions of the meaning of climate justice from these scholars mean that putting forward an all-encompassing idea of climate justice might be a pipe dream. Recognizing the conceptual and contextual diversity of climate justice, Glasgow Caledonian University’s Centre for Climate Justice conducted a thorough review of climate justice definitions and concluded that the various definitions of climate justice “recognize humanity’s responsibility for the impacts of greenhouse gas emissions on the poorest and most vulnerable people in society by critically addressing inequality and promoting transformative approaches to address the root causes of climate change” (Meikle *et al.*, 2016: 497).

In whichever case, the meaning of climate justice must have some set of moral concerns related to the struggle for equity and justice in both the causes and the effects of climate change. The idea of climate justice demands determined efforts to inject fairness in sharing the burdens and responsibilities for global anthropogenic climate change. As an ethical framework, climate justice must identify the various moral concerns that are either causing, caused by, or otherwise raised by climate change. It must seek to address not only the effects of climate change but also the ‘root causes’⁴⁶ of climate change. This can be done by relating climate impacts to issues such as equality, human rights, sustainability, and the historical responsibilities for the causes of climate change.

Justice is therefore a central issue in addressing climate change. The aim of climate justice, according to Edward Page, has always been to explain “how the burdens associated with climate change and policies should be allotted amongst agents with competing interests, entitlements, resources and responsibilities” to respond and adapt to climate change (Page,

⁴⁶ Stephen James Purdey explains that the normative “root” of the climate change problem is the economic growth paradigm that serves up an image of the future that is equitable, bountiful but ecologically benign. See-Purdey, S. J. “The Normative Root of the Climate Change Problem” in *Ethics and the Environment*, Vol. 17, No. 2, Special Issue on Climate Change (Fall 2012), pp. 75-96. In a similar manner, (Meikle *et al.*, 2016) note that the “root causes” of climate change refer to greenhouse gas emissions caused by the traditional economic growth model, with a concomitant understanding that poverty and power imbalances act as “multipliers” for the negative impacts of climate change (Meikle *et al.*, 2016).

2011: 412). For Mary Robinson, she suggests that “a climate justice approach not only amplifies the voices of those people who have done least to cause climate change but also those who are affected most severely by it. These people, she suggests must include citizens of island states whose survival is threatened, indigenous communities whose land and resources are under threat, the poorest and most marginalized people who already suffer most from poverty, hunger, ill-health and injustice (Mary Robinson, 2011: 71).

Framing climate change as a concern of justice is important for developed countries, but much more important for the marginalised developing countries, whose experience of climate change has adversely affected their fundamental existence. In this connection, Evan Gach avers that “climate justice framing is not only being utilized by developing countries to push for an agreement favourable to their circumstances but is also increasingly adopted by developed countries to effectively express to developing countries, their desire to draft a meaningful agreement” (Gach, 2019: 15) - an agreement that, I suggest, must consider their peculiar vulnerability. Such agreement must amplify the voices of the people who have done least to cause climate change and also address these impacts in a manner that promotes humane living.

There are two different attitudes to climate justice that need to be clarified. They include climate justice as a social movement and climate justice as a normative inquiry. Idil Boran explains these two attitudes. He posits that the difference between these two attitudes lays in the “vision of how justice can be pursued” (Boran, 2019: 27). That is, both attitudes prescribe different set of activity that should characterize the pursuit of climate justice.

On the one hand, climate justice's attitude as a social movement, with their operative term being ‘movement,’ see climate justice as being primarily an endeavour of social practice, a driver of change. Their main preoccupation is social activism in civil society to sensitive and mobilise the public, particularly power holders, to make decisions that will redress global warming (Boran, 2019: 27). On the other hand, climate justice as a normative inquiry has been dealt with as an object of formal inquiry. This endeavour prioritizes the consistency with which conceptions of justice are formulated concerning norms and principles. As a cognitive activity, it places a premium on the rigour with which competing formulations of climate justice are adjudicated and aims to develop well-rounded conceptions of justice that can withstand the test of rational scrutiny. Its site is that of academic discourses and, as a specialized form of inquiry, it has given rise to a growing body of work in the field of moral

and political philosophy. To distinguish this attitude from the former, one may refer to it as *climate justice as normative inquiry*, with its operative term being “inquiry” (Boran, 27-28). In both instances, climate justice entails organizing responses to climate change both in abstract and empirical terms to address the various kinds of injustices that climate change exacerbates. Thus, climate justice is a highly normative field, in the sense that its proponents prioritize certain values and ideals over others when analysing social and political issues.

My focus in this section is on climate justice as a normative inquiry. I think ethical issues must first be resolved at the level of thought before praxis. On this view, I agree with Martin Kowarsch and Ottmar Edenhofer that “principles are necessary but cannot be sufficient to fully inform well-designed climate policies” (Kowarsch and Edenhofer, 2016: 300). However, those who criticize climate ethics for being abstract and not applicable in practice miss the important point, that there is a difference between justification and implementation in the policy arena. If we do not get it right, first at the level of justification, actions of implementation would rather become prejudicial at best and arbitrary at worse. The challenge, as suggested by Kowarsch and Edenhofer, should rather be that “principles are not accepted in a *prima facie* manner without considering all relevant aspects of a given decision-making context” (Kowarsch and Edenhofer 2016: 300). Although I quite agree with the objection that philosophers *alone* cannot reasonably provide the justifications for certain principles, *let alone* a reasonable policy prescription (Furio Cerruti, 2015: 707-726), nonetheless, philosophers can at least constructively contribute to an evaluation of climate policy pathways. As experts in addressing normative problems, they have a reasonable role in policy guidance, which goes beyond providing a few, well-reflected-upon, abstract, isolated ethical principles, or arguing for fair procedures (Kowarsch and Edenhofer, 2016: 300-301). The next section will be an overview of the debates on climate justice as a formal inquiry. The overview that I will provide is not intended to fully investigate all underlying assumptions in climate justice debates from their roots.⁴⁷ Instead, I focus on some of the main issues in the contemporary debate on climate justice among normative theorists.

4.3: Mapping the Key Themes in Current Discourse on Climate Justice

Before elaborating on the themes of discourse in climate justice, let me clarify the distinction between the nature of ethical theories that have been prescribed to deal with climate change. To address the question - what kind of ethical framing will help address the nuances of global

⁴⁷ For an overview of the discourse on climate justice, see for instance Arnold, 2011; Moellendorf, 2015.

climate change, there has been, on the one hand, proponents of consequentialist or teleological approach and on the other hand, those who favour the deontological ethical approach (Von Lucke, 2017: 8). On their own, the proponents of consequentialist theory admit that redistribution of wealth through climate agreements is not the most effective way to help the world's poor that suffers most from the gnashing consequence of climate change (Jamieson 2013; Posner and Weisbach, 2010; Attfield, 2014). Some of them argue that redistribution and climate policy must be addressed on different levels and not lumped together as the same (Posner and Weisbach, 2010: 73; Jamieson, 2014). On the other hand, some others favour the deontological approaches (Caney 2010a; Shue, 1999; Page 2013: 241; Sachs 2014). They argue against the teleological view by claiming that following teleological reasoning cannot help us make a compelling argument to abate climate change at all (Sachs 2014: 209, 219). Moreover, some also criticize the understanding of redistribution projected within many prominent teleological approaches as too narrow and often conflated with distributive justice questions (Sachs 2014: 213, 214). The main idea of their reasoning is that solutions to climate change that do not focus on abating climate change is morally wrong because it clearly 'creates a threat to the life, health and wellbeing of future people' (Sachs 2014: 220).

Recently, the line of demarcation for climate ethicists has been to decide whether climate justice fits into *ideal* theory or *non-ideal* theory. The proponents of *ideal theory* and *non-ideal* theories are motivated by Rawl's distinction between two tasks of political philosophy. According to Rawls, the task of *ideal theory* is to outline a conception of distributive justice, circumscribed by two assumptions which include 'full compliance' and 'favourable circumstances' (Rawls 1971: 245). For Rawls, *full compliance* means that all individuals and institutions must act according to the principles of justice. The assumption of *favourable circumstances* refers to conditions other than the mind and actions of those to whom the conception of justice is to apply (Rawls 1971: 245-315). In Rawlsian non-ideal theory, the assumptions of *full compliance* and *favourable circumstances* are dropped. The task of *non-ideal theory* is to investigate what an agent must do or is entitled to, in situations of partial, rather than full compliance, or when any (or all) of the favourable circumstances do not obtain. For Rawls, it was necessary to engage in ideal theory before relaxing the assumptions and beginning non-ideal theorizing (Heyward and Roser, 2016: 6).

The complicated case of climate change has provoked theorists to look beyond ideal theorizations, to seek ways in which climate justice can be realized in a non-ideal world -

where agents' experience of climate change and their responses in the form of mitigation and adaptation greatly differs (Shue, 2014; Heyward and Roser, 2016; Roser and Seidel, 2017; Caney, 2016; Light and Taraska, 2016). In its broadest sense, non-ideal theorists ask how to respond to climate change in an imperfect world. Zellentin opines this when he posits that in climate change, the assumptions of non-ideal circumstances and non-ideal theories of justice have particularly focused on two issues - non-compliance with climate abatement duties and institutional design (Zellentin 2015: 124–125). Some advocates of non-ideal theory emphasize a different approach to theorizing (Sen, 2006:16),⁴⁸ others call for more practical action-guidance in climate change (Caney; 2016), and some have critiqued the different senses in which non-ideal climate justice theories have been addressed (Brandstedt, 2019).⁴⁹ In sum, it seems that scholars agree that, the *demandingness* and the *content* of duties and responsibilities must be cautiously worked out when dealing with climate change in a non-ideal world.

Before explicating some of the issues that climate justice scholars address, let me quickly comment on Furio Cerutti's contestation of the claim that normative ethics is the main philosophical access to the problems raised by climate change. He argues that "climate change is primarily a political issue with substantial moral and philosophical implications" (Cerruti, 2016: 707-708). His argument should be irksome to climate ethicists because he suggests that normative approaches to climate change are a redundant activity simply because it lacks praxis. If the arrowhead of his critic of climate ethics is that present climate ethics discourse has had little bearing on climate policy because it has focused on addressing climate change "using the tools of individual morality" (Cerruti, 714), that is understandable and indeed a matter of concern for me too. However, for him to claim that climate change is primarily a political issue is implausible because even if ethics is not seen (although present)

⁴⁸Here, Amartya Sen, distinguishes between what he calls a 'transcendental' approach to justice (associated with ideal theory) and a 'comparative approach' (associated with non-ideal theory). According to him, non-ideal theory, or the comparative approach, requires us to look at different concrete situations and context-specific options, set priorities, and rank alternative social arrangements as 'more or less just' (2006: 216). Sen goes on to claim that if people are concerned with making the world more just, they should abandon the project of ideal theorizing (or in Sen's terms, the transcendental approach) in favour of the comparative approach, on the grounds

that the former is neither necessary nor sufficient for the latter (Sen, 2016: 16).

⁴⁹Eric Brandstedt reviewed three climate justice literature and worked out three possible questions that have stimulated their response. The first is dealing with the issue of full compliance and Partial compliance. Second, how to replace utopian theories with realistic normative theories and third, the contrast between focusing on the end-state of a perfectly just society, or on transitional concerns about improvements from the status quo to a clean-energy economy. See - *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 22 (2):221-234 (2019)

at the forefront of policy formulation, its importance in guiding political administrators is overarching and cannot be neglected. The watchful eyes of ethics need to undergird any policy that will impact upon human beings in the society so that prejudiced and idiosyncratic policy will not be sublimely accepted. Putting forward a workable action plan must be clearly governed by the necessary understanding of the normative values that are involved. Therefore, the normative analysis of concepts seems to be the first assignment to set us up for a global climate change treaty. Ruth Irwin, describing the requirement for a normative assessment argues that,

Climate change.... demand a deeper cultural shift and a critical assessment of the normative socio-economic world views that inform the discourses, policy, institutional frameworks, and self-understanding of modernity (Irwin, 2010: 12).

When dealing with the demands of duties and responsibilities for redressing climate change, there is a wide array of questions, issues, and climate justice positions. However, nearly all writers consider a couple of concerns as relevant, even if they differ on their interpretations, best form of realization, and relative importance. In navigating the terrain of providing the key issues of climate justice discourse, I take on four important concerns that climate justice theorists have focused on when deciding how to share the costs and burdens of climate change and to what extent agents will be responsible. These issues are framed in connection to (a) The degree of responsibility for causing and/or contributing to the problem (b.) The ability to do something about the problem (c) the degree to which one benefitted from GHG-emissions (d). The scope of justice consideration. Discussing these issues have provoked different responses from climate ethicists, some of which I examine briefly.

On the first – how can we determine the degree of responsibility for causing climate change? This question is connected to dealing with the problem of causal responsibility. The question of causal responsibility has featured heavily in both climate ethics and policy discussions. The intuition has often been that climate change might be global in terms of its experience however, the contribution of different states to the cause of climate change varies. Thus, nation-states should have different levels of responsibility. Also, it will seem fair to request that they all contribute precisely to the extent to which they have caused climate change. This

is exactly the suggestion of those who have invoked the *polluter pays* principle⁵⁰ (Shue, 1999; Neumayer, 2000; 2003).⁵¹

The *polluter pays* principle is a “historical” principle of distribution. It posits that the distribution of costs depends on what happened in the *past*. In this sense, the cost of climate adaptation and mitigation should be borne by the rich polluting countries (Roser and Seidel, 2017: 118-120). This principle has also been defended by egalitarians who canvass that a “historical” approach to allocating the responsibilities for addressing climate change must apply egalitarian principles of justice to support their position (Singer 2002: 40; Neumayer, 2000). For instance, Neumayer argues that “historical accountability is supported by the principle of equality of opportunity” (Neumayer, 2000: 188). According to emission egalitarianism, a fair distribution of the remaining emissions budget consists of all human beings having equal per capita emission rights. This idea is based primarily on the notion of equal common ownership of the atmosphere. That is, they support the idea that the atmosphere belongs equally to all human beings.

The *polluter pays* principle has been criticized for many reasons (Caney, 2010: 126-135; 2010b: 205-213) but let me briefly comment on two of them. First, the principle presupposes an independent standard of fairness without first explaining what everyone is entitled to. Analogously, it is often assumed in the context of climate ethics that the fair shares of the total emissions to which all are entitled are *equal* (Caney 2005; Roser and Seidel, 121). Second, the guiding intuition behind the *polluter pays* principle, that one must take responsibility for *one’s own* actions, does not fully apply in the context of climate change, because some of those who failed to show moral restraint are no longer alive and it is also possible that other factors, aside from human beings could contribute to climate change as scientists have reported (Caney, 2010b: 211; Posner and Sunstein 2008). These critiques posit that the actual polluters are not the current generation of people living in developed countries. Simon Caney 2010b, Roser and Seidel submit that “anyone who wants to use the *polluter pays* principle to distribute the costs of adaptation and compensation must extend it in two ways. One, they must explain more precisely what it means to cause damage and two, they

⁵⁰ The “polluter pays” principle is also one that has been affirmed in several international legal agreements.16 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), for example, recommended the adoption of the PPP in Council Recommendations of May 26, 1972, and November 14, 1974. The principle has also been recommended by the Commission on Global Governance. See Caney, 2010a.

⁵¹ Henry Shue prefers not to describe his position as polluter pays principle (see Shue 1999: p. 534) but his position from my interpretation conforms to the PPP.

must specify more precisely at what point in time ignorance becomes culpable” (Roser and Seidel, 2017: 126).

However, a closer inspection has also shown that emissions egalitarianism, implemented consistently, is hardly more workable than the *polluter pay* principle because the annual emission rights of every person would have to be established through a very elaborate calculation based on a variety of data. This principle also fails to take account of factors like differences in responsibility for the problem, advantages resulting from the problem's causation, capabilities for dealing with the problem, or of differences between the needs of various people and, in particular, the principle does not include historical emissions. As a result of this costly negligence, emissions egalitarianism also loses plausibility from a moral point of view (Roser and Seidel, 2017: 155).

On the second issue – how do we determine those who have the capacity or ability to do something about mitigating climate change problem. This question is of normative significance for nearly all climate ethicists and a thorny issue particularly for distributive justice theorists. Doing something about climate change could be making mitigation plans, engaging in adaptation and/or assisting those who are most vulnerable to climate change. The consideration of *ability* or *capacity* in determining how to adjust the burden of climate change has favoured those who have little capacity to actively engage in climate policies because of their ‘unmade position.’ The developing countries are in the bracket of those who have found themselves in this *unmade position*. The argument for suggesting the *ability to pay* principle (APP) is that the rich emitting nations are in a good position to act (Shue, 1999; 2010: 2014). To invoke the *ability to pay* principle is to support an allocation of duties according to economic capacity. It would be unfair, its supporters argue, to expect those who have fewer resources to pay as much as those who are richer in addressing a shared problem (Moellendorf, 2012; Shue, 2010; 105-107). The *ability to pay* principle encapsulates a non-historical and patterned conception of distributive justice. Informed by an idea of distributive justice, it envisions a system of cooperation whereby those who are better off support the less well-off (Moellendorf, 2012; 136-137). In principle, the *ability to pay* principle is indifferent to who caused harm: its emphasis is on who can rectify that harm. Contrasting this principle with the *Polluter Pays Principle*, it is a forward-looking, rather than a backward-looking, principle (Caney, 2010b: 213).

In explaining this *ability to pay* principle Shue distinguishes between ‘luxury emissions’ and ‘subsistence emissions.’ While the former is connected to the rich nations and utterly irrelevant to the survival of its people, the latter is needed for the sustenance of poor people living in developing nations. He therefore argues that the rich polluting countries have duties to mitigate climate change. In contrast, the developing countries are entitled to continue developing to eradicate severe poverty and ensure opportunities for a decent life for their population (Shue, 2010: 200-215). The intuition behind this claim is in line with Rawls that the best way to ensure fairness is the scenario in which the least well-off are not harmed more (Rawls, 104-105). Thus, the most vulnerable should be favoured in any principle advocating climate justice.

However, some have also criticized the *ability to pay* principle of climate justice as one lacking a decisive moral justification but rather based on an “economic point of view” (Roser and Seidel, 2017: 142; see also Caney 2010b: 213-217). Critics also point to ambiguity over whether the duty is to be assigned to states or individuals (Moellendorf, 2012:136). Given that global cooperation on climate change is the result of treaty negotiations, one might assume that states should be the bearers of responsibility, but this implies that responsibility will be devolved to the individual members of states. This opens the way to an argumentative tangle.

On the third issue. That is, should we consider the degree to which one has benefitted from GHG emissions as the basis for sharing climate burden? The target of this question is to hold the beneficiaries of the proceeds of harmful emissions culpable. Hence, the *beneficiary pays* principle (BPP) has often been muted by some theorists. They contend that those who have caused climate change are no longer alive and as such, this can render the *polluter pays* principle difficult to apply (Shue 1999; Nemayer 2000; See Roser and Seidel, 2017: 130-138). The idea is that even though we might not be able to identify the real polluters, we can easily identify those who are responsible, by considering the extent to which they have benefitted from the carbon-emitting activities. Those who have immensely benefitted from carbon emissions are adjudged to have used unjust means to enrich themselves because their actions of emissions have not only promoted using more than their fair share of the atmosphere, but it has also caused harm to some other people. Therefore, they must pass on some of the benefits and profit to those who have suffered the consequences of their action (Caney 2005: 757; Page, 2011: 420-424).

Despite its benefits, the *beneficiary pays* principle is fraught with some problems that make it difficult to apply. First, its unfair metric for determining those who are responsible for climate change is unacceptable. Edward Page contends that the principle entails a ‘chronological unfairness’ (Page 2013: 240) because it requires present beneficiaries of climate change to pay for its abatement while earlier generations that also benefited did not have to pay (Caney 2006: 473). Secondly, the BPP could become particularly problematic if applied to states that did benefit from GHGs in the past but have since then deteriorated economically. Unlike the APP, which only targets wealthy states, the BPP would require the present generations within these poor states to sacrifice a considerable portion of their wealth for climate abatement and hence possibly throw people into poverty (Page 2013: 240). Some others also contend that just like the *polluter pays* principle, except BPP is supplemented with other principles like *polluter pays* and *ability to pay* principles, its practicability is highly questionable (Caney: 2010a; Roser and Seidel, 2017:137). Considering the problems of the PPP, BPP and the APP, Caney suggests that these principles can be merged to form a ‘hybrid principle’ of climate justice (Caney 2005, 2010a). How this will become workable where many competing interests cannot be dismissed needs to be seen.

So far, we can see that most of the principles of climate justice that I have discussed have connections with conceptions of global justice that I discussed in Chapter three. Although they differ in many ways when it comes to argumentative procedures, they all support an allocation of climate change burdens as an instantiation of global responsibilities. Nevertheless, some theorists believe that the scope of climate justice cannot merely be about assigning responsibility against the backdrop of present global inequalities, but should also, be about responsibilities toward future generations. The discourse emanating from this dilemma responds to the fourth issue - what is the scope to which climate justice should be applied? Some works on climate justice emphasized an intergenerational outlook (Gardiner, 2011; Page, 2006) while others aim to incorporate both global and intergenerational justice (Vanderheiden, 2008). Gardiner suggests that climate change presents an intergenerational challenge and implies that looking at climate change as a matter of intra-generational equity misses the point. This is another way of saying that the intergenerational problem is the more pressing one of the two (Gardiner, 2011: 143-148). Indeed, in an earlier essay, Gardiner states that the intergenerational challenge is the ‘more important’ challenge that needs to be addressed (Gardiner, 2004: 595). Vanderheiden on his own is much concerned with a global system of equal atmospheric shares, however, he also incorporates sustained discussions on

considering intergenerational cooperation and as well discusses the analytic challenges it poses (Vanderheiden, 2008).

The tension with determining the scope of justice presents a picture of climate justice that is sensitive to both global inequalities and the projected interests of future generations. This issue becomes thorny because most conceptions of justice require tangible holders or claimants of rights. Since future generations do not yet exist, it seems unclear how they can claim or hold rights. This leads some to focus on a clash of interests between generations. On the one hand, it seems to be in future generations' interest if the current generation assumed intergenerational duties toward them and reduced greenhouse emissions accordingly. On the other hand, it seems to be in the current generation's interest to delay climate action (Boran, 2019: 34-35).

From the climate justice principles that I have discussed, one could glean from them that most climate justice scholars have no dispute acknowledging that the world's most vulnerable populations are those most likely to suffer the worst consequences of climate change. As such, the discourse of climate justice is often framed as a political, social, economic, and environmental justice issue. However, climate ethicists' disposable approach to the impact of climate change on cultural heritage suggests that the focus and objective of climate justice need to be scrutinized. In the battle against climate change, we cannot be passive observers of cultural heritage extinction, which is an important part of some stakeholders' socio-cultural world. Climate change, cultural rights and cultural resources are powerful allies whose importance cannot be underemphasized in climate justice. The silence of climate justice theories on the climate dividend to those whose cultural heritage is affected is worrisome. I now turn to a critical analysis some of the reigning approaches in climate justice.

4.4: Critique of Climate Justice Theories - *The Cultural Storm*

Climate justice discourse is indeed rich in arguments. However, it is very difficult to become disengaged from the insensitivity of this bulging normative inquiries to significant normative concerns pertaining to culture evoked by climate change. This makes climate justice arguments to be less persuasive on a global scale since they are yet to address in full, the normative peculiarity that characterizes global climate impacts. Mainstream climate ethicists have put forward principles and theories that have hidden below the level of climate consciousness, the value of cultural heritage, for those who are most vulnerable, and, in this case, the contingents in Africa. This is a dire omission and to imagine that this is a climate

justice issue, whose implications reverberates in the survival and sustenance of the people makes it more disturbing. While there are other areas that current climate justice needs enhancement, I have determined to focus my critique on the insufficiency of their diagnosis and the attitude of indifference to the cultural dimension of climate change. As I will discuss later in this section, these two challenges have furthered cultural injustice in our global climate regime.

In the bid to make the critique more pronounced, I have decided to call it by the metaphor ‘the cultural storm.’ This is because climate justice discourses have neither factored the deep socio-cultural impact of climate change nor do they draw on the cultural understanding of justice in putting forward their theories. This is a gathering storm that needs to be addressed. The idea of the ‘cultural storm’ that I offer could complement Stephen Gardiner explanations in the “The Perfect Moral Storm” where he warns about the difficulty of finding ethical solutions to climate change due to three *storms* namely global, intergenerational, and theoretical storms (Gardiner, 2011: 24-48). As much as Gardiner’s metaphor of the three storms opens some important vistas hindering solution to climate change, he misses the opportunity to address the fundamental challenges of cultural injustice that climate change exacerbates for those who are affected the most by climate change. For instance, his point that climate change poses a moral challenge because of its global dimension is germane, however, it is a subtle mischaracterization to frame climate change, more as a global issue without attending to the contextual variations of its impacts because everybody is not impacted in equal measure and worst still, that which is very significant – cultural heritage – to some of the most vulnerable people is not emphasized.

Relatedly, the IPCC Assessment Report notes that “all consumption patterns are culturally embedded, and therefore culture influences greenhouse gas emissions” (IPCC, 2014: 12.3.1). This same report posits “with high confidence” that climate change will compromise “culture and identity.” Thus, I find it incredible that current climate justice theories and their critiques do not express concerns about the fate of cultural heritage as they have existed and their importance in climate justice negotiations. The mainstream climate justice discourse, no doubt, often have somewhat important claims. However, my impression is that these discourses have been more of a reflection of the masked interests that people hold when dealing with the burden of climate change. As Okereke suggests, climate justice discourse and negotiations have contemplated more of ‘vested interests’ than their insistence to safeguard the planet for present and future generations (Okereke *et al.*, 2015:6). Specifically,

Gardiner strikes the point that the United States, with a unique political system that creates numerous veto points before action can be taken, is particularly subject to delay and capture by vested interests (Gardiner, 2016: 16). In the same vein, Franziskus von Lucke shares similar sentiments when he posits that:

While it would be in the interest of all states to mitigate immediately to prevent serious harm to future generations, differences in the states' contributions to the problem, their affectedness, but also their capabilities and interests to further grow economically, have so far prevented decisive action and have opened serious rifts between developed and developing countries (von Lucke, 2017: 2).

Most times, climate justice discourses neglect the comprehensive approach that is expected of any issue such as climate change, that has social justice at its tipping point. Yet they feign empathy for the poor countries when addressing the impacts of climate change while gunning for the interest of the rich emitting nations in a cavalier manner. Interest-based politics have a crucial influence in the decision about the pollutants that should be included in the basket of regulated gases. Okereke suggests that factors like the base year against which emission reduction should be set; methodologies for counting diverse impacts, countries that should be designated as most vulnerable to ecological change; and so on must be prioritised in climate negotiations (Okereke, 2011:127).

The result of climate justice theorists' analytic effort produces contingent but a partial commitment to the evaluation of the impacts of climate change, particularly on populations whose voices and values are less represented. Yet, if climate change affects culture and cultural heritage as I have argued in Chapters One, two and three, we cannot look only at the other ways (environmental, economic and technology), when dealing with climate change impacts. In this section, I will raise two objections against the current discourse of climate justice. I will demonstrate (a) how current climate justice theories and their critiques have assumed positions that have unreflexively engage the impact of climate change on cultural heritage and (b) Why the understanding of justice that undergird most climate justice theories pose challenges for developing a feasible climate justice theory that is sensitive to the destruction of cultural heritage. I turn to the first, that is, bringing to light, some of the assumptions that have encouraged side-lining the impacts of climate change on cultural heritage in climate justice discourse.

i. Assumptions in Climate Justice Theories and the *Cultural Storm*

Most climate theorists do not state their assumptions about the problem of climate change, but this does not mean that these assumptions are not there, or that they do not impact how they frame principles of climate justice. Likewise, the excuse for moral and political inaction when critically examined is fraught with assumptions that are masking unstated interests. I will discuss thematically, six assumptions in climate justice discourse, and how it has contributed to the kind of treatment that has been given to cultural heritage devastation.

a. Focus on emissions allocation and not human wellbeing: Most climate justice proposals have been much concerned with ensuring a fair distribution of emission rights as if that is the only distributive justice issue connected with climate justice. However, I think climate justice must be addressed in combination with other questions of global justice connected to human well-being. When it comes to human well-being, which seems to me, the most important consideration in climate discourse, different distributive justice issues should overlap climate justice. Issues like poverty, development and sustainability should be addressed alongside climate justice. Roser and Seidel make this point when they suggest that “the distribution of costs of combating hunger and poverty, disease and unemployment that climate change exacerbates must also be considered alongside costs of allocating emissions” (Roser and Seidel, 2017:161). This implies that climate justice must be approached from a wider scope that focuses more on human wellbeing.

For instance, Boran (2019) posits that the influence of global climate justice and international negotiations during the Kyoto Protocol era have solidified an allocation-centrist approach to climate ethics. He suggests that the underlying assumption during negotiation is that the focus of climate justice should be the establishment of a fair allocation of responsibilities regarding the burden of climate change (Boran, 2019: 29-30). The allocation-centrist view is so pervasive among climate ethicists that Simon Caney simply states that the question of climate justice specifically concerns “who should take responsibility,” “who should perform and how much,” (Caney, 2016: 24). However, this a thin focus in climate justice as I will point out anon.

The focus on a global, mandatory regime to limit emissions might seem logically the first step that needs to be put in place, however, to find ways to redeem lives and livelihoods that are lost because of climate change-induced flooding, drought and storm are politically easier to organize than waiting for countries to agree to a binding emission limit. Again, it might

seem plausible that focusing on emission allocation is the right thing to do since we must find ways to abate emission if we are to deal with climate change, however, the priority on this approach might not be able to address some key issues in the discourse on climate justice. In climate policy discourse, both climate change emission allocation and human wellbeing are critical goals, and I think, the later must be the ultimate focus and must be done in consideration of a wide array of agents. If this is done, the people whose cultural heritage has been blighted by climate change will receive prioritized attention because their wellbeing is at stake. Hence, assumptions about the extent to which the climate problem is defined by emissions reductions or human wellbeing development, can have considerable implications on the costs and benefits included in policy negotiation.

b. More Scientific and less Socio-cultural framing

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has been saddled with the responsibility of maintaining the international process in which the evolving climate change agenda is discussed and determined. While the Convention has a wide array of concerns and priorities, it has not totally excluded the social dimension. For a moment, let me take it for granted that the Convention addresses the social dimension of climate change. A cursory reading shows that Articles 1 and 4 in the Convention have been cornerstones to building the social dimensions with the UNFCCC climate change framework.⁵² Although this might be subjected to diverse interpretation, what is much clearer is that the Convention clearly stated that its objective is “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” This is purely an environmental objective without social implications.

⁵² In the 1992 UNFCCC, Article 1 establishes definitions for the whole of the Convention. It defines “adverse effects of climate change” as including those that have deleterious effects on “the operations of socioeconomic systems or on human health or welfare” Thus it follows that any climate change policy addressing the “adverse impacts of climate change” should integrate consideration of potential impacts on people, including their health and welfare. Article 4 comprises the commitments of Parties to the Convention. It recognizes the cross-cutting nature and symbiotic relationship between climate change policy and other policies, including social dimensions. In essence, Article 4 1(f) requests that governments minimize the adverse *effects* of climate change – already established as including adverse impacts on people’s health and welfare (Article 1) – as well as to minimize adverse effects of climate *policies* related to either mitigation or adaptation, noting in particular to minimize adverse effects to public health alongside the economy and environment Article 4 7 addresses the extent to which developing states implement their commitments under the Convention and also reaffirms that “economic and social development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of the developing country Parties. These objectives – economic development, social development, and poverty eradication – have various social dimensions. Thus Articles 1 and 4 serves to highlight that social dimensions are already embedded in the Convention in relation to climate impacts, policy measures and as an overarching priority of developing states. While their emphasis in the UNFCCC text varies, there is clear legitimacy for inclusion of social dimensions within the international climate change architecture (See p. 6).

Critics often argue that the social dimensions are not explicitly outlined in the Conventions' objective, nor are they explicitly included among its principles (United Nations Task Team, 6-7).

The current climate change discourse, including the way mitigation and adaptation measures, are designed and appraised, emphasises environmental, economic or technological inputs and costs. Hence, the social dimensions of climate change are not well understood or addressed. This has prompted some scholars to analyze the limitations to climate adaptation proposals that side-lines the socio-cultural impacts. (Adger *et al.*, 2009) for instance, argue that “notwithstanding physical and ecological limits affecting natural systems, climate change adaptation is not only limited by such exogenous forces but importantly by societal factors that could possibly be overcome (Adger *et al.*, 2009: 350). This position signals that it is of great important to consider socio-cultural issues in climate change discourse.

One aspect of climate change's scientific framing is conceptualizing it as a global problem, emphasizing that no country or person will remain unaffected. However, climate justice framing differs in that it points out what the scientific framing ignores. That is, climate justice theorists are vociferous about the claim that already disadvantaged peoples and nations will suffer greater impacts from climate change and have less capacity and resources to adapt to, and recover from the environmental, economic, and social damage incurred from a warmer climate (Evan, 2019:7). More importantly, the arena of the social is wide and must be treated with credible consideration in climate justice deliberations. This suggests that a normative understanding cannot be side-lined or relegated to the backburner in matters connected with climate change, since the experience of climate change differs among the concerned stakeholders.

Against this backdrop, climate justice theories have been characterized by questions concerning the definition and meaning of the words like ‘dangerous climate change,’ ‘vulnerability’ (O’Brien *et al.* 2007) ‘responsibility’ (Jamieson, 2015), ‘loss and damage’ (McShane, 2017; Roberts and Pelling, 2018). For instance, trying to find out what ‘dangerous climate change’ is may not necessarily be only a scientific issue but also a normative one. There is considerable evidence that the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are experiencing ‘dangerous’ climate impacts, not only on their physical environment (IPCC 2007; Abeysing and Huq, 2016: 193) but also their tangible and intangible ways of life. For example, the growing climate change impacts bring frequent and extreme climate and weather-related

disasters such as floods, cyclones, tornadoes, landslides, droughts, heatwaves, and malaria outbreaks in the LDCs and these effects have destroyed lives and livelihoods that are connected to people's cultural heritage.

At its most basic, climate change impacts people's cultural heritage and responsive measures depend on people to be successful. Thus, addressing issues like the social dimensions of climate change, the interplay between climate as a phenomenon, its related policy, and society, including people's role as victims to, and agents of climate change, are critical to a successful climate policy initiative. Climate policies will consequently succeed, fail or, at a minimum, be enhanced by the everyday actions of empowered and capable individuals, households, communities, and countries. Therefore, if climate change negotiations must align with the UNFCCC position that "Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities," (UNFCCC, 1992) it must take into consideration the peculiar and relevant social, economic, and environmental conditions of the people – of which their cultural heritage values cannot be exempted.

Before moving on to discuss the other assumptions in climate justice that have undermined the impact of climate change on cultural heritage, let me provide four reasons to justify the inclusion of the social dimension of climate change. One, although the social dimension has been recognized in the existing climate agreement, this recognition is only in a modest elemental sense. As a result, it is often under-recognized and under-implemented in practice. Secondly, the socio-cultural dimension's inclusion is a prerequisite for ensuring that a broader spectrum of human rights is respected. Climate change and related response measures will impact the fundamental human rights connected with people's security, health, and livelihoods, especially the most vulnerable. Three, climate change policies' effectiveness will very likely be enhanced if the social-cultural dimension is fully integrated. Lessons learnt from the history of human development have shown that social dimensions are essential if the most powerful and resource-intensive societies are to change consumption habits and patterns. Finally, there are essential synergies between the climate change agenda, complementary sustainable development, and human rights agendas, both in terms of their objectives and their means of achievement. By integrating socio-cultural dimensions in climate policy, these synergies have significant potential to amplify concrete results.

c. The assumption about the substitution of tangible and intangible goods: Climate justice theories and policies are largely grounded in assumptions of high substitutability of the *goods* affected by climate change. These theories are likely to tolerate higher stabilization levels and focus on impacts connected to economic harms rather than impacts whose economic implications are not easily discernible like culture loss. Alternately, if human and non-human goods are perceived as less substitutable, anthropogenic climate change will be a more proximate concern, and lower stabilization levels are likely goals. The debate about substitution and the nature of the harms connected with climate change has largely driven the substantial debate about discounting across generations (Nordhaus, 2001) and contributed to the related debate about setting a ‘safe’ stabilization level (O’Neill and Oppenheimer, 2002; Harvey, 2007). Assumptions about substitutability are pivotal in the understanding of the climate change problem and can have distributive justice implications across and within generations. In reality, some goods affected by climate change are substitutable, and these impacts can be cushioned through financial or technological transfers. However, other impacts on endangered species, cultural systems, ecosystems and landscapes are not. The impact of climate change on cultural heritage portends a dilemma for theories that assume that goods adversely affected by climate impacts can be substitutable. This is because some cultural heritage has significant and considerable values to the people, and these values are connected to their unique identity and thus become difficult to substitute without upsetting their long-term identity and self-determination.

d. Assumptions on the diminutive role of culture in climate ethics

It is widely understood that success in addressing climate change at the global level will not be achieved unless all parties' key concerns, particularly that of the most vulnerable to climate change, are appropriately taken into consideration and adequately addressed (Abeyasing and Huq, 2016:189). However, most of the climate justice proposals assume away the cultural dimension of climate change because they pay less attention to the importance of culture in this global environmental age. For me, I think this is an exercise of wilful self-deception and moral corruption. That is, by focusing solutions along economic and technological lines, they take with another hand what they give. Most climate theorists admit that the most vulnerable are those living in poor countries, but never consider the peculiar vulnerability of their cherished cultural heritage when addressing global climate change. Article 4.9 of the UNFCCC might have recognized the special circumstances of the LDCs by calling for the Parties to ‘take full account of the specific needs and special situations of the

least developed countries in their actions regarding funding and transfer of technology.’ However, the implementation of this is far from settled (Abeysing and Huq, 192).

The side-lining of culture in climate ethics discourse has made some scholars to challenge the diminutive role of culture in climate policy. For instance, Markku Oksanen criticizes the institutionalist and individualist/consumerist approach to climate policy (Oksanen, 2014: 545). He explains that while the individualist/consumerist approach addresses the individual lifestyle with the confidence that consumers will respond to global warming with choices, the institutionalist approach focuses on the economic, political and social actors, structures and processes that are recognized and governed by formal rules. He contends that these approaches do not provide a comprehensive picture of human life since it neglects the non-formal aspects of human lives (Oksanen, 2014: 547). To obtain a more comprehensive picture of human life, Oksanen suggests that “attention must also be paid to its non-formal social dimensions which are neither governed by individuals nor controlled by formal laws that will undermine certain rights of people” to which culture belongs (Oksanen, 2014: 547). The point here is that global climate justice debate must take culture seriously because culture is an important facet of human life. More importantly, the liberal inclination not to base politics on cultural understandings can reasonably be understood as an attempt not to take value pluralism seriously (O’Neill 2003, 353; Lecce 2008, 3-4). Hence, the reluctance of current climate justice to attend politically to our culturally embedded ideas will undermine the objective of justice that they seek to achieve.

e. Assumptions on the Limitation of Rights

I have expressed the concern about a human right approach in chapter one. Nonetheless, it is worth devoting additional time to reflect on this issue because it holds direct consequences for the possibility of a climate justice that is sensitive to cultural heritage loss. Some climate ethicists regard climate change as a human rights problem (Shue, 1999; Simon Caney, 2010b; and Derek Bell, 2011; Tracey Skillington 2017). Common in all of them is that they argue that anthropogenic climate change has violated basic human rights.

For Caney, climate change threatens the right to life, health, and the right to subsistence. In comparison with other approaches, this approach is very instructive because it demands that we go beyond the easily observed and measured impacts to determine the harms that are suffered, thus making an important claim that mitigation and adaptation are not enough to redress harms to fundamental human rights (Caney, 2010b: 169). However, the idea of a

universal rights system has generally been seen to sit uncomfortably with an acknowledgement of the cultural relativity and specificity of rights to different human societies. Some scholars have agreed on the need for a broadly pluralistic approach to the question of human rights, although there is still disagreement about the extent to which cross-cultural perspectives might generate a sense of commonalities (Harrison, 2013: 161).

In theory, the search for universal human rights emphasized the individual's right to difference, however, there is a sense in which the search for collective cultural rights was less expressed in terms of difference and more in terms of common humanity. This was certainly the case with the World Heritage Convention's notion of universal heritage value, in which the existence of certain common cross-cultural categories of value was assumed at the collective level. The declaration makes a unique claim that cultural diversity is itself part of the common heritage of humanity when it posits that:

Culture takes diverse forms across time and space. This diversity is embodied in the uniqueness and plurality of the identities of the groups and societies making up humankind. As a source of exchange, innovation and creativity, cultural diversity is as necessary for humankind as biodiversity is for nature. In this sense, it is the common heritage of humanity and should be recognized and affirmed for the benefit of present and future generations. (UNESCO, 2002: 13).

However, some recognition theorists⁵³ suggest that rights by their very nature can only protect us from some threat to our autonomy and wellbeing but not from others (Zellentin, 2017: 17). This implies that right-based approaches to climate change can address, indeed, many of the factors that contribute to the undesirable outcome of vulnerability, but they are hard-pressed to address the issue of disrespect that seems to be at the heart of negotiated climate justice. To appreciate the practical importance of a rights-based approach, it must emphasize that developed countries cannot identify themselves as equals with developing countries. The developing countries in the Global South should have the non-demeaning right to demand not to be treated as free and equal partners, but as vulnerable and oppressed victims deserving special protections. This is owing to the history of domination and subjugation from colonialism on the one hand and the significant loss of culture from climate change that threatens their long-term survival on the other hand. What I am saying in effect is

⁵³ Recognition theory seeks to restructure rather than to reinforce our shared cultures and thus to establish a society that better accommodates pluralism and diversity.

that it must be acknowledged that the people who have experienced colonialism, racism, environmental despoliation, and other forms of disadvantage inevitably come to negotiation as the victims or subalterns of justice.

In our increasingly diverse societies, it is essential to ensure harmonious interaction among people and groups with plural, varied and dynamic cultural identities as well as their willingness to live together. Climate justice policies that encourage all citizens' inclusion and participation are guarantees of social cohesion, the vitality of civil society and peace. Thus, human rights that express concern for cultural pluralism will be indissociable from a democratic framework conducive to cultural exchange and the flourishing of creative capacities that sustain public life. (UNESCO, 2002: 13).

f. The Fiction of Dialogue

The ethical challenge of climate change does not fundamentally lie in clashes between incompatible frameworks, but rather in creating an opportunity to establish a productive dialogue between States and other relevant agents. From this dialogue, it is expected that new ethos for concepts like vulnerability, responsibility, loss and damage, sustainability change can be agreed to realise an adequate, practical, and humane ethical response to global climate change. However, the current experience shows that climate agreement is not yet a product of dialogue. In fact, Hugh Breakey's assertion that "climate discourse employs moral language, but not moral dialogue" is not far from the truth (Breakey, 2015: 157). Okereke in a similar manner posits that the decisions about environmental standards, targets, policies, and instruments of governance at the international level are by no means based on purely 'objective' sciences because they 'reflect preferences and power equations' (Okereke, 2011: 126). The reasons for the inability to take action that will redress our failing climate is evidence that the nature of moral dialogue and deliberations resulting from climate agreement is questionable. To be sincere, I think, climate negotiations have only prioritized putting forward practical principles without promoting moral dialogue. What is meant by moral dialogue? As Breakey suggests, "moral dialogue is thus, not about simply selecting and asserting a given norm, but involves reflecting with others on that norm, considering what it exactly requires, and what might be said in support of it and the critique of it (Breakey, 2015: 159). Breakey explains that moral dialogue is markedly different from 'self-interested negotiation' in that it encourages 'genuine synthesis' rather than "strategic compromise driven by self-interested negotiations" (Breakey, 2015: 159-162). For climate negotiations to

adopt moral dialogue, it must not only ensure a fair representation of concerned parties, but also, all these parties must be given fair hearing concerning their experience of climate change. In addition, the suggested pathways to redressing our ailing climate must result from a reflexive equilibrium by all the concerned parties.

Clearly, the imposition of a particular justice framework has encouraged cultural injustice in climate justice negotiations. Dale Jamieson and Marcello Di Paola, discussing the complexity of climate justice, argue that “to superimpose canonical theories of global justice theories onto a phenomenon whose causal, spatio-temporal and strategic characteristics are unique and unprecedented, may turn out to be both theoretically and practically misleading” (Jamieson and Di Paola, 2014: 109).

The other challenge I have with the current discourse on climate justice concerns the limitation of the idea of justice that informs their discourse. Besides the assumptions that have encouraged side-lining the impacts of climate change on cultural heritage, another issue, perhaps more important, is the limitation of the idea of justice that undergirds climate justice theories. To that, I turn in the next session.

ii. **The Limitation of the idea of Justice in Climate Justice Discourse**

One can infer three important claims on the limitation of justice in current climate justice discourse. First, there is the liberal position according to which culture is irrelevant from the purview of climate justice or, if this claim is considered too strong, let me retort that culture is made to be secondary in consideration of principles of climate justice as derived from reason alone. Second, climate justice discourse often shows that determining climate justice principles for the state and the individual can be done without cultural considerations. Most of them are much concerned about the formal, rule-based aspect of human lives, thereby neglecting the informal but important facets of human life. Third, climate justice discourse focuses more on the substantive but limited idea of justice. The consequence being that the procedural and relational aspects of justice that are more culturally sensitive are side-lined. These three claims have made current climate justice theories to be far removed from, and oblivious of the consequences of their insufficient application of the notion of justice. I discuss in more details, how these three claims emerge in climate justice discourse.

First, climate justice discourse has less reckoned with cultural issues that climate change exacerbates. Does it mean that there is no connection between climate justice and culture, or scholars have just decided to relegate those kinds of questions? The second instance might be

the case. While I agree with Okereke (2011) that “the claims of justice in global environmental justice, for the most part, have been subject to little definitional and philosophical precision” (Okereke, 2011:118), the intriguing question for me, is that can we discountenance the social and environmental importance of culture in climate justice? Responding to this question calls for a closer scrutiny of climate ethics. In general, the notion of environmental justice as Okereke laments has been ‘deployed more as an instinctive gut reaction than as a closely argued concept’ (Okereke, 2011: 119). However, as questions of justice become more acute in the international negotiation circles and given mounting evidence that the proliferation of justice claims has not necessarily translated into significant equity policies, there would seem to be an increasing need for more robust conceptual treatments. Although I do not intend to provide a new conception of justice, I am only worried about the parochial justice index that has characterized climate justice deliberations.

The literature on climate justice needs to move away from particularistic notions of justice. According to Mueller (1999), the literature on “negotiated justice” has come to become an “entitlement theories of justice” (Mueller, 199:8). However, this approach to justice obscures the more central questions of whether and to what extent an international agreement must favour rich or poor nations. It should be clear that environmental issues are not “distinguishable but rather interwoven into the fabric of racial, social, economic and epistemic (in) justice” (Okereke, 2011:117). One of the clear ways this manifest is ‘that the effects of environmental degradation are not necessarily experienced as costs by the people who cause and benefit the most from them.’ In other words, environmental costs and benefits are often distributed such that, those who already suffer other socio-economic disadvantages, tend to bear the greatest burden. Thus understood, environmental degradation and ecological crisis for a wide majority of people, become, as Lorraine Elliot puts it, ‘symptomatic of a broader structural oppression and silencing’ (c.f. Okereke, 2011: 118).

Climate justice is often perceived as an instrument to find a technical solution for those who bear the brunt and not for those caught up in the insidious pattern of living that is responsible for climate change. This calls for a closer examination of the informal ways of life and the kinds of values they hold. Implicit in this claim is that understanding peoples’ beliefs and culture is crucial in understanding the cause, consequence, and policy considerations necessary for addressing climate change. The objective of climate justice should not just be for foreign policy but a corrective plan for the unreflective ways of life and values that have

been the precursor of climate change and also the ways of lives connected to survival and sustenance of other people that are being destroyed by climate change.

Since climate justice is more about social justice. It is thus important to note that the content of the social life is vast and cannot be limited to the formal ways of life. As long as responses to the current global climate crises continue to focus on the need for economic growth, and provided the adopted strategies continue to result in inequality and deprivation patterns, their assumptions and understanding of social justice needs to be questioned. One should be very careful to consider the vast social impact of any environmental justice claims. A tamed and ill-informed understanding of social justice cannot produce a comprehensive climate justice proposal.

The need for a contextualized understanding of social justice is needed in addressing climate justice. Coming up with contextual markers of social justice might pose the danger of diluting international standards on the pretext of having to be true to cultural identity and values or descending into ethnically informed notions of social justice. Nevertheless, a further examination of important parameters of the definition of social justice in the local context (and the degree to which one should go in this direction) will constitute a worthwhile addition to current climate justice discourse. Of recent, some climate theorists have been worried about the selective, domineering, and hypocritical approach to climate justice. For instance, Zellentin argues that climate justice theories implicitly rely on a particular approach to justice, namely justice as impartiality. Justice as impartiality, she posits, “seeks to realize, and protect the equal moral standing that all persons are entitled to, through an appropriate regime of individual rights.” She contends that “this rights-based approach might not address some key issues in the debates on climate policy” (Zellentin, 2017:9).

John De Coninck argues that a further reflection on the demands of social justice requires that there must be the consideration of important dimensions like the primacy of the community over the individual, emphasis on diversity and the rights of cultural communities (defined in terms of traditions and languages), as well as respect for human rights within each community. In essence, the understanding of social justice must be extended to community-informed forms of justice where communities take charge of the issues affecting them and where restorative forms of justice take precedence over a system that emphasizes retribution (John De Coninck, 2013: 8).

Philosophers have long recognized the close connection between the fairness of an outcome and the legitimacy of the process by which such an outcome is determined. For instance, Aristotle distinguished between substantive and procedural justice and noted that a significant aspect of justice has to do with the bargaining process's fairness (Delba Winthrop, 1978: 1214). Similarly, Rawls' theory of 'justice as fairness' is firmly based on a stylised condition of bargaining designed to eliminate the effect of power asymmetry amongst co-operating agents (Rawls, 1973). In climate negotiations, the Global North commands massive political, the economic and scientific advantage over the South. Consequently, the countries and people of the South who are most adversely affected by international environmental problems are in many instances, permitted little or no say in the political and decision-making processes designed to tackle these challenges.

In current climate negotiations, the political South generally emphasizes the need for solutions that recognize and reflect differentials in contribution, vulnerability, and capabilities (Okereke, 201: 118). The Global North, on their part, tend to emphasize corruption and population growth in the South and on this basis, question the fairness of suggestions that they should bear a disproportionate burden of global environmental cooperation. Some of the debates also relate to and draw from, broader issues of structure and patterns of international economic and social relations (Okereke, 2011:118). The result is that global environmental institutions and policies, for the most time, do not reflect the aspirations of most of the people that bear the brunt of the problems (Okereke, 127). To avoid what Shue calls "compound injustice"⁵⁴ (Shue 2014:4), climate justice must recognize and prioritize explicit discussion of justice. The determination of a coherent demand for climate justice must go beyond substantive notions of justice so that climate justice proposals will not be an unfortunate, if not well-intentioned, manifestation of the passion for justice.

Some may be tempted to think that justice and equity are no longer central, and that the Paris Agreement's architecture is all about implementation. Justice will always remain central to the climate effort. It will move in new directions and explore new questions that the allocation-centric and socio-culturally bereft approaches left unexplored.

⁵⁴ According to Henry Shue, 'Compound injustice' occurs when an initial injustice paves the way for a second, as when colonial exploitation weakens the colonized nation to such an extent that the colonizer can impose unequal treaties upon it even after it gains independence. see Shue, H. 2014, p.4

4.5: Conclusion

I have shown in this chapter that although we may lack an adequate map of normative climate ethics as moral philosophers, there is the need to admit such narrow-mindedness when addressing a global issue like climate change. What I have suggested in this chapter is that mainstream climate justice approaches have unreflexively engaged the impact of climate change on cultural heritage, owing to their limited application of justice.

No doubt, the task of articulating the normative relevant factors to be dealt with in climate justice is an astonishingly complex one. As I have discussed, even when there is agreement about the values that belong to the list of normative concerns, there remains the contentious and challenging task of demarcating its specific content and contours. Beyond this, there is the further task of determining how the various factors interact, and what should be prioritized by climate ethicists in conflict cases for a just climate agreement.

What I have shown in this chapter is the insufficiency of current approaches to climate justice. I have argued that the climate justice theory that will be persuasive on a global scale must recognize culturally embedded ideas of justice and empower all stakeholders to find for themselves, lives that are, in the light of these ideas, judged to be adversely impacted by climate change. More specifically, I contend that cultural heritage devastation to climate change raises justice demands in their own right - demands that mainstream climate justice theories have not paid sufficient attention to. Against this dynamic backdrop, I think, there is the need for normative inquiries into climate justice to rethink its parameters of justice so that the vulnerability of cultural heritage values can be addressed sufficiently. This will be my focus in the next chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE CULTURAL DIMENSION OF CLIMATE ETHICS: A NORMATIVE ACCOUNT

5.1: Introduction

In this chapter, I aim to offer a plausible climate ethics theory that will address the vulnerability of those whose cultural heritage is affected by climate change. I submit that such theory must recognize culturally embedded ideas of justice and empower all stakeholders to build by themselves, lives that are, in the light of these ideas, deemed to be adversely impacted by climate change. Doing this requires that I take a realistic approach within the ambit of ideal theory, tailored to both the problem and context, to address the impact of climate change. Thus, I offer a normative theory of climate justice from the perspective of an African. This approach is important for two reasons. First, it allows for the plurality of ideal theories, each with their distinct non-ideal auxiliaries, connected to the understanding of Personhood. This consideration, I argue, is central to how climate justice should be advanced. Second, this approach offers an objective but agent-centered approach to address a complex problem like global warming. With its insistence on considering the patterns that lie beneath the formal approach to climate justice, the climate theory that I offer contends that it would be ironic to address one form of climate injustice while unintentionally obscuring other forms of injustice. By so doing, the theory offers an approach to climate justice from the socio-cultural lens of an African, to address the state of cultural injustice exacerbated by climate change. That is, it advances an alternative perspective to climate ethics that is sensitive to the cultural impacts of climate change thereby providing a nuanced and intuitive understanding of climate justice.

The identification of redressable injustice has birthed several theories of Justice from classical to contemporary times (Rawls, 1973; Nussbaum, 2000; Sen, 2009). However, I consider it useful to state from the onset that I do not promise novel concepts to rethink justice which is central to climate ethics; neither do I offer to reinvent the wheel of climate justice discourse, *per se*. In other words, the goal that I pursue is not to provide an all-encompassing definition of justice. Instead, I invite climate ethicists to imagine justice as a meta-language that allows one to respond to the sensitive relationship with others in a shared world. I imagine justice to be a language of Personhood, one that creates an understanding, first of what a person is, and second, of how a person should live with other persons in a common world amid an imploding environmental disaster like climate change. In this

chapter, I argue that it is important to expand the parameters of climate justice by reinforcing the idea of Personhood. By so doing, I make clear what is already there but not considered, that is the idea of Personhood and its importance for climate justice. Thus, I address two important questions – first, what are the implications of failing to pay serious attention to the cultural dimension of climate justice? Second, is there a relationship of benefit between the normative idea of Personhood and climate ethics and climate justice? I ask the second question, given the universal appeal and political currency of global climate justice and the salience of the idea of Personhood in African moral and political thought. To answer these questions, I consider whether what we have observed playing out in climate current negotiations that has neglected the significant vulnerabilities of some people is not a reflection of the neglect of Personhood - a notion that has one single rule - not to reduce other persons to anything less than the common humanity we share. Unlike the complexity of human language in communication, I think justice should be thought of as a language that communicates a single message – Personhood.

To achieve the objectives of the chapter, I divide the chapter into five sections. In the first, I discuss the difficulty of trying to put forward a plausible climate justice by ideal and non-ideal theorists. In the section, I offer an ideal theory in climate ethics that does not abandon the context of climate reality. This approach embraces realism but does not occlude the plausibility of plural ideal theories in climate ethics discourse. This ideal theory of climate justice provides a normative basis to respond to climate change in a world rife with cultural diversity. The theory suggests that a focus on ideal theorizing requires bringing on board certain cultural facts that are significant to climate negotiations. In the second section, I discuss the cultural dimension of climate change. I argue that although climate change is a global phenomenon, a cultural dimension is quite illuminating and must be integrated to climate ethics discourse. I argue that a cultural perspective can allow for an understanding of the patterns that lie beneath social responses to climate change and the challenges of responding to these patterns. In the third section, I provide a critique of the conceptualizations of justice that have influenced mainstream climate justice theories and policy. I discuss three different conceptualizations of justice – justice as non-domination, justice as impartiality and justice as mutual recognition - and show the lacuna of these three conceptualizations of justice. I further evaluate why a combination of them will not provide a plausible climate justice theory.

The fourth section addresses the relationship between the cultural idea of personhood and climate justice to show how both concepts interrelate. Much of the literature dealing with climate ethics, both at the empirical and normative levels do not engage the cultural perceptions of personhood in their discourse. While I appreciate the approaches to personhood by first-generation African philosophers,⁵⁵ I focus on normative analysis of personhood. In this connection, I explore the nature of personhood to show how such conception could illuminate climate ethics and, specifically, help us develop a new understanding of climate justice that could move us to responsive action in the face of urgent moral challenge like climate change. This is an important facet of personhood that needs to be explored in climate ethics discourse.

Having suggested the importance of a cultural dimension of climate change, I argue in this section the need for climate justice to consider the instructive ideas in the African conception of personhood. I discuss how the conception of personhood could strengthen climate justice perspectives, both for understanding the nuanced dimensions of justice and its application to the responsible action required to address climate change. Specifically, I discuss how the idea of personhood emphasizes the dignity and rights of persons in relation to their community and its importance for climate justice. This approach to climate justice emphasizes the need to recognize the vulnerabilities of the Other, provides space for inclusive deliberations on how climate change has impacted various stakeholders, and, more importantly, offers a uniquely humanizing perspective on the need for collective action.

5.2: Climate Justice in a Non-Ideal World: An Idealized non-ideal Theory

The experience of climate change has glaringly shown that we do not live in an ideal world, but more disturbing is the fact of our ideological pretence in the way this non-ideal circumstance is dealt with. In this section, I want to put forward that what a complex problem like climate change requires is an ideal theory with a non-ideal variant. Susan Murphy describes the circumstances necessitating the need for non-ideal theory in climate change ethics (Murphy, 2013: 72-73).⁵⁶ To decide whether ideal theory or non-ideal theory

⁵⁵ By first generation African philosophers, I do not mean that African philosophy started with these philosophers, I actually meant that their philosophical ideas belong to the period when African philosophy first started gaining recognition. These philosophers include Ifeanyi Menkiti, Kwame Gyekye, Kwasi Wiredu.

⁵⁶ According to Susan Murphy, he says the circumstances are described as non-ideal in the sense that all parties will not and do not take responsibility for their actions and fulfil their duties (privatising their gains and socialising the externalities); there is a distinct lack of formal coercive institutions in place to enforce principles of justice at the international scale; the circumstances of climate change are marked by practical and scientific

will best provide the spur for climate action remains unsettled. Scholars like Henry Shue defer making judgements on which is preferred between ideal theory and non-ideal theory when addressing climate justice (Shue, 2014: 90-92). However, what is clear is that the dissatisfaction with ideal theorizing on a complex and ubiquitous phenomenon like climate change has made some scholars to seek better ways to address climate change, so that it can be of greater relevance, both in practical and political terms (Zellentin, 2015c; Dominic Roser and Christian Seidel, 2017; Caney, 2016; Clare Heyward and Dominic Roser, 2016; Eric Brandstedt, 2019).

For instance, Eric Brandstedt addresses three important approaches evident in non-ideal theorization on climate ethics and politics (Eric Brandstedt, 2019). First, he explains the approach resulting from ‘non-compliance’ with climate agreements. Here, some climate ethicists react to the injustice that arises when some agents fail to comply with climate agreement. This approach's vexing issue is that questions about how to deal with non-compliers cannot be swept aside as merely insignificant matters. Proponents of this perspective contend that dealing with non-compliance is of moral significance and in need of a different, non-ideal theory of climate justice (Caney, 2005: 767-772; 2016; Sabine Hohl and Dominic Roser, 2011). Second, Brandstedt explains that the spill over from dealing with issues of ‘non-compliance’ has displeased some others to "challenge the standard *modus operandi* of climate ethics” and call for a realignment to climate policy (Eric Brandstedt, 2019: 9). In this context, scholars suggest that climate justice must start with an accurate description of people, politics, and policies before evaluating and making normative proposals (Alexandere Gajevic, 2016; Roser, 2016; Martin Kowarsch and Ottmar Edenhofer's, 2016; Darrel Moellendorf, 2016). According to him, the third non-ideal approach to climate justice generally reacts to moral issues that emanate from proposals suggesting a transition to a clean-energy economy because transition to a clean-energy economy raises questions of justice (Shue, 2014; Eric Brandstedt, 2019). The imagination here is that if dealing with climate change clashes with entrenched interests in the fossil fuel economy, there may be no practicable alternative but to aim for a technological solution to make renewables, like wind and solar, competitive.

uncertainty regarding the temporal and spatial effects of climate change and the causal connections between particular emissions and particular events (See. Murphy, 2019, p. 72

The support for non-ideal theory in climate ethics, as Laura Valentini suggests, “stem from frustration with ideal theory’s insufficient action-guidance in the ‘here and now’ and with its “perceived inability to have an impact in the political sphere” (Valentini 2012: 655). Besides, given the disconnection between ideal theory and the reality on the ground, I think there is also the obvious problem of narrow-mindedness and parochialism in ideal theorizing. The problem with ideal theorizing is that it tacitly neglects the need for plurality of ideal theories, each with its distinct non-ideal auxiliaries, connected to the understanding of persons. For me, the plurality of ideal theories is central to determining how a complex issue like climate justice can be furthered. In other words, ideal theorizing in climate ethics, most times does not consider circumstances (historical, cultural, economic) of people before determining climate burdens and responsibilities that apply. Nejma Tamoudi and Michael Reder echoes a similar sentiment when they suggest that “unsurprisingly, climate justice often implies a concept of moral universality that not only promotes context neutrality, but also misses the integration of reflections on temporality as an inherent part of future-oriented ethics” (Nejma Tamoudi and Michael Reder, 2019: 59).

The degree to which the climate change problem intersects or seeps into other issues such as humanitarian, trade issues, human rights and forced migration makes it impossible to isolate the solution to one specific normative remedy with any degree of certainty. This is because the solution to a complicated problem like climate change requires much more than prescribing justice principles. There is the need to focus on the different understandings and experiences of the people affected by climate change.

On the above premise, an ideal theory of climate justice, in its broadest sense, should ask how to respond to climate change in a world rife with cultural diversity. Thus, a focus on ideal theorizing requires bringing on board certain cultural facts that are much more specific than general appeals to partial compliance and unfavourable circumstance as the precursor to climate justice. This requirement is in tandem with Amartyr Sen’s demand for any plausible theory of justice (Sen, 2006; 2009). Amartyr Sen explains that theories of justice must allow for a comparative approach rather than a transcendental approach, where the context of specific societies are put into consideration before the advancement of justice (Sen 2006: 216-218). Sen, in his book, *The Idea of Justice*, argues explicitly that "judgements about justice have to take on board the task of accommodating different kinds of reasons and evaluative concerns." Thus, he posits that the outcome should not aim towards ideal ends of full and complete justice but rather, a more modest end that is more just (Sen 2009: 395).

This suggests that seeking an objective and universal notion of justice is less feasible in our world. My approach leans on ideal theorizing, nevertheless, it allows for the plurality of ideal theories, each with its distinct non-ideal auxiliaries on a complex global issue like climate change. I premise my approach on the undoubted possibility of cultural value pluralism. In my view, this approach offers a promising pathway to a just climate agreement.

This approach is already invoked in works on climate justice. For instance, Richard Van de Wurff (2009) compares cultural factors in Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States which have played an important role in climate change negotiations from the start to their climate change policies. Wurff's approach suggests that the interests of different countries on climate change matter are diverse and different possibly due to cultural factors. Van de Wurff posits that Germany's focus on uncertainty avoidance has made them prefer a ruled-based, structural approach to creating a climate change policy. On the other hand, the United Kingdom, as an individualistic country, underlines individual freedom. From this approach, their policy position is to meet international commitments. The USA, also an individualistic country and thus focuses on the welfare of the present population. However, they do not perceive climate change as a significant threat. For this reason, they tend to set soft targets and have a voluntary approach to climate change policy (Van de Wurff, 2009: 457 - 471). I have made reference to Van de Wurff's (2009) approach to underscore that climate ethics must recognize the cultural dimension of climate change experience. A universal approach to climate justice should focus on establishing principal norms that enable the search for, and realisation of, different solutions in different contexts (Thorp, 127). Is there any problem if climate change fails to take the cultural dimension of climate ethics seriously? I will respond to this question in the next section.

5.3: On the Cultural Dimension of Climate Change

Climate change has tremendous cultural implications and can be considered as largely a cultural phenomenon. However, to ask what are the implications of abandoning the cultural dimension of climate change is an important question for mediating global climate justice? From the outset, there is a considerable justice component to searching out the unique roles culture plays in climate justice discourse. This is because global climate change cannot simply or unambiguously be 'seen' by the unaided eye of culture. Hulme, an environmental scientist, posits that "to claim that the only cultural practice that can make this invisible phenomenon (climate change) visible is science, is to lend too much authority to this one

form of cultural knowledge" (Hulme, 2015: 3). Since the practice of science takes place in a specific cultural milieu with its own set of values, assumptions and power dynamics, the meaning of climate change and prescriptions of principles of justice cannot be limited to a specific culture. Against this light, anthropologist, Rudiak-Gould argues for what he calls 'constructed visibility', in which many different forms of cultural work like visual art, memory, myth, performance, fiction, songs etc., are needed to make climate change real or believable. (Rudiak-Gould, 2013: 129). He suggests that turning to diverse forms of cultural life and practice to resolve the politically charged argument he identifies between climate change 'visibility' and 'invisibility' (Rudiak-Gould, 2013: 120-136).

Human beings live climatically as much as they live culturally. Thus, a socio-cultural approach to understanding the problem of climate change is spot on. Adger *et al.* argue for the consideration of the cultural dimension of climate change adaptation. They submit that:

Culture is no less central to understanding and implementing [climate] adaptation: the identification of risks, decisions about responses, and means of implementation are all mediated by culture. Cultures are dynamic and reflexive and so are in turn shaped by the idea of climate change. Hence culture, and its analysis, is central to understanding the causes and meaning of, and human responses to climate change (Adger *et al.*, 2013: 1).

Most developing countries are comprised of indigenous people, and these people live under subsistence conditions. Often, they are the most vulnerable to the effect of climate change. Besides, they also have a large portion of their needs met in some culturally derivable ways to which they have been accustomed. Fishing, farming, hunting, cattle rearing, among others, are ways of life that contribute to the mainstay of their economic sustainability. This way of life is critical to their survival. Thus, it is more likely that the effects of displacing these ways of life in the event of climate change will be much more catastrophic for these indigenous people, whose contribution to the problem is insignificant. Much more problematic is the neglect of these cultural groups in climate negotiations even when what they have lost or stand to lose to climate change is more significant compared to that of the economically advanced nations. From the point of view of justice, it is important to acknowledge, prepare for, and (in some ways) compensate vulnerable people in developing countries for these kinds of losses to cherished ways of life. Therefore, a cultural perspective is important because it stresses the need to recognize and accommodate these *invisible* but important aspects of climate impacts on cultural 'goods.'

Another important pointer to the importance of a cultural dimension of climate ethics concerns procedural processes involved in negotiating climate responsibilities. Although the experience of climate change has been seen in global proportions, “the manifestation of this phenomenon will be characteristically local, inflected by local environmental features and local, social, economic, political and cultural patterns” (Oliver-Smith and X. Shen, 2009: 10). Hence, enforcing justice demands that every stakeholder is represented at the negotiation table. However, there is much to worry about when certain aggrieved people are neglected from this process. For example, representatives from indigenous groups whose cherished cultural heritage values are affected are usually absent at the discussion table. Even when the impacts of climate change on cultural heritage is mentioned by the experts during negotiations, such impacts are oversimplified. They are most times not perceived and presented as threatening the survival and sustainability of those affected. To see cultural values as only intangible properties, is one of the naive perceptions of the problem. Cultural value ought to be seen in broader terms. It must include behaviours and virtues that enable people to live, make sense of their lives and promote environmental sustainability.

Consequently, a cultural understanding is not just an add-on to climate ethics research. The cultural perspective can explain the patterns that lie beneath social responses to climate change and its challenges. Seen in this light, it should be clear that climate change discourse will benefit from a critical approach that understands the issue of climate change as deeply cultural in nature. The inclusion of socio-cultural considerations will not only increase the effectiveness and efficiency of climate change policy in the era of environmental instability, it will also provide a nuanced understanding of climate change. While consideration of social dimensions of climate change is growing, much work is needed to be done to incorporate socio-cultural dynamics effectively and as well include potentially marginalized social groups in climate negotiations.

From the above, what I have simply suggested is that there is indeed the need for climate ethics to adjust its parameters to include an approach that is sensitive to people's cultural values. In doing this, climate justice future climate negotiations will maintain a dispassionate and inclusive disposition, thereby allowing for the possibility of a global agreement that is closer to what is needed to address climate change. In the next section, I will address how the different conceptions of justice that have been evolving in mainstream climate justice discourse have posed a threat to the realisation of this objective.

5.4: Conceptualizations of Justice in Global Politics

I discussed in chapter four, some of the canonical climate justice theories but did not consider how their intuition on justice were developed. Such consideration is necessary to understand the idea of justice that influenced these climate justice theories. My aim in this section is to map out and discuss the conceptions of justice in political philosophy that have influenced climate justice proposals, put forward by mainstream climate ethicists. Influenced by the works of Erik O. Eriksen (2016), Franziskus von Lucke (2017) and Alexa Zellentin's (2017) in their GLOBUS⁵⁷ *Research Papers*, I evaluate how three conceptions of justice in political theory manifest in climate justice discussions. These three conceptions include justice as non-domination, justice as impartiality and justice as mutual recognition. Like these authors, I do not stop at just delineating these conceptions of justice and their relation to climate ethics. I move further to point out their insufficiencies in providing a plausible global climate justice treaty. I offer a critique of these notions of justice from the standpoint of their neglect of the cultural dimension of personhood. I start with the perception of justice as non-domination.

5.4.1: Justice as non-domination

Domination in this context consists of institutional conditions which inhibit or prevent people from participating in determining their actions or the conditions of their actions. Persons live within structures of domination if other persons or groups can determine without reciprocating the conditions of their action, either directly or by virtue of their actions' structural consequences (Young, 1990: 38). The view of justice as non-domination is strongly connected to the neo-republican theory and its understanding of freedom. Freedom in this sense is not only a property of persons; it is a status that one enjoys to the extent that it becomes more or less proof against dominating control by others in basic domains of choice (Pettit 2010: 140-142). At the core of this conception stands the idea that states remain the key actors in the international realm and are central in causing and working against global injustices, despite the rising importance of non-governmental organizations, international institutions, and international law (Eriksen 2016: 11). However, there is an asymmetry among states that belies the intuition of equality. This asymmetry results from states' differential positions in economic, military, political, and even technological power. There is, therefore,

⁵⁷ GLOBUS - Reconsidering European Contributions to Global Justice is a group that is dedicated to the critical evaluation of the European Union's contributions to Global Justice through the combination of normative and empirical research. They pay specific attention to the fields of migration, trade and development, cooperation and conflict and climate change.

the need to find ways to assuage the influence of more powerful states from dominating the outcome of negotiations. Justice in this context therefore becomes a machinery to moderate the subjugation of lesser nations, states or groups by their powerful counterparts.

This notion of justice becomes relevant in climate justice when dealing with who should be held responsible for harmful emission and how the abatement costs should be distributed between individuals and the state (Von Lucke, 2017: 19). This question has been settled in favour of states as bearers of climate responsibilities (Shue, 2010: 101-111). Thus, the two key justice dilemmas – distributional and intergenerational justice - have been mainly discussed in relation to different states' responsibilities and contributions (Shue, 2010; Paul Baer, 2010). Achieving climate justice requires states or their representatives to come together and negotiate climate treaties that will be binding on all parties. For instance, previous meetings of UNFCCC, Kyoto and the Paris Agreement portends to be an agreement of state actors rather than individuals.

An ethical analysis of the climate regime reveals an abiding strong interconnection between economic circumstances, geopolitical power and the justice claims that nations can assert in negotiations (Okereke and Coventry, 2016: 847). Since the powerful and polluting nations have been from Global North while their counterparts in the Global South have been the most adversely affected by climate change, how does justice as non-domination deal with this asymmetry in contributing to the problem and the capacity to provide solution to climate change? In general, the conception of non-domination does not fundamentally challenge the existing system of states but aims to improve it, to ensure a fair system of global governance and prevent less powerful states from being harmed by the action or inaction of the powerful ones (Eriksen 2016: 11–12). On a practical level, this endeavour could take different forms. On the one hand, it could mean to build coalitions between less powerful states as in the case of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) or between those that are particularly affected or even endangered by certain global problems such as in Association of Small islands States (AOSIS).⁵⁸ The aim would be to prevent harm and unfair decisions and to challenge the domination of powerful and polluting states. On the other hand, it could entail supporting international norms such as sovereignty or non-intervention, which aim at protecting less powerful states from outside interference.

⁵⁸ Association of Small islands States (AOSIS) are Small Island or low-lying coastal countries located in tropical and subtropical regions.

In mainstream climate justice theories, it can be said that scholars like Edward Page's principles of emission grandfathering⁵⁹ (Page, 2013:233), Posner *et al.*'s international paretianism (Posner *et al.* 2008: 1570) and other consequentialist principles that give priority to economic efficiency and ignore past emissions favour the powerful state actors. However, Peter Singer's focus on per capita emissions, emissions trading (Singer, 2010; 194-198), Moellendorf's right to sustainable development (Moellendorf, 2011) and antipoverty principle (Moellendorf, 2014) were envisaged to redress the power imbalance or power relation that will swing the pendulum of climate justice in favour of powerful state actors. Yet, uneven distribution of climate duties between developed and developing countries still persists. Okereke and Coventry posit that the developed countries appear to be "ducking their commitments while co-opting developing countries into binding emissions reduction and reporting commitment" (Okereke and Coventry, 2016: 835). This is evident in the actual commitment made to achieve climate justice.

The approach of justice as non-domination applied to climate justice seems promising in that it provides "concrete political strategies to overcome situations of unfair dominance" by allowing state actors to envision alternative pathways to redeem our failing climate (Von Lucke, 2017:19). Besides, it contributes to understanding intergenerational justice by suggesting that failing to take steps to mitigate climate change in the present could be seen as unfair domination by those who have the capacity and capabilities over the presently vulnerable and poor states on the one hand, and future generation on the other.

Yet, this approach is not without flaws. Although it might be difficult to see at first, a closer scrutiny shows that such view of justice tacitly supports injustice. How is this the case? The approach of justice as non-domination, to some extent, accepts the status quo and hence reproduces unfair dominance structures (Von Lucke, 2017: 20). If such view of justice does not challenge the historical power imbalances among participating states, it will be difficult to claim non-domination of powerful states whose present state of prosperity has been achieved by dominant regimes of the past.

This leaves the powerful industrialized states to be at a vantage point even before the negotiation. The objective of justice as non-domination to address inequity and injustice,

⁵⁹ The requirement that emissions should be reduced equally relative to the status quo is known in the expert discussion in climate ethics as "grandfathering." This term is explained by the fact that the distribution of *future* emissions is derived from the distribution of *past* emissions.

therefore, becomes counter-intuitive. It is also the case that justice as non-domination errs in giving equal consideration to every state's interest, particularly those without representative voices. The most dramatic example of the failure to consider all states' interests equally, no matter their size and influence, is the situation of the Small Island States (SIDs). Despite overwhelming scientific evidence that the SIDs will cease to exist as sovereign states due to sea-level rise in the not-so-distant future if the experience of global warming worsens (IPCC 2015: 67; Zellentin 2015a), the existing climate treaties or national pledges so far have not even come close to implementing measures that would prevent this from happening.

Another problem with the conception of justice as non-domination for climate ethics is that such a view does not consider the injustice that smears out, should the informal ways of life of the people that are affected by climate change are not addressed. Seeking justice must involve understanding the root cause of the problem and, at the same time, making sure that the proposed solutions do not just meet the formal criteria of justice (as non-domination). It must also address the dominant behaviours and ways of life that have largely caused and contributed to climate change. In addition, the call for climate justice as non-domination must consider the interests of human beings everywhere irrespective of their race, gender, class and position. Doing this will project justice as a concern with every human being's legitimate welfare, rather than building negotiation blocks for the expression of power, such as we have at the moment in climate negotiations. The next perception of justice – as impartiality, tries to redeem the view of justice as non-domination.

5.4.2: Justice as Impartiality

Conceptualizing justice in terms of impartiality goes back to Kant, the natural law theorists (Von Lucke, 2017: 27; Eriksen 2016: 13–18). This perspective was further developed by proponents of a universal understanding of justice and rights such as John Rawls (Rawls 1973). This view of justice necessarily starts from some form of a pre-existing theory of justice. From this perspective, justice is understood as a 'context transcending principle' (Eriksen 2016: 14) and emphasizes the need for neutral, universalist principles and institutions based on certain prerequisites such as 'veil of ignorance' and 'original position' as explained by Rawls (see Rawls, 2003). While justice as non-domination sets out to redress the imbalance of power among states, the notion of justice as impartiality entails actively transforming this system, strengthening law-based orders to deter dominance and power inequalities, and eventually build a cosmopolitan community of individuals. To do this, there

might be the need for an impartial third party to neutralize every form of oppressive tendencies. For instance, the United Nations (UN) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) are institutions that are set up to ensure justice for all (Von Lucke, 2017: 24).

Imported into climate justice theorizations, the principle of justice as impartiality envisages the need to account for the interest of all concerned stakeholders by administering some 'impartial' position concerning the nature of climate change and the necessary political and technical steps to prevent or alleviate it. An impartial view of justice does not just aim at tackling climate change. It ensures that it balances the need to respond, with the implications and consequences of each response on present and future generation on one hand and human and non-humans on the other hand. In short, the basic idea is that one ought to treat similar cases alike and different cases differently. Due to its strong links to moral philosophy and ethics, most practical principles that the climate justice literature has come up with largely concur with the criterion of justice as impartiality (Zellentin 2017: 10).

The notion of justice as impartiality is important for its vast considerations when it comes to redressing climate impacts. Thus, the conception of justice as impartiality is a useful addition to non-domination, and when combined, it can address some of the shortcomings and blind spots of the perception of justice as non-domination. Nonetheless, the problem with the view of justice as impartiality is that it relies on certain objective facts in the dispensation of justice. For instance, its reliance on scientific facts as the basis for impartial justice is untenable. By accepting some scientific consensus as to the basis for determining impartiality, climate change has ludicrously been seen to be more of an environmental problem than an ethical problem. The impact of climate change varies from place to place based on adaptive capacity and responsive capabilities. From an impartial perspective, finding a solution to the climate problem cannot only be guided by questions of political feasibility or economic efficiency but must expand the boundaries of universal normative concerns to include loss of cultural values, preventing harms to present or future generations (Sachs 2014: 214).

The other, perhaps important challenge with this principle of justice lies at the heart of its practical implementation. In trying to adapt all interests from stakeholders, the notion of climate justice as impartiality has markedly fallen short of concrete actions that will mitigate the impacts of climate change for all and sundry. This is evident in our present world. In fact, the political interventions developed so far, concerning their strength and specific

instruments, do not entirely fulfil the impartiality criterion. Evident in this notion of justice is that translating the proposal agreed from such understanding of justice at the international level into a multitude of domestic contexts bears some problems and creates new injustices (Von Lucke, 2017: 27). For instance, a look at the existing climate negotiations exemplifies some of these concerns. For instance, in the meeting of the UNFCCC in 1992,⁶⁰ the concepts suggested have no clear boundary in their meaning and application. The emphasis on 'preventing dangerous interference in climate system' in the UNFCCC 1992 meeting has left much room for individual interpretations of how to reach the overall goal (Von Lucke, 2017: 27). Thus, while the agreement is less dominating and very inclusive, it is also less effective because actions to prevent dangerous interference are not straightforward. In the Kyoto Protocol, the focus was on the international level, top-down approaches.⁶¹ In this connection, the Protocol does not only contain quite specific targets and measures to combat climate change, but it also suggests compensation plans for the different abilities of the participants. This provision increases the degree of impartiality by prescribing a specific solution. The undoing of such prescriptions in the Kyoto Protocol is that it interferes with individuals and states' freedom and, therefore, creates contestation.

For the conception of justice as impartiality to be workable in practice, it would require considering the political and economic realities of less wealthy states and their populations. It must also suggest ways of supporting them to reach ambitious climate targets or fully compensate them for their losses. In practice, this would require setting up a UN Climate Organization with the power to enforce decisive emission reductions by the biggest polluters. For instance, there might be the need to impose economic sanctions or issue substantial fines – and with considerable funds to provide financial and technological support for less wealthy countries. However, for this to become workable, international laws need to be amended.

The above-stated problems could therefore imply that a truly impartial solution (at least in practice) seems impossible to envision. This is because political struggles and diverging

⁶⁰ United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Adopted in 1992 and entered into force in 1994, the UNFCCC establishes the foundational principles of international climate policy and forms the basis for subsequent agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol.

⁶¹ Kyoto Protocol is a supplement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC); adopted in 1997 and entered into force in 2005. With this binding agreement, virtually all industrial countries (with the notable exception of the United States) committed themselves to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions (although Canada withdrew from the Protocol in 2012). See p. 225.

interests will always necessitate a form of compromise. However, impartiality in principle, is at odds with such a compromise because it presupposes the existence of an ideally typical solution that is just in its own right, independent from the actual socio-political struggles or the procedures of its development. Moreover, Barrett, Scott and Robert Stavins suggest that creating a powerful, centralized climate organization raises concerns about its democratic accountability as well as the danger of imperialist masked under interventionist ambitions. They suggest that given the experience from other policy fields and the existing climate negotiations, it seems highly unlikely that states would agree to establish such a powerful third party (Barrett and Stavins 2003: 371). Lastly, I think, without an understanding of the person and the humane needs of those who are impacted by climate change in different places, advancing the view of justice as impartiality is a non-starter.

5.4.3: Justice as Mutual Recognition

The conception of justice as mutual recognition aims to overcome problems associated with conceiving justice as impartiality and non-domination. This view of justice proffers universal norms of justice but cautions that such move can become problematic when transferred to different contexts. Without the consideration of these diverse contexts, the dispensation of justice will be fraught with sentiments. Proponents of justice as mutual recognition acknowledge the 'superiorization'⁶² of the West's moral ideals (Young, 1990; Forst, 2010, 2011; Fraser, 2005; Freter, 2020). The critical claim they make is that it is necessary to engage with others actively and their reasoning to ensure that their concerns are responded to. Hence, they submit that normative claims are validated through an appropriate discursive process (Zellentin, 2017:15). The intuition from this perspective is that justice is not a universal or neutral value that applies to all and in every context in the same manner but an inter-subjective category (Eriksen 2016: 20). In practice, this means that what is just should not be decided prior to the political struggles but directly in the processes of negotiation or deliberation among all affected parties (Eriksen 2016: 19; Young 1990: 234).

⁶² The idea of 'superiorization' has been deployed by Bjorn Freter (2020) in a way that qualifies him as a proponent of mutual recognition. In explaining what he means by superiorization of the West, he says "it seems Western thought is infused with a *permanent tacit assumption of superiority* of almost metaphysical proportions, a diffuse conviction of being the one and only thought that truly counts. It is from this assumption of superiority, entirely in accordance with Western textbook dialectics, that the idea of 'inferiorization' directly and necessarily emanates. When one identity is considered superior, others must be considered inferior. See Freter, Bjorn, 2020. p. 119

Justice as mutual recognition moves from an objective observer perspective to an agent-centric perspective and identifies the relevant equal standing as that of parties that acknowledge each other's equal right to jointly define the normatively significant features of the situation at stake (Zellentin, 2017: 5). The focus of this perception of justice is on creating rules of procedure for justice that, in the end, increase the legitimacy of the resulting decisions. This means that the decision-making procedures must be shaped in such a manner that consider the multitude of different identities (be it individuals, groups or states) and ensure that all voices are heard and recognized by each other. The aim would be to develop participatory processes, forums, and institutions where justice claims can be discussed, with an eye on the specific contexts in which they will be applied, to create a sense of ownership among all involved parties. To include all relevant stakeholders in the deliberation of justice is cogent and it makes it more legitimate and enduring for the people who will eventually have to live with it. In this context, justice should not be understood as a universal value, detached from the deliberations around it, but rather as an intersubjective category, foisted by the positions of the actors involved in the negotiations.

Applied to climate justice, this understanding of justice makes it possible for legitimate actors and stakeholders to be involved in the process of deciding what a just climate agreement should be. Stakeholders include state parties, corporations and all those affected by climate change in local indigenous and poor communities. The view of climate justice as mutual recognition seeks to find better ways to integrate all affected groups' interests, which would improve the legitimacy of the agreement reached and likewise the prospects for implementation of the adopted measures.

Beyond the potentials for inclusivity that it serves, justice as mutual recognition can also illuminate climate justice dilemmas in a different light. One such is the conflict of interest between distributional justice in the present. That is, it provides guidance when deciding between the freedom to expand the economy to overcome poverty in the present and the willingness to cater for future generations which will require adopting emissions reduction commitments that could curtail economic growth. From the perspective of justice as mutual recognition, we cannot ignore any of these considerations because they both concern the legitimate interests of present and future actors. For instance, the conception of common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR) and the pledge to 'prevent dangerous interference with the climate system' enshrined in the climate negotiations since the adoption of the UNFCCC in 1992 (Vanderheiden, 2014; UN, 1992: 2) can be understood as a form of the application of

justice as mutual recognition (but also of non-domination). This principle considers all affected parties' legitimate interests in the present, (i.e., economic prosperity or overcoming poverty) without jeopardizing the interests of future generations. Okereke (2015) however argues that the moral tenor of global climate governance has moved away from the principle of common but differentiated responsibility toward a perverse moral concept that he describes as 'common but shifted responsibility' (Okereke, 2015).

With its insistence on democratic "legitimacy" and the 'omnipresence of rights' (Von Lucke, 2017: 32), the principle of mutual recognition is an important principle for addressing a global issue like climate change. However, there are three important problems that the principle needs to overcome. First, the lacuna in the implementation of this principle is obvious. Translating this principle from abstract to the concrete is its greatest challenge. Responsibility for action might have been disbursed across a much wider range of actors, but it remains unclear how the rights and interests of all those affected by changing climates can be 'respected and protected in this new landscape of voluntariness' (Susan Murphy, 2019: 72). The adopted policies so far clearly do not reflect the interest of all affected parties. For instance, they neglect the interests of the small island states, which will almost certainly disappear due to sea-level rise (Zellentin, 2015a), the failure to consider the viewpoint of non-state actors such as indigenous groups (Tsosie 2007; Schroeder 2010) and the significant loss of cultural heritage are dire. While the small island states have been largely unsuccessful in enforcing their demands due to lack of power, countries filled with indigenous groups face even greater challenges due to the general lack of agency in the current architecture of the climate negotiations whose primary focus is on state representation.

The second and somehow perplexing problem of justice as mutual recognition is that looking at the existing negotiations through the lens of mutual recognition highlights the structural problem, that is, the difficulty in recognizing the interests of future generations. Without the benefit of a foresighted machine to peep into the future, they (future generations) have even fewer opportunities to voice their concerns than non-state actors. Somehow, they have to be included in the negotiations if we are to take the conception of justice as mutual recognition seriously. One would expect that improving the decision-making procedures and making them more inclusive and participatory would facilitate voicing concerns for the future generation. However, while mutual recognition reminds us of this problem, it cannot alone provide a solution and probably can only become effective when combined with impartial goals derived from the candour of climate science and moral philosophy.

The third challenge with this conception of justice is that it makes it difficult to determine the legitimate interest of each group's that must be recognized. Without first agreeing on some ideal solutions, the elastic nature of justice as mutual recognition could be too wide to the detriment and destruction of such principle. That is, there must first be the basis for mutual recognition, without which, it will be difficult to decide if justice should be based on economic interests, technological intervention, finance initiatives in terms of aids, cultural values, or other yardsticks, which are also legitimate concerns of others representatives. Also, it will be difficult to decide the best line of action, whether mitigation or adaptation, because different agents have diverse requirements that could help redress climate shock in their societies.

In the Kyoto Protocol, the principle of mutual recognition is quite lacking. The Protocol favours the impartial principle of justice. The Protocol has been criticized for demanding top-down forms of regulation. This approach has led to considerable opposition during the negotiation process and eventually resulted in the withdrawal of several parties, which seriously diminished the Protocol's actual impact (Gardiner 2004: 591). In a similar vein, the United Nations Climate Change Conference (UNCCC) in 2009 organised a Conference of the Parties (COP)⁶³ held in Copenhagen. The Conference's outcome was one of the biggest failures of the climate negotiations, because several European countries went into the negotiations with quite elaborated and seemingly superior ideas on how a just climate agreement should look like. This Conference was done without an open dialogue with stakeholders from other climes, particularly those from developing countries (Von Lucke, 2017: 33). However, in stark contrast, the 2015 Paris Agreement followed a different path. The negotiations that informed the Paris Agreement were less determined by a specific form of agreement or perfect solution but instead focused more on an inclusive process.⁶⁴ The Paris Agreement, although ambitious in its pattern, nevertheless recognizes "the need for a multitude of different approaches by different actors to eventually reach the goal" of a just climate agreement (Okereke and Coventry 2016: 843).

⁶³ The United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, Denmark. The Copenhagen Conference marked the culmination of a two-year negotiating process to enhance international climate change cooperation under the Bali Roadmap, launched by COP 13 in December 2007. Close to 115 world leaders attended the joint COP and COP/MOP high-level segment from 16-18 December, marking one of the largest gatherings of world leaders outside of New York.

⁶⁴ Agreement The most important agreement in international climate policy since the Kyoto Protocol. Adopted in 2015, it aims (among other things) at a temperature increase well below 2°C and it hopes to achieve this goal because of a bottom-up process of nationally determined contributions.

So far, I have discussed three important conceptions of justice in global politics and how they reverberate in climate justice discourse and policy. Explicating the notions of justice as non-domination, impartiality, and mutual recognition has shown that we must consider different categories of actors and different levels of referent objects if we want to achieve climate justice politically. However, the uneven distribution of political power and the partial solutions that imposes a specific understanding of climate justice are the main hindrances to achieving just climate agreements.

Moreover, looking at climate justice debates through the lens of justice as mutual recognition refocuses the attention towards the procedural character of climate justice and reveals possible pathways to improving the quality of climate policy deliberations. While I appreciate the importance of all the three perceptions of justice for climate ethics, the conundrum that each conception of justice exacerbates when applied to climate justice reminds us of their insufficiency. To see that amid the cacophony of perspectives on justice, emissions are increasing as are negative impacts on vulnerable communities around the world, suggests that none of these three conceptions of justice on their own can provide a convincing understanding of climate justice that will engender a responsive climate action. It might be tempting to conclude that their combination can bring us forward in achieving a plausible climate justice theory that will effectively address climate change. I am not quick to make such a concession, and I will provide justifications for my reason for this stance later in the chapter.

In the next section, I will demonstrate why the principles of justice presented above, even when combined, without a motivation that underscores the importance of Personhood will still be insufficient in addressing climate change. In other words, I suggest that climate justice should integrate the cultural views of Personhood and its dimensions of social justice to climate justice. This approach will provide a nuanced understanding of climate justice and help to overcome a form of what Eric Posner and David Wiebach call "climate change blinders" that allows climate justice to be addressed from a limiting point of view (Posner and Weisbach, 2010: 75).⁶⁵

⁶⁵ Eric Posner and David Wiesbach explain that "climate blinder" is the situation whereby scholars focus on a particular issue in climate justice policy. Posner and Wiesbach say "they (scholars) argue that rather than considering the entire set of policies. They want each individual policy to achieve distributive goals rather than achieve redistribution through the overall set of policies. They argue that "we must not be constrained by considering separate policies with blinders, where each separate policy must independently meet distributive

5.5: Personhood and Climate Ethics: A Crucial Nexus

The normative idea of personhood is central to Africa moral thought (Molefe, 2018: 217) but what has not been sufficiently done in climate ethics discourse is to explicate how this idea of personhood in Africa can illuminate climate ethics and climate justice discourse. The commonality of the aspiration for climate justice by many stakeholders has made it compelling to seek universal principles of justice that will be adopted for a just climate agreement. Yet, to arrive at such universal principle seems utopian rather than fictitious. The different interpretations and understandings of justice, as well as the inability to reach a uniform understanding of the concept could tempt one to conclude that justice is a subjective and relativistic concept, that at best can be given a human face in each context. While I do not submit that justice is a relative concept for the sake of nihilistic tendencies, what I argue for is that the dispensing of justice must be given a human face. This cannot be done without the idea of what it means to be human or a person. In this section, I provide a normative conception of personhood in Africa and discuss the plausibility of this concept in providing a nuanced understanding of climate justice.

The different conceptions of justice that I have discussed in the previous section have one basic problem – a disconnection from the idea of Personhood. This disconnection has implications, both for understanding the nuanced dimensions of justice and its application towards the responsible action required to address climate change. The idea of African personhood has not been considered in climate ethics and climate justice. However, I will show how this idea can be an enabler of climate justice in our global world. That is, this idea can enhance climate justice to live up to the expectations from a diverse world of persons dealing with a complex phenomenon like climate change. I turn to discuss how the idea of personhood can illuminate global climate justice. To do this, I begin with the analysis of personhood in Africa.

5.5.1: Personhood in African Philosophy

In this section, I present an account of Personhood in African philosophy to provide a distinct understanding of its connection with climate ethics. I explicate some important ideals that the conception of Personhood can offer to global climate ethics and climate justice debates. However, it is important to state from the outset that this section does not aim to argue that

goals. Instead, getting good overall policies in place, including a good climate treaty, must be the goal (see Posner and Weisbach, 2010: p. 78).

the idea of Personhood, in and of itself, embodies the most plausible way to think about climate justice. I only offer an interpretation of African Personhood and pursues some of its under-explored philosophical themes that could enhance climate ethics discourse in the bid to provide a plausible theory of climate ethics.

The concept of Personhood has engaged the attention of many scholars in African philosophy (Matolino, 2011: 23). One cannot dismiss or belittle the importance of this subject because it is upon it that the foundation of a thorough African philosophical theory is embedded. That is why Frederick White suggests that “the personhood of a human being is a foundational concept for all that we are and all that we do” (White, 2013: 90). The idea of Personhood has been explored in different ways by first generation African philosophers - from its metaphysical⁶⁶ to ethical (normative) referents (Oyowe, 2018: 738-801). While I appreciate these approaches to Personhood, it is important to put forward that in my reflection on the concept of African *personhood* in this chapter, emphasis is laid on how this concept addresses the quality of life, rights, dignity, respect, and the capacity to undertake responsive actions by human persons in addressing climate change. Hence, I focus on the normative approach to personhood.

To some, it seems that the idea of Personhood has been over flogged over the years, however, the richness of its application derides such conclusion. The idea of Personhood embodies a moral-political approach to thinking about solving problems occasioned by human existence both for the individual and society at large (Molefe, 2019: 150). Pady Musana also suggests this when he avers that “the concept of *Personhood* which plays out well in the different cultures and communities of Africa needs further study as a possible panacea for a world devoid of human value and respect for life in a holistic manner” (Musana, 2018: 32). He further argues that the “different communities and cultures of the world.... need to interrogate their ethos in relation to this life-affirming concept of personhood, most prevalent on the African continent” (Musana, 2018: 32). The importance of the idea of personhood is all-encompassing. Kwame Anthony Appiah thinks along this line when he submits that “a theory of the person is hard to isolate from the general views of a people about the world—social, natural and supernatural—in which they live” (Appiah 2004: 26). On the strength of these

⁶⁶ The metaphysical or ontological notion of personhood is concerned with specifying the descriptive features that constitute human nature. Commenting on this concept of personhood, Ikuenobe (2016: 118). Scholars of African thought refer to the philosophical inquiry that speaks to what defines a person qua human nature in terms of the “ontological” or “descriptive” notion of personhood (Wiredu 1996: 159; Ikuenobe 2016: 144; Oyowe 2014a: 46).

submissions, I think the concept of Personhood is laden with ideas that can help address our socio-cultural challenges even in this contemporary world. I move on to the conception of Personhood in African philosophy.

Back to the normative conception of *Personhood*. As much as I will have loved to engage all the ideas on Personhood in African philosophy, I cannot do that for want of space. However, Motsamai Molefe provides an explicit discourse (both in classical and modern-day) of the subject and brings to light most of the vagaries of Personhood in African philosophy (see Motsamai Molefe, 2019). The classical discourse on the normative conception of personhood pivots around two influential African philosophers - Ifeanyi Menkiti⁶⁷ and Kwame Gyekye (Matolino, 2019: 6).

In his influential paper on 'Person and Community in African Traditional Thought', Menkiti (1984) argues that the community has ontological and epistemological precedence over the individual in Africa. He says a person is “defined by reference to the environing community” and not by qualities such as rationality, will and memory. He holds that Personhood is acquired when one develops and carries out certain responsibilities appropriate to one's situation in the community (Menkiti 1984: 171 -172). In articulating the difference between an African and a Western conception of Personhood, Menkiti notes that most Western views "abstract this or that feature of the lone individual and then proceed to make it the defining or essential characteristic which entities aspiring to the description of "man" must-have. The African view of man denies that persons can be defined by focusing on this or that physical or psychological characteristic of the lone individual" (Menkiti 1984: 171).

Menkiti (1984) distinguishes two ideas of community to explicate his notion of communalism. He says, the notion of communalism “might be illuminated by the idea of a *constituted* community, as distinguished from a *collectivist* community. A collectivist community is a random collection of all individuals who choose voluntarily to be part of the community (Menkiti, 1984: 179-180). Polycarp Ikuenobe suggests that the moral and social dimensions of communalism or *constituted* idea of the community suggested by Menkiti implies that a community's interests and wellbeing have some degree of dependence on, or support for, those of individuals, and vice versa (Ikuenobe, 2016: 447). This dependence

⁶⁷ The influence of Menkiti's thoughts on Personhood seems to be popular such that after his demise, contemporary African philosophers could not resist engaging his idea. A book series on Menkiti's idea of Personhood was published (see Etieyibo and Ikuenobe, 2020).

relationship indicates that communal wellbeing and interests do not supersede or undermine those of individuals or their autonomy. Rather, they are coextensive. The community provides the options of goods from among which one can choose freely. Thus, individuals' wellbeing and free choices depend on communal caring and harmony, and vice versa (Ikuenobe, 2016: 448). On this African view, Personhood is meaningful only in the context of the community that helps one to construct a positive sense of identity, solidarity, harmonious living to use one's autonomy to experience or realize one's dignity and wellbeing. Hence, the communal basis for Personhood, involves using one's capacity, actively and positively, to contribute to communal wellbeing and one's own wellbeing.

According to Gyekye (1997), an appropriate conception of Personhood consists of two crucial elements, namely: the social and individualistic. On the social side, Gyekye considers human beings to be relational beings necessarily caught up in social relationships with others by their very nature. Concerning individualism, he believes human beings by nature have attributes that belong to them as individuals *qua* individual outside of the fact of their relationality (Gyekye 1997: 40). Gyekye (1997: 41) goes on to submit that moderate communitarianism "requires recognizing the claims of both communality and individuality and integrating individual desires and social ideals and demands." He proceeds to note: "I think that the most satisfactory way to recognize the claims of both communality and individuality is to ascribe to them the status of an equal moral standing" (Gyekye, 1997: 41; Molefe, 2019: 155).

The above view (of Menkiti and Gyekye) on personhood has been regarded as a 'strongly normative view' of personhood that is laden with theoretical and practical difficulties that must be addressed if one is to apply such view in the modern political terrain (Oyowe, 2018). From the ideas of Menkiti (1984) and Gyekye (1997), a robust discourse on the notion of Personhood in African philosophy has been advanced (Menkiti, 2004; Ikuenobe, 2006; Matolino, 2009; 2014; Metz, 2011; Molefe, 2017; Masaka, 2018). I will address the connections of these contemporary thoughts on personhood to climate justice in the next section. Before then, let me provide some initial thoughts on the nexus between the African conception of personhood and the role of the environment which is part of the community.

What is the basis for the normative conception of Personhood in African philosophy? The idea of Personhood is a derivative of the notion that African societies are, famously, communalistic as opposed to the West's individualistic and abstractive notion. Here,

Personhood is the sort of thing that is realized in the quality of relationships that one has with fellow community members and the good communal standing that one commands (Matolino, 2011: 24). Hence, for Africans, personhood takes place in a social world, and it is mediated by cultural practices within their environment. The environment is therefore an essential part of a community since it is in relation to the 'environeering community' that one becomes a person in Africa. The individual is brought up, from the beginning, with a sense of belonging and solidarity with an extensive circle of kith and kin in what Menkiti calls a "process of incorporation" with the people and the environment (Menkiti, 1984: 172). The basis of this solidarity is a system of reciprocity in which everyone has obligations to a large set of other individuals. These obligations are matched by the rights owed him or her by the same number of individuals. Living amid the reality of this reciprocity, one soon begins to see him/herself as presupposing the group (Musana, 2018: 26). This is the mainspring of the normative conception of a person in Africa.

From the above, one can see the role of the environment in shaping the person. The environment here includes the people and the physical structures as well as the tangible and intangible cultural traditions that a person engages with. The community and by extension the environment support the formation of the Person in Africa. As such, there is some sort of duties that a moral person owes the enviroining community, and these duties must take precedence over individual rights. This notion of personhood could be charged with anthropocentrism because it seems to privilege the interests of persons over non-humans and therefore 'weak' in advancing any form of environmental ethics (Callicot, 1994, 158). This concern for me is wrongheaded. The reason being that non-humans cannot boast of the sense of morality that human beings seek and desire. Humans have the, the ability for foresight, introspection, and various emotional states that exorciate their sense of morality. Human beings' self-awareness sets them apart from other species in the universe, a self-awareness that communicates interdependence with both the natural and supernatural world, which exalts humanity above all else (Musana, 2018: 25-26). For this reason, I appreciate the attention of some African environmental philosophers to non-human persons (Dennis Masaka, 2019; Kai Horsthemke, 2019). However, of much importance is the human person who can seek and undertake just actions that will address climate change, which is my focus. I will explore some features of African conception of personhood that relates to climate justice in the next section.

5.5.2: Personhood and Climate Justice

In this section, I will discuss the relationship between the African conception of personhood and the discourse of climate ethics. To make this clear, I address the question, what relationship entails between the African concept of personhood and climate ethics in the face of climate change threats to human beings? Also, how should we foreground the responsibility for redressing the climate on human persons? I argue that there are ethical principles that can be gleaned from the African conception of Personhood that will enhance the principle and practice of climate justice. Workineh Kelbessa suggests that it is useful to consider major ethical principles embodied in African traditions that can assist African and non-African nations to address challenges of climate change (Kelbessa, 2015: 59-78). Although Kelbessa's proposal did not directly suggest that personhood has a close connection with climate ethics, I will build on his suggestion to make further inferences from the idea of personhood in African ethics and political philosophy. I will show how this idea of personhood could meaningfully contribute to a just and responsive climate ethics.

The response to Kelbessa's demand for application of African ethical principles to climate ethics was put forward by Aïda C. Terblanché-Greeff when he describes what the individualistic capitalistic West can learn from *Ubuntu* and its ensuing potential for climate change adaptation (Aïda C. Terblanché-Greeff, 2019; 93-109). The idea of personhood has been expressed as *Ubuntu* - a term that, according to Aïda C. Terblanché-Greeff, "extends normatively into the embodiment of human relations and prescribes moral obligation towards other humans, non-humans, and nature" (Aïda C. Terblanché-Greeff, 2019: 97). Thaddeus Metz construes an 'Ubuntu-inspired' theory of personhood that upholds the human right and human dignity and can serve as a ground of public morality (Metz, 2011: 532-559). Largely perceived as originating from the maxim, "A person is a person through other persons," the idea of *Ubuntu* advances that becoming a person cannot happen in isolation but through interaction with others. Communitarianism is a trait of *Ubuntu* since its focus is on social relations and interdependency. Through the interaction with unique others, a person can subjectively grow and attain *Ubuntu*, which means truly become human (Person) (Aïda C. Terblanché-Greeff, 2019: 97-98). From Aïda C. Terblanché-Greeff's work, one will find it difficult to dispute that *Ubuntu* can serve as motivation for behaviour that is imperative for the sustainability of climate change adaptation strategies. However, the normative background of the connection between *ubuntu* and climate justice needs to be more convincing than what he puts forward.

Philosophers after Menkiti and Gyekye divided into two separate camps – radical communitarians and moderate communitarians, although some others do not see any substantive difference between radical and moderate communitarianism insofar as they both ultimately jettison rights (Molefe 2016, 2017a; Ikuenobe 2017; Matolino 2009; Famanikwa 2010). For instance, Matolino presents a very persuasive argument against the alleged differences between radical and modern communitarians, demonstrating that moderate communitarianism 'takes moral worth seriously in describing the status of personhood to individuals' (2009: 169), thus confirming that moderate communitarians concept of the person remains normative (Matolino, 2009: 86-87). In another paper, Mugobe Ramose posits that it is assumed that one cannot discuss the concept of Personhood without first admitting the "human existence" of the human being upon whom Personhood is to be conferred Ramose's (2003: 413). While acknowledging Gyekye's idea of *Personhood*, Ramose argues against a 'derivative' or 'individualistic' concept of personhood' (Ramose 2005: 57) and argues for the idea that personhood is a derivative of communal relations. The striking thing about the discourse on personhood in Africa after Menkiti and Gyekye is that robust ideas on the concept have developed and applied to socio-political and moral problems in the continent.

Contemporary scholars have applied the idea of *Personhood* in nuanced ways (Ikuenobe, 2006, 2016; Oyowe, 2016; Klaasen 2017; Katrin Flikschuh, 2020). For instance, Polycarp Ikuenobe, one of the leading contemporary scholars of African philosophy, adopts the idea of Personhood to provide a plausible conception of dignity (Ikuenobe, 2016). He proposes an interesting approach to the discourse of dignity from the normative understanding of personhood. He argues that "African conception of moral dignity...involves positive recognition based on one's behaviour or character traits that manifest and enhance the communal values of caring, mutuality, harmonious relationships, and solidarity (Ikuenobe, 2016: 438). The values of mutual caring, responsibility and harmonious relationship embedded in African personhood could be explored in addressing the problem of climate change.

More so, the gender dimension of the social justice problem of climate change is still in the infant stage despite calls that gender roles and relations shape the vulnerability and people's capacity to adapt to climate change (IPCC, 2007). There is 'no climate justice without gender justice' was the slogan of the 2007 Bali conference. This slogan was amplified Geraldine Terry when she addressed the gender issues that have hardly figured in climate policy discourse (Geraldine Terry 2009: 5-18). In this regard, we need to question the understanding

of person that has maligned certain gender in the climate justice debate. Some have expressed concerns that climate change has a gender dimension that must be paid attention to. That is, they claim that women and children are at the receiving end of the devastating effects of climate change (Geraldine Terry, 2009). Oyowe and Yurkivska (2014) explore the possibilities of gender-sensitive African communitarian conception of Personhood. Climate justice discourse can address the issues of gender justice following this approach. They (Oyowe and Yurkivska) argue that "looking predominantly at the relational concept of personhood in African philosophy... the idea of personhood cannot be gender-neutral" (Oyowe and Yurkivska, 2014: 96). This approach is particularly important because it evokes pressing concerns where certain gender (women and children) are mostly affected by climate change, but they are not adequately catered for. This ideal will help in addressing the spate of gender injustice in climate ethics.

Another interesting normative approach with regards to the idea of Personhood in Africa is the discourse on development by John Klaasen (2017). The move here is to ground the idea of development on the moral resources prevalent in the African cultural context, specifically, the idea of Personhood. Klaasen argues that the African perspective on Personhood for addressing development challenges entails "personal responsibility for self-development of both the self and others" (Klaasen, 2017: 42). This, in many ways, is a novel and promising project that could enhance climate justice. Recall that climate change presents the challenge of who to be held responsible for the harmful emissions of the past that is causing climate change. A concern for both self and others will encourage those with capacity in the present to take responsibility for addressing climate change especially when their concern is the development of humanity all over.

There are other conceptions of personhood in African philosophy like *Ukama* put forward by Munyaradzi Felix Murove (2004) that could serve as conceptual resources to address climate justice. The running thread in all these conceptions of personhood is that there is a relation of value between the person and the envioning community. Personhood is thus attained when moral priority is given to the welfare of the community (including the environment) ahead of the individual. By so doing, the individual realizes a greater sense of the self.

There is another connection between the African conception of personhood and the duties of justice that a person has towards his envioning community. There is the tension between the liberal view of justice that focuses on the individual and a communal view of justice that

focuses on the idea of common good. How to balance the individual's needs or interests of economic welfare against the common good or communal interests of sustainable atmosphere remains contentious in climate ethics. Global climate justice can benefit from this normative ideal of personhood in Africa.

The idea of justice, which previously was underexplored in African philosophy is now receiving cogent attention (Ramose, 2003; Nkeonye Otakpor, 2009; Jessica Johnson and George Hamandishe, 2018; Bilchitz David *et al.*, 2017). The instinct to examine justice with a critical cultural lens is useful and theoretically promising, considering the ubiquity of cultural injustice that abound, be it in the present political arrangement or social justice considerations connected to environmental challenges such as climate change. In articulating a contextual theory of justice, the idea of personhood, to my mind, cannot be side-lined. Although scholars did not pay sufficient attention to the varied justice component embedded in the idea of personhood at the outset of the discourse on this concept, this is no longer the case. Recently, scholars have come to realize the value in this sort of work. As a result, they have started exploring how the idea of personhood can illuminate the conception and realization of justice (Bilchitz David, Thaddeus Metz and Oritsegbubemi Oyowe, 2017; Molefe, 2018; Okeja 2020).

In recent times, Molefe (2018) invokes the idea of Personhood to give an account of how to deal with the question of historical injustice occasioned by colonialism and apartheid (Molefe, 2018: 352-367). He argues that "central to the idea of Personhood (with regards to rectification justice), is a call for correcting the past, to create a social-world where morality is a possibility, not just for African people, but for all human beings in societies that have had an ugly history of injustices (Molefe, 2018: 364). The idea of personhood he invokes emanates from the nuanced afro-communitarian perspective on personhood. From this perspective, he projects the need for rectification or corrective justice for the African people. Molefe's approach signals a collectivist view of justice, an approach Uchenna Okeja (2020) questions, not because of its implausibility, but due to the idea that scholars, most of the time, advance the view that a collectivist approach to justice necessarily follows from the community-oriented nature of African ethics (Okeja, 2020: 95).

Okeja, to my mind, does not challenge the plausibility of the view that conceptions of justice ought to evolve out of normative Personhood (Okeja, 2015: 105). However, his worry is that mainstream "analysis of justice in African Philosophy wades through a particular approach,

namely, through the prism of normative personhood" (Okeja, 2020: 112). Okeja posits that "it does not seem to [him] that the articulation of the sort of justice consistent with a community-oriented ethics must proceed from the assumption of a particular approach to thinking about justice." He further suggests that "if anything, interpreting African ethics as a community-oriented ethics ought to lead to thinking about justice from a pluralistic point of view" (Okeja, 2020: 106).

A charitable reading of Okeja suggests that the cognitive misdeed of most scholars that have discussed questions of justice in Africa is that they did not state clearly whether the notion of collective justice is the only approach from the idea of community-oriented ethics that can be advanced. I agree with Okeja that "African ethics as community-oriented ethics cannot, therefore, be taken to imply that collective justice should form a dominant approach to conceiving the nature of justice (Okeja, 2020: 112). However, I think a community-oriented ethics does not foreclose the possibility of other approaches of justice other than the collectivist approach. This will still be the case even if not explicitly stated. One can infer from this claim that the idea of collective justice, drawn from the idea of *Personhood* as a communal being, has a pragmatic and prudential advantage that must be prioritized and pursued.

The idea of personhood suggests that it is important to pursue justice from a collective point simply because the gains of justice from this approach benefits the vast majority in the community. Climate justice will benefit from this approach to justice due to the complex nature of the causes and the fact that no one individual or state can efficiently address the problem of climate change. In what follows, I propose a perspective that will demonstrate how the normative understanding of Personhood applies to climate justice and what this means both for the attempt to define the problem and also, to conceive a practical solution. Specifically, I develop three principles of justice informed by the conception of Personhood in Africa. These notions of justice, I argue, will enhance climate justice in a manner that empathetically prioritize considerations of climate impacts on diverse human beings, and at the same time, motivate responsive action in the face of the imploding climate doom that human beings are locked in.

5.5.3: Personhood and Climate Justice - Mutual Recognition

The idea of Personhood entails human relations and interconnectedness that takes the *Other* seriously and ensure that their concerns are responded to, through an appropriate discursive

process. Regarding climate justice, the idea of Personhood demands mutual recognition of all stakeholders, even when some of the worries, for example, about the impacts of a changing environment, cannot be easily translated into the formal or traditional human rights language such as the cultural heritage rights that I have identified in Chapter three.

African philosophers have advanced the socio-moral views of personhood as engendering dignity and rights in relation to others in a community (Ikuenobe, 2018). This is opposed to the dominant Western, abstract view that removes the individual's autonomy or rights from the community. Ikueonobe, posits that "a person is not an isolated abstract individual, and his or her rights are not abstract or isolated from others; instead, a person is an embedded individual in a community, whose rights, dignity, and wellbeing are related to others and the community (Ikuenobe, 2018: 598).

However, in the present struggle for climate justice, there are good reasons to assume that there are considerable blind-spots in the current debates on climate justice, especially the preference for human (individual) rights, as the basis for enforcing principles of climate justice (Caney, 2010). The focus on individual rights, individual agency, and responsibility tends to be less central to non-Western moral and political philosophies. The debate on climate justice is predominantly shaped by the traditions of Western philosophy, and this might not be best suited to consider and convince the poor and vulnerable, whose cultural heritage is destroyed as a result of the impact of climate change. In short, the underlying principle of personhood in Western political tradition is focused on the narrow conception of human rights instead of the concern for humanity. Given the shortcoming of this approach, I propose that the conception of personhood in Africa and its recognition of cultural rights should be a strong basis for expanding the parameters of human rights that are infringed due to the effects of climate change. If this is accepted, mitigation and adaptation plans must be determined on the basis of a mutual agreement of joint stakeholders, each representing an experience on the way climate change has affected and denied them the possibility of a rich humane life.

Besides, the idea of personhood in African Philosophy is important for dealing with the problem of uncertainty that climate sceptics have shoved into the discourse. The view of Personhood as one with dignity and responsibility demands that one considers himself a being interdependent with others in society. The fact that some others are not feeling the devastating effects of climate change (based on scientific claims) should not make them think those who

rely on valued natural and cultural resources that are affected by climate change have insignificant worries. To think about climate justice in an amenable way, I think it is important to acknowledge the commonalities that thread one person to another on the simple basis of humanity. This requires mutually recognizing every member of a biotic community and refusing to reduce a person to anything less than the sacredness and dignity of Personhood. Once we accept this as true, climate justice will be conceived as a collective act that requires seeing one another as the co-habitant of a common world irrespective of scientific evidence that supports or opposes climate change. This understanding will require setting aside the hierarchizing markers of *otherness*, be it through race, gender, ethnicity, nationality, or any other parameter used to separate people and deny them moral consideration for justice throughout history.

5.5.4: Personhood and Climate Justice - Inclusive Deliberations and Relational Entitlements

The notion of 'equal humanity' is implied in the position of justice as mutual recognition, but the idea of equal humanity will be a vain hope if the dimensions of participation are not agreed upon. While justice as mutual recognition focuses on the structural subordination that removes obstacles to participation, there is the need to equalize abilities to be heard considering the different meanings and understandings that we share. This view of personhood that provides inclusive deliberations relational and entitlements is an extension of justice as mutual recognition. The normative idea of personhood in Africa has practical implications for the consideration of justice as mutual recognition. There are elements of the normative idea of personhood that makes it relational to others, that is, to show respect for others and follow socio-moral rules of proper behaviour. It is not enough to recognize the *Other* and consider them legitimate stakeholders. How the deliberation is conducted and what they (the *Other*) do or choose during deliberations is also important.

In climate justice, the deliberation process seems democratic to a large extent. However, there is no acceptance (different from admittance) of the 'other' who cannot speak the language of experts comprising representatives of developing countries. This suggests that the inclusive process necessary for a just climate deliberation is lacking. Some climate ethicists have criticized the current climate justice scheme as championing substantive distributive justice over procedural and relational justice (Zellentin, 2017: 19). The dispensation of procedural justice requires a sense of what Hugh Breakey calls "moral dialogue" (Breakey, 2015).

Breakey argues that in a collective action like climate change, this form of moral dialogue needs to be distinguished from 'good faith negotiation' on solutions to collective problems. In his words:

A purely self-interested agent, faced with a collective-action problem, will have reason to engage strategically with other agents in order to come to a collective solution. In so doing, the agent will doubtless have to compromise in various ways in order to secure the necessary compromises from others, and so to solve the collective problem. She may well engage in negotiations in 'good faith'—meaning that she genuinely wants to achieve a collective solution, and fully intends to live up to her agreed commitments in order to secure that objective. But the process she enters into does not constitute moral dialogue as I am using that phrase. The self-interested agent is not interested in securing a just outcome to the problem—she is interested only in shouldering the minimum burdens necessary to ensure the agreement and compliance of other agents in the group (and only in solving the problem to the extent that doing so furthers her narrow self-interest). The solution she successfully negotiates may have little to do with what objective norms of justice would require (Breakey, 2015: 159-160).

He further argues that self-interested negotiation can, at best, result in compromise but not in synthesis. Citing Martin Benjamin (1990: 5–7), Breakey explains the vital distinction between compromise and synthesis in moral dialogue. He says compromise does not involve a change in one's view on the best way forward but instead requires acquiescing to a practical concession between what one wants and what others demand. Despite holding firm to one's view, for example, one might compromise to achieve a workable agreement. Synthesis, on the other hand, involves changing one's own standpoint. This might occur in moral dialogue, for example, when one has been persuaded of the attractions of another's position. Good faith negotiation will usually require compromise, but not the genuine revisiting of one's larger objectives and moral principles that facilitate synthesis (Breakey, 2015, p. 160).

There are relational views of justice that hold that duties of justice within a particular practice must be grounded and shaped by the underlying principle of equality and fairness. To decide what these duties might look like, and how they might play out on the global stage is not going to be smooth. In trying to deal with this demand, Christine Hobden argues that the view of relational justice must be complemented with the idea of equal standing of states, motivated by strong procedural equality within practices to ensure states can interact as equals and, as it were, act on their plan of life (Hobden, 2018: 386). This view is vital because it does

demands participatory justice alongside distributive justice. It is necessary to do this because those who hold power to perpetuate or prevent global injustice have marginalized voices of the actual victims of climate change.

Climate justice deliberations, to my mind, most times, resort to employing the agnostic form of deliberation - a process Uchenna Okeja describes as the "invocation of evidence, rational proofs and interrogation" to decide on binding emission limits (Okeja, 2019: 19). Okeja however, argues that this approach, "without inclusiveness.... becomes emptied of its capacity to deliver justice" (Okeja, 2019: 20). He posits that the constructions of otherness which preclude recognition of the humanity of a people or an individual, who should be part of the deliberative process, present a fundamental challenge to the deliberative justice model for two reasons. The first is that absence of cognitive equality nullifies the motive for deliberation. It transforms the process "into a monologue of the powerful, making it essentially a performance that makes the powerless victims." The second reason is that "the pursuit of justice through deliberation invalidates itself if it tolerates any form of otherness that negates the humanity of any party to the deliberation" (Okeja, 2019: 17-18). Okeja avers that "justice in the deliberative model is ultimately contingent upon the endorsement of the basic principle of humanity" (Okeja, 2019: 18). This view that is consistent with the communal basis of personhood in African thought.

5.5.5: Personhood and Climate Justice – Towards a Responsive Collective Action

Taking a just action, broadly construed, rightly seems to be the decisive final step required to actualize climate justice. What then is the point of seeing climate change as posing moral questions if we are not motivated to act? The definition of the concept *action* is often taken for granted to be explicit and self-explanatory. Yet, to understand what *action* is and what it does, more reflection is needed, especially in this contemporary age where many factors have complicated the sense of one's judgment about what is right or wrong at the individual and state level. The excuses (but seemingly cogent reasons from developed nations) for the 'lethargic responses' to climate change, according to Dennis O'Hara and Alan Abelson include economic harm, lack of scientific certainty, lack of global consensus and the wait for better technologies (O'Hara and Abelson, 2011: 15-27). Of course, they (O'Hara and Abelson) discredit all these seemingly rational positions to justify reticence to honour moral and legal requirements that promotes a corrective action to climate change (O'Hara and Abelson, 2011: 15-27).

I think, the main barrier to compelling climate action is the demand for collective action where everyone agrees and commits themselves to a line of responsibility, whether emission reduction, climate finance, technology transfer, in redressing climate change. We have noticed that instead of full-compliance, partial compliance, or irresponsibility (at least in the USA's case in the 2015 Paris Agreement) has been the norm. Hence, the inability of the international regime to impose or encourage the application of one or a limited set of justice principles remains a perennial constraint when translating justice concerns into practical action. Collective action is pivotal to the realization of the objective of reducing harmful emissions to the minimum. Henry Shue, echoing the need for collective action submits that “the futility of uncoordinated national efforts at protection against effects of climate change is certain and the only conceivable protection of any rights threatened by climate change is protection through concerted action by the international community as a whole” (Shue, 2010: 199). If Dale Jamieson’s (2010: 277) suggestion that ‘morality is fundamentally directed toward action’ has been taken seriously, then one need to ask, why the laxity towards addressing climate change.

From the signing of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 to the emergence of the Paris Agreement in December 2015, the most powerful and highest emitting state members of the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of Parties (COP) have systematically failed to collectively demonstrate the required level of action to ensure that human and non-human development and wellbeing are protected and respected in an age of climate change. The expectation is that once an injustice is perceived, the next important step is to act. But why is there no motivation to act? This calls for evaluation. There are three reasons why I think that the experience of climate change and climate justice proposals have not yielded any tangible result. One, there is no sustained commitment to the binding agreements that are reached. Second, the practical response from the part of those who have the capacity to act is lacking. While these are genuine and important reasons, I think there is a third fundamental reason, which is that, the understanding of human beings as persons who must take decisive actions in the face of any emergency where human lives are at stake. This is because we arrogate action to capacity, and we shirk from actions whenever we think capacities are not sufficient. However, the understanding of personhood demands otherwise. To make this point clear, I offer two characters of justice grafted in the idea of personhood that will motivate climate action. They are *entitlement justice* and *empathetic justice*.

The view of justice as something that is external to just actions, mark off what I call an *entitlement justice*. In our contemporary world, justice is often seen as an outcome of laws, rules and policies. In this manner, the superiority of laws and the democratizing element of equality before the law became a comfort zone leading to the (mis)conception that justice is something external to the person, that is, an end that is achieved through legal means. This is the position of liberal theorists that rights and liberties, safeguarded by democracy must allow those who experience injustice to seek justice through legal means. Justice, seen in this sense, will be an obstacle to climate action and remains short-sighted. By emphasizing that just actions are the actions that are determined through the invocations of laws and policies rather than actions that flows from the richness of our humanness, justice as *entitlement* is limiting. This view of justice is the prognostication of the proponents of justice as impartiality.

However, the problem with this view is that it makes law the mediator of justice, and at the same time, takes responsibility to act away from offenders until decided by the authority of the law. This then turns people into followers rather than initiators of justice. This could be seen in the problem of climate change where people are waiting for science to legislate what is 'dangerous climate change' and likewise the superior organizations (e.g UNFCCC), to determine who should be the real victims of climate change and what should be the responsibility of those that have caused climate change. Seeing action as a precursor to justice opposes the perception of justice as a temporal event, one that peaks its head when poked, rather than an active force that demands a response from us regularly through the consideration of the *other's* wellness.

One way to overcome this problem is to reverse the order of relationality between justice and right actions. This could be done by making justice a product of action rather than action being the consequence of justice. To do this is to demonstrate what I call an *empathetic idea of justice*. This idea of justice is consistent with the notion of Personhood in Africa, where action means to take the initiative in matters where the balance of the community is under threat without waiting for the approval of external agents. The capacity to see oneself and the *other* in relation to the self, as a human person, a co-habitant of the common world with a past, present and future, creates an empathetic understanding and the demonstration of justice. By the very fact of being human, all participants in the international climate system owe a type of entrusted duty of care to present and future generations. The idea of having to prove causation or pursue capacity in order to share responsibility therefore evaporates.

The uniqueness of the African conception of personhood as being-with-others offers not just the potential for justice but also demands justice in praxis based on the relatedness to the people around and in the world at large. As opposed to the liberalist notion of action that places the idea of right actions in the theoretical realm dependent on outside forces' existence, the notion of personhood in Africa merges the theory and praxis of just actions in the human person. The idea of Personhood infuses the moral consciousness that is essential for the actualization of climate justice. By demanding the active engagement of human persons with justice, the notion of Personhood sees action as a capacity to initiate and actualize justice, thereby merging 'justice in theory' with 'justice in praxis.' This distinctness and commonality that is particular to the notion of Personhood become the centre from which climate action can emerge both at the conceptual and practical level.

The conception of personhood as one who has the peace, progress and safety of his fellow humans at heart will provide a strong motivation to see justice as a lively moving force that requires praxis to save justice from a theoretically restrained existence. To redress a problem like climate change, seeing justice as an active force that demands a response becomes both urgent and of much importance. When we allow persons to be viewed with dignity in connection to their environing community, it evokes a concern to act immediately when fellow human beings and their environmental asset are in distress, even when it is yet to be decided, the cause of such distress. Responding to the *other* is not just seen as a task but an automatic reflex. The perception of Personhood that is concerned with the dignity of humans will motivate collective actions in addressing global climate change. To claim that others should not honour agreements until major emitters commit themselves to action contravenes this understanding of personhood. Also, the liberalists argument for the continued action of high scale emitters as a prerequisite for climate restorative action remains short-sighted and lampoons our collective identity as beings connected in this world.

Collective action in addressing climate change is an urgent necessity and cannot be left until there is full compliance. The idea of personhood in Africa suggests that those who have the capacity must act in the face of dangers to prevent the group's peace and safety. This brings a uniquely humanizing perspective to the need for collective action - where every stakeholder has their consciousness and will power towards saving the mass of human beings from extinction because of climate despoliation. The understanding of just climate actions through the lens of personhood brings a uniquely humanizing definition to climate action in which the agent is at the centre of action and has the consciousness and will power to take the initiative

to act. In this regard, a responsive climate action will be a necessity by powerful and polluting nation-states even without the cooperation of all states.

There is one important aspect of climate justice where the African conception of personhood will also provide useful theoretical insights. That is intergenerational justice to which I turn.

5.6: Personhood and Intergenerational Justice

The climate justice issue over who should be prioritized in addressing climate change is somewhat complex. Some have made a case for consideration of the present generation, arguing that all that we have now is the present, that the future has no real identity that should boarder us. Therefore, the 'non-identity principle' has been put forward to make a case to focus climate justice on only the current generation (Derek Parfit, 2010). Edward Page (2006), however, suggests otherwise that the current focus of subject-centred principles of justice should be widened to make space for others, especially the not-too-distant future generations (Page, 2006: 200 -300).

In many African societies, the members of the clan include the unborn, those living in a world of ordinary sense experience, and those living in the post-mortem world of the ancestors. According to the African worldview, currently living human and non-human beings, the living dead, the yet unborn, and the natural world are interconnected. For many African communities, it would be wrong to over-consume resources and leave future generations with fewer means of survival. Thus, for these societies, the current generation has moral obligations towards future generations as they are morally considerable. According to indigenous African thought, Wiredu posits that the present generation is under obligation to the past (the living dead) and future generations (Wiredu, 1994). The Zimbabwean scholar Munyaradzi Felix Murove (2004), in his work on *ukama* (relationality), holds a similar view. Kevin Gary Behrens also points out "that the backward-looking notion of duties to posterity is one of the most significant contributions African thought can make to our conception of moral obligations to the future" (Behrens 2012, 187).

If climate change does damage to the cultural architecture of some people, and in virtue of which they exhibit their personhood, then we run the risk of depriving future generations the opportunity of becoming persons in a cultural community. This is because these people's cultural values, which is a significant part of their environing community, would have been damaged significantly and it is only in reference to an environing community that one becomes a person in community. Hence, neglecting the cultural aspects of climate change can

be characterised as an assault on personal identity, including the cultural identity of future generations.

On this issue, Kelbessa argues that "African ethics does not require the current generation to pay attention to the rights and interests of future individuals, but rather those of future communities. Accordingly, there is no need to know the exact nature and demands of autonomous individuals, as the focus is on groups, that is, generational communities (Kelbessa, 2015:61). Kelbessa cites the example of the Oromo people of Ethiopia. He posits that the Oromo of Ethiopia (the largest ethnic group in the country) believe that we know enough about the welfare of future persons to act responsibly on their behalf because, like present persons, future persons are human beings and need a healthy environment (Kelbessa, 2011). Consequently, those countries that irresponsibly aggravate climate change ought to learn from this ethical principle, which highlights the intergenerational dimensions of global climate change and pay attention to future generations' wellbeing over and above their current interests (Kelbessa, 2015: 61).

Furthermore, I think we cannot dispute that the equitable treatment of future generations is very fundamental in climate ethics. However, what remains is to address what should be handed down to future generations by the actions or inactions of today. Is it the productive capacity, the health or the cultural memory or even all three together? Since we cannot survey the views of future generation, how best can we know their preferences? The climate change problem and the view of personhood demands that we should make decisions to pass on to future generations, not only productive capacities but also cultural diversities that will enhance the qualities of the principles of humane living. In addressing the problem of climate change, the African value system, specifically, the idea of personhood teaches what Jamieson calls "the interconnectedness of life" on earth (Jamieson, 2003, 377).

So far, I have shown that climate justice must not only demand equity but ought to also ensure that we can respond to the demands of personhood. I argued that the conception of personhood and its noble climate responsibility ideals will enable dealing with a kind of injustice (cultural injustice) that may otherwise be dismissed.

5.6: Conclusion

In this chapter, I argued for a plausible approach to climate justice that sheds light on some of the blind spots in climate justice debate, particularly the neglect of the cultural dimensions of justice that climate change exacerbates. I argued that once an injustice is perceived as such,

the next step would be acting to deal with it. This will require an active and conscious break-away from the status quo. I pointed out that the discourse on climate justice is predominantly shaped by ideal and non-ideal theories in the Global North that do not consider cultural ideals in other places. I provided a normative analysis of the understanding of personhood in Africa and delineated its credible potential to providing a responsive climate justice discourse. My contention was that the little success recorded by climate justice deliberations may be the result of failure to consider the cultural ideas from other climes. I argued that the idea of Personhood in Africa is an invaluable concept that can enhance climate justice. To achieve this, I described the connections between the African conception of person and climate justice. Furthermore, I suggested, there is the need to depart from the view that sees personhood as static and detached from justice in praxis. That is, we have to move away from the point of view that sees justice as an outcome that is external to human action. This position, I have shown, is untenable in this climate change era. Instead, action should be seen as a precursor to justice, especially when dealing with collective problems like climate change.

I think what is lacking in this climate age is not abundance of ideas but the lack of will to act when we do not engage in analysis of what is at stake when personhood is left out of climate ethics discourse. I have shown the insights to be gained by exploring the nexus between the African concept of personhood and climate justice. This is useful to better understand, the normative concerns of many agents that are actively involved in climate negotiations. In sum, I think there will be a significant moral loss if climate ethics does not consider and integrate the African idea of personhood as a core consideration in climate ethics discourse. The analysis of personhood in Africa and the motivation it provides in terms of responsiveness to action contributes toward defining a robust understanding of climate justice. The implication of this cultural dimension of climate ethics, especially for setting mitigation, adaptation, and compensation plans to address the impact of climate change on cultural heritage, will be the focus in the next chapter.

CHAPTER SIX

IN DEFENCE OF THE CULTURAL DIMENSION OF CLIMATE CHANGE ETHICS

6.1: Introduction

This dissertation, thus far, has acknowledged that climate change is a form of cultural injustice needing a plausible cultural approach. However, there is also the need to explore the implications of such approach for global climate change responses. In this chapter, I will discuss the implications of a climate ethics theory that is sensitive to the impact of climate change on cultural heritage values, especially for the actions of mitigation, adaptation, and compensation in a bid to for a just climate agreement. Furthermore, this chapter will address the kind of rebuttals that can be raised against this climate change ethics theory that takes the destruction of cultural heritage values seriously, particularly in Africa. I will put forward some hypothetical questions that I envisage could be raised against the plausibility of the proposal and offer some thoughts on how I think these questions can be addressed.

The chapter provides analysis of how the cultural dimension of climate ethics that I offer will affect mitigation, adaptation and compensation responses in the context of global climate change. Since the cultural dimension of climate change ethics that I offer resonates with the idea of personhood, suggesting that human beings by their actions and inactions should not reduce other human beings to anything less than their shared humanity one need to find out what implication this understanding has for climate responses? I address this question in four sections. In the first section, I address the implication of my theory on the conventional responses to climate change. In this connection, I discuss mitigation, adaptation and compensation as some of the popular climate responses and show why they are complicated without cultural considerations of the impacts of climate change. The second section offer suggestions on the ways cultural heritage needs to be addressed in global climate policy. Here, I argue that mitigation, adaptation and compensation are valuable responses to the loss of cultural heritage but, they must be deployed in a culturally sensitive way to address what really matters to the victims of cultural heritage loss. In the final section, I anticipate some questions that could be raised against the climate ethics theory that I offer. I provide response to these questions and in the end, I suggest what is needed for global climate policy to address the legitimate concerns of Africa's cultural heritage loss to climate change.

6.2: Global Climate Responses: Taking the Cultural Dimension of Climate ethics seriously

In this section, I will discuss some of the conventional responses to climate change to show how they can be useful for responding to cultural heritage loss in the context of climate policy. In terms of responding to climate change, mitigation and adaptation has been the most popular action plan. These conventional approaches have been clearly adopted in the IPCC's Assessment Reports (IPCC, 2001: 2007). The IPCC defines mitigation as an "anthropogenic intervention to reduce the anthropogenic forcing of the climate system; it includes strategies to reduce greenhouse gas sources and emissions and enhancing greenhouse gas sinks" (IPCC, 2001). The report also defines adaptation in the context of climate change as an "adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities (IPCC, 2001). These climate responses are geared towards the wellbeing of human beings in this climate era. However, the term wellbeing has a deeper connotation than just economic wellbeing because there are ecological, socio-cultural, political and other meanings that can be drawn as inferences from it. Of course, my interest in this dissertation has been to show the importance of prioritizing the socio-cultural wellbeing of people in addressing climate change.

Broadly put, mitigation seeks to minimize changes to the climate system, and adaptation seeks to adjust human institutions in order to cope with the changes to the climate system. Climate mitigation used to be very laudable at the beginning of global warming. The claim for the need for mitigation is that there is need to lower emission levels drastically, to stand a chance of forestalling the potential catastrophe that might befall our climate.⁶⁸ The ultimate goal of mitigation, Moellendorf suggests, is a 'no-carbon economy' meaning that alternatives to the use of fossil fuel should be envisioned (Moellendorf, 2015: 175). Instead of suggesting a radical departure from the use of fossil fuel, some scholars have advanced principles of carbon taxation⁶⁹ and emissions trading to lower the emission levels. While these utilitarian

⁶⁸ It has been reported that for a 75% chance of avoiding a 2° temperature rise, the permissible total from 1750 tonnes would have to be limited to 750 billion tonnes (see Attfield Robin, p. 68).

⁶⁹ Emissions trading and Carbon taxes, or greenhouse taxes in general are deployed for similar reasons. They have been, and still are, a key tool of policy-makers in several European countries, particularly in Northern Europe. Carbon taxes are levied on CO₂ emissions produced either by upstream users (during production processes), or by downstream users (during consumption), charging a fixed amount for each unit (in most cases tons) of CO₂ emitted. Carbon taxes are seen by many scientists and policy-makers as one of the most attractive options for distributing the burdens of climate change mitigation and reducing overall emissions due to a host of reasons. For a Critical analysis of carbon taxation, see Schuppert, 2011, pp. 311-312

approaches are important, there are at least two problems with them. First, their narrow focus on the economics of distributing emission burdens and benefits raises the problem of marginalization of poor nations since it does not consider people's differential vulnerabilities and the resultant starting positions of states or nations. Second, emission distribution scheme also raises the question of intergenerational justice because it tacitly ignores the moral problem of the exploitative use of the environment by fossil fuel industries. A successful climate change mitigation, Fabian Schuppert suggests "is the kind of mitigation that prevents (as far as possible) the development of negative effects and satisfies the demands of intergenerational justice. That is, such mitigation effort must not violate people's fundamental interests (whether now or in future) and must also avoid, as a matter of necessity unnecessary harm and suffering" (Schuppert, 2011: 306). This position demands that mitigation efforts consider future generations.

The inadequacy and the unrealistic nature of mitigation has made adaptation to be another important strategy for dealing with climate burdens. Scholars like William Nordhaus (2008) and Bjorn Lomborg (2007; 2020) argue that since it will be near impossible to curb climate change from happening because of the huge cost implications on the present generation, we should not focus on mitigation, rather, we should allow climate change to happen and focus on adapting to it. Adaptation to climate change has now become part of the contemporary discourse about the politics and economics of global climate change (Adger *et al.* 2009; Moellendorf, 2015; Michael Mikulewicz, 2018).

Adaptation, I think, is a moral necessity to address climate change since the impacts of climate change are apparent and will continue to worsen as current and future emissions further affect the climate. However, the nuances that have been attached to adaptation has made it suspect in climate policy. One important area where climate adaptation planning has been lacking is in the aspect of addressing the cultural vulnerability of affected people. Michael Mikulewicz criticizes the approaches to adaptation that focus on the consequences of climate change rather than the underlying issues of vulnerability (Mikulewicz, 2018). He argues that adaptation to climate change is a "highly political process that cannot be reduced" to manifestations of outward interventions like building seawalls or offering livelihood diversification. In addressing climate adaptation, what is vital, he says, is an interrogation of the political 'origins of vulnerability' (Mikulewicz, 2018: 29). Different factors limiting climate adaptation strategies must be addressed. For instance, Adger *et al.* (2009) provides four limiting factors to climate adaptation that must be carefully considered and addressed.

According to them, ethics or values, uncertainty of knowledge, risk perception and culture will affect the end goal of adaptation (Adger *et al.* 2009: 335-354).

On their own, the dualistic framework of mitigation and adaptation as a climate response have shown to be grossly inadequate. One might think that a combination of mitigation and adaptation will bring about successful climate challenges. Some scholars propose the merger of mitigation and adaptation as an effective climate response (Moellendorf, 2015). Giving the importance of mitigation and adaptation, Moellendorf reinforces the moral basis for an integrative approach. He argues that when considering the realization of climate justice, it is prudent to remember that mitigation and adaptation are both moral obligations within a response to climate change (Moellendorf, 2015: 175). In recent times, it is now clear that mitigation and adaptation responses even when combined, seems to be insufficient in addressing the harms perpetrated by climate change. For instance, Simon Caney suggests the insufficiency of these approaches (mitigation and adaptation) to deal with the impacts of climate change on fundamental human rights to life, health and subsistence (Caney, 2010: 171). Caney pushes for a compensatory response for those whose human rights have been violated in the present by climate impacts. He makes a clear distinction between compensation and adaptation as a climate response. He says,

The point of adaptation is to prevent the changes to the natural world having a malign impact on people's vital interests and human rights. If adaptation is successfully implemented, then people's rights would be protected. The case for compensation, by contrast, arises when and because persons' rights were not protected. One might put it thus: the point of adaptation is to protect and uphold rights, and the point of compensation is to redress the fact that people's rights have been violated (p. 171 – 172).

Compensation as a response to climate change requires that developed countries make financial contributions to poor countries to help them cope with present climate stressors to their prospects of living a decent life. So how can the idea of climate responses like mitigation, adaptation and compensation be applied to the destruction of cultural heritage in the context of climate change? Will a combination of these responses be appropriate or there is a need to add further kinds of response? I turn to the discussion of how the impacts of climate change on cultural heritage can be responded to. I will examine these responses as they apply to the loss of cultural heritage by climate change.

6.2.1: Mitigation, Adaptation and Compensation for Cultural Heritage Loss

To be serious about the climate response towards redressing the cultural heritage that has been damaged or destroyed by climate change, I think mitigation, adaptation and compensation will be necessary features at different times. To start with mitigation, I have stated earlier in this chapter that mitigation involves directly targeting the ultimate cause of climate change. In the context of addressing the significant cultural heritage that are being destroyed or that will still be destroyed by climate change, what should the mitigation plans look like? One thing to note is that for cultural heritage and their significance to people's lives, climate change impacts on them implies irreversible loss. That is, the kind of loss that is suffered when climate change impacts cultural heritage is usually permanent. Hence, the insistence that culture is not a disposable or inconsequential commodity must be the first step towards mitigation. It must be emphasized that cultural heritage has both intrinsic and instrumental values to the people whose lives depend on them. This will encourage all and sundry to shun activities that can jeopardize these cultural assets and when the people whose cultural heritage are impacted by environmental threats speak up, they must be treated with urgency and a renewed interest to find out what they are suffering from.

Mitigation plans for tangible cultural heritage like buildings and monuments might require sufficient and sustainable maintenance to keep them as weatherproof as possible on the one hand. On the other hand, the recognition of the fact that there is the possibility that cherished heritage sites could be lost because of climate change requires that a detailed documentation of the values associated with such heritage, needs to be worked out before it will be too late to secure a record of the heritage values. Maintenance could come in the form of making alternative provisions that would divert pressure off these heritage sites. For instance, the heritage in coastal areas must be carefully tended so that they do not lose their outstanding universal value (OUV). For intangible heritage, a mitigation plan to understand the value of heritage will be highly necessary. That is, there should be a well-documented book where the values that cultural heritage serves to people are recorded. David Lempert makes a useful suggestion towards this. He posits that a legal and political strategy to deal with the disappearance of cultural diversity is to adopt the strategy of environmentalists.⁷⁰ That is, by

⁷⁰ Environmentalists are now increasingly effective in drawing attention and funding to the issues of biodiversity and have become important political actors in the international community, I community, while social scientists are rarely heard. I scientists are rarely heard. The reason is not due to anything inherent in the areas of concern, but more to the effectiveness of organization of the biologists and ecologists, their ability to present their

seeking to work out a “Red book of Endangered Cultures” that offers an accessible way for non-specialists to understand the threats that cultures are facing (Lempert, David, 2010: 512-513). In the same vein, a systematic approach to identifying the cultural heritage that are at risk and their need for special protection and provision is important for responding to climate change.

One important mitigation effort that I would also like to touch on is the plan towards geoengineering⁷¹ and its implication for cultural heritage sites. Although the plan towards geoengineering is far from being accomplished in reality, the fact that it has been muted as credible options to mitigate climate change deserves ethical interrogations (Crutzen, Paul, 2006). According to Stephen Gardiner, some advocates of geoengineering suggest “fertilizing the oceans with plant life to soak up more carbon dioxide, some others suggest a massive program of reforestation, and some propose capturing vast quantities of emissions from power plants and burying them in sedimentary rock deep underground.” (Gardiner, 2010: 285). All these suggestions require an expert tweak of the physical environment in a way that tangible cultural heritage sites might be affected. Thus, I think the option of geoengineering, if it must be deployed, must be with care, caution and concern for the cultural heritage sites. Its potential effects on the heritage sites of poor countries who will most likely lack the means to advance such technological innovation must be clearly worked out. I move to discussing the adaptation strategy that I think is necessary for addressing cultural heritage loss to climate change.

The process of adaptation is just as important as setting mitigation plans. Just like mitigation, climate adaptation is also a moral necessity because the impacts of climate change are already apparent and will continue to worsen. This is because current and future emissions will affect the climate further. However, in the context of environmental threats like climate change, how people interpret the kinds of harm or loss to cultural heritage remains poorly understood (Tschakert *et al.*, 2017: 2). Such loss rather than being seen from an objective perspective, I suggest it must be seen from within the victim’s own place and culture-specific context. Hence, adaptation plans must not be detached from the socio-cultural values of the people.

concerns in a scientific way, and their use of a tool - the Red Book for Endangered Species - that offers an accessible way for non-specialists to understand the threats See Lempert, David, 2010, pp. 512.

⁷¹ The term ‘geoengineering’ according to Stephen Gardner lacks a precise definition but is widely held to imply the intentional manipulation of the environment on a global scale. However, in my own understanding, the term ‘geoengineering’ is the development of technologies either to reduce atmospheric carbon dioxide or to reduce warming effects by reflecting solar radiation.

Adger and Brooks (2003) argue that the current challenge in climate adaptation research is how to explain and address the “varied sensitivities” to climate change through rational justification rather than collective emotion (Adger and Brooks, 2003: 179). This notion suggests that adaptation to climate change will never be a homogeneous process agreed upon by all parties, but one influenced by various factors such as gender, class, and culture to mention but a few. Climate adaptation strategies must therefore be open to cultural considerations to avoid what I call ‘renewable cultural injustice in climate adaptation,’ – a situation where adaptation plans wear the garb of climate justice, but in the covert sense, it carries the seeds of cultural injustice. Hence, I think climate adaptation strategies must address the subjective vulnerabilities or loss that has been felt by the victims of climate change. In the case of non-economic or non-direct impacts of climate change like that of cultural heritage, a pre-defined risk assessments and existing methods cannot adequately reveal what matters to people in their daily lives, neither today nor in the future.

Furthermore, the adaptation strategy should be organised to address intergenerational justice. This is because protecting present as well as future generations is a duty of humankind and integral to the view of personhood in Africa. Climate adaptation decisions should be considered in a way that present generation are not made to be worse-off because of climate change impacts. Yet, future generations cannot be neglected. The principle of personhood and intergenerational justice if applied to the loss of cultural heritage will require climate negotiators to address the concerns of both the present and future generation. The present generation need to relate with their heritage not only as a symbol of pride but also for sustenance, while the future generation must maintain a connection to cultural heritage through generational transfer of knowledge and history. In the present climate discourse, the values of future generations are most often explicitly incorporated through formal discounting methods in economics (Matthew Rendall, 2019: 443; Posner and Sunstein, 2007), but this utilitarian approach of ‘discounting’ will be insufficient to address issues around critical natural capital like tangible and intangible heritage values. By undervaluing culture and place (and by extension, heritage values) in climate ethics, Adger *et al.* (2009) suggest that “we are ignoring certain limits to adaptation, which whilst subjective are real for those experiencing them (Adger et. Al., 2009: 340).

Defending the need for a context-specific understanding of climate adaptation, Jonas Nielsen and Anette Reeberg (2010) did an extensive empirical study on the cultural barriers to climate adaptation pathways that are available to the *Fulbe* and *Rimaiibe* people of Burkina Faso.

They submit that while the *Rimaiibe* people of Burkina Faso were quick to adapt to climate change through livelihood diversification and labour migration, the *Fulbes* cultural lifestyles did not encourage labour migration and livelihood diversification and yet the *Fulbes* were unwilling to fully embrace these strategies because they entail attributes deemed “non Fulbe” (Nielsen and Reenberg, 2010: 150). Such knowledge is important for determining the kinds of climate adaptation proposals that will be adopted in this community and likewise other indigenous communities.

A critical example of how adaptation undermines cultural heritage values resonates within the suggestion that migration is as an adaptation strategy. Overtime, I think migration has been a second-best action for those whose homeland and livelihoods are destroyed by climate change. Migration is a common but illegitimate way of adapting to climate change, especially when it ignores the agency of the people in deciding when and where to make their next habitation. It needs to be clearly spelt out that not all climate change harms can be obviated through migration. There is a significant loss involved in relocation. If migration is seen as an adaptation strategy for those people whose tangible and intangible cultural heritage are being destroyed by climate change, it must be addressed in a sensitive manner where the people are not just beguiled into taking actions that will reduce their personhood. Adaptation plans should be agreed upon through dialogue with affected people. This is to suggest that a perceived adaptation strategy may be undesirable for those whom their cherished homelands and communal identity have been destroyed by climate change. That is, when they consider the significant losses attached to their heritage sites like cultural identity, knowledge and traditions and the possibilities of self-determination, they might require more than migration as mere adaptation. To enhance migration as an adaptation strategy, I suggest two principles that is supported by the idea of personhood.

One, the decision to migrate must come from an empathetic understanding rather than a thinking that migration is the only veritable option for those affected by climate change. In this connection, the territorially dispossessed victims of climate change must be carried along on where next they would want to move and how they would like to continue their life in the new location, in such a way as to make up for their loss. Since the places, these people originally live carry attachments, memories, and expression of identities, it is impossible to rectify a loss of place by simply letting the territorially dispossessed move to a new place. The new place would be devoid of all the memories, attachments, and stories, and would therefore not contribute to one’s sense of identity. On this view, Clare Heyward and Jörgen

Ödalen make the case for “a free movement passport for the territorially dispossessed” by climate change or any environmental threat (Clare Heyward and Jörgen Ödalen, 2016: 208-225). Relatedly, Susan McIntyre-Tamwoy *et al* suggest that “an appropriate way to show concern for the destruction of cultural heritage, is ‘the timely dissemination of information and the meaningful engagement with indigenous people in terms of developing mitigation strategies and responses that are culturally appropriate and made with free, prior and informed consent’” (Susan McIntyre-Tamwoy *et al.* 2015: 84). For instance, women who spoke to researchers for Oxfam in Malawi on what they need, for them to adapt to climate change said that the help they needed to adapt was, first and foremost, a creche to look after HIV and AIDS orphans. This creche, they said, would free up their time and energy to cultivate their gardens properly and then to go on to invest in things such as soil conservation and water harvesting that were being urged on them by aid agencies. Furthermore, these people saw climate adaptation as being about diversifying rural livelihoods, not just about improving agriculture. The help they wanted included business advice, access to credit, vocational training and employment, rural libraries, free and accessible health care, prompt assistance in emergencies and family planning (Oxfam International, 2008). However, governments and donor agencies tend to have rigid views about what constitutes climate adaptation (which is not likely to include creches) and development. By so doing, they seek ways to differentiate them rather than integrate them to development plans.

Similarly, The Pastoralists – animal herders – that were interviewed by Oxfam say that government policies must be deployed to help them adapt to climate change. For these Pastoralists, successful adaptation plan would involve enhanced mobility in the course of their livelihood engagement. They want to be able to exercise meaningful freedom of choice as to whether to move or not. They also request for services like schools, boreholes and other amenities that are appropriate to their choice of life (Oxfam International 2008). This means government can consider providing social service such as schools, water points towards fulfilling climate adaptation policies.

In line with the above example, the second principle is that adaptation should be fused into development plans. This means that the people need not suffer loss of cherished places before migration as adaptation strategies will be put forward. When we consider Moellendorf’s suggestion that “adaptation policies require no evidence of climate change harm, it only requires a perceived vulnerability in order to be *pima facie* justified by the risk reduction principle (Moellendorf, 2015: 180), then we might agree that migration as an adaptation

strategy must be carried out as part of a comprehensive development programme. Also, Nicholas Stern takes this view when he says, ‘development itself is the way to strengthen a society’s ability to adapt’ (Nicholas Stern, 2009: 62) and in the case of the vulnerability of cultural heritage, what development plan can be organised towards adaptation? The poor people whose cultural heritage are vulnerable to climate change have a claim to development resources to help reduce their vulnerability and strengthen adaptive capacities.

The development plans could be providing adequate means of water aside from the reliance on the river source that is pressurised because of water scarcity due to climate variability. Also, development plans can be in the form of moving tangible heritage like historic buildings that are threatened by climate change. This is more like a reconstruction of cultural heritage which some suggest is a welcome possibility (Natalia Dushkina, 2009; Roman Andras, 2009). However, the possibility of reconstituting cultural heritage requires that certain limits be set. Amra Hadzimuhamedovic suggests some methodological approach of evaluating reconstruction of lost heritage (Hadzimuhamedovic, 2012: 229-238). He argues that “reconstruction cannot be justified when heritage is interpreted purely as a work of art, for neither artistic inspiration nor the unique nature of the creative moment can be repeated.” He further states that “heritage that is a social factor, seen by the community either as the expression of ontological values or as a means of preserving social patterns, is recognized and affirmed as such when at risk of loss or destruction” (Hadzimuhamedovic, 2012: 229). Although the question of mutability and permanence arises with the suggestion of reconstructing or transferring cultural heritage sites, if this plan is arrived at through a dialogical approach with owners of the heritage, it could be a worthwhile adaptation strategy.

Relocating heritage is a remedy which is suitable for only a small number of particularly significant heritage sites and not available for intangible heritage. However, losses of intangible heritage such as loss of knowledge, sense of place, social cohesion and identity that are neither immediately visible nor readily quantifiable must be considered in adaptation planning. This can only be done with an understanding of climate impacts that is not at odds with how people themselves view their futures, what they see at stake, and what actions they may take. Unlike the science driven, top-down, end-to-end approaches that rely on technical climate and risk modelling or the economic modelling that is disconnected from the real experience of people, an approach that reckons with what Tschakert *et al* (2017: 3) call the “culturally subjective drivers of vulnerability and lived experiences on the ground” will be appropriate to deal with such losses. Instead of putting forward a universal metric of justice,

especially when threatened values are incommensurable, a fair adaptation plan can be achieved when losses are understood within place and cultural contexts.

Much has been said about mitigation and adaptation, however, a cultural approach does not only generate duties of mitigation and adaptation, but this approach also suggests duties of compensation and care. Compensation claims, most times arise because of failures to mitigate and provide for adaptation to climate change. The harms suffered must be redressed and this has to be done by the developed countries who are culpable for emitting harmful gasses causing climate change that has adversely affected cultural heritage. However, the continuous debates regarding compensation, driven by many developing countries is still without an effective legal framework (Okereke and Coventry, 2016: 837). This legal framework for climate compensation must be prioritized in future climate negotiations. Lastly, the duty of care is an ethical imperative from the normative idea of personhood. This duty of care requires that those who have capacity to mitigate and provide adaptation benefits to do so without being compelled. This is in tandem with the Afro-communal virtue ethics that African philosophers like Thaddeus Metz advocates (Metz, 2007) and have been applied beyond the geographical boundaries of Africa (Samuel and Fayemi, 2019: 79-95).

6.3. In Defense of the Cultural Dimension of Climate Ethics

Before bringing this chapter to a close, let me respond to some hypothetical questions and the kinds of rebuttals that I anticipate, could be raised against this climate ethics theory that takes the destruction of cultural heritage values seriously. In this regard, I will respond to five hypothetical questions. First, some might prude that this climate ethics theory, because of its cultural sensitivity will engender cultural (heritage) relativism. This is a genuine question and one that is important for any plausible climate ethics theory. This question might arise from the position that principles of mutual recognition and inclusive deliberations require that the cultural heritage of people be prioritized in climate negotiation. The arguments from cultural relativists will be dealt with by making the claim that although cultural diversity is important, human wellbeing remains the utmost priority. Hence any heritage value that inhibits the flourishing of human wellbeing in the sense of promoting life cannot be accepted. Promoting cultural relativism over and above a universal objective law of humanity undermines humanity. It undermines a law of the global commons designated for human dignity. This idea, according to Theresa Thorp undermines a *jus gentium* (laws of nations) designed for humankind (Thorp, 2014: 54).

Another way to respond to such question is to make it clear that this climate ethics theory does not foreclose the possibility of varying degrees of what could be called cultural heritage, especially the intangible ones. Therefore, what qualifies as what I call ‘allowable heritage’ in climate negotiations must be constantly chosen, recreated, and renegotiated in the light of its present and future values to progressive living. To know what is to be considered allowable heritage, we might need to consider how the people will fare after the loss or damage of such heritage. The value of the heritage must be considered in connection with the risk of its loss. A useful approach for evaluating the risk of losing a heritage asset has been suggested by Klinke and Renn as cited by Dow and Berkhout (2014). They provided clear distinction between what is ‘acceptable,’ ‘tolerable,’ and ‘intolerable’ risks when considering how to deal with the climate adaptation choices that people face. They explain that acceptable risks are insignificant and would generally not trigger any necessary risk reduction effort. Tolerable risks are taking based on the perceived benefits. This will require some adaptation plans should in case the risk goes beyond what was first envisaged. Intolerable risks are those that exceed socially negotiated norm despite the adaptation plans that will be put in place (Dow and Berkhout, 2014). This sort of risk calculation can be deployed to know which heritage loss is acceptable, tolerable and intolerable.

Related to the first question is that critics might oppose that this climate ethics theory with its principle of relational entitlements could lead to a nostalgic and insipid *heritagisation* of society whereby those who have relied on heritage sites for sustenance in the past, might seek a return to that past by digging up heritage even when they do not have any benefit in the present. The contention is that some people could claim that these (outdated) tangible or intangible heritages have been destroyed by environmental changes and must be catered for. To respond to this kind of critic, I think, cultural heritage has an integral role to play in contemporary societies, but in the context of climate justice, negotiations must involve a plan to prune those forms of heritage that are inconsistent with or hold no continuing value for contemporary and future generations. Recognizing that values are part of knowledge, means that there must be space for value-based discussions in any decision-making process. The proposals for a value-based approach to climate adaptation by Karen O’Brien and Johanna Wolf (2010)⁷² and Ralph Keeney’s “value-focused thinking” (Keeney, 1992) could

⁷² Karen O’Brien suggests that Values-based approaches to climate change adaptation foreground how people understand climate change affecting what they value and consider worth preserving and achieving in the face of multiple stressors are relatively recent. See O’Brien, and Wolf, 2010, pp. 232.

complement this theory. These approaches are important in that they help to expose and clarify what matters to those affected in their own language and in a way that reflects their own terms and concepts. Such approaches can provide a crucial starting point for consultations that could make visible a wide variety of environmental, social, and cultural priorities.

For climate negotiations in this context to be just, the understanding of the value that people hold about things is therefore important. Tschakert *et al* (2017) provide an interesting understanding of value that is appropriate for understanding cultural values in climate response. They distinguish between ‘held value’ and ‘assigned values.’ According to them, ‘held values’ are understood as principles or ideas that are important to people, whereas ‘assigned values’ are those that people attach to phenomena, be they material, experiences, or opportunities (Tschakert *et al.*, 2017: 4). In this formulation, ‘held values’ are seen as motivating and guiding principles which, at least partially, determine ‘assigned value.’ Held values are typically considered relatively stable but do change across people’s lifespan and in response to socioeconomic conditions, generational replacement, and traumatic experiences (Tschakert *et al.*, 2017: 4).

However, unlike Simon Caney’s climate ethics theory that rejects value trade-off (Caney, 2010: 172), I suggest there must be value trade-offs in climate negotiations. Climate change may itself be a kind of litmus test of values. Some heritage that are at risk may become less valuable (and so their destruction may transform to be something less than a loss), while others may overtime, become more valued given their increasing significance and scarcity. No group of people are by any means self-sufficient and environmental problems like climate change do not respect contingent values attached to places and things. People’s choices about what is to be saved and what can be lost will entail trade-offs among valued things that may change over time and with new information. This understanding suggests that climate negotiations in this context will not follow the formal laws and hence cannot be predicted by expert systems. An attempt to examine the various trade-offs people are likely to make between the values that are important in their lives and livelihoods would be an important research agenda.

The people inhabiting a place must be open to progressive adaptation policies especially when the impact of climate change on such cherished places cannot be undone. However, where a community or nation chooses to value a cultural heritage asset over the progress that

might come with making trade-offs through climate adaptation, such community or nation has no moral right to hold on to when such heritage is faced with the devastating effects of climate change. Such community cannot pursue a detachable value by insisting that other communities should not consider substitutes to the affected heritage. Each generation may have new cultural influences in the form of political, economic and technologies that could lead them to change what is valued and what is seen as preferable (Tschakert *et al.*, 2017: 10).

Moreover, it must be noted that it is impossible for the negotiation of value trade-offs to be a once off event in climate negotiations. This is because each society and each generation will have new cultural influences, information, political and economic circumstances as well as technologies that lead them to change what is valued and what is seen as preferable. Hence, the potential of value trade-offs at a single point in time is limiting. The importance of value trade-offs can also be seen in the way people make adaptation preferences in practice. That is, overtime, it will be clear that certain adaptive strategies are no longer effective, and need to be replaced. For instance, Ruth Fincher *et al* (2014) describes the tensions among coastal residents between what is considered worth protecting and what people are willing to sacrifice in order to gain something else. For the majority, the prospect of losing valued aspects of living in a precious place is acceptable for the sake of more job opportunities elsewhere while, for others, moving away would mean intolerable harm to their well-being (Ruth Fincher *et al.*, 2014: 201-210). The ultimate purpose of this kind of value consideration according to Boholm and Corvellec, is to ‘look at value before looking at threat’ (Boholm and Corvellec, 2011: 175).

Another challenge that this theory might receive is the question of value representation in climate negotiations. One could be tempted to ask how possible it is for stakeholders, especially those from indigenous communities to represent their heritage values in such a way that others will understand. The language of value ascription needs understanding here. I follow Tuner *et al* (2011) to propose an intersubjective dialogue whereby metaphorical aids could be used to explain values of heritage. Turner *et al* (2011) suggest that in environmental decision making, the comparison of metaphor that may have meaning to others from a different culture may be an effective means to convey cultural loss (Turner *et al*, 2011: 8). For example, he says, “describing a sacred cave or prayer pool as ‘a cathedral’ may help those without experience in indigenous sacred geography to better understand a value. Framing a traditional harvesting area as a ‘grocery store’ can convey its importance in terms

of providing food security (Turner *et al*, 2011: 8). Although the use of narratives, metaphors, cultural practices, or place names may help indigenous and local people express what matters to them meaningfully, other experts among the negotiators such as planners, policy makers, and other stakeholders should not be indifferent to such messages or express uncertainty on how to deal with them in a climate decision-making context. They must find ways to express and compare losses or gains across categories of impact and across various management or policy alternatives under consideration.

Furthermore, another important question that I think could be raised is how to do we recognize the historical baseline for evaluating cultural heritage losses? Recognizing the historical baseline for evaluating cultural losses is indeed a critical issue and one at the base of climate change ethics. Arguably, the reason why losses to cultural heritage remains invisible is because of how long it took before the nuances of cultural heritage could be recognised by World Heritage Convention (WHC).⁷³ The usual choice of baseline for making assessments on evaluating cultural losses in the context of climate change might not be definitive, I can only suggest that acknowledging, respecting, and addressing the historical, current, and potential future losses to cultural heritage by those who have contributed most to anthropogenic climate change must be a request to demonstrate an empathetic understanding of climate justice rather than an entitlement thinking about climate justice. However, since the current conditions of cultural heritage loss have not been addressed in the varied loss and damage that the people in developing countries experience, when deciding the historical baseline for cultural heritage loss from climate change, considering only the present prevailing situation will represent profound injustice and another form of invisible loss. Also, the past socio-political and economic circumstances that have supported climate change must be keenly checkmated so that future loss to cultural heritage from climate change can be put into perspective and evaluated more accurately.

In addition, questions concerning who determines the important cultural heritage that must be considered in climate negotiations, and how can it be done without any imposition could be raise. I have suggested in Chapter two a discursive approach to understanding heritage. A discursive approach is very important to decide this. That is, the affected people must hold a sit in the table of negotiation and they must be heard in their own language. This approach

⁷³ What I have in mind here is for us to realize that it took the World Heritage Convention about 3 decades after its inception to consider intangible cultures as part of heritage. Only tangible heritage was recognized at the start of the convention in 1972.

will deepen the understanding of what people really value. This approach would also help to understand that the values that people hold only influence, but are not identical with, what they value. Although the two perspectives are often conflated if not confused. Moreover, what people say they value may not necessarily lead them to act in ways that are compatible with what they value. Climate impact assessments that incorporate values and cultural preferences attempt to reveal this social complexity. Hence all parties and not some perceived experts must be engaged in determining tangible and intangible heritage that are vulnerable to climate change. The challenge of formalizing heritage values will require a comparison of values using inter-subjective metaphors like I have earlier explained. This is important for deciding what constitutes vulnerable cultural heritage in the context of climate change. This approach adopts a democratic style that do not consign right of self-determination which is a powerful mobilizing instrument with which to resist involuntary supremacy. Hence, a climate negotiation that allows for a discursive approach to heritage values expresses consideration for self-determination for all stakeholders.

Finally, some might ask, which should be the focus - compensation, adaptation, or mitigation because the loss of heritage from climate change seems inevitable and how practical is the strategy that will be adopted? I agree that the loss of cultural heritage is inevitable, but one cannot decidedly make a choice from the outset, on the plan towards addressing how to deal with the loss of cultural heritage due to climate change. It will depend on the priorities of communities and their long-term sustenance. I propose a hybrid of all these measures. Considering the difficulties in dealing with the multitude of important cultural heritage for a just and equitable climate policy, how practical is this proposal. Given the nature of the indirect, cumulative, and interconnected invisible losses to cultural heritage, it seems unlikely that they can be addressed by simple tweaks of climate justice status quo. No doubt, it is going to be difficult in practice to incorporate multiple and marginalized voices and plural values into robust and replicable decision-making. However, what is needed is a commitment to explore new and innovative alternatives that will produce an inclusive global climate treaty. This will require a multi-dimensional framework that allows fundamentally different kinds of costs and benefits to be given equal visibility and standing in the process.

6.4: Towards a Just Climate Policy for Africa

Since 1992, when UNFCCC was formed, getting to reach a normative consensus on what to do to curb climate change has been allowed to drag for about 30 years period. From Kyoto in

1997 to Paris Agreement in 2015, nothing substantive has been achieved (even with the expertise knowledge of the West) to redeem the climate. Is this not a demonstration that our understanding of humanity is gradually liquidating? This political inertia is somewhat surprising, given the urgent and irreversible threat that the adverse effects that climate change presents to human beings and the planet at large. Such an extensive period of sluggishness may lead the global community, to think that protecting humankind is not a serious concern to stakeholders. Aside from that, I think that the failure to put forward a binding agreement and the neglect of those whose significant heritage values are destroyed in Africa may be indicative of a breakdown of fundamental normative decision-making processes that has personhood at its root.

Climate change might be known, thought and taught as a global phenomenon, but it is clear that the experience of climate change is not the same everywhere. The people of Africa are vulnerable to, and indeed have suffered from climate change not only in its physical structure but also its critical heritage values. Recall that adaptive capacity to climate change in Africa is low and for a continent filled with poor citizens, migrants and refugees, the threats of climate change can only make the continent worse-off. The dependence of most of its people on the environment means that there is something that must be understood about what they are feeling regarding the impact of climate change on their cultural wellbeing. African societies cannot bear, and should not be expected to bear, all adaptation costs on their own. This would be both an impossibility and a gross injustice. It will be inconsiderate to ask Africans to adapt to a problem they had little or no responsibility for causing, and whose devastating impacts they are bearing the brunt of.

How to understand, appreciate and cater for the destruction of Africa's critical heritage assets by climate change should be a major policy objective for climate negotiators. However, it is not immediately apparent how climate justice and policy will meet this objective other than through willingness to start out as the first important step. The capacity to affect and act on the climate perturbations on Africa's heritage must start with a commitment to articulate the crucial value of cultural heritage by demonstrating and communicating it and more so, inspiring others to do the same. Thus, climate change negotiations should altogether encourage a climate justice approach that allows for inter-subjective dialogue among cultures on their experience of climate change and the perceived plans towards mitigation, adaptation and possibly compensation must be decided in consideration of these differential vulnerabilities. The benefits of this approach to climate policy will far exceed beyond

economic development of Africa. It will also have a net positive impact on the people's socio-cultural lives.

For this to become a reality, the ambivalence in the World Heritage Convention Article must be reviewed. For instance, the wording of Article 4 of the World Heritage Convention⁷⁴ strongly suggests that states parties have the duty to take measures in order to tackle climate change. However, the extent of this obligation is open to debate. Is it sufficient to undertake adaptation measures to react to the consequences of climate change or do states parties have to become active in mitigation, most notably with a view to reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions? The majority of scholars have concluded that states parties are obliged to take all feasible adaptation measures to address the impacts of climate change on the world heritage properties on their territory (Quirico 2012; Thorson 2009).

Climate decision making processes must not focus only on what politicians, lawyers, or scientists have identified as important. If climate discussion only concerns factors that are politically prominent, professionally interesting, readily identifiable, or easily quantifiable, it might make it easier to overlook the perspectives of those who are the most affected but have no recognizable voice. Climate justice discourse and policy done in isolation, separated from due procedural justice by clinging to so-called formal laws may have the unintentional effect of disconnecting the ground of humanity. That is, by neglecting the people whose cultural heritage is affected by climate change in global climate policy formulation, such policy will be inhumane. A robust and humane climate treaty is only possible through an inclusive consultation process that allows affected people to express themselves fully in their own words, facilitates the comprehension of stakeholders through culturally appropriate and mutually understandable means, and creates a place for the consideration of cultural perspectives and values in ways that are decision relevant, using measures that successfully bring into the equation, attributes that were previously felt to be intangible or invisible.

6.5: Conclusion

⁷⁴ Article 4 states that: The *World Heritage Convention* is a unique multilateral environmental agreement as it recognizes that parts of the cultural and natural heritage are of outstanding universal value and therefore need to be preserved as part of the heritage of humankind. The key test for inclusion of cultural and natural properties on the World Heritage List is that of meeting the criteria of outstanding universal value (OUV), which are assessed through a rigorous evaluation process by the Advisory Bodies of the *World Heritage Convention*. Once the properties are inscribed on the World Heritage List, they benefit from the *World Heritage Convention* as an important tool for international cooperation; however, their conservation and management is the primary responsibility of the State Party where the property is located. See World Heritage Report

I have discussed the implications of the climate ethics theory that I offer for mitigation, adaptation and compensation as climate responses. I argued that these conventional responses will need to be culturally sensitive to address the impacts of climate change on cultural heritage and values. To effectively address the impacts of climate change on cultural heritage, the combination of these approaches to climate response is indeed important must be wrapped around the consideration of the significance of culture for those affected to avoid cultural injustice. Mitigation and adaptation plans can be deployed to accommodate the cultural vulnerabilities of Africans whose experience of climate change reverberates more in their socio-cultural environment. Furthermore, I address some hypothetical questions that could be raised against the plausibility of a climate ethics theory that is sensitive to cultural considerations. Finally, I suggest how the cultural theory of climate change that I offer, if adopted, will contribute to a robust global climate treaty for Africa.

CONCLUSION

The main goal of this dissertation was to proffer a plausible climate ethics theory that will address the related questions about how cultural heritage devastation due to climate change, can best be treated in an overall conception of climate justice. It proceeds by highlighting the current state of climate impacts on tangible and intangible cultural heritage. The argument substantiated in this dissertation is that climate ethics and climate justice discourse must expand its parameters, to consider more seriously the impacts of climate change on cultural heritage values.

The argument for climate ethics that is sensitive to the legitimacy of cultural values put forward in this dissertation had four main steps. The first step was to identify, in a morally compelling manner, the impacts of climate change on the tangible and intangible heritage values in Africa. By so doing, the dissertation claims that it is unjust for climate ethics discourse to ignore this dimension of climate change impact, particularly on the African continent. The second step investigated the value of cultural heritage to determine what is lost and how it matters to the people that are affected. The dissertation provided a normative analysis of culture in environmentally sustainable and morally appropriate ways to argue that what is lost when climate change affects cultural heritage is a significant cultural asset and cannot be side-lined in climate ethics and policy discourse. The third step explored the climate justice theories that have been put forward. The aim was to point out their failure that despite claiming that climate change is a global phenomenon, their normative principles do not account for how to deal with cultural heritage loss. The dissertation claims that this is an injustice that cannot be left unattended. To address this injustice, this dissertation evaluates the assumptions of current climate justice discourse to point out the limitations of the idea of justice that undergird their theory. The fourth step provides a plausible climate ethics theory that deals with the dimension of climate impact on cultural heritage. Specifically, this dissertation applies the African conception of personhood, to provide a normative basis for a different but instinctive and instrumental understanding of climate justice. This is the core structure of the argument.

The arguments in this dissertation were explicitly discussed in six chapters. I started with an analysis of climate impacts on Africa's cultural heritage. I discussed how climate change affects cultural heritage values in a complex way, that is not discernible to climate ethicists and policy-makers. I underscored how the impacts of climate change deny, damages, and destroys cultural heritage values in Africa. From this understanding, I argued that it is unjust

to ignore this dimension of climate change impact. In the second chapter, I noted that the reason for the insufficient treatment that cultural heritage loss has received could be connected to the misunderstanding of the value of cultural heritage in this global age. Hence, the dissertation discussed the normative value of cultural heritage in environmentally sustainable and morally appropriate ways. It argued that what is lost when climate change affects cultural heritage is a significant cultural asset that is connected to the survival and sustenance of local people in developing countries. The dissertation submits in the chapter that, based on the understanding of the value of what is lost when climate change affects cultural heritage, this dimension of impact ought to be seriously considered in climate ethics and policy discourse.

The dissertation proceeded in the third chapter to address the global justice implications of the destruction of Africa's cultural heritage by climate change. Here, the dissertation explained the connection between cultural heritage loss and global justice, noting that developing countries who suffer cultural heritage loss see it as a setback for their development. As such, it must be treated as an issue of global justice simply because the powerful and polluting nations of the Global South are responsible for causing climate change and also have the capacity to respond to climate change. The global justice implications of cultural heritage loss to climate change demand sufficient attention. In chapter four, the dissertation subjected some of the mainstream climate justice proposals to critical evaluation. The dissertation offered a different possible critique of current approaches to climate justice to show how they have furthered cultural injustice. Through the metaphor of the "cultural storm," the chapter critiqued current climate ethics theory on two accounts. First, the dissertation cautioned the assumptions in current climate ethics theory that have made it possible to unreflexively engage the impact of climate change on cultural heritage. Second, the dissertation argues that the understanding of justice that undergird most climate justice theories pose normative challenges for developing a plausible climate justice theory that is sensitive to the destruction of cultural heritage.

In chapter five of this dissertation, I offered a plausible climate ethics theory that recognizes culturally embedded ideas of personhood. In this connection, the dissertation showed in this chapter that climate justice must not only demand equity. In addition, it ought to ensure that we respond to the demands of personhood, a notion that has one single rule - not to reduce other persons to anything less than the common humanity we share. Hence, the climate ethics theory that I offered proposed three notions of justice informed by the African conception of

personhood. They include mutual recognition, inclusive deliberations (and relational entitlement) and finally, responsive action. The dissertation contended that these three notions would provide a new understanding of climate justice in a manner that empathetically prioritize considerations of climate impacts on human beings. At the same time, it will motivate responsive action in the face of the imploding climate doom that human beings are locked in. In the sixth chapter of this dissertation, I apply the climate ethics theory that I offer to current global responses in the form of mitigation, adaptation and compensation in a way that the impacts of climate change on Africa's cultural heritage and values will be taken seriously.

Having recapped the main moves of this dissertation, it is time to review some of its contributions. I will highlight three main contributions of this dissertation. First, the main contribution of this dissertation is its subject matter - cultural heritage in the era of climate change. That is, through the ideas in this dissertation, it has become clearer that cultural heritage loss to climate change will be a major challenge for climate policy-making, yet in political philosophy, the issue has received scant treatment. In the research works dedicated to the normative questions raised by climate change, the focus, thus far, has been on the account that takes justice seriously. I do not underestimate the importance of these approaches. The ideas they present are helpful when dealing with the negative impacts of climate change on cultural heritage. However, as I have shown in this dissertation, the ethical implications of cultural heritage loss in the context of climate change are broader than what has been discussed by these perspectives. My dissertation turns the spotlights on the under-investigated questions relating to cultural heritage loss to remedy this narrative deficit in climate ethics discourse. I develop a nuanced argument that provides a normative basis for articulating the impacts of climate change on cultural heritage. By so doing, I offer how such dimension of impact can be addressed. This is, to my knowledge, the first thorough normative analysis of climate change's impact on cultural heritage.

Second, in recent times, there have been growing interests in the political and moral significance of culture.⁷⁵ With my discussion of the significance of cultural heritage in this environmental age, I add another layer to the understanding of culture (although from the back end of heritage) in cultural studies literature. Furthermore, the discursive approach to cultural heritage that I adopt provides a pattern for dealing with cultural loss in climate

⁷⁵ Here, I have in mind the way culture has been a veritable marker of identity politics.

policy. I have provided principles that could help determine how the obligations of mitigation, adaptation and compensation for climate negotiations can be furthered. This theoretical innovation does not come from the suggestion of these three obligations, rather, it is found in the way I bring them together in a cohesive manner to deal with cultural heritage devastation from climate change. My approach has opened a new way of looking at climate duties for responding to cultural heritage loss. Such an outlook can be fruitful beyond the relatively narrow focus of mainstream theories of climate ethics. It is also useful to note that current writing on climate ethics is yet to fully apply the notion of personhood. In this regard, my work is also one way to test the value and validity of ideas emerging from this area of inquiry.

Third, the thesis that I have pursued in this dissertation, not only adds a new understanding of climate justice, it also developed a specific type of argument within this literature. I situate climate change as a cultural phenomenon and address its impacts on cultural heritage and values. From this account, I ground obligations for responsive climate action on three important notions of personhood in Africa. It is possible to generalize these notions to claim that the normatively significant idea of personhood can contribute to global climate negotiations. This theory is an addition to the literature on climate ethics literature.

Going forward, let me suggest two areas that should be addressed in future inquiries on the impact of climate change on cultural heritage. One way to move forward will be to work out a more specific scheme of allocation that shows what each state has to do in terms of providing adaptation and compensation for cultural heritage loss. The second area that could be explored more in-depth is global justice and cultural heritage loss. Some philosophers think that climate justice should be considered alongside global justice issues such as poverty and development.⁷⁶ There is more work to be done on how my argument can be integrated into global climate justice at large. It will also be interesting to investigate the relations between my conclusions and other arguments for different climate obligations, find out where they overlap, where different claims reinforce a similar conclusion, and where clashes demand some trade-offs.

⁷⁶ For example, Caney 2014; Moellendorf 2014

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