

THE EFFECT OF RACIAL RESENTMENT ON SUPPORT FOR DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY

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A thesis submitted to the faculty of The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science.

Chapel Hill
2022

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ABSTRACT

ERIC PARAJON. The Effect of Racial Resentment on Support for Domestic and International Climate Policy. (Under the direction of CAMERON BALLARD-ROSA)

Using data from the 2020 Cooperative Election Study, I investigate the relationship between feelings of racial resentment and approval of climate policy and explore how that relationship varies by type of agreement. I seek to extend an emerging literature that has demonstrated a link between racial attitudes and approval for climate policy by exploring how feelings of racial resentment shape public support for international climate cooperation. I find support for the linkage between heightened levels of racial resentment and reduced support for climate policy among those who identify as Republicans, Democrats, and independents. Additionally, for Republicans and independents, I find that the effect of racial resentment at reducing support for climate action is stronger when the climate action in question is U.S. involvement in an international agreement. My findings provide insight into the conditions that influence support for both domestic and international climate policy among members of the American public.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CES	Cooperative election study
CI	Confidence interval
COP21	The Paris agreement
CPP	Clean power plan
FIRE	Fear, acknowledgment of institutional racism, and racial empathy
OLS	Ordinary least squares
RR	Racial resentment
US	United States

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

While debate rages, particularly in the United States (U.S.) over the existence of anthropogenic climate change, there is little doubt about the current impact of climate change, human caused or not, in countries around the world. The impact of severe weather, sea level rise, drought, and other climate effects are felt throughout the globe. It is important to note that the effects of climate change are not evenly felt throughout the world. Newell (2005) writes that the effects of environmental devastation are experienced differently around the world due to “entrenched patterns of social inequality etched along racial, class and gender lines” (Newell 2005, 73). Therefore, successfully addressing the impacts of global climate change in an effective and equitable manner is an immensely complex and difficult task.

As a result of this complexity, negotiating successful climate agreements often requires significant political capital. The task of negotiating climate agreements that domestic audiences can approve of is made even more difficult in the U.S., as climate change is polarized along political (Egan and Mullin 2017) and racial (Leiserowitz and Akerlof 2010) lines. One recent example of both a successful negotiation and a subsequent political battle, is the agreement struck during the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) COP21 meeting, more commonly referred to as the Paris Agreement or COP21 agreement. The COP21 agreement is the largest effort to date to coordinate global policy related to climate change and the emissions of greenhouse gasses. The agreement became a hot button political issue during the 2016 Presidential election, with then candidates, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, on opposite sides. Notably, former U.S. President Barack Obama, under whom the U.S. helped negotiate the agreement, lacked political support to get the agreement approved by the U.S. Senate

and COP21 was instead approved by executive order. For these reasons, it is crucial to study public support for international climate agreements. For meaningful international agreements to stick, citizens need to approve of them.

I suggest a pivotal role for feelings of racial resentment in influencing public support for both domestic and international efforts to address climate change. Crucially, I introduce a framework in which feelings of racial resentment have differential effects based on the *type* of climate action. In doing so, I seek to bridge a divide between literature from American Politics which repeatedly finds that race and feelings of racial prejudice are critical to how American's form opinions about policies, and findings from international political economy concerning non-material explanations for international policy preferences. Here, I leverage the fact that climate policy can be focused on *both* international or domestic aspects of the climate crisis. For example, former President Obama supported both an international climate agreement, the Paris Climate Agreement, and a domestic climate proposal, the Clean Power Plan (CPP).

In this way, environmental agreements are different from other types of agreements, including trade or security agreements, because a state can take unilateral domestic action. As a result, I am able to explore the differential effects of climate agreements, which can have an international or domestic focus on the degree to which feelings of racial resentment condition public support for the policy. Therefore, climate policy represents an ideal issue area to study this potential variation.

Specifically, I propose that for individuals with high levels of racial resentment, international agreements spark feelings that the individuals benefiting from the agreement are undeserving and prime feelings of otherness and ethnocentrism. Conversely, domestic climate policy will only prime feelings that the individuals who may benefit from the policy are undeserving. In this way, perceptions of race serve as a lens for individuals with high levels of racial resentment to determine who deserves to benefit from a policy action. As a result, while feelings of racial resentment will reduce support for both domestic and

international climate policy, I expect that the effects will be greater for international action to address climate policy like the Paris Agreement (COP21).

CHAPTER 2: THEORY

Section 2.1 Race As a Central Feature in American Politics

Scholars systematically studying American public opinion have long noted the centrality of race among members of the mass public. Converse (1964) observed in his ground-breaking study that beliefs about race among the mass public are highly central and visible (Converse 1964, 238). Thus, while members of the public may not hold many stable policy preferences, opinions about race are likely to be highly salient and stable. Scholars building on this line of research continue to find that public opinion concerning race is often far more coherent than opinion on other topics and difficult to change (Kinder and Sanders 1996). Additionally, opinion about Black Americans among white Americans is frequently based on, perceived, material interest (Giles and Evans 1986). Simply put, whites who exhibit high levels of racial resentment are concerned that resources, such as action to address climate change, will be used on the interests of Black Americans.¹ This resentment based on material interests causes a variety of spillover effects, whereby public opinion on issues that are not explicitly racial become racialized.

Devos and Banaji (2005) introduced an alternative and related pathway whereby whites are viewed by the public as “more American” than other racial or ethnic groups (Devos and Banaji 2005, 447). Their survey based research found that whites are more frequently associated with being American than Asian Americans or Black Americans. As a result, it is clear that feelings of racial resentment can greatly influence public opinion and even

1. Historically prominent environmental scholars such as Garrett Hardin have proposed racist and classist ideas, including race-based eugenics and anti-immigration policies, for how to address the core motivating problem in international environmental politics the tragedy of the commons (Mildenberger 2019), which entail how individuals acting independently and rationally according to each other’s self-interest behave contrary to the best interests of the whole by depleting common resources (Ostrom 1999). In this way, racism has also influenced scholarly opinions concerning resource competition.

alter who the public views as “true” Americans.

A recent area of literature in American politics has shed light on the degree to which racial attitudes can influence American public opinion about issues that are not explicitly racial. Hutchings and Valentino (2004, 390) finds persistent evidence that “white racial attitudes also predict opinions about nonracial issues”. In this way, nonracial issues can act to prime white Americans to consider the issue along racial lines. Scholars have found evidence for this phenomenon in a variety of areas, including welfare spending (Gilens 2009), scholarship programs (Feldman and Huddy 2005) and state employment assistance (DeSante 2013). In all of these cases, the perceived race of the beneficiaries from these policies influences public approval for the policy.

Recent scholarship has found increased support for the idea that racial attitudes can influence American public opinion. For example, Harell and Lieberman (2021) find that highlighting the racial disparities in the effects of COVID-19, can cause a backlash effect among white respondents who exhibit high levels of racial resentment. This backlash reduces their overall support for policies to mitigate the effects of COVID-19 and reduces perceptions that COVID-19 is a risk to personal health (Harell and Lieberman 2021, 6). Additionally, Skinner-Dorkenoo et al. (2022) finds that among white respondents, regardless of political leanings, receiving information about the systemic health inequalities that caused racial disparities in the effects of COVID-19, “reduced fear of COVID-19, empathy for those vulnerable to COVID-19, and support for safety precautions” (Skinner-Dorkenoo et al. 2022, 2). Individuals who exhibit higher levels of racial resentment are less likely to perceive risk from the COVID-19 pandemic and less likely to support policies to mitigate the effects of COVID-19 because they perceive those policies as benefiting non-white Americans and also do not feel at risk themselves.

These results are similar to findings that feelings of racial resentment influence domestic tax preferences. Ballard-Rosa, Martin, and Scheve (2017) provide evidence that white Americans with higher levels of racial resentment desire lower taxes on wealthy Americans

who they believe are more likely to be white (Ballard-Rosa, Martin, and Scheve 2017, 12). Because income and race are correlated (Alesina, Glaeser, and Glaeser 2004) this finding suggests that whites who exhibit higher levels of racial resentment are more opposed to income redistribution because they do not want poorer Black people to benefit.

Jardina (2019) summarizes this line of logic noting “many whites are supportive of more government assistance, but primarily when they believe that assistance is directed at their group” (Jardina 2019, 4). It is clear that for many Americans high in feelings of racial animus, race serves as an informational cue when deciding whether to support a policy.

Section 2.2 The Spillover of Racialization

This “spillover of racialization” (Tesler 2016) phenomenon has only strengthened since the Obama presidency and is observed in a variety of topics including healthcare (Tesler 2012), public opinion about the existence of global warming (Benegal 2018), support for remediating water quality issues (Dietz et al. 2018), and electoral fairness (Appleby and Federico 2018). This line of research has served to formalize the linkage between racial attitudes and shifting public opinion about nonracial issues, crucially arguing that the election of the first Black President of the United States, Barack Obama, created a new mechanism through which nonracial issues may be seen in a racialized light.

Tesler (2012) argues that President Obama’s association with certain issues, like healthcare, serves to split public opinion by racial attitudes and race. He notes that the “the salient social characteristics of elite sources have the potential to activate considerations in the realms of race, religion, and gender” (Tesler 2012, 692). Tesler then utilizes Kinder and Sanders (1996) racial resentment scale to test the linkage between a respondent’s level of racial resentment and their approval of healthcare spending, finding a strong relationship. While Obama was likely linked more closely to health care than environmental action, his administration did strongly support several policies to mitigate climate action, including the Clean Power Plant Rules, and the aforementioned COP21 agreement. For

this reason, I posit that similar dynamics may hold for environmental policy. Individuals who score highly on a scale of racial resentment will be more likely to view environmental policy as benefiting specifically Black Americans, partially because of this association between Obama and climate action and therefore, be less supportive of environmental action than those who score lower on the scale.

Section 2.3 Existing Explanations for Public Support for Environmental Action

To date, existing explanations for support for environmental action among the American public are lacking both in addressing the role of racial identity and racial attitudes.² The climate opinion literature has largely focused on exploring the partisan divide in support for climate action.

In Aklin and Urpelainen (2018) for example, the authors explore the aggressive growth of renewable energy as a share of global energy consumption. However, they find that the growth rate varies considerably across countries. Motivated by this puzzle, they explore in a series of case studies how large energy companies in the United States were able to resist the external shocks that took over in Europe and successfully politicize renewable energy in the U.S. (Aklin and Urpelainen 2018, 139). As a result, while President Carter was able to successfully implement reforms and put policies in place that encouraged renewable energy investment after the oil crises of the 1970s, a swift political backlash occurred, and the business community linked with the Republican Party to push back against action to address climate change. The American political parties became locked into this position. Thus, partisans are able to effectively take cues from their respective political party.

This fits in with broader research on the nature of American opinion regarding foreign policy issues. Lippmann (1946) finds that public opinion is both volatile and subject to shifting continuously and that the public is not knowledgeable about a wide array of

2. The notable exceptions are Benegal (2018) and Benegal and Holman (2021).

policy issues, and in particular knows relatively little about foreign policy. Zaller (1992) interrogates individual opinions and finds that individuals rarely have fixed attitudes and largely construct their opinions on impulse leaving room for partisan cues to shape their opinions (Zaller 1992).³

These cues can often come from political parties themselves.⁴ Members of the Republican Party remain far less likely to support efforts to address climate change or to care about environmental issues. McCright and Dunlap (2013) explores this divide and argues that individuals more frequently engage in partisan motivated reasoning when they perceive the issue as in-group out-group issue. People agree with those they assume have similar political ideology to themselves, and often dismiss the opinions of those they assume have a different political ideology (Egan and Mullin 2017; Kahan 2013; McCright and Dunlap 2013). An increasingly polarized political environment increases the impact of party endorsement on public approval while decreasing the impact of substantive information. Recent work including (McCright and Dunlap 2011) has identified white males as the *least* likely Americans to support action to address climate change.

This result is perhaps not surprising because the effects of both a changing climate and environmental concerns are unequal at a racial level. Scholars studying the differential effects of climate change and broader environmental impacts have found consistent evidence that Black Americans are the group most negatively impacted by a changing climate (Bullard 2018; Lazarus 2000; Newell 2005). I argue that this disparity in the effects of climate impacts, a renewed focus on environmental justice activism⁵ and the connection between Obama and environmental policy (Benegal 2018), combine to increase the propensity for Americans high in feelings of racial resentment to view climate action through a racial lens.

3. Again it is important to note that mass opinion concerning race is an outlier in terms of an issue that members of the public have consistent views on.

4. Lupia and McCubbins (1998) argues commonality of interest (trustworthiness) influences the ability of a cue to be perceived as persuasive by the public.

5. See, for example, Bullard and Johnson (2009).

Additionally, high-profile figures in the Democratic Party are now explicitly linking racial issues to climate policy. For example, then Senator, now Vice President Kamala Harris was instrumental alongside Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez in introducing the Climate Equity Act which seeks to establish a Climate and Environmental Equity Office within the Congressional Budget Office (Johnson 2020). Another high profile climate policy, The Green New Deal also supported by Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Vice President Kamala Harris, has perhaps faced the most criticism of any progressive climate policy.⁶ It is also important to note that the sponsors of the Green New Deal have directly placed racial equity at the forefront of the plan. At a press conference in support of the bill, Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez stated “we must recognize in legislation that the trampling of indigenous rights is a cause of climate change, that the trampling of racial justice is a cause of climate change” (Hutzler 2021). Progressive climate policies that advocate for explicit action on climate justice by linking racial justice and climate policy led by non-white members of Congress have come under fire from Democrats and Republicans alike as overly broad and unrealistic.

Political leaders have criticized the economics and scale of the plan, with former Senator Doug Jones releasing a statement against the Green New Deal, where he argued the policy was “too broad and went too far” Jones (2019). Republican Senator John Barrasso also seized on the cost of the plan, stating “this radical socialist legislation would bankrupt the nation” (Barrasso 2021). Additionally, Former President Trump exclaimed that the Green New Deal was so expensive that if the U.S. approved the policy they will “be a Ninth World country, not a Third World country — a Ninth World country!” (Lapin 2020). While these statements do not explicitly mention race, for individuals high in racial resentment who view deservingness through the lens of race the meaning is clear, policies that have components that may help Black Americans are not worth the cost.

These remarks mentioned above are remarkably similar to complaints about other

6. See Galvin and Healy (2020) for details on the policy proposal.

potentially racialized policy areas, such as welfare (Gilens 2009). Overall, as Benegal and Holman (2021) notes, “opponents of these policies have drawn on similar themes of resentment and grievance in criticizing the Green New Deal and its proponents” Benegal and Holman (2021, 1909). Regardless of the merits of the specific climate policy, it is clear that some political leaders are arguing that climate policies that include components of racial justice are a step too far. For those high in racial resentment who are predisposed to oppose policy that may benefit Black Americans, the elite rhetoric serves to further reduce their support of climate policy. Individuals who are racially prejudiced are more likely to view climate policy through the lens of racial resentment, activating feelings of racial threat (Jardina 2019), and accordingly less likely to favor climate policies which they perceive as benefiting non-white individuals.

As a result of this emphasis on environmental justice and environmental racism combined with former President Obama’s connection to the most recent high-profile environmental agreement COP21, I argue that feelings of racial resentment rather than purely partisan beliefs are a crucial driver in public opinion regarding climate action. Here it is useful to note that partisan beliefs about climate change are not without dissenters. For example, a recent study by Pew Research Center found that 17% of Democrats believed policies to reduce the effects of climate change generally “make no difference”, and 10% answered that they “do more harm than good”. On the flip side, 34% of Republicans responded that climate policies “do more good than harm” (Funk and Hefferon 2019).

It is possible to conceptualize that some of this within party variation is due to opinions about race among partisans. Perhaps, there is something of a backlash effect among Democrats who harbor significant racial resentment who previously held pro-climate beliefs, but no longer do. In emphasizing the role of racial resentment in reducing the probability of public support for climate policy, I build on a small but growing area of the environmental politics literature.

Benegal and Holman (2021) is perhaps the most notable recent work seeking to ad-

dress the role of racial attitudes in influencing public opinion concerning environmental action. The authors find that “those individuals who hold racist views are more likely to both disagree with the scientific consensus on climate change and oppose climate policy making” (Benegal and Holman 2021, 1917). Additionally, they find a notable effect whereby higher levels of educational attainment reduces the likelihood of expressing racial prejudice and not being supportive of climate action. However, for those with racially prejudiced views, higher levels of education further reduces support for policies to address climate change across the partisan spectrum. These results indicate the complex dynamics through which racial attitudes influence support for climate action.

Benegal (2018) also finds support for the racialization hypotheses, finding that after Obama’s election, race became a highly significant predictor of belief in a changing climate. Additionally, Benegal (2018) finds evidence that respondents with higher levels of racial resentment are also less likely to believe global warming is happening. Again, these findings are suggestive that while partisanship is certainly a crucial factor in determining public support for climate change, the role of identity and feelings of racial prejudice also drives public opinion about climate policy.

Section 2.4 Differential Effects of Racial Resentment Based on Policy Type

I seek to build on the work outlined above, and propose that due to links between former President Obama and the most recent high-profile international climate agreement, COP21 (Paris) climate agreement, international climate action will be especially prone to racialization. In this way, my argument is different from previous work identifying a possible linkage between feelings of racial resentment and opinion about climate change (Benegal 2018; Benegal and Holman 2021). While these papers do find evidence that feelings of racial resentment influences belief in climate change, these papers largely utilize abstract questions compared to actual agreements and focused only on domestic climate policy.

I propose that feelings of racial resentment have a differential effect depending on the

nature of the climate policy in question. I suggest that both the explicitly racial and economic elements of racial resentment will act in different ways to reduce support for climate action.⁷ Kam and Burge (2018) finds that when both white and Black Americans consider the core questions that make up the racial resentment scale “themes of individualism, and themes of discrimination stream through their minds” (Kam and Burge 2018, 318). In this way, American’s with high levels of racial resentment are likely tapping into elements of explicit racism (fear of non-whites) and principled conservative ideology (norms such as individualism and hard-work). For those individuals with high-levels of racial resentment, these factors combine to reduce support for the already racialized policy of domestic and international climate action.

International climate action is already a difficult sell for members of the public (Stavins 2011; Tingley and Tomz 2014) and suffers an additional dilemma of activating feelings of competition and sociotropic perceptions. Mansfield and Mutz (2009) hypothesize that an individual’s attitudes towards trade policy are impacted by sociotropic perceptions, or perceptions of how the country as a whole is affected. The authors find an individual’s trade attitudes are strongly influenced by perceptions of how trade influences the U.S. economy, and that feelings of isolationism and ethnocentrism are associated with preferences for trade protectionism (Mansfield and Mutz 2009). Americans who believe trade agreements unfairly benefit other countries at the expense of the U.S. are more likely to be xenophobic and exhibit ethnocentric beliefs. These results are similar to other findings that suggest that perceptions of how agreements influence the country as a whole are highly influential determinants of an individual’s preferences (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006; Mutz and Lee 2020; Rho and Tomz 2017).

However, less scholarly attention has been paid to the role that an individual’s race or their perceptions of race may play in their preferences for international cooperation. Mutz, Mansfield, and Kim (2021) find evidence that the perceived dominant racial group

7. See Feldman and Huddy (2005) and DeSante (2013) for an explanation of how racial attitudes may work to influence the public.

of a country (white or non-white) influences the willingness of white Americans to support trade with that country (Mutz, Mansfield, and Kim 2021, 564). Further exploring the role of race and perceptions of race is an important piece to the puzzle when seeking to explore how individuals form their international policy preferences.

Just as “trade has become yet another ‘racialized’ issue” (Mutz, Mansfield, and Kim 2021, 562), I suggest that feelings of racial resentment combine with feelings of competition and sociotropic perceptions to negatively influence American’s opinion of international climate agreements. Respondents high in racial prejudice and xenophobia may perceive international climate agreements as costly to the American people and economy and will not want American resources to be spent to support interests (particularly those of non-whites) abroad.

For an example of this line of thinking, see former President Donald Trump’s statements on the COP21 agreement. When Trump announced the withdrawal of the U.S. from the agreement, he referred to the “draconian financial and economic burdens the agreement imposes on our country” (Trump 2017) and claimed the COP21 agreement “disadvantages the United States to the exclusive benefit of other countries” (Trump 2017). This logic likely strikes a note with individuals who perceive international climate agreements as only benefiting other nations.

Overall, these results from the international trade literature are similar to findings in global environmental governance that suggest that the perceived “fairness” of the agreement is a key determinant in public support for climate agreements (Bechtel and Scheve 2013; Huber, Wicki, and Bernauer 2019).⁸ Members of the American mass public are less likely to support climate action when they feel that undeserving countries are benefiting.

I suggest that feelings of racial resentment may serve as a lens through which individuals determine the fairness of climate policy. For individuals who exhibit higher levels of

8. It is worth noting that the evidence is *not* unanimous. Tingley and Tomz (2014) finds little effect for norms of reciprocity when studying the effect of environmentalist beliefs among U.S. respondents.

racial resentment, they may be more likely to perceive the beneficiaries of climate policy as Black and thus undeserving of support. As a result, I suggest that for individuals high in racial resentment, international climate agreements will also cause the respondent to consider feelings of ethnocentrism and competition towards the perceived “other” who may benefit from U.S. involvement in the agreement. This can occur domestically as well due to the connection between Obama and climate policy, an increased focus on environmental equity by Democrats and push-back by Republicans that has further racialized climate policy.

Section 2.5 Hypotheses

The above discussion leads me to three primary testable hypotheses:

H1: *Racial Resentment:* Individuals exhibiting higher levels of racial resentment (more racially conservative attitudes) will indicate **lower** probability of support for climate action.

H2: *International:* The effect of racial resentment at reducing the probability of support for climate action will be **stronger** when the climate action in question is U.S. involvement in an international agreement.

While I do not seek to discount the role of partisanship in how Americans form opinions regarding climate policy, my third hypothesis concerns establishing feelings of racial resentment as an alternative pathway to partisanship, through which respondent’s opinions concerning climate policy may be influenced. I argue that for individuals across the partisan spectrum, including political independents⁹, increased levels of racial resentment will be associated with lower support for climate policy.

H3: *Party:* The relationship between heightened levels of racial resentment and reduced support for climate action will hold for respondents who identify with the Republican

9. Hajnal and Lee (2011) find that political independents are a key voting block distinct from either Democrats or Republicans and encompass a large portion of Americans (31.1% of the CES sample).

Party, the Democratic Party and self-identified political independents.

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

Section 3.1 Data Source: CES

Throughout this paper, I rely on Common Content data from the 2020 Cooperative election study (CES) (Ansolabehere, Schaffner, and Luks 2021). This survey was fielded September 29th to November 2nd 2020 and the data made available March 26th 2021. The 2020 CES surveyed 61,000 American adults and was conducted online (Ansolabehere, Schaffner, and Luks 2021, 13). The CES is a tremendously valuable survey resource and used in a variety of political science research.¹

Section 3.2 Description of Key Variables

In this section, I describe my key variables of interest, starting with the racial resentment index. To create the racial resentment index, I rely on two questions from the CES where respondents were asked if they agree or disagree with the statements listed in Table 3.1 on a five-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree.²

After re-coding the questions so that higher values represented increased levels of racial resentment, I then followed Stephens-Dougan (2020) and re-scaled the two questions to create an overall index from 0-1 where 0.50 represents a racially moderate individual, above 0.5 conservative and below 0.5 a racially liberal respondent. The mean of the index was 0.48 with 44.7% of respondents sorted into the racially liberal category and 40.9% the racially conservative group. The full distribution is shown in Figure 3.1.

1. For a breakdown of the CES sample, see Table A.2.

2. I chose to use these two questions as they are the available questions from the four traditional racial resentment questions used in the historic battery (Kinder and Sanders 1996). However, the main results are robust to the inclusion of additional questions in the racial resentment index.

Table 3.1: Racial resentment questions: Independent Variable

Variable	Wording
RR_nofavors	Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors. [REVERSE CODED]
RR_slavery	Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class.




Figure 3.1: Distribution of Racial Resentment Across Respondents

For the two primary dependent variables, respondents were asked if they either supported or opposed the following decisions listed in Table 3.2. Crucially, the CES survey included questions about both domestic and international climate action.

I re-coded each of the dichotomous dependent variables so that a value of 100 represents the respondent approving of the climate action policy and a value of 0 represents the respondent opposing the climate action policy. Overall, 64.3% of respondents approved of COP21 and 62.7% of the CPP. Coded this way, the dependent variables measure the percentage of respondent who support the climate policies, and the racial resentment

Table 3.2: Dependent Variables

Type	Variable	Wording
International	climate_COP	For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose these decisions...Withdraw the United States from the Paris Climate Agreement [dichotomous]
Domestic	climate_CPP	For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose these decisions...Repeal the Clean Power Plant Rules (the Clean Power Plant rules would require power plants to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 32 percent by 2030) [dichotomous]

index coefficients are percentage-point changes in public support for the policies when moving from the the minimum racial resentment level of 0 (19.6% of respondents) to the maximum of 1 on the racial resentment scale (17.7% of all respondents). This way, the effects of racial resentment can be interpreted as a change in the probability of support. Again, I am primarily interested in observing any effects of feelings of racial resentment in driving down the probability that a respondent supports the climate action.

Section 3.3 Modeling Strategy

I employed ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with HC2 robust standard errors to correct for potential issues of heteroskedasticity to analyze the models of interest.³ I choose to employ a linear probability model rather than a logistic regression model for ease of interpretation.⁴

I also estimate all models with several control variables that could plausibly influence the dispersion of the racial resentment variable and views of climate change policy.⁵ I follow Stephens-Dougan (2020, 100) in including controls for education, political ideology,

3. This method is often called a “linear probability model” see Maddala (1986).

4. The main models of interest estimated as a logistic regression model are available in the appendix. The main substantive findings do not change.

5. The main models with all control variables shown, and models estimated without control variables are both shown in the appendix.

partisanship, gender, age, and region, I also add in controls for income and race.⁶ As I seek to establish that feelings of racial resentment influence approval of climate action in a separate pathway, it is necessary to include control variables for political ideology and partisanship.

I include a control variable for race because throughout the paper I include results for respondents who identify with a variety of racial or ethnic groups. This is in keeping with recent research on racial resentment, for example, Kam and Burge (2018) finds that feelings of racial resentment are linked to perceptions of negative traits for Black Americans for both white and Black respondents. Additionally, Henry and Sears (2002) finds the racial resentment scale is relatively reliable across racial groups. Therefore, as Smith, Kreitzer, and Suo (2020) write “there is no theoretical reason to exclude people of color from research on racial animus” (Smith, Kreitzer, and Suo 2020, 530). The main effects are substantially similar when I sub-sample the results to only include white respondents.⁷

The two primary models of interest are shown below:

$$\text{SupportCOP21} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Racial_resentment} + \beta_2 \text{Education} + \beta_3 \text{Gender} + \beta_4 \text{Census_Region} + \beta_5 \text{Income} + \beta_6 \text{Age} + \beta_7 \text{Political_Ideology} + \beta_8 \text{Political_Party} + \epsilon \quad (3.1)$$

$$\text{SupportCPP} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Racial_resentment} + \beta_2 \text{Education} + \beta_3 \text{Gender} + \beta_4 \text{Census_Region} + \beta_5 \text{Income} + \beta_6 \text{Age} + \beta_7 \text{Political_Ideology} + \beta_8 \text{Political_Party} + \epsilon \quad (3.2)$$

6. A description of those variables are available in the appendix. See Table A.1 and Table A.2.

7. See Table A.13 for a table of those results.

CHAPTER 4: RESULTS

In Figure 4.1, I visualize the effect of racial resentment on support for climate action as a band of support with a 95% confidence interval. This is a test of **H1**: *Racial Resentment* which suggests that increased feelings of racial resentment will be associated with a reduction in the probability of support for climate policy. The predicted probability plot, with all control variables set to their mean values, indicates that for both climate policies, as the respondent's level of racial resentment increases towards the maximum value of 1.00, the likelihood of supporting the climate action decreases. Each unit increase in racial resentment (0.125) in racial resentment is roughly equivalent to a 5.78 percentage point reduction in the probability of supporting COP21, and a 4.94 point reduction in the probability of supporting the CPP.

Additionally, there is evidence of a differential effect of racial resentment depending on the policy in question. Respondents who score higher on the racial resentment scale exhibit a larger statistically significant (95% CI) negative effect in reducing support for the international agreement rather than the domestic policy ranging from racial resentment values of 0.00 to 0.75. However, at the highest levels of racial resentment (0.875 and 1.00) the point estimates for the effect of racial resentment at reducing the probability of support for COP21 and the CPP are statistically indistinguishable from each other.¹ These results suggest that respondents who exhibit the highest levels of racial prejudice make a limited distinction between international and domestic climate agreements.

However, for the majority of respondents, those who score higher on the racial re-

1. The predicted probability of support for COP21 at a racial resentment level of 1.00 (maximum) is 51.25% of respondents (95% CI: 49.54, 53.94) and the the predicted probability for the CPP at the same level of racial resentment is 49.48% (95% CI: 47.53, 51.44) therefore the difference is not statistically significant.

sentiment scale exhibit a larger negative effect in reducing support for the international agreement rather than the domestic policy. This provides additional evidence for **H2: *International***, that the effect of racial resentment will be stronger in reducing support for international compared to domestic climate policy. In the remainder of this section, I further explore the effects of racial resentment at reducing support for climate action.




Figure 4.1: Overall Effect of Racial Resentment on Climate Policy Approval w/ 95% CI

Table 4.1 indicates that respondents with a racial resentment of 1, the maximum (17.7% of respondents) are, on average, 46.17 (95% CI: -47.67, -44.67) percentage points less likely to approve of the COP21 agreement compared to respondents with a racial resentment level of 0 (19.6% of respondents). To put this result another way, if there were two samples of 1000 respondents, one with all respondents with a racial resentment at the maximum, and the other with racial resentment at the minimum, then 462 more respondents would support the COP21 agreement in the racial resentment of 0 sample than the racial resentment of 1 sample.

Table 4.1: Overall Effect of Racial Resentment (lowest to the highest level) on Climate Policy Approval

	COP21	CPP
Racial Resentment	−46.168** (0.764)	−39.471** (0.851)
N	41,835	41,876
R ²	0.491	0.250

Coefficients reported from ordinary least squares regression models, with robust HC2 SEs in parentheses. Models include control variables for education, political ideology, partisanship, gender, age, region, income, and race. The dependent variables are coded 100 if the respondent indicated supporting the climate policy option and 0 if they opposed the climate policy option. Significance codes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, two-tailed tests.

For the Clean Power Plan (CPP), the results are similar, if less dramatic. Respondents with a racial resentment of 1, are, on average, 39.47 (95% CI: -41.13, -37.80) percentage points less likely to approve of the CPP agreement compared to respondents with an racial resentment level of 0. This result is visualized in Figure 4.2 with the dots representing point estimates and the horizontal black bars the 95% confidence interval. These results provide support for **H2: *International***, that the effect of racial resentment at reducing support for climate action is stronger when the climate action in question is U.S. involvement in an international agreement.




Figure 4.2: Effect of Racial Resentment (lowest to the highest level) on Climate Policy Approval

The Pearson correlation between the two dependent variables is 0.489 ($p < .000$) which suggests that while there is a significant correlation between the variables, there does exist a degree of variation between the two questions, thus indicating a potential role for a differential effect of racial resentment based on policy type. Thus, as an additional test of **H2: International** I sub-sampled the data to include only the 74.5% of all respondents who approved of one (or both) of the climate policies and created a composite dependent variable of the difference in approval for COP21 and the CPP.² This variable takes on a value of 1 if respondents only approved of the international agreement COP21, a value of 0 if they approved of both, and a value of -1 if they only approved of domestic policy the CPP. Overall, 16.3% of respondents approved of only the international agreement, 68.2% both, and 15.5% only the domestic policy.

Next, I ran an OLS model regressing the respondent's level of racial resentment on

2. The results are similar if I conduct the analysis on the entire sample instead.

the difference variable.³ The point estimate for racial resentment is -0.169 ($t = -14.765$, $p < .000$) suggesting that increased levels of racial resentment are associated with a highly statistically significant reduced probability of support for the international agreement.

Below in Figure 4.3, I visualize the predicted probability of the difference between COP21 and CPP Approval, with all control variables set to their mean values. More negative values indicate that racial resentment is pushing against approval of COP21 while a value of 0 (red line) indicates the respondent was equally likely to approve of both policies. Figure 4.3 indicates that respondents with higher levels of racial resentment are less likely to approve of COP21 (international) compared to those falling on the lower end of the racial resentment scale who are more likely to approve of COP21 (international) but not CPP (domestic). Overall, Figure 4.3 indicates that respondents with higher levels of racial resentment do not distinguish between international and domestic climate policy. The difference between the agreements is smallest at the highest levels of racial resentment where the predicted probability point for the difference is slightly negative, indicating the respondent is in fact more likely to approve of CPP than COP21, although the 95% CI overlaps zero. Thus, even for respondents who are somewhat supportive of climate policy in general, racial resentment is negatively associated with approval of international climate policy.

3. Results in table form are shown in Table A.6.




Figure 4.3: Effect of Racial Resentment on Difference between COP21 and CPP Approval

Overall, I have found strong evidence that respondents who report higher levels of racial resentment are less likely to support climate policy (**H1: *Racial Resentment***) and that the effect of racial resentment is most negative for international compared to domestic agreements (**H2: *International***).

After establishing the effect of racial resentment at reducing support for climate policy across the entire sample of respondents (while controlling for partisanship and political ideology), I now turn to more directly testing **H3: *Party*** to determine if my results hold across partisan affiliation. I split the respondents into three groups, those who identify with the Democratic Party, self-identified political independents, and those who identify with the Republican Party. I then re-estimate the main models of interest. Drilling deeper and exploring the effect of racial resentment among Democrats, independents, and Republicans allows me to isolate the effect of racial resentment at reducing approval

of climate policy. The results are shown visually in Figure 4.4 and in table form in Table 4.2.




Figure 4.4: Effect of Racial Resentment (lowest to the highest level) on Climate Policy Approval By Party Affiliation

Overall, the effect of racial resentment at reducing the probability that respondents approved of the climate policies (COP21 and CPP) is strong and consistent across the three pools of respondents (Democrats, independents, and Republicans). However, while there is a clear distinction between the effect of racial resentment in reducing the probability of supporting COP21 45.24 points (95% CI: -48.68, -41.80) and reducing the probability of supporting CPP -34.74 (95% CI: -38.54, -30.94) among Republican respondents, the

distinction among Democrats is not statistically significant. In fact, among Democratic respondents the point estimate for the effect of racial resentment in reducing the probability of approving of COP21 -26.06 (95% CI: -28.28, 23.84) is smaller in magnitude than the effect of racial resentment in reducing the probability of approving of the CPP -29.45 (95% CI: -32.04, -26.86), although the effects are statistically indistinguishable from each other at the 95% level. These results indicate that among respondents high in racial resentment, those who identified with the Republican Party and self-identified political independents did distinguish between international (COP21) and domestic climate (CPP) policy, while those who identified as Democrats did not.

Table 4.2: Overall Effect of Racial Resentment on Climate Policy Approval (By Party)

	Democrats		Independents		Republicans	
	COP21	CPP	COP21	CPP	COP21	CPP
Racial Resentment	-26.062** (1.132)	-29.452** (1.323)	-60.168** (1.260)	-47.683** (1.398)	-45.239** (1.755)	-34.737** (1.939)
N	17,545	17,562	12,543	12,562	11,747	11,752
R ²	0.150	0.188	0.449	0.234	0.186	0.047

Coefficients reported from ordinary least squares regression models, with robust HC2 SEs in parentheses. Models include control variables for education, political ideology, gender, age, region, income, and race. The dependent variables are coded 100 if the respondent indicated supporting the climate policy option and 0 if they opposed the climate policy option. Significance codes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, two-tailed tests.

Therefore, while the relationship between heightened levels of racial resentment and lessened support for climate action does hold for both Republican and Democratic partisans, it does not appear to have the same differential effects on the international or domestic element, whereby the effect of racial resentment at reducing the probability of support for international climate action is stronger than for domestic among Republicans but not Democrats. One possible explanation for this lies in the fact that Democrats are less likely to be isolationist and nationalistic than Republicans (Mansfield and Mutz 2009). As a result, it is possible that even racially resentful Democrats are less likely to

differentiate between non-whites in America and abroad to the same extent that racial resentful Republicans do, and thus do not perceive as large a difference between international and domestic climate action. Additionally, prominent Republican politicians like Donald Trump actively connected ethnocentrism and COP21 noting “I was elected to represent the citizens of Pittsburgh, not Paris” (Trump 2017).⁴ This type of framing explicitly suggests that policies should benefit the in-group rather than the out-group.

Additionally, I find similar effects for respondents who identify as political independents with movement from the lowest to the highest level of racial resentment associated with a 60.17 point (95% CI: -62.64, -57.70) decline in the probability of supporting COP21 and a 47.68 point (95% CI: -50.42, -44.94) reduction in the probability of supporting the CPP. The strong effect of racial resentment in reducing support for climate policy among independents is perhaps not surprising considering the findings in Hajnal and Lee (2011) who write “a clash of liberalism and racial resentment is driving many whites away from the Democratic Party toward Independence” (Hajnal and Lee 2011, 226). Additionally, it is possible that respondents who do not identify with either the Democratic or Republican Party have nebulous opinions on climate change, untainted by cues from party leaders, thus feelings of racial animus can play a pivotal role in shaping their climate opinions.

Overall, in this section I find that regardless of party affiliation higher levels of racial resentment are associated with decreased support for climate policy, thus providing support for **H3: Party**. While I do find support that the effect of racial resentment on the international policy will be stronger compared to domestic policy (**H2: International**) among Republican and Independent respondents, I do not find a statistically distinguishable difference in the effect of racial resentment on the international or domestic dimension for respondents who identify with the Democratic Party. These results suggest that racial attitudes are a key factor for understanding the climate preferences of

4. After President Joe Biden decided the U.S. should rejoin the Paris Climate Agreement, another Republican politician, Senator Ted Cruz, reiterated Trump’s statement saying that Biden has shown “he’s more interested in the views of the citizens of Paris than in the jobs of the citizens of Pittsburgh” (Jarvis 2021).

Democrats, Independents, and Republicans.

Section 4.1 Alternative Pathway: Approval of Donald Trump

Abramowitz and McCoy (2019) finds that excluding party identification “racial/ethnic resentment was by far the strongest predictor of relative ratings of Trump and Clinton” (Abramowitz and McCoy 2019, 114). This strong relationship between feelings of heightened racial resentment and support for Donald Trump could cause a confounding relationship between my variables of interest, as Donald Trump is also linked closely to the policies in question. As I am utilizing questions concerning two climate policies (COP21 and CPP) that then President Trump withdrew from and replaced respectively, therefore, it is possible that what I am really capturing is respondents who approved of former President Trump are more likely to be high in racial resentment and are also less likely to be supportive of climate action. In this section, I investigate this alternative explanation for the linkage between racial resentment and climate action.

To test this pathway, I first estimate two Trump Approval models that include an additional control variable for respondent’s level of approval for Trump. I then estimate two additional models that include an interaction effect between racial resentment and approval of former President Trump (Racial Resentment x Trump Approval). Full results of these models are shown in table form in Table 4.3.

Overall, I find that even when controlling for approval of Donald Trump, there is still a significant effect of increased feelings of racial resentment in reducing support for climate policy. This means that even for respondents who do not approve of Donald Trump, there is still an effect of racial resentment in reducing support for climate action. However, when accounting for support for Donald Trump, I find little support for **H2: *International*** and do not find that the effect of racial resentment at reducing the probability of support for COP21 is larger than for CPP. As discussed in greater detail below, one possible explanation is that respondents were far more familiar with Trump’s connection to COP21 and to CPP. Therefore, the level of support for Trump himself was

a greater predictor for support of COP21 than for CPP, mitigating some effects of racial resentment.

Table 4.3: Effect of Racial Resentment on Climate Policy Approval By Trump Approval

	Trump Approval		Interaction	
	COP21	CPP	COP21	CPP
Racial Resentment	-19.149** (0.769)	-23.820** (0.931)	-14.155** (1.203)	-29.378** (1.517)
Trump Approval	-20.774** (0.271)	-12.098** (0.317)	-18.955** (0.511)	-14.123** (0.595)
Racial Resentment x Trump Approval			-2.701** (0.591)	3.006** (0.725)
N	41,533	41,574	41,533	41,574
R ²	0.587	0.284	0.588	0.284

Coefficients reported from ordinary least squares regression models, with robust HC2 SEs in parentheses. Models include control variables for education, political ideology, partisanship, gender, age, region, income, and race. The dependent variables are coded 100 if the respondent indicated supporting the climate policy option and 0 if they opposed the climate policy option. Significance codes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, two-tailed tests.

Next, to further explore the interaction effect I display the marginal effects of the interaction between Racial Resentment and Trump Approval in Figure 4.5.⁵ This figure illustrates that when including an interaction effect of Racial Resentment x Trump Approval, the effect of Racial Resentment is mitigated by Trump Approval when respondents considered the CPP (domestic) but synergistic in COP21 (international). Thus, Figure 4.5 shows that racially resentful Trump supporters are highly unlikely to approve of the COP21 agreement.

5. 48.7% of respondents who strongly approved of Donald Trump scored the maximum of 1 on the racial resentment index, while 35.6% of respondents who strongly disapproved of Trump scored the minimum of 0 on the index.




Figure 4.5: Estimated Coefficient (w/ 95% CI) for Racial Resentment by Trump Approval

Thus, I find evidence that Trump approval strengthens the negative effect of racial resentment with the COP21 agreement but creates a positive effect of racial resentment for the CPP. One possible explanation is that respondents were more familiar with Trump’s opinions about the COP21 agreement than the CPP. It is important to keep in mind that the question did not explicitly mention Donald Trump or give any indication that he is personally opposed to the policies. During his campaign for president, Trump vehemently opposed the COP21 agreement, frequently mentioning it as campaign rallies (Jacobs 2016). Additionally, Trump gave a public speech when announcing the final withdrawal and referring to the agreement as a financial burden on the American people (Trump 2017).

In contrast, while Trump did eventually scrap the CPP, his administration replaced the plan with similar, although far weaker plans (Jordan 2019). Perhaps, respondents

were less aware that Trump was adamantly against the Clean Power Plan than they were that he opposed the COP21 agreement.

Individuals can use the views of elites as an informational shortcut to update their existing policy preferences, or even as informational shortcuts when deciding their preferences in the first place. In this way, elite cue theory suggests that elites can play a large role in shaping opinion on a wide array of public policy issues (Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013). Therefore, if respondents, even ardent Trump supporters, were unaware of where Trump himself stood on the policy, approval of Trump would potentially be less effective at moving his supporters.⁶ Perhaps fervent Trump supporters did not know where he himself stood on the CPP issue. On the flip side, if they were aware of cues from Trump on the CPP, then this result perhaps indicates that Trump loyalists do strongly distinguish between domestic (CPP) and international (COP21) climate policy.

Additionally, it is also possible that for respondents with high levels of approval for Trump, the CPP was less explicitly connected to Obama than the COP21 agreement. Therefore, the agreement was potentially less racialized. As a result, while feelings of racial resentment still reduce the probability of approval for CPP, the effect is somewhat mitigated by approval of President Trump. Thus, lack of information is one possible explanation for why increased approval for Trump himself had a mitigating effect on the negative influence of racial resentment at reducing support for the CPP.

Section 4.2 Robustness Checks

In this section, I conduct a variety of robustness checks of the main results. First, I re-run the main models with an alternative specification of racial resentment. While these questions are not part of the traditional index of racial resentment questions, these additional questions certainly capture feelings of racial animus and provide an additional

6. Barber and Pope (2019) find that cues from former President Trump are highly effective at moving his supporters to update their policy beliefs in the direction of those statements. Put another way, they provide evidence for the existence of a sizable bloc of Trump loyalists who base their policy preferences on cues from party leaders like Donald Trump.

robustness check of the central results. More specifically, these “color-blind” questions created by Neville et al. (2000) do not explicitly refer to Black Americans and thus attempt to tap into other elements of racial resentment.⁷

Table 4.4: Additional racial resentment questions from CES

Variable	Wording
RR_whites_advantage	White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin.
RR_racialprobs_rare	Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations. [REVERSE CODED]

Table 4.4 provides the wording of these additional questions that (along with the original two racial resentment questions) make up an alternative four-question racial resentment index.⁸ As with the traditional scale used in the rest of the paper, I reformatted the questions into an index ranging from 0 to 1, the mean value of the expanded index was 0.42 with 16.7% of respondents at a minimum value of 0, and 5.0% at the maximum value of 1.

In Table 4.5, I display the effect of racial resentment on support for climate policy. As before, the effects are large, with movement from least racially resentful to most resentful on the four question scale resulting in a 64.90 point (95% CI: -66.60, -63.19) decline in support for COP21 and a 53.13 point (95% CI: -55.07, -51.20) reduction in support for the CPP. These results provide greater evidence in support of **H1: Racial Resentment** and **H2: International**. Using the four-item index, respondents with higher levels of racial resentment are less likely to approve of the climate policies with the most dramatic decline for the international agreement. Overall, these results provide additional support for my findings and suggest that my findings are robust to alternative specifications of the racial resentment index.

7. DeSante and Smith (2020) refers to these questions as part of the FIRE index of racism noting “FIRE is an acronym for fear, acknowledgment of institutional racism, and racial empathy” (DeSante and Smith 2020, 643).

8. Results with *only* the additional questions are similar and shown in Table A.11.

Table 4.5: Overall Effect of Racial Resentment (lowest to the highest level) on Climate Policy Approval: 4 Question Racial resentment Index

	COP21	CPP
Expanded Racial Resentment Index	-64.898** (0.869)	-53.133** (0.986)
N	40,805	40,844
R ²	0.523	0.268

Coefficients reported from ordinary least squares regression models, with robust HC2 SEs in parentheses. Models include control variables for education, political ideology, partisanship, gender, age, region, income, and race. The dependent variables are coded 100 if the respondent indicated supporting the climate policy option and 0 if they opposed the climate policy option. Significance codes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, two-tailed tests.

Respondents in the 2020 CES were also asked a series of questions about *potential* climate proposals, which are displayed in Table 4.6. These additional climate questions serve to act as hypothetical domestic agreements untainted by any association with Donald Trump. Thus, the hypothetical climate proposals are an additional check on the effect of racial resentment at reducing support for even hypothetical climate action. This serves as a check of the robustness of the predicted effect in **H1**: *Racial Resentment* that higher levels of racial resentment (measured with the original scale) will be associated with lower support for climate action. In Table 4.7, I display results from running models for each of the four proposals.

Across all proposals, the effect of racial resentment is strong and statistically significant. Notably, for three of the agreements the point estimate for the effect of racial resentment is smaller than the estimate for the international agreement COP21, 46.17 (95% CI: -47.67, -44.67) and statistically distinct (95% confidence intervals do not cross). The exception is the effect of racial resentment on reducing probability of support for efforts to strengthen the Environmental Protection Agency’s enforcement of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act -44.11 (95% CI: -45.65, -42.58). Interestingly, this is the only

Table 4.6: Potential proposals DVs

Variable	Wording
regulate_CO2	Give the Environmental Protection Agency power to regulate Carbon Dioxide emissions
renewable_fuels	Require that each state use a minimum amount of renewable fuels (wind, solar, and hydroelectric) in the generation of electricity even if electricity prices increase a little
strengthen_EPA	Strengthen the Environmental Protection Agency enforcement of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act even if it costs U.S. jobs
raise_fuelefficiency	Raise the average fuel efficiency for all cars and trucks in the U.S. from 40 miles per gallon to 54.5 miles per gallon by 2025.

Table 4.7: Overall Effect of Racial Resentment on Climate Proposal Approval

	Regulate CO2	Renewable Fuels	Strengthen EPA	Raise Fuel Efficiency
Racial Resentment	-36.929** (0.749)	-38.141** (0.798)	-44.114** (0.781)	-32.570** (0.813)
N	42,069	42,072	42,071	42,068
R ²	0.348	0.312	0.411	0.227

Coefficients reported from ordinary least squares regression models, with robust HC2 SEs in parentheses. Models include control variables for education, political ideology, partisanship, gender, age, region, income, and race. The dependent variables are coded 100 if the respondent indicated supporting the climate policy option and 0 if they opposed the climate policy option. Significance codes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, two-tailed tests.

proposal to explicitly mention a possible reduction of employment prospects, stating “strengthen the Environmental Protection Agency enforcement of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act even if it costs U.S. jobs”. Overall, the results in Table 4.7 provide additional evidence for **H1**: *Racial Resentment*, illustrate the effect of heightened racial resentment at reducing the likelihood of support for climate policy.

CHAPTER 5: Discussion

Throughout this paper, I have provided evidence for the strong and persistently negative effect of respondent's feelings of racial resentment at predicting support for Americans approval of both international and domestic climate action. These effects persist across party lines, with Democrats, independents, and Republicans exhibiting a lower propensity to support climate policies as their level of racial resentment increases. However, those who identify with the Republican Party and self-identified political independents did distinguish between international (COP21) and domestic climate (CPP) policy, while those who identify as Democrats did not. Additionally, I find mixed effects for the interaction between approval of Donald Trump and racial resentment, finding that for respondents who were most supportive of then President Trump the effect on approval of COP21 of moving from least to most racially resentful was the largest. On the other hand, the effect worked in reverse for the CPP, with Trump approval somewhat mitigating the effects of racial resentment.

Additionally, I found that my results are robust to a variety of alternative specifications. These include measuring the effect of racial resentment on public approval of hypothetical climate policies. I find a similar dynamic emerges for the hypothetical policies as the real-world policies, increased feelings of racial resentment reduces the probability that a respondent will support the climate policy. I also find that the results hold when employing an alternative scale of racial resentment and including questions that are "color-blind" and do not explicitly reference Black Americans. These results grant further confidence in my core finding that Americans exhibiting higher levels of racial resentment will also indicate lower probability of support for climate action.

However, additional questions remain, particularly concerning the mechanisms through

which feelings of racial resentment reduced the probability of support for climate policy. It remains uncertain to what extent the international nature of these agreements and policies matter. More specifically, am I measuring feelings of bias against non-whites more generally or a specific feeling of nativism? Additionally, while I suggest that the perceived deservedness of the beneficiaries of these policies influences public support for climate policy, and that individuals who exhibit racial prejudice are more likely to perceive these beneficiaries to be Black therefore reducing their support for climate policies this mechanism is not tested directly.

As previously mentioned, measuring approval concerning climate agreements compared to other agreements, such as trade deals, provides scholars a unique opportunity to vary the scale of the agreement (domestic or international). Future work on related questions could seek to disentangle these effects by conducting a survey experiment with hypothetical scenarios in which respondents noted their approval for agreements that varied in two dimensions explicitly, domestic or international and helping whites or non-whites.

Overall, my results have important implications for the study of public opinion in the context of international relations and for scholars and policymakers wishing to better understand the conditions under-which members of the public will support action to address climate change. Understanding variance across racial attitudes is vital to more fully conceptualizing how to shape efforts to drive up climate concern, and increase support for climate change mitigation policies. If scholars can more fully understand what elements of climate agreements are most popular, or politically palatable, those policies will have a better chance of success.

CHAPTER A: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Table A.1: Survey Demographics: Question wording

Variable	Wording
Education	What is the highest level of education you have completed?
Gender	Are you...
Income	Thinking back over the last year, what was your family's annual income?
Party	Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a ...?
Political Ideology	How would you rate each of the following individuals and groups? Yourself
Race	What racial or ethnic group best describes you?
Region	In which census region do you live?
Trump Approval	Do you approve of the way [President Trump] is doing their job...
Age	Year of birth?

Table A.2: Survey Demographic Information

Variable	Value	n	Percentage
Education	Advanced Degree	8378	13.70
Education	Bachelor's degree	14152	23.20
Education	Associate degree	6539	10.70
Education	Some college	13330	21.90
Education	High school graduate	16618	27.20
Education	No high school	1983	3.30
Gender	Female	35209	57.70
Gender	Male	25791	42.30
Income	More than \$150,000	4668	8.50
Income	\$100,000–\$149,999	7272	13.20
Income	\$60,000–\$99,999	18014	32.80
Income	\$30,000–\$59,999	10789	19.60
Income	Up to \$29,999	14163	25.80
Party	Independent	17106	31.10
Party	Democrat	22745	41.30
Party	Republican	15224	27.60
Political Ideology	Conservative	19503	34.20
Political Ideology	Middle of the Road	15238	26.70
Political Ideology	Liberal	22293	39.10
Race	Asian	1831	3.00
Race	Black	6952	11.40
Race	Hispanic	5180	8.50
Race	Other	2909	4.80
Race	White	44128	72.30
Region	Midwest	13667	22.40
Region	Northeast	11456	18.80
Region	South	23493	38.50
Region	West	12384	20.30
Trump Approval	Strongly approve	14749	24.80
Trump Approval	Somewhat approve	8615	14.50
Trump Approval	Somewhat disapprove	4213	7.10
Trump Approval	Strongly disapprove	31927	53.70
Age	Mean Value	50.39	

Table A.3: Overall Effect of Racial Resentment (lowest to the highest level) on Climate Policy Approval: Baseline model

	COP21	CPP
Racial Resentment	-82.261** (0.409)	-59.131** (0.499)
N	51,152	51,194
R ²	0.374	0.195

Coefficients reported from ordinary least squares regression models, with robust HC2 SEs in parentheses. The dependent variables are coded 100 if the respondent indicated supporting the climate policy option and 0 if they opposed the climate policy option. Significance codes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, two-tailed tests.

Table A.4: Overall Effect of Racial Resentment on Climate Policy Approval: With Controls Shown

	COP21	CPP
Racial Resentment	-46.168** (0.764)	-39.471** (0.851)
Education (reference= Associate degree)		
Advanced Degree	-0.078 (0.640)	3.851** (0.788)
Bachelor's degree	-0.542 (0.606)	3.085** (0.748)
Some college	-1.438* (0.628)	0.892 (0.780)
High school graduate	-0.075 (0.659)	-3.091** (0.802)
No high school	2.531 (1.518)	-6.677** (1.767)
Race (reference= White)		
Black	-7.534** (0.670)	-18.110** (0.794)
Hispanic	-0.711 (0.712)	-7.130** (0.827)
Asian	4.648** (1.073)	-4.355** (1.203)
Other	-5.737** (0.802)	-4.093** (1.034)
Gender (reference= Female)		
Male	-3.940** (0.344)	-0.059 (0.416)
Region (reference= Midwest)		
Northeast	-0.375 (0.526)	-0.516 (0.624)
South	-1.108* (0.451)	-0.995 (0.546)
West	-0.832 (0.499)	0.411 (0.606)
Income	-0.156** (0.053)	0.245** (0.064)
Age	-0.013 (0.011)	0.018 (0.013)
Political Ideology (reference= Moderate)		
Liberal	2.432** (0.512)	6.401** (0.600)
Conservative	-28.921** (0.684)	-14.805** (0.732)
Political Party (reference= Independent)		
Democrat	8.661** (0.457)	1.433** (0.525)
Republican	-9.867** (0.626)	-5.145** (0.720)
N	41,835	41,876
R ²	0.491	0.250

Coefficients reported from ordinary least squares regression models, with robust HC2 SEs in parentheses. The dependent variables are coded 100 if the respondent indicated supporting the climate policy option and 0 if they opposed the climate policy option. Significance codes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, two-tailed tests.

Table A.5: Overall Effect of Racial Resentment on Climate Policy Approval: Logit

	COP21	CPP
Racial Resentment	-3.249** (0.055)	-2.145** (0.046)
Education (reference= Associate degree)		
Advanced Degree	0.089 (0.061)	0.281** (0.049)
Bachelor's degree	-0.012 (0.053)	0.188** (0.043)
Some college	-0.116* (0.052)	0.048 (0.042)
High school graduate	-0.053 (0.051)	-0.168** (0.041)
No high school	0.114 (0.101)	-0.334** (0.084)
Race (reference= White)		
Black	-0.907** (0.053)	-1.124** (0.042)
Hispanic	-0.208** (0.056)	-0.474** (0.046)
Asian	0.266** (0.090)	-0.344** (0.072)
Other	-0.484** (0.075)	-0.251** (0.061)
Gender (reference= Female)		
Male	-0.343** (0.030)	-0.008 (0.025)
Region (reference= Midwest)		
Northeast	-0.049 (0.045)	-0.037 (0.037)
South	-0.093* (0.038)	-0.053 (0.031)
West	-0.063 (0.046)	0.036 (0.037)
Income	-0.007 (0.005)	0.017** (0.004)
Age	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Political Ideology (reference= Moderate)		
Liberal	0.483** (0.044)	0.506** (0.035)
Conservative	-1.311** (0.036)	-0.599** (0.033)
Political Party (reference= Independent)		
Democrat	0.758** (0.041)	0.121** (0.034)
Republican	-0.473** (0.037)	-0.221** (0.032)
Constant	3.134** (0.086)	1.838** (0.070)
N	41,835	41,876
Log Likelihood	-15,465.560	-21,529.830
AIC	30,973.130	43,101.660

Coefficients reported from logit regression models. The dependent variables are coded 100 if the respondent indicated supporting the climate policy option and 0 if they opposed the climate policy option. Significance codes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, two-tailed tests.

Table A.6: Effect of Racial Resentment on Difference between COP21 and CPP Approval: With Controls Shown

	Difference between COP21 and CPP Approval
Racial Resentment	-0.169** (0.013)
Education (reference= Associate degree)	
Advanced Degree	-0.052** (0.011)
Bachelor's degree	-0.047** (0.010)
Some college	-0.030** (0.011)
High school graduate	0.069** (0.012)
No high school	0.159** (0.029)
Race (reference= White)	
Black	0.133** (0.010)
Hispanic	0.087** (0.012)
Asian	0.127** (0.016)
Other	-0.040** (0.014)
Gender (reference= Female)	
Male	-0.075** (0.006)
Region (reference= Midwest)	
Northeast	0.005 (0.009)
South	-0.001 (0.008)
West	-0.018* (0.008)
Income	-0.007** (0.001)
Age	-0.001** (0.0002)
Political Ideology (reference= Moderate)	
Liberal	-0.073** (0.007)
Conservative	-0.283** (0.013)
Political Party (reference= Independent)	
Democrat	0.083** (0.007)
Republican	-0.107** (0.014)
N	31,264
R ²	0.145

Coefficients reported from ordinary least squares regression models, with robust HC2 SEs in parentheses. value of 1 if respondents only approved of the international agreement COP21, a value of 0 if they approved of both, and a value of -1 if they only approved of domestic policy the CPP. Significance codes: *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, two-tailed tests.

Table A.7: Overall Effect of Racial Resentment on Climate Policy Approval (By Party): With Controls Shown

	Democrats		Independents		Republicans	
	COP21	CPP	COP21	CPP	COP21	CPP
Racial Resentment	-26.062** (1.132)	-29.452** (1.323)	-60.168** (1.260)	-47.683** (1.398)	-45.239** (1.755)	-34.737** (1.939)
Education (reference= Associate degree)						
Advanced Degree	-0.489 (0.775)	4.706** (1.057)	-0.151 (1.227)	3.834** (1.423)	2.062 (1.492)	1.092 (1.881)
Bachelor's degree	-1.156 (0.779)	3.740** (1.047)	0.312 (1.126)	2.257 (1.321)	0.888 (1.281)	3.253* (1.619)
Some college	-1.108 (0.834)	0.428 (1.125)	-1.569 (1.174)	1.294 (1.376)	-1.231 (1.261)	1.440 (1.616)
High school graduate	-4.168** (0.920)	-6.809** (1.214)	1.407 (1.269)	-2.762 (1.472)	2.631* (1.230)	0.285 (1.528)
No high school	-3.931 (2.213)	-11.699** (2.804)	2.797 (2.963)	-4.549 (3.399)	7.582** (2.632)	-3.528 (3.028)
Race (reference= White)						
Black	-10.232** (0.742)	-19.029** (0.929)	-3.699* (1.477)	-13.982** (1.683)	-3.008 (3.340)	-8.182* (3.792)
Hispanic	-2.571** (0.884)	-8.236** (1.121)	-2.779* (1.376)	-8.214** (1.512)	2.733 (1.687)	-1.856 (1.941)
Asian	0.716 (1.198)	-5.488** (1.523)	8.586** (2.023)	-3.008 (2.189)	10.905** (3.233)	-3.012 (3.495)
Other	-2.769* (1.148)	-3.095* (1.430)	-6.533** (1.309)	-3.237 (1.661)	-3.953* (1.700)	-3.906 (2.540)
Gender (reference= Female)						
Male	-0.101 (0.420)	2.911** (0.550)	-4.070** (0.667)	0.388 (0.766)	-7.960** (0.726)	-4.050** (0.907)
Region (reference= Midwest)						
Northeast	-0.704 (0.631)	-1.021 (0.815)	-0.253 (1.007)	0.212 (1.158)	-0.130 (1.179)	-0.514 (1.412)
South	-0.642 (0.565)	-1.435 (0.740)	-1.706* (0.846)	-2.086* (0.994)	-0.897 (0.943)	0.672 (1.148)
West	-0.245 (0.593)	0.111 (0.784)	-0.928 (0.947)	1.241 (1.098)	-1.878 (1.118)	-0.666 (1.398)
Income	0.186** (0.065)	0.653** (0.084)	-0.373** (0.102)	0.113 (0.119)	-0.204 (0.117)	-0.256 (0.145)
Age	0.221** (0.013)	0.072** (0.017)	-0.002 (0.021)	0.090** (0.025)	-0.367** (0.025)	-0.143** (0.030)
Political Ideology (reference= Moderate)						
Liberal	4.454** (0.669)	7.706** (0.855)	5.582** (0.788)	5.251** (0.900)	-12.298** (2.819)	-10.672** (2.805)
Conservative	-14.991** (1.529)	-14.682** (1.652)	-31.723** (0.996)	-17.048** (1.087)	-25.108** (1.354)	-10.010** (1.388)
N	17,545	17,562	12,543	12,562	11,747	11,752
R ²	0.150	0.188	0.449	0.234	0.186	0.047

Coefficients reported from ordinary least squares regression models, with robust HC2 SEs in parentheses. The dependent variables are coded 100 if the respondent indicated supporting the climate policy option and 0 if they opposed the climate policy option. Significance codes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, two-tailed tests.

Table A.8: Distribution of Racial Resentment Across Respondents (by party)

Party	Racial Resentment	n	Percentage
Independent	Minimum	2296	15.80
Independent	Maximum	2590	17.80
Democrat	Minimum	6963	35.50
Democrat	Maximum	621	3.20
Republican	Minimum	146	1.10
Republican	Maximum	5286	39.50

Table A.9: Effect of Racial Resentment on Climate Policy Approval By Trump Approval: With Controls Shown

	COP21	CPP
Racial Resentment x Trump Approval	-2.701** (0.591)	3.006** (0.725)
Racial Resentment	-14.155** (1.203)	-29.378** (1.517)
Trump Approval	-18.955** (0.511)	-14.123** (0.595)
Education (reference= Associate degree)		
Advanced Degree	-0.394 (0.565)	3.674** (0.767)
Bachelor's degree	-0.833 (0.541)	2.954** (0.731)
Some college	-1.105 (0.571)	1.087 (0.767)
High school graduate	0.329 (0.607)	-2.525** (0.792)
No high school	3.953** (1.504)	-5.864** (1.795)
Race (reference= White)		
Black	-9.164** (0.634)	-19.087** (0.787)
Hispanic	-2.231** (0.650)	-7.856** (0.810)
Asian	2.059* (0.972)	-5.785** (1.173)
Other	-3.731** (0.708)	-3.302** (1.014)
Gender (reference= Female)		
Male	-3.241** (0.307)	0.304 (0.407)
Region (reference= Midwest)		
Northeast	0.289 (0.476)	-0.117 (0.611)
South	-0.076 (0.410)	-0.435 (0.535)
West	-0.267 (0.445)	0.649 (0.593)
Income	-0.097* (0.048)	0.255** (0.063)
Age	-0.043** (0.010)	-0.005 (0.013)
Political Ideology (reference= Moderate)		
Liberal	1.528** (0.477)	5.008** (0.596)
Conservative	-14.260** (0.682)	-6.734** (0.765)
Political Party (reference= Independent)		
Democrat	0.159 (0.408)	-3.654** (0.513)
Republican	3.369** (0.575)	2.541** (0.733)
N	41,533	41,574
R ²	0.588	0.284

Coefficients reported from ordinary least squares regression models, with robust HC2 SEs in parentheses. The dependent variables are coded 100 if the respondent indicated supporting the climate policy option and 0 if they opposed the climate policy option. Significance codes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, two-tailed tests.

Table A.10: Overall Effect of Racial Resentment (lowest to the highest level) on Climate Policy Approval: 4 Question Racial resentment Index: With Controls Shown

	COP21	CPP
Expanded Racial Resentment Index	-64.898** (0.869)	-53.133** (0.986)
Education (reference= Associate degree)		
Advanced Degree	-0.647 (0.621)	3.548** (0.783)
Bachelor's degree	-0.876 (0.590)	3.036** (0.744)
Some college	-1.540* (0.614)	0.965 (0.778)
High school graduate	0.250 (0.648)	-3.010** (0.804)
No high school	2.999* (1.509)	-5.671** (1.786)
Race (reference= White)		
Black	-9.473** (0.663)	-19.561** (0.796)
Hispanic	-1.550* (0.687)	-8.000** (0.821)
Asian	3.205** (1.042)	-5.672** (1.193)
Other	-5.237** (0.777)	-3.874** (1.031)
Gender (reference= Female)		
Male	-2.844** (0.337)	0.768 (0.415)
Region (reference= Midwest)		
Northeast	-0.321 (0.515)	-0.230 (0.622)
South	-0.961* (0.443)	-0.659 (0.545)
West	-0.853 (0.487)	0.511 (0.604)
Income	-0.111* (0.052)	0.268** (0.064)
Age	-0.051** (0.011)	-0.014 (0.013)
Political Ideology (reference= Moderate)		
Liberal	0.348 (0.504)	5.137** (0.598)
Conservative	-25.471** (0.690)	-12.469** (0.746)
Political Party (reference= Independent)		
Democrat	6.690** (0.449)	-0.032 (0.523)
Republican	-8.232** (0.616)	-3.766** (0.723)
N	40,805	40,844
R ²	0.523	0.268

Coefficients reported from ordinary least squares regression models, with robust HC2 SEs in parentheses. The dependent variables are coded 100 if the respondent indicated supporting the climate policy option and 0 if they opposed the climate policy option. Significance codes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, two-tailed tests.

Table A.11: Overall Effect of Racial Resentment (lowest to the highest level) on Climate Policy Approval: Alternative Racial resentment Index: With Controls Shown

	COP21	CPP
FIRE Racial Resentment Index	-60.052** (0.835)	-47.206** (0.952)
Education (reference= Associate degree)		
Advanced Degree	0.866 (0.620)	4.886** (0.785)
Bachelor's degree	0.206 (0.591)	3.955** (0.746)
Some college	-1.185 (0.615)	1.249 (0.782)
High school graduate	-0.327 (0.649)	-3.585** (0.806)
No high school	2.595 (1.515)	-6.089** (1.791)
Race (reference= White)		
Black	-8.548** (0.668)	-18.555** (0.801)
Hispanic	-2.711** (0.686)	-8.926** (0.826)
Asian	1.195 (1.050)	-7.234** (1.201)
Other	-4.913** (0.784)	-3.638** (1.034)
Gender (reference= Female)		
Male	-2.236** (0.338)	1.197** (0.418)
Region (reference= Midwest)		
Northeast	-0.486 (0.516)	-0.348 (0.624)
South	-1.034* (0.444)	-0.744 (0.547)
West	-0.602 (0.490)	0.740 (0.606)
Income	-0.035 (0.052)	0.331** (0.064)
Age	-0.121** (0.011)	-0.070** (0.013)
Political Ideology (reference= Moderate)		
Liberal	3.151** (0.493)	7.770** (0.587)
Conservative	-25.956** (0.691)	-13.213** (0.747)
Political Party (reference= Independent)		
Democrat	6.849** (0.451)	0.265 (0.525)
Republican	-9.217** (0.618)	-4.741** (0.724)
N	40,848	40,887
R ²	0.520	0.262

Coefficients reported from ordinary least squares regression models, with robust HC2 SEs in parentheses. The dependent variables are coded 100 if the respondent indicated supporting the climate policy option and 0 if they opposed the climate policy option. Significance codes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, two-tailed tests.

Table A.12: Overall Effect of Racial Resentment on Climate Proposal Approval: With Controls Shown

	Regulate CO2	Renewable Fuels	Strengthen EPA	Raise Fuel Efficiency
Racial Resentment	-36.929** (0.749)	-38.141** (0.798)	-44.114** (0.781)	-32.570** (0.813)
Education (reference= Associate degree)				
Advanced Degree	-1.461* (0.681)	-1.884** (0.731)	0.437 (0.681)	-0.251 (0.766)
Bachelor's degree	-1.591* (0.644)	-0.935 (0.687)	-0.098 (0.647)	-1.483* (0.719)
Some college	-1.666* (0.667)	-1.900** (0.712)	-1.069 (0.675)	-1.522* (0.744)
High school graduate	3.280** (0.694)	1.709* (0.734)	1.264 (0.699)	1.489 (0.763)
No high school	0.032 (1.619)	-2.260 (1.685)	5.080** (1.581)	-1.387 (1.702)
Race (reference= White)				
Black	-4.528** (0.636)	-8.307** (0.713)	-7.046** (0.706)	-12.005** (0.754)
Hispanic	3.350** (0.709)	1.110 (0.762)	2.833** (0.738)	-0.374 (0.784)
Asian	8.006** (0.999)	5.820** (1.085)	7.108** (1.073)	6.100** (1.110)
Other	-5.506** (0.911)	-5.972** (0.946)	-3.317** (0.882)	-3.881** (0.982)
Gender (reference= Female)				
Male	-5.353** (0.369)	-4.630** (0.391)	-1.037** (0.368)	-6.156** (0.405)
Region (reference= Midwest)				
Northeast	2.278** (0.547)	0.868 (0.581)	0.803 (0.557)	2.450** (0.605)
South	0.921 (0.479)	-0.981 (0.508)	0.085 (0.482)	1.605** (0.528)
West	-2.076** (0.539)	-1.294* (0.565)	-1.784** (0.533)	-1.118 (0.595)
Income	-0.390** (0.057)	-0.288** (0.060)	-0.207** (0.057)	-0.561** (0.063)
Age	0.040** (0.011)	0.029* (0.012)	0.004 (0.012)	-0.030* (0.013)
Political Ideology (reference= Moderate)				
Liberal	3.066** (0.479)	4.074** (0.543)	5.805** (0.535)	3.624** (0.561)
Conservative	-25.342** (0.672)	-22.650** (0.697)	-24.413** (0.696)	-18.283** (0.705)
Political Party (reference= Independent)				
Democrat	7.925** (0.434)	6.804** (0.486)	7.449** (0.474)	4.325** (0.502)
Republican	-1.984** (0.661)	-2.825** (0.677)	-6.438** (0.651)	-2.671** (0.698)
N	42,069	42,072	42,071	42,068
R ²	0.348	0.312	0.411	0.227

Coefficients reported from ordinary least squares regression models, with robust HC2 SEs in parentheses. The dependent variables are coded 100 if the respondent indicated supporting the climate policy option and 0 if they opposed the climate policy option. Significance codes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, two-tailed tests.

Table A.13: Overall Effect of Racial Resentment (lowest to the highest level) on Climate Policy Approval: White Respondents Only

	COP21	CPP
Racial Resentment	-44.662** (0.879)	-39.173** (0.979)
Education (reference= Associate degree)		
Advanced Degree	-0.204 (0.719)	3.093** (0.894)
Bachelor's degree	-0.425 (0.685)	2.967** (0.856)
Some college	-0.956 (0.713)	1.285 (0.898)
High school graduate	0.599 (0.736)	-2.278* (0.909)
No high school	2.750 (1.728)	-5.741** (2.029)
Gender (reference= Female)		
Male	-4.785** (0.383)	-1.252** (0.467)
Region (reference= Midwest)		
Northeast	-0.290 (0.570)	-0.806 (0.680)
South	-1.017* (0.490)	-0.830 (0.599)
West	-1.283* (0.545)	-0.013 (0.671)
Income	-0.282** (0.059)	0.063 (0.072)
Age	-0.040** (0.013)	0.012 (0.015)
Political Ideology (reference= Moderate)		
Liberal	3.332** (0.603)	7.476** (0.707)
Conservative	-31.654** (0.793)	-15.027** (0.846)
Political Party (reference= Independent)		
Democrat	9.122** (0.512)	1.872** (0.594)
Republican	-8.731** (0.686)	-5.055** (0.795)
N	31,648	31,678
R ²	0.537	0.282

Coefficients reported from ordinary least squares regression models, with robust HC2 SEs in parentheses. The dependent variables are coded 100 if the respondent indicated supporting the climate policy option and 0 if they opposed the climate policy option. Significance codes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, two-tailed tests.

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