ASIA & THE PACIFIC
POLICY STUDIES

Australian
National
University

Local government performance and democratic consolidation: Explaining ordinance proposal in Busan Metropolitan Council

Byung-Jae Lee[1] | **Tae Wan Kim**[2] | **Jaekwon Suh**[3] |
O. Fiona Yap[4]

[1]The Center for Digital Social Science, Yonsei University, Seoul, South Korea

[2]Institute of Social Science Research, Pusan National University, Busan, South Korea

[3]Department of Political Science and Diplomacy, Institute of Social Science Research, Pusan National University, Busan, South Korea

[4]Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia

Correspondence
Jaekwon Suh, Department of Political Science and Diplomacy, Institute of Social Science Research, Pusan National University, Busan, South Korea.
Email: scholar.suh@gmail.com

Funding information
National Research Foundation of Korea, Grant/Award Number: NRF-2018S1A5A2A03033767; Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea

Abstract

This article assesses the role of local councils as a conduit for democratic consolidation through the examination of the legislative performance of the members of a South Korean metropolitan city council. We collected data on ordinance proposals in Busan Metropolitan Council from 2006 to 2018 (the 5th to 7th Councils) and analysed, first, the effects of individual attributes of local council members on legislative performance through negative binomial model analysis and, second, the effects of legislative networks on council members' performance. Three findings contribute to the literature: first, the number of proposed ordinances by council members increased over time, while those by the mayor decreased in the same period, suggesting an erosion of executive dominance of policymaking in local councils. Second, female and newly elected council members are most active in legislative proposals, which underlines that these members are more connected to the electorate than long-serving incumbents. Third, network analyses show increasingly diverse and multi-centred communities behind ordinance proposals; this suggests a move from personalistic politics to institutionalised politics.

1 | INTRODUCTION

An effective and well-functioning legislative branch is fundamental to representative democracy because it is through legislation that constituents' preferences are aggregated and implemented into specific policies. Not surprisingly, there is a large literature focused on studies of legislative productivity and operationalisation of performance (Binder, 2003; Clinton & Lapinski, 2006; Mayhew, 2005; Rogers, 2005). Measures of legislative performance and productivity include the number of important bills passed, failed bills, and bill pass rates (Binder, 2003; Cho & Fowler, 2010). However, most legislative studies have focused on legislative performance and productivity at the national level, with few examinations at the subnational level.

This is unfortunate: there is likely a discrepancy between national democracy and subnational democratic performance (Gibson, 2012; Linz & Stepan, 1996; Yap, 2019). In particular, the introduction of democratic institutions, usually through new constitutional arrangements, generally focuses on establishing formal democracy at the national level and overlooks governance at the subnational level. This means that authoritarian practices may persist at the local level, even in democratised countries (Gibson, 2012; Linz & Stepan, 1996; Yap, 2019). Popular wisdom may consider local politics secondary to national politics ('nation fixation'); perhaps optimistically, there is also a belief that democratisation of local politics will automatically ensue once democracy is achieved at the national level (Gibson, 2012). Yet, recent examples show that such optimism does not always prevail. Consider, for instance, Indonesia, which abolished direct elections for regional leaders in 2014 (subsequently reinstated by presidential decree in 2015) and in a highly politicised case saw popular former Jakarta Governor Basuki 'Ahok' Tjahaja Purnama found guilty of blasphemy and sentenced to two years in prison (Cha & Yap, 2019). Consider, too, the Philippines: despite democratisation at the national level, the 30-year anniversary of People Power that ousted President Ferdinand Marcos from office in 1986 was marked by the political resurgence of the Marcoses in 2016: wife Imelda was provincial congress representative in Ilocos Norte; daughter Imee was governor of the same province and has since been elected a senator; and son Ferdinand Jr. made a competitive run for the vice presidency in the 2016 elections (Cha & Yap, 2019). Clearly, attention should be paid not only to democratic developments of 'national' governments, but also to those of subnational governments, with no conceptual reason to confine the study of democracy to national-level institutions and practices.

This article examines the legislative activities of Busan Metropolitan Council (BMC), South Korea (hereafter Korea). Legislative activities are defined as the activities pertaining to the functions of the council and legislature. In general, legislative activities encompass almost all legislative procedures, such as policymaking, representation and oversight (Bowman & Kearney, 2015). However, legislative activities in a narrow sense involve the legislation of laws and ordinances and our specific focus is on the more salient activities of council members, that is ordinance making, rather than on informal and non-quantifiable activities. Admittedly, salient activities include almost all activities that occur within the council, where individual council members propose legislation and conduct budget audits and oversight. These activities

are carried out by individual council members who propose specific topics for discussion and review within the council, which is called 'ordinance proposal'. We utilise ordinance proposal to measure the council members' legislative performances in BMC.

The separation of powers within government is an essential condition of democratic governance; this should also be applied to local government. Checks and balances between the local head of government (the mayor) and the local council are one yardstick for measuring a successful democracy at the local level. In this sense, we examine the legislative performance of local councils with regard to the legislative dominance of the local government head. Specifically, our study is motivated by two research questions: first, can variation in the number of ordinance proposals be explained by the council members' individual attributes, such as a member's gender, age, educational background, previous employment and hometown? Second, are there identifiable network communities within each council? In particular, we ask whether network communities dealing with ordinance proposals led to an institutionalisation of representative politics away from narrow personalistic or patronage relations.

Although our study deals with a metropolitan city in Korea, our focus is less on the *sui generis* nature of the politics in Busan and more on legislative politics in a small-scale democracy (Oliver et al., 2012). Until the most recent municipal elections held in 2018, Busan exemplified regionalist politics and loyalties: it was a conservative party stronghold where citizens regularly voted for the different iterations of the conservative party at the local level (Grand National Party—Saenuri Party—Liberty Korea Party), which aligned with the conservative party at the national level. Under such circumstances, core democratic procedures, such as horizontal and vertical checks and balances, are not expected to operate (O'Donnell, 1998; Yap, 2006). Yet, over time, the legislative dominance of the mayor became increasingly eroded as ordinance-making by individual council members or affiliated networks increased.

Three empirical findings from this study contribute to an understanding of local-level democracy. First, the number of proposed ordinances by council members has increased over time, while those by the mayor decreased in the same period. This suggests an erosion of executive dominance of policymaking in local councils, which is notable given the absence of horizontal and vertical checks and balances in local governments. Second, female and newly elected council members are most active in legislative proposals, in contrast to the legislative record of long-serving incumbents. This may capture different strategies for office (e.g., re-election versus higher office); at a minimum, the activity suggests efforts by female and newly elected members to demonstrate representation and connectivity to voters. Third, network analyses show increasingly diverse and multi-centered communities behind ordinance proposals. This suggests a move from personalistic politics—which is characterised by a dense concentration on specific individuals—to institutionalised politics.

In this article, we analyse the ordinance proposals of BMC from 2006 to 2018 using negative binomial models and network analyses and argue that BMC shows clear signs of moving towards institutionalisation. The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a discussion of our case study and background information on BMC. Section 3 reviews previous research on the functions and activities of the council and legislature. Section 4 provides a data description and reports the empirical results from regression analyses and network analyses. Section 5 addresses two questions drawn from the empirical findings. The final section summarises the findings, discusses some implications for democratic development and points to further issues for future studies.

2 | BACKGROUND: BUSAN AS A CASE STUDY

Busan Metropolitan City (or Busan) is one of the 17 metropolitan cities in Korea and provides an ideal case for examining democratisation at the subnational level. First, as the second-largest metropolitan city in South Korea after Seoul, we were able to collect consistent ordinance data on Busan. Second, regionalist voting patterns in the Busan–Gyeongnam Area (popularly referred to as the PK or Pusan-Kyeongnam region and includes the metropolitan areas of Busan, Ulsan and Gyeongnam) remained consistent during the period under study (2006–2018), with national and local political power continuing in the hands of the same party during that time except for the first two years (2006–2008). This provides an added advantage for the empirical test because possible confounding from other variables such as different ruling parties between the two levels of government can be minimised.[1] Third, the geographic distance between Busan and Seoul—about 325 kilometres—has also led to independent and distinctive political developments in the PK region:[2] for example, public demand for self-government and decentralisation was strong in Busan when social movements in favour of self-government began in Korea in 2000.[3]

In addition to widening the scope of our understanding of democracy, our study examines the relationship between local autonomy, local democracy, and decentralisation. Unlike examples in Bohlken (2016), local government in Korea was not a product of the strategic behaviour of the central elites. In China, for example, the central government initiated and encouraged local autonomy. In Korea, in contrast, local government was interrupted by the 1961 military coup and for 30 years was considered a local branch of the central government until local autonomy was revived in the 1990s. Korea therefore is an example of a country that began democratisation at the national level and reintroduced local elections and local government at the same time. The new constitution, adopted as a result of democratisation in 1987, included clauses on the reintroduction of local elections and local government. Busan elected the first members of the BMC under the new laws in 1991. However, democracy at the national level does not guarantee local democracy. Once it begins, local democracy has its own life. In this respect, Busan provides a good example of the evolution of democracy at the local level.

Busan is also a city where the weakening of regionalism—a strong, persistent characteristic in Korean politics—has been clearly observed. In Busan-Gyeongnam, Daegu-Gyeongbuk and Gwangju–Chonnam, regionalism and the accompanying voting pattern were dominant at all levels of elections. However, Busan is the only region to witness a dramatic change in both the

---

[1]A recent example of the conflict that can arise when the president and the head of a local government are different in terms of party affiliation is in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic. As coronavirus took hold in Korea in February 2020, infections were geographically concentrated in the Yeongnam region, especially in Gyeongbuk and Daegu, where a massive outbreak in infections within a pseudo-religious group accounted for more than half of cases at that time: see https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/coronavirus-covid-19-south-korea-shincheonji-church-12490260. Nevertheless, some political commentators wrongly argued that the leading cause of the concentrated infection was due to the heads of local governments not cooperating with the national government. We can find this kind of argument in several petitions posted on the Blue House website at the time. See the petition with the most endorsement: https://www1.president.go.kr/petitions/585800 (Korean language).

[2]See http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20160414000882&ACE_SEARCH=1 and http://www.kookje.co.kr/news2011/asp/newsbody.asp?code=0100&key=20170320.33001222008 (Korean language).

[3]On 5 October 2000, 'Citizens' Actions for Decentralization and Autonomy' was launched in five regions, including Busan, which then grew to a national network, 'Decentralization Movement for Sustainable Korea', in 2002. This nationwide organisation adopted the *Busan Declaration* and its Busan regional branch worked as a secretariat in 2007. The *Busan Declaration* called for each actor's determination and efforts to lead the decentralisation, and in particular urged the central government and bureaucratic elites to boldly abandon the vested interests of the monopolistic central system in the Seoul metropolitan area.

mayor's affiliated party and the majority party in the local council in the 2018 local elections, while regionalism was still prevalent in the other two regions. The weakening of regionalist voting, and the resulting switch of power in the legislature, indicated that democracy was beginning to work at the local level. Although this study needs to be supplemented by studies of the other two regions, the selection of Busan as our case study provides a good testing ground for examining the relationship between local government, local democracy, and decentralisation.

Finally, most of the existing case studies on democratic consolidation have focused on cases in Latin America and Eastern Europe, and on national-level institutions in the analysis. Aside from a few studies, including Bohlken (2016), little has been produced on democracy in practice at the local level. In this respect, a study of Busan makes a valuable addition to the thin literature on local-level democracy.

3 | STUDIES ON LEGISLATIVE PERFORMANCE

Extant studies on the functions and activities of the council and legislature can be broadly classified into two groups. One focuses on the influence of various institutions on legislative productivity, using macroscopic institutional analyses to identify the differences in the council's performance across countries or across regions within the same country, differences in the results before and after the adoption of a specific institution, or to compare the effects of changed institutions.[4] The other analyses council performance through council members' individual attributes. These studies focus on the individual attributes of the council members and their relation to various legislative functions. Thus, Miquel and Snyder (2006) examined the individual attributes of members of North Carolina's House of Representatives that held key positions in the party committees and standing committees in council and found that these attributes significantly affected legislative productivity. In their comparative study on parliamentary elite integration in six nations, Kim and Patterson (1988, pp. 386–388) divided members' careers into four categories according to their experiences in public office and the number of terms served in local councils and found that these factors contributed to the differences in the council members' professionalism and productivity.

This study follows the second group. In particular, given that institutional arrangements for local government have been intact in Korea since 1995, it is clear that institutional effects on legislative productivity is not in question.[5] Instead, our interest is directed at how individual

---

[4]The topics in this group include the effects of structural factors such as composition of government (unified or divided), regime of the state (democratic or authoritarian), form of government (parliamentary or presidential), or the type of electoral system (proportional, majoritarian, or pluralistic) on legislative performance. This group of studies also addresses questions on variations of legislative power across political systems, the influence of institutional factors on legislation, party nomination of candidates and party culture, among others: see Binder (2003), Powell (2000), Tsebelis (2002) and Yap (2006). Although the effects of institutions can easily be examined by cross-national comparison of macro data, many questions have been raised on the adequate control of confounding factors in the analysis.

[5]There has been no significant institutional change in local government systems since local government was reinstituted in 1992, and the main structure of the system has been intact. One change that could affect the behaviour of local councillors was the implementation of stipend systems for local council members in 2006. However, we do not deal with the effects of stipend on legislative productivity for the primary purpose of this study for two reasons. First, we could not access the ordinance-making activity data before the introduction of the stipend system. Second, we could not find previous studies that examine the causal effect of the stipend system on legislative performance in either theoretical or empirical terms. Leaving this topic for a follow-up study, we speculate on how the introduction of the stipend system affects local council recruitment and the mutual recognition between local councillors and citizens in Section 5.

attributes of local councillors led to their increasing engagement in legislative activities; further, we consider how networks affect ordinance proposals.

The number of terms a local councillor has served in office may be an indicator of a councillor's legislative capacity. Conventionally, we may expect senior members of a council to be more active in ordinance making. Yet, studies show that such council members may be more interested in climbing the political ladder than re-election (Mayhew, 2005; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993). In particular, following a few successful re-elections, metropolitan council members generally consider moving up the political ladder and aim for higher positions such as a municipal mayor or National Assembly member. These senior members may spend more time on activities associated with central government agencies or political parties. As a result, the performances of the legislative activities within the metropolitan council by these members are expected to be weaker than those of junior members, who are also more likely to focus on representing their districts and possible re-election (Wood & Yoon, 1998; Wood & Young, 1997).

The effect of the gender of lawmakers on legislative productivity is mixed but remains important, especially in light of global efforts to increase gender representation. Focusing on the effect of gender on legislature passing rate, Volden et al. (2013) found that female lawmakers tend to engage in consensus-making and performed better than male lawmakers in passing their bills.[6] Carey et al. (1998) and Richardson and Freeman (1995) suggested an opposite research outcome, finding female council members are more involved in managing their districts than their male counterparts. Thus, female members are less active than male counterparts in legislative activities.

Other considerations such as the personal background of council members, including class and previous occupation, can also affect their legislative activities. Carnes and Lupu (2015) found that lawmakers from different classes bring different attitudes to economic issues in the legislative process in Latin American countries. Meier and Nigro (1976) show that family background, socialisation processes and demographic factors also influence the activities of legislators. Richardson et al. (2004) analysed how the members' personal ideology influences their interest in legislative activities.

Some studies contend that the lawmaker's electoral district predicts legislative activity. Thus, Swain (1993) and Whitby (1997) argue that council members from minority populations tend to pursue legislative activities that represent the minorities even when such activities do not benefit their own districts. Adler and Wilkerson (2012) showed that council members who normally focus on social problems and their solutions tend to have higher legislative productivity as a result of their problem-solving abilities.

One of the shortcomings in the literature on determinants of legislative activities is in the tendency to treat legislators as isolated entities having no interaction with other members, although they never make the decisions in a vacuum and they are in constant strategic interactions with other members (Denzau et al., 1985; Polsby, 1968). Some aspects of networks may be particularly relevant to democratic consolidation, including how diverse the networks may be. In particular, a group of council members may propose ordinances on topics of common interest or support the ordinances proposed by their fellow members. Consequently, a person who is connected to many other members of a network will probably perceive the others in the network very differently from someone who is isolated from these other members. A recent methodological advance, network analysis, provides an indispensable tool for analysing interactions among the legislators. By using the tools of network analysis, the structure of the

---

[6]But this is the case where they are affiliated with a minority party.

co-sponsorship network, the centre and periphery of the network, and the existence of network community within a legislative body can usefully be identified (Cho & Fowler, 2010; Fowler, 2006; Porter et al., 2005; Rhodes, 2006; Ward et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2008).

4 | DATA AND RESULTS

We analyse the ordinances proposed in the BMC in 2006–2018. The primary source of our data is the legislation records provided on the BMC website, and we collected legislation data on the 5th, 6th and 7th Councils (from July 2006 to June 2018). Supplementary data are from the National Assembly website.[7]

4.1 | Description of data

There were 52, 56 and 49 council members in the 5th, 6th and 7th BMC, respectively. The total number of serving members was 116 as some of them were elected over multiple terms. The number of seats in each council is fixed at 47, which includes five proportional representatives. The total number of the people who actually served in each term is more than 47 as there were vacancies which resulted in by-elections to fill the seats. The reasons for vacancies vary. Five members resigned during the 5th Council, of which four ran for the 18th National Assembly elections and one was forced to resign due to violations of the campaign law.[8] During the 6th Council, three members chose to run for the 19th National Assembly elections, and two seats were lost due to legal violations that occurred during the 7th Council. Six members of the Education Committee were added to the number of the 6th Council members because they could propose ordinances during the period of the 6th Council (Table 1).

The composition of BMC members was largely unchanged between the 5th, 6th and 7th Councils. Further, during the period under study, the proportion of members who were affiliated with the Liberty Korea Party (LKP), to which the council chairman was also affiliated, remained very high. The proportion of male councillors was also significantly high. Although still greater than a majority, the proportion of newly elected members gradually decreased from 59.6% (5th Council) to 58.0% (6th) and 57.1% (7th).[9] The proportion of members aged in their 50s gradually increased over the period—36.2% (5th), 40.0% (6th) and 53.1% (7th)—as did overall members in their 60s, although with a slight fall during the 6th Council: 19.1% (5th), 18.0% (6th) and 22.4% (7th). Further, a continuous increase in the proportion of members with

---

[7]The BMC website is http://council.busan.go.kr, and the National Assembly website is https://www.assembly.go.kr.

[8]Another seat became vacant in 2009 due to the death of a member, but no by-election was held to fill the seat because of the scheduled municipal election in 2010.

[9]One reviewer asked why the ratio of newly elected council members was relatively high in BMC. We could not find any previous research to address this question. Thus, we suggest two probable reasons for the high turnover of BMC members. The first reason is related to the nomination process. The nomination of candidates for city council member is less systemic than that for National Assembly members in Korea. Candidate nomination in Korea has been moving towards a bottom-up, primary-type process, but candidates are still selected by the parties. In this situation, regional party leaders or the incumbent National Assembly members of the districts in which the local council districts are nested tend to influence the nomination and selection process for city council members. Another explanation is cultural. Successful city councillors tend to have political aspirations of running for higher positions such as National Assembly member or head of local government. We believe that these two factors explain the relative paucity of the council members with long tenure.

TABLE 1 Classification of 5th to 7th Busan Metropolitan Council members

Council	Total seats	Vacancy/ by-election	Newly elected		LKP affiliated		Party member/ politician		Male		50s		60s	
	No.	No.	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
5th	47	5	28	59.6	45	95.7	28	59.6	41	87.2	17	36.2	9	19.1
6th	47(6)	3	29	58.0	43	86.0	30	60.0	44	88.0	20	40.0	9	18.0
7th	47	2	28	57.1	47	95.9	37	75.5	43	87.8	26	53.1	11	22.4

Note: Number of Education Committee members in parentheses.

Abbreviation: LKP, Liberty Korea Party.

political experience, including former and incumbent metropolitan councillors, was recorded: 59.6% (5th), 60.0% (6th) and 75.5% (7th).[10]

Table 2 shows that the total number of ordinances proposed by BMC members increased from 759 to 1218 between the 5th and 7th Councils, indicating an increase of 60.5%. Although a majority of the ordinances were proposed by either the chairman of BMC or Busan mayor, the number of ordinances proposed by the councillors increased from 54 in the 5th Council to 401 in the 7th Council, an increase of 742.6%.[11] For all three periods, the average number of ordinances proposed by the members of other political parties was higher than that proposed by members affiliated with the LKP, and the number of ordinances proposed by the proportional representatives was higher than that proposed by the district representatives. Additionally, female members and members with no political experience tended to propose more ordinances than male members and members with political experience.

In the 5th Council the average number of ordinances proposed by councillors tended to increase according to age in the 30s and 40s age groups, whereas the trend began to move downward in the 50s age group. However, a curve peaking at the 50s age group was observed in the 6th Council and the average number of proposed ordinances tended to decrease with an increase in age in the 7th Council.

The newly elected council members proposed the highest number of ordinances during the 5th and 7th Councils, and the number of members proposing ordinances decreased with an increase in the number of re-elected members. In the 6th Council, the number of proposed ordinances by members serving their second term was lower than that by members serving their first and third terms. During all three periods, members serving their fourth term did not propose any ordinances.[12]

4.2 | Models and results

Our data analyses consist of two parts since we have two separate dependent variables. In the first set of analyses, we examine the effects of socioeconomic status (SES) variables, including age, education and gender, as well as personal background and political factors on the number of proposed ordinances for individual council members. In the second set of analyses, we focus on the structure of the proposal network among council members. Specifically, we examine the networks of members who co-sponsored ordinances most frequently to evaluate whether there are temporal changes in the patterns of co-sponsorship network.

---

[10]One of the reasons for this trend is that many members were elected to the metropolitan council after building a career as a member of the municipal council. In the 7th BMC, among the newly elected members, 13 were former municipal council members, three were former advisers of National Assembly members, and three were former central or local party members.

[11]This trend has an important implication. Although there is a moderate prevailing power relation between the local council chairman and the local council members, the councils' power gradually increases. Further, the trend seems to indicate the gradual weakening of single-person-led local politics.

[12]This finding fits with earlier studies (Wood & Yoon, 1998; Wood & Young, 1997) that show that after a few successful re-elections, metropolitan council members aim for higher positions such as municipal mayor or National Assembly member and spend more time on activities associated with central government agencies or political parties. We have four cases in which a council member served in the BMC for more than three terms. Two succeeded in getting a higher position: Gil-woo Cho in the 5th BMC became a municipal mayor for Dongnae-gu in 2010; Jong-heon Baek in the 7th BMC became a National Assembly member in 2020.

TABLE 2 Number of ordinances proposed by council members in 5th to 7th Councils

Council	Number of ordinances		Average by party (LKP/others)		District/proportional representatives		Gender average		Average by political experience	
	Total	Proposed by council members	LKP affiliated	Others	District	PR	Male	Female	With	Without
5th	759	54	9.09	17.00	9.38	9.80	9.44	9.33	9.38	12.16
6th	874	212	21.33	30.71	22.09	27.60	21.59	30.33	21.73	24.00
7th	1218	401	12.04	15.50	11.98	14.00	11.44	17.5	12.19	12.17

Council	Average by age group				Average by serving term			
	30s	40s	50s	60s	1st term	2nd term	3rd term	4th term
5th	9.00	13.63	6.76	3.83	12.79	5.29	2.75	–
6th	12.00	20.95	26.05	21.00	24.45	20.00	27.67	–
7th	20.00	15.50	11.92	8.36	13.11	12.29	11.6	–

Abbreviation: LKP, Liberty Korea Party.

4.2.1 | Individual attributes and ordinance proposal

We used negative binomial regression models because the distribution of our dependent variables violate the equidispersion property—that is, $var(Y) > E(Y)$ (Cameron & Trivedi, 1998; Hilbe, 2007; Long & Freese, 2014). We also used the number of months of each legislative session (48 months) as the exposure common for all members, except for members who resigned, died, or were elected in by-elections. The exposure values for 'drop-out' members or members installed at by-elections were the number of months for which they actually served as council members.[13]

Our first set of analyses was performed in incremental steps. We began by adding the first sets of socioeconomic determinants (gender, age, college major [whether in social sciences or not] and previous occupation) that are believed to affect the number of proposals. Subsequently, we introduced political variables, such as number of terms of service, party affiliation (whether affiliated with the LKP or not) and political experience. We used the months served by each council member as the exposure variable so that the members who were elected through nationwide local elections had different exposures from those elected through by-elections (see Table 3 for the list of variables).

Intuitive interpretations are not easy for coefficients in nonlinear models such as negative binomial regression. Hence, we reported incident-rate ratios (IRRs), e^β, to facilitate interpretation, where 1.00 is the baseline (corresponding to no effect on the incidence rate). The difference between 1.00 and the reported IRR provides the percentage of increase (>1) or decrease (<1) of proposal rates corresponding to a unit increase in the independent variable.

TABLE 3 Descriptive statistics (observations = 157)

Variables	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Number of ordinance proposals	15.76	11.18	0	46
Terms	1.522	0.748	1	4
Age	52.26	7.695	34	70
Gender	0.879	0.327	0	1
Party	0.892	0.312	0	1
Social science major in college	0.618	0.487	0	1
Prior occupation	Politics: 43; business: 48; activists: 63; other: 3			
Political experience	0.618	0.487	0	1
Tenure in the Council	44.579	9.094	10	48
Degree centrality	26.96	26.74	0	164
Closeness centrality	0.198	0.0733	0.0179	0.312
Betweenness centrality	0.0162	0.0300	0	0.182

Note: Prior occupation variables are the number of council members in each occupation category.
Abbreviation: SD, standard deviation.

---

[13]Otherwise, we might consider a member that proposed, say, 10 ordinances in 48 months and the one with 10 ordinances in 20 months in a similar fashion.

The negative binomial regression results with only the socioeconomic characteristic variables (see Table 4, Model 1-1) indicate that none of the socioeconomic variables (gender, age, college major, or previous occupation) help explain individual variations in the number of proposals, except the binary variable for business background. Council members with a business background tend to propose 23.7% less ordinances than those with a politics background. Note that the baseline category in the previous occupation variable is politics, and the IRRs that are lower than 1.00 for all the other occupational categories indicate that council members with a political background proposed more ordinances.

By including political variables, Model 1-2 of Table 4 shows that older members and the members with no political background tend to propose a lower number of ordinances than younger members and members with a political background, respectively. A year increase in biological age is associated with an approximately 1.3% decrease in ordinance proposals and members with a business and other background are likely to propose 35.2% and 61.3% less ordinances, respectively, than those with a politics background. Further, the results reveal that members who served more terms in the council tend to propose fewer ordinances than newer members, and that members affiliated with the LKP (which was the ruling and majority party at both the national and local levels) tend to propose approximately 46.4% less ordinances than the other members. In addition, an increase of one term is associated with a reduction of approximately 27% in the ordinance proposal rate.

Now, we separately model each Council to examine the temporal change in the effects of individual determinants on the number of proposed ordinances. In the 5th Council, which was held in 2006–2010, age, other category of occupation and served term are significant (Table 4, Model 2-1). A year increase in age is associated with a 2.9% decrease in proposals, and members with other background propose significantly fewer ordinances (about 50.7% less) than those with a politics background. One unit increase in the served term is associated with a reduction of approximately 45.4% in the frequency of ordinance proposals, which indicates that senior, more experienced members are less likely to participate in the proposal process compared to junior members.

The 6th Council, held in 2010–2014, reveals different results (Table 4, Model 2-2).[14] Members with social sciences degrees tended to participate more in legislative activities than those with other degrees (approximately 38.0%). Although the coefficients are insignificant, the 6th Council also revealed that older, female members with backgrounds other than politics proposed more ordinances than their younger, male counterparts with political backgrounds. Further, LKP members participated less actively (approximately 29.2%) in ordinance proposals than other party members in the 6th Council.

The 7th Council, held in 2014–2018, displays a very interesting pattern (Table 4, Model 2-3). In the 7th Council, age plays a significant role in explaining the ordinance proposal process. Younger members tend to propose more ordinances than their older counterparts; a single-year increase in biological age is associated with a 3.2% decrease in the number of the proposed ordinances. Seniority in the council is also significantly related to less participation in the ordinance proposal process; a single-term increase in the 7th Council is associated with a 29.8% decrease in the number of ordinance proposals.

---

[14]The 6th Council includes six members of the Education Committee in addition to the local councillors. To check how influential these observations are on the outcome of the regression analysis, we also conducted a regression analysis excluding these six members. We found that the inclusion of the Education Committee members did not affect the results of the regression analysis.

TABLE 4 Individual attributes and ordinance proposals, all Councils and each Council

Variables	Model 1-1	Model 1-2 All Councils	Model 2-1 5th Council	Model 2-2 6th Council	Model 2-3 7th Council
Gender	0.853 (0.154)	1.048 (0.182)	1.261 (0.409)	0.857 (0.197)	0.969 (0.288)
Age	0.989 (0.008)	0.987* (0.007)	0.971** (0.011)	1.005 (0.010)	0.968*** (0.010)
Social science major	1.113 (0.140)	1.133 (0.130)	0.898 (0.152)	1.380** (0.213)	1.013 (0.181)
Prior occupation: business	0.763* (0.118)	0.648*** (0.095)	0.689 (0.169)	1.200 (0.237)	1.024 (0.247)
Prior occupation: activists	0.962 (0.143)	0.819 (0.110)	0.877 (0.217)	1.136 (0.203)	1.208 (0.239)
Prior occupation: other	0.496 (0.227)	0.387** (0.194)	0.493* (0.251)		
Terms		0.730*** (0.072)	0.546*** (0.102)	0.869 (0.134)	0.712*** (0.079)
Party: LKP		0.536*** (0.092)	0.738 (0.338)	0.708** (0.119)	0.990 (0.443)
Political experience		0.894 (0.129)	0.820 (0.168)	1.068 (0.239)	1.231 (0.245)
lnalpha	0.461 (0.062)	0.352 (0.051)	0.192 (0.070)	0.200 (0.042)	0.135 (0.049)
Constant	0.752 (0.332)	2.180* (0.962)	3.611* (2.585)	0.531 (0.338)	1.901 (1.268)
Loglikelihood	−572.061	−554.566	−152.193	−214.043	−150.945
AIC	1160.123	1131.132	326.385	448.085	321.889
BIC	1184.573	1164.751	347.849	468.339	340.807
Psuedo-R^2	.009	.039	.113	.026	.053
Observations	157	157	52	56	49

Note: Model 1 indicates regression outcomes for all three BMCs (5th, 6th and 7th). Specifically, Model 1-1 takes only socioeconomic variables to explain ordinance proposals. Model 1-2 takes political variables in addition to socioeconomic variables. Model 2 reports the results of regression analyses based on Model 1-2 for each BMC: Model 2-1 is for the 5th BMC; Model 2-2 is for the 6th BMC; and Model 2-3 is for the 7th BMC. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Abbreviations: AIC, Akaike information criterion; BIC, Bayesian information criterion; LKP, Liberty Korea Party.

***p < .01. **p < .05. *p < .1.

To summarise, we found variations in the effect of socioeconomic variables on ordinance proposal across the Councils. Age matters in the 5th and 7th Councils, but not in the 6th Council. The college major (social science) matters only in the 6th Council. Members with a politics background participated most actively in the 5th Council, but the trend changed in the 6th and 7th Councils, although the coefficients are not significant. The results show that members with a business and other background were likely to propose more ordinances in the 6th and 7th Councils.

Looking at the political variables, the terms in service were significant in the 5th and 7th Councils and show that senior members with more years of experience in the Council showed tepid participation in ordinance proposal. Finally, the members of the ruling LKP show significantly lower participation in the Model 1-2 (SES plus political variables). But, a close examination shows that the trend began to change in the 7th Council. Although it does not reach the required significance level, it suggests that members of the LKP proposed almost an equal number of ordinances (1% less) to non-LKP members.

4.2.2 | Structure of ordinance network

The next step of our analysis was to examine the proposal networks among the members in each Council. This section depicts a shift in research focus from the individual member to the legislative session, and we identify the most influential members and examine whether there are any similarities or differences across Councils in terms of the network structure and whether each Council contains so-called 'co-sponsorship communities'.

a. Terms and models

The specific structural patterns and the manner in which these structures affect their members increase the utility of networks. In other words, networks affect their members based on the latter's locations in the networks. A person who is connected to many other members of a network will probably perceive the remainder of the network very differently from someone whose location is relatively isolated from that of the other members.

By examining the locations of individual network members, we can assess the *prominence* of these members. An actor is prominent if his or her ties make the actor visible to the other members of the network (Knoke & Burt, 1983). So, the first component of the network analysis is to identify the prominent figures in the proposal network. We need to discuss the different kinds of *centrality*, which refers to viewing a central actor as one who is involved in many (direct or indirect) ties, before we embark on the examination of proposal networks (Luke, 2015).

The simplest measure of centrality is based on the notion that nodes with more direct ties are more prominent than those with fewer or no ties. This *degree centrality* is defined as the degree of a node. The degree of a node is the number of ties it has with other nodes. It is usually defined as follows:

$$C_{D(n_i)} = d(n_i), \tag{1}$$

where d indicates the path distance between two nodes.

LEE ET AL.

ASIA & THE PACIFIC
POLICY STUDIES

Australian
National
University

29

The second type of centrality is *closeness centrality*. Closeness centrality focuses on how close each node is to every other node in a network, rather than examining the direct connections alone. In closeness centrality, nodes are as prominent as their closeness to all the other nodes in the network. It is expressed as follows:

$$C_c(n_i) = \left[\sum_{j=1}^n d(n_i, n_j) \right]^{-1},$$
(2)

where d is the path distance between two nodes. Therefore, closeness centrality is the inverse of the sum of all the distances between node i and all the other nodes in the network.

The third type of centrality is *betweenness centrality*, which measures the extent to which a node sits 'between' pairs of other nodes in the network such that a path connecting the other nodes goes through that node. Accordingly, a node with high betweenness is prominent because that node is in a position to observe or control the flow of information in the network. Betweenness centrality is expressed as follows:

$$C_B(n_i) = \sum_{j < k} g_{jk}(n_i) / g_{jk},$$
(3)

where g_{jk} is the *geodesic* (i.e., the shortest path between two nodes) between nodes j and k, and $g_{jk}(n_i)$ is the number of geodesics between nodes j and k that contain the node i.

b. Contours of ordinance proposal network in BMC

We conducted a series of network analyses for each Council since we considered it unreasonable to combine all three Councils and analyse the network with respect to the members. We first drew the network for each Council using undirected graphs, as depicted in Figure 1. In these figures, the nodes in circles indicate the individual members of each session and edges connecting the nodes indicate ordinance co-sponsorships.[15] According to Figure 1, Panel A (the 5th Council), most of the members in the council, with the exception of five members, are centred on a group of council members. In comparison, the 6th Council (Figure 1, Panel B) reveals more concentration and a tighter relationship among the members, with the exception of only two members. Panels A and B in Figure 1 reveal that most of the members have very similar degree centrality with only a few members at their centre.

However, Figure 1, Panel C (the 7th Council), displays a very different landscape from the previous two Councils. In the 7th Council, the network's structure is less concentrated with a few central members.

c. Determinants of centrality

The final step of our analysis is to examine the determinants of centralities—that is, identification of the individual factors that contribute to the centrality of the network's members. For this estimation, we used linear regression models with three different centralities as dependent variables.

---

[15]For convenience and legibility, we assign serial numbers to Council members.

i. Degree centrality

A common trend in all the three Councils was that members affiliated with the LKP were less likely to be connected to the other members of the co-sponsoring network. As discussed earlier, LKP members showed lower propensities to propose ordinances than other party members across legislative sessions. Moreover, the degree centrality result (Table 5, Model 3) confirmed that the LKP members remained remote from the centre in proposal networks.

In the 5th Council, younger and junior members showed higher degree centrality than other members. However, we reserve the conclusion that seniority does not play any significant role in the sponsorship network because only three members were serving their third term and only one member was serving a fourth term in the Council. Further, 33 members were new council members, and 14 were entering their second term. Finally, approximately half of the total members (25 of 52) with high degree centralities were new council members.

In the 6th Council, female members were connected to more co-sponsorship networks than male members, although there were only six female members among a total of 56 members (including those elected through by-elections and six members of the Education Committee) in the session. In this Council, the members with college degrees in social sciences tended to show high degree centrality, similar to those with business and social activist backgrounds. The result clearly revealed a pattern of inactivity for LKP members in the co-sponsoring network. Unlike in the 5th Council, three of the top five members with the highest values of degree centrality were not new members: one was serving their second term and the other their third term.

In the 7th Council, age was negatively associated with degree centrality. Further, in this Council, the factors that had significance in the earlier sessions were not significant.

ii. Closeness centrality

Table 5, Model 4 reveals that members with backgrounds in business and activism tended to have low closeness centrality. In the 5th Council, members with seniority show low closeness centrality scores. A remarkable feature of the 6th Council was the prominence of male and older members. These groups also tended to show higher closeness centrality than female and younger members. Note that the coefficient of age switched from negative in Model 4-2 (the 6th Council) to positive in Model 4-3 (the 7th Council). Further, it is noted that the coefficients of terms in all the models had negative signs, which implies that, in BMC, seniority is generally


FIGURE 1 Networks and communities in the ordinance proposal network, 5th–7th Councils

TABLE 5 Degree/closeness/betweenness centrality in the ordinance proposal network

| | Degree centrality | | | | Closeness centrality | |
| | Model 3 | Model 3-1 | Model 3-2 | Model 3-3 | Model 4 | Model 4-1 |
Variables	All Councils	5th Council	6th Council	7th Council	All Councils	5th Council
Gender	−5.389 (6.826)	7.429 (8.680)	−41.42*** (12.820)	−1.514 (8.154)	0.028 (0.018)	−0.009 (0.019)
Age	−0.178 (0.269)	−0.605* (0.309)	0.599 (0.516)	−0.657** (0.277)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Social science major	7.084 (4.425)	3.935 (4.774)	14.820* (8.501)	5.195 (4.563)	0.010 (0.012)	−0.005 (0.011)
Prior occupation: business	−2.527 (5.553)	0.495 (6.776)	20.410* (10.510)	6.426 (5.844)	−0.038** (0.015)	0.003 (0.015)
Prior occupation: activists	1.103 (5.164)	2.394 (7.149)	23.090** (9.655)	6.829 (4.921)	−0.026* (0.014)	−0.004 (0.016)
Prior occupation: other	−2.783 (15.620)	−0.514 (11.370)			−0.074* (0.041)	−0.001 (0.025)
Terms	−3.028 (3.354)	−10.64** (4.259)	2.405 (7.927)	−3.163 (2.487)	−0.030*** (0.009)	−0.033*** (0.010)
Party: LKP	−27.460*** (6.884)	−4.739 (13.220)	−16.420* (9.478)	−2.967 (12.110)	−0.073*** (0.018)	0.005 (0.030)
Political experience	−3.378 (5.345)	−1.039 (5.841)	6.312 (11.450)	1.426 (5.207)	0.007 (0.014)	0.002 (0.013)
Constant	68.19*** (16.020)	61.98*** (21.170)	34.69 (32.290)	47.78*** (16.640)	0.255*** (0.042)	0.172*** (0.047)
N	157	52	56	49	157	52
R^2	.162	.385	.361	.209	.233	.339

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.

Abbreviation: LKP, Liberty Korea Party.

***$p < .01$.

**$p < .05$.

*$p < .1$.

TABLE 5 Continued

	Closeness centrality			Betweenness centrality		
	Model 4-2	Model 4-3	Model 5	Model 5-1	Model 5-2	Model 5-3
Variables	**6th Council**	**7th Council**	**All Councils**	**5th Council**	**6th Council**	**7th Council**
Gender	0.042** (0.021)	0.002 (0.023)	−0.008 (0.008)	0.016 (0.013)	−0.030*** (0.007)	0.003 (0.026)
Age	0.002** (0.001)	−0.002* (0.001)	−0.001** (0.000)	−0.001 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	−0.002*** (0.001)
Social science major	0.023* (0.014)	0.009 (0.013)	0.010* (0.005)	0.009 (0.007)	0.005 (0.004)	0.021 (0.015)
Prior occupation: business	0.031* (0.017)	0.000 (0.017)	0.016** (0.006)	0.014 (0.010)	0.007 (0.005)	0.021 (0.019)
Prior occupation: activists	0.019 (0.015)	0.021 (0.014)	0.018*** (0.006)	0.023** (0.011)	0.008* (0.005)	0.021 (0.016)
Prior occupation: other	0.019 (0.015)	0.021 (0.014)	0.019 (0.018)	0.020 (0.017)	0.008* (0.005)	0.021 (0.016)
Terms	−0.049*** (0.013)	−0.033*** (0.007)	−0.006 (0.004)	−0.012* (0.006)	0.005 (0.004)	−0.010 (0.008)
Party: LKP	−0.021 (0.015)	−0.006 (0.034)	−0.001 (0.008)	0.003 (0.020)	−0.002 (0.005)	−0.020 (0.039)
Political experience	0.061*** (0.018)	0.005 (0.015)	0.009 (0.006)	0.011 (0.009)	−0.004 (0.006)	0.015 (0.017)
Constant	0.173*** (0.052)	0.298*** (0.047)	0.049*** (0.018)	0.027 (0.032)	0.021 (0.017)	0.148*** (0.054)
N	56	49	157	52	56	49
R^2	.367	.423	.136	.298	.352	.242

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.

Abbreviation: LKP, Liberty Korea Party.

***$p < .01$.

**$p < .05$.

*$p < .1$.

negatively associated with all centrality measures. Overall, non-LKP members tended to lie closer to the centre of the network, while members with political experience showed significantly higher closeness centrality only in the 6th Council.

iii. Betweenness centrality

Table 5, Model 5 reveals that age is negatively correlated with betweenness centrality and that members with college degrees in social sciences and backgrounds in business and activism have high betweenness centrality. The service term in the Council and LKP are negatively correlated with betweenness centrality in all models, albeit they are insignificant.

On a closer look, Model 5-1 shows the negative role of seniority in betweenness centrality in the 5th Council. In the 6th Council (Model 5-2), female members and members with activist and other background showed higher betweenness centrality than other members; however, the 7th Council did not show any such pattern, except the negative role of age. As depicted in Figure 1, the reason for the insignificance of most variables in Model 5-3 (the 7th Council) is due to the changed structure of the network from a highly concentrated network in the 5th and 6th Councils to a loose network with multiple centres in the 7th Council.

d. Ordinance proposal communities

The final component in our proposal network analysis is to identify the communities (subgroups) in the proposal network. A community in a network is a set of nodes that has a relatively large number of internal ties, and also relatively few ties from the group to other parts of the network. Plenty of algorithms for community detection in networks are available, but we rely on hierarchical community detection.

Figure 2 shows the network structure with four proposal network communities in each Council. One useful criteria in a community detection algorithm is modularity. Modularity is the measure of the structure of the network, specifically the extent to which nodes exhibit clustering where there is greater density within the clusters and less density between them (Newman, 2006). In our case, the modularity score reflects the extent to which the proposal community explains the observed clustering among the council members in the network. The betweenness modularity scores for the 5th, 6th and 7th Councils are 0.09, 0.11 and 0.58, respectively. The dramatic increase of the modularity score in the 7th Council, compared with the previous two Councils, indicates a few subgroups (communities) that are cohesive within and distinct from each other were formed and jointly worked in the 7th Council.

Figure 2 (cluster dendrograms) for the 7th Council clearly shows the proposal ordinance network has more complex and multiple centres than the previous two Councils. Most members were grouped in two network clusters both in the 5th and 6th Councils (Figure 2, Panels A and B, respectively), while members were more evenly distributed across four network clusters in the 7th Council (Figure 2, Panel C).

5 | DISCUSSION

In this section, we address two considerations regarding the above empirical results to broaden the applicability of the findings. First, are the outcomes of network analyses of councillors' ordinance-making activities sufficient evidence of the institutionalisation of local

FIGURE 2   Dendrograms of the ordinance proposal networks, 5th–7th Councils

councils? Second, what explains the improvement of legislative performance and productivity of the BMC over time? In other words, what were the situations and/or events that facilitated the changes at BMC?

The consolidation of democracy at the local level is an unfinished project in Korea, and likely applies to many emergent democracies. In particular, local issues and news are easily subsumed under national-level issues and the head of the local government may wield control over the local council. Party nomination is important in elections in low-information settings, which is also true in Korean municipal elections of council members. Power asymmetries may exist among local council members. These conditions mean that local council members tend to be subordinate to their regional party leaders or the incumbent National Assembly members representing their districts, because their approval is necessary for the party nomination in the election.

Nevertheless, the results show that BMC has achieved a significant level of institutionalisation in local autonomy despite adverse conditions for the consolidation of local democracy.[16] According to Palanza et al. (2016, p. 9), institutionalisation is 'the process by which the institution/organisation acquires value and stability ... leading to the increased formalisation of some practices, and increased structure, all of which increase internal capacity'. The results of network analyses here show that the BMC was gaining stability: for instance, a comparison of modular scores and the examination of cluster dendrograms show that the 7th Council was structurally more stable than the 5th and 6th Councils.

In addition to the structural stabilisation of the BMC, its internal capacity has improved. Kim and Suh (2020) investigated the change in legislative leadership between the Busan mayor and the BMC. They found that the predominance of the mayor over the BMC in terms of the number of ordinance proposals gradually weakened. First, the ratios of the number of ordinances proposed by BMC members to that by the mayor have steadily increased over time (see Figure 3). They were 10.7:72.2 and 38.1:48.9 in the 5th and 6th Councils, respectively. The BMC surpassed the mayor in the 7th Council (51.6:41.2). In the plenary session, the approval rate without amendment was little changed for the mayor's proposals, while it increased significantly for the BMC. The approval rates for the mayor's proposals changed from 57.1% (5th Council), to 86.4% (6th) and 89.7% (7th), while the approval rates for BMC members' proposals rose sharply from 44.7% (5th), 74.1% (6th) to 88.2% (7th).

What explains the improvement of legislative performance in the BMC? We contend that the stipend system for the local council members is a significant factor. The stipend system is a prerequisite for the recruitment of young and competent talent who can immerse themselves in legislative activities. Prior to the 5th Council in 2006, local council members were not paid as it was an honorary position; as a result, legislative activities were not regular and it was difficult to hold the council members responsible for their legislative activities. Kim (2018), who studied the effects of the stipend system on the legislative activities in Ulsan Metropolitan City, 50 kilometres northeast of Busan Metropolitan City, reported that the introduction of the stipend system changed the way citizens look at the local council members and their views on their legislative activities. First, after the introduction of the stipend system, citizens became aware of the fact that their taxes paid the salaries of the local council members, which raised

---

[16]During the period under analysis, the political party with which the Busan mayors were affiliated was the majority party in BMC. In other words, we did not expect the system of checks and balances between the executive and law-making branches to work well at that time.

FIGURE 3 Ordinance proposal by proposer, 5th–7th Councils

interest in legislative activities. At the same time, Kim noted that the local council members took on the positions earnestly as a result of the stipend system, since they no longer needed to hold additional jobs to support themselves.[17]

In the case of the BMC, the introduction of the stipend system gave rise to striking changes in terms of the prior occupations of council members. For example, a significant number of the 5th Council members were former businesspeople. However, more candidates with political backgrounds and citizen activists were elected in the 6th and 7th Councils. Indeed, those who previously had political careers such as former members of the municipal council, congressional aides and party officials have steadily increased from 29 members in the 5th Council, to 31 in the 6th Council and 37 in the 7th Council. The number of council members coming from social movements, trade unions and education has also steadily grown from 19 in the 5th Council to 25 in the 7th Council. Thus, the stipend system significantly reduced the proportion of council members with business backgrounds. This phenomenon was unlikely to occur without the introduction of the stipend system, which we consider indispensable to making a significant contribution to the specialisation of local councils by attracting career politicians and civil society activists to local councils.

According to Model 1–2 in Table 4, the legislative activities are significantly lower for members of the BMC with business backgrounds compared to those with political experience. In contrast, there is no significant differentiating effect between career politicians and civic activists in affecting the number of ordinance proposals. If we take into account changes in the

---

[17]In this regard, we can think of culture as a *quasi-parameter*, which is basically self-enforcing and stable but also slowly changing (Greif & Laitin, 2004). Due to the implementation of the stipend system, people began to consider city council as a serious political career, because they could make a living if elected. Citizens have also become interested in the local council's legislative activities and productivity as well. The local council members may well recognise the changed expectation of citizens and try to improve the quantity and quality of legislative activities, such as the joint proposal of ordinances. This kind of explanation means that the common knowledge of local councils has changed in both citizens and local council members (and political parties). However, this change is so slow that it may not be immediately noticeable.

occupational distribution of the council members and the effects of individual characteristics on the ordinance initiative activities, we speculate that the introduction of the stipend system contributed positively to the legislative capacity of the local council.

6 | CONCLUSIONS

We are motivated to study democratic development and consolidation by considering legislative performance at subnational levels. In particular, we are struck by the contrast of scholarly attention to legislative activities and performance at the national level, and the lack thereof at the local level. The study here fills the need to examine politics at the local level for consistency with developments at the national level, through ordinance proposal making in BMC. Several results are significant and promising.

First, we find that the BMC is moving from 'imperialistic' legislative processes to a democratic one. In particular, although the chairperson of the Council and the head of local government (mayor) were dominant in the legislative processes of Busan Metropolitan City, a gradual increase is observed in the proportions of ordinance proposals made by BMC members. The proportions increased from 7.1% in the 5th Council to 24.3% in the 6th Council and 32.9% in the 7th Council, which indicates that the power dynamic between the head of government and the local council is gradually becoming equal under the current 'head of government-centered separate institution type' governmental power.[18]

Second, our statistical analysis shows that the non-dominant members in the Council have been more active in legislative processes. Specifically, those with arguably less puissance, such as female members, first-term members, and members who did not belong to LKP-affiliated parties, participated more actively in council activities than male members, re-elected members serving multiple terms, and members affiliated with the LKP, respectively, did. The local elections held in 2018 completely changed the direction of local politics in Busan. Future research may examine whether those with less influence are still actively engaged in council activities even when the dominant party has switched from LKP to DP.

Finally, our network analysis illustrates that the ordinance proposal network communities (subgroups) have become more diverse and multi-centred, which we believe indicates that Busan is moving towards more institutionalisation within legislative bodies. One of the interesting findings in our network analysis is that the members with a high degree of centrality shared a common desire to run for the heads of local governments after serving as a metropolitan council member and some of them were actually elected.

However, it is not a given that members with high centrality (those who have conducted many direct joint initiatives through ordinances) will be politically successful in the future. Some of those council members were not successful in their re-election bids, since they did not get the party's backing, despite having actively participated in various legislative activities. This opens another avenue for future research on the role that the party's nomination system for candidates of local councillors plays in local-level consolidation of democracy in Korea.

---

[18]This is applicable to the analysis of the 7th Council alone. However, with respect to ordinances, it is noted that, among a total of 735 cases, 373 ordinances were proposed by the councillors, whereas 308 were proposed by the mayor, and the fact that the number of ordinances proposed by the councillors exceeds those by the mayor is a positive indicator.

This study attempted to identify blind spots in perspective regarding the necessity of expanding the local council as a political space to facilitate the abandonment of the traditional Korean power structure, which is centered around the head of government. Ultimately, this study suggests that achieving appropriate separation between the head of government and the local council is needed to increase democratic accountability and representation. Based on various analyses, the study identifies the attributes of council members who attained outstanding results in council activities; in addition, it clarified the attributes of the members who improved their political power or influence by networking with their fellow members.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.

ORCID

Byung-Jae Lee https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9768-4933
Tae Wan Kim https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1201-5763
Jaekwon Suh https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3475-3169
O. Fiona Yap https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1287-3768

REFERENCES

Adler, E. S., & Wilkerson, J. D. (2012). *Congress and the politics of problem solving*. New York: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139150842

Binder, S. A. (2003). *Stalemate: Causes and consequences of legislative stalemate*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Bohlken, A. T. (2016). *Democratization from above: The logic of local democracy in the developing countries*. New York: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316415658

Bowman, A. O. M., & Kearney, R. C. (2015). *State and local government: The essentials* (6th ed.). Stamford, CT: Cengage Learning.

Cameron, A. C., & Trivedi, P. K. (1998). *Regression analysis of count data*. New York: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511814365

Carey, J. M., Niemi, R., & Powell, L. (1998). Are women state legislators different? In S. Thomas & C. Wilcox (Eds.), *Women and elective office: Past, present, and future* (pp. 87–102). New York: Oxford University Press.

Carnes, N., & Lupu, N. (2015). Rethinking the comparative perspective on class and representation: Evidence from Latin America. *American Journal of Political Science*, *59*(1), 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12112

Cha, J., & Yap, O. F. (2019). Challenging the East Asian development model: Evidence from South Korea. *European Journal of Development Research*, *32*, 220–250.

Cho, W. K. T., & Fowler, J. H. (2010). Legislative success in a small world: Social network analysis and the dynamics of congressional legislation. *The Journal of Politics*, *72*(1), 124–135. https://doi.org/10.1017/S002238160999051X

Clinton, J. D., & Lapinski, J. S. (2006). Measuring legislative accomplishment, 1877–1994. *American Journal of Political Science*, *50*(1), 232–249. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.15405907.2006.00181.x

Denzau, A., Riker, W., & Shepsle, K. (1985). Farquharson and Fenno: Sophisticated voting and home style. *American Political Science Review*, *79*(4), 1117–1134. https://doi.org/10.2307/1956251

Fowler, J. (2006). Connecting the Congress: A study of cosponsorship network. *Political Analysis*, *14*(4), 456–487. https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpl002

LEE ET AL.

ASIA & THE PACIFIC
POLICY STUDIES

Australian
National
University

39

Gibson, E. L. (2012). *Boundary control: Subnational authoritarianism in federal democracies*. New York: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139017992

Greif, A., & Laitin, D. D. (2004). A theory of endogenous institutional change. *American Political Science Review*, *98*(4), 633–652. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055404041395

Hilbe, J. M. (2007). *Negative binomial regression*. New York: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511811852

Kim, B., & Suh, J. (2020). Changes in legislative leadership between the mayor and the city council: A time-series analysis of ordinances in Busan Metropolitan City Council from 2006 to 2018. *Korean Journal of Legislative Studies*, *26*(1), 147–180.[In Korean.]

Kim, C. L., & Patterson, S. C. (1988). Parliamentary elite integration in six nations. *Comparative Politics*, *20*(4), 379–399. https://doi.org/10.2307/421935

Kim, D. H. (2018). Empirical analysis of legislative activities after introduction of stipend system for local council members and improvement issues: A case study on Ulsan Metropolitan City Council. *Korean Journal of Local Government Studies*, *22*(2), 91–118.[In Korean.]

Knoke, D., & Burt, R. S. (1983). Prominence. In R. S. Burt & M. J. Minor (Eds.), *Applied network analysis* (pp. 195–222). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.

Linz, J., & Stepan, A. (1996). *Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Long, J. S., & Freese, J. (2014). *Regression models for categorical dependent variables using Stata* (3rd ed.). College Station, TX: Stata Press.

Luke, D. A. (2015). *A user's guide to network analysis in R*. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/9783319238838

Mayhew, D. (2005). *Divided we govern: Party control, lawmaking and investigations, 1946–2002* (2nd ed.). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Meier, K. J., & Nigro, L. G. (1976). Representative bureaucracy and policy preferences: A study in the attitudes of federal executives. *Public Administration Review*, *36*(4), 458–469. https://doi.org/10.2307/974854

Miquel, G. P. I., & Snyder, J. M., Jr. (2006). Legislative effectiveness and legislative careers. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, *31*(3), 347–381. https://doi.org/10.3162/036298006X201841

Newman, M. E. J. (2006). Modularity and community structure in networks. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences – PNAS*, *103*(23), 8577–8582. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0601602103

O'Donnell, G. (1998). Horizontal accountability in new democracies. *Journal of Democracy*, *9*(3), 112–126. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1998.0051

Oliver, J. E., Ha, S. E., & Callen, Z. (2012). *Local election and the politics of small-scale*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Palanza, V., Scartascini, C., & Tommasi, M. (2016). Congressional institutionalization: A cross-national comparison. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, *41*(1), 7–34. https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12104

Polsby, N. W. (1968). The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives. *American Political Science Review*, *62*(1), 144–168. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055400115692

Porter, M. A., Mucha, P. J., Newman, M. E. J., & Warmbrand, C. M. (2005). A network analysis of committees in the U.S. House of Representatives. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences – PNAS*, *102*(20), 7057–7062. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0500191102

Powell, G. B., Jr. (2000). *Elections as instruments of democracy: Majoritarian and proportional visions*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Rhodes, R. A. W. (2006). Policy network analysis. In M. Moran, M. Rein, & R. E. Goodin (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of public policy* (pp. 425–447). New York: Oxford University Press.

Richardson, L. E., Jr., & Freeman, P. K. (1995). Gender differences in constituency service among state legislators. *Political Research Quarterly*, *48*(1), 169–179. https://doi.org/10.2307/449126

Richardson, L. E., Jr., Russell, B. E., & Cooper, C. A. (2004). Legislative representation in a single-member versus multiple-member district system: The Arizona State legislature. *Political Research Quarterly*, *57*(2), 337–344. https://doi.org/10.1177/106591290405700214

Rogers, J. R. (2005). The impact of divided government on legislative production. *Public Choice*, *123*(1–2), 217–233. https://doi.org/10.1007/s1112700502615

Rosenstone, S. J., & Hansen, J. M. (1993). *Mobilization, participation and democracy in America*. New York: Macmillan.

Swain, C. M. (1993). *Black faces, black interests: The representation of African Americans in Congress*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Tsebelis, G. (2002). *Veto players: How political institutions work*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400831456

Volden, C., Wiseman, A. E., & Wittner, D. E. (2013). Why are women more effective lawmakers than men. *American Journal of Political Science*, *57*(2), 326–341. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12010

Ward, M. D., Stovel, K., & Sacks, A. (2011). Network analysis and political science. *Annual Review of Political Science*, *14*(1), 245–264. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.040907.115949

Whitby, K. J. (1997). *The color of representation: Congressional behavior and black interests*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.14985

Wood, D. M., & Yoon, J.-B. (1998). Role orientations of junior British MPs: A test of Searing's categories with emphasis on constituency activities. *Journal of Legislative Studies*, *4*(3), 52–71. https://doi.org/10.1080/13572339808420564

Wood, D. M., & Young, G. (1997). Comparing constituency activity by junior legislators in Great Britain and Ireland. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, *22*(2), 217–232. https://doi.org/10.2307/440383

Yap, O. F. (2006). Agenda control, intraparty conflict, and government spending in Asia: Evidence from South Korea and Taiwan. *Journal of East Asian Studies*, *6*(1), 69–104. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800000047

Yap, O. F. (2019). How political trust matters in emergent democracies: Evidence from East and Southeast Asia. *Journal of Public Policy*, *39*(2), 295–328. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X1800003X

Zhang, Y., Friend, A. J., Traud, A. L., Porter, M. A., Fowler, J. H., & Mucha, P. J. (2008). Community structure in congressional cosponsorship networks. *Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications*, *387*(7), 1705–1712. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2007.11.004

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES

Byung-Jae Lee is a Research Professor at the Center for Digital Social Science at Yonsei University, Seoul. His research interests include causal inference, big data analysis, voting behaviour, and local politics in Korea. His work has been published in *Electoral Studies*, *Policy and Internet*, and *Korean Political Science Review*, among others.

Tae Wan Kim is a Researcher at the Institute of Social Science Research at Pusan National University, Busan. His research interests include voting behaviour, political communication, and local politics in Korea.

Jaekwon Suh teaches comparative politics, political economy and methodology in the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy at Pusan National University, Busan. Previously he was an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Truman State University, Missouri. His research interests include the economic effect of constitutions, political determinants of corporate governance, government regulations in labour and financial markets, economic inequality, and distributive politics in the era of globalisation. His articles have appeared in *Public Choice*, *Korea Observer* and *Korean Political Science Review*, among others.

O. Fiona Yap is Professor and Deputy Director at the Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University, Canberra. Her main research interests focus on how strategic interactions between government and citizens in East and Southeast Asia lead to outcomes such as democratisation, civil-military relations, peace, economic development, and policy success. Her research has been published widely including in *British Journal of*

LEE ET AL.

ASIA & THE PACIFIC
POLICY STUDIES

Australian
National
University

41

Political Science, *Comparative Political Studies*, *Journal of East Asian Studies*, *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, *Social Science Quarterly*, *Korea Observer*, *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, *Asian Survey*, *Government and Opposition*, and *Policy Sciences*. She is also a contributor to edited volumes. Professor Yap is co-editor of the *European Journal of Development Research* and *Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies*, a board member of the Korea Institute, and co-general editor of the academic blog Presidential Power (presidentialpower.net/).