ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: WORDS THAT MATTER: THREE ESSAYS ON MULTILATERAL OPPOSITION TO WAR

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Dissertation directed by: Professor Paul K. Huth, Government and Politics

My dissertation titled "Words that Matter: Three Essays on Multilateral Opposition to War" advances our understanding of how the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) constrains state behavior through the use of verbal condemnation. The UNSC has an array of tools to manage violent conflicts, including condemnations, economic sanctions, and military actions. Existing scholarship largely discounts verbal condemnations as ineffective because they are not backed up by coercive actions that impose tangible costs. Empirical patterns and anecdotal illustrations, however, suggest contrary findings – that verbal condemnations can constrain state behavior under certain conditions. I address this gap by examining how variation across UNSC condemnations impacts the crisis-actors' decision to escalate. I argue that variation in legal invocation and rhetorical severity sends important signals to the targeted state that can change the expected costs of war and, ultimately, prevent escalation. I further examine the determinants of rhetorical variation across UNSC condemnations through the lens of power-sharing and power-politics within the UN. I find that the permanent members influence the contents of the resolution, but the Council President shapes the UN's agenda. My theoretical expectations and findings are validated by an empirical analysis of international crisis-actors from 1946 to 2017 with the original coding of legality and severity in the UNSC resolutions. This dissertation project improves our understanding of the UN's role in conflict management, especially through condemnations. The

findings suggest that rhetorical tools can be just as effective, and that the UN's multilateral efforts can mitigate interstate conflicts in world politics by invoking international law and designing impactful messages.

WORDS THAT MATTER:
THREE ESSAYS ON MULTILATERAL OPPOSITION TO WAR

by

Hyunki Kim

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Advisory Committee:
Professor Paul Huth, Chair
Professor Todd Allee
Professor Will Reed
Doctor Gabriella Lloyd
Professor Ethan Kaplan

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Introduction

During international crises at risk of escalating to war, international organizations (IOs) rely on an array of conflict management tools such as economic sanctions, military actions, and written condemnations to constrain state behavior. Existing scholarship discounts the effectiveness of condemnations in preventing crisis escalation, positing that words alone, are insufficient to change state behavior. However, these studies overlook the contents of these condemnations, assuming that they are essentially identical. My dissertation, "Words that Matter: Three Essays on Multilateral Opposition to War" explores the rhetorical and textual variation across condemnations that have been unexplored by the existing literature. I address this gap by examining all condemnations issued by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to states involved in international military crises from 1946 to 2017. Specifically, I examine variations in legality and severity of the condemnations and the mechanisms through which these variations influence the crisis-actors' decision to escalate. I also explore how these variations in condemnations are generated through the lens of power-sharing and power-politics at the UNSC. This dissertation proceeds as follows.

In Part I, "Who Controls the Rhetoric: Determinants of the UNSC Resolutions," I develop a theoretical and empirical framework that examines UNSC resolutions as an outcome of multiple stages that involve agenda-selection, deliberation over contents, and voting of draft resolutions. Existing studies that seek to explain the determinants of UN intervention tend to limit their analysis to the adopted resolution alone, which often leads to a conclusion that the great powers in the Security Council influence the important decisions within the UN. This is a generalization that is drawn from a truncated examination of the UNSC's decision-making process. I argue that key players have influence over different stages and aspects of decision-making within the UNSC. I find that the Council President has significant influence over the agenda-selection stage, while the

permanent members' preference heterogeneity shapes the contents of the resolution, albeit to a limited extent when normative considerations trump parochial interests.

In Parts II and III, I examine the conditions in which condemnations impact crisis-actors' decision to escalate. Previous works report mixed findings on the effectiveness of condemnation, some considering it to be "cheap talk" because it does not directly raise credible threats of institutional punishment. Not all condemnations however, are identical and they vary across two important dimensions that are critical to crisis-actors' decision to escalate. These dimensions, legality and severity, will be introduced in Parts II and III where I explain the causal mechanisms through which they impact the crisis-actors' decision to back down.

In Part II, "Law and Order: How Legal Opposition Impacts Crisis Escalation," I examine the dimension of legality and how invocation of international law in the UNSC resolutions disincentivizes escalation. Invocation of legal principles formalizes the target state's aggression with the use of legal terms and creates a focal point around which the international community can potentially mobilize against the aggressor. Legal invocation can also rally the domestic audience of the aggressor whose concern for reputation can pressure the leader to back down from the crisis. Using originally coded data on legal and non-legal opposition based on resolutions from the UNSC, I find that legal opposition is associated with a lower likelihood of escalation and that this deterrent effect is conditional on the crisis-actor's domestic accountability.

In Part III, "Cheap Talk or Credible Signal? The Severity of UNSC Condemnation and Crisis Escalation," I examine the dimension of rhetorical severity across the UNSC resolutions. Specifically, I argue that greater severity reflects preference homogeneity among the permanent members, which signals their collective intent and, therefore, ability to punish the aggressor. Therefore, condemnations with greater severity have the ability to increase the costs of escalation by sending a credible signal that the UN will follow through on the crisis-actor's aggression. Using

original data on rhetorical severity of UNSC resolutions, I find that some condemnations, especially those with greater severity, are far from cheap talk and are associated with a lower likelihood of escalation.

Additionally, I simultaneously examine the effect of severity and legality on crisis escalation. I find that rhetorical severity of UNSC condemnation is a considerably more powerful disincentive than legality to crisis-actor's escalation. Invocation of the law alone does not appear to deter escalation, but when it is invoked in resolutions with high rhetorical severity, the deterrent effect becomes magnified. This finding however, does not render the effect of legality entirely meaningless; international law may need to be frame in a way that effectively communicates the Council's discontent with the target country's violation of the law. The effect of rhetorical severity too, is more notable in condemnations that invoke legality. While these rhetorical elements may not single-handedly deter escalation, their interactive use can be a significant incentive for the crisis-actors.

The set of papers in this dissertation collectively improve our understanding of the potential impact of IOs' conflict management through condemnation. The arguments and findings in this dissertation draw upon and build on the theories of realism, institutionalism, and bargaining theory to provide a nuanced understanding of how condemnations influence crisis-actors' decision and how such condemnations are made. Not one theoretical framework can single-handedly explain the functions of, or the power inside the UN Security Council. However, this dissertation improves our understanding of the complex processes through which the UN exerts its influence in international relations. This is the first study to systematically examine the rhetorical dimension of the UNSC resolutions using original data on legality and severity for all international crisis-actors. This research is policy-relevant and timely given the recent backlash against multilateralism and the United Nations in particular. The findings suggest that IOs' multilateral efforts can mitigate interstate conflicts in world politics by invoking international law and designing impactful messages.

Part I: Who Controls the Rhetoric? Determinants of the UNSC Resolution

How do the members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) exert their influence in delivering UNSC resolutions? This paper examines power and influence in the UNSC through the lens of rhetorical variation in the UNSC resolutions on international crisis-actors. I argue that the adoption of UNSC resolutions involves a two-step process. In the first stage, the Council President plays a key role in selecting which crises to adopt as a public agenda. In the second stage, the permanent five members (P5)'s preferences influence the rhetorical variation in the resolutions. When the P5 members' preference heterogeneity is high, the Security Council is less likely to adopt resolutions with stronger rhetorical severity. Furthermore, a high preference heterogeneity is likely to reduce the Council's ability to invoke international law in the UN resolutions. These expectations are validated in my empirical analysis of the ICB crisis dataset for the period of 1946-2018. This study improves our understanding of the key players and the process of decision-making by the UNSC. Additionally, the findings have significant implications for the debate on whether the UN plays a meaningful role in maintaining peace and security or, rather, is just an instrument of powerful states.

Introduction

How do the members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) exert their influence in delivering UNSC resolutions? To what extent is the work of the UNSC shaped by the interests of the permanent five (P5) members? Can elected members exert any influence on decisions made within the UNSC? The UNSC is designed to respond to international crises and conflicts by facilitating a peaceful settlement to a dispute (Chapter VI) and by maintaining peace and security if a threat to the peace is identified (Chapter VII). The UNSC has vast discretion in identifying crises as political threats by issuing resolutions that condemn aggressors and responding to those actors by authorizing military interventions, deploying peacekeeping operations, imposing sanctions, and, most importantly, rallying the international community against those aggressors. The Security Council is arguably one of the most salient intergovernmental bodies that exists today. The significant influence it wields in world politics has sparked much debate on whether this elite organization legitimately represents the interests of all UN members or is a mere instrument for powerful states.

Skeptics of institutions have long argued that international organizations are a reflection of existing distribution of power and serve as a tool that advances the interests of great powers (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 1994). This notion is supported by numerous scholarly works and empirical findings. O'Neill (1996) examines the relative power of veto players compared to non-veto players and finds that each of the five permanent members (P5) has 19.6 percent of the power, whereas each of the ten elected members has less than 0.2 percent. Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal (2001) have also theorized that an institutional design where a few members have veto powers is likely to lead to asymmetrical control by these members. Voeten (2001) further analyzes power asymmetry within the UNSC and theorizes that a superpower who has an outside option to act unilaterally can shape the outcomes in the Council. Other works have found that P5 members' parochial interests

are one of the primary motivators for UN's activity (Beardsley and Schmidt 2012; Allen and Yuen 2014), influencing the deployment of peacekeeping operations and even impacting the selection of UN's agenda (Binder and Golub 2020).

These conclusions, however, are drawn upon a rather narrow examination of the UN decision making procedure by primarily focusing on the outcome of voting and the voting rules that give veto power to certain members. Voting, however, is only the last stage of the entire decision-making process, which consists of bargaining, deliberation, and negotiation, which occur behind the scenes, prior to the final voting on the agenda. Without a full examination of what happens before the voting stage, our understanding on how different players influence the work of the UN remains limited.

More recent works extend the scope of research by examining the authority of the UNSC's president and the power of elected members at the Council's agenda setting stage (Allen and Yuen 2022). Some works find that there are informal rules outside the official communication channels that allow for elected members to promote their influence (Mikulaschek 2016). I build on this recent literature and argue that both the permanent and elected members exert their influence at different stages of the UN's decision-making, albeit asymmetrically. I argue that agenda selection and voting are two components of the bargaining process and what happens before the voting can significantly impact the scope of actions taken by the Council. I provide a comprehensive analysis, which identifies the key players in each stage and how the decision calculus from each stage affects one another.

Any substantive action or official position of the UNSC are expressed in the form of resolutions. Benson and Tucker (2022) argue that these resolutions are an important source of information to understand the Security Council's collective preferences and sentiment during the bargaining process. Therefore, I extend my analysis beyond the scope of many existing works whose

focus has been on vetoes cast, resolutions adopted, and policies implemented, to include a novel dimension – rhetorical variation – within the content of the resolutions. Specifically, I examine the rhetorical severity and legality of UNSC resolutions addressed to crisis-actors for all international crises in the time period of 1946 through 2017. These rhetorical variations allow us to examine how the key players exert their influence in the UNSC and how their preferences shape the bargaining process within the Council. Furthermore, these resolutions constitute a hard test to examine how power-sharing occurs, if at all, because member states are likely to have vested interests in matters related to international security, which makes them most eager to exert their influence and less willing to share power. These resolutions are an important lens to understand power and influence within the UNSC.

I contend that UNSC resolutions are a product of a two-step process. In the first stage, the Council President's political affinity with the target state is likely to influence whether an agenda is selected to be discussed at the Council meeting. In the second stage, I argue that the P5 members' preference heterogeneity is likely to impact the content of the resolution. Specifically, I focus on two rhetorical dimensions: legality and severity, both of which are important signals of P5 members' preferences. I define legality as the explicit invocation of international law as grounds for condemnation, and severity as the intensity of tone and disapproval as reflected in the wording of the resolution. I argue that P5 members' preference homogeneity increases the legality and severity of resolutions while the reverse is true when preference heterogeneity is high.

I find that although P5 members are one of the primary key players determining the content of the resolution, they are not the only players who influence the outcomes within the Council. During the first stage of agenda-setting, I find that the Council presidents' preferences as well as normative considerations have significant influence over the selection of issues for the Council's agenda. Because Council Presidency rotates monthly for all members on the council, more time is

allotted to the elected members (E10) than the permanent members. For elected members, the one month's time that is allotted can be a valuable political opportunity for them to advance their foreign policy interests (Allen and Yuen 2022). This notion shifts the popular scholarship, which examines E10 members' votes as a quid pro quo for side payments offered by the P5 countries (Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009; Kuziemko and Werker 2006). The findings suggest that elected members can influence the UNSC resolutions in significant ways.

This study makes several important theoretical and empirical contributions. Theoretically, this study improves our understanding of power and influence within the UNSC, by focusing on how the key players collectively impact the contents of the resolution. The findings here speak to the important debate on whether institutions, the UN in particular, play a meaningful role in representing the interests of the international community or whether they simply reflect the existing distribution of power (Mearsheimer 1994). Although P5 members exercise significant influence over the content of the resolution, the Council Presidents play a crucial role in selecting issues that the Council discusses. The structured monthly rotations of the Council Presidency seat helps to mitigate the risk of the Security Council being entirely dominated by the few great powers.

Furthermore, this is the first study, to my knowledge, to examine the rhetorical variation in the UNSC resolution for international military crises. I theorize and validate my theoretical expectation that rhetorical variation may be driven by P5 preferences. This finding has important implications for research on third-party conflict management. Researchers can apply this insight to future studies and examine how resolutions that vary on important rhetorical dimensions may impact outcomes relevant to conflict dynamics. Benson and Tucker (2022) have taken a similar approach and find that the intensity of resolutions can reduce rebel violence.

Empirically, I present a comprehensive original dataset on UNSC agenda, resolutions, and the rhetorical variation for all international crisis-actors identified by the international crisis behavior

(ICB) dataset. Information about agenda selection, resolution, legality and severity of the resolution (if applicable) are provided for each crisis-actor. This dataset adopts a novel but systematic scale for operationalizing rhetorical severity and presents an original concept on the legality of UN resolutions. The dataset also contains information about the individual and collective preferences of the Council President and P5 members toward each crisis-actor. This dataset can be used by researchers to examine other questions related to international organizations and their involvement in crisis-bargaining.

This paper is structured as follows. After I review the previous research, I introduce the theory and hypotheses about the determinants of UN resolutions and their variation. This is followed by a discussion of the data and methods. The final section presents the results and highlights the implications of my findings.

Prior Research

The standard realist view has been that Council decisions are largely determined by the parochial interests of the P5 and that the elected members are inconsequential (de Jonge Oudraat 1996; O'Neill 1996; Bosco 2009; Hosli et al. 2011). Superpowers with outside options can even push the bargaining closer to their ideal point outcome within the Council (Voeten 2001). The P5 can also bribe the elected members with side payments that may render their role superfluous in the UN (Kuziemko and Werker 2006; Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009). Numerous empirical findings support this realist notion as UN interventions in conflicts are found to be determined heavily by P5 members' parochial interests (Benson and Satana 2008; Beardsley and Schmidt 2012; Allen and Yuen 2014). For instance, Stojek and Tir (2015) find that civil conflict with vested economic interests of the P5 members receive most peacekeeping operations. Similarly, Binder and Golub

(2020) find that UN's agenda setting speed can be expedited by the presence of an existing trade relationship with the P5.

While many scholars would agree that the P5 members heavily influence the decision-making process at the UN, they are far from being the only actors or the only factors that influence decision-making in the UN. Studies have found that conflict severity, which increases human suffering, is one of the primary motivations behind UN action (Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Fortna 2008; Beardsley and Schmidt 2012). Other works further support this finding, as UN actions are found to be associated with negative spillover (Binder 2015), refugee flows, and deaths (Frederking and Patane 2013).

More recent works have examined non-P5 members who influence the UN's decision-making. Mikulaschek (2016) for instance, finds peacekeeping operations to an African region grows significantly in years where African delegations are represented in the Security Council. He argues that the rotating council presidency boosts the elected members by giving them agenda-setting power that allows minor powers' interests to be represented. Allen and Yuen (2022) extensively analyze the role that the Council President plays in selecting agenda for the Security Council and they, too, find that elected presidents' preferences determine what the UN discusses at their meetings.

I build on this literature by incorporating a two-step model to examine UN resolutions as an outcome. That is, I take the agenda-setting stage and voting stage as one linear process instead of two truncated outcomes. Agenda selection is a necessary condition for any UN meeting where voting takes place; if an issue is not brought to the UN's agenda, voting would not take place. Agenda selection too, may depend on the Council President's anticipation of the results of the voting because the president would not want to fill up the limited meeting time with an agenda that will be voted out. The two processes are intricately linked and therefore require an examination of

how key players in each stage affect one another theoretically and empirically. This new approach improves our understanding of power and influence within the UNSC and how players other than the P5 can exert their influence in the adoption of UN resolutions.

Theory of UNSC Resolution and Rhetorical Variation

Decision-making procedures

When and how does the UN Security Council respond to international military crises? To understand the Council's decision to act in some military crises, we need to focus on three things: decision-making rules within the UN Security Council; preferences of relevant actors; and the normative considerations. First, the decision-making rules largely determine who the relevant actors are. Existing works have identified P5 members as the key actors as they hold the veto power during the voting process. While this is true, voting by the P5 members occurs in the second-half of the decision-making process, whereas the first-stage is the agenda-setting process during which the Council president plays a central role.

The Security Council holds primary responsibility within the UN for responding to threats to the international order. According to the UN Charter, a wide array of actors can bring an issue to the Council's attention. Any member nation of the UN (Article 35(1)), a non-UN member (Article 35 (2)), UN bodies (Article 11(2)), and the UN Secretary General (Article 99) can bring a concern to the UN. Subsequently, the President of the Security Council, in consultation with the Secretary-General, produces a "Programme of Work," which lists the topics and corresponding dates for meetings. While a common view shared by many scholars is that the Council's decision-making process is dominated by the P5 members, the President plays a critical role here. P5 members do not have agenda-setting privileges whereas the President has the power to exercise discretion about

which agendas to adopt and which issues to refrain from calling during a meeting (Bailey and Daws 1998).

As the literature on agenda-setting suggests, even agreeing to hold a meeting in the first place is a strategic decision (Allen and Yuen 2022; Binder and Golub 2020). Meetings are held formally in the Council Chamber at the UN Headquarters in New York. All speeches and discussions in these meetings are a matter of an official record published by the UN so that all member states and the broader public can read transcripts of the meeting, including verbatim statements offered by delegations. This informs the domestic and international audiences of what each Council member is willing to say publicly, allowing relevant audiences to hold each member accountable to their statements (Allen and Yuen 2022). Public meetings are, therefore, a costly and consequential decision that the Council President makes. Furthermore, being on the Council's agenda is a necessary condition for subsequent Council action. No substantive action can be taken if an issue is not selected for the agenda. The strategic nature of agenda-selection suggests that an examination of UN resolutions must be preceded by understanding the process of agenda-selection.

The Council presidency rotates alphabetically between all Security Council members, including the permanent and non-permanent members. Each member holds the seat for one month and during this period of time, the Council President is given the agenda-setting power which often shapes the way the Council debates an issue and adopts certain policies (Dedring 2008). For elected members, the one month's time represents an opportunity for the President to shape the Council's agenda without requiring a veto power (Allen and Yuen 2022). What then, determines which items the Council President selects to be discussed at the UN's meeting?

The UNSC meetings serve as a way to publicly condemn the perpetrator. In the meetings, Council members will identify the perpetrator, discuss the relevant information about the crisis, and arrive at a conclusion in the form of a resolution. Resolutions contain a message condemning the

perpetrator for her actions and oftentimes impose some type of punishment such as economic sanctions or call for a collective military action in addition to the condemnation. As discussed earlier, public meetings appeal to the relevant domestic and international audiences as the verbatim meeting records become publicly available. Bringing a matter to the Council is a way for states to tell their people that they did their best to instigate international action (Bailey 1994). Furthermore, being on the agenda can also be a way to demonstrate to international and domestic audiences that there is an international consensus regarding the issue at hand (Allen and Yuen 2022). As a result, being publicly condemned at the Security Council can have negative consequences to the targeted crisis-actor. The leader may lose favors with their domestic polity or allies, and this may also threaten their bargaining position in the crisis (Chapman and Wolford 2010).

Furthermore, while some scholars view conflicts that are closely related to the interests of the major powers as more likely to invite active participation of the Security Council, other scholars contend that the Security Council is less likely to become involved in conflicts when the interests of permanent members are highly engaged (Iwanami 2011). Beardsley and Schmidt (2012) argue that P5 countries have incentives to keep the UN out of their spheres of influence. The Council President may also prefer to block UN actions in countries with whom they share strong ties. I argue that if the Council President strongly favors certain actors, this affinity is likely to lead to a lower likelihood of being selected for the Council meeting where a resolution of condemnation could take place.

Hypothesis 1: Greater political affinity between the crisis-actor and the Council President is associated with lower likelihood of agenda-selection.

The Council President may additionally consider the preferences of the P5 when selecting agenda. The seat in presidency is limited, especially for the delegations of the elected members. This

can be a valuable political opportunity for presidents to advance their policy interests in the given amount of time they have. Therefore, they may not want to bring issues that they know will lead to a veto by the P5 members so as to not expend limited meeting time on issues that will not culminate in a resolution. A veto is more likely to happen when there is disagreement among the P5 who have the veto power. I assume that when the P5 have more divided preferences about the target actor, the president is less likely to take up an issue.

Hypothesis 2: Greater P5 preference heterogeneity is associated with lower likelihood of agenda selection.

P5 Preference Heterogeneity

When an agenda enters the Council meeting, each delegation will make a statement regarding their position on the issue. The Council President will then call a vote for the draft resolution(s), which requires at least nine affirmative votes and no veto vote to be adopted. If at least one P5 member vetoes the resolution or if there are enough abstention votes, a resolution will not be adopted. In this stage, the Council President has little control over the type of resolution that gets adopted by the Council, especially if they are an elected member without the veto power. Elected members, too, play a limited role in determining whether or not a resolution passes, or how it is drafted. Elected members may influence the vote through abstentions and affirmative votes, which are often thought to be swayed largely by side payments in return for votes (Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009; Kuziemko and Werker 2006).

P5 members are the key actors whose preferences largely determine the adoption of a resolution and its language. I draw on bargaining theory to theorize about how P5 preferences can influence the rhetorical variation of the resolution. Bargaining theorists have established that preference heterogeneity among decision-makers increases distributional conflict and complicates

cooperative efforts (Schneider and Urpelainen 2014). Similarly, preference heterogeneity among P5 members can have a similar impact on their collective decision-making capacity. Sommerer and Tallberg (2016) argue that actor heterogeneity can negatively impact IOs' decision-making capacity. Beardsley and Schmidt (2012) and Binder and Golub (2020) find empirical support for this logic, as starker divergence between the two most divergent P5 states is negatively correlated with UN activity or the speed of UN activity. Allen and Yuen (2022) in their recent work also find that P5 preference heterogeneity can negatively impact meeting time devoted to a specific issue.

I build on these findings and examine how P5 members' preference heterogeneity shapes textual and rhetorical variation in the UNSC resolutions. When a threat to international peace arises, the P5 members seek to help resolve the crises, but the heterogeneity in their preferences can make it difficult for the members to come to a consensus about drafting the content of the resolution. Resolutions vary widely—some resolutions are drafted with more severe rhetoric while others are more dampened. Some resolutions invoke international law while others do not. These variations can be explained by the heterogeneity in the P5 members' closeness with the subject. Even if all other P5 members are hostile toward the aggressor, if at least one P5 member is strongly favorable, it would be difficult to adopt a resolution that is highly severe.

The content of the adopted resolution can be understood as a bargaining overlap among the P5 members. For this bargaining overlap to be generated, the draft resolution should be written in a way that satisfies the preferences of the most and least favorable members. Greater preference heterogeneity, created by the divergence between members who are favorable to the target actor and those who are unfavorable, would make it difficult for the Council to pass a resolution condemning the crisis-actor's hostile behavior. P5 members with whom the target actor shares close affinity can single-handedly block the resolution by exercising their veto power. Therefore, I argue that as P5

members' preference heterogeneity increases, the acceptable magnitude of rhetorical severity is likely to decrease.[1]

Deliberations and negotiations at the Security Council illustrate this mechanism. On February 20 1961, the Council held its 942nd meeting in which the members discussed the conflict between Belgium and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and more specifically, the assassination of the Congolese leaders by Belgium. The Soviet Union proposed a draft resolution that unequivocally condemned Belgium for these assassinations and for the unjust use of force in the DRC. This draft resolution (S/4706) stated that Belgium's actions were "crime incompatible with the UN Charter and a . . . flagrant violation of the Declaration on the grant of independence to colonial countries and peoples" and that the UN "decisively condemns the actions of Belgium". This resolution was vetoed by the US and its allies, who were reluctant to use the word "condemn" in a decisive manner to condemn Belgium. The US delegation, Adlai Stevenson stated that the US "does not believe in condemning first before investigating", which was echoed by other allies, such as Chile, who stated that an investigation should take place before condemnation. The Soviet delegation accused the US for showing "political sympathies" and for unwilling to "condemn the actives of their allies", while the Indian delegation expressed concern that "the world opinion will certainly not think well of [the UNSC]" if the Council does not strongly condemn these acts. Due to the preference heterogeneity, the resolution prepared by the Soviet delegation was vetoed and a more moderated resolution was adopted.

[1] This raises the question about a potential scenario where heterogeneity is low because all P5 members are reluctant to condemn the crisis-actor. There are two reasons why this is an unlikely scenario. First, the Western three and Russia and China have very dissimilar profiles, so there is a low likelihood that the two sides have completely aligned preferences. Second, not all crises are selected for the agenda. Crises that pass a certain threshold are likely to be selected by the Council President as they pose a major threat. As such, it is unlikely to think of a situation where all P5 members are unilaterally favorable to the crisis-actor.

Hypothesis 3: As the preference heterogeneity of the P5 increases, the rhetorical severity of the resolution is likely to decrease.

Similarly, preference heterogeneity may constrain the Council's ability to invoke international law. Oftentimes, the UN resolutions invoke international law to condemn an aggressor when her actions are in egregious violation of international law. Invocation of legal principles can enhance the legitimacy of the condemnation and can serve as an effective conflict management tool for its binding nature (Gent and Shannon 2010) and the ability to create a focal point (Huth, Croco and Appel 2013) and domestic political cover (Allee and Huth 2006).

P5 members, therefore, may be reluctant to invoke international law to condemn its ally, even if a clear violation of the law is present. This reluctance to invoke international law is based on the calculation that such condemnation can be costly to the target actor. International law can create a focal point around the aggressor's wrongdoing, which can mobilize a greater consensus from the international community and backlash toward the crisis-actor.

However, I argue that P5 members' preference heterogeneity is unlikely to impact invocation of international law. While P5 members have more maneuver to moderate the severity of condemnation, invocation of the law is likely to be based on a more rigid assessment of whether the law has been violated. When the crisis-actor has violated international law, the delegations face the decision to either invoke or not invoke the law. If delegations fail to invoke legality when the situation calls for it, the delegation who vetoed such resolution may face public costs from the international community, because the veto does not represent the interests of the international community (Allen and Yuen 2022). Thus, while P5 members may be reluctant to condemn a close friend by invoking legality, their hands may be tied in situations that call for relevant law to be invoked.

Hypothesis 4: The preference heterogeneity of the P5 will have null effect on the likelihood of adopting a resolution that invokes international law.

Normative Considerations

However, I expect that normative considerations too, play a role in determining the content and adoption of resolutions. Research has demonstrated that the Council does act primarily in accordance with the UN's mandate. Oftentimes, P5 members may face a dilemma between condemning an aggressor and shielding its ally.

Once an agenda is called into a public meeting, every statement that delegations make now becomes the subject of public scrutiny. This incurs public cost that states have to bear when their actions in these meetings reveal them as one type or another (Allen and Yuen 2022). For instance, on November 16, 2017, Russia vetoed a draft resolution condemning Syria for war crimes and crimes against humanity (S/2017/968), which was followed by a major backlash from the international community, including Ambassador Haley who called this veto "a sinful act".[2] Diplomats expressed their distrust for Russia, contending that they cannot take Russia's proposal for political talks or international peace seriously (S/PV.8105). A few months later, the Council passed resolution 2393 although it was limited in language and scope.

Similarly, in the recent Council meeting held to discuss Russia's invasion of Ukraine, China exercised an abstention instead of veto against the draft resolution condemning Russia's aggression. While the draft resolution was not ultimately adopted, as Russia's staunch ally, China's abstention can be thought of as an attempt to shield itself from international criticism by not exercising its veto power.

[2] https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russia-again-vetoes-un-resolution-syria-chemical-weapons-inquiry-n822031

As such, for crises that pose a major threat to international security and peace, P5 members are likely to face backlash if they blindly exercise their veto to protect their ally. As a result, P5 members must consider both normative implications as well as their individual preferences when voting for a resolution. I argue that the adoption of UN resolution is likely to depend on both the escalatory potential of the crisis and the preference heterogeneity of the P5 members. Crisis-actors who demonstrate greater threat are more likely to be condemned (through a resolution) and those condemnations are likely to be more severe and more likely to invoke international law. From this theoretical discussion, I propose the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 5: Greater escalatory potential posed by the crisis-actor is associated with greater likelihood of condemnation, more severe condemnation, and condemnation that invokes international law.

Research Design and Data

The theoretical expectations are tested with my original dataset on UNSC resolutions on International Crises. The cases are identified from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset, from the period of 1946 through 2017, yielding 374 crises and 802 crisis-actors. My unit of analysis is crisis-actor because the primary focus of this paper is when and how the Security Council intervenes regarding an individual state's actions. While the dynamics of crisis bargaining are inherently dyadic, UNSC's decision to condemn certain actors is determined by their preferences and assessment of the violations perpetrated by each party. Monadic design can better model this directed effect, but to capture the dyadic dynamics that may not be addressed with this design, I include various crisis-level control variables and use robust standard errors clustered on crisis.

Dependent Variables

My first outcome of interest is agenda selection. For this, I use a binary indicator that takes a value of "1" if the Security Council had a public discussion about the crisis-actor within the duration of the crisis and "0" if otherwise. The meeting records are publicly available on https://research.un.org. In my dataset, 193 crisis-actors entered the Security Council's agenda.

The central puzzle of this paper is to examine and operationalize the variation in the content and the rhetorical severity in UNSC resolutions. To this end, I first determine whether each meeting led to an official resolution. In my dataset, of the 193 crisis-actors that were selected into the agenda, 118 were subject to UNSC resolutions. To measure the rhetorical severity of each resolution, I identify key action and emotive words in each resolution. UN resolutions follow a fixed template made up of a pre-ambulatory clause that explains why the UN is acting on the given agenda. This clause begins with an emotive word that signals the degree of the Security Council's discontent. An operative clause then follows, which describes actions steps that will be taken, and each clause begins with an action word. After emotive and action words have been identified, I score them using a scale adopted and modified from a legal-linguist literature (Gruenberg 2009)[3]. Coding examples and the scale can be found in Tables A2 and A3 of the appendix and more detailed description of this variable follows in Part III.

Each crisis-actor may be subject to more than one resolution. Thus, I construct two different scores of rhetorical severity. First, I measure severity using the resolution with the highest score based on the consideration that the most severe resolution is likely to be the most difficult to adopt. Second, I take the severity score of the first resolution issued to the crisis-actor during the duration

[3] Gruenberg's severity scale provides a hierarchical classification system that rank orders emotive and action words based on their dictionary definition and the context they are used in the resolution. The severity score given to each word is summarized in Table 1 of Appendix.

of the crisis. The first resolution is likely to set the tone for the following resolutions and are thus likely to be the most important. Descriptive statistics are presented in Figure 1. As the histograms show, severity variables are highly skewed to the right, which can adversely affect the model's performance and interpretation of the results. I thus perform a log transformation to address the skewness.

Finally, I use a categorical variable to indicate whether the resolution invokes international law. This variable takes a value of "2" if there is an explicit reference to a violation or noncompliance with the law, "1" if the resolution does not invoke any international law, and "0" if there is no resolution. Sources of international law include international conventions such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, bilateral and multilateral agreements[4] and judicial rulings. 193 crisis-actors were selected into the UN's agenda. Among 113 crisis-actors that were subject to UN resolution, 52 of resolutions that invoked international law and 61 did not invoke the law.



Figure 1.1 Count of UNSC Resolutions by Severity Index

[4] Bilateral or multilateral agreements that are signed and ratified by relevant parties are considered to be an international legal treaty (Oxford Public International Law 2010).

Preferences of the P5 and the Council President

To test the relationship between the President's affinity and agenda selection, I operationalize political affinity between the crisis-actor and the Council President using S-scores from Signorino and Ritter (1999). S-scores measure political similarity between two states using the rates of common voting in the UN General Assembly. I use this to calculate average affinity between the Council President and each crisis-actor. The Council Presidency rotates monthly, so I take the sum of each Council President's affinity with the crisis-actor within the duration of the crisis and then I calculate the mean of that sum.[5]

Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 examine the relationship between the preference heterogeneity of P5 and the type of UN resolution. Following Allen and Yuen (2022), I first obtain each P5 members' preferences toward the crisis-actor by using S-scores. S-scores for each P5 member and the crisis-actor are summed and divided by five to obtain the average political affinity. I then calculate the sum of squared deviation of each member's preference from the mean and divide that number by five to obtain the variance to measure preference variability of P5. I later demonstrate in the robustness check that results remain consistent with the use of Ideal Point data instead of S-scores.

In addition to preference heterogeneity, I include a measure of alliance to account for political affinity between a P5 member and the target crisis-actor. Numerous works have found that the P5 members' parochial interests are a major determinant of UN activity. I expect that an alliance with the P5 member will shield the aggressor from being the target of a highly severe UN resolution or legal condemnation. I include a binary variable that indicates whether an alliance exists between the crisis-actor and at least one P5 member. Using the ATOP data (Leeds 2020) to identify this

[5] I do not transform my data into monthly observations because none of my variables vary over time. Using aggregated data could potentially introduce ecological fallacy, however, with one hundred random sampling from 4633 monthly observations, my results remain consistent.

relationship, this variable takes a value of "1" if an alliance exists between the crisis-actor and at least one P5 member and "0" otherwise. I use the term broadly to include different types of alliance relationship[6] because this variable is intended to reflect political affinity. I expect to find that an alliance with P5 is associated with a lower likelihood of UN actions.

Normative Considerations

I consider the normative factors as determinants of the UN's agenda selection and resolution contents. I posit that when the crisis-actors demonstrate greater escalator potential, the UN is more likely to pass a resolution and adopt resolutions with greater severity and legality. To test this expectation, I include several variables that will motivate the UN to intervene and act for the organizational mandate.

First, I include a binary variable that indicates whether the actor was the challenger in the given crisis. Challengers are more likely to show hostile behaviors and are more likely to be targeted by the UN. If the challenger is unidentifiable, then the variable takes the value of "0".[7] Moreover, I include a variable to measure the duration of the crisis. The Security Council is more likely to act when the crisis continues for longer duration as those crises are more likely to escalate to war. I expect duration to be positively correlated with agenda selection UN resolution as the longer time window will give the Council more chance to act.

In addition, I include a variable to measure regime type. The UN, UK, and France have an incentive to spread democracies. Thus, they are more likely to intervene in countries in the hopes of

[6] These include defense, offense, neutral, non-aggression, and consultation (ATOP).
[7] This might raise a question about my research design that includes both the challenger and the target (or non-challengers). Oftentimes, the non-challengers have just as much escalatory potential as challengers, and are just as likely to be targeted by UN resolution. For instance, in my data, about 18% of challengers employed violence in the intensity of a full-scale war, compared to 14% for non-challengers.

establishing a democratically governed regime. For example, Andersson (2002) argues that the UN is more likely to deploy peacekeeping operations to nondemocracies than democracies. I use the Varieties of Democracy project's (version 12) electoral democracy index to proxy for the regime type.

I also include an issue salience variable for each crisis-actor. This variable measures the gravest threat an actor perceives during a crisis and varies within a dyad. The issue salience variable has eight different values, which I recode into two levels, following Zeng (2021). The high salience issue involves threats to existence or grave damage (value 5 and 6), threats to regional or international system (4), and territorial threats (3). The low salience issue encompasses the rest (value 0, 1, 2, and 7). I expect to find a positive correlation between salience and UN action because actors are more likely to demonstrate escalatory behavior in salient conflicts.

Finally, I include a binary variable to measure the degree of hostility displayed by the crisis-actor at the onset of the crisis. This information may be key in determining whether the UN decides to intervene in the crisis. Actors who display violent tactics before or at the onset of the crisis are more likely to become targets of UN activity and these actors also have a higher propensity of escalation. ICB data codes for nine levels of hostility at the onset of crisis. I recode this variable into a binary one, where I combine values for non-military acts (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) and military acts (6, 7, 8, 9).

Statistical Model

In order to identify the determinants of variation in UN resolutions, I use the two-stage Heckman selection model (Heckman 1979). UN resolutions are an outcome of a two-step process that involves selection into an agenda in the first step and bargaining between the P5 members in the second step. If we estimate the determinants of UN resolutions on all crisis-actors without accounting for the selection into agenda, the output would be biased as it would be assuming that all

crisis-actors are randomly selected into the agenda. It would not make sense for us to compare crisis-actors that have already entered the UN's agenda to those that did not, because a resolution cannot pass on issues that are not part of the UN's public meeting. Because my outcome variable is truncated, I use the Heckman two-stage model.

The Heckman model simultaneously estimates models for agenda selection and UN resolution (and the rhetorical variation). The first step estimates an equation for crisis-actors' likelihood of entering the UN's agenda. The second step estimates an equation for the type of UN resolutions that are issued to those crisis-actors with the same coefficients as before. The exclusion restriction is built on the UN's procedural rule that the Council President's preferences can significantly influence which crisis-actors enter into the Council's agenda, while their preferences have marginal effect in the voting process (Mikulaschek 2016; Allen and Yuen 2022). In the voting process however, the Council President has little influence over whether a resolution is passed. An elected member without a veto power can rarely determine the fate of a resolution. Furthermore, penholders who draft the resolution have traditionally been from a P5 member country (Allen and Yuen 2022), which suggests that Council Presidents, if they are elected members, are unlikely to have influence over the language of the resolution. The theoretical rationale based on UN's decision-making procedure makes this variable a valid exclusion restriction.

In the first-stage selection model, I estimate the likelihood of agenda selection on the full sample of crisis-actors. The outcome stage model is estimated with a sample of crisis-actors that have been selected from the first stage, in other words, crisis-actors that entered the UN's agenda. I estimate predicted probabilities of entering the agenda from the first stage selection model, transform these into an inverse Mill's ratio (IMR), and include this ratio in the outcome stage model. This corrects for the potential bias that arises from the correlation of error in my outcome model and unobserved factors that lead to agenda selection.

Findings and Implications

Table 1.1 Heckman Models on Agenda-Selection and UNSC Resolutions (1946-2017)

	Selection	Outcome			
	Agenda Selection	Resolution	Legality	Severity	Severity
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
President's Affinity	-0.849***				
	(0.307)				
P5 Preference Heterogeneity	-3.412	-6.535	-0.288	-11.734*	-13.347**
	(3.045)	(9.655)	(8.458)	(6.975)	(6.661)
Alliance with P5	-0.149	-1.097***	-0.883***	-0.858***	-0.896***
	(0.109)	(0.390)	(0.323)	(0.260)	(0.248)
Challenger	0.328***	0.459	0.942**	0.309	0.373
	(0.122)	(0.519)	(0.468)	(0.354)	(0.338)
Electoral Democracy	-0.374*	-1.107	-1.168	-0.425	-0.544
	(0.204)	(0.791)	(0.717)	(0.542)	(0.518)
Salience	0.143	-0.144	-0.309	-0.565**	-0.582**
	(0.110)	(0.393)	(0.348)	(0.273)	(0.261)
Duration	0.247***	0.876***	0.644**	0.548***	0.486**
	(0.042)	(0.318)	(0.271)	(0.208)	(0.199)
Violence at the Onset	0.333***	0.968*	0.851*	0.427	0.287
	(0.105)	(0.500)	(0.439)	(0.343)	(0.327)
Constant	-1.301***	-4.859	-0.288	0.647	0.671
	(0.330)	(3.487)	(8.458)	(2.376)	(2.269)
Observations	792	191	191	191	191
ρ		0.514		-0.079	0.104
Inverse Mills Ratio		1.369	1.367	-0.123	0.155
		(1.644)	(1.472)	(1.126)	(1.076)

Note. N=792 in model 1 and 191 in models 2, 3, and 4 due to data missingness.

My estimation strategy is to keep each model simple and avoid including too many control variables. Table 1.1 presents the results of my main Heckman model. In Figure 1.4, I plot the average marginal effects of the coefficients for each model. Model 1 is the selection model where I use the Probit regression to estimate the likelihood that each crisis-actor enters the UN's agenda.

As expected, increasing levels of political affinity between the Council President and the crisis-actor is associated with a lower likelihood of entering the UN's agenda (Fig 1.2). One standard deviation increase in political affinity leads to a 5 percentage-point decrease ($p<.05$) in the predicted probability of agenda selection; given that the predicted probability of being on the UN's agenda is 39% for the crisis-actor with the lowest political affinity, this marginal effect is substantial. As expected, there are no significant correlations between P5 preference heterogeneity and agenda selection, a finding that suggests the possibility of a veto driven by the preference heterogeneity is not a major concern for the Council President. The President may still place an issue on the agenda that is likely to be vetoed as a way of "grandstanding," or using the moment to make a public case for or against the position of the other delegations (Allen and Yuen 2022).



Figure 1.2 Effect of Political Affinity on the Predicted Probability of Agenda-Selection

Normative considerations too, play a significant role in determining agenda-setting, as challengers and actors who use violent tactics at the onset of crisis are more likely to be the subject of the UN's agenda. Actors who display violent behavior at the onset of crisis are more likely to become the subject of the UN's agenda by 10 percentage-points compared to actors who do not.

Notably, this marginal effect is more than two-fold greater than the marginal effect of political affinity.

Models 2, 3, 4, and 5 are outcome models where I use the sample of crisis-actors that have been selected into the UN's agenda. In Model 2, I estimate the likelihood that the UN resolution will pass. There is no significant correlation between P5 preference heterogeneity UN resolutions, suggesting that the preference heterogeneity is not a deciding factor in the adoption of the resolution. Normative considerations, including the escalatory potential of the crisis-actor and duration are positively correlated with resolutions passed. These findings suggest that a disagreement among the P5 members may not prevent a resolution from being adopted, especially if the target actor poses grave threats to international peace. The preference heterogeneity, however, as I will later discuss, may translate to moderated rhetorical severity.

An alliance between the crisis-actor and a P5 member decreases the likelihood of UN resolution by 4 percentage points ($p<.5$). This mixed finding is puzzling and requires further investigation. However, the finding is consistent with Iwanami (2011) and Binder and Golub (2020) suggesting that P5 members may want to block any type of UN action involving their military allies.[8]

In Model 3, I estimate the likelihood that the resolution invokes international law. The findings indicate that there is no significant correlation between P5 preference heterogeneity and the likelihood that the UN will invoke the law. This finding lends credence to the competing hypothesis that the invocation of legality is unlikely to be driven by P5 preferences, but rather, by an objective assessment about whether the law has been violated. The positive correlation between the escalatory potential and legal resolution suggests that an aggressor who demonstrates a high level of violence

[8] This finding may seem to be at odds with Beardsley and Schmidt (2012) who find that the P5 defense pact has a positive association with UN involvement. But note that this paper uses a P5 alliance variable that encompasses broader alliance types and employs a different research design.

(and therefore more likely to be in violation of the UN Charter) is more likely to be the target of legal resolution. In situations where an aggressor is in clear violation of the law, preference heterogeneity may not matter, because even if P5 members have diverging preferences toward the crisis-actor, they may still agree on the fact that a legal violation has occurred.

In Models 4 and 5, a linear regression is used to estimate the predicted effects of the P5 preference heterogeneity on the rhetorical severity. As expected, in both models, preference heterogeneity is negatively correlated with rhetorical severity (Figure 1.3). As the histogram in Figure A.1 shows, the distribution of P5 preference heterogeneity is slightly skewed to the right and there are outliers in the right tail. In order to ascertain that my findings are not driven by these outliers, I re-run the analysis in model 10 of Table 1.2 and plot the results in Figure A.2. The findings are consistent. In Model 4, I find that a one-standard deviation decrease in P5 preference variability leads to a 0.22-unit increase in the magnitude of severity. To provide substantive context of this marginal effect, I provide a descriptive comparison from two resolutions, 211 and 228.



Figure 1.3 Predicted Effect of P5 Preference Heterogeneity on the Severity of the UNSC Resolution

Resolution 211 was adopted on September 20, 1965, addressed to India and Pakistan for their conflict in the Kashmir region. The resolution condemned both parties for the hostilities and demanded that a ceasefire take effect and for both to withdraw forces. The key words identified in this resolution are: "consider", "heard", "note", "convinced", "demand", "calls on", "decide". I compare this with Resolution 228, which was adopted on November 25, 1996 addressing Israel for large-scale military actions in the town of Samu, in the Hebron region. The UNSC condemned Israel for the use of violence and for the loss of human lives. The key words identified in this resolution are: "heard", "note", "reaffirm", "recall", "deplore", "censure", "emphasize", "request". The rhetorical severity of Resolution 228 is significantly more intense than 211, using words such as "censure," which is one of the strongest words that the UN utilizes. There is a 0.28-unit difference in rhetorical severity between Resolution 228 and 211, which corresponds to approximately a one standard deviation difference in P5 preference variability.

As expected, an alliance with a P5 member has a significant effect in reducing rhetorical severity: by 0.9 unit (Model 5). In both models, longer duration is associated with higher rhetorical severity whereas salient issues are associated with lower rhetorical severity. Salient issues might lead to more disagreements among the P5 members and higher preference heterogeneity could lead to lower rhetorical intensity. Surprisingly, the escalatory potential is not significantly correlated with the magnitude of severity, suggesting that the magnitude of severity may not necessarily be associated with the extent of violence demonstrated by the aggressor. Considering that the escalatory potential was correlated with a higher likelihood of resolution and legality of resolution, this finding appears inconsistent.

How do we reconcile these findings? Escalatory potential impacts the legality of resolution but not the severity, and similarly, the preference heterogeneity has no significant impact on the adoption of resolution and the legality of the resolution but significantly impacts the rhetorical

severity. This could be an attestation to the dilemma that delegations face as they bargain over the contents of the UN resolution. A delegation's hands may be tied when it comes to condemning an aggressor who displays a high level of violence. Even if some delegations prefer to veto the resolution, they may face significant political cost—criticism from the international community—for shielding an aggressor. They may decide to let the resolution pass but work to moderate the severity of the resolution. Therefore, even if there is preference heterogeneity among the P5, this may not necessarily block the resolution if the target country shows escalatory potentials. Similarly, when there is a violation of international law, delegations may be forced to invoke legality in the UNSC resolution because a failure to do so can incur political costs. There are different mechanisms through which preference heterogeneity impacts legality and severity in the UNSC resolutions. While there is more room to maneuver when P5 members bargain over the severity of the resolution, there is less in situations where legality needs to be invoked.

Overall, the results are consistent with the existing literature while shedding light on new findings. P5 preference heterogeneity and P5 members' alliance with the crisis-actor are the driving factors of UN resolution and resolution contents. This result is not surprising, as a number of works have found that P5 parochial interests can largely affect UN involvement (Fortna 2008; Beardsely and Schmidt 2012; Allen and Yuen 2014, 2022; Golub and Binder 2020). Building on the previous literature, the findings suggest that P5 interests influence not just the policy dimension of UN involvement but the rhetorical contents of the resolution. As P5 preference heterogeneity increases, the resolutions are likely to become dampened. This finding is crucial from a policy standpoint, because the rhetorical content of the resolution may have the potential to incentivize the crisis-actor to backdown if the aggressor believes that a united Security Council can issue punitive measures to counteract their aggression.

Although the voting stage is largely influenced by P5 interests, there is still a silver lining as the agenda-setting stage is not entirely determined by the P5 members. The Council President can substantially impact the selection of issues that the Council discusses, without which a resolution cannot be adopted. Normative considerations, such as the crisis-actor's escalatory potential has an even greater impact on agenda-setting. This finding suggests that while delegations for the P5 members may prioritize their national interests, the Council President shapes the initial stage of the process in a way that constrains the P5 members. Even if the President knows beforehand that an issue might become vetoed due to a preference heterogeneity, this consideration is unlikely to influence her decision. This study, along with many recent studies emphasize the importance of agenda-setting and highlights the indirect role that the Council President plays in the works of the Security Council. Further investigation of this complex decision-making procedure is warranted.



Figure 1.4 Marginal Effects for all Covariates for Outcomes in Models 1 through 4. One-Unit Change for Continuous Variables equals One Numerical Difference.

Robustness Checks

To test the robustness of my findings, I consider different model specifications, inclusion of omitted variables and alternative explanations, and alternative operationalization of my main independent

variable. First, I re-estimate the model for rhetorical severity and legality without Heckman selection. Using the full sample of crisis-actors, rather than selecting for the sub-sample that were selected into the agenda, the findings generally remain consistent. P5's preference heterogeneity is negatively associated with rhetorical severity but not legality. As expected, the Council President's affinity does not directly impact rhetorical severity or legality; my conjecture is that the President's authority to select agenda for the Council meetings is likely to have an indirect impact on the contents of the resolutions.

Next, I use Voeten, Strezhnev, and Bailey (2012)'s Ideal Point data as an alternative measurement of preference heterogeneity following the operationalization strategy of Binder and Golub (2020). For the P5 countries, I use the difference of the maximum and minimum ideal points to obtain their preference heterogeneity. I find that P5 preference heterogeneity is negatively associated with legality of resolution, which conforms to my initial expectation that legality can be invoked more easily with lower preference heterogeneity. This finding, however, needs to be interpreted with caution since this finding is based on a different operationalization of heterogeneity. While my original operationalization using the S-score captures target-specific affinity, the measure using Ideal Point data captures general policy stance, and, thus, may yield different results.

In addition, I examine whether the elected members' preferences matter in determining the contents of the resolution. Studies have shown that the membership in the Security Council is linked to IMF loans (Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland 2009) and foreign aid from the US (Kuziemko and Werker 2006), given that P5 members not infrequently buy votes in return for aid and loans. Although a single veto from elected members does not block a resolution from being adopted, each resolution needs at least nine affirmative votes to pass. Furthermore, great powers within the Council attempt to attain unanimity to enhance compliance (Mikulaschek 2016). I, thus, include the preference heterogeneity of elected members to the model. Interestingly, I find that elected

members' preference heterogeneity does influence rhetorical severity albeit to a lesser degree than P5 preference heterogeneity.[9] This finding is consistent with Golub and Binder (2020) who also find that the preference heterogeneity of the P5 trumps that of E10 in determining agenda-setting speed. It is noteworthy, however, that elected members may have greater influence than previously thought. This finding provides credence to existing works that theorize that attaining unanimity is important for the effectiveness of the UNSC (Mikulaschek 2016). If the elected members' preferences diverge, this may pose difficulty in the UNSC to garner consensus about the contents of the resolution.

I also consider parochial interests of the P5 and E10 in determining the variation in UNSC resolutions. There are two strands of explanations behind how the P5 members' interests can influence the contents of the resolution. Some would argue that the UN is likely to stay out of P5 spheres' of influence (Beardsley and Schmidt 2012; Binder and Golub 2020). This expectation is validated by the negative correlation between the P5 alliance and UN resolution, legality, and severity. But the second strand of argument expects that the UN intervene more actively in places where P5 members have vested interest because great powers can share the burden of acting multilaterally within the UNSC (Allen and Yuen 2022). Therefore, I include a measure of contiguity, indicating whether the crisis-actor is contiguous to at least one P5 member or E10 member. I use the Correlates of War Contiguity data version 3.2. I find that contiguity with at least one P5 members is negatively correlated with severity and legality ($p=0.109$) of UN resolution. This finding supports the spheres of influence argument, demonstrating that P5 members are less willing to draw attention to regions that are contiguous to their territory. Contiguity with E10 members has no significant impact. I also include a variable that captures the aggregate trade volume between the

[9] E10 preference heterogeneity, however, does not impact legality.

crisis-actor and P5 members. I use the Correlates of War trade data version 4. Interestingly, trade volume is positively correlated with both legality and rhetorical severity. This finding supports the burden-sharing argument and implies that the P5 members have incentives to issue resolutions that heavily condemn countries they have strong trade relationship with. The P5 members are motivated to expeditiously resolve and end conflicts taking place in countries with whom they trade. Using the UN resolutions to condemn an aggressor can be more politically effective and less costly compared to an intervention outside of the UN. The inclusion of these variables however, do not change my findings.

Table 1.2 presents the results of these robustness checks. All of my main findings are generally consistent, although control variables show some mixed results across the models. It is noteworthy that factors related to P5 preferences such as their heterogeneity, alliance, contiguity, and trade volume are consistently significant across the models, whereas normative factors retain the negative sign but drop below the conventional level in some models. This suggests that normative considerations may not always determine the contents of the UN resolutions and supports the realist view that, at least in the voting stage, great powers still control the rhetoric.

Table 1.2 Robustness Checks for the Determinants of Rhetorical Severity and Legality in the UNSC Resolutions

Model:	**OLS**	**Ordered Logit**	**Heckman Selection**							
DV:	Legality	Severity	Legality	Severity	Severity	Legality	Severity	Severity	Legality	Severity
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
President Affinity	-0.504	-0.215								
	(0.737)	(0.239)								
P5 Heterogeneity										
S-Score	-3.730	-4.252*				-0.726	-12.663*	-12.509*	-0.524	-16.520**
	(6.877)	(2.411)				(3.696)	(6.585)	(6.648)	(3.528)	(7.799)
Ideal Point			-0.210*	-0.858***	-0.762***					
			(0.108)	(0.204)	(0.208)					
E10 Heterogeneity					-0.286**					
					(0.143)					
Trade (log)						0.079***	0.177***			
						(0.024)	(0.047)			
P5 Contiguity								-0.425*	-0.198	
								(0.246)	(0.123)	
E10 Contiguity								-0.060	-0.002	
								(0.256)	(0.128)	
P5 Alliance	-0.584**	-0.281***	-0.356***	-0.718***	-0.740***	-0.530***	-1.228***	-0.775***	-0.319**	-0.930***
	(0.227)	(0.090)	(0.133)	(0.248)	(0.246)	(0.148)	(0.265)	(0.257)	(0.136)	(0.255)
Challenger	0.560**	0.220**	0.362**	0.287	0.321	0.409**	0.461	0.429	0.401**	0.380
	(0.252)	(0.103)	(0.183)	(0.343)	(0.340)	(0.184)	(0.326)	(0.339)	(0.180)	(0.342)
Electoral Democracy	-0.891*	-0.344**	-0.443	-0.200	-0.283	-0.589**	-0.934*	-0.548	-0.436	-0.573
	(0.469)	(0.163)	(0.296)	(0.561)	(0.557)	(0.280)	(0.506)	(0.513)	(0.271)	(0.533)

Salience	0.038	-0.053	-0.126	-0.502*	-0.430*	-0.157	-0.648**	-0.530**	-0.115	-0.596**
	(0.239)	(0.088)	(0.139)	(0.260)	(0.260)	(0.149)	(0.266)	(0.263)	(0.140)	(0.259)
Duration	0.721***	0.276***	0.244**	0.512**	0.540**	0.306**	0.596***	0.475**	0.245**	0.495**
	(0.101)	(0.032)	(0.115)	(0.215)	(0.214)	(0.120)	(0.216)	(0.200)	(0.106)	(0.201)
Violence at Onset	0.735***	0.298***	0.336*	0.505	0.623*	0.420**	0.484	0.325	0.351**	0.276
	(0.226)	(0.087)	(0.194)	(0.364)	(0.365)	(0.182)	(0.326)	(0.327)	(0.173)	(0.330)
Constant		-0.280	0.025	3.502	3.437	-1.777	-1.373	0.693	-0.793	0.737
		(0.262)	(1.215)	(2.279)	(2.258)	(1.383)	(2.505)	(2.277)	(1.205)	(2.261)
Observations	793	793	783	783	783	760	760	793	793	782
rho			0.613	-0.021	0.111	0.777	0.398	0.111	0.609	0.131
Inverse Mills Ratio			0.533	-0.030	0.162	0.747	0.597	0.164	0.526	0.197
			(0.606)	(1.148)	(1.141))	(0.624)	(1.131)	(1.075)	(0.566)	(1.088)

Note: *p **p ***p<0.01. Models 3 through 9 report outcome model from Heckman 2-stage

Conclusion

This study conducted the first systematic analysis on variations across the UNSC resolutions, examining their rhetorical severity and invocation of international law. The empirical findings provide evidence for a limited extent of power-sharing. When P5 members' interests are involved, this reduces the UNSC's ability to adopt resolutions that befit the degree of actors' hostilities. It is noteworthy, however, that P5 members have limited influence over the agenda-setting stage, before the voting takes place. While the preferences of the UNSC President has no direct influence in determining the contents of the resolution, they can exert indirect influence by setting the agenda. I find that agenda selection is influenced by the Council President's affinity with the target actor and the escalatory potential of the aggressor. Although the P5 members can still veto an issue from becoming a resolution, they may risk incurring public costs that may arise from shielding an aggressor. Future research may examine this mechanism more closely by studying the transcripts and verbatim records of the meetings where delegations deliberate and negotiate over the texts and phrases of resolution. These records may provide insight into delegations' dilemmas, such as when their self-interests clash with the organizational mandate of the UN.

If agenda-setting, indeed, functions as a way to tie the hands of P5 delegates, the Council President plays an even more critical role than previously thought. But whether the Council President is a promoter of self-interest or acts on behalf of the organization has not been addressed in this paper. The Council President may promote issues that serve her own self-interest, or perhaps, she may follow the organizational mandates to avoid any backlash that could be placed on her for not selecting issues that deserve the Council's attention. Further research can be done to examine how a permanent member president behaves compared to an elected president and how their parochial interests shape agenda selection.

The findings in this research are consistent with many existing works and lend credibility to the realist power-politics argument. I find that the contents of the resolution are highly influenced by the existing relationship between the P5 members and the target of the resolution. Furthermore, the preference heterogeneity that potentially results from such political affinity can prevent the Council from collectively issuing a highly severe condemnation. However, there are situations where the normative considerations trump P5 members' conflict of interest, such as situations where legality needs to be invoked. When the violations of an aggressor are egregious, the Council may decide to invoke legality while moderating the rhetorical severity of the resolution. Furthermore, findings suggest that the elected members' preference heterogeneity matters. One elected member may not have decisive power to block a resolution, but their collective opinions are unlikely to be ignored. Because the UNSC attains legitimacy and compliance from unanimity, elected members may exert more influence than previously thought.

This study opens up a myriad of avenues for future research and provides crucial insights for policymakers. One can further examine how rhetorical variations can impact various conflict outcomes. Greater rhetorical severity may lead to quicker conflict termination, prevent a recurrence of conflict, or lead to lower battle death casualties. Resolutions may directly impact the dynamics of crisis-bargaining if the resolution is one-sided and is impartial to one party. If the resolution is highly critical of one party, this may or may not lead to a one-sided victory in military crises. I present these studies in the following chapters. Although this study conducted an analysis by examining key words in the UN resolution, there is a wealth of information that have not yet been explored. Further research on the passage of resolutions could produce more information that are relevant to conflict outcomes and crisis dynamics.

Part II: Law and Order: How Legal Opposition Impacts Crisis Escalation

When does opposition from international organizations (IOs) constrain a state's behavior during military crises? Existing theories argue that IOs' opposition can reduce the likelihood of escalation by making it costly to fight. However, empirical cases demonstrate that opposition does not consistently prevent escalation. What explains this variation? I examine an unexplored qualitative dimension of IO opposition that focuses on whether it is backed up with reference to international law. I argue that legality-based opposition should be more effective in deterring crisis escalation by targeted states. I use an originally coded variable on legal opposition to test my hypotheses with crises from 1946 to 2017. I find that legal opposition decreases the likelihood of escalation from 11.7% to 5.1% and that this effect is conditional on the crisis-actor's domestic accountability. The findings contribute to the debate of whether institutions matter in international security and broadens our understanding of the conditions under which IOs can constrain state behaviors.

Introduction

On May 6, 1998, border fighting between Ethiopian and Eritrean soldiers triggered a crisis between the two countries. Ethiopia issued a formal declaration accusing Eritrea of triggering the crisis. Fighting escalated to exchanges of artillery and air strikes. In response, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted Resolution 1177 on June 26, 1998, condemning the use of force by both sides. Despite UN involvement, the crisis recurred on February 22, 1999, in the Badme region, as Ethiopia launched a massive military offensive to recapture Badme city, escalating the crisis to a full-scale war that resulted in the deaths of 650,000 people.

Although direct combat died down, tensions remained high as both countries were reluctant to accept the border and cease-fire agreements. Fighting broke out again on October 4, 2005, and both countries mobilized their troops around the border. The UNSC acted quickly and passed a resolution on November 23, condemning both countries for violating the bilateral agreement. This time, however, Ethiopia indicated a willingness to comply with the UNSC resolution and redeployed the troops away from the border area. This significantly de-escalated the crisis, and although tensions remained throughout much of 2006, a full-scale war was avoided.

Existing studies posit that IOs can deter states from escalating to a full-scale war through a statement of opposition that makes fighting costly (Chapman and Wolford 2010; Chiba and Fang 2014). This logic suggests that the UNSC's opposition should have prevented a full-scale war in both border crises described above, however, it was successful only in the second border crisis, but not the other. What explains this variation? Why did Ethiopia escalate to a full-scale war in 1998 despite the UN's condemnation but back down in 2005? If IO opposition is not always effective, what are the conditions that make opposition sufficiently effective to prevent escalation?

I contend that opposition invoking international law can effectively deter escalation. Studies have long examined whether IOs can meaningfully influence and constrain state behavior in

international crises. Research suggests that IOs can reduce the costs of fighting by a show of support for targeted states (Thompson 2006; Chapman 2007; Chapman 2011; Appel 2018) whereas an opposition can increase the costs of fighting (Chapman and Wolford 2010; Chiba and Fang 2014). IOs are made up of "elite-pact" countries and their positions can send important signals to the domestic and international audiences on the legitimacy of the leader's policy (Hurd 2002; Voeten 2005; Thompson 2006). Thus, opposition can weaken support from the domestic audience (Chiba and Fang 2014) and disincentivize foreign leaders from joining the military coalition on behalf of the targeted state (Chapman and Wolford 2010). While these studies examine the direction of IOs' decision—support or opposition—the qualitative dimensions within these positions, such as the legality, remain unexplored. Further research that examines the qualitative variations in IO opposition, which may be pertinent to understanding the effectiveness of IO opposition in preventing crisis escalation, is, therefore, needed.

In this article, I disaggregate opposition into two types: legal opposition and non-legal opposition. I define legal opposition as a formal condemnation of a crisis-actor's escalatory actions that cites a violation of specific international law, which serves as the grounds for the IOs' condemnation. In contrast, non-legal opposition is also a formal condemnation of escalatory behavior that does not invoke international law. Legal opposition highlights the seriousness of the crisis-actor's wrongdoing by framing the hostile behavior in a more official capacity that differs from non-legal opposition, which often appeals to normative concerns. Furthermore, legal opposition creates a focal point associated with the crisis-actor's wrongdoing based on the relative clarity of legal language and shared understanding surrounding international law. This, in turn, reduces the ability of the state targeted by such opposition to form a military coalition or mobilize support from the domestic public. Legal opposition, therefore, can increase the costs of fighting and prevent escalation. Each crisis-actor's sensitivity to the domestic audience, however, varies widely, as some

actors may not face any backlash or punishment from failed foreign policy. Actors who are more accountable to their domestic public may experience higher costs of fighting with legal opposition. The effect of legal opposition, therefore, is likely to be conditional on crisis-actors' domestic accountability.

I test my theoretical expectations with international crises in the time period of 1946 and 2017. I collect original data on legal and non-legal opposition using official resolutions from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). I find that legal opposition is negatively correlated with escalation. When legal opposition is issued, the probability of escalation drops from 11.7% to 5.1%, which is more than a two-fold difference ($p<0.1$). Furthermore, the results indicate that the impact of legal opposition is conditional on crisis-actors' domestic accountability. Specifically, the marginal effect of legal opposition in deterring escalation becomes greater with increasing levels of domestic accountability. The findings suggest that while legal opposition can reduce the likelihood of a full-scale war, this effect may be conditional on how sensitive each actor is to the domestic political consequences of being condemned by the UNSC.

There are potential selection problems that arise from the non-random nature of the UN's decision to issue an opposition against a crisis-actor. I address these concerns theoretically as well as empirically by incorporating the results from the first chapter. I further strengthen my results through various robustness checks including matching to demonstrate that my findings are not driven by observable factors that may contribute to this bias.

This study makes several theoretical and empirical contributions. Theoretically, this article builds on the scholarship on institutionalism by arguing and demonstrating that IOs can play a critical role in the process of conflict resolution. Specifically, I examine the qualitative variation in IOs' position-taking, legality, which has been largely unaddressed by existing works. By identifying

this key variable, this work provides a more fine-grained causal explanation behind the relationship between IO opposition and escalation.

In addition, this work highlights the important role IOs play in maintaining international security. The influence of international institutions in the areas of human rights and political economy are less questioned, yet skeptics abound when it comes to their effectiveness on matters related to international security. The findings here suggest that an IO's ability to constrain state behavior can be strengthened by invoking international law in their communication strategies.

Empirically, I collect original data to code for legal and non-legal opposition by the UNSC in international crises that other researchers can use to address other questions about crisis behavior. My work advances existing empirical studies that focus on the presence or absence of UNSC's opposition by capturing a crucial distinction among different types of opposition.

A Theory of Legal Opposition

International organizations, especially the UN, issue an opposition when states engage in what they deem to be the illegitimate use or threat of force—fighting, escalatory actions, and coercive policies. I define IO opposition as a formal condemnation on the use or the threat of force. I disaggregate opposition types into those that invoke international law (legal opposition) and those that do not invoke international law (non-legal opposition). Legal opposition invokes specific legal principles, agreements, and treaties as grounds for condemnation while non-legal opposition is a formal condemnation without reference to any legal principles.

It may seem counterintuitive that formal condemnations from IOs such as the UN can be non-legal. Most IOs operate on multilateral legal agreements between the member states such as the UN Charter. Furthermore, UNSC resolutions are binding, and thus one may argue that all IO oppositions, including the UNSC resolutions, are legal. Legal opposition, however, should not be

confused with binding resolutions. A UNSC resolution is, at least theoretically[10], always binding but can be legal or non-legal. My conceptualization of legal opposition is concerned with the explicit invocation of legal principles whereas a binding resolution may impose legal obligations on the target state, but the explicit invocation of the law may be absent (Öberg 2005).

Surprisingly, despite the close connectedness between IOs and international law, less than 50% of opposition invokes international law. Legal scholars argue that UNSC resolutions intentionally use ambiguous languages to garner greater consensus from member states (Wood 1998). While there are no conclusive empirical findings, I have theorized in the previous chapter that the preference heterogeneity of the permanent members at the Security Council can hinder legality from being invoked. Furthermore, empirical finding suggests that political affinity between two countries can potentially block an interested member from supporting a legal opposition.

What body of laws or legal principles can be invoked or drawn upon in a condemnation? One of the primary legal sources that can be drawn upon is the UN Charter. According to Article 2(4) of the Charter, states are prohibited in all use of, or the threat to use force with exception to the right of self-defense. While the Charter is the primary source of law in this area, there are other treaties and conventions, such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Chemical Weapons Convention, and international humanitarian law that help interpret the illegality of using force. Another source of international law is judicial decisions. Decisions and legal rulings made by legal bodies such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or The Hague Court of Arbitration are a type

[10] There is a debate as to whether UNSC resolutions should have *de facto* binding effect. In ICJ's advisory opinion on 1971 *Namibia* case states that "[t]he language of a resolution of the Security Council should be carefully analysed before a conclusion can be made as to its binding effect," suggesting that UNSC resolutions may not have the legally binding effect in practice.

of international law that can be invoked in legal opposition. Finally, bilateral or multilateral treaties such as border agreements, cease-fires, and armistice agreements can also be invoked.[11]

There are two ways through which legal opposition can increase the costs of fighting and prevent escalation. First, legal opposition amplifies the severity and seriousness of the condemnation by framing the crisis-actor's wrongdoing in a more legitimate capacity. Non-legal opposition on the other hand, is not grounded in legal terms but, rather, relies on a normative framing with the use of words such as violation of "peace", which may not fully reach the level of seriousness of legal opposition. Furthermore, a violation of international law is likely to be interpreted as a more serious breach and challenge to international order compared to a violation of norms, which are more likely to appear as a less threatening offense.

On September 27, 2013, the UNSC issued a legal opposition condemning Syria's use of chemical weapons. The UNSC stated: "Recalling that the Syrian Arab Republic on 22 November 1968 acceded to **the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare** . . . the use of chemical weapons on 21 August 2013 in Rif Damascus . . . constitutes **a serious violation of international law**. . . [and the] use of chemical weapons by anyone under any circumstances would be reprehensible and completely contrary to the legal norms and standards of the international community" (S/RES/2118).

This statement highlights the gravity of Syrian government's infraction by invoking an international convention. In contrast, non-legal opposition invokes normative appeal rather than relying on legal grounds. During Ethiopia-Eritrean war in 1999, the UNSC issued the following:

[11] Bilateral or multilateral agreements that are signed and ratified by relevant parties are considered to be an international legal treaty (Oxford Public International Law 2010). If the agreement was ratified by both parties, it is legally binding, and non-compliance can result in legal opposition.

"**Stressing that the situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea constitutes a threat to peace and security, condemns the recourse to the use force by Ethiopia and Eritrea"** (S/RES/1227). Non-legal opposition appeals to normative principles such as "peace" which may not convey the same degree of seriousness about the leader's actions.

Second, legal opposition is likely to establish a focal point around the crisis-actor.[12] Legal opposition communicates a clearer message about *what* the state has violated, such as bilateral border agreements, international conventions, and such. This legal framework provides greater clarity regarding the transgression and leaves less room for misinterpretation, whereas non-legal opposition may be viewed more as an ambiguous allegation and, thus, be construed in different ways. Normative principles may not be as clear-cut as the law (Kumm 2004), and states may not be able to fully agree on what constitutes a norms violation. Thus, non-legal opposition may lead to more contestations on whether the condemnation is warranted.

Furthermore, international law and legal principles are common knowledge in the international community as they are established through formal channels of interstate interaction (McAdams and Nadler 2008; Franck 1995; Huth et al 2011). Therefore, international law is likely to provide a common set of standards upon which to assess the state behavior based on the shared understanding (Franck 1995). Legal opposition communicates its message to the international and domestic observers via the common language of law and by doing so, the actions that constitute a legal violation are more likely to be accepted by the international community. It is more difficult to establish a focal point behind which to rally with non-legal opposition however, because there may

[12] I use the term focal point somewhat broadly to indicate a shared understanding established by international law. This is different from Huth et al (2011) who argued that focal point arises from clarity of legal principles and a situation where one party has unobjectionably stronger legal merit. Since this discussion is not related to the legal merit in bargaining situations, the scope and usage of focal point is different from Huth et. al (2011).

not be a shared understanding about normative principles or what encompasses a norms violation (Franck 1995).

In sum, legal opposition highlights the seriousness of legal infraction and establishes a focal point around that infraction, adversely impacting the crisis-actor's position in the crisis. Studies have found that an actor's bargaining position can be impacted by the actor's ability to mobilize domestic and international coalitions. An actor that is backed up by military coalitions are more likely to prevail in a crisis, as promises of offensive support can increase the confidence of the aggressor (Leeds 2003). On the other hand, an inability to mobilize a coalition can significantly increase the costs of fighting and prevent the probability of war (Wolford 2020; Chapman and Wolford 2010; 227). Moreover, crisis-actors' ability to escalate in the crisis may be influenced by the level of domestic support. Those who that can garner and mobilize support are significantly more likely to escalate and prevail in a military conflict (Chapman 2007; Appel 2018; Thompson 2006; Chiba and Fang 2014).

Legal opposition, however, makes it difficult for the crisis-actor to obtain international and domestic support. Foreign leaders and domestic public are less likely to condone and defend the policies that are considered to be a violation of international law. Being associated with a violator of international law can be politically costly, so foreign leaders must be selective and strategic about coalitions they join (Wolford 2014). Domestic support, too, will be difficult to obtain if legal opposition reveals that the crisis-actor's position constitutes a legal violation. Thompson (2009) argues that the primary role of the UN in international affairs is to provide politically relevant information, rather than changing states' behavior directly through sanctions. Therefore, domestic public is unlikely to render support to their leader who is deemed to be violating international law and is unpopular in the international community. From this theoretical discussion, I propose the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: A crisis actor is less likely to escalate when targeted by IO opposition that invokes international law compared to situations where IO opposition does not invoke international law.

Legal Opposition and the Domestic Audience

Existing literature places the domestic public as a channel between the IO and the crisis-actor. The idea is that an actor may not be directly influenced by the IO but through the domestic pressure placed on the actor to back down when faced with opposition from an IO (Chiba and Fang 2014; Appel 2018; Chapman 2011). Building on the previous works, I argue that the domestic public will respond to legal opposition by putting more pressure on the crisis-actor to back down.

There are two reasons as to why this may be the case. First, the domestic public perceives legal opposition to be politically neutral because they associate international law with greater legitimacy and neutrality (Simmons 2002; Tomz 2008; Gent and Shannon 2010). If the public believes that IO opposition is grounded on objective legal principles and not on political bias, they are more likely to discredit coercive policies of the crisis-actor. Second, legal opposition can generate reputation concerns. The public believes that international reputation is crucial because commitment in one area can signal commitment in another (Guzman 2008, 115) and thus bad reputation can impair the chances of future transactions. As legal opposition is more likely to draw attention from the international community, the domestic public may become concerned that such publicity will lead to reputational costs (Murdie 2014; Mitchell and Hensel 2007).

In order for the domestic public to meaningfully shape the crisis-actor's decision, three conditions need to be met. First, the domestic public must have access to policy-relevant information, including IO oppositions. Citizens in non-democratic regimes may be hampered in their access to these types of information, especially if the government is attempting to hide them. Second, there needs to be some institutional constraints on the government's use of political power through the division of authority and political opposition. Third, there needs to be some type of

institutional mechanisms, such as competitive elections, that allow the domestic public to punish the government for unsuccessful or unpopular policy. Therefore, the impact of legal opposition is expected to be conditional on domestic accountability. From this theoretical discussion, I propose the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: The deterrent effect of legal opposition on escalation is likely to be conditional on domestic accountability. That is, the magnitude of legal opposition's effect is likely to be greater for crisis-actors with higher domestic accountability.

Research Design

I test my hypotheses using international crises during the time period of 1946 through 2017. Since few IOs existed before WWII with the security mandate, I focus on observations that occurred after 1946. This results in 375 crises and 802 crisis-actors. My unit of analysis is crisis-actor because my argument is monadic; I examine how IOs can impact an individual state's behavior. While the dynamics of crisis bargaining are inherently dyadic, there are limitations to using a crisis as the unit of analysis. IO opposition can address all or some parties involved in the conflict, which is dependent on the degree of hostilities and violations perpetrated by each party. Both the challenger and target can escalate to a war, which means that both types of actors have the possibility of being condemned by legal opposition. Monadic design can better address this directed effect. I acknowledge however, that the dyadic dynamics may not be captured with the monadic design, so I include various crisis-level confounders as my control variables and use robust standard errors clustered at the crisis level.

The outcome of interest is whether the crisis-actor has escalated to a full-scale war. ICB provides actor-level information on four different levels of violence employed by crisis-actors: no clashes, minor clashes, severe clashes, and full-scale war. I collapse the four-category variable into a binary one, in which the variable receives "1" if the crisis-actor displayed violence commensurate to

a full-scale war, and "0" otherwise. Later I show that my results are robust to changes in the coding of the escalation variable.

I collect original data to create a measure for my primary independent variable: legal opposition. Legal opposition is defined as formal condemnation that draws on a specific source of international law. For each crisis-actor, I first identify whether the UN Security Council was involved and a formal condemnation (resolution) was issued. Second, I identify whether the condemnation is grounded in international law (e.g., UN Charter, bilateral and multilateral treaties). Legal opposition occurs when both conditions are met and non-legal opposition occurs when the first condition is met, but not the second condition. From this coding strategy, my independent variable takes categorical values, taking the value of "2" for legal opposition, "1" for non-legal opposition, and "0" for no opposition. This allows me to compare the likelihood of escalation for different levels and types of opposition, or the lack thereof. More examples of coding can be found in Table A3 of the appendix.

In my data, I identified 113 cases where an opposition was issued by the UN. Of those cases, 51 crisis-actors experience legal opposition and 62 actors experienced non-legal opposition. For each crisis-actor, there may be multiple instances of legal and non-legal oppositions for the duration of the crisis. This makes it difficult to make temporal causal inference if some IO opposition occur after the crisis-actor has already escalated. I address this problem by including IO opposition that occur prior to the onset of escalation, that is, I disregard those that occur after escalation. For crisis-actors that did not escalate to war, all instances of IO opposition are coded.[13]

[13] One might argue that each crisis time frame should be broken down into more fine-grained month-specific observations. The added benefit of using monthly observations is minimal, however. International crises have relatively short time frames and within this time frame, there is little variation on the independent variable. That is, given that the frequency of IO opposition is relatively low, I am unlikely to yield different results when I break down my observations to monthly intervals.

In order to test the conditional relationship (H2), I operationalize domestic accountability using the Varities of Democracy (VDEM) data. The variable that I am using is "v2x_accountability" which is an index that encompasses three aspects of a democracy: First, this measurement captures the ability of its domestic polity to hold its government accountable through elections, checks and balances between institutions, and oversight by civil society organizations and media activity. This variable captures the three conditions, which I laid out in the previous section, that allow for domestic pressure to change the behavior of crisis-actors.

I include in my analysis several control variables that relate to crisis-actors. I use the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) data to operationalize the degree of military capacity. States with greater military capability are less likely to be restrained and more likely to pursue unilateral military options. I also include a dummy variable from the ICB data to identify the challenger. Challengers are defined as the actor that triggered the international crisis. Some crises do not have a challenger because the crisis was triggered simultaneously by all parties involved. This is a binary variable that takes a value of "1" if the actor is the challenger, and "0" otherwise. In addition, I control for whether a formal alliance exists between the crisis-actor and the permanent members of the UNSC. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, a formal alliance between the P5 member and the crisis-actor might make it difficult for the UNSC to adopt a legal opposition. In turn, this alliance relationship may embolden the crisis-actor to be more hostile, increasing their propensity to escalate given that such an alliance relationship may provide material support to the crisis-actor. To this end, I include a binary variable that indicates whether an alliance exists between the crisis-actor and at least one P5 member. Using the ATOP data (Leeds 2020) to identify this relationship, this variable takes a value of "1" if an alliance exists between the crisis-actor and at least one P5 member and "0" otherwise.

In addition, I control for several confounding variables at the crisis-level. First, I control for duration as the UN is more likely to intervene in protracted crises. Duration may also be correlated with escalation since protracted conflicts tend to escalate more. Second, I control for the salience of the crisis as the UN might be more prone to intervene in crises that are fought over salient issues (Beardsley and Schmidt 2012). These crises are more likely to escalate as crisis-actors are likely to fight harder for salient claims. The issue salience variable has eight different values, which I recode into two levels, following Zeng (2021). The high salience issue involves threats to existence or grave damage (value 5 and 6), threats to regional or international system (4), and territorial threats (3). The low salience issue encompasses the rest (value 0, 1, 2, and 7).

I control for two additional factors that relate to the types of UN involvement. That is, I examine whether the UN has authorized more heavy-handed measures such as sanction or military action, including peacekeeping operations. Some studies have found that condemnation alone cannot effectively change state behavior because of less tangible consequences associated with verbal condemnation (Beardsley, Cunningham and White 2018). Without controlling for these effects, my findings may suffer from the Type 1 bias as we cannot fully attribute the effect to legal opposition. I therefore, create two dummy variables to which I give a value of "1" if threats or authorizations of sanction or military involvement have been made and "0" if otherwise. Summary statistics of covariates are presented in Table A1 of the Appendix.

Selection Effect

In order to identify the causal effect of legal opposition on escalation, I must consider the potential selection bias. As discussed in the previous chapter, UN involvement at various levels is a non-random outcome. If legal opposition is systematically correlated to observed and unobserved omitted factors, the correlations of these omitted factors with my error term can bias my findings. In

the analysis of international organizations' role in conflict management, the problem of selection bias frequently arises (Chiba and Fang 2014; Beardsley 2012). While there is no one empirical solution to fully resolve the selection bias, I attempt to mitigate these concerns with several empirical strategies.

First, I incorporate the findings from the previous chapter into my model specification. The previous chapter examines factors that determine the UN's agenda selection. I argued that the adoption of agenda is a necessary condition to any UN resolution because a public meeting and/or voting cannot be held if an issue is not on the UN's agenda. Crisis-actors who are likely to be on the UN's agenda are also more likely to escalate because actors with higher escalatory potential are more likely to enter the agenda. Because these actors have higher escalatory potential, they are also more likely to be condemned by legal opposition.

I control for this confounding effect by including the residuals from model 1 in Table 1.1. To briefly reiterate, I find that agenda selection is correlated with the preferences of the UNSC President and the escalatory potential of the crisis-actor. Instead of including the observed value for agenda-selection, I include the residuals to control for the unobserved aspect of my model, following Chen, Hribar, and Melessa (2018) and Terza, Basu and Rathouz (2008). The rationale for including residuals is that they capture some of the variability in the confounders (Palmer et al 2017) and the residuals is a test for the presence of unmeasured confounding between agenda-selection and escalation (Durbin 1954; Wu 1974).

As part of the robustness check, I replace the residual value of agenda-selection for its observed value. The results remain consistent[14]. I additionally use matching to address this concern. If crisis-actors who received legal opposition, non-legal opposition, and no opposition are

[14] See model 12 in Table 2.2

systematically different in their escalatory potential, the endogeneity could be a potential concern. Matching balances the observable covariates so that crisis-actors who are treated and controlled are not systematically correlated with escalation. Matching does not change my findings. Finally, my main model controls for country fixed-effects and accounts for potential correlation between crisis-actors within the same crisis, and I cluster standard errors at the crisis-level (Cameron and Miller 2015).

Results and Discussion



Figure 2.1 Cross Tabulation of Escalation and Legal Opposition

The basic pattern in the data supports my theoretical expectations. As illustrated in the cross-tab of Figure 2.1, among 113 cases of IO opposition, only 23.5% of legal opposition cases have led to escalation whereas 41.3% of non-legal opposition cases have led to escalation.

Turning to the main analysis in Table 2.1, the models are estimated with logit regression in models (1) and (3) and models (2) and (4) are estimated with fixed effects logit regression. The findings in models 1 through 4 are consistent with my hypotheses. As expected, legal opposition is negatively correlated with escalation and this relationship is statistically significant across all models and different model specifications. Figure 2.2 plots predicted probabilities of escalation and the

average marginal effect using Monte Carlo simulations (n=1000). Without any opposition, the baseline probability of escalation is estimated to be 11.7%. Non-legal opposition does not seem to deter escalation by crisis-actors, as marginal effect of non-legal opposition is estimated to be 1 percentage-points, without statistical significance. On the other hand, the predicted probability of escalation is 5.1% when legal opposition is issued, which is more than two-fold difference compared to the baseline. The average marginal effect of legal opposition is 6.6 percentage-points and considering that the mean predicted probability of escalation is 9% by all crisis-actors, the finding shown here is statistically and substantively significant.

Table 2.1 The Effect of Legal Opposition on Crisis Escalation (1946-2017)

	H1	*H1*	*H2*	*H2*
		Country FE		*Country FE*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Legal Opposition	-0.991*	-1.165*	-1.251**	-1.541**
	(0.540)	(0.655)	(0.601)	(0.727)
Non-Legal Opposition	-0.171	0.119	-0.208	0.064
	(0.476)	(0.566)	(0.477)	(0.572)
Domestic Accountability	-0.194*	-0.531**	-0.192	-0.500**
	(0.118)	(0.234)	(0.128)	(0.239)
National Capability	-4.338	0.621	-4.307	1.049
	(2.654)	(5.436)	(2.668)	(5.491)
Challenger	0.465	0.624*	0.450	0.643*
	(0.283)	(0.348)	(0.284)	(0.351)
Alliance with P5	-0.279	-0.315	-0.316	-0.349
	(0.251)	(0.329)	(0.253)	(0.332)
Duration	0.606***	0.791***	0.620***	0.816***
	(0.116)	(0.145)	(0.117)	(0.150)
Salience	1.344***	1.567***	1.354***	1.597***
	(0.310)	(0.387)	(0.310)	(0.392)
Onset Violence	2.150***	2.516***	2.175***	2.564***
	(0.270)	(0.328)	(0.273)	(0.335)
Military Involvement	0.232	0.508	0.308	0.712

	(0.509)	(0.597)	(0.525)	(0.617)
Sanction	1.031*	1.671**	0.899	1.513*
	(0.605)	(0.789)	(0.613)	(0.809)
e(Agenda Selection)	0.803**	0.878**	0.814**	0.879**
	(0.355)	(0.416)	(0.356)	(0.419)
Non-legal Opposition*Accountability			0.377	0.142
			(0.397)	(0.486)
Legal Opposition*Accountability			-0.544	-0.774
			(0.480)	(0.581)
Constant	-6.714***	-8.938***	-6.778***	-9.128***
	(0.688)	(1.029)	(0.698)	(1.068)
Observations	792	792	792	792

Note: *$p<.1$**$p<.05$***$p<.01$. *Observations have been trimmed down to 792 due to missing data. Missingness occurred from including the probability of agenda selection, as the data to estimate this probability includes s-scores that contain missing data as some do not have a record of UN voting prior to their accession to the UN.*

In Models 3 and 4, I interact opposition types and domestic accountability to test my second hypothesis. Since it is difficult to interpret the coefficient on the interaction variable in non-linear models, I plot the predicted probabilities and marginal effects in Figure 2.3 to fully gauge the statistical and substantive significance of the interaction term. As expected, legal opposition has an overall deterrent effect across all levels of domestic accountability, but there is a clear conditional relationship, suggesting that the effect of legal opposition may be present for certain crisis-actors. To investigate this relationship more carefully, the marginal effects are presented in the right-hand panel. Non-legal opposition does not show consistently significant effect in lowering the likelihood of escalation—in fact, non-legal opposition increases the likelihood of escalation with increasing level of domestic accountability (although this effect is not statistically significant). Legal opposition on the other hand, consistently reduces the likelihood of escalation, and its effect is greater, overall, for crisis-actors with greater domestic accountability. This finding builds on existing literature which finds that IOs' position taking can impact the level of domestic support (Chapman and Reiter 2004) and suggests IOs' use of legal rhetoric in their position statements may be a more effective tool to

constrain governments through their domestic public. Furthermore, the finding is consistent with Chiba and Fang (2014) who also demonstrate that IO opposition's deterrent effect on escalation is conditional on regime accountability.



Figure 2.2 Predicted Probabilities of Escalation by Opposition Types

To ensure that my results do not arise from unobserved features of states that make them susceptible to escalation, I estimate fixed effects logit in models 3 and 4. Inclusion of country fixed effects controls for biases that could arise from unobserved cross-sectional variation. My findings remain consistent, and the estimation yields even stronger coefficients for legal opposition. Although the magnitude of the coefficient cannot be interpreted at face value when using fixed effect models with rare events (Fearon, Kasara, and Laitin 2007), the fixed effects estimator is a conservative way to assess the robustness of the effect of legal opposition and ensures that the results are not biased by unobserved heterogeneity.



Figure 2.3 Conditional Effect of Legal Opposition by Domestic Accountability

The control variables generally produce consistent results across the models. As expected, longer duration, the crisis-actor being the challenger, and salience of the crisis are positively correlated with escalation. In addition, crisis-actors that demonstrate violence at the onset of crisis are more likely to escalate. P5 alliance variable does not seem to show any meaningful correlation with escalation. If P5 alliance is positively correlated with legal opposition as demonstrated in the previous chapter, this finding is plausible, because P5 allies who have a propensity to escalate are less likely to face legal opposition. Interestingly, the relationship between economic sanctions and escalation is positive and statistically significant in models 1, 2, and 4. Although these results may seem at odds with existing works (e.g., Beardsley 2013; Beardsley, Cunningham and White 2017), we cannot make a definitive claim that sanctions or military actions are ineffective, or even encourage escalation. The positive correlation does not necessarily mean causation, and this finding could have been driven by the shorter time frames of international crises. Sanctions and military actions require longer time frames to be effective—that is, the leader may not immediately change her actions when these actions are authorized. The crisis time frames however, are relatively short, with not enough time to gauge if sanctions or military actions are effective. To determine the long-term effects of sanctions or military actions, we need to examine conflict outcomes that occur over a longer period of time, such as conflict relapse (Beardsley 2013).

Finally, the models include the residuals from agenda selection model as an explanatory variable. This model specification is intended to address the selection effect by incorporating the results from the previous chapter. As expected, the positive and statistically significant correlation of this variable suggests that the selection effect, indeed, does exist (Hausman 1978).

Robustness Check

In this section, I present several sensitivity analyses in Table 2.2 which demonstrate that my results are not an artefact of a specific model identification strategy. First, I perform additional tests to address the concerns of selection bias. While statistical tools are not a panacea to selection problems, matching is useful in producing a balanced sample between the control and treatment groups. By matching the covariates between the two comparison groups, I can ensure that the results are not driven by observable confounding variables.

I employ entropy balancing to find precise weights to balance the treated group to the control group without pruning the data. In contrast to other preprocessing methods, entropy balancing involves a reweighting scheme that directly incorporates covariate balance into the weight function that is applied to the sample units (Hainmueller 2012). Furthermore, entropy balancing retains the data by allowing unit weights to vary smoothly across units. Whereas other matching analysis discards the data when they deviate from the baseline weight, entropy balancing reweights units as close as possible to base weights to achieve balance and retain as much information.

Models 5 and 6 in Table 2.2 report logit estimates of legal opposition post-matching. In model 5, I balance my covariates on crisis-actors that received UN resolution and crisis-actors that did not received UN resolution. While the main analysis accounts for the selection effect of agenda selection, it does not account for the non-randomness of UN resolutions that occur after an issue has been selected as an agenda. The effect of legal opposition remains consistent post-matching,

and in fact, the model yields a greater coefficient. In model 6, I similarly account for the non-randomness of legal opposition by balancing the same set of covariates on the crisis-actors that did and did not receive legal opposition. The results are similar, with the coefficient on legal opposition negatively and significantly correlated with escalation.[15] The additional test for the selection bias lends credence that my findings are not driven by observed confounders of my independent variable and escalation.

There is also a possibility that the UN is more prone to invoke legal opposition for crises surrounding disputed territories. Territorial conflicts have been a frequent cause of international wars and the risk of armed conflict is greatest over the issue of disputed territories (Allee and Huth 2006). The UN could, therefore, intervene more actively and frequently to take preventative measures. If conflict type is correlated to both my independent and dependent variables, the findings can be confounded by this selection effect. To address this concern, I control for conflict type by adding a dummy variable for territorial conflicts in model 7. My findings remain robust to the inclusion of this variable, and I do not find evidence for any interaction effect. While the marginal effect of legal opposition is greater than that of non-legal opposition, this pattern is not conditional on conflict type.

It is also important to consider the robustness of my results using alternative measurements of independent variables. I first consider the possibility that the impact of legal opposition in deterring crisis escalation is more effective when multiple legal oppositions are issued. I count the number of legal oppositions and use this count variable in lieu of my original independent variable. The results in model 8 are consistent with my original findings and suggest that higher frequency of legal

[15] In model 6, the coefficient on non-legal opposition is missing, because legal opposition is set as the treatment effect. I compare two groups of crisis-actors that received legal opposition and those that received non-legal opposition or did not receive any opposition.

opposition is associated with lower likelihood of escalation. This finding seems plausible because, intuitively, the strength of the signal should increase when multiple legal oppositions are invoked. The predicted probability of escalation is shown in the left panel of Figure 2.4.

I next consider my independent variable in the context of a dyadic crisis dynamic. Crisis bargaining is an inherently dyadic process between a challenger and a target, and their likelihood of escalation may depend on whether one or more actors are targeted by legal opposition. Legal opposition may for instance, increase the costs of fighting even more if the condemnation is one-sided. Legal opposition may be issued to one or both sides of the crisis, and this is likely to depend on the extent of each party's legal infractions.[16] If both parties are engaged in unwarranted hostile activities, opposition may be two-sided. One-sided legal opposition may occur in cases where transgressions of the challenger is clearest[17]. These are also likely to be situations where international consensus is easier to reach. Generally speaking, one-sided legal opposition may be more difficult to reach compared to non-legal opposition due to the appearance of non-neutrality. One-sided legal opposition, then, can signal a greater consensus among the UNSC to the international community, which can further dissuade support from the domestic public.

In addition, one-sided legal opposition on the challenger is likely to have a greater deterrent effect on escalation because the challenger is more likely to moderate their demands after the

[16] Existing works focus on IOs' position toward the challenger of the crisis (Appel 2018; Chapman and Wolford 2010; Chiba and Fang 2014) but in practice, the UN takes a position toward the target as well. If the level of hostility is sufficiently high from both sides, they are equally likely to be condemned.

[17] I focus on one-sided legal opposition toward challengers based on the consideration that they initiate the crisis, and they are the first actor to express dissatisfaction with the status quo. There is one case in the data where one-sided legal opposition was issued at the target. In 1989, the UNGA condemned the US for invading Panama and violating her national sovereignty. Panama was the crisis instigator by declaring the war against the US, but the US was solely condemned for its violation of the law. This is consistent with my expectation that one-sided legal opposition is likely to be issued to the actor whose violations are clearest.

opposition is issued, which the target is less likely to reject (Chapman and Wolford 2010). Furthermore, one-sided opposition can help solve coordination problems among foreign leaders unsure of whether to support the challenger's foreign policy (Chapman and Wolford 2010). By attributing fault entirely to the challenger, one-sided legal opposition can effectively dissuade potential allies from joining the challenger's coalition. Conversely, the target may be able to garner sympathy from the international community, which may increase her ability to form a military and diplomatic coalition should the challenger continue to escalate. The relative advantage of the target is likely to further increase the challenger's costs of fighting, which can effectively prevent escalation.

Two-sided legal opposition that condemns both the challenger and target, however, may not be as effective as one-sided legal opposition. Two-sided legal opposition is more likely to be issued in situations where both the challenger and target's use of force violates international law. With both the challenger and target condemned by legal opposition, some foreign leaders may interpret this as IOs' neutrality for or against any particular party and remain ambivalent about whether to support their potential ally. With this coordination problem remaining unresolved, the deterrent effect of legal opposition on crisis-actors' escalation may be attenuated. Actors on both sides may miscalculate the risks of escalation given the greater uncertainty about third party support.

In order to test this expectation, I generate a categorical variable with four categories: no opposition, non-legal opposition, two-sided legal opposition, one-sided legal opposition. Model 9 confirms this expectation, as I find that one-sided legal opposition is negatively correlated with escalation. Other opposition types fail to reach the statistical significance, suggesting that one-sided legal opposition has the strongest effect in disincentivizing escalation. I plot the predicted probability of escalation for all opposition types in the right panel of Figure 2.4. One-sided legal opposition leads to the lowest predicted probability of escalation, and the marginal effect is estimated to be 5.7 percentage-points ($p<0.05$). To ensure that this result is not driven by a specific

coding strategy, I analyze the same model with a binary variable on one-sided legal opposition. The results remain consistent in model 10.



Figure 2.4 Predicted Probability of Escalation by the Frequency and Type of Legal Opposition

In order to show the robustness of the conditional relationship presented in this paper, I use an alternative measurement for domestic accountability. I use the VDEM data's high-level electoral democracy variable ("v2x_polyarchy"). The benefit of using this measurement is that it is an index that groups different micro-level indices that make up electoral democracy. The causal mechanism of the conditional relationship presented in this paper depends on the domestic public's ability to punish a leader for unsuccessful foreign policy. The crisis-actor is likely to change their behavior only when potential backlash from the domestic audience is likely. This causal mechanism is captured by the inclusion of this variable, and my findings remain consistent as demonstrated in model 11.

Finally, I consider the possibility that the relationship between legal opposition and escalation is spurious, driven primarily by the effect of sanctions or military activity. For this, I examine the basic pattern of my data. From all crisis-actors that did not receive any sanctions, only 1.4% of those actors escalated after receiving legal opposition. However, for crisis-actors that experienced

sanctions, 4% of those actors escalated after receiving legal opposition. Therefore, it is unlikely that the deterrent effect of legal opposition is attributed to the effect of sanctions. Similarly, I compare groups that did and did not experience military action. From the actors that did not face any military involvement from the UN, only 1.3% of cases accounted for escalation and legal opposition. However, among the actors that did face military involvement, 5.1 % of cases accounted for escalation and legal opposition. While further investigation is necessary, the basic pattern in the data suggest that the concern for spurious correlation is unlikely.

Table 2.2 Robustness Checks for the Effect of Legal Opposition on Crisis Escalation

	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Non-Legal Opposition	-0.265		-1.760**		-0.170		-0.213	-0.059
	(0.473)		(0.791)		(0.476)		(0.477)	(0.480)
Legal Opposition	-1.553***	-1.514**	-2.271***		-0.717		-1.011*	-0.935*
	(0.539)	(0.728)	(0.732)		(0.651)		(0.541)	(0.541)
Territorial			-0.589**					
			(0.291)					
Legal Opposition (frequency)				-0.306*				
				(0.170)				
One-sided legal (ordinal)					-1.351*			
					(0.749)			
One-sided legal (binary)						-1.217**		
						(0.585)		
Accountability	-0.281	-0.670	-0.220*	-0.190	-0.192	-0.194		
	(0.277)	(0.456)	(0.120)	(0.118)	(0.118)	(0.119)		
Electoral democracy							-0.876*	-0.178
							(0.473)	(0.118)
National Capability	-21.639***	-23.020**	-4.160	-4.149	-4.306	-3.820	-4.072	-4.443*
	(6.912)	(10.950)	(2.689)	(2.639)	(2.649)	(2.623)	(2.656)	(2.649)
Challenger	1.828**	2.628*	0.547*	0.448	0.499*	0.479*	0.457	0.377
	(0.761)	(1.396)	(0.293)	(0.281)	(0.286)	(0.284)	(0.283)	(0.281)
Alliance with P5	0.170	0.295	-0.338	-0.249	-0.275	-0.252	-0.235	-0.232
	(0.487)	(0.756)	(0.257)	(0.249)	(0.252)	(0.249)	(0.255)	(0.251)
Duration	1.397***	1.653*	0.609***	0.597***	0.607***	0.586***	0.607***	0.544***
	(0.499)	(0.850)	(0.120)	(0.109)	(0.116)	(0.109)	(0.116)	(0.112)

Salience	3.815***	19.486	1.399***	1.348***	1.335***	1.291***	1.352***	1.303***
	(0.712)	(1,594.812)	(0.327)	(0.310)	(0.310)	(0.306)	(0.310)	(0.309)
Onset Violence	3.553***	4.264***	2.238***	2.138***	2.130***	2.124***	2.148***	2.062***
	(0.837)	(1.385)	(0.280)	(0.264)	(0.271)	(0.265)	(0.270)	(0.264)
Military Involvement	0.417	-0.164	0.536	0.255	0.146	-0.133	0.221	0.269
	(0.596)	(0.795)	(0.553)	(0.509)	(0.526)	(0.499)	(0.509)	(0.515)
Sanction	1.568**	0.565	1.527**	1.071*	1.181*	1.417**	1.035*	1.058*
	(0.665)	(1.045)	(0.617)	(0.590)	(0.646)	(0.672)	(0.604)	(0.603)
e(Agenda Selection)	14.210***	14.725	0.833**	0.621**	0.796**	0.729**	0.807**	
	(5.445)	(9.082)	(0.359)	(0.278)	(0.355)	(0.285)	(0.356)	
Agenda Selection								0.691*
								(0.358)
Non-Legal*Territorial			2.379***					
			(0.861)					
Legal Opp*Terrtorial			2.220***					
			(0.832)					
Constant	-22.874***	-40.939	-6.546***	-6.737***	-6.709***	-6.602***	-6.442***	-6.546***
	(6.873)	(1,594.853)	(0.705)	(0.674)	(0.688)	(0.662)	(0.695)	(0.673)
Observations	792	111	792	792	792	792	792	792

Note: *p**p***p<0.01. Model 5 has truncated data due to pruning that occurred from covariate balancing.

Conclusion

The question of whether IOs can meaningfully reduce hostilities between states and promote peace has been central to the international relations literature, and this article offers timely policy implications in the context of recent backlash against multilateralism we see around the world. The existing research suggests IOs' involvement matters in interstate crises—opposition can prevent an ongoing conflict from further escalating while approval makes backing down less likely. The empirical evidence, however, suggests that IO opposition does not always prevent a full-fledged escalation to war. In this article, I extend insights from existing work to examine the qualitative variation in IO opposition that is consequential to preventing crisis escalation—the legal content. The results across a range of empirical tests suggest that when legal opposition is issued against a crisis-actor, the crisis-actor is less likely to escalate to a full-scale war. There is a gradation effect of legal opposition, however. The effect of legal opposition is strongest when the legal opposition is one-sided and this effect is attenuated when legal opposition is issued to both sides. Furthermore, legal opposition is demonstrated to be stronger when multiple condemnations are issued.

Importantly, the invocation of legal principles by the UNSC consistently reduces the probability of escalation across different model specifications. My analysis provides insight into important distinctions among condemnations issued by IOs. Namely, a formal condemnation that explicitly invokes international law as grounds for condemnation has had a greater impact than a statement without legal language. At a time when multilateralism is unpopular in some policy circles, IOs can benefit from issuing firm statements that fully engage with international law to play a more central role in international security.

The findings in this article build on a prominent literature that examines the relationship between the state, IO, and the domestic public. IOs play a central role in providing necessary information for the domestic public to assess and shape the state's behavior in the international

community. While previous works have focused on IOs' position taking as an important signal that informs the domestic audience on the merits of their government's policy, this paper extends this logic and highlights the importance of the content of IOs' position. Legal opposition is found to be more effective on crisis-actors that are highly accountable to their domestic audience, which suggests that the domestic public may be more likely mobilize against an actor in violation of international law. This paper opens avenues for future research that examine the channel between IOs and domestic audience. Researchers can examine how the domestic audience responds to not only different types of information that are transmitted by IOs, but how the decision-making procedure by different IOs impact the public's reception of information.

Relatedly, this article raises new questions on the rhetorical variation in IOs' condemnation of hostile actors. While this paper demonstrates that there is important variation across condemnations that makes them more effective in shaping state behavior, there is still a wealth of information that have yet been explored. For instance, there is wide rhetorical and textual variation in UN resolutions that may affect state behavior differently. Some condemnations are more severe than others, and this varying level of severity may signal different information to the observers. This question will be addressed in the next chapter to provide a more complete understanding on the set of tools that IOs can use, rhetorically, legally, and materially, to shape the conflict dynamics and contribute to long-term peace.

Finally, the policy implications of this research are relevant to today's political landscape and the backlash against multilateralism. The evidence suggests that the UN can increase its legitimacy by engaging with international law at the forefront of its activities. While in principle, UN mandates are established in legal principles, to invoke international law more explicitly sends a signal to international audiences of their legitimacy. Furthermore, issuing legal oppositions makes fighting

costly and backing down more likely; with increased use of legal rhetorical tools, IOs have the potential to mitigate continued interstate and intrastate hostilities in today's world politics.

Part III: Cheap Talk or Credible Signal?
The Severity of UNSC Condemnation and Crisis Escalation

Condemnations by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) have largely been discounted by the extant literature as cheap talk that is ineffective in preventing aggressive states from escalating to war. Empirical patterns, however, suggest that some condemnations are more than cheap talk, and in fact, make it costly for states to escalate. What makes condemnations more credible and costly? I argue that not all condemnations are identical; they vary in the magnitude of severity, defined as the strength of the UNSC's collective disapproval as expressed through the choice of words written into the language of the UN resolution. Specifically, I argue that greater magnitude of severity is associated with preference homogeneity toward the hostile actor and lower magnitude of severity is associated with preference heterogeneity. That is, when the Permanent Five countries' preferences are generally aligned, they are more likely to adopt condemnation with greater rhetorical severity. This in turn, is likely to signal the UNSC's ability to follow through with punitive measures should the crisis-actor fail to comply with the condemnation. I test and validate the theoretically-driven hypothesis that condemnation with greater severity reduces the likelihood of crisis escalation using original data on condemnation severity for all international crises from 1946 through 2017. This article contributes to the long-standing debate on whether international organizations can effectively help manage international crises by identifying variations in the severity of UNSC condemnations as a type of information that signals preference alignment and the institutional resolve of the UNSC.

Introduction

When does the United Nations' (UN) condemnation prevent international crises from escalating to a full-scale war? One of the ways through which the UN Security Council (SC) intervenes in international crises is by issuing a formal condemnation that calls upon states to cease hostilities. Diplomats who serve on the UNSC consider the adoption of condemnations as a triumph, and often use terms like "signal" to emphasize their importance in conveying message to target countries that certain actions will be met with dire consequences. Existing scholarship however, suggests that condemnations are mere "cheap talk" because they are not backed up by coercive actions that demonstrate the UN's willingness and commitment to peace. Specifically, existing works find that condemnations are ineffective in preventing conflict relapse (Beardsley 2013), reducing the duration of international crises (Beardsley 2012), and deterring self-determination movements from escalating to civil war (Beardsley, Cunningham and White 2017; hereafter BCW). These works argue that condemnations are ineffective in conflict reduction compared to other types of intervention tactics such as peacekeeping operations.

In a number of international crises, however, condemnations alone, effectively prevented warring parties from escalating to a full-scale war. For instance, in the border crisis between Ethiopia and Eritrea from 2005 through 2006, condemnation from the UNSC was key to preventing escalation. In response to increasing troop deployment and tensions in the shared border area, the UNSC adopted resolution 1640 which "[e]xpress[ed] its grave concern at the Ethiopian Government's failure, to date, to accept . . . the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission [and] [d]eeply deplore[d] Eritrea's continued imposition of restrictions on the freedom of movement of UNMEE". In response to this verbal condemnation, Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin said "though we have seen no encouraging signs from Eritrea even after resolution 1640 has been adopted, Ethiopia is convinced that its compliance with the council's instruction is necessary even if

doing so might have some risk for Ethiopia's security".[18] His response and subsequent termination of the crisis suggests that condemnations may contain and provide important information that can potentially influence crisis outcomes.

The behavior of and anecdotal illustrations from diplomats and policymakers also suggest that condemnations are far more salient than cheap talk. It is a well-known fact that the intense pressure was placed on diplomats to acquire or stop the adoption of a condemnation during the Syrian Civil War. In 2012 and 2013, the UNSC met for numerous rounds of negotiations to pass a resolution condemning the al-Assad regime where China and Russia repeatedly exercised their veto power. The disagreement stems from the choice of words during the drafting of the resolution, which emphasizes that condemnations, albeit their lack of direct coercive power, matter.[19] When the UNSC successfully adopted resolution 2118 against the Assad regime for the use of Chemical Weapons, the international community reacted to this condemnation as a diplomatic triumph[20], because the diplomatic community believed that the condemnation represented a consensus and thus would exert pressure on the al-Assad regime.

If condemnations are in fact, merely cheap talk, why does the UNSC keep issuing them at great political cost? Condemnations are the most frequently invoked intervention tactic in international crises, accounting for more than 60% of the intervention type (Beardsley 2012). If condemnations have no constraining effect on state behavior, why would states bargain for extensive hours only to issue a text that has little effect in managing conflict?

This paper examines the conditions in which condemnations can effectively prevent crisis escalation. I argue that not all condemnations are identical; condemnations vary on the dimension of

[18] AFP, "*Ethiopia Ready to Reduce Forces on Eritrean Border.*" December 10, 2005.
[19] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-15180732
[20] https://newrepublic.com/article/114908/un-syria-resolution-good-it-gets

severity, which signals the UNSC's collective resolve about settling the crisis. I define severity as the strength of the UNSC's collective disapproval as expressed through the choice of words written into the language of the UN resolution. That is, higher severity signals greater preference homogeneity toward the target actor whereas lower severity signals preference heterogeneity toward the target actor. Preference homogeneity among the UNSC members allows them to condemn the target actor with greater severity. By issuing such condemnation, the UNSC members collectively signal their resolve and willingness to punish the target actor who fails to back down. This in turn increases the anticipation of future punishment from the UNSC and costs of fighting, pressuring the target actor to back down.

The analysis in the paper extends the literature on the role of international organizations (IOs) in conflict outcomes. Whether IOs are effective in conflict resolution has been a long-standing debate in IR (Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom 2004; Mitchell and Hensel 2007; Shannon, Morey, and Boehmke 2010; Beardsley 2012; 2013; BCW). The general consensus is that an IO's opposition to a conflict party's position increases the costs of fighting (Thompson 2006; Chapman 2007; Chapman and Wolford 2010; Chiba and Fang 2014) but these studies examine the direction of the IO's position rather than the effect of different types of intervention tactics that IOs employ. Subsequent studies have examined different tactics employed by the UNSC, including, but not limited to condemnations. The UN deploys peacekeeping operations in conflict-stricken areas, which has been shown to be associated with lower levels of battle-related hostilities (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2014). The UN oftentimes operate as mediators, and studies find that mediation and peacekeeping, together, have an additive effect in violence reduction (BCW). But the effectiveness of mediation and peacekeeping are found to be dependent on a number of factors, including the bias of the mediator (Kydd 2010) and the credibility of the use of force (Favretto 2009). That said, no intervention tactic can singlehandedly and unconditionally resolve all conflicts.

It is thus premature to disregard condemnation as an ineffective conflict management tactic without a further investigation into conditions that enhance its effectiveness.

I test my theoretical expectation with international crises from 1946 through 2017 and find that the predicted probability of escalation decreases with an increasing level of severity. In addition, I find that the impact of severity is conditional on the presence of a formal alliance between the crisis-actor and at least one P5 member. A long-standing alliance can attenuate the effect of a highly severe condemnation because the target actor may have a positive bias that she will be shielded from any punishment. Thus, the presence of an alliance may embolden the crisis-actor to escalate nonetheless. I also find that when concrete punishment such as economic sanction is present, an increasing level of severity is associated with lower likelihood of escalation. This finding suggests that severity is a signal of the UNSC's resolve which increases the crisis-actor's anticipation of future punishment.

This paper makes several important theoretical and empirical contributions. Theoretically, this study builds on the scholarship on crisis-bargaining and the role of a third-party actor by introducing a new type of information that is relevant to the dynamics of crisis-bargaining. While previous research has identified variation in involvement types (e.g., condemnation, sanction, force deployment), this is the first study, to my knowledge, to address the rhetorical aspect of a particular action type, condemnation. Severity, an overlooked dimension of condemnation, conveys information relevant to crisis-actors' calculation about the risks of escalation. A severe condemnation is associated with greater risks that stem from potential future punishments. UNSC members' preferences regarding their intent to punish an actor for their hostilities is translated to the overall magnitude of severity and this information is key to crisis-actors' assessment of the risks

associated with escalation. By identifying how the collective intent of the UNSC[21] is signaled through rhetorical severity of condemnation, this study allows us to better understand the type of information that is being sent by a third-party international organization and its implications for leaders and crisis outcomes.

Empirically, this study uses an originally coded variable on severity of UN condemnations for crisis-actors from 1946 through 2017. By adopting insights from the legal-linguist literature to operationalize the severity of UN condemnation, this paper provides a systematic way of examining a key dimension of UN intervention type. Furthermore, the data used in this paper, combined with my original data on international crises, can be used by researchers to address other questions about crisis behavior. My work advances existing empirical studies that focus on the effectiveness of condemnation by the UNSC, by extending the theoretical insight and empirical findings to the severity of condemnation.

The Credibility of Institutional Signaling

Condemnations are the primary and most common type of intervention tactic that IOs employ to deplore hostilities in international crises. A number of works have questioned the efficacy of condemnation in deterring hostilities as condemnations without inducements or enforcement mechanisms are unable to pose a threat to the crisis-actors. Because IOs are prone to convey bias toward peace, crisis-actors may believe that condemnations are just cheap talk by the IO that wants to resolve the crisis but is unable to follow through with more substantive actions. States are unlikely

[21] To be clear, other works have explained that voting pattern allows us to infer collective preferences. Chapman (2009) and Voeten (2001; 2008) for instance, explain a resolution that is adopted without a veto implies that the most ideologically distant member is supportive of the proposed policy. The discussion, however, does not extend to how supportive or reluctant the members are of adopted resolutions.

to comply with IO if they believe that the IO will say whatever it takes to get the crisis-actor to back down (Beardsley 2013).

The logic presented in this paper extends the literature on costly signaling. Signaling models have been widely used to illustrate how certain costly actions can convey information that is otherwise unobservable. For instance, in crisis bargaining, a leader may take a public stance to signal resolve to the adversary. The effectiveness and credibility of this signal depends on the leader's ability to follow through and the cost of reneging on their statement. Domestic audience cost theory holds that backing down from a public statement is costly because a leader can face punishments such as removal from office (Fearon 1994). Another aspect of the credibility of the signal is the leader's ability to follow through on the public statement (McManus 2017). If a leader does not have the political means to follow through on their statement, their statement is deemed ineffective.

The framework of credible signaling can be used to explain the credibility and effectiveness of IOs' condemnation. To say that condemnation is ineffective because it is only a verbal statement is to make the same assessment about leaders' public statements, which are often viewed as important signals. Credibility of condemnation depends on two factors: the consequences of reneging and the institutional ability to follow through. Just as democratic leaders face domestic audience cost as consequences of reneging on their public statements, institutions are also shaped by the public costs, defined as anticipated consequences for public action (Allen and Yuen 2022). IOs may lose their ability to influence foreign policy or have difficulties obtaining cooperation from member states if their reputation falters as a result of continued failure to follow through on their public statement.

In the context of institutional bargaining, however, consequences of reneging may be less important in determining the credibility of the signal. When a leader reneges from a public statement, there is a clear culpability which allows the domestic audience to punish the leader. Inside the institution, however, there are a number of different decisions-makers which makes it difficult

for observers to identify culpability. Although the cost on the institutional legitimacy may be felt by the institution as a whole, individual consequences may be attenuated. Because there are multiple decision-makers involved, institutional ability to follow through on their public statements may be greatly inhibited by the collective action problems. The targeted crisis-actor may not perceive public condemnation to be a credible signal of the institutional resolve to punish them if they believe that the IO issuing such condemnation is unable to follow through with more punishments. In other words, the target actor's threat perception of condemnation depends on whether it believes that the IO has the ability to punish them if they fail to back down from a crisis. So how does the IO signal its ability and intent to follow through? I illustrate the logic of institutional follow through in the following section.

P5 Preferences and the Anticipation of Future Punishment

The institutional ability to follow through essentially depends on overcoming the collective action problem, which is exacerbated by the diverging preference of P5 members. The key for an IO is to signal collective preference alignment as a demonstration of their ability follow through on their condemnation. I argue that the magnitude of severity in each condemnation is determined by P5 members' collective preference. Specifically, greater magnitude is associated with greater preference alignment and lower magnitude is associated with preference variability. The magnitude of severity then signals the institutional ability to follow through, shaping the crisis-actor's risk assessment associated with escalation.

Adoption of any UNSC resolution requires nine affirmative votes and no veto vote. As a result, every resolution is essentially a set of overlapping preferences among the P5 members. And what is eventually included in the UNSC resolution is the result of a bargaining game where all members agree (or agree enough not to veto) on its language and content. UN resolutions' salience,

which comes with high publicity and visibility to the international community, makes the members highly sensitive to their language and content. A resolution's fate, therefore, can be determined by a single word or phrase. The magnitude of severity, therefore, is not decided on an *ad hoc* basis but is an outcome of a, potentially, long deliberation process.

P5 members are likely to have diverging preferences on how to intervene in a crisis situation. As briefly discussed in the first chapter, rhetorical severity of condemnation may depend on the escalatory potential of the crisis-actor. The relationship between severity of condemnation and the magnitude of the crisis may not always be straightforward because P5 members' parochial interests with certain actors may incentivize them to block highly severe condemnations. Therefore, a severe condemnation is generally more difficult to adopt, as there are risks of veto from members who have political affinity with the target actor. We can then assume *ex post* that when a severe condemnation is adopted, not a single P5 member exercised their veto. A severe condemnation, then, is most likely to occur when P5 members share a generally homogenous attitude toward the crisis-actor.

I explain this logic in Figure 3.1 below. The horizontal line represents the possible magnitude of severity. In Panel A, veto power 1 prefers a relatively low severity condemnation. Even though veto power 2 prefers a highly severe condemnation, veto power is likely to veto out any resolution that exceeds its accepted range of magnitude. Veto power 2 is likely to accept the terms in the shaded overlap because an alternative will be inaction from veto power 1's veto. Consider Panel B where the preference of veto power 1 has shifted which expanded the range of possible severity outcomes available to the UNSC. This allows the institution to collectively issue a condemnation with greater magnitude. In Panel C, the preference of veto power 1 is aligned with that of veto power 2. Because of their preference alignment, neither player will veto a highly severe condemnation.



Figure 3.1 Preference Heterogeneity and Bargaining Range of UNSC Resolutions

This raises another question then, as to why veto power 2 in panel A will accept anything short of a severe condemnation. When the preferences of veto players 1 and 2 diverge, veto player 2 is likely to support a weak condemnation preferred by veto power 1 because an alternative to a weak condemnation is inaction. Generally, the UNSC members are likely to consider the organizational mandate to address threats to international peace and security (Beardsley and Schmidt 2012). Even if veto power 2 strongly favors a severe condemnation as opposed to a weak condemnation, a weak condemnation is likely to be preferred over inaction.

Another scenario to consider is when there is low heterogeneity because all P5 members may be equally reluctant to issue a highly severe condemnation. There are two reasons why this is unlikely. First, note that issues that are discussed at the Council's meeting have already been selected by the UNSC President on the basis of their escalatory potential. These crisis-actors already pass a certain threshold and pose some level of threat to peace. It is, thus, unlikely to think of a situation where all P5 members are unilaterally favorable to the crisis-actor. Some P5 members may be favorable given their political closeness to the target actor, but given the divide in the UNSC

between the Western three and Russia and China who have very dissimilar profiles, there is a low likelihood for the two sides to have completely aligned preferences.[22]

After the condemnation has been issued, the crisis-actor faces a decision to back down or escalate, a decision that is likely to depend on the actor's perception of the credibility of the signal sent by the UNSC. Condemnation with high severity signals preference alignment and communicates the institutional willingness and ability to follow through with punitive measures in response to noncompliance. Condemnation with low severity however, signals a divided UNSC, and is unable to communicate strong resolve and a willingness to follow through. The target actor is likely to interpret a weak condemnation as an internal division and therefore, cheap talk.[23] Weak condemnation is unlikely to persuade the target actor that continued hostilities will be followed by punitive measures such as economic sanctions or military involvement.

The crisis-actor can then reassess the costs of fighting with an anticipation of future punishment. The cost of fighting increases when the actor believes that continued hostilities will be followed by coercive measures such as sanctions or military actions from the UN. Sanctions may contribute to conflict reduction by constraining the actors' ability to fight and increasing the costs of continued fighting (Escribà-Folch 2010; Beardsley 2013; Radke and Jo 2018). Deployment of peacekeeping operations, too, have been theorized to increase the costs of fighting, as the addition of blue helmets and other UN forces in the battlefield would increase the thickness of barrier between the conflict parties (Fortna 2008; Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2014; Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson 2019). With an implicit but credible threat of future actions, condemnation with high

[22] The two sides may form similar preferences when the threat posed by a crisis-actor is sufficiently severe to trump ideological differences.
[23] Although unlikely, we can imagine a situation where all P5 members unilaterally prefer a weak condemnation. In this case, the crisis actor still has no reason to believe that the UNSC will punish hostile actions with punitive measures.

severity can increase the costs of fighting and deter escalation. From this theoretical discussion, I propose the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: UNSC condemnations with higher severity are likely to be associated with a lower probability of escalation.

The severity of condemnation, however, may not have a consistent effect across all crisis-actors. The effectiveness of condemnation depends on the target actor's anticipation of future punishment from the UNSC. This perception however, is likely to be confounded when the receiver (target actor) projects any prior bias toward the sender (UNSC). That is, the sender may be signaling straightforward intentions to punish the target actor by increasing the magnitude of condemnation, but the signal may become diluted when received by the target actor. Research has extensively theorized about how the neutrality or partiality of an organization affects the credibility of information being sent to the observers (Thompson 2006; Chapman 2007; 2009). Perceptive neutrality is important in information signaling because the receiver's "projection bias" – the psychological tendency to overestimate the degree to one's own beliefs or perception—can distort the intention or the content of the signals (Quek 2016; Allport 1924; Ashenfelter and Krueger 1994; Hogset and Barrett 2010; Ross, Greene, and House 1977).

This projection bias could manifest when the target actor shares an alliance with the sender(s) of the signal because they would least expect a condemnation from an organization comprised of "friends" or traditional allies (Chapman 2009, 742). The value of a shared alliance may bias the target actor's risk assessment of escalation with a miscalculated perception that the alliance will be a shield against any future punitive measures. The alliance may also bias the target actor to believe that their alliance will help them withstand the consequences of escalation, such as economic sanctions. Having been sanctioned does not necessarily lead to an immediate and complete cut-off from

supplies. Oftentimes, allies may support each other through more covert means and continue to send military supplies. An alliance with a P5 member may make this more feasible or encourage other allies to continue their support.[24]

Hypothesis 2: The effect of severity is likely to be conditional on the presence of a formal alliance between the crisis-actor and a P5 member. That is, the deterrent effect of severity is likely to be greater for crisis-actors without a P5 ally.

Severity and Legality in UNSC Condemnation

In Part II, I have argued that legal invocation deters escalation by crisis-actors by mobilizing the international community. Which rhetorical element, then, is a better predictor of the decision to escalate? Furthermore, how does the magnitude of severity impact the deterrent effect of legal opposition? Legality and severity of condemnation impact the crisis-actor through two distinct causal mechanisms. Legality is likely to impact the crisis-actor indirectly through the international and domestic audience. Legal invocation formalizes the crisis-actor's wrongdoing which rallies the international community against the target actor. This makes it difficult for the crisis-actor to garner any international or domestic support, raising the costs of fighting.

High severity is likely to have a more direct impact on the crisis-actor. The magnitude of severity can signal the extent of the UN's commitment and resolve in settling the crisis. High severity can thus raise the costs of fighting by increasing the crisis-actor's anticipation of future punishment. Whereas the effectiveness of legal opposition may depend on the extent to which the international community pressures the crisis-actor and the actor's sensitivity to international opinion,

[24] The opposite can be argued that being condemned by a P5 member who is also an ally is more effective in deterring escalation. I argue, however, that the credibility of condemnation depends on consistent signaling, which can be compromised when a formal alliance implicitly signals mixed intentions.

severity can raise the immediate costs of fighting. Therefore, I argue that severity of condemnation is likely to be a better deterrent of crisis escalation.

Additionally, I theorize that legality and severity are likely have a conditional effect in deterring escalation. If legality is invoked in resolutions that are also high in rhetorical severity, this condemnation can mobilize the international community and increase the costs of fighting for the crisis-actor. These two mechanisms can simultaneously increase the costs of fighting and reduce the likelihood of escalation. The effect of legality, however, may be conditional on the severity of the condemnation. If legality is invoked in condemnations with low severity, the low severity may attenuate the effect of legality. Low severity reflects preference heterogeneity among the P5 which in turn signals low resolve, which can weaken the effect of legality. The weak signal sent by a low severity condemnation may not be sufficient to mobilize the international community. If the international community believes that the UNSC is not resolve, this perception may have little effect in the crisis-actor's ability to garner international support. Therefore, the effect of legality is likely to be greater in condemnations with greater severity.

Similarly, the effect of severity too, is likely to be conditional on legality. Severity of condemnation can signal the extent to which the Council members are resolve about punishing the aggressor. If the aggressor has violated international law but the Council did not invoke legality, this condemnation is unlikely to deter escalation even if the rhetorical severity is high. This is because the target actor may not find the UN's resolve to be credible when they fail to invoke international law. I propose the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3: Severity of condemnation is likely to be a stronger deterrent of crisis-actor's decision to escalate compared to legal opposition.

Hypothesis 4: The effect of legal opposition is likely to be greater in condemnations with greater severity.

Hypothesis 5: The effect of rhetorical severity is likely to be greater in condemnations that invoke international law.

Research Design and Data

I test my hypotheses with international crises in the time period of 1946 through 2017. Since few IOs with the security mandate existed before WWII, I focus on observations that occurred since 1946. This results in 374 crises and 802 crisis-actors from 1946 through 2017. My unit of analysis is crisis-actor because my argument is monadic; I examine how IOs can impact an individual state's behavior. While the dynamics of crisis bargaining are dyadic, there are limitations to the crisis-level unit of analysis. Condemnation can address all or some parties involved in the conflict, which is dependent on actor-level characteristics. The magnitude of escalatory behavior might be asymmetric and P5 members' political closeness with individual parties may also be asymmetric which can result in one-sided condemnation. Monadic design can better address this directed effect. I acknowledge however, that the dyadic dynamics may not be captured with the monadic design, so I include various crisis-level confounders as my control variables and use robust standard errors clustered on crisis.

The outcome of interest is escalation by crisis-actors. I use the ordinal data on escalation from ICB at the actor level and construct a binary category from the original classification. The original variable operationalizes the intensity of violence employed by crisis actors in four levels: a value of "1" for no violence, "2" for minor clashes, "3" for serious clashes, and "4" for a full-scale war. I collapse the first three categories and give a value of "0" to indicate that a war has not occurred because the existing categories are relatively arbitrary as there is no clear delineation on what differentiates minor clashes from serious clashes. I retain the final category and give a value of "1" to indicate escalation to a full-scale war. The dichotomization allows for better substantive

interpretation because the ultimate aim of the paper is to examine whether the UN is effective in deterring war.

One of the challenges of examining the effect of UN condemnations is to make accurate temporal causal inference. If UN condemnations occurred after escalation, my analysis will be biased with reverse causality. To address this, it is imperative to ascertain that the UN condemnations were issued prior to escalation. For crisis-actors that did not escalate, I examine all UN condemnations that occurred during the entire duration of crisis, and for crisis-actors that did escalate, I only examine UN condemnations that occurred before the time of escalation.

My analysis uses original data for information on the severity of condemnation. I first identify whether a UNSC condemnation was issued. UN condemnation is coded as "1" when there is a formal resolution where the UNSC deplores hostilities, non-compliance, and other violations, and "0" if otherwise. There are 113 out of 802 crisis-actors that received at least one UN condemnation. Severity, defined as strength of rhetorical disapproval, is operationalized by examining specific key words and phrases used in actual UNSC resolutions. Resolutions follow a fixed template made up of preambulatory and operative clauses. A preambulatory clause explains why the UNSC is acting on the given agenda and begins with an *emotive* word that signals the UNSC's emotional discontent. This is followed by an operative clause which describes the action step taken by the UNSC and begins with an *action* word. The intensity of emotive and action words can be strengthened with the use of a modifier. Examining the variation in the use of emotive and actions words allows for a systematic comparison because these words are placed in fixed locations of every UN resolution and reflect the overall severity of the resolution.

For each resolution, I identify all emotive and action words, score each word using a scale that I adopted from the legal-linguist literature, upon which I expanded (Gruenberg 2009). I estimate the severity index using the total sum of each words. Gruenberg's severity scale provides a hierarchical

classification system that rank orders emotive and action words based on their dictionary definition and the context they are used in the resolution. The scale I present in the Appendix is modified from Gruenberg's original scale, as I added a number of new words based on their dictionary meaning. When action or emotive words are used with modifiers that incrementally intensify the severity score, I add "1" to the total score.

A resolution often begins by describing the situation at hand or giving the context of the Security Council meeting. These statements are used with relatively weak emotive words that receive the score of "1", such as "conscious of," "recognizing," or "underlining". The next strongest words describe the feeling of anxiety ("anxious") and concern ("concerned") and receive the score of "2". The next set of words describe the feeling of sadness, sorrow, regret and grief, and receive a score of "3". The next strongest set of words, receiving a score of "4" incrementally intensifies the previous category, with words such as "deploring," "disturbed," and "dismayed". These words are a step below "condemned" or "condemning", receiving a score of "5," which means to express a strong disapproval of a situation. Next on the hierarchical list describes the feeling of alarm, which means sudden fear caused by danger. This can be increased in the severity with words such as "shocked" or "appalled", receiving a score of "7". Next on the list describes feelings of displeasure from situations considered unjust or insulting, such as "indignant," or "outraged". Finally, the word used to indicate the highest severity is "censure" which means to criticize harshly, and this word receives a score of "9". (Gruenberg 2009).

Among the action words, the Security Council often uses words to describe that they have come to a conclusion or a decision. Words such as "decides", "determines," or "stresses" fall under this category and receive a score of "1". The next strongest action words "call upon" or "call for" the target of the resolution to comply with the given resolution. These words receive a score of "2". The Security Council can increase the strength of action words with "recommend" or "appeal"

which mean to suggest as appropriate. Next on the list are words that more directly provide instructions, such as "ask" and "request". These words receive a score of "4". The Security Council can also try to impel, induce or persuade, with the use of "urge" that receives a score of "5". The next strongest term is "warn" which means to advise to be careful or admonish. This term includes both admonishment and strong instruction. Finally, "demand" is the most severe action word receiving a score of "7" (Gruenberg 2009). Examples of coding for high and low severity condemnations can be found in the Appendix.

There may be one or more condemnations targeting each crisis-actor. Thus, I construct four different scores of condemnation severity. First, I measure severity using the resolution with the highest score based on the consideration that the most severe resolution is likely to send the clearest signal. Second, I measure severity using the first resolution, which is likely to be the most important in defining crisis bargaining tactics for the duration of the crisis. Finally, I combine scores for all resolutions based on the expectation that repeated resolutions are likely to have an additive effect on escalation. Finally, I estimate the average score of each resolution by dividing the combined score by the frequency of resolution. Descriptive statistics are presented in Figure 3.2. As the histograms show, severity variables are highly skewed to the right, which can adversely affect the model's performance and interpretation of the results. I thus perform log transformation to address the skewness.

My second independent variable examines whether a formal alliance exists between the crisis-actor and the P5 members. A formal alliance between a crisis-actor and a member of P5 may weaken the effect of a highly severe condemnation. I operationalize this variable by examining bilateral or multilateral military alliances between crisis-actor and at least one P5 member. If at least one alliance exists, I give a value of "1" and if no alliance exists, I give a value of "0". P5 members receive the value of "1" if they are allied with any of the four other P5 members. For instance, China in 1984,

receives a value of "0" because there is no formal alliance with other P5 members. The information about alliances is obtained from the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) data version 5 (Leeds et al 2002).



Figure 3.*2* Count of UNSC Condemnations by Severity Index

I add several control variables to account for confounding effects. These control variables should control for aspects that are related to crisis-actors' propensity to escalate and their likelihood of being targeted with UN condemnation. I include a dummy variable from the ICB data to identify the challenger because challengers are more likely to receive condemnation from the UN and they are also more likely to escalate. Challengers are defined as the actor that triggered the international crisis and who seek to change the status quo. Some crises do not identify a challenger when the crisis was triggered by a non-state actor or by all parties involved. This binary variable takes a value of "1" if the crisis-actor is the challenger, and "0" otherwise. Furthermore, I control for the degree of hostility displayed by the crisis-actor at the onset of the crisis. This information may be key in determining whether the UN decides to intervene in the crisis. Actors who display violent tactics

before or at the onset of the crisis are more likely to become targets of UN condemnation and these actors also have a higher propensity of escalation. ICB data codes for nine levels of hostility at the onset of crisis. I recode this variable into a binary one, where I combine values for non-military acts (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) and military acts (6, 7, 8, 9). Finally, I include an issue salience variable for each crisis-actor. This variable measures the gravest threat an actor perceives during a crisis and varies within a dyad. The issue salience variable has eight different values which I recode into two levels, following Zeng (2021). The high salience issue involves threats to existence or grave damage (value 5 and 6), threats to regional or international system (4), and territorial threats (3). The low salience issue encompasses the rest (value 0, 1, 2, and 7). Crisis-actors are more likely to escalate for salient claims and these are the cases that are more likely to involve the UN.

I additionally control for the overall national capability of crisis-actor using the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) data with an expectation that states with an outside military option are more likely to escalate. Moreover, I control for the duration of crisis, obtained from the ICB data. Longer duration is likely to be correlated with more frequent condemnations because the UNSC is more likely to intervene in protracted conflicts. Duration may also be correlated with escalation, since protracted conflicts tend to escalate more. Finally, I control for the crisis-actor's domestic accountability using the Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) data ("v2x_accountability"). I expect that democracies will tend to escalate less than their autocratic counterparts. The UN also has greater tendencies to intervene in non-democratic countries in the hopes of spreading democratic values (Andersson 2007).

There is a potential selection effect that arises from the non-randomness of UN involvement. The UN's decision to condemn may be correlated with certain observed and unobserved attributes of the crisis-actor, institutional bureaucracy, or political ties, and the correlation of these factors with the error term in my model can bias the findings. Therefore, I incorporate the findings from Part 1

as an explanatory variable in the models used in this paper. Specifically, I argued that agenda selection is a necessary condition to any UN resolution because a public meeting and/or voting cannot be held if an issue is not on the UN's agenda. Findings from Part 1 highlight that agenda selection is a function of the preferences of the President and the escalatory potential of the crisis-actors. I thus incorporate the residuals of agenda selection model as an explanatory variable account for the non-randomness of this process. Inclusion of residuals can capture some unobserved confounding effect between agenda-selection and crisis-escalation.[25] This variable can additionally function as a confounding factor because crisis-actors that have entered the UN's agenda are those who are more likely to escalate. It is crucial therefore, to control for this effect.

Finally, I control for the UN's authorization of economic sanctions and military involvement. These heavy-handed measures can act as punitive measures to shape state behavior by increasing the costs of continued fighting. While the effectiveness of condemnation severity depends on the target actor's anticipation of the UN's future involvement, it is very difficult to operationalize and test this concept. Alternatively, I examine how the magnitude of severity interacts with punitive measures that have already been authorized. I expect that the greater magnitude of severity increases the effect of sanctions or military involvement. For this purpose, I include a dummy variable indicating if economic sanctions were authorized by the UNSC. This includes arms embargo, travel bans, and other trade or financial restrictions. I also include another dummy variable which indicates the authorization of force deployment or expansion and extension of a mission with a military component. This includes UN peacekeeping missions and non-UN multinational forces. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table A.1 of the appendix

[25] Exclusion restriction for this model is the Council President's affinity with the crisis-actor.

Findings and Implications

Table 3.1 The Effect of Severity of Condemnation on Crisis Escalation (1946-2017)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
IV: Severity (logged)									
Highest Score	-0.326**								
	(0.153)								
First Resolution		-0.397**			-0.597***	-0.333**	-0.268*		
		(0.166)			(0.170)	(0.146)	(0.148)		
Combined Score			-0.252*				-0.094	-0.457**	-0.530
			(0.131)				(0.113)	(0.202)	(0.521)
Average Score				-0.390**					
				(0.169)					
P5 Alliance	-0.320	-0.354	-0.315	-0.373	-0.630**	-0.317	-0.392	-0.311	-0.303
	(0.325)	(0.326)	(0.323)	(0.323)	(0.281)	(0.254)	(0.253)	(0.253)	(0.256)
Sanction	1.876**	2.016**	1.813**	1.990**	1.131*	2.912**	1.093*	1.229**	1.661**
	(0.781)	(0.792)	(0.769)	(0.785)	(0.646)	(1.200)	(0.619)	(0.609)	(0.650)
Military Involvement	0.690	0.719	0.620	0.741	0.583	0.301	2.162**	0.748	1.040*
	(0.606)	(0.603)	(0.603)	(0.603)	(0.528)	(0.516)	(0.875)	(0.543)	(0.564)
Legal Opposition								0.526	3.929**
								(0.878)	(1.662)
Non-Legal Opposition								1.191	-0.301
								(0.767)	(1.009)
Challenger	0.568*	0.631*	0.589*	0.563*	0.449	0.506*	0.410	0.482*	0.450
	(0.344)	(0.343)	(0.341)	(0.342)	(0.284)	(0.283)	(0.283)	(0.284)	(0.287)
Salience	1.578***	1.550***	1.563***	1.527***	1.322***	1.284***	1.326***	1.289***	1.299***
	(0.386)	(0.385)	(0.384)	(0.381)	(0.310)	(0.310)	(0.312)	(0.311)	(0.315)

Duration	0.863***	0.855***	0.858***	0.864***	0.696***	0.681***	0.696***	0.680***	0.681***
	(0.149)	(0.147)	(0.149)	(0.147)	(0.120)	(0.119)	(0.120)	(0.123)	(0.125)
Accountability	-0.485**	-0.467**	-0.477**	-0.439**	-0.182	-0.199*	-0.200*	-0.188	-0.207*
	(0.223)	(0.221)	(0.220)	(0.216)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.120)
National Capability	-0.128	0.244	0.600	0.002	-4.191	-4.332	-4.204	-4.787*	-3.809
	(5.286)	(5.252)	(5.208)	(5.192)	(2.679)	(2.697)	(2.693)	(2.729)	(2.705)
Violence at Onset	2.642***	2.652***	2.616***	2.647***	2.272***	2.264***	2.270***	2.223***	2.261***
	(0.333)	(0.333)	(0.331)	(0.332)	(0.276)	(0.276)	(0.276)	(0.275)	(0.278)
e(Agenda Selection)	1.208***	1.232***	1.123***	1.208***	1.122***	1.075***	1.018***	0.870**	0.838**
	(0.394)	(0.393)	(0.389)	(0.396)	(0.331)	(0.334)	(0.339)	(0.360)	(0.369)
Severity x P5 Alliance					0.420**				
					(0.189)				
Severity x Sanction						-0.625			
						(0.425)			
Severity x Military							-0.580**		
							(0.228)		
Severity x Legal									-0.841
									(0.658)
Severity x non-Legal									0.490
									(0.577)
Constant	-9.183***	-9.119***	-9.142***	-9.079***	-6.920***	-7.025***	-7.105***	-7.037***	-7.112***
	(1.030)	(1.023)	(1.023)	(1.014)	(0.705)	(0.703)	(0.711)	(0.720)	(0.732)
Observations	792	792	792	792	792	792	792	792	792
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No

Note: *p **p ***p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered on crisis.

The main findings are reported in Table 3.1. Logit estimation is used across all models and models 1 through 4 include country fixed effects. The findings across all models are consistent with my expectation that greater magnitude of severity is associated with a lower likelihood of escalation. Models 1 through 4, respectively, use scores for the severest resolution, the first resolution, combined resolutions, and their average score to test their effect on escalation. Results are consistent with my expectation even with an inclusion of the country fixed effects to control for any unobserved country-level attributes that could be biasing the analysis.



Figure 3.3 Effect of Severity on the Predicted Probability of Escalation

For substantive interpretation, the findings from models 1 through 4 are presented in Figure 3.3. In each graph, the x-axis represents the magnitude of severity. For each data point, the x-values are marked by one-standard deviation change and the y-value indicates predicted probability of escalation for the corresponding x-value. Following Hanmer and Kalkan (2013), the predicted probability is calculated with Monte Carlo Simulations (n=1000). All graphs demonstrate that a greater magnitude of severity is associated with lower predicted probability of escalation. Specifically,

in the upper right graph, a one-standard deviation increase in the magnitude of severity[26] leads to about 4 percentage-point decrease in the predicted probability of escalation. Considering that the mean predicted probability is 10.4%, this marginal effect is significant.

To aid the substantive interpretation, examples of two resolutions are provided that correspond to one-standard deviation difference in their magnitude of severity. The first example is resolution 38 adopted on January 17, 1948 to condemn India and Pakistan for their fighting over Kashmir. Without giving the full text of the resolution, the key words I identified are: *recognize, note, call upon, request*. In contrast, resolution 825 was adopted on May 11, 1993 to condemn North Korea for its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The key words that I identified include: *concern, note (5), regret, recall (2), emphasize, call upon (2), decide*.[27] One standard deviation between these two condemnations account for approximately 4 percentage point difference in predicted probability of escalation.

In model 5, I test the conditional relationship between the magnitude of severity and the presence of a P5 alliance. As expected, the effect of severity is conditional the presence of an alliance between the crisis-actor and a member of the P5. Figure 3.4 illustrates this finding. The predicted probability of escalation decreases with an increasing magnitude of severity for crisis-actors without P5 allies, but this deterrent effect is not evident for actors with P5 allies. The right panel illustrates the marginal effect of severity. One unit increase in the magnitude of severity decreases the probability of escalation by 5 percentage points for actors without P5 allies. The marginal effect of severity for those with P5 allies, however, is not statistically significant. This finding suggests that political closeness through an alliance with a P5 member can potentially dampen the signal sent by the UN. The signal sent by the UN through a high severity condemnation may not be so

[26] This corresponds to about 1.15 log increase for the first resolution score.
[27] Frequency in parentheses.

straightforward, as some actors may believe that their P5 ally would be able to shield them from future punitive measures.



Figure 3.4 Conditional Effect of Severity by Existing Alliance with the P5

In models 6 and 7, I examine the effect of severity on economic sanctions and military action. While the theoretical expectation for the severity of condemnation is conditional on the target recipient's anticipation of future punishment, it is difficult to operationalize and test this perception. Therefore, I test the observable implication of this causal mechanism, in which I expect that the deterrent effect of severity to be greater when combined with concrete punishment mechanisms such as economic sanctions or military intervention. By authorizing these heavy-handed measures, the UN is able to overcome the problem of cheap talk and demonstrate its institutional resolve and willingness to punish hostile actors. If these measures are coupled with rhetorical severity, the deterrent effect on escalation can become amplified. The findings are generally consistent with my expectation. Greater severity increases the effect of economic sanctions as shown in Figure 3.5. The marginal effect of severity reduces the likelihood of escalation by approximately 24 percentage points when combined with economic sanction, compared to approximately 3 percentage points at the baseline. Similarly, the marginal effect of severity reduces escalation by approximately 21 percentage points when the UN has authorized military involvement, compared to about 1 percentage point deterrent effect at the baseline. These results suggest that the effect of punitive

measures can be magnified with the use of severe rhetoric. Severe condemnations can serve as a tool that can enhance the effect of existing punishments but also increase the anticipation of further disciplinary action.[28]



Figure 3.5 Marginal Effects of Severity on Escalation by UN Involvement Types

Now I turn to examine the relationship of severity and legal opposition. In model 8 and 9, I include the ordinal variable that captures opposition types to examine the effect of severity and legality simultaneously. Interestingly, I find that severity retains the magnitude and the statistical significance even when legality is controlled for. However, legal invocation loses statistical significance when severity is controlled for. This finding is consistent with my expectation that that legal invocation may not be as powerful a predictor of the crisis-actor's decision to escalate compared to the severity of condemnation. The crisis-actor is more likely to be influenced by the possibility of future punishment by the UN, rather than legal opposition's ability to mobilize international community's against the crisis-actor.

[28] As the statistical results demonstrate, the predicted probability of escalation is generally lower for crisis-actors that did not experience sanctions or military intervention by the UN. This does not however, lead to a conclusion that economic sanctions or military intervention lead to greater likelihood of escalation. This finding can be driven by the fact that sanctions or military authorizations are issued in conflicts that are highly escalatory. The causal effects of these measures are not within the scope of this paper and requires further investigation, but the focus of this analysis is to examine how increasing magnitude of severity decreases the likelihood of escalation when sanctions or military involvement have already been authorized.

To examine the relationship between legality and severity more carefully, I examine their conditional relationship in model 9 and plot the substantive effect of the interaction variable in Figure 3.6. As expected, find that in resolutions with low rhetorical severity, legal opposition does not have deterrent effect on escalation. This finding suggests that low severity may attenuate the effect of legality. Interestingly, an increasing magnitude of severity has no substantive effect in non-legal opposition. This finding suggests that even when a condemnation is drafted with highly severe rhetoric, it may not be sufficient to change the crisis-actor's behavior without legal invocation. For legal opposition, greater severity has a strong deterrent effect on escalation, by approximately 18 percentage points. This finding is notable, because legal opposition on average, have been found to reduce the likelihood of escalation by 6.6 percentage points. Similarly, severity reduces the likelihood of escalation by approximately 4 percentage points. When legality and high severity are used simultaneously, their effects become amplified in deterring crisis escalation.



Figure 3.6 Conditional Relationship between Legal Opposition and Rhetorical Severity

Finally, the control variables generally behave as expected. Challenger, salience, duration, and violence at the onset are positively correlated with escalation. Domestic accountability is negatively correlated with escalation, suggesting that non-democracies are more likely escalate. As expected, the residuals from agenda-selection are positively correlated with escalation and is statistically significant,

a test that suggests selection effect exists (Hausman 1945). The actors that are likely to be selected into the UN's agenda are also likely to receive condemnation with greater severity and those actors are more likely to escalate.

P5 Preferences and the Severity of Condemnation

The main findings show support for my hypothesis that the severity of condemnation can prevent escalation by crisis-actors. I conduct an additional empirical test to examine the causal mechanism of my argument that the magnitude of severity is indicative of preference heterogeneity. Specifically, I have argued that a greater preference homogeneity allows for the P5 members to adopt a severe condemnation. When the variability of the preferences is high, however, some P5 members are likely to veto out a severe condemnation to dilute the magnitude of rhetorical severity. To empirically assess this mechanism, I conduct a mediation analysis to show, first, the collective preferences of P5 members are reflected in the magnitude of severity, and, in turn, the severity of condemnation impacts escalation. Causal mediation analysis is used to test for the impact of mediating variable's impact on the relationship between the explanatory and outcome variables (Tingley et al. 2014). I use this method to examine the causal relationship between P5 preferences, the severity of condemnation, and the likelihood of escalation.

There are two reasons for why I consider the magnitude of severity as the mediating variable. Chronologically, the rhetorical content of condemnation can only be an outcome of the collective preferences of P5. The draft resolutions are written with the consideration of P5 members' collective preferences and the members cast their vote on each resolution based on their preferences. P5 preferences should not impact escalation directly because the preferences are initially unknown to the crisis-actors. While information signaling is an important and central function of the UN, they can only do so through some actions that are publicly visible and available, such as public

meetings, resolutions, and statements. The severity of condemnation is one such way that the UNSC signals its collective preferences and through this channel the preferences of P5 can indirectly impact escalation.

I operationalize the preferences of P5 using S-scores (Signorino and Ritter 1999). Following Allen and Yuen (2022), I take the mean of each P5 member's s-score with the crisis-actor and calculate the variance of each member's s-score from the mean. The variability measure indicates how wide or narrow the preferences of P5 members are spread out.

Table 3.2 Mediation Analysis of Preference Heterogeneity, Severity of Condemnation and Crisis Escalation

	Severity	Escalation
	(1)	(2)
Severity		-0.442***
		(0.147)
Preference Variability	-3.495**	-10.239
	(1.685)	(8.678)
Constant	-0.397***	-6.707***
	(0.138)	(0.768)
Controls	Yes	Yes
Observations	792	792
ACME	0.116**	
	(0.001)	
ADE	-0.196	
	(-0.468)	
Total Effect	-0.0804	
	(-0.274)	

Note: *p**p***p<0.01

My estimation strategy consists of two stages, following Tingley et al (2014). First, I estimate an OLS regression to examine how preferences affect the severity of condemnation. As expected, model 1 in Table 3.2 demonstrates that lower preference heterogeneity is correlated with a greater magnitude of severity. Second, I estimate a Logit regression to examine how preferences and severity affect the likelihood of escalation. As expected, the magnitude of severity is negatively correlated with escalation and the P5 variability has no statistically significant correlation with escalation. Next, I estimate the causal mediation relationship to test for the direction of my analysis and ascertain that P5 preferences constrain escalation through the condemnation severity.

I use the mediation model developed by Imai, Keele, and Tingely (2010, 2014). I find that the estimated average causal mediation effects (ACMEs) are statistically significant from zero but the estimated average direct and total effects are not. The results suggest that the direct effect and the total effect are null; as expected, P5 preferences impact escalation when the condemnation can effectively reflect the collective preferences of P5.

This finding however is not a dogmatic assertion that P5 preferences will never impact escalation. There may be unobserved factors not accounted for by the model that may impact escalation. For instance, the model controls for the probability of agenda selection which is positively correlated with escalation. While the UNSC president selects issues to be brought to the Council meeting, she may consider the collective preferences of P5 members because she may want to avoid selecting issues that will naturally lead to a veto. The purpose of this mediation analysis is to validate the causal process in which P5 preferences impact escalation through the severity condemnation.

Robustness checks

Table 3.3 Robustness Checks for the Effect of Severity on Crisis Escalation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Severity	-0.290**	-0.338	-0.815***	-0.401***	-0.179	-0.479***
	(0.126)	(0.223)	(0.197)	(0.148)	(0.180)	(0.162)
Mediation	-0.272					
	(0.494)					
Protracted Conflict		1.954***				
		(0.411)				
Territorial Conflict			-0.556*			
			(0.291)			
Frequency					1.061***	
					(0.387)	
Trade Volume						-0.128***
						(0.030)
Challenger	0.502*	0.536*	0.573**	0.488*	0.546*	0.271*
	(0.279)	(0.294)	(0.289)	(0.281)	(0.282)	(0.159)
Salience	1.353***	1.200***	1.445***	1.383***	1.094***	0.844***
	(0.308)	(0.323)	(0.328)	(0.309)	(0.312)	(0.170)
Duration	0.708***	0.802***	0.719***	0.718***	0.634***	0.389***
	(0.119)	(0.131)	(0.122)	(0.121)	(0.124)	(0.067)
National Capability	-4.748*	-4.332	-4.616*	-4.580*	-4.003	-1.398
	(2.647)	(2.697)	(2.704)	(2.670)	(2.695)	(1.353)
P5 Alliance	-0.382	-0.395	-0.483*	-0.428*	-0.493*	-0.122
	(0.249)	(0.260)	(0.256)	(0.252)	(0.260)	(0.149)
Violence at the Onset	2.225***	2.308***	2.341***	2.262***	2.082***	1.233***
	(0.268)	(0.282)	(0.282)	(0.273)	(0.277)	(0.146)
e(Agenda Selection)	1.249***	1.220***	1.182***	1.206***	0.716*	0.507***
	(0.329)	(0.356)	(0.339)	(0.333)	(0.369)	(0.195)
Domestic Accountability	-0.159	-0.199	-0.175	-0.145	-0.178	0.048
	(0.115)	(0.122)	(0.118)	(0.127)	(0.120)	(0.074)
Sanction		1.167*	1.749***	1.253**		0.723*
		(0.654)	(0.634)	(0.627)		(0.370)
Military Involvement		0.680	0.833	0.493		0.259
		(0.556)	(0.561)	(0.520)		(0.299)
Severity x non-Legal						

Severity x Legal						
Severity x Protracted		-0.080				
		(0.219)				
Severity x Territorial			0.719***			
			(0.197)			
Severity x Accountability				-0.012		
				(0.102)		
Severity x Frequency					-0.305***	
					(0.106)	
Severity x Trade						0.047**
						(0.020)
Constant	-7.032***	-9.005***	-6.983***	-7.130***	-6.506***	-3.230***
	(0.698)	(0.888)	(0.722)	(0.708)	(0.712)	(0.406)
Observations	789	789	789	789	766	757

Note: *p**p***p<0.01

I conduct a series of additional analyses to further examine the relationship between the magnitude of severity and escalation. The results are presented in Table 3.3. First, I consider a number of alternative explanations that could be driving the result. Existing works have found that mediation can reduce battlefield fatalities (Beardsley, Cunningham, and White 2019) and lead to shorter conflict duration (Wilkenfeld et al 2003). I control for whether mediation occurred to ascertain that the effect of severity is not driven by mediation. The analysis demonstrates that there is no significant relationship between mediation and escalation, but my results remain consistent.

I also consider the claim that conflict type could be driving my results. If the magnitude of severity is systematically correlated with conflict type such as territorial conflicts or protracted conflicts, this could be biasing my findings. Inclusion of these control variables do not change my findings. However, Figure 3.6, which shows the interactive effect of severity and conflict type, demonstrates some interesting findings. The marginal effect of severity decreases the likelihood of

escalation by approximately 6 percentage points for non-territorial conflicts, but this deterrent effect is not present for territorial conflicts. This finding suggests that crisis-actors may continue fighting even at the expense of a future cost because territorial claims are politically salient. The effect of severity shows mixed findings for protracted conflicts as well. For non-protracted conflicts, the effect of severity is statistically insignificant, however, for protracted conflicts, one unit increase in the magnitude of severity decreases the likelihood of escalation by approximately 4 percentage points. This finding could be driven by the fact that protracted conflicts have a tendency to reach stalemate compared to a compromise or victory by one party (Beardsley 2012). Because protracted conflicts rarely end in quick, decisive victory, crisis-actors may be more inclined to back down when faced with condemnation.



Figure 3.7 Marginal Effects of Severity on Escalation by Conflict Types

Finally, I consider the potential conditional relationship between severity and the crisis-actor's domestic accountability. The previous chapter and numerous works have found that the IOs shape state behavior through their impact on domestic audiences. To test this expectation, I interact severity with the domestic accountability variable. Although the impact of severity remains consistent, a conditional relationship does not exist. The deterrent effect of severity is generally consistent across different levels of domestic accountability. This finding may seem to be at odds

with the conclusion derived from the previous chapter, but the nature of the rhetorical variation that I examine are vastly different. Legal opposition is powerful because of its visibility. Legal principles are a focal point that can be understood by different audiences. Furthermore, legal invocation in UN resolutions are often publicized in the media, which allows the domestic public to easily grasp the extent of the condemnation that their government is facing. While legal opposition can be relatively easily understood by the regular citizens and directly referenced by news media outlets, the severity of condemnation is only visible to those that read the text lines of the resolution. If citizens rely on news reports to understand UN politics, their understanding of the rhetorical severity is likely to be minimal. Legal opposition, thus, shapes state behavior through the domestic audience, but the rhetorical severity of condemnation may not work via this mechanism.

In addition to testing for alternative explanations, I conduct an additional analysis to examine the causal mechanism that the effect of severity depends on the condemnation recipient's perception of the signal. First, I examine whether and how an existing trade relationship between the crisis-actor and the P5 members shape the effect of severity. I have argued that the credibility of the signal (the institutional ability and willingness to follow through) may depend on the recipient's prior bias of the sender. I validated this expectation with the finding that the deterrent effect of severity is greater for crisis-actors without a P5 ally. I now examine how existing trade volumes between the crisis-actor and the P5 members impact how the crisis-actor perceives the severity of condemnation. I use the Correlates of War trade data (v. 4.0) to obtain the crisis-actor's import from and export to all P5 members in the given year (Barbieri and Keshk 2016). Figure 3.8 demonstrates the conditional relationship between the magnitude of severity and the trade volume. As trade volume increases, the marginal effect of severity decreases and becomes less significant. This finding is consistent with my main analysis and lends credence to my expectation that the severity of condemnation can more effectively constrain a state's behavior when there are no strings attached.



Figure 3.8 Effect of Severity on Escalation Conditional on Trade Volume

Finally, I consider how the frequency of condemnation impacts the effect of severity of condemnation. I have argued that the credibility of condemnation depends on the recipient's anticipation of future punitive measures. If the recipient believes that a future punishment is impending after being condemned, this will incentivize the actor to back down. However, if the recipient believes that the UN is still bluffing, condemnation is unlikely to have an impact in constraining the actor's behavior. The UN is more likely to appear to be bluffing if it continues to issue severe condemnations without authorizing sanctions or military involvement. I examine the effect of severity, conditional on the frequency of the condemnations issued for crisis-actors that did not receive any economic sanctions. The rationale behind subsetting the data is to examine the effect of severity when the recipient perceives it as bluffing. I expect that the marginal effect of severity will increase up to a certain point along the frequency of condemnation and decrease as greater frequency can increase the risks that the condemnations will be perceived as bluffing. Figure 3.8 validates this expectation. The marginal effect of severity increases (deters escalation) when the frequency of the condemnation reaches about three. This effect, however, slowly decreases as the frequency increases, which suggests that the recipient is likely to perceive the high severity as bluffing.



Figure 3.9 Marginal Effect of Severity on Escalation by the Frequency of Resolution

Conclusion

This article examines the conditions in which UNSC condemnations prevent crisis-actors from escalating to a full-scale war. I extend the logic of credible signal and apply it to the context of institutional bargaining. I argue that condemnations are not always cheap talk as they vary on the magnitude of severity, which is an important signal that reveals the collective preferences of the P5 members. The credibility of the condemnation and its ability to constrain a crisis-actor's behavior depends on the crisis-actor's perception of the ability of the UN to follow through. A high magnitude of severity signals that the UN is collectively homogenous, which would allow them to issue punitive measures in the future if necessary. A low magnitude of severity however, signals that the UNSC is divided, and that they are unable to issue a more severe condemnation. The target actor, therefore, is unlikely to fear future punishment. This effect is conditional on the crisis-actor's alliance and trade volumes with P5, suggesting that any prior favorable relationship will attenuate the effect of severity. Through mediation analysis, I also find that P5 members' preference variability impacts the magnitude of severity which in turn influences escalation.

This article makes an important contribution to the institutionalism literature. While numerous works have theorized on the IO's function of information transmission, this work provides a more fine-grained explanation on how and to whom IOs send informative signals. The findings in this

article highlight the importance of rhetorical aspects of information transmission, specifically focusing on the rhetorical severity, a concept that has yet been explored. Through the rhetorical severity, the UN is able to signal institutional resolve and collective preferences, which can impact the dynamics of conflict and crisis-bargaining. Further investigation is necessary, however, regarding if and how the rhetorical severity can be communicated to the domestic audiences. From the foreign policy standpoint, being able to convey signals such as collective preferences to domestic audiences could be a useful tool for IOs to restrain hostile behavior.

This work speaks to a burgeoning literature that has started to recognize the concept of costly signal in the context of the UN (Allen and Yuen 2022). Institutions and delegations in the institutions can incur public cost, consequences that are associated with making their actions public (Allen and Yuen 2022). Delegations expend resources and time to issue public statements, even if they are weak condemnations. Many works assume that condemnations are cheap and therefore ineffective, but such a claim may be premature assessment of the effectiveness of condemnation. Condemnations may have an indirect impact on conflict dynamics; for example, they can rally the international opinion and create a focal point. This indirect effect may underlie other conflict management strategies that have been deemed to be more effective such as mediation or arbitration. Future research could examine these mechanisms and consider the following questions: How do the delegations send costly signal by making public statements? How does the international community interpret those signals? And how do they impact the dynamics of conflict?

The outcomes presented in this paper and the previous chapter are only a small piece of the peace process. Conflicts recur, especially protracted conflicts-- if and how condemnations impact post-conflict peacebuilding is another important question to consider. Relatedly, future research could examine whether condemnations reduce battle-death fatalities, duration of the conflict, and reduce crime against humanity. This study and the future research on this topic can have important

policy implications for IOs' intervention strategies in international conflicts including how they can effectively communicate with actors who can shape state behavior

Conclusion

Despite the backlash against multilateralism and mistrust toward the United Nations Security Council's ability to respond to threats to international peace and security, numerous academic studies have demonstrated empirical evidence for the UN's pacifying effect. This dissertation builds on and improves this literature while opening a new dimension of analysis for future studies. While the UN utilizes a range of different conflict management tactics, this study specifically examines important aspects of condemnations, which have been overlooked as empty threats. If condemnations are ineffective, why does the Council expend valuable political resources to continue to issue them? This question leads to an important conclusion that not all condemnations are empty threats because not all condemnations are identical. I demonstrate that condemnations vary on severity and legality, and these are important variations that impact the dynamics of international crises.

In Part I, have I argued that UNSC resolutions are an important lens through which we can understand power and influence within the UN. I have examined how various factors, including key players' preferences and conflict attributes, shape the contents of the UNSC resolution. My findings provide evidence for both power-sharing and power-politics. Agenda-selection is largely influenced by the Council President, a seat that rotates monthly between all UNSC members and grants elected members some institutional mechanism to exert influence. Contents of the UNSC resolution, on the other hand, are shaped by the preferences of the permanent members.

In Parts II and III, I have examined how the legality and severity of condemnations impact crisis-escalation. I have found that non-legal opposition has no significant deterrent effect while legal opposition can deter crisis-escalation significantly. Invocation of legal principles increases the legitimacy of the condemnation by framing it in legal terms. The findings from Part I validates this mechanism. Preference heterogeneity of P5 is found to have null effect on the invocation of

international law, which suggests that P5 members may put aside their differences and interests in situations where the law has been egregiously violated. This expectation can increase the legitimacy of legal opposition as perceived by the international community.

In Part III, I have found that greater rhetorical severity leads to a lower likelihood of escalation. I have argued that the magnitude of severity reflects the degree of preference heterogeneity, and, thus, signals the institutional ability to follow-through on noncompliance with UN resolutions. Findings in Part I validate this expectation as I have demonstrated that preference heterogeneity among the permanent members is positively associated with the magnitude of severity but not whether a resolution passes. This finding suggests that some resolutions will pass even though there is disagreement among the Council members. These resolutions may be moderated, however, in rhetorical severity to satisfy the preference heterogeneity among the members.

The formal empirical findings from Parts II and III importantly suggest that condemnations can be drafted in a way that deters escalation more effectively. But an examination of legality and severity's interactive effect demonstrates that their effectiveness may be limited if used alone. Legal invocation may not have a significant impact if used alone, but when combined with highly severe rhetoric, the deterrent effect increases by three-fold. Similarly, rhetorical severity's effectiveness becomes amplified in condemnations that invoke international law.

These findings offer important implications about the international organizations' role in information signaling. Invocation of international law can increase the costs of fighting by mobilizing the international community against the crisis-actor. Rhetorical severity can directly impact the crisis-actor by increasing the anticipation for future punishment. These mechanisms may not be as effective individually; legal invocation may not sufficiently mobilize the international community in condemnations with low severity. Highly severe condemnation, in turn, may not effectively communicate institutional resolve when legality is not invoked. Decision-makers in IOs

can use these rhetorical elements simultaneously to generate their additive effect in deterring crisis-actors.

One of the primary roles of international organizations lies in the provision of information. This dissertation opens a myriad of research avenues that can be undertaken through this approach. What are other types of information and signals that the UN provides? What can we learn from the deliberation and meeting records of the UN? Who are the key players that generate the signals and how does that shape the effectiveness of those signals? How can we apply these mechanisms to other conflict management tactics? How does condemnation influence longer-term outcomes such as post-conflict peace

Appendix

Table A1. Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	1st Quartile	Median	Mean	3rd Quartile	Max	Standard Dev
Legal (ordinal)	802	0	0	0	0.206	0	2	0.541
Legal (One sided)	802	0	0	0	0.054	0	1	0.225
Legal (frequency)	802	0	0	0	0.117	0	8	0.575
Severity (Highest score)	802	0	0	0	0.491	0	5.787	1.246
Severity (First resolution)	802	0	0	0	0.455	0	4.890	1.161
Severity (Combined)	802	0	0	0	0.553	0	7.107	1.423
Agenda Selection	800	0	0	0	0.241	0	1	0.428
UN Resolution	802	0	0	0	0.141	0	1	0.3484
President's Affinity	802	0	0.480	0.613	0.591	0.725	1	0.180
P5 Preference Heterogeneity	795	0.007	0.0338	0.0403	0.042	0.045	0.160	0.018
Escalation	802	0	0	0	0.152	0	1	0.359
Duration	802	0	3.562	4.625	4.501	5.476	7.287	1.320
Sanction	802	0	0	0	0.029	0	1	0.170
Military Involvement	802	0	0	0	0.0486	0	1	0.215
Domestic Accountability	799	-1.969	-1.058	-0.172	-0.015	1.098	2.029	1.075
Electoral democracy	802	0	0.121	0.216	0.351	0.646	0.913	0.283
Challenger	802	0	0	0	0.208	0	1	0.406
National Capability	802	0	0.001	0.004	0.030	0.015	0.311	0.060
Violence at Onset	802	0	0	0	0.389	1	1	0.487
Salience	802	0	0	1	0.646	1	1	0.4788
P5 Alliance	802	0	0	1	0.611	1	1	0.487
Frequency of Resolution	802	0	0	0	0.387	0	9	1.297

Trade	762	0	5.245	6.844	6.883	8.506	13.721	2.806
P5 heterogeneity (Ideal pt)	785	2.819	3.705	4.197	4.187	4.669	5.448	0.634
E10 heterogeneity (Ideal pt)	785	1.190	2.107	2.641	2.712	3.393	4.506	0.745
E10 Contiguity	802	0	0	0	0.198	0	1	0.398
P5 Contiguity	802	0	0	0	0.298	1	1	0.457
Mediation	799	0	0	0	0.050	0	1	0.218
Protracted Conflict	802	0	0	0	0.643	1	1	0.479
Territorial Conflict	802	0	0	0	0.444	1	1	0.497

Table A2. Scale of Rhetorical Severity

Emotive Words			**Action Words**		**Modifiers**
Acknowledging (1)	Guided by (1)	Concerned (2)	Decide (1)	Call upon (2)	Gravely (1)
Affirming (1)	Having heard (1)	Anxious (2)	Determine (1)	Calls for (2)	Strongly (1)
Aware (1)	Having reviewed (1)	Regretting (3)	Affirm (1)	Calls on (2)	Deeply (1)
Bearing in mind (1)	Keeping in mind (1)	Distressed (3)	Reaffirm (1)	Invites (2)	Seriously (1)
Believing (1)	Mindful (1)	Grieved (3)	Adopt (1)	Encourages (2)	Urgently (1)
Cognizant (1)	Noting (1)	Disturbed (4)	Establish (1)	Recommend (3)	Vigorously (1)
Conscious (1)	Observing (1)	Deploring (4)	Directs (1)	Appeal (3)	
Considering (1)	Recalling (1)	Dismayed (4)	Stresses (1)	Request (4)	
Convinced (1)	Referring (1)	Condemning (5)	Emphasizes (1)	Ask (4)	
Conscious (1)	Recognizing (1)	Alarmed (6)	Remind (1)	Urge (5)	
Determining (1)	Stressing (1)	Shocked (7)	Recalls (1)	Require (5)	
Desiring (1)	Underlining (1)	Appalled (7)		Warn (6)	
	Taking into account (1)	Indignant (8)		Demand (7)	
		Outraged (8)			
		Censured (9)			



Figure A1 Histograms of Preference Heterogeneity and Political Affinity



Figure A2 Predicted Effect of P5 Preference Heterogeneity on the Severity of the UNSC Resolution (Outliers removed)

Table A3 Examples of Coding[29]

Type	Resolution Text	Score
Low Severity	S/RES/143 July 14, 1960 Belgium *The Security Council*, *Considering* the report of the Secretary-General 6 on a request for United Nations action in relation to the Republic of the Congo, *Considering* the request for military assistance addressed to the Secretary-General by the President and the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo, 7 l. *Calls upon* the Government of Belgium to withdraw its troops from the territory of the Republic of the Congo; 2. *Decides* to authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Govern-ment of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks; 3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council as appropriate.	**1** **1** **2** **1** **4**
High Severity	S/RES/1990 June 27, 2011 Subject: Sudan and South Sudan The *Security Council*, *Recalling* its previous resolutions and its presidential statements on the situation in Sudan, and noting the priority it attaches to the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, *Reaffirming* its commitment to the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity; and to peace, stability and security throughout the region, *Reaffirming* its previous resolutions 1674 (2006) and 1894 (2009) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, 1882 (2009) on children in armed conflict, 1502 (2003) on the protection of humanitarian and United Nations personnel, and 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), and 1889 (2009) on women peace and security, *Welcoming* the Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area reached on 20 June 2011 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, *Commending t*he assistance provided to the parties by the African Union High Level Implementation Panel and its chair President Thabo Mbeki, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and Special Representative of the Secretary-General Haile Menkerios, *Noting* the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement's request for the assistance of the Government of Ethiopia with regard to this matter, *Noting* the readiness of the United Nations and the international community to assist the parties in establishing and implementing mutual security arrangements in support of the objectives of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, *Bearing* in mind the importance of coherence of United Nations assistance in the region, *Deeply concerned* by the current situation in the Abyei Area, and by all acts of violence committed against civilians in violation of international humanitarian law and human rights law including the killing and displacement of significant number of civilians, *Reaffirming* the importance of full and urgent implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement by both parties,	**1** **1** **1** **1** **1** **1** **1+2** **1** **2**

[29] Examples of low and high severity condemnation are provided. Low and high magnitudes correspond to about one standard deviation above and below the mean.

	Calling on all parties involved to provide humanitarian personnel with full and unimpeded access to civilians in need of assistance and all necessary facilities for their operations, in accordance with international humanitarian law,	**5**
	Urging all parties to facilitate the rapid return of internally displaced persons,	
	Noting the intent of the parties to establish a special unit of the Abyei Police Service which shall deal with particular issues related to nomadic migration,	
	Welcoming and encouraging efforts by the United Nations to sensitize peacekeeping personnel in the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases in all of its peacekeeping operations,	**2**
	Calling upon all parties to engage constructively in negotiations towards the final agreement on the status of Abyei,	**1**
	Recognizing that the current situation in Abyei demands an urgent response and constitutes a threat to international peace and security,	**1**
	1. *Decides* to establish, for a period of 6 months, the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), taking into account the Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area, and further decides that UNISFA shall comprise a maximum of 4,200 military personnel, 50 police personnel, and appropriate civilian support;	**1**
	2. *Decides* that UNISFA shall have the following mandate, in addition to tasks set out in paragraph 3:	
	3. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes UNISFA within its capabilities and its area of deployment to take the necessary actions to:	**4**
	4. *Requests* that the Secretary-General and the Government of Sudan, in	**2**
	5. *Calls on* all Member States to ensure the free, unhindered and expeditious movement to and from Abyei of all personnel, as well as equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods, including vehicles and spare parts, which are for the exclusive and official use of UNISFA;	**1**
	6. *Underscores* the imperative of expeditious deployment of UNISFA and urges the Secretary-General to take necessary steps to ensure rapid and efficient implementation;	**5**
	7. *Urges* the Government of Sudan and the Government of Southern Sudan or its successor to fully cooperate with each other and provide full support to UNISFA, enabling it to fully implement the mandate;	**1**
	8. *Stresses* that improved cooperation between the Government of Sudan and Government of Southern Sudan or its successor, is also critical for peace, security and stability and the future relations between them;	**2**
	9. *Calls upon* the Government of Sudan and the Government of Southern Sudan or its successor urgently to fulfil their commitment under the CPA to resolve peacefully the final status of Abyei, and calls upon them to consider in good faith proposals the African Union High Level Implementation Panel shall make to resolve this matter;	**4**
	10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ensure that effective human rights monitoring is carried out, and the results included in his reports to the Council;	**4**
	11. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed of the progress in implementing the Agreement and to report to the Council no later than thirty days after the adoption of this resolution and every 60 days thereafter;	**1**
	12. *Decides* to review UNISFA's role in the implementation of the Agreement not later than 3 months after adoption of this resolution;	**4**
	13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary measures to ensure full compliance of UNISFA with the United Nations zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuses and to keep the Council informed if cases of such conduct occur;	

	Subject: Syria	
Legal	Reaffirming that the proliferation of chemical weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,	

	Recalling that the Syrian Arab Republic on 22 November 1968 acceded to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925 . . . Deeply outraged by the use of chemical weapons on 21 August 2013 in Rif Damascus, as concluded in the Mission's report, condemning the killing of civilians that resulted from it, affirming that the use of chemical weapons constitutes a serious violation of international law, and stressing that those responsible for any use of chemical weapons must be held accountable,
Non-Legal	Subject: Ethiopia and Eritrea Strongly urges Ethiopia and Eritrea to maintain their commitment to a peaceful resolution of the border dispute and calls upon them in the strongest terms to exercise maximum restraint and to refrain from taking any military action;

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