Class voting and religious voting in the European democracies: A preliminary report

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The social and demographic bases of party support have been explored by political scientists and sociologists for many years. One of the principal findings of *The People's Choice,* published in 1944, was the great importance of socio-economic status, religion, and rural-urban residence in explaining party preference. In this first American voting study, Paul F. Lazarsfeld and his collaborators combined the three variables into the famous 'Index of Political Predisposition,' which could serve as a highly accurate predictor of voting.[1]

Not until fairly recently, however, has there been any attempt to test and elaborate the relationships between these variables (and variables like region of residence, age, and sex) and party preference in a systematic cross-national fashion. It is symptomatic that Bernard Berelson and Gary A. Steiner in their effort to compile an inventory of scientific findings concerning human behavior had to rely almost exclusively on a single source for their general propositions on the social bases of party preference: an unpublished manuscript by Seymour M. Lipset and Juan J. Linz.[2]

Berelson and Steiner's inventory was published in 1964. Of course, a few other important comparative studies covering several countries had already appeared before that time: J. J. de Jong's *Overheid en Onderdaan,* published in 1956,[3] Michael P. Fogarty's 1957 analysis of *Christian Democracy in Western Europe,*[4] Lipset's *Political Man* (1960),[5] and Robert R. Alford's *Party and Society* (1963).[6] These were followed in the late 1960's by the multi-authored *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (1967)[7] and the special issue of *Comparative Political*

[1] Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign* (New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1944).
[2] Bernard Berelson and Gary A. Steiner, *Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings* (New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964), pp. 426-36. The manuscript by Lipset and Linz is entitled 'The Social Bases of Political Diversity in Western Democracies', 1956.
[3] J. J. de Jong, *Overheid en Onderdaan* (Wageningen, Zomer & Keunings, 1956), chaps. 8 and 9.
[4] Michael P. Fogarty, *Christian Democracy in Western Europe* (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957).
[5] Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Garden City, Doubleday, 1960) esp. chaps. 7 and 8.
[6] Robert R. Alford, *Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies* (Chicago, Rand McNally, 1963).
[7] Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives* (New York, Free Press, 1967).

Studies edited by Richard Rose and Derek Urwin (1969), which is the first of a series of publications on the relation of social structure, party systems, and voting behavior.[8]

This paper is the first report on a cross-national study of voting behavior, which also aims at exploring the social bases of voting by means of an explicitly comparative and multivariate analysis. It will present some of the main findings of the project, and discuss the methodological problems encountered in it.

The principal objective is to measure the relative strengths of a number of independent variables (such as class, religion, etc.) in determining the dependent variable (party preference), and to analyze the possible interactions of the independent variables. Five independent variables were selected for analysis: class, religion, rural-urban residence, age, and sex. These five correspond to the main variables analyzed in *The People's Choice,* and also appear on Lipset's list of seven factors that are related to party support.[9] The two variables listed by Lipset, but not included in the present study, are ethnic or nationality divisions and region of residence. The former is a factor present in only a few of the Western democracies. The latter is a factor of considerable importance in most countries; as Lipset states, 'every country has a South.'[10] But it is difficult to operationalize this variable in order to make it suitable for comparative analysis.[11] One factor was added to the five independent variables by making a distinction between two dimensions of the religious variable: religion in the sense of church affiliation, and religiosity measured in terms of frequency of church attendance.

The primary emphasis will be on the influence of class and religion on voting behavior. It is particularly interesting and necessary to analyze these relationships cross-nationally and as precisely as possible because of the divergent claims that have been made about the relative strength of these variables. On the one hand, Lipset singles out class as the most important variable. He regards elections as 'the expression of the democratic class struggle,' and argues that 'on a world scale, the principal generalization which can be made is that parties are primarily based on either the lower classes or the middle and upper classes.'[12] Similarly, Berelson and Steiner state that 'class is the single most important differentiator of political preferences across societies.'[13] On the other hand, Philip E. Converse argues that although class differences mark every

[8] *Comparative Political Studies,* Vol. 2, No. 1 (April 1969).
[9] Lipset, *Political Man* (paperback edition), pp. 230-32.
[10] Ibid, p. 273.
[11] See Kevin Cox, 'On the Utility and Definition of Regions in Comparative Political Sociology', *Comparative Political Studies,* Vol. 2, No. 1 (April 1969), pp. 68-69.
[12] Lipset, p. 230.
[13] Berelson and Steiner, p. 427.

society, they are not of overwhelming importance for party choice. Other group cleavages, in particular religious differences, may have 'greater penetration into mass publics than do class differences, as far as consequences for political behavior are concerned.' [14] In a later publication, he states that religion is in 'the front rank of determinants' of party choice, not only in religiously hetero-geneous countries but also in 'monoreligious' systems such as the predominantly Protestant or Catholic countries to the north and south of the religious frontier in Europe: 'the general rule seems to be that religious differentiation intrudes on partisan political alignments in unexpectedly powerful degree wherever it conceivably can.'[15] De Jong also concludes that religion is of primary signifi-cance and that class, although important, occupies a secondary place in the hier-archy of voting determinants.[16] In order to measure the influence of religion in monoreligious societies, it is of crucial importance to include the factor of religiosity; in polyreligious societies, religion should be analyzed in terms of both church affiliation and church attendance.

The present study had to rely on secondary analysis of existing survey data containing the basic six independent variables and party preference. Such data were collected for the four major West European democracies (Great Britain, France, West Germany, and Italy) and five of the smaller European democracies (the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Sweden, and Norway). For comparative purposes, the United States was added to this group of European countries. Only data based on national probality samples were used.

Two general approaches may be followed in analyzing the relationship between the independent variables and party preference. The first one uses the individual party as the unit of analysis, and explores the social composition of its ad-herents. The second approach uses the party system as the unit of analysis and emphasizes the relative support given to the parties by different social groups. Rose and Urwin opt for the first approach: 'the social cohesion of polit-ical parties, rather than the political cohesion of social groups.' [17] The second approach is exemplified by Alford's *Party and Society,* and is also used in the present study.

Alford's example is also followed in a second respect. The measures used to indicate the degree of association between class, religion, etc., and party pref-erence are Alford's 'index of class voting' and similar indices for the relation-

[14] Philip E. Converse, 'The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics', in David E. Apter, ed., *Ideology and Discontent* (New York, Free Press, 1964), pp. 247-48.
[15] Converse, *Some Priority Variables in Comparative Electoral Research,* Survey Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, Occasional Paper No. 3, 1968, pp. 7-8.
[16] De Jong, p. 160.
[17] Rose and Urwin, 'Social Cohesion, Political Parties and Strains in Regimes', *Comparative Political Studies,* p. 7. De Jong also presents his data in this fashion (pp. 75-121).

ship between the other independent variables and party choice. The following rule is used to compute the index of class voting: 'Subtract the percentage of persons in non-manual occupations voting for Left parties from the percentage of persons in manual occupations voting for Left parties.' [18] This means that occupation is used as the indicator of social class, and that both occupation and party preference are dichotomized – into manual and non-manual workers, and Left parties and Right parties respectively. In other words, the index of class voting is a measure of association in 2 x 2 contingency tables; it is a difference of proportions (if divided by 100). which is conceptually and computa-tionally similar to the cross-product of proportions and to Yule's Q. It is also the regression coefficient for the regression of party preference on class, when both variables are dichotomized.[19] The index can vary from —100 to +100. An index of 0 indicates that the variables are not related at all.

Similar indices may be developed to measure the strength of the other relation-ships by dichotomizing both the independent variables and party preference, and calculating the differences between the percentages. Alford uses an 'index of religious voting' which he defines as 'the percentage point difference in Left voting between religious groups (mainly Protestant and Catholic) within a given class.' In practice, he also gives the index of religious voting for the whole sample and not just for separate occupational categories.[20] This is the way in which the index of religious voting (church affiliation) will be used here. Similarly, the index of religious voting (church attendance) is based on a dichotomy between frequent (weekly) and infrequent or zero attendance. And the indices for residence and age are based on the rural-urban and old-young dichotomies. A positive index of class voting indicates that manual workers have a greater tendency to vote for Left parties than non-manual workers; the plus or minus sign is based on an expected correlation between lower class membership and Left voting. The signs of the other indices are based on an expected correlation between Protestantism and conservative voting in the United States and Great Britain, between Catholicism and conservative voting in Germany and the Netherlands, between membership in fundamentalist and dissenters's associations and conservative voting in Norway, and, in all countries, between frequent church attendance, rural residence, older age, and female sex on the one hand, and conservative voting on the other hand.

Table 1 presents the different indices of voting for the ten countries. The first

[18] Alford, pp. 79-80.
[19] See Hayward R. Alker, Jr., *Mathematics and Politics* (New York, Macmillan, 1965), pp. 59-63, 84-85; and Bo Särlvik, 'Socioeconomic Determinants of Voting Behavior in the Swedish Electorate', *Comparative Political Studies,* Vol. 2, No. 1 (April 1969), p. 132.
[20] Alford, pp. 91, 136, 202-03, 242-43, 274-76.

Table 1, Indices of Voting in Ten Democracies

	class	church affln.	church attnd.	rural/ urban	age	sex
United States (1960)	+20	+16	0	+11	+4	—2
Great Britain (1959)	+37	+7	—1	+10	+10	+1
Italy (1959)	+19	—	+51	+12	+4	+21
West Germany (1959)	+27	+29	+40	+17	0	+8
West Germany (1956)	+28	+28	+34	+6	+3	+8
Netherlands (1956)	+26	+50	+73	+10	—5	—1
Belgium (1956)	+25	—	+72	+7	+1	+14
France (1956)	+15	—	+59	+11	+5	+12
Austria (1967	+31	—	+54	+22	+6	+3
Sweden (1955)	+53	—	+16	—8	+3	0
Norway (1957)	+46	+26	+21	+2	+9	+4

striking aspect of the table is that the indices of class and religious voting are generally much higher than the other indices. Among the indices of voting for rural-urban residence, age, and sex, there are only eight that exceed a value of +10 and two that are greater than +20. Class and religion are clearly the most significant variables. It is less easy, however, to formulate a generalization about the relative strength of the class and religious variables. On the one hand, in four countries (United States, Britain, Sweden, and Norway) the indices of class voting are higher than the indices of religious voting in terms of church affiliation and/or church attendance, but in the other six (continental European) countries, the indices of religious voting are higher. Also, the indices of religious voting generally reach higher values than the indices of class voting. But, on the other hand, the indices of class voting are everywhere of substantial magnitude. The additional evidence on class voting and religious voting (exclusively in terms of church affiliation) for three other democracies does not clarify the picture. The indices of class and religious voting for Switzerland, based on a 1963 survey, are +26 and +59, similar to the figures obtained in Austria and France.[21] The mean indices of class voting and religious voting calculated by Alford for Australia and Canada put Australia in the same category as Britain and the United States with indices of +33 (class) and +14 (religion), but Canada has a very low mean index of class voting (+8) and a higher, but not exceptionally high mean index of religious voting (+21).[22]

The table also indicates that class voting and religious voting are negatively correlated with each other. In general, the higher the index of class voting the lower the indices of religious voting, although this relationship is by no means perfect. Alford points out that the rank order of the four major Anglo-American democracies according to their indices of class voting is the same as their reverse

[21] Data obtained from the Institut Suisse d'Opinion Publique.
[22] Alford, pp. 102, 202-03, 274-76.

rank order according to religiosity.[23] The rank orders of these four countries in terms of class voting and religious voting (church affiliation) are also perfectly correlated, if the indices of religious voting for the United States in the abnormal 1960 election are excluded. For the ten countries of the present study, there is no such perfect rank order correlation. The United States is the most deviant case with its relatively low indices of both class and religious voting. These relationships will be discussed further below.

Among the indices of class voting, the high indices for Sweden and Norway stand out: +53 and +46 respectively. Such high indices may also be found in the other Nordic countries: +44 in a Danish survey conducted in 1963,[24] and +59 in Finland in 1958, according to data presented by Erik Allardt and Pertti Pesonen.[25]

The indices of religious voting in Table 1 show how important it is to analyze the religious influence on voting behavior in terms of both church affiliation and church attendance. Church attendance is a negligible factor only in Britain and the United States. In the six continental European countries (excluding Scandinavia) the indices of religious voting based on church attendance are strikingly high. This is true not only for the polyreligious countries (Germany and the Netherlands), where the indices based on church attendance exceed those based on church affiliation, but also for the virtually monoreligious societies (France, Italy, Austria, and Belgium).

Methodological problems

So far, some of the major findings have been presented but without a complete explanation of how the indices were calculated and without the important reminder that these figures should be interpreted with caution. For reasons of space, not all minor methodological problems can be discussed here, but it is necessary to review the principal questions.

1 – The quality and comparability of the data. Comparability is always a vexing problem in cross-national survey research, but particularly so in secondary analyses of cross-national survey data. Class structures, religions, and the other independent variables differ a great deal from country to country, and the dependent variables – party systems – show even greater differences. Moreover, the time factor also has a bearing on the question of equivalence: should the data be collected in different countries as much as possible at the same time, or rather at a similar stage in the development of each country, for instance, with regard to national elections? In designing and executing

[23] Ibid, pp. 317-18.
[24] Data obtained from the Roper Public Opinion Research Center.
[25] Erik Allardt and Pertti Pesonen, 'Cleavages in Finnish Politics', in Lipset and Rokkan, eds., *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, p. 342.

an explicitly comparative study of different countries, one can achieve a satis-
factory approximation of equivalence. But secondary analysis obviously lacks
this advantage. In order to try to minimize the problems of comparability,
this study is based on survey data from national probability samples taken at
approximately the same time: the late 1950's. The Austrian data (1967) are the
only exception. Furthermore, it relies to a large extent on data from two sets
of surveys that were designed as comparative cross-national studies: the 'Civic
Culture' study by Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, which provided data
on the United States, Britain, Italy, and Germany,[26] and the Unesco study of
'Common Ideas About Foreign Peoples' which covered Germany, the Nether-
lands, and Belgium.[27] Germany was included in both studies; that is the reason
why it appears twice in Table 1. The data on the other four countries are from
separate national surveys.[28]

2 – Operational definitions of the variables. The respondents' choice of political
party may be elicited by means of several different questions. The principal
possibilities are: the respondent's last vote (or his vote in more than one pre-
vious election), his intended vote (if an election will take place in the near
future), or his general party preference. The last variant usually receives the
highest response, and is most often included in survey questionnaires. It is used
in this study with one exception: in the Italian 'Civic Culture' survey, the
response to all questions concerning party choice was extremely low, but rather
unexpectedly the question about the respondents' vote in the last election
received a somewhat higher response than the question on party preference.
The former item was therefore used as the indicator of 'party preference' in
the Italian case.

The selection of an indicator of class presents a more complicated problem.

[26] Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1963). These data have already been used, several times in secon-
dary analyses; see, for instance, Giuseppe Di Palma, *Apathy and Participation:
Mass Politics in Western Society* (New York, Free Press, 1970).
[27] France was also included in the Unesco study, but unfortunately the question of
party preference was not asked. For other uses of the data, see Erich Reigrotzki
and Nels Anderson, 'National Stereotypes and Foreign Contacts', *Public Opinion
Quarterly,* Vol. 23, No. 4 (Winter 1959-60), pp. 515-28; Nels Anderson, 'Opinion on
Europe', *European Yearbook,* Vol. 5 (1957), pp. 143-60; and Marten Brouwer,
'International Contacts and Intergration-Mindedness', *Polls,* Vol. 1, No. 2 (Summer
1965), pp. 1-11.
[28] The Austrian data were made avaible to the author by the Institut für Empi-
rische Sozialforschung in Vienna. The Norwegian data have been used by Stein
Rokkan in several studies, e.g. in his chapter in *Party Systems and Vote Alignments.*
The French data were used in Lipset, *Political Man,* and in Richard F. Hamilton,
Affluence and the French Worker in the Fourth Republic (Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1967).

Occupation was used as the operational definition of class position on the basis
of both practical and theoretical considerations. Occupation is included in most
surveys and, although occupational categories differ widely, it is fairly easy
to reclassify these categories into the manual-nonmanual dichotomy. Occupation
is also a more reliable item than income and interviewer's assessment of the
respondent's socio-economic status. Moreover, occupation has been found to be
the best predictor of party preference, at least in the United States. The authors
of *The American Voter* conclude that of the objective criteria of social class
–occupation, income, and education – 'occupation tends to predict political
attitudes and voting most efficiently.' [29]

On the other hand, Converse has recently made a plea for greater attention
to the education variable: 'while it is . . . probably *the* prime predictor for the
whole class of dependent variables reflecting political interest, participation and
mobilization, it also shows remarkable discriminating power as a status measure
in predicting to variables on the other side of the watershed–ideology and party
position.' He further states that he has often found, primarily in American
research, that 'using education and occupation as competing status indicators,
the occupation relationship washes out when education is controlled, but a
residual relation with education remains when occupation is controlled.' [30]

The 'Civic Culture' data offer an opportunity to assess the relative utility
of the four indicators of social status, because all four were included in the
surveys. By dichotomizing education, income, and interviewer's rating of status,
indices of class voting may be computed in the same way as the index of class
voting based on occupation. Compared with the index of class voting based
on occupation of +20 in the United States, the index based on education is
only +9, the index based on income is +3, and the index based on interviewer's
rating of status +11. The respective indices for Britain are +37, +16, +15,
and +38; for Italy +19, +9, +8, and +5; and for West Germany +27, +18,
+9, and +16. With the exception of interviewer's rating of status in Britain,
occupation turns out to be the best predictor. Income appears to be the weakest
predictor, and education and interviewer's rating are in an intermediate
position. Occupation also generally maintains its strength as a predictor when
the other three variables are controlled.

Religiosity may be measured in terms of a variety of indicators. Alford uses
both frequency of church attendance and belief in life after death, although
religiosity is not an important variable in his study.[31] Other possible indicators
are the respondent's assessment of the role of religion in his life, attitudes

[29] Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes,
The American Voter (New York, Wiley, 1960), p. 344.
[30] Converse, *Some Priority Variables,* pp. 4-5.
[31] Alford, pp. 317-18.

toward the clergy, opinions on religious schools, etc. For the present study, church attendance was selected as the indicator of religiosity, in the first place because it is a straightforward measure based on objective behavior rather than subjective opinions, and secondly because this item occurs most frequently in survey questionnaires. Even so, it was extremely difficult to find surveys that included this variable. The absence of Denmark, Finland, and Switzerland from the sample of countries analyzed is due to this obstacle. The frequent omission of church attendance or a similar indicator of religiosity is particularly surprising and unfortunate, because as Table 1 shows this variable is a very strong predictor of party preference.

The operational treatment of church affiliation, rural-urban residence, age, and sex is relatively simple and straightforward. The only problem is that most surveys measure rural-urban residence in terms of the population size of the city, town, or village in which the respondent lives, without taking into account the possible proximity of large urban centers.

3 – Dichotomizing the independent variables. The indices of class voting and the other indices of voting require the dichotomization of both the independent and the dependent variables. For each variable, this entails the combination of the categories into two – and often *three* – broader categories: the two categories of the dichotomy and a residual category of unclassifiable cases. Alford thus divides occupations into manual and non-manual occupations and a third group of occupations that do not fit this dichotomy and that are not considered in the calculation of the index of class voting.[32] Similarly, the index of religious voting (church affiliation) is based on the Catholic-Protestant dichotomy with all respondents of other faiths or without religious affiliation being left out of consideration. The exception is Norway, where the dividing line was drawn between members of the state church and members of the fundamentalist or dissenters' religious groups.

The dichotomization of the church attendance variable presented more serious problems because the categories in the different surveys were not always the same. Moreover, even with exactly the same categories, the problem of equivalence is not solved, because, as Linz points out, the obligation of church attendance has a different meaning for Protestants and Catholics.[33] In order to keep the dichotomy as simple and straightforward as possible, the dividing line was drawn between frequent church attenders ('weekly' or 'regular' attenders, and the *pratiquants* in France) and those attending church only infrequently or never. This standard had to be relaxed considerably in the case of Sweden and Norway in order to get a sufficient population in the category of 'frequent'

[32] Ibid., p. 70.
[33] Linz, 'Cleavage and Consensus in West German Politics: The Early Fifties', in *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, p. 318.

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church-goers.

The main problem in dichotomizing the variables of rural-urban residence and age was that the categories of the different surveys varied considerably. The dividing line was drawn at or as closely as possible to a population size of 50,000 inhabitants and to age 40. Only sex, being a natural dichotomy, presented no problems in this respect.

4 – Dichotomizing the dependent variable. The indices of voting also require that the political parties are divided into two groups. One problem, particularly in continental Europe, is the presence of many small parties, which are sometimes coded separately but often lumped together as 'other parties.' In order to avoid this problem, it was decided to include only the major parties in the analysis and to omit all parties receiving less than 5 to 10 per cent of the popular vote in elections held around 1960. As a consequence, the study is restricted to the two largest parties in Austria and the United States, the three largest in Britain, Italy, Germany, and Belgium, the four largest in Sweden, and the five largest in the Netherlands, France, and Norway.

The second problem is how to dichotomize these larger parties. Especially in continental Europe, there are at least two important dimensions of party conflict: the Left-Right dimension and the religious-secular (or anticlerical) dimension:

None of the parties considered here can be placed in the upper left-hand quadrant, but this quadrant is not necessarily always empty. For instance, the French M.R.P. of the early postwar period probably belongs in it.

This two-dimensional scheme was used as the criterion for classifying the parties: the Left-Right dichotomy for the index of class voting and the religious-secular dichotomy for the indices of religious voting. The other indices for

residence, age, and sex were calculated according to both criteria. The indices in Table 1 are based on the Left-Right dimension, but the differences between the two sets of indices are generally very small. An exception was made for the multiparty systems of Norway and Sweden, which were dichotomized only along the Left-Right dimension into socialist and 'bourgeois' parties – the usual classification made by Scandinavian politicians and political scientists alike.

5 – Predetermined classifications or classifications emerging from the data. As indicated above, the dichotomization of the variables was guided by general theoretical criteria: the programs and traditions of the political parties, the basic two-class structure of industrial societies, etc. In other words, the classifications were made before the data were analyzed. An alternative possibility is to let the classifications depend wholly or partly on the data themselves. For instance, a party could be classified as a Left party if it has predominantly manual adherents. Or, the boundary between Left and Right could be draw in such a way as to maximize the index of class voting. Although, in general, the method of predetermined classifications seems more satisfactory, it is instructive to pay special attention to those few cases in which the alternative method would have led to higher voting indices. For instance, the index of class voting for France would be slightly higher (+19 instead of +15) if the Socialists were classified among the Right parties rather than together with the Communists on the Left. In Norway, the two indices of religious voting would be higher (+34 instead of +26, and +25 instead of +21) if the dividing line were drawn between Labor-Liberal-Conservative and Christian-Agrarian rather than between socialist and bourgeois parties.

6 – The paucity of suitable survey data. One big advantage enjoyed by Alford in his study of class voting in the Anglo-American democracies was that several surveys for each country were available for analysis. This permitted a consideration of the developmental aspects of class voting, and also strengthened confidence in the reliability of the indices. Unfortunately, not so many surveys are available for the European countries, and the inclusion of the important variable of church attendance restricts the number of usable surveys even more. An effort was made, however, to compare the indices of Table 1 with other independent data – with, generally, gratifying results.

For instance, the indices of class voting and religious voting (church affiliation) for the United States and Britain in Table 1 are extremely close to the average indices found by Alford: the largest difference amounts to only 4 percentage points.[34] The voting indices for class, church attendance, and sex computed on the basis of a 1958 Italian survey are +21, +46, and +24 – very similar to the +19, +51, and +21 of Table 1.[35] Mattei Dogan reports that a dozen Italian

34 See Alford, pp. 102, 136, 242-43.

surveys between 1952 and 1963 support the conclusion that 'more than three-fifths of those voting Communist and Socialist (considered together) are men; by contrast, nearly two-thirds of those voting Christian Democratic are women.'[36] This gives a voting index of approximately +25.

For Germany, two sets of indices are given in Table 1. With the exception of the indices of rural-urban voting, they are in close agreement with each other. They are also quite close to the indices of class and religious voting computed from 1953 data reported in studies by Linz and by Erich Reigrotzki: +32, +26, and +40.[37] On the basis of Austrian data reported by Rose en Urwin, indices of class voting and religious voting (church attendance) of +27 and +53 can be calculated, again very close to the indices of +31 and +54 of Table 1.[38] Finally, the highest index of Table 1 – the index of +73 for religious voting (church attendance) in the Netherlands – is extremely close to the indices of +71 and +74 found in Dutch surveys held in 1956 and 1964.[39]

Multivariate analyses

The voting indices discussed so far measure the strength of the bivariate relationships between a number of independent variables and party preference. It is likely, however, that these independent variables are mutually related.

Table 2, Indices of Class Voting for Different Religious Groups in Ten Democracies

	Over-all index	Frequent attnd.		Infrequent attnd.	
		Cath.	Prot.	Cath.	Prot.
United States (1960)	+20	+23	+25	+8	+24
Great Britain (1959)	+37	+66	+33	+64	+32
Italy (1959)	+19	+3	—	+36	—
West Germany (1959)	+27	+10	+36	+38	+35
West Germany (1956)	+28	+9	+41	+33	+31
Netherlands (1956)	+26	−2	+18	+33	+32
Belgium (1956)	+25	+3		+30	
France (1956)	+15	+7		+15	—
Austria (1967)	+31	+25	—	+26	—
Sweden (1955)	+53	—	+59	—	+53
Norway (1957)	+46	(+47)	(+47)	(+35)	(+43)

35 DOXA Survey No. 5810.

36 Mattei Dogan, 'Political Cleavage and Social Stratification in France and Italy', in *Party Systems and Voter Alignments,* pp. 159-60.

37 Linz, pp. 287, 302; Erich Reigrotzki, *Soziale Verflechtungen in der Bundesrepublik* (Tübingen, Mohr, 1956), p. 131.

38 Rose and Urwin, p. 52.

39 The 1956 data were used in Lipset, *Political Man,* pp. 257-59, and De Jong, pp. 179-215. The 1964 data are reported in Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1968).

Table 3, *Indices of Religious Voting (Church Attendance) for Different Social Classes in Ten Democracies*

	Over-all index	Manual	Non-Manual
United States (1960)	0	—5	+2
Great Britain (1959)	—1	—11	+3
Italy (1959)	+51	+64	+31
West Germany (1959)	+40	+40	+36
West Germany (1956)	+34	+40	+29
Netherlands (1956)	+73	+74	+71
Belgium (1956)	+72	+71	+74
France (1956)	+59	+55	+56
Austria (1967)	+54	+49	+48
Sweden (1955)	+16	+4	+16
Norway (1957)	+21	+12	+15

It is necessary, therefore, to institute controls. Some of the principal findings are presented in Tables 2 to 4. Table 2 gives both the over-all index of class voting and the indices with church attendance and church affiliation controlled. The introduction of these controls brings about substantial changes in the indices of class voting. The table shows that the relatively low indices of class voting for Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium are caused by the virtual absence of class voting among church-going Catholics in these countries. In fact, the indices of class voting for all other groups in Germany and Italy (based on the 'Civic Culture' data) reach the same high level as the index for Britain. Austria is a reather surprising deviant case because its index of class voting is almost unaffected by frequency of church attendance. Another noteworthy finding is the extremely high index of class voting among British Catholics. Table 3 presents the indices of religious voting (church attendance) with class controlled. On the whole, the indices for manual and non-manual occupations do not differ a great deal. The principal exception is Italy, where the index of class voting is twice as high for manual workers as the index for persons in non-manual occupations.

Finally, Table 4 presents all the indices of voting for the 'Civic Culture' countries: first, their unadjusted (uncontrolled) values, and second, their adjusted values, i.e. adjusted for the influence of all other independent variables according to the procedure developed by Alan B. Wilson. This procedure permits simultaneous control of all control variables by statistically adjusting subclass frequencies for the effects of all other variables together.[40] The unadjusted

40 Alan B. Wilson, 'Analysis of Multiple Cross-Classifications in Cross-Sectional Designs' (revised version of a paper presented to the American Association for Public Opinion Research, 1964; mimeographed). See also Glen H. Elder, Jr., 'Family Structure and Educational Attainment: A Cross-National Analysis', *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (February 1965), pp. 94-95.

Table 4, *Unadjusted and Adjusted Indices of Voting in Four Western Democracies*

		U.S.	Britain	Germany	Italy
Class	Unadjusted index	+28	+36	+29	+17
	Adjusted index	+28	+36	+28	+16
Church affln.	Unadjusted index	+14	+5	+29	—
	Adjusted index	+12	—6	+15	—
Church attnd.	Unadjusted index	—4	—5	+38	+52
	Adjusted index	—5	—12	+28	+47
Rural-Urban	Unadjusted index	+10	+7	+10	+7
	Adjusted index	+6	+5	+5	+4
Age	Unadjusted index	+3	+9	—5	+7
	Adjusted index	+3	+5	—3	+7
Sex	Unadjusted index	—5	—1	+7	+21
	Adjusted index	—6	+1	+4	+10

indices deviate to some extent from the indices of Table 1, because they are based on different totals. The indices of class voting are virtually unchanged by the introduction of multiple controls, but the two indices of religious voting go down considerably – probably mainly because church affiliation and church attendance are interrelated (especially in Germany). The index of religious voting for Italy remains at a high level.

It should be noted that the adjusted indices of Table 4 are not ideal summary measures. For instance, the fact that the adjusted indices of class voting reach virtually the same values as the unadjusted indices does indicate that class does not wash out when the other variables are introduced as controls. But it conceals the crucial differences in the effect of class position on voting behavior in different religious subgroups. However, for reasons of space not all multivariate relationships can be discussed here.

It is hoped that this preliminary report has provided a useful summary of the main features of the project, in spite of its brevity. The author will be grateful for any critical comments on its methods and findings.