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Pijl, K. van der

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- inequality of nations*, London, Granada, 1971.
- 3 Aidan Foster-Carter, Neo-Marxist Approaches to Development and Underdevelopment, in: *Journal of Contemporary Asia* (III, 1), 1973, blz. 30-31.
 - 4 Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 4th ed., New York, Knopf, 1967.
 - 5 'In der Vergangenheit waren ausländische Investoren etwas besorgt über die generellen politischen Aussichten für dieses Gebiet/i.e. Südostasiën. Ich muss jedoch sagen, dass die Aktionen der USA in Vietnam in diesem Jahr, die den Willen demonstrieren haben, wirksamen Schutz für die freien Nationen dort weiterhin zu gewähren, sowohl westliche wie asiatische Investoren beträchtlich ermutigt haben'. Op soortgelijke wijze, namelijk door W. W. Rostow te citeren, poogt Krippendorff het economische belang van de Derde Wereld voor de Amerikaanse kapitalisten aan te tonen (K 1972: blz. 193).
 - 6 Deodato Rivera, Let us face Chile, Yes, But: Which Chile? A rejoinder to Ekkehart Krippendorff's 'Chile, Violence, and Peace Research', in: *Journal of Peace Research*, 1974/2, blz. 105-106.
 - 7 Arend Lijphart, The Northern Ireland Problem: Cases, Theories, and Solutions, gestencilde versie blz. 11; publikatie binnenkort in *British Journal of Political Science*.
 - 8 J. H. Leurdijk, Van Internationale naar Transnationale Politiek: een Verandering van Paradigma?, in: *Acta Politica* (IX, 3), juli 1974, blz. 308-309.
 - 9 Zie over dit tekort in de marxistische theorievorming ook: G. van Benthem van den Bergh, Over de Structuur van de Wereldmaatschappij, in: *Civis Mundi* (IX, 2), februari 1972, blz. 30.
 - 10 Jerzy J. Wiatr, A Sociological Perspective in the Study of International Relations, in: *International Social Science Journal* (XXVI, 1), 1974, blz. 109-118.
 - 11 Het is ondoenlijk om in dit bestek een overzicht te geven van de vele benaderingen die waardevolle bijdragen hiertoe leveren. Daarom volsta ik met enkele verwijzingen. Zie voor de ontwikkelingen op het niveau van het internationale systeem het goede literatuuroverzicht bij het eerder genoemde artikel van Leurdijk (noot 8); zie over de rol van individuen: Herbert C. Kelman, The Role of the Individual in International Relations, in: *Journal of International Affairs* (XXIV, 1), 1970, blz. 1-17; over sub-nationale aktors en de totstandkoming van buitenlandse politiek: George Modelski, The International Relations of Internal War, in: James N. Rosenau (ed.), *International Aspects of Civil Strife*, Princeton, Princeton U.P., 1964, blz. 14-44 en William Wallace, *Foreign Policy and the Political Process*, London, Macmillan, 1971; specifieke studies over buitenlandse politiek en besluitvorming: Michael Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israël: Setting, Images, Process*, London, Oxford University Press, 1972 en Graham T. Allison, *The Essence of Decision. Explaining the Cuban missile crisis*, Boston, Little Brown, 1971.
 - 12 Robert J. Lieber, *Theory and World Politics*, Cambridge, Winthrop 1972, blz. 162.

A note on internationalization of capital as an independent variable in the analysis of the international system*

by K. van der Pijl

1 Introduction

In this short contribution we shall make use of the elements and logical construction of Marxist theory, clarifying terms where necessary. In the first place, the notion of capital.

As an *empirical phenomenon*, capital stands for a quantity of value that enters the *production process* in the form of commodities (labour and means of production). The purpose of the capitalist, who brings together these commodities as capital, is the creation of surplus value which is the value of the product in as far as it exceeds the reproduction costs of labour and means of production. In terms of value, therefore, the ensuing product contains three elements: constant capital (raw materials, depreciation of machinery); variable capital (wages) and surplus value; together symbolized by $c + v + s$. This product, in the form of commodities, subsequently enters the *circulation process*; because if the capitalist has the intention to start production again, he will have to get hold of the value of his commodities in money form to be able to buy new labour and means of production and to invest ('accumulate') the surplus value in new c and v , thus expanding the scale of production.

Capital as a broader term, actually as an *heuristic device*, elucidates the social context of the above process. For, as the reader will have noticed, in the short description of the process of capitalist production and circulation quite a few assumptions were taken for granted: for example, the existence of free labour, separated from the means of production; and capitalists, obviously operating on the market unhindered, buying labour and means of production and appropriating the surplus value only to accumulate it as new labour and means of production again. Certainly, these conditions do not apply to all types of society. Capital, therefore, is a specific *social relation*, but it is so in two ways: as class, i.e. production relations, it is the relation between proprietor-bourgeoisie and propertyless proletariat; as competition, i.e. circulation relations, it is the relation between capitalists, creating the necessity to accumulate.

It is now possible to see the fundamental unity of the production and circulation processes but at the same time to recognize that in their functioning together in a situation of mutual determination, production is the dominant element. Here we shall mention two contradictions within this superficially harmonious model (others we shall come to later). First, there is the relation of exploitation between capitalist and worker, the latter producing his own reproduction costs e.g. in half a day while working until

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evening, thus creating the surplus value that accrues to the capitalist at no cost; second, there is the fact that the bourgeoisie, though united against the proletariat, are divided among themselves, especially from one system of division of labour to another; this mostly because of the unequal development of the productive forces.

Just looking at only these two aspects shows that economic relations cannot endure without political enforcement, at least not as long as the necessities of the mode of production demand the oppression of certain classes by other classes. In capitalism, this is clearly the case.

Going over the main points of our definition of capital, we can now indicate what is meant when one speaks of *internationalization* of capital. Practically, internationalization occurs when a specific capital, running through its cycle of production and circulation, crosses the national border. (However, as will be shown presently, the 'national border' did not arrive from another world but developed in close interrelation with capitalist development and the rise of the bourgeoisie).

Taking the second and broader interpretation of the term capital, we observe the social context of the capitalist mode of production being recreated wherever capital goes. It must be recreated at least to some degree, otherwise capital as a quantity of value cannot run through its complete cycle. For internationalization of circulation to take place, less far reaching conditions have to be met than when production is internationalized; in the first case, a mere market will do so as to enable the selling and buying of commodities; for capitalist production, labour as such has to appear on the market as a commodity.

The two contradictions that were touched upon above of course accompany capital as a social relation: conflict between the bourgeoisie themselves as well as class conflict are present in the degree that capital, as circulation and production relations respectively, crystallizes; the same goes for the political enforcement that is required to regulate both conflict situations.

Having explained, unavoidably by means of extreme simplification what must be understood by the notion of internationalization of capital, two additional remarks must be made.

Naturally, if the capitalist mode of production and its international ramifications can be anything like the independent variable in the analysis of the international system (or international relations in general for that matter), then *any* mode of production must determine international behaviour of its organizational unit, or else there is in reality another variable at work. However, though there has been both war and trade long before the development of capitalism, it is only with capitalism that a mode of production comes into existence that on the one hand is capable of stimulating the

development of productive forces to an extent that knows no limits (neither in terms of production nor geographically), but that on the other hand is plagued by contradictions, like accumulation causing the rate of profit to fall, competition developing into its opposite (monopoly) and first of all the class struggle obstructing the income distribution that we saw was essential for accumulation in the first place (in its simplest form, $c + v + s$). Therefore, capitalism is forced to expand into non-capitalist regions and strata, subjugating them in the process but never able to overcome its dependence on outside elements completely (Cf. section 2).

Still, the general proposition about the mode of production determining international relations can be made, though we shall not elaborate on this matter further here.

Our second remark concerns the notion of 'independent variable'. In a dialectical analysis this term should of course be stripped of its bivariate connotations, and should be interpreted as meaning the *dominant factor* in a situation that is determined by a multitude of factors. When we use the term, it will be with this modification.

2 Accumulation of capital and internationalization

How to explain the outward bound thrust of the capitalist mode of production? To grasp this fundamental problem, it may be useful to note the Marxian distinction between the two aspects of the commodity: *use value* and *exchange value*.

To be able to exchange commodities, people have to confront each other as owners of the commodity. The relation of mutual *independence* that is required for this confrontation, does not exist within primitive — in general: pre-capitalist — communities: here the transfer of use value is regulated by a system of appropriation based on personal relations. Because of this, the exchange of commodities begins where the communities end, at their point of contact with foreign communities or members of foreign communities.¹

This exchange (simple circulation of commodities on the thus-defined *external market*) stimulates the production of commodities in the communities that participate in the exchanges; thus dialectically creating potential new units based on capitalist division of labour by destroying the old communities with their social order based on the vertical appropriation of use value.

Describing the process of nation-building, which is always characterized by an interplay of this internal division of labour and its political reflection as it is modified by the relative strength of the rising bourgeoisie (on the two conflict dimensions already mentioned), cultural continuities — which in turn are reinforced by the orientation towards a certain market centre —

and geographical continuity, would take us too far; but the very fact that there is an interplay of several factors prevents the external market from being completely internalized the moment the nation is constituted. The *territorial non-coincidence*² between formal and informal nation is therefore present from the start. It is in this sense that Rosa Luxemburg calls England a part of Germany's internal, capitalist market, while she considers the German peasants being an external market for German capital.³ In the same way the native peasants of the East Indies formed an external market for British and Dutch merchant capital.

However, exchange between the communities or rather regions that take part in the division of labour is not the same for all, nor are its effects on class relations the same everywhere. We shall not dwell on the debate that is being waged between A. Emmanuel, Ch. Bettelheim and S. Amin on the problem of unequal exchange,⁴ but just note that a commodity contains a number of elements that constitute its value, reflecting the class and production relations in which it was produced. In capitalist society, commodities have a value composition of $c + v + s$, as was shown above. In this formula the c/v ratio (the so-called organic composition of capital) is indicative for the degree of mechanization of the production process (assuming constant production costs of c). The higher the c/v ratio, the shorter the time needed to produce a commodity, the lower its value. The Marxian *law of value* states that in a society, i.e. among producers linked up by a market, the c/v ratio will tend to equalize within all sectors of the production process, equalizing by the transformation process of values into prices the rate of profit ($\frac{s}{c+v}$; variations in the rate of surplus value, $\frac{s}{v}$ can compensate a lagging c/v ratio temporarily) between them.

The workings of the law of value *devalue* all production that takes more time per commodity than is *socially necessary* when looking at the average c/v ratio.

Though it is not wholly legitimate to speak of a c/v ratio when pre-capitalist society is concerned, we can say like Palloix does⁵ that in exchanging commodities between regions developing towards capitalism, socially necessary labourtime is exchanged. The more advanced regions, able to shorten this labourtime, in this way secure an advantage when trading with the less developed ones. It will also be in the more advanced regions, where class relations are conducive to it, that accumulation of capital will take place. The less developed regions, on the other hand, though forced to produce commodities as well (e.g. cash crop agriculture) and contributing via simple commodity circulation part of their surplus product to the capital that is accumulated elsewhere, generally remain as they are with regard to class

relations, these mostly even being reinforced.⁶ Accordingly no shortening of labourtime and no accumulation takes place as the surplus is tapped off and production factors are distributed unfavourably.

This process of transferring value from backward sectors to more advanced centres is called *primitive accumulation* and what is here presented as a short series of mechanical causes and consequences in reality took centuries to evolve. Marx depicts primitive accumulation in Britain in chapter 24 of 'Capital', Bk. I; Palloix, in his already cited article (note 5), gives a thoroughly documented account of the same process as it occurred, in a later period, on an international level.

What is important for our argument, however, is that once expanded reproduction on the basis of capital accumulation takes off in the centre, trade with non-capitalist regions and strata both inside *and* outside the formal nation loses its accidental and optional quality. For, as the reader will remember from what was said in section 1, the capital that enters the production process as a quantity of value will have to be *realized* afterwards so as to enable the capitalist to obtain the different elements (c , v , s) of his product in money-form and start production again. Accumulation, however, was also based on extraction of surplus value (*mutatis mutandis*) from non-capitalist regions and strata, and though theoretically the excess production (the value of which will be a function of the accumulated surplus-contribution from the non-capitalist regions) may be absorbed on the internal market with the help of credit, in reality part of the accumulated surplus value is realized on the external market.

We can now speak of *internationalization of circulation*. Functioning within the process of capitalist production and circulation, international trade now becomes subject to the contradictions of the capitalist mode of production. In the first place, the *falling rate of profit*. In counteracting this tendency (which can easily be deduced from the combination of the rising c/v ratio caused by accumulation and the formula of the rate of profit $\frac{s}{c+v}$ given the fact that s can only be obtained from v) international trade can offer only temporary relief. As Marx rightly saw, international trade, while propping up the rate of profit by cheapening the elements of both constant and variable capital, fosters the development of production and therefore accumulation, consequently lowering variable capital in relation to constant capital and pulling the rate of profit down again.⁷

When, at the turn of this century, export of commodities began to be accompanied by export of capital, internationalization of capital entered its second stage: *internationalization of production*. This development, however, was not mechanically caused by the falling rate of profit. There were

other elements that constituted together with the rate of profit a conditional system of considerable complexity: international tariff wars, monopoly, trade unionism, the so-called 2nd industrial revolution and its ramifications e.g. the need for raw materials and first of all, the low c/v and high s/v ratios in the colonies or like-colonies that held out the prospect of high returns on capital investment. These factors mostly were to be found in the sphere of class and production relations in the component parts of the informal nations, — now turned into empires — and were mediated between them by commodity circulation, actually by capital 'fractions' managing conversion of the functional forms of capital (p.m. productive, commodity- and money-capital).

These fractions — banks, trade companies and in the case of colonies one is tempted to include, *mutatis mutandis*, the colonial government — secured orders for metropolitan cartels in railway construction (through international credit mediation) and organized joint-stock companies for this and other applications of the new technology, thereby investing portfolio capital entrusted to them.⁸

In fact, in what is generally regarded as a self-contained episode of the history of international relations, namely the *imperialism* of the 1870-1914 period, the two forms of internationalization of capital are *fused*, though dialectically so: while reinforcing each other, as Lenin clearly saw ('Export of capital is practised to further export of commodities'), they are connected with two different modes of capitalist production: international trade with the dying competitive capitalism and international production with the new capitalism of the monopolies.⁹

From a theoretical point of view, there is no need to create a new imperialism associated with the international corporation, suggesting an essential difference between international investment in the periods before 1914 and after 1945, as Palloix does.¹⁰

In reality there is a continuity, the portfolio investment of the imperialist period being internationalization of production in its infancy, closely connected with highly developed international trade and credit and protected by the structure of empire, while the 'neo'-imperialism of the giant international firms and their mothercountries embodies internationalization of production in full swing, engulfing circulation within the structure of the corporation.

Rather, the differences between the two periods lie in the field of concentration and centralization of capital and the elimination of traffic barriers, coupled with the changes in the organizational structure of the foremost institutional form of capital: the *firm*.¹¹

In the next section we shall add the notion of capital as a social relation to

the description of the internationalization process as it was presented in this section.

3 The state and internationalization of capital

In our introduction two dimensions of conflict directly relating to the capitalist mode of production were mentioned. First, there is class conflict between bourgeoisie and proletariat; second, conflict between capitalists themselves. These two dimensions of conflict were then associated with production and circulation respectively and what was said about production being the dominant element in a situation of mutual determination with circulation can be re-formulated with respect to *conflict*: class conflict and inter-capitalist conflict mutually determine each other, class conflict being the dominant element in the long run.

The political *enforcement* of the economic relations between capitalists and workers *and* between capitalists themselves is entrusted to the capitalist state, whose *public power* varies with the intensity of the above mentioned conflicts. In the words of Engels:

'(Die öffentliche Gewalt) kann sehr unbedeutend, fast verschwindend sein in Gesellschaften mit noch unentwickelten Klassengegensätzen und auf abgelegenen Gebieten, wie zeit- und ortsweise in den Vereinigten Staaten Amerikas. Sie verstärkt sich aber in dem Mass, wie die Klassengegensätze innerhalb des Staats sich verschärfen und wie die einander begrenzenden Staaten grösser und volkreicher werden'. (note next citation)

Of course, 'public power' is in the first place derived from economic power which is then reinforced dialectically.

'Da der Staat entstanden ist aus dem Bedürfnis, Klassengegensätzen im Zaum zu halten, da er aber gleichzeitig mitten im Konflikt dieser Klassen entstanden ist, so ist er in der Regel Staat der mächtigsten, ökonomisch herrschenden Klasse, die vermittelst seiner auch politisch herrschende Klasse wird und so neue Mittel erwirbt zur Niederhaltung und Ausbeutung der unterdrückten Klasse'.¹²

However, our second dimension of conflict makes clear that the bourgeoisie is not a solid block; state power, therefore, must transcend the interests of the individual capitalist or group of capitalists at least vis-à-vis the proletariat (at home and abroad) and also in the inter-capitalist confrontation. Because of this, the state will tend to appear in the eyes of the individual capitalist as an obstacle for this possibilities for accumulation.¹³

In analyzing the workings of the capitalists state, two levels can be distinguished which correspond with our two-level definition of capital and which are borrowed from Fennema's thesis:

1 — *technical-economic* functions, connected with regulation and organization of the production and circulation processes; and

2 — *ideological-integrative* functions,¹⁴ regulating 'capital as a social relation' as we have defined it above.

Having ordered the minimum requirements for analyzing the dialectical interplay of internationalization of capital and the role of the state which should be in the long run determined by it, we can now briefly look at internationalization for a second time.

First, *internationalization of circulation*. As Palloix sees it, internationalization of capital in the first place is internationalization of the law of value (cf. above, p. 28). The confrontation of national values in the process of international trade (which under capitalist production conditions can be defined as internationalization of circulation) results in an *international value*,

— (...) contraignant toute mise en valeur (roughly: realization, v_dP) dans un espace national à se mouler sur les normes mondiales de mise en valeur édictées par la valeur internationale en dernière instance. —¹⁵

However, the unequal development of productive forces and class relations does not permit such an equalization of the rate of profit. The 'national' contrasts between the bourgeoisie bring out the foremost state function on the *technical-economic* level with respect to internationalization of circulation: the *rate of exchange*, modifying the workings of the law of value by the workings of a second market besides the commodity market: the market of the different currencies.

The constitution of a rate of profit on a world level is postponed by the countervailing power of the rate of exchange, and more so by deliberate *tariff walls*. As these mechanisms prevent automatic enlargement of the market because of low prices, they stimulate the extensive growth of the capitalist mode of production.¹⁶

To be able to even maintain a currency or to put up a tariff wall, however, political power is required; a power that in the 18th and 19th centuries could be mobilized by relatively backward Germany and Italy, but that was deficient in the case of the Iberian and Balkan countries. The *ideological-integrative* function of war, reinforcement of inner cohesion and weakening of outside enemies, plays a central role in state formation. And as Krippendorff says,

— Nicht nur Staat und Krieg, sondern, weitergehend, Nationalstaat und kapitalistische Produktionsweise entwickelten sich interdependent. —¹⁷

Also on the ideological-integrative level, one could put forward the proposition that the degree in which *nationalism* is encouraged varies inversely with the ability of the national bourgeoisie to compete directly (without refuge to tariffs) with other capitalist countries *and* with its ability to assert

its power vis-à-vis the other classes, both pre-capitalist landed interests and proletariat.

Internationalization of production, as it was described above, developed in close interplay with highly developed international trade and credit.

The role of the state in the production process as such, however, did change fundamentally in the course of the 20th century. Because of the objective *socialization* of production, state tasks on the *technical-economic* level greatly increased. We shall not try to sum up these tasks, but just indicate that when production was internationalized, state intervention duly followed: from the imperial structure that protected the infant productive investment in the colonies to the so-called *development aid* that serves to facilitate investment in the dependent periphery by the international firms, while keeping in place the desired ruling groups.

The international firm in its modern form transcends the fundamental mechanism that can be used by the state in international economic relations: its possibility to regulate the circulation process by tariff policy and financial and monetary measures. While because of the international interpenetration of capital the ability of the state to defend its 'national' capital is being undermined already (this defence only being really possible and worth the costs in case of a recession,¹⁸ the international firms, in fact constituting in Neusüss's words 'an aggregate social capital on a world level',¹⁹ can withdraw from state measures in the above mentioned fields at will.

Still, it would be wrong to conclude that the international firm is really the all-powerful organization that it seems to be. In reality it is tied hands and feet to the state(s) in which it operates, and the state/firm relation is subject to a host of contradictions. Production in general, and connected costs especially are being socialized, but appropriation is private and decisionmaking goes uncontrolled. Or: capital demands unhindered movement to look for and settle in profitable areas where it can raise surplus value, but on the other hand depends completely on protective demarcation of such areas by state power, enforcing class relations necessary for surplus creation and realization. Because of the very fact that socialized costs constitute a too heavy load for smaller countries, international firms exert pressure for internationalization of state functions in the technical-economic realm (international organizations like the IMF, IBRD etc.) and enlargement of the state as such, e.g. the EEC.²⁰ (Of course, in this case a multitude of factors are at work)

State functions on the *ideological-integrative* level in the process of internationalization of production, working on two mutually determined conflict dimensions, namely *international class conflict* and *inter-imperialist conflict*, account for most of the features of the present scene of international

relations; *the very fact of the mutual determination of these two conflict dimensions accounts for its systemic nature.*

Therefore, we think that the analysis of the international system in these terms should be preferred to Krippendorff's 'internationale Solidarität der herrschenden Klassen einerseits und die nationalistische Provinzialisierung der unterdrückten Klassen anderseits'.²¹

The mutual determination of the two conflict dimensions manifests itself clearly in the case of both the German and Japanese economic development efforts prior to the Second World War. To improve their position relative to the more advanced capitalist countries, Germany and Japan were forced to raise the rate of surplus value, in this way trying, protected by tariff walls, to raise their level of industrialization (i.e. raise the c/v ratio) by a program of forced accumulation. Class struggle was intensified to better the economic position vis-à-vis other capitalist countries: nationalism proving to be the binding element between the two, canalizing conflict (Cf. our remark on nationalism above, p. 32).

Today, internationalization of capital as a social relation manifests itself in the internationalization of state functions that regulate social conflict on the two mutually determining dimensions. Repression of international class struggle (both interstate and intra-state) is organized by U.S.-sponsored defense organizations like NATO, SEATO, CENTO etc. International imperialist rivalry is being regulated mainly by diplomatic consultation as conflict regulation takes place for the most part on the technical-economic level in organizations like OECD, GATT etc.

Having grossly simplified both international reality and the analytical tools of Marxist theory that can be used to grasp it, we can still conclude that by taking internationalization of capital as an independent variable in the analysis of the international system one can create a comprehensive framework with which the main course and events of the history and contemporary reality of international relations can be explained.

Class struggle can only be understood if the relation which creates the class structure is seen in its broad historical development; the international system can only be understood if the interrelation between class struggle and imperialist rivalry is accorded due weight.

Notes

- 1 K. Marx, *Das Kapital*, Bd. I, Marx-Engels-Werke (MEW) 23, Berlin/DDR, p. 102.
- 2 R. Murray's term. See his 'Internationalization of Capital and the Nation-State', *New Left Review*, 67.

- 3 R. Luxemburg, *Die Akkumulation des Kapitals*, Frankfurt/M 1970 (1912), p. 228.
- 4 For a concise overview of the debate, see S. Amin, *Le Développement inégal*, Paris 1973, pp. 113-132.
- 5 C. Palloix, 'Imperialismus und kapitalistische Produktionsweise' in S. Amin, C. Palloix, *Neuere Beiträge zur Imperialismustheorie*, Bd. I, München 1971, p. 42.
- 6 See for instance E. Laclau, 'Feudalism and capitalism in Latin America', *New Left Review*, 67, pp. 30-31.
- 7 K. Marx, *Das Kapital*, Bd. III, hrsg. F. Engels, MEW 25, p. 247.
- 8 See R. Luxemburg, o.c., ch. 30 especially.
- 9 Lenin, *Der Imperialismus als höchster Stadium des Kapitalismus*, Ausgewählte Werke in 3 Bde, Berlin/DDR, Bd. I, ch. 4.
- 10 C. Palloix, *Impérialisme et mode d'accumulation international du capital*, paper, CSE conference on Imperialism, London, jan. 4/5th, 1974, p. 17. Also E. Krippendorff, 'Das internationale System zwischen Stabilisierung und Klassenkampf', in Ders., Hrsg., *Probleme der internationalen Beziehungen*, Frankfurt/M 1972, pp. 14, 29.
- 11 See M. Fennema, *The Multinational Corporation: the Internationalization of Finance-Capital*, paper, to be delivered to the 'Colloque sur l'internationalisation du capital', Grenoble, June 4/5/6th, 1974, passim.
- 12 F. Engels, *Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentums und des Staats*, MEW 21, pp. 166; 166/167.
- 13 M. Fennema, *De Multinationale Onderneming en de Natie-Staat*, unpubl. M. A. thesis, University of Amsterdam, 1973, p. III-10.
- 14 Fennema, *De Multinationale onderneming*, etc., o.c., p. III-29.
- 15 Palloix, *Impérialisme et mode*, etc., o.c., p. 9.
- 16 C. Neusüss, *Imperialismus und Weltmarktbeziehung des Kapitals*, Erlangen 1972, p. 147.
- 17 E. Krippendorff, 'Staatliche Organisation und Krieg', in D. Senghaas, hrsg., *Friedenforchung und Gesellschaftskritik*, Frankfurt/M, 1973, p. 31.
- 18 E. Mandel, *Europe vs. America*, New York 1970, pp. 110/111.
- 19 Neusüss, o.c., p. 160.
- 20 S. Picciotto, H. Radice, 'Capital and State in the World Economy', in *Kapitalstate*, 1, 1973, pp. 56/57, 62/63.
- 21 Krippendorff, *Das Internationale System*, etc., o.c., p. 13.