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The Interconnection between Processes of State and Class Formation

G. van Benthem van den Bergh

1 Introduction

In recent years a great deal of attention has been given to the exploitative character of the political and economic relations between the rich industrial ('developed') countries and the poor agrarian ('underdeveloped' or 'developing') countries, as interconnected parts of the global capitalist 'system'. The global network of capitalist relations or system has been called 'imperialism' and the parts or components of this whole have been named centers and peripheries or metropolises and satellites.¹ The thrust of the argument in these analyses has been to demonstrate that 'underdevelopment' (persistent poverty) is caused by mechanisms of surplus-extraction and unequal distribution of spin-off effects of productive activities inherent in the global network of capitalist relations of production, for which the term 'imperialism' is used as a short-hand expression. These theories of imperialism try to demonstrate that the foreign policies of metropolitan states such as the United States or the EEC countries are necessarily expansionist and counter-revolutionary; that the imperialist 'stage' in the development of capitalism produces stagnation and impoverishment of peripheral capitalist countries ('the development of underdevelopment' in Frank's expression) and that 'real' development will only become possible after most of the links which connect peripheral countries with the imperialist system will be broken, following an internal transformation of their social and political structures ('social revolution').

Though these theories posit *interconnections* between international and internal development processes, they in fact tend to present a uniform image of imperialist domination and dependence: the *global* 'system' is analysed in its past performance and present structure, but about the *specific* interconnections between global and domestic *processes* in the development of particular societies these theories have little to say.² Yet, if the misdirected development within imperialism is to be changed, an *internal* social revolution is posited as necessary.³ But the prospects for such

revolutions cannot be derived from the theories of imperialism: according to familiar precepts of social analysis, whether Marxian or not, one has to analyse class formation processes in each country in relation with the development of the structure of the state (f.e. the strength and legitimacy of the governing class(es); its potential for repression; the effectiveness of government and bureaucracy etc.) For that reason increasing attention is now being given to the analysis of class formation processes in postcolonial societies.⁴ But class analysis appears to be quite difficult in these societies, firstly because 'competing affiliations (such as ethnic, caste or religious loyalties) are more manifest determinants of an individual social role'⁵, and secondly, because it is complicated by the international dimension of class formation, to which terms such as 'comprador bourgeoisie' or 'intendant class' (Cohen's concept, which includes indigenous managers of multinational corporations and state functionaries) testify. Because state formation, and especially the position of the military, is correctly seen to be in the nexus of international and domestic development, there is also increasing concern with the analysis of 'the post colonial state' and its relation to class formation processes.⁶

However, if one reads the literature it becomes quite clear that it is pervaded by considerable conceptual and therefore theoretical confusion. Since the available terms, whether in Marxian or in mainstream social science analysis, are insufficient to conceptualise class formation processes in postcolonial societies new terms are continually being introduced, on the basis of ad hoc criteria and without relating them clearly to a theoretical framework. This is also the case with respect to state formation processes: the Marxian theory is admitted to be inadequate, whereas the political science literature cannot help out, since there the state is usually taken for granted – in the sense that there is but little concern with processes of state formation.⁷

In this article I will attempt to conceptualise more adequately the interconnections between processes of state and class formation. I will first examine the Marxian concept of class and the Marxian theory of the state, and attempt to demonstrate in which respects and why Marxian conceptualisation and theory is inadequate. The alternative I will develop is based on Norbert Elias' theory of state formation processes.

2 The Marxian Concept of Class

The concept of class as used by Marx in his famous unfinished chapter of *Capital*, is defined in terms of mode and means of production.⁸ The capitalist mode of production tends to the development of two main classes in

society, consisting of those who control the means of production and those who do not and are therefore forced to sell their labour-power on the market as any other commodity. In the early stages of capitalist development landowners are still one of the 'three big classes of modern society based on the capitalist mode of production', but as all labour is increasingly transformed into wage-labour and all the means of production into capital ('a continual tendency and law of development of the capitalist mode of production') the more capitalism develops, the more a two-class society will come into existence. Implied in Marx' conception is that the more this polarisation of capitalist society advances, the more the conditions for its transformation into a socialist society will come into being, i.e. will lead to increasing competition within the capitalist class. Out of classes in itself ('an sich') classes for itself ('für sich') will emerge.⁹ But since remnants of pre-capitalist modes of production will probably not disappear before capitalism itself, real capitalist societies will never completely correspond to the theoretical model of the capitalist mode of production.¹⁰

In Marxian theory class is therefore a concept that refers to a *relationship in process*: it can be used to better understand the structure of development processes. The usefulness of such a concept of class can be demonstrated by studies such as E. P. Thompson's *The Making of the English Working Class* (1968). As Thompson says in his introduction: 'I do not see class as a 'structure', nor even as a 'category', but as something which in fact happens (and can be shown to have happened) in human relationships . . . the notion of class entails the notion of historical relationship. Like any other relationship it is a fluency which evades analysis if we attempt to stop it dead at any given moment and anatomise its structure. The finestmeshed sociological net cannot give us a pure specimen of class . . .' What Thompson attempts to say is that class is a concept that expresses a particular kind of changing interdependence between human beings, rather than particular sets of attributes of human aggregates arranged on some kind of high-middle-low scale, as in short-term stratification analysis.¹¹ Interdependence does not imply equal dependence: the point of Marxian class analysis is precisely that social classes have *opposing* interests, because control over the means of production enables the capitalist (and forces him because of the relentless competition in which he is engaged) to exploit the workers by appropriating surplus-value. Why is he able to do this? Why are workers more dependent upon capitalists than vice versa? As far as I can see this question is not explicitly discussed in Marxist writings, probably because the answer is regarded as selfevident. I have, however, found an answer that Marx himself has given. 'The great beauty of capitalist production is, that it not only reproduces wage labourers as wage labourers, but that it produces

in relation to the accumulation of capital continuously a relative overpopulation of wage labourers'.¹² Marx added that this *relative* overpopulation assures the 'necessary social dependence of workers upon capitalists' which is an '*absolute* dependence relation'.¹³ The quotation is from the last chapter of *Capital I*, 'The modern theory of colonisation', in which Marx himself demonstrates not the *absolute* but indeed the *relative* nature of this dependence relation. He discusses a book by E. G. Wakefield about the relationship between England and America when America was still a colony of England. Wakefield pleads for 'systematic colonisation' by which he means, as Marx shows, a policy of deliberate 'fabrication of wage workers'. Why was such a deliberate policy necessary? Why could this not be left to the development of market forces, as in England? Wakefield describes the adventures of a Mr. Peel, who did not only bring 50,000 pounds worth of means of production with him to America, but also his workers ('3000 people from the working class, man, wives and children'). But upon arrival in America 'Mr. Peel did not even have a servant to make his bed anymore...'. The workers disappeared because they could easily acquire land for themselves or establish themselves an independent craftsman. Mr. Peel thus learned the lesson that 'capital is not a thing, but a social relationship between people mediated by things'. The term 'mediated' ('vermittelt') is here not yet the stop-gap, nearly metaphysical concept linking 'basis' and 'superstructure', that it has become in later Marxist writings: it simply means that to control 'things' (means of production) is a *power resource* in the English social context but not yet in the American context. In America land had not yet been sufficiently expropriated from the mass of the people. Therefore the 'relative overpopulation' of wage labourers which explains the asymmetry of inter-dependence between capitalists and workers did not exist to the same degree. The degree of exploitation of wage workers remains low, the workers lose their 'feelings of dependence' and disappear from the labour market. Therefore a dependence relation has to be 'artificially created', i.e. by colonial (state) policy. But if degrees of dependence and exploitation vary with the degree of 'overpopulation' and with state policy (and in later phases with the degree of political organisation of the working class), does it then not also follow that it is necessary to speak of *degrees of opposition of interests* between social classes? But the recognition of that fact would make the notion of class struggle as necessarily leading to social (or 'system') transformation questionable.¹⁴

To see class as a particular kind of interdependence (in process) between human beings leads to yet another question: is it indeed the case, as it still is asserted in Marxian analysis, though with varying degrees of recognition of its problematic character, that this kind of 'economic' interdependence is

the *basic* social relationship, that conditions (if not determines) all other relations between human beings? In Ralph Miliband's attempt to update the Marxian theory of the state this is simply assumed: 'The economic and political life of capitalist societies is *primarily* determined by the relationship, born (?), vdB) of the capitalist mode of production, between these two classes – the class which on the one hand owns and controls, and the working class on the other. Here are still the social forces whose confrontation most powerfully shapes the social climate and political system of advanced capitalism. In fact, the political process in these societies is mainly *about* the confrontation of these forces, and is intended (by whom?, vdB) to sanction the terms of the relationship between them'.¹⁵ But can the development of states, of knowledge, of culture, of ethnic groups indeed be adequately enough explained by class analysis in the sense indicated? And perhaps even more crucial: can the development of the capitalist mode of production itself be adequately enough explained in terms of class analysis? As I have argued elsewhere, processes of social integration (in this case: state formation) and differentiation of social functions (in this case: class formation) are *interconnected* processes, of which it is impossible to state that the one 'causes' or 'determines' the other.¹⁶ That brings us to the inadequacies of the Marxian theory of the state.

3 The Marxian Theory of the State and the Ruling Class

The development of modes of production and the formation of social classes are described by Marx as occurring within a society. But what constitutes a society? Though Marx at least programmatically takes the 'world market' as his unit of analysis, when analysing class formation or when dealing with political processes he implicitly regards 'society' as coinciding with the people living on a territory enclosed by the boundaries of a particular state. As 'society' is commonly used in social science analysis it is also implicitly synonymous with a state-society or 'nation'. Now if the developments commonly associated with the concept 'capitalism' are not accompanied by the progressive abolition of state boundaries and the development of transnational political institutions regulating the global network of capitalist relations as a whole, but on the contrary by a continuous increase in government functions (also with respect to the economy) and a continuous expansion of state institutions and power, a theory not so much of *the* state but of state formation as an ongoing process becomes necessary. However, the two most conspicuous recent attempts, those of Miliband and Poulantzas, to improve the Marxian theory of the state, still aim at determining the *role* of the state in capitalist society.¹⁷ Though their approaches

are rather different, a difference which has led them into a prolonged debate, neither of them sees the need to go beyond such a static conception of the state, as fulfilling *essentially* the same functions in capitalist societies (Miliband) or in the capitalist mode of production (Poulantzas).¹⁸ Miliband's analysis is directed mainly at the attempt by American political scientists (the so-called 'pluralists') to deny the existence of a ruling class (of capitalists) within capitalist state-societies. But as Balbus has argued, his own theoretical position corresponds more closely to C. Wright Mills' ruling elite theory than to a *class* theory of the state.¹⁹ Poulantzas has more ambitious aims, i.e. to apply Althusser's interpretation of Marx to the political sphere of society, and especially to assess the position of the state in the capitalist mode of production, which he designates with the capital initials M.P.C., always the same. The 'M.P.C.' must thus be a static 'system', and indeed Poulantzas' alternative to Miliband is a variety of structural-functionalism clothed in Marxist concepts. As Poulantzas argues in his critique of Miliband: '(We should see) social classes and the state as objective *structures*, and their relations as an objective *system* of regular connections, a *structure* and a *system* whose agents, 'men', are in the words of Marx, 'bearers' of it, "Träger".' He continues: 'the State is precisely the *factor* of cohesion of a social formation and *the factor* of reproduction of the conditions of production of a system...' In other words: in Poulantzas' conception the state is seen as fulfilling particular functions *for* the capitalist system. For Poulantzas it is then easy to say that the class origin of members of the State apparatus, to which Miliband gives much attention, is irrelevant. The bureaucracy (for Poulantzas a not further defined 'social category', not a class) has 'as its *objective function* the actualisation of the *role* of the state'. For Poulantzas as for Parsons everything falls nicely into place. However, what is established is a relationship between concepts instead of relations between interdependent 'men', the human beings which Poulantzas appropriately places between quotation marks, seeing them only as 'agents' of functions necessary for system maintenance (or transformation). In his 'Pouvoir Politique et Classes Sociales', Poulantzas discusses the absolutist state as a 'state of transition' between the 'feudal type of state' and the 'capitalist type of state'.²⁰ His *types* of state are of course reducible to *modes* of production, which are again *theoretically* defined, i.e. as ideal-types. This implies that he uses a system-transformation image of change instead of seeing change as structured process (development).²¹ For these reasons neither Miliband nor Poulantzas have much to add to the basic assumptions of the Marxian conception of the state: that it was created in its present form by the bourgeoisie and that it functions as 'a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie', as the *Communist*

Manifesto formulates it, or in slightly less crude terms as 'the protector of an economically and socially dominant class' as Miliband will have it. Poulantzas attempts a more sophisticated formulation to account for anomalies such as government policies of capitalist states going against the specific (short-term) interests of important sections of the bourgeoisie: 'the state can only serve the ruling class in so far as it is relatively autonomous from the diverse factions of this class, precisely in order to organise the hegemony of the whole of this class'. Girardin makes the relationship between state and ruling class even more indirect: 'the state and the superstructure in general maintain the cohesion of a society deeply undermined by the contradictions inherent from the relations of production'.²² But all this does not go much further than what Marx and Engels themselves wrote already in *The German Ideology*: 'Through the emancipation of private property from the community, the State has become a separate entity, beside and outside civil society; but it is nothing more than the form of organisation which the bourgeoisie necessarily adapt both for internal and external purposes, for the mutual guarantee of their property and interests'.²³ Whether doing so in an open or more covert manner, the state is seen as serving the interests of the ruling class, at the very least by guaranteeing the continuing operation of the capitalist mode of production. However, with respect to the state in post-colonial societies Alavi, basing his arguments on both Miliband and Poulantzas, feels forced to amend this conception of the role of the state by positing that a *single* ruling class does not exist in post-colonial societies: There are, according to him 'three propertied classes, the metropolitan bourgeoisie, the indigenous bourgeoisie and the landed classes'... The state – for Alavi identical with 'the military-bureaucratic oligarchy' – is relatively autonomous and it mediates between the competing interests of the three propertied classes'.²⁴

Common to all these interpretations of the precise relationship between the state and the ruling class, is that the state is held to fulfil functions only for the class(es), that control the means of production. Common to them is also, that no clear distinction is made between state and government: in most cases they are treated as if they coincide completely. But whether the state is seen as 'relatively autonomous' (i.e. from the ruling class) or as an 'organ of repression of one class by another' (Lenin), the state is analysed only in terms of economic interdependencies and the power resources and power chances to which these give rise *within* particular state-societies. There is a peculiar blindness in most of these writings to what is obvious: that *the state in the singular* does not exist, but that the existence of a state presupposes the existence of other states, in other words of a *plurality of states*. State formation therefore implies an ongoing process of inter-state

competition, which influences the distribution of power resources and power chances within states. Neither in Miliband's nor in Poulantzas' analysis of the capitalist state any mention is made of the significance of inter-state competition. Only Alavi in his analysis of the post-colonial state takes interdependencies across state-boundaries into account. This leads him to introduce the metropolitan bourgeoisie (the British bourgeoisie, I presume, since Alavi's example is Pakistan, but then what about the American bourgeoisie – and what about the British and the American states?) as a *class*, which for purposes of analysis he treats as being on the same footing as the 'indigenous bourgeoisie' and the 'landed class'. Because the 'bureaucratic-military oligarchy' has no *direct* control over means of production, it is not a class, but since its power has to be explained by reference to the 'basis', it must derive its power from the *real* ruling class(es). The only solution is then to give it a 'mediating' function. But Alavi does not stop there. He notes that the 'relative autonomy' of the state (the bureaucratic-military oligarchy) is also based on 'positive conditions which stem from the far-reaching interventions by the state in the economics of post-colonial countries, both by way of a *network of controls* in which the vested interests of the bureaucracy are embedded, and a *direct appropriation and disposition of a substantial proportion of the economic surplus*. These constitute *independent material bases* of the autonomy of the bureaucratic-military oligarchy' (my italics, vdB). In other words, the 'bureaucratic-military oligarchy' has power resources of its own: 'a direct appropriation and disposition of a substantial proportion of the economic surplus'. It controls the state apparatus (bureaucracy, military, police) and through that tax collection (including import and export duties) and the distribution of tax revenues. It also controls inter-state relations: foreign aid and private investment also provide power resources for those who control the state monopolies.

As it became clear from the previous analysis of Marx' conception of class, power resources – such as Mr. Peel's capital – have to be seen as connected with particular kinds of interdependencies between human beings. Does the concept of the 'state' refer to a particular kind of interdependence, to particular ties between people? Alavi does not ask such a question, because it contradicts the Marxian conception of the state. Not only the role, but also the formation of states in that conception is seen as derivative of the development of capitalism. As Alavi writes: 'In Western societies we witness the creation of the nation-state by indigenous bourgeoisies, in the wake of their ascendant power, to provide a framework of law and various institutions which are essential for the development of capitalist relations of production'.²⁵ Indigenous to what, we may ask. Alavi's thesis about the development of the nation-state is shared by other Marxist writers. Harry Mag-

doff for example writes: 'A successful capitalist society *needs* (my italics, vdB) a strong and centralised state to provide the conditions for unimpeded trade within a goodsized national market'.²⁶ The Marxian view is phrased most succinctly by David Horowitz: 'Capitalism unified the nation-state'.²⁷ It probably all goes back to the *Communist Manifesto* 'Independent, or but loosely connected, provinces with separate interests, laws, governments and systems of taxation, became lumped together into one nation, with one government, one code of laws, one national class-interest, one frontier and one customs-tariff'.²⁸ To all such explanations we can reply: how did 'societies' become successfully capitalist?, and: why do 'socialist' societies need a state?

But before answering these questions, we should first recognise that this explanation of state formation (and of the role of the state) serves a polemical function; it is directed against the conception of the state as serving the 'general interest' of all the people living on the state territory. Engels in *The Origin of the Family; Property and the State*, and Lenin following his footsteps in *State and Revolution* – oppose this conception by giving a combined interpretation of the formation and role of the state as being a 'product' of the development of class conflict: a power that *in appearance* stands above the social classes with their irreconcilable opposed interests becomes necessary to keep that conflict within the boundaries of 'order'. In fact, Miliband's *The State in Capitalist Society* can be read as a continuation of this polemic, which in our time has to be directed against the 'pluralist' theory of the capitalist state. This theory asserts that 'all the active and legitimate groups in the population can make themselves heard at some crucial stage in the process of decision'.²⁹ According to Miliband the theory that a ruling class does not exist has 'in one form or another, come to dominate political science and political sociology, and for that matter political life itself, in alle advanced capitalist countries'.³⁰ Balbus in this connection speaks of the 'false universalism' of the state.³¹

To criticise from a Marxian perspective the pluralist conception of the state as being no more than a set of institutions for bargaining between interest-groups, a kind of central political marketplace, then nearly inevitably becomes a demonstration on the basis of 'data', examples and illuminating stories of the power resources and power chances of the 'ruling' class and the way in which it succeeds in decisively influencing government policy. That selective demonstration is bound to be successful, since there can be little doubt that 'control over the means of production' still is a very important power resource. But the attempt to refute 'pluralist' theories, developed primarily to account for the operations of the American political system, does not contribute much to the analysis of state formation pro-

cesses. Isaac Balbus attributes Miliband's 'inability to explain and anticipate social and political change' to his abandonment 'of the Marxist dialectical model of class' in favour of ruling elite analysis, but does not provide more arguments in support of the fruitfulness of the two-class model than an attempt to redefine the criterion of subordinate class formation as 'the production of alienated labour, including intellectual labour'. Accordingly, 'students and intellectuals could conceivably be considered an increasingly important element of the subordinate class of advanced capitalist societies'.³² Balbus thus remains faithful to the conception of economic interdependencies as the prime mover of change and development. He has not been able to show that his model enables him 'to explain and anticipate social and political change' in a more satisfactory manner than Miliband.

Alavi states that he is aware of the deficiencies of the Marxian analysis of the state. Many other Marxists would agree with him – as their growing concern with *the* theory of *the* capitalist state (in their formulation) demonstrates. Why is it then that they seem to be unable to take any distance from their original model? One reason may be the coerciveness of the polemics in which Marxists feel forced to engage themselves: Miliband's book is in fact one extended polemic. But a second reason is more important: to leave the conception of economic interdependencies as the prime mover of change, would make it impossible to any longer see the capitalist mode of production as the 'root cause', as the 'fundamental' explanation of all the social evils Marxists want to eradicate. This belief in a root cause, in a cause that can be blamed for all developments in a 'bad' direction, fulfils important orientating functions, and makes it relatively easy to take an uncompromising political stand. It also provides certainty to participants in the internecine struggles within the Left: he who can show his preferred strategy to go to the 'root', to really address itself to the fundamental causes of exploitation, oppression, poverty, underdevelopment etc. will have a good conscience, even if he does not win the struggle. He can then still 'win' by forming with his comrades in arms a new movement or party. For Marx himself the search for a root cause was very important: 'It is each time the direct relation of the proprietor of means of production to the direct producers – a relationship, of which the specific form at any moment corresponds to a certain level of development of the manner and kind of labour and because of that with its social productivity – in which we find the *innermost secret*, the *hidden basis* of the whole social construction and therefore also of the political form of relations of sovereignty and dependency, in short of the specific form to the State at any moment'.³³ To give up the belief in an 'innermost secret' can be damaging for one's sense of orientation and political identity. And there is still another reason: to ana-

lyse state formation in terms of power resources not necessarily derivative of economic interdependencies and the class struggle implies that the process of 'class' formation does not come to an end with the disappearance of the capitalist bourgeoisie – as the development of the Soviet Union and other socialist states has demonstrated but too clearly.³⁴ To admit this, instead of regarding Stalinism as an 'aberration' and the present Soviet-state as a transition, necessary until all capitalist states (and China?) will have disappeared, is at the same time to hurt the dream of a better world that will *have* to come into existence after the capitalistic structure of economic interdependencies will have disappeared. Miliband ends his book with a description of that dream: 'the socialist society they (the working class and its allies in other classes) will create, will not require the establishment of an all-powerful state on the ruins of the old. On the contrary, their 'faculty of ruling the nation' will, for the first time in history, enable them to bring into being an authentically democratic social order, a truly free society of self-governing men and women, in which, as Marx also puts it, the state will be converted from an organ superimposed upon society into one completely subordinated to it'.³⁵ But such dreams may blind us to the reality of the structure of development. The question that I have asked before: does the concept of the 'state' refer to a particular kind of interdependencies, to particular ties between people, therefore remains to be answered.

4 What are 'States'

What are 'States'? How and when did they emerge? Is it indeed the case that 'indigenous bourgeoisies' created the nation states, because they needed them? Is it sufficient to explain state formation as the necessary consequence of the emergence of the capitalist mode of production? These questions show that the interpretation of state-formation is indeed related to fundamental tenets of the Marxian paradigm: to the relation between 'basis' and 'superstructure' and to the conception of social change or development based on a succession of 'modes of production'. If it can be demonstrated that not only the development of economic interdependencies is a structured process, which is the essence of Marx' theory of class formation, but also state formation, a conceptualisation in terms of 'basis' and 'superstructure' can no longer be considered adequate.

The demonstration that state-formation is a structured process has indeed been provided by Norbert Elias in his studies *Über den Prozess der Zivilisation* (1969²) and *Die Höfische Gesellschaft* (1969) and further elaborated in a paper *Processes of State Formation and Nation Building* (1971). I will

attempt to answer the question about the specificity on the interdependencies, to which the concept of the state refers, on the basis of the model which Elias has designed.³⁶ Elias' analysis is primarily, though not exclusively, based on the formation of the French state. But though his model could be improved upon by further comparative studies, its limitation to the French case does not affect the theoretical advance of showing the structuredness of state-formation as a long-term process of development.³⁷ Elias has studied mainly the formation of *dynastic* states. The French revolution, the long-term origins of which he has also explained, marks the transformation of these *dynastic* states into *nation* states.

The process of industrialisation changed the nature of interdependencies between social classes. Kings and aristocrats could in the eighteenth century still regard the people over which they ruled as 'subjects', as only being there to fulfil functions for them. But when technological skills and schooling became increasingly important for industrial production, reciprocity of dependence between social classes became greater.³⁸ At the same time another process continued: once a monopoly is established (whether the 'political' monopolies of violence and taxation, or the 'economic' monopolies of large corporations) the individual or group controlling the monopoly becomes himself more and more dependent on his dependents for the administration of the monopolised chances. Therefore the power of the dependents as a group (class) gradually increases. Because of this gradual reduction of the unevenness of interdependence between stronger and weaker social classes, ruling elites and political parties increasingly had to justify themselves as governing *for* the 'public interest', for all the people living within the state. We can begin to speak of 'nations', when the power differentials between social classes become smaller, when the distance between ruler and ruled becomes less great, and when state monopolies are to some extent controlled by and used for the 'people'. In the eighteenth century the word 'nation' was still a term of opposition: used to express that the people were there not for the state, but the state was there for the 'nation'. Again, this process of nation-state (or perhaps better state-nation) formation has been very slow, with many ups and downs, and it is by no means completed. With the increasing strength of the working class, through the formation of trade unions and socialist parties, the *liberal*, laissez-faire states of the nineteenth century were transformed into the *welfare* of *service* states of the twentieth century.³⁹ At first a three-cornered struggle takes place: the formerly antagonistic relation between the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie (the main axis of struggle up to the second half of the nineteenth century) is gradually transformed into antagonistic cooperation against the threatening increase of power of the organised working class. Later the working

class, in the nineteenth century still struggling to be represented in the political system, also becomes more and more 'integrated' in the state. The gradual extension of voting rights is one of the expressions of the growing strength of the working class. In the process, the state apparatus becomes increasingly powerful and begins to perform more and more functions.⁴⁰ These centralising tendencies occur even in a country like the United States, where the national political ideology is very much opposed to increasing governmental and state functions. The class struggle inherent in the development of capitalism, combined with the increasing need for central coordination, in societies with a highly developed division of labour, continuously strengthens state power. The 'internationalism' of nineteenth century socialist parties was unable to counteract this process, as was most clearly demonstrated by the fact, that the German socialist party voted for the war credits in 1914.⁴¹

The formation of states in Western Europe as large, internally pacified territories, has been an important condition for the development of capitalism. The existence of stable monopolies of violence made it possible for a process of purely *economic* (market) competition to take place. If entrepreneurs would have had to maintain private armies to protect their factories from attempts at destruction by competitors and to safeguard the roads, railways and canals over which their products were transported, the process of industrialisation could hardly have proceeded – certainly not as quickly as it did.⁴²

Elias has demonstrated that there is a structure, a specific direction, in the process of state formation, even though the *histories* of European states are very different. What Elias has started to explain – and what is not explained by the Marxian theory of state formation as being a necessary *consequence* of the development of capitalism – is why states were formed *before* the capitalist mode of production developed. He gives in particular a detailed analysis of what he considers not a *transition* period between feudalism and capitalism but a distinct phase, a specific configuration: court society or the 'absolutist' state, as it has become known in the historical literature.⁴³ That the power of the monarchs was far from 'absolute' but was based on a delicate triangular power balance has already been mentioned. The importance of such triangular power balances has been seen also by Engels in *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* though he saw them as an exception, not as a common condition as Elias: 'By way of exception, however, periods occur in which the working classes balance each other so nearly that the state power, as ostensible mediator, acquires for the moment, a certain degree of independence from both'. It was seen in more specific terms also by Marx who remarks in *The Civil war in*

France (1871) about the rise of Bonapartism in France in the nineteenth century that this 'was the only form of government possible at the time when the bourgeoisie had already lost, and the working class had not yet acquired, the faculty of ruling the nation'. What Marx could not yet see, is that neither of the two industrial classes would acquire the *sole* faculty of ruling the nation. In the *welfare* state the organised employers and the organised working class became the ruling classes of the state in antagonistic cooperation with one another.

Common to Marx and Elias models of development is that they both see 'as one of the indispensable ingredients of a scientific theory of society the fact that men may oppress and exploit men and that far from being unstructured accidents, social oppression and exploitation are structured and can be explained in connection with the overall development of societies'.⁴⁴ Common is also that they see exploitation and oppression, as social development in general, as originating in competition, resulting from the scarcity of what people need and value in life. In that sense Elias is just as much a (historical and dialectical) materialist as Marx was.⁴⁵

The difference between Elias' and Marx' models of development is that Elias shows that the development of the capitalist mode of production and of (nation) states are interconnected *aspects* of one overall process of development, of structured changes in the nature and in the degree of unevenness, complexity and geographical extension of human interdependencies. In the history of Western Europe the development of capitalism can be seen as the *differentiation* aspect and the formation of states as the *integration* aspect of that process. Both increasing differentiation and increasing integration provide particular groups of human beings with new functions and new power resources, which make them into what are called 'rising' groups or classes, whereas other 'declining' groups or classes come to lose their old functions and power resources.⁴⁶ Both aspects of the process are therefore a source of conflicts: not only class conflict is a structured process, but also integration conflict - the latter a combination of concepts, that runs counter to the meaning as opposites which the terms 'integration' and 'conflict' have acquired in the social sciences. The development of capitalism and the formation of states have also in common that they are processes of monopolisation, that they have an immanent, coercive dynamic towards the concentration of power resources and chances into an ever smaller number of hands.

It may be clear that in Elias' model the conceptualisation in terms of 'basis' and 'superstructure' is transcended. The 'basis' are power resources derived from ongoing and often coercive processes of differentiation of social functions. These may be important, in particular periods so impor-

tant that they seem to overshadow all other power resources as it could indeed appear during the 'industrial revolution', the structure and meaning of which Marx attempted to conceptualise and explain. But in order to become so decisive, the 'superstructure' had already to be developed to a rather high level. Whether power resources derived from 'superstructure' (states or 'integrations') weigh less, are less 'basic' than power resources derived from the 'basis' (from social differentiation or 'relations of production') is a question that cannot be answered a priori. If 'ideas' (knowledge, ideology, science) are also included in the 'superstructure', as Marxists do, that conceptualisation becomes even more confusing. Knowledge, both in its orientation and control functions, is interconnected both, with integration processes (for example the development of the bureaucracy and the army; the development of planning methods and institutions; the development of national ideologies etc.) and with differentiation processes (the development of productive technology, management and organisation techniques; the development of class ideologies). Both in its orientation and control functions knowledge may be important a power resource. Governments have increasingly become conscious of this as the 'nationalisation' of scientific research and the development of propaganda and 'intelligence' techniques may demonstrate, not to speak of patent rights or industrial spying. The development of knowledge can be studied as a long-term structured process in the same manner as class formation or state formation.⁴⁷ These process are interconnected but *relatively autonomous* with respect to each other: they can be distinguished as *aspects* of one overall process of development of societies, but they can neither be separated from each other nor reduced to each other. Both the Marxist conceptualisation in terms of 'basis' and 'superstructure' and the division of social science into supposedly fully autonomous disciplines, each with their separate conceptualisations and theories, are therefore mistaken.

The widening of the theoretical perspective on development processes Elias' model provides may be illustrated by examining the question why the industrial proletariat has not fulfilled its assigned system-transforming revolutionary role. Because the 'basic contradiction' of the capitalist mode of production has not disappeared, an explanation of the 'failure' of the proletariat became necessary. Increasing affluence and 'embourgeoisement' of the workers, indoctrination in capitalist 'values' by mass media and schools have been advanced as explanations for the lack of proper class consciousness of the working class.⁴⁸ But it may be more fruitful to look into the consequences of the process of increasing 'socialisation' of the central monopolies of the state through the increasing integration of the working class in the state apparatus. An important symptom of this process

is the decline of anti-militarism, which in the nineteenth century (and in countries not involved in the First World War such as the Netherlands up to 1939) still was an integral part of the socialist movement.⁴⁹ The working class increasingly acquired a stake in the existing state-societies. State policy and planning as counteracting the damages done by the unplanned development of capitalism, became the dominant creed of the social-democratic parties. And the more the welfare state indeed provided important benefits to the working class, the more its members identified with their own nation-state rather than with the working class in other states. As Gunnar Myrdal has said: 'The Welfare State is nationalistic'.⁵⁰ But this process contributed also to increasing differentiation *within* the working class: ruling groups of working class political parties and trade unions started to derive new power resources and chances from the functions they were able to fulfil at the central, the 'state' level. They acquired some common interests with the ruling groups of the bourgeoisie: at the state level they deal as equals with the representatives of the bourgeoisie, while at the factory level class based inequalities in income and power remain very great – though they are smaller than in Marx' time. State formation and the development of capitalism lead to contradictory processes: the replacement of the class struggle to the central, state level has resulted in increasing oligarchisation, to which the so-called 'New Left' has again responded by stressing both decentralisation and democratisation. It is impossible to explain the emergence of this new opposition movement, which in most European countries has now forced trade unions to shift their activities again to the factory level, without looking at state and class formation as interconnected processes.

Elias therefore suggests that the concept of class should be amended in two respects.⁵¹ In the first place it should no longer be based only on interdependencies at the factory level – as the coercive relationship between owners/controllers of the means of production and the exploited sellers of their labour power – but take into account that struggles between representatives of capital and labour occur at many integration levels and in particular at the highest level of integration of state society. In the second place, it should not only be based on the distribution of economic chances, as expressed by the concept of surplus-value. At issue are also chances to control, command and supervise others, to which I would add chances to be more or less autonomous in one's work, to do stimulating, 'creative' work, etc. In order to get a better grip on these very complicated patterns of distribution of chances and power resources, he suggests that it could help to determine the number of levels of integration in a society in relation to the degree of differentiation of functions ('division of labour'). Behind

this suggestion is 'of course' that people can derive power resources both from increasing differentiation, from functions they fulfil with respect to production, distribution, exchange and what economists call 'services', and from functions they fulfil with respect to increasing integration, from providing 'law and order', coordination and planning, conducting, 'international' relations, collecting and distributing taxes, etc. This perspective also makes it possible to move beyond the division in 'sectors' (or 'sub-systems') corresponding with existing social scientific disciplines: the 'political', the 'economic', the 'social' and the 'cultural' sectors.

The question whether the concept of the 'state' refers to a particular kind of human interdependencies remains to be answered. It may help to first ask the question: why is it that if people speak – and social scientists attempt to generalise – about *the* society or *the* economy, they always appear to have a particular *state-society* in mind, instead of a village or town society, or indeed human society as a whole? Is it because those are the social units with which people primarily identify? But why *do* they identify with units having the characteristics of states – and what are these characteristics? Elias' answer is that 'states' are units, 'in which the use of physical violence in the relations between the members is relatively strongly controlled, whereas at the same time they prepare, and sometimes even stimulate people for the use of physical violence against all nonmembers'.⁵² As crucial for the formation of the dynastic states in Europe, Elias sees the establishment of relatively stable central monopolies of violence and taxation over large territories, which include what Marxists call 'feudal' estates and towns, some of which before had the characteristics of states themselves (city-states). What these units have in common is that they are groups of people which are united in order to defend their own lives and the survival of their own group against other groups, or to attack other groups together. Because it is impossible to separate the defense from the attack function, Elias gives them the generic name: *attack and defense units*. At different levels of social development these may be villages, towns, tribes, states, 'federations' of states – and perhaps in the future a 'world' state, but that would be an altogether different kind of social unit.

In feudal attack and defense units the ruling groups were warriors: these derived their power resources both from the protective function they fulfilled and from their control over the means of violence: horses, armour, weapons. To perform the protective, 'security' function for the members of a social unit, which is tied to conducting its external ('international') relations, gives a group considerable power resources *within* that unit. Gradually, the protective function was taken over by the kings, who could acquire mercenary armies, when they were able to increase their revenues

from taxation in money instead of land. Increasing social differentiation, in particular urbanisation, was a necessary condition for the defunctionalisation of the feudal warrior aristocracy. But the kings started to perform new functions: their power was not only based on the attack and defense function, but also on building and protecting the road networks, which made safe long distance trading possible, on the development of legal systems, through which business could be guaranteed; and on standardising the value of currencies, etc. The higher the level of guaranteeing social differentiation, the greater the number of government functions became. What needs to be explained is therefore why control over the means of physical violence has not remained the most important power resource in highly developed state-societies. Why are not *all* societies ruled by military-bureaucratic oligarchies? Why have 'control over the means of production', or 'representing the organised working class' become such important power resources, that they begin to form the power base of governments? The answers have to be found in the increasing reciprocity of dependence both between social classes and between ruling groups and the ruled (if we take 'rule' as a shorthand description for the specific nature of 'state' interdependencies, being based on the changing functions of 'integrations' as related to specific figurations of social differentiation).

The concept of the 'state' can in its most general formulation be seen to refer to different kinds of 'integrations' corresponding to different patterns of social differentiation. States are therefore not synonymous with governments – and are not to be confused with governments. States are specific *types* of societies, corresponding to particular developmental phases. We can thus speak of state-societies. The lower the level of social differentiation, the greater the power chances of those who control the means of physical violence. That is the starting-point for the explanation of the predominant position of 'military-bureaucratic oligarchies' in most countries of the Third World. It is related to their low level of 'development' – more specifically to the low levels of integration and differentiation, or again: of state and class formation. It is also related to their position within the worldwide network of 'the international division of labour' and the competitive struggle between coalitions of states.

The question about the specific interdependencies to which the concept of 'state' refers, has now been answered, in as far as that is possible, given the present state of our knowledge about long-term development processes.⁵³

Notes

1 See e.g. Andre Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin*

G. van Benthem van den Bergh Processes of State and Class Formation

America (New York and London, 1969); Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe, *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism* (London, 1972); Johan Galtung, 'A Structural Theory of Imperialism' in *Journal of Peace Research* (1971) pp. 81-117. On the basis of such works and borrowing from classical Marxist texts, especially Lenin's *Imperialism as the highest stage of Capitalism* (1917) a voluminous pamphlet literature has developed.

- 2 For a critique of the static or a-historic character of theories about imperialism as a *system*, see G. van Benthem van den Bergh 'Theory or Taxonomy?' Some critical notes on Johan Galtung's 'A structural theory of Imperialism'. *Journal of Peace Research*, (1972), 77-85.
- 3 For the full scale of arguments in support of this thesis see W. R. Wertheim, *Evolution and Revolution: The Rising Waves of Emancipation* (Harmondsworth, 1974), esp. part 3, 227-353.
- 4 See e.g. T. Shanin, 'Class and Revolution' *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, (1970) 22-35; Malcolm Caldwell, 'The Role of the Peasantry in the Revolution', *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, (1970), 50-64; Theotonio dos Santos, 'The Concept of Social Classes' in *Science and Society*, Vol. XXXIV, no. 1 (1970) pp. 166-193; Gavin Williams 'The Social Stratification of a Neocolonial Economy in Western Nigeria, in C. Allen and R. W. Johnson *African Perspectives*, (London 1971), Robin Cohen, "Class a African analytical problems and perspectives" in *The Socialist Register* (London, 1972). Ken Post *On Peasantisation and Rural Class Differentiation in Western Africa*, ISS Occasional Paper (The Hague, 1970); Leo Kuper, 'Race, Class and Power: some comments on revolutionary change' *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (1972) pp. 400-421; Peter Worsley, 'Frantz Fanon and the 'Lumpenproletariat': *The Socialist Register*, (London 1972) pp. 193-230.
- 5 Cohen, op cit. p. 231.
- 6 See e.g. Hamza Alavi, 'The State in Postcolonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh', *New Left Review*, no. 74 (July-August 1972) pp. 59-81; Heinz Rudolf Sonntag, 'Der Staat des Unterentwickelten Kapitalismus', *Kursbuch 31* (Mai 1973) pp. 157-183; John Saul, 'The State in Postcolonial Societies: Tanzania'. *The Socialist Register*, (London 1974) pp. 349-372.
- 7 Significantly most of the contributions to a recent collection of studies, sponsored by the Committee on Comparative Politics of the American Social Science Research Council (Charles Tilly, Ed. *The formation of National states in Western Europe*, Princeton, 1975) have been written by historians.
- 8 Karl Marx, *Das Kapital, Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*, Dritter Buch. Kap. 52 (Hamburg 1894 and Berlin 1969).
- 9 In his extension of the Marxian class concept to the development of the international capitalist network (the 'international system') Krippendorf argues, that the bourgeoisie first within states and later as an international bourgeoisie not only becomes a class for itself before the proletariat is able to do so, but also actively prevents the proletariat from becoming a class for itself, thus prolonging the existence of capitalism as a 'system'. (Ekkehart Krippendorf, 'Towards a class analysis of the international system' in *Acta Politica*, vol. X (1975) pp. 3-13 and 'Das Internationale System Zwischen Stabilisierung und Klassenkampf' in *Probleme der internationalen Beziehungen* (Frankfurt am Main 1972)). I agree with L. M. van der Mey's critique of

- Krippendorff's analysis ('De visie van Krippendorff op het internationale systeem en de klassenstrijd' *Acta Politica*, Vol. X (1975) pp. 14-24).
- 10 The concept of 'mode of production' is taken too much for granted. It resembles ideal type or system concepts, static theoretical constructs, which create difficulties when employed for purpose of process analysis. Might that not explain the need to introduce 'come to the rescue' concepts like semi-feudalism or semi-capitalism? These problems result from the combination of the image of changing 'modes of production' with the postulate of an unchanging relationship between 'basis' and 'superstructure'. It then becomes impossible to conceptualise process in any other way than in terms of *transformation* from one 'basis' ('mode of production') into another, with the superstructure following suit. The span of time in which the necessary relationship between 'basis' and 'super-structure' has not yet been established then becomes a 'transition' period. But *why* the transformation occurs is not explained.
 - 11 For an extensive elaboration of the distribution between different kinds of class or stratification analysis see Stanislaw Ossowski, *Class Structure in the Social Consciousness* (London, 1963). What I would call *attribute* analysis, Ossowski terms 'schemes of gradation'.
 - 12 Das Kapital, I, p. 796. My translation.
 - 13 Marx probably uses the term 'absolute' in this context because he polemicizes in the same sentence against the political economists that produce the lie ('Umlügen') that instead of a dependence relation the capital-labour relationship is a free contract relation between buyers and sellers as equally independent owners of the commodity labour and the commodity capital.
 - 14 It also makes the concept of 'contradiction' problematic, if that is identified with class relations. This may remain a useful concept if it refers to 'contradictory' processes: tendencies in directions conceptualised as 'opposites', for example, centralisation and decentralisation; monopolisation and demonopolisation; oligarchisation and democratisation etc. See further G. van Benthem van den Bergh, 'Conflict and contradiction, or how to cope with time' in Johan Niezing, Ed. *Urban Guerilla* (Rotterdam, 1974).
 - 15 Ralph Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society* (London 1969) p. 16.
 - 16 See G. van Benthem van den Bergh, 'State formation and Interstate Competition from Pre-Industrial to Contemporary Europe', Institute of Social Studies, mimeo, (1975).
 - 17 Ralph Miliband, *op. cit.*; Nicos Poulantzas, *Pouvoir politique et Classes Sociales* (Paris, 1971).
 - 18 See Nicos Poulantzas and Ralph Miliband, 'The Problem of the Capitalist State' in Robin Blackburn, Ed. *Ideology in Social Science* (London 1972).
 - 19 Isaac Balbus, 'Ruling Elite Theory vs Marxist Class Analysis', *Monthly Review*, Vol. 23, May 1971, pp. 36-46. For elite theory see Tom Bottomore, *Elites and Society* (Harmondsworth 1965).
 - 20 Vol. I, Chapter 3.
 - 21 See note 9 and G. van Benthem van den Bergh 'The Structure of Development: an invitation to the sociology of Norbert Elias'. *ISS Occasional Paper No. 13* (1971) esp. pp. 6-11.
 - 22 Jean Claude Girardin, 'On the Marxist theory of the State', *Politics and Society*, Vol. 4, no. 2 (Winter 1974) p. 195.
 - 23 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology* (1846), (New York

- 1963) p. 59.
- 24 Hamza Alavi, *op. cit.* p. 59. The relative autonomy of the state in post-colonial societies derives then mainly from its being juxtaposed between 'foreign' and 'domestic' interests.
 - 25 Alavi, *op. cit.* p. 61.
 - 26 Harry Magdoff, 'Imperialism: a short historical survey'; *Monthly Review*, Vol. 24, no. 1, 1972, p. 5.
 - 27 David Horowitz, *Imperialism and Revolution* (London 1969) p. 42.
 - 28 Penguin edition, 1967, p. 82. See also Poulantzas, *op. cit.* Vol. 1, Ch. II.
 - 29 R. A. Dahl, cited in Miliband, *op. cit.*
 - 30 Miliband, *op. cit.* p. 3.
 - 31 Balbus, *op. cit.*
 - 32 All quotations from Balbus, *op. cit.* p. 45-46.
 - 33 Karl Marx, *Das Kapital*, Dritter Band, p. 841. My translation (vdB).
 - 34 In the Soviet state-society class formation is more directly related to control over the means of violence, taxation and socio-economic planning, than to control over the means of production. In that sense one can speak of a *new* class, as Djilas has done (See Milovan Djilas, *The New Class: an analysis of the communist system* (New York, 1957).
 - 35 Miliband, *op. cit.* p. 277.
 - 36 For a description of his model see G. van Benthem van den Bergh, 'State Formation and Interstate Competition from Preindustrial to Contemporary Europe'. *op. cit.*
 - 37 Elias owes much to Max Weber's analysis of different historical types of states. But as Reinhard Bendix (*Max Weber: an intellectual portrait* (New York, 1962) p. 382) notes: '... the concrete emergence of the modern state fell outside the scope of his (Weber's) research...' Though Weber provides very important material for the analysis of state formation, he discussed historical types of states in the same way as Marx analysed the development of historical types of 'modes of production'. In *Die Grundrisse* (1857-58) Marx speaks of 'Formen, die der Kapitalistische Produktionsweise vorausgehen; in Martin Nicholas translation 'Forms, which precede capitalist production'. See Karl Marx, *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy* (Harmondsworth, 1973) pp. 471-514, and E. J. Hobsbawm Ed., *Karl Marx Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations* (London, 1964). Hobsbawm has made the mistake of translating 'Formen' in to 'formations', and has thus contributed to the introduction of the term 'social formation', which is now widely used in Marxist literature. But as 'formation' in this usage does not refer anymore to a process of becoming ('the forming of...'), as in ordinary language, but to an entity in a state of rest, this usage does not help to better understand and explain the development of societies - on the contrary.
 - 38 The changing character of warfare, in particular the superiority of conscriptive armies over mercenary armies, as demonstrated in the wars after the French Revolution, has also contributed to the increasing reciprocity of dependence and to lessening the power differentials between rulers and ruled and between social classes, which occurred in 19th century Europe. See Alfred Vagts *A History of Militarism: civilian and military* (New York, 1959²) esp. pp. 104-293 and Stanislav Andreski: *Military Organisation and*

- Society* (London 1968²) esp. Ch. 2 Stratification pp. 20-75.
- 39 See Gunnar Myrdal, *Beyond the Welfare State*, London, 1969, and P. Thoenes, *The Elite in the Welfare States* (London 1966).
- 40 As contemporary state functions seen from a Marxian perspective Robin Murray gives the following list: (1) guaranteeing of property rights; (2) economic liberalisation: the establishment of the conditions for free, competitive exchange; (3) economic planning; (4) input provision at low cost: labour (education, wage control), land (public utilities), capital (national banking system, special credits), technology (financing of research and development, especially in connection with the military), economic infrastructure (energy, communications); (5) intervention for social consensus; prevention of pollution, wide regional disparities, regulation of conditions of work and sale, social security; (6) management of external relations. See Robin Murray, 'The internationalisation of Capital and the Nation State', *New Left Review* (1971) pp. 83-109.
- 41 See Merle Fainsod, *International Socialism and the World War*. (New York, 1965²). Most of the literature dealing with this subject according to Fainsod are apologies and polemics, of which 'the prime object is to justify one's own conduct as socialists while denouncing the abandonment of socialist ideals by enemy socialists'. The general strike proposed as the proletariat's weapon to fight war suffered from the weakness which Bebel analysed already at the 1908 conference of the Second International in Stuttgart: as long as the labour movement unevenly developed in different states, in the event of such a strike the country with the best organised proletariat would be at the mercy of attack from countries with proletariats less well organised. Important was also the experience of German Social-Democracy, that its rise had coincided with the growing commercial and industrial supremacy of Germany on the European continent. Any threat that supremacy would be an attack against the German labour movement, which the German government had allowed to become the strongest in the world. To defy the government, would be to invite repression. Fainsod's analysis makes quite clear why the integration of the working class in the state was much stronger than class solidarity across national borders. That this is still the case can be observed in the apparent impossibility to form one social-democratic party for the whole European Community. See Johan Galtung, *The European Community: a superpower in the making* (1972) and Sicco Mansholt, *La Crise*. (Paris 1974).
- 42 For the analysis of a case in which a state did not succeed in curbing violence see Anthon Blok, *The Mafia of a Sicilian Village (1860-1960): an anthropological study of political middlemen* (Oxford, 1974).
- 43 See esp. *Die Höfische Gesellschaft*. Neuwied und Berlin, 1969.
- 44 Norbert Elias, 'Sociology of knowledge: new perspectives', part I, *Sociology*, Vol. 5, no. 2 (1971) p. 155.
- 45 It should not be forgotten that 'materialism' acquired its meaning in the polemic against 'idealism', as the conception that 'ideas' are the prime mover of the historical process. For a clear expose see 'Opposition of the Materialist and Idealistic Outlook' in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The German Ideology*, American edition, pp. 3-79. For Elias' comments on the Marxian concept of 'consciousness' and the problem of the relation between science and ideology, see Elias, 'Sociology of knowledge: new perspectives' part 1

- and 2, *Sociology*-, Vol. 5, no. 2 and 3 (1971).
- 46 Elias remarks that though Marx' attempt to develop a theory of the rise and decline of social strata has been an important theoretical advance, its further improvement has been hampered by mingling of theory with social ideals: Marx could not distantiate himself from the idea that classes which are 'rising' at a given moment are 'good' (the bourgeoisie in its 'progressive' phase), whereas declining classes (the bourgeoisie in its 'decadent' phase) are 'bad'. This mingling of theory and ideals explains, according to Elias, why Marx neglected the still quite fierce struggle, which in his time was waged between the rising industrial bourgeoisie and the traditional noble-military-agrarian aristocracy – as if the French Revolution really had destroyed the power of the latter. It also explains why Marx could not see clearly enough the rising and declining strata within the industrial bourgeoisie and within the working class. It may be added that 'rise' and 'decline' has to be seen in relation to the functions particular strata fulfil and the power resources and chances they thus acquire. See Norbert Elias, *Was ist Soziologie?* (München, 1970) p. 202.
- 47 See Norbert Elias, 'Sociology of knowledge', *op cit.*; 'Theories of Science and History of Science: comments on a recent discussion', *Economic and Society*, 1972, pp. 117-132 and 'The Sciences: towards a theory' in Richard Whitley, Ed. *Social Processes of Scientific Development* (London, Boston, 1974) pp. 21-42.
- 48 See Ralph Miliband, *op. cit.* esp. pp. 179-279; Herbert Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man. Studies in the ideology of advanced industrial Society* (Boston, 1964).
- 49 See Fainsod, *op. cit.* Vagts, *op. cit.*; Karl Liebknecht, 'Militarismus und Antimilitarismus unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der internationale Jugendbewegung' (1907) in *Reden und Aufsätzen*, Band 1 (Frankfurt am Main, 1971) pp. 6-225.
- 50 Myrdal, *op. cit.*, p. 160.
- 51 Elias, *Was ist Soziologie?* *op. cit.*, p. 137.
- 52 Elias, *Was ist Soziologie?* *op. cit.*, p. 151.
- 53 It is curious that in political science state formation has hardly been regarded as a problem needing investigation. The state is treated in the best books as a given, as an entity with particular properties, that may have different forms (democratic, authoritarian, dictatorial, totalitarian governments; different electoral systems; different party compositions, etc.) but no structured development. In an influential textbook we only find a static definition, derived from Weber: 'The Government is any government that successfully upholds a claim to the exclusive regulation of the legitimate use of physical force in enforcing its rules within a given territorial area. The political system made up of the residents of that territorial area and the government of the area is a 'State'. (Robert A. Dahl. *Modern Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, 1964). No attempt at explanation of the genesis of such a 'state' is being made. In a 'critical' German textbook more attention is being given to the state under the name 'öffentliche Herrschaft'. But there again only 'Modelle' (liberal; sozialstaatlich, fascistisch, kommunistisch) are discussed, not state formation. See Wolfgang Abendroth and Kurt Lenk (Herausg.) *Einführung in die Politische Wissenschaft* (München, 1973).