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The structure of the progressive-conservative controversy I Attitudinal referents in the Netherlands 1975 II A structural analysis of ideological developments in the Netherlands 1970-1975

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De stagnerende verzorgingsstaat

De verzorgingsstaat lijkt op een punt gekomen, waar aan een aantal eisen die haar gesteld worden niet meer kan worden voldaan. Velen vragen zich af of de verzorgingsstaat, paradepaard van onze na-oorlogse politiek, wel een succes is gebleken. Verscheidene klemmende vragen komen nu, aan het einde van de jaren zeventig, op ons af.

Is er geen afstand gegroeid tussen gewekte verwachtingen en feitelijke realisering? Sluit de bureaucratistische stijl van veel voorzieningen wel aan bij de persoonlijke aard van de behoeften? Kan het stelsel, dat in tijden van welvaart en groei floreerde, ook onder stagnerende omstandigheden doeltreffend werken? Zijn democratie en verzorgingsstaat blijvend te combineren.

J. A. A. van Doorn schrijft over de beheersbaarheid van en I. Sewandono over de theorie achter de verzorgingsstaat. C. J. M. Schuyt schrijft over de sociale toekomst, A. Heertje over de economische toekomst en H. Daudt over de politieke toekomst van de verzorgingsstaat. J. de Lange en P. B. Lehning vragen zich af of de burger wel krijgt wat hem toekomt. A. Peper belicht de beheersproblemen in één sector van onze verzorgingsstaat: de welzijnssector, en M. van Doorn-de Leeuw doet dat voor de gezondheidszorg.



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Onderzoek

The structure of the progressive-conservative controversy*

Attitudinal referents in the Netherlands, 1975

C. P. Middendorp

1 Introduction

This is the first of a series of papers on the further assessment of the structure of the progressive-conservative controversy in the Netherlands.¹ This antithesis is comparable to what is known in American research as the liberalism-conservatism controversy. In Great-Britain, it is often called radicalism-conservatism (see Middendorp, 1978 : 4). There is a large research tradition in this field, which has been summarized by Middendorp (1978: Chapter 3) and Ray (1973). Due to insufficient definitions and conceptualizations (and consequently, operationalizations), sampling procedures and analytical techniques applied to the data, the results of empirical research have been confusing and contradictory. A methodology to tackle these problems has been outlined elsewhere (Middendorp, 1978: Chapter 2) and will not be repeated here.

The major point is that it is not a fruitful approach to study 'the structure of social attitudes' without defining *some domain*. Rather, there should be criteria to select certain items, i.e. there should be a conceptual framework. Too often, this has been lacking in earlier research (see e.g. Ferguson, 1939, Eysenck, 1954, 1971; Comrey and Newmeyer, 1965).

In a previous study (Middendorp, 1978) the *progressive-conservative* controversy has been chosen as such a framework: a *conceptual* model of this controversy was developed and criteria were derived from it in order to be able to operationalize the model at the attitude level. In addition to this, the model was operationalized 'directly' using bipolar items of a rather abstract nature: the philosophical level. The main results will be outlined below since the attempt that has been made to explain those results has inspired the present study.

At the philosophical level it was found that in the general Dutch population, in 1970, three relatively independent dimensions emerged: the philosophies of *liberalism*, *conservatism* and *socialism*.

At the attitude level, two major dimensions emerged, as well as an additional

subdimension: *socio-economic left-right, non-economic libertarianism-traditionalism* and its sub-dimension of *authoritarianism*.²

In order to explain the fact that in the Dutch population the progressive-conservative 'antithesis' falls apart into several dimensions, Kerlinger's (1967, 1972) theory of the criteriality of attitudinal referents was generalized in two ways.³

The original theory maintains that there is a dual structure of social attitudes. A *liberal* and a *conservative* dimension (in the American sense) appear, which are relatively independent of each other, due to the fact that most people are unable to develop consistent responses to all ideological stimuli. Since there are basically two sets of referents (ideas, notions) offered by the ideological superstructure, a liberal and a conservative one, most people will choose either one, of which the referents become 'critical' to them. Their responses to the referents in the other set are essentially random; hence the appearance of the two independent dimensions.

The *first* generalization was developed in order to explain the *three-dimensional* structure at the philosophical level that was found in the Netherlands using bipolar statement-items. It was maintained that in Western Europe, there are *three* ideologies which form a superstructure (socialism, economic liberalism and conservatism — European style; see Rossiter, 1962) rather than the two American ones.

The *second* generalization was needed to explain the *two-dimensional* structure at the attitude-level. Here it was maintained that the two values of *freedom* and *equality* — and their application to the economic and non-economic realms — will be differentially criterial to people. Since socio-economic equality seems to underly the left-right dimension and non-economic freedom the libertarianism-traditionalism dimension, this explains the appearance of the two basic factors.⁴

Although Kerlinger's theory thus seemed a useful starting point to explain the structure of ideological controversy in the Netherlands, it has not yet been tested in a random sample from the general population. Kerlinger (1972) found evidence in favor of the theory, but his selection of referents was rather loose and the samples were dominated by students. Wilson (1973) also used referent-type items, but found quite different results (e.g. strong bipolarity of 'progressive' and conservative referents on first-order promax-factors and a tendency towards a unidimensional structure, i.e. strongly positively correlated second-order promax-factors). His item-selection was even looser than Kerlinger's, however, and the samples used were also special and unspecified. Although Thurstone (1947: 324) has argued against the use of a random sample for the discovery of underlying order in a domain (see Kerlinger et al, 1976: 272) it seems essential to the theory (and its generalizations) that it holds

for the general population, since it is formulated in general terms. In this paper the theory will be tested on the basis of data from a cross-sectional sample from the Dutch population in 1975 (see below; footnote 9).

The predictions that can be made are the following. Kerlinger's (1967) original theory predicts that there will basically appear a *two-dimensional* structure with all progressive referents loading on one factor and all conservative ones on the other.

The predictions that can be made on the basis of Middendorp's (1978) generalizations would be somewhat different. To the extent that referents are abstract, 'philosophical' stimuli, one would predict a *three-dimensional* structure interpretable in terms of the three-fold ideological superstructure in Western Europe: *liberalism, conservatism and socialism*. However, although referents are rather abstract notions, they are also 'simplistic' and in that sense non-philosophical. To the extent that referents evoke 'attitudinal' responses, Middendorp's (1978) findings would suggest a *two-dimensional* structure in terms of economic *equality* (left-right) and non-economic *freedom* (libertarianism-traditionalism).

2 The data

Eighty referents have been selected, inspired by Kerlinger's earlier work⁵ and statement-items developed by Middendorp (1978). All referents are supposed to belong to the progressive-conservative domain as defined there, i.e. are somehow related to the values of *freedom* and *equality*, as applied to the economic versus the non-economic realms.⁶

Progressive referents are those belonging either to the 'economic equality' domain or to the 'non-economic freedom' domain. There are 25 items in the economic equality domain e.g. government price control, social legislation, income levelling, profitsharing and militant trade-unions, and 20 referents in the 'non-economic freedom' domain, e.g. demonstrations, sexual freedom, divorce, emancipation of women and birthcontrol.

Conservative referents are found in the 'economic freedom' and the 'non-economic equality' domains. There are 15 referents in the economic freedom domain, e.g. capitalism, private property, profits, discipline and competition, and there are 20 referents in the non-economic equality domain, implying a reference to the value of 'equality' in the sense that 'similar behaviour' or 'conformism to traditions' is implicitly or explicitly required, e.g. family, film censorship, authority, aristocracy, law and order, love of country, obedience of children.⁷ The referents in the various domains are presented in Table 1.

We can see that most referents can easily be categorized. The basic values of freedom and equality have also been added to the set. Since the non-econo-

Table 1: Referents of attitudes in the four progressive-conservative domains (cf Middendorp, 1977: Table 4.2)*

Values	Fields	
	Economic (N = 40)	Non-Economic (N = 40)
Freedom (N = 35)	78 capitalism	83 freedom private living
	26 existing economic relations	51 freedom of expression
	44 multi-nationals	47 <i>freedom</i>
	7 competition	9 action groups
	37 moderate trade-unions	15 having a say
	13 social classes	23 aid to developing countries
	65 employers	39 demonstrations
	75 industry and trade	16 sexual freedom
	86 achievement	30 free abortion
	25 free enterprise	32 homosexuals
	68 profits	41 divorce
	53 private property	66 pornography
	84 workers	33 childless couple
	43 private initiative	56 conscientious objection
	22 money	60 birthcontrol
	77 emancipation of women	
	59 tolerance	
	45 European government	
	54 modern society	
	61 future	
	(N = 15)	(N = 20)
	(N = 25)	(N = 20)
Equality (N = 45)	31 higher minimum wage	27 aristocracy
	34 <i>equality</i>	17 love of country
	49 equality of opportunity	73 royal family
	48 public utilities	24 conscription
	21 national health	20 discipline
	80 having a say in work	10 tradition
	69 government care	36 film-censorship
	58 social equality	2 police
	8 government price control	82 authority
	40 governm. interference	55 law and order
	19 social legislation	76 good manners
	63 income levelling	85 respect for parents
	57 social change	52 morality
	67 economic reform	79 social harmony
	5 democratisation	61 civilisation
12 profit sharing	64 national independence	
50 progressive taxation	62 strong punishment crime	
38 nationalisation big industries	29 obedience of children	

Values	Fields	
	Economic (N = 40)	Non-economic (N = 40)
	74 thorough social change	1 family
	4 governm. aid to education	71 past
	46 govern. ownership public utilities	
	14 social planning	
	81 militant trade-unions	
	35 class struggle	
	70 maximum income	

Note: * Numbers refer to the order of presentation in the questionnaire; see footnote 5.

mic dimension can most easily be interpreted in terms of freedom and the economic dimension in terms of equality, these values have been assigned to these sections respectively.⁸

The 80 referents together with 8 'self-description' referents in ideological terms ('Do you regard yourself as: conservative, leftwing, liberal, traditional, socialistic, libertarian, rightwing, progressive – which have been included for validating reasons) have been submitted to a cross-sectional sample from the Dutch population aged 18 years and older (N = 815).⁹

3 Results

Principal component analysis has been applied to the correlation matrix of the 80 variables and 2, 3 and 4 factors have been rotated orthogonally (varimax; see Kaiser, 1958).¹⁰ The results are presented in Table 2. It can be seen that there is a clear structure in the responses to the referents, although it is rather weak in terms of explained variance.¹¹ The results can be described as follows. *The two-factor rotated solution tends to confirm Kerlinger's theory.* However, 16 of the 80 referents do not have loadings of .30 or higher on either of both factors and an additional 9 have loadings between .30 and .35. Thus, roughly, of the 80 % of the referents which have sufficiently high loadings, all confirm the theory that the progressive and conservative ones load on different factors which are relatively independent of each other. There is only a slight overlap and a very minor tendency towards bipolarity. On the progressive and conservative side no distinction is made between the economic and non-economic realms. The *conservative* factor could, in European terms, be considered as a '*liberal-conservative syndrome*' with the highest loadings for 'law and order', achievement, authority, good manners, discipline, love of

Table 2: The structure of the progressive-conservative domain in the Netherlands — as assessed by the criterial referents of attitudes

	2 factors	3 factors	4 factors
27 aristocracy	—	.48	.50
17 love of country	.53	.54	.50
78 capitalism	—	.42	.49
73 royal family	.46	.50	.48
24 conscription	.43	.51	.47
20 discipline	.55	.50	.44
26 exist. econ. relat.	.35	.42	.41
10 tradition	.33	.42	.40
44 multi-nationals	—	.36	.39
36 film-censorship	.34	.40	.36
7 competition	.36	.38	.36
37 moderate trade-unions	—	.35	.33
13 social classes	—	.33	.32
2 police	.45	.36	.31
31 higher minimum wage	—	—	.30
65 employers	.52	.46	.44 .34
75 industry-trade	.48	.43	.41 .32
25 free enterprise	.40	.34 .30	.35 .36
82 authority	.57	.42 .36	.35 .35
68 profits	.47	.36 .33	.34 .41
55 law and order	.60	.40 .47	.32 .46
86 achievement	.60	.30 .51	.57
76 good manners	.59	.32 .49	.55
83 freedom priv. living	—	.47	.52
85 respect for parents	—	.49	.52
51 freedom of expression	.43	.49	.49
47 FREEDOM	.32	.46	.47
53 private property	.47	.39	.47
52 morality	.38	.43	.45
79 social harmony	.30 .43	.45	.42
84 workers	—	.44	.42
43 private initiative	.40	.32	.40
11 civilization	.46	.33 .37	.39
64 national independence	.31	.34	.34
22 money	.41	—	.34
62 strong punishm. crimin.	.35	—	.30
34 EQUALITY	.50	.37 .31	.31
1 family	.37	—	—
49 equality of opportun.	.50	.56	.50 .30
48 public utilities	.32 .42	.53	.47 .30
31 national health	.30 .35	.48	.40 .32
80 having a say-work	.54	.47 .30	.38 .31
69 government care	.31 .41	.46	.37 .40
58 social equality	.55	.45 .32	.35 .39

	2 factors	3 factors	4 factors
29 obedience of children	.52	.34 .34	.35 .30
81 governm. price control	—	— —	.43
40 governm. interference	—	.37	.43
19 social legislation	.36	.33	.42
63 income levelling	.46	— —	.42
57 social change	.47	.30 .30	.40
67 economic reform	.51	.33 .41	.40
5 democratisation	.42	.34	.39
12 profit sharing	—	.34	.38
50 progressive taxation	.32	.31	.38
38 nationalisation big indus.	—	.31	.37
74 thorough soc. change	.38	.30	.37
4 governm. aid to education	.31	.30	.36
46 governm. ownersh. pub. util.	.34	.39	.36
14 social planning	.34	— —	.36
15 having a say	.51	.36 .35	.34
23 aid to devel. countries	—	— —	.33
81 militant trade-unions	—	— —	— —
54 modern society	.38	— —	.33
9 action groups	.43	.57	.39 .40
39 demonstrations	.47	.62	.35 .50
16 sexual freedom	.48	.51	.64
30 free abortion	.32 .42	.51	.61
32 homosexuals	.42	.54	.61
41 divorce	.38	.45	.48
66 pornography	.31 .30	.41	.47
33 childless couple	.33	.40	.46
56 conscient. object.	.35 .41	.49	.46
60 birthcontrol	.44	.40	.45
77 emancipation women	.45	.49	.45
50 tolerance	.43	.36	.35
Variance explained	21.1 %	25 %	28,4 %

Note:

The eigenvalues of the first three factors are 9.2, 7.7, 3.1 and 2.7. The total number of factors with an eigenvalue ≥ 1.0 is 21.

Only loadings of .30 or higher have been presented. There are only 5 referents without such a loading in any factorial solution presented here: class struggle, European government, the future, the past and maximum income.

The rationale for rotations with a varying number of factors and for disregarding the arbitrary criterion of rotation of factors with an eigenvalue ≥ 1.0 has been given earlier — see Middendorp, 1978: par. 2.2.2.4 (see also footnote 10).

country, employers and obedience of children. The *progressive* factor has highest loadings for social equality, having a say in work — workers participation —, economic reform, having a say in general, equality of opportunity and equality. It can be seen that this second factor is 'dominated' by the value of equality rather than freedom — which loads on the same factor but only .32. Freedom does *not* load negatively on the liberal-conservative factor whereas freedom of *enterprise* loads *positively* on that factor and freedom in *private living* does not load at all.

When this weak structure is 'unfolded' by rotating three and four factors, we can observe some interesting developments which are difficult to explain by way of the criterial referents theory or indeed the theory of the criteriality of the values of freedom and equality and their differential application to the economic versus the non-economic realms.

In the three-factor solution the progressive and the conservative factor both split off some elements which then form a third factor which consists of a mixture of progressive and conservative elements, all loading positively (cf. Kerlinger et. al., 1976: 272, where this tendency has been reported in two second-order factors). This factor has the highest loadings for *conservative* referents such as achievement, good manners, respect for parents, law and order and for *progressive* referents such as equality of opportunity, public utilities, freedom of expression, national health and freedom in private living as well as the value of *freedom* itself. Three conservative referents which dominated the original liberal-conservative dimension — law and order, achievement, good manners — now dominate the mixed third dimension. The same goes for the progressive referents such as equality of opportunity, public utilities, and having a say in work.

The first factor is still a liberal-conservative one with the highest loadings for love of country, royal family, conscription, discipline and aristocracy, but also high loadings for capitalism, existing economic relation, employers and industry and trade. The original progressive factor has become more clearly non-economic, with highest loadings for demonstrations, action groups, homosexuals, sexual freedom and free abortion. The value of equality does not load highly on any factor anymore.

In the four-factor solution we see that the mixed progressive-conservative factor is a stable one. Its nature changes somewhat in that some elements are more clearly drawn away from the original liberal-conservative factor — i.e. profits, law and order, achievement — and some elements from the original progressive factor are weakened, i.e. equality of opportunity, public utilities, national health, government care and social equality. These latter referents now tend to load weakly or moderately on a *fourth* factor, which is not very strong, but is clearly dominated by *socio-economic left-right* referents such

as government price control, government interference, social legislation, income levelling, economic reform and government care. The third factor is now, even more clearly than before, a non-economic libertarianism-traditionalism factor.

The two- and four-factor solutions seem to be the most interesting ones.

The *two-factor solution* seems to warrant the conclusion that even though in Western Europe there are three ideological superstructures — rather than just two as is the case in the United States —, the progressive-conservative notion is a reality in that people tend to structure their attitudes along these lines, i.e. along two rather independent dimensions. (For similar results using bipolar statement items, see Middendorp, 1977a).

The structure becomes more complicated when we go on rotating more than two factors. The decision as to how many factors one should rotate, and the decision as to which solution is the best one, should depend on theoretical considerations rather than on arbitrary statistical ones. Sometimes there will be a situation where there is not *one* best solution. (see Middendorp, 1978, Chapter 6, note 21.)

In the *four-factor solution* it can be seen that the *first* factor is the familiar liberal-conservative factor, the third factor is an economic left-right factor, and the fourth factor is a non-economic libertarian-traditional factor. So, on the progressive side we find the economic-non-economic distinction, as would have been predicted by Middendorp (1978) but on the conservative side, we find a mixed liberal-conservative factor. In addition, the second factor in Table 2 is not easily interpretable from the theoretical perspectives presented thusfar, since both progressive and conservative referents are included, which can be either economic or non-economic, e.g. public utilities, private property, freedom in private living and law and order.

4 Development of theory

The following rationale has been set up to explain the existence of the mixed progressive-conservative factor. First of all, the fact that various progressive-conservative dimensions appear to exist in the general population already points to the fact that there are relatively many people who tend to respond positively or negatively to both progressive and conservative referents. Secondly it is postulated that this tendency becomes *dominant* for those referents, which imply notions, objects and ideas *which generally tend to be accepted by individuals who share a certain culture*. This would mean that these referents reveal the 'unity' of such a culture, which is a mixture of progressive and conservative ideas. These ideas tend to be non-ideological and relatively non-controversial, in particular when certain possible implications remain

unspecified, as is the case when using general expressions and phrases which, in a way, lack a specific content. If we look at the most highly loading referents on the mixed factor, we see that they indeed tend to be rather 'neutral' and generally acceptable, for instance achievement, good manners, freedom in private living (privacy, one could say), freedom of expression, freedom, equality of opportunity, public utilities and national health. This suggests a non-ideological syndrome reflecting the basic values 'uniting a culture'.

On the basis of this rationale, the following predictions can be made:

(1) the mean score on the mixed factor — which may be called 'populism' for the time being — is higher than the mean scores on the other dimensions, i.e. almost all people will accept the notions implied by the referents in the dimension; they are relatively non-controversial as compared to the notions in the other dimensions;

(2) positions on the populism dimension are virtually unrelated to self-descriptions in ideological terms, i.e. the dimension is relatively non-ideological as compared to the other three dimensions.

In order to test these predictions, the two dimensions in the two-factor solution and the four dimensions in the four-factor solution have been measured by summing the scores on the referents with loadings of .35 or higher on a factor, and subsequently recording the summated scores to 10-points scales. These measures have been related to the respondents' self-descriptions in ideological terms — as has been indicated above. The mean scores on the six dimensions, the standard-deviations and the Tau-beta's for their relationship to the self-descriptions are presented in Table 3.

The mean scores show that the first prediction is confirmed: the notions in the populism dimension are almost universally accepted: its mean score is 7.62: a huge majority (86.5 %) of the population scores 7,8 or 9 on a scale ranging from 0 to 9. The standard deviation is 1.04, which is lower than that of any other dimension. This warrants the conclusions that *populism is relatively non-controversial split-off from the original progressive and conservative factors (in the two factor solution) which also have rather high mean scores (7.20 and 6.14 respectively) and higher standard-deviations (1.20 and 1.28 respectively).*

In the four-factor solution, the mean score on the liberal-conservative factor has dropped to 5.71 whereas the mean scores on the two progressive factors have become 5.89 and 4.27. The standard-deviations have also increased generally. The three other dimensions clearly include more controversial notions, which already suggests their ideological nature as compared to the non-ideological nature of the populism-dimension.

This is confirmed by the correlations of the four dimensions to the eight self-descriptions. The second prediction made above is also confirmed: the popu-

Table 3: Validating evidence for the two dimensions in the two-factor solution and the four in the four-factor solution, plus mean scores and standard-deviations¹

Factors	Self-descriptions								liber- tarian	M ²	std. ³
	conser- vative	progres- sive	left wing	right wing	socia- listic	liberal (Dutch version)	tradi- tional	liber- tarian			
2-factors											
Conservatism	.15	-.04	-.20	.25	-.15	.06	.30	-.08	7.20	1.20	
Progressiveness	-.16	.31	.21	-.17	.28	.00	-.11	.16	6.14	1.28	
4-factors											
Liberalism-conservatism	.20	-.10	-.21	.29	-.19	.15	.30	-.04	5.71	1.39	
'Populism'	.07	.09	-.09	.12	-.01	.02	.21	-.05	7.62	1.04	
Socio-economic left-right	-.11	.25	.17	-.13	.23	-.07	-.08	.08	5.89	1.25	
Libertarianism	-.19	.26	.24	-.21	.29	.04	-.18	.22	4.27	1.95	

Notes:

- 1 Correlations are Tau-beta's
- 2 Mean scores on 10-point scales
- 3 Standard-deviations

lism dimension is virtually unrelated to these self-descriptions, except for a moderate relation to traditionalism, which is in fact in line with the theory developed above: the notions in the populism dimension have become part of the *traditional* culture.

The other dimensions in the four-factor solution are clearly ideological, and validated as such. Liberalism-conservatism is most strongly related to traditionalism and right-wing, and moderately to conservative, left-wing, liberal and socialistic. Socio-economic left-right is moderately related to progressive, socialistic and left-wing. Libertarianism is substantially related to socialistic, progressive, left-wing, libertarian, rightwing, conservative and traditional.

The two broader dimensions seem to have slightly different meanings in relation to the self-assignments. *Conservatism* is most strongly related to traditional and rightwing rather than to conservative, whereas *progressiveness* is most strongly related to progressive and socialist and moderately negative to conservative.

Of the three ideological dimensions in the four-factor solution, the libertarianism dimension seems to be most ideological: it is substantially related to all self-assignments except for liberal (Dutch), which is unrelated to any dimension except for a moderate relationship to the liberal-conservative dimension.

All ideological dimensions seem to be valid ones although the moderate correlations with self-styled ideological positions suggest a substantial amount of a certain type of false consciousness: many people wish to describe their ideological postures in terms that are not warranted on the basis of their 'objective' positions on ideological dimensions (see: Middendorp, 1978 : 255 and 210).

5 Discussion

Many have argued that for a parliamentary democracy to function in the Western sense, there should be agreement on at least some basic values. Prothro and Grigg (1960) and McClosky (1964) have shown that in the general population, such an agreement only exists as far as *abstract principles* are concerned; it no longer exists when such principles are applied in more specific terms. To explain the generally high level of agreement with (abstract) referents, Kerlinger (1972) has used the same reasoning. The present study shows that some specification of this rationale is possible: over and above a weak two-dimensional structure conforming Kerlinger's (1967) original theory, a four-factor solution has been found reflecting *three 'ideological' dimensions*, (along which the population is rather divided) as well as a cluster of notions on which the population tends to be united.

Kerlinger's theory can now be seen as a global but rather weak tendency in the general population. Further analysis reveals the underlying ideological structure (alongside elements of cultural unity) which reflects a mixture of results as obtained in earlier studies wherein other types of stimuli have been used.

The first factor is a mixture of liberal-conservative thought in European terms, similar to a factor obtained, at some stage, in earlier research: the two- and three-factor rotated solutions in the philosophical domain, using bipolar statements (see Middendorp, 1978: 192-193). *Obviously, using referents as stimuli, there appears no split up between economic liberalism and non-economic conservatism elements in subsequent analysis.* Perhaps referents are too global stimuli to allow respondents to make this distinction. So, such notions as aristocracy and capitalism, love of country and existing economic relations, royal family and multi-nationals (!), all remain united on one factor.

Alongside this factor, there appear, on the progressive side, two other factors. There, the predicted economic-non-economic distinction appears, like in the attitudinal and ideological domains in earlier research (see Middendorp, 1978 : 215 ff).

Obviously, referents of attitudes tend to evoke a unique structure of ideological controversy in the general population: conservative (and liberal) referents tend to remain united on one factor whereas the progressive notions split into two dimensions. This would suggest that, in terms of such notions — at once abstract, philosophical and simplistic, attitudinal — a complicated pattern of ideological dimensions emerges (alongside an indication of cultural unity) which suggests more division of opinion regarding progressive than regarding conservative ideas: the population tends to be consistent regarding conservative notions but to be divided regarding progressive one.

6 Conclusions

Responses to attitudinal referents in the progressive-conservative domain show a clear pattern in the Dutch population. The two-factor-structure confirms Kerlinger's theory of the criteriality of attitudinal referents. The generalizations of this theory developed by Middendorp (1978) have generally *not* been confirmed. Rather, further analysis of the data reveals (a) a *three-fold ideological structure* with a liberal-conservative factor (in European terms), an economic left-right factor and a non-economic libertarianism factor, and (b) the existence of a non-ideological 'populism' factor indicating those elements in the culture which can be brought into the progressive-conservative domain *theoretically* but on which so much consensus exists so as to render those elements non-ideological, i.e. they are or have become non-

controversial.

The threefold ideological structure which has appeared in the general population using the referents of attitudes *themselves* as stimuli does not reflect — as separate, relatively independent dimensions — the threefold ideological superstructure in this country, which was found in our earlier study using bipolar, abstract statement-items. It is possible that the notion of attitude-criteriality, in ideological terms, is still a valuable one, as well as the notion of the criteriality of attitudinal referents, but if we accept the nature of the threefold ideological 'superstructure' in this country in terms of classical economic liberalism, conservatism and socialism, then our conclusion has to be that attitudinal referents which indicate this ideological domain do not evoke a threefold ideological structure along these lines in the general population. Nor do they evoke a twofold ideological structure which can be interpreted in terms of the values of freedom and equality and their differential applications to the economics vs. the non-economic realms which we found in our earlier study using statement attitude-scales.

In one of the next articles in this series we will make an attempt to systematically link referent-items to statement-items and to more specifically assess the differential nature of the factorial structures which appear using stimuli of these differential types. For the moment we have found no direct evidence in favor of the usefulness of an application of Kerlinger's (1967) theory of the differential criteriality of attitudinal referents in attempting to interpret ideological structures in the Netherlands as assessed by means of bipolar statement items or attitude-scales on the basis of statement items. There is, however, a time lag between the assessment of our original structures (in 1970) and the structure of referents (in 1975). In the next article in this series we will test the assumed 'relative stability' of the original structures over this 5-year period.

As far as the referents of attitudes are concerned, we have seen again in this article the existence of more than one dimension of ideological controversy. This already provides the political system with some 'stability': there is not one ideological cleavage dividing the population potentially into two 'camps' opposed to each other. Further stability is provided however, by the rather broad consensus, which exists on issues which potentially could form the basis for ideological cleavages (and which perhaps have formed such a basis previously). This study has been revealed and specified at least some of the consensus that has often been seen as a necessary prerequisite to democracy.

Notes

- * Results have partly been reported in an earlier paper (Kerlinger et. al., 1976) in the context of a cross-cultural study mainly based on student samples, in the

U.S., Spain and the Netherlands. In the above mentioned study the sample and the item-sets were somewhat truncated for various reasons, and the analysis proceeded along such lines as to make results comparable to the earlier work of the senior author. The present report entails an interpretation of results which is more in line with the previous work of the present author.

Analyses have been carried out at the Steinmetz Archives, Amsterdam, where the data are also available. I thank Mr. G. C. Schild and Mr. J. Stapel from the Netherlands Institute for Public Opinion and Marketing Research (NIPO BV) for having made possible the collection of the data, and Prof. Dr. F. N. Kerlinger for his cooperation in selecting the referents.

- 1 See Middendorp (1978 : 362) for a brief introduction to the study to be reported in this paper.
- 2 These structures have been found again in 1975 (results will be reported elsewhere). Philosophical dimensions load consistently on attitudinal ones. When religious attitudes are included, the structure — for churchmembers — becomes more complicated (see Middendorp, 1978 : 229). Other results, more in line with Kerlinger's (1967) original theory of the criterial referents of attitudes in terms of a progressive and a conservative factor, have been obtained in 1977 and reported elsewhere (see Middendorp, 1977).
- 3 'A referent' is a name, a recurrent, a category' (Brown, 1958; in Kerlinger, 1972: 614). In other words, a referent is a set of 'things' towards which an attitude may be directed (see Middendorp, 1978 : 72, 73).
- 4 For both generalizations, see Middendorp, 1978 : 194ff and 220, 232. The outline of the rationales given here is somewhat simplified.
- 5 See Kerlinger (1972) and Kerlinger et. al. (1976). Of the original 86 items, 3 on 'love, warmth, affection' and 3 religious ones were left out (see note 2).
- 6 See Middendorp (1978 : 149) for an analysis of the progressive-conservative anti-thesis in terms of these values and fields.
- 7 See Middendorp (1978 : 148ff) where it is maintained that in the non-economic sense, the values of *freedom* and *equality* do in fact have similar implications if equality is taken to mean: of equal value, egalitarian.
- 8 It is not expected that freedom and equality *in general* do have much meaning to most people, since their *application* to the economic or non-economic domain seems essential.
- 9 The sample has been briefly described elsewhere (Kerlinger et. al., 1976: 268). In the present analysis, it is not truncated on the basis of five or more missing data per case, as was done there. Missing data are disregarded — pairwise — in computing correlations. In the sample, women are overrepresented. The weekly NIPO-surveys do not use a call-back system and are rather heavily clustered. Respondents were asked to express their positive or negative attitude to each of the referents on a 6-point scale (-3 + 3). The questionnaire was self-administrative.
- 10 Rotation with 5 factors did not yield a meaningful fifth factor: the fifth factor was a rather uninterpretable subdimension (cf. Middendorp 1978 : 273, note 17, for similar results, and p. 271; note 2, for similarities in the results obtained through various factorial and rotation procedures.) The unrotated solution has not been presented because the structure is clearly not undimensional; see the eigenvalues of the factors in Table 2.
- 11 See Middendorp (1978 : 190ff) for similar percentages of explained variance

using fewer, but abstract and complicated bipolar statement-items.

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Onderzoek

Een begrippenapparaat voor de beschrijving van redeneringen van politici

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Sinds de publikatie van J. von Neumann's en O. Morgenstern's 'Theory of games and economic behavior' (1947) heeft een grote ontwikkeling plaats gehad op het gebied van de besliskunde, bijv.: P. Fishburn (1964, 1970), R. D. Luce and H. Raiffa (1957), H. Raiffa (1961, 1968), A. Rapoport (1966, 1970, 1974). Ook op het terrein van de beleidsanalyse wordt aan de besluitvorming aandacht besteed, zie bijv.: G. Kuypers (1973), Commissie voor de ontwikkeling van beleidsanalyse (1971, etc.).

Naast deze normatieve richting die streeft naar het ontwikkelen van richtlijnen voor het nemen van beslissingen zijn ook reeds enkele empirische studies verricht die nagaan op welke wijze beslissingen genomen worden om op basis daarvan een bijdrage te leveren tot een descriptieve theorie, bijv.: M. Leiseron (1968, 1970), A. de Swaan (1973), W. E. Saris, I. N. Saris-Gallhofer (1975) en talrijke publikaties in het Journal of Conflict Resolution.

In het kader van een beschrijvend onderzoek naar de besluitvorming in de buitenlandse politiek van Nederland na 1900 willen we de wijze bestuderen waarop politieke besluitvormers hun beslissingen formuleren.

Dit vereist in de eerste plaats de keuze en definitie van een te hanteren begrippenapparaat. Daarom zullen we in de eerste paragraaf een aantal mogelijke begrippen de revue laten passeren en onze uiteindelijke keuze beargumenteren. Wanneer de keuze juist is dan zouden deze begrippen door de codeurs op betrouwbare wijze uit de teksten gehaald moeten kunnen worden. Dit wil zeggen:

- 1 — dat dezelfde codeurs bij herhaling op gelijke wijze deze begrippen uit de teksten moeten kunnen opsporen (intracodeurbetrouwbaarheid);
- 2 — dat verschillende codeurs dezelfde begrippen uit dezelfde teksten kunnen halen (intercodeurbetrouwbaarheid).

Of dit ook zo is wordt in paragraaf 3 aangegeven. In paragraaf 2 zullen we kort ingaan op de onderzoeksoptzet.