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Are party-activists parochial? Pro-European attitudes of national party activists

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Voorkeurstemmen uitgebracht per partij bij de gemeenteraadsverkiezingen; 1946-1982 (in percentages)

	1946	1949	1953	1958	1962	1966	1970	1974	1978	1982
KVP	-	8.0	13.8	15.9	-	-	-	29.6		
ARP	-	11.0	12.0	12.6	-	-	-	25.5		
CHU	-	15.6	17.5	16.9	-	-	-	29.1		
CDA									27.1	28.7
PvdA	-	7.8	9.0	7.7	-	-	-	20.4	22.6	24.6
VVD	-	16.3	18.0	14.7	-	-	-	23.7	27.4	26.0
D'66							-	18.6	19.6	26.3
PPR								27.9	26.9	30.7
PSP					-	-	-	22.5	26.6	40.5
CPN	-	4.1	6.6	9.4	-	-	-	11.4	12.8	19.8
SGP	-	13.0	15.9	13.8	-	-	-	14.9	17.7	16.3
GPV			8.7	7.8	-	-	-	10.3	11.1	10.2
RPF										20.5
EVP										
CP										
Ned.	-	13.6	15.5	16.6	-	-	-	26.3	27.0	28.4

Het CBS heeft geen gegevens berekend voor de verkiezingen van 1946, 1962, 1966 en 1970.

Bron: CBS, *Statistieken der verkiezingen, 1949-1958 en 1974-1982 (gemeenteraden)*.

Onderzoek

Are party activists parochial?

Pro-European attitudes of national party activists

Wijbrandt H. van Schuur en Michiel S. de Vries

Introduction

Attitudes toward European integration have been studied by Inglehart and his colleagues over the last decade. Inglehart (1977, Chap. 12) interprets these attitudes in terms of a supra-nationalist belief system, which includes such elements as an identification with some larger-than-national geographical unit (Europe, the world), support for the European Community or a more extensive European Political Union, and selection of the European level for making decisions about a number of political problems like unemployment, inflation, pollution, defense, and developmental aid. People who oppose these beliefs are called 'parochial'.

Inglehart finds three predictors of parochial versus supra-national identity: nationality, value type, and cognitive mobilization (in that order of importance). Other variables are also correlated, such as education, wealth, age, and size of home town, but the effects of these tend to disappear when the three leading predictors are controlled for (p. 340-1).

By 'nationality' is meant the dichotomy between the original Six member countries (Germany, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg), and the Three countries that joined the EC in 1973 (The United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland). 'Long term membership in Europe seems to have given rise to a relatively strong sense of supra-national identity' (p. 331). Rather than calling this 'nationality', we propose to call this process 'habituation'. This is in line with Inglehart's interpretation: 'The publics of the Six seem to have made considerable progress in developing a supra-national sense of belonging. Perhaps the publics of Britain, Ireland, and Denmark will also move in this direction' (p. 332).

'Value type' is operationalized in terms of the well-known twelve-item battery of materialist-postmaterialist values. Postmaterialists tend to be more supra-national in their outlook than materialists.

'Cognitive mobilization', which is supposed to measure the respondent's political skills, is defined operationally in terms of answers to two

political opinion leadership questions and a knowledge question about which countries belong to the European Common Market (p. 339)¹. The higher the degree of cognitive mobilization, the more supra-national a respondent tends to be.

Though the combined effects of value type and cognitive mobilization account for a large amount of variance in Europeans' sense of (geographical) identity (p. 340), the nationality variable plays an important intervening role.

The relationship between pro-European attitude and both age and left-right voting preferences differs for respondents within the original Six countries and respondents within the new Three. All six of the original Six members' publics showed age-related differences (young people being more pro-European) that were larger than in any of the other three nations. For Irish respondents the relation even seemed to be curvilinear: for people under 64 it went in the opposite direction (p. 332-3).

With respect to left-right voting preference, support for European integration tends to be stronger on the *right* half of the political spectrum in the new Three. In the original Six the overall tendency is negligible, but there is a faint tendency for the electorate of the *left* to be more pro-European (p. 350-1).

In a more recent study by Inglehart and his colleagues of Candidates for the European Parliament (Inglehart et al., 1980), the nationality variable was found to predict again: Candidates and members of the EP from the original Six countries were more supportive of pro-European Parliament measures than were those of the new Three member countries. The cleavage between supporters and opponents of pro-European Parliament measures among EP Candidates did not coincide with the left-right dimension. On the whole, the differences among parties belonging to the same cross-national party group were larger than the differences among rival parties in the same nation. The political history of a nation thus seemed to be a more important influence on the attitudes of its representatives than the party groupings to which they belonged (p. 113-4).

In the present paper we investigate whether the attitudes found by Inglehart and his colleagues to characterize mass electorates and Candidates for the European Parliament are also held by national party activists. First we attempt to determine whether there is a difference between party activists from the original Six and the new Three member countries. Second, we compare party activists to mass publics and EP Candidates with respect to degree of supra-nationalism shown in judgments about the geographical level of decision-making at which a number of political issues can best be handled. On the one hand, a more supra-national outlook

might be expected among party activists. They are generally well educated (average age of leaving school is over twenty, and for the first quartile even over twenty-four years), and education was found by Inglehart to be positively related to supra-nationalism. Moreover, the very fact of being active within a party suggests that party activists have a high level of cognitive mobilization, and this is also positively correlated with supra-nationalism. On the other hand, however, party activists may well have developed a closer identification with the national political system because of their party activities. This would lead to a more nationalistic and parochial outlook.

Inglehart in fact comments that national political leaders may be less pro-European than mass publics or EP Candidates. He suggests that European publics may be well prepared to go beyond the present scope of European integration – perhaps even more so than their political leaders, who, after the first oil crisis in 1973, not only failed to move toward the goals they had set themselves, but threatened to undo progress already attained (Inglehart, 1977, p. 362). Inglehart also points out differences in interest between European and national governments in connection with the EP Candidates study: 'It is clear that a solid majority of the directly elected European Parliament favors entrusting such newer problems as energy policy, environmental policy, and control of multinationals to European institutions. Vested interests within the national governments, of course, oppose such shifts of functions (Rabier and Inglehart, 1981, p. 199).

The data

The data used in this study were obtained from the Middle Level Elite Project (for an overview, see Reif et al., 1980; Cayrol and Reif, 1983; Van Schuur, 1984)². The data come from a total of 9526 party delegates, representing 45 parties in 9 countries of the European Community, who responded to questionnaires at an annual conference held by their parties between 1977 and 1982. Since this research was part of a project on the First Direct Elections of the European Parliament in 1979, all EC countries were involved in the analysis. The financial resources and manpower available to conduct the surveys differed among the countries. In general, the largest parties were surveyed and as many others as resources allowed. The relevant questions were not given to the Italian DC, PSI, PSDI, and PDUP, and the data from the Northern Irish parties and the British SDP were not available at the time of the analysis.

The delegates were relatively homogeneous on several demographic variables. Many delegates had achieved high levels of education and the proportion of academics was much higher than among the population at large. They were predominantly male. Only five of the 45 parties had more than 25% female respondents, and about half of the parties had even less than 15% female respondents. The average age of delegates from most parties was 40 to 45 years. Most delegates came from communities with a population of less than 50,000. On the basis of these socio-demographic variables, the party delegates were apparently more homogeneous than the mass electorates in the nine EC countries.

In this study we will analyze only data generated by answers to the following question for each of the fifteen political issues (shown in Table I): 'At what level of government should each be decided upon?' Three different levels of government were offered: European, national, and regional. For none of the fifteen issues was the regional level of decision-making selected by more than a small percent of the respondents. Most respondents selected either the European level, the national level, or both. For a response to count as showing a pro-European attitude, the European alternative had to be selected *in preference* to the national or regional alternative, not merely in addition to it. Table II shows the percentage of respondents who selected the European level of decision-making for each of the fifteen issues; the analysis is limited to those respondents who responded to at least one of the fifteen political issues.

Missing data

Before turning to the substantive results, we will first discuss the representativeness of our results. In comparison to studies of mass publics and of EP Candidates, where the respondents can be considered to be either a random sample or a relatively complete population, respectively, establishing representativeness is difficult in the Middle Level Elite Study. Party delegates within and among parties may differ with respect to their local and regional interests (e.g., Niedermayer and Schmitt, 1983), and the number of respondents in a party is unrelated to its political influence in the national political system. Whereas in studies of mass publics or EP Candidates conclusions can be drawn at the aggregate level of a party group or a country, it is hazardous to aggregate the party activist data beyond the level of a single party.

Further, a very large proportion of party delegates did not respond to the questions under discussion. Of the 9526 respondents in our 45 parties, 15%

did not respond to any of the issue questions, and only 36% gave a substantive reply to all fifteen issue questions.

Complete failure to respond to any of the fifteen issue questions was low in The Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom, but it reached high enough levels to worry about in France and Italy. Delegates from parties in the original Six member countries did not seem more prone to answer these questions than delegates from parties in the new Three countries. Nor was there any difference between the original Six and the new Three with respect to the amount of nonresponse to individual issue questions. Percentages of nonresponse were just as high in Luxemburg and France as in Ireland or Denmark, and they were just as low in the United Kingdom as in The Netherlands or Germany.

Results

First we will discuss results concerning the number of political issues that respondents believed should be treated at the European level of decision-making, giving consideration to nationality, value type, and cognitive mobilization as possible predictors of degree of supra-national identity. Second, we will have a closer look at the individual issues, and compare the opinions of party activists to those of mass publics and Candidates for the European Parliament.

A pro-European attitude index

The procedure of adding up all the 'European level' responses to individual issue questions and interpreting the resulting numbers as a measure is similar to the procedures followed by Inglehart et al. In his studies, for most policy areas the judgment that they should be decided at the European level was interpreted in terms of a general pro-European attitude.

For the mass publics in all nine countries, opinions on the issue questions offered were found to be rather closely related to respondents' overall degree of support for European integration. All the political problems offered except 'Foreign investment' loaded highly on one factor, which was interpreted as a 'European integration support' factor (Inglehart, 1977, p. 358)³.

In Inglehart's Candidates Study, fifteen political areas or functions were investigated. These overlapped partially with those posed to the party activists in the present study. A factor analysis showed three different types of policy areas: (starred problems are similar to ones used in the Middle

Level Elite Study): the first factor comprised 'Control of multinationals(*)', 'Environment(*)', 'Energy policy(*)', 'Transport policy', 'Third World aid(*)', 'Welfare policy', 'Economic development', 'External commerce', 'Monetary policy', and 'Fisheries policy'. The second factor consisted of 'Defense policy(*)', 'Foreign policy', 'Monetary policy', and 'Economic development'. The third factor comprised 'Regional policy(*)', 'Agricultural policy', and 'Fisheries policy'. Support for transfer of functions to the European Community institutions is strongest in connection with policy areas that load highly on the first and third factors. It is markedly weaker for those policy areas that constitute the traditional realm of the nation-state (Rabier and Inglehart, 1981, p. 195).

In the Middle Level Elite Study, the 'European level' response to most issue questions were positively interrelated and formed a cumulative scale⁴. Ironically, opinions about the issue 'Accelerate the process of European integration' was statistically unrelated to judgments about the other issues. The fourteen interrelated issues were combined into one index that ranged numerically from zero (no issue at the European level) to fourteen (all issues at the European level).

The lack of association of the judgments about the 'Accelerate European integration' issue and the other issues does not need to be construed as a falsification of the validity of our index. We cannot assert that those respondents who gave the 'national level' response to this issue are less pro-European than those who want to focus on the European level for this issue area.

There are large differences of opinion within each party about the number of issues that should be treated at the European level. Standard deviations are usually 3 or higher. 95% intervals around the mean (i.e. two standard deviations) include the value zero for all parties and also the value fourteen for some parties.

There are also large differences across parties in the mean number of issues favored for treatment at the European level. Most pro-European was the French MRG with 6.9 issues (and this is particularly impressive, since the MRG was not asked to respond to fifteen issues, but only to twelve). Least pro-European was the Danish RF with only 1.4 issues. For all parties except the French MRG, the mean number of issues favored for treatment at the European level was less than half of the highest possible number.

In trying to interpret the differences identified in pro-European attitudes, let us look first at the nationality variable. Did party delegates from the original Six indeed have a more pro-European attitude than delegates from the new Three, as Inglehart found for both mass publics and EP Candida-

tes? Belgium (with the exception of the Belgian communists), The Netherlands, and Germany were homogeneously more pro-European than the United Kingdom, which corroborates the hypothesis. Our information about Italy is very incomplete. Not only were the largest Italian parties missing entirely, but also sixty to seventy percent of the activists from the remaining Italian parties, PLI and MSI, gave no response to these questions. The responses that were obtained were not more favorable toward Europe than the responses of the Irish, Danish or Luxemburgian delegates. Differences among rival parties within France and Denmark are greater than differences among parties belonging to the same cross-national party group. In short, nationality is not as powerful a predictor among party activists as it was found to be for mass publics or for Candidates for the European Parliament.

Value type was Inglehart's second predictor of a pro-European attitude. This variable was not incorporated in the Middle Level Elite Study. Nevertheless we can approach it indirectly, since value type has been shown to be related to age, and age was asked in the study. Moreover, age by itself has been shown to be related to a pro-European attitude: Inglehart (1971) predicted a 'silent revolution in Europe' because young people were more pro-European than the older cohorts. The results of the correlations between the pro-European index and age are given for each country in Table III. The associations are rather weak. In only three of the nine countries is the correlation statistically significant (as might be anticipated, these three were part of the original Six). In Belgium and Germany the correlation is lower than -0.10, however. Only in Luxemburg does this correlation approach substantive relevance (-0.28).

Inglehart (1977, p. 351) has already reported conflicting results for the relationship between pro-European attitude and left-right voting preferences. Our results (see Table III) for the party activists also show no clear-cut relationship. Correlations are generally weak; in only four of the nine countries are they statistically significant. Moreover, they take on different signs in different countries. Rightist respondents are more pro-European in Denmark and in The Netherlands, whereas leftist respondents are more pro-European in Luxemburg and Ireland. The nationality variable does intervene, but not in the same way as it did for the mass electorate, where the major distinction was between the original Six and the new Three.

Our findings on the relationship between a pro-European attitude and nationality or age in party activists do not parallel those of Inglehart in mass electorates and EP Candidates. How can these differences be explained?

A first possible explanation for the differences between our results and

those of Inglehart et al. invokes response set. It is easy to imagine that a pro-European response set was induced in the Candidates for the European Parliament: the whole interview with the Candidates hinged around their opinions about the European Community. But this is also true to some extent for the mass public studies. Before the questions about the best level of decision-making was posed, a number of interest and information questions about the European Community had already been asked (Inglehart, 1977, p. 402-8), and the scene was set for an interpretation of the responses in terms of pro- or anti-European attitudes. This was not the case in the Middle Level Elite Study. The question about the fifteen political measures was the first in a series of questions for which opinions about the European Community were solicited. This question was preceded by questions about the delegate's personal and political background, about the activities of his local party branch, and about the party conference he was attending. A test of the response set hypothesis would involve experimenting with question order in both surveys. This has not been done, however.

A substantively more interesting explanation is that party activists may have a closer identification with the national political center than do mass publics or EP Candidates. This possibility has already been pointed out by Inglehart (1977). The explanation seems particularly well suited to explaining the difference between the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany in the extent to which the pro-European index correlated with the 'Accelerate European integration' question (a high 0.40 in the United Kingdom versus a low 0.10 in Germany). As compared to the German conferences, the British party conferences studied were mass events, with many fewer elected party representatives (between 55% and 77% in Germany, versus between 23% and 44% in the United Kingdom for different parties), fewer respondents who spent time on their party, and fewer highly educated respondents. Mean age of leaving school for the British Labour Party was 17 years, for the Conservatives it was 18, and for the Liberals it was 20. In Germany, in contrast, mean age of leaving school was 20 years for delegates from the NPD, 22 for SPD and CSU, 23 for CDU, and 24 for FDP. The British delegates may therefore have been much more similar to a mass public than the German party delegates. We assume, then, that party activists who identify closely with the national political center are much more homogeneous in their beliefs about political problems than are mass publics. If this is the case, then correlations among political belief elements should be lower in countries where more party delegates have an elected representative function. This is indeed the case (see Van Schuur, 1984, Chap. 7).

Comparing party activists with mass publics and EP Candidates on single issues

Since a number of political issues offered to mass publics or EP Candidates were similar to those offered to party delegates, we can compare the three sets of respondents with respect to these single issues. First we compare our results with those of the mass public studies.

If the habituation interpretation of the nationality variable is correct, mass publics which were more pro-European in 1973 (as reported by Inglehart, 1977) should have become even more so in 1979, since they would have had more experience with the European Community. Since, as our results show, party activists were less pro-European in 1979 than mass publics were in 1973, this implies that the discrepancy between mass publics and party activists would have become even larger by 1979. 'Military defense' or 'Defense against the superpowers' is judged to be better handled at the European level by a majority of mass publics in the original Six and by majorities of the party activists in most parties of the original Six. But this is not true for the other comparable issues. The peculiar wording of the question about 'Developmental aid' may be responsible for the marked absence of a pro-European attitude toward that item, but wording cannot explain the discrepancy for the other issues. 'Pollution' was favored for treatment at the European level by mass publics of seven countries, but only by party activists from The Netherlands. 'Inflation', mentioned by five of the original Six mass publics (Belgium was the exception), was mentioned by majorities of party activists in only two countries: The Netherlands, and, interestingly enough, Belgium. And 'Employment', mentioned by the same five mass publics, was not favored for treatment at the European level by majorities of party activists in a single country. Compared to the mass publics then, party activists were definitely more parochial, despite their (assumed) high level of cognitive mobilization.

Candidates for the European Parliament were, not surprisingly, markedly more in favor of European options than were the national party activists, with one notable exception: their attitude toward 'Defense policy'. A majority of party activists favored handling this issue at the European level, but this remained a national prerogative for EP Candidates. Perhaps nobody wants to be left with this ultimate responsibility? There was considerable agreement about the advantages of handling 'Control over multinationals' at the European level. This met with the approval of 75% of the EP Candidates and with majorities of party delegates in Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany, Ireland, and Denmark. Agreement

was much weaker for the issues next most favored for European treatment: 'Nuclear energy' and 'Environmental policy'. The majority of EP Candidates supporting treatment at the European level was 75%, but the endorsement among party activists was lower. The Dutch were in favor, and for 'Nuclear energy' the Belgians were too, but the delegates from the other countries were not. The issue of 'Regional development' showed the difference even more dramatically: 63% of the EP Candidates were in favor of a European approach, as compared to only twenty to thirty percent of the delegates (with the notable exception of the Irish: majorities in the Irish Labour Party and in the Fine Gael endorsed a European approach to the reduction of regional differences). In sum, national party activists think more in national terms, and Candidates for the European Parliament think more in European terms.

Summary

A pro-European attitude index was constructed for party activists in a way similar to the procedures used in previous research on mass publics and Candidates for the European Parliament. The pro-European attitude index was related to two of the three variables that had been the strongest predictors at the level of the mass publics: nationality (i.e., the original Six member countries versus the new Three), and age (as a substitute for Inglehart's materialist-postmaterialist value type). These variables failed to perform as good predictors among the party activists, however. Degree of cognitive mobilization, the third strongest predictor, was not assessed for party activists. Two possible explanations were given to account for the discrepancies between our findings and the results for the mass publics and EP Candidates studies: response set in the other studies, and a stronger identification with the national political center among party activists. When the responses of party activists and mass publics or EP Candidates to single issues were compared, it turned out that party activists were notably more parochial than were either mass publics or EP Candidates. The only exception involved 'Defense policy', about which party activists were more pro-European than were the Candidates for the European Parliament.

We suggest that party activists' judgments about the best level for decision-making are guided more by cognitive than by ideological factors. It is easier to imagine a European Community contribution in the 'Defense against the superpowers' than in 'Increasing military expenditure', and it is easier to envision 'Control over multinationals' as a European Communi-

ty task than 'Control over private enterprises'. To the extent that policy areas are mentioned in relatively concrete terms, party activists hedge on their pro-European mode of thought. General principles? Fine, let the European Community take care of those, as long as concrete actions are carried out by the national government. In this respect party activists are more parochial than either mass publics or EP Candidates.

Table 1: Formulation of the fifteen issues (English version)

The question was introduced as follows: 'Here we present you with a list of important political issues. Would you please indicate your opinion on each issue: ... At what level of government should each be decided upon?'

1. Defend oneself against the superpowers
2. There should be a far more active control over activities of multinational corporations
3. Accelerate the process of European integration
4. The most severe penalties should be introduced for acts of terrorism
5. Fight against inflation
6. Nuclear energy should be developed in order to meet our future energy needs
7. Greater effort should be made to protect the environment
8. Fight against unemployment
9. In giving aid to the Third World countries more consideration should be given to our own needs
10. Military expenditure should be increased
11. Implement the principle of equal opportunity for men and women
12. Develop policies to reduce regional economic differences
13. Reduce income differences
14. Women should be allowed to decide matters concerning abortion
15. Reduce the capacity of public control over private enterprises.

Table II: Opinion about European level of decision-making for fifteen issues. Countries, parties and issues are ordered from more to less pro-European. The first two columns give mean and standard deviation of the pro-European attitude index for each party. The last fifteen columns give percentage of respondents within a party who select the European level of decision-making over the national or regional level.

name party	mean number issues Eur. level	s.d. number	Defense superp.	Multinationals	Eur. integration	Terrorism	Inflation	Nuclear energy	Environment	Unemployment	Developmental aid	Mil. expenditure	Equality men-women	Reg. differences	Income differences	Abortion	Control priv. ent.
<i>Belgium:</i>																	
BSP	6.8	4.4	64	67	63	53	70	54	48	57	33	38	52	37	38	30	37
PVV	6.6	3.7	52	64	64	64	65	69	49	59	38	38	43	30	26	37	29
PSC	6.1	3.7	70	58	60	68	61	63	30	57	40	36	30	19	22	30	24
VU	5.8	3.6	55	64	49	51	55	63	44	41	35	42	37	31	23	28	14
FDV	5.4	3.6	65	56	55	63	48	48	26	36	23	39	37	30	22	28	15
CVP	5.3	3.7	45	64	57	53	58	60	34	42	32	38	33	26	22	8	13
PSB	5.2	3.6	64	62	58	58	59	41	24	44	26	35	34	18	23	19	15
PRLW	5.1	3.9	53	46	51	71	47	47	24	44	33	37	31	13	20	25	16
RW	5.0	3.4	67	51	44	55	64	31	15	36	36	35	31	27	22	24	9
PCB	3.1	4.1	33	37	31	25	27	27	22	25	19	21	22	10	21	16	7
<i>The Netherlands:</i>																	
VVD	6.0	2.9	80	50	73	67	61	75	59	45	36	48	33	13	14	9	12
D'66	5.9	3.3	65	72	67	50	68	57	60	54	34	37	32	20	20	11	13
CDA	5.7	3.2	73	63	57	49	61	61	54	49	33	40	34	19	18	7	14
PvdA	5.7	3.5	54	81	63	45	59	57	56	48	34	32	27	16	23	15	23
<i>FR Germany:</i>																	
SPD	5.9	4.2	77	63	57	34	61	44	53	51	38	22	30	47	30	20	21
FDP	5.5	3.7	78	67	57	66	56	45	48	43	40	25	35	33	23	19	11
CDU	4.8	3.5	74	55	53	36	46	42	42	35	30	26	27	29	17	9	9
NPD	4.4	3.4	63	46	34	57	41	29	57	30	23	30	13	14	18	14	9
CSU	4.4	3.4	73	52	64	36	42	35	33	29	32	27	27	24	13	9	9
<i>France:</i>																	
MRG	6.9	3.0	81	69	-	74	70	70	57	41	76	48	43	30	-	-	26
UDF	4.3	3.7	59	50	46	44	52	29	27	38	33	24	24	18	15	11	7
PFN	4.3	3.1	76	48	73	73	58	30	15	30	33	27	9	6	6	12	3
FN	3.3	3.1	47	31	42	47	36	29	15	22	31	25	9	7	9	16	2
PSU	2.1	3.5	23	24	17	9	23	19	14	18	14	13	13	13	11	10	6
RPR	2.1	2.5	37	22	17	32	31	17	10	17	15	7	7	4	4	3	2
PS	1.8	2.5	32	22	40	20	21	6	8	13	16	7	9	7	5	2	3

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Table II

name party	mean number issues Eur. level	s.d. number	Defense superp.	Multinationals	Eur. integration	Terrorism	Inflation	Nuclear energy	Environment	Unemployment	Developmental aid	Mil. expenditure	Equality men-women	Reg. differences	Income differences	Abortion	Control priv. ent.
<i>Italy:</i>																	
PLI	3.9	2.6	78	49	1	17	22	25	29	29	40	34	22	21	16	9	1
MSI	3.6	3.2	62	39	62	27	1	38	31	35	17	31	20	22	17	9	8
<i>Luxembourg:</i>																	
DP	4.4	4.1	62	40	52	40	46	36	30	30	24	24	28	40	20	16	8
LSAP	3.6	3.4	57	35	53	34	37	35	13	24	18	11	21	30	13	11	20
CSV	3.4	4.1	56	33	53	33	31	31	22	27	16	24	18	25	15	5	7
<i>Ireland:</i>																	
LAB	6.7	4.2	67	69	51	38	33	49	64	49	38	49	62	67	36	36	18
FF	3.5	3.1	32	52	42	16	27	19	35	19	23	13	29	48	23	10	10
FG	3.5	2.8	59	39	54	39	33	17	11	26	9	15	22	57	15	2	7
<i>Denmark:</i>																	
CD	5.6	3.1	63	61	79	67	67	39	42	52	34	29	27	23	17	19	20
KFP	4.3	3.0	53	54	74	66	50	26	33	35	23	18	25	13	8	13	9
S	4.3	3.7	35	57	41	27	56	25	37	40	22	12	29	14	19	17	14
V	3.9	3.1	47	67	59	57	34	23	33	22	22	18	18	14	10	13	11
KrFP	3.6	3.4	37	48	48	52	34	32	33	25	18	18	20	16	15	10	8
FRP	3.4	3.2	40	38	55	57	27	31	24	19	18	24	17	8	13	14	12
SFP	1.7	3.0	9	28	6	13	15	10	24	16	8	12	14	4	8	9	3
RF	1.4	2.2	7	20	2	23	10	7	18	9	10	12	11	3	3	4	2
<i>Britain:</i>																	
LIB	3.9	3.6	55	55	40	34	26	31	27	25	26	31	22	26	14	13	6
CON	2.4	2.9	40	30	39	24	3	27	18	12	18	22	16	19	7	3	3
LAB	1.9	2.9	22	32	19	14	10	16	14	15	14	11	15	12	7	6	3

Table III: Correlations between the pro-European attitude index and age and left-right self-placement per country.

	Age	Left-right
Belgium	-0.09(a)	-0.01
The Netherlands	+0.04	+0.05(c)
FR Germany	-0.08(b)	-0.03
France	-0.01	+0.03
Italy	+0.07	+0.01
Luxemburg	-0.28(a)	-0.14(b)
Ireland	-0.11	-0.30(a)
Denmark	+0.00	+0.11(a)
United Kingdom	+0.01	-0.00

a: $p < 0.001$

b: $0.001 \leq p < 0.05$

c: $0.05 \leq p < 0.10$

Notes

1. In a later study (Inglehart and Rabier, 1979, p. 485-6), the knowledge question was dropped. For a discussion about the reliability of the remaining two items as an index, see Mokken (1971, p. 290-9).

2. The Middle Level Elite Project is a project of the European Election Study. It unites three European research projects: The European Middle Level Elites Project, an Election Study, and interviews with Candidates for the European Parliament. The Middle Level Elite Project is directed by Karlheinz Reif (Mannheim) and Roland Cayrol (Paris).

The European Election Study was financed through a coordination committee from means supplied by the Volkswagen Foundation, the European Committee, and the European Parliament. The committee members were Rudolf Wildenmann, Mannheim; Dusan Sidjanski, Geneva; Henry Valen, Oslo; and the late Paolo Farnetti, Turin.

The national directors of the Middle Level Elite Project are:

Belgium	: Nicole Loeb-Mayer and Paul Clayes, Université Libre de Bruxelles;
Denmark	: Ib Faurby and Ole P. Kristensen, Universitat Aarhus;
France	: Roland Cayrol and Colette Ysmal, Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris;
FR Germany	: Hermann Schmitt, Universität Mannheim;
Ireland	: Ian Gordon, Kingston Polytechnics, London, and Neil Collins, University of Liverpool;
Italy	: Gianfranco Pasquino, Ugo Mancini, and Piero Ignazi, Università di Bologna;

Luxemburg	: Mario Hirsch, Luxemburg, and Université de Strassbourg;
Netherlands	: Isaac Lipschits, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen;
United Kingdom	: Ian Gordon, Kingston Polytechnics, London, and Paul Whitley, University of Bristol;

Technical project coördinator: Terry Barton, Universität Mannheim.

3. The wording of the relevant questions were: (a) for the studies of mass publics: 'For each of the problems I am going to mention, would you say whether they would be better dealt with by an European government, or by the (British, French, etc.) government?' (b) for the EP Candidates study: 'The functions that I am about to describe can be performed in various ways. This card gives four alternative ways of handling them'. The alternatives are then shown on a card: 1) National Government; 2) National Government with Consultation; 3) European Community with National Veto; 4) European Community by Majority Vote.

4. This uses Mokken's stochastic nonparametric cumulative scaling model (for an elementary introduction, see Stokman and Van Schuur (1980), for a more extensive treatment, see Niemöller and Van Schuur (1983). This scale analysis was performed over the 3454 respondents who responded substantively to all fifteen issues. Scalability for the scale as a whole was 0.44. The item 'Accelerate European integration' was not admitted to the scale because its item-coefficient of scalability (0.28) was below the specified lower boundary (0.30). There are some disturbances in the 'double monotony', but they are smaller than 0.04. For an interpretation of these terms and numbers, see the references given above. For a more extensive application to the Dutch data, see Middel and Van Schuur (1981).

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Onderzoek

De perceptie van sociale bewegingen in Zürich en Amsterdam*

A. K. den Boon

1. Aanleiding tot het onderzoek

In Zürich hebben zich in 1980 en 1981 ernstige sociale onlusten voorgedaan tussen de politie en leden van 'Die Bewegung', een beweging van alternatieve jongeren. De oorzaak van de conflicten was het sluiten en vervolgens slopen van een zelfstandig functionerend jongerencentrum (een combinatie van een sleep-in en zoiets als 'Paradiso' in Amsterdam). Om een beter inzicht te krijgen in de beweegredenen van de bij het conflict betrokken partijen heeft H. Kriesi (1982, 1984) geanalyseerd welke hun achterliggende maatschappijvisies waren. Hij kwam tot de conclusies dat er drie geheel verschillende manieren zijn waarop de betrokkenen (tegenstanders van de jeugdbeweging, de sympathiserende buitenstaanders en de leden van de jeugdbeweging zelf) tegen de functie van de 'Bewegung' in de maatschappij aankijken.

Ook Amsterdam kent zijn sociale conflicten met jongeren. De conflicten tussen de kraakbeweging en de stad zijn de laatste jaren zeer bekend geworden. Er zijn natuurlijk nogal wat verschillen tussen de conflicten in Zürich en Amsterdam. In Amsterdam spitsen de conflicten zich toe op het gebied van woningnood, leegstand, speculatie, kraakacties en ontruimingen. In Zwitserland ging het vooral om een gebrek aan sociaal-culturele voorzieningen voor jongeren, met name om een zelfstandig functionerend jeugdcentrum. Toch zou het interessant zijn na te gaan in hoeverre de denkbeelden in Zürich ook opgaan voor Amsterdam, of dat er andere factoren een rol spelen. In dit onderzoek wordt een poging gedaan een verband te leggen tussen de perceptie van sociale bewegingen in Zürich en Amsterdam.

Het onderzoek bestaat uit twee delen. Het eerste deel is een toetsing van de modellen van Kriesi. Daartoe worden voor de modellen indexen gecon-

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