New concerns for coalition theory: allocation of ministries and sectoral policy-making. A comparative analysis

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Ian Budge and Hans Keman

1. Introduction

As empirical research on coalition formation accumulates, it becomes clear that the free-bargaining assumption underlying most existing theories is violated in many cases, so that serious rethinking is necessary. The violation stems from the fact that most actual coalitions are not based on unconstrained bargaining among free agents. At best the parties are severely limited, not only by ideology (which is taken account of in many existing models) but also by pre-existing commitments (e.g. to a standing electoral alliance): bans on participation by certain parties (Communists, Fascists); permanent self-exclusion from coalitions by others; the dominant position of (structurally – not policy – determined) 'swing' parties; the presence or absence of majority requirements for the government; and so on.

Evidence for the influence of these constraints and other structural factors[1] over coalition formation comes from several sources:

a. direct observation and systematic surveys of what actually goes on in coalition negotiations (Browne and Dreijmanis 1982; Bogdanor 1983; Franklin and Mackie 1983; Strom 1984; Pridham 1986). These demonstrate that parties come to coalition negotiations with existing commitments and rights, which are not necessarily reflected in the policy-distances which separate them (e.g. when a party's only chance of gaining office is to join with a party of quite diverse ideology against a closer one which refuses to go into coalition);

b. the disappointing performance of models based on free bargaining assumptions themselves. Whether these emphasize strategic bargaining to form minimal winning coalitions (Riker 1962), the influence of policy-distances (De Swaan 1973; Grofman 1982), a mixture of the two (Axelrod 1970); or more subtle conceptions such as the core (Schofield 1982) or cycle set (Schofield 1985), their empirical performance has been patchy.

Neither minimal winning nor minimal connected winning coalitions 'fit' much more than a third of post-war coalition governments (Herman and Pope 1973; Taylor and Laver 1973). Moreover, their efficiency levels (the number of successfully predicted governments over the total number of governments predicted) are generally even lower. Better results have been obtained for selected cases from individual countries (Axelrod 1970; Grofman 1982; Schofield 1982). However, the measures of policy-distance on which these results are based are generally subjective or indirect, and open to the (tautological) possibility that estimates of distance are themselves based on the parties' participation in coalitions together (Budge and Laver 1986). Recent comprehensive tests of policy-based models in ten post-war coalitional systems, where distances were estimated from programmatic data, have produced much more patchy results[2];

c. simple structural models of coalition formation, incorporating the influences mentioned above, perform better than policy-based or strategic models, at any rate at a statistical level, with success and efficiency rates (i.e. number of successful predictions over total number of predictions) ranging from .50 to .80.[3]

The point of citing these results is not to argue for the necessary superiority of structural models per se. It is rather to demonstrate the remarkable extent to which coalitions are *pre*determined by structural influences. This in turn argues for a rethinking of coalition theory to take cognisance of the fact that much of the time parties find themselves in coalitions they have been structurally pushed into, rather than bargaining their way in. The purpose of this paper is to look at the theoretical implications of this situation and to check some of them against comparative evidence from a diachronic perspective.

2. From pre-formation bargaining to internal norms: allocation of offices and sectoral policy-making within a constrained coalition

Of the four major aspects of party behaviour in government-initial formation, allocation of ministries to coalition partners, policy-making, and termination – the last three have traditionally been seen as dependent on the first. By bargaining on terms for its admission, a potential partner can move allocations and policy in its own favour to the extent its strategic position allows it to. If through chance or miscalculation the resulting co-

alition is based on suboptimal distributions, it is in unstable equilibrium and will terminate earlier than better constructed ones.

However, where the membership of a coalition is largely determined by structural factors, opportunities for precoalition bargaining are sharply reduced. Since a party is in some sense already committed to joining, such bargaining itself is transformed to an intra-coalition decision process.

The characteristic feature of such processes, at any rate in the extreme case of a wholly constrained coalition to which there is no feasible alternative, is that alle parties enjoy an equal bargaining share. None can threaten credibly to withdraw: even if they did withdraw, the same coalition would eventually reform.[4] In this sense all members have equal power. How do they set about, then, devising ways to allocate offices and to regulate internal decision-making?

Our suggestion is, that with strategic bargaining ruled out, there is no alternative to norms of fairness and proportionality. Coalition members *have* to live with each other – possibly over a long series of coalitions if no alternatives are left. They have equal power over each other, so there is no way of forcing any partner to take less than what he thinks is his due. What they must do is to find some rule on which to allocate ministries, which can be accepted by everyone.

It is not obvious what other rules could be found than: a. dividing ministries equally between parties and rotating the Premiership; b. recognizing relative party size and weighting ministerial distributions by this, and giving the largest party the Premiership. We might expect that where parties approached equality, and (other things being equal) in two-member coalitions, rule a would hold: but in the more common case of multi-member coalitions with great disparities between parties, rule b would be the norm. Clearly large parties would be discontented if they were treated like the pygmies: moreover their country-wide standing and in a sense electoral validation give them superior claims to the position of national spokesman.

Such expectations fit very well with the best known finding about ministerial distributions – Browne and Franklin's (1973) discovery of a strong relationship between proportions of legislative seats contributed to the government coalition, and proportions of ministries received by a party. It has always been a puzzle why, in pre-coalition bargaining, more powerful parties did not 'pull' the distribution more in their own favour (Schofield and Laver 1984). Their inability to bargain in this way because of constraints explains quite neatly why the rule should hold.

However, there is a further stage to which we can take this reasoning.

Suppose, under a rule of proportionality in a constrained coalition, one party develops preferences for particular ministries. We describe grounds for having such preferences below. Here we are concerned with the effect of having preferences in itself. The party in question then has an advantage in debates over allocation, since none of its partners have arguments to oppose to its having what it wants and to keep harmony within the coalition will have to yield it the ministries requested.

However, the effect of one party getting more desirable ministries (at any rate from its own point of view) will be to push its partners in the direction of developing substantive preferences on their own account, if only to avoid being the last party without preferences who would be left with the ministries no-one else wanted.

There are thus good, abstract, strategic reasons why, within a constrained coalition governed by rules of fairness, parties should want to get particular ministries. There are also a variety of substantive grounds for wanting them, which will become clearer once we consider policy-making within such a coalition.

Even parties primarily concerned with office will want to influence government policy so as to please their voters, gain votes, and (hopefully) claim more ministries in post-election coalitions. Policy-pursuing parties will clearly wish to influence policy. However, a coalition produced by structural constraints may or may not be able to evolve general policy agreements, depending on the nature of the constraints. Where an ideologically based alliance has formed, there may be a considerable degree of general agreement. Where parties have joined only to keep other(s) out, there may be less basis for it.

In any case there will be many specific issues not covered by general agreements, of importance just to one party and its supporters. Control over the implementation of policy may crucially redefine existing administrative practices to the benefit of the latter.

All these considerations provide substantive motives for parties wanting to be in charge of particular ministries, quite apart from their internal bargaining position and regardless of the general state of policy agreement within the coalition. We shall go into the nature of party preferences in the next section, pausing only to consider a last internal norm which should emerge in constrained coalitions like the ones we have described.

This is a strong emphasis on party autonomy within ministries and thus in particular in certain sectors of policy-making. Once allocations are settled, and since each partner shares a desire to use ministries to advance their own policy purposes, they should agree fairly easily on giving each other a free hand. Obviously this will be limited by general government

policy (if any), by budgetary constraints and legislative requirements, but only up to a point, since each minister is also free to fight for his own corner in Cabinet.

The consequence of autonomy should be some degree of sectoral policy-making in coalitions, where the influence of party control of ministries should emerge on policy and outputs within the relevant sector. There is already cross-national evidence of this (Keman, forthcoming). In Section 6 we explore comparative evidence on this for coalitional democracies in the post-war period.

3. Party preferences for ministries: general hypotheses and operationalizations

First, however, we have to investigate the nature of party preferences – both for ministries and policies – and suggest how we could operationalize these so as to check them against comparative data on party tenures of ministries and relate policy sectors. We also have to show how substantive preferences for specific ministries can be reconciled with a proportional share-out, since proportionality has often been taken as showing that parties cannot target particular ministries.

The answer to this last point is clear. There is no inherent contrast between proportionality and getting substantively preferred ministries, provided the latter is done within the due proportions. Of course these may sometimes constitute a severe constraint on a party getting what it wants. We discuss this below.

To demonstrate that parties have particular preferences for certain ministries we could rely on evidence of some consistent patterning, on which there are already findings within particular countries (Mastropaolo 1989; Dogan 1979; Browne and Feste 1975). To show in detail however how norms of proportionality and specialization interact with each other, and how the latter carry over into policy-making within sectors, we have to go further and impute substantive preferences to parties on an *a priori* basis. This has also the merit of saving us from a possible tautological loop: using the ministries actually allocated to parties as evidence for what their preferences are; and then using these preferences to explain the allocation of ministries. We can short-cut this by setting up explicit hypotheses in the first place, and seeing if these work out in the actual distributions of ministries.

In order to generate hypotheses we have to do more than locate each 'party family's'[5] ideology on a left-right scale, since preferences are also

likely to relate to the other historical cleavages that generated parties of particular types (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). In determining preferences we can, fortunately, base ourselves on the great number of detailed studies of party ideology which have recently appeared. These have been general surveys of the various party 'families' in Western Europe (Paterson and Thomas 1977; Irving 1979; Pelinka 1980; Horner 1981; Layton-Henry 1982; Kirchner 1988). There have been historical studies of party support groups and of the cleavages on which they based themselves (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Rose and Urwin 1979; Rokkan and Urwin 1983). There have also been detailed content analyses of supporters' attitudes and of programmatic statements (Robertson 1976; Janda 1980; Sainsbury 1980; Scarbrough 1984; Von Beyme 1985; Budge, Robertson and Hearl, eds. 1987). From these we can distill a necessarily brief summary of each party family's leading concerns, as they appear at any rate in these studies:

1. *Conservatives* – Emerging in the nineteenth century as defenders of the existing order against radical experiments, Conservatives have tended to define themselves as guarantors of the existing order and its traditions. This gives them a major interest in law and order at home, and defence and foreign affairs abroad.

2. *Liberals* – Liberalism was the first of the historical challenges confronting State powerholders in the nineteenth century, with its challenge to the established Church and assertion of individual freedom – both legal and economic. Both brands of modern Liberalism – the 'progressive' and 'free enterprise' wings – share this concern, which has also led to tussles with the Churches over control of education.

3. *Religious parties* – Usually based on Catholic Social doctrine, these have sought to assert Church influence over education against Liberals and Socialists. Like the latter, however, they have asserted the need for minimal standards in welfare and labour legislation to preserve the dignity of the individual and especially – a particular concern with religious parties – the strenght of the family. These preferences are not too distant from those of Israeli religious parties.

4. *Socialist parties* – Originating as defenders of the working class against established interests, these have sought both to strengthen welfare and labour legislation as well as to influence economic policy in favour of the worker. They have also sought to emancipate the latter ideologically by breaking the Church hold on education.

5. *Agrarian* – Much more than any of the others these have been a single issue parties, concerned with the defence of farmers, peasants and the countryside against the town (their modern redefinitions of themselves e.g. in Sweden, have come fairly late, and in any case they are still strongly concerned about farmers and rural interests).

These thumbnail sketches are a summary of the source arguments: for a full justification it would be necessary to go back to the authorities cited. We can, however, see whether these arguments are upheld, in the sense of expected ministerial assignments actually being made along these lines. A first step to doing so is to rank hypothesized party preferences within

Table 1: Hypothesized ranking of 'standard' ministries within the party families

CONSER-VATIVE	LIBERAL	RELIGIOUS	SOCIALIST	Agrarian
Interior	Economics/Finance	Religious Affairs	Health/Social Welfare/Labour	Agriculture, Fisheries
Foreign Affairs/Defence	Justice	Education		
Justice	Education	Agriculture	Economics	
Agriculture	Interior		Industry	
Economics	Trade/Industry/Commerce	Social Welfare/Health/Labour	Education	
Education				
Trade (Commerce)/Industry				

Note: for this table and for others following we have (slightly) standardized ministries into the following categories: Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs, Defence, Interior, Justice, Finance, Economics, Labour, Social Welfare, Education, Health, Housing, Infrastructure, Agriculture, Industry, Religious Affairs, Other

The higher-ranking ministries under each 'family' reflect the preferences sketched above. The lower-ranking reflect what we might term a 'substitution effect'. It is obvious that not every party exists in every country. Even more clearly, not every party is represented in every coalition. We must envisage substitution effects, in which one party takes over another party's interests when it is not represented. It is failure to allow for

substitution which produced mainly negative results in the pioneering study of substantive party preferences for ministries (Browne and Feste 1975). This relied on an analysis-of-variance design relating party families to 'standardized ministries' across Western Europe, and found only two strong connections: largest parties took the Premiership and Agrarian parties took Agriculture. By allowing for substitution we can engender more realistic expectations and provide a basis for the flow diagrams described below.

In general we may say that because of their strong rural base and appeal to the traditions existing there, religious parties will be the natural 'heirs' of Agrarian parties, and Conservatives of religious parties. Conservatives are also heirs of the Liberals in the industrial-commercial sector. As far as Conservative concerns with order, morality and education go, however, we should expect them to be inherited by the religious parties in the absence of Conservatives themselves. Where only one 'bourgeois' party is represented it should take over the interests of the others.

Socialist parties exist in all countries, so there is no question of their concerns being substituted by others. From the point of view of policy concerns, Communist parties are regarded as equivalent to Labour or Social Democrats. In the case of coalitions formed without Socialists, ministries will be shared out among 'bourgeois' parties in line with their own major concerns, without any one of them becoming the unique 'heir' of the Socialists.[6]

4. Putting substantive preferences and proportionality together: a full specification of ministerial allocation processes

Rather than a one-off shareout based on a rule of proportionality, we have hypothesized that constrained coalitions produce a more complex multi-stage process in which parties may substitute each other, may have conflicting preferences for the same ministry, and may not get all the preferences to which they would otherwise be entitled because they come up against a proportionality ceiling. The process can be summarized as follows:

a. parties assert claims to specific ministries of interest;
b. conflicts involved in claims to the same ministry are provisionally traded;
c. the resulting distribution is checked against the proportionality criterion and accepted when it fits.

Negotiations may go between these different levels several times, leading to adjustments and failure because of the upper limits imposed by proportionality to gain some ministries of interest. Distribution can be smoothed out with the aid of 'make-weight' ministries of no particular policy interest to any party, and possibly by sacrificing ministries of lower priority to keep those more valued by the party.

For maximum clarity we have combined these assumptions in 'flow-diagrams' – direct representations of every step in the process of allocation for each party-type, which we present immediately below.[7] Clearly these diagrams, based on the hypothesised priorities of Table 1, are also hypothetical at this point. The very precise way in which processes have been specified, however, makes it possible to check them holistically against the data in our possession. By 'holistically' we mean that the final set of ministries a party would be expected to receive if the diagram is correct can be checked against the actual set of ministries it did receive, for all coalition governments in which that type of party participated, both in total and within each country. The analysis cannot therefore validate every stage and sequence of the postulated processes; but if the final results correspond to what seems to emerge in practice, there are strong grounds for accepting them as a fair approximation of the actual processes of negotiation and distribution within constrained coalitions. Such a result would mean an improvement of existing theory, since the predicted outcomes reflect both the overall process of government formation and the pattern of intra-coalition negotiations and related choices in terms of a qualitative distribution of policy preferences by means of allocating ministerial tenure across policy sectors.

We start in Figure 1 with single-issue, agrarian parties, because they form the simplest case.

Being irrevocably committed to having their one ministry of concern – Agriculture, and possibly Fisheries or Lands – getting such ministries if they exist forms the first stage of Agrarians' postulated allocation process, (though in itself it may not be a sufficient payoff, depending on the size of the Agrarian contribution).

The next stage is to review possible government situations. Three are particularly important from the point of view of distributing ministries:

a. There are situations, less constrained than others, in which one party could form a government on its own (because it has a majority or at least is very strongly predominant). As participation of the smaller partner(s) is dependent to some extent on goodwill, the predominant partner can take the ministries it wants (the exception being that Agrarians would not participate at all without the ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries). If

Figure 1: Flow diagram of the distribution of ministries for Agrarian Parties

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1  Agrarian Party takes agric. min.
   Agrarian Party takes related min

2  One party in govt.          ──3 Yes──▶  4  Is largest party
   can dispense with                          Agrarian?
   other(s)?

9 No                              5 Yes        7 No

10  Largest party is Agrarian?    6 Agrarian Party    8 Agrarian Party
                                    takes:              takes no other
11 Yes        13 No                 PM                  ministry
                                    Interior            preferred
12 Agrarian Party                   Foreign             by partner
   takes PM                         Economics
                                    Finance
14 Agrarian Party now over proportion  Defence
   of mins. relative to proportion of  Soc. Welf.
   seats?                              Health
                                       Labour
15 Yes        16 No                    Education
   Stop                                Stop            Stop

17  Agrarian Party receives additional ministries not desired by partner(s) to bring
    it up to the proportion of seats
                                                       Stop
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the Agrarians are the largest party in this situation, they will proceed to take the important ministries leaving to partner(s) only one of the latter's preferred choices. If they are the smaller (and dispensable) partner, they will take (in addition to Agriculture and Fisheries), nothing which is preferred by their partner(s).

b. A second situation is where relationships between coalition partners are more equal but where Agrarians are largest. In that case they will be expected to take the Premiership in addition to Agriculture which they have secured in their very first step.

c. Where parties are relatively equal but Agrarians are not the largest, obviously they do not get the Premiership, but they will secure Agriculture as a *sine qua non* of governmental participation.

In any case, Agrarians being satisfied on their single issue (and if largest, on the Premiership) now have no more specific ministries they want. It is at this point that the criterion of proportionality comes in. While for other parties there might exist a possibility of having too great a proportion of ministries relative to seats, and of being docked of those of lower priority, this could not be the case with the Agrarians. To participate in the coalition at all they must have Agriculture, and if largest must have the Premiership. As these are indispensable it is only if, having these, they still have less than their due proportion of ministries that any further allocation takes place: and this can only be upwards, carrying them into box 17 and gains of enough ministries not desired by partners to make their share proportional to their contribution of seats.

Hopefully this review of the diagram makes clear the processes which we hypothesise and their relationship with the preceding hypotheses. We turn now to Figure 2, which at a similar level of detail specifies processes of allocation for Conservative parties.

Again three possible types of coalition situation recur. In the case of coalitions with a totally dominant party, the question is again whether the Conservatives are dominant or dependent. If the former, then they will take all their preferred ministries leaving only those not preferred by them to the partner(s). If they themselves are dependent, on the other hand, they in turn will obtain only a ministry not preferred by the partner.

In a situation where they are largest, they will take the Premiership; and even if not largest they will bargain for their first priorities of Interior, Foreign Affairs and Defence. At this point, however, they begin to compete for ministries also desired by other parties in the coalition, so whether they get Justice, Education, Trade etc. depends on whether interested partners are asserting claims. If there is a clash between other parties' first priority ministries and ones which rank lower for Conservatives, the latter will obviously tend to give way.

The question of what other parties form the coalition is also of concern because the Conservatives may 'inherit' an interest in certain ministries if a partner of a certain type does not exist. This is particularly the case with regard to Agriculture if there are no Agrarian or religious partners.

With desired ministries obtained, the equalizing process based on proportionality comes into play. If Conservatives have too few ministries

Figure 2: Flow diagram of the distribution of ministries for Conservative Parties

1. What kind of coalition? Largest party can dispense with other(s)?
2. Yes
3. Largest party Conservative?
8. No
4. Yes
6. No
9. Is Conservative largest party?
5. Takes PM, Interior, Foreign Affairs, Economy, Education, Trade/Commerce, Justice and Agriculture if partner not Agrarian Stop
7. Takes no ministry preferred by partner Stop
10. Yes
12. No
11. Takes PM
13. Takes Interior, Foreign Affairs, Defence
14. Who are partners?
15. Takes Justice if no Liberal partner
16. Takes Agriculture if no Agrarian or Religious partner, if there is does not take Agriculture
17. Takes Economics and Finance if no Liberal, or Socialist partner
18. Takes Education if no Liberal, Religious or Socialist partner
19. Takes Trade and Commerce if no Liberal partner
20. Takes Industry if no Lib. or Soc. partner
21. Is Cons. Party now over proportion of ministries relative to prop. seats
22. Yes
24. No
23. Loses sufficient of last allocated (lower ranking) ministries to make share of ministries proportional to seats subject to always retaining Interior, Foreign, Defence Stop
25. Receives additional ministries not desired by partners to make share up to proportion of seats Stop

in relation to their seats, they will receive make-weights not especially desired by anyone else to make them level. If too many preferred ministries have gone to them, however, they have to lose enough of their lower ranked ones to bring them down to proportionality with seats. This final, adjusting process cuts across the earlier allocation in terms of substantive preferences and can reverse some of its results. This could account for some preferred ministries not being obtained, in ways perfectly consonant with the theory, but which are not caught by broad comparisons of hypothetical preferences with actual results. This will also

Figure 3: Flow diagram of the distribution of ministries for Liberal Parties

1. What kind of coalition? Largest party can dispense with other(s)?
2. Yes
3. Largest party Liberal?
8. No
4. Yes
6. No
9. Is Liberal largest party?
5. Takes PM, Economics/Finance, Education, Justice, Interior, Trade/Industry/Commerce, Foreign Affairs, Defence Stop
7. Takes no ministry preferred by partner Stop
10. Yes
12. No
11. Takes PM
13. Takes Economics/Finance and Justice
14. Who are partners?
15. Takes Education if no Religious or Socialist partner
16. Takes Interior if no Cons. partner
18. Is Lib. Party now over proportion of ministries relative to proportion of seats?
17. Takes Trade, Industry & Commerce if no Cons. or Soc. partner. If Cons. or Soc. partner and at least two ministries, divides them
19. Yes
21. No
20. Loses sufficient of last allocated (lower ranking) ministries proportional to seats subject to always retaining Economy Stop
22. Receives additional ministries not desired by partners to make share up to proportion of seats Stop

lower the extent to which parties get their 'expected' ministries, in the data reviewed in Section 5.

Figure 3 lists the same processes for Liberal parties.

As the preferences of Liberals for ministries have already been specified in relation to Table 1, and distribution follows the same broad principles as those described for Conservatives, we do not need to discuss the Figure in detail. Because Education is also a priority for religious parties – as the Interior/Home Affairs is for Conservatives – Liberals are not assumed necessarily to get them if they have partners of these types. Again Liberals have *sine qua nons* (Economics/Finance and Justice) and again the proportionalisation of ministries and seats may knock out some substantively preferred ministries from their final allocation (in the case of very small parties, entitled to only one ministry on proportional criteria, most of the preferred ministries would not in fact be obtained).

The distributions for religious parties (Figure 4) and Socialists (Figure 5) are again similar, once essential modifications have been made to accommodate their different preferences and relationships with partners. Again precisely who is a coalition partners makes a great difference to the

Figure 4: Flow diagram of the distribution of ministries for Religious Parties

Figure 5: Flow diagram of the distribution of ministries for Socialist Parties

final allocation, which is also affected by proportionalisation.

These figures spell out our expectations in more precise detail than the general formulations made up to now. What they do for analysis is to make possible a total specification of the set of ministries a party should end up with in a given parliamentary situation, rather than checking the destination of particular types one by one. Taking the simplest case, not only do we expect the Agrarians to end up with Agriculture and Fisheries, but where they 'earn' less than one ministry in terms of their proportion of Government seats that is all they will get. Where they are largest the set will consist of Agriculture, the Premiership and additional make-weight ministries (i.e. those not specifically desired by any party) up to their level of proportionality.

5.   Actual party preferences for ministries[8]

We can proceed to an immediate check of this simplest case before coming to the more complicated allocations for the other party families. The results are shown in Table 2, which presents statistics on the actual allocation of ministries in the five countries (exclusive of Switzerland)[9] where agrarian parties took part in coalitions during the post-war period. These can be compared with the leading predictions from Figure 1.

Table 2: Distribution of ministries among Agrarian Parties of five countries in the post-war period

	Proportions of cases where Agrarian Party:			
	takes Agriculture and related ministries	is largest and takes Premiership	gets number of ministries roughly proportional to its number of government seats (± 5%)	overall distribution conforms broadly to expectations
DENMARK	0.66 (12)	1.00 (2)	0.33 (6)	1.00 (6)
FINLAND	0.94 (33)	1.00 (9)	0.51 (33)	0.73 (33)
IRELAND	0.50 (4)	–	1.00 (2)	1.00 (2)
NORWAY	0.70 (10)	0.50 (2)	0.60 (5)	0.80 (5)
SWEDEN	1.00 (6)	1.00 (2)	0.33 (6)	0.83 (6)
TOTAL	0.83 (65)	0.93 (15)	0.52 (52)	0.79 (52)

N.B.: N represents total ministries counted in the first three columns. In the last column N represents the number of governments that have been judged

As in no case an Agrarian party was large enough to dispense with partners if it so wished nor could it be dispensed with, the right-hand branch of the figure is irrelevant. The most important criteria as to whether the diagram works are therefore whether in fact Agrarian parties do take the Agricultural and related ministries: whether, if largest, they take the Premiership; whether the overall relationship of their seats to ministries is roughly proportional.

In addition we can scan the final, overall, distribution of ministries, taking account of, but not limiting ourselves to, these points, to see whether the process works generally as expected. The 'overall' evaluation is designed to complement one-by-one, mechanical checking of whether particular ministries have been assigned as they ought to be, in terms of our hypotheses. Minor deviations from such assignments (e.g. where a very small agrarian party received only one agriculture-related ministry rather than two) can be discounted in the overall assessment, provided that other processes were respected. Alternatively, such achievements as gaining the Premiership where Agrarians were not largest go against expectations though not specifically checked in other parts of the table, and lead to negative evaluations of overall success even though some proportions in Table 2 are favourable.

The Premiership is less related to the specific character of the party and more to its situation in regard to coalition partners. In the limited number of cases in which Agrarians are the largest party it almost exclusively falls to them. In Finland, where they occupied a quasi-dominant position in the party system under the very active Presidency of their former party leader, Kekkonen, they have quite often obtained the Premiership when not the largest party. This counts as a failure for expectations in regard to other parties' claims to the Premiership, rather than appearing in the columnproportions of Table 2. However, it *is* taken into account in the overall-assessment of 'fit', where it depresses the success of the representation in the case of Finland.

Parties' claims to particular ministries are assumed in Figure 1 to be made within overall limits of proportionality. It is expected, in other words, that preferences will be met only to the extent that the proportion of ministries obtained does not exceed the proportion of seats contributed to the government coalition. This assumption is upheld by the results of much other research on the relationship, and also by the high correlation for our own data (r = .88), confirming Browne and Franklin (1973). The correlation, however, reflects a tendency for proportions of ministries received to go up or down with proportions of government seats contributed. It does not inform us about the exact limits within the relationship holds: whether, for example, the proportions always correspond fairly precisely – 40 per cent of seats being met by more or less 40 per cent ministries in every case – or whether they are 'gaps' or 'lags' between the proportions. As a rough check here and in succeeding tables on 'degree' of proportionality we note the number of times the ministerial and seat proportions come within one 'ministry' of each other – normally five per cent, as this represents 'one ministry' in the usual case where the cabinet numbers about twenty posts.

The results of Table 2 show that some agrarian parties (e.g. in Ireland) get a very exact return for their input of government seats. Mostly, however, proportionality in this very strict sense holds in only half the relevant coalitions of each country, and this level is reflected overall. There is no general tendency for the share of ministries to either exceed or fall short of the share of seats, either overall or within particular countries.

The final column of Table 2 reports the proportion of cases in which expectations about allocations are confirmed on balance over the whole set of governments examined. Contrary to the other columns this figure represents an overall *qualitative* judgment of each case (i.e. government formed) and accounts for specific deviations which cannot be accounted for in the structure of the flow diagrams.

Table 3: Distribution of ministries among Conservative Parties of eleven countries in the post-war period

	Proportion of cases in which Conservative Party:					
	takes ministries expected overall criteria	if largest takes Premiership	takes at least majority of Interior, Foreign Affairs, Defence[1]	takes Justice, Agriculture, Economics/Finance, Education, Trade/Commerce/Industry as predicted[2]	gets number of ministries roughly proportional to its number of government seats (± 5.0%)	overall distribution conforms broadly to expectations
AUSTRIA	0.50 (84)	1.00 (12)	0.08 (12)	0.00 (12)	0.75 (12)	0.92 (12)
DENMARK	0.54 (24)	0.66 (3)	0.60 (5)	1.00 (5)	0.40 (5)	0.80 (5)
FINLAND	0.30 (27)	0.00 (1)	0.00 (7)	1.00 (7)	0.14 (7)	0.00 (7)
FRANCE 4	0.27 (100)	0.00 (8)	0.08 (24)	0.67 (24)	0.55 (24)	0.08 (24)
FRANCE 5	0.56 (75)	0.83 (18)	0.27 (18)	0.77 (18)	0.68 (18)	0.61 (18)
GERMANY	0.80 (5)	– (5)	0.00 (3)	– (3)	1.00 (3)	0.66 (3)
ICELAND	0.64 (28)	0.75 (8)	0.38 (8)	0.37 (8)	0.38 (8)	0.75 (8)
IRELAND	0.83 (24)	1.00 (5)	1.00 (5)	0.80 (5)	0.40 (5)	0.80 (5)
ISRAEL	0.57 (49)	1.00 (7)	0.44 (9)	0.43 (7)	0.11 (9)	0.44 (9)
NORWAY	0.88 (17)	1.00 (4)	1.00 (4)	1.00 (1)	0.75 (4)	1.00 (4)
SWEDEN	0.43 (7)	0.00 (1)	0.50 (2)	0.00 (2)	0.50 (2)	0.00 (2)
TOTAL	0.50 (440)	0.79 (67)	0.29 (97)	0.61 (97)	0.50 (97)	0.54 (97)

1 Up to proportionate share where small party, i.e. where not entitled by proportionality to more than one ministry, takes one of these ministries

2 i.e. where there is no partner with competing preference and up to limit imposed by proportion of government posts

In the case of agrarian parties this would imply that they got an agricultural ministry, and the Premiership if largest – otherwise not; and in addition received one or two other ministries if their numbers justified it. The overall evaluation of success does not, however, insist on close numerical proportionality, within the limit of five per cent, as reported in column three of the Table. In these terms the overall representation works well – in about four-fifths of cases overall, for all cases in Denmark and Ireland; and for over eighty per cent in Norway and Sweden. Owing to the success of Agrarians in obtaining the Premiership even when not the largest party, the Finnish proportion is lower, at 0.73. Even so, this figure indicates that the representation fits nearly three-quarters of coalitions.

We started with Agrarians because, with only two types of allocation to check (Agriculture and Premiership) they constitute the simplest case.

Table 3, dealing with the 'family' of Conservative parties, is at first sight very complicated but follows substantially the same logic. It checks expectations summarized in Figure 2. Conservatives are expected to assert claims over a much wider range of policy sectors than Agrarians, hence the first column indicated what proportion of all ministries expected to be taken actually are taken. For various reasons, many connected with structural inflexibilities in the allocation of small numbers of posts, this is rarely 100 per cent. For example, a deputy Prime Ministership may be linked with the Interior or with Foreign Affairs and hence go to another party – to balance a Conservative Premiership, for example. In such a case the associated responsibility does not go to the Conservatives either. Such situational peculiarities, however, hardly detract from the broad validity and usefulness of the representation of Figure 2 unless they work consistently across the board to prevent a designated ministry ever going to the Conservatives. This is not the case.

Assessments in the Table generally work in a probabilistic base. Do a majority of ministries which Conservatives are presumed to put as their first priority, actually go to them? (These are the Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Defence in the third column of Table 3). Do a majority of the ministries which Conservatives will take in soms cases but not in others according to who they are in coalition with, actually go to them? (i.e. Justice, Agriculture, Economics/Finance, Trade/Commerce/Industry, in the fourth column).

In addition we check, as with Agrarians, whether the Premiership goes to the Conservatives when they are largest and whether their proportion of ministries corresponds to their proportion of government seats. Finally, we make the same assessment of overall 'fit' between the expected final allocation of ministries (as summarized in Figure 2) and the actual results.

The overall success of the Conservative representation, as estimated on this basis, is much less than that of the Agrarian equivalent, at 0.54. In six out of eleven countries the representation works reasonably well. It is pulled down particularly by its almost total failure in Finland, for the National Coalition (KOK), and in the Fourth Republic of France for the Independent Conservatives. The position of the KOK is in fact a good example of the coalition constraints mentioned in Section 1: it is suspect to the Russians. Given Finnish sensitivity to Russian reactions, the KOK has been relegated to a less important role even on the relatively rare occasions when it has succeeded in entering government.

The Independent Conservatives under the French Fourth Republic are a different case, since it is even debatable to what extent they constituted a cohesive party. The other two countries where the model works less well are Sweden and Israel. In the latter case predictions improve as Gahal and Likud emerge as a definite party instead of aggregating diverse, loosely associated groups. The overall representation fits reasonably well for the well-established, influential, Conservative parties of Austria, Denmark, Iceland and Norway.

The match (overall and within countries) between proportions of government seats and proportions of ministries is at much the same level as for Agrarians i.e. it occurs in about half the cases. We will put this in context when we look at these results for alle countries and parties together.

Liberal parties conform better to the corresponding model of allocation (Figure 3) than Conservative parties do. This is clear from a comparison of Tables 3 and 4.

Both Tables are presented in the same form except that Liberal parties are expected to give their highest priority to getting Economics and/or Finance, and Justice, with secondary preferences for Education; the Interior; and Trade or Commerce or Industry. Their success in getting one or other of the latter, however, depends crucially on who their coalition partners are, as well as when they cross the threshold of proportionality between seats and ministries.

The Radical Socialist party of the French Fourth Republic emerges as a mainstream model of Liberal preferences for ministries. Even where ministries, which we have posited as first priority, were not taken (and thus counted as failures by our hypotheses) the ones actually taken were nonetheless Education and Industry which we had also regarded as lower-ranking Liberal preferences.

Expectations for religious parties are summarized in Figure 4 and checked in Table 5. Very consistent patterns of success appear here for the Low Countries, Federal Germany and Italy.

Table 4: Distribution of ministries among Liberal Parties of twelve countries

	Proportion of cases in which Liberal Party:						
	takes ministries expected overall criteria	if largest takes Premiership	takes at least one of Economics/Finance and Justice	takes one of Economics/Finance and Justice	takes Education, Interior, Trade/ Commerce/ Industry as predicted[1]	gets number of ministries roughly proportional to its number of government seats (± 5.0%)	overall distribution conforms broadly to expectations
BELGIUM	0.77 (44)	–	1.00 (1)	1.00 (11)	0.82 (11)	0.36 (11)	0.91 (11)
DENMARK	0.53 (34)	–	0.75 (8)	0.75 (6)	0.33 (6)	0.37 (8)	0.63 (8)
FINLAND	0.35 (34)	–	0.32 (22)	0.32 (11)	0.72 (11)	0.64 (22)	0.35 (22)
FRANCE 4	0.73 (81)	–	0.76 (25)	0.76 (18)	1.00 (18)	0.65 (25)	0.72 (25)
GERMANY	0.56 (46)	–	0.92 (13)	0.92 (13)	0.00 (13)	0.46 (13)	0.85 (13)
ICELAND	0.59 (29)	1.00 (2)	0.87 (8)	0.87 (8)	0.37 (8)	0.37 (8)	0.37 (8)
ISRAEL	0.41 (29)	–	0.53 (19)	0.53 (19)	0.00 (2)	0.77 (19)	0.53 (19)
ITALY	0.69 (52)	–	0.74 (27)	0.74 (27)	–	0.48 (27)	0.63 (27)
LUXEM-BOURG	0.64 (28)	–	0.87 (8)	0.87 (8)	0.62 (8)	0.12 (8)	0.87 (8)
NETHER-LANDS	0.88 (36)	–	0.75 (8)	0.75 (6)	0.83 (6)	0.85 (8)	0.75 (8)
NORWAY	0.55 (9)	–	1.00 (4)	1.00 (4)	1.00 (1)	1.00 (4)	0.75 (4)
SWEDEN	0.58 (12)	–	1.00 (3)	1.00 (3)	0.33 (3)	1.00 (3)	0.66 (3)
TOTAL	0.64 (434)	1.00 (2)	0.70 (156)	0.70 (156)	0.59 (87)	0.55 (156)	0.64 (156)

1   i.e. where there is no partner with competing preference and up to the limit imposed by proportion of government seats which it contributes

Table 5: Distribution of ministries among Religious Parties of nine countries

	Proportion of cases in which Religious Party:					
	takes ministries expected overall criteria	if largest takes Premiership	takes Religious Affairs	takes Education, Agriculture, Social Welfare/ Labour as predicted[1]	gets number of ministries roughly proportionate to its number of government seats (± 5.0%)	overall distribution conforms broadly to expectations
BELGIUM	0.96 (81)	0.84 (19)	[2]	1.00 (19)	0.64 (19)	0.89 (19)
DENMARK	0.00 (2)	– (2)	0.00	0.00 (2)	1.00 (2)	0.00 (2)
FRANCE 4	0.51 (76)	0.42 (12)	[2]	0.36 (25)	0.46 (25)	0.16 (25)
GERMANY	0.90 (41)	1.00 (9)	[2]	0.55 (9)	0.60 (9)	1.00 (9)
ISRAEL	0.52 (94)	–	0.80 (29)	0.00 (29)	0.74 (29)	0.55 (29)
ITALY	0.92 (101)	0.91 (33)	[2]	0.93 (33)	0.51 (33)	0.90 (33)
LUXEM-BOURG	0.84 (45)	1.00 (2)	[2]	0.73 (11)	0.63 (11)	1.00 (11)
NETHER-LANDS	0.73 (81)	0.71 (17)	[2]	0.53 (17)	0.72 (17)	0.76 (17)
NORWAY	0.69 (16)	–	0.60 (5)	0.80 (5)	0.80 (5)	0.60 (5)
TOTAL	0.74 (537)	0.82 (102)	0.76 (34)	0.57 (148)	0.60 (150)	0.67 (150)

1 i.e. where there is no partner with competing preference and up to the limit imposed by the proportion of government seat which it contributes

2 Ministry of Religious Affairs does not exist in country

It is perhaps significant that these are the countries where Christian Democrats are strongest and practically always dominant when in government (so presumably, are most able to get their preferences met). In contrast the Danish Christian People's Party is small and fails to obtain any preference. Nevertheless, the corresponding Norwegian party is reasonably (and consistently) successful.

Israel is interesting in that it is the sole country, with the exception of the Scandinavian cases, to have a ministry of Religious Affairs. Expectations here are handsomely fulfilled as the National Religious Party almost always participates in government and takes the religious ministry in such a high proportion of cases as to make it clear that this is a normal practice (i.e. 80 percent).

Where expectations break down in Israel is in regard to Agriculture, given the absence of traditional affiliations such as those between European Christian Democrats and the peasantry. Otherwise the NRP frequently holds Health, Social Welfare, Labour and Education as expected, even in coalition with Socialist and Liberal parties.

The most successful representation among the 'multi-issue', more ideologically oriented parties, are the Socialists (Figure 5 and Table 6).

Success shows in the overall proportions for general 'fit' of the representation (0.75), in the proportion of ministries going where expected (0.79), and the proportion of cases where the welfare and labour ministries go to Socialists (or are divided with Christian Democrats, as anticipated). Complications enter with ministries of lower priority such as economics, finance and education, where the overall proportion of succcesses is only 0.56. It is of course anticipated that such lower priority ministries are more likely to be traded, or affected by proportionality.

The better fit of the Socialist representation compared to the three preceding cases is probably due to their more developed ideology and the cohesion this gives to party goals and objectives. Moreover this means that their position within a party system is more clear-cut and in most cases they hardly have to compete with other parties related to their 'family' (i.e. other parties of the Left). These factors seem to reveal themselves in a greater ability to obtain relevant ministries. In contrast, Conservative ideologies are looser and produce more variation in ministries obtained. The Liberal and religious 'families' fall between these extreme cases.

What about the other 'norm' incorporated into the flow diagrams and examined in the Tables – that of proportionality of seats to ministries? There is clearly a general tendency for share of ministries to go up or down with share of seats, as attested both in our own evidence (r = .88) and previous research (Browne and Franklin 1973). Over the party families

Table 6: Distribution of ministries among Socialist Parties of thirteen countries

Proportion of cases in which Socialist Party:

	takes ministries expected over all criteria	if largest takes overall Premiership	takes Labour, Health, Social Welfare as predicted	takes Economics, Industry, Education, as predicted	gets number of ministries roughly proportional to its number of government seats (± 5.0%)	overall distribution conforms broadly to expectations
AUSTRIA	0.54 (26)	1.00 (26)	1.00 (13)	0.08 (13)	0.54 (13)	1.00 (13)
BELGIUM	0.88 (44)	0.37 (8)	1.00 (15)	0.92 (12)	0.46 (15)	0.80 (15)
DENMARK	0.92 (26)	1.00 (7)	0.71 (7)	0.00 (1)	0.14 (7)	0.86 (7)
FINLAND	0.62 (96)	0.50 (24)	0.80 (25)	0.57 (7)	0.54 (25)	0.56 (25)
FRANCE 4	0.79 (44)	0.25 (4)	0.66 (18)	1.00 (2)	0.50 (18)	0.55 (18)
GERMANY	1.00 (25)	0.00 (6)	1.00 (6)	1.00 (1)	0.33 (6)	1.00 (6)
ICELAND	0.80 (10)	0.00 (7)	1.00 (7)	0.50 (2)	0.28 (7)	0.71 (7)
IRELAND	0.60 (15)	–	0.60 (5)	0.40 (5)	0.20 (5)	0.60 (5)
ISRAEL	0.93 (68)	0.00 (26)	0.80 (26)	1.00 (5)	0.74 (26)	0.85 (26)
ITALY	0.79 (24)	1.00 (1)	0.76 (17)	1.00 (5)	0.76 (17)	0.71 (17)
LUXEMBOURG	0.87 (16)	0.00 (1)	0.83 (8)	0.25 (4)	0.75 (8)	0.83 (6)
NETHERLANDS	0.80 (25)	1.00 (1)	0.88 (9)	0.00 (3)	0.55 (9)	0.88 (9)
SWEDEN	0.80 (15)	1.00 (3)	1.00 (3)		0.33 (3)	1.00 (3)
TOTAL	0.79 (434)	0.74 (82)	0.82 (157)	0.56 (61)	0.54 (157)	0.75 (157)

1 i.e. where there is no partner with competing preference and up to the limit imposed by the proportion of government seats to which it contributes

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we have examined, however, there is a 'match' between the proportions of ministries and seats, within a band of 5 per cent, in only about half the cases examined. This seems to be due to two factors:

a. the 'lumpiness' of the distribution: there are about twenty ministries in the average cabinet so each counts for about 5 per cent of the total (or more if there are fewer ministries). One ministry allocated on lines that depart slightly from proportionality destroys the exact match;

b. small parties getting above their strict proportion – in part for technical reasons (where contributions in seats is 2-3 per cent and one ministry counts 8-9 per cent) – and in part because it costs little to larger parties, relatively, to give smaller ones slightly more. There is also an influence from two-party coalitions – where, as suggested in Section 2, a norm of equality between partners may seem more obvious than proportionality.

None of this suggests that the proportionality norm incorporated in the flow diagrams does not hold, but that it is approximate rather than exact.

6. Sectoral policy-making

The final norm we suggested as arising out of constrained coalitions was the relative autonomy of party policy-making within the allocated ministries in relation to policy sectors that are ideologically important for the different parties participating in a coalition. This is likely to be agreed by all the partners because each thereby gains some ability to take initiatives in areas of concern.

There are of course going to be limits to this. Some areas will be more central to overall government policy than others and hence more affected by it. Some areas will be lower in terms of party priorities themselves so that ministers will assert themselves less. In most, more than one party holds ministries relating to a sector. In some cases, as cross-national evidence shows (Keman, forthcoming) the relation between allocation of ministers in policy sectors and parties is quite strong in terms of dominating a sector. On average parties – in particular religious and Socialist ones – manage to 'colonize' policy sectors that are important to them for about two-thirds of all cases. It appears that the 'rule of thumb' with respect to proportionality is less followed in this respect. Therefore we may expect to see some relationships emerging by party control and policy, though not necessarily in all areas equally strong.

The Tables 7, 8 and 9 below relate party dominance within each policy-sector (defined as a major share of relevant ministries) – and tempered by whichever party the sector shared with – to sectoral outputs (percentages

add up to 100 per cent across the three rows defined by dominance of particular party in a sector).

Outputs are judged holistically rahter than as exact monetary aggregates (although informed by the expenditure figures), given the difficulties of putting together expenditures in different sub-areas across different

Table 7: Relationship between party control of government policy sectors and Social Welfare 1965-1983 in democracies with coalition governments

Dominant party family Degree of social welfare provision in sector:						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	% of total	N
1. *Conservatives with*:						
– Liberals	0.0	14.3%	0.0	0.0		
– Religious parties	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
– Socialists	0.0	14.3%	71.4%	0.0		
					14.6%	14
2. *Liberals with*:						
– Conservatives	50.0%	50.0%	0.0	0.0		
– Religious parties	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
– Socialists	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
					10.4%	10
3. *Religious parties with*:						
– Conservatives	0.0	4.8%	0.0	0.0		
– Liberals	14.3%	14.3%	2.4%	0.0		
– Socialists	33.3%	26.1%	4.8%	0.0		
					43.8%	42
4. *Socialists with*:						
– Conservatives	0.0	0.0	10.1%	0.0		
– Liberals	3.3%	50.0%	13.3%	0.0		
– Religious parties	20.0%	3.3%	0.0	0.0		
					31.2%	30

The party family which is in italics is the dominant actor within the relevant sector (comprising the ministries of Social Affairs, Health and Education, or their equivalents in each country). Only coalition governments appear in the table: the cases are 'country years' to match the expenditure data. Rank-orders run from high (1) to low (4). Internal percentages add to 100% across the three rows defined by each party's dominance of the ministries. See for the operationalization of degree of welfare provision the appendix

countries. A summary of the way indexes have been constructed is given in the Appendix. The period covered is 1965-1983 because of the difficulties of collecting reliable comparable information for earlier years. The cases in alle the tables are coalition-years – not necessarily therefore separate coalitions. This derives from the fact that expenditure figures are organized in years.

Table 7 relates levels of Social Welfare provision to party sectoral control (which will of course vary despite party preferences for ministries, owing to their absence from the country or the coalition; proportionality; and various chance factors). The main contrast opens up between Conservative and other parties, rather than between Socialists, or Socialists and religious parties, and the rest. When Conservative parties dominate the welfare policy sector, only 28.6 per cent of those years in office show an above average effort, whereas Liberals indeed are associated with the higher levels of provision within the sector (100 per cent). This is partly due to the fact Liberal parties who take Welfare Ministries are 'progressive' rather than New Right in orientation. Religious and Socialist parties perform to expectations: the domination of the former leads to very high levels in 47.6 per cent of the cases, and to a second highest level in 45.2 per cent of the years in office. For the Socialists this figure is 76.6 per cent (level 1 & 2 together) if dominant and 73.7 per cent if not. Apparently it does matter which party takes up what ministries in relation to policy sectors in terms of effective policy-making.

In the case of economic policy an anticipated difference opens up between Socialists and religious parties on the one hand, and Liberals and Conservatives on the other. Whatever the nature of the overall coalition, sectoral dominance by the former produces more interventionist policies of the kind traditionally used to combat unemployment. Active economic policy-making, fiscally direct or with caution, is characteristic for religious dominance in 86.2 per cent, and in 89.5 per cent of those years that Socialists dominate this policy sector. Dominance by Liberals and Conservatives does not preclude these but clearly pushes policy towards fiscal caution and non-intervention (respectively: 69.6 and 66.7 per cent). Expenditure-cutting and worries about inflation rather than unemployment appear to be a higher priority (Cf. Hibbs 1977; Schmidt 1982; Whiteley 1986). Table 8 allows for the conclusion, that constrained government formation and in particular the internal negotiations on who holds party control over certain policy sectors is not only influencing the eventual distribution of ministries *per se*, but also the programmatic direction and actual degree of efforts of economic policy-making in coalitions.

Table 9 reveals broadly similar patterns for military expenditure. Clearly this is an area even more directly exposed to external non-party pressures – international as well as national – than the other two (see for

Table 8: Relationship between party control of government policy sectors and economic policy 1965-1982 in democracies with coalition governments

Dominant party family in sector:	Kind of economic welfare strategy					
	fiscal directiveness	fiscal caution withdrawal	fiscal minimalism	fiscal minimalism	% of total	N
1. *Conservatives with*:						
– Liberals	16.7%	25.0%	0.0	0.0		
– Religious parties	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
– Socialists	16.7%	0.0	0.0	41.6%		
					11.7%	12
2. *Liberals with*:						
– Conservatives	8.7%	21.8%	26.0%	4.4%		
– Religious parties	8.7%	0.0	17.4%	0.0		
– Socialists	13.0%	0.0	0.0	0.0		
					22.3%	23
3. *Religious parties with*:						
– Conservatives	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
– Liberals	43.3%	6.7%	11.0%	0.0		
– Socialists	11.0%	21.3%	6.7%	0.0		
					29.1%	30
4. *Socialists with*:						
– Conservatives	13.2%	0.0	0.0	0.0		
– Liberals	15.8%	23.7%	0.0	10.5%		
– Religious parties	36.8%	0.0	0.0	0.0		
					36.9%	38

The party family in italics indicates the dominant one of the sector under review. Only coalition governments appear in the table: the cases are 'country years'. Percentages add to 100% in the three rows defined by each party's dominance of the ministries. See for the operationalization of economic welfare strategy the appendix

this: Keman 1987). Hence it is not surprising to discover expenditures tending to 'high' and 'highest' under all types of party control (i.e. 53 per cent on average for all parties). But they are clearly highest for Conservatives and religious parties and lowest for Socialists where these have dominance (52.5 per cent).

Table 9: Relationship between party control of government policy sectors and level of military 1965-1983 in democracies with coalition governments

Dominant party family in sector:	Very High %	High %	Medium %	Low %	% of Total	N=
1. *Conservatives with*:						
– Liberals	10.0	20.0	0.0	10.0		
– Religious parties	0.0	15.0	10.0	0.0		
– Socialists	0.0	25.0	0.0	10.0		
					16.7	20
2. *Liberals with*:						
– Conservatives	10.4	17.2	24.1	6.9		
– Religious parties	0.0	34.5	0.0	0.0		
– Socialists	0.0	0.0	6.9	0.0		
					24.2	29
3. *Religious parties with*:						
– Conservatives	0.0	22.6	0.0	0.0		
– Liberals	0.0	25.7	12.9	0.0		
– Socialists	0.0	25.7	9.7	3.3		
					25.8	31
4. *Socialists with*:						
– Conservatives	0.0	0.0	25.0	15.0		
– Liberals	0.0	27.5	0.0	0.0		
– Religious parties	0.0	20.0	10.0	2.5		
					33.3	40

Notes: Very High is greater than one standard deviation above mean of military expenditure; High is within one standard deviation above the mean; Medium is within one standard deviation below the mean; Low is more than one standard deviation below the mean. Sector-dominance implies that the italicized party-family not only occupies the majority of relevant ministries (i.e. Defence + Foreign Affairs + PM) but must also occupy Defence itself. Only coalition governments appear in the table: the cases are 'country years'. Percentages add to 100% in the three rows defined by each party's dominance of the ministries

Given the complex intermixing of influences on policy-making, we cannot expect unambiguous results from the tables. It is surprising that they emerge as sharply as they do. The sectoral differences which they

reveal provide good motives for parties' wanting to get certain ministries because of their influence over areas of concern to them: and provides good reasons for the patterns of ministerial allocation which we pin-pointed in the last section.

7. Conclusions: towards a new concern with party behaviour *inside* coalitions

The evidence presented above goes some way towards reversing the traditional concerns of coalition theory. Most existing theory implicitly assumes that the behaviour of parties inside coalitions is unproblematic: the allocation of ministries is taken care of by proportionality or power-based bargaining (Schofield and Laver 1984) and policy is settled by pre-coalition negotiations. Duration of governments also depends on a suitable equilibrium being established at the start. Everything hinges on coalition-formation: if that is governed by appropriate criteria (or, in the case of the 'core', if the party-constellation allows appropriate criteria to be applied) the other processes fall into place.

We suggest, in contrast, that there is often no place for pre-coalition bargaining because most coalitions are constrained (some even pre-determined) by structural factors unrelated to immediate policy-conside-rations. Allocations of ministries and policy-making are governed by internal processes; and termination is less important because constrained coalitions have to reconstitute themselves in much the same form after the crisis. Living together over long periods of time favours the acceptance by coalition partners of norms – generally of proportionality – in the allo-cation of ministries; and of relative autonomy in their management. It also inclines parties to consolidate their internal negotiating position by res-ponding to the demands of electoral support groups and of historical ideo-logy and developing substantive preferences for ministries.

We have not addressed all points of this argument equally here. Prima-rily, we have concentrated on showing that parties do have preferences for ministries which show up in the allocations they actually receive. We have also aduced evidence for the existence of sectoral policy-making related to the degree of party control of policy sectors in a coalition. While neither patterned allocations nor sectoral policy-making are totally at odds with existing theory, they do provide insight into how policy-diverse parties can coexist within a government they have to carry on together. Our evi-dence certainly supports the contention that internal coalition processes should be studied in their own right and not just as adjuncts to formation.

On the possibility that structural constraints may also, paradoxically, render government formation less difficult to explain, we have reported elsewhere.[10]

Appendix

Measures of sectoral output

1. Social welfare policy-output is constructed from governmental expenditure (expressed as % of GDP) on Transfers to Households, Education and Health. This index runs from 1 (= high) to 4 (= low) and is based on OECD figures (1985) and complemented, if necessary, by OECD National Accounts. A high score (1) is attained if the level of expenditure is high on each policy-field and conversely a low score (4) if the levels of expenditure are low. The reason for using rank-orderings is to get a robust measure for inter-nation comparisons as expenditures themselves are too sensitive to variations across sub-fields (e.g. education versus health): the exact meaning of lump sums aggregated across the sub-fields is often ambiguous.

2. The four leading types of economic policy which can be distinguished for the second half of the post-war period are:

I Fiscal directiveness – a relatively strong emphasis on fiscal policy in-struments, with relative indifference to the money supply. The level of public spending is manipulated to influence the level of general demand, and goes into deficit if necessary to maintain it (and as a consequence also to maintain employment levels).

II Fiscal caution – the long term aim is to reduce public spending and taxes so as to increase individual and production incentives. In the short run, however, public deficits may be tolerated so long as they are balanced by a suitable rate of economic growth.

III Fiscal withdrawal, influenced by a perceived need to relate the amount of money in circulation to the rate of economic growth. The normal strategy to get the money supply under control is to avoid deficit spending and indeed to reduce public expenditure in general, without taking other considerations into account.

IV Fiscal minimalism – dedicated to letting free markets produce their own solutions, and thus rejecting State economic activity outside its traditional narrowly defined functions.

3. External security is simply based on Total Expenditure on Defence (expressed as a % of GDP). Sources are the various volumes published by the International Peace Research Institute at Stockholm (SIPRI).

Notes

1. Structural factors denote those factors that are either the result of institutional features within which government formation must take place or those factors which remain constant throughout the period under review with respect to the room for manoeuvre of parties within a given party system.

2. These results emerge from comprehensive analysis of the relationship between party policy and coalition-formation in Western Europe, carried out by the Manifesto Research Group of the European Consortium for Political Research; and which are in the process of being written up in book form. The results come from content and other analyses of party electoral programmes on the one hand and Government programmes and policy declarations on the other.

3. Ian Budge, 'Towards a General Empirical Account of Coalition Government', Tables 16.6 and 16.9 and supporting discussion. The paper summarizes the results of the Manifesto Research Group's analyses mentioned in Footnote 2.

4. The definition of a government adopted here and for succeeding analyses is the standard one first put forward by Hurwitz (1971). Governments begin and end with any of the following events: a. Elections; b. Change in the Prime Minister; c. Change in party composition of the cabinet; d. Formal resignation.

5. Our subsequent discussion and analyses are based on preferences of five party 'families' rather than on those of individual parties 1. because this eases large scale matching of parties, ministries and policies in a broad comparative investigation; 2. there is some difficulty at arriving at an a priori specification of what an individual party would want other than through its membership of a broad ideological grouping. Not to proceed with some independently derived specification of preferences is to infer preferences, tautologically, from the ministries a party actually takes, through one could (and in fact does) observe patterning there.

6. It should be noted that recently in some countries a new type of party has emerged which – like the Agrarians – is based on a single, albeit broadly defined, issue: the environment. These parties have not (yet) participated in government, but are likely to become important, at least as a 'support party' (Cf. Lijphart 1984). Most of the time these parties are considered as 'Left wing' and therefore may replace the Communists in future as natural allies of the Socialists (see also Müller-Rommel 1985).

7. Representation in this form raises the possibility of eventual computerization of the processes involved. We have not done this as yet because of the complexity of the programming and inadequacies of data. However, this is a possible future development of the research.

8. Countries are selected from a comparative data set on twenty democracies, assembled specially for this study and related research. The data consists mainly of structural and policy information about governments of the post-war period from 1946 to 1984. The countries included in the full set are: all those in Scandinavia and the Low Countries, UK, Ireland, West Germany, Switzerland, France (Fourth and Fifth Republics), Italy, Israel, Canada, US, Australia, New Zealand, Japan. Only countries with coalition governments appear in the analysis.

9. In Switzerland the Federal Executive is 'balanced' proportionally by party (the so-called 'magic formula' of 2-2-2-1); see: Kerr 1987: 126. However, parties have no ability to put their nominee in a particular ministry as assignations are made by the Federal Assembly as vacancies come up. Hence we omit Switzerland from this analysis.

10. Ian Budge and Hans Keman, *Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in Twenty States*, 1990, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

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