A quarter century of Dutch politics: A changing political system or le plus que change.. ?

Wolinetz, S.B.

9. Bogdanor, 1983, *Op. Cit.*, p. 157.

10. In V. Bogdanor (ed.), *Constitutions in Democratic Politics*, Gower, Aldershot, 1988.

11. Bogdanor, 1988, *Op. Cit.*

12. 'Coalition Behaviour and the Problem of Party Merger – The Case of the Dutch Christian Democratic Party', ECPR Paper, Salzburg 1984.

13. See K. Gladdish, *Governing From the Centre: Politics and Policy-Making in The Netherlands*, Hurst, London 1990, chapters 3 and 4.

14. See J.J.C. Voorhoeve, *Peace, Profits and Principles: A Study of Dutch Foreign Policy*, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden 1985.

15. Viz. 1951-2, 1958-9, 1972-3 and 1982 (May-November).

16. *Acta Politica* VII, 3, *Op. Cit.*

17. In 1952 the KVP and PvdA tied for first place. Both entered the subsequent cabinet.

18. To enumerate even key texts would be laborious. But on Dutch coalition formation I would cite especially A. de Swaan, Chapter 7 in Browne and Dreijmanis, *Op. Cit.*, and R. Andeweg et al., Chapter 9 in R.T. Griffiths (ed.), *The Economy and Politics of The Netherlands since 1945*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1980.

19. In Browne and Dreijmanis, *Op. Cit.*, p. 234.

20. Coalition Formation and Policy Formulation: Patterns in Belgium and The Netherlands, R.L. Peterson, M. de Ridder, J.D. Hodds and E.F. McClellan? *Res Publica*, 25, 1, 1983.

21. See H. van Mierlo, Depillarisation and the Decline of Consociationalism in The Netherlands, *West European Politics*, 9, 1, January 1986.

22. 60% as against 34% who favoured a CDA-VVD combination, even though the latter had aggregated 48,1% of the poll.

23. Van Mierlo (1986), *Op. Cit.*

A quarter century of Dutch politics: A changing political system or le plus que change..?*

Steven B. Wolinetz

I. Introduction

Characterizing change in Dutch politics in the last twenty-five years is a daunting task. In 1965 the academic study of Dutch politics was still in its infancy and political life was relatively quiescent, particularly when compared to the conflicts soon to emerge. The late 1960s and much of the 1970s were marked by persistent efforts to restructure and 'democratize' politics and, particularly on the left, expand the boundaries of what was possible. Changes in voting patterns, parties, and elite behaviour appeared to mark the demise of an accommodative system then only recently described. Twenty-five years later the impact of either deliberate attempts to reform the political system or social and economic changes from which political changes seemed to flow is less certain. By the late 1980s politics appeared to have settled into patterns not unlike those of the 1950s and 1960s. Although few would deny that some changes have occurred, it is striking that in a recent issue of *West European Politics* on change in the Netherlands (January 1989) half the articles stressed continuity or minimized the extent of change.[1]

Emphases on continuity are not surprising. Events which loomed large at the time often appear smaller in historical context. Looking back, it is apparent that would-be reformers proffered far more than they could deliver. Institutional reforms intended to reshape the party system, such as changes in the electoral law or proposals for the direct election of the cabinet formateur, failed to secure the support of a parliamentary majority (Andeweg 1989), while the polarization strategies, pursued in one guise or another by the Socialists (PvdA) in the 1970s and 1980s in order to divide the confessionals and prevent the formation of single unified party

(Tromp 1989) helped to solidify the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA). The failure of institutional reforms left the formal structure of the political system intact, while the stabilization of the confessional centre reproduced a party system which bore a haunting resemblance to the old: although there were fewer parties and Christian Democrats were numerically weaker than before, the CDA retained the pivotal position which its predecessors had enjoyed in the 1950s and 1960s. Impressions of déjà vu were reinforced by the Socialists' (PvdA) retreat from polarization in the late 1980s and their willingness to enter coalitions on terms not entirely of their choosing. The renewed moderation of the PvdA gives contemporary politics an air of consensus reminiscent of the 1950s and early 1960s.

Nevertheless, the degree to which one perceives change depends on the optic used to assess it. In the special edition of *West European Politics*, Arend Lijphart (1989) argues that the Netherlands has changed on only one of the eight dimensions – the use of minimum-winning rather than oversized coalitions – which he used to classify democratic systems as majoritarian or consensual. In contrast to his views in successive editions of *The Politics of Accomodation* (Lijphart 1968; 1975), Lijphart maintains that the Netherlands has not become an adversarial democracy but 'merely moved from the politics of accommodation to the politics of relatively less accommodation and relatively more adversarial relations' (Lijphart 1989, p. 151). However, Lijphart's assertion is a product of the broad comparative perspective which he has adopted. If we look more closely, using different instruments, it will become apparent that a good deal has changed: prior to 1967, Dutch politics rested on a system of segmented pluralism which regulated the flow of demands and facilitated the resolution of conflicts. Parties, closely tied to subcultural networks, played a major role in the articulation and aggregation of interests, and trade unions and employers associations were incorporated into a series of bipartite and tripartite structures instrumental in formulating the terms of the postwar bargain as well as the administration of guided incomes policies. Since 1967 the scope and impact of pillarization have receded, parties have lost their central position in the process of interest intermediation, and the neocorporate subsystem, although organizationally intact, has proved far less capable of generating consensus than in the earlier postwar years. Changes have also occured in processes of political socialization and communication. Institutions remain the same. However, politics has become a much more public process and political leaders must now go to greater efforts to mobilize consent.

Subsequent sections will examine this shift from a highly structured variant of organized pluralism[2] to a more open variant and its impact on

the Dutch system. We will use Gabriel Almond's four input functions (Almond and Coleman 1961) in order to compare pre- and post-1967 politics. Later sections will explore the impact of changes in the performance of input functions on the operations of the system, as well as the question of how the Netherlands should be viewed in comparitive perspective.

II. Parties and interest groups in a segmented polity

Two factors exercised a profound influence over postwar Dutch politics. One was the segmentation of Dutch society; the other, the incorporation of major producer groups into a nexus of bipartite and tripartite organizations. The former was a product of nineteenth century mobilization and the Pacification Settlements, while the latter reflected compromises worked out during and after World War II. State support for denominational schools, proportional representation, and universal suffrage entrenched a party system with no automatic or ready-made majorities and enabled confessional parties, and also the Socialists, to extend incipient networks of religious or ideologically based organizations.[3] The former produced not only a fragmented party system in which there were no automatic or ready-made majorities, but also a pattern of interest articulation and interest aggregation in which party and subcultural elites could exercise decisive influence. The latter provided the basis for an emergent consensus on an active government role in the economy and a corporatist underpinning to the political system, which further regulated the flow of demands.

Detailed treatment of the segmentation of Dutch society or variations among the Calvinist, Catholic or general pillars is not possible here.[4] Crucial for our purposes is the fact that through the late 1960s, virtually all organizations interceding between citizens and the state in the Netherlands (with the possible exception of the ANWB[5]) were organized on a religious or ideological basis. Pillarization had a number of consequences for the operation of the political system. One is that processes of political communication and political socialization took place almost entirely within pillarized networks, another that party and subcultural elites dominated the articulation and aggregation of interests.

Political socialization and communication – We can be brief in our treatment of political communication and socialization. Virtually all organizations with which individuals came in contact were structured on a segmented

basis. Although the religious or ideological content varied and tended to be weaker in organizations primarily engaged in the provision of services (Bakvis 1981), individuals moved largely in homogeneous milieus ideal for shaping values and inculcating loyalties, or failing that, mobilizing followers. Primary political socialization took place in segmented milieus – family or schools – while secondary socialization was mediated by pillarized organizations. The encapsulation of the individual was enhanced by the segmentation of the print and broadcast media. Although a few independent newspapers such as *Het Parool* existed, major newspapers were closely linked to parties and subcultures, and broadcasting was dominated by subculturally-based organizations.[6] This gave party and subcultural elites substantial influence over political communication.[7]

Interest articulation and aggregation – Pillarization also shaped the articulation and aggregation of interests. The pervasiveness of segmentation meant that demands were articulated primarily by religious or ideologically-based organizations with close links to political parties and that parties were involved not only in the aggregation but also in the articulation of interests. The role which parties played in the aggregation of conflicting interests reflected authority patterns which gave political elites considerable freedom of action, the interlocking directorates which linked parties and subculturally based organizations, and the absence of alternate channels through which demands could expressed. Authority patterns were a product not only of political culture (see Lijphart 1968 and Daalder 1974) but also the tendency within pillarized organizations to push decisions upward, to the leaders of groups, who coordinated actions and negotiated differences with their opposite numbers in parallel organizations. Both tended to grant party and subcultural leaders considerable leeway to speak and negotiate for their followers (Lijphart 1968).

Interlocking directorates linked parties, major producer groups, and the media. Party executives and parliamentary caucuses usually included officials of major subcultural organizations, such as trade unions, agricultural groups, small and large business associations, educational institutions and care-giving organizations. Parties, trade unions, and other organizations were in turn represented on the governing boards of segmented broadcasting organizations (Lijphart 1968). Interlocking directorates meant not only that interest groups had readily available channels to the political system, but also that demands were most likely to be channelled through parties whose elites were well placed to negotiate with the leaders of other groups. This was common not only in the Catholic Party – sometimes described as a holding company for Catholic

interest groups (Bakvis 1981) – but also in other parties as well. Intricately involved in cabinet formations, as well as bargaining on legislation, party elites were well-placed to decide which claims they wished to advance, orchestrate, or ignore.

The position of party elites was reinforced by absence of alternate channels though which demands might be raised. Prior to the proliferation of advisory organs which accompanied the postwar growth of government, the principal channels of access were through parliamentary parties.[8] However, even in instances, such as agriculture or industrial relations, in which informal policy networks and formal advisory organs provided alternate channels of access, leaders of peak associations played a major role in tempering demands raised by their members.

The structure of the pillarized system of interest representation not only gave party and subculture elites a major role in directing traffic and reconciling competing claims but also exerted direct and indirect influence on demands brought forward. Interest articulation in the segmented Netherlands was almost exclusively the province of organizations linked to one of the pillars. General or non-denominational organizations ended up by default in the secular subculture, and organizations operating outside of the pillarized structure were typically weakened by the difficulty of attracting members or marginalized by exclusion from consultative or coordinating bodies. Formal and informal channels of communication provided opportunities not only for subculturally based organizations to raise demands, but also for party and subcultural elites to exert influence over related organizations. Even if direct pressures were absent, the scope and tenor of demands raised were influenced indirectly by the ideological context in which demands were formulated and the kinds of people recruited into leadership positions[9]. One consequence of this was that it was often difficult for established groups to articulate extreme positions or for extreme groups to gain the critical mass required to make themselves heard.

The combination of segmentation and the incorporation of major producer groups – themselves segmented – into corporatist structures produced a system in which the flow of demands from society was controlled and in which major groups could be harnessed within a broader consensus. We have already discussed in general terms the ways in which segmentation and the authority of political elites affected the flow of demands from society. This was particularly pronounced within the divided trade union movement. The access provided by corporate structures and government coalitions committed to an active government role in the economy provided trade union federations with channels of access

and influence largely unavailable during the interwar period. However, using them required moderation of trade union demands. If trade union federations were to be effective, they had to coordinate their demands, and in effect moderate their tone. Moreover, trade unions participating in the Foundation of Labour effectively abandoned strikes in exchange for a voice in wage policy (Windmuller 1969). In practice, this was not difficult. Although the Catholic, Protestant, and Socialist federations were challenged by a more militant organization, the Trade Union Unity Centre (EVC) in the late 1940s, despite its initial numerical strength the EVC was quickly marginalized (Cooimans et al. 1976; Windmuller 1969). At the same time, the Netherlands Federation of Trade Unions (NVV) allowed scant room for militant action. Communists and other more radical elements were not tolerated, and federation leaders dominated meetings of the NVV's top decision-making organ, the Verbondsraad (Federation Council). An examination of almost verbatim transcripts of meetings from 1950 to 1955 reveals no discussions of strategy and tactics – which seem to be taken for granted – and virtually no sign of dissent.[10] Indicative of the general tenor of discussion and the authority of elites within the NVV is the treatment given to unions, such as the Diamond Workers, who dared to organize a strike in 1955; instead of support, the principal response was to scold the chairman of the deviant union for allowing his members to strike against the guided incomes policies which the NVV enthusiastically supported.[11]

Sources of accommodation – Let us draw our portrait together. We have been describing a political system in which political power was fragmented but in which the load on the political system was low because segmentation and the incorporation of major producer groups moderated the flow of demands and insulated elites from pressures from below. In earlier treatments, the postwar system has been characterized as accommodative and consociational. In our view the element of accommodation is present but its significance is different than in the consociational model. There accommodation was seen as the product of deliberate efforts of self-conscious elites to compromise lest their fragmented system disintegrate (Lijphart 1968). In our interpretation, accommodation flows from the logic of a system in which parties and interest groups derived benefits from the compromises which they concluded and in any case had few alternative strategies available to them.

Accommodation in the postwar years was also facilitated by the emergence of an underlying consensus around full employment, an active government role in the economy, and the expansion of the welfare state.

Blocked in the interwar period by prevailing doctrines and the reluctance of the Catholic Party to ally with the Socialists, the new policy coalition took form during and after World War II and provided the basis for the guided incomes policies and the active industrial policies pursued until the early 1960s and the gradual expansion of the welfare state. Initially shared only by the Catholics and Socialists, the new consensus eventually received the endorsement of other political parties. However, that consensus was never complete. Questions of when and how and what form were the subject of continual haggling among parties in the centre-left coalitions in office through 1958. Growing disagreements on the terms of the postwar bargain led to a shift to a centre-right coalition in 1958 and by the end of the 1960s, a much more confrontational form of politics in both the party system and in the neo-corporative bargaining system (Wolinetz 1988b; 1989).

III. The contemporary system

Though superficially similar, the Dutch system of the 1980s and 1990s differs from the political system of the 1950s and 1960s. Parties, operating in a regrouped party ststem, now compete for a far more open and available electorate (Irwin and Van Holsteyn 1989a; 1989b). Political socialization and communication are no longer dominated by party and subculturally based organizations. Patterns of interest articulation and aggregation have also changed: party and subcultural elites – if the latter term can even be used – are less central to the process and the articulation of demands is less controlled than before. Policy processes have not changed to the same degree, but the ways in which consent is mobilized are different. Neo-corporate structures persist but are no longer capable of mobilizing support or sustaining agreements in the same way as before. Elites are also far less authoritative than before and must manoeuvre more actively and openly to secure support for what they want.

Sources of change – Some appreciation of the sources of change is useful to understand both the extent and limits of transformations which have taken place. Four factors have contributed to changes in the performance of the input functions which we have been considering: first, the growth of government throughout the postwar years spurred changes both in interest groups and the channels of access avilable to them. As Van Mierlo (1988) points out, the expansion of government activity led to greater interaction between groups and government. The expansion of govern-

ment activity led both to the delegation of new tasks and subsidies to sub-culturally-based interests and proliferation of advisory organs attached to different ministries. New tasks and greater involvement in turn led to professionalization and bureaucratization of groups and concomitant changes in the ways in which groups defined their interests (Cox 1989), while expansion in the number of advisory bodies created alternate channels of access, previously unavailable to organized interests.

Second, changing patterns of religiosity and changing views about the relationship between religion and politics, particularly among Catholics, opened up questions about the necessity of maintaining separate de-nominationally based organizations or parties and spurred a substantial reorganization of subcultural life and the party system which it sustained. Free from pressures from the Dutch Church, itself undergoing substantial change, many Catholics withdrew support from organizations such as the Catholic Party whose tasks were more peripheral from religious obser-vation (Thurlings 1971). The KVP declined from 31.9% of the vote in 1963 to 17.7% by 1972, triggering discussion of a federation or merger with the ARP and the CHU. Although most Catholic organizations were able to maintain their members or clientele (Bakvis 1981), they began to question the necessity of maintaining a distinct Catholic identity or organizational form. This resulted in the partial reordering of the Catholic pillar. In some instances, former Catholic organizations merged with Protestant or secular counterparts, while in others, they retained a nominal Catholic identity but ceased to articulate a distinctive Catholic view. Typically, separate organizations survived in instances where organizations were either engaged in the provision of high quality services and/or enjoyed sound financial status because of subsidies from the state (Bakvis 1981; Van Mierlo 1988).

The result is a pattern of segmentation which varies from activity to activity. Some of the most extensive changes have been among producer groups. Catholic socio-economic groups usually merged with the Protes-tant or secular associations with whom they had the greatest affinity – secular organizations in the case of retailers and the trade unions, the Protestant organization in the case of employers – producing a pattern of parallel secular and Christian organizations. The latter were formed either by the merger of separate denominational organizations (employers) or by Protestant organizations opening themselves to all Christians after Catholic and secular organizations had merged (trade unions, retailers). Only Catholic farmers retained a separate organization. In areas such as education, social welfare or health care, in which organizations were involved in the provision of state-subsidized services, parallel (but often

virtually identical) Catholic, Protestant and secular organizations contin-ue to operate. Broadcasting also remains segmented: despite the intrusion of neutral commercially-oriented broadcasters such as TROS or Veroni-ca, separate Catholic, Protestant, Liberal, and Socialist broadcasting cor-porations persist.[12] However, the pattern in the print media is quite different. Ties between newspapers and parties have been severed: some papers such as *De Volkskrant* have quite literally changed their stripes[13], while financial problems have forced the closure or merger of others. Among the national press, only *Trouw* can be said to be loosely linked to Christian organizations. Finally, the three main confessional parties, the Anti-Revolutionary Party, the Christian Historical Union, and the Cath-olic People's Party merged to form the Christian Democratic Appeal.

Third, attitudes toward authority changed, undermining the position of political and subcultural elites.[14] Increasingly exposed to the media and the demands of a more vocal generation, parts of which were determined to have a voice, political leaders as well as subcultural officials found that they no longer commanded the unquestioned authority that they pre-viously enjoyed. Disagreements which had previously been kept behind closed doors were increasingly fought out in public, and political leaders found that they no longer had the last word. Dissident groups and factions emerged within parties, along with Provo, student groups, and potpourri of action groups greatly expanded the range of tactics which could be employed.[15]

Fourth, the media in the 1960s began to play a different role. Journalists assumed a more critical posture (Daalder 1974; Wigbold 1979), and tele-vision increasingly provided the public with a window on politics, exploited uncomfortably by politicians accustomed to working behind closed doors, but with greater ease by dissident groups, activists, and in the 1970s, by a younger generation of politicians who rapidly displaced their elders (Van den Berg and Molleman 1974). Focusing on the less orthodox and sometimes disruptive tactics of dissident groups, the media magnified their importance, and in doing so helped to widen rapidly the range of permissible techniques and weaken the authority of political elites.

Political socialization and communication – These changes substantially alter-ed the role of parties in political socialization and communication and the articulation and aggregation of interests. Processes of political social-ization and political communication are far more open than before. Parties and increasingly loose, if not non-existent networks of sub-culturally based organizations are not well-positioned to influence either

primary or secundary political socialization. Family and schools remain the principal sources of primary socialization, but neither are as tightly encapsulated in subcultural life as they once were – Catholic schools, for example, may be religious in name only – while secondary or adult socialization may take place in very diverse circumstances. Party and subcultural influence over political communication is also weak. Close links between newspapers and political parties have been severed. Formal and informal links between parties and/or subcultures and segmented broadcasting corporations persist, but these are primarily involved in the provision of entertainment and have no monopoly over communication with a select group or class (Wigbold 1979; Brants 1985). Public affairs rubrics provide an opportunity to favour one party over others (Brants et al. 1982), but journalists are often uniformly critical of all parties. Moreover, viewers watch what they please – as they have since the introduction of television – and media are more typically used by politicians and others to communicate directly with the public (Wigbold 1979).

Interest articulation and aggregation – Substantial changes have also occurred in the articulation and aggregation of interests. In contrast to the pre-1967 period, parties are less well-positioned to influence either the articulation or the aggregation of interests. There are several reasons for this. First, the organizations articulating interests have changed considerably. Major producer groups, such as trade unions and employers associations are now more responsive to members and affiliates than before, and groups derived from the former *zuilen* no longer enjoy a monopoly of interest representation. Instead, they have been joined by newer groups. These are independent or 'categorical' trade unions, such as the Raad voor Middelbaar en Hoger Personeel (RMHP), an organization of salaried and professional employees, the action groups and citizens' initiatives of the 1970s and the Dutch peace movement (a coalition of several groups) in the 1980s (Van Mierlo 1988; Windmuller and De Galan 1979; Rochon 1988).

Second, interest groups can now choose from a wider range of strategies and channels of access. Representation on advisory bodies attached to many ministries allows some groups to press their claims directly on government officials without the intermediation of parties. Parliamentary committees provide an alternate (but not unrelated) channel of access. However, if working within these specialized policy networks does not succeed – or if access is unavailable – interest groups have recourse to wider range of tactics than before. These include not only direct actions such as blockades, strikes, or demonstrations, but also contacts with members of the First and Second Chambers and government officials.

Third, interest groups are no longer as closely tied to political parties as they were in the past. As we noted earlier, both the party system and the system of interest representation have been partially reorganized. In the process, links between parties and key interest groups, such as the trade unions, were allowed to lapse, and interlocking directorates have become increasingly rare. As Van den Berg (1989) notes, the proportion of members of the Second Chamber with ties to organized interests dropped markedly in the early 1970s. This reflected not only the desire of some interests to assume a more independent posture (for example Protestant, Catholic, and Socialist trade unions were trying to form a single federation), but also the increased workloads of both members of parliament and interest group officials, which made it difficult to combine more than one job. Of the three major parties, only the Christian Democrats have links with anything approximating a network of subcultural organizations. However, these ties – loosened during the process of merger but cautiously re-established in the late 1980s – are informal and are not meant to exclude contact with secular organizations. Despite a sense of kinship, no formal ties link the PvdA and the Federation of Dutch Trade Unions (FNV).[16] Both the PvdA and the FNV are represented in the governing board of the VARA (Socialist Broadcasting organization), but little else remains of the socialist network. As in the past, the Liberals (VVD) are only weakly linked to the more loosely organized general pillar.

This reworked pattern of interest representation substantially altered the ability of political parties to involve themselves in the articulation or aggregation of interests. Major interest groups, such as the Federation of Dutch Trade Unions (FNV) and the Association of Dutch Employers (VNO) deal directly with the government, rather than working through political parties. This is not all that different from the 1950s and 1960s: trade unions and employers enjoyed privileged access to the government through the Foundation of Labour and the Social and Economic Council. However, producer groups were also closely linked to parties and couched their demands within a nexus of understandings shared within and among political families. By the 1970s, however, social partners and political parties had drifted apart, and both the PvdA and the left were trying to redefine the terms of the postwar bargain (Wolinetz 1989). Rather than working through the Social and Economic Council, mediated by the presence of independent crown members, trade unions and employers associations preferred to deal directly with each other and the government.

However, it was not only the mediating influence of political parties or the crown members of the SER which was reduced: peak associations and

their officials had considerably less influence over their affiliates. This is readily apparent if we consider the internal politics of the Socialist Trade Unions (NVV). As we noted earlier, minutes of the Verbondsraad or union council indicate that in the 1950s NVV officials could lay down policy with relatively little dissent or opposition. In contrast, in the 1970s, the chairman of the NVV (after 1976, the FNV) could do little more than extract a consensus from competing points of view expressed by the chairmen of affiliated unions. Larger unions, such as the Industrial Union and later the civil servants union, exerted considerable influence over FNV positions. The Federation of Metal and Electrical Employers (FME) and large multi-national firms played as similar role within the VNO (Nobelen 1987; de Wolff 1982/3). Moreover, the scope and tenor of demands had changed: rather than participating within a broader policy coalition in support of economic growth and full employment, both trade unions and employers made more explicit demands on the government and each other. As in the past, trade unions in the 1970s were willing to moderate wage demands, but only in exchange for action on so-called 'immaterial demands' such as the extension of codetermination, profit sharing, and a selective investment policy. For their part, employers reacted sharply to the demands of the unions and policies of the left of centre Den Uyl cabinet and demanded major changes in government policy (Wolinetz 1989; Nobelen 1987; Akkermans and Grootings 1978).

Changes in the internal politics of interest groups, the weakening of links between groups and parties, and the emergence of alternate tactics and channels of access have substantially weakened the ability of parties to intervene in the articulation of interests. Although informal contacts exist, party leaders are not well-placed to exert pressure on would-be claimants. More to the point, even if such pressure could be exerted, it would not necessarily be effective. Neither party leaders nor the heads of peak associations command the authority which their counterparts wielded a generation ago; trade unions and other organized interests are now more responsive to pressure from below than to entreaties from above (Windmuller and De Galan [1970] 1979; Van Doorn et al. 1976; Van Mierlo 1988).

Although less involved in interest articulation, parties still play a role, albeit less central than before, in the aggregation of interests. Parties must still reconcile competing claims in election programmes and play a major role in determining priorities in cabinet formations. However, the existence of advisory bodies and specialized policy networks involving interest groups, ministries and parliamentary committees means that organized interests may circumvent political parties if they wish. Interests

may make an end-run around parties, or more typically enlist policy specialists within the parliamentary caucus in support of group demands. In some instances, broad-based movements, such as the peace movement in the 1980s, may penetrate parties, influence their positions, and assume a role nearly equal to that of political parties (Van Mierlo 1988). However, this is rare. Parties are most typically spokesman for some interests, the mediators and aggregators of others, and the opponents of still others. Nevertheless, even if parties are closely linked to specific interests (for example, the PvdA and the FNV), when issues spill beyond the domain of a single department, as they often do because of budgetary or other considerations, government parties – or at least their ministers – must balance conflicting claims against each other.

IV. Changes in policy making

According to systems theory, changes in the nature or organization of inputs lead to changes in political outputs (Easton 1953). We have argued that the Netherlands has moved from a highly structured variant of organized pluralism in which parties played a major role in the articulation and aggregation of interests to a more open variant of pluralism in which parties play a much less central role in regulating the flow of demands. In that we have argued that one factor (but only one) accounting for the stability of the pre-1967 political system was the ability of party and subcultural elites to deflect demands and reduce the load on the system, we might expect the greatly diminished ability of political parties to aggregate interests to increase load and even destabilize the system. However, although the Netherlands in the late 1960s and early 1970s showed signs of suffering under the pressure of the demands of political activists committed to a more populist version of democracy, the Dutch political system can hardly be described as unstable. Parliamentary democracy remains deeply entrenched. Nevertheless changes in policy-making processes have occurred. These have had less impact on basic institutional structures or locus of decision-making than on the terrain on which policy-makers operate.

Political institutions – Let us begin by considering what has not changed. As Lijphart (1989) argued, no revolution has occurred in Dutch politics. Relations between cabinet and parliament and ministers and civil servants remain substantially the same. Although in some instances, such as the first and second Lubbers cabinets, detailed governing accords have bound

parliamentary parties tightly to cabinet coalitions, a dualistic relationship between cabinet and parliament persists. MPs from governing parties freely criticize the government and on occasion demand and secure changes in proposed legislation. Moreover, the parliament as a whole is more actively involved in administrative oversight: the right to hold parliamentary inquiries, dormant since 1947-48 and rarely used in the past, was employed three times in the 1980s to investigate administrative malfeasance.[17]

Similarly, few changes have occurred in cabinet politics. The Dutch cabinet has historically been a non-collegial institution in which ministers enjoy considerable autonomy within their own departments. This tendency has been reinforced by the development of specialized policy networks but eroded by other changes. One is that active prime ministers such as Den Uyl and Lubbers have increased the visibility and influence of the minister president within the cabinet (Van den Berg 1990). Another is that efforts to reduce government spending in the 1980s have resulted in somewhat greater constraints on the activities of individual departments. Instructions to reduce expenditures provide a counterweight to the organized interests operating within departmental or sectoralized policy networks and may, in some instances, convert what previously would have been departmental issues into cabinet questions. Nevertheless, the extent to which this has occurred should not be overestimated. Ministers have been instructed to pare down expenditures, but what is cut has usually been left to individual ministers. Moreover, as Toirkens (1988) demonstrates, even under stingent budgetary regimes, ministers find ways of evading cutbacks.

The political process – Even if few changes have occurred in decision-making processes, changes in authority patterns and the erosion of the postwar consensus have altered the environment in which policy-making takes place. Politics has become a more public process. Bargaining processes have also changed and include a wider range of political actors. Politicians must now go to greater effort in order to mobilize support and secure consent for their actions, but at the same time have a wider range of tactics and policy options open to them.

It is difficult to consider these changes in isolation from each other. However, changes in the terrain in which decision-making takes place can be set off in sharp relief if we recall certain facets of the pre-1967 policy process. One is that policy-making took place behind closed doors, another that policy-making was dominated by authoritative elites who could generally count on the support of their followers. A third was that

neo-corporate structures such as the Foundation of Labour and the Social and Economic Council played a prominent role, not only by including trade unions and employers associations in the formulation and implementation of economic and social policy, but also by narrowing the options available to the government. Although there is little evidence that the SER usurped the prerogatives of either cabinet or parliament (Scholten 1965; Fortuyn et al. 1983), it was difficult for cabinet to reject the unanimous advice of its principal advisory organ. Fourth, politics was seen, in the eyes of Arend Lijphart and others, to be governed by rules of the game which constrained elite behaviour and facilitated compromise (Lijphart 1968; Daalder 1974; Van den Berg and Molleman 1974).

Post-1967 politics are different. Although political activists' penchant for participatory democracy has faded, politics is a more public process and a greater number of actors are involved or must be taken into account. Although the public is not always paying attention, the media follow cabinet formations and other major political events closely. Negotiations still take place behind closed doors, but the process bears some resemblance to a spectator sport.[18] Although the public is neither present nor directly involved, interim outcomes are monitored by journalists, supporters and attentive publics. Bargaining with each other, leaders must take into account not only the position of their opposite numbers but also the wishes of their followers, who may conceivably become involved.

Operating in a more public setting with a greater number of potential partners has altered bargaining in some arenas more than in others. The rituals of cabinet formation have barely changed despite the increased glare of publicity; cabinets continue to emerge from extended negotiations among party leaders, refereed by the monarch, and mediated when necessary by politically prominent individuals. The process has been simplified somewhat by the merger of three regular participants into one: fewer permutations and combinations are possible. However, whatever advantages may have been gained by the formation of the CDA have been offset by the need of leaders to take greater account of the wishes of their followers and the risk that rivalries among two parties of nearly equal strength (the PvdA and the CDA) will make a coalition difficult or alternatively, that imbalances between a larger CDA and weaker VVD will upset a coalition. In 1972-1973 and 1977, the demands of PvdA militants resulted in protracted formations with different outcoumes: the left-of-centre Den Uyl cabinet, formed after 163 days because no other alternative was possible, and the centre-right Van Agt cabinet, established in a 208 day formation after PvdA militants refused to accept compromises negotiated by their leaders. Although neither the CDA nor the VVD have

been as constrained by the pressure of militants as the PvdA in the 1970s or early 1980s, both must consider the response of their rank and file. Even under a popular leader such as Ruud Lubbers, switching from a centre-right to a centre-left alignment in the fall of 1989 was not possible without first allowing a few weeks for CDA members to become accustomed to the idea.[19]

Socio-economic bargaining – Changes in socio-economic bargaining have been much more extensive. Despite attempts by cabinets to bridge differences, centrale wage negotiations repeatedly broke down, and only in one instance, 1972, were social partners able to conclude a central accord. At the same time, deliberations or 'overleg' in plenary sessions of the SER gave way to a more adversarial politics in which positions, known in advance, were put forward more for the benefit of outside audiences (meetings were opened to the public in 1974) than for purposes of discussion. Deadlocks reflected not only increased disagreement on the terms of the postwar bargain but also the growing influence of sectorally-based unions and employers organizations at the expense of their peak associations. Sectoral organizations carefully monitor the stances taken by their peak associations in central discussions. Differences between the internal dynamics of the NVV in the 1950s and the 1970s are striking. In contrast to the 1950s, affiliated unions in the 1970s were actively involved in debates: decisions could not be made without taking account of the positions of larger unions, and leaders led not by imposing their points of view but rather by extracting common points of view from conflicting positions. Officials of the VNO were similarly constrained (Nobelen 1983; Nypels and Tamboer 1985).

Shifts in power substantially reduced the ability of the social partners to conclude agreements. Rather than bargaining directly with each other, leaders of trade union federations and employers associations were forced to engage in multi-level games (Putnam 1988) in which they had to take account not only of their opponent's bargaining position but also the demands of affiliated organizations interested in carving out a wider sphere of autonomy for themselves. Negotiations between social partners in the 1970s were further complicated by the likelihood that the government would intervene by freezing wages or imposing a settlement. Unable or unwilling to conclude agreements, trade unions or employers could try to get the government to impose measures to which their affiliates or opposite numbers were unlikely to agree.[20]

The widening gulf between trade unions and employers associations not only decreased the collective influence of social partners on social and

economic policy but also altered the environment in which policy-makers operated. In the 1950s and 1960s, the government had been able to rely on neo-corporate structures not only to give form to an underlying consensus but also to share in the implementation of guided incomes policies. However, this had become increasingly difficult in the full employment economy of the 1960s and impossible in the highly polarized 1970s. By this time, guided incomes policies had given way to free collective bargaining within the context of centrally negotiated guidelines, and except on more technical issues, there was little consensus to which the Social and Economic Council could give form.

Opportunities and constraints – The new situation provided both opportunities and constraints for political actors. Governments were no longer confined by the unanimous advice of social partners but could pick and choose among competing recommendations or ignore the SER entirely. However, it was also impossible to enlist trade unions or employers in the implementation of policies. Unable to get social partners to agree to consensual wage regulation in the 1970s, cabinets repeatedly intervened in wage formation and increasingly relied on alternate sources of advice to explore options and provide changes in policy. These include not only advisory councils attached to different ministries but also the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) and royal commissions. Reports from the Scientific Council have been important in redefining public agendas, while royal commissions have helped to provide a grounding for changes in government policy. Typically containing indirect rather than direct representation from organized interests (i.e. from individuals sitting on their own behalf rather than as representatives of specific groups), commissions enable governments to circumvent entrenched interests. In contrast to established advisory bodies with fixed memberships, commissions may be structured in ways which ensure that they come up with answers different from those of established councils. Several prestigious commissions were used in the 1980s to provide backing for changes in industrial and economic policy (Wagner), research and development (Dekker I), financing health care (Dekker II), and taxation (Oort).[21]

Politicians, operating in a more open and fluid political environment, have also gained greater freedom in their choice of tactics. Political leaders no longer operate in a system in which there were few opportunities for parties or leaders who deviated from the rules of the game. Instead, both the electronic media and the attempts to restructure the political system in the late 1960s and early 1970s have made a broader range of strategies and tactics possible. Television makes it possible for party leaders to use

populist appeals which would have been less likely in the interwar or post-war party systems. Nor are parties or leaders necessarily prisoners of a consensual system in which a broad basis of agreement must be sought. Instead, the experience of both the Den Uyl cabinet in the 1970s and the first and second Lubbers governments in the 1980s suggests that parties or leaders may, if they choose, attempt to impose policies based on a pur-ported majority rather than on a broader basis of consensus.

Whether such tactics will succeed or not is another matter. The Social-ists' attempt to polarize the political system and pursue redistributive policies failed because the Den Uyl cabinet could not maintain majorities for many of the reforms which they regarded as vital. In contrast, the centre-right Lubbers governments not only had the support of durable parliamentary majorities but also were able to use the economic crisis to pare down the Dutch welfare state, reassert the importance of the market, and redefine the terms of the postwar bargain without the full consent of the trade unions.

Nevertheless, the options open to Dutch politicians should not be over-stated. Policy alternatives, though somewhat broader than before, con-tinue to be constrained by the exigencies of small open economy which is extremely vulnerable to the pressures of the international economy, and the strategies and tactics available to politicians are bounded by the problems of working within a political system in which there are no auto-matic or ready-made majorities. Our argument is merely that the rules of the game are less confining than those set forth by Arend Lijphart in 1969. Lijphart argued that Dutch politicians followed certain rules op the game which facilitated the resolution of conflict. However, these appeared to be submerged by the more adversarial politics of the 1970s. Then, Dutch politics could be described as a compition between two teams playing totally different games – one soccer, the other rugby.[22] Now there is more agreement on a revised set of practices, broader than those which they superseded. In light of the growing pragmatism of the 1980s, it may be possible to consider politics a business, or failing that, a serious rather than a frivolous game. However, like businessmen politicians have different options open to them. Proportional allocation continues to be followed in many instances because in a system without majorities it is often difficult to avoid.[23] Nevertheless other options may themselves be the subject of political debate: some politicians may opt for secrecy or quiet discussions as a device to smooth over differences, but other actors may oppose this, either on principle or because more open discussions would widen the scope of conflict and result in different outcomes (Schattschneider 1960). Similarly, politicians may resort to summit diplomacy in an effort to settle

differences, but others may oppose this because different procedures would produce different results.[24]

V.   Conclusion

Our discussion has shown that substantial changes have occurred in the articulation and aggregation of interests and the environment in which political leaders operate. In contrast to the pre-1967 political system, in which authoritative elites enjoyed almost automatic support, political leaders operate in a less certain environment and must go to greater effort to mobilize consent. Processes of interest articulation and interest aggre-gation are less controlled and less dominated by political parties, and political leaders must cope with a wider range of demands. Politics has also become a more public process. However, contrary to predictions which might be extracted from systems theory, the Netherlands has not been destabilized and policy processes are not as extensively changed as one might predict. Despite greater publicity and the need of leaders to take a wider range of actors into account, basic institutional structures remain intact.

The changes which have occurred in the Netherlands are puzzling. Seen from one perspective, the Dutch system appears to be greatly changed. Seen from another, the system barely seems changed at all. At the outset we argued that the extent of change depends very much on the optic used to view it. Throughout this essay our emphasis has been on change. In concluding, we need to place this in perspective and balance the changes which we have described against some very obvious elements of continu-ity. We will consider three inter-related questions; the reasons why politi-cal stability has not been threatened, the reasons why change has not been more extensive, and the question of how the Netherlands should be re-garded in international perspective.

Political stability – We can be brief in our treatment of political stability because this is not central to the study of the Netherlands. The problem is raised here for two reasons: one is that the functional categories used to focus changes in patterns of interest intermediation lend themselves to such questions, the other that much of the English and earlier Dutch lan-guage literature on Netherlands is cast in terms of the consociational model – an offshoot of structure-functionalism – which emphasizes the potential de-stabilizing effects of earlier patterns of pillarization. However, neither the interwar, nor the postwar or contemporary sys-

tems were threatened with instability. The interwar and postwar systems were firmly anchored by pillarized structures which reduced and controlled the flow of demands and gave religious subcultures and their elites a substantial stake in the operation of the system. The central ingredient in the consociational model, the self-conscious and deliberate efforts of subcultural elites to overcome the deleterious effects of fragmentation, is not needed in any parsimonious explanation of the stability of the interwar or postwar systems. Both (but particularly the interwar system) might have been unstable if the confessional parties had been able to achieve none or only a small portion of their demands before or during the Pacification Settlements. In that the confessionals were able to achieve a substantial portion of what they realistically thought that they could achieve, they had a stake in maintaining the system. Liberals and particularly Socialists were more frustrated with the system which the Pacification wrought, but neither was in a position to do much more than work within it.

Our disgression on the interwar and postwar systems does not explain why changes in patterns of interest articulation and aggregation in the late 1960s and early 1970s did not destabilize the political system. However, several answers can be given. One is that the Netherlands moved from one stable variant of interest aggregation, structured pluralism, to another more open but equally stable configuration more closely approximating the classical cross-cutting patterns of pluralist theory. Another is that the new pattern offered multiple channels of access, not only for established interests, but also for newer groups using conventional and unconventional means. More to the point, however annoying and frustrating the demands of political activists were in the transitional period, Dutch political leaders – or in many cases their replacements – responded supplely to new groups. The upsurges in direct action in the late 1960s and 1970s were a problem for a generation of political leaders accustomed to operating in a political system in which direct action and direct pressures were rare. However, this generation of leaders was rapidly displaced by a younger cohort, some of whom had themselves been engaged in protests and were less alarmed by them.[25] As one former political activist put it, it was easier to know when you could deflect or ignore sit-ins or occupations if you had used the same tactic yourself. Tactics which had once been regarded as extreme became as normal as telephone calls or formal deputations. Confronted with conflicting pressures, politicians manoeuvre among them, selecting those to which they can respond or safely ignore. New techniques such as the use of the media to talk directly to the public over the heads of organized interests also provide a means of responding to increased pressures or compensating for the absence of deference or automatic bases of support.

The limits of change – The supple responses of political leaders and more generally the political system are one reason why change has not been more extensive. Dissident groups such as New Left, the founders of Democrats '66 or the KVP radicals who established the Radical Party (PPR) were either absorbed into existing parties or else made use of existing outlets for dissent such as establishing new parties. In the case of New Left, their incorporation within the PvdA proceeded so rapidly that by 1978 they were already under attack from 'new New Left' groups who accused the first generation of being part of the Haags Establishment (the Hague establishment). However, the emergence of dissident groups and parties was a more visible facet (and not one to which we have paid a great deal of attention) of the changes underway in the Netherlands. More crucial to our analysis are other changes which folded in on themselves and prevented furthergoing changes from occurring. The formation of the CDA is one such development. The fusion of three separate parties into a single Christian Democratic Party is one of the most important unsung developments of the post-1967 Dutch political system, not because of the thirteen years which it took to complete the process, but rather because it bridged cleavages among three historically separate political parties. Even if Western European party systems are now not nearly as frozen as Lipset and Rokkan (1967) suggested they once were, mergers of separate party organizations are uncommon in the absence of major crises (when they are still rare) or changes in the formal rules of competition (Wolinetz 1988a).

Why, then, has the formation of the CDA received relatively little attention? One reason may be that political scientists (including this author) pay greater attention to parties of the left, with which they often feel greater kinship. Another is that the formation of the CDA was largely a defensive manoeuvre, designed to stabilize the waning power of the confessional bloc. In this, it was eminently successful. The CDA was able not only to arrest the decline of KVP, ARP and CHU but also to reoccupy the pivotal position that the three confessional parties occupied in the postwar system (Wolinetz 1988b). In doing so, the CDA not only blocked the polarization strategies pursued by the PvdA and the VVD but also preserved many features of the postwar political system: had the three confessional parties not come together but rather divided into competing conservative and progressive parties, the Dutch system might have moved closer to the majoritarian forms advocated by many reformers.

Nevertheless, blame or credit for arresting further change should not be laid solely at the door of the CDA. Democrats '66 was ineffective in advancing the constitutional reforms which it originally advocated, and

once the PvdA had recovered electorally from its decline in the mid 1960s, it lost interest in electoral alliances and constitutional reforms which might have led to more far-reaching changes. More important, though, because it deals with what has happed rather than what might have been, the formation of the CDA has led not only to the maintenance of previous alignments but also to important changes. In contrast to its three predecessors, the Christian Democratic Appeal is an open political party, capable not only of appealing to regular or lapsed church-goers but, under leaders such as Lubbers, to younger voters without previous links to confessional parties.[26] The effects on the Socialists are already visible. Confronted with a CDA which not only failed to split but also recaptured the centre of the spectrum, the PvdA has been forced to abandon polarization and come to terms with its need to join coalitions if it is to govern rather than operate as party of permanent opposition. In doing so, the PvdA has re-emerged as a more pragmatic and flexible party. However, this works to restore facets of the earlier postwar political system.

Lest we conclude with the same sense of déjà vu with which we began, it is important to remember that the political system of the late 1980s and early 1990s is different from that of the 1950s or 1960s. Although the contemporary party system bears some resemblance to its predecessors, parties are competing for a more open and available electorate. Moreover, the system of socio-economic bargaining has changed markedly. Growing recognition of the importance of the market in an increasingly internationalized economy has not heralded a return to the guided incomes policies of the 1950s or 1960s or the restoration of the Social and Economic Council as the principal advisory organ to the government. Instead, social partners prefer to deal with each other and the government on an instrumental basis, striking bargains when it suits their purposes but seeking other means to accomplish their goals when this is not possible.

The Netherlands in comparative perspective – Where, then, does the Netherlands fit within the larger universe of western democracies? Its former rubric, consociational democracy is inadequate both as a description of contemporary politics and, because of its excessive pre-occupation with elite accommodation, as an explanation of political stability in the interwar and pre-1967 periods. Lorwin's emphasis on segmented pluralism is useful for grasping the extent and impact of pillarization before 1967 but does little to capture the shift to more forms of pluralism since then. Nor is neo-corporate (Katzenstein 1985) necessarily a useful label to place upon a system in which the operation of bipartite and tripartite institutions has changed markedly.

One possibility is to regard the Netherlands as distinct and not fitting comfortably into any one box or rubric. This is implicitly suggested in Daalder's introduction to the special edition of *West European Politics* on the Netherlands. Daalder (1989) notes that the Netherlands is not a pattern state and goes on to highlight a number of distinctive features which may be of interest to comparative researchers. However, this is not of much help when we try to locate the system as a whole. Our analyses of change, however, suggests certain enduring features which characterize past and present systems. The most important of these is that the Netherlands was and is a political system without automatic or ready-made majorities. Instead, the Netherlands is one of several parliamentary systems in which majorities must be constructed through sometimes arduous processes of coalition-building. As such, the Netherlands could be classified as one of the several consensus democracies which Lijphart (1984) distinguishes from adversarial or Westminster-model systems. This is more helpful but suffers from two disadvantages: one is that the rubric is broad and includes not only federal systems but others, such as the Scandinavian democracies, which rely heavily on consultation but have been dominated by large Social Democratic parties (Heclo and Madsen 1987; Einhorn and Logue 1989); the other is that it is too easy to make the mistake of thinking that consensus democracies – referring to the way in which decisions are ultimately made – are consensual polities in which there is agreement on a large number of issues. If we want to locate the Netherlands within a larger universe of non-majoritarian or non-adversarial systems (both potentially less misleading terms), it is important to remember that the Netherlands, in contrast to Sweden, is a system in which no one party has been able to impose its views on government policy. Dutch Socialists, to be sure, would like to occupy a hegemonic position comparable to that enjoyed by the Swedish and other Scandinavian Social Democratic parties. Their inability to do so because of past confessional mobilization and the continuing strength of Christian Democracy is a continuing source of tension within Dutch politics. Particularly in the postwar period, Socialists were able to shape parts of the postwar agenda. However, Christian Democrats have been able to place a distinctive stamp on the shape of the welfare state and patterns of administration. Mediating between Socialists and Liberals, they have also been able to define the extent and limits of the postwar bargain. As such, the Netherlands is one of several states in which no one party of political force has been able to exercise a dominant role. Others include the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, Belgium, and Switzerland – almost but not quite the old universe of consociational democracies, but differently defined.

Notes

1. Also published as Daalder and Irwin, eds. *Politics in the Netherlands: How Much Change* (1989). Andeweg (1989), Thomassen and Van Deth (1989), and Lijphart (1989) emphasized continuity. Irwin and Van Holsteyn (1989a and 1989b), Van Staden (1989), and Wolinetz (1989) stressed changes.

2. As will be apparent, organized pluralism in the Netherlands resembles societal or liberal corporatism (Schmitter [1977] 1979; Lehmbruch [1977] 1979). The term organized pluralism is used because unlike much of the literature on neo-corporatism the article considers not only major producer groups but also other organized interests.

3. There is considerable debate on the origins of pillarization. For a summary see Van Mierlo (1986). See also Daalder (1966), Lijphart (1968, 1975), Van Schendelen (1978) and Stuurman (1983).

4. There was considerable variation among the pillars. The Calvinist and Catholic pillars were more tightly organized but differed from each other. The general or neutral subculture contained both loosely affiliated non-denominational associations and the socialist organizations jointly extended by the Social Democratic Workers Party (SDAP) and the Netherlands Federation of Trade Unions (NVV). Authors such as Lijphart (1968) have treated socialist organizations as a separate pillar.

5. Algemene Nederlandse Wielrijders Bond (automobile association).

6. News broadcasts were provided by a coupling organization, the Netherlands Radio Union (NRU). However, the *zuilen* or segmented broadcasting corporations were represented on the governing board of the NRU, over which they exerted considerable influence, and its more independent successor, the Netherlands Broadcasting Foundation (NOS), established in 1967. (Wigbold 1979; Brants 1985).

7. See Faas (1989) for a personal view of the contrasting experiences of journalists working for independent and party or subculturally-dominated newspapers. On the broadcasting corporations, see Wigbold (1979) and Brants (1985).

8. See Van Mierlo (1988) for a summary of the literature.

9. Recruitment was primarily by cooptation. See Lijphart (1968) and Van Mierlo (1988).

10. These were read in conjunction with research on the changing countours of neo-corporatism in the Netherlands. Minutes of the *Verbondsraad* and other records of the NVV are on deposit in the Institute of Social History (IISG) in Amsterdam.

11. Minutes of the *Verbondsraad*, meeting no. 150, March 21, 1955 and meeting no. 152, April 18, 1955. *NVV Archives*, International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam.

12. In addition, a recent law allows commercial broadcasters to operate alongside the *zuilen*. Existing organizations may convert themselves into commercial broadcasters. AVRO, TROS, and Veronica have indicated that they intend to avail themselves of this opportunity.

13. *De Volkskrant* was originally *De Katholieke Volkskrant*, edited by Romme, the parliamentary leader of the Catholic party from the 1930s through the 1950s. It is now a progressively oriented paper.

14. See Andeweg (1982), p. 182-187 and Brinkgreve and Korzec (1978) for evidence on changing attitudes to *parental* authority.

15. For an extended comment on this, see Daalder (1974), and Van den Berg and Molleman (1974).

16. Formed by the merger of the Netherlands Federation of Trade Unions (NVV) and the Netherlands Catholic Trade Union Federation (NKV).

17. Eight parliamentary inquires took place between 1852 and 1887. However, the only use of the right of inquiry between 1887 and 1982 was the 1947-1948 inquiry into the conduct of wartime governments in exile (Daalder and Schuyt, eds. 1986).

18. The Netherlands is not different from other countries in this regard. Recent negotiations in among Canadian 'first ministers' intended to rescue the Meech Lake Accord were held *in camera* but monitored by the media in a fashion reminiscent of a sports event or major spectacle.

19. The entire formation lasted 61 days, but preparations for the switch were underway before the election. Debates between Prime Minister Lubbers and PvdA leader Wim Kok during the 1989 campaign seemed to presage the cabinet formation that would follow.

20. Trade union officials were frequently confronted with the threat of government intervention in the 1970s. Minutes of the NVV *Verbondsraad* and the FNV *Federatieraad* indicate that this was regarded with equanimity by some and positively by others in the early years of the Den Uyl cabinet (1974 and 1975), when trade unionists were still optimistic about what a left of centre cabinet could deliver, but with much more uniform dismay afterward. Minutes of the *Verbondsraad*, 1973-1975 and the *Federatieraad*, 1976-1979. *NVV/FNV Archives*, International Institute for Social History, Amsterdam.

21. The device of the royal or state commission is not new. However, in the past commissions were more likely to contain representatives from parties and subcultures. Those of the 1980s drew heavily on directors of major corporations such Wagner (Shell) and Dekker (Philips).

22. H. Molleman, quoted in R.B. Andeweg, K. Dittrich and Th. van der Tak (1978), p. 127.

23. Van den Berg and Molleman (1974) noted that proportional allocation of mayorships and other appointments continued to be observed despite the polarization of the early 1970s.

24. Whether such techniques would succeed is another matter. Few recent controversies have been resolved by summit diplomacy. In instances in which a large number of actors are involved, deft manoeuvres finessing the opposition may be more effective. Differences on the deployment of cruise missiles, opposed in the early 1980s by an active peace movement, capable of mounting massive demonstrations against deployment, were not resolved either by secret negotiations or summit diplomacy but rather by the imposition of a compromise which placated and eventually deflated the opposition. Deployment was made contingent on the number of Russian SS-20s in place on a given date (November 1, 1985); this provided both an opportunity to avoid deployment if fewer SS-20s were in place and a pretext to go ahead if this was not the case.

25. As Van den Berg (1983, 1989) notes, there was substantial turnover in the membership of parliament as well as other elective bodies in the early 1970s. See also Van den Berg and Molleman (1974).

26. In 1986, the CDA won support not only from irregular church attenders, but also from voters rarely attending church and voters without any religious affiliation. According to data from the 1986 national election study, 62.5% of those attending church at least once a week supported the CDA, as well as 56.2% of those attending at least once a month, 40.5% of those attending a few times a year, 27.2% of those virtually never attending, and 11.8% of those without religion (Irwin, et al. 1987, table 2, p. 133). Although there is a clear correlation between church attendance and support for the CDA, as Irwin, et al. (p. 135) point out, support among those without religion for the CDA constitutes a development which, if it continues to grow – preliminary data indicate that it may not have done so in 1989 (personal communication, R.B. Andeweg) – could augur a significant breakthrough for the CDA.

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