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Boekbespreking van: Human Rights in Global Politics

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to political citizenship to guarantee a robust 'republic', whereas the latter possess political rights wherever authority is being wielded because it is *their* autonomy that is at stake. In the first case, societal democratization is a means to the goal of a vibrant republic; in the second case the democratization of organizations is a goal *sui generis*.

The second deficiency of republicanism is its statism. There are two sides to this. The first has to do with the allocation of rights, the second with internationalization and the 'end of the nation-state'. Republican citizenship is based on the idea of self-rule of a 'republic'. This can be a 'thick' historical community, but also a 'thin' 'community of fate'. In the first case, citizenship rights are allocated according to criteria of belonging – *ius sanguinis* –, in the second case by means of mere residence – *ius soli*. Van Gunsteren explicitly distances himself from the communitarian strand within republicanism. In the second part of the book where the crafting of citizens is addressed, Van Gunsteren lists legitimate claims for admission as well as grounds for refusal. Mutual consent, mutual interdependence and homelessness can be legitimate reasons for admission. If migrants lack general or particular competencies, or if there are insufficient means on the side of the receiving country, they can be refused. Acceptance of the culture of the receiving country, however, can never be obligatory.

Incidentally, this ties in with Van Gunsteren's restricted conception of citizenship. Extensive conceptions of citizenship that include welfare rights are currently used as a legitimization for keeping borders closed. Van Gunsteren's neo-republicanism is not open to such misuse. However, costs in terms of social inequality can be high. Although Van Gunsteren's admission that principles are not practices and that judgements should be contextual is generally correct, more can and should be said on this issue. Stressing the need for 'situated judgements' as an antidote to political philosophy such as Rawls's is one thing, practising the art of situated judgements is quite another.

The issue of globalization can be dealt with cursorily. If 'hard boiled' globalization theorists are right, the end of the nation-state is near. In the absence of alternative forms of political sovereignty, this spells disaster for the republican project. Does this equally implicate neo-republicanism? According to Van Gunsteren, gloomy predictions should not be taken at face value. Given the fact that internationalization itself has been set in motion by political decision-making at the national level, unwanted effects can, in principle, be countered by political means too; "if the nation state is in trouble [...] it needs to be strengthened" (p. 150). Neo-republicans try to do so by performing the 'role of citizenship', and performing well. Unity, homogeneity and consensus are not what is needed, but rather "a steady diet of conflicts" – Van Gunsteren suggests, quoting Albert Hirschman.

The third deficiency of republicanism is its institutional monism. The political domain can be conceptualized in at least two ways. The first is a topographical one. In this perspective, politics is synonymous to the traditional political institutions of liberal democracy; politics is what takes place in parliament. In some passages Van Gunsteren reproduces the republican theme of the *citoyen*: although political participation is no

longer the fulfilment of life, it still represents an activity that prevails over others, especially 'labour and daily life'. Van Gunsteren thus seems to replicate the topographical perspective of the political domain that is characteristic of republicanism. Another example can be found in Van Gunsteren's treatment of the distinction between the public and the private. There the age-old republican strategy of 'blocked exchanges' is used to keep both spheres separate.

According to the second approach, politics is identical to binding collective decision-making in general, and is – indeed – to be found everywhere. Here, Van Gunsteren's description of citizenship as a role or an office seems to fit in. His neo-republicanism thus betrays a fundamental ambiguity with regard to the political domain. Given the fact that 'institutional citizens' merely guard the sphere of political equality, my hunch is that the topographical perspective predominates and that Van Gunsteren's republicanism is therefore not yet as 'neo' as he wants us to believe.

Ewald Engelen

Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler (eds.), *Human Rights in Global Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999. ISBN 0-5216-4643-X. USD 24.95.

The fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights spawned a variety of volumes within both the political science and legal disciplines. The genre was, in essence, one of critically looking back on a half century of human rights 'practice' and looking forward with optimism or pessimism to the years to come. As such, many of the books produced will probably soon be dated, destined only to re-emerge for comparative purposes when another anniversary comes around. The volume by Dunne and Wheeler stands out as one that will not date, but rather will contribute to a range of discussion and debate in political science, the study of international relations and 'globalization' in particular, and that will have something to contribute to wider philosophical and juridical discussion as well. The editors are to be congratulated on bringing together a team of eminent contributors, and on constructing an imaginative and interesting text.

The Introduction to the volume (Dunne and Wheeler) sets the twelve contributions in context. The book is divided into two parts: five wide-ranging theoretical chapters address the philosophical background and context of human rights discourse in global politics, while seven issue-oriented or case chapters discuss the practice not of human rights, but of human wrongs. The last fifty years, during which human rights have been set out on paper and pulled apart in international diplomatic practice, have not been all rosy: but both the juridical enumeration of human rights given by the Universal Declaration, International Covenants and regional instruments, such as the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as the longer-standing philosophical grounding

expressed in the five theoretical chapters give sufficient material to make measurements that allow an exposé of where rights are not upheld and wrongs are committed. The editors pose the question "why are there all these human rights standards but the bodies keep piling up?" (p. 2), showing why they choose to focus on human wrongs in practice. The question as such is not answered directly, but the message is clear in all the chapters: there is little or no agreement on what human rights really are, even if some compromise text can be formulated. On the other hand, in general, we all understand when something is a 'human wrong'. The victims understand that what they are suffering is a wrong, those who hear of or see their wrongful treatment understand that too. However, it seems that this negative sense of knowing that a specific act wrongs a human being cannot be translated into, and is certainly not enforceable as, a human right.

The introductory explanation places the theoretical chapters and their authors in a two-by-two matrix with ontology and epistemology as the axes. Thus, each of the authors is characterized as a cosmopolitan pragmatist, a communitarian pragmatist, a traditional communitarian or a liberal, natural rights-ist. Not all of the chapters lend themselves to automatic categorization, some cross the borders, others sit close to them. Clearly, human rights discourse cannot be simplified to: you are a universalist or a relativist; you either think the individual is socially constructed and human at root, or that the human is community constructed and individual at root. The issue-oriented chapters in particular are not to be boxed. Indeed, the chapters dealing with practice (on genocide [Falk], civil society [Kaldor], media [Shaw], refugees [Loescher], women [Ashworth], principles [Hurrell], and education [Booth and Dunne]), clearly show elements of all the philosophical claims set out in the first part, and see philosophy translated into practice, without directly referring to the theoretical exposés. More thought to the references between the parts of the book would have made it an even stronger contribution. Like so many other edited volumes, this one would have benefited from a strong concluding chapter, balancing the detailed and useful introduction. In a sense, Hurrell's description of 'power, principles and prudence' and Booth and Dunne's thoughts on the role of human rights in education, going beyond the right to education into education on rights, bring the reader back from the practical issues to a form of theorizing. However, a conclusion could have done more to tie the two parts explicitly together.

The five theoretical chapters are as such neither time nor place specific. In chapter 2, Donnelly gives an overview of the 'social construction of human rights'. Brown's critique of universal human rights and Bhiku Parekh's exposé on 'non-ethnocentric universalism' demonstrate the varied features and challenges of the human rights discourse. Midgley looks forward to an 'ethic of global responsibility', while Booth's opening chapter to the book sets the scene for the practical discussion of human wrongs, following the theoretical discussion of human rights.

Ken Booth's chapter on the three tyrannies: 'presentism' (the present tense), 'culturalism' (cultural essentialism) and 'positivism' (scientific objectivity) seeks an

escape via solidarity theory, emancipation and universality, respectively. Emancipatory in itself, this chapter seeks to free the thinker from the boxes of traditional thought (into which the editors have just put the contributors, including Booth himself), and puts forwards challenging points that appear virtually incontestable. An example of the latter would be the suggestion that the rejection of universalism in human rights is in fact the adoption of a universalist position – to universally suggest that humans do not have the same rights. Oppressors of rights may not perceive them as universally held, says Booth, but their victims generally do.

The development of 'civil society' is one means by which emancipation and the upholding of rights is being sought from within and without countries in development and transition. Mary Kaldor writes an authoritative chapter, full of facts, on transnational civil society. Civil society is, she says, clearly no substitute for state institutions: the Bosnian case has demonstrated that. She demonstrates how twentieth century advocates of civil society share the call for a public consciousness based on individual moral values with their eighteenth century predecessors. Her chapter is one that clearly is specific in time and place, but is no less valuable than the more general philosophizing chapters for that feature.

Loescher's chapter on refugees highlights the links between human rights and refugee movements. Rights violations are, correctly, seen by most people to be the cause of forced migration. However, often only the violation of rights based on the five grounds mentioned in the 1951 Geneva Convention are met with protection, and the judgement that rights have been violated, or there is reason to fear they would be violated on return, is made increasingly restrictively. The gist of Loescher's chapter is also the strong suggestion that Western states violate rights when they deny protection in needy cases, or when they refuse entry to those who are 'seeking and enjoying asylum from persecution' by stipulating that protection must be sought close to home. What is the point of accusing other states of committing human wrongs, if Western states then commit a wrong in terms of the protection of the victims?

This insightful volume will be of interest to students of human rights from various disciplinary perspectives, and the main lines of its arguments on the nature of human rights and wrongs in global politics will have a shelf life far beyond the 50 years anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It has a major role to play within the literature on human rights and on international and/or global politics. In the sphere of human rights, the conjunction of theory, philosophy and empirical focuses from the political science perspective will form a strong counter-balance to the still predominantly legally oriented literature. In the sphere of international relations, this book will add food for thought to the ongoing debates about the changing and changed nature of security in the post-Cold War world, offering as it does a historical basis which goes back centuries as well as delving into the recent swings towards humanitarian concerns.

Joanne van Selm – Thorburn