The Role of Globalization in Arguments for Cosmopolitanism

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Abstract

In this paper I discuss several arguments for adhering to a cosmopolitan theory of global justice. The central question I raise is whether it makes more sense to advocate cosmopolitanism on the basis of abstract arguments or on the basis of recent global trends such as globalization. I argue that there are abstract arguments for cosmopolitanism and that it is worthwhile pursuing the justification of cosmopolitanism by reference to them. Although it could be useful in the current debates, as a matter of strategy, to rely on a more practical and minimalist justification rather than having to defend a specific conception of human nature, the underlying arguments for adhering to cosmopolitanism need to be made explicit. Therefore, my conclusion is that globalization may illustrate in a most urgent way the duties of people and institutions across boundaries, yet this does not mean that a globalized world is a necessary condition for duties across boundaries.

1   What is cosmopolitanism?

Cosmopolitanism is the subject of renewed and widespread debate in the areas of international relations and political theory. Present circumstances in the world raise increasing questions about the scope of justice and duties across the boundaries of nation-states. Economic globalization creates increasing inequality between people across the world, and the changing international political order leads to a re-evaluation of responsibilities of the actors in the international arena for the protection of human rights across the globe.

Theories of justice were traditionally developed for the domain of domestic societies only. Rawls started the resurgence in political philosophy in 1972 by publishing *A Theory of Justice*. In this book Rawls designed principles of justice for a democratic Western society, although he acknowledged the need to specify principles of justice for the global order at a later stage. In 1993, Rawls argued for the basic rules of international law in his Amnesty Lecture *Law of the Peoples* (Rawls 1993) but he did not argue for the globalization of the Difference Principle.[2] Rawls argued, however, that his Difference Principle would

not be opted for in the question of international justice. The theory of international justice would justify the non-intervention principle that presently rules the international order, albeit combined with a basic set of human rights, including the right to life and security, the right to personal property, and the elements of the rule of law, as well as the right to a certain liberty of conscience and freedom of association, and the right to emigration (Rawls 1993: 68). The Difference Principle was not applicable to international justice, according to Rawls, for the following reason:

> persons' adverse fate is more often being born into a distorted and corrupt political culture than into a country lacking resources. The only principle that does away with that misfortune is to make the political traditions and culture of all peoples reasonable and able to sustain just political and social institutions that secure human rights. (...) We do not need a liberal principle of distributive justice for this purpose (Rawls 1993: fn52).

Others took up the theme of international justice and extended Rawls's original theory of justice as fairness (Beitz 1979; Pogge 1987). The tradition in political philosophy to develop theories of distributive justice and, more recently, normative arguments about the global distribution of resources, is well established. In recent years, this tradition has been seen as a valuable contribution to new approaches within international relations theory (Brown 1997b; Beitz 1999).

Cosmopolitan political theory is an area in which the starting point is abstract from the current pattern of international relations or global realities. The aim of a theory of justice, for example, is to formulate principles of justice that are not yet necessarily reflected in existing institutions. The only limit to this design of principles of justice is that they could be implemented by real, existing people and would not require the development of super-humans. In most cases, political theory initially abstracts from the current distribution of resources and power to develop principles of justice on the basis of which existing institutions can be criticized. The questions of feasibility and the creation of the motivation necessary to uphold stable institutions are taken into account once the picture has been drawn of what justice would require. There is a clear distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory in this field of enquiry.

Cosmopolitan theories have in common that they hold three things as fundamental to their arguments. They view the individual as the ultimate unit of moral concern; they consider all presently living human beings as belonging to the scope of justice; and they hold that principles should apply universally to equal cases. Cosmopolitan arguments have been made in debates on world government, global democracy, humanitarian intervention, perpetual peace, global distributive justice, and the development of European political institutions.

A distinction can be made between moral and political cosmopolitanism (Pogge & Beitz in Brown 1994). Political cosmopolitanism is concerned with the project of global government and global governance. Moral cosmopolitanism focuses on global principles of distributive justice and duties across boundaries, independent of the political structure that governs relations beyond states at that particular time or of which type of political arrangements are seen to be most attractive by the theorist in question. This paper will be concerned with moral cosmopolitanism rather than with designs for global political institutions. I am not arguing for a world government or global democracy here.

Within moral cosmopolitanism there is another distinction to make, namely between the view that principles of justice and moral duties apply to institutions (contractarian cosmopolitanism) and the view that they apply to individuals directly (consequentialist cosmopolitanism). The latter is defended, for example, by Peter Singer (1972) and has been open to criticism by people who believe this type of cosmopolitanism generates duties that are too demanding on people, given that people should have the right to prioritize significant others in their lives (O'Neill 1986). Consequentialism has also been criticized for not taking individuals as ends in themselves and for allowing the possibility that they will be sacrificed for the good of the collective (Rawls 1972). Contractarian cosmopolitanism as defended by Barry (1995) has been criticized for not solving the conflict between universal obligations to humankind and special obligations to family, friends and fellow nationals. I believe that Barry's concept of first order impartiality and second order impartiality is convincing. However, the debate needs to be developed further to determine what are proper limits to duties to humankind collectively and when we are allowed to make special allowances for fellow nationals, family members and friends. In this respect, I would like to endorse Thompson's view that cosmopolitans need to look at political obligation beyond the nation-state.

> Cosmopolitans cannot be content with putting forward a moral position or with constructing blueprints for a cosmopolitan society. They must turn their attention to the creation of community. If, for example, cosmopolitans propose that the United Nations should become a body capable of legislating in a democratic way for the people of the world and of imposing principles of justice on world society, then they have to consider what social development could make individuals into world citizens prepared to obey the law and accept the rule of the majority, even at the expense of personal objectives and the communities that they value. Whatever form it takes, the political realisation of cosmopolitan values will require that individuals come to identify with trans-national communities in a way that so far has not happened. This does not mean that existing social commitments will have to wither away, but it requires that these other allegiances sometimes take a subordinate place in a global framework in which new loci of political authority become more prominent and are able to common support on crucial issues (Thompson in Archibugi et al. 1998: 193).

My view of cosmopolitanism is therefore specifically focused on the institutional changes this type of theory implies and not so much on individual duties over and above the duty to create and uphold just institutions. I follow the definition of moral cosmopolitanism put forward by Beitz that:

> (i)t applies to the whole world the maxim that answers to questions about what we should do, or what institutions we should establish, should be based on an impartial consideration of the claims of each person who would be affected by our choices (Beitz in Brown 1994: 124-5).

A further distinction has recently been made between pragmatic and deontological cosmopolitanism (Dunne & Wheeler 1999: 4). Cosmopolitan approaches based on deontological principles are classified as epistemologically foundationalist whereas cosmopolitan pragmatism is characterized as non-foundationalist. This distinction cuts through the distinction between moral and political cosmopolitanism. It is possible to combine a foundationalist or a non-foundationalist view with either a moral outlook or a defence of political institutions that apply worldwide. The same is not true for the distinction between contractarian and consequentialist cosmopolitanism. Contractarian cosmopolitanism falls within the deontological category whereas a consequentialist theory might or might not be founded on non-foundationalist premises.

Dunne and Wheeler make their distinction with regard to theories of human rights, but it could also be applied to other cosmopolitan theories. The distinction I make in this paper between abstract cosmopolitanism and practical cosmopolitanism could be understood to overlap with the classification of pragmatic and deontological cosmopolitanism. However, the practical argument for cosmopolitanism defended in this paper aims to avoid the reliance on any strong conception of the person, not because of non-foundationalist convictions, but because the debate is most likely to progress if the most minimally controversial argument is relied on.

2 The shortcomings of a realist approach to global politics

Realism is the approach to politics and international relations that finds its origin in the theories of Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes.[3] It now has many versions, but in both classical realism and neo-realist statements the main descriptive thesis holds that people and states act on the basis of their self-interest and seek to maximize their power. In classical realism the use of any principles of justice to judge social institutions or the foreign policies of states by external criteria is rejected and morality is supposed to be effective only to the extent that it is enforced by physical power. This form of realism is found in Hobbes, for example, who argues that in the state of nature any

concept of right and wrong is lacking. This state of nature is the hypothetical state all individuals were in before they set up a central government. The state of nature is described by Hobbes as a place where there is a war of all against all. Life is nasty, brutish and short. Industry and agriculture are impossible because no one is safe from attack by others and possessions are not securely held. Out of fear people will resort to pre-emptive strikes, so violence is widespread.

In order to escape from the state of nature, individuals in a domestic society form a central government to protect a peaceful society in which government secures possessions, enforces promises and guarantees limits on violence. In Hobbes' terms people give up the right to everything (which was not worth much in a society where the weakest can wipe out the strongest) and settle for a sovereign power, which limits their liberty severely (Hobbes [1651] 1968).

According to the domestic analogy drawn by the realist approach to international relations, nation-states in the global order are in the equivalent of a Hobbesian state of nature. Therefore, they argue that there is no place for morality in relations across borders although morality may legitimately play a role in domestic arrangements. Realists believe in a domestic analogy with nation-states as the main actors in the global order. States are portrayed as in the equivalent of a Hobbesian state of nature since a central global authority or world government does not exist. As a consequence of the international anarchy it is claimed that mere self-interest governs the relations between states, and moral considerations are out of the question. The question of justice in the global context is therefore not worth asking: it is seen as a waste of time.

Neo-realism, like realism, defends as its main starting points the self-interest of states and the anarchical nature of international relations (Brown 1997a). In addition to its empirical claims about the lack of morality in relations beyond national boundaries, neo-realism incorporates an underlying normative element in the way it treats reason and rationality. This is basic to the game theories in which the conception of what is essential to human nature is presented as common rationality of the competing actors who appraise the stakes at issue, the alternative strategies and the respective pay-offs in a similar manner. Neo-realism is founded upon this idea of a common rationality (Cox 1992). The normative element in the paradigm is that it advocates this form of rationality. This normative claim shows up in all three areas to which realism has contributed: the understanding of the nature of human beings, the nature of the state, and the nature of the relations between states. The normative part of the paradigm holds that since people act on their self-interest that is what they should do and as a consequence the aggregate result is just. Internally, the state should provide order to prevent anarchy and externally it should act in the interests of its own existence. Note that this is different from acting in the interests of its citizens. For example, if a majority is in favour of an ethical

foreign policy, it is the duty of the government to implement this only to the extent that it does not harm the interests of the state as such, according to orthodox realist views.

The crudest forms of realism have lost their attraction to many modern thinkers, since the moderation of societies based purely on self-interest by norms and social schemes is generally accepted. This does not apply equally to scepticism in the realm of international relations. In the global context there is still a strong adherence to realism. To be fair, many neo-realists recognize the existing and growing cooperation between states internationally, for example, in the area of regime building, but their analysis of regimes is true to the old assumptions of realism. States are seen as acting only in their self-interest and no independent body of moral norms is recognized to influence the behaviour of states in cases where their (short-term) self-interest may be harmed.

So why do I think the realist position is wrong? I endorse Beitz's criticism of the main empirical and normative claims of realism. The empirical claim holds that the international state of nature is a state of war, in which no state has an overriding interest in following moral rules that restrain the pursuit of more immediate interests. The theoretical claim states that moral principles must be justified by showing that following them promotes the long-range interests of each agent to whom they apply. The first claim is wrong because it involves an inaccurate perception of the structure and dynamics of contemporary international politics, and the second because it provides an incorrect account of the basis for moral principles and of the moral character of the state. Both premises are embodied in the image of international relations as a Hobbesian state of nature. Beitz argues convincingly that one cannot maintain that moral judgements about international affairs are meaningless without embracing a more far-reaching scepticism about all morality (Beitz 1979: 14). One cannot consistently maintain that there are moral restrictions on individual action but not on the actions of states. In addition to that, the point should be noted that most realists do not only accept individual morality, but also moral limits for the behaviour of governments towards their own citizens. Only the behaviour of states on the international stage, towards others countries, or towards citizens of other countries is supposedly outside the reach of morality. That is not a very plausible position.

The recent critique of using any normative theory in the global context centred around two problems. First, the lack of a global government that could enforce the norms if any national government would not comply with them. Second, the role of a state is seen as defending its citizens' interests over and above the interests of citizens of other states. This would prioritize the pursuit of these interests over any moral considerations. However, as Barry suggested, there are some answers to this type of criticism (Barry 1986). These problems have a direct analogue in domestic relations where they are not seen as detri-

mental to theories of justice. Non-compliance does not rule out the possibility of norms and rules in the law for example. And the pursuit of our own interests or our families' interests before the interests of others does not rule out limiting the way in which we are allowed to go about pursuing our interests. For example, there are moral limits to the harm we may cause others.

Corresponding to the claim that political leaders have a right, and perhaps a duty, to pursue the national interest is the common sense notion that people have their own legitimately differing 'moral ends', which will permit or, again, possibly even require them to give more weight to the interests of themselves and of others connected to them in various ways than they give to the interests of others. This feature of common sense morality is not often recognized as contradictory as a source of moral obligations and other moral phenomena. Why then should it be supposed that their international analogues must have such devastating implications for the possibility of moral appraisal in international affairs? (Barry 1986)

Countries in the world system are in a position similar to that of citizens in a single country. They owe their own citizens things they do not owe citizens of other countries, just as citizens themselves may owe more to their fellow nationals than to others outside the boundaries of the nation-state, according to Barry. But, it does not follow from this that anything is justified. The special obligation is set in a context of constraints on the morally acceptable ways of advancing 'moral ends'. The similarity for countries is that they have special duties towards their own citizens, but this does not mean they have a moral licence to do whatever appears to advance the national interest, however much that may violate the legitimate interests of other countries (Barry 1986: 67-68). Common international morality takes the form of a belief that there are morally binding constraints on the things governments can do in pursuit of their national interests. This leads directly to the question of how to enforce moral rules without an agency compatible to a national government. Barry's initial answer is the following:

> The simple answer, which is not complete, but is still worth making, is that the moral norms that govern everyday life in a society are not for the most part backed up by legal sanctions either but are none the less quite broadly effective in restraining conduct (Barry 1986: 68).

Still, the security provided by the legal enforcement provides the essential underpinning of the whole system of mutual constraints within a society. International relations are fundamentally conditioned by the absence of an agency capable of enforcing compliance. However, in Barry's view, "the notion that in the absence of a core of centrally enforced norms there can be no others that are effective is simply a crude error" (Barry 1986: 68). The fact that huge numbers of international transactions take place every day on the basis of such

norms (some codified in international law, others developed through custom), norms that are generally relied on by the parties involved and in fact adhered to, belies this. A great deal of compliance can be accounted for without looking beyond the rational pursuit of interest. It is in a state's interest not to be excluded from the system of diplomatic relations, to have a reputation as a reliable trading partner, and so on. It is equally true that there are many motives of self-interest for sticking to the prescriptions of everyday morality. At the same time, there is a commonly felt obligation to do so.

In conclusion, traditional versions of realism are wrong because they rely on a Hobbesian theory of human nature. This account has been criticized in many ways. The most important flaw is that it does not give any account of human cooperation other than the set up of a sovereign, authoritarian government. Any considerations for fellow human beings are not part of the picture. Neo-realism has not solved this problem because it has incorporated the Hobbesian model in the context of a world of sovereign states. Again any motivation other than pure, short-term self-interest is denied.

The present global order does not reflect the realist world-view. Cooperation exists in the present global order and norms are adhered to. Even if there is no global government, there are international norms and regimes. The realist position, that these are simply adhered to out of self-interest, conflicts with empirical evidence of states cooperating globally at least partly out of concern for humankind as a whole – as in the case of environmental problems – or out of concern for the rights of citizens in other states – as in the case of human rights instruments.

The question I turn to now, is whether we argue for cosmopolitanism on the basis of abstract arguments or on the basis of practical arguments. In other words, is the case for cosmopolitanism dependent on the existence of interdependence or globalization? I will consider first the two abstract arguments put forward by Grotius and Kant.

3   Grotius, neo-Grotians and international norms

A case for using moral arguments in the global context is found very clearly in the Grotian or rationalist tradition in international relations. This conception of international relations regards them as taking place within a global society where rules and institutions confine the behaviour of individuals and states alike (Vincent in Bull et al. 1990: 241). According to realists, the possibility of morality in international interactions depends on the existence of a global government. However, Bull argues from a neo-Grotian perspective that although states may not be capable of installing a global government, they are still organized in such a way as to have common institutions and rules. Not only do

they consider each other in their calculations, they also realize that they are bound by common rules and they recognize that they have common values.

Inevitably the emphasis in Grotius's work, written in the sixteenth century, differs from that of the neo-Grotians, written in the twentieth. The main distinction is the re-interpretation of natural law as the basis for the norms governing the global society. The neo-Grotians replace the Grotian notion of natural law with a more empirical account of the basic necessities to maintain social life at all (Hart 1994; Bull 1995). The neo-Grotian tradition in international relations develops a theory of international society, but as Cutler shows, the neo-Grotians do not use this to argue for an account of justice or human rights. She argues that the neo-Grotian tradition has mainly abandoned its natural law origins and has adopted a positivist stance, more in line with realism and the classical tradition (Cutler 1991: 58). Because the Grotian tradition has abandoned Grotius on a number of crucial issues (van Gelderen 1994), I turn to Grotius himself and focus on the notion of sociability to affirm the norm-governed status of the global context.

Grotius is famous for his ideas on international law and the society of nations. He tried to systematize and complete the body of rules governing international relations that gradually became accepted, on the basis of an understanding of the Law of Nature. Grotius sought to develop an understanding of the state in the context of the 'society of states'. He explored the conditions and requirements of coexistence and cooperation among states, focusing in particular on the nature and extent of law-governed relations (Held 1991b: 205).

Grotius held the view that morality is constitutive of all relations between people. He considered the existence of moral norms the automatic consequence of the fact that people live together in society and are capable of understanding that certain rules are necessary for the preservation of society. From this idea – that norms are constitutive of societies – Grotius derived that international society and the relations between states are also norm-governed. He asserted in *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* (The Law of War and Peace), written in the middle of the Thirty Years War, that there was a common law among nations, which was valid, both in times of war and peace, and elaborated on what he believed this common law prescribed.

Grotius argued against the sceptic's assertion that all human conduct is motivated by self-interest. Law, according to the sceptic, is consequently merely a social convention that is generally beneficial and supported not by a sense of justice but by prudence. Grotius responded that such an appeal to utility is essentially ambiguous since human beings are inherently social beings.

> (…) (A)mong the traits characteristic of man(sic) is an impelling desire for society, that is, for social life – not of any and every sort, but peaceful, and organised according to the measure of his(sic) intelligence, with those who are of his(sic) own kind; this social trend the Stoics called 'sociableness'(Grotius [1625] 1957 Prolegomena, section 6).

Grotius presented a picture about human nature distinct from that of Hobbes. He contradicted the essentially Hobbesian notion that the individuals constitute the collective, by assuming the sociability of people as their desire for living together. In this way, the peaceful preservation of the social order itself becomes an intrinsic good, and the conditions required for that purpose are as binding as those which serve more strictly private ends. Many accounts of why people come together in a society focus on their mutual dependence, but according to Grotius, the formation of a society would also take place if people were not mutually dependent. "For the very nature of man(sic), which even if we had no lack of anything would lead us into the mutual relations of society, is the mother of the law of nature" (Grotius [1625] 1957, Prolegomena, section 16).

I call this the principle of sociability. Grotius believed that this principle could be sustained on purely secular grounds. The Grotian idea that an international society exists and that there are norms of natural law which rule the conduct of states, is built on the assumption that natural law is to be found in reason. There is no divine link via which natural law is to be known. Here I just want to affirm the norm-governed status of the international order and my adherence to a position within the Grotian tradition. This does not mean I adhere to any account of natural law; instead I believe there are other ways of developing principles of morality that hold globally. Those principles need to be debated and agreed upon instead of discovered in natural law. It seems to me that the force of Grotius's account of norm-governed global order does not rely on natural law but on his concept of human sociability.

Sociability can be said to apply to the creation of domestic societies only. This raises the question of whether the global order is a social community in a sense that makes normative arguments relevant. Grotius saw the society between states as a great society of humankind and not a society of states alone. The individual had a dignified place in this society and was not merely an object (Vincent in Bull et al. 1990: 244). Grotius held that sovereigns retain a residual responsibility for humankind at large. "They ought to care not only for the single nation which is committed to them, said Grotius, but for the whole human race" (Vincent in Bull et al. 1990: 247). Grotius can therefore be understood to defend a cosmopolitan interpretation of sociability instead of a narrow Hobbesian interpretation of sociability.

In principle we can classify the Grotian argument for cosmopolitanism (in the sense of morality existing beyond boundaries) as an abstract argument, the force of which does not rely on existing practices or interdependence. My own theory of global justice as impartiality uses the Grotian principle of sociability to strengthen the notion of reasonableness and the human tendency to justify behaviour to others. Before assessing arguments relying on the current process of globalization, I will discuss the Kantian view of morality in the global context as another example of an abstract argument for cosmopolitanism.

4 Kant and universal moral obligations

Another argument for cosmopolitanism is provided by Kant's theory of perpetual peace. The Kantian approach is not based on sociability but on the Categorical Imperative and the universality of moral principles. Kantians believe – even more so than the Grotians – that moral norms should be applicable to the international context. Kantians do not consider the empirical existence of the state system to be a limit on moral duties. A question of debate is whether or not Kant argued for a world government. The interpretation of Kant's cosmopolitan right is not straightforward and further research could be done on how he deployed it. However, for the purposes of this article the focus is on the justification of cosmopolitanism and the role of abstract and empirical arguments.

Kantian moral theory is based on universal principles and the conviction that principles have precedence over consequential or collective considerations. Kantian universality means that principles stand independently of place or time. The analysis of the world as it is cannot alter those principles. The widespread opinion that globalization in itself raises questions of a moral nature in determining the obligations we have towards people who live outside our nation-state would be denied by strict Kantians. This does not mean that duties across borders cannot be justified from a Kantian perspective. On the contrary, duties across borders are part of the underlying universality of the Kantian morality. Both Kant and modern day cosmopolitans argue that national boundaries are arbitrary and do not plausibly limit the duties we have to other people.

In Kant's view, existing or potential cooperation is largely irrelevant when framing the responsibility of global actors. The basis for international morality is the moral demand of reason, just as it is for domestic morality (Donaldson 1992). The main source for Kant's cosmopolitanism is his Categorical Imperative: "act only in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law" (Kant 1991: 67). The Categorical Imperative is valid independent of any desires or inclinations towards alternative actions; it is also valid for all rational human beings. O'Neill has illustrated the importance of universality by considering some principles that can not be universalized. There are, according to O'Neill, certain principles of action which may be consistent with the views of some agents but which cannot be proposed as principles for all. For example, if coercion and deception were universalized, then all projects of individual coercion or deception would be made incoherent: "(s)ince nobody who hopes to deceive can coherently will that a principle of deception be fundamental to the practice of any plurality, justice require that it be rejected" (O'Neill 1992: 64). The Categorical Imperative leads to a universal theory of ethics.

Many of the contemporary cosmopolitan liberal theories rely to some extent on Kantian universalism. A focus on theories of justice rather than virtue and giving just principles priority to the consequences of actions are examples of this Kantian heritage. Kantian ethics is sometimes criticized for its reliance on a metaphysical conception of the person. Contractual theorists claim that in their scenario any strong metaphysical position is avoided, for example in Rawls's (1972) original position or Scanlon's (1982; 1999) more inclusive notions of reasonable agreement as used by Barry (1995).

If we were to take Kant's work seriously, whether in its original form or in the revised form of the contemporary cosmopolitans, the question of the ethical implications of globalization would have to be answered in a balanced way. Duties beyond borders do not arise from globalization, but from the principle of universalizability or the Categorical Imperative. In the contractarian theories duties are owed according to the principles of justice. In contractarian theories of justice, Kant's universality of principle was taken seriously from the start whereas the universality of scope was not accepted at first. However, the Kantian notion of universalizability, the Rawlsian Original Position with its Veil of Ignorance and the impartial hypothetical agreement between people of roughly equal power all boil down to similar attempts to establish principles of justice that can reach beyond agreements hijacked by the powerful.

Some cosmopolitan versions of the contractarian theory, such as that developed by Beitz (1979; 1983), for example, used globalization to show why theories of justice should no longer be confined to models of one society. Strictly speaking, however, it is not globalization in itself that creates moral duties. Humanity should have accepted universal moral obligations before globalization became as influential as it is. People knew of the existence of others in the world and contact was possible. The assumption that globalization was the necessary condition for a global theory of justice implies that practices like the slave trade and imperialism were morally acceptable. Barry pointed out this problem in Rawls's work as early as 1973. Although globalization is empirically disputed it is now becoming less plausible to deny duties across borders. It might make sense to hold that globalization, strictly speaking, cannot alter our duties across borders, since we have already been in a position to influence the lives of others for a long time. The process of globalization just make it even more clear that the effects of interaction demand moral responsibility. In the penultimate section I will sketch a view that includes globalization in this careful way, without denying that in a less globalized world duties could have been the same.

I will now look at the second group of arguments for cosmopolitanism, namely those that provide pragmatic or practical arguments rather than abstract arguments based on a specific conception of human nature. Some defences of cosmopolitanism are based on an assessment that the present situation in the world is moving towards cosmopolitanism as a result of globalization and increasing interdependence. The question that needs to be asked is: how relevant are these changes in the defence of a cosmopolitan outlook on morality?

Grotius held that natural law makes rules and norms a requirement for every state ruler, sovereign or prince, since they are also human beings. Neo-Grotians did not regard this to be a moral requirement but accepted that there is empirical evidence that states do behave as if they are bound by normative rules. They also referred to the evidence of philosophers and other intellectuals and statesmen who think that states and princes should behave like that. Kant put forward the categorical imperative, based on universal natural law in defence of morality across boundaries. Contemporary cosmopolitans sometimes rely on their own interpretations of these traditional arguments. In response to criticism stating that these arguments rely on contestable assumptions about human nature some theorists chose to defend cosmopolitanism from a more practical perspective, based on recent trends in the world. They rely on empirical evidence for a process of globalization and the growth of supra-national regimes to justify the existence of global principles of justice. The next section assesses whether this is a more solid basis for the justification of cosmopolitanism.

5   Cosmopolitanism and the implications of globalization[4]

The developments that are commonly believed to constitute globalization are economic expansion and increased flexibility in the choice of locations for production; reduced influence of the governments of nation-states on their economies; and an intensification of the social and cultural connections between people in different parts of the world. The development of technology is commonly identified as the main cause, as it speeds up and increases communication, the transportation of goods and the mobility of people. Sometimes other factors, such as the growth of global networks of social movements and non-governmental organizations, the growing awareness of environmental problems, which need to be addressed globally, and security issues in a nuclear age, are also considered important elements of globalization. Shaw (1999) has argued recently that there is a distinct role for political actors in generating globalization processes. In short, globalization is often defined as the process by which the world seems to shrink and actions in one place have major long distance effects. This process is sometimes linked to the end of the Cold War and the global rise of liberal capitalism (McGrew et al. [eds.] 1992).

In evaluating whether globalization creates new types of duties across borders, it is also important to establish whether globalization is anything new. Nicholson argues that even though there is more interaction today between

different parts of the world than there was a century ago, it is only an intensification of what went on before and not something qualitatively different (Nicholson in Shaw 1999: 23). If globalization is indeed merely a continuation of the initial expansion of the world economy and the rise of modern states from the late sixteenth century onwards, then there would be no need to re-evaluate our moral duties. The topic of this paper therefore suggests that there are reasons to believe that globalization in its present form is qualitatively different from earlier forms and requires a critical evaluation of its ethical implications. According to O'Neill, the time in which strangers were temporary visitors who had a right to hospitality for the length of their visit is in the distant past. Our relations to people across our national borders are very different. "We live in a world where action and interaction at a distance are possible. (...) Distant strangers may be benefited or harmed, at the limit sustained or destroyed, by our action or inaction as we may be by theirs" (O'Neill 1995).

An objection to this view claims that there is nothing new about global interconnections: a dense pattern of worldwide interconnections began to emerge with the initial expansion of the world economy and the rise of the modern state in the late sixteenth century. Held admits that the complex interplay between state and non-state actors is hardly new. But claiming an element of continuity in the formation of the states system is quite different from claiming that there is nothing new about the present global system. The first new feature of our time is that political, economic and social activity is becoming worldwide in scope, and the second new feature is the intensification of levels of interaction and interconnectedness within and between states (Held 1991a and 1991b). If globalization is both an expansion of the scope of activities and an intensification, it is clear that this is a relatively new trend even though expansion of networks of trade across the globe has been going on for centuries. It is the intensification and the acceleration that make a qualitative difference. Scholte holds that something approximating 'planetary' social relations has emerged only in recent history (Scholte 1993). Recently, Scholte argued that globalization is qualitatively different from what went on before. So much so, that it calls into question the adequacy of international relations and comparative politics as methodologies of social science and requires a paradigm shift (Scholte in Shaw 1999: 9). Without taking a stance on the qualitative differences in the recent trend, for the purposes of this paper it is sufficient to conclude that globalization has its origins in much earlier developments but has accelerated since the end of the Second World War.

Another important element in the debate on globalization is the connection between the two sides of a paradoxical relationship. On the one hand globalization can be defined as the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa (Giddens 1990: 64). On the other

hand local transformation also forms an intrinsic part of globalization. While the nation-state becomes less influential and cross-border influences become stronger, the connection between local communities and their national state may become weaker and the identity of the smaller unit more pronounced. In Scholte's view the process of globalization is characterized by "an intertwining of processes of globalization and the promotion of sub national, sub-state territorial identities" (Scholte 1996). This has important implications for the way duties are perceived and for debates on who is included in the scope of distributive justice. Universalists and particularists make references in support of their arguments to these different sides of the process of globalization.

There is also a reflexive element in globalization, which may be very important for its moral implications. The growing interconnectedness and expansion of contacts across borders as well as their intensification, and the speeding up of communication, transport and travel have made many people aware of the fact that they live in a globalized world. Observers sometimes connect this element of realization and self-reflection to a larger awareness of others in distant locations as fellow human beings. According to cosmopolitans the awareness of sharing one world may make it easier to see that we have moral obligations towards others even if they live outside our borders. I suggest, however, that this is a matter of motivating people to act on principles of justice rather than a justification for a particular scope of principles of justice. Globalization may make it easier for people to act on universal cosmopolitan principles of justice but it does not make those principles right or wrong.

The sometimes implicit cosmopolitan stance of authors on globalization contributes to the common assumption that the causal link between globalization and global moral duties no longer needs explicit justification. For example, in Luard's view the centre of decision-making is moving away from nation-states and towards collective institutions.

> The welfare of ordinary men and women no longer depends primarily on the actions of their own governments. It depends, far more, on actions and decisions reached, far beyond the frontiers of their own state, by other governments, or by international bodies taking decisions collectively (Luard 1990: vi).

It remains to be seen to what extent the space created by the diminishing powers of the nation-state will be occupied by trans-national or global institutions. It may well be that regional institutions are going to play a more important role than global ones in the near future. Waters sketches a picture of what he calls 'a fully globalized world' as far from being a cosmopolitan utopia of one world community. He foresees that in a globalized world there will be a single society and culture occupying the planet, however, social relations will not be harmoniously integrated nor will there be a central government. Territoriality will disappear as an organizing principle for social and cultural life and we will

be unable to predict social practices and preferences on the basis of geographical location. We can expect relationships between people in disparate locations to be formed as easily as relationships between people in proximate ones (Waters 1995: 3). Obviously, the picture of a global village (McLuhan 1964: 93) can no longer be taken for granted. Some recent arguments, on the other hand, confirm the growth of global responsibility on the grounds of a growing global civil society (Shaw 1996 and 1999). Although some globalization theorists are careful to keep empirical and normative arguments apart, Shaw's is an example of a theory that defends a cosmopolitan moral outlook based on the empirical fact of globalization.

A further point worth making, when assessing cosmopolitan claims about the ethical impact of globalization, is that globalization and interdependence do not automatically imply equality. Inequality between nation-states and within nation-states can be and is frequently increased by integration in the global economy. The Newly Industrialized Countries are often mentioned as an example of how beneficial the integration into the world economy is for countries in the South. Although there may be some success stories, the countries in the South diverge greatly as to what extent integration in the global economy has paid off and who has benefited from it. In the heyday of Structural Adjustment Programs many countries were advised to focus on the production of primary goods for the world market. As a consequence of the additional supply, the price for those goods declined and the end effects are well known. Even in those countries that did integrate in the world economy successfully, the results were not beneficial to everyone. In Brazil, for example, economic growth over the past twenty years has been remarkable, yet the internal distribution of income has not advanced. Equality has not increased, it has diminished. Globalization and integration in the world economy have not had any positive outcomes for Brazil's poor. Furthermore, the use of the term interdependence in the world economy conceals that the poorer countries in the world are part of this integrated economy on the basis of dependency rather than genuine interdependence. Even if one does not hold that dependency causes underdevelopment, dependence cannot be denied. While everyone may take part in the process of globalization, they do not all do so to the same extent. Therefore, it must be noted that interdependence does not coincide with equality (Gilpin 1987).

So far, globalization has been widely held to mean the increased freedom of market forces and the diminishing roles of political actors, mainly nation-states, in softening the impact of market outcomes. In the context of national societies it is now common practice to smooth out the worst implications of market capitalism. As national governments' influence on economics decreases, the sombre situation for the world's poor has sometimes been seen as a possible cause of social change in the direction of some form of power to contain global

capitalism. In reality this can only be a coordinated power between nation-states and other global actors since single nation-states no longer have many instruments to control the major players in the global economy.

> The strongest impetus towards the re-imagining of our communities will come from the realisation that without political opposition capitalism will not on its own accord provide the conditions for narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor, a redistribution of wealth globally nor even much more than a basic level of security and stability. Without the articulation of a political balance to the international economy, the likely result will be a perpetuation of the system's inequalities (Horsman & Marshall 1994).

Luard argues that the vacuum left by national governments in the provision of welfare will make welfare a global issue in the same way as the environment.

> If national politicians are not always capable of making decisions to protect the well being of their citizens, there is a vacuum in which human welfare must be considered. If we use the analogy of the environment human welfare becomes a global problem which requires an open debate about the extent of duties across boundaries (Luard 1990).

Political philosophers can be of great help in opening up the debate by providing relevant concepts and arguments. Seeing a role for political philosophers in the debate on the impact of globalization is, however, not the same as viewing globalization as the basis for duties across borders. The direct route of arguing that global interdependence creates duties to fellow human beings across boundaries raises philosophical problems.

The issue here is whether or not globalization changes the moral obligations people have towards others in the world. The main element in globalization that causes the need to take a fresh look at moral obligations is sometimes seen as the growing knowledge about others in the world. Luard, for example, maintains that people are more prepared to take human rights issues seriously across the globe "because the world is so much smaller that we are all today more conscious of the human rights violations that occur in other parts of the world and more determined to do something about them" (Luard 1992: 296). Alternatively, it is argued that interdependence in a globalized world causes the need for new principles of global justice. Robinson, for example, suggests that "(i)n an interdependent world, questions of justice and fairness, duty and obligation, rights and responsibilities, and trust and care are more pressing than ever" (Robinson 1996: 1). It is clear from the argument in this section that globalization and interdependence do not automatically lead to the cosmopolitan ideal. Moreover, using empirical trends to make moral claims is philosophically not convincing. This section therefore critically discussed the implicit link made by globalization theorists between increasing interdepen-

dence and moral duties across boundaries. However, the inegalitarian effects of globalization (as discussed in Thomas & Wilkins 1996) do require an urgent response by political theory as well as public policy. The next section looks in more detail at the cosmopolitan political theory of duties explicitly based on global interdependence developed by Charles Beitz.

6   Moral duties based on global interdependence

The main proponent of a moral theory based explicitly on growing interdependence is Beitz (1979). Although he altered his argument (Beitz 1983), the original theory is worth looking at in more detail since many people share the intuition that globalization causes a shift in the moral duties towards people across boundaries. In some ways interaction is the obvious condition for moral duties. Even though morality may come into play in situations where there is no interaction, such as the balance between present and future generations, it cannot be plausibly excluded from situations in which there is human interaction. While we could argue that in the period before communities knew about the existence of other communities in the world the members of those communities did not have moral duties towards one another, in a historical period where we know of the existence of others and have intensive interaction with them, morality and obligations are denied only by outright moral sceptics. The form global interaction has taken, according to Beitz (1979), leads to a strong argument for global duties of redistribution. Since nation-states are no longer self-contained, justice becomes a global matter and cannot be coherently theorized within models of one society.

Beitz's original argument follows in the Rawlsian tradition. He uses the persuasive force of a hypothetical contract agreed on by all those involved. As long as the situation in which the choice of the principles is made satisfies the criteria of justice, the principles that result from the deliberations are also just.

The main concern here is that Beitz's position, that the world is now in practice a single society as a result of interdependence, and Rawls's principles should therefore be applied without exception, brings up some interesting problems (Beitz 1979: 129 and onwards; Beitz 1985: 295 and onwards). The argument runs as follows:

> (i)f evidence of global economic and political interdependence shows the existence of a global scheme of social co-operation, we should not view national boundaries as having fundamental moral significance. Since boundaries are not coextensive with the scope of social co-operation, they do not make the limits of social obligations. Thus, the parties to the original position cannot be assumed to know that they are members of a particular national society, choosing principles of justice for that society. The veil of ignorance must extend to all matters of national citizenship (Beitz 1985: 298).

In conclusion, Beitz argues that there is no reason why the content of the chosen principles of justice should change when the original position is thus transformed.

A first difficulty is that the present interdependent world system cannot plausibly be defined as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage, which is the definition of society Rawls presents in his original theory of justice. "Possibly parts of the industrial world could be seen in this way – the European Union, for example – but it would be difficult to see relations between rich and poor countries in this light" (Brown 1997b: 290).

Further critics have attacked the causal link Beitz presupposes between the currently growing interdependence and moral duties of redistribution across borders. Brown, for example, writes that a sense of obligation towards people across national boundaries is not "something that can be expected to emerge simply as a result of individuals and peoples coming to have more contact with one another, because such contact need not generate the essentially moral consciousness of common identity that is required" (Brown 1995: 94). Similarly, Robinson rejects the "dubious causality whereby the increasing scope and range of influence and contact among individuals, institutions and states is thought to bring about the creation of a set of universal norms, universalised moral commitments and a global shared identity" (Robinson 1996: 17). The critics expect that there may be certain trends, commonly associated with globalization, which hinder rather than assist the creation of positive moral relations across borders. They do not see why, for example, the expansion of the global market economy would contribute to an extension of moral concern to other communities when the global capitalist system is characterized not only by interdependence, but also often by dependence and increasing inequalities between and within North and South. Moreover, these two critics argue, certain trends associated with the spread of what might be called a 'global consumer culture' – the fact that young people everywhere desire the same jeans, trainers and electronic games (Brown 1995: 93) – do not suggest any movement towards new understandings between cultures or heightened moral awareness of the well-being of distant others. Scholte also warns for over-enthusiasm on the side of cosmopolitan arguments: "(W)orld interdependence is not by definition a good thing. World social relations do not guarantee us equality or community, although these eventualities are not logical impossibilities, either" (Scholte 1993: 39).

The points made by these critics are essentially about the fact that increasing contact between people across the globe does not necessarily lead to moral concerns for each other. I would add that some parts of the globalization process may seem to include more contact with people in other parts of the world, when they in fact add to the increasing isolation in which people (especially in the North) sometimes live. For example, contacts made through

Internet talk-rooms are often based on complete fantasy stories about one's life, and the home-shopping trend means that people can withdraw even more within their own four walls. In some instances the point is developed even further, arguing that even if some moral obligations are the result of these contacts, they may never add up to the same kind of obligations people have towards their fellow nationals. Brown, for example, concludes that:

> (I)n practice, and quite sensibly, we recognise degrees of obligations towards family, friends, acquaintances, fellow citizens, and so on, and as long as this recognition does not lead us to disregard the interests of those in the outer circles of our concern, there is no reason to see this as immoral (Brown 1995: 96).

Although the discussion of priorities in moral obligations is beyond the scope of this paper, I present some comments about it in the section on impartial global justice.

A point in favour of Beitz's argument is that, in his original version, he does not argue that globalization leads to moral concern and to equality among nations. Beitz clearly suggests that the benefits of globalization are distributed unequally and that principles of global distributive justice are therefore required:

> Economic interdependence, then, involves a pattern of relationships which are largely non voluntary from the point of view of the worst off participants, and which produce benefits for some while imposing burdens on others. These facts, by now part of the conventional wisdom of international relations, describe a world in which national boundaries can no longer be regarded as the outer limits of social co-operation (Beitz 1985: 296).

Beitz rejects in this way the criterion of cooperation for mutual advantage which Rawls developed for principles of justice.

The final and most important criticism posed the hardest problem for Beitz's initial position. It can be argued that not only is his prediction of the effect of globalization at the least uncertain and at the worst wrong, but furthermore the use of an empirical fact to justify moral duties as in the sense described above is methodologically unsound. In Beitz's original theory his account of the international Difference Principle relies on the empirical fact of interdependence. Inclusion of all human beings alive on earth now in a universal theory of international or global justice may be morally obligatory even when the states system has not evolved into anything like a global society. Exactly how relevant the present circumstances of globalization and mutual dependence are is questioned by the more strictly Kantian approaches.

Beitz himself has answered this objection, which was first formulated by Barry (1982), by stating that his argument that the members of the Original Position should be global rather than national because national societies are

not self-sufficient misses the point although he still agrees with its conclusion (Beitz 1983: 595). The foundation for Beitz's inclusion of all human beings in the theory of justice are the two basic powers: a capacity for an effective sense of justice, and a capacity to form, revise and pursue a conception of the good (Beitz 1983 and 1991).

> Since human beings possess these essential powers regardless of whether, at present, they belong to a common co-operative scheme, the argument for construing the original position globally need not depend on my claim about the existence of international social co-operation (Beitz 1983: 595).

Beitz may well have revised his theory arguing for global redistribution but many continue to link globalization with worldwide duties. If this is put forward in the form Beitz chose in 1985, namely, using the increasing global inequalities as a result of the unfair global economic and political institutions to illustrate why a theory of global justice is needed, then this seems a plausible argument. The crux of this version of his argument is the denial of any moral relevance to national boundaries. This would be in line with a Kantian moral theory. The problematic version of the argument is the one that relies on global interdependence *per se* to invoke duties of redistribution.

7 Global justice as impartiality[5]

Having assessed several versions of cosmopolitan theories, I will now turn to defending my own view of global justice. The type of cosmopolitanism my theory defends is moral rather than political. I am not arguing for the equivalent of a world government.

A consequence of my cosmopolitan position is that I speak of global justice rather than international justice, since I am not speaking of inter-state relations, but focus on the individual as the ultimate unit of moral concern. Finally, my theory specifically focuses on the institutional changes this type of theory implies and not so much on individual duties over and above the duty to create and uphold just institutions.

I do not assume the existence of a global society in any strict sense. I follow Grotius who has already argued that morality is constitutive of the relations between people. I use the notion of sociability to affirm the norm-governed status of the global context.

My proposal for a theory of global justice as impartiality follows Barry (see Barry 1989; 1995; 1999). It is based on the notion of impartiality as in the Scanlonian formulation, which holds that principles for the distribution of resources should be such that no one could reasonably reject them under circumstances of roughly equal power. If a distribution was rejected when

people were roughly equal, this means that the principles are unjust and that they should not govern the distribution even if the circumstances of rough equality do not hold in reality.

This formulation of impartiality requires a specification of what is meant by 'being reasonable'. The motivation for people in Scanlon's model is to justify behaviour to others so that agreement can be reached which no one can reasonably reject (Scanlon 1982; 1999). This might be strengthened by reference to the Grotian idea of intrinsic social norms binding individuals. It is in fact one of the meanings of reasonableness, because of the foundation of human sociability on which it is built. The Scanlonian premise of moral motivation to reach reasonable agreement is supported by Grotius's notion of people as sociable beings. The notion of sociability implies potential solidarity and wired into sociability is the need to see peaceful coexistence as an intrinsic good.

In Scanlon's model, people occupying different social and economic positions enter into a debate on how to distribute the resources in society. They all wish to reach a reasonable agreement on the principles of distributive justice. In a domestic society an impartial agreement leads to redistribution, since it is obvious that the least well-off have a veto over schemes of distribution that are unequal. Barry has developed six principles of justice that could be the outcome of an impartial agreement. Two principles are directly relevant to how impartiality leads to redistribution. Barry's fourth principle is the Principle of Compensation, which expresses that the victims of misfortunes that could not have been prevented have a prima-facie valid claim for compensation or redress. According to Barry, this principle embodies the intuition that when people's lives go badly through no fault of their own, it is a moral duty for others to provide for them, up to a limit. The fifth principle is the Principle of Priority of Vital Interests. This principle requires that in the absence of some compelling consideration to the contrary, the vital interests of each person should be protected in preference to the non-vital interests of anyone. Vital interests, according to Barry, include security from physical harm, nutrition adequate for the maintenance of health, clean drinking water and sanitary arrangements, clothing and shelter appropriate to the climate, medical care, and education to a level sufficient to function effectively within one's society (Barry 1991: 4).

If impartiality leads to redistribution within one society, then it seems logical to conclude that it does so, too, in the context of an impartial agreement between everyone in the world. Barry's principles, therefore, are not restricted to a scope of one national society but cover the whole of humanity. Current living standards are unequal and there is no way this inequality in both resources and power over decision-making could be justified on an impartial basis to all those involved. The argument for justice as impartiality seems therefore to make a clear case for various forms of global redress. The place where

one is born can be taken as one of the arbitrary factors for which people should be compensated in a global distribution of resources. This would be a perfect analogy with the national welfare state that redistributes to people who are worse off through no fault of their own.

Some defend global inequalities on the basis that they benefit all. This would be an acceptable justification of inequality. Even if one does not want to adhere to the Rawlsian view that inequalities lead to incentives and benefit the worst off in the end, a principle should be included that holds that if everyone agrees to a certain inequality in living standard, then this should be allowed for under a theory of global justice as impartiality. Barry therefore adds to his list of possible principles of justice coming out of an impartial agreement the Principle of Mutual Advantage. This principle specifies that whenever it would be to everyone's advantage not to apply rather than to apply the five principles of justice, it is permissible to do so. If more than one arrangement has this property, then the arrangement that maximizes the gain of those who gain least when the five principles are not applied should be given preference (Barry 1991: 4). However, the present inequalities in the world do not benefit all and cannot be seen as satisfying the impartial principles of justice. Therefore, the principle that inequalities may be justified if they benefit all is not a justification for the current inequality.

My position differs from Barry in that it envisages a more egalitarian outcome of an impartial agreement than the principles of justice Barry specifies. A principle of compensation combined with a principle for the satisfaction of basic needs seems to allow for an unspecified gap between incomes and focuses on economic indicators without recognition of injustices suffered in non-economic terms. For this reason I defend the notion of capabilities as the currency of justice and a review of the rules governing economic exchange within and between nation-states. This involves more than a system of redistribution as suggested by Barry, whose cosmopolitan ideal would be a global progressive taxation system (Barry 1991), or Pogge's Global Resources Dividend (Pogge 1998). Within capitalist economic systems, whether their inegalitarian impacts are softened by a welfare state or not, people suffer from the exploitative nature of work as well as the oppressive nature of the separation between classes. The principles requiring provision of basic needs and compensation for lack of income through no fault of one's own, do nothing to deal with these types of injustices. An impartial agreement between equals would in my eyes lead to a system where people live according to the principle of all for one and one for all. What this means in terms of transforming present institutions into properly impartial institutions will have to be addressed in a future paper.

My theory does not rely on the fact of globalization for its cosmopolitan scope. It is the starting point of viewing the world as one and all the people in it as connected to one another as human beings that justifies a global principle

of impartiality. Nation-states can be useful in the practical implementation of systems of global redistribution and may have a role to play in the movement towards a changed world simply because they are what we have at this time. When we consider getting 'from here to there', the existing institutional scheme cannot be ignored. I agree with liberal nationalists that humans flourish by getting together with like-minded others, but this need not take the form of nation-states. It seems to me that the nation-state as we know it is based on one homogenous nationality anyway and recent history has shown that the type of nationalism that is based on a dominant group claiming to represent the nation is vulnerable to violent conflict. In any case, the boundaries of nation-states should not be the boundaries of morality. Even if, for practical reasons, they can be the boundaries of social insurance schemes, there are duties of justice across boundaries (see Barry 1999). This means that everyone in the world is part of a global social and economic system that needs to be just in its distribution of resources and opportunities, so that everybody can make use of them and have a wide range of options as included in Sen's notion of capabilities (see Sen 1987; 1990; 1999). It is not enough to discharge duties towards poor people in other countries through charity or as a gesture of humanitarian concern. Instead of looking for reasons to convince people that they should contribute to the elimination of poverty and the creation of equality in the world, people should be required to give reasons why they do not feel such a responsibility.

Finally, the priority for fellow nationals and family members taken for granted in Brown's 'widening circles of concern' seems to me to present a false dilemma. Contributing to the welfare of strangers who are worse off should be a duty of justice, whereas spending more than is required by justice on one's own children, for example, is not disallowed by such a scheme of global obligations. It is unlikely that fulfilling global obligations reduces people to poverty. If it does, then this is the responsibility of a local scheme of redistribution (see also Pogge 1998). There are enough resources in the world for everyone to live above an imaginary poverty line and it is a matter of 'bad organization' that so many live below it or die prematurely.

This type of cosmopolitan theory relies on a view of human nature that is sometimes said to be unverifiable. In order to overcome the stalemate in debates between universalists and particularists or cosmopolitans and nationalists, O'Neill has suggested relying on the most minimal assumptions regarding human nature. It is to her argument I turn next, in order to assess whether cosmopolitanism needs to present its claims in a more modest form to make any progress in gaining enough consensus to move on with its redistributional policies.

8   O'Neill's practical approach to cosmopolitan ethics

After the discussion of several problems with the cosmopolitan position insofar as it relies on globalization to make its point and mentioning the Kantian problem of relying on metaphysical notions of the person and human rationality, I will now turn to a recently suggested alternative that accepts globalization as an element in moral reasoning but does not rely on it. As I pointed out earlier, the two main positions in ethics, universalism and particularism, both deal well with one aspect of the globalization process but not with the two simultaneously. Universalism, broadly speaking, holds that judgements in ethics should be made according to universal principles, which hold for all lives and in all situations. The scope of universal principles is mostly seen as cosmopolitan. Universalism uses as evidence for its position the aspects of globalization such as the process of growing worldwide interdependence, the expansion of supra-national institutions and the development of a cosmopolitan frame of mind. In contrast, particularism appeals to the actual practices or traditions of particular communities, thus ruling out the cosmopolitan scope of the universalists. Particularists emphasize the aspect of globalization which causes the restatement of sub-national local communities and of groups coming together on the basis of particular identities. If it is true that both aspects of globalization are causally linked, it may be best to look for an approach in ethics that could include both universal principles and an account of existing local practices. O'Neill's version of practical ethics aims to arrive at universal principles without having to rely on a metaphysical account of the person. O'Neill avoids the question "what are the obligations from one person to others in the world?" and asks instead "what are our obligations in the present time?" (O'Neill 1996). In her search for an answer to the questions of global or trans-national justice she acknowledges that in today's world, theories of justice for a wider scope than national societies are unavoidable: "(T)oday questions of global distributive justice will arise whether or not we can find the theoretical possibilities to handle them. Modern technical and institutional possibilities make far wider intervention not only possible but unavoidable" (O'Neill 1991: 277). In order to solve those questions, according to O'Neill, we need to look at who is obliged to take which sorts of actions for whom. In her later work she therefore focuses on the question of moral standing.

O'Neill takes a practical approach rather than a theoretical one because cosmopolitan, universal principles have not convincingly overcome the objections from the communitarians and liberal nationalists. One way forward could be to focus on the practical approach to moral standing. This approach holds that assumptions of moral standing we show when acting cannot be denied in the realm of moral obligations. In short, when we interact with others across borders we make quite complicated assumptions about the agents

and subjects with whom we are dealing. It would be incoherent to deny those agents or subjects moral standing while clearly assuming their complexities when we interact.

In my opinion, O'Neill is right when she argues that it is not possible to have complex relations with others without conceding that they are indeed agents or subjects. She argues that agents must accord moral standing to neighbours and strangers, near and far, but her theory does not need any account of essential features of beings deserving moral standing. In this way she avoids the trap that universalists are often accused of falling into. The result is a less universalistic approach which nevertheless defends the principles the universalists hold so dearly. O'Neill's practical approach will yield different results for different people at different times; a theoretical universalist approach would not. The approach does not say anything about agents on whom we cannot act (such as inhabitants of distant planets) and whether or not they have moral standing.

What then is the importance of empirical facts for moral obligations in the practical approach to ethics? O'Neill makes three assumptions relevant to fixing ethical standing. From an agent perspective the first assumption is that there are others who are separate from the agent. Second, the agent assumes that those others are somehow connected to him or her. Third, an agent makes the assumption that the others have limited but determinate powers. These three assumptions are called plurality, connection and finitude, respectively. "Where assumptions under all three headings are made, there will be a basis for agents to determine which others they are committed to according ethical standing and consideration" (O'Neill 1996: 101). In O'Neill's theory of moral standing, connection means that agents can be or are acted on by others. For this it is necessary that the agents believe they are connected to others by some causal link. This causal pathway may be a very indirect route, as is the case in many instances in the modern, globalized world. This is a much more modest claim than what is sometimes thought to be a necessary condition of moral standing, namely that agents share a language, normative ties and so on. (For a discussion see Brown 1995.)

O'Neill presents some examples to show that moral standing is not due if communities are not aware of each other's existence. One such example are the inhabitants of Anglo-Saxon England and their T'ang Chinese contemporaries (O'Neill 1996: 105) and another the Vikings living in Dublin and their Peruvian contemporaries (O'Neill 1995). These communities lived beyond the pales of each other's known world. They did not and could not base actions on assumptions about each other's capacities to act or to suffer. It would be absurd to accuse them of acting either justly or unjustly towards members of the other group.

Since action, which is globally institutionalized, is a reality in our world, O'Neill's approach shows that a more or less cosmopolitan view of moral

standing is contingently appropriate. Due to the assumptions we make about others as soon as we take part in practices in which they play a part, moral standing cannot be denied. Examples of such assumptions are that others can trade and negotiate, translate and settle payments, pollute the environment and contribute to its renewal, and so on. O'Neill concludes therefore that "(i)f we owe justice to those whose moral standing we acknowledge (by our actions) we will owe it to strangers as well as to neighbours and to distant strangers as well as to those who are relatively near at hand" (O'Neill 1995).

However, O'Neill invites at least three reactions. First, the practical approach to global ethics cannot answer the question of what duties we owe based on our common humanity. This is because moral standing relies on people being recognized as human beings already in the shared practices of communication and trade. O'Neill's theory explicitly starts with the question of what we owe others in the present world rather than the question of what do human beings owe each other. From the perspective of ethical debate it would still be interesting to discuss the latter question, but O'Neill's more modest approach may help us to move ahead and establish obligations here and now which is helpful in a world where action to reduce poverty and other injustices are urgently needed. Moreover, I do not believe that the contingency O'Neill brings into the debate is a threat to the universality of justice in her theory, since her notion of complex moral assumptions does not require one-to-one contact between all people in the world but a network of intricate causal links which can only exist if we assume moral standing of others involved in this network of interactions.

Second, O'Neill's approach can be questioned for whether it provides a model in which duties follow from the recognition of moral standing. An important part of the ethical debate on duties across borders is focused on the strength of those duties. Although it is important that O'Neill argues for duties based on justice rather than on common humanity, a theory of the hierarchy of duties and the relevance of the borders of nation-states needs to be developed.

Third, O'Neill can be criticized for relying on a notion of human agency that, although it is a minimal one, is grounded in metaphysics. And, if this is the case, then one may as well be explicit about one's metaphysical assumptions and bring them into the debate (see Flikschuh, forthcoming).

9   Conclusion

In this paper I have rebutted the position that if moral arguments can be meaningfully applied in domestic cases of moral argument, they cannot be used in the case of global relations. I discussed the shortcomings of the realist approach to global politics and defended the Grotian argument that all

relations between people are norm-governed and that international relations are therefore subject to social norms as well. This is based on the notion of human sociability. I argued that sociability is not just the collective human tendency to create moral relations with others in domestic societies, but a cosmopolitan notion of viewing all relationships with other human beings as norm-governed. This leaves the global order open to evaluations from a moral point of view. I discussed the Kantian position on global morality based on the Categorical Imperative and indicated some criticisms strictly Kantian approaches have generated in recent debate. Then I posed the more general question of whether cosmopolitanism should be defended in abstract terms at all or whether a practical defence could bring the debate further. I argued that it is possible and important to develop the arguments to defend a more abstract cosmopolitanism, although the question of duties across borders is most urgent under the present circumstances. If we can argue a convincing case for the duties across borders in the contemporary world then that is a big step forwards. The context of globalization becomes relevant to the duties we have to people outside our own nation-state without being relied on as the justification for cosmopolitan principles of distributive justice. My conclusion is, therefore, that even though there are abstract arguments for cosmopolitanism, it might make sense in the current debates to rely on a more practical and minimalist strategy rather than having to defend a specific conception of human nature. Therefore, globalization is seen to illustrate the duties people and institutions have across boundaries yet this does not mean that in a non-globalized world duties across boundaries would not exist.

However, it is not coherent to argue, as Charles Beitz did in 1979 and many others have done more or less implicitly since then, that global interdependence in itself means that we now have global obligations. As Brown and Robinson have objected, interdependence can add to global inequality and does not necessarily bring about a broadening of moral scope in common sense morality. In order to show the existence of moral obligations beyond those recognized in common sense morality, a separate argument is required since global interdependence cannot provide the grounds for global obligations. Such an argument is provided by the practical approach to moral standing as proposed by O'Neill. The main advantage of her approach is that cosmopolitan universal principles are defended without having to rely on metaphysical assumptions. This strengthens my argument for a universal scope of principles and weakens grounds for arguments that duties across borders are based on humanitarian considerations rather than principles of justice. However, my own project is to generate critical discussion on what a just world is and to include the metaphysical assumptions underlying different views.

Finally, this paper has dealt with the moral implications of globalization in a rather abstract and theoretical way. This does not mean that the effects of globalization in terms of increased poverty and exclusion of specific social groups within Northern and Southern societies do not affect the understanding of global duties. This paper argued that these effects need to be theorized in the context of a separate theory of global justice rather than as part of an argument for duties across borders based on global interdependence.

Notes

1. I would like to thank the participants of the workshop on 'International Distributive Justice: Cosmopolitanism and its Critics' at the 27th Joint Sessions of Workshops of the European Consortium Political Research held in Mannheim 26-31 March 1999 for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. Thanks are also due to two anonymous referees for their helpful comments on how to improve the paper for publication.

2. Rawls has just elaborated on the argument presented in this lecture in his latest book *Law of Peoples* Harvard University Press, 2000 which was not available at the time of publication.

3. It has been argued that international relations theorists take a crude view of Hobbes' account of human nature and political order. However, the focal point of my critique here is the lack of room for human behaviour based on human sociability in realism and not a criticism of the interpretation of Hobbes used in realist international relations theory. Therefore, if Hobbes is misrepresented in this article this is due to the interpretation of his work in realism and not part of my own analysis of Hobbes.

4. An earlier version of the argument in this section has been developed in van den Anker 1999: 127-142.

5. For a more elaborate outline of my theory on global justice as impartiality including a defence against some of the objections from liberal nationalists see van den Anker 1998.

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Party Identification: Nothing but the Vote?

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Abstract

In a very influential article on party identification, Jaques Thomassen (1976) rejects the directional component of party identification as meaningless in European party systems, but finds the strength component to be meaningful. Most authors refer to this article when explaining why they concentrate on the strength component and exclude the directional component. However, this position is confusing since it leaves us with a dubious analytic concept. My argument against the conclusion is mainly directed towards the theoretical foundation developed in the sixties. Party identification was considered to be a lifelong property, and the theory had no mechanism to handle changes in party identification. Several authors have objected to this, and claimed that European citizens do have lasting identifications with parties, although nobody has carried out a proper validation of the revised concept. Traditionally, 'independent' voters are left out in the analysis. With reference to realignment theory, I argue that 'independence' should be included in our search for the meaning of party identification. With this approach, it is demonstrated – using Dutch and Norwegian data – that the directional component is closely related to party choice, but the analysis suggests that party identification may be separated from party choice regarding long-term properties. That is an important finding since it ensures that the widely used strength component is indeed a measure for lasting identification and voter alignments.

1   Introduction

Party identification originated in the United States and was used to "characterize the individual's affective orientations to an important group-object in his environment" (Campbell et al. 1960: 121). In the fifties the importance of partisan loyalties was well recognized in electoral studies, while there was some disagreement on how such a phenomenon should be defined and measured. Earlier, Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson and Hazel Gaudet (1948) at Columbia University invented the Index of Political Predisposition (IPP), but Americans did not feel comfortable about having their political preferences