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Parricide and Violence against Parents: A Cross-Cultural View across Past and Present

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Chapter 6

Responding to Violence Against Parents: Prevention and Intervention Strategies

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ABSTRACT: The chapter deals with how the state and society respond to violence against parents at different levels. It examines various responses by agencies; the approaches and contexts offered by academic research and practical work. The chapter describes how the legal system handles parricide and violence against parents' cases. It then proceeds to look at punishments as deterrence and correction practices. Furthermore, the chapter analyzes how communities and the police respond to incidences of violence against parents. Finally, it gives an overview of intervention and prevention programs utilized by social services and other agencies. The chapter shows that all these response practices have been a result of gradual historical development of formal and informal, official and unofficial, state-based and community-based structures that have dealt with family conflict and crimes within the family in different political, cultural and economic environments.

In 1683 Natalia Armetinova, a widow from Moscow, complained to the patriarch's court against her son Kondrashko, a cavalryman who served in one of the Moscow's reiter companies. Natalia stated that he "forgot the fear of God", did not go to church, did not have a spiritual father (a confessor), mingled with "unbaptized foreigners" (that is with those foreigners who were not of Orthodox belief), fornicated, did not obey her, scolded her and threatened to kill her. Hers was a typical complaint against her adult son's misbehavior with which she sought help and conflict resolution from appropriate authorities outside of her family and friends. Kondrashko was brought to the authorities and interrogated. He denied all the charges and insisted that he obeyed his mother and never insulted or threatened her; he also

said that he preferred to pray at home instead of going to a crowded church. Notwithstanding, the judge called him a “church rebel” and “his mother’s vexer”. Kondrashko was sentenced to corporal punishment for disrespecting his widowed mother and then sent to one of the regional monasteries for correction and repentance (Muravyeva, 2017). This case indicated how early modern Orthodox and Catholic communities dealt with family conflict. The authorities often ran intervention in such cases by sending quarrelsome children to monasteries under the supervision of an experienced monk or a nun so that they could think about their unappropriated behavior and repent. The stay in the monastery involved a lot of praying, but also hard labor that was always thought as a good component of correctional practices. In communities which did not have monasteries, workhouses and other similar institutions performed the same function. Removing a perpetrator from the household was considered to be an appropriate solution in cases of parent abuse.

Historical development of prevention and intervention policies had been deeply rooted in socio-cultural and political context of past and present societies. The chapter describes how the legal system handles parricide and violence against parents’ cases. It then proceeds to look at punishments as deterrence and correction practices. Furthermore, the chapter analyzes how communities and the police responded to incidence of violence against parents. Finally, it gives an overview of intervention and prevention programs utilized by social services and other agencies. The chapter shows that all these response practices have been a result of gradual historical development of formal and informal, official and unofficial, state-based and community-based structures that have dealt with family conflict and crimes within the family in different political, cultural and economic environments.

Legal Responses to VaP

Traditional criminal justice system's responses to VaP

Legal responses to violence against parents include a number of elements: legislation, procedure, civil law activities, law enforcement activities, prosecution, punishment and rehabilitation. They have developed as state-mandated strategies utilized by government institutions to identify and intervene in cases of family violence. As we have pointed out in previous chapters as well as in prior research (Muravyeva & Toivo, 2018), early laws recognized violence against parents as a crime and protected parents from any types of disrespect from their children. For centuries, parents were the only family members explicitly protected by criminal law. It is ironic, that when the state developed more specific legislation and state agencies focused on providing services based on detailed and sensitive assessments of the domestic situations, violence against parents ceased to be of major concern.

As Holt (2016) notes for the UK, incidents involving parent abuse do not have a specific “category code” and may be recorded under a range of codes, such as “domestic incident”, “family violence” or “child protection”, and some incident records make no reference to the abusive nature of the incident (for example, it may be recorded as “criminal damage”). This situation is common for other countries. Moreover, in countries such as Russia which does not have any specific family violence *corpus delicti* in the criminal law resulting in the usage of general assault categories for prosecution of any type of family violence incidents, violence against parents (or other family members) fall between the lines and becomes even further invisible (Muravyeva, 2018a). In this section, we will analyze how traditional criminal justice system responds to VaP, look at alternative justice solutions such as restorative justice and at specialized justice programs such as juvenile justice to assess the efficiency of the legal system in this case.

Currently, many countries have specific legislation criminalizing family and/or domestic violence. In the majority of European countries, the tradition to have such categories

“crimes within the family” or “crimes against the family” goes back to early modern legislation and even before. This legislation included assault, verbal abuse, disrespect and homicide against parents as grievous crimes punishable more severely than the same offenses against strangers (Muravyeva, Toivo, 2018). It was imperative for second wave feminists and, later, international bodies to push for recognition of domestic violence as a criminal offense that led to intensive legislation in the 1990s and early 2000s (Meyersfeld, 2010). Having domestic violence or IPV recognized by the criminal justice system entitled survivors not only to services and state support, but in many contexts to their basic right to protect themselves by using the state legal system. However, the recognition that vulnerable populations need special legal protection works unevenly around the world due to local cultural and political contexts.

In European countries, domestic violence legislation has been extended to protect other family members, such as the case of Spain. The crime of “habitual family violence” was introduced into Spanish Penal Code in 1989. It prosecuted spousal and intragenerational violence, following old categories of European penal law. In 2003, the Penal Code was amended and the new article 173 was introduced according to which any habitual act of physical or psychological violence against not only family members, but anyone residing together or under guardianship in public or private centers, was punishable (Marmolejo, 2008). In the UK, the Serious Crime Act as of 2015 introduced a new offence of “controlling or coercive behavior in an intimate or family relationship” which can be applied to young people over the age of 10 in England and Wales and could potentially criminalize violence against parents under the umbrella of domestic violence and abuse (Miles & Condry, 2015). In Finland, parents could apply for a restraining order in cases when their children try to extort money from them, in addition to being covered under domestic violence law (Hearn & McKie, 2010). The Criminal Code of Finland separates IPV and violence between family members, providing specific protection to various categories of relatives. The legal trend in EU countries is to

provide legal recognition and protection to most vulnerable groups, such as women and children, but at the same time introduce such categories as “coercive” or “controlling” behavior within the family thus underlining the core of family violence problem. Criminalization of family violence also serve as deterrence which is a typical prevention strategy on behalf of the state.

The US legislation is similar to European, however, due to the different legal system and federal structure, it is problematic in many ways. In general, legal approach to family abuse in the US has been to criminalize it with the focus on both punishment and deterrence. Criminalization has involved mandating members of medical and social services professions to report suspected cases of abuse and imposing criminal penalties on perpetrators on acts identified as abusive. By today, the US has criminalized abuse of children, domestic partners and the elderly, that those categories they deem vulnerable. The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA, 1994) and the federal Older Americans Act (1965) provide a national legal framework for protection against family violence. Due to the peculiarities of American legal system, the VAWA has been just re-authorized (April 2019) not without a staunch opposition from republicans and the National Rifle Association, which happens every time the VAWA goes through re-authorization. By contrast, the Older Americans Act is rarely opposed or debated during its re-authorization. Nevertheless, no legislation deals specifically with family violence against siblings or parents. On a top of it, each state has its own set of laws that could differ from federal law; for example, corporal punishment by parents is legal in every state of the US (Hines, Malley-Morrison & Dutton, 2012).

Canada has taken a different approach in family violence legislation. The Criminal Code of Canada does not refer to specific “family violence offenses”, but the Department of Justice has an extensive guide for federal legislation addressing family violence, listing all the offenses that could occur within the family. It is aided by the Provincial/Territorial legislation

that has its own jurisdiction. To date, six provinces (Alberta, Manitoba, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland and Labrador and Saskatchewan) and three territories (Northwest Territories, Yukon and Nunavut) have proclaimed specific legislation on family violence. Other jurisdictions deal with family violence under their own Family Law Acts, such as, for example, in British Columbia. By contrast with the US, which has federal structure as well, Canada represents a successful case of legislating against family violence. This is also a case with Australia. Some experts argue, that federal structure could facilitate more sensitive family violence legislation and responses, using New Zealand as an example, where, subnational experiments have occurred, but continuous progressive policy responses have been less evident because centralization accentuates the need for left-wing governments to substantively advance the issue (Momirov & Duffy, 2011; Chappell & Curtin, 2013).

In other federal contexts, though, the explicit criminalization of family violence worked to the disadvantage of the family. Russia is a good example of how gender-neutral (or rather gender-blind) legislation completely erased any awareness about domestic and family violence. In Russia, this happened due to socialist approaches to criminal law in the 1920s, when removing specific “crimes within the family”, which included spousal abuse, violence against parents and child maltreatment according to its first criminalization in 1845, was viewed as a progressive measure liberating women from the constraints of patriarchal family. It backfired as the population perceived it rather as a license to commit violence against family members than gender liberation project. Already in the 1930s, the authorities pointed out that the levels of what they called “everyday” domestic abuse were high enough to attract legislator’s attention as these actions signified lack in communist morals. Family violence ended up firmly under hooliganism category of criminal and administrative offenses and stayed there till the 1990s (Muravyeva, 2014). What happened in the post-Soviet context is instructive in many ways. With rapid and hasty change in policies, attempts to introduce democracy, join

international institutions and denial of their immediate Soviet past, Russian legislators and policy makers looked at gender-equality initiatives as part of the package they had to accept to integrate back into European and international community. However, when Putin came into power and started his decent towards centralized, controlled and authoritarian rule, gender-sensitive legislation was the first to be tabled. With Putin's government's policies becoming exceedingly protectionist and critical of "the West", domestic violence and other gender equality initiative were shut down. Paradoxically, the refusal to recognize family violence and violence against parents contradicted the newly emerged conservative "traditional values" concept, in which respect to parents and the elderly was proclaimed as a value "inherent to Russian culture" (Muravyeva, 2014a).

In 2016, the group of human rights lawyers and activists led by Marie Davtyan campaigned for explicit criminalization of domestic violence while the State Duma (lower house of the Russian parliament) decided to relegate some types of assault not resulting in injuries or health(?) damage down to administrative offenses and by this to make the prosecution of physical assault more effective. Davtyan and other activists insisted that assault against family members should stay within the scope of criminal law. In July they won their campaign when the amendments to the art. 116 of the Criminal Code (simple assault) included explicit mention of assault against family members (coded as "blizkie litsa", in Russian to indicate not only kinship or family connection but partnerships or surrogate families) with the maximum punishment for such assault up to two years imprisonment. This was a hard-won campaign against a vocal and furious resistance of infamous deputy Elena Mizulina, Russian Orthodox Church, conservative parents' movement and others related to them. Muzulina called these changes "absurd" and "antifamily" and expressed her anger by saying: "There is an impression from this article [116] that such a behavior within the family [assault] is more dangerous to the society than that of strangers". On 27 July 2016 she introduced the bill to

reverse these changes. It took six months and the new Duma composition to make it into law. This made the criminalization of family violence the shortest lived law of this type in the post-Soviet legislation. The new version of the code from February 2017 excluded family members from the article, thus making assault against any family member not resulting in serious injury an administrative offence punishable under the Administrative Code of the Russian Federation (art. 6.1.1) with a fine (60-400 euros) or other administrative punishments (10-15 days of jail or community labor). The statistics, though, suggest that while “simple assault against close persons” was explicitly named in the Criminal Code the reportage of family violence doubled and then it dropped after the removal of the charge. It also generated enormous awareness of domestic violence and public debates resulting in a number community and non-governmental initiatives for survivors of family violence, including a draft law on prevention of family violence that was introduced into the Russian parliament in fall 2019 and caused an enormous response from all social and political forces (for other post-communist countries see also Fabian, 2010).

At the same time, China passed its first domestic violence law in 2015 which was a historic step by the State Council towards further recognition and institutionalization of protection for victims of abuse. The law limits domestic violence to abuse between a narrow definition of family members, excluding unmarried, divorced and homosexual couples; it is a significant development for the anti-domestic violence cause. Prior to the 2015 law, China had legislated on domestic violence within family law. The Marriage Law of 1980 in its revisions from 2001 for the first time defined domestic violence in national law as involving physical and/or mental harm from beating, detaining or restricting personal freedom. Article 43 also aimed to offer women victims better protection. In 2003, revisions focused on marriage and divorce registration. The 1992 Women’s Protection Law (revised in 2005) legally prohibited domestic violence (§ 46). Therefore, the 2015 law is built on the previous legislation and

reflects the political will of the communist party to recognize and deal with family violence (Leggett, 2017).

Criminalizing family violence is an important prevention strategy that allows people to understand the permissive boundaries of their behavior. However, enforcing the law requires a different level of political and executive will. Training police officers, creating specific investigation guidelines, establishing specialized domestic violence units are among the measures that have been executed in different countries. The US researchers argued that mandatory report and mandatory arrest laws are effective remedies against arbitrariness of enforcement of domestic violence incidents. This increases the number of cases reported and processed through the criminal justice system (Kurst-Swanger & Petcosky, 2003; Payne, 2005). Making prosecution in these cases mandatory and following “no-drop” policy, the state makes family violence a crime against the state. Victims then become witnesses for the prosecution and therefore are not responsible for the outcome of criminal charges. Many victim advocate programs have supported such policy reforms, arguing that such strategies protect victims from further abuse (Kurst-Swanger & Petcosky, 2003). However, many argue against such strategies for two reasons: by removing power from their hand they make witnesses uncooperative and such stringent policies deter victims from reporting incidents in the first place. Victims come to understand that they will lose control of decision making when they involve the police. In fact, it could be argued, that mandatory state interventions mirror the abusive relationship itself, reinforcing a patriarchal system in which women and dependents have little power (Nichols, 2014).

Protective or restraining orders is another measure criminal justice systems adopted to intervene into family violence situations and prevent further abuse. In the US, protections orders have been acting as a standard protective measure in cases of domestic abuse. In Europe protection order legislation had been contained at the local level till 2015 when European

Protection Order and the Civil European Protection Measure were introduced. Once these two EU instruments are implemented on 11 January 2015, protection orders issued in one Member State have to be recognized by the other Member States. Although, there is a variation of protection orders in EU member states and other European countries, all of them deem to be more or less efficient tool of intervention in domestic conflicts (Van der Aa, 2012; Van der Aa et al., 2015; Tamasi & Bolyky, 2015).

Punishments and its Alternatives: Deterrence, Mediation and Restorative Justice in VaP Cases

Historically, death penalty had remained as a punishment for any type of violence against parents, qualified death penalty – for parent killing. Death penalty served as a strong deterrent and, at the same time, a revenge for taking a life. In Russia, that stopped using capital punishment in the 1740s (with exception of high treason cases) death penalty was substituted by katorga, that is penal labor in Siberian mines, often for life.

Sentencing to death for parricide sent a very harsh message to everyone saying such a deed could not be tolerated. Executing parent killers in a certain way strengthened this message and was supposed to deter anyone even thinking about it. In 1792 John Day was hanged for killing his parents: he cut their throats when they refused to give him more money “to carry on his profligate courses”. The broadsheet with a detailed description of his crime, trial and execution states that after the execution his body hung in chains near the spot where his crime had been perpetrated (see also Bennett, 2018). Such spectacles of horror continued into the nineteenth century (see Ruff, 2001).

The only alternative for death penalty in parricide cases was an asylum for mentally ill, if insanity was firmly established (see chapter 2). However, as historical evidence shows the courts were reluctant to use capital punishment in cases of non-fatal violence reserving death penalty to murders (Toivo, 2016). The approach to what would constitute an appropriate

punishment for non-fatal violence against parents changed between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries to reflect a shift in theoretical frameworks that we described in chapter 2. Generally, children who perpetrated violence against parents received the same type of punishment as for assault but harsher, that is corporal punishment in a higher degree; they were more likely to be banished or sent to an available correctional facility. In our opening case, disrespectful adult children regularly were confined in the monasteries for repentance and correction, the punishment reserved by the state for domestic offenders (Muravyeva, 2017; Muravyeva, 2013).

The patriarchal nature of the family remained the main framework for the public institutions in terms of defining the degree of the importance of family conflict and assessment whether intervention was needed. The nineteenth century brought an increasing focus on juvenile justice and attention to delinquent children in relation to poverty and vagrancy. Taking young vagrants and delinquents into care was emblematic of child welfare, because neglected children were considered culprits as well as victims (even thought to be culprits on account of being victims), as well as constituting a threat on account of being poor. This kind of analysis was common from the nineteenth century onwards. From then on, they had a specific status which, on a criminal level, lessened their responsibility and, on an institutional level, gave permission to take children away from their family in order to fully nurture them and try to get them back on the right path (Fass, 2013). Before that, the status of children in public sphere was almost non-existent, that is, when committing a crime they were prosecuted as adults, but they were seen as belonging to their father, which often resulted in courts returning children to their fathers for punishment (Muravyeva, 2016). Once children acquired a separate and recognizable public status, concern over their welfare became public as well. This allowed the authorities to intervene into family matters if they had concerns about their welfare. By the 1970s and 1980s every European and Western state had a well-developed child protection

system in place. Such re-focusing of attention of the public institutions has happened at the expense of other family members, mostly because their vulnerabilities were not that obvious: they were adults, so they could take care of themselves. It took another twenty years to prove that women have major vulnerabilities in abusive family situation. The criminal justice system has been very slow to respond to research as we have seen in the previous section.

Criticism of the traditional criminal justice system in its inability to combat domestic violence with harsh punishments that rarely served its goal of correction resulted in researchers and policy makers to look for alternative solutions such as mediation and restorative justice since the 1980s on. Mediation has increasingly become a popular strategy for many European countries to deal with IPV and other types of domestic violence. The premise is that mediation empowers victims of domestic violence crimes while traditional criminal justice system further victimizes them. The growth of mediation and restorative justice has been spurred on at European and international levels by the development of initiatives grounded in restorative principles. International bodies like the United Nations and the Council of Europe have developed a number of legal instruments, of which the UN Declaration of Basic Principles for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power and the Council of Europe Recommendations 85(11) and 2006(8) are the most noteworthy. Policy at the level of the European Union is laid down in the Council Directive 2004/80/EC relating to compensation to crime victims and the Framework Decision on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings of the 15th of March 2001. The 2012 EU Victims Directive promoted mediation and restorative justice as even superior for victim's services (Lauwaert, 2013).

Victim/Offender Mediation (VOM) is currently the most popular form of restorative justice not only in continental Europe, but also in Asia, Australia, and New Zealand. The aim of mediation is to give victims and offenders a safe environment in which they are able to discuss the crime, its impact and harm it may have caused, and to allow an opportunity to put

right the harm caused (Doak & O'Mahony, 2010). The decision on whether to use mediation is often made by the prosecutor, before cases make it to court. Most mediation programs available are not explicitly restorative although there has been an emphasis on providing program that have a strong restorative focus. In Europe, the mediation projects are most developed in Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Norway and Spain (in Catalonia) (Johnstone & Van Ness, 2013). In majority of countries, VOM was often used to mediate family conflicts and IPV that led to a heated discussion as to whether domestic violence cases should be mediated at all. Concerns such as safety of the victim, further victimization, trivialization of family violence, additional trauma remain visible in VOM processes (Drost at al., 2015). However, various assessments of VOM programs in Europe, Australia and South Africa attest that VOM provides more positive than negative outcomes (Pelikan, 2010; Uotila & Sambou, 2010; Johnstone & Van Ness, 2013; Drost at al., 2015).

VOM programs are based on restorative justice principles but do not represent restorative justice. As scholars insist restorative justice is not mediation, where the outcomes might be mandated by the mediator rather than by the victim and/or the batterer); it is not primarily about forgiveness or reconciliation either. Broadly speaking, the aims of restorative justice are to repair the harm caused by an offence and to make the perpetrator accountable for it (Fernandez, 2010). Restorative justice interventions may be offered as a diversion away from the courtroom or as a court-ordered sanction and can be applied to a range of contexts. A range of specific interventions operate under the umbrella term “restorative justice”, and these include family group conferences, restorative justice conferences, sentencing circles, victim impact panels and practices (Coogan, 2011).

As Holt (2016) point out the most common form of restorative justice used in response to VaP is restorative justice conferences. They involve a meeting between a conference facilitator, victim, offender and other community members who may act as supporters. The

role of the professional is to facilitate (rather than “lead”) the restorative process and decision-making is “owned” by the participants themselves. They may result in written apology, actions of reparation or restitution (to the victim or community), restrictions on particular behaviors and agreement to participate in further treatment (such as substance misuse programs). These agreements become part of a “contract”, which can result in court action if the contract is not complied with. The assessment of these conferences used in VaP situations comes with positive results due to the following reasons: (1) it provided access to other important services; (2) parents felt listened to in a non-judgmental way by practitioners, often for the first time; (3) parents felt able to talk with their child in a safe environment about both the violence and other related family issues; (4) the community and support system was designed to support the whole family, rather than just the child as parents had previously felt to be the case; (5) the legally binding contract enforced change, and the presence of authority figures (such as the police) while it was signed underlined its importance (Doran, 2007; see also Coogan, 2011; Routt & Anderson, 2014; Holt, 2015).

Community and Police Responses to VaP incidents

Community responses to domestic conflict

Today, it is the police we think about when a crime is committed: it is expected to respond and provide the first steps to start remedying the situation. However, before the nineteenth century and even then, the police was not the first responder since the community took care of conflict resolution and crime prevention using different strategies. It is especially true about domestic conflicts. The response of the community to domestic affairs was very direct and personal. From at least the fifteenth century, public shaming, ridicule, and punishment were used by local people to attempt to change the behavior of offending persons. European communities, especially rural ones, practiced a variety of public rituals such as riding the stang, skimmington

rides, rough music, katzemusik, Cencerrada and vitos, known generically as charivaris and misrules (Muravyeva, Nash & Rowbotham, 2013). Public shaming represented an attempt to make unspeakable community grievances and private disputes into matters of community concern. Additionally, the rituals and punishments intended to shame and humiliate transgressors operated in a more general fashion to reinforce and protect traditional patriarchal values and relations. This was done both by mocking inversion of the hierarchical order and by controlling excessive abuses of male privilege. These were acts of popular justice, and they were part of the arsenal of patriarchal domestic politics (Dobash & Dobash, 1981; Muir, 2005). Children were often publicly shamed for violence against parents by their communities with support from the state and the church (Muravyeva, 2016; Kilday, 2016).

The community's response to violence against parents is visible in their communications with local authorities. Local communities expressed their attitudes towards parent abusers by turning them in or bailing them out when the authorities arrested the abuser. Reputation assessment that included door-to-door inquiries about the family's status in the community, the behavior of its members and relations to the neighbors to assess if the complaint of an abused parent was reasonable, expressed the community's opinion about a particular domestic conflict. Thus, by turning an offender in, the community communicated that it did not approve of their behavior as in the following case (see also Hardwick, 2006).

In 1643, the Cossack Ivashka Dem'ianov's father-in-law accused him of assault and slashing him with a sabre. His report was supported by a petition from the whole town, signed by all the heads of local households. Ivashka ran away probably knowing that, in this situation, with emotions running high against him, he did not stand a chance to provide any mitigating circumstances. He was apprehended by other Cossacks, local residents, and brought to the local voevoda (governor) for investigation. Because he used a weapon and wounded his father-in-law with it, this case automatically became a felony. To satisfy the community, the voevoda

proceeded with public corporal punishment, which was highly humiliating, especially for a military man. Ivashka was undressed in front of the people, put on the scaffold and flogged; he was then released on bail and with a promise never to commit such an act again (Muravyeva, 2017).

The community's disapproval created an emotional environment, unfavorable to the offender, that included both the symbolic and physical setting for administration of public punishment and humiliation to level with community expectations and to ensure solidarity between the community and the authorities, often themselves part of the same community. The physical setting for public punishment—in front of the chancellery, which signified the presence of power, on the one hand, and the people, on the other—ensured a full solidarity. Simultaneously, the symbolic setting—the public administration of the punishment and the nakedness of the body—made an offender understand the degree to which his actions were violating the normative order and the conditions in which the community was prepared to take him back.

If the community was ambivalent about the offender's actions, the offender was often released on bail with the guarantee of a surety bond, through which the community (relatives and/or neighbors) promised to produce a defendant before the court at any time and bore responsibility if they failed to do so. The surety bond usually showed the willingness of the community to have the accused of violence against their parent among them while the case was under investigation. The court accepted surety bonds only in cases that were not felonies or when there was no solid evidence to support an accusation (see also Houston, 2016). Accepting a surety bond indicated the level of trust toward the accused and mistrust toward the parent who brought a complaint; it also encouraged the use of extra-judicial methods to pacify the parties. If nobody was willing to give a surety bond, this definitely meant that the community did not want such a person back (in case they were local). At the same time, surety bonds

provided a system of social control, as the community could exercise certain powers over the accused to make him compensate for any harm done. In the surety bond, the community's representatives promised to watch the perpetrator and prevent them from engaging in any disruptive behavior.

Thus, in 1640 Ivan Zagustin, accused by his mother of disrespect and disobedience, was released on bail; his sponsors (ten men altogether, only one of them his relative—a brother) promised that Ivan would not quarrel with his mother, would not abuse her and his wife, would not drink, gamble and wander around at night, would not smoke and deal in tobacco (an offence under the 1649 Conciliar Legal Code in Muscovy), that is that he would maintain a proper way of life (“as the rest of us”). However, if they failed, they promised to pay a fine imposed by the authorities. Zagustin obviously was of a quarrelsome nature and prone to lewd behavior. However, the community was willing to take him back and give him a chance to reform. The emotional signal they were sending to the authorities was that of approval: they were ready to provide an emotional environment for him to improve (Muravyeva, 2017).

The community's role and its responses changed with the state expanding its control over the public sphere and monopolizing any type of violence administered, which meant, that these days the communities are left mostly with functions of support provides via charity and voluntary activities. They still can express their approval or disapproval of the situation by ritualized vandalism against offenders' possessions (cars or housing), but the risk of prosecution deters many except in situations of high emotional gain. Domestic conflicts rarely provoke such a response. Therefore, in contemporary societies the legitimate community response takes form of voluntary and charity work such as support groups and charity organizations (shelters, hotlines and so on). These groups provide general support (such as victim support) or specialized support (such as parental support groups). However, the

authority to intervene and remedy belongs to the police and state agencies these days (Holt, 2016).

Police intervention into domestic conflict

The modern police officer is the embodiment of the state's claim to monopolize both the use of force among its citizens and the administration of justice. Charged with preserving public order against all threats, while at the same time pursuing proactive policies against crime and violence, police agencies are central to the functioning of the modern state (Bittner, 1978). Before the nineteenth century, though, policing was largely administered by the local community as we discussed in the previous section, or by the church when watching morality, including family life.

In numerous European towns and cities in the early modern period, there existed neighborhood organizations that created solidarity between inhabitants of a district and enabled the district to exercise control and monitor behavior that deviated from accepted norms. The kind of policing practiced by local residents is comparable to what we might call today community policing or "proximity policing" (Denys, 2010). If anything of deviant or criminal nature happened, the residents were obliged to tell the neighbors and then call an available representative of the authorities: it could be an official policeman, but it could be any other official, including church officials. In cases of domestic conflicts, abused wives or parents (mothers, mostly) often turned to their neighbors for help: to hide from the abuser or to vocalize their initial complaint before the authorities showed up (see also Hardwick, 2006). During the trial, the complainants and witnesses often stated that the complainant came to the neighbors first and shared the story of abuse (Muravyeva, 2013; Muravyeva, 2016).

Preventive policing had been administered by the church. In catholic (France) and orthodox (Russia) countries, it was the confessional where major policing took place. The

confessional guides directed parish priests to ask questions such as “Did you insult your father or mother? Did you swear at them? Did you hit them?” (Muravyeva, 2016). The punishments for such behavior confessed during the session involved a variety of penances that had to be performed in front of the community; the community could easily infer what the penance was for (Haliczer, 1996). Penitential discipline played an important role as both prevention and intervention strategy in family violence and, particularly, in violence against parents’ cases. In protestant countries, as Kilday (2016) shows for Scotland, the church practiced the culture of intense supervision, that was supported by its own interventionist parish-based court system, called the Kirk Session, which rigorously rooted out moral lapses and publicly punished sinners.

Public penances practiced by churches throughout Europe functioned as preventive strategies by explaining to their flock that abusing parents was morally and politically wrong. In Spring of 1766 Moscow residents and guests witnessed an unprecedented procession: a man and a woman in chains and robes were led from church to church. They stopped at each church’s gates and gave a repentance speech asking the kind people of Moscow to forgive them for their horrible crime. The procession ended at the church of St. Nickolas Miracleworker at Arbat, where the royal manifesto was read. From the manifesto, the public learned that the penitents were husband and wife – Alexei and Varvara Zhukovs – who killed Alexei’s mother and sister, that is, committed a crime “against Christian religion and natural law”. However, the merciful Empress (Catherine II) chose not to execute them but put them under God’s judgement, so that everyone started contemplating on the theme of respect and love to their parents (Muravyeva, 2016; Chrissidis, 2011).

The policing tandem of church and state continued into the nineteenth century; however, it became more professionalized as the police emerged as a separate agency and the church lost its public powers (see Monkkonen, 1979, 1992). By the nineteenth century police

sciences insisted on preventive policing moving towards tasking police force with prevention and detection of crimes. Police manuals of the era contained rules not only to police the streets—public sphere—but the households, that is surveil the behaviors of people (Finnane, 2016). Standard police instructions and manuals included detailed recommendations of making sure that people behaved properly, including that children respected their parents and elders (Muravyeva, 2018).

However, with the emergence of liberalism and ideas of privacy and autonomy of the family, criticism of police intervention in the private sphere led to the police being wary of dealing with “domestic situations”. In the twentieth century, while the police were obliged to respond to “domestic disturbances”, it was reluctant to follow through due to a possibility to be accused of unnecessary intervention. The policemen, women were not part of the force till at least the 1960s, also had no training to deal sensitively with domestic abuse, including parent abuse. They were also part of the same society having the same values and ideas about proper social and family order. As a result, today the major problem discussed by experts and researchers cross-nationally is the impact of how police responds to a domestic violence incident on the willingness of survivors to report it and deal with it. As Holt (2016) points out parent abuse may come to police attention either through direct contact from parents (for example, to report a violent incident) or through referral from other services. For parents who contact the police, conflicts over its potential ramifications make it “the most difficult decision of their lives”, according to Routt and Anderson (2011, p 10), who interviewed parents from the US about their experiences. Even if family violence legislation is in place, that is, the understanding that violence could be perpetrated against parents (not just IPV or child abuse or elder abuse), coming to the police might be a difficult exercise as there is a disparity between expectations from the police and availability of tools and recourses to respond to VaP situations. In most EU countries, the US, Canada, and Australia the police have introduced

crisis intervention trainings, gender sensitivity trainings and/or domestic violence trainings, even elder abuse sensitivity trainings, which prepares officers to deal with IPV or child abuse (Buzawa, 2012; Hendricks & Hendricks, 2014).

Yet, police officers often leave the scene of many domestic dispute calls, unable to collect evidence needed to lay charges against the accused. They may find the residence in order, no visible signs of injury, and denial/refusal of all parties to provide statements to the police. Police officers may be called to respond to families with repeated calls to emergency response, leaving without evidence on numerous occasions. As a result, many police officers may go to calls with preconceived notions about the risks and dynamics in parent-child relationships, potentially impacting the kind of intervention used (Ruff, 2012). One of such preconceptions is to assume child abuse, if the police are called to the APV situation. In some studies, parents have reported feeling blamed by the police or feared that they themselves may be charged with an offence (Haw, 2010).

In other cases, parents report that they contact the police because they want to send a message to their child that their behavior is unacceptable – perhaps through the police giving their child “a good talking to” (Holt, 2016). While research suggests that, in some cases, police involvement does act as an effective deterrent in this way (Edenborough et al, 2008; Holt, 2009, 2011), in other cases parents have felt that the abuse was not taken seriously by the police (Cottrell, 2001; Edenborough et al, 2008; Haw, 2010; Holt, 2011).

With digitalization and availability of digital services, police forces have detailed online guides to how to report an offense as well as victim support services, although some of them are not easy to navigate. The e-resources include not only text but videos and versions for disabled people. In Russia, there is even a police app for smartphones that allows quick connection with emergency services. Moreover, in some countries an offense could be reported online if urgent police intervention is not required. In Finland and Spain, such cases include

stolen or damaged property. Digitalization of emergency services can potentially facilitate higher reportage, especially in VaP situations, because the abused parents do not need to have a face to face communication with the police so they can avoid uncomfortable situations. These services might be taken further to allow reportage of violent incidents, but police are reluctant to do it mostly due to false reporting.

Contemporary Family Violence Prevention and Intervention Programs

While in many societies violence against parents was condoned and children who perpetrated it harshly punished, in European and American contexts societies slowly developed differential attitudes to offenders, including young offenders, the process that was part to emerging child-centered society. Leaving aside debates in family history, history of childhood and population studies on the role of children in pre-modern societies (see Turmel, 2008; Heywood, 2017) as well as attitudes to age and the elderly (Muravyeva & Toivo, 2018), it is clear that by the end of the nineteenth century social policies of the nascent welfare states in Europe focused on providing a variety of services for victims and offenders in family violence, be it juvenile justice, social services for abandoned children, housing for the elderly, or asylums for those deemed mentally challenged.

The development of educational sciences in connection with modern ideas on the family shifted responsibility for children and their behavior on parents, which resulted in reluctance to hold children, especially, young and adolescent accountable for their aggressive behavior (Agnew & Huguley, 1989; Korbin, 2003). Violence against parents also challenges our perceptions of cycles of abuse and power within families. Violence within the family usually involves attacks on less powerful individuals (children or partners) by more powerful individuals, but child-to-parent violence involves attacks on parents, usually regarded as more powerful individuals, by the usually less powerful child or adolescent (Korbin, Anetzberger &

Austin, 1995; Coogan, 2011). The reversal of conventional power dynamics within families represented by child-to-parent violence leads to significant challenges for the conceptual frameworks of practitioners and policymakers (Winkworth & McArthur, 2006). Due to these challenges, prevention and intervention programs have been fragmented and firmly placed within the framework of family violence prevention and intervention approaches. Researchers argue today, that while general family violence prevention and intervention programs provide an initial help, they are still focused on children as victims, therefore, there is a need to overcome this assumption and develop interventions tailored to help abused parents (Holt, 2015). At the same time, the society and policy makers have no problem with recognizing elder abuse and hold those children accountable, mostly because they are adults and elderly parents are reversed in the category of dependency, so the power dynamic remains intact.

The vast majority of programs in existence by the twenty-first century in the West aimed at dealing with IPV or child abuse, such as such as shelters, crisis day care centers, police intervention programs, and parent support groups, are treatment programs that are implemented after the abusive incident (Gelles, 1999). Twenty years ago, the literature offered a number of steps that dealt with long-term changes in society and the family, such as, elimination of the norms that legitimize and glorify violence in the society and the family, reducing violence-provoking stress created by society (dealing with poverty, inequality, unemployment, housing and so on), integrating families into a network of kin and community to reduce and manage stress, change the sexist character of society, and breaking the cycle of violence in the family (Gelles, 1999; Blau & Long, 1999).

Recently, on a more global scale, that involves international agencies and transnational programs, the field of prevention science represents a concerted and coordinated effort to develop interventions that prevent the development of psychological, social, and/or physical outcomes. Those programs are believed to be comprehensive. Due to the involvement of

international agencies, prevention and intervention models are becoming more and more universal as the countries adopt what they see as good practices. Some experts identify three levels of prevention: primary, secondary, and tertiary (McClennen, Keys & Day, 2016). Primary prevention is directed at the general population. It seeks to be proactive, by strengthening an individual's ability to cope with issues, and provides services such as public awareness campaigns, educational programs, and family support. Secondary prevention targets individuals and families who are either at risk or in the initial stages of experiencing problems, by providing services such as substance abuse treatment, home visitations, health care screenings, and respite care. Tertiary prevention targets individuals and families who are experiencing more intense levels of the problem and provides services such as intensive family preservation, mental health counselling, shelters, prosecution of perpetrators, and rehabilitative programs; the aim of these services are to preclude further damage and reoccurrence of these symptoms.

In the majority of countries, prevention and intervention policies break into general programs aimed at strengthening the family and community and specialized programs aimed at specific categories of abused. In this latter category, parents started being receivers of such services only as recently as since the 1990s; the services have provided to the elderly based on their age and need rather than on their status as survivors of family violence. A number of specialized programs dealing with parents who survived abuse from their adolescent children have been developed in the past ten or so years. However, parents whose abusive children are adult and they do not fit to the elderly category, that is, they are younger than seventy, healthy, active and independent, can only count on general services and, probably, police and criminal justice system in cases of crimes committed if they are willing to report. It remains the biggest omission of the prevention and intervention policies.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have analyzed the approaches to prevention and intervention strategies in violence against parents. We have shown that up until the twentieth century, it was the community that took care of domestic offenders by either handing them to the state or by willing to have them returned after punishment if they saw the potential for restoring the situation. The church and religious institutions played an important prevention and intervention roles by making offenders contemplate their behavior by repenting and serving penances. When police came into the picture, the intervention became formalized but less desirable as it clashed with the idea of privacy and autonomy of the family, and the police, being a part of the public power, did not have any moral authority as the church did to intervene. This led to contemporary situation with the detailed regulations and guidelines of how to respond to violence against parents for the police force.

At the same time, the core problem with prevention and intervention programs remain: any state agency, such as social services, happen to be in the same situation as the police as to having no moral authority to make survivors of VaP report an abuse. Having a legal obligation to report themselves creates a tension with survivors who might want to protect their privacy. The community's help might be more effective here as the survivors choose to ask for it. Therefore, assessing efficiency of contemporary prevention and intervention programs needs to be grounded in historical analysis of responses to violence against parents as it reveals fundamental contradiction between the state's welfare policies and ideology of family autonomy.