

**“And, so today, a new season of American renewal has begun.”**

**A Critical Metaphor Analysis of NEWNESS  
in American Presidential Discourse.**

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# TYPOGRAPHICAL CONVENTIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

## Typographical Conventions

SMALL CAPITALS	Conceptual metaphors, e.g. CHANGE IS MOTION  Conceptual domains or concepts, e.g. PERSON, JOURNEY or BUILDING  Names of categories, e.g. the category OLD
<i>italics</i>	Linguistic categories, lexical concepts
[frame], small letters and square brackets	Frame, i.e. domain-like conceptual structure, possibly metaphorical, organizing knowledge structures, e.g. [relationship], a frame motivated by conceptual metaphors such as RELATIONSHIP IS PROXIMITY and SEPARATION IS DIFFERENCE.

## Dictionaries Used

<i>AHD</i>	<i>The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language</i>
<i>LDOCE</i>	<i>Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English</i>
<i>NSOED</i>	<i>The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (CD-ROM)</i>
<i>OED</i>	<i>The Oxford English Dictionary</i>

## Abbreviations Used in the Analysis

(WJC, II, 2)	Initials of the president's name, here <b>William Jefferson Clinton</b> , followed by the inaugural's number, <b>I</b> for the first inaugural, <b>II</b> for the second inaugural and so on, followed by the number of the paragraph from which it is quoted, here <b>2</b> . The paragraphs may be shortened by [...].  Note the following exceptions: If a particular president only delivered one inaugural, the roman numeral is absent, for example, President Taft's inaugural would be indicated as (WHT, 3). If a particular president does not have a middle name, the abbreviation derives from the first name's initial and the first two letters of his last name.
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See appendix for a complete list of American presidents

## General Abbreviations

CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CL	Cognitive Linguistics
CMT	Conceptual Metaphor Theory
ESM	Event Structure Metaphor

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## INTRODUCTION

“You’re thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don’t. I think that’s old Europe.” These remarks made by the then American secretary of Defense in 2003 brought about a temporary rift between member states of the European union which, subsequently, were to be antagonized into categories of a pro-American New Europe vs. an anti-American Old Europe.

Later on in the same year, the divisive potential inherent in the concepts OLD and NEW, which had meanwhile predominated political discourse on either side of the Atlantic, was taken up by the late Susan Sontag in her acceptance speech for the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade. In her succinct observations on the political climate Sontag elaborates on the complexity of the opposition of *old* and *new*. While she maintains the fundamental and indisputable gap between the European and American experience resulting from significant political, cultural and historical differences, she also underlines the singularity of this antagonism. Unlike other pairs of opposites the clash of ‘old’ and ‘new’ touches on the very essence of human experience. Newness and oldness are ‘experiential’ in the sense that they function as landmarks in the dynamics of culture — oscillating between innovation and conservation — and hence serve as important anchors in the flow of human existence.

This begs the question of what aspects have contributed to shaping the specific American experience of these anthropological constant factors. The straightforward answer entails that newness has framed the American experience in more than one significant domain. For instance, newness can be regarded as a socio-political category, but also an economic category; on the other hand, newness is an important cultural-historical category as well as a religious category. Given the diversified impact of newness on American cultural, political and historical development, the large majority of the conceptual metaphors that have been pervasive in American political discourse are in fact framed by NEWNESS as a cultural model.

Elaborating on an earlier case study (Sing 2004), in which the category of NEWNESS is analyzed against the background of iconographic frames of reference that set antagonist evaluation standards for self- and other-presentation, I will propose a critical analysis of the systems of conceptual metaphors clustering around and interacting with the domain of NEWNESS.

Following its two-fold objective of studying American presidential discourse on the one hand and the category NEW on the other, the study is organized as follows. Chapters 1 to 3 focus on the theoretical foundations revolving around the interdisciplinary nature of political discourse and the formation of an American political-cum-presidential discourse. Moreover the correlation of political cognition, newness and culture is examined in great detail, laying the foundations for the in-depth analysis of chapter 6.

Chapter 1 subdivides into two sections, introducing political discourse as an object of study from a theoretical, disciplinary and methodological perspective. In the first sub-chapter, the case for a discourse-theoretical conception of language is made. Departing from Orwell’s notion of political language, exemplified by the fictional Newspeak of *1984*, it is argued that the political in language is best studied within the viable framework of discourse theory,

particularly with respect to the study of socio-political ideologies. The second sub-chapter provides an overview of theoretical and methodological approaches to (political) discourse. This discussion of previous accounts serves to pinpoint the shifting focus of the analysis of political discourse, ranging from the study of individual 'political lexemes' to the identification of connected (metaphorical) systems of political cognition underlying political discourse events.

Chapter 2 explores political discourse from diverse angles, pointing out its interdisciplinary character by virtue of addressing vital theoretical, definitional and analytical issues. In sub-chapter 2.1 the emphasis is placed on the interdependency of language and politics in the light of an elaboration of political cognition. The fact that the relationship of language and politics is anything but straightforward is demonstrated in chapter 2.2, in which the most common definitions are surveyed. As it happens, the only framework to offer viable propositions for the analysis of political discourse is Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA). Nonetheless, the large majority of existing research on language in politics has not sufficiently accommodated the methodologies of CDA. It appears to be the case that discourse is overpoliticized, leaving no scope for a systematic exploration of political - in the narrow sense of the word - strategies in language use. As a consequence, chapter 2.3 identifies some major shortcomings in the analysis of political discourse, both in terms of theory and methodology. This is particularly remarkable when taking into account one of the key areas of political language use, that is, the role of ideology and truth in political discourse (chapter 2.4). It is this aspect that most strongly advocates the need for a cognitive approach to the study of political discourse.

In chapter 3 the perspective is narrowed down from the more general characteristics of political discourse to the specific American context. The configuration of American political discourse draws on the conflation of religious and political discourse, accounting for the striking temporality and historicity in today's political and, of course, presidential discourse. As a result, contemporary discourse is best studied as a layered text whose discontinuities are synchronized on the discourse level. The analysis goes back to the onset of American political discourse and works its way to the present. This diachronic perspective is also adopted in the analysis in the second part of this study, based on the assumption that all discourse is simultaneously a discourse on history as well as from history (cf. Blommaert 2005: 136). In the course of its development, American political discourse has gradually given rise to a presidential discourse, which, at present, is the only part of political discourse that actually has political weight in public discourse. In chapter 3.2.1 the impact of language on the nation-building process and the impact of newness on identity formation are discussed. Other important factors include the emergence of rhetorical styles inherent in the Puritan legacy on the one hand, and the gradual configuration of a public philosophy on the other. Its evolution is indicative of the pervasive influence of newness, which has smoothed the merging of religious and political discourse, for example.

NEWNESS as a concept is the focus of chapter 4. Its surprisingly long-standing history attests to the salience of newness as a culturally-informed concept. Based on the elaboration

of newness as a lexical concept, the conceptual structure of NEWNESS as a cultural model is explored, embedded into the larger context of culture and cognition. Within the specific American context, space is particularly relevant for theorizing on culture and the understanding of national identity. The Leibnizian dictum *Spatium est ordo coexistendi* is reflected in the pervasiveness of SPACE as a source domain for a large number of metaphorical mappings in American political discourse. Moreover, NEWNESS is shown to be conceptualized in terms of MOTION, drawing it close to the conceptualization of time on the one hand, and the so called event structure metaphor on the other. Crucially, however, the category of NEWNESS in political discourse is typified by a dynamic construal of the event structure metaphor and has a conceptual structure similar to change: NEWNESS IS A SUBEVENT OF MOTION in comparison to CHANGE IS MOTION.

Chapter 5 prepares the ground for the subsequent analysis. First, the inaugural address is anchored in the framework of presidential discourse, elaborating on its major functions and genre-specific characteristics. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to discussing methodologies within Cognitive Linguistics in the light of a discourse-based study and to outlining the procedure for the analysis of the corpus consisting of 56 presidential addresses.

Chapter 6 explores the construal of *newness* in the inaugural address from two complementary angles. The concept of NEWNESS is deployed by discourse in a language-specific format encoding lexical and grammatical properties that lend themselves to elaborating other categories. Whereas semantic structure provides rich, detailed knowledge about a situation or event, the grammatical structure attributes structural properties to that situation or event. In discourse processing, the mapping NEWNESS IS A SUBEVENT OF MOTION will be shown to interact with other motion concepts such as TIME and CHANGE, whilst being couched in the metaphor system of the event structure metaphor (ESM).

The analysis pursues the two-fold objective to lay bare the cognitive representation of discourse on the basis of its particular linguistic coding on the one hand, and to point out the ideological representation inherent in discourse structures on the other. The concept of NEWNESS is relevant in various frames, underlining its sustained impact on American political culture while fulfilling important rhetorical functions.

Finally, chapter 7 summarizes the major results of the in-depth analysis. The concluding discussion ties the findings more closely into the larger context of the metaphor analysis of political discourse.



# 1. Setting the Stage: Discourse Theory & Political Language

## 1.1 From Political Language to Political Discourse

Political language (...) is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind.

George Orwell

This famous quotation from George Orwell appears to capture the very essence of political language. Few people would disagree with Orwell's contention that political language is deficient in truthfulness, morality and substance, echoing the equally deficient character of politicians themselves. The manipulative potential in and through language is vividly illustrated by the dystopian world in Orwell's famous novel *1984*. Although the author and essay-writer is also acclaimed for his severe critique of the English language in general, and political language in particular, the fictitious text world of 'Big Brother' is a long way from the analysis of political discourse in its actual discourse world. Without intending to overstretch the analogy, I will make use of some of Orwell's points in order to illustrate the outset of my own observations.

While Orwell's grim depiction of the mechanisms and effects of political language bears testimony to his deep mistrust of politics and political leaders, it also unveils his hypostatical conception of language. Although the alleged scarcity of truthfulness, morality and substance is well entrenched in our common sense assumptions about political language, these attributes are by no means reserved to language used in a political context, or to political ends. This conception of language proposed in a framework termed "Orwellian Linguistics"<sup>1</sup> (Hodge/Fowler 1979) both oversimplifies and overstates (the role of) language and is thus counterproductive to the analysis of political language on a sound methodological basis.<sup>2</sup>

First, Orwell's conception of language constitutes an oversimplification because it envisages political language as a clear-cut category. As the notion 'political language' suggests, there are linguistic features that are assumed to delineate political from, supposedly, 'non-political' language. The realm of the political is, however, not restricted to political activity in the narrow sense of governmental or institutional policies. It is not until the impact of discourse theory takes effect that static conceptions of what constitutes language and meaning

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<sup>1</sup> 'Orwellian linguistics' as a sub-discipline of linguistics does, of course, not exist. If it did, what could it possibly mean? As Hodge/Fowler (1979: 22) argue it could mean "a narrow, bizarrely pedantic form of academic enquiry which ultimately serves the interests of the status quo, or a systematic demystifying study of language and power in a class society."

<sup>2</sup> Hodge/Fowler (1979) discuss the difficulties of Orwell's critique of language in general, and the language of politics in particular. The fact that Orwell's major contribution to the critique of language originates from fiction — apart from one or two of his essays that also deal with language — flaws its relevance and applicability to 'real', non-fictitious instances of political language. More importantly, Orwell's conception of language is opposed to a clear analysis of language. "Orwell seems to have regarded standard English as a neutral form of communication" (ibid.: 14).

suffer deep repercussions. According to Orwell, political language is marked, i.e. it contrasts with non-political language by the absence or presence, respectively, of attributes such as truthfulness, morality and substance.<sup>3</sup> This view, however, is ill-conceived since it entails that ‘non-political language’, if such a thing exists at all, can be typified as truthful, rule-abiding and invariably meaningful. As a result, language would be conceived of as a medium whose main function is the neutral conveyance of information on the basis of moral principles and adequate evidence, at least in its default mode. To a degree, this perception of language corresponds to idealized cognitive models about language and communication which help to further entrench the ‘markedness hypothesis’ of political language.<sup>4</sup>

What is more, this view also leaves very little scope for the functions of political language itself. Orwell presupposes that political language mainly serves the purposes of deception and manipulation, and perhaps, that of persuasion. In order to achieve these ends political language is specially and specifically ‘designed’, in other words, it exploits certain linguistic resources and thereby perverts ‘ordinary’, i.e. non-political language.

Second, Orwell’s definition of political language as quoted initially, also overstates the impact of language. Although language can, and does, become a dangerous tool when placed in the ‘wrong’ hands, it does not mechanically have the brainwashing effect depicted in Orwell’s startling novel.<sup>5</sup> Since political communication leads to highly asymmetrical communicative situations, the emphasis should also be placed on the role of the recipient in this process of communication.

However problematic Orwell’s at once simplistic and hypostatical critique of political language may be, its evident appeal to analysts of political language, subscribing to a critical approach to the study of language, is uncontested. Despite Orwell’s overt normativity and deterministic mindset, his illustration of the mechanisms of language in a totalitarian regime reveals a series of challenging points of what it means when language becomes political, including the world outside ‘Big Brother’.

The issues I have illustrated so far pinpoint two problem areas with respect to the analysis of political discourse. First and foremost, the precise nature of political discourse must be clarified. This predicament is both terminological and definitional, centering on the following questions: What is to be analyzed? Is it political language, political discourse or political communication? What is the political in language? As could be seen above, the answers to these questions touch upon the conception of language on the one hand, and the difficult

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<sup>3</sup> This distinction is also reflected in the uses attributed to political vs. non-political language. There is a clear-cut distinction between the uses and abuses of language based on cross-listed dichotomies. The uses of ‘ordinary’, non-political language are positive and negatively reflected in the abuses of political language.

<sup>4</sup> The existence of idealized cognitive models (so-called ICMs, Lakoff 1987) manifests itself in the well-known conduit-metaphor (Reddy 1979) and continues to be part and parcel of our common-sense understanding of language and communication (e.g. Sweetser 1987).

<sup>5</sup> Even in the novel itself, the manipulative aims, initiated by language, have to be amplified by additional measures such as ministerial filters of information and the continuous screening of all activities in order to be operative.

relations between language and the representations of ‘the world’ in and through language on the other, none of which can be answered in a straightforward way.

Second, methodology is certainly another problem area. In principle, the analysis of discourse should be not be marred by the inclusion of a general critique of language. By contrast, referring to a framework of critical descriptivism crucially encompasses both the description of political discourse as well as its criticism, preferably in this order. What is more, the study of political discourse should involve a transparent methodology in the sense that the *analysanda* as well as the analytical tools used are clearly stated.

Both problem areas can be redressed by substituting ‘political language’ for ‘political discourse’ as the object of study. This modification not only involves a different theoretical focus but also offers the advantage of a sound methodological basis. The subsequent passage sketches the most important theoretical foundations of Discourse Analysis (DA), highlighting its distinct conception of language. Critical research on language itself does not originally pertain to twentieth century contexts, although the changes of discursive practices are particularly significant during that period. The need for critical language studies has been strongly felt throughout the closing stages of this past century (cf. Chouliaraki/Fairclough 1999). Accordingly, discourse and discursive practices are typified by a series of interdependent processes, which can be catalogued as primary and secondary factors in the constitution of discourses. The primary factors, such as the technologization, marketization and globalization of discursive practices, are indicative of the deep modifications of twentieth-century discourse. More precisely, these factors refer to the changes of discursive practice due to the dialectical relationship that is thought to hold between language and society. In addition, the conversationalization, synthetic personalization and hybridization of discourse are secondary factors in that they are epiphenomenal to the primary ones and concern the modeling of discourse itself. In other words, the secondary factors describe what types of input the discourses feed on.

First, there has been an increasingly acute awareness of the power of language in social life throughout the twentieth century, to the extent that language practices are both controlled and shaped on the basis of and in agreement with economic, political and institutional objectives. Fairclough (e.g. 1996) refers to this development as the ‘**technologization of discourse**’. One of the major implications of this process of technologization of discourse is the engineering of both social and cultural change through the shaping and reshaping of discursive practices (Fairclough 1995). Technologizing discourse is closely aligned with another two aspects, which will be discussed separately since it is a question of focus rather than chronology or causality. Second, the **marketization of discourse** can be considered an immediate upshot of the technologization of discourse. As Fairclough (e.g. 1995) points out using the example of universities, the aspect of marketization becomes vital in virtually all domains of public discourse. The marketization of discursive practices is defined as the penetration of ever more

domains of public discourse by the discursive practices of the market.<sup>6</sup> Third, the **globalization** of discursive practices entails that these practices transcend traditional boundaries, which can be cultural, linguistic, stylistic and generic; simultaneously, it encourages the interpenetration of these traditionally distinct areas. Due to the hegemony of a small number of discourses and, on a different level, also languages, the globalization of discursive practices assists in permeating power relations as well as their ideological implications. Equally, the codes available for the globalization of discourse are made available through what is captured by Baudrillard's notion of 'signe flottant'.<sup>7</sup> However, this proneness to globalized social practice enhances the need for anchorage, both temporally and locally, an epiphenomenon referred to as 'glocalization'.

These principal factors have not only contributed to reshaping discourse worlds in recent decades, they have also had a considerable impact on the discursive practices themselves. Amongst these secondary factors, the **conversationalization of discourse** has been one of the first to emerge and has since been established in a systematic way. Its pervasiveness is such that we tend not to notice the range and depth with which it has been incorporated. Conversationalization of discourse may be paraphrased as the appropriation and imitation of conversational discourse in both written and spoken public discourse. This is particularly perceptible in political discourse but also in media discourse. Conversational style is a popular device used in political speeches but also party manifestos, for example.

Another piece of evidence for the apparent changes in discursive practices is what Fairclough (2001: 52) refers to as the **synthetic personalization** of discourse, "a compensatory tendency to give the impression of treating each of the people 'handled' *en masse* [emphasis original] as an individual." Embedded in the larger context of advertising and consumerism, Fairclough (ibid.: 167) argues that advertising constructs consumer communities through ideology. The irony about mass consumerism is that advertising is also individualized. Thus advertising discourse, at least partially, not only relies on building relations with the audience but actively intends, or pretends, to do so.

And finally, the **hybridization of discourses** can be considered as yet another important aspect of discursive practice throughout recent decades. Hybridity means that discourses in contemporary society tend to draw on various other discourses, building a network-like structure (cf. Chouliaraki/Fairclough 1999: 58). Thus we have an interface of different discourse types that are combined. This mixing of discourses does not occur at random; rather

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<sup>6</sup> An example of the effect of marketization would be the increase in the dissemination of various forms of advertising in ever new kinds of discourse formerly unaffected by it. Accordingly, the discourses of education and universities have been changing to the extent that they increasingly focus on economic competitiveness and therefore have to resort to various forms of advertising. In this context, Fairclough (1995) even refers to the colonization of public discourse.

<sup>7</sup> Baudrillard (1978) argues for the absence of reference, where codes in general have ceased to establish reference, and linguistic signs appear to 'float', allowing for a multitude of possible references none of which, however, has an equivalent in reality. Instead, Baudrillard (ibid.) proposes a process of simulation, originating from the loss of reference and substituting the real with the simulation of the real. This replacement means living in a sham world because the signs have lost all genuine reference and have been compensated for by a simulated one.

both the selection and the positioning of these ‘borrowings’ are crucial and indicative of the productivity of certain discourses within contemporary societies.

Given these characteristics of discursive practices one can already sense the impacts which these developments could have had on the language of politics. Thus the subject matter, the analysis of political language, is undeniably molded by these major changes too.

The important aspects introduced as primary and secondary factors are largely incompatible with Orwell’s notion of political language. In order to illustrate this vital point I will briefly elaborate on the points I have mentioned above, without, however, anticipating the detailed discussion presented in chapter 2.2, which deals with the specificity of political discourse in the twentieth century.

Apart from the fact that the term ‘political language’ has unwanted associations, another problematic upshot is the stipulation of its *a posteriori* nature. Accordingly, the analysis of ‘political language’ continues to be populated by studies that focus on the somewhat magic power of individual words on the one hand, and the scheming power attached to language on the other. In either case, the influence of language is demonized rather than analytically described. Titles such as *The Language War* (Lakoff 2001) or *At War with Words* (Dedaić/Nelson 2003) betray this one-sided focus on ‘wordsmithing’. Consequently, the emphasis was placed on the meaning of individual lexemes based on the assumption that their primary, true, unambiguous meaning is distorted when used politically, giving rise to vagueness or even being gradually and steadily emptied of meaning. Apart from the obvious parochialism of studying words in isolation, this approach subsumes that there is such a thing as the true meaning of lexemes, which is corrupted through political language.

However, the framing of political language as a static, clear-cut entity is completely irreconcilable with the tenets of (critical) discourse theory. The notion ‘political language’ suggests that we are dealing with the end product of a series of perversions and corruptions thrust onto language in its default mode. From this we may derive that the latter stands for the unambiguous symbolic representation of prefabricated social and linguistic realities, whereas the former exploits this representation, i.e. misrepresents those realities and thereby, abuses this relationship. In brief, a one-directional relationship between language and the world is supposed to exist, which is assumed to hold in a static way. Meaning is thus established and either adequately represented or else disfigured.

In sharp contrast, discourse theory puts forward a vastly different conception of language. Language is framed as discourse, i.e. language is a form of social practice, and the construction of meaning is thus processual. Hence there is no unilateral relationship that envisages language as a mere reflex of society. Fairclough (2001: 19) summarizes this principal understanding as follows (emphasis original):

[T]here is no external relationship ‘between’ language and society, but an internal and dialectical relationship. Language is a part of society; linguistic phenomena *are* social phenomena of a special sort, and social phenomena *are* (in part) linguistic phenomena.

One of the most significant implications of this quotation is that the meaning of text is negotiated via interaction. The processes of text production and text interpretation are to be regarded in the context of the social conditions viable for both the production and the interpretation. Thus, meaning neither pre-exists the text nor does it simply occur through the act of reference, isolated from the social circumstances.

From this claim follows that textual semantics is regarded as a ‘discursive formation’, a term adapted from Foucault.<sup>8</sup> Accordingly, the meaning of words alters depending on the positions of the people who use, or rather, make use of them.

[...] although two different discursive formations may have certain words or expressions in common, the relationships between these and other words and expressions will differ in the two cases, and so too will the meanings of these shared words or expressions, **because it is their relationship to others that determines their meaning** [emphasis added]. For example, ‘militant’ means different things in trade-union discourse [...] and right-wing conservative discourse. (Fairclough 1992: 31)

The meaning of words and expressions may predate the discursive construction of texts, yet their textual meaning is negotiated in and through discursive practice. As a result, the notions of ‘discursive practice’ and ‘interdiscursivity’ are two important cornerstones of Discourse Theory. First, Fairclough’s adaptation from Foucault’s and Pêcheux’s work — to name but a few of several French philosophers who have influenced the elaboration of CDA — centers on the idea of how social structures and social relations are reproduced and instantiated in language. Crucially, this process of discursive practice contributes to both reproducing and transforming society. If the relationship between discourse and society is not a straightforward one, how else can it be specified? According to Fairclough (1992: 65), this relationship is devised as dialectical in order to avoid the one-sided focus on the social determination of discourse on the one hand, and the bias towards the construction of the social in discourse on the other. Second, the notion of interdiscursivity encompasses the relations between discursive formations. Typically this term is also used to describe the processes of translation from one discourse type to another (Fairclough *ibid.*: 113).

These important alterations of discourses and discursive practices in the course of the twentieth century have also had an impact on political discourse. Both the primary and secondary factors discussed above are relevant in two respects:

1. How can hegemony of discourse be achieved against the background of the primary factors technologization, marketization and globalization of discourses?
2. How can the growing heterogeneity and diversification be overcome to create a sense of unity and identification?

As to the former, it is clear that hegemony of discourse can only be achieved in the political domain when an adequate equilibrium is established, taking into account all of the primary

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<sup>8</sup> In fact, Fairclough does not use Foucault’s original term but refers to Pêcheux’s adaptation. Pêcheux’s work on political discourse is heavily influenced by Marxist theory of ideology, which is illustrated by his definition of discursive formation as “that which in a given ideological formation [...] determines *what can and should be said*” (Pêcheux 1982: 111, original italics, quoted from Fairclough 1992: 31).

factors listed above. To the extent that economic, political and institutional factors interact in (re)shaping discursive practices, political discourse can draw on a whole range of diverse discourses at the same time. With regard to the second issue raised — the unity and level of identification within discourse — both the conversationalization and (synthetic) personalization of discourse are pivotal. To a similar degree as media discourse, political discourse is characterized by synthetic personalization which serves to close the societal rift typical of highly industrialized, capitalist consumer societies. Where advertising slogans no longer hit home because they fail to establish relations between the product and the consumer, this is even more acute with regard to political discourse. Mass culture and diversity make it increasingly difficult to provide slogans or political messages that appeal to people from diverse backgrounds, providing them with a platform of unity and identification.

From a different perspective, the chasms running through late modern discourse cultures reveal a deep paradox: The wider the discourse opportunities the narrower the discourse choices. It is therefore no coincidence that late modernity has experienced a renaissance of ideology.<sup>9</sup> As Reis (1993) observes, a sense of diversity encourages the proliferation of ideologies. The greater the incompatibility of conflicting values and belief systems, the greater the likelihood for ideological compensation:

[B]y its nature and by reason of cultural circumstances, ideology ends up by being unthinkable *when singular* [emphasis original]. [...] to study the ideological field is to look at **a space of opposing senses** [emphasis added] and proliferating ideological discourses which, different as they are, confront and engage one another; so, only by abstraction can one speak of a cohesive ideology internally coherent and susceptible of systematic description. (Reis 1993: 2)

Corroborating the changes in discursive practices, this quotation illustrates the hybridization of discourse in particular. If we conceive of ideology as “a space of opposing senses,” the difficulties that are inherent in the attempt to provide a unifying, integrative representation of relevant events and entities are manifold. If successful, it will help to reinforce the identity-formation of individual groups or entire nations. If ideologies fail, opposing ideologies will inevitably attempt to occupy the space available. Alternatively, successful ideologies are able to seize the space available and derive a sense of authenticity and verisimilitude from it.

[...] because ideologies are associated with the human seeking of a comprehensive explanation of the world, hiatuses are regarded as anathema among adherents of a world view; hence ideological communities find ways and means to meet the possibility that **an outgroup or an innovator will recategorize experience and call attention to a heretofore unconceived and therefore worrisome gap in doctrine** [emphasis added]; [...]. (Brown 1978: 134)

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<sup>9</sup> Reis (1993) describes ideology as a semiotic process. He locates the emergence of ideologies at the turn of the century, i.e. nineteenth to twentieth century, coinciding with the expansion of individualistic and capitalistic societies. Reis (ibid.) illustrates this point with reference to the ‘crisis of unity’. The biased emphasis on economic values accounts for both the coexistence as well as the rivalry of incompatible values, resulting in fragmentation. Hence the inability of modern societies to integrate diverse trains of thought, which is why ideologies multiply to cater for this heterogeneity.

The need to cater for totalizing representations of ‘the world’ meets with even more opposition when the discourses are already trying to accommodate the inherent potential for antagonism. Thus it is important to resort to discourse strategies that hold all the options, which, politically speaking, frequently invokes the single common denominator.

The role of language in the ideological construction of socio-political realities has not always been fully acknowledged. Here again, there is the possibility of underrating and overstating the role of language. Conceiving of language as a mediator of world view present in both the production and interpretation of discourse, would probably be a viable compromise. The claim of an underlying monolithic and homogenous reality, which comes in preconfigured, internally consistent concepts, is inadequate for a number of reasons. Most importantly, however, language use rests on selectivity, i.e. we can choose from a multitude of linguistic expressions in order to represent the extra-linguistic world. Competing representations are thus possible because human conceptualizers perceive the world in a number of different ways.

Consequently, the construction of consistent and coherent representations of socio-political realities presents a huge challenge to modern political discourse in the light of highly diversified discourse communities. The ‘conceptual space’ available, gaps in the doctrine, is filled almost instantaneously. In the process, the manipulative potential inherent in language due to its vagueness and ambiguity can be exploited in various ways.

Orwell’s example of *Newspeak* acutely demonstrates the workings of totalizing ideologies. The arbitrariness of replacing the existing language and its established, conventional meanings by the purposeful construction of a new language constitutes the most poignant form of thought control. The well-known party slogans WAR IS PEACE, FREEDOM IS SLAVERY and IGNORANCE IS STRENGTH invert existing concepts, aiming to alter the belief system and cognitive structures in people’s heads; in other words: a reframing if not reconceptualization process.

First and foremost, Orwell’s notion of *Newspeak* highlights the importance of both the conceptual and semantic levels of language. More importantly, however, *Newspeak* illustrates the drastic changes in the representation of socio-political realities in and through language. *Newspeak* not only changes the meaning of words, but it is designed to reconceptualize the mental representation(s) of the world. Thus the obsolescence of concepts involves their obliteration, in other words, it intends to reshape the relevant segments of the extra-linguistic world. Orwell’s novel insinuates that this occurs as a direct reflex. Conceptually, causalities and contingencies are established that have not existed before.

Second, Orwell’s *Newspeak* is a suitable example for another reason. The substitution of existing models of ‘the world’ with new representations in the shape of a new language also implies that ‘Oldspeak’ is assumed to no longer adequately represent the relevant socio-political categories, at least in the eyes of the people in power. Thus there is an inherent claim for the truthful representation of the world based on *Newspeak*. It is hardly surprising therefore that representation has been recognized as a vital strategic function of political discourse.



Third, the antithesis of ‘Oldspeak’ vs. *Newspeak* opens up an antagonism that shows why NEWNESS can operate as a vital ideological concept.<sup>10</sup> NEWNESS as a category lends itself particularly well to exploiting the ongoing conceptualization process. Discussing word meaning and category membership in connection with the adjective *old*, Aitchison (1994: 62) observes that the multiple meanings of *old* are particularly difficult to categorize according to the prototype (similarly Taylor 2003). This also holds for the level of lexical relations that may exist between the adjectives *new* and *old*. In some cases, as Aitchison (ibid.) outlines, they function as antonyms, as in the example of an ‘old building’ vs. ‘a new building’; placed in another context, however, ‘old woman’ vs. ‘\*new woman’, the antonymy would not work.<sup>11</sup>

The multiple meanings of both adjectives may complicate or even block the possibility for antonymy, but they do not prevent antagonistic categorizations. Since conceptualization operates on various conceptual structures, among them categories and frames, the categories NEW and OLD can develop their full antagonistic potential on several levels.

Crucially, antagonism has to be considered a potential relation holding not only on the conceptual level but also on the level of discourse itself. As a consequence, the possibility of establishing antagonistic relations is ultimately determined by discourse constraints. Hence antagonism is discursively constructed, i.e. whether or not ‘old’ and ‘new’ are in fact antonyms, depends on their discourse meanings.

This potential, however, is also ideological. Antagonism in itself provides a basis for social and political ideologies. As such, ideologies serve as the basis of the social representations that account for group membership and identity. Van Dijk (1998: 8) argues that “ideologies allow people, as group members, to organize the multitude of social beliefs about what is the case, good or bad, right or wrong, *for them* [emphasis original], and to act accordingly.” To this list we might add the adjectives *old* and *new*, since they can act as powerful ideologems too, as we shall see later on.

Nevertheless it is no coincidence that the notion of newness was taken up in Orwell’s *Newspeak*. The lexical item *new* has developed a marked experiential and expressive value throughout the twentieth century. Similarly, Safire (1993) argues that “in the past century, no word stands out like ‘new’ in the framing of themes for political movements.”<sup>12</sup> In order to

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<sup>10</sup> The conceptual history and discourse functions of *newness* will be discussed in depth in chapter 4.1. Suffice it to say that the antagonism of ‘Oldspeak’ and *Newspeak*, however, is not as neat as Orwell would have wished it to be. Not only do they have similar functions in political activity and thought, they also build on one another. Similarly, Hodge/Fowler (1979: 21) point out that the substitution of ‘Oldspeak’ by ‘Newspeak’ is not the equivalent of the extinction of ‘old meanings’. Rather “this elimination also meant an *inclusion* [emphasis original] of the meanings of the old words in certain new ones. [...] So a single word in *Newspeak* might be immensely more meaningful than any Oldspeak word could be.”

<sup>11</sup> Having said that, this particular example presented in Aitchison (1994: 62) needs to be specified. She argues that in this case the opposite of *old* would be young. Yet due to the increasing importance of newness in the 20th century, there are many social changes labeled by the attribute *new*. It is also possible to recognize *new* as an opposite formed on the basis of analogy to ‘new man’ (Ayto 1999).

<sup>12</sup> Safire (1993) himself speculates that this popularity results from the expressiveness of the adjective *new*. However, this view not only ignores the tradition and conceptual history of NEWNESS but also fails to acknowledge the defining, even recategorizing properties of premodifiers such as the adjective *new*. Used in this context, the category NEW may well be paraphrased as ‘selling old wine in new bottles’, an oft-reiterated, yet insufficient account of the success of contemporary political movements that exploit NEWNESS as a

fully understand the importance of newness for twentieth-century American political discourse, it is necessary to embed this phenomenon in the wider context of discourse theory.

The changes of discursive practice are also closely intertwined with political reasons. A changed understanding of the presidency involves the enhanced importance of presidential communication. There have been many terms to refer to the American presidency — the rhetorical or imperial presidency are the most common —, but all of them highlight that political communication has increasingly come to be hinged on the chief executive.

The influence of the presidency reached a temporary peak during the Reagan administration but has reached its provisional point of culmination during the Bush administration. Comparing the Bush administration's pursuit of American supremacy to a stock market bubble, Soros (2004: 177) summarizes its most important implications as follows:

The important thing to understand about stock market bubbles is that they do not grow out of thin air. **They have a solid basis in reality, but reality is distorted in the participants' minds by a misconception** [emphasis added]. [...], there is an inherent discrepancy between what people think and the actual state of affairs. Normally the discrepancy is kept within bounds by a self-correcting process: People notice that outcomes fail to correspond to expectations and adjust their expectations accordingly.

Needless to say, this self-correcting process appears to have been absent lately. The present administration appears to be out of bounds, which also manifests itself in the most recent inaugural addresses that are part of the corpus of this present study. Retracing the development of presidential discourse along the lines of all inaugural addresses currently in existence, our journey will end with the administration of George W. Bush.

As van Dijk's viable definition of ideology exemplifies, ideology itself is based on antagonism. Mitigating the good properties of others while emphasizing one's own, is the very essence of ideological practice. Using another of Orwell's telling examples shows the ideological potential of newness:

There is a word in Newspeak, [...]: *duckspeak*, to quack like a duck. It is one of those interesting words that have two contradictory meanings. **Applied to an opponent, it is abuse; applied to someone you agree with, it is praise** [emphasis added]. (Orwell 1984, 57)

This quotation can also be translated into contemporary non-fiction, as exemplified by the New Europe vs. Old Europe debate.<sup>13</sup> Crucially, political ideologies are not as largely typified

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concept. The fact that NEWNESS functions on several levels of conceptualization is sufficient evidence in itself not to restrict its political import solely to the uses of an attributive adjective. A case in point is the well-known slogan used in political advertising, *New Labour, New Britain*. Beyond premodification, the campaign slogan is designed to invite an important analogy: On the basis of the conceptual metonymies CAUSE FOR EFFECT and EFFECT FOR CAUSE, the two parts of the slogan are linked, establishing a relationship of causation between them: a renewed political party will also refresh, i.e. improve the condition of the country.

<sup>13</sup> Similarly, Herman argues for the use of 'snarl' words to refer to adversary nations as opposed to the use of 'purr' words for allegedly pro-American nations in his critique of present-day American (foreign) policy. (cf. Herman, Edward S., *Autodafe* 3, 2003: [http://www.autodafe.org/autodafe/autodafe\\_03/art\\_05.htm](http://www.autodafe.org/autodafe/autodafe_03/art_05.htm) (14.11.03))

by their ‘ideological vocabulary’ as one may expect. These ideological meanings are not confined to the lexical level. Rather, their semantic structure points to the underlying conceptual structure, where the impact of reframing or reconceptualization processes is most strongly felt; its effect may then surface in terms of friend-foe schemas.

Due to its highly polysemous structure the concept of *NEWNESS* appears to be predestined for exploitation in ideological discourses.<sup>14</sup> The category *NEW* lends itself to framing or even reshaping discursive practices, which however is a slow and gradual process.

Yet, the ideological power of antagonistic categories such as *NEW* as opposed to *OLD* is hardly an invention of Orwell himself. Its long-standing tradition attests to its cognitive salience in organizing human experience. For instance, newness is pivotal in historiography since periodization is difficult, if not impossible without introducing something ‘new’, i.e. bringing about change. Newness is not inherently positive though, as the category *OLD* is conventionally connoted with both knowledgeable authority and authenticity. To the American nation, which takes pride in representing the New World to an extent that it has become an integral part of the nation’s self-identification, the old has been a challenge to establishing a coherent national narrative. The discourse strategies used to resolve the tension between the old and the new are part of the analysis below.

## 1.2 From ‘Wordsmithing’ to Political Cognition

Having outlined some central problem areas from a theoretical perspective, this section outlines the object of study in political discourse analysis while also drawing attention to some methodological difficulties in analyzing political texts. To a degree, this section also lays the foundations for the methodological discussion in chapter 5, in which the procedure of this present study will be explained.

Generally speaking, previous research has revolved around three areas. A large number of studies, particularly those originating from the German line of research, have focused on the ideological potential inherent in individual lexical items, mostly nouns. Here political ideologies are situated on the level of abstractions, i.e. abstract nouns that form a part of the ideological lexicon. Second, political discourse has been explored within a communication-science framework, including genuinely pragmatic issues. This approach either includes the analysis of the (communicative) functions of political discourse in the sense of political rhetoric or communication, or alternatively, it encompasses the study of speech acts in political discourse in the sense of talk.

The enduring relevance of the study of political discourse becomes obvious in a recent example, which is clearly reminiscent of Orwell’s depiction of dystopian Oceania. Under the pretence of providing the public with the ‘right’ amount of information about the activities of

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<sup>14</sup> This is one of the most essential component parts of ‘doublethink’. It works with contradictions, with opposing ideas that are held at the same time. Thus the linguistic programme of *Newspeak* itself is trapped in the ideology of ‘doublethink’: “The compression achieved by Newspeak [...] could correspond to impoverishment of thought, or to richness of significance. These are opposites, so the whole programme of Newspeak is built on a contradiction” (Hodge/Fowler 1979: 21).

the Pentagon, the *Office of Strategic Influence* set up in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks aims to influence public opinion predominantly outside the U.S. With this truly Orwellian title, evoking Oceania's *Ministry of Truth* devoted to the extinction of historical records and the dissemination of their falsified versions, it is easy to project the 'doublethink' illustrated in the novel onto the 'real' late-modern world. Although "[w]e habitually accept such perversions of language from government officers and agencies, [...] there is still a sense of shock at the precision and openness of the lie, the naked insanity of its logic" (Hodge/Fowler 1979: 6).

Yet this bluntness of distortion - singular as it may be - has to be considered an isolated instance. This is not to say that abuses of language do not follow a systematic patterning of their own. Renaming processes are a perfidious technique of deception, leading to the kind of misrepresentation that Allan/Burridge (1991) have referred to as dysphemism.<sup>15</sup>

Typically, one criterion for dysphemism in political discourse can be the occurrence of abstract nominalization, or abstractions in general. This is why it is hardly surprising that a great deal of studies on political language have focused on the strategic and manipulative power of abstractions.<sup>16</sup> For example, Tocqueville observes as early as 1835 that the American language of politics is replete with abstractions and personification.<sup>17</sup> Similarly, the words Dieckmann (1975) uses to describe the phenomenon of 'ideological polysemy' are abstractions, without exception.

However rewarding the study of abstractions may prove to be, it fails to account for the more tenacious and unfathomable implications of political discourse which are to be found on the conceptual level of language. Apart from being singular phenomena in the sense of isolated, unrelated linguistic units, the one-sided focus on the study of abstractions in political discourse is problematic for additional reasons. First, the study of abstract nominalizations has been the equivalent of identifying the so-called 'ideological vocabulary' (Dieckmann 1975) of a given political system. This approach entails two tragic flaws. As with many alleged ideologemes such as democracy, freedom, disarmament etc., they are part of the general vocabulary and are not as such marked, in the sense that they are part of specialized language. It is not their lexical status but their use in a specific context and co-text that classifies them as

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<sup>15</sup> Allan/Burridge (1991) make the important distinction between euphemism and dysphemism. The latter is important for highly asymmetrical communicative situations. Whereas the effect intended by one of the interactants might be that of euphemism, the actual effect on, say the recipient of the verbal exchange might be that of dysphemism. The overall result will be miscommunication.

<sup>16</sup> Interestingly, Orwell's elaboration of *Newspeak* also draws on this linguistic knowledge. One of the transformations to be achieved through *Newspeak* is the nominalization of verbs (except for imperatives), through which all indications of time and truth-value are removed.

<sup>17</sup> De Tocqueville's observations on the impact of democracy on the English language in America are a rich source indeed. As a telling testimony of the period of the 'Early Republic' (approximately 1789-1837), Tocqueville (1981: 363) considers abstraction as a characteristic of democracy itself. "Democratic nations are passionately addicted to generic terms and abstract expressions because these modes of speech enlarge thought and assist the operations of the mind by enabling it to include many objects in a small compass." He (ibid.) elaborates on this fitting characterization, including the phenomenon of personification. "Democratic writers are perpetually coining abstract words of this kind, in which they sublimate into further abstraction the abstract terms of the language. Moreover, to render their mode of speech more succinct they personify the object of these abstract terms and make it act like a real person."

ideological (semantic) concepts. For example, democracy can be a ‘snarl word’ as opposed to a ‘purr word’ in conflicting political systems. What is more, if a historical perspective is included, democracy is a concept which has undergone a process of significant amelioration in the course of its development (cf. Hughes 1988). Equally, it is the linguistic context that helps to categorize lexical items or syntactic groups as ideological. Girth’s (2002: 2) interesting example ‘Blut und Boden’ illustrates this important point. It is neither ‘blood’ nor ‘soil’ that evokes the ideological meaning; rather these two lexemes mutually contextualize one another in order to implement the ideological reading.

Second, the importance of context as well as co-text in political discourse results in the stipulation of the analysis of extended texts rather than individual words. Thus we may conclude that the types of meaning that are most relevant in the analysis of political discourse are contextual and referential meaning. Third, the role and nature of ideology in political discourse needs to be clarified. Are ideologies conveyed through individual words only? Is the study of ideology to be separated from the study of political discourse?

Fourth, another misconception of the study of individual words lies in the specification of their potential for distortion. The issues of truth and credibility are vital in any discussion about political discourse. Yet, the assessment of the transformational power of these ideologemes has been, at times, hair-raising. Using the example of two abstract nominalizations — ban and production — Kress/Hodge (1979: 23) illustrate how the transformation of ‘reality’ can be operationalized linguistically. The abstract linguistic form creates a world of thing-like abstract beings or objects, which are capable of acting or being acted on. Due to this process of abstraction language determines our perception by first crafting an alternative world and then imposing this alternative world on the material world to the extent that we no longer see or believe in the world of physical events. However, this deterministic view would presuppose two things: on the one hand, we could assume that abstraction, which is, after all, a vital process in our conceptual system as well as an integral part of cultural semiosis, inevitably results in distortion; on the other hand, this view also implies that the world of physical events, or the material world, is truthful *sui generis* and that abstractions blindfold our vision of the truth. Both claims are difficult to uphold, as we shall see below. One of the major reservations against these assumptions is that there is no simple, straightforward relation between truth and language just as the ideological transformation of the material world into a world of abstraction does not correlate with the antagonistic reversal of truth into untruth.

Yet analyzing the capacity for transformation is appealing in other respects. It shows that ideology and language are closely intertwined to the extent that ideology involves a systematically organized presentation of reality via the important process of conceptualization, whereby the conjecture of an alternative world is conceivable.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> This approach has been taken up in Possible Worlds Theory, for instance, or, more recently in the shape of ‘Text World Theory’ (e.g. Werth 1999; Gavins 2000, 2007), which has received considerable attention, particularly with respect to the study of literary texts or analyses within the framework of cognitive poetry (e.g. Stockwell 2002).

Provided that ideological meaning is conveyed through all instances of language use rather than simply superseding conventional meanings like a coat of paint on neuter priming, the question is what methodologies are suitable to identify the mechanisms and patterns of linguistically mediated political ideologies.

However, methodological discussions are still the exception rather than the rule in studies conducted within the framework of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). To a similar extent, methodology has predominantly played a subordinate role within Cognitive Linguistics (CL) up until recently. While developing a methodological framework viable for the great variety of approaches to political discourse is not the center of attention here, I will nevertheless discuss the methodological cornerstones of CDA in this section, postponing the methodological explorations within CL to chapter 5, where they will be outlined with regard to the procedure followed in the study at hand.

In part, the scarcity of methodological reflection results from the cloudy distinction, if any, between theory and method. This, however, does not mean that the need for a sound methodological basis has not been voiced time and again:

Critical analysis should also be practical analysis. The critic ought not be content just to display his own virtuosity (which is the case with most of what passes for *literary* [emphasis original] criticism) but ought to be committed to **making a technique of analysis available to other would-be practitioners** [emphasis added]; if the critic does not attempt this, his sincerity must be doubted. (Fowler/Kress 1979: 196f.)

In order to meet the standard requirements of scientific methodology, the analytical procedure should be as transparent and inter-subjective as possible.<sup>19</sup> In the light of the options available — amongst them normative, descriptive and critical accounts of political discourse — the normative approach should be ruled out straight away on the grounds expounded earlier, and on account of introducing too strong a standpoint on behalf of the analyst. Descriptive investigations of political language beg the question to what extent the identification of ‘suspicious’ material provides adequate insight into the functions and strategies involved in political language use. Conversely, critical accounts are frequently criticized for imposing ideologies of their own onto the analysis of political discourse.

A case in point is Wilson’s (1990: 10) harsh criticism of approaches to political discourse aiming to unveil “the rhetorical techniques used by politicians to create and manipulate a specific view of the world.” What is worse, however, is that he charges scholars subscribing to a critical framework with “a kind of ‘chauvinism’” (ibid.: 11). This point of criticism is directed at the value judgment which he assumes to be part and parcel of critical language study.

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<sup>19</sup> Expanding Halliday’s three predominant functions of language, the ideational, interpersonal and textual functions, Fowler/Kress (1979: 198ff.) propose a catalogue for the analysis of texts, which consists of five main areas. First, the grammar of transitivity refers to the propositional level, particularly to the role of predicates in texts. Second, the grammar of modality focuses on the relations of producer and recipient. The third aspect involves various kinds of transformations, particularly nominalizations and passivizations, which account for stylistic and perspectival changes. Fourth, the grammar of classification is used to study linguistic ordering, i.e. the lexical features of text. Here the emphasis is placed on the processes of relexicalization and overlexicalization. And finally, textual coherence is the center of analysis. At this level the order and unity of discourse are investigated. The producer of discourse is assumed to implement his or her conception of “the inner order of the materials” (ibid.) that are being presented.

Instead, Wilson considers his own position “not a moral one but a linguistic one offering an objective description” (ibid.: 16). In doing so, Wilson (ibid.) intends to “provide a linguistic account of **actual political talk** [emphasis added].” In contrast, the formulation of the objectives within a critical-linguistics framework reads as follows:

The linguistic analyses in this book differ from conventional linguistics and sociolinguistics in taking as their subjects **real, socially situated and usually complete texts** [emphasis added]. These texts are not mined for structures which exemplify the general construction of language, or of English, or the characteristic expression of some social group [...]. The texts are not appropriated as sources of data, but are treated as independent subjects for critical *interpretation* [emphasis original]. (Fowler/Kress 1979: 195)

The use of authentic material is the benchmark set by both approaches.<sup>20</sup> This simple comparison illustrates why it is so important to provide a clear formulation of both the theoretical background and the methodology used.

In their programmatic essay entitled “Critical Linguistics” Fowler/Kress (1979) outline the basic tenets of the sub-discipline in the making, Critical Linguistics. Challenging the dualism between linguistic and sociolinguistic patterns in discourse, the authors posit two important improvements in the understanding of linguistic analysis in relation to conventional approaches. First, Fowler/Kress (1979: 185f.) emphasize the ‘binding ties’ between linguistic structure and social structure:

[...] social groupings and relationships influence the linguistic behavior of speakers and writers, and moreover, that these socially determined patterns of language influence non-linguistic behavior including, crucially, cognitive activity.

Second, the authors introduce the important notion that ideology is linguistically mediated. “[...] the world-view comes to language-users from their relation to the institutions and the socio-economic structure of their society” (ibid.). As a result, ideology and language cannot be separated; they are both inscribed in a process which perpetuates relations of power and control. However, critical linguists are primarily concerned with the construction of social inequities, which, of course, are also political in the broader sense of the word. Provided that linguistic categorization cannot be but ideological, how can the ideological potency of political discourse in the narrower sense of the word be specified?

The stipulation of discourse theory that language use invariably involves ideological transformation of the existing socio-political realities bears a potential drawback for its application to the study of political discourse. The following quotation refers to potential leverage points that could alleviate the quandaries mentioned.

Discourse theory investigates the way in which social practices articulate and contest the discourses that constitute social reality. These practices are possible because **systems of meaning are contingent and can never completely exhaust a field of meaning** [emphasis added]. (Howarth/Stavrakakis 2000: 3)

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<sup>20</sup> Obviously, Wilson and Fowler/Kress have clearly distinct subjects in mind when outlining their aims. Wilson (1990), on the one hand, subscribes to a general pragmatic framework. Accordingly, he describes the core aim of pragmatics as the study of ‘implicative relations’ and their impact on the context-sensitivity of political talk. On the other hand, Fowler/Kress (1979) predominantly focus on discourse analysis in the sense of textual analysis, i.e. they predominantly, but not exclusively, focus on the written medium.

The passage illustrates a paradigmatic shift of emphasis, departing from conventional approaches to meaning towards a constructivist framework, according to which meaning is constructed online; meaning is thus retrievable from a given context in relation to other meanings.<sup>21</sup> In other words, this changed focus entails the discursive construction of meaning.

The introduction of discourse theory into linguistics has combined the methodological tools and the epistemological interests that had previously resided in content analysis and text analysis (e.g. van Dijk 1980). In a way, discourse analysis seems the natural outgrowth of the conventional study of texts, highlighting the mutual influence of language and world present in both text production and interpretation. The notion of discourse implies that the relationship between language and world is bidirectional rather than a reflex of the world. Accordingly, the subject in discourse is considered “as having the apparently paradoxical properties of being socially determined, and yet capable of individual creativity; obliged to act discursively in preconstituted subject positions, yet capable of creatively transforming discourse conventions” (Fairclough 2001: 140).

Despite the sensitivity to the political instilled into linguistics by discourse theory, the analytical tools to analyze political discourse itself were to remain largely pedestrian for some time. Similarly, Chilton/Schäffner (1997: 211) state that “the tools of anglophone political discourse analysis have been essentially eclectic, drawing particularly on pragmatics, [...] implicit meaning of various types [...], conversation analysis [...] and European text analysis as developed by van Dijk (1980).”

Another unsatisfactory corollary is the assumption that political discourse constitutes a speech genre of its own right, implying that there is such a thing as a set of texts that can be catalogued on the basis of the identical coherent organisation of (thematic) substance and interaction. This view of political discourse is at once too narrow and too unspecific. A superficial glance at ‘real’ linguistic data of political discourse shows that this cannot be the case (cf. Seidel 1985).

In part, these methodological shortcomings could be redressed by a new branch that grew out of critical linguistics and discourse theory. Its more challenging aims found expression in the discipline of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA).

CDA sees discourse - language use in speech and writing - as a form of ‘social practice’. Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s) which frame it. A dialectical relationship is a two-way relationship: the discursive event is shaped by situations, institutions and social structures, but also shapes them. (Fairclough/Wodak 1997: 258)

This approach rests on the assumption of language as social practice. Theorizing within the realm of CDA is reflexive of a distinct characteristic of late-modern society: the critical

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<sup>21</sup> This shift of emphasis is also consequential for the understanding of how language ascribes truthfulness. If we exclude the possibility of unequivocal, unambiguous reference, notions such as truth or a linguistic unit’s true meaning are also backgrounded. In connection with political discourse, however, the truthfulness of a political actor’s utterances is vital. This discussion occurs in chapter 2; for an account of the coding of lying in language see Sing (2007).



orientation towards discourse in everyday life. Conceivably, this is also consequential for the design of political discourse and, incidentally, for its analysis too.

The enhanced awareness of language, however, cannot be accommodated within the field of CDA alone, taking into consideration the vast degree of heterogeneity and diversity that exists within political discourse, let alone its ideological potency. In fact the growing differentiation of discourses and discursive practices — recall the important developments referred to above as technologization, marketization and globalization on the one hand, and conversationalization, synthetic personalization and hybridization of discourse on the other — is mirrored in differentiation of theories and methods as well. Accordingly, sub-disciplines such as Political Linguistics (e.g. Blommaert 1997) or Political Discourse Analysis (henceforth PDA) (cf. van Dijk 1997) have fine-tuned their analytical tools in order to address domain-specific issues, which may have been marginalized within CDA due to its bias for social ideologies. This point of criticism is voiced by Howarth/Stavrakakis (2000: 1), who state that the adherents to the “new discursivity have neglected a range of traditional topics in political theory and political science. Hence there is little or no examination of populist and nationalist ideologies [...]”

This is, however, not the only misconception. Apart from these thematic blind spots, the unclear distinction between theory and methodology presents a major caveat. This haziness results from CDA’s understanding as a discipline, which self-identifies as both a theory and a method. It tries to keep the balance between theoreticism, the unilateral bias to theory for theory’s sake, and methodologism, the virtually non-theoretical zeal of data-driven research. Following its renewed ‘manifesto’ CDA can be understood as

a method for analyzing social practices with particular regard to their discourse moments within the linking of the theoretical and practical concerns and public spheres just alluded to, where the ways of analyzing ‘operationalize’ — make practical — theoretical constructions of discourse in (late modern) social life, and the analyses contribute to the development and elaboration of these theoretical constructions. (Chouliaraki/Fairclough 1999: 16)

Transdisciplinary by definition, CDA feeds on various other fields such as philosophy and sociology, which is why it also lends itself to exploiting methods predominantly used in the social sciences, e.g. ethnographic research or traditional text analysis. The disadvantage of this eclecticism is that its rationale of analysis frequently remains vague.

Another point of criticism is the focus on discourse as a synchronic social practice, which continues to typify the large majority of studies within the framework of CDA. Since language is not only socially and culturally conditioned, but also a historically constituted phenomenon, it is imperative to include a historical perspective. Similarly, Blommaert (2005: 37) criticizes “the absence of a *sense of history* [emphasis original] in CDA.” In part, he addresses the problem by proposing (ibid.: 12f.) a model of “higher level analysis” in which texts are embedded into textual traditions as well as into social, cultural and historical backgrounds. This coding unfolds by virtue of layered simultaneities that need to be synchronized at the moment of textual meaning construction.

As we shall see in the analysis of presidential discourse below, the speeches are replete with instances of synchronization glossing over obvious discontinuities and contradictions. Crucially, representation in political discourse is not immediately experientially grounded; rather it is mediated through various instances, reflecting the general character of cultural semiosis in which the concrete experience is increasingly abstracted. In the process, the initial experience is not only less and less tangible, it is also temporally displaced. As a result, discourse is devised as “a general mode of semiosis, i.e. meaningful symbolic behavior” (Blommaert 2005: 2).

More precisely, discourses are modeled as consisting of several layers of historicity, which make every discourse a discourse on history as well as a discourse from history (Blommaert 2005: 136). These layers create a tension between continuity and discontinuity, which can be resolved through synchronization. In this process the distinct temporal levels are narrowed down in order to produce a single coherent discursive meaning, if possible. The multiple temporalities of discourse cannot always be retrieved by discourse participants. This is due to the simultaneity of discourses, in which co-occurrence establishes meaning and suggests a single reading beyond different time-scales. However, temporal developments do not usually advance at a similar velocity nor are they equally significant. As a result, discourses not only construct their own temporality, their “temporalization constitutes an essential element of the continual reshaping of human action” (Bronckart 2005: 80).

The temporality of discourse is particularly important with respect to political discourse which presents itself as action-oriented and public-centered. In the attempt to establish coherent representations, political discourse can be construed in term of diverse strategies. However, human activity is never simply represented in a straightforward, decontextualized way, which is even less likely in the ‘double reality’ (cf. Edelman 1985) of political activity:

[...] Since action is a product of linguistic evaluations, it can only be interpreted – directly or indirectly – by and in terms of actual linguistic productions, or discourses. This discursive evaluation of action comprises a synchronic aspect (the reciprocal attributions of capacities and responsibilities that come with these behaviors), as well as a historical aspect: [...] discourses evidence the ways in which previous social formations bestowed human activities with meaning, how they interpreted and clarified activities in accordance with the situation, interests and stake that prevailed. (Bronckart 2005: 79)

The historical dimension in particular accounts for the fact that discourses reshape human actions, a process of reconfiguration in which temporality plays a vital role (cf. Bronckart 2005: 79). In this respect, political discourse assumes a singular position since it is concerned with timing as well as synchronization, a prerequisite of coherent representation. Compounding the temporal construction on the discourse level, political discourse may also exploit the functional and strategic repository inherent in temporal concepts. A case in point is the invocation of time and change in terms of newness in American political discourse.

In this context, modeling discourse in layers of historicity also has a significant cognitive dimension. Since the experiential basis of political cognition may no longer be retrievable, this experience needs to be regularly updated. These knowledge structures which have become part of the cultural memory have to be re-enacted in order to give sense and ‘reality’ to the

socio-political. Each time these cognitive patterns are re-activated, they are further entrenched into political cognition.

Despite the legitimate critique of the absence of a historical dimension in critical discourse analysis, CDA has proved to be a strong foothold for analyzing political discourse from a critical perspective. This is the case whenever the emphasis is placed on the relationship of discourse and politics as two sides of the same coin, amplifying the traditional understanding of (classical) rhetoric as an integral part of political science.

In part, this classic approach has recently been invoked by the appeal made in order to “expand cognitive linguistics in the direction of a [...] cognitive rhetoric” (Dirven et al. 2003: 2). In the last decade or so, cognitive linguistics has concerned itself with the construal of ideologies in the political domain. Due to its pervasiveness conceptual metaphor has served as a viable tool used in diverse linguistic studies ever since the theory was first introduced by Lakoff/Johnson (1980). The initial theory has since been modified on a number of occasions (e.g. Lakoff 1993) and expanded to accommodate conceptual metonymy (e.g. Radden/Kövecses 1999) and, more recently, cultural frames have been argued to be structured either metonymically or metaphorically (Kövecses 2006).<sup>22</sup> In Cognitive Linguistics, metaphor is not regarded as a matter of language, but of thought and reason. Accordingly, metaphor is described as a cross-domain mapping in the conceptual system, involving a transfer from a source domain to a target domain. A conceptual metaphor is typically expressed as TARGET DOMAIN IS SOURCE DOMAIN.

Building on this theory of conceptual metaphor, a number of studies have been carried out, exploring the uses (and abuses) of metaphor in political rhetoric. The most comprehensive analyses of American political discourse from a cognitive-linguistic perspective to date are those proposed by Lakoff (e.g. 1992, 2005, 2004).<sup>23</sup> For example, Lakoff (1992) investigates the metaphors used in the political rhetoric relating to the first war in Iraq. Similarly, Kövecses (1994) proposes a study of American democracy on the basis of Tocqueville’s book *Democracy in America*. His findings underscore the pervasiveness of personifications in terms of which democracy is conceptualized as a person. As a person, democracy has a multi-faceted character; for instance, democracy may be construed as an active person in one context, while it is represented as a passionate person in another.

Cognitive approaches to political discourse also deal with different levels of conceptualization as points of leverage for their analysis. In her study of frames, Sandikcioglu (2000) examines the conceptual mechanisms used in the news coverage in the first Gulf War.

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<sup>22</sup> Lakoff/Johnson’s (1980) original hypothesis includes various types of metaphors, including ontological, structural and orientational metaphors.

<sup>23</sup> Lakoff’s (2004, 2006) recent publications on progressive political thinking do not represent studies conducted within an explicitly linguistic theoretical framework. Apart from the practical advice on how to respond to conservatives — “Don’t expect to convert staunch conservatives” (Lakoff 2004: 115) — his analyses lay bare the conservative hegemony of the contemporary political debate. Lakoff (ibid.) concludes that Liberals would benefit from reframing the ongoing political debate. However, the process of reframing cannot be accomplished within a relatively short time span (see Wodak 2006 for a critique of this claim).

She argues that Iraq is framed as the incarnation of the Orient on the basis of the idealized cognitive model typical of Western thought. What is more, Sandikcioglu (ibid.) illustrates the construction of friend-foe schemas, making use of two distinct frames, that of self-presentation and that of other-presentation. Conversely, Hawkins (2001: 32) demonstrates the important connection of ideology and conceptualization in what he terms “iconographic (frames of) reference,” which he defines as “a common mode of textual representation which represents simplistic images of our experiences and does so in a way as to underscore familiar values [...]”. The effect of iconographic reference is to establish a powerful conceptual link between the referent and a particular value judgment, thereby merging both social and cognitive dynamics of linguistic knowledge. Drawing on conceptual space or conceptual blending theory, the work by Rohrer (e.g. 2004) aims to isolate the cognitive tools used in the formation of political ideologies. His analysis of political cartoons combines visual and textual information in his quest for uncovering the underlying representations of metaphors in conceptual space.

To this day, book-length studies of American political discourse within a cognitive framework are rare.<sup>24</sup> The most influential treatment of contemporary American political discourse is Lakoff’s (2005) monograph *Moral Politics*. Lakoff states that morality is conceptualized on the basis of economic concepts as evidenced by the metaphor system of moral accounting. Furthermore he looks into the distinct conceptualizations of morality in the contemporary rhetoric of Republicans and Democrats. According to Lakoff (ibid.), Democrats subscribe to a nurturant father morality while Republicans tend to enforce a strict father morality. Lakoff substantiates his claims by elaborating a complex metaphorical network based on the correspondences and entailments of these mappings.

Analyzing political discourse within a cognitive framework constitutes an unnecessary gap in the study of socio-political ideologies. Very much in the same vein, Dirven/Frank/Pütz (2003: 3) deplore the unsatisfactory degree to which the interplay between cognitive linguistics and ideology has been acknowledged:

Cognitive linguistics is primarily concerned with meaning and it should approach meaning in its deepest societal reality, as negotiated meaning, i.e. as symbolization by **human conceptualizers** [emphasis added] who wish to create and construe meaning complexes they want to exchange with partners in interaction.

This understanding is also consequential for the role and self-definition of the analyst of political discourse. According to Hawkins (1999: 8) the cognitive scientist’s role consists in “see[ing] oppression as a conceptualized social order imposed upon a particular sociopolitical

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<sup>24</sup> If studies not restricted to American political discourse are included, there are several recent studies worth mentioning. Charteris-Black’s (2005) ‘critical metaphor analysis’ (CMA) makes use of the methodology of corpus linguistics in analyzing the mechanisms of conceptual metaphors across the field of political rhetoric. His analysis includes material from a range of political contexts, for example, Churchill, Martin Luther King, Margaret Thatcher, or Clinton. Other book-length studies include Musolff (2000) or Rash (2006), which, however, are not centered on American political discourse.

formation. That social order emerges from a belief system **in the mind of the oppressor** [emphasis added]; [...].”

The highlighted parts in the quotations above illustrate one significant dilemma in the proposals within a cognitive-linguistics framework. CL as a discipline has not embraced the notion of discourse to the extent to which the study of comprehensive discourse units necessitates. Instead, the studies of metaphorical (and metonymical) concepts do not usually go beyond the sentence level. Similarly, Werth (1994) criticizes the narrow focus of CL with respect to metaphorical concepts. He (ibid.: 79) claims that “[...] despite the cognitive broadening of the explanatory basis of metaphor due to their work, Lakoff and his colleagues are still talking about *sentence* [emphasis original] phenomena.” Using the definition of metaphor proposed within the usual CL-framework is, in fact, mutually exclusive with the study of larger segments of discourse. This is why the call for a cognitive rhetoric may be justified but is not easily reconcilable with the tenets of both CL and CDA. As these aspects will be treated in chapter 5 below, I will draw attention to more general issues in the remainder of this section.

CL has been committed to an essentially mentalistic and theoretical agenda, in spite of the initiatives made to include data-driven research. Also there has been a long and, at times, heated debate about to what extent cognitive domains are culturally informed, i.e. whether or not, culture and cognition are compatible notions. Despite recent attempts at “taking metaphor out of our heads and putting it into the cultural world” (Gibbs 1999: 154), the discipline in general still leaves little scope for exploration of those issues traditionally dealt with in anthropology and sociolinguistics. Exceptions such as Kövecses’ (2006) account of metaphoric and metonymic frames, shaping the conceptualization of vital domains of human experience, appear to prove the rule within the more general accounts of conceptual metaphor theory. The only areas in which culture is consistently embedded into the analysis are the domains of spatial and temporal cognition (e.g. Levinson 2003, Evans 2004a), in which space and time are considered as primary in the organisation of human experience to the extent that the conceptualization of time and space, respectively, are largely determined by the cultural environment.<sup>25</sup>

In view of this recent shift of emphasis in favor of exploring culturally informed cognitive domains or frames, the need for the inclusion of discourse-centered accounts of cognitive phenomena is even more crucial. Similarly, this is central to the analysis of political discourse, where both discursivity and cultural practice are conducive to the political process. Due to its hybridity and interdiscursivity political discourse feeds on various other discourses, linking various conceptual domains in the construction of a coherent construction of meaning on the

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<sup>25</sup> More precisely, in his account of temporal cognition, Evans (2004a,b) distinguishes between primary and secondary lexical concepts on the one hand and three main cognitive models for TIME on the other. While primary lexical concepts relate to human cognitive processing in general, secondary lexical concepts are culture-specific, for instance the conceptual metaphor TIME IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY. Moreover, Evans identifies three major models of temporal cognition, which subdivide into a time-based model, and an ego-based model, which consists of a moving-time and a moving-ego model. These models will be discussed in more detail in chapter 4, in which the domain of NEWNESS is described as a temporal concept.

discourse level. These domains need to be linked by cognitive tools whose identification can be achieved by a framework that combines CL theory and CDA methodology.

One such proposal is made by Text World Theory (TWT) (e.g. Werth 1999 expanded on by Gavins 2007). Building on the theories of Possible Worlds, Werth (1994, 1995, 1999) develops his experiential account of human language on the grounds of studying ‘real’ text, which is but one objective of text world theory. Another goal is to “represent the various conceptual layers, based on deixis and related systems, which discourses fall into” (Werth 1995: 78). Werth’s text world account rests on four basic properties, namely the **discourse world** (henceforth DW), the **text world** (henceforth TW), the **Common Ground** (henceforth CG) and the notion of **sustained metaphor**. The vital distinction between discourse world and text world is the starting point of Werth’s theorizing. Both the DW and the TW are constructs; the former is a construct resulting from the participants’ mental representation of the immediate situation while the latter is constructed from the participants’ mental representations of the discourse as such (cf. Werth 1995: 60).

Werth (ibid.: 49) defines the **discourse world** as “the situational context surrounding the speech event itself. It contains all the elements perceivable by (“manifest to”) the discourse participants.” Crucially, these percepts are not to be understood as mere sensory input; rather they are subject to the processes of categorization and classification, both of which are based on (previous) experience. Similarly, ‘situation’ is specified as an equally experiential notion in the sense that any situation is linked to a discourse participant. Closely related to the concept of point of view, situations are described as states of affairs, i.e. perceivable entities that are either immediately accessible or can be accessed through memory, knowledge or imagination. Any such knowledge consists of various component parts and is frame-based, i.e. “stored as coherent schematizations of experience which allow efficient retrieval and deployment at a later date” Gavins (2000: 19). Thus the discourse world feeds on beliefs, collective imaginaries etc. and can be said to include the broader social and cultural context.

Addressing the definitional problems of context, Werth (1995: 53) narrows down his understanding of context in introducing the notion of **text world**, which is “the conceptualization of that part of the discourse world which is “in focus” [emphasis original] for the purposes of the discourse.” As such, the TW is essentially both knowledge-dependent and knowledge-informed in that it draws on the information available as “shared baggage of cultural assumptions” (ibid.: 55).

Consequently, a text world is a conceptual space that is deictically remote from the DW and consists of various conceptual layers, so-called sub-worlds. Werth (1999: 51) defines TW as “a deictic space, defined initially by the discourse itself, and specifically by the deictic and referential elements in it.” Hence deixis and reference play a crucial role in both the organisation and the setting of the TW. Since text worlds are text-driven portions of the DW, the elements of the DW are profiled by two different mechanisms in the TW. On the one hand, there are “world-builders” (Werth 1995) or “world-building elements”, which “denote the basic deictic arrangement of the text world and can be seen to provide some sense of

setting, including time, place and characters” (Gavins 2000: 20). On the other hand, “function-advancing propositions” design the textual contents. In other words, they “relate to the actions, events or arguments involving the entities present in the text world, as well as any predications made about them (ibid.)” For example, the advancement of the plot may be considered a discourse function of a function-advancer in narrative texts.

Within the text-world framework discourse is conceived of as a joint venture for building up the so-called **Common Ground** (e.g. Werth 1995: 51). CG can be compared to the unity of time, place and action in the classic theatrical system. More specifically, a CG is negotiated in a given discourse event (or several discourses altogether) as the entirety of the potentially relevant propositions within a certain field of knowledge (cf. Werth 1999: 48f.). Thus CG consists of these activated relevant propositions as well as the active context of a text world. Werth (ibid.) defines CG as

At any point in the current discourse, all those propositions which have been expressed and tacitly accepted (1); together with:

Any propositions evoked by (1) from general or mutual knowledge, though not necessarily expressed. (2)

The negotiation of CG follows certain principles that Werth (e.g. 1999: 49f.) terms ‘principles of discourse’. Suffice it to say that the acceptance of CG presupposes a certain degree of coherence and co-operativeness. As a concept, CG is reminiscent of the tacit agreement inherent in a social contract in the shape of the Saussurean ‘contrat social’, albeit with a larger cultural dimension and knowledge base rather than mere convention. What is important, however, is the fact that only those propositions are added to the CG which have been acknowledged as truthful and reliable by the discourse participants.

Finally, text world theory builds on the notion of **sustained or extended metaphor**. Unlike the cognitive-linguistic accounts of metaphor mentioned above Werth (particularly 1994) devises metaphor discursively; this means that one single metaphor may underlie an entire text. Comparable to the gist of a text, extended metaphor unfolds in building the macrostructure of a text. Werth’s definition of metaphor is an extension of a special kind since he studies metaphorical fields that extend through an entire discourse. He draws a distinction between ordinary-language metaphor and poetic or literary metaphor (cf. Lakoff/Turner 1989). The fundamental difference is that the latter is typified by the sustained metaphor running through a single text. The producer of such a metaphorical concept subscribes to the concept of ‘double-vision’, i.e. he or she “allows the topic to be viewed simultaneously from more than a single perspective” (Werth 1994: 84). This last point is particularly relevant with respect to political discourse since it permits the integration of diverse viewpoints within a single, sustained metaphorical concept.

The strong appeal of sustained metaphor lies in its conception as an interrelated system of individual metaphors, which derives from empirical evidence. Devising conceptual metaphor as a singular phenomenon is in fact counter-intuitive. It is rather unlikely that domains of human experience can be covered by one metaphor only, which is also implicitly stated in Lakoff/Johnson’s (1980) early account of metaphor. More recently, Goatly (2007) elaborates

on the finding that several target concepts share the same source concept. This contiguity invites conceptual ‘short-cuts’, particularly when two or more metaphors frequently co-occur.

Modeling discourse in terms of layers of conceptual space is generally appealing. The exclusive reliance on the interaction of reference and deixis in linking the individual spaces is however highly subjective.<sup>26</sup> Although the elaboration of a cognitive deixis is a welcome extension of traditional approaches, it is a concept that is best suited to the analysis of literary discourse. Furthermore, reference and deixis are not the only mental constructs capable of bridging domains of experience. Conceptual metaphor is also an appropriate tool in this respect. Werth’s notion of sustained or extended metaphor, in particular, is conducive to analyzing (political) discourse from a historical perspective. Consequently, it could be argued that the mapping AMERICA IS A NEW NATION underlies American political discourse as an extended metaphor.

In the remaining part of this introductory chapter I will summarize the most important points raised so far. In principle, the quality and reliability of the analysis of political discourse depend on the conception of language in which the explorations are grounded. The Orwellian term ‘political language’ opens up a dichotomy that conceives of ‘non-political’ language as a neutral medium of expression, a default mode of communication. In contrast, language as discourse rests on the principle of (inter)discursivity, which implies a bidirectional relationship between language and world. Crucially, ideology is not to be dissociated from language (use). In other words: language as discourse both transforms and perpetuates ideologies. In the process the ideological meaning construction is essentially antagonistic, framing opposing values for self-presentation versus other-presentation.

In chapter 1.2 some approaches to political discourse and their findings have been evaluated. It was argued that a viable solution to the theoretical and methodological predicaments consists in linking a critical perspective on political discourse with conceptual metaphor theory (CMT). While CDA’s self-definition as both a theory and a method may be suitable in various respects, it raises many questions about the analytic tools used. The eclecticism — consisting of the legacy of systemic-functional linguistics and the subsequent inclusion of pragmatic principles on the one hand and the conflation of various lines of discourse theory and sociological methodology on the other — has left its injurious mark on the discipline. The subsequent dilution of both theory and methodology is increased by extending the analytical scope to the context, another unmanageable concept.

More recently, discourse has been modeled in layers of temporality, with each layer being indicative of a specific temporal, historical context. As political discourse is subject to historicity itself, the construction of political meaning is regularly determined by time and is therefore liable to change. Furthermore, political discourse is characterized by a temporality of its own, framing political actions in terms of the temporal reference of their occurrence.

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<sup>26</sup> Werth (1995: 79) argues that “reference and deixis are mental constructs because they answer human conceptual needs: deixis defines the conceptual space appropriate for the processing of a particular discourse; reference fills the need to keep track of entities in the conceptual space.”



Hence the event sense of time describes the event as an “occurrence of some kind bound into a temporally framed unity” (Evans 2004a: 80f.). The temporal framing of political events also surfaces in the construal of the event structure metaphor, which is predominantly conceptualized on the basis of MOTION concepts in political discourse (see chapter 4).

Text-world theory was introduced as another account that deploys discourse as a layered model. Taking an anti-objectivist stance, text world theory intends to lay bare the representations of conceptual space in actual discourse, written or spoken. As a result, both cultural and situational context become vital for the analysis. Conceiving of metaphor discursively rather than sententially, Werth’s (1994) account incorporates extended texts in his analytical framework. His notion of sustained metaphor is an integral part of the macrostructure of texts rather than conceptualizing one area of experience only.

Against the background of the preceding discussion, this present analysis departs from previous accounts in the following respects. First, conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) will be used to shed light on the cultural construct of newness whose meaning is argued to be motivated by the event structure metaphor (ESM) as well as a number of temporal metaphors. Accordingly, the mapping NEWNESS IS A SUBEVENT OF MOTION will be the center of attention. Departing from the multiple meanings of the lexical concept *new*, the study will identify the construals of these metaphors in presidential discourse. Unlike previous accounts of American political discourse, this study explores the different construals of one particular concept across time rather than providing a diffuse, thematically unconnected description of various conceptual metaphors.

Second, the focus on a particular cultural model or construct will corroborate the influence of culture in conceptualization. The indexicality of newness within American political culture derives from its experiential grounding. One of the fundamental properties of political discourse is the fact that this experience may not be immediate but (re-)enacted due to the historicity of political concepts.

Third, the synchronic framework of CDA is extended to accommodate a historical perspective which manifests itself in the emphasis placed on the meaning construction of temporal expressions, which, in part, is also motivated by conceptual metaphors. Making use of van Dijk’s (1998) account of ideology, the ideological potential of newness is explored on the level of discourse.

Last but not least, the analysis will break new ground in its methodology. Adhering to the three-fold analysis typical of CDA or CMA, which consists of identification, interpretation and explanation, this study clearly extends this framework in several respects. It proposes an analysis of local and global (ideological) meanings on both the sentence level and the discourse level, in doing which the (discourse) event of newness is couched in the sentential event schema. The construal of these event schemas is motivated by the underlying conceptual metaphors of the event structure metaphor. Beyond the sentence level, the concept of

NEWNESS will be shown to influence the temporality of the inaugural address in terms of the journey metaphor, which has framed American political cognition from the onset.

Following the generalization commitment of CL, according to which all levels of language are interrelated, the analysis includes the grammatical, lexical and conceptual levels in the attempt to lay bare the ideological functions of the event of newness in American presidential discourse, using the example of the inaugural address. Compiled as a corpus consisting of 56 speeches covering the entire time span of American national history, the inaugurals will be analyzed within a discourse-analytical framework that relies on conceptual metaphor theory. In the process some 'megametaphors' or sustained metaphors will materialize, building the macrostructure of the speeches while underlining the fact that conceptual metaphor is not a single phenomenon.

## 2. Political Discourse – An Interdisciplinary Project

### 2.1 Theorizing on Political Discourse

Ubiquitous as it may be, the meaning of the term ‘political discourse’ is far from obvious. Even the attempt at delimiting what constitutes ‘political discourse’ appears to be futile due to “the reflexive and potentially ambiguous nature of the term *political discourse*” [emphasis original] (Wilson 2003: 398). In part this predicament derives from the terminological and definitional variance of the two component terms, political and discourse. The case for the conception of language as discourse has been made in chapter 1.1 and will now be further elaborated by virtue of its relations to the political. In part, however, these difficulties result from the fact that political discourse is to be regarded as the product of both individual and collective mental processes informed by the interaction of knowledge stored in the long-term memory and the online construction of social meaning provided by a so-called social memory (cf. Chilton 2006: 51). This political cognition is organized on the basis of cognitive models in which information about beliefs, values and social practices is encapsulated. Due to its discursive nature, i.e. the dialectical relationship between language and society, political discourse is not merely a reflex of the political context, for example the prevalent socio-political realities within a given discourse community, but also actively shapes these realities. In other words, political discourse may be regarded as both the process of meaning construction and its outcome. As we shall see in the course of this study, newness functions as such a model inherent in American political cognition.

However, political cognition in the guise of generalized knowledge structures frames our perception of political discourse, both as analysts of (see chapter 5), and participants in political culture. While it is true that the majority of key political concepts is highly recurrent and looks back on a long-standing tradition, their reception and interpretation is largely typified by discontinuities which have produced distinct, often competing cognitive models according to which the understanding of politics is more often governed by common sense assumptions rather than accuracy as to their development in intellectual history. A case in point is the relationship between language and politics which not only lies at the center of this present discussion but is also regularly obfuscated.

The preceding discussion has drawn attention to the fact that political discourse is an open, self-regulating system rather than a closed, self-contained unit as is suggested by the Orwellian term ‘political language’. It has also highlighted the futility of delimiting political discourse on the basis of exclusively linguistic criteria. The problems of delimitation multiply when the two component terms political and language are regarded in combination.

In what follows, political discourse will be described as a conceptual and analytical category in examining the object of study more closely. For this purpose I have devoted several sub-chapters to the in-depth discussion of possible definitions and analytical objectives. Its interdisciplinary nature allows for various theoretical and methodological standpoints, which is

reflected in alternative labels, such as political discourse, political language, political rhetoric, and political communication.

The related concepts ‘political’, ‘politician’ and ‘politics’ have undergone some interesting semantic changes ever since they were first attested in the English language. In the process, the political has undergone increasing specialization towards its present-day denotation designating party-political or governmental political activity while only gradually acquiring its negative connotations. This development will be illustrated by the following entries taken from the *OED*.

According to the *OED*, the adjective *political* designates an entity

of, belonging, or pertaining to the state or body of citizens, its government and policy, esp. in civil and secular affairs; public, civil; of or pertaining to the science or art of politics.

Dating from the middle of the 16<sup>th</sup> century (1551), this definition exemplifies that the political is primarily concerned with state and civic organization; there is also a reference to publicness, evidently an issue to address in the remainder of this chapter. Interestingly, the adjective is not marked for any pejorative connotations, which, as the following illustration underlines, was only added later (in 1749, *OED*):

Belonging to or taking a side in politics or in connexion with the party system of government; in a bad sense, partisan, factious. **Also (freq. in derogatory use), serving the ends of (party) politics** [emphasis added]; having regard or consideration for the interests of politics rather than questions of principle.

Thus we may conclude that in everyday usage the interpretation of *political* has evolved, in its default mode, from a chiefly neutral lexical item, denoting people’s lives in organized communities, into a predominantly negative term that mechanically evokes unpleasant associations. Simultaneously, its semantic scope has narrowed down to what may be paraphrased as “the battleground of conventional party politics” (Beard 2000: 5).

Even though the adjective has undergone pejoration, this cannot be maintained for the noun denoting the person engaged in political activity, the politician. The earliest attestation of the word *politician* in the English language dates from 1588, signifying “a shrewd schemer, a crafty plotter or intriguer,” marked as obsolete now. Let us compare the following entries (the date of its first attestation is provided in brackets):

One versed in the theory or science of government and the art of governing; one skilled in politics; one practically engaged in conducting the business of the state; a statesman. (1589)

One keenly interested in politics; one who engages in party politics, or in political strife, or who makes politics his profession or business; **also (esp. in U.S.), in a sinister sense, one who lives by politics as a trade** [emphasis added]. (1628)

In contrast to the adjective, the noun has not narrowed down semantically to the same extent. Rather, we witness a process of specialization and professionalization.<sup>27</sup> What remains,

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<sup>27</sup> In contrast, Hughes (1988: 186) argues that terms such as politics and politician have always been loaded with suspicion and cynicism. This is why he evaluates the development from a politician as a “crafty plotter or

however, is the deterioration due to semantic change, if to a lesser degree in comparison with the adjective and the activity.<sup>28</sup>

Finally, the lexical entry of the noun *politics* is neutral, being marked for negative connotations only in its sense as “political actions or practice” (first attested in 1644; *OED*). In its semantic core, *politics* is codified (first attested in 1529) in the sense of “art of government” and as such charged with the “form, organization, and administration of a state [...]” and “its relations with other states.” Interestingly, the entry also illustrates why in our political cognition the close connection between politics and morality (or rather the alleged absence of it) persists. As the *OED* proposes, politics constitutes a “branch of moral philosophy,” dealing with “public or social ethics,” which builds on the Aristotelian understanding of politics. This sense is marked as obsolete now. Clearly, this moral-philosophical legacy is anything but superseded. Illustrations are easily found, ranging from Orwell’s claim that political language is designed to “make murder sound respectable,” to the ubiquitous accusation of politicians as professional liars to contemporary invocations of just-war traditions used to legitimate the use of (armed) force(s).<sup>29</sup> In political discourse, morality and trust are essential cornerstones of the strategies legitimization vs. delegitimization. As will be discussed in chapter 3, morality, or rather moralistic components have played a crucial part in the formation of American political discourse and continue to do so to this day.

In sum, the semantic field of the political has experienced two important modifications, at least within everyday usage. On the one hand, we observe growing specialization in the guise of professionalization and institutionalization of politics and politicians. On the other hand, however, this development is increasingly accompanied by pejoration, which has not affected all the members of the field to the same degree.

### 2.1.1 The Scope of the Political

The growing specialization of most members of the word family also has an impact on the role of language for political activity. The literature in this field has branched out into two opposing camps for which language is either an integral part of political action or subsidiary to political action (cf. Holly 1990: 5). While the latter view typifies most approaches taken within the field of political science, the former is most frequently encountered within linguistics. While it may be true that the political process is chiefly determined by deliberation and

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intriguer” to its present-day understanding as a slight amelioration in time. As Hughes (ibid.: 189) rightly concludes, this change does not result from ethical improvement in the practice nor on behalf of the practitioners but from their institutionalization.

<sup>28</sup> Similarly, Sperber/Trittschuh (1964) comment on the lexical entry ‘politician’ as follows: “While *politician* (with its cognates) is an international word and frequently used in a derogatory sense in many languages, it seems this sense is also strongly prevalent in American usage.”

<sup>29</sup> In its original design the just-war theory is thought to provide a rational, rule-based framework for moral reflections on war, outlining the rules for just warfare. Deeply anchored in all major world religions — Christian roots of the tradition may be encountered in the writings of St Augustine and Aquinas — the theory was soon to be incorporated in Western politics in a secular form. As such it represents, according to Mellon (1995: 1699), “an important way in which resort to force has been seen to face limits, and an important example of the application of moral reasoning to issues of international politics.”

decision-making, ‘doing politics’ is by no means an autonomous closed system, in which language can be regarded as a mere tool used to verbalize the procedure of deliberation and to communicate the results of the decision-making process.

The interdisciplinary dispute is mirrored in the notorious contention of ‘deeds’ versus ‘words’. This well-entrenched dichotomy is part and parcel of the political cognition of western discourse communities. There is ample evidence for this common-sense assumption which, amongst other folk cognitive models (e.g. Sweetser 1987), directs our perception of concepts such as communication, lying and also political activity. Orwell’s distinction between ‘solidity’ and ‘wind’, introduced in chapter 1, on the one hand, and the more recent contrast of ‘substance’ vs. ‘spin’ in the British context entrench this alleged pair of opposites. What Holly (1990: 8) describes as an artificial contrast designed to instrumentalize language, in fact subordinates language to politics. Yet the role of language cannot easily be confined to this instrumental use in politics; rather it can be considered as its *conditio sine qua non*. As Dieckmann (1975: 29) states, action continues to be political as long as it is linguistic action; where politics is speechless, it ceases to exist. Others (e.g. Girth 2002: 3) have suggested a strict separation of the decision-making process as such and the communication of its results. However, this distinction does not address the issue at hand, rather it shifts the problem. Contrasting deliberation proper with communicating its results reduces the role of language to that of an auxiliary tool.<sup>30</sup>

In sharp contrast, proponents of a broader definition of the political argue for its inseparability from language. This interdependence primarily concerns the functional level of language as well as the speaker’s communicative intents.

A close look at the naïve, ‘innocent’, and spontaneous ways we use language in our everyday lives, in our conversations with friends and intimates and at work, would reveal, inchoate perhaps but definitely present, **the same strategies of persuasion and manipulation** [emphasis added] the professionals have at their disposal. In communicating, no matter what the level or the function, we all have the same basic needs, which we try to meet through our linguistic interaction. We want to be liked, first of all; the rest follows: we want to be authoritative, to have our instructions or advice followed, to be admired [...]. But from the most intimate tête-à-tête (micropolitics) to a speech aimed at millions (macropolitics), **the aims are the same, and the techniques closely related** [emphasis added]. (Lakoff 1990: 1)

If we suppose that any linguistic action is unavoidably political, all analysis of language would also be political. There are two things to be noted in Lakoff’s (1990) proposal. First, this view stems from the basic understanding of politics as an integral part of social practice. As such any form of social practice is inherently political, linguistic action is political action. This view echoes Orwell’s (1946) earlier claim that “all issues are political issues” and also betrays a similar bias of study, which leads to the second quandary. Judging from Lakoff’s choice of

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<sup>30</sup> The uncritical emphasis of the processes of deliberation and decision-making as the essence of political activity is unsatisfactory with respect to another important characteristic of today’s political culture. More often than not, the governmental decision-making process is depoliticized to the extent that technical competence and administrative expertise have become key criteria (cf. Mueller 1973: 110).

words (“persuasion and manipulation”) which betrays an in-built negative evaluation of anything political, we can presume that there is no such thing as a neutral use of language.

Moreover, we intuitively feel that the levels of ‘micropolitics’ and ‘macropolitics’ are not interchangeable, particularly with respect to the strategies used, the potential impact of the linguistic actions involved, and the context the interaction is embedded in. Therefore, van Dijk (1997) compiles a list of relevant properties that distinguish the political from other forms of discourse. It is primarily the context that is decisive in delimiting political from non-political linguistic action. “Structures and strategies are only necessarily part of political discourse analysis if such properties can be politically contextualized” (van Dijk 1997: 24).<sup>31</sup>

So far, we have seen that political is a concept typified by a large degree of variety and ambiguity in both everyday usage and more specialized senses. This complexity attests to the underlying political cognition which will be elaborated against the background of another two important issues, the different traditions of politics and the social nature of politics.

### **2.1.2 Political Traditions**

As illustrated by the lexical entries above, politics was originally devised as a branch of moral philosophy. This link not only persists but is frequently re-enacted, particularly in contexts in which the suspicion of dishonesty is articulated. Hence politics, more precisely political action is frequently framed by moral principles, or their absence.

However, the (unconscious) invocation of this tradition cloaks the existence of two long-standing traditions of politics — as well as one more recent practice —, which have different implications not only for morality but also for the role of language attached to politics. In the first place, the presumed interdependence of politics and (im)morality derives from the Aristotelian conception of politics which might be viewed as an idealized political norm, at least from a contemporary perspective. As such political action is anchored in moral philosophy, the ruler is assumed to act ethically in the sense of the common good, adhering to superordinate moral principles. This tradition is contrasted with the Machiavellian understanding of politics, which may be paraphrased as ‘power management’. Its key words are domination, power of the people and the non-adherence to moral codes. Accordingly, the ultimate aim of politicians consists in the ascension to power and its subsequent preservation.

More recently, these two conceptions of politics have been challenged by a third one which Holly (1990: 15) refers to as a ‘technocratic model’ of politics. Accordingly, politics is conceived of as a domain of expertise that can only be handled and managed by specialists. With ‘expertdom’ taking over the reins, acting ethically and morally is still conceptualized as acting for the common good, albeit on a different basis. Specialists are in possession of

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<sup>31</sup> Van Dijk (1997: 16ff.) distinguishes between as many as thirteen categories, all of which are vital for the characterization of the relevant properties of political text and context. For example, one criterion is the societal domain in which the communicative event unfolds. Another characteristic is the political organization of a given discourse community, or simply the political system. Alternatively, the values and beliefs dominating within the polity are also influential factors in that they govern the limits and possibilities of political action.

information that only they have access to. This exclusive knowledge is taken as a legitimization for taking the ‘right’ decisions. These choices become moral choices whenever they are framed as actions for the common good. The analogy of well-being and wealth is encountered in the complex MORAL ACCOUNTING METAPHOR, which is highly pervasive in American political discourse. The metaphorical mappings it entails indicate that morality is principally conceptualized in economic terms. The ubiquitous metaphor WELL-BEING IS WEALTH instills quantitative reasoning into the qualitative realm of morality (Lakoff 2005: 62). On the political scene, moral authority is enacted by displays of benevolence towards the general public. For example, Lakoff (ibid.) has identified two conceptualizations of morality which feed into American political discourse. On the one hand, the strict father morality, associated with the Republican Party, may be regarded as a morality of reward and punishment, building on what Lakoff (ibid.: 65) refers to as ‘folk behaviorism’. This model envisages that punishing a disobedient child for violating strict moral rules while praising her for obeying these rules will eventually lead to moral improvement if not rectitude, i.e. the child will internalize the rules and will adhere to them. On the other hand, the nurturant parent morality (ibid.: 112f.), which is assumed to characterize the Democrats’ standpoint, is grounded in the assumption that mutual respect is stronger than mere dominance. This is why people have to grow into taking on social responsibility from which authority may be earned depending on one’s capability of measure, judgment, wisdom but also empathy. The far-reaching implications of these co-existing models will be expanded on in chapter 6 against the background of the development of American political discourse. Let us now turn to the role of language in each of these three models.

In principle, the “study of political discourse has been around for as long as politics itself” (Wilson 2003: 399). A case in point is the importance of rhetoric in classic times, which ties in with the Aristotelian conception of politics. Essentially, politics is conceived of as a process of decision-making based on legitimization which, in turn, is achieved by consensus through debate. However, the importance of language is not spread evenly across all three Aristotelian rhetorical genres, *genus iudiciale* (forensic genre), *genus deliberativum* (deliberative genre) and *genus demonstrativum* (epideictic genre).<sup>32</sup> Nonetheless, this classification is significant with respect to the formation of presidential discourse and the role of the inaugural address within the American political system, which will be discussed in chapter 3.

The distinction between rhetorical genres, which were not clear-cut even in classical rhetoric, is functional in another respect. From Aristotle to James Harrington, one of the key figures in seventeenth-century political philosophy, the distinction between the function of the few and that of the many is uncontested. Harrington clearly differentiates between debate, in

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<sup>32</sup> Interestingly, each of the rhetorical genres has a time reference of its own. The forensic genre has past time reference since legal arguments involve verdicts on past actions. The deliberative genre has future time reference because deliberation, as an integral part of political rhetoric, requires judgment on future action(s). Finally, the epideictic genre has present time reference, which is frequently also the eternal present, resulting from the fact that ceremonial rhetoric addresses values associated with either praise or blame and does not usually involve decision-making. This specific temporality will play a vital role in the analysis of the inaugural address.



which the few assume a deliberative role, and its result, when the many are involved in the political process by means of their votes (cf. Robertson 1995: 3). On the one hand, the hierarchical political order, which Harrington maintains despite his vision of an ideal republic, is reflected in the rhetorical mode in which the audiences used to be addressed. Whereas the deliberative mode served to address the assembly, the demonstrative or epideictic mode was the standard genre when addressing a larger audience. By the end of the eighteenth century, around the time when constitutionalized government first began to take roots, these distinctions dissolved into increasingly less schematic categories.

On the other hand, the collapse of the old political order of ranks is also consequential for political rhetoric. The growing reliance on the public for political support contributed to the conflation of the deliberative and demonstrative modes, giving rise to an understanding of political communication to which the epideictic genre adapted. In the American context, the epideictic mode assimilated features from the Puritan pulpit rhetoric, particularly its hortatory style.

While much of the ongoing research on political discourse has placed its emphasis on the Aristotelian conception of politics, the existence of alternative concepts is sometimes ignored. This is all the more astonishing since Aristotle treated rhetoric as purely ‘verbal’ in the sense that a “rhetorician is like one voice of the dialogue” (cf. Burke 1967: 63). This means that Aristotelian rhetoric primarily focused on the deliverance of speeches as a means of persuasion or dissuasion, not concerning itself with their possible effects on the recipient or the audience at large.

In contrast, the focus on audience response is encountered in the Machiavellian understanding of politics. Producing effects upon the audience was clearly part of the political agenda. Burke (*ibid.*: 69) refers to Machiavelli’s rhetorical style as “bland strategy” that builds on the exploitation of antagonistic principles for the sake of persuasion. For example, Machiavelli deploys the strategies ‘treat well or crush’, ‘defend the weak and weaken the strong’ to achieve his political ends. As a consequence, language is conceived of as a tool, assisting in the self-promotion to power and the avoidance of being demoted from it. Hence, ‘doing politics’ and communicating politics are conjured up as two distinct activities, both of which, however, are political.

Undoubtedly, the more recent technocratic model of politics also comprises specialist knowledge about the power of discourse. The contemporary conception of politics entails the professionalization of all communication processes in the political domain. While critics (e.g. Holly 1990) have argued for a truncated role of language within the political process (of deliberation) itself, suggesting that it chiefly functions to sell off decisions that have already been made, others have underlined the centrality of language for political discourse, especially from the twentieth century on. As pointed out in chapter 1.1, discursive practices have been subject to significant modifications. For political discourse, in particular, the technologization and marketization on the one hand, and the personalization and hybridization of discourse on the other, have set the communicative standards in the political context to a considerable

degree. Not only do the former — technologization and marketization — interact with the conceptualizations of morality outlined above; they also underline the heightened awareness of the importance of discourse in late modern political culture. With the onset of a participatory political culture political discourse assumed an enhanced role: political actors are only able to reach the public if the communication format is configured in a way that meets with the public's moral sensibilities and elicits its interests (cf. Robertson 1995: 212).

Similarly, the personalization and hybridization of discourse have brought about important changes within discourse genres and the linguistic microstructure of discourse itself. In the political domain personalization of discourse has assisted in generating several new genres of which presidential communication is perhaps the most influential one.<sup>33</sup>

The concentration on presidential discourse has not only added to the complexity of political discourse, it has also produced some important upshots. The growing intersection of political discourse and public discourse, including media discourse, has created a new rhetorical practice, namely spin. Ayto (1999) defines spin as “a bias or slant on information, intended to create a favorable impression when it is presented to the public.” This kind of news management is only able to thrive under the communicative conditions of ‘expertdom’, making information the most sought-after asset on the political market.

Moreover, contemporary political discourse is characterized by hybridization, i.e. the merging of genres and styles. What is important, however, is that the integration of diverse discursive formations does not usually occur at random but is achieved by establishing certain, preferred hierarchies within the order of discourses. Yet hybridization in political discourse, in particular, entails the merging of rhetorical genres. The strict Aristotelian distinction in three genres has long since perished in this domain. Rhetoricians (e.g. Mainberger 1987) claim that the only genre to be influential in modernity is the epideictic genre. Indeed, epideixis plays a crucial role in symbolic politics (cf. Kopperschmidt 1999), to a degree that the ancient distinction between deliberation and communication of its result is superseded. A case in point is the American inaugural address, which has blended diverse rhetorical styles and traditions, exhibiting both deliberative and epideictic elements. This is further substantiated by the reversal of the time reference that used to be inscribed into each of the rhetorical genres. The alterations of discursive formations within all domains of social practice have created a specific temporality of (political) discourse. Late modern political discourses can be said to draw on ‘inclusive time reference’, which means that the past, present and future need to be encompassed in conceptualizations of political experience. It is part of specialist competence to handle difficult situations inclusive of those that are unpredictable and volatile such as news, for example. For this reason, political discourse needs to be able to ‘control’ all relevant public domains of a given discourse community. As a result the political process is frequently depoliticized in favor of creating the impression of problem-solving competence. From this

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<sup>33</sup> The twentieth century witnessed the rise of presidential discourse even in those political systems that do not even have a president. For example, Foley (1993) remarks that the office of the British Prime Minister has been converted into a presidency as evidenced by the concentration of public discourse on ‘prime ministerial discourse’. Thus personalization is operative on two levels, the role of the communicator itself and the communicative style chosen.

perspective, it is important to include yet another aspect of the political, i.e. its relationship with the social domain.

### 2.1.3 Politics as Social Practice

The human species has been analogized to many things, ‘a symbol using animal’ in semiotic accounts and, of course, a political animal, Aristotle’s well known formula ‘*zoon politikon*’.<sup>34</sup> This supposedly social dimension inherent in the very nature of humankind appears to be deeply entrenched in our political cognition — cognitive models that encapsulate our knowledge about the nature of politics (as political activity) and politicians.

The ‘common good’ has preoccupied political theorists and philosophers for centuries. Postulating that the whole is more important than its parts on the one hand, and that once the whole disintegrates its parts also cease to exist, is a principal and recurrent component of political thinking. It has found expression in the construct of body politic, whose specific configurations are themselves remarkable, for they have assimilated to political systems as distinct as the Greek polis, the medieval standing order of ranks or modern democratic republics. This organic symbolism of the state is frequently exploited to underline the state’s primacy to the nature of human beings, but also to legitimate hierarchical power relations. The conceptualizations of the state and the society also play a crucial role in the analysis of presidential discourse beginning in chapter 6.

There is no denying that Aristotle’s classic understanding of politics is still felt in contemporary political cognition.<sup>35</sup> His conception of the political, provided that life in a Greek *polis* bears resemblances to our present-day understanding of social and political organization, was relatively broad in that the political was assumed to be inherent in all social interaction. Whether or not this was part of the original Aristotelian definition, is not germane to my interest here and deserves book-length treatment in itself. However, some current approaches to political discourse have maintained the close interweaving of the social and political.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> The difficulty in applying such a concept to modern conditions becomes evident when we take into consideration that the political is frequently dissociated from the social in other accounts. A case in point is Aquinas’ interpretation of the Aristotelian formula as ‘man is a social and political being’.

<sup>35</sup> For obvious reasons Aristotle’s *The Politics* serves as the catalyst for numerous studies of political discourse (e.g. Chilton 2006). Yet many scholars are inclined to force analogies between modern politics and old political models without taking into account issues such as changed rhetorical practices or the enhanced role of publicness in contemporary political activity, to name but a few problem areas.

<sup>36</sup> A case in point is Chilton’s (2006) interpretation of Aristotle’s political *zoon*, which overemphasizes the link between the human faculty of speech and their living in a *polis*, an organized community. Thus, language is assumed to be a helpful tool, assisting in organizing the community of the *polis* and expressing the (moral) judgment of which, however, not everybody was deemed capable. Deriving the social nature of humans and language from Aristotle’s ‘political being’ overstates the conceivable connection. Instead, Aristotle clearly differentiates between the ‘social nature’ of humans and their functioning as members of a state, i.e. their ‘political’ role. The former is a precondition for the latter, used to legitimate the state-philosophical concept of the polis in terms of its body politic.

Given this complexity, the only viable solution consists in a broad conception of the political, which subsumes political action as a form of social practice. This is one of the basic tenets of CDA, according to which politics is understood as a form of ‘social practice’, similar to any other type of social practice.<sup>37</sup> Recall the implications of language as social practice, which means that a) language is a part of society, b) it is a social process involving an interaction of productive textual properties (as traces) and interpretative processes (as cues), and c) it is a socially conditioned process in that discourse is determined by non-linguistic parts of society, for example social organization (cf. Fairclough 2001: 18ff.).

The broad conception of the political derives from the theoretical and methodological ramifications of CDA as a discipline, whose analytical thrust is to lay bare the power structures and belief systems ascribed to the prevailing representations of the socio-political realities within a given society or polity. In this constellation, however, either the social or the political tends to be marginalized. Regardless of this, society is an inappropriate reference system for the large majority of political discourse, at least in its modern understanding. Society is an action-system and locates the political also in the realm of actions. This may be true for political action in the (narrow) sense of deliberation and decision-making itself, but political discourse also relates to another dimension, namely the ideational, that has to be included and hence, linguistically coded. The political is inevitably couched in a (political) culture. Unlike the notion of society, culture is a system of ideas and concepts, which, depending on their functionality and indexicality may evolve into cultural symbols. In this context, the enhanced importance of symbolic politics in twentieth-century discourse is a vital factor, hence ‘doing politics’ involves cultural practice. For example, the American inaugural address serves the important function of refreshing the cultural memory by invoking the ‘shared knowledge’ of the past in the shape of public recollection. Building on the assumption that language is not only socially and culturally conditioned, but also a historically constituted phenomenon, it is imperative for any analysis to include a historical perspective. As we shall see below, the speeches are replete with instances of synchronization glossing over obvious discontinuities and contradictions caused by the historicity of political discourse.

Proposing a perspective of discourse that encompasses different layers of historicity also means laying bare discontinuities. As to the origins of contemporary political discourse we have seen that the Aristotelian tradition predominates contemporary thinking about politics. This is problematic, however, since the development of what constitutes today’s political discourse is marked itself by two far-reaching breaks with discourse traditions. The first is to be located in the late eighteenth century, which coincides with the onset of modern political discourse, including the formation of American political discourse as far as it is constitutive of the nation-building process. The second caesura occurred in the first decades of the twentieth century and has brought about a radicalization of these developments.

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<sup>37</sup> If employed in such way, it is difficult to divorce the political from other concepts such as power, ideology, but also group identity or bilingualism. Similarly, Wilson (2003: 398) criticizes this vagueness when he rightly argues that “any of these concepts [= *power, conflict, control, or domination*, emphasis original] may be employed in almost any form of discourse.”

There are numerous reasons why the closing stages of the eighteenth century mark a fundamental turning point in the understanding of politics. Up until the second half of the eighteenth century the language of politics was a technical jargon used by a small group of experts (cf. Dieckmann 1975: 52f.), which means that the political lexicon was not widely circulated. It was only after the French revolution that politics began to be 'publicized' in the sense that political language gradually gained wider currency and increasingly included publicness as a regular feature. As a consequence, the gradual process of democratization in the course of the nineteenth century entailed a steady democratization of the political lexicon (cf. Dieckmann *ibid.*). However slow the beginnings of publicness, it was the result of influential and extensive developments such as the rise of the press and the increasing participation in political process of ever larger portions of the population, the emerging middle classes, all of which deeply transformed politics.

The impact of the print media on politics steadily brought about a change in political rhetoric, closing the gap between addressing a scarce assembly of experts and insiders and a larger audience of people ignorant of the inner-circle political process. This shift in rhetorical practice is particularly conspicuous in the American context, where it has entailed the conflation of rhetorical styles. Consequently, laudatory style, which was prevalent in eighteenth-century political rhetoric, was juxtaposed with hortatory style. Whereas laudatory style is largely uncontroversial due to its proneness to appraisal and self-congratulation, hortatory rhetoric is essentially competitive and is geared towards audience response. Its predominant modes are persuasion vs. dissuasion on the one hand, and exhortation vs. affirmation on the other. Thus, hortatory style is used in political debate and campaigning, which is why it gained weight with the changed discourse conditions.

This transformation of political culture, however, was significant beyond its localized context. Another corollary of these changes is the enhancement of moral judgment of political actions and actors, i.e. a 'renaissance' of political morality. As the *Ancien Regime* was associated with corruption and immorality, the emerging civic ethic morality was to be anchored in the new political system as the only morally conceivable (cf. Eisner 1991: 68). Again, this development is more radical in the 'New World', where the fresh outlook on political and moral conduct gave rise to the invention of a nation and 'a new political science' which was constructed as being free from the moral debasement of the Old World. This 'new morality' in politics is once more mirrored in the shift of rhetorical styles: There is a moral dimension to hortatory rhetoric, in that it seeks to establish rules of moral conduct for the citizens and commits them to abide by them.

Throughout the nineteenth century the transformation into a participatory political culture continued to take shape, subverting the traditional understanding of political culture. These changes contribute to the constitution of publicness on the one hand, and to the transformation of politics into a dynamic process on the other. Crucially, both developments have enhanced the importance of language as an indispensable prerequisite of political participation. Modern democracies understand themselves as processual, where politics relies

on language in the concrete sense of ‘doing politics’ and democracy has gradually turned into democratic practice rather than being an abstract state-philosophical concept.

Although these discontinuities tend to be glossed over, these breaks with political traditions are still effective in our political cognition, where they continue to shape our perception of politics and political activity. Bearing in mind that discourses are characterized by a common-sense background, i.e. assumptions and expectations about our common-sense world of everyday life that are operative as implicit assumptions and inferences (cf. Fairclough 2001: 64), present-day discourses can be said to represent past power struggles such as overcoming the old regime or the founding of the American nation against the negative predictions of their contemporaries.

In this respect, common sense functions as “a repository of the diverse effects of past ideological struggles, and a constant target for restructuring in ongoing struggles. In common sense, ideologies become naturalized or automatized” (Fairclough (1992: 92), referring to Gramsci 1971: 324). Due to the dialectical relationship between discourse and society these common-sense assumptions shape, and are shaped by political cognition. The impact of discourse on political cognition materializes in terms of attitudes to, and evaluations of political actors and actions:

In the same way as ideologies are the cognitive counterpart of systems, organizations or groups at the broader, societal and political macro-levels, political actors, actions and discourse are locally guided and interpreted and evaluated by various forms of political cognition, such as shared social knowledge and political attitudes, as well as more specific knowledge (models) of concrete political events. The most pervasive common-sense notion of this category is probably that of ‘public opinion’. (van Dijk 1997: 18)

Thus cognitive models can be argued to frame our perception of political events with public opinion making use of frames of reference on the basis of affective and cognitive knowledge structures. Crucially, the knowledge does not need to be immediately experiential for it is re-enacted in public discourse.

The preceding discussion has identified a number of problem areas in delimiting the scope of political discourse such as the width and variability of the two component terms political and discourse. While the significance of language for politics is as ubiquitous as it is true, there is no general agreement as to the actual weight of discourse in politics. The existence of broad and narrow conceptions of the political constitutes another stumbling block for the delimitation of the object of study. Diachronically, most members of the ‘political word family’ have undergone gradual specialization, which is indicative of current political practice. Moreover, the analysis of political discourse is influenced by underlying cognitive models which are part and parcel of our reasoning on politics. The study of (political) discourse has to take into consideration the existence of common-sense assumptions that unconsciously shape our perception of the political.

Furthermore, the emergence of publicness has shaped political discourse in that public opinion is interwoven with the political process, to the extent that deliberation is often

initiated by the public, the entire “public domain [also] functions as an ideology-reproducing system” (Blommaert 1997: 2). The increasing focus on the public domain has given rise to the internal differentiation of the field of interest of political discourse. On the one hand, political discourse analysis has been subdivided into diverse sub-disciplines, each of which has specialized in ever more individual aspects of the entire political communication process. On the other hand, the interweaving of political and public discourse has enhanced the awareness of political activities. As they are more or less immediately conveyed via the communicative channels available, there is a certain degree of acceleration caused by the continuous necessity of ever new political events to be reported on.

Finally, given the scope of the political even without taking into account its relationship with language, any study of political discourse is forced to focus on carefully outlined aspects of the political process in order to provide a valid contribution to the understanding of politics as a complex of actions and functions (cf. Dieckmann 1975: 47).

## 2.2 Defining Political Discourse

The analysis of political discourse is an interdisciplinary undertaking that can be situated within political science, communication science but also social psychology to name but the most prominent. Owing to the distinct disciplinary objectives and frameworks, the role of language is assessed differently:

The recognition of the relevance of discourse analysis presupposes realization of the perhaps trivial fact that the many ways of ‘doing politics’ often involves engaging in discursive practices. Upon some reflection, even political scientists who are not working on political communication or political rhetoric, will accept that many if not most political acts and events consist of text and talk. (van Dijk 1997: 37f.)

Endorsing the fact that linguistic science has indeed a valid contribution to make to the study of political discourse, we are faced with two lines of research that have dominated the field, i.e. discourse-cantered accounts and lexicon-based studies.<sup>38</sup> How then, would we classify

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<sup>38</sup> Similarly, Wilson (2003) subdivides the research literature on western political discourse into two substantial fields that have taken shape in the course of the twentieth century. First, there is a voluminous body of literature within a predominantly Anglophone tradition whose advocates are included in the main part of my discussion above. Second, there is a highly influential line of research studying political discourse in the German context. However, I do not uphold this artificial differentiation between the two research traditions. Instead I argue that both branches mutually contribute to a complete and comprehensive analysis of the object of study. In the German context, studies have clustered around the two important political caesuras in its twentieth-century history. The thorough analysis of (ab)uses of language during the Nazi regime is well documented by a voluminous literature (e.g. Greule 2004). Similarly, Schlosser (2005) explores political discourse during important historical periods such as the Weimar Republic and the period after WW II as well as the impact of German reunification on political discourse. Thus it is hardly surprising that some commentators (e.g. Diekmannshenke 2001: 1) argue that the German branch of political linguistics has contributed cutting-edge research due to its systematic development throughout the twentieth century. According to Diekmannshenke (ibid.) the field of political linguistics (‘Politolinguistik’) has gradually established itself as a discipline in its own right from the 1970s onwards, adopting a range of methodologies. By contrast, Januschek (1985: 3) refers to political linguistics as a discipline concerned with investigating linguistic practice as political practice, i.e. as one aspect of the social practice in organized communities. A major drawback of the German branch of political linguistics is its strong emphasis on lexicon-based

applications of conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) or other theories of CL such as conceptual blending or frame semantics in political discourse analysis?<sup>39</sup>

While CMT has been applied within the framework of CDA, this has mostly occurred in a way that modifies CMT to a considerable degree. For instance, Charteris-Black (2004: 21) contends that metaphor is “a linguistic representation that results from the shift in the use of a word or phrase from the context or domain in which it is expected to occur to another context or domain where it is not expected to occur, thereby causing semantic tension. It potentially has linguistic, pragmatic and cognitive characteristics.” Basically, Charteris-Black (2004, 2005) claims that metaphors are a matter of expectation on the one hand, and persuasion on the other, reducing their cognitive characteristics to the sudden recognition of hitherto unperceived similarities. In other words, his account of metaphor is Aristotelian rather than anchored in cognitive linguistics.<sup>40</sup>

In chapter 1.2 the case for cognitive approaches to political discourse on the basis of connected texts was made. The conceptual level is pivotal in both the meaning construction and meaning interpretation process. The constructivist theory of meaning maintains that “the meanings of words, of sentences and of discourses are in the mind, not objectively given” (Chilton 2006: 48). With respect to the vital strategic function of representation within political discourse (see below) the adoption of a cognitive perspective is indispensable.

The representation of political events and actions has to be both cohesive and coherent if it is to be credible. While cohesion can be achieved by linguistic and contextual cues alone, coherence is essentially a cognitive activity. The quality of representation is chiefly determined by likelihood, corroborated by preconceived and pre-existent knowledge structures. Consequently, representation on the level of discourse feeds on cognitive models or frames in which these knowledge structures are stored. Crucially, cognitive models have to be updated from time to time, invalidating conceptual structures that no longer match the representation of socio-political realities while reinforcing those that are still ‘in touch’ with them. For example, the meaning of concepts such as ‘freedom’ or ‘democracy’ is derived from cognitive models pertaining to a particular political culture, i.e. they are subject to a particular time and place. As a result, the representation of political worlds is only persuasive as long as they are ‘possible worlds’ in the sense that they agree with our political cognition.

Accordingly, I will use the term political discourse in order to refer to those activities and discursive practices that are used to achieve coherent representations of socio-political

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approaches. Methodologically, this focus involves the obfuscation of a critique of language with an analysis of language. The invocation of normative approaches to linguistic analysis is reminiscent of Orwell’s reflections on the English language, where the alleged corruptness of political language is assumed to be directly associated with a decay of the English language itself.

<sup>39</sup> The virtual absence of cognitive-linguistic theories within lexicon-based accounts is remarkable, particularly in the German line of research, in which traditional semantic frameworks still appear to be the state-of-the-art.

<sup>40</sup> Other cases in point are Fairclough (2000: 32f.), who refers to metaphorization as a device of meaning construction, or van Dijk (1998: 272f.), who subsumes metaphor under “the system of special ‘rhetorical figures’ that have specific persuasive functions at various structural levels of discourse.”



realities, inclusive of both self and other presentation. As such, the term ‘political discourse’ may be used generically denoting all activities to do with the political — broad and narrow — provided that language is conceived of as discourse.

In what follows I will be doing what Blommaert (1997: 1) has referred to as “toying with terminology.” With the intention of delimiting my object of study more carefully from alternative categories such as political language, political communication and political rhetoric, I will discuss to what extent the characteristics of presidential discourse draw on the properties of these categories. Clearly these delimitations can never be absolute; since they need to be defined in relation to the goal of the analysis, i.e. the analysis of American presidential discourse using the theory of conceptual metaphor within the framework of CDA.

### **2.2.1 Political Language**

This chapter resumes the discussion begun in chapter 1.1, in which the problematic implications of the notion ‘political language’ were described on the basis of Orwell’s conception. Generally speaking, political language is a descriptive label mostly concerned with theorizing rather than with developing particular methodologies. As such, political language may denote the language used in politics, by politicians, to political ends etc. Despite, or even because of its vagueness the term political language fulfils important functions. Due to its marked symbolic value language in politics is associated with a strong integrative force comparable to other symbols such as a shared socio-historical background, common beliefs and value systems or national monuments (cf. Dieckmann 1975: 32).

This symbolic nature may also account for the assumption that there are at least the following linguistic features that define political language. First, political language is typified by a specialist vocabulary, an expert language so to speak. Accordingly it is a technical jargon such as that used by medics, lawyers, computer scientists or genetic engineers. Historically, political language may be conceived of as the language of an inner circle of experts but that is counter-intuitive to today’s understanding. Nowadays political language is a hybrid in the strict sense of the word. It consists of a large segment of everyday language as well as technical vocabulary. However, political language draws on several jargons (cf. Klein 1989: 5). The exact proportion of technical language depends on a number of contextual parameters, for example, whether or not political language is used in institutional (i.e. behind closed doors and addressed to insiders) or public communication. Moreover, political language can be argued to possess international currency, as evidenced by a number of ‘internationalisms’ which are linked to political, social and cultural communities on the basis of political affinities other than their nationality. Importantly, political language is also not confined to ideologies since opposing ideologies usually take resort to the same vocabularies, albeit with antagonistic meanings and evaluations.

Second, the ambivalent nature of political language means that we cannot refer to political language as the realization of one particular text type on the written level of language and as different speech styles on the spoken level. In view of this disparity, political texts can be

realized by a multitude of different text types which makes each political text a singular event. In order to recognize the potentiality of political texts, it is important not only to focus on their textual properties as such, but also on their communicative goals and their intertextuality. Similarly, Diekmannshenke (2001: 5) conceives of political language as a generic term encompassing all forms of public, institutional and private talk about political issues on the one hand, and all text types characteristic of politics on the other, as well as any use of lexical and stylistic means typical of political contexts. Hence political language may be regarded as “the totality of spoken and written utterances made in relation to political action” (Eisner 1991: 3).<sup>41</sup>

Third, some commentators even view political language as a variety in its own right. Kilian (1997: 66) distinguishes between the general characteristics of the ‘variety’ political language and its domain of communication; he argues that language norms in the latter are always dependent on historical times and the system of rule prevailing at a given period.<sup>42</sup> Finally, political language is also employed to designate the language of X, for example the language of New Labour (Fairclough 2000), the language of democracy, the language of war etc. This usage is misleading since “there is no such thing as the language of fascism, anti-Semitism etc. but only language used in this particular way” (Girnth 2002: 10).<sup>43</sup>

### 2.2.2 Political Communication

The scope of political communication is determined by its interface with public discourse. The varying degrees of public exposure necessitate distinct communicative styles on behalf of political actors. Predictably, due to its interdisciplinary character, the definition of political communication exposes similar incongruities to those mentioned earlier, and yet these conflicts appear to be less reconcilable.<sup>44</sup>

In part, this is due to the ‘binary code’ of political communication, which means that any political message that is publicly communicated is simultaneously encoded for two distinct audiences, that is, in-group vs. out-group addressees. Similarly, political communication may be addressed to the general public or to political decision-makers, in which case it would be interpersonal or inter-group political communication. Some commentators have referred to

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<sup>41</sup> As the intention was to include some of the literature that originated within the German line of research on political discourse, the procedure with the German research literature was as follows. When merely acknowledging the fact that my argument is supported by another source, a reference is made to the author without providing the passage. However, when quoting or paraphrasing directly from the German source, the translation will be supplied. The latter applies to the passage quoted from above; the German original text reads: “Politische Sprache als Gesamt jener gesprochenen und geschriebenen Äußerungen, die in einem Bezug zu politischem Handeln stehen” (Eisner 1991: 3).

<sup>42</sup> The German original reads: “Sprachnormen im Kommunikationsbereich der Politik sind im Unterschied zu allgemeinen Eigenschaften der Varietät ‘Politische Sprache’ stets abhängig von historischer Zeit und Herrschaftsform” (Kilian 1997:66).

<sup>43</sup> The German text reads: “Es gibt keine Sprache des Faschismus, Antisemitismus etc. sondern nur einen solchen Sprachgebrauch” (Girnth 2002: 10).

<sup>44</sup> Conversely, Girnth (2002: 32) presumes that politics as a domain in which communication takes place consists of a limited amount of communicative situations, all of which are intuitively accessible to most participants as they are part of our collective knowledge.

this differentiation as an artificial contrast (Holly 1990) or an overt simplification (e.g. Kriesi 2004: 187), emphasizing the enhanced importance of public discourse for policy-making today. Nevertheless the discrimination as such persists, particularly in the discipline of political science. Accordingly, public-policy analysts (e.g. von Beyme 1994: 332) contend that the impact of political communication on the actual policy-making process tends to be overrated.<sup>45</sup> As a consequence, political scientists have only recently focused on the central interdependence of public opinion and the political process itself. Kriesi (2004: 186) pinpoints his critique as follows:

Thus, analyses of political decision and implementation processes by political scientists hardly take the public sphere into account, and focus instead on bargaining and debate in the parliamentary or administrative arenas. By contrast, analysts of social movements are primarily interested in the movements' mobilization of the public, but hardly ever pay attention to their impact on bargaining inside the political system. Finally, practitioners from the communication sciences concentrate on how the opinions and electoral decisions of citizens are influenced by the media.

Kriesi's evaluation addresses the distinct disciplinary biases inherent in the existing approaches to political communication. The insufficient focus on the communicative aspects of the political process within political science is well known as is the one-sided emphasis on the mechanisms of "political arousal, violence, and quiescence" (Edelman 1971: 1) within social-psychological frameworks. This point of criticism echoes the concerns articulated by van Dijk (1997, see quotation above), stating that the role of language in the political process is regularly underrated by political scientists. The alleged one-sidedness on behalf of social-psychological factors, however, needs to be further qualified. The absence of feedback is inherent in the political process itself. To a degree, it thrives on the exclusiveness of information and negotiations behind closed doors. The analyst of political communication is inevitably barred from a substantial part of the communications that are significant for the political process.<sup>46</sup> For this reason, direct response to communicative input is frequently unavailable, except perhaps for communicative situations involving political debate.

The validity of analyses of political communication is largely determined by the conceptions of communication on which the investigations are based. In its simplest form, communication involves an addresser, an addressee, a code shared by transmitter and receiver, and something that is being communicated, a message or subject. The underlying model (Shannon/Weaver 1949) devises communication as mechanical despite the liability to

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<sup>45</sup> Yet, one could equally argue that the reason why the role of language in the policy-making process is often misjudged derives from the apparent absence of direct response. The lack of immediate feedback does not downplay the actual power of public opinion which is, time and again, illustrated by the influence of both opinion polls and media coverage on the decision-making process. A case in point is Margaret Thatcher's resignation as British Prime Minister, which was, at least in part, a result of the run-up of media coverage concerning the popularity and efficacy of her leadership (cf. Franklin 1994).

<sup>46</sup> McNair (2003: 4) refers to the political discussions of people in public places, behind-closed-doors negotiations of governments and 'first-hand' information of political journalists as "interpersonal political communication." While he (ibid.) underlines their significance for the political process, he calls into question the possibility of analyzing this kind of communications as "requiring methodologically difficult and costly empirical research to uncover their secrets."

interferences of the communication process. This view of communication essentially builds on an understanding of human communication that has become known as the conduit metaphor, according to which communication is conceptualized as a ‘conduit’ (Reddy 1979), conveying thoughts and feelings without potential failure in transmission.<sup>47</sup> From a cognitive perspective, our basic understanding of communication is derived from a set of ontological metaphors which “facilitate the perception of structural similarities between otherwise conceptually distant domains” (Kövecses 2002: 74). Accordingly, human communication is conceptualized on the basis of the following metaphorical mappings:

THE MIND IS A CONTAINER

IDEAS ARE OBJECTS

COMMUNICATION IS SENDING IDEAS FROM ONE MIND-CONTAINER TO ANOTHER

Ontological metaphors impinge on the way we think about abstract entities such as ideas, mind and communication. Importantly, ontological metaphors are not simply based on idiosyncratic assumptions about these abstractions. Similarly, Sweetser (1987) has identified the existence of a cultural model about language use and, by extension, communication. Sweetser (*ibid.*: 45) elaborates on the cultural motivation for a folk understanding of language (use) as informational. According to this cultural model the informational mode of language is conceptualized as the direct mode, i.e. all discourse is assumed to involve the conveyance of information. Thus this ‘basic’ informational discourse mode is viewed as discourse in its unmarked mode, serving as a vehicle for other modes of discourse.

Sweetser (*ibid.*) emphasizes that this cultural model of discourse modes does not constitute rules of language use. Rather this cognitive model is indicative of assumptions and beliefs associated with language and communication, which is modeled as a process involving several modes; in its default mode, however, it primarily conveys information.

As a consequence, delimiting political communication processes from those instances of ‘normalized’ everyday communication frequently involves the deviance from this ‘basic’ mode of discourse. In particular, theorizing on political communication strongly advocates deviant, indirect, even strategic communicative styles, which are assumed to be constitutive of political communication.

The onset of such considerations is Edelman’s (1985) influential concept of the doubling of political reality. In a public context, events are invariably politicized to a degree that one has to differentiate between events themselves and the representation of these events on behalf of political actors. For instance, what is staged as a casual discussion may in fact be political advertising; similarly, what is encoded in the informational mode may well dysphemistically

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<sup>47</sup> The conduit metaphor rests on two basic assumptions. First, language is thought to transfer human thoughts and feelings. Second, the conduit metaphor states that words are spatial metaphors in which their meanings reside; similar to a container, they have ‘insides’ and ‘outsides’ as exemplified by the expression “to put something into words”. In the communication process, the speaker packs his intended meaning into the container and the listener’s task is to extract the meaning (Reddy 1979: 286ff.). Reddy criticizes this view of communication as too ‘mathematical’ and hence not suitable to describe the process of human communication with its social implications.

decode as propaganda. Thus we would need to distinguish between ‘actual’ communicative styles and enacted communicative styles, which in practice, however, is difficult to uphold.

Nevertheless, the modes of political communication need to be studied more closely against the background of this binary code. According to Mueller (1973: 19), political communication constitutes a paradigmatic case of distorted communication, which is used as an umbrella term to cover three forms of restricted and prejudiced communication all of which, by their nature, prevent an open discussion of issues of public relevance.<sup>48</sup> Inversely, distorted communication precludes the development of a public discourse that might influence or even control the practices of political movers and shakers. In its most alarming form the communicative practice of arrested communication may even erode the foundations of a participatory political culture, which rests on an informed public and electorate.

Defining political communication in such negative terms is indicative of one of the two political traditions of politics mentioned in connection with political cognition above. So far, political communicative behavior has been viewed as decidedly Machiavellian in that it is essentially strategic while the possibility of using language communicatively, i.e. in the direct informational mode, is unequivocally dismissed.

It is true that political communication is frequently directed and therefore can hardly be dissociated from a certain level of intentionality on behalf of the political actor. McNair (2003: 4) defines political communication as “*purposeful communication about politics*” [emphasis original]. As such it encompasses “all forms of communication undertaken by politicians and other political actors for the purpose of achieving specific objectives” (ibid.).<sup>49</sup> Yet communicative practices aimed at achieving specific ends are not restricted to political actors and linguistic action alone. In order to clarify the notion of intentionality in the political context, political communication needs to be embedded into an action-theoretical framework. Here two types of intentionality are typically distinguished. On the one hand, political actors may have the intention of doing something, i.e. they devise a plan or desire to do something which might commit them to further actions in the future. On the other hand, political communicators may have the intention to do something, in which case the intention relates to

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<sup>48</sup> More precisely, Mueller (1973: 19) defines the three forms of distorted communication as follows. (1) Governmental policy may be aimed at structuring language and communication as a means of social control. This directed communication is pertinent to political systems that are close to totalitarianism, in which communication is regularly used to drive home the preferred ideological interpretation of ‘the world’. (2) Constrained communication denotes those instances of communication between the government and the public which overtly address societal problems while being subject to the systematic bias of governmental and private interests (ibid.: 87). (3) Arrested communication indicates that due to restrictions on the flow of information members of the public or even a large proportion of the public are prevented from engaging in political communication, at least regarding some issues. Due to this absence of insight there is no basis for involvement; citizens might feel barred from access to information by governmental regulators of communication.

<sup>49</sup> In fact, McNair’s (2003: 4) definition of political communication is even less specific than this. He (ibid.) also incorporates all communication addressed to political actors by non-political politicians as well as communication about these political actors and activities, hence meta-political communication in the strict sense of the word. What is more, however, he considers all symbolic codes, i.e. not only verbal or written discourse but other aspects, for example someone’s outer appearance, as conducive to the creation of a political image.

the logic of the action itself. Here the action is successfully completed when the intended result and the intended consequences are named (cf. Keller <sup>2</sup>1994: 26f.).

Within the framework of action theory, however, further qualifications need to be made. Habermas' ([1981], 1998: 118f.) model of *purposive-rational* action deploys social action as conditioned by two distinct purposes for action. Accordingly, "social actions can be distinguished according to whether the participants adopt either a success-oriented attitude or one oriented toward reaching understanding" (ibid.). More precisely, the former is called 'strategic action' on the basis of rules of rational choice and the degree of efficiency of its influencing the decisions of a rational counterpart in action (ibid.: 118). The latter is referred to as communicative action "whenever the plans of action of the actors involved are coordinated not through egocentric calculations of success but through acts of reaching understanding" (ibid.). Evidently, both actions are liable to collide, which is the case in 'latent strategic action' (Habermas [1981], 1998: 169). As Habermas (ibid.) argues, in this situation "at least one participant of the communication process behaves with an orientation toward success, but leaves others to believe that all the presuppositions of communicative action are satisfied."<sup>50</sup>

As a result, the correlation of intentionality and its action-theoretic implications build on the same distinction between supposed cooperativeness as the basic or default mode of language on the one hand, and the selection of a different strategy, which is regarded as deviant, departing from the underlying idealized case of communication.

In fact, human linguistic behavior encompasses both strategies, as does our knowledge of the mechanism of communication. More importantly, one form of linguistic communication presupposes the other: the expectation of cooperative behavior in social interaction is a precondition for distortion and deception. "Such a fundamental expectation of truth is consistent with the way perception works. The world that one perceives (and constructively conceives) is taken to be *prima facie* accurate" (Chilton 2006: 23).

Transposing the claims made about communication in the preceding paragraphs onto the political level, we may conclude that the explorations into political communication appear to be distorted by some fundamental common-sense assumptions about the nature of communication itself. To the extent that a default model of discourse is stipulated, in which human communicative behavior is conceptualized as essentially cooperative, a distinction is usually made between so called 'communicative' strategies — if the actual linguistic behavior complies with our expectations of cooperation — and so called strategic uses of language — if communicative practice is perceived as deviating from those 'common-sense assumptions'.

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<sup>50</sup> In his *Universal Pragmatics* account Habermas ([1976], 1998: 93) further elaborates on the various types of strategic action. He distinguishes between two types of 'latently strategic action', namely 'manipulation' and 'systematically distorted communication'. Whereas "the manipulator deceives at least one of the *other* participants about their own strategic attitude, in which she *deliberatively* behaves in a pseudoconsensual manner," in systematically distorted communication "at least one of the participants deceives *himself* about the fact that the basis of consensual action is only apparently being maintained" (ibid., emphasis original).

The adherence to action-based and goal-oriented approaches to political communication as exposed above runs the risk of introducing too strong a bias into the analysis. From a goal-oriented or telic perspective, these accounts are fuelled by the artificial contrast of communicative vs. strategic linguistic action, which should read ‘strategically communicative’ since both types apply to one and the same linguistic action and only differ in the speaker’s attitude to the communicative event. Moreover, in socially meaningful communicative actions the combination of consensus-oriented and success-oriented communicative strategies may not only be possible but may even represent the socially preferred practice. This is why clear definitions of the (situative) context are a vital prerequisite for an adequate analysis of communicative action. The possibility that this may eventually include a value judgment of a given political action has to be taken into account.

From an action-theoretic perspective it is difficult to view intentionality as a key factor of political communication. With regard to the important distinction between two types of intentionality, there is a very weak methodological basis for investigating the intentionality of political actors and their communication. Intentionality, either in the sense of a political communicator’s intention of doing something, which may be compared to a promise or self-commitment, or in the sense of framing a political action with the intention of doing something is constrained by the political agent’s public role. And yet, it is the intentionality residing in the intent to frame political communication to one’s preferences that is most relevant within an action-theoretic framework. In political action, intentionality is usually couched in a specific political function, context, or even the investiture of a political office.<sup>51</sup> In these institutionalized forms of intentionality the ascription of certain modes of discourse (even in the guise of speech acts) is doomed.

Goal-oriented and action-based analyses of political communication expose several weaknesses, all of which, however, feed on the same source: the unilateral bias towards the communicator. The speaker, including the political speaker, is but one part in any complex communication process, but particularly political communication. Fortunately, the ‘receiving end’ of the political communication process has become increasingly important in the analysis of political communication. Consequently, the concentration on pragmatic aspects of the communicative practice should be extended to the addressee. Allan & Burrige’s (1991) vital distinction between euphemism and dysphemism illustrates why both interactants are central to an adequate analysis of communication. What might be encoded as euphemism on this side of the communication channel might eventually be decoded as dysphemism on the other end. Essentially, the function of a euphemistic expression can be a face-saving strategy when it is used as an alternative to a dispreferred expression in order to avoid a possible loss of face.

Ideally, the study of political communication also accounts for the representations of socio-political realities that are constructed online via the communication process. Crucially, these representations feed on various levels of knowledge that are encapsulated in human political

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<sup>51</sup> For Girth (2002: 32) the politician’s intention is the equivalent of a linguistically encoded intention, which need not correspond with the politician’s ‘true’ intention.

cognition. Effective representation occurs by virtue of socially and politically preferred knowledge structures, which have authority over dispreferred ones.

Political discourse involves [...] the promotion of representations, and a pervasive feature of representation is the evident need for political speakers to imbue their utterances with evidence, authority and truth, a process that we shall refer to in broad terms, in the context of political discourse, as 'legitimization'. (Chilton 2006: 23)

The dynamics of language as discourse — the dialectical relationship between language as a symbolically encoded social practice and its representations — involve a huge potential for selectivity and displacement. By necessity, political communication is an adaptive system, seeking to accommodate these changing discourse conditions. Devising political communication as a process differs from goal- and action-oriented approaches in that the adaptability of all participants involved in this process is taken into consideration.

The heightened awareness of the role of public discourse is indicative of such an adjustment. Political communication takes place in various public arenas simultaneously, each of which has its communication professionals, making use of specific public strategies. Kriesi (2004: 189) distinguishes between three categories of actors and their characteristic strategies. First, public-political agency is assumed on behalf of the decision makers whose public strategies are to be seen as top-down strategies. Thus, political decision makers address the public regularly and habitually. "They not only produce institutionalized events on which the media report in a routine fashion, they also stage pseudoevents, which are routinely reported on by the media, too" (Kriesi *ibid.*: 191). Addressing the public in order to get attention and support is most advanced in American political culture due to the origins of political discourse which have favored its early and natural institutionalization (see chapter 3 below).

Second, the opponents of governmental and administrative dominance constitute an important group of public agents which, however, further subdivide into challengers belonging to the inner circle and 'outsiders', belonging to organizations that range from civic initiatives to socially based movements. These adversaries of governmental coalitions engage in activities that are best described as "bottom-up strategies" (Kriesi *ibid.*: 189). More precisely, these strategies are motivated by the intent to gain access to parts of the public arena that are otherwise closed to the general public. One possibility of achieving this goal is to engage in protest politics, another is information politics.

Third, the established media, i.e. the press, newspaper, television channels, the internet and radio stations, are influential political actors partaking in as well as shaping the political communication process. Throughout the twentieth century the media evolved into the major mouthpiece of politics. Constituting an in-between world between political decision makers and the general public, the media are anything but mere respondents to the political communication process. Rather, they have adopted an active role in that "they also become actors of their own in the political process" (Kriesi *ibid.*: 194). More precisely,

[the] public discourse of the media is a process of interaction in which participants use or appropriate texts and produce texts as almost incidental tools by which they, journalists, owners of the media and newsmakers alike, engage in the day-to-day



social practices within their communities of practice and in doing which they construct for themselves various discursive identities [...]. (Scollon 1998: 3)

In agreement with the shifting identities of participants in the political communication process, political decision-makers and the media have developed relations that are frequently constructed as peaceful co-existence.<sup>52</sup> The politicians themselves have adjusted their communicative styles as well as their leadership styles. As to the media, they have increasingly claimed agency instead of merely reporting on political events as part of their “media-centered strategies” (Kriesi 2004: 194f.). A telling example in this respect is the ‘anchor’ or ‘anchor person’, a news presenter, who not only personalizes news events but also frames them on the basis of time and location.<sup>53</sup> Thus political action has been increasingly mediatized, as a result of the top-down and media-centered strategies of the participants of communication in the public domain. The outcome is that political action is not only mediated but mediatized, which is why Fairclough (1998) refers to this form of political discourse as ‘mediatized political discourse’.

The rising importance of the public-political interface<sup>54</sup> with regard to communicative practice is dependent on the changed conditions of representative government. Whereas parliamentarianism is the prevailing form of representative government in the nineteenth century, the twentieth century gave rise to two new forms of representative government. At the beginning of the last century democratic systems were typified by strong party-political interests that had a large impact on political discourse. Whereas political debate is the preferred discourse mode in parliaments, party-political communication is individualized and personalized, originating from the “decline of the ideologically oriented and structurally rooted mass party” (Kriesi 2004: 184), and the emergence of an “electoral audience” (ibid.).

In line with the changed discourse conditions throughout the twentieth century the hegemony of discourses — political as well as public — has been increasingly subject to personalization. In the realm of politics this development is mirrored in the personalization of political issues on the one hand, and personalization as a style of leadership on the other. In American politics, the personalization of political issues, if not politics itself, has contributed to the rise of the rhetorical (Tulis 1987) or symbolic (Hinckley 1990) presidency. Interestingly, the phenomenon of personalization has also affected “the British presidency” (Foley 1993), a

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<sup>52</sup> This cohabitation is only overtly peaceful because in the event of conflict it has become a popular strategy to mutually accuse one another, shifting responsibilities. Alternatively, one or the other is used as a shield of protection, which is why the practitioners of news management have been referred to as ‘flak catchers’. Nowadays it is more common to denote them as spin doctors.

<sup>53</sup> Scollon (1998: 4) includes yet another perspective, drawing attention to the fact that the format of the news presented in the media is usually placed in social situations, increasing the impact of mediatization on the actual news text. Moreover, Scollon observes that the ritual of passing the floor further contributes to constructing “a particular social-discursive identity to the participants” (ibid.) in the community of practice.

<sup>54</sup> Some commentators draw a strict distinction between political communication and politico-public communication (Girnth 2002) in order to underline the separation of political decision-making from communicating its outcome to the public.

process in which “politicians and policies have become ‘packaged’ for media presentation and public consumption” (Franklin 1994: 4).<sup>55</sup>

In their management of public communication, political actors are assisted by armies of aides. These personal advisers and consultants are usually referred to as ‘spin doctors’ whose special trade is called spin.<sup>56</sup> Both areas have generated an extensive literature of their own, and will be briefly outlined in the context of the developments of the American presidency in chapter 3.

Besides the new ‘interpretation’ of the presidential office, or in the British context the interpretation of the Prime Minister’s office as presidential, the personalized public-political communication coincides with a changed understanding of leadership. In the American context the personalization of politics has resulted in ‘spatial leadership’ (Foley 1993), which has gradually been incorporated into other political institutions such as that of the British Prime Minister. Spatial leadership builds on personal and physical detachment from the government, which entails a communicative style that creates maximal distance between the public and its representatives (see chapter 3).<sup>57</sup>

In the light of the enhanced importance of public discourse, it would be conceivable that the general public is generally speaking more aware of the political process due to the constant media footage. However, the actual impact on the public, for instance its readiness to engage in political action, appears to be weak. As early as 1973, Mueller commented on the consequential implications of ‘going public’. He (1973: 24f.) criticized the depoliticization of the public in advanced capitalist societies due to affluence on the one hand, and increasing public exposure on the other, whereby the political process is left to a handful of political experts. A case in point is the drastic decrease in voter turnout as one likely consequence of ‘mediatized political discourse’. A general disengagement from politics appears to be the rule rather than the exception in contemporary societies. There is no denying that the media, especially news coverage of electoral campaigning, do have a strong impact on voter behavior i.e. on those who decide to go to the polls eventually. Thus many political decisions may precede a public discussion while others are certainly initiated by public discourse. What are the reasons for this inconsistency?

Sarcinelli (2000) investigates the interaction of political communication with modern information technologies in German politics. Interestingly, Sarcinelli (ibid.) correlates the

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<sup>55</sup> These major modifications on behalf of the addressers of political communication are also consequential for the addressee or audience. This professionalized public discourse is variously referred to as “media democracy” (Fairclough 2000), “electronic democracy” (Zittel 2004), or “audience democracy” (Manin 1997: 279). Whatever the label used the general thrust is obvious: the public sphere has been recognized as a decisive front line in the political arena.

<sup>56</sup> Fairclough (2000: 121) points to their awkward position between major political agents. He argues that “[s]pecial advisers are in an ambiguous position between the political party and the Government — they are appointed politically but are members of the civil service.”

<sup>57</sup> In media discourse, the increasing dissociation and dislocation of political communication has been compensated for by the emergence of a so-called anchorperson. This development runs parallel to the detached leadership style in politics. As the two developments can be synchronized, we have another piece of evidence of the degree of interwovenness of media and politics in the public sphere: the more ‘spatial’ the president, the more need for localization in the news.

publicness of political communication with the potentiality of modern technologies. Not only are they capable of archiving and saving enormous amounts of information and knowledge, but they also allow for instantaneous retrieval through the virtually unlimited accessibility of online memory. Consequently political communication has changed both in quantity and in quality and has deprived political events of their singularity and irrepeatability. Modern political communication requires a specific design of communication formats configured to suit the communicative ends of a mass audience. Sarcinelli (2000) argues for the ritualization of political communication, i.e. the fact that any public address is converted into a singular (historical) event. Within a media-centered framework, this is the equivalent of the serialization of news. Perhaps the most telling example in this respect is the coinage of terms such as breaking news, photo op, press kit etc., pointing to the packaging of politics into ever smaller portions, which are broadcast again and again with only slight modifications.

In fact, repetition has become a key component of contemporary political communication. In the process, it has increasingly come to rely on affective responses on behalf of the public. Edelman (1971: 77) pinpoints this phenomenon as follows: “If a few classic themes are surefire vehicles for engaging the emotions of large numbers of people, leaders will predictably interpret events in these forms, and their audiences will eagerly cooperate in creating the world in the same configurations.”

Apart from this strong emotional appeal the invocation of well entrenched values and beliefs also fulfils very important ideological functions. Eisner’s (1991: 57ff.) distinction between “instrumentelle Orientierung” (‘instrumental orientation’) and “Werteaktualisierung” (‘reinvigoration of values’) is useful for the illustration of the dual encoding of political discourse. Suspended between culture as a system of knowledge and the world of objects and actions, political communication has to mediate between them. In the process, instrumental orientation and the reinvigoration of values constitute two distinct modes of action. Instrumental thinking is goal-oriented and thus directed to actively shaping ‘the world’. Its key words are thus efficiency, planning, benefits etc. If fundamental interpretations of ‘the world’ are at stake, however, the thrust of political discourse may be geared towards moral or normative issues. In this case, values and interpretations of the world are constructed as ‘shared beliefs’ or ‘shared knowledge’. In order to perpetuate these constructs political communication draws on the historical past of a given discourse community, which is accessible in the guise of ‘collective imaginaries’ (Laclau 1985) or the so-called “kulturelles Gedächtnis” (‘cultural memory’) (Assmann 2005, 2006). Refreshing this ‘shared’ memory is one of the most essential functions of political discourse. It is also one of the key functions of the American inaugural address as will be shown in the second part of this study.

The degree, however, to which political communication has an impact on public opinion, is not uncontested. While there is no denying that political communication actively and efficiently works with information, there are limits to the controllability of public opinion. Neither the direct suppression of public discourse, nor the mechanic brainwashing of totalitarian regimes are strategies typical of Western democracies. Nonetheless, the striving for

hegemony of discourse in the public sphere is part and parcel of political communication. In this respect, “Einwegkommunikation” (‘one-way communication’) (Holly 1990: 23) may prove an efficient strategy to streamline public discourse. Consensus is indeed manufactured more easily by virtue of staging political pseudo-events in the place of genuine public debate. The absence of controversy is beneficial to the hegemony of dominant groups, particularly against the background that political action no longer relies on the consent of a large percentage of the electorate (cf. Mueller 1973: 90).

Even the incantations of an era of information cannot mask the fact that ‘information’ has become a strategic resource whose accessibility is eagerly controlled:<sup>58</sup>

In advanced industrial society, information has become a crucial prerequisite for political control and opposition politics, a necessity which is due to factors such as the complexity of society, the growth of governmental bureaucracies, and the tremendous distance between those who make the decisions and the individual citizen. Even though the mass media and the growing literacy of the population create the preconditions for an informed public, it could be argued that the political information the individual possesses decreases in proportion to the total information that exists, much of which is repositied with governmental agencies. (Mueller 1973: 88)

The dissemination of information in the era of information technology has led to a social practice of withdrawal from public political action, which is foreshadowed by Mueller’s (1973) remarks. This is only superficially paradoxical. When socio-political realities are continuously obscured by ‘information pollution’, ‘information fatigue’ is but a natural response.

### **2.2.3 Political Rhetoric**

Recurrence thus exerts a profound but subtle influence on the development of political culture as old rhetorical themes are fashioned to suit new values. (Struever 1974: 414)

Information is also an issue when investigating the phenomenon of political rhetoric. Rhetoric, associated with a lack in substance, is frequently contrasted with using language in a communicative way, i.e. discourse with an informational value. Political rhetoric is presumably the most negative label to denote communicative activities of political actors. Similarly, van Dijk (1997: 34) traces the negative connotations of rhetoric back to our common-sense assumptions of political discourse, which as cultural models are deeply entrenched in our political cognition. Rhetoric is typically associated with verbose, hyperbolic, dishonest and immoral discourse behavior, to name but a few of the negative features. In part, these apprehensions result from the pervasiveness of particular communicative styles associated

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<sup>58</sup> Pörksen (1997) states that information, which he includes in a list of what he terms ‘amorphous plastic words’, is a prime example of the mathematization of public discourse. In what follows, I will paraphrase Pörksen’s (ibid.: 18) original line of argument. “Plastikwörter” (‘plastic words’) as connotative stereotypes are the end-product of a process which blends the scientific domain with the domain of everyday experience. Popular and colloquial words are embedded into the scientific domain whereby they obtain an overcoat of prestige and the status of generally accepted truths. Having acquired this state of authority, the plastic words find their way back into public discourse, in which they become myths that cloak the meanings of our everyday language. Similarly, Fairclough (1999) argues for a conceptual shift, resulting in the contiguity of knowledge and information in late-modernity discourse.

with political rhetoric, for example repetition, deletion or substitution; in part, however, these negative terms are epiphenomenal to changes in the field of politics itself.

Political action is determined by nonverbal actions and symbolic actions. Verbal, rhetorical political action is perceived as subordinate to ‘real’ action in the sense of taking political decisions. This claim is reflected in the dichotomy of ‘words’ vs. ‘deeds’ on the one hand, and of symbolic politics vs. politics ‘proper’ on the other.

The word pair ‘reality and rhetoric’ is another important dichotomy. To Fairclough (2000: 142) the rift between rhetoric and reality rests on two assumptions: the familiar misconception of rhetoric as empty words, in which case the government fails to live up to what it says, and the perhaps less obvious case where the government’s actions go further than its words. In brief: whenever a mismatch occurs between governmental actions and their articulation in discourse, rhetoric appears to be the system of reference. Accordingly, Mueller (1973: 91) invokes the manipulative powers of language when he argues that

the obfuscation of political reality can be achieved with the use of a highly evocative, ritualistic language. Political campaigns and careers are dependent upon symbolic, rhetoric-laden statements which have little if any effect on the decision-making process. [...] The public is – and probably wants to be – reassured by political symbolism of its civic importance while the decision-making process itself runs counter to its interests.

It is tempting to equate political rhetoric with propaganda, particularly when we do not agree with its contents (cf. Dieckmann 1975: 36f.). Thus the accusation of propaganda, similar to ideology, can be regarded as the battle cry of political opponents. The ‘propaganda’ of political rhetoric is characterized by informative-persuasive language use on the one hand and the important purpose of integration on the other, i.e. it contributes to delimiting group membership. The label propaganda is typically associated with totalitarian regimes but is also critically applied to democracies where “(political) propaganda consists of political symbols manipulated for the control of public opinion” (Lasswell 1963: 111). Consequently, propaganda necessitates publicness and diversity as well as a conflict of interests, all of which are not part of a classical understanding of rhetoric. The political elite of the Greek polis constituted a closed system in which the orator did not have to bridge ideological gaps. Moreover the rhetorical address was not held in public but in front of the assembly. While it is true that, from a modern perspective, rhetoric and propaganda can be used interchangeably, this is not necessarily valid within its classical context.

More recently, commentators have therefore contended that propaganda is not to be regarded as an entirely negative phenomenon; rather, political propaganda is to be seen as a form of political advertising (cf. Holly 1990: 15). Similarly, Robertson (1995: 6) observes that political rhetoric, new and old, is not merely bombast, florid in style, but invariably concerns itself with choice. In the case of electioneering rhetoric this choice means the mobilization of voters. Its efficiency, however, builds on the integrity of the political actors, the politicians. Van Dijk (1997: 13) defines politicians as “a group of people who are being paid for their (political) activities, and who are being elected or appointed (or alternatively, self-designated) as the central players in the polity.” The morality of politicians, their actions as well as their

words is an essential asset for political success. Credibility is directly linked to the public face of politicians, whose successful and efficient use of rhetoric constitutes a vital face-saving discourse strategy. In turn, a great deal of the communication addressed to the public aims to counter face-threatening acts while serving to legitimize one's own policies.

Its strong reliance on emotional appeal shifts the focus of political discourse onto the domain of rhetoric in the sense that rhetoric is traditionally regarded as the art of persuasion. The affective component of 'mass arousal' tends to supersede other modes of communication. Nonetheless, political rhetoric cannot be defined solely on the basis of persuasion. As a criterion of definition persuasion also applies to the language of advertising, religion or economics (cf. Dieckmann 1975: 26). Even within its classical understanding rhetoric as the *ars bene dicendi* does not imply speaking in an ornate style but also in a functionally apt way (cf. Dieckmann *ibid.*: 98). Analogizing rhetoric with persuasion in terms of its reliance on elaborated style is misleading.

Following a shift of emphasis within the discipline of rhetoric itself, a distinction is made between old rhetoric and new rhetoric; the former is concerned with persuasion while the latter centers on identification. Interestingly, this modification can be observed in American presidential rhetoric, beginning around the late 1920s and 1930s (cf. Finkelstein 1981). Perhaps this is one reason why the notion political rhetoric appears to be connoted with negative evaluations to a lesser degree in the American context. While not intending to claim that rhetoric is a neutral term, there are however a number of aspects that would account for a more favorable overtone. Chiefly, there are important historical reasons. The rhetorical founding of American political discourse, emerging from the Puritan's pulpit rhetoric, is deeply ensconced in public perception. Moreover the American system has produced a powerful presidential office, which has gradually taken over more and more communicative domains. This increase in the president's public exposure has brought about the phenomenon of the rhetorical presidency (see chapter 3). Prior to elaborating on these crucial aspects I will continue to outline the multi-faceted concept of political discourse, followed by a brief discussion of the role of ideology in political discourse.

#### **2.2.4 Political Discourse**

The definitions of discourse are legion, making discourse one of the most ambiguous and controversial notions within recent history of science. In what follows I will briefly outline the properties of discourse that are germane to this present study. Conceiving of language as discourse is based on the hypothesis that all reality is mediated by ideology. From this perspective, linguistic coding is not only inevitably selective but importantly, all experience of reality is fractured by an ideological lens. This claim corroborates the theoretical groundwork laid down by Voloshinov (1973), whose hypothesis of the ubiquity of ideology will be the point of departure of the discussion later.

Methodologically, the analysis of political discourse includes the conditions at the time of a text's production and its reception in relation to both preceding and ensuing texts. In other

words, discourses are temporally bounded in that they have a layered temporal structure. As a consequence, the analysis of political discourse revolves around the socio-historical context in which it originated and received its specific formation.

Second, discourse is a conception of language that is based on the bidirectional relationship between language and society. Furthermore, political discourse is characterized by its discursivity. Within the theoretical framework of discursivity all objects are necessarily objects of discourse as their meaning depends on a system of rules that is socially constructed (cf. Howarth/Stavrakakis 2000: 1-15). As such, political texts are reflexive of the socio-political realities inscribed in discourse as they serve to perpetuate the ideological structures inscribed in discourse. Within this framework, language is neither instrumental nor merely representational in a straightforward way. Instead, any discursive act includes an intended recipient who partakes in an interaction-based meaning construction process, which also implies the existence of a point of view.

Third, discourse is frequently used to designate the “use of a language” (Chilton 2006: 16). When employed to refer to political discourse, this pragmatic definition could read as the specific realization of political texts (cf. Bochmann 1986: 1). This way, political discourse consists of political texts, which are either a component part or the result of political activity.

Due to the great diversity of political actions the functions of political texts are liable to variation, to the extent that they may end up being secondary to political action. In other situative contexts, however, in which political texts prepare, control or coordinate political actions, in other words: whenever they are functional in political action, they may indeed be primary.

[...] as soon as a discourse or part of a discourse is directly or indirectly functional in the political process (e.g., of campaigning, canvassing or otherwise influencing or being influenced in view of elections), such discourse should be categorized and analyzed as being (also, mainly) political. Such problems of categorization and genre-delimitation also suggest that communicative contexts should feature not simply categories for goals, but also a hierarchy of goals. (van Dijk 1997: 22)

Generally speaking, the above quotation illustrates why political discourse should not be regarded as a genre. Any attempt at outlining its generic features is doomed as it would involve a process of continuous refinement of the criteria used for classification. In order to circumvent these predicaments van Dijk (1997: 14) introduces the notion of context which he considers decisive for the categorization of discourse as political. While it is true that political discourse should never be studied on the basis of textual features alone, the inclusion of context, an ambiguous concept in itself, is anything but a panacea. What Blommaert (2005: 25) terms “the inflation of context,” manifests itself in the overemphasis of context-dependent discursive practice. What precisely are the contexts that qualify as political contexts?

According to van Dijk (ibid.: 15), political actions are “essentially defined contextually [...] in terms of special events or practices of which the aims, goals or functions are maybe not exclusively but at least primarily political.” The bottom line of the introduction of ‘context’ is that we have another unmanageable concept which complicates the analysis of political discourse. In other words: we are back to square one, in particular within a methodological

framework that is devoted to interaction-based meaning construction processes in which we have a multitude of contexts. If it is not the context that can be used as a reliable basis for its definition, there are perhaps textual features according to which political discourse may be delimited. This would result in establishing sub-genres of political discourse, each typified by its own “canonized schematic structure” (van Dijk 1997: 29), i.e. its textual organisation.

Seidel (1985: 45) convincingly argues against the existence of the genre ‘political discourse’. She (ibid.) differentiates political discourse from genres (e.g. literary discourse), domains (e.g. economic discourse) and fields (e.g. scientific discourse), arguing that neither politics nor political discourse can be viewed as closed systems on the grounds of “mystifying closure.”

Instead, it might be more useful to distinguish between different modes of discourse. The two basic modes of discourse are the narrative mode as opposed to the non-narrative mode (Georgakopoulou & Goutsos 2004: 43-48). The former entails the sequencing of past experiences in a temporal order. In the process of narrativization past events are not merely represented as an accurate account of what happened. Instead these earlier occurrences are reconstructed as if adding another layer of representation, gradually shifting the actual event as it happened then from the event as it is retold. In the process, the events narrated are typically perspectivized from the point of view of a ‘narrator’, who is herself anchored in time and space in relation to the narration.

The temporal reference of the narrative mode is by no means straightforward although there is a preponderance of past time reference. The sub-division of narrative modes of discourse into “generic narrative,” which revolves around present events, and “projective narrative,” which is directed towards future events, compensates for potential drawbacks with respect to temporal reference.

By contrast, the non-narrative mode of discourse is knowledge-based in that it is used to narrativize certain beliefs, attitudes and arguments. Hence, this discourse mode foregrounds positions rather than experiences, invoking ‘truths’ or other shared representations (Georgakopoulou & Goutsos 2004: 47f.). Crucially, non-narrative discourse does not have a temporal dimension imposed by the sequencing of real or fictitious events but by structural or argumentative necessity.

In political discourse the two discourse modes are combined. The formation of political discourses entails the convergence of topics from different societal domains as well as the addition of different layers, each of which has a temporal structure of its own. As van Dijk (1997: 27) observes, political texts are constituted by specific “predicate macrostructures,” which tend to have future-time reference. This prospectiveness manifests itself in the utterance of threats, promises or announcements, for instance. To these topics we may add crisis, history and change.

Yet the temporality of political discourse goes beyond the simple time reference of the three clear-cut temporal categories. Its temporal perspective depends on the representational mode chosen. Narrating events or presenting events as “self-evident truths” necessitates a clear position of both the discourse and the political actor. Only when both are localized in an unambiguous way can events or actions be sequenced and evaluated. In other words: a both



local and temporal frame of reference needs to be established. As we shall see below, the temporal reference of American presidential discourse contains a huge ideological potential, attaching opposing frames of value based on their temporality.

Crucially, representation in political discourse is not immediately experientially grounded; rather it is mediated through various instances, reflecting the standard procedure of cultural semiosis in which concrete experience is increasingly abstracted. In the process, the initial experience is not only less and less tangible, it is also temporally displaced. This makes discourse “a general mode of semiosis, i.e. meaningful symbolic behavior” (Blommaert 2005: 2).

In conclusion, political discourse can be defined as a mode of representation, in which political action and events are discursively constructed as a system of relations, based on the discourse strategies of selection and combination. In order to achieve a representation as coherent as possible some aspects have to be selected, i.e. profiled, while others are best backgrounded to the extent that they are not (easily) noticeable. As a consequence, the aim of the analysis of political discourse consists in laying bare the structures of these representations. Conceptual metaphor is a suitable analytic tool for identifying the patterns underlying political cognition.

All in all, the preceding discussion has illustrated that political discourse is not easy to dissociate from other discourses due to its reflexive character. For this reason political discourse analysis (PDA) subdivides into the analysis of political discourse on the one hand and political approaches to discourse analysis on the other. The subject at hand, the analysis of the inaugural address, is certainly a matter of analyzing political discourse in the narrow sense.

Above, political discourse has been modeled as a mode of representation that is selective in providing at once comprehensive and coherent accounts of relevant segments of socio-political realities. Moreover, political discourse is characterized by its temporality, which means that the political itself is liable to change; there is no fixed understanding of political events and actions. This holds for past events as well as recent situations and events, which the construal of political discourse transforms into political actions. In brief: political discourse is geared towards action, which can frequently be tantamount to the perpetuation of the predominating ideology:

The public domain functions as an ideology-reproducing system, in which hard socio-political realities are shaped and reshaped by the virtuose [sic] (ab)use of genres, instruments and channels of communication, blended into communication products which can hardly be decrypted as ‘political’, and in which the material processes and direct interests of the groups producing the message can be dissimulated or embellished. (Blommaert 1997: 2)

Due to the dual coding of the political, especially in communication directed to the public domain, political discourse possesses an underlying structure of normativity and evaluation. Without anticipating the discussion of chapter 3, political discourse can be argued to have undergone dramatic changes during the twentieth century. A case in point is the increasing personalization of discourse, according to which ‘the political’ is frequently backgrounded in

favor of constructing the political actor as an efficient problem-solver, an expert who is capable of handling difficult situations. This view predominates in the technocratic model of politics, which focuses on the managerial expertise of politicians. Consequently, these characteristics have given rise to a presidential discourse in the American context, which, amongst other things, reflects the specialization in communicative practice.

### **2.3 Analyzing Political Discourse**

Despite the disparities in the theoretical approaches to political discourse, the findings of the studies in existence are surprisingly homogeneous. They can be catalogued on the basis of their methodologies, i.e. as lexicon-oriented or discourse-centered accounts. A third group can be tentatively said to have emerged, if one attempts to explore political discourse from a more systematically cognitive-linguistic perspective. Overcoming theoretical and (some) methodological incompatibilities,<sup>59</sup> which are, for the most part, perceived rather than genuinely divisive, sociolinguistics and cognitive linguistics have established a common denominator in conceiving of language as a social phenomenon.<sup>60</sup>

This focus is particularly central to the analysis of the strategic functions of political language use. While the significance of the strategic function representation (vs. misrepresentation) of the group-specific, and hence socially grounded, knowledge of ‘the world’ has been emphasized earlier, it is not the only strategy used in political discourse to validate the cognitive bias in the analysis. Other vital strategies include legitimization vs. delegitimization and coercion (cf. Chilton 2006: 45f.).

Crucially, all of these functions can be used to determine group membership in that they do not simply convey preferred as opposed to dispreferred meanings but they provide patterns of evaluation. These evaluative frames can be entrenched to varying degrees; in political ideologies, they may assume the shape of ‘iconographic frames of reference’ (Hawkins 2001), ascribing an antagonistic set of values to in-group vs. out-group categories. Moreover, these discourse strategies are also used to frame political events and actions as credible and truthful, which is a key function of political discourse. Prior to expanding on the issues of ideology and truthfulness I will outline the major findings from previous studies.

#### **Lexicon-based Approaches to Political Discourse**

Today’s political lexicon of western democracies originated during the French Revolution and is impregnated with enlightenment state philosophy, particularly the impact of English parliamentarianism (cf. Dieckmann 1975: 22). The interest in the political lexicon is epiphenomenal with the study of the history of words, placing the main emphasis on their

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<sup>59</sup> See chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion of the methodologies available in Cognitive Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis.

<sup>60</sup> More precisely, a ‘cognitive sociolinguistics’ would conceive of language as a mental phenomenon, which is invariably embedded in the social practice within a certain group or discourse community.

origin, their semantic development and their vitality. There is a long-standing German tradition of collecting political lexemes, but also in the American context this compilation has resulted in a number of dictionaries of political terms (e.g. Sperber/Trittschuh 1964; Safire 1993). Remarkably, even core political terms such as democracy are not political per se. Instead they are increasingly politicized the more they are used, which results in the continuous growth of the political lexicon.

The aim of lexicon-oriented studies of political discourse therefore consists of providing a systematic classification of the political lexicon in the sense of a “structured inventory of lexemes” (Schippan 2002: 1). Dieckmann’s (1975: 5f.) classification subdivides the inventory of political lexemes into three main categories. Accordingly, the political vocabulary consists of lexemes pertaining to institutional uses of language, for example, the technical language of political institutions and governmental departments as is exemplified by the coinage of ‘Pentagonese’. Conversely a substantial part of the political lexicon corresponds with, at least originally, the technical jargon of politics. The third category, the ideological inventory, is also the most relevant one, which is why it will be given special consideration below.

More recently, Dieckmann’s classic systematization has been extended by a fourth category. Klein (1989: 5ff.) elaborates on Dieckmann’s category of political discourse as specialist or technical discourse by introducing the important discrimination between the department-specific lexicon (‘Ressortvokabular’) and the interaction-based vocabulary (‘Interaktionsvokabular’). The former is characterized by the use of terminology mediating between technical jargon and everyday language in domains such as foreign relations, finance etc. Yet the more global the departmental province concerned, the less likely the use of ‘Ressortvokabular’. The latter consists of expressions denoting linguistic actions and all types of interaction in the realm of politics. In other words, the ‘Interaktionsvokabular’ applies to political communication.

Furthermore, the vocabulary of ideology, i.e. the words used by political groups to interpret and evaluate the socio-political world (cf. Klein 1989: 5) has been the focus of lexicon-oriented research.<sup>61</sup> The ideological vocabulary branches into two types of lexemes,<sup>62</sup> the catchwords (‘Schlagwörter’) and the key words (‘Schlüsselwörter’ or ‘Symbolwörter’). Yet they also share a few general characteristics; for instance, both exploit the descriptive and emotive levels of meaning. Ideological lexical concepts signify and evaluate simultaneously. Moreover, they do not acquire their status as catchword and key word, through their position in the language system but through their (re)currency. Catchwords and key words differ however on the conceptual level. A closer look at their semantic structure reveals the following differences.

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<sup>61</sup> The question that will be addressed below is whether it is adequate to draw this distinction or whether it would be more suitable to stipulate that any language occurrence is potentially, depending on communicative parameters, ideologically used.

<sup>62</sup> Dieckmann’s classification is both dated and somewhat idiosyncratic. He (1975: 5) distinguishes between three types of lexical expressions used in the ideological inventory. First, the so-called ‘Miranda’ words used to express one’s affinity and loyalty to the political system. Second, the ‘Credenda’ expressions used to convey the set of shared beliefs but also the fundamental principles the social and political organization is based on. And third, the ‘Formula’ terms used to describe the political system, the polity and its major functions.

First, catchwords serve — to a considerably larger extent than key words — as important rhetorical devices in political persuasion. Due to their ‘bipolar lexical structure’ (cf. Dieckmann 1975: 102) they only require minimal contextualization and can serve as ‘loaded weapons’ in the language war.<sup>63</sup> Their potential for (public) appeal is exploited to an almost limitless extent.<sup>64</sup> Since appeal and evaluation in politics are interdependent, catchwords have a specific semantic structure consisting of three components (cf. Felder 1995: 68ff.). Evidently, catchwords have a descriptive meaning but, more interestingly, they are typified by propagandistic and programmatic constituents. In other words, their emotive potential is huge, based on the stereotypization (and heterotypization) of their meaning. More often than not, catchwords are used as ‘condensed party programs’, undergoing the process of ideologization.

Second, key words, in contrast, are not primarily characterized by their strong emotional appeal; rather, they serve a predominantly integrative function. Typically, key words or symbols reduce complex realities to preconfigured templates that channel the perception of ‘the world’. Lexemes with hidden or implicit meanings are paradigmatic examples of key words (cf. Felder 1995: 68). In their conceptual complexity they are comparable to ‘shorthand formulae’.

In sum, both catchwords and key words evolve into politically charged lexemes through their specific semantic structure. The large majority of these lexemes is highly polysemous to begin with and is liable to growing abstraction; in the process, their semantic scope is narrowed. Traditional approaches to lexical semantics stated that this generalization concerns the associative meaning rather than the conceptual core. From a cognitive perspective, however, this distinction is no longer relevant since conceptualization is argued to be operative on diverse linguistic levels. Moreover, semantic structure is assumed to reflect conceptual structure which, in turn, derives from the cognitive-linguistic tenet of embodiment.<sup>65</sup>

As we have seen above, the classification of the ideological vocabulary is based on the assumption that the meaning of ideologically loaded lexemes diverges from its formal semantic meaning. As a consequence, the ‘ideological features’ are to be located outside the core, intensional level. In other words, the ideological potential manifests itself in the lexeme’s extension. This is what Dieckmann (1975: 72) defines as ‘ideological polysemy’, which holds that the ideological uses of a lexeme are to be encountered outside its formal definition, irrespective of language and ideology. Thus the ideological meaning of a word is linked to a

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<sup>63</sup> The catchwords may be further sub-categorized into ‘Fahnenwörter’ and ‘Stigmawörter’ when used to favor self-presentation (“pledge of allegiance”) or negate other presentation.

<sup>64</sup> Catchwords undergo a characteristic development. In the beginning, it is not their descriptive meaning components that prevail, but their deontic meaning aspects that are highlighted (cf. Klein 1989: 12f.). This predominance is not made explicit, however. As the conceptual meaning recedes, the emotional appeal comes to the fore (cf. Felder 1995: 75).

<sup>65</sup> The principle of embodied cognition “holds that the human mind and conceptual organization are a function of the way in which our species-specific bodies interact with the environment we inhabit. In other words, the nature of concepts and the way we are structured and organized is constrained by the nature of our embodied experience” (Evans 2007: 66).

state, a society or a group by the ideological signification system and not by a language (cf. Dieckmann 1975: 57).

Crucially, the ideological content does not rest upon a single lexeme in isolation but depends on its value within the entire ideological system. Although most if not all ideologies in existence share an inventory of ideologically exploitable linguistic items, not all aspects of the extensional level are affected to the same degree. As we shall see below, it is the key words that are particularly susceptible to ideological exploitation. However, what these lexicon-oriented studies do not take into consideration is that the notion of ideology itself is an antagonistic concept.

All in all, lexicon-oriented studies of political discourse have provided valuable insights into the lexical inventory of political ideologies. However, the rigid classification of the political inventory begs the question to what degree the criteria used, e.g. fuzziness, multiple meanings or expressivity are exclusively characteristic of political lexemes (cf. Kilian 1997: 82). What is more, the presumption of fixed, unambiguous reference on the basis of formal semantic principles betrays, at best, a normative attitude towards language that is largely incompatible with natural language. It is the vagueness of language itself, not the vagueness of political language that enables ‘political’ linguistic action (the latter merely exploits the preconditions inherent in language as social practice). Proposing a taxonomy of political lexemes is counterproductive to the analysis of political discourse in itself. As words are only ‘ideologized’ through use, the political lexeme inventory is subject to change itself. In addition, political discourse thrives on hybridity, which is why the ideological inventory of lexemes should not be considered a self-contained unit within the lexicon. As a result, a clear distinction of ideological and non-ideological terminology cannot be upheld as the divisive potential does not pertain to individual words but to their contextualizations.

Although the study of isolated pieces of discourse has lately been extensively criticized, the importance of political labels or slogans is uncontested. “The abstract nature of political labels not only gives them their evocative power, but causes politicians to fight over them. Because the labels have no fixed meanings, politicians are perpetually attempting to infuse them with politically useful connotations” (Green 1992: 2). Crucially, the majority of the different types of lexemes used as catchwords, key words or symbols are abstractions.

The fact that human language is a symbolic system of signs accounts for the development of continuous symbolification, the process of signs evolving from a state of contiguity into an increasingly symbolic mode of representation. The point of departure of semiosis is that linguistic action can be interpreted on two levels, the linguistic and the symbolic level. This duality is an important precondition for the process of symbolification.<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> Keller (1995:186) describes the process of symbolification as the substitution of rule-based conclusions with causal or associative ones on the basis of use. The process of simplification begins at the level of symptoms which are either imitated or simulated when used communicatively. Here the relationship between the signifier and the signified is direct as it is based on contiguity. The ‘factuality’ of the ‘natural’ (i.e. not learned or acquired) relationship that holds between signifier and signified in the indexical or symptomatic mode is steadily transformed by the process of cultural semiosis, thereby becoming increasingly distant from what is accessible on a perceptual basis. The immediacy of percepts suggests an experiential basis of signs in their

Having completed the cycle, the original sign is abstracted from its concrete, experiential basis. Hence these abstractions are the result of a cultural process, which is indicative of the preferred knowledge structures within a given discourse community. For example, in American political discourse liberty and freedom are highly pervasive key words, whose degree of abstraction allows for their use in almost any context.

Notwithstanding the obvious symbolic potential of abstract political lexemes, their actual potency lies on the conceptual level. From a cognitive perspective, abstractions play a vital role in conceptualization as well as categorial structure. Prototypical categories have an experiential basis and are organized according to the principle of resemblance.<sup>67</sup> These categories remain abstractions as long as they are not framed, i.e. embedded into specific knowledge structures or contexts through which their meaning is constructed (cf. Blank 1997: 88). Concepts are subjective abstractions of individual experiences which have originated from several processes of abstraction.

More precisely, abstraction is also an important notion in view of conceptual metaphor and metonymy. Radden (2000: 95f.) argues that metaphor and metonymy are not to be considered as two different conceptualizations; rather they can be situated at the lower (metonymy) and upper end (metaphor) of a continuum of growing abstraction. Since metonymic mappings tend to be based on contiguity, they may serve as a trigger in the initial phase of the semiotic process. In the process of abstraction, contiguity recedes in favor of similarity: metonymy melts down to metaphor. Gradually, a transition between metonymies and metaphors occurs on the grounds of correlation and complementarity, which approximates source and target domain conceptually until they are linked in a way that makes us think of them as a unity rather than counterparts (cf. Radden *ibid.*). This last point in particular can be used to reconcile opposites that would even be mutually exclusive, a strong ideological potential that is used in the construction of ideologies.

In addition, the focus on individual lexical concepts in the analysis of political discourse could be further exploited from a cognitive perspective. Since their individual history is only temporarily activated (cf. Holly 2001: 126), their recurrence is indicative of an underlying web

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indexical mode. Crucially, these indexical signs can be simulated when used in communicative contexts. This characteristic dissociates the signified from the signifier even further, i.e. the original indexical has undergone a process of abstraction. As a result the relationship has to be learned and is transmitted as cultural knowledge within discourse communities. The characteristics of 'learned behavior', i.e. the assignment of a particular signified-signifier relationship, can be exploited in discourse, with the effect of constructing this relationship as natural, logical and true.

<sup>67</sup> As early as at the beginning of the twentieth century Mauthner (1901: 501) refers to metaphor as a psychological process that enables us to perceive similarities. In time, these similarities grow ever more sophisticated due to the fact that this metaphorical process is embedded in culture. Thus the history of a given metaphor is a history of culture. In underlining metaphor's key function as a cognitive tool and linguistic surface form in the cultural process, Mauthner could be an important precursor of contemporary theories of metaphor. In addition, Mauthner implicitly argues for metaphor's crucial role in semiosis, where we decreasingly rely on iconicity due to emerging symbolic structure. At this level of abstraction, the categorial difference between knowledge, symbol and belief ceases to exist: we have reached the utmost distance towards the original sign based on contiguity. This characteristic is regularly exploited in the construction of mythologies and ideologies. Interestingly, in ideologies the cultural semiosis threatens to come to a halt once the most abstract level is reached. In Mauthner's eyes, these turn to symbols or religious beliefs that make us believe that these concepts are imbued with knowledge. In reality we have become oblivious to the original similarity-based comparison.

of cognitive models, which is operative in framing their respective meanings. As such these symbols are embedded in the historicity of political discourse itself and are related to other concepts. As a result, abstract political terms grow into symbols when they are institutionalized in political discourse, i.e. when they are entrenched in the political cognition of a particular discourse community. Alternatively, they perform the function of ideographs, i.e. concepts that act as signposts in the construction of socio-political ideologies (see below).

### **Systemic-functional and Pragmatic Studies of Political Discourse**

Another substantial bulk of studies of political discourse has originated from within the frameworks of linguistic pragmatics and systemic-functional linguistics. Synthesizing both theory and methodology of sociolinguistics and text analysis, systemic-functional approaches to political discourse are generally concerned with linguistic units on the sentence level or beyond. I also catalogue the more recent research paradigms of CDA or PDA within this line of research for reasons that will be specified below.

Generally speaking, the linguistic unit that is profiled within these research paradigms is the political text and its functions. While text is used to denote both written and spoken texts, there is usually more weight on the written medium, which is conceived of as a transcript of what is said (cf. Fairclough 2001: 20).

A given text is classified as a political text when it is embedded as a discursive unit within a political discourse (cf. Bochmann 1986: 10). However, this criterion applies to legions of texts. In subdividing political texts into sub-domains of political action, each type of action could be attributed to particular textual functions. Frequently, the standard function of political texts is assumed to be that of appeal, analogous to persuasion on the level of political rhetoric. This function is believed to predominate as political texts are intended to assert a politician's interests and claims on the one hand, and to gain public support and authority on the other.

In the research literature four major types of functions of political texts have been identified. First, political texts as discursive units of political discourse have a regulative (Bochmann 1986: 12; Girth 2002: 39ff.) function. Essentially, language is used here as a means to establish and maintain clear hierarchies. Deployed in such a way, political texts are a device for demonstrating and preserving power. For this reason this function or rather strategy, is also referred to as "coercion" (Chilton/Schäffner 1997: 211ff; Chilton 2006: 45). Political actors "act coercively through language in setting agendas, selecting topics in conversation, positioning the self and others in specific relationships, making assumptions about realities" (Chilton 2006: 45). Depending on the political system acts of coercion may involve legal and/or physical sanctions. In democracies, 'coercion' is manifest in symbolic strategies whereby coordinated, consensus-based political actions are to be achieved (cf. Dieckmann 1975: 29). In the process, the power relations, the regularities of norms and sanctions within the polity need to be made clear. Typical text types would be legal texts, commands, edicts or censorship but also the construction of hierarchies in political debates.

Second, political texts are geared towards change and future political action.<sup>68</sup> Here the term political actor is understood in its broadest sense ranging from politicians (as challengers) and other professionals to interest groups or other political activists. In their capacity as political actors individuals or groups engage in political action in order to publicize their demands and queries, and to stake their claims in opposition to the established forces. This function is pinpointed in Chilton/Schäffner's (1997: 213) strategy "resistance," which as a function encoded in political texts serves to articulate protest and opposition to institutionalized political power.

Third, the diversity of discourse communities underscores the importance of the integrative function of political texts. Reinforcing and stabilizing political consciousness is particularly vital in polities in which the absence of shared backgrounds gives rise to centrifugal dynamics undermining the foundations of consensus. In the absence of shared backgrounds a common denominator has to be discursively constructed. For example, the evocation of such a thing as 'international community' suggests that there are values which everybody belonging to this 'community' shares. Such a construct clearly has identificational momentum in that it serves the purpose of delimiting group members from outsiders. While these mechanisms strengthen the inner circle, they also assist in identifying more clearly outsiders, opponents and enemies. As a result, this function is always ambiguous and antagonistic in itself since it not only serves to integrate, providing the insiders with a potential platform of identification and solidarity, but also alienates others by dislocating them from the cultural touchstone. As we shall see in the analysis, American newness constitutes such a cultural construct as it initially provided a platform for identification for the settlers from distinct backgrounds and religious denominations.

This strategic function is not confined to symbolic uses of language (e.g. Bochmann 1986: 13) nor to particular text types such as party-political speeches or epideictic discourse (e.g. Girth 2002: 40). Instead, it is pivotal in political discourse because it simultaneously serves the double purposes of legitimization and delegitimization within the same text. While legitimization involves positive self-presentation, e.g. highlighting past achievements and successful leadership, delegitimization implies that "others (foreigners, 'enemies within', institutional opposition, unofficial opposition) have to be presented negatively, and the techniques include the use of ideas of difference and boundaries, and speech acts of blaming, accusing, insulting, etc." (Chilton 2006: 46).

Fourth, political texts as discursive units form an integral part of social practice, and as such are both goal-oriented and public-minded. For some commentators (e.g. Girth 2002) this strategy dominates contemporary political discourse. A case in point is the progressing politicization of ever more domains of social life in the course of the twentieth century, which has blurred the boundaries between institutional and non-institutional policy-making. From this point of view this function combines persuasion and information as it is mostly realized in

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<sup>68</sup> Bochmann (1986: 12) refers to this mode of expression as "prospektiv-verändernde Form," i.e. the fact that political discourse is geared towards change and future action. Similarly, Girth's (2002: 40) idiosyncratic term "poskative Sprachverwendung" circumvents one of the most essential uses of political texts, namely the demand for change in the shape of resistance and opposition.



debates, campaigning, party-political programs, i.e. largely associated with political advertising. These texts function to motivate, prepare and coordinate political communication. Clearly, the dissemination of information on political events and problems lies in the centre of attention. Yet what is publicized, i.e. made public, is rarely neutral as we could see in the in-depth discussion of political communication above.

Therefore, this function may also be viewed as “dissimulation” (Chilton/Schäffner 1997: 21f.) due to the fact that providing information is only partially ‘informative’ in the political context. Accordingly, Chilton/Schäffner (*ibid.*) distinguish between varying degrees of dissimulation depending on qualitative and quantitative controls of information. Political control is regarded as control of information; secrecy is thus construed as the inverse of censorship. The fact, however, that discourse control is not achieved through the withholding of information, whether qualitative or quantitative, but involves the cognitive effect of selection, i.e. through profiling preferred referents while backgrounding dispreferred ones, is later acknowledged by Chilton (2006: 46) when he refers to the same phenomenon, in exactly the same wording, as representation and misrepresentation.

This outline of the most important functions of political texts needs to be further specified as none of the functions mentioned is suitable to serve as a hard and fast criterion of what constitutes a political text. On the contrary: in practice, these functions cannot be divorced from one another so if we apply this classification to actual political texts it can only be on a gradient scale.

In practice, the functions of political discourse manifest themselves as ‘domains of action’ (“Handlungsfelder,” Girth 2002: 37), which represent segments of political realities and are simultaneously constrained by these realities. Resulting from the discursive construction of its individual scope, each domain of action is associated with several text types and functions.

If exclusively textual functions are unreliable criteria for the identification of political texts, their communicative functions could provide a line of demarcation in order to classify political texts by virtue of communicative properties not found to the same degree in other text types. A case in point is the ‘ideational function’ of language, organizing and structuring the extra-linguistic world (Halliday 1973: 19ff.), which can be assumed to play a crucial part in political texts. On another level, the predicates of ‘semantic macropropositions’, i.e. preferred topics, particular actions such as policy-making, opposing or controlling (cf. van Dijk 1997: 25ff.), are also indicative of a certain bias towards the prevalence of global meanings. These semantic macropropositions are realized by textual superstructures in the shape of schemata that organize the line of argument pursued in the text.

In order to redress these difficulties of definition the notion of communicative function should be extended to include pragmatic aspects. For example, Girth (2002: 38) defines language function as a politician’s intention encoded in a linguistic action. However, the ‘politician’s intention’, if this is a category that can be analyzed at all, can be realized on the textual level by a series of linguistic actions. Moreover, political texts are, by and large, to be

regarded as political actions themselves, hence we would have to differentiate between primary and secondary political actions, producing similar incongruities to those discussed above. Nonetheless, political texts appear to expose a preference for certain types of speech acts, e.g. the representatives, commissives and expressives of Searle's (1979) classification.<sup>69</sup>

In sum, previous research on political discourse has identified four major functions of political texts, which are defined as discursive units embedded in political discourse. The preceding discussion has highlighted the fact that these specific functions are not constitutive of political texts and only provide an approximation. Nonetheless, there are preferred textual structures as well as communicative functions that are more frequently found in political texts rather than in other text types.

Both the analysis of the political lexicon and the functions of political texts have exposed the necessity of including a cognitive perspective. While studies of the political lexicon fail to account for the process of abstraction and the conceptual structure of political lexemes,<sup>70</sup> the systemic-functional approaches discussed above do not fully exploit the local and global meanings of political texts. As will be demonstrated in the analysis below, the semantic macrostructure of political texts is essentially schematic, i.e. the textual meaning is motivated by an underlying system of connected conceptual metaphors and other tools of embodied cognition such as image schemas. These conceptual tools support the meaning construction and interpretation processes throughout the text.

Language and cognition cannot be separated from each other, which is particularly significant with respect to political discourse. Language is not merely a repository of knowledge; it actively conveys and perpetuates these stored knowledge structures via discourse. The conceptual structure of language is a cultural and political reference system in which knowledge structures, derived from past experience are deeply entrenched. It is this 'matrix' that helps to organize present information and experience. Similarly, this past experience is (re)constructed from the present viewpoint.

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<sup>69</sup> These three speech act types are generally associated with the following functions (cf. Yule 1996: 53f.). Representatives are speech acts that convey an implicit claim to the truthfulness and accuracy of an utterance. They are chiefly realized as statements, assertions, conclusions or descriptions. Commissives usually commit the speaker to some future action while also reflecting a speaker's intentions. Typical commissives "are promises, threats, refusals, pledges [...], they can be performed by the speaker alone, or by the speaker as a member of a group" (Yule *ibid.*: 54). In political texts, commissives are predominantly group-specific, as exemplified by the highly pervasive pronoun 'we'. Last but not least, expressives articulate the speaker's feelings. Alternatively, they "express psychological states and can be statements of pleasure, pain, likes, dislikes, joy, or sorrow" (*ibid.*: 53). While these feelings may be caused by external factors, they invariably attribute the participant role of experiencer to the speaker (see chapter 6).

<sup>70</sup> Crucially, the abstractness of political concepts or lexemes constitutes the final stage of an entire process that is grounded in experience. Departing from concrete, empirical experience and events, concepts only gradually attain a level of abstraction that mechanically evokes their authority and propositional value. Temporality plays an important role in this development. It is not only the frequency of these initially concrete concepts, but their vitality and relevance in a given cultural environment that advances their growing abstraction. This positive evaluation is based on temporal progression, in other words: if experiences or events prove to be culturally relevant they pass the test of time. If concepts are time-honored, they function as symbols which are worth occupying on the semantic battlefield. Yet a certain level of standardization is an essential prerequisite of the propositionality of abstract concepts (cf. Felder 1995: 47).

Another important point is that political cognitions themselves are “often ambivalent and highly susceptible to symbolic cues for change and that much of the impression of their stability is an artifact of measurement procedures, and perhaps of our anxiety about instability and irrationality” (Edelman 1971: 3). Far from forming knowledge structures in the shape of immutable blocks, political cognition is just as liable to change as the political process itself. Both levels, the processing of existing political knowledge and the experiential input from the surrounding political culture interact to a degree that changes on one of the levels entail changes on the other too. The historicity of political experience is thus a crucial determining factor in the organisation of knowledge and information.

Our knowledge of entities, events, actions or (situative) contexts is mentally represented by frames, i.e. “a knowledge structure, which is represented at the conceptual level and held in long-term memory and which relates elements and entities associated with a particular culturally embedded scene, situation or event from human experience” (Evans 2007: 85). In a way, the knowledge encapsulated by the frame is stereotypical and includes prefabricated templates of evaluation. The valorization of these frame-based entities is surprisingly stable. The transformation of political cognitions does not appear to primarily affect individual frames or conceptual domains but connections in-between them. Frames and their evaluations typically encompass several domains of experience rather than being isolated concepts, hence the inadequacy of studying individual lexical concepts as key terms or symbols.

Frames are also significant with respect to the organisation of experience. Their capacity of linking several domains of experience, particularly when the frames themselves are metaphorically structured, is regularly exploited in political discourse. The knowledge structures and their evaluative attributes encoded by the frame(s) usually provide a systematic and coherent representation of socio-politico realities.

Above, representation has been identified as a central strategic function of political language use. Crucially, representation hinges upon coherence alongside properties such as likelihood, truthfulness, and credibility. To a degree, representation subsumes all other strategic functions outlined above. This primacy of representation is also mirrored on the level of discourse since these functions regularly co-occur in one and the same text. Efficient representation appeals to the public and is perceived as integrative because it evokes truthfulness and communality; when successful, representation entails the legitimization of one’s own policies while delegitimizing others.

As has been pointed out on various occasions throughout the chapter, representation is rarely neutral.<sup>71</sup> For example, staking claims in political discourse may be achieved through diverse strategies, legitimization vs. delegitimization on the one hand, but also by making appeals to collective imaginaries that are pervasive in the polity on the other. For this reason representation is also a key term in socio-political ideologies. In the ensuing chapter, the role

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<sup>71</sup> Interestingly, language norms may also bridge political language and ideology in that linguistic knowledge and world knowledge are encoded in specific domains (cf. Kilian 1997: 65). These domains are operative on the conceptual level and (pre-)structure the speakers’ perception of the world.

of ideology will be discussed against the background of other highly relevant notions such as truthfulness and political myths.

## 2.4 The Role of Ideology in Political Discourse

Sooner or later any analysis of political discourse is faced with having to locate the role of ideology within its theoretical and methodological framework. Provided that the emphasis is placed on representation, ideology becomes a major issue in the analysis of (political) discourse. According to Chilton (2006: 46), representation (vs. misrepresentation) implies both qualitative and quantitative discourse control in terms of the dissemination of and access to information. Crucially, both parameters are measured in gradients.<sup>72</sup> Qualitatively, the gradient scale ranges from misrepresentation as a comparatively mild form of discourse control to lying proper. The suppression of relevant amounts of information is overstepping the line in quantitative respects. Conceptually, representation consists in highlighting those attributes of entities, actions or events that one considers relevant. This process of selection invariably involves the backgrounding of aspects that also pertain to this entity, action or event. As we shall see in the course of this chapter, the mechanism of emphasizing some properties while de-emphasizing others is an integral part of van Dijk's (1998) viable definition of socio-political ideologies. Prior to elaborating on suitable conceptions of ideology from a linguistic perspective it is vital to delimit ideology from other notoriously difficult notions such as truth, reality or myth, all of which are highly recurrent issues in the analysis of political discourse.

### 2.4.1 The Relativity of Truth: Discourse Verisimilitude

Truth has been studied within a number of disciplines. There are currently three major theories of truth, the correspondence theory, the coherence theory and the social theory. With respect to a discourse-centered analysis of political language, only the social theory of truth is relevant and will be briefly outlined below.<sup>73</sup>

<sup>72</sup> Similarly, Verschueren's (1985) study of what he terms *verba mentiendi* lays bare that in our culture, i.e. Western capitalist societies, there are two scales of truth, a quality scale of truth and a quantity scale of truth based on the semantic range of his *verba mentiendi*. These include verbals that do not denote lying proper but express concepts such as exaggerating, distorting, understating etc. Each of these verbals possesses the following five semantic dimensions: a truth dimension, an illocutionary dimension, a perlocutionary dimension, a textual dimension and, finally, a dimension of value judgment and the role of imagination. Furthermore, Verschueren's (ibid.: 124) distinction between the two scales of truth is revealing; whereas the quality scale of truth is constituted by quality-increasing and quality-diminishing verbals such as 'to whitewash' and 'to slander', the quantitative scale comprises quantity-diminishing and quantity-increasing verbals, for example 'to understate' and 'to exaggerate'. What is interesting, though, is the relationship between these two categories. Verschueren (ibid.) draws attention to important cultural factors inherent in the conceptualization of lying. There seems to be a one-directional interdependence between them: the quality scale is dependent on the quantity scale but not vice-versa. Thus, there is an in-built cultural reference in their conceptualization, reflecting that we tend to take quantity as a criterion for quality. In addition, the verbals of lying can easily be extended to the conceptual domain of quality-diminishing verbals. As Verschueren (ibid.) rightly concludes, there seems to be a tendency to regard unpleasant things as untrue.

<sup>73</sup> For obvious reasons, the tenets of the correspondence theory of truth are largely incompatible with an understanding of language as discourse, in which language is regarded as social practice. The correspondence

The evidence for a theory of truth that conceives of truth as a relational rather than an absolute concept is strong. First and foremost, “truth is [...] an indefinable concept. This does not mean we can say nothing revealing about it: we can, by relating it to other concepts like belief, desire, cause and action” (Davidson 1996: 265). Second, there is ample linguistic evidence for embedding truth in a specific context and relating it to neighboring concepts.<sup>74</sup>

In the English language, the relational character of truth is mirrored by the complexity of the semantic field, which is constituted by, at least, the following concepts: truth, truthfulness, veracity, and verisimilitude. It is possible to organize its core members in terms of dichotomies. Figure 1 illustrates these potential lexical opposites:

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theory is grounded in an overall mathematical and logic conception of language, maintaining that the truth of a statement can be determined by the extent to which it ‘corresponds’ with the world. Accordingly, truth resides in an ideal state of ontological reference that hold between words and the world. This state occurs when the propositional content of an utterance is isomorphic with ‘the world’, i.e. bearing a similar or even identical structure. Isomorphy is not only viewed as the best possible correspondence but also a sign of propositional factuality. Another classic account of truth, the coherence theory, states that the relationship between propositions as truth bearers and the world is one that arises from a coherent system of social and epistemological relations. According to this view, truth depends on the validity of one of two logical conditions. Either a given proposition is consistent with the entire set of additional propositions, or else a proposition comprises the members of the set of propositions in question. How and when either of these conditions is met is highly contested by coherentists such as Putnam (1981), for example. Generally speaking, these conditions are fulfilled when the set of propositions is only partially coherent due to our cognitive limitations. Needless to say only few people, if any, have the capacity and knowledge necessary to pass rational judgment on coherence even within a limited system. Both correspondence theory and coherence theory are unsuitable frameworks for the analysis of natural language. A case in point is Tarski’s (1956) scheme of so-called T-sentences, which represent a relation of correspondence between language and the world. The former is unable to accommodate standard issues such as ambiguity and multiple meanings. More importantly, defining truth on the basis of a set of correspondences devalues the epistemological component of truth itself. On the one hand, truth as a knowledge-based concept is itself not immutable and hence cannot be used as an absolute reference system. This time-bound characteristic of truth is also the reason for which correspondences between words and the world do serve as viable criteria of truth. The relativity and subjectivity of truth, which is encountered in various types of truth, does not permit a strict, fixed ontology of one expression and the world. Many of these reservations also hold for coherence theory, for example, its focus on propositional language. However, when expanded to include a more pragmatic outlook, coherence theory can be reconciled with positions within a linguistic framework. Habermas (1973) proposes a consensus theory of truth, which rests on two types of consensus: factual consensus manifests itself in the beliefs that happen to be valid within a given discourse community. Yet consensus is also assumed to be rational when approximating a supposed ideal discourse situation. Rational discourse occurs when the members of a discourse community discard existing beliefs and begin to commit themselves to a discourse that is aimed at the truth. Typically, this kind of discourse is conditioned by an uninhibited exchange of information and knowledge.

<sup>74</sup> In his programmatic essay entitled “Is truth a linguistic question?” Bolinger (1973) asserts this in a highly affirmative way. In an earlier proposal (Sing 2007) I surveyed the scope of a linguistic analysis of truth and lying, in which the case for a subjective, context-sensitive approach was made against the background of the state-of-the-art of research on the phenomenon of lying from diverse linguistic frameworks.




Figure 1: The semantic field of truth

It is important to note however, that these semantic relations do not pre-exist discourse; instead they are construed in and through discourse, which is why they are potential relations. Native speakers of English would, to a certain extent, agree that the core dichotomy is truth vs. lie. Yet a large number of speakers would also conceive of an alternative classification, depending on their individual, subjective criteria, inclusive of their experience with situations in which these matter. In their analysis of the prototype of lie, Coleman/Kay (1981) encounter similar difficulties of categorization. While the participants in their study converge on three prototypical constitutive conditions of lie,<sup>75</sup> their assessment of whether or not a given statement constituted a lie rarely depended on linguistic criteria alone. Instead the decisive factors were highly subjective, taking into account not only the specific context of situation but also aspects such as the likely effects of a given statement (as a lie) or the discourse genre in which the lying occurred.

Furthermore, the categorization of truth appears to be language-specific. Wierzbicka (1997) draws attention to the fact that the meaning of an abstraction such as truth relies on social factors. A case in point is the existence of two closely related concepts of truth in Russian, ‘pravda’ and ‘istina’, whose category boundaries do not coincide with the ones suggested by the English example above. Wierzbicka (ibid.: 11-15) argues for differences in usage, e.g. their frequency, which are suggestive of differences in cultural salience. In Russian, the pravda-istina distinction is typified by distinct frequency patterns. ‘Istina’, which designates the ultimate or hidden truth, has been found to occur less frequently than its counterpart. This disparity indicates a tension between cultural values comparable to the one that exists between truthfulness and truth (see below).

<sup>75</sup> Coleman/Kay (1981) identify three parameters of the prototypical lie, which are also an integral part of St Augustine’s classic definition, *mendacium est enuntiatio cum voluntate falsum enuntiandi*. The authors formulate three conditions constituting the prototypical lie, which is assumed to occur when a speaker (S) utters a proposition (P) to an addressee (A), under the conditions that P is false, S believes P to be false and, finally, in uttering P, S intends to deceive A. If only one of the conditions was given, the participants appeared to base their judgment on whether a given act was a lie or not, on the graveness of the consequences and moral implications rather than on the parameters they wished to investigate.

The subjective and relational character of truth is also an integral part of discourse theory. Effectively, this relationship is bidirectional: the discursive event shapes these features as it is shaped by them. In discourse as social practice the meaning of a discursive event goes beyond the linguistic representation of a concept; rather, its meaning is the source as well as the result of interaction via language. With regard to truth discourse as social practice implies that the assessment of what counts as truth or is meant to be true is framed by the interplay of the context of situation, social structures and institutions in question. Furthermore the discursivity of truth demands a fresh outlook on the nature of truth itself. Truth is no longer perceived in both abstract and absolute terms; more importantly, truth as a discursive construct is no longer located outside discourse. Instead it is something inscribed in discourse itself. Discourse activities revolve around negotiating power relations at various societal levels. Thus a social theory of truth within a critical discourse paradigm builds on the “understanding of relations of power and control over knowledge and claims to possess truth” (Blum 2001: 252).

Given this emphasis, truth can no longer be viewed as unconditional, particularly with respect to late modern societies. Instead there is a rising tension between truth and its neighboring concepts, resulting in a quality scale of truth as opposed to a quantity scale of truth (cf. Verschueren 1985). Therefore the claim to either know or possess the truth is measured in gradient rather than absolute terms. Accordingly, truth is no longer considered a singular concept; it can be claimed and possessed by a multitude of different people. As a consequence, if one party claims to possess the truth, this assertion is understood as undermining other people’s right to also have knowledge of the truth. The plurality and relativity of truth has led to a deterioration of truth as a concept. While it used to be an ideal, yet unattainable notion, it is met with suspicion in late modern societies. Since ‘the truth’ is now commonly associated with a totalizing representation of ‘the world’, any claims to possess (knowledge of) the truth are promptly discredited for fear of political regimes acting in the name of truth.<sup>76</sup>

This discourse-based adaptation of the social theory of truth does not stand apart from traditional accounts of a social theory of truth. In effect it represents a collection of interdisciplinary approaches, which have mostly originated during the poststructuralist era. Poststructuralist criticism has called into question concepts such as objectivity and truth, both of which cannot be accommodated within a constructivist framework. Theorizing on truth increasingly included the relations of truth to other important notions such as truthfulness or reality for example. Rather than modeling truth as a set of unambiguous correspondences between language and the world, truth is bound into specific social and epistemological structures, couched in a set of propositional values and presuppositions that are only coherent in this given context. To a degree, pragmatism bridged the gap opened up by an adherence to

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<sup>76</sup> Cases in point are not only political systems but also social systems which have been increasingly politicized. Here truth is almost automatically associated with asymmetrical power relations and the existence of master discourses in the Foucaultian tradition. The shibboleth ‘knowledge is power’ illustrates why the claim to be in possession of truth is consequential for the socio-political structures in a given social system. The possession of knowledge and power is invariably group-dependent. As a result, if one specific group claims this knowledgeable and powerful position, divergence from this position will result in the ascription of non-truth.

correspondence theories of truth on the one hand and social theories on the other. A pragmatic theory of truth specifies the conditions under which truth is operational. As a result, actions or events are true as long as it is viable to believe that they are true. In other words: truth is what is coherent in a given discourse community, or quite simply ‘works’ for this community in question. A case in point is the dictum “we hold these truths to be self-evident [...]” within the Declaration of Independence of the thirteen original states. This articulation of democratic principles has become an integral part of the American public philosophy (see chapter 3), and is a prime example of truth based on factual consensus.<sup>77</sup>

The social theory of truth thus addresses the fundamental issue of how truth is present in social interactions, in brief, how truth manifests itself in and through social practice. Anchoring truth within a given social system precludes the existence of an absolute truth while not negating the importance of truth in general. Since “all societies must ground their interactions in some sort of validation and provide limits to play” (Blum 2001: 253), a social approach to truth is also knowledge-based albeit with different implications.

There is some sort of paradox within late modern societies: while there appears to be a general agreement that the ultimate, whole truth is unattainable, the preoccupation with exactly this kind of truth has not abated.

Add to these difficulties the awareness that everything in life and experience connects, that all is a ‘seamless web’ so that nothing can be said without qualifications and elaborations in infinite regress, and a sense of lassitude begins to steal over even the most intrepid. [...] The whole truth *is* [emphasis original] out of reach. But this fact has very little to do with our choices about whether to lie or to speak honestly, about what to say and what to hold back, these choices can be set forth, compared, evaluated. (Bok 1978 : 4)

The claim that the “whole truth is out of reach” is consequential for various reasons. Out of the many truths available out there, speaking ‘the truth’ is always a matter of choice. This choice is double-layered. Since speaking the truth is impossible in a comprehensive way, ‘the truth’ is a matter of discursive selection. Indeed the quest for truth may be confined to a given discourse only, in the sense of discourse verisimilitude rather than “the whole truth”. As Bok (ibid.) is implying in the quotation above, whether or not the truth is at all attainable, does not appear to affect our moral choices or our evaluations of discourse behavior. Thus there is a discrepancy in our knowledge about what is possible on the conceptual level and our world knowledge which predominates when making moral choices.

The political arena, in particular, underlines this inconsistency, in which the pursuit of truth is personified in the politician’s profession itself. The general public assumes that politicians are in fact professional liars, yet each time a politician is caught in the act, there is a huge outcry. Similarly, accusing political actors of misrepresentation or even lying is still the most

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<sup>77</sup> Williams (2002:210) argues for a strong connection between the democratic element of liberal societies and the need for governmental truthfulness. As “the people are the source of the government’s authority and [...] even of its policies, government is in some sense a trust; there is a special relationship between government and people, and it is a violation of this conception for secrecy or falsehood to come between trustee and people.”



efficient strategy of undermining a political opponent's legitimacy. Yet this paradoxical adherence to 'the truth' is not confined to political culture in a narrow sense. Rather it points to a more deep-seated conflict within culture in general.

Two current ideas are very prominent in modern thought and culture. On the one hand, there is an intense commitment to truthfulness — or, at any rate, a pervasive suspiciousness, a readiness against being fooled, an eagerness to see through appearances to the real structures and motives that lie behind them. [...] Together with this demand for truthfulness, [...] there is an equally pervasive suspicion about truth itself: whether there is such a thing; if there is, whether it can be more than relative or subjective or something of that kind; [...]. (Williams 2002: 1)

According to Williams (*ibid.*) there is a tension in our culture between truth and truthfulness. The observation that the demotion of truth is connected to the promotion of truthfulness as the 'next of kin' corresponds with a conceptual shift within the domain itself. Hence the dichotomous relationship truth vs. lie is transposed onto another level. Interestingly, this claim begs the question as to whether this transfer also constitutes a qualitative shift. Generally speaking, the focus on truthfulness appears to be settling for second best, which approximates the meaning of truthfulness to reality and authenticity. Similarly, Williams (*ibid.*) suggests that the "desire for truthfulness weakens the assurance that there is any secure or unqualifiedly stateable truth."

To summarize, discourse activity results in incomplete representations of 'the world', which are nevertheless perceived as truthful or real. Second, truth is a discursive concept whose meaning needs to be negotiated in discourse and hence precludes any absolute conception of truth. Third, conceptual metaphor demonstrates why the contingency of truth is a cognitive prerequisite.

As regards the first aspect, it is crucial to differentiate between truth and reality. Semantically, they can be said to be paradigmatic concepts of inclusion, overlapping to some extent whilst not being entirely interchangeable. What is deemed 'real' is to a certain degree also true; yet what is true is not necessarily real. In line with the basic tenets of CDA reality is, in analogy to truth, discursively constructed. As such, reality is constituted in and through discursive practices in cultural transmission. Thus reality is also a gradient category or, as Edwards (1997: 51) puts it, a "counts as" category:

The real world of objects and events can be approached in [...] a 'counts as' fashion — that is, as a discourse topic or concern. In defining the nature of mind–world or subject-object relations, **factuality is the obverse of mind** [emphasis added]. It is the thing known, the criterion of what counts as knowledge, as objectivity and subjectivity. The way we define knowledge's adequacy, and distinguish between categories such as knowledge or belief, perception or illusion, memory or confabulation, is by appealing to what is real. [...] The real world is what counts as the real world, and this is a product or feature of, rather than something prior to, descriptive practices.

Devising the focal relations as 'count as' categories draws attention to a mental framework in which beliefs, common-sense assumptions and culture-specific knowledge is stored. In other words, these conceptual categories are socially acquired. This social cognition, in which

different types of memory and metaphoric frames play a crucial role,<sup>78</sup> is operative within the triad of discourse, cognition and society. Ideologies as social belief systems are an integral part of social cognition which, in turn, is constituted by cognitive models or frames to organize our knowledge about the world. Kövecses (2006: 64) defines frame as a “structured mental representation of a conceptual category.” Crucially, frames organize human experience in a coherent way, requiring that the meanings of a lexical concept are constrained by the frame in which we conceptualize it. Newness, as I shall discuss in more detail later, belongs to the realm of social beliefs or cognition and also constitutes a powerful frame in which other important metaphorical concepts are stored. In the remainder of this chapter I will focus on the most significant properties of ideologies “as the basis of the social representations shared by members of a group” (van Dijk 1998: 8).

Cognitive models or frames operate on both the discourse and conceptual levels, organizing human experience in several respects. Their bearing on discourse is mirrored in the characteristic representations of entities, events and actions. In the political function of discourse control, the ultimate aim consists in achieving a representational mode that is believable, truthful, and hence, persuasive and legitimate. Discourse is geared towards truthful appearance, a phenomenon that may be referred to as discourse verisimilitude. According to Neale (1990: 46ff.) the notion of verisimilitude subdivides into two broad categories. In the first place, there is so called **generic verisimilitude**, which consists of discourse-specific textual features as well as cues for their interpretation. Thus generic verisimilitude assists in recognizing a certain discourse type and provides a genre-specific system of expectations and hypotheses typically associated with the genre. In brief: this type of verisimilitude builds on knowledge frames which function as cues for the interpretation of a discourse at hand. A case in point is the communicative or instrumental intent inherent in the discourse genre. For example, when referring to political discourse, we may argue that its communicative intent is persuasive and integrative.

In the second place, however, there is also a somewhat broader category of verisimilitude, the so-called **social or cultural verisimilitude**. This genre-specific and discourse-specific property manifests itself in the relationship that exists between discourse and its addressee. The discursive construction of specific types of discourse relies on what addressees, the public, believe is true. Thus, the expectations and attitudes of the recipients are already included in the construction of the discourse, which then explicitly invites evaluation and assessment on behalf of the recipient. In this mode, verisimilitude draws on the generic

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<sup>78</sup> Van Dijk (1998: 21) defines memory as “a theoretical construct of the ‘cognitive’ part or dimension of the mind, that is, the theoretical location where information is stored and processed.” He further distinguishes between an episodic and a social memory, which are associated with different cerebral regions or functions of memory. “Episodic memory is the part of memory where beliefs are stored about concrete episodes (facts, events, situations etc.) we have witnessed or participated in ourselves, or about which we have information through discourse from others” (van Dijk *ibid.*: 29). In contrast, the “beliefs we typically share with many others, for instance most other members of a group, organization or whole culture” (van Dijk *ibid.*: 29) is our social memory, in which our socially and culturally shared beliefs are stored. This is sometimes also referred to as ‘semantic memory’. See also Assmann’s (2005) notion of cultural memory, which is outlined below.

properties of a given discourse. As a consequence, the political function of representation in discourse may not be primarily constrained by factuality itself; instead political discourse may invite a judgment of the credibility or the transparency of its own intents and mechanisms. A case in point is Ford's address to the deeply traumatized nation in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal, which he begins with the following words: "I feel it is my first duty to make an unprecedented compact with my countrymen. Not an inaugural address, not a fireside chat, not a campaign speech -- just a little straight talk among friends." Although these words functioned as a surrogate inaugural — Ford could not deliver a regular inaugural address on account of not being elected president — Ford's strategy is to make his communicative intent, emphasized by a three-fold negative contrastive statement, explicit; this departs from what the audience expects to be part of an inaugural. A conscious, strategic break with generic verisimilitude results in heightened credibility, that is, socio-cultural verisimilitude.

More often than not, the most important aspect is not the credibility of the argumentation, if any, itself but the explicitness of the generic intents and mechanism. This also means that discourses have to work with existing perceptions while trying to create new ones; whichever way, both aspects involve resorting to basic cultural knowledge and beliefs.

As a result, a given discourse bears verisimilitude when generic and cultural knowledge concur in the discursive construction of the discourse itself. Since cultural perception is subject to as well as determined by the space and time in which recipient/producers actually live, the conceptions of things and entities are inevitably local, further restricted to a perspective which invariably includes a knowledge gap if not an absence of knowledge whatsoever.

### **2.4.2 Ideology in Discourse**

The conceptual history of ideology bears testimony to the concept's versatility and instability.<sup>79</sup> Despite its pervasiveness in diverse fields of interest such as politics, sociology, philosophy, literature and economy, it is not easy to establish or to adopt a durable definition of ideology as a concept. Compounding the conceptual difficulties mentioned, the role of language and linguistics in ideology is regularly understated, except for analyses that specifically focus on the ideological lexicon as discussed in the preceding section.

From the onset, ideology "coincides with the progress of an individualistic and mercantilistic society in which the indifference towards all non-economic values constitutes the basis of a tolerant pluralism which favors the coexistence and competition of heterogeneous values that are often incompatible" (Reis 1993: 7). In this adaptation of Zima (1984), two important points are raised. First, ideology as a concept is epiphenomenal to the plurality and diversity of societies. Second, ideology as a concept is janus-faced in itself.

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<sup>79</sup> In part, this overview draws on the theoretical part of an earlier case study (Sing 2004).

As regards the former, it is not until a sense of diversity occurs that the proliferation of ideologies is encouraged. Thus, in order to study the ideological field one has to examine opposing senses and proliferating ideological discourses that confront and engage one another. As a result, the inevitable upshot of ideology is a proliferation of discourses, a plurality that is best expressed by the term ‘ideologies’, for “ideology ends up being unthinkable *when singular* [emphasis original]” (Reis *ibid.*: 2).

In part, this conceptual plurality is a corollary of both the concept’s roots and anchorage in Western thought. Similar to Zima’s (1984) claim that ideology is a characteristic product of bourgeois society, Hutton (2001: 281) regards the analysis of ideology as “a deconstruction of the categories of Western thought.” The implications of this universalist claim that is usually purported within a General Semantics framework are manifold. Chase (1955: 106) pinpoints the core issues of this approach in the following way:

Linguists have [...] emphasized that Chinese is a ‘multi-valued’ language, not primarily two-valued like English and Western languages generally. We say that things must be ‘good’ or ‘bad’, ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, ‘clean’ or ‘dirty’, ‘capitalistic’ or ‘socialistic’, ‘black’ or ‘white’ — ignoring shades of grey. [...] Speakers of Chinese set up no such grim dichotomies; they see most situations in shades of grey, and have no difficulty in grasping the significance of a variety of middle roads. As a result, Chinese thought has been traditionally tolerant, not given to the fanatical ideologies of the West [...].

Thus the propagation of dualistic, if not antagonistic concepts appears to be paradigmatic of Western thought, as is evidenced by the socio-political ideologies that have prevailed in Western societies and polities. This proneness to dichotomies, however, does not exclude the very concept of ideology itself. This is the point where approaches to ideology are misleading when theorizing ideology as pertaining to or even inscribed in a given political or social system in order to differentiate this system from other existing systems. This view envisages that ideology functions as an add-on layer, permeating the strata of complex systems in either a horizontal or a vertical way. Yet not only do the mechanisms of the ideological construction of socio-political realities operate differently following more general rules, they also rely on language to an extent that transcends the incorporation of Dieckmann’s (1975) notion of ‘ideological vocabulary’. These more general principles cannot be divorced from language and are liable to involve aspects such as inclusion and exclusion.

One of many possible consequences that this account of ideology entails is that, conceptually, ideology cannot be considered a rival of either veracity or mendacity. Instead, they are contiguous concepts, whose scope is constrained by their neighboring concepts. Empirically, however, ideology and truth(fullness) continue to be conceived of as counterparts, a fact that is nicely illustrated in the following *bon mot* by Terry Eagleton (2004) in *The Guardian*: “As with bad breath, ideology is always what the other person has. Socialism and anti-racism are ideas; greed and inequality are just plain, honest-to-goodness facts of life.”

From the onset in the movement of the ‘Idéologues’ the formation and dissemination of ideologies have been achieved in and through language.<sup>80</sup> Nonetheless, the role of language in

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<sup>80</sup> With respect to the French language, it was first and foremost Condillac, who placed the emphasis on language, more precisely the linguistic sign, as both the foundation and support of abstract and reflective

the ideological constructions of socio-political realities continues to be typified by one of the two models illustrated by Figure 2 below:




Figure 2: The ideological representation of socio-political realities

On the one hand, as version (1) illustrates, ‘the world’ could be assumed to be directly accessible through language, which, however, entails a monolithic representation of entities such as reality and truth. This is expressed by the single arrow pointing straight to ‘the socio-political reality’. In this case, ideology would inevitably be the conceptual opposite of this very socio-political reality, for it would obstruct this direct ‘mapping’ of reality through language. Thus the access to ‘the world’ would be ideologically flawed. On the other hand, version (2) denies that there is a position outside ideology, which appears to be the more adequate approach. Its first proponent developed his theory within a Marxist framework, maintaining that there is no such thing as a ‘reality’ independent from ideology. Accordingly, Voloshinov (1973: 70) contends that “[l]anguage, in the process of its practical implementation, is inseparable from its ideological or behavioral impletion.” If, instead, this separation between language and ideology is maintained, as is implied in version (1) above, then the linguistic sign is reified to the extent that we are merely dealing with a signal rather than a linguistic sign. Yet, even this rather modern view of the interweaving of ideology and language continues to conceive of ideology as a monadic concept. It was not until the late 1970s that this gap could be bridged. Kress/Hodge (1979) developed a model of language study which incorporated ideology as a pluralistic concept.

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ideas. What is more, however, the role of language was fully acknowledged with respect to the dissemination of ideologies, and language (policy) played a vital role in both the unification and homogenization of revolutionary France. This is only one part of the deal, however. Despite the emphasis on these allegedly positive impacts of aggressive language policies, there is also the negative component in the guise of those not benefiting from the measures taken. In other words: the ideology of language, as put into practice during and following the French Revolution, is ideological in that it selects and thereby excludes those whose language was to be marginalized in the aftermath of the implementation of the language policies.

Nonetheless, most analysts of discourse behavior would intuitively argue that version (2) predominantly holds for political discourse in the narrow sense. Similarly, Girth (2002: 3) states that political reality almost inevitably is ideologically mediated reality. But so are social realities, which are constructed in terms of our social cognition, our software for organizing sociocultural experience within a given discourse community. To the extent that any verbal utterance, any linguistic action relates to a social context, any reality is mediated ideologically.

Human perception is determined by language in two interrelated ways. On the one hand, language assists in creating an alternative world that can only be ‘seen’ in language. On the other hand, language imposes this alternative world on the material world so that we no longer see or believe in the world of physical events (cf. Kress/Hodge *ibid.*: 23). Thus the interaction between language and ‘the world’ inevitably involves transformation, which may be expressed in the following way: “Ideology involves a systematically organized presentation of reality” (Kress/Hodge *ibid.*: 15).

Similarly, van Dijk (1998: 127) defines ideologies as “socially shared representations of a general and abstract kind.” More precisely, ideologies are group-based, meaning that

[...] the very general polarization schema defined by the opposition between Us and Them [which] suggests that groups and group conflicts are involved, and that groups build an ideological image of themselves and others, in such a way that (generally) We are represented positively, and They come out negatively. Positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation seem to be a fundamental property of ideologies. (van Dijk 1998: 69)

On the discourse level, ideological structures are realized as four major discursive strategies, which are modeled in van Dijk’s (*ibid.*: 267) ‘ideological square’:

- Express/emphasize information that is positive about Us.
- Express/emphasize information that is negative about Them.
- Suppress/de-emphasize information that is positive about Them.
- Suppress/de-emphasize information that is negative about Us.

However, while the general polarizing effect of live ideologies appears to be almost trivial, the significance of these strategic moves used in the ideological reproduction of discourse is uncontested. Nevertheless this definition is insufficient in itself because it cannot account for the motivations of either emphasizing or suppressing information. This is why this approach needs to be supplemented with a cognitive dimension. The organisation of the world in and through language involves two basic devices that are an essential part of human cognition: classification and selection.

First and foremost, categorization is not only language specific but also socially given. Systems of categorizations are not valid for society in its entirety, hence their sociolinguistic relevance, but correlate with different groupings within society. At the conceptual level, this mechanism warrants the integration of (basic) ongoing conceptualizations within social cognition. Yet, categorization also functions as a means of control for it is partial and selective by definition, favoring certain mappings over possible alternatives. This preference for certain conceptual transfers is constrained by power relations of a general kind. As Fairclough (1989:

2) remarks, “the exercise of power, in modern society, is increasingly achieved through ideology, and more particularly through the ideological workings of language.”

At this stage, the second important factor comes into play: selection. Conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) deploys categorial structure as metaphorical. These conceptual metaphors establish ontological correspondences, according to which entities in one domain correspond systematically to entities in another. Crucially, this cross-domain mapping involves selection, in which certain correspondences are highlighted (cf. Lakoff 1993: 206). “The very systematicity that allows us to comprehend one aspect of a concept in terms of another [...] will necessarily hide other aspects of the concept. In allowing us to focus on one aspect of a concept [...], a metaphorical concept can keep us from focusing on other aspects of the concept that are inconsistent with that metaphor” (Lakoff/Johnson 1980: 10). In political discourse in particular, these mapping processes might be guided by meaning construction processes that are indicative of the values and interests informing the representation of socio-political realities.

Cultural assumptions, values, and attitudes are not a conceptual overlay which we may or may not place upon experience as we choose. It would be more correct to say that all experience is cultural through and through, that we experience our ‘world’ in such a way that our culture is already present in the very experience itself. (Lakoff/Johnson 1980: 57)

But how do the ideological and linguistic levels actually synthesize? Hawkins’ (2001) term ‘iconographic frame of reference’ is a useful tool for the analysis of meaning construction in ideological discourse. Iconographic reference is defined as “a common mode of textual representation which represents simplistic images of our experiences and does so in a way as to underscore familiar values [...]” (Hawkins *ibid.*: 32). The effect of iconographic reference is to establish a powerful conceptual link between the referent and a particular value judgment, thereby comprising both social and cognitive dimensions of linguistic knowledge.

Pivotal within such systems of knowledge are the so-called cultural models or frames mentioned earlier on. According to Hawkins (2001: 28), there is a conventionalized system of ideals peculiar to a group or subgroup constituted by an evaluative hierarchy of iconographic frames of reference encoding positive images of this group. The negative ideals of this same group are allocated at the bottom of the hierarchy. These cultural models are linked to conceptual metaphors which, in turn, implement the iconographic frames of reference.

In sum, language and ideology are tightly interwoven. Adhering to the presumption that language cannot be used without ideologizing, it is, however, vital to identify the fundamental principles of ideological language use. More precisely, the mechanisms inherent in the ideological construction of discourse should be the centre of analysis.

The preceding discussion raises the question as to what makes political ideologies tangible for analysis and to what extent they differ from social ideologies. It is not only the scope and the accumulation of power that makes party-political viz. state-political ideological structures more influential and consequential than other instances of ideological language use. In part the answer lies in the analyses of ‘language wars’, which Lakoff (2001) examines in the semantic

battlefields of politics. One of the most poignant political scandals in this respect is Clinton's 'Monicagate', where the language war revolved around the semantics of sex, a word which is assigned vague meanings although everybody insists that they know what it means. Yet when a conflict arises, "absolutists insist that ... [words like sex, lie, apologize] have single, decontextualized meanings: everyone knows what each of these words means [...]. Language is fixed. Meaning is certain" (Lakoff 2001: 270).

The 'language war' is essentially fought between two competing signifiers, a pair of conceptual opposites or deontic rivals. The strategy is successful when only one of two (or even several) signifiers gains the upper hand in the socio-political minefield. In the process, the fixity of meaning is important, especially when lexemes deeply anchored in everyday language are to be 'loaded' for ideological purposes, adding evaluative semantic attributes.

Conceiving of ideology as an inevitable condition of socio-political realities, however, also entails major drawbacks with respect to the actual impact of ideologies in the twentieth century. Some commentators (e.g. Reis 1993) argue that the increasing diversity and heterogeneity of contemporary societies has enhanced the need for ideologies; adherents (e.g. Mueller 1973) to a more conventional understanding of ideology maintain that traditional ideologies can no longer grasp the needs of advanced industrial society because of the rapid changes occurring within them. More precisely, "the rapid change in advanced industrial society would require a constant updating of a dominant ideology, a revision which would in itself alienate the old believers and limit its claim to absolute veracity" (Mueller 1973: 104). Since societies can only persist if they thrive on intact and coherently organized systems of social cognition, the functions of the ideological system have been increasingly superseded by alternative belief systems. As a result, the continuity and coherence of modern societies is also achieved by systems such as religion, myth or para-ideologies, all of which act as a stabilizing force in any political system. Crucially, these 'collective' beliefs may only express the interests of the dominant group which provides seemingly plausible interpretations of political reality.

### **2.4.3 The (Quasi-) ideological Functions of Myth and Cultural Memory**

On principle, Barthes' (1964) conception of myth approaches in function and signification the Marxian term ideology, since the actual aim of myth is to transform history into nature and to make the present appear the ultimate state of affairs. Barthes (*ibid.*) maintains that capitalist power relations are sustained by myths in that capitalism is capable of continuously producing myths about itself. As a result, reality is distorted by myths to the extent that it is no longer recognizable.

One of the most basic properties of Barthes' notion of myth is that it reinvigorates dislocated knowledge. However, these knowledge structures are not merely restored but a shift of meaning occurs.<sup>81</sup> Accordingly, Barthes deploys myth as a secondary semiological

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<sup>81</sup> Thus it is not merely a case of restoration, in the process of which the mnemonic building blocks of collective memory are put back together again as part of a concerted cultural effort in order to establish and consolidate



order overriding the primary, language-based system, which is displaced from its original signification, adding to the temporal and spatial incongruity or distance between the language system and mythic system. Figure 3 illustrates the onset of the semiological process that results in the mythic signification system:




Figure 3: Myth as a secondary system (adapted from Barthes 1964: 93)

Crucially, Barthes' notion of myth conceives of myth as an utterance ('Aussage') rather than an idea. Since the myth is invariably also a system of information ('Mitteilungssystem'), there is always a linguistic as well as a historical dimension to the myth. As a result, the metalanguage of myth forms a semiological chain, i.e. the components of what is a sign in the first order, is transformed into signification, consisting of a (meta-)signifier and a (meta-)signified, in the second order. Both are then merged into a (meta-) signification, the myth's meaning.

The shift is caused by the ambiguity of the signifier ('Bedeutendes'): the signifier either constitutes the end point of the object language or primary system, or it represents the point of departure of the myth or secondary system, i.e. signifier or SIGNIFIER. No such ambivalence resides within the signified though. Instead, the signified marks the ending of the primary system, in other words its signification is perceived as a sign in itself (SIGNIFIER). As a consequence, this signified is coupled with a SIGNIFIED on the meta-linguistic level since it cannot be used without a secondary meaning. This 'double articulation' results in the myth's SIGNIFICATION.

In sum, Barthes' notion of the mythic system is an ongoing process — Figure 3 merely represents a segment of the process in its entirety — which eventually constructs a parallel universe of signification. While the assumption that the myth's semiological chain somehow underlies the linguistic system of signification rather than being inscribed in the linguistic meaning construction process itself cannot be easily reconciled with the definition of ideology propagated above, Barthes' conception of the mythic system highlights an important factor

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membership and cultural cohesion. Although there undoubtedly is a connective dimension to the collective or bonding memory, this clearly does not exhaust itself by projecting a shared perspective of the world, or in Assmann's terms a 'connective semantics': "Wherever people join together in larger groups they generate a connective semantics, thereby producing forms of memory that are designed to stabilize a common identity and a point of view that spans several generations" (Assmann 2006: 11). Rather each subsequent act of remembering is subject to provoking a shift further away from the first event of remembering.

that is frequently overlooked in other systems that can be associated with the construction process of ideological meaning. Barthes' mythic system underlines the factors time and temporality as pivotal to ideological meaning construction.<sup>82</sup> Thus the relevant time frame is the present; yet the present is also central to the construction of the past as well as the modeling of the future (see also chapter 3). As cultural time is essentially discontinuous, a considerable part of socio-cultural practice is directed to the meaningful and coherent segmentation and periodization of cultural time. In discourse this is achieved by establishing a temporality that is indicative of this underlying structure of temporal cognition.

The so-called cultural memory also serves as an important function in this context. According to Assmann (2005: 42), memory works as reconstruction, recollection or restoration. Crucially, the past does not simply persist unaltered but is continuously reorganized by the ever-changing frame of reference of the present. This is also significant for the phenomenon of newness, which may only be possible in the guise of the reconstructed past; traditions may be substituted for traditions and past for past. Society does not merely adopt new ideas and put them in the place of their past; instead the representation of the past is group-specific — bearing in mind that groups can be different sizes ranging from small, local groups or communities to national or even international communities —, the standard procedure thus involves focusing on the past of groups other than dominant one so far. All in all, the collective memory is operative in two directions: back and forth, retrospective and prospective, organizing the experience of present and future. Let us investigate the functions of the cultural memory in the construction of a national narrative more closely.

Assmann's (e.g. 2005, 2006) important notion of cultural memory is a useful starting point for the analysis of the construction of a national identity. The notion of cultural memory underscores both the cultural and the social basis of memory. Elaborating on the theories developed by Halbwachs in the 1930s, Assmann (2006: 3) refers to the socially conditioned nature of memory. In fact, Assmann (ibid.) argues that all instances of remembering are socially mediated to the extent that the differences between individual and social memory are blurred. He proposes the term **communicative memory** to denote the social dimension of individual memory that is so significant in processes of cultural transmission. There is a broad distinction between two modes of remembering, which he terms episodic memory and

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<sup>82</sup> This is not to entertain the view that Barthes' mythic system is the exact equivalent of ideology in the sense of 'false consciousness', which entails the present symbolic representation of socio-political realities being constructed as ahistoric. In other words, the present situation is represented as natural or even universally valid instead of having grown out of a historical situation with its particular power relations and history of dominance. In this respect, ideology is similar in function to Barthes' (1964) conception of myth since the actual aim of myth is to transform history into nature and to make the present appear the ultimate state of affairs. Hawkins' (2001: 28f.) distinction between a narrow and a broad view of ideology seeks to close the gap between this narrow definition of ideology and a broader concept of ideology according to which ideology informs any representation of reality (as illustrated by Figure 2 above). More precisely, Hawkins (ibid.) distinguishes between ideology in the broad sense, i.e. a system of ideas that is conventionalized by a particular community and ideology in its narrow sense, i.e. a set of ideals that accounts for a conventionalized pattern of evaluations. The latter is reflected in iconographic frames of reference (iconographies for short), introduced in the main body of the text above.

semantic memory (Assmann 2006: 2). The former has an experiential basis and is derived from practical knowledge rather than learning as is the case with semantic memory. Crucially, remembering is partial: the act of remembering not only foregrounds some things but also entails the backgrounding, if not suppression of others.

More precisely, the notion of communicative memory comprises the life span of three generations, during which remembering may still be based on the methods of personal interrogation. However, this period of time rarely extends beyond a time span of about eighty to a hundred years. Thus communicative memory, by and large, is a generation-based memory whose contents are transformed or renewed as a new generation takes shape.

Second, memory also constitutes a sociogenetic force, particularly in its function as **collective memory**. The collective memory primarily transmits a collective identity and thus contains all societal norms and values. “Collective memory is particularly susceptible to politicized forms of remembering” (Assmann 2006: 7), in which the invocation of (national) history plays a crucial, mobilizing function in order to obtain public support for political goals. Public forms of (collective) remembering are a powerful strategic function of political discourse. Political commemoration fulfills the essential strategies of political discourse, namely coercion, legitimization and representation. This is why Assmann (2006: 24) refers to the instrumentalized past of the bonding memory.

The inaugural address provides such an institutionalized opportunity for public recollection. As will be shown, the sociogenetic potency of collective memory coincides with the process of cultural semiosis, the process of growing abstraction according to which an increasing reliance on symbols occurs. These collective memories are ‘collective imaginaries’ (cf. Laclau 1990), i.e. remembering is manufactured, “it is a projection on the part of the collective that wishes to remember and of the individual who remembers in order to belong” (Assmann 2006: 7).

Due to the dislocated nature of collective memory its contents need to be retrieved and re-enacted frequently. This characteristic lends itself to the refreshment provided by epideictic discourse. Unlike communicative memory, which builds up gradually and usually vanishes in the course of three generations, collective memory may last eternally, depending on whether or not it can still perform a socio-political and cultural function. What is important, however, is that the reinvigoration of dislocated knowledge is not merely the equivalent restoration; it also implies a shift of symbolic meaning of the stock of memory concerned, which makes it similar to Barthes’ notion of myth.

Finally, Assmann’s notion of **cultural memory** can be considered as a subtype of what he terms communicative memory. Whereas communicative memory’s three-generation cycle describes the synchronic axis of remembering, the cultural memory symbolizes its development along the diachronic axis. Accordingly, Assmann (2006: 24) claims that “with cultural memory the depths of time open up.” Unlike communicative memory cultural memory includes the ‘unconscious’, the traditions and archives, i.e. the knowledge (structures) that are old, dislocated and dispersed. In other words: cultural memory points to knowledge

which, strictly speaking, can no longer be remembered or recollected. Transposed onto the discourse level, the evidence of cultural memory manifests itself in the layers of temporality, which not only attest to the incongruity of time and place that exists within discourse communities but also illustrate the progression of (historical) time. The dislocation of culture, i.e. the loss of links of coherence and a locality of cultural identity is then compensated by establishing or drawing on the forces that are capable of locating a given culture within its time and space (temporal and spatial synchronization).

Moreover a crucial distinction between functional memory and stored memory has to be made.<sup>83</sup> In what may be termed a dialectical relationship, the boundary of functional and stored memory is constantly shifting, which accounts for the cultural dynamism of change and renewal (ibid.: 25).<sup>84</sup> While stored memory corresponds to an amorphous, fuzzy stock of knowledge, functional memory maintains or provides a structural grid that helps to create coherence and boundaries. Similar to a device that glosses over the ruptures and discontinuities of living cultures on the one hand, while smoothing over the transitions of cultural change on the other, functional memory draws on the remote, even unconscious aspects of stored memory in order to provide duration and continuity.

The functionality of memory is also vital with respect to newness in the sense of innovation. Novelties and inventions can only be handed down as significant, memorable knowledge, if there is an awareness of memory, if knowledge is selected and if this knowledge is then elected as acceptable, valuable knowledge for the generations to come. Groys (1999: 23) argues that the new is invoked whenever values are to be protected from the destructive force of time by virtue of the archivization of the old. In the absence of archives, existing traditions rather than innovations are transmitted. Alternatively, there is a strong tendency to perceive principles and ideas as both timeless yet accessible at any time. Importantly, these enduring principles are held to be true, in the hope that they will persist in order to be renewed or rediscovered in the event of their cultural dislocation.<sup>85</sup>

Interestingly, it is the temporality of the different types of memory that serves as a powerful criterion of distinction. As a consequence, Assmann's (2006) notion of connective memory (as a subtype of the collective memory) draws attention to both the temporality and

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<sup>83</sup> As Assmann (2006: 24) observes, the distinction between functional and stored memory is particularly significant against the background of oral as opposed to written cultures. In oral societies the stock of memory that is actually needed in order to sustain a particular culture coincides with the totality of cultural memory in that it is both functional as long as it can be stored with the mnemonic devices available to oral cultures without the archivization of written cultures.

<sup>84</sup> This claim parallels the conceptions of culture proposed within a semiotic framework. In fact, Eco's definition of culture as a productive/dynamic tension between innovation and conservation as the locomotive of cultural semiosis also lends itself to describing the gradual transformation into symbolic forms as an essential process of cultural activity.

<sup>85</sup> This is a paraphrase from Groys's (1999: 23) German original which reads: "Das Neue wird immer dann gefordert, wenn alte Werte archiviert und dadurch vor der zerstörerischen Arbeit der Zeit geschützt werden. Wo keine Archive existieren (...) wird die Weitervermittlung der intakten Tradition der Innovation vorgezogen. Oder es wird an Prinzipien und Ideen appelliert, die als von der Zeit unabhängige und (...) zu jeder Zeit gleich unmittelbar zugängliche und konstante angesehen werden. Solche angeblich zeitunabhängige Prinzipien und Ideen werden als »wahr« postuliert in der Hoffnung, dass sie auch dann weiter bestehen oder neu entdeckt werden, falls ihre kulturelle Fixierung zerstört werden sollte."

locality of memory. In ritualistic commemoration memory is crafted in such a way as to strengthen the ties between members of the community. The practice of the ritual underlines the fact that memory is couched in a specific social and local context. The American legacy of covenantal theology in which the invocation of the special bond or covenant with God was regularly made, is indicative of the mechanisms of connective memory. Crucially, the larger political bonds and obligations to which the members of the communities were sworn on the occasion of political jeremiads have to be periodically refreshed lest this memory should be lost. By analogy with the Puritans' interpretation of the jeremiad the inaugural address illustrates the close connection of religion and memory.<sup>86</sup>

It is no coincidence that connective memory is also referred to as bonding memory for it mostly conveys the normative aspects of collective memory. In what has been termed the "calendrical rites" (Finkelstein 1981) of the ascension of power in American politics, the inaugural address and the ceremonies that accompany it, is replete with national symbolism. From this angle, the emphasis is clearly on those aspects of knowledge that are assumed to unite and those components of memory that are believed to create community. These profiled attributes of memory presuppose a clear normativity and provide binding points of reference that are decisive of group membership. In the American context group membership, including nationality, is strongly determined by resorting to the shared past.<sup>87</sup> Moreover, this vital function can also be argued to be both group-specific and genre-specific. The inaugural address has been referred to as an epideictic genre, i.e. it serves to re-enact shared beliefs and knowledge in emphasizing positive, uniting aspects while de-emphasizing negative aspects of the past. Other genre-specific functions of the presidential inaugural address, as well as the importance of epideictic discourse features in the modern political process, will be described in chapter 5 below.

## 2.5 Summary

Theorizing on political discourse involves the discussion of broad and narrow definitions of the political on the one hand, and the understanding that the political itself is subject to change on the other. What is more, these considerations are largely dependent on the conception of language which underlies the relationship between language and politics. Both the reflexive nature and the ambiguity of political discourse have proved to be major drawbacks in the attempts to delimit the object of study.

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<sup>86</sup> In this respect, the impact of religion on memory needs to be further specified. Drawing on Luckmann's (1967) differentiation between visible religion, i.e. the religion of institutionalized churches, and invisible religion which underlines the binding, normative character of the knowledge shared by a group, Assmann (2006: 32) assimilates the notion of invisible religion to his concept of cultural memory which is also typified by the normativity of collective memory.

<sup>87</sup> The USA is one of the countries in which citizenship, amongst other things, depends on the proof of thorough knowledge of national history. "The past is the decisive resource for the consciousness of national identity. Whoever wishes to belong must share the group memory" (Assmann 2006: 87).

Political discourse has been identified as a generic term that draws on several political traditions while informing social practice to a considerable degree. In the attempt to define political discourse more accurately, the preceding discussion has shown that, depending on the focus and objectives of the political use of language, it can be framed as political language, political communication, political rhetoric or political discourse. The conventional notion of political language betrays a simultaneously simplistic and normative understanding of the political meanings of language. In this context, the ‘study’ of political language is frequently the equivalent of a general critique of language.

Political communication can be conceived of as the purposeful communication about politics, comprising all forms of communication of political actors and their intent to achieve specific objectives. The large majority of studies define political communication as a goal-oriented, action-based system, focusing on the enhanced intentionality on behalf of the speaker. In contrast, this present study favors a cognitive approach to political communication as an essentially knowledge-based process. Furthermore, the emphasis is placed on the adjustment to shifting conditions of political communication, particularly throughout the twentieth century. As political communication is an adaptive system, both sides of the communication process have adjusted within their domains; for example, politicians have altered their communicative styles — a case in point is the reduction of argument complexity and a shift from elaborate, written-medium style in favor of short paragraphs encoded in spoken, conversational style — while audiences have fine-tuned their receptive competences. Political communication is a function of its publicness, i.e. there is a doubling of political reality. To the extent that political communication is public, it simultaneously addresses the inner circle and the general public. In the process, political communication oscillates between instrumental objectives and the synchronization of values — both old and new.

There is no denying that political discourse, in its broadest possible conception, is not merely instrumental. In fact, political discourse is typified by narrative and non-narrative modes of discourse. Narrativization implies that political events are not simply reported on; instead occurrences are constructed on the basis of an event schema in terms of which causalities, sequencing or agency are constructed. Crucially, this construction also establishes a deictic center as the point of view, an experiencer from whose perspective events and situations are perceived. Yet political discourse is also deployed in the non-narrative mode, which foregrounds beliefs, attitudes or truths rather than experiences. While these modes are suggestive of a discourse temporality that focuses on the present and the past, political discourse as an action system is also directed towards the future. These predicate macrostructures are realized as promises, announcements, threats etc.

Although the theories and definitions of political discourse have differed widely, the findings of previous accounts are surprisingly consistent. One line of research has concerned itself with the political lexicon, particularly the ‘ideological vocabulary’. The large majority of political lexemes are abstract nouns which, due to their conceptual structure, provide representations of socio-political realities that reduce complexities. By and large, four major functions of political discourse have been identified. The regulative or coercive function

establishes and preserves power and its hierarchical structures. This can be achieved on several levels, for example, by virtue of agenda setting, selecting topics in conversation, positioning the self in relation to others, to name but a few. Another important function is ‘resistance’, the change-oriented activities undertaken by interest-groups and other opponents of the established powers.

Third, political discourse serves to integrate diverging and conflicting forces that exist within a polity. Given the diversity of modern societies this function of political discourse is central to unifying socio-political organization in constructing ‘shared’ beliefs and knowledge structures with which people can most easily identify. Crucially, this strategic function of political language is instrumental in determining group membership. Legitimizing the actions and events of the in-group while delegitimizing dispreferred ones, reinforces the preferred values and structures.

The fourth characteristic of political discourse is its purposiveness. The construal of representation is usually telic, i.e. it is directed towards a specific objective. In order to achieve this goal, the strategies used are either representation or misrepresentation, depending on a particular viewpoint. More often than not, the choice for either strategy is determined by whether or not it concerns the in-group (us) or the out-group (them), based on a polarization schema. It is this antagonism that makes the strategy of representation vs. misrepresentation pivotal in the construction of ideological meaning. The success of the strategy depends on verisimilitude on the one hand and coherence on the other.

The preceding discussion has illustrated that truth is a relative, if not subjective concept. Nonetheless, there is such a thing as a social theory of truth which manifests itself in and through social practice, hence discourse. In line with constructivist theorizing on meaning, all societies must ground their interactions in some sort of validation. This setting of boundaries by entrenching positive, truthful values is a cognitive propensity, which makes truth also a discursive concept that is negotiated in and through discourse. Frequently, political events and situations are not validated in a straightforward way. They are imbued with symbolic meaning in the course of time, as for example, in Barthes’s mythic system. Importantly, the primary meaning of a linguistic sign is increasingly distanced from its signifier, whereby a shift of meaning occurs. Conversely, political actions and occurrences may also be corroborated and further entrenched from a retrospective angle. Relying, once more, on time as a contributing factor, the cultural memory serves to convey or re-enact knowledge structures stored in social cognition. In several respects, this process is similar to narrativization in that past experiences are re-enacted and re-constructed in a particular temporal sequence. Language thus plays a vital role not only in constructing the past but also in perpetuating knowledge that is significant for the political culture. This knowledge is passed on from generation to generation in what has been termed cultural transmission. Whereas the oral tradition re-enacted these knowledge bases following generational cycles — the capacity of this cognitive recollection does not usually survive for more than three to four generations — in modern societies this has to be achieved over an extended period of time.

Political discourse can therefore be regarded as the product of both individual and collective mental processes informed by the interaction of knowledge stored in the long-term memory and the online meaning construction process. Political cognition can be assumed to be organized on the basis of cognitive models in which information about beliefs, values and social practices is encapsulated. Due to its discursive nature, stipulating a bidirectional relationship between language and society, political discourse is not merely a reflex of the political context, for example the prevalent socio-political realities within a given discourse community, but also actively shapes these realities. In other words, political discourse may be regarded as both a process of meaning construction as well as its outcome.

The American inaugural address fulfills such a function of cultural transmission. It symbolizes the continuity of the American system despite its precarious origins as a new nation in a New World. The invocation of newness represents the break with existing political traditions, yet this does not occur without considerable internal contradictions as we will see in the analysis below. As will be shown, the reasoning seeking to establish a political cognition of its own can be explained in terms of several conceptual metaphors which will be identified through the analysis. The point of departure is the domain of NEWNESS as a cultural model that has informed political discourse in providing it with an underlying temporal structure that is geared towards change. Prior to looking in more detail into the conceptual structure of NEWNESS I will situate American political discourse within its specific historical context, which will lay bare important factors that have contributed to its formation and its characteristic temporality.



### 3. Configuring a New American Political Discourse

In the introductory chapter, I elaborated on the assumption that discourses consist of (several) layers of historicity. However the multiple temporalities of discourse cannot always be retrieved by discourse participants. Neither do temporal developments usually advance at a similar pace nor are they equally significant. As a result, discourses not only construct their own temporality, but their “temporalization constitutes an essential element of the continual reshaping of human action” (Bronckart 2005: 80). Within American political discourse, the specific temporal developments have not only brought about a highly characteristic temporality of their own, including the time reference within the discourse itself, but they have also given rise to a discourse genre, namely presidential discourse.

The temporality of discourse is particularly important with respect to the analysis of political discourse which presents itself as action-oriented and public-centered. In its attempt to seek coherent representation political discourse has been shown to employ diverse strategies in order to achieve its goals. However, human activity is never simply represented in a straightforward, decontextualised way, which is even less likely in the ‘double reality’ of political activity. The historical dimension of political discourse illustrates that discourses reshape human actions, a process of reconfiguration in which temporality plays a vital role (cf. Bronckart 2005: 79). In this respect, political discourse assumes a singular position since it is concerned with timing as well as synchronization as a prerequisite of coherent representation. A paradigmatic case in point is the discursive construction of political events, which will be shown to have a specific conceptual structure. The analysis of the event of American newness (see chapter 6) will reveal the system of conceptual metaphors structuring, as well as being structured by NEWNESS in the event structure frame.

Having focused on political discourse from a general perspective, I will now situate American political discourse temporally and locally. The importance of location will be treated in more detail below. In what follows the development of American political discourse will be calibrated on the basis of its characteristic temporal coordinates, tracing its historical development from its formative years to the present. In the first part of this overview I will explore the foundations of American political discourse in its specific ‘context of situation’ while the second part is concerned with the importance of language and rhetoric in constructing a national narrative within the new American polity. The notion of newness is central to this development in several respects. Since the conceptual structure of NEWNESS as well as its ideational history will be discussed in great detail in chapter 4, I will only provisionally deal with a few points here.

NEWNESS as a concept consists of two major subcategories. NEWNESS can be conceived of in terms of time and origin, or alternatively in terms of kind and quality. Irrespective of its subcategories, NEWNESS itself is a relational concept for it relies on two fundamental frames of reference. On the one hand, NEWNESS is framed temporally, that is NEWNESS is embedded into the ‘before-and-after’ of temporal progression, against which the differences in time,

origin, kind or quality can be measured. On the other hand, NEWNESS is realized within an underlying action or event frame, i.e. NEWNESS is contiguous with other ‘motion’ concepts such as CHANGE, for example.

Therefore the conceptual category of NEWNESS is grounded in some very basic domains of human experience. This experiential basis may be perceptual, bodily, cognitive and cultural. NEWNESS is clearly **perceptual** in that it builds on the human capacity of perceiving difference, which may be experienced as a result of preceding movement, as change induced by a process or action, or simply as a sense of dynamic ‘becoming’ as opposed to stationary ‘being’. But newness is also based on **bodily** experience, i.e. NEWNESS is conceptualized in terms of MOTION as a source domain, which is a crucial domain of human cognition and feeds on sensory experience, involving a change of position.

Moreover, NEWNESS is essentially **cognitive** in that we experience its interconnectedness with other important domains of human experience such as TIME, MOTION, SPACE and EVENTS. This cognitive salience makes NEWNESS a vital component of organizing human experience. Finally, NEWNESS is an integral part of **cultural** experience if we conceive of culture as a dynamic system oscillating between innovation and conservation. In this respect culture determines the spatial and temporal setting in which NEWNESS may, or may not, unfold. Furthermore cultural experience provides the frame in which NEWNESS as a conceptual domain is perceived and assessed. In some systems such as capitalism, while the idea of newness may in general be a highly valued concept, particularly when it functions as a preferred change of the status quo, it may be disdained when modifications do not produce the desired effects. This ambivalence in the evaluation of newness illustrates its entrenchment within a given discourse community or cultural context. The frames of reference used to assess newness can be internal or external, linking it to the notion of standpoint, which can be literal or conceptual. It is the location within a cultural system of signification, and by extension within a given discourse, that is crucial for the construal of *newness*. All in all, the conceptual domain of NEWNESS can be said to be marked for its discursive and indexical meaning, “a way of pointing to, presupposing or bringing into the present context beliefs, feelings, identities, events” (Duranti 1997: 37).

The fact that newness occupies a pivotal role in the formation of American national identity is well known. The degree to which newness continues to frame American political discourse to this day is less well known — except for the Old Europe – New Europe debate, which as a discourse strategy was sufficiently authoritative to cause a (provisional) rift between EU member states. In the light of its continuing impact, the concept NEWNESS is best studied as part of a metaphorical network, eventually serving as the source concept of the sustained metaphors THE AMERICAN NATION IS A NEW NATION or AMERICA IS INNOVATION. It lies at the heart of what constitutes American socio-political organization and is thus deeply entrenched in the rhetorical styles that are prevalent in political discourse.

The major landmarks in the development of American political discourse are highly recurrent in the approximately 350 years of Europeanized American history. Closely related to

the concept of NEWNESS, temporality and historicity have assumed a high degree of indexicality as well. In what follows I will explore the factors which have been most influential in shaping American political discourse.

In the American context political culture abides by a carefully orchestrated calendrical organization of the polity. The temporal structure of politics has followed a rhythm of its own. Cases in point are numerous, such as the tension between tradition and counter-tradition, the character of the ‘public philosophy’, the institutionalization of clearly defined speech events and, last but not least, the emergence of marked rhetorical styles which have gained preponderance in political discourse.

### 3.1 American Cycles

First and foremost, the American newness in terms of time and origin had to be integrated into the existing temporal frameworks. The possibility of newness could not easily be integrated into either a linear or a cyclical temporality. The response to the discovery of America in Renaissance Europe was highly consequential:

The discovery of America was revolutionary for political thought because it rendered unacceptable the habitual linear patterning of events derived by way of St Augustine from Paul’s letters and also undermined the alternative way of making sense of events, the classical notion of the cyclic nature of history. (Slavin 1976: 139)

The existence of America thus posed a problem to both major conceptions of temporal progression in existence during that period. In general terms, time and temporal progression have frequently been modeled in terms of physical objects moving through space.

In European thought a gradual paradigmatic shift of temporal models concurred with the transition to modernity. St. Clair (2002: 324) argues for the existence of three major metaphors of time.<sup>88</sup> Based on two principal temporal modes, the time of being and the time of becoming, a distinction is typically made between the sacred time of being and the profane time of becoming. The Platonic conception of time as being is the divine realm of perfection, in which there is no room for change. The eternal time of being has no end and no beginning and is liable to never-ending circular motion. In contrast, the time of becoming is compositional. Since this ephemeral time can be divided into smaller time units, there is also a beginning, middle and end to it. Its finality implies that the motion of time is directed towards a final goal, the telos. Within this temporal framework the progression of time is conceived of as irreversible and linear,<sup>89</sup> nonetheless the possibility of change is not precluded, albeit on account of two alternative conditions. On the one hand, change may occur as a linear change

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<sup>88</sup> It is important to note that St.Clair (2002) is referring to metaphor in the traditional understanding of figure of thought or speech rather than a contemporary conceptual theory of metaphor.

<sup>89</sup> At a first glance, the Augustinian “one-time cycle of becoming” (St. Clair 2002: 327), proceeding from the City of Man to the City of God, appears to contradict the overall linear conception of time. However this is a matter of perspective or the knowledge available at a given point in time. Perceived from within one lifetime, the process is linear whereas from within a larger, more comprehensive framework it is cyclical. The events in time are repeated as an ever-renewing cycle.

in terms of the theory of the four causes — growth, decay, death and rebirth. Crucially, this time model envisages change as both directional and immanent, i.e. resulting from forces within the system itself. On the other hand, within a religious framework change may be possible through divine insight in spite of the overall deterministic conception. Only God may intervene with the predestined course, predestination thus being temporally framed as the totality of all successive events in one act. Both conceptions of time are undermined by the discovery of America.

While this discovery did not entail an entire collapse of these well-entrenched temporal models, it nonetheless assisted the formation of a third model. In fact, this model is actually closely related to the preceding one except for its imagery. The substitution of the religious model of temporal linearity by a spiral model occurred in the course of the nineteenth century. The march of time towards the sublime constitutes a secularized version of the one-time cycle of becoming. Accordingly, “in the spiral model [...] events in time are directed towards a teleological end” (St. Clair 2002: 327). It is no coincidence that the spiral model of time found expression in the progress-mindedness of nineteenth-century thinking. For example, this temporal model manifests itself in the metaphorical conceptualizations PROGRESS IS UP or WEALTH IS UP, based on an upward spiral movement.

Compounding the difficulties of temporal cognition, mediaeval and early renaissance thought did not easily embrace the notion of innovation which, by and large, results from the two conceptions of temporal progression, linear or cyclical, that prevailed at the time. Neither permits the occurrence of newness, so then America emerged as a free space apparently deficient of a particular history and political organization.

The timeline of American national history is imbued with all three different notions of time - linear, cyclical and spiral, while there is a certain bias towards periodizing in terms of cyclical patterns. American national history is typified by two major developmental cycles both of which originated from a Calvinist ethos and were renewed by secular infusions. Schlesinger (1986: 12) refers to them as the tradition and counter-tradition.

### **The Tradition**

The dominant theme of the early republic consists of “the idea of America as an experiment undertaken in defiance of history, fraught with risk, problematic in outcome” (Schlesinger 1986: 12). The Calvinist notion of the fragility of the human condition had evolved into the precariousness of human existence in more general terms. By the time of the early republic, this outlook on life had been transferred to the political life cycle (organic conception, body politic). Derived from the cycle of birth, growth, maturity and decay the new nation was conceptualized as an organism or a person, as will be demonstrated in the analysis of the socio-political frame of newness (see chapter 6).

Hence the secularized version of providential history — in the human realm of corruption all things have a beginning and an end — was mapped onto the republic. Modeled on the

paragon of ancient republics, the framers of the nation feared that the American republic might face the same inglorious end as the Roman republic. In fact this organic life cycle ending in decay was believed to be the destiny not only of all republics but of states in general. This mindset resulted from a firm belief in predestination, according to which the finitude of humans is contrasted with divine eternity. As a consequence only God may intervene in the predestined course of all mortals. Given that the totality of all successive acts and events can only be comprehended on the basis of divine insight, human beings live in constant uncertainty. This view had a bearing on the formation of the republic in several respects. Predestination constrains the likelihood of change in a significant way. If there is no escape from republican doom, the attempt to establish a new, timeless social and political order on the American continent, as the framers of the constitution aspired to, is also futile. In fact, the endeavor was a battle against time, which was running in the direction of catastrophe. Cases in point are metaphorical concepts of time such as *TIME IS A THIEF*, *TIME IS A DEVOURER* or *TIME IS A DESTROYER* (Lakoff/Turner 1989),<sup>90</sup> which map the uncontrollability and unpredictability of time onto the source domain *PERSON*. Hence personification is a means to project any potential failure of the political experiment onto a clearly identifiable, evil person. Epiphenomenally, crisis was also an integral part of the American experience from the beginning. As will be seen below, the political discourse around the presidency relies on the experience of crisis, be it impending or merely probable.

There were two ways out of the dilemma of predestination both of which shaped early American history. On the one hand, time had to be conceptualized in more positive terms, underlining its affirmative qualities in order to enforce a highly characteristic temporality in discourse. The notion of experiment captures the essence of what Schlesinger (1986: 12) describes as the tradition. Conceiving of nation-building as an experiment involves not only a different conceptualization of time — the appropriate metaphor in this respect would be *TIME IS AN EVALUATOR* or even the general metaphor *TIME IS A CHANGER* — but also entails the internal temporality of the nation itself by making it the equivalent of trial. Therefore the nation is a permanent test case. In the process, time may help improve and thereby correct mistakes. Thus the Federalists set up a huge gamble, trying to defy history and theology (cf. Schlesinger 1986: 10f.).<sup>91</sup>

On the other hand, theology was circumvented in another respect. Secularizing the idea of providence by introducing the experimental level coincided with a shift of emphasis that could be referred to as geopolitical. The Founding Fathers believed in the geographic and demographic (Schlesinger *ibid.*: 7) advantage of their undertaking rather than divine intervention, thereby foregrounding the notion of place. Furthermore this emphasis is also

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<sup>90</sup> Actually the personifications *TIME IS A DEVOURER* and *TIME IS A DESTROYER* are not based on metaphorical mappings but they are cultural constructs (Lakoff/Turner 1989: 41f.), which are deeply entrenched in Western thought and can also be found in classical antiquity.

<sup>91</sup> The break with history, at least secular history, is to be expressed by the so-called Monroe Doctrine, taking up Washington's proposal of avoiding entangling alliances with foreign powers. Schlesinger (1986: 17) refers to this retreat as a "process of narcissistic withdrawal from history."

encapsulated in the salience of newness at the time. Newness refers to change of place in terms of time and origin (the new and ‘vacant’ lands) and to a qualitative change when denoting the arrival of an increasing number of like-minded people.

### The Counter-tradition

Geopolitical considerations are also relevant for the counter-tradition which is juxtaposed to the above-mentioned tradition. Although springing from the same source, this strand of development is located in the millennial tradition rather than providential determinism.<sup>92</sup> In lieu of experiment, the national destiny took center stage. Epitomized by Winthrop’s City-on-the-Hill sermon, which was to evolve into a full-fledged political myth, it was the nation’s fate to be the chosen people for whom a glorious fortune was envisioned. This eschatological promise, in which the future, and hence all things new, is but the continuation and expansion of the present, turns providence on its head. The chosenness involves the idea of providence to the extent that it is due to divine providence that the Puritans were originally dispatched to New England (cf. Schlesinger 1986: 13). Yet their arrival does not mark an end but the beginning of something entirely new. Hence redemptive history replaces providential history,<sup>93</sup> making salvation possible for the elect. This changed outlook also involved a different conceptualization of time. Unlike the TIME IS A CHANGER metaphor underlying the tradition of the national experiment, time as a concept is now increasingly associated with the metaphors TIME IS A HEALER or even TIME IS AN EVALUATOR.

Newness plays a vital role in this redemptive history. The Puritan voyage across the Atlantic Ocean is conceptualized as the Jewish exodus, in which God promised a new heaven and a new earth. What is new, however, is the specificity of this newness: “This geopolitical specification of the millennium — this identification of the New Jerusalem with a particular place and people — was rare, even in the time of millennial fervor” (Schlesinger 1986: 13).<sup>94</sup> This millennialism was an integral part of New England public discourse, encompassing the idea that the ultimate purpose of the Puritan experience in the New World was to return and transform the corrupt religion of the Old (cf. Clark 1994: 40).

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<sup>92</sup> According to Clark (1994: 40f.), millennialism, alongside the Great Awakening, is a dominant theme in the discourses of the American Revolution. Being a much older theme within Christian thought, millennialism refers to the expectation of the thousand-year rule of the saints on earth, foretold in the *Book of Revelation*, and which would succeed/precede the Second Coming. Millennial themes were highly pervasive in colonial rhetoric and revolved around the powerful idea that the ultimate purpose of the Puritan experience in the New World was to return to and transform the corrupt religion of the Old. This religious millennialism slowly yet not completely receded and was increasingly superseded by its political adaptations.

<sup>93</sup> St Augustine’s notion of providential history denotes the rise and decline of secular communities within history (cf. Schlesinger 1986: 13).

<sup>94</sup> At the time, millenarians argued that the Second Coming would be initiated by an era of peace and prosperity in which the godly would inherit the earth and love hold sway for one thousand years. Far from passively awaiting Christ’s arrival, the faithful believed that the advent would have to be prepared on earth, making the knowledge of nature a Christian duty (Bergin 2000: 166f.). This understanding also accounts for the dynamic component of American political culture that was inherited from this tradition.

Yet the course to salvation is anything but smooth even for the chosen people, whose path is obstructed by obstacles or aggravated by burdens. Both the tradition and counter-tradition converge in the belief in probation, the former testing deeds or actions and the latter testing faith (cf. Schlesinger 1986: 15). Unlike the trials imposed by God on the unfaithful, the chosen people is more immediate to God through the covenant of salvation. Crucially, this special compact with God is only provisionally awarded and has to be renewed every so often, which also corresponds to a cyclical development arising from the tension of crisis and the resolution of critical moments.

A case in point is the American Revolution, which is a genuine test case. Passing this trial would not only reward the American people with political freedom but would also be interpreted as a sign to the world. The victorious completion of the war would mark the beginning of a new era, *novus ordo seclorum*, whose continued existence was yet another risk-bearing experiment that would follow suit.

Some of the Americans who rebelled in 1776 sought to found a new and timeless social order, *novus ordo seclorum*, in which material prosperity would naturally attend moral and religious purity, in which peace and righteousness would be, without further exertion, the inheritance of their descendants, in which human nature would be freed from its ancient disease and released into a new age of creative fulfillment and innocent emancipation. (Clark 1994: 25)

Although the “new and timeless social order” has persisted for almost 250 years and the original millennial vision has since been transferred onto the secular stage, the creative mechanism of experiment vs. destiny has remained operational.

The idea of a ‘new American’ era has only recently — around the time of the turn of the century — experienced a boost in popularity, albeit not for all political convictions. The recent ‘Project for the New American Century’ (PNAC) is a neo-conservative think tank, articulating in propositional form the benefits of American leadership, which largely relies on military strength, for both America and the world. The following excerpt of its statement of principles reads like a continuation, if not a radicalization of what has been described above:<sup>95</sup>

As the 20th century draws to a close, the United States stands as the world's preeminent power. Having led the West to victory in the Cold War, America faces an opportunity and a **challenge**: Does the United States have the vision to build upon the achievements of past decades? Does the United States have the resolve to shape a new century favorable to American principles and interests? [...] As a consequence, we are jeopardizing the nation's ability to meet present **threats** and to deal with potentially greater **challenges** that lie ahead. [...] We seem to have forgotten the essential elements of the Reagan Administration's success: a military that is strong and ready to meet both present and future **challenges**; a foreign

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<sup>95</sup> This passage is quoted from the organization's website and may be retrieved at <http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm>. This website contains an abundance of illustrative material. Another case in point is the following excerpt, which is also mentioned in the statement of principles: “The history of the 20th century should have taught us that it is important to shape circumstances before crises emerge, and to meet threats before they become dire. The history of this century should have taught us to embrace the cause of American leadership.” Interestingly, the new stage of leadership does not merely imply the successful mastery of a given crisis or test case; instead, the challenge presented consists in anticipating the crisis, which means the utmost predictability and controllability of political events and actions.

policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the United States' global responsibilities.

The quotation contains a number of key words such as 'challenge' and 'threat' that underline the topicality of the crisis-induced conception of political activity. Prior to discussing these more recent developments within American political discourse below, I will explore the notion of the covenant introduced above in more detail.

### 3.1.1 The Notion of Covenant

The notion of covenant was to become the primary metaphor of the so-called American public philosophy or civil religion (Sherrill 1994: 129). Reflecting the two cycles of tradition vs. counter-tradition, the covenant idea has also undergone two formative strands of development.

The first stage in the development of the covenant idea set in with the Pilgrims' arrival in the New World at the beginning of the seventeenth century and was gradually secularized coinciding with the general decline of Puritanism at the close of the century. By the revolutionary era the idea of a covenant had been superseded by the notions of a compact and the Constitution, once the 'new political science' became established.<sup>96</sup>

Originally, however, the covenant was devised as both a theological concept and a theory of society (cf. Elazar 1994, 1995). Modeled on the Israelites that escaped Pharaonic slavery and bondage, the Pilgrims' interpretation of the covenant idea was that humans have a special bond with God through predestination, according to which they are free to live, albeit in agreement with the predetermined constitution. Importantly, this covenant with God is only provisionally awarded and has to be renewed every so often, owing to crises in the special relationship between the people and God which were typically interpreted as test cases or trials. Challenged in such a way, the Puritans considered moral strength and endurance in overcoming obstacles as major virtues that additionally sealed their divine election.

Indisputably, the first settlers had ample opportunity to show their faith and moral strength through achievement. In those early days, the covenant idea, though a religious concept *sui generis*, was combined with practical necessity. Seeking consensus amongst a population of growing diversity and heterogeneity in terms of origin and religious conviction proved increasingly difficult. Compounding the difficulties of integration, the unknown environment had to be secured. Both factors demand particular skill and efficiency in terms of self-organization, which brought the covenant idea into existence. Social ranks were organized in compactual ways on the basis of a free contract between equals. This political act created local communities which used the principle of compact to establish local networks of covenant-formed partnerships based on the principle of reciprocity. This agreed-upon mutuality, similar

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<sup>96</sup> The Mayflower Compact (originally known as the Plymouth Combination) was the first of these covenantal acts. Since it is the earliest occurrence of a written document in the Plymouth colony it may be seen as a forerunner of the Constitution.



to a communal commonwealth, also included obligations toward the community, while individual liberty was usually not touched upon.<sup>97</sup>

All in all the covenant idea fulfils two major functions. First, in its theological conception, the covenant idea establishes a common moral code which delimits the scope within which individuals may act without jeopardizing the community. As a by-product, a sense of community arises, unifying and reaffirming the people in the covenant. Second, this union of people is based on mutual agreement which not only enables a covenant to gain shape but also constitutes an efficient device for reaching collective decisions. Hence the covenant idea proved to be far more than the initial consolidation of settlements as a political entity and can be rightly assumed to be the cradle of American constitutional federalism. Despite its enhanced functions in social and political self-organization, the covenant idea was to remain a predominantly 'religious' principle up to the closing stages of the eighteenth century.

In what constitutes the second strand of the development, the idea of the covenant is increasingly secularized. This 'Americanization' of the covenant principle began during the formative years of a would-be nation. The period that can be approximately marked off by the end of the American Revolution in 1789 and the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861 gradually led to the configuration of the "American principle" (Slavin 1976: 160), although this national period by no means finalized the American public philosophy or civil religion in a definite mold. Rather, the covenant idea was to be steadily transformed and amended, distancing itself from Puritan religious self-image and progressively gaining in political weight. This transformation was fuelled by the ideation of romanticism whose self-referentiality assisted in creating a national consciousness despite the absence of common origins and shared political doctrines. In part, the absence of a shared background was to be compensated for by the hypostatical reference to the new continent, their place of abode. This genius-of-place approach — the distinct character of the American experience makes for a distinctive kind of human being in this particular environment — attributed a kind of 'primal authenticity' to the human condition (cf. Sherrill 1994: 137).<sup>98</sup> In part, the both temporal and qualitative newness of place and situation counterbalanced the lack of common ancestry. The continuous invocation of newness as distinctness, exception and selection was to become a major theme in the formation of a national identity.

All in all the idea of covenant was transferred into an ideology of place, making the appropriation of geography a geopolitical act, in which geography encompasses location, size,

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<sup>97</sup> However, individuals could legitimize their status as 'citizens' by playing an active part in the defense of a covenanted polity in the making, in which a kind of military service in the covenantal community did not take long to become established (cf. Elazar 1994, 1995).

<sup>98</sup> Primordality is also associated with the native population of America which continues to be one of the most predominating myths about the first images of America. In fact there are two contradictory myths regarding the indigenous population of the Americas. Jantz (1962: 9) distinguishes between the myth of golden age primitivism and the myth of the animalistic savage. The former is a well-known offspring of European Enlightenment, which manifests itself in the marvel of the noble savage. According to this myth the early settlers encountered a situation of paradisiacal unspoiltness, in which the native peoples were in a state of nature as the true survivors of the golden age. The second myth is diametrically opposed to the preceding one in that the native population is construed as being savages that are hardly superior to animals.

and the resources of places. The accentuation of location and size is also significant with regard to another key term in American national history. The mythology of the American frontier has been exploited to account for diverse sociological, political and cultural aspects of the American 'national character'. With the frontier experience the pioneers were construed as innovators responding to the characteristic geography of the new continent.

The frontier hypothesis dates back to Turner (e.g. [1920] 1996), who proposed a processual conception of the frontier as the 'cutting edge' of civilization. Conceiving of the west not as a place but as a process, Turner's outline of the frontier suggests that the frontier experience was conducive to democratic development since the pioneers had to prove themselves as self-reliant beings first. Slotkin (1985: 15) argues that

[t]he myth of the Frontier is arguably the longest-lived of American myths, with origins in the colonial period and a powerful continuing presence in contemporary culture. Although the Myth of the Frontier is only one of the operative myth/ideological systems that form American culture, it is an extremely important and persistent one. Its ideological underpinnings are those same 'laws' of capitalist competition, of supply and demand, of Social Darwinism 'survival of the fittest' as a rationale for social order, and of 'Manifest Destiny' that have been the building blocks of our dominant historiographical tradition and political ideology.

The myth of the frontier is an integral part of the American public philosophy. More precisely, the frontier hypothesis constricts (the possibility of) newness in an intriguing way. Since the closing of one frontier involves the opening of another, there is a constant recurrence of newness — perceived or 'real'.<sup>99</sup> Moreover, the invocation of ever new frontiers ties in with what has been said about the cyclical development of American national history. It can easily be accommodated within the dynamic, processual conceptions of both the early experimental national phase and the second, 'secularized' stage during which the motion forward is fuelled by the manifest destiny.

Far from being an American invention, the myth of the frontier as the myth of the westward movement of civilization (cf. Jantz 1962: 10) is an ancient topos, according to which courageous men were rewarded with dream lands for leaving behind their native lands. In recompense the new territory would then become a land of promise. This eschatological motif was reintroduced into Protestantism when it was threatened by the Roman Catholic Counter-Reformation (cf. Jantz *ibid.*). In combination with the City-on-the-hill myth<sup>100</sup> the mythology

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<sup>99</sup> While Turner ([1920] 1996) argued for the closing of the final frontier in 1890, predicting the ensuing decline of democracy in the United States, others (e.g. Slotkin 1998) have emphasized the effectiveness of the frontier up to the present. Slotkin (*ibid.*: 4) refers to the development of the mythology of the frontier as the transition from a geographical to an ideological conception. Initially, the myth of the frontier captured the experience of life and warfare on the colonial and early national frontiers. The second stage of the frontier mythology involves the transformation from an agrarian republic to a full-fledged industrial nation-state. During this period the concept of the frontier underwent abstraction from the geographical to the sociological. With the closing of the land frontier of the United States, frontier increasingly evolved into an ideologeme.

<sup>100</sup> The city-on-a-hill myth is the first myth of the origin of the American society, introduced by John Winthrop's sermon entitled *A Modell of Christian Charity* (1630). The myth states that the Puritan settlers "were bound individually to each other as a church and polity, and collectively to God, by a holy covenant" (Twing 1998: 19). Furthermore, in their assumed role as the 'new Israelites' they were on a special mission which consisted in establishing a perfect society on the basis of Christian faith, which would set an example for the rest of the world.

of the frontier provides a strong identificational fabric and reinforces the understanding that activities expressing their faith and deeds advancing the cause of civilization are also relevant for world history. These early beginnings of American political discourse account for the pervasiveness of motion concepts as will be shown in the analysis below.

The temporal frameworks that I outlined initially — the linear, cyclical and spiral conceptions of time — are thus represented in different strands of the developing public philosophy. The linearity of Christian thought is juxtaposed with cyclical ideas of time in the second strand. The linearity of the predestined course has been described above. As to the cyclical concept of time, the idea has been taken up from various perspectives and disciplines in order to describe the development of the American polity. Modeling the development of the American nation on the basis of cycles is appealing due to the inherent antagonism within the political culture. This antagonism creates a continuous tension between the antagonized poles, for instance between the two conceptions of America as experiment (America as a nation of history) and America as destiny (America as a nation of destiny).

This American national historical rhythm has been modeled in terms of self-generating and self-sufficient cycles, whose development is propelled by external causes only in the event of catastrophes (cf. Schlesinger 1986: 25ff.). Their self-sufficiency not only implies their organic nature, as tides and seasons are cycles occurring in nature, but also caters for a self-corrective mechanism. In addition, Schlesinger (*ibid.*) identifies two separate yet overlapping equations, experiment–destiny on the one hand and public–private on the other. Resulting from this interwovenness the American cycle describes periodic alternations of national priorities and may be defined as a continuing shift in national involvement between public purpose and private interest (cf. Schlesinger 1986: 25). As each cycle is determined by an internal causality, it develops along the lines of phases, creating its own contradictions until the cycle has been completed. Accordingly, the public action phase accumulates changes and the amount of innovation paralyses or suffocates the political organism (cf. Schlesinger 1986: 28), while the immersion into private interest passes public problems over into the hands of market forces (*ibid.*). These phases of undercurrents and budding contradictions merge after about twenty years into the cycle and prepare the ground for the onset of another cycle. Each of the cycles comprises a time span of about thirty years which applies to twentieth-century politicians except for Taft (for being a progressive Conservative), Nixon (for obvious reasons) and Carter (for being a conservative democratic president) (cf. Schlesinger 1986: 32f.).

From a historical perspective this cyclical pattern is not the only one identifiable for the development of the American polity. Elazar's (e.g. 1994) analysis of the generational rhythm of American politics, linking the frontier myth to a generational pattern similar to the one in the Bible, proposes an alternative classification of the periods in American national history. The notion of generation has recently become the center of attention in studies of the continuity and transmission of cultural knowledge. A case in point is Assmann's ([1992] <sup>5</sup>2005) notion of communicative memory. This type of memory comprises the time span of three

generations, based on the assumption that knowledge can be passed on communicatively between as many as three generations.<sup>101</sup>

### 3.1.2 The American Public Philosophy

Generally speaking, “the entire political debate in the United States has concerned the interpretation, application, and revision of the public philosophy” (Germino 1984: 4). This ‘public philosophy’ (cf. Thompson 1981) is the equivalent of the well-known American ‘civil religion’ (Bellah 1975: 38) or *theologia civilis* (Gebhart 1976: 224; Gebhart 1990). Whatever the label used, the origins of this civil theology are to be located in the period of struggle for national independence, where the concept acquired most of its secular imprints in that it was to become a “religion of the republic” (Sherrill 1994: 129).<sup>102</sup> In its present form the civil religion can be defined as “a set of beliefs, symbols and rituals” (Bellah 1967: 4), which is closely associated with the notion of social cognition mentioned in the context of socio-political ideologies and mythologies and its function to construct sociocultural coherence. Conceptually, civil religion is closely associated with its “primary metaphor of covenant” (Sherrill 1994: 129), which has been shown to be one of the highly indexical key words of American political culture.

Deriving from a genuinely Protestant concept, the public philosophy had to adapt to changes in the demographic profile of the evolving nation. The influx of people from diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds demanded a concept strong enough to accommodate people of non-protestant faith. Gradually departing from the spirituality of the first settlers, the civil religion was to be increasingly ‘Americanized’ during the period of struggle for national independence. The words “We hold these truths to be self-evident [...]” are perhaps the strongest articulation of the early beginnings of the public philosophy, which results in the fact that “the US is uniquely a society begun and held together by a body of beliefs typically expressed in propositional form [which] needs no further justification” (Germino 1984: 3). This belief system supplied the resources that would prove necessary to secure the newly achieved independence and to surmount the obstacles on the way to becoming one nation: Thus, it is hardly surprising that the newly founded Union, which appeared to be forever jeopardized by disintegrating forces culminating in the Civil War 1861-1865, was in the foreground of political preoccupations of the period.

It is during these formative years that newness in the sense of being unique or exceptional is the subject of public debate. In what Abbott (1999: 97) refers to as “the outside text,” meaning Tocqueville’s renowned *Democracy in America*, Tocqueville explores the full extent of

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<sup>101</sup> The generational cycles are not the only framework available for the periodization of American national history. For example, Namenwirth/Weber (1987) have identified another cyclical pattern on the basis of sociological factors.

<sup>102</sup> For this reason, analogies to the Rousseauian notion ‘religion civile’, dating from 1762, might be inviting, but are, in fact misleading. The formation of the American civil religion predates the enlightenment movement in the ‘Old World’ but gained new momentum through the political and social alterations in eighteenth-century Europe.

American newness: “For Tocqueville everything about America is new” (Abbott *ibid.*). Tocqueville ([1835] 1981: 22) himself remarks that

[t]hey [the Europeans] seem to have been placed by Providence amid the riches of the New World only to enjoy them for a season; they were there merely to wait till others came. Those coasts, so admirably adapted for commerce and industry; [...]; the whole continent, in short, seemed prepared to be the abode of a great nation yet unborn.

Far from being uncritical of America in general, Tocqueville considers American newness both an asset and a peril.<sup>103</sup> The former implies the unique or first-instance exceptionalism of American newness while the latter draws attention to the risk of newness as a source of potential imitation or incapacity of replication, in other words: newness as a promise that is both replicable and unique and newness as a loss that is both irretrievable and recoverable (cf. Abbott 1999: 117). Tocqueville’s awareness of the inherent ambiguity if not antagonism within newness itself is illustrated by the following quotations:

In that land the great experiment of the attempt to construct society upon a new basis was to be made by civilized man; and it was there, for the first time, that theories hitherto unknown, or deemed impracticable, were to exhibit a spectacle for which the world had not been prepared by the history of the past. (Tocqueville [1835] 1981: 22)

First, the positive dimension of newness is captured by the uniqueness and first-instance experience of the American experiment. The opening of the American frontier was equated with a historical moment without precedent. Not only is the American experiment a first-instance novelty, i.e. newness in terms of time and origin but it is also conceptualized as a qualitative improvement, matching newness in terms of kind and quality as exemplified above. As to the former, newness as a temporal concept, America symbolizes the onset of a new age to the extent that it was generally believed that the future had already begun, adding a prospective dimension to the perception of time. As to the latter, newness as a qualitative concept, the opening of the American frontier represents a qualitative change since the appropriation of foreign territory was not perceived as a barbarous act of conquest but as the almost ‘natural’ advancement of the westward movement of civilization. This view has found expression in American presidential discourse as the remarks taken from Jefferson’s and Theodore Roosevelt’s inaugurals reveal:

- (I) The aboriginal inhabitants of these countries I have regarded with the commiseration their history inspires. Endowed with the faculties and the rights of men, breathing an ardent love of liberty and independence, and occupying a country which left them no desire but to be undisturbed, the stream of overflowing population from other regions directed itself on these shores; without power to divert or habits to contend against it, they have been overwhelmed by the current or driven before it; [...] (TJE II, 8)

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<sup>103</sup> The significance of Tocqueville’s study of American Democracy is occasionally called into question for its impressionistic rather than analytical style. Yet his analysis is coherent in that Tocqueville does not juxtapose the old and the new in his two-volumed book. Instead his explorations on newness are to be situated in the tradition of the foreign travelogue. Abbott (1999: 98) emphasizes their importance as a genre in which the ‘outsider’ or stranger not only becomes a source of authenticity — based on the assumption that the specialties of a culture are most discernable to foreigners — but also the locus of national inspiration and identity.

- (2) [...] To us as a people it has been granted to lay the foundations of our national life in a new continent. We are the heirs of the ages, and yet we have had to pay few of the penalties which in old countries are exacted by the dead hand of a bygone civilization. We have not been obliged to fight for our existence against any alien race; and yet our life has called for the vigor and effort without which the manlier and hardier virtues wither away. [...] (TRO, 1)

These two passages illustrate which models have gained preponderance in American political cognition. While Jefferson construes the colonial expansionism as a natural force and the rationale of colonization as Darwinism, Roosevelt even denies the existence of “any alien race.” Both remarks are prime examples of the schematic construction of the beginnings of settlement in the New World.

The frontier movement gained additional momentum through the continuous influx of immigrants, which served as a double movement pushing the westward frontier further forward and opening up ever more frontiers on the eastern part of the continent. Hence the newness of the first arrivals is incessantly replicated by the settlers moving westwards and the incoming immigrants. This mechanism warranted the intrinsic thrust of the movement and accounts for the perceived velocity of progress in America. On the conceptual level, this proneness to movement and action is mirrored by metaphorical mappings such as ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION or PROGRESS IS MOTION FORWARD, both of which use motion as their source domain. These concepts will be further explored in theoretical terms in chapter 4 and will be shown to be pivotal in the analysis (chapter 6). Molding the allegedly uncharted territory on the basis of an experience unblemished by past experiences was to set an example not only for the new continent but also for what was left behind. In this context, newness refers to the absence of an organized polity on the American continent as far as it was known at the time, which eventually leads to conceptual metaphors such as NATION IS INNOVATION or BEING DEMOCRATIC IS BEING IN MOTION, instilling the temporality and locality of nation-building into the very notion of newness. In the attempt to leave behind the despotism of the Old World, the early settlers focused on a decentralized administration and a socio-political organization based on the principles of freedom and reciprocity. This compactual organization of the early settlements is also indebted to the covenant tradition in American politics. Equality was to be found in the common point of departure, their religion and mores. The compactual structure of small cells of political organization were replicated locally and, as the territory expanded, the compactual communities loosely affiliated with another, retaining their own internal legal structure and self-reliance. The formation of these associated communities — *pares sine primi* — on a religious foundation paved the way for strengthening the moralistic and ethical aspects of reciprocal, compactual political organization rather than adhering to the strictly confessional religiosity which, gradually, was to be considered an aspect of every individual’s right to spirituality which, however, would also have to subside if the functioning of the entire community was jeopardized. In this case pragmatic considerations could overwrite the individual practices of faith. In time the hierarchy of purposes was to be increasingly reflected in the conception of communality in terms of the body politic.

Second, the fact that (American) newness was not a unilaterally positive concept and that newness did not inevitably involve the obliteration of dispreferred socio-political practices is

particularly strongly felt in nineteenth-century American practical reality, in which the inverse of the original intent is closer to home than could have been envisaged. The continued existence of the American nation was severely endangered by internal and external forces that threatened to disintegrate the nation for the better part of the century: ongoing war and domestic conflicts, the issue of national defense and military organization in order to prevent the Union from external disintegrating forces. The prevalent social practice is increasingly typified by segregation and inequity rather than community and equality. Cases in point are the domination or elimination of Native Americans and the overt racism of plantation slavery. This dark side of American exceptionalism, which conceives of America as the center of world history and as the primary source of the new as part of its self-definition, is also an integral part of the American experience of the first-instance.

The perseverance of the American republic despite its adversaries and trials fortified the public philosophy and contributed to constructing a national identity, which gave rise to considerable polarity. Anticipating contemporary attitudes to growing American nationalism, the following quotation is indicative of a deeply entrenched sense of national identity:

All free nations are vainglorious, but national pride is not displayed by all in the same manner. The Americans, in their intercourse with strangers, appear impatient of the small censure and insatiable of praise. The most slender eulogy is acceptable to them, the most exalted seldom contents them; they unceasingly harass you to extort praise, and if you resist their entreaties, they fall to praising themselves. (Tocqueville [1840] 1981: 510)

The feeling of national pride stems from a deep-seated sense of achievement, in which the continuing success of an experiment has been overwritten by a feeling of predestined accomplishment. What has evolved from America being the prototype of an irresistible historical process developing into an American narcissistic personality (cf. Abbott 1999: 115), grounded in an expansive yet fragile sense of self, is merged in the American public philosophy, which substitutes the experience of a condition, newness, for the event of that condition. By approximating the experience and the thing experienced, newness is no longer simply a condition but is evaluated: newness turns into salvation when it becomes an integral part of self-definition. Establishing this contiguity brings together the two entities temporally and conceptually. There is a merging of cause and effect, evoking an immediacy of experience.<sup>104</sup> The blending of the positive and negative sides of newness is captured in the public philosophy; it is the American source of political consciousness as well as its expression.

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<sup>104</sup> Another case in point is the American habit of naming newly discovered places after the countries of origin, for example New York, New Orleans, New England etc. Used in such a way, *new* usually denotes succession, breaking bonds to the original place, or it means inheritance, i.e. the new carries on the legacy from the old in a legitimate way. In this constellation, the new and the old are sequential in the sense that there is a temporal, diachronic order due to which the old precedes the new, separated by an interval. This naming tradition on political or religious grounds is not entirely new in itself, yet there is an important shift of emphasis, particularly in the period of the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. As Anderson (1996: 187f.) observes, it was then that new and old were to be increasingly aligned synchronically, effacing the interval in between and gradually yielding to a competitive coexistence. This transfer is captured by the substitution of toponyms for politonyms.

The public philosophy which contains the essential ingredients of the national narrative clearly has a strong integrative function. Since it not only serves as socio-political cohesion but functions as a ‘new’ political science, the public philosophy is an instance of a strategic communicative practice. As mentioned above it is inherently propositional, i.e. aimed at representing the relevant socio-political realities in as comprehensive a way as possible, leaving no unintended ambiguities. Hence the strategic functions of political language use, explored in great detail in the preceding chapters, also hold for the public philosophy which is part and parcel of all public-political communication. For example, coercion is mostly evidenced in the construction of specific relations within the public philosophy. This is achieved by creating a particular setting in which the position of each member of the community has to be earned through abiding by the set standards and rules. Furthermore the public philosophy is employed to achieve legitimacy. Invoking the creed of the civil religion might turn a mediocre politician into a charismatic leader. In general, the public philosophy may be used for gate-keeping, projecting a positive self-image against the background of negative other-presentation. Since the promotion of the former inevitably also involves the promotion of the latter, self-praise and self-identification implies blaming and marginalizing of the other as the two sides of the same coin.

Thus the public philosophy clearly has a strong ideological component, although this reading is occasionally ostracized. Despite the acknowledged propositional characteristics of the American civil religion, which translates the usual “minimal set of beliefs which is appropriate for any society” (Germino 1984: 3) into self-evident truths, the idea of an in-built ideology, “or a set of all-encompassing principles for interpreting and guiding reality, as was the case in the USSR or Hitler’s Germany” (ibid.) is generally dismissed.<sup>105</sup>

The reasons for dismissing the possibility of ideology are to be found in a shift of emphasis that can be observed in political practice. During nineteenth-century territorial expansion and the general concentration on the consolidation of the Union, an era that is sometimes called isolationist, “the theory that American interests are best served by a minimum of involvement in foreign affairs and alliances” (Safire 1978: 343), the adherence to the public philosophy primarily served the purpose of constructing a national narrative. During these times the awareness of exceptionalism and uniqueness was acute and it is not surprising that the word ‘nation’ became a highly charged symbol. This means that the essence of nineteenth-century public philosophy was indebted to the core idea of nation.<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> According to Germino (1984: 3f.), there was some danger that the adherence to the public philosophy might transform it in the course of the nineteenth century into an ideology of the ecumenical type (i.e. referring to the inhabited world), yet in his (1982) view America averted this peril of apocalyptic nationalism or political messianism because its doctrines are rooted in a pragmatic political reality, which is expressed in a rhetoric of assent based on the profound awareness of exceptionalism. From this unique experience derives its so called manifest destiny.

<sup>106</sup> This view has to be further qualified since nation as a concept has continued to be influential in political discourse to this day. Unlike today’s interpretation of nation as an active political agent leading to a personified conception of political control, at that time nation was mostly conceptualized in terms of organic imagery and nautical metaphors. Yet the medieval understanding of body politic was only incompletely substituted in favor of a more enlightened version. Not only have the RULER FOR RULED metonymy and STATE/NATION IS PERSON metaphors persisted, the head of state has outlived the earlier ship of state imagery. The latter is pervasive in early republican texts, originating from the numerous nautical metaphors in



As the twentieth century took its course, nation was not only reinterpreted — in this respect Wilson’s inaugural address was paramount in setting the agenda for a personified understanding of the nation as an energetic political agent — it was increasingly overridden by the concept of supranation due to a changed emphasis of policy. Unlike the isolationist focus of pre-World War I America, the turn of the century almost coincided with a turn towards ‘internationalism’. Due to “a tension between allegiance to the original idea of the exceptionate nation and the new idea of America as the supranation which will save the world” (Germino 1984: 19), another abstract key term gained preponderance, namely the notion of democracy.<sup>107</sup> As I pointed out above, it is quite common to tie the study of ideology to an inventory of ‘ideological’ lexemes. There is no denying that political symbols can be highly pervasive shorthand representations of socio-political realities, while the actual impact of these symbols on social practice is increasingly called into question, as was the case throughout the twentieth century. Although the diversity and heterogeneity of modern societies heightens rather than decreases the need for ideological structures, witness Reis’ (1993) remarks in my introductory chapter, this function is less and less performed by traditional ideologies and their proneness to antagonistic key symbols. Instead the continuity of collective beliefs is increasingly warranted by para-ideologies in the guise of common-sense assumptions or mythologies. Mueller (1973: 108) argues that there is a generalized acceptance of consumer patterns and a diffuse agreement about political institutions while collective imagery in material and social compensations and political slogans such as ‘the Great society’, ‘defense of democracy’, or ‘power to the people’ have become surrogate ideologies. In addition, social and political cognitions build on the ideational and conceptual rather than the mere expressivity of individual key words. Nonetheless they may serve as ideographs, marked symbols that “signify and ‘contain’ a unique ideological commitment; [...] they presumptuously suggest that each member of a community will see as a gestalt every complex nuance in them” (McGee 1980: 7).

Aiming to cover the entire political battleground and to avoid gaps in the doctrine, the public philosophy should also be considered an ideology in the sense elaborated above since it clearly fulfils the strategic functions of ideological texts. This ‘civil religion’ is not primarily typified by the use of ideographs but involves the culture-specific organization of human experience, including cultural space and time. To this day space and, in another sense, also time constitute the most fundamental coordinates of the American polity, in which *ius soli* decides citizenship to this day (cf. Gustafson 1992). Locating the would-be community within its specific environment was an important geopolitical factor in the construction of a sustainable notion of national identity. Moreover, the public philosophy is totalizing in the

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the bible. Typically, the sound foundation of the nation, once established, is less likely to be represented by an imagery evoking the instability and liability to tidal forces beyond human control.

<sup>107</sup> In fact, there are a number of highly indexical key words in American (political) culture. Rodgers (1987: 11f.) proposes a different selection — utility, natural rights, the people, government, the state, interests, freedom — each of which bears testimony to “a series of historical moments when the basic metaphors of politics were up for grabs.” Importantly, none of the key words mentioned have a fixed meaning; on the contrary their meanings are contentious.

sense that it aims to organize the polity in its entirety. The construction of the national narrative is achieved through the concept of NEWNESS, which links both space and time to American nation-building. Paradoxically the American understanding of newness includes both the initial novelty and the renewal of entities that have proved time-honored as they have passed trials and have thus reached a stage of refinement which is itself regarded as new.

All in all, newness may be but one aspect of the public philosophy or civil religion, yet it underlies the majority of American public discourses. As to American political discourse the experienced newness had to be translated into a political language in which newness and exceptionalism have the unifying effect of integration. However, it was not possible to eradicate other voices in the discourse, which was expanded by utilizing a new political science conceived as public philosophy. The ‘invention’ of cultural symbols is a response to the meaning and identity gap in early America (cf. Twing 1998): “When the first European settlers arrived in America, there was a significant need for new symbolic structures that would provide new constitutive meanings and a collective identity that fitted the settlers’ new situation” (Twing *ibid.*: 17). As the cultural shaping process unfolds, the disparity of the members of the Union has to be compensated for by strong symbolism on the societal level.

However symbolic structures do not usually appear in isolation; rather they give rise to or form part of discourses themselves, particularly when they are embedded in publicness. In order to become collectively meaningful ‘shared’ knowledge and beliefs need to be narrated, hence publicized. If efficient, these collective beliefs provide coherent representations of events, entities and actions, which are entrenched in the social cognition. More often than not, myths evolve into such a preferred symbolic structure which is socially transmitted and represents the socio-political collective. “Members of a society use collective representations to conceptualize their society and those things that affect it” (Twing 1998: 13). Importantly, myth as a notion has to be regarded, if not as a secondary system, as a twofold system. The conception of myth deployed by Barthes (1964) was introduced above and is represented by Figure 3. Similar to the language system the mythic system is also characterized by duality and consists of a first system, the object language, and a second system, analogous to a meta-language, which is used to describe the first. According to Barthes (*ibid.*) the myth is a purely ideographical system since it transforms a historical process into a final state of affairs. In other words: a myth strips an entity of its history, making it appear the end-product of a process and hence immutable.

Devised in such a way, the myth is the equivalent neither of distorted representation nor of ideology in a straightforward way. Although myths are frequently read as systems of facts, they represent socio-political realities in a modified way. The alteration occurring within the mythic system corresponds to a displacement or transfer rather than a simple misrepresentation. The analogy to ideology is warranted, yet myths usually connote self-conception rather than the both strategic and systematic self-presentation vs. other-presentation of ideologies. To a lesser degree than ideologies, myths are concerned with imagination, of which the myths of origin are prototypical. In this context, the process of transfer, built into the secondary

semasiological system of a myth, becomes paramount. Establishing a relation of similarity or contiguity between the first system and the mythic system is certainly an imaginative, even creative process.

The character of the American public philosophy begs the question whether it is to be understood as a mythic system rather than an ideology. While I am only able to raise a small number of provisional points here, a well-founded evaluation is provided in the in-depth analysis of the presidential inaugural address in chapter 6.

To the extent that myths may be devised as para-ideologies the American public philosophy clearly can be either. Evidently the civil religion is not only highly evocative it is also totalizing. The former would align it more closely with the collective imaginaries immediately recognizable to the large majority of the community. Similar to Assmann's ([1992] <sup>5</sup>2005) notion of cultural memory,<sup>108</sup> which was introduced in the preceding chapter, the discursivity of the American public philosophy performs crucial functions in identity-formation. It clearly serves as a mnemonic device, ensuring cultural, social and political continuity. While the invocation of its key concepts attempts to situate the American society within an appropriate spatial and temporal framework, their indexicality reassures its members of both their unity and exceptional singularity, i.e. the 'imagined community' (Anderson 1996) adopts a historical consciousness of its own. Yet this particular historical condition can only occur if a series of preconditions are met. It requires a sense of parallelism or simultaneity, the awareness that the old world has not ceased to exist.

This new synchronic novelty could arise historically only when substantial groups of people were in a position to think themselves as living lives *parallel* [emphasis original] to those of other substantial groups of people – if never meeting, yet certainly proceeding along the same trajectory. Between 1500 and 1800 an accumulation of technological innovation in the fields of shipbuilding, navigation, **horology and cartography** [emphasis added], mediated through print-capitalism, was making this type of imagining possible. [...] One could be fully aware of sharing a language and a religious faith (to varying degrees), customs and traditions, without any great expectation of ever meeting one's partners. (Anderson 1996: 188)

Whereas the above-mentioned technological innovations, particularly horology and cartography, are certainly pioneering in the true sense of the word, the actual role of language has not yet been illuminated. The triad of language, narrative and rhetoric plays a vital role in the emancipation of cultural independence and national identity. In all three cases, newness is pivotal in the discursive formation of 'Americanness'. Nonetheless only two of them, language and rhetoric, will be treated in depth here since they are immediately germane to the analysis of political discourse. Undoubtedly nineteenth-century literary discourse had a deep impact on the development of American national identity and produced a number of highly influential

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<sup>108</sup> Assmann's ([1992] <sup>5</sup>2005: 50-56) notion of cultural memory concerns the outer dimension of memory. This 'memory culture' reassures a given society of its continuity by recording and commemorating its collective knowledge on the basis of which the cultural identity can be reconstructed. More or less explicit references to the past raise people's awareness of a dynamic, living community, which has persevered for an extended period of time, going back to a retrievable shared past.

figures, all of whom would have had to be discussed in due detail if the emphasis of this present study had been placed differently.<sup>109</sup>

## **3.2 Framing the New World**

### **3.2.1 The Role of Language in Constructing the National Narrative**

The development of a variety of American language as a national symbol is a vital factor that should not be underestimated. By analogy with the major national periods, the history of American English can also be subdivided into three stages, the colonial, national and international. The so-called “gestation period of American English” (Algeo 2001: 4) commences with the early permanent English-speaking settlements during the first decades of the seventeenth century. It was in these formative years that the process of diversification began to take shape. The development of a new variety of language was facilitated by their new environment and experiences the Puritan settlers made in it, instigating lexical innovations and language contact. The emerging speech communities were strengthened from the inside by their closely knit structures and from the outside by the lack of communication with English speakers from the Old World. Finally, the emergence of American English as a new variety received additional momentum from the descendants of the first colonists, who regarded themselves as Native Americans with a cultural space and language of their own. This important psychological factor also found expression in their attitudes to language, on which the ‘thriving’ American variety of English —rife with lexical innovations — impressed a deep sense of Americanness.

The drift between American and British usage was widened by the fact that in the new land the colonials had to cope with a new environment – new topography, new flora and fauna, new economic and social conditions. Their response to that challenge was inevitably reflected in their language, most apparently in the vocabulary. New words were borrowed and coined. Old Words changed their meanings and uses under the pressure of the new environment. (Algeo 2001: 18)

However, it was not until the national period that the political independence achieved through the American Revolution was followed by cultural independence. In the process, the closing

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<sup>109</sup> Nineteenth-century American culture was influenced by the presence of an Emersonian climate that was felt in the national experience (see Howe 1986). In what came to be termed ‘the newness’, denoting the decades of the 1830s and 1840s, Emerson and his disciples put a stamp on the American literary tradition during these important years of national consciousness. The New England culture was experiencing a crisis of faith as the solid structure of authoritarian belief slowly began to crumble, undermined by secular thought (Howe 1986:3). Emerson’s own ‘literary independence’ is typified by the critique of his contemporaries. Led by an anti-materialist attitude, Emerson sought the guidance of retrospection and introspection. The former manifested itself in the rediscovery of seventeenth-century English writing, especially Carlyle, while the latter is mirrored in his poetry of meditation and religious intensity (Packer 2004: 88). At the same time, Emerson’s writings are not aloof from the political situation of his time despite his anxiety to ‘transcend’ the status quo. His commitment to and concern for the changes of political climate are renowned, which is why his contribution is central not only to the American literary tradition but also to the growth of national consciousness.

of the continental frontier and the opening up of the urban and industrial frontiers helped to advance the cause of a unified national language. The main protagonist in this achievement is, of course, Noah Webster, whose orthographic and lexicographic activities are the major landmarks in establishing a standard American English variety. Being “an American patriot” (Algeo 2001: 34), Webster was also committed to a didactic mission, setting cultural norms in education.

Nevertheless the aspiration to self-identification by means of an American variety of English that was distinct from British English is not entirely obvious.<sup>110</sup> As with all instances of language policy a distinction between top-down and bottom-up processes is crucial. Presumably the political emancipation from the ‘mother country’, culminating in the American Revolution and subsequent constitutionalized nationhood, was also largely grounded in an anti-English sentiment amongst the framers of the constitution (cf. Fisher 2001: 59). At the same time, however, none of the official documents that followed or the writings of important literary figures contained ‘Americanisms’. While this betrays a certain degree of nostalgia for English culture (cf. Fisher *ibid.*), there is also political calculation involved. The stability of the constitution symbolized the stability of the union through adherence to its laws. As far as bottom-up initiatives are concerned, language awareness is an important factor contributing to cultural emancipation. The cognitive and affective components of language attitudes build on the existence of such an awareness of one’s own language and culture and, equally important, on the contrast to others. Up to this point, the promotion of popular usage and vernacular variation are feeble attempts to also ‘republicanize’ the language. Slang, for example, evokes negative connotations prior to the 1850s (cf. Lighter 2001: 233), and colloquialisms only become palatable once they are frequent in the writings of some of the Transcendentalists (like Emerson for example, cf. Fisher 2001: 70). The actual ‘democratization’ of American English implies the leveling of social dialects, the standardization of informal speech and the integration of foreign elements (cf. Kahane 1982).

In the American context, theorizing on language is particularly closely associated with political thinking, especially during that time: “Americans frequently made comparisons between the rules of grammar and the laws of the land and, more broadly, between language and political constitutions” (Gustafson 1992: 38). Hence it is not surprising that Webster was specially committed to establishing a written standard language by analogy with the written constitution, which was regarded as a secular bible and hence the language in which it was cast was analogized to Scripture itself. Although Webster undoubtedly was an authority and his dictionaries have been national symbols since, the voices articulating language attitudes were by no means unanimous. As with other elements of the public philosophy, approaches to language are also frequently antagonistic. While on the one hand the need for purity and uniformity was eagerly advertised, if not prescribed, on account of their reflecting the laws laid

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<sup>110</sup> For example, Dillard (1975) argues against the hypothesis of linguistic transfer. Instead he proposes the existence of a koiné that developed in the colonies due to the absence of linguistic input from the Old Anglophone World and the availability of linguistic input of non-English immigrants.

down in the constitution, this prescriptivism was to be challenged some years later in favor of advocating popular usage, ‘slang’. Unlike some advocates of a standard language, arguing for the uniformity and purity of language as a political necessity, others maintained the ‘republicanization’ of the language, placing an emphasis on vernacular usage.<sup>111</sup>

The parallel of language to legal constitutions is, however, not uniquely American. Eighteenth-century linguistic theory is guided by the principles of analogy, reason and the notion of language academies to supervise, and if necessary, to enforce the observance of language laws. Typically, the American interpretation of these principles seeks to merge the overtly contradictory without resolving it: the country could be governed by a written grammar without, however, binding the forces of spoken usage, which translates as follows:

In the United States, the analogy was put to new uses befitting a country ruled at once by a written grammar and a spoken idiom: the Constitution and the *vox populi*. These analogies illustrate not only that language was conceived of in political terms but also that the schoolmasters of the language were not eager to embrace democratic rule in their province. Though grammarians in the new republic generally consented to the principle that ‘common usage’ should rule language just as We, the People, ruled the country, few were willing to give common usage unlimited sovereignty. Instead most preferred to see the people led by an elite in linguistic usage as well as in political practice, [...]. (Gustafson 1992: 39)

Summing up the most important points so far, language did turn into a national symbol, although the onset of a new variety of English has to be evaluated against the background of the more general trends in linguistic theorizing at the time. Rather than constituting a directed effort of linguistic and cultural gatekeeping, the refinement of American English occurred within the general framework of rationalizing language, possibly in founding a language academy modeled on a number of Old-World countries. Even though the difficulties in establishing such an institution were felt on either side of the Atlantic, the problem-solving strategies pursued were rather different (Fisher 2001: 62):

The literati in Boston and Philadelphia were as aware as Swift and Johnson of the variations in eighteenth-century English and of the British failure to establish an academy on the French model to standardize the language. They felt, quite simply, that America could succeed where the mother country had failed, by creating an academy to choose among variations and enforce uniformity in English worldwide.

Here again, the shift of emphasis in the relationship between new and old is remarkable. As observed above, the meaning of newness is not always constructed as antithetical to oldness. They can exist side by side, synchronically aligned as rivals. In this context it is language policy

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<sup>111</sup> Gustafson (1992: 40ff.) illustrates the focus of attention during the glossopolitical debates of the Early Republic. The major concerns were neologisms on the one hand and language change on the other. The objections made against neology were targeted at the variation initiated by colloquialism and Americanism, which was believed to undermine the existing social and political order. Yet the invention of new words was also part of personal freedom and demonizing neology threatened to undermine the foundations of the polity grounded on individual rights. As to the threat of language change, this was acutely felt with respect to the Constitution. Fixing the language in its status quo was assumed to secure the perseverance of the nation as well. The analogy was drawn that if the letter of the Constitution could be changed, the foundation of the nation was also subject to change and instability. Similarly, the meanings of words should be unambiguously defined, reflecting the original intent of the Constitution, which should be retrievable at all times.

that is the bone of contention, opening up a rivalry for the supremacy of language, a controversy that was not to be settled until the third period of the history of American English, which will be outlined below. Prior to considering this final stage, I will turn to the analogy of language and politics in more detail, outlining the controversy of two key figures of American politics.

As we shall see, the debate revolves around neology and language change on the one hand, and the installation of a political order conceived of as timeless and immutable on the other. An unchangeable language was deemed to be the sole acceptable means of expressing the articles of the Constitution lest they should themselves fall prey to the claws of time. In this case, newness and innovation clearly are dispreferred concepts. In sharp contrast, political activity as well as a sense of communality builds on newness as an identity marker. This conflict is rarely reconciled in the debate and prevails in the discussions on the political stage.

James Madison and Thomas Jefferson are not only two prominent protagonists of the political process at the time, they are also articulate spokesmen on the subject of this controversy. While James Madison represents the more conservative position regarding language matters, underlining the importance of a national language and the need for it to be pure and stable (cf. Gustafson 1992: 41), Jefferson holds more progressive views with greater philological aptitude. What reconciles their positions, however, is their drawing an analogy between politics and political institutions and language and its development. The example below illustrates Madison's conception of language, particularly his concern for the fixity of reference of individual words. In *The Federalist Papers*<sup>112</sup> he expresses his fear that the ambiguity of the words, as containers of ideas, may have a negative impact on the Constitution:

[...] The use of words is to express ideas. Perspicuity, therefore, requires not only that the ideas should be distinctly formed, but that they should be expressed by words distinctly and exclusively appropriate to them. But no language is so copious as to supply words and phrases for every complex idea, or so correct as not to include many equivocally denoting different ideas. Hence it must happen that however accurately objects may be discriminated in themselves, and however accurately the discrimination may be considered, the definition of them may be rendered inaccurate by the inaccuracy of the terms in which it is delivered.

Jefferson had a pronounced interest in philology, demonstrated by his both insightful and accurate observation on language development. Unlike Madison, he holds a more progressive view on the role of language. For instance, in his letter to John Waldo<sup>113</sup> Jefferson explains his attitude to language change:

I am no friend, therefore, to what is called Purism, but a zealous one to the Neology which has introduced these two words without the authority of any

<sup>112</sup> Madison's comments were published in *The Federalist Papers* No 37, Friday, January 11, 1788 (retrievable from <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/federal/fed.htm>, last accessed on 1 July 2007). "The Federalist Papers, written to encourage support for ratification of the Constitution, were variously the work of Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, and were usually signed with the pseudonym 'Publius'. There were 85 such appeals, which appeared in local newspapers in a space we would call an Op-Ed Page today" (Matuz 2004: 83).

<sup>113</sup> Jefferson, Thomas: Letters 1760-1826. (<http://etext.virginia.edu/toc/modeng/public/JefLett.html> (last retrieved on 16 February 2007). Here *A Ductile and Copious Language*, written to John Waldo, Monticello, August 16, 1813.

dictionary. I consider the one as destroying the nerve and beauty of language, while the other improves both, and adds to its copiousness [...]. The new circumstances under which we are placed, call for new words, new phrases, and for the transfer of old words to new objects. An American dialect will therefore be formed; so will a West-Indian and Asiatic, as a Scotch and an Irish are already formed. But whether will these adulterate, or enrich the English language?

In fact Jefferson's description of the need for vocabulary expansion goes beyond linguistic theorizing, showing yet again the interrelatedness of language and political thinking, the focal point being newness once more. As in some of his other writings, for example his *Notes on the State of Virginia* (1781-1782), Jefferson emphasizes the need for change in adapting to changing conditions for it implies improvement, i.e. a change is always for the better. Drafting American newness in terms of exceptionalism, the new is a force that requires movement and action instead of indolence and passivity. For Jefferson newness characterizes American nature, culture, politics and economics, all of which are projected as extraordinary as well as different (cf. Abbott 1999: 4f.).

Nonetheless newness is not simply a condition, it is also an imperative that requires continuous progress and action. The uniqueness of the American experience is expressed in the following words by Madison:<sup>114</sup>

Hearken not to the voice which petulantly tells you that the form of government recommended for your adoption is a novelty in the political world; that it has never yet had a place in the theories of the wildest projectors; that it rashly attempts what it is impossible to accomplish. [...] And if novelties are to be shunned, believe me, the most alarming of all novelties, the most wild of all projects, the most rash of all attempts, is that of rendering us in pieces, in order to preserve our liberties and promote our happiness. But why is the experiment of an extended republic to be rejected, merely because it may comprise what is new? Is it not the glory of the people of America, that, whilst they have paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times and other nations, they have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for names, to overrule the suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons of their own experience?

Madison underlines the necessity of innovation lest the reticence towards innovative change should produce negative consequences. Hence the idea is that deliberate change or innovation tends to be for the better and, more specifically, that procrastination may lead to the disintegration of the Union itself, i.e. newness may imply dramatic political consequences due to the failure to acknowledge the signs of change. Compounding exceptionalism and difference, newness also clearly involves the readiness to experiment and to recognize the time for change. In this context, change implies adjustment to new situations; what is more important, however, is that newness is juxtaposed with oldness in the sense of antiquity, customs and traditions. In Madison's words, newness and oldness coexist, perhaps with a slight bias towards newness, which is used to delimit the American people from others. Thus the need to innovate involves the gradual emancipation from old models without completely devaluing their authority.

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<sup>114</sup> James Madison's revealing comments appeared in *The Federalist Papers* No 14, Friday, November 30, 1787 (<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/federal/fed.htm>, last accessed on 1 July 2007).



The salience of change alongside with newness is also central to Tocqueville's ([1840] 1981: 359) argument on the impact of democracy on the English language in America. In this passage he blends democracy, change and newness into an inseparable unit:

The constant agitation that prevails in a democratic community tends unceasingly, on the contrary, to change the character of the language, as it does the aspect of affairs. In the midst of this general stir and competition of minds, many new ideas are formed, old ideas are lost, or reappear, or are subdivided into an infinite variety of minor shades. [...] Besides, **democratic nations love change for its own sake, and this is seen in their language as much as in their politics** [emphasis added]. Even when they have no need to change words, they sometimes have the desire.

The undivided focus on change is amenable to a number of developments that have been pervasive in American political discourse from the beginning. In general terms, American political discourse has always been geared towards change to an extent that has only recently impacted political communication systems in other Western democracies to a similar degree. Hallin/Mancini (2004: 35ff.) argue for an increasing homogenization of political communication in the public sphere resulting from globalization processes modeled on US-led political communication structures and practices. The both public- and action-centered orientation of American political communication is but one of several important aspects which will be taken up below as well as in the analysis of chapter 6. Meanwhile I will point out the significance of change for the development of American political discourse.

Originally the experience of change in the shape of newness may have been quite concrete and experiential in the cognitive sense. The numerous key cultural concepts, such as the covenant, which is only temporarily awarded and needs to be renewed every so often, the frontier experience, which implies temporal and locational alterations, and the jeremiad, creating tensions between an ideal and reality on the one hand and the old and the new on the other, all bear testimony to a provisional status quo which is likely to shift at any moment. This restlessness, or agitation in Tocqueville's words, is typical not only of democratic nations, but of market economies in particular. Hence newness is also very clearly an economic category.

In more abstract terms, these experiences, constructed as they may be, have been gradually metaphorized and are now re-enacted and reactivated in varied combinations in contemporary discourse. As a result, there is a level of momentum not inherent in other political discourses, a tension that is not even resolved when the various layers of historicity are synchronized. American political discourse is rife with mappings using MOTION as a source domain, which is encountered with target domains of SPACE, TIME, ACTIONS or the event structure metaphor (Lakoff 1993: 220; Kövecses 2002: 135) to name but a few. Based on the conceptual metaphor CHANGE IS MOTION, change is conceptualized as involving a change of location, that is movement from an initial position A into a position B that is different from A; alternatively, change may be conceptualized in qualitative or categorial terms, in which case the focus is not merely on the movement from A to B but also on the intended improvement the change will

hopefully entail. In either case, newness plays a crucial part since it may be a by-product of change itself.

Tocqueville's observation of the "constant agitation that prevails in a democratic community" is reflected to this day on the discourse level. The pervasiveness of MOTION concepts is remarkable and will be shown to be deeply entrenched in American political discourse.

By way of conclusion, the national period has not only charted the New World in political terms but has paved the way for far-reaching consequences which foreshadow some of the developments of the decades to come. Newness is the decisive concept not only in the molding of political and social cognition, as reflected on the discourse level, but also in building an image of nationhood. The interwovenness of political thinking and language has taken an ironic turn in the most recent history of American English. Reaching its peak of divergence during this national period, in which American English became increasingly uniform, distinct from both the colonial speech of the settlers and British English, the twentieth-century witnessed the rise of globalism — either as economic imperialism,<sup>115</sup> or as some might argue, as cultural and linguistic imperialism (e.g. Phillipson 1997, Pennycook 1996). Incidentally, both eras, internationalization and linguistic expansion, are usually marked off by the same historical event, the Spanish and American War of 1898. "The otherwise minor Spanish-American War marked the maturity of American English and its entrance onto the world stage" (Algeo 2001: 6). Similarly, the hegemony of American technology (including military) and economy rapidly advanced throughout the twentieth-century. On the linguistic level, the American variety increasingly gained the upper hand, curbing the reach of British English, particularly in the period following World War II.

### 3.2.2 Rhetorical Styles

The development of stylistic properties within the two varieties of English, particularly the declamatory style of oratory, has followed a different course. While the American stylistic variant may be described as free and impulsive in general terms (cf. Fisher 2001: 70), the style in oratory, especially after the 1830 'Kentucky spirit' of the frontier, is frequently equated with grandiloquence, or more negatively, as the glorification of the commonplace. Rhetorical styles had begun to grow apart in the US and GB due to an increase of political participation of ever larger portions of the population (cf. Robertson 1995: 1).

Throughout the nineteenth century the territorial expansion and rising immigration put the franchise under the constant strain of adjustment. The 1830s constituted a provisional peak of popular votes in the presidential elections. By nineteenth-century standards, the greatly

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<sup>115</sup> Ambrose/Brinkley (<sup>8</sup>1997) argue for several important turning points in American foreign policy, oscillating between isolationist and 'internationalist' policies. Peaks of isolationist moods are around 1939 and 1993, when America followed the Monroe Doctrine of shunning away from entangling alliances most closely. Amongst the causes that brought about change are a vulnerability to national security (Pearl Harbor and 9/11) on the one hand, and to foreign economic threats on the other.

expanded electorate of the Jacksonian Era may be called a mass electorate, which is also a mass audience. In all states admitted to the Union after 1815 the franchise had been broadened, at least for white men; in some states property and tax qualifications for voting were abolished to the extent that a massive increase in voter turnout occurred.

This transition also entailed a shift of emphasis in political rhetoric beyond stylistic aspects. The growing democratization involved changes in political themes as well as the role assumed by the people in the political communication process. Whereas the people had been a passive audience who merely applauded or showed their disapproval of governmental actions, the rhetorical style of participatory democracies accommodated them within the deliberation process itself to an ever larger extent. The political rhetoric typical of political contexts, in which participation rather than deliberation is the keystone of the political process, chiefly involves strategies that tap people's feelings and attitudes, often involving a monolithic representation of political activities; if on the other hand deliberation as a subset of political participation is focused on, a more informative rhetorical style is required, enabling the audience to assess the political situation, at least in the ideal case.

Traditionally, rhetorical style is determined by the principle of aptness (*aptum*), which encompasses the orator, the subject and the target audience.<sup>116</sup> Following this understanding, rhetoric is directly aimed at the intended target audience. With the gradual transformation of this 'audience' into a both more participatory and deliberative type, the distinction between the classical rhetorical genres could no longer be upheld. A new (political) rhetoric emerged, which also entailed a new purpose of rhetorical activity (cf. Robertson 1995: 6). While the older political rhetoric followed classical forms, the new rhetoric combined the style of a demonstrative speech with the deliberative purpose of debating policy. Hence the classical genres — with the *genus deliberativum* being an action-based genre with future time reference and the *genus demonstrativum* addressing norms and values within a present tense framework — were subsequently merged.

More importantly, in the American context rhetoric and rhetorical styles cannot be dissociated from a rhetoric of American identity, the innovative construction of a national narrative as illustrated by the works of Bercovitch (e.g. 1978). Bercovitch (*ibid.*) demonstrates how Puritan rhetoric manufactured consent amongst a colonist population with diverging attitudes and backgrounds. Rhetoric constituted the sole means available not only to transform the cultural identity and provinciality of the colonial communities but also to introduce an alternative discourse which would shape the American society as distinct and separate from the mother country with which they were likely to still have bonds. Accordingly, political language served as a means of integration. This early rhetoric of American identity managed to politicize the colonists in an environment that would be adverse to military action or conflict and needed to be mobilized for a common cause. Thus rhetoric and history are

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<sup>116</sup> In Aristotle's *Rhetoric* the decisive criterion for a speech's aptness is the recipient or target audience, which acts as a reference system for determining the subject matter, the choice of rhetorical style and genre on account of the situative context and the orator's presentation (cf. Ueding/Steinbrink <sup>3</sup>1994: 216).

intertwined in the sense that the conquest by arms is succeeded by the conquest of words (cf. Bercovitch 1978), approximating the two realms conceptually.<sup>117</sup>

For this purpose political discourse itself had to undergo profound transformation to the extent that we can refer to it as a new political discourse, which subsequently merges religious and political rhetoric in public oratory. As a result, contemporary political discourse blends these distinct discourse traditions which, however, are both still noticeable, as will be demonstrated in the frame analysis below. The merging of rhetorical tradition is evidenced by the initial co-existence of two particular styles, namely hortatory and laudatory rhetoric, and the collapse of the distinction in the late eighteenth century (Robertson 1995: 3).

According to the *American Heritage Dictionary* hortatory speech is “marked by exhortation or strong urging.” Indebted to the traditions of oral culture as well as written polemics, hortatory discourse is geared towards audience response and (future) action. Using this rhetorical style in political contexts places political action within a larger moral framework. Hortatory style is widely used in political campaigning and traditionally in electioneering where it is used as an index for audience response, facilitating the selection of suitable political actors and personalities (cf. Robertson 1995: 1f.). Hortatory rhetoric only began to establish itself as a popular device in the aftermath of the French Revolution. Accordingly, late eighteenth-century electioneering may be pictured as an elaborate stage play, creating the dramatic illusion of immediacy (cf. Robertson *ibid.*). The audience is thus included in a communication process, in which it may respond in an immediate, emotional way to the events, political actors and their policies enacted on the political stage.

In this staged event, the audience is strongly encouraged to choose actors and actions, i.e. candidates as well as policies. In brief: it intends to polarize and to politicize in order to provoke active political participation. In view of the strategies identified for political language use above (chapter 2.3), we may argue that hortatory style fulfils all the strategic functions mentioned, namely coercion, legitimization and representation. This is why the rhetorical device of *amplificatio* is typically used in this genre, reinforcing one’s own positive properties while mitigating those of others, which illustrates the ideological function of this rhetorical genre, at least following the conception of ideology mentioned above.

To a degree, the classical rhetorical equivalent of hortatory discourse may be the *genus deliberativum* (‘Parteiredē’), which is based on viewpoint and partiality. Hence hortatory discourse accumulates all the rhetorical devices that are key components of persuasion. What is important, however, is the fact that this rhetorical genre is also determined by the societal environment. Dieckmann (1975: 97f.) points to the important social function of the *genus deliberativum*.<sup>118</sup> Elaborating on Edelman’s (1985: 137) doubling of political reality, he

<sup>117</sup> In the introduction to *The American Jeremiad* Bercovitch (1978: xii) invokes the impact of Puritan rhetoric on American culture. Analogizing rhetoric to history he relates the American jeremiad to the growth of American middle-class culture, a development which he characterizes as ongoing and violent.

<sup>118</sup> The propagation of social functions of this genre is not to be mistaken for their publicness. Dieckmann (1975:81) distinguishes between sub-categories of political language, namely functional language (‘Funktionssprache’) and ‘ideological’ language (‘Meinungssprache’). The former is devoted to communication within the organizations of the polity while the latter is predominantly addressed to the general public, i.e. representing the socio-political realities within the polity.

emphasizes the ambiguity of political discourse; in its simplest form, it implies that what is discursively constructed as information may not be simply a rendition of facts but of events presented tendentiously. A case in point is the staging, literally or figuratively, of the political process as it mostly occurs in political advertising or campaigning.

In contrast, laudatory discourse is focused on self-presentation rather than on producing a perlocutionary effect on the audience. This rhetorical style is typified by a marked praise-and-blame dualism in a highly ritualized form. Unlike hortatory discourse laudatory rhetoric is not designed for direct public appeal in the sense of being action-centered. The oral performance as such is the center of attention and while this requires an audience it is not part of an action-response pattern. Thus laudatory style aims at passive participation rather than arousal. Some commentators (e.g. Robertson 1995: 11) have argued for the equivalence of laudatory discourse with the epideictic genre of classical rhetoric.<sup>119</sup> Although the *genus demonstrativum* is frequently marginalized in both the classical rhetorical catalogue and in the political life of the Greek polis or Roman forum,<sup>120</sup> it can be assumed to have fulfilled important functions in the contemporaries' social practice. More recently, scholars (e.g. Mainberger 1987: 218) have argued for the epideictic genre to be the sole genre of the classical rhetorical canon to have survived to this day.

Contemporary American political rhetoric abides by a strictly organized political calendar. The speech events attributed to American presidents have crystallized into eight communicative situations, of which only one major genre has been orally delivered since the nation's founding.<sup>121</sup> The presidential inaugural address is an institutionalized speech event which fulfils a variety of political functions within the American political (communication) culture. For instance, the inaugural performs socio-cultural functions such as swearing in the general public and sensitizing it to the overall political situation.

Despite its continuity, the inaugural's bearing on the political process has been regularly contested. As a consequence, two conflicting positions are usually advocated in the existing research literature. The inaugural address is either classified as a political paperweight, reducing it to festiveness and rhetorical formulae, or as a significant mode of expressing future

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<sup>119</sup> Analyzing electioneering on both sides of the Atlantic in the late eighteenth century, Robertson (1995: 11) concludes that election campaigns are framed in the mode of demonstrative rhetoric. According to Robertson, this rhetorical form used either panegyric or invective, i.e. praise or blame, in appealing to the moral sensibility of a mass audience. Accepting or rejecting a candidate thus is a moral rather than a political choice, since little attention used to be paid to political detail in those speeches. Predictably most electioneering language praised candidates; hence this demonstrative rhetoric may be referred to as the laudatory mode of discourse.

<sup>120</sup> Cicero regards the *genus demonstrativum* as an umbrella term covering various occasions and speech events, all of which could be treated in analogy to the forensic genres. After the fall of Rome, however, which obliterated the forensic genres, the *genus demonstrativum* became the center of attention (cf. Göttert 1991: 17).

<sup>121</sup> Another major form of an institutionalized address is the State-of-the-Union address. Although it has also existed since the Constitution's implementation, the State-of-the-Union address, which is a presidential message to Congress in order to report on and account for the presidential policies in the American system of checks and balances, the practice of delivering this address as a speech to the members of Congress was discontinued by Jefferson, replacing it by a written message. The spoken medium was not restituted until Wilson's presidency.

policies in the light of the present political context as well as past experiences. While I shall defer the detailed discussion of the manifold historical, rhetorical and political reasons that account for the political significance of the inaugural address (see chapter 5 instead), I will nonetheless raise a few minor points here.

The inaugural address is the only illustrative material available that may serve as a reliable basis for the analysis of presidential discourse from a diachronic perspective. The inaugural has always held a prominent position in the political process, and hence is indicative of the changes that have occurred or have failed to occur throughout American national history. On the one hand, this salience bears testimony to presidential leadership styles which have been subject to dramatic changes; on the other hand, the inaugural address is indexical within American political culture. The legacy of the homiletic tradition is perhaps most strongly felt in the inaugural, without however marginalizing the important political functions it has fulfilled from the beginning. Without intending to overstate the importance of homiletic discourse for the development of today's presidential discourse, the apparent parallels cannot be disregarded. The jeremiad, a literary work or speech, constitutes a paradigmatic mode of expression for themes and issues relevant at the time:

Rhetoric functions within a culture. It reflects and affects a set of particular psychic, social, and historical needs. This is conspicuously true of the American jeremiad, a mode of public exhortation that originated in the European pulpit, was transformed in both form and content by the New England Puritans, persisted through two hundred years of turbulence and change. The American jeremiad was a ritual designed to join social criticism to spiritual renewal, public to private identity, the shifting "signs of the times" to certain traditional metaphors, themes, and symbols. (Bercovitch 1978: xi)

Bercovitch's notion of the American jeremiad is essential for the understanding of American political discourse. Its gradual Americanization exemplifies the growing conflation of religious discourse and political discourse.<sup>122</sup> It is the Puritans' molding of the European jeremiad that "entailed a fusion of secular and sacred history" (Bercovitch 1978: 9). While in Europe the jeremiad had predominantly addressed mundane matters, the Puritan emigrants altered the original design to the extent that the genre of homily was charged with a mission. This is important in two respects.

Not only was the community now increasingly perceived as chosen rather than 'called', it also considered itself elected for sacred as well as secular matters. The "church-state was to be at once a model to the world of Reformed Christianity and a prefiguration of New Jerusalem to come" (Bercovitch 1978: 8). More importantly, it established what Lakoff ([1996] 2005) refers to as the 'strict father morality'. The modification provokes a shift in the pattern of reward-and-punishment in a decisive way. Far from mitigating the risk of God's revenge in the event of disobedience and betrayal, the Puritan interpretation of God's punishment also

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<sup>122</sup> Perhaps the sharpest contrast to the traditional European mode of the jeremiad is that the American version is essentially ambiguous. Unlike its European counterpart whose major theme consisted in the lamentations about the depravity of the world, the American jeremiad struck a different note from the onset. Typically, it involves both affirmation and exhortation (cf. Bercovitch 1978: 6f.).

resulted from their elect character. The rationale underlying Puritan thinking envisaged that divine retribution is corrective rather than destructive.

However, this motivation also enhanced the significance of newness. Had God's retribution been envisioned as destructive, there could have been no opportunities of renewing one's faith and devotion through acting morally. Thus an action-based frame of reference is gradually installed, according to which newness in the sense of moral reform manifests itself in morally superior activities. This means that there are several stages on the way to redemption and that attaining another stage involves newness, at least in the sense of renewal. This view of corrective improvement resorts to a New Testament understanding of newness (see chapter 4) and is pervasive in political discourse to this day.

In order to acknowledge the impact of the jeremiad on the development of American political discourse, it is imperative to explore the characteristics of the jeremiad itself. First and foremost, the jeremiad consists of a recognizable rhetorical structure (cf. Elliot 1975, 1994). The sermons generally derived their themes and ideas from the prophets Jeremiah and Isaiah.

[...] these orations followed — and reinscribed — a rhetorical formula that included recalling the courage and piety of the founders, lamenting recent and present ills, and crying out for a return to the original conduct and zeal. In current scholarship, the term jeremiad has expanded to include not only sermons but also other texts that rehearse the familiar tropes of the formula such as captivity narratives, letters, covenant renewals, as well as some histories and biographies. (Elliot 1994: 257)

From the wide variety of topics included in the jeremiad we may derive that homily as a genre was considered a practical consultation rather than a theological discourse in the strict sense of the word. Hence it is the political sermon that is predestined to be the jeremiad's preferred mode of expression. Bercovitch (1978: 4) refers to the political sermon as “the state-of-the-covenant address, tendered at every public occasion (on days of fasting and prayer, humiliation and thanksgiving, at covenant renewal and artillery-company ceremonies, and [...] at election-day gatherings).” Traditionally, the rhetorical style prevailing in the jeremiad is characterized by public exhortation, culminating in a prophecy of doom. The overall threatening, apocalyptic tone creates an atmosphere of constant anxiety. As can be expected, popular themes were the false dealing with God, the betrayal of covenant promises, the degeneracy of the young, the lure of profits and pleasures, and the prospect of God's revenge (cf. Bercovitch 1978: 4).

Yet from Winthrop's shipboard sermon (*The Mayflower Compact*), swearing in the newly arrived Puritan settlers for the challenges in store, to John Cotton, another principal amongst the New England Puritan ministers held in high esteem, the threatening overtone, prompted by the experience of settling unknown territory, was combined with more soothing themes and symbols. In its continuous emancipation from its European counterpart the American jeremiad both discourages and encourages, i.e. the hortatory style prevailing in the European variant is merged with affirmative concepts typical of laudatory style viz. demonstrative

rhetoric. The fusion of these rhetorical styles was no coincidence since it performed the important political function of integration. This was achieved by exploiting the ambiguous rhetorical effect in the sense of inclusion, i.e. establishing a ‘both-and relation’, rather than contradiction, that is an ‘either-or relation’ of mutual exclusion.

As a consequence, ‘the Puritan errand’ as it is frequently referred to implies a dual mission, spiritual and historical (cf. Bercovitch 1978: 12); it is consigned to fulfill “the church’s gradual conquest of Satan’s wilderness world for Christ” (Bercovitch *ibid.*), thereby bringing the ‘errand’, the Christian mission, as well as history to an end. The strong eschatological component of this dual exodus entrenches the perception of life’s activities as purposeful in the sense of committing one’s actions and behavior to reaching this higher goal.

The activity-centered view also impinges on the notion of covenant. Since this bond with God is made by special appointment, modeled on the Israelites in Scripture, the chosenness manifests itself through the covenant, whose renewal enables change and development for the community. The models of progression — the development from the Old Testament to the New, from the Incarnation to the Second Coming — posited by Scripture imbued the Puritan errand with internal dynamics as inscribed in the rhetoric itself. A case in point is the pervasiveness of motion concepts in presidential discourse to this day as will be illustrated in the analysis below. The dynamic conception of the Puritan mission and the re-interpretation of divine admonition as a well-meaning ‘reminder’ to mend one’s ways serve as powerful interactants of a ‘progressive’ community. Although the mission itself may be ambiguous, the important thing is that the journey towards the final destination is pursued at all costs, basically against all odds since history is understood as having no reversible powers. Having thus accomplished the mission, both the promise and the rebuke will be altered to fit new purposes.

Both the dual character of the errand and the prophecy prevailing in the political sermons suggest a distinctly persistent temporality. The eschatology of sacred history, which “unfolds in a series of stages or dispensations” (Bercovitch 1978: 13), each of which symbolizes a higher degree of revelation, typically proceeds from promise to fulfillment. For the American jeremiad this means that this journey began in the Old World and reached its destination in the New World. Hence New England already epitomizes a new, higher stage of the revelation process. Indeed the construction of newness in this homiletic discourse is significant. On the one hand, it functions as an important cultural stratagem that can be used as an integrative force fostering a sense of community. On the other hand, it builds on the New Testament meanings of newness, which will be further discussed in chapter 4 below.

The newness of New England becomes both literal and eschatological, and (in what was surely the most far-reaching of these rhetorical effects) the American wilderness takes on the double significance of secular and sacred place. If for the individual believer it remained part of the wilderness of the world, for God’s “peculiar people” it was a territory endowed with special symbolic import, like the wilderness through which the Israelites passed to the promised land [sic]. In one sense it was historical, in another sense prophetic; [...]. (Bercovitch 1978: 15)



This dual nature of American newness plays an essential role in the fusion of religious discourse and political discourse. Newness functions as an important conceptual switch paving the way for the growing Americanization of the original European jeremiad.

The ‘double edge’ of the American jeremiad, its amalgamation of exhortation and affirmation as well as its inclusiveness, finds its continued expression in the inaugural address. From this viewpoint, the inaugural is a major amplifier of the public philosophy, and hence fulfils major symbolic functions. On the one hand, it addresses collective hopes and fears, while it emphasizes the necessity of change and moral reform on the other. Attuning to change exerts a particularly stabilizing effect, creating the impression that the system easily adjusts to any conditions, however shifting they may be. Finally, the evocation of historical situations through which analogies with the present are drawn, constructs one human (domain of) experience as corresponding to another. This strong affirmative component is meant to weaken the anxiety with respect to the future, because in making the future the analogue of the past it becomes more predictable or even inevitable, and definitely less threatening.

The integrative force of pulpit rhetoric is reinforced by the concept of covenant introduced above. Recall that the covenant idea is an integral part of the American public philosophy, which has been assimilated to more worldly domains, especially during the American Revolution, when the original covenant idea found new modes of expression as illustrated by Sherrill (1994: 128) below:

[T]he rhetoric emanating from a great variety of pulpits began in this period to reflect a denominator more common to them all in that national ethos which invested America as a symbol with the spiritual substance of the covenant. That rhetoric found its echo in the political realm. The requirements of democratic citizenship, as articulated by the founding fathers, attached in many respects to the old social values of Puritanism, and the rhetoric of corporate life, though derived by the political patriarchs from the republican models of ancient Rome, continued to deal in the stuff of the covenant having to do with chosenness, moral community, and destiny.

Today’s discourse situation was beginning to take shape over time during the era of the young republic, which generated this combination of pulpit rhetoric and political rhetoric in which covenant imagery still abounded (Sherrill *ibid.*: 131). This re-interpretation as a “religion of the republic” (Sherrill *ibid.*: 129) offered sufficient scope to accommodate those of non-Protestant religious conviction since the social, economic and political ideals that were propagated within this public, national faith gradually replaced the ‘old’ spiritual values.

This change of emphasis is reflected in a change of rhetoric. While the covenantal idea is still part and parcel of today’s political discourse, its integrative power has spent its force, at least as a strong and binding principle of socio-political organization. Hence the strategic function of integration increasingly relied on alternative imagery such as the body politic, which looks back on a long tradition and has played a vital part in political theorizing. Perhaps its earliest occurrence is in Plato’s *Republic*.<sup>123</sup>

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<sup>123</sup> The full version of the electronic text is available at <http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext94/repub13.txt> (last accessed on 7 July 2006). These passages are contained in Book VIII, entitled *Four Forms of Government*.

And, as in a body which is diseased the addition of a touch from without may bring on illness, and sometimes even when there is no external provocation a commotion may arise within - in the same way; wherever there is weakness in the State there is also likely to be illness, of which the occasions may be very slight, the one party introducing from without their oligarchical [sic], the other their democratical [sic] allies, and then the State falls sick, and is at war with herself; and may be at times distracted, even when there is no external cause.

The underlined expressions illustrate that the analogy of body politic is largely conceptualized in organic imagery.<sup>124</sup> As Peacock (2000: 203) points out, the covenant idea is linked to psychological individualism. Whereas in medieval times the body politic was predominantly organized in an organic hierarchy, the New England settlers substituted this with organic reciprocity. However, this does not mean that the medieval system was entirely abandoned. Social differences continued to be legitimized by an analogy to the functional differences of the body's organs. Similarly, each part of the commonwealth was interdependently linked to every other part, and thereby the whole. The relationship between the members of the community was also organized by the functional principle of co-operation lest the entire body should malfunction or even fall sick: charity was the communal principle just as there must be involuntary co-operation between bodily organs. But it was not merely a case of give-and-take but a system of extraordinary personal sacrifice based on moral imperatives. Thereby, the hierarchic structure of medieval body politic was replaced by the non-hierarchical structure of sacrifice to maintain the precarious health of the entire body.

In the Middle Ages, the image of the body politic had been used to suggest that co-operative functions were performed involuntarily by organs in that body. Winthrop's (1620) shipboard address blended this organic necessity with a sense of communal voluntarism. In this Puritan adaptation, individuals were no longer just 'organs' with an assigned place and function in the body politic: they had become purposeful ethical agents. In theory, there was no longer a hierarchy of superior vs. inferior organs, with the head being in control, which was an integral part of the medieval Great Chain of Being. The notion of covenant assisted in modifying the political domain in the direction of greater reciprocity between members of the body politic. Political life was based on conditions to be met rather than on fixed prerogatives. Individuals were free within specified limits to meet these conditions, but once made, they were binding. In practice, however, the hierarchical organization of the polity was hardly dismantled despite the lip service paid.

The exploitation of the imagery of body politic is an attempt to create a more closely knit community out of the great diversity of members of the colonial society. On the conceptual level, the body politic is reflected in metaphorical mappings such as NATION IS A PERSON or SOCIETY IS A PERSON. Political discourse dating from the Early Republic is replete with conceptualizations of the nation in the making, attempting to construe a both comprehensive

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<sup>124</sup> According to Peacock (2000: 203) the seventeenth century inherited three different organic principles from the medieval ideal of the body politic. First, there is a concept of organic hierarchy, i.e. a case of inferior vs. superior organs. Second, organic involuntarism disqualifies involuntary organs as jeopardizing the whole. And, last but not least, organic cyclicism refers to the life span of nations, according to which they have their youth, their strength and after a while their declination.

and coherent conception of ‘the nation’ as a symbol of the new political science. The fact that the appeal to unity and integration is a dynamic process makes it an integral part of strategic political language use.

In a society beset by many conflicts of interests and aiming with the help of verbal tactics to transcend those conflicts, the uses of spiritualization as a device are endless. Spiritualization is the device par excellence of the Upward Way – vibrant with the gestures of unification, promise, freedom. [...] (Burke 1967: 76)

Burke’s device of spiritualization oscillates between materialist and idealistic positions in its attempt to reconcile contradictions. The “Upward Way” mentioned above encompasses linguistic devices whereby we may move from a world of disparate particulars to progressively higher levels of generalization (cf. Burke 1967: 64). The underlying principle of unity serves to gloss over a number of apparent contradictions, all of which can be subsumed under the formula ‘disunited by body, united in spirit’. In discourse, all notoriously manifest ills are substituted by both invisible and intangible ideals. This formula is an efficient political strategy of legitimization, which may be exploited to justify diverse political actions. Burke (*ibid.*: 76) provides the following illustrative examples: imperial foreign policies are deployed as the spreading of ideals such as freedom or democracy, contradictions are suddenly the equivalent of balances, an organization in disarray is construed as having a common purpose or struggles over means are converted into agreements on ends.

By way of conclusion, the actual impact of religious discourses on the social practice prevailing at the time is difficult to assess. By the time the first generation of Americans became participants in public life, the colonies were already involved in theological conflict. The great varieties of sects and religious denominations on the one hand and the strong anti-clerical feeling on the other had soon begun to undermine the authority of the Church. For this reason, the function of religious discourse is symbolic rather than spiritual in an orthodox way. In the public congregations religion served as a definition and symbol of group identity, responding to a deep-seated psychological need of communality. Furthermore religion embodied a society’s or a sect’s sense of its historic trajectory, including its past experience and its future expectations (cf. Clark 1994: 35f.). Suspended between millennial prospect, which could be articulated more or less covertly or overtly, and recollecting retrospect, often involving divisive denominational conflicts rather than bonding collective memories, the colonist’s hands-on experience with religious discourse could not have been a universally acknowledged principle of unification. As early as the seventeenth-century, religious practice had to be broadened to include secular rather than sacred elements. This shift of emphasis also affected the perception of the errand or mission, particularly after the American Revolution and the nation’s foundation.

Gradually, Americans’ understandings of the essence of their Great Experiment were modified. The separation of Church and State soon entailed that the new Republic’s sense of its crusading mission to reform the old world was summed up not in Deism or Arianism but in the inclusive and seemingly secular term ‘democracy’. Democracy was now held to be the essence of the American

experiment; other states were divided into ‘democracies’ and the objects of reform.  
(Clark 1994: 383)

Up to now, we have assumed that American political discourse originated from the unilateral process beginning with the politicization of religious discourse, which entailed the secularization of religious discourse. While it is true that the Puritans’ original mission was increasingly secularized, which captures the essence of the ‘Americanization’ of the European jeremiad, the errand’s dual objective — secular and sacred in nature — was inscribed into this process from the very beginning. This is why the substitution of spiritual expectations by worldly goals is but a small step, leaving the overall dynamic conception untouched. To a degree, replacing religious terminology by political terminology may be grasped as a spiritualization of political discourse; it appears to be the case that the influence is mutual rather than unilateral.

What is important, however, is the fact that these alterations did not finalize the public philosophy in a definite mould. Rather, the so-called national period, comprising the period that is marked off by the end of the American Revolution in 1789 on the one hand and the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861 on the other, gradually led to the formation of the “American principle” (Slavin 1976: 146),<sup>125</sup> which is to be regarded as work in progress. The keystones of the American ‘civil religion’ may have been established, yet its content has been continuously transformed and amended, adjusting it to changing times and conditions.

Interestingly, the switch from the religious domain to the political domain is not significant for the conceptual level. The dynamic construal pertaining to the Puritan rhetoric, enhanced by the duality of the mission, persists despite the shift of the domains involved. A case in point is the characteristic temporality inherent in American political discourse to this day against which the accomplishment of a given ‘mission’ is measured. The temporal metaphors and various instantiations of other metaphorical mappings will be analyzed in the analysis of chapter 6.

Having illuminated the origins of American political discourse from a general perspective, looking into two major strands of development that have continued to shape the American public philosophy from its beginning and exploring the adaptation of rhetorical styles to suit the communicative requirements of the new polity, I will now turn to another major landmark in the overall configuration of American political discourse, the role of the president in the political communication culture.

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<sup>125</sup> Slavin’s (1967: 146) ‘American Principle’ is based on More’s observation of a new reality of politics, namely the unprecedented combination of the rule of reason with private gain. Although capitalism was not original to America, the contemporary image of the New World was to be quickly dominated by merchants, including the general belief that America was the place to make a fortune and to escape the creditors. Hence the American Principle implies that community of property is the key to a good commonwealth (cf. Slavin *ibid.*: 159). Yet this early image of America did not prevail. English thinkers after More grappled with this image of America; in the process, America was to be transformed from a symbol of freedom into a symbol of opportunity for appropriation. Locke, in particular, completed this transformation, creating in the course of his work what later came to be the ideology of the American Revolution (cf. Slavin *ibid.*: 160).

### 3.3 The Rise of Presidential Discourse

The preceding explorations have focused on the properties of political discourse, including the development of the American political communication culture. Within this system, presidential rhetoric has always occupied a prominent position. While the formation of a presidential discourse is not to be dissociated from the developments of political discourse in general, its specific configuration justifies an in-depth treatment of its particularities. In principle, the analysis of presidential discourse comprises a great diversity of leadership styles ranging from the almost majestic aloofness of George Washington's tenure to Ronald Reagan, whose presidency as 'The Great Communicator' represents a provisional, yet debatable peak in the long-standing tradition of American presidential rhetoric. The recent administrations have once again demonstrated that the leeway offered by Article 2 of the Constitution is frequently exploited in order to strengthen presidential power in the guise of discourse control.

The varying styles of leadership are determined by a series of interdependent factors, institutional, political, historical and discursive, to name but the most significant ones. These interlocking factors account for the voluminous research literature that interest in the American presidency has produced. The large majority of scholars have focused on twentieth-century developments within the American presidency and appear to converge on a critical assessment of these practices which are alternately labeled as rhetorical, symbolic, mediated or even imperial presidencies.<sup>126</sup>

Based on the explorations of the preceding sections the logical conclusion is that presidential discourse comprises political rhetoric, political communication and political discourse as it occurs within the public domain. The development of an American presidential discourse has to be explored against the background of discourse conditions prevailing in the period under consideration. Nineteenth-century conditions were shaped by the ongoing elaboration of democratic structures, the nation's consolidation and national identity formation. Accordingly, nineteenth-century presidential discourse was determined by these general concerns and aimed to put a stamp on these very conditions itself. As far as twentieth-century discourse conditions are concerned, Fairclough has identified several significant alterations, all of which were introduced in chapter 1. These are vital factors contributing to

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<sup>126</sup> It is only the rhetorical and symbolic presidencies that are germane to this study here. In their recent analysis of the 'mediated presidency' Farnsworth/Lichter (2006) focus on the role of the presidency in news coverage of military operations, including the invasion of Iraq, and various other controversial policies since the 1980s. The findings include the growing dominion of the White House, further undermining the authority of Congress as an equal branch of government before the public. On a different level, the term imperial presidency, which gained currency with Schlesinger's (1973) monograph, analogizes presidential governance with holding court. This comparison is primarily directed at the practice of vesting important positions in advisory boards, for example, with candidates who would prove their personal loyalty to the office holder and who were beyond outside approval or control. Another case in point is the creation of the Executive Office of the President, thereby institutionalizing in an unprecedented way a small army of presidential aides. The notion of the imperial presidency is similar to the spatial leadership (Foley 1993), which will be discussed within the chapter, or the epithet of "Teflon (coated) president," which was applied to Reagan's tenure for his "ability to sail unscathed through all difficulties" (Ayto 1999: 565).

the configuration of American presidential discourse. However, the discursive formation of presidential discourse can only be fully reconstructed when reflected against presidential discourse behavior in its nineteenth-century context. Hence the analysis of the major developments of discourse conditions throughout the twentieth century needs to be supplemented by a historical perspective.

By analogy with the systematization provided in chapter 1.1 the following analysis of the discursive construction of presidential discourse will be subdivided in terms of the primary factors technologization, marketization and globalization on the one hand, and the secondary factors personalization, conversationalization, and hybridization of discourse on the other. While this systematic classification is viable in theory, all of these factors mentioned are interdependent in practice. This is why they cannot be explored in a strictly isolated way; nonetheless their impact on the construction of presidential discourse will be discussed individually wherever possible. In what follows, however, I will primarily focus on the technologization, marketization and personalization of discourse.

The term technologization of discourse describes the heightened general awareness of the impact of language on social practice. Over the course of the twentieth-century language practices were increasingly synchronized with economic, political and institutional objectives. One of the major implications of this technologization of discourse is the engineering of both social and cultural change through the shaping and reshaping of discursive practices. To a degree, the marketization of discourse may be regarded as an outgrowth of the technologization of discourse. One aspect of this dramatic increase is the dissemination of various forms of advertising in ever new kinds of discourse formerly unaffected by it. With respect to political discourse, the blurring of the distinction between campaigning and governing has had the effect that political discourse is chiefly determined by the discursive practices of the market. Finally, the personalization of discourse is associated with diverse aspects such as the packaging of politics, according to which politicians and policies are wrapped up in palatable chunks, or the enhanced focus on presidential rhetoric in public perception. Thus the notion of personalization will be used differently from Fairclough's (2001: 52) original understanding without being incompatible with it. Fairclough's term synthetic personalization describes the fact that advertising discourse constructs mass consumerism in such a way as to suggest that relations are built with individual consumers. In political advertising, the individualization works in both ways: both the voter and the politician are personalized. How precisely are these factors represented in American political discourse in general and presidential discourse in particular?

In order to address these issues the specific contexts of situation need to be investigated in some detail. Prior to looking into the changed discursive practices of twentieth-century political discourse, where a shift from presidential rhetoric towards presidential discourse occurred, the prevailing nineteenth-century practices will be outlined.

First and foremost, presidential rhetoric is indicative of underlying principles of governance and is as such also symptomatic of transformations in leadership style. Nineteenth-century inaugurals evince a specific self-understanding concerning the authority that the presidential office should be vested with. In order not to anticipate the findings of the analysis in chapter 6, I will only draw attention to some aspects germane to this overview here. The empirical evidence available from the material suggests a clear tendency to a comparatively subservient leadership style, at least when assessed in relation to contemporary approaches to the most powerful political office. In spite of the occurrence of similar conceptual metaphors such as the PERSON metaphor, for example, NATION IS A PERSON or SOCIETY IS A PERSON, and the emphasis placed on the head as the most important part of the nation, the uses of these metaphors in nineteenth-century inaugurals are distinct from those encountered in their twentieth-century counterparts. This is why the actual metaphorical entailment through which the relationship between the body politic and the president is expressed is more significant than the mere occurrence of a given metaphorical mapping, let alone its absolute frequency. This relationship, however, can only be identified appropriately if the metaphorical linguistic expressions are contextualized on the discourse level. Therefore a discourse-centered perspective is vital to supplement the analysis of conceptual metaphor. While the NATION IS A PERSON mapping typifies much of the early nineteenth-century inaugurals, the relationship of the president to this ‘national person’ is construed as based on servitude rather than dominance. The nation as a concept is clearly superordinate to the presidential leader who is interpreted as a ‘humble servant’ to the nation.

Similarly, Tulis (1987) differentiates between ‘the old way’, ‘the middle way’ and ‘the new way’ in his seminal work on what he terms the ‘rhetorical presidency’.<sup>127</sup> To date, Tulis’ analysis of the full array of nineteenth and twentieth-century rhetorical practices provides the most comprehensive survey of the major developments of the American presidency on the basis of presidential rhetoric over two centuries.<sup>128</sup> Tulis (1987) posits a sharp distinction between traditional and modern presidencies with Wilson being the key transition figure, which is why Tulis (*ibid.*) determines the onset of the rhetorical presidency with Wilson’s two-term tenure. The implications of the rhetorical presidency as one specific leadership style will be discussed in some detail against the background of the personalization of discourse below.

Tulis’ (1987) ‘old way’ chiefly refers to nineteenth-century presidents who “believed that a strong national government led by a strong executive was compatible with, indeed required,

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<sup>127</sup> In actual fact, the term ‘rhetorical presidency’ dates back to an earlier article (Ceaser et al. 1981), which Tulis co-authored.

<sup>128</sup> Apart from Ellis’s (1998) edition whose contributions focus on individual presidents or the impact of a certain political era on the presidency from a historical perspective, there is Parry-Giles’s (2002) account of the rhetorical presidency focusing on U.S. propaganda in the twentieth century. In what she (*ibid.*: xvii) terms “hidden-hand leadership,” first detected during Eisenhower’s administration, propaganda is coupled with psychological strategy. “Although Presidents Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt relied on government propaganda in wartime, Truman and Eisenhower were the first two presidents to introduce and mobilize propaganda as an official *peacetime* [emphasis original] institution” (Parry-Giles 2002: xvii).

the proscription of most of the rhetorical practices that have now come to signify leadership” (Tulis *ibid.*: 26f). This view counters the general belief, often articulated by political scientists and historians, that nineteenth-century presidents acted as the Constitution’s chief executives or implemented congressional policies, subordinating their political agendas more or less voluntarily to the representative government. In contrast, ‘the new way’ may be equated with an extensive use of popular rhetoric and the conception of leadership as interpretation (cf. Tulis 1987: 117f.). A case in point is the opening paragraph of Wilson’s first inaugural address, in which he deploys himself as an interpreter of political events (see chapter 6).

To a degree, ‘the new way’ constituted the reverse of the old, translating as frequent public addresses and the mobilizing of public support, all of which occurred independently from Congress and with the intent to put pressure on the legislature. Finally, ‘the middle way’ denotes the early progressivist era associated with Theodore Roosevelt’s tenure, in which the way to the transformation of the presidential office is paved.<sup>129</sup>

In exploring ‘the old way’ Tulis (1987: 27-45) draws attention to four basic principles that determined the scope of presidential rhetoric within nineteenth-century American political discourse: demagoguery, republicanism, independence of the executive, and the separation of powers, all of which will be briefly outlined. First, the founders deemed demagoguery as well as “majority tyranny” (Tulis *ibid.*: 28) to be fundamental threats to democracy. Accordingly, a demagogue is generally held to be the equivalent of a ‘popular leader’, both being highly pejorative terms and typified by extensive appeals to popular passion or political ‘mass arousal’ (cf. Edelman 1971: 1). The founders, in drafting the Constitution, showed particular concern for the prevention of demagoguery on the grounds of its divisive and manipulative potential. Regarding the implementation of political structures suitable to counter potential populist powers that the presidential office may be vested with, the founders only succeeded in adopting indirect measures rather than clear institutional provisions. These political institutions — representation, independence of the executive and separation of powers — are merely intended to weaken the impact of presidential popular appeal rather than institutionalizing it to an extent that would constrain the reach of presidential rhetoric itself.<sup>130</sup>

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<sup>129</sup> The strict distinction between traditional and modern conceptions of the American presidency is not uncontested. This critique usually translates as the denial of an epochal shift. Of the two groups of critics that challenge the traditional vs. modern divide, one downplays both the impact and the proliferation of presidential rhetoric altogether while the other emphasizes the continued significance of presidential rhetoric while denying that it specifically pertains to modern times. In particular, Bimes/Skowronek (1998) call into question the clear distinction in arguing for the continuity of presidential rhetoric.<sup>130</sup> In part, the absence of the institutionalization of presidential rhetoric results from the emphasis placed on liberal political philosophy. “Because liberal theorists and the founders were so concerned to circumscribe politics, to narrow the public sphere, they generally addressed problems of rhetoric indirectly, through discussions of institutions” (Tulis 1987: 32). What is more, the political philosophers consulted by the framers of the Republic, such as Locke, Hume and Montesquieu, for example, could not provide treatises on rhetoric, unlike Aristotle, Quintilian or Cicero. As a result, political actors developed their rhetorical skills through interplay with political institutions, guided by their specific political and moral frameworks (cf. Tulis *ibid.*).

<sup>130</sup> In part, the absence of the institutionalization of presidential rhetoric results from the emphasis placed on liberal political philosophy. “Because liberal theorists and the founders were so concerned to circumscribe politics, to narrow the public sphere, they generally addressed problems of rhetoric indirectly, through discussions of institutions” (Tulis 1987: 32). What is more, the political philosophers consulted by the framers



This is why the development of presidential discourse is largely constrained by the strong interdependency of political institutions and the mechanisms of public appeal.

Second, the founders expressed reservations about the principle of the majority will “due to the manifold differences of intensity of preferences and the plethora of possible hierarchies of preferences” (Tulis 1987: 33). Despite the deep-seated mistrust of direct forms of democracy, they felt that democratic constitutionalism cannot be implemented without giving political weight to the citizenry. As a result, the problems of carefully distinguishing between what they considered an ‘unreflected’ popular majority rule and the clear, institutionalized social hierarchies in which the majority would tyrannize the minority were addressed by positing republicanism as representative government. In the attempt to minimize the effect of political rhetoric on the public’s voting behaviors, popular election was confined to the selection of representatives rather than the direct election of institutional members of the Senate or the Supreme Court, and, above all, the president.<sup>131</sup> The rationale of this significant curtailment of popular sovereignty resides in the elitist, authoritarian approach to governance taken by the principal political agents at the time. Earlier the case for the analogy of language and politics, which approximates the rule over linguistic structures with the political rule over territory, was made. Just as contemporary grammarians agreed to the principle of common usage while maintaining the need for written grammars as linguistic normative authorities, contemporary political actors overtly subscribed to popular sovereignty as exemplified by the “We the people” of the Constitution’s preamble while institutionalizing a political practice in which the people would be led by an ‘enlightened’ few. Tulis (1987: 39) concludes that “[t]he presidency [...] was intended to be representative of the people, but not merely responsive to popular will. [...], the president was to be free enough from the daily shifts in public opinion so that he could refine it and, paradoxically, better serve popular interests.” The inaugural addresses analyzed provide ample evidence for what was to become one of the major paradoxes of American political discourse. While it is true that the constant invocation of the popular will as the foundation upon which the national edifice could be constructed is highly pervasive in discourse, the actual political weight within the political process resulting from this position is very little.

Third, the independence of the Executive was to counterbalance any tendency towards the unsettling influence of popular opinion. Contemporary political activists felt that the presidential office should derive its authority directly from the Constitution rather than the legislative branch. Due to the fact that the connection between Congress and popular opinion is strong, deploying the executive branch independently from public opinion also involved

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of the Republic, such as Locke, Hume and Montesquieu, for example, could not provide treatises on rhetoric, unlike Aristotle, Quintilian or Cicero. As a result, political actors developed their rhetorical skills through interplay with political institutions, guided by their specific political and moral frameworks (cf. Tulis *ibid.*).

<sup>131</sup> This alteration of majority rule is the most significant one but it is not the only one. Other vexing issues settled by the founders include the different lengths of tenure for office holders (the presidential four-year term as opposed to the two-year tenure of members of the House of Representatives), distancing officials from shifting public opinion in conferring authority from the Constitution rather than from the people, and finally, the continuous extension of the national territory in order to counter the formation of majority factions (cf. Tulis 1987: 35).

virtual independence from Congress. In severing the executive from the legislative branch, the framers of the Constitution created the conditions under which presidents may adopt public-policy stands diverging from those adopted by the legislature. This position was to pave the way for the so-called ‘spatial leadership’, a style of governance that was to gain preponderance in the later half of the twentieth century; figuratively speaking, it permits the president space of his own, a position outside the other estates upon which he may impose his visions on the polity.

Fourth, the principle of the separation of powers has given rise to considerable controversy. Whereas political scientists in particular have queried the logic of the separation of powers in view of the fact that power is actually shared amongst the governmental branches, others argue that the nation’s founders distinguished not merely between powers, i.e. one particular function was conferred onto one particular governmental branch, but between political structures in the Constitution’s original design. This entails the separation of powers as an organizing principle according to which the domains of authority are not delimited in terms of watertight categories. Thus everyday political activity was designed to involve active negotiations of overlapping departmental provinces; in other words, political action comprised toeing the line of demarcation, which to this day has caused political conflict between the branches. In sum, “[t]his political process is dynamic. Viewed at particular moments the system may appear deadlocked; considered over time, substantial movement becomes apparent” (Tulis 1987: 45). Hence the pervasiveness of MOTION concepts in American presidential discourse may also be derived from the conception of the political process laid down by the Constitution itself.

In the light of this hostility towards public oratory and publicness in general, the transition to a predominantly media-centered political communication culture appears to be anything but smooth. In today’s American system the interpretation of politics chiefly depends on two institutions, the president and the media (cf. Pfetsch 2004: 358). However, this does not mean that the separation of powers and the independency of the executive, for example, have not been extensively and publicly discussed. The latitude of presidential powers, insufficiently constrained by the Constitution, preoccupied political agents from pre-constitution times throughout the Early Republic, which is well documented by formal rhetoric such as the inaugural address. A case in point is Harrison’s inaugural address of 1841, which represents a provisional peak in the, at times, harsh debate of the potential as well as actual abuses of presidential power. Harrison’s speech is replete with admonitions about the abuses of presidential power, which is aimed at Jackson’s leadership style and frequently amounts to ‘Jackson-bashing’, although Jackson obviously is not explicitly mentioned.

The extent to which twentieth-century political communication can justifiably be regarded as a completely ‘new way’ will now be investigated. In the process, I will concentrate on the marketization and technologization of (presidential) discourse against the background of the major landmarks in the development of twentieth-century political communication.

The case for political communication has been made above (chapter 2.2.2). Following from these explorations political communication is determined on the one hand by structural conditions such as publicness, particularly its impact on the public discourse of politics, and the co-dependency of politics and the media. On the other hand, political communication has been shown to be frequently modeled on the basis of a simplified conception of communication according to which a basic distinction between a default or communicative mode and a strategic mode of language is stipulated. As a consequence, political communication is typically viewed as deviating from this default mode, which entails specific configurations for both the speaker and the recipient within the political communication process. The political actor as the speaker not only encodes a message but also projects a public self-image; hence he or she assumes a variety of speaker roles. Regarding the receiving end of the political communication process, typically a mass audience these days, the addressee is conceived of as either a passive, depoliticized respondent or an agitated, and at times subversive political activist.

Depending on the construction of the political communication process itself the interaction norms are frequently classified in terms of manipulation, mobilization and agitation. Resulting from the overall negative connotation of these characteristics of political communication, the distinction between euphemistic, face-saving encoding on behalf of the political speaker and dysphemistic decoding on behalf of the recipient becomes crucial.

Thus political communication is conceived of as a purposive, strategic mode of communication. It uses a 'binary code', which means that any political message that is publicly communicated is simultaneously encoded for two distinct audiences, the 'in-group' of party-political allies and the general public.

However, the modes of interaction between political actors and the so-called general public are not the only variables that need to be taken into account. Since the input of public opinion is amplified by the media, the weight given to it within a political communication culture is crucial. As a rule, the complex interaction process is negotiated between three instances, political actors, the public and the media, provided that political communication is not regarded as an interpenetration system of politics and media; in this case all instances are attributed an active, shaping role in the process rather than mere responsiveness in the asymmetrical mode of one-way communication. As a result, the output of the political communication process involves strategic communication, aimed at news management. In what follows I will focus on the pivotal interface between politics and the media.

The interweaving of media and politics is one of the major themes in analyzing political communication in the twentieth-century. The growing marketization and technologization of discourse on the one hand, and the personalization, hybridization and conversationalization of discourse on the other can be identified on several levels.

On the lexical level, neologisms (first attestations and dictionaries used in brackets) such as 'photo-opportunity' (mid 1970s, Tulloch 1991), 'press kit' (1963, Barnhart 1990), 'anchor'

(1960, Green (1991); 1974, Barnhart 1990), ‘media event’ (1972, Barnhart *ibid.*; 1976, Green *ibid.*), or ‘sound-bite’ (1976, Green *ibid.*)<sup>132</sup> are indicative of important innovations in the field of public-political communication, pointing to a productive peak in the decade from the mid-60s to the mid-70s. Similarly, ‘broadcast journalism’ (1968, Barnhart *ibid.*), ‘investigative journalism’ (1964, Barnhart *ibid.*; 1972 Green *ibid.*), and ‘checkbook journalism’ (1963, Barnhart *ibid.*, Green *ibid.*) are also first attested during that time, suggesting the steadily increasing intensity of the interpenetration of politics and the media throughout the twentieth-century.

These developments in the media domain are mirrored in the introduction of new practices in the political domain. Ayto (1999: 425) records the first attestation of news management, the “manipulation of the news media, especially by public relations or press office,” as early as in 1969. By this time, the practice of ‘flackery’ (1962, Barnhart *ibid.*), denoting publicity or promotion, was already widely spread. The verb *to flack* (1966), which means to act as someone’s press agent, with the noun *flack* originating from the American slang term for ‘press agent’ (1946, Barnhart *ibid.*), describes the activity later on accomplished by ‘spin doctors’ (1986, Barnhart *ibid.*). The term *spin* (1978), indicating “a bias or slant on information, intended to create a favorable impression when it is presented to the public” (Ayto 1999: 506) is another illustrative example of the tightly knit connection between politics and media. The personalization of the practice, embodied by the so-called spin doctor, “a political press agent or publicist employed to promote a favorable interpretation of events to journalists” (Ayto *ibid.*: 562), follows in 1984.

Crucially, the majority of these neologisms first originated in American political discourse, underscoring the focal orientation of political communication towards political public relations, which has been increasingly adapted in other political cultures as a result of the globalization of discourse. Generally speaking, political communication takes place in diverse arenas, which makes political communication systems dynamic and adaptive. As a result, there has been a growing homogenization of media systems and the public sphere under the influence of external factors such as globalization. The globalization of discursive practices entails the increased blurring of traditional boundaries, irrespective of their being cultural, linguistic, stylistic or generic, due to the hegemony of a small number of discourses in the public domain.

The global influence of American media discourse derives from the hegemony of U.S. commercial broadcasting. The authors argue that the U.S. model is devised as information-oriented, projecting a politically neutral professionalism. Cases in point are the personalized, media-centered forms of political campaigning, exploiting the practices of consumer-product marketing. The regular appeals to the public, a characteristic feature of the rhetorical presidency (see below), produces institutionalized events staged as pseudo-events.<sup>133</sup>

<sup>132</sup> Ayto (1999) supplies a different date (1980) as the first attestation, specifying the term’s US origin and its prominence in the 1988 US presidential election campaign.

<sup>133</sup> The strategy of going public was first detected with U.S. presidents and subdivides into two strategies. In the proactive version the political actor seeks to control public opinion by packaging public policy in order to maintain public support rather than deriving it from public opinion. In contrast, the reactive mode of going

Similarly, Pfetsch (2004: 353f.) deploys a typology of political communication cultures on the basis of which she distinguishes between four types of cultures. These categories are further constrained by two dimensions, the self-image of the political communicator and the output of political communication. On the one hand, the self-image of the political communicator, including the proximity vs. distance in relation to the media as well as communication roles and norms, is a crucial factor. Yet the output of political communication, which is liable to varying degrees of political public relations depending on whether or not it follows political logic as opposed to media logic, also determines the modes of political communication on the other. Consequently, Pfetsch (2004: 358f.) describes the American system, in which the interpretation of politics relies on the president and the media, as a media-oriented political communication culture.<sup>134</sup> One of the characteristic features of a media-oriented political communication culture is “that political spokespersons have to accept the maxims of media production as their own rules if they are to be in any position at all to communicate their messages” (Pfetsch *ibid.*: 354). Furthermore, there is a great distance between the two groups, political actors and media representatives, while media logic dominates political logic. A case in point is the spatial leadership style identified by Foley (1993), which will be discussed below in the light of the institutional changes resulting from the changed discourse conditions.

Crucially, media-centered political communication cultures thrive on weak party-political structures — hence the sharp distinction between European party democracies and the U.S. presidential system —, often involving the complete depoliticization of public discourse. Prior to exploring the American system in more detail, focusing on the institutional changes connected to presidential discourse, I will briefly outline the major landmarks in the development of twentieth-century political communication.

In more general terms, the technologization, marketization and, to a lesser degree, the globalization of discourse not only constrain the context of situation of political discourse but have also enhanced the significance of language and discourse in the pursuit of political power.

Indeed, much of political power may safely be operationalized in terms of the means and patterns of access and control of politicians, parties or political movements over public discourse. **Who controls public discourse, at least partly controls the public mind** [emphasis added], so that discourse analysis of such control is at the same time inherently a form of political discourse analysis. (van Dijk 1997: 44)

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public consists in adapting public policy to public opinion as it finds expression in polls and surveys (cf. Kriesi 2004: 192).

<sup>134</sup> Pfetsch’s (2004: 354) classification of political communication cultures also comprises the following three types. In a **public-relations-oriented political communication culture** there is a relative proximity between political spokespersons and the media. In this climate of mutual agreement political messages are created in order to receive the attention of a mass audience. In **(party) political communication cultures** political logic dominates over media logic, in particular with reference to power-political calculations. Finally, **strategic political communication cultures** produce a mode of communication in which political actors have to deploy specific strategies in order to “instrumentalize the media [...] in the pursuit of their power-political goals” (Pfetsch *ibid.*).

Due to the interrelationship of language and politics, which is discussed in chapter 2.1 above, there is a vast potential of discourse control as a means of power-political control. In a media-centered political communication culture like the American system, in which media logic prevails, the organization of political communication is determined by an economic rationale to a larger degree than in other systems. However, what exactly are the dominant features of the marketization, personalization and technologization of political discourse?

First, policies and political actors are devised in terms of economic rather than political strategies, to the extent that they come in packages. In particular, senior political agents are the product of image-makers instead of party-political representatives. This unilateral bias of the media coverage has further entrenched the personalization of political discourse, particularly in the American context: “Because the president can symbolize the nation and the government, the news media concentrate on this individual in reporting the national news, thereby strengthening the symbolic connection” (Hinckley 1990: 11f.). While it is true that the personalization of discourse is further advanced in symbolic politics, it is also consequential for political action in general.

Thus political activity in the public domain involves managerial skills, either in the guise of news management or crisis management, through which political actors publicize the fact that they are in control, i.e. they are reliable and competent trouble-shooters and not merely liable for damage limitation. The small portions of policies served in palatable chunks for public consumption may be compared to “cornflakes, if they are not marketed they will not sell” (Franklin 1994: 4).

On the one hand, this aspect of marketization of political discourse is not universally disreputable. Given that participatory democracy relies on an informed electorate as a prerequisite of voters’ capacity for election, the enhanced media focus on policies and political actors can be regarded as an advancement of ‘media democracies’.

The packaging of politics [...] brings evident advantages to a democratic polity and is consequently highly desirable. Political communication via television, press and radio guarantees that people receive greater information about political issues, events and personalities in a more readily comprehensible and accessible form. (Franklin 1994: 9)

While the accessibility and amount of information have been steadily increasing on the basis of ever more diversified communication technologies, captured by the catchphrase ‘the era of information’, a careful distinction between quantitative and qualitative criteria has to be made. Although the impact of public opinion on public policies cannot be underestimated, the one-sided focus on media logic, coupled with the growing distance of political decision-makers from the public, has also entailed the professionalization of discourse behavior on both sides of the communication process. Where the professional dealings of political actors and the media have led to the virtual depoliticization of large parts of the population, public discourse is the domain of consensus-based, consumer-oriented global communities rather than committed political activists. Nonetheless the awareness of discourse due to its technologization also involves the somewhat paradoxical effect of the public as consumers of

politics. In the process, issues or events which are traditionally apolitical now tend to be politicized.

On the other hand, the economic exploitation of information due to the technologization and marketization of discourse is not unanimously beneficial to democratic structures and processes. As regards the professionalization on behalf of political actors, one of the strategic functions of political language use (see chapter 2.3), namely representation, becomes a vital discourse strategy. This information paradox — the inconsistency of increasing amounts of information that can be processed more and more immediately due to reduced transmission delays on the one hand and the more and more sophisticated techniques in political communication through which disinformation rather than information is disseminated on the other — makes the important differentiation between euphemism and dysphemism (cf. Allan/Burridge 1991) ever more vital. While all representation is essentially selective, the manipulative effects of language can be amplified in strategic representation. For language is used euphemistically as a shield, veiling the true intent or full implications of a message, whereas the addressee may decode it as a dysphemism, i.e. language that is particularly misleading and thus functions as a weapon. Accordingly, euphemisms are designed to conceal the subtle mechanisms of simultaneously disseminating and withholding information emanating from sources that are carefully selected. Conceptual metaphor is one device that is particularly conducive to establishing favorable connections between different, even opposing domains of experience. Due to the partiality of metaphorical mappings only some attributes of a given entity are highlighted while other, possibly less desirable attributes, are inevitably backgrounded. The more pervasive a conceptual metaphor, the more deeply entrenched the metaphorical entailments become.

The emphasis placed on the strategic function of representation entails far-reaching conceptual and emotive modifications of the notion of information.<sup>135</sup> Conceiving of information as an economic value has shifted the power relations inscribed in discourse as social practice. As a result, information has evolved into a resource through the marketization of discourse, producing a power asymmetry between those who have it and those who haven't. The divide between the haves and have-nots is widened by discourse practices such as the withholding or spinning of information. The media also play a vital role because they act as filters, deciding what will be shown and how things should be interpreted; this interpenetration of media and politics has been intensified by so-called 'embedded journalists', who are an integral part of the political process in the public-political interface (cf. Ceaser et al. 1981: 164).

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<sup>135</sup> This emphasis on, and control of information as an asset of value has culminated in the establishment of government departments such as the British *Government Information Services* (GIS) or more recently, the formation of the American Office of Global Communications (OGC) in 2002, which was designed to convey America's message to the world in coordinating strategic communications overseas to integrate the President's themes while truthfully depicting America and Administration policies. More important still, the Pentagon itself has set up a new department with the Orwellian title Office of Strategic Influence, aiming to influence public opinion outside the U.S.

What is more, however, the accessibility of information is not to be equated with a qualitative increase in information that is now being more readily disseminated due to the technologization of discourse. During the 1980s novelties such as ‘rolling news’, “a service in which a broadcasting channel or station is dedicated entirely to news reports, which are broadcast 24 hours a day” (Ayto 1999: 558), or ‘breaking news’ in which news segments are continuously repeated in a more or less unmodified way, the newsworthy issue is broken up into small chunks and packages in order to be processed for public consumption in a more readily comprehensible and accessible mode. This process of serialization of news and events has to do with the ever-present public appeal that is pertinent to today’s ‘media democracy’, which coincides with a dramatization of politics, including political actors and events. Thus, the presentation of information has to pass the acid test with the public while the particularization of newsworthy items or information inevitably leads to their repetition in order to drive home the message. Moreover, the serialization of news fulfils an economic strategy itself. In creating a demand for news and newness of its own, a certain level of appetite and attention is maintained.

The serialization of information also manifests itself on the level of presidential discourse. As with virtually all forms of public address, the structure of the inaugural has also dramatically changed from a diachronic perspective. This can be seen in the transition from argument-based inaugurals to those consisting of one-sentence paragraphs, which are only loosely associated, if they cohere at all. Similarly, Tulis (1987: 187) notes that “the rise of the press as an autonomous institution is important not only for the shift in power that it signifies, but also as a cause of change in the character of presidential speech and of constitutional rule more generally.” Furthermore, it is also a shift from written messages to oral performance due to the conversationalization of discourse. The conversationalization of discourse may be paraphrased as the appropriation and imitation of conversational style in both written and spoken public discourse. Furthermore the one-sentence paragraphs so common to contemporary presidential messages are devised to accommodate television news. “With short aphorisms rather than developed arguments, presidents are [...] less likely to be quoted out of context for there is no context” (Tulis *ibid.*).<sup>136</sup>

Second, the marketization and technologization of political discourse have also transformed political discourse in structural respects. The constant public appeals are not merely a mode of political strategy; rather they are a direct application of popular pressure since ‘going public’ subverts the logic of bargaining as a political strategy and undermines pluralist premises in which the strategy is built (Tulis 1987: 10f.).

In addition, there is ample evidence that the gap between campaigning and the political business-as-usual is closing. This is due to the over-assertion of public appeal which characterizes the rhetorical presidency (see below). Yet political campaigning is not only

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<sup>136</sup> In his analysis of one-sentence stories in the news media Bell (1998: 69-75) reveals that they can function as mini-narratives with an event-structure of their own, which does not always follow the sequentiality of natural events. Crucially, even one-sentence stories have a complex event structure, narrating more than one event (cf. Bell *ibid.*: 72).



indicative of the growing personalization of discourse but also of an enhanced professionalism. For example, these advertising campaigns are frequently filmed by professional film directors, legitimating the notion of television democracy.

In media-centered political communication cultures the scope of mediatized election campaigns is subject to a particularly systematic exploitation. Continuous campaigning appears to be the rule rather than the exception in the contemporary American system. The relative distance between political agents and journalists has produced two extreme forms of journalistic activity. So-called investigative journalism played a decisive role in the Watergate Affair, putting an end to disinformation<sup>137</sup> practices. More recently, the other extreme originated in the guise of embedded journalism, guaranteeing a government-friendly coverage.<sup>138</sup>

The lesson to be learnt from distinct forms of journalism is that governments as well as the media adapt to the ever-changing communicative conditions, potential (re)sources and outlets of information. Hence both systems are highly adaptive and efficient. However, efficiency can be measured by diverse criteria, of course. If the classic antagonism between words and deeds on the one hand, and of substance vs. spin on the other is maintained, the only 'natural' conclusion to be drawn is that media-centered political activity can not be efficient, as is exemplified by Blair's New Labor government, since "their expertise in massaging the news agenda was to prove no substitute for effective decision-making and substantive action" (Jones 1999: 17f). If, however, efficiency is measured by success in elections, this strategy of 'media spin' has proved highly efficient as well as successful.<sup>139</sup>

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<sup>137</sup> 'Disinformation' has two uses. First, it is used in business to refer to "the deliberate spreading of inaccurate information about designs, sales, marketing, etc., which is intended to confuse and worry trading rivals. Second, in espionage or military use it denotes "distorted or false information deliberately disseminated either at home to confuse foreign agents operating in one's own country or in a foreign country to confuse its inhabitants" (cf. Green: 1991).

<sup>138</sup> These journalists accompanied the armed forces of The United States, Britain and Australia during the Iraqi Freedom operation that started in 2003, where they were supposedly supplied with first-hand information and images. In fact these embedded journalists were accompanied by a monitor, who was in charge of selecting what would be broadcast in the end. Yet caution is needed when assessing the close-up images provided and the topicality of commentaries. These close-up views were usually incomplete and what was presented was not a full coverage of the war but rather a slice of war. The embedded journalists had to sign carefully drafted contracts, which left little scope for the open exploration of war events. Although many commentators have argued that embedded journalism has forever changed the rules of war coverage in the media, the only thing that can be claimed for sure is that it has added a new chapter to the history of mutual control and exploitation by media and politics alike.

<sup>139</sup> Tony Blair's New Labour government started out as the paradigmatic example of news machinery fuelled by the government itself. Obviously Blair had learnt his lesson well from his close affinity to the American political scene where the rhetorical presidency and the practice of spin doctors had already taken root. For example, the constant appeal to the public has paid off; this is why "Blair's tactics of keeping his party on a constant election footing had proved a phenomenal success" (Jones 1999: 16). A couple of years later, a completely different picture presents itself. The 'information' policies practiced by both the contemporary American and British governments in the follow-up to the 9/11 attacks have opened new dimensions of disinformation. This is also illustrated by the phrasing used to describe the level of dissimulation reached. Whereas Jones (*ibid.*: 17) refers to "the massaging of the news agenda," the dossiers need to be 'sexed up' these days in order to be credible. This sexing-up strategy describes the conscious effort to enforce an unpopular foreign-policy decision through the manufacturing of consent which is achieved by deliberately and knowingly misleading the public.

By way of conclusion, the developments of the personalization of discourse and the emergence of spin doctors, who also exploit the strategy of going public, are interdependent since the increased focus on presidential communication has also heightened their vulnerability and potential loss of face, which can be countered by the think-tank organization of public-political communication. Although popular and mass rhetoric has become a principle tool of presidential governance, the role of the media is frequently overstated (cf. Tulis 1987: 16). In particular, when adopting a historical perspective, it becomes evident that the mass media are not the only determinant factors of modern styles of governance.

The differences between nineteenth and twentieth-century political rhetoric do not depend upon the development of modern mass media, though contemporary presidential rhetoric is certainly reinforced by requirements of modern television. Rather, the differences depend essentially upon the very phenomena that they reveal — the changing conceptions of leadership and the place of these conceptions in our political order. (Tulis 1987: 16)

Since the American political communication culture is traditionally media-centered, focusing on the media available at a given period, Tulis's remarks are hardly surprising. Nineteenth-century speeches and controversies used to be widely circulated in newspapers and as pamphlets. Witness the famous Federalist Papers, published in order to have a large audience for the controversies concerning the Constitution; from the beginning, even speeches would be printed in newspapers.

Compounding the marketization, personalization and technologization of political discourse, one of the bedrocks in the formation of presidential discourse has been the variable of publicity and publicness. Neither has always been an integral part of presidential discourse due to institutional factors such as the emergence of political structures building on publicness on the one hand, and the self-interpretation of the presidential office on the other. As to the latter, the predominant practice in the nineteenth century was largely influenced by the so-called 'Cincinnatus Pose' (cf. Goetsch 1993: 11f.). The Roman statesman Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus is assumed to have gained a reputation for his selfless commitment to the Roman republic in times of crisis and for stepping down as soon as a crisis was over. The myth of a humble servant to state affairs had thus been conjured up and was mapped onto George Washington, whose two-term presidency has meanwhile undergone a process of increasing mythologization.<sup>140</sup>

This mode of presidential discourse behavior implies a leadership style that is fundamentally paternalistic: in helping the polity in crisis, the president lays down the moral rules, setting an example himself, which gives him the authority to set up a reward-and-punishment scheme according to which he is vested with the authority of reinforcing

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<sup>140</sup> While some commentators have contributed to further entrenching this view of Washington as a master of resignation due to his voluntary resignation after two terms of office (e.g. Wills 1984), other have increasingly articulated their critique of such a mythic construction of Washington's presidency. For example, Longmore's (1999) study examines Washington's presidency in the light of publicity and self-presentation, proposing that Washington created his own public image, albeit not to an extent of our contemporary understanding. With respect to Washington's interpretation of governance in the budding nation, Smith (1993) posits that Washington actually had a patriarchal leadership style, adopting a strong, authoritarian style concerning the infant nation under the presumption that it needed protection in the guise of a 'mild' parental authority.

preferred social practices while policing less acceptable ones. This moralistic understanding has since branched out into two distinct conceptualizations of morality in American political discourse — the strict-father morality and the nurturant-father morality — as shown by Lakoff's ([1996] 2005) influential monograph. Lakoff (*ibid.*) refers to this system of conceptual metaphors as MORAL ACCOUNTING metaphor. The pervasiveness of this metaphor system is well documented for American political discourse. Chapter 6 explores the ways in which the two distinct ways of conceptualizing morality in American political discourse can be expanded to twentieth-century foreign-policy contexts.

Although this original understanding of moral leadership as an integral part of the presidential office has not been radically altered, it has adapted to changing political structures. Nineteenth-century American presidents, particularly during the first half of the century, are frequently pictured as withdrawn from the public. Similarly, Tulis (1987: 5) states that “the rhetorical presidency and the understanding of American politics that it signifies are twentieth-century inventions and discoveries. Our pre-twentieth-century polity proscribed the rhetorical presidency as ardently as we prescribe it.”

This alleged reserve towards ‘the public’ has to be further qualified, however. First and foremost, a political public discourse had to constitute itself through the implementation of political structures such as participatory democracy or representative government. This is why American presidents up to the 1840s did not regularly ‘go public’; for a public in the sense of growing involvement of common Americans in the political process first had to take shape, which occurred only slowly, particularly with the extension of the suffrage in the period from around 1816 to the late 1820s.<sup>141</sup>

The impact of the broadening of the suffrage was first felt in the election campaigns of the 1830s, which was to be consequential for presidential rhetoric. In the early 1830s, a controversy over Jackson’s use of presidential authority erupted, leading to the formation of the Whig Party, whose candidate William H. Harrison defeated the Democratic Party’s candidate van Buren in 1840 (cf. Matuz 2004: 155f.). This election campaign is thought to mark a turning point in presidential campaigning for it “introduced a manipulative element into American politics” (Matuz *ibid.*).

His [Harrison’s] run for the presidency was a shrewdly managed campaign, with image counting far more than reality, with songs and slogans overwhelming discussion on issues, and with powerful figures behind the scenes holding the real power. (Matuz 2004: 156)

The campaign itself was characterized by personalization, constructing Harrison as a down-to-earth, humble man despite his wealthy background. What is more, however, Harrison was advised by the new Whig party leaders to keep a low profile during the campaign itself,

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<sup>141</sup> There was a sharp public reaction to the so-called Salary Act of 1816, according to which the members of Congress voted themselves a considerable pay rise. “The uproar over the Salary Act marked a turning point in the transition from the deferential politics of the Federalist-Republican period to the egalitarianism of the coming Jacksonian era. Since the War of 1812 demands for a greater popular voice in government had noticeably quickened the pace of democratization. The public would no longer passively accept decisions handed down by local elites or established national figures” (Goldfield et al. 2001: 279).

keeping controversial issues such as slavery, high tariffs and his leadership style to himself (cf. Matuz 2004: 162). While he did address the public during the campaign, he was advised to make short speeches only. As one might say, he compensated for having been muzzled by delivering the longest inaugural address to date. In fact his inaugural continues campaigning, focusing on the distribution of presidential vs. congressional powers. From what he argues one could infer that the nation would be governed by Congress only. Indeed, major political figures within the Whig party had assumed to be able to manipulate Harrison in order to strengthen the legislature. Accordingly, the Whig leaders had “carefully planned legislation that would be enacted by a president who pledged to follow Congress” (Matuz *ibid.*: 157).<sup>142</sup>

The changed political structures also entailed a shift of emphasis from the written to the spoken medium in presidential discourse. While there is a long tradition of discussing political issues publicly — such as *The Federalist Papers*, which discussed constitutional issues in the form of newspaper articles — the significance of political rhetoric on behalf of the president is enhanced.

The shift of medium also coincided with a shift in rhetorical style as was noted in the preceding sub-chapter. The transition from eighteenth-century demonstrative rhetoric or laudatory discourse into hortatory discourse, which could be written or spoken, constitutes a rhetorical innovation.<sup>143</sup> The onset of a participatory political culture required a form of rhetoric that tapped people’s moral sensibilities, reminded them of their obligations, and elicited their interest (cf. Robertson 1995: 212). One such rhetorical style was hortatory discourse, blurring the distinction between debate and result by the middle of the nineteenth century. Recall that hortatory discourse is typified by its concern for moral and political issues that lay beyond individual political actors. Instead these general concerns were projected onto individual politicians and their policies, which were to represent the collective hopes of the society. Indebted to the legacy of the jeremiad and its two-fold objective of both exhortation and affirmation, the new rhetorical style embraced positive self-assertion without, however, completely eschewing potential threats and fears. By analogy with its affirmative side, public

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<sup>142</sup> Harrison’s administration is interesting for another reason. His death within a month of taking office sparked a constitutional crisis since there were no clear provisions in the Constitution for such an incident. The Vice President Tyler reversed the distribution of powers between the legislative and executive branch that had been so carefully schemed by the Whigs. Tyler swore himself into the office and challenged legislation, which led to a deterioration of the relationship between Congress and the presidency (Matuz 2004: 164). Whether or not the history of the United States would have followed a different course had Harrison not died so unexpectedly is a matter of speculation. What is interesting, however, is the lasting impact of Tyler’s boldness in succeeding Harrison in office on the relationship of the presidency and the legislature. In response to Tyler’s chutzpah several of the presidents that followed Tyler were dominated by Congress, especially during the period from 1852 to 1884 with Lincoln’s two-tenure administration being the only notable exception (Matuz *ibid.*: 169).

<sup>143</sup> Hortatory rhetoric as a rhetorical innovation is indicative of the conflation of print culture and oral culture. This cultural merger performed a crucial function in enabling a proportion of the population to become a participating political audience (cf. Robertson 1995: 214). The adoption of new rhetorical styles serves the strategic function of absorbing an increasing amount of people, potential voters into the mainstream culture. This is why identification becomes an issue whenever the diversification in pluralist societies augments to an extent that it needs to be compensated for by political discourse. Similarly, Finkelstein (1981) has identified a shift of rhetoric at the onset of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s four-term presidency, which coincided with a new peak of immigration figures (amongst other factors such as market orientation and foreign policy) and the enhanced need for both integration and identification.

exhortation was also achieved by projecting the collective fears onto evil individuals or entities.

To a degree, the two modes stand for two different cultural practices or layers of culture, namely rituals and heroes. The layered or “onion model” of culture (Hofstede/Hofstede 2005: 7) distinguishes between four layers of culture with decreasing levels of depth: values, rituals, heroes and symbols. The deep-seated cultural values are relatively stable while the cultural practices, rituals, heroes and symbols are liable to change. Rituals are also fairly deeply entrenched in cultural practice; typically, rituals are collective activities, including discourse as social practice. Hortatory discourse (if not all political discourse) is such a ritualized practice, allowing political actors to assert themselves as well as their policies when used in campaigning, or else serving the purpose of cultural cohesion. The construction of collective hopes often occurs through personification, whereby national cultural heroes are created. In Hofstede & Hofstede’s (2005) model this layer of culture is not quite as deeply ensconced as the ritual level. This conception of culture will also play a crucial role in defining American (political) culture more closely and in elaborating on the changes in American political culture.

The symbolic level of cultural practices is the most superficial level in terms of the ‘onion model’ of culture. Nonetheless, symbols are a vital manifestation of culture, which Hofstede/Hofstede (2005: 7) describe as “words, gestures, pictures, or objects that carry a particular meaning only recognized as such by those who share the culture.”

On the political stage, symbolic forms or symbolic communication is an integral part of political activity. Similarly, Hinckley (1990: 1) appears to suggest that the use of symbols is a means of discourse control:

Symbolism forms a large and important part of political activity. It supports governments, selects leaders, and defines the terms of debate. Symbols can be used politically to shape attitudes, build support, persuade to action, or in one widely accepted definition of political power, to help A get B to do what A wants done.

Hinckley’s conception of symbols allocates them on the level of abstractions with a strong emotive appeal to relevant domains of experience. Accordingly, Hinckley (1990: 4) defines symbols as “a kind of shorthand communication for a large and powerful part of human experience not otherwise easily evoked.” This means that symbols are a condensed form of speech, so-called mini-narratives (myths!), resembling cognitive models or frames which serve as knowledge bases in which more complex knowledge structures are encoded. More precisely, Hinckley (1990: 5f.) attaches the following characteristics to political symbols:

First, symbols are socially based, in other words, their meaning is constituted by social interaction. Only when used in a communicative context do they unfold their shared meaning. Second, symbols are purposive, i.e. they are intentionally placed in specific discourse situations. Third, symbolic communication establishes a particular kind of reference, which may best be described as discourse verisimilitude (see chapter 2.4 above).

The communication by political actors to others for a purpose, in which the specific object referred to conveys a larger range of meaning, typically with emotional, moral, or psychological impact. This larger meaning need not be

independently or factually true, but will tap ideas people want to believe in as true.  
(Hinckley 1990: 7)

The representation of factuality is achieved by politically charged symbols evoking referents that people consider believable or truthful. As Hinckley (1990: 5) points out, “the symbolic meaning typically evokes ideas already in the public philosophy.” As has been discussed on various occasions within this study, symbols typically are abstractions whose repetitive, recurrent use as key words conveys a set of beliefs from which an inherent truth claim is derived. Finally, a symbol can be substitutional to the extent that it “can help produce the independent condition it stands for” (Hinckley 1990: 5). However, this strong evocative effect of political symbols is both facilitated and constrained by contextual features on the discourse level. This is why political symbols are not to be studied in isolation, for their symbolic potential can only be grasped on the conceptual level. While it is tempting to view symbols as isolated, abstract key words with a strong evocative potential, their continued pervasiveness in American political culture in particular, means that they should really be assigned to the level of conceptual frames.

Unlike Hofstede/Hofstede’s (2005) conception of cultural layers, according to which the symbolic level only comprises words rather than discourse, in this study the symbolic level will be argued to extend to the discourse level. First and foremost, this is due to the fact that political discourse deploys cultural practices differently from other modes of discourse. The distinction between the layers of cultural practices — rituals, heroes and symbols — is blurred. While heroes and symbols are constructed in and through discourse, the discourse conditions are shaped by collective activities. What is more, the construction of symbols and heroes in political discourse is not necessarily geared to changing underlying cultural values; instead the relationship is frequently reinforced rather than deliberately changed. Hofstede/Hofstede (ibid.: 13) argue that cultural change is relatively slow with respect to the ‘onion’s core’, accounting for the considerable stability of the basic values of a given society in view of ever-changing cultural practices:

These basic values affect primarily the gender, the national, and maybe the regional layer of culture. Never believe politicians, religious leaders, or business chiefs who claim they will reform national values. These should be considered given facts, as hard as a country’s geographic position or its weather. (Hofstede/Hofstede 2005: 13)

While there is no denying that the national or regional layers of culture represent fundamental manifestations of culture that are not readily changed, the impetus of political debate is typically directed not towards changing cultural values but towards restoring them. In particular, the American controversy of values is characterized by retrospection, which itself is focused on the stability of the so-called American principles in view of a changing world. In this respect, the symbolic level is geared to re-enacting cultural values. This is also the reason why collective imaginaries and public recollections, for example in the shape of the inaugural, serve such an important function of national coherence.

Yet not only is the layering of culture merged in political discourse, making for a distinct dynamic relationship between the cultural practices and the core values, political institutions and political discourse themselves can evolve into (national) symbols. Presidential discourse has originated from the growing personalization, marketization and technologization of discourse and is thus indicative of institutional change. To what extent it is also symptomatic of more far-reaching transformations within American political culture, however, can only be explored in connection with the frame analysis in the second part of this study.

The presidency as an institution has been subject to a number of changes, one of which is captured by the term symbolic presidency.

Since the presidential office is virtually undefined by article 2 of the Constitution it lends itself to symbolic exploitation. Symbols generally denote what we, as members of a given discourse community, construe them to mean, rather like a receptacle that can be filled with any liquid as long as it holds some agreeable, believable content. Hinckley (1990: 9f.) summarizes the most pervasive features of what the office of American presidents symbolizes in the political culture. On the one hand, there is a strong cognitive component in the attitudes to the office-holder. The presidency is not only a national symbol but it also symbolizes the nation. The president is generally perceived as being the equivalent of the American government. This strong metonymic motivation is, however, not the only conceptual tool for constructing the presidency as a symbol. The cognitive focus on an individual reduces the complexity of the political process in its entirety. On the other hand, there is also a powerful affective component that reinforces the focus on the president, which facilitates the identification with the abstract entity 'nation'. Hence the symbolic presidency may encourage participation in the political process, since people feel more integrated into political events for the simple fact that it is easier to 'interact' with another individual than with an abstract entity such as government or nation.

Whereas the president may serve as "an outlet for affect — a way of feeling good about one's country" (Hinckley *ibid.*: 9) in times of economic well-being, he or she may be regarded as a parental figure or manager in times of crisis. Presidents are symbols of authority and power, and usually believed to adhere to high moral standards, which considering the behavior of recent presidents appears utterly naive, at least from an outsider's perspective. Presidential popularity "rises at a time of international crisis as people rally around the flag and the president, and declines in economic hard times and during prolonged unsuccessful wars" (Hinckley 1990: 11). A marked situation such as a crisis demands strong political actors, heroes an entire nation is able to cling to.

If the presidency has increasingly turned into a symbol, so has presidential communication (cf. Goetsch 1993: 24). The president's handling of crises is a part of the institution, for it has to live up to expectations placed in his office and is generally regarded as an acid test for his leadership. Similarly, the president's public addresses are also a part of his leadership style and are constrained by institutionalized practices.

There are currently eight major (cf. Campbell/Jamieson 1990) institutionalized presidential public appearances in the American political calendar. In a way, all major speech types

originated from strong institutional constraints and constitutional practice. While the institutionalization of presidential discourse accounts for its conventionality and routinization, it does not marginalize its political function. The ubiquity of political rituals not only emphasizes their importance for our political cognition, it also points to underlying commonsensical cultural models that frame political debates.

If American political discourse has increasingly evolved into a presidential discourse on the one hand and a media-centered public discourse on the other, as is argued here, present political debate should be symbolic in the sense that it focuses on the president as a national symbol. Here it is worth noting that in the U.S. context, political debates rarely address issues. Kriesi (2004: 198) identifies two techniques of symbolic politics: issue-centered and actor-centered strategies. The former is characterized by the displacement of problems, shifting debates to secondary arenas. More often than not, this shift results in a transformation of substantive conflicts into moral ones. The latter entails that public attention is distracted from political issues and controversies in favor of political self-marketing, whereby the debate is personalized.<sup>144</sup>

By way of conclusion, the construction of a presidential image is reinforced by several layers of culture. On the most superficial level, the presidency is viewed as a national symbol which, however, interacts with deeper cultural layers. The fact that some presidents have been constructed as heroes also highlights the necessity to add a temporal dimension to the 'onion' model of culture. The more deep-seated the manifestations of culture, the more temporally remote they are. The emergence of cultural practices such as discourse modes or genres from ritual settings points to another vital issue that I have touched upon in previous chapters. Political rituals reveal collective belief systems, socio-political ideologies and preferred modes of interaction.

More importantly still, the preceding discussion has shown that cultural practices cannot be dissociated from discourse. Presidential discourse is marked by a high degree of intertextuality according to which each individual president has aligned himself with his predecessors, underlining the continuity of political practice; simultaneously, each incoming president will have to delimit himself from his immediate precursor, hence his inaugural address serves the important symbolic function of self-presentation.

Taking into account the discourse level on which cultural practices are negotiated, the symbolification of the presidency is an immediate corollary of the personalization, marketization and technologization of discourse.

As with other discourses, presidential discourse is typified by a dialectical relationship between discourse and 'world', i.e. socio-cultural practices, including political practices in the narrower sense of the word. The enhanced focus on the presidency has influenced public

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<sup>144</sup> More precisely, Kriesi (2004: 198) distinguishes between two sub-versions of the actor-centered strategy. The version mentioned above constitutes the weaker version. In its most strongly pronounced form, negative publicity, the media themselves may be by-passed in presenting topics and issues in different contexts or placing them in news channels directly.



discourse, including media discourse, as political public discourse affected the presidential office, particularly presidential rhetoric. As noted above, some analysts argue for the existence of a clear divide between nineteenth-century and twentieth-century presidential rhetoric. The large majority of nineteenth-century presidents did not address the public directly; on the contrary, their public rhetoric circumvented party-political issues and political controversies.

In sharp contrast, the ‘rhetorical presidency’, as a twentieth-century invention, is defined by the following parameters:

Direct popular appeal has been the central element of a political strategy that has produced a stunning string of partisan successes, including budget cuts, tax reform, a large military build-up and accompanying social and diplomatic policies. Beneath the differing policies of Democrats and Republicans and varying abilities to secure partisan objectives lies a common understanding of the essence of modern presidency — rhetorical leadership. (Tulis 1987: 4)

Tulis (1987) has examined the full array of nineteenth and twentieth-century rhetorical practices, which he regards as reflections and elaborations of underlying doctrines of governance. As a consequence, he equates changed rhetorical practices with a changed position of the presidency within the political system.

Generally speaking, the rhetorical presidency has resulted from a combination of three factors (cf. Ceaser et al. 1981: 161ff.). First, this interpretation of the presidency is the outcome of a modern doctrine of presidential leadership, which is contrasted with an understanding of the presidential office as a ‘head of government’. The growing reliance on public appeal found its ideal platform in ceremonial occasions in which national principles could be presented in condensed, yet pointed form, hence the importance of demonstrative discourse. As a consequence, changes in the understanding of the presidency have entailed changes in rhetorical style — recall the shift from laudatory to hortatory discourse. The president’s public address to Congress, the institutionalized State-of-the-Union Address, can be exploited to place political pressure on the legislature.

Second, the opportune communicative conditions supplied by modern mass media have also modified the internal structure of public speeches. While nineteenth-century speeches tended to follow a line of argument, modern rhetoric delivers significant messages packaged into one-paragraph chunks. Along with a highly ritualized political calendar, the one-line argument speeches have intensified the feeling that the performance of speaking matters most. In addition, the structure of one-sentence paragraphs has quickened the political process “because complex arrangements of policies are packaged and defended as wholes and rejected as wholes” (Tulis 1987: 178). This shift of emphasis involves another two significant changes. Thinning out the argument structure of major public speeches increases the importance of temporality; speeches as political events are marked off by time. The tightly scheduled political calendar further heightens the awareness of temporality. Political issues and events — speeches are staged political events — gape apart, hence the need to synchronize political topics with the topicality of the schedule. On yet another level, the ever increasing number of public appearances have not only multiplied the White House public relations staff but they have also institutionalized speech writing staff, who no longer merely figure as so-called

'ghost-writers' but have adopted a more active role in the political process. The actual importance of the Office of Speech Writing as it is officially called, will be briefly outlined in chapter 5.

The third influential factor is the clout of political advertising, with political consultants or spin doctors being its most prominent upshot. Yet within the system of the rhetorical presidency the constant advertising footage has blurred the distinction between political campaigning and governing. In media-centered political communication cultures like the U.S., this shift of emphasis has more recently given rise to a leadership style distinct from the rhetorical presidency. This leadership style has been referred to as "spatial leadership" (Foley 1993; see below).

Another vital characteristic of the rhetorical presidency is the routine appeal to public opinion, which levels the crucial distinction between crisis politics and political business as usual. As outlined above, the rhetorical practice of the founders as well as the presidents of the Early Republic was characterized by the so-called Cincinnatus pose on the basis of which crisis demanded a strong leader while 'normal' politics could be conducted by a humble servant to the Republic. As Tulis (1987: 181) observes, the rise of the rhetorical presidency coincides with a routinization of crisis, which is believed to be an integral part of popular leadership. Accordingly, popular leaders resort to a discourse strategy that can be called a 'crisis tool', which is deployed to demonstrate their capacity of successful crisis management.

Evidently, any crisis, whether a real or pseudo-crisis, qualifies as a newsworthy event and feeds into the political communication process as dictated by media-logic. As a consequence, presidential speeches themselves have become the issues and events of modern politics rather than the medium through which issues and events are discussed and assessed (cf. Tulis 1987: 179). But there is also a historical dimension to the invocation of crisis. On the one hand, we have seen that the American experiment, as it is sometimes referred to, manifests itself in trials or challenges that have to be met. On the other hand, the rhetoric of the American jeremiad has been shown to summon the chosen people in order to renew their bond or covenant with God as a reward for living through a period of crisis.<sup>145</sup>

All in all, the rhetorical presidency is a sign of institutional change in several respects. First and foremost, the onset of the rhetorical presidency, which coincides with Wilson's presidency (cf. Tulis 1987) is the final stage in the formation of a presidential discourse. Not only has it been subject to significant changes itself, it has also produced additional institutional changes. The ongoing personalization of discourse has resulted in political and structural modifications of presidential rhetoric. Congress as a democratic institution has been further weakened since the president's constant public appeal almost routinely by-passes the legislature. Although the American system has never been party-political, except for a strong, hard-lived bipartisanship,

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<sup>145</sup> Compounding these historical accounts of the constant state of anxiety, there is also an economic dimension: keeping the people on constant alert increases activities and entails a continuously high level of appetite, which heightens economic activities.

the strong presidential power throughout much of the twentieth century has further reduced the political weight of parties.<sup>146</sup>

Generally speaking, the number of public addresses has both multiplied and diversified, which has resulted in an increasing complexity of potential target audiences and of topics to be selected. The disparity of audiences and incongruity of topics to be addressed has stressed the importance of two strategies of political language use, legitimization and representation (see chapter 2). Legitimization involves establishing one's authority as well as projecting a convincing leadership style, both of which are achieved through positive self-presentation. Representation implies the control of political public discourse; more precisely, it involves the highlighting of preferred readings of socio-political realities while de-emphasizing dispreferred referents. Both strategies aim at reaching the lowest common denominator in the attempt to provide a platform of identification.

As mentioned above, the emphasis placed on 'bowling down the middle', has reduced the argument structure, compared to the majority of nineteenth-century presidential speeches, in favor of one-sentence paragraphs. While the majority of nineteenth-century speeches pursued a developed line of argument, their twentieth-century counterparts are typified by a list of points, loosely strung together. More often than not, however, the points raised are merely separated by paragraphs. These mini-narratives package policies which can either be accepted or rejected as a whole. The simplified internal structure of the major speeches in particular, has facilitated the processing of political discourse for media consumption. A case in point is the blurring of campaigning and governing: "It is true that modern presidents are schooled in contemporary rhetorical techniques before they reach office, and that recent presidents have tended to understand governing as a continuation and reduplication of campaigning" (Tulis 1987: 14). Conversely, the media focus on major speeches has steadily increased, giving rise to the carefully orchestrated public addresses. The enhanced importance of major speeches derives from the fact that they address fundamental principles and American values rather than everyday political issues.

Furthermore, the myriads of public speeches have introduced a trade of their own, the "speechwriting shop" (Tulis 1987: 185), institutionalizing speechwriting experts, political advisers and PR agents to an unprecedented degree — despite the fact that all American presidents have relied on aides in their speechwriting; hence its current influence frequently tends to be overstated, as will be outlined in chapter 5 below. Nonetheless, public relations are a vital branch of efficient and successful administrations; for instance, U.S. administrations in the 1980s are estimated to have employed 20,000 people in the field of public relations (cf. Goetsch 1993: 17).

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<sup>146</sup> According to Tulis (1987: 7), political scientists deplore the following changes in the executive branch of government: a) the regular active initiation and supervision of the legislative program, b) the use of veto to oppose legislation as a matter of partisan policy rather than constitutional propriety, c) the development of unilateral powers such as the executive agreement in place of treaties, and d) withholding of documents from Congress under doctrines of executive privilege. All of these alterations can mostly be traced back to FDR's administration, with the exception of the strengthening of unilateral powers, which originated during Johnson's and Nixon's administrations.

Compounding the significant institutional changes occasioned by the rise of presidential discourse, the presidential office, especially the self-understanding of the office holder, has been transformed. To a degree, the modern conception of the presidential office is an interpretation of the office permitted by the Constitution. In discussing fundamental issues of the Constitution in the making, Hamilton (*The Federalist Papers*, 70, March 18, 1788) makes the following points:

[...] A feeble Executive implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad government.

Taking it for granted, therefore, that all men of sense will agree in the necessity of an energetic Executive, it will only remain to inquire, what are the ingredients which constitute this energy? How far can they be combined with those other ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense? And how far does this combination characterize the plan which has been reported by the convention?

The ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive are, first, unity; secondly, duration; thirdly, an adequate provision for its support; fourthly, competent powers.

While the need for a strong, energetic president is overtly stated, the limitations of presidential power are less clearly outlined. This latitude is also built into the constitutional structure. As a consequence, the various periods or cycles of the national history have been characterized by different approaches to the presidency as well as diverging public perceptions of the presidential office holder.

The alleged reticence of nineteenth-century presidents in view of public appeals is in part due to the simple fact that the vacuum caused by the non-existence of democratic structures had yet to be filled in order to establish a so-called public sphere. Had presidential office holders been less dominated by Congress, the tools available to construct a public self-image would have been exploited to a larger degree. While it is true that nineteenth-century newspaper coverage concentrated on Congress rather than on the president, as Tulis (1987: 186) observes, the reversal of this practice is in itself not a reliable indicator of the enhanced importance of presidential communication. Instead, it simply points to changed media practices. Crucially, one needs to take into consideration the conditions of the reception of political discourse at the time. As was illustrated above, the audience would be attuned to political oratory rather than written political debates. Similarly, Robertson (1995: 10) argues that the introduction of print media did not relegate American oral electioneering to lesser importance despite its growing influence in nineteenth-century campaigning. This view is also substantiated by the fact that transcripts of presidential speeches were regularly published.

What are the reasons for the development of distinct leadership styles against the background of these traditions? Without any doubt, the first presidents were outstanding individuals – if they weren't, their progressive mythologization has constructed them as such. More importantly, their self-understanding as office holders set an example that would make them appear as benevolent, paternal popular leaders for all succeeding generations. In time this presidential duty has been converted into an unquestioned premise; popular leadership is

moral leadership, especially in times of crisis. In marked situations, leadership involves self-denial and self-discipline. Thus the “lonely man in the White House is burdened — with the government *and* (emphasis original) with the moral leadership” (Hinckley 1990:15).

Turning the presidency into a symbol primarily originates from people’s political cognition, in which a historical perspective of presidential discourse reveals a strong bias to personification or substitutional concepts concerning the organization of the polity. As we will see, conceptual tools such as the metaphor THE NATION IS A PERSON or THE RULER FOR RULED metonymy are highly pervasive. Yet the emphasis placed on these conceptualizations in discourse, in this case the inaugural, suggest a misrepresentation of political realities.

The dramatic increase of presidential public oratory since the nation’s beginnings has endowed the office holder with another powerful tool, namely discourse control. Since the use of public appeals was traditionally understood as a means to demonstrate popular and moral leadership when it was most needed, Tulis (1987: 181) has argued that overuse of what he terms the ‘crisis tool’ is a defining characteristic of the rhetorical presidency: “the long-term consequence of the rhetorical presidency may be to make presidents less capable of leadership at any time. If crisis politics are now routine, we may be losing the ability as a people to distinguish genuine from spurious crises. Intended to ameliorate crises, the rhetorical presidency is now the creator of crises, or pseudo-crises.”

Meanwhile, the rhetorical leadership style has produced another result through buttressing the divide between the executive and the legislative branches of government. The distance between the presidency and government, more precisely the leadership style relying on perceiving them as two distinctly separate institutions is referred to as ‘spatial leadership’ (Foley 1993: 25). While this form of leadership reached a provisional point of culmination during the tenure of Ronald Reagan, its precedents were set as early as in the 1930s and early 1940s. It was in the period that followed Franklin D. Roosevelt’s tone-setting term in office that assisted most in institutionalizing the presidency to the extent that it was to become the sole source for direction, coordination, decisiveness and national vision. This concentration requires a leadership style that is both self-denying and self-promoting.

In contrast to the rhetorical presidency, the spatial-leadership style is not geared towards creating proximity between the public and the federal government, including the president as the government’s figurehead. Instead its most important keystones may be paraphrased as follows (Foley 1993: 32):

The strategy of spatial leadership was not used then and has not been used since as simply a new way to achieve an old goal. It is not deployed to achieve — by means of innovative ways of engaging public support — the modern presidency’s traditional objective of executive dominion. On the contrary, it is an overtly self-denying form of leadership that uses the public to maintain a distance between the presidency and ‘the government’. As a result, spatial leadership helps to generate an imagery of government that is differentiated from the public. It transforms

'government' into a populist issue that in its turn can protect the presidency from Washington and even from the consequences of a president's own actions.

The most dramatic impact of spatial leadership is on public discourse, which is increasingly depoliticized. The presidency is constructed as protagonist and antagonist at the same time, replacing the political deliberation process by a public discourse in which government is constructed as a negotiable token rather than a political agent. This tendency is reinforced by the media-centered political communication culture, in which public discourse on politics has been increasingly superseded by media analyses that serve as a surrogate public.

Given this bias in American political communication culture the development of spatial leadership is no coincidence. On the contrary: the distance between political agents and media representatives is traditionally great.

In line with Tulis's (1987: 173f.) findings the modern presidency is thus a hybrid. While structural features of the institution continue to embody founding doctrine, the traditional and, as some might argue, constitutional underpinnings of the president's self-understanding have been transformed. To a degree, these alterations result from the president's ambivalent constitutional station, which permits the adjustment to changing conditions as is the case with many principles or key concepts such as nation, democracy or government. The development of a rhetorical or even spatial leadership style is thus the price the American system has to pay, even though this may involve an increasing lack of fit between institution and occupant, a greater mutability of policy, an erosion of the process of deliberation, or a decay of political discourse (Tulis *ibid.* 175).

American politics today, and American political development since the founding, can usefully be treated as a layered text. The first layer of this text-polity is formed by the political theory of the founders. Because subsequent attacks on that theory have sometimes gained public legitimacy without also altering constitutional and structural features of the regime, this thought can be viewed as superimposed upon the founding theory, altering without obliterating the original layer. The dilemmas of modern governance may be located, I argue, in that theoretical space between the layers of politically significant thought that form our political culture. (Tulis 1987: 17)

These layers of American political discourse account for the fact that the modern presidency is regarded as a development from, rather than a transformation of, the original system. More importantly, departing from Tulis's line of argument, it primarily highlights the historicity of discourse, in which the dissection of the temporal layers is crucial.

One consequence of the historical development of American political discourse is that it has increasingly revolved around presidential discourse. In fact, American political discourse has produced presidential discourse as a discursive formation out of the constraints existing within the discourse genre of political discourse. With the increasing diversification of discourse conditions as outlined in chapter 2 — political communication, political rhetoric or political public discourse — presidential discourse supplies the most efficient intersection between all relevant domains of social practice.

### 3.4 Summary

Given the time span covered by the preceding considerations, some aspects had, of necessity, to remain sketchy. What has become clear, however, is the fact that the formation of American political discourse has revolved around a number of identifiable points that are remarkable for their indexicality within American political culture — historicity, temporality and newness.

The historicity of discourses manifests itself in textual layers that need to be synchronized. Discourses construct their own temporality, which means that the event structure of discourse is also bound into a temporally framed discourse unit. This temporalization is specifically significant for political discourse due to its action-centeredness. The temporally framed event structure, whose chronological sequence need not correspond with the actual order of occurrence, accounts for the continuous shaping and re-shaping of political actions as well as the shifting constructions of political actors.

In the American context, the historicity of discourse is mirrored by a marked preoccupation with history and temporality beyond the discourse level. American national history has followed a rhythm of highly recurrent patterns, which were introduced as tradition and counter-tradition above. Whereas the traditional view traces historical change back to the so-called American experiment, according to which national history unfolds through the interplay of trial and error, the counter-tradition conceives of American national history as the well-known ‘manifest destiny’, the assumption that America was settled by a chosen people with a divine mission. What unites the two perspectives, however, is their unclear outcome, resulting from the experimental character of risk-taking on the one hand, and the difficulties and crises to be overcome even by a chosen people on its journey to predestined salvation.

This open-ended, processual character of the American endeavor has been shown to be built into the emerging political structures and institutions as well as the political discourse in the making. The framers’ aim to establish a ‘timeless political order’ was not without controversy either, as illustrated above. Analogizing language and politics, the framers of the Republic were faced with two options: they could attempt to phrase the constitution in a defined and immutable way, hoping that this might prevent political structures from decaying if language change was to be arrested too. Alternatively, they could reverse the analogy, which implied that political structures would only be finalized within limits in order to allow for their adaptability to changing conditions.

As a result, key political concepts have remained largely undefined, as is the case with the responsibilities of individual governmental branches such as the executive, which paved the way for the rise of presidential power. Beginning in the first third of the nineteenth century, this development quickened its step at the turn of the twentieth century until it reached a provisional point of culmination in establishing today’s political communication culture that largely relies on two instances, the president and the media.

While the marketization, technologization and globalization of political discourse, all of which are contributing factors to the formation of presidential discourse, are twentieth-

century inventions, the hybridization of American political discourse is inscribed in its very beginnings. Hybrid discourses typically draw on various other discourses in a systematic way, which serves as a reliable indicator of the productivity of these discourses within the discourse communities of a given period.

The American public philosophy or civil religion as it is sometimes referred to, has always been shaped by American political discourse, as it continues to shape political discourse to this day. In the process this public philosophy has been exposed to countless disintegrating forces without, however, changing its core principles. This flexibility is remarkable in various respects. Its ideological potential — ideology as grasped by van Dijk's (1998) viable definition — has proved to be a stronghold for the integration and identification of an ever more diversified society, which underlines the fact that the civil religion fulfilled important political functions from the onset. To this day the American understanding of democratic citizenship builds on old Puritan social values. By the eighteenth century, Puritan pulpit rhetoric had become a rhetoric of corporate life. Nevertheless, the oft-cited secularization of Puritan religious discourse is only partially accurate. Instead there is ample evidence to assume that even in its 'original' form homiletic discourse addressed pragmatic issues concerning the daily organization of communities rather than being theological in the orthodox, dogmatic sense of the word. Seen from this angle its subsequent development attests to a discourse strategy that does not obliterate the original text; instead, additional layers are constantly added, superseding the earlier layer in a 'both-and' rather than 'either-or' fashion, which accounts for the inherent tension observed in present political debate.

This begs the question whether the formation of American political discourse is not more adequately described as the politicization of religious discourse instead. The preceding discussion has drawn attention to the fact that some key concepts such as the notion of covenant are not only pervasive within political discourse (see chapter 6), but that the underlying covenant theology continues to shape the social and political organization of the U.S. Accordingly, the compactual arrangements of Puritan communities can be regarded as forerunners of the contemporary state constitutional design. Similarly, this chapter's line of argument has focused on the long-standing tradition of public oratory as one of the cornerstones of American (political) culture. Extending the reach and functions of the homily, rhetoric is deeply rooted in American social practice, differing from its British counterpart. Under the influence of its characteristic context of situation an American style of public oratory began to take shape.

The strong connection between rhetoric and politics, however, was soon to be felt. Any major shift in rhetorical styles has coincided with significant socio-political developments. A case in point is the transition from laudatory style to hortatory style due to the emergence of a public sphere, which made political campaigning a stronger necessity than before. Another example is a re-orientation in American politics, the American progressivist movement, which entailed the gradual introduction of the so-called rhetorical presidency. The president's self-understanding as a popular leader personalized political discourse in an unprecedented way.



Presidential rhetoric was discovered as a power tool used to control discourse by by-passing Congress in the majority of political communications addressed to the public.

New directions in foreign policy, together with a number of domestic issues such as immigration and the Great Depression, occasioned further changes in both rhetoric and leadership; when F. D. Roosevelt attempted to weld together an interventionist coalition, the practice of spatial leadership was initiated. The aim of this mode of presidential governance is to convey the image of the president and government as being two separate entities in the public's perception.

Hence a new season of American renewal has begun, as one of FDR's successors put it, albeit in a different context. The adaptability of the American system to changing times and conditions is thus an integral part of the national narrative whose discourse/event structure appears to be geared towards change. Therefore the step from implementing a timeless political and social order to the modern short-term oriented national culture is rather small. Short-term orientation "stands for the fostering of virtues related to the past and the present — in particular, respect for tradition, preservation of face, and fulfilling social obligations" (Hofstede/Hofstede 2005: 210).

Today's American political discourse largely centers on public recollection as well as the reinvigoration of old values. Within the American political calendar, the presidential inaugural address is predestined to fulfill these vital political functions. In this process, even retrospection implies newness on the one hand, and newness quickens the pace of national development on the other.

Consequently, the reason for the coherence of the national narrative, including political discourse, despite its myriads of temporal layers is that newness is pervasive. As a concept, newness subdivides into two broad categories: newness can be understood in terms of time and origin, or alternatively, in terms of kind and quality. Crucially, both sub-categories are closely related to change, either as a change of position or as a qualitative change.

For Jefferson, however, newness was encountered in virtually all relevant domains of experience within the Early Republic. As pointed out in the course of the chapter, newness was gradually extended to delimit the new nation from the Old World in the sense of succession, to refer to the exceptional, unique (hence new) American experience or to denote the moral reform of the chosen people in the sense of renewal.

The growing valorization of newness is an important sociolinguistic factor. While used by outsiders as a pejorative term, implying that the new nation would not persevere due to its inherent inferiority to old, time-honored models, the framers of the republic would use it as an identificatory marker, never missing an opportunity to emphasize the fate of ancient political models like the Roman republic. Relevant examples are numerous and the matter is vividly discussed in most early nineteenth-century inaugurals.

In the construction of a national narrative and political discourse both categories of newness played a vital role. Initially, it may have been the case that newness in its local sense — the allegedly uncharted territory of the New World — was foregrounded while its

qualitative meaning components were only gradually increasingly highlighted in discourse. Exactly how this occurred is revealed by the analysis of the socio-political frame of newness in presidential discourse below. Prior to analyzing the conceptual metaphors within this frame, I will introduce the conceptual structure of newness in greater detail.

## 4. The Conceptual Domain of NEWNESS

This chapter explores NEWNESS as a conceptual domain. Domain is understood as “a body of knowledge within our conceptual system that contains and organizes related ideas and experiences” (Evans/Green 2006: 14). The experience of newness is both introspective and subjective in that it is closely connected to the experience of things changing, either resulting from (self-)action, forces or time passing. In other words: the experience of newness on the part of an experiencer is closely linked to the awareness of change, which can be brought about by a human agent, by (super)natural forces or the passing of time. Crucially, all of these concepts are conceptualized in terms of motion, for example CHANGE IS MOTION, ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION or TIME IS MOTION. As will be shown throughout this chapter, the conceptual structure of newness is also grounded in spatial experience, i.e. the trajectory of motion in space as evidenced by the mapping NEWNESS IS (A SUBEVENT OF) MOTION.

Departing from these general principles, newness as a concept will be described. The first part of this chapter is devoted to the relationship of NEWNESS to other domains of knowledge such as history or religion, which lays the groundwork for the elaboration of newness as a cultural concept. The main part of this chapter focuses on the semantic structure and categorial properties of newness on the one hand, which is investigated by virtue of the linguistic unit *new*, and the specific organization of related knowledge structures within the domain of NEWNESS on the other. As to the former, categorization will be shown to be particularly difficult due to the high degree of polysemy of the lexical item *new*. With regard to the latter, the experience of newness is grounded in both temporal cognition and spatial cognition. Moreover, the contiguity of NEWNESS and CHANGE relates the notion of newness to the so-called event-structure metaphor (ESM), a complex metaphor system consisting of several metaphors organized in inheritance structures. Inheritance is “the phenomenon whereby a more specific-level metaphor inherits structure from a more generic-level metaphor” (Evans 2007: 109). Given the subjectivity of its experiential basis, the study of newness should take into consideration the human perspectival system. As will be shown, newness can be perceived from a retrospective and prospective angle. It is also this perspectivity that makes newness a key concept to encode culture-specific experiences such as the American experience of the ‘New World’. While Cognitive Linguistics (CL) chiefly focuses on individual rather than ‘collective’ conceptualization processes, the two needn’t be irreconcilable, particularly with respect to the study of political discourse where the bias to an individual conceptualizer would be disturbing. Nonetheless, the political and the cultural are not easily compatible from a system-theoretical viewpoint. Politics, organizations and economics are referred to as action systems while culture is a ‘classic’ system of ideas (cf. Namenwirth/Weber 1987: 8). In the American context, this disparity has been reduced within the system itself by the specific coding of presidential discourse for the reasons expounded in chapter 3. American political discourse thrives on both actions and ideas. For instance, the purposiveness of political actions inheres in the American experiment whereas the realm of ideas and beliefs is most pervasive in the notion of manifest destiny.

The human conceptual system compensates for the seeming incongruity of actions and ideas by virtue of cognitive tools such as conceptual metaphors. Conceptual metaphors are expressed by the formula A (target domain) is B (source domain), or TARGET DOMAIN IS SOURCE DOMAIN. This cross-domain mapping typically transfers only some attributes of the source domain onto the target domain for the simple fact that two concepts cannot be identical. On the surface, however, the propositional form of the mapping is comparable to an equation or analogy. This is why each conceptual metaphor is further characterized by entailments, a set of correspondences that determine the relationship between source and target domain. Metaphorical mappings are, by definition, incomplete. Whereas the attributes chosen for metaphorical projection serve to highlight some characteristics of a given entity, others are inevitably backgrounded or even concealed.<sup>147</sup> Importantly, metaphorical concepts have an experiential, bodily basis to the extent that conceptual metaphors can be viewed as embodied experience.

Following the basic cognitive-linguistic tenet of embodiment, language and mind cannot be studied in isolation from the human body. This empiricist view has several corollaries (cf. Evans/Green 2006: 45f.). Human experience is embodied experience in that our view of the world is essentially species-specific. This means that the things we can perceive and conceive derive from the nature of our bodies. For example, if we perceive an entity as tall or upright, we do so on the basis of our bodies which have a certain height and are also vertical. This embodied experience also manifests itself in our conceptual system in terms of embodied concepts. A paradigmatic example of the mechanism of embodied cognition is the principle of “conceptual projection” (Evans/Green *ibid.*), according to which image schemas as concepts derived from pre-conceptual experience are extended by virtue of conceptual metaphors. For example, the image-schematic concepts container or motion are metaphorically extended by the mappings IDEAS ARE CONTAINERS or CHANGE IS MOTION. The third aspect concerns the construal of reality as mediated by embodied experience. Consequently, cognitive linguistic theorizing views reality as not objectively given. This experiential realism implies that language reflects our construal of the world rather than being a direct reflex of the world. “Indeed, the very purpose of our perceptual and cognitive mechanisms is to provide a representation of this reality, and thus facilitate our survival as a species” (Evans/Green 2006: 47).

In modeling the American experience as the fulfillment of God’s new millennium — evidenced by the mapping THE SETTLEMENT OF NORTH AMERICA BY THE ENGLISH SETTLERS IS THE MOVEMENT OF THE JEWS FROM EGYPT TO THE PROMISED LAND (cf. Kövecses 2002: 61) — newness served as a central concept from the onset, to the extent that it may be perceived as embodied experience. Due to its salience within American public philosophy, the

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<sup>147</sup> For example, studying the metaphorical expression ‘collateral damage’ underscores the efficiency of this instrument. Pertaining to US military jargon, Pentagonese, the metaphor has several entailments. Warfare is given the properties of keyhole surgery, highlighting the precision and efficiency of modern weaponry. In the unlikely event of their missing their target collateral damage occurs, denoting the unfortunate imprecision of the warheads rather than its effect on the surroundings. What is completely concealed, however, is the fact that not only are inanimate objects hit by military action but also civilians not involved in the military operation. This aspect is backgrounded, facilitated by the selection of ‘damage’ rather than ‘injury’ because damage cannot be grammatically subcategorized for animate objects.

signification of newness soon extended to other important domains of experience. As a result, the concept of NEWNESS frames the majority of those domains that are pervasive in American political discourse, for example, the socio-political domain, cultural historical domain or religious domain.

Thus it was not an unlikely strategy. The construction of newness as shared experience that would bind incoming settlers from distinct ethnic and religious backgrounds proved to be a both successful and efficient approach to establishing a common ground for the integration into and identification with the new polity; hence it served a key political function.

However, it would not be without significant drawbacks. “Building something new early in the nineteenth century depended first on breaking down something old: the prerequisite to construction was destruction” (Wiebe 1995: 27). Establishing a new political order implied a process of nation-building and the firm implementation of democracy that lasted throughout the century if not beyond. The experimental character of this American experience led to an enhanced awareness of historicity, which is highly pervasive in political discourse. The American experiment had to be devised as open-ended and processual out of pragmatic necessity as well as political reasoning. The settlement of unknown territory builds on the mindset of free, self-reliant and competitive ‘pioneers’, whose political mission ultimately aims to reverse the static political order of the Old World in favor of laying the groundwork for political power by temporary appointment, and hence, the possibility for change.

#### 4.1 Newness: A Concept and its History

There is a deep-lying struggle in the whole fabric of society; a boundless grinding collision of the New with the Old.

Thomas Carlyle

The antagonism of *old* vs. *new* is inscribed into social practice and touches the core of human experience. As such newness has established a tradition of its own, which is most salient in modernist thinking. The onset of the discursive formations of newness as a modern figure of thought roughly began in Renaissance times and gained momentum at the closing stages of the eighteenth century, which coincides with an eventful period of American national history, including the formative debates preceding the Constitutional Convention. The gradual radicalization of newness occurred in the course of the nineteenth century, accompanying the process of nation-building.

Originally newness was an aesthetic category, giving “rise to unique contradictions, myths, absurdities — often, creative absurdities” (Rosenberg 1965: 10). A case in point is the *lux novitas* of Baumgarten’s *Aesthetica* (1750) (cf. Bubner 2002: 7), in which newness is viewed as an episteme on the basis of cognizance.<sup>148</sup> The novelty sheds light on representations in a hitherto

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<sup>148</sup> In fact, newness is the only epistemological principle in aesthetics (cf. Bubner 2002: 1).

unknown way, giving salience to unfamiliar aspects. Perceptual experience is thus equated with authenticity and epistemological value. This view is relevant from a cognitive perspective since newness is frequently associated with cognitive salience. “Attention comes in degrees and is usually modeled in terms of degree of activation of conceptual structures in a neural network model of the mind” (Croft/Cruse 2004: 46f.). When domains are active, the perceiving mind is directed to specific knowledge structures inside the domain. As a result of intense sensory experience only certain attributes are highlighted, comparable to the zooming effect of focal adjustment. This occurs in the process of construal, i.e. the mapping from linguistic meaning to experience. As there is a wide range of experiences, there is a variety of construal operations. Nonetheless, there are recurrent patterns of particular construals for particular experiences, for instance, scanning actions as sequences (cf. Croft/Cruse 2004: 71f.).

In the arts, however, the occurrence of newness in the sense of innovation used to be severely restricted.<sup>149</sup> Common practice prescribed the orientation towards the aesthetics established by long-standing traditions. Clearly retrospection served as a source of inspiration from recognized, time-honored models. As to the visual arts, the authority of the old masters was to be followed and mastery manifested itself in the perfect imitation of traditional models rather than the demonstration of personal skill and finishing touches. This understanding of the fine arts suggests that newness is the equivalent of emulation rather innovation.

The orientation towards ‘old models’ is also present in the emerging written literature. This point is relevant with regard to cultural transmission, the passing on and storing of (cultural) knowledge through discourse. The transition from orality to literacy resulted in a coexistence of two traditions in cultural transmission, linking the notion of newness to epistemology. Cultural knowledge is based on experiential gestalts which are encapsulated in cognitive cultural models (see below). This knowledge is passed on and re-enacted from generation to generation. However, the oral tradition reinvigorated these knowledge structures following generational cycles — the capacity of this cognitive recollection did not usually survive three to four generations — while the introduction of the written form opened up unprecedented possibilities beyond the narrow confines of the communicative memory and the individual’s mental capacities. This shift of emphasis, however, entailed the risk of major discontinuities in the tradition of knowledge. The ability to resort to storage options outside the realm of human cognition also facilitated temporal and spatial displacement to a larger extent than ever before.<sup>150</sup>

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<sup>149</sup> The impossibility of genuine newness finds expression in popular clichés such as “old wine in bottles” or the biblical “nothing new under the sun.” Yet some degree of awareness of the new (cf. Bubner 2002: 4) as well as some experience of newness in terms of change and breaks with traditions (cf. Figal 2002: 101) can be traced back to antiquity. Newness was largely confined to the realm of rhetoric, in particular to the person of the poet or maker. In this respect, newness was chiefly an apperceptive category: using the faculty of recognizing differences (rather than similarities), which, however, had to be accommodated within the existing system (cf. Schmitt 2002: 26f.).

<sup>150</sup> This beginning of the archivization of knowledge led to a rift between the knowledge passed on orally and what was increasingly recorded in writing. The fact that there were discontinuities in the reception of the old is also reflected by emerging signs of reinterpreting the knowledge inherited from both Greek and Roman

The growing focus on newness during this time does not represent a contradiction to the enhanced interest in recorded knowledge. Newness was still conceived of in terms of retrospection, that is the re-interpretation of old literary models would be regarded as an act of originality according to which old meaning was adjusted to the state-of-the art, and hence (re)newed. In a way, the cultural legacy of transmitted knowledge was synchronized with the knowledge structures prevailing at the time. The Renaissance period is characterized by a mounting tension originating from the discrepancy of the old order and the emergence of more dynamic, pluralistic modes of thinking.<sup>151</sup>

The development of newness in the course of the eighteenth century represents a sea change in the concept's history. The gradual emancipation process from old models, starting with the Enlightenment movement and reaching its point of culmination towards the closing stages of the eighteenth century, eventually led to the displacement of the old order. From 1800 a more radical view of newness gradually establishes itself. The prevailing intellectual climate or zeitgeist manifests itself in the experience of living in a new era, which prevailed to such a degree as to evolve into an identificational marker. Newness is increasingly contrasted with the old, becoming its conceptual antonym. In American national history, this period is marked by the gradual detachment from old models, including political models such as the Roman republic. The inaugural addresses dating from the Early Republic supply an abundance of illustrative material indicative of the ongoing debate and the very emancipation process itself.

This heightened awareness of newness presupposes the awareness of one's own position as well as one's capacity of bringing about change and innovation oneself. In other words, a prospective perspective of newness thrives on human agency. In social practice newness thus relies on spatial and temporal cognition, the awareness that cultural space and cultural time can be formed by actions and events rather than being predestined realms out of the range of human influence.

Romanticism further advanced the cause of newness in underlining the importance of ingenuity and introspection. It is no coincidence that, in the history of American literature, Romanticism is frequently referred to as the 'American Renaissance'. Its concern for the past in terms of origins and originality was easily reconcilable with a conception of newness that derived its *raison d'être* from the historical. This double edge becomes a preferred mode of

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antiquity during medieval scholasticism. The age of commentaries initiated hermeneutic processes in order to save what could be saved by re-motivating connections long since disconnected (cf. Schmitt 2002: 30f.)

<sup>151</sup> The most important landmark in the attempt to break free from the dominance and authority of old models is the well-known quarrel between the Ancient and the Modern initiated by Perrault and Boileau. Under the pretext of a predominantly aesthetical discussion, the dispute was soon to become of a more comprehensive nature. Closely connected to the issue of vernacular languages — the argument was triggered off by the dispute as to whether inscriptions on monuments should be in French or Latin — the authority and superiority of classical times was increasingly called into question which, in part, is to be seen against the background of a growing contemporary expansionism, i.e. the rise of discoveries, inventions, scientific research activity and, last but not least, a growing body of vernacular literature. This is why the contemporaries less and less frequently consulted the past for insights and guidance. As a result newness was increasingly associated with innovation and authenticity on the one hand, but also with experimenting and progress on the other.

articulation in modernity, linking newness to the concepts of time and historicity (cf. Figal 2002: 101). All in all, the radicalization of newness manifests itself in an important conceptual switch: had pre-nineteenth-century thinking been associated with retrospection, the modern mindset increasingly perceived newness from a prospective angle which, however, does not mechanically replace retrospection as a means to innovate; rather, the new could now be construed from two perspectives.

### **Newness as a Cultural-historical Concept**

There was a time when titles and letterheads followed the establishment of the institution and the work of its founding members. Today we know that it is sometimes better to start with letterheads and self-representation. All the founders of institutions know this. As for deciding if titles in ‘new’ are more efficient than those in ‘post’, [...], if it is more appropriate to periodize violently and make the historicist telos the herald that brings down an old dragon, it is a matter of detail. It is basically the same gesture, the cultural strategem [sic] as an inevitable by-product of the oldest of historicisms. (Derrida 1990: 68)

Newness is an integral part of social practice and the dialectic between newness and oldness is the bedrock of human experience. By analogy with periodical cultural cycles of innovation vs. conservation, the ever-shifting focus on newness as opposed to oldness fuels social change.

Newness has been an important category for theorizing on cultural history. In what follows I will first of all embed newness into its cultural-historical context. Second, I will explore the concepts that are deployed by discourse, particularly with respect to their impact on American political discourse.

In cultural history, newness is conditioned by both the awareness and the experience of change to the extent that any experience of newness is the reflex of historical change (cf. Figal 2002: 101). Yet the possibility of change is usually not warranted without restrictions — both temporal and spatial. The telos of history draws on the presumption that time and space are in fact empty, filled only by the actions and results of the historicist telos (cf. Göring 2002: 128f.).

In the quotation above, Derrida underlines the function of newness as “the historicist telos that brings down an old dragon,” that is, as a driving force of historical change. In nineteenth-century philosophy of history, historical development was devised as a process, resuming the Enlightenment notion of linear progress directed towards specific ends. As a result, the historical process, advancing along a timeline, is merged with the linearity of progress. This teleological conception of history rests on the assumption that there are, at times, mysterious forces that account for historical changes, unfolding on the basis of a rhythm and velocity of its own. Once initiated and directed, historical development subsequently follows its course. Alternatively, the historicist telos is frequently also personified, motivated by the conceptual metaphor HISTORY IS A PERSON. The conceptualization of the historical process as a person’s activity is also highly pervasive in the inaugural addresses under examination.

Irrespective of conceiving of historical progression as a (super)natural force or powerful person, the individual’s abilities to interfere with the predestined course of historical



development are restricted. Within this framework, human agents are never capable of redirecting the course of history nor are they able to provoke its standstill. They might delay or accelerate the developments to a minor degree but, as a rule, the existing tendencies are inalterable once set on target. In the process, there is no room for coincidence, everything is assumed to run its predetermined course.

Interestingly, non-interference is also a component part of an underlying system of evaluation. Since the pursuit of the course of events is mechanically associated with morality, anyone attempting to interfere with the path taken is believed to be acting immorally. The only exception to this rule is also central to political uses of language: informing the historical process for the common good is perceived as morally superior.

The historical process terminates at the very moment of reaching its destination, which, for example, may be the Promised Land, hence its affinity to sacred history. This final stage of the historical process is inevitably linked with perfection, which introduces a utopian dimension to the 'historicist telos'. Crucially, the historical process is regularly associated with vision, the prospect of an enhanced future. More often than not, the fact of being in progress is equated with improvement itself.

In the twentieth century, however, this historicist conception was increasingly met with opposition. Nonetheless, American national history is still largely attached to this historical framework as is exemplified by the pervasiveness of conceptual metaphors in political discourse. The impact of historicist thinking on the conceptualization of history, historical change and historical events in American political discourse is thus particularly pervasive. As expected, the experience of history or historical change is grounded in spatial cognition, more precisely the trajectory of motion through space.<sup>152</sup> In its prototypical form, spatial orientation implies that an individual, or in some instances an object, moves along the temporal axis from left to right, i.e. from the past towards the future. This is consistent with the prototypical front-back orientation according to which the moving entity turns its back to the past while facing the future.

Spatial orientation is structured by so-called orientational metaphors, i.e. conceptual metaphors that structure and organize an entire system of concepts in relation to one another, derived from bodily experience. Deeply anchored in our conceptual systems, orientational metaphors are either image-schematic or knowledge-based. An image schema is a "relatively abstract conceptual representation that arises directly from our everyday interaction with and observation of the world around us. Image schemas derive from sensory and perceptual experience" (Evans 2007: 106). Thus spatial orientation is grounded in the embodied

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<sup>152</sup> Görling (2002: 128f.) illustrates the interweaving of history and newness with reference to Walter Benjamin's interpretation of Klee's painting *Angelus Novus*. Klee's painting shows a figure, the angel of history, staring at something with his eyes and mouth wide open. The angel is portrayed as though it is trying to escape from something, represented by its wings that are spread as if caught by a strong wind. Crucially, it is facing the past in disbelief - at least this is Benjamin's interpretation - as he is blown towards the future to which he turns his back. Thus, in Klee's painting the canonical front-back orientation is reversed. The embodied, 'personified' symbol of newness adopts a retrospective perspective, turning its back towards the future but is not (yet) powerful enough to withstand the force of the historical process.

experience of our physical environment. However these concepts are not isolated or randomly assigned for they are part of an overall external systematicity: they “are rooted in physical and cultural experience; [...]. A metaphor can serve as a vehicle for understanding only by virtue of its experiential basis” (Lakoff/Johnson 1980: 18). As the authors argue, there are in fact many possible experiential bases that individually form an inseparable part of the metaphorical representations themselves. Typically, these orientational metaphors are embedded in our cultural environment, which influences spatial orientation in general. More precisely, these conceptual metaphors are based on imagery, involving a mapping process in terms of which conceptual elements of image schemas are transferred from a source to a target domain (cf. Kövecses 2002: 36f.).

A case in point is the experience of space which is grounded in image schemas such as FRONT-BACK, UP-DOWN, LEFT-RIGHT, CENTRE-PERIPHERY, CONTACT or VERTICALITY. Another example would be the experience of LOCOMOTION, which is structured in terms of MOMENTUM and the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL image schema. Both SPACE and MOTION are schematic representations resulting from embodied experience.<sup>153</sup>

Crucially, embodied experience is an ongoing process, which is why image schemas can be transformed or assigned additional attributes. In this case, the direct experiential basis may no longer be warranted. Such instances of knowledge-based orientational metaphors are listed below (cf. Lakoff/Johnson 1980: 15f.):<sup>154</sup>

MORE IS UP; LESS IS DOWN

GOOD IS UP; BAD IS DOWN

VIRTUE IS UP; DEPRAVITY IS DOWN

RATIONAL IS UP; EMOTIONAL IS DOWN

Due to their complementarity, these metaphorical mappings establish coherence in our conceptual system. In other words these metaphors perform the cognitive function of conceptualizing one concept in terms of an upward orientation while ‘making sure’ that its opposite is conceptualized in terms of a downward orientation. Interestingly, the vertical pole also serves as a scale of evaluation. In spatial orientation the upper scale tends to be assigned positive values while their lower-scale equivalents are frequently negative. Kövecses (2002: 36) refers to this evaluative patterning as bipolar and bivalent, which also extends to other spatial image schemas. For example, with respect to the image schema CONTAINMENT, ‘in’ may be considered as positive whereas ‘out’ would be the dispreferred, hence invalidated notion.

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<sup>153</sup> The MOTION schema underlies the concept of a journey. The motion schema consists of concepts such as SOURCE, PATH and GOAL, which correspond with the point of departure, the traveling, and destination of journeys (cf. Kövecses 2002: 37f.).

<sup>154</sup> It is also important to emphasize that the metaphorical concepts illustrated above might not be coherent with one another although they form a coherent system within themselves. This is due to the fact, as Lakoff/Johnson (1980: 19) argue, that MORE IS UP has a different kind of experiential basis than RATIONAL IS UP. This is not to suggest, however, that there are different kinds of UPS; rather, we have different instantiations of verticality, each depending on varying evaluation schemes.

Since concepts are deployed by discourse, these patterns may not be valid for all types of discourse to the same degree. In the first place, this variance may result from inter-language variation based on underlying cognitive models or frames. In the second place, the valorization may be reversed depending on the situative and linguistic context established by discourse. With respect to political discourse, the bipolarity of evaluation is frequently exploited ideologically, following the ascription of iconographic frames of reference, which can also be metaphorically structured. A case in point is the conceptual metaphor CHANGE IS MOTION, with change being a valorized concept in American political discourse. Yet its valorization depends on the reference of the metaphorical linguistic expression it is associated with. It is a crucial tool for the ideological representation in political discourse, where a consistent bipolar pattern may serve to entrench the distinction between self-presentation and other-presentation. When applied to out-groups or when entailing negative consequences for the discourse community in focus, change may be negatively evaluated.

What is more, the impact of image-schematic metaphors on other domains of experience, such as the experience of history, change or historical events is also remarkable. The subsequent paragraph will provide a provisional application of the preceding discussion to the American context. Accordingly, American national history is, at least partially, conceptualized in terms of the metaphor HISTORICAL CHANGE IS MOVEMENT FROM A STATE OF IGNORANCE TO A STATE OF KNOWLEDGE (Kövecses 2006: 136). Thus the linearity and upward movement of historical development, which is suggested by the metaphorical mapping, appears to be an immediate upshot of the progress-minded enlightenment notion of history. The conceptualization of historical change as telic motion is also motivated by yet another conceptual metaphor: purposeful activities are journeys, which amongst other, more specific-level metaphors is highly pervasive in American political discourse.

The experience of (historical) change builds on the possibility of locating oneself somewhere on the timeline. The function of the anchor is crucial for it permits the interpretation of what a change of position entails, i.e. the assessment of the before and after.<sup>155</sup> This understanding is also vital for the conceptualization of newness which, as we will see shortly, is also largely conceptualized in terms of motion. The focus on change, however, is characteristic of a modern understanding of history. As Schmitt (2002: 33) notes, the upshot of the permanent repetition of (radical) change may be an overall stationary and conservative effect, preventing 'real' change from occurring. Finally, 'historicism' is also accounted for by the metaphors HISTORY IS A PERSON and HISTORY IS A (NATURAL) FORCE in presidential discourse. As mentioned earlier, the historicist framework proscribes the possibility of human

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<sup>155</sup> The so-called time anchor is also crucial for determining the event-structure in discourse, especially its chronological sequence. In the narrative mode of discourse, the sequencing of the events narrated is pivotal for the texture of the plot. Similarly, political discourse may also be, at least partially, in a narrative mode. Here the chronology of representation decides whether an event is constructed in a way that is logical, truthful, or believable – in short, convincing.

interference, which leaves the momentum of historical progression to the actions of a person — as an agent — or to natural forces.

### Newness as a Religious Concept

Having looked at newness from a cultural-historical angle, let us now resume the discussion of religious discourse begun in chapter 3 above, in which the influence of millennialism on the construction of a national narrative was discussed. The geophysical concreteness of the settlers' self-identification with the new continent is remarkable, highlighting the impact of redemptive history on the Puritan settlers. The mapping of this experience onto the discursive formations of American political rhetoric is mirrored in the quotation from *The Revelation of John* (21, 1-4):<sup>156</sup>

Then I saw a new heaven and a new earth, for the first heaven and the first earth had vanished, and there was no longer any sea. I saw the holy city, new Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God, made ready like a bride adorned for her husband. I heard a loud voice proclaiming from the throne: 'Now at last God has his dwelling among them! He will dwell among them and they shall be his people, and God himself will be with them. He will wipe every tear from their eyes; there shall be an end to death, and to mourning and crying and pain; for the old order has passed away!'

The importance of newness as a religious concept is particularly significant in the New Testament. According to Harrisville (1960: 13) “[t]he concept of newness involves a qualitatively as well as a temporally new time process.” Yet its two basic features time and quality are not to be considered as a simple chronology or a timeless property, respectively. Rather these two fundamental characteristics of newness are conceptually interwoven. Harrisville (*ibid.*) distinguishes between four distinctive features which determine the New Testament meaning of newness. The first two properties, **continuity** and **contrast**, are closely linked since they both relate to the eschatological goal of the union of the earthly and heavenly worlds. Thus **continuity** finds expression in the union of the two worlds, incarnated by the arrival of Jesus Christ. On the other hand, this fulfillment of the eschatological goal represents a **contrast** to the world as it was before, which is now radically different in character. The thrust of newness is aimed at this one goal – the fulfillment of God’s redemptive activity which is an opportunity offered once in the shape of *kairos*. Consequently newness also implies **finality**, the third distinctive characteristic. The renewal made possible by the eschatology is non-recurrent. This final renewal cannot be repeated because the believer has been placed within the last and final period of the eschatological process which advances towards its goal (cf. Harrisville 1960: 17). Perhaps the most significant property for today’s understanding of newness, particularly with respect to its meaning in American political discourse, is its **dynamics**. The dynamic nature of newness is not to be seen as a kind of catalyst or locomotive, assisting the dynamic movement; rather newness is itself the dynamic force which initiates the activity. In the Apocalypse, in particular, the momentum of newness

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<sup>156</sup> This passage is quoted from *The New English Bible* (1970).

unfolds as stages in the divine purpose. The scenes and events appear to occur due to some inherent necessity and thus do not necessarily proceed in a strict chronological order which would be transparent to everyone. Instead, their interpretation relies on an external authority, a seer who has a view of the whole, a kaleidoscopic view of the progression although he might not be able to interfere with the process itself. Harrisville (1960: 19f.) summarizes the dynamic aspect of newness as follows:

The intrinsic energy or dynamic of the new is first of all revealed in the fact that the new asserts itself over against the old and actually crowds it out of existence. It is also revealed in the power of the new to perpetuate itself in contrast to the old which is transitory. The new possesses the power of renewal in contrast to the old which has the tendency to remain as it is.

This dynamic conception of newness appears to stand or fall by its strictly linear temporal progression. Yet the temporality combines the human one-time cycle of becoming, which for the human experiencer is linear, with the sacred time of being, in which there is no end and no beginning.<sup>157</sup> From what we can see, the *Revelation* presents decay and newness as tightly interwoven; more precisely, however, newness is substitutional, it is the successor of the old which “has passed away.” When applied to the end point of a historical process, in both sacred and secular history, newness has successfully replaced any existing order.

All in all, newness plays a vital role in this redemptive history. The Puritan voyage across the Atlantic Ocean is conceptualized as the Jewish exodus, in which God promised a new heaven and a new earth. Accordingly, the metaphorical mapping THE SETTLEMENT OF NORTH AMERICA BY THE ENGLISH SETTLERS IS THE MOVEMENT OF THE JEWS FROM EGYPT TO THE PROMISED LAND (Kövecses 2002: 61) is deeply entrenched in social cognition.

Even though this metaphor is operative, the newness of the experience as the chosen people did not prevent the settlers from having aggravating experiences. The underlying covenant theology (see chapter 3) modeled each stage of redemptive history in terms of an event, a trial or a crisis. Renewal thus describes an upward movement, comparable to a stepped pyramid, for instance. Mastering one such test case is the analogue of climbing another step. As mentioned earlier, image-schematic verticality frequently serves the purpose of evaluation. Overcoming these crises would be understood as an improvement in general terms or, more specifically, as moral reform. Conceptually, these activities are coded in the event structure metaphor, particularly in terms of the mappings DIFFICULTIES ARE IMPEDIMENTS and PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS (see below).

At the beginning of this sub-chapter, newness was introduced as an integral part of social practice. However, newness in modernity has evolved into a shibboleth characterizing the climate of opinion of a historical period and feeding into the nation-building process of the American republic. Interestingly, the perception of living in an era of newness is not simply a naïve concept; indeed the cultural strategem invoked by Derrida bears a systematic pattern. In

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<sup>157</sup> The exact wording taken from the Revelation (21, 5-6) reads: “Then he who sat on the throne said, ‘Behold! I am making all things new!’ [...] I am the Alpha and the Omega, the beginning and the end.” The distinct temporal metaphors, differentiated as linear, cyclical and spiral, were introduced at the beginning of chapter 3.

a straightforward way, human cognition relies on the dialectical dynamics of *old* and *new*, conservation and innovation, both of which are subject to temporality. This dependency on time makes culture an open, adaptive system (e.g. Fleischer 2001). Prior to investigating the impact of newness on American political culture more closely, I will treat the conceptual structure of the linguistic unit *new* in depth.

## 4.2 The Conceptual Structure of Newness

The elaboration of the conceptual structure of newness rests upon the basic assumption that linguistic structure encodes and externalizes conceptual structure. This approach is reflected in the outline of this chapter, beginning with the study of the semantic structure of the lexical item *new*, which is to be followed by an exploration of the frame-like structure of NEW as a concept.<sup>158</sup> Frame will be used interchangeably with domain in the sense of “a body of knowledge that organizes related concepts” (Evans/Green 2006: 190). It will be argued that the category NEW is structured metaphorically and is represented by the mapping NEWNESS IS A SUBEVENT OF MOTION in the conceptual system. Its conceptual domain thus exhibits a large degree of contiguity to both temporal and spatial cognition; similarly, its structure suggests that it may also be embedded within the event structure metaphor (ESM). In other words, *newness* as a lexical concept reflects a semantic structure that is associated with a linguistic form or lexical item, whereas the conceptual domain of NEWNESS represents knowledge structures that cohere with other knowledge structures or domains.

### 4.2.1 Newness as a Lexical Concept

I understand a lexical concept to be a concept that is “encoded in a language-specific format” (Evans 2007: 31), emphasizing however that a lexical concept and its assigned sub-senses provide significant cues for the underlying conceptual structure.<sup>159</sup> The adjective *new* is highly

<sup>158</sup> The *OED* defines *newness* as “the state, fact, or quality of being new,” derived from the adjective *new*. In the text above, the switch from the reified noun *newness* to the adjective *new* does not occur at random. First and foremost, the noun is used to refer to the experience or phenomenon of the new in a generic way, which is why it is the most appropriate form in which to describe newness as an abstract concept. However, the noun is rather infrequent; in contrast, the adjective is far more frequent, since the idea of newness, as will be shown in the analysis below, rarely denotes an abstraction for its own sake. As its conceptual structure suggests, it attaches itself to other concepts in specifying its particulars. Second, there are also terminological reasons for the preference of NEWNESS to denote the concept at the generic level. The mapping NEWNESS IS A SUBEVENT OF MOTION is the analogue to CHANGE IS MOTION or TIME IS MOTION on the one hand and, on a different level, to HAPPINESS IS FLUID IN A CONTAINER or VIRTUE IS UP, the variant of GOOD IS UP (cf. Kövecses 2002: 86). Thus there is a tendency to phrase the metaphorical mappings by virtue of nouns apart from the image-schematic concepts that occur in consistent sets of opposites.

<sup>159</sup> The term concept is subject to diverse, contradictory uses. Traditionally, concepts are mental descriptions of the meaning of a linguistic unit linked to a specific sound pattern and are thus the equivalent of meaning. Concepts contain information for specific kinds of entities, i.e. categories (cf. Löbner 2002: 20). This information permits us to distinguish between different kinds of entities, which is usually referred to as categorization. The process of categorization is pivotal to the interface of perception and cognition. Perception means that we perceive an entity as an entity of a kind, in other words as belonging to a particular category. The actual categorization is performed by the cognitive system on the condition that the category concerned is available. From this angle, concepts are representatives of categories because they are the mental

polysemous, i.e. it has several related meanings or meaning variants. In traditional accounts of polysemy (e.g. Cruse 2000, Löbner 2002) these multiple meanings are assumed to be realized as distinct, established senses and sub-senses by the linguistic context which acts as an operational constraint. This means that they pre-exist language use as ready-mades with clear-cut sense boundaries.

In Cognitive Linguistics (CL), however, the study of polysemy extends beyond word-meaning. In agreement with the Generalization Commitment of CL, which refutes the modular view of the organization of linguistic structure, the phenomenon of polysemy is operative on all levels of language. Therefore, “polysemy reveals important fundamental commonalities between lexical, morphological and syntactic organization” (Evans 2007: 163). Moreover, this study conceives of polysemy as the construal of sense boundaries. Croft/Cruse (2004: 109) understand polysemy “as a matter of isolating different parts of the total meaning potential of a word in different circumstances,” which results in delimiting a sense unit. Crucially, the authors posit sense boundaries as fairly sharp while the actual boundary construal is influenced by contextual factors on the discourse level and thus occurs at the moment of use. Interestingly, Croft/Cruse (2004: 110) do not consider “the meaning potential of a word [...] a uniform continuum: the interpretations tend to cluster in groups showing different degrees of salience and cohesiveness, and between the groups there are relatively sparsely inhabited regions.” Crucially, the sense units in the shape of individual clusters or sub-clusters are not to be understood as totally distinct and pre-existing boundaries; rather, these boundaries are realized on the discourse level, when the linguistic unit is deployed.

Based on this understanding of polysemy, Figure 4 below represents the meaning potential of the adjective *new*, whose potential interpretations cluster around two major groups.<sup>160</sup> Thus, newness can be understood in terms of time and origin or in terms of kind and quality. Crucially, the representation in Figure 4 is not to suggest that the various senses and sub-senses are clear-cut units of meaning. Rather, the capitalized, bold descriptions serve as ‘points of access’ to encyclopedic knowledge structures. In keeping with the basic tenets of cognitive semantics, meaning representation is invariably encyclopedic.

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representations necessary for assigning category membership. Therefore, when we refer to lexical concepts, they constitute only a subset of the concepts inherent in the conceptual system. Due to the centrality of categorization in cognitive semantics the term concept is frequently avoided (in favor of conceptual domain or domain for short in order to designate the “knowledge of any coherent segment of experience” Kövecses 2002: 247), which leads to terminological imprecision since it equates the linguistic-semantic system with the conceptual system (Evans 2004a: 6). In discussing patterns of temporal cognition, Evans (2004a; also Evans/Green 2006: 79) distinguishes between primary and secondary lexical concepts in order to highlight the differences between potentially universal experiences (primary concepts) and those that are likely to be more culture-specific in the process of concept elaboration.

<sup>160</sup> The semantic scope of the adjective *new* was compiled on the basis of the *Oxford English Dictionary* and the *Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English*. I identified and arranged the clusters on the basis of the meaning paraphrases provided in the dictionary entries; this specific structure is also informed by what has been found out about the concept’s history and cultural indexicality.




Figure 4: The meaning potential of NEWNESS

For example, we have some knowledge regarding succession, which may sometimes imply that an entity is replaced by another, for instance when one person succeeds another in an official job; in other contexts, it designates a series in which the old and new form part of a sequence, i.e. there is a chronological order in which two entities occur. In this case, the old and the new exist side by side or the new builds on the old, for instance, in a series of related events or actions in which the foregoing event serves as the basis for the one that follows.



Newness subdivides into two major semantic sub-sets. First, newness can be interpreted on the basis of our conventional knowledge and our experience of the passing of time and the temporality of human events and actions. From this angle the representation of the meaning of newness ranges from the concept of **BEGINNING** and **SUCCESSION** on the one hand to ‘points of access’ such as **LOCATION** and **ORIGINALITY** on the other, denoting an entity not previously in existence. Apart from the shared meaning components clustering around time and origin, in its locative sense, most of the sub-senses of **BEGINNING** may be paraphrased as ‘pioneering’. These may denote an entity that either has not previously existed at all, for example, “the baby” or “the railway station” in Figure 4, or has not been known to exist as in the example sentence featuring “the oilfields.” Alternatively, newness in the sense of beginning marks a fresh start that either discontinues what has been there before or functions as a caesura of some description (as in “new life”).

This approximates another sub-sense, namely **SUCCESSION**, in which the caesura expresses a difference from, if not contrast to the earlier status quo. In Figure 4, the “new modesty” does not necessarily constitute a modification of an ‘old’ modesty in the sense of an improvement as is the case in the second meaning cluster, i.e. newness in terms of kind and quality. Instead, the contrast to the preceding type of modesty is emphasized, also implying that the new and old modesty are juxtaposed (for competitiveness or comparison) rather than substituted. Nevertheless, newness as succession may also imply the substitution of one entity with another as illustrated by the ‘new girlfriend’ example.

When studied in isolation or illustrated by individual example sentences only, the sub-clusters identified may appear to be overlapping. On the discourse level, however, only one sense unit is foregrounded by a particular context. This becomes evident when we look at the example sentence provided for the meaning of newness as sequence: “Have you got the new edition of the dictionary?” Although a new edition is also different from the preceding one and might eventually replace it, the interpretation as sequence is likely to override that of substitution for it also relates to the continuity of the series.

Another point of access is **ORIGINALITY**, which branches out into two sub-senses. Newness may indicate an entity’s originality, its occurring for the first time but with a lasting impact on a particular field, for instance, the “new acoustic aid” that emerged as something not previously possible and thereby serving as a benchmark for future entities of the same category, similar to a prototype. Newness may also occur as a singular idea, something that can only be measured with difficulty, at least from a present perspective, against the things to come and offers no ground for comparison with previous occurrences of the same kind.

Finally, newness also relates to the concept **LOCATION** as exemplified by the senses of provenance and foundation. In the former sense, newness indicates the location of an entity within a particular system of reference. If understood in terms of provenance, the position from which the new entity derives or issues is denoted, witness the example sentence “He comes from a new breed of politicians.” More literally, ‘new’ is also frequently used to qualify geographical terms. It is a regular feature in place names but also to mark recently implemented social or political organizations and structures. The example “The city of New

York was founded on the mouth of the river Hudson” illustrates this concrete sense of location.

From the preceding descriptions of the cluster ‘newness in terms of time and origin’, we derive that the boundaries between the various sub-senses appear to draw on temporal expressions, or more generally, a temporal frame of reference. It is virtually impossible to paraphrase the meanings of ‘new’ without any reference to time, which manifests itself in three distinct ways. The temporal frame provided is specified as ‘a short time ago’, ‘recently’ or ‘not known etc. before now’, which means that newness connotes with (a point of time in) the recent past. Moreover, the temporality of newness finds expression in a provisional standstill of temporal progression, thereby marking the here and now as the present moment of speaking. In establishing a situative context of ‘before-and-after’ or ‘then-and-now’, newness introduces a comparison between something of present importance on the grounds of something already in existence. Equally, this (implicit) comparison may reveal that a change has occurred.

Prior to drawing any important conclusions let us investigate the second major cluster according to which the meaning of newness is processed in terms of kind and quality. Figure 4 depicts its five sub-clusters as development, innovation, reinvigoration, unusualness and unfamiliarity. Crucially, all knowledge structures of this cluster relate to category elaborations by virtue of intrinsic categorial properties. For example, development may be understood as changing what is already there rather than inventing something; similarly, improvement may be paraphrased as changing something already in existence for the better. Thus the pattern appears to be more of the same kind. Frequently the meanings of the adjective represented within this cluster denote recategorized properties, i.e. ‘new’ relates to the manner, situation or reality status of a given entity. Moreover, many of the points of access listed appear to be derived from metaphorical extensions of the temporal meaning of ‘new’. For example, ‘new’ in the sense of ‘inexperienced’ results from the fact that a person young in years has not lived long enough to accumulate the amount of knowledge typical of an older person.

Newness frequently implies a certain degree of momentum that can be understood as **DEVELOPMENT**. In the example “He became a new person after his mother’s death,” the development does not automatically bring about a qualitative enhancement, as would be the case in the sub-sense of **IMPROVEMENT**. (The “new man” in the example sentence can certainly be considered as a ‘reformed character’, implying not only an alteration but also a switch over to a preferable category). Thus newness describes a development according to which an entity evolves into another, often superior category, which is also the case for the following two sub-clusters. Equating newness with modernity on the one hand and progress on the other is central to this aspect of newness. In both cases newness represents the advances of the human condition. Modernity and progress are highly valorized concepts in themselves and are also an integral part of newness. Similarly, newness stands for **INNOVATION** in many contexts and is thus associated with positive connotations. Utterances such as “the new information is now

available” stand for epistemological gain, of which the phrase ‘to broaden one’s horizon’ is paradigmatic. Similarly, the first-time discovery of scientific evidence is also evaluated positively in terms of both kind and quality. In addition the alterations described as new, for example in the sentence “The new spirituality is the key to a satisfying life,” may also create a sense of authenticity in that newness opens up opportunities not previously encountered and hence perceived as more ‘real’. All these sub-senses are in fact indicative of qualitative refinement which, in our culture, is a key asset of social development. Unlike the sense of originality above, it is naïve to assume that newness cannot be repeated. The notion of **REINVIGORATION** implies that newness is not simply repeated but is specifically altered in the process. This process in which a foregoing event, action etc. is imitated to reproduce the positive effect it once had, can be referred to as replication. This implies some variation of a prototypical model or behavioral pattern, which may also be viewed as a renewal of another entity. For instance, in the sentence “The company took a new start” the process of starting anew may be regarded as re-enacting a known activity while actively working on previous knowledge and thus modifying it. Moreover, renewal also involves a refreshment of something already in existence, like ‘the company’ mentioned in the example sentence.

The new may also represent a complete departure from existing patterns or habits to the extent that the new activity is considered as pioneering. From a positive viewpoint, newness manifests itself as an exception or specialty when activities or events are compared to the conventionality of those preceding them. However, entities already in existence may also create a sense of security that can be jeopardized by the emergence of newness and thus generate an atmosphere of unfamiliarity. Here, newness is associated with strangeness in more negative terms. In this respect, the familiar security of things known may be perceived as a potential threat to what has been known, established etc. Perhaps in more neutral terms the newness of something is experienced as a sharp contrast to what has been before, as exemplified by the sentence “We went to Africa which was quite a new world to us.”

Wrapping up the discussion so far, we may conclude that to a larger degree than in the first cluster newness relates to change. The importance of change suggests a highly dynamic conception of newness, in which it is either the cause or the effect of change. Yet this change is not neutral as to a before-and-after; rather newness is to be grasped as a qualitative change, chiefly in the sense of improvement or enhancement of those entities already in existence. Even in those instances in which *new* is construed as synonymous with ‘renewal’, the notion of change is tangible. Renewal does not merely constitute a replication of an entity, event or action; it builds on this previous experience and includes it in order to reach an improved version of it. This is the analogue to climbing another step in a layered pyramid model.

The impetus inherent in the meaning potential of newness also entails another important issue: the awareness viz. perception of movement, of things becoming different. In other words, we need an entity, an observer-experiencer or an abstract entity such as another event, action or past point of time, which functions as a point of reference. It is only then that the changed situation can be perceived and hence evaluated as such.

Functionally the assessment of a given context or situation is performed by a so-called deictic centre in discourse.<sup>161</sup> The deictic centre performs a vital function in that it represents a vantage point that enables the participants to assess a given situation.<sup>162</sup> Thus both location and time are important cornerstones of the conceptual domain of NEWNESS which will be further elaborated below.

Apart from the interrelatedness of newness (as change) and time, the relational character of newness manifests itself in its polysemy. As the meaning of newness can only be defined in relation to other concepts, most of which are temporal and/or spatial in nature, it is also likely to be contiguous to or even overlap with these concepts. One such concept is ‘old’ whose meaning is directly impinged on by ‘new’. While in lexical semantics ‘old’ and ‘new’ are occasionally treated as antonyms, their actual relationship is not straightforward, neither does it preexist the construal of the sense boundaries of either ‘old’ or ‘new’ in discourse (see discussion of category membership in chapter 1). Thus antagonism is discursively constructed, i.e. whether or not ‘old’ and ‘new’ are in fact antonyms depends on their discourse meanings.

In the American context, the construal of *new* and *old* does not occur in a mechanical way although there are patterns of construal that can be identified. Chapter 3 illustrated the tight interweaving of newness and American political culture. Deployed in discourse, the meanings of ‘old’ and ‘new’ are represented in a variety of ways, ranging from their construal as antonyms, their juxtaposition or even partial synonymy. Consequently, in American political discourse ‘old’ and ‘new’ are not necessarily antonyms. While it is true that the new somehow builds on the existing, it does not necessarily bring down “the old dragon” (cf. Derrida 1990). The question of whether or not ‘new’ and ‘old’ are constructed as opposites is determined by discourse constraints. Similarly, the evaluation of ‘old’ and ‘new’ is also subject to discourse constraints. Whereas ‘old’ could simply denote what is already in existence without explicitly valorizing the entity in question — this construal foregrounds ‘old’ as a temporal category —, it may equally be associated with knowledge, authority and experience, all of which could be interpreted as positive.

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<sup>161</sup> Perhaps the notion of ‘deictic center’ is misleading here when referring to concepts such as newness that appear to be based, at least partially, on movement. Originally, the term deictic center (Levinson 1983: 63f.) is used to pinpoint the speaker, the central time of speaking and the central location, i.e. the speaker’s location at the moment of speaking, thus offering an ‘egocentric’ perspective on discourse events. Recently, this egocentric view has been subject to critique in order to accommodate the deictic theory within dynamic construals of viewpoint in discourse. For example, Stockwell (2000) explores the possibilities of deictic projection in narrative discourse, in which deictic expressions are ‘shifted’ by characters in relation to contextual frames. Accordingly, traditional person deixis is projected as perceptual deixis in discourse (Stockwell 2000: 24). Compounding the drawbacks of egocentricity (as in Bühler’s ‘speaker origo’) the implication of a stationary deictic center weighs heavier in this present context. With respect to the perception of time, the present time may or may not coincide with the “canonical observer” (Lakoff 1993: 217), and what is more the deictic center can be stationary or moving as we shall see below.

<sup>162</sup> In classical rhetoric this particular moment is referred to as *kairos*, according to which the moment of speaking is framed as the opportune moment for an event to occur. This moment of *kairos* is a convenient discourse strategy, according to which a speaker constructs a given point in time as an outstanding moment selected to give a bias to the interpretation of what is happening. Importantly, this point of reference is provisional, symbolizing an interim peak as of now, although it is frequently devised as having some authority of its own.

## 4.2.2 Newness as Embodied Experience

Having outlined newness as a lexical concept, I will now elaborate on the conceptual domain of NEWNESS. Kövecses (2002: 247f.) defines conceptual domain as “our conceptual representation, or knowledge, of any coherent segment of experience. [...] This knowledge involves both the knowledge of basic elements that constitutes a domain and knowledge that is rich in detail.” Typically, conceptual domains are not operative in an isolated way but connect to other conceptual domains, which is the case in metaphorically structured cognitive processing. From the discussion of newness as a lexical concept we may conclude that the knowledge structures stored for the conceptual category NEWNESS are dependent on other basic domains of experience such as SPACE and MOTION on the one hand but also temporal cognition on the other. This chapter will explore how the domain of NEWNESS is modeled cognitively. The experience of newness — a cultural practice woven into the fabric of society — touches on fundamental aspects of human experience, that is, it is embodied experience grounded in temporal and spatial cognition. Time and space organize human experience in a fundamental way. In what follows I will demonstrate that newness, time, space and the event of change form a coherent segment of experience. In the process I will first explore both temporal and spatial cognition as well as the event structure metaphor (ESM) in great detail. Figure 8 below provides a survey of the conceptual domain NEWNESS, illustrating the coordinates necessary to outline the domain.

### 4.2.2.1 Temporal Cognition

Time is constitutive of human life not only in society but also in nature to the extent that all life is in time (cf. Luckmann 1991: 151). Yet when it comes to describing, let alone categorizing the phenomenon of time, the inescapability of time gives rise to many practical as well as conceptual difficulties, both of which highlight the socio-cultural determinacy of temporal categories. Time as a social category is conditioned by the cognitive models and frames available. The presence of these underlying knowledge structures is also the reason why temporal structure and organization appear to be ‘natural’ rather than learned behavior patterns. However, “temporal categories are [...] ready-made only from the point of view of any given individual born and socialized into a particular society in a particular epoch” (Luckmann 1991: 158).<sup>163</sup>

Another important aspect of the social nature of time is the awareness of temporal progression. The passing of time can be perceived on the individual and collective level. This historical consciousness, or historicity, “is a universal characteristic of human life in society” (Luckmann 1991: 164f.). Luckmann (ibid.) traces this historical consciousness back to the very

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<sup>163</sup> The fact that many cognitive models for time are deeply entrenched across linguistic and cultural boundaries is no counter-indication in this respect. This cross-linguistic ‘evidence’ simply accounts for the historicity of these models since they underlie conceptions of time that can be traced back to classical thinkers such as Aristotle or St Augustine. Due to the process of cultural transmission some temporal concepts have remained rather generic while others have undergone increasing specification. As it happens, temporal concepts, just like any other concept, are deployed by discourse; it is at this level that they are culturally informed.

heart of human interaction in society. The awareness of finitude, as he refers to it (*ibid.*: 165), provokes a variety of responses that are themselves constrained by a number of social determinants. On the one hand, the perception of change and boundaries is part of the “human fissure of time” (Luckmann *ibid.*: 165), which may be bridged by the repertoires of ‘historical’ genres, for example, narration and commemoration, that are available within a given society. On the other hand, the “social stock of knowledge” (Luckmann *ibid.*), entrenched by the socially constructed cognitive models available, also determines cultural practices in response to their historical discursivity.

However, it would be inappropriate to assume that historicity itself is not liable to socio-cultural cognitive modeling. On the contrary, the concept of time is as much a historical construct as it is a social one.<sup>164</sup> In addition, the dependency of time on a variety of influential factors has conventionally led to a distinction between several temporal categories. Castoriadis (1991: 38) distinguishes between the well known concepts of ‘subjective time’, ‘objective time’ and ‘time as such’. What is important, however, is his observation that time is inseparable from being. Society also corresponds to this type of being, which manifests itself as follows (cf. Castoriadis 1991: 49):

It [=society] creates, in each case, its own world, the world of social imaginary significations embodied in its particular institutions. This world — [...] — appears as the deployment of two receptacles, **social space and social time** [emphasis added], filled with objects organized according to relations, etc., and vested with meaning.

Thus social space and social time are the backbones of human interaction with the (physical) environment. Interestingly, Castoriadis draws an analogy between both entities and containers. This container view of space, and to a lesser degree, of time is highly pervasive and will be discussed below. Castoriadis elaborates on the important aspects of social time and space by making another important distinction. He (1991: 49) argues that social time and space are instituted in two interrelated ways. First, there is the concept of identitary (ensidic) time, which manifests itself in the calendrical organization of socio-cultural practices. Identitary time embodies socio-culturally important reference points and outlines the duration of important periods in the society’s history. This institution of time is marked by repetition, recurrence and equivalence. Second, Castoriadis introduces the notion ‘imaginary time’, implying that time in a given society is never a neutral medium. The ‘container’ of social time holds the coordination of socially significant activities. As a rule, imaginary time is endowed with meaning, or as Castoriadis (1991: 50) phrases it, “imaginary time is both significant time and time of signification.”

‘Imaginary time’, or as it has also been termed, collective imaginary or myth (see chapter 2) is a powerful tool which avoids, or at least cushions structural dislocation. Irrespective of the terminology chosen, the process that is operative is essentially temporally bounded. This

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<sup>164</sup> Hareven (1991: 168) points to an interesting shift of emphasis that occurred in the timing of life transitions in the US. She noticed that after World War II, life tended to be portrayed in fixed stages that would adhere to much stronger age norms than before. The notion of life stages is, of course, well known and can also be encountered in Shakespeare’s play *As you like it*, in which the well known passage containing “all the world’s a stage” also includes a reference to the seven stages of life (“his acts being seven ages,” II, 7).

implies, however, that (social) time is not only “time of signification,” but time that actually does something to the ‘original’ signification; it works with and acts on it. In other words, the discursive formations, which serve as the basis of identification and signification, are subject to time, and hence change resulting in discontinuities. Social imaginaries cushion the impact of this structural dislocation (cf. Laclau 1990: 61).<sup>165</sup>

Social time (and space) is also a functional feature in political discourse. Political discourse analysis is primarily concerned with laying bare the discontinuities and structural dislocations that expose the contingency of discursive formations. In social practice, however, the representation of socio-political realities occurs in a way suggesting that they are characterized by continuity and homogeneity. Due to the centrality of representation as a strategy of political language use, potential temporal discontinuities can be glossed over in synchronizing the temporal layers of a political text.

Despite the social grounding of time, there is an astonishing degree of broad similarities of temporal concepts across a large number of distinct languages. As temporal experience is a universal phenomenon, the basic conceptualizations of time are comparatively uniform. As we would expect, the more specific level exposes the cultural determinacy of time in terms of variant patterns of conceptualization across languages.

One recurrent pattern, however, is the conceptualization of time in terms of motion; virtually all temporal concepts are elaborated in terms of motion, which can be traced back to Aristotle’s well-known definition of time, which is adapted from Castoriadis (1991: 42): “Time is the number of movements according to the before and after” (219b 1-2).<sup>166</sup> Although time itself is not a physical entity that can be measured, Aristotle’s conception is not counter-intuitive. In fact, there is some empirical evidence for the perceptual reality of temporal experience, i.e. that temporal cognition is indeed computable.

Our awareness of time emerges from the process of perceiving and from the properties of our perceptual apparatus. It is a consequence, ultimately, of the various ‘timing mechanisms’ in the brain that give rise to a range of perceptual moments, which in turn underpin perceptual processing. It follows that time enters into all human experience, since it is fundamental to the way in which perceptual processes operate. (Evans/Green 2006: 78)

Motion is a basic sensory experience that provides a concrete basis for metaphorical mappings. Consequently, motion is a highly pervasive source domain for conceptual metaphors and will be discussed in some detail in the section on spatial cognition below. Meanwhile I will explore the conceptualizations of time as far as they have been identified.

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<sup>165</sup> More precisely, social imaginaries originate from myths which have proved capable of neutralizing social dislocations. In doing so, they act as boundaries that structure a given domain (Laclau 1990: 64). Myths not only predate these imaginaries but they arise from the very existence of dislocation, in that dislocation necessitates the construction of new domains of representation.

<sup>166</sup> Castoriadis (1991: 42f.) specifies that Aristotle’s definition has been frequently misinterpreted. In his view, Aristotle’s conception of movement does not only involve local movement but change in general. In other words: time is one of the essential determiners of the movement. Thus without time, movement and change could not be measured.

Evans's (2004a) study constitutes the most comprehensive account of temporal cognition to date. While it is impossible to survey all of the issues raised, I will draw attention to a number of aspects germane to this present study.

Evans (2004a, 2004b; also Evans/Green 2006: 78f.) identifies two levels of organization for temporal experience. The first level relates to lexical concepts, i.e. temporal expressions of time, each of which has its specific meaning as represented by the lexical unit. The second level of organization relates to cognitive models for time, which serve as the basis for what Evans (2004a) terms "concept elaboration".<sup>167</sup> Evans's approach to the study of word meaning is based on the assumption that the linguistic evidence available through the analysis of lexical concepts, i.e. their senses and sub-senses, only represents a part of the knowledge structures that inhere in the conceptual system. Nonetheless it is possible to elaborate the conceptual structure on the basis of the distinct senses of a lexical concept, hence the English linguistic unit *time*. Evans (2004b: 15) identifies "eight distinct lexical concepts conventionally associated with the lexical item *time*." Prior to investigating some of them more closely, another crucial distinction should be mentioned. Evans (2004a) distinguishes between primary lexical concepts and secondary concepts of time. The former are phenomenological temporal experiences and thus constitute fundamental cognitive abilities that enter into virtually all aspects of perceptual processing and cognitive evaluation (cf. Evans 2004a: 141). In contrast, the latter are derived from socio-cultural experience, which makes them more complex in concept elaboration. In what follows, I will briefly introduce the primary and secondary lexical concepts of time.

The four primary lexical concepts of time are constituted by the duration, moment, event and instance senses of time. The most central sense is the **duration sense** of time, which describes an interval whose duration can be assessed. Typically, the interval is marked off by two boundary events, the onset and the offset as two identifiable, discrete events (cf. Evans 2004a: 108). The concept is elaborated in terms of the perceived quality of experience, i.e. on the basis of highly subjective criteria. As a result, time may be perceived as passing more slowly than usual, which is a case of protracted duration, or else time is experienced as proceeding more quickly than would be expected, hence an instance of temporal compression (cf. Evans 2004a: 115f.). The **moment sense** provides for a conceptualization of time as discrete moments. While this lexical concept of time may be understood as embedded within a given temporal interval, it typically designates a point of time without any reference to its duration. This concept is frequently elaborated in terms of deictic motion, i.e. motion that presupposes a particular deictic centre with respect to which the motion takes place (cf. Evans 2004a: 124). In the **event sense**, time is conceptualized with reference to a specific event. It

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<sup>167</sup> Evans (2004a: 93f.) proposes three criteria for determining the distinct senses of the English noun *time*. First, the semantic criterion determines that in order to qualify as a distinct sense of time it has to carry meaning that is not encountered in other senses of the word. Second, the criterion of concept elaboration relates to "the selectional or collocational restrictions that apply to the lexeme *time*" (Evans 2004a: 93). Accordingly, time is frequently elaborated in terms of motion. Third, the grammatical criterion encompasses the subcategorization frames of the noun *time*. This principle states the grammatical properties inherent in a particular, distinct lexical concept.



indicates a specific referential point that is embedded in an ongoing sequence of events. The event sense is typified by so-called boundary events that constitute beginnings or endings. Interestingly, “a new experience often results from the motion of objects towards us, and indeed our own motion to particular objects and locations. In this way, occurrences are often the result of ego-directed motion, or self- or other-propelled motion towards a particular location/object” (Evans 2004a: 136). The **instance sense** relates to an instance of a particular event, activity, process or state (cf. Evans 2004a: 131ff.). Temporal events can be enumerated as they are perceived as instances of one and the same event.

The secondary lexical concepts of time include the matrix, agentive, measurement-system and commodity senses of time. The **matrix sense** is based on Newton’s notion of ‘absolute time’, prompting a conceptualization of time as an independent and unbounded experience. Time functions as a temporal matrix on the basis of which all other events occur. According to Evans (ibid.: 142) the matrix sense occupies a salient and significant position in the English-speaking culture, constituting the temporal framework deployed to measure other events such as change, for instance: “It serves to reveal change, and hence manifest events, by virtue of its ‘equable’ motion, which forms the backdrop or reference frame against which all else can be measured” (Evans 2004a: 144). Crucially, due to its inherent motion the matrix sense of time helps to organize temporal events which are sequenced in the order of their occurrence. Resulting from the ongoing process of temporal progression, the matrix sense of time prompts a conceptualization of time that carries new events along with it, thereby bringing them into being and into the focus of attention. Thus the matrix sense of time accounts for the conception of change; as such, it is in many ways similar to the temporal model above of becoming identified in the context of the cycles of American national history (see chapter 3). The strong impact of motion on both the concept elaboration and the semantic criterion approximates this lexical concept of time to metaphorical concepts such as CHANGE IS MOTION, which will be discussed below.

The **agentive sense** of time extends the matrix sense in that it represents an advanced degree of ‘reification’. The agentive sense “relates to an entity which is conceived not just as serving to manifest change, but in addition, as one which actually brings about and hence causes change” (Evans 2004a: 159). Predictably, this lexical concept of time foregrounds various instances of agency, chiefly human agency in the shape of personifications. Here time refers to an entity that has some bearing on human existence and our environment. In fact, the personifications proposed by Evans (ibid.) are almost identical to the conceptual metaphors detected by Lakoff/Turner (1989) in poetic language (see below). To a degree, the agentive sense can be assumed to derive from the matrix sense of time for it also implicates agentivity. According to the matrix sense, our experience of new events is ongoing, hence the conventional imagery of a river flowing, which replaces old water with new in a continuous way (cf. Evans 2004a: 166). This way, time is understood as an agent-like cause that carries along new experiences until they are in focus. Therefore, time is frequently personified, which thus highlights the agentive sense. Yet human or human-like agency is not the only cause to bring about a changed, hence new situation. Natural, at times even supernatural, forces may

also account for changes and novelties, for example, the worn metaphors ‘winds of change’ or the ‘ghosts of the past’.

The **measurement-system sense** originates from the correlation of external patterns of periodically recurrent behavior and our experience of duration. This reading is analogous to periodicity, which facilitates the organization of human experience. The calendrical, cyclical or chronometrical organization of temporal experience within a given discourse community is the paradigmatic case of this lexical concept. But also on the personal level this sense of time assists in coordinating recurrent activities. Finally, the **commodity sense** of time has a high degree of indexicality in Western capitalist societies. To a larger extent than the other secondary lexical concepts this is chiefly a socio-cultural product. The concept is elaborated in terms of a physical entity which is quantifiable (cf. Evans 2004a: 179). This reading is also evidenced by a number of metaphorical mappings which will be introduced below.

Evans (2004a, 2004b) derives three major cognitive models from the patterns of the conceptualization of time as evidenced by the eight distinct lexical concepts. In fact, there are two basic models for time, a time-based model and an ego-based model, which subdivides into a moving time model and a moving ego model (cf. Evans/Green 2006: 84ff.). This distinction is based on the assumption that the location of a temporal event is interpreted differently in terms of the underlying model used. The **moving time model** presupposes a static ego, for example an experiencer who serves as a time anchor since his/her position determines the here and now of speaking. In contrast, temporal moments and events are conceptualized as objects in motion, representing the passage of time, for these ‘objects’ usually move towards the ego and beyond it into the past while the ego itself is located facing the future. The **moving ego model**, however, takes as its starting point a movable ego in a ‘timescape’ that is construed as stationary and spatial (i.e. three dimensional). Hence the ego is able to move through time, mostly towards specific temporal moments in the guise of locations or bounded regions within this temporal space. Within this model we recognize the universal metaphorical mapping TIME AS SPACE.<sup>168</sup> Interestingly, this cognitive model of time is linked to events as locations as opposed to the conceptualization of events as objects in motion in the moving time model. This is a relevant distinction for a number of reasons. First, the subjectivity of temporal experience, particularly with respect to the passing of time, suggests that our experience of time is less abstract than is commonly assumed. A case in point is our perception of duration, which may be grasped as “protracted duration” or “temporal compression” (see above). While it is true that the distinction between subjective time and objective time may account for this difference in perception (cf. Radden 2004: 225), the different focus is more likely to be knowledge-based, i.e. it is conceptual rather than perceptual.

Last but not least, the **time-based model** relates to temporal sequence as independent of an ego or human experiencer. Establishing a temporal order of earlier-later one temporal

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<sup>168</sup> There is considerable cross-linguistic evidence for the universality of the conceptualization of TIME AS SPACE as well as its irreversibility, i.e. time is conventionally metaphorized as space while space is never understood in terms of time (cf. Radden 1997: 431).

event is understood in relation to another. “This model integrates those temporal lexical concepts which can be conceptualized as discrete. That is, this model relates to specific temporal events, moments etc. and does not involve integration of the matrix sense” (Evans 2004b: 23). The in-tandem alignment implies that the model is determined by the position of a temporal event in relation to another temporal event (cf. Evans *ibid.*: 24).

Apart from these patterns in the conceptualization of time there are a number of conceptual metaphors that have been identified in the research literature. Some of them relate more or less directly to the lexical concepts and the cognitive models elaborated by Evans. These conceptual tools by virtue of which we conceptualize time can be classified on the basis of their pervasiveness in discourse. While personifications of time prevail in poetic language, the construal of time in ordinary language is subject to an inherent duality, which gives rise to two seemingly contradictory conceptualizations of time. Alternatively, there are a number of conceptual metonymies that are either action-centered or motion-based, which, however, form a marginal category.<sup>169</sup>

Lakoff/Turner (1989: 35-49) explore the conceptualizations of time in poetic language, which chiefly occur through personifications, for example

TIME IS A CHANGER  
 TIME IS A THIEF  
 TIME IS A REAPER  
 TIME IS A DEVOURER  
 TIME IS A DESTROYER  
 TIME IS AN EVALUATOR  
 TIME IS A PURSUER

Despite the apparent systematicity of these personifications, metaphorical expressions of time are subject to incoherence. The majority of our conceptualizations of time arise from the awareness of our finality and mortality. The passage of time may bring about unpredictable, inevitable *viz.* incomprehensible events whose impact on our lives is felt more or less severely. Mapping human qualities onto an abstract, nonhuman entity such as time helps us to understand the motivation behind the occurrence of temporal events as they are then the deeds of a human agent. Personifications are a form of ontological metaphor (cf. Kövecses 2002: 35). Ontological metaphors do not usually provide a richly structured source domain to be mapped onto the target concepts. Instead they establish a particular ontology without providing more detailed knowledge structures. For example, the general metaphor TIME IS A CHANGER is an instance of an ontological metaphor for it gives an ontological status to the passing of time that implicates some kind of change, which can be a transformation, progress,

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<sup>169</sup> Kövecses (2002) identifies the following metonymies of time. The metonymy TIME PERIOD OF ACTION FOR THE ACTION, for instance in the conversion “to summer (in Paris),” the season stands for the activity that typically occurs for this time of the year (cf. Kövecses 2002: 220). In another example sentence, “The 8:40 just arrived,” the underlying metonymy IS TIME OF MOTION FOR AN ENTITY INVOLVED IN THE MOTION (cf. Kövecses *ibid.*: 154).

growth, destruction, decay or disappearance. This general metaphor subsumes more specific metaphors that provide additional, more structured information about the kind of change that occurs. Accordingly, the metaphor *TIME IS A THIEF* relates to the brevity of life resulting from the velocity of temporal passage. Time takes away somebody's life or youth, which is conceived as a valuable possession. Similarly, the precious possession of life is plucked and harvested, as in *TIME IS A REAPER*, or it is simply eaten up as exemplified in the mapping *TIME IS A DEVOURER*. Alternatively, the passage of time may be experienced as a reassessment of values as in *TIME IS AN EVALUATOR*. Finally, the metaphor *TIME IS A PURSUER* implicates the inevitability of death. Analogous to an unwanted pursuer that inevitably catches you at some point, life's journey comes to an end. Importantly, we experience the passing of time as an exposure to a process with an inherent causality. In order to provide a motive for these temporal occurrences we attribute human agency to them.

According to Lakoff/Turner (1989), the more specific metaphors that are subsumed under the general metaphor *TIME IS A CHANGER* derive from other general or basic metaphors such as *EVENTS ARE ACTIONS*, *PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS* or *LIFE IS A JOURNEY*.<sup>170</sup> This is not unusual as ontological metaphors can be further specified by so-called structural metaphors; once an entity is given the ontological status of a person, for example, the conceptualization can be further qualified in attributing additional qualities to that person. A case in point is the conceptualization of American democracy as a passionate person (cf. Kövecses 1994).

Another basic metaphor that is connected to the personifications of time is the mapping *TIME IS MOTION*. Since the source domain of this metaphor, *MOTION*, provides a comparatively rich knowledge structure, this kind of metaphor is termed structural metaphor (e.g. Kövecses 2002: 33). The metaphorizations of time are subject to an inherent duality by virtue of location-object pairs. In the English language, there are two special instantiations of the conceptual metaphor *TIME IS MOTION*, which appears to be contradictory, resulting in two distinct varieties of front-back organization in embodied experience. This inconsistency is exemplified as follows (cf. Lakoff/Johnson 1980: 41):

In the weeks ahead of us ... **(future is ahead)** vs. In the following weeks ...  
**(future is behind)**

That's all behind us now ... **(past is behind)** vs. In the preceding weeks ... **(past is ahead)**

This well-known example serves to illustrate that, in English, there is an allegedly conflicting organization of temporal experience, in which the natural front-back orientation of people is reversed. The general case of *TIME PASSES US* appears to subdivide into two subcases (cf. Lakoff/Johnson 1980: 44). Lakoff (1993: 217ff.) elaborates on this duality in specifying two inconsistent submappings for the general metaphorical mapping *TIME PASSING IS MOTION*. Figure 5 illustrates these two subcases that are indicated as object and location duals:

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<sup>170</sup> Since these general mappings are also an integral part of the so-called event-structure metaphor, they will be discussed in this context below.




Figure 5: The time dual

First, time is conventionally structured in terms of the *TIME IS A MOVING OBJECT* metaphor,<sup>171</sup> according to which “moving objects generally receive a front-back orientation so that the front is in the direction of motion (or in the canonical direction of motion, so that a car backing up retains its front)” (Lakoff/Johnson 1980: 42). In this metaphor, the front-back orientation matches the natural or ‘canonical’ order, hence the future is moving towards us and we face it. This metaphorical mapping accounts for the alleged contradiction mentioned in the examples above. If time is understood as an object moving towards us, it implies that the future consists of several temporal events that appear one after the other. For example, in the expression “next week and the week following it” (ibid.: 43) future times appear in the shape of two distinct temporal events both of which lie in the future.

Second, there is another conventional metaphor in terms of which we conceptualize the passage of time, namely *TIME IS STATIONARY AND WE MOVE THROUGH IT* (the location dual). In this metaphor, time is standing still and we are moving. As we can see, Lakoff/Johnson’s (1980) classification of two pervasive metaphorical mappings of time can be accommodated within the ego-based cognitive model for time (cf. Evans 2004a, see above). Both conceive of motion in relation to an ego, which itself is either stationary or is in motion itself. By and large, the object dual corresponds with the moving-time model whereas the moving-ego model finds expression in the location dual.

These two basic metaphorizations of time have been subject to slight modifications and have occasionally been specified. Consequently, the moving time model is alternatively expressed by *TIME PASSING IS MOTION OF AN OBJECT* as in “the time for action has arrived” (Kövecses 2002: 33). The moving ego model, in which time is mapped as a stationary object, can also be further specified as, for example, *TIME PASSING IS AN OBSERVER’S MOTION OVER A LANDSCAPE*, which entails times being fixed locations and the observer moving with respect to

<sup>171</sup> The variant terminology goes back to the original sources. Frequently, the reformulations of the metaphorical mappings coincide with the specification of the correspondences between source domain and target domain. For reasons of convenience and consistency, the nomenclature of the original studies was adopted.

time, e.g. “there is going to be trouble along the road” (Kövecses 2002: 34). Alternatively, the relationship between TIME as the target domain and the source domain can be further detailed. A case in point is the metaphor TIME IS MOVEMENT THROUGH SPACE, in which there is a metonymic motivation for the conceptual metaphor. Accordingly, the source domain enables the target domain in that “without time, there is no movement” (Kövecses 2002: 158). While the metonymic relationship suggests itself, the argument provided is counter-intuitive. Instead, the metonymic motivation can be assumed to derive from the fact that there is no motion without void, hence space. Thus space is a precondition which enables movements, temporal or other. This is why space may also serve as the source domain for the target concept time, as exemplified by TIME AS SPACE (cf. Radden 2004).

While the spatialization of time is a popular misunderstanding (cf. Edwards 1967: 78), the distinction between time and space is regularly blurred in everyday discourse. Spatial orientation as embodied experience is conceptually linked to the experience of time in that there is neither spatial experience without time nor temporal experience without space (cf. Radden 1997: 428), giving some degree of subjectivity to temporal experience. The way we perceive motion in space, however, lends itself to different interpretations depending on whether the experience is grounded in long-term or short-term observation. Empirical studies conducted within the framework of perceptual psychology have demonstrated that short-term operations are assessed as moving temporal units while long-term observation of the passage of time is interpreted as change.

Moreover, spatial orientation is not merely an instance of moving along a one-dimensional timeline. Instead “we may take advantage of the conceptual richness inherent in the spatial domain” (Radden 2004: 225). Accordingly, the three-dimensional space offers three axes that may be used for temporal movement. Thus time may move up or down the vertical axis or else it may move in circles around us. To a degree, the rich knowledge structures are used in another metaphor, TIME IS A CONTAINER, identified in Hungarian (cf. Kövecses 2006: 189). According to Kövecses (*ibid.*), this metaphor entails the filling of the time container with actions, instantiated by the mapping ACTIONS ARE SUBSTANCES THAT GO INTO THE TIME CONTAINER.

Last but not least, there are also a number of metaphors that can be regarded as cultural products, in which time has a commodity sense in Evans’s terminology. The most basic and also most pervasive mapping is the metaphor TIME IS MONEY (Lakoff/Johnson 1980: 7ff.). In fact, the “metaphorical concepts TIME IS MONEY, TIME IS A RESOURCE, and TIME IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY form a single system based on subcategorization, since in our society money is a limited resource and limited resources are valuable commodities” (Lakoff/Johnson 1980: 9). As a result, (social) time has been shown to organize human experience in various respects, whereby a small number of cognitive models recur despite the polysemy of time as a lexical concept. While not all experiences of time are experiential in a phenomenological sense and need to be conceptualized in terms of richly structured domains, temporal cognition is an important cornerstone of our interaction with the world. Yet the conceptual system also

relates to embodied experience based on imagery rather than knowledge, which is the case in spatial cognition.

#### 4.2.2.2 Spatial Cognition

The human sensory-perceptual apparatus is specialized for assessing spatial experience. Despite the centrality of spatial orientation for the human conceptual system, the research interest in spatial concepts has only recently been reinvigorated (e.g. Levinson 2003). The focus on spatial cognition takes metaphor back to its roots. Etymologically, metaphor is a vehicle which as a conceptual tool transfers meaning from one location to another, thereby involving a re-description of ‘reality’. As regards conceptualization itself, “language is universally and infinitely spatial. Tropology is topology. Language abounds in spatial metaphors” (Shands 1999: 35). The ubiquity of spatial metaphors in language and conceptualization is relevant in three respects.

First, spatial metaphors serve orientation in space, which is why they are also referred to as ‘orientational metaphors’. The possibility of orientation, however, depends on the following two parameters, the locus of the experiencer and the socio-cultural context. The former is due to the experiential basis of human categorization; spatial metaphors can only be correctly interpreted when both the source and its position are stated without any doubt. As Lakoff/Johnson (1980: 15-18) point out, ‘orientational metaphors’ are not only based on specific physical and cultural experiences, but they cannot be dissociated from their source. Consequently, coordinate systems or frames of reference underlie spatial memory (cf. Levinson 2003: 2).<sup>172</sup> Accordingly, Levinson (ibid.) maintains that “possible points of reference can be objects and their sidedness as well as bodily coordinates.” While there is considerable variation in the patterns of the conceptualization of space across languages, spatial reasoning itself appears to abide by universal laws that are inherent in our humanness. Levinson (2003: 10) argues that all languages use the planes through the human body to give us our first grounds for intuitions about space in terms of ‘up and down’, ‘left and right’ and ‘back and front’.

The influence of the cultural environment on the conceptualization of space also manifests itself in the patterns of evaluation assigned to individual spatial concepts, for example connoting UP with a positive valuation while systematically associating DOWN with negativity. This pattern has been found to be deeply entrenched in what Lakoff/Johnson (1980) refer to as ‘Western culture’. More precisely, Kövecses (2006: 156f.) posits that primary or simple metaphors such as HAPPY IS UP have indeed a universal motivation:

The HAPPY IS UP metaphor is a generic-level metaphor. We know that metaphors tend to be universal or near-universal at this level. Specific-level metaphors tend to be different cross-linguistically. For example, a specific-level version of the

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<sup>172</sup> Levinson (2003: 3) differentiates between languages with relative frames of reference and languages with absolute frames of reference. For example, the former would conceive of the location of an object as being behind a truck whereas the latter would conceptualize the object as being north of the truck.

metaphor HAPPY IS UP in English is HAPPINESS IS BEING OFF THE GROUND.  
(Kövecses 2006: 157)

Needless to say, this mapping is not universally encountered. Second, spatial thinking directly correlates with our cognitive propensities. It is a well known characteristic of human cognitive processing that abstractions are conceptualized in terms of concrete entities. In folk-theoretical models of causation spatial metaphorical concepts underlie English prepositions that establish a causal relationship (cf. Radden 1983), which is particularly viable in a prototypical event causation. Here “the naïve observer tends to perceive a succession of events in terms of a cause-effect relationship” (Radden 1983: 5). Similarly, problem-solving strategies are frequently grounded in spatial reasoning. As Levinson (2003: 16) notes, one of the most fundamental ‘tricks’ of human cognition consists of converting non-spatial problems into spatial ones.<sup>173</sup> This becomes evident when looking at expressions that involve dealing with a tricky situation (my own examples):

to get one’s head *around* something  
to look *into* something  
to sort something *out*

Third, human spatial cognition is also conducive to establishing an ontological status beyond spatial orientation that is grounded in image-schematic concepts such as up-down, front-back, on-off etc. Our experience of physical objects and substances derives from embodied experience. “When things are not clearly discrete or bounded, we still categorize them as such, [...]. Human purposes typically require us to impose artificial boundaries that make physical phenomena discrete just as we are: entities bounded by surface” (Lakoff/Johnson 1980: 25). Accordingly, human bodily experience with space provides the ‘gestalt’ in terms of which unbounded entities are conceptualized.

The container metaphors are the most paradigmatic instance of ontological metaphors. According to Lakoff/Johnson (1980: 29) “we project our own in-out orientation onto other physical objects that are bounded by surfaces.” This container view applies to entities ranging from those with natural physical boundaries such as a building, pool or a courtyard to objects with less discrete physical boundaries such as the sea, desert or mountains. Another example is the visual field which is conventionally conceptualized as a container. Everything that is visible is understood as being inside the container; hence the metaphorical concept VISUAL FIELDS ARE CONTAINERS underlies the following example sentences (cf. Lakoff/Johnson 1980: 30):

I have him *in* sight.  
She’s *out of* sight now.

Interestingly, we also use ontological metaphors to conceptualize abstract, non-physical entities such as events, actions, activities or states. The corresponding metaphorizations are:

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<sup>173</sup> In addition, Levinson (2003:16) posits that spatial schemata are often used to encode myth, religion and cosmology. This is hardly surprising; one need only look at the spatial (but also temporal) grounding of biblical imagery. For example, Moses’ trip through the desert, Noah’s ark, the Garden of Eden as an enclosed space, the Babel tower and, last but not least, the Exodus. Imagery is also clearly achieved through spatial arrangements which serve as “symbolic maps” (Levinson *ibid.*) or, today, we would refer to them as mind maps. Visualization is encoded as rambling through a building, a technique also known as *ars memoria*.



EVENTS ARE PHYSICAL OBJECTS: They *went to* the race.

ACTIONS ARE PHYSICAL OBJECTS: He *gave* me a call.

ACTIVITIES ARE CONTAINER SUBSTANCES: She's very much *into* knitting.

STATES ARE CONTAINERS: They lived *in* fear.

Yet the container view of space is not uncontested. Shands (1999: 36) introduces two rival models to the container model of space. On the one hand, there is the “prime stuff view” of space which presupposes that space is an integral part of everything else, i.e. space is conceptualized on an experiential basis. Accordingly, any object is space-bound in the sense that it is both localized and spatially expanding. On the other hand, Shands (*ibid.*) posits the existence of a “relational view”, according to which space is not a thing that exists independently. Instead, space is assumed to build a network of things or events. Moreover, Shands (1999: 38) argues that space stands for the undifferentiated, which is subsequently converted into place once it becomes familiar. Thus space symbolizes freedom and independence, providing room for actions and the future, while place represents safety and protection. All in all, human spatial cognition is both relative and relational. It is derived from the centrality of egocentric, anthropomorphic and relativist spatial concepts and abilities in the human conceptual system (cf. Levinson 2003: 9).

Space itself is a concept structured by image schemas which provide a concrete, bodily basis for metaphorical mappings in the conceptual system. The following overview reproduces parts of the list compiled by Evans/Green (2006: 190):

SPACE	UP-DOWN, FRONT-BACK, LEFT-RIGHT, NEAR-FAR, CENTRE-PERIPHERY, CONTACT, STRAIGHT, VERTICALITY
CONTAINMENT	CONTAINER, IN-OUT, SURFACE, FULL-EMPTY, CONTENT
(LOCO)MOTION	MOMENTUM, SOURCE-PATH-GOAL
FORCE	COMPULSION, BLOCKAGE, COUNTERFORCE, DIVERSION, REMOVAL OF RESTRAINT, ENABLEMENT, ATTRACTION, RESISTANCE
EXISTENCE	REMOVAL, BOUNDED SPACE, CYCLE, OBJECT, PROCESS

Table 1

Spatial cognition is constituted by two vital cognitive activities, spatial orientation on the one hand and the tracking of motion on the other. In the conceptual domain of SPACE, each image schema has a well-entrenched set of correspondences as illustrated in Table 1 above.

Another important concept that is grounded in image schemas is (LOCO)MOTION, which has been mentioned in passing on various occasions throughout the chapter, particularly with respect to conceptualizations of time where it serves as a source domain. Motion is a basic

sensory experience which derives from pre-conceptual sensory experience. While image schemas provide a concrete basis for metaphorical mappings in the shape of “analogue representations deriving from experience” (Evans/Green 2006: 184) they are by no means simple memories of physical, sensory experience, but they emerge when experiences recur at regular intervals and hence are memorized as holistic representations. For this reason, the primary sensory input is valid but is not mirrored in a straightforward way. Apart from momentum the conceptual structure of motion relies on spatial orientation following the source-path-goal image schema (see Table 1 above). This image schema reflects the prototypical trajectory of motion in space (cf. Evans 2007: 108).

MOTION is in fact a common source domain for a number of abstract concepts such as time or change, for instance. The pervasiveness of motion as an essential part of mental activity is reinforced by the psychological evidence of the stream of thought. Intuitively, we would attest to the continuity of mental processing, in which the relationship between time and change is crucial.

The concepts of TIME and CHANGE are cognitively connected on two levels.<sup>174</sup> First, time appears to be inseparable from its concrete changing content.<sup>175</sup> Since time and change are conventionally understood in terms of motion, suggesting the contiguity of the two concepts, the mapping TIME IS CHANGE is also conceivable, given the metonymic motivation of a great number of conceptual metaphors.<sup>176</sup> The motion of time can be grasped as a precondition for change. In this case, temporal awareness is experiential rather than knowledge-based due to the input of change as a sensory and introspective spatial experience. As shown above this mapping is occasionally specified through the personification TIME IS A CHANGER (cf. Lakoff/Turner 1989). Second, the perception of change cannot be separated from temporal

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<sup>174</sup> In other respects, of course, the two concepts can be rather dissimilar. Unlike in CHANGE, which is a sensory and introspective experience, any such experiential basis is absent in TIME (as a concept). The awareness of time is a wholly introspective or subjective experience, which is why time is frequently conceptualized in terms of image-schematic concepts such as SPACE on the personal level or conceptually linked to the concrete temporal experience of events on the cultural level.

<sup>175</sup> This view corresponds to the Aristotelian understanding of time, which attached time to perception while claiming that ‘empty time’, i.e. time that is not experienced as ‘flowing’, is meaningless (cf. Edwards 1967).

<sup>176</sup> Some metaphorical mappings can be grounded in, or traced back to one conceptual domain; hence they are metonymy-based metaphors. Radden (2000) argues that conceptual metaphors and metonymies are two prototypical categories, marking the end points of a continuum of mapping processes, rather than two mutually exclusive conceptual devices. Radden (ibid.) differentiates between four instances of metonymy-based metaphors. First, metaphors and metonymies may have a common experiential basis; while the initial motivation may be metonymic, metaphor takes over as the degree of abstraction increases. Second, metonymy-based metaphors occur when conceptual domains are related by implicature. In their most salient form these metaphors manifest themselves in patterns, in which we impose a causal interpretation on sequential events. Third, metaphors may also be called metonymic due to their category structure. In metonymies the whole genre can stand for individual members, or else individual category members represent the whole genre. Radden (2000: 101f.) provides the example of the metaphor PSYCHIC HARM IS PHYSICAL INJURY, which exploits the contiguous experience that physical injury and psychic harm are often experienced together. And finally there are those metonymic metaphors whose conceptual domains are interrelated by cultural models.

awareness in general. The evidence of change relies on a temporal threshold,<sup>177</sup> which manifests itself in either continuity (duration) or discontinuity (succession).

However, our knowledge of change is much more detailed as is expressed in the mapping CHANGE IS MOTION, which also holds for our perception of change as a temporal phenomenon. This distinction finds expression in scientific models of change. For instance, in theories of change management, which is pervasive in political discourse, “change, in its broadest sense, is a planned or unplanned response to pressures and forces” (Jick/Peiperl<sup>2003</sup>: xvi). Models of change attempt to categorize the most recurrent changes that are common in organizations. Anderson/Ackerman Anderson (2001: 31-50) propose three types of organization change. **Developmental change** is essentially the improvement of what already exists, for example the fine-tuning of an existing method, condition or skill. Achieving this kind of change consists in elaborating the direct course from A to B, i.e. beginning with the status quo to the intended end point. Typically, the beginning and end points of the changing move are not located at a great distance from another. By contrast, **transitional change** describes the transfer of an old state into a new one. The transitional stage, the interval in between the old and the new, requires temporal change management, comprising the period of time necessary to implement the change. Crucially the new state is known, i.e. the direction and destination of the motion is clear. However, temporary measures may still have to be taken in order to keep the change process on track. If change management is efficient and successful, the time period of the interim transition stage can be planned and controlled.

Finally, **transformational change** builds on the cyclical pattern of linear change, eventually leading from complete destruction to a kind of ‘rebirth’. The process of transformational change adapts the Aristotelian theory of the four causes — growth, decay, death and rebirth — to a radical model of change. The onset of the development, at the end of which the so-called re-emergence occurs, is the birth of an organization, followed by its rise (growth), which however stagnates at some point after having advanced to a certain degree. While this state might last for a limited amount of time (plateau), the process itself is doomed. The ensuing chaos brings about ruin (death), after which it takes some time for a new state to emerge whose actual mould takes time to develop. The new state cannot be outlined prior to reaching its final point of completion, nor can the transition period required for it to materialize be controlled or predicted.

By way of conclusion, change not only involves motion but also takes time; this time lag existing between A and B is not invariably represented by a straight line. The richness of the image schemas motion and space can be exploited creatively. Temporal progression has been modeled on distinct visualizations of temporal movement through space. For example, temporal movement can be cyclical, linear, spiral or unfolding in stages, to name but the most

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<sup>177</sup> Threshold is to be understood in its conventional psychological meaning, denoting a point that separates one conceptual domain from another.

ubiquitous.<sup>178</sup> Crucially, whatever the actual temporal movement, there is an end-point focus of the source-path-goal image schema (see also below). The contiguity of time and change is thus fruitfully exploited and is applied in various scientific models. The event of change, however, is dependent on and responsive to other events such as forces and activities, for instance. This interaction is conceptualized in terms of a system of conceptual metaphors, the event structure metaphor (henceforth ESM).

#### 4.2.2.3 The Event Structure Metaphor (ESM)

First and foremost, spatial cognition, particularly the trajectory of motion in space, is central to the ESM. The various metaphors pertaining to the event structure system are predominantly conceptualized or grounded in terms of space, motion or force. Generally speaking, spatial inferences are typified by the topological structure of image-schemas (cf. Lakoff 1993: 216). Crucially, events, actions and causes are mapped by virtue of specific conceptual structures, for example states, changes, processes etc., which add up to the event structure in its entirety. However, not all of the conceptual metaphors that potentially constitute the ESM have to be operative in order to describe a given event. More often than not, events have a schematic structure in which only some details are profiled. Prior to investigating the event of newness, I will outline the metaphor system in more general terms.

Interestingly, Lakoff (1993: 225) differentiates between two event structure systems, which result from the duality inherent in the metaphorizations of time. Based on the assumption that there are several correspondences between target domain and source domain, the TIME IS MOTION mapping draws on the schematic categories inherent in our perspectival system. Accordingly, events can be viewed from various perspectives that also have an impact on the overall temporality of the event structure system. In attributing a viewpoint to the event described, the perspectival system draws on four schematic categories, location direction, mode and distance, all of which are central to the conceptualization of all events, particularly, however, the event of newness. The **location** identifies the position or vantage point of the ego/experiencer in relation to the utterance by virtue of deictic expressions. The **direction** specifies the angle from which an event A, which is often related to another event B, is viewed. Consequently two interrelated events can be interpreted from a retrospective or prospective perspective. The retrospective direction implies that event A is viewed as

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<sup>178</sup> So far, the focus has been placed on time and temporality within everyday discourse or as based on general experience. If we take specialized discourses into consideration as, for example, religious discourse, we are faced with a different situation. St. Clair (2002: 324) distinguishes between two fundamental conceptions of time, namely the time of being and the time of becoming. While the former, God's eternal time, is non-compositional and hence has no end and no beginning, the human time of becoming can be divided up into smaller segments or temporal units, as a beginning, a middle, and above all, an ending. Thus there is linearity for the temporal movement is not only directed towards a given end point but appears to be drawn towards it. Interestingly, the eternal time is immutable, as there is no movement — the realm of the divine is frequently pictured as a location or point — whereas directional change is the rule in the temporal model of becoming. In religious discourse these distinct conceptions of time are operative and functionally distinct. This is also the case in other types of discourse, for example, American political discourse which has inherited this particular temporality. Both the time of being and the time of becoming may serve as the matrix senses.

temporally preceding event B, which coincides with the location of the deictic centre. From a prospective standpoint, the temporal sequence of the two events is reversed. This time event A precedes event B, while the deictic centre is located at the height of event A. The categories **mode** and **distance** frequently interact; mode relates to the ego/experiencer within a given event, detailing whether or not the ego/experiencer is in motion. Accordingly, a stationary ego/experiencer habitually correlates with perspectival distance, which may provide an overview of the totality of events or subevents, while a moving ego, which can be envisioned as moving along with the occurrences, tends to be up to date with the temporal sequence of events and hence is typified by proximity.

The location-object duality encountered in the conceptualizations of time is reflected in the two submappings of the complex ESM, which are represented in Figure 6:




Figure 6: The event structure dual

Figure 6 illustrates the inconsistent conceptualizations of change within the two event structure sub-systems. The centrality of the metaphorical mapping CHANGE IS MOTION on the one hand, and the salience of the source concept MOTION underline the temporality of events and actions.

The connection of temporal cognition to events has been pointed out elsewhere (e.g. Vater <sup>3</sup>1994; Radden 1997). Accordingly, our immediate experience of time typically concurs with events; these temporal events can be highly individual as in the example of duration above, or they may be culturally framed as is the case with events of national history, for instance (see chapters 6 and 7). In any case, events are crucial for temporal cognition since they have perceptual and psychological (discursive) salience, or they are construed as such. More important still, this salience, perceived or constructed on the discourse level, is invariably dependent on reference frames. Talmy (2000) has devised a taxonomy of reference frames for spatial concepts which also apply to this kind of temporal cognition, for temporal concepts as well as events rely on the specific construal of temporality. Cases in point are the distinct conceptualizations of temporal events either as EVENTS ARE MOVING OBJECTS or EVENTS ARE

LOCATIONS. Alternative constructions of the event structure reveal that their construal relies on reference frames too. This is also evidenced by another two conceptual metaphors. Kövecses (2002: 49) distinguishes between two conceptualizations of events. The first metaphorical mapping, *EVENTS ARE ACTIONS*, occurs on the generic level, i.e. the metaphorical concept is filled with very little detail. Generic level concepts may then be realized in diverse forms on the specific level.<sup>179</sup> The second is *EVENTS ARE OBJECTS* as, for example, in “going to the race,” in which the metaphorical concept establishes a particular ontology by mapping a physical object with clearly discernable outlines onto a non-physical, abstract entity such as race.<sup>180</sup>

The impact of the location-object duality on the event structure system is hardly surprising given the inherent temporality of all events. Nonetheless the large majority of the recent research literature (e.g. Kövecses 2002: 134ff, Evans/Green 2006: 298ff<sup>181</sup>, Evans 2007: 74f.) disregards this crucial fact. Table 2 below summarizes the individual metaphors that make up the location-dual of the ESM, where they interact in the interpretation of events.<sup>182</sup>

STATES ARE LOCATIONS (BOUNDED REGIONS IN SPACE)	John is in love.
CHANGE IS MOTION FROM ONE LOCATION TO ANOTHER	Things went from bad to worse.
CAUSES ARE FORCES	Her argument forced me to change my mind.
ACTIONS ARE SELF-PROPELLED MOVEMENTS	We are moving forward with the new project.
PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS	We've finally reached the end of the project.
MEANS ARE PATHS (TO DESTINATIONS)	We completed the project via an unconventional route.
DIFFICULTIES ARE IMPEDIMENTS TO MOTION	It's been uphill all the way on this project.
EVENTS ARE MOVING OBJECTS	Things are going smoothly in the operating theatre.
LONG-TERM PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEYS	The government is without direction.

Table 2

<sup>179</sup> Kövecses (2002: 49) does not provide a convincing example of this metaphorical mapping. He merely supplies one example taken from literary discourse, in which death as an event is personified and performs an action.

<sup>180</sup> Crucially, the object domain is also an image schema; it is a schematic representation emerging from embodied experience which generalizes over what is common to objects (cf. Evans/Green 2006: 191).

<sup>181</sup> Building on Lakoff's (1993) account of the event structure metaphor, Evans/Green (2006: 299) describe it as “collections of more schematic metaphorical mappings that structure more specific metaphors.”

<sup>182</sup> The metaphors and example sentences are taken from Evans (2007: 75).

While the above list includes some of the most pervasive metaphors, there are a number of mappings absent which are, however, relevant to the analysis of American presidential discourse. The following examples are taken from Kövecses (2002: 134f.): EXTERNAL EVENTS ARE LARGE MOVING OBJECTS (The flow of history ...), PROGRESS IS MOTION FORWARD (The Service will continue to stagger from crisis to crisis), EXPECTED PROGRESS IS A TRAVEL SCHEDULE (We're behind schedule on this project) or A PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A JOURNEY (He's without direction in life). This list is still not exhaustive, but the most important target domains such as CHANGE, PROGRESS, CAUSES, STATES, PURPOSES or DIFFICULTIES have been introduced. Any remaining domains will be introduced in the analysis itself.

Due to their temporality events can also be interpreted in a different way. Based on the metaphor TIME IS A MOVING OBJECT, implying the prototypical front-back orientation of the stationary ego/experiencer on the one hand and the likewise prototypical direction of temporal movement from the future towards the ego and beyond it into the past on the other, the object-dual of the ESM involves different entailments for the central metaphor CHANGE IS MOTION.

By analogy with the location-dual introduced above, Lakoff (1993) devises a second submapping to the event structure system as illustrated in Figure 6 above. This object-dual involves the conceptualization of change as the motion of an object to, or away from the thing changing, which does not necessarily move itself. More precisely, the object in motion is conceptualized as a possession and the thing changing as a possessor, in other words change is conceived of as the acquisition or loss of an object (cf. Lakoff 1993: 225). Similarly, causation is interpreted in terms of giving or taking something, i.e. changes are understood as attribution. Table 3 lists some of the object-duals corresponding to their location-dual counterparts illustrated above. All examples are based on Lakoff (1993: 225f.) except for the instances specifically marked as being mine:

ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS	I have a headache.
CHANGE IS MOTION OF AN OBJECT TO/AWAY FROM A LOCATION <sup>183</sup>	I got a headache. My headache went away.
CAUSES ARE FORCES CONTROLLING MOVEMENT TO OR FROM LOCATIONS	Her argument forced me to change my mind.
ACTIONS ARE SELF-CONTROLLED ACQUISITIONS OR LOSSES	We took the decision and saw it through. (my example)
PURPOSES ARE DESIRED OBJECTS	They handed him the job.
ACHIEVING A PURPOSE IS ACQUIRING A DESIRED OBJECT	

<sup>183</sup> Lakoff's (1993: 226) proposal is CHANGES ARE MOVEMENTS OF POSSESSIONS, which is specified as the acquisition or loss of a given attribute. However, this phrasing does not typify both of his examples. Rather the attribution coincides with the location of a given entity. Thus the experiencer of the headache stays put whereas the attributive possession moves away.

MEANS ARE PATHS TO ACHIEVING DESIRED OBJECTS <sup>184</sup>	He got himself a top position. (my example).
DIFFICULTIES ARE IMPEDIMENTS TO ACQUIRING A DESIRED OBJECT	He cut me short from articulating my opinion. (my example)

Table 3

This overview needs to be supplemented by the mapping A PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A BUSINESS (Its time to take stock of my life), which is the object-dual equivalent of (A PURPOSEFUL) LIFE IS A JOURNEY which is also inherited from the superordinate mapping of the ESM. In fact, the duality in the event structure system coincides with distinct thematic roles. While the location-dual tends to involve an agent, the object-dual typically assigns the roles of experiencer or possessor.

Another important factor is the hierarchical organization of the metaphorical mappings of the ESM. Using the example of the ESM, Lakoff/Turner (1989: 80ff.)<sup>185</sup> establish the crucial distinction between generic-level and specific-level metaphors. Generic-level metaphors such as EVENTS ARE ACTIONS lack specificity in that “they do not have fixed source and target domains, and they do not have fixed lists of entities specified in the mapping” (Lakoff/Turner *ibid.*: 81). Specific-level metaphors such as LIFE IS A JOURNEY, however, are more detailed and instantiate knowledge structures contained in the generic-level domain. More precisely, Lakoff (1993: 222) argues for the hierarchical organization of the ESM, implying that metaphorical mappings that are situated at some lower level of the hierarchy inherit the structures of the higher level mappings.

The taxonomy of layered categorization builds upon the psychological evidence of the salience of concrete objects and organisms. The reasons for this salience are perceptual, by virtue of imagery, generality (cf. Kövecses 2002: 38) or inclusiveness (cf. Croft/Cruise 2004: 83).<sup>186</sup> Given these characteristics of generic or basic level concepts, the understanding of EVENTS ARE ACTIONS as a generic-level concept is misleading. First and foremost it lacks the concrete, sensory basis that is usually attributed to such concepts. The motivation for conceptualizing specific-level concepts rather than generic ones remains as obscure as does the accountability of allocating EVENTS ARE ACTIONS rather than EVENTS ARE LOCATIONS on

<sup>184</sup> Lakoff (1993) does not provide an object-dual of the location-dual MEANS ARE PATHS. The example sentence illustrates the contrast to the location-dual, in which the end-point of the movement is typically focused and may be interpreted as a success. A case in point is the metaphorical expression “We completed the project via an unconventional route”, in which the unconventional means applied to finish off the project are envisioned as motion along unusual paths. In contrast, the object-dual focuses on the object in possession.

<sup>185</sup> Lakoff/Turner (1989: 80ff.) identify various schemas, including one schema for events and another for actions. These schemas are typified by their lack of specificity (not highly structured in themselves, no fixed source and target domains), thus not yielding a list of fairly fixed correspondences but merely providing a scaffolding for metaphorical mappings. The schema occurs at the generic level, imposing higher-order constraints on the possible mappings.

<sup>186</sup> Ungerer/Schmid (1996: 68f.) add another two factors to account for the primacy of the generic or basic level of categorization. First, we regularly perceive the basic level holistically, i.e. all category members have a common characteristic shape. Second, whenever we interact with objects or organisms, we perform characteristic actions.



the highest level of generality. As Lakoff/Turner (1989: 80) note, the EVENTS ARE ACTIONS mapping does not consist of a list of fixed correspondences, i.e. that mapping does not indicate what slot in the EVENT target domain is to be filled with what slots in the source domain ACTION.<sup>187</sup>

Instead the various levels of generality or specificity, whichever way we prefer to look at it, may be determined by frames of reference on the one hand and discourse constraints on the other. In view of the temporal concepts discussed here the specific instantiations of metaphorical concepts at the expense of others are not likely to correlate with the distinction of subjective vs. objective temporal categories.

The different construals of events provide evidence in themselves that temporal categories are subject to a great deal of socio-cultural determinacy. Hence the artificial distinction between subjective and objective categories should be replaced by the presupposition that temporal cognition is largely determined by the social construction of reality which obliterates the notion of objective temporal categories. As a result, time dissociated from social practice in the shape of 'absolute time' is not a relevant category. However this does not mean that conventional metaphorical concepts of time are indicative of 'scientific truth' as the pervasive metaphor TIME AS SPACE nicely illustrates. I have referred to this 'popular misunderstanding' above in order to underline that linguistic evidence in the form of entrenched conceptualizations does not attest to scientific, i.e. physical accuracy. Instead they account for a folk understanding of complexities that are relevant for the human world of everyday experience; they are truthful from an anthropological view. A case in point is the pervasiveness of emotion concepts, which as richly structured domains, have numerous entailments. The oft-cited ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER is ubiquitous in English yet its meaningful implications can be traced back to the state-of-the-art of humoral psychology. Thus the original imagery builds on the knowledge available at the time of concept formation. Imbued with this historical perspective the assessment of concepts dissociated from their instantiations appears to be even less convincing. Hence temporal cognition is invariably relational, construed as the specific temporality as framed by the discourse(s) in which it occurs.

Initially, the close connection of newness to temporal expressions was emphasized when exploring the semantic structure of newness as was its dependency on spatial orientation. These coordinates can now be further qualified.

The analysis of the highly polysemous lexical concept NEW has demonstrated that virtually all meaning paraphrases rely on temporal categories. Furthermore, the two major clusters

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<sup>187</sup> It is highly contentious however whether EVENTS ARE ACTIONS is a conceivable mapping at all. While there is no denying that the schema for action is an integral part of the interpretation of an event structure, nonetheless it is counterfactual to categorize actions on the same level as events. From an action-theoretical perspective (see chapter 2) one could argue that events occur in 'nature', i.e. outside discourses (in the sense of text), while actions are performed by human beings. Yet these actions need to be classified, i.e. they are endowed with meaning in discourse, in which these actions are interpreted and evaluated. Similarly causes and changes are to be classified on the same level, with their conceptual domains providing a rough outline which is highlighted by more specific mapping processes in discourse.

identified — newness in terms of time and origin vs. newness in terms of kind and quality — exhibit strong affinities to the object-location duality of the underlying temporal models.

Out of the many distinct senses of time the following three are most relevant: the primary lexical concept event and the secondary, culture-specific concepts matrix and agentive relate to the encoding of newness. In the event sense the experience of newness is either construed as the movement of objects towards us or as resulting from ego-directed movements towards a particular location or object. Evidently this lexical concept of time carries both submappings of the ESM, both of which are ego-based.

The matrix sense of time constitutes an essential precondition for the experience of newness; it supplies a temporal reference system against the background of which other temporal events are projected. Here a time-based cognitive model prevails, which structures the temporal events by virtue of an earlier-later or before-and-after sequence. Since time is chiefly understood in the sense of becoming, newness is the inevitable, regular upshot of the passage of time. In other words: temporal progression continuously produces new experiences, based on the dictum ‘as long as there is motion, there is novelty’.

On the other hand, time may actively bring about new experiences as exemplified by the agentive sense of time, which is frequently conceptualized in terms of personifications. Conceivably, the metaphor TIME IS AN INNOVATOR is an analogue to the numerous personifications of time.

New experience has also been shown to be embedded in the ESM. The basic understanding of an event is that it has an impact on something else, i.e. it denotes something that has happened or that is happening. However, the preceding discussion has revealed that newness tends to thrive on epiphenomena such as temporal progression, activities or causal change itself. It is conceivable that, in some instances, new occurrences are perceived as inextricably linked to other concepts such as time and change. The interpretation depends on whether or not the construal of *newness* is performed on the basis of the conceptual tool of metaphor or metonymy. This is possible because these concepts are closely related to a degree that they can be perceived as either similar or contiguous. In the former case they can be treated as individual metaphors (TIME IS MOTION, CHANGE IS MOTION, NEWNESS IS MOTION), possibly even organized in an inheritance structure. The latter implies that all target concepts, time, change, newness, are indeed contiguous, i.e. all entities form a single domain and can stand metaphorically for one another. Yet metaphors and metonymies as conceptual devices have distinct functions. Whereas metaphors chiefly facilitate understanding of complex, abstract domains in terms of more accessible, concrete ones, metonymy functions “to provide mental, cognitive access to a target entity that is less readily or easily available; typically, a more concrete or salient vehicle entity is used to give or gain access to a more abstract or less salient target entity within the same domain” (Kövecses 2002: 148).

The fact that conceptual metaphors can indeed have a strong metonymic motivation is well known (e.g. Radden 2000). As new experience frequently coincides with temporal progress and change, a metonymic relationship rather suggests itself. In addition, the relationship between the concepts time, change and newness is hierarchically structured, ranging from the

generic level to the specific level. While TIME IS MOTION is a precondition for CHANGE IS MOTION, NEWNESS IS (A SUBEVENT OF) MOTION further specifies both mappings. The hierarchical structure is represented by the arrow on the left-hand side of Figure 7.

Crucially, each target concept establishes a distinct set of correspondences, that is, each of the target domains picks out only some concepts of the source domain motion, represented by the black dots. Conversely, each of the target concepts is structured by motion in slightly different terms. For a large number of conceptual metaphors there is a metonymic relationship between source and target domain. Unlike conceptual metaphors, conceptual metonymies are derived from a single mapping within one domain. This mapping describes a transfer from one entity to another within the same source domain. Typically, there exists a relation of contiguity between these two entities. Kövecses (2002: 157ff.) distinguishes between several metonymic relationships of source and target domain. The metonymic relations that hold between the target concept newness and its source motion can be traced back to the causation ICM. According to this idealized cognitive model the source domain causes the target to occur and the target domain causes the source to occur. More precisely, the EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymy is viable with respect to the relationship between newness and motion. Accordingly, the source domain MOTION results in the target domain NEWNESS. Moreover, the metonymy PRECONDITION FOR RESULTING EVENT/ACTION also holds for the NEWNESS IS (A SUBEVENT OF) MOTION mapping. In this case, the source motion enables the target.




Figure 7: MOTION as a multivalent source domain

Another interesting possibility consists in conceiving of interaction on the metaphorical level, which is not unusual for multivalent source domains. Goatly (2007: 12f.) differentiates between two interrelations of conceptual metaphors. Due to the partiality of metaphorical mappings, the same target domain such as NATION, for example, can be conceptualized in terms of diverse source domains such as PERSON, BUILDING, PLANT or SHIP. This diversification occurs whenever a target domain is referred to by a variety of source domains originating from distinct conceptual schemas (cf. Goatly 2007: 12). Alternatively, one and the same source concept may be related to a number of targets. Whenever such a multivalent source domain is applied to a series of targets (witness the pervasive source motion that is used by time, change and newness), these may eventually be construed as interacting, for example:

TIME IS MOTION + CHANGE IS MOTION = TIME IS CHANGE

TIME IS MOTION + NEWNESS IS MOTION = TIME IS NEWNESS

CHANGE IS MOTION + NEWNESS IS MOTION = CHANGE IS NEWNESS

These conceptual metaphors and their interactions are motivated by causation. The causal link between them is an agent-like cause, which is frequently conceptualized in terms of personification. Thus the personified correspondences would be: TIME IS A CHANGER, TIME IS AN INNOVATOR or CHANGE IS AN INNOVATOR. The important issue of how these interrelations are construed on the discourse level will be addressed in the analysis below. In the remainder of this section, I will treat the conceptual domain of NEWNESS in more detail still.

As mentioned earlier, spatial cognition plays a vital role in the meaning representation of newness. Spatial orientation and image-schematic concepts such as motion are an integral part of the experience of newness. More precisely, the event of newness impinges on all attributes of the motion schema, which yields the following correspondences:

- **Newness relates to an entity in motion (person/object)**
  - Newness involves the movement of an entity to a new location or leaving on old location (location dual):  
Change is conceptualized as involving the motion of an object to a new location, or away from an old location.
  - Newness is the acquisition of new attributes (object dual):  
Change is conceptualized as the motion of an object to, or away from the thing changing, which does not necessarily move itself.
- **Newness relates to the kind of the movement(s) involved:**
  - Direction
    - Linear forward movement: newness results from forward motion, influenced by the mapping PROGRESS IS MOTION FORWARD
    - Vertical, up-down movement; an upward motion toward a higher goal is newness in the sense of improvement (UP IS GOOD, PERSISTING IS BEING ERECT)
    - Locative movement; newness is the acquisition of new attributes in the sense of renewal

- Mode of movement:
  - Ego-directed, self- or other-propelled motion; purposive activities lead to newness (ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION)
  - Controlled movements: newness denotes an improvement of the means to achieve a given goal (MEANS ARE PATHS)
  - Velocity; newness accelerates entities in motion
  - Dynamics, intensity; newness enhances entities in motion
- Momentum:
  - Source of energy for the movement involved; motion is fuelled by newness as an entity's intrinsic property
  - Motivation of initial movement; newness has initiated motion
- **SOURCE-PATH-GOAL**
  - The prototypical (based on the front-back orientation) trajectory leads to new experiences, which means that newness is ahead (prospective) and that we have an end-point focus, i.e. newness is the goal or destination of the motion forward (location-dual)
  - Newness does not entail the movement to another location but the present location is enhanced by the acquisition of new attributes; the present location of the entity coincides with the goal of the movement of the entity bringing along new experience. The prototypical perspective is reversed; we have goal-path-source orientation instead while the end-point focus remains.

This survey underlines the intricate interaction of newness and motion. The trajectory of motion typically occurs along the temporal axis beginning in the past and pointing to the future. Crucially, image schemas are subject to transformation (cf. Evans 2007: 109), which means that the focus of attention may be placed on either of the three component parts of the trajectory, gradually shifting from the source via the path towards the goal of the movement. Consequently, this switch of focus may concur with newness as the goal or end-point of the movement.

Figure 8 provides an overview of the conceptual domain NEWNESS, summarizing the elements central to the construal of *newness*.




Figure 8: The conceptual domain of NEWNESS

Since the most important implications have been expounded, I will only provide a cursory description of the model introduced by Figure 8. In doing so I shall begin at the bottom of the model moving successively up to the top.

The NEWNESS IS (A SUBEVENT OF) MOTION metaphor is embedded in the ESM with its two specific submappings derived from the central metaphor CHANGE IS MOTION. Newness in the location-dual is the result of movement from an (old) location A to a new location B. Alternatively, newness originates from the acquisition of new attributes due to the movement of an object towards a given stationary entity (object-dual). This is represented by the arrow directed to the left. These two submappings draw attention to the fact that the construal of *newness* relies on our perspectival system. While a prospective perspective inheres in newness as long as the moving entity comes from ahead, newness is characterized by retrospection when an event A, preceding another event B, serves as a reference frame against the background of which change, and hence newness, can be measured.

Given the hierarchical relationship of the target domains TIME, CHANGE and NEWNESS (see Figure 7 above), CHANGE and NEWNESS are not completely overlapping. As there is no

newness without change, there is no change without newness. Last but not least, let us briefly focus on the transitory interval represented by the broken line. This provisional moment or short-term temporal interval coincides with the present moment, the ‘now’ in discourse, which serves as a temporal frame of reference on the basis of which new experience can be assessed.<sup>188</sup> Occasionally, the new is regarded as interrupting the passage of time, i.e. a lasting moment that is even understood as a state. In other words, newness appears to freeze the historical process.

The dependency of newness on motion has further consequences, however. First, newness establishes a temporality of its own. As a temporal event or part of a temporal event newness serves to organize temporal experience in installing a temporal sequence based on a before-now perspective. Alternatively, it constitutes the provisional end-point of a given temporal interval. Hence newness is a perspectival switch: either it involves a retrospective orientation, by putting an end to a foregoing temporal event, or it implies a prospective orientation by looking out for the new experiences ahead. In this case, newness can be seen as an ‘empty’ category, which can be filled with knowledge structures transferred from the source domain. The impact of an object in motion moving towards an entity results in the attribution of newness to this (stationary) entity. This conceptualization correlates with newness in the sense of renewal, in which case entities of the same category move towards the static entity or ego.

The two submappings of the ESM are both relevant for the construal of *newness* in discourse. Hinging on the conceptualization of change, particularly its entailments, the presumption is that the movements are directed towards a goal, i.e. the movements have a destination and thus fulfill a purpose. In chapter 2 political discourse was described as an action-centered, purposive type of discourse. Therefore it is hardly surprising that motion concepts such as change, action, purposes, forces or newness are regularly deployed on the discourse level. With respect to American presidential discourse, an outgrowth of the particular development of American political discourse, the impact of newness in the senses of progress, processuality, and the proclivity for schematic concepts is specially marked. The characteristic temporality encountered in American political discourse — the extent to which American political discourse overlaps with presidential discourse justifies their interchangeability — the cultural time of American national history frequently serves, as we shall see in the analysis below, as the matrix sense of time, i.e. the temporal reference system against the background of which all other political events, domestic or global, are measured.

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<sup>188</sup> There is some evidence from a cognitive point of view that humans are not capable of perceiving the present or a point of time perceived as now. This finding appears to be counter-intuitive to our everyday experience in which we are able to delimit temporal sequences in such a way as to open a time window to the present. Similarly, newness is also not perceivable as such. The awareness of newness is thus introspective and subjective on the one hand, and culturally and discursively determined on the other.

### 4.2.3 Newness: A Frame of American (Political) Culture

The preceding discussion points to the existence of a strong correlation between the concept newness and the conceptualization of key political concepts and events in American political discourse. Similarly, this view also suggests that concepts are deployed by discourse, i.e. concepts are not viewed as mental representations once stored and mechanically operating in the computation of raw input data. Instead, concepts are vested with meaning on the discourse level. Moreover, concepts are regularly refreshed and updated so that category membership is negotiated, confirmed, shifted or discarded on the level of discourse as well. Evidently this does not occur on the spot but extends over a certain period of time.

Nonetheless, the knowledge structures encapsulated within concepts or domains are relatively stable and usually extend over several domains of experience that are metaphorically linked. This knowledge about ‘the world’ is not stored randomly but is organized into larger strings of knowledge structures. One such organizational principle is a frame, which is used here to mean shared representations of knowledge similar to cultural models. “The frames constitute a huge and complex system of knowledge about the world. This large network of frames reflects the knowledge that we make use of in using language [...] and thinking about and acting in the world” (Kövecses 2006: 69).<sup>189</sup>

From a historical perspective, we have seen that newness has operated as such a frame in the conceptualizations of socio-political events or complex structures. Provided that the conceptual domain of NEWNESS is derived from embodied experience, this begs the question whether or not this experience directly translates into conceptual structure. More specifically, are the domain boundaries construed by the experiential input, which would then be, to a degree, also culturally determined. This claim raises an important issue that has been absent from the discussion so far, which will, however, be considered in the following sub-chapter.

#### 4.2.3.1 Cognition, Culture and Discourse

This section addresses some notoriously controversial issues: the role of linguistic relativity, culture and discourse within the cognitive linguistics paradigm. Without intending to be exhaustive, the bias of this study towards an interweaving of conceptualization and cultural input will be further substantiated.

Human beings as conceptualizing animals interact with the world in structuring and labeling their experiences. Provided that the human conceptual system functions metaphorically as advocated by the proponents of Conceptual Metaphor Theory these embodied experiences are metaphorized, that is, they are represented as cross-domain mappings in the conceptual system. Accordingly, a metaphorical expression consists of an individual linguistic expression that can be regarded as the surface realization of such a cross-domain mapping. Nevertheless these mappings are not propositions themselves; rather they

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<sup>189</sup> There is a variety of definitions for what Fillmore (e.g. 1985) has proposed as a frame, i.e. “specific unified frameworks of knowledge, or coherent schematizations of experience” (ibid.: 223). In Cognitive Linguistics, the terms ‘experiential gestalts’, ‘cognitive model’, or domain may be used interchangeably with ‘frame’.



are sets of correspondences that are determined epistemically, i.e. they map knowledge about one domain onto the knowledge structures about another.

Conceptual metaphor as the ‘language of thought’ is grounded in bodily experience, which ‘mediates’ categorization in the human conceptual system. The theory of embodiment implies that the human body plays a central role in conceptualizing the world around us. This embodied reference system is perhaps most tangible on the level of image schemas, some of which have been mentioned above. Spatial experiences such as containment, force, motion or contact are frequently referred to as directly experiential, ‘mediated’ only by the human body. With more abstract concepts the human body may serve as a rich source domain in the metaphorical mapping, for instance, in the linguistic metaphorical expression ‘to shoulder a problem’.

Kövecses (2006: 10ff.) summarizes the cornerstones of the experientialist framework. Following his account, the experientialist view states that the mind is holistic rather than modular, i.e. it is a system in which the separate modules are each directed by distinct cognitive processes. As to the nature of ‘reality’, according to experientialism reality is not prestructured in the shape of clearly defined categories of the world. As a consequence, we have only access to the external reality on the basis of human experiences which, in turn, are derived from perception or knowledge-based interaction with ‘the world’.

Regarding the relationship of mind and reality, the mind is considered as a reflex of the world as we experience and perceive it. Hence there is no such thing as an objective reality. Instead the world is a projected space resulting from our mental capacities, including “such cognitive processes as categorization based on prototypes, organizing knowledge in terms of frames and understanding experience through metaphors” (Kövecses 2006: 10ff.). This understanding of the human mind is also consequential for its correlation with language. Human experiencers configure the world by imposing certain cognitive patterns on it. This experience acts as a template for future experience, i.e. our interaction with the world, the process through which we make sense of the world, depends on how experience is framed.

The theory of embodiment as the driving force of human categorization is generally acknowledged.<sup>190</sup> Within a cognitive-psychology framework, categorization is devised as a fundamental process of individual psychological functioning, by which sensory input is converted into perceptions of objects and events. Inversely, categorization is not restricted to

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<sup>190</sup> This general support does not mean, however, that the approach is not subject to critique. Edwards (1997: 231) raises several points of criticism. First, in his view perceptually derived categories of experience are not reconcilable with linguistic relativity given the universality of the human sensory-perceptual apparatus. Second, the distinction between reality and experience is doomed since they are themselves categories produced in and for common-sense reasoning and thus inhere in discursive practices. Third, Edwards (ibid.) claims that cognitive linguistics devises language as a system of neutral mental representations and, by analogy, communication as occurring between minds. In his eyes, the cognitive linguistic theorizing reduces the language user to an obedient computer processing whatever there is to process. The severe lack of performativity exposed by some proponents of cognitive linguistics does indeed constitute a major drawback for it ignores the embeddedness of human cognitive processing in discursive practices, which represent a ‘frame of mind’, i.e. it does not simply compute information from sensory-perceptual input but this process is not lacking in purpose, intention, attitude or expectation.

language, let alone discourse, since it is essentially a biological as well as perceptual phenomenon which, as such, pre-exists language. Similarly, within cognitive semantics, the act of categorization is regarded as one of the most fundamental human cognitive activities. “Categorization involves the apprehension of some individual entity, some particular of experience, as an instance of something conceived more abstractly that also encompasses other actual and potential instantiations” (Croft/Cruse 2004: 74).<sup>191</sup> The resulting abstract mental construct is called a conceptual category or concept for short, which may be loosely defined as mental representations of objects, entities or events stored in the memory. Crucially these concepts inscribed in the meaning of words are assumed to derive from bodily experience with ‘the world’. This means that human concepts are a matter of abstracting information from perceptual experience and storing metaphorically structured mental representations of it, which serves as a knowledge base against which new input is measured. Hence the process of categorization is mediated by metaphors that translate perception or sensation into cognitively palatable chunks, or mappings.

The focus on the universality of human cognition within the cognitivist paradigm is frequently argued to refute linguistic relativity. Scholars devoted to the rehabilitation of the linguistic relativity theory,<sup>192</sup> which, as they argue, suffered a major drawback through the cognitive turn in the sciences, criticize the inability to account for the relationship between mind and world. A case in point is Levinson’s (1996: 177) line of argument, which refers to the rise of the cognitive sciences in the 1960s as a “sea-change in our approach to issues concerning the relation between language, culture, and thought.” This has a devastating impact on the theory of linguistic relativity, seeing its presumption of radical linguistic and cognitive difference as a result of cultural input as flawed. As a consequence, this strong preconception of “the commonality of human cognition and its bias in human genetic endowment” (Gumperz/Levinson 1996: 3) appeared to forever discredit the tenets of linguistic relativity. Indeed there appeared to be sufficient support for emerging universalist claims.<sup>193</sup> However, the universalist claim is not viable for all branches of cognitive linguistics.

Regarding conceptual metaphor theory, which is in the centre of attention in this present context, the centrality of culture in embodied experience has been emphasized from the theory’s onset. The knowledge structures stored in the conceptual system are not only systematically organized but this knowledge has an experiential basis.

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<sup>191</sup> This definition reveals the “cognitive conundrum of reality and its apprehension” (Edwards 1997: 253).

<sup>192</sup> Levinson (1996: 177) contends that “[...] there is surely something wrong about a theory of human cognition that treats that great cultural bulk of human conceptual structure as obfuscating detail: the fact that human cognition is built for culture, and thus built for enculturated variation, is a central fact about it. [...] From that perspective, a good grasp of the cultural variation is just as important to the science of Mind as it is to a science of Culture. And every plausible universal that fails is actually rather interesting.”

<sup>193</sup> The universality of basic color terms is regularly invoked to substantiate the universalist claim while denigrating the idea of linguistic relativism. However, the findings of the so-called color studies — the oft-cited Berlin/Kay (1969) study is but one of several — which set out to provide independent measures of cognition, are not uncontested. See Edwards (1997: 213-221) for a detailed review against the background of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis.

[...], what we call ‘direct physical experience’ is never merely a matter of having a body of a certain sort; rather, *every* [emphasis original] experience takes place within a vast background of cultural presuppositions. It can be misleading, therefore, to speak of direct physical experience as though there were some core of immediate experience which we then ‘interpret’ in terms of our conceptual system. **Cultural assumptions, values, and attitudes are not a conceptual overlay which we may or may not place upon experience as we choose** [emphasis added]. It would be more correct to say that all experience is cultural through and through, that we experience our “world” in such a way that our culture is already present in the very experience itself. (Lakoff/Johnson 1980: 57)

Lakoff/Johnson’s contention underlines the centrality of culture on all levels of cognitive processing, which is substantiated by another passage in the aforementioned book. The authors (1980: 146) argue that reality is dependent on human conceptualization of the world: “[...] human aspects of reality [...] vary from culture to culture, since different cultures have different conceptual systems.” This statement even suggests a strong affinity to linguistic relativity, a weak version of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Nearly three decades later a more detailed picture presents itself.

[...] language not only *reflects* conceptual structure, but can also *give rise to* [emphasis original] conceptualization. It appears that the ways in which different languages ‘cut up’ and ‘label’ the world can differentially influence non-linguistic thought and action. It follows that the basic commitments of cognitive linguistics are consonant with a weak version of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, [...]. (Evans/Green 2006: 101)

Despite the compatibility of the tenets of Cognitive Linguistics (henceforth CL) with linguistic relativity, a distinction has to be made between universal vs. culture-specific concepts. While some conceptual metaphors are assumed to be universal, for example, HAPPINESS IS UP or the container metaphor for ANGER (cf. Kövecses 2002: 163ff.), there is a range of intercultural and intracultural variation. Whether or not conceptual metaphors are prone to be universal or to vary cross-culturally or within a given culture appears to be a matter of the level of conceptualization concerned. Universal metaphorical concepts are more likely to be encountered at the generic level whereas cultural variation predominantly occurs at the specific level.

The hierarchical taxonomy of categorial structure, organizing the knowledge structures within a given category, is only part of the matter. We also have to distinguish between different types of knowledge, which means that the knowledge of what constitutes a cultural concept is in itself cultural since it relates to what categories are accepted within a given culture. The cultural concept is invariably more specific than the primary concept. This cultural knowledge comprises individual knowledge as well as shared knowledge.

In cognitive theorizing, the interest in the role of culture has only recently been renewed (e.g. Kövecses 2006). Accordingly, cultural experience is modeled as a set of shared frames (Kövecses *ibid.*: 151f.). Culture constitutes a knowledge system i.e. knowledge shared by the members of a group or even a society. The knowledge structures organized in frames can be the equivalent of the entirety of cultural knowledge available. Cultural practice organizes and perpetuates these knowledge structures. With regard to discourse, knowledge is not a monolithic block but can be subdivided into three different types. The ‘knowledge that’ relates

to the linguistic knowledge stores in our mental lexicon. By contrast, the ‘knowledge how’ denotes the performativity of language. Lastly, the ‘knowledge about’, i.e. cultural knowledge (which to a certain extent is encyclopedic knowledge) is best described as a huge knowledge base, encompassing all cognitive representations that belong to a certain domain. This description applies to other mental storage devices, for example cognitive models, which may be defined more precisely as “the sum of the experienced and stored contexts for a certain field by an individual” (Ungerer/Schmid 1996: 55). Cultural knowledge is encapsulated in so-called cultural models, which are as knowledge-based as they are knowledge bases. The term cultural model is used interchangeably with frame, both denoting shared knowledge.

In their now classic work, Holland/Quinn (1987) propose a cognitive approach to the organization of cultural knowledge. In anthropological theorizing on cultural theory culture is generally understood as shared knowledge, i.e. a framework on the basis of which the members of a society are able to act. Such a frame of reference is provided by cultural models which “are presupposed, taken-for-granted models of the world that are widely shared (although not necessarily to the exclusion of other, alternative models) by the members of a society and that play an enormous role in their understanding of that world and their behavior in it” (Holland/Quinn 1987: 4). Moreover, Holland/Quinn (*ibid.*: 24) specify that culturally shared knowledge is organized into prototypical event sequences enacted in simplified worlds. While cognitive models emphasize the psychological nature of cognitive entities, the analysis of cultural models belongs to sociolinguistics, in both theory and methodology. Cultural models are predisposed to an inherent normativity since they can operate in a way that not only organizes thought but also directs thinking due to their acknowledged authority. Cultural models frame experience by rationalizing preferred behavior, supplying interpretations for it as well as defining actions and their goals. For this reason cultural models or frames play a vital part in ideologizing uses of language. They seek to entrench preferred or preferable inferences about the nature of an event, action or person. In other words: cultural models are both thinking and doing (cf. Holland/Quinn 1987: 8).

Accordingly, each culture facilitates access to its environment and defines social realities within which people function socially. What is more, however, cultural knowledge also enables people to interpret their experience in a characteristic way. Although these repositories of knowledge are sometimes misleadingly referred to as ‘folk models’, suggesting folklore instead of ‘rational’ thought, they clearly transcend the level of customs or beliefs since the knowledge structures perpetuated by cultural models are systematic rather than random associations. Crucially, the social realities sketched by a culture affect its conception of the physical and phenomenological environment. Cultural models as ideational representations of (cultural) knowledge are to be tied to the organization of the conceptual system.

Considering categorization as a knowledge-based process is also consequential as regards the ‘truth-value’ of the cognitive models that originate from the categorization activities described above. Leaning on Lakoff’s distinction between propositional models and image-schematic models, Holland/Quinn (1987: 24f.) differentiate between proposition schemas and

image schemas as being “two alternative forms in which knowledge may be cast.” Either type of schema is suited to performing different kinds of cognitive tasks. Proposition schemas may be used in reasoning and problem-solving, providing a set of related propositions that can easily be added to causal chains by filling ‘empty’ slots with assumptions about the world. These ready-made schemas are then assumed to lead to the acceleration of preferable inferences. Image schemas, however, are not to be confused with mere visual imagery in terms of which conceptualization occurs. Image schemas facilitate the conceptualization of abstract concepts; they are used particularly to convey knowledge about physical phenomena such as motion but they are also used to reconceptualize logic in terms of spatialization.

Alternatively, the cultural model has been termed a frame, which is “[t]he largest organizational unit” (Lehrer/Kittay 1992: 4). Fillmore (e.g. 1985) differentiates between various characteristics of frames, which can either be created by or reflected in language. This feature makes frames amenable to discourse-centered approaches to language. Generally speaking some frames are innate while others are acquired through experience-based routines or explicit training. Frames as cognitive knowledge structures are traditionally understood as interpretative devices that assist in determining the meaning in a given context. Following Fillmore/Atkins (1992: 76f.) the meaning of a word is understood

[...] with reference to a structured background of experience, beliefs, or practices, constituting a kind of conceptual prerequisite for understanding the meaning. Speakers can be said to know the meaning of the word only by first understanding the background frames that motivate the concept that the word encodes. Within such an approach, words or word senses are not related to each other directly, word to word, but only by way of their links to common background frames and indications of the manner in which their meanings highlight particular elements of such frames.

Frames, in their function as the most comprehensive organizational unit in the lexicon, are also influenced by what may be termed encyclopedic knowledge or cultural knowledge to the extent that culture **and** cognition have to be considered ubiquitous factors of language processing.

The knowledge-based approach to culture from a CL theoretical framework has to be improved in one crucial respect. So far, we have assumed that knowledge is both totalizing and typified by immutable structures. Crucially, structural discontinuities, knowledge gaps, and the possibility or recategorizations are regularly ignored.

Instead, categorization has been studied as a predominantly decontextualized process in cognitive linguistic theorizing — despite cognitivism’s emphasis on knowledge. The insights gained from studying individual categories in an atomistic way rather than investigating the configuration of interacting categories are limited. A case in point is Edwards’s (1997: 236f.) critique aimed at the CL definition of category, which he likens to installations on a computational platform. As a consequence, cognitive category theory devises categories as ready-made resources that can be activated automatically if not mechanically. According to Edwards (1997: 236f.) the central issue of category membership is shown to be a matter-of-

course or even a-priori instantiation within the cognitive linguistics framework, leaving out the possibility of construal in context-dependent discursive practices.

If based on discursive formations, category theory could be designed to illustrate how concepts can be used as resources typifying the world. In this framework the attribution of category membership is not only subject to change but also a way of using conceptual resources both creatively and flexibly. In other words: the gradient scale of membership can be, and indeed is, manufactured in discourse. In the process, categories will be shown to interact with other categories in a systematic way, establishing knowledge structures analogous to the knowledge encapsulated in frames.

The same is true for yet another interesting feature of (semantic) categories, namely their contrastive organization, which is also mentioned by Edwards (*ibid.*). Accordingly, categories are organized into systems of contrasting pairs. This differentiation into two-set classes is not inherent in the semantics of the category members. Thus these contrasts are not the inevitable result of sense-making via conceptual resources but they are the outcome of discursive practices which have constructed these entities as opposites. The proclivity within Western cultures to binary categorization was already mentioned in chapter 1, when discussing the ideological potential of these dichotomies.

Edwards's (1997) critique of the atomistic theory of categorization within the cognitive-linguistics paradigm is also vital with regard to another shortcoming. Edwards (*ibid.*) emphasizes the importance of category use in actual discourse, which is not easily reconcilable with much of the ongoing work within cognitive linguistics. While cognitive approaches to political discourse can be regarded as a notable exception to this rule — under the condition that many of these accounts bear no reference to the contextualization factors common in discourse analysis — the mentalistic overall framework still dominates.

The cognitive turn gave primacy to knowledge-based processes. Yet exploring human cognition within a cognitivist framework extends beyond studying individual minds. According to Edwards (1997: 27), cognitive science is concerned with more than cognition whenever it is preoccupied with aspects such as knowledge, reasoning, memory and cultural life. By contrast, the subject matter may include less than cognition when studies focus on issues of individual minds, which, however, typifies much of the ongoing research. This critique is frequently articulated in terms of 'mentalism', rendering cognitive linguistics a mentalistic discipline.

For this reason, the need for discourse-centered approaches as well as a stronger focus on the analysis of issues traditionally dealt with within anthropology and sociolinguistics is still valid.

Despite recent attempts at "taking metaphor out of our heads and putting it into the cultural world" (Gibbs 1999: 154), a reorientation towards exploring the mechanisms of the frame-based organization of cultural knowledge on the discourse level is vital.

While the omnipresence of both cognitive and cultural models in language processing is usually acknowledged, the centrality of cultural models is regularly downplayed to the extent that they are relegated to second place after cognitive models.

Finally, Cognitive Linguistics could hardly be characterized as a discourse-centered approach to language. Initially I criticized the fact that metaphors are largely considered sentence phenomena within the cognitive-linguistic framework. Similarly Palmer (1996: 33) reaches the conclusion that “[c]ognitive linguists have so far largely confined themselves to the explanation of grammatical patterns, only occasionally grappling with such wider notions as culture, discourse, narrative, and world view. Cognitive linguistics has so far produced few studies of discourse.” While it is apt to report a certain poverty of cognitive approaches to discourse, it is equally true that meanwhile, some cognitive studies of political discourse (e.g. Charteris-Black 2005 or some of Musolf’s work, for example 2000, 2004) have, in part, redressed the situation. While the fact that discourse deploys concepts is ubiquitous, the chasms between cognitive linguistics and discourse-centered approaches by and large continue to remain unbridged. Bridging this gap can be achieved through contextualizing metaphorical expressions in two ways: first by embedding these expressions into their historical, social, and political contexts and second, by laying bare their interaction with other metaphorical linguistic expressions. In combination, the underlying metaphors will be shown to be subject to a functional distinctiveness that fulfills important persuasive functions.

By way of conclusion, the cognitive-linguistics paradigm is not categorically incompatible with linguistic relativity despite the harsh critique of the alleged universalism of the cognitivist framework. Subscribing to an approach to conceptual metaphor that does not obfuscate discourse as cultural practice, the knowledge structures stored in metaphorical concepts are, of necessity, contingent. They are a matter of perspective, determined by cultural space and time and inscribed in discursive formations.

The real world of objects and events can be approached in [...] a ‘**counts as**’ fashion — that is, as a discourse topic or concern. In defining the nature of mind-world or subject-object relations, factuality is the obverse of mind. It is the thing known, the criterion of what **counts as** knowledge, as objectivity and subjectivity. The way we define knowledge’s adequacy, and distinguish between categories such as knowledge or belief, perception or illusion, memory or confabulation, is by appealing to what is real. [...] The real world is what **counts as** the real world, and this is a product or feature of, rather than something prior to, descriptive practices. (Edwards 1997: 51)

As a rule, the concepts deployed by discourse establish the realities within a given system of culture. Discourse shapes these realities and is shaped by them. For this reason, the insights gained from analyzing conceptual metaphors without contextualizing their surface realizations — the metaphorical linguistic expressions — are flawed. Prior to proposing a discourse-based, qualitative analysis of the most pervasive metaphors framed by the event of newness in American presidential discourse, I will focus on the temporality and spatiality of American (political) culture.

#### 4.2.3.2 American Culture as Spatial Culture

The fact that time and space are cultural constructs does not refute their existence as physical categories. Although they do not have a physical character themselves — their reality uniquely depends on present perception — both time and space do have real dimensions, arising from the here and now (cf. Fleischer 2001: 363).

Unlike the matrix sense of time (see above), describing temporal progression as a continuous and relentless process, cultural time is essentially a discontinuous process. Cultural time can be extended or protracted, depending on or necessitated by requirements within the cultural system itself. Alternatively it can be constructed by a given viewpoint within discourse. Moreover, temporal events may even be left out entirely in the construction of cultural time. Frequently, these ‘non-events’, which are not stored in the system, are particularly interesting. For example, some periods of the national history tend to be constructed as ‘blind spots’. The frequent occurrence of so-called ‘historical moments’ in political discourse is another illustrative case in point for the arbitrariness of segmenting (matrix) time into culturally, politically, or historically meaningful units.

Despite the culture-specific delimitations of time, the matrix sense of becoming serves as an important reference system, by virtue of which cultural events, actions etc. can be assessed. The so-called cultural memory constitutes a particular instance of such an assessment. Since both past and future are modeled on the present state of affairs, the culture-specific past is constructed from a present viewpoint, including its specific discursive formations. Recollection is an important cultural practice whose requirements are, however, invariably oriented towards the past as viewed, imagined or perceived from the present. This is why the collective shapes and reshapes rather than simply re-enacting that ‘shared’ past.

The process of recollection is particularly relevant with respect to American political culture. The ubiquity of American national history in social practice is uncontested. Equally, as has been shown on various occasions throughout this study, the focus on temporality is deeply ensconced, which can be derived from the directedness and processuality inscribed into the very essence of American political discourse.

The paradox of this historicity has been explained in great detail above. Broadly speaking, this historical consciousness instills a retrospective viewpoint, while being progress-oriented and forward-looking. This is noteworthy in two respects. First, this retrospection is institutionalized in the shape of the inaugural address. The public recollection is instrumentalized in the inaugural: segmenting historical time into temporal units inevitably puts newness back on the map. Newness, captured by the moment of speaking, permits a focus on the present or from the present and thus is perceived or constructed as real. Second, in the American context, looking back to the origin of the nation is also inevitably linked with newness.

Blommaert (2005: 221) refers to space as the overarching motif in historical and identity narratives. The ubiquity and centrality of spatial cognition for human experience not only touches upon the schematic organization of spatial orientation, that is, the ability to localize



one's position within a particular system of coordinates, but it also relates to the deeper layers of cultural practices. "Because we live, not only in, but also through, and with space, it affects every area of human existence" (Benesch 2005: 15).

Cultural space is not a continuum, either. By analogy to cultural time, it also subdivides into compartments, assembled around and in relation to significant reference points within the cultural system. Similarly, spatial relations function as an important reference system according to which events, tendencies, developments or ideas can be located spatially in relation to one another.

Blommaert (2005: 221) draws attention to the significance of space for understanding human identities. More specifically, he (*ibid.*) underlines "the importance of space and spatial references in organizing motives in narratives, emphasizing how space provides a framework in which meaningful social relationships, and the events can be anchored and against which a sense of community can be developed [...]."

The container view of space (see above) appears to be a viable concept here, for the infinity of natural space is segmented into smaller units or spheres. Not only are these spheres delineated through cultural practices, they are also typically "filled with social, cultural, epistemic, and effective attributes" (Blommaert 2005: 222).

Similarly to cultural time, cultural space can be constructed as expanding beyond particular boundaries; alternatively, it can be experienced as providing too little scope, that is, cultural space appears to be condensed. In this context, the in-out or contact schemas of spatial cognition can be very influential indeed, as we shall see in the analysis below.

Crucially, cultural space is discontinuous, which opens gaps within the system; these empty slots within the cultural system are not filled at all or only provisionally by a surrogate. Evidently, filling or occupying meaningful domains is strategically functional on the level of political discourse. Here, spatial anchoring is the equivalent of staking claims, i.e. establishing a sense of belonging, but also priorities, privileges, or authority. Group membership is also frequently decided on the basis of spatial relations. Delineating spheres creates spatial containers, opening clear in-out schemas, which can be mapped in terms of in-group vs. out-group categorization.

However, spatial relations are strategically functional in political discourse in another way. The criteria of proximity vs. distance on the one hand, and those of centre-periphery on the other are regularly used to express political relations. While proximity and centre are usually associated with familiarity and assert group membership, hence their positive evaluation, distal and peripheral relations are, in contrast, typically negatively connoted.

The fact that cultural space is fundamentally a space of action, communication and discourse is perhaps most strongly manifested in the American context. In combination with newness space has been the most important "driving force not only to build a new nation but to imagine one" (Benesch 2005: 18). Cases in point are numerous; the Frontier movement, the analogy to the 'Exodus', or the theory of the two hemispheres denote spatial relations as an integral part of geo-political strategies. This geo-political outlook is typical of the "era of

‘spatiality’, that is the imperialist exploration, usurpation, and exploitation of geo-physical spaces during the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century (both on earth and in outer space)” (Benesch 2005: 15).

America’s concept of cultural space is replete with internal contradictions and antagonisms. The construction of the North American continent as a mythical, empty space, which could be filled according to the desires, needs, and demands of the settlers veils the fact that this was much contested territory. The perceived newness of the spatial experience, a territory whose natural resources were at once idealized to the sublime and exploited to the maximum by virtue of purposive political activities, is ideologically powerful.

[...] Many foundational issues in American history (the dislocation of Native and African Americans, the geo-political implications of nation-building, immigration and transmigration, the increasing division and ‘clustering’ of contemporary American society, etc.) involve differing ideals and notions of space. Quite literally, space or, more accurately, its ‘warring’ ideological appropriations formed the arena where America’s search for identity (national, political, cultural) has been staged. [...]. (Benesch 2005: 19)

This ongoing conflict of space has shaped American socio-political realities. In contrast to the relative stability of natural space, cultural space is an arena of events and actions, by virtue of which cultural space is continuously worked on. In other words, it is geared towards historical progress and change. This is the momentum inherent in cultural space, which can be conceived of as constantly in the making. Again, this processual nature of cultural space, enhanced by the American proclivity to spatial exploration and exploitation, is made use of in political discourse which is itself action-centered, and aims at occupying important (conceptual) domains. All in all, cultural space can be argued to be primarily functional in understanding identities, which can be national, social or political. From the onset, American cultural space has been politicized in the attempt to achieve emancipation from the Old World. The toponym of the New World soon began to evolve into a politonym, resulting in shifting attitudes towards the Old World. It seems that the New World could and could not emancipate Americans from the Old World despite the ardent propagation and politicization of the overarching experience of newness. The perspectival ambivalence of newness is inscribed in the very essence of American political discourse which received its definite mould during the period of raging newness. In spite of inventing a new nation the political institutions are influenced by some very old models indeed — Athens, the Roman republic or even the biblical New Jerusalem.

### **4.3 Summary**

The approach to the analysis of conceptual metaphor in discourse taken in this present study extends the contextualization of key concepts into discursivity. Concepts are couched in discursive formations, making them contingent as they are indicative of past formations as well as present viewpoints. Every discourse is simultaneously a discourse on history and a discourse from history (cf. Blommaert 2005: 136).

This historicity is also viable for the conceptualization process that is devised as predominantly knowledge-based within CL. Frames are culturally informed knowledge structures that connect several domains in a characteristic way. These interacting domains are represented in cultural models or frames which organize human experience in relation to spatial and temporal coordinates. Compounding the provision of a cognitive reference system the cultural models or frames are pivotal in transmitting cultural knowledge, i.e. values and practices. While these models or frames are, in principle, relatively stable, they are also subject to change and revision. Consequently, it is more in agreement with the position held in this present study to conceive of the cultural system as a dynamic system.

Conceiving of discourse as symbolic behavior and political discourse as social practice, perpetuating power relations as well as socio-political realities results in the basic assumption that concepts are actively and continuously worked on by a given discourse community. Concepts are conventionally deployed by discourse; as such they are informed by the historicity of discourse, which typically materializes as the layers of text.

Relativism claims that knowledge is obtained through culturally mediated conceptual schemes, i.e. historically situated, contingent frameworks of meaning and understanding [...]. These are made up of folk and scientific theories, linguistic and cultural categories, and social practices which we acquire as a result of the trajectory of our life experience, situated in a particular culture, language, space, and time. As a result, these schemes may be relative to that live trajectory and not shared with others of a different history. (Foley 1999: 169)

Historicity and linguistic relativity automatically combine when exposing the contingency of meaning. With regard to the experiential basis of newness, which may well be universal, this claim implies that its actual meaning is culturally and discursively informed. A case in point is the role of newness within the event structure system. What counts as and is perceived as an event within a specific cultural system and a particular discourse mode does not pre-exist discourse but is constituted by discourse.

For this reason, the analysis of conceptual metaphors needs to include the discourse level in order to lay bare their interaction within frames of reference. This is possible because lexical structure reflects and externalizes conceptual structure.

Newness as a lexical concept has been shown to be highly polysemous; the complexity on the lexical level extends onto the conceptual level, according to which newness is embedded in temporal and spatial cognition as well as the ESM system. The intricacies multiply when also taking into consideration the duality inherent in cognitive models for time and the event structure systems. In addition, newness is also a convoluted concept regarding its ambivalent perspectivity. In delimiting its meaning from OLD, the concept of NEWNESS corroborates a retrospective perspective while adopting a prospective viewpoint in other contexts. In any case, newness establishes a temporal structure of its own in shaping the sequence of temporal events in discourse.

The conceptual switch that manifests itself in major discontinuities on the discourse level implements newness as a figure of thought that has continued to frame centuries of

cognizance. This paradigmatic shift is reflected by a switch in the perceptual system from a predominantly retrospective perspective towards a prospective viewpoint.

Marking the transition from medieval and Renaissance times to modernity, coinciding with the explorations of the New World, it has developed a tradition of its own. Rather than typifying the onsets of so-called modernity in a straightforward way, the notion of newness has undergone abstraction itself in the process. In particular, when we study newness in its twentieth century design, newness as a concept is one of topicality. Hence it has evolved into a **modernist** concept, narrowing its scope to prospective orientation and innovation as its paramount characteristics.

Newness as a concept has been shown to be grounded in experience, touching on the focal points of reference of cultural space and time. So far, the significance and signification of newness within American (political) culture have been illuminated from the theoretical angle. The characteristic configuration of cultural space and cultural time is an essential part of social practice, including political discourse. Due to its impact on the formation of American political discourse, newness has been parasitic on a number of related concepts in political cognition. In what follows, the knowledge structures inherent in the conceptual frame of newness will be analyzed. First, newness is an important socio-political concept that has not only framed the institutionalization of the American political discourse but has also served as a vital identificatory marker of the would-be nation. Second, newness also pieces together the conceptual domains that are pervasive in the construction of American national history as a 'shared' past. Finally, newness has played an important role in religious discourse from the beginning. Concomitant with the conflation of religious and political discourse, newness in the sense of renewal imposes a moral imperative on political discourse. The pervasiveness of the moral accounting metaphor points to the fact that moral and economic issues are closely related. The constant need to prove oneself extends into the economic realm in which the accumulation of assets can be analogized to the layered model of redemptive history. The agglomerate of culture, cognition and discourse has presented major challenges to the cognitive linguistics paradigm. The following analysis proposes to address these vexing issues and, possibly, to close an avoidable gap.

## 5. Analyzing Presidential Discourse: The Inaugural Address

Political communication takes place in several arenas simultaneously. American political communication culture has been characterized as media-centered, which means that the political communication process primarily revolves around the president and the media, bypassing other political institutions such as the legislative branch as well as the majority of the civic community in substituting it for a surrogate public. The enhanced focus on the presidential office is the result of changing discourse conditions, which, in turn, have produced major institutional changes within the American political system. The hybrid of presidential discourse can be considered an upshot of transformations such as the marketization, technologization or personalization of discursive practices.

Within presidential discourse, office holders have elaborated leadership styles of their own, adapting to as well as shaping discursive practices. One such style of presidential governance is the rhetorical presidency on the basis of which political power is exercised as discourse control. Moreover, presidential discourse itself is subject to developmental cycles of stability and change. This development occurs in the interplay of economic growth and crisis on the one hand and of socio-cultural processes of innovation and conservation on the other. Presidential discourse attunes to shifting political situations while language used in daily political business is relatively stable, adhering to well-established communicative practices. Interestingly, in the event of crisis and conflict, political language use is predominantly geared towards rehearsing familiar values. Political actors probe for sustainable representations of socio-political realities. This crisis tool is pivotal in periods of economic or social conflict, during which there is a heightened attentiveness to emerging signs of change.

Since the nation's founding, presidential public oratory has undergone dramatic changes in form, quality and quantity. Due to the personalization of political discourse and the growing symbolization of the American presidency, the major public addresses — an integral part of presidential discourse — have become increasingly institutionalized. Their delivery follows a strictly organized political calendar according to which each form of address is vested with its own specific communicative and political functions. For example, the State-of-the-Union Address's function, laid down by the Constitution as the president's annual message to Congress, is to inform the legislature about policies and the decision-making process. Irrespective of their particular political functions, all major public forms of address fulfill the crucial purpose of propagating national principles, fundamental (republican) policies, and core American values. In brief: public political communication revolves around the American public philosophy whose centerpiece is the American concept of newness. In what follows, the inaugural's primary communicative functions and its genre-specific properties will be explored. In the second part of this chapter, the general procedure of the analysis will be outlined against the background of pragmatic methodological concerns.

## 5.1 Characteristics & Communicative Functions of the Inaugural Address

The inaugural address is an integral part of presidential discourse. The only other institutionalized public form of address that is comparable to the inaugural in public significance is the State-of-the-Union Address. The festivities around the inauguration of the American president are an event of nationwide, even worldwide importance. Critical voices have compared the pompous occasion to compensation for the non-existing crowning ceremony of a monarch. These ceremonies, held regularly on the occasion of the ascension to power of American presidents, culminate in the newly-elected president's speech.

The incoming president is in the limelight, leaving a first impression on the American public as their political and moral leader. Newness appears to be in the air, hence the need to position the new office holder in the line of past administrations, both temporally and qualitatively. This public enactment of the transition of power is certainly highly evocative, comparable to a rite of passage at the end of which the president becomes *persona publica* (cf. Gester 1993: 42), thus emphasizing the event's symbolic nature.

The inaugural is the first official speech of the incoming president after a lengthy election campaign, which has prompted some scholars to argue for a clear-cut distinction between campaign rhetoric and the ceremonial rhetoric of the inaugural. The possibility that campaign rhetoric may be carried over into the address is frequently overlooked. “[...], in terms of the issues addressed, Woodrow Wilson’s first inaugural, Warren Harding’s, Calvin Coolidge’s, Herbert Hoover’s, and Ronald Reagan’s first inaugural can all be conceived as their last campaign speeches” (Ryan 1993: xv-xvi). In the preceding chapter, the case for the blurring of the distinction between political advertising and political business-as-usual was made, and the impact of modern discourse conditions such as marketization, technologization and personalization on political discourse was considered.

Although individual inaugural addresses have been well researched, chiefly focusing on the president's overall performance as a political leader, there are currently only two substantial studies (Campbell/Jamieson 1990, Ryan 1993) that provide a comprehensive overview of the inaugural's development across a larger time span. While both studies were conducted within the framework of the rhetorical presidency, they propose an entirely different approach to the inaugural, which will be discussed in the ensuing sub-chapter. Meanwhile I will summarize the general characteristics of the inaugural address as they have been identified by previous accounts. In a second step, I will evaluate those findings against the background of the focus of this present study.

At first glance, however, any attempt at establishing general tendencies for the approximately 56 inaugural addresses<sup>194</sup> in existence appears to be doomed in view of the time

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<sup>194</sup> The approximation results from the fact that not all presidents in history have actually delivered an inaugural address. The corpus this study is based on comprises 56 speeches, of which 55 are official inaugural addresses. Gerald Ford's "Inaugural remarks" constitute an exception to the rule and have been included in

span covered and the impact of a variety of conflicting political, historical and social factors — let alone the array of office holders and their leadership styles. Despite this ambivalence, the studies reviewed converge on the following points.

First, the rhetorical purpose of the inaugural is assumed to be largely constrained by its situative context. Gester (1993: 39ff.) points to the salience of the verb ‘to celebrate’ and the fact that the significance of the national ceremony is invariably stated. Gester (*ibid.*) concludes that the emphasis placed on the ceremonial occasion classifies the inaugural address as an epideictic discourse, even in the classical sense of the *genus demonstrativum*. While it is true that an explicit reference is regularly made to the occasion, this contextualization is restricted to the opening paragraph(s) as it is apt for any type of public oratory. Moreover, even this practice has been subject to change. The ritualistic incantations typical of festivities are predominantly encoded as expressive speech acts such as appeals to solidarity and group-membership. In particular the public oath of office is regarded as the proclamation of a socio-political creed; in this respect, the inaugural’s symbolic function is to renew the covenant between the people and its political leader. In addition, the staged character of this event is assumed to provide a first opportunity of self-presentation for the incoming president.<sup>195</sup> However, the prevalence of expressive speech acts is not as strongly pronounced as Gester (*ibid.*) claims. On the contrary, other speech acts such as representatives or commissives are also comparatively pervasive.

According to Gester (*ibid.*), inaugurals are typically low in informational value; instead, they are geared towards the “amplification and reaffirmation of what is already known and believed” (Campbell/Jamieson 1990: 15). For this reason, the overall rhetorical style of inaugurals is contemplative rather than informative, which is believed to manifest itself in the rehearsing of popular themes and figures taken from American national history. Similarly, the inaugural’s temporality, the “mythic present” (cf. Campbell/Jamieson 1990: 27), is occasionally regarded as evidence of its allegedly contemplative character. Since the issue of time reference is also relevant for the discussion of genre, it will be deferred to the section below.

Contrasting contemplation and information betrays some of the misconceptions already addressed in chapter 2. The cognitive model of communication, in terms of which the default mode of communication is informational, clearly influences this unfruitful distinction. What is more, however, it erroneously disregards the dual encoding of political reality, i.e. what is staged as festive and contemplative need not be such on another level. The invocation of national history, which is constructed as homogeneous and continuous, is an important outlet for the cultural memory. The public recollection of the glorious past is a powerful device to

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the corpus on account of its contents. However, the nineteenth-century presidents that were not inaugurated are absent from the study.

<sup>195</sup> The point of the president’s proclivity to self-assertion and self-presentation is regularly made and tends to be overrated. What is more, it is inaccurate from a historical perspective as the degrees of publicness and publicity vary dramatically. Riccards (1995) differentiates between six main models of the presidency, not all of which are typified by broad public appeal. As mentioned in chapter 3, the rhetorical presidency is a twentieth-century ‘invention’. In comparison, some nineteenth-century models, for example the Whig model, virtually excludes direct appeals to the people.

achieve cultural cohesion, especially in view of the heterogeneous, inherently contradictory American society. For this reason the appeals to national history as an integral part of the public philosophy are rarely contemplative only. There is a strong normativity inherent in this ‘reverberation’ of the national narrative which constructs the socio-political reality (cf. Fischer/Vorländer 1993: 218). These components of the inaugural are not to be viewed as politically irrelevant, which is why the hard and fast classification of the inaugural as an instance of epideictic rhetoric has to be re-examined. The reiteration of national principles and cultural values is important from a cognitive perspective too; conceptual links, once established, need to be refreshed every so often with the re-enactment of the ‘first-hand’ experience in which they are allegedly grounded.

Second, the situative context is generally held to account for the inaugural’s style. Based on the assumption that the inaugural address is a paradigmatic case of ceremonial rhetoric, it is regularly described as a (linguistic) action without a goal. Strictly speaking, this criterion would not classify the inaugural address as political discourse, provided that political discourse is defined as action-centered and goal-oriented. It is also the situative context that has had an impact on the inaugural’s internal structure. Short paragraphs of listed points have taken the place of elaborated arguments extending over a series of paragraphs. Generally speaking, this modification is assessed as an adjustment to the spoken medium, which has entailed a reduction of syntactic complexity — the rule in the large majority of nineteenth-century inaugurals — to the paratactic simplicity of contemporary inaugurals in order for the listener to be able to adjust more easily to the oral performance. Traditionally, however, the inaugural address has always been scripted speech, i.e. written language to be read aloud. Ever since Jefferson’s administration the transcripts have regularly been handed out in advance to the press (cf. Gester 1993: 34).

On the lexical level, the inaugural has undergone a gradual process of abstraction. The address is claimed to be replete with clichés and rhetorical encrustations. From a stylistic perspective, the inaugural is, by and large, a tone-setting rather than a policy-setting speech, delivered to the advantage of presidential self-presentation. The incoming president’s self-assertive tone serves the important political function of legitimization and frequently occurs in delimitation to a predecessor, which need not be the one immediately preceding. Furthermore, Gester (1993: 40) has identified a tendency of self-congratulation in twentieth-century inaugurals, based on his corpus consisting of the inaugural addresses since F. D. Roosevelt. This virtual absence of historical perspective — Gester only selectively draws on earlier rhetoric — accounts for this tendentious remark. It is true, however, that there is a growing tendency for presidents to emphasize their leadership qualities as well as highlighting their accomplishments. One of the most striking examples of publicly legitimizing one’s authority is the opening paragraph of McKinley’s second inaugural (1901), in which he unmistakably underlines the achievements of his first term. Interestingly, he establishes a temporal frame of comparison in structuring his argument in terms of the then-now contrast (witness the underlined words in the quotation below):



- (3) When we assembled here on the 4th of March, 1897, there was great anxiety with regard to our currency and credit. None exists now. Then our Treasury receipts were inadequate to meet the current obligations of the Government. Now they are sufficient for all public needs, and we have a surplus instead of a deficit. Then I felt constrained to convene the Congress in extraordinary session to devise revenues to pay the ordinary expenses of the Government. Now I have the satisfaction to announce that the Congress just closed has reduced taxation in the sum of \$41,000,000. Then there was deep solicitude because of the long depression in our manufacturing, mining, agricultural, and mercantile industries and the consequent distress of our laboring population. Now every avenue of production is crowded with activity, labor is well employed, and American products find good markets at home and abroad. (WMK II, 1)

From a broader perspective still, the American proclivity to self-praise was also remarked on by Tocqueville as exemplified by the quotation in chapter 3 above. In contemporary inaugurals, the strategy of self-presentation is occasionally embedded in intertextuality, for example, presidents regularly quote or paraphrase from their predecessors or explicitly refer to their administrations.

Third, the inaugural address is assumed to perpetuate the American public philosophy or civil religion, which is a set of beliefs, symbols and rituals, in other words, the array of cultural practices and values that frame political discourse and public debates alike. However, the invocation of the public philosophy does not account for the pervasiveness of religious imagery as claimed by Fischer/Vorländer (1993: 220f.), who maintain that the religious metaphors have a civil-religious function. More precisely, the imagery is argued to manifest itself in (quasi-)religious motifs and quotations from the bible, to name but a few. Yet, this view reveals a misconception of the American public philosophy against the background of the description provided in chapter 3. The formation of American political discourse builds on the conflation of various discourses and their tradition, which can be understood as the politicization of religious discourse. This process of hybridization is not random but has produced structured representations of religious discourse in political discourse that can be modeled as a layered text.

The religious imagery does not simply represent illustrative material however. It has been a driving force in the formation of American political discourse, which has established a morality based on moral accounting. Since republicanism hinges not only on liberty but also on civic virtue, political discourse has to mark the boundaries of what constitutes moral, true, just etc. behavior. As a result, the rhetorical style in which the inaugural speech is coded, resumes the tradition established by the jeremiad which, in its Americanized version, amalgamated admonition and affirmation. This combination lends itself to political exploitation when used to reinforce preferred behavior or to sanction dispreferred actions.

The inaugural's strong appeal for integration and identification goes uncontested since it directly addresses the core of the American national narrative. Germino (1984: 5) appears to refer to these deeper layers of American (political) culture, which are less likely to change than their more superficial layers such as symbols, "conventional ceremonial utterances:"

When one has finished stripping away the conventional ceremonial utterances appropriate to the installation of a republic's head of state, one is left with a core of ideas noteworthy for their specificity. These ideas constitute the public philosophy of the American polity. Although there is development and change in these ideas as

one moves through the decades, on the whole the continuity of political thought is remarkable.

While it is true that one of the inaugural's major functions consists in perpetuating the public philosophy, Germino's conclusion about the conventionality and continuity needs to be further qualified. If measured in terms of recurring key words, such as freedom, democracy, the people or the State, one could indeed be tempted to presuppose some unchanging ideas within the public philosophy. However, this view is not tenable from a historical perspective, or if one is investigating the cognitive representation of discourse rather than isolated keywords, as will be done in the analysis below. Chapter 3 outlined the heterogeneity and historicity of the American public philosophy, underlining its cyclical development suspended between the tradition of the American experiment and the counter-tradition of the manifest destiny. The mere recurrence of key concepts such as the notion of covenant is not in itself reliable evidence for "the continuity of political thought". There are countless examples to substantiate this claim. For instance, the notion of covenant has served as a crisis tool for the rhetorical presidency, in which its ostentatious renewal is designed to smooth over difficult transition periods. Yet the inaugural itself is liable to change; its persistence cannot be characterized as continuity in a straightforward way as is claimed by previous accounts, which often preclude the possibility for discontinuities in the tradition.

In view of these aspects it would be startling to argue for a genre-based continuity and predictability of the presidential inaugural address. Instead, the interesting question is what cultural layers are touched, following the onion model of culture (cf. Hofstede/Hofstede <sup>2</sup>2005) mentioned above. The deep-seated cultural core is not usually liable to change; the cultural practices, including the symbolic or ritual level, are meaningful within a given culture only and are thus reflexive of preferred social practices.

Fourth, the weight given to the ceremonial aspects of the inaugural implies that it is considered as a political lightweight. In part, this view mirrors the ambivalence towards the presidential office itself, distinguishing between the symbolic and political functions of the Executive branch. In part, it reveals the distinction between politics proper, i.e. the deliberation process and the communication of its results, which finds expression in the contrast of political communication vs. publico-political communication (see chapter 2). The one-sided focus on the ornamental and ritualistic aspects of the inaugural address ignores the specificity of response to the political climate at the time of delivery. Conceiving of the inaugural address as an integral part of presidential discourse means, however, that the inaugural cannot be seen as a mere reflex of the situative context, but rather as actively seeking to shape these conditions as it is shaped by them. The following excerpts are taken from two inaugural addresses that originated within distinct historical contexts, but nonetheless illustrate the traditional understanding of the political functions of an inaugural:

- (4) In a government which is founded by the people, who possess exclusively the sovereignty, it seems proper that the person who may be placed by their suffrages in this high trust **should declare on commencing its duties the principles on which he intends to conduct the Administration** [emphasis added]. (JMO II, 3)
- (5) The office of an inaugural address is to **give a summary outline of the main policies of the new administration** [emphasis added], so far as they can be anticipated. (WHT, 2)

The quotations, taken from James Monroe's second inaugural dating from 1821 and William H. Taft's 1909 address, both express the political strategy of legitimization. Evidently, the self-presentation of a politician's personal and institutional aptness may involve the delegitimization of political adversaries or opposing policies. The fact that this function is not subsidiary to the alleged prevalence of ceremonial, contemplative rhetoric as suggested in the research literature under consideration is further substantiated when taking into consideration the specific political context, for example the Cold War rhetoric of US propaganda following WW II:

Propaganda production and psychological strategy represented key instruments for both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations' Cold War operations. Although Presidents Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt relied on government propaganda during wartime, Truman and Eisenhower were the first two presidents to introduce and mobilize propaganda as an official peacetime institution. (Parry-Giles 2002: xvii)

Needless to say this governmental propaganda was also carried over into the inaugural addresses — witness the following excerpt taken from Truman's speech (1949; emphasis added):

- (6) That false philosophy is communism. 12 **Communism** is based on the belief that man is so weak and inadequate that he is unable to govern himself, and therefore requires the rule of strong masters. 13 **Democracy** is based on the conviction that man has the moral and intellectual capacity, as well as the inalienable right, to govern himself with reason and justice. 14 **Communism** subjects the individual to arrest without lawful cause, punishment without trial, and forced labor as the chattel of the state. It decrees what information he shall receive, what art he shall produce, what leaders he shall follow, and what thoughts he shall think. 15 **Democracy** maintains that government is established for the benefit of the individual, and is charged with the responsibility of protecting the rights of the individual and his freedom in the exercise of his abilities. 16 (HST 12-16)

The list of antithetical constructions — syntactic parallelism coincides with a contrast on the semantic level — continues throughout the inaugural and demonstrates that no form of public oratory was omitted as a potential platform to expose citizens to psychological warfare. The rhetorical presidency had become a bully pulpit from which war messages were issued in cold war rhetoric. The inaugural does not only relate to foreign policy issues but also includes references to domestic policies, which further corroborates its political weight.

- (7) Idle industries have cast workers into unemployment, causing human misery and personal indignity. Those who do work are denied a fair return for their labor by a tax system which penalizes successful achievement and keeps us from maintaining full productivity. 4 But great as our tax burden is, it has not kept pace with public spending. For decades, we have piled deficit upon deficit, mortgaging our future and our children's future for the temporary convenience of the present. To continue this long trend is to guarantee tremendous social, cultural, political, and economic upheavals. 5 (RWR I, 4-5)

In his first inaugural, Reagan anticipates severe cuts in the social welfare system, announces tax reforms, and appeals to work ethics and free entrepreneurship (cf. Fischer/Vorländer 1993: 230). Thus he prepares the public for dramatic changes in political priorities, including foreign policy through which America's old strength is to be restored.

Last but not least, newness is a pervasive concept in presidential inaugural addresses. Intuitively, it could be argued that this rather suggests itself since the incoming president proclaims the beginning of a new era while delimiting himself from his predecessors. However, this strategy bears some risk, since placing too much emphasis on change may be viewed as jeopardizing the continuity of the American system. The transfer of power was a sensitive point at the nation's early beginnings as it was widely believed that the transfer of power to Washington's successor John Adams would spark off disintegrating forces. Thus both the situative context and the inaugural genre act as influential constraints restricting the potential emphasis on newness as a discourse strategy.

The occurrence of newness is not confined to the opening paragraphs. Fischer/Vorländer (1993: 224f.) detect the — numerically rather than statistically — frequent use of the epithet 'new' and the verb 'to renew' throughout Carter's, Reagan's and Bush's inaugurals. The authors conclude that "new" never stands for a rupture but signifies continuity, particularly when being used in the sense of renewal. In this context, renewal relates to the American experiment, reflecting the Puritan origins of the American Jeremiad and rhetorically capturing the prophetic promise of a new covenant (cf. Fischer/Vorländer 1993: 228). The political reinvigoration resulting from renewal is particularly relevant when putting an often symbolic end to times of crisis, thereby restoring the City-upon-the-Hill myth and American exceptionalism (see chapter 3). Fischer/Vorländer (ibid.) contend that the notion of newness evokes "religious connotations," which does not account for its pervasiveness in the inaugurals they investigated. The only 'explanation' provided is their claim (Fischer/Vorländer 1993: 225) that the focus on newness derives from Carter's deep religiosity — Carter is a practicing born-again Christian. If this were an adequate line of argument, the frequency of newness encountered in Reagan's and Bush's inaugurals would have stemmed from their commitments to the 'Moral Majority', "[...] a political movement of evangelical Christians, [...], advocating an ultra-conservative political and social agenda" (Ayto 1999: 488), which, of course, pertains to the realm of speculation. Had Fischer/Vorländer's (1993) corpus consisted of more than only a few inaugural addresses, they would have realized that there is an entire tradition of using newness not only as an attribute but also as a concept. In principle, there is no twentieth-century inaugural in which "new" or renewal is not encountered on the discourse

level. This is hardly surprising, given the influence of newness on the construction of the American national narrative, including the formation of American political discourse itself.

It is this historical perspective that underlines the fact that the inaugural address is directly influenced by the development of political factors such as the consolidation of the nation and its political institutions on the one hand, and the building of a national identity on the other.

The development of the inaugural address can be organized on the basis of major historical landmarks. Tulis (1987: 47-51) differentiates between several types of inaugural speeches. . The first and original type was invented by Washington and only lasted through two administrations, Washington's and Adams's.<sup>196</sup> In those days, Washington and his successor used the inaugural ceremony to stress the necessity of virtuous men, including themselves, and to seek guidance from the Constitution, which is constructed as the secular Scripture. The emphasis placed on moral and ethic issues makes these first addresses truly epideictic in the classic understanding of the word. Although Washington was said to have taken his oath of office before 'the people', his actual audience consisted of a select congregation of congressmen and dignitaries, resembling a royal appearance before Parliament rather than a public address. For this reason, Washington himself was anxious to restrain any extravagance accompanying the speech for fear it would provoke imitations of future presidents aspiring to monarchy (cf. Tulis 1987: 49).

The second type was shaped by Jefferson and was to become the established form until Lincoln's address. The majority of these speeches serve to articulate the president's understanding of the republican principle, concentrating on controversial issues with regard to the Constitution which was, and still is, an object of reform. Some of the later speeches also addressed public policies, outlining the office holder's political objectives. Typically the relevant topics are presented on the basis of a list of enumerations. The third type prevailing from the Civil War into the twentieth century reversed the original form of address. Now presidents supplied the policy concerns first and, in a further step, those policies were legitimized on the grounds of republican principles however vaguely articulated. Accordingly, there are hardly any twentieth-century inaugural addresses in which the Constitution is mentioned.<sup>197</sup>

In sharp contrast, the first two decades of the twentieth-century bear witness to the radicalization of presidential discourse, transforming the executive branch into a 'rhetorical presidency'. There is general agreement that Wilson's two-term presidency marks a turning point in presidential history (e.g. Germino 1984, Tulis 1987, Goetsch 1993). Departing slightly from Tulis's typology of nineteenth-century inaugurals, Germino (1984) argues that Jefferson's first inaugural served as a model on the basis of which all ensuing presidents drafted and delivered their addresses. Accordingly, the inaugural was designed to "instruct the people in, and fortify their attachment to, true republican political principles" (Germino 1984: 33).

<sup>196</sup> In fact, John Adam's speech is "unintentional parody of Washington's first Address" (Tulis 1987: 49).

<sup>197</sup> As Tulis (1987: 119) remarks, Wilson changed his mind about the Constitution. While first subscribing to the traditional view that it is a timeless document, Wilson later adopted a historicist understanding, claiming that the meaning of the Constitution changed as a reflection of the prevailing thought of successive generations.

Furthermore, all office holders up to Wilson are assumed to have calibrated their policies in terms of “constitutional and republican principles” (Germino 1984: 33). In the opinion of some commentators Wilson twisted (cf. Ceaser et al. 1981) if not violated (e.g. Germino 1984) the Constitution due to his enhanced focus on presidential rhetoric. Wilson’s rhetoric suggests a re-interpretation of the idea of ‘the Nation’ in favor of a more activist role (Germino 1984: 8); the nation is personified and henceforth asserts its will (Germino *ibid.*: 9). The decisive keyword that is regularly used to pinpoint Wilson’s distinct outlook on presidential rhetoric and the presidential office is ‘interpretation’.<sup>198</sup>

- (8) There has been a change of government. It began two years ago, when the House of Representatives became Democratic by a decisive majority. It has now been completed. The Senate about to assemble will also be Democratic. The offices of President and Vice-President have been put into the hands of Democrats. What does the change mean? That is the question that is uppermost in our minds to-day. That is the question I am going to try to answer, in order, if I may, **to interpret the occasion.** (TWW I, 1)

Accordingly, Wilson places the emphasis on interpretation rather than judgment; his understanding of politics is aimed at more direct forms of democracy. Following his pragmatic and progressivist convictions his aim is to educate rather than form public opinion, based on a process of fathoming people’s desires (cf. Tulis 1987: 125). Compounding Tulis’s (1987) leader-interpreter view, Goetsch (1993: 14) states that Wilson did not content himself in being a moral and political leader; instead he intended to pressurize the legislature in decreeing publicity the foremost principle of representative government. Wilson’s rhetorical leadership consists in making everything the president says official (cf. Tulis 1987: 192); hence rhetoric is both political persuasion and manipulation.

While the break with nineteenth-century traditions is perhaps most drastic during his tenure, Wilson is not the first president to regularly address the public. The transition from nineteenth-century practices to the implementation of the rhetorical presidency occurred during Theodore Roosevelt’s tenure (cf. Goetsch 1993: 13). The idea that the president stood above partisan issues and that his duty consisted in reminding the people of national values and principles began to take shape during the progressive movement. Similarly, Tulis (1987: 117) argues that Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency marks the beginning of a new leadership style, in aiming to revive founding principles, to disseminate progressive thought, and to establish practical democracy, that is, truly democratic governance.

In contrast, some commentators (e.g. Gester 1993: 41f.) have argued for a changed understanding of the presidency coinciding with Harrison’s inaugural speech in 1889. Harrison (1889) provides a re-interpretation of the presidential oath of office. His investiture is reminiscent of a collective oath, symbolizing an act of solidarity and integration.

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<sup>198</sup> More precisely, Wilson altered two nineteenth-century prescriptions of presidential speech (cf. Tulis 1987: 133). Following Wilson, the character of important messages to Congress would be shaped by the development of standards for popular speech; Wilson modeled two forms of popular address. On the one hand, visionary speech, which is deployed to envision the future, taps the public’s feelings in creating rather than explaining principles. Its overall tone is both inspirational and moralistic. On the other hand, the so-called policy-stand speech aims at specificity without conveying too much information. Instead it should indicate where the president stands and what he would do regarding the issues of the day.

- (9) There is no constitutional or legal requirement that the President shall take the oath of office in the presence of the people, but there is so manifest an appropriateness in the public induction to office of the chief executive officer of the nation that from the beginning of the Government the people, to whose service the official oath consecrates the officer, have been called to witness the solemn ceremonial. **The oath taken in the presence of the people becomes a mutual covenant.** The officer covenants to serve the whole body of the people by a faithful execution of the laws, so that they may be the unfailing defense and security of those who respect and observe them, and that neither wealth, station, nor the power of combinations shall be able to evade their just penalties or to wrest them from a beneficent public purpose to serve the ends of cruelty or selfishness. (BHA, 1)

Harrison's invocation of the mutual covenant reintroduces a term loaded with political and theological significance since Puritan times; in making it a collective oath, Harrison includes the public, the people, to an extent not encountered before.

Another possible caesura is Franklin D. Roosevelt's four-tenure administration, entailing a marked shift in rhetorical situation.<sup>199</sup> Finkelstein (1981: 51) states that in 1933 "the traditional and accustomed inaugural emphasis on deliberation was replaced by an increased emphasis on ritualistic faith intensification." In his opinion (*ibid.*: 53), there are two factors that account for this new situation: immigration had reached another peak, making American society even more pluralistic and heterogeneous and the need for ritualistic components in inaugural rhetoric increased with the Great Depression. Finkelstein (1981) concludes that the new rhetorical form is a strategy of identification rather than persuasion.

The line of great communicators, all of which have exploited the latitude offered to the president by the Constitution, can be traced back to the era of the Early Republic. The course of development taken by the inaugural address also reflects the huge swings which took place in the national history. Although the nineteenth-century office holders were important pioneers in several respects, contributing their share to the 'experiments' made within the scope of the presidential office, they were not faced with comparable political, social, or historical conditions, let alone the degree of publicness of their twentieth-century successors. From the preceding discussion we may derive that inaugural addresses are not merely examples of ceremonial rhetoric delivered in a contemplative way; their function as amplifiers of the American public philosophy also assists in constructing socio-political realities. American political culture may be understood as a collective in which renewal and transmission are vital processes. Given this processual conception of the political system, it is no coincidence that presidential discourse can be modeled as a layered text consisting of several levels of historicity, all of which have a dynamism of their own.

## 5.2 The Inaugural Address as an Epideictic Genre

The preceding discussion has highlighted the fact that the American inaugural address fulfils vital political functions. This claim, however, is not easily reconciled with the conception of the inaugural as epideictic rhetoric, at least not in terms of the conceptions formed by

<sup>199</sup> If political factors such as a re-orientation in foreign policy are taken into consideration, one could also argue that McKinley's administration marks the beginning of the modern presidency. He is generally acknowledged to have redirected US foreign policy towards a more interventionist or internationalist stance.

previous accounts. Instead the notion of epideictic discourse has to be reviewed in order to elaborate on the criteria that could indeed serve to define the inaugural address as an epideictic genre without downplaying its political relevance. Prior to exploring these aspects in more detail, the vexing issue of genre will be addressed.

As mentioned earlier, there are currently two encompassing studies of inaugurals both of which present two completely opposite views while subscribing to the theoretical framework of the rhetorical presidency. Campbell/Jamieson (1990) propose a generic theory according to which the inaugural is one of nine distinct genres of presidential rhetoric. In contrast, Ryan (1993) advocates the existence of substantial differences between individual speeches which, in his eyes, necessitates a case-study approach to the analysis of inaugural addresses. This present study adopts an intermediate position.

Unlike Ryan, I will argue that a generic account is indeed tenable, depending on the criteria used, that is, including the cognitive representation of discourse. At the same time my account of epideictic discourse diverges from Campbell/Jamieson's (1990) in that it brings up to date the genre's tradition in strengthening the ties between politics and epideictic discourse.

The generic understanding of the inaugural address is appealing in several respects. Campbell/Jamieson (1990) have identified nine rhetorical genres of presidential public oratory, which have evolved to support the institution of the presidency. Whereas the authors differentiate between nine genres, strictly speaking there are only eight, since they make the somewhat arbitrary distinction between inaugurals and what they call 'special inaugurals', referring to the speeches of ascendant vice presidents. Apart from these two types, there are the following genres: State-of-the-Union Addresses, Veto Messages, War Rhetoric, Rhetoric to Forestall Impeachment, the Rhetoric of Impeachment, Pardoning Rhetoric and finally Farewell Addresses.

As the communicative practices have both multiplied and diversified, they have crystallized into distinct genres, each constrained by its particular goals and functions as well as the situative context. In general terms, genre may be defined as "a text or discourse type which is recognized as such by its users by its characteristic features of style or form, which will be specifiable through stylistic and text-linguistic/discourse-analysis, and/or by the particular function of texts belonging to the genre" (Malmkjaer 2004: 176). Swales's (1990) conception of genre adds another important aspect, namely the functional objectives of a given genre. Consequently, Swales (1990: 58) deploys genre as a more or less standardized "class of communicative events, the members of which share some set of communicative purposes." These purposes are mutually understood by the participants in that event and occur within a functional rather than a social or personal setting. More specifically, Swales (1990: 45-58) posits five criterial features of genre. First and foremost, an array of communicative events classifies as genre on the basis of shared purpose rather than similarities of form. Crucially, genres may have more than one communicative purpose in common. Second, a genre comprises communicative events in which communication is an integral part of the activity. While the frequency of their occurrence is not primarily important, the communicative event



itself has to be prominent within the discourse community. Third, the relationships between individual members of a genre are categorical rather than definitional. The genre coheres as a category based on resemblance, which is why members of the category may vary in their prototypicality. Fourth, there are generic constraints that determine the scope of what is communicatively permissible. This knowledge is not innate; it needs to be acquired even within the members of discourse communities. For this reason, Swales (1990: 52) draws a distinction between established or parent members and apprentice members of discourse communities. Finally, the analysis of a community's nomenclature for genres can be indicative of the social practice prevailing within a given discourse community.

Generic approaches (e.g. Finkelstein 1981, Campbell/Jamieson 1990, Gester 1993) to inaugurals imply that they are "defined by their pragmatic ends and typified by their substantive, stylistic and strategic similarities" (Campbell/Jamieson 1990: 6). Similarly, Finkelstein (1981: 51) states that the inaugural genre is characterized by the "distinct rhetorical situation and identifiable stylistic and substantive responses to that situation." As far as the stylistic and substantive similarities are concerned, these are most strikingly encountered in the inaugural's opening and closing paragraphs. Yet the president's speech is hardly a mere reflex of the rhetorical situation, in which he is simply acting within the scope permitted by the genre constraints. In the light of the general characteristics and functions of the inaugural outlined above, it is evident that generic features such as stylistics, functions, goals and strategies rather than the rhetorical situation, i.e. the festive occasion and the president's first official speech, are primarily relevant. Since stylistic features are not germane to the focus of this present study, only the shared functions and objectives will be briefly mentioned. For instance, the inaugural's key functions consist in perpetuating the American public philosophy, addressing short-term political issues, and refreshing cultural models. One potential objective would be to act in a socially productive way, i.e. where the incoming president set himself up as a legitimate leader.

According to Campbell/Jamieson (1990: 15) all inaugurals contain the following four generic defining criteria that distinguish them from other types of presidential discourse:

The presidential inaugural (1) unifies the audience by reconstituting its members as the people who can witness and ratify the ceremony; (2) rehearses communal values drawn from the past; (3) sets forth the political principles that will govern the new administration; and (4) demonstrates through enactment that the President appreciates the requirements and limitations of the executive functions.

These elements, by and large, converge with the characteristics and functions identified above. However, the authors' generic account of the inaugural is based on the assumption that inaugurals are an instance of epideictic rhetoric: "Presidential inaugurals are a subspecies of the kind of discourse that Aristotle called epideictic, a form of rhetoric that praises or blames on ceremonial occasions, [...], recalls the past and speculates about the future while focusing

on the present, [...] and amplifies or rehearses admitted facts” (Campbell/Jamieson 1990: 14).<sup>200</sup>

Yet it is difficult to acknowledge how these aspects apply to individual inaugurals at all, let alone from a generic perspective. The authors’ emphasis on contemplation, as opposed to deliberative and action-centered rhetoric, and on ceremony as the cornerstones of their generic approach is, at best, contentious. While not going to the same lengths as Ryan (1993: xviii), who states that “to conceive the inaugural as Aristotelian epideictic rhetoric, [...] has troublesome consequences. To assert that inaugurals aim toward contemplation tortures Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*,” it is nonetheless vital to redress the misconceptions and specify those aspects of the traditional conception of epideictic rhetoric that could indeed corroborate the inaugural as a type of epideictic discourse.

Aristotle’s classic typology, which was largely influenced by the political system of his time, differentiates between the three well-known *genera orationis* or rhetorical genres. Dreading powerful individuals for fear of demagoguery, classical theory only allowed for an epideictic that oscillated between functional and purely ornamental ends (cf. Vickers 1988: 54). In ancient Athens the only public form of epideictic discourse was the *laudatio funebris*, which was however restricted to the memorial of soldiers killed in action, and thus had a political motivation. The speech justified their deaths for a good cause, a virtue which consisted in personal sacrifice for the state’s hegemonic military success. More often than not it combined the *laudatio* on the deceased with (implicit) self-congratulation of the state (cf. Zinsmaier 1999: 379f.).

Epideictic discourse has occupied a marginal and much contested position in the rhetorical catalogue (cf. Götttert 1991: 17). However, its allegedly minor political significance results from both the rationale of Aristotle’s typology as well as the prevailing political practice at the time, which did not envision epideictic discourse becoming institutionalized. Yet the *genus demonstrativum* was not the only genre whose relevance for the actual political process has been misjudged. Just as the epideictic genre is underestimated for its political significance, so the *genus deliberativum* is overestimated in this respect. As Vickers (1988: 53) describes it, there was a considerable dichotomy: “Despite the rhetorician’s celebrations of the power of speech in open political gatherings, the fact is that oratory was never the sole source of political influence, and what power it had was always at the mercy of changes in the state.” In this niche the epideictic was able to develop a special status which offers considerable scope for interpretation. There are a number of commentators who argue that the “epideictic was to become the sole genre to survive intact” (Vickers 1988: 54). For example, Mainberger (1987:

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<sup>200</sup> More precisely, Campbell/Jamieson’ (1990: 15) attempt to substantiate their claims as follows: “[P]residential inaugurals are epideictic rhetoric because they are delivered on ceremonial occasions, link past and future in present contemplation, affirm or praise the shared principles that will guide the incoming administration, ask the audience to ‘gaze upon’ traditional values, employ elegant, literary language, and rely on ‘heightening of effect’ by amplification and reaffirmation of what is already known and believed.”

218) states that today's mass media are the continuation of the epideictic genre which would also include political advertising.

Another misconception concerns the allegedly contemplative tone, implying action without a goal, and the stylistic device of amplification. While it is true that *amplificatio* is the most important stylistic device in demonstrative speech, it is also employed as a tool of persuasion. This important political function was also recognized by Aristotle (1954: 1367b):

To praise a man is in one respect akin to urging a course of action. The suggestions which would be made in the latter case become encomiums when differently expressed. When we know what action or character is required, then, in order to express these facts as suggestions for action, we have to change and reverse our form of words. [...] Consequently, whenever you want to praise anyone, think what you would urge people to do; and when you want to urge the doing of anything, think what you would praise a man for having done. Since suggestion may or may not forbid an action, the praise into which we convert it must have one or other of two opposite forms of expression accordingly.

Aristotle clearly invokes the coercive potential of epideictic rhetoric. This results from the intimate relationship that traditionally exists between epideictic discourse and ethics. Epideictic discourse is ethically ambivalent since the substance that is being treated in the speech is framed according to the superordinate principle of noble vs. base. Its tendency towards praise and affirmation derives from reinforcing noble behavior, which however frequently implies censuring dispreferred practices. In the same vein, Matuschek (1999: 189) draws attention to the fact that praise itself is a highly suspicious concept, which may be used both normatively and correctively. Accordingly, praise is considered the appropriate response to virtuous behavior just as censure is thought to rightly discourage vice. Consequently, praise may be used as a discourse strategy that can easily be converted into formulating exigencies. Rewarding conformist actions implicitly censures, and discourages, would-be dissenters. Crucially, the selection of people, events or actions worthy of praise is an ideological act in itself. Contemporary cases in point are the praise of democracies, which censures so-called undemocratic states as objects of reform, or the promotion of New Europe, which demotes other nations as being Old Europe.

There is ample evidence for the existence of the praise-and-blame dichotomy in American political discourse. Historically it has played a major part in what I referred to as laudatory style in chapter 3, which is a form of rhetorical performance designed to praise and castigate candidates in electioneering. In hortatory discourse, which is concerned with moral and political issues beyond the personalities of the contestants, a shift of emphasis towards public exhortation above the personal level occurred. On the conceptual level, the ethic ambivalence persists, either in the shape of iconographic frames of reference (see chapter 2) or in the moral accounting metaphor that Lakoff ([1996] <sup>2</sup>2005) has identified in American politics.

Epideictic discourse is thus inherently antagonistic, even though the dichotomous pattern may only be implicit. Inevitably, there is a double edge to this genre; it is invariably praise-and-blame, affirmation and subversion. Epideictic rhetoric is intended to be antagonistic (cf. Matuschek 1999: 182), which also holds for the festivity itself: never are ceremonies

affirmative *tout court*, they are staged to be just that, or in Kopperschmidt's terms (1999: 10), they are affirmations that can be politically prescribed. As a result, the epideictic has a binary code (Kopperschmidt *ibid.*). For individuals, epideictic discourse could serve as an invective aimed at political opponents, especially when woven into other speech types, for example as digression; it is a subtle yet highly efficient way of foregrounding one's own virtues while vilifying other people's character. This binary code corresponds to the dual encoding of political reality and translates into the strategic functions of political language use, namely representation, coercion and legitimization.

Resulting from this double edge, the expressivity of epideictic rhetoric is based on the symbolic as well as on the propositional level. The symbolic level of abstractions reduces the specificity of statements in order to accommodate a mass audience in terms of the most common denominator. Traditionally, epideictic rhetoric refers to *certa* only (cf. Kopperschmidt 1999: 14), which can also be exploited ideologically. In the American context the (re-)assertion of these 'self-evident and uncontested truths' plays a significant role. To a degree, this involves authenticity, reinforcing the doctrine in the sense of 'we can afford the truth because we own it' (cf. Matuschek 1999: 185).

The (re-)affirmation of what is regarded as true and credible is linked to the time reference prevailing in epideictic rhetoric. Each of the three rhetorical genres of Aristotle's classification has a distinct time reference following an internal logic. Whereas the judicial genre refers to the past, the deliberative genre addresses issues with future time reference. Consequently, epideictic discourse is typically concerned with the present.<sup>201</sup>

This focus on temporality, however, extends into the past and future as well. Due to its characteristic event structure the epideictic genre frames the past in terms of present events, which is typically represented as a continuous, homogeneous process. Epideictic discourse is a major tool for the collective tribute to a community's or nation's past. The communal values inscribed in the past have a vast potential for identification.

Conversely, mere contemplative commemoration is rarely the case, as is captured by Assmann's ([1992] 2005) notion of cultural memory. In this function, epideictic discourse does not simply inform the public about the past; instead, the common past is re-enacted collectively, which converts ceremonies into media of recollection (cf. Miklautz 1999: 199). This is even more likely in political instances of recollection, a highly selective process that oscillates between self-indulgent glorification and oblivion towards less gratifying periods in the national history. Thus remembering, or recollecting, is an active process in which old connections between knowledge structures are re-established, even modified, and new ones are made. In this respect, conceptual metaphor is a vital cognitive tool due to the partiality of metaphorical mappings through which only some aspects or attributes of an entity are projected onto another. The collective memory, also called bonding memory (see chapter 2), enforces a specific interpretation of socio-political reality, which is conserved and perpetuated

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<sup>201</sup> Campbell/Jamieson (1990: 27) claim that "the time of epideictic rhetoric, including inaugurals, is the eternal present, [...] time out of time."

as a particular version of the past by the ceremonial event. It is through this version of the past that a nation or any other collective body achieves continuity. As a consequence, dispreferred interpretations as well as apparent discontinuities are veiled or glossed over in order not to lay bare the contiguity of constructs such as national identity (cf. Miklautz 1999: 199). In short, the incantation of communal values and a shared past is not confined to contemplation but has important symbolic and ideological functions. The social construct of cultural memory is selective and frames both present and future,<sup>202</sup> while the knowledge of the past is stored in biased event models.

In the event of presidential inaugurals the present is frequently conceptualized as a kind of crisis or decisive moment (cf. Gester 1993: 46), which is a rhetorical device that looks back on a long-standing tradition. Kairos as a discourse strategy is best explained in contrast to *chronos*, both of which have different underlying conceptions of time in discourse. While *chronos* represents the linearity of time as well as temporal sequence (chronology), *kairos* denotes opportune moments or critical intervals. The *kairotic* construction of the present against the background of the past is highly pervasive in the inaugural address. Crucially, it is linked to newness, itself a temporal concept (see chapter 4), which originates from a before-and-after or before-and-now situation. Moreover, newness as a motion concept may produce, even create this *kairotic* moment by providing the temporal outline of a given event — events being, by definition, couched in a temporal unit that is marked off by boundary events. Chapter 4 provided an in-depth analysis of the temporality of newness, underlining its double perspectivity. On the one hand, it has a retrospective effect because the construction of newness on the discourse level may cause the obliteration of existing, henceforth ‘old’ entities. On the other hand, newness may not simply be a replacement of the old but can be construed as a qualitative improvement that is simply added on, opening up better opportunities and prospects for the future.

To summarize the most important issues raised so far, the potential intersections of the American inaugural address and a modern adaptation of epideictic discourse are numerous. The reasons underlying the classification of the inaugural as epideictic rhetoric may not automatically derive from the Aristotelian system but from the subsequent development of the rhetorical genre itself.

A major drawback of previous studies emphasizing the ceremonial and contemplative character of the inaugural could be redressed by making a careful distinction between the ceremony itself and epideictic discourse. Festivity as a concept plays an indispensable role in cultural semiosis. As such it is liable to instrumentalization, particularly in view of the binary code of epideictic discourse on the one hand, and the double reality of the political on the

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<sup>202</sup> More precisely, the common past is a network of myths that has an impact on the perception of both present and future. Similarly, Gester (1993: 40) likens the visualization of national history to mythic imagery. The common past, however, foreshadows the description of the present, and to a lesser extent, that of the future. Ceremonial acts of nomination construct an image of the present seeking for acknowledgement. Programs of perception are provided, to the extent that description becomes prescription (cf. Miklautz 1999: 203).

other. It is significant that the overtly contemplative tone frequently veils the normativity in terms of which the audience is split into members and non-members of a particular group. A case in point is the exploitation of the inaugural address for discussing constitutional principles in the nineteenth-century or cold war propaganda in its twentieth-century context. Alternatively, the genre may be used to continue campaigning as exemplified above.

Second, the amplification and reaffirmation of national principles on the one hand and the invocation of American national history on the other are regular features of inaugural address. Accordingly, American history is depicted as exceptional, constituting an unbroken, linear process, which is marked by continuity despite individual kairotic intervals. Crucially, these communal values are not simply reiterated; instead the construct of the shared past is modified in rhetorical recollection, which frames both the present and the future. It provides an ideological structure on the basis of well entrenched cognitive models which function as points of reference in the perception of present occurrences. Ideologizing is also relevant with respect to the public philosophy. Guided by the principle of selectivity, the invocation of the American public philosophy is inherently divisive. As a consequence, the praise-blame dichotomy relentlessly prompts a certain degree of responsiveness on behalf of the audience.

Third, this ideological potential highlights the important political functions of epideictic discourse, particularly with respect to the enhanced importance of symbolic politics. But also in its Aristotelian sense, the epideictic genre was politically significant. As shown above, Aristotle recognized political praise as a persuasive tool whose double edge is based on the genre's ethical ambivalence. Strategic praise is highly selective on the one hand, while it tends to make sweeping generalizations on the other. This lack of specificity is particularly efficient in speeches designed for a mass audience. In today's world, epideictic discourse serves an important function: it provides suitable tools for the integration and cohesion of modern pluralistic societies.

By way of conclusion, the inaugural address may be classified as an epideictic genre, albeit for different reasons than the ones proposed in the majority of the existing research literature. The numerous similarities, particularly regarding the political functions, the rhetorical situation and some of the speech's standardized objectives, should not mistakenly mask the fact that the inaugural has considerably changed since its installation.

Systemic changes, such as the transformation of the American presidency, and changed discourse conditions such as the technologization, marketization or personalization of discursive practices, have all left their mark on the inaugural genre. Compounding these developments, the inaugural is also more than likely to be affected by shifting partisan perspectives or conflicting factional exigencies, in brief: the ever-changing agglomerate of a president, the discourse of an inaugural speech, and a historical context. This view has prompted Ryan (1993: xvii) to assert that any analysis of the inaugural should presuppose a *tabula rasa* in order not to be flawed by generic considerations. For this reason he proposes the methodology of the case study.

Conceiving the inaugural address as an integral part of presidential discourse resolves the genre discussion. By definition, "discourse is shaped by its contexts as discourse shapes its

context” (Johnstone 2002: 9). Discourse as a knowledge-based approach to language reveals the functional, stylistic and substantive similarities identifiable for the large majority of inaugural addresses.

### **5.3 Guiding Principles Underlying the Procedure**

This section provides an outline of the procedure on which the analysis is based in order to avoid the potential pitfalls any analysis of political discourse is faced with. I will outline general concerns and shortcomings of previous accounts on the basis of which the rationale for this present analysis will be established. In the process, I will first expose some of the more general conundrums involved in analyzing political speeches. Subsequently, I will clarify some methodological concerns prior to outlining the procedure of this present study against the background of the diverse shortcomings raised in the course of the chapter.

#### **Difficulties in Analyzing Political Speeches**

Due to its interdisciplinary nature political discourse analysis is almost predestined to be exposed to criticism from virtually all disciplinary angles it is concerned with. To political scientists, a linguistic analysis falls short of political acumen while to linguists, the role of language in the political process is frequently misjudged in studies that originated within a political science framework. The central challenge that work in this field appears to be confronted with is that political discourse analysis continues to be mistaken for a method of disclosure, aiming to unveil the ‘true meaning’ behind the haze of political uses of language.

Occasionally, this misguided understanding of political discourse analysis underlies the criticism voiced in view of the analysis of political speeches whose principal reliability is called into question. A second source of controversy appears to be the role of the analyst, particularly his or her position in a grey area between involvement and ‘scientific’ distance.

The extent to which speeches serve as a reliable indicator of a particular president’s leadership style is indeed a moot point. For this reason, it is useful to draw a clear distinction between the president’s role as a public figure and a leader on the one hand, and his role as the head of government on the other. While the two aspects are linked in reality, they need to be differentiated for the purpose of linguistic analysis. The president metonymically represents an administration at a specific historical time and context, which is reflected in discursive practices. And it is the linguistic coding as well as the cognitive representation of these discursive formations that should be of primary interest for linguistic analysis. Due to the dual encoding of political reality the president’s role is significant in that that any public statement relates to several levels of meaning simultaneously. Thus whenever a president delivers a formal, institutionalized speech he does so in his role as President of the United States, and not, as George W. Bush, for instance. Therefore, the issue of personality is not relevant to the analysis of presidential discourse, instead it is a question of delivery and rhetorical performance. In the analysis below, I frequently refer to the passages analyzed in terms such

as “President X argues, claims” and so on. Such references are not to be understood to express the president’s personal views as they are not retrievable in this context.

The authorship and personal aspect of political speeches can also be considered as marginal for another reason. The inaugural as an institutionalized form of address has never been an instance of spontaneous speech. Historically, the inaugural has invariably been carefully drafted by the President in cooperation with various aides. What is more, the speech transcripts were regularly made available in advance, which can be regarded as the forerunner of the modern press kit. Nonetheless, the tradition of speechwriting has also undergone considerable developments as it is tightly interwoven with the institution of the presidency itself.

### **The Tradition of Speechwriting**

Contrary to popular belief assistance in speechwriting has always been an issue for the office-holders dating back to George Washington himself. Evidently the growth of publicness and changes within the institution of the presidency across the decades, even centuries, have left their mark on presidential discourse as well as its speechwriting practices. In more general terms, the changes to be observed across time are systemic rather than resulting from external socio-political necessity. Furthermore, the significance of speechwriting in presidential speeches is not to be overrated. In their exposure to the diversified challenges of rising publicness, the presidential office-holders rely on speechwriting staff for mere pragmatic reasons of efficiency. The steady increase in direct public appeals, the institutionalization of the speechwriting staff and the reliance on public relations experts are but the most prominent factors.<sup>203</sup>

More specifically, however, American presidents have not all relied on the crafts of speech writers to the same degree. American presidents up to Woodrow Wilson can be generally assumed to have written their own speeches, although it is safe to believe that this did not occur without the assistance of presidential aides. It is also generally believed that the first full-time speechwriter of an American president was under contract to Warren G. Harding (cf. Medhurst 2003: 5). However, it is a long way from the 1920s to a permanent speechwriting office as is common practice with more contemporary administrations. From the White House’s official website we derive the following information: “The Office of Speechwriting is charged with crafting the President's message in formal speeches and other remarks.” Moreover the Office of Speechwriting consists of several departments, one of which, for example specializes in foreign policy speeches.

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<sup>203</sup> Tulis (1987: 185) adopts a more critical perspective of what he refers to as the “speechwriting shop.” He contends that the Office of Speechwriting is the locus rather than the annex of policy-making in the White House. Tulis conceives of another important point, i.e. the impact of institutionalized speechwriting on routinization. A great deal of the speeches are scheduled considerably before they are delivered, which means that the knowledge of a given topic is not up to date with current affairs at the time of text production. This may cause speechwriting staff to even invent an issue.



The actual impact of presidential speech crafting is difficult to evaluate. This haziness results from a deficiency in systematic observations of White House staff influence since material sources, for example drafts of speeches, are frequently unavailable. In addition, the speechwriting team consists of several players, not all of whom are likely to have an impact on the president's final decision during the composition process. Finally, the speechwriting staff are not the only determinant of presidential discourse. On the contrary we have to conceive of the entire process as a multi-staged negotiation process between the speech crafters and the president's think tank of political advisers. It is only at the very end of the assembly line that the president publicizes the end product. Rather than analyzing presidential discourse as indicative of a particular president's intellectual capacities — although it might be said that it occasionally shows — the study of presidential rhetoric as discourse aims to uncover the patterns and mechanism at work while the overall conditions of discourse production can be assumed to be stable across a certain period of time.

### **The Role of the Political Discourse Analyst**

The analysis of political discourse frequently produces queries on yet another level: that of the role and position of the political analyst. For this reason it is crucial for the analyst to position him/herself and to lay bare the disciplinary understanding and methodological framework used. In qualitative-interpretative approaches to discourse the contention of 'positivism' appears to be omnipresent. This critique partly results from the act of interpretation itself, which is frequently compared to imposing a rigid grid of preconceived ideas onto the linguistic material. Partly, however, the difficulties encountered originate from the temporality, if not the historicity of discourse. As such, any text or discourse may be deemed as inaccessible for interpretative analysis and is liable to historical and cultural distortion, which is why "a reflexive understanding of personal positionality is a prerequisite for the analyst" (Hyatt 2005: 520). While it is true that critical self-reflection is mandatory on behalf of any analyst in order to avoid the trap of the observer's paradox, it is particularly relevant with respect to the study of political language:

To ensure that an act of textual analysis is valuable as a disclosing device rather than itself an act of ideological cloaking and masquerade, it is necessary for the analyst to be open about his/her positionality, to attempt to offer a reflexive account of the interpretation, to be aware that textual encodings are polysemic, and to emphasize the centrality of the context of the production and reception of texts. (Hyatt 2005: 520)

Nevertheless the possibilities for achieving positionality and a sufficient amount of contextualization are restricted. What is worse, however, is the risk of overstating as well as overrating the role of the discourse analyst. The emphasis on 'disclosure' as a valid aim of textual analysis imposes too strong a constraint on the analysis, even against the background of the analyst's general awareness of interpretations other than his/her own. The stipulation of revelation has been (mis)understood as an inherent claim of objectivity. The disclosure of 'hidden' meanings of discourse is not to be confused with possessing an objectivist analytical

angle. Indeed it is to be regarded as a slant that may be particularly detrimental for the analysis of political discourse since the mechanical ascription of manipulative language prevents the possibility of impartial descriptivism. Impartiality does not mean, however, that the analyst is politically neutral, thus re-inviting objectivism through the backdoor. For this reason it is the analyst's responsibility to distinguish between primary and secondary goals of analysis, which means "to first consider political language as discourse, and only secondly as politics" (Wilson 2001: 399).

In practice the emotive stance of aiming to catch politicians in the act of manipulating language — based on the assumption that they are professional wordsmiths and liars — is both unprofessional and opinionated for it implies that "politicians actively create for us a specific cognitive environment which directs our thinking on various issues" (Wilson 1990: 9f.). Moreover, there is a general belief that the aim of political discourse analysis is to uncover the rhetorical techniques used by politicians. If this were the case, the analyst would assume a position of superiority since it could be inferred that only he/she is capable of this insight.<sup>204</sup> Instead the aim of the analysis can only be a (critically) descriptive account of the representation of socio-political realities. From a linguistic perspective the emphasis should be placed on the modes and patterns of representation rather than providing the kind of evaluative assessment encountered in investigative journalism, for example. Moreover the interpretation should not reflect the analyst's political conviction.

### Methodological Remarks

This section resumes some of the points raised in chapter 1, where the major methodological frameworks available for Critical Discourse Studies and Cognitive Linguistics were introduced. This present discussion focuses on the pragmatic, even practical concerns of the methodologies that underlie this present corpus-based analysis, which combines the three-staged analysis typical of CDA with the tools of CMT.

Corpus analysis can be broadly categorized as consisting of quantitative and qualitative analysis. While these two types of analysis constitute different approaches to the study of linguistic data, their perspectives are not necessarily irreconcilable. Ultimately, the method used depends on the questions and phenomena that are being researched.

The major advantage of **quantitative studies** lies in the potential for generalizing their findings. Provided that the sampling and significance techniques are valid and compatible, direct comparisons between different corpora can be made on the basis of statistical evidence. Quantitative research involves classifying and counting features on which Aristotelian categories are built. The results gained are indicative of what constitutes 'frequent' as opposed to 'rare, 'normal' as opposed to 'abnormal', variant discourse behavior. This is particularly insightful when investigating language variation or language change.

In other instances, however, this both rigid and idealistic classification can be a stumbling block to studying linguistic phenomena that are difficult to subject to clear-cut categorization,

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<sup>204</sup> Wilson (1990: 11) criticizes this kind of involvement as a kind of 'chauvinism' on behalf of (critical) linguists.

which, in fact holds for the majority of categories in human language. While polysemy, multiple category membership or metaphorical meaning are by no means insurmountable barriers for quantitative studies, they continue to be a challenge that has, so far, not been met with in an entirely compelling way.

The goal of **qualitative corpus analysis** is to provide a complete, detailed description of the phenomena under scrutiny. As it does not tend to impose a rigid and finite number of classifications on the data, qualitative research is sensitive to finer distinctions and may even detect ambiguities and peripheral cases that would otherwise have gone unnoticed. Qualitative analysis stands for richness and precision, to the extent that it permits valuable insights into notoriously difficult phenomena such as metaphorical meanings. Although a growing number of quantitative analyses of metaphorical meaning have recently been published, the actual insights derived from frequency counts of source domains is limited — unless, of course, the findings are sufficiently explained and contextualized. Prior to specifying the method used in the analysis at hand I will further elaborate on the use of qualitative or quantitative methods in CL and CDA.

In terms of methodological awareness the two disciplines are largely incompatible. As has been seen in chapter 1, CDA has traditionally incorporated the methodologies of sociology, a field that is grounded in empirical research, whereas CL has only recently grown more generally aware of methodology and receptive to sociolinguistic tenets. A discussion of methodologies is thus long overdue. In this context Gibbs (2007: 7) draws attention to the fact “that there are very few writings on methods in cognitive linguistics,” which manifests itself in the virtual absence “of reliable, replicable methods that can be employed to identify words as metaphorical, or for relating systematic patterns of entire expressions to underlying conceptual metaphors” (Gibbs *ibid.*). In addition to the lack of methodological awareness, CL is still characterized by its deficiency in data-driven research although this claim does not hold for all branches of CL to a similar degree (see below).

The reticence to incorporate empirical research as well as a fully contextualized conception of language study appears to be significant, considering Geeraerts’s (2006) fervent plea for the inclusion of empirical research to a larger and more systematic extent than has been the case so far. Geeraerts (2006: 23ff.) specifies several characteristics of empirical research that make it eligible for CL. First and foremost, empirical research must be data-driven, which precludes the study of individual and isolated linguistic phenomena. Second, Geeraerts (*ibid.*) claims that empirical research must involve quantitative methods, preferably on the basis of statistical tests. Another integral part of empirical work is the formulation and operationalization of hypotheses on the one hand and the “empirical cycle” (cf. Geeraerts *ibid.*: 24), i.e. several analytical stages of data collection or the testing and interpretation of hypotheses, on the other. Geeraerts’s (2006: 28ff.) rationale for the need to include quantitative research can be pinpointed to three characteristics of Cognitive Linguistics: “its very cognitive nature, the usage-based perspective it takes, and the importance it attaches to contextualizing linguistic structures.”

The first issue is actually a moot point as it touches upon the controversial issue of introspection, resulting from the long shadows cast by the innateness principle of generative grammar. Geeraerts (2006) proposes two remedies to redress these ills: if CL self-identifies as a cognitive science, it should embrace the experimental techniques of other cognitive sciences such as psychology, computer modeling or neuroscience. Alternatively, it could depart from the introspective methodology in favor of a more varied set of analytical tools. Second, Geeraerts (*ibid.*: 29) states that CL has adopted usage-based approaches to grammar, i.e. accounts of cognitive grammar that derive from actual uses of language. Finally, Geeraerts (*ibid.*) points to the contextualized conception of language within CL, which not only entails an ‘experientialist’ as opposed to an ‘objectivist’ understanding of the human mind but also includes the social and cultural context as key variables of linguistic research, irrespective of its theoretical, and methodological persuasion.

Whether or not introspection may pass as a reliable methodology is, in fact, subject to contention as it depends on the phenomena that are being analyzed. Geeraerts’s (2006: 30) proposal of resorting to the experimentation of psychology or neuroscience is not feasible for all theoretical standpoints within the CL method. Interestingly, the field of Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) is absent from the discussion,<sup>205</sup> although alongside Cognitive Grammar it has been a particularly productive line of research for almost three decades now, chiefly based on introspective methods. Similarly, Gibbs (2007: 3) argues that “within cognitive linguistics particularly, a scholar’s trained intuitions seem essential in being able to uncover language-mind links, such as the mental spaces, the image schemas, the conceptual metaphors (...) that have now become a major foundation for cognitive linguistic theories of human conceptual systems.” Although these intuitive methods have indeed produced viable results, Gibbs (2007) emphasizes the need for a more transparent explication of the methods used, possibly including experimental techniques.<sup>206</sup> Yet he does not conclude that cognitive linguists should mechanically commit themselves to experimental and computational methods, but rather that they should continue to do what they are most proficient in (cf. Gibbs 2007: 16).

This is a compelling argument since the conceptual metaphors and metonymies identified by introspective methodology have not only been corroborated by other methodologies used, including quantitative methods (e.g. Charteris-Black 2005), but they have also been proved to be surprisingly stable and consistent for a number of distinct discourse types. While it is true that some of the early accounts (e.g. Lakoff/Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1993 or Kövecses 2002)

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<sup>205</sup> This claim needs to be specified in that Geeraerts (2006: 30) does mention some recent work on cultural models, focusing on their role in the processing of beliefs and so-called common-sense assumptions about language and its varieties.

<sup>206</sup> In this context, Gibbs (2007: 7f.) issues a number of recommendations from which research in cognitive linguistics would greatly benefit. These guidelines include the potential falsification of hypotheses, the consideration of alternative explanations, and the possibility that language understanding involves more than one single type of cognitive processing. In order to put these recommendations into practice, the hypotheses tested by empirical methods would have to be possibly false, the explanations provided would have to account for a variety of reasons for the systematicity of, say, a set of conceptual metaphors, and finally, comprehension would also have to be determined by the auditory and visual channels but would also involve competences other than speaking, such as reading or hearing, for example.

are not exactly data-driven — with their exemplification being confined to a few more or less systematic examples taken from ordinary language (with the exception of Lakoff/Turner 1989 or Gibbs 1994) — the findings generally tend to be replicable. Importantly, recent work in this field, applying CMT to political discourse (e.g. Musolff 2004 or Charteris-Black 2005) is hinged on these earlier findings, extending them by virtue of the methodologies of CDA. This development is significant for it redresses a number of ills that have plagued CMT from the beginning, namely its tendency to study decontextualised, isolated metaphors on the sentence level. By way of conclusion, ongoing research in CMT would benefit from more transparency and systematicity, which could be achieved by providing a clear explication of the procedure.

The second point raised by Geeraerts (2006), the need for usage-based accounts in cognitive linguistics, is not germane to my focus here, yet I will briefly comment on it. The compatibility of interaction-based or conversation-analytic frameworks and cognitive linguistics is not straightforward. One of the reasons why usage-based accounts and cognitive linguistics have long been perceived as incompatible is the adherence to innate and universalist principles within the CL framework, which are irreconcilable with a constructivist theory of meaning, which, in turn, is central to the understanding of spoken discourse. The online processing of meaning that typifies linguistic interactions is reflected in the notion of construal within the cognitive linguistic paradigm. Lee (2001: 170) pinpoints the major challenges encountered when combining cognitive linguistics with discourse analysis:

The idea that everyday social talk involves an ongoing process of construal raises a number of questions for the analysis of discourse. It suggests, for example, that communication will be successful to the extent that participants succeed in aligning their construals — a process that may involve ongoing negotiation as the discourse unfolds. It also suggests that misunderstandings and arguments are likely to arise in situations where there are significant discrepancies in this regard. In other words, the process of construal should be a major focus of discourse analysis.

The significance of construal, i.e. “the way a language user chooses to ‘package’ and ‘present’ a conceptual representation as encoded in language” (Evans 2007: 40f.), in online meaning construction entails a number of constructivist processes such as radiality, selectivity, foregrounding, framing and perspectivization, all of which serve to distinguish between prototypical and peripheral members of a given category while stipulating the principal open-endedness of the categories themselves (cf. Lee 2001: *ibid*).

The third point made by Geeraerts (2006), the alleged contextualizing approach of CL, touches on two fundamental tenets of CL at the same time. The first of them, the ‘generalization commitment of CL’ (cf. Evans/Green 2006), which refutes the modular view of language pertinent to ‘objectivist’ views of language,<sup>207</sup> has been mentioned on various occasions; the second tenet, contextualization, also involves the social and cultural context. While the former is rather straightforward and has been a standard commitment in the study

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<sup>207</sup> Kövecses (2006: 8-12) distinguishes between an objectivist and an experientialist view of language, which propose different conceptions about the mind — the former argues for a modular while the latter stands for a holistic conception of the human mind — and the relationship of mind and language. The objectivist view holds that the world is essentially prestructured with the conceptual system merely reflecting the structure of the world. In contrast, the experientialist view is grounded in the human conceptualizer’s interaction with the largely unstructured world.

of polysemy within cognitive semantics, the latter is a notoriously difficult area and has been severely criticized. The criticism relates partly to the issues raised in chapter 4, such as the lack of emphasis placed on cultural input in conceptualization, and partly to those voiced in chapter 1, where conceptual metaphor was argued to be a sentence phenomenon with traditional approaches to CMT. Similarly, Leezenberg (2001: 150) advocates the context-dependence of metaphorical interpretation. More precisely, Leezenberg (*ibid.*) takes the locus of metaphor to be the sentence in context rather than the sentence or utterance in isolation. The inattention to contextual factors characterizes the majority of ‘conceptualist’ approaches to metaphor. According to Leezenberg (2001: 270), “conceptualists take metaphorical mappings between decontextualized conceptual domains as resulting from universal and cross-culturally constant cognitive processes.”

In the light of these observations, the methodology of CDA appears to be the ideal complement to CMT. Indeed, conceptual metaphor has proved to be a useful tool in studying the ideological representation of socio-political realities. The partiality of metaphorical mappings serves to reduce complexities in ideological discourse structures. Uncovering these mechanism permits viable insights into the hidden ideology of political reasoning. By and large the compatibility of CDA and CMT is fairly straightforward:

[...] some mental processes must exist which link text production and text comprehension to both [sic] explicit utterances, text and talk as well as to social phenomena. This becomes most apparent while analyzing phenomena such as attitudes towards language (behavior), as well as stereotypes and prejudices held about specific social groups. Moreover, when studying identity constructions or narratives of the past, we are confronted with perceptions, beliefs, opinions and memories as essential parts of these discursive processes; of course, all these notions (such as ‘collective memories’ or ‘imagined communities’) inherently label cognitive processes which need to be spelled out [...]. (Wodak 2006: 180)

Analyzing political ideologies by virtue of conceptual metaphors invites some interesting parallels. As Wodak (*ibid.*) observes, cognitive processes cannot be studied directly, neither can ideologies. Both processes can only be studied across time in identifying the specific entailments and inferences of conceptual metaphors on the one hand, and the socio-political changes resulting from ideological tensions on the other.

However, there are a number of aspects that make CDA and CL approaches to the study of language difficult to reconcile. The constructivist conception of meaning as one potential setback has been mentioned earlier. Another obvious and recurrent concern is the discrepancy between the cognitive linguistic focus on mental models and CDA’s notion of social cognition. The knowledge structures stored in social cognition are typified by historicity and tend to be rather stable as they are held in long-term memory as schematizations of experience, i.e. frame-like structures. Wodak’s critique (2006) of Lakoff’s (2004) equation of frame-setting as the equivalent of agenda-setting is most compelling. Wodak (*ibid.*: 185) argues that a change of frames, as is contended by Lakoff (2004) could indeed be difficult, provided that frames are reflective of belief systems that “are cognitively and emotionally deeply embedded and also have historical roots” (Wodak 2006: 185)

Despite the affinities between CDA and CMT, the full potential of conceptual metaphor as an analytical tool for CDA has not been exhausted. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) identifies three analytical stages: description (or identification), interpretation and explanation. These stages reflect the general modes of organization of discourse. The description stage involves a functional analysis of representation in discourse. At the interpretation stage, the analysis revolves around textual cues that can be used for discourse processing, i.e. the meaning construction as understood in cognitive linguistics in terms of the notion of construal. The explanation stage investigates the relationship between discourse and social context, which in CDA is typically associated with Marxism and Critical Theory.

The preceding discussion has outlined some of the guiding principles of CMT within the frameworks of CDA and cognitive linguistics. In what follows, I will relate these points to the analysis at hand.

The methodology on which this analysis is based arises from the phenomenon that is being researched. Despite the increasing tendency to place rather one-sided emphasis on qualitative research in CL and, to a lesser extent in CDA, this corpus-based study of presidential discourse is conducted on the basis of qualitative methods. Its objective necessitates richness and precision rather than generalization and quantification. This is not to deny the general validity of quantitative methods in investigating metaphorical meaning, yet the more principal queries produced by quantitative research are succinctly pinpointed by Schegloff (1993: 101): “Let me begin, then, by remembering that one is also a number, the single case is also a quantity, and statistical significance is but one form of significance.” Thus plurality of methodologies is usually preferable to a strong bias in favor of one single method, as methodological choice should be determined by the research questions rather than by the alleged superiority of quantifiable results. This is particularly important if reasoning on methodology is to avoid the pitfalls of the conceptual metaphor MORE IS BETTER.

The qualitative method is motivated by the focus of this present investigation on the construal of *newness* in presidential discourse. Generally speaking, if a complex phenomenon is studied from a discourse-centered perspective, there is a prevalence of interpretative approaches. The construal of *newness* does not draw on individual metaphors but on a system of related metaphors, the so-called event-structure metaphor. Unlike previous accounts of critical metaphor analysis I argue that metaphorical meaning does not derive from individual ‘words’. Instead, metaphorical meaning will be shown to be supported by both the lexical and grammatical elements of discourse, which together build the conceptual representation of discourse. To a degree this addresses the issues raised by Gibbs (2007), who argues that the lack of systematicity on the one hand, and the vagueness of metaphorical meaning itself on the other have proved to be major drawbacks in research using CMT. Faced with studying connected pieces of discourse and frequently even on the sentence level, it is difficult to determine what exactly are the words and phrases that express metaphorical meanings. There is a strong possibility that there will be more than one expression reflecting or carrying a metaphorical meaning. In previous conceptual metaphor accounts metaphorical meaning has

tended to be attributed solely to nouns and verbs. While this is in general agreement with the participant structure that forms the conceptual core within a sentence, this narrow focus has to be extended in two respects. More precisely, metaphorical meaning is expressed by all content words, including adjectives, as well as temporal and locational adverbs. The latter, however, do not typically belong to the conceptual core of a sentence. In their syntactic function as adjuncts, they are assigned non-participant roles. Crucially, the temporal and spatial meaning they convey is frequently metaphorical as well, motivated by underlying conceptual metaphors.

As with all methodological issues, it is ultimately a question of establishing clear criteria and applying them consistently and systematically to the linguistic data. Gibbs (2007: 8) formulates possible hypotheses which could be useful for more systematicity within ongoing conceptual metaphor research. Two of them in particular are germane to this present study and will be briefly outlined. One helpful hypothesis consists in drawing a distinction between diachronic and synchronic assessments of metaphorical meaning. Accordingly, it may be argued that “conceptual metaphors motivate why certain words and expressions have acquired their various figurative/metaphorical meanings over time (...), but play no role in how contemporary speakers use and understand conventional and novel metaphorical expressions” (Gibbs *ibid.*). The second hypothesis relates to the notion of whether or not conceptual metaphors are employed automatically. In other words, provided that conceptual metaphors are part of speakers’ conceptual systems, they may be or may not be a prerequisite for processing metaphorical meaning in that they “motivate why certain words and expressions have the meaning they do” (Gibbs *ibid.*: 9). As far as the corpus of inaugural addresses is concerned, both hypotheses are relevant as the dual encoding that characterizes political uses of language frequently combines the processing of literal and metaphorical meanings.

This present analysis proposes to close another gap in that it will focus on the interpretation stage of the three-fold analytical process typical of analyses within the CDA framework. While CDA has made use of conceptual metaphor theory, it has not sufficiently recognized the input cognitive linguistics provides at the interpretation stage. Empirical work in CDA is characterized by the tripartite analysis consisting of description (which is sometimes referred to as identification), interpretation and explanation. Evidently these three component parts are not to be understood as separate, isolated units but are interlocking stages of a comprehensive analytical process. The emphasis placed on the interpretation stage manifests itself in the fact that the metaphorical meaning that motivates discourse processing is argued to be entrenched by both the lexical and grammatical elements within a given discourse unit, which provide two different perspectives on the cognitive representation of discourse.

The description/identification stage is concerned with formal properties, which includes the vocabulary used, the prevalent grammatical structures or textual structures in more general terms. Fairclough (2001: 92f.) identifies three types of values that may be attached to both lexical and grammatical categories. These will be explained at the beginning of chapter 6.



The explanation stage typically revolves around the relationship between discourse and context, more precisely “the social determination of the process of production and interpretation, and their social effects” (Fairclough *ibid.*: 22). What is more, the notion of explanation also involves a dual perspective on discourse, which is central to the construal of *newness* as will be seen below. Discourse as social practice is based on bidirectionality, i.e. the tenet that discourse shapes the world as the world is shaped by discourse. As a consequence, current discourse conditions and their prevalence for specific discursive formations are an inevitable product of past power struggles and can only be understood when these are uncovered by virtue of analytical retrospection. However, discourse structures are also relevant from a prospective angle, as (current) social practice is likely to have an impact on emergent discursive formations. All in all, the explanation stage thus involves contextualization, including the political, historical and cultural context, which has been provided in the preceding chapters. It is uncontested that context provides a linguistic unit with a semantic value. Croft/Cruse (2004: 102f.) distinguish between several contextual constraints. I will adapt three of them for the study at hand, but not without first specifying them. First, there is the linguistic context, which consists of several components of which the discourse type is most relevant here. According to the authors this criterion includes the issues of genre, register and the field of discourse. As regards the inaugural address, this type of context specifies the inaugural as an official speech and an instance of public rhetoric, attests a high degree of formality and typifies it as a genre of presidential discourse. Second, the socio-cultural context rather than the social context is particularly significant for the analysis of meaning construction in the inaugural address as a paradigmatic case of American presidential discourse. While the social context, more precisely the power relations that may be inscribed in distinct types of social interaction, is valid in all kinds of discourse, the power relations with respect to the analysis of presidential discourse are too obvious to be worth commenting on. More importantly, the kind of situation invoked by the distinct political culture appears to be a much stronger constraint on the construal of meanings.

A third crucial determining factor is the impact of stored knowledge, i.e. “a vast store of remembered experiences and knowledge, which is capable of affecting the likelihood of particular construals” (Croft/Cruse 2004: 103). However, this is only one component part of the context of knowledge. With respect to American presidential discourse, in fact all types of public political discourse, a distinction between social context, an action system, and the cultural context, an ideational if not ideological system, is vital. This mixture of activity-based and ideational components is one major characteristic of political discourse. Rather than focusing on the social context, it is therefore more appropriate to dissociate the social level and cultural context on the level of analysis. Moreover, a substantial portion of what is generally considered as metaphorical meanings by virtue of conceptual metaphor theory is in fact part of a body of cultural and historical constructs. While the more subtle distinction between cultural-historical constructs and conceptual metaphors is not the primary focus here, the observation that this difference is meaningful is still important. Although a great deal of these stored knowledge structures are interculturally relevant, if not included as the default

mode of cultural models across the western world, it is not the most relevant fact for the analysis., this being the framing of these concepts that occur within a given political culture. A case in point is the notion of body politic, which has served a wide range of political systems to legitimize and represent socio-political structures and relations. This adaptability derives from the historicity of political concepts but also from the potential open-endedness of category membership. Last but not least, it demonstrates that the frames of knowledge further constrain the meaning construction within a specific linguistic and cultural context.

Prior to beginning with the analysis, I will point out a minor technicality concerning the classification of the inaugural addresses. Rather than imposing a strong bias on the study in subdividing them according to political and historical parameters, I will refer to the inaugurals as nineteenth and twentieth century inaugurals, respectively. The division is strictly chronological and for reasons of simplicity nineteenth-century inaugurals include the eighteenth-century inaugurals by Washington and Adams, comprising all speeches up to McKinley's first inaugural. McKinley's inaugurals are classified as twentieth-century inaugurals as his tenure extends into the twentieth century. This group also encompasses the first two inaugurals of the twenty-first century as they would hardly build a significant sub-group by themselves. Therefore, any changes observed derive immediately from the analysis itself. The systematic patterns identified result from the deployment of the concept of NEWNESS in the construal of major political events.

## 6. The Analysis of Newness in American Presidential Discourse

This central section analyzes the event of newness in the American inaugural address, based on the procedure that was outlined in the preceding chapter. In keeping with the three-stage analysis of CDA — identification, interpretation and explanation — on the one hand, and the principles of corpus-based qualitative analysis by virtue of cognitive-linguistic tools on the other, this present study is structured as follows.

Guided by these principles, the analysis aims to lay bare the entrenchment of the concept of NEWNESS in the American inaugural address, and by extension, in American presidential discourse. More specifically, the study has a two-fold objective that consists of examining the construal of *newness* in presidential discourse and uncovering the mechanisms of how this particular construal is conducive to the representation and perpetuation of ideological discourse structures. The former involves the analysis of the general metaphor NEWNESS IS A SUBEVENT OF MOTION whereas the latter relates to the more specific mapping, the extended metaphor THE AMERICAN NATION IS A NEW NATION, for which AMERICA IS INNOVATION represents the shorthand formula.

In view of the construal of *newness* in American presidential discourse, the degree to which the NEWNESS domain has actually penetrated both discourse organization and discourse structures is of primary importance and manifests itself on the sentence level and beyond. Therefore the entire analysis bifurcates into two sub-analyses consisting of the investigation of local meanings chiefly on the sentence level and second, the study of more global structures of meaning, which may be viewed as discourse meanings.

In either case, the study identifies and interprets the construal of political events as framed by newness and reveals the strategic function in the representation and perpetuation of ideological discourse structures.

The identification stage is not confined to singling out relevant discourse units or structures but also involves categorizing the conceptual representations identified in terms of larger knowledge structures such as frames. The knowledge of NEWNESS is represented and organized within several frames of American political cognition, which have been identified as socio-political, cultural-historical and economic. The socio-political frame was found to be the most substantial one, while the other two frames are, by and large, derived from it. These variants do however not represent a category of their own and are therefore absent from the analysis. Crucially, the identification stage is not pre-analytical, but is an integral part of the overall analysis as it is a knowledge-driven process itself. Conceiving of language as discourse rests on the assumption that there is a bidirectional relationship between language and world. This is consequential for the analysis itself since it builds on previous knowledge, which may be text-external, inclusive of the input of the cultural, historical, political and social context, or the (meta-)linguistic, i.e. derived from the cognitive representation of concepts. Crucially, however, both types of knowledge, world and linguistic, feed into the production and the reception of the text, here the inaugural address. This knowledge may include information on

what a political text encompasses and what strategies are typically used (see chapter 2). As discourses are shaped by previous discourse and as they continue to shape other discourses, the methodology requires a historical perspective that traces back contemporary discourse structures to the various influences they have been subject to across time (see chapter 3). As to the encyclopedic representation of knowledge structures, the analysis of an individual concept such as NEWNESS also involves researching the conceptual structure of this particular domain and more precisely, the organization of knowledge structures within the domain itself as well as its contiguity to other domains (see chapter 4). It is an important part of the analysis to draw attention to the contextual factors that have influenced discourse, to make them transparent and available and to use them for the explanation of the discourse(s) analyzed.

In spite of being essentially corpus-based, the methodology involves a circular process that includes text and context on the one hand and theory and analysis on the other. This bidirectionality manifests itself in the fact that textual and contextual analysis fuel one another to the extent that their epistemology is tightly interwoven; in practice, this means that the linguistic material is regarded as both the product and process of a knowledge-based approach to the production and reception of discourse. The contextual factors, which are themselves part and parcel of social cognition, have an impact on all three analytical stages, including all the frames identified. First, previous knowledge is pivotal in the identification stage of the analysis as it guides the selection of relevant discourse structures and helps to systematize the material. Second, the interpretation of specific discourse structures is also knowledge-driven for it involves the meaning construction and representation processes that are operative in the deployment of concepts on the discourse level. Finally, the explanation stage further contextualizes discourse processing in drawing attention to the knowledge structures available beyond the text-semantic representation, for example, in the shape of cognitive models, whether cultural, event-based or of another type, that have an experiential basis and are stored in cultural memory.

It is against the background of these fundamental principles that the chapter outline mirrors the analytical procedure. Importantly, the individual stages of the study are not to be understood as isolated components. Instead, they are integral parts focusing on different aspects of an interlocking analytical process, which is rounded off by the so-called explanation stage. The division into subchapters is thus indicative of a division of labor without suggesting a piecemeal approach.

## **6.1 Introduction: Newness in the Socio-Political Frame**

The initial stage of the analysis has exposed the cognitive representation of NEWNESS in terms of the mapping NEWNESS IS A SUBEVENT OF MOTION. It was found that the domain of NEWNESS not only tends to interact with other motion concepts such as time and change, for example, but that it is a specific-level concept included in the metaphor system of the event structure metaphor (ESM). As a result, it was hypothesized that the concept of NEWNESS is deployed by discourse in terms of a language-specific format that encodes the notion of

recategorized properties, i.e. lexical and grammatical categories that lend themselves to specifying a subcategory of another entity. In lexical terms this means that the domain of NEWNESS is chiefly realized by the linguistic category *adjective*, the adjective *new*, a category that by definition qualifies other concepts by virtue of individual properties, hence their ‘newness’. Adjectives tend to define subcategories in terms of single categorial attributes.

From a grammatical perspective, the adjective *new* performs its predictable function as a premodifier in NPs of varying degrees of complexity. Alternatively, adjectives can be, to a degree, used like an adverb, in that they specify the manner or the setting of an action, event or situation. Their actual function, however, is determined by the construal of a given sentence or discourse unit and typically involves the type of schematic meaning that derives from complex knowledge structures as well as contextual cues. For this reason, the position of the grammatical category *new* within a clause or phrase is central to sentence processing as is the schematic meaning underlying the sentence structure, the so-called sentential event schema. As will be seen, there is a predictable range of sentence schemas, participant roles and conceptual metaphors that motivate the meaning construction process around NEWNESS.

However, the bifurcation that is traditionally made between the lexical and grammatical subsystems has been severely criticized within the cognitive-linguistic framework. A case in point is Talmy’s (2000) proposal of a lexicon-grammar continuum that structures the cognitive representation (CR) of a given concept, a tenet that also underlies this present analysis. According to Talmy (*ibid.*: 21f.), concepts may be semantically and/or grammatically specified. The term ‘cognitive representation’ is understood as the “experiential complex” (Talmy *ibid.*) that a sentence or portion of discourse evokes in the listener. Whereas semantic structure provides rich, detailed knowledge about a situation or event, the grammatical structure attributes structural properties to that situation or event:

The grammatical and lexical subsystems in a sentence seem generally to specify different portions of a CR. Together, the grammatical elements of a sentence determine the majority of the *structure* [emphasis original] of the CR, while the lexical elements together contribute the majority of its *content* [emphasis original]. The grammatical specifications in a sentence, thus, provide a conceptual framework or, imagistically, a skeletal structure or scaffolding for the conceptual material that is lexically specified. (Talmy 2000: 21)

Crucially, grammatical structure includes temporality, tense and aspect, all of which add to the experiential complex of NEWNESS. The impact of NEWNESS on the temporal structure of the discourse will be shown to build up a tension that explains why the general thrust of discourse is geared towards change. The semantic structure as one part of the cognitive representation of NEWNESS was explored in chapter 4, illustrating the detailed knowledge structure provided by the lexical sub-system. The analysis below will uncover the close interweaving of grammar and lexicon in arguing that both sub-systems are bridged by conceptual metaphors which support the schematic meaning outlined by the sentence structure. As regards the grammatical structure the focus will be on syntactic aspects rather than closed-class morphological properties of grammar.

In either case the meaning construction process involves complex knowledge structures. A key term for the understanding of how conceptual structure ‘translates’ into semantic structure is ‘construal’, i.e. “the way a language user chooses to ‘package’ and ‘present’ a conceptual representation as encoded in language, which in turn has consequences for the conceptual representation that the utterance evokes in the mind of the hearer” (Evans 2007: 40f.). Crucially, the construal of a given scene, that is, the situations and events that language describes, or of a given set of referents, i.e. objects or people, implies a so-called focal adjustment according to which the recipient’s attention is directed in a particular way. For example, in an active construction the focus is on the agent (cf. Evans *ibid.*: 41). Furthermore, the focus of attention is determined by the grammatical system of a language which codes meaning in several possible ways due to the property of selectivity. This criterion chiefly relates to the choice of the (main) verb or the alignment of sentence constituents, (in short word order). A case in point is the conceptual salience of the clause-initial position, which illustrates the close interweaving of grammatical structure and conceptual representation. This “grammatical iconicity” (Evans/Green 2006: 527) will also play a role in the analysis below.

As mentioned earlier, the cognitive tool of conceptual metaphor is crucial in the analysis of the lexicon-grammar continuum that structures the cognitive representation of a given concept. Thus it is particularly relevant at the interpretation stage of the analysis, where the construal of *newness* will be shown to involve a set of conceptual metaphors that motivate both the creation of sense boundaries in antonym construal and the grammatical specifications in the sentence grammar.

The chapter outline derives from this central understanding of the lexicon-grammar continuum, focusing on the specifications provided by the lexical and grammatical elements in the portions of discourse analyzed. While chapter 6.2 concentrates on the lexical subsystem, particularly with regard to the lexical specifications that determine the antonym construal of *old* as opposed to *new*, chapter 6.4 explores the grammatical elements that frame the construal of *new* on the sentence level. The discussions in these two chapters chiefly involve the identification of the construals as well as providing some provisional results immediately following the study. The interpretation of the patterns derived from the initial stage of the analysis will be provided in chapters 6.3, for the lexical part, and 6.5, for the grammatical part. It is also in these chapters that the second major objective of this study is dealt with.

Recall that the analysis occurs on two levels, the deployment of *newness* in American inaugural address and the role of *newness* in the representation and perpetuation of ideological discourse structures. For this reason the interpretation provided also involves the analysis of the political uses of language, building on what has been identified as strategic uses of language, i.e. ideological discourse, iconographic frames of reference and biased event models, and on the rhetorical functions of the inaugural address, both historically in including the rhetorical structures and styles of the political homily and generically in placing the inaugural address in the rhetorical canon of the American political system. This also includes the fact that the legitimization of arguments frequently involves the rhetorical strategy of ‘spiritualization’ resulting from the conflation of religious and political discourse in the

American political discourse in general. Given the high degree of polysemy the adjective *new* can denote all kinds of things as Susan Sontag mentioned in her speech. The general objective of this section, however, is to provide some insight into the continued influence of newness on political reasoning beyond the expressivity of a single lexical item, *new*.

A variety of the aspects treated in chapters 1-5, for example the references made to the central issue and patterns of American political development, are also pivotal to the clarification of these findings and thus can be argued to extend into the explanation stage. Consequently, the aim of the explanation stage consists in embedding the inaugural address into its historical context in terms of the American jeremiad and the political homily, the development of American national history as has been exemplified by the cyclical or generational structure of American political development and the development of presidential discourse. At this stage, the possibility of American newness as a political myth and cultural construct are also elaborated. This general contextualization rounds off the analytical process. The discussion of the findings will also include some remarks on the contemporary political situation in the United States but will also point to some springboards for future research.

Prior to investigating these aspects in the American inaugural address, it is vital to outline some fundamental properties of the linguistic unit *new* as a grammatical category. The adjective *new* premodifies nouns within more or less complex noun phrases. Bearing in mind that the object of study is political texts, it is to be expected that the premodification of nouns is anything but arbitrary. Instead we may expect a discoverable pattern that assigns properties (sub-types of a given category) or may even provide recategorizations by virtue of clearly identifiable political, rhetorical and ideological functions. Prior to looking more closely into the sample passages extracted from the presidential inaugural addresses, the most fundamental grammatical properties will be introduced on the basis of a cognitive-grammatical framework.

Adjectives function as qualifiers, describing characteristic or occasional qualities. These properties typically relate to single qualitative features in association with an entity or an instance of an entity (cf. Radden/Dirven 2007: 146). Thus adjectives tend to define subcategories of a given entity only in terms of single categorial features. Adjectives assign different types of properties, which is why there are different types of adjectival uses depending on the kind of property they describe. For example, adjectives may describe scalar properties or recategorized properties. According to Radden/Dirven (ibid.: 151) scalar properties “may be placed along two kinds of scale: a scale of comparison and a scale of intensity.” The former correspond to the three ‘classic’ levels of gradation: positive, comparative and superlative, whereas the scale of intensity is typically expressed in terms of adverbs such as *very*, *extremely* or *highly*, for example. Recategorized properties are typically deployed by so-called deadverbial adjectives, which are assumed to be related to adverbs within the framework of traditional grammar. They conventionally offer some specification about the manner of an action or the setting of a situation. Frequently, deadverbial adjectives provide details about the temporal frame of reference that a given event is couched in. In another context, deadverbial adjectives may denote the reality status of a situation as in the

expression, the future president of the United States, for example. Interestingly, the standard grammar book example “an old colleague” continues to be illustrative even from a cognitive perspective (cf. Radden/Dirven 2007: 152).<sup>208</sup> The phrase’s ambiguity can be described as follows: in its reading “a colleague old in years,” the adjective is said to refer to an intrinsic, scalar property whereas the interpretation “a colleague of old,” i.e. a person who used to work at the same institution or place at some former point of time, captures its deadverbial use. Yet ‘old’ has another two deadverbial senses which can be inferred by implicature. On the one hand, ‘old’ may refer to things that are no longer usable or are deficient after long years of service, for instance, “an old file” or “an old syringe” (cf. Radden/Dirven *ibid.*: 152). On the other hand, ‘old’ may be used to express duration as in “an old friendship,” which refers to long-standing friendly relations which have survived many crises in the course of time.

Due to its enhanced degree of polysemy, the adjective *new* is able to assign both scalar and recategorized properties. In other words, it can be classified as a scalar adjective for some uses and senses as well as a deadverbial adjective for others. This is remarkable in the light of what has been defined as a premodifying adjective’s primary function of subcategorizing another entity on the basis of one qualitative property only. Radden/Dirven (2007: 147) argue that in spite of the fact that “the property denoted by an adjective only represents a single qualifying feature, its understanding typically involves complex background knowledge.” Yet it also relies on contextual cues identifiable in the particular construal of the sentence.

These characteristics, however, are functional on the level of discourse, resulting from the indexicality of the concept of NEWNESS within American political culture. The language-specific format in which this concept is coded is the linguistic unit *new*. As an adjective *new* exhibits all three types of value that Fairclough (<sup>2</sup>2001: 92f.) attaches to formal features: experiential, relational and expressive. First and foremost, the new has an enhanced experiential value referring to knowledge and beliefs, more precisely the belief that American political culture and national identity is grounded in the experience of newness and that the establishment and implementation of social and political (economic) structures have derived from this specific experience. Although, of course, this experience is no longer immediately accessible, the ‘knowledge’ (common beliefs, ‘common sense’) of this experience is regularly re-enacted and thus updated, to a large extent within the inaugural address, in order to be retained in the society’s episodic memory. What is more, *new* as a qualifier in discourse structures that serve self-presentation, in combination with other-presentation in terms of its opposite *old*, for instance, lends itself to ideological representations of socio-political realities. Cases in point are lexical relations such as synonymy or antonymy, which are construed on the discourse level. As a result, ‘new’ may or may not be the opposite of ‘old’, or in other contexts,

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<sup>208</sup> Traditionally the distinction is made between inherent as opposed to noninherent adjectives (Greenbaum/Quirk 1990: 146). While the large majority of adjectives are indeed inherent, that is in the expression a solid ground, solid applies to the referent directly: ground that is solid enough to tread on. In contrast, in solid evidence there is no such inherent connection, since it refers to the ability of a person to provide facts that are dependable and trustworthy. In the former case the adjective would relate to an intrinsic property of the ground whereas the latter sense would be non-inherent, which corresponds to its deadverbial sense. It appears to be the case that senses derived from the more concrete sense by way of metaphorical extension tend to denote recategorized properties (deadverbial adjectives).



'new' may be synonymous with 'fresh', 'different', 'young', 'modern', 'progressive', 'unfamiliar' to name but the most pervasive examples.

Second, the adjective *new* is also important in terms of relational values, particularly with respect to establishing socio-political relations, where the relational value is closely associated with the experiential value of 'new'. Since 'new' is ideologically charged within American political discourse, it is also frequently used in order to create relationships between agents and participants of political discourse, most recently in the New Europe vs. Old Europe debate. As will be shown, it is also frequently used in a dysphemistic way, blurring the representation of a given political event in suggesting the improved situation following a political change. Another relational value may be the 'heralding effect', i.e. effect that the introduction of newness creates a caesura, thereby bringing about change.

Finally, the adjective *new* also has an expressive value, indicating the positionality on behalf of the producer of political discourse. In chapter 4 above, it was pointed out that newness may indeed be the equivalent of change, modernity or the inevitable upshot of temporal progression; yet the assessment of a given situation, experience or event depends on the subjective perspective of a discourse participant or, as in the event of a political speech like the inaugural address, it relates to realities that are significant for large parts of society. The evaluation of a given entity or event as 'new' as opposed to 'old' is also a matter of perspective, which, in turn, relies on the speaker's position. Importantly, 'newness' is typically positively evaluated whereas 'oldness' functions as a negative marker.

By analogy with the experiential, relational and expressive values identified for lexical units, these values can also be assigned to grammatical structure. Fairclough (2001: 93) proposes the following criteria that serve as a rough guide for the analysis. Accordingly, the experiential value of grammatical features manifests itself in the actual construal of a sentence. Thus, the identification involves determining a preference for a certain type of participant role or grammatical coding on the one hand, and a prevalence of active vs. passive, positive vs. negative sentences on the other. As regards the relational value of grammatical structure, the vital criteria are the coding of mode, i.e. whether or not there is a tendency towards declarative or imperative sentences, for example, and the use of certain pronouns. The expressive value relates to the modality expressed in the grammatical structure. Finally, the liaison of sentences may be a controversial issue, particularly when considering the type of connectors involved. Conversely, coordination rather than subordination may also be a moot point.

However, not all of these criteria are of equal importance for this present study although they provide some vital points of reference that outline the general procedure below. Given the focus of this analysis, the investigation will extend beyond the grammatical and semantic structure to include the conceptual level, more precisely, the cognitive representation of NEWNESS.

## 6.2 Lexical Structure and Antonym Construal

The in-depth discussion of the categorial properties of the adjective *new* in chapter 4 has pointed to the vast range of its potential uses on the discourse level. In interpreting the meaning construction of the lexical unit *new* in the American inaugural address, I will first of all discuss the different values, i.e. the experiential, relational and expressive value the adjective has in its immediate linguistic context within the inaugural addresses. In doing so, I will initially focus on the semantic relations that may be construed between the adjectives *new* and *old*. The aim of this section is to examine the discourse conditions, i.e. the lexical and grammatical elements, which account for the construal of *old* and *new*, whether or not they are being construed as antonyms. At the interpretation stage, the emphasis is placed on the linguistic rather than the historical, political and cultural aspects of American presidential discourse, which nonetheless are present and operative, framing the meaning construction process even at the local level. While these important aspects form the core of the explanation stage of the analytical procedure, the linguistic features analyzed in this part are the rhetorical and political functions attached to the concepts OLD and NEW on the one hand, and the impact of conceptual metaphors of the ESM system on meaning construction and representation on the other. The second part of this chapter will be devoted to the influence of grammatical elements on the construal of *new*. In this respect, sentential event schemas and their assignment of participant roles are of particular interest. In both parts the analysis proceeds in chronological order, i.e. from nineteenth-century to twentieth-century inaugurals unless marked differently on account of content and argumentation.

In keeping with the ‘Generalization Commitment’ of cognitive linguistics which refutes the view that “the ‘modules’ or ‘subsystems’ of language are organized in significantly divergent ways, or indeed that distinct modules or subsystems even exist” (Evans/Green 2006: 28), the guiding principle of the analysis is to investigate the impact of schemas, models and frames on the meaning construction of the concept of NEWNESS in American presidential discourse. For this reason the separation of the analysis into distinct subchapters represents a division of labor rather than a theoretical acknowledgment of a subdivision between lexical, grammatical and semantic levels of language.

### 6.2.1 Nineteenth-century Inaugural Addresses

Generally speaking there are very few occurrences of the linguistic unit *old* in nineteenth-century inaugural addresses within the socio-political domain. Similarly there are no co-occurrences with the lexical item *new*, which is remarkable, particularly when compared in absolute numbers to the examples extracted from twentieth-century inaugurals (see below). Another important aspect is the fact that the adjective *old* is exclusively used to refer to American political institutions and policies. In its function as a premodifier the adjective *old* provides qualification for nouns such as the American Government and Constitution and descriptions, even evaluations, of political activities. Accordingly, the passages found in the

nineteenth-century inaugurals have been classified into two groups, one of which includes the construal of *old* while the other contains references to the Old World. Although the concept of NEWNESS is not expressed on the lexical level, its meaning(s) can frequently be inferred from the construal of *old*.

The following two examples illustrate different strategies of dealing with OLD as a dispreferred concept. The first reference to the category OLD occurs in the context of the controversial political debate concerning the limitations of executive power. In (10), the quotation provides more than just the minimal context in order to illustrate the overall framing of Harrison's argument.

- (10) [...] The same causes will ever produce the same effects, and as long as the love of power is a dominant passion of the human bosom, and as long as the understandings of men can be warped and their affections changed by operations upon their passions and prejudices, so long will the liberties of a people depend on their own constant attention to its preservation. The danger to all well-established free governments arises from the unwillingness of the people to believe in its existence or from the influence of designing men diverting their attention from the quarter whence it [= the spirit of liberty] approaches to a source from which it can never come. This is the old trick of those who would usurp the government of their country. In the name of democracy they speak, warning the people against the influence of wealth and the danger of aristocracy. History, ancient and modern, is full of such examples. [...] (WHH, 20)

Harrison's point is the potential of demagoguery within a strong and powerful executive, which he assumed had been the case with Jackson's presidency. Under the premise of constant conditions, temporal or otherwise — “the same causes will ever produce the same effects” —, Harrison makes a confident prediction about the abuses of power on behalf of the presidential office, in which he has just been voted in himself. Let us have a closer look at how his argument is construed.

The adjective *old* clearly has a temporal meaning, i.e. the category is not metaphorically extended as in other instances in which the adjective *old* is synonymous with ‘knowledgeable’ or ‘experienced’. The durative sense of ‘old’, which can be paraphrased as ‘having existed for a long time’, is supported by the overall rigid framework in which the event of power abuse is presented lexically and grammatically. As far as the event structure is concerned, the mappings CAUSES ARE FORCES and STATES ARE LOCATIONS are particularly influential. The abuse of power is represented as a passion, which is understood as an uncontrollable force. The energetic potential inherent in forces has an impact on political actors who are distracted from their responsibilities towards the state and the people (“as long as the understandings of men can be warped and their affections changed by operations upon their passions and prejudices”). The moral dimension underlying the rationale of Harrison's argument is clearly discernible. Acting morally is metaphorically understood as moving along a clearly defined path, the path of virtue; any immoral action is understood as a departure from this path (“the influence of designing men diverting their attention from the quarter whence it [= the spirit of liberty] approaches to a source from which it can never come”). Harrison's claim that these factors remain constant, i.e. they are not likely to change is motivated by the mapping STATES ARE LOCATIONS. This static construal is supported by the temporal framework: temporal

adverbs such as “ever,” “as long as,” “so long” or “never” convey a general sense of immutability. Furthermore, the eternal present gives additional weight to Harrison’s argument, which is motivated by the conceptual metaphor HISTORY IS A CONTAINER (“history, ancient and modern, is full of such examples”). The temporal evidence, the length of time during which this phenomenon has been observed, is imbued with authority and thus functions to legitimate Harrison’s grim depiction of the abuses of political power by the executive. His line of argument is validated by the generally positive evaluation of history which, in the American context, typically stands for duration, continuity and controlled changes (see separate chapter below), as is exemplified by HISTORICAL CHANGE IS MOVEMENT FROM A STATE OF IGNORANCE TO A STATE OF KNOWLEDGE. Harrison’s invocation of history, and by extension, the meaning of time as duration, demonstrates the salience of history as a category in American political discourse.

Harrison’s strategic moves are relatively transparent albeit heavy-handed. The popular understanding of force dynamics as rather mechanical builds on well entrenched beliefs in event models according to which passion is attributed an almost magnetic energy.

The linguistic devices used to describe the inevitability of the abuse of political power also suggest the prevalence of the strategic functions of representation and legitimization. There is a bias towards representatives, i.e. speech acts that state what the speaker believes to be valid and accurate. A case in point is his assertion that “the same causes will ever produce the same effects.” Moreover, there are a number of ‘matter-of-course’ predictions (“so long will the liberties of a people depend on their own constant attention to its preservation”), which are part of commissives, i.e. speech acts that make predictions about the future by virtue of threats, refusals, promises etc., which generally commit the speaker individually or as the representative of a group to the utterances made.

The ideological discourse structures are indicative of domestic power struggles. Harrison’s detailed description of the perils of demagoguery is overcomplete — the quotation above considerably shortens his lengthy argumentation — emphasizing the negative attributes that he assumes account for political manipulation. What is more, his assertions are sweeping generalizations; while the relations between individual propositions are fairly coherent from the perspective of the ESM, they betray a certain (ideological) bias.

This passage is a prime example of hortatory discourse that is geared towards audience response. In addressing present political ills, he urges the people to be watchful. This exhortation is combined with the outlook that this is not likely to change, as warranted by the ‘evidence’ of history. Although the name of the ‘schemer’ is not provided, it can be easily inferred, and it would have been obvious to the contemporary audience. As the first Whig president Harrison’s speech reflects the partisan power struggles occurring at the time, and as such his address can be regarded as ‘Jackson-bashing’. What is more it also reflects the transition to another model of the presidency, from the Jacksonian model to the Whig model.<sup>209</sup>

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<sup>209</sup> The Jacksonian model essentially represents a populist view of the presidency in direct communication with the people but it also involves the president’s assertion of the executive’s dominance over party and Congress

All in all, the category OLD is associated with immutability, i.e. the absence of change. Conceptually this is represented as STATES ARE LOCATIONS or STATES ARE BOUNDED AREAS IN SPACE. Given that change is the preferred concept (see below), the stationary construal of *oldness* is usually negatively evaluated. Similarly, the negative evaluation is motivated by another conceptual metaphor of the ESM, ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION. This mapping entails that the agent not only acts according to his own intentions but also, conceptually, that he or she has control over the movement. As the politician's capacity of controlled, rational action is no longer guaranteed in the event of demagoguery, there is a general sense of lack of control, measure or restraint, which needs to be compensated for by the people's responsibility.

In the second example the adjective *old* also qualifies political activities. In this case the event in focus is the impending Civil War, hence Lincoln's argument of the futility of military action in the attempt to solve existing political problems. Despite the very different political situation, there are compelling similarities in the conceptual structure underlying both passages.

- (11) [...] Is it possible, then, to make that intercourse more advantageous or more satisfactory after separation than before? [...] Suppose you go to war, you can not fight always; and when, after much loss on both sides and no gain on either, you cease fighting, the identical old questions, as to terms of intercourse, are again upon you. (ALI I, 28)

The durative meaning of 'old' is also operative in (11), supporting Lincoln's point that military action is never crowned with success. In other words, the overall political situation will remain unchanged; thus, 'old' means 'unchanged', 'well-known' or even 'familiar'. The construal of the scene is framed by [comparison], which chiefly occurs by virtue of temporal expressions, for example "before-after," but also by means of comparative constructions ("more advantageous or more satisfactory [...] than before"). The [comparison] frame is also effective on the conceptual level, where the situation before and after military operations is mapped in terms of A CHANGE OF STATE IS A CHANGE OF LOCATION. Lincoln's representation of the event suggests that combat is futile as the political situation remains fundamentally unchanged, i.e. that, conceptually speaking, no motion has occurred that would have entailed this change of location. More specifically, this lack of success is metaphorically understood as SUCCEEDING IS PROGRESS with progress being conceptualized as PROGRESS IS MOTION FORWARD. These mappings motivate the meaning construction of this passage, since it is understood that military action (ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION) is not a suitable strategy to solve the problems, i.e. it is not an appropriate means to move away from the problem. On the contrary, there is virtually no distance between the problem, conceptualized as an object, and the warring parties. Indeed it is close by, even in contact ("the old questions are again upon you").

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based on specific programmatic initiatives (cf. Riccards 1995a: xix). It was originally formed in response to Jacksonian plebiscite views of direct democracy. The presidents pertaining to the Whig model rarely appealed to the people in a direct way and, at least openly, respected Congress. Frequently it also involved a strong patriotic, even nationalist agenda, chiefly concerning itself with internal improvements (cf. Riccards *ibid.*).

Finally, the [comparison] frame is also valid on the level of sentence constructions. The antithetical potential of comparative constructions and rhetorical questions is well known. As we shall see, however, antithetical constructions in general are highly pervasive in the inaugural addresses, lending themselves particularly well to establishing ideological structures in discourse. Rhetorically these tend to be exploited by virtue of a hortatory style, which combines political critique in the form of prophesying unfavorable outcomes with pointing to ways to redress present ills.

The first reference to the age of American political institutions is made by Abraham Lincoln on the occasion of his first inaugural address.

- (12) Descending from these general principles, we find the proposition that in legal contemplation the Union is perpetually confirmed by the history of the Union itself. The Union is much older than the Constitution. It was formed, in fact, by the Articles of Association in 1774. It was matured and continued by the Declaration of Independence in 1776. It was further matured, and the faith of all the then thirteen States expressly plighted and engaged that it should be perpetual, by the Articles of Confederation in 1778. And finally, in 1787, one of the declared objects for ordaining and establishing the Constitution was "to form a more perfect Union." (ALI I, 14)
- (13) My countrymen, one and all, think calmly and well upon this whole subject. Nothing valuable can be lost by taking time. If there be an object to hurry any of you in hot haste to a step which you would never take deliberately, that object will be frustrated by taking time; but no good object can be frustrated by it. Such of you as are now dissatisfied still have the old Constitution unimpaired, and, on the sensitive point, the laws of your own framing under it; while the new Administration will have no immediate power, if it would, to change either. [...] (ALI I, 33)

In both examples Lincoln invokes the early beginnings of the precarious nation-building process. According to general belief all republics, including the ones that initially served as model republics in the nation-building process, were doomed and destined to decay, following the cyclical conception of political institutions at the time. In the context of (12) and (13) above, 'old' premodifies American political institutions, emphasizing their durability in the light of the severe difficulties the Lincoln administration is facing, i.e. the looming secession and Civil War. In this respect the category OLD, standing for continuity and duration, clearly has a positive evaluation. Thus 'old' carries a predominantly temporal meaning, which reinforces the authority of old, long-standing relations. As such the premodifier *old* is a temporal category highlighting the continuity and sustained existence of the American republic.

Interestingly, the occurrence of the adjective *old* in both comparative constructions is exploited differently from a rhetorical angle. While in (13) the age of the Government is linked to the speech event of the inaugural address itself, the comparative construction in (12) establishes a hierarchy between two political institutions in terms of their age. Crucially, the relationship between the Union and the Constitution is constructed as the product of past power struggles, as illustrated by the historical events mentioned by Lincoln.

This particular inaugural occupies an important place in American national history since it connects the age of the ceremonial to the age of the Republican government.<sup>210</sup> Lincoln, who had joined the recently established Republican party, consisting of former Whigs and abolitionist former Democrats (cf. Matuz 2004: 255), addresses the public in offering peace and inviting the South back into the Union. Appealing to their feelings of national pride and identity, which are intensified by a sense of achievement that was initiated by the tradition and counter-tradition within American national history (see chapter 3),<sup>211</sup> Lincoln's pledge for peace and the persistence of the Union draws on the view of the nation as a permanent test case and the insight that it has, thus far, mastered all challenges. The rhetorical strategies used comprise laudatory components concerning the self-presentation of the nation and its ability to endure. Last but not least this sense of national achievement also derives from conceiving the national experiment as a test of the laws of time and, when accomplished successfully, this test will be a sign to the world.

Not only is the older political structure, the Union, vested with more authority and thus priority over the more recent, newer Constitution, but also Lincoln's argument is framed in terms of morality that is assumed to inhere in structures (or people) that have endured and successfully overcome challenges, i.e. they are believed to have built moral fiber. The older institution has, to a larger degree than the younger one, proven itself, which is why the more recent Constitution is in the service of the Union, as the Constitution's Preamble, from which Lincoln is quoting, specifies: it is an ongoing project to "form a more perfect Union." This rationale is in agreement with what is known as the 'strict father morality' (cf. Lakoff [1996] 2005) according to which familial relations build on a clear hierarchy of authority and responsibility, both of which are highly valued attributes. According to Lakoff (ibid.: 76ff.), moral authority is patterned metaphorically on parental authority, which in turn, derives from the father's ability to know what lies in the child's best interest, coinciding with the child's inability to know just that. It is the father who sets and enforces standards of behavior as exertion of authority is also seen as a moral obligation. By extension, a similar pattern applies to moral authority within communities and even international relations which are also structured in terms of parental authority. In this context, the metaphor of moral authority has the following correspondences:

A COMMUNITY IS A FAMILY

MORAL AUTHORITY IS PARENTAL AUTHORITY

AN AUTHORITY FIGURE IS A PARENT

A PERSON SUBJECT TO MORAL AUTHORITY IS A CHILD

In the second example taken from Lincoln's inaugural another central metaphor of the strict-father morality can be invoked: MORALITY IS STRENGTH ("impaired"). On principle, moral

<sup>210</sup> The importance of the inaugural address as a rite of passage is in line with one of the major functions of the epideictic genre as illustrated in chapter 5.

<sup>211</sup> The continued existence of the American Republic and newly-founded nation had been at stake due to both the tradition and counter-traditional perspective, both of which regarded the nation as a permanent test case. While the former has tested deeds, the latter has assessed the faith in the national destiny and the will to continue the national journey.

strength is not innate, it has to be built using both self-discipline and self-denial, following the motto “no pain, no gain” (Lakoff [1996] 2005: 72). Lakoff (ibid.) differentiates between two types of moral strength. Fighting external evils builds courage while facing internal evils builds character, developing self-control and will power to control passion. As moral strength takes time to develop (“haste makes waste”), untimely decisions are virtually immoral according to Lincoln’s rationale, the argument being that “Nothing valuable can be lost by taking time. [...] but no good object can be frustrated by it.” Thus Lincoln’s strategy consists in converting secession into a moral rather than political issue.

Given the preoccupation with American national history to this day, Lincoln’s invocation of the Union’s history by his selection of historical development can be regarded as a wise rhetorical move. The historical events that he represents as having marked the Union as perpetual are chronologically aligned; furthermore this sequence is also constructed as a causation, which gives additional weight to his argument and legitimizes the superior authority of the older institution. Yet it also simultaneously de-legitimizes more recent political institutions for their lack of political clout, based on the assumption that power and political prerogatives are the outcome of a more comprehensive maturation process. This equation is indeed made by Lincoln at some later stage within his inaugural. The maturation of political actors and institutions is frequently construed as a moral issue within American political discourse, grounded in the conceptualization of political institutions and their interrelations as people. This personification implies that the existence of the Union is based on the cyclic conception of organisms. Consequently these personified political structures and institutions go through developmental stages. The profiled stage in (12) is maturity, which is construed as the accumulation of experience and knowledge through EXISTENCE. Note that the authority of national history is also frequently portrayed as a container filled with past experiences or as a person acting as an authority looking on and evaluating present activities and events (see below). What is interesting here is the fact that *oldness* appears to be conceptualized as static, derived from the mapping BEING OLD IS BEING IN A STATE OF KNOWLEDGE. The focus on maturity also ties in with the use of *old* as a scalar adjective (see Radden/Dirven 2007 above). Scalar adjectives denote intrinsic properties which relate to some inherent norm. It appears to be the case that there is a suitable, standardized age for political institutions, in order for them to function effectively and reliably.

The organic conception of American political institutions is also important in another respect. In the context of pondering on the nation’s origins, the emergence of the Union is typically, even mythically constructed as a creative process. The experience of EXISTENCE is grounded in a number of image schemas such as PROCESS, CYCLE or SPACE (cf. Evans/Green 2006: 190), all of which are relevant here. The idea of process is tightly interwoven with temporal experience, which may work in favor of things or against them. The construal of *old* as ‘duration’ or ‘age’ is illustrated by Figure 12 in the summary chapter below. Essentially, it involves an ego-experiencer’s movement along the time axis. Its age is understood in terms of the distance covered from the starting point, its birth, to the present moment, which is



generally the moment of speaking. Motivated by the metaphor time as space, this stretch in between the two temporal boundary events (birth and now) may also be understood as taking up an extended space (LOCATION IS A BOUNDED AREA IN SPACE).

Thus ‘old’ is attributed a positive evaluation, derived from the intrinsic authority of the category OLD, particularly when subcategorizing an American political institution. While this validation of *oldness* is reflexive of the more comprehensive veneration of history, which has characterized American theorizing on politics from the onset, it is also indicative of the paternalistic structures underlying political thought. It is no coincidence that history and time, especially in its durative meaning, are regularly personified as authorities, for example, the mappings HISTORY IS A TEACHER and TIME IS AN EVALUATOR. In both cases the understanding involves a mapping of the domain of authority onto the temporal domain.

Lincoln’s argument points to the very essence of the dilemma of the American experience and could thus backfire, since the adherence to old models and their experience and authority is not easily reconcilable with the self-identification as a new nation. The inherent antagonism is essentially an ideological tension between experience and change (new experiences). The dynamic understanding of the political system, the creed to “form a more perfect Union,” and the continuation of the inherited, time-honored political theorizing has time and again fuelled political conflict. Yet both models — experience and change — are aimed at the preservation of the American system in that adaptation to changing conditions is pivotal. The only difference is the perspective taken: while experience builds on retrospection, change frequently implies a prospective perspective in discarding or modifying the old.

The category OLD may also be used in another respect, denoting a former situation or state that is no longer valid, i.e. its closest synonym would be ‘former’.

- (14) The theory of government changes with general progress. Now that the telegraph is made available for communicating thought, together with rapid transit by steam, all parts of a continent are made contiguous for all purposes of government, and communication between the extreme limits of the country made easier than it was throughout the old thirteen States at the beginning of our national existence. (USG II, 5)

This change of situation from an old state to a new one is motivated by the ESM. Yet it is not the generic mapping CHANGE IS MOTION that is foregrounded; instead the improved condition is motivated by the more specific conceptual metaphor PROGRESS IS MOTION FORWARD. The progress is measured in terms of the movement, temporally or locationally, that occurred between a point of departure (“the old thirteen States at the beginning of our national existence”) and an end point, which coincides with the moment of speaking, *now*.

Thus, there is a temporal frame, delimited by two temporal boundary events, a past point or period of time and the present. Again, the [comparison] frame is active, according to which an earlier position is contrasted with the present position. This construal corresponds to the event sense of time, according to which an event is bound into a temporally framed unit, delimited by ‘now’ and ‘then’ as temporal boundary events. The conceptual metaphor

PROGRESS IS MOTION FORWARD thus interacts with temporal progression, motivated by the mapping TIME IS MOTION.<sup>212</sup>

Interestingly, the end point of the movement, the boundary event that coincides with the speaker's location, frames the occurrences described by President Grant from a retrospective angle. If we visualize the time axis and mark the present moment of speaking as the location of the ego-experiencer, the speaker refers back to a former state that serves as a past boundary event. This positioning is comparable to a windowing operation, i.e. opening a time slot that is viewed from the present vantage point and is thus perceived as old (see Figure 12 below). *Oldness* can either be attributed in terms of the distance covered from the beginning boundary event to the end point of the boundary event, or alternatively in terms of the present situation which is viewed as having replaced the previous one. In the former case the focus is on the distance covered while the latter entails end-point focus.

The end-point focus is vital when a given event, as in the example above, is framed by [progress], which involves a matching process of two states, "before" and "after" in temporal categories or of the distance covered in spatial terms. Given these specific contextual features, Grant emphasizes the huge national developments made by the national government within this temporal interval. He also specifies the nature of the progress made - territorial expansion and national identity (social cohesion).

The construal of Grant's argument is structured by several interrelated metaphors. As this is a popular strategy, which is revealing in view of the reasoning underlying the American system, I will explain these mappings in some detail.

Social cohesion is frequently expressed in terms of spatial relations, as exemplified by the mapping RELATIONSHIP IS PROXIMITY (cf. Goatly 2007). The notion of proximity is also an integral component of identity formation. Blommaert (2005: 221f.) argues that historical and identity narratives require locality in order to be able to establish positionality. In other words: in order to be able to assess the relationships between events, actions and objects in a meaningful way the certain knowledge of one's own position with respect to these happenings is an indispensable prerequisite. As a result, both identity and a sense of community develop on the basis of establishing and, importantly, securing spatial relations once they are specified. In this connection the spatial relations "near – far" and "center – periphery" (the distance between them), are particularly significant regarding socio-political organization. Typically, distance is perceived as a source of difference or separation which is likely to spark off disunity and disharmony. Proximity is both consistently and conventionally regarded as the basis of meaningful social and political relationships. The metaphorical mapping SIMILARITY IS PROXIMITY and its entailments DIFFERENCE IS DISTANCE and DIFFERENCE IS SEPARATION (cf. Goatly 2007: 192f.) are powerful conceptual tools for reasoning on the process of nation-building. When analyzing discourse on nineteenth-century colonial expansion, the equation

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<sup>212</sup> Importantly, new experience is tied to the event sense of time, i.e. it results from temporal movement towards us (TIME IS A MOVING OBJECT); recall that the future is in front and thus describes movement towards the speaker. Alternatively, new situations arise from the speaker's change of position, i.e. his or her motion towards a new object or location (ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION).

SIMILARITY IS RELATIONSHIP, resulting from the interaction of metaphors within the multivalent proximity source domain,<sup>213</sup> appears to be of particular import.

As to locality, the cognitive model that serves as a guiding principle in establishing clear-cut spatial relations is the experience of EXISTENCE which, as has been explained earlier, is grounded in the image schemas PROCESS, CYCLE, (BOUNDED) SPACE, OBJECT and REMOVAL. Justifying political existence by means of founding a nation and claiming geophysical space as national territory is, of course, influenced by all of these image schemas, particularly against the background of nineteenth-century imperialist exploration and exploitation of space. In this context political existence is clearly established by publicly declaring the lines of demarcation of a political entity. Goatly (2007: 32ff.) has identified an important conceptual metaphor in this respect, namely CATEGORY IS DIVIDED AREA. Once a position is outlined, the political activity focuses on securing this space from the inside and against potential threats from the outside. While a clear conception of the boundaries establishes the image-schematic *in* as opposed to *out* relation, which creates a sense of security and an internal organisation on the basis of proximity providing stability. Social cohesion builds on an imagery of body politic, i.e. the conception that all parts are connected and rely on one another if they are to function properly. The experience of stability is grounded in BALANCE and VERTICALITY whereas security derives from both stability and the experience of CONTAINMENT. Moreover, a sense of security and protection is also frequently derived from another set of spatial relations namely *over* and *under*. Whereas the former is typically used to designate the space in which rules and laws are operative, *under* represents protective relations as in (JKP, 11) below, or denotes the scope of a set of rules that hold for a specific area, as in “under the new order of things” (JAD, 6) meaning the American Constitution.

Except for the [progress] frame (“the theory of government changes with general progress”), which holds for both the social and political realm, the [comparison] frame is also active. This is supported by the sentence construction, for example the comparative construction “communication [...] is made easier than [...]” in (14) above.

With respect to the analysis of ideological discourse structures, (14) provides a very detailed description of the positive attributes and achievements of the in-group, the American people. The positive self-presentation is emphasized on the speech act level by representatives that prevail. Assertions such as “the theory of government changes with general progress” are represented as ‘eternal truths’ that can be generalized, exposing the biased models of representation Grant’s argument rests on. Grant is being very explicit about American political accomplishments, as is mirrored in the rhetorical strategy of laudatory style, which is typically used for the purpose of self-presentation. Being largely uncontroversial, it serves to amplify

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<sup>213</sup> Goatly (2007: 193) has identified a number of interesting interrelations between individual metaphors. Due to the multivalency of source domains, the same source is variously applied to different target domains within its scope. This may frequently lead to an interrelation of metaphors to the extent that they are equated. For example, the metaphorical mappings SIMILARITY IS PROXIMITY and RELATIONSHIP IS PROXIMITY may indeed merge when frequently co-occurring in specific knowledge contexts. In this case, the blending produces the mapping SIMILARITY IS RELATIONSHIP.

the positive attributes of the in-group, frequently involving self-congratulation if not self-praise.

As ‘old’ denotes a past state or period of time, the evaluation of the old is relatively neutral and primarily serves the purpose of establishing a reference point against which the progress made can be measured. In this case, the focus is on the present state of affairs, the current political situation. It is rhetorically significant that this past point of comparison is not randomly assigned. It is random from a strictly logical and causal perspective but it is not arbitrary with regard to the speaker’s strategic timing, according to which the specifically chosen point of time fulfills the purpose of driving home an issue of present relevance.

The second group consists of sample passages including expressions referring to ‘the Old World’. One may assume that the only clear case where the adjective *old* forms a sharp contrast to *new* is the expression ‘Old World’. However, the lexical items *New World* and *Old World* are fully lexicalized in their capitalized forms. The compound noun *New World* denotes

North, Central, and South America [the opposite of the Old World] (LDOCE).

In other words, it belongs to the [geography] frame, i.e. it is categorized as a toponym.<sup>214</sup> The *NOSED* does not list the expression ‘New World’ as a separate entry but within the entry for the adjective *new*. The expression ‘New World’ may be used as a noun or premodifier, thus exhibiting adjectival qualities in that it designates the location or provenance of another entity. According to the entry, ‘New World’ denotes the western hemisphere, i.e. the Americas, or it describes an entity as being “native to, characteristic of, or associated with the New World,” to use the original *NSOED* definition. Similarly, the expression ‘Old World’ is lexicalized in its capitalized form, denoting “the Eastern Hemisphere, especially Europe, Asia, and Africa” (*LDOCE*).

- (15) The United States now enjoy the complete and uninterrupted sovereignty over the whole territory from St. Croix to the Sabine. New States, settled from among ourselves in this and in other parts, have been admitted into our Union in equal participation in the national sovereignty with the original States. Our population has augmented in an astonishing degree and extended in every direction. We now, fellow-citizens, comprise within our limits the dimensions and faculties of a great power under a Government possessing all the energies of any government ever known to the Old World, with an utter incapacity to oppress the people. (JMO II, 26)

While not expressing a direct contrast between ‘the Old World’ and the ‘New World’, the delimitation can easily be inferred. Again the temporal frame of reference provides a [comparison] frame, in which the present state of affairs (“now”) serves as the basis of comparison from a retrospective perspective.

As the focus is on the present as well as on the recent past, tense is an important factor in the construal of this situation. (15) exhibits a mixture of the present and present perfect,

<sup>214</sup> In the *NSOED* the expression ‘New World’ is only attested as a derivative from the adjective *new* or in a number of definition texts chiefly as a geographical marker. There are very few political uses that are, in fact, geopolitical even in these definition texts; one interesting example would be the following: line of demarcation - a dividing line; orig. spec. that dividing the New World from the Spanish and the Portuguese, as decreed by Pope Alexander VI in 1493.

illustrating the nation's accomplishments without specifying a past point of time against which the achievements can be measured (as in the preceding example). Nonetheless, the fact that the territory is 'developing', i.e. that westward expansion is advancing, is constructed as a political success, following the metaphorical mapping PROGRESS IS MOTION (FORWARD) or Goatly's (2007) more specific elaboration SUCCEEDING IS MOVEMENT FORWARD. This aspect will be treated in depth in the systematic analysis of events and action schemas below.

The addition of new States completes the successful political activities of the comparatively new nation in that it was believed to add to the political strength of the young American nation. The rationale of territorial gain as political gain, pertaining to nineteenth-century colonialism, also manifests itself in the conceptualization of the Union as a container. This mapping, A NATION IS A CONTAINER, underlies nationalist ideologies to this day. The container view entertains an acute awareness of boundaries, highlighting the 'in-out' contrast.

One important criterion of the New States, following Monroe's line of argument, is the fact that they are "settled from among ourselves in this and in other parts," i.e. showing lexical evidence for the metaphor RELATIONSHIP IS SIMILARITY, as mentioned earlier. Simultaneously, it is one of the guiding principles of colonial power: securing new territories depended on the ability to furnish a constant flux of the surplus population willing to settle these new areas and satiate the territorial hunger demographically.

The noun phrase (NP) 'the Old World' is used metonymically to represent a 'part-whole' relation. The totalizing effect of metonymies is well known. Its hyperbolic effect is frequently exploited in the ideological representation of socio-political realities in political discourse. Here Monroe uses it to amplify his point that the American government has not only drawn level with other governments as far as power and influence is concerned, but it also excels 'Old World' governments in being the only free government in existence. The cognition schema ("ever known") of the sentence suggests the personification of both the American government and the metonymic symbol of the Old World. As we shall see in other contexts, the world is frequently understood as a person, which is the analogue of personifications of other key socio-political concepts such as nation or society. The personification also enables the activation of a [competition] frame. The Old World and the New World are constructed as two competitors, and the New World has just outplayed its rival.

In (16), the lexical item *Old World* is used literally to denote the provenance of immigrants, hence functioning as the thematic role source. The American Republic is constructed as a magnet for people from the Old World in their quest for protection and freedom:

- (16) [...] New communities and States are seeking protection under its [= the Union's] aegis, and multitudes from the Old World are flocking to our shores to participate in its [= the Union's] blessings. [...] (JKP, 11)

These interesting examples are indicative of the fact that in order to exist and derive some sense of identity one needs to have some awareness of one's identity. There are a good twenty years between James Monroe's second inaugural in 1821 and John Knox Polk's address in 1845, but they illustrate the vast development that occurred during that time. The nationalism

and increasing emancipation from the Old World, giving rise to the protectionist policies officially laid down by the Monroe doctrine in 1823, is reflected in the metonymic construction of Old World, whose long-standing knowledge and experience with governance is finally matched and excelled.

### 6.2.2 Twentieth century Inaugural Addresses

Let us now have a closer look at the construal of *old* and *new* in some twentieth-century examples. In comparison to their nineteenth-century counterparts, a more diversified situation presents itself, pointing to the profound political changes under way throughout the twentieth century. While it is true that there are quantitative changes, it is primarily the qualitative difference that is striking. Numerically, there is a vast increase in lexical occurrences with the scope of functions considerably broadening. The findings can be classified into five major categories. By analogy with the discussion of the nineteenth-century examples, the first two categories encompass the construal of *old* and ‘Old World’, respectively. In the third group the antonym construal of *old* and *new* is explored. In contrast to the nineteenth-century examples, ‘old’ and ‘new’ may also be juxtaposed as well as being opposites; this is the subject matter of the fourth group. Finally, there is a remarkable group in which the categories OLD and NEW are virtually equated, hence: the old is new (again). In the following analysis I will discuss these five main categories. The comparison and evaluation of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is deferred to the summary chapter below.

The first category consists of examples that focus on the category OLD whose meaning is frequently represented in such a way that the category NEW can be inferred. The following passage includes two occurrences of the adjective *old* whose construal is slightly different, however. In the first example (see underlined clause), the construal occurs from a retrospective perspective. The temporal expression “no longer,” which indicates that a past state of affairs is not valid anymore — hence the quasi-synonymy of ‘old’ with ‘former’ —, serves as a temporal boundary event. This condition has been changed, even improved, by substituting political and diplomatic solutions for military combat, so that it now describes the present, secondary boundary event. By extension, ‘old’ may also be understood as ‘outlived’ or ‘outdated’, indicating a qualitative improvement in the present political situation.

President McKinley represents the changed situation in an assertive way by virtue of a representative speech act, combined with coercion in that he accuses those not agreeing with his claim of not being a “lover of the country.” This is also evidenced by the selection of lexical expressions such as “old lines” as opposed to “principles and policies.” While ‘lines’ can be understood both literally, designating the geographical lines on the war maps, and metaphorically in terms of disunity and conflict, recall the effectiveness of the mapping(s) CATEGORY IS DIVIDED AREA or DIFFERENCE IS SEPARATION, where the abstract nouns “principles and policies” are in fact an instance of wordiness, in that they express very similar ideas.

- (17) The North and the South no longer divide on the old lines, but upon principles and policies; and in this fact surely every lover of the country can find cause for true felicitation. Let us rejoice in and cultivate this spirit; it is ennobling and will be both a gain and a blessing to our beloved country. It will be my constant aim to do nothing, and permit nothing to be done, that will arrest or disturb this growing sentiment of unity and cooperation, this revival of esteem and affiliation which now animates so many thousands in both the old antagonistic sections, but I shall cheerfully do everything possible to promote and increase it. (WMK I, 17)

In the second example, the construal occurs from a prospective angle, in which ‘old’ is given a durative meaning, denoting the regions which have been marked by the Civil War ever since it first started and continues to be so.<sup>215</sup>

The prospective construal of the scene is suggestive of ongoing change, which is further supported by the temporal framework surrounding it. The focus of attention is on the present (“now”) and on the (immediate) future as is evidenced by the *will*-future. The speech acts in the lower part of the quotation are chiefly commissives, except for the representative “this revival of esteem and affiliation which now animates so many thousands in both the old antagonistic sections.” The strategy followed by McKinley builds on setting targets for the future; he clearly wishes to change the political landscape.

Conceptually, both expressions designate an activity that is carefully planned and is purposeful. In the ESM, this notion is frequently understood in terms of PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEYS, which may motivate the construal of a political action, for example, in terms of a political agenda. In brief, President McKinley is suggesting that a significant change has occurred and that a new situation is taking shape. What exactly these changed conditions imply and where the political agenda is pointing may become more evident when examining another example, this time taken from McKinley’s second inaugural address:

- (18) Strong hearts and helpful hands are needed, and, fortunately, we have them in every part of our beloved country. We are reunited. Sectionalism has disappeared. Division on public questions can no longer be traced by the war maps of 1861. These old differences less and less disturb the judgment. Existing problems demand the thought and quicken the conscience of the country, and the responsibility for their presence, as well as for their righteous settlement, rests upon us all—no more upon me than upon you. (WMK II, 7)

Echoing his own words from the first inaugural, McKinley restates his position on national unity and domestic policy issues. As in the previous example, McKinley construes the situation from a dual perspective. More precisely, he shifts the focus of attention from the past (“less and less”) towards the present (“existing problems”), and presumably, the immediate future. The dynamic construal permits a focal adjustment similar to a windowing operation, zooming into the present while the past, which is remote, is obscured and increasingly blurred. This interpretation is motivated by several conceptual metaphors. First, there is a considerable temporal distance between the point of time indicated (1861, the beginning of the Civil War) and the moment of speaking. Although McKinley’s second

<sup>215</sup> Although it sounds odd, this construal reflects the deadverbial use of *old* meaning ‘having –ed for a long time’. This would correspond to the ‘old colleague example’ mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. Yet, the paraphrase ‘antagonistic sections of old’ appears to be awkward as the phrasing usually applies to positive contexts only.

inaugural does not exactly take place in the aftermath of the Civil War, the invocation of the Civil War is evidently no coincidence. McKinley rises to the occasion as the ceremonial coincides with the fortieth anniversary of the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861. In establishing a causal link between the two events, which are synchronized at the discourse level, McKinley instrumentalizes people's living memory of the nation's most frightful nineteenth-century conflict in order to drive home his point that a united nation is ready to take on more internationalist challenges. In arguing that national divisiveness belongs to the past and is thus no longer valid, he overemphasizes national unity while focusing on current domestic issues, and in view of foreign policies, on forming an internationalist coalition for his expansionist ambitions.<sup>216</sup>

On the conceptual level, the construal of the change of political focus is processed by virtue of the CHANGE IS MOTION mapping. More specifically, the change is linked to temporal cognition. The relevant cognitive model of time, the ego-based model, conceptualizes time by virtue of a dynamic ego-experiencer that moves through time (TIME IS A LANDSCAPE AND WE MOVE THROUGH IT). In the quotation above, the personified American nation has moved through time, away from the times of conflict and secession and is now placed at the edge of a new period of national history. Thus the rationale of McKinley's argument is that the time has come for a new direction and purpose of political activities (MEANS ARE PATHS and PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS within the ESM).

While the line of argument concerning national divisiveness draws on the imagery described above (RELATIONSHIP IS SIMILARITY, UNITY IS STRENGTH), the distraction of attention from the issues that are pressing right now is constructed as a lack of judgment or even the incapacity for rational judgment. As he aims to initiate new policies, he needs to create a political environment that is ready to act (ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION). However, acting in a systematic way also presupposes a strategy or plan, i.e. some idea of where one is going. Staying within the self-motion frame, the experience of advancing invariably presupposes vision — unless, of course, one is guided. Metaphorically, these two domains are linked in the mapping KNOWING IS SEEING. Both rely on a cognizing individual, who also has the motor-sensory capacity of movement.

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<sup>216</sup> McKinley overturned many of his predecessors' policies, for instance, protective tariffs, which he gradually lowered to encourage international trade. Cleveland held a decidedly antiexpansionist standpoint, backed by the large majority of the American public, which was subsequently undermined during McKinley's tenure. Being a strong political leader and independent chief executive, McKinley instilled new confidence into Manifest Destiny, "the belief that American expansionism was meant to happen" (Matuz 2004: 361). Consequently, McKinley reintroduced the annexation of Hawaii and as a result of the Spanish-American War the United States seized Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines (cf. Matuz *ibid.*: 385). As regards McKinley's leadership style, he succeeded in accumulating several key activities in the course of the military conflict during his presidency. Most significantly, the role of chief diplomat, the direction of war efforts and the supervision of negotiations were personalized (cf. Matuz *ibid.*: 389). All in all, McKinley's presidency is generally acknowledged to mark the transition from isolationist foreign policies to what is dysphemistically referred to as internationalism. It is during his administration that free-trade policies — involving a minimum of governmental interventions in business affairs — are increasingly implemented, substituting the high-tariff system practiced throughout most of the nineteenth century. McKinley thus initiated a change in policies that paved the way for transforming the United States into its modern identity as an economic, industrial and military giant (Matuz 2004: 390).



At first glance the attribution of *oldness* as a negative value to domestic affairs seems astonishing, given that OLD as a category is not a preferred mode of characterization of American political activities – except for denoting the age of American political institutions. The category OLD is central to the journey metaphor, which is one of the most pervasive sustained metaphors in American political discourse. The category OLD is used to describe a former state or condition, similar to a stopping point during a journey, conceptually speaking.

In what is generally recognized as a period of transition within American national history, McKinley's rhetorical strategy of forging an internationalist coalition is compelling. In the light of these developments the adjective *old* has a marked expressive value. Constructing domestic problems as pertaining to the past heralds a new stage on the political journey. In terms of the ideological functions of 'old', van Dijk's ideological square, which was introduced in chapter 2, can also provide useful insights in this context. The representation of an old state of affairs is hence ideological in the sense that the negative aspects of the entities premodified by the adjective *old* are emphasized as no longer valid, while the new state of affairs is evaluated as positive. Prior to explaining these strategic functions in more detail I will briefly draw attention to another aspect of the interpretation of the linguistic unit *old*.

In (19) and (20) 'old' has another meaning which, however, is also temporal in that it denotes the age of an entity. In the context of the examples below, these entities are abstractions, which suggest their metaphorization. They are what Radden/Dirven (2007: 78) refer to as reified nouns, or abstract nouns in traditional terms. The process of reification is thought to involve "a metaphorical shift from a relational entity into a thing" (Radden/Dirven *ibid.*), thereby establishing an ontology. Crucially, the conceptual content is not touched but "the impact of reification is in giving relational concepts the kind of stable existence that we typically associate with things" (Radden/Dirven 2007: 79). This ontological reality helps us to understand events or states that do not belong to the physical domain. Importantly, abstract entities are based on relational concepts that are in some way or other reified. On the linguistic level, nominalization is the equivalent of reification, implying that abstract nouns derive from other word classes. "Nominalized abstract nouns are typically derived from verbs, adjectives or nouns" (Radden/Dirven 2007: 79).

Both "civilization" and "nation" are personified and the premodifier *old* denotes their age as the age of a person. Besides the well known mapping THE NATION IS A PERSON we also have CIVILIZATION IS A PERSON. Thus, 'old' may be understood as contrasting with 'new' in the sense of 'young', 'not having lived or existed for a long time'.

- (19) [...] Surely civilization is old enough, surely mankind is mature enough so that we ought in our own lifetime to find a way to permanent peace. [...] (HCH, 25)

Hoover is the final president of a series of three Republican presidents of the "Republican Ascendancy" (Riccards 1995b) during the 1920s. Attempting to escape the ghosts of the Democrat Wilson, Harding had heralded his triumph in the elections of 1920 as the beginning of a new era, which he invoked in the form of a leitmotiv throughout his inaugural address. As we shall see below, the phrase "new order" is one of the key words of his speech.

Yet this new era drew to a close during Hoover's tenure at the time of the Great Depression. Despite his reputation as a "crisis manager" (cf. Matuz 2004: 491) Hoover ranks as one of the least effective presidents, chiefly as a result of his inability to redress the economic ills during the early years of the Great Depression due to his dislike of government interference with the business cycle. Instead Hoover built on the self-healing forces of capitalism (cf. Schäfer 1990: 125), which is also reflected in his foreign policy stance. Strongly committed to a policy of non-intervention, Hoover focused on Western Europe, where the large World War I debts remained the major challenge on the political agenda (cf. Riccards 1995b: 121f.). In order to further economic expansionism, he supported the Young Plan's open-door policy, which stabilized capitalist power relations in Europe (cf. Schäfer *ibid.*: 127). Most notably, however, Hoover accumulated a distinguished record of humanitarian aid and volunteer service (cf. Riccards *ibid.*: 112).

Hoover's plea for peace, appealing to the maturity and experience of civilization in its entirety, is clearly influenced by the generally unstable political situation that still haunted many parts of the world following the traumatizing event of World War I. In the light of these circumstances and the president's leaning to *laissez-faire* policies, his rhetorical emphasis on 'organic forces' to bring about peace is compelling and consistent. Amplifying the rationality and knowledgeable authority of age (BEING OLD IS BEING IN A STATE OF KNOWLEDGE, see above), his appeal feeds on the cognitive model of CYCLE, whose organic conception entails the dynamic of rise and fall, growth and decay. The trick is to maintain the level of growth and maturity, a stage in which *oldness* stands for political action based on rationality and experience.

The amplification is reflected on the syntactic level in the guise of wordiness, in fact, the two clauses are virtually identical in meaning. It is as if the second paraphrases the first, adding intensification rather than additional information to the issue at hand. The fact that both adjectives, 'old' and 'mature', are highly expressive in value, besides their partial synonymy, makes them eligible for rewording. The rhetorical device of *amplificatio* is characteristic of hortatory discourse as it is geared towards audience response. Hoover's invocation of the age of civilization is meant as a reminder of the generally unstable and unsettling status quo on the stage of world politics. Once more the parallels in the construals of foreign-policy reasoning as the analogue of domestic issues are compelling.

The rhetorical strategy underlying this thinking was referred to as spiritualization in chapter 3 above. Distracting the electorate from difficult issues, such as the economic problems troubling world business, Hoover introduces peace as an intangible ideal, a common purpose that is largely uncontroversial. While not outlining any means as to how exactly this can be achieved, he instills the natural cause of *oldness* into the sense of maturity, even suggesting that we are very close to achieving it ("in our own lifetime") which is conclusive given the entailments of the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor: when you are old, you are fairly advanced in your travels, nearing your destination.

The exhortative potential of OLDNESS may also be exploited from a different angle. Whereas age may be constructed as a positive attribute, providing you with the asset of knowledge derived from experience as in the preceding example, it may still give rise to

uncertainties and situations that are difficult to handle. In (20), President Eisenhower makes use of this potentiality:

- (20) No nation, however old or great, escapes this tempest of change and turmoil. Some, impoverished by the recent World War, seek to restore their means of livelihood. In the heart of Europe, Germany still stands tragically divided. So is the whole continent divided. And so, too, is all the world. 13 (DDE II, 13)

In his second inaugural address, Eisenhower draws on the highly popular notion that America is an old, and of course, great nation. As in the rewording strategy described above, the experiential and expressive value of the lexical item *old* is made use of and the allegedly positive attributes mutually reinforce one another. In the light of the two strands of development within American national history, *oldness* is a sign of achievement, in which the life of the (personified) American nation is analogous to a journey. It is implied that old nations are also great because they have achieved a lot, which gives them both physical and moral strength. Nonetheless, the age of a nation — note that *old* functions as a premodifier of the reified noun nation again for the reasons expounded earlier — is no warranty for safety from harmful political events. Crucially, and this is the difference from (19), these events are external, originating from a global situation of unrest, which is modeled in terms of the conceptual metaphor CAUSES ARE FORCES. While both causes are natural, one is more predictable than the other. *Oldness* as part of the organic cycle is an intrinsic cause, belonging to the properties of the nation and functioning as a potential cause for the general improvement of the state of affairs. The personified American nation is constructed as not being able to move away from the danger; despite its age and strength, the American republic is not safe from harm and is likely to be negatively affected by current political events that characterize the post-WW II period leading to the Cold War. The agency of the American nation is called into question in view of the power of external events, which are understood as ongoing change (CHANGE IS MOTION) that is hard to control even by an old and strong nation. The sense of danger and anxiety is intensified by the lexical expressions *tempest* and *turmoil*, which suggest that this kind of situation is difficult or even impossible to control. Thus, the overall level of exhortation is more enhanced than in (19) due to the dynamic construal of the scene, which is represented as being caused by external events.<sup>217</sup>

In a number of twentieth-century examples an explicit reference is made to the Old World, which constitutes the second category to be examined. In (21) Harding, the first Republican president after Wilson's influential administration, alludes to the practice that typified nineteenth-century foreign policies up to the transition phase beginning with McKinley's tenure: the policy that is referred to by a number of terms such as isolationism or non-

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<sup>217</sup> The sense of exposure and vulnerability was enhanced by the hesitancy that typified Eisenhower's difficult second term. Ironically Eisenhower, the Second World War hero (cf. Matuz 2004: 566), pursued cautious foreign policies that were characterized by his reluctance to use military force. His administration was increasingly pressurized into seeking military solutions for the manifold conflicts of the time. Accordingly Eisenhower's second term was "plagued by two conflicting attitudes: he genuinely wanted peace and a détente with the Soviets, but he distrusted them to carry out their part of the bargain if it were ever struck" (Riccards 1995b: 238).

interventionism, depending on the speaker's standpoint, was recommended by Washington in his well-known Farewell Address.<sup>218</sup>

Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalry, interest, humor or caprice?

It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world; so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the maxim no less applicable to public than to private affairs, that honesty is always the best policy. I repeat it, therefore, let those engagements be observed in their genuine sense. But, in my opinion, it is unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them.

His recommendation is best remembered for the coinage 'entangling alliances', which would subsequently find expression in the Monroe Doctrine, which subdivided the world into two hemispheres, the western hemisphere including the New World, and the eastern hemisphere including Europe, Asia and Africa, in other words, everything but the Americas. The Doctrine, which was first delivered as a message to Congress, originated in an isolationist spirit, underscoring the deep sense of difference from the Old World, to the extent that the New World and the Old World were to be conceived as belonging to two different spheres. However, towards the closing stages of the nineteenth century a new spirit began to emerge, aiming to reconcile isolationism and the pursuit of interests located outside the American hemisphere.

The concept of a New World dedicated to republicanism and democracy and different from the Old, became with time less correspondent with reality; [...] but the sense of differentness persisted; [...]. The notion of the two spheres cut deep into the American mind and has more than influenced the practical evolution of American diplomacy. (Perkins 21968. 36)

This passage illustrates the gradual and growing abstraction of a sentiment that originated from immediate spatial experience. Having said that, the 'immediate' experience of newness in terms of space on behalf of the settlers is not to be understood as literally immediate – for this kind of immediacy is not even included in the *Mayflower Compact* which constructed the experience of newness and chosenness. Evidently, some 150 years later, when the Constitutional Convention took place, the notion was already deeply entrenched, a biased event model, so to speak. What this growing dislocation illustrates, however, is two things. In the first place, it is a case of increasing mythologization in the Barthian sense introduced in chapter 2 above, in which the original correspondence between the New World and a new political order in the shape of republicanism and democracy has increasingly declined. While the signification attached to the experience of newness is stored as general knowledge, the political realities have developed in a different direction.

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<sup>218</sup> As with all the major public speeches by American presidents, they can be accessed on a number of web sites. In agreement with the source of my sample collection of inaugural addresses I used the following site to retrieve Washington's Farewell Address: <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/washing.htm> (date of last retrieval: 9 January 2008).

In the second place, the divisive potential of space was fully exploited by the spatiality of nineteenth-century colonial imperialism. The ideological underpinning of the two-hemisphere theory converted the geophysical space into a cultural space, an appropriation that transferred cultural space into a space of action, communication and discourse.

- (21) The recorded progress of our Republic, materially and spiritually, in itself proves the wisdom of the inherited policy of noninvolvement in Old World affairs. Confident of our ability to work out our own destiny, and jealously guarding our right to do so, we seek no part in directing the destinies of the Old World. We do not mean to be entangled. We will accept no responsibility except as our own conscience and judgment, in each instance, may determine. <sup>3</sup> Our eyes never will be blind to a developing menace, our ears never deaf to the call of civilization. We recognize the new order in the world, with the closer contacts which progress has wrought. (WGH, 3-4)

The two prepositional phrases in which “Old World” is contained are suggestive of the dual construction of political reality (see chapter 2). While “Old World” is a toponym, it is also an expression that has an enhanced expressive and experiential value. The first occurrence, “Old World affairs,” relates to political events and activities connected to the Old World. Invoking the Monroe Doctrine, Harding is certainly referring to both the location, i.e. Europe as the recent theater of war, and American interests outside the western hemisphere in general. Thus, the meaning of “Old World” is motivated by the PLACE FOR ACTION/EVENT metonymy. In the second occurrence, the phrase “the destinies of the Old World,” the meaning of “Old World” is motivated by THE PLACE FOR THE PEOPLE IN THAT PLACE metonymy.

What is interesting about this passage in terms of the event structure system (ESM) is the apparent incongruity of the metaphors in effect — despite the fact that all of them draw on the source domain MOTION. First, the mapping PROGRESS IS MOTION FORWARD is realized by virtue of several linguistic forms. Crucially, the positive evaluation holds for the development of the American Republic which is modeled in terms of a journey. As progress is the default mode for this understanding of the United States, it is, so to speak, in-built; it is conceptualized as EXPECTED PROGRESS IS A TRAVEL SCHEDULE.<sup>219</sup> From this angle, time also plays a vital role since progress is not only measured in terms of distance covered but also in terms of the time needed (“recorded progress,” “wisdom of the inherited policy”). The assessment of the actual progress is derived from the mappings TIME IS AN EVALUATOR and BEING OLD IS BEING IN STATE OF KNOWLEDGE (see above).

Yet when relating to developments that are not associated with the US, progress is not mechanically evaluated in positive terms. In the last line of the passage, progress is represented as an agent-like cause (CAUSES ARE FORCES) that has brought about negative or even detrimental changes (“wrought”). There is an antagonism between “recorded progress” and current progress on the one hand, and self-induced progress and that of external events (that are not beneficial to American interests) on the other, i.e. the contrast of self-motion as opposed to caused motion, and by extension, controlled changes vs. uncontrollable changes.

<sup>219</sup> Kövecses (2002: 59) has identified this conceptual metaphor in his discussion of the cultural symbolism of the Statue of Liberty. He (ibid.) argues that cultural symbols may be based on well-entrenched metaphors such as metaphors for free action, history and knowledge, for example.

It is worthwhile looking more closely into the change brought about by progress. American foreign policy in the aftermath of the First World War tried to restore the non-interventionist tradition that was valid up until the turn of the century and continued to be alive amongst large parts of the American political establishment as well as the general public. Political events, “the new order in the world,” had established closer political ties on the world stage. However, the conceptual metaphor RELATIONSHIP IS PROXIMITY is largely incompatible with the mapping ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION since this would require maneuvering space, conceptually speaking. Here we have a contiguity relation to another dominant model within American political thinking, namely, the conceptualization of FREEDOM IS SPACE TO MOVE, which may be blended into FREE ACTION IS UNINHIBITED SELF-PROPELLED MOTION.<sup>220</sup> The closer contacts imply a restriction of this freedom, as is further evidenced by the schematic meaning of CONTAINMENT, which disables this possibility.

Second, the journey metaphor is relevant in yet another respect. Based on the mapping PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEY, which entails metaphors such as PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS or MEANS ARE PATHS, Harding draws a marked distinction between the purposes of the United States and those of other nations. Neither do their interests and aims coincide nor is the United States inclined to assume the role of a guide for the policies of other nations. The third aspect relates to the mapping ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION, which is realized in the passage “confident of our ability to work out our own destiny, and jealously guarding our right to do so.”

The ideological tension between motion and freedom on the one hand, and stable relations and bonding amongst nations on the other is resolved by a rhetorical strategy that construes them as compatible rather than antagonistic. The idealism of ‘both-and’ instead of ‘either-or’ is reinforced on the syntactic level by simply sequencing the sentences without explicitly providing any causal connectors. Consequently Harding implies that the nation can be both free and independent while being engaged and committed when necessity requires, that is, when its help is needed. This shifts the argumentation onto the moralistic level — the notion of mission springs to mind — issuing protective and paternalistic policies.

In the following two examples, the New and Old Worlds are again personified, metonymically standing for the place of origin. The phrase “the New World” is the first mention in an inaugural address as a marker of self-identification. President Hoover converts the two toponyms into politonyms by means of elegant variation. In fact, the two layers of meaning, the meaning framed by [geography] on the one hand and [person] on the other are blended metonymically, establishing a causal link. The underlying rationale is that the location accounts for a certain type of person. The metaphorical mappings are THE NEW WORLD IS A PERSON and THE OLD WORLD IS A PERSON, as is evidenced by the lexical expressions *free*, *troubled*, *inheritance*, *fear*, and *distrust*, all of which collocate with the [person] frame.

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<sup>220</sup> Goatly (2007: 163) identifies the metaphor FREEDOM IS SPACE TO MOVE as one half of a pair of evaluative opposites. According to Goatly (ibid.: 183) the preference for the freedom concept of human relationships originates from the metonym of the wide open spaces of the American West.

- (22) [...] While we have had wars in the Western Hemisphere, yet on the whole the record is in encouraging contrast with that of other parts of the world. Fortunately the New World is largely free from the inheritances of fear and distrust which have so troubled the Old World. We should keep it so. (HCH, 24)

The claim that “the New World is largely free from the inheritances of fear and distrust” appears to be common amongst Republican presidents, since it recaptures Theodore Roosevelt’s assertion that “to us as a people it has been granted to lay the foundations of our national life in a new continent. We are the heirs of the ages, and yet we have had to pay few of the penalties which in old countries are exacted by the dead hand of a bygone civilization.”

Hoover’s use of the antagonism illustrates the importance of locality, even cultural space, as a means of group membership, which evidently occurs with significant ideological underpinning. I have drawn attention to the vital connection of space for the formation of national identity on various occasions throughout this study. From Hoover’s words in (22) we may draw the conclusion that the United States intended to reinforce the Monroe Doctrine, particularly when he included the beginning of the paragraph reading “I have lately returned from a journey among our sister Republics of the Western Hemisphere.”<sup>221</sup> What is interesting is the fact that the more a political object is personified, the more it is in focus at the time in question. The reference to the Latin American states as “sister Republics,” hence members of the family so to speak, is in sharp contrast to the political practice of imperialist supervision of the political and, above all, economic developments in those states.

On another level still, the personification of nations that are in political focus is taken into a different dimension approximately seventy years later:

- (23) We have a place, all of us, in a long story—a story we continue, but whose end we will not see. It is the story of a new world that became a friend and liberator of the old, a story of a slave-holding society that became a servant of freedom, the story of a power that went into the world to protect but not possess, to defend but not to conquer. (GWB I, 5)

In what could be interpreted as the biography of the New World — note that it is conceptualized as a person as derived from the mapping THE NEW WORLD IS A PERSON mentioned earlier — the destinies of the two worlds are intertwined in an interesting way. The new world is understood as a benevolent, helpful, trustworthy person as well as a brave and strong one; these characteristics have made it “a friend and liberator of the old.”

Besides the person metaphor there is also the pervasive story metaphor according to which American national history is understood as a book (AMERICAN HISTORY IS A BOOK), in which one comprehensive story is narrated, subdivided into smaller episodes, chapters or plots or even sub-plots, where there are several protagonists but, crucially, only one main plot and one main protagonist.

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<sup>221</sup> Hoover alludes to his “Good-will tour” around several Latin American states in November 1928, which was generally interpreted as the sign of a more flexible approach to foreign relations with Latin America, typified by securing American economic and political influence in that area in the fashion of imperialist supervision. Hoover also presided over the so-called Clark memorandum to the Monroe Doctrine, relativizing US interventionist ambitions in Latin America, which refuted the earlier Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, arguing that American interventionism could indeed be derived from the doctrine (cf. Schäfer 1990: 109).

Bush jun. conceives of foreign relations in a way that is characteristic of the strict-father morality (cf. Lakoff [1996] <sup>2</sup>2005). This metaphor system is assumed to underlie Republican political reasoning. As this conception of ‘moral politics’ is well known, I will only briefly outline the metaphors that are germane to this present analysis. The central metaphor is the mapping MORALITY IS STRENGTH, which implies standing up to evil, having moral fiber and having the backbone to resist evil. As has been shown earlier, the strict-father morality describes a system of conceptual metaphors typical of Republican familial values. Lakoff ([1996] <sup>2</sup>2005) provides some evidence for the validity of this moral conceptual system for a number of domestic policy issues such as taxes, abortion, racial issues and the environment. What is more, however, these systems are also applicable to the twentieth-century developments of American foreign policies, in the course of which new political relations have emerged. Tailored to suit the changed political landscape and the American rise to globalism, the existing cognitive models have been gradually adjusted to the world stage. The most paradigmatic case in point is the mapping THE WORLD IS A PERSON which has typified American foreign policy for some time.<sup>222</sup> The personification of the world and the relations amongst the nations of the world is even understood in terms of another mapping, THE WORLD IS A FAMILY, for instance in constructs such as ‘the international community’ or the ‘United Nations’. Crucially, the relations of America (AMERICA IS A PERSON) with other nations or even with the rest of the world involve the following set of correspondences:

THE NEW WORLD/THE FREE WORLD/AMERICA IS A PERSON who  
protects/saves/befriends/advises/parents  
THE OLD WORLD/UNFREE/EUROPE IS A PERSON who  
needs protection/a friend/a saviour/a supervisor/authority

The relations between the United States and ‘the world’ are organized in terms of a paternalistic and hierarchical structure derived from the “strict father” moral conceptual system. Representing American interests as the equivalent of the world’s interests reflects a totalizing claim. “Although the American public philosophy is not a collectivist ideology and although it does not claim that America has a mission to conquer the world in the name of a new total ersatz-religious truth, that philosophy does make universal claims” (Germino 1984: 15).

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<sup>222</sup> Charteris-Black (2005: 179ff.) has also identified the mapping THE WORLD IS A PERSON in his account of Bush’s “rhetoric of moral accounting” in which he also comes across this passage taken from Bush’s inaugural. However, his analysis of the metaphor appears to dissociate it from its place within the system of conceptual metaphors in American political discourse. Charteris-Black (ibid.) argues that the pervasiveness of this mapping is pertinent to the rhetoric following the 9/11 attacks, in which it served to equate US interests with the world’s interests. In contrast, the mapping is argued here to have evolved out of other-person metaphors such as A NATION IS A PERSON, A NATION IS A FAMILY etc., which have been common in foreign policy discourse or war rhetoric for some time. Witness my earlier observation that issues on top of the political agenda are regularly personified. Another point of criticism relates to Charteris-Black’s (ibid.: 179) explanation of the story metaphor. Linking it up with the history metaphor, he claims that it “is **probably** [emphasis added] intended to evoke the Protestant beliefs in predestination of the Pilgrim Fathers.” If predestination indeed is the guiding principle, the journey metaphor rather than the story metaphor would be the suitable conception. Devising it as a string of successive events that cannot be interfered with by human beings is most suitably expressed in terms of a process or an activity that unfolds in stages like a journey.



Remarkably, all references to the Old World are made by Republican presidents. It is no surprise that the strict father model gradually raises a family of nations based on its implications of ‘morality’. However, it is a long way from the foreign policy of the ‘Republican era’ in the 1920s, which “was a strange mixture of isolationism and idealism” (Riccards 1995b: 98) to the open-faced world-power claims made by the Bush administration at the turn of the century, which suggests that the universalist potential inherent in the American public philosophy has increasingly materialized as an ideology of “the ecumenic type” (Germino *ibid.*), i.e. it does articulate universal claims.

The third group of twentieth-century inaugurals contains co-occurrences of the adjectives *new* and *old*, frequently in antonymic construal, following an ‘us-vs.-them’ pattern of evaluation. Since there is a strong bias towards party-political affinities in favor of the Republican Party in this group, I will depart from the chronological order and discuss the relevant passages following their theme and function rather than their chronology. The only Democratic presidents represented in this group are Wilson and Truman, whose ‘contributions’ will be discussed at the end of this section.

- (24) [...] To us as a people it has been granted to lay the foundations of our national life in a new continent. We are the heirs of the ages, and yet we have had to pay few of the penalties which in old countries are exacted by the dead hand of a bygone civilization. We have not been obliged to fight for our existence against any alien race; and yet our life has called for the vigor and effort without which the manlier and hardier virtues wither away. [...] (TRO, 1)

Both adjectives, *new* and *old*, premodify nouns belonging to the [location] frame. Nonetheless the referring expressions “in a new continent” and “in old countries” are distinct on several linguistic levels, which constrains the possibility of meaning construction for both adjectives.

On the semantic level, the two adjectives function as antonyms in several ways, feeding on the classification schemas available within this specific context. Consequently, the construal of *new* implies that the subcategory referenced by the prepositional phrase (PP) (“in a new continent”) had not previously existed or had been recently discovered. These sub-senses contrast with the temporal sense of ‘old’, which can be paraphrased as ‘aged due to long service’. As temporal categories, the contrastive meaning of ‘old’ and ‘new’ is induced by cognitive models of time such as TIME IS AN EVALUATOR, which establishes a set of correspondences as follows:

The passing of time carries along new events and experiences. Moving along through time entails the accumulation of ever new experiences

Having lived through a significant number of new experiences vests a person with strength, moral and physical

The crucial point here is that Theodore Roosevelt is faced with an argumentative dilemma as he has to circumvent the incongruity of ‘old’ and ‘new’ in this context. His rhetorical ‘sleight of mouth’ succeeds in validating the cognitive model in claiming that “[w]e are the heirs of the ages.” Given the experiential value of ‘old’ derived from a mapping such as OLD IS KNOWLEDGEABLE, the shorthand formula of BEING OLD IS BEING IN A STATE OF

KNOWLEDGE, it would be counterproductive to the argumentation as it stands. For this reason his claim “that our life has called for the vigor and effort without which the manlier and hardier virtues wither away” is an argumentative necessity. Life on the frontier has compensated for the alleged lack of competition and conflict, hence his invocation of the continent as being ‘new’.<sup>223</sup> *New* also invites another reading, i.e. as ‘unspoilt’, ‘fresh’, ‘not marked by previous experiences’. The reference made to the newly discovered continent is suggestive of the myth that the continent presented itself as *tabula rasa*, which could be shaped according to the colonists’ needs and demands.

As a consequence, the construal of *new* and *old* on the sentence level is marked on account of agency, which is also mirrored in the sentence construction. While both are part of prepositional phrases that are attributed non-participant roles in the sentence schema, i.e. thematic roles that do not form a part in the sentence’s event schema (cf. Radden/Dirven 2007: 303), the PP “in old countries” is an adjunct in preposed position. This marked position within the sentence serves to highlight the contrast between the inferable ‘new country’, America, and the inclusive category of ‘old countries’. The noun phrase is both vague and generic; the plural suggests that any old country is meant, thereby opening a [comparison] frame that can easily be inferred. Yet the passive constructions suggest another semantic contrast between ‘new’ and ‘old’. While the elect position of the American nation derives from an unknown source, the scope of action within old countries is constrained by the remains of other peoples, with distinct socio-political structures of their own, that have pre-existed (“bygone civilization”) contemporary societies. The antagonism between pioneering and marching along trodden paths that channel your actions could not be more strongly pronounced. The free and unrestrained ability to move, which is typical of the American situation, contrasts with the situation encountered in old parts of the world, in which the profiled part, the dead hand, performs an arresting grip on the nation’s development (motivated by the mapping CIVILIZATION IS A PERSON, mentioned above). This comparison taps into the idea that some developments such as the development of a democratic nation on the one hand, but also the rise of capitalism on the other benefited from the virtual - if we exclude the native American population and colonial rivals - absence of opposition apart from the challenges of exploring a new continent.

Moreover, the [comparison] frame is also conveyed by the distinct construal of the two geophysical spaces: on the one hand, the relevant expression is a spacious continent as opposed to the narrower dimension of a country on the other. This contrast adds to the overall construction of FREEDOM IS SPACE TO MOVE. As location is conceptualized in terms of the metaphorical mapping LOCATION IS A BOUNDED AREA IN SPACE, this almost inevitably evokes the schematic image of CONTAINMENT. It is conceivable for, a continent to be envisioned as virtually boundless while the experience of being in a country relies on the security of borders.

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<sup>223</sup> This claim is factually inaccurate for a number of reasons. First, it is oblivious to the fact that the colonial powers did indeed compete for the supremacy and ultimate control of the Americas, in the course of which the young American nation was forced more than once to either fight for or purchase territory. Second, the native American population did not yield their fruitful soil to the settlers without resistance either.

In the light of these events, the notions of agency and freedom come to the fore again. The pervasiveness of the conceptual metaphor FREE ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED, UNINHIBITED MOTION appears to be grounded in the experience of vast spaces. Thus there is a mutual reinforcement between the political ideas and their ‘realization’ in terms of territorial potential. The agency on behalf of the American people, who are conceived of as being able to shape the new continent according to their (boundless) potential of innovation and exploration, restricted only by their own limitations, is contrasted with the constant exposure to external forces (“exacted”) prevailing “in old countries.”

The ideological interweaving of space and motion is grounded in the experience of newness, which in this combination was certainly without precedent. Similarly, the ideological construction of time and temporality, which for most Republican presidents is retrospective, i.e. temporal experience is bound to historical events, mostly dates from the transition period of the colonial time to the Early Republic. The temporality is also exploited in another respect. The eternal present is used with reference to the old countries in order to corroborate the unbounded validity of their lack of freedom on the one hand, and to the American nation in order to substantiate the claim of “we are the heirs of the ages” on the other.

The frontier myth conjured up the American west as both a place and a process that was conducive to democratic development. It contributed to building a self-reliant, free people, but furthered capitalist development in conceiving of the frontier as supply and demand. In brief, the frontier cannot be dissociated from what is generally referred to as ‘the American experience’. Roosevelt’s invocation of the myth’s fundamental idea is no coincidence. Barely a decade earlier the historian Turner ([1920] 1996) had left a huge impact on American political thinking in introducing his Frontier Thesis. In keeping with the spatiality and the ideological underpinning of the frontier, Roosevelt subscribes to America’s experimental character rather than its manifest destiny: instead of divine intervention the advantage over other nations and peoples is viewed as both geographic and demographic.

In a similar vein, another Republican president appeals to the notions of freedom and independence, thereby introducing an affirmative component into his rhetoric. The analogy of two historically distinct situations, the period in national history he mentions and the present moment, which conveys newness, establishes a subjective perspective on the development of national history. Presumably, this analogy is intended to suggest another sea change in “national consciousness,” comparable to a new period, which is constructed as being within reach:

- (25) We stand at the opening of the one hundred and fiftieth year since our national consciousness first asserted itself by unmistakable action with an array of force. The old sentiment of detached and dependent colonies disappeared in the new sentiment of a united and independent Nation. Men began to discard the narrow confines of a local charter for the broader opportunities of a national constitution. Under the eternal urge of freedom we became an independent Nation. [...] (JCC, 3)

The national consciousness is construed as an agent-like cause within the sentence’s action schema. The personification of national identity serves as a catalyst, explaining the power to act and bringing about change (ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION and CHANGE IS MOTION).

The antonymy of *new* and *old* is constructed by means of other lexical items, all of which are connoted with an established pattern of iconographic frames of reference through the expressive values of ‘new’ and ‘old’. Accordingly, *old* is construed in such a way — encoded as a premodifier in the noun phrase “old sentiment” and attached to an *of*-phrase containing further qualifications (“detached,” “dependent,” “colonies,” “local charter,” “narrow”) — as to convey highly dispreferred concepts within American political discourse. In contrast the adjective *new*, by means of similar, parallel constructions, evokes an overall positive frame of reference, realized by the positive words “united,” “independent Nation,” “national constitution” and “broad.” While ‘new’ and ‘old’ are clearly constructed as a contrastive pair, the new is also understood as replacing the old, implying a qualitative change.

The successful achievement of this political development — the accomplishment of the American Revolution and implementation of an independent Nation — is thus perceived not only as change (CHANGE IS MOTION) but also as progress (PROGRESS IS MOTION FORWARD). Moreover, the development of a national identity is also constructed as deriving from this changed situation. More precisely, it results from the resolution of the conflict between “detached” and “dependent” in favor of the latter (RELATIONSHIP IS PROXIMITY).

Change is also the guiding principle underlying the following two passages. Again, the antonymy, ideologically contested, provides the anchor on which the contrast of “before-and-after” hinges.

- (26) [...] This policy represents a new departure in the world. It is a thought, an ideal, which has led to an entirely new line of action. It will not be easy to maintain. Some never moved from their old positions, some are constantly slipping back to the old ways of thought and the old action of seizing a musket and relying on force. America has taken the lead in this new direction, and that lead America must continue to hold. (JCC, 6)

This passage is particularly rewarding in the analysis of the antonymy construal of *new* and *old*. Table 4 summarizes the individual contrastive pairs:

<b>Source</b>	(initiation of) activity	<b>motion</b>	a new departure	vs.	<b>lack of motion</b>	never moved from old positions
<b>path</b>	means	<b>progress</b>	an entirely new line of action	vs.	<b>retrograde step</b>	are constantly slipping back to the old ways of thought
<b>goal</b>	purpose of activity/action	<b>ideational</b>	[...] a thought, an ideal, [which has led to an entirely new line of action]. America has taken the lead in this new direction, [...]	vs.	<b>physical</b>	the old action of seizing a musket and relying on force

Table 4

The three-part inventory, moving as a gradation from the very general to the more specific, which is mirrored on the conceptual level in the source-path-goal trajectory, construes the

antonymy of *new* and *old* on several levels. At the top level, *new* relates to (the initiation of) motion, while *old* expresses an absence of motion, a fact that was the outcome of an earlier stage in the analysis. At the intermediate level, the means of an activity is represented (MEANS ARE PATHS) whereas the bottom level indicates the purpose of the action involved (PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS). The achievement of taking new initiatives such as embarking on new foreign policies is understood in terms of new paths that you move along. The lack of progress coded as the adherence to the same path is further highlighted by the kind of movement associated with a retrograde step. The verb phrase “slipping back” expresses a lack of control over movement (LACK OF CONTROL OVER CHANGE IS LACK OF CONTROL OVER MOVEMENT). Finally, the notions of change and newness are articulated in the superiority of negotiation and mutual agreements over the use of military power, the rational domain over the physical domain. In order to add persuasive force to this latter point, Coolidge claims that “America has taken the lead in this new direction.” Ironically, being anything but a grand innovator Coolidge’s administration was characterized by inaction and delaying decisions (cf. Riccards 1995b: 102-108). While (26) resonates with change and reform, Coolidge’s actual efficiency is restricted to very few efforts. One such effort is an international agreement that extended the negotiations reached at the Washington Naval Conference, the first joint effort at disarmament, which introduced ratios for different types of naval vessels (cf. Riccards 1995: 110). Coolidge talks about this international agreement earlier in the same paragraph using the following words:

- (27) In common with other nations, it [= this Nation] is now more determined than ever to promote peace through friendliness and good will, through mutual understandings and mutual forbearance. We have never practiced the policy of competitive armaments. We have recently committed ourselves by covenants with the other great nations to a limitation of our sea power. (JCC, 6)

What is interesting about this passage is the fact that the organization of foreign relations is described using the same models as with domestic relations. Derived from the Puritan model of self-organization and covenant theology, the notion of covenant, a compact between different communities based on the mutual principle of reciprocity (see chapter 3), foreign relations are conceptualized on the basis of this model (“in common,” “mutual understandings and mutual forbearance,” “covenants”). The movement towards disarmament, accompanied by a huge amount with a great portion of idealism, captured the spirit of the time. Thus Coolidge’s lack of initiative reflects the times that were dominated by the fresh memory of the “terrible losses of the Great War, pacifist sentiment and the popular mood [that] made such movements seem a proper postscript” (Riccards 1995b: 110).

Another major change in the global political arena is the one invoked by Bush sen., the collapse of communism (see below). The cliché “a new breeze is blowing,” which is probably modeled on “the winds of change,” another oft-cited cliché,<sup>224</sup> is repeated several times throughout his inaugural address, in which the temporal meaning of ‘old’ and ‘new’ is

<sup>224</sup> For instance, President Eisenhower uses this cliché in his second inaugural address: “Thus across all the globe there harshly blow the winds of change. And, we—though fortunate be our lot—know that we can never turn our backs to them” (DDE II, 17). This passage will be discussed at a later stage in the analysis.

foregrounded. Whereas the meaning of ‘new’ is the equivalent of ‘recent’ (‘having just developed or not there before’), ‘old’ denotes an entity that has existed for a long time, to the extent that it is ‘outlived’ and ‘outdated’. Another meaning for *newness* that could be implicated is the notion of ‘freshness’ and ‘vitality’ (energetic), which contrasts with the construal of *old* as ‘used-up’ or even ‘burnt-out’, which corroborates the fact that totalitarianism has outlived itself.

The modeling of time and temporality within (28) is also interesting in another respect. As discussed in chapter 4, there are two major cognitive models for time, an ego-based and a time-based model. Here the ego-based model applies, more precisely in its moving-time variant. (28) construes a stationary ego-experiencer, realized as “a nation (...) stands ready to push on,” relative to TIME IS THE MOVEMENT OF AN OBJECT PASSING or simply TIME IS MOTION. Consequently, political events and ideas are devised as having their time, the relevant temporal interval being defined by the political conviction in terms of properties or relations. For example, the prepositional *of*-phrase specifies the same aspect as the premodifier *totalitarian* as a defining property of a temporal unit. In other words: the expressions “the day of the dictator is over” and “the totalitarian era is passing” express the same idea, though tackled from two opposing angles. The former describes a part-whole relation whereas the latter represents a whole-part relation; hence the link is established by virtue of conceptual metonymy. Functionally they have the same ideological underpinning, i.e. the representation that totalitarianism has been displaced by a fresh political conviction in the name of freedom. This different perspective also holds for the temporal level. While the verb phrase *to be over* denotes that the ego-experiencer has moved to the end of a temporal interval marked off by two boundary events A and B (the ego-experiencer moves along the time axis), the expression “the totalitarian era is passing” suggests a stationary ego in view of moving times. Crucially, these temporal units are conceptualized as objects that move along (HISTORICAL PERIODS ARE MOVING OBJECTS). As a result, there is a time for totalitarianism, democracy, freedom and so on.

- (28) For a new breeze is blowing, and a world refreshed by freedom seems reborn; for in man's heart, if not in fact, the day of the dictator is over. The totalitarian era is passing, its old ideas blown away like leaves from an ancient, lifeless tree. A new breeze is blowing, and a nation refreshed by freedom stands ready to push on. (GBU, 6)

The entire event is construed dynamically with natural forces (“breeze”) acting (“blowing”, “blown away”) as causes (CAUSES ARE FORCES) that bring about change. Another powerful energizing force that increases the momentum of (loco)motion is freedom, which is devised as an agent-like cause. The inextricable interweaving of newness and freedom (the new generates the free, freedom allows for novelty) manifests itself in (28), in that the stationary ego-experiencer, the nation, is confronted with agents and forces that shape the present situation. Crucially, both the nation and the world are conceptualized in terms of the source domain PERSON, both collocate with ‘refresh’ which, in its non-technical sense, subcategorizes for [person]. The multivalent source concept PERSON permits the synchronization of the impact of events on the American nation with those on the world. The conceptual link is established

via freedom which acts as the energizing force that reinvigorates both parts and thus likens the rest of the world to America; at least this is how it is constructed.

Time and again, the concepts that are on the top of the political agenda tend to be personified. The changed global situation allows for a general process of reshuffling, re-aligning and reorientation, all of which is presented from the American perspective. In defining new relations with the world, America is not merely experiencing a thorough renewal itself as is the case for ‘the world’ (“a world refreshed by freedom seems reborn”) but also gains new momentum (“a nation refreshed by freedom stands ready to push on”). Again, there is an opposition between a static construal for the out-group, the old, unfree world or other nations, vs. a dynamic construal of the in-group, the American nation, new world etc.

Just as the progressive Roosevelt generally abides by his Republican thinking, so the progressive Wilson adheres to his Democratic party-political principles in applying the ‘old vs. new dichotomy’ to immaterial entities of public interest for a change. Explaining the recent success of the Democratic campaign after two decades of Republican presidents — the last Democratic president to be sworn into office was Cleveland in 1893 — Wilson nurtures the notion of change and the connoted meaning of novelty, albeit in an unspecific way:

- (29) It [= change] means much more than the mere success of a party. The success of a party means little except when the Nation is using that party for a large and definite purpose. No one can mistake the purpose for which the Nation now seeks to use the Democratic Party. It seeks to use it to interpret a change in its own plans and point of view. Some old things with which we had grown familiar, and which had begun to creep into the very habit of our thought and of our lives, have altered their aspect as we have latterly looked critically upon them, with fresh, awakened eyes; have dropped their disguises and shown themselves alien and sinister. Some new things, as we look frankly upon them, willing to comprehend their real character, have come to assume the aspect of things long believed in and familiar, stuff of our own convictions. We have been refreshed by a new insight into our own life. (TWW I, 2)

As in many previous examples, the syntactic structure is at odds with the semantic level, i.e. there is syntactic parallelism and semantic antithesis: the subject noun phrases “some old things” and “some new things” are antithetical. The temporal meaning of ‘old’, denoting an entity or thing that has existed or been used for a long time, contrasts with the temporal meaning of ‘new’. Potential sub-senses of ‘old’ and ‘new’ are evoked in terms of the adjectives that could be their partial synonyms. This allows for the construction of contrastive pairs on several levels, reinforcing the general message that a consequential change has occurred, a change that brings the American people, the nation in whose service the Democratic Party acts, to a more authentic understanding of itself. The parallelism entrenches the notion of change on two levels as we have, in fact, two events of change, which are however merged in the frame of [familiarity]. This [familiarity] frame relates to the category OLD, building on its temporal meaning of ‘duration’; hence it denotes an entity that has been seen or experienced many times before. Crucially, these “old things” are represented as having changed to their opposite meaning, i.e. they now appear alien instead of familiar. The driving force (CAUSES ARE FORCES) behind this event of change is the impact of novelty which puts an end to an old

habit. While contemplating the current state of affairs “with fresh, awakened eyes,” the personified nation or the people have adopted a changed perspective. Thus old things change for the worse and are gradually substituted by new things which are perceived as familiar as a result of this changed outlook. How does this work conceptually?

There are at least two sets of conceptual metaphors and their entailments that motivate the construal of *old* and *new*. The first one is the pervasive event structure metaphor (ESM) and its core mapping CHANGE IS MOTION. As illustrated in chapter 4, there are two construals of the ESM, the object dual and the location dual. In line with an earlier observation, namely that the concept OLD is frequently not deployed in terms of motion, the ESM is construed in the object dual; change is conceptualized as the motion of an object to or away from the thing changing, which does not necessarily move itself. Typically, this moving object is time itself, as motivated by the mapping TIME IS A MOVING OBJECT, which implies a stationary ego-experiencer and entails the fact that temporal progression carries along novelty and brings it into being and present focus. In the event of this present experience, it is ‘novel’ and ‘fresh’ for some time, which is conceptualized as the temporal object’s movement beyond the perceiving ego into the past. In (29) above, time is a moving object that has moved away from the old thing, thus changing it. Consequently, the mappings TIME IS A CHANGER and TIME IS AN INNOVATOR apply. As will be shown in the analysis below, this conception of the necessity and inevitability of change, which is hailed as flexibility or adaptability, particularly by Democratic presidents, is another ‘progressivist’ feature inbuilt into American political cognition, dating back to Jefferson’s conception of novelty in his *Notes on the State of Virginia*.<sup>225</sup>

Second, the experience of change is also couched in the psychological world of experience. The perceiving ego-experiencer acknowledges the change either because there is a (temporal) distance between the experiencer and the things that caused the experience, which is the case in the sub-clause “as we have latterly looked critically upon them,” or because the ego-experiencer’s perception occurs from a different perspective or within a changed frame of mind, as is exemplified by “as we look frankly upon them, willing to comprehend their real character.” Crucially, both aspects are included in a causative construction, in which temporal sequence establishes causality, i.e. the preceding event, which is part of the subordinate *as*-clause, causes the second event included in the main clause. The meaning construction is

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<sup>225</sup> According to Abbott (1999: 47), Jefferson depicts “America in all its facets – natural, cultural, political, and economic – in terms of newness.” This claim is also valid in its reverse form, i.e. for Jefferson everything that was not new was not American. Abbott (*ibid.*) contends that this mindset is reflected in the *Notes on the State of Virginia* in a paradigmatic way. Obsessed with the classical world of Athens and Rome, Jefferson’s observations on the Virginia constitution of 1776 concentrate on American newness in terms of Republican thought. While not being overtly critical of the defects of Republicanism in the original constitution, his depiction of American political newness is interesting from another perspective. Jefferson claims that the Virginia constitution was formed when “we were new and inexperienced in the science of government” (cf. Abbott 1999: 57). More important still, Jefferson argues that the actual fault is neither the inexperience nor the newness but the fact that this early constitution does not fully embrace the Republican principle (cf. Abbott *ibid.*). Moreover, Jefferson’s line of argument also includes a solution to the problem which consists of promoting liberty under conditions of relative newness: “Newness as ‘inexperience’ produced these defects; the newness of Republican America will cure them” (cf. Abbott *ibid.*). This is a fascinating twist of argument in focusing on the future, the newness of the American future, which cannot undo the past but will always change and improve political entities as time progresses.



clearly motivated by the conceptual metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING. Cases in point are, for instance, various content words such as the lexical verbs *to look on*, *to show oneself*, the nouns *point of view*, *aspect*, *eyes*, *insight* or the adjective *awakened*. According to Radden/Dirven (2007), sentential event schemas can be classified by virtue of the world of experience they belong to. In (29), there is one domain of experience, the psychological domain that is predominant. The majority of the schematic meanings are part of the cognition or emotion schemas, in which knowledge is typically conceptualized in terms of the light-dark imagery. Similarly, vision is pivotal to cognizance. True insight is typically represented in light imagery, thus Wilson's interpretation of the event of change that has just taken place is a claim to authenticity. There is ample evidence on the linguistic level, for example, "drop disguises," "frankly," or "real character." *Change* and *newness* are constructed as an epistemological value, legitimizing the change in executive power as a means to true governance.

The cognition schema also applies to the construal of the second event of change, namely "some new things." Here the object dual of the ESM applies, as the transition from the new things to "things long believed in" results from careful reflection on behalf of the ego-experiencer,<sup>226</sup> which can also be understood collectively as the inclusive 'we' of political speeches. Metaphorically speaking, the change consists in a transfer or movement of an attribute or possession to a given entity, motivated by the mapping CHANGES ARE MOVEMENTS OF POSSESSIONS. More specifically the movement is the acquisition or loss of a given attribute ("have come to assume the aspect of things long believed in"). In (29), it is the acquisition of the attribute 'familiar'. The result of the sudden, recent realization is what Wilson refers to as "a new insight into our own life." Once again it is the object dual of the ESM that is used to construe the qualitative change. This developmental change builds on what already exists and serves to modify it. Thus 'new' means 'reinvigorated', a qualitative improvement in the shape of something acquired resulting from an object moving toward the thing changing.

Truman outlines "four major courses of action" for the post-WW II era, which he refers to as "our program for peace and freedom" in his inaugural address. In what corresponds to a drastic change in foreign policy, the end of appeasement, his speech is laden with cold war rhetoric. Indeed Truman's change of foreign policy represents a clear departure from what may be termed an "uncertain legacy of cooperation with the Soviets" (Riccards 1995b: 214), inherited from his predecessor FDR. The Truman Doctrine builds on the major rehabilitation program for Europe known as the Marshall plan. In granting economic assistance to European states, as only the United States could compensate for the shortages in supply,

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<sup>226</sup> There is also considerable evidence from perceptual psychology that duration is processual, yet consists of snapshots our cognition has taken of the continuity of duration. According to Bergson's notion of "durée réelle", every duration that can be understood as movement along the temporal axis is essentially incomplete in the sense that each of these virtual halts in time introduces an element of novelty which was not included in the past. As Bergson (1946: 17) observes, "[...] duration will be revealed as it really is, - unceasing creation, the uninterrupted upsurge of novelty."

Truman hoped to curb Soviet influence by virtue of a policy of containment, i.e. enclosing the Soviet Union and its satellite states by an alliance that was to become known as NATO.

In his inaugural Truman represents the prototypical ‘rhetorical president’ (see the definition of the rhetorical president in chapter 3 above), picturing the crisis in which Europe finds itself after WW II in drastic terms and employing outspoken anti-Communist rhetoric which, however, does not show in the following excerpt:

(30) Such new economic developments must be devised and controlled to benefit the peoples of the areas in which they are established. Guarantees to the investor must be balanced by guarantees in the interest of the people whose resources and whose labor go into these developments. 52 The old imperialism — exploitation for foreign profit — has no place in our plans. What we envisage is a program of development based on the concepts of democratic fair-dealing.<sup>227</sup> 53 All countries, including our own, will greatly benefit from a constructive program for the better use of the world's human and natural resources. Experience shows that our commerce with other countries expands as they progress industrially and economically. 54 (HST, 52-54)

*Old* in (30) clearly has a temporal meaning, denoting a former type of imperialism that is no longer valid and has presumably been replaced by a more appropriate model, namely a program of new economic development. The novelty, hence the improvement of this program with respect to “the old imperialism,” i.e. the “exploitation for foreign profit,” consists in establishing the capitalist principle of supply and demand, binding the beneficiaries by the moral principle of retribution. What Lakoff ([1996] 2005: 135ff.) has identified as the “Nurturant Parent Morality” on behalf of Democrats finds expression in (30) in terms of the metaphorical mappings MORALITY AS NURTURANCE and MORALITY AS SELF-DEVELOPMENT. This model will be explained in the context of a more prototypical example taken from Kennedy’s inaugural below.

Another important point in Truman’s argument is the authority of time and experience (TIME IS AN EVALUATOR). Two separate developments, conceptualized as movements, are analogized; they are construed as occurring in chronological order, thereby establishing a causal link. In (30), the complex sentence “our commerce with other countries expands (A) as they progress industrially and economically (B)” establishes not only a temporal sequence but also a causal link between the two clauses. As a result there is an event (A), i.e. the event that American trade with other nations grows, and an event (B), i.e. that these other nations experience economic growth. The event in the sub-clause begins first, followed by the event described in the main clause.<sup>228</sup> Moreover, the main clause includes the foregrounded situation while the sub-clause contains the backgrounded one. In combination both the sequential order and the foregrounding of one situation construe the event in (B) as the cause or even precondition of (A). Conceptually this may be motivated by the mappings FREEDOM IS SPACE

<sup>227</sup> Like almost all presidents during the Cold War and era of American Liberalism such as Eisenhower, Truman was somehow connected to FDR and two of his major policies, namely the *New Deal* and the wartime alliance with the Soviet Union (Riccards 1995b: 205f.). Truman attempted to exploit FDR’s *New Deal* by converting it into a Fair Deal, though to no avail. It was revived later on by Johnson as “the Fair Deal agenda in housing, education, medical care, civil rights, and other areas” (Riccards 1995b: 235).

<sup>228</sup> Radden/Dirven (2007: 55) argue that “the order of the events is not iconically reflected in the order of the clauses, but in the grammatical form of the clause: the subordinate as-clause always describes the event that began first, the main clause describes the event following it.”

TO MOVE, which entails BEING DEMOCRATIC IS BEING IN MOTION, and PROGRESS IS MOTION FORWARD, which entails DEMOCRACY IS PROGRESS.

Framed in terms of a prospective perspective, the outcome of this substitution of ‘programs’ is unclear for the possibility that the “old imperialism” may eventually be replaced by a ‘new imperialism’, as the analyst is tempted to propose, is certainly not what Truman intended to convey. Imperialism is, of course, a highly loaded term of cold war rhetoric, with Stalin claiming that peace was not possible due to the forces of capitalism and imperialism (cf. Riccards 1995b: 212).

The meaning of ‘old’ is processed as synonymous with ‘former’ and ‘new’ as ‘replacive’, which links the textual level to the conceptual level. Truman literally states that the old imperialism “has no place in our plans,” which links it back to EXISTENCE. Thus, in Truman’s representation imperialism does not even exist.

The fourth group is an important variant of the preceding one, illustrating that *new* and *old* may indeed co-exist side by side. John F. Kennedy (henceforth JFK) is said to have taken politics into the twentieth century (cf. Matuz 2004: 578).<sup>229</sup> His entire inaugural address (see below) points to some of the issues Kennedy raised during his election campaign, for instance a thorough reform of both domestic and foreign policies. The general public was receptive to progressive social programs that would lower unemployment, improve education and boost the economy. On the world stage, Kennedy was faced with several areas of conflict in what turned out to be a difficult and critical period in U.S. foreign policy. On the one hand, he was concerned with the economic conditions in the Caribbean and Latin America, for which he devised a plan to rebuild their economies (cf. Matuz 2004: 581). What he hails as “a new alliance for progress” in his inaugural address (JFK, 9) — envisaging economic aid and future cooperation in economic and social reforms — consists, in fact, in further consolidating economic control over Latin America (cf. Schäfer 1990: 237). On the other hand Kennedy’s major preoccupation in view of communist expansion was focused on the Southeast Asian region, notably Indochina and Vietnam. In the context of these developments Kennedy mentions all areas of conflict in his inaugural address, two of which are represented in (31):

- (31) To those old allies whose cultural and spiritual origins we share, we pledge the loyalty of faithful friends. United, there is little we cannot do in a host of cooperative ventures. Divided, there is little we can do— for we dare not meet a powerful challenge at odds and split asunder. 6 To those new States whom we welcome to the ranks of the free, we pledge our word that one form of colonial control shall not have passed away merely to be replaced by a far more iron tyranny. [...] (JFK, 6-7)

The deadverbial use of the adjective *old* in the noun phrase “those old allies” denotes the long-standing relations the United States have entertained with these allies. Conversely the adjective

<sup>229</sup> In the election campaign of 1960 a number of debates between Kennedy and his opponent Nixon were televised for the first time (cf. Schäfer 1990: 231, Matuz 2004: 578f.). Kennedy was also the first presidential candidate to use polling. Apparently, his victory was largely indebted to the desire for change within the country. However, his election by the smallest margin also suggests that almost half of the American electorate were doubtful about the time for change (Schäfer *ibid.*). The ongoing election campaign of 2008 is in many ways reflective of the elections of 1960s.

*new* in the phrase “those new States” conveys the temporal meaning of ‘having come into existence recently’.<sup>230</sup> The political relations are once more personified in that the relations between allied nations are represented as the relationship of old friends (NATION IS A PERSON). Once more, the [relationship] frame, which has been mentioned on various occasions, motivates the construal derived from the underlying metaphor SIMILARITY IS RELATIONSHIP (“cultural and spiritual origins we share”), and its metaphorical entailments DIFFERENCE IS DISTANCE and DIFFERENCE IS SEPARATION (“at odds,” “divided,” “split asunder”). The appeal to unity is also intertwined with a moral claim, motivated by the metaphor of MORAL WHOLENESS, i.e. morality is conceptualized as wholeness or unity (“host of cooperative venture,” “united”).

Functionally the preference of unity over division (DIVISION IS WEAKNESS) is reflected in the sentence construction and on the level of speech acts. Syntactically the sentences have a parallel structure (“united, there is little we cannot do [...] vs. divided, there is little we can do [...]”), while the overall sentence meaning is antithetical. Interestingly the argument is couched in representative speech acts, conveying the notions truthfulness and factuality in terms of their illocutionary force of assertions. This is particularly remarkable with respect to the prevalence of commissives in the second part of the paragraph when referring to the new States.

Furthermore the conceptual metaphor UNITY IS STRENGTH also has another link to the moral domain. The mapping MORALITY AS THE NURTURANCE OF SOCIAL TIES could be argued to have MORAL WHOLENESS or UNITY IS STRENGTH as its entailments. What is more, the conceptual metaphor UNITY IS STRENGTH appears to be very active in the cultural memory as a consequence of the constant threat of national unity throughout the nineteenth-century, to a degree that reasoning on national cohesion does not appear on the whole to be influenced by party-political morality conceptions. Only in the more specific elaborations do they betray partisanship. For example, Kennedy’s line of argument, reminiscent of Truman’s earlier validation on the occasion of his inaugural, builds on nurturant parent morality, which relies on community responsibility and the maintenance of social ties. Lakoff ([1996] 2005: 112) contends that the nurturant parent morality thrives on the understanding “that bonds of affection and earned mutual respect are stronger than bonds of dominance.” Consequently this conception of morality builds on cooperation and interdependence rather than hierarchical structures and centralized power. Although Lakoff’s (ibid.) argument does not include foreign relations, the application of the same system of metaphors for distinct political contexts such as domestic as opposed to foreign policy context is evident.<sup>231</sup> From the

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<sup>230</sup> The new States — presumably the states of Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia, which had gained independence during the 1940s — were a permanent center of conflict that eventually heated up to terminate in the Vietnam War. It is also possible that Kennedy is referring to the emergence of nations on the African continent due to the onset of the process of decolonization after World War II.

<sup>231</sup> On a more critical note, conceiving of foreign relations as familial structures, in which the American nation either self-defines as a strict father or a nurturant parent, can still be perceived as patronizing by other nations. Seen as children that either need a firm guidance or are encouraged to develop and use their potential in the frame of mind intended by the parent figure at hand, the power relations remain virtually identical. The only notable difference between the two cognitive models of morality concerning foreign relations is that of

metaphor system of the nurturant parent morality, the following mappings apply to the situation described in (31):

MORALITY AS THE NURTURANCE OF SOCIAL TIES

MORALITY IS HAPPINESS

MORALITY AS SELF-DEVELOPMENT

Adapting these mappings and their entailments to the foreign policy context produces several entailments. Moral action on the global level, on the international political stage, involves the constant attention to mending and maintaining political relations to other nations, whether allies or foes. It may imply compromise but it is perceived as a duty, even though it may also imply making sacrifices. In order to be responsible and emphatic, i.e. in order to be able to help others, the understanding is that only a happy person can be nurturant towards others. Interestingly the line of argument pursued by Kennedy is evocative of Truman's rationale underlying his "new program of development based on the concepts of democratic fair-dealing." In this model of morality in foreign policy — the same rationale as in territorial expansionism, i.e. the world as a place is the analogue to the American continent — the A NATION IS A FAMILY metaphor has been extended to THE WORLD IS A FAMILY. Obviously this would be a desirable ideal if it were not for the grim political reality that this world in fact consists of several worlds, whose relations are not exactly reflective of equality. These metaphorical mappings are instantiated on the basis of the morality models available, i.e. the metaphor is corroborated in terms of the idealized models of the Strict Father morality or Nurturant Parent morality.

The political development that has resulted in the founding of new States is also represented in moral terms. The event itself is construed in the object dual; colonial control is conceptualized as a moving object that has moved away and its place is filled by another object. JFK describes the changed political situation as a substitution process in which one kind of political dominion ("colonial control") is not to be replaced by a far worse kind of political authority ("iron tyranny"). The allusion to the iron curtain is evident.

The improvement is also reflected on the level of speech acts for the changed situation, described in terms of commissives ("pledge"), in which the President welcomes the "new States" as new family members (THE WORLD IS A FAMILY/PERSON). The assertive assurance addressed to the long-standing members of the family of nations is contrasted with the almost soothing commitment to the new arrivals. This change for the better is motivated by another conceptual metaphor which illustrates the hierarchy of nations as a 'Great Chain of Nations', according to which reasoning on international relations is structured in terms of a social order of nations. This societal organization can be regarded as hierarchical, as is reflected in the group-based conceptualization of foreign relations ("the ranks of the free"). Accordingly a new State is a free state, modeled on the American 'free state.' Furthermore the world is subdivided into 'good' and 'bad' members of the family with the free and democratic state on

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unilateralism, in the case of an underlying strict father model, or that of multilateralism if the nurturant model dominates.

the one hand, and the unfree, totalitarian states on the other. While this pertains to Cold War rhetoric, it also clearly goes beyond it. The segregation of the world in terms of ‘good for America’ as opposed to ‘bad for America’ looks back on a long tradition and continues to be efficient, as more recent examples of this ideological rhetoric demonstrate: Reagan’s ‘evil empire’, denoting the former Soviet Union, Bush’s ‘axis of evil’ or ‘rogues states’, and Rumsfeld’s ‘old Europe’.

After more than a decade of Republican chief executives, Clinton continues to emphasize the change and novelty of the political landscape, which he constructs as resounding across the globe throughout his entire inaugural address.

(32) Today, as an old order passes, the new world is more free but less stable. Communism's collapse has called forth old animosities and new dangers. (WJC I, 33)

In his representation of the recent political developments *newness* and *change* are quasi-synonymous. Having said that, Clinton’s words, particularly those invoking the end of an old order, echo those of his predecessor Bush sen., in (28) above. Both refer to the communist era as an old order, whose ideological underpinning is emphasized by reference to the American Constitution as “the new order of things.” Unlike other substitution processes, in which ‘new’ denotes the replacement of an existing entity by another entity, thus turning it into an old, no longer valid entity, the outcome of this process is not entirely clear. While it is, generally speaking, an encouraging development (“the world is more free”), entrenched in the universal positive evaluation of change and novelty, Clinton also draws attention to some potentially negative and critical upshots of the changed political situation. In keeping with the tradition of hortatory rhetoric, Clinton’s admonition serves as a reminder of the (new) world’s instability, and hence atmosphere of constant anxiety. This is reflected in discourse by virtue of the unresolved tension between ‘new’ and ‘old’: It is both affirmation and exhortation.

There are a number of interesting points in this passage. As far as the ESM is concerned, the central mapping is once again CHANGE IS MOTION. The decisive aspect, however, is what is construed as the cause of change. There are several possible interpretations: the passage of time, external events or agency may be the instigators of change. In (32), the event of change is construed as an external event, motivated by the mapping EXTERNAL EVENTS ARE MOVING OBJECTS (“an old order passes”).<sup>232</sup> The construal of causation occurs in a similar way to (30): the event expressed in the *as*-subclause temporally precedes the one occurring in the main clause. The chronological sequence is thus deployed to establish a causal link between the two events. In the following sentence, another cause of the recent developments is provided, the “collapse of communism.” As with other political concepts such as nation, democracy and thus communism, their meaning is frequently personified. As to communism, there are two readings, one of which could be motivated by COMPLEX SYSTEMS ARE BUILDINGS whereas the other could be motivated by the mapping COMMUNISM IS A PERSON. It is, however, more

<sup>232</sup> It is possible that there is another interpretation here, which would also be supported when taking the entire inaugural address into account. The “old order” could include the three-term reign of Republican presidents.

conclusive on etymological grounds to argue for the latter, since collapse is originally a medical term, describing a falling movement due to illness (cf. *NSOED*). The reified noun, collapse, denotes the result of the action of falling based on the motion schema.

In terms of construal, the event of change is realized on two layers. In the event of an old order passing, it is the object dual — change is conceptualized as the motion of an object to, or away from the thing changing. Thus, the changed, new world is the product of the object moving away (EXTERNAL EVENTS ARE MOVING OBJECTS), leaving the world new, hence changed. The result of the change produces change itself which is construed by an agent-like cause (personified communism, COMMUNISM IS A PERSON) and an inchoative verb (“call forth”) in the following sentence. The end-point of the motion, this time construed as the location dual, according to which change is conceptualized as involving the motion of an object to a new location, coincides with the result of change, i.e. the emergence of existing, long-standing hostilities (“old animosities”) as well as more recent, not previously present difficulties (motivated by NEWNESS IS A SUBEVENT OF MOTION). The temporal reference (“today”) and the double construal of the event of change amplify the far-reaching consequences of the changed political situation.

Rhetorically the hortatory style observed in (31) above also applies, being indicative of the rhetoric of the American jeremiad which, by definition, is both discouraging and encouraging. Geared towards audience response, Clinton’s assessment of the changed situation occurs in terms of representative speech acts, reflecting the truth claim and validity of his observation. Ideologically the representation is informed by biased event models whose selectivity narrows down the angle on the one hand while being unspecific on the other. The narrow focus is that of the in-group as the overall situation is constructed in a way that narrows down the choices: the American people are faced with either a multitude of new opportunities or threats. However, as to the specific nature of these opportunities and dangers, Clinton does not provide any insights.

The key focus on change is also reflected in another passage, this time taken from Clinton’s second inaugural address. Once more the underlying conceptual structure is supportive of this emphasis on change, albeit using different linguistic material:

- (33) At this last presidential inauguration of the 20th century, let us lift our eyes toward the challenges that await us in the next century. It is our great good fortune that time and chance have put us not only at the edge of a new century, in a new millennium, but on the edge of a bright new prospect in human affairs—a moment that will define our course, and our character, for decades to come. We must keep our old democracy forever young. Guided by the ancient vision of a promised land, let us set our sights upon a land of new promise. (WJC II, 1)

The three occurrences of the adjective *new* are contained in a three-part list, deployed as a gradation. Interestingly, this gradation is also conveyed by the conceptual structure in terms of gradual spatial extension, beginning with a point, then extending through a two-dimensional plane to a three-dimensional space. In this process, the choice of prepositions is decisive for the meaning construction - all of them are spatio-temporal. The preposition *at* is the head of the prepositional phrase “at the edge of a new century.” It designates the location of a boundary position and has a temporal meaning, referring to points of time within a day, e.g.

‘at six o’clock’. The conceptual blending of time and space, in other words, the fact that we can only understand time in terms of spatial metaphors, means that this location may also be used to demarcate the end point within a long-term activity, such as a journey. In this case, *at* may also be employed to indicate the stopping point during a journey as, for instance, in ‘the train stopped at Reading’. In other words, “at the edge” stands for a location, i.e. a point of time, like a temporal boundary event marking the beginning of a new temporal unit. This position is further entrenched by the grammatical structure. The prepositional *of*-phrase typically describes relations between two entities. In this particular example, the *of*-phrase expresses the part-whole relation in terms of an outside or boundary part of an entire unit, possibly a container.

The prepositional phrase “in a new millennium” is introduced by the preposition *in*, which typically expresses spatial relations in designating a position or place within a larger (spatial) unit. Its temporal meaning derives from the image schema of containment in that it denotes parts of larger temporal units such as parts of the day, months, seasons, years, for instance in temporal expressions such as ‘in the afternoon’ (part of a day), ‘in the summer’ (as one of four seasons) or ‘in 2008’ (as a component part of a series of years). Finally, the prepositional *on*-phrase “on the edge of a bright new prospect in human affairs” describes a position close to the point at which something different will happen. The preposition itself indicates the position of an entity that is attached to or touching another. This proximity serves to express specific temporal units, for instance, ‘on Friday’ or ‘on time’. Conceptually this is motivated by the image schema CONTACT, which is instrumentalized here in order to drive home the point that new opportunities are in reach and even at hand. In all examples, the meaning of the adjective *new* is framed by [sequence], thus expressing a different entity without any reference to the old, former state or situation. Due to the construal in terms of a sequential order, the meaning of *new* may also be processed as a temporal category, in which its meaning is quasi-synonymous with ‘unprecedented’. This can be pictured as a movement along the temporal axis.

Another interesting aspect is the construal of causation, the reason for being in that fortunate position as claimed by Clinton. There are two reasons to account for this moment of promise. First, it is temporal progression itself based on the moving time model according to which time is conceptualized as an object in motion.<sup>233</sup> Second, the present state of affairs may have been brought about by what Clinton refers to as chance, meaning good luck or fate. In other words, there are no discoverable causes.

Crucially the present situation is constructed as a time to act, underlined by the prospective perspective of the ego-experiencer (“we,” “us”) who is facing the future. The momentous occasion is said to be rich with promise in that it is time for a political change. But change may not be completed in the immediate future. Bearing in mind that the CHANGE IS MOTION mapping has more elaborated correspondences if we take into consideration the image schema SOURCE-PATH-GOAL that our experience of motion is grounded in, the idea of vision implies

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<sup>233</sup> The construal could also occur via the personification TIME IS A CHANGER which would then merge with TIME IS AN INNOVATOR.



the setting of new goals. These, however, may be temporally and locationally distant, so that it will take time to reach them, which does not appear to be relevant from the present perspective. The fact that they are indeed new purposes prevails over the possibility of achieving them. This is why the notion of vision is so important for change. If there is a lack of vision, it is difficult, if not impossible to take decisions. If you do not know where you are aiming it is impossible to change your way (of life).

Therefore, vision, in the case of agency, serves as a guide for long-term activities like political agendas or missions. Motivated by the conceptual metaphor PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEYS visions perform the vital function of a 'travel guide', encapsulated in the colloquialism of changing your ways. This is realized on the textual level by the words "define our course," "guided by an ancient vision," "set our sights upon." New aims and purposes of political action are but one part of a long-term activity. The subdivision into smaller, more manageable portions, coinciding with the formulation of interim goals, is of equal importance. Crucially, however, these components, irrespective of whether understood in terms of stages or interim goals ('stopping places') form a part of a more encompassing whole, involving an activity extending beyond conceivable boundaries.

All in all, the need for change is construed as vital to the persistence of the American nation. The key word of both of Clinton's inaugurals is change, which is not only mirrored in the conceptual structure underlying the local meaning construal of individual passages but also extends to other passages of the inaugural, indeed to a substantial portion of the text. The spirit in which this focus of change occurs, is captured in the following two quotations taken from Clinton's first inaugural address, which serve as illustrative examples:

- (34) When our founders boldly declared America's independence to the world and our purposes to the Almighty, they knew that America, to endure, would have to change. (WJC I, 4)
- (35) Thomas Jefferson believed that to preserve the very foundations of our nation, we would need dramatic change from time to time. Well, my fellow citizens, this is our time. Let us embrace it. (WJC I, 18)

Analogizing change with endurance and continuity is, of course, an audacious conception of a would-be nation. The adaptation to changing times was recognized as a precondition central to national survival and development to a similar degree as the appropriation of the natural environment. The highly recurrent analogy has evolved into being the leitmotif of the national narrative, which is why newness is the inevitable precondition and by-product of the new nation with its constant need to both innovate and renew itself. The passing of time is a natural cause of change; yet the attempt to locate the nation relative to events, temporal, political or otherwise, gives rise to constellations which also require positionality in the sense of locating oneself vis-à-vis these events.<sup>234</sup> The impact of Jefferson's ideas on the American newness, particularly its major implication of future-mindedness, has been mentioned on

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<sup>234</sup> Similarly, Bhabha (1994: 240) draws attention to the fact that it is vital "to specify the discursive and historical temporality that interrupts the enunciative 'present' in which the self-inventions of modernity take place. And it is this 'taking place' of modernity, this insistent and incipient spatial metaphor in which the social relations of modernity are conceived, that introduces a temporality of the 'synchronous' in the structure of the 'splitting' of modernity. It is this 'synchronous and spatial' representation of cultural difference that must be reworked as a *framework* for cultural otherness *within* the general dialectic of doubling that postmodernism proposes."

several occasions. In order to round off the argument, another important aspect will be introduced.

The focus of the American newness on the future, chiefly the immediate future, is conspicuous. In the attempt to establish a ‘timeless political order’ the authors of the Constitution obviously sought various sources of inspiration. One such source was history, ancient and modern, colonial and biblical. In fact “history [...] was more valuable than political theory because it was more real; [...] history was philosophy teaching by example” (McDonald 1994: 67). Yet there are also a number of political thinkers that influenced eighteenth-century Americans. First and foremost, it was Machiavelli whose writings were also relevant for the institution of the presidency, for example (cf. McDonald *ibid.*: 42). But then again, Machiavelli was widely read and studied; his disciples included Sir Walter Raleigh and Francis Bacon, “whom Thomas Jefferson reckoned to be one of the three greatest men who ever lived” (McDonald *ibid.*). The following passage is taken from Bacon’s essay *Of innovations*, dating from 1625, which offers valuable insights into the general mindset that may have contributed to the beginnings of American state philosophy.

It were good therefore that men in their innovations would follow the example of time itself; which indeed innovateth greatly, but quietly, and by degrees scarce to be perceived. For otherwise, whatsoever is new is unlooked for; and ever it mends some, and pairs other; [...] It is also good not to try experiments in states, except the necessity be urgent, or the utility evident; and well to beware that it be the reformation that draweth on the change, and not the desire of change that pretendeth the reformation. And lastly, that the novelty, though it be not rejected, yet be held for a suspect; and, as the Scripture saith, ‘that we make a stand upon the ancient way, and then look about us, and discover what is the straight and right way, and so to walk in it. (Bacon 1992: 6)

This excerpt captures the very spirit of what Clinton refers to in (35) above: the need to adapt to changing times without, however, losing track of the valuable lessons from experience. Although temporal progression does not mechanically involve change for the better, as Bacon himself also observes in another passage of the essay, it is due to “wisdom and counsel” to decide whether or not to turn back the clocks of time, figuratively speaking. The contiguity of time and newness finds expression in another passage of Bacon’s essay, in which he refers to time as “the greatest innovator.” Nonetheless, Bacon’s statement should not be mistaken for its ambivalence towards innovation itself. Instead of validating innovation unreservedly, Bacon invokes the need for rational and careful judgment of changes, which are nonetheless inevitable. Although not a political text itself, Bacon’s essay provides useful insights into the cognizance that may account for the distinct temporality of American presidential discourse.

One final twentieth-century example serves to illustrate an interesting variant of ESM construal. While the large majority of the preceding examples focused on motion itself, (36) presents a different perspective on the understanding of change. The conceptual metaphors CAUSES ARE FORCES, PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS, and CHANGE IS MOTION are all relevant here.

The temporality of this paragraph supports the temporal meaning of *old* as ‘ongoing’ or ‘durative’ (“constant,” “still”). Its temporal structure contrasts with the construal of *new* (“each new wave”), which is framed by [sequence], i.e. it is processed as chronological order. Each temporal interval can be understood as a temporal event consisting of discrete points of time, each of which is represented as a point of a series. Accordingly *new* is the equivalent of ‘another’, following a sequential and chronological order. As to the second instance of the adjective *new*, it is the unusual case in which the transferred object of a metaphorical transfer, expressed in terms of the verb ‘to give something to someone’, is qualified as new. In this respect the meaning of *new* is also temporal in that either it is different from preceding targets or we are talking about unprecedented ones, because the purpose of the prejudices has changed.

- (36) The divide of race has been America’s constant curse. And each new wave of immigrants gives new targets to old prejudices. Prejudice and contempt, cloaked in the pretense of religious or political conviction are no different. These forces have nearly destroyed our nation in the past. They plague us still. They fuel the fanaticism of terror. And they torment the lives of millions in fractured nations all around the world (WJC II, 14)

Conceptually this latter point is represented by the mapping PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS, which means that the reified noun *prejudice* (ABSTRACT ENTITIES ARE OBJECTS) is set in motion, heading off in a different direction, which is processed to denote a change of purpose. Both the transfer schema and caused-motion schema apply (“gives new targets to old prejudices”), motivated by the underlying conceptual metaphors CHANGE IS MOTION and CAUSES ARE FORCES. A wave is a natural force, comparable to an agent-like cause, which has an impact on existing prejudice. As a result, it gains new momentum, which is conceptualized in terms of locomotion. Again, external events, i.e. events that are not controlled by the U.S. or are detrimental to the U.S., serve the rhetorical strategy of exhortation. Clinton is lamenting social ills; the purpose of social criticism is reinforced by his use of representative speech acts, which gives legitimization to his argument. His case is also amplified by opening the [relationship] frame, building on separation (“divide,” “fractured”) vs. proximity. Interestingly his line of argument includes another frame of reference which has become increasingly significant in the course of the twentieth century: the invocation of ‘the world’ as a stage in order to specify or generalize the argument in question. In the context of (36) above, the global stage is used to reinforce the point made for America, in that the situation in the United States is constructed as the analogue of that experienced by other nations around the world.

In what perhaps constitutes the most interesting category, the construal of *old* and *new* is radically different from any of the patterns discussed so far. However, they still form one group as in both instances *old* and *new* are somehow equated — albeit from different perspectives. The refusal to innovate, while emphasizing the notion of renewal, can be regarded as paradigmatic for Carter’s presidency. The negation of newness in (37) is the only occurrence of that kind throughout the corpus of inaugural addresses. Carter voices his opinion in a way that is characteristic of Republican rather than Democratic presidents in that

he refers back to the nation's origin by relating the present moment to a specific temporal event in the past.

*Old* has a durative meaning, which is conceptualized in terms of the distance covered by a moving ego across time (see Figure 12 below). The temporal interval is not marked off by two temporal boundary events, the onset of an activity and a second temporal boundary event which designates the provisional end point, for example. Instead Carter describes an ongoing process, which is why it is impossible to introduce an element of novelty while the continuing process has not yet been accomplished. Consequently *new* cannot be construed as a temporal category, meaning 'fresh', 'original' or even 'unprecedented'. The NP "new dream" is negated, which further highlights the continuation of the 'old dream'.

The temporal framework ("two centuries ago," "still," and "today") and the tenses used, (simple past and simple present), are indicative of a narrative mode of discourse, in which the temporal sequence of the events narrated follows its natural order of occurrence.

- (37) Two centuries ago our Nation's birth was a milestone in the long quest for freedom, but the bold and brilliant dream which excited the founders of this Nation still awaits its consummation. I have no new dream to set forth today, but rather urge a fresh faith in the old dream. (JEC, 6)

As far as the ESM is concerned, the central mapping CHANGE IS MOTION is not operative here. Instead the construal of the event occurs in terms of the more specific-level metaphorical mapping PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEYS. More precisely still, this mapping could result from the interaction of the conceptual metaphors A NATION IS A PERSON ("birth") and LIFE IS A JOURNEY ("set forth").<sup>235</sup> A person can be attributed various participant roles, agent, experiencer or possessor, but in (37) it is a case of agency (ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION). Consequently, the duration of the process invoked, which is metaphorically understood as the stages of a journey, is not merely subject to the organic cycle of the stages of human life. Instead, it may be understood in more self-reliant terms, i.e. involving the conscious and purposive effort of the human agent or a personified entity, hence the mapping PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEYS. Generally speaking, long-term agendas, missions or commitments are conceptualized in terms of the source concept JOURNEY; in the American context, however, the completion point or destination of the journey tends to be the aspect that is mostly highlighted.

Carter represents the Declaration of Independence as a key political event, which is described as a stopping place during a journey ("milestone," "quest") as well as the product of a creative act by political thinkers ("founders," "bold"). Rather than setting new targets or changing the overall political agenda, Carter intends to imbue the existing, "old dream" with new, fresh energy. Thus it is not the source-path-goal schema that is framed by newness but the image schema MOMENTUM, expressed by "urge a fresh faith in the old dream." According to the *OED*, the verb *to urge* has a causative meaning, 'cause to move', which is metaphorically

<sup>235</sup> The *NSOED* identifies the following sub-senses of the verb 'to set forth' that are currently in use: a) promulgate, publish; issue (a regulation, proclamation, etc.); b) give an account of, esp. in order, distinctly, or in detail; expound, relate, narrate, state, describe; c) begin a journey.

extended to convey a meaning similar to provoke, excite or intensify on the one hand, but also to advocate or recommend on the other.

Other commentators (e.g. Fischer/Vorländer 1993) have drawn attention to the fact that the adjective *new* occurs frequently within Carter's inaugural. This claim needs to be further qualified against the background of this present analysis. In absolute numbers this may be true, yet some of the noun phrases in which *new* premodifies the head noun are highly recurrent as, for instance, the phrases "new spirit" or "new beginning." It is remarkable, however, that the majority of the nouns premodified by *new* refer to immaterial, spiritual things. The strong emphasis placed on the spiritual coupled with the notion of newness has prompted analysts to put this down to Carter's faith as a born-again Christian. Within the context of this present analysis it has become evident that a president's personal faith can by no means be the sole reason for the pervasiveness of the concept of NEWNESS.

All in all, the quotation in (37) is remarkable as it does not foreground the event of change but focuses on the ongoing, unfulfilled mission.<sup>236</sup>

Bearing in mind that Carter's construal of the ESM is atypical of Democratic presidents, it is no coincidence to find a somewhat similar articulation of his ideas in Bush's inaugural:

- (38) **The old ideas are new again because they are not old, they are timeless: duty, sacrifice, commitment, and a patriotism that finds its expression in taking part and pitching in. (GBU, 16)**

The reasoning appears to be circular, yet when looking at the conceptual structure identified for OLD and NEW Bush's line of argument is (almost) logical: old has been shown to be conceptualized in terms of location, or when denoting an extended temporal interval, in terms of a bounded area in space; for example, the preposition *at* is sometimes used to denote short time spans such as 'at Easter', meaning the entire Easter period. In contrast, newness has been argued to involve motion, particularly when construed as the location-dual of the ESM.

Bush's claim of timeless ideas takes us back a long way to the early beginnings of the American republic, when a timeless new order was heralded. Conceptually the meaning construction process only functions when grounded in a time-based model of time. In chapter 4, temporal cognition was argued to be based on three cognitive models. One of them, the time-based model, relates to temporal sequence without involving an ego-experiencer. Thus time is understood as an independent, unbounded experience. "Timeless" denotes an entity's duration, i.e. things that continue for ever and have no beginning, at least not perceivable from a human perspective.

Rhetorically Bush sen. avoids the logical trap in undermining the very category that predominantly accounts for the evaluation of *new* and *old*: the ego-experiencer. The category of time which, in the majority of cases accounts for a negative evaluation of *old* and a positive

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<sup>236</sup> One could possibly contend that Carter is arguing for a highly specific type of change — recall the description of different types of changes provided in chapter 4 — i.e. developmental rather than transformational change. As a result, Carter's invocation of change is, at best, a renewal in the sense of a development or improvement of what is already going on or in existence rather than transforming something, which would be conceptualized as CHANGE IS MOTION. In other words, developmental change would be construed as the object dual of the ESM whereas transformational change would be construed as the location-dual of the ESM. Moreover, there is also a distinct perspective involved: developmental change is described from a retrospective perspective while transformational change occurs from a prospective angle.

evaluation of *new* is not given any weight here. Instead, Bush represents the notions of “duty, sacrifice, commitment, and a patriotism” as eternal truths, articulated by virtue of assertions, i.e. representatives in Searle’s classification of speech acts. Moreover, in claiming that these ideas are timeless, Bush shifts the understanding of time from finite, human time to divine or eternal time. This mode of spiritualization is used as a distraction from difficult issues by referring to intangible ideals, at least within the framework of the Republican ‘strict-father morality’. Once more the rhetorical legacy of the jeremiad manifests itself in the rhetorical style: the nation is constructed as aspiring towards a higher goal. The unusualness of the construction is also reflected on the sentence level. The occurrence of *new* and *old* in the predicative position is also indicative of their specific construal. The copular verb *to be* denotes a state, which further entrenches the claim of perpetual validity.

### 6.3 Major Patterns in the Construal of *Old* and *New*

This section will summarize the major patterns of the construal of *old* and *new* as far as they have been identified in the preceding in-depth analysis. Beginning with the construal in nineteenth-century inaugurals, the discussion will follow the general outline, proceeding in chronological order and pertaining to the categories built for each. The analysis focused on the construal of sense boundaries, which was hypothesized to be largely influenced by the lexical and grammatical elements available from the linguistic context and the conceptual metaphors of the ESM system.

This first part of the analysis revolved around the construal of *old*, guided by the question of whether the construal of *old* builds on the concept of NEWNESS, and if so, whether this occurs in a systematic way that can be organized into predictable patterns that are both consistent and coherent. In another step the analysis aims to uncover how these patterns may be strategically used to influence reasoning on certain political issues such as territorial expansion, nation-building, to name but a few recurrent nineteenth-century issues, or foreign relations, the nation’s rise to globalism, to introduce a number of ubiquitous twentieth-century political topics. Naturally political developments and power relations on a more general note are also included.

As to the nineteenth-century inaugurals, perhaps the most striking observation resulting from the first stages of the analytical process — identification and interpretation — is the fact that the contrast between the categories OLD and NEW is rarely invoked, not even by virtue of the Old World – New World word pair. Crucially this does not mean that the concept of NEWNESS is not operative in conceptualizations of the political process during that period. As we will see in the second part of the analysis below, *newness* is indeed vital, yet in highly specific ways beyond antonym construal. For example, the category NEW is not used with reference to American political institutions themselves but chiefly relates to the political activities and events that the American nation is concerned with. Linguistically this means that the category NEW is embedded in grammatical structures that convey this idea, i.e. participant roles,

sentence schemas and other grammatical categories that identify the American nation as a particular type of nation performing particular types of actions.

In what follows I will outline the construal of *old* as it has been identified in both nineteenth- and twentieth-century inaugurals, specifying their characteristics. This overview will initially exclude the discussion of its impact on the political, rhetorical or ideological discourse structure, since this will form the second part of this sub-chapter.

All in all, five major construals of *old* could be identified. First and foremost, *old* has a durative meaning, particularly when invoking the authority of time and history. Figure 9 illustrates this construal: the ego-experiencer, which frequently coincides with the deictic center in discourse, is represented as a circle. Depending on whether or not the ego-experiencer is the focus of a given construal, this circle is either presented as an empty circle, in which case the ego-experiencer's location is not in focus, or as a black circle, i.e. the ego-experiencer is indeed in focus.

The durative meaning of *old* builds on specific contextual cues, for example, temporal expressions such as “earlier-later,” “many times,” “before,” “always,” “ever,” “still” and so on. The actual location of the ego-experiencer does not need to be specified in general terms, the only crucial thing being that the ego-experiencer is constructed in discourse as someone who holds a vantage point that enables him or her to oversee a given event, which puts the deictic center in a comfortable position that even permits confident predictions on political developments in the (near) future. This is possible as the speaker is not involved in the actual course of events, at least this is how this construal works; he or she is an onlooker, using the observations of the activities of other people to gain insights from them.

In nineteenth-century inaugurals this construal occurs whenever an external authority or cause of events is invoked. Crucially the enduring validity of the authority is uncontested, thus the old is positively evaluated.

The temporality inherent in this construal has the character of so-called eternal truths, or is constructed as such in discourse. The prevailing linguistic structures in which this construal is realized are, therefore, the use of the present tense on the one hand, and the prevalence of representative speech acts on the other. The meaning construction process is chiefly motivated by the mapping TIME IS AN EVALUATOR, according to which past actions and events are judged for their truthfulness and validity.




Figure 9: The construal of *old* in its durative meaning

In addition, this construal frequently involves a moral judgment, particularly in terms of the strict-father model and its central metaphor “morality is strength.” Based on the assumption that moral fiber builds up with time, moral actions typically involve sacrifice, self-discipline and meeting challenges. An important point is that the focus on the validity of historical events and developments is one of two persistent approaches to problem-solving in American presidential discourse. The strategy employed here can be referred to as “learning from experience” as opposed to “learning by doing,” which is described below.

This construal of *old* appears to constrain the possibility of newness. In reality, however, the retrospection involved in learning from the past is used to redress present ills and to make general improvements for the future. The new may then be understood as a qualitative change, developing what already exists instead of radically innovating. From a schematic angle this conception represents an upward movement (UP IS GOOD) or in terms of the mapping, HISTORICAL CHANGE IS A MOVEMENT FROM A STATE OF IGNORANCE TO A STATE OF KNOWLEDGE, as introduced in chapter 4 above. A case in point is President Carter’s invocation of the “old dream” whose general validity is uncontested and thus there is no need to substitute it for another. Nonetheless the present situation needs to be improved by instilling fresh faith into the realization of the dream. Similarly Bush’s depiction of “timeless ideas” is intended to ameliorate the status quo without introducing radically new ideas.

The ideological tension inherent in this construal is not as much conveyed by the antagonism of *new* and *old* as by constructing the past from a present perspective. In the process, one historical situation is understood as the analogue to another, implying that one domain of human experience corresponds to another. Rhetorically, this view entails a strong affirmative component that may indeed lift the audience beyond the material and the nitty-gritty of daily political business. Yet it also constitutes one principle of ideological reproduction *par excellence*: the selection of information in the semantic representation of historical events. Serving the purpose of forming local coherence in discourse, the ‘knowledge from the past’ establishes connections between various propositions, for example, in putting them into a particular sequence that doesn’t need to be chronological nor causally or factually adequate. Aligning historical events creates a point of view which is used to legitimize the



representation chosen. This may occur, for example, in terms of generalizations such as “the same causes always produce the same effects” or “the theory of government changes with general progress.” Frequently these simplifications are ‘substantiated’ by examples taken from the present context.

Second, the construal of *old* may also be understood from another angle, which is illustrated in Figure 10 below. To a degree, this construal of *old* also derives from duration, the vital difference being that the ego-experiencer is, unlike in the preceding model, in focus as he or she is involved in the action, situation or event represented, as is indicated by the black circle. While states are chiefly understood as locations, motivated by the mapping STATES ARE LOCATIONS, it is also possible to conceive of a state as extending over a longer period of time. This understanding is actually in-between a state and a process, hence the durative meaning. The ego-experiencer is not necessarily understood as a stationary entity; he or she may also be in motion, depending on how strongly the emphasis is placed on the ego-experiencer’s actions or activities. The analysis has demonstrated that the situation depicted in Figure 10 typically describes a dispreferred state or the undesirable outcome of an event or activity. The latter in particular, implies a lack of success, which conceptually involves a lack of (forward) motion. Instead the agent is still in the same state or situation as when he or she first attempted to change the initial state of affairs.

Nineteenth-century examples are President Harrison’s representation of demagoguery and the concentration of political power in the presidency, or Lincoln’s appeal to the futility of military action on account of its inability to solve the political problems that led to Secession. Similarly President Wilson’s interpretation of the changed political situation in the second decade of the twentieth century involves an increasingly grim depiction of old states entrenched in habit, thus disabling the possibility of change or any dynamic, innovative approaches to policy-making.

The negative evaluation predominantly originates from the overall positive evaluation of change to the extent that it can be considered a default event model in American political discourse. This in-built bias in the construction of socio-political realities activates knowledge structures that are used to interpret a given situation as depicted by Figure 10 (below) as largely undesirable - the attachment to an old position beyond due time or the incapacity for rising to occasions.

Given the bias for understanding political events in terms of motion, the negativity of the scene represented in Figure 10 becomes evident: the ego-experiencer’s maneuvering space is restricted as he or she is attached to an old position. Moreover, this construal may also mean that the state or process is ongoing or, if one views it from a retrospective perspective, it is understood as a situation that has not yet or not successfully been changed.




Figure 10: The construal of *old* denoting a state

In its discourse functions the preceding construal is in sharp contrast to the third type of meaning construction process identified, which is depicted in Figure 11 below. In the event of successfully overcoming an old, undesirable situation, the present moment is foregrounded, as illustrated by the black circle, whose position coincides with the present, i.e. 'now', which may either be explicitly stated or inferred on the basis of contextual cues. The central mapping here is A CHANGE OF STATE IS A CHANGE OF LOCATION, obviously involving a retrospective perspective. The original state is defocused in favor of highlighting the actual process involved, as represented by the arrow, or the end-point of this movement, terminating in the here and now. Thus, this construal requires a temporal framework of 'then and now', in which a new state, situation or event either replaces the foregoing or alternatively establishes a sequence, in that event B becomes the starting point of another transfer and so on. In either case the former state is de-emphasized and also devalued, either through replacement or focal adjustment, according to which the more recent is also the preferred and more highly valued state of affairs.

In the light of these parameters, the [progress] frame springs to mind and in fact this construal is the positive counterpart of the preceding construal in which action may indeed have been initiated to change or improve the current state of affairs but has not been successfully completed up to now. Once more the focus is clearly on motion concepts; the most central mappings that influence reasoning on progress are CHANGE IS MOTION, PROGRESS IS MOTION FORWARD, ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION and, of course, NEWNESS IS A SUBEVENT OF MOTION. Following the source-path-goal trajectory of motion, the concept of OLDNESS is understood as a past point in time, marking the beginning of the trajectory of motion, hence its source, while the new state marks the goal of the motion. The type of change produced is a transitional change, in which a former state is transferred to a new state (A CHANGE OF STATE IS A CHANGE OF LOCATION). In contrast to the preceding

model, this transition includes the completion point, which is why this construal is chiefly used to underline the success of political actions.




Figure 11: The construal of *old* meaning former

As has been revealed by the analysis, this is a typical coding for American political activities, frequently also implying a qualitative change. For example, President Grant invokes the political situation during the time of the confederation, comparing it to the status quo, which he represents as much improved regarding the issues of social cohesion and the building of a national identity. This improvement is hardly surprising given the time span of approximately a hundred years covered. The ideological potential of this construal is enormous because the two states compared are frequently absurdly incongruous or temporally so distant that the invocation of the previous temporal boundary event appears to be arbitrary, which is only superficially the case, however. As it is the present that is in focus, the first state is purely instrumental. It serves the sole purpose of providing a framework for comparison onto which a sense of accomplishment can be projected as a mode of national aggrandizement.

Although this construal chiefly occurs in retrospection, the focus is invariably on the completion point of a certain activity or transfer. The pattern identified is completely consistent in that *old* meaning 'former' consistently collocates with 'new' meaning 'replacive' or 'substitutional'. A case in point is Coolidge's depiction of the process of emancipation leading to independence from the colonial power and the building of a national identity on the basis of it. This construal of *old* has in fact the greatest potential for antonym construal. It can be embedded in the event schema identified for *newness* in chapter 4. Correspondingly, in the examples analyzed this end-point focus veils the fact that the path was rarely smooth. It de-emphasizes any kind of adversity while highlighting the accomplishment itself. The pervasiveness of this meaning representation and the fact that the suppression of information has important ideological implications suggest that the American nation is to be constructed as emerging victoriously from any competition or conflict.

The fourth type of construal of *old* relates to the age of a person or personified abstract entity such as nation, democracy, civilization or the world. Recall that this construal only occurs once in the nineteenth-century corpus, crucially when the continued existence of the

nation was at stake. The meaning of the lexical unit *old* can be paraphrased as ‘having existed or having lived for a long time’, depending on whether or not it relates to an inanimate entity or a person. The concepts most consistently construed in terms of *old* in this sense are American political institutions and their relations amongst each other or with other political institutions. Crucially the adjective *old* denotes a subcategory of this specific political entity, either in terms of some intrinsic property, which can be standardized and thus compared to other entities of a similar type, or it denotes a so-called recategorized property in that it specifies the conditions in which an event occurred. In other words, this construal holds for the scalar and deadverbial uses of *old* in which the age of a political structure or relation is represented in a normative way, i.e. there is an appropriate age for X, or it describes the temporal framework that typifies certain political events or actions.

This construal occurs from a retrospective perspective in which the ego-experiencer is located at some distance from the original location of a moving entity that is described from the present perspective. This temporal boundary event A may be a person’s birth, the beginning of a particular activity or the implementation of a political structure. The position of the ego-experiencer coincides with the moment of speaking, now, which, however, is not regularly made explicit. The focus is not so much on the present moment but on the temporal interval marked off by the boundary events A and B.




Figure 12: The construal of *old* relating to age

In nineteenth-century inaugurals the ‘age factor’ is only used once, contrasting the “old Constitution,” which after a long time in service is “unimpaired” as President Lincoln puts it, with the “new administration,” meaning the government of the Confederate States of America after seceding from the Union, i.e. a political institution that has only recently been implemented. This pervasive construal of *new* as a temporal category constitutes a major pattern and will be explained in the context of other highly recurrent construals of *new* within the remainder of the corpus analysis below.

The ideological potential of these uses of *old* and *new* — *old* as ‘being knowledgeable’, ‘experienced’ and, generally speaking, as ‘having proved its worth’ in contrast to *new* as being ‘young’, ‘inexperienced’ and ‘having yet to prove oneself’ — can be exploited by metaphorically extending the mere temporality of either category. NEWNESS is more closely connected to the ego-experiencer’s motion along the time axis — except for the construals in the object dual, in which time itself brings on the change (TIME IS A CHANGER). The qualitative difference between the categories is measured in terms of the distance covered on the time axis. Consequently, *new* means ‘recently’ when relating to the source of the motion and the moment of its departure in the recent past.

The evaluation of the metaphorical extensions can be positive as in the mapping BEING OLD IS BEING IN A STATE OF KNOWLEDGE or BEING NEW IS BEING IN A GOOD CONDITION, yet it may also be negative, for instance, in terms of the mappings BEING OLD IS BEING IN A BAD CONDITION and BEING NEW IS BEING IN A STATE OF IGNORANCE. As we can see, the pattern of evaluation is both consistent and coherent and can be argued to create an ideological tension in the sense of the ideological square introduced in chapter 2 above.

This ideological potential has been shown to be exploited whenever discussing the origins of the American settlement, for example, when comparing the “new continent” or the New World with “old countries” or the Old World in general. The ideological reproduction of these cultural frames only functions because the construal of other meanings of *new* is blocked in this context. A case in point is Theodore Roosevelt’s construction of the American experience as a “time out of time,” which makes it incongruous with and thus incomparable to any other experience, temporal or otherwise. Furthermore, the ideological potential resides in the moral component that is attributed to the age of political structures, which frequently also include a fair degree of normativity. The fact that a nation or state was only recently founded is used to legitimate US control or influence, which is constructed as deriving from this state’s or nation’s need of protection due to this recency, motivated by the mapping BEING NEW IS BEING IN A STATE OF IGNORANCE.

In twentieth-century inaugurals, the age of political entities is evaluated positively when relating to personified abstract entities such as civilization, the world, or democracy. In this case, the adjective *old* specifies the intrinsic properties of these entities, as for example, in President Eisenhower’s argument for peace that is based on the age of civilization. More precisely, the age of political structures appears to matter where the relations of the American nation to other nations are concerned. A case in point is the passage studied within President Kennedy’s inaugural in which the age of states or nations defines the nature of relationship the American nation is likely to entertain with them - new states are typically in need of American protection while older ones are assumed to have matured and are thus able to act as partners rather than ‘infant’ states.

Finally, there is a construal of *old* that appears to be particularly relevant for twentieth-century examples. In this case, the ego-experiencer adopts a prospective perspective from the present moment, the moment of speaking, and is thus oriented toward some future point of

time. As this future event or situation comes into focus, the present, but even more so the past, becomes increasingly defocused. Thus the emphasis is placed on activities that are to alleviate a dispreferred situation, resulting in a different or improved situation in the (near) future. For example, President McKinley's urge to focus on "existing problems" rather than the past, especially the "old differences," which is constructed as disturbing the adequate judgment of pressing political issues of today and tomorrow.




Figure 13: The construal of *old* meaning 'outdated'

This change of focus involves highlighting some future point of time or location in spatial terms. More important still, the changed focus involves perceiving the present as an untenable situation. Unlike the construal represented above as a change of state construed from a retrospective perspective, the situation pictured in Figure 13 is a variant whose construal occurs from a prospective angle. As a consequence, this type of change may appear planned as the focal adjustment towards the future entails the purposeful demotion of the status quo. To a degree this construal elaborates the idea conveyed in Figure 10, i.e. a political situation that is in many ways unsatisfactory or fruitless. The lack of productivity is to be terminated, forcing the political class into action. The construal of *old* in this sense could also be the negation of the unbounded validity of eternal truths expressed in Figure 9 above. In what could be paraphrased as 'no longer useable due to long service', the entity recategorized as old is to be replaced by new, more up-to-date models. Hence the actual length of time during which an entity has indeed served well is irrelevant for this construal; what matters is that it is anticipated not to be of any use in the future. The temporal expressions "no longer ... but," accompanied by the present tense or the *will*-future, provide the lexical and grammatical grid for this construal that is pervasive in the twentieth century.

The meaning construction process that applies in this model also includes examples in which the new does not necessarily involve the substitution of the old but in fact introduces a changed situation that can be described as a sequence or as differing from the preceding one. A case in point is the sharp contrast of "new programs" as opposed to "old imperialism" in

Truman's argument above. Crucially these programs are to be understood in a way that constitutes a complete break with the past that is to be defocused and devalued as "old imperialism," i.e. an old, utterly undesirable state.

The prospectiveness of this model is also central to the construal of situations in which newness does not result from human actions. The object dual of the ESM, in which change is the result of temporal progression, also belongs to this model. This study has revealed that global political change, brought about by a complex interplay of causes, events and actions, is frequently construed in this way. A case in point is both Bush's and Clinton's interpretation of the implications that the collapse of communism entails for the American nation and the world. The American nation is conceptualized as a static ego-experiencer who is about to set off (ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION), adapting to the changing times.

Apart from these major patterns in the construal of *old* and *new* there are a number of recurrent discourse structures that could be identified by the analysis above. These structures range from knowledge frames used in the argumentation and speech acts to syntactic constructions. It is remarkable that the patterns of construal involve a limited set of knowledge structures or cultural models that frame all major discourse topics of both nineteenth- and twentieth-century inaugurals.

The knowledge of major topics in the socio-political domain — territorial expansion, globalism, nation-building and so on — is organized in frame-like structures that are culturally informed. One such frame is the understanding of cultural space, which is grounded in the experience of newness on the one hand and image-schematic structures such as EXISTENCE or spatial orientation in general. Similarly, the knowledge of political institutions and relations also builds on spatial relations, particularly the "far-near" and "center-periphery" contrasts. Again NEWNESS helps to structure the understanding of these relations in that 'new arrivals' on the political scene are integrated into the existing system, based on the underlying principle of 'moral wholeness'. Crucially all arguments are interwoven with moral issues, allowing for rhetorical flexibility; the strategy of 'spiritualization' has been shown to serve to shift from the political to the moral, from the material to the idealist level.

Another substantial part of knowledge in the socio-political domain concentrates on the notion of progress, including competition and comparison. One unit of measurement of the progress made is time and newness as the end-point, hence result, of an activity. This particular interplay of movement, time and progress is indicative of the ideological exploitation of time. Temporal measurement allows for the quantification of human activity, including political events and actions, and thus partakes in the ideological reproduction of social and political control. The enhanced focus on NEWNESS sets the pace for the success of political action and thus increases the competition between political rivals (POLITICS IS A RACE).

Generally speaking all major political concepts identified are understood in terms of motion, which invites a number of cognitive associations between the target concepts. As a

result these targets tend to be if not equated, then at least set in relation to one another. As illustrated in chapter 4 above, this relation is frequently metonymic in which case the domains involved in the metaphorical mappings are construed as cause and effect; conceivably, this relation is also reversible:

NEWNESS ↔ CHANGE

NEWNESS ↔ PROGRESS

NEWNESS ↔ ACTION

This prevalence of certain patterns in the argumentation is mirrored in the preference for certain types of speech acts and syntactic constructions. On the pragmatic level the ideological discourse structures are predominantly realized in terms of representative speech acts. When the construal occurs from a prospective angle, directives and commissives are also fairly evenly distributed. The polarity inherent in the ideological representation of socio-political realities finds expression in terms of syntactic parallelism that conveys antithetical content.

By way of conclusion, the patterns in the construal identified can be interpreted as entrenching a bipolarity of evaluation, comparable to the iconographic frames of reference introduced in chapter 2 above. They provide relatively stable ‘knowledge’ structures in order to frame self- and other -presentation by virtue of opposing values.

Conceptually these ideological discourse structures can be grouped on the basis of their schematic meanings which, in fact, produces a fully fledged ideological tension on several levels as illustrated in Table 5:

	<b>old</b>	<b>new</b>
Spatial schemas: in – out near – far spatial orientation	enclosed, limited lacking cohesion behind	open, boundless working relations ahead
Motion schema	motionlessness, states no change	motion, progress change
Action schema	inaction	action: self-propelled, controlled when American vs. other propelled, uncontrolled when not American
Temporal schema	lasting (retrospective perspective)  knowledgeable, experienced, strong	lasting (prospective perspective)  fresh, original, in good condition when American vs. inexperienced, ignorant, weak when not American

Table 5

As illustrated by Table 5, the category OLD is very much a dispreferred category except for the temporal schema, i.e. its construal relating to age or history. In contrast the category NEW is almost without exception positively evaluated. Having said that, the activities and situations



framed as 'new' have to be further specified as to whether or not the reference is to the American nation in the mode of self-presentation. If it is used for other-presentation the construal occurs in less positive terms, similarly when negative external events have an impact on American political structures.

These patterns of evaluation are deployed in discourse to refer to a variety of political events, topics or actions. However, the construal of *new* and *old* appears to apply chiefly to periods of national reorientation, often induced by system-external or system-internal contradictions that create ideological tensions. For this reason the nation's relocation in times of crisis — the Civil War, the post-war periods or the collapse of communism are all major landmarks in this respect — is a political necessity. Similarly the American political system has a rhythm of its own, as is the case with any political system. Internal contradictions have been shown to establish cyclical patterns of their own, some of which were introduced in chapter 3 above, such as the cycles produced by swings from public to private interests, generational divisions and transitions or the dominance of the tradition, i.e. conceiving of the American nation as experimenting with the counter-tradition, - identifying America with manifest destiny - accounts for policy changes. In addition the approach to foreign policy is also subject to cyclical patterns, for instance, isolationism vs. internationalism or unilateralism vs. multilateralism.

Crucially these influences are dealt with in an individualistic, idiosyncratic way; whether or not political changes are brought about by external or internal events, they are construed in a force-dynamic way. The interplay of forces in the interpretation of events invariably subdivides them into protagonists and antagonists to the extent that there are, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, - which is also referred to as the American century (see chapter 3) - few political events that are understood as not directly or indirectly affecting American interests, which may give rise to another cognitive association:

AMERICA IS A PERSON + THE WORLD IS A PERSON = AMERICA IS THE WORLD

## 6.4 The Role(s) of Newness in Sentential Event Schemas

In political cognition two central domains of knowledge are blended: the knowledge of actions and events on the one hand, and socio-cultural knowledge, that is, the knowledge that is frequently referred to as folk knowledge or common sense on the other. This realm of beliefs, ideas, and attitudes is encapsulated in social cognition and is stored in cultural models or cultural frames. These two domains, the political and the social cannot be dissociated in political discourse, if political discourse is understood as a dynamic concept that shapes socio-political realities as it is shaped by them. In chapter 1, the important principles of discourse theory were introduced. Accordingly, discourse is assumed to perpetuate ideological knowledge structures. Van Dijk (1998: 267f.) argues that there are several important principles for the ideological reproduction in discourse. Following van Dijk (*ibid.*), ideological meaning, the biased representations of events or actions, is conveyed by the actual content of discourse, which is also the level where ideological beliefs are chiefly incorporated. These beliefs relate to

event models which are constructed on the principle of selection. The selectivity concerns the presence vs. absence of information in the semantic representation derived from event models. The guiding principles in the selective representation of information are, on the one hand, the function(s) that the expression or suppression of information fulfils for the speaker/writer and on the other the fact that the ideological opinion expressed in discourse must have implications for particular groups or social issues.

Crucially, ideological meaning is encoded on several levels of discourse. On the global level, ideological meaning is conveyed by virtue of the topics or semantic macropropositions that recur in social practice and are thus indicative of what is relevant for the discourse participants (cf. van Dijk 1998: 270). In the preceding section, the concept of NEWNESS has been shown to frame the understanding of fundamental political concepts such as nation, for example, but also organizes knowledge of political activities. Consequently, NEWNESS as a cultural cognitive model is also part of biased event models, according to which significant political actions and events are rationalized in terms of their newness. On the local level, the in-depth analysis of the meaning construction involved in the processing of sense boundaries of the categories NEW and OLD revealed that the underlying conceptual metaphor NEWNESS IS A SUBEVENT OF MOTION motivates the construal of political actions and events, forming event models on the basis of beliefs that are selectively constructed to form semantic representations of text and talk (cf. van Dijk 1998: 267).

While the foregoing analysis focused on the lexical elements and their contribution to the cognitive representation of relevant knowledge structures within political cognition, the ensuing section revolves around the impact of grammatical elements on the construal of *newness*. It is hypothesized that the meaning construction process of the linguistic category *new* interacts with the event schemas that prevail in a sentence in a meaningful way.

Depending on the grammatical skeleton provided, the construal of the sentence relates to different worlds of experience, for example, the material world, the psychological world or the force-dynamic world.<sup>237</sup> All three worlds of experience will be demonstrated to be central to the construal of *newness* in the socio-political domain. It is assumed that the conceptual metaphor NEWNESS IS A SUBEVENT OF MOTION elaborates or frames events, actions or even psychological states. In what follows, the local meaning representation of the concept of NEWNESS, embedded in sentential event schemas that assign specific participants roles, will be analyzed. The aim of this part of the analysis is to interpret the meaning construction process so that systematic and coherent patterns can be identified. The discourse functions and ideological discourse structures of these patterns will be discussed in the separate chapter immediately following this section.

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<sup>237</sup> These three different worlds of experience are adapted from Radden/Dirven (2007). In its original form the force dynamics of language and cognition were introduced to linguistic study by Talmy (2000). According to Talmy (ibid.: 409) force dynamics, i.e. “how entities interact with respect to force,” play a crucial role in both grammatical and lexical subsystems. “Lexical items [...] refer not only to physical force interactions but, by metaphoric extension, also to psychological and social interactions, conceived in terms of psychosocial ‘pressures’. In addition, force-dynamic principles can be seen to operate in discourse, preeminently in directing patterns of argumentation, but also in guiding discourse expectations and their reversal” (Talmy 2000: 409).

Sentences underlie event schemas that can be identified by virtue of their functionality. These event schemas are defined by a small set of ‘thematic roles’, i.e. participant roles such as agent, cause, experiencer, location, possessor or theme. The participant roles form the conceptual core of a sentence and are regularly supported by so-called non-participant roles, i.e. “thematic roles that typically do not participate in event schemas” (Radden/Dirven 2007: 303). Following Radden/Dirven (*ibid.*), “[t]hese peripheral roles describe notions of space, time, circumstance, cause, reason, purpose [...]” In their function as complements and adjuncts, these prepositional phrases specify spatial relations in relating to space or the extension of space.

Furthermore, sentential event schemas subdivide into action schemas, consisting of the participant roles agent and theme, emotion schemas (experiencer-cause) or transfer schemas (location-possessor). Crucially, these event schemas can be categorized in terms of the ‘worlds of experience’ in which they occur. As initially only the material and the force-dynamic world are central to the study, I will only sketch the two of them now, deferring the outline of the psychological world of experience to later.

The three event schemas of the material world, “the structured world of entities as they exist, change or undergo processes” (Radden/Dirven *ibid.*: 272), have a both static and dynamic construal. Accordingly, the **occurrence schema** describes states or processes (changes of states) while the **spatial schema** indicates a location or movement along a trajectory and the **possession schema** denotes the relation of a possessor and a theme.

In the force-dynamic world, “the external world of action, force, and causes and their effects” (Radden/Dirven 2007: 299), situations are typically represented as energetic. They are ‘brought about’ rather than simply existing, which is why the participant roles agent and cause are vital here. It is also due to the interplay of agency and causation that three different types of scene construal can be distinguished. “The **action schema** [emphasis original] describes events in which a human agent deliberately and responsibly acts upon another entity, the theme” (Radden/Dirven *ibid.*). A sub-type of this schema is when an agent-like cause rather than a human agent performs the action. Frequently, the human agent is replaced by a metaphorical agent resulting from PERSON metaphors or personification (example see below). Second, the **motion schema** also subdivides into various sub-types depending on the entity that has initiated the motion. Thus the motion schema branches out into a **self-motion schema** and a **caused-motion schema**. In the former ‘motion’ results from an agent’s initiative while the latter involves “an energetic force that brings about the motion of a thing to or from a location” (Radden/Dirven 2007: 299). The third and last category is the so-called **transfer schema**, “in which an agent passes a thing to a recipient, who becomes its new owner” (*ibid.*). Such a transfer is realized by virtue of ditransitive constructions, which often involves the beneficiary of a given transfer. Crucially, the idea of transfer can also be expressed by the caused-motion construction, the difference being that the recipient, encoded as the indirect object, is more strongly affected in ditransitive constructions than in caused-

motion constructions, in which the motional aspect appears to be foregrounded.<sup>238</sup> Importantly, the transfer coded by the grammatical structure is, more often than not, metaphorical rather than ‘literal’. This is also viable for the analysis of the event schemas encountered in the corpus of the presidential address.

As mentioned earlier, the analysis of this section centers around the local meaning construction process in sentences that contain the lexical item *new*. More precisely, I am focused on the impact of grammatical elements on the processing of the category NEW. It is hypothesized that the following parameters have an influence on this particular meaning construction:

- Grammatical structure
  - Position of the adjective within the sentence
  - Types of nouns premodified by *new*
  - Verb types involved in the construal
- Sentence schemas involved (e.g. transfer, action, or motion schemas, for example)
- Configuration of participant roles (their configuration determines the schematic meaning of a situation)

As the analysis aims to lay bare patterns and functional values, the examples discussed below are selective rather than exhaustive and serve the purpose of defining the models that prevail. The examples are classified on the basis of the sentence position in which the NP containing the premodifier *new* is coded. Due to the fairly fixed word order in English sentences, the position permits the correlation with participant roles, for example, for the subject position there is a predictable set of participant roles, chiefly agency, of course.

In keeping with the chronological order observed in the preceding part of the analysis, I will proceed from nineteenth-century to twentieth-century inaugurals. If there is a set of examples discussed together, the chronological order is maintained unless stated otherwise. The noun phrases containing the adjective are underlined in the examples below.

### 6.4.1 Nineteenth-century Inaugural Addresses

In what follows, the schematic meaning (and its interaction with the lexical level) of sentences or larger portions of discourse containing the linguistic unit *new* will be analyzed. Given the qualitative bias of this present study, not all individual occurrences can be analyzed with the richness of detail and precision required by the methodology. However, a complete and systematic overview is provided by Tables 10 and 11 at the end of this section. Again, the focus is on first identifying major patterns, followed by interpreting them in-depth. An explanation that includes the impact of the construals identified in political discourse,

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<sup>238</sup> Radden/Dirven (2007: 299) provide the example sentences (A) “Please give me an aspirin” (ditransitive construction) as opposed to (B) “I gave an aspirin to you” (caused-motion construction). Besides the difference in the degree of affection, the more interesting distinction between the two construals appears to be the direction of the transfer movement. Whereas (A) describes a movement towards the speaker, the movement in (B) is directed away from the speaker.

particularly the strategic functions and ideological discourse structures, will be provided in the closing chapters of this study.

The adjective *new* overwhelmingly occurs in attributive position, thus denoting a characteristic single property and functioning as a prenominal modifier. As such, it is contained in noun phrases (NPs) that function as the subject or object NP within a clause or sentence. Frequently, the NP including the premodifier *new* is linked to a preceding NP by the preposition *of*, yielding a phrase structure as follows:

NP → NP + PP

NP → N

PP → Prep + NP

NP → Det, adj (*new*), N

The adjective is distributed evenly amongst the three positions. It is hypothesized that the meaning construction process largely draws on the metaphorical coding of the schemas, presumably motivated by the conceptual metaphor NEWNESS IS A SUBEVENT OF MOTION. This mapping interacts with other conceptual metaphors in the event-schematic construal of the example sentence. In the light of the preceding discussion the following hypotheses can be made: the foregrounding of motion entails a preference for the schemas of the force-dynamic world over those of the material world. More precisely, all of the schemas of the force-dynamic world are hypothesized to be operative; in the material world, a prevalence of occurrence and spatial schemas can be predicted. In the events of stationary construals, however, it is hypothesized that the cognition and emotion schemas prevail.

The premodification of nouns in subject position is interesting from a functional perspective in two respects. On the one hand, the clause-initial position has conceptual salience, especially when containing a ‘marked theme’, i.e. the preposed theme of a passivized sentence. On the other hand, the subject position frequently coincides with the participant roles of agent or cause, but also experiencer or possessor; their construal is central to the building of ideological structures in political discourse. As such, they revolve around what van Dijk (1998) terms biased event models, i.e. they are represented or constructed from a particular angle.

The first set of nineteenth-century examples deals with the occurrence of *new* in NPs in subject position, either as the subject of the main clause or that of a sub-clause:

- (39) New communities and States are seeking protection under its [= the nation's] aegis, and multitudes from the Old World are flocking to our shores to participate in its blessings. (JKP, 11)
- (40) It is no paradox to say that although comparatively weak the new-born nation was intrinsically strong. (FPI, 3)
- (41) The new Republic was then beset with danger on every hand. (JAG, 2)

In all three examples, new political institutions are referred to by virtue of an NP including the premodifier *new*. The grammatical structure of the example sentences is indicative of distinct

underlying schematic meanings that are used strategically. The subject position typically assigns the participant roles of agent, possessor or experiencer, all of which are found in the examples above. What is more, the sentence meanings are structured in terms of the person [frame], motivated by the conceptual metaphors A STATE IS A PERSON, A NATION IS A PERSON and A REPUBLIC IS A PERSON. Thus, the conceptual structure, the grammatical function and the participant role assigned are entirely consistent. Yet, if the schematic meanings of the sentences under consideration are further examined, there are also significant differences between the event schemas underlying the sentences.

In (39), the personified agent is embedded in a self-motion schema, according to which the agent is understood as in need of US ‘protectorate’. Conceptually, this is represented as the agent’s movement into a position in which the agent would be covered by another entity (“under the nation’s aegis”).<sup>239</sup> The magnetic effect of the American nation is not only represented as a fact, vesting President Polk’s assertion with truthfulness, its depiction is also amplified by virtue of the tense and aspect of the predication. The windowing operation realized by the progressive aspect (“are seeking,” “are flocking”) adds to the vivid description of the unbounded events. This grammatical framework affects the meaning construction of *new*, whose temporal meaning is metaphorically extended. *New* denotes a recently formed state or community, which is then metaphorically extended to mean ‘young’ and ‘inexperienced’. Highlighting *new* as a property of the agent-like communities and States points to an intrinsic property and subcategorizes for a specific sub-type of the categories community or state. The line of argument pursued here is in line with the [morality] frame that is used to legitimize political actions and events (see above). Here, territorial expansion is represented as resulting from the new states and communities’ initiative due to the construal in terms of the self-motion schema.<sup>240</sup>

In sharp contrast, the construal of the new American nation is remarkably different in (40). Being the subject within a sub-clause, which is framed in terms of a meta-linguistic comment (“it is no paradox to say”), this NP is linked to a subject complement by a copular verb construction. As in the previous example, the NP contains a personified concept (A NATION IS A PERSON), yet this time another schema prevails. The sentence can be understood in terms of the possession schema, which would correspond to the grammatical structure of subject and subject complement typical of property assignment. But how could this be motivated conceptually? Arguing from the angle of the ESM system, states are typically conceptualized in terms of locations. The participant roles location and possession can be linked via metaphorical transfer, according to which attributes (devised as objects) are transferred to

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<sup>239</sup> It is not inconceivable to argue for the action schema instead, which would also account for the sentence meaning. Yet it would ascribe a greater degree of deliberateness and determination on behalf of the agent. Frequently, the action-schema is goal-oriented, focusing on the point of completion of a given activity. However, it would also involve the understanding that the agent more or less deliberately acts on the theme, i.e. protection. In fact, the two schemas may both apply on the grounds of their conceptual contiguity that invites cognitive associations. Motivated by the conceptual metaphor ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION, both schemas could be argued to interact in establishing the schematic meaning of the sentence.

<sup>240</sup> From a diachronic perspective, it is also conceivable to argue for a completely different event schema, namely the perception/cognition schema. Accordingly, the actions of the cognizing individual would be regarded as immediately experiential. Etymologically, the verb ‘to seek’ is perceptual, meaning ‘to perceive by scent’.

another entity which is their new owner. Motivated by the conceptual metaphor ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS, the interpretation that the American nation was intrinsically vested with strength could indeed be a biased event model.

The *new* in “new-born” is used like an adverb, hence it corresponds to the deadverbial use of the adjective, which opens up a temporal frame of reference. The [person] frame invites the understanding of a young, inexperienced person in need of protection as is the case in (40). Due to the possession schema and the syntactic construction of the sentence, this interpretation is blocked, as it would not be consistent with the American self-definition anyway. The possession schema entails the attribution of the participant roles possessor and theme. Interestingly, the representation of the American nation as young and inexperienced only occurs once and this is in the past tense. The American nation is associated with several characteristics at once, “comparatively weak,” “new-born” and “intrinsically strong.” More precisely, however, the only significant attribute is expressed by the theme “intrinsically strong,” linked to the NP by virtue of a copular verb. The other two adjectives are de-emphasized, either for being part of a concessive sub-clause or by the deadverbial use of the adjective *new*, which de-focuses the sense of ‘inexperienced’. Moreover, this shift of emphasis coincides with a shift in terms of experiential domains from the force-dynamic world (“comparatively weak”) to the psychological world (“intrinsically strong”). This coding is entrenched by the construal of the ESM; while in (39) it occurs in terms of the location dual, thus involving motion, the static construal of (40) corresponds with the object dual of the ESM.

Rhetorically, President Pierce (in example 40) resolves the paradoxical tension that arises between conflicting frames of evaluation and metaphorical models BEING OLD IS BEING IN A STATE OF KNOWLEDGE vs. BEING NEW IS BEING IN A STATE OF IGNORANCE. Due to the impact of mapping TIME IS AN EVALUATOR, expressed by linguistic expressions such as time-honored, which is typically assigned a positive value (see above), entities that have proved their worth over time are held in high esteem. The validity of the cognitive model, including its pattern of evaluation, is corroborated despite the clash of values. Using the rhetorical strategy of spiritualization, i.e. framing events or actions in terms of their opposites (here: external vs. internal contrast), Pierce reassesses familiar topics: he shifts the emphasis from physical strength that is assumed to, more or less mechanically, derive from competition (POLITICS IS A RACE) to moral strength, which, in the American context, is perceived as inherent, God-given (manifest destiny). Furthermore, the internal contradiction observed by Pierce himself is resolved by the rhetorical strategy of both-and, according to which the American nation can be new, but at the same time as strong as older nations. Pierce construes the American nation as **both** new (frame: ‘not having lived for a long time’, ‘inexperienced’, ‘immature’, ‘weak’) **and** old (frame: ‘having lived for a long time’, ‘experienced’, ‘matured’, ‘strong’). Originating from the rhetorical legacy of the American jeremiad there is a proneness to be affirmative and integrative in pursuing a ‘both-and strategy’ rather than an ‘either-or approach’. This coding is also mirrored in the sentence structure. The concessive conjunction *although* more or less balances the content of the main clause, establishing an equilibrium

between the meaning of the sub-clause and the main clause. The rationale underlying Pierce's argument is in many ways similar to that in the quotation taken from Theodore Roosevelt's inaugural (TRO, 1). The obvious inexperience of the newly founded American nation can be compensated by the focus on novel, future experience, de-focusing the present as well as the past.

Moreover, reasoning on political institutions and structures exhibits a strong tendency towards an organic conception of socio-political concepts. Crucially, the experience of EXISTENCE is grounded in several image schemas (see above); the most important schema in this context is PROCESS. Consequently, in line with the organic, cyclical conception of political entities, they are argued to undergo developmental stages, according to which nations are subject to cyclical development.<sup>241</sup> For example, a nation is assumed to be in a phase of infancy, followed by a maturation process which culminates in adulthood, which is constructed as the peak of activity and efficiency. Evidently, this process-based understanding also holds for the American nation. Consequently, the American nation accomplished a maturation process, beginning with infancy, via adolescence into adulthood, where it is generally maintained, as is evidenced by Clinton's (see example 33) plea that "we must keep our old democracy forever young."<sup>242</sup> The following nineteenth-century examples illustrate the family-based structure of the American nation:

- (42) [...] the States respectively **protected** by the National Government under a **mild, parental system** against foreign dangers, and enjoying within their separate spheres, by a wise partition of power, a just proportion of the sovereignty, have improved their police, extended their settlements, and attained a **strength** and **maturity** which are the best proofs of **wholesome** laws well administered. (JMO I, 4)
- (43) It is now rather more than forty-four years since we declared our independence, and thirty-seven since it was acknowledged. The talents and virtues which were displayed in that great struggle were a sure presage of all that has since followed. A people who were able to surmount **in their infant state** such great perils would be more competent as they rose **into manhood** to repel any which they might meet in their progress. (JMO II, 23)
- (44) Amongst the other duties of a delicate character which the President is called upon to perform is **the supervision** of the government of the Territories of the United States. Those of them which are destined to become **members of our great political family** are compensated by their rapid progress **from infancy to manhood** for the partial and temporary deprivation of their political rights. (WHH, 15)

The [family] frame also applies to the third example above (41). Embedded into a historic context, President Garfield alludes to the early beginnings of American political emancipation, which is further contextualized in (45) below:

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<sup>241</sup> The image-schematic base of the person concept explains the rhythm of the American political system. In chapter 3, the case was made for various patterns of political change in the American system. The pervasiveness of organic conceptions of political entities and events in focus would also account for the generational rhythm that is thought to account for major patterns of political change.

<sup>242</sup> The need to preserve the nation in its prime also makes sense from the organic conception of political systems. As the role models, the ancient republics, including the Roman Republic, all perished, this was to be avoided at all costs.



- (45) It is now three days more than a hundred years since the adoption of the first written constitution of the United States—the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union. The new Republic was then beset with danger on every hand. It had not conquered a place in the family of nations. The decisive battle of the war for independence, whose centennial anniversary will soon be gratefully celebrated at Yorktown, had not yet been fought. The colonists were struggling not only against the armies of a great nation, but against the settled opinions of mankind; for the world did not then believe that the supreme authority of government could be safely intrusted to the guardianship of the people themselves. (JAG, 2)

Garfield draws attention to the first written constitutional document of the United States, the predecessor of the present Constitution, the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union, which were drafted prior to the military conflict referred to as the American Revolution or the War of Independence, respectively. The victorious emergence from these conflicts is construed not only as a sign of emancipation but also as a process of maturation, a kind of initiation or rite of passage from a young, inexperienced nation to a fully grown, independent adult nation, equipped with the same rights and powers as any other nation of “the family of nations,” as Garfield phrases it. Thus [competition] is deeply entrenched in American reasoning on political activities in general and nation-building in particular. Similarly, [person], motivated by the mapping A REPUBLIC IS A PERSON, is coherent with the overall conceptualization of international relations as a family. Consequently a “new Republic” is understood as a novice in the field, who needs to prove himself first.

The premodification of the noun *Republic* with the adjective *new* draws on the adjective’s both experiential and expressive values. In view of the underlying rationale of Garfield’s argument, it is both the emotion schema and the temporal framework that evoke the sentence’s schematic meaning. The participant role experiencer is coded as the sentence subject; here it is the grammatical subject of the passivized sentence. The experiencer is personified by virtue of the mapping A REPUBLIC IS A PERSON, following from the overall consistent pattern of understanding political entities in terms of persons. The person frame helps to determine the deployment of NEWNESS. The construction in (41) is a stative passive in which the experiencer, the NP containing the premodifier *new* (“the new Republic”), is the grammatical subject whose negative experience is caused by the contents of the prepositional phrase “with danger on every hand.” Thus it appears to be the case that negative experience of the American in-group is expressed in terms of the emotion schema, which adds expressivity to the depiction. Also, if the underlying correspondence of a nation’s newness is its need for protection, i.e. construing the “new Republic” as undergoing grave difficulties during its phase as a young and inexperienced nation, the accomplishment is enhanced to an even larger degree. While this is usually a passing experience, at which the individual grows more and more proficient in time,<sup>243</sup> the stative passive suggests that this experience was then perceived as persistent. If the temporal structure is included in the analysis, the notion of achievement is even more strongly pronounced. Seen from a long-term perspective, the experience of weakness and a state of danger is represented as having long since been overcome. This is expressed by virtue of a temporal frame that opens up a comparative construction consisting

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<sup>243</sup> It appears to be the case that experience is typically understood as events piling up on each other, leading to an accumulation of events experienced in the course of time.

of then and now (see Figure 11 above). While the latter is not explicitly stated it coincides with the moment of speaking and is thus easy to infer. The inferences to be drawn from the choice of verb tenses point to a similar direction. For example, the past perfect (“had not conquered”) relates to a past situation that is no longer valid, suggesting that the situation is different now.

The concept of NEWNESS is not only central to the conceptualization of the American nation, it also plays a vital role in the construal of the event of territorial expansion in the light of newness exclusively occurs in terms of passive constructions. As in the passivized sentences discussed earlier, the subject position is filled by the NP containing the adjective *new* and the head noun it premodifies. Unlike the previous examples, in which the subject position was filled with a personified political institution, the subject position of the examples below is assigned the participant role of theme, i.e. the entity that is directly affected by the action(s) of the agent. Yet, these passive constructions are indicative of what is referred to as topicalization in traditional accounts of grammar. The themes of the transitive constructions are preposed while all the agents are suppressed. Given the strong preference for end-focus in English, the suppression of the agent allows for the focus to be also placed on the verb.

- (46) Under this Constitution our commerce has been wisely regulated with foreign nations and between the States; new States have been admitted into our Union; our territory has been enlarged by fair and honorable treaty, and with great advantage to the original States; [...] (JMO I, 4)
- (47) Our physical attainments have not been less eminent. Twenty-five years ago the river Mississippi was shut up and our Western brethren had no outlet for their commerce. What has been the progress since that time? The river has not only become the property of the United States from its source to the ocean, [...], but Louisiana, with a fair and liberal boundary on the western side and the Floridas on the eastern, have been ceded to us. The United States now enjoy the complete and uninterrupted sovereignty over the whole territory from St. Croix to the Sabine. New States, settled from among ourselves in this and in other parts, have been admitted into our Union in equal participation in the national sovereignty with the original States. [...] (JMO II, 26)
- (48) Since that period [= the thirty-six years since this great national covenant was instituted a body of laws] a population of four millions has multiplied to twelve. A territory bounded by the Mississippi has been extended from sea to sea. New States have been admitted to the Union in numbers nearly equal to those of the first Confederation [...]. (JQA, 4).
- (49) In the earlier stages of our national existence the opinion prevailed with some that our system of confederated States could not operate successfully over an extended territory, and serious objections have at different times been made to the enlargement of our boundaries. These objections were earnestly urged when we acquired Louisiana. Experience has shown that they were not well founded. The title of numerous Indian tribes to vast tracts of country has been extinguished; new States have been admitted into the Union; new Territories have been created and our jurisdiction and laws extended over them. As our population has expanded, the Union has been cemented and strengthened. [...] (JKP, 24)

The preference for the passive construction and the concomitant suppression of the agent is strategically useful. De-emphasizing the agent involves a focus on the theme, the verb phrase, and, to a degree, also on the prepositional complement. The preposed theme of the passive construction is thus topicalized, representing the outcome of an agent’s actions. *New* denotes the recently acquired statehood. Historically, the term ‘new State’, particularly when

capitalized, designates the territories that successfully petitioned for accession to the Union and thus changed their status from territory to full members of the Union, the United States of America.

All verb phrases have the verb *admit* as their head, which expresses the idea of allowing someone to enter or join an organization (cf. *LDOCE*). In all but one instance (see below), the schematic meaning of the sentence is conveyed by the transfer schema. The transfer schema also involves movement, which can be articulated from two different perspectives. The construal can either occur in terms of the object dual or the location dual of the ESM. In the former, the physical, abstract or metaphorical transfer is a movement towards the speaker, deictic center or ego-experiencer in discourse, while the construal of the location dual typically involves (the speaker's) movement towards a new location. In the examples above, the event of accession is construed on the basis of the object dual, suggesting a movement towards the 'Union'.

Given the end-weight and end-focus of English, the passive construction also places the focus on the prepositional phrases (PP), which are assigned the participant role of recipient, or even beneficiary. Thus the end point of the transfer, i.e. the goal of the trajectory of motion not only designates the new location of an entity but also coincides with the clause-final prepositional phrase "(in)to the Union." Crucially, the Union is conceptualized as a container, implying clear boundaries, and by extension, a clear understanding of *in* and *out*. This is significant for political reasons as it depicts the stages involved in the process towards statehood. Complete integration is understood as being inside the 'container', i.e. a full member of the national community.

Similarly, the schematic meaning of (49) the sentence including the NP "new territories" can be interpreted on these grounds. The acquisition of new territory constitutes the stage preceding statehood. Here, a different event schema applies. The appropriation of territory belongs to the action schema although, of course, the agent is suppressed by the passive construction but can be easily inferred from the context; it is even represented as a natural, creative act. The sentence meaning hinges on the schematic meaning of the verb 'to create', which conveys an inchoative meaning along the lines of making something exist that did not exist before. Alternatively, the verb also expresses the idea of invention or even innovation. Conceptually, this experience of bringing into existence is grounded in image schemas such as PROCESS, CYCLE, or BOUNDED SPACE. Crucially, territorial expansionism is construed as a process derived from the embodied experience EXISTENCE. This process is deployed as resultative, which is in agreement with the suppression of agency. The complete truncation of agency is a standard strategy in political uses of language as it permits the shifting of responsibilities. Nonetheless, the agent-pronoun *we* can be implicated by virtue of the co-referential *our* contained in the sentence.

This construal has an impact on the meaning representation of *new*; the adjective has a temporal meaning, recategorizing 'territories' as 'new', i.e. 'original', 'fresh' or even 'pioneering'. Again *new* is used as deadverbial adjective, underlining the fact that deadverbial uses are supported by metaphorical extension. Both action and progress are understood as

motion forward, the only difference being that the former often coincides with the self-motion schema while the latter involves caused-motion or simply motion. The experience of territorial gain is best reflected in the action schema as it suggest self-motion, motivated by the conceptual metaphor ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION. The notion of the Frontier captures the idea of being at the head of a forward motion in denoting the outermost and foremost areas of settled or developed territory.<sup>244</sup>

The argumentation on behalf of the presidents in favor of territorial expansion is another important aspect worth examining more carefully. The processual character of territorial expansion is construed in terms of both the object and the location dual of the ESM, reflecting the different stages of the expansion. Crucially, however, the perspective remains the same; merely the perspectival mode — whether or not the ego-experiencer is stationary or in motion — is different. In the dynamic mode, the event of the Union's enlargement is represented as involving activity, thus the predominance of metaphorical mappings such as ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION or PROGRESS IS MOTION FORWARD but also SPACE IS FREEDOM TO MOVE and DIFFICULTIES ARE IMPEDIMENTS TO MOTION. The exploration and exploitation of the North American continent was part of manifest destiny that increasingly dominated reasoning on the frontier. Therefore, the understanding of territorial expansionism may also be framed by the specific-level mapping LONG-TERM PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEYS.

In contrast, the object dual deploys the accession of new States as the acquisition of new attributes (ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS, CHANGE IS MOTION OF AN OBJECT TO A LOCATION). This construal has the following metaphorical entailments: the purpose of the frontier movement is the acquisition of territories; hence these are understood as desired objects (PURPOSES ARE DESIRED OBJECTS). The event of successful transfer, thus contributing to the Union's enlargement, is understood in terms of the mapping ACHIEVING A PURPOSE IS ACQUIRING A DESIRED OBJECT. Importantly, the new is merely an addition, another object within the Union container; it is not substituting the old but denoting that the statehood is a recently acquired property coinciding with the movement to a new position. From the perspective of the Union, the acquisition represents an addition (*new* means 'another' or 'more of the same' but also has a temporal sense as in 'recently acquired'), hence a qualitative change. Importantly, the change described is developmental rather than transformational, as the relevant point of access (see Figure 4 in chapter 4) would be SUCCESSION. Due to the recency of the acquired attribute, the overall meaning representation is suggestive of an improvement (MORE IS BETTER).

The rationale of territorial expansionism is grounded in the experiences of MOTION and SPACE. While the appropriation of cultural space was generally acknowledged and welcomed,

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<sup>244</sup> Interestingly, this spatial experience has given rise to a metaphor-based meaning extension. The term frontier also denotes the farthestmost limits of knowledge or achievement in a particular subject or field. According to the *LDOCE*, the lexical item *frontier* denotes "the limits of what is known about something," for example, "the frontiers of knowledge/physics etc." Another example would be the expression "push back the frontiers (=discover new things)."

the case for the Union's enlargement — which dysphemistically stands for the conquest and colonial subjugation of the Continent as well as fighting back other colonial powers — had to be made time and again as is evidenced by the following quotation:

- (50) I know that the acquisition of Louisiana had been disapproved by some from a candid apprehension that the enlargement of our territory would endanger its union. But who can limit the extent to which the federative principle may operate effectively? The larger our association the less will it be shaken by local passions; and in any view is it not better that the opposite bank of the Mississippi should be settled by our own brethren and children than by strangers of another family? (TJE II, 6)

Thus we have an ideological tension between FREEDOM IS SPACE TO MOVE and RELATIONSHIP IS PROXIMITY on the one hand, and BALANCE, DIFFERENCE IS DISTANCE and DIFFERENCE IS SEPARATION on the other. As mentioned on various occasions, the mappings of MORAL WHOLENESS and RELATIONSHIP IS PROXIMITY (“better...settled by our own brethren and children than by strangers of another family?”) are highly influential in the meaning representation of national cohesion. For this reason, the idea of enlargement is counterintuitive to the reasoning underlying these mappings. However, the concept of freedom, motivated by the conceptual metaphors FREE ACTION IS UNINHIBITED SELF-PROPELLED MOTION or FREEDOM IS SPACE TO MOVE (“who can limit the extent to which the federative principle may operate effectively?”), implies that there are no impediments to motion. Yet the maneuvering space is restricted by the ideal of strong relations, which are typically conceptualized in terms of proximity. On the other hand, spatial relations frequently serve to conceptualize socio-political relations. Following the tenet of embodiment, this experience can be grounded in image schemas such as SPACE (including the experience of near-far, center-periphery), but also BALANCE (“shaken by local passions”), CONTAINMENT or FORCE. Jefferson's line of argument includes the preference of freedom over proximity, which can be counterbalanced by stable relationships beyond the existing borders (“New States, settled from among ourselves in this and in other parts,” in (47) above).

Similarly, subsequent presidents, see examples (48) to (49) above, make use of these arguments. The enlargement is presented as beneficial transfer (“to the original states”) or as giving rise to stronger national cohesiveness (“the Union has been cemented and strengthened”). The policy is legitimized once more by the authority of time, motivated by the mapping TIME IS AN EVALUATOR (“experience has shown that they [ =objections to the enlargement of our boundaries] ...), which also attests to the success of the undertaking (SUCCESS IS MOTION FORWARD, exemplified by the linguistic expressions “progress,” “extended from sea to sea”).

Conceptually, successful development is measured in terms of the distance covered from the original location (the source of motion), the proximity to the goal envisaged or by the extension of space, all of which occurred during a given period of time. The temporal structure in the paragraphs above further corroborates the idea of accomplishment. There are a number of references to past points of time (“twenty-five years ago,” “since that period,” “in the earlier stages of our national existence”), which are compared and contrasted to the present situation, which is represented as completely different. The focal adjustment to the present, now, means that the temporal interval in between the two boundary events is

constructed as a period of achievements, de-emphasizing the failures, difficulties and defeats that are also part and parcel of this particular period. The notion of accomplishment is also conveyed by the tenses used, chiefly the present perfect and the present. While the former highlights the result of an activity begun in the past and whose outcome has an impact on the present, the latter codes the present situation as stable and lasting, which is frequently used to legitimize past policies.

Another position, in which the NP containing the premodifier occurs, is the object position, which is typically assigned the participant role of theme, i.e. the entity directly affected by an agent or cause. The predominating event schema is the transfer schema with the participant roles of agent, recipient or beneficiary and theme.

A verb that is predestined to occur in the transfer schema is the verb *to give*. As mentioned earlier, the transfer schema can be realized in terms of two alternative constructions. If the recipient is in focus the ditransitive construction applies while the caused-motion construction emphasizes the object, metaphorical or otherwise, that is being transferred; in this case the prepositional *to*-phrase is compulsory.

- (51) Passion has swept some of our communities, but only to give us a new demonstration that the great body of our people are stable, patriotic, and law-abiding. (BHA, 35)

In (51), the transfer schema is encoded in the ditransitive construction, highlighting the recipient as the new possessor of the transferred entity. Since it is metaphorical transfer, modeled on the mapping COMPLEX IDEAS ARE OBJECTS, the recipient (“us”) is now imbued with a fresh experience of the Union’s political stability; this knowledge results from the transfer, in which an abstract idea is transferred to another entity. The transmission involves the movement of a (new) object towards the speaker, which is why it is perceived as ‘new’, hence ‘fresh’.

In (52) to (54), the transfer schema is embedded in a caused-motion construction, thereby highlighting the transfer itself rather than the goal or recipient of the transfer.

- (52) It [=the elevation of the negro race from slavery to the full rights of citizenship] has given new inspiration to the power of self-help in both races by making labor more honorable to the one and more necessary to the other. (JAG, 11)
- (53) Under this Constitution the boundaries of freedom have been enlarged, the foundations of order and peace have been strengthened, and the growth of our people in all the better elements of national life has indicated the wisdom of the founders and given new hope to their descendants. (JAG, 4)
- (54) Actual events have proved their error; the last war, far from impairing, gave new confidence to our Government, and amid recent apprehensions of a similar conflict we saw that the energies of our country would not be wanting in ample season to vindicate its rights. [...] (MVB, 10)

Let us have a closer look at the entities that are being transferred. The metaphorical transfer includes abstract concepts such as ideas (“inspiration”) and emotions (“hope,” “confidence”). Their transfer to another entity involves a change in the receiving entity in the sense of a development. *New* thus has a temporal meaning in specifying a recently acquired attribute, but it also implies a qualitative change. It conveys the idea of being the most recent of a series of

entities of the same category, i.e. another portion of inspiration, hope or confidence is added to existing inspiration, hope or confidence. There is thus a tendency to conceive of the most recent entity of entities of the same category as the most positive, valuable, insightful, and so on, which could be motivated by the conceptual metaphor *NEW IS GOOD*.<sup>245</sup>

In all instances, the transfer schema is construed in the object dual of the ESM. Motivated by the underlying conceptual metaphors *ABSTRACT IDEAS ARE OBJECTS* and *EMOTIONS ARE OBJECTS*, the actual transmission of these objects towards the thing-changing is foregrounded. What is also important is the cause of the motion. Since the transfer schema is part of situations that belong to the force-dynamic world, they “describe events which are brought about by human agents or other causal entities and have effects” (Radden/Dirven 2007: 284). In all examples, political events — the abolition of slavery, war, consolidation periods — account for the transfer in the caused-motion schema. The meaning construction process assigns agency to these events by virtue of the conceptual metaphor *EVENTS ARE ACTIONS*. As to the beneficiaries of the metaphorical transfer, the recipients are personified abstract entities, non-metaphorical recipients and personified political concepts (*GOVERNMENT IS A PERSON*).

The object NPs, containing the premodifier *new*, are as themes directly affected by the agent-cause. The notion of newness impinges on the transfer movement itself, thus standing for a fresh way of doing things.

The third position in which the premodifier *new* occurs is the prepositional complement of complex NPs, for instance, “the foundations of the new government.” The large majority of the prepositional phrases identified consist of the prepositional *of*-phrase with only a few occurrences of other prepositions such as *under* or *over*. For example,

- (55) Returning to the bosom of my country after a painful separation from it for ten years, I had the honor to be elected to a station under the new order of things, [...] (JAD, 6)

Prepositional *of*-phrases specify the antecedent NP to which they are attached in order to provide further qualifications. More precisely, prepositional *of*-phrases express (intrinsic) relations that hold within complex NPs. These relations frequently assign additional properties to the superordinate NP as they are not randomly assigned. Rather, the relations of two NPs linked by the preposition *of* exhibit a certain degree of iconicity, i.e. the notion that “the conceptual structure (the conceptualization) is reflected by the linguistic structure (the linguistic expressions used)” (Kövecses 2006: 301). In the event of grammatical iconicity it is a grammatical form or syntactic structure that points to a particular kind of conceptual link between the relevant entities. The iconic relationship can take the form of metaphorical conceptualization but may also rely on other conceptual tools such as metonymy. For example, Radden/Dirven (2007: 159) distinguish between part/whole relations, relational,

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<sup>245</sup> This meaning could be conceptually represented in terms of a container in which the most recent addition corresponds to the top layer. This container is filled with previous events and actions and the height of its filling functions as a vertical scale, which is conventionally used as a scale to measure quality. For example, the *UP IS GOOD* vs. *BAD IS DOWN* contrast. The higher the contents of the container pile up, the more eventful and experienced an entity is. As has been seen earlier, experience is generally evaluated in positive terms within the corpus of inaugural addresses.

reified and identifying relations that may be established in connecting two NPs by virtue of a prepositional *of*-phrase. Crucially, the meaning of the relations is determined by the categorial properties of the two entities linked, which may be motivated by underlying conceptual metaphors or metonymies. At any rate, the deployment of these relations is indicative of tightly knit (conceptual) connections identifiable through the sentence's construal.

Prior to looking at the nineteenth-century examples in detail, let us take an inventory of the distribution of prepositional *of*-phrases. The adjective *new* is part of the postmodification of a given NP. Within this prepositional *of*-phrase it premodifies the noun of the dependent NP. In performing the qualifying, property-assigning functions of an adjective, it further contributes to specifying the intrinsic relations expressed via the prepositional *of*-phrase. Furthermore, the large majority of nouns function as the subject of the clause and are assigned the participant roles of theme or agent/agent-like cause, which constitutes the conceptual core of a given situation or event.

Table 6 provides a systematic overview of the intrinsic relations that hold in the complex NPs containing the premodifier *new*. However, the analysis below will not include all of them individually; rather it aims to lay bare the patterns of construal following the parameters laid down above.

(I)	a)	<b>Activities (resultative)</b>	performance of my new duties, addition of many new ones, accession of these new States, prosperity of the new States and Territories
	b)	<b>Activities (processual)</b>	proceedings of a new and free government, commencement of a new term, early stages of the new Government
(II)		<b>Part/whole</b>	foundations of the new Government, portion of a new confederacy

Table 6

As can be derived from the Table above, all of the nouns identified are what Radden/Dirven (2007: 78) refer to as reified nouns, or abstract nouns in traditional terms. The nouns in (I) are all derived from verbs conveying the meaning of an activity such as 'to add', 'access', 'proceed' or 'perform'. Let us have a closer look at the sentence schemas they are embedded in:

- (56) To a casual observer our system presents no appearance of discord between the different members which compose it. Even the addition of many new ones [= member states] has produced no jarring. They move in their respective orbits in perfect harmony with the central head and with each other. (WHH, 10)
- (57) The people who have settled these Territories are intelligent, enterprising, and patriotic, and the accession of these new States will add strength to the nation. (BHA, 29)

The nominalized nouns 'addition' and 'accession' stand for the action itself or express the result of the action described by the verb (EVENTS ARE ACTIONS). Conceptually, an action or activity involves (self)-motion along a trajectory (ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION). The path along which the motion occurs describes the ongoing activity while the goal coincides with the accomplishment of the activity, its result. The resultative noun is conceived of as a more stable concept than the corresponding verb. The temporally bounded character of



activities, which typically have a beginning and an end marked off by two temporal boundary events, is expressed by the time it takes to travel from the departure point (SOURCE) to the destination (GOAL). Crucially, the nominalization of action verbs establishes a tight connection between the action itself and its result. Motivated by the conceptual metonymy RESULT FOR ACTION, the nominalization of activity verbs feeds on the strong cognitive salience or end-point focus attributed to activities. In some cases, this contiguity even suggests a unitary construal, i.e. conveying two aspects of one activity at once. This is possible because the metonymy is reversible, hence ACTION FOR RESULT. Intuitively, this is hardly surprising since some actions or activities cannot easily be dissociated from their results.<sup>246</sup>

The tight connection between action and result is also relevant for the two examples above. Interestingly, the complex NPs are themselves embedded into event schemas, more precisely the action schema and the transfer schema. Thus on the one hand the addition of new States did not result in negative consequences, and on the other the Nation is predicted to benefit from the accession of additional states. As these sentence schemas belong to the force-dynamic world, the contiguity of action and result of action produces a chain of events, which is evocative of progress. Perceptually, the links may also be understood as causation, in which one action initiates another, i.e. the result of a particular activity becomes the cause of another, which then produces a certain effect and so on. Crucially, causal chains may have an effect of continuity as has been evidenced by findings from process or gestalt psychology. While successive actions may be distinct units they form a dynamic unity despite their diversity.

In (56) the subject NP (“the addition of many new ones”) is assigned the participant role of agent-like cause, while in (57) the agency consists of an event (“the accession of these States”) that entails advantageous consequences (“add strength”) for another entity, the recipient (“to the nation”). The construal of either sentence is motivated by the conceptual metaphor EVENTS ARE ACTIONS. In either case, the event schema is the caused-motion schema.

However, the actual construal in terms of the ESM is different. Example (56) is construed by virtue of the location dual, particularly in terms of the mappings CAUSES ARE FORCES and CHANGE IS MOTION. More precisely, Harrison argues for the absence of negative consequences of political change, the event of territorial expansion. The caused-motion schema implies that the agent-like cause, the complex NP “the addition...” has not resulted in negative consequences (“no jarring”) as the changes occurred in a smooth and controlled way. The mental space opened up by “discord” and “jarring” is suggestive of uncontrolled, conflicting movements, which apparently have failed to occur.<sup>247</sup> This construal is motivated by the conceptual metaphors LACK OF CONTROL OVER CHANGE IS LACK OF CONTROL OVER MOVEMENT and ACCIDENTAL CHANGES ARE ACCIDENTAL MOVEMENTS. The inference to be drawn is that this only occurs in the event of a lack of agreement or incongruous difference

<sup>246</sup> For instance, the sentence ‘there was a huge public outcry’ describes the action and result as virtually co-occurring (ACTION FOR RESULT). Similarly, the meaning of the sentence ‘she still remembers the hurt she felt back then’ illustrates the RESULT FOR ACTION metonymy.

<sup>247</sup> The linguistic expressions ‘discord’ and ‘jarring’ also suggest another interpretation in terms of the theory of musical harmony. Etymologically, the meaning of disagreement predates the specialized musical sense, which indicates that the musical meaning is itself a metaphorical extension.

between the parties involved. The clashing occurs when movements are not sufficiently coordinated and synchronized, which also produces dissonance in musical pieces. This conception is supported by the schematic meaning of the connected sentences. The notion of harmony is understood in terms of motion, i.e. two or more entities move with synchronized movements along a clearly defined path or within a clearly delineated bounded space. From a different angle, this synchronicity means that the entities concerned are also dependable on one another, i.e. their relations are grounded in morality (see below). Prior to looking into the argumentation in more detail, the meaning construction process in (57) will be outlined.

The construal of (57) occurs by means of the object dual as the transfer schema appears to interact with this dual of the ESM. The accession of new States is represented as the acquisition of desired objects. Schematically, the result of the activity of accession is predicted to cause the nation to be stronger. In the transfer schema, the abstract entity 'strength' is reified (ABSTRACT IDEAS ARE OBJECTS) and is transferred onto another entity, which becomes the new possessor of the relocated object. Thus the recipient or beneficiary is the personified nation.

The meaning construction of *new* is determined by the overall construal of the ESM. In the location dual *new* frequently codes a temporal meaning denoting an entity not there before. In the object dual, *new* tends to express a qualitative change, i.e. more of the same kind ('another'). Schematically, the event of newness is represented in the location dual by a spatial extension along a horizontal plane or the movement of an entity to a new position. The object dual, however, is devised as an upward movement; the image schema of verticality serves as a scale for the evaluation of entities on the basis of the UP-DOWN schema. Furthermore, the grammatical elements exhibit grammatical iconicity: If we compare the sentence structures of the two examples above, there is a tendency from dependency relations, e.g. hypotaxis and connectors, towards parataxis, coordinated subject complements and periphrasis. The location dual is coded in grammatical constructions such as periphrastic constructions, juxtaposition and postpositions that appear to spread over the entire sentence.

The different grammatical construals are also reflected in the argumentation offered by the two Harrisons — Benjamin Harrison is William Harrison's grandson. Whereas both frame their arguments in terms of [relationship] and [morality] — the underlying message being that the American system is capable of adapting to any changing condition while continuing to function effectively — they do so in distinct ways that are evocative of the changed political situation. Indeed, there is a shift in the conceptualization of national unity, departing from the older concept of the body politic, typified by hierarchical dependency relations, to the personification of the nation, resulting from the successful completion of the nation-building process. Benjamin Harrison's address dates from 1889, which is well after the Civil War and occurs at a time when the American national experiment is, for the time being, accomplished and territorial expansion drew to a close with the final land frontier being closed. Benjamin Harrison conceptualizes the nation as a person with certain characteristics (based on the metaphor ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS). Despite the differences in conceptualization national unity is conceived of as moral wholeness (UNITY IS STRENGTH). Yet the unity is

achieved differently. The distinct perspectives manifest themselves in construal of the deictic center. Whereas William H. Harrison externalizes the deictic center in referring to the outside, neutral observer (“To a casual observer”), Benjamin Harrison as the speaker is the deictic center, assessing the political situation from his position. This difference in construal appears to be mirrored in their distinct outlooks on the event of expansionism. While for William Harrison the new states are absorbed into the existing Union, they represent an additional asset in Benjamin Harrison’s view. This reading is entrenched by the [relationship] frame, which, in a similar way to the occasions described above, serves to legitimize the political developments. Once more, the mapping RELATIONSHIP IS PROXIMITY frames the pro-expansionism argument, for example, Benjamin Harrison’s claim that “the people who have settled these Territories are intelligent, enterprising, and patriotic,” insinuating that they are of the same kind as in the remainder of the Nation.

Yet, [relationship] frames reason on territorial expansionism in another way. “By furnishing them [= the new States and Territories] a hardy and independent race of honest and industrious citizens,” president Buchanan hoped to unite the Nation. The ontology of prosperity is first of all established by means of reification, derived from the verb *to prosper* that provides the conceptual content. The verb *to prosper* conveys an inchoative meaning, i.e. a change of state. As with the other reified nouns above, *prosperity* also denotes the result of the process of prospering, which is conceived of as a temporary or permanent state. In this case it is an object with clearly delineated boundaries (ABSTRACT THINGS ARE OBJECTS), which can be caused to move along (“promote”). As in an earlier example, the complex NPs that are related to each other by virtue of an action schema are themselves again embedded in another event schema of the force-dynamic world. This embeddedness gives rise to a chain of events, producing further changes.

(58) We shall thus not only best promote the prosperity of the new States and Territories, by furnishing them a hardy and independent race of honest and industrious citizens, [...] (JBU, 16)

The line of argument followed by Buchanan is best understood against the background of the interdependence of territorial enlargement and the issue of slavery.<sup>248</sup> Whether or not slave-owners or abolitionist majorities were going to people the new territories could decide

<sup>248</sup> By the time of Buchanan’s tenure the issue of slavery was tightly interwoven into expansionist policies. It was at the end of his administration that several pro-slavery southern states formally declared secession from the Union. The division over slavery had been an issue since Polk’s presidency, if not before, which oversaw the largest expansion of U.S. territory (cf. Matuz 2004: 185). Polk’s expansionism was fuelled by the Monroe Doctrine on the one hand, according to which he successfully curbed French and British influence in the western hemisphere, but also by the fulfillment of Manifest Destiny, i.e. the belief that American settlement of the entire continent was a rightful claim, on the other. While intended to unite the increasingly fractured nation, Polk’s expansionist policies were suspiciously regarded by northern, abolitionist states in particular, which feared that the new territories would become expanded areas for slavery. Regarding the issue of slavery, a compromise had been found in terms of the Missouri line, which divided slave states from free states. Many politicians, like Polk himself, took a slightly different stance, arguing that slavery was an issue concerning states’ rights. In view of this political legacy, Buchanan’s campaign slogan had been “save the Union” (cf. Matuz *ibid.*: 239), yet his presidency was characterized by inaction (cf. Riccards 1995a: 205). In his inaugural, Buchanan made his position on slavery clear in arguing that the issue should be settled in the Federal Courts. The Supreme Court ruling, issuing the Kansas-Nebraska Act, allowed prospective states to decide for themselves whether to permit slavery or not (cf. Matuz 2004: 242).

whether these became slave states or free states. Buchanan's administration ends with the secession and the outbreak of the Civil War.

As far as the second aspect is concerned, marked as (Ib) in Table 6 above, the emphasis is placed on distinct stages of an activity rather than its result.

- (59) You will join with me, I trust, in thinking that there are none under the influence of which the proceedings of a new and free government can more auspiciously commence. (GWA I, 2)
- (60) In the early stages of the new Government, [...], it was a common sentiment that the great weight of his [=the first President's] character could alone bind the discordant materials of our Government together and save us from the violence of contending factions. (MVB, 8)
- (61) We have assembled to repeat the public ceremonial, begun by Washington, observed by all my predecessors, and now a time-honored custom, which marks the commencement of a new term of the Presidential office. (RBH, 19)

The invocation of the nation's beginnings as the onset of a 'new political science' is pervasive throughout the corpus of inaugural addresses. The mode in which this occurs, however, attests to the political changes underway at the time of its occurrence and to the essential political functions of the inaugural address as a genre. There are roughly 40 years between the inaugurals and yet they reflect three different approaches to executive leadership and the nation's political activities. Riccards (1995a: xviii-xx) differentiates between six different models of the American presidency. The Federalist model initiated by Washington is typified by a general disregard of public policy positions while being preoccupied with pomp and protocol as a means to safeguard executive leadership. The leadership style comprised powerful assertions of presidential authority. The Jacksonian model of a populist leadership style established direct communication with the people, by-passing both party and Congress in the political communication process. The Whig model applies to the presidency after the Civil War and stands for a series of presidents who expressed their deep national sentiments. Riccards (1995a: xix) pinpoints the major tenets of the Whig model as follows:

The Whig model reemphasized a broad nationalism replete with an agenda of patriotism and internal improvements, a public respect for Congress, a general view of the executive as a chief magistrate who would be zealous against encroachments of his power, but would not engage in great demonstrations of executive leadership.

Washington's words bear testimony to the sense of achievement that must have been inherent in the atmosphere of an absolute beginning, hence a novelty. This may sound paradoxical, and yet his words in (59) capture the spirit of the American jeremiad, particularly its sense of mission towards a higher goal combined with the promise of fulfillment. The absolute construction "there are none ... more auspiciously" is reinforced by representative and commissive speech acts. These are embedded into the sentence's motion schema, according to which the nation's beginnings are understood as an entity that is set in motion (EVENTS ARE ACTIONS, "proceedings"). The construal within the ESM frame is motivated by several of the metaphors mentioned throughout this chapter. First and foremost, the mappings ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION and FREE ACTION IS UNINHIBITED SELF-PROPELLED MOTION

FORWARD appear to be highly influential yet again. The activities described, particularly the mode in which they are to be conducted, are consistent with the meaning construction of *new* and *free*, which denote a specific subtype of government. The deadverbial use of *new* describes the temporal setting of the event as original, unprecedented, which is reinforced by the attribute *free*, insinuating that the would-be government is different from previous governments. The newness of the government is conceptualized as the entity's location on the time axis, which constitutes the source of the trajectory of motion, the source-path-goal schema. The motion schema is specified by another premodifier, *free*, whose construal is motivated by FREE ACTION IS UNINHIBITED SELF-PROPELLED MOTION FORWARD. This conception of the government has important entailments, some of which can also be expressed in terms of conceptual metaphors. As these mappings have been explained on various occasions, I will only list them here without further details. Free action predisposes space to act freely, hence the interdependence of the mapping with FREEDOM IS SPACE TO MOVE. Moreover, the telic understanding of the prospective government's actions ("auspiciously commence") can be argued to derive from the ubiquitous conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY, more precisely however from its specific-level inheritances: A PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A JOURNEY, LONG-TERM PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEYS, and EXPECTED PROGRESS IS A TRAVEL SCHEDULE. The journey metaphor system has had a deep impact on the formation of American political discourse beyond the construal of *new*.<sup>249</sup> For instance, it accounts for the deployment of other vital concepts in American political reasoning as well as for the temporal structure of discourse.

Yet, one important corollary of the conceptualization of the nation's activities as a journey is the construal of political events in terms of the perspectival system, i.e. the representation of events from a retrospective or prospective view. The prospective perspective of the construal in (59) is expectable as the government takes up its responsibilities and begins to conduct its affairs; it proceeds along the line, preferably in forward motion. Washington's conception of the American government and its activities lays the foundation for all future references to the workings of the American system.

Approximately 40 years later, President van Buren makes a reference to this initial period of the nation's history ("in the early stages of the new Government").<sup>250</sup> While the expression "early stages" designates a particular time or state that something reaches, this invariably entails a reference to a more comprehensive process of growth or development. Therefore, the idea of process evokes the organic conception of the entities to which it refers, possibly

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<sup>249</sup> The pervasiveness of the A LIFE IS A JOURNEY mapping need not be discussed in great detail here. It has occupied cognitive linguists ever since it was first proposed by Lakoff/Johnson's (1980) pioneering book. Devised on the generic level as A LIFE IS A JOURNEY, the conceptual metaphor has since been adapted to various contexts. Only recently, however, has the centrality of journey metaphors to political discourse been recognized (e.g. Charteris-Black 2005)

<sup>250</sup> What is interesting from a cognitive perspective, however, is the observation that historical periods of time are conceptually represented as containers or at least as bounded areas in space, for example, "in the early stages" as a temporal interval clearly relates to this idea of containment or boundedness (the underlying metaphor being STATES ARE BOUNDED REGIONS IN SPACE) .

also in the sense of MORAL WHOLENESS (see above). Accordingly, it brings to mind the concept of EXISTENCE, along with the image schemas PROCESS, BOUNDED SPACE or CYCLE. Again the experiential domain of EXISTENCE collocates with the [person] frame, as, for example, ‘in the early stages of a child’s development’. Bearing in mind the pervasiveness of journey metaphors, it is conceivable that the construal of the American nation and its activities is chiefly motivated by the following metaphor interactions or “nested metaphors” (cf. Charteris-Black 2005), grounded in the experience of EXISTENCE. Table 7 provides a survey of the nested metaphors that originate from the pervasive mapping A NATION IS A PERSON, which has the following entailments and set of correspondences:

THE AMERICAN NATION IS A PERSON

The existence of a person is grounded in experiences of PROCESS, CYCLE, or BOUNDED SPACE, hence a person’s life cycle in terms of a journey

AMERICA’S LIFE AS A NATION IS A JOURNEY

The way of life of the American nation is exceptional: America is a nation with a purpose (A PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A JOURNEY) and America is a free nation (FREE ACTION IS UNINHIBITED SELF-PROPELLED MOTION)

THE AMERICAN NATION’S PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A JOURNEY

The American nation is predestined to achieve its purpose and all its actions and activities ultimately serve this purpose

AMERICAN LONG-TERM PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEYS

Table 7

The interaction of person and journey metaphors is straightforward and intuitive. As journeys are undertaken by people, it is hardly surprising that whenever a reference is made to a journey, the government, nation, democracy etc. is conceptualized as a person (see below). The construal of the journey metaphor is also crucial with respect to newness. Since a journey can be subdivided into various components or stages, the accomplishment of each stage introduces another, a new step to follow. In other words, a sequence of events is introduced, which are typically understood in terms of the distance covered between two stopping places on a journey. This conception also has the temporal meaning of duration, which derives from the temporal interval marked off by two stopping places, i.e. they are understood as two temporal boundary events as illustrated by Figure 11 above.

Due to this [sequence] frame, the construal of *new* in (61) is straightforward in meaning ‘next’ or ‘another’. Therefore, the notion of sequence is decisive for the meaning construction of the adjective *new*. If the frame is active, it is understood by virtue of a sequential ordering of discrete events, temporal or otherwise. *New* denotes an entity or location ahead of us and we are moving towards it. The processual character of a journey, reinforced by the notion of sequence, evokes a sense of continuity.

The experience of continuity is central to American political discourse. Bearing in mind that the newly founded nation faced severe tests of action and faith, the continued existence of the American nation was first and foremost a trial of time. Things that endure pass a physical and moral test; they are positively evaluated by time; their construal is induced by the underlying metaphor *TIME IS AN EVALUATOR* (“now a time-honored custom”). Moreover, it was generally believed that the Union, whose continuation was jeopardized by internal conflicts (“the discordant materials of our Government”), would not survive the transfer of power from Washington to another president. This belief and, more importantly, the reassurance of its inaccuracy, is regularly re-enacted by the inaugural ceremonial and address. This episode is deeply entrenched in the cultural memory, which, for example, prompts later presidents such as Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush to refer to it in their inaugurals more than a century later. For this reason and many others, the inaugural address has fulfilled political key functions ever since the nation’s founding.

In (60) above, President van Buren refers to the two terms served by George Washington. In making use of the [relationship] frame mentioned on several occasions throughout this chapter, van Buren draws attention to the monarch-like leadership style of Washington, who during his lifetime had become a national symbol and, as such, was perceived as a guarantee of unity in view of the increasingly fractured nation. Bearing in mind that Washington’s Farewell Address also contains a warning against party-political tendencies — in his time, the Federalists were in much dispute about the division of powers amongst the branches of government and between states and the Federal Government —, the seriousness of the issue goes uncontested.

Interestingly, van Buren’s line of argument is also suggestive of the different leadership style chosen. As mentioned earlier, van Buren’s role of chief executive pertains more to the Jacksonian model and its appeal to the ‘common man’, the people for short. This becomes evident when examining the paragraph ensuing the quotation above:

- (62) The capacity of the people for self-government, and their willingness, from a high sense of duty and without those exhibitions of coercive power so generally employed in other countries, to submit to all needful restraints and exactions of municipal law, have also been favorably exemplified in the history of the American States [...]. (MVB, 9)

The second category identified in Table 6 above consists of intrinsic relations within complex NPs that express part/whole relations. As has been seen, national unity has been one of the major challenges of American politics during the nineteenth century, suspended between the poles of breaking new ground and securing what has been accessed. In the light of this polarity, it is no coincidence that the socio-political cohesiveness of the American nation is frequently understood in terms of moral wholeness. The two examples chosen to illustrate this point construe the issue of part/whole relations from different angles, to the extent that discourse deploys the concept of *NEWNESS* as a preferred and dispreferred concept.

- (63) [...] Most carefully were all these circumstances [= the fact “that various habits, opinions, and institutions peculiar to the various portions of so vast a region were deeply fixed”] weighed, and the foundations of the new Government laid upon principles of reciprocal concession and equitable compromise. (MVB, 4)
- (64) For instance, why may not any portion of a new confederacy a year or two hence arbitrarily secede again, precisely as portions of the present Union now claim to secede from it? (ALI I, 23)

The nation as a functioning entity can be conceptualized in different ways. Apart from the ubiquitous mapping A NATION IS A PERSON, the metaphorical mapping COMPLEX SYSTEMS ARE BUILDINGS is also fairly pervasive. In (63) van Buren highlights the most essential part of a building, the foundations (A GOVERNMENT IS A BUILDING). The caused-motion schema of the passive construction suppresses the agent and places the theme, “the foundations of the new Government,” in a marked position. The image-schematic concepts VERTICALITY and STRAIGHT suggest that buildings can only be erected on solid ground and when the groundwork is prepared so the foundation can be placed in the horizontal position. Crucially, it is also one of the first activities involved in constructing the national edifice.

What is more, the mode in which this undertaking was achieved is represented as “carefully weighed.” The positive evaluation of rational decisions (RATIONAL IS UP) is occasionally expressed in terms of movements. The mapping RATIONAL ACTIONS ARE CONTROLLED MOVEMENTS motivates the construal of van Buren’s argument. Against the background of these conceptual representations, the meaning construction process of *new* builds on temporal categories, i.e. it has a temporal meaning. As van Buren refers to the early beginnings of the nation’s history, the meaning of *new* can be paraphrased as ‘recently implemented’, ‘not previously existing’.

In contrast, the passage quoted from Lincoln’s first inaugural approaches the issue of national unity from a different vantage point. Evidently, his argumentation is likely to be anything but ordinary given that the nation was facing its most dramatic crisis ever since it was first founded. Nonetheless, Lincoln’s line of argument is interesting for a number of reasons. The first difference from van Buren’s reference to the new political institution is that the abstract entity Lincoln is referring to is not conceptualized in terms of a concrete domain such as a building, person or plant, i.e. the standard source domains. Thus the “new confederacy” remains a vague entity; it is merely specified as something larger consisting of several parts. The cohesive forces between these parts are constructed as weak and loose so that the entity is likely to disintegrate any time soon. Again, the sentence is structured by the motion schema, according to which it is anticipated that parts of the Confederate States of America will move away (“secede”). This construal is in sharp contrast to the representations of new states, whose joining the Union is typically conceived of as a movement towards the receiving entity.

Furthermore, the mode of movement involved in the conceptual representation of secession is construed as uncontrolled, which is suggestive of irrational action (“arbitrarily”) as motivated by the mapping IRRATIONAL ACTIONS ARE UNCONTROLLED MOVEMENTS. One significant entailment of this mapping is that the event of secession lacks purpose (“again”). This view is reinforced by the use of the indefinite article (“a new confederacy” as opposed to “the new Government”) and the indefinite pronoun *any*. Yet the motion schema suggests even more consequential entailments: based on the metaphor LACK OF CONTROL OVER CHANGE IS



LACK OF CONTROL OVER MOVEMENT the construal implies not only a capricious movement away from a given entity, but also its likely repetition, adding to the overall sense of unpredictability and uncontrollability. This interpretation is entrenched by the temporal frame of reference (“a year or two hence,” “now”). As reasoning on the age of American political institutions typically involves a value judgment (TIME IS AN EVALUATOR), Lincoln’s claim concerning the short span of time that the new confederacy is going to be intact is undoubtedly negative. As can be derived from the sentence construal, *new* conveys the meaning of ‘young’ and ‘inexperienced’ (BEING NEW IS BEING IN A STATE OF IGNORANCE).

A president’s task involves preserving the Union, and Lincoln left no doubt about his determination to achieve it. His campaigning slogan “A house divided against itself cannot stand” (cf. Matuz 2004: 255) is telling in this respect and underscores his ambitions. Lincoln is trying to construct a view of secession that is likely to have the effect of a worst-case scenario, underlining its incompatibility and conflicting potential for the perseverance of the Nation by highlighting the irrationality of the undertaking as an unstoppable, uncontrollable process. He emphasizes the representation of the confederacy as a loosely affiliated assemblage of individual states as opposed to the Union as a closely knit political structure and hence more stable organization.

Prior to examining the sentential event schemas of twentieth-century inaugurals, I will conclude this discussion by providing a systematic overview of the lexical concepts that are specified by the linguistic category *new*. Table 8 below provides a complete overview of the domains and the concepts through which they are realized. This table is replicated as Table 10 in chapter 6.5 below when comparing the results yielded for nineteenth-century and twentieth-century inaugurals.

Frame	Concepts
Political institutions	Government, Republic, Union, nation, confederacy, order of things [= the Constitution]
Political organization	Keeping, term
Political events	
Actions	Demonstration, duty, instrumentality
Ideas	Inspiration, proof, questions, meaning
Emotions	Confidence, hope
Geo-political space	Territories, communities, states, members [= member states], census

Table 8

### 6.4.2 Twentieth-century Inaugural Addresses

By analogy with the structure of the preceding section the analysis of the construal of *newness* in twentieth-century inaugurals is once more based on the position of the complex NP containing the adjective *new*. The individual aspects discussed will be further subdivided in terms of the sentence schemas that frame the actual construal of events.

Generally speaking, the subject position is typically associated with agency or causation. Departures from this pattern usually construe the sentences in terms of their ‘opposites’, i.e. possession rather than agency, experiencer rather than causes, similarly, states rather than processes. As mentioned earlier, there is a marked increase of occurrences, permitting a more detailed classification and interpretation of the construal of *newness*. As with the nineteenth-century counterparts, the sentences are predominantly in the active declarative mode, with only a few passivizations.

Furthermore, twentieth century examples subdivide more clearly into schematic meanings. Strikingly, there is one domain of experience that is not present in the nineteenth-century examples: the psychological world of experience that is coded in terms of emotion and cognition/perception schemas, which typically assign the roles of theme and cause or theme and experiencer, respectively. The construal thus involves all domains of experience, the material, psychological and force-dynamic world (cf. Radden/Dirven 2007).

The occurrence schema describes changes in the material world, i.e. the world of objects and entities which are not directly subject to the influence of a human agent. As we know, there is a stative and dynamic construal of the occurrence schema, in other words, it may describe states or different types of processes.

(65) One might say that our new relationship in part reflects the triumph of hope and strength over experience. (GBU, 21)

(66) Now, for the third time, a new century is upon us, and another time to choose. (WJC II, 6)

Both examples express a schematic relation between a theme, the NP containing *new*, and a state. The theme is the participant directly affected by an agent or neutrally involved in the situation (cf. Radden/Dirven 2007: 269). The metaphorical setup is as follows: STATES ARE LOCATIONS, ABSTRACT ENTITIES ARE OBJECTS (“relationship,” “century”) and CHANGE IS MOTION, more specifically, A CHANGE OF STATE IS A CHANGE OF LOCATION.

In both cases, the deictic center or perceiving ego is not directly involved in the process of change. This is due to the construal of the sentences in terms of a stationary ego-experiencer. Crucially, the perspective on the present state is retrospective in (65) and prospective in (66). In the former, Bush sen. describes a present state of affairs, “our new relationship,” as a change that has recently occurred, resulting from political events that predate the moment of speaking. The recency of the change is conceptualized as the end point of a movement from A to B (CHANGE IS MOTION). In the event of the location dual of the ESM, change is conceptualized in terms of the movement from an old location to a new location. The focus of attention is directed towards the outcome of this process, i.e. the new location of an entity or object, i.e. the different kind of relationship that has recently been established. Bush alludes to the new relationship with the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War and de-emphasizes the issues of agency in construing the political event as a natural occurrence. Things change and so do political systems. In (65), the linguistic unit *new* is synonymous with ‘different’, in substitution of the old, hence the result of a recently accomplished change. This construal is illustrated by Figure 14 below:




Figure 14: The construal of *recent change*

Interestingly, the occurrence schema also involves the construal of events that are largely understood as not involving human agency but still express a kind of change.

- (67) For a new breeze is blowing, and a world refreshed by freedom seems reborn; for in man's heart, if not in fact, the day of the dictator is over. The totalitarian era is passing, its old ideas blown away like leaves from an ancient, lifeless tree. A new breeze is blowing, and a nation refreshed by freedom stands ready to push on. (GBU, 6)
- (68) Today, as an old order passes, the new world is more free but less stable. (WJC I, 33)
- (69) As this new era approaches, we can already see its broad outlines. (WJC II, 17)

In all three instances the underlined NP including *new* is coded as the sentence's subject and is assigned the participant role of theme. The occurrence schema denotes a state or change of state, similar to a process. These changes also involve causation which is construed on the grounds of temporality. (67) and (69) describe an ongoing process that occurs in the material world. Bush refers to the changed global political landscape resulting from the collapse of communism, i.e. the “new breeze” is the result of a political event itself. This different situation was brought about by an agent-like cause, freedom, which could be personified (FREEDOM IS A PERSON) or understood as a natural force (CAUSES ARE FORCES). Correspondingly, the utterances “a world refreshed by freedom seems reborn” and “a nation refreshed by freedom stands ready to push on” suggest that the “new breeze,” has, at least partially, produced the present situation, which in turn would support the natural force construal. As a result, the entire passage includes several schemas, in which present states, couched in the occurrence schema, are constructed as deriving from preceding actions (freedom as an enabling cause). This way, *new* has a temporal meaning on the one hand, denoting the recently accomplished change resulting in a “new breeze” (see Figure 14 above), while also emphasizing the difference from the old, preceding situation on the other.

Crucially, the construal in (67) is a windowing operation according to which the events underway are represented as happening almost simultaneously. Cases in point are the progressive aspect (“blowing,” “passing”), and the coordinated construction (“and,” “for”)

rather than the subordination by means of the conjunction *as* in the other two examples. This instance of grammatical iconicity is reflected conceptually in the perspectival mode in which the construal occurs. The meaning construction in (67) implies a stationary deictic center which is located at some distance from the events described and thus holds a vantage point, a position from which an overview of a more comprehensive scene is possible. In this way, several events can be described as happening without establishing a clear temporal sequence, and, by extension, a causal link between the various sentential events.

Having said that, there is also a parallel construction that invites analogies between the world and the nation as both have been “refreshed by freedom.” Typically, the world is conceived of as a static entity, as is evidenced by the copular verb construction “seems reborn,” while the American nation is not devised as static for long (compare the pattern of evaluation identified and represented in Table 5 above): “it stands ready to push on.”

In contrast, the two examples taken from Clinton’s inaugurals have a clear temporal and causal sequence, as coded in the subordinate constructions introduced by *as*. The foregoing events, “an old order passes” and “this new era approaches,”<sup>251</sup> are understood as the causes of the present states, coded in the occurrence schema (“the new world is more free but less stable”) and the perception schema (“we can already see its broad outlines”), respectively. Importantly, the NP including *new* is assigned the participant role of theme, yet in (69) it is part of the cause while in (68) it is part of the result. The themes “old order” and “new era” are metaphorically understood as objects in motion (ABSTRACT IDEAS ARE OBJECTS, TIME IS A MOVING OBJECT); neither source nor goal of the movement are highlighted. However, the direction is indicated as the movement towards the speaker (“pass” and “approach”) and beyond the speaker (“pass”). This direction suggests that both construals occur on the basis of the object dual of time. As has been seen on various occasions above, the understanding of political structures and their temporally bounded validity is derived from the conceptual metonymy CONTAINER FOR CONTAINED, provided that time is conceptualized as a container.

In (69) the construal is slightly different. While change is also devised as largely uninfluenced by the static ego-experiencer, change is brought about by time itself. In what constitutes the moving time model, time is understood in terms of the mapping TIMES ARE MOVING OBJECTS, which in this case is the temporal unit ‘century’. The passing of time brings with it new things and experiences and they come into focus with the present (‘now’), which is expressed spatially, with the position of the ‘temporal object’ coinciding with the position of the ego-experiencer (‘us’). In the object dual of time, *new* denotes the next or simply another entity out of a set of similar categories. From this sequential meaning, the meaning ‘fresh’ can

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<sup>251</sup> The coding of these two clauses obviously also involves motion (the verbs ‘to approach’ and ‘to pass’ both imply motion). Thus it could be argued that the motion schema rather than the occurrence schema applies. According to Radden/Dirven (2007: 278), the “motion schema describes a theme’s change along a trajectory from one place at one time to another place at a later time.” More important still, the authors argue that motion is typically understood as bounded, i.e. the entity in motion accomplishes the entire source-path-goal trajectory, for example, in “the bottle rolled down the slope” (ibid.). In the examples taken from the corpus, the case is different as neither source nor goal can be easily invoked. The profiled aspect is that the entity is in motion, foregrounding the process rather than the starting or end point of the movement.

be derived provided that the changed situation is perceived as positive; if not, it is referred to as ‘different’, i.e. as not involving a qualitative difference.

In (69), there is a gradual movement towards the speaker. Conceptually, there is a similar construal to the one above, namely the object dual of time (TIME IS A MOVING OBJECT), which is linked up with the conceptual metaphor NEWNESS IS A SUBEVENT OF MOTION. The approaching era is perceived as new as it is brought into focus for the first time by temporal progression. Spatially, the new is ahead (we face it and see it) and it comes into focus when it is near enough. The mapping TIME IS A CHANGER motivates the meaning construction, as there is no human agent or other cause that accounts for the changes.

Unlike the occurrence schema, the schemas of the force-dynamic world involve human or other agents, both of which are viewed as the cause of a given action. As far as the action schema is concerned, a crucial distinction has to be made between agents and causes. Metaphorically, agents are linked to self-motion via the mapping ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION while non-human agency is understood as involving causes, which are either construed as agent-like or as forces via the mapping CAUSES ARE FORCES; in the latter case they pertain to the caused motion schema. Agency, however, is a matter of degree: human agents are regarded as more prototypical, hence more energetic, sources (of power) which may be used to ‘act on’ another entity. While agents and agent-like causes are typically coded as the subject of a sentence, the schematic meaning of these sentences can be realized in terms of quite distinct schemas. As agency has a huge manipulative potential in political uses of language, this issue merits special consideration. Typical examples that illustrate the pattern are the following:

- (70) New forces and new nations stir and strive across the earth, with power to bring, by their fate, great good or great evil to the free world's future. (DDE II, 12)
- (71) This new world has already enriched the lives of millions of Americans who are able to compete and win in it. (WJC I, 14)
- (72) And each new wave of immigrants gives new targets to old prejudices. (WJC II, 14)

All subject participants are thus agents, agent-like causes or (natural) forces, albeit metaphorically speaking. For example, personified agents such as “new nations” and “new world,” or unspecific forces and natural forces (“new wave”) are themselves embedded in different sentence schemas. In (70) the agent is framed by the spatial schema and the transfer schema (“bring”); the latter also applies to (72) while (71) is coded in the caused motion schema.

In (70) there is an interesting doubling of schemas, which reinforces the overall effect of the construal. The dual encoding of the subject position is reflected in the combination of two motion schemas: caused-motion (“stir”) and self-motion (“strive”). Correspondingly, the likely effects are also doubled, “great good or great evil,” including the impact on the entity coded by the prepositional phrase “to the free world’s future,” which can be understood as a beneficiary in the positive event but also as an experiencer of negative consequences if things do not develop in the way they should. In line with the pattern of evaluation identified above

it may be argued that the self-motion of the “new nations” is understood as conducive to the free world. Moreover, it appears to be the case that unpredictable and uncontrollable causes are constructed in terms of natural or even unspecific forces, combined with uncontrollable movement. These scare tactics are used for friend and foe alike. Rhetorically, this strategy has been referred to as hortatory discourse, invoking an atmosphere of threat and anxiety.

*New* clearly has a temporal meaning, deriving from the adjective’s deadverbial use of *new* as in ‘a newly discovered place’ or ‘newly founded nation’. Thus *new* describes the temporal frame of reference or the reality space in which something happens. However, the expressions “new nation” and the “new world” also metonymically represent the American nation in that any new nation is first and foremost a model of the American new nation and should be modeled on it. Similarly, Clinton’s invocation of a “new world” reflects the attempt to reinvent the American nation at the closing stages of the twentieth century, as is evidenced by the aspirations to make the twenty-first century the ‘American century’ (see chapter 3). It is understood that the entire world has become a bit more like the New World, and the changed political situation on the global level represents another stage accomplished on the journey to the ‘American Century’.

The occurrence of the NP including *new* in the object position holds for the majority of the examples identified in the twentieth-century corpus. Thus the passages analyzed will be further classified in terms of the ‘world of experience’ in which they originate.

In the material world the occurrence schema is the most pervasive event schema, in which changes are largely unaffected by human agency. The sentence subject is the theme but in the particular examples below, the NP including *new* is also assigned the role of theme for reasons to be explored below:

- (73) This policy represents a new departure in the world (JCC, 6)
- (74) Budapest is no longer merely the name of a city; henceforth it is a new and shining symbol of man's yearning to be free. (DDE II, 16)
- (75) This inauguration ceremony marks a new beginning, a new dedication within our Government, and a new spirit among us all. A President may sense and proclaim that new spirit, but only a people can provide it. (JEC, 5)

One vital characteristic of the occurrence schema is the category of the verb involved. Typically, the occurrence schema includes a copular verb construction or another verb whose semantic structure is similar to that of copular verbs. As copular verbs denote a state, the notion of relationship is particularly relevant, for example, the verbs *represent* and *mark* denote such relations. Interestingly, the inclusion of the adjective *new* within the thematized NP has a crucial effect: the construal of a state is understood as a change of state involving motion based on the mapping CHANGE OF STATE IS CHANGE OF LOCATION or CHANGE IS MOTION for short. How exactly is the idea of change supported by the grammatical and lexical skeleton of the sentence?

First and foremost, the construal of change depends on a location and/or temporal frame of reference, which is provided in all instances above. A case in point is the prepositional

phrase “in the world” or, figuratively, “within our Government.” The temporal framework is either provided by a temporal expression, “henceforth,” or is conveyed by the semantics of the verb itself. The verb *to mark* conveys a temporal meaning, which can be understood as follows: “if a particular year, month, or week marks an important event, the event happened on that date during a previous year” (*LDOCE*). While the meaning construction of *new* is supported by the overall schematic meaning of the sentence, including temporal and spatial adjuncts, its actual construal varies from case to case. The ‘change-of-state change’ is also referred to as transitional change, in which an old state is submerged in a new state. This type of change, which involves the [substitution] frame, chiefly holds for (74) because of the copular construction and the temporal framework (“no longer” and “henceforth”), both of which are associated with prototypical changes of states. Thus the new replaces the old, which is invalidated by the introduction of the new state.

In (73) and (75), however, the profiled part of the motion trajectory is the source. Both examples describe the beginning of something, i.e. the transition from a state of motionlessness to being in motion. Once more, the construal is different. While the construal in (73) occurs from a prospective perspective, it is the retrospective angle in (75). This distinct perspectivity has an important impact on the meaning construction of *new*. In the former *new* conveys the meaning of ‘fresh’, ‘innovative’, ‘original’, or even ‘pioneering’, i.e. a new way of doing things. In the latter, the intrinsic retrospectiveness of the situation means that the [sequence] frame is active, since each inaugural address of a series of addresses has constituted “a new beginning, a new dedication.” Thus *new* denotes another component of a series, which also involves a qualitative improvement in the sense of reinvigoration and renewed strength. For all cases the point of access is thus SUCCESSION (see Figure 4 of chapter 4), involving substitution, sequence or difference induced by temporal or spatial movement. The deadverbial use of *new*, representing recategorized properties, describes the manner of action or the reality status of a given event that comes into existence or being.

The second world of experience, the force-dynamic world, has been shown to be of utmost importance to the dynamic construal prevalent in American presidential discourse as it constructs the president as the mover and shaker of the entire political process.

The action schema involves an agent (agent-like cause) participant and a theme. Since this discussion revolves around the NP in object position, the category NEW qualifies an activity in progress or its result. As mentioned earlier, one vital aspect is the construal of the agent participants, another is its relation to the theme. The examples below can be classified according to non-metaphorical agents and metaphorical agents.

With regard to non-metaphorical agency, the issue of agent participants exclusively concerns the in-group, exemplified by the pronouns *we* and *us*, in the sense of group membership being one of the factors of socio-political ideologies. The action schema frames the schematic meaning of the sentences. Crucially, it relates to future actions, more precisely the encouragement to engage in action in the immediate future. This interpretation is entertained by the level of speech acts, notably by the directives “let us reach out” and “let us

create,” but also in (76) where the action is coded in terms of a description but has the communicative purpose of instigating some future action. Its illocutionary force as a directive speech act is unmistakable.

- (76) We are ready to undertake new projects to strengthen the free world. (HST, 31)
- (77) And let each of us reach out for that one precious quality government cannot provide — a new level of respect for the rights and feelings of one another, a new level of respect for the individual human dignity which is the cherished birthright of every American. (RMN II, 36)
- (78) Let us create together a new national spirit of unity and trust. (JEC, 8)

As is evidenced by these examples, the inaugural address is characterized by hortatory discourse, more specifically, its focus on audience response. In this respect, the inaugural’s central function to the political process manifests itself in smoothing the transition from one administration to another, but also in the crucial transition point of the campaigning-governing interface.

The construal of *new* depends partly on the verb and partly on the prospective perspective that underlies the schematic meaning of the sentences. As a result, *new* denotes ‘fresh’, ‘innovative’ or ‘pioneering’, marking a transition from inaction to action, or alternatively, departing from an established or conventional way of doing things in favor of a less habitual one. This idea finds expression in the saying ‘to leave the well-trodden paths’, for example, which implies that people begin to do things differently. The emphasis on departure is mirrored in the verbs *create* and *undertake*, which have an inchoative meaning, or in the particle verb *reach out* that, metaphorically speaking, also denotes a conscious effort to achieve something by virtue of beginning to move. Figuratively, the stationary ego-experiencer begins to act in that he or she grows out of an enduring old state in beginning to set himself or herself in motion (ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION). The fact that action as opposed to inaction is the preferred concept in American presidential discourse was mentioned above.

In the following examples, the purposiveness of activities is foregrounded in that the aim of a given action or activity is specified:

- (79) From the deserts of North Africa to the islands of the South Pacific one third of all mankind has entered upon an historic struggle for a new freedom; freedom from grinding poverty. (DDE II, 12)
- (80) [...], we were able to establish the base for a new and more durable pattern of relationships among the nations of the world. (RMN II, 5)

In both (79) and (80) the action schema applies with (79) focusing on the beginning of an activity, expressed by the verb *to enter upon* whose meaning can be paraphrased as “to start doing something or being involved in it” (*LDOCE*). The location dual of the ESM entails an entity’s movement from one location to a new location. The mappings involved in the construal are

CHANGE IS MOTION

ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION and PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEYS

PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS and MEANS ARE PATHS



The preposition *for* indicates forward motion and/or the direction of the movement. It thus highlights both source and path of the image-schematic trajectory of motion. Similarly, the activity described in (80) produced the result that is a prerequisite of future activities, pointing to the aim of long-term purposes. Therefore, NEWNESS impinges on the direction, and possibly, the goal of the motion involved in political activity.

The second set of examples contains metaphorical agents, some of which belong to the standard repertoire of metaphorical target concepts. For example, the process of personification relates to the concepts democracy, nation and freedom, derived from a mapping process that conceptualizes abstract political terms as people.

- (81) Most vital to our present and our future is this experience of a democracy which successfully survived crisis at home; put away many evil things; built new structures on enduring lines; and, through it all, maintained the fact of its democracy. (FDR III, 11)
- (82) And if a beachhead of cooperation may push back the jungle of suspicion, let both sides [=two great and powerful groups of nations] join in creating a new endeavor, not a new balance of power, but a new world of law, where the strong are just and the weak secure and the peace preserved. (JFK, 19)
- (83) [...] "These were golden years—when the American Revolution was reborn, when freedom gained new life, when America reached for her best." (RWR II, 14)

In (81), the metaphorical agent ‘democracy’ (DEMOCRACY IS A PERSON) is constructed as a very successful and energetic person indeed. The American democracy is personified as a survivor, a heroic person that leads a normal life in spite of many difficulties. This success is measured temporally in terms of duration in that the American democracy has outlived the times of threat and anxiety, which are understood as transient objects. It may also be measured in spatial terms as it has continued to move on in spite of the difficulties experienced; this reading is motivated by the mappings PROGRESS IS FORWARD MOTION and DIFFICULTIES ARE IMPEDIMENTS. There is, of course, a moral dimension to this persistence as morality is typically understood in terms of strength, i.e. MORALITY IS STRENGTH, PERSISTING IS BEING ERECT, both of which are blended by virtue if the mapping BEING MORAL IS BEING UPRIGHT is included. In addition, the American democracy is represented as being able to perform activities without changing itself and without losing its momentum in the process (“maintained the fact of its democracy”). Furthermore, the American democracy is also conceptualized as a person who successfully discards threats and evil — the verb *to put* is framed in the caused-motion schema — and successfully created, if not constructed something; in other words, democracy is also devised as an innovator. In this context, the verb *to build* is synonymous with *to create*. Crucially, the outcome of the activities of the democratic agent, the “new structures,” is represented as durable. In order to block the understanding of *new* in the sense of ‘young’ and ‘inexperienced’, which could be evoked by the temporal meaning of ‘recently built’ due to the deadverbial use of *new*, the lexical framework within the sentence also stresses the aspect of duration. For example, the linguistic expressions “maintain,” “enduring,” “through it all” are indicative of the long-term, sustainable activities as the nation’s actions are described (derived from LONG-TERM, PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEYS). Similarly, the set of nations, the eastern block and the western block, Kennedy is

referring to in (82) is personified and is to engage in concerted activities. Finally, the key political concept freedom is also personified in very much the same way as democracy. The clause “when freedom gained new life” can be interpreted as a renaissance of freedom, a process in which it was reinvigorated and thus given strength – moral and physical. At first glance, it is also possible to conceive of the clause “when freedom gained new life” as a change of state, i.e. it would be classified as the occurrence schema. In line with other personifications of freedom identified in the corpus this interpretation was ruled out as the target concepts freedom and action are frequently mutually invoked in American political cognition. The conceptual metaphors FREE ACTION IS UNINHIBITED SELF-PROPELLED MOTION and FREEDOM IS SPACE TO MOVE are suggestive of such cognitive associations.

What is interesting is the construal of the schematic meaning from the perspectival system. In the two examples with past time reference, past activities are construed as successes. The knowledge about accomplishments achieved in the past, whether or not they actually occurred as such, is re-enacted as the past is regularly constructed from a present viewpoint. Yet FDR derives lessons from the past (TIME IS A TEACHER), which are intended to demonstrate to the American public what they can achieve even in times of crisis. This appeal is part of an affirmative rhetorical strategy in order to boost the morale of the general public. At the same time, this retrospectiveness does not only affect the present, but also has an impact on the immediate future, which is understood as the continuation and extension of present achievements into the future. Importantly, innovations are a characteristic and continuous component of (past) achievements. In this case, *new* means ‘unprecedented’, as the present moment, from which the past is constructed, is a vantage point that permits the ego-experience to overlook several past events due to his or her distance from the events described.

In general times of crisis or reorientation, the participant role of agent can be suppressed, because the agency is clear, unimportant or would imply negative connotations. The following passages are revealing in this respect:

(84) As we explore the reaches of space, let us go to the new worlds together - not as new worlds to be conquered, but as a new adventure to be shared. (RMN I, 57)

(85) There is new ground to be broken, and new action to be taken. (GBU, 6)

Nixon’s argument merits further consideration which is why the preceding paragraphs in his first inaugural address should be presented as well:

(86) We cannot expect to make everyone our friend, but we can try to make no one our enemy. 55 Those who would be our adversaries, we invite to a peaceful competition—not in conquering territory or extending dominion, but in enriching the life of man. 56 (RMN I, 55-56)

The military strategy of ‘divide and rule’ (or conquer), describing the tactical approach of defeating people in making them confront each other instead of opposing you, serves as antithetical model to Nixon’s issues, i.e. the space race, in which the Americans had suffered a series of dramatic defeats, culminating in the Sputnik crisis, which had initiated the space race (COMPETITION IS A RACE). Unlike other international conflicts, the space race was surprisingly ‘unterritorial’, i.e. devoid of territorial imperative in that ownership of the Moon was

disclaimed even after the first successful landings on the Moon: hence Nixon's claim of 'peaceful competition' instead of "conquering territory or extending dominion." Ironically, Nixon's demoting of rivalry in favor of promoting the case of humanity could also be interpreted against the background of US inferiority in that space race up to the Apollo 11 landing that actually occurred after Nixon's inaugural. Rhetorically, this strategy has been referred to as spiritualization, the approach of shifting attention away from controversial topics onto intangible ideals. Frequently, this ploy is the equivalent of constructing a common purpose. Alternatively, a general agreement on ends is constructed in the event of struggles over means. This way, Nixon's appeal to 'teamwork' does not erode the preferred cognitive models in American political cognition. In replacing "new worlds" by "new adventure" the American zeal for exploration, progress and self-determination is still satisfied as the latter evokes territorial imperative as well as the imperialist practice that had begun to dismantle the pioneering spirit even in the early days of the American Republic. The beliefs encapsulated in this biased event model are deeply entrenched in American political cognition. For this reason the phrase "new adventure" resuscitates knowledge of the pioneering character of making new experiences. As far as the schematic meaning of (86) is concerned, Nixon's argumentation invokes the mapping LONG-TERM PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEYS, i.e. he reaffirms that the United States will not have to abandon its plans for the exploration of space nor its ambitions to dominate it in the long run.

In (85) above, agency is suppressed while the themes are in focus. The message is constructed in such a way as to instigate audience response and thus as a direct appeal to engage in action, which is frequently referred to as the coercive strategy of political language use. The generalization of the construal mirrors the political situation after the collapse of communism, a period of political reorientation and repositioning. The construal of *newness* reinforces the general sense of opportunity that Bush evokes, constructing the changed global arena of politics as an opportunity for the US to make and remake the world. As with other instances of this type of processing, (illustrated by Figure 13 above), the prospective perspective from which the situation is represented enhances the understanding that the present is typified by changeability. In general agreement with this pattern the most central mappings are PROGRESS IS MOTION FORWARD and ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION.

In sub-chapter 6.1.2 above, some pervasive patterns of evaluation within the presidential inaugural address were identified. The fact that action rather than inaction is the preferred concept can to be further elaborated by correlating it with the conceptual salience of motion concepts. Yet there are situations in which this correlation is not entirely positive. While pertaining to distinct historical contexts, both the passages below relate to postwar eras, periods that involved a reorientation on the political stage. This occurs from two completely opposite angles in the quotations below:

- (87) We are not without our problems, but our most important problem is not to secure new advantages but to maintain those which we already possess. (JCC, 19)

- (88) Let us resolve that this era we are about to enter will not be what other postwar periods have so often been: a time of retreat and isolation that leads to stagnation at home and invites new danger abroad.  
(RMN II, 3)

In the Republican New Era of the 1920s, Coolidge's administration stood for the continuation of the foreign policies of his predecessor Harding, which, generally speaking, represented a return to isolationism following the traumatizing events of the Great War. Coolidge's appeal for the conservation and fostering of the status quo is schematically represented by the concepts of LOCATION and MOMENTUM. In other words, the negation of "securing new advantages," which would involve moving to a new location, indicates that conventional, well-founded, long-standing policies should be followed.<sup>252</sup> This view is reinforced by an activity that is expressed by the verb *to maintain*, i.e. "to make a level or rate of activity, movements etc. stay the same" (*LDOCE*). Conceptually, this meaning representation concerns the issue of momentum, which is one of the image schemas the experience of (loco) motion is grounded in. Loosely speaking, Coolidge's line of argument implies an adherence to old positions and the preservation of the status quo — despite his emphasis on the idea of novelty throughout his speech.

Conversely, Nixon criticizes this lack of engagement that typifies postwar eras. His critique is articulated in construing two dispreferred strategies at once. Reinforced by two different references to physical space, "at home," designating a place like a "0-dimensional point" (Radden/Dirven 2007: 310), and a locative adverb, "abroad," referring to any other place except 'home'. The time of inaction is metaphorically understood as motionlessness (the opposite of ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION), as is expressed by "stagnation," for example. More drastically, however, the lack of progress may manifest itself in terms not only of immobility, but even of backward movement or moving away from danger ("retreat"). According to Nixon, the event of withdrawal has even more severe consequences ("invites new dangers"), derived from an inability to face potential challenges, which are, according to American political reasoning, best countered when acting oneself. Rhetorically, the hortatory element is once more felt: using the authority of the past (TIME IS AN EVALUATOR, HISTORY IS A TEACHER), Nixon induces an atmosphere of unrest resulting from his urge to alertness.

What is more, the level of involvement of the United States on the world political stage at the time of Nixon's administration cannot be compared to Coolidge's tenure. The United States can no longer afford to stay clear of international engagement, as a result of its foreign policies since WW II.

Strictly speaking, these two passages are not coded as prototypical action schemas. First and foremost, there are several sentence schemas involved in the construal of the meaning of the entire passage, particularly the construction of agency itself. In (88) historical times are constructed as agent-like causes. The complex NP "a time of retreat and isolation" expresses metonymic relations similar to those identified above. The metonymy of time for the socio-political structures prevailing during that period appears to be a twentieth-century

<sup>252</sup> The *LDOCE* defines the verb *to secure* as "to get or achieve something that will be permanent, especially after a lot of effort."

characteristic. Here the temporal object or container, which contains past experiences and actions, produces undesirable effects itself. The static ego-experiencer is faced with “new dangers,” i.e. dangers that are brought about by temporal progression — derived from the moving time model of temporal cognition —, thus processing *new* in the sense of ‘unprecedented’, ‘unknown’.

Another pervasive type of sentence schema is the transfer schema, which also belongs to the force-dynamic world. Recall that the transfer schema involves the participants agent, recipient and theme, which can be realized by virtue of the ditransitive and caused-motion construction. As far as the political functions of language are concerned, the assignment of agent and recipient tends to be instrumentalized to a large extent. The first set of examples to be analyzed is coded in the caused-motion construction in which the transfer frequently involves a beneficiary rather than a neutral recipient:

(89) Our efforts have brought new hope to all mankind. (HST, 29)

(90) To the world, too, we offer new engagement and a renewed vow: We will stay strong to protect the peace. (GBU, 20)

The pattern of agents and recipients involved in the transfer is representative of presidential discourse on a larger scale. The agents or agent-like causes identified (“we [Americans],” “our efforts,” or the implicated *we*) all refer to the in-group, i.e. they are used as a means of positive self-presentation. In a complementary way, the beneficiaries of American political action are to be found on a global stage, for example, “to all mankind,” “to the world.” The bias of the agent-recipient pattern is increased when taking into account the examples coded in the ditransitive construction:

(91) We have given freedom new reach, and we have begun to make its promise real for black as well as for white. (RMN I, 14)

(92) We will confront weapons of mass destruction, so that a new century is spared new horrors. (GWB I, 26)

In both examples the issue of agency lies with the pronoun *we*, which is either explicitly coded as the subject participant or is suppressed in the passive construction in which case it can be easily inferred. The two ditransitive constructions represent different approaches to the issue of transfer. The themes of the transfer, “new horrors” and “new reach” are placed on opposite ends of the scale of evaluation. Interestingly, the positive one results from successful US agency; crucially, the avoidance of negative consequences on a global level also occurs by virtue of US political action in confronting weapons of mass destruction, as is implicated. The purposiveness implied in Bush’s argument (“so that”) is derived from the central metaphor PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEYS and its metaphorical entailments on the specific level of American political activities (see above). As to the recipients of the transfer, both are abstract concepts, freedom and century, both could be argued to involve personification.

The examples illustrate the impact of temporality on the construal of *newness*. A case in point is the use of tenses in the passages above. The present perfect underlines both the recency of the situation and the effect of actions, situations that began in the past and extend

into the present. The pervasive use of the present perfect is indicative of the emphasis on accomplishment. In a broader context, this emphasis reflects the lasting success of American exceptionalism — recall the two strands of development identified by Schlesinger (1986) as tradition (America as experiment) and counter-tradition (America as destiny) — as a sign to the world to this day.

The verb *to bring* denotes the metaphorical transfer of an object (emotions are objects/containers) towards the speaker. As in other instances of beneficial transfer, the recipient, hence beneficiary, profits from the transfer in that he or she is reinvigorated by receiving fresh attributes, adding to the ones he or she already possesses. *Newness* thus denotes a qualitative change. In (92), the meaning construction process is realized from a prospective angle, implying that *new* conveys the meaning of ‘next’ or ‘another one of a series of related elements’ (here “century”). In other instances of this construal (Figure 13) the deadverbial use of ‘new’ prevails, in which case the adjective *new* recategorizes an activity as one which has not been performed in this particular way before; in other words, it specifies the manner or mode in which something is done, highlighting the attributes of novel or pioneering.

The ditransitive constructions in (91) and (92) above describe a particular type of beneficial transfer in that the beneficiary is strongly affected by the agent’s actions. The beneficiaries of the metaphorical transfer are both personified, freedom and century, yet the actual construal is distinct. As the construal of (92) is highly recurrent and has been discussed earlier, (91) will be given special attention. Figure 15 below depicts the construal of beneficial transfer as change in the sense of growth or development:




Figure 15: The construal of *new* denoting ‘growth’ or ‘development’

Unlike other conceptualizations of change, the understanding of change as (beneficial) transfer does not necessarily involve the image-schematic motivation of MOTION; rather it is the image schema SPACE that is salient. The improved change of state induced by the actions of an agent or agent-like cause consists of the enlargement of the space the entity in focus is given. As in

the figures above, the entity in focus is represented by the black circle while the defocused entity is merely outlined. The processing of “new reach” is grounded in the extension of space. The concomitant factors of spatial extension are an increase of power or import on the more general level and the growth of freedom on the more specific level. The metaphorical correspondences would be EXISTENCE on the one hand and the mapping FREEDOM IS SPACE TO MOVE on the other. As the latter is fairly straightforward and almost ideally depicted by Figure 15 above, I will focus on the entailments of the former. The image-schematic concepts EXISTENCE and SPACE are tightly interwoven in that conceptual salience is given to entities that occupy a considerable portion of space. The correspondence between space and power implies that an extension of the space allotted to an entity is the equivalent of an extension of power; the mapping would be EXTENSION OF A SPACE IS EXTENSION OF POWER. Evidently, this connection is underlying the rationale of colonial territorialism for the reasons explained in the context of earlier instances of territorial enlargement.

The conception of developmental change or growth is also consequential for the processing of the *new* which is then understood to mean ‘additional’ or ‘extra’. In terms of evaluation this construal is the horizontal equivalent of UP IS GOOD, which, correspondingly, could be formulated as SPACIOUS IS GOOD. As a result, *newness* can not only be understood as a subevent of motion but also in terms of an extension of space, which, however, also involves the extension of the space to move. Moreover, it is not invariably upward motion that is cognitively associated with improvement nor forward motion with progress. As illustrated above, a given situation can be comprehended as a qualitative change in the sense of growth if the conceptual space available is enlarged, which includes all and any directions of movement.

The following example has mixed characteristics and serves to mark the transition from the force-dynamic world to the psychological world, which is realized by the emotion schema or cognition/perception schema. The transfer schema is included in the sub-clause, which in turn is embedded in the cognition schema (“we believe”) of the main clause. Furthermore, the actual transfer becomes perhaps more evident if one paraphrases the verb *strengthen* as to ‘give strength to’.

- (93) We believe that the United Nations will be strengthened by the new nations which are being formed in lands now advancing toward self-government under democratic principles. (HST, 33)

Once more, the “new nations” are not only characterized by their newness, i.e. that fact that they will be founded in the very near future, in which case the construal depicted by Figure 13 above applies, but also by freedom (“advancing toward self-government”) and democracy, i.e. they are new in the sense of the newness of the American nation.

In line with this interpretation the qualitative improvement, the strengthening of the United Nations, would also be conveyed by the notion of addition. This reading is based on the assumption that more of the same, a larger amount of new and free democratic nations is likely to add muscle to the body of the UNO. While this conjecture is, undoubtedly, accurate, there is also a less obsequious reading: the US could benefit from the accession of nations instilling their values into an organization such as the UNO.

Let us now turn to a domain of experience that was not present in the nineteenth-century examples. According to Radden/Dirven (2007: 281) “[s]ituations that belong to the psychological world describe experiences people have or are subjected to. These experiences include emotions, perceptions and thoughts.” There are two schemas that prevail in situations or events pertaining to the psychological world. The perception/cognition schema involves the participant roles of experiencer and theme while the emotion schema assigns the roles of experiencer and cause. One of the differences between the emotion and perception/cognition schemas is the degree of control on behalf of the experiencer on the one hand, and the intensity of the external stimulus on the other. In the emotion schema, a low degree of control coincides with an intense external stimulus, the cause, whereas the perception/cognition schema implies a low-intensity external stimulus with the experiencer typically exercising a medium to high degree of control.

The construal of the perception/cognition schema typically involves a stationary ego which focuses on the events in a kind of windowing operation.

- (94) New things are often found hard to do. (WMK II, 7)
- (95) The feelings with which we face this new age of right and opportunity sweep across our heartstrings like some air out of God's own presence, where justice and mercy are reconciled and the judge and the brother are one. (TWW I, 10)
- (96) We recognize the new order in the world, with the closer contacts which progress has wrought. (WGH, 4)
- (97) Each of us must find a way to advance the purpose of the Nation, thus finding new purpose for ourselves. (LBJ, 19)
- (98) But let us clearly understand the new nature of America's role, as a result of the new policies we have adopted over these past four years. (RMN II, 10)

With the exception of (94), the role of experiencer is assigned to *we* and its variant forms, which points to the self-referentiality within America presidential discourse to a similar extent to what has been observed with respect to the assignment of participant roles such as agent or beneficiary, which exhibits a clear in-group vs. out-group pattern. In the light of this focus on self-presentation, it is remarkable that the experiencer is suppressed when difficulties arise, as is the case in the quotation from McKinley's first inaugural (WMK II, 7).

This role assignment is indicative of an emphasis on self-presentation, particularly in reinforcing the positive attributes of the in-group. The amplification also occurs on the syntactic level in the shape of comparative constructions, analogies and concessions.

The temporal frame is clearly the present tense, which is in agreement with the coordinates of the perspectival system. As a result of the static construal, the ego is stationary and thus literally up-to-date with the events; the location of the ego coincides with the beginning of the temporal boundary events, except for (100), where the position of the ego-experiencer coincides with the end point of boundary events owing to the use of the present perfect.

This temporal frame also accounts for the meaning construction of *new*. Depending on the viewpoint of the stationary ego, the angle from which events are perceived is prospective, a fact that is mirrored in the linguistic expressions (“find,” “face,” “are found hard to do,” “let



us”). Conceptually, this construal again corresponds to the model represented in Figure 13 above.

With regard to the themes which are represented by the NPs containing the premodifier *new*, it is useful to differentiate between the awareness of future action and the acknowledgement of a present state. The meaning of *new* can be retrieved from the overall construal. In the event of future action, the present moment is a momentary pause in which action is provisionally suspended. In (94) and (97) *new* denotes not only the onset of motion, hence the initiation of action (ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION), but also the mode of movement involved (MEANS ARE PATHS), which is to be different from what you have done before, possibly because you are acting in a different way. Conversely, the static construal of (95) and (96) does not indicate whether or not there is an intent to do something about the present state that is being contemplated.

However, the states described differ conceptually, motivated by the verb semantics. In (95) the ego-experiencer is facing the future, thus adopting a prospective perspective, and thus being able to experience the deep impact of the change in atmosphere described by Wilson. The moving time model, derived from the mapping TIMES ARE MOVING OBJECTS, involves movement towards the static ego-experiencer (“face”) and presumably beyond him/her into the past. In (96), however, the event is construed as retrospection as the perceiving ego relates to a situation (“new order”) that has recently emerged, which is coded in the caused-motion construction (“the closer contacts progress has wrought”) and is motivated by the mapping NEWNESS IS A SUBEVENT OF MOTION, whether or not it is a case of self-motion or otherwise. The situation of recent change is depicted in Figure 14 above. The retrospective angle in terms of which the meaning of *new* is processed is also supported by the meaning construction of the verb *to re-cognize*. The NSOED defines *re-cognize* as “cognize again” or as “identify as previously known or perceived; know again, esp. by recollection of some distinctive feature.”

The situation depicted in (98), is also construed from a retrospective angle, the difference being that the concept of NEWNESS impinges on several aspects of the event schema. More precisely, the complex NP featuring *new* is embedded in two different event schemas, the cognition schema (“clearly understand”) and the action schema (“adopted new policies”). Thus “the new nature of America’s role” is a product of the change initiated by a fresh political approach. The meaning of *new* in “new nature” relates to the recently changed character of America’s role in the world, at least this is Nixon’s representation of it in the aftermath of the Vietnam War.

Examples (99) and (100) below represent a specific construal of the cognition schema, which also includes the awareness of somebody else’s position. The passage taken from FDR’s second inaugural address illustrates how two senses of the adjective *new* can be processed as quasi-antonyms. The linguistic category *new* in “wholly new truth” relates to the reality status of the phrase, alluding to its originality or firstness; in contrast, *new* in “a new chapter” makes use of the point of access SUCCESSION, designating the next of a series of entities. It constitutes

a prime example of how two distinct temporal senses of *new* can be used antithetically. The coding of the verb phrase in the past progressive enhances the notion of an unbounded experience and hence the idea of sequence. From this construal, the ongoing activity or process, the continuity of the American experiment and democracy, is in focus rather than a particular end point, the goal of an activity. When the process rather than the accomplishment of a political action is emphasized, the underlying mapping PROGRESS IS MOTION FORWARD would intuitively be assumed to motivate the meaning construction. However, whenever PROCESS in general terms is the salient concept deployed by discourse, the reasoning appears to be conceptualized in terms of the journey metaphor, which offers various strategic advantages. First and foremost, a journey subdivides into stages whose completion can be constructed as significant. Second, from the different angle of conceiving a journey as a comprehensive whole, the activities of the present can be represented as being meaningful to future purposes, thus giving direction to political activities that might otherwise be regarded as pointless from the present perspective.

- (99) In this [=the truth that democratic government has innate capacity to protect its people against disasters once considered inevitable] we Americans were discovering no wholly new truth; we were writing a new chapter in our book of self-government. (FDR II, 4)
- (100) In throwing wide the horizons of space, we have discovered new horizons on earth. (RMN I, 5)

Instead of toying with two different, even opposing senses of *new*, Nixon (RMN I, 5) makes use of parallel constructions in order to invite analogies between the situations described in the main clause and the sub-clause. It appears to be a popular rhetorical move to establish analogies or even causal links between two largely incongruous events or situations. The phrase “new horizons” can be interpreted as a general improvement of political relations, similar to the construal of *growth* depicted by Figure 15 above. As mentioned earlier, an unspecific kind of growth or development is frequently conceptualized in terms of spatial extension.

The discussion of a final set of examples illustrates another aspect of the perception/cognition schema, also involving an experiencer and a theme. The schematic meaning of the sentences hinges on the construal of *need* on the one hand and the schematic categories of the perspectival system on the other. The meaning construction of *need* involves at least two types of processing. There is a strong cognitive component in that a given situation is assessed, resulting in the insight that action to change or redress the status quo is required. However, the necessity may not be the result of thought and reflection but may be acutely felt at a given point in time. In either case the essential message consists in communicating the want or deficiency perceived, combined with the encouragement to redress the ills experienced.

The construal by virtue of the perspectival system occurs from a prospective angle in which the moment of speaking and the location of the ego-experiencer coincide. After all, the speakers make use of the inclusive *we*, reinforcing the necessity to act on all levels of the ‘body politic’. Both speakers amplify the need for change, which is coded as developmental, i.e. it

represents a qualitative improvement of what is already there without substituting it for something radically different. The point of access used for the meaning construction is thus SUCCESSION.

- (101) We need a new engagement, too, between the Executive and the Congress. (GBU, 17)
- (102) We need a new government for a new century—humble enough not to try to solve all our problems for us, but strong enough to give us the tools to solve our problems for ourselves; [...] (WJC II, 10)
- (103) And we need a new sense of responsibility for a new century. (WJC II, 11)

This interpretation is not only supported by the lexical elements in the sentences but also by the pragmatic level. Whereas the requirements are all expressed in an assertive way, underlining the truthfulness of the claims, the speech acts also have a directive component in that their perlocutionary force conveys the idea of future action that is greatly encouraged.

In what follows, the analysis revolves around the emotion schema rather than the cognition schema. “The emotion schema describes the emotional state or process which a sentient human experiences” (Radden/Dirven 2007: 282). The examples taken from the corpus do not describe primary emotion concepts but so-called secondary emotions: secondary emotions, i.e. feelings attached to objects [e.g., to dental drills], events, and situations through learning, require additional input, which is largely based on the re-enactment of percept or previous experiences in the memory. Secondary emotions, in Damasio’s (2004: 134) definition, “occur once we begin experiencing feelings and forming systematic connections between categories of objects and situations, on the one hand, and primary emotions, on the other.” Thus thoughts and emotions are thought to be tightly interwoven in that every thought almost invariably carries with it some emotional undertone, however subtle. This side-effect of categorization and recategorization is frequently made use of in political discourse.

The emotion schema typically dispenses the participants experiencer and cause, and in this context, it is predominantly the participant of cause that is of interest. Again the situation described involves a prospective perspective, construing the meaning of *new* as ‘different’ as well as ‘improved’:

- (104) Within the lifetime of most people now living, mankind will celebrate that great new year which comes only once in a thousand years—the beginning of the third millennium. (RMN I, 7)
- (105) Our greatest responsibility is to embrace a new spirit of community for a new century. (WJC II, 12)
- (106) Today, we affirm a new commitment to live out our nation’s promise through civility, courage, compassion and character. (GWB I, 16)

Evidently, all the verbs concerned denote an activity, yet in all cases the manner in which this is performed is equally important and forms an integral part in the meaning representation. For example, the activity of embracing is usually done eagerly, readily, lovingly or in a friendly manner; similarly, the verbs *celebrate* and *affirm* imply speciality and occasionality.

The causes are either idealistic as well as societal/communal — “new spirit of community” and “new commitment” — or have a temporal reference, “that great new year.” The aim of the re-enactment of the covenant, which has been argued to be an important function of the

inaugural address (see chapter 5), is to strengthen the socio-political ties. The reference to the ‘new millennium’ merits special notice in this respect, resulting from the millennial legacy of the American jeremiad introduced in chapter 3 above. Against the background of the sense of mission inspired by the jeremiad, it is no coincidence that the experiencers of these acts of affirmation are both the American in-group and all of mankind. Importantly, the emotionality of the event is not only conveyed by the verb semantics and the event schema but is also encoded in the discourse event itself. After all, one of the American inaugural address’s major functions consists in publicly re-enacting the ‘national creed’, the American public philosophy. Thus the genre as well as the situative context of publicness also account for the emotional undertow.

As in the nineteenth-century inaugurals, a substantial portion of the occurrences of the category *new* in twentieth-century inaugurals has been identified in complex NPs, in which two NPs are related by the preposition *of*. Table 9 provides a summary overview of all the relations that could be identified:

(I)	a)	<b>Activities (resultative)</b>	a result of the new policies, the productive work of this new beginning, a strange mingling of regret and new hope
	b)	<b>Activities (processual)</b>	the pre-eminent mission of our new government
(II)		<b>Part/whole</b>	the threshold of the new administration, the edge of a new era, the edge of a new century, the edge of a bright new prospect in human affairs, the dawn of a new age of progress for America
(III)		<b>Relational</b>	a summary outline of the main policies of the new administration, the story of a new world
(IV)		<b>Definitional</b>	four years of new experience, on this day of a new beginning, a land of new promise (several times), challenges/opportunities of this new world

Table 9

As in the study of nineteenth-century inaugurals, the analysis of the construal of *new* as part of a complex NP will be structured on the basis of the intrinsic relations that hold between the two NPs related by the preposition *of*. This type of intrinsic relation is determined by the head noun of the superordinate NP; the adjective *new* functions as a premodifier in a subordinate NP.<sup>253</sup> In cognitive grammar, the types of relations between the two NPs are assumed to derive from a conceptual link, possibly metonymic, between the two entities. Evidently, the construal of *new* in complex NPs within twentieth-century inaugurals is more varied and distinct than in the nineteenth-century counterparts. Primarily, there are a number of intrinsic relations not present in the nineteenth century such as relational or identificational relations.

<sup>253</sup> This choice of traditional terminology serves to illustrate the dependency structure that is thought to exist between NPs and their postmodifications, as can be represented by a tree graph.

The first type (I a) of intrinsic relations is expressed by virtue of reified nouns, all of which denote action and/or their results.

- (107) But let us clearly understand the new nature of America's role, as a result of the new policies we have adopted over these past four years. (RMN II, 10)

The construction “as a result of,” containing the reified noun *result*, can be paraphrased as ‘resulting from’. The complex NP is framed by the action schema, which however profiles only some aspects of the action domain. More precisely, Nixon’s argument is intended to drive home the point that a changed political focus (“new policies”) has already produced first results (“new nature of America’s role”). This is motivated by the conceptual metonymy RESULT FOR ACTION which was introduced in the discussion of the nineteenth-century examples above. Strategically, the conceptual contiguity can be used in order to entrench the view that political actions not only produce immediate results but that these results have a deep impact on the political environment to the extent that it is profoundly changed. In the process, *newness* impinges on the initiation of political action — further evidenced by the inchoative meaning of the verb *adopt* — as well as on the goal of this particular activity.<sup>254</sup> As far as the trajectory of motion is concerned, in the source-path-goal schema, the notion of *new* in the sense of ‘different from before’ specifies the path, i.e. the manner in which a political action is performed. This interpretation is motivated by the conceptual metaphor MEANS ARE PATHS of the ESM. The overall construal of the ESM occurs in terms of the location dual, primarily by virtue of the CHANGE IS MOTION mapping, which itself derives from the ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION mapping.

An important subtype (I b) of the ‘activity group’ includes intrinsic relations within the NP that also specify the processual character of activities. For example,

- (108) The preeminent mission of our new government is to give all Americans an opportunity—not a guarantee, but a real opportunity—to build better lives. (WJC II, 10)

The sentence construal occurs in terms of the transfer schema, which is realized by the ditransitive construction. The focus is on the recipient (“all Americans”), while the linguistic expression “opportunity” is the object of the metaphorical transfer. In fact, the intrinsic relations of the complex NP in subject position, here a theme, are indicative of the transfer schema in that the term mission intrinsically requires other participants. By definition, a mission is a task or service that has been given to someone.<sup>255</sup> Crucially, the “preeminent mission” relates to a future commitment, realized by a commissive speech act. Thus, the parts of the activity of the recently instituted government that are highlighted are the direction and the goal. The temporal meaning of *new*, denoting the recency of government institution, is

<sup>254</sup> The *LDOCE* defines the meaning of the verb *to adopt* as “to start to deal with or think about something in a particular way.”

<sup>255</sup> The *NSOED* defines *mission* as “an act or instance of sending someone or something, or an instance of being sent, esp. to perform some function or service.” Furthermore, the term mission may also designate “the purpose for which such a body is sent or established; the commission with which a messenger, envoy, or agent is entrusted, esp. the errand on which a political mission is sent.”

consistent with the focus on prospective actions and targets. Furthermore, this construal foregrounds the present moment as an opportune moment for change.

Embedding the “new government” into event schemas that are couched in the force-dynamic world themselves, such as the action or transfer schema, was also valid in the nineteenth-century context. Yet, the findings listed in Table 9 demonstrate that in the construal of complex NPs the coding of political events in the force-dynamic world is generally on the decline in favor of intrinsic relations that draw on other conceptual links.

The second category consists of part/whole relations which are indicative of the enhanced significance of time and temporality for political action.

- (109) As we meet here today, we stand on the threshold of a new era of peace in the world. (RMN II, 2)
- (110) From this day forward, let each of us make a solemn commitment in his own heart: to bear his responsibility, to do his part, to live his ideals—so that together, we can see the dawn of a new age of progress for America, [...]. (RMN II, 35)
- (111) It is our great good fortune that time and chance have put us not only at the edge of a new century, in a new millennium, but on the edge of a bright new prospect in human affairs—a moment that will define our course, [...]. (WJC II, 1)

In all three instances the object dual of the ESM prevails, i.e. there is a static ego-experiencer. However, the construal suggests that this stand-still is merely a passing experience as the immediate future that is about to begin is perceived as eventful. This general sense of departure derives from the intrinsic part-whole relations that hold. For example, the notion “dawn” intrinsically relates to another entity, designating the beginning of a day. Although the terms “threshold,” “dawn,” and “edge” convey the meaning of beginning, the actual construals of the three examples are distinct. This is due to the spatial schemas that frame the events represented. In (109) and (111) the preposition *on* implies that the ego-experiencer is in position in which he or she touches a surface he or she is about to move along, which is image-schematically grounded in CONTACT. In (111) the idea of beginning is amplified by a quasi-repetition of the prepositional phrase, except for a change of preposition. The prepositional phrase “at the edge of a new century” adds precision to the location of the ego-experiencer. In (110) however, the construal is different in that the occurrence schema of the material world does not apply. Here it is the perception/cognition schema that frames the sentential event schema. The ego-experiencer is assigned the role of experiencer, while the complex NP containing the adjective *new* is specified as the theme of a situation.

The salience of time and temporality in the construal of scenes can be further elaborated, however. The spatialization of time is expressed by virtue of the prevalence of the spatial schema and the fact that the prepositions have a spatial and temporal meaning (TIME AS SPACE). The spatiality of time also means that time is understood as a three-dimensional entity, at least from the ego-based cognitive model of time (see chapter 4). Irrespective of the actual construal of the time dual — the issue of whether time or the ego-experiencer is in motion — the conceptualization invariably involves a conceptual space with clearly outlined boundaries. Thus in all cases time is understood as an object or at least, an area that the ego can move

through. Curiously, in retrospect time is more likely to be a container, which is filled with the actions and experiences resulting from the ego-experiencer's motion through the timescape.

Moreover, the prospective construal of the situations in (109-111) is echoed on the pragmatic level in terms of commissives (“let us”) on the one hand and the meaning representation of *new* on the other. The latter is further supported by the grammatical construal of the sentence in the *will*-future, which assigns the meaning of ‘next’, ‘another’ or ‘different’ depending on the points of access employed. In other words, whether or not the meaning representation of change is mapped as a complete break with the past or simply as an improvement of the status quo achieved by ‘moving on’ depends on both the lexical and the grammatical elements of the sentence. In all cases the notion of [sequence] frames the construal of the situation as it is metonymically linked to TIME IS A CHANGER (“time and chance have put us not only at the edge of a new century [...]”), which itself is embedded in a caused-motion schema. The emphasis on the present point in time can also be interpreted as ‘kairos’, a term that refers to the rhetorical strategy of constructing the present moment as an opportunity for change, hence the switch from inaction to action in the contexts of the quotations above. The emphasis on inception is evidently genre-specific, in that the inaugural address implies a caesura, hence its function of glossing over the changes in parts of the system while emphasizing the continuity of the system in its entirety.

Intrinsic relations themselves can also be based on relational nouns. This third type of intrinsic relations that have been identified for the construal of *newness* has not been encountered in nineteenth-century inaugurals.

- (112) The office of an inaugural address is to give a summary outline of the main policies of the new administration, so far as they can be anticipated. (WHT, 2)
- (113) It is the story of a new world that became a friend and liberator of the old, [...], the story of a power that went into the world to protect but not possess, to defend but not to conquer. (GWB I, 5)

Basically, this type of intrinsic relation depends on a NP containing a relational noun as its head. For example, both “summary outline” and “story” intrinsically relate to another entity, i.e. summary relates to ideas or facts while story relates to events or people. Remarkably, Truman's argument is typified by wordiness since summary, outline, main policies all imply that the central ideas rather than the details are expressed. Furthermore, both instances are framed by the occurrence schema, which assigns the participant role of theme plus a state or process. In (112) and (113) the occurrence schema designates a state, which underlines the construal of intrinsic relations, as they appear to be even more stable. On the speech act level this is expressed by virtue of representatives, i.e. there is an inherent claim to accuracy and authenticity. The person frame of story interacts with the conceptualization of the new world as a person while “policies” opens an action frame, implying the actions of the newly instituted administration.

The fourth group consists of intrinsic relations that not only specify relations within an NP but also express a certain reality status in defining an entity in terms of another. The link

between them represents an equation which is why Radden/Dirven (2007: 159) term it “identifying relation,” i.e. A is B and possibly, B is A. In this present study, these relations are referred to as definitional. This group subdivides into two subtypes, one of which specifies the relations in term of geographical categories, denoting the physical environment, while the other does so in terms of temporal categories. Conceptually, these are blended due to the spatialization of time.

- (114) While America rebuilds at home, we will not shrink from the challenges, nor fail to seize the opportunities, of this new world. (WJC I, 34)
- (115) Guided by the ancient vision of a promised land, let us set our sights upon a land of new promise. (WJC II, 1)
- (116) Our land of new promise will be a nation that meets its obligations—a nation that balances its budget, but never loses the balance of its values. (WJC II, 24)
- (117) And in this land of new promise, we will have reformed our politics so that the voice of the people will always speak louder than the din of narrow interests—regaining the participation and deserving the trust of all Americans. (WJC II, 25)

The definitional relations can be diagrammatically represented as follows. Both NPs mutually specify and characterize one another:

opportunity and challenge = new world

land = new promise

The “land of new promise” is a major theme throughout Clinton’s second inaugural, toying with the cultural construct ‘Promised Land’. Remodeling the most significant theme of the American jeremiad implies a reinvention of the American nation. Clearly, Clinton attempts to reconstruct or even reinvent the nation in setting new targets for the political mission. Clinton addresses the following issues, each of which implies social and political criticism; accordingly, the land of new promise

“will be a nation that meets its obligations,” which implies that it did not do that before,

“a nation that balances its budget,” which implies that current economics do not, and in that land of new promise

“we will have reformed our politics so that the voice of the people will always speak louder than the din of narrow interests,” which implies: this has not always been the case before

Here the legacy of the rhetorical structure of the jeremiad comes into play. While being affirmative in general terms, Clinton also shuns political ills, which is part of the hortatory style of the political homily. The distribution of sentence schemas is also noteworthy. While the occurrence schema frames the meaning construction in (114) and (117) — in each case the subject participant is the theme that undergoes a process in the sense of a change of state —, it is the perception/cognition schema (“set sights on”) that is valid in (115). Generally speaking, it is phases of political reorientation that are conceptualized in terms of spatial orientation, which relies on positionality and vision and thus occurs from a prospective perspective.



The prepositional *of*-phrase is not the only syntactic construction in which the adjective *new* is pervasive in twentieth-century inaugurals. There are a number of prepositional phrases that were not encountered in nineteenth-century inaugurals — recall that the only nineteenth-century occurrence was a prepositional phrase with the preposition *under* —, such as the directional prepositions *to* and *from*, the spatial preposition *in* or the instrumental prepositions *by* and *with*.

The prepositions *to* and *from* are typically part of motion or transfer schemas, depending on the verb type involved in the construal of sentences. This means that the experience of motion is central to the construals, particularly with respect to the source-path-goal schema. As can be expected, it is primarily the goal that is realized by the *to*-phrase. The actual movement can either be part of the subject NP or part of the verb phrase. Interestingly, it is invariably the American nation, the American people or both that are in progress.

- (118) The transfer of American control to the new government is of such great importance, [...], that I am glad to be advised by the recent act of Congress of the policy which the legislative branch of the Government deems essential to the best interests of Cuba and the United States. (WMK II, 10)
- (119) When last we gathered, our march to this new future seemed less certain than it does today. (WJC II, 6)

The nouns *transfer* and *march* both convey the meaning of motion. While the transfer schema involves the relocation of “American control,” which is conceptualized as a moveable, hence transferable object, the recipient of the transaction is the “new government.” As with all concepts of political institutions, *new* refers to the recency of this particular government but also, in the context of (118) above, involves the substitution of the ‘old’ government.

In other cases, however, the prepositional *to*-phrase may be a compulsory part of the verb phrase in terms of complementation. All the examples below belong to the force-dynamic world, chiefly coding the pronoun *we* in subject position. Some examples can be grouped into the caused-motion schema, for example, (120), (122) and (123), while others are coded as self-motion such as (121) and (124). Either the American nation is construed as moving itself into a superior or improved position (“a new realization ... and a new appraisal” or “the new worlds”), the location dual of the ESM, or external events have caused the American nation to move to a better position — “a new unity,” “an entirely new line of action” or “new influence and “new responsibilities.”

- (120) We are being forged into a new unity amidst the fires that now blaze throughout the world. (TWW II, 12)
- (121) We have come to a new realization of our place in the world and a new appraisal of our Nation by the world. (WGH, 7)
- (122) It is a thought, an ideal, which has led to an entirely new line of action. (JCC, 6)
- (123) Events have brought our American democracy to new influence and new responsibilities. (HST, 68)
- (124) As we explore the reaches of space, let us go to the new worlds together — [...].(RMN I, 57)

In the metaphorical movement, based on the mapping CHANGE OF STATE IS CHANGE OF LOCATION, the new is implied in the event of change itself motivated by the mapping

NEWNESS IS A SUBEVENT OF MOTION. Conceptually, the preposition *to* denotes the direction of the movement but also its purpose (PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS). The activities described in the examples above, can be argued to be telic, hence goal-oriented. As agency lies with the American nation or the transfer of an entity to a meaningful goal, the overall set of correspondences identified above is also effective here: AMERICAN POLITICAL ACTIONS ARE SELF-PROPELLED, UNINHIBITED, PURPOSIVE ACTIONS.

One final example of directional prepositions relates to the beginning rather than the end point of the trajectory of motion. *Newness* impinges on the onset of an activity very much in the sense of a new departure, implying the notions of ‘freshness’ and ‘difference’:

(125) This past year saw far-reaching results from our new policies for peace. (RMN II, 5)

The preposition *from* denotes the source of a movement, marking the beginning of an activity, as motivated by the metaphor action is self-propelled motion. While it is true that the focus is on the originality or even daring quality of the policies chosen, it is equally the case that Nixon also emphasizes the fact that this boldness has produced results, and hence, has proved to be successful (SUCCESS IS MOTION FORWARD).

In contrast, the preposition *in* is closely linked to the image schemas CONTAINMENT and location, derived from the mappings STATES ARE LOCATIONS or STATES ARE BOUNDED AREAS IN SPACE.

(126) [...] To us as a people it has been granted to lay the foundations of our national life in a new continent. (TRO, 1)

(127) The old sentiment of detached and dependent colonies disappeared in the new sentiment of a united and independent Nation. (JCC, 3)

As both examples have already been analyzed within a broader context above, I will not comment on them at this point. Instead, I will draw attention to another aspect in which the preposition *in* relates to the mode in which an activity is performed. As (127) has been examined in great detail above, I will concentrate on (129). Conceptually, the spatial preposition *in* can be understood as the path of the motion trajectory, which is metaphorically represented by the mapping MEANS ARE PATHS. More precisely, the prepositional phrase “in new ways” denotes the manner in which the activity expressed by the main verb *to strive* is performed. This can be understood as an entity’s motion along a new path. *New* conveys the meaning of ‘unprecedented’, assigning a temporal but also an evaluative meaning dimension to the activity described: it is a clear instance of qualitative change to which Nixon commits himself.

(128) America has taken the lead in this new direction, and that lead America must continue to hold. (JCC, 6)

(129) We will strive to listen in new ways—to the voices of quiet anguish, the voices that speak without words, the voices of the heart—to the injured voices, the anxious voices, the voices that have despaired of being heard. (RMN I, 29)

Finally, the spatial preposition *in* also relates to the category of time in that it typically denotes parts of a day or parts of a larger temporal unit than day. (130) describes discrete temporal events that, in combination, establish a sequence of discrete moments or points in time, i.e. “in each new day.”

- (130) Our founders understood that well and gave us a democracy strong enough to endure for centuries, flexible enough to face our common challenges and advance our common dreams in each new day. (WJC II, 9)

To a degree, this prepositional phrase denotes the manner in which an action is taken. At the same time, the temporal unit serves to measure the progress (“advance”) made. This progress invokes again the source concept JOURNEY, particularly its understanding as a long-term purposeful activity that brings the American nation closer to its predestined goals with each new day.

The last aspect concerns the political instrumentalities used to achieve a certain goal. The instrumental prepositions such as *with* or *by* relate to the attributes involved or the tools used in meaningful actions.

- (131) In their ardent heat we shall, in God's Providence, [...], be purged of faction and division, [...], and shall stand forth in the days to come with a new dignity of national pride and spirit. (TWW II, 12)
- (132) With a new vision of government, a new sense of responsibility, a new spirit of community, we will sustain America's journey. The promise we sought in a new land we will find again in a land of new promise. In this new land, education will be every citizen's most prized possession. (WJC II, 20-21)

The accompanying factors “with new dignity of national pride and spirit” and “with a new vision of government” may also be conceived of as the effect of an action. The former implies that any future situations or events are attributed to an enhanced sense of national consciousness. Similarly, the “new vision” in (132) is the outcome of some preceding activity which imbues the American nations with a changed outlook on things.

Moreover, the preposition *by* also frequently describes the manner in which something is done. Prototypically, *by* conveys the idea of agency, possibly also including the mode in which this occurs. The latter is realized by the deadverbial use of the adjective *new*.

- (133) Let us be proud that by our bold, new initiatives, and by our steadfastness for peace with honor, we have made a break-through toward creating in the world what the world has not known before – [...]. (RMN II, 44)
- (134) The world itself is now dominated by a new spirit. (JEC, 17)

A new way of doing things, even if it is in spirit rather than in action, almost invariably appears to pay off morally. The fact that political reasoning and the legitimization for political actions is interwoven with morality has been argued to be typical of American political discourse due to the conflation of religious discourse and political discourse. While the actual strategies used in the rhetorical exploitation of political and moral issues are truly American, the long-standing tradition of acting for the common good represents a moral choice that has been acclaimed by political leaders dating back to classical antiquity.

## 6.5 Major Patterns in the Construal of Event Schemas

The preceding in-depth analysis has revealed the degree to which the concept of NEWNESS is entrenched in the discourse structure of the American presidential address. Irrespective of the sentence position in which it occurs, it is invariably part of the conceptual core of the sentence. Resuming the discussion of the first section of this chapter, which focused on the impact of lexical elements on the cognitive representation of a given portion of discourse, this latter part has revolved around the grammatical elements such as the sentence schemas, the configuration of participant roles and the verbs involved in the sentence construal.

Due to its primary function as a pre-modifier, the linguistic category *new* is typically part of an NP, which occurs in subject or object position, but may also be part of a more complex NP itself. Lexically, the adjective *new* was introduced as highly polysemous in chapter 4. As a resulting of this semantic complexity, the adjective *new* can be used as a scalar adjective, denoting intrinsic properties, and as a deadverbial adjective, specifying recategorized properties of a given entity. In the corpus the adjective *new* is predominantly used as a deadverbial adjective, except for construals in which *new* qualifies one of two categories on the grounds of its recency: category A is more recent, hence newer, than category B. This temporal meaning of ‘new’ is consistent with what has been identified as the temporal meaning of *old* above, in which case the adjective *old* is also used deadverbially. Conceptually, this construal appears to coincide with a retrospective prospective, according to which the ego-experiencer’s position determines the length of time that an entity has existed. However, this assessment rarely occurs without an at times implicit evaluation, which may even appear arbitrary due to the moment of retrospect selected as well as the entities chosen for comparison. This selectivity is characteristic of the ideological representation of sociopolitical realities and will be discussed in more detail below. Meanwhile, the distribution of patterns identified for the assignment of participant roles will be explored. In chapter 4, it was hypothesized that newness impinges on all aspects of the motion schema, motivated by the mapping NEWNESS IS A SUBEVENT OF MOTION. The image schema of motion is pivotal to the schematic meaning of sentences and serves as a source concept for some of the conceptual metaphors underlying the event schemas of sentences.

In nineteenth-century inaugurals all subject participants that are attributed newness refer to political institutions, for example, states and nations. As mentioned initially, sentential event schemas can be classified according to the world of experience they originate in. Across all nineteenth-century inaugurals there is a clear prevalence of force dynamics, and within the force-dynamic world of agents, actions and causes, the transfer schema dominates. Table 10 below provides a complete overview of all frame-like domains and the concepts by which they are realized. As can be derived from the domain of political events, corroborated by the foregoing analysis, the majority of the concepts listed, for example, actions, ideas, but also emotions, were found to be embedded in transfer schemas. Remarkably, a striking pattern in these older inaugurals is the fact that territorial expansion is almost exclusively represented by virtue of transfer schemas in passivized sentences, which are exclusively truncated passives.

In the subject position, it is mostly the preposed theme, for instance, a new territory that is being transferred to a beneficiary, chiefly the US. There is no such thing as US agency in the construal of territorial expansion. It appears to be the case that the object dual of the ESM and the transfer schema interact on the sentence level. In the event of territorial enlargement, the territorial gain is constructed as the acquisition of desired objects that are being transferred to their new possessor. In this case, the recipient is understood to be stationary, and the desired objects are relocated, not, however, without also implying some extra value. Conceptually, the beneficial transfer is best depicted by Figure 11 above.

In the object position, the category NEW specifies a subtype of the transferred object, for example, 'a new inspiration', 'new hope', 'new demonstration', and so on, and is chiefly assigned the meaning fresh. Being the most recent or fresh experience is associated with an improvement, motivated by the mapping NEW IS GOOD. As a consequence, the metaphorical transfer of new confidence, hope, inspiration, and so on, renders the entity endowed with these qualities or attributes as more confident, more hopeful and more inspired, which of course, generally speaking, is a positive development. As regards the occurrence of 'new' within complex NPs, one important insight gained from the analysis is the fact that these complex NPs have relations grounded in activity while being themselves couched in another event schema of the force-dynamic world; again this distribution exhibits a strong bias towards transfer schemas, and to a lesser extent, action schemas. In other words, force dynamics perform a dual purpose for reasons that will be explained below. This proneness to creating action or event chains is also supported by the verb types involved. A great deal of the verbs used convey inchoative meanings.

The ideological potential inherent in the coding of sentences in different event schemas may be summarized as follows: in the subject position, it is always the issue of agency or the suppression of agency that is indicative of ideological discourse structures. A case in point is the construal of new states or communities as agents whenever they are represented as actively seeking US protection. In other instances, they are conceptualized as objects of transfer. Another telling example is the distinct construal of the new American republic as opposed to other newly or recently founded political institutions. Unlike any other construal of *new* in this particular context, the meaning construction of *new* as inexperienced or in need of protection is blocked. In the object position, ideological meaning is mostly represented by virtue of the unequivocal construal of the US, nation and people, as the beneficiary. The only instance in which the perpetuation of ideological discourse structures is suspended occurs, perhaps not surprisingly, in the event of internal conflict. A case in point is Lincoln's ideological use of 'new' in his construal of 'good' as opposed to 'bad' part/whole relations when referring to the moral wholeness of the American nation in the light of the impending Secession.

In twentieth-century inaugurals, a more diversified picture presents itself. At the same time, however, there is a stronger bias in favor of construals from a prospective perspective as well as a greater awareness of the strategic exploitation of temporality. First and foremost, the sentential event schemas originate from all three worlds of experience, the material,

psychological, and force-dynamic world, while the overall prevalence of force dynamics persists. Second, the category NEW chiefly interacts with the linguistic categories that form the theme of a sentence.

As far as the subject participant is concerned, the analysis revealed a strong tendency towards the metaphorical agency of time and other forces, natural or otherwise. If the current situation of the American nation or the state of the world in general is described, the occurrence or spatial schemas of the material world are valid. All subject themes relate to changing times and their effects on the US and, increasingly, on the world in its entirety. The latter is a twentieth-century characteristic as the inclusion of the world as a potential political agent, beneficiary, or cause of unrest was not a regular feature in earlier inaugurals for the reasons explained above. The agency of time, derived from the mapping, TIME IS THE CHANGER, is also a pervasive twentieth-century feature. If there is such a thing as a subject agent — the action schema rarely occurs when the agent is typified as new — it is never the American nation. Instead, there are new forces, resulting from global political changes that are constructed as having a potentially negative impact on America. It is perhaps not surprising that the American nation does not subcategorize for new in twentieth-century inaugurals. After all, the nation's newness is no longer in immediate focus nor is its persistence in jeopardy. It is thus in complete agreement with the finding that the majority of tokens of American non-metaphorical agency occur in event schemas in which American agency is constructed as ostensibly dynamic; in this case newness specifies the theme, i.e. the entity that is directly affected by American political activities.

In the force-dynamic world the analysis exposed a distinction between metaphorical and non-metaphorical agents. The latter are mostly coded as 'we' (Americans). From the assignment of participant roles within the action schema, agent and theme, it can be derived that this agent is a special subtype or subcategory of nation, one that is specified for its activity, innovation and progress. As regards metaphorical agents, it is once more American political institutions and activities that either act or initiate further developments. In either case, the actual construal suggests that the American people or the metaphorized American nation is a successful, powerful agent. Remarkably, there are only a few occurrences in which there is no American agency, which coincides with the processing of 'new' as 'different', devoid of value judgment. This blend of literal and metaphorical agents is not encountered in nineteenth-century inaugurals.

The transfer schemas also assign agency to the American in-group, chiefly coded as 'our' or 'we'. As in the older inaugurals it is mostly immaterial, ideational or emotional entities that are metaphorically transferred. Unlike their nineteenth-century predecessors, however, the beneficiaries are increasingly more global, i.e. beneficiaries such as "to the world" or "to mankind" are more consistently encountered. The transfer schema predominantly implies a qualitative change, which can be construed in terms of the object dual — when benefiting the in group — or in terms of the location dual when denoting development in a more general way. The difference lies in the direction of movement: beneficial transfer invariably implies a

movement towards the ego-experiencer, while more general developments tend to be conceptualized as the ego-experiencer's movement towards a new location.

Finally, the psychological world of experience is typically framed by the perception/cognition schema or the emotion schema. Accordingly, the category NEW either relates to a new theme or a new cause. The perception/cognition schema is absent from nineteenth-century inaugurals; in more recent speeches, the role of experiencer is exclusively assigned to the American in-group ("we"). By and large, the cognition/perception schema describes the recognition or assessment of a given political event or situation and is indicative of the increasing personalization of discourse in the course of the twentieth century. What is more, however, the emergence of this event schema attests to the enhanced focus on publicness on the one hand, but also to the growing importance of symbolic politics on the other.

On another level still, the emotion schema is an indication of symbolic politics. The situative context of the discourse event, the inaugural address, can also be argued to account for the emotional, ceremonial mode and overtones that also characterize this speech, albeit it not to the extent to which it has frequently been claimed to hold. The strengthening of the nation's moral and emotional ties is chiefly coded in the transfer schema, in which a metaphorical abstract object such as hope, dedication, or inspiration is imparted and shared. The verb to 'renew', which has been absent from the discussion this far, also fulfils this vital function. Again, there are only a few occurrences in nineteenth-century inaugurals as compared to their twentieth-century counterparts. However, there is a strong party-political bias in favor of Republican presidents, which is consistent throughout the corpus. The only twentieth-century Democratic president to 'renew' is Clinton. If the concept of renewal is taken into account from a broader perspective, another Democratic president should be included, namely Carter, whose relative 'conservatism' has been remarked on above. In the light of these findings, Clinton's use of renew may be surprising, particularly when taking into consideration the actual construal of renewal. As the lexical meaning suggests, the construal occurs from a retrospective perspective, which is in line with an earlier observation that Republican presidents tend to invoke newness by referring back to the nation's initial newness or, alternatively, any other historical event that is understood to have produced a sweeping political change. As can be expected, radical change is not usually on top of the agenda; instead the emphasis is placed on developing what already exists and may have been displaced in the process. In contrast, Clinton's use of renew is clearly construed from a prospective angle: the renewal is achieved by future action rather than the reinvigoration of past experiences. Thus, the approach to solving political problems appears to exhibit a bipartisan pattern: while Republicans tend to learn from the past, Democrats learn by doing.

- (135) To renew America, we must revitalize our democracy. (WHC I, 27)
- (136) To renew America, we must meet challenges abroad as well at home. (WJC I, 32)
- (137) We vowed then to set a clear course to renew our nation. (WJC II, 7)

The concept of NEWNESS also pervades within complex NPs in which it specifies the head noun of the second NP. Crucially, the two NPs attached to one another by virtue of the preposition *of* express what has been referred to as intrinsic relations. Some relations have been identified in both nineteenth- and twentieth-century inaugurals, for example relations that themselves express activities or stand for part/whole relations.

As for the activity relations, the pattern identified for the older inaugurals is also valid for the more recent speeches. In all instances, there is a doubling of force dynamics, i.e. the complex NP building on the notion of activity is itself embedded in another event schema of the force-dynamic world, preferably the action or transfer schema. It has been found that this characteristic is enabled by the conceptual metonymies RESULT FOR ACTION/ACTION FOR RESULT which invite these cognitive associations.

The part/whole relations identified for twentieth-century inaugurals attest to the increasing spatialization of political reasoning. The prevalence of spatial schemas in which the part/whole relations are grounded is evocative of a sense of departure, corroborated by the frequent use of verbs conveying inchoative meanings. In the light of these developments it is no coincidence that there is also an increase in construals from a prospective perspective, motivated by the mapping NEW IS AHEAD, in which a static ego-experiencer first positions him/herself in order to assess the present situation, and then moves on. Spatial orientation is also vital in another respect in that there appears to be a correspondence between geophysical orientation and political orientation. Moreover, spatiality, or rather the extension of space, is a major determining factor in construals using other prepositions than the preposition *of*. Being another twentieth-century particularity, the prepositional phrases identified express the idea of motion in a specific way. Crucially, newness impinges on all components of the source-path-goal schema, as was hypothesized in chapter 4. Most importantly, however, the goal of the motion trajectory is given conceptual salience, constructing the activities or occurrences as telic and goal-oriented.

All in all, the major characteristics that differentiate nineteenth- from twentieth-century inaugurals can be summarized provisionally as follows. Table 10 and 11 illustrate the fact that there is a marked increase in the occurrence of newness, which not only permits a more varied evaluation but also constitutes a major finding in itself: American newness is deeply entrenched in the discourse structure, which is indicative of the bidirectionality of discourse and world. The impact of newness on the formation of American political discourse has not only shaped discourse from the onset, but discourse has also shaped reasoning on political entities.



<b>Frames</b>	<b>Concepts</b>
<b>Political institutions</b>	Government, Republic, Union, nation, confederacy, order of things [= the Constitution]
<b>Political organization</b>	Keeping, term
<b>Political events</b>	
<b>Actions</b>	Demonstration, duty
<b>Mode of action</b>	Instrumentality
<b>Ideas</b>	Inspiration, proof, questions, meaning
<b>Emotions</b>	Confidence, hope
<b>Geopolitical space</b>	Territories, communities, States, members [= member states], census

Table 10

The study has identified the following changes in major domains or frame-like structures of American political cognition: reasoning on the political organization of the American nation on the one hand and on political events or activities on the other has increasingly incorporated the idea of newness, which is suggestive of an enhanced awareness of discourse and its (political) functions. Moreover, this finding attests to an acceleration of political changes and developments, irrespective of their being real or constructed. This attentiveness to the impact of discourse on social practice has been referred to as the technologization of discourse (see chapter 1). What is more, Tables 10 and 11 point to the vast differentiation of political events and actions. The atomization of political events and actions implies that ever smaller aspects of activities are highlighted and, of course, publicized. This marketization of discourse entails, as its concomitant factor, the (re)presentation of political events and actions being increasingly serialized, for example by supplying ever smaller portions of ‘information’ in public political communication, which again enhances the significance of newness. The increase of the deadverbial uses of the adjective *new* derives from the observation that a growing number of individual aspects of political actions is characterized by one single property, hence their newness, which may relate to the mode, goal or motivation of a given political action. Similarly temporal, causal or other conditions under which political actions are performed have become more central. Time, in particular, appears to be the prime factor for the understanding of political events to the extent that political entities are frequently conceptualized in terms of the times during which they are in effect. For example, “the day of the dictator is over” or “the totalitarian era is passing.” This definitional characteristic of the temporality of political structures has been found to be chiefly framed in the occurrence schema; in other words, the political change is understood to be a natural occurrence like temporal progression itself (TIME IS A CHANGER). Finally, the example concepts of the geopolitical domain illustrate the spatial extension but also the abstraction of geophysical space that has been under way, a development that evokes the globalization of American presidential discourse. While the nineteenth-century understanding is typified by specific, almost concrete concepts, for instance, territory, the twentieth-century examples exhibit a proneness to abstract, metaphorical concepts such as horizons, reach, closeness, ground, and generalizations (“the world”).

<b>Frames</b>	<b>Concepts</b>
<b>Political institutions</b>	Nations (several times), government (several times), States
<b>Political organization</b>	Structures, relationship, order, balance of power, world of law, pattern of relationships, ties, administration, unity, economic system, social system, political system
<b>Political events</b>	
<b>Actions</b>	Projects, endeavor, things (to do), action, adventure, experience (knowledge gained from doing things), responsibilities, activism, departure
<b>Mode of action</b>	Policies (several times), line of action, ways, initiatives, direction
<b>Goal of action</b>	Purpose, dream, prospect, promise (several times), realization
<b>Motivation of action</b>	Vitality, dedication, spirit (several times), engagement, commitment
<b>Process</b>	Experience, chapter, estate
<b>Ideas</b>	Symbol, truth, insight, vision
<b>Emotions</b>	Hope (several times), sentiment
<b>Time</b>	Era (several times), age (several times), century (several times), year, millennium, day, beginning, future
<b>Conditions</b>	Advantages, freedom, danger (several times), nature level, life, horrors, unity, dignity, appraisal
<b>Causes</b>	(Military) forces (Political) influence (Natural) breeze (several times), sense (several times), wave (Supernatural) miracles
<b>Geopolitical space</b>	New World, horizons, reach, closeness, ground, continent, land, world (several times)

Table 11

The pattern of evaluation identified by the analysis in the first section of this chapter was corroborated by the study of the sentential event schemas. The priority of action and motion over inaction and motionlessness is uncontested. The pervasiveness of sentence schemas that either build on motion themselves or are metaphorically framed by motion concepts is compelling evidence. Even the perception/cognition schema of the psychological world of experience is geared towards (future) action. Contemplation frequently serves to evaluate one's present position and to survey the possibilities for political activities. Similarly, the pattern identified for the spatial schemas and temporal schemas has not only been confirmed but has become increasingly influential in the course of the twentieth-century as the diversification of spatial schemas demonstrates.<sup>256</sup> A case in point is the emergence of directional prepositions that entrench the preferred modes of action.

The enhanced importance of spatial and temporal imagery also entails a shift in their ideological meaning representation. Motivated by the mapping NEWNESS IS A SUBEVENT OF

<sup>256</sup> The distinction between temporal and spatial schemas may appear artificial if not inaccurate given the spatialization of time. In this particular context, however, the distinction is upheld as the temporal meaning of the adjective *new* is determined by the construal of the schematic categories of the perspectival system. The meaning of the category NEW is processed differently from a prospective than from a retrospective angle.

MOTION, both temporal and spatial schemas are evaluated as positive when evoking open and boundless space and forward motion on the one hand, or when involving prospectiveness on the other (NEW IS AHEAD). The construal of political events and actions has been shown to occur increasingly from a prospective perspective, which conceptually relies on the availability of space to move, and thus highlights motion concepts to an even larger degree. This shift of emphasis does not principally undermine the existing pattern of evaluation. Nonetheless, some antagonistic patterns such as the bipolarity of spatial schemas inherent in NEW and OLD appear to be more significant for nineteenth-century than for twentieth-century inaugurals. Furthermore, the shift towards temporality is consequential for the meaning construction process of *new*. Out of the five models elaborated above, only those permitting a prospective construal apply when taking into account the insights gained from the analysis of the grammatical elements in the second part of this chapter, in other words, the models depicted in Figure 11 and Figure 13. It was argued above that the construals represented can be blended into a single one. It is, however, more compelling to refer to the representation in Figure 11 as the location dual, in which case newness marks the end point of the movement from an original, old location, and to the one in Figure 13 as the object dual, according to which new experiences are brought into the present focus by temporal progression.

As a result, the cognitive representation of newness, which was elaborated in chapter 4, has been confirmed as the most prototypical way in which the concept is deployed by discourse. There is, perhaps, one further qualification needed to account for the perspectivity of the construal. While the representation of the conceptual structure argues for a retrospective angle in the construal of the location dual, this has only been found to hold in the event of recent change, in which case the new primarily conveys the temporal meaning of recency.

As far as the contrast of *old* and *new* is concerned, the five construals identified exhibit varying degrees of oppositeness. In Figures 9 and 10, *old* and *new* are complementary, i.e. they are construed “as mutually exclusive and mutually exhausting some domain” (Croft/Cruse 2004: 167). In Figure 12 ‘old’ conveys the meaning of age or designates the length of time that an entity has existed. Thus the adjective *old* denotes properties that can be construed as varying by degrees. Similarly, the adjective *new* can also be construed as a scalar adjective. In this context, *old* and *new* can be construed as antonyms; crucially, however, the possibility for antonym construal is constrained by the frame in which the construal occurs. The antonym construal works in contexts in which the temporal frame rather than the person frame is active. For example, the expressions ‘an old car’ and ‘a new car’ can be understood as antonyms while the adjectives in the expressions ‘an old man’ as opposed to ‘a new man’ do not have opposite meanings.

In the prototypical construal discussed above, the oppositeness of ‘old’ and ‘new’ is also blocked as they do not bisect the domain in focus with each other. There is an external frame of reference or scale that is not inherent in either concept. This is the domain of CHANGE, whose metaphorical meaning draws on the spatial and temporal attributes of the categories OLD and NEW. In other words, ‘old’ and ‘new’ merely serve to specify the locations involved in the mapping CHANGE OF STATE IS A CHANGE OF LOCATION, but are not both in focus

themselves. Therefore, the complementarity of ‘old’ and ‘new’ is based on bipolarity of evaluation rather than binarity of meaning.

Concepts are deployed by discourse — this holds for the position of sense boundaries as well as the degrees of indexicality attributed to concepts. Initially it was argued that formal features of language are assigned three different types of value in discourse. The linguistic categories OLD and NEW can both be ascribed marked experiential, relational and expressive values. First and foremost, the experiential value of new in American presidential discourse manifests itself in the biased event models that have been identified for the early beginnings of the American republic in particular. Although the experience is no longer immediately accessible, and perhaps never was, the common beliefs about the American newness are regularly re-enacted as the examples from the inaugural addresses have demonstrated. However, the category OLD is also given an experiential value, expressing the idea that the oldness of political institutions is indicative of their moral worth. The relational value of ‘new’ relates to its capacity to structure, or even establish relations in discourse, which is clearly the case as the analysis has revealed. For example, the single property of newness has been found to determine the political relations of the US vis-à-vis other nations: recall John F. Kennedy’s distinction between “old allies” and “new states.” On another level the property of newness specifies themes rather than other discourse participants such as experiencer, agents, or even possessor or location.

Finally, the expressive value of a formal feature is determined by the positionality of discourse participants, notably the creation of a point of view. The study of the construal of *newness* in discourse has exposed the fact that the meaning construction and representation of newness relies on perspectivity, producing distinct meanings of newness from a prospective as opposed to a retrospective perspective. Moreover, the expressive value also manifests itself in the end-point focus, according to which ‘new’ marks the location, more precisely, the goal of the trajectory of motion. This telic focus ascribes conceptual salience to the new location, which is also frequently understood as an improved state.

The degree to which the concept of NEWNESS is entrenched in the cognitive representation of the presidential inaugural address is suggestive of its indexicality in a cultural model. The knowledge structures stored in this model are schematizations of experience that are not accessible themselves, but are retrievable from memory, imagination or biased event models. For this reason, a great deal of political activity is geared towards re-enacting these knowledge structures for as long as they are vital to the American polity. This can be achieved by a number of so-called strategic functions of political language use that were introduced in chapter 2 where the case for the salience of the strategic function of representation was made. Representation is a means of discourse control in that it highlights those aspects or attributes of events, actions or relations that are considered as relevant, while de-emphasizing those that are deemed irrelevant or controversial. One such disproportion in representation is the emphasis on the point of completion of a political action or process, which was found to be a pervasive pattern in the corpus. This mode of representation constitutes the interface of social

action and political action within political discourse. Social actions are typically success-oriented, i.e. they are strategic actions, or else they intend to reach understanding, which would be the case with communicative action. Political action is by definition goal-oriented, even invoking a certain degree of intentionality or purposiveness.

Political discourse oscillates between instrumental objectives and the bringing up to date of values. The concept of NEWNESS is pivotal in both: its prospectiveness in twentieth-century inaugurals in particular is instrumental in defining the objectives of future political actions, while it also invokes well entrenched values such as the exceptionalism of the American experience. While it is true that the strategic function of representation is of primary importance in the inaugural address, it is not the only ubiquitous political use of language. Coercion is also central to the ideological representation of sociopolitical realities in the inaugural. The emphasis placed on the successful mastery of political challenges and the accomplishment of political actions often takes on self-congratulatory dimensions. Yet, it constitutes a distinct type of coercion that draws on effect and audience response in general. This is the rhetorical legacy of the American jeremiad, the political sermon, which coerces by virtue of emotional appeal. More importantly still, the emotional appeal is an integral part of the situative context of the speech event. In chapter 5 it was argued that ceremonials often involve a considerable degree of normativity, which is another coercive function of the inaugural address.

In addition, the proneness to self-praise fulfils another important strategic function, namely legitimization. The building of national identity or any group identity in fact, is an ongoing project. The construction of shared beliefs and knowledge, such as the 'knowledge' that the American nation is a new nation, is a means of self-presentation. This process also involves legitimizing out-group members, threats and opponents, which occurs on the basis of projecting negative attributes onto these 'outsiders'. A neat example of this strategic function is the conceptualization of the New World in contrast to the Old in many examples taken from both nineteenth- and twentieth-century inaugurals.

All strategic functions of political uses of language ultimately carry a truth claim as they aim to underscore familiar values — either in terms of coercion, (de)legitimization or (mis)representation. Truthfulness, alongside morality and trust, is the cornerstone of political action. The relativity of truth makes the distinction between a truth claim and the ascription of truth a discursive issue. Truth manifests itself in and through social practice, as all societies must ground their actions in some sort of validation. In this context, factuality is not an issue: whether or not it is factually accurate that everything about America is new, as some would have us believe, it is true as long as it is politically viable to believe it. Instead, the question is how beliefs in the truthfulness of political events and actions are perpetuated in and through discourse. Here, morality plays a vital role as it adds credibility to the representation of a given political event and at the same time, legitimizes it. The rhetorical strategy of 'spiritualization' is a pervasive means to achieve legitimization. The specific interweaving of morality and political discourse in the American context is well known. It is less well known that the models of morality chiefly serve to frame other political actions that are in focus, such as territorial

expansion and foreign relations, for example. As almost any political action can be legitimized by virtue of the appropriate moral frames, the mechanical way in which this mode of legitimization occurs in the American context is often worrying and has been shown to look back on a long-standing tradition.

The pervasiveness of newness and motion on the one hand and the persistently positive evaluation of change and political activity on the other are inscribed in the very essence of the ‘new political science’ and ‘the timeless political order’ that the nation’s founders intended to establish. In this context, the claim of the unchangeability of the American nation itself strikes one as paradoxical. However, the following two quotations underline the processual and dynamic conception of the American political system:

- (138) As heretofore, so hereafter will the nation demonstrate its fitness to administer any new estate which events devolve upon it, and in the fear of God will "take occasion by the hand and make the bounds of freedom wider yet." (WMK II, 7)
- (139) In this outward and physical ceremony we attest once again to the inner and spiritual strength of our Nation. As my high school teacher, Miss Julia Coleman, used to say: "We must adjust to changing times and still hold to unchanging principles." (JEC, 2)

The adaptability of US political institutions and structures is succinctly illustrated.<sup>257</sup> This argument is resumed by American presidents of all political convictions at regular intervals, which suggests that the issue is prompted by political factors outside the realm of partisan policies.

One major factor is so-called American Progressivism. The notion of American Progressivism commonly refers to “the political and social reform movement that began at the end of the nineteenth century” (Eisenach 2006: vii). In American political life, Progressivism comprises the period that began in the mid-1890s and, provisionally, comes to a close in the 1920s. This is not to argue, however, that the appeal of progressivist thinking spent its force during that time. On the contrary, the body of progressivist ideas has not only survived intact, it has also adapted to the changing tides of political climate. Over the last two decades or so, modern left Progressivism has established itself, with George Lakoff and Noam Chomsky acting as mouthpieces of Liberal political ideas. With its overall anti-Republican rationale this ‘new’ Progressivism presents a fresh outlook on the contemporary American political landscape.

Progressivism is by no means inscribed in the party-political program of either of the big political parties. On the contrary, Progressivism is first and foremost a body of ideas and ideals affiliated to national policies. The bipartisan character of progressivist (political and social) thought provides a coherent mindset that survived the gradual transformation of America throughout the twentieth century. As with other key ideas of the American public philosophy (see chapter 3), the development and continuous modification of Progressivism

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<sup>257</sup> According to Eisenach (2006: 19) the Progressive rationale implies that “nations unable to adapt would cease to drive human history and destiny. These themes were at once Hegelian in their philosophical spirit, Protestant millennialist in their religious expression, and Enlightened in their codification in the new social sciences.”

attests to the stabilization of national interests without, however, being restricted to them. Progressivism includes both a national and global dimension and is thus indicative of the transposition of national, isolationist political practices and reforms onto the international arena: “The Progressive vision of America’s future was inseparable from its vision of America as the dominant force for justice in the world; thus, Progressive internationalism was an integral part of Progressive nationalism” (Eisenach 2006: 287).

Despite being shaped into a more definite mold at the initial and closing stages of the twentieth century in particular, the roots of American Progressivism even predate the American Civil War and can be traced back to the first half of the nineteenth century.

To a degree, the Progressive movement first fuelled the nation-building and consolidation processes and subsequently advanced the cause of democracy, making it the most salient notion of twentieth-century political discourse — nationally and internationally. David Francis Bacon, Herbert Croly and John Dewey are perhaps the most articulate spokesmen of a dynamic, progressivist understanding of democracy.<sup>258</sup> Eisenach (2006: 2) refers to Bacon as a pre-Civil War “proto-Progressive”, whose line of argument is most poignantly illustrated by an election pamphlet dating from 1844. In what follows, I will briefly outline its major tenets to the extent that they are germane to my focus here.<sup>259</sup> Bacon argues for constant motion, insisting that “the mental, moral and physical power of America is not, is not to be, and cannot be, stationary.” This view derives from a specific temporality, even historicity inherent in the conceptualization of political entities. At the time liberty was predominantly conceived of as “liberty of motion, with perfect, free choice of direction, whether forward or backward, upward or downward,” hence the conceptual metaphors FREEDOM IS SPACE TO MOVE and FREE ACTION IS UNINHIBITED SELF-PROPELLED MOTION. The centrality of motion is also mirrored in another of Bacon’s arguments in which he pinpoints the preferred directions of movement as “uniform progress upward” and forward motion (“The course of liberty is not only onward but upward”). According to Bacon, there is one powerful enhancement within the system itself, which is the political concept of democracy. To Bacon, democracy “can never be inactive; for it is only by the continual exercise of their strength that the people are assured of its continued possession.” Hence democracy is conceptualized as work in progress which requires constant attention and effort. As such, democratic progress is metaphorically understood as a constant uphill battle. Moreover, the inverse is also valid: inaction and indifference are antidemocratic. This rationale suggests the influence of a conceptual metaphor such as BEING DEMOCRATIC IS BEING IN MOTION, which is derived from

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<sup>258</sup> It is beyond the scope of this section to provide even a short introduction to the main body of Dewey’s important and influential ideas. Generally speaking, Dewey places particular emphasis on personality as a manifestation of democratic individualism. Dewey argues that democracy is already at work in every personality rather than being inherent in institutions and organizations within society (cf. Eisenach 2006: 75). Thus democracy does not unfold in various stages, each of which offers democratic fulfillment as is the case within other areas of progressivist thinking. Instead the democratic personality renews itself. This claim rests on a very idealistic conception of human beings. More importantly, this idea of democracy stands for “a society, in which the distinction between the spiritual and the secular has ceased, [...]” (Eisenach *ibid*).

<sup>259</sup> The discussion is based on Eisenach’s (2006) excerpt of the original election pamphlet, which is otherwise not available in print.

correspondences such as ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION and BEING DEMOCRATIC IS ACTING.

This conception of democratic action manifests itself in Croly's ([1909] 2004) overriding principle of effective nationality.<sup>260</sup> In elaborating the difference between the American national idea and other national ideas such as the German, English or French national principle, Croly (ibid.) specifies the national principle of the American democracy as follows. The individual's involvement as a member of a democratic body is not only appreciated but explicitly encouraged. This engagement holds for any type of political goal — national as well as international. These goals are constructed as common objectives to be achieved in the (near) future. Thus American democracy implies a national perspective that is simultaneously retrospective and prospective.

(...) American national cohesion is dependent not only upon certain forms of historical association, but upon fidelity to a democratic principle. A nation is a very complex political, social, and economic product – so complex that political thinkers in emphasizing one aspect of it are apt to forget other and equally essential aspects. Its habits and traditions of historical association constitute an indispensable bond; but they do not constitute the only bond. A specific national character is more than a group of traditions and institutions. It tends to be a formative idea, which defines the situation of a country in reference to its neighbors, and which is constantly seeking a better articulation and understanding among the various parts of its domestic life. (Croly [1909] 2004, Chapter IX)

The in-built processuality of the American system, which is also captured in the Constitution's preamble as mentioned earlier, may indeed explain the pervasiveness of motion concepts and the newness identified in the American inaugural address as a paradigmatic example of presidential discourse. The ubiquity of motion has also made inroads into other parts of the political system, however. As a consequence, political structures develop crisis tendencies resulting from internal contradictions which undermine existing patterns and necessitate change within the structures themselves.

These tensions and contradictions surface in periods of reorientation in terms of developmental cycles or may be crisis-induced when springing from an external source. In discourse these periods coincide with an enhanced focus on newness and change, which has been shown to come to the fore whenever a change of government occurs after a long period in which the other of the two big political parties was in power. A case in point is the 'New Era' invoked by the first of a series of Republican presidents succeeding Wilson's influential presidency. This swing of political climate has been referred to as the public-private conflict of interests (cf. Schlesinger 1986), according to which Republican presidents tend to stand for ideas pertaining to private interests while Democrats chiefly turn to topics of public purpose. Alternatively, the change of political climate may be brought about by the generational rhythm of the American political system.

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<sup>260</sup> The quotation is taken from chapter IX entitled "The American Democracy and its national principle" of Croly's ([1909] 2004) influential work *The Promise of American Life*, which is available from <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/14422/14422-8.txt>.



In the event of crisis-induced change, the present moment is constructed as an opportune moment for change, which is indicated by the nation's adaptability to any changing condition that "events may devolve upon." The American nation is a new nation in that it is a free, democratic, active, adaptive, and creative kind of individual.

## 7. Summary and Concluding Remarks

The two-fold analysis of the construal of *newness* in the American inaugural address revealed the concept's deep entrenchment in American political reasoning. Political discourse comprises a variety of distinct linguistic actions that can be framed as 'political language' to refer to a static entity, as 'political communication' to emphasize the purposiveness of political linguistic action, or as 'political rhetoric' to foreground the manipulative character of political uses of language. The dynamic conception of political discourse underlines the fact that using language politically is itself a process liable to change. The historicity of political discourse entails its adaptation to changing discourse conditions. In American political communication this flexibility has not only brought about a presidential discourse but has also led to the differentiation of communicative tasks by virtue of distinct rhetorical genres of institutionalized forms of presidential address. The inaugural address occupies a cardinal position within presidential discourse for being one of two forms of address to have existed ever since the foundation of the American and, second, for occupying a key political function at the interface between political campaigning and governance. As a discourse event, the inaugural address is typified by a number of political functions that are coded in specific linguistic structures.

First and foremost, the presidential inaugural address fulfils the vital function of perpetuating the American public philosophy or civil religion. This political function is encoded in communicative styles that oscillate between instrumental objectives and the updating of cultural values. These values form the core of American political culture and thus have both a strong affective and cognitive component. What is more, however, these core values include a plus and a minus side, entrenching a relatively stable pattern of evaluation. While the provision of polarizing evaluations is rather typical of the cultural practice of bivalent Western cultures, such a clear-cut distinction is also liable to ideologization in political contexts. Ideologizing itself is frequently linked to the ritualization of discursive practices according to which ideological discourse structures are reproduced and perpetuated. Prior to elaborating on this aspect which has been substantiated by the foregoing study a range of other substantial findings will be discussed.

In American (political) culture, the concept of NEWNESS constitutes a core value. In its function as a cultural model, NEWNESS has been shown to organize important domains of political knowledge and to frame political relations and structures. As I hope to have shown this occurs by virtue of two conceptual metaphors, one of which is embedded in the event structure metaphor (ESM) system, while the other is a specific-level metaphor that is culturally informed to an even larger degree. The in-depth study of the conceptual structure of NEWNESS revealed that the concept informs the cognitive representation of discourse by virtue of the conceptual metaphor NEWNESS IS A SUBEVENT OF MOTION. The mapping instills a certain bias into the representation of political events and actions. Another important finding is that reasoning on political development is motivated by the sustained metaphor THE AMERICAN NATION IS A NEW NATION or AMERICA IS NEW for short.

All in all, two prototypical construals of *newness* could be established, both of which are motivated by the mapping NEWNESS IS A SUBEVENT OF MOTION. On the one hand, the notion of newness marks the end-point of an activity that brings about change as represented by Figure 11 of chapter 6. The conceptual representation of this construal implies an entity's movement from an original, hence old location, along the source-path-goal trajectory of motion towards a new location, the end point of a boundary event. This construal is the location-dual of the event structure metaphor, including the mappings CHANGE IS MOTION, ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION or PROGRESS IS MOTION FORWARD. In this case, the contiguity that exists between these concepts, all of which are derived from the multivalent source domain MOTION, invites significant cognitive associations between them. For example, the mappings NEWNESS IS CHANGE or NEWNESS IS PROGRESS, which are motivated by the RESULT FOR ACTION metonymy. Crucially, the new experience or situation is brought about by an active ego-experiencer, i.e. a moving entity.

On the other hand, the mapping NEWNESS IS A SUBEVENT OF MOTION was found to be construed from another angle, which is depicted in Figure 13 of chapter 6. In this case, the new situation is not brought about by the ego-experiencer but by another entity, typically an external event or a natural occurrence. The construal occurs in the object-dual, i.e. the thing changing does not move itself; instead the change is induced by objects or entities moving to or away from the thing changing. Typically, this construal is motivated by the metaphors ABSTRACT THINGS ARE OBJECTS or EXTERNAL EVENTS ARE MOVING OBJECTS. These objects are transferred to the ego-experiencer, who is the new possessor of a given attribute (ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS) and is thus changed. This construal has a special sub-type in which the changed situation is caused by temporal progression. Based on the mapping TIMES ARE MOVING OBJECTS, time is understood to be carrying along new experiences as it moves towards us and brings them into focus at the present moment. This construal invites the association of the passing of time with novelty, which is conveyed by the mapping TIME IS AN INNOVATOR. In this specific case, the stationary ego-experiencer is represented as being in a position in which an opportunity opens up due to the changing times. The 'natural' occurrence of temporal progression is frequently personified in terms of the metaphor TIME IS A CHANGER.

In addition to these central construals the concept of NEWNESS was also found to express the length of time during which an entity has existed. In this case newness marks the location on the time axis that is close to the position of the ego-experiencer. This situation is illustrated by Figure 12 of chapter 6. Interestingly, this is the only construal in which *new* and *old* are processed as opposites since the linguistic category *old* is understood as a location that is remote from the ego-experiencer's current position or vantage point. The mapping BEING OLD IS BEING IN A STATE OF KNOWLEDGE complements the metaphor BEING NEW IS BEING IN A STATE OF IGNORANCE.

Another construal of *old* is based on NEWNESS although the latter is absent from the scene construal and needs to be inferred. In Figure 10 of chapter 6, the construal of the sense boundaries of 'old' occurs in terms of motionlessness, which can be inferred from the

conceptual representation of NEWNESS. The mapping OLD STATES ARE BOUNDED AREAS IN SPACE suggests that motion does not occur beyond clearly restricted boundaries, if it occurs at all. The static conception of this situation invites negative associations as NEWNESS is typically understood in terms of motion, and hence evaluated in positive terms. Finally, the concept of NEWNESS may also be included in OLDNESS itself, which is the case when the usual temporal framework, consisting of two temporal boundary events, is not valid. This situation of timelessness holds for so-called ‘eternal truths’ in which some ideas are constructed as ‘timeless’ and hence are both old and new.

The validity of these results was corroborated by a thorough analysis of their linguistic, socio-cultural and knowledge contexts. As concepts are deployed by discourse and are thus accorded their semantic value(s), the linguistic context is of primary importance to the meaning construal of *newness*. The linguistic context includes the immediate linguistic environment on the one hand, taking into account that the phrase or sentence strongly constrains the construal of a given word, and the type of discourse and field of discourse in question on the other. As far as the linguistic environment is concerned, a number of significant constraints have been identified: the temporal structure, the perspectivity of construal, and the conceptual representation of the argument.

### **Temporal Structure**

The particular temporality of the inaugural address was also recognized by previous accounts, in which, however, it was however erroneously put down to the alleged contemplative character of the inaugural address (see chapter 5). The present in-depth study of the 56 inaugural addresses to date produced a drastically different result. The temporal framework that dominates discourse processing is considerably more variegated than the accounts mentioned in chapter 5 have claimed it to be. First and foremost, the inaugural’s temporal structure is determined by the perspective of the ego-experiencer vis-à-vis the events represented as events are typically bound into a temporally framed unit. Second, there are a number of temporal expressions that serve to outline the duration of a given activity or event. Third, the temporal framework is supported by the prevalence of specific tenses that are highly recurrent: these are primarily the present perfect and the present tense, but also the will-future, which predominantly encodes predictions about the future, preferably in the mode of ‘matter-of-course’ predictions. Consequently, the time span covered begins at some point of time in the past, which extends into the present and possibly also into the (near) future.

The temporal order is central to the mapping of the event structure onto the discourse structure. While there is only one ‘real-world’ event structure, there are many possible discourse structures to represent these real-world occurrences. The representation of political actions and events in the chronological order enhances the truth value of the representation itself, for chronology as the ‘natural’ order suggests that the discourse structure matches the event structure. However, the chronological structure is frequently instrumentalized in constructing it as a proof of causation. Accordingly, causal links are established between the

present and a past event that is specifically and strategically selected for this particular purpose. The rationale behind this connection is to highlight the present moment as an improved state in relation to an undesirable past situation or state. In other words, the particular temporal coding enhances the sense of accomplishment that has been found to predominate in the inaugural address.

However, the enhanced focus on the present is marked from yet another perspective. Any action, linguistic or other, is determined by its situative context. On principle, action is concerned with the potential changeability of things and the extent to which these can be influenced and specified by human actions. For this reason, political communication is fundamentally geared towards changing the status quo. The situative context delimits the possibilities of these changes. The present thus marks the watershed between action and inaction in that it is constructed as the ideal moment for action while the next instant is associated with having missed this right moment of due or appropriate action. The present moment is thus vital in rhetorical terms. The temporality of the present moment is different from the chronological discourse or event structure. While the notion of *chronos* implies a sequence or serialization of temporal events, the present is typified by another temporal concept, the Greek term *kairos*. The *kairotic* present is deployed as a critical, decisive or opportune moment. *Kairos* captures the idea of timing, which invokes a turning point in a historical process:

Thus *kairos* means *the time when* something should happen or be done, the ‘right’ or ‘best’ time; it means *the time when* a constellation of events presents a crisis to which a response must be made; it means *the time when* an opportunity is given for creative action or for achieving some special result that is possible only at ‘this’ time. (Emphases as in the original; Smith 1969: 6)

The analysis demonstrated that the focus on temporality began to emerge as a salient characteristic with early twentieth-century inaugurals and has been a regular feature ever since. There is ample linguistic evidence that temporal categories indeed increased in importance regarding the political uses of language. A case in point is the observation that political events or, in more general terms, political entities, are understood in terms of the time during which they are in effect. The “day of the dictator,” “an hour of national history,” or “the totalitarian era is passing” are but a few illustrative examples, which however point to the wider implications of the temporality of political actions. On the level of discourse, the growing awareness of their temporality entailed the ever more fine-tuned differentiation between political events and actions on the one hand, and their purposes or modalities on the other. The enhanced focus on time has also intensified the necessity to innovate or change. Based on the dual encoding of political reality the changed discourse conditions are also mirrored in the discourse structures themselves. Rhetorically, the present moment is increasingly constructed as *kairotic*, which manifests itself in the development undergone by the inaugural address as a genre. First, *kairos* denotes the appropriate time, or timing of a specific activity. It is in this sense that *kairos* is most strongly linked to the linguistic context in the sense of discourse type or discourse genre. In chapter 5, the case for the inaugural address as a type of epideictic discourse was made. It was argued that the proneness to *kairos* inheres in the genre itself.

Furthermore, its genre-specific kairotic function is associated with the inaugural address as a discourse event. The address is delivered at a moment in the political process that is replete with kairos in all the three senses expounded by the quotation above. It is the rhetorical genre that is delivered at the interface between campaigning and governing on the one hand, while conveying both change and continuity on the other. To a degree, this concentration of kairos in both content and genre accounts for the self-referentiality that has been frequently noted in the inaugural address. In this respect, the differences between nineteenth- and twentieth-century inaugurals are not primarily the result of genre-specific changes but are the upshot of comprehensive transformations within the institution of the presidency.

Second, kairos is understood as a critical or decisive moment due to an overall situation that is perceived as a potential turning point. In the inaugural, this ‘crisis tool’ was recognized as yet another twentieth-century characteristic which results from the rise of the rhetorical presidency. The current ‘crisis’ is typically construed as a constellation that has arisen from external events and necessitates action in response to these changed conditions. The steady increase — from the nineteenth-century inaugurals to the contemporary ones — in the clustering of event schemas from the force-dynamic world is but one piece of compelling evidence for the salience of kairos. The study revealed that action schemas are themselves embedded into other action schemas or motion schemas, leading to a chain of events, mounting the challenges of crisis management. As a consequence, the president’s role is that of a crisis manager who takes the right, well-timed decisions in this overall atmosphere of unrest, in which there is a constant need to respond to the ceaselessly changing conditions in the political arena.

Third, kairos describes an opportune moment, in which a particular purpose or objective can be achieved. Crucially, this moment is not objectively given; rather it is perceived and constructed as such, which holds for all senses of kairos to varying degrees. This aspect of kairos is perhaps the most important development of the inaugural address across time as it coincides with a significant bias in the construal of *newness* towards prospectiveness. The present moment is constructed as the opportune moment for either initiating political actions, hence the pervasiveness of inchoative verbs, or for gaining new momentum to achieve long-term purposes, i.e. the proneness to understanding long-term political activities as journeys. In the latter case the present moment is conceived of as a stopping place in-between two stages of the journey.

In the inaugural address, the detailed representation of the status quo also serves as a means of legitimization. Importantly, the current situation does not only confirm the president’s official role as head of government and political leader, it also legitimizes his political activities. This is due to the moral imperative that inheres in kairos itself: acting at the ‘right’ time is a moral responsibility and thus also a measure of the president’s capability as a moral leader. Importantly, the focus on the present moment as a ‘time when’ does not marginalize the importance of the past, for the present moment is typically construed as growing out of the recent past, including shared experiences. A case in point is the finding that

the construal of *newness* to express the idea of recency is used to establish this common ground between the audience and the speaker.

### The Perspectivity of Construal

In discourse, the creation of a point of view occurs by virtue of the schematic categories of the perspectival system. In the inaugural address, this construal chiefly occurs from an American perspective, in which the American nation either acts on the status quo or has benefited from a certain activity or event. The American nation's perspective is encoded as the ego-experiencer's or the deictic center's position vis-à-vis the events. Typically, it is either positioned at the focal point of the construal or is located at a vantage point that permits the overview of a given event or course of action. Politically, this position legitimizes almost any decision or action; holding an elevated position can be used to justify the interference in political activities of other political institutions or even nations.

This bias in construal proved to be a constant factor in the analysis and manifested itself in the assignment of participant roles, particularly with regard to the roles of agent and beneficiary. As far as agents are concerned, the construal of American agency involves metaphorical and non-metaphorical agents, which are associated with two different event schemas. The personified American nation is the most paradigmatic metaphorical agent and is typically embedded in event schemas of the force dynamic world. The strategic function of metaphorized agency is that the speaker is deictically distal to the events represented, which are narrated in the third person. Not only are the president and the nation represented as two distinct entities, the president's distance to the nation's activities permits him to either disengage from the nation's political activities, in case the events described are negative, or to use his distance to assert his authority in constructing his position as a vantage point in the sense mentioned earlier. In either case, it is the strategy used in spatial leadership, introduced in chapter 3. In contrast, non-metaphorical agency is couched in the occurrence schema and is linguistically coded in the pronoun *we*. Unlike the distal construal in metaphorical agency, the use of the pronoun *we* conveys the idea of deictic proximity, which includes the speaker and the addressee, i.e. the audience. As regards the role of beneficiary, the American nation is typically assigned this participant role through the sentence schema of beneficial transfer. Metaphorically speaking, the US is encoded as the recipient of a variety of entities which include ideas and emotions but also territories. It was found that the transfer schema is conceptually linked to the object dual of the event structure metaphor (ESM), whose central mapping is ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS. Accordingly, the metaphorical transfer is the equivalent of qualitative change, which further improves, develops or strengthens the nation.

What is more, the focal adjustment to or away from an entity that is included in the event or action also entails a shift in the evaluation of this particular event or action. A change of focus was found to frequently coincide with a change of value in favor of more recent events that are understood as improved or changed for the better (see Figure 14 of chapter 6). Conceptually, this shift of emphasis implies two interrelated aspects. The first one concerns

the conceptualization of change. The mapping CHANGE IS MOTION relies on a prospective perspective, according to which the ego-experiencer focuses on the end-point, the goal of the changing activity. Once this is completed, the following scene was found to occur: while the ego-experiencer is already facing new targets and challenges, this occurs on the basis of the recently accomplished activity, which, from the present perspective, is now located in the past and thus involves a retrospective perspective. This shift of perspective can also occur online, i.e. in the meaning construction process itself. A case in point is the foregrounding of the present, which is generally assigned a positive value in the inaugural address. It appears to be the case that the shifting the focus to a given entity implies its valorization while de-emphasizing correlates with devaluation. Another relevant implication of this perspectivity lies in the position of the ego-experiencer in relation to the discourse event. For example, the linguistic unit *old* is given a positive evaluation when the ego-experiencer, which is the American nation in the majority of the cases, is not in focus while the old is perceived as negative when the ego-experiencer is deictically proximal. In these instances, oldness is cognitively associated with a lack of motion, which in the context of American political culture is almost mechanically bound up with negativity.

The modulation from retrospectiveness to prospectiveness is pivotal to political problem solving strategies. Whereas retrospection implies that current ills can be cured by learning from past experience, the prospective perspective is valid when new actions are initiated to meet present challenges, which is the equivalent of learning by doing. In more general terms, the construal of *newness* from a prospective perspective was shown to have become increasingly influential beginning with President McKinley's inaugural addresses. In fact, the prospectiveness appears to characterize contemporary political reasoning in a more comprehensive way, underlining the purposiveness of political activity. Conceptually, this strategy involves envisioning a future point of time at which a given activity is to be accomplished on the one hand, and working one's way back from there into the present on the other. The managerial qualities of the president involve implementing a known new state while managing the provisional transition state in a controlled way, which is a genuine case of change management.

### **Conceptual Representation of the Argument**

Another major finding of the analysis is the pattern identified for the conceptual representation of the arguments that are typically invoked in order to legitimize political activities. The concept of NEWNESS is central to global discourse meanings, it is related to the most important political issues and topics, for example, the representation of territorial expansion in the nineteenth-century or, more generally speaking, the construction of national identity.

The linguistic environment in which the construal of *newness* occurs features a number of highly recurrent reference frames that support the line of argument. The [progress] frame is closely connected to the concept of EXISTENCE which is grounded in several image schemas,



for example, SPACE, CYCLE, PROCESS, or OBJECT. Image schemas provide a more or less concrete basis for metaphorical mappings. Crucially, the overall dynamic conception of the American political system as an open-ended process derives from the organic conception of the concrete experience of existence. In order to thrive and develop, with growth being structured in terms of cycles, an entity requires space. Thus being in progress is not only an essential prerequisite of continued existence but also validates the activities leading to progress, which is motivated by the mapping PROGRESS IS MOTION FORWARD. The prevalence of the [progress] frame is typically encoded in terms of the temporal framework provided by the temporal adverbs 'then' and 'now'. The present state of affairs is typically compared to a past state, as motivated by the mapping CHANGE OF STATE IS CHANGE OF LOCATION. Alternatively, progress is measured in terms of the distance covered between two temporal boundaries events. Again the contents of the speech are linked to the situative context of the discourse genre. The analysis yielded the result that the notion of accomplishment is of particular import in the inaugural address. These national accomplishments are frequently presented in a self-congratulatory tone, instilling a strong affirmative component into the rhetoric.

Another set of frames consists in the highly recurrent [morality] frame which interacts with the [relationship] frame, motivated by the conceptual metaphor of moral wholeness. These frames are highly influential in nineteenth-century inaugurals, where they specify the rationale behind territorial expansion. Accordingly, the notion of moral wholeness is a means of legitimization that is derived from the conceptual metaphor SIMILARITY IS RELATIONSHIP. It was found that reasoning on twentieth-century American foreign policies, particularly when specifying American relations to other nations, is conceptually grounded in very similar frames. Meanwhile, the idea of expansionism has been projected onto more abstract domains, i.e. economic, military or scientific, which however also translate into concrete foreign policies that can be just as liable to territorial imperative as the nineteenth-century colonial exploitation of geo-physical spaces.

These latter aspects are a reflex of the sustained metaphor THE AMERICAN NATION IS A NEW NATION mentioned initially. While the mapping also has an impact on the meaning representation of discourse structures, it is more strongly constrained by the socio-cultural and knowledge contexts rather than the immediate linguistic environment. The adjective *new* was found to specify another category in terms of one single property, hence its newness.

The socio-cultural context specifies the relations of the discourse participants, including the power relations. Conceiving of the American nation as a specific sub-type of nation, i.e. a new nation, entrenched the relational and expressive value of the linguistic category *new*, by which the concept of NEWNESS is realized. Both values are concerned with the effects of societal organization, either in terms of social relations or social identities. The conceptual metaphor A NATION IS A FAMILY is central to establishing socio-political relations between or within nations. According to the metaphorical understanding of the nation in terms of a person, and

by extension, as a family, any political entity is regarded as entertaining social relations with other political entities just like an ordinary person. It was found that the relational value of newness frames the relations of the American nation as follows. When relating to the American nation the adjective is a positive attribute. However, if another political entity is concerned, for example 'new states' or 'new territories', the concept of NEWNESS is construed to mean inexperienced and in need of protection. Thus there is an evaluative opposition between 'their newness', which is the equivalent of weakness and inexperience, and 'our newness', implying an intrinsic advantage over other nations (cf. American exceptionalism).

The analysis yielded that the construal of *newness* frequently implies a hierarchy of nations, in which new and free nations are constructed as being inherently superior to their conceptual opposites, provided that these nations are modeled on the American example. Interestingly, the concept of NEWNESS also frames international relations in the twentieth-century and beyond. The mappings THE WORLD IS A PERSON and THE WORLD IS A FAMILY are the analogues of the same mappings using the target domain NATION. Similarly, the reasoning on political relations is also analogous to the earlier conceptualization, i.e. the world is subdivided into old and new nations, or old and new alliances between nations. The polarizing evaluation of newness, depending on whether or not the American in-group is referenced, also derives from the enhanced expressive value of the linguistic category *new*. A lexical item's expressive value serves as a cue in establishing social identities. Motivated by the conceptual metaphor AMERICA IS A NEW NATION, the American nation self-identifies as a new nation, hence the new is naturally assigned a positive value and evokes an enhanced expressive value. The construal of sense boundaries thus involves establishing social relations and social identities. Depending on the actual construal of newness, a political entity may or may not be included in the American political family.

The knowledge context constrains discourse processing on the basis of stored knowledge that is derived from (past) experiences. The possibility of a particular construal of *newness* is further determined by the experiential value of the linguistic category *new*. It was found that the experiential value of 'new' manifests itself in schematic polarizations according to which it is mechanically associated with positive evaluations. This oppositeness is either based on the construal of *old* and *new* as complementaries or it derives from different reference frames, as is evidenced by the example of 'their newness' vs. 'our newness' given above. This study identified a schematic classification of evaluative oppositions which not only holds for the linguistic coding in terms of formal features but includes the level of cognitive representation. Accordingly, the categories NEW and OLD are conceptually represented in terms of several schematic classifications that draw on space and motion on the one hand, and the action schema and temporal schema on the other. The analysis revealed that the concept of OLDNESS is associated with being enclosed and being located behind the ego-experiencer whereas NEWNESS is linked to unboundedness and is located ahead of the ego-experiencer. With regard to motion, OLDNESS is perceived as motionlessness, which implies the absence of change (derived from the mapping CHANGE IS MOTION). In contrast, the concept of NEWNESS is

closely bound up with motion in general and invites cognitive associations with other target domains that are also mapped in terms of MOTION such as PROGRESS or CHANGE. On the sentence level, the action schema is valid in the construal of *newness* and even provides for further elaborations: when referring to American political actions, hence ‘our actions’, these are typically coded as self-propelled while ‘their action’ is either other-propelled or embedded in the caused-motion schema. Finally, both categories at hand can be processed in discourse to mean ‘lasting’, the difference being the perspectivity involved in the construal: the lexical item *old* has a durative meaning from a retrospective angle while a new situation is generally assumed to be lasting from a prospective perspective. Evidently, these evaluative oppositions are ideologically contested. The ideological discourse structures are indicative of a consistent set of schematic polarizations that are, however, context-sensitive.

It was concluded that the preference of motion concepts over static conceptions of political entities derives from the constraints of the linguistic context, more specifically the discourse genre. Political discourse was defined as an action system. Consequently, political uses of language are both purposive and telic. What is more, the notion of discourse entails itself a dynamic conception of political activity in and through language due to the bidirectionality of discourse as social practice. More specifically, it was argued that the dynamic, open-ended conception of the American political system itself accounts for the salience of motion concepts, possibly also the American progressive movement whose beginnings were traced back to the first half of the nineteenth-century. Thus it was deduced that the pragmatic conception of the American system is motivated by the conceptual metaphor BEING DEMOCRATIC IS ACTING.

Crucially, these schematizations of experience are knowledge-based. The stored knowledge structures clustering around the notion of newness serve as the experiential basis for the representation of the natural world or socio-political realities. Interestingly, this study acknowledged the pervasiveness of image schemas in the construal of political entities, for example, EXISTENCE, SPACE but also CONTAINMENT, FORCE or PART-WHOLE. The image-schematic grounding, at least partially, derives from the proneness to abstraction in political discourse. Abstract concepts tend to be understood in terms of sound, concrete bases which make them experientially accessible.

Moreover the experiential value of the lexical item *new* accounts for biases in the coding of political events and actions, so-called biased event models. The study of the conceptual structure of NEWNESS revealed that the conceptualization of NEWNESS is an instance of embodied experience. All the evidence gathered by the in-depth analysis pointed to the strong experiential basis of NEWNESS. NEWNESS is a cultural model whose domain boundaries are outlined by cultural input. In view of its lasting impact on American political culture, the sense boundaries appear to be construed in relation to the shifting national identities and self-conceptions of the American nation itself.

However, NEWNESS is not the only pervasive concept that is culturally informed. For example, the target concept CHANGE can also be contextualized in terms of its socio-cultural

context and stored knowledge structures. In American political culture, two pervasive types of change could be identified. On the one hand, there is developmental change, which aims to improve the existing, and transitional change, which implements a new state in replacing the old on the other. As can be expected, Republican presidents tend to invoke developmental change while Democratic presidents contend for transitional change. However, it must be said that patterns of party-political tendencies on the whole were rather weak and inconsistent except for a tendency of Republican presidents to construe events from a retrospective angle, which, however, predominantly holds for nineteenth-century and early-twentieth-century inaugurations. Another minor pattern is the popularity of the perception/cognition schema amongst Democratic presidents. The concept of *NEWNESS* is regularly invoked by presidents of all convictions, its actual sense boundaries are determined by external factors rather than party-political color. These factors converge on periods of national reorientation, which are induced by domestic or foreign policy issues. During these phases the American nation repositions itself vis-à-vis the world, reaffirming its national identity or reinterpreting it. If there is however a bipartisan pattern in the construal, however, it concerns the latter aspect. Republicans tend to reaffirm the original Americanness while Democrats tend to reinterpret or even reinvent what it means to be American.

The qualitative analysis of the corpus consisting of 56 inaugural addresses involved a detailed study of the construal of *newness*. Unlike previous studies employing the tool of conceptual metaphor, the present study did not derive metaphorical meaning from individual words but focused on the cognitive representation of larger portions of discourse. It was argued that the conceptual structure of a given discourse unit is supported by the lexical elements as well as the grammatical elements included in it. Combining the methodologies of CDA and CMT on the basis of a three-fold analytical process proved to be a viable procedure to uncover the input of two conceptual metaphors in discourse processing: *NEWNESS IS A SUBEVENT OF MOTION* and *AMERICA IS A NEW NATION*.

The inaugural address is an integral part of presidential discourse, and yet it only constitutes a small segment of presidential communication, let alone American political discourse in its entirety. For this reason, the results produced by this study will have to be applied to other genres or discourse types. Similarly, it would be interesting to conduct a quantitative research in order to explore whether these findings are replicable and can be substantiated for a larger corpus of presidential discourse, possibly including non-institutionalized forms of address or other formats of presidential communication.

Furthermore, the findings are relevant to other frameworks, for example text world theory, which would provide a sound methodological and theoretical basis for the exploration of the impact of deictic projection onto American presidential discourse. Similarly, the importance of the perspectival system in the construal of *newness* is central to cognitive approaches to pragmatics, particularly the influence of deictic proximity and distance in legitimizing political actions. Finally, the overall significance of temporal and spatial categories for the meaning construction and representation in political discourse appears to be underresearched.

The evidence provided by the foregoing analysis is compelling, however. The ‘American system’, as it is occasionally referred to, is essentially open-ended and adaptive, so it appears that the notion of renewal appears to be inscribed in the system itself. Even now, the rhetorical tradition of the American jeremiad, the political homily that resourcefully merges exhortation and affirmation, proves to be more up-to-date than ever. The ‘Obama movement’ is directed at the “old Washington.” Presidential campaigning in 2008 is not only framed by the concept of change, it also introduces change in its most radical form: it is the transformational change that has not infrequently been encountered in American presidential discourse before: “And, so today, a new season of American renewal has begun.”

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## LIST OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTS

President's full name	Party	Tenure	Abbreviation
George Washington	Federalist	1789-1797	GWA
John Adams	Federalist	1797-1801	JAD
Thomas Jefferson	Dem.-Republ.	1801-1809	TJE
James Madison	Dem.-Republ.	1809-1817	JMA
James Monroe	Dem.-Republ.	1817-1825	JMO
John Quincy Adams	Dem.-Republ.	1825-1829	JQA
Andrew Jackson	Democratic	1829-1837	AJA
Martin Van Buren	Democratic	1837-1841	MVB
William Henry Harrison	Whig	1841 (March-April)	WHH
John Tyler	Whig	1841-1845	JTY
James Knox Polk	Democratic	1845-1849	JKP
Zachary Taylor	Whig	1849-1850	ZTA
Millard Fillmore	Whig	1850-1853	MFI
Franklin Pierce	Democratic	1853-1857	FPI
James Buchanan	Democratic	1857-1861	JBU
Abraham Lincoln	Republican	1861-1865	ALI
Andrew Johnson	Democratic	1865-1869	AJO
Ulysses Simpson Grant	Republican	1869-1877	USG
Rutherford Birchard Hayes	Republican	1877-1881	RBH
James Abram Garfield	Republican	1881 (March-September)	JAG
Chester Alan Arthur	Republican	1881-1885	CAA
Stephen Grover Cleveland	Democratic	1885-1889	SGC
Benjamin Harrison	Republican	1889-1893	BHA
Stephen Grover Cleveland	Democratic	1893-1897	SGC
William McKinley Jr.	Republican	1897-1901	WMK
Theodore Roosevelt	Republican	1901-1909	TRO
William Howard Taft	Republican	1909-1913	WHT
Thomas Woodrow Wilson	Democratic	1913-1921	TWW
Warren Gamaliel Harding	Republican	1921-1923	WGH
John Calvin Coolidge	Republican	1923-1929	JCC
Herbert Clark Hoover	Republican	1929-1933	HCH
Franklin Delano Roosevelt	Democratic	1933-1945	FDR
Harry S. Truman	Democratic	1945-1953	HST
Dwight David Eisenhower	Republican	1953-1961	DDE
John Fitzgerald Kennedy	Democratic	1961-1963	JFK
Lyndon Baines Johnson	Democratic	1963-1969	LBJ
Richard Milhous Nixon	Republican	1969-1974	RMN
Gerald Rudolph Ford	Republican	1974-1977	GRF
James Earl Carter Jr.	Democratic	1977-1981	JEC
Ronald Wilson Reagan	Republican	1981-1989	RWR
George Herbert Walker Bush	Republican	1989-1993	GBU
William Jefferson Clinton	Democratic	1993-2001	WJC
George Walker Bush	Republican	2001-	GWB

## ALPHABETICAL LIST OF CONCEPTUAL METAPHORS

A CHANGE OF STATE IS A CHANGE OF LOCATIONS

A NATION IS A FAMILY

A PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A BUSINESS

A PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A JOURNEY

A REPUBLIC IS A PERSON

ABSTRACT IDEAS ARE OBJECTS

ACCIDENTAL CHANGES ARE ACCIDENTAL MOVEMENTS

ACHIEVING A PURPOSE IS ACQUIRING A DESIRED OBJECT

ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION

PROGRESS IS MOTION FORWARD

ACTIONS ARE SELF-CONTROLLED

ACQUISITIONS OR LOSSES

ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION

ACTIONS ARE SUBSTANCES THAT GO INTO THE TIME CONTAINER

AMERICA IS A NEW NATION

AMERICA IS A PERSON

AMERICA IS INNOVATION

AMERICA IS NEW

AMERICAN HISTORY IS A BOOK

ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS

BEING DEMOCRATIC IS ACTING

BEING DEMOCRATIC IS BEING IN MOTION

BEING MORAL IS BEING UPRIGHT

BEING NEW IS BEING IN A GOOD CONDITION

BEING NEW IS BEING IN A STATE OF IGNORANCE

BEING OLD IS BEING IN A BAD CONDITION

BEING OLD IS BEING IN A STATE OF KNOWLEDGE

CATEGORY IS DIVIDED AREA

CAUSES ARE FORCES

CAUSES ARE FORCES CONTROLLING MOVEMENT TO OR FROM LOCATIONS

CHANGE IS MOTION

CHANGE IS MOTION FROM ONE LOCATION TO ANOTHER

CHANGE IS MOTION OF AN OBJECT TO/AWAY FROM A LOCATION

CIVILIZATION IS A PERSON

COMMUNISM IS A PERSON

COMPETITION IS A RACE

COMPLEX SYSTEMS ARE BUILDINGS

DEMOCRACY IS A PERSON

DEMOCRACY IS PROGRESS

DIFFERENCE IS DISTANCE

DIFFERENCE IS SEPARATION

DIFFICULTIES ARE IMPEDIMENTS

DIFFICULTIES ARE IMPEDIMENTS TO

ACQUIRING A DESIRED OBJECT

DIFFICULTIES ARE IMPEDIMENTS TO MOTION

DIVISION IS WEAKNESS

EMOTIONS ARE OBJECTS

EVENTS ARE ACTIONS

EVENTS ARE MOVING OBJECTS

EXPECTED PROGRESS IS A TRAVEL

SCHEDULE

EXTENSION OF A SPACE IS EXTENSION OF POWER

EXTERNAL EVENTS ARE MOVING OBJECTS

FREE ACTION IS UNINHIBITED SELF-PROPELLED MOTION

FREEDOM IS A PERSON

FREEDOM IS SPACE TO MOVE

GOVERNMENT IS A PERSON

HAPPINESS IS UP

HISTORICAL CHANGE IS MOVEMENT FROM A STATE OF IGNORANCE TO A STATE OF KNOWLEDGE

HISTORICAL PERIODS ARE MOVING OBJECTS

HISTORY IS A (NATURAL) FORCE

HISTORY IS A CONTAINER

HISTORY IS A PERSON

HISTORY IS A TEACHER

IDEAS ARE CONTAINERS

KNOWING IS SEEING

LACK OF CONTROL OVER CHANGE IS LACK OF CONTROL OVER MOVEMENT

LIFE IS A JOURNEY

LOCATION IS A BOUNDED AREA IN SPACE

LONG-TERM PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEYS

MEANS ARE PATHS (TO DESTINATIONS)

MEANS ARE PATHS TO ACHIEVING  
 DESIRED OBJECTS  
 MORAL WHOLENESS  
 MORALITY AS THE NURTURANCE OF  
 SOCIAL TIES  
 MORALITY IS STRENGTH  
 MORE IS BETTER

NATION IS A PERSON  
 NATION IS INNOVATION  
 NEW IS AHEAD  
 NEW IS GOOD  
 NEWNESS IS A SUBEVENT OF MOTION  
 NEWNESS IS CHANGE  
 NEWNESS IS PROGRESS

PERSISTING IS BEING ERECT  
 POLITICS IS A RACE  
 PRECONDITION FOR RESULTING  
 EVENT/ACTION  
 PROGRESS IS MOTION FORWARD  
 PROGRESS IS UP  
 PURPOSES ARE DESIRED OBJECTS  
 PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS  
 RELATIONSHIP IS PROXIMITY

SIMILARITY IS PROXIMITY  
 SIMILARITY IS RELATIONSHIP  
 SOCIETY IS A PERSON  
 SPACIOUS IS GOOD  
 STATES ARE LOCATIONS  
 STATES ARE BOUNDED REGIONS IN SPACE  
 SUCCEEDING IS MOVEMENT FORWARD  
 SUCCEEDING IS PROGRESS

THE AMERICAN NATION IS A NEW  
 NATION  
 THE NEW WORLD IS A PERSON  
 THE OLD WORLD IS A PERSON  
 THE SETTLEMENT OF NORTH AMERICA  
 BY THE ENGLISH SETTLERS IS THE  
 MOVEMENT OF THE JEWS FROM  
 EGYPT TO THE PROMISED LAND  
 THE WORLD IS A FAMILY  
 THE WORLD IS A PERSON  
 TIME IS A CHANGER  
 TIME IS A CONTAINER  
 TIME IS A DESTROYER  
 TIME IS A DEVOURER  
 TIME IS A HEALER  
 TIME IS A MOVING OBJECT  
 TIME IS A TEACHER

TIME IS A THIEF  
 TIME IS AN EVALUATOR  
 TIME IS AN INNOVATOR  
 TIME IS CHANGE  
 TIME IS MONEY  
 TIME IS A RESOURCE  
 TIME IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY  
 TIME IS MOTION  
 TIME IS MOVEMENT THROUGH SPACE  
 TIME IS STATIONARY AND WE MOVE  
 THROUGH IT  
 TIME PASSING IS AN OBSERVER'S MOTION  
 OVER A LANDSCAPE  
 TIME PASSING IS MOTION OF AN OBJECT

UNITY IS STRENGTH

VISUAL FIELDS ARE CONTAINERS

WEALTH IS UP  
 WELL-BEING IS WEALTH