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a new proposal for Freudian psychoanalysis based on Kantian theory

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THE STRUGGLE OF THE SOUL AND THE RETURN TO GOODNESS

A new proposal for Freudian psychoanalysis based on Kantian theory

By

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A dissertation submitted to the University of Bristol in accordance with the requirements of the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in the Faculty of Arts.

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ABSTRACT

Most ethical theories focus on the study of the moral behaviour of human beings, on those human beings who are considered adults. However, there is no consistent account of what an adult is in moral terms, or of how we become adults with moral responsibilities. In this dissertation I interrogate the Kantian moral theory and I propose to complement it by incorporating a model of moral development inspired by Freudian psychoanalysis. The purpose of this dissertation is to depict a model, based on the observation of the dynamics of guilt, capable of explaining the moral transition from childhood to adulthood in order to reflect on what goodness means, how we can take care of our moral goodness, and how we can recover it if we lose it.

I declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with the requirements of the University's *Regulations and Code of Practice for Research Degree Programmes* and that it has not been submitted for any other academic award. Except where indicated by specific reference in the text, the work is the candidate's own work. Work done in collaboration with, or with the assistance of, others, is indicated as such. Any views expressed in the dissertation are those of the author.

SIGNED: Maria Berta López Ríos [redacted] DATE: 21 March 2022

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Dedicated to my children

Amaru and Eva

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LIST OF THE ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE REFERENCES TO KANT´S WORKS:

A and/or *B*	The two versions of the *Critique of Pure Reason*
G	Groundwork of the *Metaphysics of Morals*
M	Metaphysics of Morals
CPR	Critique of Practical Reason
CJ	Critique of Judgment
R	Religion within the Boundaries of mere Reason
Anth	Lectures on Anthropology

LIST OF THE ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE REFERENCES TO FREUD´S WORKS:

I am only using SE as abbreviation for the Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud.

'[how] to explain with words of this world
That a ship set sail from me and took me with her'
(Alejandra Pizarnik)

INTRODUCTION

The 11th of September of 1973 drastically altered the lives of the people of my country, Chile. After the armed forces staged a coup under the command of General in Chief Augusto Pinochet, we had almost two decades of military government, and then a long process of slow return to democracy. The military government changed the laws of the country, its constitution, political and economic system, interpersonal relations, and so on. The regime adopted a political ideology to justify crimes and human rights abuse, which was executed in the most bloodcurdling way.[1] I grew up in the middle of that tense environment.

My most chilling childhood memories involve listening to those who lost family members who were suddenly kidnapped by the army and never heard from them again after they went missing. Those families could not mourn their loved ones, because they were not able to bury their bodies. When people suddenly disappeared, sometimes the authorities offered political justifications for the kidnappings; some other times their families did not receive any justification, they could only imagine the abductee's fate. They knew that awful things happened to those who were kidnapped and went missing, but they did not know for certain if their relatives were among those unfortunate people. The families of the missing people did not want to give up hope of finding them alive. Perhaps they escaped and then hid somewhere!

1 This information is public knowledge; you can find a summary of the facts on:
Wikipedia contributors, 'Military dictatorship of Chile (1973–1990)', *Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopaedia*. [accessed 15 March 2022]
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_dictatorship_of_Chile_(1973%E2%80%931990)#cite_note-35>

Thus, the families never lost hope, but neither got over their dread, and society at large felt terrified.[2]

In my early twenties, I was shocked to read in the newspaper that some former Chilean soldiers, who were barely 18 years old in the 70s had revealed where the bodies of some kidnapping victims and missing persons were buried. On the one hand, providing that information could be considered a heroic act under the circumstances; the army put pressure on its members to keep this information under wraps. In addition, the new democratically elected institutions of government and justice could sentence soldiers to prison, and speaking up could expose the military men to public opprobrium. On the other hand, the information they revealed exposed the cowardice and the moral monstrosity of the conscripts because it implicated them in the murders and kidnappings. That tension, from what I learned, led to one of two outcomes: the soldiers who had come forward either committed suicide or lapsed into psychopathological behaviour as their mental health deteriorated.[3][4] Nowadays, the country must deal with the traumas of the survivors, their families, and the perpetrators who betrayed their humanity and consequently became self-deceived or consumed by guilt.[5]

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[2] This dramatic episode of our history is very well explained in the award-winning documentary *The Nostalgia for the Light*: Wikipedia contributors, 'Nostalgia for the Light', Wikipedia*, The Free Encyclopaedia.* [accessed 15 March 2022] <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nostalgia_for_the_Light>

You can find a detail of the records of the missing persons in: Elías Padilla, 'La Memoria y el Olvido'*, Nunca Más.* [accessed 15 March 2022] <http://www.desaparecidos.org/nuncamas/web/investig/lamemolv/memolv00.htm>

[3] See the name of seven soldiers committing suicide after their declarations in the court, in:
Notimérica, 'Los 7 ex militares condenados por crímenes de DDHH que se han suicidado en Chile', *Notimérica*. [accessed 15 March 2022].
<https://www.notimerica.com/sociedad/noticia-ex-militares-condenados-crimenes-ddhh-suicidado-chile-20150813212408.html>

[4] A soldier offering information through the news, in:
Pascale Bonnefoy, 'Un exsoldado chileno recuerda con culpa las atrocidades de la dictadura de Pinochet', *The New York Times.* [accessed 15 March 2022].
<https://www.nytimes.com/es/2016/03/07/espanol/america-latina/un-exsoldado-chileno-recuerda-con-culpa-la-dictadura-de-pinochet.html>

5 The Chilean news interviewed ex-soldiers that claim for protection in exchange for information; see this in:
Wari, 'Ex conscriptos del 73: Obediencia debida y confesión militar', *El Ciudadano*. [accessed 15 March 2022].
<https://www.elciudadano.com/justicia/ex-conscriptos-del-73-obediencia-debida-y-confesion-militar/11/02/>

I understood that it would be easier for the families of the victims to begin healing their emotional wounds by mourning their dead and bringing their despair to a close if more soldiers would come forward with information about the kidnapped and missing people. It would go a long way toward balancing national social relations. However, it would clearly come at a cost. That cost has to do with how those soldiers who bear the burden of their guilt can deal with it. The evidence seems to suggest that part of the society (those close to the army) has used cruel self-deceptive mechanisms to avoid confronting its guilt. As the old model and structure of the police and the army keep ruling those institutions without paradigmatic reformulations -- because those institutions and their members have not been judged in a fair trial, and therefore they have been wrongly justified, then, those organizations (the Chilean police and the army) have been recapitulating some episodes of the violent dynamics of the past.[6] Since the 2000s, the country has experienced massive social protests, which have been contained using police and military force, awfully violating fundamental human rights once again and leaving many people dead, injured (often by being shot in the eyes) or missing. [7] The history of my country provides some of the motivation for this dissertation. In this Introduction, I wanted to explain the personal journey that has led me to look for answers, and more specifically, to try to understand the dynamics of guilt, and the possibility of healing. However, my work does not focus on clarifying historical issues my country has had to deal with, but on exploring the deep psychological dynamics that govern our human behaviour. Therefore, the main questions that I aim to explore, and answer are: How can we return to goodness once we have become conscious that we have failed morally? What role do emotions play in this process of moral corruption and recovery? How is self-knowledge relevant to this return?

[6] This is the judgement of many international courts of law. See for example:
Tomás González, 'Baltasar Garzón y denuncia ante la Corte Penal Internacional por crímenes de lesa humanidad: "Responden a una política generalizada y sistemática del gobierno chileno"', Radio Universidad de Chile. [accessed 15 March 2022].
<https://radio.uchile.cl/2021/04/30/baltasar-garzon-y-denuncia-ante-la-corte-penal-internacional-por-crimenes-de-lesa-humanidad-responden-a-una-politica-generalizada-y-sistematica-del-gobierno-chileno/>

[7] See about this in:
Wikipedia contributors, 'Eye injuries in the 2019–2020 Chilean protests', *Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopaedia*. [accessed 15 March 2022].
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eye_injuries_in_the_2019%E2%80%932020_Chilean_protests>

I designed this project by stages. First, in part I (chapters I, II, and III), I started my journey by reflecting on, exploring, and comparing the theoretical grounds and concepts of two complex psycho-moral theories, namely Kant's and Freud's, in order to configure a conceptual ground for discussion. On that basis, I offered a critical reading of those theories, incorporating other scholars' comparison of Kant´s and Freud´s theories into my discussion. In general terms, I highlighted the theoretical gaps found in Kant´s and Freud´s theories, and I proposed some possible solutions making a theoretical graft on both theories. By means of the theoretical graft I present an account where moral development is central. Thus, in part II (chapters IV - VII), I explain the dynamics of guilt and the process of healing (which I defined as maturity). I briefly describe each chapter below:

CHAPTER I: The purpose of this chapter was to provide an introduction to the most relevant postulates of Kant´s epistemology, ethics, and moral psychology, in order to lay the basis for a comparison with Freud´s ideas about the psyche. This chapter is mostly explanatory, aiming to present the Kantian standpoint.

CHAPTER II: The purpose of this chapter was to delve into the idea of soul or psyche Kant defends. This is partially an explanatory chapter. In the first section, I explain the Kantian postulate of the soul, which I take as a starting point for reflecting on responsibility. In the second section I criticise the Kantian account, arguing that it cannot account for responsibility because of the lacunae in its maturation model. That is, Kantian ethical theory offers an intelligible but incomplete picture of the process through which a child becomes a fully-fledged human being, or an adult with responsibilities.

CHAPTER III: The aim of this chapter is to explain the Freudian standpoint in order to draw comparisons with the Kantian theory. I identify theoretical connections between Kant and Freud, and the relevant divergences regarding their ideas of how our "psyche" works. In the first section, I explain what the mental apparatus is for Freud, its topography, and the key concepts of the Freudian theory, which mostly revolve around the domains of the conscious and the unconscious. In section two, I focus on the concept of the unconscious. I explain that

comparative scholarship on Kant and Freud generally acknowledges similarities between both authors' views on epistemology and representation. However, it is in Freud´s idea of repressed unconscious content that we can find some difficulties, which hinder any attempt to make both theories match harmoniously.

There are more difficulties because, first, Kant never used the concept of the "unconscious". However, scholars widely agree that we can derive that concept from Kant´s theory. Second, Freud´s theory focuses on the material nature of the unconscious, but the focus of Kant´s moral theory was placed on how reason can be applied independently of naturalistic causes. Third, Freud posits that "moral conscience" is formed and works from one specific unconscious domain; on the other hand, Kant regards "moral conscience" as an a priori capacity, a type of guide that is part of practical reason, which is totally detached from any natural influence. In order to resolve the difficulties or incongruences I propose that we should integrate some intellectual domains of the unconscious to the Freudian model.

CHAPTER IV: In this chapter I delve into the ideas of "conscience" and the feeling of "guilt" in Freud´s and Kant´s theories. This chapter introduces my main argument, which describes the dynamics of guilt, what can help us to discern how to move back to goodness once we have failed ourselves. In the first section, I provide a general picture of my interpretation of Freud´s concept of the superego, and I point out that his theory lacks a consistent explanation of guilt's initial emergence. In other words, like Kant, Freud has an important lacuna in his account of how we attain moral maturity. I criticize some of Freud's assumptions related to that lacuna and offer some ideas about how to fill it. Thus, in the second and third sections I proposed a theoretical Freud-Kant graft to fill the gaps in both theories' accounts of maturation and the original emergence of guilt.

CHAPTER V: This chapter aims to familiarise the reader with key points in the scholarship on Kant and Freud, in order to illustrate my contribution to that discussion. As current comparative studies of Kant and Freud have understood their divergences (mostly regarding the concept of conscience) differently than I do, in this chapter I do a critical review of two

works that I believe exemplify the two main trends in the scholarship that analyzes the conceptual relationship between Freud and Kant, Béatrice Longuenesse's *Kant's "I" in "I Ought to" and Freud´s Super-Ego* (2012); and Alfred Tauber's *Freud the Reluctant Philosopher* (2010).

CHAPTER VI: The purpose of this chapter is to describe in more detail the mechanisms of irrationality, especially those of *akrasia* and self-deception, to explain how those mechanisms both complicate the question of responsibility and constitute an important element for psychoanalysis to reckon with in its search for mental health. I engage with the analysis of those mechanisms Sebastian Gardner expounds in his *Irrationality and the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis* (1993).

CHAPTER VII: This chapter brings the dissertation to a close by integrating all the concepts reviewed in it into a model that clarifies the interrelations among them. Furthermore, to complement the preceding chapters' focus on guilt, I reflect on the feeling of love through a reading of Apuleius´ myth of *Eros and Psyche* to incorporate it into the model I defend.

Finally, I would like to say that the purpose of the whole dissertation is to offer a theoretical basis for answering the main questions mentioned above concerning the ideas of responsibility and guilt. The dissertation does not purport to answer those questions, but to provide a theoretical ground for thinking about possible answers for them. Nonetheless, I will ponder some answers in the conclusion of the dissertation.

PART I

THE TWO STANDPOINTS

PART I

THE TWO STANDPOINTS

The purpose of Part I is to offer a general overview of some of the key concepts that compose Kant's and Freud's theories. The specific goal of this first division of the dissertation is to offer a ground to be able to discuss a theoretical comparison between both philosophers. So, Part I is not pursuing to introduce the reader toward the main questions of the dissertation and their possible solutions, but to achieve an understanding of Kant´s and Freud´s standpoints. This discussion will be used (in Part II) to propose a novel approach to the questions mentioned in the introduction, which are: how can we return to goodness once we've become conscious that we have failed morally? What role do emotions play throughout this process of moral fall and recovery? And how is self-knowledge relevant to this return? I do believe that a clear identification of the two standpoints can offer us valuable means to reaching a satisfactory proposal that allows us to approach to the main inquiries of this dissertation from an interesting angle capable of facilitating our reflection.

In general terms, throughout this first Part, which I divided into three chapters, I work on the identification of some theoretical agreements and disagreements in Kant and Freud, mostly regarding their ideas of soul, consciousness and unconsciousness, and conscience. In this part, I conclude that it is necessary to identify more unconscious domains that those three that were found by Freud and I thus propose to integrate three more unconscious domains inspired by Kant's thoughts.

CHAPTER I

THE KANTIAN APPROACH

Kant's philosophical influence is foundational for later European thinkers. Moreover, Kant offered many sophisticated thoughts about emotional experience and psychology. However, they have been under-appreciated in scholarship on the history of theories of emotions, and psychology. The aim of this chapter is to offer an introduction to the most relevant theoretical pieces of the Kantian puzzle, i.e., to provide a descriptive picture of Kant's most relevant postulates in order to be able to derive a ground from his reflections on epistemology, ethics, and moral psychology, and establish a comparison with Freud's theory of the mental apparatus. This chapter specifically seeks to characterise the Kantian standpoint.

As many scholars note, In Freud's work it is possible to identify a philosophical tension, a somewhat forced effort to unify different views within German philosophy in order to support the theoretical discoveries that slowly emerge from his psychotherapeutic praxis. Throughout this chapter I plan to depict an expository synopsis of those theoretical Kantian grounds that, by means of a conceptual comparison, can contribute to elucidate some aspects of Freud's work that were left inconclusive. Therefore, I have divided this chapter into three sections, which will only present the Kantian overview, as this will be later required in the comparison:

The first section aims to introduce the reader to Kant's epistemology, mainly in order to sketch a basic picture of the Kantian theory of representation, which will be important to later establish a parallel with Freud's theory of the mental apparatus and its topographies. By means of the topographies, Freud attempts to explain the mechanism of reception of stimuli and its processing. Those explanations of Freud, which will be explained in chapter III, will give us a first material to link with Kant.

The second section aims to introduce some basic concepts of Kantian ethics, mostly those reflections related to our rational will and freedom, which will be relevant to later initiate a discussion on the ideas of spontaneity of the soul, heteronomy, autonomy, and conscience in Kant and Freud. Those ideas will be discussed from different angles in the following chapters of this dissertation.

The third section aims to show a general synopsis of Kant's moral psychology, mainly his reflections on emotions, feelings, and desires. Those reflections will serve as basis for the later comparative discussion between Kant and Freud about the role that the feelings of guilt, frustration, and love play in our inner psychology. Mostly, that comparison will show divergences between Freud and Kant because although those emotions and feelings are very relevant for the genesis of Freudian theory of the repressed unconscious, they are not treated with the same relevance in the Kantian account. This will be explained and discussed from chapter IV onwards.

I based this descriptive chapter on my own insights regarding Kant´s work, with reference to recent Kant scholarship by Henry Allison (2004), Sebastian Gardner (1999), Howard Caygill (1995), Christine Korsgaard (1996,2009), Alix Cohen (2014), Seiriol Morgan (2005,2008), and Matt McCormick (2018), among others.

i. Kantian conceptual grounds

In general terms, we can think of the whole Kantian theory of the human mind as if this were an organic apparatus that can adequately run thanks to the work and camaraderie of its inner powers, which Kant calls faculties or capacities of the mind.[8] Kant says in his *Critique of*

[8] According to Kant, there are three main faculties or capacities of the mind, which are: Faculty of Sensitivity, Faculty of Understanding, and the faculty of Reason. There are two other internal faculties, which are: Faculty of Imagination, which run throughout those three main faculties; and the faculty of Judgement; which run within the Faculty of Understanding.

See Matt McCormick, 'Immanuel Kant: Metaphysics', *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. [accessed 15 March 2022]. <https://www.iep.utm.edu/kantmeta/>

Pure Reason: 'An organon of pure reason would be a compendium of those principles according to which alone all pure cognitions *a priori* can be obtained. The completely extended application of such an organon would afford us a system of pure reason' (A10/ B23 – A11/B25). He adds, 'The transcendental enlargement of our rational knowledge would be, not the cause, but merely the effect of a practical teleology imposed by itself upon us' (A816/B844). Kant defines teleology as 'a necessary unity […] founded on the essence of the individual will itself' (A816/B844). These are complex quotations. The key points for us, which I will explain throughout this section, are that Kant explains "pure reason" mainly as the great organon capable of providing systematization and unity to the pure cognitions a priori of our mind, and their applications, which impose themselves upon us.[9]

Let us begin with the question, what are cognitions a priori? In his First *Critique,* Kant explains that cognitions a priori are 'knowledge that is independent of any experience' (B1). Paradoxically, such knowledge cannot be known in itself; it can only be known via its applications. But what are those "applications of the pure cognitions a priori"? According to Kant, there could be two possible forms of applications of the pure cognitions a priori, namely analytical and synthetical judgments (A6/B10). Analytical judgment has a predicate contained in its subject. There, the subject-predicate connection is 'thought through identity' (A6/B10). On the other hand, Sebastian Gardner specifies that a synthetical judgment has a subject different from its predicate, and the connection between them can be 'thought without identity' (1999:54).

[9] Ioli Patellis delves into this Kantian analogy between rational system and organisms (2007:77-95). He says, 'Kant does indeed draw a number of analogies between systems and organisms or reason and organisms. Organisms lend themselves to this analogical use, on the one hand, because they are systems and, on the other, because they are the only naturally occurring instances of the idea of a system, of the product par excellence of reason' (2007:79).

"Synthetical" derives from "synthesis," which signifies a relation between two different wholes (Subject-Predicate). Kant explains in his *First Critique* that synthesis is 'the act of putting different representations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one act of knowledge' (B 103); it is an act of knowledge that 'cannot be derived from the manifold but is always added to it' (Caygill 1995: 382). Howard Caygill highlights that for Kant, 'synthesis is cast as the fundamental activity of the human mind' (1995: 382). Kant also warns in his *First Critique* that a synthesis of two disjunctive elements implies coordination and not subordination (B 112). In other words, a synthesis does not mix different elements, but coordinates them within an act of knowledge.

For Kant, the whole organon of pure reason is related to nature, that externality where the objects or things in-themselves reside. As pure reason and nature are two totally different wholes, a relation between them can only be thought "without identity," like any synthetical judgment. Again, like any synthetical judgment, the connection between them must necessarily add something new (knowledge). Now, that connection can only be possible thanks to the existence of sensibility.

Thus, whereas analytical applications contract pure reason into a "concentrated" compendium of principles a priori (*CPR* BXXi-BXXiV), synthetical applications by contrast extend pure reason to experience its otherness (nature). However, Kant warns us that our mind applies its own rules of interpretation when it is processing that otherness. In other words, he warns us that we cannot know what is outside our mind (nature), we can only know that phenomenon or representation that our mind is receiving, perceiving, and processing.

On the one hand, our human mind is open and receptive to nature; on the other, nature offers the stimuli to wake the powers of our mind (*CPR* B1). Thanks to the stimuli and our receptive capacity, we can make synthetic judgments a posteriori. Thus, the faculty of

sensibility works as a permeable frontier of receptivity capable of answering (being affected) and converting the external stimuli into intuitions and/or sensations of our mind.

Sensibility rests primarily on two aesthetic principles a priori of configuration called space and time.[10] Space and time are the fundamental representations of the openness (in space) and receptivity (in time) of the mind; they represent the possibility of answering 'for the existence of a corresponding object' (*CPR* BXXiV). That way, nature can affect us by means of our sensibility, as long as our sensibility possesses the capacity to receive, intuit, sense, and perceive that alien input that comes from the outside. We also possess an intellectual capacity -- called understanding -- to process and conceptualize what is perceived by our sensibility.[11]

Thanks to sensibility it is possible to distinguish two types of cognitions: a posteriori and a priori. Cognitions a posteriori are the knowledge that emerges from experience by means of the power of our sensibility and its fundamental configurations of time and space.[12] This knowledge, as I explained before, is the effect of a synthetical extension. Cognitions a posteriori are first of all representations of something external, which can be then transformed into

[10] Sebastian Gardner explains that for Kant the word "aesthetics" 'is concerned with sensibility, and thus with the objects in so far they are sensed (…). Its focus, however, is principally on space and time' (1999:65). The idea of space is very controversial and has generated an extended debate among scholars. In this document I will not delve in the details of this debate; I will only rest on Kant´s quotation rescued in Allison´s work (2004:21): 'time and space are only sensible forms of our intuition [sensibility], but not determinations given for themselves or conditions of objects as things in themselves' (A 369).

[11] Kant separates every faculty of the mind in order to describe properly their respective functioning and relevance. With respect to sensibility and understanding, Howard Caygill in his reflections about Kant´s *Apology for Sensibility* (2003) describes the relevance of sensibility, as a faculty that is not subordinated to understanding, he argues that 'Kant distinguished between the sources of the two faculties and the limits of their respective forms of judgment' (2003:189). To delve into the definitions of intuition and concept in Kant, see Gardner 1999: 66.

[12] Space and time are first of all cognitions a priori, pre-installed in our mind. However, as they work in sensibility, they must receive the external stimuli and give them a determined configuration, producing cognitions a posteriori. That special status of space and time of being a priori, but at the same time receiving the objects and producing immediate cognitions a posteriori corresponds to what Kant called the first antinomy of pure reason. On the one hand, space and time are the frame to receive the external, and insofar as they are a frame, they only can receive the external in a finite and limited way; on the other hand, since they are pure cognitions a priori, they are at the same time infinite. Therefore, it is the disjunctive relation between these two dialectical qualities of time-space, between being finite and at the same time infinite. For a review of the first antinomy of pure reason see: Alisson 1996:357-395

empirical concepts. Cognitions a priori, by contrast, would be logical applications previously installed in our mind in a mysterious way; they allow incoming intuition to be processed and organised in a manner that allows us to have knowledge.[13]

In Kantian terms, all these applications of cognitions a priori – in other words, these analytical and synthetical judgments – are "transcendental" actions. The word "transcendental" is of capital importance in Kant´s theory. It is worth beginning by clarifying the difference between two words: 'transcendental' and 'transcendent'. In his *Prolegomena*, Kant explains that 'the word "transcendental" (…) does not signify something passing beyond all experience but something that indeed precedes it a priori, but that is intended simply to make cognition of experience possible'.[14] Gardner notices that '[t]ranscendental is thus not to be confused with transcendent, which does precisely mean "passing beyond all experience"' (1999:46). In his *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant defines as transcendental 'all knowledge which is not so much occupied with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of these objects, so far as this mode of knowledge is possible a priori' (A 11/ B 25). In other words, Kant is explaining that "transcendental" involves that final and necessary principle that supports the possibility of our knowledge.

In the terminology I have already introduced, analytical and synthetic a priori judgments are actions or applications of our pure reason. In order to be considered "a priori," these applications must pass two irrefutable tests: they must be necessary and they must be strictly universal. Gardner explains, 'Kant makes necessity criterial for a priori because he holds that experience can teach us "that a thing is so and so, but not that it cannot be otherwise"' (1999:53); Kant also specifies that a cognition is strictly universal when 'no exception at all is

[13] Kant expresses in his *First Critique* that the purpose of his work does not 'require to carry our analysis any further than is necessary to understand, in their full extent, the principles of synthesis a priori, with which alone we have to do' (A 11/ B 25). In other words, he does not try to delve into the analytical a priori. He recognizes the limitations when he states that he does not try to build a Doctrine of Pure reason, but just a Critique. That means, a 'correction and guide of our knowledge' (A11 B25).

[14] See Gardner 1999: 373.

allowed to be possible'(*CPR* B3). Now, there must be a "ground" or a principle that allows our reason to mesh with the objects of our sensory intuitions. Otherwise, we could not in any meaningful sense think theoretically or practically about the natural world in which we live. That ground must be necessary and strictly universal, and it must allow a deep and unknown coordination between both dimensions.

Kant recognizes in his *First Critique* that cognitions a priori 'are merely subjective aptitudes for thought implanted in us contemporaneously with our existence, which were so ordered and disposed by our Creator, that their exercise perfectly harmonizes with the laws of nature which regulates experience' (B 167). Even when Kant cannot answer how the genius of our Creator makes this harmonization between both dimensions possible, he gives us one clue to understanding the ground of that coordination, which lies in the "appearances", also called "phenomena".

The place and meaning of the appearances or phenomena have always been a philosophical problem. In his *First Critique*, Kant warns, 'We never can present an adequate image of it, it remains for us a problem incapable of solution' (A 327/ B 384). He explains that appearances are not the same as things in themselves (A 368). Kant also says, 'I cannot perceive external things, I can only infer their existence from my inner perception in so far as I regard the perception as the effect of which something external is the immediate cause' (A 368). Intuitions (immediate cognitions a posteriori) are related to the external objects, whose existence we infer from appearances. Hence, Kant concludes that 'appearances are not things in themselves, but themselves only representations, which in turn have their object, which therefore cannot be further intuited by us, and that may therefore be called the non-empirical, i.e., transcendental object =X' (A 109). Thus, Kant calls an object that is unknown to us but necessarily exists "the transcendental object".

Therefore, all our mental production and reality involves representations of appearances, which are constantly synthesized by our intellectual faculties and turned into empirical concepts (mediated cognitions).[15] Sensibility is primarily the mental faculty that allows us to "be affected" by "external objects" but, as Allison stresses, in Kantian terms it means to be affected in a "certain way" or "manner" (2004:14). In other words, we are not just being affected by objects, there is something more in the middle of that. Appearances would be the manifestation of that intriguing intersection between the two dimensions: internal (mental) and external (nature or things in themselves).[16]

It is precisely this intriguing space, where we are "affected in a certain manner", situated in the middle between the transcendental laws of reasoning and the given of the natural world, in that, in order to delve into it, it will be important to understand the psychological Kantian approach as whole. In the next sections I will turn to that topic.

ii. Kantian Ethics

Firstly, Kant clarifies in his *Groundwork for The Metaphysics of Morals* that the organization of our human mind can be studied through three types of philosophies.[17] In Christine Korsgaard's words, these three philosophies are: '*logic,* which applies to all thought; *physics,* which deals with the way the world is; *and ethics,* which deals with what we ought to do'.[18] She continues, 'logic deals with the laws of thought, physics with the laws of nature, and ethics with

[15] Gardner quotes Kant and explains, 'an intuition "is that through which it [an object] is immediate relation to us" (A 19/B 33) (…). Concepts, by contrast, when they relate to objects, do so mediately, "by means of a feature which several things may have in common" (A 320/B 377)' (1999:66).

[16] This is a summary of some the most influential Kantian ideas, however, there is a large philosophical discussion among Kantian scholars about most of these ideas. I sought to depict this synopsis only with the purpose of serving as a ground to start a discussion regarding some comparative aspects that will be developed through the next chapters.

[17] Kant defines in his First Critique, 'philosophy is the system of all philosophical knowledge' (A 838-B 866).

[18] See Introduction of Groundwork for The Metaphysics of Morals (Kant 1997: ix)

the laws of freedom, that are the laws governing the conduct of free beings',[19] and they are better known as moral laws. In *Groundwork*, he further divides these three philosophies into two groups: (1) formal philosophy, which is 'occupied only with the form of the understanding and of reason itself and with the universal rules of thinking in general, without distinction of objects' (*G* 4:387); and (2) material philosophy, 'which has to do with determining objects and the laws to which they are subject' (*G* 4:388). Therefore, logic belongs exclusively to formal philosophy, and physics and ethics belong to material philosophy, because they determine objects and laws.

a) Understanding human behavior, the two standpoints

Kant explains that physics and ethics share the same particular condition of being under two influences at the same time: a purely rational one, and an empirical one. For example, chemists primarily work on the observation of the behavior of matter, and secondarily on the classification of what they observe. Those observations and classifications are empirical. However, that empirical work demands to be understood under the encompassing light of a theory, because if matter behaves in a given way, it must be because of its composition. So, what can we know about that? In one way or another, chemists adopted of the philosophical assumption that matter must be composed of atoms, which must necessarily exist even when it is not possible to see them. That assumption is purely rational.

On the other hand, Kant defines ethics as a moral philosophy and also as a practical anthropology; with both definitions complementing each other. Practical anthropology corresponds to the empirical influence, that is, it has firstly to do with the observation of human phenomena (human actions or behaviors). Moral philosophy corresponds to that purely rational influence present in ethics, and it has to do with the inner rules or guiding principles that frame and determine our actions or behaviors within a particular social and

[19] *Ibid*

physical context.[20] However, unlike physics, whose objects are externally provided by nature, Kant regards human phenomena (actions) as the external result of an internal rational process of free choice.

In Freud, we will see that he gives credit to the empirical character of his research; that is, he adopts a scientific attitude to approach the study of human behavior. He examines human actions as if they were the inevitable result of a natural mechanism, which he must elucidate. On the contrary, in Kant we will see that he gives more relevance to the purely rational or transcendental character of his study of human behavior, as he centers his focus on the idea of choice and freedom to act, which is different from the idea of a natural deterministic mechanism.

Thus, a confusion generally arises when we think of practical anthropology only as related or mixed with natural drivers, that is, as if our behaviors and actions were always the manifestation of subterranean organic instincts and emotions that influence, and even command, our reason (the naturalistic view of the young Freud). Because if we take Kant on account (the transcendental idealist view) that would not be necessarily the case. Kant explains that our actions can follow from two different standpoints (*G* 4:452): the laws of nature and the laws of reason[21]. Hence, our actions can also be examined in both ways, as motivated by our natural organic disposition (the empirical-scientific approach) or by our rational disposition (the transcendental moral philosophy approach). Thus, Kant affirms that even when natural stimuli (stimuli that work under the laws of nature) can indeed seduce and motivate the

[20] Peter Vardy and Paul Grosch tell us that '"ethics" and "morality" have come to be translated as almost identical in meaning, but they have different derivations. "Ethics" comes from the Greek word *ethikos* which relates to *ethos* or character' (1994:14). Morality, on the other side, 'is more concerned with which actions are right or wrong rather than with the character of the person who performs these actions. Today the two terms, ethics and morality, are often interchanged with particular philosophers wishing to emphasize one or another aspect' (1994: 14-15).

[21] For Kant, certainly there also are obscure and mysterious forces that affect us, and undoubtably play a relevant role in our decision making, he ambiguously admits in the *Lectures on Anthropology* that 'human beings are themselves a play of obscurity' (25:482).

subject, their seduction is never a determinant cause for the internal process of decision making of the subject. We will see that Freud distances himself from that affirmation. Thus, the reflection on how to connect these different standpoints to look at human phenomena will be the most interesting puzzle to solve in the Kant-Freud comparison.[22]

Therefore, here we finally arrive to a question that is relevant for this particular investigation: if for Kant, natural seduction is not a determinant cause for our decision making, as reason is, why do we behave irrationally? Freud´s focus will mostly be placed on the imperative influence of nature on our behaviors; In contrast, as Seiriol Morgan (2005) highlights, for Kant the answer to that question will lie on the principle of radical evil.

As the purpose of this chapter is to understand Kant´s standpoint, I will continue this section by clarifying the six fundamental concepts that make up Kantian Ethics, in order to try to grasp the Kantian mental mechanism that works or influences our decision making. These concepts are the will, the final end, the means, goodness, freedom, and radical evil.

b) The will, the means and ends

Kantian ethics mainly revolves around the idea of will. According to Paul Guyer (2000: 89-96), Kant starts to develop the concept of free will for the first time in his writings of the 1770s, which allows us to appreciate a mature conceptual development of this concept in his core works of the 1780s and 1790s. So, what does "will" mean for Kant? On the one hand, Kant mentions in the *Groundwork* that the will is vocation or purpose of pure reason (4:396), or a principle of "means" necessary arranged to reach a "final end". On the other hand, Kant

[22] Freud and Kant are recognized by holding specific standpoints (Freud the empirical, and Kant the metaphysical), however, we can see that Freud moved himself from his original standpoint toward a humanistic view of the human behavior, and Kant wrote from the beginning many ideas about reflecting judgments in aesthetic and anthropology, focusing at the end of his life mostly on his *Metaphysics*. So, that general portrayal about these philosophers is not so accurate as it seems to be.

explains that a will is an agency of practical reason (4:413), or an active rational application that arranges the "means" to reach a "final end". I will now examine the terms "means" and "final end".

In the *Third Critique*, Kant gives a definition of "final end", stating that it is what 'needs no other as the condition of its possibility' (5:434). From that definition we can understand that if the will grounds a "final end", then it must contain all the conditions of its possibility. In that case, the final end of the will can only be an action done for the sake of an end.[23] Focusing on *the Groundwork* Kant explains that a "means" is that which 'contains merely the ground of the possibility of an action, the effect of which is an end' (4:427). From this definition we can understand that the final end is the action itself, but also that the will can avail itself of conditions (grounds) to reach the end. Now, since "the ground of the possibility of an action" contains "the effect of which is an end", we can firstly think of the means-end relation as analytical. As Kant affirms in the *Groundwork,* 'whoever wills the end also wills (…) the indispensable necessary means to it that are within his power' (4:417). Now, from this quote, we enter in the difficult endeavor of trying to explain and understand the Kantian imperatives.

Firstly, Kant explains in the Groundwork that '[e]verything in nature works in accordance with laws. [However o]nly a rational being has the capacity to act in accordance with the *representation* of laws, that is, in accordance with principles, or has a will. Since *reason* is required for the derivation of actions from laws, the will is nothing other than practical reason' (4:413). Hence, the rational will is composed of means (principles for actions) and ends (actions based on principles), but in order to be synthetical, the will must also incorporate the agent´s choice to commit to act according to the means. As Christine Korsgaard states, 'the concepts of morality are concepts of pure reason (…). But the claim that a concept of pure reason applies to the world is always synthetic' (1996:46), however, Morgan adds that the will of reason does

[23] As Christine Korsgaard explains, Aristotle and Kant share the view that 'the objects of choice are actions, acts done for the sake of ends' (2009:18).

not act like an automatic logical reflex in accordance with formal a priori principles of our rationality, as ratiocentric Aristotelian approaches hold. Rather, and as voluntarists observe, the will involves the deepest commitment of an agent in the actions that the agent executes (2008, 114-15). In other words, a voluntary action does not happen automatically as a consequence of an agent conceiving both an objective and a feasible pathway to that objective; for Kant, even when an agent has both an objective and a feasible pathway to reach it, she still must decide to commit herself to this pathway. This is when the imperatives play an important role.

Therefore, we can think of the will as an a priori principle, which is synthetically applied to the conditions of the external world by a committed decision made by a subject. Thus, the practicality of the will offers the human being 'the capacity to act in accordance with the *representation* of laws' (*G* 4:412), Kant refers to this capacity as the ability to follow 'a command (of reason), and the formula of the command is called an **imperative**' (*G* 4:413). According to Kant, '[a]ll the imperatives are expressed by an ought and indicate by this the relation with the object' (*G* 4:413). Therefore, we can understand that the means of the rational will, are the laws or principles of reason, and the ends are the actions themselves commanded under the formula of an imperative. Because the agent chose a ground (a principle), there is then a practical effect, a command to act upon.

For instance, if the rational end of a society is "living in peace together", a proper means or ground to attain that end could be "reaching a common agreement about the value and necessity of social practices of respect". In that way, we have the following analytical statement: "Living in peace together is possible through reaching a common agreement about the value and necessity of social practices of respect". That is, the subject of the sentence ("living in peace together"), and the predicate of the sentence ("reaching a common agreement about the value and necessity of social practices of respect"") are in an analytical correspondence. However, in order for this means-end rational relation to be effectively applied in the world, it needs the synthetic intervention of the committed volition of an agent

(society) to become possible. Thus, if society commits to the mean that states, "reaching a common agreement about the value and necessity of social practices of respect", then the social imperative should be "we ought to live in peace all together". Hence, from the understanding of what this committed volition means (the committed volition that allows us to adopt a principle and follow our commands), we can just start to grasp an idea about how the mechanisms of decision-making work.

The committed volition of an agent must arrange the means to be able to achieve an end. Thus, we can see that "reaching a common agreement about the value and necessity of social practices of respect" must firstly be chosen in order for it to become a fact (an action and an end). If we follow the imperative of "we ought to live in peace all together", then we can reach the end of "living in peace together". However, even though the committed volition of an agent opens the possibility of attaining an end, its intervention teaches us that we can fail ourselves. That means, we can fail to choose the ground or principle about "agreement and respect", because we chose another principle over this, a principle that follows an end that is contrary to "living in peace together", contrary to the moral law, such as "living in conflict together".

On the one hand, Kant suggests in his *Third Critique* that it's possible to fulfill a rational final end because in principle a final end must contain all the conditions (means) to be reached (5:434), as it does in the example above. On the other hand, Kant writes in the *Groundwork*, 'it is impossible for the most insightful and at the same time most powerful but still finite being to frame for himself a determinate concept of what he really wills' (4:418). At first glance this seems contradictory, which is why Kant clarifies and distinguishes two types of ends in the *Groundwork*: the rational and the sensual. The ends of pure reason are concepts a priori determined in the will itself, and they must, in principle, be achievable, since it is our duty to commit ourselves to infer and pursue them. However, the sensual ends correspond to "happiness" (understood as satisfaction), and since these are a posteriori ends, they cannot conceptually be a priori determined in the will itself; therefore, they are not necessarily

achievable. The determination to adopt a rational or sensuous end will depend on choice and committed volition.

Regarding sensuous ends, Kant states, '[all] the conceptual elements that belong to happiness are without exception empirical' (*G* 4:418), and as we know, empirical concepts are a posteriori, that is, they are not determined a priori. In the first place, happiness represents the satisfaction of specific natural needs, but satisfaction cannot be guaranteed a priori. However, Kant argues that we can learn from experience (a posteriori knowledge) what is more conducive to happiness (*G* 4:418). Happiness provides us with a permanent empirical incentive, a constant need to search for satisfaction. However, as happiness is always an external incentive, that is, we do not contain it a priori in ourselves, but we need to look for it, Kant affirms that '[nobody is] capable of any principle by which to determine with complete certainty what would make him truly happy' (*G* 4:418). Nevertheless, Kant expresses that if we cannot be completely certain of what makes us truly happy, at least we can completely be certain of our rational ends.

c) Goodness, freedom, and radical evil

Rational ends therefore demand a priori determination from a will. Hence, practical reason needs an agent who commits to the means that lead us to a rational end. That is, and end that is possible of being inferred as "good and possible of being achieved". Now, Kant explains that the rational will possesses two indispensable qualities to determine itself, the qualities of: (1) highest good, which is analytical; and (2) freedom, which is synthetical. A will is good in that it follows a rational principle to reach a rational end; therefore, a sensuous end does not necessarily make a will good. Regarding the idea of highest good of a rational will, Robert N. Johnson argues that this quality has to be thought without qualification. That is, it 'is impossible for [a will that pursues rational ends] to fail to be good; it is necessarily good' (2009:28). According to him, 'there is such a thing as being necessarily good, and (…) the only thing that has this property is the good will' (2009:28). A quality without qualification like that can only

be analytical a priori. Hence, the rational will, which pursue rational ends is qualified as the highest good as long as it reflects pure reason.

However, the synthetical practical will (which involves the committed volition of an agent) leaves room for the possibility of its alterity. That is, a synthetical will is not necessarily good, because the agent can fail to reason, and choose to commit to a sensuous means-end that is?? contrary to reason. Hence, the agent can become evil. The syntheticity of the will incorporates a choice, that is, the choice of a maxim on which to act. However, to be able to choose, the agent firstly needs to possess freedom.

A free will is defined as the will of an agent, 'which can be determined independently of sensitive impulses, consequently by motives presented by reason alone' (*G* 4:453). Kant argues in the *Groundwork* that freedom in order to be determined needs that an agent makes use of her autonomy, which is opposed to heteronomy. Autonomy 'is the property of the will by which it is a law to itself' (*G* 4:440). This implies that a rational will must possess the capacity of creating or determining the conditions of its possibility. According to this, freedom of the will is a synthetical quality a priori. In other words, the rational will must be free to create the laws that it wills to obey. However, it is in the practical active principle of "choice" (and not in freedom itself) that the synthetical will turn into immorality and become evil. Kant states in the *Metaphysics*, 'a propensity to evil can only attach to the moral faculty of choice. Nothing is, however, morally (i.e imputably) evil but that which is our own deed' (6:31). Thus, the synthetical free will offers us a choice, but the choice itself is not the pure reflection of this freedom, it is something else.

Kant in the *Groundwork* explains that when a law is determined beyond itself, that is, by sensuous incentives, that law loses its autonomy, and it is then heteronomous. That is, a will is heteronomous when it is determined on the basis of an external object of desire that 'gives the law to it' (4:441). Thus, as this heteronomous end (the end for happiness) is alien to the

will, the actions of the agent can become blind and irrational if it adopts maxims that are not universalizable. According to Kant, an agent can choose to experience the loss of freedom. Thus, the agent can rationally choose to fall into heteronomy and transgress the universal laws given by the rational will. But why? Because, as Kant explains in *Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason,* we have a predisposition to goodness (6:26-28), and also a propensity to evil (6:29-32).

In the *Religion*, Kant defines "disposition" as 'the first subjective ground of the adoption of the maxims' (6:25). Kant thinks of a "disposition" as 'the first act of the power of choice that pertains to it [(the subject)] by nature' (6:26), and he claims that as all human being 'possesses the incentive to adopt the moral law as the governing maxim for maxim choice by virtue of it having arisen out of a basic predisposition to the good. As such, an individual's predisposition constitutes the determinate nature (*Bestimmung*) of a human being as a whole'. That incentive to adopt the moral law is, according to Kant, a feeling, but a feeling of a special type, the moral feeling of respect (6:27-28). A "propensity" on the other hand, is thought by Kant as 'a subjective ground of the possibility of the deviation of the maxims from the moral law' (6:30). Hence, we can guess that a "predisposition to goodness" means to be disposed in advance to choose to behave according to the adoption of a rational maxim or moral duty (*R* 6:36); and we can understand that by a "propensity to evil" Kant means to choose to be inclined, i.e., an agent who is 'firstly conscious of the moral law and yet has incorporated into his maxim the (occasional) deviation from it' (6:32).[24]

Thus, according to Kant in the *Religion*, in order to be able to formulate maxims for our actions, we must choose between two different types of incentives (the good and the evil ones). However, Kant clarifies that being good or evil, 'must not lie in the difference between the incentives that the agent incorporates into his maxim (not in the material of the maxim)

[24] In *The Religion* Kant states that 'the origin (the first origin) [of evil] is the descent of an effect' (6:39), a first effect in time for a first cause, that is, the origin has to do with a first contact with nature or with the external world.

but in their subordination (in the form of the maxim); that is, which of the two he makes the condition of the other (6:36). Kant suggests that, even if the agent is constantly tempted and seduced by natural stimuli, those stimuli do not have the necessary power to break the autonomy of the agent, and to transform her into evil (6:35), because only the agent herself can do that through free choice, which is first of all a rational choice. That is why, again, to break autonomy it is necessary to think of an element rooted in freedom itself. Kant says that we must accept that internally we have a propensity to fail, to fail in our commitment to fix a ground to follow our rational purposes, and that this happens because we obviously have a propensity for self-love.

Self-love or hope for happiness, something that in principle is not bad because it only means satisfaction, can seriously oppose itself to goodness. This is, because goodness always addresses the means towards the determination of a wide "universal end" capable of embracing the whole of humanity in its maxims. However, self-love necessary attracts the agent to a sensuous context, where the agent can be overstimulated and tempted to choose wrongly, giving priority to pleasurable interests over the strictly necessary ones. Hence, the agent's ends (if these are chosen) can spontaneously turn into narrow actions of satisfaction, losing sight of the rational encompassing context.

Hence, the agent can be attracted to law-breaking, to its heteronomous dispersion, and loss of unity because s/he seeks happiness. However, the possibility of resisting a powerful sensuous attraction from natural stimuli capable of breaking autonomy and the possibility of recovering autonomy, freedom, and goodness once this has been lost will always remain available to the agent. For Kant, that possibility cannot disappear even in the worst circumstances, because that would mean giving up freedom. He affirms, 'there still remains hope of a return to the good from which he has strayed' (*R* 6:44). Therefore, in order to answer the main inquiry of this investigation regarding 'how we can return to goodness once we become conscious that we have morally failed ourselves', from a Kantian perspective we need firstly to try to understand what that intriguing space of choice or committed volition of an

agent means; and secondly, we need to reflect on the idea of "propensity of self-love". Hence, I consider relevant to start exploring the Kantian ideas about affectivity or emotions, as key pieces to understand this idea of "self-love".

iii. Kant on emotions

As we will see in the next chapters, emotions are very relevant for Freud; for him, emotions act like drives that trigger or motivate important process within our psyche. In my view, Kant does not neglect the relevance of the emotions for our inner moral psychology, as is understood by some post-Kantian and contemporary philosophers who work on ethics.[25] So, I will talk about this topic throughout this section with the purpose of introducing my reader to a general overview of the Kantian theory on emotions.

First of all, it is important to clarify that Kant does not use the modern German terms that are usually translated as "emotion" (e.g. *Gefühl*, Emotion) in any of his texts. Rather, like most early modern philosophers he uses other terms to refer to what we now refer to as emotions. Wiebke Deimling (2013), Krista Thomason (2017), and many other contemporary Kantian philosophers agree that we can take those Kantian terms to refer to emotions. Deimling states that Kant uses in his *Antropology* (25:1340) the idea of *Gemüths Bewegung* to refer to feelings, desires, affects, instincts, inclinations and passions (2013:2). Deimling translates *Gemüths Bewegung* into English as "affective states". I will use that translation.

Through the *Lectures on Anthropology* of 1772-1773 (Kant´s pre-Critical period) we can appreciate that Kant reflects on the idea of soul to talk about emotions. He firstly mentions that thanks to the movements of the soul or affective states we can experience life. In those

[25] See for example, Justin Oakley (1990) 'A Critique of Kantian Arguments against Emotions as Moral Motives'.

Lectures Kant talks about the soul (psyche) dividing it in three parts: Soul (anima), the receptive part of the psyche; Spirit (mens), the active agency of the psyche; and mind (animus), an idea that encompasses the other two in a regulative way of mutual moderation, which Kant also called "heart". For Kant, the soul is calm, when the spirit (will) becomes active.[26] According to him, it is only possible to sense life and desire properly when the soul is calm. However, if the soul (anima) becomes agitated, that means that the spirit (will) is turning passive. In that case, Kant notices that it is easier to lose our composure when the anima is agitated (*Anth* 25:588-89), because our anima loses the clarity of what it is sensing, and our spirit (will) loses the distinctness of the ends that it is desiring (*Anth* 25:482).

Years later, in the *Second* and *Third Critiques*, when the grounds for his transcendental idealism were already established, Kant explains that the soul has powers (faculties), and that those powers (having no common basis among them) can be reduced to three: the power of feeling pleasure and displeasure, the power of desire, and the cognitive power. The idea of powers or faculties of the soul does not necessarily line up with the previous insights about the dynamic between spirit and soul described in the *Lectures* of the 70s. However, the idea of powers of the soul was slowly evolving from that period and from those insights. The powers gave structure to what Kant kept developing in his written works of the Critical period. That is why in this section I will explore the scope of the powers of the soul, and how his account of these powers incorporates the concepts previously explained. I will focus mainly on the Kantian Critical texts, with a few references to some texts of the pre-Critical period.

a) The power of feeling pleasure and displeasure

In the *Lectures of 1775-76* Kant distinguishes between "senses of intuition" and "senses of sensation", and he offers us an extended description of them. However, the distinction is made

[26] The anthropological lectures of 1772-73 are previous to the development of the concept of will. "Spirit" would be a proto "will", Kant defines it as 'a free self-active principle' (*Anth* 25:16).

much more succinctly in the *First* and *Third Critiques*. In the *First Critique*, he explains that 'an intuition is that through which [a cognition] relates immediately to [objects], and at which all thought as a means is directed as an end'(A 19/B 33); and that a sensation is 'the effect of an object on the capacity for representation' (B 34). In the *Third Critique* he specifies that intuitions are subjective references or appearances, whereas a sensation 'stands for what is material (real) in them (that through which something existent is given)' (189). There, Kant also specifies, 'that subjective feature of a presentation which cannot at all become an element of cognition is the pleasure or displeasure connected with that presentation. For though this pleasure or displeasure I do not cognize anything in the object of the presentation, though it may certainly be the effect of some cognition' (189). In Wiebke Deimling´s words this power of feeling refers to how the objects change our sensations of enjoyment and/or pain (2013:16). However, even if the feelings of pleasure and displeasure are non-cognitive, Kant explains that they are indeed an 'aesthetic presentation of purposiveness' (*CJ* 189). In other words, feelings of pleasure and displeasure are subjective movements within our sensitivity, which can be contemplated because they are capable of arise purposiveness or appreciation without having to be conceptualized.

In the *Third Critique*, Kant also distinguishes between mere sensations and feelings of pleasure and displeasure. For him mere sensations can be objective; however, feelings of pleasure and displeasure are always subjective (206). In the *Metaphysics of Morals* Kant is perhaps more precise; he states: '[sensations] are still referred to an object as elements in our cognition of it, pleasure and displeasure (in what is red or sweet) expresses nothing at all in the object but simply a relation to the subject. They are ideas that do not represent objects but refer to sensations within us' (211-12). Deimling (2013, 2018) claims that for Kant, these non-cognitive feelings or subjective sensations are reliable indicators, because 'whenever we feel pleasure or displeasure there is some change in the activity of our faculties underlying it' (2018:37). She notes that feelings can answer to simple or complex value structures. For example, a feeling of pain is different from a feeling of suffering; suffering is a more complex emotion than pain, that is, suffering answers to more complex value structures.

Visualize a child who is enjoying a sweet but loses it because the sweet falls on a dirty surface; then, his mother does not allow him to keep eating it. That child can feel frustration and experience pain because of the loss. By contrast, we can visualize the same child, but this time he sees that his mother is leaving him for the first time in a nursery with strange people; now, he can feel something stronger, like suffering. The difference lies in the value structure of the implications of the facts. Even though he's only a child, he can sense the danger and the difference in value between losing a mother and losing a sweet. Up to this point, we are still only talking about feelings, because the child is confronting a loss, but an encompassing mental association of memories and cognitive conceptualizations is still not well defined.

Thus, Kant clearly distinguishes between objective sensations and subjective feelings of pleasure and displeasure. However, he also makes a further distinction among the latter group of feelings, separating them into simple feelings and affects (emotions). Kant talks about affects in the *Lectures* of the 70s, but I find no deep reflection on them in the Critical works. Only a few comments can be found in the *Third Critique*. Deimling notes that for Kant, feelings are firmly connected to our bodily sensations (2013:62). On her view, the difference between affects and feelings in Kant is mainly a difference of attention and length. That is, an affect is a particular feeling that is overwhelming in itself and absorbs our complete attention, like blushing. Thus, affects are brief (2013:30) and resist being guided by reason (2013:29). Because of that recalcitrance, Kant speaks of them pejoratively in his *Lectures* of the 70s, saying for instance, 'affects are 'an illness of the mind' (*Anth* 7:251).[27] However, he also recognizes that they can serve a relevant function. For example, they can drive one to fulfill an important life mission (See Deimling 2013:31).[28]

[27] However, that is not the only vision about affects that we can find in Kant´s works. Apparently, it is because of those types of quotations that 'Kant has long been seen as the philosopher who denies any important role to emotions' (Borges 2004:141).

[28] Thomason affirms, 'Kant´s claims that emotions are types of pleasure and pain, and that the antagonism of the two moves us to do things. But this antagonism is not just an "incentive to activity", but also one that allows us "to progress towards what is better"' (2017:455).

In the *Third Critique* Kant only explains that 'an affect is an agitation of the mind that makes it unable to engage in free deliberation' (5:272). In the *Second Critique* he only describes one type of affect; he says 'what is good [(referring to sympathy for the good)] rises into an affect, or rather degenerate into it. An affect of this kind is called enthusiasm' (5:22). For Kant, a feeling instead reveals something wider and less intense than an affect, because feelings can rest on judgments (*CJ* 197-198).[29] In some ways, feelings approach the faculty of desire, because, in Kant´s words, a feeling 'affects one and the same life-force which is manifested in the faculty of desire' (*CPrR* 5:23).

As for the idea that Kant's feelings rest on judgments, I will briefly explain what a judgment is. Nicholas Dunn quotes Kant and explains that the judgment 'is "faculty for thinking of the particular as contained under the universal" (5:179; cf. FI 20:211)'. According to Dunn, Kant 'makes a distinction within the power of judgment—between what he calls its "determining" [bestimmend] and "reflecting" [reflectirend] use. The distinction hinges on whether the universal is given prior to our encounter with a particular. If it is given, then judgment is determining (…). In seeking out a universal for the particular, the power of judgment is reflecting' (2020:9-10). So, for example, determining judgments can be related to our practical morality, our duties, how we apply principles for action, as it was explained in the previous section. However, reflective judgments are different, as these are related to second order thoughts, which are subjective and only arise purposiveness or appreciation. Now, as reflective judgments are appreciative, they can lead us to the acquisition of understanding. Understanding is previous to the particular, but once we obtain appreciation for the particular, we can rightly apply our understanding. I resorted to this explanation because, as Stefan Bird-Pollan pointed out,[30] the idea of a reflective judgment can help us to understand how to make connections with Freudian theory. I will talk about those connections in the following chapters.

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[29] About the different types of judgments, see Kant´s *Critique of Judgment*.

[30] See Bird-Pollan, Stefan, 'Making Conceptual Space for the Unconscious', *7th Session Leuven Seminars in Classical German Philosophy YouTube.* [11th February 2021] <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ICzNywjVu7A>

b) The power of Desire

Desires fix purposes addressed to an object and are entangled with feelings. However, as Korsgaard warns us, 'we must distinguish between the emotions, feelings, and desires which prompt us to adopt a purpose and those that result from the adoption of a purpose' (1996:59). For example, because I can appreciate my feelings of love, benevolence, respect, and admiration for the person I am dating, I become aware that I have the desire of sincerely communicating my feelings to that person in order to avoid misunderstandings, and also I become aware of the desire of starting a romantic relationship with her. However, once I realized about my desires, I felt fear of being rejected, and anxiety about the future. In a first moment the feelings helped to be aware of the desires and configurate them; in the second moment, the feelings popped up as a consequence of having those desires. Thus, as we can see, desires involve a purpose addressed to an object, but unlike emotions and feelings, desires are always working on maxims, intellectual (good) or material (self-love). Basically, desires involve three elements in their configuration: objects, willing (fixation of means-ends), and choice.

If our choices and actions successfully reflect the adoption of a pure good maxim such as "I have the duty to communicate my romantic feelings to in order to avoid misunderstandings", then the agent will consolidate its autonomy, i.e., the agent will fix rational ends (to tell the truth) for her intellectual object of desire (to avoid misunderstandings). In that case, she will experience feelings of pleasure and displeasure, which can fluctuate from being calm to agitated, and also experience the emergence of a special type of feelings, called "moral feelings". Autonomy here must be understood from two dimensions: (1) as being a law for oneself, in the sense of legislating that law; and (2) as acting on the law one has legislated for oneself. However, if our choices reflect the adoption of a material maxim, then the agent will fall into heteronomy, and from there the agent will be moved or commanded by the conditionings of self-love (*CPrR* 5:22), that is, by the pursuit of finding satisfaction through an

end (action) that is addressed towards an external object, an object that cannot be determined by the agent. For example, “as communicating my feelings to clarify my intentions in order to avoid misunderstandings causes me too much fear of rejection and anxiety, I will lie to the person I am dating about my feelings, and I will keep the appreciation of my feelings in secret”. In that case, we can see that the original intellectual maxim determined by the agent about telling the truth becomes tergiversated or overlapped by a new maxim of desire (which is determined by the feelings of fear and anxiety) that says, “to avoid a possible rejection and the bad feelings associated to that, I will lie”. The new object of desire (to avoid rejection) is external because the agent cannot determine a priori the experience of rejection, the agent cannot be totally sure if she will be rejected once she confronts the other person with her truth, however, the agent is letting her feelings of fear and anxiety to anticipate, motivate, and fix her maxim of desire to act. Thus, after the lie the agent will be able to experience many different types of emotions and feelings, mostly in agitation, but not “moral feelings”. In some way, the choice to make is a choice between conserving autonomy or giving up ourselves to heteronomy. Hence, Kant divides desires into intellectual and sensible desires, according to their objects.

An ordinary desire projects itself towards a future, in progression, establishing a relation between a subject (who disposes of the means) and an object (where the actions are addressed). The relation subject-object involves pleasurable and unpleasurable feelings, also memories, habits, and motivations or influences. An example of a desire associated with a sensible object could be the following: “I desire to eat chocolates and sweets every day”. We can assume that the subject recognizes that she once enjoyed eating chocolates (sensory memory of a past experience), and because of that, she desires to repeat that experience every day, to be able to obtain that satisfaction (feeling) repeatedly. Now, the subject will have to try to manage different issues related to the consummation of her desire, for example, where and how to get the chocolates, and what are the pros and cons of eating them constantly. However, if good moral reasons or heath concerns prompt the subject to stop eating chocolate every day, then she will feel uncomfortable.

On the one hand, Kant explains that morality is always related to constraint, and this always involves discomfort of some sort. According to Kant, 'the effect of [the moral] law on feelings is humiliation' (*CPrR* 5:78), and 'this humiliation occurs proportionately to the purity of the law' (*CPrR* 5:79). However, 'since the constraint is exercised only through the legislation of one´s own reason, it also contains something elevating' (*CPrR* 5:80). Hence, on the other hand, this discomfort is also accompanied by a "moral feeling" of self-contentment, 'which in its real meaning refers only to negative satisfaction with existence in which one is conscious of needing nothing' (*CPrR* 5:117). Now, a "moral feeling" is a different type of feeling; it is not a proper feeling of pleasure and displeasure; instead, it is 'an effect on feeling and thus on the sensibility of a rational being' (*CPrR* 5:76). Kant says that a moral feeling is produced by reason (*CPrR* :76), and a good example of a moral feeling is the feeling of respect.

Coming back to the previous example, if the desire to eat chocolates and sweets every day increases instead of being constrained by reason, this can easily be distorted into an addiction. The desire of eating chocolates and sweets every day can turn into addiction if the subject only focuses on dramatically increasing the quantity of chocolates and sweets and the frequency of eating only to experience pleasure. That is one example of what Kant called inclination of the will, an inclination to heteronomy or self-love that rests only on sensations, natural needs, and/or feelings (*CPrR* 5:74), and not on reason (which in this case would involve a restriction). Inclinations can vary; Kant says, 'they grow with the indulgence we allow them, and they leave behind a greater void than the one we intended to fill' (*CPrR* 5:118).[31] However, we are not victims of inevitable inclinations of wanting to experience pleasure in detriment of our health or moral integrity, because we can always choose regardless of inclination, since we are rational beings that can be responsible for our actions.

[31] Nevertheless, not all sensuous desires represent a danger of moral failure, because we have also a general predisposition to good in our animality, which it is possible to see through the natural principles of self-preservation, propagation of the species, and community with other human beings (*R* 6:26). Even if on these three good natural principles 'can be crafted all sorts of vices' (*R* 6:26), that does not mean that the influence of natural principles brings us per se badness or evilness.

For Kant, there are many similarities in addictions and passions, but they are not exactly the same. Passions fix only human beings as objects (*Anth* 25:733), whereas addictions can be related to all type of objects. Both addictions and passions have to do with a desire that turns into a vice in detriment of reason. Morgan adds that '[a p]assion takes pleasure in surrendering freedom and self-control' (2008:124). Now, not all sensuous desires are strong enough to become a vice; because the agency of the subject can constrain them, they can be always regulated by reason, at some point and in some degree. Kant says, 'we stand under a discipline of reason, and in all our maxims we must not forget our subjection to it' (*CPrR* 5:82). However, as he dramatically describes in his *Anthropology*, 'Passions are cancerous sores for pure practical reason, and for the most part they are incurable because the sick person does not want to be cured' (7:266). Passions and addictions are not just bad inclinations that a subject can constrain; they are evil, because they are the response to a sharp self-destructive choice.

Morgan points out a distinctive characteristic of passions that makes them clearly different from mere addictions, so they are not synonymous even when there are many similarities. He explains that passions are fed through the resistance of another will. So, '[i]t is the choice that another makes to oppose us that sparks the will to defeat it, without which there would be no passions' (2008:125). Thus, Morgan concludes, '[passions] are exactly the kind of inclinations that one would expect a radically evil being to develop' (2008:124). Why? Because through passions, as Kant affirms, a human being chooses to reverse 'the moral order of his incentives in incorporating them into his maxims' (*R* 6:36). Hence, we can understand that passions are related to our radical evil, because they primary imply the deliberated adoption of an immoral maxim that enslaves the subject. Dramatically, passions enslave the subject under her own will.

Thus, Morgan adds, 'what the will needs to combat is not mere temptation by appetite, but its own attraction to evil as well' (2008:125). In other words, what a human being needs to combat is not the natural seduction of the external stimuli, but mainly her own temptation to betray herself when she chooses her maxims for actions. Then, in order to restore our original predisposition to goodness, we firstly need to recover the purity of our laws, 'as the supreme

ground of all our maxims' (*R* 6:46). To accomplish that, Kant suggest that we need an inner revolution, a change of heart (*R* 6:47). In Morgan's words, 'a complete reversal of [our] own moral orientation will be required to make any proper progress in defeating [passions]' (2008:125). We know that this is complicated, because passions are especially tricky, their sharp intensity can make us to want to remain stubbornly steady in the constant adoption of immoral decisions. So, Kant suggests exercising our will through discipline, in order to make it stronger and more resistant to the influences of self-love.

c) The cognitive Power

Regarding intellectual desires and feelings (those different from passions and affects), firstly I consider it interesting to review Alix Cohen's (2014) explanation of rational feelings. According to her, we learn from Kant that reason has a need, which corresponds to that constant demand for systematicity in our desires, as in everything. That affirmation is controversial if we understand "a need" as something that only can run through a natural drive. However, as Cohen notices, it is clear in Kant that the cognitive power of reason is precisely that faculty that responds to a demand of organicity, which tries to suture the open breach between what it is being already cognized and the final goal of reason, i.e., the complete systematization of knowledge (2014:14). Kant does not punctually mention in his *Critiques* that reason has a need, but it seems perfectly possible to grasp that idea from his works, as Cohen (2014) remarks. This, because the pure ideas of "synthesis" and "knowledge" developed in the *First Critique* point out the consideration of a "gap" in reason and a constant "effort for completeness".

Now, what is relevant for us regarding cognitions and emotions is that, when reason reaches a certain degree of unification, that is, when the rational need is for a moment satisfied, then some feelings of pleasure pop up. These feelings are called rational feelings because they answer to a rational cognitive process. They are not related to the satisfaction of natural needs, but to the satisfaction of intellectual needs. However, there are some subtly

different views of this in recent Kant scholarship. On the one hand, Paul Guyer (2000) explains that reason orients itself towards the ultimate form of systematicity, what is understood as the *summum bonum* or highest good, i.e., 'a systematic harmony between all intended purposes on the one hand and all outcomes of action of the other' (2000:93). However, Guyer emphasizes that the summum bonum is accompanied by a "system of happiness" (2000:98). For him, that system means 'the unification of the greatest happiness with the greatest degree of capacity to be worthy of this happiness' (2000:94). That is, our 'morality uses reason to regulate our attempts to satisfy our inclinations so that we satisfy only those which fit into an interpersonal system of happiness' (2000:100). So, Guyer in his interpretation of Kant is making happiness a transcendental idea, transforming it into a necessary and "universal happiness" (2000:120); that is, a happiness necessary 'not just for oneself but for all' (2000:100).

Now, other Kantian philosophers, such as Korsgaard (1996), pay more attention to the fact that Kant orients "the ends of morality" towards "the highest good" and separates these ends from any empirical influence, i.e., from happiness. For Korsgaard, happiness in Kant can never be thought as a transcendental final purpose; however, happiness can perfectly follow the pursuit of a final end. Hence, happiness can only be thought of as a "conditional end" (Korsgaard 1996:129), and not as a final motivation for reason. In the same line of thought as Korsgaard, Cohen does not adhere to this idea of universal systematization of happiness. She notices that 'reason can be successful in the concrete unification of certain laws, and that epistemic success gives rise a feeling of pleasure' (2014:15). However, she also explains that the need of reason is based on reason´s incapacity to achieve its final goal (2014:14). In other words, the whole systematization of knowledge carried on by a will is theoretically possible (by inference from an analytic truth) but practically impossible. Hence, the "possibility" of satisfying reason's needs gives rise to a pleasure of systematization, which is not exactly the same as thinking that there exists "a systematization of happiness," as Guyer suggests. This discrepancy with Guyer, as well as Cohen´s view of reason's need, will be relevant for the development of the comparison Kant-Freud at some point in my next chapter. So, I will take up this discrepancy again later in the comparative discussion of morality in Kant and Freud.

- <u>Final words and next steps</u>

In the following chapters (chapters II and III), I will present a comparison between Kant´s ideas about the human soul, and the insights regarding the psychic apparatus elaborated by Sigmund Freud. The purposes of this comparison are: (1) to identify the key theoretical explanations around the concepts of "psyche", "consciousness" and "unconsciousness" in Kant and Freud; and (2) to be able to identify the two standpoints (Kant and Freud), the agreements and divergences among the thinkers, which will the basis on which I will be able to build my argument (I will address it in chapter IV), to then answer the main questions of this dissertation, 'how can we return to goodness (or how we can recover our mental health) once we become conscious that we have morally failed to ourselves? What role do emotions play throughout this process of moral fall and recovery? And what is the relevance of self-knowledge in this return?'.

Basically, the key elements to think about the soul in Kant revolve around: (1) a will, or how the soul chooses and fixes its purposes; (2) emotions, or how the soul is affected or moved; and (3) a conscience, or how the soul orients itself. For Kant, it is the will, under the adoption of a maxim, which addresses the soul towards an end, and emotions (feelings of pleasure and displeasure) pop up in answer[32]. Nevertheless, Kant admits that the soul needs guidance to fix its purposes and adopt a maxim, and he metaphorically describes that guidance as though it were an internal voice, the voice of conscience. Kant describes the role of conscience in his *Metaphysics* as a role of warning (6:440).[33] Conscience will always guide and tell us what is reasonably right or wrong to do, and it will always prevent us from the risk of becoming unreasonable, i.e., the risk of losing our autonomy. Thus, "conscience" provides purely good

[32] However, emotions can also pop up without reference to a fixed desire, as I explained before.

[33] See Martin Sticker (2016) 'When the Reflective Watch-Dog Barks: Conscience and Self-Deception in Kant'.

and true knowledge (practical reason), and subjectively, we will always have the capacity of inferring what conscience is warning us against.

Freud sees the three aforementioned key elements of the soul differently. To achieve proper understanding of those differences it is first necessary to reflect on the concept of "soul" itself, and what the soul (psyche) signifies for Kant and for Freud. So far, we have been exploring or describing the key concepts of Kantian ethics (goodness, self-love, evilness, freedom, autonomy, heteronomy, among others), and how those concepts relate to the powers of the soul. In the following section I will examine specifically the concept of soul, to understand how everything (practical will, emotions, and conscience) converges in the agency of our making decision process.

'beware of me, my love
Beware of the silent woman in the desert
Of the traveler with an emptied glass
And of her shadow´s shadow'
(Alejandra Pizarnik)

CHAPTER II

KANT ON THE "PSYCHE"

Kant´s idea of the soul, as an empty entity rather than an inner object, was a revolutionary turn in the context of the philosophical work of his time. Then, almost two centuries after Kant, Freud carried out another relevant turn regarding the idea of the soul by reflecting on the knowledge he acquired by means of empirical observations in his medical praxis, challenging the classical philosophical approaches by incorporating sexual drives into his account. The purpose of this chapter however is firstly to explore the idea of soul defended by Kant so I can begin to compare his view with Freud's in the next chapter.

Therefore, in the following pages I will only focus on Kant´s idea of the soul, and I will confront this idea with an inquiry about the responsibility of our actions. The reflection on the soul becomes especially relevant when we try to identify the subject who makes moral choices and commits to act. On the one hand, Kant´s account offers us an interesting perspective to think about the subject or soul, who is for Kant, in principle, capable of self-determining itself to act. So, after clarifying the enquiry about the agency of the soul in Kant's terms, the next logical step is trying to figure out the moral responsibility of that agency for its actions. However, it is there where we will find that Kant's moral theory by itself is not enough to resolve an inquiry about practical "responsibility", since there is a theoretical gap in it that does not yield the complete picture that we would need to give a satisfactory answer. So, the purpose of this chapter will be to establish a view of the soul that can serve as a theoretical basis to discuss practical responsibility, and also point out the problems that emerge when we try to understand this as part of a general framework.

i. The soul

In this first section I will lay out an overview of Kant´s idea of the soul, which I consider one of the most difficult and elusive parts of his psychology. Since the focus of the second section will be on the reflections on practical responsibility and maturity, not on ontology, I won't take up the debate surrounding Kant's view of the soul, but I will simply expound some of the insights it has yielded -- mainly those of Béatrice Longuenesse (2019), Lucca Forgione (2019)), Marco Scarbi (2012), and Henry Allison (1996) -- that mesh with my understanding of his thought.

a) The soul and the paralogisms

In his *First Critique,* Kant discusses the idea of the soul through an extended reflection about the paralogisms of pure reason. So, what is a paralogism? Firstly, he explains that a paralogism 'consists in the falsity of a syllogism due to its form, whatever its content may otherwise be' (A 341/B 399),[34] and he warns us that 'a fallacy of this kind will have its ground in the nature of human reason' (A 341/B 399). If the idea of the soul has become entangled in the paralogisms of pure reason,[35] then, in order to elucidate what the soul really is, we need to understand how. Kant's explanation begins with the Cartesian claim '*Kantsum*' -- usually translated into English as 'I think, therefore I am/exist' – from which Descartes moves to postulate a principle of duality between mind (soul) and body.[36] Thus, since Descartes, the soul (under the referent of "I") was grasped as something not corporeal (A 356) but with substance

[34] A syllogism is: 'An instance of a form of reasoning in which a conclusion is drawn (whether validly or not) from two given or assumed propositions (premises) that each share a term with the conclusion, and that share a common or middle term not present in the conclusion (e.g. all dogs are animals; all animals have four legs; therefore all dogs have four legs)' (*Oxford Dictionary of Phrase and Fable*, 2006).

[35] It involves four paralogisms: substantiality, simplicity, personality, and ideality of the soul. See Kant's *First Critique* (A 341-405).

[36] See Descartes´ *Meditations on First Philosophy* (second meditation).

and singularity; that is to say, the soul was understood as one object of inner sense (ideal), a spiritual substance (a thing) different from the body.

Kant tries to make clear in his *First Critique* that the "cogito ergo sum" is inconsistent. To clarify this, Kant first explains that the referent "I" in "I think, therefore I am" is only the designation for 'a mere consciousness that accompanies every concept' (A 346),[37] and the whole proposition "I think", therefore "I am" does not come from experience, 'but rather [it is] the form of apperception, on which every experience depends, and which precedes it' (A 354). The "I think" is therefore for Kant an *a priori* form, something purely intelligible, spontaneously designated as an a priori condition for thinking in general. Up to this point, Kant's explanations do not seem to sharply contradict the Cartesian "*cogito ergo sum*", but they do, because Descartes thinks he has discovered a substantial, simple, and ideal entity, or person, or inner object behind the "I think" in the "I am"; however, for Kant there is no such underlying object with those characteristics, but only an unknown empty entity which can become aware of itself thanks to its self-reflective activity,[38] by means of the use of the "I" in "I think" through the process of apperception. Now, theoretical difficulties emerge when we see that Kant thinks of the "I" as an a priori form, but at the same time, he links the "I" to an entity, the existence in "I am". Kant first thought the "I" as if this were the intuition of the entity, but then he concluded that the "I" cannot be an intuition, because the entity in question is not an object (a thing that possesses the properties of an object), but an empty entity.[39] Can intuitions exist without being

[37] Forgione makes an interesting observation regarding the "I" as a referent, his conclusion is that 'the *I* seems to designate rather than to represent' (2019: 44). Forgione quotes Kant, and says, '[The I] is simple only because this has not content, and hence no manifold, on account of which it seems to represent a simple object, or better put, it seems to designate one' (2019:44).

[38] Longuenesse defines awareness as 'a consciousness of being engaged in the act of thinking (and synthesizing: transcendental imagination) just in virtue of being engaged in that act. That consciousness is the consciousness of an existence' (2019:86-87).

[39] Kant states in *The First Critique of Pure Reason*, '[t]his *I* would have to be an intuition, which, since it would be presupposed in all thinking in general (prior to all experience), would, as an intuition, supply a priori synthetic propositions if it were to be possible to bring about a pure rational cognition of the nature of a thinking being in general. Yet this *I* is no more an intuition than it is a concept of any object' (A 381-2).

tied to the experience of external objects? For Kant, the answer is no, but also yes if we think of the soul under a paralogism.[40]

b) The soul is only a referent without substance. The "I" in "I think"

We know thanks to Kant that we obtain intuitions from experience, specifically from our sensitive capacity of perceiving external objects. We know that, having perceived stimuli and having formed intuitions, "apperception" enters into play spontaneously as a selective combinatory synthesis that transforms the intuitions into concepts in judgments. Apperception is for Kant 'the synthesis of manifold of intuition' (A 401). However, the synthetical cognitive work in apperception is necessarily accompanied by a consciousness to which the "I" in "I think" and "I am" refers. Therefore, Kant assumes that this consciousness must be the consciousness of that entity that is carrying out the synthesis -- which can only be formally designated as a referent 'with which we do not and cannot have the least acquaintance' (A 350). As Beatrice Longuenesse notes, in the apperception of "I think" the existence of an entity ("I am") is not put into question, but the question is 'what kind of entity is that referent?' (2019:125). Is it an object of inner sense? If not, then what? It is here that Kant distances himself from Descartes. He firstly says that what we really have is a self-consciousness that 'provides thought with no object at all' (B 407). But how is that possible? Kant claims that the inference "I think, therefore I exist" is predicated on a misunderstanding of what the referent of "I" is. Longuenesse explains that, according to Kant, this happens because 'rationalist metaphysicians confuse inner sense and apperception' (2019:110).

According to Kant, the problem with the Cartesian postulate, which the rationalist metaphysicians accept, is that, if we think of the soul as an inner object, then we need to think

[40] As Luca Forgione states, '[i]t is interesting that Kant ponders the possibility of regarding *I* as an intuition, with the ultimate aim of demonstrating quite the reverse. (…) this is not possible according the [clarification in the] Paralogism section. It is worth noting that the *I* could also be regarded as an intuition at first glance, as it displays some of the features summed up as the intuitions´ (2019:43).

of it as substance with "content". Now, what Kant emphasizes in his *First Critique* is that the apperception "I" is an intuition 'wholly empty of content' (A 355). For Kant, "content" can only be granted to those intuitions that emerge from external objects, which possess quality in some way, and which can be determined in space. However, the soul is not an intuition, it is undeterminable, precisely because it is not experienced as having any quality and/or shape (it cannot be experienced as heavier, warmer, brighter, or rounded for example); it can only be perceived in time. Longuenesse (2019) highlights the relevant distinction between the verbs "experiencing" and "perceiving" to help us to understand how Kant's explanations dissolve the paralogisms of the soul.

c) The soul can think about itself, but the soul cannot know itself

As we know, according to Kant, we can experience and perceive external objects through the a priori categories of space and time. However, within us, we can only perceive the soul as a movement in progression, i.e., in time, but not in space. Hence, Kant explains that for the soul 'everything is in continual flux, it has nothing abiding [as external objects have], except perhaps (if one insists) the I' (A381). Therefore, as we do not possess internal spatial perception of the soul (only the perception of her progression), we cannot think of the soul as an inner object, but only as a form of unity of apperception, the "I" of "I think" (B 407), which does not add any knowledge of the subject herself. Here, we will find one of the most interesting contrasts with the Freudian theory, because, as we will see in the next chapter, for Freud there is only a psychological apparatus, not an entity, and this is merely space, a reservoir without temporality.

The subject of soul, the "I", is then for Kant only the referent for a spontaneous entity or being. Now, even if the soul is not an object (extended in space), that does not mean that the soul cannot be experienced, or thought through a paralogism, because as Kant remarks, paralogisms are grounded in the nature of pure reason (A 341). That is, the soul can indeed be

wrongly experienced as an object when we associate it for example with the spatial sensitivity of our body (as our biological body), or with any representation, referent, or image of ourselves. The point is that for Kant, the only possible way to know (to wrongly know) of the soul as an object is by making a mistake, a false association. In other words, we will never be able to directly know our soul as it really is.

Regarding this, Longuenesse explains that there is 'a striking disconnect between the way, necessarily, each thinker thinks about herself, on the one hand; and what she knows of herself, on the other' (2019:125). What Kant claims is that there is no 'consciousness of the determining self, but only that of the determinable self' (B 407). In Guyer´s words, the human soul 'is related to its observable actions but is not itself part in any sense of observable reality' (1987:399). That is, a subject can obtain knowledge of herself through whatever embodied existence she determines as hers, but in that case, we must assume that her "self-knowledge" is as fallible as any other kind of knowledge. Now, it is important to note that self-knowledge in this case is not the same as the apperception "I think". Self-knowledge implies empirical knowledge (for this we need to become an object to ourselves, a body); that is, it implies a posteriori knowledge. On the other hand, apperception of oneself as an "I" that thinks, as a consciousness, implies instead an a priori designation (a formal referent, which is universal and necessary). Hence, we must infer that the "self-consciousness" of the inner perception of the entity in "I think", cannot be fallible, because apperception is a necessary and strictly universal principle of unity on which all our judgments rest.

So, as Longuenesse emphasizes (2019:105-132), Kant regards the soul as an empty entity whose existence is referred to in the act of apperception itself. Thus, on the one hand, we can assume that the soul is only a standpoint, a necessary postulate in order to explain how the act of thinking is possible; and on the other, we can also understand that any knowledge of the soul is indirect and empirical, and thus most certainly mistaken. Unlike the objects that can be determined in space and time, the subject of the soul, the entity herself, cannot be determined in that way. Nevertheless, despite its indetermination in space and quality, the subject of the

soul can be perceived as a progression, and this can also be designated as an "I" thanks to its capacity of making use of the faculties of reason and reflecting on its own identity. Therefore, by being aware of itself, this entity can be consciously perceived as an agency, and this can be referred to as "I" in the proposition "I think" (and elliptically or not as "I" through every judgement).[41] I suppose that is the farthest we can go to answer the question about who the subject of the soul is for Kant.

d) About self-determination to act

According to Kant, the soul seems to be an object of inner sense (a paralogism), but is instead an empty entity. However, the unknown subject of the soul is also "who" spontaneously makes a choice; in her activity, the soul becomes the agent of the selective combinatory that happens in apperception. That is why it holds a very relevant position in the general picture of this work. At this point, I would like to make a link with an idea expounded in chapter I, Morgan's idea (2005) of a "committed volition of an agent". Because Morgan reminds us that the subject does not move herself in a deterministic mechanistic way as an inevitable consequence of imperative needs of any type, the subject instead can always make her own choices spontaneous and willingly commit to them. But then, what does spontaneity mean here?

[41] Kant explains that as '[the subject of the soul] must be a condition that precedes all experience and makes the latter itself possible' (A 107), the subject of the soul must be transcendental. That is why Tauber also expresses that due to this self-reflective capacity, the subject attains hers autonomy and becomes transcendental (2010:151).

Regarding spontaneity,[42] in short, we could contrast this term with "mechanistic determinism",[43] and we could think of some links between "spontaneity" and "concurrence". According to Allison (1996), the core aspect of spontaneity refers to self-determination to act, something that leaves aside any strictly mechanistic view, since pure mechanisms are externally determined to act and cannot be self-determined in their actions. On the one hand, we know that the soul cannot be determined or known as an object; but on the other hand, we also know that it is possible to infer that the soul is an entity, because the soul can be perceived in her flux. Now, this entity becomes an agent through her self-reflection and activity of processing (apperception), but if the soul becomes an agent, then this must be self-determined in her action because "apperception" is a combinatory processing that is not automatic but self-imposed (Allison 1996:134). Hence, it is from the premises of "self-imposition" and "self-determination" that we can infer two important characteristics of the soul;[44] it must necessarily be: "unconditioned", and "spontaneous".

Being unconditioned means that the soul is not conditioned by any external cause.[45] So, in order to be spontaneous, the soul needs to be first of all unconditioned. Being spontaneous means that the soul can be the origin of a new chain of causes and consequences, or not.[46] Now, in order to be an origin and act in a self-determined way, the agent necessarily has to self-impose an elaborative reflection on the maxims on which its choices are based. So, according to Allison´s reading of Kant, spontaneity cannot be an aspect that happens in

[42] I will not address the discussion on "spontaneity" in Kant, because that goes beyond the scope of this dissertation, I will mostly offer my reading on Kant, taking into account mostly the works of Allison (1996) and Sgarbi´s (2012) regarding this.

[43] Regarding mechanistic determination I refer, in Allison words to this, a subject that is 'sensuously determined or necessitated (…) [,] causally conditioned to respond to the strongest stimulus or desire, with the strength being determined by physiological factors, independently of any valuation placed upon it the subject. Such a subject is, therefore, more properly characterized as a patient rather than an agent' (1996:130).

[44] See Sgarbi´s 2012:42-45

[45] In Sgarbi´s words, '[t]he unconditioned, therefore, is not in the things as the object of knowledge, but it is as those things that cannot be the object of knowledge, as things in themselves [noumena]' (2012:43).

[46] See Sgarbi 2012:109

sensibility, but only in “concurrence” with understanding,[47] because we necessarily have to incorporate reflection in order to be self-determined to act. In Allison´s words, ‘in addition to sensible stimuli, the "concurrence of the understanding" [concurrenz des Verstandes] is necessary to determine a rational agent to act’ (1996:131).

If that is the case for spontaneity, then self-determination to act must inevitably be related to the idea of freedom because freedom is the only intellectual resource that can offer us a choice to act. Now, freedom can be employed in two ways: (1) in its negative form, as the freedom to do whatever I want; or (2) in its positive form, as the freedom to do what I ought to do according to myself. Consequently, some contemporary Kantian philosophers link the concept of “negative freedom” to “relative spontaneity”, whereas “positive freedom” is linked to the concept of “absolute spontaneity”.[48] Unsurprisingly, the agent can be free (in positive or negative terms) to incorporate sensible incentives in her maxims to act or not. Now, the incorporation of sensible incentives does not necessarily mean that the will of the agent will necessarily become heteronomous for that reason, and that the agent herself will become passive (as a mechanical subject), totally determined in her actions. Allison clarifies that the subject can be sensuously affected, but also this can choose whether to incorporate sensuous incentives into her maxims to act or not (incorporation thesis) -- which is not the same as being sensuously determined to act by an external object or agent (1996:130) --.[49] It is because of this room for choice, even if the choice moves the agent to heteronomy, that we can think of the agent as self-determined and free.

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[47] Allison discusses and incorporates Ameriks’ ideas regarding “concurrence” (1996:131). Ameriks incorporates to the debate the idea of spontaneity in a “concurrence” with sensibility, and Allison amplifies this to also a “concurrence” with understanding. Allison says that Ameriks is right when he explains that ‘[w]hat Kant has in mind here is .. . a model where the self “goes along” with terms of use, available at, subject to what is proposed to it without being compelled by this proposal…’(1996:131-32). Allison also stresses that spontaneity ‘concerns rational agency, that is, the capacity to determine oneself to act on the basis of general principles (whether moral or prudential)’ (1996: 129).

[48] See Allison 1996:132

[49] Allison specifies that an agent who is sensuously affected ‘finds itself with a set of given inclinations and desires, which provides possible motives or reasons to act, [but] it is not causally necessitated to act on the basis of any of them’ (1996:131).

Therefore, the incorporation of sensible incentives can work well with "negative freedom" and "relative spontaneity", and with "positive freedom" and "absolute spontaneity", as well as with a combination of both types of freedoms in one spontaneity. That means that in "relative spontaneity", the agent makes use of her "negative freedom" to commit to follow her desire. This is an act of volition and not of mechanistic determination but, as 'its exercise depends upon a prior determination of an external force' (1996:132), the agent will inevitably fall into a willing passivity or heteronomy. This will happen only if the agent does not persevere in looking to align her "negative freedom" with the use of her "positive" freedom,[50] because the sensuous incentives that motivate the use of the "negative freedom" can indeed coexist with universal maxims enacted by the agent (Allison`s incorporation thesis). For example, I am willing to eat potatoes today, but potatoes are also part of the healthy diet I designed for myself. In this case, I am making use of my negative freedom, the desire to eat potatoes, but also of my positive freedom, because I am following my moral duty to look after my body health. In that example, I would not be falling into heteronomy, but I could if my desire to eat potatoes were against my duty with respect to my health.

On the other hand, in "absolute spontaneity" the agent must make use of her "positive freedom" in order to seize her autonomy to be able to commit to enact universal maxims to act.[51] As we saw, this can also work in alignment with her "negative freedom". Finally, it is the freedom (positive or negative) to choose that allows the entity or soul the possibility of becoming spontaneous, and thus, of indirectly knowing herself through the practical decisions or actions taken (which must be based on the maxims that the subject of soul determined for herself). Hence, the subject of the soul must deal with different motivations (morality and self-

[50] As Allison explains, 'in acting on the desire, I am also committing myself to that rule, and such a commitment must be viewed as an act of spontaneity on my part (of self-determination, if you will), which is not reducible to the mere having of the desire' (1996:131).

[51] Allison claims that for Kant, 'autonomy is "the supreme principle of morality" in the sense of being the condition of the possibility of action on the basis of this imperative '(1996:134). Here, Allison also reminds us that according to Kant, 'freedom and unconditional practical law reciprocally imply each other', what is called the Reciprocity thesis (1996:136).

love), needs (reason's need and natural needs), [52] and influences (a predisposition to goodness and a propensity to evil) in order to spontaneously make a choice with commitment. Here, commitment is taken for granted when we consider that the agent, in order to be spontaneous, is bound to will her self-determination.

Now, if the soul is passive, there is no way to perceive it in her activity, because what we perceive of her is her processing. However, by being passive (that is, by not making use of her freedom to act) the soul, as an existing being, is still capable of being affected (by making use of the faculty of sensitivity, but not of understanding). Thus, by being affected by stimuli internal or external to her, the soul inevitably changes. The changes of state of the soul are mostly associated with emotions. Every time the soul is moved or affected, an emotion or sensation pops up. Emotions are then phenomena linked to the changes of state of the soul, which can indeed be perceived and recognized in a certain way when there is a consciousness actively paying attention to them. Without those emotions and that consciousness paying attention to them we would not realize that our soul is being affected.

That is why, for Kant the concept of soul necessarily involves self-perception and awareness, agency, self-reference (the "I"), commitment and volition, physical embodiment (a body), and affection. Finally, the soul, as long as it is also an agency, is understood as that pure spontaneity that resists being determined by something other than itself. Regarding one very relevant aspect of the soul, namely, spontaneity, some doubts emerge. As Sgarbi says, 'from this account is still not possible to establish 'what distinguishes the spontaneity of the human being as a being from other animals' or entities (2012: 101). I will not address this last inquiry, but I will focus only on the human soul as it has been portrayed until here as a starting point to understand Kant`s idea of a committed volition in us. This is especially relevant to help us grasp what "responsibility" means and to get closer to answering the principal inquiries of this work: 'How can we return to goodness once we become conscious that we have morally failed

[52] Alix Cohen`s idea of reason's need (see Cohen 2014).

ourselves? What role do emotions play throughout this process of moral fall and recovery? And, how is self-knowledge relevant to said recovery?'

ii. About stages of maturity to reach autonomy

From a Kantian perspective, the subject, the soul or the human being, can only make use of her absolute autonomy if it is enlightened, that is, if it is educated or immersed in reason, freeing her agency from any natural determinism, while remaining connected to its natural instinctual life. However, the steps to reach absolute autonomy or enlightenment are not clear in Kant's theory. In this section, I will try to look more closely at that problem and engage the discussion about adulthood and responsibility.

a) Recognizing some problems around the idea of stages of maturity in Kant

The idea that there are stages of educational training one must go through to reach absolute autonomy by making use of our absolute freedom indeed appears in Kant's texts (Lectures and Critical works). Basically, he describes a transition from childhood to adulthood, and says a child is not responsible for his or her actions as a mature human being is. One of the transcripts of his *Lectures on Pedagogy* reinforces this idea of training through stages; said it says that 'a human being **only** can become a human being through education' (9:444), and it is specified that 'a human being is **only** educated by human beings' (9:444). Also, Felicitas Munzel highlights the relevance of the pedagogical training in Kant's Critical works, stating that in 'the Doctrine of Method of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant expresses concern about "the youth entrusted to academic instruction" as being central to the critical challenge to dogmatism' (2003:44).[53] We also identify in Kant's paper *An answer to the question: What is*

[53] Regarding education, Munzel also mentions that 'Kant makes one of his most explicit claims for the pedagogical function of the critical philosophy as such, declaring the remedy for the "error of still crude, unpractised

enlightenment? (1784) the relevance of educational training when he states, '[enlightenment is the human being's emergence from his self-incurred minority. Minority is inability to make use of one's own understanding without direction from another' (8:35). In that text he reinforces the relevance of becoming enlightened, but in order to reach enlightenment or absolute autonomy, he says you first need to be able to find resolution and courage in yourself (8:35), and to find it, you need to pass through a slow and gradual process of maturation. That is, a process to unwrap 'the spirit of a rational valuing of own worth and of the calling of each individual to think for himself' (8:36).[54]

Now, even when Kant indeed clarifies several times that a human being is an individual who is capable of fixing purposes for him/herself, he is not totally clear or consistent regarding when, or under what conditions, the phenomenon of intellectual maturity (the passage from childhood into adulthood) or unwrapping occurs. In physiological terms, the transition from childhood to adulthood is easy to verify in a body, but in intellectual terms that distinction is note. Intellectual faculties are a priori, they accompany us from the start, so that fact hunders our ability to think about our degrees of responsibility for our choices and actions.

b) The child-adult distinction

We can notice that a child cannot be judged in the same terms as an adult, because a child is still in the process of developing physiological and cognitive structures of learning and understanding,[55] but an adult already has a fully formed character. My concern about this has

judgment" to be the critical philosophy as the science required for the cultivation of reason, a science to be mastered precisely by those who would take upon themselves a pedagogical role in relation to others' (2003:44-5). Thus, Munzel also states that '[Kant's major works] spell out how the critical philosophy is to serve teachers as a guideline, how the educator is to bring about the realization of its principles in the Building of students' (2003:45).

[54] In *An answer to the question: What is enlightenment?* Kant argues that both, the spirit and the calling, need only of a few independent thinkers to be unwrapped and disseminated in society (8:36).

[55] In Paul Formosa's words, The Kantian claim is that '[t]hrough cultivation the student obtains the skills and knowledge to achieve all sorts of ends' (2011:170).

to do with how can we ascertain that this transition from childhood to adulthood has indeed been accomplished? Again, we know from Kant's *First Critique* that 'all our cognition begins with experience' (B 1). However, we also know from Kant that there is another knowledge, a priori knowledge (necessary and universal), which is always available for us from the very beginning,[56] is good and free of determinism, is the source of our moral wisdom, and can be put into action in practical terms by the spontaneous agency of our soul. Now, even if these two ideas put together sound confusing, my understanding of this is that, through experience, and by making use of the concurrence between sensibility and understanding, our human soul gradually unfolds *a priori* knowledge that has been there for us from the start. Thus, the spontaneous unfolding that the soul carries out is what would allow us to apply a priori knowledge in practice. Now, it seems that our different learning experiences stimulate this process in different ways and to different extents,[57] and perhaps that is exactly why educational training becomes relevant and necessary.

Kant affirms that we always have the capacity of recognizing our moral duties through our imperatives.[58] [59] The recognition of our moral duties represents the willing application of our a priori knowledge in practical circumstances.[60] But a proper recognition of duties needs the discernment of an adult. Because, as Kant warns us, in all this process of recognitions of duties we have to deal with our natural temptations, which are a powerful counterweight to our duties (*G* 4:405), and we need to acquire some degree of moral strength and maturity to be

[56] Regarding this, Kant expresses in in the Introduction of the *First Critique,* that 'although all our cognitions commence with experience, yet it does not on that account all arise from experience' (B 2).

[57] Regarding this idea of stimulation and progress, Kant teaches us in the *Metaphysics of Moral* that '[v]irtue is always in progress and yet always starts from the beginning […], if it is not rising, is unavoidably sinking' (6:410).

[58] That idea is expressed in the Metaphysics of Morals 6:235.

[59] Kant makes a distinction between hypothetical (conditional to) and categorical imperatives. Regarding the categorical imperatives he says, in *The Grounds of the Metaphysics of Morals*, that '[T]here is, therefore, only a single categorical imperative and it is this: *act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law'* (4:421).

[60] 'Duties are rules or laws of some sort combined with some sort of felt constraint or incentive on our choices, whether from external coercion by others or from our own powers of reason'. See this definition in Johnson, Robert and Adam Cureton, "Kant's Moral Philosophy", in *The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*.

successful in that purpose. For Kant, the duty of freedom is an innate duty (not an acquired one), which predisposes us to recognize and pursue moral ends despite the temptations that hinder us through our senses. However, we need to develop some strength so that our our agency remains steadfast to the high purposes fixed by reason.

c) The problem of radical evil

As we saw in chapter I, Freedom predisposes us to pursue our moral ends, and to use the necessary means to achieve those moral ends. That is, our innate freedom tells us how to arrange our means (our maxims) to raise ourselves from animality (from the use of our "relative autonomy" or "relative spontaneity") to humanity (in the use of our "absolute autonomy" or "absolute spontaneity"). However, Kant also warns us in the *Religion* about a propensity to evil rooted in our humanity, which is not part of our nature but of our own rationality, because it is part of the choice itself. Thus, Kant warns us against the choice of that agent who wills to make wrong decisions. So, now in addition to asking how we know if we are adults and not children in intellectual terms, we must inquire how to distinguish whether we are still developing toward intellectual maturity (we are still children) or whether we are acting wrongly as a consequence of a rational free choice (as self-deceptive adults).

First of all, for Kant, the fact of being able to make a free choice (positive freedom) depends on an agent that is autonomous (making use of her "absolute spontaneity"); that is, an agent that, by serving to its innate duty of freedom, is strong enough to absolutely determine itself. Now, Kant is not totally clear when he tries to explain why some people possess a strong rational will and others a weaker one, but he concludes that the rational will needs to be trained, educated, and reinforced constantly. Hence, even when we arrive at the insight that we possess absolute freedom and are part of something bigger and good (a whole community of people), we still need to keep training our rational will continuously, because we can easily weaken, decline and lose sight of that global picture.

- <u>Final words and next steps</u>

In this chapter I have shown that, first, if we cannot have clarity about our stages of intellectual maturity then we cannot have clarity about our degrees of responsibility,[61] because what we indeed know is that only a mature adult human can fully be responsible for his/her acts. So, we can see those acts of *akrasia* and self-deception in people for example, [62] are especially complex to analyze. It is difficult to discern to what extent those acts are voluntary (coming from absolute spontaneity, but falling into relative spontaneity because of our radical evil) or involuntary (coming from relative spontaneity only, following impulsive desires as children do), because in order to be able to determine their nature, we first need to know whether we are dealing with a "mature human being" or with a person "*en route* to becoming a mature human being" (a child or a young human).

So, we know from Kant that training to reinforce our rational will requires us to pass through stages of development (which are difficult to identify), through which we can little by little test our moral strength by means of our self-determination to act in our everyday praxis[63]. However, when we think of degrees of responsibility we must take into account two points: (1) that the idea of stages of development suggests that there are determining factors in experience that can notoriously influence our human development, and thereby, our decision-

[61] Saunders focuses on this problematic and mentions: 'Kant's locating freedom outside of experience, space and time, also causes problems in thinking about mental illness. Consider, for instance, someone who suffers from a condition such that their agency is occasionally diminished. The very notion of diminished agency seems to conflict with Kant's claim that every human action is either entirely determined or entirely free' (2019:141).

[62] Akrasia understood as lack of self-control to act.

[63] Kant's *Lectures of Anthropology* offer some ideas regarding possible ages to determine the development of our maturity (how to differentiate childhood, from youthhood, and adulthood) in intellectual terms, but those precritical thoughts do not seem to be consistent enough to answer the aspect of? "our becoming adults", since these thoughts show contradiction[63]. As Sticker and Saunders say, '[t]he more specific issue is that typically children become agents over time, and improve gradually as they develop into adults. Education presupposes the possibility of gradual improvement, which means that it occurs over time, whereas Kant [the Kant who writes during the post-*Critique* Period] locates (transcendental) freedom outside of time' (2020:660). See more about this problem in Joe Saunders 2019, *Kant and The Degrees of Responsibility*.

making process, and we should not ignore them;[64] and (2) that the idea of innate freedom offers us the possibility of willingly becoming evil and deceiving ourselves (predisposition to goodness, but also propensity to evil) in unpredictable ways. So, with all this in mind, how can we properly distinguish and judge when we are responsible for our actions? I will set these questions aside for a moment, and look at Freud next, since his account allows us to differentiate stages of maturity. However, Freud´s approach raises further problems.

[64] Kant states in the *Methaphysics of Morals*, 'Subjectively, the degree to which an action can be imputed (imputabilitas) has to be assessed by the magnitude of the obstacles that had to be overcome. – The greater the natural obstacles (of sensibility) […], so much the more merit is to be accounted for a good deed' (6:228).

'She undresses in the paradise of the memory
She knows nothing of the fearsome fate
Of her visions' (Alejandra Pizarnik)

CHAPTER III

FREUD ON THE PSYCHICAL APPARATUS

The purpose of this chapter is to identify the Freudian standpoint and make connections with Kantian theory. Here, I seek to find theoretical connections between Kant and Freud, and distinguish relevant divergences regarding their ideas about how our "psyche" works. As has been stated, Freud in principle followed a very different path than Kant for the elaboration of his theory of the human soul. He declared in 1914 that he denied himself the very great pleasure of reading philosophical works, 'with the deliberate object of not being hampered in working out the impressions received in psycho-analysis by any sort of anticipatory ideas' (*SE* XIV:15-16). Freud was a doctor, a neurologist, and his concern revolved primarily around the health problems of people. The path that he followed was based on the empirical observations of his medical praxis, and he built his theory on that basis. Hence, he mostly focused on his observations of the behaviour and symptoms of his patients. Even if his theory of the human psyche emerged from empirical observations, he resorted to German philosophy on several occasions in order to articulate the hypotheses that were turning up in his work. Freud mentions Kant in some of his works,[65] and as some scholars believe, Kant´s thoughts seem to form part of the groundwork of his definition of the unconscious.[66] The connections and divergences that I present here are not historical (related to how Freud acquired knowledge and reflected on Kant´s ideas) but only conceptual (a comparison of both theoretical models). All this, in order to unravel to some degree, the mystery of the decision-making process.

[65] Alfred Tauber (2010:117) indicates that Freud references Kant in 19 instances throughout the corpus of works published by *The English Standard Edition*.

[66] Matt Ffychte wrote a history of the evolution of the term "unconscious" after Kant (as part of a philosophical dialog or discussion of the Kantian theory); he refers to the emergence of the term: '[t]here are good grounds for locating this moment historically at the threshold of the nineteenth century in Germany, under the wings of Romanticism and post-Kantian idealism. Here, at the very least, one finds the initial integration of a theory of the unconscious with the mind's inner medium, named as the 'psyche' or the 'soul'' (2011:2).

i. The Freudian approach

Freud summarises the purpose of his work in his *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* (1915) as an attempt 'to discover the common ground on the basis of which the convergence of physical and mental disorder will become intelligible' (*SE* XV:21). As is known, Freud distanced himself from those studies of psychiatry that considered the psyche a mere manifestation of what happens in the brain, and he was sympathetic to those studies (especially those related to hypnosis) that probed the connection between psychical processes and the body.[67] That is, it is known that the affections of the body can also affect the psyche, but for Freud it was also relevant to understand the psychological mechanisms that affect the body. Thus, by following his passion for learning from different academic disciplines and creating new methodologies Freud gave birth to psychoanalysis: a new approach to try to understand our inner psychology. In the explanation of psychoanalysis he does not offer a specific definition for the human "soul", nevertheless, Freud indeed describes and reflect on a "psychical or mental apparatus", or *Seele.*[68]

Here, it is important to make a clarification of terms because some of them produce confusion due to the complexity of the translations. Mainly, I would like to clarify the term "mind" or "mental". As Bettelheim explains, Freud´s translators use the word "mind" or "mental" to refer to *Seele* (German word for "soul") or psyche, and "mind" is not used for *Geist* (German word for "spirit"). That clarification is relevant when we try to make a comparison with Kant, because the "mind" for Kant is related to our rational faculties, which are not the same as that the "soul". Bettelheim says, 'in German the words *Seele* and *seelisch* have even more exclusively spiritual meanings than the word "soul" has in present-day American usage.

[67] Paul Bercherie wrote a detailed explanatory synopsis about the first influences of Freud in the field of psychiatry. See Bercherie 1980.

[68] Bettelheim explains many important concepts used in psychoanalysis, and he warns us about the English translations. Regarding the "soul" and the official translation as "mental apparatus", he says, 'Freud often spoke of the soul -- of its nature and structure, its development, its attributes, how it reveals itself in all we do and dream. Unfortunately, nobody who reads him in English could guess this, because nearly all his many references to the soul, and to matters pertaining to the soul, have been excised in translation' (1985:4).

The word that the translators substitute for "of the soul" - "mental" - has an exact German equivalent; namely, *geistig*, which means "of the mind," or "of the intellect." If Freud had meant *geistig*, he would have written *geistig*' (1985:71-72). Therefore, as in the following paragraphs (and also in the one above) I make use of the words "mind" or "mental" through quotations of *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, I wish to make clear that those words will be conceptually referring to "soul", and not to "mind" -- as understood from a Kantian context.

In this section I will look at Freud´s works presented by the *Standard Edition* of three different periods: *The Interpretation of Dreams* and other early works previous to 1915, *The Ego and the Id and Other Works* written around 1923, and *The New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis and Other Works* written around 1933. Thus, in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900-1901), Freud describes the psychical or mental apparatus 'as a compound instrument', and the components of this instrument as systems or agencies (*SE* V:536). [69] Some years later, in the *Papers on Metapsychology* (1914), Freud adds and hypothesises a correlation between the psychical apparatus and the nervous apparatus.[70] He explains that: on the one hand, 'the nervous apparatus has the function of getting rid of the [external] stimuli that reach it, or of reducing them to the lowest possible level' (*SE* XIV:120);[71] and on the other hand, 'the mental apparatus reflects the manner in which the process of mastering stimuli takes place' (*SE* XIV:120). So, the psychical apparatus would correlatively imitate the performance of the nervous apparatus in the effort of reducing stimuli in us. This theoretical postulate is called a principle of "constancy", and as Octave Manoni notes, 'Freud always remained faithful to it,

[69] Freud uses the German Word *Instanzen*, which can be literally translated into English as "instances".

[70] Those ideas are previous to 1914, but they are here revised in more detention. For a detailed explanation of Freud's first project on the mental apparatus, see Wollheim 1971: 30-58.

[71] Freud sustains this punctual idea throughout his whole career in several documents, for example, in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920) he states almost exactly the same, '[t]he facts which have caused us to believe in the dominance of the pleasure principle in mental life also find expression in the hypothesis that the mental apparatus endeavours to keep the quantity of excitation present in it as low as possible or at least to keep it constant' (*SE* XVIII:9).

because it had played an important role in the theoretical orientations of the beginning' (1971:30).

Considering this first reflection of "systems or agencies", we can think of a first comparison with Kant. We know from Kant that, in order for agency to exist, it is necessary that a subject (being or soul) spontaneously participate with her intellectual capacities of organisation, systematisation and freedom, because if the subject (being or soul) can act and become an agent, it is due to the possibility of deliberation, choice, selectivity, and enactment of intellectual maxims for action, which can help to orient her needs or desires towards ends. So, when Freud posits the "mental or psychical apparatus" as a composite instrument of agencies or systems, he does not seem to contradict any of Kant's relevant claims, but on the contrary, to align with them closely. However, regarding the second claim about a ground to establish a correlation between the functions of the two apparatuses (nervous and psychical or mental), we find that for Kant the working of the psychical apparatus is not just a "reflection of"; it has to be different from that of the nervous system. For Kant, the processing of stimuli that our psychical apparatus carries out is not only a mechanical, causally determined process (even if the brain takes part), but also a spontaneous one; it involves choice, consciousness, and the committed volition of and agent; that is, the use of the pure rational faculties by an agent. This difference appears more pronounced when we consider Freud's early work, but the gap between his views and Kant's narrows in his mature work.

So, regarding the psychical or mental apparatus, we can see that the Freud of 1914 distances himself even more from Kant's postulates. Freud adds that the 'mental apparatus is subject to the pleasure principle, i.e., is automatically regulated by feelings…' (*SE* XIV:120). Freud here keeps pointing out that the psychical or mental apparatus is mostly (not totally) ruled by mechanistic natural laws, which move us in a search for satisfaction (pleasure principle). Feelings then serve the functions of orientation and regulation in it. For Kant, on the other hand, feelings do not possess the relevance they do for Freud; these are just a phenomenological output, a pop up that supervenes every time the soul is affected. However,

despite the differences, we can see that these ideas of Freud are not in principle totally alien to what we have studied in Kant. In the Freud of 1914, we can find a reflection on the fundamental Kantian concepts concerning the states of the soul, namely: receptivity (or passivity) and processing (or agency).

a) Regarding receptivity

Freud first clarifies in the *Papers on Metapsychology* (1914) that the human body must deal with the reception of two types of stimuli: external and internal. In principle, according to his writings of 1914, internal stimuli are instincts: 'precipitates of the effects of external stimulation' (*SE* XIV:120). So, firstly the body receives external stimulation and tries to get rid of the effects of it through muscular movements spurred by the nervous apparatus, but as the body cannot get rid of all the effects of stimulation, precipitates remain in it and keep reproducing more stimulation, which is called "internal stimulation".

(a.1) Internal stimulation

Having to deal with internal stimuli demands extra effort from the individual, and this leads to the creation of a more complex system of discharge (a psychological one).[72] Because '[instincts] make far higher demands on the nervous system and (…) they oblige the nervous system to renounce its ideal intention of keeping off stimuli, for they maintain an incessant and unavoidable afflux of stimulation' (*SE* XIV:120). In other words, internal stimuli are those that cannot be discharged through muscular movements, as external stimuli are. Hence, they remain inside the body, affecting it constantly independently of further external stimulation; thus, they become a constant source of stimulation in the body that reaches the psyche. Richard Wollheim clarifies that, for Freud, our cells are also sources of internal stimulation

[72] This idea is also clearly introduced in the early work of 1900 *The Interpretation of Dreams.*

(1971:40), therefore, we can understand that internal stimulation is not only related to the precipitates of external stimulation.

Freud explains in the *Papers on Metapsychology* (1914) that an instinct 'does not arise from the external world but from within the organism itself' to reach the mind (*SE* XIV:118),[73] and he affirms that 'an instinct appears to us a concept on the frontier between the mental and the somatic, (…) as a measure of the demand made upon the mind for work in consequence of its connection with the body' (*SE* XIV:120). Hence, for Freud, the psychical apparatus necessarily emerges as an apparatus of self-regulation and support, which must deal, in order to survive, with that constant internal stimulation that inevitably remains in the body as an active stimulus.

Throughout his early works (those written before 1923) we can see that Freud also describes an instinct of self-preservation, which stands for a natural intelligence that emerges from the body and makes us naturally aware of external dangers in order to keep threats to our survival at bay. He designed a neurological model to explain how our survival abilities are grounded in a self-preservation instinct. However, those preliminary explanations were not successful enough.[74] So, after 1923, he began to modify this hypothesis little by little, making room for alternative explanations. He introduced the view that culture modifies our natural instincts, those that are looking for discharge. Thus, Freud distances himself somewhat from the strict naturalist approach he took at first, and incorporates a new element, a certain

[73]Bercherie describes this hypothesis as Freud´s first epistemological project, which started its development even before 1914, in 1885. He asserts that this Freudian "psychophysiology" describes when 'the psyche is conceptualized as a corporeal-physical organ; the mobile 'energy that runs through it derives from the workings of the organs and cathects the representations, which thus become ideational representatives or delegates of the body's needs (instincts). Affect is a direct manifestation of these processes; it is conceptualized in terms of the model provided by the visceral processes of tension and discharge' (2006:29).

[74] Bercherie expresses that 'Freud soon modifies certain aspects of his model considerably by removing the 'neuronal' references and by abandoning any short-term attempt to establish a direct correlation between the workings of the mental apparatus and the physiology of the brain. The hypotheses of the Project are still present in the first truly metapsychological model (Freud does not use the term 'metapsychology' until 13 February 1896), but they are, so to speak, "laicized" or "deneuronalized"; it is this change which promotes the term "metapsychology"' (2006:28).

rationality in our inner agency, which no longer arises directly from our natural condition, but emerges from our interaction with our cultural environment. In this respect, he moves closer to Kant.

Therefore, to explain why that internal energy could not be discharged or the "cathexis" resolved by muscular movements, Freud drew a map of the psychical apparatus. A map that changed little over his years of research, which illuminated the dynamics of cathexis morphing into inner stimulation.[75] Bettelheim clarifies that the term "cathexis", in German *Besetzung* (noun) from the verb *besetzen*, is for Freud a term that means "occupation" from the verb "to occupy" (1985:89). He states, 'Freud gave these terms a special meaning within his system to indicate that something – an idea, a person, an object – is being or has been invested with a certain amount of psychical energy' (1985:89). Thus, on the one hand, as the instinctual cathexis reaches the mind (*Seele*), the mind gets affected, and needs to represent that affection. The source of the cathexis (the inner drive or instinct) must be located somewhere within the biological organism itself (the body), but the cathexis itself that affects the mind must be the one presented through our imagination, dreams, phantasies, hallucinations, behaviours, habits, symptoms, etc.

As we cannot identify the exact place where the instincts are localised in our body, Freud thought of them as these were in a space hidden from our consciousness. He called this place the unconscious, and in *The Interpretation of the Dreams* (1900) he imagined the unconscious

[75] The main impediment for discharge has to do with the idea of repression. I will revise this idea properly in the next chapter. As Freud mentions in *On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement* (1914), his three most influential masters from the medical field were Breuer (physician), Chrobak (gynaecologist), and Charcot (neurologist). According to him, they would have communicated 'a piece of knowledge which, strictly speaking, they themselves did not possess' (*SE* XIV:13). Nevertheless, thanks to their teachings and assistance, as well as the influence of other recognized physicians, Freud could grasp and elaborate his "theory of repression". This was 'a theoretical inference legitimately drawn from innumerable observations' (*SE* XIV:17) that became 'the corner-stone on which the whole structure of psycho-analysis [rested]' (*SE* XIV:16). However, Freud admits that none of those masters would have fully accepted in life all his Psychoanalytic claims, because none of them were ready to accept his most revelling discovery, this is, the relevance of the role of sexual desires and their transferences in the justification of the mechanisms of repression in the psyche.

as part of a particular topography, which also includes consciousness in the surface. Consequently, the processing and dynamism of the cathexis must be guided by the psyche by making use of its passive and active disposition.

(a.2) Freud´s first topography

In the periphery of the topography, Freud thought and located a sensory system (Pcpt), like an abstract permeable membrane through which it is possible to perceive and incorporate to the mind any type of stimulus, an incorporation without retention. However, according to Freud, stimuli passing through this sensory system inevitably leave behind traces,[76] or a mnemonic register (a representation) of its passage. Now, a perceptual system or membrane was not enough. That is why Freud thought that his topography also needed to make space for what was left (the bits of instinctual cathexis morphed into traces), and Freud called that space unconscious. However, Freud differentiated inner spaces within the unconscious space, and he called them "preconscious" and "(repressed) unconscious".

In *The Interpretations of Dreams* (1900) Freud explains that only those traces or representations stored in the preconscious can then become accessible to consciousness.[77] Freud also imagines consciousness in spatial terms. Consciousness is understood by Freud as another location, distinct from the preconscious and (repressed) unconscious. Consciousness is where processing or synthesis take place, a place where stimuli are detected due to the performance of a sensory system, and where the old traces stored in the preconscious can be moved and transformed into pieces of a proper meaningful structure. Regarding the preconscious, Laplache and Pontalis, in *The Language of Psychoanalysis*, explain that in general terms it 'is understood to designate whatever is implicitly present in mental activity without constituting an object of consciousness' (1985:327). Now, the possibility of accessing the traces

[76] See *SE V*:538.

[77] See *SE* V:533-550.

stored in the preconscious relies firstly on a process of selectivity (preconscious censorship), which is related to the quality of the traces that are calling for attention.

As a complementary explanation, in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900), but also some years later with a more mature development in *The Ego and the Id* (1923), Freud warns us that preconscious traces of cathexis can be associated to one another due to the intervention of that other adjacent system – a system that does not count as part of the topographic spaces, which contains the records of: association in time, similarity, or other types of coincidences among the traces (*SE* V: 538-539, also *SE* XIX:20). The preconscious hypothetically provides storage for the psychical cathexis of the external/internal stimuli morphed as traces or representations. The stored cathexis that is linked to the traces and is played by the adjacent systems of association that correspond to it, creates through those links word-presentations that can become conscious (*SE* XIX:20). This is possible because, for Freud, all preconscious traces were originally conscious perceptions, and since perceptions are residues of memories, like all mnemic residues they can become conscious again (*SE* XIX:20).[78]

Freud did not develop a more extensive explanation regarding the mnemic system, but as Laplanche and Pontalis point out, the necessity of 'making Perception-Consciousness the function of one system in particular, leads to the postulation of an incompatibility between consciousness and memory' (1985:247). Therefore, regarding the understanding of what memory-traces are, we must confront a problem of theoretical incompleteness.[79] What we can indeed understand is that for Freud, memory traces (representations) and words do not

[78] This explanation of Freud regarding the consciousness and unconsciousness of the memory-traces is very obscure and incomplete. Laplanche and Pontalis warn that due to this the Freudian theory of memory 'has given rise to mistaken interpretations' (1985:247).

[79] Freud asks himself, 'How does a thing become preconscious? And the answer would be: Through becoming connected with the word-representations corresponding to it' (*SE* XIX:20). He also explains, 'it dawns upon us like a new discovery that only something which has once been a Cs. perception can become conscious' (*SE* XIX:20).

follow from the same antecedents (stimuli) as cathexis, but they are linked to each other in the preconscious.

These hypotheses regarding stimuli, and the storage of cathexis (through traces) are the basic psychoanalytic assumptions Freud upholds in the long run. It is curious that for Freud the reflection on the soul itself is not as relevant as its function as apparatus, the apparatus that receives and processes the inner stimuli or cathexis. Hence, Freud regards the soul as being more related to the idea of topography than as a perception of a progression in time. Hence, the things that are processing, the agencies, are for Freud the organisations that compose the apparatus, but the unconscious material and the apparatus itself is mostly topographic. So, understanding the topography on which the agencies move is even more important than understanding what the agencies are. This is because for Freud, stimuli are mostly external, they enter our body to reach the soul, but what reaches the soul is specifically the cathexis, and cathexis is energy, a material substance that needs representation in space to be stored and processed.

(a.3) The timeless soul and its affection

Here, we can note a relevant divergence between Freud and Kant. If, for Kant the soul is unknown and associated with emptiness and its agency not only depends on the stimulation of a natural source (because the soul can be activated by the mind's drive) but also of a rational one, then the soul itself can only be perceived through the progression of its activity or through its changes of states. However, for Freud the soul is also unknown, but mostly timeless. To explain this, Jonathan Lear makes links between the timelessness of the psyche and the phenomenon of "repetition" of our behaviours. He understands "behaviours" as the consequence of that constant inner stimulation that we must deal with, that is, the stimulation that cannot be totally discharged. Lear explains that from the Freudian perspective '– if we may speak loosely – it is less like "the same thing happens again" and more like "the same primordial struggle endures". [Therefore, for our psyche t]here is no passage of time; there is

just the primordial struggle of removal and retrieval. This is the Typhonic monster with hundred heads (…). The only time is the present and the monster is always hungry' (2005:46). In other words, as inner stimuli are located in the body, and from there they reach the psychical apparatus, their cathexis gains representation and associations. Consequently, the psychical apparatus offers its unconscious topography to store and process the instinctual cathexis that remains stimulating the subject. Therefore, for Freud as the inner stimuli do not move in progression (in time) to affect the mind, because they remain stuck in the subject's body, unconsciously stimulating it constantly, then the psyche that is affected by them remains timeless. However, it is possible to attribute progression or time to consciousness.

Thus, according to Freud, the psyche must be related to its topography. For him, energy (cathexis) and agency cannot be understood without the ideas of materiality and extension in space, because energy and motion are linked to matter by the laws of physics and, as energy (cathexis) depends on materiality, the psyche becomes precisely the apparatus that makes possible the perception, storage and organisation of it. Therefore, even when the space in our body for the inner stimuli is shielded from direct perception by our eyes, this space must exist, as an unconscious space. The ideas of spatiality, matter, and energy reaching the mind, are traces of other philosophical influences than Kant in Freud, but these remain in dialogue with Kant.[80]

At this point, we must also note that Freud's duality of external and internal stimulation does not map onto the external/internal polarity in Kant, but there are affinities between them. If, for Freud, internal stimulation has to do with precipitates of external stimulation, then we can consider an analogy with Kantian affection and sensibility, because for Kant our affection is a reflective answer to the reception of external stimuli, which, as a consequence of the external stimulation, produces an output of inner objects,[81] like emotions, representations

[80] See Ffichte 2011.

[81] Yibin Liang clarifies that for Kant '[w]hile outer sense represents spatial objects, inner sense represents the self and its inner states as objects (A38/B55)' (2020:311). Liang concludes that for Kant '[t]he proper material in inner

(intuitions), or feelings,[82] and associations among them through purposiveness.[83] However, for Kant, stimuli that come from inner objects do not remain necessarily linked to the external stimuli that come from external objects, as if these were their direct consequence or precipitates, because an inner object can stimulate the mind independently. For Kant, this would resolve more likely in this way: a spontaneous thought that seeks to become conscious can affect our sensibility, and that effect can elicit an emotion or feeling, which in turn can produce a bodily reaction, which can affect our sensibility again, completing a cycle of cause and effect, but a cycle initiated by the mind itself, from the inner object. However, (but probably not in contradiction) Freud mostly pays attention to the source of external stimulation that becomes inner stimulation for the body, which is why he expresses 'that anything arising from within [as the inner Kantian objects] (apart from feelings) that seeks to become conscious must try to transform itself into external perceptions' (*SE* XIX:20).

Hence, we see that Freud's explanation of stimulation indeed has some parallels with the Kantian view of being affected by "objects",[84] but it does not cover every aspect the Kantian theory covers; for instance, it does not cover the source of power or agency that the spontaneity of the soul in itself represents, at least not explicitly. Nevertheless, Freud makes a particular and very relevant observation: he explains that there are some stimuli (inner stimuli

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intuitions, with which we occupy our mind, consists in sensations of outer senses and feelings of pleasure and displeasure (…). In other words, the premise precludes outer phenomenal experience and feelings from being generated with the participation of inner sense. Without this premise, inner sense could be still said to yield a sensory manifold (even if not a sensory manifold of its own' (2020:311).

[82] Liang agrees with Friederike Schmit and asserts, 'outer sensations are the output materials of inner sense and constitute its material aspect. Schmitz claims that in the Critique, Kant does not speak of "innere Anschauungen" but only of "innere Anschauung" (Schmitz 2015: 1057). Accordingly, there are no genuine inner intuitions that represent inner phenomena but only 'inner intuiting,' which is the process of producing outer intuitions through inner sense (Schmitz 2015: 1056–1058)' (2020:315).

[83] Kant explains in the *Third Critique* that the concept of purposiveness 'belongs to reflective judgement, not to reason, (…) For we call something purposive if its existence seems to presuppose a presentation of that same thing; [and] natural laws that are constituted, and related to one another, as if judgement had designed them for its own need[s] are [indeed] similar to [the cases where] the possibility of [certain things presupposes that these things are based on a presentation of them. Hence judgement, by means of its principle, thinks of nature as purposive, in [the way] nature makes its forms specific through empirical laws' (*CJ* 404).

[84] As we saw before for Kant, "external" is related to the natural world, and "internal" to the intellectual world. Whereas for Freud, external is related to the natural world that is external to our body, and internal on the other hand, has to do with the biological processes that take place within the body and then reach the soul.

only) that constantly affect the psyche which we cannot get rid of altogether by using our body (muscle movements). So, the main question for Freud has to do with how to get rid of the excess energy (cathexis) generated in the process of stimulation (external), affection, precipitation, more stimulation (internal), and more affection. Regarding this, Freud proposes, together with this first topography regarding the spaces of the preconscious, conscious, and unconscious, and the adjacent systems (sensory system and associative systems), a second topography focused on the agencies themselves that work on those spaces, which have the main function of looking for means of discharging the cathexis.

b) Regarding the processing

Freud mentions in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900) that '[our] perceptions are linked with one another in our memory – first and foremost according to simultaneity of occurrence' (*SE* V:539).[85] There, Freud is talking again about what takes place in the preconscious. Now, processes of "simultaneity" and "occurrence" are not the same that processes of "spontaneity" and "concurrence" as we saw in Kant with respect to the soul.[86] Spontaneity and concurrence require deliberation, and simultaneity and occurrence obey mechanical reflective laws only. From the preconscious, the unconscious contents can move to the conscious space. The agency that moves the traces through these psychical spaces, and then processes them into something else is one's consciousness.

[85]In order to make a comparison with Kant on the idea of "memory", Ilaria Ferrara explains, '[e]xcept *for § 34 of Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* and some notes *in Lectures in Anthropology*, Kant does not give memory a precise theoretical treatment. This may be attributed either to his transcendental turn, or to the theoretical and cultural contexts in which he was working. Memory, linked to the reproductive activity of representations in the inner sense, does not receive a transcendental definition and corresponding treatment but only a phenomenological analysis that subordinates its activity to that of the formal laws of the understanding. The inner sense, in fact, is a passive faculty that is affected by understanding -performing its figurative synthesis on given material from the outer sense. And memory is connected to these activities of simultaneous production of the empirical manifold' (2019:117).

[86] Freud´s reflection on "simultaneity" and "occurrence" in the Preconscious has its origin in his reflexions on neurology, regarding this Scorza and Cavalheiro say, '[in 1880] Freud first proposed a basic law of neuroplasticity that states that neurons that fire together, wire together and neurons that fire apart wire apart. This very monumental discovery Freud called the law of association by simultaneity' (2013:122).

(b.1) On perception

In *The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud* distinguishes two stages in this process of turning mere stimuli into memory-traces, which are guided by two different psychic agencies or systems. Firstly, as mentioned above, there is a moment of mere perception (primary process), where what is registered by the sensory system is not retained in the mind (*SE* V:538-39). That is, the internal stimuli are perceived as a display of sensations, or sensory images in a movie (like hallucinations), but without any mental link to give them any coherence to reach proper word conscious recognition. Hugh Haughton states, 'Freudian psychology is the one which makes poetry indigenous to the very condition of the mind' (2003:X) in reference to that moment of mere perception without retention. Now, there is a second psychic moment (or secondary process), where what it is perceived is indeed retained, some of it permanently.

(b.2) On storage and processing

Laplanche and Pontalis explain that '[t]he primary and secondary processes can be defined in purely economic terms –the primary process as immediate discharge. The secondary process as inhibition, postponement of satisfaction and diversion' (1985:305). This second psychic moment or secondary process of postponement corresponds to the moment that the perceptions of the stimuli are turned into traces and connected among them by means of the work of the associative systems, and thanks to them, the traces also acquire psychical significance, which 'would lie in the intimate details of its relations' (*SE* V:539). Here, Freud again makes a distinction. He explains that some traces are available for conscious recall, but others not. Those traces available are those that were stored in the preconscious. By contrast, there are other traces that, when processed by consciousness and gain memory and significance, are then divested of their memory, by a mechanism of rejection in consciousness. Those rejected traces remain hidden to consciousness, as unconscious traces without any meaningful memory associated. It is the act of association and meaning among the memories

what it is intervened or ciphered by the mechanism of rejection.[87] However, their cathexis still 'can produce all their effects while in an unconscious condition' (*SE* V:539).[88] Now, the key to understanding why some traces are accessible to the consciousness and others remain divested of memory and unconscious (ciphered) lies mainly in Freud's idea of repression, which I will explain later.

On the one hand, Freud called that agency in charge of processing the traces and their associations "consciousness". On the other, he calls the agency in charge of conducting the instinctual cathexis of the traces towards their discharge, any discharge, "id". The focus of the next section will be on the psychical apparatus, the spaces of consciousness and preconscious, and the agencies "ego" and "id" working there. In the following chapter, I will dedicate special attention to that other space, the unconscious of what is repressed, and the agency "superego". In relation to the superego, I will return to the reflection on "responsibility" that I started in Chapter II.

Even if Freud took a different path than Kant to build a theory of the human psyche, and they lived in different centuries, many elements of their theories are worth comparing. Because, even if Freud developed his ideas of mental apparatus and unconsciousness from empirical grounds, in Gardner´s words, 'the question as to what most fundamentally distinguishes Freud's conception of the unconscious is conceptual' (2006:137). Hence, the purpose of the next section is to draw a conceptual comparison between these thinkers rather than a methodological or historical one. In the following pages, I will examine some recent efforts by Kantian philosophers to understand Freud's ideas from a Kantian perspective, and I

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[87] "Ciphered" here means that the logical associations among the traces get distorted by the mechanism of rejection, in order to not be recognized by consciousness, and in that way, to remain trapped in unconsciousness.

[88] Some years after *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1901), in the *Papers on Metapsychology* (1914) Freud explains that the representatives of the unconscious are attached to bits of drives. He says, '[t]he nucleus of the Ucs. consists of instinctual representatives which seek to discharge their cathexis; that is to say, it consists of wishful impulses. These instinctual impulses are coordinate with one another, exist side by side without being influenced by one another, and are exempt from mutual contradiction' (*SE* XIV:187).

will discuss the relevance of going back to Kant to look at Freud. I will focus on work by Bèatrice Longuenesse, Alfred Tauber, and Sebastian Gardner.

ii. An approach to the Freudian concepts of consciousness and unconsciousness

I will start this section comparing the Freudian and Kantian ideas of "consciousness" and "unconsciousness"; the commentators I discuss agree there are correlations between each author's use of these ideas. However, in the next chapter, I will compare their different ways of understanding guilt and conscience, autonomy and moral constraint (or repression). I will show an important point of disagreement among the contemporary Kantian philosophers, and I criticise some aspects of their approaches.

a) About consciousness

Freud does not offer an extended explanation of "consciousness" in his works, but we can find a few relevant definitions of it. So far, we have only seen a provisional explanation of the term mostly linked to its topographic position and its activity of processing, but that sketch is not enough to grasp what consciousness means for Freud. In *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900), Freud also explains that consciousness is 'a sense-organ for the perception of psychological qualities' that associates verbal memories, i.e., traces or residues of quality that draw the attention, with thought-processes (*SE* V:615-17). Later, In *Totem and Taboo* (1913) Freud explains some linguistic complications surrounding the term "consciousness", because in many languages (unlike in English or German) it happens that there is one idea that combines two concepts, *Bewußtsein* (consciousness) and *Gewissen* (conscience) (*SE* XIII:67-68). In *Totem and Taboo* Freud builds some subtle links between conscience and consciousness; he defines conscience as 'the internal perception of the rejection of a particular wish operating within us' (*SE* XIII:68). However, when Freud talks about conscience (*Gewissen*), he does it in alignment

with that definition of consciousness ("the internal perception of the rejection", *Bewußtsein*). He says, '[f]or what is "conscience"? On the evidence of language it is related to that of which one is "most certainly conscious"' (*SE* XIII:67).[89] Throughout this chapter, we will see that the idea of consciousness will require constant revisions from different angles.

Freud mainly uses the term "consciousness" to refer to that which is not "unconscious".[90] However, at some point, he linked the idea of "consciousness of" or "self-consciousness" specifically with the agency or term "ego", a term that is explained in more detail in his second topography. But, even when "ego" is related to consciousness, it still possesses an unconscious component[91]. Through the definitions of consciousness, depicted in the paragraph above, we can summarize at least two relevant ideas: firstly, the idea of consciousness as an intermediary sense organ (a space) of perception and processing, and secondly, from *Totem and Taboo*, the idea of rejection as a necessary condition for the emergence of a "consciousness" (knowing or awareness), of a "conscience of guilt", that is, as 'the perception of the internal condemnation of an act by which we have carried out a particular wish' (*SE* XIII:68). Therefore, the editor of the *SE* explains that the functions of consciousness 'include such activities as censorship, reality testing and so on, all of which are now assigned to the "ego"' (*SE* XIX, 9).[92] In this section I will

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[89] I will leave here the original words in German expressed by Freud in *Totem and Taboo (1913)*, mostly because in that text Freud uses the expresion *am gewissesten weiß* (related to "knowing with certainty"), and then *Bewußtsein* (related to "knowledge" or "awareness") instead of *Bewußtheit* ("consciousness") to refer to the idea that English translators have understood as "consciousness". The original quote says, 'Denn was ist "Gewissen"? Nach dem Zeugnis der Sprache gehört es zu dem, was man am gewissesten weiß; in manchen Sprachen scheidet sich seine Bezeichnung kaum von der des Bewußtseins.' (*GW* IX:85) I do not see that the translation "consciousness" goes in contradiction with the strict literal meaning of those expressions of the original text in German, that is, "knowledge", "awareness", and "certainty", and thus I agree with the adaptation that the translators use.

[90] He says in *The Ego and the Id*, '[a]s far I can see, it is impossible to avoid this ambiguity; the distinction between conscious and unconscious is in the last resort a question of perception, which must be answered "yes" or "no"' (*SE* XIX,15).

[91] Freud says in *The Ego and the Id* (1923), '[w]e have formed the idea that in each individual there is a coherent organization of mental processes; and we call this his ego. It is to this ego that consciousness is attached' (*SE* XIX, 17). This, even when Freud admits that "ego", also possesses an inseparable unconscious component (See *SE* XIX,24).

[92] In the Dictionary of Laplanche and Pontalis (1985:86-87) is portrayed from a dynamic point of view an evolution of the term "consciousness", which is summarised in three stages: (a) 'as a voluntary rejection still akin to the mechanism of attention'; (b) as 'the attribute of being conscious' (which in 1915 is not necessarily associated to

elucidate the notion of the ego in Freud's second topography, bracketing the idea of conscience and rejection until later.

(a.1) The Freudian ego and the Kantian "I think"

According to Longuenesse, the Freudian "ego" is equivalent to the Kantian "I think" (the referent), but different from the Kantian idea of soul (the empty entity). As I explained in chapter II, for Kant our faculty of sensibility intuits phenomena that are then transformed into concepts thanks to our transcendental faculty of imagination. Longuenesse, on the one hand, reminds us that the Kantian "I think" or "self-consciousness" is a referent for that spontaneous entity that is behind the process of synthesis that involves a transition between the act of perceiving and the act of conceptualising. The "I think" accompanies the moment of metabolization of the phenomena into empirical concepts as the referent for that entity that is also the agency (the entity in her activity) that is thinking. Kant called that moment the "unity of apperception", and "the I think" must always be behind that process. On the other hand, Longuenesse explains that the Freudian ego represents an '[organization of] mental events governed by the reality principle' (2019:194) because according to Freud (1923), the ego or self-consciousness is the agency that organises the memory-traces previously stored in the space called "preconscious", and then offers them a new mode of expression and meaning.[93] However, grasping the ego may be more complicated than that.

What we can understand from Freudian psychoanalysis (mostly from Freud's mature works, written after 1923) is that the "reality principle" is a regulatory principle working on the ego, which counteracts the "pleasure principle" that also works on the ego as a regulative

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any particular location); and (c) '[T]he transposition to consciousness', related to the process of therapy and the moment where the 'gradual integration [of the repressed unconscious contents] into the preconscious takes place'.

[93] In a similar line of thought, Laplanche and Pontalis would support Longuenesse´s claim when they explain that for Freud '[t]he primary process endeavours to find a perception identical with the image of the object which results from the experience of satisfaction. In the secondary process, the identity sought is that between one thought and another' (1985:305).

principle. For Freud, the pleasure principle means 'instinctual cathexis seeking discharge' (*SE* XXII:74). On the other hand, Pontalis and Laplanche explain in their dictionary of Freudian psychoanalysis that the reality principle 'corresponds to a transformation of free energy into bound energy' (1985:379).[94] That is, the ego is the final dynamic product of a regulation between a search for discharge (which is carried out by the id) and the confrontation with reality (natural and cultural boundaries). According to Freud, we need to discharge an enormous flow of internal stimulation (cathexis). However, this cannot be carried out in just any way; this cathexis needs to find a proper resolution, which is the ego's task. According to Pontalis and Laplanche, 'the search for satisfaction does not take the most direct routes but instead makes detours and postpones the attainment of its goal according to the conditions imposed by the outside world' (1985:379). Therefore, we can say that the ego is a synthesis that works in a specific psychic location of the psychical apparatus, but firstly we must consider that this synthesis emerges as bound energy between these two principles.

Longuenesse draws the following parallels: (1) between the Freudian preconscious -- as the space where the traces inhabit -- and the Kantian sensibility -- as the spatial conditions for the reception of the phenomena and affection; and (2) between the Kantian unity of apperception -- that is, the moment when consciousness emerges -- and the Freudian reality principle -- the moment where the conscious ego is determined as a bound energy. However, the concept of ego is more complex than this correlation suggests, mainly because the Freudian ego has motivation, but the Kantian "I think" is non-motivated.[95] At least, it is not motivated in the way that the Freudian ego is.

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[94] As Pontalis and Laplanche explain, 'psycho-analysis seeks to base the intervention of the reality principle on a particular type of instinctual energy said to be more specific ally in the service of the ego' (1985:379). In Freud words, 'the ego seeks to bring the influence of the external world to bear upon the id and its tendencies, and endeavours to substitute the reality principle for the pleasure principle which reigns unrestrictedly in the id' (*SE* XIX,25).

[95] Gardner reaffirms the same idea in the following terms: 'if being qua ground of consciousness must be considered in abstraction from any objectual character, then its proximate manifestation within us must be similarly non/objectual, that is, it must comprise a mode of consciousness which is not intentionally directed' (2018:33).

Longuenesse explains that, according to Kant, the act of thinking (apperception) can be perceived as a feeling, the feeling of an inner processing. Now, according to Freud, we also know that the act of thinking is also related to self-perception and feeling, because there is an inner agency (ego) that can be perceived and felt as expressing itself through the processing of a compound of word-traces framed in a conceptual linguistic narrative (Longuenesse 2019:190-193). So, even if those two proposals are not exactly the same, that is, the idea of apperception does not include everything the idea of ego does, there is nevertheless a certain basis for linking the Kantian "I think" and the Freudian "ego", as Longuenesse notes. I mostly agree with her view on this, but I also believe that the symmetry she describes is not perfect, mainly because the idea of ego seems to involve some motivational components that the referent "I" of "I think" does not possess, at least not in the same manner.

(a.2) The encounter with the Unconscious

Tauber (2010) carefully inspects this Freudian ego or bound energy through a Kantian lens, focusing on its narratology. He says '"what is' (i.e., the reality as described by the analytic narrative [in therapy]) cannot be understood independently from how that reality is reconstructed" (2010:198), because "facts become elements in a narrative created by a constellation of subjective interpretations" (2010:213). Therefore, the subject herself (the entity who makes choices and interprets reality by means of a logical language woven into a narrative) is undetermined, but as her narrative expressions contain her activity, they inevitably get to determine part of what the agent -- the ego -- is. As I explained in chapter II, the soul -- whose referent is the "I" of "I think" -- can determine herself through her spontaneous actions (agency). Thus, for Tauber, what makes the Freudian ego (the agency) a subject and object of change is the indeterminacy of the "subjective interpretations" (its soul) (2010:200). Regardless, we can always discern part of what the subject is by paying attention to the reconstruction of her narrative.

It is because of this "indeterminacy" in the subject of the soul that Tauber adds that 'self-consciousness itself becomes acutely self-conscious in the encounter with the unconscious' (2009:3). Here, Tauber refers to "unconscious" as that which is indeterminate, or not conscious. This, because Freud himself claims in his mature work of 1933 *The New Introductory Lectures on Psychology* that 'we call a psychical process unconscious whose existence we are obliged to assume, – to infer it from its effects, but of which we know nothing' (*SE* XXII:70). Gardner also concludes that it is in the idea of an undetermined agency of self-consciousness, where we can primarily find the roots of the phenomenon of "unconscious" (2013:138), and he also remarks that all the Kantian faculties of pure reason, as spontaneous agencies of processing, are undetermined and unconscious (2013:137). However, complications emerge if we follow Kant in thinking of the soul as an empty entity, since we know that for Freud the unconscious is mostly a space only for material contents and their traces. How can we resolve this tension?

Like Tauber (2010) and Longuenesse (2019), Gardner (2018) introduces the idea that the Freudian unconscious must indeed be transcendental. Gardner explains that Freud inherits and combines some reflexions of the Idealism of the Post-Kantian Romantics (mostly those of Novalis) with another naturalistic line of thought that is first possible to identify from Spinoza, and that then aligns with the thought of Shelling, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche, among others. Gardner firstly encourages us to rethink the link between Freud and the Post-Kantian Romantics. With respect to them, Gardner explains regarding to the transcendental unconscious (by quoting Dieter Henrich) that this mainly 'aims to construct a theory of the subject in which the subject can recognize itself' (2018:33).[96] What does this mean? Gardner paraphrases Richard Wollheim (1972) and explains that for the Romantics philosophers '[t]he transcendental image of the mind [soul?] should thus be or correspond to (…) the mind's own image of itself' (2018:33).[97] However, 'for a variety of reasons, gaps may be affirmed in the

[96] In that quotation Gardner was quoting the words of Dieter Henrich.

[97] That is why, Gardner mentions that some Romantic post-Kantians suggested (as Novalis) that this correspondence should work through an "ordo inversus" (2018:33), that is, not through an identical image that is spontaneously given in the process, but more like a mirror reflection. As we know, all reflections work projecting illusions, and illusions, as Kant notices, lay in the ground of the human mind. However, illusions differ from reality,

transcendental theory of the mind, and where these exist they will imply regions of opacity in the subject's apprehension of its own grounds' (2018:33). Hence, Gardner invites us to reflect on the regions of opacity (those regions that are inaccessible for our consciousness), as if these were part of the Kantian transcendental project itself, as understood by some Post-Kantian Romantic philosophers (Novalis among them). As Freud indeed mentions, the regions of opacity should cover all what we are obligated to assume or infer, 'but of which we know nothing' (*SE* XXII:70). Following this, we could think of the indeterminacy of the soul, the things in themselves, the faculties of reason, but also, of the traces of inner cathexis and their psychic spaces as zones of opacity.

By recalling Kant, Gardner brings back the aporia of the *First Critique*, and argues that 'any attempt to cognize the self qua subject of thought "can only revolve in a perpetual circle"' (2018:32), where 'I cannot know as an object that which I must presuppose in order to know any object' (A402). Therefore, when Gardner reconstructs the history of the term "unconscious" from Kant onwards, he offers this idea of "opacity" by invoking the First Post-Kantian idealists (mostly Novalis), as a necessary claim to understand that there are limits to our self-knowledge. Now, regarding this idea of transcendental self-recognition, Tauber also reminds us that in Kant's transcendental project there are always restrictions on what we can know. He states, '[humans] observe their own thoughts and emotions just as they observe the world, but just as they are limited in their knowledge of the exterior reality, so are they restricted in knowing themselves' (2010:151). In other words, he reminds us that we can know ourselves but only up to a certain point, because empirical knowledge is fallible and limited.

Thus, if the "ego" or the "I" in "I think" can say something about the soul through their agency, reference or/and narrative, there are still many mysteries surrounding it. The task of trying to determine or know what the soul is in herself, has a limit according to both Kant and

in a similar way that consciousness differs from unconsciousness. Gardner explains this saying that a 'reflection reverses the true relations obtaining within the subject, on the analogy with a mirror image, so that when reflection takes up feeling, being's affective self-manifestation is lost from view, and the status of being something is attributed instead to what has been formed conceptually' (2018:33).

Freud. However, it is indeed possible to bring some light to that obscure unconscious that affects the soul and offers the material (traces and mnemic residues) for her agency, processing, and narrative. I think both authors would agree with this perspective.

b) About unconsciousness

Freud is more generous providing definitions of "unconsciousness" than of "consciousness" throughout his works. The editor of *SE* notes that at the beginning of his psychoanalytic project (1895) Freud distinguished three types of "unconscious", which were streamlined to only two types some years later in the *Interpretation of Dreams* (1900) and in the *Papers of Metapsychology* (1915). However, in a more mature stage of his work, when he writes *The Ego and the Id* (1923), Freud again proposes the threefold distinction (*SE* XIX:6).[98] The editor of *SE* also mentions that the term '"unconscious" was being used in two senses: the "descriptive" sense (which merely attributed a particular quality to a mental state) and the "dynamic" sense (which attributed a particular function to a mental state)' (*SE* XIX:5).[99] I will start by looking at Freud's explanation of its two variants in the 1900s.

Freud says, 'the unconscious comprises, on the one hand, acts which are merely latent, temporarily unconscious, but differ in no other respect from conscious ones and, on the other hand, processes such as repressed ones, which if they were to become conscious would be bound to stand out in the crudest contrast to the rest of the conscious processes' (*SE* XIV:172). These two definitions of the unconscious harmonise with the definitions of consciousness above as their counterparts. On the one hand, if consciousness is a mental perceptive organ (a space for processing), unconsciousness is then that mental reservoir for that which cannot be perceived at present. And on the other hand, if consciousness is linked to conscience (to a

[98] We can find clear references in Laplanche and Pontalis (1985).

[99] See this explanation directly from Freud in *SE* XIX: 15.

certain extent), that is, if consciousness emerges from "the perception of an internal rejection", then unconsciousness also represents precisely that which is rejected.[100] These rejected impulses and representations are what precisely constitute the dynamic unconscious.

(b.1) The Preconscious

So, "unconscious" in its primary sense (as it was explained in 1915), stands for those "acts which are merely latent". However, that idea was previously labelled "preconscious" in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900). The change follows Freud's modification of the term "unconscious" (originally coined by the Post-Kantian philosophers) into "preconscious", in order to be able to differentiate, in a descriptive sense, one term (the preconscious, related to the latent contents, and their traces) from the other (the unconscious, related to the repressed contents).[101] Originally the terms "conscious", "preconscious", and "unconscious" were grouped together in *The Interpretation of Dreams* as "the first Freudian topography".

From a Kantian point of view, Freud's first characterization of the "unconscious" (as preconscious), which connects it to "acts which are merely latent", is unobjectionable; the Kantian theory would not invalidate the Freudian concept of the unconscious (or preconscious), at least not as understood in that first definition. Longuenesse, Tauber, and Gardner support this claim in different ways. In this connection, Gardner adds that for Kant, 'mental contents are not conscious per se, in and of themselves, but need to be made conscious' (2018:31); there must be contents beyond consciousness, resources available for the ego to recall and process.

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[100] What is perceived is the rejection itself, but not the content, the content remains unknown.

[101] Years after *The Interpretation of Dreams*, that is, in *The Ego and the Id* (1923), Freud talks again about the ambiguity of the term "unconscious". Now, he explains that we can distinguish two types of unconscious from a descriptive sense (Perceptual system, and Preconscious), and that we can only distinguish one unconscious from a dynamic sense (*SE* XIX:15).

In a previous essay, Gardner explains that the unconscious, as the "preconscious" for the "acts which are merely latent", can also be understood in two ways, which mostly correspond to what was depicted in Freud's works of 1923, as: 'entirely composed of, or at least as including some ideas that were not originally conscious but that could become conscious' (2006:144);[102] and 'entirely composed of, or at least as including some ideas that were not originally conscious and that could not become conscious' (2006:144). I agree with these definitions, however, in them Gardner is integrating a reflexion on Freud´s perceptual system. As I described before, Freud explains in some texts that what was consciously perceived before can become conscious again. That affirmation has motivated different interpretations in Freudian scholars. Gardner calls this claim the "Lockean condition on mentality", that is, 'that there can be nothing in the mind that has not previously been in awareness' (2006:143). However, Gardner points out an incongruence in the Lockean condition, he says, '[i]f an idea can become unconscious at a later time, why can it not be originally unconscious and later become conscious?' (2006:144).

Gardner does not see intelligibility in the Lockean condition, and he says that the only rationale for this would seem to lie, 'in a view to the effect that the creation of mental item somehow involves consciousness as a genetic ingredient' (2006:144). Now, according to him (and other scholars) that notion is difficult to support. So, Gardner, in his reading of Freud, decides to exclude consciousness from the work of the sensory system, because he thinks that it is necessary to make a separation between the unconscious material (the inner stimulation) that is perceived and unconsciously represented, with the unconscious material that is unconsciously represented, and at some point, made conscious.

[102] By way of clarification, Gardner refers to "ideas" from a Freudian context, in correspondence with how Freud's work was officially translated by the *SE*. So "ideas" here specifically means 'instinctual representatives' (See Gardner 2006: 137).

I agree with Gardner in that theoretical observation, if the source of inner stimulation is in the body, producing a constant stimulation, it does not make sense to think that every moment of stimulation has a conscious memory associated. Also it does not make sense to think that we can offer a memory to all the manifold of stimulation external or internal. However, it makes more sense to think that any stimulation can mechanically affect us "in a certain way", and we can mechanically associate that stimulation with traces or representatives that can remain unconscious to us or become conscious at some point. In some way Gardner is suggesting that the instinctual stimulation in the body and the traces associated to that stimulation are both originally unconscious, and both (the material content and its representation) meet in the preconscious. By making mention of the Lockean condition, Gardner makes a particular criticism of Freud (perhaps a correction of his definition of preconscious) which I agree with. Gardner is suggesting that what is caught by the Freudian sensory system in the primary processes should not necessarily involve consciousness, but we can add consciousness to what is perceived through the secondary process.[103]

Now, neither of these two definitions of the unconscious (as preconscious) totally coheres with the idea of a transcendental unconscious that, according to Gardner (2018), we can derive from Kant's theory (according to the post-Kantian romantic reading) regarding the zones of opacity with respect to the indeterminacy of the soul. It is clear to Longuenesse, Tauber, and Gardner, as contemporary Kantians, that Kant did not work on the concept of unconscious, but it is also clear that his theory never conflicted with that concept. That is why, Kantian theory served as a ground for the later development of the concept of unconscious, which was first developed by post-Kantian German philosophers, and then handed down to Freud. Likewise, Freud did not work on the theoretical postulate of the soul as Kant did, because Freud also

[103] This was also very well explained by Stefan Bird-Pollan in his talk on *Making Conceptual Space for the Unconscious* at the Leuven Seminar (online 7th session, Feb. 2021). There, he establishes interesting differences between the primary and secondary Freudian processes, and he links them with Kantian terminology, mostly through the Kantian concepts of reflective judgement, determining judgement, and analytical judgement.

took ideas from other philosophical influences, which diverted from Kant. However, Freud's theory does not totally contradict Kant's postulate of the soul.

As Gardner identifies, in Freud there is a theoretical tension because in psychoanalysis we can find 'an attempt to unite in a single concept two major and distinct trajectories in modern philosophy' (2018:38). Therefore, as the soul according to Kant is unknown, following Freud´s logic, it should be unconscious. As in Kant's view, the soul is an existence, that is, we can perceive it, but we cannot be conscious of it, then we can conclude that the soul is unconscious. Now, we should differentiate the soul from the objects of experience (the unknown things in themselves), that can also stimulate the mind unconsciously because those objects can become knowable as phenomena, unlike the soul. Freud incorporates this Kantian idea of "things in themselves" as a ground for his definition of unconscious,[104] but from there then he moves towards Schopenhauer-Nietzsche's direction.[105] Therefore, in order to be able to differentiate the Kantian idea of soul from unconscious phenomena – the Freudian unconscious traces of instinctual cathexis -- it is necessary to propose or think of other unconscious domains, unlike the Freudian preconscious described above.

(b.2) Three Kantian unconscious. A proposal

I would like to incorporate some of Kant's ideas to propose other definitions of unconscious, as a first step for the elaboration of my theoretical graft Freud-Kant. In other words, I want to move Freud closer to Kant, intervening his theory. Considering Kant, I propose three definitions of unconscious, which are not related to the storage of energy, traces or

[104] Freud wrote in *The Unconscious*, 'Just as Kant warned us not to overlook the fact that our perceptions are subjectively conditioned and must not be regarded as identical with what is perceived through unknowable, so psycho-analysis warns us not to equate perceptions by means of consciousness with the unconscious mental processes which are their object' (*SE* XIV:171).

[105] Gardner explains, '[t]he instinct theory that lies at the foundation of Freud´s metapsychology asks us to recognise forces of nature at the foundation of our personalities, but the conceptual means provided by Romantic Idealism for grasping these as continuous with rational subjectivity have been eliminated, making the relation to instinctual force a confrontation with elements antagonistic to personality' (2006:155).

matter. Three definitions of unconscious that are not related to space or experience, these are (here, I am imitating Gardner's style in his definitions of the psychoanalytic unconscious): [106] (1) an unconscious "entirely composed of mental faculties, powers, or conditions for knowledge that were not originally conscious, and that could **never** become conscious", for example the faculties of reason; (2) other unconscious "entirely composed of mental capacities, and forms or formulae that were not originally conscious, but that could become conscious once they are incorporated to a practical experience", for instance, the moral conscience, the memories, the imagination, aesthetic forms, and imperatives. (3) an unconscious "entirely composed of empty existence, which did not belong to the realm of experience nor the mental realm, and could spontaneously intervene the mind and the matter, but which could **never** become conscious", as for example, the soul. Now, in order to be able to think of these types of unconscious, we would need to agree with the Kantian assumption of a transcendental dualism.

Transcendental dualism implies the coexistence of an unconscious that is purely mental (related to the faculties and resources of reason) with an unconscious that is material (the storage of cathexis), both unconscious being regulated by an empty soul, which is also unconscious.[107] However, Freud through most of his career was very sympathetic with Shelling-Schopenhauer-Nietzsche's idea of a material unifying will, and from that perspective transcendental dualism is not easily seen as a possibility. That is why we talk of a philosophical tension in Freud. Nevertheless, we must consider that Freud was changing his position little by little through time, mostly because of his reflection on the therapeutic process, and he left an inconclusive work. That inconclusiveness in Freud's work gives us room to figure new solutions,

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[106] See Gardner 2006:143-44.

[107] Leopold Hess, without entering the discussion on the unconscious, also distinguishes two domains or worlds in Kant's theory of reason (a distinction that according to Tauber (2013) was depicted firstly by J. Church in *Reasons Of Which Reason Knows*). He states, 'these two "worlds" correspond roughly to two distinct modes of intelligibility: the logical space of nature and the logical space of reasons. The relations between these two spheres are to be construed differently than in Kant's original theory, however – so as to overcome its inherent dualism' (2016:12). Dualism can be overcome, according to Leopold Hess, if we think of the two worlds as without a "gap", he asserts, 'there is no "gap" between the logical space of reasons and the logical space of nature, or between mind and world' (2016:8). The "no gap" argument makes sense if one thinks of the soul (the mediator) as an empty entity.

or adaptations for his inquiry about the unconscious.[108] Hence, on the one hand, the proposal of this dissertation is to bring Freud closer to Kant; and on the other hand, to use Freud's theory to help fill some theoretical gaps left by Kant in his theory, such as the one mentioned in Chapter II, which is related to the journey of our humanity from childhood to "adulthood".

Thus, from a Kantian perspective, we conclude that we will always remain ignorant of what the soul is. However, in spite of this, we can understand that the soul can be self-determined to act and apprehend it indirectly to some degree by tracking her activity or agency (agency that is fed by natural and rational drives), and the products of her affectivity (emotions and feelings). Therefore, if for Freud the unconscious is mostly a space, then it is a space only for what possesses matter, for those traces of instinctual cathexis left. Hence, Freud did not study the theoretical postulate of the soul (the Kantian empty soul); he wanted to investigate the unconscious matter that affects us, which could be unveiled, grasped, and channelled through a therapeutic analysis in order to heal. Nevertheless, Freud does not refute or undermine the idea of the soul (as Kant does); he only ignores the metaphysical reflection on the soul because his interests is mostly placed on the reflection on the unconscious dynamism of the material cathexis; how the cathexis reach the soul and then get stored and discharged.[109] Then, due to his interest in the cathexis, the "id" and not the soul is what acquired prominence in his theory.

(b.3) The "Id"

According to Freud, there must be an agency responsible for moving the cathexis of the stimuli into all the Freudian topographic spaces mentioned above, and he called this agency the "id". So, if the ego's job is to select, process and systematise the instinctual traces or

[108] Alfred Tauber (2013) also interrogates Freud´s unconscious taking Kant into account and proposes the existence of "cognitive unconscious". He explains that the idea of a cognitive unconscious dates from the mid 1970s; he states, 'we consider recent findings that show the extend of normative unconscious thinking, which occurs in a wide range of cognitive activities (ranging from complex problem solving to stereotyping) and suggest how Freud´s insights still serve as a useful framework for understanding such mental processing' (2013:232).

[109] Regarding this, Bettelheim infers that for Freud, 'the soul is the seat both of the mind and of the passions [cathexis], and we remain largely unconscious of the soul' (1985:77).

mnemic residues, bringing them into consciousness, then the id´s job will be to free a chaos, 'a cauldron full of seething excitations' (*SE* XXII:73), which will not be looking for systematisation of any type but only for satisfaction. The id, in Freud`s words, 'is filled with energy reaching it from the instincts, but it has no organisation, produces no collective will, but only a striving to bring about the satisfaction of the instinctual needs subject to the observance of the principle of pleasure' (*SE* XXII:73).

Over the years, Freud comes to the conclusion that within the id must be two opposing instinctual forces at work, Eros, and Thanatos.[110] Eros is that loving (sexual) drive that attracts the individual towards an object of love;[111] Thanatos is associated with the death drive,[112] which pushes the individual backward towards separation, aggression, destruction and inertia. However, Freud tells us, based on his conclusions of the observation of his study cases, that some of the energy moved by the id (coming from Eros and/or Thanatos) cannot be incorporated or processed by the bonding agency of the ego (consciousness). That is, not all the chaos can be systematised. But, moreover, some of that energy or cathexis of the id that becomes conscious can become unconscious again and return to consciousness one more time or many times. However, in this process, there is some cathexis that is deliberately rejected by the ego. That means that this cathexis becomes unconscious again but cannot return to

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[110] See "The Two Classes of Instincts" in *The Ego and The Id* (*SE* XIX: 40-47). Freud states, '[o]ur hypothesis is that there are two essentially different classes of instincts: the sexual instincts, understood in a widest sense – Eros, if you prefer the name – and the aggressive instincts, who aim is destruction' (*SE* XXII:103).

[111] The original word for drive is *trieb* in German, however, many translations into English use the word instinct instead of drive, and this causes confusion. Regarding this J. Laplanche clarifies, '*Trieb* has frequently been translated in French as instinct, and transposed by psychoanalysts in English, as well, as instinct. Yet we encounter in Freud, and in the German language in general, not one but two terms, two "signifiers," to use a more recent terminology. Two signifiers then, and it may be said that in common usage they have more or less the same meaning, just as their etymologies are parallel: *Trieb* comes from *treiben*, "to push"; Instinkt finds its origin in Latin, from *instinguere*, which also means "to incite," "to push". (…) *Trieb* ("drive") and *Instinkt* ("instinct"): two terms which are employed by Freud even if, unfortunately, it has been insufficiently noted that the term *Instinkt* is used to designate something entirely different from what is described elsewhere as sexuality' (1976: 9-10).

[112] It is not completely accurate to state that Freud used the term *Thanatos* in his works, he used instead the terms destructiveness or aggressiveness to refer to a death drive (*Todestribe*). However, many renowned post-Freudian psychoanalysts such as Melanie Klein and Jacques Lacan have defended the use of this term to refer to that instinct of aggressiveness or destructiveness, and I decided to also make use of it in this document to replace those Freudian ideas of aggressiveness or destructiveness.

consciousness, so it is expelled into another unconscious space and turned into repressed cathexis.

Freud's account implies that the rejected energy does not disappear, but remains trapped in a particular unconscious location, where it keeps producing intensified affection within the individual, without said individual becoming conscious of it. Thus, Freud´s spatial topography helps explain the movements of the cathexis: we have a place for consciousness and a location for the unconscious material, but this second location, as we saw, is divided (latent cathexis is not the same as repressed cathexis). To try to understand what these divisions consist of, it is very relevant to get an idea of what Freud's psychical apparatus is. That is why we need to analyse Freud's second definition of the unconscious (that which is related to the repressed contents), because if we look at that idea from a Kantian point of view, then we can find theoretical dissonances. Recent Kantian philosophers disagree about the scope and interpretation of that definition and, hence, about its distance from Kant. If the second definition has to do with '[t]he unconscious as entirely composed of ideas that were conscious and have been repressed' (Gardner 2006:143), then "repression" becomes the key concept to clarify.

Furthermore, this concept (repression) plays a major role in what was called "the second Freudian topography" of the mind, which is explained in more detail in *The Ego and the Id* (1923). There, Freud distinguishes between the ego (attached to conscience), the id (cathexis, natural instincts or passions), and the superego (repressive instinctual authority or conscience).[113] According to Freud, the "id" and the "superego", and even part of the "ego" itself belong to the domain of the unconscious; it is only a portion of the ego that properly belongs to consciousness (the Kantian "I think", according to Longuenesse). However, it is in the figure of superego that Freud posits the place for a moral conscience, and "moral conscience" is a concept that in Kantian terminology is only associated with rationality and

[113] See *SE* XIX:24-39

never with natural instincts. That difference will be the greatest obstacle to finding a common ground between Kant and Freud.

Longuenesse (2012) and Tauber (2010) both interpret the Freudian idea of "repression" or "constraint" as a resource to achieve autonomy (in Kantian terms), but they base their understandings on totally different arguments. Unlike them, Gardner (2018) remains sceptical of that possibility; for him the idea of repression, as it is depicted by Freud, does not necessarily lead us to autonomy, but mostly to irrationality. For him the "constraints" of the conscience in Kant and the "repression" of the conscience in Freud are definitely different things. I share Gardner's scepticism, so in the next chapters I will add my arguments in support of some of his lines of thought regarding the contrast between irrationality and morality and autonomy.

- Final words and next steps

To summarise, in this Part I of this dissertation I wanted to introduce all the terms that I discuss in this document. I started with a presentation of Kant in chapter I, and I pointed out a theoretical gap in Kant's account in chapter II, which refers to the process of how a child becomes an adult. In chapter III, I disassembled the main psychoanalytic concepts to start the comparison between Kant and Freud, I differentiated the two standpoints of the philosophers with respect to the soul, and I distinguished six different domains or possible approaches to unconscious. I believe that differentiation will be relevant when I address the discussion of my argument, which will be illustrated in Part II.

PART II

THE DYNAMIC OF GUILT, A THEORETICAL GRAFT KANT-FREUD

'the young traveller
Died from explaining her death'
(Alejandra Pizarnik)

CHAPTER IV

FREUD AND KANT ON "CONSCIENCE" AND THE FEELING OF "GUILT"

In the previous chapters, I mentioned two different standpoints from which to approach the idea of the soul: those adopted by Freud and Kant. Kant presents the soul as a transcendental postulate, whereas Freud focused on explaining the receptivity of the soul, and its dynamism or agency. I claimed that those different approaches to the question of the soul were not mutually exclusive, but rather, complementary. In this way, it is significant that the unconscious described by Freud was mostly spatial (it was located in the body to reach the psyche). However, I proposed that Kant's theory also allows us to conceive of an unconscious (considering Gardner's, Tauber's, and Longuenesse's ideas about a transcendental unconscious), since ultimately the Freudian idea of the unconscious covers everything that is not conscious. So, in order to complement Freud's picture of the unconscious, I gave three definitions of the unconscious based on Kant's approach. Drawing on Longuenesse, I also identified some possible points of convergence between the two theories, centring on the concept of consciousness, the "I" of the Kantian "I think," and the Freudian ego. In this chapter I plan to show divergences or incompatibilities between Kant and Freud, specifically with respect to the ideas of "conscience" and the feeling of "guilt". The enquiry about guilt constitutes the axis point of the whole dissertation, because it is the understanding of the dynamic of guilt that can help us to discern how to move back to goodness once we have failed ourselves. So, in the first section I will offer a general picture of my understanding of Freud's picture of the formation and emergence of the superego and lay out some criticisms (and possible modifications) to some of the assumptions that underlie that picture. In the second and third sections, I will propose a theoretical Freud-Kant graft to resolve the incompatibilities regarding "conscience" and introduce the main argument of my dissertation.

i. A general picture about the emergence of "superego"

The superego is an innovative idea, or perhaps discovery, made by Freud. The relevance of looking into this idea is that superego can cover some aspects of Kant's moral theory that seem ambiguous, even though the Freudian theory of the emergence of the superego is also ambiguous. My proposal for this chapter is that the idea of the superego can help to fill the theoretical gap in the Kantian moral theory that was pointed out in chapter II. As we saw in that chapter, the Kantian account cannot explain how we move from immaturity to adulthood, whereas Freud focuses on explaining this process. On the other hand, I will also show in this chapter that the Kantian idea of moral conscience, is not a mistake or an obstacle for psychoanalysis; on the contrary, it can help us further understand the dynamics of the superego.

After clarifying the ego as reality principle and bound energy in the preceding chapter, we can move on to Freud's summary in his mature work *The New Lectures on Psychoanalysis* (1933), where he mentions that the ego (as a bound energy) is constantly split in its functions and at some point, is split into two agencies. That is, the ego becomes both an ego and an ego ideal or superego.[114] So, according to Freud, the ego comes into existence before the superego. The Freudian superego is an *a posteriori* agency, a product of a process in time. Now, what is right to affirm is that when the superego begins to operate in the psyche, the ego's regulatory function becomes more complex because it now has to regulate two inner agencies (the superego and id), plus the two principles mentioned in chapter III which make its existence possible, "the reality principle" and "the pleasure principle". In Freud's words, the 'ego is as it should be if it satisfies simultaneously the demands of the id, of the superego and of reality – that is to say, if it is able to reconcile their demands with one another' (*SE* XXIII:146). Now, what

[114] Superego and ego ideal were considered as synonyms in Freud's 1923 works, however, in his most mature works Freud claimed that superego and ego ideal were practically different agencies. Freud mentioned that superego is 'the vehicle of the ego ideal by which the ego measures itself' (*SE* XXII:64). For the purpose of this chapter, I will keep both ideas as synonyms, as it was stated in the works of 1923. In chapter VII I will return to the problem of trying to understand why Freud, at the end of his career, wanted to differentiate superego from ego ideal. See "dissection of Personality" in *The New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* (*SE* XXII).

is the superego? And why does the ego need to be split into two agencies, the ego and superego? In order to answer these questions, I will focus on explaining the ego's dynamic process of selectivity, as it relates to the superego. Then, in chapter VI, I will again take up these questions by reflecting on Freud's theory of "the phases of sexual development in childhood".

a) Selectivity and rejection

First, we have that for Freud the bound processing of the ego (the synthesis between principles) is selective because the ego's synthesis incorporates consciousness, and in its function of consciousness, the ego is also a discriminating organ of perception and association of traces.[115] Therefore, this process of selectivity in the ego means that not all the instinctual traces will be able to find a resolution or discharge through the ego. First, because not all the instinctual traces can be attended to and transformed by the ego and second, because there are some instinctual traces that are rejected by consciousness. Regarding the second case, Freud tells us, based on his conclusions about his case studies, that some of the energy of the id (coming from Eros and/or Thanatos) cannot be incorporated into the bonding process of the ego, and moreover, that some of that energy, or cathexis, that is not integrated is deliberately rejected, exiled into the (repressed) unconscious. Freud's account implies that the rejected cathexis does not vanish, but remains in the unconscious, whence it continues to affect the subject.

I have another important clarification to make about the term "repression". As Bettelheim explains, '[i]n Strachey's notes on translations in the General Preface to *The Standard Edition*, he does not discuss *Verdrängung*, a term that is most often translated as "repression"' (1985:93). Since I will be using the word "repression" throughout this dissertation as it is used in the *Standard Edition*, it is important to understand the subtle connotation of the original *Verdrängung* to grasp what Freud meant by it. Bettelheim points out that '*Verdrängung* is

[115] In Freud words, '[t]he ego is that part of the id which has been modified by the direct influence of the external world through the medium of the Pcpt [perceptual apparatus]-Cs [consciousness]' (*SE* XIX:25).

derived from the word *Drang*, which is explained in *Duden* by the example "to give in to a strong inner motive". A *Verdrängung* is thus a displacement or dislodgement caused by an inner process. The German word gives no indication in which direction such dislodging or pushing away takes place' (1985:93). Then, Bettelheim concludes that '[c]orrect translations of the noun *Verdrängung* and the verb *verdrängen* would have been "repulsion" and "to repulse"' (1985:94). Hence, in this document I will refer to "repression" in the sense of "repulsion".

Now, what is important to note in the dynamics of the rejected cathexis is that for Freud, the superego is precisely the agency that emerges from that process. Thus, the superego emerges as an *a posteriori* formation, a consequence of the process of rejection of the instinctual impulses, or contents in the traces processed by consciousness. Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that the ego and the superego are two agencies fed by the same source: the id. Both agencies are supplied of the same natural forces driven by apparent opposition, however, they are powered by different degrees of agitation (Eros' and Thanatos'). Thus, the ego will try to preserve life and find a way to discharge all those impulses moved by the id, but inevitably some of those demands will remain unattended to, because consciousness, in order to remain attentive and preserve life effectively, must necessarily be selective. That means some natural impulses will not be selected by consciousness, because they are not capable of passing the test of adequacy for the subject. And what is not selected is then rejected or repulsed.[116]

[116] In his early work, Freud understood the ego to be an instinct of preservation in opposition to sexual instincts. He then worked on distinguishing between the sexual and death instincts. Finally, in his more mature works, Freud refers to object-instincts (sexual and death instincts) and ego-instincts (the ego). However, the word "instincts" used by the *Standard Edition* confuses the reader, since the German word *Trieb* should have been translated as "drive" instead of "instinct". Bettelheim says, '[i]n no respect has the rendering of *Trieb* as "instinct" done more harm to the understanding of psychoanalysis than in its use in connection with the "death instinct". (…) Freud never spoke of a death instinct -- only of a mostly unconscious drive or impulse that provokes us to aggressive, destructive, and self-destructive actions. Some of us are certainly driven toward death -- our own death or death inflicted on others' (1985: 106-107). See about ego, in *The Ego and the Id* (*SE* XIX:40), where Freud presents the ego as a self-preservation drive linked to Eros.

Thus, Freud explains that discharging those needs or impulses of cathexis through the ego releases the subject's tension, and that release produces pleasure. However, those needs or impulses that cannot be discharged through the ego will increase the inner tension in the individual and leave her feeling unsatisfied (*SE* XXXIII: 146). Thus, Freud implies in his later texts (after 1930) that that dissatisfaction foments excess aggression in the id (mostly an increase of Thanatos).

What is interesting in the Freudian picture is the subtle distinction that Freud makes between the sources of supply for the ego and superego, which in principle seem to be the same. The ego is fed by the natural cathexis of Eros and Thanatos, which comes through the id; but the superego is fed by an **excess** of them. Superego is mostly fed by an excess of aggression (as dissatisfaction or frustration) that comes from an increase of Thanatos, as in the form of auto-aggression, and by an excess of love that comes from an increase of Eros, [117] but only in the form of sadistic pleasure. [118] This excess triggered by the impossibility of discharging aggression paradoxically makes that superego finds itself in opposition to the id that feeds it, because the superego will react against the id within itself. Its destructive behaviour will act like an autoimmune disease.[119]

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[117] In chapter VII I will explain that in his mature works, Freud associates an excess of Eros with the genesis of the ego ideal; in the works of 1932, Freud separates superego (fed by an excess of Thanatos) from the ego ideal (feed by an excess of Eros). However, as Laplanche and Pontalis affirm, 'in *The Ego and the Id* (1923b) "ego-ideal" and "super-ego" appear as synonymous' (1985:144). In this chapter, I will treat superego and ego ideal as synonyms, as they are in *The Ego and the Id*.

[118] In his text *Life and Death in Psychoanalysis,* Laplanche makes a distinction between aggressiveness and sado-masochism. He clarifies that aggressiveness 'is first of all directed against the subject' (1976:86), but is not necessarily sexual; however, sado-masochism involves, 'either consciously or unconsciously, an element of sexual excitement or enjoyment' (1976:87). For more references about this see "Anxiety and Instinctual Life" in *The New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* (*SE* XXII:81-111)

[119] The comparison with an autoimmune disease has to do with that capacity of auto aggression. As I explained in chapter III, Freud thought of the ego primarily as an instinct or drive for self-preservation, which is capable of establishing boundaries for itself. However, the superego ends up undermining the preservation of the ego by performing a similar function (establishing boundaries for the ego), but in excess. Jacques Derrida pointed this out several times in different texts. He explains in a dialog with Giovanna Borradori that 'an autoimmunitary process is that strange behaviour where a living being, in quasi-suicidal fashion, 'itself' works to destroy its own protection, to immunize itself against its "own" immunity' (2003:94).

Let me explain a bit more thoroughly how an excess of Thanatos underpins the superego. Firstly, we must accept that the idea of the superego was a work in progress. Freud started to work on the idea of the death drive in *Beyond the Principle of Pleasure* (1920) and added variations on it over time. However, there is indeed a relation between superego and the excess of Thanatos, as is portrayed in his *New Introductory Lectures* (1933). What is relevant in this relation between the excess of Thanatos and the superego, is that Freud warns us that the excess of Thanatos is first projected onto the external world, and thus perceived as a danger coming from outside. Later, however, the excess of Thanatos is introjected into the individual -- through a key process of identification [120]-- and perceived as a terrifying conscience.[121]

In other words, Freud explains that from the unconscious, the rejected cathexis does not give up on its effort to be discharged or resolved by the ego; it keeps seeking resolution once it is exiled. So, little by little, the energy of the rejected instinctual impulses becomes a more violent force developing new strategies to put pressure on the ego. Thus, the repressed cathexis only grows stronger. It grows because it is continuously fed by all the unpleasant sensations and affections (frustration) that proliferate within the individual because of the ego's constant rejections. Thus, the repressed cathexis pushes hard to find a resolution in the ego (which, despite the repressed cathexis's persistence, continues trying to do its job of marginalising, repelling, or ignoring it), and it is in that effort and growth that this repressed cathexis is projected, as if it were a danger coming from outside of the individual, making him or her very anxious. What we need to understand now is how the projected cathexis comes to be introjected again. According to Freud, the introjection of the cathexis is crucial to

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[120] Laplanche and Pontalis explain that "identification" has to do with a '[p]sychological process whereby the subject assimilates an aspect, property or attribute of the other and is transformed, wholly or partially, after the model the other provides'. This can be applied in two ways: (1) 'through a substitution of one image for another', or (2) through the replacement of 'a partial identity or a latent resemblance by a total identity' (1985:205). However, "identification" is not limited to the superego, it also allows the ego in its narcissist forms to internalise and control the object of love. It also enables the ego to de-sexualize Eros by means of narcissism and sublimation. I will talk about sublimation in chapter VII.

[121] In his *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* Freud explains this process of internalisation of the external aggression through the superego. However, there he also indicates his reservations when he says, 'we are in fact in doubt whether we should suppose that all aggressiveness that has returned from the external world is bound by the super-ego and accordingly turned against the ego, or that a part of it is carrying on its mute and uncanny activity as a free destructive instinct in the ego and the id. A distribution of the latter kind is the more probable; but we know nothing about it' (*SE* XXII:109).

understanding the emergence of superego, because the superego is a moral mechanism our psyche gets trapped in. In his letter to Einstein, Freud summarizes:

> 'The death instinct turns into the destructive instinct when, with the help of special organs, it is directed outwards, on to objects. The organism preserves its own life, so to say, by destroying an extraneous one. Some portion of the death instinct, however, remains operative within the organism, and we have sought to trace quite a number of normal and pathological phenomena to this internalization of the destructive instinct. We have even been guilty of the heresy of attributing the origin of conscience to this diversion inwards of aggressiveness' (*SE* XXII:211).

b) The superego's introjection and the feeling of guilt

I will explain my preliminary reading of the Freudian picture of projection and introjection of superego piece by piece throughout this section. **At the first stage**, the individual projects outward what she cannot consciously recognize as her own (because her consciousness repels it). **At the second stage**, what is projected is perceived as disgusting, repulsive, and/or dangerous, so the individual feels a strong conscious rejection of it.[122] Thus, what was first rejected inwardly is then also rejected outwardly. **At the third stage**, by being drawn from those conscious feelings of repulsion, the individual contemplates destroying that external threat at any moral cost (in other words, killing it). **At the fourth stage**, guilt emerges and triggers the process I will describe throughout this chapter.

[122] The feeling of "disgust" is strongly related to "repression" and "reality". As Winfried Menninghaus affirms in his Introduction of *Disgust, Theory and History of a Strong Sensation*, disgust would be the opposite of sublimation. Regarding this, Menninghaus says, '[w]hen it comes to the disgust-sensation, the Cartesian dictum "I think therefore I am" can be replaced by a new variant: "I am disgusted, hence something is real"' (2003:42). Menninghaus also explains that this feeling is for Freud key to move forward the process of civilization. He states, '[Freud] offers to explain the emergence of upright posture and the civilizing transformation of anal lust and olfactory pleasure with the genitals into something disgusting. The barriers of disgust define the massif of repressed libidinal drives. According to Freud, the libido must triumph again and again over the inhibitions codified in the feeling of disgust, and it must do so precisely in the form of "perverse" practices' (2003:10).

For Freud, it is strong positive and negative feelings that trigger the kinds of processes of projection and introjection that constitute the superego. It is important to notice that, for Freud, it is normal for opposite feelings to coexist in the unconscious. Thus, a person can experience different feelings originating from different sources, but once a feeling is consciously identified as opposing another, this inevitably creates a conflict for consciousness. That is why Freud believes that when an adult is consciously perceiving a specific feeling, she mostly perceives its opposite unconsciously. For instance, when we feel repulsed by an external object, it is also possible to unconsciously feel love and longing for it. [123] Somehow what was rejected internally was also momentarily desired. The same goes for what is rejected outwardly. For Freud, when we realise that we have destroyed or wished to destroy that which we rejected, we also realise that we love that which we wanted to destroy. The sense of guilt plays a role in that realisation. As Freud notices, consciousness does not tolerate ambivalence easily; that is, if you consciously feel one feeling for one object, then the simultaneous perception of an opposite feeling gives rise to a contradiction.[124] That is why Freud thought his patients usually displaced their conflicting feelings onto another object. For example, by hating their father, the patients displaced their love and desire for him onto their mother.

We can see how the feeling of guilt emerges out of this complex dynamic of conflicting feelings if we look carefully at a key passage in *Totem and Taboo* (1913). There, Freud draws connections with anthropological studies to explain the neurotic's sense of guilt and describes

[123]The case of little Hans is rich in elements that illuminate these dynamics. Freud's analysis concludes, '[I]n the adult these pairs of contrary emotions do not as a rule become simultaneously conscious except at the climaxes of passionate love; at other times they usually go on suppressing each other until one of them succeeds in keeping the other altogether out of sight. But in children they can exist peaceably side by side for quite a considerable time' (*SE* X:113).

[124] Freud's account of conflicting feelings is mainly found in his analysis of a boy's relationship with his father, which is commonly ambivalent and usually employs the mechanisms of displacement and hiding as resources to overcome the contradiction. He states in *Dostoevsky and Parricide*, '[t]he two attitudes of mind combine to produce identification with the father; the boy wants to be in his father's place because he admires him and wants to be like him, and also because he wants to put him out of the way' (*SE* XXI:183). However, Freud in *Female Sexuality* warns us that in adults '[w]e cannot go so far as to assert that the ambivalence of emotional cathexes is a universally valid law, and that it is impossible to feel great love for a person without its being accompanied by a hatred that is equally great, or vice versa' (*SE* XXI:235).

how that sense of guilt arises and triggers the introjection of the superego.[125] He illuminates, by means of a phylogenetic interpretation, a narrative of the evolution of primitive societies. Freud explains that, once upon a time, there was a primal father who was a 'jealous violent father who originally keeps all the females for himself and drives away his sons as they grow up' (*SE* XIII:141). Because of that, '[o]ne day the brothers that had been driven out came together, killed and devoured their father and so made an end of the patriarchal horde' (*SE* XIII:141). According to Freud, that is the moment when guilt emerges and the father figure is internalised in our psyche as the superego, i.e. as moral conscience. In *Civilization and its Discontents* Freud looks again at this narrative and adds, 'since the inclination to aggressiveness against the father was repeated in the following generations, the sense of guilt, too, persisted, and it was reinforced once more by every piece of aggressiveness that was suppressed and carried over to superego' (*SE* XXI:132).

Freud's explanation about the situation that precedes the popping up of guilt and the introjection of the superego can also be found in his interpretations of other narratives, such as *Oedipus.*[126] What is relevant in the thread running through all those narratives is that there are aggressive emotions (frustration and hate) which are first addressed onto an external figure of power (in this case this is the primal father). Then that figure of power is internalised by the children because of their sense of guilt. But how does this work? Freud explains that this works through a sequence of processes of identification. First, the children identify with the father, motivated mostly by the admiration that the male role of leadership inspires in them; Freud says, '[t]he violent primal father had doubtless been the feared and envied model of each one of the company of brothers' (*SE* XIII:142). In other words, the children wanted to be like the father, but the father himself was an obstacle. Thus, another process of identification is activated, an identification motivated by the hatred and fear the tyrannical attitude elicits. In my interpretation, the children identify their own hate for the father with his tyrannical

[125] The account I will present here with respect to guilt has to do with the feeling of guilt in general, however, Freud first focused his interest on guilt by researching on the neurotic behaviour of his patients.

[126] Laplanche and Pontalis explain that the founding character that Oedipus Complex had for Freud is 'brought out particularly in the hypothesis of *Totem and Taboo* (1912-13) of the killing of the primal father – an act seen as the first moment in the genesis of the mankind' (1985:286). We can see a complete interpretation of Oedipus in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (*SE* IV:261).

attitude. That is, the children respond to the father with the same violence (but augmented by the repression) that the father used on them.[127] Finally, Freud concludes that the emergence of guilt must be associated with ambivalent feelings, with the desire to destroy the external abusive figure of power, but also with the pain or remorse of destroying what is loved and admired.

For Freud, it is guilt that makes possible the configuration and emergence of this new agency in the psyche called the superego, which is distinct from the ego and apparently opposed to the id. Freud believes he found, through this phylogenetic narrative of our past, an explanation to interpret the mechanism of emergence of a conscience in our psyche. Now, the process of internalization of the father under the form of conscience is moved by another sequence of processes of identification: after confronting their guilt, the children identify as wrongdoers (even worse than the tyrannical father was), and the father becomes the victim (because he was murdered). To my understanding, as a consequence of this change of positions, the dead father (who is loved, hated, and feared) comes to occupy a higher moral position (because he was the victim and not the murderer) in the psyche of the children, and from that higher position he regains his power over the children (the wrongdoers).[128] That is why the superego is also called an ego ideal.[129] Freud states:

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[127] Freud explains in *Totem and Taboo* that the identification is with the father who inspires ambivalence of feelings, love and hate. With respect to the totemism and identification Freud says, 'I will only emphasi[s]e two features in it which offer valuable points of agreement with totemism: the boy's complete identification with his totem animal and his ambivalent emotional attitude to it. These observations justify us, in my opinion, in substituting the father for the totem animal in the formula for totemism (in the case of males). It will be observed that there is nothing new or particularly daring in this step forward. Indeed, primitive men (…) describe the totem as their common ancestor and primal father' (*SE* XIII:131).

[128] In Civilizations and its Discontents Freud states, '[i]t set up the super-ego by identification with the father; it gave that agency the father's power, as though as a punishment for the deed of aggression they had carried out against him, and it created the restrictions which were intended to prevent a repetition of the deed' (*SE* XXI:132).

[129] My reading of the narrative of the primal father is not the mainstream reading within Lacanian psychoanalysis. Russel Grigg believes guilt only appears in the narrative of the primal father in *Totem and Taboo* after the introjection of the father, not before. I disagree with this. He argues, '[i]n Freud's Oedipal myth, the law is there from the outset; it is an inexorable law, demanding punishment even when the transgression has been committed unwittingly or unconsciously, and it exists for the subject as an unconscious sense of guilt. The law precedes enjoyment, and enjoyment henceforth takes the form of a transgression. The relationship is the inverse of this in *Totem and Taboo*, where it is enjoyment that is present at the outset, and the law comes afterwards' (2008:47).

> '[t]hey hated their father, who presented such a formidable obstacle to their craving for power and their sexual desires; but they loved and admired him too. After they had got rid of him, had satisfied their hatred and had put into effect their wish to identify themselves with him, the affection [*die zärtlichen Regungen*] which had all this time been pushed under was bound to make itself felt. It did so in the form of remorse [*Reue*]. A sense of guilt [*Schuldbewußtsein*] made its appearance, which in this instance coincided with the remorse [*Reue*] felt by the whole group. The dead father becomes stronger than the living one had been' (SE XIII:143).

Thus, in Freud's reading, the figure of the dead father (the victim) is reborn as a powerful agency in our psyche which ends up inspiring devotion and fear instead of hatred. This mechanism of introjection of the dead father into the psyche is triggered by the sense of guilt. It is guilt that produces first a split in the ego, and then the emergence of a superego (the agency that represents the identification with the dead father), an inner authority or conscience capable of watching over the ego. The word "guilt" in the English translation represents the original German *Schuldbewußtsein;* perhaps the analysis of the German word can help us interpret the idea of guilt in this narrative better, because it derives from "consciousness" (*Bewußtsein*) of "being at fault" (*Schuld*). Therefore, in addition to being a feeling, guilt seems to be a conscious judgement about a status. In other words, Freud is admitting that the sons are capable of a conscious critical self-assessment of the acts committed, that is, they are capable of realising that the murder was wrong, but Freud states that his acknowledgment must be triggered by the ambivalence of feelings of the children.

At this point, Freud explains that it is in this realisation of being at fault that the feeling of remorse emerges. However, Freud adds, remorse is also directly triggered by the feeling of love for the father. Freud reminds us that even if the father was seen as an external danger when he was alive, he was also regarded unconsciously as a role model and object of love for his children (*SE* XIII:143). According to Freud, it has to be the ambivalence of feelings that triggers both the feeling of remorse and the sense of guilt. In other words, the children knew that they should get rid of the father because he was a threat and an impediment, in the sense that the father 'presented such a formidable obstacle to their power and their sexual desires'

(*SE* XIII:143); but on the other hand, they also unconsciously knew that they should not kill what they love. For Freud, hate and love, the contradictory feelings of the children, generate the sense of guilt. In fact, Freud later says this explicitly in *Civilization and its Discontents:* 'the sense of guilt is an expression of the conflict due to ambivalence, of the eternal struggle between Eros and the instinct of destruction or death' (*SE* XXI:132).

Now, in my view, Freud's analysis of the primal father in *Totem and Taboo* is still insufficient. He paid too much attention to the configuration of superego as an a *posteriori* conscience, and he did not reflect enough on the infantile moral judgement (the first guilty status) that made that configuration possible. Freud does not offer an explanation of how we come to acknowledge the state of guilt; he skips that explanation, leaving an explanatory gap. Freud only suggests that the explanation of the emergence of this first guilt must have something to do with ambivalent feelings, with the feeling of love (when he says, "but they loved and admired him too") that the children unconsciously felt for their father despite his tyranny. Now, that gap in his explanation is not a minor thing, because for him it is guilt that splits the ego into an ego and a superego and gives a final shape to our inner psychological structure. So, we can claim that Freud fails to provide a proper account of the emergence of guilt, which is a key piece of the structure of his theory.

The furthest I can go in my interpretation of Freud's narrative in *Totem and Taboo* is that, for him the children are responding to the acknowledgement gained by their experience that tells them that they should not kill what you love; because by killing you become what you hate, and you lose what you love, so you feel pain. Now, we can add a few more elements to this narrative if we turn to a passage in *Thoughts on War and Death* (1915) where Freud writes:

> '[The] primaeval man must have triumphed beside the body of his slain enemy, without being led to rack his brains about the enigma of life and death. What released the spirit of enquiry in man was not the intellectual enigma, and not every death, but the conflict of feeling at the death of loved yet alien and hated persons. Of this conflict of feelings psychology was the first offspring. Man could no longer get death at a distance, for he had tasted it in his pain about

> the dead; but he was unwilling to acknowledge it, for he could not conceive of himself as dead (…). It was beside the dead body of someone he loved that he invented spirits, and his sense of guilt at the satisfaction mingled with his sorrow turned these new-born spirits into evil demons that had to be dreaded' (*SE* XIV:294)

In this text Freud explains that the sole motivation for primaeval man to confront his act of murder is his acknowledgement of conflicting feelings that tell him, "you destroyed something! The consequence of that act is that that person is no longer with you!" According to Freud, the sorrow of losing a loved one triggers the need to create spirits, and then guilt transforms them into demons. Freud is proposing a chain of feelings triggering each other until they conform in a psychological structure full of a symbolic imaginary (with spirits and demons), but in most decisiveness, in that paragraph of *Thoughts on War and Death* Freud is claiming that guilt follows love.

Furthermore, in that paragraph Freud is saying that in losing a loved one, the primaeval man loses a part of himself. Therefore, in his pain for the dead, he experiences his own death. Now, Freud is not very consistent with respect to the emergence of guilt across his texts. What seems logically weak are the links he makes between: (1) the act of killing, (2) the sense of loss of a loved one, (3) the fact that the dead loved one was momentarily perceived as a stranger, and 4) the sense of guilt itself. It seems that there is a link missing between 3 and 4; between the feelings of love and alienation on the one hand, which certainly give rise to a contradiction in feeling and a sense of loss; and on the other hand, the sense of guilt as "being at fault", which acknowledges wrongdoing. It seems that wrongdoing can cost us our status as good individuals, but losing the object of our love cannot. In other words, the loss of a loved one can be felt as a sad and disadvantageous consequence of something that happened, but the loss cannot kindle a sense of guilt simply because it is disadvantageous. To motivate guilt, we inevitably need to recognize a moral standard of right and wrong, and then assess our actions according to it. It is the assessment of the act that can reveal its wrongness. What I seek to convey here, is that feelings themselves cannot motivate or offer us a moral standard to assess our behaviour, but they can make us aware of the existence of that standard. We experience guilt because we are aware that we are at fault according to a standard. Thus, we can fill the

gap and say, “because primaeval man recognized a moral standard in himself, the disadvantageous situation of losing a loved one was also felt as wrong, and consequently, a feeling of guilt emerged”. Freud tries to account for the emergence of our inner psychology solely on the basis of feelings, but in attempting to do so, he is skipping necessary steps in his explanation.

Hence, my suspicion is that the ambivalent feelings and the pain that allows the acknowledgment of a contradiction are not enough to produce the sense of guilt or awaken the consciousness of being at fault after the crime. Surely, that acknowledgement plays a role in the emergence of guilt because ambivalence can lead us to acknowledge conflicting feelings. However, Freud is not clear on how we can get from ambivalence to acknowledgement of wrongdoing. Therefore, I propose that his account of guilt’ genesis needs to be supplemented with the following elements:

First, there must be, in the perception of guilt, a capacity to realise that something is being broken (a law) that should not be broken, that is, a capacity to acquire the consciousness of being at fault. In the case of the narrative of the primal father, Freud points to ambivalent feelings, but he does not notice that, in the act of murder, the children are also breaking a law (committing a betrayal), the law that governs the father-child relationship. A sense of loyalty, which is also accompanied by feelings of respect and belonging, can also relate to the consequent “duty to be loyal to the relationship”. Even though the primal father is an ambivalent figure that inspires hate and also unconscious love, as Freud describes him, the narratives shows that he is first of all an authority for the whole clan, the leader of the “patriarchal horde” who looks after the survival of the group.[130] So, even if the father adopts a hierarchical and tyrannical attitude toward the children, he respects the relationship with them after all, guaranteeing their survival. The father-child relationship offers the children the

[130] Freud in *Totem and Taboo* makes an interpretation of Darwin's primal horde, and he explains that the father took care of the children until they grew up, until that moment in that they became a threaten to his authority. Once the children grew up, they were forced by the father to keep celibacy, that tension would have triggered the necessity of attacking the father (see the Freud's foot notes in *SE* XIII:142).

possibility of being alive and surviving by growing up as members of a group (clan, social group, and so on), but clearly as members subject to the authority of the father.[131] So, the revelation of the feeling of love after the death of the father must certainly play a role in the acknowledgment of this sense of loyalty, respect, and belonging, but that sense of loyalty, respect, and belonging does not necessarily come from love, but from the recognition of the important contribution that the father made to the lives of the children, and from the realisation that being loyal to the relationship that has allowed you to be alive, belong to a group, and create bonds is good, and that therefore, to betray that relationship is wrong, even when you can find strong justifications for the betrayal.

In my view, it is the capacity for elaborating a critical self-assessment that can explain the original guilt of the children, because the children feel guilty when they acknowledge that they have become wrongdoers, exchanging the role of victims to a tyrannical father for that of perpetrators who betrayed their father's trust. That realisation is different from the acknowledgment of ambivalent feelings that Freud describes, because ambivalence can only make you aware of a contradiction in your feelings, not of the turpitude of your acts. The realisation that I refer to has to do with an inner critical assessment that concludes, "You acted wrongly! You have betrayed the relationship with your father! You are at fault!" In my view, the problem with Freud's general picture is that there is no room in it for the possibility of thinking of a critical assessment before the superego, because for him, conscience is a function ascribed to the superego, and it alone delivers moral assessments.[132] The lacuna in Freud's

[131] In Freud's interpretation, '[the] primaeval man aboriginally lived in small communities, each with as many wives as he could support and obtain, whom he would jealously guard against all other men (…); when the young male grows up, a contest takes place for mastery, and the strongest, by killing and driving out others, establishes himself as the head of the community' (*SE* XIII:125).

[132] In *Civilization and its Discontents* Freud states, '[t]he super-ego is an agency which has been inferred by us, and conscience is a function which we ascribe, among other functions, to that agency. This function consists in keeping a watch over the actions and intentions of the ego and judging them, in exercising a censorship. The sense of guilt, the harshness of the super-ego, is thus the same thing as the severity of the conscience. It is the perception which the ego has of being watched over in this way, the assessment of the tension between its own strivings and the demands of the super-ego. (…) We **ought not to speak of a conscience** until a super-ego is demonstrably present. As to a sense of guilt, we must admit that it is in existence before the super-ego, and therefore **before conscience**, too' (*SE* XXI:136).

account, therefore, is its failure to explain how we can feel guilt at first without having a conscience.

Second, children must have an *a priori* sense of the value of life, and a capacity to assess that killing "other beings like you" is not right on the basis of that sense.[133] So, first there was a betrayal, but that betrayal was compounded by a bloody death. Freud recognises something of this when he says about primaeval man, "for he had tasted it in his pain about the dead; but he was unwilling to acknowledge it, for he could not conceive of himself as dead". However, Freud only focused on feelings, specifically the feeling of pain for the loss, as if the feelings were drivers that allowed the children to both appreciate the value of life and critically self-assess their act of killing.

In the narrative of the primal father, even when the feelings of love and pain help them become aware of the crime they have committed, as Freud highlights, we can surmise that the children are also capable of recognizing that they broke something else. This is evident in the paragraph from *Thoughts on War and Death,* where acknowledgement of the loss and the status of guilt follow upon the murder of someone who was both alien and loved. Even when I agree that an appreciation for life must be associated with feelings, the act of murder itself, in my view, necessarily produces a reflective judgment. It is that reflective judgement that allows us, first, to identify with the Other (the stranger) based on our commonalities, and consequently to acknowledge an intrinsic moral law necessary for the survival and protection of the species that says, "to kill others like you is wrong". What I am claiming is that the moral realisation "you have killed someone like you!" must be independent of the sensation of pain for the loss that Freud highlights in his texts. Freud tacitly admits that something like an intrinsic moral law applies to the act of murder, because he understands guilt as "being at fault". However, he cannot explain how the acknowledgment of the moral law emerges and what this moral law entails. In my view, it is important to separate the sense of guilt that comes from a rational realisation, from the feelings that pop up as a consequence of that guilt and that then

[133] "Other beings like you" involves identification.

trigger the process of introjection. On the one hand, we have the recognition that the father-child relationship has been betrayed, and on the other hand, we have the realization of having committed murder. Neither of these realisations is a direct consequence of feeling love or feeling pain, but of an *a priori* capacity to elaborate critical self-assessments that makes us consciously recognize that those actions are not good actions, independently of the ambivalent feelings that may or may not be present.

ii. The emergence of guilt, a new proposal based on Kant's approach

Here, I am proposing a variation on the reading of the narrative of the primal father with respect to what was emphasised by Freud. My proposal draws on Kant's moral theory. Thus, I construe the status of guilt as the result of a critical assessment that emerges when the individual can recognize that there is a broken law, and as the law can affect our sensibility, then a feeling of guilt arises.[134] This is different from Freud's account of guilt as a reaction to ambivalent feelings.

Throughout his texts, Freud does not offer a consistent explanation of the mechanism of the emergence of the first guilt, but guilt indeed plays an important role in his theory.[135] In other words, I believe that when Freud refers to the feeling of loss of a loved one as a cause for guilt, he ignores the child's capacity to critically appreciate a situation, to recognize that he is in a relationship with his family, that he belongs to a group, and because of that, he feels bonds of loyalty to his group, and also other moral feelings toward it, such as respect, benevolence, and caring.[136]

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[134] As Longuenesse (2012) explains, the inner conflict of the subject relates to the feeling of guilt, 'which is for Kant the negative component in the feeling of respect for the moral law' (2012:32) and 'the experiential manifestation of the metaphysical primacy of our rational nature, imposing its standard on our sensible nature' (2012:34).

[135] See A Dark Trace: Sigmund Freud on the Sense of Guilt by Herman Westerink (2013).

[136] I am using Kant's definition of moral feelings, which I discussed in chapter I, section iii.

a) A variation on Freud's interpretation of the myth of the primal father

For Freud the Superego is **the product of** a process of projection, emotional reaction (to guilt and remorse), and introjection. Now, I wish to offer my own interpretation of the whole picture of Freud's narrative of the primal father. (1) Once the children murder their father, they realize they have committed a crime, *Schuldbewußtsein,* and because of that status, a feeling of guilt emerges (this is Freud's interpretation with which I agree, but Freud does not explain how this guilt emerges, whereas I attribute it, following Kant, to an *a priori* capacity for critical self-assessment). However, because the children do not know how to deal with the moral status of being at fault, with the acknowledgement that tells them that they are acting wrongly, they react to that realisation with anxiety and fear on the one hand. On the other hand, the discharge of aggressiveness against the tyrannical father reveals to the children that they also feel love for the father (ambivalence), and that revelation triggers the feeling of remorse, as well as, in my view, also a necessity of compensation. (2) Those emotions of fear and anxiety, plus the feeling of love that is revealed after the death of the father, and the remorse and need for compensation trigger the process of introjecting the father figure. Thus, the emergence of the superego is mostly pushed by feelings. Since, as Freud notes, the father cannot be physically resurrected, he can only be psychologically (as an inner God or moral conscience for example) and symbolically (through rituals and symbols) revived.[137] Thus, the act of introjection works as an attempt of emotional compensation: an emotional release of the love for the victim and the frustration of not knowing what to do with the moral status that states, you are a murderer! Being a murderer is wrong! (3) Hence, once the children introject the

[137] Freud makes links between his theory of the introjection of the father and the origin of the religions. *Totem and Taboo* was the first reflection made in that direction, but that analysis was mostly addressed to describe ancient cults or proto religions. In *Civilization and its Discontents*, *The Future of an Illusion*, and other texts, years later, Freud makes links among his previous works and the idea of religion as we know it today. He summarises that encounter stating, '[w]hen the growing individual: finds that he is. destined to remain a child for ever, that he can never do without protection against strange superior powers, he lends those powers the features belonging to the figure of his father; he creates for himself the gods whom he dreads, whom he seeks to propitiate, and whom he nevertheless entrusts with his own protection. Thus, his longing for a father is a motive identical with his need for protection against the consequences of his human weakness' (*SE* XXI:24).

father, they turn him into a role model to love and admire, occupying a position of moral superiority (in order to compensate for their crime), but he also becomes an aggressive and fearsome power once more, because that is what he always was in the first place. The symbolic revival of the father inevitably means renouncing freedom again, because resurrecting him restores his power. In other words, the problem of the father's tyranny was not resolved, but only introjected.

In my understanding of Freud, the introjected aggressive agency constantly reminds the children that they are vulnerable and susceptible to being punished or becoming victims of revenge, as a result of their original transgression, i.e., the murder of the father. Furthermore, this agency is continuously feeding back the feelings of guilt, fear, and anxiety through the activation of an automatic unconscious mechanism (or symptomatology) that operates through the daily dynamics of children's behaviour and that keeps their status as wrongdoers unconsciously alive. Through this unconscious mechanism children on the one hand remain trapped in a dynamic of subjugation; and on the other hand, they keep repeating moral mistakes (more in their thoughts or wishes) which reaffirm the ideal position of the dead father (the victim).[138] Freuds states in the *Ego and the Id*, '[a]s the child was once under a compulsion to obey its parents, so the ego submits to the categorical imperative of the super-ego' (*SE* XIX: 48).[139] In other words, the children become subjugated and extorted by their own conscience, the introjected father. However, it is because of the introjection of the father that the children also find a way to release the excess of Thanatos that constantly grows through the memory

[138] In *Totem and Taboo* Freud links neurosis to the mechanism of guilt. He states, 'Originally, that is to say at the beginning of the illness, the threat of punishment applied, as in the case of the savages, to the patient himself; he was invariably in fear for his own life; it was not until later that the mortal fear was displaced on to another loved person. The process is a little complicated, but we can follow it perfectly. At the root of the prohibition there is invariably a hostile impulse against someone that the patient loves – a wish that that person should die. This impulse is repressed by a prohibition and the prohibition is attached to some particular act, which, by displacement, represents, it may be a hostile act against the loved person. So that when the neurosis when the neurosis appears to be tenderly altruistic, it is merely compensating for an underlying contrary attitude of brutal egoism' (*SE* XIII:72).

[139] In *The Ego and the Id*, Freud understands the categorical imperatives as they were dictated by the violent (also ideal) father, the superego. However, in his more mature texts Freud distances his view from this analogy with the Kantian terminology. I will explain this in chapter V.

of their incapacity to deal with the guilt after the crime, and with their incapacity to change their status of wrongdoers.

In *Dostoevsky and Parricide* (1928), some years after *Totem and Taboo* (1913) Freud reiterates the same ideas. He states that parricide 'is in any case the main source of the sense of guilt' (*SE* XXI:183). 'The relation of a boy to his father is, as we say, an ambivalent one. In addition to the hate which seeks to get rid of the father as a rival, a measure of tenderness for him is also habitually present. The two attitudes of mind combine to produce identification with the father' (*SE* XXI:183). Thus, he concludes, '[y]ou wanted to kill your father in order to be your father yourself. Now you are your father, but a dead father' (*SE* XXI:185). In my view, it seems right to connect the feeling of guilt with an awareness that one has failed and is morally inadequate. Even if Freud makes some questionable links between guilt, hate-love, and introjection, he admits he cannot find a suitable answer for the original mechanism of guilt, and he concludes, 'researchers have not yet been able to establish with certainty the mental origin of guilt and the need for expiation' (*SE* XXI:183). What I wish to highlight in this chapter is that the moral realisation that comes about after the parricide (the consciousness of a moral failure regarding the figure of the father), which produces the sense of guilt, is prior to the existence of the superego, because it is prior to the introjection. I do believe love plays an important role in this process, as Freud points out, but my point is that the love for the father itself does not trigger guilt. In my view, the rational realisation that first triggers the guilt, and then the introjection of the superego which keeps constantly triggering guilt in the individual, are not the same thing.

b) Can children be moral before they develop a superego?

I would like to pause here to reflect on the possibility of an *a priori* capacity for morality in children that precedes the formation of the superego. Freud famously claimed in his 1905 work *Three Essays on Sexuality* that children possess a "polymorphously perverse disposition". There, he assumes that children in their early stages of sexual development (before killing the father) do not possess any principle of primacy to subordinate their multiple sexual aims. They

do not have any internal moral organisation either that can tell them what is right or wrong to do with those desires. In some ways children are dominated by the pleasure principle, and they are unable to understand the moral meaning of their actions themselves, so they gradually acquire the requisite understanding from their parents. Although I agree with Freud to some extent about the development and acquisition of moral character, I want to explain my reservations about the reach of his claim.

I believe Freud is ignoring a relevant factor in the formative process of the moral character. It is evident that little children, even if they have a perverse disposition, can also choose to act in a proto-moral way. It is not unusual for children to spontaneously and honestly care about other children or enjoy sharing their toys, for example. How does this happen? From a Freudian perspective we could answer that, because the pleasure principle gains primacy, little children (babies and toddlers) should have less accumulated frustration (in the form of an excess of Thanatos) than the older ones (those between 4 and 10 years old). So, it should be easier for them to regulate of the influences of their various natural drives. However, we know this is not so. The psychoanalyst Melanie Klein shows that it is also possible for little children to experience a lot of frustration, and to introject the superego before the age of four, the age at which Freud believed they did so.[140]

Klein says with respect to babies and little children, '[s]mashing things, tearing them up, using the tongs as a sword – these represent the other weapons of the child's primary sadism, which employs his teeth, nails, muscles and so on' (1998: 212). Thus, she explains that 'the ego falls under the sway of the super-ego even at this early period' (1998: 212). Klein attributes the child's early sadism to a strong emotional reaction to the sexual union of the parents, which is perceived traumatically, because it is seen as extremely cruel. According to Pete Harris, for Klein the superego should be present from birth, but she could only find evidence of guilt in

[140] See *Early Stages of the Oedipus Conflict* by Melanie Klein (1986). I will not analyse the work of Melanie Klein in this dissertation. Here I mention her to argue that it is difficult to determine a precise moment for the emergence of the feeling of guilt. Melanie Klein's case studies open the door to the possibility that children can experience guilt earlier than Freud believes they can; at least she legitimises that inquiry.

‘children as young as two years old’ (1997:X). Klein also connects the sense of guilt with the feelings of love and hate. According to Judith Hughes (2008), ‘Klein portrays the infant as deeply troubled by its beliefs about its capacity to harm loved ones. The child is embedded in multiple relationships and, as a result, his concerns about others, although largely derivative of fantasies mediated by projection and introjections, betoken (proto) moral agency from the beginning’ (Naso 2008:34-36). Thus, the inquiry about moral processing and perversity becomes more intricate when considering Melanie Klein. I must warn that it is not the task of this dissertation to resolve the many inquiries that Melanie Klein left for psychoanalysis, nor even to try to decipher her understanding of the Freudian superego, or her interpretation of the mechanism for emergence of guilt. I only want to highlight her concrete findings concerning the sense of guilt in little children.[141] If there is a feeling of guilt in very early stages, must we suppose that there is moral self-assessment at those early stages too? Now, I will look at Kant to answer this.

From a Kantian point of view, we can think of this problem of the moral character of children differently. This can be thought in the following terms. Children possess moral capacities, and an innate natural predisposition to goodness, but clearly their behaviours are in a process of development. Therefore, their actions lack precision, and they are also easy to corrupt.[142] On this view, children may seem perverse because they have stronger inclinations than adults do. Again, we are forced to confront the gap in Kant's account that was mentioned in chapter II; where he explains that children are born with rational capacities, but are not capable of mastering them, because they are not adults. Thus, Kant’s analysis implies that children have stronger inclinations because they are still exploring an uncodified cultural setting, starting to make sense of their environment and developing gradually toward maturity.

[141] More or less the agreement among philosophers is that in order to experience a sense of guilt the children need to possess self-consciousness; however, there are different opinions among scholars about when exactly the children develop their self-consciousness. I will not enter the debate on pinpointing the exact moment of acquisition of self-consciousness, but I agree with the idea that children that possess self-consciousness can experience a sense of guilt. My point is that the children experience a sense of guilt earlier than Freud thought, before the emergence of superego, before seven, and even four years old.

[142] See “Kant's Children” by Mika LaVaque-Manty (2006).

Since children have not completed this process, they are not in a position to reach the necessary understanding to master their behaviours. Next, I will clarify this point.

Following Kant, it seems children must have some *a priori* capacity for elaborating critical self-assessments from the very beginning; however, this innate capacity must be combined with another capacity to infer the moral law and enact moral imperatives in the form of "I ought to".[143] Now, an agent must unfold this capacity to infer and enact moral imperative to exercise it, as life experiences call for it through time, and as the organic development of their bodies allows. Bodily functions seem to be relevant, because Kant also explains that our capacity to understand our experience, and the capacity to infer our duties in practical terms, depends firstly on our capacity to experience and perceive the world we are immersed in, and the only way to experience and perceive that world is through our sensibility. As we know, sensibility is connected to our organic bodies. Therefore, our bodies play an important role in order to be able to understand our experience rightly. Thus, if our sensibility is imprecise because our bodies are undergoing many structural transformations, then our ability to understand our context objectively, and therefore, our capacity to act on moral imperatives, in the form of "I ought to", will be altered as well.[144]

LaVaque-Manty affirms that according to Kant, 'children are agentic very early on, but their agency is not the same thing as mature, rational adult agency' (2006:368). Now, if children possess some sort of moral agency, they must have an innate capacity to infer and orient themselves toward goodness, by recognizing moral value in the actions of caring and sharing, for example. However, as LaVaque-Manty highlights, autonomy must be given in degrees and kinds (2006:368), because children still need to reach maturity, as was explained in chapter II, they are *en route* to becoming autonomous. A key question here has to do with the distinction

[143] See When the Reflective Watch-Dog Barks: Conscience and Self-Deception in Kant by Martin Sticker (2016).

[144] In her interpretation of Kant, Angelica Nuzzo explains, '[t]he body is the site of sensibility. What is "sensibility"? It is projection -- toward the outside but also toward the inside; it comprises the physical senses (touch, sight, smell, taste), perception, sensation, intuition, feeling, affection, emotion, imagination, pleasure, and pain' (2011:123).

between the capacity for moral self-assessment of what was thought or done under the standard of the moral law, **and** the capacity to act according to the moral law and enact moral imperatives in the form of "I ought to". Those seem to be different capacities or aspects to consider, and the main difference is that the second is fallible, but the first, the assessment, must be accurate.[145] It must be accurate because, as Martin Sticker (2016) notes, the critical self-assessment is reflective and not determining.[146]

In the first chapter I briefly mentioned the difference for Kant between a reflective and a determining judgement. I will add something more about reflective judgement here. As Sumangali Rajiva says, '[the] judgement that reflects has its own principles and its own *modus operandi*' (1999). A reflective judgement for Kant has to do with the spontaneous subjective conditions of intuition and representation but it has nothing to do with purpose (*CJ* 400-404). Rajiva explains that a reflective judgement is 'a technical principle of nature, the principle of the purposiveness without purpose of nature, and it operates by organising the subject rather than by determining the object. These attributes, by allowing reflective judgement to be independent of reason and understanding in some sense, give reflective judgement the ability to bridge the gap between knowledge and morality, thus providing a connection between these central domains of rational human activity' (1999:3). Thus, Sticker's observation of the *modus operandi* of the critical assessment of the moral conscience as an infallible reflective judgement and the one related to the understanding of the duty as a fallible determining judgement, seems to be very useful to help us to also understand this distinction between the proto-morality in childhood and the morality in adulthood, as I will now explain.

As Martin Sticker observes, '[c]onscience does not judge directly about our duty in concrete cases but it watches over or reflects about how cautiously an agent uses her rational capacities

[145] Sticker states: 'Infallibility of conscience then does not actually pertain to the verdict of conscience itself, but to the judgement that I did critically scrutinise my first-order [objective] judgement' (2016:96). Therefore, '[t]he claim becomes much easier to stomach if we bear in mind that the infallibility of conscience does not imply that our first-order moral judgments about duty [the "I ought to"] are infallible' (2016:96).

[146] Sticker claims that 'we should understand conscience as a reflective watchdog concerned with second-order reflection on the cautiousness of our first-order [objective] processes of cognizing our duty' (2016:91).

when she reasons about concrete matters of duty' (2016:86). However, in Sticker's interpretation, the critical moral self-assessment of our conscience cannot always be accurate or infallible if it is considered 'according to the standards of self-assessment that prevail at the time' (2016:103). The standards of self-assessment that prevail at the time are not necessarily in correspondence with the ideal standards of pure reason. Therefore, if the agent listens to other standards, the agent 'might believe herself justified before conscience, even when she is not' (2016:103). With that last claim, Sticker is opening a door to the possibility of rationalisation and self-deception, which also constitutes the main characteristic of immaturity. However, since self-deception in little children is difficult to identify. I will propose something different from self-deception specifically in relation to little children, but something that is still related to Sticker's idea of listening to standards for self-assessment "that prevail at the time". I will keep using Sticker's idea in this chapter. What seems certain is that if the child attends to standards for self-assessment which are different from the ideal ones revealed by the moral law, then her agency will become impaired, and consequently, the alignment between the agent and her understanding of her duties will become distorted.

It seems that children can make use of their moral capacities from the start (at least from the moment that the self-consciousness or ego emerges). However, they need time to reach their full potential, as LaVaque-Manty's reading (2006) of Kant shows. Children need time to adjust their understanding and align their actions and thoughts with their moral standards of reason. However, as LaVaque-Manty concludes, 'it makes all the difference in the world whether you think the children you educate are not yet capable of "thinking for themselves" at all or whether you think they can think for themselves in some way' (2006:387). So, in order to understand better how these young agents can endure the moral misalignments of their childhood, which mainly stem from their immaturity. I will propose a theoretical graft (Kant-Freud) and incorporate Kant in the Freudian picture of the myth of the primal father.

My interpretation of the Kantian account is that, since children's immaturity makes it difficult for them to be good, they often behave immorally. We know that children's imperatives can easily be inconsistent because children can misunderstand their duties. Thus,

children are generally capable of critical self-assessment, and even of respecting the boundaries reason imposes on them, but since they are not mature enough to infer their moral duties, they need to recur to adults. The problem is that adults do not necessarily help them to recognize their duties. Adults generally impose their own standards for self-assessment on children, and those standards can be self-deceptive, making the misalignment between the little agent and their duties more pronounced. For example, a prevailing family standard might say that the family children can only play and show respect to other children of the same social group. That family standard imposes a rule of conduct and invites social segregation, opposing the ideal standard of the moral law that would encourage respect for all people independently of their social group, and so on. Therefore, as children depend on their seniors' tutelage, their agency and autonomy, which is highlighted by LaVaque-Manty (2006), can fluctuate very intermittently, showing poor consistency.

Children's main challenge seems to be dealing with their sense of guilt. If we bear in mind that children have, from an early age, a sense of right and wrong, or fair and unfair, but not the ability to reliably act according to that sense, then it is easy to understand how the feeling of guilt arises and becomes a major problem. Inevitably, every standard of self-assessment provokes a sense of inadequacy, both the standards of reason and the standards that, as Sticker (2016) states, "prevail at the time". In my view, the children's conscience tells them that they are acting wrongly, and are therefore guilty, but since they are not able yet to discern their duties clearly, they have to deal with their guilt without knowing what to do with it. That is why, in my view, they need guidance and succour, and therefore need to entrust themselves to an external authority (an adult) who can handle their guilt for them. As a consequence of transferring the responsibility for their guilt to an adult, the children will have to accept and learn how to deal with the standards for self-assessment that prevail, those established by the adult who is in charge.

c) About autonomy in little children

Now, this Kantian line of thought that seems to suggest that children indeed possess a capacity for moral assessment from the beginning, is supported by many other psychological and pedagogical theorists. Consider the work of the educationalist Maria Montessori. Montessori discerns moral self-assessment, autonomy, and moral behaviour in little children. What is interesting about her approach is that she explicitly credits little children (babies and toddlers) with moral capacities, but she clarifies that children can only achieve autonomy by exercising those capacities when their external environment allows it.[147] Thus, she worked to create spaces in which little children could find the conditions to exercise their autonomy.[148] Those spaces were similar to the adult spaces, but they were made in a small format, and with some adaptations. The Montessori adaptations allowed the children's little bodies to fit well in their environment, so they could also feel safe in them. Thus, children could manage without much extra help from an adult. Surprisingly, she demonstrated that in those spaces most children could explore the sensibility of their bodies and socialise with other little children in some harmony, and consequently, some of them were able to develop their reasoning and creativity enough to perform difficult tasks, and also showed a tendency to behave morally, sharing with other children, and even caring for them with benevolence.[149]

I think of myself as a mature Latin-American person, a Spanish (now also English) speaker with a good disposition. I ask myself, what could happen if I suddenly decided to move to China, a country with a very different culture and language from mine? I would probably have to confront many challenges. I would probably make many mistakes; mistakes that might be considered perverse for that culture. I imagine the only way to stop making such mistakes

[147] Montessori explains that due to her work with little children, she could observe many moral behaviours that inspired her to create 'a method where spiritual liberty became demonstrated' (1915:?). Regarding Maria Montessori method see *My System of Education* (1915).

[148] Patrick Frierson states: 'Montessori shows, in contrast to many ordinary and philosophical assumptions, that children's incapacities for autonomy are best understood as due to an absence of adequate external conditions, rather than intrinsic limitations based on their stage of life' (2015:2).

[149] See Dr Montessori's Own Hand Book (1964)

would be to decide to learn about the language and culture of that place in order to orient myself. But, in order to accomplish that mission, I would need to first find the right support. That means, a good guide, teacher, or facilitator. If that were the case, I would be able to exercise my good disposition in that context. Now, what Montessori proposes seems to be similar to this situation; according to her, children are exploring a new world, with big tables, big chairs, and big people doing things that they do not understand at all, and which their bodies are not well suited to. She proposes a method to orient the children, to help them feel that they can deal with the challenges that the proximate environment presents, but for that it is necessary to make adjustments to that environment. For Montessori, we can only expect children to exercise their choice to behave in an autonomous free manner and act under a good moral disposition when they feel competent and have found their bearings.[150] Thus, she concludes, if children can act morally, it is only because they possess a moral capacity for critical self-assessment from the beginning. She is not saying that the environment influences the children to become autonomous, but that when children can orient themselves in their environment, then they can do good freely, without guilt and fear.

The Montessori Method was created in 1913, and it is still accepted and in use in many countries. It subtly distances itself from some other studies (also contemporary with Freud) on developmental psychology, where morality is configured in stages over time. According to developmental psychologists like Piaget and Kohlberg, little children have no autonomy at all.[151] However, they believe that children do have the potential to develop moral judgement from the beginning; but their moral capacities develop in tandem with their bodies by stages. Montessori is more sceptical about the regularity of those stages and their direct relation to the biology of the body. She claims that the right education can help children free themselves even at early stages of life. Nowadays, many contemporary studies support some aspects of the Montessori's account, like the investigation by Sophia Ongley, Marta Nola, and Tina Malti

[150] Montessori's claims seem to align well with the Kantian account. As Leopold Hess explain, '[t]he most important contribution of Kant in this respect is the critical dimension of his transcendentalism: the claim that concepts can only be applied, and judgments made, if and insofar their grounds and the conditions of their use can be indicated. Kant's central question is therefore not what is the content or nature, or function of concepts which we employ in cognition and action, but what are the conditions of possibility of concept use' (2016:6).

[151] See *El Desarrollo Moral: Una introducción a La Teoria de Kohlberg* by Enrique Barra Almagiá.

(2014) for example, which through the observation of donation behaviours in children attributes moral reasoning and moral feelings to little children at earlier stages[152].

iii. The theoretical graft

Returning to the inquiry about guilt and the superego, we have on the one hand, some psychoanalysts, like Melanie Klein, claiming that children can experience guilt at very early stages of development. On the other hand, some pedagogues like Maria Montessori argue that it is possible to discern morality and autonomy in little children, which allows them to be good. In very **general** terms I agree with both positions because they dovetail with my investigation in this chapter, which examines whether it is possible to think of an *a priori* moral capacity for critical self-assessment in children, and it seems the general observations of these scholars do not contradict my suspicion. Thus, I conclude that if little children can experience guilt, it is because there is a capacity for critical assessment that triggers that status. Therefore, the sense of guilt acknowledges the status of being guilty by recognising the agent's transgression. Furthermore, we also can conclude that if children behave in a moral way, it is because they have the capacity to do so, that is, they have the capacity to understand their duties, and they are making use of that capacity.

I am not claiming here that Freud's theory of the superego is wrong, but only that he ignored the possibility that moral conscience precedes the internalisation of a punitive, idealised paternal object around the age of five.[153] That is why I want to argue that if we rule

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[152] See "Children's giving: moral reasoning and moral emotions in the development of donation behaviors" (2014) by, Sophia Ongley, Marta Nola, and Tina Malti. However, the Russian scholar Lev Vygotsky, who also reflects on the role interpersonal relations and the environment play in unfolding the moral capacities of children, may come closer to Montessori's idea that their environment should be configured to facilitate the exercise of their moral capacities. Peter Langford explains that in his mature works, Vygotsky interrogates his own understanding of Marxism to answer for 'how the development of the child differs from the historical development of human characteristics' (2005:7). According to Vygotsky, the child is a rational agent from the beginning who is unfolding his or her capacities by interacting with the environment, but, like Montessori, he believes the world of the child differs from the adult world. See Peter Langford's Vygotsky *Developmental and Educational Psychology* for a background on Vygotsky.

[153] I will talk about the ages and stages of maturity in Freud in chapter VI.

out that critical self-assessment triggers the feeling of guilt, then there is no consistent ground on which to base the concept of superego. To confront this problem about our development from childhood to adulthood, I propose to combine both theories, Freud's and Kant's, to find a solution. Even when we know that the Freudian superego is not a perfect guide for the ego (because its standards for self-assessment are not necessarily the standards of reason). In the narrative of the primal father, Freud tells us that the superego manages the children's guilt for them after the crime; the superego represents a management solution. In some way, we can guess from the Freudian picture that, at the beginning of the narrative of the primal father, the living father was looking after the children; this involves, in my view (incorporating Kant's ideas), educating them in the prevailing values (the tyrannical ones) and taking responsibility for their behaviours. But once the children grew older, according to Freud, they found the control and oppression of the authority of the father unbearable, so they decided to kill the father to remove this obstacle, without realizing that they were not ready to be able to deal with the guilt that the act of murder would trigger. That is why the children need their father back, and thus inaugurate a new, internalised tyranny. So, in my view, on the one hand, both periods of paternal tyranny that Freud depicts can help us flesh out that stage in the children's moral development that is ambiguously elucidated in the Kantian account. On the other hand, the *a priori* conscience of Kant can help us to better understand the emergence of the Freudian superego. Therefore, the challenge now will be to understand how an individual can become independent of the power of the superego in order to finally achieve autonomy.

a) The reality principle, the superego and the Kantian moral conscience in interaction

As we have seen, the superego is, for Freud, an agency that works in that unconscious that is 'entirely composed of ideas that were conscious and have been repressed' by the ego, [154] in accordance with its bounding with the reality principle. That is, the cathexis that was rejected by the ego was repressed because it was censured according to the parameters of adequacy to survive which were pointed out by the reality principle. The Freudian reality principle

[154] see Gardner 2006:143

therefore works by disciplining certain impulses and urges, but for the sake of the impulses' overall satisfaction. The reality principle is internal to an attitude which is instrumental; it serves as a means to the end of discharging the impulse. Thus, as a result of this process of rejection, an excess of Thanatos accumulates is then projected outside, and finally introjected. The idea of Thanatos allows us to draw connections between Freud's ego theory with his narrative of the primal father (the living tyrannical father) and the emergence of a moral conscience. Now, we can infer from Freud's general picture that when the superego emerges, it imposes its own standards for moral self-assessment on the child, and thus functions as a false moral conscience. It is false, because it will not necessarily observe universal moral standards, but rather the demands of an excess of id (mostly Thanatos).

The superego will disguise itself as a moral conscience by imposing a distorted moral standard which is rooted in the id and in its need to discharge the repressed cathexis (mostly excess of Thanatos). The superego's standard tries to seem universal and good, because the superego enters the psyche as an ideal, but it is not universal and good because the superego remains deeply tyrannical despite its ideality. In other words, the superego is not pure. Thus, the superego, as a death drive, will try to censure the ego's impulses and urges and will influence the child to neglect any spontaneous self-moral motivation that emerges outside the moral standards that the superego promotes. Why? In my view, because the function of superego is firstly to release aggression, that is, to make the child err in some sense, to make it punishable. Therefore, if the child enacts moral universal duties for himself, then there is no reason to punish him, and the aggressiveness of superego cannot be released. However, Freud does not focus on the moral tyranny of the superego over the ego as the only way to discharge the repressed cathexis or excess of Thanatos; he offers an extensive explanation through many texts of other types of discharges less self-destructive in real terms, such as the discharges through dreams and phantasies. Now, the ideality of the superego triggered at the beginning by the feeling of love will also drive the ego towards an alternative way of discharging the repressed cathexis. Love and ideality will push the ego toward sublimation. I will talk about this other direction in chapter VII. Here I will keep my focus on the tyrannical function of the superego described by Freud.

The reality principle does not function exactly like the moral conscience does in Kant's account, but it comes close. The main difference is that the reality principle was thought of as a means of self-preservation that worked on the basis of "trial-and-error".[155] This means it is not always accurate but can appraise the environment and adjust to it. The reality principle has no moral principles, and its "trial-and-error" approach does not help the subject to identify or understand universal truths to guide her behaviour but is only geared toward adapting in order to survive. According to Freud, it is responsible for ushering in civilization.[156] Thus, Freud provides no basis on which to formulate moral assessments from which the ego could derive moral duties. The ego is guided by a reality principle that only serves the purpose of self-preservation. From there, the ego goes on to follow the superego's moral guidance in response to the frustration that was unconsciously repressed and that motivated the murder of the father. Freud leaves no room for morality because he does not regard the little child as a moral agent. Now, the Kantian moral conscience is different from the principle of reality and the superego, because in principle the Kantian moral conscience is innate,[157] and infallible in its reflective subjective modality.[158] Thus, the Kantian moral conscience must in part belong to an unconscious domain that Freud did not recognise, which was identified in chapter III. An unconscious "entirely composed of mental faculties, powers, conditions for knowledge, judgments, or formulae for thoughts which were not originally conscious but that could become conscious once they are incorporated to a practical experience". Nevertheless, the reality principle in its role of censor is perhaps the closest idea to the Kantian moral conscience that we can find in the Freudian account.

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[155] See Laplanche and Pontalis 1985:379-382.

[156] See The Future of an Illusion and Civilization and its Discontents (*SE* XXI).

[157] Kant states in the *Metaphysics of Morals*: 'conscience is not something that can be acquired, and we have no duty to provide ourselves with one; rather, every human being, as a moral being, has a conscience within him originally' (6:400).

[158] Kant also states in the *Metaphysics*: 'an erring conscience is an absurdity. For while I can indeed be mistaken at times in my objective judgement as to whether something is a duty or not, I cannot be mistaken in my subjective judgement as to whether I have submitted it to my practical reason (here in the role of judge) for such a judgement; for it I could be mistaken in that, I would have made no practical judgement at all, and in that case there would be neither truth nor error' (6:401).

b) Final assumptions

Now, I will shift my focus back to Kant. The Kantian account holds that conscience is a guide (an inner voice) that tells us what is right and wrong to do in a particular circumstance.[159] That voice belongs to us from the beginning. So, according to Kant, all human beings possess it.[160] If we act in a morally reproachable way, our conscience will tell us its assessment. That is, it will say that we are acting wrongly, and therefore we are guilty. The status of being guilty is a consequence of having a moral conscience, and that judgement is beyond the attributions that Freud gave to the reality principle. Thus, the condition of guilt will trigger the feelings of guilt, fear, and anxiety, among others, but the deliberation on the moral verdict, and the capacity to deal well with the consequences and with those difficult feelings, only depends on the subject's higher capacities for thought. The moral conscience shows the subject her moral mistakes, and because the subject can discern her mistakes, she can also behave and understand her duties better.

If children possess a moral conscience, that is, a capacity for elaborating critical self-assessment of their behaviour from the beginning, which is tied to their innate freedom and their good predisposition (as Kant affirms in the *Metaphysics of Morals*), then they should have to deal with their guilt and the consequences of their acts from the very beginning as well.

[159] There is a vast literature in different languages on Kant's idea of a moral conscience. Here, I am mostly using Martin Sticker's (2016) interpretation of conscience as a reflective capacity. He divided the interpretations of the scholars who work on this concept into three groups: (i) Those who believe 'conscience makes my duty my duty parallel to the I think of the First Critique, which makes my thoughts my thoughts'; (ii) those who argue 'conscience has a motivational function'; and (iii) those who hold that 'conscience is reflective: it warns an agent before an action that she cannot be certain that what she intends to do is right or it makes itself felt after an action in the form of pangs of conscience' (2016:91-92).

[160] Kant states in his *Metaphysics*: 'every human being, as a moral being, has a conscience with him originally' (6:401). Further, 'if someone is aware that he has acted in accordance with his conscience, then as far as guilt or innocence is concerned nothing more can be required of him' (6:401). In his interpretation of Kant, Martin Sticker claims that conscience is a mechanism that 'observes the way agents apply common universalization tests to concrete cases' (2016:88). Thus, he explains that 'the infallibility of conscience does not imply that our first-order [or objective] moral judgments about duty are infallible' (2016:96).

However, we know it is very difficult for children to regulate or channel the overwhelming feelings that the status of guilt can trigger. It is even more difficult considering that children are living in an adult environment, an environment that has not been adapted to them, and that, therefore, makes them feel unsafe, frustrated, and disoriented, as Montessori notes. Under those circumstances, children do not have the capacity to respond properly to the status revealed by their moral conscience, and this situation makes them vulnerable to inclination and irrationality.

By combining both theories, Kant's and Freud's, I will illustrate the following assumptions -- here, I am integrating the Kantian idea of moral conscience and the Freudian reality principle and superego, as a theoretical graft Kant-Freud --: (1) following Freud, we can assume that if children can survive in the world, it is in part because they possess a natural mechanism, or reality principle, to adapt their natural drives (Eros and Thanatos) to the demands of the world; that mechanism should be mediated by self-consciousnesses, and should generate a large amount of unconscious frustration and aggressiveness in the children. (2) Following Kant, we can assume that if self-conscious little children can feel a sense of guilt, it is because they also possess an *a priori* capacity for critical moral assessment.

Now, with respect to the first two assumptions, my first conclusion is that, as children are learning how to survive, and are not capable of assuming responsibility for their guilt, an adult must necessarily assume responsibility for them and help them understand the new standard for self-assessment that, as Sticker (2016) says, “prevails at the time”. My second conclusion is that, if an adult necessarily takes responsibility for the actions of the children, then the *a priori* moral conscience that follows the rational standard for self-assessment must remain partially unconscious (the voice must remain in a silent mode), as a quiet truth. Once an adult takes responsibility for the children’s actions, the moral assessments that the children spontaneously elaborate must now attend to the external standards imposed by the adult in charge. Therefore, the children's conscience cannot superpose the standards of reason to the new standards for self-assessment “that prevail at time”, and the agent must inevitably incorporate them, giving them primacy.

Thus, (3) following Freud's ideas, we can assume that due to the growing tension in the child-adult relationship – which develops over time, following the model of the narrative of the primal father, where children disagree with the tyrannical father and hate (but also love) him – children think seriously about killing, destroying or getting rid of the adult who is in charge of them (the father), and as a consequence of this, guilt and the superego emerge. (4) Freud gives us reason to believe that the "death" of the father exposes the children's inability to take care of themselves without the father. So, they need their father back, and the superego is internalised, achieving a position of power and dominance in the psyche of the children again.

My take on these last two assumptions is that the children of the primal father unconsciously felt love and respect for their father and became loyal to him because he took care of them when they felt overwhelmed by their moral inadequacy. Thus, once the father took responsibility for them, they established a relationship that was asymmetric but necessary. However, the children end up hating their father because he became a tyrannical adult. The father interfered with their impulses and urges, and did not allow them to develop their own inner strength to take charge of themselves (autonomy). We can conclude that, even if the children became trapped by the authority of the father, clearly the moral assessments issued during that time by their original moral consciences were not totally silenced. They remained operative, independent of the father's stewardship. So, once the children kill the father and supposedly regain their autonomy, they realise that they must deal with their guilt again, and since they feel they are unable to do so, they decide to revive the father symbolically, and reverse the process. Thus, the children are forced to attend both to the standards for self-assessment of the moral law, and to the external standards for self-assessment imposed by the father which, as Sticker (2016) states, "prevail at the time".

Those standards that prevail at the time are not necessarily in alignment with reason. In that sense, children are not being self-deceptive with respect to their conscience because they have never become independent of the adults in charge but have been subjugated by a heteronomous (but internalised) power.

(5) In my view, if we assume that the voice of the moral conscience must have been partially silenced (or repressed) by the authority of the introjected father, we must also assume that repression would trigger emotions of frustration. (6) Therefore, if more emotions of frustration are generated, we can assume that the superego will become stronger as it feeds on mounting frustration. (7) If we assume that the superego is getting fed by the emotions of frustration triggered by the repression of the *a priori* moral conscience and by the persistent original cathexis that was once repelled by the reality principle, then we can conclude that the superego is getting fed from two sources of unconscious repressed contents, and not from only one.

Therefore, (8) we also must assume that the only way for the children to become adults, is to take responsibility for their guilt. In doing so, they will have to confront most of the buried truths and find a way to channel the original repressed cathexis. We can suppose that the repressed voice of their moral conscience will become amplified and reveal itself as a terrifying verdict,[161] as terrifying as the superego is.[162] This is because all the assessments that were ignored in the past were probably accumulated through time in the unconscious.

Hence, drawing on Kant's ideas and Freud's logic, we can postulate a seventh unconscious: one "entirely composed of pure ideas that were conscious but that then were repressed, ideas that were repressed by the ego in accordance with its bounding with superego". The difference here with respect to the other (repressed) unconscious pointed out by Freud is that this (repressed) unconscious is not related to the mechanism of the reality principle that demands

[161] Kant explains in his *Metaphysics of Morals*, '[e]very human being has a conscience and finds himself observed, threatened, and in general, kept in awe (respect coupled with fear) by an internal judge; and this authority watching over the law in him is not something that he himself (voluntarily) makes, but something incorporated in his being' (6:438).

[162] Kant states in his *Metaphysics of Morals* that conscience follows the human being 'like his shadow when he plans to escape. He can indeed stun himself or put himself to sleep by pleasures and distractions, but he cannot help coming to himself or walking up from time to time; and when he does, he hears at once its fearful voice' (&:438).

the ego repress the id, but rather has to do with the superego demanding the ego repress its good inner guide.

- Final words and next steps

My goal in this chapter was to introduce the main argument of this dissertation. I am offering a theoretical graft (Kant-Freud) based on the interaction of the Kantian moral conscience with a superego that emerges as a result of having a moral conscience. The final purpose of this chapter was to interrogate the genesis of the superego, mostly through the portrait of a death drive, which is a crucial piece to help us understand our return to goodness. I believe that if we can understand the problem that emerges from the first guilt and the introjection of the superego well, then it will also be possible to think about a solution to our status of wrongdoers.

In this chapter I claimed that we should consider the role of an *a priori* moral conscience in more depth, in order to gain a bigger picture of the whole dynamism and struggle of the ego. Since Freud did not entertain the possibility of an *a priori* moral conscience, I decided to include it in the general picture as a proper mechanism of moral self-assessment that fits well with some of his ideas. The purpose was to modify and improve Freud's proposal by replacing his original idea of the superego with a new one that is based on an innate moral conscience.

Polishing his thoughts over time, Freud formulated two interesting concepts that interact more closely with the idea of morality: the concept of “sublimation” and the concept of “the ego ideal”, which he linked to the superego. He did not develop those ideas in full, but they are worth considering. So, the next stage of this theoretical journey will be to elaborate an exegesis of Freud's ego ideal, which will help us understand how that ideal can connect with deliberation or (Kantian) morality. However, before I begin deciphering the ego ideal, I will look at some

controversial contemporary debates about the idea of the superego, which will provide us with further clues about Freud's ideas of morality.

Next, I will look at the work of some Kant scholars who try to read Freud through Kant, focusing on how they understand the problem of superego as a moral conscience. I will firstly discuss the work of Longuenesse (2012), and then the work of Alfred Tauber (2010). Longuenesse offers a naturalistic view of Kant; she works out a link between the Kantian "I ought to" and the Freudian "superego." Alternatively, Tauber tries to read Freud as a Kantian philosopher, presenting the ego as a rational agent capable of detaching itself from the natural instincts.

CHAPTER V

DIFFERENCES REGARDING THE FREUDIAN SUPEREGO AND THE KANTIAN MORALITY: LOOKING AT LONGUENESSE'S PAPER *KANT'S "I" IN "I OUGHT TO" AND FREUD'S SUPER-EGO* AND TAUBER'S BOOK *FREUD THE RELUCTANT PHILOSOPHER*

Recent comparative studies of Kant and Freud have interpreted their divergences (mainly related to the concept of conscience) differently. In this document, I present a critical review of two works that I believe exemplify two trends in the scholarship that analyse the conceptual relationship between Freud and Kant. On the one hand, I will talk about the work of Béatrice Longuenesse, who explores the possibility of moving Kant's idea of moral imperatives toward a naturalist account linked to superego in her paper *Kant's "I" in "I Ought to" and Freud's Super-Ego* (2012). On the other hand, I will look at Alfred Tauber's *Freud the Reluctant Philosopher* (2010), who offers a Kantian reading of Freud. Tauber claims that Freud, the humanist, always had in mind a project about autonomy, because he depicted the enterprise of the ego as revolving around a rational capacity capable of detaching itself from the natural instincts and to overcome superego. Thus, this chapter seeks to answer, what are the key points of discussion of the scholarship that studies Kant and Freud? And what is the place of my proposal in relation to that discussion? In what sense is my proposal on the mechanism of guilt novel?

i. Béatrice Longuenesse's view about the Kantian "I ought to" and the Freudian "superego"

Longuenesse offers an interesting interpretation of Kant that attempts to naturalise his theory using Freud's ideas.[163] She notices that Kantian practical philosophy gives rise to a problem regarding moral development, and she proposes to look at this problem from a

[163] Other philosophers like Samuel Scheffler in *Human Morality* (1992), David Velleman in *A Rational Superego* (1999), and John Deigh in *The Sources of Moral Agency: Essays in Moral Psychology and Freudian Theory* (1996) also work on a similar argumentative line, namely, the naturalisation of morality based on Freud.

Freudian perspective. I agree that bringing Freud's perspective to bear on the issue can be worthwhile but I disagree with some of her arguments. She mainly relies on Freud's texts prior to 1924, but I disagree with Freud's naturalist approach about morality in those years, as I mentioned in chapter IV, especially with Freud's poor explanation of the mechanism of emergence of the first guilt. So, mostly because of this, my thoughts regarding the superego will follow another course, different from the one of Longuenesse.

Longuenesse mainly affirms that Kant's and Freud's views about morality and constraint share two important features: 'One is the representation of the moral self as fundamentally conflicted. The other is the categorical nature of the moral command' (2012:20).[164] I superficially agree with the first claim, but I disagree with the second. I will first approach her first claim.

a) About the moral self as fundamentally conflicted

According to Longuenesse (2012), the inner self-conflict (the conflict of the subject of the soul) and the moral imperative (the consciousness of a command to do what is right to do) relate to the feeling of guilt, 'which is for Kant the negative component in the feeling of respect for the moral law' (2012:32) and 'the experiential manifestation of the metaphysical primacy of our rational nature, imposing its standard on our sensible nature' (2012:34). Now, taking into account those Kantian definitions, Longuenesse establishes a link with Freud's theory when she states that this feeling of guilt is 'the experiential manifestation of an ego ideal [or superego]' (2012:32). I agree with the Kantian portrayal of the feeling of guilt. However, the link with the superego follows the same Freudian logic discussed in chapter IV; that is, thinking of guilt as a consequence of having a superego and ignoring that this guilt preceded and

[164] In Longuenesse's words, "categorical" means what 'is not conditioned by particular desires and beliefs' (2012:32).

motivated the introjection of the superego. As Longuenesse agrees with Freud's work of 1923, in principle, my disagreement is with Freud. Now, this original discrepancy with Freud turns to be more puzzling in Longuenesse's work when she makes a link between superego and the Kantian theory and considers that the law of superego can become equivalent (through a developmental process) to the moral law (as understood by Kant), that is, it can become not motivated by self-love.

Longuenesse uses the feeling of guilt as a point of encounter between both theories. By contrast, I see the feeling of guilt as the main point of divergence. As I explained in chapter IV, guilt does not necessarily acknowledge trespassing a moral law (as Kant believes) because guilt can also be thought as an indicator of the awareness of trespassing something that "pretends to be" a moral law, such as the standards for self-assessment that, as Sticker (2016) states, "prevail at time". For example, a woman writing philosophy in Kant's milieu (eighteenth century Germany) would probably feel guilty since she should not be doing that due to the social bias (and punishment) linked to that behaviour at the time, and women were expected to pursue other activities. If not for that social bias, she probably would not feel guilty for writing philosophy. Now, imagine this same woman feels a moral imperative to write philosophy, but decides to refrain from it in order to avoid social bias. In this second scenario, the woman will probably feel guilty as well, not because of any stigma attached (the social disapproval), but because she is aware of failing to do her moral duty, so she must consciously declare herself guilty. In the first case, guilt arose as a heteronomous feeling firstly motivated by the fear of an external power imposing its will over her, namely, social bias. However, it was probably never clear to her what exactly was wrong with writing philosophy because the cause of the social bias was hidden or distorted. In the second case, guilt popped up as a rational feeling because she could indeed identify the standard of the moral law, and even her duty to herself based on that standard. Therefore, she could infer she was transgressing an inner law.

Longuenesse does not focus on the differences between the mechanisms through which the sense of guilt can arise, but only on the fact that guilt responds to a subject's feeling of inadequacy relative to moral standards. In any case, that general observation is right. Longuenesse reads Freud's developmental account of the superego as a trial-and-error process, which gradually adjusts the tension between the ego and superego originated by the feeling of guilt, until superego can dictate moral imperatives that are not motivated by self-love. According to Longuenesse, that becomes possible after the resolution of the Oedipus complex (however, she does not explain what the Oedipus complex consists of, but only mentions it briefly). An important detail is that Longuenesse does not see superego as something external to the subject, but she focuses on the ego's division into an ego and a superego. As the ego is self-conscious and has access to rational capacities, then the superego should have access to that rational power as well.[165] Longuenesse recurs to Kant (*G* 4:421) to explain that it is possible to think of the "I" as the author and the subject of a moral command issued by superego. Thus, for her the superego is not related to something external (*Totem and Taboo*'s idea of the primal father who becomes introjected), but is a part of the ego that contributes by structuring it, 'and makes us capable of meaningful use of "I" in the moral categorical "I ought to"' (2012:23). In some way, Longuenesse's interpretation of the superego seems to be modifying Freud's original idea of it, because as I explained in chapter IV, the superego is portrayed by Freud as a split of the ego, but a necessary split that allows to introject by means of a process of identification with something that is external, and it is that external power that takes control of the ego.[166]

[165] This idea is also present in the works of Sheffler (1992) and Deigh (1996). Sheffler states, 'there seems to be no reason why one could not take the view that the (generic) superego is part of the psychological apparatus whereby purely rational considerations succeed in motivating rational human agents. On this view, the superegos of rational human agents confer motivational authority on moral principles in recognition of their status as principles of pure practical reason' (1992:96-97).

[166] As discussed in chapter III, external stimuli affect the subject, but that stimulation leaves traces or precipitates of cathexis that remain in the body and keep stimulating the subject. In chapter IV it was explained that the inner stimulation or cathexis that was repressed by the censorship of the ego, was first projected outside, and then it was introjected again by a process of identification. Therefore, it is through the introjection of the repressed cathexis by identification that the superego emerges. Now, Identification is a non-rational process (see Lear 2019:752). Under this view, the split of the ego has to do more with a dissociation of the ego, which makes the ego heteronomous, subjugated to another power (the inner stimulation) that is not rational, but is using the rational capacities of the ego to command the ego.

To summarize, Longuenesse understands guilt mainly as an indicator of the subject's inadequacy, and this inadequacy shapes the relation between the ego and superego through a development over time. In general terms, I agree with that reading; our differences have to do with the understanding of the dynamics of guilt, and with our understanding of the superego.

b) About the categorical nature of the moral command

Longuenesse rightly concludes that 'there are striking structural similarities between Freud's ego and Kant's transcendental unity of apperception ["I" in "I think"]' (2012:19). There are similarities, but as explained in chapter III, apperception and the ego are not exactly the same. However, it is more suspicious when she concludes that 'there are also striking similarities between Freud's superego and Kant's account of the mental structure that grounds our use of "I" in the moral "I ought to"' (2012:19).[167] For Longuenesse the superego is an incomplete form of morality, which evolves over time into something more like the Kantian portrait of morality, as the categorical imperatives. I must admit that what Longuenesse claims is not far from what Freud suggested in *The Ego and the Id* (1923), where he mentions that 'Kant's categorical imperative is the direct heir of Oedipus complex' (*SE* XIX:167); but it is far from what Freud wrote in *The New Introductory Lectures* (1933), where he distances himself from Kant and states that regarding 'the well-known pronouncement of Kant's which couples the conscience within us with the starry Heavens, (…) God has done an uneven and careless piece of work (…). We are far from overlooking the portion of psychological truth that is

[167] Longuenesse's claim that links the "I" of "I think" with the ego, is broadly accepted for scholars, but not without some minor objections. However, the claim that links the "I ought to" with the superego is debated, as we will see in the next section of this chapter. Regarding the minor objections, Jonathan Lear answers to Longuenesse's paper of 2012, which is also contained in her book of 2019, and in his essay *A Freudian Naturalization of Kantian Philosophy* (2019) and argues, 'I think that any attempt to use Freud's ego as the basis of a naturalized account of Kant's use of 'I' in 'I think' needs to acknowledge the lack of coherence, disregard of logical relations, distortions and false images of reason that regularly characterize ego functioning' (2019:752).

contained in the assertion that conscience is of divine origin (…). Even if conscience is something "within us", yet it is not from the first' (1933:61). Thus, I believe it is more coherent to read Freud as holding that the superego is unrelated to morality. As I explained in chapter IV, the superego's genesis is linked to an irrational reaction, and its development moves more like a spiral, feeding on the same repressed original cathexis, and finding different mechanisms for updating itself, but according to Freud, it always progresses toward civilization. Now, civilization for Freud does not seem to be related to an idea of morality independent of self-interest.

Longuenesse relates the moral achievement of superego mostly to its ideality. So, in what sense is superego also an ego ideal? As we saw in chapter IV, in the myth of the primal father of *Totem and Taboo, an* "ego ideal" is born as a consequence of the remorse and the love that the children feel for the father. It contains the benevolence of the children and their desire to compensate for the crime they committed. In *The Ego and the Id*, the Freudian text that Longuenesse concentrates on, it is hard to distinguish the ego ideal and the superego. This is evident from reading the title of the third chapter of *The Ego and the Id* where Freud writes, 'The Ego and The Superego (Ego ideal)'. If Longuenesse understands ideality as goodness, then it makes sense for her to think of the superego as an agency capable of achieving it. However, Freud through time kept adjusting his theory because the association of the superego with the death drive was problematizing any possibility of moral ideality. Therefore, in *The New Introductory Lectures*, Freud separated the terms ego ideal and superego, as two terms designating two different agencies apparently fed by different drives. Thus, the ego ideal is fed by an excess of Eros, and the superego by an excess of Thanatos.[168] Now, regardless of the differentiation or relationship between the superego and the ego ideal, which for some philosophers was a mistaken turn of Freud, the question that arises is about ideality itself.

[168] We can talk about an excess of Eros and Thanatos because all what was retained within the repressed unconscious keeps growing by accumulation and stimulation, increasing pressure. Freud warns us that all that hidden or latent repressed cathexis has an urge for discharging its content, as water pressing a dam (*SE* XXIII:224). So, on the one hand we have that part of Eros and Thanatos cannot be discharged and they are accumulated; and on the other, we have new frustration added (extra Thanatos) because of the impossibility of the discharge itself. In some way, Freud attributes the aggressive quality only to the superego (as the tyrannic master, see *SE* XXII:77), and the loving one to the ego ideal (as the expression of admiration, see *SE* XXII: 65).

Jonathan Lear asks, why must this account of the ego [and its identification with superego] be treated as holding good ideally? (2019:750). Why does Longuenesse understand ideality as good (in a Kantian sense)?

Even if Freud seems optimistic in some texts, in others he seems sceptical about the idea of morality in a Kantian sense. However, Freud was always committed to understanding civilization as a process and an achievement, which although not perfect, is at least in some way, "striking and unambiguous".[169] Longuenesse links the superego with the ego ideal when she affirms that the superego's imperative is 'not conditioned by particular desires or beliefs, (…) [the superego] is so demanding that it can be only an ideal, not a structure of motivation for which we can ever claim that it has actually legislated over the determination of any of our maxims' (2012:32).[170] Regarding the moral good quality of the imperative, Longuenesse sorts this obstacle through an interesting observation related to the impossibility to know about our moral motivation. She explains that the superego (or the ego ideal) -- just like the Kantian "I ought to" -- works from the unconscious of the mind as an emergent agency or moral conscience for an ego or "I" that is conscious. Therefore, the ego that can consciously perceive the existence of this inner moral conscience and interpret its commands as obligations, knows nothing about the source of motivation that influences behind those commands. So, for Longuenesse to make a distinction between the sources of motivation of the laws enacted by the ego ideal and those enacted by the Kantian moral law is not relevant; only the ideality of the law is.[171]

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[169] See *Why War?* Where Freuds states, '[t]he psychical modifications that go along with the process of civilization are striking and unambiguous. They consist in a progressive displacement of instinctual aims and a restriction of instinctual impulses' (*SE* XXII:214).

[170] This claim is partially supported by Velleman (1999), but he explains that it is necessary to complement Freud's theory of the ego with more elements related to "ideality" to be able to link the superego with the categorical imperatives. He affirms, 'Freud describes the ego as the seat of "reason and good sense". But how can the ego exercise reason and good sense if there are no standards of rationality to which it aspires? The rational function that Freud has assigned to the ego would seem to require that it have a more extensive ideal than he has provided' (1999:556).

[171] She states that 'the very effort at self-reflection and conceptually clear elucidation of one's motivation all too naturally turns into a mere tool for moral pretence, where discursive formulation of one's purported motivation by one or the other formulation of the moral imperative is just a complacent mask for another kind of motivation,

Longuenesse highlights that 'we are blind to the true nature of the moral motivation' (2012:27). She also reminds us that, according to Kant, 'common moral wisdom just knows, without any reasoning, what ought to be done' (2012:26), and therefore, as there is a limit to what we can know, we cannot get total conscious access to the understanding of that determination (the choice of the mystery subject of the soul) that we perceive as our inner imperative, which also imposes an effect on our feelings. Therefore, that blindness to our sources of moral motivation and also the impossibility of fully understanding the volition that enacts the moral imperatives, lead us to accept and recognize unconsciousness behind our morality. In general terms I agree with this line of thought.

Now, my point is that the assumption of "unconsciousness behind our morality" is misleading if we use it to equate Kant's and Freud's ideas of morality and the unconscious. As explained in chapter III, their theories cover different domains of the unconscious. Longuenesse's main statement illustrates that 'it is impossible positively to know whether an action has ever been accomplished from duty rather than merely in external conformity with the commands of duty. Indeed, we have, according to Kant, a natural propensity to deceive ourselves and to conveniently present ourselves as an action done from duty what is really only an action in conformity with duty' (2012:28). There, she rightly points out that our feelings (mainly the feelings of respect, guilt, and love) can serve as sources of unconscious moral motivation[172]. In that case, the moral axiom of our actions is questionable, because apparently there is no way to know if the moral axiom was enacted from absolute freedom or not.

whose explicit conceptual formulation is thus conveniently blocked. The procedure is made all the more effective by the fact that one and the same mental activity, that of reason in its practical use, and one and the same faculty of desire or will (the faculty of desire affected by reason) are at work in enforcing, on the one hand, the structural priority of the moral imperative and on the other hand, the counter-influence of hypothetical imperatives of self-love' (2012:29).

[172] Longuenesse especially reflects on the relevance of the feelings for our moral motivation, she says, '[t]he immediate insight into what one ought to do is experienced as a feeling of a unique kind: respect for the moral law. Respect is both caused by the moral law and directed at the moral law' (2012:26). And because respect is directed at the moral law, it is also serving as a source of moral motivation. Now, she warns us firstly that 'respect for the law is not respect for the law in its universal formulation (...), but respect for duty [our duty to correspond to the law]' (2012:27).

However, we must also hold in mind that, as Kant reminds us, even when we cannot know our motives, we can become aware of them.

When Longuenesse emphasises the relevance of the unconscious components, she does so because of the impossibility to totally penetrate them. She is very critical of the Kantian moral position because as Kant thinks that it is impossible to know with certainty whether our moral actions are influenced by the moral law itself or by self-deception and self-love, then how can we know that our actions are right actions? She emphasises that paradoxically for Kant, 'common moral understanding may have a correct representation of what duty commands without having a clear representation of the moral principle under which this command is justified' (2012:27). Now, I do believe there is some basis for Longuenesse's criticism, but it is also questionable. Kant teaches that reason has limitations. However, a transcendental project has to be able to navigate that inconvenience in a satisfactory way, for otherwise the whole transcendental project fails.[173] That is, even though Kant thinks we are blind to the subjective source of motivation that influences our moral choices, we should at least be aware of the moral standard that guides our acts. That is the role of conscience: it makes us aware of the moral standard. Conformity to that standard is the basis for assessing whether our acts are intelligible enough to be moral or not.

Therefore, because the acts are intelligible enough to the standard of our moral conscience, we can assume that there is an unconscious rational source of motivation that corresponds to them.[174] Now, we can appreciate that the Kantian moral conscience is different

[173] Korsgaard answers the claim about moral skepticism in *Skepticism about Practical Reason* stating, 'skepticism about practical reason is sometimes based on a false impression of what the internalism requirement requires. It does not require that rational considerations succeed in motivating us insofar as we are rational. We can admit the possibility of true irrationality and yet still believe that all practical reasoning is instrumental'(1986:15). She concludes, '[m]otivational skepticism about practical reason depends on, and cannot be the basis for, skepticism about the possible content of rational requirements. The extent to which people are actually moved by rational considerations, either in their conduct or in their credence, is beyond the purview of philosophy. Philosophy can at most tell us what it would be like to be rational' (1986:25).

[174] Based on the works of W.D Falk, William Frankena, and Thomas Nagel, among others, Korsgaard classifies this interpretation of Kant, as an internalist view, 'according to which the knowledge (or the true or the acceptance)

from the superego, because for Kant, moral conscience is innate, *a priori*, but for Freud it is the product of a process, it is *a posteriori*. However, Longuenesse (2012) explains that the superego could replace the Kantian idea of moral conscience. Here is where my clarification of three forms of Kantian unconscious is worth taking into account.[175] Indeed, the unconscious covers everything that is not conscious, but we need to be able to differentiate among the various types of unconscious domains (that is, the domains where moral conscience originates) that are working within us. Thus, the *a priori* Kantian moral conscience arises from a different unconscious domain than the repressed unconscious that originates the superego.

In my view, the Freudian superego is not rational (as Kant understands the term), because its commands cannot pass the requirement of being intelligible, disinterested, necessary, and strictly universal like the Kantian categorical imperatives are. A blind subject (who does not understand its purpose) guided by the superego obviously cannot be in charge of her choice, since a blind subject is someone who cannot understand the choices she faces in the first place. Hence, a blind subject guided (or inconsistently orientated) by the superego is not the same as a blind subject guided (consistently oriented towards a purpose) by a Kantian conscience -- as we can understand it by considering the transcendental approach as Longuenesse does, that is, a blind subject under the acceptance of the limits of her knowledge. Even if the Kantian subject is blind to the source of moral motivation, this subject can be aware of the standards for self-assessment, the boundaries themselves, imposed by the moral law.

I believe Longuenesse tackles the problem of the unconscious motivation of our practical morality in a way that is insufficient. This is because she explains the unconscious motivation that traverses through the superego as if this could come from any unconscious domain. We must remember that the superego for Freud is only a product of the repressed unconscious. On the one hand, it is inapprehensible for us in the same way that the Kantian

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of a moral judgment implies the existence of a motive (not necessary overriding) for acting on that judgment' (1986:8).

[175] See that clarification in chapter III, section ii.b(2).

soul is, and on the other, it is apprehensible for us in the same way that the contents of the preconscious system are for the ego, what is wrong.[176] The unconscious for Freud is organised topographically, and the superego is fed and configured from a particular unconscious domain. So, it is precisely the challenge of excavating the superegoic space in order to make its compulsions more comprehensible that psychotherapists undertake. Although the unconscious indeed underlies our morality, that does not mean Freud's understanding of that unconscious is equivalent to morality in Kant. Furthermore, the fact that there is an unconscious motivation influencing our morality, does not mean that we can assume that all our moral acts (whether on a Kantian or Freudian conception of morality) are motivated from the same unconscious domain.

Now, Longuenesse highlights that it is possible to connect categorical imperatives with the superego, because '[b]oth the formulation of the categorical imperative and the assessment of one's maxims under the standard of that imperative depend on keeping in view the unity of the propositional and inferential content of one's thought' (2012:24). I completely agree with that claim. However, my observation is that the unity of the propositional (related to my duties) and inferential (related to the critical self-assessment) content that should be given by the superego to be then grasped or incorporated by the ego never seems to reach categorical coherence. That is, the content does not reach a consistent alignment between means and rational ends. Longuenesse does not give any example of how we could identify that coherence in the superego's imperatives in her 2012 article. On the other hand, there is an agreement among scholars that, for Freud, the superego's commands are incoherent, that is, intentionally distorted.[177] Now, that is not a mere detail, because an intentional distortion in the imperatives makes the superego deceptive.

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[176] Longuenesse very briefly admits that according to Freud we are able to become conscious of the contents of our unconscious (see 2012:36), but she does not explain how. Specifically, she does not explain the difference between the preconscious and repressed unconscious systems, and she seems to confuse how these different unconscious systems interact, thinking of superego as if this were working from both systems, what is wrong.

[177] According to Jonathan Lear, ideality entails distortion; For him, the resources of internalisation and identification of the Freudian ego 'are themselves non-rational and one has reason to suspect that the outcome of such identifications – namely, the ego – will be somewhat irrational. Thus, 'when Freud says that his view of

Hence, Longuenesse tries to resolve the problem of the distortion of superego by stating that this only happens because superego is partially unconscious (distorted): 'in this sense: it is manifested in representations whose meaning, and connection are opaque to the subject of those representations because they do not obey conceptual/logical rules of combination' (2012:34). However, I believe that the superego's distortion has another cause: I believe the superego is distorted because it adopts standards for self-assessment different from the ones the (Kantian) moral law is based on.

Now, I admit it is very difficult to differentiate the ideas of moral conscience, self-assessment, moral failure, and guilt in both authors, because Freud himself was in general very confused regarding his position with respect to Kant and the moral law. In *The Ego and the Id* (1923) Freud indeed takes the position Longuenesse emphasises, stating that 'the ego ideal [as well as the superego] answers to everything that is expected of the higher nature of man' (*SE* XIX:37) and then adding, '[a]s a child grows up, the role of father is carried on by teachers and others in authority; their injunctions and prohibitions remain powerful in the ego ideal and continue, in the form of conscience, to exercise the moral censorship. The tension between the demands of the conscience and the actual performance of the ego is experienced as a sense of guilt' (*SE* XIX:37). That is why, as Longuenesse rightly notes, the feeling of guilt becomes especially relevant for Freud. However, Freud is not consistent in clarifying what he understands by "the higher nature of man". Hence, Longuenesse admits that a Kant-Freud comparison is not easy, but she bases her optimism on the aspects that she thinks work well in both theories. Specifically, she grounds her comparison in the belief that both authors share the idea of a "moral imperative" and hold similar positions on "guilt" as an indicative sign of moral inadequacy.

the ego as the voice of reason and common sense should be taken as holding ideally, one should realize that this is a very substantial idealisation. Indeed, it is an idealization that taken by itself distorts our understanding of what the ego is' (2019:752). In other words, ideality leads us to think of the ego as the referent for a rational processing.

Even if Freud attributes an ideal dimension to the superego through the ego, this is not necessarily good or rational in a Kantian sense. Because, even when the superego can sometimes perform its tasks in external harmony with moral goodness, it is always moved by self-love.[178] On the other hand, it is true that the superego sets moral standards, but the moral maxims that underlie its commands are usually inconsistent, unintelligible, and show contradiction under the external façade of ideality and distortion. According to Freud, the superego usually acts compulsively, not rationally. Thus, the main function of the superego, as Freud describes in many texts, is discharging an excess of stimulation (which, even if it is enjoyable at some point, is not necessarily pleasant).[179] So, if for Freud our morality is grounded in our natural drives (an aspect that Longuenesse recognizes but does not develop), then it seems difficult to connect the idea of superego with the Kantian idea of rationality.

It seems that by equating the moral imperative in Kant and in Freud we are crossing lines with respect to the domains of reason and nature in both theories. I will keep examining Longuenesse's ideas by commenting on Tauber's ideas of autonomy in Kant and Freud in the next section.

ii. Alfred Tauber's idea of autonomy

Alfred Tauber also disagrees with the link that Longuenesse establishes between Kant and Freud based on "the categorical imperative" and its relation to the "unconscious".[180] He rightly states, '[u]nlike Kant, who sought to recognize and act according to a universal categorical

[178] Self-love in the sense of serving to the satisfaction of the pushing of the natural drives, but as the superego tries to satisfy mostly toward?? the accumulated frustration, this selflove becomes mostly a love for punishing or self-hatred.

[179] See *The Economic Problem of Masochism* written in 1924 (*SE* XIX:159-170). In *The Ego and the Id* (1923) Freud writes, '[f]ollowing our view of sadism, we should say that the destructive component had entrenched itself in the super-ego and turned against the ego' (*SE* XIX:53).

[180] See Tauber 2010:9

imperative, Freud assigned the placement and character of value (and choice) within the individual's own psychical apparatus' (2009:17), and he 'did not subscribe to the renunciation of self-interest as the basis of the moral at all' (2012:9). Tauber recognizes that Freud took some ideas from Kant, but also borrowed from a variety of sources that criticise the Kantian approach, of which the German post-Kantian philosophers, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, were perhaps the most influential.

In *Freud the Reluctant Philosopher,* Tauber explains that thanks to Schopenhauer, Freud was able to validate his psychological biological approach, by converting the Kantian will into an organic unconscious primary force (2012:153), and that thanks to Nietzsche, Freud was able to validate his conception of autonomy. Thinking of it as a capacity that emerges from the individual organism itself (which allows a multiplicity of perspectives), and not from a universal abstract source (in the proper Kantian sense) like the categorical imperative. However, according to Tauber, Freud also takes distance from Nietzsche and Schopenhauer when he thinks of morality as something that becomes independent of the organism. So, in Kant we have a universal abstract source that each of us personally embodies, but in Nietzsche we have a categorical imperative that can emerge from the organic individual itself, as in "…*my* categorical imperative!". Now, according to Tauber, psychoanalysis partially combines and excludes both visions. It partially combines them because Freud converts the body into the force that feeds the ego and superego, and it partially excludes because the mature Freud finds in the ego a rational component that is not given from the biology. Following this, Tauber argues that 'psychoanalysis depends on an ego capable of separating itself from its own instinctual biology' (2012:9). That is, for Tauber, Freud would see morality as a detached mechanism, which would be ready to take rational control of our natural unconscious drives (2012:168). According to him, it is in that idea of detachment that Freud engages again with the Kantian view.

Tauber's interpretation of Freud is built around the idea of the ego's autonomy, which lies in its detachment.[181] However, Freud rarely uses the word "detachment", and not necessarily for the purpose that Tauber does. For example, in the context of a discussion of the progress of culture in *The Future of an Illusion*, Freud states, '[t]he first step is to distinguish between privations which affect everyone and privations which do not affect everyone but only groups, classes or even single individuals. The former is the earliest; with the prohibitions that established them, civilization -- who knows how many thousands of years ago? -- began to detach man from his primordial animal condition. We have found to our surprise that these privations are still operative and still form the kernel of hostility to civilization' (*SE* XXI:10). Now, Tauber argues that when the ego is capable of freeing the subject from the authority of the unconscious, it achieves autonomy.[182] In very general terms I agree with his view, but I have some concerns regarding his idea of "detachment". Tauber, and arguably Longuenesse as well, believe that Freud uses the term 'autonomy' to refer to 'the basis for the personal struggle to establish a life deemed "free"' (2012:9). However, Tauber depicts the personal struggle in a different way from Longuenesse. He looks at it in two ways: (a) as a result of the superego, ego, and id relationship (the psychological view); and (b), as a result of a healing process, which is triggered by an analyst who works through a talking therapy with a patient, interpreting symptoms by means of a narrative analysis (the therapeutic view).[183] I describe both below.

a) Regarding the "superego, ego, id" relationship (the psychological view)

On the one hand, Tauber insists on presenting the ego as a synthesis (in the Kantian sense), which can be detached from its components (the natural instincts) to reach autonomy. This

[181] This idea of autonomy and the allusion of a possible detachment was claimed by some Freudian scholars from the Ego psychology's school.

[182] Tauber talks about Freud's autonomy, but that is not exactly the word that Freud uses. So, Tauber explains that 'Freud did not specifically define his use of autonomy, and the word itself only appears once in entire opus (Kobrin 1993)' (2013:5).

[183] Tauber differentiates both views, the psychological and the therapeutic, in his Introduction of *Freud, the Reluctant Philosopher* (2010:3).

idea of autonomy and the allusion of a possible detachment was claimed by some Freudian scholars from the Ego psychology's school. Heinz Hartmann and Rudolph M. Loewenstein state in *Notes on The Superego*: 'what Freud observed about a gradual detachment of moral imperatives from the original objects, can well be called a developmental trend toward growing "autonomy" of the superego's functions - that is, autonomy from the objects on the one hand and from the drives on the other' (1962:65). However, this interpretation is not easy to sustain. Heinz Hartman, who was very sympathetic to the idea of autonomy warns us, '[w]e spoke of "relative" independence because there can be no question of "absolute" independence in this or in the other forms of autonomy we know in psychoanalysis' (1962:64). Laplanche and Pontalis also note that for Freud the autonomy of the ego 'is strictly relative' (1985: 130), that is, it is not an absolute autonomy. In my understanding, what Freud indeed depicts is something like a tangled ego, i.e., an ego that is not exactly a detached synthesis (or product) of the id, the external world, and the superego, but rather is a binding mediator.[184]

Tauber indeed recognizes the ego's role as mediator; that is why, he claims in a more convincing way, at the end of *Freud the Reluctant Philosopher*, that '"[a]utonomy" for Freud does not share any alliance with Kant's specific notions of the categorical imperative and the negation of self-interest as the content of some true moral system' (2010:145). Hence, for Tauber, Freud's "autonomy" should be placed in alignment with Nietzsche's and Emerson's ideas; "autonomy" should correspond to the achievement of 'some undefined perfect state in the expression of a re-conceived individualism' (2010:145). However, for Tauber, in the achievement of this state, the consciousness of the individual would detach itself from the id and superego. Now, this claim about detachment is still problematic.

[184] Freud explains, in *An Outline of Psycho-Analysis* (1940), that ego is an organisation that 'acts as an intermediary between the id and the external world' (*SE* XXIII:145). Thus, he also mentions that the ego can perform its task 'by becoming aware of stimuli, by storing excessively strong stimuli (through flight), by dealing with moderate stimuli (through adaptation) and finally by learning to bring about expedient changes in the internal world to its own advantage (through activity)' (*SE* XXIII: 145).

Tauber explains at the beginning of *Freud the Reluctant Philosopher* (2010) that it is important to separate the Freud who is linked to the scientific studies of biology, from Freud the therapist. The neuroscientist Freud cannot give an account of absolute autonomy, but the humanist Freud, the analyst, can.[185] Personally, I do not know if it is possible to separate Freud the biologist from Freud the humanist, but Tauber makes a good point when he indicates that Freud's biological approach is not enough to account for autonomy and the phenomenon of healing. What we can piece together from the different stages of Freud's research is that once the ego emerges, it starts gaining complexity little by little. However, Freud gives us no reason to believe that the ego reaches an "undefined perfect state", or that the ego becomes detached from the other agencies that work with it, as Tauber claims it does. Even when we are aware that every agency depicted by Freud possesses a certain degree of independence.

My objection to Tauber's use of the idea of detachment in his interpretation of Freud should become clearer when we consider that Freud explains in *The Ego and the Id* (1923), that there is always a connection in the body that receives external stimuli, the inner instincts, and the ego as an emergent synthetic processing. He says that the consciousness of the ego is like 'the germinal disc [that] rests upon the ovum' (*SE* XIX, 24), and he explains that, like the germinal disc, which is never disconnected from the rest of its yolk, the ego always keeps its roots in unconsciousness, because 'the conscious ego […] is first and foremost a body-ego' (*SE* XIX, 27).[186] This idea of Freud seems to be closer to the Schopenhauer-Nietzsche conception of the natural will (as Tauber recognizes),[187] but from there, it does not seem easy to make connections with Kantian autonomy as a detachment of the ego, even if we are referring to an "undefined perfect state", because for Freud the same natural drive and cathexis is running

[185] Tauber highlights in his Intro of *Freud the Reluctant Philosopher* (2010) that there is a well-known criticism of Freud nowadays because of his outdated knowledge of biology. However, Tauber insists on rescuing the humanist side of Freud, his philosophy, which is not outdated.

[186] Freud explains in 1923 that 'the ego is not sharply separated from the id; its lower portion emerges into it' (*SE* XIX: 24).

[187] See Tauber 2010:158.

through all the agencies. This is even more evident when Freud explains the therapeutical process in general, mostly the idea of "sublimation".

Freud's idea of sublimation was firstly taken from chemistry, 'the procedure whereby a body is caused to pass directly from a solid to a gaseous state' (Laplanche and Pontalis 1985:430). Freud was looking for a term to explain how the cathexis in the body can be transformed or diverted into something else, something healthier. However, as most scholars warn, even if this term is extremely valuable for therapy, Freud left its theoretical elucidation in a primitive state[188]. Freud defines sublimation in *On Narcissism* (1914) as 'a process that concerns object-libido and consists in the instinct directing itself towards an aim other than, and remote from, that of sexual satisfaction' (*SE* XIV:94). In *The Ego and the Id* (1923), speaking about identification as a particular form of sublimation, Freud adds, 'this transformation of an erotic object-choice into an alteration of the ego is also a method by which the ego can obtain control over the id and deepen its relations with it' (*SE* XIX:30). In *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1932) Freud explains furthermore that '[s]ublimation of instinct is an especially conspicuous feature of cultural development; it is what makes it possible for higher psychical activities, scientific, artistic, or ideological, to play an important part in civilised life' (*SE* XXI:96). In the same text, he adds the controversial claim that '[t]he work of civilization has become increasingly the business of men, it confronts them with ever more difficult tasks and compels them to carry out instinctual sublimations of which women are little capable' (*SE* XXI:102). In other words, sublimation can be reached thanks to the intervention of civilization, which he portrays as a masculine intervention, related to the figure of the father. So, for Freud, we first become part of the civilized world through the mechanism of the introjection of the figure of the father (superego), due to the Oedipus complex (the updated version of the narrative of the primal father), and then through the sublimation of the sexual instincts due to the resolution of that complex (when the child can exert some control over his impulses and urges, and that way, can also address his wishes and identification towards other objects different from his

[188] See Laplanche and Pontalis 1985:433.

parents). It is in the dissolution of the Oedipus complex that sublimation plays a role, but Freud does not fully explain it.

On Tauber's reading, the Freudian ego emerges as a detached autonomous mediation between the instinctual forces (the id and superego), something like an abstract synthesis which comes to life from the tension of a divided organic unconscious, infusing the subject with an independent consciousness that, thanks to its detachment, can gain control over the instincts (2010:9). Now, according to Tauber, Freud only develops this argument in his writings on therapy, not in the theoretical ones that explore biological explanations. Tauber warns that to incorporate the inquiry about autonomy into the Freudian account it is necessary to appeal to a philosophical approach, and I agree.

However, it must be noted that Freud never states that the ego attains "full control over the instincts". He thinks it exercises partial and intermittent control, but partial control does not move us closer to the Kantian idea of absolute "autonomy", to the idea of "detachment", or even to an "undefined perfect state".[189] Tauber's focus on the ego mostly refers to consciousness, but for Freud the ego is more than consciousness, which is only the surface of the ego. Nevertheless, the idea of ego as consciousness may well serve as a foundation on which to base a connection with some aspects of Kantian theory. However, that connection would only connect with the idea of apperception, as Longuenesse (2019) explains, and not with the idea of autonomy as absolute autonomy, an "undefined perfect state", or detachment.

[189] The claim of detachment is indeed very difficult to defend, Freud states many times that the ego is linked to biology, even when it has the capacity to split itself to merge again, and even when the ego can gain "some independence", total independence is never achieved. In one of his more mature works in 1933, regarding the separation among the superego, ego, and id, he states that 'we cannot do justice to the characteristics of the mind by linear outlines like those in a drawing or in primitive painting, but rather by areas of colour melting into one another as they are presented by modern artists' (*SE* XXII:79).

As Longuenesse (2019) highlights, the Kantian "I am" or self-consciousness is indeed, like the Freudian ego, a processing of awareness and synthesis, which is set in motion by an unknown agency, and involves the actions of perceiving and associating through conscious thoughts. From a Kantian perspective, that unknown agency would be the soul, and from a Freudian perspective, the unknown agency would be the result of a binding process among drivers or principles (the principle of pleasure and the principle of reality) and the superego. Thus, the ego's function seems similar to what Kant labels "apperception".[190] As long as the ego is bound to reality and pleasure principles, it works as an organ of sensibility, perception and association, fomenting self-reflection and consciousness of the boundaries of the real world. However, as long as the ego is also influenced by the death instinct, it necessarily splits itself, introjecting a separate conscience (the superego) capable of appraising and punishing it.

The ego Freud depicts is an *a posteriori* product, in the Schopenhauer-Nietzshe line. By contrast, the Kantian "I am" is an *a priori* referent of unity for an *a priori* empty entity. That is, the Freudian ego is produced by a negotiation between principles, and investments, but the Kantian subject of the soul is not produced. So, even when it comes to those concepts, apperception and ego, that truly are affine, we need to keep in mind that they are not exactly the same, and we should proceed carefully taking this in mind. Now, when we compare both authors' (Kant's and Freud's) ideas about moral conscience and autonomy, this becomes even more complicated. According to Kant, we can talk of autonomy in practical terms only when reason is able to offer the agent (or soul) a (positive) free choice that can be determined by self-reflection and understanding. The only possible connection between the Freudian ego and Kantian autonomy is the notion of "sublimation"; that is why Longuenesse appeals to the ideality of the superego in her comparison. However, Freud's explanations of "sublimation" are ambiguous.

[190] See Longuenesse 2019.

In order to approximate the idea of absolute autonomy in a Freudian framework, the ego would need, as a condition, to be offered a (positive) free choice. Therefore, the key question is: Can superego offer a free choice to the ego? What is at stake here is absolute freedom. If superego is fed by irrational feelings and represents a split in the rational synthetic unity of the ego, it is difficult to imagine how this agency could offer a free (absolute) choice. The superego can only offer the imperative order to submit to its commands; it is always demanding. Now, of course, ego can (up to a certain point) find a way to rebel against the superego's demands and gain power over it, and this is Tauber's central goal. Tauber's project points out that in order for the ego to be successful, and capable of transcending the superego's domination, it needs to marshal higher intellectual resources which are not provided by its biological sources of supply. This leads to the question of how the ego can access those higher intellectual resources.

Here, I agree with Tauber in that, according to Freud, the natural drives, or all the instinctual cathexis within the individual, push for the emergence of psychological agencies that are capable of investing and continuing creating by themselves (by means of their interaction) more complex agencies of synthesis and identities, such as the ego and the superego. In my view, the ego is indeed partially conscious, but not necessarily autonomous *per se*.[191] I believe the Freudian ego can achieve a higher degree of autonomy at some point in its role of mediator, inasmuch as it is capable of connecting with those higher faculties of reason that can offer it a (positive) free choice. As Tauber noticed, Freud at some point needed to complete his theoretical picture by making use of his philosophy and humanist background, because the biological explanations were not enough to account for the ego's autonomy.[192]

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[191] Tauber understands ego as an agency that is cognitively growing and gaining autonomy, I agree with that claim. He writes, 'the rational faculty of the ego permits, given proper support and articulation, the means of both understanding the deterministic forces of the unconscious as well as freeing the ego from their authority' (2009:3). However, I disagree with respect to the emphasis put on the idea of autonomous detachment. He says, 'Kantianism plays a complex role in the development of Freud's thought: the capacity of autonomous reason to detach itself from the natural domain permits scrutiny of nature and oneself, and from that faculty scientific inquiry and moral choice derive' (2009:2).

[192] We can find a very different view in the work of John Maze, which gave birth to a diverse and rich discussion in the field of psychoanalysis. Maze directly criticises Hartman's idea of autonomy of the ego. Maze downplays the rational capacities of the ego and pays more attention to the enormous capacities and diversity of the natural

However, the philosophical work that Freud started was always a work in progress; it took many paths in its development and was sadly never finished. I believe his completed work does not support the view that his philosophical-therapeutical project was helping his patients to detach their egos from their natural drives, cathexis, or instinctual forces. Rather, Freud's work depicts his constant effort trying to help his patients attain some higher state of self-domain and realisation, and a Freud who is constantly researching, surmising, and trying to explain the healing role of the phenomenon of sublimation and its relationship with the discharge of the natural drives. My concern therefore is that "autonomy" for Freud, as Hartman (1962), and Laplache and Pontalis (1985) mention, is always relative. Further, although "sublimation" indeed implies a transformation, transformation is not necessarily a detachment.

It is uncontroversial that Freud believes the ego acquires its higher functional capacities when it finds some behavioural balance (health). Thus, I agree with Tauber that it is necessary to reflect on what health and therapy mean for Freud in order to grasp what kind of autonomy he might attribute to the ego.

b) Regarding the psychotherapeutic process

Tauber's claims about this topic show firm consistency. He firstly points out that, according to Kant, it is the 'autonomy of reason [, which] confers on humans (…) the ability to assume responsibility for their actions' (2012:6). Therefore, in order to ultimately control our natural drives and take responsibility for them, reason must be invoked (2012:124). According to him,

drivers to make us know. He centres his focus on the idea that every drive has an object; the object therefore establishes a relation of identification with the drive, and because of this, the author concludes that we can know about the drive by paying attention to the object chosen by the subject (See 'The complementarity of object-relations and instinct theory', in International Journal of Psycho-Analysis. 1993). Simon Boag in *Ego, drives, and the dynamics of internal objects* explains that for Maze 'the knowing subjects within the individual are the instinctual drives. Furthermore, given that there are multiple instinctual drives, each person then consists of a multiplicity of knowers. Consequently, this position has radical implications for conceptualizing the id, ego, and superego, and personality structures in general' (2014:1).

reason is invoked through self-consciousness, and 'self-consciousness is enacted through self-reflexivity of self-awareness, and in this process of self-awareness, identity emerges' (2012:146). According to Tauber, to be fully autonomous, the individual must find the person or identity in herself. Therapy sets in motion the process of interpretative insight necessary to do so.[193]

According to Tauber, through therapy the individual gets transformed, from a subject dominated by an accidental symptomatic phenomenology into a person capable of giving unity, understanding, and commands to herself. In this way, Tauber admits that the ego becomes split (into ego and superego), and therefore, the ego needs to pass through an insightful path to reach its unity again, as a higher form of autonomy which can detach itself from the natural instincts. Ego is "invoking reason" (in Tauber's words) but it is not initially constituted as a full autonomous agency.

Tauber quotes Freud to support his view; he mentions that in order to achieve a full degree of autonomy, '[t]he analysand must find the courage to direct his attention to the phenomena of his illness' (2010:206),[194] and also must choose 'himself over his own alienation' (2010:235). When Tauber talks about therapy, he incorporates the ideas of choice and courage. Courage, because if there is an internal ethical struggle or battle in the ego, then the analysand must be brave enough to take responsibility for herself and choice, because the awareness of this struggle and the responsibility for it involve a committed decision to change. For Tauber, if humans are strangers to themselves, then psychoanalysis is dedicated to finding that person within. Even when 'the foundation of the entire enterprise rests on accepting that the unconscious cannot be directly known' (2010:123), 'the unconscious [can] be broken by

[193] Tauber explains, 'the reflexive component of psychoanalytic self-consciousness becomes the means of achieving a revised sense of personal history and identity, as the ego, the pronominal agent-possessor of rationality, becomes increasingly self-aware of options and choices as a result of insight and reconstruction' (2010:195).

[194] The original quote is in Freud *SE* 1914:152.

reason's autonomy' (2010:124). Now, that "breaking" depends on a decision, and the courage to take responsibility for it.

Tauber describes psychoanalytic therapy as 'an ongoing project without firm prescription or dictates' (2010:210), which works on the free narrative that the analysand builds in the meeting with the therapist. Throughout that narrative the analysand shifts perspectives and roles, 'from the analysand as object of inquiry, to the subject who inquires and creates both understanding and identity' (2010:210). The analysand's awareness of the phenomenology of her narrative, symptomatology, and transference makes her discover the logical psychological structures underlying her discourse and behaviour. Therefore, the success of the therapy has to do with the ability 'to discern deterministic causes of overt behaviours and thoughts that hitherto were inaccessible' (2010:124). It is easy to spot a Kantian line of argument in Tauber's description of psychoanalytic therapy. The term "autonomy", understood as a rational capacity to take responsibility for ourselves, involving a rational choice and courage, is something that we can read as Kantian. It does not seem wrong to suggest that this was the final goal that Freud was pursuing.

It is worth noting that on Tauber's account, the ego does not automatically become autonomous when it emerges as consciousness (a regulatory synthesis between the natural instincts), but only after the ego goes through a therapeutical process and deep realisation. This is because it seems that the first free autonomous act is harder to perform, and we are not guaranteed to be able to do it without help or interaction with others. Now, it always seems relevant to Freud that our human psychology passes through stages of development, which are linked to bodily processes and mature gradually from early stages of life to adulthood. That is why I am sceptical specifically of Tauber's idea of "detachment", because it seems that biology plays an important role in the whole Freudian theory, so the detachment is always partial.

As I explained before, I do not understand the Freudian ego as a detached autonomous entity like Tauber does. My reading instead is that for Freud the ego is always connected to natural drives and impulses, as a bound representative, which regulates the energetic exchange by dealing with the two fundamental principles that also determine it. These are: the "principle of reality", which modifies the ego from outside; and the "principle of pleasure", which demands from the ego from inside. However, I do believe the ego can reach a high degree of autonomy at some point of its development by invoking reason, and making use of those higher intellectual capacities, which allow it to redirect the excess of cathexis in a more optimal manner. In a way, Tauber's idea of Kantian autonomy regarding the Freudian therapeutic process does not sound as controversial to me as the idea of a detached autonomous ego does.

- <u>Final words and next steps</u>

I cautiously agree with Longuenesse that there are parallels between the Freudian ego and the Kantian apperception, mainly because I understand the "I" of the "I think" that Longuenesse is proposing as a referent given by reason as a result of a process of apperception executed by an agent. Through apperception the agent can synthetise the contents of the experience by making use of her mental capacities. Clearly the Freudian idea of an ego involves more than the referent itself, the "I" of "I think", because the ego entails the content in the referent, that is, the cathexis of all the natural drives that are stimulating or motivating the subject. However, I believe Longuenesse's proposal does not negate the empirical content of the ego, because her emphasis is on the synthetical process of apperception itself. Contra Longuenesse, as well as the Freud of 1923, I claim that the agency of the superego depicted by Freud cannot be, in any way, considered a moral conscience in a Kantian sense, because the Kantian idea of conscience is pure, free of any empirical influence, even though it must consider the external world in order to be practical. Therefore, as the superego is mostly made of contents from experience, the imperatives that superego enacts for the ego are never imperatives inspired by reason.

I agree with Tauber that the ego can achieve enough autonomy and strength for self-control, and in that way, support the discharge of the drives. Moreover, I totally sympathise with his conclusion that states that through therapy the patient is indeed invoking reason's higher power. Unlike Tauber, I believe that Freud's general portrait gives us no basis to assume that the ego gradually becomes detached from the natural instincts because the ego is always synthetical. Tauber highlights that assumption many times, however, throughout his interesting portrayal of Freud and Kant. I find that the particular emphasis in that idea of detachment is absolutely unnecessary.

If the ego is not detached, as Tauber claims, then Longuenesse's perspective seems more adequate, in that she takes the ego to perform a function similar to the Kantian apperception, i.e., as a mediator. If the superego does not dictate moral imperatives for the ego, as Longuenesse claims, then Tauber's perspective offers us a more suitable alternative, thinking of autonomy as choice and a means for action originating from the ego itself (and not from the superego). In that way, the ego by invoking reason and reaching autonomy, would be able to dictate its own moral imperatives.

So, what is the place of my proposal regarding an *a priori* conscience and a dynamic of guilt that take account of Kantian morality and the superego? In first place I diverge from Longuenesse because I separate the idea of moral conscience from the idea of the superego. I diverge less from Tauber, because I appreciate the relevance of the ego's autonomy, but I pay more attention to the reflective capacity of conscience -- which in my view must count as an innate capacity available for us from the beginning, and not only awakened at a later stage of development-- and how this participates in an inner developmental mechanism that mostly revolves around the dynamic of the feeling of guilt. Tauber does not focus on the dynamic of guilt, but mostly on the capacity of the ego to detach itself from the natural drives.

Next, I turn to the work of Sebastian Gardner for an understanding of how to deal with the natural drivers and with the feeling of guilt in order to reach autonomy. Gardner seems more interested in understanding the dynamic of irrationality of the subject, as a necessary step to then be able to discuss the possibility of autonomy.

CHAPTER VI

FROM IRRATIONALITY TO AUTONOMY

As we saw in previous chapters, Freud's and Kant's theories share some similarities. Thus, we might suppose that their proposals can be aligned. However, we should also take note of important dissonances that hinder this theoretical alignment. Taking into account the points their proposals have in common, I proposed looking for a way to harmonise both theories. So, by accepting their differences, mainly those regarding the idea of a moral conscience I discussed in previous chapters, I suggest that we can still reconcile them by making accommodations; understanding that the accommodations are valuable only if they help build a consistent explanatory model of the dynamic of guilt and our path to adulthood. Hence, the purpose of this chapter is to keep exploring possibilities to make adjustments, in this case by examining the problem of irrationality more closely. Thus, I will first look at Sebastian Gardner´s work on irrationality, and then at Freud's theory of the phases of maturity.

i. Thinking of irrationality

Freud explains in *The Ego and the Id* that the ego is "as a man on a horseback". In Freud's allegory the horse represents the id. For Freud, the ego needs to guide its horse and, at the same time, be careful not to be dragged by it. Freud says, 'the ego is in the habit of transforming the id's will into action as if it were its own' (*SE* XIX:25). However, to achieve this, Freud believes that the ego needs to master the complex mechanics of the forces (the horse in Freud's allegory) that move it. That seems to be the purpose of Freud's analytic therapy. Therefore, following Freud's inquiry about how the will of the horse works, this chapter was designed precisely to delve into those natural forces that motivate the subject. Next, I will introduce Gardner's thoughts about irrationality.

a) Sebastian Gardner on irrationality

At the end of *Psychoanalytic Theory: A Historical Reconstruction* (2018), Gardner expresses his disagreement with Longuenesse (2012, 2019) regarding a possible comparison between the idea of morality in Kant and Freud. He says, 'our difference lies in our respective attitudes to the proposed unification of Kant's "I ought" and Freud's superego. Longuenesse regards this as an unproblematic theoretical unification, which promises to support Kant's ethical theory, by transposing a questionable transcendentalist conception into a secure naturalistic context' (2012:42). Gardner does not develop this objection at length; he only suggests that a comparison between Freud and Kant must be addressed from another angle, not by assimilating their ideas of moral conscience to each other. Gardner (2012) suggests that, in order to clarify the theoretical components that Freud and Kant have in common, it is first necessary to trace the historical philosophical influences on Freud's work.

Gardner affirms that '[Freud] insists, in line with Spinoza, that the real forms of motivational causation are incongruent with the image of action as proceeding from a centre of self-conscious self-determination' (2012:39). That is, for Gardner the Freudian idea of motivational causation in our psyche is not equivalent to the idea of an undetermined absolutely free soul expounded by Kant. However, in his text *Kantian Origins: The Transcendental Unconscious*, Gardner adds that if we think of '"the value of the ego itself as a higher form of psychic organisation" (…), then Naturphilosophie and Idealism are vindicated' (2013:157). That is, it is also possible to affirm that 'at the base of human subjectivity lies a Bildungstrieb' (2013:157). In other words, through the ego, we can reconcile two different philosophical streams, if we accept that a natural formative impulse can move our development toward a coordinated encounter with our rational capacities of organisation. Now, as Gardner notes, to connect in one image a heteronomous ego (motivated by our natural drives) with an autonomous ego (motivated by our rational drives) is not simple. As Gardner notes, that link is not explained clearly throughout Freud's work. Now, that does not mean that we cannot elaborate on this link.

Regarding unconsciousness, consciousness, and the idea of soul, in *The unconscious: transcendental origins, Idealist metaphysics and psychoanalytic metapsychology,* Gardner distinguishes two main readings or possible ways to view the activity behind the ego through a Kantian lens: on the one hand, he distinguishes a reading from Schelling. There, he explains that it is possible to understand the processing of apperception of the soul as force, a force that arises along with its product (2013:145). In other words, the agency of the soul and its phenomenological material representativity would be the same and one. On the other hand, he distinguishes a reading from Novalis. There, he explains that it is also possible to understand that in the processing of apperception, the soul is partially lost from consciousness (2013:142); that is, there are regions of opacity between the ego (as referent and consciousness) and the soul (as empty existence). Therefore, what we can appreciate instead is only a mirror effect. It seems that Gardner sympathises and agrees more with this second reading (Novalis'), which fits better with Freud's appropriation of the term "unconscious", as long as "unconscious" can be understood in its more general sense as that which is not conscious.

The idea of zones of opacity also fits well with Longuenesse's thoughts about the unknown in consciousness, ideas that were explained in chapter V. She warns us in *I, Me, Mine* that 'consciousness is the consciousness of an existence ("the existence is thereby already given") but there is nothing we can cognize about either the act or its existence' (2019:86-87). However, Longuenesse's project attempts to translate Freud's entire naturalistic account into Kantian terminology. Longuenesse pays attention to the similarities between Freud and Kant. On the other hand, for Gardner there is no such unified theory. In his view, it is important to pay attention to the divergences between Freud and Kant, in order to then be able to think about possible connections. As I reviewed Longuenesse's approach in the preceding chapter, here I will pay attention to Gardner's thoughts.

In general terms, we can appreciate that the focus of Kantian theory is on our rationality, whereas the Freudian approach focuses on the id, that is, on our irrationality. This difference is not a minor issue. However, in philosophical terms, the border between rationality and irrationality does not seem to be so easy to pinpoint. Nevertheless, Gardner paradoxically

claims in the introduction of *Irrationality and The Philosophy of Psychoanalysis* that 'we can recognise irrationality even though we are unable to say in any systematic way what rationality itself consists in' (1993:4). Based on that premise, he begins his text by defining the "irrational subject", as 'one who will in some loosely cognitive sense fail the test of self-confrontation: either he will be unable to provide an explanation-cum-justification of himself, or, in the course of attempting to do so, he will betray a failure of self-knowledge' (1993:4). Like Gardner, I believe that, even when taking into account our blind spots, it is indeed possible to differentiate an irrational subject from an autonomous one capable of acting on categorical imperatives, provided that the autonomous subject must be able to pass a test of self-confrontation (consistency), and thanks to our moral feelings, we must be able to recognize without detailed explanation that she has passed it.

Gardner highlights that a person's fundamental project arises in the first place from the fact that 'consciousness which is for-itself, experiences itself as "lack(ing)", as an "insufficiency" of being, relative to in-self, and is compelled to try to rectify this deficiency' (1993:36). This claim seems to harmonise with both Freud and Kant (taking on account some aspects of the Novalis' reading of him). Freud portrays the conflict of the ego well when he exclaims, '[l]ife is not easy! If the ego is obligated to admit its weakness, it breaks out in anxiety' (*SE* XXII: 78). Gardner focuses on the links between this feeling of lacking, as an insufficiency of being, and the involuntary motivation that triggers the mechanisms of the subject. Hence, he firstly works on a description of two different types of irrationality, *akrasia* and self-deception. Primarily, he takes concepts given by ordinary psychology, but then reflects on them using psychoanalytic terminology. I will mention them next because they offer an interesting ground for discussion.

(a.1) Akrasia

According to Gardner, in ordinary psychology (folk or common-sense psychology) the main forms of irrationality would be "self-deception" and "akrasia" (1993:16). Gardner characterises akrasia as: 'failing to do what one's knows it to be best to do' (1993:34). He also explains,

‘[a]krasia consists in failure to apply the principle of continence’ (1993:34), that is, failure to subordinate the natural impulses or urges to what we think it should be done. Therefore, ‘an akrates is weak of will for no reason’ (1993:34), because the akrates knows what must be done, but does not know how to subordinate her natural impulses to her perception of the right thing to do. Thus, akrasia is described by Gardner as a passive form of irrationality, where the individual shows weakness of will, and is easily inclined by emotions or urges.

In my interpretation, it is possible to link this type of irrationality to the psychology of little children presented in chapter IV. There, I explain that, from a Kantian point of view, even when children have the capacity to recognize the standard of the moral law, because they can make use of their reflective judgement, they have not trained their rational will well enough. Therefore, we can assume that their rational will is not strong enough, and we can add to this that they are still not in a position to fully understand their duties with respect to any law, so they frequently act wrongly. Children are in a process of development, so they are still confused about how to act rightly in accordance with the moral standards (the moral law or the standards that prevail at the time). Following this Kantian view, we can think for example of a girl, whose parents have told her to wake up at night when she needs to urinate so as not to wet the bed; however, the girl cannot control herself, and has frequent accidents at night. She dreams that she wakes up and goes to the bathroom and successfully follows her parents' orders, but what she dreams of does not happen in real life. The dream replaces reality but makes her fail her parents. In the example, we can see that the child cannot apply any principle of self-control. Although the girl can adapt to the circumstances (trying to not drink water before going to sleep), her rational will is still not strong enough to offer an active resistance to her impulses when she is sleeping, however, she can recognize and channel those impulses when she is sleeping through dreams (as Freud studied). Thus, she wets the bed frequently at night without being capable of stopping it. Nevertheless, certainly the child has the capacity to learn with the right guidance and passing of time how to reinforce her rational will and restrain those impulses.

(a.2) Self-deception

Then, Gardner contrasts *akrasia* with self-deception. He explains the term self-deception as "an active form of irrationality, where the individual suffers 'a failure of self-knowledge because her motivation interferes with her beliefs' (1993:16)[195]. In general terms, Gardner explains self-deception as 'an ability to form true belief, combined with an attitude of truth-violation, (…) [which] means nothing less than that a subject is self-deceived when he believes one thing in order not to believe another' (1993:19). Therefore, self-deception corresponds to another process in the development of the individual, where she experiences her own irrationality actively (by elaborating a belief) rather than passively (as she would if she could not control herself).

From a psychoanalytical perspective, Gardner explains that what is special about strong self-deception is that this form 'invites the strategy of positing a division in the mind of the irrational person' (1993:31). He states, '[w]hat is singular about the presence of contradictory belief in self-deception is that both beliefs show themselves in the very same piece of behaviour, in contrast with cases in which behaviour is fragmented in such a way that contradictory beliefs are only alternately or dispersedly manifest' (1993:24). Thus, the belief 'that is buried will persist, contradicting the promoted belief, rather than destroying it' (1993:23). In my interpretation, Gardner's idea of a buried belief in tension with a promoted belief, and his idea of lack as insufficiency of being, share similarities with my reading of Freud's primal father in *Totem and Taboo,* presented in chapter IV. This is similar to the process of resurrecting the father as an inner conscience.

Gardner's analysis is useful in framing my reading: in *Totem and Taboo* the resurrection of the father is self-deceptive, because once the father is dead (the buried belief), what is resurrected (the promoted belief) is not the father himself, but only a sense of identification with him, an identification motivated by many feelings (love, hate, benevolence, remorse, fear,

[195] Gardner affirms, '[t]his difference –the "purposelessness" of akrasia, the fact that the akrates is weak of will for no reason – means that something it must take the place of self-deceptive intent. This is not hard to find. Self-deception is a distinctively active form of irrationality, and akrasia a passive form' (1993:34).

anxiety, and so on). Thus, the murder of the father is, on the one hand, a passive act, in that the children did not restrain their hatred for the father, could not hold back, and consequently allowed themselves to kill their father, perhaps as an akratic reaction. However, in the act of resurrecting him, the children are not merely passive subjects motivated by feelings, but active individuals who affirm a new belief over another. They are active in their efforts to convince themselves that they did not kill their father, that is, that the father is still alive (knowing that they indeed killed the father, and that he is dead) but in a new form. Therefore, what I am arguing here is that the introjection of the father depicted by Freud corresponds to a first act of self-deception in our developmental process. My interpretation is that, as after the killing of the father the children embraced the belief that they could save the father by internalising him. By losing their guardian, they automatically became responsible for their acts. However, since they still were not mature enough to take on that responsibility, they only could embrace a deceptive belief in order to deal with the situation.

Because Freud describes the killing of the father as the axis point that gives birth to our civilization, his account implies that our civilization is based on a self-deceptive act.[196] However, this self-deceptive act, Gardner claims, is not a voluntary evil act. [197] A voluntary act, from a Kantian point of view, demands a free choice, that is, demands maturity; however, our civilization, according to Freud, is born as a consequence of an act of immaturity, i.e., as the result of the killing of the tyrant father and then introjecting him. Self-deception is seen by Gardner as a propositional attitude with an intention (the mechanical intention of covering an insufficiency of being). As with *akrasia*, '[an] inferior intention is adopted as the ground for action' (1993:35). Therefore, in self-deception the incorporation of an intention makes the act a conscious and intentional act, but not necessarily a (positive) free voluntary act (in Kantian

[196] See Freud's *Totem and Taboo.*

[197] Gardner explains that '[s]elf-deception is certainly not, as we would ordinarily put it, a voluntary matter, in the sense of issuing directly from reflective acts of choice. Reflective voluntariness is however a distinct property from being intentional, and only the latter is required for self-deception to qualify as a doing' (1993:25). Gardner also explains, 'involuntariness manifests an underlaying constitution, which forms the background to propositional attitudes, (…) but involuntariness enters into its aetiology at the point where the inferior intention is adopted as the ground for action' (1993:35).

terms). This is relevant to be able to differentiate a young adult (who is still a child) acting wrongly from a proper adult performing evil acts.

(a.3) The third-person perspective

On the one hand, we know from Kant that '[t]he evil person is someone who wilfully does what in some sense she knows to be bad' (Morgan 2005:85). On the other hand, we also know from Kant that we need to reach a certain degree of maturity to be able to experience ourselves as rational beings capable of managing our drives and acting well. But how and when do we become mature people capable of resembling a mature civilization? In order to think about how we reach maturity or full autonomy in Kantian terms but from a Freudian perspective, Gardner encourages us to think of the relevance of "the third person perspective".[198] When he talks about a third person perspective, he is also suggesting the incorporation of an Other as support for our process of maturation. This implies, in my understanding, the incorporation of another person capable of encouraging us to take a different perspective, which can facilitate (in Novalis's terms) the incorporation of the many mirror images or representatives of the own soul. That is, in Freudian terms, to facilitate the incorporation of the many projected and/or introjected identifications of the ego, within a unifying transcendental image (also through the ego) of the whole being (the soul itself).

In my interpretation of Gardner, this "third person perspective" can help us to give up in advance on making the soul an inner object totally apprehensible for reason, as the Cartesian approach tried to achieve.[199] In other words, this third person perspective can help us accept the limitations of our knowledge of our own souls, to accept we are unable to fully apprehend

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[198] Gardner explains, '[t]he way that psychoanalytic states may appear in consciousness may be called "quasi-manifestation" (1993:219). 'The quasi-manifestation of psychoanalytic states requires the subject to have the concept of the relevant kind of psychoanalytic state, and this concept is not basically observational, but initially acquired in the course of learning how to explain irrational phenomena, through adopting a third-personal perspective on oneself' (1993:219). Gardner quotes Sartre and states, 'I can know myself only through the mediation of the other' (1993:280).

[199] Gardner states, 'so long as we are not Cartesian, we can not claim to know a priori what can not be got at through extended introspection' (1993:219).

our own being. So, building on Gardner's thoughts, in order to grasp a more complete picture of what we really are, we need: firstly, the intervention of an Other to encourage us to make use of our third-person perspective; and secondly, by making use of this perspective, to learn how to bear what this perspective is showing us without ignoring or resisting it. In other words, we need to recognize our limitations as much as the fact that we rely on illusions. This means that we need to accept our lack, and the existence of illusions in our self-perception. The illusions include: (1) intentional misrepresentations, like a self-deceptive image, and (2) necessary illusions, illusions framed in transcendental terms, as a necessary integral image of ourselves as human beings.[200] That is why, in light of Kant's ideas, I believe that in order to discern the highest image of ourselves, we need a transcendental illusion as the most encompassing and integral referent to stand for our humanity.

The "third person perspective" Gardner mentions, means that, in order to look at our dynamics of self-deception and akrasia, we need an Other who can help us to turn our gaze on ourselves. In other words, the only way to gain control over our inner mechanisms (the wild horse in Freud's allegory) is by viewing ourselves from a wider, encompassing perspective, and for that, the Other plays an important role. The challenges are: on the one hand, to overcome our ignorance through gaining understanding (learning), as the child who does not know any better, and on the other hand, to be capable of avoiding self-deception, as the young adult who does not want to face a truth because she is confronting a lacking of being.

Gardner disagrees with Longuenesse (2012,2019) about the relevance of the superego as the agency capable of encouraging the ego to gain a wider perspective. We must remember that for Freud and Longuenesse the superego functions as a moral conscience; therefore, the superego watches over the ego. In my belief, and considering Gardner's view, the reason for doubting the superego can help broaden the ego's perspective is that, although the superego in principle involves a third person (the resuscitated father in *Totem and Taboo*), this third

[200] Gardner explains, 'psychoanalysis is concerned with selfhood as integration, which Klein describes as the goal of analysis. But the degree of integration which psychoanalysis aims to secure is not complete: psychoanalysis is concerned with the radical failures of integration which cause psychoanalytic irrational phenomena' (1993:203).

person is not the same as a third-person perspective. The superego has to do with a process of identification, that is, of reproducing a first-person perspective (but in a deceptive way). As we saw in previous chapters, the ego becomes divided by internalising the superego. There is a division in the agent because the ego creates a separation, a superego (an inner father, conscience, or God) that is different from itself.

That is why Gardner describes a different way of attaining a wider perspective to reach understanding, unity, or self-integration through the ego than Longuenesse does. Gardner (1993) points to a third-person perspective which is acquired thanks to the intervention of an Other, an Other capable of helping the subject use her own capacity to observe herself from a broader perspective. This Other can be a therapist, a good friend, a consultant, a master, and so on. This Other, the helper, is not internal to the subject, but external. Gardner aligns himself with Freud when he asserts that the aim of psychoanalysis is 'to strengthen the ego, to make it more independent of the superego, to widen its field of perception and enlarge its organisation' (*SE* XXII:80). Next, I will focus on this transition from irrationality to rationality, and the role that this "third-person perspective" plays for the subject.

b) The inner split

Freud identifies phases in the physical and mental maturation of individuals. Most importantly, perhaps, he identifies psychological dynamics that make us regress from mature to immature mental stages. He considers that a person is immature during their first 14 or 18 years of life.

Freud teaches us that the parents are the first external authorities who help their children fix boundaries for self-containment; the parents primarily provide a ground for them, teaching them the standards that prevail to keep them safe from any external danger and help them become fully-fledged members of the community. The parents also represent an exemplar, a

model. However, the general picture of the fundamental learning process through which children mature into adults becomes more intricate with the emergence of the mechanism of self-deception, and when the family moral standards that prevail are enormously distanced from the standards of the moral law. Once the ego has successfully introjected the father or authority figure – this happens, according to Freud, between the end of childhood and the beginning of adolescence -- the ego starts experiencing a complex moral struggle, which increases little by little. The struggle places the subject, the adolescent, in the frontier with adulthood. Now, it is precisely this adolescent subject who we began analysing in Chapter IV, where we discussed Freud's myth in *Totem and Taboo.*

Once we find ourselves immersed in feelings of lack, insufficiency, or inadequacy, as the children who kill their father in *Totem and Taboo* do, it seems natural to deploy a range of strategies to actively deal with all the uncomfortable emotions motivated by our failures. However, the main question has to do with why we are inclined to self-deception instead of accepting "what is". In other words, why do we cultivate the false belief that we are mastering a situation instead of accepting that we cannot master it? Why can we not accept the facts as they are, instead of lying to ourselves and others? For Freud, as I discussed in chapter IV, the main answer to this has to do with a reaction to the feelings of love and fear. We know it is not easy to confront the truth when it reveals our failures or lacking, because in most of the cases "lacking" reveals that we do not have control over a situation, and that fact triggers fear and many other related emotions. We know that self-deception seems (at first glance) to be the easiest way of dealing with the feelings of insufficiency, failure, and fear, but Freud warns us that self-deception has a cost, and this is the splitting of the mind, the splitting of the ego.

Freud's theory makes it difficult to draw the line between rational and irrational behaviour, but it seems that the split ego shows something relevant regarding our irrationality. Even though it is difficult to discharge the inner cathexis, Freud indeed recognizes different ways of doing so, and helps us identify the meaning of some sporadic moments of attention and consciousness regarding our actions and decisions, such as the conscious reflection that "I could not control myself and I failed" (like the child who wakes up in the morning after wetting

the bed), or "I acted wrongly and now I am lying to myself" (as a teenager might think to herself after shouting at her parents, I hate you and I do not need you at all!), or "I am accepting this truth about myself" (a possible mature thought). Thoughts like that can be understood as stages of realisation[201], and they can move us in many directions. Gardner explains that a '[r]ealization characteristically involves bringing together two matters in such a way as to yield the kind of combination which is exemplified when one thing is visually seen as another: typically, it is realized that one thing is also something else (that two descriptions apply at once to the same object)' (1993:26)[202]. The Freudian account does not make it sufficiently clear, on the one hand, how we can become mature enough to endure a moment of realisation capable of freeing us from our self-deceptive mechanisms or, on the other hand, how we can handle our mental split (ego-superego) in order to attain proper self-control.

However, we can guess that the only way for holding for a period of time that transformative effect of integration offered by a realisation, which is only triggered when we avoid self-deception and we surrender to the agreement of "what is", is by training ourselves in the art of self-control and/or resilience. However, it seems that this is not easy to accomplish. It is clear that for Freud, Thanatos, the superego, all the cauldron of chaos, and all the challenging situations in our lives, such as our failures, or especially our failures, play an important role and catalyse the development or unfolding of our human mental capacities. As Freud depicts in *Why War?,* failures can be seen as necessary challenges on our path toward civilization (for us, maturity).

Somehow the inner wild horses in Freud's allegory make us feel we need to develop our humanity to become proper riders for them. That is why in the beginning Freud, as Longuenesse and I read him, doggedly tried to find connections between the superego and Kant's categorical imperative. Somehow the superego represents a smart but chaotic

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[201] According to Gardner, a realisation 'belongs in the class of such mental events as change of mind, surprise and deciding'(1993:26). That is why, a 'realization carries implications for action'(1993:26), and 'is pivotal for self-deception'(1993:26).

[202] Gardner warns us that 'self-deceivers are often said to prevent themselves from realising things' (1993:26).

organisation of a big problem, the accumulated, repressed cathexis. The superego is presented by Freud as the wildest horse to tame, but also the superego allows us to unfold our highest self. Such a difficult challenge requires us to marshal our greatest mental capacity to avoid losing ourselves in heteronomy. Thus, Freud invites us to recognize the relevance of the superego in our journey toward maturity.

In that sense, Gardner rightly points out 'that irrationality is so deeply bound up with what it is to be a person that irrationality is a necessary, legitimate way of pursuing one's destiny as a human being' (1993:39). Nevertheless, this reflection still leaves us with the question: when does a person become mature and responsible for her acts? Next, I will look more closely at Freud's model of the phases of psycho-sexual maturity, in order to then figure out how we can start answering this important question.

ii. A description of the Freudian phases of psycho-sexual maturity

Basically, Freud thinks of the progression from childhood to adulthood as something directly related to the development of sexuality.[203] However, for Freud, human sexuality is governed not only by a biological drive to reproduce, but also by a search for satisfaction (which also involves pain). For Freud, this search for satisfaction first becomes possible through a psychological reconfiguration of our representations of "objects of desires" and "aims." Freud defines "object of desire" as 'the person from whom sexual attraction proceeds' (*SE* VII: 136), and "sexual aim", as 'the act towards which the instinct tends the sexual aim' *(SE* VII:136). According to Freud, the objects and the aims can deviate; that is, objects can change from representing a man to representing a woman (and vice versa), or even a fetish. Sexual aims can also vary, and not necessarily be related to the act of coitus itself. For example, a sexual aim

[203] There are two important works by Freud on this subject: the *Three Essays on theory of Sexuality* (1905) and *The Infantile Genital Organization* (1923. However, according to the editor of *The Standard Edition*, since the 1905 essays there was a 'succession of editions over a period of twenty years' (VII: 126). In the 1905 essays Freud mostly works ordering his discoveries regarding infantile sexuality and mental illness in adults, and in his work of 1923 he mostly introduces his new discovery, which he calls "the primacy of the phallus", which becomes very relevant to understanding what a mature sexual organization means.

can be focused only on the production of excitation in different parts of the body (other than genitals), or on the visual contemplation of a body or a fetish, or on the touching of different part of a body, or even on the production of pain (sadistic erotization). All those deviations or variations (which Freud also labels perversions), can, but do not need to evolve into pathologies[204].

a) The phases

Freud distinguishes three main phases in the psychological development that human beings experience by establishing and reconfiguring sexual aims, focusing on particular sexual objects, beginning in early childhood. In this next section, I present a general description of Freud's three phases of development of infantile sexuality (or organization of sexual life). Some psychoanalysts writing after Freud believed this account should be modified, but I will not discuss their proposals in this dissertation, I will keep my focus only on Freud's ideas.

(1) The oral phase: Freud took thumb-sucking as one of the main examples to explain this phase. According to him, thumb-sucking appears in early infancy and sometimes persists for a lifetime. It would be through this praxis that children transition to masturbation (*SE* VII:179). The main takeaway from that observation is the link that Freud found between thumb-sucking and nourishment. Freud says, 'no one who has seen a baby sinking back satiated from the breast and falling sleep with flushed cheeks and a blissful smile can escape the reflection that this picture persists as a prototype of the expression of sexual satisfaction in later life' (*SE* VII: 182). On this view, the thumb-sucking would be replacing breastfeeding by repeating the sense of satisfaction.

[204] Freud explains, for example, that a fetish can become pathological if it 'passes beyond the point of being merely a necessary condition attached to the sexual object and actually takes the place of the normal aim, and further, when the fetish becomes detached from a particular individual and becomes the sole sexual object' (*SE* VII: 154).

Freud adds that children choose the praxis of thumb-sucking when they realise that they are not capable of controlling the external world anymore[205]. The child suddenly feels separated from the mother to whom he felt united. Thumb-sucking provides the child with a momentary replacement, 'he provides himself, as it were, with a second erotogenic zone, though one of an inferior kind' (*SE* VII:182). We can think of this as a first step in the long path from relative to absolute autonomy because when the child replaces the breast with the thumb, she gains control and a way to obtain pleasure independently of the mother. The child can now give herself pleasure. However, Freud interprets this process as a confusion of the sexual aim (mother-food confusion), which is in principle to assimilate or incorporate the object of love (see *SE* VII:198). Also, the child can confuse the enjoyment of the object with its destruction because everything is united in the act of eating. That is why this phase is also called the "cannibalistic phase".

(2) The anal phase: This is related to the sexual life of the preschool child as he attempts to control his bladder and bowel movements, a passive and active motion of the muscles (expulsion and retention) that produces great excitement mostly in the anal zone. In Freud's interpretation, "[the contents of the bowels] are clearly treated as a part of the infant's own body and represent his first 'gift': by producing them he can express his active compliance with his environment and, by withholding them, his disobedience" (*SE* VII:186). What is interesting in this phase, is that the children discover that they are capable of producing an external object of which to be proud (the faeces), an external object they create themselves, and thus feel can be offered as a "gift". Perhaps we can think of the consummation of this phase as another step towards autonomy. Here, the children acknowledge themselves as the producers of a gift, and not only as the recipients. They thus gain some independence and control but are obviously not yet fully autonomous beings.

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[205] Freud's interpretation of the praxis of thumb-sucking in babies is interesting but we know it cannot remain nowadays as it is; inevitably, it needs revisions and re-interpretations because now the new modern technologies (scanners) can inform us that foetuses do this before, from the uterus of the mother. See for example Reissland, Francis, Aydin, Mason, and Schaalin's article in *Developmental psychobiology, Vol. 56 (5),* 'The development of anticipation in the fetus: a longitudinal account of human fetal mouth movements in reaction to and anticipation of touch' (2014: 955-963).

According to Freud, practising good hygiene allows children to get more pleasure from urinating and defecating (as masturbatory practices). That is why, both in the anal and oral phases, what acquires special relevance is the exploration of new sensations through the stimulation of the erotogenic zones[206], sensations that are still not unified by a single aim, but that are indeed related to an object of love. Thus, the sensations associated with the erotogenic zones can be related to: (1) the assimilation of an object of love, or cannibalism, as Freud describes in the oral phase; or (2) to the production and mastery of the object of love, or sado-masochism, as Freud describes in the anal phase.[207]

(3) The phallic phase: Freud explains in *The Infantile Genital Organization* (1923) that in the previous phases the child has no concept of male and female but can only recognize the differentiations or antitheses: subject-object from the oral phase and being passive or active from the anal phase. However, in this third, phallic phase we have that 'maleness exists, but no femaleness' (*SE* XIX:145). So, what Freud attempts to explain is that in this phase only the male sexual organ matters, only the possession of a penis matters to the child (even when that child can indeed recognize the difference between the sexes, female-male). That is, if the penis is not present or visible (as in the case of the girls), then the girl's first assumption is that the reason for that is that there was a castration, or that the penis still needs time to grow, or that perhaps the clitoris is a small penis. So, the new differentiation or antithesis that emerges in this phase is between 'having a male genital or being castrated' (*SE* XIX:145). That is why Freud clarifies that this phase is not about 'a primacy of the genitals, but a primacy of the phallus' (*SE* XIX:142), because the child's attention is no longer focused on the stimulation of its erotogenic

[206] Freud explains that the child has a polymorphous perverse disposition, that is, '[the child] can be led into all possible kinds of sexual irregularities. There is consequently little resistance towards carrying them out, since the mental dams against sexual excesses – shame, disgust and morality – have either not yet been constructed at all or are only in course of construction' (*SE* VII:191). Freud also distinguishes different phases of the development of masturbation, which are related to the phases of development of the sexual organization. Regarding this see *SE* VII:185-193.

[207] Laplanche and Pontalis summarize, 'The anal-sadistic stage sees the strengthening of sado-masochism in correlation with the development of muscular control' (1988: 35).

zones as it was before (as it was when she was fed by the mother or produced a gift), but on the possession of a penis.

The primacy of the phallus links the phallic phase to the narrative of the primal father in *Totem and Taboo*, and with the "Oedipus complex", because this phase ushers in the antagonism between the child and the father (or authority). Firstly, the primacy of the phallus is understood as the moment when the boy feels the existence of a powerful object of pride (the penis) in himself, but this moment installs a permanent fear in him, the fear of castration, the fear of the possibility of losing this precious object that is adhered to his body. This happens when the boy realises, based on his observations, that not all children possess a penis: some children (the girls) lack one. For the girls this situation is obviously different; for them the issue of the penis raises many questions, for instance, will they grow a phallus at some point? Is it possible that I do not have a penis?.[208] For girls it is difficult to accept that they do not possess a phallus, when clearly other children (the boys) do (this realisation is called "the envy of the penis").[209] Having the phallus becomes so important to children during this phase, that Freud curiously also concludes that neither boys nor girls would easily accept the fact that their mother does not have a penis. Since they admire their mothers, they cannot accept that lack in them. Mothers must possess a phallus. So, children elaborate complicated theories to justify the mother's lacking a penis, even speculating that the mother exchanged her penis for babies. That assumption allows the mother to remain an important object of love for the child because of course, as she is important, she must have a penis somehow.

b) Oedipus complex

According to Freud, the "Oedipus Complex" which represents the child's longing for his/her mother, makes itself felt at every stage of childhood. However, it is in the third phase that it

[208] Freud clarifies that children at the age of 3 and 5 also pass through a stage of sexual research, being moved by an instinct of knowledge, see *SE* VII: 194.

[209] See Laplanche and Pontalis 1985:302.

finally becomes possible to appreciate the whole dramatic picture of the Oedipus complex, because at that stage that the idea of an antagonist appears. That is, the idea of an intimidating father, which Freud takes to be an updated form of the narrative of the primal father from *Totem and Taboo*. Thus, the fear of castration is in principle linked to the father, because the father becomes the actual powerful rival who can threaten the bond of love between the children and their mother. It is a fear of castration because, according to the mind of the children, the father has the power to punish them for their love at any moment, and that punishment can only be cutting off the penis, making the children lack the most important thing that a being can possess.

Now, Freud articulates the Oedipus complex in many directions. In principle, the bond of love is between the boy and his mother, in that case the father represents a threat. However, Freud claims there can also be an ambivalent bond of love between the boy and his father (homosexual love[210]). If the love for the father is a conscious feeling, then the mother represents the threat by coming between them, or on the contrary, she can become diminished due to the discovery that she lacks a penis and thus would not be worthy of the child's love. Freud is less confident in his analysis of the girl's case, but it follows a similar pattern: the girl loves her mother (homosexual love), but then shifts her love to her father, as a way of compensating for her lack of a penis. When the girl begins to desire her father, her mother becomes her rival[211]. Now, the Oedipus complex persists only until this succumbs to repression, that is, when the external threat becomes more and more real, and the incest taboo, fully operational. Next, the child enters a period of latency, where there is no object of love[212].

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[210] In a later work (1927) Freud summarises, 'In this function [of protection and love] the mother is soon replaced by the stronger father, who retains that position for the rest of childhood. But the child's attitude to the father is colored by a peculiar ambivalence. The father himself constitutes a danger for the child, perhaps because of its earlier relation to its mother. Thus it fears him no less than it longs for him and admires him' (*SE* XXI:24).

[211] "The primacy of the penis" goes together with "the envy of the penis", and also with "the masculine protest". The envy of the penis corresponds to the 'positive striving [of the female] to possess a male genital' (SE XXIII:250). The masculine protest on the other hand, corresponds to the struggle of the man against his passive or feminine attitude to another male' (*SE* XXIII:250).

[212] Commenting on this phase, Freud states in his *Three Essays on Sexuality*, 'by the postponing of the sexual maturation, time has been gained in which the child can erect, among other restraints on sexuality, the barrier

Freud explains that it is not possible to determine why latency begins, but he observes that it always does so approximately between the ages of 8 and 12. After this period without an object of desire (latency), the child moves into puberty or adolescence. Puberty coincides with the maturation of the sexual organs and represents the passage to adulthood. Adulthood for Freud consists in giving up the Oedipus complex and taking an object of love other than one's parents. However, Freud insists that puberty as the transition to adulthood is different from the phallic phase, because here, not only do the physiological differences between men and women become clear, but the primacy of the phallus is no longer operative. In his 1923 text, Freud explains that vaginas also come to play an important role at this point: 'femaleness takes over [the roles of] object and passivity. The vagina is now valued as a place of shelter for the penis; it enters into the heritage of the womb' (*SE* XXIII:145). Therefore, in this new phase the individual must choose a position (masculine or feminine) with respect to the object of desire.[213]

iii. Adulthood and regression

Freud also warns us that after childhood, '[c]onscience and morality have arisen through the overcoming, the sexualization of the Oedipus complex; but through moral masochism morality becomes sexualized once more, the Oedipus complex is revived, and the way is opened for a regression from morality to the Oedipus complex' (*SE* XXIII:169). Next, I will talk about masochism.

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against incest, and can thus take up into himself the moral precepts which expressly exclude from his object-choice, as being blood relations, the persons whom he has loved in his childhood' (*SE* VII:225). He explains this at greater length in *Totem and Taboo* (1913).

[213] According to Freud, latency is directly related to the dissolution of Oedipus complex, he says, 'Oedipus complex would go to its destruction from its lack of success, from the effects of its internal impossibility' (*SE* XXIII:173). He also expresses that Oedipus complex 'is nevertheless a phenomenon which is determined and laid down by heredity and which is bound to pass away accordingly to program when the next pre-ordained phase of development sets in' (*SE* XXIII:174).

a) Freud's ideas on masochism

A famous example that Freud used to explain the masochist's behaviour and its "compulsion of repetition" was a game called *fort da.*[214] Through this example Freud described the actions of a child (his grandson) who played throwing objects and waiting for his mother to recover them for him. However, Freud observes that at some point the child starts playing the game without the help of his mother. He does it by throwing away a wooden reel exclaiming "o-o-o-o", what Freud interprets as *fort* ("gone"), and immediately after that, pulling it back in by using a string, and expressing a joyful "ahh", which Freud interprets as *da* ("there"). The game, as Freud notes, is a game of "disappearance and return." Freud takes it to be a type of training for control and mastery based on having to constantly confront the disappearance and reappearance of the mother, and the feelings associated with this. Freud interprets this child's game as a great cultural achievement of mastering his instincts, 'in allowing his mother to go away without protesting' (*SE* XVIII:15). We could consider this another achievement in our development toward autonomy; however, what the game also represented, according to Freud, was a human compulsion to revive traumas, since the game repeatedly reminded the boy of the painful experience. So, Freud explains that the game represents an achievement, a mastery, but by means of regression. This compulsion for repetition would only find an answer in the existence of a drive capable of moving human beings backward, that is, towards loss and suffering, which are relived again and again.

As we saw in previous chapters, in his mature works Freud makes subtle changes to his account of the origin of the death drive (here, moral masochism). At first, Freud thought of the death drive as a natural law in opposition to life drive, but then he reconceived of it as a consequence of an excess of accumulated or repressed cathexis, and the constant frustration that cathexis provokes, as I explained in chapter IV. This amendment to his picture of the death drive also changed his view of the repetition compulsion, or compulsion of suffering. Thus, some of the wishes motivated by the life drive that guided the individual toward satisfaction

[214] See *SE* XVII: 14-15.

and pleasure are then transformed into repressed cathexis and frustration, which is fed every time the child must confront the boundaries the adult world imposes on him. The cathexis that originally followed the dictates of the life drive is then transformed into an aggressive power, capable of pulling the individual back again and again towards the past, to relive what she experienced during earlier stages of her development.

Freud's account implies that the individual can only become mature by getting over his parents and moving on by choosing a new object of love. However, we can conclude that, because of masochism, the individual feels forced to regress toward traumatic episodes from his childhood rather than moving forward. In other words, the individual gets trapped in immaturity. Freud warns us that this backward movement can easily become pathological when the individual regresses too far to the Oedipal stage. That is, when the person unconsciously decides not to take a position (masculine or feminine) with respect to a new object of love, but, on the contrary, decides to persist in his or her love for one or both parents by ignoring the boundaries s/he was warned or learned about in the previous phases of childhood (such as the incest taboo), or unconsciously regresses to the moment of fear of castration and is stuck in the trauma that experience caused.

It is important to note that Freud continues developing different theories over time that complement each other as different parts of an assemblage. Those theories canvas his thoughts about the phases of sexual development in childhood, the Oedipus complex, his analyses of pathologies (neurosis, perversion, psychosis, etc.), his topographic model of the dynamic unconscious-conscious, his thoughts about the languages of the unconscious, the "ego, superego, and id" model, and his proposal about the mechanisms of resistance and projection, amongst other ideas. Thus, to isolate a conception of "maturity" or "adulthood" in Freud, we need to combine many of the conceptual elements of all those theoretical constructs. Firstly, we must keep in mind that for Freud, childhood is a crucial moment in the life of a human being. Throughout childhood, the individual (who is settled in his familiar environment) develops knowledge fundamental for life step by step. The child creates a crucial setup for all her emotional responses and need for control. Childhood happens when the

knowledge that prepares the individual for all the tasks and relationships (subject-object of love, and all the pleasurable and unpleasurable sensations attending that phenomenon) that will come in the future is acquired.

b) Toward adulthood

Before becoming an adult, the child has to confront external authorities, to confront family and social boundaries (taboo of incest), and give up some of his wishes (between the phallic phase and latency). Thus, adulthood for Freud will mean, on the one hand, managing, mastering (the capacity to ride the horse, in Freud's allegory) or accepting the death drive (under the agency of the superego) that is constantly motivating us, and on the other hand, abandoning the objects of past love (the parents), and replacing them with newer ones (people from other family systems). We can see that this seems to be the main picture at the moment. Hence, Freud concentrates on the role reliving the past plays in our maturation. That is, even if someone learns from the past, part of the learning process is inevitably traumatic and/or addictive. Therefore, in order to move forward, we first need to look back and resolve those issues.

Freud explains, 'those portions of the earlier organization always persist alongside of the more recent one' (*SE* XXIII: 229). So even when the individual establishes more mature structures (physical, psychological, and moral) of support, she cannot free herself from the past (childhood) unless she can find a way to reconfigure, control or discharge most of the cathexis left by the traumas, desires, or rejections from earlier stages. Freud explains, 'even in normal development the transformation is never complete and residues of earlier libidinal fixations may still be retained in the final configuration' (*SE* XXIII:229). Therefore, we can then assume that in general terms for Freud, "adulthood" is left pending. Nevertheless, Freud suggests that therapy can help the individual reconfigure her past (fictitious or real) in order to improve his or her mental health. Gardner's argument for the relevance of the third-person perspective is applicable here.

Thus, in order to grasp what adulthood is for Freud, we need to consider the idea of therapy. No one is inevitably bad or evil in his view; most evildoers are immature individuals who are trapped by their family dynamics. Thus, the only way to achieve an understanding of ourselves and leave the past behind is to move on through an analytic process of recognition, rearrangement, and control of the repressed cathexis, and that is what therapy consists in. Now, the therapeutical process can only be encouraged by means of the help of an Other, as Gardner points out. Freud believes it is impossible to determine with certainty whether a therapy has succeeded or not, because this comes down to "a practical matter" (*SE* XXIII:249).

Freud ends by declaring that the aim of psychoanalysis 'will not be to rub off every peculiarity of human character for the sake of a schematic "normality", nor yet to demand that the person who has been "thoroughly analysed" shall feel no passions and develop no internal conflict. The business of the analysis is to secure the best possible psychological conditions for the functions of the ego; with that it has discharged its task' (*SE* XXIII:250). Thus, we can assume that when Freuds talks about "the best possible conditions for the functions of the ego", we are getting closer to the idea of adulthood, but this still sounds obscure.

The phases of maturation that Freud describes do not occur in a linear sequence, because the ego can evolve and then regress, remaining stuck in early stages of childhood. Also, the ego can suddenly advance into higher forms of maturity, and then regress again to early stages. So, what finally differentiates an adult from a child in Freud's work is only the moment of fixation of psychic structures of personality (Oedipus complex), like an axis point from whence the individual can move forward or back.[215]

[215] In *The Language of Psychoanalysis* Laplanche and Pontalis summarise, '[t]he Oedipus complex plays a fundamental part in the structuring of the personality, and in the orientation of human desire. Psycho-analysis makes it the major axis of reference for psychopathology, and attempts to identify the particular modes of its presentation and resolution' (1985:283). As we saw in chapter IV, the Oedipus complex is also a sophisticated way to explain the emotional and ambivalent attachments of the child, which were also explained through the phylogenetical narrative of the primal father and other classical myths that involve parricide.

Now, is Freudian adulthood the same as Kantian adulthood? My view is that it is not. Freud depicts different stages of biological and psychological phases of development in individuals, but the final stage (adulthood) is only an inconclusive phase. It is a "becoming", captured only in degrees. Kant on the other hand claims that humanity is freely self-determined and can redefine its axioms to act and even enact new ones, under universal and necessary maxims. Adulthood for Kant is the enlightenment of our life, which must be developed, and we are born with the capacity to unfold it. Thus, there is a gap in both theories, and as I proposed in chapter IV, we need a bridge.

- Final words and next steps

Freud makes a very important observation about regression when he explains the phases of maturation: regression is a response to unfinished businesses. There is an increased amount of Thanatos needing attention and relief. For Freud, the solution for the problem of regression rests on therapy, or in Gardner's view, on the acquisition of a "third person perspective".

Freud claims that psychological structures start developing from the moment the child is born, when the ego appears for the first time, and continue to develop until adolescence. Once the psychological structures are configured and fixed in us, it seems that they endure for a lifetime. That conclusion, however, was never clearly stated by Freud. However, the goal Freud envisages for therapy seems not to try to change the patient's psychological structures, but to help him recognise and master them. In other words, a therapist should encourage the patient to choose to become the rider of her own horse.

As Gardner rightly points out, there is 'a striking parallelism between the propositional schism brought about in self-deception, and the phantastic manoeuvre that Freud describes as the splitting of the ego' (1993:197). Therefore, the fixation of the psychological structures

must be the result of a process of cause and effect motivated by our irrationality. However, Freud claims those structures need a master to control their functioning, otherwise, they inevitably move us to a self-destructive pathology. Following Kant, I believe it is important here to make a distinction between the irrationality of immaturity, and the evil of a free choice motivated by self-love. In terms of Freud's allegory of the horse, the difference is that in the first case, the rider does not have control of the horse, but is in the process of developing that mastery; now, in the second case, the rider has control over the horse, so her actions with the horse are not only intentional but freely chosen. Although psychoanalytic observation of patients does not provide us with the resources to draw the distinction between irrationality (as immaturity) and evil (as a free mature choice), in transcendental terms that distinction must exist. For otherwise, we will never be in a position to attribute responsibility among ourselves, or to lay down the rules necessary to guide us and our society. In other words, it has to be a difference between a young adult who makes moral mistakes, and an adult who decides to be evil by making use of her free choice.

In the next chapter I will explore further intersections between Kantian theory and psychoanalysis. I will examine the positive side of psychoanalysis, that is, how the natural drives can also collaborate to move us toward our highest self and nourish life.

CHAPTER VII

EROS AND PSYCHE, AND THE PATH TOWARD MATURITY

In the previous chapter I mentioned that Freud identified the problem of regression, or masochistic repetition, which I linked to the problem of self-deception. Now I wish to talk about the feeling of love, and our maturation into adulthood. Thus, this chapter has two purposes: (1) to illustrate the main theoretical concepts that have been used throughout this dissertation by means of a creative correlation (inspired by Freud's work), which involves the mythical Greek goddesses, the three Moerae; and (2) to offer some final thoughts regarding the love desire by means of an interpretative reading of *Eros and Psyche*. These final clarifications intend to offer the necessary basis to be able to conclude this project, and answer the question raised in the introduction: how can we return to goodness once we have failed ourselves?

What do the three Moerae have to do with Kant and Freud? I will clarify this. Freud, the humanist, used to explain his theories by means of myths, such as the Oedipus myth. Moreover, Freud used the word "Eros", which refers to the mythological Greek God of Desire and Love, to designate the vital drive that gave life to the agencies. Now, as Bettelheim points out, 'it is impossible to think about this drive without thinking of the Greek/Roman myth of *Eros and Psyche'* (1985:11), which Freud comments on The *Theme of Three Caskets* (1913). In that essay, he makes interesting observations and points out conceptual connections between *Eros and Psyche* and the three Moerae, which I would like to make use of in my work. These are the preliminary links.

In the essay *The Theme of Three Caskets,* Freud pays special attention to some narrative devices that are recurrently used in classical myths and legends, including *Eros and Psyche*, and uses those observations to explain some general and dynamic aspects of his libido theory. Freud was mostly interested in two recurrent narrative devices: (1) the common use of a triad of characters, three siblings or three suitors; and (2) Cinderella's situation. Cinderella is the

youngest, fairest, and most loveable of three sisters, and she suffers because of her sisters' envy and her stepmother's cruelty. Freud explains that this excellent third sister in all the stories has 'peculiar qualities besides her beauty. They are qualities that seem to be tending toward some kind of unity' (*SE* XII:294), and resemble death. Little by little, Freud ends up suggesting links between his discovery of common narrative devices in literature, and the main postulates of psychoanalysis that revolve around life and death drives.

In the essay of 1913, Freud explains that the myth of *Eros and Psyche* written by the Roman author Apuleius probably derived from other, older Greek myths told by Homer, and that we can obtain rich material to make insightful interpretations from that process of narrative derivation. Freud firstly highlighted some of the very meaningful characters depicted by Homer, such as: (1) the three Moerae, Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos, whose names, according to Freud, can be read as '"what was" [innate dispositions], "what is" [experience], and "what shall be" [death]' (*SE* XII:297-98); and (2) the three Horae, the three seasons related to the passage of time (*SE* XII:297). Freud interpreted the "essential nature of these deities", the Moerae and the Horae, as 'the guardians of the natural law and of the divine Order which causes the same thing to recur in nature in unalterable sequence' (*SE* XII: 297). Freud noticed that these goddesses were superseded in later myths by new characters with apparently opposite meanings (*SE* XII:299-300).

About the third Moira,[216] Freud says, '[o]n our supposition the third of the sisters is the Goddess of Death, Death itself. But in the Judgement of Paris she is the Goddess of Love, in the tale of Apuleius she is someone comparable to the goddess for her beauty' (*SE* XII:298). Finally, Freud concludes, 'the Goddess of Death was replaced by the Goddess of Love and by what was equivalent to her in human shape' (*SE* XII:299). Thus, in his 1913 essay, Freud linked the three Moerae and their later replacements to 'the three inevitable relations that a man has with a

[216] I am using the word *Moira* to refer to the ancient Greek word *μοῖρα*, which is the singular form of *Μοῖραι (plural).* Now, the plural form that Freud uses in his text is *Moerae*, however, nowadays that form is not in use.

woman – the woman who bears him, the woman who is his mate, and the woman who destroys him' (*SE* XII:301). The essay *The Theme of the Three Caskets* does not reflect on the role of the father, on which Freud focuses in other texts, but on the mother - son relationship, which he uses to reflect on our relationship with our motivations and aspirations. That is the main topic that this chapter will cover.

As Apuleius' *Eros and Psyche* is rich in symbolism and open to many philosophical readings, I will summarise and comment on it below. In the first section, I will consider the resemblance of this myth to Freud's reading of the three Moerae and offer my own interpretation of them, drawing on the theoretical framework presented in the previous chapters. I will turn the three Moerae into a methodology that serves to explain the concepts of the dissertation. My justification to use this novel method is that, by means of the metaphors of the three Moerae, the method can help us to integrate many concepts at the same time in a coherent way. In my view, the method generates a coherent reading of the concepts and can thus be considered valid. Following this method, in the second section, I will describe some episodes of *Eros and Psyche.*[217] I will also offer my creative interpretation of them, paying special attention to the love drive, which was not discussed in the previous chapters.

Firstly, I will relate the three Moerae to the main Freudian postulates. Secondly, a correlation among that first correlation and the main Kantian postulates that were worked throughout the dissertation will be made. Finally, I will offer a correlation among the previous correlations and my interpretations of the myth *Eros and Psyche*. Therefore, I will now present a table with an organisation of the concepts in correlation according to my method (inspired by Freud), which I call the three Moerae's associative method, and below it, I will offer my explanation of the table.

[217] I will offer my reading and summary of Books IV to VI of *The Golden Ass*, by Lucius Apuleius (2nd Cent. A.D.), trans. by William Adlington (1566), and revised by S. Gaselee. I changed the names of the characters using the Greek references, since they are frequently discussed that way by scholars, including Freud.

Freud´s interpretation	Clothos "What was" ('[I]nnate disposition with its fateful implications') (*SE* XII:298)	Lachesis "What is" ('[T]he accidental that is required in the regularity of destiny, or as we should say, "experience"') (*SE* XII:298)	Atropos "What shall be" ('The ineluctable Death') (*SE* XII:298)
Freud	The inquiry about illness	Research and therapeutical studies	Healing
	1. The Body (And the psychic spaces in the body: the Unconscious, the preconscious, and consciousness)	The drives (Eros and Thanatos), and the agencies (the id, the ego, the superego, and the ego ideal)	The mental apparatus or Psyche (*Seele*)
	2. The source of the drive	The aim of the drive	The object of desire, projection, or the orientation of the drive
	4. Pleasure and reality principles	The bound energy	Civilization, or the mastery over the drives
Kant	The metaphysical inquiry	Looking for philosophical postulates	The theory
	1. The objects or things in themselves	The processing: perception-apperception	Knowledge (transcendental knowledge), understanding, and self-knowledge (about our self-determination to act)
	2. The grounds of possibility for an action (The means of the rational will)	The action done for the sake of an end, or agency (The final end of the rational will)	The end in ourselves, our humanity.
	3. The source of motivation: Laws, principles or commands (natural or rational).	The primacy and subordination of the laws in the act	The transcendental object in a kingdom of ends
Apuleios	Inspiration from ancient Greek and Roman literary sources and knowledge	The author, poet, or writer	The Myth
	1. Aphrodite (Eros´s mother) and Zeus (Eros´s grandfather) **Eros´s divine Family**	Eros in love and in inadequacy	Psyche
	2. Psyche´s parents and sisters **Psyche´s human family**	Psyche 2.0 in love and in inadequacy	Eros 2.0 (Psyche´s fate according to Apollo´s Oracle)
	3. **Eros´s autonomy**	Eros 3.0 again in love	Psyche 3.0

→ The arrow in between the first and the second column indicates cause-effect progressing. The arrow in between the second and the third column can indicate direction or purpose, or both.
The curve arrow is indicating circularity, a conservator cause-effect system that feeds itself, without necessity of progressing into a further stage.

i. Freud, Kant and the three Moerae

In the first section of the table, in light orange colour, we can see the ordering of the three Moerae introduced by Freud. Following Freud's thoughts about the temporal characteristics of the Moerae, and their relationship with the ideas of birth and death, we can think of the first and the second Moira as connected through a synthetical dependency relationship, since the past (or "what was") is not the same as the present (or "what is"), but the past makes the present possible or determines it, and the present becomes the past for a new present. Thus, these two sisters are linked through a chain of cause and effect, extending the interactivity of their relationship like a thread coming off a spindle (as depicted in the original myth[218]). Now, the third Moira is different from the other two, as Freud points out. In my view, she is different because she is out of the spinning mechanism between the first and second sisters, but she has power over it because she is the one who can cut the spun yarn. She is in some way, undetermined.

My interpretation of the allegorical narrative device that involves the Moerae in Freud's essay is that the third Moira or sister always seems to be ahead of the other two but is able to guide their spinning by means of the edge. In my view, the third sister is not part of the relationship between the first and the second, but she affects that relationship by offering it the chance of taking a path towards a resolution, of cutting, of finding a meaningful rest. That is why, the resolution works as an illusory presence or ideal: it is illusory because we know that one's future is never graspable until death, when it becomes real, and somehow definitive. Thus, as an illusory presence and a chance of resolution, the third sister can become the reservoir of all that is most hoped for (the ideal) and feared. Because even if the third sister is always ahead, she also represents an ineluctable possibility awaiting us, as Freud emphasises.

[218] See Graves 1992:48 (10b)

Hence, the third Moira is different from the other two. As Freud points out, she is dumb and unreachable, and those characteristics are what make her in some sense special.[219] Because she is undetermined and can be anything, she can be the best and the worst at the same time.

Next, I will explain my organisation of the main Freudian and Kantian concepts according to the logic of the three Moerae. That is, my reading of the concepts that I put together in the different columns: first, those concepts that relate to the characteristics of the first Moira; then, those that can be associated with the characteristics of the second Moira; and finally, those that can be associated with the third sister.

a) Freud's section

Below the introductory section on the three Moerae, also in light orange, I placed some of the main Freudian concepts I have used in this dissertation. Thus, we can see that the first and the second columns are correlated with the first and second sisters. Both columns interact in a cause-effect relationship, as the concepts in the first are the ground or cause of the concepts in the second. That is, the concepts in the second column are effects of those in the first. For the effect to come about, it is also necessary for a subject to intervene.

First, I illustrated Freud's own work. His research began as an investigation of the causes of bodily illness and its relationship to the mental. That curiosity consequentially motivated him to study and analyse in depth many phenomenological data related to his patients in order to find a cure for them or heal them. The inquiry and the study (or search for answers) stimulated one another in a mutually dependent relationship, like the first two sisters, because the study

[219] *SE* XII:296

raised new questions to be researched. However, Freud's investigations and his study made sense to him only because he believed there was a path to healing (to put an end to the illness); it was the idea of finding healing that made his research meaningful. Now, as we know, psychoanalysts still think the path to healing is mysterious. Nevertheless, we can suppose that once we are aware of possessing an illness, the healing process of the subject results ineluctable (like the third sister), even if "healing" (understood as the end of the illness) means "death" (which also can be considered metaphorically).

Now, this view of Freud's own work is informed by concepts from his own theory. I see correlations between some Freudian concepts and the Moerae, ordering the Freudian concepts in groups of terms that can be thought as alike, each group resembling one sister. In the first group, I placed the body, which Freud presents as the source from which the internal stimuli (drives) come, and the agencies emerge. All those concepts – body and psychic spaces, source, and principles – can be thought of as "innate dispositions which possess fateful implications" (the first Moira). That is, those concepts make possible the existence of the second group of concepts – the drives, the agencies, the aiming, and the bound energy— that represent the processing and the activity, or the experience of life (the second Moira), which, as Freud tells us, tries to reach the mind or *Seele* (*SE* XIV:118) (The third Moira).

In the third group of concepts we have those that in some way determine the first and second groups. On the one hand, we have seen that Freud's idea of healing is synonymous with his idea of mastering our drives, as I explained in chapter VI. This idea of mastery harmonises with Freud's idea of civilization, but also with other ideas that in one way or another can be thought of synonyms or homologues and grouped together on that basis. That is why we can also put the idea of psyche (*Seele*) and the idea of object of desire in the same group. Figuring out "what the psyche is" constituted the main goal or objective of Freud's research, because he believed that understanding what the psyche is would provide clues for healing. Thus, the psyche (*Seele*) can be put in the third sister's place only if we link it with our never-ending search for self-knowledge.

Freud understood that the soul should somehow exist, but we could only approach it by interrogating our actions, dreams, phantasies, or thoughts through analysis. However, in the diagram, "Psyche" stands for something different: it is the apparatus that organises the drives, and that is reached by the drives. In that sense we can observe a slight difference with Kant, because for Kant the soul is not something that can be reached by our drives, but it is already a priori present in every action performed by our drives. Hence, in order to act, we first need a soul capable of determining our actions. Therefore, what can be reached is only a postulate, an understanding of what the soul could be. As we can also see, all the concepts of the third column – psyche, object of desire, mastery of the drives and civilization – share characteristics with the third Moira in different but consistent ways. What they have in common is the sense of being always ahead or being ungraspable, while remaining a constant and powerful presence eluding concreteness (as an illusion or hope of rest). An object of desire for example is pursued meanwhile is not reached, meanwhile is only imagined or is a phantasy. Like the three Moerae, the third group of concepts determines the first and the second, because, given that we have settled on an object of desire (for example, self-knowledge), we move to pursue it.

b) Comparing the section on Kant to the section on Freud

Below the section on Freud, we can find the section on Kant, in light blue colour. There, I grouped some of the Kantian concepts that I have been using throughout this dissertation by affinity or alikeness, following the same logic (the narrative device) of the three Moerae or sisters. In the first column I located a group of concepts in relation to those of the second column; those in the first group are the basis for those in the second.

I began by presenting Kant's and Freud's own work. Kant began his research to answer a metaphysical question, which motivated him to study the thoughts of different philosophical traditions of his time and of the past in order to find consistent answers.[220] His investigations were the basis for his criticism of our forms of thinking and systematisation and raised more questions and stimulated new proposals about our own reasoning. Like a thread coming off a spindle, the incessant questions and search for clarifications were the source that extended his work. A satisfactory theoretical answer that Kant gave in his *Critique of the Pure Reason* is that our capacity for knowledge has limitations or boundaries, and that because of that, there are questions that we cannot answer. Thus, his original metaphysical inquiry ended up producing a new metaphysical proposal, a transcendental metaphysics capable of navigating the limitations of our knowledge. The old dogmatic metaphysics was replaced by a new metaphysics, but the new metaphysics would not have been possible without the first.

To ground this new metaphysics, Kant explained that despite our "limitations to know", we should be able to understand what these limitations consist in, we should be able to formulate a critique,[221] and use it as a basis for a theory about our own knowledge. Kant called this framework "transcendental metaphysics" and distanced himself from previous systems of metaphysics, such as the Cartesian tradition, which considered the soul an inner object, and therefore, knowable. In my view, Kant found a way to think about the soul without transgressing its mystery. So, instead of trying to unveil what the soul is, he navigated the challenge by resorting to transcendental postulates. In the Preface to his most famous work, the *Critique of Pure Reason,* he describes the challenge saying, '[h]uman reason has the peculiar fate in one species of its cognitions that it is burdened with questions which it cannot dismiss, since they are given to it as problems by the nature of reason itself, but which it also cannot answer, since they transcend every capacity of human reason' (A vii). However, since reason 'becomes aware in this way that its business must always remain incomplete because

[220] See Korsgaard 1996: 3-42.

[221] Korsgaard states, 'In Kant's terminology, a "critique" investigates the legitimacy of applying pure rational principles and their concepts to objects; while a metaphysics" sets forth those principles and their implications' (1996: 12).

the questions never cease, reason sees itself necessitated to take refuge in principles that overstep all possible use in experience' (A viii).

In the first group of Kantian concepts I correlate with the first Moira, I included the sources or means that motivate our actions according to his practical theory. That is, the objects or things in themselves and laws or principles of nature and reason. This group is importantly different from the only motives for action Freud recognises, namely natural motives; he did not think reason as such could induce action. Despite this, an important part of Freud's work was dedicated to trying to figure out what the capacity for cognition consists of in. Firstly, Freud thought our capacity for cognition came from the neurons, from the body itself; however, as we saw in chapter III, he could not support that premise. Now, in Freud's description of the psychical apparatus there is indeed a place for consciousness, memories, and for a sensory system that selects stimuli, but he barely developed those ideas because when he addressed cognition he focused mostly on the agencies, mostly on the ego, and not on the intellectual basis of cognition. Thus, the psychic spaces in our mind were considered by Freud as physical inner spaces offered by our body, without a specific location, as invisible containers of some type of sensory traces and memories. In later works Freud made a turn, and he incorporated the idea of an intellectual capacity in the ego, which he thought developed due to our encounter with civilization.

As I explained in previous chapters, Freud believed that our rational capacity emerges at a later stage of our development, that is, that capacity is not with us from the beginning. We can see that as Freud tried to explain cognition, he made many uneasy adjustments due to finding many stumbling blocks along the way. By contrast, Kant consistently maintains that agents are rational from the beginning. As I explained in chapter III, the addition of a rational unconscious domain in Freud's theory does not necessarily contradict his work, but can complement it. Thus, in chapter III I proposed incorporating three new unconscious domains or rational *a priori* sources of drives into Freud's theory of the unconscious.

In the second group of Kantian concepts, I located the idea of agency and the concepts related to the capacity for action, which also differ from their Freudian counterparts. Since Freud thought nature was the only source of drives, in principle our agencies should only come from nature. However, Freud introduced a cognitive capacity that should work on the ego giving support to its developmental process. Now, as the ego is an agency initially only motivated by nature, he had to explain how this agency evolved into something with moral capacities. Thus, he incorporated the idea of a bonding ego: an ego that is the result of the contact of the individual with her external world. Because of that contact, the ego would supposedly gain intellectual capacities that would allow it to become a consciousness. However, Freud also incorporated other agencies to support the ego in its development, such as the superego and the ego ideal, which are the splits that the ego suffered because of this contact with the external world. According to Freud, the superego and the ego ideal would be in charge of supporting the ego to keep developing itself into something more sophisticated and moral. However, as we saw in chapter IV, this theoretical proposal of Freud has gaps.

In my view, even when those Freudian ideas cannot explain the emergence of our cognitive capacities by themselves, they offer an interesting contribution to the explanation of our development. I speculate that Kant did not provide a consistent explanation of our development because he was mostly focused on our rational mind and the agency that emerges from it, that is, our rational will. So, even when Kant tried to account for our natural agency, or natural will, he did not develop that idea in full. Rather, he focused on the primacy of our reason over nature, and he depicted our natural dimension mostly, but not only, as an incentive for inclination, or a counterweight to the commands of duty.[222]

[222] See *The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* 4:405.

I made two claims in the previous chapters. First, I critiqued Freud in chapter IV, where I explained that the Freudian superego and our encounter with morality (the rational capacity developed by our civilization) by means of it, is not moral. I also explained that in order to be able to support the argument that the superego derives from the death drive, first we need to incorporate a rational source or rational capacity working within us from the beginning. Regarding this incorporation, my proposal in chapter IV was that a rational capacity (a reflective judgement) should be what motivates the emergence of the superego (or introjection of the father) by fomenting a sense of guilt. Second, in chapter II I explained that Kant's moral project fails to explain our developmental process towards adulthood. Kant jumps from the fact that we are born with rational capacities to the fact that we must act as responsible adults. He barely explains our process of development toward adulthood, he only offers some incomplete ideas about our education. On that point, Freud's work is more thorough, because he depicts a sequence of developmental phases that are easy to verify empirically in our everyday life. Finally, my proposal attempts to unify both views, Kant's and Freud's, complementing one theory with the other by filling their gaps.

Finally, the most important in the third group of Kantian concepts, now in correlation with the third sister, are the ideas of knowledge and self-knowledge, humanity, and kingdom of ends. The soul is one of the concepts that Kant explains cannot be known: the soul as a noumenon is beyond the limits of our knowledge. Therefore, he claims that the soul should only be approached as a postulate, a transcendental postulate. The soul should then be that existence that, being always present, spontaneously determines an action, offering it a horizon of possibilities, to move towards a purpose or purposiveness. Now, Kant explains that our transcendental purposes, such as achieving our higher goodness or highest idea of ourselves, that is, our humanity, can only possibly be reached in theory but not in praxis, because they are only postulates. However, we should keep pursuing our highest ideas of humanity, which we can rationally identify, considering our practical limitations. On the other hand, Kant warns us that the natural objects of desire can never be known, not even theoretically, because we cannot fix them; they are imposed on us externally. With respect to this third group of concepts, we can probably find more agreement in both authors. Finally, Freud also appeals to

rational understanding or analysis as a limited but necessary method for healing, and he hopes that our development will one day resemble a mature, peaceful civilization[223], which can be from a certain point of view translated into Kantian terms as a "kingdom of ends"[224].

ii. Apuleius' *Eros and Psyche*

Below the section on Kant, there is a section on Apuleius, in light green. I will not discuss the author because I did not cover him in the earlier chapters of this dissertation; I will only focus on his *Eros and Psyche*. The original story was written in Latin, but I will refer to the characters of the story by the Greek forms of their names, following Freud (1913) and other scholars of psychoanalysis. As a clarification, I wish to say that I am using this story as a narrative device that is useful to present my ideas about the love desire. Therefore, I do not claim to have discovered the true meanings of Apuleius' myth, or attribute any particular wisdom to him; rather, I am presenting my own reception of that myth, my reading of some parts of the myth through the lens of my theoretical thoughts, which are inspired by Kant's and Freud's works.

In the table, I divided the story of *Eros and Psyche* in three parts. The three numbers in the green section correspond to three intersecting dimensions of the story: one related to Eros' family, another to Psyche's, and a last one related to Eros' and Psyche's as a new family. Every section of the story follows a progressive logic, like the three Moerae. Next, I will narrate and comment on the story from beginning to end. I will pay special attention to the movements of

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[223] Freud argues, '[o]f the psychological characteristics of civilization two appears to be the most important: a strengthening of the intellect, which is beginning to govern instinctual life, and an internalization of the aggressive impulses, with all its consequent advantages and perils' (SE XXII: 214-15). Freud concludes, whatever foster the growth of civilization works at the same time against war' (SE XXII: 215).

[224] For Kant, a kingdom of ends must be made of the relationship among mature autonomous human beings capable of restraining their passions, respecting and loving themselves and others, and taking responsibility. See *G* 4:433-40. Korsgaard concludes, '[w]hen we enter into relations of reciprocity, and hold one another responsible, we enter together into the standpoint of practical reason, and create a Kingdom of Ends on earth' (1996:212).

the characters and the forces or motivations that emerge from the relations among them, arguing that the characters also represent deep metaphors, whose meanings change according to their position or function in the narrative of the story. Now, I will deliberately ignore or skip any possible interpretation of Apuleius's use of the genders of the characters and its meaning. I believe that the portrayal of gender in Apuleius' story follows specific cultural influences of the time, whose analysis is beyond the scope of this chapter and dissertation.

In order to make the analysis easier to follow, I will associate the individual characters with concepts from the theoretical discussions of previous chapters: (I added an *F* for the concepts that correspond to a Freudian terminology, and a *K* for a Kantian terminology)

Aphrodite = Natural source of motivation (*F* and *K*).

Zeus = Rational source of motivation (*K*).

Psyche's birth family = Natural source of motivation (*F* and *K*).

Sobriety = The third person perspective (following *G*ardner's use of the term)

Eros = The live-love drive or love desire (*F*) of the heteronomous agent (overwhelmed by his/her inadequacy) that executes the actions (*K*).

Eros 2.0 = Psyche's object of desire, and Psyche's justification for her introjection as a death drive (*F*).

Eros 3.0 = The ego ideal (*F*) of the autonomous agent who executes the actions (*K*).

Psyche = Eros' object of desire and Eros's projection of his repressed cathexis, as excess of love, inadequacy, and excess of frustration (*F*), and therefore, also Eros´ justification for self-deception (*K*).

Psyche 2.0 = The death drive or the introjection of the repressed feelings (*F*) of the heteronomous agent (overwhelmed by her inadequacy) who executes the actions (*K*).

Psyche 3.0 = The sublimated object of desire (*F*) and the purpose of the autonomous agent who executes the actions (*K*), or transcendental object of desire and self-knowledge (*K*).

a) The beginning of the story

The young Psyche was the third daughter of a family. She was adored by the people close to her as if she were more beautiful than even the Goddess Aphrodite. The people forgot to make their usual offerings to Aphrodite, and they decided to worship Psyche's beauty instead. Aphrodite reacted by expressing jealousy of Psyche. Apuleius says about Aphrodite:

> '[E]very person honoured and worshipped this maiden instead of Venus, calling upon the divinity of that great goddess in a human form, and in the morning at her first coming abroad, offered unto her oblations, provided banquets, called her by the name of Venus which was not Venus indeed' (Gaselee 1915:189).

Apuleius introduces Psyche into the narration through a comparison with Aphrodite. He shows us that the Goddess, who used to be warm and beautiful, suddenly became a resentful and vengeful character because of Psyche. Because of Aphrodite's rancour, Psyche started having problems with her suitors. Psyche's father was worried about her situation, and he decided to visit Apollo's Oracle in Delphi. Once Psyche's destiny (her husband) was revealed to him, the father reacted with submission but also with deep sadness. The father interpreted Psyche's destiny as a type of sacrifice, and therefore the whole family wept and lamented Psyche's fate. The Oracle said:

> 'Let Psyche's corpse be clad in mourning weed
> And set on rock of yonder hill aloft:
> Her husband is no wight of human seed.
> But serpent dire and fierce as may be thought.
> Who flies with wings above in starry skies
> And doth subdue each thing with fiery flight.
> The gods themselves and powers that seem so wise
> With mighty Jove be subject to his might'
> (Gaselee 1915:195).

(a.1) About the circularity of love. Some comments on the beginning of the story

Regarding the beginning of the story, my observation on Eros' family system, is that the Goddess of Love exchanges her known attributes (warmth, beauty that can be appreciated, and delicacy) for their opposites (coldness, beauty that is ignored, and aggressiveness) once Psyche appears in the narration. That is why, as I said before, the position of the third Moira (the third column in the scheme) requires special attention, because this position has the power to influence the other two by offering them new significance. In other words, in the story, Psyche is incorporating a new orientation of the desire, but with the new orientation the desire itself becomes transformed. Aphrodite used to inspire love and devotion in her people and son. However, when Psyche appears this situation changes. Psyche breaks the circularity of the desire that used to feed on itself, that is, the circularity that moves the love from Aphrodite to the people and her son, and from the people and her son to Aphrodite again. Psyche breaks the circularity because the love of the people turns towards her, towards a new object of love and desire. As a consequence of the breaking of circularity, Aphrodite feels affected and altered.

Freud used the mythical character of *Narcissus* to explain the circularity of the feeling of love, which he called Narcissism (*Narzissmus*).[225] However, the myth of *Eros and Psyche* contrasts with the myth of Narcissus, because in the former, love breaks the circularity by moving towards an object of desire external to the original circuit of love.

Something similar happens in Psyche's birth family. At the beginning of the story, the lovely parents felt happy to have three beautiful daughters who loved them. However, at some point of the story the daughters got married. That meant that they broke the circularity of the feelings, because they (at least at the beginning) started to focus their feelings on their

[225] See 'On Narcissism', in *SE* XIV:73-107.

husbands, not their parents. After the marriages, the lovely family's feelings transformed into suffering, fear, and insecurity. Now, in the specific case of Psyche, we can appreciate that once the Oracle revealed her fate, her family sank into deep sadness.

Up to here, we can appreciate that Freud's main ideas regarding emotional attachment can easily be applied. That is, Freud's ideas about the emotional natural attachment or love between the parents and their children, and the circularity of that feeling. Freud states, '[n]arcissism in this sense would not be a perversion, but the libidinal complement to the egoism of the instinct of self-preservation, a measure of which may justifiably be attributed to every living creature' (*SE* XIV: 73-75). As we saw in Freud's description of the phases of sexual and psychological maturation, in chapter VI, the circularity of love is important in childhood for a period of time; it is important for self-preservation and learning (as preparation or training). Therefore, it becomes very difficult to break the circularity of love between parents and children, but it is also imperative to choose an object of love other than one's parents. That act marks the beginning of the transition towards adulthood at certain age (when the incest taboo becomes operative).[226] As it was explained in previous chapters, Freud also pays special attention to our refusal to break the circle of love we form with our parents, our hesitancy to start the process of transition, and he believes that this reluctance is the key to our mental pathologies.

From this first *précis* of *Eros and Psyche,* we see that there are some important differences with respect to Freud's narrative of the primal father, which I discussed in chapter IV. First, the children in *Totem and Taboo* wanted to keep the circularity of their feelings toward their mothers; therefore, the father represented the impossibility of maintaining that circularity, but also the impossibility of looking for another love attachment. The father was an obstacle for the children (as agents) in all possible ways. In *Eros and Psyche* we have something different; the agents *want* to break the circle of love. That is, the people and Eros wanted to adore a

[226] See 'Totem and Taboo', in *SE* XIII.

beauty other than Aphrodite; the daughters wanted to marry their suitors and leave their parents and Psyche wanted to find her fate. In this story the main obstacles to breaking the circularity of love are the birth family's feelings, which resemble the agent's inability to manage a difficult situation. In some way, the original family's feelings are conservative, and they try to boycott the new possible attachments because the new attachments open the possibility of transformation, new meanings, and dynamics of relation, which trigger an uncomfortable uncertainty and fear, and as a consequence, a feeling of inadequacy.

b) The climax of the story

Moving forwards: Apuleius tells us that Eros, Aphrodite's son, pursues Psyche's love and marries her in secret against her mother's will. Eros says, '[t]his have I very wantonly done, I know (and I have wounded mine own body with my proper weapon)' (Gaselee 1915:235). According to the myth, Aphrodite asked Eros to ruin Psyche's life by shooting an arrow of love at her and making her fall in love with the first person she sees, who should be the most miserable creature alive. Aphrodite says:

> 'My dear child, by the motherly bond of love, by the sweet wounds of thy piercing darts, by the pleasant heat of thy fire, revenge fully the injury which is done to thy mother upon the false and disobedient beauty of a mortal maiden; and this beyond all I pray thee without delay, that she may fall in desperate love with the most miserable creature living…' (Gaselee 1915: 191).

Instead, Eros took Psyche to his home as his wife and offered her a beautiful life in a hidden castle, and sexual passion at night. Eros made sure that Psyche could not see him, or anyone else at home. Despite the mystery, Eros and Psyche had a happy life, living in a nice house far away from their original families. Psyche's family never met Eros. Psyche's father gave her to the mysterious suitor (Eros) only because of the advice of Apollo's Oracle. Psyche's family left her on a rock, thinking that they were leaving her to die. At the beginning of the story, we can see a fast progression: Eros pursues Psyche's love and marries her, her father reluctantly and

sadly agrees to leave her on the rock, Eros moves Psyche to their new house, which was inhabited by invisible beings, and there they become a happy couple, then Psyche gets pregnant. But everything up to that point was only the beginning of the story.

Moving backwards: They were a happy couple, until one day, Psyche felt pity for her original family, who cried because they falsely believed she had met a bad fate. Thus, she asked Eros to allow her to contact her sisters to calm them with the truth: that she was alive, and happy! Eros reluctantly agreed on one condition: that no matter what, she should never try to view him in the light.

Once Psyche contacted her sisters and told them about her happy life, they, instead of stopping their lamentations, became full of envy and bad intentions. Learning about Psyche's fate did not ameliorate the family's feelings but made them worse. The family felt intimidated by Psyche's happy fate, and as a consequence, during their family meetings they poisoned Psyche's mind with doubts about her husband and future child. They made an effort to turn Psyche against her husband and fate. Since Psyche could not see Eros, the logical assumption according to her sisters was that he should be a monster as the Oracle supposedly described him, and her future child should be a snake. They said to Psyche:

> '[F]or we are credibly informed, neither can we but utter it unto thee, that are the companions of thy grief and mishap, that there is a great serpent of many coils, full of deadly poison, with a ravenous and gaping throat, that lieth with thee secretly every night. Remember the oracle of Apollo' (Gaselee 1915: 225).

Thus, because her sisters piqued her apprehension and curiosity, Psyche violated Eros's trust (his invisibility, and the warranty for their happiness) by viewing him. To her surprise, he was more than beautiful, not a monster. However, Psyche was accidentally pierced by one of Eros's arrows of love, and as consequence, 'she fell in love with Love. Then more and more broiling in the love of Cupid, she embraced him and kissed him a thousand times, fearing the

measure of his sleep' (Gaselee 1915:231). However, then she made another mistake, and she burned Eros by accident with a drop of the oil of the lamp she was using to look at him, and due to that, Eros woke up and realised she had betrayed him. As a consequence, Eros abandoned Psyche, 'perceiving that promise and faith was broken, he tied away without utterance of any word from the kisses and hands of his most unhappy wife' (Gaselee 1915:235) and moved back to his mother's house. This is perhaps the climax of the story. Psyche's outreach to her birth family leads her into a bad situation, also pushing Eros back to his original family, his mother.

Apuleius says about Psyche's pain, 'when he was flown clean away out of her sight, she threw herself into the next running river, for the great lack of her husband' (Gasilee 1915:235-37). After that, she was rescued by the God of that river, who convinced her to start a search for Eros. At some point in the story, after many painful experiences, Psyche arrives at Aphrodite's house looking for Eros.

Firstly, when Aphrodite learned of the lies of Eros, who was hiding Psyche and disobeying her will, she wanted to punish him and Psyche, so she asked Zeus (Aphrodite's father) and the Goddess Sobriety for help. Aphrodite says, 'to her must I have recourse for help, and to none other (I mean to Sobriety) who may correct sharply this trifler' (Gaselee 1915:245). Psyche was not welcome in Aphrodite's house. Eros was in another part of the house, and he did not try to pursue Psyche's love there. Aphrodite became as vengeful and cruel as possible, like the stepmother in *Cinderella*'s tale. Aphrodite asked Psyche to accomplish four difficult tasks in order to gain her favour to see Eros again.

(b.1) The feeling of lacking. Some comments on the climax of the story

Some of Freud's theoretical proposals can help illuminate this story. Freud was convinced that at some point in our development we start moving backward, as we saw in chapter VI. We

psychologically regress to relive some moments of our past that clamour for attention. Freud defined the movement of regression as the movement of Thanatos, the death drive. Psyche's contacting her sisters and then looking for Eros at Aphrodite's house may be a movement of regression, as if in that movement Psyche 2.0 were personifying the death drive. We can contrast the regression of Psyche 2.0, with the progression movement of Eros: the agent who, disobeying and lying to Aphrodite, moves towards his object of love, and with it towards the continuation of life, as if he personified the live/love drive. We must remember that Eros leaves Psyche pregnant.

In Freudian terms, the death drive (personified here by Psyche 2.0) is rooted in the same source (Aphrodite) as the life drive (Eros), but in altered or distorted form. On the one hand, we saw that Aphrodite was distorted by a natural process of development; that is, due to the necessary break of the circularity of love and the fear and insecurity (inadequacy) that the break generates. On the other hand, Eros and Psyche suffer a transformation (a change of position in the scheme) due to their inability to confront the break of the circularity of love. Thus, the transformation of the characters resembles their inadequacy and the distortion of the source of motivation. As we saw, originally Eros did not tell Aphrodite about Psyche; he lied to Aphrodite and hid Psyche to protect her. For her part, Psyche started to resist Eros's love, and then turned into an active character (Psyche 2.0), because she felt guilty about her birth family's distress.

Now, following Freud's idea of phases of maturity, in our Story, Eros' self-deceptive lie and Psyche's betrayal (provoked by her guilt) seem to serve as a metaphoric example of the inevitable stumbles that we experience in our developmental process towards adulthood. Because there are important but ignored issues to attend to and resolve in ourselves that make us feel inadequate, we cannot embrace maturity without stumbling or failing in the process.

The story of *Eros and Psyche* parallels Freud's narrative of the primal father in *Totem and Taboo* in interesting ways. The similarities revolve around the idea of exchanging roles. In the narrative of primal father, we have the portrayal of a tyrannic abusive father and his children, his victims; then, that situation is reversed, as the children become murderers, and the father, their victim. In *Eros and Psyche* there is also an exchange of roles: Eros was the agent who pursued Psyche's love and Psyche at the beginning was passive, receiving Eros' love and enjoying her happy life for a while. However, at some point that situation changes: after Psyche's betrayal, she became the agent, the pursuer of Eros' love, and Eros became the object to reach, waiting passively, recovering, and learning the teachings of the Goddess Sobriety.

There are more similarities. One pertains to the ambivalence, or dual meaning, of the characters. Thus, in the narrative of the primal father we can see that the father is dreaded and rejected but also admired and wanted. In the same narrative we can see that the children are victims, but also murderers. In *Eros and Psyche* Eros was presented as a powerful beast, but also as a beautiful and kind being. In the same story, Psyche is presented as a lovely woman who gets pregnant, but also as a woman who brings tragedy and regresses towards death. In my interpretation, the pivot for ambivalence in both narratives is always related to the feeling of lacking or inadequacy, which is mostly triggered after breaking the circularity of feelings.

In my view, on the one hand, lacking can be perceived as a need;[227] what allows us, as agents, to move forward. For example, in the statement "because I am lacking something, I need to go for it", the term "lacking" is generally related to progress and development, such as Eros pursuing Psyche's love. On the other hand, I believe lacking can also be perceived as inadequacy or insufficiency what prevents us, as agents, from moving forwards. For example, in the statement "because I am lacking, I am not worthy of …", "lacking" can be perceived as

[227] In this alignment we can consider the needs of nature, but also the need of reason (a need for systematisation, as it was mentioned in chapter I, quoting Alix Cohen 2014).

what triggers the mechanism of regression, like Eros hiding Psyche from Aphrodite.[228] As Eros was incapable of confronting Aphrodite with the fact that he loved Psyche, he had to lie to Aphrodite about Psyche, and the lie triggered a whole tragedy and transformation for the lovers, a mechanism of regression. As we saw in previous chapters in our discussion of Freudian theory, the feeling of inadequacy or insufficiency, mostly linked to frustration and guilt, always seems to be the main trigger for self-deception and masochism. In *Eros and Psyche,* it seems to be what triggers a process of transformations that ends with Aphrodite becoming something absolutely monstrous or sadistic. In the narrative of the primal father in *Totem and Taboo*, the feeling of inadequacy after the murder is also what triggers the introjection of the father as a superego, a sadistic authority.

The story tells us that Eros, not wanting to fulfil his mother's will, shoot the arrow at himself, for which he will fall in love with Psyche. The allegory is confusing, but we can assay an interpretation. As I read it, the arrow is a symbol of Eros himself. Thus, if Eros is also his arrow, then he was shot at Psyche, as his mother had asked. But Psyche was constantly receiving his "arrowness" without suffering the exalted effects of it, because Eros was delaying the second part of Aphrodite's plan. Eros was lying to Aphrodite. Since Aphrodite planned that the first-person Psyche saw would be the most horrible creature alive, then Eros is the most horrible creature, and that is the reason why he forbids Psyche from looking at him in the light: because, if Psyche looked at him in the light, then she would fall in passionate love with him (that is effect that the arrows produce). In that scenario, Psyche would inevitably become an agency and no longer be the receiver of the love. So she would start sexually pursuing him, badly lacking him, wanting to be with the beautiful Eros, who was also a horrible creature (because he is always lacking). Thus, Psyche would also feel her inadequacy or insufficiency. She, a mere human, confronts a gorgeous, powerful God. And the feeling of inadequacy would lead her to make unfortunate mistakes.

[228] This idea of lacking in relation to the death drive or irrationality was mentioned in previous chapters, as suggested by Longuenesse 2012 and Gardner 1993.

Regarding the ambivalent metaphor about Eros, Bettelheim says, '[t]o view Eros or anything connected with him as grossly sexual or monstrous is an error that, according to the myth, can lead to catastrophe' (1985:11). In my view, it is not an error as Bettelheim claims, but part of the ambiguity of the character. I believe, the monster that Eros represents has to do with the feeling of lacking that he produces in people, in those who are pierced by his arrows, and then experience an endless need to grasp at that object of desire, which only can resemble the inability of the agent to satisfy that need. The endless need easily makes people feel undeserving of the object of their desire and confused about how to secure and retain that object. Hence, it seems that the feeling of lacking becomes monstrous only when the lack is felt as an unresolved inadequacy: as an insufficiency that cannot be compensated for. In my view, the character of Eros also teaches us that lacking can be seen as our most beautiful quality, because it is also the drive that can move us forward and overcome obstacles. At this point, we need to make a distinction between the different types of desires that move us, and the Kantian terminology is relevant to this. I develop that distinction in the next section.

c) The end of the story

Being still: While Psyche was trying to accomplish the tasks for Aphrodite to be able to approach Eros, Eros became immobilised at Aphrodite's house. On the one hand, Psyche's effort to contact Eros did not affect him; he remained still. On the other hand, Aphrodite kept abusing Psyche, and Psyche accepted the nonsense challenges of Aphrodite, acquiring a masochistic disposition. Firstly, Aphrodite told Psyche that she did not recognize her as Eros's wife because Psyche was a human and Eros a God. If Psyche was not adequate for Eros, then their marriage was not valid, and her child was then illegitimate. Psyche bore Aphrodite's abuse because she felt that, if she was able to perform Aphrodite's tasks, then she would once again deserve Eros's love, but the tasks were nearly impossible to complete.

The fourth task that Psyche was told to accomplish was one directly related to death: she had to visit Hades, meet Persephone, and ask her for a present, the secret of Persephone's beauty, for Aphrodite. However, even though Psyche was able to accomplish such a difficult task, on her way back from Hades, Psyche felt inclined by curiosity to open Aphrodite's present before finishing the task, believing that the present could help her recover Eros' love. And indirectly, she was right. She failed to accomplish Aphrodite's fourth task, and as a consequence, she fell into a deadly sleep, because the secret of Persephone's beauty was a deadly sleep. Nevertheless, it is death that finally helps Psyche recover her original status: she becomes passive again, she stops being masochistic and tries to deserve Eros' love, as if she did not deserve it.

Moving forwards once more: The myth ends with the intervention of Zeus. Eros recovers his animus precisely at the moment when Psyche falls into the deadly sleep and becomes passive, so he begins moving again in a fast progression. Apuleius says, 'Cupid being now healed of his wound and malady, not able to endure the long absence of Psyche, got him secretly out at a high window of the chamber where he was enclosed, and (his wings refreshed by a little repose) took his flight towards his loving wife; whom when he had found, he wiped away the sleep from her face, and put it again into the box' (Gaselee 1915:279). Thus, Eros moves towards Psyche again, rescues her, and helps her finish the last task Aphrodite had set her, in order to not fail the Goddess. Suddenly, Psyche emerges from her despair and becomes once again an object for Eros' desire, capable of moving him.

During the time of recess, Eros was healing his wound, but he was unable to move from Aphrodite's house. However, once he healed completely, he was able to move again. Eros understood that the only way to pursue Psyche's love was by appealing to something higher or more powerful. Thus, Eros asked for Zeus' favour. The supreme God agreed to help the couple. However, Zeus also recognized the power Eros had over him because he felt the need to be loved and pursued, and he needed Eros for prompting people of excellence to do that. Thus, the agreement between the Gods also meant a polite negotiation of favours. Finally, Zeus

offered Psyche the possibility of eating ambrosia and becoming a Goddess. Psyche was offered a place on Olympus that was not Aphrodite's place, and Zeus planned a celestial legitimate marriage. According to the myth, in the celestial marriage, Zeus announced the end of the mischievous behaviour of Eros. Zeus says, 'It sufficeth in that he is defamed in every place for his adulterous living and all manner of vice; wherefore all such occasion ought to be taken away and his boyish wantonness tied up in the bonds of marriage' (Gaselee 1915:283). Thus, the story had a happy ending, Eros and Psyche were eternally reunited in their love and reconciled with Aphrodite. Finally, their child was born, and was called Pleasure.

(c.1) About adulthood. Comments on the end of the story

I will propose a psychoanalytical reading of the ending, and then incorporate some Kantian ideas. As we know, psychoanalysis is focused on healing, that is, on resolving the tensions of the past to be able to look at the future, as Eros does in our story. I interpret that resolution as the advent of adulthood. At the beginning, Eros is moving towards Psyche (the external object of desire, and the involvement of having to tell a lie in order to reach it) and breaks the circularity of love with his mother. However, at some point, once Psyche, feeling confused, betrayed Eros, she started actively pursuing Eros's love, as though she were a deadly agency and no longer an object of desire. Eros was paralysed when Psyche 2.0 started to pursue his love. In psychoanalytic terminology, we could say that once Psyche 2.0 became active, she ceased to be an external object of desire and became internalised or incorporated into Eros's love circuit with Aphrodite as a new agency, displacing or immobilising Eros in his role of agent. We can interpret this as a split of the agency, as the reestablishment of the circularity of love that was broken, but now incorporating Psyche 2.0. Hence, this reestablishment is a deadly one, because it is not a reestablishment of love but mostly of the inadequacy in love (the feeling of lacking in its more frustrating version).

Freud warns us about the death drive on many occasions, but he also brings out its positive aspect. For Freud the death drive makes possible our individual and cultural development: in

Why War he says, '[w]e owe to that process the best of what we have become, as well as a good part of what we suffer from' (*SE* XXII:214). Finally, Freud thinks that our hope of healing and developing into civilization must lie in the action of the ego ideal, which is another drive or agency different from Thanatos (for us, the Psyche 2.0). What is the ego ideal? According to Freud, it is the agency that has the capacity to motivate the agent to overcome the problems triggered by the feelings of lacking, insufficiency, fear, hate, frustration, and guilt. Freud says, the death drive 'is also the vehicle of the ego ideal by which the ego measures itself, which it emulates, and whose demand for ever greater perfection it strives to fulfil' (*SE* XIX:65).[229] Thus, the ego ideal parallels the figure of Eros 3.0 in our story, the Eros or agency that is revitalised after a moment of surcease, reflection, and healing, and after having been taught by Sobriety.

Eros 3.0 is the agent who appeals to Zeus and gains the capacity to transform Psyche 2.0, by feeding her ambrosia, into a living Goddess, Psyche 3.0. On the one hand, the higher capacity of this new agency can only awaken after Psyche becomes active as a death drive. On the other hand, Eros 3.0 cannot operate until Psyche 3.0 takes a rest. Freud never fully developed the idea of an ego ideal distinct from the death drive, or the idea of sublimation that was mentioned in chapter VI, but it is important to take them into account. I will not criticise those Freudian ideas, which fit the myth very well, here. Instead, I will complement my psychoanalytic reading with some Kantian ideas.

In the story, Eros and Psyche constantly strive to be together despite adversity. In Freudian terms, we can interpret their relationship as follows. First, we have a life/love drive (Eros), which then incorporates a death drive (Psyche) in its functions. Then, both drives work on awakening a third drive or ego ideal (an Eros 2.0), which unifies the efforts of all the drives, transforming them into something new and better. From a psychoanalytical perspective, this unification can be taken as the watershed that marks the beginning of a new phase of life, a

[229] As I said above, Freud thought of the ego ideal as being synonymous with the death drive in *The Ego and the Id*, but conceived of it differently in other texts, such as *The New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*. Laplanche and Pontalis explain this in *The Language of Psycho-Analysis*, see 1985:144.

phase of maturity. Now, Freud always had in mind natural drives, not rational ones. That is why I would like to add to his theory a rational drive working together with the life/love drive from the beginning. By rational drive (Zeus), I mean a drive that does not arise from a somatic natural unconscious source or domain (Aphrodite). I mentioned the possibility of rational unconscious domains in chapter III. This, in my view, helps to fill the inconclusive parts or gaps of the psychoanalytical theory that were not fully developed by Freud.

A common version of the Greek myths tells us that Aphrodite was foam-born;[230] however, Apuleius' myth tells us that Zeus is the father of Aphrodite.[231] So, even though the myth does not give us information about Eros' father, the myth places Zeus in a relevant role, as the maternal grandfather. That is why I found that narrative element useful to justify placing Zeus in the first column, as a source, as part of the birth family of Eros, and not in the third column, linking him only to their future. So, following Freud's logic, if Eros is a drive that moves the natural love desire for attachment and the beauty associated with it (the known attribute of Aphrodite, the natural source) and Zeus is also a source of motivation for Eros, then Eros, as a drive, can move love, and through love, something else. Love is understood as a feeling; however, this feeling must be connected to something beyond the known natural attributes of Aphrodite, that is, it must also be connected to the attribute of Zeus, whom I associated with rationality.

In the myth we can appreciate that Eros, in all his interventions as Eros, Eros 2.0 and Eros 3.0, showed intelligibility, and that capacity was crucial for the development of the story. However, Eros's intellectual capacity also needed to be unwrapped by means of a process of development. That is, Eros needed to learn how to use his intelligibility in order to apply it well in his life. To sum up, at the beginning of the story, we can see that Eros had the good intention of protecting Psyche and making her happy, but he was unable to find a good solution to the

[230] See Graves 1955:39.

[231] We can also find that reference in Homer's Iliad.

problem that breaking the circle of love with Aphrodite was generating. From a Kantian point of view, I interpret that incapacity of Eros as a sign of immaturity. In the middle of the story, we see that Eros 2.0 got stuck in Aphrodite's house but used that interlude to heal and assess his situation. Following a Kantian point of view, I interpret that recess as Eros' training of his rational will, which triggers the awakening of his categorical imperative. At the end, we can see that Eros, now Eros 3.0, was moved by a mature, good imperative motivated by the same good intention he acted on at the beginning of the story, that is, to pursue Psyche's love, protecting and making her happy, now in the context of a proper relationship, a "legitimate" marriage consecrated at the *Olympus*. At the end of the story, he was mature enough, or capable of understanding how to figure out solutions to their problems. Following a Kantian point of view, I interpret that as the beginning of Eros's adulthood: when he can finally make use of his autonomy.

The final solution that Eros found in his time alone, while he saw no one but the Goddess Sobriety, was a wise one. From a Kantian point of view (in Gardner's interpretation), I interpret Sobriety, in her role of teacher, as the third person perspective that helps Eros examine his problems from a different angle than that of Aphrodite.[232] In the story, the main problem had to do with the distortion of Aphrodite once the family dynamics changed (the known circularity of love between her and Eros). In the myth, Aphrodite became distorted because she was also corresponding to Eros's inadequacy, and she could only recover herself when Eros was in control of his capacities to meet the challenges of adulthood. So, in Freudian terminology, the healing element after the breaking of the circularity of love (narcissism) was to awaken the capacity (the ego ideal) to redirect the flow of love towards the future.

On this reading of the myth, love, which Freud originally thought of as the feeling/drive that moves us to unite with our object of love, can also be appealing to our best approach to

[232] I mention the third person perspective in chapter VI.

reach our object of love.[233] In other words, Apuleius's story contributes to help us to see Eros not only as a blind drive pursuing any object of desire, but as a drive capable of orientating the agent towards something good. Through Apuleius's myth we can find a narrative that allow us to make alignments with Kant's ideas; that is, we can also find rationality motivating love[234]. That is why, we can see that Eros looks for an object of love that can be achievable in some way and offers meaning to his search for love.

With respect to the connections with Kant, we can offer some interpretations. First, we have Eros the child, the son of Aphrodite, who according to the old Greek traditions of myths used to randomly shoot his arrows at people and make them motivated to look for their objects of love mechanically and blindly. That is only briefly suggested in Apuleius' story. The objects of love in those cases only correspond to the first person that the targeted people would see, most probably their parents. As we can guess, the meaning that the object of love can offer in those cases is poor, but we know the desire is still abundant. That love in the myth is depicted as an immature love, a curse and a tragedy. Now, the Roman Apuleius focuses his story on Eros the child who was passing through a process of maturity. In my interpretation, Apuleius depicts Eros as guided from the beginning by a rational capacity, in alignment with Kant's ideas. Eros the child is portrayed as a character that little by little goes unwrapping intellectual powers (the one coming from Zeus) that are part of him from the beginning, which collaborate so that the loving search of Eros becomes finally a success.

In my view, using Freudian terminology, once we (as agents motivated by our life/love drive) decide to break with the circularity of love (narcissism) towards our parents, our rational capacities, in Kant's view, become an indispensable support to reach adulthood. Using

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[233] In *On Narcissism* Freud says, '[b]eing in love consists in a flowing-over of the ego-libido on to the object' (*SE* XIV:100).

[234] In his Metaphysics, Kant considers love as a feeling of benevolence; he states, '[b]enevolence is satisfaction in the happiness (well-being) of others; but beneficence is the maxim of making others' happiness one's end, and the duty to it consists in the subject's being constrained by his reason to adopt this maxim as a universal law' (6:453).

psychoanalytic terminology, proof of this can be found when we subordinate our love to our frustration in our pursuing or search for our object of love, and the death drive becomes immediately functional and almighty, as a distorted love drive. Now, frustration, fear, guilt, lacking, and inadequacy are probably unavoidable feelings. Therefore, I am not claiming here that they should be avoided, I do not think that Freud or even Kant would claim that either. According to Freud, as we saw in chapter IV, V, and VI, the death drive remains with us for the rest of our life, being permanently part of our psychological structure. In my belief, Freud was not wrong in that affirmation. However, what I argue here, in alignment with Kant, is that the rationality (Zeus) that is used by our love desires (Eros) is what can help us subordinate difficult feelings to a project that is good and achievable, but because of that, also limited.

It seems that the beautiful love that naturally emanates from Aphrodite and motivates Eros, needs to resemble the right capacity of conduction towards the right purpose so as not to distort into its opposite. It seems that the learning about how to rightly drive that love towards a meaningful future, resembles the journey of our main character, Eros.

Now, the myth tells us that the attributes of Aphrodite get distorted because of the object of desire (Psyche). So, what is in the first place distorting the source of love (Aphrodite)? In the myth we can see that it is a feeling: fear. The fear of being incapable of confronting the future (Psyche). The future makes Eros confront the otherness, what is unknown but must be integrated to the flow of love in some way. It seems that, as Freud pointed out, our passing to maturity is marked by the taboo of incest. That is, by the breaking of the circularity of love, and by the time we must take to assess ourselves and recover from the traumatism produced by the taboo of incest to finally integrate the otherness. The breaking of the circularity of love (or narcissism) can be thought, metaphorically speaking, as a second cutting of the umbilical cord in our lives. According to Freud, we can remain stuck in the traumatism produced by confronting the taboo of incest, negating it, or reviving repeatedly the traumatism for long time of our lives without moving from that psychological position. Kant, on the other hand, focuses his attention only on the future, on our duty to pursuing good purposes, on our

capacity for rational assessment to resolve our moral problems, and on the education of our desires to acquire the right skills to be better prepared to reach adulthood on time.

- Final words

Through this chapter I put together and applied most of the concepts worked in previous chapters. The dynamic of *Eros and Psyche* involves most of the problems presented before. Through that dynamic I wanted to depict a model of phases of development, mostly inspired by Freud's work, but also integrating the idea of rational Kantian capacities as operative from the beginning, and not only added at the end. In Apuleius's story we can notice the absence of a character that represents the moral conscience. As we saw before, it is the father who used to take that role in Freud's analysis of myths, but here he is absent. However, it seems that a moral conscience is acting quietly through the characters at all times as a consequence of the inadequacy. The characters indeed experience guilt, and it is guilt what triggers the distortion of Psyche and Aphrodite.

Following the phases of development towards maturity suggested in the chapter, we can notice that there is a difference between immaturity and evilness. In the myth, Psyche and Eros are trapped in a tragic dynamic that starts with the alteration of Aphrodite because of Psyche, and the lie of Eros. In the story, Psyche and Eros fail themselves on more than one occasion. In my opinion, taking Kant's ideas into account, while the agents have not achieved maturity, they have not been able to properly awaken the innate intellectual capacities to handle their inadequacies. Therefore, they are not being evil, but only immature people (still children). Evilness (as understood by Kant) on the other hand should only be attributed to our adulthood. Now, in my belief, the model to exercise our evilness is not a random one, but it is the model or discovery originally pointed out by Freud (which I modified in chapter IV), that is, the model represented by our death drive (for us, Psyche 2.0), which is given through our process of development. So, once we become adults, we should be able to freely choose our

purposes and the means for those purposes, and according to that, it is expected that we behave as being moved by a love drive or a death drive.

The development towards adulthood seems to be long and very complex, and it seems there is no known way to determine how long this process will take for every individual, let alone for a whole society. Finally, it seems more relevant to work on offering support to the process of maturity for the members of our society than to be worried about the evilness of human beings, and the consequences that evilness can bring, in general terms. That is why it seems very relevant, perhaps a moral duty, to reinforce our educational institutions, be available to support people (teachers, therapists, friends, and so on) to manage their feelings of inadequacy by offering in a non-invasive way, tools to acquire a third person perspective. This can happen if we possess the necessary skill, which also indirectly involves collaboration with the training of their and our intellectual capacities and the empowering of their and our love drive over their and our death drive.

CONCLUSION

The first part of the dissertation aimed to clarify the two standpoints, Freud's and Kant's. In the second part, I depicted an explanatory psychological dynamism around the sense of guilt and the love desire by making use of Kant's and Freud's theories, making a theoretical graft. Hence, I used many Freudian ideas, but I complemented them with Kantian postulates. My purpose was to offer a conceptual explanation that can serve as a basis for answering the questions highlighted in the Introduction. Now, I will examine those key questions.

How can we return to goodness once we've become conscious that we have failed morally?

To answer this question, we must first reach an agreement on the idea of goodness. In this dissertation I only considered the Kantian idea of goodness, because the Freudian framework does not attribute a moral status of goodness in us from the beginning. Freud does not reflect on goodness specifically, but on the recovery of our mental health after suffering a mental pathology. According to him, we suffer mental pathologies because of our natural developmental process; therefore, if we can reach mental health at some point of our lives, this fact will be only recognizable in a later phase of our development. As we saw, Freud regards children as being polymorphously perverse, so for him we are not good from the beginning. Therefore, only the Kantian theory helps us conceive of an original, innate goodness that we, as rational agents, can lose partially but never altogether, and recover at different stages of our lives.

The view I developed is that human beings are born with a predisposition to goodness, as Kant thought, but that we can easily become corrupt because of the challenges that arise during our developmental process (here, I draw on Freud's model of development). Therefore, to understand the possibility of recovering that original goodness, we need to consider what stage of development we are at. In other words, it makes a difference whether we have been corrupted as children, young adults, or grown humans.

The moral situation of the child: In chapter IV, I argued that a child who loses her goodness can turn to her adult guardian to help her deal with her guilt. In other words, that child cannot be held responsible. If Kant is right, then every child has the right to be educated (i.e., to be corrected and properly stimulated to learn) as well as possible. Therefore, their guardian, who is also their first role model and teacher, is responsible for their acts. One important premise of my argument is that a child can be conscious of her moral wrongdoing, because she possesses rational capacities, which includes a moral conscience with her from the beginning but is still in the process of unwrapping and reinforcing those rational capacities. The child is in a process of adjusting and learning to be able to understand how to act rightly. Hence, as a child will inevitably make moral mistakes because of her immaturity, it is her human direct environment, her guardian, who has the duty to encourage or facilitate her learning, providing enough guidance for her to learn safely.

The moral situation of the young adult: In Chapters IV, VI, and VII, I explained that a young adult is still immature, and is beginning the difficult process of emancipation from her parents or guardians. According to the Freudian developmental model (which I incorporated in the theoretical graft), that process entails making moral mistakes, and dealing with the consequences of those mistakes, that is, with the condition of being guilty. Now, according to this dissertation, the actions of a young adult can still be excused by her immaturity. However, following Kant, the young adult has the moral duty to work on reversing the wrong moral maxims in order to move to proper adulthood. Therefore, to become a full-fledged adult, the young adult has to figure out how to reconcile the moral standards of the moral law with the moral standards she learned from the adults in charge of her. Now, as I also discussed in those chapters, despite the moral mistakes, we must assume (considering mostly Kant, but also some ideas of Freud) that a young adult counts on the capacity of finding the necessary strength in herself to confront herself with her failures, embrace them, bear them, and transform them into something good by means of an autonomous disposition of character, which can be reached thanks to the collaboration of a third person perspective, thereby becoming a full adult.

The moral situation of the mature adult: as I mention at the end of the last chapter, a mature adult who loses her goodness becomes evil (according to Kant). Therefore, on his view, that adult is morally responsible and punishable. Now, we can also assume that, as the mature adult belongs to a social group, the social group has also the faculty to attribute her responsibility and punishment in matters that have been previously agreed, established, or regulated. Thus, the only way for her to return to goodness is to choose to endorse a will strong enough to reverse the ethical laws that have been ruling her conduct and accept the responsibility and punishment she herself and/or a rightful court of law imposes.

Regarding this classification (of child, young adult, and mature adult), as I explained in chapter VI, it is impossible to pinpoint the precise moment when a young adult (who is still a child) becomes an adult because the decisive moment is achieved differently in every person. That is, different human groups and multicultural societies develop differently, in part because of their different educational models and systems. Therefore, some of those differences can influence the tempo of the process of maturation. Nevertheless, it seems that what is determinant to differentiate this frontier between the young adult and the mature adult, has to do with the inner awareness of the person regarding the possession and mastery (in understanding and use) of her rational capacities, that is, the moment the agent can recognize that she does possess understanding of her moral duties. Therefore, in my view, on the one hand, we must acknowledge this imprecision in the classification in any assessment of an agent's maturity when it comes to judging a moral behavior; however, on the other hand, this imprecision should not be an impediment to judgment, because independently of the age of the agent, we can determine if that person acted from a position of responsibility (awareness and understanding of duties) or not.

For example, a 17- or 18-year-old soldier who was conscripted into the Chilean army and obeyed criminal orders against the Chileans laws and human rights (as I described in my introduction) cannot be judged in the same way as his commanding officer because the older

officer was appointed to a position of great responsibility and consciously accepted that job.[235] Therefore, we can assume that the latter individual is a mature adult; that is, he possesses the necessary capacity to exercise the job, an inner moral ground for exercising his free choice and being responsible for his actions. Now, if the officer who committed crimes were excused by a court of law, we would need powerful proof and explanations (which could exist) to understand why a court of law decides to justify him.

In my view, there could be only one possible excuse for the defence of the officer, the defenders could appeal to his individual psychological process, arguing that he was an immature person, suffering a psychopathology (perversion) that forced him to make bad choices??. Now, if that were the truth, that would mean that the responsibility for his acts would fall in the institution that offered him the position, because that institution mentored his whole career and chose him for the job. In that case, the whole institution requires a reformulation. If that is not the case, that is, if the officer was a proper adult who took the position offered by the army because he was aware that he had the capacity to exercise that role (that includes the understanding of his duties and recognition of the fundamental laws of the country, and the international laws linked to human rights), then we have a ground to think that the officer became evil by choice. In that case, he is the only one responsible for his acts. As we saw in Freud´s work, self-deception (here, evilness) can break consciousness (or splitting our agency), can make a person act wrongly and pathologically (in perversion), and can turn her into a subject to his death drive.

This clarification is relevant if we consider cases like the Chilean General Augusto Pinochet, the highest-ranking member of the Chilean army and the country after the 1973 coup. Pinochet was absolved in many occasions by the Chilean court of law from any punishment and

[235] The former Chilean soldiers who had served in their youth organized to petition for protection and compensation for the psychological damage done to them during the dictatorship and requested an assessment of their human rights. However, Chilean politicians paid little attention to their demands, which were supported by human rights experts. See: Corporación Nacional Unidos De Organizaciones de Ex Conscriptos, *Informe ex Soldados conscriptos*. [accessed 15 March 2022]

<https://www.camara.cl/verDoc.aspx?prmID=134735&prmTIPO=DOCUMENTOCOMISION>

responsibility for the many crimes he committed, because his defence offered an inconsistent proof (contradictory proof) that he may have suffered from a mental illness or an incapacity to remember facts.[236] The crimes committed by Pinochet, from the beginning of his dictatorship, were constantly justified by him by means of a weak (very contradictory) self-deceptive speech. The weak speech could warn the population about his incapacity to exercise the job as leader of the nation; however, he was supported by some politicians and families with power, and he kept the position of leadership for a very long period.[237] With respect to his trial, his defence focused only on the mental break when confronting the court. Even if he had suffered a mental breakdown when he appeared in court of law, that could not excuse the lies, frauds, and crimes he committed before suffering it. In other words, the court of law was evidently not executing its role rightly, and that fact had many consequences for the country.

As we saw over several chapters, if a person commiting a crime cannot recognize her moral status as wrongdoer, that person has no possibility of correcting her moral axioms, healing (even from a mental breakdown), or moving back to goodness again. We can also add that without fair trials (verdicts without contradiction), there is no possibility of psychological healing for a traumatized society (a society that has had to confront violations to their human rights) either. By the end of his days, Pinochet was considered guilty of only a few violations during his dictatorship, even though there was strong evidence implicating him in many more crimes, which prompted some foreign courts of law to request his extradition. A few days before his death, in his ninety-three-year-old birthday, in front of his guests but not in a court of law, he finally declared himself responsible of all the crimes committed. After that declaration, and armed with countless evidence, the Chilean court of law started to debate his guilt and responsibility, but only charged him with a minor crime and sentenced him to home arrest. Why? It was evident to everyone that he was not judged properly before dying; clearly the judgment of the court of law was deceptive, and that caused the Chilean population,

[236] This information is of public knowledge, you can find information in: Wikipedia contributors, 'Augusto Pinochet', *The Free Encyclopaedia.* [accessed 15 March 2022] <https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Augusto_Pinochet#Regreso_a_Chile_y_%C3%BAltimos_a%C3%B1os>

[237] He and the army used to justify their actions claiming that they were saving the country of communism. Therefore, they declared themselves as heroes of the nation.

especially the many victims and their friends and families a lot of pain, frustration, and insecurity.

What role do emotions play in this process of moral fall and recovery?

Over the course of the dissertation, we saw that emotions and feelings trigger important processes. In chapters IV and VII, where we delved into Freud´s ideas, we saw that the feelings of guilt, fear, frustration, and love trigger the split of the vital drive, and the split of consciousness. That is, they trigger the emergence of the death drive, but also of the ego ideal. We saw that the emergence of the death drive is inevitable and sadly necessary for our developmental process. If the pain is inevitable, then we must focus on the challenge of training our will or our ego ideal (as it is understood in chapter VII) to heal and develop towards maturity. The feeling of love plays a relevant role in that development. Because, following Kant, we saw that in order to overcome our weakness of will and self-deceptive state, we must invoke the highest capacities of reason, and as those capacities affect our feelings, reason can motivate and orient love, and love can powerfully motivate our actions. Thus, we can infer that moral feelings (the feeling of love, as benevolence) help the agent find the strength to choose autonomy.

We may surmise that the emotions of the young Chilean soldiers and officers who committed crimes during the dictatorship were in flux. Those who served in their youth in the 70s reported being afraid of disobeying their commanding officers because they risked their lives if they did so. Fear, as we have seen in Freud's account, can trigger the split of our agency and the loss of our integrity as human beings. Those young soldiers had to silence their moral conscience and be loyal to the standards that prevailed at the time, the cruel and atrocious standards imposed by high-ranking officers. That way, their integrity was ruptured, as they became subjects to the will of the officers who gave the orders. In Kantian terminology, we could say that they were treated as mere means and not as ends. However, those standards slowly changed over time; the soldiers were discharged, and then, we can surmise that they fell into a moral limbo, without a clear ethical ground of support (such as a prevailing standard).

They faced public discrimination, which served as a harsh external moral authority capable of indirectly punishing them, making them feel like victims.[238]

If the ex-young soldiers had decided at that point to listen their moral conscience, which had to be silenced during the hard times, its verdict would undoubtedly be scary and loud. They were certainly guilty of many horrible crimes, but according to the model I have developed in this dissertation, we cannot state with certainty that they deserve to be punishable for them (because they are justified); most likely they do not. But were they prepared for a guilty verdict? Is there any socio-psychological support for them? The answer is that the Chilean government of the new democratic times has not offered them any support in all these years.[239] They were rejected by the army and by society at large. In my view, if there were psychological, emotional, and legal counselling for them, that would probably help to heal many social wounds and tensions, bring understanding, and help us learn more historical facts and the final whereabouts of the missing people, because the former military men possess key information they still have not revealed.

How is self-knowledge relevant to this return?

As was explained in chapter II, self-knowledge in this dissertation refers to our knowledge regarding our self-determination to act, the self-determination of the soul observable through its actions. The answer to this question will also revolve around the idea of autonomy because

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238 According to the declarations of the association of ex-soldiers of the dictatorship, they consider themselves victims of the Chilean State, accusing it of using them for evil purposes. They also consider themselves victims of discrimination because they are labelled criminals when they were only following orders. See: Carolina Blanche, 'Ex conscriptos de la Dictadura vuelven a la carga por indemnizaciones', Radio Universidad de Chile. [accessed 15 March 2022].

<https://radio.uchile.cl/2013/03/29/ex-conscriptos-de-la-dictadura-vuelven-a-la-carga-por-indemnizaciones-tambien-somos-victimas/>

239 Nowadays there is little support from the Chilean government for the victims, only a health program called PRAIS, which is quite limited. For more details about this see: Kate Hails, 'Una Mirada Crítica a los Servicios de PRAIS', *SIT Chile, Cultura, Desarrollo y Justicia Social.* [accessed 15 March 2022].

<https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1717&context=isp_collection>

autonomy cannot be achieved without understanding and self-knowledge. It is through deep reflection on our actions that we can obtain knowledge about those free choices made by the soul. Thus, the journey from childhood to adulthood can only be completed through an understanding and recognition of the mechanisms that constantly motivate the agent to fall into heteronomy. Understanding the *modus operandi* of our own inner psychological mechanisms can offer us the necessary awareness to freely choose to determine ourselves in an act. In that sense, the dissertation offered a wide spectrum to understand the scope and functioning of the mechanism of guilt, by thinking of Freud's and Kant's theories together.

Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation was not related to judging whether people are guilty or innocent, responsible or not responsible; rather, it sought to understand our psychological dynamics and the possibilities of healing after wrongdoing. I conclude that there are three elements we need in order to heal psychologically:

In my view, the first necessary element for psychological healing is a supportive social environment willing to help its members manage their difficult emotions, understanding that all human beings must deal with the uncomfortable, complex, and inevitable dynamics of guilt. Also, we must assume that the dynamics of guilt are more complex when the social or family standards for moral assessment that prevail at the time are dramatically distorted or distant from the universal standards of the moral law. Therefore, a morally distorted social context demands major efforts from its members to move back to goodness. According to Kant, we are always capable of reversing our bad moral axioms.

The second element necessary for psychological healing is a willingness to confront our lackings or inadequacy honestly (that willingness can first require to confront the need to look for help to support that confrontation and the psychological resistance to that confrontation), that is, subordinating our many emotions and desires to the commitment to not deceive ourselves. In that sense, to know ourselves, I would claim that first of all we need to love ourselves enough (in a benevolent sense) to be able to look at ourselves (that means, look at

our actions) as we really are, and in this way, agree to the way we are (in our actions), with all our insufficiencies.

To conclude, the third element necessary for psychological healing has to do with also being capable of (if necessary, to look for help for that; that is, to look for a third person perspective) recognising our strengths, mainly those higher rational capacities that, according to Kant, we have always had known, at some level. Recognising these capacities can help us understand how to channel our good emotions and our problematic ones. Doing so entails being brave enough to constantly train those capacities and use them when necessary, especially in those difficult moments when we need to embrace our inadequacies or bear our guilt in order to find good solutions to the many challenges that our failures and our everyday lives present us with.

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