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Hayti Was the Measure: Anti-Black Racism and the Echoes of Empire in Josiah Royce's Philosophy of Loyalty

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Introduction

In 1814, Baron de Vastey wrote in *The Colonial System Unveiled*: “When Europeans came to the new world, their first steps were accompanied by crimes on a grand scale, massacres, the destruction of empires, the obliteration of entire nations from the ranks of the living” (de Vastey 84). Jean Louis Vastey was a Black Haytien man born in 1781, who assumed the role of an administrator in Hayti after Jean-Jacques Dessalines freed the island from European rule. The Haytien Revolution, which was fought from 1791 to 1804, is the origin of Black theories of liberation from the nineteenth century. The possibility of freedom was not found in the rhetoric of American democratic proclamations, as many authors have asserted, but rather in the ability of Black people to fight and claim their natural right to rule themselves instead of being ruled and enslaved by whites. This triumph not only created the first free Black republic the world had known after enslavement; it simultaneously shattered the theories of racial inferiority that asserted that Black men, and consequently the race, were passive savages whose natural position was that of the slave. It is the echo of Hayti's liberation by a deliberate act of revolution that Black thinkers reflected upon for more than a century; the revolution inspired reflections on Black liberation from slavery and Jim Crow through the late 1800s.

Since the early 2000s, the work of Josiah Royce has been used to buttress the ideology of integration and assimilation within the canon of American philosophy. These interpretations of Josiah Royce presuppose two central arguments: first, that Josiah Royce developed a theory of racial amelioration that opposed the racial violence of his time; and second, even if Royce failed to remedy the antiblack racism and xenophobia of his thinking and actions, he provides resources for liberal democratic thinkers concerned with issues of racism in America by means of his philosophy of loyalty. Both claims have been shown to be false in *Another white Man's Burden: Josiah Royce's Quest for a Philosophy of white Racial Empire*. To the first argument, I show that Royce was a deliberate racist thinker who aimed to manage Black people in the American South as they were in British colonies. To the second, I argue that Royce deliberately based his theory of assimilation into white culture and communities on his belief that the Anglo-Saxon people were superior not only to other white ethnic groups such as the Teutons, but also to the Black, Indigenous, and Asian races who had populations in the United States. A foundational misunderstanding by Royceans who see Josiah Royce's idea of loyalty to loyalty as a progressive social-political philosophy revolves around the neglect of key texts and debates Royce himself responded to in his writings. This neglect is perhaps most apparent in Royce's disagreement with Thomas Nelson Page over lynching, but perhaps even more important for our understanding of Royce's philosophy of loyalty is his response to Houston Stewart Chamberlain's *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*.

Present interpretations of historic and contemporary Black figures focus almost solely on integrating a given Black thinker into previously established white schools of thought. This technique resuscitates the previously racist work of white philosophers by directing them toward the problem of race and the perils of racism. Such an approach to the study of race has rarely been analyzed since many of the Black figures recognized within American philosophy are done so through establishing that the said Black thinker was under the tutelage of the white philosopher or a student of a white philosopher's thought. Understanding Black thinkers' texts in this assimilative way has made the historical periodization irrelevant. Philosophers are free to integrate Black thinkers as they please with little regard for what these Black authors may have said or even their status or position in their day. It is not uncommon to read, for example, W. E. B. Du Bois as a student of pragmatism or the Chicago School of Sociology despite the fact that Du Bois was the founder of American sociology a decade before in the early 1890s (Morris; Wright). Philosophers attempt to integrate these figures into the existing canon of American philosophical thought. While this critique is

certainly not uncommon in my previous writings on Black historical figures,¹ and has a long history in Black philosophers' engagements with the disciplinary limits of philosophy more generally (see Harris, *Philosophy of Struggle*), the application of these critiques to the debates surrounding Royce is particularly relevant because the conceptualizations of freedom and equality that Black philosophers articulated are fundamentally at odds with being colonized within the United States (AwMB2 vii–xxi). My critique of both the existing scholarship and the interpretive orientation of American philosophers emerged from what I observed throughout conversations about racism and Black figures—complete ignorance of the thought and writings of Black intellectuals separate from their engagement with white philosophers.

Contrary to the idea that all critiques of white philosophy as racist are ahistorical and anachronistic, there is a substantial amount of evidence suggesting that Black peoples around the world perceived the encroachments and death-making of Europe from the eighteenth to twentieth centuries (AwMB). Throughout the nineteenth century, Black thinkers waged seemingly endless critiques of the slave institution and the colonial program that were the basis of America's empire and its democratic republic. The history of colonialism and enslavement are often absent from engagements with American philosophers. While colonialism and racism may be acknowledged as problems in early America, these ills are externalized, treated as maladies reflected upon by white American thinkers rather than the basis of white philosophers' theories. In dealing with problems of colonialism and racism, American philosophy summarily ignores the fact that Black thinkers in the nineteenth century did not simply appeal to the conscience of whites to abolish slavery. They rather developed positive scientific accounts of race and racism that sought to refute the ethnological findings and origin stories of white scholars. This basic fact of history has huge ramifications for how philosophers and intellectual historians contextualize the debates, and how they engage in the reconstruction of ethnological arguments advanced by classical American philosophers such as Josiah Royce. The almost exclusive focus on how Josiah Royce's thinking about race and racism differed from that of other white thinkers offers little to philosophers who endeavor to understand what might have been considered anti-racist thought in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. More importantly, this focus ignores the concepts of freedom and equality that were endorsed and advocated by Black people of that time.

Black philosophers from the nineteenth century such as Hosea Easton, David Walker, and Frederick Douglass, and Black philosophers from the twentieth century such as W. E. B. Du Bois and Anna Julia Cooper reflected on the historical significance that Hayti had in the generation of Black American resistance literature. Today, however, these writings go unmentioned in the discipline of philosophy. This article argues that the notions of freedom developed by Black thinkers throughout the nineteenth century were solidly based on the idea that the Black race had the capacity and right to rule themselves. Current conversations concerning the desire of Black Americans to be part of the American republic deliberately decontextualize the demands of Black abolitionists and thought leaders throughout the 1800s. The liberation of Hayti showed that the Black race could establish government and rule over themselves. This historical event becomes evidence that Black people should not only be freed from slavery but that they were fully capable of suffrage rights and citizenship. Consequently, I argue that the historical events motivating nineteenth-century understandings of Black liberty and freedom were incompatible with many if not most of the theories by white American philosophers during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries concerning the Black race. This incompatibility is particularly worrisome regarding the thought of Josiah Royce. While Royce was influenced by the expanding works of white anthropologists, ethnologists, and philosophers aiming to modernize their colonizing techniques in the late 1800s, Black intellectuals were reflecting on the lessons of Hayti and the promise that this victory held for the realization of Black freedom in America and Black internationalist struggles against the European empire in the twentieth century (Byrd).

On Self-Possession and the Capacity for Self-Government

In the early nineteenth century, the Haytian Revolution played many roles: it was an example of racial liberation; it provided the refutation of ethnological theories of racial inferiority; and it signaled the birth of a new epoch of racial equality for the darker races (Joseph, *Haitian Modernity*; "Memory"). The revolt against the tyranny of the white French colonialists indicated that within the Black race, there was a natural tendency toward freedom—a God-given intuition yearning for liberty that reverberated throughout the Americas and the Caribbean (Hunt). Throughout

Black abolitionist periodicals and pamphlets, Black Americans celebrated the Haytien Revolution as evidence that the Black race was not intended by God to be the slaves of whites. In March 1827, the first Black newspaper, *Freedom's Journal*, was created by Samuel Cornish and John B. Russwurm to further the cause for Black freedom from enslavement and white supremacy (Bacon, *Freedom's Journal*). Throughout its pages, *Freedom's Journal* emphasized self-determination and the right of the Black race to rule over itself without the violence imposed by racial inferiority. As Jacqueline Bacon explains: "To better understand the creation of *Freedom's Journal*, we must look not beyond but within the African American community. Generations of leaders had laid the groundwork for the periodical by building community institutions, demonstrating the power of rhetoric in forming a national consciousness, and asserting the right to determine their destinies" (Bacon, "History of *Freedom's Journal*" 3). This comes as no surprise given John Russwurm's description of the meaning that the Haytien Revolution had for the Black race.

John B. Russwurm graduated from Bowdoin College in 1826. Like other antebellum Blacks, he believed both in man's natural yearning for liberty and in the inability of enslavement to extinguish that desire in one's soul. Russwurm's commencement speech "The Conditions and Prospects of Hayti" not only articulated his praise for the success of the Haytien Revolution, but also reflected a larger point concerning the philosophical anthropology of the Black race under the duress of slavery. Russwurm writes: "The changes which take place in the affairs of this world show the instability of sublunary things. Empires rise and fall, flourish and decay Man alone remains the same being, whether placed under the torrid suns of Africa or in the more congenial temperate zone. A principle of liberty is implanted in his breast, and all efforts to stifle it are as fruitless as would be the attempt to extinguish the fires of Etna" (Russwurm 395). Russwurm continued in his commencement speech:

Can we conceive of anything which can cheer the desponding spirit, can reanimate, and stimulate it to put everything to the hazard? Liberty can do this. Such were its effects upon the Haytiens men who in slavery showed neither spirit nor genius: but when Liberty, when once Freedom struck their astonished ears, they became new creatures: stepped forth as men, and showed to the world, that though Slavery may benumb, it cannot entirely destroy our faculties. Such were Touissant L'Ouverture, Dessalines, and Christophe. (Russwurm 396)

Russwurm held a newly liberated Hayti in high regard, and believed that the newly founded Black republic held a new possibility for the Black race. The liberation of a nation by the militant and revolutionary resistance of enslaved African peoples showed to the world that freedom was not a matter decided by the position of white civilization, but is in actuality a right born by the flesh and housed in the human soul—a soul Black men reclaimed with iron and blood on Haytien soil.

The Haytien Revolution bolstered the belief that the condition of slavery imposed upon the Black race was the creation of white greed, immorality, and inhumanity. The revolution was perceived as a historical and providential refutation of white supremacist theories that designated the Black race as docile and naturally subservient to whites. Educated and free Blacks in the United States were moved to circulate and popularize this evidence to their free and bonded brethren. The Black press was now motivated to articulate and socialize nineteenth-century Black Americans into a different racial consciousness—one that did not solely depend on deliverance from the chains of chattel slavery by the grace of God. It offered rather a more agentic account according to which the actions of Black men and women could topple the laws and overcome the whips of white tyranny. Said differently, the Black press became the organ through which the Black race could see itself anew. It provided a new lens through which to interpret their history, and through which to view their current political situation as enslaved in the United States. As the historian Charlton Yingling explains:

For five decades from the start of the Haitian Revolution in 1791 to the closing of the *Colored American* in 1841, the Black Atlantic had varyingly negotiated Haiti's example of black talent and independence that had, to many, legitimated the efficacy of universal freedom and inalienable rights. Haiti's autonomy inspired the ambitions, informed the resistance, and instructed the bigoted adversaries of the free black community of New York City. Incidentally, the editors of the early black press came also to imbue the symbol of Haiti with selective values and evidence, initiating a dynamic reciprocation in which they often projected meaning on an imagined Haiti as much as Haitian realities influenced them in their own right. (315)

Throughout the nineteenth century, Black thinkers embraced the philosophical outlook committed to the view that the Black race could realize freedom through the actions of Black peoples. Contrary to the view that Black people were natural born slaves, the Haytien Revolution was evidence of the humanity gifted to the Black race by God.

Many of the early nineteenth-century Black philosophical treatises against slavery sought to awaken the Black race from the ignorance imposed upon them through the teachings of a white Christianity. The latter sought to convince Black people that their slavery was not only natural but intended by God. “Ignorance is a mist, low down into the very dark, and almost impenetrable abyss which our fathers for many centuries have been plunged,” writes David Walker (20) in his appeal to the “coloured citizens of the world.” White Christianity aimed to make slaves of men and cattle of humans. This was the deliberate aim of the white religion, according to Walker, and would be corrected when God himself ordered salvation. Hayti was thus the result of Black men being undeterred by the false ideals of freedom offered by the white race and their religion. God gave the Black race prophets that showed them the truth of freedom and, in doing so, ignited in the world proof of the Black race’s desire for self-determination. As Walker writes,

the Lord our God, as true as he sits on his throne in heaven . . . will give you a Hannibal, and when the Lord shall have raised him up, and given him to you for your possession. Oh! my suffering brethren, remember the divisions and consequent sufferings of Carthage and of Hayti. Read the History particularly of Hayti and see how they were butchered by the whites. The person whom God shall give you, give him your support, and let him go his length, and behold in him, the salvation of your God. (21)

It would be a mistake to interpret the significance of the Haytien Revolution, as is often done, in purely political terms. While the Haytien Revolution did inspire Black radical theorists and theologians in the early 1800s, like David Walker or Robert Alexander Young, who authored *The Ethiopian Manifesto*, the independence of Hayti also produced an intellectual shift in how Black Americans publicly engaged white ethnology within the Western world. As the historian Bruce Dain explains: “The specter of the Haitian Revolution fundamentally changed and heightened American public discourse regarding race. Blacks had acted on a world stage in the most dramatic way possible. They had agency as never before. To many European Americans this was terrifying; to African Americans, inspiring” (Dain 83). The demystification of white ethnology and popular theories of Black inferiority followed from the self-proclaimed right of Black Haytiens to have their freedom at any cost. The liberty of Black Haytiens that reverberated throughout the African diaspora led to radically new Black perspectives on religion, philosophy, and science. For example, Hosea Easton begins his 1838 work *A Treatise on the Intellectual Character and Civil and Political Condition of the Colored People of the U. States and the Prejudice Exercised Towards Them* by asserting a monogenic theory of human origin as the basis of Black racial equality and the refutation of white racial superiority. Easton unapologetically insisted that

one great truth is acknowledged by all Christendom, viz.—God hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth. Or, in other words, I conclude it is a settled point with the wisest of the age, that no constitutional difference exists in the children of men, which can be said to be established by hereditary laws. (5)

By observing natural variation within the same species of plants and animals, Easton continues: “The variety of color, in the human species, is the result of the same laws which variegates the whole creation. The same species of flowers is variegated with innumerable colors; and yet the species is the same, possessing the same general qualities, undergoing no intrinsic change, from these accidental causes” (5).

Dr. James McCune Smith was the most formally educated Black person of the early nineteenth century. McCune Smith was born in New York in 1813. Unable to obtain a formal education in the United States due to antiblack racism, he traveled to Scotland to attend the University of Glasgow. From 1832–1837, Smith earned a BA in philosophy, an MA in the hard sciences, and finally an MD. Despite his rich knowledge of Greek, Latin, and heroes of Western thought, it was Hayti that most particularly motivated his thinking about blackness. His attention was specifically drawn to the philosophical orientation and character of the generals of the Haytien Revolution: Toussaint L’Ouverture, Jean-Jacques Dessalines, and Henri Christophe. In *A Lecture on the Haytien Revolutions*, Smith argued that the Haytien Revolution was an event “determined to overthrow an ERROR which designing and interested men had craftily instilled into the civilized world, a belief in the natural inferiority of the negro race” (24).

Smith attributes this epochal nature of the Haytien Revolution to the ideals that inspired the rebellion: “It was the glory and the warrantable boast of Toussaint, that he had been the instrument of demonstrating that, even with the worst odds against them, this race is entirely capable of achieving liberty and of self-government” (Lecture 24–25). Smith believed it was the ideas, the values L’Ouverture produced to realize a free Black race in Hayti, that were the true gift of the revolution. L’Ouverture’s idea of a Black race capable and inherently due freedom established an isochronal wave throughout nineteenth-century Black thought. “By abolishing caste he proved the artificial nature of such distinctions, and further demonstrated that even slavery cannot unfit men for the full exercise of all the functions which belong to free citizens,” writes Smith (Lecture 25). Because of Hayti, specifically the ideas of L’Ouverture, the world now knew that the theories of Black inferiority and caricatures of Blacks as subhuman were pure inventions of the racist white imagination.

Throughout his writings, Smith made the racial caricatures of Blacks into weapons to use against white ethnology. In his editorial responding to Ephraim George Squier’s *Nicaragua: Its People, Scenery, Monuments, and the Proposed Interoceanic Canal*, Smith highlighted that even when white American ethnologists accepted a seemingly color-blind and monogenetic account of human origins, Indigenous and Negro races were assumed to be primitive and bettered through admixture in intellect and appearance (see Barnhart).

Smith took offense to Squier’s remark that the Negro was made handsomer through their admixture with the native populations of Central America. “Mr. Squier,” he writes, “professes to be an Ethnographer. He is a member of the New York Ethnological Society; he should know, therefore, that the Joloffs on the Guinea coast are just such looking negroes as those in Nicaragua” (Smith, “Nicaragua” 86). Pointing out the prejudicial ignorance of Squier led Smith to conclude that “the Negro ‘with us’ is not an actual physical being of flesh and bones and blood, but a hideous monster of the mind, ugly beyond all physical portraying, so utterly and ineffably monstrous as to frighten reason from its throne, and justice from its balance” (Smith, “Nicaragua” 86). By advancing the argument that racist ideas of the Negro were nothing more than products of the white mind, Smith showed that white ethnology constructed the Negro to reflect the bigotry of white scientists. Because nature shows no evidence of Negro inferiority, Smith insisted that white ethnology was merely masquerading as objective science.

In 1857, James Theodore Holly, author of *A Vindication of the Capacity of the Negro Race for Self-Government and Civilized Progress as Demonstrated by Historical Events of the Haytian Revolution*, reiterated Smith’s analysis describing the Haytien Revolution as “one of the noblest, grandest, and most justifiable outbursts against tyrannical oppression that is recorded on the pages of the world’s history” (6). Holly believed the revolution emerged for the suppressed humanity of enslaved men who understood that, in their souls, they possessed the God-instilled notion of liberty. “A race of almost dehumanized men—made so by an oppressive slavery of three centuries arose from their slumber of ages and redressed their own unparalleled wrongs with a terrible band in the name of God and humanity” (Holly 6). This was unlike the American Revolution where “American revolters had their colonial government in their own hands, as well as their individual liberty at the commencement of the revolution. The black insurgents of Hayti had yet to grasp both their personal liberty and the control of their colonial government, by the might of their own right hands, when their heroic struggle began” (Holly 7).

By the mid-century, Black thinkers had well-established an analysis of government and political economy describing the myth of Black inferiority as nothing more than the deliberate policy of white tyrants that mirrored how nations throughout history had created political classes of people they deemed to be inferior. By creating a political analysis that broke with the presumption that the hierarchical organization of society was dictated by Nature and God, Black thinkers created a paradigm of racial analysis that understood that whites created societal structures and ideologies to produce Black inferiority for their own interests. In 1852, Martin R. Delany wrote in *The Condition, Elevation, Emigration, and Destiny of the Colored People of the United States, Politically Considered* that there are and have been numerous classes proscribed and oppressed, and it was not for them to cut short their wise deliberations, and arrest their proceedings in contention, as to the cause, whether on account of language, the color of eyes, hair, skin, or their origin of country—because all this is contrary to reason, a contradiction to common sense, at war with nature herself, and at variance with facts as they stare us every day in the face, among all nations, in every country—this being made the pretext as a matter of policy alone—a fact worthy of observation, that wherever the objects of oppression are the most easily distinguished by any peculiar or general

characteristics, these people are the more easily oppressed, because the war of oppression is the more easily waged against them. (18)

Extending the insights of previous thinkers, Delany argued that the proscription of Black Americans by whites was “mere policy, nature having nothing to do with it. [A]s a policy, we the colored people were selected as the subordinate class in this country, not on account of any actual or supposed inferiority on their part, but simply because, in view of all the circumstances of the case” (19).

Even Frederick Douglass held the view that the genesis of Black philosophies of struggle—the very concepts deployed to understand how a white republic that committed genocide and only recently had abolished slavery could accommodate the existence of free Blacks—came to be from the blood and life of Hayti. In his *Lecture on Haiti*, Douglass wrote:

Speaking for the Negro, I can say, we owe much to Walker for his appeal; to John Brown for the blow struck at Harper’s Ferry, to Lundy and Garrison for their advocacy, and to the abolitionists in all the countries of the world. We owe much especially to Thomas Clarkson, to William Wilberforce, to Thomas Fowell Buxton, and to the anti-slavery societies at home and abroad; but we owe incomparably more to Haiti than to them all. I regard her as the original pioneer emancipator of the nineteenth century. It was her one brave example that first of all, startled the Christian world into a sense of the Negro’s manhood. It was she who first awoke the Christian world to a sense of “the danger of goading too far the energy that slumbers in a black man’s arm.” Until Haiti struck for freedom, the conscience of the Christian world slept profoundly over slavery. It was scarcely troubled even by a dream of this crime against justice and liberty. (35–36)

Throughout the fields of science, philosophy, theology, and ethnology, the Black race was thought to be no more than a mere animal. The Black man was no more than a mere beast (Curry, *Man-Not*; “Killing Boogeymen”). The liberation showed the Black race could produce men and, in doing so, fundamentally challenged the idea that the Negro had no men (or women) and could not grasp the natural rights of man ordained by God. As Douglass writes:

The Negro was in its estimation a sheep like creature, having no rights which white men were bound to respect, a docile animal, a kind of ass, capable of bearing burdens, and receiving stripes from a white master without resentment, and without resistance. The mission of Haiti was to dispel this degradation and dangerous delusion, and to give to the world a new and true revelation of the black man’s character. This mission she has performed and performed it well. (36)

This unshaken faith in the capacity of the Black race to be guided toward liberty and freedom through an ideal of Black self-governance and racial conscience, urging for Black life to be worthy of absolute freedom, stands in stark contradiction to Royce’s administrative plan to domestically colonize Black Americans.

Loyalty was a Metric of white Racial Superiority: Josiah Royce and Houston Stewart Chamberlain’s Debate over Racial Stock

For over a decade, I have argued quite forcefully that Black men at the turn of the century had read and refuted the dominant ethnological frames of Josiah Royce’s racial corpus and understood Royce to be an assimilationist. Other white American philosophers, however, argued quite strongly against the evidence I presented, concluding that Josiah Royce was the most progressive (white) American thinker on race in the nineteenth century (see Kegley, “Is a Coherent Racial Identity”; “Josiah Royce on Race”; “Racism, Race, and Josiah Royce”) and offering anti-racist theories concerning Black American oppression (Pratt, Introduction; Sullivan, “Whiteness as Wise Provincialism”; “Royce’s Race Questions”; “Transforming Whiteness”). Whereas Royce’s reflections on Black people and other racial contacts view non-white bodies and cultures as an obstacle to national unity and social cohesion, white supremacist thinkers like the British Germanophile Houston Stewart Chamberlain believe they were incapable of genuine loyalty to begin with. The disagreement between Royce and Chamberlain was based on a debate concerning the right to rule over others. Would this right be materialized in the worldview of the Anglo-Saxon or the Teutonic race? This is the fundamental disagreement between the racial worldview of Josiah Royce in “Race Questions and

Prejudices” and Chamberlain in *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, which was first published in 1899. At the turn of the twentieth century, the white races of the world aimed to establish which evolutionary strand of white supremacy had earned the right to govern over the world and hold the torch of civilization for the next hundred years. This contest led philosophers and statesmen to not only articulate the relationship between race and nation, but also the values that different races had given to the world that justified their dominion over all others.

Houston Stewart Chamberlain was born an Englishman in 1855. Despite his birthplace, he had a cultivated love for German culture. Martin Woodroffe (“Racial Theories of History”) remarks that Chamberlain “was a Wagnerite, eventually marrying the composer’s daughter Eva, was an intimate of and an influence upon Wilhelm II, and was one of the first to hail Adolf Hitler as the future saviour of Germany” (Woodroffe 143). As a member of the Wagner Circle, Chamberlain belonged to an intellectual community formed around the ideas of Richard Wagner, who believed that the nineteenth century “was leading white Germanic mankind towards decadence, degeneration, and death” (Chapoutot). Chamberlain greatly admired Hitler, and this admiration was reciprocated. In *Mein Kampf*, Hitler suggests that the lack of a *Weltanschauung* by political leaders in the Reich could be ameliorated by the ideas of Houston S. Chamberlain. Hitler writes: “Those who had the Government of the country in their hands were quite as indifferent to principles of civil wisdom laid down by thinkers like Houston Stewart Chamberlain as our political leaders now are” (264).

In “Race Questions and Prejudices,” Royce enumerates several reasons for his distrust of Chamberlain’s claims concerning the exceptionality of the Germanic man, while still supporting the idea of a science dedicated to understanding racial types and their psychologies. This is not surprising, since this was the central thrust of Adolf Bastian’s research. Royce explains that he has no problem trusting the sciences of race, which are ethnology and the recently emergent field of anthropology. As he writes, “[a]s a fact, if I supposed that, in their present stage of progress, the sciences which deal with man had already attained to exact results regarding the mental and moral differences, prospects, and destinies, of the different stocks of the genus homo, nobody would be humbler than I should be in accepting, and in trying to use the verdict that would then have been obtained” (“Race Questions and Prejudices” 267). He then explains that as a student of ethics and common human nature, he has been “a good deal baffled in trying to discover just what the results of science are regarding the true psychological and moral meaning of race differences” (“Race Questions and Prejudices” 267). This bafflement however does not come from a general criticism of all ethnology, but specifically the work of Houston Stewart Chamberlain. Royce explains:

[W]hen I consult any of the known *Rassentheoretiker* [race/breed theorists] for light, I do indeed learn that the concept of race is the key to the comprehension of all history, and that, if you only form a clear idea of the important types of men (types such, for instance, as the marvelous Germanen of Chamberlain’s *Grundlagen des Neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*, you can then determine with exactness precisely who ought to rule and who ought to yield, and can predict the forms of civilization, the *Weltanschauungen*, and the other possessions, which will be characteristic of each type of men, so long as that type shall endure. (“Race Questions and Prejudices” 269)

Previous scholars have simply overlooked this passage and mistakenly suggested that Royce is generally talking about race theory, or more specifically ethnology, but this is not Royce’s target. *Rassentheoretiker* means race theorist not theory, so Royce is clear that he is targeting the race theorist Chamberlain who argues for an enduring Germanic type in *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*. Royce says

When I observe, however, that the *Rassentheoretiker* [race theorist] frequently uses his science to support most of his personal prejudices, and is praised by his sympathizers almost equally for his exact knowledge and for his vigorous display of temperament, I begin to wonder whether a science which mainly devotes itself to proving that we ourselves are the salt of the earth, is after all so exact as it aims to be. (“Race Questions and Prejudices” 269–70)

Royce is criticizing the reception of Chamberlain’s *Foundations* and its aspirant visions for the Teuton to lead the world to civilization. This is what Royce means when he invokes Matthew 5:13. The salt of the earth refers to a chosen and benevolent people, a group that has a message to improve the world. This is exactly the argument being advanced by Chamberlain throughout the pages of *Foundations*. Royce is not criticizing ethnology as such but is indicting the basis of Chamberlain’s book because he picks the wrong racial stock as the vanguard of twentieth-century civilization. In other words, he chose the Teuton instead of the Anglo-Saxon.

The references to competition between a Germanic and Anglo-Saxon worldview become more apparent when considered with Royce's references to Rudyard Kipling's poem "The Truce of the Bear" and *The Jungle Book*. Royce has repeatedly drawn reference to the tropes of Kipling both in "Race Questions and Prejudices" and in "Some Characteristic Tendencies of American Civilization." "The Truce of the Bear" was Kipling's warning to the world of the threat an imperial Russia would pose to Britain and the Western world more generally. After Russia cut Britain out of a deal for naval ships and railways and chose to partner with France, America, and Germany, Kipling warned that Britain had much to lose from an imperial power that showed disregard for the British Empire. The irony is that by 1914, Kipling had to reverse his course and urge Britain to partner with Russia to defeat the threat rising in Germany that was inspired by the Wagnerism of Chamberlain's *Foundations*. In fact, in an article entitled "Kipling and the Truce of the Bear," Dr. Charles Blackford, an associate editor for the *Stanton News* points out the contradiction between Kipling's writing of "The Truce of the Bear" in 1898 and his newfound support of a British-Russia alliance in 1914. To this Kipling replied that Germany is the present menace, not to Europe alone, but to the whole civilized world. If Germany, by any means, is victorious you may rest assured that it will be a very short time before she turns her attention to the United States. If you could meet the refugees from Belgium flocking into England and have the opportunity of checking their statements of unimaginable atrocities and barbarities studiously committed, you would, I am sure, think as seriously on these matters as we do, and in your unpreparedness for modern war you would do well to think very seriously indeed. (107)

Royce is suggesting that Chamberlain's work has a nationalistic tone and an exceptionalism that ignores the contributions of Anglo-Saxon heritage to civilization at large. Royce happened to be correct as, less than a decade later, World War I would set the stage for a rising German empire set to challenge France, Russia, Britain, and America. Chamberlain praised the actions of Germany during World War I as a fulfilling of his prophecies laid out in *Foundations* and argued that the rise of Germany was a civilizational war for the German ideal against the decadent values of the un-German (see Field).

Beyond acknowledging that Royce mentioned Chamberlain's work, no philosopher has engaged this text besides my analyses in *Another White Man's Burden*. Whereas Royce offers loyalty to loyalty as a program of social cohesion that enlarges the community, Chamberlain focuses much of his attention on the Teutonic origins of loyalty and the state. In the sixth chapter of *Foundations*, in a section entitled "Loyalty and Freedom," Chamberlain advances the argument that Germanic peoples have inherited from the Greeks the blessing of the Stagirite. Chamberlain does believe that there are fundamental and inherent differences between the races, and he ridicules views that say otherwise. "Certain anthropologists would fain teach us that all races are equally gifted; we point to history and answer: that is a lie! The races of mankind are markedly different in the nature and also in the extent of their gifts, and the Germanic races belong to the most highly gifted group, the group usually termed Aryan (Chamberlain 542). However, Chamberlain's concept of racial inferiority and superiority cannot be reduced to an unrefined or brutish belief in the biological determinism or ethnological hierarchy. For Chamberlain, the testament of a race's *Weltanschauungen* lay solely with the strength of its loyalty, or as Chamberlain himself says of the Teuton, "[loyalty] is the central point from which we can survey his whole character, or better, his personality" (548). Quoting Karl Lamprecht, Chamberlain writes "[t]hat no one in the world surpassed the Teuton in loyalty" (546).

Chamberlain did not believe that loyalty was unique to Teutons, but rather that it was perfected by their racial characteristics. Loyalty was developed by freedom and self-determination. It requires individuals of a racial group to serve an ideal to rationally embrace their self-will as cared for and cultivated by the unity of the group. This is unlike the traits of the Negroes who serve their white masters as dogs obey theirs. Chamberlain explains that only a free man may enjoy the choice to select their master and in doing so choose himself, as the idea of loyalty makes the master and the person loyal to the master the same. The Negro is a weak race to be ruled. He was born a slave. The Teuton chooses his master given under the duress of freedom. Chamberlain writes:

Loyalty, though distinguishing the Teutons from mongrel races, is not altogether a specific Germanic trait. One finds it in almost all purely bred races, nowhere more than among the negroes, for example, and—I would ask—what man could be more faithful than the noble dog? No, in order to reveal that "primary source of Germanicism," we must show what is the nature of this Germanic loyalty, and we can only succeed in doing so if we have grasped the fact that freedom is the intellectual basis of the whole Germanic nature. For the characteristic feature of this loyalty is its

free self-determination. The human character resembles the nature of God as the theologians represent it: complex and yet indiscernible, an inseparable unity. This loyalty and this freedom do not grow the one out of the other, they are two manifestations of the same character which reveals itself to us on one occasion more from the intellectual on another more from the moral side. The negro and the dog serve their masters, whoever they maybe: that is the morality of the weak, or, as Aristotle says, of the man who is born to be a slave; the Teuton chooses his master, and his loyalty is therefore loyalty to himself: that is the morality of the man who is born free. (546–47)

Freedom was a condition offering individuals the ability to pursue their course in life. It burdens the individual to pursue their self-interest. Chamberlain explains that

[f]reedom is an expansive power which scatters men, Germanic loyalty is the bond which by its inner power binds men more closely than the fear of the tyrant's sword: freedom signifies thirst after direct self-discovered truth, loyalty the reverence for that which has appeared to our ancestors to be true; freedom decides its own destiny and loyalty holds that decision unswervingly and forever. (548)

Beyond a practice or value, Chamberlain believes that Teutonic loyalty rises to the level where it is a guiding force of life and being. "Loyalty to the loved one, to friend, parents, and fatherland we find in many places; but here, in the case of the Teuton, something is added, which makes the great instinct become a profoundly deep spiritual power, a principle of life" (Chamberlain 549).

The Teuton laid claim to the truest ideal according to Chamberlain. Following Kant's Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, which asks what man makes of himself under the condition of freedom, Chamberlain insists that the Germanic ideal best describes the racial inclination and moral personality of the Teuton when free to decide their end.

If we wish clearly to distinguish the Teuton from his nearest kinsmen we should study the inmost being of both and compare a Kant as an ethical teacher with an Aristotle. For Kant "the autonomy of the will is the highest principle of morality"; a "moral personality" exists for him only from the moment when "a man is subject to no other laws than those which he gives to himself." And according to what principles shall this autonomous personality give itself laws? We must suppose that there is an unprovable "realm of impulses—certainly only an ideal!" An ideal is therefore to determine life! (Chamberlain 550)

Like Royce, Chamberlain understands loyalty as an ideal that liberates the individual through his choice to serve the cause of the race—by liberating him from himself through his service to the Germanic peoples. The ideal guides life—directs it toward the truth of the larger cause and racial legacy of the Teutonic peoples.

In *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, Royce defines loyalty provisionally as "the willing and practical and through going devotion of a person to a cause" (51). One is loyal when they first have a cause to which they are loyal when said person willingly and completely dedicates themselves to this cause, and lastly expresses their devotion to this cause practically and acts consistently in service to this cause (*Philosophy of Loyalty* 52). A cause, according to Royce, is larger than the private self of individuals and social (*Philosophy of Loyalty* 51–52), but "something that unifies many human lives as one" (*Philosophy of Loyalty* 351). Like Chamberlain, Royce offers his philosophy of loyalty as a practical philosophy (*Philosophy of Loyalty* 351) that can inform not only how individuals make rational choices but how individuals look upon national problems. Royce explains that loyalty in the plainest form is "is the Will to Believe in something eternal, and to express that belief in the practical life of a human being" (*Philosophy of Loyalty* 357). Chamberlain simply believes that this ideal, which Royce intends to be practical, is best exemplified throughout the history of the Teutons. "The Ideal is, as Kant here wishes it to be understood, a practical idea as distinguished from a theoretical one. And that which we see here, on the heights of metaphysics, in clear-cut outlines, we find again everywhere: the Teuton is the most ideal, but at the same time the most practical, man in the world" (Chamberlain 551). Royce envisions loyalty similarly, though he traces this to his lessons with William James. Royce considers himself a pragmatist precisely because he believes that "all search for truth is a practical activity, with an ethical purpose, and that a purely theoretical truth, such as should guide no significant active process, is a barren absurdity" (*Philosophy of Loyalty* 326).

Royce had previously established the idea(s) that guides humanity in history and through the empire. Now he is concerned with the means through which the individual comes to this realization, not through predeterminism, but a rational choice. Royce achieves this by showing that loyalty must involve sociality. As I argue in the chapter entitled “No Revisions Needed: Historicizing Royce’s Provincialism, His Appeal to the white Man’s Burden, and Contemporary Claims of His Anti-Racism” (Curry, *Another white Man’s Burden*), provincialism is a mechanism of assimilation for Royce. The ideal becomes social because the local community makes the foreigner part of the ideal. A loyal person is a person who is not simply driven by their emotional relationship to a cause, but their service and devotion to it. Their life is dedicated to the enhancement and realization of this cause (see Royce, *Philosophy of Loyalty* 18). The cause is embodied by the person and guides their reality completely. This cause, however, is not simply personal; it is not only one’s dedication to their achievement or end. Royce explains that “the cause to which a loyal man is devoted is never something wholly impersonal. It concerns other men. Loyalty is social” (Royce, *Philosophy of Loyalty* 20). Loyalty to loyalty allows the assimilation of foreign groups into the ideals of the dominant racial group.

The preface to Royce’s *Race Questions, Provincialism, and Other American Problems* explains quite readily that loyalty to loyalty assimilates racial groups into the ideals of the Anglo-Saxon while joining diverse communities and people into a shared American ideal. “Loyalty is the practical aspect and expression of an idealistic philosophy,” according to Royce (*Race Questions* vii). It expresses how the spirit becomes a principle that acts and engages with the problems confronting white American life. As I have argued in *Another white Man’s Burden*, Royce uses assimilation to mean two very specific processes, “one that brings races into the fold of the dominant Anglo-Saxon worldview, and the other that describes the organization of the society such that diverse races and communities are nationally tied together” (Curry, *AwMB* 70).

After giving two examples of less civilized racial stocks (namely, the Japanese and the Negro in Jamaica) that benefitted from contact with the Anglo-Saxon, Royce (“*Race Questions and Prejudices*”) replies to Chamberlain’s theories of Teutonic loyalty that

[i]n estimating, in dealing with races, in defining what their supposedly unchangeable characteristics are, in planning what to do with them, we are all prone to confuse the accidental with the essential. We are likely to take for an essential race-characteristic what is a transient incident, or a product of special social conditions. We are disposed to view as a fatal and overwhelming race-problem what is a perfectly curable accident of our present form of administration. If we are indeed of a superior race ourselves, we shall, however, best prove the fact by learning to distinguish the accidental from the essential in our relations with other races. (“*Race Questions and Prejudices*” 277)

Royce’s theory of racial assimilation requires that races can change from environmental stimuli and contact. In this regard, he is much more closely aligned to the racial psychology of Adolf Bastian, which explains how elementary ideas provide the basis of cultural evolution (Curry, *AwMB* 60–64). Royce argues that “[n]o race of men, then, can lay claim to a fixed and hereditary type of mental life such as we can now know with exactness to be unchangeable” (*Race Questions* 285). This serves his interests in two ways: first, it shows that American and British races can have an idea of loyalty that is of a more practical consequence than the Teutonic concept, and, second, that primitive races like the Negro or childlike races like the Japanese can improve upon contact with superior races. Both examples show that Chamberlain has mistaken what is thought to be essential in races with that which is accidental. The primitive state of the races in question is a result of their condition. Once supplied with the true ideal, the cause to which they should aspire, they can be civilized.

The failure to consider Chamberlain’s theory of loyalty next to that of Royce has led to several misunderstandings of Royce’s actual project and disposition toward race. American philosophers have continued to assert that Royce was exceptional in his considerations that linked race, loyalty, and American communities together without recognizing that the form and considerations that Royce entertains throughout his work are similar if not identical to the considerations of other authors like Chamberlain. Royce’s view of loyalty makes the arguments being waged by Black thinkers impossible considerations because the free Black Americans of the 1900s were demanding self-determination and the end to European colonialism. Royce, like Chamberlain, depends on the exceptionality of the white races to rule over others. This contradiction between the self-determined concepts of liberation birthed by

Hayti and the colonial projects of Chamberlain and Royce illustrates the incompatibility of Black liberty and white American philosophy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

As evidence of this claim beyond the historiographic reconstruction of Hayti, I present Kelly Miller's view of the matter articulated in *Race Adjustment: Essays on the Negro in America*, which was published in 1909. Miller was a mathematician who received his MA and LLD from Howard University in 1901 and 1903, respectively (Jones). In *Race Adjustment*, Miller explains that the debates among white race theorists of his day were rooted purely in the false ideology of white supremacy, not science. According to Miller, "[c]ivilization is not a spontaneous generation with any race or nation known to history, but the torch is handed down from race to race and from age to age, and gains in brilliancy as it goes" (43). In this regard, the cultural and social progress of the Negro "has been natural and inevitable" (Miller 43). Miller reminds the white race theorists of his day that the Negro is a young race and as such must first "appropriate and apply what has already gone before"

(43); such is the case for any and all races, according to Miller. The power of Miller's sentiment, however, is that it peels back the illusion of white exceptionality. Miller, like other Black intellectuals of his day, understood that racial development is a product of multiple factors and milieus. He writes:

The Negro has advanced in exactly the same fashion that the white race has advanced, by taking advantage of all that has gone before. Other men have labored and we have entered into their labors. The Japanese did not invent the battleship, modern artillery, or the modern manual of arms, but they use them pretty effectively. The young race, like the individual, must first appropriate and apply what has already gone before. The white man has no exclusive proprietorship of civilization. White man's civilization is as much a misnomer as the white man's multiplication table. It is the equal inheritance of anyone who can appropriate and apply it. This is the only practicable test of a people's capacity. (43)

Contrary to both Royce and Chamberlain, Miller insists that there is nothing unique about the development of the Negro race or the white races. Rather, he insists, the exclusive claim to civilization advanced by the white European races assert—with little evidence—that their possession of civilization and technology are products of their racial lineage rather than inheritance from various civilizations.

Miller's use of Japan as an example deliberately addresses the myth of Negro inferiority and the popular trope of the recently civilized Japanese nation prevalent among white race theorists at the turn of the century. As mentioned in *Another white Man's Burden* (91–98), the examples of the Black Peril and Yellow Peril were well known cultural tropes circulating throughout the ethnological literature of the late nineteenth century and the anthropological literature of the early twentieth century. Prior to my research, Royce scholars (Kegley, "Josiah Royce on Race"; Sullivan, "Royce's 'Race Questions and Prejudices'") argued that Royce's "perils" were merely rhetorical flourishes that turned the table on white people concerning their privilege. Previous authors have insisted that there was no specific meaning or debate to be had concerning how Royce, Chamberlain, or other white race theorists understood racial contact or the dangers such contacts posed. There is nothing exceptional in Royce utilizing these racial groups, especially when he gets their circumstances wrong. Royce suggests that a race's plasticity, or ability to assimilate white culture, must be considered in our attempts to understand racial problems. Miller argues that this notion is irredeemably racist because all races, including the Anglo-Saxon and Teuton, learn from previous civilizations and inherit the knowledge of those before them.

Miller's evidence for this view of racial development was Hayti. He explained that the racist theories that included an account of degeneration, suggesting that the Black race would revert to barbarism with the burdens of freedom, assumed that Blacks were incapable of self-determination. Miller writes: "We are told all about the incapacity of the black race for self-government, the relapse into barbarism, and much more, all of which we have heard before; and yet when we take all the circumstances into account, Hayti presents to the world one of the most remarkable achievements in the annals of human history" (45). Hayti was a remarkable refutation of white supremacist theories of racial hierarchies. Miller asks:

Where else in the course of history has a slave, with the aid of slaves, expelled a powerfully entrenched master-class and set up a government patterned after civilized models, which without external assistance or reinforcement from a

parent civilization has endured for a hundred years in face of a frowning world? . . . [T]he marvel is that the republic of Hayti still endures, the only self-governing State of the Antilles. (45)

In short, the writings of Black thinkers show that there are rich traditions that have already addressed the racist implications and deficiencies of white American philosophers. Rather than Black philosophers being placed in relation to the philosophical traditions of white American thinkers, it would be much more appropriate for Black philosophers to be read and centered as correctives to the problems of white American philosophy itself.

Conclusion

The criticisms waged by Another white Man's Burden are methodological and historical. In many ways, the historiographic interventions made by the text are an attempt to remedy the ideological pre-determinacy of racial inquiry in philosophy. This position is an extension of my previous works suggesting that political ideologies (e.g., integrationism, liberalism, etc.) dictate the interpretive direction and presumed emancipatory ends of Black philosophical analyses.³ American philosophy has continued to assert without evidence or argument that the political analyses of Black thinkers throughout the nineteenth century are compatible with, if not completed by, the liberal progressivism of American philosophers. Previous research has not asked if the events driving Black political analysis throughout the nineteenth century was compatible with the progressive ideologies and strategies of white philosophers in the late 1800s and early 1900s. This article argues that the Haytien Revolution was the foundation of Black political theory and was also the formative event behind Black liberatory aspirations well into the twentieth century. Whereas ethnology undergirded the white progressive ideology in the United States and the racial theories emanating from Europe that emphasized the subjugation of darker races to Anglo-Saxons and the Teutonic peoples, Black thinkers argued against such theories because the racist ideology of the white world did not allow for the possibility that Black people were able to determine their own fates. Throughout the 1800s, Black thinkers used the Haytien Revolution to refute the ideas of white racists who asserted that the Negro needed to be ruled, managed, and contained for the security and safety of whites. American progressivism assumes that Blacks could be assimilated and managed similar to white ethnic populations that migrated to the United States. This idea was contrary to the writings, examples, and figures that were the inspiration behind Black liberatory efforts. Without a rigorous understanding of the Haytien Revolution, American philosophy erroneously asserts that white liberal paradigms can accommodate the political aspirations of Black thinkers.

Tommy J. Curry

Hayti was the Measure edits

Page 75: First full paragraph: change perceived to criticized the colonial encroachments.

p.81 first full paragraph: replace "for" with "from"

page 81, line second indented paragraph: Replace "mid-century" with "mid-19th century"

page 87, first full paragraph line 16: eliminate "the" in the sentence "in the biological determinism."

p. 87, Second full paragraph, line 10: eliminate the word "given"

page 89, Line 12: Eliminate the word "is" in the parentheses "is the"