Virtuous Soldiers: Is the current ethical training sufficient for the United States Army or is a character development programme what soldiers and officers need?

A mixed-method study with particular regard to the moral reasoning of cadets in the required ethics and philosophy course at the United States Military Academy at West Point

By

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Abstract

Recent years have seen a few academic studies on 'morality and the military'. Some of those studies have attempted to measure moral reasoning while others constituted an intervention or a course evaluation, but none of the studies has involved both. This doctoral study is the first to evaluate the effectiveness of the coursework on a measure of moral reasoning at the intermediate-concept level. The aim of this thesis is to determine if the current ethical training for cadets at the United States Military Academy at West Point has a significant effect on how they reason about and adjudicate moral issues. More specifically, the main research question is: 'Does the ethical training for cadets in their required ethics and philosophy course at West Point have a significant effect on how they reason about moral issues?' To achieve this aim, the research design needed to be a course evaluation to see if cadets would improve their moral reasoning after receiving instruction in normative ethical theories, specifically virtue ethics and just war theory. Before reporting on the empirical part of the study, the thesis critically reviews some of the relevant background literatures. The ethical theories reviewed include utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics, and just war theory. Arguments are presented as to why adopting a virtue-and-character-based framework, as opposed to a rule- or consequence-based one, would be advisable for the military profession, specifically at a military academy. After reviewing the ethical theory, opportunities for ethical training at West Point and in the United States (US) Army are considered. Following this, an overview is given of six empirical studies that have focused on ethics and moral reasoning in a military setting. The ensuing empirical research involves an evaluation of a required philosophy and ethics class during the fall 2018 semester. The evaluation included 129 cadets of whom, 97 were male (75.2%) and 32 (24.8%) were

female. The research measures used were an army-centric intermediate-concept measure (ICM), called the Army Reasoning and Ethical Training and Education Test (ARETE), the VIA Inventory of Strengths (VIA-IS) and semi-structured interviews. Among several interesting findings in the study is that the female cadets performed better on the ARETE than the male cadets in a variety of ways. Female cadets start at a higher baseline in moral reasoning than do male cadets at roughly the same age. Further, while female cadets did improve after the coursework, male cadets remained stagnant in moral reasoning. A second conclusion is that cadets at West Point are not able to take ethical concepts and apply them to novel or complex dilemmas or situations without explicit instruction. A third conclusion is that cadets struggle to reason about the right action and justification when two or more virtues collide. Further, the cadets prioritise character traits that are not virtues and that might not lead to virtuous actions. These findings have implications for West Point and those other military academies trying to improve the moral reasoning of cadets, as well as more generally for the moral education undertaken in these institutions.

This thesis is dedicated to my wife Clare
and our sons Preston and Andrew

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I would like to thank COL Chris Mayer for serving as my State-side PhD advisor and for being a world-class mentor for the last six years of my life. Chris, you are one of the kindest humans on this planet. I would also like to thank my USMA Department Head, COL Dave

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

The United States Military Academy's mission is to educate, train and inspire the Corps of Cadets so that each graduate is a commissioned leader of character committed to the values of Duty, Honor, Country and prepared for a career of professional excellence and service to the nation as an officer in the United States Army. – West Point Mission Statement

The object of this thesis is to determine if the current 'ethical training' (as it is commonly referred to) for cadets at the United States Military at West Point has a significant effect on how they reason about and adjudicate moral issues. It also explores how this training – which I would prefer to refer to as 'moral or character education' – could be improved. More specifically, I set out with the following set of research questions that I will justify and elaborate upon in due course: Does the ethical training for cadets in their required ethics and philosophy course at West Point have a significant effect on how they reason about moral issues – and how could this training be improved? I have five sub-questions to support my research question: (1) What is the best ethical theory for grounding ethical training for cadets, and why? (2) What role does instruction in just war theory play in the development of moral reasoning skills among cadets? (3) Does the United States (US) Army have a systematic problem with ethical failures, and if so, to what extent could improved ethical training be expected to remedy that problem? (4) What lessons can be learned from experienced US Army officers about the content of the ethical training they received and its practical salience, and is there scope for improvement? (5) Judging from the findings of the present study (with respect to the above questions), is there a good

reason to extend the sort of ethical training on offer for cadets to the rank and file in the US Army – and how radically would current teaching materials and methods have to be amended to suit their needs?

Through my experience as an enlisted soldier, Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO), commissioned officer, and as an Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Ethics at West Point, I have come to believe that character education, and a life of virtue, are essential to being an army officer. I believe this to be true of any army or military organisation in the world, but the focus of my thesis is the US Army.

I have an educational background in philosophy and ethics. I have just finished my sixth year as an Instructor/Assistant Professor of Philosophy at West Point. I have also been in the US Army for over 21 years, and I have just recently retired from active service. In that time, I have had three combat deployments to Iraq and one combat deployment to Afghanistan. My motivation for this thesis stems from my time at West Point and from my observations of moral behaviours (exemplars and failures) in combat and in military garrisons back at home.

On my first day of Army Basic Training back in 1999, my senior drill sergeant had us all in formation. We had just finished doing somewhere in the neighbourhood of 10,000 press-ups and he said to us in a very calm, slow, and steady voice, 'Privates… there are three things you have to do in order to be successful in the Army'. He held his first finger up in the air and proceeded to add an additional finger as he ticked off each point of success, 'Do what you're told. Do what you're told. Do what you are damn well told'.

Fast forward a few years. As a young Non-Commissioned Officer, I frequently took the initiative to do things. As I saw it, my changes improved the situation, the time, the effort or the money involved with the task given to me. On more than one occasion, however, I was told that the Army did not need 'free thinkers' and that I should just follow the rules and the mission would be accomplished.

Is following the rules bad? Not necessarily. Rules are everywhere. There are rules for driving. There are rules in sport. There are even rules at West Point. Rules come in all shapes and sizes. We have the 'Cadet Honor Code' at West Point and we have Rules of Engagement (ROE) in combat zones. More generally, we have just war theory as a philosophical reference to engender rules. We must have mechanisms in place to enforce rules. To enforce rules in the Army, we have the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).

These rules serve a purpose. As my drill sergeant in basic training would point out, rules are used to impose and enforce discipline. The Army's hallmark has been its discipline. But is that enough? In my view, just having rules is inadequate. It is insufficient for the Army to be concerned only with disciplined leaders and soldiers. It can, and must, work towards improving the moral character of its future leaders and develop them into moral agents so that they choose, from stable states of character, to make moral decisions, not just follow rules.

From time to time, most of us are guilty of breaking a rule. Occasionally, I exceed the speed limit while driving. While this example of rule breaking might not relegate me to the status of a bad person, there are plenty of examples of broken rules leading to unethical behaviour. In the not-too-distant past, members of the US Army have broken rules that have resulted in moral

failures and human rights abuses. Sometimes their moral failures are in war and sometimes in their private lives.

In 2003, US soldiers tortured and sexually assaulted Iraqi detainees at Abu Ghraib Prison, Iraq (Hersch, 2004). Similarly, in November 2005, a group of US Marines killed 24 unarmed men, women and children in the city of Haditha, Iraq (Von Zielbauer, 2007). In 2006, four US soldiers raped, killed and then burned the body of a 14-year-old Iraqi girl. These soldiers also murdered her mother, father and six-year-old sister in an attempted cover-up of their heinous crimes (CNN, 2008; Frederick, 2010). In 2008, a US airstrike killed an estimated 90 Afghan civilians in Helmand Province, Afghanistan (DeYoung and Rondeaux, 2008). In 2012, US Army Staff Sergeant Robert Bales absconded from his base in the Panjawi district of Kandahar Province and entered a nearby house. He shot all 10 residents, killing six. Bales returned to base briefly before setting out to another home, where he killed 10 and wounded two more. Nine of the sixteen killed were children (Healy, 2013). As early as 2011, senior officers instructed US military personnel to ignore Afghan soldiers sexually abusing boys, even on US bases, because 'it is part of their culture'. This was an effort to maintain good relations with Afghan police and militia and refrain from imposing cultural values (Rivett-Carnac, 2015).

Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, a retired Army Military Intelligence General and National Security Advisor to President Trump at the time, pleaded guilty to lying to the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) about conversations he had with the Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak (Haberman et al., 2017; Miller, Entous and Nakashima, 2017; Pramuk, 2017). The fact that he lied was even more questionable since speaking to the Russian Ambassador as the

incoming National Security Advisor was not necessarily wrong, illegal or immoral. Why did he lie?

There are plenty of examples of unethical behaviour among members of the US military. From senior officers instructing US military personnel to ignore Afghan soldiers sexually abusing boys, to General Officers having extra-marital affairs with their subordinates (Goldman, 2016), many leaders seem to have lost their way morally. The example of General Flynn lying is actually not an anomaly for members of the US military. The US Army appears to have a problem with honesty. In fact, in February of 2015, the US Army's Strategic Studies Institute published a report entitled 'Lying to ourselves: dishonesty in the army profession' (Wong and Gerras, 2015). In it, the authors claim that the US Army currently has a 'culture of dishonesty' where 'untruthfulness is surprisingly common'. The authors argue that their study found that army officers have become 'ethically numb' due to repeated overwhelming demands that force officers to choose which requirements will be done to standard and which ones the officers will merely say were done to standard. The authors call this 'ethical fading'. If army officers are consistently untruthful over time on mundane and pedestrian issues, 1) their word is no longer any good, 2) their subordinates cannot, or will not, be able to trust them and 3) these officers will begin to lie about important things. I will discuss the notion of dishonesty in the US Army in more detail in Section 2.1.2.

These horrific war crimes of commission and omission reflect poorly on the Army. I hope to show that these unethical acts can be attributed to the fact that the Army is only focused on a deontologically-based system. This means that the Army is solely focused on following rules. What if each soldier focused on his or her character? What if decision-making was about who

you are as a person and not following the rules? I hope to show that an Aristotelian virtue ethics-based approach to the US Army would potentially decrease the moral lapses of soldiers in the US Army. While soldiers may continue to break rules, if we are an army of character, these types of moral transgressions will reduce. The US Army now takes account of this fact, more systematically than before, by striving to develop character in their officers, soldiers and cadets. As in other areas of professional practice, more and more people are starting to realise that merely following the rules is not enough. Character education is essential for the Profession of Arms[1] so that soldiers do not just follow the rules but act ethically because it is line with their character. This is why character is not only important in the US Army – and indeed, in any well-functioning army – but essential, as I stated as my personal belief at the beginning.

In my philosophy course at West Point, I cover the main normative ethical theories of Consequentialism, Utilitarianism, Deontology and Aristotelian Virtue Ethics. At face value, it would seem that Deontology, or a rule-based system, would be the best fit for the army. As I pointed out earlier, while discipline is the hallmark of the army, it does not necessarily have to be rule-based, at least not exclusively. If your actions are motivated and based on your character, then your actions will fall in line with the rules, unless the rules are ambiguous or a senior officer gives an unethical or illegal order. In those moments, we want our character to override the rules. This is who the virtuous soldier is and what soldiers should strive to be.

After reflecting on my ethical orientations as an assistant professor of philosophy at West Point, I decided to embark on a doctoral study of the topic that is closest to my heart. I chose the

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[1] Western armies (the United States, Great Britain, etc.) are often referred to as 'the Profession of Arms'. This is due in large part to professionalisation of the military. Due to the professional education and development of soldiers and officers throughout their career, the military is more than a job, but in fact part of a profession.

University of Birmingham, UK, because it is the home of the Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues. The Jubilee Centre is the preeminent character and Aristotelian virtue ethics centre in the world. The work, research and publications from members of staff is ubiquitous in the field of character. Further, the Jubilee Centre conducted groundbreaking research on the Character of the British Army. That project was the impetus of my desire to work with the Centre. Presenting papers at four Jubilee Centre conferences introduced me to the work of the Centre, as well as giving me the opportunity to meet two prolific writes in this field – Professor Kristján Kristjánsson and Professor James Arthur. After sharing some of my work and goals with both Professor Kristjánsson and Professor Arthur, they agreed to be my supervisors for my PhD. At a later stage, as my research methods turned more quantitative than originally intended, Professor Stephen Thoma replaced Professor Arthur.

In order to overcome the aforementioned moral failures, the US Army needs to do the very thing that Aristotle points out – soldiers need to make decisions that are in line with their character and not solely based on a set of rules. Like West Point's Mission Statement, cited at the outset, it is imperative the US Army have leaders of character.

CHAPTER 2. MORALITY AND THE ARMY: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE BACKGROUND LITERATURE

Discipline is the soul of an army. It makes small numbers formidable, procures success to the weak, and esteem to all. – General George Washington (1732–1799)

There is only one sort of discipline – perfect discipline. Men cannot have a good battle discipline and poor administrative discipline. – General George S. Patton (1885–1945)

2.1 Introduction: Discipline and Beyond

The aim of this chapter it to critically review some of the background literatures that are relevant for the empirical study conducted for this thesis and the educational implications that I ultimately propose to draw from it. It stands to reason that the topic of 'Morality and the Army' does not form an easily circumscribed discursive field. In fact, it would allow one to head in a number of different directions. The topics I have chosen to focus on in this chapter have been selected because they help illuminate the background considerations that informed the motivations behind the empirical study and its eventual design. An obvious first port of call in any discussion of army morality is the concept of 'discipline'.

It is often said that the hallmark of an army[2] is discipline. Without question, what Generals Washington and Patton pointed out in the quotations above is true: discipline is absolutely necessary for an army to be effective. However, is that enough to hang our ethical hats on? Do we need more than rule following as our ethical framework and as a guide to effective and morally justifiable ethical training in army contexts? This chapter offers a sustained reflection on these questions through a critical survey of the relevant background literatures. A subsidiary purpose is to identify lacunae in existing literatures and current knowledge bases that the present doctoral study could possibly help ameliorate.

In the next section of the chapter, Section 2.1.1, I discuss the notion of moral agency within the context of the military, specifically the moral agency of soldiers. Following that, I discuss the problem of lying and dishonesty within the US Army in Section 2.1.2. While it seems that ordinary soldiers having the ability to make some autonomous decisions during war (i.e. strategic and tactical) could be counterproductive to success, do we really want soldiers having 'undeviating obedience to its officers'? Although blind obedience may be motivated not simply by respect for discipline but by a moral virtue – loyalty – the obvious problem that arises here is if the officer is giving an unethical or unlawful command. While loyalty is prima facie virtuous, what happens when you are presented with a dilemma that results in conflicting moral demands such as the duty to prevent harm or intentionally targeting and killing innocent civilians? Where is your allegiance? Is your allegiance with your military leader or with what you consider to be right morally? This specific moral dilemma may occur when a soldier is forced to choose

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[2] In my thesis, I will refer to armies generally as well as to specific countries' armies. When speaking generally, I will use 'army' or 'armies' with a lower case 'a' and when referring to a specific country, I will capitalise it, as in the US Army, the British Army, etc.

between a special obligation to his military leader (interpersonal loyalty) and another virtue like honesty, integrity or respect. This is referred to as the Loyalty Dilemma about which I speak in more detail in Section 2.1.3. In my introductory chapter, I gave recent examples of horrific war crimes of commission and omission. For these reasons, blind obedience, which could result in the Loyalty Dilemma, is arguably not enough. There needs to be some underlying normative ethical theory supporting the idea of discipline and helping with adjudication should discipline conflict with other moral values or virtues. This is particularly true when the ethical ideal of discipline is turned into an educational aim as generally happens in ethical training for the army.

In Section 2.2 of the present chapter, I discuss several normative ethical theories and why each is a good or bad fit as an essential framework for a soldier individually and an army collectively. I will look with a critical eye to see if utilitarianism, deontology and virtue ethics are good fits as an ethical foundation for the army. All three have facets that would make for a potentially good marriage with military values. Utilitarianism, crudely put, is concerned with the greatest good for the greatest number of people. This has potential relevance for the aims of my thesis, as we see in due course. Deontology is a rule-based system, which at first blush appears to be what effective armies have endorsed for millennia. Lastly, I will look at Aristotelian-based virtue ethics, which also appears to have connections with the modern-day army. The US Army has seven basic values that soldiers are meant to live by, both on and off duty.[3] The US Army uses an acronym to help soldiers remember them as they enter basic training, with the hope it becomes part of who they are. The Army refers to this as 'The Seven Army Values' and

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[3] Several western armies have values or virtues that they publish and proscribe to their members. For example, the British Army has six Values and Standards: Respect for others, Selfless Commitment, Courage, Integrity, Discipline and Loyalty. For a list of these western armies' values and virtues, see Table 2 in Section 2.2.3.3.

LDRSHIP is the acronym for Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honour, Integrity and Personal Courage. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle distinguishes between different types of virtue. One type of virtue he discusses are moral virtues, and many of those are shared with the US Army. While the army has 'values' and Aristotle promoted 'virtues', they both seem to have something in common, and I explore these commonalities and potential variance or dissimilarities Additionally, in Section 2.4 I argue that just memorising the Seven Army Values is insufficient in getting cadets and soldiers to adhere to an army professional ethic. I propose 10 Martial Virtues that are specific to the profession of arms and like other categories of virtues, must be developed through habituation, experience and practice.

Something else that governs ethical behaviour in war, above and beyond any general ethical theories, is so-called just war theory. It deals with the justification of how and why wars are fought ethically. While it has evolved over the millennia, just war theory is almost as old as war itself. Just war theory is broken down into three divisions: *jus ad bellum* is concerned with the justice of going to war, *jus in bello* is concerned with right action in war and *jus post bellum* is concerned with the responsibility and accountability of the warring sides after the conclusion of war. In Section 2.5, I examine how just war theory melds with the normative ethical theories we have discussed to see if this helps determine which normative approach best suits the army profession as an ethical and educational blueprint.

In Section 2.6 I transition from philosophy to psychology and explain the theory that I singled out as the main basis of my empirical work in this thesis. I begin with a description of moral judgement from a Kohlbergian perspective and trace how Kohlberg's views have informed Rest's neo-Kohlbergian model. I then describe a new class of measurements defined within the

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neo-Kohlbergian model, labelled Intermediate Concept measures, which are designed to assess ethical development within specific professional settings or age-groups.

Towards the end of this chapter, I discuss the way West Point, as well as the army as a whole, look at ethics. I look at some of the army's ethical failures and see if some of the blame belongs to the army. I will then make some initial recommendations for improvement to ethical behaviour by soldiers and officers. The last part of this chapter will be devoted to various previous empirical findings based on research conducted on various western armies, including the Dutch Army, the British Army and the US Army. Finally, I discuss my empirical research project and explain what my initial hypotheses were, as well as the justifications for this research. Throughout the chapter, my motivation and orientation are educational rather than purely theoretical. This is not, first and foremost, a philosophical doctoral thesis on army ethics and its potential moral grounding as such, although my line of argument necessitates a somewhat lengthy and detailed exploration of theoretical issues. Throughout, I will be trying to keep the eye on the eventual prize, which is to say something relevant about ethical training (or, as I would prefer to put it, moral education) in the army and how it could be improved. However, readers must be forewarned that, by necessity, Chapter 2 will be quite eclectic, as it needs to draw on various theories and considerations in the background literature (which comprises philosophy and psychology as well as education) as well as practical considerations about what is already being done at West Point in promoting character and virtues.

Notice that despite forays into international research, most of the examples I take and elaborate upon will be from US Army contexts. This is because the object of my thesis and research is to determine if the current ethical training for cadets at West Point has a significant

effect on how they reason about moral issues – and how this training could be improved. I am also interested in what the best ethical theory for grounding ethical training for cadets is, and why. I discuss what role instruction in just war theory plays in the development of moral reasoning skills among cadets. I am also curious to see if the US Army has a systematic problem with ethical failures, and, if so, to what extent could more theoretically driven ethical training be expected to remedy that problem.

2.1.1 Moral Agency

Moral agency has dual constituency. Moral agency allows one to 'behave humanely' and to 'refrain from behaving inhumanely' (Bandura, 2002, 111). A moral agent is thus self-regulatory. Therefore, a moral agent is a rational individual who is justifiably responsible for their own actions or inactions. Rational in the sense that the individual is capable of, and ought to, use moral reasoning in determining the rightness of an action or inaction. Individuals develop moral agency through adopting a normative framework as a guide to engage in, or restrain from, certain actions (McAlister, Bandura and Owen, 2006). Which ethical framework a person adopts can be varied as seen below in Section 2.2, where I discuss ethical theories and their relevance to army ethics. According to MacIntyre (1999), there are three specific ways in which a moral agent is justifiably held responsible for their actions. The first is when the agent's action was intentional. Second, the agent may be held responsible when they should have been aware of 'incidental aspects' of the action. Third, the agent may be justifiably held responsible for 'at least some of the reasonably predictable effects of their actions'.

As the Profession of Arms, soldiers and officers are assigned weapons and are authorised the use of lethal force within the context of rules of engagement, the Law of Armed Conflict (Peterson Legal, 2018), international law such as the Hague and Geneva Conventions and just war theory (see Section 2.3). As such, it is imperative that we see soldiers and officers as moral agents that must negotiate lethal actions humanely and within the context of an ethical framework. The US Army sees soldiers as individual moral agents as recognised through their leadership and command philosophy known as Mission Command. Formally titled the Army Doctrine Publication 6-0 Mission Command (HQ, 2012), this philosophy of command is the 'exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of Unified Land Operations'. Concisely, Mission Command is the idea of pushing decision-making down to the lowest level of leadership (which could even include the individual soldier) both in war and in normal peaceful military scenarios (Ghikas, 2013; HQ Army, 2012; Shamir, 2010). If we are going to push down the decision-making of life-and-death actions in war, the soldiers must be their own moral agents. Simply following the rules or orders of military superiors is not a justifiable defence for immoral actions in war. In fact, soldiers, as moral agents, have an obligation to refuse immoral orders from senior military leaders. We must, therefore, hold soldiers responsible for their actions. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, in the recent past, the fact that soldiers and officers in the US Army have behaved inhumanely has resulted in moral failures and human rights abuses. Sometimes these moral failures occurred in war and sometimes in their private life. As moral agents, these members of the military must be held accountable for their actions. Sometimes individuals act due to incontinence (a lack of self-control) as in extra-marital affairs, or for self-serving and or vicious means (General Flynn's lying to the FBI). However,

sometimes inhumane actions come from soldiers suspending ethical restrictions on actions through moral disengagement. Moral disengagement is when an individual convinces themself that ethical standards do not apply to them within a particular situation for a particular reason (Bandura, 2002; McAlister, Bandura and Owen, 2006). Moral disengagement occurs when the individual detaches moral requirements from inhumane actions, self-justifying immoral actions such as killing innocent civilians because they 'support terrorism' by virtue of their country of origin, ethnic makeup or religious affiliation or beliefs. When soldiers use moral disengagement to allow themselves to act in heinous and immoral ways, situations occur like the sexual assaults in Abu Ghraib Prison or the killing of the innocent in Haditha, Iraq.

Because the US Army uses Mission Command as its leadership and decision-making philosophy, and because of the complicated nature of war, it is imperative that our soldiers and officers be people of character and make virtuous decisions in their moral reasoning. I argue in Sections 2.2.3.3 and 2.3.6, that virtue ethics, coupled with just war theory, is the best normative ethical framework for armies and should ideally be adopted by all moral agents within the Profession of Arms.

2.1.2 Lying and Dishonesty in the Army

In Chapter 1, I referenced Lieutenant General Michael Flynn pleading guilty to lying to the FBI about speaking to the Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak. I also mentioned a report entitled 'Lying to ourselves: dishonesty in the army profession' that was published by two retired US Army officers, Dr Leonard Wong and Dr Stephen Gerras, who are also research professors at the

Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College. The US Army is notorious for sending training, manning and mission requirements that are impossible for their units and commanders to comply with in their entirety. Wong and Gerras's study found that most army officers put their honour on the line by being put in positions where they have to claim they completed their tasking requirements when it would not be possible to actually do so.

As a result of years of repeated impossibilities, Wong and Gerras describe the army officers as having become 'ethically numb'. This results in commanders having to decide which of the tasking requirements are given priority and which are merely claimed to have been completed, both verbally to superior officers and with their signature on completion memos. Similarly, training often takes place through 'packet training' where a Microsoft PowerPoint Presentation is printed out on paper, is then placed in a pocket folder with a sign-up sheet that states that you completed the training and is passed around from one member of the unit to the next until 100% of the unit is 'trained'. I discuss the occurrence of 'packet training' in more detail in Section 2.6.2. Unfortunately, much of this dishonesty is passed down from the highest levels and encouraged from senior leaders down to the lowest levels. This means that dishonesty is surprisingly common in the US Army despite our Seven Army Values of Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honour, Integrity and Personal Courage that I mentioned in the introduction of this chapter. Wong and Gerras (2015, 4) share a 2002 US War College study that counted the available training days allotted to company commanders and compared that with the mandatory training directives. The study found that the commanders had to fit '297 days of mandatory requirements into 256 available training days'.

2.1.3 The Loyalty Dilemma

As noted in the previous section, sometimes soldiers and officers alike are caught in moral dilemmas.[4] 'Do I tell the truth or am I loyal to this person?' Coined by Snowden (2015), this type of moral dilemma is called the Loyalty Dilemma. According to Snowden (2015), this type of moral dilemma is called the Loyalty Dilemma. According to Snowden (2015), the Loyalty Dilemma occurs when a person must choose between honesty and loyalty to another person that they have a special relationship with and obligation to. The Loyalty Dilemma is essentially a moral trade-off in decision-making and in no way unique to the army (Arthur et al., 2014). Which outweighs the other? Most humans develop interpersonal relationships, and sometimes those might seem more important to us than our loyalty to an organisation such as the government, the police, the army or even West Point.

A prominent example of the Loyalty Dilemma is the case of US Army Lieutenant Colonel Alexandre Vindman (Myers, 2020; Schmitt and Cooper, 2020; Vadner Brook, 2020). Vindman was the Director for European Affairs for the United States National Security Council and a Ukrainian specialist. While under oath during the President Trump impeachment hearings, Vindman testified to the content of a phone call between US President Trump and Ukrainian President Zelensky as part of his assigned duties. Vindman testified that President Trump offered a quid pro quo to President Zelensky, recounting that Trump would give Zelensky already promised military aid in exchange for investigating the son of Joe Biden: Trump's opponent in

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[4] I follow the psychological terminology, dating back to Kohlberg, in talking about 'moral dilemmas'. In philosophy, the term tends to be used in a narrower sense, in which the two options are both seen as impossible or equally bad, and/or involve incommensurable values. Philosophers would call the Loyalty Dilemma a 'moral quandary' rather than a 'dilemma' in this strict sense.

the next US Presidential election. Biden's son Hunter had been on the board of a Ukrainian energy company and Vindman used official channels through his chain of command to bring attention to this situation. His concern was that he believed President Trump's action had posed 'significant implications' to the US's national security. Whoever holds the Presidency of the United States is also the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. This meant that the senior-most leader in Vindman's chain of command was President Trump. Vindman had to choose between loyalty to his Commander and President or honesty and loyalty to his country. Vindman's tough decision cost him his job as the Director for European Affairs for the United States National Security Council and promotion to Colonel.

The Loyalty Dilemma also plays a prominent role with the cadets at West Point and will be discussed in detail in the empirical study's general findings (Section 4.1.3.1) and specific findings (Section 4.1.3.2) in Chapter 4 and in revisiting theory (Section 5.5) in Chapter 5.

2.2 Normative Ethical Theories and their Relevance to Army Ethics

Armies, western armies particularly, have become increasingly interested in ethics and developing or embracing an ethical framework. The three standard normative ethical theories of choice are utilitarianism (a particular form of consequentialism), deontology and virtue ethics. I discuss each of the theories, some of the standard objections to these theories, and what an application of each theory to an army context may look like. This discussion will help motivate the choice and design of an empirical research project to be discussed in Chapters 3–4.

2.2.1 Consequentialism/Utilitarianism

Bad men need nothing more to compass their ends,
than that good men should look on and do nothing.
– John Stuart Mill (1806–1873)

He who knows only his own side of the case
knows little of that. – John Stuart Mill

2.2.1.1 The Core of the Theory

Consequentialism, as its name suggests, is the normative view that moral value depends

exclusively on consequences of actions. For an act to be morally permissible, it must produce the

best overall consequence. Therefore, for a consequentialist, morality completely hinges on

producing the best overall consequences individually and collectively. If there are multiple

actions that are equal in consequence, then any of those choices are compatible with

consequentialism. An extreme version of consequentialism would argue that 'the ends justify the

means' completely. A way to understand this is that even if an individual act, seen at face value,

is distasteful, it is morally acceptable to engage in that act if the outcome or end of that act is the

best. For these consequentialists, if a goal is morally important enough, any method of achieving

it is acceptable.

Less extreme versions of consequentialism would modify the claim that 'the ends justify

the means' in various ways, for example by subjecting the means also, individually, to a rigorous

consequentialist test, not only the intended goal. An example of the extreme interpretation in an

international relations or military context would be the justifiability of bombing an entire village

because a high concentration of murderous insurgents lives there. That would be an example of

'the ends justify the means'. Some less extreme consequentialists might say the goal would be to stop the insurgents from killing again or to bring about justice by holding them accountable for their actions. If that is the outcome (the end), there seem to be more compatible or corresponding actions that would give the same result, such as setting up a cordon around the village so no individual can escape and then systematically searching the village for the insurgents.

Consequentialism works in a variety of ways. If you believe the main purpose of morality is to relieve suffering (either human or animal), spread happiness or ensure survivability of the human race, then you are likely to opt for a consequentialist moral theory as your theory of choice. While the three purposes differ as to what kinds of consequences matter (relieving suffering, spreading happiness, promoting humanity), they all agree that the consequences are what determines right action.

The most common type of consequentialism is utilitarianism. At its core, utilitarianism takes the notion that the consequence is what matters and then specifies what the 'good' is. The consequence that results in overall pain and/or unhappiness is bad and is not a viable consequence to determine right action as long as there is a viable option that results in less overall pain or unhappiness.

Utilitarianism has evolved over time. One of the first utilitarian thinkers was Epicurus who was a believer in 'hedonistic utilitarianism' (Tännsjö, 1998). For Epicurus, to determine what was right and wrong boiled down to felt pleasure over pain. If an act resulted in felt pleasure, it was morally correct. If an act resulted in felt pain, that act was morally incorrect. The distinction between good and evil was simply pleasure and pain. One interpretation of this idea, which nevertheless diverges from that of Epicurus, justifies self-indulgent behaviour since it

brings the individual actor pleasure, even if it causes another pain. This type of consequentialism is called 'ethical egoism', where the right action is not just the one that produces the best consequence, but the one that produces the best consequence for the actor. This type of consequentialism diverges from utilitarianism based on who benefits (the one or the many).

One can see how utilitarianism diverges from ethical egoism by the fundamental maxim behind utilitarianism. The 'greatest happiness principle' (also known as the 'principle of utility'), first articulated by Jeremy Bentham, claims the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the measure of right and wrong (Bentham, 2019, 8). Bentham is thus the founder of utilitarianism as a philosophical movement (West, 2013). Having studied law, he wanted to create a 'Pannomion'; a complete utilitarian code of law to be applied universally.

While Bentham uses the notion of happiness in his fundamental axiom, pleasure over pain is still at the heart of creating the greatest happiness principle. By 'happiness', he understood a predominance of 'pleasure' over 'pain'. He wrote in *The Principles of Morals and Legislation*:

> Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think. (cited in Bentham, 2019, 7)

Pleasure and pain are individualistic. Someone might derive pleasure from running five miles each morning, and for his or her partner, running five miles might be a special kind of hell. Further, humans have different pain thresholds. These examples run the risk of turning utilitarianism into ethical egoism, which should be avoided if we are to follow Bentham. But how would a utilitarian then determine the moral value of acts that affect large numbers of people?

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Should we increase taxes in order to provide healthcare to everyone? Some people might find pleasure in getting medical treatment, even if it meant their taxes would go up. Others, who already have healthcare and make a decent living, would find the opposite of happiness in paying even more taxes. How do we determine the greatest good for the greatest number of people? What is the right action? How do we solve these practical problems?

Bentham developed a procedure for estimating the moral status of any action, which he called 'hedonistic' or 'felicific calculus'. Felicific calculus is an algorithm that applies the principle of utility to calculate the amount of pleasure a specific action is likely to create. The calculus includes seven variables to consider. The first variable is *intensity*: How strong is the pleasure? The second variable is *duration*: How long will the pleasure last? The third variable is *certainty:* Is pleasure likely or unlikely to occur when I do this act? The fourth variable is *propinquity*: How long will it take before the pleasure occurs? The fifth variable is *fecundity*: What are the chances of the same pleasure being repeated? The sixth variable is *purity*: What is the probability that this act will not result in sensations of the opposite effect (pain) occurring? Finally, the seventh variable is *extent*: How many people will be affected by this particular action? What we see from this is that the criteria of happiness are to be predicated over a large number of variables.

Following in the footsteps of Bentham, John Stuart Mill carried on the tradition of utilitarianism and expanded upon it. While Mill did believe that the good life should be defined in terms of pleasure, he was aware of the criticism levelled at Bentham and his view of the greatest happiness principle. One criticism of utilitarianism is that to reduce the meaning of life to pleasure debases or demeans human existence. This criticism argues that if pleasure is the only

thing valuable in its own right, then all other actions only have instrumental value in helping achieve pleasure. The critic argues that this position implies that the act of creative genius in any field is no better than that of someone engaging in hedonistic and animalistic bodily pleasures, assuming that they both experience an equal amount of pleasure. Mill takes on this criticism by amplifying the utilitarian position. While Bentham's felicific calculus takes into account only quantity of pleasure (intensity, duration, certainty, etc.), Mill points out that it is not just the quantity of the pleasure but the quality of that pleasure that is important as well. Mill highlights that human pleasures are superior to those of other animals and distinguishes between 'higher' and 'lower' pleasures. He argues that humans use 'higher faculties' (Mill, 2017, 12–15) than other animals to distinguish 'higher' and 'lower pleasures'. Some examples of humans' higher pleasures include 'the pleasures of intellect, of the feelings and imagination and of the moral sentiments' (Mill, 2017, 12–15). Mill argues that humans prefer the higher pleasures to the lower pleasures due to our developed cognitive abilities. He cements his position by saying, it 'is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied' (Mill, 2017, 15). His point here is that we would not trade being a human for being a pig, nor would we trade being intelligent for ignorance. It is true that sometimes we do give in to our base desires for pleasure, such as eating a whole tub of our favourite ice cream or drinking two bottles of our favourite wine, but that only provides momentary pleasure. The pleasure is fleeting and occasionally results in pain (stomach ache or a hangover) after the temporary pleasure is gone. The point is, as Michael Sandel articulates it in *Justice: what's the right thing to do?*, that true happiness or pleasure is long term. Sandel argues that 'Mill thinks we should maximize utility, not case by case, but in the long run' (Sandel, 2010, 50).

What are higher sources of pleasure? Was Mill sure that humans would choose the higher over lower pleasures if forced to choose between them? Mill would argue that yes, you would; at least if you are an experienced and competent chooser (and if you are not, you have good utilitarian reasons for listening to one who is). It is empirically true that no matter how much chocolate were offered to you, the pleasure of all that chocolate would never outweigh the love you have for your spouse/best friend. The love you have for your spouse is qualitatively so unique it will, in fact, override these other offers. If you had a choice between marrying this amazing person that you love or receiving 100 (or 1 million) free chocolates, you would choose to marry that person.

Mill's argument for pursuing higher pleasures served not only to achieve happiness in an everyday sense, but to ground other values like truth. Mill would completely disagree with the saying, 'ignorance is bliss'. In fact, Mill argues that humans need to search and find truth to be truly happy. Remember, for Mill, happiness was not just the greatest good for the individual but for society as a whole (utilitarianism versus ethical egoism). Mill expanded on the moral principles he discussed in *Utilitarianism* (2017) and related its ideals to society in his book *On liberty* (2002). In *On liberty*, Mill discusses the idea of happiness through certain rules of thumb regarding norms and sanctions, both formal and informal.

Mill believed that society should allow all individuals the freedom to pursue happiness, that this right should be protected by the government and that legislation should be drawn up to protect the individual's freedom to pursue personal goals. Mill believed that there is one exception in which freedom should be curtailed, and that is when one person's action impinges on the happiness of others. He called this the 'harm principle'. Mill was very specific with his

harm principle. He pointed out that mere offence is not harm. Screaming at someone, walking around completely nude if you are clinically obese, giving someone two fingers or scraping your fingers down a chalk board is not causing anyone harm. It is merely offending someone. Mill was adamant that mere offence was not harm, and people should not be curtailed from that behaviour. Mill took this position because he felt that censorship is the enemy of progress (Mill, 2002, 51, 71) and hence of long-term happiness. He argues that all opinions lead to truth – if we silence someone's expression of an opinion, we are 'robbing the human race' (Mill, 2002, 14) as neither they or us will ever realise the truth. Mill believed in freedom of expression as 'being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself and resting in great part for the same reasons' (Mill, 2002, 10). As I mentioned earlier, Sandel points out that Mill believes we ought to maximise happiness over the long term, not just in the moment (Sandel, 2010, 50). Over time, Mill argues, respecting individual liberty will lead to truth and to the greatest happiness. If we allowed the majority, or societal leaders, to silence or suppress freethinkers, we might maximise happiness today but will make society worse off in the future (Sandel, 2010, 51). Mill points out that we have to uphold the right of individual liberty for several reasons. First, the dissenting view might actually be true or even partially true and would help correct an inaccurate prevailing view. Second, if the dissenting view is wrong, subjecting the prevailing view to debate will prevent it from 'hardening into dogma and prejudice'. Finally, if a society suppresses dissenting opinion, it will stifle social improvement.

The harm principle has an interesting corollary. While my pleasure cannot come at the expense of harming you, I am allowed to harm myself if it gives me pleasure. Mill believed that individuals should be able to do whatever gives them pleasure, even if it could harm themselves.

In *On liberty*, Mill argues that 'over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign' (Mill, 2002, 8). What about smoking cigarettes? There is clinical proof that using tobacco causes cancer. You are harming yourself by smoking. While there is an argument to be made that people who want to quit smoking cannot quit due to its addictive ingredients, at some point at least, people smoke because they find pleasure in it. Mill, and other utilitarians, will protect the right for you to smoke yourself to an early grave. Some critics question if the harm principle is justified as part of the greatest happiness principle or should be considered independently. In other words, does it complement the greatest happiness principle or is it an application of the greatest happiness principle? Utilitarian scholars have divided opinions on this, but I consider it wise to take Mill on his word and think of the harm principle as simply subordinate to the greatest happiness principle. Mill's justification for the self-harm thesis then would be that it is, in fact, empirically true that constraining an individual from performing acts that only harm herself is always, in the long run, conducive to overall unhappiness in society, because of the great utility that people place on their individual freedom. One could argue against that empirical thesis with empirical counter-evidence or claim that it is only true in individualistic as opposed to collectivist societies, but those empirical arguments would not subvert the logical justificatory status of the harm principle as ultimately underwritten by the greatest happiness principle.

2.2.1.2 Standard Objections to Consequentialism/Utilitarianism

Consequentialism, and more specifically utilitarianism, is a very divisive and controversial theory. Why is it controversial? As we will see in Sections 2.2.2 with deontology and in 2.2.3

with virtue theory, other normative ethical theories are non-consequentialist views by nature. These theories find things like following the rules, respecting peoples' rights, obeying God, having resilience and developing intellectually are what matters, not mere consequences. Before exploring the alternatives to Utilitarianism, I will discuss two main kinds of problems for utilitarians: *victimisation* and *integrity*.

The first problem for utilitarians is that of potential victimisation. Critics of utilitarianism point out that if you take the greatest happiness principle to its logical extreme, people can easily become victimised. Judith Jarvis Thomson (Thomson, 1985, 1396) asks you to imagine you are a truly gifted organ transplant surgeon with a 100% organ acceptance in each of your transplant surgeries on countless patients. Further, imagine you have five patients that need an organ transplant very soon or they will all die. Two patients need a lung, two need a kidney and one needs a heart transplant. Fortuitously, a stranger, travelling through town, comes in for a check-up and the stranger, miraculously, is a perfect donor match for all five of your patients. You ask the stranger if they will donate all five of his or her organs, and the stranger politely refuses. What do you do? Do you do nothing and allow five people to die or do you save five people at the expense of one life? Again, it seems like the consequentialist is committed to these actions because the consequence of acting with the result of one death and saving five presumably causes greater pleasure and happiness, other things being equal. People who subscribe to non-consequentialist views continue to raise the spectre of these thought experiments. What if you have five starving children and the only way to feed them is to kill an elderly person who refuses to share their food? Even Foot points out that, 'It is not, for instance, permissible [in

Utilitarianism] to commit a murder to bring one's starving children food. If the choice is between inflicting injury on one or many there seems only one rational course of action' (Foot, 2002, 28).

Let us use a thought experiment, provided by Foot, that seems less brutal. Think of a person who needs a very large dose of a certain medicine in order to live. Further, imagine that this person would need the normal dosage of five people. Do you deny this person the medicine so that five others could receive their 1/5 dosage and live or do you save the one person requiring the large dosage resulting in the five deaths? This thought experiment is a little more palatable than the organ transplant. We have a difference based on the distinction between the duty to avoid injury and the duty to provide aid (Foot, 2002, 28). You have one person who needs a massive dose of the drug and you withhold it from that person in order to save the life of five people. In this case, we are weighing aid against aid (Foot, 2002, 25). In the case of the organ transplant, we are killing a human being in order to save the life of five others. Thomson also changes this thought experiment to include a homeless beggar instead of the traveller. This person is a blight on society and does not contribute – contribute – now they can. They can contribute because we need bodies for medical research in order to save lives of productive citizens in the future. This quickly starts to sound like Hitler and the Nazis, who believed that the Jewish people were sub-human, inferior and should be sacrificed for the greater good. Due to this, his actions went from the Aryanisation (the taking of Jewish businesses and property and giving it to non-Jewish people) of Germany and Austria (Cesarani, 2011) to a number of German physicians conducting painful and often deadly experiments on thousands of concentration camp prisoners without their consent (Holocaust Encyclopaedia), to, finally, genocide. While this is a

slippery slope argument, the example of justifying medical research and surgery on homeless people because they are a blight on society has worrying echoes of what Hitler and the Nazis did.

Mill would respond that we are not giving the utilitarian position fair treatment. He would argue that victimisation will not, in fact, occur under utilitarianism because of the fear of setting a utility-undermining precedent. He would argue that utilitarians would not allow an innocent healthy person to be killed in order to harvest their organs for four or five other sick people. A pervasive fear is created in such a scenario because it sets a precedent whereby people in a low risk zone are being moved to a higher risk zone. You go from a regular risk zone of just getting a medical health check-up to going to a high-risk zone of surgery to remove bodily organs if your health check-up shows you are healthy or at least have healthy organs. If utilitarians allowed this to happen, no one would get health check-ups or even walk on the same side of the street as a hospital for fear of losing their life. Consequently, where risk is entailed, utilitarians will not cross work zones. We cannot live this way. Some people choose to become police officers, fire fighters and soldiers. There is an inherent risk with any of these professions. A person accepts being placed in a high-risk zone when becoming a member of those professions. Some people choose to become primary and secondary school teachers. They did not accept the risk of being shot at as soldiers do. That is crossing risk zones and utilitarians would not indiscriminately move people between risk zones because it would make the world an impossible place to live. The goal of the utilitarian is to make the world a happier place overall in the long run, not imposing overall fear-inducing norms.

Bentham may be seen as somewhat narrow in his considerations of overall utility but not Mill. Mill is practical. He does not like talking about the world in isolated strange cases. Thought

experiments are fine for philosophers, but he wants to create a practical world to maximise happiness. The risk-zone strategy helps Mill and utilitarians deal with the problem of victimisation, at least in everyday cases of possible sacrifices of the innocent for the greater good (although one could continue to devise far-fetched science-fiction cases where overall it is beneficial to override risk zones), but Mill has a greater issue to resolve when it comes to the second problem: integrity.

Bernard Williams famously addresses this problem of integrity for utilitarians in his book *Moral Luck*. In the book, Williams argues that for people to have any reason to live and act at all, they have to be motivated by certain integrity-building 'ground projects', for example an un-overridable dedication to loved ones. However, utilitarian theory forces people to be ready, in principle, to give up on any such projects for the greater good. That makes life impossible to live. The utilitarian might argue that it is in fact always utility-maximising to adhere to 'ground projects'. Williams would respond that even if after a utilitarian consideration you decide the best way is to continue being devoted to your loved ones, you have justified that decision in the morally wrong way, by having 'one thought too many' (Williams, 1981, page 18).

In the novel *Sophie's Choice*, by William Styron (1976), a Polish woman, Sophie Zawistowska, is arrested by the Nazis and sent to the Auschwitz death camp. On arrival, she is 'honoured' for not being a Jew by being allowed a choice: one of her children will be spared the gas chamber if she chooses which one. In an agony of indecision, as both children are being taken away, she suddenly makes her choice. They can take her daughter, who is younger and smaller. Sophie hopes that her older and stronger son will be better able to survive, but she loses track of

him and never learns of his fate. Did she do the right thing? Years later, haunted by the guilt of having chosen between her children, Sophie commits suicide.

Here is another thought experiment that exposes the same problem.[5] Imagine that you are a very talented surgeon who specialises in an area with very few surgeons. Imagine you are driving by the site of an airplane crash. You can see that there are about 50 seriously wounded people on one side of the road. On the other side of the road, there is only one person. It is possible that in one hour you will be able to save the lives of most if not all of the people if you start working on them right away. The one person on the other side of the road is the absolute love of your life, your wife of 30 years. You have had an amazingly close and powerful love. You cannot save or help her in any way, but she only has about an hour left before succumbing to her injuries. Her last and dying wish is you sit with her and hold her hand as she is dying. What would the greatest happiness principle have us do in this situation? In these instances, you either spend that time with the love of your life or regret the decision not to for the rest of your life. Look what resulted from the choice that Sophie Zawistowska made at Auschwitz. The love of your spouse and the love you have for your children are part of who you are. If you have to choose the death of your child or not to spend the last hour you can with the love of your life, you will become alienated from yourself and such alienation may result in the direst of consequences, which, for Sophie, was suicide. The logical point is that you cannot have a best friend or develop a deep love for someone simply for the reason that more utility cannot be created. It is psychologically impossible to live by that reasoned maxim. It results in alienation. You would never sell your grandmother into slavery. The devil could offer you world peace, the most

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[5] This thought experiment came up in a discussion with my supervisor Professor Kristján Kristjánsson.

beautiful mansion, riches untold, etc., but you could not sell your grandmother into slavery. If you do, you are just hollow. Hollow at the core of your psyche.

2.2.1.3 Application of Consequentialism and Utilitarianism to the Context of the Army

Many armies, including the British and US Armed Forces, have been involved in the War on Terror. These countries have been participating in that war for over 17 years. In war, there is invariably death. It is inescapable. How, then, might utilitarianism be applicable to the military? There are actually some interesting compatibilities. If you are seeking the greatest good for the greatest number of people, it might be the case that a country, like the United States or Great Britain, need to enter a war in order to stop the spread of a demagogue and a dictator committing genocide. Stopping Hitler would have been the greatest good for the greatest number of people. However, are there instances where western nations have tried to use utilitarian logic to justify actions to stop people committing acts short of Hitler's atrocities?

In February 2003, the Bush Administration announced a new doctrine of preventative war (as opposed to preemptive war, which I will discuss in more detail in Section 2.3) against the Republic of Iraq and its leader Saddam Hussein. The declaration was meant as a justification for invading Iraq and forcing regime change for the betterment of the Iraqi people, the Middle East, and the world. The justification of the attack was distinctly utilitarian in a 'scatter shot' way by offering up many different reasons all for the betterment of others, namely an application of the principle of the greatest happiness for the greatest for the greatest number of people. Brian Orend points out in his book, *The Morality of War*, that the reasons given by the Bush Administration to

justify regime change were severalfold (Orend, 2014, 51): 1) Saddam had 'Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) which could be deployed in under 45 minutes, which ultimately were proven to never have existed; 2) Saddam 'intended to give some of the WMDs to al-Qaeda for use against the US', which was proven false; 3) Saddam was 'involved with the 9/11 attacks', again proven false; 4) as an 'act of humanitarian intervention', Saddam 'needed to be overthrown on behalf of the Iraqi people'; 5) Saddam posed a threat to Middle East stability and security, particularly to the 'Saudi oil fields and to the nation of Israel'; 6) Saddam violated the 1998 Persian Gulf War Treaty 'by kicking UN weapons inspectors out' of Iraq; finally, 7) Saddam needed to be removed from power in order to create the world's first Arab democracy that would function as a 'trojan horse for better values throughout the Islamic world' (Orend, 2014, 51). Although, as noted above, many of the empirical claims underlying the justification were later proven to be false, this does not subvert the theoretical point that the justification involved an omnibus of different utilitarian reasons. Militaries thus can, and have, tried to justify going to war using utilitarian principles.

2.2.2 Deontology

Morality is not properly the doctrine of how we may make ourselves happy, but how we may make ourselves worthy of happiness.
– Immanuel Kant (1724–1804)

Live your life as though your every act were to become a universal law. – Immanuel Kant

2.2.2.1 The Core of the Theory

Deontological ethics argues that the morality of an action is based on the action's adherence to a rule or set of rules. It is sometimes described as 'duty-based', 'obligation-based', 'rule-based' or 'rights-based' ethics because rules 'bind you to your duty' and the 'right' has priority over the 'good'. The philosopher most central to deontology is Immanuel Kant.

Kant was an 18th-century philosopher who felt that the ethical theory of the day, consequentialism, in its various forms, was too subjective and touchy-feely. Kant did not think morality was subjective or had anything to do with feelings. In fact, he believed that morality should be objective, rational and absolute. He believed that morality holds up regardless of context or circumstance. He strongly believed that morality was, in essence, black and white with no grey areas, at least not in principle. Kant argued that if rational thought leads us to objective reality, then rational thought would lead us to an objective morality. This absolute, objective and unbreakable moral law Kant called the categorical imperative.

Kant distinguished between two types of imperatives or commands: *hypothetical* and *categorical*. *Hypothetical imperatives* tell you what to do in order to achieve a particular goal: 'If

you need money to go on holiday, then get a job'; 'If you want to lose weight, then diet and exercise'; 'If you don't want to get arrested, then don't shoplift'.

For Kant, morality is not like this. Morality does not tell us what to do on the assumption that we want to achieve a particular goal, e.g. losing weight or staying out of jail. Moral behaviour is indeed not about losing weight or staying out of jail. Morality consists of *categorical imperatives*. Categorical imperatives, unlike hypothetical imperatives, tell us what to do regardless of our desires. Morality does not say 'If you don't want to get arrested, then don't shoplift'; it says, 'Don't shoplift!' We should not shoplift, whether or not we want to stay out of jail.

Kant had three formulations of his categorical imperative (CI). His first formulation is the *formula of universal law*, sometimes referred to as the 'universality principle'. The universality principle argues that we should 'Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law without contradiction' (Kant, 2012, 17). Kant uses this principle to argue that all actions must have universality, i.e. be universalisable. An action is only morally correct if it can be done by anyone at any time or by everyone all of the time. If you are trying to work out if an action is acceptable, imagine a world where everyone could do that act at any time. If this does not seem like a world which would work, then it is not in order to do that action, even once. That is why the CI is absolute. There are no grey areas in the CI as a principle (although you may still face agonising choices personally). If you are trying to work out whether it is permissible to tell your friend a sexist or racist joke quietly when no one else is around, you have to work out if it would be in order for this joke to be told to anyone, by anyone, at any time or location. If you and your children are hungry and out of money until payday and

you want to decide if it is morally acceptable to steal a loaf of bread to feed your hungry children, again, you have to decide if stealing would be morally acceptable at any time by anyone. There are no exceptions to the rules under the CI. If you decide to tell the joke only once to one of your friends or steal the bread this one time to feed your starving children, you are, as a rational decision-making agent, implicitly universalising that action. Kant argues that you cannot make exceptions for yourself as it undermines the absoluteness of morality. There are social programmes and churches that will help feed you and your children, and there really is nothing funny about telling sexist/racist jokes.

One can see how Kant thought that universalising an immoral action leads to a practical contradiction. The universality principle tells us that lying to your partner when they ask you if they look good in an unflattering outfit universalises lying. If lying is universalised, then anyone can lie at any time. If everyone can lie, then we will never know if someone is being truthful. The whole institution of truth-telling has been undermined and, at the same time, the very rationale of human association.

Kant's second formulation of the CI is the *formula of the end in itself*, also referred to as the 'human dignity principle'. The human dignity principle states that we should 'Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never as a mere means' (Kant, 2012, 21). Kant uses the principle to show that every human being must be treated as an end rather than a means to an end. This is in stark contrast to Bentham and Mill who advocate that the consequence is what matters. If the best consequence is what matters, then the ends may, in fact, justify the means (albeit with the caveats given earlier), which contradicts the human dignity principle. The principle insists that people are

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not allowed to manipulate another person to achieve a goal. For Kant, it is not for the greatest good for the greatest group of people – each person is their own rational agent and therefore must be considered as an end in themselves. All of Kant's formulations tie in together. The universality principle argues that lying is not an action that can be universalised, and thus lying violates the CI. Similarly, lying violates the human dignity principle because when you lie, you are manipulating someone and using that person as a means to another end instead of as an end in themselves. For instance, you know that another person is interested in a romantic relationship with you. You decide to take advantage of their interest in order to spend only one night of intimacy with that person. Further, imagine that you knew that person would never be interested in a one-night stand. You decide to tell them you were interested in developing a relationship to get the one night of intimacy. In this example, you would be lying as well as treating them as a mere means to your end instead of as a means in his or herself, thus violating both the universality principle and the human dignity principle.

When it comes to Kant's human dignity principle, Mill might argue that in fact the principle does sound very utilitarian. Mill might point out that it is reminiscent of what he tried to do with the greatest happiness principle when combining it with the idea of the Golden Rule. What would be the Kantian objection to that? It would be Bernard Williams's quotation of 'one thought too many'. Kant's human dignity principle is not a happiness calculation but a categorical imperative. Further, not only does emotion not have any relation to morality, like you find in utilitarianism, because for Kant, emotions are actually a distraction. If you feel really good about doing a morally good act, then you risk devaluing the ethical action you have performed by choosing it for non-moral and ultimately self-serving reasons. Kant thus argues that the existence

of a co-operating emotion ultimately compromises, rather than adds to, the moral value of a chosen course of actions. It is more morally valuable to give a friend in need money if you feel bad about doing it, but still do so because it is your duty, rather than because it makes you feel good.

Kant's third formulation of the CI is the *formula of the kingdom of ends*, also referred to as the 'autonomy principle, which complements the other two formulations to complete the CI. The autonomy principle asserts that 'Every rational being must so act as if he were through his maxim always a legislating member in the universal kingdom of ends' (Kant, 2012, 45–46). It contends that if rational beings are ends in themselves, and not means to some other end, then the will of a rational being must be thought of as the maker of universal law. Human beings must understand themselves to be subjects as well as authors of the law, and they must recognise that the law requires unconditional obedience. The 'dignity' of rational beings requires that they accept no law that they would not themselves have enacted. We are self-governed. This Kantian insistence on self-governance has motivated the turn to 'autonomy' as a fundamental goal in much of contemporary professional ethics.

2.2.2.2 Standard Objections to Deontology

There are several objections posed to deontologists. One of the major challenges posed to Kant was from the French philosopher Benjamin Constant. Constant argued that universalising not lying could result in peril. Constant asked Kant to imagine that if a murderer wielding an axe went to your door and kindly asked you the location of your children (who happen to be in your

basement). Should you not lie to the axe murderer? Constant felt this was a ludicrous position to be in but would nonetheless be required if you were an adherent to the CI and the universality principle. Kant answered Constant controversially that yes, you would have to tell the truth. Because the axe murderer is his or her own rational and moral agent, they would be morally responsible for their own action. You also would be responsible for your own action. So, for instance, if you lied and said that your children were not home and were playing in the park down the street and simultaneously your children left out the backdoor and the axe murderer found them and killed them, you would be morally responsible because they died partially as a result of your lie. Kant also said that while you should not lie to the axe-wielding murderer, there is nothing wrong with locking your door and calling the police to protect your children. To be fair to Kant, he could also have pointed out that you could distract, mislead, tell partial truths or use delay tactics. Kant would say that you may do these things to stall the axe murderer, and they will not lead to a self-contradiction with the universality principle. If everything else fails, a Kantian would however rather attack the axe-wielding murderer barehanded rather than tell a direct, blatant lie.

Critics of Kant argue that he takes for granted that the maxims to be subjected to the test of universalisability can be derived unproblematically in every situation. The objection is, however, that it is often possible to specify the relevant maxim in two or more different ways in the 'same' situation and thus arrive at diverging answers to the universalisability test. Imagine a situation where you borrow a knife from a neighbour. Next day he comes back to ask for the knife back, but you know that he is going to use it to kill his wife. Two maxims are relevant to the given situation, but they yield different results. Maxim 1: one should return borrowed items to

their owners. Maxim 2: one should not give knives to potential murderers. The same thing can be specified in different ways that results in both 'yes' and 'no' answers, with critics of Kant quick to argue that situations do not come to you in pre-specified packages. Here is another example. Imagine that you have a maxim that says whenever you see a child drowning in a pond you have to save them. Further imagine then that you have a gifted specialised doctor who cannot swim but sees a child drowning. If you universalise the maxim that one should save a drowning child, then the non-swimming doctor must go into the pond. Does he or she have to sacrifice his or her own life to due to this maxim? Further, it is not just any human that cannot swim, but a gifted, specialised doctor that will not be easily replaced.

As mentioned in the last section on the human dignity principle, for Kant, emotion should play no part in morality. Contrary to consequentialism and virtue ethics, according to which morally proper emotions form part of the good life and are implicated in morality at all levels of engagement, this assumption is far removed from the Kantian contention that 'no moral principle is based […] on any feeling whatsoever' (Kant, 1964, 33). A further objection to Kant is, however, that, as humans, we cannot ignore emotion completely. In Charles Dickens's novel, *Hard Times* (1854) Mr Thomas Gradgrind is a notorious school board superintendent who is all about facts and keeping emotion out of learning. In the book, he is painted as a cold, duty-driven figure who is emotionless and hence both morally and educationally wanting. By our very nature, emotion is at the core of being human. The essence of this objection is that Kantian morality and Kantian moral education are ultimately Gradgrindian and hence morally wanting.

2.2.2.3 Application of Deontology to the Context of the Army

At first blush, deontology seems a perfect fit for the army. Rules are important in the army. In fact, every aspect of military life seems to be structured and relegated by rules. The army thus seems to be the epitome of a deontological institution. Rules of Engagement (ROE) are important because the US Government and the US Army want to make sure that soldiers are not targeting non-combatants and others not engaging in war. One can imagine the increase in carnage in war if there were not ROE in place.

Instilling the idea that the army is a rule-based organisation starts from the very beginning of an individual's time in the army. Whether a person is in basic training as a brand-new recruit or as a new cadet preparing to be an officer at West Point, rules are the first things mentioned. At West Point's Reception Day, before getting their head shaved and receiving military uniforms, all 1,230 new cadets receive a copy of the 'Cadet Honor Code'. The Cadet Honor Code states, 'A cadet will not lie, cheat, steal, or tolerate those who do'.[6] This meets all three formulations of the CI. For enlisted soldiers, their first day in the army is no different than for the future officers at West Point. As I mentioned in the introduction of Chapter 1, on my first day of Basic Combat Training, my senior drill sergeant told us that all you have to do to be successful in the army is just do what you are told.

Most militaries in first-world nations have a code of conduct, and the US is no different.[7] A code of conduct is a rule-based institutional instrument, the purpose of which is to ensure, and reinforce, morality. While a code of conduct seems like a good idea because it appears to support

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[6] A more detailed explanation of the 'Cadet Honor Code' is in Section 2.4
[7] The US, UK, Germany, France and the Netherlands are a few examples of militaries with a code of conduct.

the notion of discipline, in fact, it has only limited value because it lacks a practical connection with a soldier's routine daily life, both at work and at home. Despite this, there seems to be an overemphasis on codes of conduct in the military. Tom Harrison, the Director of Education at the Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues, argues that codes of conduct in many professions are abstract, 'professionals are often called on to use their character virtues to judge situations that are not covered in their code of conduct.'[8] While Harrison is referring to professions like law, medicine and teaching, it is equally true for the military. If we base a soldier's behaviour on deontological rules or a code of conduct, then there is no reliable predictor that the soldier who exhibits a virtue, say courage, will exhibit that same virtue in a different situation.

The US Army is very Kantian. It sees itself as black and white. Always follow the rules – not following the rules can get you killed in combat. Yet what about the times when following the rules will actually get you killed in combat? Does that mean that you die an honourable death just because you have to follow the rules? Is it never acceptable not to follow the rules in order to save lives? This seems counter-intuitive. In the Army, we are told to take care of our fellow soldiers. I would be violating the order and duty of taking care of my fellow soldiers if I knew following a rule would result in my comrade's death, injury or detainment by the enemy. What do you do when you have conflicting duties based on conflicting maxims that can be derived from the same situation, as explained in the previous section?

It is true that the hallmark of the army is its discipline. Nevertheless, while rules are designed for discipline, they do not always account for efficiency or even for making the most

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[8] These arguments were made in a presentation to West Point Cadets at the Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues on 29 June 2017.

ethical decisions. For instance, imagine an occasion where you have intelligence reporting rules

set up in a war zone in order to keep every person in the chain of command informed so that the

intelligence can be disseminated properly to all pertinent individuals and units. Unfortunately, it

can take critical minutes to pass intelligence to all individuals and units in a chain. Drawing on

my own personal experiences here as an example, on my first deployment to Iraq, there was an

occasion where I became aware of an imminent attack on a US Marine convoy. I knew that I had

maybe 30 seconds to get the information to the Marine convoy that they were about to be

decimated with a series of five Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). If I followed the rules and

sent the information up the proper channels, it would be too late, and potentially over 30 Marines

would be dead or wounded. I knew the Marine Intelligence Officer in charge of this mission and

contacted him directly by phone, completely bypassing the entire chain of command and

intelligence reporting structure. I told the Marine Intel Officer to radio his convoy and

immediately stop their movement. The Marine in charge of the convoy initially questioned why

but did halt the convoy. At the moment the convoy stopped, the insurgents became agitated and

could not understand why the American convoy was no longer approaching the IEDs. I instructed

the Marine Intel Officer to have his convoy commander go a kilometre off the paved road into the

desert, turn left, drive two kilometres, and then come back to the paved road. The insurgents were

frustrated and could not understand how the convoy could have known that insurgents were lying

in wait when they were hidden from the convoy. Two interesting things happened shortly after

this. The Marine battalion commander asked the Marine Intel Officer what had happened. The

Marine Intel Officer explained that Lieutenant Parsons had contacted him directly, bypassing the

intelligence reporting rules, in order to save people's lives. The Marine battalion commander had

one of his helicopters take him to my forward operating base to personally thank me and my

commander for bypassing the rules to save his Marines' lives. The second thing that happened was immediately after the Marine battalion commander left: my battalion commander lambasted and rebuked me for violating the rules. He told me the rules were in place for a reason and that, as a soldier, I had a duty to follow them. Yet if the occasion ever rose again, I know I would do exactly the same thing. Kantian deontology does not give much help, however, in justifying that strong moral intuition.

Unfortunately, war by its very nature is a grey area. I am not arguing that because it is a grey area you can set aside the rules and fight any way you want in order to win (I speak more about this in Section 2.3). I am arguing that sometimes following the rules results in a bad outcome and is detrimental to your own moral virtue. If you are merely following the rules, knowing that the outcome will be bad and that it will have a demoralising influence on you as a person, you are merely following the rules for rules' sake and not as a guide for morality. Kant would respond that because human lives are so important, it is vital to protect human lives and treat others with dignity. War is ugly, and we should do everything we can to limit the death and destruction inherent in war. To do this, we need clear rules, roles and duties, ultimately justifiable via the categorical imperative. While I agree with these premises, I have suggested above that rigid deontological conclusions do not necessarily follow from them.

2.2.3 Aristotelian Virtue Ethics

> *It is better to suffer injustice than to commit it.*
> – Socrates (470 BC – 399 BC)
>
> *Virtue is not an act; it is a habit.*
> – Aristotle (385 BC – 323 BC)

2.2.3.1 The Core of the Theory

Virtue ethics is the third of the three major approaches to normative ethics. Virtue ethics focuses most fundamentally on *how we should be*, rather than *what we should do*. The emphasis is on the role of one's character and the virtues that one's character embodies for determining or evaluating ethical behaviour rather than on codifiable rules (such as the principle of utility or the categorical imperative).

Imagine a person needs help. A utilitarian would help because the consequence of helping that person would result in maximising happiness. A deontologist would help because it would be in line with a universal categorical rule or duty mandating assistance. A virtue ethicist would help because it is a virtuous act, and virtuous behaviour is central to who we are as rational and emotional humans. All three theories encourage helping the person, just from a different perspective, reason and purpose. This should remind of an obvious point, which cannot be over-stated. Although this chapter focuses on distinctions between ethical theories, often by invoking far-fetched moral dilemmas, in most ordinary moral contexts these different ethical theories will give us the same advice about what to do – albeit for slightly different reasons. For theoretical purposes, those 'different reasons' matter greatly, although the outcome, in terms of actual act or omission, may look identical from a mere behavioural perspective.

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There are various forms of virtue ethics, in both eastern and western traditions. Eastern traditions started with Mencius and Confucius and the western traditions can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle. The ideas central to the various forms of virtue ethics are virtue and character. While all four of these thinkers had influence on virtue ethics, most of the modern forms of the theory rely on Aristotle's thinking. Much of the language used in virtue ethics is comprised of Greek vocabulary found in Aristotle's treatise on morality, the *Nicomachean Ethics*. At the core of the theory, Aristotle argues that our *ethos* (character) is who we are, our ultimate *telos* (goal) is *eudaimonia* (happiness/flourishing) and we strive to reach *arête* (virtue/excellence) through practice and learning which develops our *phronesis* (practical wisdom). Each of these Greek words work together to inform the theory that strives to improve human flourishing. More on each of these words below.

Aristotle argues that a human's highest goal is to flourish – all human activities aim at some end that we consider good. Most activities are a means to a higher end. The highest human good, then, is that activity that is an end in itself. For Aristotle, that good is happiness or human flourishing. Kristjánsson (2017, 14–15) explains that for Aristotle, flourishing is an ongoing activity that strives for 'human excellences'. These excellences are called virtues and are considered 'necessary conditions for flourishing'. A virtue is an enduring component of a person, of their character. As Annas (2011, 8) explains, it is 'a tendency for a person to be a certain way' and is central to who they are as a person. Think of it as an individual's disposition. A person's particular virtues are not static, but active facets that develop over time through responses to different situations. The virtue can either strengthen when the person thinks and acts in generous ways or weaken when they fail to act in charitable ways (Annas, 2011, 9). Aristotle points out

that for a feeling and action to be properly virtuous, it must be exhibited 'at the right times, about

the right things, towards the right people, for the right end, and in the right way' (Aristotle, 1985,

44 [1106b29–35]). If it does not meet these criteria, then it is not a virtue. Aristotle clarifies this

by stating that actions and feelings might veer from the 'right' intention: 'Actions also admit of

excess, deficiency, and an intermediate condition' (Aristotle, 1985, 44 [1106b29–35]). Aristotle

establishes an architecture by which to determine if the character trait is exercised in just the right

amount to be a virtue. Although not named so by Aristotle, this schema is often referred to as the

'the golden mean' (Arthur et al., 2017, 28; Kristjánsson, 2017, 28) or the 'doctrine of the mean'

(Annas, 1993, 59; Curzer, 2015, 99). Aristotle explains his architectonic structure in this way

(1985: 44 [1107a1-3]):

> Virtue then is a state that decides, consisting in a mean, the mean relative to us, which is
> defined by reference to reason, that is to say, to the reason by reference to which the
> prudent person would define it. It is a mean between two vices, one of excess and one of
> deficiency.

Aristotle is indicating that every virtue is just the right amount of a character trait, between not

enough of it, a vice of deficiency, and too much of it, a vice of excess. For example, courage,

(which is a virtue discussed in more detail in Section 2.2.3) is the just right amount of fortitude in

the face of danger. The relevant vice of deficiency, cowardice, is a matter of not having enough

such fortitude in one's character. The relevant vice of excess, foolhardiness (or rashness) is a

matter of having too much courage, given the context. Virtue is a medial state between the

extremes of excess and deficiency. This medial state varies from person to person, situation to

situation and reason to reason (Aristotle, 1985, 44 [1106b29–35]). This idea of the 'golden mean'

indicates that while there are many ways to be 'bad', there is only one way to be 'good' (that is to

say correct) and that is the 'mean' of that character state for that person, at that time and in that situation (Aristotle, 1985, 44 [1106b29–35]). Notice too that Aristotle above described the 'mean' as 'relative to us, which is defined by reference to reason, that is to say, to the reason by reference to which the prudent person would define it'. Kristjánsson (2018, 15) describes how good character is relative to the individual. He illustrates this point by showing 'two people with equally good moral character may possess quite different character traits'. This is because the mean state of a character trait will be dependent on who we are as humans, our tendencies, desires and physical, mental and emotional needs. For instance, temperance in eating is going to be different for a 20-year-old cadet on the West Point football first team compared to me, an army officer quickly approaching 50. Additionally, the mean could appear at first blush as possibly a vice of some kind. For instance, take the notion of anger or indignation, which could be that the right way (the virtue) to feel on a specific occasion. If the anger is toward some person's inhuman treatment toward a child or the elderly, or a politician trying to prevent fellow citizens from voting based solely on their ethnicity, righteous indignation would be displaying the appropriate amount (the mean) of anger between tolerance (or mild annoyance) and hatred (possibly violence). Annas explains that this extreme anger is still 'in a mean because [it is] neither excessive nor defective but displaying the appropriate amount of anger' (1993, 61).

In the Aristotelian way of thinking of character, there are two different types or categories of virtues, *intellectual* and *moral*. *Intellectual* virtues are character traits that are necessary for discernment, right action and the pursuit of knowledge, truth and understanding. A few examples of *intellectual* virtues are critical thinking, judgment, reasoning, autonomy, curiosity, reflection and resourcefulness. *Moral* virtues are character traits that enable us to act well in situations that

require an ethical response. Some examples of *moral* virtues are courage, honesty, integrity, respect, justice, compassion and gratitude. In a recent neo-Aristotelian reconstruction, there are four categories or types of virtues (Arthur, 2020, 157–158; Arthur et al., 2017, 10–12, 37–38; Jubilee Centre, 2017, 5; Kristjánsson, 2007, 17–18; Kristjánsson, 2017, 17; Kristjánsson, 2018, 15–16; Kristjánsson, 2020, 14–19). In addition to *intellectual* and *moral* virtues, there are *civic* and *performance* virtues. *Civic* virtues are character traits that are necessary for engaged responsible citizenship, contributing to the common good. Some examples of *civic* virtues are citizenship, civility, community awareness, neighbourliness, service and volunteering. *Performance* virtues are character traits that have an instrumental value in enabling the *intellectual*, *moral* and *civic* virtues. A few examples of *performance* virtues are confidence, determination, motivation, perseverance, resilience and teamwork. For Aristotle himself, *civic* virtues fall under the *moral* virtues, and *performance* virtues are not virtues in and of themselves, but rather mere skills (*techné*). In another neo-Aristotelian reconstruction, based on actual factor analysis of characterological self-reports, there are three categories or types of virtues (Burger and McGrath, 2019; McGrath, 2015; McGrath, 2020). The McGrath three-factor model of virtue corresponds substantially to that of the four categories of *performative*, *intellectual*, *moral* and *civic* virtues mentioned above. The difference between the three- and four-category models is that the categories of *moral* and *civic* virtues are combined into one category, labelled *moral/civic* (for more on McGrath's three-cluster groupings of virtue see Section 3.4.2.2, below).

MacIntyre (2007, 154) explains that the intellectual virtues are acquired through teaching and the virtues of character through exercise, and, while different, these two types of virtues are entwined, a notion he attributes to Aristotle: 'the excellence of character and intelligence cannot

be separated'. This leads to our discussion of *phronesis*, or practical wisdom. Aristotle describes *phronesis* as an intellectual virtue that is required to exercise all of the virtues of character. If moral knowledge is knowing the right moral judgment and moral action is doing the right moral activity, the bridge that connects the two is *phronesis*. Julia Annas perhaps puts this best when she says, 'whatever else phronesis is, it is the disposition to make right moral judgments' (1993, 73).

As virtue is a disposition, it takes time for a person to become virtuous, and, as such, it 'requires habituation and experience' (Annas, 2011, 12). Character traits, or virtues, must be practised in order to develop practical wisdom. All humans can develop their practical wisdom, but we all do so at different paces, and some virtues come more naturally and easily to each of us than do others. Starting at a very early age, we learn and develop virtue through practice. The practice is living our lives. Habituation, achieved through practice, is first introduced to us at a young age by our family, and by teachers at school. It is not just rules we are told to follow, but we are given role models that not only explain what we should do, but also show us how to put the virtue into practice. This means we need experience, in a variety of situations, to apply the virtue in the right amount and in the right way whilst being guided by our role models (parents, teachers and communities). Curzer (2002, 147) explains that habituation does not necessarily mean doing the exact same thing each time. Remember, the virtues action is dependent on time, situation and other variables. Therefore 'habitually acting virtuously does not mean repeatedly doing the same thing, but rather it means repeatedly doing the right thing'. This idea is best understood through Aristotle's use of the word *arête*. *Arête* is often translated as 'virtue' in English. *Arête*, more generally, means excellence. Just as you have to practise a sport like

basketball, you also have to practise virtuous behaviour. In basketball, for most athletes, their

shot is not automatically perfect. While some athletes will be more naturally gifted and suited for

a sport than other people, they still need to practice their shot in order to improve. The same is

true of virtuous behaviour. It has to be practised in order for improvement and consistency of that

virtue. Aristotle uses the example of an equestrian. He argues that a good equestrian does not

become good by simply reading about horses and theorising about horses but by actually going

out and riding the horse in practice. You can read all day for a year about playing basketball, but

until you go out and practice your shot, you will not develop excellence in basketball. Through

practice and muscle memory, your form and shot will become more consistent, more accurate

and excellent. The same idea applies to a virtuous act, say, courage or gratitude. For Aristotle, the

kind of excellence that marks a good basketball player, a good equestrian and a good person is

not so different. As a theory, virtue ethics holds that reaching *eudaimonia* or a flourishing life in

all virtues is very difficult to do and, to a certain extent, dependent on 'moral luck' or external

necessities, such as health, material resources, sound upbringing and good friends. It is a lifelong

process, and some virtue ethicists do not think we can ever completely get there, for the theory

prescribes a life-long process of cultivating each of the virtues. As we discussed with the

basketball and equestrian examples, every person is different, and different skills and virtues are

easier for some of us and harder for others. That is why we practise the virtues as we practise

riding a horse or shooting a basketball.

Aristotle has a taxonomy of character traits, or scheme of classification, for the various

stages or states of moral character that vary by degree. In Book VII of the *Nicomachean Ethics*,

he discusses six states of moral character, with three being 'good' and three being 'bad'. Vice,

incontinence and brutishness (bestiality) are the bad states of character, and these are contrasted

with the three good states that Aristotle calls virtue, continence and superior virtue (also thought

of as heroic and divine) (Aristotle, 1985, 172–173 [1145a15–33]). Aristotle points out that it is

rare for a divine person to exist. It is also rare to come across a brutish person. Aristotle says that

the word bestial (brutish) is used as a term of reproach for people who exceed the human level of

vice. Curzer (2002, 3) explains that the virtuous person reasons, acts and feels rightly without

internal conflict, while the continent person overcomes bad desires and passions in order to

execute virtuous acts. The continent person practises self-control and acts in the right way. And

despite the base desires that they have, they use reason and do not succumb to their desires.

Despite their self-control and good actions, Kristjánsson (2007, 21) explains that for Aristotle,

they are still far from being virtuous because 'self-control is not the ideal state'. Continent people

still have bad desires and want to act on those bad desires but manage to avoid acting on those

base desires. The incontinent person is someone that knows what is right, wants to do right, but

has a lack of self-control. Aristotle argues that the incontinent fail in many cases, despite

knowing what they should and want to do, 'because of too much [pleasure] (Aristotle 1985: 173–

96 [1145a34–1151b33]). Kristjánsson (2007, 21) observes that despite a lack of self-control, most

of the time they do the right thing, 'otherwise they would quickly become much worse than

incontinent'. Curzer (2002, 161, note 38) maintains, and Kristjánsson (2007, 21) supports, that

incontinence is actually an 'under-appreciated state of character' because they are in fact more

morally advanced than many people. This is because they know and can make the right choices,

despite not doing so. Aristotle acknowledges that most people find themselves somewhere

between the levels of continence (self-control) and incontinence (morally aware but lack self-

control) (1985, 190 [1150a15]). Curzer (2015, 73, footnote 10) provides an excellent example of

enjoying a hot fudge sundae that illustrates the difference between the actions and feelings of the continent and incontinent person:

> The continent person, however, experiences the pain of unsatisfied desire together with the supervenient enjoyment of refusing a second hot fudge sundae. Similarly, the incontinent person experiences tactile enjoyment together with a supervenient pain upon eating a second hot fudge sundae.

Curzer (2015, 3) claims that the vicious are 'incorrigible'. This is because they have three things that are in a wrong state: 1) they have vicious desires, 2) wrong beliefs about virtue and 3) they are 'strong-headed'. Curzer believes that as long as a person has good mental health and only one or two of the three, they can improve. Brutish people fall into three further categories someone similar to vicious, incontinent and incontinent people. Some brutish people do not realise anything is wrong with their thoughts and actions (vicious-brutish). Some brutish people know what is right in regard to reason and action but give in to their brutish desires despite knowing (incontinent-brutish). Finally, some brutish people know what is right, and somehow manage to act right, despite their brutish desires (continent-brutish). Table 1, based on Howard Curzer's table in *Aristotle and the virtues* (2015, 81), illustrates the different states of character.

Table 1: Aristotle's States of Character

States of Character	Desires and Pleasures	Choices	Acts
Phronemos / Divine / Heroic / Superhuman Virtue	Perfect	Perfect	Perfect
Virtuous	Right	Right	Right
Continent	Wrong	Right	Right
Incontinent	Wrong	Right	Wrong
Vicious	Wrong	Wrong	Wrong
Continent-Brutish	Very Wrong	Right	Right
Incontinent-Brutish	Very Wrong	Right	Very Wrong
Vicious-Brutish	Very Wrong	Very Wrong	Very Wrong

2.2.3.2 Standard Objections to Virtue Ethics

The two theories discussed previously, utilitarianism and deontology, offer clearer guidance on

ethical behaviour. Utilitarians have the greatest happiness principle, and deontologists have the

categorical imperative. A common objection to virtue ethics is that it does not provide guidance

on how to act. There are no clear principles for guiding our actions. All the theory seems to say

is, 'act like a virtuous person would in any given situation'. Further, as it relates to Aristotle and

the doctrine of the mean, some objectors point out that 'too much' or 'too little' is too vague,

especially if it is different for every person. How do we know what the right amount of a character trait is for us at this given moment in time? Aristotle would respond to these critiques by saying that is why we use *phronesis*. Over time, it will help us refine our actions and know what the just right amount of a character trait to employ in a given situation. This does not satisfy some objectors. Some argue that if I have practical wisdom, then I know what to do. If I do not have practical wisdom, then I do not know what the virtuous person would do, so how do I ever learn what to do? Aristotle would have several responses to this. First, how we develop practical reason is through experience. This particular time, I might have had too much anger and be irascible. Next time, I might not have enough anger and be timid and let people walk over me or be intemperate and appear not to care. Over time, though, I learn the right amount of a character trait to employ. Another point Aristotle would offer is that mentorship is important. We need moral exemplars to act as moral mentors to help develop character and virtues in younger, less practically wise people. Remember, we will not be good equestrians, basketball players or virtuous people without practice and coaching. We also have access to resources and theoretical advice through books like the *Nicomachean Ethics* or places like the Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues.

There is still a potential dilemma lurking here. Either *phronesis* supplies a motivation to overall virtuous functioning over and beyond the individual moral virtues or not. If it does not, then it is difficult to see how it can adjudicate virtue conflicts (such as the Loyalty Dilemma discussed in Section 2.1.3). If it does, then this seems to make the individual moral virtues redundant and turns *phronesis* into a standalone consequentialist maximisation principle. Aristotle, and neo-Aristotelian thinkers, would argue that the practical experience we gain over

time helps motivate us toward the right virtuous action, but for them, it is not a maximising principle or rule, as each person is different and requires a different and personal set of considerations specific to each individual.

The moral action guidance problem comes to the fore when we are faced with a moral dilemma of conflicting virtues. For instance, what do you choose to do when honesty and loyalty collide? As I mentioned in Section 2.2.3, at West Point, there is something called the 'Cadet Honor Code'.[9] The 'Cadet Honor Code' states: 'A cadet will not lie, cheat, steal, or tolerate those who do'. The Code is strictly enforced and if it transpires that you have violated it, there are serious ramifications that include being kicked out of West Point. The 'Cadet Honor Code' is prominently displayed around West Point on posters, plaques and engraved in granite. Setting aside the fact that this is clearly a rule, a mandate and an imperative that West Point places on the cadet, something else is going on here. West Point is instilling these virtues in cadets. To think of the 'Cadet Honor Code' in positive terms, a cadet will be honest, just and have integrity. West Point also prominently displays the Seven Army Values, which are Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honour, Integrity and Personal Courage. The cadets are constantly told that they need to look out for the best interest of their fellow cadets who will be their comrades and brothers and sisters-in-arms. Imagine when one cadet has found out that another cadet has 'cheated' on an assignment/exam or has lied to a professor that they finished the reading the night before when they had multiple other homework assignments due. Maybe one cadet knows that his or her classmate did not do the reading. Maybe the cadet saw the classmate had copied someone else's homework. In these circumstances, the 'Cadet Honor Code' prescribes that you

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[9] As a reminder, a more detailed explanation of the 'Cadet Honor Code' is in Section 2.4.

will not tolerate other cadets that violate the code. This is known as the 'Cadet Honor Code's Toleration Clause'. You have a duty to be honest and to have the integrity to report them. However, the cadet knows how harsh the penalties are for copying homework or lying to the professor about the reading. The cadet chooses to have the personal courage to take care of his or her fellow cadet and tells them that they will not turn them in this time, but they know they should not have done that and that they should never violate the 'Cadet Honor Code' again. In taking this course of action, the cadet lives up to the seven army values by admonishing the cadet whilst showing loyalty to their fellow cadet, respecting the cadet made a mistake but will correct themselves in the future. This is a clear example of the Loyalty Dilemma (as discussed in Section 2.1.3) in a military, specifically West Point, context. The cadet that observed his fellow cadet cheat, yet chose loyalty to his friend over honesty and even over loyalty to the academy and the 'Cadet Honor Code'.

This instance of the Loyalty Dilemma is presumably not a problem for Aristotle, as Aristotle argues *phronesis* is the solution. The practical wisdom we develop over time will help us choose which virtue to employ in this situation. *Phronesis* will give us deliberation tools to help us choose the right action. However, as already mentioned, sceptics will see this move as simply impaling the chooser on the horns of a dilemma about the source of the action-guiding motivation.

A potential solution to the non-action guidance problem is Hursthouse's conception of virtue rules or 'v-rules' (1999, 37). She contends that virtue ethics offers a considerable number of rules which in fact can be action guiding. The v-rules offer prohibition on vices – do not be cruel, dishonest or cowardly, and prescribes virtues – be compassionate, honest and courageous.

Hursthouse has support from other virtue ethicists like Athanassoulis (2018) who asserts that v-rules provide pragmatic moral guidance. In fact, in a lecture she gave at the Jubilee Centre (2018), she argued that 'we receive more guidance from considering what is involved in the virtue of honesty than in following a rigid rule such as "always tell the truth"'.

There is another problem to consider here, however. As I mentioned in the introduction to this section, virtue ethics focuses on *how we should be*, rather than *what we should do*. The emphasis is on the role of one's character and the virtues that one's character embodies for determining or evaluating ethical behaviour rather than on rules (such as the principle of utility or the categorical imperative). This means, in the view of many objectors, that virtue ethics promotes a self-centred conception of ethics because human flourishing is seen as an end in itself. Whenever we encounter people that only talk about 'me, me, me', we are alienated and occasionally offended, even if the 'me, me, me' is all about the person's desire not to get her hands morally dirty. That person only cares about themselves and their own purity, we would say. How is that moral? How is that virtuous? The problem for some is that virtue ethics does not sufficiently consider the extent to which our actions affect other people. Critics might argue, how and why does it matter if we are virtuous in a vacuum? To make ourselves feel pure and good? Morality is supposed to be about how we treat other people. If the primary concern is our own character, how does that morally relate to others?

Tim Scanlon (1998, 108–113) argues that well-being is not a moral notion but one of self-interest. Scanlon further argues that a focus on one's own well-being does not form comparisons with other people and therefore cannot play the role virtue ethicists want it to. The reason that this objection fails, the Aristotelian virtue ethicist might say in response, is that it does not take

into account the role virtues actually play. By their very nature, virtues are about actions toward others. Yes, virtue ethicists are trying to improve themselves, but they do so only by improving themselves in their interaction with others. In remembering the basketball player example, no one is going to judge harshly the person who shoots 500 free throws in a row in an effort to improve himself or herself. We would not call them selfish or self-centred, but a person who wants to improve themselves. Similarly, if someone is practising acts of kindness, it is not a purely selfish endeavour. They are trying to be a better person, yes, but they are also trying to benefit others as well. The problem is that this response might fall prey to Williams's 'one thought too many' objection to consequentialism. If you say, for example, that the virtue of compassion is not self-centred because, although it is justified in terms of its effects on the agent, it is in essence about wanting to improve the situation of another person, you seem to be saying that improving the situation of others is just a happy, fortuitous side-effect of the virtue of compassion. But then you have invoked other regard as 'another thought' about morality when it should be the *only thought*.

As with the other two moral theories, virtue ethics is thus subject to possible objections. The dream of finding the perfect theory to fit every circumstance may be an illusion. The best we can hope for is, perhaps, a theory that provides the 'least bad fit' with our moral intuitions. It may well be the case also that the different moral theories fit different contexts in varying ways so that, for example, one theory might be more fitting for close personal moralities, another for professional-ethics contexts and another for large socio-political decision-making. At all events, it must be stressed that the current thesis is about morality in an army context and ethical training

for such context. That particular situatedness of the discussion will steer the argument later in this chapter about why virtue ethics may be the best moral theory for the army.

2.2.3.3 Application of Virtue Ethics to the Context of the Army

In Section 2.2.2 on deontology, we discussed that the hallmark of an army is its discipline. Armies are all about rules. They need the structure that rules provide. The Profession of Arms employs violence on behalf of governments. Lives, on both sides of a conflict, hang in the balance. While rules are important, something else western armies are interested in is character and virtues. Armies even call their mottos by the Greek word for character: ethos. The Warrior Ethos for the US Army says: 'I will always place the mission first, I will never accept defeat, I will never quit, and I will never leave a fallen comrade' (HQ Army, 2011). The motto goes to show the soldiers, and the people of the United States, that soldiers have character by which they live. It is not just the word character, or ethos, that armies have embraced. Most western armies have adopted virtues they feel to be central to who they are as an organisation and describe their values in terms of virtues (see Table 2 for a list of western militaries' values/virtues).

Table 2: Values and Standards of Western Armies

Values and Standards of Western Armies and/or Armed Forces				
Australian Army	**British Army**	**Canadian Armed Forces**	**Norwegian Armed Forces**	**US Army**
	Loyalty	Loyalty		Loyalty
		Duty	Responsibility	Duty
Respect	Respect		Respect	Respect
	Selfless Commitment			Selfless Service
				Honor
	Integrity	Integrity		Integrity
Courage	Courage	Courage	Courage	Personal Courage
	Discipline			
Initiative				
Teamwork				
			Broadmindedness	

As I mentioned in the introduction, the US Army has the acronym (LDRSHIP) for their Seven Army Values: Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honour, Integrity and Personal Courage. The British Army also has what they call Values and Standards, which lists six virtues: Respect for Others, Courage, Loyalty, Integrity, Discipline and Selfless Commitment. While operating within rules is important, just as important is having people that practise virtuous living.

Sometimes people do not follow the rules. Sometimes there is an absence of an applicable rule. If we are only living by rules, such instances create a gap. That is why it is important to have people developing practical wisdom by practising virtuous living, through which they are able to make morally excellent decisions in the absence of rules.

As I have already explained and defined in Section 2.2.3.1, all four categories of virtues are, arguably, important for an army to inculcate in their soldiers. The previous paragraph discussed how armies are adopting *moral* virtues like *courage*, *respect*, *integrity* and *honour*, but it is equally important the other three categories of virtues are adopted, introduced and promoted by armies. The *intellectual* virtues are important for soldiers and officers in war and in peace. Soldiers need to be critical thinkers, possess sound judgment and be resourceful. *Civic* virtues are important for armies at home and in other countries in which they may be operating. To help bridge the civil-military divide, soldiers need to practise civility to citizens who may be inconvenienced by western militaries occupying space in foreign countries. Soldiers need to be communally aware, in both foreign and domestic contexts. Clearly, *performance* virtues are important for soldiers to practise as they aid them in the development of other virtues. For instance, having the *performance* virtue of determination will help you with the *moral* virtue of courage. Having the *performance* virtue of teamwork helps the *moral* virtue of loyalty and selfless service. *Performance* virtues can also enhance the *intellectual* virtues, for example, confidence can help with autonomy and critical thinking.

A sceptic of virtue ethics would ask how a soldier or army get around the problem of non-action guidance and the problem of self-centeredness. How can we have an effective army if there is not a specific rule, or set of rules, to follow, and if all individual soldiers care about is

improving themselves? A virtue ethicist might argue something like this: if there is buy-in of the army values, soldiers continually strive to act virtuously, originally, perhaps, by practising continence, but over time through having developed practical wisdom. If they try to live the army values of being honest, having loyalty and practising selfless service, then the soldiers are acting for others and not just themselves. They will strive to live a life of service to others, as well as strive to live a virtuous life. I return those issues in Section 2.3.6 on why virtue ethics is best for the army, after I discuss the lessons to be drawn from just war theory in the next section.

2.3 Army Ethics: The Advantage of neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics

When it comes to the best theoretical approach to morality, what sets the three main theories of deontology, utilitarianism and virtue ethics apart? Why does one better suit the profession of arms? I argue that it boils down to moral reasoning and moral action. The main objective of the profession of arms is to fight and win their nation's wars. Fighting to win a war requires killing and destruction. Pacifists would argue that it is never moral acceptable to kill. Even in war. Short of pacifists, at face value, it would seem to be that there are morally permissible times to kill and morally impermissible times to kill. Due to the unique duties of this profession, soldiers must be able to reason and act morally in these delicate circumstances. When the soldier, in times of war and peace, uses moral reason to arrive at the moral action she or he must make, what guides them in their deliberation? What guides them to right action? It is something that tells you what to do in a given situation? It can be seen as following the rules. As I have mentioned, following the rules can guide you most of the time. Can I shoot at this person in a combat zone? What do the rules of engagement (ROE) say? Should I admit that I cheated on a physics exam at West Point?

What does the Cadet Honor Code say? Sometimes the right thing is straightforward, and rules can guide you to the right action. What happens when it is not such a cut and dried scenario, however? Imagine a scenario where a certain terrorist organisation routinely visually records torture of coalition forces' soldiers before beheading them. Further imagine that several of your soldiers have been captured by this organisation; however, your platoon has been able to capture one of the terrorists. Can you torture the captured terrorist in order to find the location of your soldiers before it is too late? What about a military example that does not include life or death? Do I as a cadet have to tell my leadership at West Point that my best friend cheated on a physics exam? What does the Cadet Honor Code and its Toleration Clause say? This is the loyalty dilemma again (as discussed in Section 2.1.3). Do I choose honesty, or do I choose loyalty? These are very difficult decisions to make. These situations are called moral dilemmas for a reason. There are no good or comfortable choices in these scenarios. Moral reasoning in these instances cannot be broken down to the greatest good for the greatest number or if the best action is universalisable. Maybe the best action, morally speaking, does not provide the greatest good to the majority. Maybe we would not want to universalise the best action in the situation because it is essentially unique and person-specific. When you face these difficult decisions in complex moral dilemmas, virtue ethics arguably offers the individual action guidance where deontology or utilitarianism do not. This action guidance comes by way of *phronesis*, or practical wisdom.

As mentioned in Section 2.2.3 (pages 50, 55-56) *phronesis*, or practical wisdom, is the bridge that connects moral reasoning and moral action (Annas, 1993, 73; Kristjánsson, et. al, 2020; 2021). How is practical wisdom acquired and how does practical wisdom help us make incredibly difficult decisions? It starts with the idea of habituation, which is an ongoing process

of learning (Annas, 2011, 12; 2015). Schwartz and Sharpe (2010, 271) point out that practical wisdom is not something that can be taught directly.[10] It is a learning process. Habituation is the notion of practice through experience. Practical wisdom cannot be learned as a particular subject or a type of application for all things. Practical wisdom is embedded in the actual practices we engage in. This includes professional practice (Schwartz and Sharpe, 2010, 271). Specifically, we can develop practical wisdom as a doctor, lawyer, teacher or military officer. It is called practical wisdom, because is practical in nature: we learn what to do, we learn through actually doing it, refining it, getting better at it. It is like the basketball example back in Section 2.2.3.1 page 50. Someone has to show you how to shoot a free throw. Then you need to start practicing the free throws. While the basic form will be the same, eventually you develop your own style of how to shoot the free throw that works best for you. You will also need to practise shooting free throws within different variables and contexts (e.g., in the final seconds of a game with an exuberant crowd and the game on the line, inside a climate-controlled gym, in a park with lots of sun, twilight, perfect weather, windy conditions, etc.).[11] The same is true for our professional practices. For a soldier, we need to be taught the martial virtues (discussed in more detail in the next section 2.4) and then practise the virtues in a variety of contexts and situations. This will develop our practical wisdom. As it relates to which theoretical approach to morality is best for a cadet, soldier and military officer, when facing difficult decisions in complex moral dilemmas, virtue ethics offers the individual action guidance in the form of context-sensitive practical wisdom whereas deontology or utilitarianism do not.

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[10] When Aristotle says that *phronesis* is learnt by teaching and experience, he is probably referring to what Darnell and colleagues (2019) call the 'blueprint' component of *phronesis* when referring to the teachable part.
[11] I would like to thank Paul Watts for pointing out that practising free throws in different weather conditions is similar to practising virtues in different conditions.

2.4 The Seven Army Values or Martial Virtues?

As initially mentioned on page 11 and will be elaborated upon in more detail in the next section (2.5), just war theory is broken down into three divisions: *jus ad bellum* is concerned with the justice of going to war, *jus in bello* is concerned with right action in war and *jus post bellum* is concerned with the responsibility and accountability of the warring sides after the conclusion of the war. In each of the three divisions, different individuals are responsible for right action. Politicians and elected officials are morally responsible for the road to war. The soldiers and officers engaging in war are morally responsible for right action. Finally, a mix of politicians, civilian administrators, and military leaders are morally responsible for the termination of war, for justice and for reconstruction. Each group must exercise certain virtues in their moral decision-making. While some virtues will undoubtedly overlap in the three groups (such as prudence, critical thinking, respect and justice), each group will have specific virtues that are important in making morally just decisions. As initially mentioned on page 13 and elaborated upon in Section 2.1.1, in Western armies, every soldier is potentially a 'leader', right down to the individual soldier in accordance with the leadership philosophy known as Mission Command. While being in command or following orders will require slightly different virtues, most soldiers and officers will find themselves at some stage in all three roles of leader, subordinate and teammate. Because most soldiers and officers will experience all roles, when choosing the right set of virtues for the military, it will require virtues for all three roles.

As initially mentioned on page 10 and further elaborated in Section 2.2.3.3, most armies have a chosen set of values and standards (see Table 2 on page 61). While I believe each nation's

chosen 'value' or virtue was selected with good faith and good intention, haphazardly chosen 'values' that collectively fit a clever acronym like LDRSHIP (loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity and personal courage) will fall short. While memorising an acronym will likely help soldiers and officers remember the seven 'values', it does not help them in their decision-making, and definitely not in their actual moral actions. As mentioned in 2.2.3.1 on page 49, because virtue is a disposition, it takes time for a person to become virtuous, and, as such, it 'requires habituation and experience' (Annas, 2011, 12). Virtues must be practised in order to develop practical wisdom. As such, for soldiers and officers to actually develop their moral-reasoning and practical wisdom, mere memorisation will not be sufficient.

As mentioned on page 47 (Section 2.2.3), in a recent neo-Aristotelian reconstruction, there are four categories or types of virtues (Arthur, 2020, 157–158; Arthur et al., 2017, 10–12, 37–38; Jubilee Centre, 2017, 5; Kristjánsson, 2007, 17–18; Kristjánsson, 2017, 17; Kristjánsson, 2018, 15–16; Kristjánsson, 2020, 14–19): Intellectual Virtues, Moral Virtues, Civic Virtues, and Performance Virtues (See Table 3 below). Further, the Jubilee Centre has argued that professions (such as doctors, lawyers, nurses, teachers, social workers, etc.) have specific categorical virtues as well (Arthur and Earl, 2020; Arthur et al., 2019; Harrison and Khatoon, 2017; Jubilee Centre, 2016; 2018). For the Profession of Arms, I propose the category of Martial Virtues to complement the other four neo-Aristotelian virtue categories.[12] Like the other virtues, the Martial Virtues must be developed through habituation, experience and practice. As mentioned, soldiers

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[12] I chose these 10 virtues based on three factors. First, I looked at the Jubilee Centre's framework (2017). Second, I based them on some of the army- specific virtues that the Jubilee Centre discussed in their *Soldiers of character* study (Arthur, Walker and Thoma, 2018; Walker, 2020; Walker, Thoma and Arthur, 2020). Finally, I looked over the 24 character strengths listed on the VIA Inventory of Strengths searching for virtues that would be crucial to the army profession. While essentially open-ended and debatable, this list is therefore not arbitrary.

and officers find themselves in the roles of leader, subordinate and teammate. As such, it makes sense to create Martial Virtues instead of Officer Virtues and Enlisted Soldier Virtues. When selecting virtues for this category, a good place to start looking is at the list of virtues on the VIA Inventory of Strengths (see appendix 2). Of the 24 character strengths listed on the VIA, there are nine that seem particularly important virtues for the Profession of Arms: Bravery/Courage, Judgement/Critical Thinking, Perspective/Wisdom, Perseverance, Honesty, Kindness, Teamwork, Leadership and Self-Regulation. In addition to these eight virtues, one could add other virtues such as Selflessness/Sacrifice/Service, Resilience/Grit and Respect. Other virtues that are synonymous with some of the eight VIA virtues are Discipline/Temperance/Self-Regulation, Prudence/Perspective/Wisdom and Compassion/Kindness. Taking in these considerations, I propose the 10 following Martial Virtues, in no particular order, as equally important to the Profession of Arms: Prudence, Courage, Honesty, Respect, Selflessness, Discipline, Perseverance, Resilience, Teamwork and Leadership (See Table 4 below). It should be understood that this is not an exhaustive list of Martial Virtues, but 10 representative virtues to include in this novel category. Some of the Martial Virtues also fit in other virtue categories (such as Courage, Honesty and Respect are Moral Virtues; Selflessness and Leadership are Civic Virtues; Prudence is an Intellectual Virtue; and Perseverance, Resilience and Teamwork are Performance Virtues). While some of the Martial Virtues overlap with the Seven Army Values (Courage and Respect), the importance takeaway is not to create an easy to remember nomic device in acronym form to just memorise a list. It is not memorisation that we use to help soldiers and military cadets develop their character, it is education, experience, habituation and reflection.

Table 3: neo-Aristotelian Categories of Virtues[13]

Neo-Aristotelian Categories of Virtues					
Intellectual Virtues	**Moral Virtues**	**Civic Virtues**	**Performance Virtues**	**Martial Virtues**	
Autonomy	Courage	Citizenship	Confidence	Prudence	Perseverance
Critical Thinking	Compassion	Civility	Motivation	Courage	Resilience
Judgement	Honesty	Neighbourliness	Perseverance	Honesty	Teamwork
Reasoning	Justice	Service	Resilience	Respect	Leadership
Reflection	Respect	Volunteering	Teamwork	Selflessness	Self-Regulation

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[13] Adopted from Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues (2017) *A framework for character education in schools*. Birmingham: University of Birmingham. Available at: https://www.jubileecentre.ac.uk/userfiles/jubileecentre/pdf/character-education/Framework%20for%20Character%20Education.pdf (Accessed: 3 August 2019).

Table 4: List and Definitions of Martial Virtues

Martial Virtues	
Prudence	Using practical wisdom to choose the right action, in the right way and for the right reason
Courage	Facing fear and overcoming challenges and adversity
Honesty	Being truthful, authentic and sincere. Taking responsibility for your actions.
Respect	Respect the dignity of all persons – subordinates, teammates and enemy combatants (through just actions in war).
Selflessness	Prioritising the mission, your fellow soldiers, and your nation over your own self-interest.
Self-Regulation	Being disciplined. Manage your impulses, desires and emotions. Acting justly in war despite the actions of your enemy.
Perseverance	Continuing your efforts despite obstacles, difficulties or discouragement.
Resilience	Adapting to adversity and recovering quickly from hardships or failures.
Teamwork	Being a collaborative and participative member of the team. Feeling a sense of loyalty and duty. Always do your share.
Leadership	Positively influence those you lead. Motivating your team to act together toward achieving a common goal.

2.5 Just War Theory

In order for a war to be just, three things are necessary. First, the authority of the sovereign. Second, a just cause. Thirdly, a rightful intention.
– Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274)

The aim of the present section is to explore just war theory as it forms, historically and conceptually, an essential element of any army ethics and army ethics training. The ultimate aim is to show how a certain view of just war theory helps to add backbone to the argument, being developed in this chapter, that virtue ethics forms a suitable basis for moral education in the US Army and, indeed, in armies more generally. As we will see in due course, two of the most influential developers of just war theory were Aristotle and St Thomas Aquinas, so virtue theory plays, historically at least, a prominent part in just war theory. I propose to show that, collectively, the two theories constitute the most suitable moral foundation for the Profession of Arms. As already discussed, armies often use words like 'virtuous', 'honourable' and 'courageous'. Unintentionally or not, this language has its basis in virtue theory. If we want soldiers to be good people throughout all aspects of life, virtue ethics is a good foundation. However, if we want soldiers to do the right thing in war, just war theory provides the institutional and contextual guidance that a more general virtue ethics cannot give. I go on to argue in Section 2.3.6 that virtue ethics and just war theory are strongly compatible, which should not be surprising, given their two most influential developers, mentioned above.

Just war theory (as I go on to argue in more detail later) complements virtue ethics as the most suitable normative ethical theory for soldiers, conceptually, morally, practically and

educationally. When it comes to research into virtue ethics in professional contexts, the Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtue has conducted significant research in this area. The Centre published a 'Statement on Character, Virtue and Practical Wisdom in Professional Practice' (Jubilee Centre, 2016) in which it points out that 'a virtue-based approach to professional education would seek to strengthen the character of all who engage in professional practice'. As well as conducting research into character and virtue in the professions generally, it has also done so within specific professions, such as doctors, nurses, lawyers, teachers and business professionals.[14] If there is empirical evidence to show that virtue ethics can improve the medical, law and teaching professions, I believe there is strong reason to believe that the coupling of virtue ethics and just war theory can improve the Profession of Arms.

The Jubilee Centre believes that character is caught, taught and sought and has argued this as part of their 'Framework for Character Education in Schools' (Jubilee Centre, 2017, 3). This idea is not only useful for teaching schoolchildren, but for educating soldiers as well. By transferring the notion of 'caught, taught and sought' and applying it to the moral education of the army, one can develop a positive framework for using both just war theory and virtue ethics. Virtues can be *caught* if the senior officers, NCO's and military retirees provide the example, culture and influence as moral mentors for junior soldiers and officers. Virtues can be *taught* at both military academies, as well as all professional schools within the army, if they include virtue ethics and just war theory in their curriculum. Finally, virtues can be *sought* if the army provided various opportunities that, as the Jubilee Centre's 'Framework for Character Education' points

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[14] The Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtue has published reports on *The Good Teacher: Understanding Virtues in Practice*, *Virtuous Medical Practice* and *Virtuous Character for the Practice of Law*. For these reports and more, visit the Jubilee Centre's website at: https://www.jubileecentre.ac.uk/1595/projects/published-research/virtues-in-the-professions

out, '[help] generate the formation of personal habits and character commitments'. In time, soldiers would seek out virtuous living on their own and eventually become the moral exemplars, or moral mentors, that influences the next generation of soldiers.

Just war theory deals with the justification of how and why wars are fought. The ethics of war and peace is something people have been grappling with since the origins of humanity. Most major civilizations, like those of the Egyptians, Babylonians, Aztecs, Chinese, medieval Europe and the United States (Orend, 2002, 9), have wrestled with the purported justifiable reasons for going to war and the morally acceptable way to fight in war. Not only have world civilizations debated the ethics of going to war and conduct in war, but religious texts, like the Koran, the Bible and the Bhagavad Gita (Orend, 2002, 9), have debated the ethics of war as well. The historical account of developing ethically based rules to govern going to war and fighting in war is known as the 'just war tradition'. The theoretical account of going to war ethically is 'just war theory'. Michael Walzer points out that it is a very old theory (Walzer, 2008) and notes that 'no government in high civilization [...] will send their young men into battle, to kill and be killed, without offering some justification for what they are doing'. Notice that although just war theory provides 'rules', it would be wrong to prejudge the theory as being essentially deontologically grounded. All moral theories are *action guiding*; otherwise they fail as normative theories. Indeed, I go on to argue later for the strong compatibility between just war theory and virtue ethics, as already indicated. What can be said at the present juncture, without prejudging any theoretical issues, is that just war theory provides specific action guidance for the human institution of warfare.

The just war tradition has had some notable thinkers, such as Aristotle (384–322 BCE), Cicero (106–43 BCE), Augustine (354–430 CE) and Aquinas (1225–1274 CE). Most of the religious texts, mentioned above, talk about ethical behaviour in terms of a 'holy war', whereas Aristotle, Cicero, Augustine and Aquinas looked at ethical behaviour in war as a 'just war'. It is instructive to distinguish between a 'holy war' and a 'just war', as many early Christian thinkers conflated the two (Orend, 2013). *Bellum sanctum* (holy war) is a war approved, commanded or permitted by God (Orend, 2013), as promulgated by Pope Urban II in 1095 and which initiated the First Crusade. There is a similar idea of holy war in the Islamic tradition of *jihad*. In contrast, *bellum justum* (just war) is not thought to be religious, only ethical (Orend, 2013). At its core, just war theory is secular; however, just war theory has come to be associated with Catholicism, due to the work done on the theory by Saints Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. While true, it was Aristotle, in his book *Politics*, who some experts claim was the first theorist to use the phrase 'just war' (Aristotle, 1992, 44 [1256b20-25]):

> Hence even the art of war will by nature be in a manner an art of acquisition (for the art of hunting is a part of it) that is properly employed both against wild animals and against such of mankind as though designed by nature for subjection refuse to submit to it, *inasmuch as this warfare is by nature just.*[15]

Augustine is often credited with creating just war theory alone. This is not true, as we have seen by Aristotle's quotation above, for other thinkers have discussed the justness of war prior to Augustine. In fact, some of the key parts of just war theory used today came from Aristotle (having a just cause) and Cicero (public declaration, proper authority, and restraint in battle) before Augustine began discussing just wars. Later in this section I discuss these rules and others

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[15] The emphasis on Aristotle's quote from his *Politics* is mine.

in more detail. Augustine was not even the first Christian thinker developing just war theory. According to Orend, Ambrose, Augustine's mentor, stressed that soldiers should strive to display the classical virtues (Orend, 2013, 14), as discussed in Section 2.2.3 on virtue ethics – courage, prudence, justice and moderation of will in war. Augustine did significantly contribute to just war theory by adding the rule of *right intention* (Orend, 2013, 15), which I discuss in more detail in Section 2.5.3 *jus ad bellum*.

Many just war theorists believe that by the time St Thomas Aquinas contributed to just war, there was a proper tradition that has, in most ways, remained the same through to today (e.g. Orend, 2013,15; Cox, 2018, 99). There were quite a few different thinkers, over a long period, discussing the justness of going to war and of actions in war, arriving at very similar conclusions (Orend, 2013, 15). By the time of Aquinas's contribution, there were two distinct just war categories: *jus ad bellum* (justice in going to war) and *jus in bello* (justice while in war). Under *jus ad bellum*, the tradition established the rules of just cause, right intention and public declaration by proper authority (Orend, 2013, 15). Under *jus in bello*, the tradition developed the rules of non-combatant immunity, right intention and non-use of prohibited weapons. While I discuss the new rules that have been added since Aquinas in Section 2.5.3 *jus ad bellum* and Section 2.5.4 *jus in bello*, it is important to point out that between Aristotle and Aquinas there was over 1,500 years of theoretical progress in the just war tradition (Orend, 2013, 15). It is also important to point out the virtue ethical influence on just war theory, with Aristotle and Aquinas contributing significantly to its foundation, and virtue ethicists of modern times, such as G.E.M. Anscombe and Philippa Foot, continued to play a significant part in the argument for including

just war theory in a virtue ethical account. Notably, all those writers, either explicitly or implicitly, assume the compatibility of a virtue ethical framework and just war theory.

2.5.1 Are *Jus ad Bellum* and *Jus in Bello* Connected or Distinct and Separate?

Since Aquinas in the 13th century, there have been a steady number of just war theorists who have discussed the morality of war. In the 20th century, there have been significant contributions to the just war tradition. This is possibly because the 20th century (as well as the first two decades of the 21st century) has been ultra-violent. Last century saw both World Wars, the Korean War, the Cold War and nuclear deterrence, the Vietnam War, and this century has seen the War in Iraq, the War in Afghanistan and terror attacks around the globe. Think of the major aggressors and offensives of the 20th and 21st centuries: Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, Stalin's USSR purges, China's Cultural Revolution, Pol Pot's killing fields in Cambodia, Gaddafi's Libya, Saddam Hussein's Iraq, all three of North Korea's leaders and Vladimir Putin's annexation of Crimea. These events, leaders and countries have possibly influenced the influx of just war contributors.

G.E.M. Anscombe had a seminal influence on contemporary virtue ethics and she was a prominent figure of Analytical Thomism.[16] In her essay, *War and Murder*, (1961, 44–52), one of the most influential works in that century on the morality of war, she defends the Doctrine of Double Effect (more on the Doctrine of Double Effect in Section 2.5.5) and rejects pacifism

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[16] In his book, *Faithful reason: essays Catholic and philosophical* (2004, xii), Scottish philosopher John Haldane, sets out that 'analytical Thomism involves the bringing into mutual relationship of the styles and preoccupations of recent English-speaking philosophy and the ideas and concerns shared by St Thomas and his followers'.

(more on this in Section 2.5.2). Her essay was written in response to President Truman dropping

the atomic bomb and the nuclear arms race that ensued. After the Vietnam War, we saw an

increase in writings on the morality of war. The breakthrough work of the 20th century, and

possibly the most influential, was Michael Walzer's *Just and Unjust Wars* in 1977. Walzer's

book argues that World War II exemplifies a just war and Vietnam an unjust war. Since the

publication of *Just and Unjust Wars*, the just war tradition has been brought back to the forefront

of political philosophy, and there has been an explosion of modern day thinkers that have

supported or rebuffed Walzer's interpretations of the morality of war. There is a lengthy list, but I

shall point out just a few of the significant contributors to the just war tradition in this and the

previous century: R.M. Hare, R.K. Fullwider, David Luban, Thomas Nagel, J.N. Moore, Anthony

Hartle (Philosopher, Retired Army Colonel, and former Department Head at West Point), Jenny

Teichman, Brian Orend, Henry Shue, Jeff McMahan, Nigel Biggar, Cecile Fabre, Helen Frowe

and Seth Lazar. Notably, these writers belong to different moral theoretical camps, which

indicates that the just war tradition often straddles the divides between traditional moral theories.

Contemporary just war theory mainly comprises two groups: traditionalists and

revisionists (Lazar, 2017). The traditionalists follow what Walzer lays out in *Just and Unjust*

Wars. The traditionalists essentially follow international law and the law of armed conflict. Their

goal is to provide moral support to underpin the laws on warfare. An example is that states, and

only states,[17] may go to war only for self-defence or to defend others from aggression, or, as

Walzer points out, to intervene to avert 'crimes that shock the moral conscience of mankind'

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[17] It is important to point out here that Walzer and other traditionalists claim that only states can resort to war. This means that it is unjust for terrorist organisations like al-Qaida, unrecognised quasi-state groups like ISIL or rebel groups fighting against nation-states to go to war or fight in war.

(2016). Traditionalists also argue we must discriminate between civilian and military targets. This means that soldiers may only target other soldiers. Although civilians may not be targeted, it is understood that there will be civilian casualties in war and that is morally acceptable even when some foreseeable harms may occur to civilians[18] (Lazar, 2017). It is important to point out here that traditionalists also argue for the moral equality of soldiers. This means that the first war right of all soldiers is to kill the enemy soldier (Walzer, 2016). Regardless of whether your nation is the just or the unjust side in the war, you have the right to kill enemy soldiers. Walzer argues all combatants are moral equals, regardless of side in the conflict. The argument for the 'moral equality of soldiers' states that since combatants on both sides take up arms against each other, then all combatants are both threats to their enemy and threatened by their enemy. This is problematic for revisionists who say that only the side who was just in going to war can fight justly in war.[19] That is to say that if you are soldier fighting for the unjust side, you should refuse to go to war, refuse to fight in the warzone or lay down your arms once you realise the side you are fighting or is unjust (Lazar, 2017). This brings up the biggest distinction and contention between traditionalists and revisionist: the connectivity or distinction between *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*.

As pointed out at the beginning of Section 2.5, the two main parts of just war theory are *jus ad bellum* (the justice in going to war) and *jus in bello* (justice in war). Each just war subsection has its own rules to determine if a side is just (I discuss these rules in detail in

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[18] This is referencing the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) introduced by Aquinas and used by traditionalists. I will examine the DDE in Section 2.3.6.

[19] It is important to point out that the majority of just war theorists agree here. There can only be one just side in war. They both cannot be just as one must have committed aggression initially (more on that in Section 2.3.3, *jus ad bellum*). However, it is possible that both sides go to war unjustly.

Sections 2.5.3 and 2.5.4). In order for a nation to be just in going to war, they must meet all six of these rules. In order for a nation to be just during war, they have to meet three rules (or six in the case of some just war theorists). There is a contention about the connectivity or distinction between these two parts of just war theory between traditionalists and revisionists. Traditionalists, like Walzer, argue that *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* are separate and distinct. That means that it is possible for a nation to go to war justly by adhering to the *jus ad bellum* rules and not be just in their actions in war by violating the *jus in bello* rules. Similarly, traditionalists believe it is possible for a nation to go to war unjustly by violating the rules of *jus ad bellum* but the soldiers fight justly by adhering to the rules of *jus in bello*. Revisionists on the other hand argue that if a nation has gone to war unjustly, their soldiers cannot possibly fight justly as they should not be fighting in the first place. Thus, even if the soldiers from an unjust nation meet all of the rules of *jus in bello*, they still are unjust because they should never have fought in the first place. Revisionists see the two as a continuum. Yes, *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* are two parts to one theory, but they are interrelated and interconnected. Traditionalists see them as two distinct concepts within just war theory. This is important for traditionalists because of Walzer's moral equality of soldiers, noted earlier. Walzer's idea that the first war right of all soldiers is to kill enemy soldiers in widely accepted. In fact, it is part of international law. Walzer argues that we do not and should not make soldiers pay the price for the injustice of the wars that they may be ordered (or even conscripted) to fight (Walzer, 2016). Even setting aside conscription, soldiers are not able to pick and choose wars like you would when choosing a salad today or fish tomorrow, cafeteria style. If you have signed up for service or are conscripted, you fight where you are told to fight and when you are told to fight. The consequence of refusing to go to the war or to fight while in the war, in most western nations, is military prison, and in non-

western nations this insubordination results in death. Vitoria and Walzer agree, according to Orend, in that if soldiers were allowed choose when to participate in war, it would result in 'grave peril' for that nation (Orend, 2013).

As I have already indicated that I consider virtue ethics and just war theory to be compatible, an observant reader may want to ask at this point whether I side more with the traditionalists or the revisionists. At first glance, the revisionist seems to be arguing more in line with virtue ethics' focus on individual character and for a person's responsibility to preserve it from all evil influence, whereas the traditionalist foregrounds the soldier as a non-accountable rule follower. My view on this is that, indeed, the revisionist position is the just war theory stance that best aligns with virtue ethics. Traditionalism has its strong points, nevertheless. We do not want soldiers to take advantage of a situation and just select the wars in which they fight. Revisionism may attribute more autonomy to ordinary soldiers than they normally possess, as they are often not in possession of the relevant knowledge about the given state of play to pass an informed judgement (even if they are morally competent, in principle, to pass such statements, provided that all the relevant information is available to them).

That said, following the traditionalists approach is problematic. If we teach soldiers 'just do what your leader tells you to do and you will be doing the "right" thing', that is going to lay the groundwork for getting a pass for immoral actions as long as we can claim we were just following orders. This might even lead into a justification of an immoral act if, in the absence of leadership, you believe your leader would do the same immoral act. Do we not want soldiers to be their own moral agents and question immoral orders from more senior officers? It might be the case that a senior leader is under significant stress, trauma or anger and made a bad decision. If a

junior soldier just uncritically follows the command that the senior leader might not have given under normal circumstances, a potentially immoral or vicious act could ensue. If the junior officer questions the senior officer on the order, that might shock the senior officer back into the right frame of mind and emphasise the mistake she or he almost made. More importantly, if the US Army really is adopting the idea of Mission Command (as was discussed in Section 2.1.1), or the idea of pushing decision-making down to the lowest levels, soldiers and officers have to be their own moral agents. They have to be virtuous persons, so they not only make virtuous decisions in war in the absence of leadership but also serve as moral mentors to junior officers and other soldiers, helping them develop good character traits and virtues. The revisionist approach of choosing to do a virtuous thing over a vicious thing, which may include refusing to fight in an unjust war, is consistent with virtue ethics.

Revisionists ask, effectively, that if you are a soldier of a just nation, fighting justly in war, how do you lose your right to life? Take for example, Japan in World War II. The Japanese Empire's attack on Pearl Harbor, as we will see in the section on *jus ad bellum*, was an act of aggression against the United States. The United States met the rules of *jus ad bellum* and went to war against Japan justly. Now why is it that a US sailor in the Pacific Ocean fighting in the Battle of Midway against the Japanese Navy or a US soldier fighting against the Japanese Army in the Battle of Attu had the same moral right to life as their Japanese counterpart? The revisionist will say that it does not matter if the Japanese soldier was fighting justly, meeting all the rules of *jus in bello*, the Japanese Empire was unjust in attacking the United States, and thus he should have laid down his arms and refused to fight the US soldiers. In support, multiple lawyers and philosophers ask the important question, 'Why shouldn't we hold soldiers responsible for the

justice of the wars they fight? If we hold soldiers responsible in this regard, wouldn't that

constitute an additional bar against aggressive war?' (Orend, 2013; Pogge, 1989; Rodin and

Shue, 2008; and Walzer, 2016). Orend disagrees with Walzer. While Walzer believes that

soldiers fighting on an unjust side are not principally to blame for the aggression, Orend argues

that, like their nation's leaders, they are still contributing in a smaller but still material sense

(Orend, 2013). Orend articulates this further by pointing out that 'soldiers are not automatons'

and being a member of the Profession of Arms does not relieve them from the duty not to inflict

unjust harm or death to others (Orend, 2013). A virtue ethicist would say that if you are going to

war against another nation unjustly, you are ethically responsible for any killing you do. The

virtuous act would be to refuse to kill innocent people in a country you have no ethical reason to

be in.

2.5.2 The Morality of War as a Continuum

If you were to think about the morality of war as a continuum, on one side you would have

'pacifism' (war is never justified) and on the other 'realism' (ethics should not be a consideration

in war). On that continuum, just war theory would be placed between pacifism and realism,

arguing that *sometimes* nations are morally justified in going to war (Lazar, 2017; Orend, 2013).

Realism, or *Realpolitik,* is a political theory that argues politics, especially as it relates to

international relations, is based on practical and material factors rather than on theoretical or

ethical objectives (Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015).[20] Realism argues that what is most important is

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[20] Miriam Webster definition at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/realpolitik

the nation's own self-interest, survival, security and pursuit of hard and soft power over rival nations (Orend, 2013). Realist Hans Morgenthau argues that we cannot speak meaningfully of state actions in terms of ethics or morality (Morgenthau, 1985). Orend argues that realists believe that it is a 'category mistake' to speak about ethics or moral concepts as it relates to international relations. It would be like trying to apply the rules of cricket to football. It simply does not make sense to discuss bowlers, wickets and bails in a football match. Similarly, for a realist, it does not make sense to discuss ethics or justness in war, merely to discuss how to win the war and win completely. Walzer argues that if realists endorse any rule during wartime, it is something like the sayings 'all is fair in love and war' and 'in war, anything goes' (Walzer, 2016).

There are historical examples of war that can be seen from a realist perspective. One example is the US firebombing of Japanese cities and dropping two nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the documentary, *The Fog of War*, former Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara discusses World War II, when the United States sent B-29 bombers to firebomb 67 Japanese cities killing between 50 and 99% of the people in those cities. When destroying over 50% of a city, clearly, a large proportion of that figure will be civilian non-combatants and the deaths due to the firebombing occurred before dropping the two nuclear bombs (Fog of War, 2003). McNamara grappled with the question, 'In order to win a war, should you kill 100,000 Japanese civilians in one night, with firebombs or any other way. Is that moral?' (Fog of War, 2003). Realists would rebuff McNamara and say that discussing morality within the context of war is a category error. They would argue that this is a matter of saving American military lives, in that, if the United States did not firebomb the Japanese cities or drop the nuclear bombs, then US troops would have had to breach the beaches of Japan, the Unites States would have suffered

deaths in the tens of thousands and the war would have persisted. That is why a realist would argue that morality is not part of war or international relations. War is an ugly business and we need to end it as soon as possible with the best possible outcome for our nation. It is not always entirely clear, when looking at the realist nature from a meta-ethical point of view, if the realists are taking more of a nationalistic egoist position or a utilitarian Benthamite approach, but their claim is that ethics, as standardly understood, plays no part in international relations or war.

Another classic example of realism is the Siege of Melos, best described in Thucydides' Melian Dialogue (2019). In 416 BCE, during the Peloponnesian War, Athens sent a delegation to the small island nation of Melos to negotiate terms to occupy their island and take advantage of their natural resources. The Athenian delegation gave them the option of complete unfettered occupation of the island or of facing the total annihilation of every male, with women and children put into slavery. Melos had remained neutral throughout the Peloponnesian War, siding with neither Sparta nor Athens. When the Melian commissioners refused to take sides, Athens did what it promised – they killed every male of fighting age and sold the women and children into slavery. Orend points out that just war theory would see the Athenians actions as aggression, but realists would regard this as how 'the world works' (Orend, 2013).

It goes without saying that realism is inimical to the virtue ethical stance on the ethics of warfare that is being developed in this thesis. It is important to note here, however, that realism is not a one-off position in the ethics of warfare but an offshoot of a more general position about the ethics of political life. As a departure from virtue ethically minded just war theorists, like Aristotle and Aquinas, who believed that political life should be based on ethics and morality, other political theorists, like Niccolò Machiavelli, challenged this position. Machiavelli was an

Italian diplomat and political theorist in the late 15th and early 16th century. He believed that 'virtuous' behaviour in domestic affairs, international interactions and war was unrealistic and argued that politics and ethics should be separate (Korab-Karpowicz, 2018). Machiavelli would agree with Morgenthau that one could not speak meaningfully of state actions in terms of ethics or morality. Machiavelli actually uses the word 'virtue' and twists it to fit his worldview. In his book, *The Prince*, Machiavelli intentionally used the Italian word 'virtù' (Machiavelli, 1965). Virtù is normally translated into English as 'virtue', but Machiavelli does not use the word with its conventional connotation of a moral act (Nederman, 2014) or as we discussed in Section 2.2.3 on Aristotelian virtue ethics, but as 'ability' or 'vigor' (Korab-Karpowicz, 2018). Political theorist Cary Nederman points out that Machiavelli uses virtù to refer to qualities that are necessary to 'maintain his state' and to 'achieve great things' (Nederman, 2014). Ultimately, le virtù are the qualities of power, whereas virtues are the qualities of moral standards. It could be argued that realists use qualities of power instead of qualities of morality and that they reduce 'virtues' to what Aristotle would have designated as performative skills (*techné*).

Other political theorists believe that there are two types of realism. Political theorist W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz argues that realism is not as simple as Orend makes it out to be. Korab-Karpowicz distinguishes between two types of realism: 'classical realism' and 'extreme realism' (Korab-Karpowicz, 2018). Classical realism does not necessarily deny ethics plays a part in international relations (Korab-Karpowicz, 2018), but it does still emphasise that what is most important in international relations is the idea of national self-interest. While classical realism may not be Machiavellian in nature (like Korab-Karpowicz describes as 'extreme realism' or as Orend argues is what realism is at its core), the right choice for a state to make is the one that is in

its best interest in making. Korab-Karpowicz's argument that classical realism is not incompatible with ethics, but a state may have to choose an act that may appear to be immoral, amoral or less-than-moral because it is in its best interest, seems not that far from Orend's criticism of realism or Machiavelli's embrace of it. Korab-Karpowicz wants ethics to have the opportunity to play a part in international relations but leaves the option on the table to justify an unpalatable action by saying that it was in the state's best interest. I believe that both Machiavelli and the Athenian delegation, in Thucydides account of the Melian Siege, would not disagree with Korab-Karpowicz. It seems to me that Orend's and Korab-Karpowicz's positions on realism (sans one type or two types of realism) are not that far from each other. In any case, either form of realism is incompatible with a virtue ethical stance on just war theory.

While realism offers the opportunity for a nation to do what is best for its survival and prosperity, there are several criticisms of realism. One criticism is about the claim that moral concepts are inapplicable to international affairs. Often, nations' leaders claim that they are going to the aid or defence of another nation on moral grounds. They are standing up for what is right. This is normative talk and, at the very least, a mix and match of ethical motives with realist motives. If that is true, then it is not a category mistake to use ethical language in international relations. Another criticism would be the crushing of the Melians by the Athenians was not a necessity or a counter-existential risk but one of economic and strategic strength. It was not a case of rule or be ruled (Orend, 2013) but a large state crushing a small state because they were able to do so.[21]

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[21] For a more robust response to realism, see Walzer 2006: Chapter 1.

Going back to the 'morality of war' continuum, if just war theory is somewhere in the middle and realism is far to one side, the opposite side of the continuum would be pacifism. While realism clearly has its followers, many just war theorists argue that realism is not the main ethical challenge to just war theory, but rather pacifism is (Lazar 2016). There are several types of pacifists. No matter what kind of pacifist you are, you believe that war is always wrong (Orend 2013). There is always a better approach to take, i.e. diplomacy, sanctions, etc., than war. Orend points out that a pacifist objects to killing: a pacifist would object to mass killing for political reasons, so there are no moral grounds which can justify going to war (Orend, 2013). One of the best illustrations of pacifism is in a story told by Jenny Teichman in her book *Pacifism and the Just War: A Study in Applied Philosophy*. In the story, a Frenchman attending a 1902 peace conference describes pacifism as 'anti-war-ism' (Teichman, 1985, 3). Unlike realists, pacifists do believe that not only is it possibly to apply morality to international relations, but it also is obligatory. On this point, pacifists agree with just war theorists; however, they stop there. They disagree with just war theorists in applying morality to war (Orend 2013) – there never should be war as it is inherently immoral. Harkening back to Section 2.2 Normative Ethical Theories, pacifism, generally, can be broken down into three types: virtue pacifism (VP), consequentialist pacifism (CP) and deontological pacifism (DP). VP pacifists assert that 'war and killing are at odds with human flourishing' (Orend, 2013). The CP pacifists argue that the costs of war will always outweigh any benefits from fighting (Orend, 2013). Finally, DP pacifists posit that war in and of itself violates all three formulations of the categorical imperative due to killing other human beings (Orend, 2013).

A common objection to pacifism is that while the duty not to kill human beings is important during normal everyday conditions, it does not take into account the fact that sometimes there is an overriding duty to prevent other killing. Virtue ethicist and just war proponent Anscombe claims that the problem with pacifism is that it does not distinguish between the shedding of innocent blood and the shedding of *any* human blood (Anscombe, 1961). That is to say, pacifism does not distinguish between shedding the blood of the innocent and shedding the blood of the guilty. This is a problem for Anscombe (1961, 49) as she points out that:

> in this way pacifism has corrupted enormous numbers of people who will not act according to its tenets. They become convinced that a number of things are wicked which are not; hence seeing no way of avoiding wickedness, they set no limits to it.

The essence of this objection is this: while we do have a duty not to kill other human beings, what happens when you are being attacked, or another person nearby is being attacked? What if the only way to stop person A from killing you or killing a person nearby, person B, is to kill person A? Pacifism ties your hand and prevents you from defending your life or defending the life of another when the only way to stop the assailant is with lethal force. That is not only contrary to moral duty (on a deontological understanding) but also contrary to virtue. A similar example would be where you have an opportunity to stop a terrorist from continuing down the road in a large truck running over hundreds of pedestrians, but the only way is to kill the terrorist. A pacifist is stuck here. You cannot kill another human being, even if it is to save the lives of hundreds of other humans.

It would seem that if we adopted realism as a theory for the army, it would not be compatible with virtue ethics. As Morgenthau, Machiavelli and Korab-Karpowicz point out, a

nation's action in international relations, and more specifically in going to war, is not about virtues and ethics, but it is about virtù and power. Realism might at first sight seem to be compatible with consequentialism/utilitarianism, but then again, it might not, as it would not be geared towards the greatest good, even if it was best for, say, Nazi Germany, Putin's Russia or Hussein's Iraq. Clearly, ethical egoism would be compatible with realism, but that is because ethical egoism is not an ethical theory in the same sense as deontology, utilitarianism or virtue ethics. If we truly want virtuous soldiers, and not ones simply basing their decisions on power, an army cannot embrace either Orend's or Korab-Karpowicz's definitions of realism. Realism is incompatible with virtuous soldiers, virtue ethics and just war theory.

I do not think that a fully coherent pacifist could be a virtuous person (at least on an Aristotelian understanding, which sees righteous indignation and proper anger as virtuous emotions). Moreover, pacifism could not be completely embraced by an entire nation as then it would only take one moderately strong country (economically and militarily) to completely forgo diplomacy and attack, thus leaving the pacifist country either enslaved or destroyed. Each country must protect itself from aggression. We need virtuous soldiers and we need countries governed by virtue. As I argue in more detail later, the best way to make virtuous soldiers is give them a moral education with virtue ethics and just war theory as its cornerstones. It is important, however, to include a discussion of both pacifism and realism for soldiers, including West Point Cadets. While it is unlikely that many pacifists find themselves joining the army (as distinct from someone discovering that they are a pacifist while serving in the army), realists do populate the ranks – a fact discoverable when cadets and soldiers, in conversations and in responding to moral dilemmas, justify actions in war that would otherwise appear as violating a moral code or law. To

allow for critical thinking and avoid indoctrination, all moral learners (and this includes army cadets) need to be introduced to a variety of ethical views and be encouraged to learn to pass their own judgements. As Aristotle puts it (1985, 39–40 [1105a28–34]):

> for actions in accord with the virtues to be done temperately or justly, it does not suffice that they themselves have the right qualities. Rather the agent must also be in the right state when he does them. First, he must know that he is doing them; secondly, he must decide on them for themselves; and thirdly, he must also do them from a firm and unchanging state.

Aristotle is explaining that the virtuous act itself is not the most important part of the action. It must meet other criteria. Namely, the moral agent must know what she is doing, she must be intentionally doing the action and for its own sake, and, finally, this action must come from a solid and immutable character.

2.5.3 *Jus ad Bellum*

As I mentioned at the beginning of Section 2.5, *jus ad bellum* is about how to go to war justly. The goal of just war theory is to minimise the just reasons in going to war. *Jus ad bellum* typically comprises six principles or rules (Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015; Lazar, 2017). These rules are directed to heads of state; the people that actually make the decision to go to war. Sometimes this is a parliament or congressional body, and sometimes it is the leader of a nation, whether they be democratically elected, a totalitarian or an autocrat. While just war theorists have slightly different naming conventions for the *jus ad bellum* rules, generally speaking they agree on what these rules are and that they must be followed in order to go to war justly. The rules are:

1. Having a *Just Cause*: the war is only an attempt resist aggression. This can be done in either a self-defensive posture – an effort to end the aggressive act thrust upon your nation, or one of other-defense of aggression – Aiding another nation that is unable to fend off the aggression themselves (Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015; Lazar, 2017).

2. Having a *Legitimate* or *Proper Authority*: the war is being initiated by the group that has the authority to fight such wars i.e. Parliament, Congress, etc. not a sub-group of a country or terrorist organization (Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015; Lazar, 2017).

3. Having a *Right Intention*: the proper authority intends to achieve the just cause, rather than using it as an excuse to achieve some wrongful end such as an old grudge, changing the regional balance of power, economic reasons or ethnic hatred (Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015; Lazar, 2017).

4. Having a *Reasonable Prospect* or *Probability of Success*: the war is likely to achieve its aims (Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015; Lazar, 2017).

5. Having *Proportionality*: the morally weighted good achieved by the war outweigh the morally weighted bad that it will cause. These are universal benefits over universal costs, not just the national self-interested benefits and costs (Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015; Lazar, 2017).

6. Entering war was the *Last Resort* (*Necessity*): there is no other less harmful way to achieve the just cause. This assumes actions such as diplomacy and international sanctions have not stopped the aggressive actions of the guilty nation (Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015; Lazar, 2017).

There is consensus by just war theorists that the most important rule for *jus ad bellum* is having a *just cause* in going to war. Resisting aggression by either self-defence or other-defence is the only just cause for going to war. In fact, international law lines up with just war theory here. No other kinds of war are allowed under international law unless explicitly authorised and endorsed by the United Nations' Security Council (UNSC) (Orend, 2013). Article 2(4) of the United Nations (UN) Charter states that, 'All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.' The UN Charter 51 takes this a step further arguing that if a state is a victim of aggression, the state has the right to protect itself:

> Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

These six rules complement virtue ethics. Having a just cause, right intention and making war your last resort are virtuous acts. The compatibility with the language of *jus ad bellum* and virtue ethics should not be surprising – both had Aristotle and Aquinas as leaders in their respective theories.

2.5.4 *Jus in Bello*

As I mentioned at the beginning of Section 2.5, *jus in bello* is about the justice in war. *Jus in bello* is concerned that the actions that take place *during* war. *Jus in bello* typically comprises seven principles or rules (Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015; Lazar, 2017). These rules are directed at the officers and soldiers who formulate and execute the war plans. As I pointed out in Section 2.5.1, just war theorists are in disagreement over whether *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* are distinct from each other, or if they are continuous and interconnected. The traditionalists, like Walzer, will argue that they are indeed separate, whereas the revisionists will say that if a state violates one of the rules of *jus ad bellum*, and thus never had the right to go to war in the first place, soldiers cannot possibly justify fighting. Just war theorists also differ some on how many rules comprise *jus in bello*. All agree with the first three rules listed, but only some just war theorists include the last four. Although the word 'rules' may grate on the ears of some virtue ethicists, I would argue that those rules could just as well be framed as virtue-based injunctions. As discussed above in Section 2.2.3.2, Hursthouse (1999, 37–39) argues that there really is not an action-guidance problem in that virtue ethics has something called virtue rules, or 'v-rules'. While a Kantian would say that you could never tell a lie because it violates the universality principle and the human dignity principle of the categorical imperative, a virtue ethicist would say something like, 'I cannot tell a lie because to do so would be dishonest, and dishonesty is a vice'.

The *jus in bello* rules are:

1. ***Discrimination*** or ***Non-Combatant Immunity***: Soldiers must always distinguish between military objectives and civilians, and only intentionally attack legitimate military targets

(Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015; Lazar, 2017). More on this idea of intentional attack in Section 2.5.6 on Discrimination and the Doctrine of Double Effect.

2. *Proportionality*: foreseen but unintended harms must be proportionate to the military advantage achieved. Soldiers may only apply proportionate force against legitimate targets (Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015; Lazar, 2017). Again, more on this idea of intentional attack in the next section on Discrimination and the Doctrine of Double Effect.

3. *Necessity*: the least harmful means feasible must be used (Orend, 2013; Walzer, 2015; Lazar, 2017).

4. No *'means mala in se'*: You cannot do actions that are 'evil in itself'. This is like rape as a weapon of war, using prisoners of war as human shields or ethnic cleansing (Orend, 2013).

5. No *Reprisals*: Just because an enemy destroyed a residential city block nowhere near a military target in your home country does not justify you being able to do the same thing that the enemy did. They violated several rules of just war theory, but that does not now legitimize you doing the same (Orend, 2013).

6. No *Prohibited Weapons*: Such as the use of Chemical, Biological, Nuclear, Radiological, or high yield Explosives (CBRNE) in war (Orend, 2013).

7. *Benevolent Quarantine and Torturing Terrorists*: Once an enemy soldier has surrendered, you can no longer harm them and you must treat prisoners of war with reasonable care such as provide shelter, food, and water (Orend, 2013).

There is consensus amongst just war theorists that the most important rule for *jus in bello* is Discrimination or Non-Combatant Immunity. Soldiers must take due care in protecting innocent civilians in war. This brings up an interesting question: can you ever take innocent lives in war and not violate Discrimination or Non-Combatant Immunity? The next section addresses that issue.

2.5.5 Discrimination and the Doctrine of Double Effect

Recall from Section 2.5.4.1 that discrimination and non-combatant immunity is one of the most important rules for *jus in bello*. Discrimination says that an action in war is just only if it does not target the innocent. Sometimes soldiers intentionally only aim at legitimate targets, and further, they can often foresee that taking out some of these targets will still involve collateral civilian casualties. Can a soldier still take out the legitimate target if she can foresee an unintentional civilian casualty? Would that be a just act or meet the *jus in bello* rule of discrimination? Does a person violate discrimination whenever she performs an action foreseeing that it will harm or kill the innocent? If a person performs an action foreseeing that it will produce certain effects, does this entail that she intends these effects? (Orend, 2013). This is the perfect conundrum by which to explore the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE). The DDE was first discussed by early just war theorist and virtue ethicist, St Thomas Aquinas. The idea is that our actions often produce both intended and merely foreseen unintended side effects (hence the name 'Double Effect'). A proponent of DDE argues that there is a morally relevant difference between these two types of effects. In determining the moral status of an action, the intended effects presumably carry more weight than the unintended side effects. Philippa Foot, one of the founders of contemporary virtue ethics, points out that 'sometimes it makes a difference to the [moral] permissibility of an

action involving harm to others that this harm, although foreseen, is not part of the agent's direct intention' (Foot, 1978, 21). It seems that Aquinas and Foot are arguing here that it might be morally permissible for action if it results in harm or death if is merely foreseen and not intended. It is important to point out that Foot, a founder of contemporary virtue ethics, and Aquinas, who melded virtue ethics and Christianity, were both heavily influenced by Aristotle. Here, through the DDE, both Foot and Aquinas are melding virtue ethics and just war theory. Here is the DDE Calculus:

> An action resulting in foreseeable good and bad effects is morally right only if:
>
> 1. It is otherwise (w/out regard to the killing of the innocent) morally right.
>
> 2. The good effects are intended while the bad effects are unintended.
>
> 3. The bad effects are not a means to the good effects.
>
> 4. The intended good effects outweigh the foreseen unintended bad effects.

Clearly, the DDE has applications for the killing of the innocent in war. Let us use the example of a weapons factory. Imagine in one case that you want to target the largest, most productive weapons factory in your adversary's country. The problem is that this prolific weapons factory is nestled inside a residential neighbourhood. In addition, the factory is only in production and staffed with workers from 7:00 am until 7:00 pm. Further, imagine that if you destroy the weapons factory by hitting it directly in the centre of the factory, it is very likely some of the residential structures on the periphery of the factory will be destroyed. You are not intending to destroy the homes close in proximity to the factory; you merely foresee that some of the residential buildings might be destroyed. These non-military structures would be collateral

damage. If you then in fact bombed the weapons factory in the middle of the night when workers were home away from the factory, and some of the surrounding residential structures were indeed razed, and innocent civilian, non-combatants died as a result, it seems that you meet the DDE calculus and are therefore just and have not violated discrimination. The first rule is met because the act of bombing a large weapons factory is a legitimate target in war. The act of bombing the factory is also in line with the second rule: you intended to destroy the weapons factory but did not intend to destroy any civilian structures. The third rule is also met because the destruction of the civilian structures was not the means to destroying the factory. Finally, the intended good effect of destroying the enemy nations' largest and most prolific weapons factory outweighs the foreseen, yet unintended effect that several civilian living structures were destroyed and resulted in deaths of civilian non-combatants.

Now, let us change the weapons factory example slightly. Let us say that we in fact know that majority of the homes in the surrounding neighbourhood have at least one family member working in the weapons factory. Further, let us assume that because this is a time of war, the production facility is in overdrive and it has three eight-hour shifts to maximize weapon production. Additionally, you decide to bomb the factory at the shift change in order to maximize the number of deaths. Thus, with the destruction of the factory, you kill two shifts of workers instead of only one. Further, imagine you have two types of munitions you could use to destroy the factory. One particular type of smaller bomb would require you to use two or three of the bombs in strategic places in the factory. This would have the additional benefit of resulting in fewer residential buildings destroyed. The other type of munition is a larger bomb that would destroy the entire factory, regardless of where it landed on the factory. The downside of using the

larger munition is that its blast radius is significantly larger, resulting in the destruction of several blocks of residential buildings outside the circumference of the factory. Furthermore, you know that most of these homes have at least one family member that works at the factory, and you could possibly kill additional factory workers that might not be on shift at the time of detonation. If you decided to bomb the factory during the shift change using the larger, more destructive bomb and applied the DDE calculus, it seems you would be violating the DDE. Like the previous example, the first rule is met to the extent that the act of bombing a large weapons factory is a legitimate target in war, but conversely, you could argue that targeting a larger area violates the first rule. The second rule is clearly violated here. While the good effects of destroying the weapons factory were intended, clearly by maximising the deaths by dropping the bomb at shift change and choosing to use the bomb with the largest blast radius, the bad effects were also intended. Additionally, the third rule of the DDE is violated because the bad effects of choosing shift change and using a larger bomb to kill more people were a means to the good effect of destroying weapons production. The fourth rule is a bit harder to adjudicate. Did the intended good effects outweigh the foreseen unintended bad effects? It does not seem to me that there are any unintended bad effects. It seems that the very fact of choosing the larger bomb and choosing the shift-change time shows you were intending to kill as many of the civilian factory workers as possible. Regardless of your motivation, choosing the shift-change time and the larger bomb violates not only the rules of the DDE, but quite clearly the *jus in bello* rule of discrimination and non-combatant immunity.

Notice that the mechanism of adding DDE as a side-constraint is wholly incompatible with the spirit of utilitarianism, which sees all intended and foreseen consequences to be on a par

in the calculation of the greatest utility for the greatest number. However, one of the advantages of virtue ethics is that is allows for side-constraints of this kind, if they can be shown to be virtuously motivated. It is no coincidence, therefore, that through the ages the main proponents of DDE have been virtue ethicists.

2.5.6 Concluding Thoughts on Just War Theory

The discussion of just war theory in this thesis supports the idea of a multifaceted approach to ethical living and a multifaceted approach to moral education for the army. I have argued in the previous sections that just war theory, at least on a revisionist reading, is both fully compatible with virtue ethics and also complements virtue ethics by providing it with virtuous side-constraints and contextualised practical guidance.

Just war theory is a focused normative look within a profession. Soldiers are human and have lives outside of the army. They should use a normative ethical theory to guide their life. What is helpful about just war theory is that it enables solders to get further guidance within their profession. A moral education for soldiers would be incomplete with only general normative ethical theories; they need to be able to contextualise virtuous living within the role of their profession. My hope, when starting work on this thesis, was that the empirical data gathered through questionnaires and semi-structured interviews would show that cadets at West Point do make progress in military-based moral dilemmas after receiving instruction in both normative ethics and just war theory. This would provide a basis for arguing that the whole US Army would benefit from a moral education that includes virtue ethics and just war theory as its foundation.

To return to the significance of this discussion of just war theory for the purposes of the present dissertation, I have foregrounded the ways in which it connects with moral theory, particularly with virtue ethics. While I believe it is possible for a soldier, in fact an army, to have virtue ethics as the sole moral grounding, using just war theory as companion to virtue ethics in the army's moral education will give soldiers the opportunity to develop practical wisdom within the context of war. Understanding virtue ethics and using just war theory in that context will allow soldiers to see, and to make use of, moral exemplars in wartime situations. As discussed in Section 2.2.3, Aristotle discusses six states of moral character (the good states are continence, virtue and superhuman virtue; the inferior states are incontinence, vice and brutishness). In war, there are numerous examples of all six. By using just war theory and virtue ethics, soldiers can learn from people in war who illustrate the six states of moral character. Soldiers can not only look up to moral exemplars, but also learn from the incontinent, continent and vicious actions of previous soldiers in war. Understanding just war theory in the context of virtue ethics will allow members of the Profession of Arms to develop their moral excellence (*arête*), as well as knowledge of justice (*episteme*) in war and their skills (*techné*) as soldiers.

If the army inculcated virtue ethics into its ethos through moral education and development of practical wisdom, how would that fit in war? How does just war theory tie into virtue ethics in practical (as distinct from theoretical) contexts? Clearly, it makes sense to say that we want soldiers to act virtuously in war. We want soldiers to be courageous, brave, honourable, etc. How then does a virtuous soldier kill virtuously? A pacifist would say that it is impossible. Just war theory says that not only is it possible, but it is mandatory. This is a practical, action-guiding principle. At the risk of sounding like a realist, if most governments embraced pacifism,

then it would only take one moderately strong country to throw diplomacy out of the window and attack, as I pointed out in Section 2.3.2. If you turn the other cheek and refuse to defend yourself from aggression, you will become enslaved or your life may be ended. This is reminiscent of Aristotle's dismissal of the deficiency form of justified anger as in irascibility (1985,105–106 [1126a4–9]). Therefore, if we do not want to embrace realism or pacifism, what we are left with is just war theory. We have to defend ourselves from aggression and protect what is rightfully ours, but we must do so virtuously.

Back to my original question: how does a virtuous soldier fight virtuously? Do you only kill enemy combatants? What if discrimination is impossible? Both just war theory and virtue ethics will tell you: no. No, you cannot kill if you cannot discriminate between legitimate targets. What about when you are targeting a legitimate enemy combatant, and you know that you can kill them, but you foresee that in doing so you might harm or kill innocent civilians? What does a virtuous soldier do? Does she just walk away from her legitimate target? If she does kill the enemy combatant, and it results in the death of an innocent civilian, is she vicious? I have tried to offer tentative answers to those questions above, by synthesising virtue ethics and the just war traditions.

In sum, then, I set out at the beginning of Section 2.3 to argue that the most suitable normative ethical theory for soldiers, conceptually, morally, practically and educationally, is virtue ethics complemented by just war theory. I have shown how it is *conceptually* suitable by highlighting how notable thinkers of virtue ethics, such as Aristotle and Aquinas, have helped shape the just war tradition. Further, Aristotle and Aquinas have influenced more recent contributors to both virtue ethics and just war theory, such as G.E.M. Anscombe and Philippa

Foot. I have shown how the combination of virtue ethics and just war theory is *morally* suitable, as both provide action guidance. *Jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* provide virtuous rules of action in war and just war theory provides 'v-rules' to guide us in our day-to-day actions and actions in war. Just war theorists and virtue ethicists, like Aquinas and Foot, use the DDE as a way to determine the moral permissibility of actions that produce both intended and merely foreseen or unintended side effects. Further, both theories encourage discrimination of enemy combatants and non-combatants for the protection of the innocent. If the US Army is going to continue the leadership philosophy of Mission Command, pushing decision-making in war down to the lowest level, we need decisions and actions to be virtuous, and both virtue ethics and just war theory provide practical guidance for the ordinary soldier in war. Finally, I have indicated how virtue ethics combined with just war theory may be *educationally* suitable also; an argument that I will develop further later in thesis.

2.6 Neo-Kohlbergian Psychological Theory of Moral Development

It is now time to turn from philosophy to psychology and explain the theory that I singled out as the main basis of my empirical work in this thesis. To that end, I begin with a description of moral judgement from a Kohlbergian perspective and trace how Kohlberg's views have informed Rest's neo-Kohlbergian model. I then describe a new class of measurements defined within the neo-Kohlbergian model labelled Intermediate Concept measures, which are designed to assess ethical development within specific professional settings or age-groups.

How individuals' reason about moral issues is a concern of both moral psychologists and moral philosophers. Within psychology, moral judgement/moral reasoning is a psychological process in which an individual considers and resolves whether a course of action is either morally right or morally wrong in a given situation. While reasoning implies a psychological mechanism, moral judgement/moral reasoning has a leg in both moral philosophy and moral psychology. Lawrence Kohlberg was one of the first to create a theory of moral development based on moral reasoning. Kohlberg was inspired to create his Cognitive Moral Development theory by both Piaget's stage-based theory of cognitive development of human intelligence and John Rawls' work in moral philosophy (Bebeau and Thoma, 1999; Narvaez, 2005; Rest et al., 1999a; Rest et al., 2000). Fusing Piaget and Rawls, Kohlberg's initial cognitive model of individual moral development was called the Six Stages theory that he refined and developed throughout his life. Kohlberg held that the development of moral judgements was best described by broadly defined 'global' stages (Narvaez, 2005; Rest et al., 1999a; Rest et al., 2000; Thoma, 2014). These global stages were comprised of qualitatively different kinds of responsiveness to moral issues.

Kohlberg's student, James Rest, developed a similar, but new approach to moral development he called the Four-Component Model of Morality (FCM). In developing the model, Rest argued that the empirical literature in the late 20th century did not support Kohlberg's stage model in which moral reasoning is primary and a central feature of moral action. Instead, Rest (1983, 1999) argued that empirical evidence supports a model of moral functioning that is best described as a multi-process system that includes moral sensitivity (Component I), moral judgement (Component II), moral motivation (Component III) and moral implementation/moral character (Component IV) (Bebeau, Rest and Narvaez, 1999; Bebeau and Thoma, 1999; Darnell

et al., 2019; Narvaez and Rest, 1995, 385; Rest, 1983; Thoma 2006; Thoma, 2014; You and Bebeau, 2013). These four components of moral functioning are claimed to contribute to moral action both individually and in interaction. Rest (1983) claimed that all four of the components must be activated for moral action to occur.

More specifically, the moral sensitivity component includes processes that promote the ability to understand a situation contains a moral dimension. Supporting this component are research traditions describing empathy, prosocial development among others. The Moral judgment component focuses on reasoning and justifying which of the available courses of actions is the most appropriate. Kohlberg's system as well as DIT research are examples of Component II along with other systems focusing on identifying the ideal moral choice. Component III, Moral motivation, describes processes that attend to the relative weighting of the moral choice against all other competing, and legitimate, concerns. Less developed than the other processes, current research informing this component include the moral identity and moral self research traditions. Moral implementation/moral character is the ability to create, implement, and follow through with the moral course of action. Included in this component are processes that focus on self-regulation and other systems that promote appropriate action. The four components should not be seen as a systematic check-list approach or a linear progressive model of problem solving. Rest (1983) is clear that the components are interactive. Any of the four components can impact the other three in any given situation. The conclusion is that the appropriate interaction of the four components results in moral action.

The introduction and adoption of the FCM by Rest, and his colleagues at the University of Minnesota (Narvaez, Bebeau and Thoma), was just the beginning of this expanded neo-

Kohlbergian approach to moral judgement/moral reasoning. The next change was the 1999

adoption of a schema view of moral judgement development. This change signalled the shift to a

more context-dependent description of moral development and away from Kohlberg's context-

free description of stages as cognitive operations that directly describe the structure of moral

thinking (Thoma, 2014). In other words, for Kohlberg, the specifics of the moral dilemma are not

central to the description of stages. Instead, Kohlberg suggests that measures of moral judgement

development should focus on how the participant structures the information provided by the

dilemma; however, the specific features of the dilemma are immaterial to the stage designation.

This is where the neo-Kohlbergian schema theory diverges. Thoma (2014) explains that

Kohlberg's focus on the stage structure as measured by a structured interview is problematic

because it assumes that the measurement can directly assess the stage structure through the

participant's verbal responses. It may be, however, that the participant is not aware of how he/she

interpreted the dilemma or cannot articulate the reasoning leading to a moral judgement. For

Thoma, and the other neo-Kohlbergians, the schema view is a better way to understand what

develops in moral thinking because it emphasises a multi-assessment approach that attempts to

describe how people 'understand, organize, and prioritize moral content such as societal norms,

systems, and organizations' (Thoma, 2014).[22] The schema approach does not favour a particular

assessment strategy, rely on what the individual can articulate or deny the role of dilemma

content in defining moral judgement development. To be more specific, a schema is a structure of

general knowledge that resides in a person's long-term memory (Rest et al., 1999a). Schemas are

formed and reinforced as people observe repetitive and similar occurrences of situations and

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[22] To get a detailed account of the differences between the Kohlbergian moral stages and the neo-Kohlbergian moral schemas, see Rest et al., 2000, specifically pp 384-386.

conditions. The schema applies the prior knowledge to a new, yet similar, situation helping the individual to understand, reason and judge the situation based on the prior knowledge. According to Cantor (1990, 738), schemas that are used more often become more easily accessible and thus reinforce their use in moral dilemmas in the future. Kristjánsson (2017) points out that this process, or system, corresponds significantly to the neo-Aristotelian notion of 'habituated virtue' discussed in more detail in Section 2.2.3.1 on page 49 and in Section 2.3 on pages 64-67. Neo-Kohlbergians divide moral thinking into two distinct ways: micro-morality and macro-morality (Narvez, 2005; Rest et al., 1999a; Rest et al., 2000; Thoma, 2014). Micro-morality is the morality of everyday life. It is how we engage in positive interpersonal interactions with individuals who are important to us like family and friends. Macro-morality is society-wide morality. In other words, interacting and cooperating with those we do not necessarily know, or have relationships with, in morally and impartial ways.

In addition to research describing the different components and how they work together in the service of moral action, the FCM also focused attention within individual components to explore new measurements systems and to provide more detailed descriptions of how they functioned. Of particular interest to neo- Kolbergians is the multiple ways individuals arrived at a moral judgement within Component 2. This work suggested at least three types of processes that could lead to a moral judgement, which could be loosely defined as narrow to broad-based in their application. These three levels include codes of conduct, intermediate concepts, and bedrock schema (Bebeau and Thoma, 1999; Thoma, 2006; Thoma 2014). Codes of conduct are the most concrete system; they are particularly prescriptive, clearly defined and require little interpretation. By contrast, bedrock schemas are the most broad-based interpretive systems. Bedrock schemas

are seen as basic strategies offering the individual a means of interpreting wide-ranging moral dilemmas and situations. The third, and middle-level schema, comprises intermediate concepts. Moral judgements at the intermediate concepts level are more abstract and require more interpretation than codes of conduct. They are more abstract in that they usually apply to a range or class of moral situations that are not tied to a single cause or event. While many professions have a code of conduct (the military, medicine, law, business, teaching, etc.), it is actually the intermediate concepts that are the focus of professional ethics education as these represent the variety of moral dilemmas specific professionals face in their fields (Arthur and Earl, 2020; Arthur, Walker and Thoma, 2018; Bebeau and Thoma, 1999; Thoma, 2006; Thoma, 2014; Thoma, Derryberry and Crowson, 2013).

2.6.1 Psychological Assessments and Measurements of Moral Reasoning and Moral Development

The neo-Kohlbergians have relied on several measurements to access moral reasoning and moral development. The first is the Defining Issues Test (Rest et al., 1999a; Rest et al., 1999b; Thoma, 2006; Thoma 2014) and the other is the Intermediate Concept Measure (hereafter ICM). Developed by Rest and his colleagues, the DIT was first introduced in 1974. The DIT consists of six moral dilemmas that trigger/activate three schemas and assesses them. When deliberating on macro-moral situations or dilemmas, there are three developmentally ordered (levels of) moral schemas that individuals can be in psychologically: Personal Interests (pre-conventional level), Maintaining Norms (conventional level), and Post-conventional thinking (Narvez, 2005; Rest et al., 1999a; Rest et al., 2000; Thoma, 2014). These schemes become progressively more sophisticated in moral reasoning and moral decision-making. The Personal Interest schema

develops in childhood. Within the Personal Interest schema, the individual focuses on what they may gain or lose by the actions available to them in the moral dilemma. The individual does not take into account society-wide concerns; although the individual can take into account the concerns of people that they have close personal relationships with (family and friends). The Maintaining Norms schema is more advanced than the Personal Interest schema, as it takes into consideration a society-wide moral concern within the moral dilemma deliberation. In fact, it takes a social contract theory approach to morality. The Maintaining Norms schema has five elements: 1.) the need for societal norms; 2.) these norms are society-wide; 3.) the norms are uniform and categorical in application; 4.) the norms are reciprocal (social contract – all of society should adhere to the norms and 5.) there is a hierarchy of authority to enforce the norms (Narvez, 2005; Rest et al., 1999a; Rest et al., 2000; Thoma, 2014). The Maintaining Norms schema is very Lockean in that without law there would be no order because people would act on their own special interests, which would result in chaos and anarchy. In the Post-conventional schema moral duties and obligations are based on shared ideals, open to debate, subject to logical scrutiny and on the experience of the community. The neo-Kohlbergians argue that there are four required elements in the post-conventional schema: 1.) primacy of moral criteria; 2.) appeal to an ideal; 3.) sharable ideals and 4.) full reciprocity (i.e., not only uniform application of societal norms, but that the social norms are not biased in favour of one group at the expense of another group of individuals).

At the conclusion of each moral dilemma, the individual taking the DIT is asked to resolve the dilemma through rating a series of 12 options in terms of their importance in helping solve the moral dilemma. Then the respondent is to rank the 12 options in order of moral

importance. If the option makes sense to the respondent and is seen as a good option, it is because it resonates with the respondent's preferred schema and they rank it high and as important. Conversely, if the option does not resonate with the respondent because it seems wrong or does not make sense, the respondent ranks it low and as unimportant. Each of the options raise a specific issue that describes key components of the moral dilemma based on the moral schema of the respondent (Thoma, 2014). Ultimately, the respondent receives a 'P-score' (a principled morality score based on their ranking of post-conventional options) resulting from their ranking across all six moral dilemmas. The DIT has been widely used to analyse a range of moral issues (Bunch, 2005; King & Mayhew, 2002), specifically playing a significant role in understanding the development of moral reasoning in university students. Countless studies show random samples of many populations have a large number of individuals at different moral stages and schemas (Bunch, 2005; King & Mayhew, 2002; Turner, 2008). The neo-Kohlbergians believed that individuals would view what was a moral action in a moral dilemma differently based on which schema they were in (Rest et al., 1999a; Rest et al., 1999b; Turner, 2008). Due to criticism that the content of the moral dilemmas was becoming dated, the neo-Kohlbergians developed the DIT2 (Rest et al., 1999a; Rest et al., 1999b; Thoma, 2006; Thoma 2014). The DIT2 was modernised by updating the context of the options and the dilemmas (now referred to as stories), as well as reducing the stories from six to five to improve validity.

The second type of moral reasoning measurement is the ICM. As referenced above, intermediate concepts comprise the middle-level moral schema. When comparing ICMs to DIT and DIT2, at first blush, they seem very similar. Both start with a moral dilemma (story/quandary) and provide a variety of option choices for actions and reasons for the actions

(justifications) in each dilemma. That said, ICMs differ from the DIT in a variety of ways

(Bebeau and Thoma, 1999; Thoma, 2014; Thoma, Derryberry and Crowson, 2013; Turner, 2008).

First, the dilemmas collectively focus on a certain population or profession (adolescents, college

students, teachers, dentistry, military, etc.) and not abstract moral dilemmas used to assess moral

schemas (e.g., the DIT). Second, the ICMs not only offer the multiple options for moral action,

but in a separate section, ICMs additionally offer multiple options for the justification (based on

moral reasoning) of those actions. Finally, the ICM responses (both action and justification) are

scored against an expert panel in the focused population or profession.

ICMs have often been used to measure the effectiveness of professional ethics instruction

on moral reasoning. The first ICM was developed by Bebeau and Thoma (1994; 1998;1999) as

an outcome measure for professional ethics instruction for the field of dentistry. The Dental

Ethical Reasoning and Judgment Test (DERJT) measured dentist professionals' ability to reason

through moral dilemmas using specific moral concepts that apply to dentistry. The purpose of the

DERJT was to assess the outcomes of dental ethics instruction. In other words, did the dental

ethics instruction impact the moral reasoning of the dental students? ICMs for other specific

groups and populations were created. Following the DERJT, an ICM was developed for

adolescent populations (Arthur et al., 2015a; 2015b; Thoma, 2014; Thoma, Derryberry and

Crowson, 2013; Turner, 2008). This ICM was called the Intermediate Concepts Measure for

Adolescents (AD-icm). The AD-icm was designed to see if character education programmes

improved the moral reasoning of young people. The AD-icm was the first but not the only ICM

for adolescence. Walker et al. (2017) and Arthur et al. (2015a; 2015b) also used an ICM on

secondary UK pupils to assess their moral judgement. Other profession-specific ICMs have been

created to assess the efficacy of professional ethics education such as pharmacists (Roche, Thoma and Wingfield, 2014), teachers (Kerr, 2020) and military officers/cadets (Arthur, Walker and Thoma, 2018; Arthur, Walker and Thoma, 2020; Turner, 2008; Walker, 2020).[23]

Finally, to distinguish the DIT and ICM, the ICM's content is authentic and central to the measure whereas the DIT is a trigger to access bedrock schemas. Additionally, as it relates to the scoring, the ICM uses an expert key and the schemas are tied to theoretical descriptors for the DIT. Expertise in a field or profession is essentially to the development of an ICM key. The team developing the key must have training in ethics and have a deep practical knowledge of the content.

This overview of the nature and history of ICMs, and their grounding in neo-Kohlbergian theory, explains their initial appeal for the current study. However, further motivation for the selection of measures will be provided by an overview of previous empirical research in this area (in Section 2.10), where neo-Kohlbergian theory has been the leading theoretical paradigm, and subsequently in Chapter 3 when I turn to the methodology of the current study.

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[23] For specific information on Turner's ICM - the Army Leader Ethical Reasoning Test (ALERT) and Arthur et al.'s ICM - the Army Intermediate Concept Measure (AICM), see this chapter, section 2.8 - Overview of Previous Empirical Research on Army Ethics and Army Ethical Training.

2.7 Character and Virtue at West Point

The next stepping-stone in this review of the background of the study takes us from the psychological developmental theory grounding it to the role that character and virtue play at West Point.

Despite the explicit promotion of discipline and obedience to rules, such as the 'Cadet Honor Code' and the 'Toleration Clause', the ideas of character and virtue also permeate West Point. West Point's Mission Statement makes reference to character, several required courses discuss character and West Point even has a character development program. This section discusses the ways that cadets come into contact with the concept of character at West Point.

As quoted at the top of Chapter 1, the West Point Mission Statement starts with: 'The United States Military Academy's mission is to educate, train and inspire the Corps of Cadets so that each graduate is a commissioned leader of character…'. The mission statement appears to be purposefully virtue ethical. It does not say '…so that each graduate is a commissioned leader of obedience' or '… commissioned leader of discipline'. By including 'a leader of character' in the mission statement, West Point is signalling that character is important to the Profession of Arms, and particularly to the future army officers West Point develops and sends out as leaders across the Army.

West Point's framework for cadet development during the 47 months the cadets are there is called the West Point Leader Development System (WPLDS). WPLDS contains four programmes: the Academic Program, the Military Program, the Physical Program and the Character Program. As discussed in Section 2.2.3.1, the West Point Character Program uses

multiple categories for character. Partly overlapping with the Jubilee Centre's four categories of virtues (*performative*, *intellectual*, *moral* and *civic*) and McGrath's three-factor model of virtue (similar but with the combined category of *moral/civic virtues* as other-regarding), West Point has five categories of moral, civic, social, performative and leadership developmental virtues. There are several key components to the West Point Character Program. As discussed back in Sections 2.2.2.3 and 2.2.3.2, the 'Cadet Honor Code' is the first component of the Character Program. The second component is the Cadet Character Education Program (CCEP). CCEP is led by the two most senior class cadets for the two junior class cadets. The senior cadets guide discussions once every two weeks on topics ranging from sexual harassment to behaviour in war. The third component of the Character Program is 'Cadets Against Sexual Harassment and Assault' (CASHA). This cadet-led programme's goals are to provide education and training for cadets concerning sexual harassment and assault and eliminating those offences at West Point. CASHA implements the Army's Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) programme, which is discussed in detail below, in Section 2.5. The fourth component of the Character Program is the senior class's required capstone course called MX400 – Officership. The course requires cadets to reflect and integrate what they have experienced at West Point as they finalise their transformation from cadet to officer.

Finally, for each of the four years at West Point, cadets take a required course that touches on the idea of character. In the cadets' first year at West Point, they take PL100 – General Psychology for Leaders. PL100's learning outcome is that cadets become more ethical and effective as leaders through a scientific understanding of human behaviour. More specifically, PL100's goal is to 'explain, predict, and change behaviour to become an effective leader of

character'. In their second year, cadets take PY201– Philosophy and Ethical Reasoning. PY201, introducing cadets to ethical theories, including utilitarianism, deontology and virtue ethics. Additionally, cadets are introduced to just war theory, and the goal of the course is to enhance cadets' ethical reasoning. This course is the subject of the empirical study in this thesis, discussed in Chapters 3–5. In the cadets' third year, they take PL300 – Military Leadership. PL300 is a multidisciplinary study of leadership in organisations. Topics explored in PL300 include character development, leadership development, decision-making, organisational culture and change, counselling and negotiations, conflict management and leadership theories. Finally, MX400, described in the previous paragraph, is the required course for the cadets in their final year at West Point.

2.8 Current Ethical Training in the US Army

The next transition in this review of the background of the study takes us from the role that character and virtue play at West Point to the ethical training that occurs in the US Army more generally.

While it is common to encounter character and virtue as part of the ethical training at West Point, as a force, the US Army does not have a bespoke character education or virtue ethics-based training program. The US Army does mandate annual training for soldiers, but the focus of the training is on job specific skills, safety and wellness (nutrition, sleep and physical fitness). The Army also requires annual training on quasi-ethical concepts, such as suicide prevention and conduct in war, but the conduct-in-war training is more akin to legal behaviour training than ethical training. The ethical training that the Army focuses on is Equal Opportunity (EO)

Training and the Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) programme that was mentioned in the previous section. EO training focuses on the fair and equal treatment of all people regardless of race, colour, gender, religion or national origin, and supporting individual and cultural diversity (HQ, 2014). The SHARP programme 'reinforces the Army's commitment to eliminating incidents of sexual harassment and sexual assault through awareness and prevention, training, victim advocacy, reporting and accountability' (Lopez, 2011).

There are a variety of ways to complete the training. Sometimes, one or two full days are set aside by units to go through Microsoft PowerPoint presentations on the aforementioned topics, and sometimes it is spread throughout the year, so the training takes place one afternoon each month. As mentioned in Section 2.1.2, often the training does not take place with an instructor leading the soldiers and officers, but is self-learning self-instruction, whereby the person in charge of the training prints out the PowerPoint presentations and puts them in a folder with a sign-off sheet for soldiers and officers to indicate that they have read the presentation. As soldiers and officers are commonly over-tasked, as discussed in Section 2.1.2, often the sheet is signed without the attached presentation necessarily having been read. One way that the Army is trying to combat this problem is by creating online modules that focus on the training previously mentioned.

2.9 Promotion of Virtue Ethics and Character Education in the US Military

Despite the US Army not having a bespoke character education or virtue ethics-based training programme, there are pockets of officers across the US Army who are incorporating character

and virtue ethics within their specific ethical training programmes. I will discuss some of these officers and their programmes as it relates to empirical research they conducted on character and virtue across the military in more detail in the next section of this chapter. It should not be surprising that many of the instructors incorporating character and virtue into their curricula are chaplains. Chaplain (Lieutenant Colonel) Kenneth Williams served as an instructor in leadership and ethics at the US Army Military Police School. In the early 2000s, Chaplain Williams began to incorporate character education into his ethics course. As noted in the next section, in 2009, Chaplain Williams conducted an empirical study on military police soldiers to gauge their moral development in their Basic Training using a Defining Issues Test (DIT). Carrying on the tradition of incorporating character education in the Military Police School from Chaplain Williams, Chaplain (Major) Kevin Banks is the United States Army Military Police Regimental Chaplain and an ethics instructor at the US Army Military Police School. Since 2018, Chaplain Banks has incorporated character education into his ethics course. His focus is on why each soldier's character is important to the US Army and how to develop that character. His framework is based on neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. Finally, in an effort to enhance character development at the US Air Force Academy, Chaplain (Colonel) Gregory Tate introduced two programmes for cadets in their first year at the academy to help identify and discuss virtues. Chaplain Tate's empirical study on the US Air Force Cadets will be introduced in the next section.

2.10 Overview of Previous Empirical Research on Army Ethics and Army Ethical Training

The aim of this section is to critically review some of the background literatures that are relevant for the empirical study conducted for this thesis and the educational implications that I propose to draw from it. It stands to reason that the topic of 'Morality and the Army' does not form an easily circumscribed discursive field. In fact, it would allow one to head in a number of different directions. The six empirical studies listed below all focus on assessing 'morality and the military', with most focusing on values/virtues. While four of the studies focus on the army, the studies on cadets and midshipman at the US Air Force and US Naval Academies are still useful to the context of 'morality and the military'. Additionally, while five of the studies focus on the US military, perhaps the most useful study, the one that influenced my study the most, was the study conducted on the British Army. All six studies help illuminate the background considerations that informed the motivations behind the empirical study of this thesis and its eventual design.

2.10.1 Character Strengths and Virtues of Developing Military Leaders 2006

2.10.1.1 Introduction and Background of Empirical Study

Working from the assumption that positive character strengths, virtues and values are touted in the military as essential for military leadership, Matthews et al. (2006) conducted an empirical study comparing 24 self-assessed character strengths of West Point cadets, Royal Norwegian Naval Academy (RNA) cadets and US civilians. The instrument used in the study was the Values

in Action Inventory of Strengths (VIA–IS).[24] The VIA-IS is a self-report questionnaire assessing character strengths and values and is comprised of the 24 strengths of character associated with the six virtues developed by Peterson and Seligman (2004).[25] The study contained three different groups of respondents, but because the military samples contained small numbers of female respondents, this findings included only male responses. This is a significant point to make because other empirical studies (reported below in Sections 2.8.2–2.8.6) and my empirical study (reported on in Chapters 3–5) contain both male and female responses, and the gender differences in the studies striking.

2.10.1.2 Study Participants

The study participants included 103 West Point cadets (M age = 18.3 years, range = 18–22 years), 141 RNA cadets (M age = 25.31 years) and 838 US civilian respondents ranging in age from 18 to 21 years old (no mean was provided for the civilian respondents). The sample of US civilians was obtained from a database maintained by the Values in Action website (www.viastrengths.org), and the respondents had completed some college education. The sample of West Point cadets comprised of volunteers from the first-year class (freshman/new cadets) who entered West Point in 2004. All RNA cadets entering the RNA in 2003 and 2004 were tested.

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[24] The development and initial validation of the VIA–IS was described in detail by Peterson and Seligman (2004, 627–633). The measure includes 24 scales, each consisting of 10 items with a 5-point response option, asking respondents to indicate to what extent (very much like me, like me, neutral, unlike me, or very much unlike me) a particular statement (e.g., 'I find the world an interesting place') is representative of them.
[25] There have been multiple iterations and versions of the VIA-IS. I will discuss the VIA-IS in greater detail when discussing my study in Section 3.4.2 Self Reporting Measures – VIA-IS. The version used for my study was the VIA-IS-R, and a copy of the VIA-IS-R that I used in my study can be found in Appendix 2.

2.10.1.3 Findings of Study

Findings showed that the absolute scores of West Point cadets were higher than the other two groups. Specifically, the West Point cadets rated themselves higher than RNA cadets on 22 of the 24 assessed character strengths. The US civilians rated themselves higher than West Point cadets on only the character strength of beauty. When the 24 character strengths were grouped into Peterson and Seligman's (2004) six 'core virtues' of Wisdom and Knowledge, Courage, Humanity, Justice, Temperance and Transcendence, the two military groups were more highly correlated with each other than either military group was with the US civilian group.[26] The West Point cadets rated themselves higher than the RNA cadets on all six of the core moral virtues and higher than the US civilian samples on courage, justice and temperance. The Norwegian Naval cadets rated themselves lower than the US civilian group on wisdom and knowledge, humanity and transcendence. No significant differences were found between the RNA and the US civilian sample on the core moral virtues of courage, justice and temperance. West Point cadets rated themselves higher than US civilians on courage, justice and temperance. Paired comparisons among the three groups for each of the 24 strengths indicated that West Point cadets rated themselves higher than RNA cadets on 22 of the 24 assessed items, with no significant difference between West Point and Norwegian cadets on forgiveness and zest. West Point cadets rated themselves significantly higher than US civilians on the strengths of bravery, prudence, teamwork, curiosity, fairness, honesty, hope, industry, leadership, modesty, self-control, social intelligence and spirituality. US civilians rated themselves higher than West Point cadets on only the character strength of beauty. There were no differences between West Point cadets and US

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[26] See Table 6 in Section 3.4.2 for a visual representation of Peterson and Seligman's six 'core virtues'.

civilians on capacity to love, creativity, forgiveness, gratitude, humour, judgment, kindness, love of learning, perspective or zest. Comparisons between RNA cadets and US civilians showed the RNA cadets rated themselves lower on the 13 character strengths of beauty, capacity to love, creativity, gratitude, humour, judgment, kindness, leadership, love of learning, modesty, perspective, social intelligence and spirituality. RNA cadets rated themselves higher on only the character strength of self-control. There were no differences between RNA cadets and US civilians on the 10 character strengths of bravery, prudence, teamwork, curiosity, fairness, forgiveness, honesty, hope, industry and zest.

Finally, the relatively high scoring of all the participant groups is worthy of consideration. Considering the five-point Likert-type scale used on this version of the VIA-IS, the West Point cadets had eight out of the 24 character strengths with a mean score of 4.00 or higher. And additionally, nine character strengths had a mean above 3.75. Only beauty and forgiveness mean scores were below a 3.5. For the RNA Cadets, none of the 24 character strengths had a mean of 4.00 or higher. Nine of the 24 character strengths had a mean score of 3.75 or higher. For the RNA cadets, there were five character strengths of the 24 whose mean were below a 3.5 (beauty, gratitude, love of learning, modesty and spirituality). For the US civilians, only the two strengths of humour and kindness had a mean score of 4.00 or higher. The US civilians had an additional 10 character strengths with a mean above 3.75. For the civilians, there were four character strengths whose mean were below a 3.5 (prudence, love of learning, modesty and self-control). Finally, there was only one character trait with a mean below a 3.0 and that was spirituality for the RNA cadets, with a mean of 2.75. Although in the study's discussion, the researchers did not suggest why the mean of the participants was so high, it is possible that it might have something

to do with this being a self-report. However, this does not explain the differences between the cohorts.

2.10.2 Army Leader Intermediate Concepts Measure (Army ICM) 2008

2.10.2.1 Introduction and Background of Empirical Study

Coming from the notion that the assessment of professional ethics education in the US Army has traditionally relied on context-free measurement systems to assess the effectiveness of ethics education, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Turner created, developed and tested the Army Leader Ethical Reasoning Test (ALERT) in 2007 for his PhD dissertation in Educational Psychology (Turner, 2008). Aiming to substantiate claims of moral judgment and reasoning development at West Point and advance its methods of moral and professional ethics education, Turner concluded that moral development must be made measurable. The ALERT targeted the army profession, and its purpose was to measure the moral reasoning and judgment of West Point cadets at the intermediate ethical concepts level (ICM).[27] Prior to developing his own ICM, Turner also used the Defining Issues Test-2 (DIT-2).[28] Because most measures of moral judgement development only measure general moral reasoning and do not target reasoning specific to a profession, he created the ALERT to focus on the army profession. The ALERT is a questionnaire that consists of six stories that relay moral dilemmas set within the army

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[27] Both the Jubilee Centre study on British Soldiers (below in Section 2.8.6) and my study found in Chapters 3–5 of this thesis, use a variation of Michael Turner's ICM. A more in-depth explanation of an ICM can be found in Section 3.4.1 ARETE (ICM). A copy of the ICM I used for my study can be found in Appendix 2.

[28] The DIT (and the DIT-2) is a component model created by James Rest (Rest, 1979) that uses moral dilemmas as a way to test moral development. For more information on the DIT and DIT-2, please consult (Rest *et al.*, 1999b) and (Thoma, 2006).

profession. After each moral dilemma, there is a variety of possible choices for actions related to the dilemma contained in one section, as well a variety of possible choices for justifications (reasons) for those actions in a subsequent section. A panel of military experts created a scoring key that defines the possible action and justification items as acceptable/unacceptable or important/not important, and by which participants' responses were compared and scored. Participants rate the appropriateness of items in both the action choice and justification sections using a five-point Likert-type scale. Comparing the participants' choices with the expert panel scoring key generated three main summary scores: 1) the percentage of times a respondent's action choice rankings (for both good and bad items) match the experts' rankings; 2) the percentage of times a respondent's justification rankings (for both good and bad items) match the experts' rankings; and 3) a total score that combines the action choice and justification rankings scores.

2.10.2.2 Study Participants

Turner administered the ALERT survey to four groups in a cross-sectional study that included first-year (freshman) West Point cadets (N = 780), fourth-year (senior) West Point cadets (N = 466), first-year (freshman) students at civilian university in the US State of Alabama (N = 85) and fourth-year (senior) students (N = 64) at that civilian university in Alabama (Turner, 2008). The participants (N = 1,399) included in this analysis came from all four samples, freshmen and seniors from West Point (N = 1246; 202 females, 1044 males) and the civilian university (N = 153; 125 females, 28 males). Turner's study did break down the demographic factor of ethnicity of the participants (West Point: 845 (76%) white cadets, 297 (24%) minority cadets; civilian

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university: 129 (87%) white students, 20 (13%) minority students). However, while Turner did consider the factor of gender in his analysis, he did not consider the factor of ethnicity.

2.10.2.3 Findings of Study

The main purpose of Turner's research was to present a new measure of moral reasoning and judgment at the intermediate ethical concepts level and to provide reliability and validity data support for this new measure. A secondary purpose was to assess whether the four-year experience at West Point affects scores on the ALERT.

Turner's findings did provide evidence that supports the validity and reliability of the ALERT (Turner, 2008, Chapter 5). Feedback from Army professionals, as well as moral development experts, substantiated the content validity of Turner's ALERT. All eleven of the moral development experts agreed that all six of the ALERT's dilemmas represented at least two of the army's most relevant intermediate concepts. The experts also agreed that the ALERT is assessing moral reasoning within the Army profession. Over 94% of Turner's expert feedback on the ALERT was positive. This was an important study, and the validity and reliability results of the ALERT were important to both the Jubilee Centre study (see below in Section 2.8.6) on British Army officers and to my study on West Point cadets as we both used versions of the ICM that Turner developed and tested.

When it came to comparison of student performance on the ALERT, there were some interesting findings. For the *total ranking index* of the ALERT (action choices and justification of choices combined), when looking at the college-type factor, whether a respondent was a West Point cadet or civilian university student influenced the ALERT Total Ranking score, the West

Point senior (N = 466) and freshman (N = 780) sample (M = 67.9, SD = 17.52) had a higher

ALERT Total Ranking mean than the university senior (N = 64) and freshman (N = 85) sample

(M = 53.5, SD = 22.98). There was no statistically significant effect based on the class-year

factor. For the *action choice only ranking index* of the ALERT, focusing on both the college-type

and class-year there was a statistically significant difference. The West Point sample (M = 65.8,

SD = 18.49) had a higher ALERT *action choice ranking* mean than the civilian university sample

(M = 53.9, SD = 24.22). Additionally, the main effect for the class-year factor indicates that the

ALERT *action choice ranking index* was influenced by whether a respondent was a senior or

freshman. The senior sample (N = 530) scored higher (M = 65.7, SD = 19.59) than the freshman

sample (N = 866) (M = 63.37, SD = 19.41). The between-group differences in the *action choice*

ranking index where as expected (i.e., West Point seniors score higher than West Point freshmen,

who score higher than civilian university seniors, who score higher than civilian university

freshmen). Turner concluded that because these results identified a college-type main effect on

all three ALERT *ranking indices* and a class-year main effect on the *action choice ranking index*,

this provided some preliminary evidence that the ALERT is possibly sensitive to military interest.

Further, the class-year effect on the *action choice ranking index* alludes to a possible maturation

or West Point experience effect as well.

The *justification ranking scores* of the ALERT produced similar results to the *total*

ranking index. There was a main effect for the college-type factor, $F(1, 1391) = 77.48$, $p < .001$,

but no main effect for class year, $F(1, 1391) = .083$, $p = .773$ and no significant interaction, $F(1,$

$1391) = .268$, $p = .102$. Once again, the West Point sample (M = 69.9, SD = 20.77) scored higher

on the *justification ranking index* than the civilian university sample (M = 53.2, SD = 25.86).

Turner noted that surprisingly, for the *justification ranking index*, the West Point freshman scored higher than the West Point seniors, who scored higher than civilian university seniors, who scored higher than civilian university freshmen. Further, Turner identified the mean differences between both the West Point and college seniors and the West Point and civilian university freshmen as significant (for both, $p < .001$). Again, Turner believed the results further supported the claim that the ALERT is sensitive only to the effect of military interest and West Point experience, although the West Point experience appears to provide a negative effect on the ALERT's *justification ranking index* based on performance by the West Point seniors. Turner identified that there were statistically significant mean differences between the West Point seniors and the civilian university seniors and between the West Point freshmen and the civilian university freshmen (both with $p < .001$). The difference between the two West Point samples (freshman and senior) was not significant ($p = .999$). Civilian university seniors had a higher mean than civilian university freshmen on the *total ranking index*, but this difference was not significant ($p = .464$).

Turner then turned his attention to gender. He measured the effects of gender, college-type and class year on all three ranking indices. The main effect for gender was significant for the ALERT *total ranking index* ($F(1, 1387) = 19.30$, $p < .001$), the *action choice ranking index* ($F(1, 1388) = 12.16$, $p = .001$) and *justification ranking index* ($F(1, 1387) = 18.71$, $p = .001$). Therefore, the students' gender had a significant influence on all three ALERT scores, with females having higher means.[29] Turner compared gender and class year of only the West Point cadets. There was a statistically significant difference, specifically, there was a main effect for

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[29] This was also true of my study with West Point cadets in 2018. My study is discussed in Chapters 3-6 of this thesis.

gender on the ALERT *total ranking index* (F(1, 1242) = 19.96, p < .001), *action choice index* (F(1, 1243) = 9.86, p = .002) and *justification index* (F(1, 1242) = 22.25, p < .001). As before, the female cadets had the higher overall means on all indices. Additionally, when analysing the gender and class year interaction, there was a statistically significant effect on the ALERT *total ranking index* (F(1, 1242) = 6.76, p = .009), *action choice index* (F(1, 1243) = 3.91, p = .048) and *justification index* (F(1, 1242) = 6.86, p = .009). Therefore, the West Point female cadets' results followed the hypothesis that West Point seniors will score significantly higher on the ALERT than West Point freshmen. Finally, during Turner's analysis, he concluded that this hypothesised West Point effect by class year and college type only applied to females and not to males. In other words, during their four years at West Point, while the female cadets' moral reasoning capability grew at the intermediate concepts level, the male cadets moral reasoning remained flat.

2.10.3 Assessment of Moral and Character Education in Basic Training (2010)

2.10.3.1 Introduction and Background of Empirical Study

In an attempt to gauge the moral development of soldiers while attending Initial Entry Training (more commonly referred to as basic training), US Army Chaplain Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Williams conducted a study using the Defining Issues Test (DIT)[30] that was administered at the beginning and conclusion of the 19-week Military Police basic training course as part of his PhD dissertation in Applied Management and Decision Sciences (Williams, 2010). The study was

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[30] Again, for more information on the DIT and/or the DIT-2 please consult Rest (1979), Rest et al. (1999) and Thoma (2006).

designed to determine if there was a change in the soldiers' moral judgment and the effect of the Military Police basic training course on the moral character of soldiers. The theoretical framework for this study was based on Rest's Four Component Model of moral development, the schemas of the DIT (Kohlberg's stages redefined in terms in three schemas: *personal interest*, *maintaining norms* and p-score/*postconventional*),[31] the Seven Army Values, the Soldiers' Creed and the Warrior Ethos. In addition to using the DIT pre- and post-test, focus groups of the soldiers participating in the study were also used after the study to identify what influenced changes in the moral development of the participating soldiers.

2.10.3.2 Study Participants

A total of 190 soldiers completed the pre-training DIT and 167 completed the post-training DIT. Due to extreme inconsistencies in responses, 19 pre-intervention DIT entries were discarded, and 34 post-intervention scores were discarded. The remaining 120 soldiers' scores were analysed. The DIT scores were analysed by overall scores and by three demographic groups (gender, age and education level). There were 28 female (23.3%) and 92 male (76.7%) soldiers. The age groupings were individual ages from 18 to 30, with the final age grouping being 30+. The educational categories ranged from some secondary school experience to a college degree.

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[31] *Personal Interest* is the lowest of three schemas (Kohlberg's Stages 2 and 3) and represents when a person makes decisions based on personal considerations (self-centred). *Maintaining Norms* is the middle of the three schemas (Kolbergian Stage 4) and represents when a person makes decisions based on appealing to maintaining societal norms, including following the law. P-Score/*Postconventional* is the final schema (Kohlberg's Stages 5 and 6) and represents when a person makes decisions based on appealing to consensus, producing procedures such as abiding by majority vote, insisting on due process, safeguarding minimal basic rights. One can find out more about these stages in Williams dissertation (2010a, 24–26), his journal article (2010b) or in Rest et al. (1999, 649).

2.10.3.3 Findings of Study

Data analysis of the DIT pre- and post-intervention scores revealed three statistically significant differences. First, females scored higher than males in postconventional reasoning (highest schema of reasoning on the DIT-2) on both the pre- and post-intervention assessments. Second, females scored lower than males on the post-intervention personal interest schema (lowest schema of reasoning on the DIT-2). Finally, the female score for personal interest was significantly lower on the post-intervention assessment. These differences indicate that females in the Military Police basic training course exercise postconventional reasoning (highest schema of reasoning) more than male soldiers and that the Military Police basic training course affects a decline in personal interest moral reasoning among female soldiers (lowest schema of reasoning). Analysis of DIT scores revealed no significant changes in scores of the overall sample based on either the demographics of age or educational level. Traditionally, norms for the DIT indicate that postconventional scores increase with age and educational level. The data from Williams's study did not support those norms.

2.10.4 Ethical Decision Making at the US Naval Academy (2011)

2.10.4.1 Introduction and Background of Empirical Study

Seeking to understand the process in which individuals engage in ethical decision-making and the factors influencing this process in order to develop more effective ethics education and leader development programmes in the US Navy, Lincoln and Holmes (2011) developed a study that investigated three components of James Rest's (1994) Four Component model of ethical

decision-making: moral awareness, moral judgment and moral intention.[32] Additionally, the

researchers were interested in seeing if Thomas Jones's (1991) *moral intensity model* might

influence Rest's model. Jones argued that there are six facets that a person considers when

deciding to act in a moral issue – *Magnitude of Consequences*, *Temporal Immediacy*, *Social

Consensus*, *Proximity, Probability of Effect* and *Concentration of Effect*. *Magnitude of

Consequences* refers to the degree an individual may be harmed or benefit from the action of the

decision maker. *Temporal Immediacy* refers to the length of time between the action and the

consequences of that action. *Social Consensus* refers to the degree a social group believes an

action is good or bad. *Proximity* refers to how close the decision maker is to the individuals

potentially affected by the consequences. *Probability of Effect* refers to the likelihood that the

consequences and the anticipated harm or benefit will occur. Finally, *Concentration of Effect*,

refers to the relationship between the number of people affected and the magnitude of harm.

Additionally, Lincoln and Holmes were interested in seeing if professional military education and

officer development, in this case the US Naval Academy, could serve as exemplars in developing

ethical and effective leaders in other professions such as health care providers.[33] Like the studies

I discussed previously, James Rest's Four Component Model of ethical decision-making was the

basis for this study. The researchers adapted the Canadian Armed Forces Defence Ethics Survey

into a two-part survey for the purposes of the study. The questionnaire consisted of five

scenarios, each describing a military moral dilemma of varying ethical intensity and included a

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[32] Williams's study on the Military Police basic training course above in Section 2.10.3 also used James Rest's Four Component model of ethical decision-making.

[33] As mentioned in Section 2.5, Just War Theory, the Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues has done significant research on virtue and character in the professions. See Jubilee Centre (2016) for their published statement on 'Character, Virtue and Practical Wisdom in Professional Practice'. Additionally, go to the Jubilee Centre's website at: https://www.jubileecentre.ac.uk/1595/projects/published-research/virtues-in-the-professions to see more research reports on various professions, such as doctors, nurses, lawyers, teachers and business professionals.

subsequent action/decision.[34] The authors claim in their article that other studies have not

researched students of the military academies related to ethical decision-making and that their

study is the first. It should be noted, as indicated above, two previous studies have been

conducted at West Point on ethical decision-making using moral dilemmas prior to the study at

the Naval Academy.

2.10.4.2 Study Participants

A total of 812 Naval Academy Midshipmen (students) participated in the study. The students

were recruited to voluntarily participate in an anonymous computer survey. The survey

demographics included gender, class and ethnicity. Of the survey respondents, 168 were

female (21%) and 644 were male (79%). The survey sample included students from all four

class years, 18.8% seniors, 27% juniors, 29.1% sophomores and 25.1% first-year (freshman)

Midshipman. Finally, the sample included 80.7% white and 19.3% minorities.

2.10.4.3 Findings of Study

Data analysis of the study results suggested that the survey participants were morally aware,

judge immoral actions negatively and were inclined toward the right intention to act morally.

There were no significant gender differences for moral awareness, judgment or intention. The

study showed that both *social consensus* and *proximity* were strong predictors of moral

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[34] The military moral dilemmas used for this survey were similar, although slightly different, to the moral dilemmas used by Turner's ALERT (see Section 2.8.2, above), the Jubilee Centre's AICM (see Section 2.8.6, below) and my study discussed in Chapters 3–5 of this thesis. A copy of the moral dilemmas I used for my study can be found in the ARETE in Appendix 1.

awareness, with statistical significance affecting all five moral dilemmas for *social consensus* and

four of the five dilemmas for *proximity*. There was moderate support for *probability of effect* and

temporal immediacy, with each statistical significance affecting three of the five moral dilemmas.

The study showed that *magnitude of consequences* was a weak predictor of moral awareness, as

only two of the moral dilemmas showed statistical significance. Lincoln and Holmes (2011)

suggest that their results show that *social consensus* and *proximity* are significantly associated

with an individual's moral awareness, but *probability of effect* and *temporal immediacy* have a

weaker relationship with moral awareness. Further, they believe that the results of the study also

indicate that *magnitude of consequences* does not contribute to an individual's recognition that a

situation presents a moral dilemma.

2.10.5 Effects of Character Development on Cadets at the US Air Force Academy (2016)

2.10.5.1 Introduction and Background of Empirical Study

To gauge the effects of the US Air Force Academy's (USAFA) character development

programme on first year (freshman) USAFA cadets, US Air Force Chaplain Colonel Gregory

Tate conducted a mixed methods intervention as part of his PhD dissertation in Educational

Leadership, Research and Policy (Tate, 2016). Like US Army Chaplain Williams's (2010) study

(see Section 2.10.3, above), Chaplain Tate's study included an intervention followed up with

focus groups of the USAFA cadets participating in the intervention in order to identify what

influenced changes in the moral development of the participating cadets and to assess the

USAFA's character development programme. The intervention consisted of two inventory

surveys initially focused on 11 virtues ('courage', 'honesty', 'accountability', 'fairness', 'humility', 'duty', 'care for others', 'self-control', 'respect for human dignity', 'attention to detail' and 'excellence') that contained 54 inventory questions. Only nine of the original 11 passed a reliability test. The virtues of 'honesty' and 'fairness' were dropped from the study. The pre-intervention test was administered in August 2012, and the post-intervention test was administered in January 2013.

2.10.5.2 Study Participants

A total of 210 first year (freshman) USAFA cadets volunteered to be part of the study. The 210 cadets made up 22% of the freshman class (total freshman class was 976 cadets) and were part of two groups of 105 freshman the participated in both the pre- and post-test. One group of 105 was labelled 'VECTOR Seminar', and the other group of 105 cadets was labelled 'Mosaic Program'. There was also a control group of 105 cadets from the USAFA freshman class which also took the pre- and post-test without the intervention between tests. All three groups contained 105 cadets, which equalled 11% of the entire freshman class. This study did not provide demographic factors such as gender or ethnicity.

2.10.5.3 Findings of Study

Data analysis of the pre-and post-intervention for the group labelled 'VECTOR seminar', eight of the nine virtues, and the overall mean of the nine virtues, showed an increase from pre- to post-test. There was no change to the virtue of 'duty' from pre- to post-test. For the group labelled 'Mosaic Program', eight of the nine virtues, and the overall mean of the nine virtues, showed an

increase from pre- to post-test. There was a decrease to the virtue of 'care for others'. Regarding the control group, four of the nine virtues ('courage', 'accountability', 'duty' and 'attention to detail') and the overall mean of the nine virtues showed an increase from pre- to post-test. Five virtues (humility, care for others, self-control, respect for human dignity and excellence) showed a decrease from pre- to post-test. Using a paired sample t-test, one factor ANOVA comparing the pre-test scores between 'VECTOR seminar', 'Mosaic Program' and the 'control group', it was determined there was no statistical significance. A paired sample t-test analysis was used to see if there was a statistically significant difference between pre- to post-test. For the group labelled 'VECTOR seminar', differences for virtue 'attention to detail' and the overall mean of the nine virtues were statistically significant. For the group labelled 'Mosaic Program', differences on four variables ('duty', self-control', attention to detail' and 'excellence') and the overall mean of the nine virtues were statistically significant. Finally, for the control group, differences on the variables and the overall mean of the nine virtues were not statistically significant. Findings showed that cadets who attended the VECTOR seminar or Mosaic Program experienced an increased ability to identify with the set of nine virtues when compared to the control group.

2.10.6 Character of British Army Officers (ICM/VIA/Interviews) (2018)

2.10.6.1 Introduction and Background of Empirical Study

As mentioned throughout this thesis, the Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues has conducted research about virtues in a variety of professional practices and public services, including law, teaching, medicine, nursing and business professions. The *Soldiers of Character* Research Report

describes a rare empirical study on the British Profession of Arms (Arthur, Walker and Thoma, 2018). The goal of the research was to see if British Army Officers were people of good character and ethical leadership. The *Soldiers of Character* combined three methods: moral dilemmas in the form of an Intermediate Concept Measure (ICM), a self-report of character strengths through the VIA Inventory of Strengths (VIA-IS) and semi-structured interviews. The moral dilemmas were military focused, and the Jubilee Centre researchers came up with a new research measure called the Army Intermediate Concept Measure (AICM).[35] The AICM and the VIA were placed together and made up the 'survey' that was given to the officer cadets at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (RMA Sandhurst) and British Army Officers. The predominant method for this research was the AICM with the VIA and interviews serving to validate the ACIM results. Two separate panels scrutinised the moral dilemmas and modified the terminology in the ALERT's moral dilemmas to fit the British Army context and reduced the moral dilemmas from seven to four. The results of all three expert panels (the two UK panels and the original US panel) were compared to finalise the four moral dilemmas. Both the ALERT and the ACIM used panels of senior experts in ethical judgement in an army context. Further, both the ALERT and ACIM went through two expert panels to further hone the moral dilemmas for believability, accuracy and effectiveness.[36]

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[35] The Jubilee Centre's AICM and military moral dilemmas used for this survey were similar, although slightly different, to the moral dilemmas used by Turner's ALERT (see Section 2.10.2, above), as my study discusses in Chapters 3–5 of this thesis. A copy of the moral dilemmas I used for my study can be found in the ARETE in Appendix 1.

[36] For more information on the methodological process for using expert panels for intermediate concepts, consult Thoma, Derryberry and Crowson (2013).

2.10.6.2 Study Participants

There were three different populations of officers: officer cadets at RMAS, lieutenants and junior captains (1–5 years of experience), and experienced captains and junior majors (6–10 years of experience). In addition to rank and experience, the study looked at the demographic factors of gender and branch of service. Overall, there were 242 officers and officer cadets that participated in the study. Of the 242 participants, 52 were female (21%) and 190 were male (79%). Overall, of the 242 participants, 97 participants were infantry or artillery (40%) and 145 were non-infantry or artillery (60%). It is also important to point out that while there was some diversity to gender and branch of service, there was no diversity of ethnicity. Almost 97% of the sampled participants were white.

2.10.6.3 Findings of Study

Overall, female participants moderately outperformed males (Female M=.69 compared to Male M=.64) (F(1,235)=4.85, p<.05, ηp2 = .020). If anything, these gender differences are smaller than for other populations taking moral dilemma tests or ICMs, where females tend more conclusively to outperform males. Extending analysis to the four AICM subscales again revealed a moderate between-subject main effect for gender (F(1,235)=4.85, p<.005, ηp2 =.020). These findings highlighted modest differences between male and female officers. For instance, for detecting action choices (best and worst), female AICM scores were 7% higher than male scores (M=.71 and M=.78 versus M=.64 and M=.71), whereas for justification scores (best and worst) there was an insignificant gender difference (females M=.64 and M=.63 versus males M=.62 and M=.60). This suggests female officers were slightly better than males at identifying appropriate (action) choices,

but that both genders were equally matched identifying appropriate justifications (for action). When separating the officers into infantry and artillery combined and all other branches of service combined, and comparing total AICM scores for these groupings, there was a significant interaction effect ($F(2,205)=3.088$ $p<.05$, $\eta p2 =.036$). This interaction effect showed that non-infantry/artillery officers outperformed infantry/artillery officers, except at the officer/cadet level, where this pattern was reversed. Other than these differences, total AICM scores followed similar patterns by rank for infantry/artillery officers versus other branches of service.

When the researchers analysed the VIA-IS character strengths self-report survey, they found that overall, with all 242 officers, the top five reported strengths were 'teamwork', 'honesty', curiosity', 'fairness' and perseverance'. The least dominant strengths reported for the whole group were 'spirituality', 'prudence', 'self-regulation', 'appreciation of beauty' and 'forgiveness'. It is important to point out that although there were only small average gender differences, 'kindness' made it into the top five reported strengths for females, compared to men, where 'kindness' ranked above half way in the list of 24 strengths. Finally, the semi-structured interviews were useful in helping the researchers clarify answers given on both the AICM and on the VIA-IS.

2.10.7 Conclusion

One theme that emerges from the previous empirical studies is the demographic category of gender. While the Matthews et al. (2006) West Point and Norwegian Naval Academy study did not take into account gender due to its small sample size, and with the exception of the Lincoln and Holmes (2011) Naval Academy study, which found there were no significant differences

with gender, the other four studies show that females outperformed males consistently in most, and in some cases every, evaluation of the individual studies.

The six empirical studies covered in this section were invaluable in helping me decide how to formulate my study. There were some interesting commonalities with the six studies. First, all six studies were related to morality and the military. Second, five of the studies were done with cadets at military academies (Matthews et al., 2006; Turner, 2008; Lincoln and Holmes, 2011; Tate, 2016; Arthur, Walker and Thoma, 2018). Third, five of the studies focused on the US military (Matthews et al., 2006; Turner, 2008; Williams, 2010; Lincoln and Holmes, 2011 and Tate, 2016. Fourth, four of the studies focused specifically on the army: (Matthews et al., 2006; Turner, 2008; Williams, 2010; and Arthur, Walker and Thoma, 2018). Fifth, three of the studies were part of a PhD completion requirement (Turner, 2008; Williams, 2010; Lincoln and Holmes, 2011 and Tate, 2016).

The methods used by the six studies were interesting as well. First, five of the six studies used some type of moral dilemma (Turner, 2008; Williams, 2010; Lincoln and Holmes, 2011; Tate, 2016 and Arthur, Walker and Thoma, 2018). Second, two of the studies used an Intermediate Concept Measure (Turner, 2008 and Arthur, Walker and Thoma, 2018. Third, two of the studies used the DIT/DIT-2 (Williams, 2010 and Tate, 2016). Fourth, two of the studies used the VIA-IS as part of their study (Matthews et al., 2006 and Arthur, Walker and Thoma, 2018). Fifth, two groups did an intervention (Williams, 2010 and Tate, 2016). Sixth, two groups used focus groups (Williams, 2010 and Tate, 2016). Finally, one group used semi-structured interviews (Arthur, Walker and Thoma, 2018).

2.11 Conclusions and Justifications for the Empirical Research Undertaken

This chapter has discussed how the US Army wants leadership decisions pushed down to the lowest level under the Army Doctrine of Mission Command. The chapter has also discussed how lying and dishonesty is prevalent in the US Army and how these two aspects can contradict each other. When facing the Loyalty Dilemma, in which members of the military must choose between honesty and loyalty, moral agency is tested, and leadership and moral decisions can fail. I have argued that neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, complemented by just war theory, is the best normative ethical theory for soldiers whom we want to act as moral agents exercising Mission Command and who, through practice and direct instruction, can develop the practical wisdom to choose the correct virtue when two virtues collide. One way to test the effectiveness of such instruction would be to conduct a study. The main research question of the study chosen was 'Does the ethical training for cadets in their required ethics and philosophy course at West Point have a significant effect on how they reason about moral issues?' The course chosen for the evaluation was PY201 Philosophy and Ethical Reasoning, which is the core ethics and philosophy course for all cadets their second year at West Point. After analysing six previous empirical studies on military ethics and ethical training, I concluded that the best way to design a study to determine if the cadets improve their moral reasoning would be to conduct an a programme evaluation on PY201 before and after instruction in neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics and just war theory. The study design should also include a mixed-methods approach of an army-centric ICM, the VIA Institute's Inventory of Strengths and semi-structured interviews. I outline the methodology of this study in Chapter 3.

CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY

> *Although a soldier by profession, I have never felt any sort of fondness for war, and I have never advocated it, except as a means of peace.* – Ulysses S. Grant (Civil War General and 18th President of the United States, 1822–1885)

> *Any soldier worth his salt should be antiwar. And still there are things worth fighting for.* – General Norman Schwarzkopf (1934-1912)

3.1 Purpose and Description of Study

The research questions motivating this study as a whole were introduced in Chapter 1. As we now approach the empirical part of the study, it is worth reiterating that the purpose of the empirical sections is to answer the main research question: 'Does the ethical training for cadets in their required ethics and philosophy course at West Point have a significant effect on how they reason about moral issues?' To achieve this, the research design needed to be an programme or course evaluation of PY201 that would examine whether cadets would improve their moral reasoning after receiving instruction in normative ethical theories, specifically, virtue ethics and just war theory (as explained in Chapter 2). This chapter describes the choice of methods, the design of the study, sample selection, data collection procedures and statistical analyses.

Method chapters in doctoral theses in education typically contain lengthy discussions of the pros and cons of various quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods, along with the philosophical (ontological and epistemological) assumptions undergirding different research

designs. Given the current state of research in the relevant field to which this research contributes, the decision was taken fairly early on in the study process to use the same methods as we have seen in similar research projects in the past (recall Chapter 2), both in order to allow for helpful comparisons and contrasts and because of the inherent merits of the underlying psychological theory of development, explained in Section 2.6. I refrain, therefore, in this chapter from engaging in lengthy elaborations of methodological options that were *not* chosen, in order to have sufficient space to focus on the details of the mixed methods that I did choose to employ.

3.2 Programme Evaluation of PY201 through Cadet Moral Reasoning

Programme evaluation, sometimes referred to as educational evaluation, has been defined a variety of ways.[37] The original, and best-known, definition of evaluation came from Ralph Taylor (1950): 'evaluation is the process of determining to what extent the educational objectives are actually being realized'. Cronbach's (1960) definition of evaluation is 'the collection and use of information to make decisions about an educational programme'. Priest (2001) defines evaluation as a 'type of inquiry that uses similar research-related skills to "improve" practice effectiveness in a specific situation'. Wholey et al. (2015, 8) define programme evaluation as the 'application of systematic methods to address questions about program operations and results'. Finally, Dalal (2016) defines evaluation simply as 'assessment of learning'. All of these definitions, while

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[37] Educational evaluation is a type of programme evaluation within an educational context. For the purposes of this thesis, I shall interchange the words 'educational evaluation' and 'programme evaluation' as does much of the literature.

different, apply to what I was attempting to do in evaluating whether or not cadets taking PY201 would improve their moral reasoning at the conclusion of the course.

There are two main types of evaluation: formative and summative (Dalal, 2016; Isaac and Michael, 1983; Nevo, 1983; Priest, 2001). Formative evaluation is used for the improvement and development of an ongoing programme. Summative evaluation is used for accountability, certification, or selection of the programme. Wholey et al. (2015, 9) point out that while accountability is an important goal of evaluation, the major goal should be to 'improve program performance'.

PY201 is the only required course in philosophy and ethics at West Point. As mentioned on page 114, cadets take PY201 in their second year. This course is intended to help students reflect more carefully and seriously about their moral responsibilities as future army officers. The class stresses critical thinking, moral character and the nature of moral virtue and vice as well as the morality of war. As such, the desired outcome of the course is an improvement in moral reasoning, and ultimately moral action. The purpose of the present course evaluation is to see if PY201 does improve the cadets' moral reasoning by the time they complete the course.

As I am interested in seeing if PY201 improves their moral reasoning of cadets, this will be a formative evaluation to see if the course should be modified in order to improve the course to meet the stated goal of improving moral reasoning. For evaluations, the researcher can use either quantitative methods, qualitative methods or a combination of the two (Priest, 2001). In my case I used both. I used the ARETE, a type of Intermediate Concept Measure (ICM), the VIA and semi-structured interviews, as explained later.

3.3 Pilot Study

In preparation of the PY201 course evaluation, the decision was made to run a pilot study. While the course evaluation was focused on second year West Point Cadets in PY201, a selection of US Army officers ranging in rank, gender, experience, branch, and commissioning source also took the survey. The version of the ARETE that the officers took was identical to the ARETE that the cadets took, except for the demographic section. While the cadets took the ARETE at two points in the course to see if their moral reasoning improved, the officers only took this at one point in time. The goal to run a pilot study the ARETE merely to see how respondents answered the moral dilemmas and the self-reporting of character traits and whether any misunderstandings or misapplications could hamper the study.

The 25 army officers that were part of the trial were from a variety of ranks ranging from Second Lieutenant to Colonel, from a variety of branches (military specialties) and both genders (See Table 23 in Appendix 4, page 356, for the Officer Pilot Study Demographics). Similar to the cadets that were part of the course evaluation, all of the officers took the moral dilemmas section and the VIA self-reported character strengths. Additionally, four (15%) of the 25 US Army officers that took the survey were interviewed as well.

The process of recruitment of officers for the trial was multi-faceted. First, an invitation was sent out to all departments at the United States Military Academy at West Point. Second, a former colleague who taught PY201 that was stationed at the 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina at the time of recruitment, was asked to solicit fellow army officers for interest in taking the survey at their base. Third, a former colleague who taught PY201 and was stationed at the 2nd Infantry Division, Joint Base Lewis McChord, Washington at the time of

recruitment was asked to solicit colleagues for interest in taking the survey at their base. Finally, a former colleague who taught PY201 and was stationed at the 2nd Infantry Division, Republic of Korea[38] at the time of recruitment was asked to solicit colleagues for interest in taking the survey at their base. Of the invitations sent to these four pools of army officers, 25 took the survey.

The pilot study was successful and as such no changes to the survey were necessary for the PY201 course evaluation. This is likely because versions of the ARETE had been trialed twice before with LTC Turner at West Point and the Jubilee Centre at Sandhurst and military installations around the United Kingdom. To see the findings of the officer pilot study and a chart of the demographics, see Appendix 4 which starts on page 355.

3.4 Participants

In order to see if cadets in West Point's required ethics and philosophy course (PY201 – Philosophy and Ethical Reasoning) improve their moral reasoning, the course evaluation needed to take place as part of the PY201 course in a particular semester. I decided to conduct the study during the fall 2018 semester. All 129 participants were enrolled in PY201 in that semester.

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[38] The 2nd Infantry Division performs split-based operations. Of the 17,000 soldiers assigned to the 2nd Infantry Division, roughly 10,000 are assigned to the Republic of Korea and the remaining 7,000 soldiers are assigned to Joint Based Lewis McCord near Tacoma, Washington.

3.5 Demographics

The study's sample demographics were commensurate with the actual full class size of cadets taking PY201 in the graduating class of 2021 and comparable to the demographics of the cadets at West Point overall.

3.5.1 Cadets as a Whole

Cadets take PY201 in their second year at West Point. There were 589 cadets from the class of 2021 taking PY201 in the fall of 2018. These 589 cadets were spread across 38 sections and taught by 12 instructors. Nine sections of PY201 classes were selected for the study, taught by three instructors, with a final number of 129 cadets completing the entire study. Sample size of the study was 25% of the instructors teaching PY201, 24% of the PY201 sections, and 22% of the cadets taking PY201 that semester.

3.5.2 Diversity of Participants

The diversity of the study participants was analysed with respect to gender, ethnicity, religiosity and course instructor. The distribution of gender and ethnicity by sample size, class size and West Point overall is shown in Table 5 below. The diversity of the sample size was commensurate with the diversity of both the Class of 2021 and of the complete student body.

Of the 129 cadets participating in the study, 97 cadets were male (75.2%) and 32 (24.8%) were female. Additionally, 81 of the cadets identified as white (63%) and 48 (37%) cadets

identified as a minority (due to the small number of African Americans, Asians and Latinos, these ethnicity groups were analysed together). See Appendix 1 for the demographics section of the ARETE survey to examine all *ethnicity* options that were available to the cadets. Finally, when responding to the question about religion, 113 of the 129 cadets (87.5%) identified as Christians and the remaining 16 identified as something other than Christian (12.5%). Similar to the shortage of minority groups, the very small number of cadets from other religious traditions, atheism and agnosticism meant that these groups were also analysed together. See Appendix 1 for the demographics section of the ARETE survey to examine all *religion* options that were available to the cadets.

While the sample size of females taking the survey was small (N = 32, 24.8%), it was still representative of not only all of the females in the entire class of 2021 (N = 300, 24.4%) but also the full population of female cadets at West Point (N = 1,117, 22.5%). Although this was also true of ethnicity, it is interesting to point out that for the study, the percentage of African Americans and Hispanics flipped from that of their entire class and all of West Point. Thus, for African Americans, the study participants made up 7.75% (N = 10). For the entirety of the class of 2021 it was 16.7% (N = 205) and for all four classes at West Point, 14.8% (N = 736). For Hispanics, the study participants made up 13.95% (N = 18). For the entirety of the class of 2021 it was 9.7% (N = 119) and for all four classes at West Point, 9.6% (N = 478). The change may likely be accounted for by the fact that roughly half the cadets in the class of 2021 take PY201 in the fall semester, and the remaining cadets take the course in the spring semester. Which semester the cadets are assigned is dependent on what their individual major course of study is and what

the requirements are like in the respective majors and semesters. See Table 5 below for the breakdown of demographics.

Table 5: Breakdown of Demographics

	Study Participants from Class of 2021	Entire Class of 2021	All four classes of Cadets at West Point (classes 2018-2021)
Total Number of Cadets in Group	129	1,228	4,960
Women	(N = 32) 24.8%	(N = 300) 24.4%	(N = 1,117) 22.5%
Men	(N = 97) 75.2%	(N = 928) 75.6%	(N = 3,843) 77.5%
African American	(N = 10) 7.75%	(N = 205) 16.7%	(N = 736) 14.8%
Hispanic	(N = 18) 13.95%	(N = 119) 9.7%	(N = 478) 9.6%
Asian	(N = 7) 9.4%	(N = 98) 8.0%	(N = 403) 8.1%
Non-White (including Mixed Race) Combined	(N = 48)* 37.2%	(N = 422) 34.3%	(N = 1,617) 32.6%
White	(N = 81) 62.8%	(N = 806) 65.6%	(N = 3,343) 67.4%

*includes Cadets self-described as Mixed-Race.

3.5.3 Instructor Recruitment

In order to assess the effect of instructor on cadet performance and obtain a sufficient participant pool, I invited two PY201 instructors to take part in the course evaluation and study alongside myself. The resulting three instructors covered nine sections and enough of the target cadets to insure the required participant sample. Additionally, the instructors provided a mix of military

and civilian background and philosophical orientation. Taken together, the sample included three of the 12 PY201 instructors (25%), nine of 38 sections (24%), and originally 139 of 589 (24%) cadets taking PY201 in the fall 2018 semester.

In determining which instructors to invite, I chose a senior army officer with over 20 years of service who has taught PY201 for 10 semesters (5 years). I am similarly experienced as a senior army officer with 20 years of service and at the time had taught eight semesters of PY201. In an attempt at diversity, I invited a civilian visiting professor who was in their first of only two semesters teaching at West Point to take part in the study.

3.6 Control Group

A concern in designing the evaluation of PY201 for its ability to improve the moral reasoning of cadets in the course is that most empirical studies normally require a control group. As stated in Sections 2.4, 2.8 and 3.2, PY201 is a required course for all cadets to take their second year. One half of the cadets take PY201 in the fall semester and the other half take it in the spring semester. In assessing whether the course, and its current curriculum, improved the cadets moral reasoning it would be very difficult to have a control group. In order to set up a control group, what potentially could be done is to have cadets who are scheduled to take PY201 in the spring semester take the ARETE both times in the fall with the PY201 students, despite not being in PY201 at the time and compare their first and second score changes against those in PY201. This might have shed more light on the efficacy of perceived improvements (or lack thereof) of cadets after the PY201 instruction; however, I believe it would be very difficult to enlist the cadets who

are not currently in PY201 to take the ARETE as the demands placed on cadets' time at West Point are quite stringent.

There is precedence of empirical studies not having a control group when using ICMs, DITs and/or content-specific moral dilemmas to measure the moral development of distinct populations. Examples include adolescents (Arthur et al., 2015b; Thoma, Derryberry and Crowson, 2013; Walker et al., 2017), students in higher education (Turner, 2008), dental students (Bebeau and Thoma, 1994; 1998a; 1998b; 1999), military academy students in both the US (Lincoln and Holmes, 2011; Turner, 2008) and the UK (Arthur, Walker and Thoma, 2018; Walker, 2020), teachers (Arthur et al., 2015a), enlisted soldiers (Williams, 2010) and army officers of various ranks and lengths of service (Arthur, Walker and Thoma, 2018; Walker, 2020; Walker, Thoma and Arthur, 2020). Each of these studies had varying demographics but no control group when assessing the moral development of the targeted population using moral dilemmas.

3.7 Research Measures of Study

3.7.1 ARETE (ICM)

3.7.1.1 Why Choose an ICM as a Measure?

As mentioned in Section 2.6.1 on page 106, there are several measurements associated with the neo-Kohlbergian physiological theory of moral development, more specifically with the Four-Component Model of Morality (FCM). To rehearse, the FCM's second component is moral judgment. Moral judgment is broken down further into three schemas: codes of conduct,

intermediate concepts, and bedrock schema (Bebeau and Thoma, 1999; Thoma, 2006; Thoma 2014). These three levels of moral schema differ in their degree of specificity in directing moral behaviour. From their psychological theory of moral development, the neo-Kohlbergians developed a series of measures to assess moral reason, moral action and moral development. This included the Defining Issues Test (Rest et al., 1999a; Rest et al., 1999b; Thoma, 2006; Thoma 2014) (Hereafter DIT), the DIT2 and the Intermediate Concept Measure (hereafter ICM). The ICM was first developed as an outcome measure for professional ethics instruction, for the field of dentistry (Bebeau and Thoma, 1994; 1998;1999) but quickly was adopted to a variety of professions and populations (Arthur et al., 2015a; Kerr, 2020; Roche, Thoma and Wingfield, 2014; Thoma, 2014; Thoma, Derryberry and Crowson, 2013; Turner, 2008). Most importantly, it has been used twice for military officers and military cadets (Arthur, Walker and Thoma, 2018; Arthur, Walker and Thoma, 2020; Turner, 2008; Walker, 2020).

I chose to use an ICM as my primary measure for this study for three reasons. First, I adopted the neo-Kohlbergian theory of moral development on grounds of its theoretical face validity and its general credibility in the literature (recall Section 2.?). Second, ICM has been used extensively within university student populations, and professions like the military. Finally, ICMs specifically have been used to assess the moral reasoning of individuals after receiving profession-specific ethics instruction, thus illuminating the efficacy of the ethics instruction. As I wanted to measure the moral reasoning of the cadets as part of a course evaluation, it would make sense to use an ICM.

3.7.1.2 Main Features of the ARETE

The research methodology in the empirical part of this doctoral study was influenced by two previous research projects on future and current army officers. As mentioned at the end of Chapter 2, the Jubilee Centre's groundbreaking research on character in the British Army in 2017/2018 (Arthur, Walker and Thoma, 2018) and Lieutenant Colonel Michael Turner's research on cadets at West Point in 2007 (Turner, 2008) served as the motivation and inspiration for my research on cadets' moral reasoning. As noted in Chapter 2, both previous research studies used Intermediate Concept Measures (ICMs). The first Army ICM, developed by Lieutenant Colonel Turner, is called the Army Leadership Ethical Reasoning Test (ALERT) and the Jubilee Centre's measure is called the Army Intermediate Concept Measure (AICM).

The ALERT was vetted through two separate military panels of senior officers (Majors to Colonels) expert in ethical dilemmas within a US Army context. This vetting process allowed the panel to create seven military-focused moral dilemmas. These moral dilemmas were the core of the ALERT. The Jubilee Centre's empirical study on the military also included expert panels to vet the AICM. In preparation for their research, the Jubilee Centre convened two separate expert panels of lieutenants and captains of various lengths of military service in different British Army garrisons to look at the seven ALERT, US Army-centric moral dilemmas. The two separate panels scrutinised the moral dilemmas to modify the terminology to fit the British Army context and reduced the moral dilemmas from seven to four. The results of all four expert panels (the two UK panels and the two US panels) were compared to finalise four of the seven moral dilemmas originally in the ALERT for the AICM.

After reviewing the Jubilee Centre's AICM and Lieutenant Colonel Turner's ALERT, the decision was made to select three of the Jubilee Centre's four AICM moral dilemmas and two of

the original ALERT moral dilemmas to use in the survey. This new ICM is called the Army

Reasoning and Ethical Training and Education Test (ARETE). The five moral dilemmas that the

ARETE uses are from Lieutenant Colonel Turner's original seven. The reason for dropping one

of the Jubilee Centre dilemmas and adding the other two dilemmas from the ALERT is that they

arguably fit better in the US Army context and with the cadet population. To explore the full

ARETE, see Appendix 1. A brief overview of the five moral dilemmas used for the ARETE is

shown below:

> **Dilemma 1 (Metcalf)** – *Injured US Army informant who is a local Somalian* – requires a
>
> decision about how to respond to this injured man who is surrounded by a volatile crowd
>
> and completing a time-sensitive mission given to the respondent by headquarters.

> **Dilemma 2 (Billups)** – *Torture/aggressive methods* – requires a decision about how to
>
> respond to the capture of two soldiers when they may know where the respondent's
>
> captured soldiers are being held by the enemy. In the past, the enemy has tortured, killed
>
> and dragged the respondent's soldiers' bodies through the streets.

> **Dilemma 3 (Jacobs)** – *Fraternisation* – requires a decision about how to respond to a
>
> fellow male officer and friend who is fraternising with a female soldier, contrary to army
>
> rules.

> **Dilemma 4 (Mullins)** – *Honesty and accountability of sensitive military items* – requires
>
> a decision about how to respond to a fellow male officer and friend who has been
>
> dishonest with a senior officer and instructs other soldiers to keep quiet about the incident.

Dilemma 5 (Edwards) – *Honesty of military readiness* – requires a decision about choosing between honestly reporting readiness deficiencies of their company, as well as the other companies who have been telling the senior commander what he or she wants to hear.

After reading each moral dilemma, cadets were asked to rate a series of possible responses to the situation described in the dilemmas on a five-point Likert-type scale:

1 – I strongly believe this is a GOOD choice.

2 – I believe that this is a GOOD choice.

3 – I am not sure.

4 – I believe this is a BAD choice.

5 – I strongly believe this is a BAD choice.

After finishing rating the possible action choices (solutions) to the moral dilemma, the cadets were asked to select the two best actions (solutions) of the ones they had rated (best solution to the dilemma and then the second-best solution to the dilemma). Then the cadets were asked to select the two worst action choices (solutions) of the ones they had rated (worst solution to the dilemma and then the second-worst solution to the dilemma).

After focusing on the actions related to the moral dilemma, cadets were asked (as is *de rigueur* in ICM research) to rate possible justifications (reasons) and the importance of the

justifications in making a decision on what ought to be done in the dilemmas on a 5-point Likert-type scale:

1 – I strongly believe this is important.

2 – I believe this is important.

3 – I am not sure.

4 – I believe this is not important.

5 – I strongly believe this is not important.

After finishing rating the importance of possible reason choices (justifications) when making up their minds to act to the situation described in the moral dilemma, the cadets were asked to select the two most important reasons (justifications) of the ones they had rated (best reason to act in the dilemma and then the second-best reason to act to the dilemma). Then the cadets were asked to select the two least important reasons (justifications) of the ones they had rated (worst reason to act in the dilemma and then the second reason to act in the dilemma).

3.7.1.3 Scoring Procedures

The second expert panel used by LTC Turner's ALERT created an 'expert key' that was used to score the answers on the ICM by the participants in his study. Additionally, both expert panels set up by the Jubilee Centre's study on British Army officers confirmed the same expert key for the AICM. This expert key was chosen for the ARETE study as well.

When using the expert key to score the ARETE, each possible response to a moral dilemma (choices and justifications) was scored as 'acceptable', 'neutral' or 'unacceptable', as was done for the ALERT and AICM. This code underpins all calculated scores. For example, best and worst scores for choices and reasons can be calculated to achieve a 'total good' and 'total bad' score that represents the extent to which judgements correspond or contrast with those of the expert panels. A total ICM score is also calculated, which indicates the overall convergence of judgement with the expert panel for all variations (such as the selection in the moral dilemmas of 'appropriate' good and poor reasons, together with 'appropriate' good and poor choices). Notice that there is no 'right' or 'wrong' single answer to the dilemmas because for each dilemma, there is more than one 'acceptable', 'unacceptable' or 'neutral' option. Always selecting 'acceptable' options as good and 'unacceptable' options as bad will produce a score fully compatible with the expert panel (100%), selecting appropriate choices in this way for half of the required choices will produce a score of about 50% and selecting 'neutral' options will not raise or lower the score. Poor scores (even negative ones) occur when the individual consistently selects 'acceptable' items as 'bad' and 'unacceptable' items as 'good'. Typically, participants select most choices in the 'appropriate' direction, so a few misidentifications can be absorbed, and the summary score remains positive. The scoring procedure for the ARETE was done in accordance with Table 6, below.

Table 6: ARETE Ranking/Rating Section Scoring Procedure

Respondent's Item Ranking	Expert Panel Rating	Score
Best Action / Reason	Acceptable / Important	2
Best Action / Reason	Unacceptable/Unimportant	-2
Best Action / Reason	Neutral	0
2nd Best Action / Reason	Acceptable / Important	1
2nd Best Action / Reason	Unacceptable/Unimportant	-1
2nd Best Action / Reason	Neutral	0
Worst Action / Reason	Acceptable / Important	-2
Worst Action / Reason	Unacceptable/Unimportant	2
Worst Action / Reason	Neutral	0
2nd Worst Action / Reason	Acceptable / Important	-1
2nd Worst Action / Reason	Unacceptable/Unimportant	1
2nd Worst Action / Reason	Neutral	0

The scoring procedure was identical for the pre- and post-test. This way it is possible to see if the cadets improved or scored worse on the best and worst action/reason for each dilemma and ultimately overall on the post-test.

For example, if an item ranked by the respondent as the 'Best Action' or 'Best Reason' was also rated by the experts as acceptable (both the Jubilee Centre's and LTC Turner's expert panels), then the respondent receives a score of 2. If the experts rated the item unacceptable, then the respondent receives a score of -2. Thus, there is a scoring range of -2 to 2 for a respondent ranking answers as a 'Best Action' or 'Best Reason'. Items rated 'Neutral' by the experts that are

ranked 'Best' by a respondent receive a score of 0. For the 'Second Best Action' or 'Second Best Reason' that the expert panel designated as 'acceptable', the scoring process is similar, with one modification: instead of -2 or 2, the scores received are either -1 or 1. Selecting neutral rated items as 'Second Best Action or Reason' still receives a score of 0. The same method is used for scoring the ranking of the 'Worst Action/Reason' items. Therefore, the potential scoring range for each dilemma's ranking section is -3 to 3.

The summary scores were converted into percentages that reflected the match between the participant's responses and the expert panels' key. Thus, a .65 means that the participant matched the key in 65% of his or her answers. That is, the score reflects how well the individual makes decisions like the experts. The higher the number, the better the choice pattern matches the experts. To keep the data consistent across indices and summary scores, these values are also reported as percentages (Bebeau and Thoma, 1999).

3.7.1.4 Scoring Indices

To summarise a respondent's performance on the ALERT, two indices are calculated: 1) the percentage of times a respondent's action choice rankings (for both good and bad items) match the experts' rankings and 2) the percentage of times a respondent's justification rankings (for both good and bad items) match the experts' rankings. See Table 7, below.

Table 7: ARETE Scoring Indices

Scoring Indices	Consists of
Total Best Action Score	Best Action Scores added from all 5 Dilemmas
Total Worst Action Score	Worst Action Scores added from all 5 Dilemmas
Total Best Reason Score	Best Reason Scores added from all 5 Dilemmas
Total Worst Reason Score	Worst Reason Scores added from all 5 Dilemmas
Total Best Score	Total Best Action Score + Total Best Reason Score
Total Worst Score	Total Worst Action Score + Total Worst Reason Score
Total Action Score	Total Best Action Score + Total Worst Action Score
Total Reason Score	Total Best Reason Score + Total Worst Reason Score
Total ARETE (ICM) Score	Total Action Score + Total Reason Score

In addition to the two indices of action choice and justification, several summary indices are computed: 1) a Total ARETE (ICM) Score, combining action choices and justifications from all dilemmas (both good and bad); 2) a Total Action Score combined from all dilemmas (both good and bad); 3) a Total Reason Score combined from all dilemmas (both good and bad); 4) a Total Best Score, combining action choices and justifications from all of the dilemmas that were good; 5) a Total Worst Score, combining action choices and justifications from all dilemmas that were bad; 6) a Total Best Action Score, from across all five dilemmas; 7) a Total Worst Action Score, from across all five dilemmas; 8) a Total Best Reason (Justification) Score, from across all five dilemmas; and 9) a Total Worst Reason (Justification) Score, from across all five dilemmas.

3.7.1.5 Psychometrics and Validity

Internal consistency reliability estimates (coefficient alpha) assess measures, in this case, ICMs, for stability and consistency (Thorndike, 2005). In other words, these estimates assess whether the responses are the same if the measure was given again to the same group of subjects. An acceptable reliability coefficient is 0.50 or higher and an acceptable sample size is that over 100 individuals (Thorndike, 2005). The extant research shows that all the following ICMs were extensively tested for reliability and validity. The Dental Ethical Reasoning and Judgment Test, another ICM, had internal consistency estimates in the .70 range (Bebeau and Thoma, 1999; Turner, 2008). For an ICM for adolescent populations, the Adolescent Intermediate Concepts Measure (AD-ICM), the coefficient alpha indicated good internal consistency in all summary scores and in the overall index within the .75–.85 range (Thoma et al., 2013). The Army-centric ICMs, on which the ARETE was based, the ALERT (Turner, 2008) and the AICM (Arthur, Walker and Thoma, 2018) had similar consistency with other ICMs. The Cronbach's alpha coefficients were all above 0.50, with the majority in the .70–.80 range. The ARETE is derived from measures that have acceptable to good IC-reliability; however, the measure is not exactly the same, and therefore the researcher is projecting the reliability of the ARETE from estimates derived from related measures.

Finally, both army ICMs (ALERT and AICM) were vetted through two separate military panels of senior officers (Majors to Colonels), expert in ethical dilemmas within an army context. This vetting process allowed the panel to create seven military-focused moral dilemmas. These moral dilemmas were the core of the ALERT. The Jubilee Centre's empirical study on the military also included expert panels to vet the AICM. In preparation for their research, the Jubilee Centre convened two separate expert panels of lieutenants and captains of various lengths of

military service in different British Army garrisons to look at the seven ALERT, US Army-centric moral dilemmas. The two separate panels scrutinised the moral dilemmas to modify the terminology to fit the British Army context and reduced the moral dilemmas from seven to four. The results of all four expert panels (the two UK panels and the two US panels) were compared to finalise four of the seven moral dilemmas originally in the ALERT for the AICM.

3.7.2 Self Reporting Measures – VIA-IS-R (VIA)

The idea of virtue and the virtuous person is often referenced in both religious and philosophical traditions. In these traditions, the idea of 'virtue' and 'living virtuously' is the epitome of character. Individuals who live virtuously are worthy of admiration and stand out as moral exemplars to the rest of their community. In an effort to create a comprehensive model of virtue and positive character traits, Peterson and Seligman (2004) undertook a three-year research project that included 55 distinguished social scientists who studied positive human character strengths and traits. Their final list consisted of 24 character strengths and became their comprehensive and holistic framework for positive and virtuous individual actions. Additionally, Dahlsgaard, Peterson and Seligman (2005) undertook a research project that was a historical survey of human virtues that served two purposes: 1) as a literature review of classic texts that listed human virtues, and 2) as an empirical search for virtues that appeared on multiple lists and that were valued across traditions and cultures. Their research focused on eight classical moral and religious texts and traditions: Ancient Greek philosophy, Buddhism, Christianity, Confucianism, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism and Taoism.

In their research, they identified six 'core virtues' that were valued across the above-mentioned traditions. These 'core virtues' were: Wisdom and Knowledge, Courage, Humanity, Justice, Temperance and Transcendence. Peterson and Seligman (2004) argued that the 24 character strengths would be operationalisable character strengths that would represent and fall under one of the six core virtues. Peterson and Seligman came up with an initial model representing the core virtues and their character strengths called the VIA Classification of Strengths and Virtues (see Table 8, below).

Table 8: The 24 Strengths of Character

Wisdom	Courage	Humanity
Creativity Curiosity Love of Learning Judgment Perspective	Bravery Perseverance Honesty Zest	Love Kindness Social Intelligence
Justice	Temperance	Transcendence
Fairness Leadership Teamwork	Forgiveness Humility Prudence Self-Regulation	Appreciate of Beauty Gratitude Humor Spirituality Hope

After Peterson and Seligman (2004) finalised their model of character strengths and virtues, they developed an instrument to measure those 24 character strengths. The measurement they created was the VIA Inventory of Strengths (VIA-IS). The VIA-IS is a self-report questionnaire comprised of the 24 strengths of character associated with the six virtues developed

by Peterson and Seligman. There have been multiple iterations and versions of the VIA-IS. The version used for this study was the VIA-IS-R. For the layout of the VIA-IS-R, see Appendix 2.

3.7.2.1 Main Features of the VIA

Respondents to the VIA rate the degree to which statements reflecting character strengths ('*This strength is an essential part of who I am in the world*') describe them on a Likert-type seven-point scale of: *very strongly agree* (7), *strongly agree* (6), *agree* (5), *neutral* (4), *disagree* (3) *strongly disagree* (2), *very strongly disagree* (1). There are three positive and three negative options with neutral in the middle. For this study, the cadets complete this for all 24 character strengths.

3.7.2.2 Scoring Procedures and Indices

McGrath, Greenberg and Hall-Simmonds (2018) point out that it is noteworthy that the six core virtues and their character strengths that Peterson and Seligman (2004) came up with were developed purely on theoretical grounds, in an attempt to 'mirror the cultural understanding of how abstract principles manifest in personal traits'. As such, a Senior Scientist at the VIA Institute, Robert McGrath, conducted three studies (2015) using different measures of the VIA classification. In all three of McGrath's studies, a three-component/factor core virtue model, not a six-component model of virtues, appeared. Additionally, this three-component/factor model more closely mirrored culturally meaningful conceptions of the basic elements of positive social characteristics and traits than Peterson and Seligman's six-core model described (Burger and McGrath, 2019; McGrath, 2015; McGrath, 2020). The three-factor model of virtue that McGrath

identified, he labelled 'Caring', 'Self-control' and 'Inquisitiveness' (see Table 9, below). Interestingly, McGrath's empirical model fits better with the neo-Aristotelian distinction between moral, intellectual and performative virtues than it does with the original VIA theoretical model.

Table 9: McGrath's Three Factor Virtue Model

Inquisitiveness	Caring	Self-Control
Wisdom Appreciation of Beauty Creativity Curiosity Love of Learning Bravery/Courage Zest Hope	Fairness Love Kindness Teamwork Leadership Forgiveness and Mercy	Judgment/Critical Thinking Perseverance Honesty Humility Prudence Self-Regulation

To assess the relationship between the cadets' responses on the VIA and improvement on the ICM at time 2, this study attended to two areas on the VIA: 1) how the cadets rated themselves on the individual character strength of 'Wisdom' as an essential part of who they are, 2) how the cadets rate themselves in McGrath's three different factors of 'Inquisitiveness', 'Caring' and 'Self-Control' and 3) through the seven VIA traits found in the 'Martial Virtues' that I proposed in Section 2.4. The reason for focusing specifically on the character strength of 'Wisdom' is that to improve their moral reasoning during the course evaluation, it would make sense that wisdom played a part in developing cadets' moral reasoning. More specifically, because wisdom is typically considered to incorporate meta-cognition (Grossmann et al., 2020) and meta-cognition is arguably required to solve dilemmas, wisdom seemed to be a plausible

contender for a trait that could change during the course evaluation. The reason for the focus on the 'Martial Virtues' is to see if there is a connection with how cadets self-select on the 'Martial Virtues' and their ability to improve their moral reasoning. The 'Martial Virtue' of Prudence, also known as practical wisdom or phronesis, is the meta-virtue that we want cadets, and indeed all people, to strive for.

While this study will focus on 'Wisdom' as an individual character trait, and on McGrath's three-factor model, it is worth pointing out that 'Wisdom' falls into the category of 'Inquisitiveness'. This is interesting in that most of the other character strengths found in 'Inquisitiveness' are strengths that could potentially impact improvement on the ICM after the course evaluation. Additionally, during the course evaluation, there was discussion of 'Bravery/Courage' in the just war theory section of the course, and it was also discussed in the section on Aristotle and virtue ethics, as courage is meant to signal the 'right amount' of the relevant character trait. Too much courage would be rashness and not enough would be cowardice.

To look for a correlation between the character strengths and the ICM, a repeated measures ANOVA was used. The VIA scores were used as a covariant instead of a regular factor to see if change in ICM scores could be accounted for by VIA cluster scores at either time point or across the time interval. The within-subject factor was the dependent variable, which is the total ICM Time 1 and Time 2. The between-subjects' factors were the different demographic factors of gender and ethnicity.

3.7.2.3 Psychometrics

Like the ICM, the existing research on the VIA-IS has been extensively tested for reliability and validity (Arthur, Walker and Thoma, 2018; Peterson and Seligman, 2003; Peterson and Seligman, 2004; Park and Peterson, 2006; Park, Peterson and Seligman, 2006a; Park, Peterson and Seligman, 2006b; Peterson, Park, Pole, D'Andrea and Seligman 2008; Peterson, Ruch, Beermann, Park and Seligman 2008; Turner, 2008; Park, Peterson and Ruch, 2009). The validity and reliability of using the VIA-IS specifically following an Army ICM has also been vetted in a military setting (Arthur, Walker and Thoma, 2018). The VIA-IS has acceptable internal consistency and reliability. All versions of the VIA showed firm reliability and the coefficient alpha was above 0.70 in all cases.

There have been numerous studies that try to replicate the VIA-IS findings using multiple indicators of well-being in an attempt to show validity. In adapting and validating the German version of the VIA-IS, Ruch et al. (2010) compared their findings to three different indicators of subjective well-being: 1) the Satisfaction with Life Scale, 2) the Subjective Happiness Scale and 3) the Authentic Happiness Inventory. In comparing the three subjective well-being indicators to the German VIA-IS, the correlations with satisfaction with life were essentially the same as those reported in previous measures. All four measures showed similar and related scores, providing support for the claim that the German VIA-IS proved to be both a reliable and valid measure of moral reasoning.

3.7.3 Semi-Structured Interviews

3.6.3.1 Main Features of the Interviews

Interviews were conducted to complement the findings from the quantitative measures, as explained in more detail below. (The interview schedule appears in Appendix 3.) Interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed and then analysed thematically. I chose to use a thematic analysis of the interview data because of its flexibility (Braun and Clarke, 2006) and the ability to deliver complex and detailed accounts of the data. Thematic analysis identifies themes and patterns which allow you to better organise your data. According to Boyatzis (1998, 4), thematic analysis is a method used for encoding qualitative data. The specific 'code' used for the data may be a single theme or a list of themes. The themes may be part of a complex arrangement or have no causal relationship (Boyatzis, 1998, 4). Not only does thematic analysis allow for easier organisation and analysis, it can frequently interpret a variety of facets and features of your research (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Additionally, thematic analysis is a common method of analysing interview data in the social sciences and is widely used across disciplines (Boyatzis, 1998; Roulston, 2001).

The cadets were interviewed for several reasons. The interview design allowed the interviewer to ask the cadet why they answered the ARETE moral dilemma questions in the way that they did; specifically regarding the best and worst actions and the best and worse reasons for the actions of each of the five moral dilemmas. Further, the interview could be used to discover if something in the PY201 course lectures or conversations contributed to the cadet either increasing or decreasing their score on one of the moral dilemmas. The interviewer was able to ask the respondents what they were thinking about each of the VIA character strengths and why

they made the decision about why that strength was or was not an essential part of who they are. Additionally, the interview was conducted to see if the respondent made a connection between the way they answered the ARETE questions and the VIA character strengths. To examine the interview schedule, see Appendix 3.

3.7.3.2 Demographics/Diversity of Interview Participants

Of the 129 cadets who completed both surveys, just over 15% (20 cadets) were interviewed. While an initial group of 50 cadets agreed to be interviewed, in the end only 20 participated. As a reminder, the diversity of the sample size for the entire study was commensurate with the diversity of both the Class of 2021 and of the complete student body; however, there was a slightly higher percentage of female and minority cadets (and subsequently fewer white male cadets) who participated in the interviews compared to the total number of cadets participating in the study and within the Class of 2021. To revisit the demographics of the entire study, see Section 3.3.2 and for a visual representation, see Table 5. Of the 20 cadets interviewed, 13 cadets were male (65% compared to 75% for the study and 76% in the Class of 2021) and seven were female (35% compared to 25% for the study and 24% in the Class of 2021). Additionally, 12 of the cadets identified as white (60% compared to 63% for the study and 66% in the Class of 2021) and eight cadets identified as a minority (40% compared to 37% for the study and 34% in the Class of 2021). Finally, when responding to the question about religion, 16 cadets responded as Christians (80% compared to 87.5% for the study) and the remaining four cadets responded as something other than Christian (20% compared to 12.5% for the study). Of note is that all four of the cadets who identified as non-Christian were female. Finally, as a reminder, of the 129 cadets who completed the study, 29 cadets (22%) were in the visiting professor's sections, and 100

cadets (78%) were in the USMA professors' sections. Considering this, it is important to point out that only two of the visiting professor's cadets initially agreed to be interviewed but withdrew consent in the end. Thus, the interview data only include students who were in classes of the USMA professors.

3.6.3.3 Psychometrics

The validity and reliability of using semi-structured interview questions following an Army ICM has been vetted in a military setting (Arthur, Walker and Thoma, 2018). This British Army study by the Jubilee Centre supported the face validity and the appropriate construct validity necessary for an assessment of the ICM measure.

3.8 The Programme Evaluation

At the start of the semester, the cadets were given the ARETE and VIA before receiving instruction in normative ethical theories that included virtue ethics and just war theory. An auditorium was reserved during the Dean's Hour Study Period in which all 129 cadets took a paper-and-pencil version of the ARETE and the VIA on the same day and at the same time.

After the cadets completed the pre-test, all 129 cadets that took part in the study were assigned readings, attended class lectures and participated in class discussions on normative theories and just war theory. The ethics lessons covered consequentialism, ethical egoism, utilitarianism, Kantian deontology, Rossian deontology and neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. The just war theory lessons covered *jus ad bellum*, *jus in bello* and *jus post bellum*. After the lectures, to clarify the readings, class discussions focused on the cadets' thoughts on the theory,

application of the theory, using thought experiments/historical examples, and applicability of the theory to the army profession. The three instructors' syllabi were loosely designed to cover the required ethical theories within the required time for all 129 cadets to take the post-test together.

3.9 Data Collection

3.9.1 Methods Used

Both the ARETE and the VIA were used to collect the data at both time points. After receiving instruction in the different ethical theories, the cadets took the post-test in the same auditorium as they had taken the pre-test during the Dean's Hour Study Period. All 129 cadets took the same paper-and-pencil version of the ARETE and VIA as they did for the pre-test on the same day and at the same time.

3.10 Data Analytics

Qualitative and quantitative steps were taken to evaluate the validity and reliability of the ARETE. The questionnaire completion times for both pre- and post-tests were reviewed to identify invalid data prior to analysing ARETE responses. No ARETEs had to be discarded as all ARETEs were completed in no less than 40 minutes (both pre- and post-test). Nevertheless, there were some instances of invalid data from the cadets. First, a few cadets missed a whole page of the survey or did not take the VIA at the end of the survey. If a cadet only omitted answers for a few questions, we kept them as part of the survey, entering '999' for their answer for both the Excel spreadsheet and in SPSS. We averaged the remaining numbers in order to not lose all of the data. Missing data procedures were applied in under 15% of the cases. Valid responses for the

ARETE were then scored in accordance with the expert panel scoring script. Means and standard deviations for the scoring indices were analysed to look for outliers.

By the end of the post-test, the number of cadets participating in the study dropped from 139 to 129. The reasons for this were that five cadets were unavailable to take the post-test due to trips to athletic competitions away from West Point, and further, four cadets seemingly inadvertently left blank a whole page of either the ICM or the VIA in the post-test. Finally, one cadet was not considered as she or he selected the middle option of the ICM (*'I am not sure'*) for the majority of the pre-test.

3.10.1 Research Questions

Main Research Question:

Does the ethical training for cadets in their required ethics course at West Point have a significant effect on how they reason about moral issues?

The main research question can best be answered by considering a number of enabling questions. This overall research question, *'Does instruction matter?',* was operationalised in the following ways: *'What are the indicators that instruction matters?'* 1) *'Do scores on the ICM increase from Time 1 to Time 2?',* 2) *'Do scores on ARETE dilemmas that were discussed in class (labelled as familiar) increase more than the dilemmas that were not discussed (labelled unfamiliar)?'.* These enabling questions can assist in helping answer the main and sub-research questions. The interviews with the cadets, post-test, were intended to help answer the questions and the responses given by cadets on the ARETE on the post-test.

The question of *'Do scores on the ICM increase from Time 1 to Time 2?'* was assessed as a general analysis and then by demographic categories to see if the observed change is generic or conditional on student characteristics. Additionally, the analysis attended to whether the effect is common across indices (specifically Best Action/Worst Action and Best Reason/Worst Reason). The question of *'Do students who differ in engagement change on the ICM at different rates?'* required anecdotal comments from the instructors. Historically, topics within just war theory like 'torture', 'targeting civilians and non-combatants' and 'terrorism' see significant engagement from cadets. Because these cadets are about to become army officers, and with the United States involved in two wars in the last twenty plus years, these cadets are likely to encounter these things in their careers, and thus they find these topics interesting. We identified these issues on the ARETE. Dilemma 2 on the ARETE deals with torture. *'Is it morally permissible to torture a captured enemy in order to find out the location of your fellow soldiers who have fallen into enemy hands?'*

In addition to the enabling questions, it was interesting to see if cadets of different demographic categories improved on their moral reasoning on the ARETE after instruction in virtue ethics and just war theory. For *'Do female cadets improve significantly over male cadets?'*, it was considered likely that they would. Numerous studies show female superiority on certain cognitive tasks. These studies show that females have an advantage in episodic memory tasks, semantic memory, verbal processing and verbal fluency (Herlitz et al., 1997; Wegesin 1998; Maitland et al., 2004; Andreou et al. 2005; Jaušovec and Jaušovec, 2009).[39] Additionally, on

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[39] According to Wegesin (1998), verbal fluency is a cognitive function that allows us to retrieve words that belong to a specified category in a specified time.

average, females excel at perceptual speed (of rapid pattern-identity matches) and some fine motor skills (Kimura 1997). Moreover, some studies show that females outperform males on emotional intelligence tests (Mayer et al., 2000). Emotional intelligence is the ability to perceive emotions and their meaning, and to use that perception to problem-solve situations, which include morally-based dilemmas (Mayer and Salovey, 1997; Mayer et al., 2000). Finally, Demie (2001) explains that 'whatever the pupils' ethnic origin, girls tend to perform at higher levels than boys at all key stages'. The ICM is a heavily verbal task and as such may favour females since it emphasises this advantage.

For *'Do minority cadets improve significantly over non-minority cadets?'* there are multiple studies on the performance of minority students compared to non-minority students and the 'late-bloomer' hypothesis (Wilson, 1980; Kermanshachi and Safapour, 2017). The 'late-bloomer' hypothesis is the idea that minority students show greater improvement on performance over their non-minority classmates following instruction, course, semester or even first year of university. The hypothesis purportedly originates from the idea that minority students come from adverse backgrounds and childhoods and/or insufficient earlier resources that adversely affect their initial performance at university, but not their long-term performance. Some of these studies have used ANOVA tests to compare the minority and non-minority students' initial and final class performance as well as their rate of progress in various universities (Wilson, 1980; Kermanshachi and Safapour, 2017). The results of these studies show there is a significant difference between the minority and non-minority students' progress in their grades throughout the semester. Additionally, some studies also identified minority students' performance had an accelerated and significant improvement over their non-minority peers by the end of some course

topics and the course itself (Wilson, 1980; Kermanshachi and Safapour, 2017). Based on this previous research, I expected the gap would diminish between minority and majority cadets.

Possible outcomes from a comparison analysis of the above groups' mean ARETE scores are depicted in Figure 1, below.


Figure 1: Possible ANOVA Plots for Gender and Ethnicity

Sub-Research Question #1:

What is the best ethical theory for grounding ethical training for cadets, and why?

This is a philosophical question that was considered in Chapter 2. Further, one of the enabling questions for this sub-research question might shed some light on this question with the ARETE results (to be addressed momentarily). In Chapter 2 of this thesis, I considered the three main normative ethical theories of consequentialism/utilitarianism, deontology and virtue ethics. For each of the three theories, I discussed the foundation, the standard objections and the application to the context of the army. My conclusion was that virtue ethics is the best ethical theory for grounding ethical cadets; however, the following enabling questions might illuminate sub-research question #1: *Does instruction matter? What are the indicators that instruction matters?*

3.11 Ethical Considerations and Permissions

Prior to data collection, full ethical approval was granted from the Humanities and Social Sciences Ethical Review Committee of the University of Birmingham and was assigned the reference: ERN_18-0932. Additionally, I received Human Research Exemption Status by the US Military Academy (USMA) Human Research Protection Program (HRPP). Informed consent was also obtained from all participants.

3.12 Summary of Methodology

The purpose of this research was to answer the main research question *'Does the ethical training for cadets in their required ethics and philosophy course at West Point have a significant effect on how they reason about moral issues?'* To achieve this purpose, the research design needed to be a course evaluation of PY201 to see if cadets would improve their moral reasoning after receiving instruction in normative ethical theories, specifically virtue ethics, and just war theory. This chapter has provided a detailed account of all the methods used.

CHAPTER 4. FINDINGS

The fog of war is thick, but these acts of abuse and humiliation contradict international norms, military regulations and the very values that our military fights to defend. – Jane Harman

… this military has come to welcome the talents of more of our fellow Americans… open to women. I know that women are at least as strong as men. We're stronger for it. It's one of the reasons that our military stands apart as the most respected institution in our nation by a mile. The American people look up to you and your devotion to duty and your integrity and your sense of honour and your commitment to each other. – President Barack Obama

4.1 Data from All Three Methods

After describing the choice of methods, design of the study, sample selection, data collection procedures and statistical analyses in the last chapter, we now turn to the main empirical findings of the study. First, I will focus on the ARETE itself, followed by the self-assessed character strengths of the VIA and finally the semi-structured interviews that took place at the completion of the second survey. More specifically, this chapter reports upon and details the results of the cadets' scores on the ARETE, how they assessed themselves on their strongest character strengths on the VIA and what was further illuminated and explained through the interviews.

4.1.1 Moral Dilemmas – ARETE (ICM)

The purpose of this study was to see if cadets at the United States Military Academy at West Point improve their moral reasoning in army-centric moral dilemmas after instruction in neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics and just war theory. To repeat, the cadets completed paper surveys in order to respond to the five moral dilemmas in the ARETE. Below I report upon and illustrate the results of the cadets' summary scores. As this was a course evaluation, the cadets who participated in the study took an identical version of the ARETE before and after instruction.

Due to the multiple in-depth analyses the test provides, the statistical approach used was a repeated-measures ANOVA (Analysis of Variance). I used the repeated-measures ANOVA for both comparing simple mean change from pre- to post-test, as well as focusing on the analyses attending to multiple means. The ANOVA test assumes that the variances in each of the tested means is equal, which is often not the case in applied settings. When the group variances are unequal, the resulting statistical test becomes unstable and increases the chance of interpretation error. To counter this problem, statisticians have developed several corrective measures including the Greenhouse-Geisser correction. In the following analyses, I first test for equal variances across groups (i.e., testing for sphericity). If the test suggests that the sample variances are unequal, I then employ the Greenhouse-Geisser correction to interpret the ANOVA results. Otherwise, the ANOVA will be interpreted without correction. The detailed overview of findings below may sound repetitive at times, but I sacrifice lucidity for accuracy in trying to report on all the nuances of the findings.

When looking at the ARETE scores of the cadets, there were five scores of interest/focus: The Total ARETE (ICM) Score, the Total Action Score, the Total Reason Score, the Total Good

Score and the Total Bad Score. Additionally, there were different variables/factors I considered in the analysis: Time (the change, or lack of change, from pre- to post-test), Choice (the best action to choose in the dilemma and the best reason/justification to act), Valence (were the actions chosen good or bad?) and Dilemma (the five different moral dilemmas or stories outlined in Section 3.4.1.1). I ran a repeated-measures ANOVA to observe the main effects of individual within-subject factors, such as Time, Choice, Valence or Dilemma, as well as two- and three-way interactions with the factors. Additionally, I included between-subject factors (the demographic groups of Gender and Ethnicity) in the analysis.

As a reminder, an example of the ARETE is provided in Appendix 1. To review an explanation of the scoring procedure based on the expert panels, revisit Section 3.7.1.3 in Chapter 3. Additionally, for a graphic representation of the ARETE Ranking/Rating Section Scoring Procedure, see Table 6, also in Chapter 3, page 155.

4.1.1.1 ARETE Performance for All Cadets as A Whole

Table 10: Overall ARETE Baseline Scores for Pre- and Post-test

Area of Focus	Pre-test Mean Score and Standard Deviation	Post-test Mean Score and Standard Deviation
Total ARETE (ICM) Score	.59 (.22)	.60 (.27)
Total Action Score	.56 (.27)	.57 (.32)
Total Reason Score	.61(.23)	.63 (.27)
Total Good Score	.64 (.25)	.65 (.28)
Total Bad Score	.54 (.25)	.55 (.31)

4.1.1.1.1 Mean Pre-/Post-test Changes

As mentioned in the previous section, when looking at all 129 cadets' scores collectively, there were five scores of interest/focus: the Total ARETE (ICM) Score, the Total Action Score, the Total Reason Score, the Total Good Score and the Total Bad Score. The Total ICM Score showed a slight increase in mean scores (pre-test M=.59 to post-test M=.60) with the variability of the sample increasing (SD pre-test=.22, post-test=.27), suggesting that there may be heterogeneity in the relevant growth patterns. The Total Action Score also reflected an increase in mean scores post-test, (pre-test M=.56, post-test M=.57), and similar to the Total ICM Score, the variability of the sample increased with the standard deviation spreading (SD pre-test=. 27, post-test=.32). The Total Reason Score indicated an increase in mean scores post-test (pre-test M=.61, post-test M=.63). Again, the variability of the sample increased with the standard deviation spreading (SD pre-test=.23, post-test=.27). The Total Good Score also increased in mean scores post-test, (pre-test M=.64, post-test M=.65). Further, there was also an increase in the variability, with the standard deviation spreading slightly (SD pre-test=.25, post-test=.28). The Total Bad Score reflected an increase in mean scores post-test (pre-test M=.54, post-test M=.55). Finally, the Standard Deviation shows that the cadets were more variable in their Total Bad Scores at post-test than their Total Good Score with the (SD pre-test=.25, post-test=.31). Unfortunately, however, none of these mean contrasts was statistically significant. To clarify, it is possible for cadets to increase and/or decrease in both Reason and Action Scores, as well as in both Good and Bad Scores. There is not an inverse relationship between Good and Bad Scores, but they are separate from each other. As a reminder, this was explained in more detail in Section 3.7.1.2.

4.1.1.1.2 Total ICM Score Pre- to Post-test Change for All Cadets as A Whole

Only one main effect, the factor of Time, was observed in the Total ICM Score for all the cadets combined. However, the analysis did not produce statistical significance for the factor of Time, $F(1,128)=.59$, $p=.44$, $np2=.01$.

4.1.1.1.3 Action Choices vs. Justifications (Choice) All Cadets as A Whole

Main Effects

As noted above, there was no statistical significance for the factor of Time, $F(1,128)=.59$, $p=.44$, $np2=.01$. However, there was statistical significance for the factor of Choice (action and reason/justification), $F(1,128)=11.24$, $p=.00$, $np2=.08$, indicating that the action scores differed from the reason scores. Both action scores and reason/justification scores were more varied (indicating more heterogeneity) at post-test. Increased heterogeneity in the post test indicates that there may be subsets of cadets who are increasing on the ICM at rates different from their peers.

Two-Way Interactions

To assess whether the *Total Action* and *Total Reason* scores differed from each other, and in their rate of change from pre- to post-test, a two within-subjects factors repeated-measures ANOVA was applied to the relevant data in Table 1. These two within-subjects factors were Time (pre to post) and score type (action choice and reasons/justifications), known as Time by Choice. Unfortunately, there was no statistically significant Time by Choice interaction, $F(1,128)=.13$, $p=.72$, $np2=.00$, indicating that the rate of change for the scores are not different from each other (see Figure 2, below).

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Figure 2: Cadets Action and Reason Scores at Pre- and Post-test

4.1.1.1.4 Good vs. Bad scores (Valence) All Cadets as A Whole

Main Effects

As noted in the previous section on Choice, there was no statistical significance for the factor of Time, $F(1,128)=.57$, $p=.45$, np2=.00. However, the *factor* of *Valence* did show statistically significant results, $F(1,128)=42.71$, $p=.00$, np2=.25, indicating that the cadets scored higher on identifying Good Choices over identifying Bad Choices.

Two-Way Interactions

To assess whether the *Total Good* and *Total Bad* scores differed from each other, and in their rate of change from pre- to post-test, a two within-subjects factors repeated-measures ANOVA was applied to the relevant data in Table 1. These two within-subjects factors were Time and Valence

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(good and bad). Unfortunately, the Time by Valence interaction did not yield statistically significant results: $F_{(1,128)}=.21$, $p=.65$, $np2=.00$ (see Figure 3, below).


Figure 3: Cadets' Good and Bad Scores at Pre- and Post-test

4.1.1.1.5 Five Dilemma Scores (Dilemma) All Cadets as A Whole

Main Effects

As noted in the previous sections on Choice and Valence, the factor of Time showed no statistical significance: $F_{(1,119)}=.31$, $p=.58$, $np2=.00$. However, the factor of Dilemma did show statistically significant results, $F_{(3.36, 399.48)}=11.50$, $p=.00$, $np2=.09$, indicating that a statistically significant number of cadets had changed their minds about certain dilemma-related issues. More specifically, Dilemma #2 Captain Billups, stood out as seen below.

Two-Way Interactions

To assess whether there are differences between dilemma scores and whether these scores differ

from pre- to post-test, a two-level time effect and a five-level story effect repeated-measures

ANOVA was applied to the data in Table 11, below.

Table 11: Overall ARETE Baseline Scores for the Five Moral Dilemmas

Moral Dilemma	Area of Focus	Pre-Test Mean Score and Standard Deviation	Post-Test Mean Score and Standard Deviation
#1 Captain Metcalf	Total ICM	.70 (.25)	.68 (.26)
#2 Captain Billups	Total ICM	.49 (.44)	.62 (.47)
#3 LT Jacobs	Total ICM	.65 (.27)	.65 (.35)
#4 LT Mullins	Total ICM	.49 (.42)	.45 (.49)
#5 Captain Edwards	Total ICM	.61 (.39)	.59 (.42)

Interestingly, the Time by Dilemma interaction indicated that the dilemmas performance differed

over time: $F(3.75, 445.73)=4.82$, $p=.00$, $np2=.04$. Inspection of Figure 4, below, suggests that this

effect is primarily due to a large increase in performance on the Billups (torture) Dilemma #2. All

other story scores indicated small to moderate decreases.

Estimated Marginal Means (Total ICM) for the Five Moral Dilemmas

Figure 4: All Cadets' Total ICM for all Five Dilemmas.

4.1.1.2 ARETE Performance Based on Demographic Factors

After analysing the data from the cadets as a whole, I broke the cadets down into two different

demographic groups (Gender and Ethnicity). As with the ARETE scores of all 129 cadets

collectively, for the analysis there were five scores of interest/focus for the different demographic

factors: the Total ARETE (ICM) Score, the Total Action Score, the Total Reason Score, the Total

Good Score and the Total Bad Score. Additionally, there were different variables considered in

the analysis: Time (change/lack of change, from pre- to post-test), Choice (best action to choose

in the dilemma and the best reason/justification to act), Valence (were the actions chosen good or

bad?) and Dilemma (the five different moral dilemmas or stories). I ran a repeated-measures

ANOVA to observe the main effects of individual within-subject factors such as Time, Choice,

Valence or Dilemma, as well as two- and three-way interactions with those factors. Additionally,

I included between-subject factors (the demographic groups of Gender and Ethnicity) in the

analysis.

4.1.1.2.1 Does Performance on the ARETE Differ by Gender?

The first demographic group I analysed was Gender. The aim of this analysis was to assess

whether female cadets and male cadets moderated the trends in the summary and dilemma scores.

For summary ARETE scores based on Gender, see Table 12, below.

Table 12: Overall ARETE Baseline Scores Based on Gender

Moral Dilemma	Area of Focus	Female Cadets		Male Cadets	
		Pre-Test Mean Score and Standard Deviation	Post-Test Mean Score and Standard Deviation	Pre-Test Mean Score and Standard Deviation	Post-Test Mean Score and Standard Deviation
All Moral Dilemmas Combined	Total ICM	.69 (.19)	.76 (.17)	.56 (.22)	.55 (.28)
	Total Action	.66 (.24)	.75 (.22)	.53 (.27)	.51 (.33)
	Total Reason	.72 (.19)	.76 (.17)	.58 (.23)	.59 (.28)
	Total Good	.72 (.21)	.80 (.17)	.61 (.25)	.61 (.29)
	Total Bad	.65 (.21)	.71 (.20)	.51 (.25)	.49 (.32)
#1 Captain Metcalf	Total ICM	.66 (.25)	.66 (.24)	.71 (.25)	.68 (.27)
#2 Captain Billups	Total ICM	.70 (.33)	.86 (.17)	.43 (.45)	.55 (.50)
#3 LT Jacobs	Total ICM	.72 (.25)	.78(.23)	.63 (.28)	.61 (.37)
#4 LT Mullins	Total ICM	.66 (.31)	.76 (.29)	.43 (.43)	.36 (.50)
#5 Captain Edwards	Total ICM	.69 (.41)	.75 (.31)	.58 (.38)	.54 (.43)

Similar to the analysis on the 129 cadet scores collectively, there were five scores of interest/focus when looking at scores based on gender: the Total ARETE (ICM) Score, the Total Action Score, the Total Reason Score, the Total Good Score and the Total Bad Score. To assess whether gender moderated the trends in the summary and dilemma scores described above, a series of two-way repeated-measures ANOVAs, with time as the within-subjects factor and gender as the between-subjects factor, were applied to the data described above in Table 10.

4.1.1.2.1.1 Total ICM Scores by Gender

Main Effects

As noted in the previous section on the cadets as a whole, the factor of Time showed no statistical significance: $F(1,127)=2.753$, $p=.100$, $np2=.02$. However, when looking at the between-subjects effects tests on the Total ICM scores for the factor of Gender, it showed statistical significance. Females scored higher overall than males, $F(1,127)=14.14$, $p=.00$, $np2=.10$, indicating a large effect.

Two-Way Interactions

The Time by Gender interaction was statistically significant, $F(1,127)=3.83$, $p=.05$, $np2=.03$, and indicated that females increased at a different rate than males. Inspection of Figure 5 below suggests that female cadets increased from pre- to post-test, whereas male cadets did not change. This finding is consistent with the interpretation that, overall, the females benefitted significantly from the PY201, whereas the males did not.

Figure 5: Combined Action and Reason Scores Based on Gender at Pre- and Post-test

4.1.1.2.1.2 Action Choices vs. Justifications (Choice) by Gender

Main Effects

As noted in all of the previous sections, the factor of Time showed no statistical significance: $F_{(1,127)}=2.75$, $p=.10$, np2=.02. However, as indicated in the last section, the between-subjects factor of Gender showed statistical significance and females scored higher overall than males: $F_{(1,127)}=14.14$, $p=.00$, np2=.10. As noted in Section 4.1.1.1.3 'Action Choices vs. Justifications (Choice) all Cadets as a Whole', the factor of Choice showed statistical significance and indicates the scores are differing overall, with the cadets reflecting higher reason scores over action scores: $F_{(1,128)}=11.24$, $p=.00$, np2=.08.

Two-Way Interactions

As discussed in the last section, the Time by Gender interaction was statistically significant, $F(1,127)=3.83$, $p=.05$, np2=.03, and indicated that females increased at a different rate than males. When assessing the interaction of Time by Choice, the result showed that the rate of change was not statistically significant: $F(1,127)=.33$, $p=.57$. np2=.00. Finally, when evaluating Choice by Gender, there was not a statistically significant rate of change for justification/reason versus action choices: $F(1,127)=.77$, $p=.38$, np2=.01 (see Figure 6, below).

Figure 6: Action and Reason Scores by Gender

Three-Way Interactions

The three-way interaction between Time by Choice by Gender, $F(1,127)=3.06$, $p=.08$, $np2=.02$, approaches statistical significance and suggests that change from pre- to post-test affects the difference between choices. Specifically, female cadets close the gap between their action and justification/reason choices after the invention (see Figure 7, below). Unfortunately, the justification scores of the male cadets only increase slightly and the action scores decrease; therefore, instead of closing the gap between action and justification as the females did, the male scores reflect an even wider gap after the post-test (see Figure 8, below).

**Figure 7: Female Cadets Action and Reason Scores at Pre- and Post-test**

Figure 8: Male Cadets Action and Reason Scores at Pre- and Post-test

4.1.1.2.1.3 Good vs. Bad Scores (Valence) by Gender

Main Effects

As noted in all of the previous sections, the factor of Time showed no statistical significance: $F(1,127)=2.69$, $p=.10$, np2=.02. However, as indicated in the last section, the between-subjects factor of Gender showed statistical significance and females scored higher overall than males: $F(1,127)=14.07$, $p=.00$, np2=.10. As noted in Section 4.1.1.1.4 'Good vs. Bad scores (Valence) all cadets as a whole', the factor of Valence did show statistically significant results, $F(1,127)=28.24$, $p=.00$, np2=.18, indicating that the cadets scored higher on good choices over bad.

Two-Way Interactions

As discussed in the last section, the Time by Gender interaction was statistically significant, $F(1,127)=3.78$, p=.05, np2=.03, and indicated that females increased at a different rate than males (see Figure 9, below). When assessing the interaction of Time by Valence, the result shows the rate of change is not statistically significant: $F(1,127)=.18$, p=.67, np2=.00. Finally, when evaluating Valence by Gender, there is not a statistically significant rate of change for good and bad choices: $F=(1,127)=.40$, p=.53, np2=.00.


Figure 9: Combined Good and Bad Scores Based on Gender at Pre- and Post-test

Three-Way Interactions

A three-way repeated-measures ANOVA with two between-subjects factors (Time and Valence) and one between-subject factor of Gender (Time by Valence by Gender) did not show a statistically significant change: $F(1,127)=.01$, $p=.94$, np2=.00.

4.1.1.2.1.4 Five Dilemma Scores (Dilemma) by Gender

Main Effects

As noted in all of the previous sections, the factor of Time showed no statistical significance: $F(1,118)=2.51$, $p=.12$, np2=.02. Additionally, as indicated in the last section, the between-subjects factor of Gender showed statistical significance and females scored higher overall than males: $F(1,118)=13.10$, $p=.00$, np2=.10. Finally, as noted in Section 4.1.1.1.5 'Five dilemma scores (dilemma) all cadets as a whole', the factor of Dilemma did show statistically significant results: $F(3.36, 395.80)=3.289$, $p=.02$, np2=.03.

Two-Way Interactions

As discussed in the last section, the Time by Gender interaction was statistically significant: $F(1,118)=4.33$, $p=.04$, np2=.04. When assessing the interaction of Time by Dilemma, $F(3.76, 443.12)=2.80$, $p=.03$, np2=.02, there is a statistically significant relationship in the rate of change from one dilemma to the other, with Billups (#2 on Torture) being the dilemma that appears to be the most influenced by PY201. Finally, when evaluating the Dilemma by Gender interaction, there is a statistically significant difference in performance by gender for individual stories:

F(3.35, 395.80)=5.83, p=.00, np2=.05. The female cadets have a higher mean score that the male cadets on all the dilemmas except for Dilemma #1 (Metcalf) (see Figure 10, below).


Figure 10: Individual Dilemma Scores Based on Gender Over Pre- and Post-test Combined

It is important to note that the females are more consistent over the Five Dilemmas, while the men are more varied. Together with the finding that choices and justifications become more coordinated for the female cadets, we see a pattern which suggests that females not only get more out of PY201, but their thinking becomes more consolidated. They look more 'mature' than males, not only because of their mean scores but also the way the scores fit together.

Three-Way Interactions

A three-way repeated-measures ANOVA with two between-subjects factors (Time and Dilemma) and one between-subject factor of Gender (Time by Dilemma by Gender) showed that there was no statistical significance in the Time by Dilemma by Gender interaction: $F(3.76, 443.12)=.65$, $p=.62$, np2=.01 (see Figures 11 and 12, below).


Figure 11: Female Means at Pre- and Post-test for All Five Dilemmas Combined

Figure 12: Male Means at Pre- and Post-test for All Five Dilemmas Combined

To summarise the findings regarding the gender variable in non-technical language: males and females were consistently different from each other. Females came into the study with a better grasp of the concepts measured by the ARETE and improved over duration of PY201. This performance differential was observed on the overall ICM scores and constituent parts. Further, there is evidence that females were qualitatively different in their performance, as indicated by the consistent responses across the Five Dilemmas (vs. the male unevenness across stories) and the increasing coordination between action choices and justifications across the course (whereas the males maintained a difference).

4.1.1.2.2 Does Performance on the ARETE Differ by Ethnicity?

The second demographic group I analysed after Gender was Ethnicity. The aim of this analysis was to assess whether ethnicity moderated the trends in the summary and dilemma scores. As the sample size was small, and the demographic makeup and diversity at West Point is small, in order to run analysis, I had to combine all of the ethnic minorities together to compare against non-minority (specifically, white) cadets. For summary ARETE scores based on Ethnicity, see Table 13, below.

Table 13: Overall ARETE Baseline Scores Based on Ethnicity

Moral Dilemma	Area of Focus	White		Minority	
		Pre-test Mean Score and Standard Deviation	Post-test Mean Score and Standard Deviation	Pre-test Mean Score and Standard Deviation	Post-test Mean Score and Standard Deviation
All Moral Dilemmas Combined	Total ICM	.60 (.22)	.63 (.25)	.57 (.23)	.55 (.30)
	Total Action	.58 (.26)	.61 (.29)	.52 (.28)	.51 (.36)
	Total Reason	.61 (.23)	.66 (.25)	.62 (.23)	.59 (.29)
	Total Good	.65 (.24)	.68 (.27)	.61 (.26)	.61 (.29)
	Total Bad	.55 (.25)	.58 (.28)	.53 (.26)	.49 (.34)
#1 Captain Metcalf	Total ICM	.72 (.24)	.72 (.24)	.66 (.26)	.61 (.28)
#2 Captain Billups	Total ICM	.47 (.47)	.63 (.46)	.53 (.39)	.61 (.49)
#3 LT Jacobs	Total ICM	.68 (.25)	.71 (.30)	.60 (.30)	.54 (.40)
#4 LT Mullins	Total ICM	.52 (.42)	.49 (.46)	.43 (.42)	.38 (.52)
#5 Captain Edwards	Total ICM	.63 (.39)	.61 (.42)	.58 (.40)	.56 (.40)

Similar to the analysis done using Gender, there were five scores of interest/focus when analysing scores based on Ethnicity: the Total ARETE (ICM) Score, the Total Action Score, the Total Reason Score, the Total Good Score and the Total Bad Score. To assess whether a cadet's

ethnicity moderated the trends in the summary and dilemma scores described above, a series of two-way repeated-measures ANOVAs, with Time as the within-subjects factor and Ethnicity as the between-subjects factor, were applied to the data described above in Table 13.

4.1.1.2.2.1 Total ICM Scores by Ethnicity

Main Effects

As noted in the previous section on Gender, the factor of Time showed no statistical significance: F(1,127)=.12, p=.73, np2=.00. Additionally, when examining the between-subjects effects tests on the Total ICM scores by Ethnicity, minority students obtained lower scores on the Total ICM scores, but this difference was not statistically significant: F(1,127)=1.87, p=.17, np2=.01.

Two-Way Interactions

Interestingly, for the Time by Ethnicity interaction, even though the factor of Time with the moderator of Ethnicity does not yield statistically significant findings, F(1,127)=2.43, p=.12, np2=.02.. Figure 13, below, reflects how the moderator Ethnicity affects the cadets' scores with Time, showing an upward trend for white cadets and a downward trend for minority cadets.

Figure 13: Ethnicity at Pre- and Post-test for the Total ICM

4.1.1.2.2.2 Action Choices vs. Justifications (Choice) by Ethnicity

Main Effects

As noted in all of the previous sections, the factor of Time showed no statistical significance: $F_{(1,127)}=.12$, $p=.73$, $np2=.00$. Additionally, as indicated in the last section, regarding the between-subjects factor of Ethnicity, minority students obtained lower scores on the Total ICM scores, but this difference was not statistically significant: $F_{(1,127)}=1.87$, $p=.17$, $np2=.01$. However, as noted in Section 4.1.1.2.1.2 'Action Choices vs. Justifications (Choice) by Gender', the factor of Choice showed statistical significance and indicates the scores are differing overall, with the cadets reflecting higher Justification scores over Action scores: $F_{(1,127)}=12.73$, $p=.00$,

np2=.09. Consistent with the previous analyses, the main effect for Choice was statistically

significant, indicating that Justification choices were more consistent with the expert panel than

were Action choices.

Two-Way Interactions

As noted above, even though the Time by Ethnicity interaction does not yield statistically

significant findings: $F(1,127)=2.43$, $p=.12$, np2=.02. As previously mentioned, when assessing

the interaction of Time by Choice, the result shows the rate of change is not statistically

significant, $F(1,127)=.02$, $p=.88$. np2=.00. Finally, when evaluating Choice by Ethnicity,

$F(1,127)=1.56$, $p=.21$, np2=.01, it reflects a wider gap between Total Action, whereas the gap

with Total Reason/Justification narrows (see Figure 14, below).

Figure 14: Ethnicity with Choice (Action and Reason)

Three-Way Interactions

The three-way interaction between Time by Choice by Ethnicity, $F(1,127)=.58$, $p=.45$, np2=.01, does not change the rate sufficiently enough to make it statistically significant.

4.1.1.2.2.3 Good vs. Bad Scores (Valence) by Ethnicity

Main Effects

As noted in all of the previous sections, the factor of Time showed no statistical significance: $F(1,127)=.12$, $p=.74$, np2=.00. As mentioned in the last section, when considering the factor of Ethnicity, minority students obtained lower scores on the Total ICM scores, but this difference was not statistically significant: $F(1,127)=1.86$, $p=.18$, np2=.01. However, as noted in Section 4.1.1.2.1.3 'Good vs. Bad scores (Valence) by Gender', the factor of Valence did present statistically significant results, $F(1,127)=39.42$, $p=.00$, np2=.24, showing the cadets scoring higher on Good Choices over Bad.

Two-Way Interactions

As discussed in the last section, even though the Time by Ethnicity interaction does not yield statistically significant findings, $F(1,127)=2.40$, $p=.12$, np2=.02. Additionally, when assessing the interaction of Time by Valence, the result shows the rate of change is not statistically significant: $F(1,127)=.47$, $p=.49$, np2=.00. In fact, the rate of change over time is flat to minimal. When assessing the interaction between Valence by Ethnicity, the rate of change is not statistically significant: $F(1,127)=.00$, $p=.954$, np2=.000.

Three-Way Interactions

A three-way repeated-measures ANOVA with two between-subjects factors (Time and Valence) and one between-subject factor of Ethnicity (Time by Valence by Ethnicity), $F_{(1,127)}=.92$, $p=.34$, $np2=.01$, shows the rate of change for white cadets is the same for both Good and Bad Choices, whereas the rate of change over time for minority cadets shows the Good Choices as flat and the Bad Choices decreasing (see Figures 15 and 16, below).


**Figure 15: White Cadets Good and Bad Scores at Pre- and Post-test**

Figure 16: Minority Cadets Good and Bad Scores at Pre- and Post-test

4.1.1.2.2.4 Five Dilemma Scores (Dilemma) by Ethnicity

Main Effects

As noted in all of the previous sections, the factor of Time showed no statistical significance: $F_{(1,118)}=.04$, $p=.84$, $np2=.00$. As mentioned in the last section regarding the factor of Ethnicity, minority students obtained lower scores on the Total ICM scores, but this difference was not statistically significant: $F_{(1,118)}=2.54$, $p=.11$, $np2=.02$. However, as noted in Section 4.1.1.2.1.4 'Five dilemma scores (Dilemma) by Gender', the factor of Dilemma did show statistically significant results: $F_{(3.35, 395.11)}=10.59$, $p=.00$, $np2=.08$.

Two-Way Interactions

As discussed in the last section, even though the Time by Ethnicity interaction does not yield statistically significant findings, $F(1,118)=1.735$, $p=.19$, np2=.01. When assessing the interaction of Time by Dilemma, $F(3.75, 442.03)=4.20$, $p=.00$, np2=.03, there is a statistically significant relationship in the rate of change from one dilemma to the other, with Billups (#2 on Torture) being the dilemma that appears to be the most influenced by PY201. Finally, when evaluating Dilemma by Ethnicity interaction, $F(3.35, 395.11)=1.33$, $p=.26$, np2=.01, the result shows that for the dilemmas Billups and Edwards, the cadets (both white and minority cadets) yielded scores close to each other. However, the other three dilemmas showed more variation in scores (see Figure 17, below).

Three-Way Interactions

A three-way repeated-measures ANOVA with two between-subjects factors (Time and Dilemma) and one between-subject factor of Ethnicity (Time by Dilemma by Ethnicity), and a five-level dilemma effect showed that $F(1,118)=1.74$, $p=.19$, np2=.01. When all five dilemmas are combined, Ethnicity causes the cadets scores to spread out over time (see Figure 13, above). Unsurprisingly again, the five dilemmas scores did not show statistically significant findings for all five of the dilemmas having different scores across Time: $F(3.75 , 442.03)=.354$, $p=.83$, np2=.00.

Figure 17: Ethnicity and the Five Dilemmas

To summarise the findings regarding the ethnicity variable in non-technical language: overall, across the total ICM and its constituent parts, ethnicity did not explain differences in scores or in change over time in a statistically significant way.

4.1.2 Self-Reporting Measure – VIA-IS-R

To rehearse, in addition to responding to the five moral dilemmas in the ARETE (ICM), the cadets filled out the VIA Inventory of Strengths (VIA-IS). The VIA-IS is a self-report questionnaire comprised of 24 strengths of character, associated with the six overarching universal virtues identified by Peterson and Seligman (2004). Respondents to the VIA rate the degree to which statements reflecting character strengths ('*This strength is an essential part of who I am in the world*') describe them on a Likert-type seven-point scale, including *very strongly*

agree (7), *strongly agree* (6), *agree* (5), *neutral* (4), *disagree* (3) *strongly disagree* (2), *very strongly disagree* (1). These are three positive and three negative options, with neutral in the middle. The cadets did this for all 24 character strengths. When analysing the cadets' responses on the VIA, I used McGrath's three-factor model of virtues (2019) instead of Peterson and Seligman's six-factor model (2004) because the former has turned out to have more real-world validity (Burger and McGrath, 2019; McGrath 2015; McGrath 2020). The three factors, or clusters, of virtue that McGrath identified are labelled 'Caring', 'Self-Control' and 'Inquisitiveness' – recall McGrath's three-factor model in Table 9, Chapter 3, corresponding roughly to a standard division of virtues into moral/civic, performative and intellectual (Arthur, 2020, 157–158; Arthur et al., 2017, 10–12, 37–38; Jubilee Centre, 2017; Kristjánsson, 2007, 17–18; Kristjánsson, 2017, 5–7, 17–19, 25–30; Kristjánsson, 2018, 15–16; Kristjánsson, 2020, 14–19).[40] In addition to McGrath's three clusters, I also looked specifically at the VIA's individual character strength of Wisdom. Within the three clusters, the strength most likely (in theory) to affect moral reasoning would presumably be Wisdom, as indicated in Chapter 3. This is why I decided to single Wisdom out for consideration. Finally, in addition to McGrath's three cluster model, and the individual character strength of 'Wisdom', I looked at the seven proposed 'Martial Virtues' found in the VIA Inventory of Character Strengths. To rehearse, in Section 2.4, instead of the traditional Seven Army Values approach, I proposed the idea of the 'Martial Virtues' as a category of professional virtues for the military that complement the four neo-Aristotelian virtue categories.[41] Seven of the 10 virtues I propose also appear on the VIA

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[40] As a reminder, in Section 2.2.3 'Aristotelian Virtue Ethics', I discussed the recent neo-Aristotelian reconstruction of four categories, or types, of virtues that include intellectual, moral, civic and performance virtues.
[41] To see the Martial Virtues laid out next to the other four neo-Aristotelian virtue categories, please see Table 3 on page 69. To see the definitions of the Martial Virtues, please see Table 4 on page 70.

Inventory of Strengths (Prudence, Courage, Honesty, Self-Regulation, Perseverance, Teamwork and Leadership).

The hope was that, by adding the VIA to the ICM, as previous researchers have done – such as in the Jubilee Centre's *Soldiers of Character* project (Arthur, Walker and Thoma, 2018) – we would be able see if high, middle or low scores on the VIA could be an indicator of how cadets scored on the ICM post-test. For example, is there a meaningful relationship between how the cadets self-assess on the VIA and their post-test scores on the ICM? Do the VIA clusters influence the rate of pre/post growth on the ICM?

In order to see if there was evidence that the cadets' self-reporting of their character traits informed the ICM trends, I used a repeated-measures ANOVA for the VIA clusters as I did for the ARETE (ICM). As the survey has a Likert-type seven-point scale, we organised the 129 cadets into three groups: low, middle and high, based on responses at the 33rd and 66th percentiles. See Table 14 for the Total Mean Scores using McGrath's VIA clusters and see Table 15 for the seven VIA strengths found in the proposed Martial Virtues. To see a summary of the interaction of the Martial Virtues with the Total ICM from pages 212-216, see Table 16 on page 217 below.

Table 14: Total ICM Mean Scores by McGrath's VIA Clusters and Self-Report Response of the Via Character Strength of Wisdom

Total ICM Mean Scores by McGrath's VIA Clusters and Self-Report Response of the Via Character Strength of Wisdom			
Time by VIA Caring Cluster	**Mean Scores T1**	**Mean Scores T2**	**Difference**
Low	.58 (.23) N = 41	.58 (.27) N = 41	.00
Middle	.54 (.26) N = 43	.58 (.31) N = 43	(.04)
High	.64 (.17) N = 40	.63 (.24) N = 40	.01
Time by VIA Self-Control Cluster			
Low	.56 (.22) N = 40	.58 (.27) N = 40	(.02)
Middle	.54 (.26) N = 28	.54 (.27) N = 28	.00
High	.62 (.21) N = 56	.63 (.28) N = 56	(.01)
Time by VIA Inquisitiveness Cluster			
Low	.57 (.22) N = 39	.55 (.32) N = 39	.02
Middle	.56 (.24) N = 46	.61 (.25) N = 46	(.05)
High	.64 (.21) N = 39	.62 (.25) N = 39	.02
Time by VIA Strength of Wisdom			
Low	.54 (.25) N = 51	.55 (.28) N = 51	(.01)
Middle	.58 (.22) N = 37	.60 (.28) N = 37	(.02)
High	.65 (.19) N = 36	.64 (.25) N = 36	.01

Table 15: Total ICM Mean Scores by the Seven VIA Strengths found in the Proposed Martial Virtues

Total ICM Mean Scores by the Seven VIA Strengths found in the Proposed Martial Virtues			
Time by VIA Strength of Prudence	**Mean Scores T1**	**Mean Scores T2**	**Difference**
Low	.57 (.23) N=89	.56 (.28) N=89	(0.01)
Middle	.58 (.22) N=26	.64 (.27) N=26	(0.06)
High	.75 (.08) N=7	.81 (.09) N=7	(0.06)
Time by VIA Strength of Courage			
Low	.57 (.22) N=64	.59 (.26) N=64	(0.02)
Middle	.60 (.22) N=35	.64 (.27) N=35	(0.04)
High	.60 (.24) N=25	.55 (.30) N=25	0.05
Time by VIA Strength of Honesty			
Low	.53 (.21) N=52	.55 (.27) N=52	(0.02)
Middle	.60 (.24) N=36	.62 (.28) N=36	(0.02)
High	.65 (.21) N=36	.63 (.28) N=36	0.02
Time by VIA Strength of Self-Regulation			
Low	.58 (.22) N=94	.59 (.27) N=94	(0.01)
Middle	.58 (.21) N=21	.59 (.28) N=21	(0.01)
High	.59 (.31) N=7	.60 (.31) N=7	(0.01)
Time by VIA Strength of Perseverance			
Low	.58 (.21) N=41	.56 (.26) N=41	0.02
Middle	.58 (.25) N=42	.61 (.30) N=42	(0.03)
High	.59 (.21) N=40	.62 (.26) N=40	(0.03)
Time by VIA Strength of Teamwork			
Low	.60 (.23) N=63	.62 (.25) N=63	(0.02)
Middle	.58 (.24) N=40	.55 (.33) N=40	0.03
High	.57 (.18) N=21	.61 (.22) N=21	(0.04)
Time by VIA Strength of Leadership			
Low	.58 (.23) N=62	.61 (.24) N=62	(0.03)
Middle	.59 (.24) N=40	.57 (.30) N=40	0.02
High	.56 (.20) N=21	.57 (.30) N=21	(0.01)

In this section, I will be discussing both unique findings pertaining to the VIA as well as reassessment findings that have been discussed in the previous section on the ICM (ARETE). These reassessments of previous findings are necessary to ensure completeness. These reassessments are part of a set of main effects: Time, VIA Cluster, Total ICM and the demographic factors of Gender and Ethnicity. The analyses of the main effects will be: 1) the within-subjects effect for Time, 2) the between-subjects effect for the VIA Cluster and 3) the interaction between Time and the VIA Cluster. Additionally, when a demographic factor like Gender is added, to the analyses some redundant information is also produced, namely: 1) the Gender main effect and 2) the Gender by Time interaction. These effects were evaluated in the previous section when focusing on the ICM only, specifically, when I assessed Total ICM by Gender in Section 4.1.1.2.1.1 Total ICM Scores by Gender as well as the other demographic factors found in Section 4.1.1.2. Again, these findings, as part of the analyses, need to be mentioned again in this section in order to ensure completeness.

In this section on the VIA, there are two unique pieces of information contained within the analyses: 1) the demographic factor (such as Gender) by VIA Cluster interaction and 2) the demographic factor (such as Gender) by VIA Cluster by Time interaction. The demographic factor by VIA Cluster interaction is the relationship between the VIA cluster assignment and the ICM scores similar or different for participants in the demographic categories. The demographic factor by VIA Cluster by Time interaction assesses whether the pre-post change differed by VIA Cluster and the demographic factor. If there is statistical significance in this effect, then at least one of the six cells in this analysis grew at a different rate from the others. There are six cells based on the three levels of the VIA (low, middle and high) subdivided by the demographic factor into two parts (male and female or minority cadet and white cadet).

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4.1.2.1 Total ICM Mean Scores and VIA Self Report Responses for Cadets as a Whole

4.1.2.1.1 The VIA Caring Cluster

(Reassessment of) Main Effects

As a reminder, when I initially ran a two-way repeated measures ANOVA test on the Total ICM Score for all the cadets combined, focusing only on one main effect (factor of Time), the analysis did not produce statistical significance: $F(1,128)=.59$, $p=.44$, np2=.01.

Two-Way Interactions

When I ran a two-way repeated measures ANOVA test with Time as the within-subjects factor and the VIA Caring cluster as a three-level between subject factor, the effect for Time was unchanged ($F(1,121)=.27$, $p=.60$, np2=.00). When evaluating the effect for the VIA Caring cluster, the statistical results indicated no differences between groups ($F(2,121)=1.11$, $p=.33$, np2=.02).

4.1.2.1.2 The VIA Self-Control Cluster

(Reassessment of) Main Effects

As previously shown in the section on the cadets as a whole, the factor of Time showed no statistical significance: $F(1,118)=2.782$, $p=.100$, np2=.02.

Two-Way Interactions

When I ran a two-way repeated measures ANOVA test with Time as the within-subjects factor and the VIA Self-Control cluster as a three-level between-subject factor, the effect for Time was unchanged: $F(1,121)=.20$, $p=.65$, np2=0.00. When evaluating the VIA Self-Control cluster in the between-factor effects, $F(2,121)=1.62$, $p=.20$, np2=.03, there was more of a difference between the low, medium and high mean scores than with the Caring Cluster, but still not statistically significant. Finally, the VIA Self-Control cluster had no influence on the rate of pre-post growth on the ICM: $F(2,121)=.14$, $p=.87$, np2=.00.

4.1.2.1.3 The VIA Inquisitiveness Cluster

(Reassessment of) Main Effects

As previously shown in the section on the cadets as a whole, the factor of Time showed no statistical significance: $F(1,118)=2.78$, $p=.10$, np2=.02.

Two-Way Interactions

When I ran a two-way repeated measures ANOVA test with Time as the within-subjects factor and the VIA Inquisitiveness cluster as a three-level between-subject factor, the effect for Time was unchanged, $F(1,121)=.16$, $p=.69$, np2=.00; scores which were very similar to both scores from the VIA Caring cluster and VIA Self-Control cluster that showed no statistical significance influence. The main between-subjects effect of the VIA Inquisitiveness also did not show any significance: $F(2,121)=.98$, $p=.38$, np2=.02. However, the interaction between Time and VIA Inquisitiveness cluster indicated a statistical tendency, $F(2,121)=1.90$, $p=.15$, np2=.03, tentatively

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suggesting that the different VIA clusters included cadets that changed at different rates. Inspection of Figure 18, below, suggests that the middle group of cadets accounted for the marginal effect.


Figure 18: Cadets Total ICM with VIA Inquisitiveness Cluster Over Time

4.1.2.1.4 The Individual VIA Character Strength of Wisdom

(Reassessment of) Main Effects

As previously shown in the section on the cadets as a whole, the factor of Time showed no statistical significance: $F(1,118)=2.782$, $p=.100$, np2=.02.

Two-Way Interactions

When I ran a two-way repeated measures ANOVA test with Time as the within-subjects factor and the VIA character strength of Wisdom as a three-level between-subject factor, the effect for Time was unchanged, which was very similar to the results for the other VIA clusters. The main between-subjects test for the character trait of Wisdom, which is a part of the VIA Inquisitiveness cluster, while not statistically significant, $F(2,121)=2.09$, $p=.13$, $np2=.03$, is much closer to significance than the three VIA clusters were (see Figure 19, below). However, in assessing the influence of the rate of change in the growth of the ICM from pre- to post-test, the VIA Wisdom does not yield any significant statistical information, $F(2,121)=.19$, $p=.83$, $np2=.00$.


Figure 19: Cadets Total ICM with the VIA Wisdom Classification Over Time

4.1.2.1.5 The Individual VIA Character Strength of Prudence

(Reassessment of) Main Effects

As previously shown in the section on the cadets as a whole, the factor of Time showed no statistical significance: $F(1,118)=2.782$, $p=.10$, np2=.02.

Two-Way Interactions

When I ran a two-way repeated measures ANOVA test with Time as the within-subjects factor and the VIA character strength of Prudence as a three-level between-subject factor, the effect for Time was unchanged, which was very similar to the results for the other VIA clusters. The main between-subjects test for the character trait of Prudence, which is a part of the VIA Self Control cluster, is statistically significant, $F(2,119)=3.09$, $p=.05$, np2=.05. However, in assessing the influence of the rate of change in the growth of the ICM from pre- to post-test, the VIA Prudence does not yield any significant statistical information, $F(2,119)=1.34$, $p=.27$, np2=.02.

4.1.2.1.6 The Individual VIA Character Strength of Courage

(Reassessment of) Main Effects

As previously shown in the section on the cadets as a whole, the factor of Time showed no statistical significance: $F(1,118)=2.782$, $p=.10$, np2=.02.

Two-Way Interactions

When I ran a two-way repeated measures ANOVA test with Time as the within-subjects factor and the VIA character strength of Courage as a three-level between-subject factor, the effect for Time was unchanged, which was very similar to the results for the other VIA clusters. The main between-subjects test for the character trait of Courage, which is a part of the VIA Inquisitiveness cluster, is not statistically significant, $F(2,121)=.39$, $p=.68$, np2=.01. Unfortunately, in assessing the influence of the rate of change in the growth of the ICM from pre- to post-test, the VIA Courage does not yield any significant statistical information, $F(2,121)=2.14$, $p=.12$, np2=.03.

4.1.2.1.7 The Individual VIA Character Strength of Honesty

(Reassessment of) Main Effects

As previously shown in the section on the cadets as a whole, the factor of Time showed no statistical significance: $F(1,118)=2.782$, $p=.10$, np2=.02.

Two-Way Interactions

When I ran a two-way repeated measures ANOVA test with Time as the within-subjects factor and the VIA character strength of Honesty as a three-level between-subject factor, the effect for Time was unchanged, which was very similar to the results for the other VIA clusters. The main between-subjects test for the character trait of Honesty, which is a part of the VIA Self-Control cluster, is not statistically significant, $F(2,121)=2.30$, $p=.11$, np2=.04. Unfortunately, in assessing

the influence of the rate of change in the growth of the ICM from pre- to post-test, the VIA Honesty does not yield any significant statistical information, $F(2,121)=.54$, $p=.59$, np2=.01.

4.1.2.1.8 The Individual VIA Character Strength of Self-Regulation

(Reassessment of) Main Effects

As previously shown in the section on the cadets as a whole, the factor of Time showed no statistical significance: $F(1,119)=.08$, $p=.78$, np2=.00.

Two-Way Interactions

When I ran a two-way repeated measures ANOVA test with Time as the within-subjects factor and the VIA character strength of Self-Regulation as a three-level between-subject factor, the effect for Time was unchanged, which was very similar to the results for the other VIA clusters. The main between-subjects test for the character trait of Self-Regulation, which is a part of the VIA Self Control cluster, is flat and not statistically significant, $F(2,119)=.01$, $p=1$, np2=.00. Unfortunately, in assessing the influence of the rate of change in the growth of the ICM from pre- to post-test, the VIA Self-Regulation does not yield any significant statistical information, $F(2,119)=.01$, $p=.99$, np2=.00.

4.1.2.1.9 The Individual VIA Character Strength of Perseverance

(Reassessment of) Main Effects

As previously shown in the section on the cadets as a whole, the factor of Time showed no statistical significance: $F(1,120)=.32$, $p=.57$, np2=.00.

Two-Way Interactions

When I ran a two-way repeated measures ANOVA test with Time as the within-subjects factor and the VIA character strength of Perseverance as a three-level between-subject factor, the effect for Time was unchanged, which was very similar to the results for the other VIA clusters. The main between-subjects test for the character trait of Perseverance, which is a part of the VIA Self Control cluster, is not statistically significant, $F(2,120)=.30$, $p=.74$, np2=.01. Also, in assessing the influence of the rate of change in the growth of the ICM from pre- to post-test, the VIA Perseverance does not yield any significant statistical information, $F(2,120)=.78$, $p=.46$, np2=.01.

4.1.2.1.10 The Individual VIA Character Strength of Teamwork

(Reassessment of) Main Effects

As previously shown in the section on the cadets as a whole, the factor of Time showed no statistical significance: $F(1,121)=.38$, $p=.54$, np2=.00.

Two-Way Interactions

When I ran a two-way repeated measures ANOVA test with Time as the within-subjects factor and the VIA character strength of Teamwork as a three-level between-subject factor, the effect for Time was unchanged, which was very similar to the results for the other VIA clusters. The main between-subjects test for the character trait of Teamwork, which is a part of the VIA Caring cluster, is not statistically significant, $F(2,121)=.43$, $p=.65$, np2=.01. Also, in assessing the influence of the rate of change in the growth of the ICM from pre- to post-test, the VIA Teamwork does not yield any significant statistical information, $F(2,121)=1.09$ $p=.34$, np2=.02.

4.1.2.1.11 The Individual VIA Character Strength of Leadership

(Reassessment of) Main Effects

As previously shown in the section on the cadets as a whole, the factor of Time showed no statistical significance: $F(1,120)=.11$, $p=.75$, np2=.00.

Two-Way Interactions

When I ran a two-way repeated measures ANOVA test with Time as the within-subjects factor and the VIA character strength of Leadership as a three-level between-subject factor, the effect for Time was unchanged, which was very similar to the results for the other VIA clusters. The main between-subjects test for the character trait of Leadership, which is a part of the VIA Caring cluster, is not statistically significant, $F(2,120)=.14$, $p=.87$, np2=.00. Also, in assessing the influence of the rate of change in the growth of the ICM from pre- to post-test, the VIA Leadership does not yield any significant statistical information, $F(2,120)=.64$ $p=.53$, np2=.01.

Table 16: Summary of the Interaction of the Martial Virtues with the Total ICM

Martial Virtue	Martial Virtue	Time	Virtue x Time
Prudence	$F(2,119)=3.09$, $p=.05$, np2=.05*	$F(1,119)=1.77$, $p=.19$, np2=.02	$F(2,119)=1.34$, $p=.27$, np2=.02
Courage	$F(2,121)=.39$, $p=.68$, np2=.01	$F(1,121)=0.00$, $p=.99$, np2=.00	$F(2,121)=2.14$, $p=.12$, np2=.03
Honesty	$F(2,121)=2.30$, $p=.11$, np2=.04	$F(1,121)=.18$, $p=.67$, np2=.00	$F(2,121)=.54$, $p=.59$, np2=.01
Self-Regulation	$F(2,119)=.01$, $p=1$, np2=.00	$F(1,119)=.08$, $p=.78$, np2=.00	$F(2,119)=.01$, $p=.99$, np2=.00
Perseverance	$F(2,120)=.30$, $p=.74$, np2=.01	$F(1,120)=.32$, $p=.57$, np2=.00	$F(2,120)=.78$, $p=.46$, np2=.01
Teamwork	$F(2,121)=.43$, $p=.65$, np2=.01	$F(1,121)=.38$, $p=.54$, np2=.00	$F(2,121)=1.09$ $p=.34$, np2=.02
Leadership	$F(2,120)=.14$, $p=.87$, np2=.00	$F(1,120)=.11$, $p=.75$, np2=.00	$F(2,120)=.64$ $p=.53$, np2=.01

4.1.2.2 Total ICM Mean Scores, VIA Self-Report Responses Based on Demographic Factors

4.1.2.2.1 Does Performance on the ARETE Differ by VIA and Gender?

The first demographic group I analysed with the VIA clusters, VIA Wisdom and the VIA Martial Virtues was Gender. The aim of this analysis was to assess whether Gender moderated the relationship between the different VIA clusters/VIA Wisdom/VIA Martial Virtues and Total ICM scores. For summary ARETE scores based on Gender and McGrath's VIA clusters, see Table 17, and see Table 18 ARETE scores based on Gender and for the seven VIA strengths found in the proposed Martial Virtues. To see a summary of the interaction of the Martial Virtues with the demographic factor of Gender (from pages 225-231), see Table 19 on page 232 below.

Table 17: Total ICM Mean Scores by McGrath's VIA Clusters and Self-Report Response of the Via Character Strength of Wisdom for Gender Change from Pre- and Post-test

Total ICM Mean Scores by McGrath's VIA Clusters and Self-Report Response of the Via Character Strength of Wisdom for Gender Change from Pre- and Post-test						
Time by VIA Caring Cluster	**Female Mean Scores T1**	**Female Mean Scores T2**	**Difference**	**Male Mean Scores T1**	**Male Mean Scores T2**	**Difference**
Low	.68 (.12) N=7	.72 (.13) N=7	(0.04)	.56 (.24) N=34	.55 (.28) N=34	0.00
Middle	.68 (.24) N=16	.75 (.21) N=16	(0.07)	.46 (.23) N=27	.47 (.31) N=27	(0.01)
High	.66 (.17) N=7	.76 (.15) N=7	(0.10)	.63 (.18) N=33	.60 (.24) N=33	0.03
Time by VIA Self-Control Cluster						
Low	.59 (.21) N=7	.75 (.16) N=7	(0.16)	.55 (.22) N=33	.54 (.27) N=33	0.01
Middle	.65 (.27) N=7	.71 (.16) N=7	(0.05)	.51 (.25) N=21	.48 (.27) N=21	0.03
High	.73 (.15) N=16	.76 (.19) N=16	(0.03)	.58 (.22) N=40	.58 (.29) N=40	0.00
Time by VIA Inquisitiveness Cluster						
Low	.69 (.12) N=8	.76 (.12) N=8	(0.07)	.53 (.23) N=31	.49 (.33) N=31	0.04
Middle	.64 (.30) N=10	.77 (.17) N=10	(0.13)	.53 (.22) N=36	.57 (.26) N=36	(0.03)
High	.70 (.14) N=12	.72 (.22) N=12	(0.02)	.60 (.23) N=27	.58 (.25) N=27	0.03
Time by VIA Strength of Wisdom						
Low	.60 (.23) N=11	.73 (.15) N=11	(0.12)	.52 (.25) N=40	.51 (.29) N=40	0.01
Middle	.79 (.09) N=8	.79 (.25) N=8	0.00	.53 (.21) N=29	.55 (.27) N=29	(0.02)
High	.67 (.21) N=11	.74 (.14) N=11	(0.06)	.64 (.18) N=25	.60 (.28) N=25	0.04

Table 18: Total ICM Mean Scores by the Seven VIA Strengths found in the Proposed Martial Virtues for Gender Change from Pre- and Post-test

Total ICM Mean Scores by McGrath's VIA Clusters and Self-Report Response of the Via Character Strength of Wisdom for Gender Change from Pre- and Post-test					
Time by VIA Strength of Prudence	**Female Mean Scores T1**	**Female Mean Scores T2**	**Difference**	**Male Mean Scores T1**	**Male Mean Scores T2**	**Difference**
Low	.66 (.23) N=19	.72 (.20) N=19	(0.06)	.55 (.23) N=70	.52 (.28) N=70	0.03
Middle	.72 (.16) N=7	.79 (.12) N=7	(0.07)	.53 (.23) N=19	.59 (.29) N=19	(0.06)
High	.72 (.14) N=3	.81 (.07) N=3	(0.09)	.77 (.01) N=4	.82 (.11) N=4	(0.05)
Time by VIA Strength of Courage					
Low	.67 (.19) N=15	.73 (.14) N=15	(0.06)	.54 (.22) N=49	.54 (.28) N=49	0.00
Middle	.62 (.25) N=9	.77 (.15) N=9	(0.15)	.59 (.22) N=26	.59 (.29) N=26	0.00
High	.78 (.10) N=6	.75 (.28) N=6	0.03	.55 (.25) N=19	.48 (.28) N=19	0.07
Time by VIA Strength of Honesty					
Low	.51 (.25) N=8	.67 (.17) N=8	(0.16)	.53 (.21) N=44	.53 (.27) N=44	0.00
Middle	.71 (.17) N=10	.73 (.21) N=10	(0.02)	.56 (.26) N=26	.57 (.29) N=26	(0.01)
High	.77 (.10) N=12	.81 (.12) N=12	(0.04)	.59 (.22) N=24	.54 (.29) N=24	0.05
Time by VIA Strength of Self-Regulation					
Low	.66 (.22) N=23	.73 (.19) N=23	(0.07)	.56 (.22) N=71	.55 (.28) N=71	0.01
Middle	.73 (.09) N=5	.79 (.10) N=5	(0.06)	.53 (.22) N=16	.53 (.29) N=16	0.00
High	.87 (0) N=1	.90 (0) N=1	(0.03)	.54 (.31) N=6	.54 (.31) N=6	**0.00**
Time by VIA Strength of Perseverance					
Low	.60 (.24) N=8	.71 (.15) N=8	(0.11)	.57 (.20) N=33	.52 (.26) N=33	0.05
Middle	.72 (.20) N=9	.80 (.17) N=9	(0.08)	.54 (.25) N=33	.55 (.31) N=33	(0.01)
High	.68 (.17) N=12	.72 (.20) N=12	(0.04)	.56 (.22) N=28	.57 (.28) N=28	(0.01)
Time by VIA Strength of Teamwork					
Low	.68 (.21) N=14	.76 (.16) N=14	(0.08)	.57 (.23) N=49	.58 (.25) N=49	(0.01)
Middle	.75 (.17) N=9	.74 (.23) N=9	0.01	.53 (.23) N=31	.49 (.34) N=31	0.04
High	.58 (.19) N=7	.72 (.14) N=7	(0.14)	.56 (.19) N=14	.55 (.23) N=14	**0.01**
Time by VIA Strength of Leadership					
Low	.64 (.23) N=17	.73 (.14) N=17	(0.09)	.56 (.23) N=45	.57 (.26) N=45	(0.01)
Middle	.79 (.10) N=8	.77 (.26) N=8	0.02	.54 (.24) N=32	.52 (.30) N=32	0.02
High	.58 (.14) N=4	.74 (.18) N=4	(0.16)	.56 (.21) N=17	.53 (.31) N=17	**0.03**

4.1.2.1.1.1 Gender and the VIA Caring cluster

(Reassessment of) Main Effects

When assessing the test within-subjects of Time, $F(1,118)=1.947$, $p=.17$, np2=.02, no statistical significance was found. Next, reviewing the results for between-subjects effects for the VIA Caring cluster, $F(2,118)=.81$, $p=.45$, np2=.01, no significant findings were found for the rate of change for the three different levels in the VIA Caring cluster across Time. Finally, the between-subjects effect for Gender was $F(1,118)=11.53$, $p=.00$, np2=.09, showing significance.

Two-Way Interactions

Assessing the two-way between-subjects effect for Gender and the VIA Caring cluster, $F(2,118)=1.14$, $p=.32$, np2=.02, reflects a limited effect of Gender in moderating the relationship between the VIA Caring cluster and Total ICM scores over time. Additionally, assessing the within-subjects contrasts for the VIA Caring cluster and Time, $F(2,118)=.13$, $p=.88$, np2=.00, the relationship was also non-significant.

Three-Way Interactions.

Finally, when assessing whether or not Gender and the VIA Caring cluster has any effect on the Total ICM scores, I ran a three-way within-subjects tests for Total ICM, VIA Caring cluster and Gender, $F(2,118)=.36$, $p=.70$, np2=.01, with the results showing no impact from both Gender and the VIA Caring cluster on Total ICM scores.

4.1.2.1.1.2 Gender and the VIA Self-Control Cluster

(Reassessment of) Main Effects

As previously shown in the section on the cadets as a whole, the factor of Time showed no statistical significance: $F(1,118)=2.782$, $p=.100$, np2=.02. Similarly, the between-subjects test for the VIA Self-Control cluster, $F(2,118)=.993$, $p=.37$, np2=.02, did not show any statistical significance, continuing the trend of a limited relationship between VIA clusters and Total ICM scores. However, when looking at the between-subjects effects tests on the Total ICM scores for the factor of Gender, there is statistical significance: $F(1,118)=10.07$, $p=.00$, np2=.08. This effect is expected based on the preceding analyses suggesting that females achieve higher scores on Total ICM scores as well as all ICM summary scores.

Two-Way Interactions

When assessing the within-subjects test results for Time and the VIA Self-Control cluster, there does not appear to be any statistical relationship, $F(2,118)=.85$, $p=.43$, np2=.01. Likewise, the between-subjects effects test for the VIA Self-Control cluster and Gender, $F(2,118)=.11$, $p=.90$, np2=.00 shows a non-significant relationship.

Three-Way Interactions

Finally, in assessing the three-way within-subjects relationship for Time, the VIA Self-Control cluster and Gender, no statistical relationship was found: $F(2,118)=.97$, $p=.38$, np2=.02. Thus, Gender does not moderate the relationship between VIA Self-Control cluster and Total ICM scores.

4.1.2.1.1.3 Gender and the VIA Inquisitiveness cluster

(Reassessment of) Main Effects

As mentioned above, the factor of Total ICM, F(1,118)=2.17, p=.14, np2=.02, did not produce any statistical significance. Next, the factor of the VIA Inquisitiveness cluster, also did not show any statistical significance: F(2,118)=.19, p=.83, np2=.00. Again, as previously mentioned, the factor of Gender was significant: F(1,118)=11.59, p=.00, np2=.09.

Two-Way Interactions

Next, in evaluating the within-subjects tests using a two-way repeated measures ANOVA test of Time and the VIA Inquisitiveness cluster, F(2,118)=1.78, p=.17, np2=.03, indicates statistical tendency in the rate of change was shown within the cluster categories of low, middle and high; with the middle group showing a different positive growth pattern. Statistical tendency typically means that the P values fall within the range of .15–.05, and while technically this P value is out of this range (.17), I am still mentioning this as it is very close to the range and because it fits the pattern of the middle group associated with the steeper slope (see Figure 20, below).

Figure 20: Cadets Total ICM with VIA Inquisitiveness Cluster with Gender Over Time

Additionally, the between-subjects test for the VIA Inquisitiveness cluster and Gender did not show any statistical significance: $F_{(2,118)}=.29$, $p=.75$, $np2=.01$.

Three-Way Interactions

Finally, the VIA Inquisitiveness cluster, together with Gender, does not have any statistically significant effect on Time: $F_{(2,118)}=.24$, $p=.79$, $np2=.00$.

4.1.2.1.1.4 Total ICM, Gender and the Individual VIA Character Strength of Wisdom

(Reassessment of) Main Effects

After performing a three-way repeated measures ANOVA test for the Total ICM, the VIA individual character trait of Wisdom and Gender, the value of Time was not statistically significant: $F(1,118)=1.65$, $p=.20$, np2=.01. Further, the VIA character strength of Wisdom as the between-subjects test also does not show statistical significance: $F(2,118)=1.21$, $p=.30$, np2=.02. However, the between-subjects tests for Gender reflect a statistically significant difference between males and females: $F(1,118)=11.91$, $p=.00$, np2=.09. Again, as mentioned in previous sections, this is an expected effect based on the preceding analyses, suggesting that females achieve higher scores on Total ICM scores as well as all ICM summary scores.

Two-Way Interactions

The interaction of the two-way within-subjects tests show Time and Wisdom not having a statistically significant relationship: $F(2,118)=.53$, $p=.59$, np2=.01. However, the two-way interaction for between-subjects effect shows Wisdom and Gender tending towards a relationship, but one that is not statistically significant: $F(2,118)=1.02$, $p=.36$, np2=.02.

Three-Way Interactions

When assessing the effect both Wisdom and Gender have on Time, there is statistical tendency, $F(2,118)=1.12$, $p=.33$, np2=.02, with females outperforming males and at different rates.

4.1.2.1.1.5 Total ICM, Gender and the Individual VIA Character Strength of Prudence

(Reassessment of) Main Effects

After performing a three-way repeated measures ANOVA test for the Total ICM, the VIA individual character trait of Prudence and Gender, the value of Time was not statistically significant: $F(1,116)=2.63$, $p=.11$, np2=.02. Further, the VIA character strength of Prudence as the between-subjects test also does not show statistical significance: $F(2,116)=1.96$, $p=.15$, np2=.03. Unfortunately, the between-subjects tests for Gender does not reflect a statistically significant difference between males and females: $F(1,116)=2.55$, $p=.11$, np2=.02.

Two-Way Interactions

The interaction of the two-way within-subjects tests show Time and Prudence not having a statistically significant relationship: $F(2,116)=.45$, $p=.64$, np2=.01. Also, the two-way interaction for between-subjects effect shows Prudence and Gender not yielding any statistically significance: $F(2,116)=.70$, $p=.5$, np2=.01.

Three-Way Interactions

When assessing the effect both Prudence and Gender have on Time, there is no statistical significance, $F(2,116)=.32$ $p=.73$, np2=.01.

4.1.2.1.1.6 Total ICM, Gender and the Individual VIA Character Strength of Courage

(Reassessment of) Main Effects

After performing a three-way repeated measures ANOVA test for the Total ICM, the VIA

individual character trait of Courage and Gender, the value of Time was not statistically

significant: $F(1,118)=.86$, $p=.36$, $np2=.01$. Further, the VIA character strength of Courage as the

between-subjects test also does not show statistical significance: $F(2,118)=.10$, $p=.91$, $np2=.85$.

However, the between-subjects tests for Gender does yield a statistically significant difference

between males and females: $F(1,118)=11.64$, $p=.00$, $np2=.09$. This effect is expected based on the

preceding analyses suggesting that females achieve higher scores on Total ICM scores as well as

all ICM summary scores.

Two-Way Interactions

The interaction of the two-way within-subjects tests show Time and Courage not having a

statistically significant relationship: $F(2,118)=2.31$, $p=.10$, $np2=.04$. Also, the two-way

interaction for between-subjects effect shows Courage and Gender not yielding any statistically

significance: $F(2,118)=.61$, $p=.55$, $np2=.01$.

Three-Way Interactions

When assessing the effect both Courage and Gender have on Time, there is no statistical

significance, $F(2,118)=.50$ $p=.61$, $np2=.01$.

4.1.2.1.1.7 Total ICM, Gender and the Individual VIA Character Strength of Honesty

(Reassessment of) Main Effects

After performing a three-way repeated measures ANOVA test for the Total ICM, the VIA individual character trait of Honesty and Gender, the value of Time was not statistically significant: $F(1,118)=2.51$, $p=.12$, $np2=.02$. Further, the VIA character strength of Honesty as the between-subjects test also does not show statistical significance: $F(2,118)=2.21$, $p=.11$, $np2=.04$. However, the between-subjects tests for Gender does yield a statistically significant difference between males and females: $F(1,118)=9.33$, $p=.00$, $np2=.07$.

Two-Way Interactions

The interaction of the two-way within-subjects tests show Time and Honesty not having a statistically significant relationship: $F(2,118)=1.48$, $p=.23$, $np2=.02$. Also, the two-way interaction for between-subjects effect shows Honesty and Gender not resulting in any statistically significance: $F(2,118)=1.03$, $p=.36$, $np2=.02$.

Three-Way Interactions

When assessing the effect both Honesty and Gender have on Time, there is no statistical significance, $F(2,118)=1.13$ $p=.33$, $np2=.02$.

4.1.2.1.1.8 Total ICM, Gender and the Individual VIA Character Strength of Self-Regulation

(Reassessment of) Main Effects

After performing a three-way repeated measures ANOVA test for the Total ICM, the VIA individual character trait of Self-Regulation and Gender, the value of Time was not statistically significant: $F(1,116)=.37$, $p=.54$, np2=.00. Further, the VIA character strength of Self-Regulation as the between-subjects test also does not show statistical significance: $F(2,116)=.29$, $p=.75$, np2=.01. However, the between-subjects tests for Gender does yield a statistically significant difference between males and females: $F(1,116)=6.75$, $p=.01$, np2=.06.

Two-Way Interactions

The interaction of the two-way within-subjects tests show Time and Self-Regulation not having a statistically significant relationship: $F(2,116)=.02$, $p=.98$, np2=.00. Also, the two-way interaction for between-subjects effect shows Self-Regulation and Gender not yielding in any statistically significance: $F(2,116)=.53$, $p=.59$, np2=.01.

Three-Way Interactions

When assessing the effect both Self-Regulation and Gender have on Time, there is no statistical significance, $F(2,116)=.03$ $p=.98$, np2=.00.

4.1.2.1.1.9 Total ICM, Gender and the Individual VIA Character Strength of Perseverance

(Reassessment of) Main Effects

After performing a three-way repeated measures ANOVA test for the Total ICM, the VIA individual character trait of Perseverance and Gender, the value of Time was not statistically significant: $F(1,117)=2.71$, $p=.10$, np2=.02. Further, the VIA character strength of Perseverance as the between-subjects test also does not show statistical significance: $F(2,117)=.41$, $p=.67$, np2=.01. However, the between-subjects tests for Gender does yield a statistically significant difference between males and females: $F(1,117)=10.58$, $p=.00$, np2=.01.

Two-Way Interactions

The interaction of the two-way within-subjects tests show Time and Self-Regulation not having a statistically significant relationship: $F(2,116)=.02$, $p=.98$, np2=.00. Also, the two-way interaction for between-subjects effect shows Self-Regulation and Gender not yielding in any statistically significance: $F(2,116)=.53$, $p=.59$, np2=.01.

Three-Way Interactions

When assessing the effect both Perseverance and Gender have on Time, there is no statistical significance, $F(2,117)=.74$ $p=.48$, np2=.01.

4.1.2.1.1.10 Total ICM, Gender and the Individual VIA Character Strength of Teamwork

(Reassessment of) Main Effects

After performing a three-way repeated measures ANOVA test for the Total ICM, the VIA individual character trait of Teamwork and Gender, the value of Time was not statistically significant: $F(1,118)=1.90$, $p=.17$, $np2=.02$. Further, the VIA character strength of Teamwork as the between-subjects test also does not show statistical significance: $F(2,118)=.26$, $p=.77$, $np2=.00$. However, the between-subjects tests for Gender does yield a statistically significant difference between males and females: $F(1,118)=10.35$, $p=.00$, $np2=.08$.

Two-Way Interactions

The interaction of the two-way within-subjects tests show Time and Teamwork not having a statistically significant relationship: $F(2,118)=1.39$, $p=.25$, $np2=.02$. Also, the two-way interaction for between-subjects effect shows Teamwork and Gender does not yield in any statistically significance: $F(2,118)=.65$, $p=.53$, $np2=.01$.

Three-Way Interactions

When assessing the effect both Teamwork and Gender have on Time, there is no statistical significance, $F(2,118)=.68$ $p=.51$, $np2=.01$.

4.1.2.1.1.11 Total ICM, Gender and the Individual VIA Character Strength of Leadership

(Reassessment of) Main Effects

After performing a three-way repeated measures ANOVA test for the Total ICM, the VIA individual character trait of Leadership and Gender, the value of Time was not statistically significant: $F(1,117)=1.89$, $p=.17$, $np2=.02$. Further, the VIA character strength of Leadership as the between-subjects test also does not show statistical significance: $F(2,117)=.29$, $p=.75$, $np2=.01$. However, the between-subjects tests for Gender does yield a statistically significant difference between males and females: $F(1,117)=8.36$, $p=.01$, $np2=.07$.

Two-Way Interactions

The interaction of the two-way within-subjects tests show Time and Leadership not having a statistically significant relationship: $F(2,117)=1.17$, $p=.31$, $np2=.02$. Also, the two-way interaction for between-subjects effect shows Leadership and Gender does not yield in any statistically significance: $F(2,117)=.74$, $p=.48$, $np2=.01$.

Three-Way Interactions

When assessing the effect both Leadership and Gender have on Time, there is no statistical significance, $F(2,117)=1.02$ $p=.36$, $np2=.02$.

Table 19: Summary of the Interaction of the Martial Virtues with Gender

Martial Virtue	Martial Virtue	Time	Gender	Virtue x Time	Virtue x Gender	Virtue x Time x Gender
Prudence	F(2,116)=1.96, p=.15, np2=.03	F(1,116)=2.63, p=.11, np2=.02	F(1,116)=2.55, p=.11, np2=.02	F(2,116)=.45, p=.64, np2=.01	F(2,116)=.70, p=.5, np2=.01	F(2,116)=.32 p=.73, np2=.01
Courage	F(2,118)=.10, p=.91, np2=.85	F(1,118)=.86, p=.36, np2=.01	F(1,118)=11.64, p=.00, np2=.09 *	F(2,118)=2.31, p=.10, np2=.04	F(2,118)=.61, p=.55, np2=.01	F(2,118)=.50 p=.61, np2=.01
Honesty	F(2,118)=2.21, p=.11, np2=.04	F(1,118)=2.51, p=.12, np2=.02	F(1,118)=9.33, p=.00, np2=.07 *	F(2,118)=1.48, p=.23, np2=.02	F(2,118)=1.03, p=.36, np2=.02	F(2,118)=1.13 p=.33, np2=.02
Self-Regulation	F(2,116)=.29, p=.75, np2=.01	F(1,116)=.37, p=.54, np2=.00	F(1,116)=6.75, p=.01, np2=.06 *	F(2,116)=.02, p=.98, np2=.00	F(2,116)=.53, p=.59, np2=.01	F(2,116)=.03 p=.98, np2=.00
Perseverance	F(2,117)=.41, p=.67, np2=.01	F(1,117)=2.71, p=.10, np2=.02	F(1,117)=10.58, p=.00, np2=.01 *	F(2,117)=.02, p=.98, np2=.00	F(2,117)=.53, p=.59, np2=.01	F(2,117)=.74 p=.48, np2=.01
Teamwork	F(2,118)=.26, p=.77, np2=.00	F(1,118)=1.90, p=.17, np2=.02	F(1,118)=10.35, p=.00, np2=.08 *	F(2,118)=1.39, p=.25, np2=.02	F(2,118)=.65, p=.53, np2=.01	F(2,118)=.68 p=.51, np2=.01
Leadership	F(2,117)=.29, p=.75, np2=.01	F(1,117)=1.89, p=.17, np2=.02	F(1,117)=8.36, p=.01, np2=.07 *	F(2,117)=1.17, p=.31, np2=.02	F(2,117)=.74, p=.48, np2=.01	F(2,117)=1.02 p=.36, np2=.02

All in all, to summarise the findings regarding the Gender variable and the three VIA clusters, the VIA character strength of Wisdom and the Martial Virtues in non-technical language: overall, male and female cadets were consistently different from each other. As seen in the first section of Chapter 4, the female cadets came into the study with a better grasp of the concepts measured by the ARETE and improved over the duration of PY201. However, that said, the VIA clusters, the character strength of wisdom and the Martial Virtues had a limited effect on the ICM scores as it relates to Gender. The closest significant (statistical tendency) interaction was the relationship between the VIA Inquisitiveness cluster and Time with all the cadets. This was due to the steepness of the middle category's scores from pre-test, where it had the lowest score, to post-test, where it concluded with the highest scores, as seen above in Figure 20.

4.1.2.2.3 Does Performance on the ARETE Differ by VIA and Ethnicity?

The next demographic analysed with the VIA clusters, VIA Wisdom, the Martial Virtues and Time was Ethnicity. The aim of this analysis was to assess whether Ethnicity moderated the relationship between the different VIA clusters/VIA Wisdom/Martial Virtues and Total ICM scores. For summary ARETE scores based on Ethnicity and McGrath's VIA clusters, see Table 20, and see Table 21 ARETE scores based on Ethnicity and for the seven VIA strengths found in the proposed Martial Virtues. To see a summary of the interaction of the Martial Virtues with the demographic factor of Ethnicity (from pages 242-248), see Table 22 on page 249 below.

Table 20: Total ICM Mean Scores by McGrath's VIA Clusters and Self-Report Response of the Via Character Strength of Wisdom for Ethnicity Change from Pre- and Post-test

Total ICM Mean Scores by McGrath's VIA Clusters and Self-Report Response of the Via Character Strength of Wisdom for Ethnicity Change from Pre- and Post-test						
Time by VIA Caring Cluster	**White Mean Scores T1**	**White Mean Scores T2**	**Difference**	**Minority Mean Scores T1**	**Minority Mean Scores T2**	**Difference**
Low	.57 (.25) N=27	.60 (.26) N=27	(0.03)	.59 (.19) N=14	.54 (.29) N=14	0.05
Middle	.57 (.24) N=28	.67 (.24) N=28	(0.10)	.49 (.29) N=15	.40 (.35) N=15	0.09
High	.65 (.16) N=23	.60 (.25) N=23	0.05	.62 (.19) N=17	.67 (.22) N=17	(0.05)
Time by VIA Self-Control Cluster						
Low	.57 (.22) N=29	.61 (.25) N=29	(0.04)	.53 (.23) N=11	.49 (.30) N=11	0.04
Middle	.59 (.25) N=16	.62 (.22) N=16	(0.03)	.48 (.26) N=12	.43 (.30) N=12	0.05
High	.62 (.22) N=33	.64 (.27) N=33	(0.02)	.63 (.20) N=23	.62 (.30) N=23	0.01
Time by VIA Inquisitiveness Cluster						
Low	.60 (.20) N=24	.62 (.25) N=24	(0.02)	.52 (.25) N=15	.44 (.39) N=15	0.08
Middle	.56 (.24) N=31	.63 (.26) N=31	(0.07)	.54 (.25) N=15	.57 (.25) N=15	(0.03)
High	.64 (.23) N=23	.63 (.25) N=23	0.01	.63 (.19) N=16	.62 (.25) N=16	0.01
Time by VIA Strength of Wisdom						
Low	.54 (.25) N=38	.57 (.27) N=38	(0.03)	.54 (.25) N=13	.51 (.33) N=13	0.03
Middle	.64 (.19) N=23	.71 (.16) N=23	(0.07)	.49 (.24) N=14	.42 (.35) N=14	0.07
High	.66 (.18) N=17	.64 (.29) N=17	0.02	.64 (.19) N=19	.65 (.22) N=19	(0.01)

Table 21: Total ICM Mean Scores by the Seven VIA Strengths found in the Proposed Martial Virtues for Ethnicity Change from Pre- and Post-test

Total ICM Mean Scores by McGrath's VIA Clusters and Self-Report Response of the Via Character Strength of Wisdom for Ethnicity Change from Pre- and Post-test						
Time by VIA Strength of Prudence	**White Mean Scores T1**	**White Mean Scores T2**	**Difference**	**Minority Mean Scores T1**	**Minority Mean Scores T2**	**Difference**
Low	.59 (.22) N=60	.61 (.25) N=60	(0.02)	.53 (.25) N=29	.47 (.30) N=29	0.06
Middle	.59 (.28) N=14	.66 (.25) N=14	(0.07)	.58 (.15) N=12	.62 (.30) N=12	(0.04)
High	.72 (.08) N=3	.79 (.13) N=3	(0.07)	.77 (.10) N=4	.83 (.06) N=4	(0.06)
Time by VIA Strength of Courage						
Low	.58 (.21) N=37	.62 (.23) N=37	(0.04)	.56 (.24) N=27	.54 (.31) N=27	0.02
Middle	.61 (.24) N=23	.66 (.24) N=23	(0.05)	.57 (.19) N=12	.59 (.32) N=12	(0.02)
High	.61 (.24) N=18	.58 (.31) N=18	0.03	.60 (.27) N=7	.46 (.28) N=7	0.14
Time by VIA Strength of Honesty						
Low	.53 (.19) N=31	.59 (.22) N=31	(0.06)	.52 (.24) N=21	.50 (.31) N=21	0.02
Middle	.59 (.27) N=24	.66 (.26) N=24	(0.07)	.61 (.18) N=12	.53 (.31) N=12	0.08
High	.68 (.18) N=23	.63 (.28) N=23	0.05	.60 (.25) N=13	.63 (.28) N=13	(0.03)
Time by VIA Strength of Self-Regulation						
Low	.59 (.22) N=57	.62 (.26) N=57	(0.03)	.57 (.23) N=37	.56 (.29) N=37	0.01
Middle	.61 (18) N=15	.66 (.15) N=15	(0.05)	.50 (.29) N=6	.42 (.45) N=6	0.08
High	.58 (.37) N=5	.56 (.37) N=5	0.02	.62 (.14) N=2	.68 (.05) N=2	(0.06)
Time by VIA Strength of Perseverance						
Low	.59 (.20) N=24	.60 (.22) N=24	(0.01)	.56 (.23) N=17	.50 (.29) N=17	0.06
Middle	.59 (.24) N=29	.64 (.29) N=29	(0.05)	.56 (.28) N=13	.53 (.32) N=13	0.03
High	.60 (.23) N=24	.63 (.23) N=24	(0.03)	.59 (.20) N=16	.60 (.31) N=16	(0.01)
Time by VIA Strength of Teamwork						
Low	.60 (.23) N=38	.65 (.23) N=38	(0.05)	.58 (.24) N=25	.57 (.26) N=25	0.01
Middle	.60 (.25) N=24	.61 (.29) N=24	(0.01)	.54 (.23) N=16	.46 (.37) N=16	0.08
High	.57 (.18) N=16	.59 (.22) N=16	(0.02)	.56 (.23) N=5	.65 (.25) N=5	(0.09)
Time by VIA Strength of Leadership						
Low	.59 (.23) N=42	.64 (.22) N=42	(0.05)	.57 (.23) N=20	.55 (.28) N=20	0.02
Middle	.60 (.23) N=22	.61 (.31) N=22	(0.01)	.58 (.25) N=18	.53 (.30) N=18	0.05
High	.58 (.20) N=13	.59 (.23) N=13	(0.01)	.53 (.19) N=8	.54 (.41) N=8	(0.01)

As seen above, the demographic grouping of Ethnicity was proportionately more relevant than the other demographic grouping of Gender. It yielded some interesting results worth mentioning.

4.1.2.1.2.1 Ethnicity and the VIA Caring Cluster

(Reassessment of) Main Effects

When assessing the test within-subjects of Time, $F(1,118)=.01$, $p=.92$, $np2=.00$, no statistical significance was found for the within-subjects tests. The between-subjects tests for the VIA Caring cluster showed significance in the differences the low, middle and high scores: $F(2,118)=1.96$, $p=.15$, $np2=.03$. The tests results for the between-subjects tests for Ethnicity also showed significant results: $F(1,118)=1.98$, $p=.16$, $np2=.02$.

Two-Way Interactions

The within-subjects contrasts for the VIA Caring cluster and Time, $F(2,118)=.13$, $p=.88$, $np2=.00$, was non-significant. However, in the two-way between-subjects tests, the VIA Caring cluster and Ethnicity showed statistical tendency: $F(2,118)=1.96$, $p=.15$, $np2=.03$.

Three-Way Interactions

Important findings emerged with the relationships between Time, the VIA Caring cluster and Ethnicity: $F(2,118)=5.61$, $p=.01$, $np2=.09$. Not only was the rate of change for Time different for both white and minority cadets but also for the three categories assigned to the VIA Caring cluster as well (see Figures 21 and 22, below).

Figure 21: Minority Cadets Total ICM with VIA Caring Cluster Over Time

Figure 22: White Cadets Total ICM with VIA Caring Cluster Over Time

4.1.2.1.2.2 Ethnicity and the VIA Self-Control Cluster

(Reassessment of) Main Effects

Next, when evaluating the results in the relationships between Time, the VIA Self-Control cluster and Ethnicity, the value of Time was very similar to the previous sections: $F_{(1,118)}=.00$, $p=.99$, $np2=.00$. The tests for between-subjects effects shows the VIA Self-Control indicated no statistical tendency, $F_{(2,118)}=2.14$, $p=.12$, $np2=.04$, showing the classifications of low, middle and high scores differing overall. As for Ethnicity, $F_{(1,118)}=2.99$, $p=.09$, $np2=.04$, the results are not statistically significant.

Two-Way Interactions

The within-subjects effects for Time and the VIA Self-Control cluster shows a flat relationship: $F_{(2,118)}=.07$, $p=.93$, $np2=.00$. Assessing the values for the two-way tests for between-subjects for the VIA Self Control and Ethnicity shows no statistically significant results: $F_{(2,118)}=.96$, $p=.39$, $np2=.02$.

Three-Way Interactions

Additionally, the three-way interaction between Time, the VIA Self-Control cluster and Ethnicity does not indicate a statistically significant relationship: $F_{(2,118)}=.22$, $p=.80$, $np2=.00$.

4.1.2.1.2.3 Ethnicity and the VIA Inquisitiveness Cluster

(Reassessment of) Main Effects

In the last of the trio of VIA Clusters, I assessed the relationship between Time, the VIA Inquisitiveness cluster and Ethnicity. The main effect for Time was non-significant, as was the effect for the Inquisitiveness cluster: $F(1,118)=.00$, $p=.98$, np2=.00. Additionally, the main effect for Ethnicity did not show statistical significance: $F(1,118)=1.86$, $p=.18$, np2=.02.

Two-Way Interactions

When running the within-subjects three-way interaction between Time, the VIA Inquisitiveness cluster and Ethnicity (see the next section), interestingly, the two-way relationship between Time and VIA Inquisitiveness cluster showed rates of change for the different VIA classifications being diverse (see Figure 23, below). However, the between-subjects effect for the VIA Inquisitiveness cluster and Ethnicity does not yield any significant findings, $F(2,118)=.69$, $p=.50$, np2=.01.

Figure 23: Total ICM with VIA Inquisitiveness Cluster and Ethnicity Over Time

Three-Way Interactions

The within-subjects three-way interaction between Time, the VIA Inquisitiveness cluster and

Ethnicity did not yield any significant values, $F(2,118)=.52$, $p=.60$, $np2=.01$.

4.1.2.1.2.4 Ethnicity and the Individual VIA Character Strength of Wisdom

(Reassessment of) Main Effects

Finally, an evaluation for the relationship between Time, the VIA character strength of Wisdom

and Ethnicity was performed using a repeated measures ANOVA test. The value for Time,

$F(1,118)=.02$, $p=.90$, $np2=.00$, was very similar to the previous VIA cluster tests. The between-

subjects test for the character strength of Wisdom showed a statistical tendency: $F(2,118)=2.36$,

p=.10, np2=.04. Additionally, Ethnicity as a between-subjects test, showed a statistical tendency: F(1,118)=3.74, p=.06, np2=.03.

Two-Way Interactions

The two-way tests between Time and the character strength of Wisdom shows Wisdom not being a statistically significant moderator of the pre- to post-test change on Total ICM scores: F(2,118)=.03, p=.97, np2=.00. Additionally, the two-way between-subjects test of Wisdom and Ethnicity is not statistically significant: F(2,118)=2.42, p=.09, np2=.04 (see Figure 24, below).

Figure 24: Ethnicity with the VIA Wisdom Classification

Three-Way Interactions

Finally, when assessing the interactions between Time, the character strength of Wisdom and Ethnicity, F(2,118)=1.63, p=.20, np2=.03, there is no statistical significance. However, the rate of

change for white cadets versus minority cadets is completely different. White cadets who ranked in the middle classification showed the most improvement from pre- to post-test, but in the case of the minority cadets, the middle classification was not only the lowest scoring group, but their values decreased from pre- to post-test (see Figures 25 and 26, below).

Figure 25: White Cadets, Total ICM and the VIA Wisdom Classification Over Time

Figure 26: Minority Cadets, Total ICM and the VIA Wisdom Classification Over Time

4.1.2.1.2.5 Ethnicity and the Individual VIA Character Strength of Prudence

(Reassessment of) Main Effects

Next, an evaluation for the relationship between Time, the VIA character strength of Prudence and Ethnicity was performed using a repeated measures ANOVA test. The value for Time, $F(1,116)=1.37$, $p=24$, $np2=.01$, was again not significant like the VIA cluster tests. The between-subjects test for the character strength of Prudence yielded statistical significance: $F(2,116)=3.62$, $p=.03$, $np2=.06$. However, Ethnicity as a between-subjects test, did not show any statistical significance: $F(1,116)=.16$, $p=.69$, $np2=.00$.

Two-Way Interactions

The two-way tests between Time and the character strength of Prudence shows Prudence not being a statistically significant moderator of the pre- to post-test change on Total ICM scores: $F(2,116)=1.80$, $p=.17$, np2=.03. Also, the two-way between-subjects test of Prudence and Ethnicity does not yield any significance: $F(2,116)=.53$, $p=.59$, np2=.01.

Three-Way Interactions

Finally, when assessing the interactions between Time, the character strength of Prudence and Ethnicity, $F(2,116)=.17$, $p=.84$, np2=.00, there is no statistical significance.

4.1.2.1.2.6 Ethnicity and the Individual VIA Character Strength of Courage

(Reassessment of) Main Effects

Next, an evaluation for the relationship between Time, the VIA character strength of Courage and Ethnicity was performed using a repeated measures ANOVA test. The value for Time, $F(1,118)=.31$, $p=.58$, np2=.00, was again not significant like the VIA cluster tests. The between-subjects test for the character strength of Courage also did not yield any statistical significance: $F(2,118)=.322$, $p=.73$, np2=.01. Ethnicity as a between-subjects test, did not show any statistical significance either: $F(1,118)=1.42$ $p=.24$, np2=.01.

Two-Way Interactions

The two-way tests between Time and the character strength of Courage does not yield a statistically significant moderator of the pre- to post-test change on Total ICM scores:

F(2,118)=2.66, p=.07, np2=.04. Also, the two-way between-subjects test of Courage and

Ethnicity does not yield any significance: F(2,118)=.01, p=.99, np2=.00.

Three-Way Interactions

Finally, when assessing the interactions between Time, the character strength of Courage and

Ethnicity, F(2,118)=.29, p=.75, np2=.01, there is no statistical significance.

4.1.2.1.2.7 Ethnicity and the Individual VIA Character Strength of Honesty

(Reassessment of) Main Effects

Next, an evaluation for the relationship between Time, the VIA character strength of Honesty and

Ethnicity was performed using a repeated measures ANOVA test. The value for Time,

F(1,118)=.00, p=1.00, np2=.00, was flat and again not significant. The between-subjects test for

the character strength of Honesty also did not yield any statistical significance: F(2,118)=2.06,

p=.13, np2=.03. Ethnicity as a between-subjects test, did not show any statistical significance

either: F(1,118)=1.358,p=.24, np2=.01.

Two-Way Interactions

The two-way tests between Time and the character strength of Honesty does not yield a

statistically significant moderator of the pre- to post-test change on Total ICM scores:

F(2,118)=.22, p=.80, np2=.00. Also, the two-way between-subjects test of Honesty and Ethnicity

does not yield any significance: F(2,118)=.01, p=.99, np2=.00.

Three-Way Interactions

Finally, when assessing the interactions between Time, the character strength of Courage and

Ethnicity, $F_{(2,118)}=.29$, p=.75, np2=.01, there is no statistical significance.

4.1.2.1.2.8 Ethnicity and the Individual VIA Character Strength of Self-Regulation

(Reassessment of) Main Effects

Next, an evaluation for the relationship between Time, the VIA character strength of Self-

Regulation and Ethnicity was performed using a repeated measures ANOVA test. The value for

Time, $F_{(1,116)}=.01$, p=.90, np2=.00, was again not significant. The between-subjects test for the

character strength of Self-Regulation also did not yield any statistical significance: $F_{(2,116)}=.24$,

p=.79, np2=.00. Ethnicity as a between-subjects test, did not show any statistical significance

either: $F_{(1,116)}=.36$, p=.55, np2=.00.

Two-Way Interactions

The two-way tests between Time and the character strength of Self-Regulation does not yield a

statistically significant moderator of the pre- to post-test change on Total ICM scores:

$F_{(2,116)}=.17$, p=.84, np2=.00. Also, the two-way between-subjects test of Self-Regulation and

Ethnicity does not yield any significance: $F_{(2,116)}=.84$, p=.43, np2=.01.

Three-Way Interactions

Finally, when assessing the interactions between Time, the character strength of Self-Regulation

and Ethnicity, $F_{(2,116)}=.71$, p=.49, np2=.01, statistical significance is not yielded.

4.1.2.1.2.9 Ethnicity and the Individual VIA Character Strength of Perseverance

(Reassessment of) Main Effects

Next, an evaluation for the relationship between Time, the VIA character strength of Perseverance and Ethnicity was performed using a repeated measures ANOVA test. The value for Time, $F(1,117)=.02$, $p=.90$, np2=.00, was again not significant. The between-subjects test for the character strength of Perseverance also did not yield any statistical significance: $F(2,117)=.33$, $p=.72$, np2=.01. Ethnicity as a between-subjects test, did not show any statistical significance either: $F(1,117)=1.45$, $p=.23$, np2=.01.

Two-Way Interactions

The two-way tests between Time and the character strength of Perseverance does not yield a statistically significant moderator of the pre- to post-test change on Total ICM scores: $F(2,117)=.65$, $p=.52$, np2=.01. Also, the two-way between-subjects test of Perseverance and Ethnicity does not yield any significance: $F(2,117)=.16$, $p=.86$, np2=.00.

Three-Way Interactions

Finally, when assessing the interactions between Time, the character strength of Perseverance and Ethnicity, $F(2,117)=.36$, $p=.70$, np2=.01, statistical significance is not yielded.

4.1.2.1.2.10 Ethnicity and the Individual VIA Character Strength of Teamwork

(Reassessment of) Main Effects

Next, an evaluation for the relationship between Time, the VIA character strength of Teamwork and Ethnicity was performed using a repeated measures ANOVA test. The value for Time, $F(1,118)=.35$, $p=.56$, $np2=.00$, was again not significant. The between-subjects test for the character strength of Teamwork also did not yield any statistical significance: $F(2,118)=.54$, $p=.59$, $np2=.01$. Ethnicity as a between-subjects test, did not show any statistical significance either: $F(1,118)=.40$, $p=.66$, $np2=.01$.

Two-Way Interactions

The two-way tests between Time and the character strength of Teamwork does not yield a statistically significant moderator of the pre- to post-test change on Total ICM scores: $F(2,118)=1.55$, $p=.22$, $np2=.03$. Also, the two-way between-subjects test of Teamwork and Ethnicity does not yield any significance: $F(2,118)=.41$, $p=.66$, $np2=.01$.

Three-Way Interactions

Finally, when assessing the interactions between Time, the character strength of Teamwork and Ethnicity, $F(2,118)=.99$, $p=.38$, $np2=.02$, statistical significance is not yielded.

4.1.2.1.2.11 Ethnicity and the Individual VIA Character Strength of Leadership

(Reassessment of) Main Effects

Next, an evaluation for the relationship between Time, the VIA character strength of Leadership and Ethnicity was performed using a repeated measures ANOVA test. The value for Time, $F(1,117)=.01$, $p=.93$, np2=.00, was again not significant. The between-subjects test for the character strength of Leadership also did not yield any statistical significance: $F(2,117)=.10$, $p=.91$, np2=.00. Ethnicity as a between-subjects test, did not show any statistical significance: $F(1,117)=1.14$, $p=.29$, np2=.01.

Two-Way Interactions

The two-way tests between Time and the character strength of Leadership does not yield a statistically significant moderator of the pre- to post-test change on Total ICM scores: $F(2,117)=.41$, $p=.67$, np2=.01. Also, the two-way between-subjects test of Leadership and Ethnicity is flat and does not yield any significance: $F(2,117)=.00$, $p=1.00$, np2=.00.

Three-Way Interactions

Finally, when assessing the interactions between Time, the character strength of Leadership and Ethnicity, $F(2,117)=.30$, $p=.74$, np2=.01, statistical significance is not yielded.

Table 22: Summary of the Interaction of the Martial Virtues with Ethnicity

Martial Virtue	Martial Virtue	Time	Ethnicity	Virtue x Time	Virtue x Ethnicity	Virtue x Time x Ethnicity
Prudence	F(2,116)=3.62, p=.03, np2=.06 ✱	F(1,116)=1.37, p=24, np2=.01	F(1,116)=.16, p=.69, np2=.00	F(2,116)=1.80, p=.17, np2=.03	F(2,116)=.53, p=.59, np2=.01	F(2,116)=.17, p=.84, np2=.00
Courage	F(2,118)=.32, p=.73, np2=.01	F(1,118)=.31, p=.58, np2=.00	F(1,118)=1.42 p=.24, np2=.01	F(2,118)=2.66, p=.07, np2=.04	F(2,118)=.01, p=.99, np2=.00	F(2,118)=.29, p=.75, np2=.01
Honesty	F(2,118)=2.06, p=.13, np2=.03	F(1,118)=.00, p=1.00, np2=.00	F(1,118)=1.358,p=.24, np2=.01	F(2,118)=.22, p=.80, np2=.00	F(2,118)=.01, p=.99, np2=.00	F(2,118)=.29, p=.75, np2=.01
Self-Regulation	F(2,116)=.24, p=.79, np2=.00	F(1,116)=.01, p=.90, np2=.00	F(1,116)=.36,p=.55, np2=.00	F(2,116)=.17, p=.84, np2=.00	F(2,116)=.84, p=.43, np2=.01	F(2,116)=.71, p=.49, np2=.01
Perseverance	F(2,117)=.33, p=.72, np2=.01	F(1,117)=.02, p=.90, np2=.00	F(1,117)=1.45,p=.23, np2=.01	F(2,117)=.65, p=.52, np2=.01	F(2,117)=.16, p=.86, np2=.00	F(2,117)=.36, p=.70, np2=.01
Teamwork	F(2,118)=.54, p=.59, np2=.01	F(1,118)=.35, p=.56, np2=.00	F(1,118)=.40,p=.66, np2=.01	F(2,118)=1.55, p=.22, np2=.03	F(2,118)=.41, p=.66, np2=.01	F(2,118)=.99, p=.38, np2=.02
Leadership	F(2,117)=.10, p=.91, np2=.00	F(1,117)=.01, p=.93, np2=.00	F(1,117)=1.14,p=.29, np2=.01	F(2,117)=.41, p=.67, np2=.01	F(2,117)=.00, p=1.00, np2=.00	F(2,117)=.30, p=.74, np2=.01

To summarise the findings regarding the Ethnicity variable and the three VIA clusters, VIA character strength of Wisdom, and the Martial Virtues, in non-technical language: overall, the VIA clusters relate to ICM scores differently for whites and their non-white peers. The pattern accounting for the change appears to be the middle Wisdom group. White cadets in this group achieve the highest ICM scores, whereas for minority cadets, the middle cluster is associated with the lowest score. The only Martial Virtue to show statistical significance with the demographic variable of Ethnicity was Prudence.

4.1.3 Semi-Structured Interviews

The purpose of using interviews was to complement the quantitative data in this study, as noted in Section 3.4.3. The questions chosen for the interview schedule (Appendix 3) were based on the

moral dilemmas from the ARETE, interactions and engagement in the class discussions, the Seven Army Values in comparison with the VIS-IS 24-character strengths and on ethical challenges faced at West Point and potentially by the future as officers in the US Army. Only three of the five ARETE moral dilemmas were included in the interviews for the sake of time (#1–3, as dilemmas 4 and 5 were similar in moral reasoning to dilemma #3). The interviews lasted between 30 and 45 minutes, and the qualitative data collected in these interviews were interpreted through thematic analysis. For more information on interview data collection and analysis, see Section 3.4.3.

In Sections 4.1.3.1 through 4.1.3.3, I report on the findings in the following logical order. I begin in Section 4.1.3.1 by identifying some general findings from the interviews. I consider the enabling question, *'Does instruction matter?'* and how it can be operationalised. I then consider the sub-research question of *'Do scores on ARETE dilemmas that were discussed in class (labelled henceforth as 'familiar') increase more than the dilemmas that were not discussed (labelled henceforth as 'unfamiliar')?* and apply the question to the first ARETE dilemma. Then I reveal some findings that stood out from the interviews that were not directly relevant to the research question, tangentially tied into the cadets' moral reasoning. I start by discussing the 'Cadet Honor Code' and its Toleration Clause (introduced in Sections 2.2.2.3, 2.2.3.2 and 2.4) and conclude the section with the VIA 24-Character Strengths and the Seven Army Values. I then move to Section 4.1.3.2 and reveal some specific findings unearthed in the interviews and analyse them within the context of the research question and sub-questions. I start with the first three ARETE dilemmas and then discuss the VIA 24-Character Strengths and the Seven Army Values. Next, I transition to some interesting findings that emerged from the interviews. Specifically, I look at the ARETE performance between female and male cadets. I conclude Section 4.1.3.2 by

discussing the 'Cadet Honor Code' and its Toleration Clause, and the Loyalty Dilemma (as initially presented in the introduction to the thesis and Sections 2.1.3, 2.2.2.3, 2.2.3.2 and 2.4), using cadet quotes to tie it back to the idea of cadets developing their moral reasoning in the required ethics course at West Point. Finally, I conclude the interview section of Chapter 4 in Section 4.1.3.3, by discussing my main conclusion from the interviews.

In both sections below, general and specific findings are reported and are illustrated with representative quotations from the interviewee. Each quotation is annotated with participant number and either an (M#) or an (F#) to indicate the gender of the interviewee.

4.1.3.1 General Findings

The purpose of the semi-structured interviews was to complement the quantitative data in this study by assisting in answering the main research question, '*Does the ethical training for cadets in their required ethics course at West Point have a significant effect on how they reason about moral issues*?' found in Section 3.1. The way that the interviews helped answer the main research question was constituted primarily by the enabling question '*Does instruction matter?*' This overall research question was operationalised through the following question: '*What are the indicators that instruction matters?*' which is comprised of the following sub-research questions: 1) '*Do scores on the ICM increase from Time 1 to Time 2?*' 2) '*Do students who differ in engagement change on the ICM at different rates?*' '*Do scores on ARETE dilemmas that were discussed in class (labelled as familiar) increase more than the dilemmas that were not discussed (labelled unfamiliar)?*' The sub-research question of '*Do scores on the ICM increase from Time 1 to Time 2?*' was answered in Section 4.1.1 and it was not necessary to revisit in the interviews. Finally, when considering the sub-research question of '*Do scores on ARETE dilemmas that were*

discussed in class (labelled as familiar) increase more than the dilemmas that were not discussed (labelled unfamiliar)?, the interviews seemed to confirm that if an ARETE dilemma was considered 'familiar', and was discussed significantly in class, the cadets' scores did improve in a statistically significant way. Further, if the ARETE dilemma was considered 'unfamiliar', and had not been thoroughly or adequately discussed in class, the cadets either had no statistically significant change or their scores decreased post-test. I discuss the specific findings related to the main research question and enabling questions in more detail below, in Section 4.1.3.2.

While the interviews did help better answer the research question and enabling questions, there also emerged some striking comments and ideas relating to moral reasoning and moral action, even though they were not directly relevant to the research questions. The tangentially related topics include the 'Cadet Honor Code', the 'Toleration Clause' and the Loyalty Dilemma. As mentioned in Chapter 2 (Sections 2.2.2, 2.2.3 and 2.4), West Point has something called the 'Cadet Honor Code' that states: 'A cadet will not lie, cheat, steal, or tolerate those who do'. The Honor Code is strictly enforced, and there are serious ramifications if a cadet violates the Code. The consequences can mean a complete loss of privileges extending to being forced to withdraw from West Point. The last part of the Cadet Honor Code, '… or tolerate those who do' is known as the 'Toleration Clause'. If a cadet is aware that another cadet has violated the Honor Code, she or he must turn in the violator to the cadet leadership, or she or he is 'tolerating' the violator's conduct and, as such, is also in violation of the Cadet Honor Code. At first blush it is easy to see that this could put pressure on loyalty to friends and fellow cadets, but I did not know the degree to which this is significant and problematic at West Point until the interviews were conducted. I refer to this as a Loyalty Dilemma.

According to Snowden (2015), a Loyalty Dilemma occurs when a person must choose between honesty and loyalty to someone to whom you have a special relationship and obligation. The Loyalty Dilemma is essentially a moral trade-off in decision-making. Which outweighs the other? Most humans develop interpersonal relationships and sometimes those might seem more important to us than to an organisation such as the government, the police, the army or even West Point. There are multiple factors that people consider in the decision-making calculus: 1) the strength and type of relationship between the violator and the witness, 2) the severity of the 'unethical' act and 3) if anyone else is likely to find out that the witness knows what the violator has done. Judging from the interviews, the Loyalty Dilemma plays a huge role in everyday cadet decisions, in both their personal and professional lives. Due to the Cadet Honor Code and its Toleration Clause, cadets are frequently put into situations where they feel motivated to violate the Toleration Clause. According to most cadets interviewed, fraternisation, lying and cheating are rampant at West Point. Further, the Toleration Clause is used as a weapon to get rid of cadets whom others do not like, or cadets do the opposite and refrain from turning people in they like, due to peer pressure. While some of the cadets interviewed believed that the 'Cadet Honor Code' is effective, they described it as only being effective as a deterrent through fear. The cadets interviewed overwhelmingly disliked the Cadet Honor Code. I will discuss the Cadet Honor Code, the Toleration Clause and the Loyalty Dilemma in more detail in Section 4.1.3.2.

When discussing their VIA responses with the interviewees, the cadets as a whole reported subscribing to the Seven Army Values. They typically referred to the Seven Army Values when asked questions about ideal characteristic traits for themselves, or ideal traits army officers are expected to hold, when discussing their responses to the VIA-IS. All but one of the male cadets, and all of the female cadets, discussed the importance of the VIA positive character

strengths found in the Seven Army Values. Unfortunately, the interviews did not help tease out, beyond the survey analysis, if there was a connection between the cadets' scores on the ARETE and their self-reported character strengths on the VIA.

Finally, the cadets were asked towards the end of the interview if anything in the course assisted them in their decision-making on the ARETE post-test. Ten of the male cadets and six of the female cadets expressed that while the lectures were 'useful' (F2, F7, M2, M6, M9, M12), 'interesting' (F1, F5, F6, M1, M8), 'helpful' (F3, M3, M4, M13) and 'good' (M11), the discussions and interactions with the professors and fellow cadets were the 'most beneficial' (F2, F5, F6, M1, M9), 'most constructive' (F1, F3, M2, M10), 'most valuable' (M8, M9, M13) and 'best' (M12) part of the course. When asked what units and/or blocks of instruction fit the description the cadets gave above, the answers included 'just war theory' (F1, F2, F3, F5, F6, M2, M3, M4, M6, M8, M9, M10, M11, M12, M13), 'seven army values' and/or 'character' and/or 'leadership' (F1, F5, F6, M1, M2, M3, M6, M8, M9, M10, M12, M13), 'the torture discussion' (F1, F2, F5, F6, M1, M2, M3, M4, M9, M12, M13) and 'ethics' (F1, F3, F6, M1, M4, M8, M9, M12). The cadets did not mention virtue ethics specifically. Additionally, three cadets were 'not sure' (F4, M7, M11) and one cadet said that he 'knew the right answer to the dilemmas before he took the course. It [the course] merely reinforced what I already knew' to be true (M5).

4.1.3.2 Specific Findings

As mentioned in the previous section on General Findings, cadet responses in the interviews illuminated the fact that if the topic of the ARETE moral dilemma was considered familiar, the cadets' dilemma scores improved post-test. Further, if the topic of the ARETE moral dilemma

was considered either unfamiliar, or familiar but not thoroughly discussed in class, the cadet scores either remained unchanged or decreased post-test.

The ARETE dilemma on torture (#2) would be considered as 'familiar'. We spent a significant amount of class time and discussion on torture in the units on just war theory and virtue ethics during PY201. In consultation with the other two professors, it transpired that when the topic of torture was first introduced to all nine sections of the course, there were multiple cadets in each of the sections, sometimes as much as a third of the class, who argued torture was morally permissible. The cadets' justifications for torture fell into several argumentative categories: 1) 'they' are the bad guys and we are the good guys, 2) it is justifiable as it may save countless innocent American lives if we torture them and get the information we need, 3) they do it to us; therefore we can do it to them, 4) they were the ones who started the war, and 5) they are terrorists. As discussed earlier in this chapter (Section 4.1.1.1.5), the cadets (males and females) had statistically significant increases in their post-test scores on this dilemma. In fact, when taking the cadets on their performance on the five moral dilemmas as a whole, there was a large increase only in performance on Dilemma #2, whereas the other four moral dilemmas indicated small to moderate decreases (see Table 9 and Figure 7 at the beginning of this chapter).

When asking the interviewees if they would allow the First Sergeant to go in and torture the prisoner or prevent the torture from occurring in a variety of ways, nine of the 13 male cadets and six of the seven female cadets said that torture is an unacceptable option. Comments such as 'Do not allow torture' (M3), 'I couldn't just let someone to go beat the crap out of the person or torture them' (M10) and 'Definitely do not leave the First Sergeant alone with the prisoner' (F6) were recorded. These are representative of many of the opinions of the interviewees. However, a small minority of the cadets interviewed still claimed they would allow the torture as: 'Do what

you have to do to save lives' (M5), 'I would allow the First Sergeant to torture the guy' (M6) and

'You owe it to your soldiers. Be loyal to them. Not torture but enhanced interrogation is okay.

Water boarding is okay but not torture' (F3). Clearly, however, 'enhanced interrogation' is a

euphemism for torture. Moreover, waterboarding is torture according to the Geneva Conventions,

the UN Declaration Against Torture and the UN Convention Against Torture and other Cruel,

Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Koh, 2004; Druce, 2008; Kanstroom, 2009).

When it came to the best and worst reasons, the six female cadets chose acceptable reasons for

their actions according to the expert panel scoring key, which included it not being morally right

to torture and that they did not want to cross the line. The female cadet who argued for

waterboarding also chose unacceptable answers according to the expert panel scoring key,

arguing it is acceptable because, 'You owe it to your soldiers. Be loyal to them' (F3). This is

obviously another example of a Loyalty Dilemma. It is interesting to point out that from the pre-

to post-test, for both the best actions (p-value=.04) and the worst actions (p-value=.0) related to

torture, the female cadets showed a statistically significant increase in score on the post-test. To

rehearse, there was considerable time spent on torture in class relating to both just war theory and

neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, which might account for the significant increase in anti-torture

sentiments. However, clearly not all cadets ended up subscribing to the anti-torture arguments –

witness the case of F3 above.

A follow-up question was asked of the cadets who answered that torture was not an

acceptable option. *Did you change your position on torture from Time 1 to Time 2 and if so,*

why?' While the change in score at Time 2 for Dilemma #2 was not always reflected in their

answers, seven of the nine male cadets and five of the six female cadets stated that they always

believed torture to be wrong. Of the three remaining cadets, the reasons for the change of position

on torture were all related to course discussions. Comments included: 'After class I continued the discussion with Cadet 'X', and she persuaded me torture is always wrong' (F7), 'I realised over several lessons and discussions that it doesn't matter if they do it, it doesn't make it okay for us to do it. I now realise torture is a war crime' (M4) and 'I now realise torture does not work. People will tell you anything you want to hear to get you to stop. It does not work' (M11). As it relates to the enabling question of question *'Does instruction matter?'* and the sub-research question of *'Do scores on ARETE dilemmas that were discussed in class (labelled as familiar) increase more than the dilemmas that were not discussed (labelled unfamiliar)?*, the interviews seemed to confirm that for the ARETE torture dilemma, labelled 'familiar', instruction did matter, and the cadets' scores did improve in a statistically significant way.

The ARETE dilemma on fraternisation (#3) became an interesting topic as the interviews progressed. West Point also has a fraternisation policy similar to the one in the dilemma, and, as such, the topic of fraternisation would come up in the context of normative ethics in class discussions. However, judging from the interviews, neither I nor the other two instructors understood this significance at the time of instruction. It was only during the interviews that I became aware of the significance of fraternisation for the cadets. The amount of fraternisation that occurs at West Point was described as 'overwhelming' (F6) and 'very common' (F3 and F7) in the interviews. After speaking with the other two professors taking part in the PY201 course evaluation, while we could consider this dilemma as 'familiar' (as the cadets did bring this up in all nine sections during ethics lectures), it is clear in retrospect that we did not discuss fraternisation sufficiently enough in the context of virtue ethics during PY201. Other comments, such as 'It happens a lot on sports teams. Everyone lets it go if they are well liked and low-key' (M5), 'Fraternisation does happen here at West Point. Is it really worth reporting?' and

'Fraternisation is a problem, but people look the other way' (M8), were recorded. As discussed earlier in this chapter (Section 4.1.1.2.1), while there was no statistically significant change in the female cadets' scores related to fraternisation, the male cadets' scores post-test decreased statistically significantly for the worst actions related to fraternisation. This dilemma had, in fact, provided an opportunity for all three professors involved in the PY201 course evaluation to use the course to help the cadets in their moral reasoning as it relates to the topic of fraternisation. However, it seemed we failed to do so, perhaps by not relating the dilemma sufficiently to 'local' situations more intimately familiar to the students. As this dilemma relates to the enabling question of *'Does instruction matter?'* and the sub-research question of *'Do scores on ARETE dilemmas that were discussed in class (labelled as familiar) increase more than the dilemmas that were not discussed (labelled unfamiliar)?*, the interviews seemed to confirm that while the cadets did bring up fraternisation in class, and thus the relevant dilemma should be considered 'familiar', instruction opportunities were lost because the professors did not capitalise on the opportunity to discuss this within the context of virtue ethics, at least not in a relatable way. Hence, the female cadets' scores did not improve in a statistically significant way, and the male cadets' scores even decreased in a statistically significant way.

Finally, as it relates to not just to fraternisation, but the larger idea of the enabling question of *'Does instruction matter?'* and the sub-research question of *'Do scores on ARETE dilemmas that were discussed in class (labelled as familiar) increase more than the dilemmas that were not discussed (labelled unfamiliar)?*, something very elucidating occurred during the interviews of M6 and F3 that forced me to add a new question, that was not part of the original interview schedule, for the remaining interviews. While they were discussing different questions in the interview schedule (Q33 for M6 and Q16 for F3), they both inadvertently explained a

possible reason why the torture dilemma fared better than the other dilemmas. I spoke with M6 the day before I spoke with F3. When I asked M6 Q33, '*How realistic did you find the dilemmas/options?*', M4 stated that while he, '*found the dilemmas realistic, other than torture, I am surprised that we did not actually discuss the other dilemmas in class*'. At first, this had not resonated with me and I mentioned to him that since there was a lot of material to cover in the semester, I was limited to which of the dilemmas, examples and case studies were used. The next day, I interviewed F3. When I asked her Q16 on the interview schedule, to think back to moral dilemma #3 on fraternisation, where there was conflict between being loyal to the group and doing the right thing, 'have you faced this issue yourself?', F3 stated that this was 'very common' at West Point. She then mentioned, 'I wish we would have discussed fraternisation during the course as it is something cadets talk about. Everyone knows someone that is doing this.' This was the second time in two days of interviews that a cadet mentioned the fact that some of the dilemmas had not been discussed in class. Additionally, for the dilemmas that I had not discussed in class, there was no statistically significant change. This prompted me to ask the remaining 15 of the 20 cadets (eight of 13 male cadets and five of seven female cadets) a second part to Q33: '*Do you believe that if all of the dilemmas were presented in class, and a class discussion was held on the morally decision and right actions, that would help you form your opinion on what to do in a similar circumstance in the future?*'. For the remaining 15 cadets interviewed, 12 cadets responded affirmatively saying, 'yes' (F5, F6, F7, M7, M8, M10, M12), 'definitely' (M8) and 'very likely' (M9). Additionally, two cadets were 'not sure' (F4, M11) and none of the 15 replied in the negative, although it is likely that had M5 been asked, he would have likely said no based on his comment mentioned at the very end of Section 4.1.3.1 General Findings, on page 254, that he 'knew the right answer to the dilemmas before he took the course. It [the course] merely

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reinforced what I already knew' to be true (M5). The answers of the 15 cadets may support the

fact that when it comes to instruction, maybe making the four other dilemmas 'familiar' (the

torture dilemma was labelled as familiar), the cadets' scores in moral reasoning might have

improved as they did with the torture dilemma.

The interviews also elucidated the cadets' performance on the ARETE dilemma of

rescuing and saving the life of a seriously wounded informant (Dilemma #1) at the risk of

completing the mission. After a discussion with the other professors involved in the PY201

course evaluation, all three professors confirmed their classes discussed the importance of the

moral virtues of kindness and compassion (among others); however, while the two neo-

Aristotelian-inclined professors mentioned the idea of virtue reasoning (or *phronetic* deliberation)

during the virtue ethics lectures, neither of them held a discussion specifically on virtue

reasoning. Further, the visiting professor did not mention or discuss the concept of virtue

reasoning to his two sections. Virtue reasoning is the judgment and understanding that comes

from deliberating the right action to take regarding virtues, including when situations arise where

virtues conflict with each other (Arthur et al., 2017). In this case, the dilemma related to what

happens when the virtues of kindness, compassion, beneficence and loyalty come into conflict

with the virtues of duty and discipline. Because virtue reasoning was not discussed by any of the

professors involved with the PY201 course evaluation, I would consider Dilemma #1

'unfamiliar'. Cadets understand the importance of being kind and compassionate, as transpired

from the interviews; however, if cadets are consistently told through their academic and military

courses at West Point that the mission must come first, and if they have not discussed virtue

reasoning, they may not able to use it to understand that the civic virtue of loyalty (not just to

fellow soldiers but others like the informant), as well as kindness and compassion, might override

the mission or delay the mission in order to provide aid. The lack of discussion on virtue reasoning in general and *phronesis* in particular was, perhaps, the reason that there was no statistically significant change in the responses of male or female cadets on this dilemma. During the interviews, the majority of the cadets mentioned to 'offer/render aid' (M2, M3, M7, M11) and 'pick him up and bring him with us' (F2). Other cadets said they would 'radio for medical personnel to come help' (F3, F5, F7, M4, M10, M13). Other comments included 'My soldiers and mission come first. I would not intervene' (F1) and/or to 'just focus on the mission' (M6). The cadets who mentioned to offer/render aid were asked a follow-up question, *'Did you change your response from Time 1 to Time 2 and if so, why?'* All of the cadets who suggested aiding the injured Somali in the interview said that they had not changed their responses at Time 2; thus the course did not contribute to the cadets' moral reasoning as it relates to Dilemma #1 on the ARETE (although it might have strengthened the capacity of the cadets to argue for the view that they already had, or strengthened their resolve). As this dilemma relates to the enabling question of *'Does instruction matter?'* and the sub-research question of *'Do scores on ARETE dilemmas that were discussed in class (labelled as familiar) increase more than the dilemmas that were not discussed (labelled unfamiliar)?*, the interviews seemed to confirm that cadets did not understand the idea of virtue reasoning or adjudication. It must be admitted here that most books on virtue ethics are fairly reticent on painful *phronetic* adjudications when two or more virtues collide, perhaps because of implicit allegiance to a common virtue ethical view of the essential unity of virtues. This provides food for thought regarding recommendations for the further development of ethical training at West Point.

All in all, when considering the main research question of '*Does the ethical training for cadets in their required ethics course at West Point have a significant effect on how they reason*

about moral issues?' and the enabling questions of *'Does instruction matter?'* and, *'Do scores on ARETE dilemmas that were discussed in class (labelled as familiar) increase more than the dilemmas that were not discussed (labelled unfamiliar)?,* it appears from the interviews that the required ethics course *can* have an impact on cadets' moral reasoning. More specifically, instruction does seem to matter, because when the moral dilemmas on the ARETE were discussed in a significant way over a significant period of time (being 'familiar'), the cadets improved on the ARETE scores on the post-test, as indicated in the torture dilemma. When the moral dilemmas were not discussed significantly, sufficiently or at all, the cadet scores either remained unchanged or decreased post-test, as indicated with the ARETE dilemmas on fraternisation and helping a severely injured person at the potential risk of the mission.

In addition to the ARETE, the interviews illuminated findings regarding the VIA Character Strengths. In the interviews, all the male cadets mentioned the virtues found in the Seven Army Values when discussing the VIA-IS Character Strengths. Comments about which character strengths were important to them included 'integrity, leading by example. trustworthiness' (M7), 'confidence and dedication' (M11) and 'integrity, leadership and loyalty' (M6). Additionally, all of them made references to virtues that are not found in the Seven Army Values, but which can be considered broadly neo-Aristotelian in nature. For example, the male cadets mentioned caring/love, compassion, confidence, drive, empathy, honesty, humility, motivation, open-mindedness, perseverance and proficiency. It is important to note that not all of the cadets discussed character strengths in the way that would be considered 'correct' according to a virtue ethical conception. While 12 of the cadets referred to the context-dependence of the virtues (displaying them in the right way, in the right context and in the right amount), one cadet (M5) mentioned a willingness to do immoral things for his soldiers: 'Have best in mind for your

soldiers'. He went on to say that 'it is okay to do immoral things in order to take care of your soldiers'. He gave the example of stealing another unit's vehicle tyres to accomplish his soldiers' mission. He did mention virtues of care but in the 'incorrect' amount (*qua* what Aristotle would have called 'excess'), resulting in non-virtuous behaviour and almost making a utilitarian case for such behaviour. The female cadets also mentioned the virtues found in the Seven Army Values. Comments such as 'take responsibility; loyalty, competence' (F3), 'honesty and transparency' (F7) and 'courage; wisdom' (F4) were recorded. For the female cadets, the single character strength worth the most admiration in the army was empathy. It should be noted that one of the 13 male cadets also said it was empathy (M13). Notice that I specify empathy as a 'character strength' and not 'virtue', as it is not a virtue in and by itself (Kristjánsson, 2007, 94; Prinz, 2011; Bloom, 2016, 2–3; Kristjánsson, 2019). As such, it is interesting that all of the female cadets find empathy worth the most admiration in the army. Kristjánsson (2019) explains empathy is just a psychological capacity to understand other people's feelings that can be used for good or bad. Prinz (2011) takes this further arguing that empathy is not even a precondition of moral judgment because empathy often leads to biases that 'render it potentially harmful'. Bloom (2016) notes that while empathy can prompt us to do good, on the 'whole, it is a poor guide'.

In addition to the specific findings on the ARETE dilemmas and the VIA Character Strengths, there were some interesting findings that came out of the interviews but were not directly related to the research questions. While the 'Cadet Honor Code' and its Toleration Clause are not necessarily causally connected to the Loyalty Dilemma, the topics turned out to be intricately intertwined for the cadets, and this was displayed in the interviews. The cadet interviews illuminated a problem that exists at West Point. While this problem does not directly relate to the main research question, it has huge ramifications for cadets' moral reasoning. As a

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reminder, when discussing the ARETE dilemma on fraternisation in Section 4.1.3.2, Cadets stated in interviews that the amount of fraternisation that occurs at West Point was 'overwhelming' (F6) and 'very common' (F3 and F7). In the interviews, this brought up the topics of the 'Cadet Honor Code' and its Toleration Clause as well as the Loyalty Dilemma. I would like to point out that the cadets never used the phrase Loyalty Dilemma in the interviews, but what they described was an incessant problem at West Point requiring a moral trade-off in decision-making in choosing between honesty and loyalty. When I asked cadets in the interview what sorts of moral challenges they face at West Point, 10 of the 13 male cadets mentioned the 'Cadet Honor Code' and its Toleration Clause. All 10 said that cheating, lying and fraternisation are rampant at West Point, and you must choose to confront the other cadets, look the other way, or turn them in. Comments such as 'The Cadet Honor Code is not morally based, but rule-based' (M5), 'His friends, twist the truth or lie on a daily basis' (M2) and 'the Cadet Honor Code as a whole […] does not breed honour, it breeds people getting ahead at the expense of others' (M13), abounded. As a reminder, when discussing virtues and the VIA towards the beginning of this section, a cadet (M5) argued that he prioritised taking care of his soldiers and that it would be acceptable to do immoral things including stealing other unit's tyres to accomplish a mission.

It was not just the male cadets who discussed the 'Cadet Honor Code' and its Toleration Clause. All seven of the female cadets mentioned The Cadet Honor Code and the Toleration Clause – it 'truly is a moral dilemma' (F1). Comments included, 'You do not want to turn in your friends' (F1), It's hard to turn in your friends' (F2), 'Will you be able to screw over other people?' and 'Is it fair that you get in trouble if you do not turn in other people and your silence is detected by the academy?' (F3). Finally, one female cadet stated that 'People here are not fully committed to the Cadet Honor Code, nor to the Seven Army Values' (F6).

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4.1.3.3 Main Conclusion

The semi-structured interviews did complement the quantitative data in this study by assisting in answering the main research question, '*Does the ethical training for cadets in their required ethics course at West Point have a significant effect on how they reason about moral issues*?' Further, they helped to answer the enabling question of *'Does instruction matter?'* in that the interviews demonstrated that the cadets improved on the ARETE dilemmas that were discussed in class (labelled as familiar) and decreased in scores on the ARETE dilemmas that were not discussed sufficiently (or at all) in class. Further, the interviews uncovered the problem of the Loyalty Dilemma, which is a barrier to the cadets' moral reasoning development.

Interestingly, the interviews revealed aspects of the cadets' experiences that I did not have in mind when creating the questions for the semi-structured interviews. In that sense, it would have been better to create the questions after all the quantitative data had been analysed. However, that was not possible for practical reasons. Even if the questions had been created retrospectively, I would probably have missed important aspects of the students' moral experiences, such as their preoccupation with fraternisation. Possibly, a less structured interview format (e.g. following phenomenology) would have captured more free-flowing responses from the cadets. However, the purpose of the interviews in the present study was always to complement the quantitative data rather than provide a primary source of information of its own.

CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION

See what a man does. Examine in what things he rests. How can a man conceal his character? How can a man conceal his character? – Confucius (551 BC – 479 BC)

5.1 Introduction

This discussion chapter aims to establish the value-addedness of my doctoral research by comparing and contrasting it with previous research findings.

In Section 2.8, I discussed previous empirical research that focused on assessing 'morality and the military'. All six of the studies were influential in the design of my study, sometimes due to the methodology and results of the studies and sometimes for what they recommended in terms of future research. The key participants in the present study were military academy cadets who would eventually become army officers. All six of the studies reported on in 2.8 had one or more of these common features: four of the studies focused on the army (the fifth and sixth were situated at the US Naval and US Air Force Academies). Additionally, five of the six focused on a military academy (Williams, 2010, was focused on the US Army Military Police basic training course for enlisted personnel). The methods of the six studies were varied as well, including at least one of the following: moral dilemma-based survey (specifically an ICM-based dilemma, DIT/DIT-2 based survey), the VIA character strengths survey, focus groups and semi-structured interviews. The two most influential studies for my design were Turner's (2008) study of West Point cadets and the Jubilee Centre's study (Arthur, Walker and Thoma, 2018) on British Army

officers and RMAS cadets. I found both studies' methods appealing because both used an ICM (the Jubilee Centre study slightly modified Turner's ALERT to make it fit the British Army lexicon). Additionally, I was attracted by the Jubilee Centre's mixed-methods approach of using the VIA inventory of strengths and semi-structured interviews to triangulate the results of their empirical study. Finally, in his recommendation for future research (2008, 110), Turner encouraged the use of an Army-centric ICM-related intervention, administering the ICM as a pre- and post-test, for West Point cadets. Both studies provided an inspiration for my study's design as a PY201 course evaluation to assess whether cadets improve their moral reasoning when they take the required philosophy and ethics class at West Point.

The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. I begin, in Section 5.2, by discussing confirmations of previous research findings, specifically as they relate to gender. Then I explore novel research findings emanating from my thesis, specifically the application of ARETE dilemmas and the importance of whether the dilemmas were familiar or unfamiliar. Next, I revisit theory and discuss the findings of the study and how they confirm the superiority of virtue ethics and just war theory as ethical frameworks for cadets. Following the section on theory, I discuss the strengths of the study, juxtaposing those with perceived weaknesses and limitations. I then provide recommendations for future research on this and similar topics. Finally, I reflect upon the entirety of the study, and my place in it, followed by a summary of Chapter 5.

5.2 Confirmation of Previous Research Findings

5.2.1 Gender

One of the most interesting findings in the present study was related to the variable of Gender. In my study, the females performed better on the ARETE than the males in a variety of ways. This is consistent with most findings in previous research on improving moral reasoning in the military (Turner, 2008; Williams, 2010; Arthur, Walker and Thoma, 2018). Like in my ICM-based study, both of the other ICM studies (Turner, 2008; Arthur, Walker and Thoma, 2018) showed female cadets outperforming males. Williams's (2010) study using the DIT is not a one-off instance of females outperforming males in moral reasoning as measured by the DIT. Interestingly, females often score significantly higher on studies using either the DIT or DIT-2 than do males (Bebeau, 2006; Thoma, 2006; Turner, 2007). Finally, it should be pointed out that two of the three remaining studies did not include females in their study (Matthews et al., 2006) or did not report on gender demographics (Tate, 2016). Further, only one group of researchers did not see statistically significant gender differences in the findings of their study (Lincoln and Holmes, 2011). This study was a lone outlier and, further, did not measure moral reasoning or judgments.

In the present study, there were various and interesting ways in which the female cadets improved compared to their male counterparts. First, the female cadets improved on all five of the moral dilemmas on the ARETE, whereas the male cadets declined in all of them except for Dilemma #2 on torture, as mentioned in Section 4.1.3. That is likely due to Dilemma #2 being the only dilemma on the ARETE labelled as familiar to the cadets, as I discuss further in Section

5.4.1. Second, not only did the female cadets advance in all five moral dilemmas on the post-test, the female cadets scored higher than the male cadets on the pre-test and the post-test. Both findings seem to show that the female cadets came into the study with a better grasp of the concepts measured by the ARETE and improved over the course of PY201. This performance differential was observed on the overall ICM scores and constituent parts. This is significant because it presents a completely different profile for female and male cadets.

The female cadets were consistent across the dilemmas, they improved with instruction and their Action Choice and Justification scores converged. The female profile suggests a more consolidated understanding of the ethical concepts, and, in that way, they are qualitatively different from the male cadets. The male cadets were inconsistent across the dilemmas, presented little evidence of growth and had a more scattershot profile than the female cadets. This supports the argument that the female cadets are both more developed initially and seem to benefit more from PY201 than the male cadets. Finally, the female cadets showed statistically significant improvement in two of the three main indices (Total ICM and Total Action), whereas the male cadet performance indicated almost no change (although again, their scores decreased on the post-test, albeit statistically insignificantly). This is interesting in that Turner's study showed a similar pattern.

To rehearse, my study was a course evaluation, comparing the same cadets a few months later after receiving instruction in PY201. Turner compared the answers between male and female cadets, who were West Point freshman (first year cadets) and West Point seniors (fourth year cadets). Turner's study showed similar results in that West Point female first-year cadets started out higher than male first-year cadets, and the females showed statistically significant

improvement as fourth year cadets, whereas the male cadet's growth on the measures remained flat after the four years. Turner's hypothesis was that the 'West Point Effect' (being at West Point for four years) would naturally develop cadets' moral reasoning as it related to military-focused dilemmas. Turner did find that there was improvement in the moral reasoning of the female cadets as he predicted but no such improvement in the male cadets. Seemingly, being at West Point for four years did not improve the male cadets' moral reasoning at all (at least on the relevant measure). This is parallel with the cadets in my study, as mentioned earlier in this section. Indeed, it is interesting to compare the moral reasoning improvement of the females over four years with the moral reasoning improvement of the second-year female cadets in the required philosophy and ethics class at West Point.

Although there are many similarities between the ARETE and the ALERT, they are not identical. Thus, to directly compare the degree of change observed in both studies, I computed effect sizes for each study's pre- to post-change using Cohen's d statistic on the Total ICM, Action Choice and Justification scores. Arguably the best way to convert both Turner's and my findings to the same scale is to convert the findings to Cohen's d statistics.[42] Interestingly, both studies describe gender differences via change over time in very similar ways. For female cadets, both studies indicate moderate growth over the duration of the study (ARETE: .40, .42, 21; ALERT: .40, .45,.26 for Total ICM, Action Choice and Justification scores, respectively). By contrast, male cadets' effect sizes for the same time intervals were small and near zero (ARETE: .05, .08, .05; ALERT: .08, .07,.20 for Total, Action Choice and Justification scores, respectively).

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[42] Cohen's d statistic assesses the magnitude of the difference between two means. These effect-size estimates are not sample specific, so they can be directly compared across different studies.

The comparison of the two studies appears to show that the increase in moral reasoning that naturally happens in four years at West Point for female cadets happened in two months in the required philosophy and ethics course. Interestingly similar is that the lack of improvement in moral reasoning that happened in PY201 is something that is typical of male cadets from the time they enter West Point until the time they leave four years later. This might point to a greater female sensitivity to the ethical component of the Profession of Arms, although there is obviously more to ethical competence than just moral reasoning.

It must be added here as a general caveat that females tend to outperform males in almost all measures of moral development, be those deontologically or virtue ethically grounded. The reason why has not elicited any unanimous scholarly answer (Thoma, 1986; Jaffee and Hyde, 2000; Thoma, Derryberry and Crowson, 2013). This enigma requires further empirical work, both in an army context and a more general moral/characterological developmental one. Whatever the reason, from a teaching perspective, this gender difference may call for some additional considerations about the best teaching methods to maximise the learning capacity of both genders. For example, potentially changing how the course is instructed could help male cadets increase and develop their moral reasoning over the course of the semester. Most PY201 instructors, including the author, rely on the use of traditional instructor lecture and/or a class discussion model. Perhaps changing these traditional methods to more active learning techniques could help develop the male cadets. Active learning uses approaches to engage students by incorporating them into the teaching. Examples of active learning strategies include case studies and simulations (both similar to moral dilemmas), multiple team-based learning, cooperative learning groups, small group discussion, small group work and peer-to-peer teaching (Reddy,

2000; Gleason et al., 2011; Bromley, 2013; Paolini, 2015). Gleason et al. (2011) contend that active learning techniques facilitate peer-to-peer engagement, resulting in students helping fellow students understand and solve problems. In fact, they argue that the most effective method of teaching might be 'students teaching other students'. One study (Kamphorst et al., 2015) using active learning techniques on male and female engineering undergraduate students found that the active learning technique of social integration was only important for male students' academic success. The same study showed that female undergraduate students seemed to benefit less from good preparation through active learning. In another study (Carrick et al., 2015), medical students in a 'flipped curriculum' classroom were compared with those from a traditional lecture classroom. The significant difference in outcomes between the male and female medical students suggest that women may do better than males in traditional classroom settings.

One possible technique in helping male cadets develop their moral reasoning would be to capitalise on the female strengths in moral reasoning by using active learning techniques in the PY201 classroom. For instance, based on the number of females in the in the particular class (usually 2-–5 out of 15–16), one could create teams with at least one female in the group. If one had three females in a classroom of 15, three small teams could be created. One could make the female cadet the team leader to facilitate small group discussion using ethical concepts. While I did not systematically use moral dilemmas in the instruction that semester, potentially taking the moral dilemmas from the ARETE (and even creating new moral dilemmas) and giving them to the female cadet-lead teams to work through would be another example of an active learning technique that could help the male cadets develop their moral reasoning, following the argument that peer-to-peer and fellow-student teaching appears to be effective (Reddy, 2000; Gleason et

al., 2011; Bromley, 2013; Paolini, 2015). The same semester the PY201 course evaluation took place, two of my lessons were observed by a female Editorial Director of a prestigious international academic publisher. She asked me if I assign cadets to specific seats in the classroom. I told her that the cadets are allowed to sit wherever they prefer. She commented that she thought that it was interesting that the three females in the class sat together, away from the other male cadets. This likely speaks to the moral climate of the institution, and that female cadets still feel like outsiders, in both the academy and the profession, whereas males have the privilege and comfort of being representative of the culture. Turner suggests in his thesis that females may be 'more attuned to issues such as injustice and inequalities because of their minority position within society and at USMA' (2008, 105). I reference this to illustrate that if we harness the ability of female cadets to improve their own moral reasoning, then through team-based learning and peer-to-peer teaching, female cadets could potentially help male cadets through teamwork. That could result in male cadets transferring moral concepts to dilemmas and other novel situations in which they have not been instructed. The strategy of creating female-led teams and incorporating moral dilemmas could be an effective way of increasing male improvement in moral reasoning over the course of a semester (cf. Kamphorst et al., 2015). Finally, an army-centric ICM could not only be used as assessment measure but could also be used as an active learning strategy. The ICM dilemmas could complement the other active learning strategies by being incorporated into the female-led teams, cooperative learning groups or the peer-to-peer teaching.

5.3 Novel Research Findings

5.3.1 Familiar Versus Unfamiliar

One of the ideas I considered in the analysis of the data was the sub-research question of *'Do scores on the ARETE dilemmas that were discussed in class (labelled as 'familiar') increase more than the dilemmas that were not discussed (labelled as 'unfamiliar')?* I discussed this in detail in Section 4.1.3 (more particularly in Sections 4.1.3.1 to 4.1.3.3). Of the five moral dilemmas on the ARETE, only Dilemma #2 on torture was considered familiar to the cadets. We discussed in detail the ethical stance of torture as part of the just war theory block of instruction. The other moral dilemmas on the ARETE were not discussed specifically. Dilemma #2 had the largest improvement – when considering all cadets, the pre-test mean score and standard deviation was .49 (.44) and improved to .62 (.47) on the post-test. This was the lowest mean score on the pre-test of all five dilemmas. On one hand, this supports the argument that PY201 had an effect on the cadets' moral reasoning; however, the ethical concepts and theories that were taught do not appear to have been generalised to other related ethics topics or situations. This observation is significant. If West Point wants cadets to internalise a particular ethical concept using traditional classroom instruction, it must be directly addressed. In other words, cadets do not transfer their understanding of ethical concepts to dilemmas that have not already been unpacked in the instructional process. As mentioned above in Section 5.2.1, the way to solve this problem may be through active learning techniques, using the better prepared female cadets to lead small teams through various moral dilemmas.

How do we develop the philosophy and ethics curriculum to help cadets make relevant inferences? The torture dilemma carries a variety of implications. Examples include: dealing with power and using people as a means to an end under stress and interpreting the ethical climates of groups and organisations, to name a couple. This is where I believe a virtue ethics-focused curriculum can make an impact. If we focus on how we should *be,* not solely on what we should *do*, in the curriculum, cadets will arguably become better equipped to make inferences on appropriate action and reason in different circumstances. Cadets will then understand that practising virtuous behaviour develops practical wisdom. The objection that focusing on 'what we should be' rather than 'do' in the curriculum creates an uneven playing field that favours virtue ethics over consequentialism or deontology, would carry traction when arguing about the content of an 'ordinary' ethical-theory module at a university. However, we must bear in mind that the role of West Point in general, and its ethical teaching in particular, is in preparing cadets for military duty. Practical concerns may therefore trump ideals of academic neutrality. Because the very core of the profession is based on the concept of harm, and on preventing harm, just war theory and a virtue-based ethical approach to actions and justifications of those actions in war could develop the moral reasoning of officers, which could potentially limit war crimes and human rights violations. Modifying the curriculum to be more explicitly virtue ethics-focused would increase the probability that individuals think about applications and concepts beyond the examples used in class, especially as just war theory is compatible with virtue ethics, as argued in Section 2.3.6.

5.4 Revisiting Theory

5.4.1 Confirmation of Virtue Ethics and Just War Theory

My teaching during the PY201 course evaluation and the results of the study have confirmed the hypothesis, originally proposed in Chapter 2, that virtue ethics and just war theory are the best normative foundations for West Point cadets and the larger Profession of Arms as a whole. While it is disappointing that the cadets were not able to derive virtuous inferences from torture to the other dilemmas, such as the Loyalty Dilemma, I do believe, as I mentioned in both Sections 2.1.3 and 2.2.3.2, and as Kristjánsson points out (2020, 17), the cadets are most often not struggling with choosing between a virtue and a vice but between two conflicting virtues. This is where the cadets need *phronesis*. Practical wisdom will help them acknowledge and choose the correct virtue in that moment. If directly prompted to address and discuss specific ethical concepts and situations, like those dealing with the Loyalty Dilemma, cadets are more likely to be able to develop *phronesis* (cf. Lin et al., 2019) because virtue is a habit (of mind and reaction). We need to expose the cadets to these moral dilemmas, ones that are important to them at West Point, as well as ethical dilemmas they will face in the larger army when they become officers. This will enable them to habituate the virtues after the introduction from virtuous exemplars, or at least from continent exemplars (Athanassoulis, 2018; Kristjánsson, 2020, 140), which is where most adults are likely fall in Aristotle's taxonomy of ethical states of character.

This study was motivated by the desire to see if cadets are developing their moral reasoning in the required philosophy and ethics class at West Point. Moral reasoning includes the components of right action and right justification/reasoning. Annas reminds us that *phronesis* 'is

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the disposition to make right moral judgments' (1993, 73). If we need to practise virtue to develop and to get better at practical wisdom, is it surprising that cadets are not developing their moral reasoning after two-months in PY201? Recall that this study is based purely on classroom interactions twice a week. To be sure, virtue ethicists like Curzer (2002, 147) and Annas (2011, 12) may be perfectly right in noting that a person needs practice for habituation. However, it is going to take more than a twice-weekly classroom presence to help cadets practise virtue and moral reasoning. The study makes evident that it is clearly beyond the scope of the classroom to ensure that the relevant internalisation takes place; the entire university needs to be a part of the students' character development (Jubilee Centre, 2020; Lamb, Brant and Brooks, 2021).

5.4.2 How Virtue Ethics and Just War Theory are Best Taught

When using the ARETE as either an assessment tool or a way to help structure class discussions to promote ethical reasoning, it is imperative that the just-war-theory block of instruction should immediately follow virtue ethics. The thinking behind this is that after learning about virtue, practical wisdom, competing virtues and habituation, applying these concepts to the principles of just war theory might help the cadets develop and make inferences about behaviour in war. If the cadets first discuss dilemmas they face in everyday life and in cadet life in the virtue ethics block of the course, then when they discuss military and war-specific dilemmas, the cadets will be better equipped to make inferences about the morally acceptable solutions to those dilemmas. This may help them eventually develop practical wisdom applicable in other areas of their lives, not just the profession they are entering, particularly when they have to negotiate dilemmatic space involving competing virtues like loyalty/honesty, loyalty/kindness and loyalty/justice.

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Again, this will require the help of moral mentors to introduce the ideas and foster the discussion of the different dilemmas, starting in the PY201 classroom and extending across the academy through other courses and activities.

All in all, my experience from teaching this course in the context of a course evaluation and thinking more critically about its content and its practical implications than I have had a chance to do before, has strengthened my belief in virtue ethics as the best ethical paradigm for prospective army officers. The reasons are various, but I would summarise them as follows.

First, cadets currently prioritise character traits that are not virtues. During the interviews, all seven female cadets described 'empathy' as the most important character trait to have as an army officer. As a reminder, simply *qua* the psychological capacity to understand others' emotions, empathy is not a virtue (Kristjánsson, 2007, 94; Prinz, 2011; Bloom, 2016,2–3; Kristjánsson, 2019) as it can equally motivate the bad as well as the good and can be based on biases such as racism. By focusing on virtue ethics, we can dissuade cadets and army officers alike from focusing on character traits that are inferior (non-virtuous) and focus on superior traits (virtues like compassion, over non-virtues like empathy).

Second, cadets struggle with clashing virtues as in the Loyalty Dilemma. As discussed in Section 4.1.3.2, 10 of the 13 male cadets interviewed, and all seven of the female cadets, noted that they struggled with the Loyalty Dilemma within the context of the 'Cadet Honor Code' and the 'Toleration Clause'. For them, this ethical struggle is a barrier to improving their moral reasoning. While knowing the 'right' action is important, understanding the 'right' reason(s) for the 'right' action(s) is more important in helping the cadets develop moral reasoning. This is best

suited for instruction within a virtue ethics framework, and the information they receive in PY201 should therefore be the educational focus.

5.5 Strengths of the Study

One of the strengths of this study has arguably been the depth of methods used. This study took some of the best performing methods from previous empirical research on morality and the military, including a twice-proven ICM, the VIA character strengths survey and semi-structured interviews, all within the context of a course evaluation. The fact that this study used a mixed methods approach provided more in-depth coverage than previous research. Another strength was that this study focused on what was occurring in a specific course at West Point to see if cadets' moral reasoning improved in that course. Prior to the current study, previous research was focused more broadly on either an entire year group of cadets or the full military academy population. Finally, while I do not believe, in retrospect, that I used the VIA in the best possible way to help confirm findings from the ARETE, one of the strengths of this study was how the interviews reflected the performance on the ARETE, especially with the female cadets (see final paragraph of 4.1.3.2 Specific Findings). Another strength was using semi-structured interviews. Having the cadets meet with me in a one-on-one setting, knowing that what they said and who they were would be anonymised, allowed the cadets to be candid. I would not know the extent of the problem cadets are having with fraternisation, the 'Cadet Honor Code' and the Toleration Clause if not for these discussions.

5.6 Weaknesses and Limitations of the Study

The biggest weakness of the study was its sample size. While the idea of the study was to focus on what was occurring in a specific course at West Point, to see if cadets' moral reasoning improved, was good in theory, the sample size of 129 was not large enough to analyse or observe changes in some demographic categories, such as ethnicity or religion. Further, with the added statistical power of a larger sample size there might have been statistically significant findings emerging regarding instructor differences if we had included more than three instructors and their students. Additionally, this study would have been better as a trial. Only using one class to do this was insufficient as a trial. I should have run this study as a second trial and then increased the number of course sections, cadets and instructors to deepen the sample for the actual study. An additional weakness of the study was that I only interviewed 20 cadets. While the data I received from the interviews were invaluable to the study, because I had so few interviews, there was a lack of diversity in the interviewees. I wonder what more I could have found out from the perspective of a more diverse group of interviewees. Further, I now wonder if I should have included focus groups in addition to the semi-structured interviews. On the one hand, I might have gleaned even more information, but on the other, I might not have elicited as candid answers as I did when the discussion was just between me and the individual cadets.

Regarding the use of the VIA, in the Jubilee Centre's study on the British Army, the researchers checked the officers' self-reported character strengths to see if they related to the AICM dilemma scores. They found that the military dilemmas were significantly and positively

correlated with the officers' self-reported character strengths on military related virtues[43] (Arthur, Walker and Thoma, 2018, 25). Unfortunately, in the current study, there was no positive or negative correlation found for the cadets' self-reported character strengths with their performance on the ARETE. No perceptible pattern emerged.

Finally, it is important to point out that a limitation to this study was that I was one of the instructors taking part in the PY201 course evaluation. While I tried my best to remain neutral in the data analyses, it is possible that confirmation bias (MacCoun, 1998; Nickerson, 1998; Kaptchuk, 2003) and an instructor effect (Nye, Konstantopoulus and Hedges, 2004) could have played a role in the performance of my individual students and affected the outcome of the study. In future studies on cadet and military moral reasoning, the person running the study might want to exclude themselves from an instructing role within the study.

5.7 Significance of Situations in Moral Reasoning and Moral Action

Some social psychologists do not believe in the importance of a person's character. In fact, these 'situationists' argue that when people (including academics) inflate the importance of 'personality traits and dispositions' and fail to see the importance of situational factors when it comes to people's behaviour, they commit a 'fundamental attribution error' (Doris, 2002; Harman, 1999; Ross and Nesbitt 1991). Situationism, as a theory, argues that it is the situation individuals find themselves in that has the influence on behaviour and not the individuals' past

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[43] The military related character strengths were judgement, honesty, bravery, perseverance, fairness, leadership, prudence and self-regulation.

experiences, dispositions or feelings (Doris, 2002; 2005; 2010a; 2010b; Kamtekar, 2004;

Fletcher; 1966; Ross and Nesbitt 1991).

The most prominent situationist in the last 20 years is John Doris. Not only does he

believe the situation is important in moral decision-making, but Doris (2002, 2) also believes that

'behavior is extraordinarily sensitive to variation in circumstance'. Doris (2002, 6) goes on to say

that 'the problem with character explanations […is that…] they presuppose the existence of

character structures that actual people do not very often possess'. Doris sites several 20th century

social psychology experiments in defence of his thesis. He posits that the experiments show that

situations have a powerful influence on decision making (Doris, 2002, 2-3). Average and

ordinary people, when placed in unfamiliar situations, can be amenable to electrically shocking a

screaming victim (Milgram, 1963; 1962) and are equally willing to enforce authoritarian

measures and subject others to psychological torture (Zimbardo, 1992; 1974).

To illustrate his point about situational ethics, Doris uses the example of sexual fidelity.

He asks the reader to imagine a scenario where your spouse is out of town and a colleague, that

you have a long-standing flirtation with, asks you to dinner with delectable food and delicious

wine (Doris, 2002, 147). Further, he asks you to assume that the likely culmination of this

rendezvous is infidelity, and that this would be an 'ethically undesirable outcome'. Doris offers

two approaches to this scenario. Either you are not concerned about the dinner because you are

the epitome of impeccable character and know that infidelity is a vice resulting in your refusal of

attempts at seduction, or you take this notion of situationism to heart and absolutely avoid the

dinner at all costs. You choose the latter option, according to Doris, because you cannot predict

how you will act in this situation despite valuing fidelity. You know that the temptation may be

too great, especially as inhibitions start to drop as the wine is imbibed. His point is that situational circumstances overwhelm a person's character and thus behaviour is actually not based on your character, but in fact on situational factors.

I do think it wise to encourage people not to put themselves in a situation where they may be tempted. I absolutely love donuts. However, twice a year I must be fit for an army physical fitness exam. Further, the older I get, the harder it is to shed excess weight. Knowing my penchant, and weakness, for donuts, it would be wise to pick up my morning coffee at a coffee house like Starbucks, then say, Dunkin Donuts.

Often people conflate the terms 'self-control' and 'willpower'. While they sound synonymous, they are actually about different things when looked at through an academic lens. 'Willpower' is described as the 'straightforward, brute force approach to doing what is in one's best interest when an alluring alternative beckons' (Duckworth, Milkman and Laibson; Mahoney and Thoresen, 1972). Duckworth et al. (2018) describe self-control as a tension between 'want' and 'should'. It is the distinction between a normative requirement and desire. The 'should' behaviour enables a goal of long-term success (e.g., saving for retirement, healthy eating habits, regular exercise). The 'want' behaviour is more enticing in the now, despite knowing what is better for you in the long run (purchasing a convertible, having extra donuts, skipping your evening run in order to watch Netflix). For Duckworth et al. (2018), when people pursue the 'should' behaviour, they enjoy 'self-control success' and when they pursue the 'want' behaviour, they experience 'self-control failure'.

Often those with the least willpower exert the strongest self-control (i.e. by staying away from situations where their willpower will be tested). A good example of this is from Homer's

Odyssey. In it the Greek hero Odysseus knows that his willpower will be tested beyond the breaking point by the Sirens. Knowing that he and his men may succumb to their singing, he instructs his men to put beeswax in their ears and tie him securely to the mast and do not untie him no matter his pleas in the moment.

There have been many publications of late in psychology challenging situationism either empirically or conceptually or both (see e.g., Jayawickreme and Fleeson, 2017; Ng & Tay, 2020). It would take me too far afield to delve into all the details of that discourse here, but I want to offer the following observations only. While I do agree that our behaviour is sensitive to situational factors, I believe that is more likely because we are continent in certain virtues at best and incontinent at worst. Clearly a vicious person would absolutely be influenced by situation. As a person who believes that developing one's character is important toward flourishing as a human being, it is hard to argue against the idea that if we want to be people of good character, surely, we will want to put ourselves in positive situations and away from negative situations. This is not antithetical to character education or virtue ethics. However, only relying on situation modification as your strategy in prevention of vice, bad decisions or bad actions is going to come up short. This is why situation modification is a complement to character education, not a replacement of it. Situation modification assists us in improving character education practices, rather than making the foundations of Aristotelian virtue ethics and character education redundant (Annas, 2005; Arpaly, 2005; Kamtekar, 2004; Miller, 2018; 2003; Samuels and Casebeer, 2005; Upton, 2009). Situation modification strategies could present themselves, for instance, as 1) always making sure another colleague or your spouse is with you when you meet with the flirtatious colleague, 2) only get coffee at Starbucks and not Dunkin Donuts and 3) a

cadet not putting themselves in a position when it would be easy to cheat on a test or putting a fellow cadet in a position to either be loyal to their fellow cadet and their bad action or to be honest and uphold the Cadet Honor Code. If you make use of situation modification strategies now, you make it 'harder for your future self to get into bad situations and easier for your future self to get into good situations' (Miller, 2018, 205).

By actively seeking out situations which encourage us to act well, while actively avoiding situations replete with temptation, we are developing our practical wisdom which is a virtue and key component to developing character. This holds importance for the Profession of Arms as often ethical decisions we make in war are made under extreme situations. Do you target and fire at a group that has 15 insurgents firing weapons at you, but is in front of a mosque? What if a child is monitoring your location and pulls out a radio to call in your position? Do you shoot the child to prevent the enemy knowing your location? If you can use a drone to destroy a car driven by your commander's HVI (high value individual) and number one on the target deck if his 8-year-old so is also in the car? If the wife of a known insurgent, and this insurgent was responsible for the death of your best friend, refuses to tell you her husband's location, do you 'soften her up' to get the answer you are looking for? If she still refuses, do you torture her until she confesses his location? We cannot always control environmental situations or conditions. We can say we are not going to get our coffee at Dunkin Donuts, but we cannot say, I am not going to fight the enemy in battle today. However, if you are a person of good character, you are going to fare better in those situations you cannot control like fighting justly in war. In many cases, soldiers can regret decisions made in war, which haunt them for a lifetime. This is referred to as a moral

injury (Litz et al., 2009; Sherman, 2015, 174).[44] Being rash in combat (vice of excess) could lead to the death of one of your soldiers, equally, being cowardly in war (vice of deficiency) could lead to death of a fellow soldier. To use Doris' example of dinner with the flirting colleague, it is one thing to lose a marriage over infidelity, and quite another to try to overcome the weight of a brother or sister-in arms' death that was due to your action or inaction.

While it is hard to employ situation modification strategies in combat, they are indeed possible at West Point. One situation modification strategy is to seek out another person you look up to as a moral exemplar. Think of this as moral mentorship. Often junior officers and cadets develop a mentorship with a more senior officer that they admire. As I mentioned on page 54, Aristotle pointed out that mentorship is important. We need moral exemplars to act as moral mentors to help develop character and virtues in younger, less practically wise people. These moral mentors will encourage us to make good decisions and eschew choices that we may live to regret. As mentioned above, soldiers can regret decisions made in war, which can haunt them for a lifetime.

Another situation modification strategy that West Point actually uses, is the Cadet Honor Code as mentioned on page 40 and page 230, which states: 'A cadet will not lie, cheat, steal, or tolerate those who do'. The later portion is referred to as the 'Toleration Clause' which is a call to all cadets to encourage another cadet to turn themselves in to their senior officers or do so if the guilty cadet will not. Knowing that another cadet could turn you is a deterrent to cheating or

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[44] There are a variety of definitions of 'moral injury' and those are very similar in description. One definition of moral injury from Litz et al. (2009) is 'perpetrating, failing to prevent, bearing witness to, or learning about acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations'. Sherman (2015) stresses the fact the transgressions can be real or perceived and cause deep moral suffering. She points out that occurrences of survivor guilt may not have come from a real transgression, even though it causes a sense of failing another and falling short.

lying. If your grade in a certain course is poor, and you feel quite certain that either no one will know that you cheated, or a fellow cadet will keep your secret, it is tempting to cheat. If on the other hand, you are not sure if the fellow cadet that is cheating with you will not feel guilty and turn themselves in, along with you, or someone finds out that the other cadet cheated, this should really make a cadet think twice about cheating.

The Covid-19 Pandemic has forced many universities and colleges in higher education to move their in-person courses to online platforms. This has made it significantly easier for students to cheat on course examinations (Isai, 2020; Newton, 2020). A surprising number of universities and colleges have reported cheating through group texts or apps like GroupMe or WhatsApp, including Texas A&M University (McGee, 2020) and the University of Missouri (Williams, 2020). This is not solely a US problem. Researchers are also seeing cheating in UK universities rise during the pandemic. In some instances, universities have uncovered multiple separate cheating instances (Williams, 2020). Even Ivy League schools such as the University of Pennsylvania (Perlman, 2020) are seeing 'a wave of cheating'. West Point, despite developing leaders of character, as stated in the West Point Mission Statement, has not been immune to the temptations of online cheating during the pandemic (Vanden Brook, 2020). More than 70 cadets were accused, with 58 cadets admitting to cheating on a maths test taken online. In these instances, how do you present situation modification strategies? Character education and situation modification strategies like moral mentorship and the Cadet Honor Code ideally work together at West Point. Additionally, when course have to be taught online, like during the Covid-19 Pandemic, if it is a humanities course, give more essays, blog entries or other individual writing assignments to reduce the opportunity to cheat due to the requirement of

original work instead of quizzes or multiple-choice examinations that makes sharing answers easy. If it is a STEM course such as maths, like calculus, or chemistry that require problem sets, allow cadets to use their books and notes on the examinations. This takes away the situation and the need to cheat.

So, if 1) strategies work in helping cadets make moral choices while at West Point, 2) cadets receive character education through their 47 month experience at West Point, 3) the cadets have moral mentorships guiding them while at WP, 3) after graduation they maintain moral mentorships as a young officers, 4) become a moral mentor for others, 5) understand the moral significance of just war theory, then this collective moral education should ideally allow more soldiers than otherwise to rely on their character in combat when they are unable to control the situation or incorporate situation modification strategies.

What stands out at the end of this discussion is also the need to make situation-modification techniques more explicit in teaching about character and virtues at West Point. It is tempting to confine character education to high-minded virtues and to budding *phronimoi*. However, if more indirect methods work better, or at least complement more direct character education – even if Aristotle would have referred to them as a second-best tack – those should be incorporated in any well-rounded programme of character coaching.

5.8 Negative and Positive Influences on Cadet Character

When thinking about ways to improve character development, not just in PY201, but across the 47-month West Point experience, Lamb, Brant and Brooks' (2021) university strategies for

character development is a great place to start. Their seven strategies for character development are: 1) habituation through practice, 2) reflection on personal experience, 3) engagement with virtuous exemplars, 4) dialogue that increases virtue literacy, 5) awareness of situational variables, 6) moral reminders, and 7) friendships of mutual accountability.

How could West Point use these seven strategies? I believe that it starts with virtue literacy. Virtue literacy is the 'capacity to know and understand the necessary language and virtue concepts required to evaluate morally salient situations' (Arthur et al., 2017, 94). There are two components to virtue literacy: 1) providing ways in which people can learn virtue terms and their meaning and 2) encouraging them to use these terms in practical ways in real life. The key to the success of virtue literacy is through familiarity and frequency of use of the virtue terms. Virtue literacy is consistent with Aristotle's point that if we 'discuss particular aspects of character one at a time, we will acquire a better knowledge of them' (1985, 108 [1127a16–17]). While having the ability to discuss virtue terms is insufficient to guarantee virtuous behaviour, it is the place we must start. A mastery of virtue literacy is necessary in order to utilise the other strategies, to include reflection, habituation through practice and engagement with virtuous exemplars (moral mentors).

Once we have been introduced to, and have an understanding of, virtue terms, then we need to practise the virtues and reflect on our use of the virtue terms in practical ways. As I mentioned in the basketball example back in Section 2.2.3, this early practising of virtues is referred to as habituation. It is not enough to read a book or watch a YouTube video of how to shoot a free throw, you must actually try to shoot free throws. Further, you need to do it in different situations and conditions in order to improve your shoot. Similarly, it is not enough to

read about virtue terms, we must practise them in practical daily ways. While it can be done within the context of just living your life, it is also done through your professional practices (Schwartz and Sharpe, 2010, 271).

An important component of virtue education at more developed stages (e.g., with young adults) is the strategy of reflection on personal experience. Once you have virtue literacy and you are practising the virtues, you need to reflect on the experience of using the virtues. Did I use the right amount of the virtue in that moment this morning? Reflecting on the situation in which you employed a certain virtue, will help you improve the virtue the next time you exercise it. If you reflect on how your free throw hits the rim if you do not put enough arch on the ball as it is released, it will help you remember to add arch when you are in the intense moment of a spirited and passionate game that rests on your ability to make the free throw in the last second to win the game.

Another strategy to help with virtuous action is engaging with virtuous exemplars. These are other people in your profession that have been practising virtues for a long period of time and have learned strategies they can impart for choosing and practising virtues. I refer to these people as moral mentors. Situational variables could have an impact on how, and even if, we employ virtues in practical situations. As mentioned here in Chapter 5, situationists, like Doris, believe that people commit a 'fundamental attribution error' (Doris, 2002; Harman, 1999; Ross and Nesbitt 1991) when they overinflate the importance of character and virtue in behaviour. While I disagree with the situationists that the situation is the most important aspect in predicting moral action, clearly there is something to this line of thinking. If you keep putting yourself in a tempting situation, it is going to be very difficult to continually employ the virtues. As I

mentioned back in section 5.7, using situation modification strategies like the Cadet Honor Code and moral mentorship can help cadets act virtuously.

Moral reminders are another strategy to employ in character education. Sometimes we need a reminder that certain actions are not in line with the virtues we have adopted or the professional practice we have inculcated. While most of us know that cheating is wrong, people still do it. Interestingly, Miller (2018, 134) refers to studies that when given the opportunity to cheat, if required to recite the 10 Commandments before doing so, people are less likely to cheat. Moral reminders 'call our attention to our moral commitments … and make it much more difficult in our own mind to justify doing the wrong thing' (Miller, 2018, 134).

Friendships of mutual accountability is a strategy that points out that not only are we going through life, and this profession together, we have decided to live virtuously. Sometimes, maybe based on situations, we find it difficult to do the morally right action. Our friends can remind us of who we are and who we want to be. They will help us choose the morally right action.

How might we go about adopting Lamb, Brant and Brooks' seven university strategies for character development at West Point? I believe that there are plenty of officers at West Point to serve as moral mentors for cadets. In many instances it happens organically, as well as part of the curriculum in certain courses like PL300 – Military Leadership. Additionally, I believe that the Cadet Honor Code (and its Toleration Clause) serves as a moral reminder, helps with encouraging situation modification, and enables cadets to have friendships of mutual accountability. Reciting the Cadet Honor Code aloud before taking exams or typing it on the coversheet of essays, might help decrease the instances of cheating. Encouraging situation

modification strategies like the Cadet Honor Code and moral mentorship can help cadets act virtuously as well.

Knowing that, how might we go about incorporating virtue literacy, habituation through practice and reflection on personal experience at West Point? I believe it must be done from the very beginning of the 47-month experience and reinforced throughout a cadet's time at West Point. Cadets report to 'Cadet Basic Training' at the very beginning of July and spend six weeks learning army tactics, techniques and procedures; this is the professional practice referenced back in Chapter 2 (Schwartz and Sharpe, 2010, 271). This is where all five domains of virtue can be introduced, practised and reflected on. In Chapter Section 2.2.3 on page 47, I discussed the four neo-Aristotelian categories of virtues (Intellectual Virtues, Moral Virtues, Civic Virtues, and Performance Virtues), and recommended the adoption of what I call the Martial Virtues (see pp. 66 – 70 and Tables 3 and 4 on pp. 69 – 70).

I believe that one way to incorporate virtue literacy, habituation through practice and reflection in Cadet Basic Training is through a small 'Character and Virtue Journal'.[45] It could be a paper copy published at the printing facility at West Point, and then ultimately developed into an app that can be used on a tablet or computer. Firstly, every person, every department and every directorate at West Point must agree on the adoption of this framework for character education to include all five categories of virtues. Courses that touch on ethics and/or behaviour need to reinforce the character development framework in their curriculum. This would be

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[45] The journal idea was inspired by the Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues' 'My Character Journal' that as developed as part of a study that ran from May 2011 to April 2014 involving over 1,000 young people throughout the United Kingdom. More information on 'My Character Journal' at https://www.jubileecentre.ac.uk/1631/character-education/teacher-resources/my-character

essential to continue developing virtue literacy. Second, for the new cadets coming to Cadet Basic Training, they receive their journal for their six weeks in basic training. This journal would have a visual representation of the five categories of virtues and how they work together. Next, the journal would have a glossary of the virtue terms with their definitions. The journal would have clear, but simple, instructions on how to use it. At the end of each day, a cadet can reflect on their day, and could check off three virtues (that include virtues from all five categories) that had been the most important to them through the course of the day. At the end of the week, they would have a section for weekly reflection and the cadet can simply list out the virtues that they had developed over the week and the virtues that would like to focus on in the coming week. They can use some of the same virtues if they feel they need to still work on a specific virtue, or they can focus on new virtues. Then there would be a page where they can write out in prose their personal reflections on their character and virtues for the week. Finally, at the end of the journal there would be a few blank pages for the cadet to write their reflections of the virtues they developed over Cadet Basic Training and how it affected their character. If this were a success, it could be expanded to their military summer training over the next two summers at West Point, or even something they do each semester while they are engaged in academics.

As mentioned, courses that touch on ethics and/or behaviour need to reinforce the character development framework in their curriculum. They could do it in a variety of ways, to include the Character and Virtue Journal or something similar like a class 'Character blog'. Examples of these types of courses could be spread out over their 47-month experience to reinforce character and virtues such as PY201 – Philosophy and Ethical Reasoning, PL100 – General Psychology for Leaders, PL300 – Military Leadership, MX400 – Officership and a

variety of history courses that use historical exemplars, villains and good people who have done bad things.

Finally, a formal moral mentorship programme at West Point, coupled with informal relationships with virtuous exemplars, should be established to help cadets grapple with profession-centric moral dilemmas, as well as dilemmas that come up by virtue of just being alive. After four years with their mentor, cadets would likely reach back to the moral mentors as they encounter moral dilemmas throughout their military career and began to serve as moral mentors for cadets and younger officers.

CHAPTER 6. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

For mankind are by no means agreed about what the things to be taught […] Neither is it clear whether education is more concerned with intellectual or with moral virtue – Aristotle (Politics, 1337a36-9)

6.1 Recommendations for Future Research

For future research on improving moral reasoning in specific courses at a military academy, I would increase both the sample size, as well as the number and diversity of instructors involved in the study. For instance, PY201 typically has 12 to 15 instructors teaching between 500 and 600 cadets in a given semester. That could mean four to five times more than the number of instructors participating in the current study and more than four times the number of cadets participating. This would provide more substantial data to examine trends in demographics such as gender and ethnicity, although too large a sample increases the danger of 'noise' and 'false positives' in the findings. Additionally, I would recommend that researchers continue conducting the study as a course evaluation, as this allows the researcher(s) to see if there has been improvement in the cadets' moral reasoning over time. To further test the moral reasoning of cadets over time, it might be beneficial to follow a full class of cadets and test their moral reasoning once a year for each of the four years they are at West Point, possibly as they take courses that include some type of character education as part of their curriculum across the

academy.[46] By doing so, researchers will generate a large sample size and multiple assessment

points across four years.

Another recommendation for future research would be to assess the moral reasoning of

students from all US Army's commissioning sources with an army-centric ICM, like the ALERT

or ARETE. There are three ways to commission as an officer into the US Army. The first is

through the Academy (West Point). The second army-officer commissioning source is through

the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programme (US Army ROTC, 2020).[47] ROTC is a

programme offered at more than 1,700 colleges and universities in the United States (Today's

Military, 2020). The programme trains and develops university students to become officers in the

military. The ROTC programme pays for the university tuition and fees and guarantees post-

graduate employment as a military officer, and the university student commits to serve in the

Army upon graduation. The third and final commissioning source is the United States Army

Officer Candidate School (2020). Officer Candidate School (OCS) is a 12-week intensive

military leadership course open to enlisted personnel that have a university or college degree.[48]

The OCS course culminates with a commission in the US Army. A potentially interesting study

could be done using an army-centric ICM to compare the moral reasoning of future army officers

from these three commissioning sources. Additionally, a fourth group, consisting of army officers

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[46] As mentioned in Section 2.4, some of the required classes across the Academy's curriculum that could integrate character education are the first year required class PL100 'General Psychology for Leaders', the second year required class PY201 'Philosophy and Ethical Reasoning', the third year required class PL300 'Military Leadership' and finally MX400 'Officership', which is the fourth year required class.

[47] To find out more about the US Army's ROTC Program, visit https://www.goarmy.com/rotc.html.

[48] To find out more about the US Army's OCS Program, visit https://www.goarmy.com/careers-and-jobs/current-and-prior-service/advance-your-career/officer-candidate-school.html.

across the US Army (similar to the Jubilee Centre's study with British Army officers), could be used to compare the moral reasoning of recruits from the different commissioning sources.

Since completing research for this project, I have retired as a US Army officer and have taken up a position as the Character Development Integrator for the Military Program at West Point. This new position requires me to design and implement character education across the military curriculum at West Point. My ambitions in that role, and in my future research on character, include introducing and reinforcing character through the Jubilee Centre's approach of 'Taught, Caught, and Sought' (Jubilee Centre, 2017, 2020). Cadets at West Point can 'catch' good character from those around them, such as faculty, staff, senior cadets and peers alike. Cadets can be 'taught' good character theoretically, in courses like those mentioned in Section 2.4. Additionally, cadets can develop character through 'sought' opportunities in the many sports, clubs and organisations available to cadets at West Point. In order to introduce character education into different parts of the curriculum, I would like to develop a USMA Character Integration Matrix. The USMA Character Integration Matrix will allow West Point to see how best to incorporate character into these programmes and make sure we are not unintentionally losing opportunities to include character development opportunities. Finally, I would like to develop several assessments in order to see where our shortcomings are at West Point. The assessment in which I would be most interested would be a longitudinal study using an ICM, like the ALERT and ARETE, that a whole class takes each year during their time at the academy to assess their moral reasoning.

6.1.1 Trends of Approaching Statistical Significance

Another reason to conduct this, or a similar research study, with a much larger sample size is that during this study there were some results 'trending toward statistical significance' or were 'approaching statistical significance'. Approaching statistical significance means that a result did not meet the predetermined significance criterion (for example, the α level was set as < .05, and the P value for the finding was .08) but was close. By conducting the research with a larger sample size one of two things could happen. Either the results will reach statistical significance or move even further away from significance. Either way, this will give the researcher more information by attaining significance or can be completely ruling significance out. If this or a similar study is replicated, the researcher(s) should be mindful of the following interactions that have a P value slightly above .05.

There are several such interactions to look out for in the ARETE. First, the three-way interaction between Time by Choice by Gender, $F(1,127)=3.06$, $p=.08$, np2=.02. Specifically, female cadets close the gap between their action and justification/reason choices after the invention. Second, the two-way interaction between Time by Ethnicity interaction, $F(1,127)=2.43$, $p=.12$, np2=.02 indicating that ethnicity might influence the factor of Time (pre- to post-test) if a larger sample size was used. The moderator Ethnicity affects the cadets' scores with Time, showing an upward trend for white cadets and a downward trend for minority cadets. Additionally, there are several interactions to observe for with the VIA. As when looking at the moderator Ethnicity affecting the cadets' scores with Time, similarly when looking at the two-way between-subjects test of the VIA character strength of Wisdom and the moderator Ethnicity $F(2,118)=2.42$, $p=.09$, np2=.04, it also shows an upward trend for white cadets and a downward

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trend for minority cadets, particularly the medium score group. Finally, when evaluating the results in the relationships between Time, the VIA Self-Control cluster and Ethnicity, for between-subjects effects shows the VIA Self-Control $F(2,118)=2.14$, $p=.12$, $np2=.04$, also shows an upward trend for white cadets and a downward trend for minority cadets, particularly the medium score group.

6.2 Personal Reflection on Doctoral Study

While I have believed for some time that virtue ethics is the best ethical framework for the military, and specifically for young cadets and soldiers, this study has confirmed my beliefs. Deontological rule-following is insufficient. Further, we do not want to excuse away our actions in the Profession of Arms by applying the crude utilitarian notion of 'the ends justify the means'. This study has shown me that while the morally right decision is important, the more important concept is the reason or justification for that action. Only virtue ethics can accomplish this in a fully 'non-self-effacing' way. An ethical theory is 'self-effacing' if it tells us that, sometimes, we should be motivated by considerations other than those which justify our acts. Being self-effacing is, in my view, a serious defect of consequentialist theories, for instance. There is a thin line between being self-effacing in this sense and being wilfully self-deceitful. Some critics dismiss virtue ethics because, in default of any clear-cut rules, it does not provide direct moral action guidance. In fact, as Hursthouse (1999, 36–39) and others (Athanassoulis, 2018) have shown, there are implicit virtue-derived rules (v-rules) that help guide our action and yet still help us understand the reasoning behind the morally right decision, which deontology and utilitarianism cannot do in the same way. The example of the Torture Dilemmas, for example, convinced me

that once a virtue conflict is discussed satisfactorily along virtue ethical lines (and becomes 'familiar' in the above-mentioned sense), it develops practical reason which, in turn, provides non-self-effacing action guidance (cf. Darnell et al., 2019).

Another positive outcome of this study is that it has helped me see that programmes and institutions need rigorous studies to help assess whether their character education programmes and curricula are working: to see if students are *in fact* improving their moral reasoning. Without wanting to cast aspersions on various current efforts at the tertiary level in the United States that go by the name of 'character education', it is rare to see them backed up with satisfactory empirical evidence (as opposed to mere anecdotal evidence and hunches). This study has helped me see that it takes a very deliberate and focused effort to try to develop moral reasoning in young people, and that without rigorous pre-and-post tests, it is easy to be self-deceived about the effectiveness of those efforts, let alone their generalisability and scalability. This whole doctoral process has made me excited to develop and engage in my next research study.

In hindsight, there are so many things I would go back and do differently given the opportunity, but this is a learning experience, and these valuable lessons I will be able to take with me. My next empirical study will hopefully be a much better study thanks to this doctoral project and the trials and errors of this whole process.

6.3 Summary of the Empirical Part of the Thesis

In short, my empirical findings in this thesis *confirmed* the existing knowledge base in a number of ways such as:

- Female cadets outperformed the males in moral reasoning.

- The female cadets came into the study with a better grasp of the concepts measured by the ARETE and improved over their time in PY201. For instance, the female cadets improved on all five of the moral dilemmas on the ARETE, whereas the male cadets went down in all of the moral dilemmas, except for the one on torture.

- The male cadets were inconsistent across the dilemmas, remained flat post-test, and had a more scattershot profile than the female cadets.

My findings *complemented* the existing knowledge base in the following way:

- Students conflated common virtue-and-character related terms, such as empathy and compassion. Such lack of virtue literacy is well-known from previous literatures, but mainly drawn from studies of younger students.

Finally, my findings unearthed *some new points* that have not been discussed in previous literatures, such as:

- The observation that cadet performance was tied to familiar dilemmas versus unfamiliar dilemmas is significant.

- The cadets were not able to carry over ethical concepts or reason about them correctly in different circumstances, topics or situations, which is problematic.

6.4 Main Lessons from the Whole Project

For a summary of the main conclusions of this doctoral study as a whole, I refer readers back to the abstract at the beginning of the thesis. Without wanting to repeat what I have said there or in Section 6.3, I consider the following to be the most important lessons that I took from this whole project.

The first main lesson of this study is that, for a variety of potential reasons, female cadets start at a higher baseline in moral reasoning than do male cadets at roughly the same age. Further, while female cadets do improve post-test, male cadets remain stagnant in moral reasoning. A second lesson is that cadets at West Point are (despite their presumed relatively high academic competence) not able to take ethical concepts and apply them to novel or complex dilemmas or situations without explicit help from instructors. A third lesson from this study is that cadets struggle to reason well about the right action and justification when two or more virtues collide. Further, the cadets are prone to prioritising character traits that are not virtues and might not be traits that lead to virtuous actions.

All three of these lessons are potentially useful as they allow West Point the opportunity to both know what the moral reasoning shortcomings of the cadets are and also suggest solutions to help resolve these deficiencies. First, we at West Point need to change the way we approach training in moral reasoning, as traditional instruction methods are not working. Using more active

learning techniques to address moral dilemmas in the classroom via multiple team-based learning, cooperative learning groups, small group discussion, small group work and peer-to-peer teaching (Reddy, 2000; Gleason et al., 2011; Bromley, 2013; Paolini, 2015) has been recommended.

Additionally, if we want to help cadets prioritise character traits that are virtues and subsequently adjudicate which virtue has primacy when they conflict, we need to help them, in the first instance, to develop their 'virtue literacy' (Jubilee Centre, 2017). Researchers in this field often seem to take it for granted that all grown-ups, at least, understand the relevant virtue terms (such as 'gratitude', 'compassion', 'honesty') and what they imply. However, my interviews revealed the fact that even relatively mature students at West Point may be lacking in the basic virtue literacy required to understand what exactly those terms mean and how they are differentiated – witness, for example, the common conflation of 'empathy' with 'compassion'. Acting virtuously in the Aristotelian sense requires a basic understanding of a virtue vocabulary (Vasalou, 2012). Hence 'virtue literacy' must be a primary goal of introduction to, and initiation into, a virtue ethical mindset. We also must not let theoretical purity, and a romanticised view of 'full virtue' as an ideal, direct us a way from 'second-best' methods to instil virtuous behaviour in cadets, for example through systematic use of situation-modification techniques.

Finally, if virtue and character are to be the ethos of the United States Military Academy at West Point by commissioning 'leaders of character', as stated in our Mission Statement, then this ethos needs to be reinforced in every aspect of our institution. As the Jubilee Centre (2017) points out, character should be reinforced 'on the playing fields, in classrooms, corridors' as well as in teacher-student interactions, assemblies and all modes of communication. This advice,

which was originally geared towards primary and secondary schools, seems to apply equally well at the tertiary level, such as at West Point.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: The Army Reasoning and Ethical
Training and Education Test (ARETE)

(The questionnaire below is a copy of the paper and pencil version given to the cadets pre- and post-test.)

Army Reasoning and Ethical Training Education Test (ARETE)

Cover Sheet

Participant Code Number: _____

This cover sheet is designed to separate your name from your survey by using a code number. This will enable Major Parsons to contact individuals who have agreed to be interviewed.

Name _____ Class _____ C# _____

Contact email:_____

Contact Number: _____

This cover sheet is to be removed from the survey and handed to Major Parsons on completion.

The separated sheet will be placed in an envelope that Major Parsons will store in a locked cabinet in his office in Lincoln Hall. Access will be limited to Major Parsons. The list of names will be destroyed after interviews have taken place.

Army Reasoning and Ethical Training Education Test (ARETE)

I.   DIRECTIONS

Thank you for taking this questionnaire. Your careful consideration on the different questions is greatly appreciated. It will take you approximately 35-45 minutes to complete the questionnaire. The questionnaire contains five stories that present ethical challenges for military personnel. For each story, you are asked to take the role of the main character. After the stories, there is a list of possible action choices that the main characters can use to react to the dilemmas. Military professionals have suggested these action choices. Using the provided scale, rate each action choice. Then, pick the two best and two worst choices. Please select your answers based on how you would honestly handle the situation.

When you have finished rating and ranking the action choices, you will be asked to rate and rank several ideas in terms of their relevance to you in making your decision on how to handle the presented situation.

Should you think of actions or ideas that seem better than the options presented, write them in the provided area, but please rank choices from the options presented. Keep in mind that there is no single right answer to each case. Rather, some choices are better than others are, and some are probably not relevant. Your careful consideration of each story and the items that follow is greatly appreciated.

Also, if you have any suggestions to improve the questionnaire, please write your comments in the comment block at the end of the questionnaire.

These directions may seem complicated, but once you begin taking the questionnaire they will become clearer.

This is extremely important and I thank you for your frank and honest answers.

II. DEMOGRAPHICS SECTION

* 1. What is your gender?

◯   Female
◯   Male

* 2. What is your age?

◯ 17-19   ◯ 26-29
◯ 20-22   ◯ 30-39
◯ 23-25   ◯ 40 and Over

What is your ethnicity?
- ☐ White American – (Non-Hispanic or Latino)
- ☐ White American – (Hispanic or Latino)
- ☐ African American
- ☐ American Indian
- ☐ Asian American
- ☐ Alaska Native
- ☐ Native Hawaiian
- ☐ Other Pacific Islander
- ☐ Mixed Background
- ☐ Other Ethnic Background (please write) _____
- ☐ Don't know
- ☐ Rather not say

What is your religion?
- ☐ Christianity
- ☐ Buddhism
- ☐ Judaism
- ☐ Islam
- ☐ Hinduism
- ☐ Sikhism
- ☐ Atheist (non-believer)
- ☐ Other (please write) _____
- ☐ Don't know
- ☐ Rather not say

* 3. Do you have prior enlisted military experience?

○   Yes
○   No

    1. **If yes, how many years?**

          ┌──────────────┐
          │   │
          └──────────────┘

* 4. Do you have combat experience?

○   Yes
○   No

    5. **List the name of the Combat Operation(s) you participated in (write N/A if it does not apply)**

          ┌──────────────┐
          │   │
          └──────────────┘

* 6. When you were growing up, did you have a parent/guardian who was career military?

○   Yes
○   No

III. CPT METCALFE CASE

CPT Metcalfe is the S-4 of a military police battalion deployed to Somalia to provide humanitarian assistance to the Somali people, and to restore order in southern Somalia. Armed bandits and rival clan factions continue to operate throughout Somalia, creating a hostile environment for the advancement of humanitarian aid and economic assistance. During several mission briefs, CPT Metcalfe learned that Somali bandits and clansmen routinely used innocent civilians (women, children, elderly, etc.) as human shields or decoys. In fact, just two days ago, two soldiers from CPT Metcalfe's unit were ambushed and killed while their squad was investigating a disturbance reported by a female. It was later determined that the disturbance was fabricated in order to set an ambush.

On this day, CPT Metcalfe and three of her soldiers are moving in their armored HMMWV, through the streets of Mogadishu enroute to a checkpoint on a non-time sensitive resupply mission. Another HMMWV with three soldiers is following close behind. While traveling, they come across a Somali who was severely wounded (covered in blood from his abdomen all the way down to his feet) and is surrounded by a crowd of people. A soldier riding with CPT Metcalfe recognizes the injured man as a person who provided them with information that led to the capture of several bandits. Current soldier rules are that soldiers collect and care for the wounded, whether friend or foe. CPT Metcalfe does not know the situation that has led to the man's injury but is aware that the area they are in is known to have insurgents and frequent ambushes. The personnel in the two vehicles are only lightly armed and probably could not repulse an organized ambush. It appears the injured Somali is sure to die if he does not receive immediate medical attention. What should CPT Metcalfe do?

* 1. Now, using the scale below, rate each of the following actions that CPT Metcalfe should take to deal with the situation. Rating can be used more than once.

	I strongly believe this is a GOOD choice.	I believe this is a GOOD choice.	I am not sure.	I believe this is a BAD choice.	I strongly believe this is a BAD choice.
1. Bypass the injured Somali and continue the assigned mission.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
2. Stop, set-up security, provide medical assistance and call and wait for medical support.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
3. Bypass the injured Somali but call in the know location and request medical support with armored escort.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
4. Set-up security, retrieve the Somali, and immediately transport him to the nearest aid station	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
5. Radio back to her headquarters to request guidance on how to handle the situation.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
6. Continue her mission, but leave two soldiers with the inured Somali to provide security and assistance until a requested medical ambulance arrives.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
7. Set-up security, retrieve the Somali, provide medical assistance, and transport him to the nearest aid station after completing her mission.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

2. Pick the BEST two actions by writing the item number (1-7) below:

Best action   ☐

2nd best action   ☐

3. Pick the WORST two actions by writing the item number (1-7) below:

Worst action   ☐

2nd worst action   ☐

4. Using the scale below rate how relevant to you the following ideas are in making up your mind on how to act.

	I strongly believe this is relevant.	I believe this is relevant.	I am not sure.	I believe this is not relevant.	I strongly believe this is not relevant.
1. A Somali's life is not worth risking the well being of American soldiers.	○	○	○	○	○
2. Stopping to help could affect our ability to accomplish our assigned mission.	○	○	○	○	○
3. I shouldn't risk four lives to save one.	○	○	○	○	○
4. The injured Somali has helped us, so we should help him.	○	○	○	○	○
5. My conscience will bother me if I leave an injured man I could have helped.	○	○	○	○	○
6. It is every human's responsibility to care for an injured person.	○	○	○	○	○

7. The mission doesn't call for me to stop and help a Somali.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
8. I must do what my superior wants.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
9. Even if we stop and help, it looks like the injured Somali will die.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

	I strongly believe this is relevant.	I believe this is relevant.	I am not sure.	I believe this is not relevant.	I strongly believe this is not relevant.
10. We can negate any risk to ourselves if we move in quickly to provide assistance.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
11. We didn't injure the Somali, so let his people take care of him.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
12. If we helped and one of my soldiers were injured or killed, my unit would condemn my actions.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
13. Leaving him to die might discourage other informants from helping us.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
14. The injured Somali could have additional information that could lead to the capture of more bandits.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
15. I will lose the respect of my soldiers if I do not stop.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

16. My soldiers could get hurt or killed.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
17. I could get hurt or killed.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
18. The soldier rules explicitly tell me to collect and care for the wounded.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

5. Pick the two MOST relevant ideas by writing the item number (1 – 18) below:

Most relevant

2nd most relevant

6. Pick the two LEAST relevant ideas by writing the item number (1 – 18) below:

Least relevant

2nd least relevant

IV. CPT BILLUP CASE

CPT Billup's company, due to heavy enemy activity, has been ordered to shift 6 kilometers to the rear to more defensible positions. CPT Billup's company has packed up and is ready to move. CPT Billup has received a special task in the adjustment. He has been told to move to a counterattack position and wait there for orders to attack and flank a fast moving enemy column. His counterattack is extremely important to his taskforce's success and only his unit can reach the position in time.

As CPT Billup and his company are making the necessary arrangements to move out, one of his platoon sergeants tells him that one of two reconnaissance patrols being pulled back to the company has just returned. This two-man patrol reported that they observed members of the other recon patrol, CPL Bobbett and SPC Tree, being captured by a squad of enemy soldiers. The patrol followed the enemy squad on a trail into some dense vegetation and captured the man in the rear of the enemy column at a sharp bend in the trail. That prisoner revealed that his squad is on its way to a safe house, but the prisoner will not reveal its location.

The First Sergeant says, "CPT, we have got to get those guys back! You know what happened to SGT Wright and SPC Field when the enemy captured them. They burned their bodies and dragged the corpses through the streets. If Bobbett and Tree are lucky, they will just be shot!

Give me five minutes with the prisoner the patrol brought back and I will get the exact location of where they took our guys. He will beg to talk to me. If it's close, we can snatch them back in no time."

A quick check of the distance to the counterattack position convinces CPT Billup that he has enough time to conduct a rescue if they can get the information they need from the enemy prisoner. He knows time is not on his side and Bobbett and Tree will most likely be tortured and brutally killed unless they are quickly rescued. The nearest military interrogators are 3 hours from their location. What should CPT Billup do?

1. Using the scale below rate each of the following actions that CPT Billup should take to deal with the situation.

	I strongly believe this is a GOOD choice.	I believe this is a GOOD choice.	I am not sure.	I believe this is a BAD choice.	I strongly believe this is a BAD choice.
1. Let the First Sergeant question the prisoner alone.	O	O	O	O	O
2. Let only a trained interrogator question the prisoner.	O	O	O	O	O
3. Use any means available to get the location of the enemy safe house.	O	O	O	O	O
4. Notify higher headquarters and request guidance.	O	O	O	O	O
5. Transport the prisoner to the friendly POW collection point and move the company immediately to its counterattack position.	O	O	O	O	O
6. Force the prisoner to guide a rescue party to the enemy safe house.	O	O	O	O	O
7. Monitor the First Sergeant's questioning of the prisoner to ensure proper procedures are followed.	O	O	O	O	O
8. Allow the torture of the prisoner to get the location of the	O	O	O	O	O

captured soldiers, but afterwards, turn self over to superiors to take responsibility for actions.

2. Pick the BEST two actions by writing the item number (1-8) below:

Best action   [   ]

2nd best action   [   ]

3. Pick the WORST two actions by writing the item number (1-8) below:

Worst action   [   ]

2nd worst action   [   ]

4. Using the scale below rate how relevant to you the following ideas are in making up your mind on how to act.

	I strongly believe this is relevant.	I believe this is relevant.	I am not sure.	I believe this is not relevant.	I strongly believe this is not relevant.
1. Whatever the First Sergeant does to get the information won't be as bad as what the enemy will do to our soldiers if we don't rescue them.	○	○	○	○	○
2. I am responsible for the actions of the First Sergeant.	○	○	○	○	○
3. We should not leave fallen comrades.	○	○	○	○	○
4. Two soldier lives are more important than the proper treatment of one prisoner.	○	○	○	○	○
5. I should consider the guidance higher headquarters provides.	○	○	○	○	○
	○	○	○	○	○

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6. I will dishonor my country if I allow mistreatment of the prisoner.

7. Our mistreatment of this prisoner could lead to future mistreatment of other captured US soldiers.

⚪ ⚪ ⚪ ⚪ ⚪

	I strongly believe this is relevant.	**I believe this is relevant.**	**I am not sure.**	**I believe this is not relevant.**	**I strongly believe this is not relevant.**
8. The unit has overlooked any extreme measures taken against prisoners as long as vital information was obtained.	⚪	⚪	⚪	⚪	⚪
9. Established procedures need to be followed when handling prisoners.	⚪	⚪	⚪	⚪	⚪
10. The prisoner has rights that must be protected.	⚪	⚪	⚪	⚪	⚪
11. My responsibility is to my soldiers.	⚪	⚪	⚪	⚪	⚪
12. The only way to get results from this enemy is to use the same tactics they use.	⚪	⚪	⚪	⚪	⚪
13. If I don't get our soldiers back, my soldiers will lose confidence in my ability.	⚪	⚪	⚪	⚪	⚪
14. The death of these two soldiers will negatively affect the morale of my unit.	⚪	⚪	⚪	⚪	⚪
15. I can be relieved of command if higher HQs find out we mistreated prisoners.	⚪	⚪	⚪	⚪	⚪
16. Because of their inhumane actions, the enemy has lost their	⚪	⚪	⚪	⚪	⚪

rights to be treated properly.					
17. No one in the unit would corroborate that I tortured the prisoner.	○	○	○	○	○
18. Torture is cruel and inhumane.	○	○	○	○	○
19. Torture is wrong but morally permissible to save lives.	○	○	○	○	○

5. Pick the two MOST relevant ideas by writing the item number (1 – 19) below:

Most relevant ☐

2nd most relevant ☐

6. Pick the two LEAST relevant ideas by writing the item number (1 – 19) below:

Least relevant ☐

2nd least relevant ☐

V. LT JACOBS CASE

Things couldn't be going any better for LT Jacobs. After two hard months of training and one week of testing, he had earned the Expert Field Medical Badge (EFMB). His best friend, LT Drake, who was the honor graduate, had really helped him in training for the qualification tests. LT Drake, considered the best lieutenant in the battalion, had used most of his free time to make sure LT Jacobs was ready for both the written and performance portion of the test. During qualification, LT Drake had even slowed up his pace on the 12-mile road march to help push LT Jacobs to the finish line. LT Jacobs and Drake had become inseparable ever since the Officer Basic Course and even asked for the same assignment location. Drake had always done well and helped LT Jacobs succeed as well. The leadership in the battalion, especially the battalion commander, really liked LT Drake and saw in him tremendous potential.

The Friday night after the awarding of the EFMB, LT Jacobs and Drake decide to celebrate at a new club that just opened downtown. Within a few minutes, LT Drake meets a very pretty female and her friend. He introduces them to LT Jacobs and the four of them spend the next few hours talking and dancing. LT Jacobs can tell that LT Drake really likes the female he is with.

However, when it is time to leave, the females tell them that they are enlisted soldiers assigned to a logistical battalion on post. LT Jacobs immediately tells them that they are officers and that it is against regulation to establish a personal relationship with them. Drake appears annoyed at Jacobs' comments and whispers something in the female's ear before she leaves. LT Jacobs again reminds LT Drake about the fraternization brief they received a month ago. LT Drake tells Jacobs that he doesn't have to worry about him and that he won't be seeing her again.

Yet, one week later, as LT Jacobs is driving downtown he sees LT Drake and the enlisted female coming out of a coffee shop holding hands. LT Drake sees LT Jacobs watching them. That night LT Jacobs calls LT Drake to ask him what he was doing. LT Drake tells Jacobs that he is dating the enlisted soldier, plans to continue to do so, and that he knows that Jacobs has his back. What should LT Jacobs do?

1. Using the scale below rate each of the following actions that LT Jacobs should take to deal with the situation.

	I strongly believe this is a GOOD choice.	I believe this is a GOOD choice.	I am not sure.	I believe this is a BAD choice.	I strongly believe this is a BAD choice.
1. Tell LT Drake that he doesn't have his back when it comes to violating Army regulations and that LT Drake needs to end the relationship now.	○	○	○	○	○
2. Do nothing and let LT Drake continue the relationship with the enlisted soldier.	○	○	○	○	○
3. Tell the chain of command about LT Drake's improper relationship.	○	○	○	○	○
4. Tell the enlisted soldier to stop the relationship.	○	○	○	○	○
5. Threaten LT Drake with informing the chain of command unless he ends the relationship.	○	○	○	○	○
6. Sit both LT Drake and the enlisted soldier down and	○	○	○	○	○

explain to them the consequences of their actions.

7. Tell another peer about LT Drake's relationship and see if he informs the chain of command.

   ○   ○   ○   ○   ○

8. Call LT Drake's parents and let them know about their son's prohibited relationship.

   ○   ○   ○   ○   ○

9. Express his resentment to LT Drake for putting him in this dilemma, but do not tell the chain of command.

   ○   ○   ○   ○   ○

	I strongly believe this is a GOOD choice.	I believe this is a GOOD choice.	I am not sure.	I believe this is a BAD choice.	I strongly believe this is a BAD choice.
10. Send an anonymous note to the commander about LT Drake's prohibited relationship.	○	○	○	○	○
11. Tell LT Drake to inform the chain of command about the relationship or he will have to.	○	○	○	○	○

2. Pick the BEST two actions by writing the item number (1-11) below:

Best action   [ ]

2nd best action   [ ]

3. Pick the WORST two actions by writing the item number (1-11) below:

Worst action   [ ]

2nd worst action   [ ]

4. Using the scale below rate how relevant to you the following ideas are in making up your mind on how to act.

	I strongly believe this is relevant.	I believe this is relevant.	I am not sure.	I believe this is not relevant.	I strongly believe this is not relevant.
1. I should be loyal to my best friend.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
2. My peers will resent me if I tell on LT Drake.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
3. LT Drake wouldn't tell on me so I shouldn't tell on him.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
4. LT Drake's fraternization could get him in trouble.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

	I strongly believe this is relevant.	I believe this is relevant.	I am not sure.	I believe this is not relevant.	I strongly believe this is not relevant.
5. LT Drake lied to me about the relationship.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
6. By doing what is right, I will gain the respect of my leaders.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
7. I could get in trouble if LT Drake gets caught and the leadership finds out that I knew about the relationship.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
8. The Army fraternization policy is pointless anyway.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
9. LT Drake's actions compromise authority, discipline and the morale of our unit.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

| 10. It is my responsibility to take corrective action against any soldier not following Army policy. | ◯ | ◯ | ◯ | ◯ | ◯ |
| 11. Everybody else seems to look the other way when soldiers violate this policy. | ◯ | ◯ | ◯ | ◯ | ◯ |

5. Pick the two MOST relevant ideas by writing the item number (1 – 11) below:

Most relevant

2nd most relevant

6. Pick the two LEAST relevant ideas by writing the item number (1 – 11) below:

Least relevant

2nd least relevant

VI. 2LT MULLINS CASE

2LT Mullins and his platoon just completed a 10-day gunnery exercise with the rest of their company. Since he was due an evaluation report, 2LT Mullins was hoping that his platoon would shoot high in the company. But 2LT Dempsey's platoon took the high platoon award and had consistently looked the best throughout the exercise. His platoon also received praise from the Company Commander and First Sergeant for quickly getting their recovery tasks complete the day of redeployment and being the first to get accountability of their sensitive items.

Because they were best friends, 2LT Mullins was happy for 2LT Dempsey, but he was concerned with how his platoon's mediocre performance would affect his upcoming evaluation.   During the next day of recovery operations, 2LT Mullins and his gunner hear one of 2LT Dempsey's soldiers tell him that he thinks his protective mask fell off his vehicle at the last range they occupied. Realizing that he had given the Company Commander a report the day before that all his platoon's sensitive items were accounted for, 2LT Dempsey tells the soldier to keep quiet about the lost protective mask. Soon after, 2LT Dempsey takes off in the First Sergeant's vehicle and a few hours later returns with the Soldier's protective mask. What should 2LT Mullins do?

1. Using the scale below rate each of the following actions that 2LT Mullins should take to deal with the situation.

	I strongly believe this is a GOOD choice.	I believe this is a GOOD choice.	I am not sure.	I believe this is a BAD choice.	I strongly believe this is a BAD choice.
1. Report the incident to the Company Commander for this action.	○	○	○	○	○
2. Do nothing.	○	○	○	○	○
3. Tell 2LT Dempsey that he needs to tell the Co Commander about the lost protective mask.	○	○	○	○	○
4. Ask the First Sergeant if he knew about the lost protective mask in 2LT Dempsey's platoon.	○	○	○	○	○
5. Order the soldier who had the lost protective mask to report the incident to the First Sergeant.	○	○	○	○	○

	I strongly believe this is a GOOD choice.	I believe this is a GOOD choice.	I am not sure.	I believe this is a BAD choice.	I strongly believe this is a BAD choice.
6. Discuss with 2LT Dempsey his responsibility to correct his report.	○	○	○	○	○
7. Inform the Company Executive Officer about the lost protective mask.	○	○	○	○	○
8. Tell 2LT Dempsey that you know about the lost protective mask, however; you won't tell anyone.	○	○	○	○	○
9. Correct 2LT on his inaccurate report and tell him that he needs to take steps	○	○	○	○	○

to make sure it
doesn't happen
again.

2. Pick the BEST two actions by writing the item number (1-9) below:

Best action

2nd best action

3. Pick the WORST two actions by writing the item number (1-9) below:

Worst action

2nd worst action

4. Using the scale below rate how relevant to you the following ideas are in making up your mind on how to act.

	I strongly believe this is relevant.	I believe this is relevant.	I am not sure.	I believe this is not relevant.	I strongly believe this is not relevant.
1. It is my duty and responsibility to inform the commander of any false report.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

	I strongly believe this is relevant.	I believe this is relevant.	I am not sure.	I believe this is not relevant.	I strongly believe this is not relevant.
2. Fellow officers should be loyal to one another.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
3. This was a mistake and it caused no harm.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
4. My peers will ostracize me if I tell on 2LT Dempsey.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
5. If I tell on 2LT Dempsey I will lose his friendship.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
6. Informing my chain of command might improve my	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

upcoming evaluation.

7. I need to set a good example for my gunner by taking correction actions.	○	○	○	○	○
8. An officer should not compromise his integrity.	○	○	○	○	○
9. If this happened to me, I wouldn't want 2LT Dempsey to tell the commander.	○	○	○	○	○
10. It is my duty to help another officer properly resolve a mistake.	○	○	○	○	○
11. If I don't inform the commander, 2LT Dempsey will owe me.	○	○	○	○	○
12. It's not a big deal since he found the protective mask.	○	○	○	○	○

5. Pick the two MOST relevant ideas by writing the item number (1 – 12) below:

Most relevant

2nd most relevant

6. Pick the two LEAST relevant ideas by writing the item number (1 – 12) below:

Least relevant

2nd least relevant

VII. CPT EDWARDS CASE

CPT Edwards has just signed into 3rd Battalion and taken command of Delta Company. She is new to the unit, coming from the Division staff by recommendation of the Division Chief of Staff. The other company commanders had spent their time on the battalion staff before earning a company command position. CPT Edwards senses some resentment from her peers, as well as

the Battalion Commander, because of this and knows she will have to prove herself to them to earn their respect.

During her second week, the Battalion Commander schedules a meeting for CPT Edwards to update him on the readiness of Delta Company. To prepare for this meeting, CPT Edwards goes to her company Maintenance NCO and ask him for the status of all the vehicles. "Officially, or what we report to the Battalion Maintenance Officer?" he asks. "What do you mean?" CPT Edwards says. "Well, we don't report all the vehicles that are down. It only makes matters worse if it looks like the company has a readiness problem. That is how things are done around here, all the companies do it. The Battalion Commander even knows about it." "That's interesting sergeant." CPT Edwards says.

CPT Edwards walks over to see CPT Taylor, the Alpha Company Commander. She asks CPT Taylor about the maintenance reporting system. Taylor hesitates for a moment, then says, "Let me give you a piece of advice. The old man does not like bad news. When I first got here, I reported all of the vehicles that were deadlined. Then I started to notice that my company consistently had the lowest readiness percentages. The Battalion Commander and the Executive Officer were always on me about reporting a higher readiness and they said my company was bringing down the battalion. The commander even said my unit's low readiness was a reflection of my leadership ability. That's when the Bravo Company Commander told me the way things were done in this battalion. As long as you have a good status on parts coming in, you should only report those vehicles deadlined that have major problems. Ever since then, I look good on paper and the Battalion Commander and Executive Officer have stopped riding me and my company."

CPT Edwards thanks CPT Taylor for the advice and heads back to her office. She has her scheduled meeting with the Battalion Commander in two days. What should CPT Edwards do about her company's readiness report?

1. Using the scale below rate each of the following actions that CPT Edwards should take to deal with the situation.

	I strongly believe this is a GOOD choice.	I believe this is a GOOD choice.	I am not sure.	I believe this is a BAD choice.	I strongly believe this is a BAD choice.
1. Take CPT Taylors' advice and make her company look good on paper.	○	○	○	○	○
2. Report her readiness accurately without telling the Battalion Commander what the other companies are doing.	○	○	○	○	○

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3. Talk to the other company commanders and tell them what she found out and that she plans to report her readiness accurately.

○　　　○　　　○　　　○　　　○

4. Go to the Battalion Commander, report what she found out about the maintenance reporting system, and ask for the commander's read of the situation.

○　　　○　　　○　　　○　　　○

5. Meet with the Battalion Executive Officer to discuss your speculation of inaccurate reporting.

○　　　○　　　○　　　○　　　○

6. Set up a meeting between the company commanders and battalion maintenance officer to discuss and correct the maintenance reporting system.

○　　　○　　　○　　　○　　　○

2. Pick the BEST two actions by writing the item number (1-6) below:

Best action　　　　☐

2nd best action　　☐

3. Pick the WORST two actions by writing the item number (1-6) below:

Worst action　　　☐

2nd worst action　☐

4. Using the scale below rate how relevant to you the following ideas are in making up your mind on how to act.

	I strongly believe this is relevant.	I believe this is relevant.	I am not sure.	I believe this is not relevant.	I strongly believe this is not relevant.
1. I need to show I am a team player.	○	○	○	○	○
2. If I don't report readiness conditions like the other commanders, my company will be singled out.	○	○	○	○	○
3. I am not doing anything wrong since my senior leaders condone this type of reporting.	○	○	○	○	○
4. I will let down my profession if I participate in this type of reporting.	○	○	○	○	○
5. I have a responsibility to question my senior leaders concerning an issue such as this.	○	○	○	○	○
6. This erroneous reporting is not harming anyone.	○	○	○	○	○
7. I could be jeopardizing my career if I question my leadership about this issue.	○	○	○	○	○
8. Everyone else seems to be doing it.	○	○	○	○	○
9. I need to show loyalty to my battalion and the system in place.	○	○	○	○	○

	I strongly believe this is relevant.	I believe this is relevant.	I am not sure.	I believe this is not relevant.	I strongly believe this is not relevant.
10. I could get caught providing a false report.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
11. Senior leadership makes critical decisions based on our reports.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
12. A leader does not compromise his/her integrity.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

5. Pick the two MOST relevant ideas by writing the item number (1 – 12) below:

Most relevant

2nd most relevant

6. Pick the two LEAST relevant ideas by writing the item number (1 – 12) below:

Least relevant

2nd least relevant

You have just finished the Army Reasoning and Ethical Training Education Test.

Thank you for your participation!

If you have any comments or suggestions on this survey, please write them here.

Appendix 2: VIA Inventory of Strengths
(VIA-IS-R)

Personal Strengths Scale

Instructions: The following are 24 strengths of character. For each, place an X in the box that indicates how strongly you agree or disagree that that strength is an essential part of who you are in the world. Be as honest as you can.

	This strength is an essential part of who I am in the world.						
	Very Strongly Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Very Strongly Agree
1. Creativity: You are viewed as a creative person; you see, do, and/or create things that are of use; you think of unique ways to solve problems and be productive.							
2. Curiosity: You are an explorer; you seek novelty; you are interested in new activities, ideas, and people; you are open to new experiences.							
3. Judgment/Critical Thinking: You are analytical; you examine things from all sides; you do not jump to conclusions, but instead attempt to weigh all the evidence when making decisions.							
4. Love of Learning: You often find ways to deepen your knowledge and experiences; you regularly look for new opportunities to learn; you are passionate about building knowledge.							
5. Perspective/Wisdom: You take the "big picture" view of things; others turn to you for wise advice; you help others make sense of the world; you learn from your mistakes.							
6. Bravery/Courage: You face your fears and overcome challenges and adversity; you stand up for what is right; you do not shrink in the face of pain or inner tension or turmoil.							
7. Perseverance: You keep going and going when you have a goal in mind; you attempt to overcome all obstacles; you finish what you start.							
8. Honesty: You are a person of high integrity and authenticity; you tell the truth, even when it hurts; you present yourself to others in a sincere way; you take responsibility for your actions.							
9. Zest: You are enthusiastic toward life; you are highly energetic and activated; you use your energy to the fullest degree.							
10. Love: You are warm and genuine to others; you not only share but are open to receiving love from others; you value growing close and intimate with others.							
11. Kindness: You do good things for people; you help and care for others; you are generous and giving; you are compassionate.							
12. Social Intelligence: You pay close attention to social nuances and the emotions of others; you have good insight into what makes people "tick"; you seem to know what to say and do in any social situation .							

	This strength is an essential part of who I am in the world.						
	Very Strongly Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Very Strongly Agree
13. Teamwork: You are a collaborative and participative member on groups and teams; you are loyal to your group; you feel a strong sense of duty to your group; you always do your share.							
14. Fairness: You believe strongly in an equal and just opportunity for all; you don't let personal feelings bias your decisions about others; you treat people the way you want to be treated.							
15. Leadership: You positively influence those you lead; you prefer to lead than to follow; you are very good at organizing and taking charge for the collective benefit of the group.							
16. Forgiveness/Mercy: You readily let go of hurt after you are wronged; you give people a second chance; you are not vengeful or resentful; you accept people's shortcomings.							
17. Humility/Modesty: You let your accomplishments speak for themselves; you see your own goodness but prefer to focus the attention on others; you do not see yourself as more special than others; you admit your imperfections.							
18. Prudence: You are wisely cautious; you are planful and conscientious; you are careful to not take undue risks or do things you might later regret.							
19. Self-Regulation: You are a very disciplined person; you manage your vices and bad habits; you stay calm and cool under pressure; you manage your impulses and emotions.							
20. Appreciation of Beauty & Excellence: You notice the beauty and excellence around you; you are often awe-struck by beauty, greatness, and/or the moral goodness you witness; you are often filled with wonder.							
21. Gratitude: You regularly experience and express thankfulness; you don't take the good things that happen in your life for granted; you tend to feel blessed in many circumstances.							
22. Hope: You are optimistic, expecting the best to happen; you believe in and work toward a positive future; you can think of many pathways to reach your goals.							
23. Humor: You are playful; you love to make people smile and laugh; your sense of humor helps you connect closely to others; you brighten gloomy situations with fun and/or jokes.							
24. Spirituality/Sense of Meaning: You hold a set of beliefs, whether religious or not, about how your life is part of something bigger and more meaningful; those beliefs shape your behavior and provide a sense of comfort, understanding, and purpose.							

Appendix 3: Interview Schedule

(Below is the interview schedule I used for each cadet interview post-test.)

What you say will be confidential to me and my thesis supervisors (Professor Kristján Kristjánsson and Professor James Arthur). If I use anything you have said in my thesis, it will be reported anonymously. I am interested in your honest views and opinions based on your experiences as a West Point Cadet. However, in the unlikely event that you describe an issue of serious misconduct, I will be required to pass this information on to the chain of command.

You can withdraw your interview data until one month after participation. While I have questions, I hope the discussion will be informal and that you will feel free to add anything else you think may be relevant. All records will be stored securely in a locked file cabinet within my locked office in Lincoln Hall. Forms are usually retained for a period of 10 years. All original documents will be securely shredded once they are no longer needed.

Are you happy to begin?

********Start recorder ******* Confirm consent *******

(Introductory Questions / Building Rapport)

If you are ready, we will begin. The first few questions are about your current role and aspirations as an Army officer and West Point Cadet.

Q1 - How long have you been at USMA?

Q2 – Do you have prior enlisted time in the Army or another branch of the military?

       Q2a – Have you been an NCO?

       Q2b – Have you been deployed?   What location?

       Q2c – Have you seen combat?

Q3 - Do you have an idea of what branch you would like to get and where you would like to go for your first duty station as an officer?

Q4 - Why do you want to become an Army officer?

> Q3a - What are your expectations?

Q5 - Do you expect to have a full Army career?

> -if no, how long do you expect to stay?   Why?

Q6 - Do you have any family members that are currently in, or have served, in the military? If so which family members and which branches?

Q7 - Which personal qualities do you expect will be worthy of most admiration among soldiers in your future unit?

Q8 - Which personal qualities do you expect will be worthy of least admiration among soldiers in your future unit?

Q9 - Which personal qualities do you expect will be worthy of most admiration among officers more senior than yourself in your next unit?

Q10 - Which personal qualities do you expect will be worthy of least admiration among officers more senior than yourself in your next unit?

(Moral Exemplars)

Q11 - Often officers model themselves on others / mix of others they admire in order to improve themselves as professionals and people. Do you sometimes have in mind other Army officers whose qualities you try or will try to emulate or copy?

Possible probes:

> Can you describe this person / these people?

> Which qualities do you admire?

> Do they have flaws – what are they?

Q12 - Have moral role models been readily available to you in your life so far?

Possible probe: If yes, or no, how so?

(Professional Challenges)

Q13 - Can you tell me about the sorts of professional challenges you have faced or continue to face at USMA?

    Q13a - How about moral challenges?

Q14 - What pressures or barriers make it difficult for you - or others like you – to do the right moral thing from time to time?

-      Can you give an example?

Q15 - Looking back over your time at USMA, does a single challenge stand out as especially difficult for you? It may not.

Possible probes:

-      How did it develop? When?

-      How did you address or deal with this?

-      What significance does this incident have for you now?

Q16 - One challenge was addressed in the moral dilemmas (No 3) that you completed in the form of situations where there was conflict between being loyal to the group and doing the right thing – have you faced this issue yourself?

-      or have you seen others deal with this sort of situation?

(Character Across Professional and Private Lives)

Q17 - How far do you think that professional standards of good character should also transfer to personal lives for soldiers and officers?

Possible probes:

- How far is this possible / reasonable?

- Do you foresee any particular difficulties?

(Ideal Soldiers and Officers)

Q18 - What personal qualities / character strengths might an ideal officer have when they leave USMA?

Possible probes:

- Probe using the 7 Army Values, if not mentioned – Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity, Personal Courage

(Self – Report)

Q19 - Which personal qualities or strengths are most important to you now at USMA?

Q19a - Which do you generally get right and which do you find more difficult to achieve?

Q20 - Looking back over your time at USMA, however short it may be, can you identify a professional regret or failure?

Possible probes:

- How did you cope with this?

- What did you learn from it?

-        What effect did it have on you if any?

(General)

Q21 - Is there anything else you could add to help me understand the current strengths and weaknesses of character among Cadets at USMA?

Q22 - Is there anything going on more generally at USMA that might be impacting Cadets such as yourself?

Q23 - Are the 7 Army Values still relevant to Cadets? – are there gaps or areas where change is needed for Cadets?   For soldiers and Army officers?

(Honor Code and the Honor System)

Q24 – Is the Cadet Honor Code effective at USMA?

Q25 – Would you change the Cadet Honor Code? If so, how?

Q26 – Any additional thoughts on the Cadet Honor Code or system?

(CCDP – Cadet Character Development Program)

We are almost at the end of the interview.

Q27 - Is CCDP effective at USMA?

Q28 – What parts are effective? How?

Q29 – What parts need improvement? How?

Q30 - Any additional thoughts on CCDP?

Finally and very briefly, I would like to ask you about your experience completing the moral dilemmas to help us understand how the measure is working.

Q31 - During the survey you completed, there was a dilemma (Dilemma 1) about whether or not the protagonist should rescue a local in Somalia from a crowd and there were various options. -Do you remember what your own instinctive response was?

Q32 - Another dilemma (Dilemma 2) concerned the need to get information out of a prisoner that potentially could save soldiers lives. -Again, do you remember your response to this dilemma?

Q33 - How realistic did you find the dilemmas/options?

Q34 - How did you approach the measure? In other words, can you explain the frame of mind you were in when you took it and how seriously did you view the measure?

Q35 - Do you have any suggestions for changes?

Thank you. That is all my questions. Is there anything else you would like to add?

Appendix 4: Officer Pilot Study

When comparing the answers of the 25 army officers taking the ARETE to the scoring key of the expert panels, only one of the demographic areas stood out: rank (see table # Officer Pilot Study Demographics below). When looking at the answers of officers ranks, as rank went up, so did both their frequency of agreement with the expert panel, as well as their consistency among their rank. Colonels had the closest alignment with the expert panel's choices. Additionally, their answers were the most homogeneous. Conversely, the Lieutenants' and Captains' scores were not consistent and were the least like the expert panels' choices. It might be the case that the other demographic factors did not show significance because the sample size was too small. For instance, in many studies, to include the cadets, females show more homogeneity in their scores of moral reasoning. However, in this pilot study, not only were there only five female officers, but they were spread out among the five ranks.

It was not possible to compare the pilot study of officers with the PY201 results as the officers only took the survey once and the cadets took it twice. The analysis of the officer data was to compare their answers with the expert panel. The analysis of the cadets scores was to see if their improved their moral reasoning scores as part of the PY201 course evaluation. Additionally, officers will have various training throughout their career which would potentially help them to choose more appropriate answers to the moral dilemmas. This training may influence them, and this training is not training that the cadets would have received. This could also explain why the more senior the officer, the more homogenous in their answers and more closely tied to the expert panel.

Table 23: Officer Pilot Study Demographics

Officer Pilot Study Demographics							
Rank		**Gender**		**Ethnicity**		**Military Branch**	
Colonel	3	Female	5	Minority	6	Combat Arms	9
Lieutenant Colonel	5	Male	20	White	19	Non-Combat Arms	16
Major	5						
Captain	10						
Lieutenant	2						